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UMI
ANTON PANNEKOEK AND THE SOCIALISM
OF WORKERS' SELF-EMANCIPATION, 1873-1960

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

John Paul Gerber

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To perform great things, man has to set himself even greater aims. The lasting fruit can grow only in a larger organic structure, first living, afterwards withering to dry straw. The strong impulses to work and struggle which man receives from his world are transformed in him into objectives and tasks largely determined by the world concept of his time. Through his lifework then there runs, as the fulfillment of the ideas absorbed in his youth, a unity of purpose which makes it a harmonious entity. But later generations — different persons with different aims in a changed world — take from it only what may serve them, discarding the framework. Thus what inspired and proved the triumph of the earlier precursor often appears to those who follow to be superfluous or a false direction.

— Anton Pannekoek, A History of Astronomy
INTRODUCTION
Anton Pannekoek (1873-1960) has remained until recent years a largely neglected and unknown figure in the history of socialist thought.\textsuperscript{1} The partial eclipse of Pannekoek that began in the 1920's and the almost total eclipse later do not mean that he can be regarded as a purely ephemeral and negligible tendency in Marxist thought. On the contrary, his work can be viewed as one of the most thorough, consistent, and intelligent attempts yet made to develop Marxism as a theory of revolutionary practice, and the neglect he has suffered might be considered less the result of a reasoned intellectual judgment than the consequence of a concurrence of unfavorable historical events.\textsuperscript{2}

Pannekoek's long life and political career spanned several epochs of socialist history. His political maturity coincided with the rise of social democracy; his last years of political life witnessed the first stirrings of the New Left. His writings left their imprint on both movements. During the intervening years he was an international figure active in both the Dutch and German socialist movements. Prior to 1914 he collaborated with Kautsky on the Neue Zeit, taught in the SPD party schools, and along with Rosa Luxemburg emerged as one of the leaders of the left wing of German social democracy. Pannekoek was one of the first in Europe to understand the fundamental weakness of the social democratic movement and to anticipate its eventual collapse.
Following the outbreak of the First World War, he was the first to call for the formation of a new International and later became a prominent figure in the Zimmerwald anti-war movement. Although he played a pivotal role in the initial formation of European communism and was a leader of the Comintern's Western European Bureau, Pannekoek was among the first to break with authoritarian communism. As the preeminent theoretician of the German "left" communist KAPD in 1920, Pannekoek articulated an alternative West European conception of communism and a powerful critique of Leninist orthodoxy, which earned him Lenin's denunciation in *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. From 1927 until his death in 1960, he remained active as the intellectual mentor of the quasi-syndicalist "council communist" movement.³

As a theorist, Pannekoek's specific contribution to West European Marxism lay in his bold and sweeping critique of the Marxism of both the Second and Third Internationals. Perhaps more lucidly than any Marxist of his generation, Pannekoek grasped the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the political movements inspired by Marxism and sought to develop new anti-bureaucratic models of revolutionary transformation. In his extensive theoretical reflections, Pannekoek strikingly anticipated many of the most essential contributions made by other thinkers of the Western Marxist tradition. Like Lukács, he articulated the centrality of ideas and consciousness to historical development and
emphasized the organic link between class consciousness and class organization. Like Gramsci, he sought to develop Marxism as a philosophy of praxis and stressed the importance of combatting bourgeois ideological domination. Like Korsch, he attempted to strip Marxism of its concern with metaphysics, highlight its importance as a critical method, and when necessary use the Marxist conception of history to analyze the history of the Marxist movement itself.

Pannekoek's scientific achievements are no less impressive. A pioneer in the development of modern astrophysics, Pannekoek began his studies at the age of fifteen as an amateur astronomer fascinated by the Milky Way. In 1891 he entered the University of Leiden where he received his doctorate in 1902. While still a student, he became a geodesist at the Leiden Observatory in 1895 and an observer in 1898. During this period he began a detailed investigation, which extended over fifty years, of stellar distribution and the structure of the galactic system. Among his many discoveries were the groups of early stars that were later called associations. Upon leaving his observatory post for Germany in 1906, he began a lengthy study of Babylonian astronomy and published several articles on the subject. Returning to Holland after the outbreak of the First World War, he found himself excluded from university positions on political grounds. Following several years of high school teaching, he finally secured an appointment in 1919 at the
University of Amsterdam, where in 1925 he founded an astronomical institute. It was here that Pannekoek undertook his groundbreaking work in astrophysics. In addition to his other concerns, Pannekoek also maintained a lifelong interest in the history of astronomy, which culminated in his influential work, *A History of Astronomy*, an excellent and original study emphasizing the interrelation between the evolution of astronomy and society. Among his many awards were an honorary doctorate from Harvard University and the gold medal of the Royal Astronomical Society, the highest honor in his profession.4

Despite the broad contours of his thought, Pannekoek's social theorizing in the later decades of his life often seemed out of tune with the times, a romantic and utopian holdover from an earlier phase of the socialist movement. In recent years, however, the renewal of interest in issues of democratic participation and workers' self-management has occasioned a rediscovery of Pannekoek and his concerns, which makes it useful to attempt a comprehensive and critical account of his contribution to socialist and democratic thought. But the aim of this study is not simply to write a biography or to rescue Pannekoek's ideas from oblivion; it is also an attempt to reconstruct the historical circumstances in which his theoretical development took place. To understand Pannekoek's interaction with his historical environment, it is necessary to critically examine the social movements
in which he was involved, the intellectual and political traditions which shaped his concerns, the experiences and learning process by which he came to his ideas, and the means by which he sought to test and implement these ideas. Examined in such a manner, Pannekoek's long life thus provides a privileged perspective from which to explore the dynamics of revolutionary Marxism in Western Europe during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, it is as an explanation of the relationship between the development of social movements and the formulation of social theory over a period of six decades that a study of Pannekoek acquires a central part of its interest and justification.
NOTES

1. Obscurity was not always the case for Pannekoek. Prior to the First World War, and for a few years afterward, Pannekoek was a widely known figure in the international socialist movement. Commenting on the impact of Pannekoek's thought on the formation of American communism, the historian Theodore Draper has noted: "... Pannekoek and Gorter were familiar names to many American socialists when Lenin and Trotsky were virtually unknown." Theodore Draper, The Roots Of American Communism (New York: Viking Press, 1957), pp. 65-66. It was common during this period for Pannekoek's writings to be reprinted in numerous American socialist weeklies, even in places as remote as Montana.

2. The reasons for the neglect Pannekoek has suffered are many. Not the least of them is the prevailing form the Marxist movement took after 1920 which effectively shaped its historiography. Consciously or unconsciously, most historians have tended to be preoccupied with those movements which have either attained success or enjoyed a sizable following. Other reasons include Pannekoek's status as a theoretician rather than a party leader (Pannekoek's highest party position was chairman of the Leiden branch of the Dutch SDAP) and the inaccessibility of many of his writings, either through language or through the obscure nature of many of the publications in which his writings appeared. These factors were compounded by the variety of pseudonyms Pannekoek used during his later years (known pseudonyms include: Karl Horner, John Harper, P. Aartsz, L.V., J. Braak, and van Loo).


CHAPTER I

THE MAKING OF A SOCIALIST:

THE MILIEU OF PANNEKOEK'S MARXISM
The Historical Context: Society and Social Democracy in the Netherlands

The milieu in which Anton Pannekoek came to political maturity had a deep and profound effect in shaping both his initial political concerns and the character of his thought. This milieu was defined by the relative absence of an independent, mass-based, class-conscious, working-class movement of any significant dimensions. Due to several features of Dutch socio-economic development, the context in which Dutch social democracy struggled to gain a foothold was markedly different from elsewhere in Western Europe.

Among the most prominent factors shaping working-class political culture in the Netherlands was the structure of the Dutch economy itself. Until at least the first decade of the twentieth century, labor-intensive agriculture remained the dominant sector of the economy. In the absence of coal and mineral resources, the Netherlands lacked the ingredients for the first phase of heavy industrialization. Compared to the rest of Western Europe, industrialization came relatively late, gaining momentum only in the last decades of the nineteenth century as an effect of the opening of the East Indies to private exploitation and the spillover of German economic growth. Even as it became irreversible, the process of industrialization and modernization developed only gradually and lagged far behind Great Britain, Belgium,
and Germany. Factory production methods and technical and organizational innovations were accepted only slowly in a country characterized by a strong spirit of traditionalism and lethargy, which had its roots in the prolonged cultural and economic decline which began in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

Until well into the twentieth century, the non-agricultural sector of the Dutch economy was still dominated by the commercial and shipping legacy of an earlier era. Within the urban centers, the labor-intensive craft trades and the small-scale retail sector predominated. Of those workers subject to impersonal wage structures, the overwhelming majority were employed in the transportation sector—predominantly as railway and dock workers. Lacking mineral resources, the Netherlands was unable to generate the mining, iron, and steel complexes found elsewhere in Western Europe. What little factory organization that existed consisted of small productive units which were widely dispersed throughout the country. Only the complex of textile mills in the Twente district presented an exception to this pattern. As a consequence, the large and socially cohesive working class concentrations common to the rest of Western Europe which formed a base for socialist organization were late in evolving.¹

The effects of these structural features were further intensified by the passive and demoralized character of the
Dutch work force. For over a century prior to the coming of industrialization, the underdeveloped nature of the economy and a subsistence-level poor law system combined to create a large class of semi-paupers. Long accustomed to poverty and being passive beneficiaries of paternalism, the Dutch working class was reluctant to attribute their misery to the emerging industrial capitalism, since they experienced neither the rupture of a pre-industrial way of life, nor a contrast in material circumstances, which might have served to inspire revolutionary resistance. Henriette Roland-Holst has described this state of passive resignation:

> It is clear that the Dutch proletariat differed completely from the revolutionary class which grew up in the other countries. The spirit of rebellion, or resistance against capitalist pauperization, demonstrated by French and British workers in the first half of the nineteenth century and later also by the German and Belgian workers, was the spirit of a proletariat flanked by capitalism. They felt its effects; they constantly witnessed the contrasts it produced—huts and palaces, riches and misery, idleness and toil—contrasts sharpened by the work of their own hands. Yet, quite early they realized their own indispensability, and they raised their sense of self-respect. The Dutch proletariat, however, felt not indispensable but superfluous. Far from claiming his 'right to work,' he begged for it as he would for charity. The rich were not his enemies living off his sweat and blood but good people, benefactors, on whose generosity he depended. . . . The mood of the Dutch proletariat was not one of fundamental resistance but of resigned suffering.²

An equally formidable barrier to the emergence of a class-conscious work force was the historical division in Dutch society between Catholics and Calvinists. Far more
than a simple religious division, this cleavage was expressed in separate and distinct subcultures with long-standing historic grievances which extended into every layer of Dutch society. The worker's religious-cultural identification, which integrated him into a strong network of ecclesiastical and political organizations, was at least as important as social class as a factor in determining his social identity. It was not surprising, then, that by the turn of the century, competing parallel trade union movements had developed in both the Catholic and Calvinist subcultures. Because of the strength of Dutch religious affiliations, the Christian labor movement in the Netherlands became a stronger, larger, and more viable political force than it was elsewhere in Western Europe.  

Lacking clear lines of class identification, the Dutch working class was slow to develop independent organizations to further their class interests. Although trade unions first emerged out of the mutual aid societies and social organizations formed by skilled workers in the 1860's, they were often weak and unstable organizations which had little impact on the development of the Dutch working class. Owing to the weak and localized nature of most early Dutch trade unions, a national labor federation could not be formed until the 1890's.  

In these circumstances, socialism had even less success than trade unionism in taking root in Dutch society.
Due to the introverted and isolationist orientation of the religious subcultures, neither the petit bourgeois nor the artisans had any significant heritage of radical and liberal ideas to draw upon in constructing a socialist analysis. The initial impetus for socialism came largely from outside the Netherlands, from the active efforts of radicalized Belgian workers, who aided their Dutch counterparts in forming a small and impotent Dutch section of the First International. At this point, the idea of independent class organization and political action had virtually no appeal to the Dutch working class and the section left few traces, except perhaps to frighten the opponents of socialism into greater organizing efforts. 5

An organization more typical of the paternalistically dominated Dutch working class was the Netherlands General Workingman's Association (Algemeen Nederlandsch Werkliedenverbond—ANWB), which was formed in 1871 as a national labor association. Devoted to a policy of reconciliation and harmonious collaboration between capital and labor, the ANWB rejected the theory of class conflict and independent political action. Although strikes were considered justifiable in certain extreme cases, it was felt they were more harmful than helpful to workers. The ANWB's foremost aim was to induce the employers to enter into benevolent cooperation with the workers of their own free will. When it became apparent that the employers were not inclined to
pursue such a policy of benign paternalism, the ANWB began to explore the alternatives of producer cooperatives and limited political support of the Liberal Party.\textsuperscript{6}

Two major defections soon occurred in the ranks of the ANWB. The first of these occurred in 1877, when an orthodox Protestant segment, objecting to the ANWB's support of denominationally neutral public education, withdrew to form the organization \textit{Patrimonium} (Heritage of the Fathers). Open to employers as well as workers, \textit{Patrimonium} was even less class conscious than the ANWB. It rejected all collective action to secure wage increases, all social legislation, including child labor laws, which it regarded as an infringement on the rights of parents. It placed its trust not in class organization, but in the belief that "the Word of God and the traditions of our people constitute the reliable foundations of a Christian 'society.'"\textsuperscript{7}

At about the same time that \textit{Patrimonium} was formed, a distinctly socialist tendency began to evolve within the ANWB. Once again, the main impetus came from outside the Netherlands, this time through contacts with German workers active in the rapidly developing social democratic movement. As a result of these contacts, ANWB members began to form socialist societies in the larger cities which became increasingly independent of the ANWB. This rudimentary socialist movement was strengthened a year later when Domela
Nieuwenhuis founded the publication *Recht voor Allen* to propagate a socialist viewpoint. On February 12, 1881, the loose network of local socialist societies held a national conference in Amsterdam and formally constituted themselves as the Social Democratic Union (*Sociaal Democratische Bond-SDB*).³⁸

Although the first chairman of the SDB was H. Gerhard, the leader of the Dutch section of the International, leadership soon passed to the charismatic and powerful figure of Domela Nieuwenhuis, who would leave a lasting imprint on Dutch socialism.⁹ Nieuwenhuis began his career as a political activist when, as a young Lutheran pastor in Friesland, he unsuccessfully struggled to improve the condition of the impoverished landless rural laboring population. As he became increasingly convinced that social problems could not be solved by appeals to Christian morality, Nieuwenhuis turned to socialism as the solution and left the church in 1879. Although he corresponded extensively with both Marx and Engels and translated a short, abridged version of Marx's *Capital* in 1881, Nieuwenhuis was never a Marxist. At the outset, he was hardly more than a humanitarian social reformer whose eclectic writings and speeches combined ideas of an ethical, utopian, and eschatological character. With his apocalyptic style and a firmness of conviction that bordered on the absolute, Domela Nieuwenhuis appeared to many workers as a fiery
prophet of the imminent collapse of capitalism and the coming liberation of the working class. So great was his appeal to the small politically conscious sector of workers that long after Nieuwenhuis had become an anarchist, a leading Dutch socialist was prompted to note: "The belief in Domela Nieuwenhuis is a greater hindrance to becoming a socialist than the belief in God." 

During the early years of its existence, the SDB's main efforts were devoted primarily to the struggle for universal suffrage. Owing to a series of property qualifications, suffrage in the Netherlands was restricted to about one in eight males. To campaign for voting reform, the SDB established in 1882 the Universal Suffrage League (Bond voor Algemeen Kies-en Stemrecht) which grew to 43 sections. The highpoint of the suffrage campaign came in 1885 with a national demonstration in the Hague, which drew 8,000-10,000 supporters. In keeping with their revolutionary aspirations, the SDB sought to use the suffrage issue to appeal to the revolutionary sentiments of the workers with slogans such as: "The Vote or Revolution!" and "Voting Rights or Fist Rights!" These tactics, however, had only a limited political effect and succeeded mainly in arousing the fears of the authorities, who launched a full-scale campaign of repression against the SDB in 1886, culminating in the arrest and imprisonment of Nieuwenhuis.

Defeated in its efforts to achieve suffrage reform
and decimated by the effects of government repression, the SDB in 1886 entered a new stage of development which increasingly de-emphasized parliamentary tactics. With little prospect for suffrage reform, the SDB no longer felt that parliamentarianism offered a potential avenue for major social and economic change. Under these circumstances, the SDB could do little to attract a mass following and by 1887 was reduced to only seventeen local sections.13 Although the SDB's organizational structure was weak, its propaganda had a greater effect in creating an atmosphere of militancy among the workers. Following a disappointing franchise revision in 1887, which granted the vote to only about a quarter of all adult males, the workers turned increasingly to direct economic action, stimulated in part by SDB propaganda. During the late 1880's, a wave of strikes broke out in several trades, including a series of major textile and dockworkers' strikes, which demonstrated a spirit of resistance hitherto absent in the Dutch working class.14

This new spirit of industrial militancy coincided with, and gave powerful reinforcement to, Nieuwenhuis' growing personal disillusionment with parliamentary politics. In 1888, Nieuwenhuis was elected to parliament from a Friesland constituency through a combination of his oratorical skills and a set of particular local circumstances which secured for him the decisive votes of lower-middle-class Calvinist
electors. Once there, he was completely ignored by his bourgeois opponents. His experiences in parliament left him convinced that it was so dominated by reactionary and capitalist interests that nothing could be achieved by attempting to use it for building a new society. The working class, he felt, must concentrate on building up their own organizations and attempt to emancipate themselves through direct industrial action. Defeated for re-election in 1891, he wrote: "We now know that our power does not lie with the electors . . . but with the non-electors."\(^{15}\) Shortly thereafter, he made his famous statement at a public meeting that the revolutionary way was the only way.\(^{16}\) During this same period, Nieuwenhuis experienced a catastrophic deterioration of his personal relationships with the leaders of German social democracy, especially Wilhelm Liebknecht, with whom he clashed in bitter public debate over the question of war and the general strike at the international congresses of the Socialist International in Paris (1889) and Brussels (1891).\(^{17}\)

While Nieuwenhuis was reassessing his commitment to parliamentary tactics, a new tendency began to emerge within the SDB which favored a Marxist party based on the German model. Two individuals played a key role in shaping this movement: Frank van der Goes and Pieter Jelles Troelstra.

In purely intellectual terms, the more significant of the two was Frank van der Goes, one of Holland's leading
literary figures at the time. Of seemingly boundless intellectual pursuits and energies, he was, through his countless articles and translations, almost single-handedly responsible for introducing a whole generation of Dutch intellectuals and militants to Marxian socialism. Although his temperament was that of a "refined aristocrat," van der Goes also possessed a "natural sense of social justice" which represented the driving force of his politics.  

For van der Goes, the transition to Marxism came slowly. Throughout much of the 1880's, he was active as a social reformer and member of the Liberal Party. His interest in socialism was largely an outgrowth of humanitarian concerns and his intellectual activities in connection with his literary publication, *De Nieuwe Gids*. By the late 1880's, he was convinced of the need for socialism as a means of revitalizing Dutch society and embarked on a systematic study of German Marxism. In 1890, he publicly proclaimed himself a socialist, although he did not join the SDB for a year. Almost immediately, he came to the conclusion, on the basis of his studies, that Nieuwenhuis' conceptions were incorrect.

Although far less knowledgeable than van der Goes in theoretical matters, Pieter Jelles Troelstra complemented him well by virtue of his superior abilities as an agitator and organizer. Troelstra began his career as a young lawyer in the province of Friesland--the most backward
and underdeveloped province in the Netherlands—where he was often called on to defend impoverished agricultural laborers. By his own admission, it was "moral opposition to their misery" that initially brought him to socialism.\textsuperscript{19}

Troelstra's first activity as a socialist, however, was in the Peoples' Party of Friesland (\textit{Friese Volkspartij}), which has been described as "a curious amalgamation of socialists, populists, and proponents of land nationalization, a movement half and sometimes entirely bourgeois."\textsuperscript{20} At the time, the \textit{Volkspartij} was allied with the SDB, which brought Troelstra into contact with it. Initially, Troelstra sought to give the \textit{Volkspartij} a social democratic platform and a strong organizational structure. Failing in this, he joined the SDB in 1891, where he was introduced to Marxist theory by van der Goes.\textsuperscript{21}

An organized opposition movement first began to gain momentum within the SDB at the Congress of Amsterdam in 1891, when van der Goes and Willem Vliegen, a typographer from Maastricht, clashed openly with Nieuwenhuis over the issues of parliamentarianism and breaking the alliance with the \textit{Volkspartij}. The struggle, however, began in earnest the following year when the ties with the \textit{Volkspartij} were formally dissolved, which greatly reinforced the SDB's isolation. It was this issue, above all, which brought Troelstra, whose concerns were more pragmatic than ideological, into an alliance with van der Goes. In order to counter
Nieuwenhuis' *Recht voor Allen*, Troelstra transformed the existing *Sneeker Courant* into a socialist weekly with van der Goes as editor. Support for their efforts was soon forthcoming from Henri Polak and the predominantly Jewish National Union of Diamond Workers of the Netherlands (*Algemene Nederlandse Diamontbewerkersbond*-ANDB), which at the time was the largest and most cohesive trade union in the country. Additional financial and moral support also came from the German social democrats. The turning point of the conflict came at the 1893 Congress of Groningen which, after heated debate, unconditionally rejected all participation in elections by a vote of 1300 to 900. With the expulsion of van der Goes at the same congress, the lines between the two factions became clearly drawn.

By now, van der Goes favored a definitive break with the SDB and the creation of a new organization. Troelstra, less firmly committed to the German model of socialism, was hesitant. His view was that a split could be avoided and that the real struggle should be for freedom of discussion within the SDB. In keeping with this strategy, Troelstra began to organize parallel social democratic election societies within the local SDB sections. Van der Goes termed this policy "incorrect" and a series of polemics between the two followed. In May, 1894, van der Goes took the initiative and called a meeting in Amsterdam to set up a local socialist society. About 40 persons, mostly diamond
cutters, showed up. In the months that followed, a number of other local groups were formed elsewhere in Holland. On August 24, 1894, these groups combined to form the Social Democratic Labor Party (Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij—SDAP). The SDAP's beginning was rather inauspicious. Only 54 persons were present at its foundation Congress. Its program, which was drawn up by van der Goes, was largely a carbon copy of the 1891 German Erfurt program.

Apart from establishing a new line of strategic and tactical demarcation, the SDAP had little immediate impact on the small politically conscious sector of the Dutch working class which still remained firmly committed to the direct action tactics of the SDB. Few workers left to join the new movement and during the first few years of its existence, the SDAP's direct influence on the working class was extremely limited. It was, in the words of one of its founders, largely "a new movement with new men." Except for the diamond cutters, who constituted nearly three-quarters of the Amsterdam membership, the party had almost no base in the urban working class. For the small number of politically active workers, the predominantly middle-class SDAP signified little more than "splitters" and "gentlemen." Paradoxically, the main organizational base of the SDAP was among the tenant farmers and landless laborers of rural Friesland who had been politicized during the prolonged economic crisis of the 1880's. As late as
1899, the SDAP was still considered predominantly a
Friesland movement. At the time of its first congress in
1895, only 40 persons were present, representing 26 sections
with a total membership of 600.

Freed of its parliamentary faction, the SDB continued
its development toward a form of anarcho-syndicalism.
Within a few years, Nieuwenhuis and his followers—disdaining
party organization entirely—dissolved the SDB to regroup in
the National Labor Secretariat (National Arbeids-Secretariaat-
NAS), which the SDB had organized in 1893 as a national trade
union federation. Through agitation within the NAS-
affiliated unions, they attempted to pursue a policy of
direct industrial action. For the next two decades, they
were to remain the most militant and class-conscious sector
of the Dutch working class and the main working-class
competitor of the SDAP.

Struggling with Ideas: Pannekoek's Conversion to Marxism

Although Marxian socialism had little appeal to the
Dutch working class during the latter part of the nineteenth
century, it did leave a lasting imprint on an entire
generation of Dutch intellectuals, among them Anton Pannekoek.
Born to Johannes Pannekoek and Wilhelmina Dorothea Beins
on January 2, 1873, in the small village of Vassen, located
in the poor and backward agricultural province of
Gelderland, Pannekoek spent a relatively happy childhood
in a rural milieu. Like many other Marxist intellectuals, he came from a family upwardly mobile from the lower middle class. By hard work and a self-acquired education, his father rose from a farming background to become a manager of a small foundry. His father, a Calvinist turned freethinker and a supporter of the Liberal Party, was also a man of advanced ideas who made considerable sacrifices to educate his four children. From his family, Pannekoek inherited a strong work ethos and a serious devotion to occupation that help account for his incredible productivity in two separate spheres. Like most middle class Dutch youth of this period, Pannekoek was not of a particularly rebellious nature and no serious conflicts marked his early years. Only a lame leg acquired in an accident marred an otherwise tranquil childhood and created in him a predisposition toward solitude and intellectual activity. When he was twelve years old, Pannekoek began to develop a strong interest in nature, particularly in astronomy and botany. In high school his interest in astronomy was further stimulated by his science teacher, J.M. Smit, who helped him to become an accomplished amateur astronomer. As a result of Smit's encouragement, Pannekoek decided to embark on a career in astronomy and in 1891 left for the University of Leiden.37

The composite picture that emerges of the young Pannekoek is of a modest, sensitive, rather private person, excelling
in the sciences, quick at languages, and at the immense
task of disciplining himself for self-imposed studies. Even
in his youth, the main traits of his intellectual work
were present. When he looked at the world he saw only
unity and structure. His entire career, in both politics
and astronomy, was to be an effort toward synthesis and
system building, which he often carried to extreme limits
to achieve internal coherence. "He potters around with a
little stick in the drainpipe of theory," his friend Willem
van Ravesteijn later noted.38

Following a long courtship, Pannekoek married Johanna
Nassau Noordewier: in 1903. A talented musician and a
teacher of Dutch literature from a family with deep roots
in Dutch intellectual life, Johanna Nassau Noordewier had
been one of the first women in the Netherlands to receive
a doctorate. Through her, Pannekoek gained entry to literary
and artistic circles. By all accounts, the marriage, which
produced two children and lasted over fifty years, was an
unusually happy and intellectually rewarding one.39

Throughout his student years, Pannekoek had continued
to follow the conventional path of the son of a respectable
bourgeois family. His only political activity was as a
member of the Liberal Party and chairman of a student
debating society.40 Although he was first introduced to
the ideas of the left by his high school science teacher
J.M. Smit, a friend of Domela Nieuwenhuis who was later
expelled from his teaching position for speaking at a suffrage rally, these ideas had no impact on him. Pannekoek has recalled how as a high school student he argued on an examination that "although communism leads to equality, it would be an equality under conditions of the greatest poverty."\(^{41}\) His whole pre-Marxian world view was built upon his faith in science as the primary instrument for the liberation of humanity:

There was nowhere a principle or direction which could evoke in me a strong enthusiasm, other than the conviction . . . that natural science was the source of all progress, in which we can play a part, and to which all our energy ought to be directed.\(^{42}\)

Pannekoek arrived at his socialist convictions only after an intense intellectual odyssey, or what he termed a "struggle of ideas."\(^{43}\) By his own admission, Pannekoek found the middle class lifestyle and career opportunities that astronomy offered completely fulfilling and saw little need to look beyond them.\(^{44}\) For Pannekoek, the road to Marxism began unexpectedly in January, 1899, when he encountered, in the reading room of the local Liberal Club, the Leiden tulip grower and ardent socialist, Willem de Graff, who engaged him in a heated argument over the question of socialism.\(^{45}\) Shortly afterwards, de Graff gave him a number of books to read on the subject. For the first time, Pannekoek began to grapple intellectually with major social problems, which prompted him to ask:
Why is it that I cannot participate and find a place in the struggle? While others are actively striving to improve the world, I sit reducing meridian plates. Science can only remain living when it changes men and conditions. It must help prepare a better future... to enable humanity to become free and happy.46

The direction in which Pannekoek was moving became apparent in early April, when he and his older brother Adolf, a career army officer, began to draw up a plan for a utopian community based on the writings of Louis Blanc.47 Shortly afterwards, Pannekoek noted that he felt "drawn" to the doctrines of a number of largely idealist and utopian thinkers such as Tolstoy, Kropotkin, Lao-tse, Thomas à Kempis, the elder Arnold Toynbee, and the Persian Bahaiists. His feeling at the time was that, like science, each of these doctrines strived, in their own way, for a better life. "Why is it," he asked, "that scientific beliefs are considered clearer, higher, and more correct than other beliefs?"48

While each of these doctrines had a side that appealed to Pannekoek, none satisfied him completely. For this reason, he felt convinced that he was being "driven by fate" toward social democracy, although he admitted "it is not clear to me why." His main objection to social democracy at this point centered around his belief that it fostered a "party spirit" and "party hatred."49 The critical turning point in Pannekoek's political development came in early June, 1899, when de Graff gave him a copy of Edward Bellamy's
novel *Equality*. The effect of this American utopian novel, he later noted, "was as if a blindfold had been removed": "For the first time it dawned on me that all theories have a social basis and significance and develop in response to real material interests rather than abstract reasoning."\(^{50}\)

In Bellamy's *Equality*, Pannekoek found many of the themes that would come to dominate his Marxism. Although Bellamy was primarily concerned with examining the nature of equality in a hypothetical utopian society, he sought at the same time to identify the main obstacles to the realization of an egalitarian society. In the simplest terms, Bellamy argued that the fundamental cause of class domination was the continued predominance of the "false teachings" of the dominant class and the lack of class consciousness on the part of the masses. For this reason, he felt that the primary task of a revolutionary movement was to assault the doctrines of the old order by a "diffusion of knowledge among the masses."\(^{51}\) Before a revolution could begin, Bellamy argued, it "must accumulate a tremendous moral force, an overwhelming weight of justification."\(^{52}\)

As a result of his reading of Bellamy, Pannekoek declared that he had been "totally changed": "Now I know for the first time what the social democrats want and predict. Their beliefs are my beliefs, their aspirations my aspirations."\(^{53}\) Due to his connections with the Leiden middle class, Pannekoek was at first reluctant to make his
newly found socialist convictions known publicly. During the July, 1899 municipal elections in Leiden he continued to work for the Liberal Party by transporting voters to the polling booths in a horse-drawn carriage. Pannekoek's formal announcement of his changed political perspective came shortly afterwards at a Liberal-sponsored meeting on educational legislation when—to the surprise and disapproval of the audience—he gave an address favorable to the socialist viewpoint.54

Once begun, Pannekoek's political development was rapid and purposeful. Under de Graff's tutelage, he began to digest the socialist classics.55 Within only a few weeks of reading Bellamy's novel, Pannekoek felt confident enough in his understanding of Marxism to write a short article enunciating the issue that was to dominate his theoretical work for the next sixty years: the relationship of ideas and thought to social development.56 Several months later, he wrote another short article adding his comments to a lengthy debate that had been going on in the independent leftist review De Kroniek between Frank van der Goes and P.L. Tak over the nature of surplus value.57 Pannekoek's theoretical ability immediately caught the attention of van der Goes who suggested that he join him in an extended study of Marxist economics.58 Through his collaboration with van der Goes, Pannekoek established regular contact with most of the leading figures of Dutch
social democracy and acquired many of the intellectual skills necessary for his own emergence as a major theoretician of Dutch Marxism.

Rank-and-File Militant: Pannekoek and the SDAP in Leiden

Although he came to socialism by an intellectual route, Pannekoek was not content to confine himself solely to theoretical activity. From 1899 until his departure for Germany in 1906, Pannekoek was totally immersed in the socialist movement in Leiden and these experiences provided a critical reference point for his thought. During these years, Pannekoek's activities were not unlike those of many other working-class militants involved in the daily life of social democracy.

Shortly after he announced his conversion to socialism, Pannekoek joined de Graff in an attempt to organize a SDAP section in Leiden. Despite an extensive propaganda campaign at Pannekoek's and de Graff's expense, only 20 persons were present for the initial meeting in a room designed for 200. Of these, less than a half dozen decided to affiliate with the SDAP. Like the SDAP itself, the Leiden section took root only slowly and precariously due to the low level of working class development. Although a modest industrial city of 55,000 and a textile center since the Middle Ages, Leiden was characterized by an outmoded and declining industrial base, and a work force that was impoverished and demoralized even by Dutch
standards. Pannekoek, in reporting on conditions in Leiden, characterized the factories as "medieval institutions" based on a form of "semi-serfdom." These conditions were reflected, at least in part, in the absence of a trade union movement of any sizable dimensions. At one of the city's largest factories, for instance, only 40 out of 500 workers were unionized on the eve of the great strike wave of 1903. In these circumstances, only a handful of Leiden's workers affiliated with the SDAP. In 1900, after a year of intense organizing, membership stood at only 13; by 1901, it had increased to 21; and by 1903, to 29. Of these members, the overwhelming majority were artisans and small tradesmen.

Despite a full-time commitment to astronomy, Pannekoek made his presence felt in virtually all sectors of party activity; indeed, it might be said that he was the moving force within the small Leiden section. At various times, he served as chairman, secretary, treasurer, editor of the local weekly, De Weeker, and a frequent delegate to national congresses. Shortly after Pannekoek was elected chairman in February, 1900, the Leiden SDAP embarked on a full-scale effort to develop the local working class as a political, economic, and social force. The first step toward politicizing the working class was undertaken almost immediately, when the section established a League for Universal Suffrage (Vereeniging voor Algemeen
Kiesrecht) with Pannekoek as general secretary. But the Leiden SDAP's most important achievement was the formation in March, 1900 (on Pannekoek's initiative) of a steering committee to help coordinate local working class trade union, political, cultural, and economic activities, in which Pannekoek served as chairman.

During the years which followed, this committee played an indispensable role in the formation of a viable trade union movement in Leiden. Its first major test came in 1902, when it helped coordinate support activity for strikes of metal and textile workers. In his activity on this committee, Pannekoek's special concern was with creating a new type of trade union publication, which would seek to develop socialist consciousness within the working class by providing a forum for the workers to expose and write about conditions in the local factories. By providing a means for the workers to articulate, and attempt to understand, their most immediate experiences, such a publication, he felt, would help foster a long, slow conceptual process of development that would ultimately culminate in a socialist consciousness. On an economic level, the SDAP sought, at Pannekoek's behest, to practice a form of anti-capitalist economics by establishing a cooperative bakery. Once again, Pannekoek played a central role by serving on the board of directors, advancing a substantial loan, and on many occasions working late nights in the
bakery.\textsuperscript{74}

In addition to his extensive organizational role, Pannekoek distinguished himself as a lively polemicist and orator by championing the cause of Marxism in Leiden in numerous public forums, courses, and debates. Throughout this activity, Pannekoek's constant preoccupation was with making Marxist theory comprehensible to the workers in such a way that they could use it to gain a conscious understanding of their actions. For this reason, Pannekoek devoted a considerable part of his efforts to experimentation with different forms of socialist education. These efforts began in the fall of 1899 when he started teaching a popularized course on Marxist theory.\textsuperscript{75} Within a few years, his series of courses became the nucleus of a "development club" which he hoped would help bridge the gap between theory and practice by study centered around a variety of practical activities.\textsuperscript{76}

Pannekoek's course work was only one aspect of a sustained effort by the Leiden SDAP to raise the cultural level of the local working class. At Pannekoek's insistence, the SDAP established a local cultural center and library to help further the development of an autonomous proletarian culture.\textsuperscript{77} To help combat what he felt to be one of the leading barriers to working class consciousness and moral development, Pannekoek also initiated a continuing propaganda campaign against alcohol abuse and in support
of government restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages. 78

Despite their best efforts, Pannekoek and the Leiden SDAP clearly failed in their stated goal of radicalizing the local working class. But for the future development of Pannekoek's thought, however, these experiences remained one of the main prisms through which he was to view the problems of socialist transformation. It meant that during his most formative period, Pannekoek's Marxism was nurtured in a setting where historical conditions placed the questions of class consciousness and ideological development uppermost in his mind. As he noted in an analysis of the situation in Leiden at the time: "The future belongs to the workers, but most of them still do not know it." 79
NOTES


5. The origins and early development of the Dutch section of the First International are extensively covered in J. Gielen's undoubtedly definitive work, *De Eerste Internationale in Nederland* (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij Nijmegen, 1974).


13. Ibid.


21. On this relationship Troelstra has noted: "I was very much apprenticed to him and considered him my teacher because I was not very well versed in theory." Pieter J. Troelstra, *Gedenkzchriften*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 10.

22. Ibid., p. 45.

23. Ibid., p. 60.


26. Troelstra has indicated in his autobiography that at least part of his reason for accepting German Marxism was tactical. In order to counter Nieuwenhuis, they had "great need for scientific conceptions" which in turn put them "completely under German influence." Pieter J. Troelstra, *Gedenkzchriften*, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 235.
27. Ibid., p. 116.


29. Ger Harmsen, Historisch overzicht van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland, op. cit., p. 29.


31. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., p. 118. The ANDB was also a major source of the SDAP's financial support and provided many of its early leaders and militants such as Henri Polack, Jos Loopuit, A.S. Levita, and Jan van Zutphan.

32. Ger Harmsen, Historisch overzicht van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland, op. cit., p. 29.


34. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., p. 117.

35. Ibid., p. 101.


38. Dirk Struik, "Years of Revolution," unpublished manuscript, p. 13. I am indebted to Professor Struik for making a copy of this manuscript available to me.


40. Pannekoek was a founder of the debating society "Christian Huygens" and chairman from 1895 to 1896. 75 Jaar Christian Huygens (n.p., Christian Huygens, 1970).
41. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," in Anton Pannekoek, Herinneringen (Amsterdam: van Gennep, 1982), p. 71. This document was originally written by Pannekoek as a personal memoir for his family in 1944 during a time when his fate under the German occupation remained uncertain.

42. Ibid.


44. Anton Pannekoek to B.A. Sijes, January 21, 1953, B.A. Sijes Archives, op. cit.


46. Anton Pannekoek, undated entry, untitled notebook, Anton Pannekoek Astronomical Institute, University of Amsterdam. Pannekoek used this notebook to record his thoughts during the years 1899 and 1900.

47. Ibid., entry for April 8, 1899.

48. Ibid., entry for April 23, 1899.

49. Ibid.


52. Ibid., p. 329.

53. Anton Pannekoek, entry for June 11, 1899, untitled notebook, op. cit.

54. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 73.

55. Ibid.

56. A.P. [Anton Pannekoek], "Misverstand," Het Sociaal Weekblad, August 8, 1899.


59. Ibid., p. 74.

60. Socio-economic conditions in Leiden and the state of the city's working class are described and analyzed at length in the January 24, 1903 issue of De Wekker. Also useful is: Dick Wortel, 80 jaar vakbeweging in Leiden (Leiden: FNV, 1980), pp. I-18.


63. De Wekker, January 24, 1903.


67. An occupational listing from the early 1900's lists members in the following trades: cigarmakers, 2; shoemakers, 2; typographers, 1; housepainters, 4; blacksmiths, 4; plasterers, 4; guards, 3; masons, 2; bricklayers, 5; carpenters, 6; weavers, 1; bakers, 1; paper hangers, 1. Undated membership listing attached to the "Notulenboek van de afdeeling Leiden der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij, 1899-1903," SDAP-Leiden Archives, op. cit.

69. Pannekoek's role in the formation of this organization and its first activities are discussed in: Dick Wortel, 80 jaar vakbeweging in Leiden, op. cit., p. 17.

70. Anton Pannekoek to the SDAP Partij Bestuur, March 5, 1900, SDAP-Leiden Archives, op. cit.

71. The activities of this committee are traced in Dick Wortel, 80 jaar vakbeweging in Leiden, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

72. Pannekoek described these strikes in articles: "Van de Leidsche katoenfabriek," op. cit.; "De staking te Leiden," Het Volk, August 19, 1902; "De staking aan de Leidsche Grofsmederij," Het Volk, April 10, 1902. Although Pannekoek detected a "new spirit of opposition" in these strikes, they were both easily defeated.

73. Anton Pannekoek, "Wat wij willen," De Wekker, December 20, 1902.

74. Pannekoek's key role in the development of this bakery is discussed in: Dick Wortel, 80 jaar vakbeweging in Leiden, op. cit., pp. 42-44.

75. De Sociaal Demokrat, October 26, 1899.

76. This club is described in the February 20, 1904 edition of De Wekker.


78. A resolution by Pannekoek favoring legal penalties for alcohol abuse is contained in the minutes for January 28, 1901. "Notulenboek van de afdeeling Leiden der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij, 1899-1903," op. cit. Pannekoek also articulated his position in one of his first articles: "Arbeidskracht en rust," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1899-1900, pp. 644-648. Pannekoek's support for government restrictions on alcohol consumption represents one of the few occasions in which he accepted the capitalist state as an instrument of reform.

CHAPTER II

MIND AND REALITY:

PANNEKOEK'S METHODOLOGY
Pannekoek and Dietzgen: The Dialectics of Distinction

Pannekoek's practical activities in Leiden were paralleled by his rapid emergence as a prominent theoretician of Dutch Marxism. Shortly after becoming a Marxist, Pannekoek began a prolonged period of theoretical inquiry into the nature of Marxism as a method of human social transformation. Through his reading of Edward Bellamy's *Equality* in 1899, Pannekoek acquired a popularized conception of the role of ideas and consciousness in social development. This conception was deepened the following year during his extensive study of Marxist economics with Frank van der Goes. Although he accepted the basic categories of van der Goes' highly voluntaristic version of German Marxism, Pannekoek was still dissatisfied with what he perceived to be the determinism inherent in Marxist economics. With the hope of developing a scientific framework for analyzing the relationship of human consciousness and action to the material world, Pannekoek went on in 1900 to a systematic study of the philosophical basis of Marxism, starting with a reading of Wilhelm Windelband's *History of Philosophy* and Frick Adiches' *Kant Studies*. Shortly afterwards, Pannekoek discovered the writings of the German "worker-philosopher" Joseph Dietzgen, which marked the decisive turning point in his theoretical development.¹ Through his study of Dietzgen, Pannekoek developed the key

41a
philosophical and scientific concepts upon which he built his Marxism, and which he retained with only slight revision and reformulation throughout the different phases of his political career.

Like Pannekoek, Joseph Dietzgen (1828-1888) has been largely neglected as a theorist, although he was once widely known and respected. A tanner and auto-didact with little more than an elementary school education, Dietzgen had been active in the socialist movement in both Europe and the United States. At the Hague Congress of the First International, Marx introduced Dietzgen as "our philosopher." Although critical of certain aspects of Dietzgen's work, Marx pronounced it "excellent and--as the independent product of a working man--admirable." Engels, in Ludwig Feuerbach, subsequently credited Dietzgen--somewhat loosely in view of their different conceptions--with the independent discovery of the materialist dialectic. In his extensive efforts to elaborate a specifically "proletarian philosophy," Dietzgen's writings were deeply infused with the spirit of working class auto-didacticism, in which the enthusiasm for ideas was often combined with a reluctance to develop them in a systematic manner. It was this aspect of Dietzgen's work, coupled with his often rough, abrupt, and repetitive language, that led to the skepticism and indifference his ideas met in intellectual circles. This indifference, however, was partly offset by the popular vogue his writings
later enjoyed among many rank-and-file working class militants during the first two decades of the twentieth century. 7

Dietzgen considered himself essentially a philosopher of science and sought to develop an inductive methodology for attaining a comprehensive view of the world for the purpose of prediction and control. From a philosophical standpoint, Dietzgen's main aim was to bridge the dualism of thought and reality, a task inherited from the German classical tradition and specifically from Feuerbach, of whom Dietzgen was initially a disciple and correspondent. 8 Dietzgen held that this duality could only be bridged by a philosophy that was inductive and identified with natural science. In keeping with this aim, Dietzgen rejected the greater part of the Hegelian system on the basis of its non-inductive character. 9 On the most general level, Dietzgen sought to establish: (1) the objective reality and unity of both the natural and social processes. (2) The relative and tentative validity of all knowledge obtained about these processes. (3) The unity of human activity (particularly thought activity) with the natural and social environment and its importance as a factor conditioning it. From this point of departure, Dietzgen developed his system along five main lines: a theory of knowledge and cognition; a theory of philosophy and its dissolution; a theory of science and its formation; a theory of "proletarian logic";
and a theory of "practical ethics."

The most original characteristic of Dietzgen's philosophy was his attempt to develop a scientific and materialistic theory of understanding. The human thought process, he felt, was as accessible to scientific analysis and elaboration as any other natural or social process:

If we could place this general work of thinking on a scientific basis, if we could develop a method by which truth is produced scientifically, then we should acquire for science in general and for our individual faculty of judgement the same certainty of success which we already possess in special fields of science.  

From a political standpoint, Dietzgen envisioned his theory of understanding as an active element in the continuous transformation of mind and matter. For the proletariat, it represented an indispensable intellectual tool for developing new forms of thought and for progressively gaining an understanding of their objective situation. Dietzgen felt that without an educated and class conscious working class neither a revolution nor proletarian rule was possible.

Dietzgen's first and best known study, The Nature of Human Brainwork (1869), represents his most systematic effort to formulate an inductive theory of cognition. Starting from a detailed critique of Kantian dualism and its separation of the material world from the world of thought, Dietzgen attempted to affirm the unity and dynamic interconnection of all things material and non-material.
Dietzgen's conception, the world was viewed as a process of continuous formation, conflict, and interaction. From his perspective, all forms of natural and human phenomena were organized into complex systems of circular causality with multiple and interlocking relationships, each part of which could be explained only as a product of its relations with the other parts. What this meant for Dietzgen's theory of understanding was that the "real world" was composed of an infinite and continuously changing number of sense-perceptible qualities whose interdependence unites them into a single whole. The human mind, he felt, in its interaction with its environment, attempts to generalize particular combinations of sense perceptions into mental concepts. As Dietzgen noted: "The absolutely relative and transient forms of the sensual world serve as raw material for our brain activity, in order through abstractions of the general or like characteristics to become systematized, classified, or ordered for our consciousness." A thought, like everything else in the universe, is composed of many different parts. It arises from the relation between a thinking brain and the object about which the brain thinks and is as much a product of the object as it is of the thinking process.

The key element in the formation of conceptual thought, Dietzgen insisted, was the process by which the mind abstracts the particular qualities from the general qualities in various objects of thought and attempts to classify them into
different systems. According to Dietzgen, the senses perceive an endless stream of phenomena and the role of the mind, as the organ of human understanding, is to make sense of this data by distinguishing and naming parts of it: "Knowledge, thinking, understanding, explaining, has not, and cannot have, any other function than that of describing the process of experience by division or classification."¹⁶ What actually occurs in this classification process is the construction of units of a particular type on the basis of similar characteristics which are then labelled with a name. Explaining this principle, Dietzgen noted that a table, for instance, does not have an independent existence of its own, but is simply a name given by the mind to a recurring type of phenomena perceived by the senses. It is an abstraction, a mental construct that becomes separate from the whole only by the act of conceptualization. Dietzgen, at the same time, resolutely maintained that these conceptualizations were not purely mental constructs in the idealist sense, but were, in fact, abstractions derived from perceptions of an objectively existing external reality. The mind was not so much constructing the external world as reconstructing an image of it: "It is the substantial force of the universe in which we participate, which has brought about the things that are, and all that the human mind can do is to form a picture of its gradual, consistent, and rational working."¹⁷ In attempting to draw out the implications of this for human
activity, Dietzgen argued that conceptualization defines the precise categories by which the world is viewed and acted upon. In the process described by Dietzgen, the world is seen as a continuous flow of events in which individuals play an integral part by utilizing their minds to sort out these events, distinguish among them, generalize from them, and act on the basis of their conclusions.

Dietzgen considered this classification and abstraction process to be dialectical in the way that it mediates distinctions and differences in a particular object of thought. As a dialectical process, thought recognizes that all things simultaneously form parts of other things and at the same time change into other things which require different names or descriptions. For Dietzgen, dialectical did not necessarily mean absolute opposites or contradictions. In his view, contradictions exist only through the mental separation of the component parts of a particular object of thought. Without this mental act there could be no contradiction. The mind merely constructs them and makes them equal as part of the classification and systematization process. It followed from this, that in Dietzgen's conception of dialectics, classification and interaction were the key principles rather than the internal organization of things. Dietzgen treated it as axiomatic that no form of knowledge can ever be regarded as absolute, but only as a tentative approximation of reality subject to revision on the basis of further
experience. What this meant was that all truths, as parts of the world, were only partial truths. Truth and error flow into each other dialectically: "Truths are valid under certain conditions and under certain conditions errors may be true." In Dietzgen's view, a perfect truth could only be one which was based on a recognition of imperfection.

In defining the relation of thought to the material world, Dietzgen stressed repeatedly that there was no such thing as a rigid distinction between mind and matter. In his view, they were merely names to distinguish between two different things, but since the names were abstractions derived from phenomena they were not identical with the things. For Dietzgen, the point to be emphasized was that mind and matter represented two parts of the same thing artificially separated by mental classification, only because no name has been developed to cover both terms: "The mind is the collective name for the mental phenomena, as matter is a collective name for the material phenomena, and the two together figure under the idea and name of the phenomena of Nature." Dietzgen, nonetheless, stressed at the same time that because it arises as a function of naturally evolved parts of matter--the brain and sense organs--thought is as much a natural phenomenon as other seemingly non-tangible phenomena such as the rays of the sun and the scent of flowers.

Dietzgen expanded this analysis into a critique of what
he regarded as "mechanical materialism"—the view that the world is composed of tiny particles of matter and that thought is the product of the movement of these particles. This "narrow materialism," he argued, "wholly misunderstands the nature of the problem."\(^{22}\) It fails to take into consideration the fact that parts of the world do not exist separately, but only as interconnected parts of the whole:

In the endless universe, matter in the sense of old and antiquated materialists, that is of tangible matter, does not possess the slightest perferential right to be more substantial, i.e., more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any other phenomena of nature.\(^{23}\)

To isolate one part of the universe and make it the basis of all other parts, Dietzgen felt, was to ascribe an independent existence to what is essentially an abstraction. Only the complete world of phenomena itself—the universe in its entirety—has a separate, independent existence of its own. Dietzgen, however, made it clear that his hypothesis did not rule out a scientific explanation of the world based on the movement of atoms. In a passage that broadly anticipated the theoretical course of modern physics, he noted:

Atoms are groups. As smallest parts they exist only in our thoughts and thus give excellent service in chemistry. The consciousness that they are not plastic but only mental things, does not detract from their usefulness, but heightens it still more.\(^{24}\)

Although Dietzgen's system, like Marx's, aimed at understanding and transforming the world on the basis of the
social division of labor, he never managed to work out the political and social implications of his theories. The task of establishing the relationship between Marx and Dietzgen thus fell upon Pannekoek. For Pannekoek, the discovery of Dietzgen provided a critical link between Marxism and his professional role as a natural scientist:

Here I found for the first time everything that I had been looking for: a clear, systematic elaboration of a theory of knowledge and an analysis of the nature of concepts and abstractions . . . Through this reading I was able to completely clarify my conception of the underlying relationship between Marxism and a theory of understanding and develop it into a unified whole. 25

Dietzgen's theory of understanding, Pannekoek felt, had the potential to serve as the philosophical basis of not only Marxism, but also of the natural sciences. 26

Following an intensive study of Dietzgen's writings, Pannekoek embarked on a lengthy effort to integrate Dietzgen's doctrines into the theory and practice of the socialist movement. 27 Pannekoek began this effort in 1901 with his first major work as a Marxist, "Kant's Philosophy and Marxism." ("De Filosofie van Kant en het Marxisme"), in which he counterposed Dietzgen's proletarian philosophy to the Kantian philosophy of the revisionists. This analysis was broadened the following year when Pannekoek made contact with Dietzgen's son Eugen and journeyed to Germany to discuss with him ways of popularizing the elder Dietzgen's ideas. At Eugen Dietzgen's request, Pannekoek agreed to write an
introduction to a collection of Joseph Dietzgen's writings. In these two early works, Pannekoek attempted to establish Dietzgen's place in the history of philosophy and socialist thought and to show the practical significance of Dietzgen's dialectics of distinction for proletarian emancipation. Beyond this immediate goal, these two works also provided Pannekoek with an opportunity to develop and elaborate his own unique conception of Marxism.

In Pannekoek's view, Marx had elaborated only on the nature of the social process of production and its fundamental significance for social development without really concerning himself with the question of the human "spirit" (Geist); other than to show that it derived its content from the material world. The question thus remained open: what was the exact content of human consciousness and what was its real relation to the material world? This gap in Marxian theory, Pannekoek felt, coupled with the traditional influence exercised by bourgeois thought, was one of the main reasons for the erroneous understanding of Marxism by anti-Marxists and revisionists alike. Dietzgen, by making the human mind the special subject of his investigation, and by attempting to show the exact content of the process of human consciousness, had made a major contribution toward

*Although the word "geistig" might best translate as "mental," Pannekoek in his own English writings specifically chose the term "spiritual." By spiritual, he meant a combination of subjective, mental, intellectual, psychological, and moral qualities.
filling this gap. Because Dietzgen's work appeared to demonstrate that scientific methodology was able to furnish an adequate picture of the world, Pannekoek felt that Dietzgen's theory of understanding constituted "the essence and foundation of Marx's theory of society and man." By constructing out of philosophy a "science of the human spirit," Dietzgen "raised philosophy to the position of a natural science, the same as Marx did with history." For this achievement, Dietzgen could be ranked "third among the founders of 'socialist science,' next to Marx and Engels." As a result, Pannekoek contended that "a thorough study of Dietzgen's writings is an immediate necessity for anyone desiring to learn the philosophical fundamentals of Marxism and the proletarian outlook on life."

To lend additional credence to his assessment of Dietzgen, Pannekoek also attempted to render a critical and dynamic account of the development of "proletarian philosophy" itself, using both Dietzgenian and Marxist categories of analysis. The first stage in this process, he maintained, began with Kant. The significance of Kantian philosophy was twofold. It was at once "the purest expression of bourgeois thought" and a precursor of modern socialist philosophy. Since "freedom" of production, competition, and exploitation were all at the heart of the developing capitalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Kant's emphasis on "freedom" and "free
will" corresponded to the needs and aspirations of a rising bourgeoisie. By challenging the mechanistic materialism of the French rationalists, Kant also provided a firmer foundation for religious belief, clearing the way for a revised form of faith and freedom of the will. Yet in focusing on sensory experience and on the organization of the human mind, Kant made the first valuable contribution to a scientific theory of understanding and human causation, which was a necessary component of any proletarian philosophy.

Pannekoek argued that a second stage in the development of a scientific theory of understanding came with Hegel. In strictly social terms, Hegel's thought was the product of the reaction against both bourgeois society and bourgeois philosophy that developed after the French Revolution. Historically, Hegel's attempt to develop a practical critique of bourgeois philosophy was but one part of a larger intellectual effort to provide a theoretical justification of the Restoration. Stripped of its social origins and transcendental character, the real significance of Hegelian philosophy lay in the fact that it provided an excellent theory of the human mind and its working methods:

The vicissitudes of the absolute spirit in the course of its development are but a fantastical description of the process which the real human mind experiences in its acquaintance with the world and its active participation in life. Instead of the evolution of the absolute idea, the dialectics
henceforth becomes the sole correct method of thought to be employed by the real human mind in the study of the actual world and for the purpose of understanding social development.

This quality of Hegel's work, however, could not be fully appreciated until Dietzgen had created the basis for a dialectical and materialist theory of understanding. Like Dietzgen, Pannekoek was quick to reject Hegel's doctrine of knowledge and absolute truth and to question the direct applicability of Hegelian methodology to Marxism. In an assessment of Hegel's impact on Marxism, Pannekoek later noted: "The Hegelian garb in which Marx and Engels clothed their philosophical ideas makes it very difficult for modern people to grasp the underlying principles." 35

The conclusion that Pannekoek drew from this analysis was that "the idealist philosophical systems from Kant to Hegel, which consist chiefly of the development of the dialectical method, must be regarded as the indispensable pioneers and precursors of Dietzgen's proletarian philosophy." 36 The previous systems, far from being useless speculations, were ascending stages of understanding characterized by increasing truth and decreasing error. As an intellectual process, Dietzgen's system represented "the scientific culmination of former philosophies just as astronomy is the continuation of astrology and of the Pythagorean fantasies and chemistry the continuation of alchemy." 37 Dietzgen, therefore, "completed the work of Kant, just as Marx
completed the work of Adam Smith.\textsuperscript{38} Dietzgen's philosophy, moreover, was neither "his" philosophy nor a new system of philosophy, but merely one of the more systematic intellectual components of the historical mode of abstraction of a rising working class. Although Dietzgen's "proletarian philosophy" was a direct and logical successor to previous bourgeois philosophical systems, it differed fundamentally from them in the sense that it sought to be less. Whereas earlier philosophical systems pretended to give absolute truth, Dietzgen offered only a "finite and temporary realization of truth" which could be further perfected only through the course of social development.\textsuperscript{39} Dietzgen's methodology, Pannekoek felt, signified "the completion and conclusion of philosophy, which is equivalent to saying that philosophy as such passes out of existence, while its place is taken by the science of the human mind, a part of natural science."\textsuperscript{40}

Theory and Social Development: The Class Basis of Science

Following his intensive study of Dietzgen, Pannekoek began a new period of inquiry into the relationship between Marxism and science, which he hoped would help establish a more authentically scientific basis for Marxism. Prior to taking up the question of what Marxism itself represented, Pannekoek undertook a detailed examination of the role of science in social development. Pannekoek
directed his inquiry on two levels: an examination of the methods, meanings, and objects of inquiry behind scientific knowledge; and an analysis of the origins and position of science in human social and mental activity.

Taking as his point of departure Dietzgen's theory of understanding, Pannekoek argued that scientific thought was characterized by a process of systematization, conceptualization, and practice. From this standpoint, the goal of science is to find the knowledge that explains existing relationships in such a way as to enable one to predict, change, and control them. While facts represent the basis of science, facts alone do not form a science. Science is the systematization of facts into general conceptions and rules within a world structure suitable for the computation and prediction of future events. Like Dietzgen, Pannekoek believed the basis of science was found in human social life and practical activity. As an element in the general process of social development, science originated not so much from an abstract urge for truth and knowledge, but as a spontaneous practice born of social needs. Like Science, Pannekoek felt, was only one among many social activities arising from society and developing as other social activities did—in part autonomously and in part as a component of the overall structure of society. Although primitive societies are characterized by various forms of theoretical knowledge, science in the real sense
of the word can arise only at a higher stage of civilization. The key factor in the emergence of science, Pannekoek maintained, was the invention of script, which enables practical knowledge to be transformed into scientific knowledge by establishing relationships between concepts:

Through script conceptions acquire an existence of their own; they can be handled and stored, compared and connected with each other. Now science as a system of generalized knowledge of relations between general notions and abstract conceptions becomes possible.\(^{42}\)

As conceptualized by Pannekoek, science was not only a special form of human thought activity, but also an integral part of the general social and economic process of a particular epoch. Within the framework of social development, science "stands as a mental tool next to the material tools and, itself a productive power, constitutes the basis of technology and so is an essential part of the productive apparatus."\(^{43}\) Approached from this point of view, science represents a response to socially produced motivations and purposes and is based on socially stimulated modes of inquiry and explanation. As part of a larger mode of abstraction, science has always reflected a particular epoch in its subject matter, its laws, its metaphysical propositions and in its embedded values. The new scientific "truths" that evolve out of each epoch represent an important and indispensable source of "spiritual power," both for the development of new technologies and the new
social relationships that arise out of them. Consequently, the emergence of a particular form of scientific consciousness or structure of ideas cannot be separated from the social conflicts of its era:

A new rising ruling class is able to understand through its particular class situation the new 'truths' that serve its interests. These new 'truths' then become a powerful weapon in the struggle against the rulers of the declining social order, who have neither interest in, nor understanding of, the new doctrines and perceive them only as a threat. . . . So it was with the natural science that accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie; so too is it with political economy, which is a science of the proletariat. 44

Pannekoek treated it as axiomatic that the emergence of new forms of scientific consciousness entailed an intense process of "spiritual struggle" in which new views are both counterposed to the old views and at the same time evolve out of them. Viewed in such a manner, the development of natural science in the nineteenth century represented an expression of the growing historical self-understanding of an emerging bourgeoisie and a necessary precondition for industrial expansion. Under the technical requirements of capitalism the evolution of the natural sciences became a "triumphal march of the human mind."

Nature was subjugated first through the discovery of its laws by the human mind, and then by the material subordination of the known forces of nature to the human will in the service of commodity production. 45 For these reasons, Pannekoek felt that the natural sciences could be considered
"the spiritual basis of capitalism."46

While stressing the class origins of science, Pannekoek rejected the view that every class maintains its own special set of scientific doctrines. For Pannekoek the point to be emphasized was "that a certain form of science can be both an object of and a weapon of class struggle, and that a class has an interest only in the investigation and diffusion of those truths which directly advance its own living conditions."47 Scientific ideas were therefore both classless and class defined. Thus, while the natural sciences of the nineteenth century could be termed "bourgeois" on the basis of their objects and interests, they were objective in their cognitive achievements. The quest for objectivity as a scientific principle, declared Pannekoek, was part of the norm of self-preservation:

For these reasons, the bourgeoisie's quest for objectivity in the natural sciences conforms to their class interests and represents a social norm. But for this same ruling class, Marx's doctrine of capitalist development represents a dangerous threat to their interests, and self-preservation compels them to struggle against it and ignore its validity. For the proletariat, on the other hand, the scientific validity of the same doctrine gives them even greater power to struggle, and for this reason it can also be seen as a form of self-preservation. Both forms of science, therefore, aim for objectivity within their respective class frameworks.48

For the physical sciences, this meant that there could be no such thing as a "bourgeois science" to be replaced by
a "proletarian science." The question of a specifically proletarian science, he felt, was one of an entirely different form of historical consciousness.

What a Marxist critique of science must be directed against, Pannekoek argued, was the class-determined ideological interpretation and class-determined practical utilization of science whenever it conflicts with the needs of humanity. By the same token, the methodology of the natural sciences could not be used to criticize and improve Marxism. The real task was to use Marxism to criticize the role of the sciences in capitalist society.49 By this criterion, a sociological understanding of the origins and development of scientific ideas was part of a true appreciation of science. To the extent that socialism implied the further growth of productive forces, it also implied a corresponding growth of science. Since the proletariat, as inheritors of the new social order, would eventually reap the full benefits from natural science, they would have an even greater interest in building upon the scientific traditions of the past. The science and technology of the hypothetical socialist future—no matter how altered—could only be based on all previous scientific and social developments. To the principle of scientific objectivity, however, would be added that of social responsibility.50

In analyzing the relationship between science and
social development, Pannekoek saw a major alteration in the social character of twentieth century natural science which had potentially great significance. Whereas the natural scientists of the mid-nineteenth century had "stood in the avant-garde of the spiritual struggle as leaders themselves, or as spokesmen for the new class, professing the doctrines and ideals of a new form of progress," those of the early twentieth century were either "isolated in their narrow specialties or bearers of reactionary ideas or old illusions." This social decline and fragmentation of the natural sciences, Pannekoek felt, was directly related to a "spiritual crisis" of capitalism and the inability of the bourgeoisie to understand the dynamics of social development. The principal gap in the scientific outlook of the bourgeoisie, he argued, was that "a science of society lay outside of its grasp," since the bourgeoisie as a class could not see its own limitations and eventual downfall. It could not, therefore, view the world, with complete clarity and without illusion, as a dynamic and interconnected unity. The proletariat, by contrast, has every interest in discovering the true dynamics of social development since it is destined to reap the full benefits from this discovery. What this ultimately meant was that as the driving force of social development, natural science had been superseded by a new and qualitatively different form of scientific consciousness: historical materialism—"the class science of the proletariat."
Social Knowledge of a New Kind: Pannekoek's Conception of Historical Materialism

Pannekoek's synthesis of Marx and Dietzgen served to inspire him with a conception of Marxism which was unique on the theoretical spectrum of the Second International. In addressing the question of what Marxism itself represented, Pannekoek's main concern was with developing a theory of knowledge and transformation which could be applied to the foundations of society. In the simplest terms, this meant: "History is nothing less than the deeds and actions of men; but these deeds and actions must be willed. Marxism attempts to address itself to the origins of this will."52

In formulating his conception of Marxism, Pannekoek was prepared to openly question and reinterpret the basic methodology of the orthodox Marxism of the Second International. The materialistic conception of history, as conceived by Marx, was meant to be an anti-metaphysical theory based on the evidence of human sense data, to be examined "in the manner of the natural sciences." While the later writings of Marx reflected an increasingly positivistic trend, it was primarily Engels, in his Anti-Dühring, and later his spiritual heir, Karl Kautsky, who generalized the historical materialism advanced by Marx into what came to be considered an extension of natural science.53 At the core of this methodology, which defined
the Marxism of both the Second and Third Internationals, was a conception of the dialectic as the "supreme science" governing the general laws of movement and development for nature, human society, and thought. Engels summarized this view in sweeping terms when he asserted that "in nature, amid the welter of innumerable changes, the same dialectical laws of motion force their way through as those which in history govern the apparent fortuitousness of events; the same laws as those which similarly form the thread running through the history of the development of human thought and gradually rise to consciousness in the mind of man."54 Through this conception of the dialectic, Marxism was increasingly transformed into a cosmogony, a total scientific synthesis of universal validity for all questions of social, historical, and natural development.55

While remaining firmly committed to the basic evolutionary premises of the classical Marxist paradigm, Pannekoek questioned the positivist and determinist form it had taken, by attempting to retrieve the subjective and active elements in Marxism. In broad historical terms, Pannekoek felt that the "new spiritual science" of Marxism (Pannekoek uses the terms Marxism, spiritual science, social science, and historical materialism interchangeably) was both a "theoretical expression" of a new stage of social development and one aspect of the "spiritual culture" of a new ascendent class.56 As the systematizers of the
ideas and experiences of a rising working class movement, Marx and Engels were the first to transcend the limitations of bourgeois thought and, for this reason, could most properly be viewed as "the first class scientists of the proletariat." At the same time, Pannekoek maintained that the set of doctrines collectively termed Marxism were themselves the outcome of a long process of active "spiritual development," in which new ideas arise from conflicts with old ideas. Since "every thinker can only work with the existing conceptual materials of his era," Marx's ideas arose directly out of the intellectual doctrines of the bourgeoisie. Marx's economic theories, for instance, were "not catapulted like a meteor out of the heavens," but were grounded in the work of bourgeois economists such as Ricardo and Adam Smith. By the same token, Marx's philosophical doctrines were largely a continuation of the revolutionary philosophy of the bourgeoisie.

In attempting to pinpoint the theoretical and cognitive possibilities of Marxism, Pannekoek argued that since all actions occur through the intervention of human consciousness, Marxism, as a true "science of human action," could only be based on a "science of the human spirit," which Dietzgen had provided in his dialectics of distinction. Like the methodology of science in general, Marxist methodology must be a careful process of conceptual
For Pannekoek, there were no doubts that Marxism was a science; but a science founded on the new theoretical object of social practice. There could be no such thing as deriving social theory either from, or by analogy with, physical processes, or, conversely, reading social laws of development into nature. Any attempt to do so must be regarded as an aberration. Theory functioned not to unravel the laws of nature or the mystery of the universe, but to provide new levels of historical consciousness for building a revolutionary workers' movement.64

In the same vein, Pannekoek insisted that Marxism could never be considered a theory of physical materialism. What distinguished physical materialism (or what Pannekoek chose to call "bourgeois materialism") from historical materialism, he maintained, was its conceptual focus. For historical materialism, matter was essentially "an abstraction, a concept by the spirit out of phenomena which our sensations construct."65 From a methodological standpoint, this meant that:

Historical materialism sees the results of science, concepts, substances, natural laws and forces, although formed by nature, as first of all the products of the mental work of humanity. Bourgeois materialism, on the other hand, from the point of view of natural science-sees all this as belonging to nature which has been discovered and brought to light only by science. Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, water, energy, electricity, gravity, ether, the law of gravitation, the law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of the world itself, as reality, that which has to be discovered.
From the viewpoint of historical materialism, however, these are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena. 66

Pannekoek attributed the fact that Marxism had become identified with a theory of physical materialism to a fundamental misinterpretation of Marx's doctrines. What was most critical for Marx, he felt, was not the division between matter and spirit, but that between reality and fantasy. 67

Probing further into the scientific character of Marxism, Pannekoek moved to a specific examination of the nature of laws and predictions in Marxism. Pannekoek took the position that all science consists of doctrines and hypotheses which rest on differing degrees of certainty. All "scientific truth" is therefore relative; it is considered the best truth of the moment, and it is part of a process of continuing development. It contrasts with "dogmatic truth" which is based on "primitive experiences" and is viewed with complete certainty as the final truth. 68 Writing on the meaning of laws and predictions in natural science, Pannekoek contended:

What certainty do I have that the event thus asserted and computed really takes place? The answer can only be: none. . . No scientist assumes that for predictions on the basis of known laws there is absolute certainty. Hundreds of times it happened, contrary to expectations, that it did not come true, and on such cases depended the progress of science. 69
On this basis, Pannekoek felt that it stood to reason that an even more tentative causal relationship between laws and predictions existed for the social sciences:

Through the immense complication of social relations, 'laws' of society are much more difficult to discern, and they cannot be put into the form of exact formulas. Still more than in nature they may be said to express not the future but our expectations about the future. It is already a great thing that, whereas former thinkers were groping in the dark, now some main lines of development have been discovered. 70

Indeed, Pannekoek had contended as early as 1901 that it mattered very little whether or not Marx's theories, or even his basic methodology, were completely valid, but that they produced results through practice just as the natural sciences had continually produced significant findings with wrong methods. 71 Thus, just as the history of astronomy, for example, was "full of predictions that did not come true, of disagreements that alarmed the scientists and had to be explained by new unforeseen circumstances," so too would be "the new class science of Marxism." 72 To speak, therefore, of Marxism as a set of absolute doctrines and predictions would be "a half-defeat, a laying down of one's arms." 73

Marxism, in Pannekoek's view, was a science to the extent that the social development and revolutionary activity which it reflects and seeks to explain requires the comprehension of its own subject matter, methodological concepts and procedures. The conditional validity of its
propositions depends both on the state of its external subject matter and the internal articulation and development of its own conceptual categories. From such a perspective, no statement about Marxism could ever be considered final. Marx's theories, and the social practice on which they are based, do not stand outside the course of social evolution, but undergo a constant process of transformation, development, and regression. In a broader historical sense, it was not the ideas of Marx per se that had the greater significance, but the fact that these ideas represented the first systematic formulation of the ideology of a rising revolutionary working class movement. His theories sprang from the recognition of an actually existing social movement opposed to the prevailing conditions, and they were expected to help this movement realize its own potentialities. The theoretical and philosophical formulation of ideas was, from this standpoint, not the basis of, but just the transitory ideological form of the revolutionary class struggle. A Marxism ossified in the doctrines of Marx and Engels, Pannekoek felt, not only was not, but could never be, a theory of proletarian revolution.\textsuperscript{74}

In a cognitive sense, Pannekoek felt that the scientific categories of Marxism could only arise with and be understood by the proletariat:
The proletariat, therefore, has every interest in discovering the inner laws of society and the sources of their endless torment. Because the working class is the only class which has nothing to conceal, and can, therefore, look at social phenomena in an unbiased manner, it alone is in a position to discover and advocate the truth about society.

Marxism was, therefore, a science which allows the working class to see through the mask of bourgeois ideology as a pre-condition for its own self-emancipation. Whereas for the bourgeoisie, science represents a system of abstract ideas and concepts to be used by intellectuals, for the workers it constitutes an integral part of their own life experiences. For Pannekoek, what was to be stressed was that for the workers Marxism represented merely a form of "ordered knowledge, a short summary of reality" based on their productive experiences, which both explains and clarifies these experiences as a guide to daily praxis:

It is very unlikely that many of the socialist workers have ever read Kant or Hegel, and perhaps not even Marx, Engels, or Dietzgen. But they have something entirely different: life itself. . . . it is their own life experiences which represent the study form which gives them their determined convictions. 76

From the standpoint of its cognitive possibilities in the realm of daily life, Marxism represented a "revolution in science" for which it would take at least a generation to fully comprehend. The recognition of the truths in Marxism, Pannekoek felt, would come about only through a long, hard ideological struggle which was an essential
component of the class struggle itself.\textsuperscript{77}

Pannekoek's most sustained effort to apply his conception of science and Marxism can be found in his treatment of the question of Darwinism. Few questions had more centrality to the ideology of the Second International than that of the relationship between Marxism and Darwinism. The link between Marx and Darwin was officially formalized from a socialist perspective when Engels, speaking at the graveside of Marx, stated: "Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history."\textsuperscript{78} In Engels' view, evolutionary biology was the decisive connecting link between nature and mankind. This verdict of Engels on the fundamental link between Marxism and Darwinism was eventually to become a cornerstone of Marxist theory--orthodox and revisionist alike--and received particular emphasis in the works of Karl Kautsky. As a young man, Kautsky, in fact, had initially come to socialism through his interpretation of Darwinist evolutionary doctrine, and some of his earliest theoretical efforts were devoted to developing a Marx-Darwin synthesis.\textsuperscript{79} Early in his career Kautsky had made it clear that Marxism "wishes to be nothing else then the application of Darwinism to social development."\textsuperscript{80}

Unlike most Marxists of the Second International, Pannekoek resolutely opposed all attempts to integrate
Darwinism into Marxist doctrine. Pannekoek first addressed himself systematically to this question in his 1909 brochure, *Marxism and Darwinism*, a work he considered to be among his best. His immediate practical aim was to combat, on the one hand, the "bourgeois Darwinists" who sought to use Darwinism as an intellectual justification for capitalism, and the orthodox Marxists, on the other, who saw it as "natural proof" of the inevitability of socialism. The basis of Pannekoek's analysis was outlined in his earlier distinction between natural and social science. "The scientific importance of Marxism as well as Darwinism," he wrote, "consists in their following out the theory of evolution, the one upon the domain of the organic world . . . the other upon the domain of society."  

What this meant was that: "Marxism and Darwinism should remain in their own domains; they are independent of each other and there is no direct connection between them."  

To carry a theory from one domain to another where different laws are applicable would necessarily entail wrong conclusions. This did not mean that they were opposed to each other, but that "they supplement each other in the sense that according to the Darwinian theory of evolution the animal world develops up to the stage of man, and from then on the Marxian theory of evolution applies."  

What was important in Darwin's work was the recognition that under certain
circumstances some animal kinds will develop into other animal kinds through a mechanism of natural law. The fact that this natural law became identified with a struggle for existence analogous to capitalist development did not affect the validity of his theory, nor, conversely, did it make capitalist competition a "natural law." The differences between Marx and Darwin were just as significant as their similarities and the failure of Marxists to recognize them was a major weakness of their scientific position.

In drawing out the political implications of his analysis, Pannekoek argued that Darwinism, like all scientific formulations, was not mere abstract thought but an integral part of the class struggles of its epoch. In this instance, Darwinism functioned as a "tool of the bourgeoisie" in its struggle against both the remnants of feudalism and the proletariat. By undermining the entire foundation of orthodox Christian dogma, Darwin's theory destroyed the main ideological prop of the opponents of bourgeois rule. But Darwinism worked equally well for the bourgeoisie as a weapon against the proletariat. By seeming to offer "scientific" proof of inequality and teaching that "struggle is unavoidable," Darwinism served as a powerful counterweight to the socialist doctrines of equality and cooperation. What Marx and Darwin really had in common, Pannekoek felt, was to shatter an old,
rigid, immobile world view. For socialists, therefore, the real significance of Darwinism lay in the fact that it represented a precondition for understanding historical materialism rather than a doctrine directly related to it in any way.

In attempting to establish a more authentically scientific basis for Marxism, Pannekoek stressed repeatedly that his effort represented more than a purely intellectual inquiry. From Pannekoek's standpoint, Marxism, although clearly an empirical science, was not intended to be above values, but had an obligation to serve the practical aims of the class struggle. Like science in general, the goal of Marxism was explanation in practice; the doctrine was only a medium to this end. Marx's aim, Pannekoek argued, was not to proclaim doctrines about social organization, but to clarify social events as a prelude to action. Theory for Marx was above all partisan, and had meaning only as an indivisible and essential part of social transformation. His theories sprang from the recognition of an actually existing social movement opposed to the prevailing social order, and they were expected to help this movement realize its full potentialities. Pannekoek felt that as a view of life, Marxism becomes real only through the class that embodies it: "Thus Marxism as the theory of the proletarian revolutionary movement is a reality and at the same time a living power only in the minds and hearts of the revolutionary proletariat."
NOTES


4. Karl Marx, Letters to Dr. Kugelmann (London: Martin Lawrence, 1941), p. 54. Marx qualified this enthusiasm by noting "a certain confusion" and a "too frequent repetition" in a manuscript Dietzgen had sent him. Ibid., p. 80.

5. "And this materialistic dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us and even of Hegel, by Joseph Dietzgen." Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (London: Martin Lawrence, 1934), p. 54. Although he termed Dietzgen's "account of the thing-in-itself as a thing made of thought" as "brilliant," Engels complained that Dietzgen's use of the dialectic appeared "more in flashes than as a connected whole." Engels to Marx, November 18, 1868, in Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1942), pp. 253-254.
6. In this connection, George Lichtheim has noted: "On the whole he probably came closest to expressing what the average socialist of the period thought and felt about the world, but his thinking was too unsystematic to yield the coherent doctrine that could be opposed to the official teaching in the universities." George Lichtheim, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Survey (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 242.


8. Dietzgen noted to Marx: "Feuerbach showed me the way." Quoted in: Karl Marx, Letters to Dr. Ruge,man, op. cit., p. 56.

9. Dietzgen's objections to Hegel's methodology are noted in a letter from Eugen Dietzgen to Ernst Mach, July 20, 1906, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 109.


12. "Everything is large, everything is small . . . everything is whole and a part, because everything is the essence of everything, everything is contained in the all, everything is related, everything is connected, everything independent," Joseph Dietzgen, The Positive Outcome of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 417.

13. For these reasons, Dietzgen noted: "Any thing that is torn out of its contextual relations ceases to exist." Joseph Dietzgen, "The Nature of Human Brainwork," op. cit., p. 110.


15. "Every idea corresponds to an object which may be practically separated into its component parts. To analyze a concept is equivalent, therefore, to analyzing a previously experienced object by theoretical means." Ibid., p. 78.


18. "Thou shalt sharply divide and further subdivide to the utmost the universal concept, the concept of the universe, but thou shalt be backed up by the consciousness that this mental classification is a formality, by which man seeks to register and systematize his experience; thou shalt furthermore remain conscious of thy human liberty to progressively clarify thy experience, which is constantly enriched in the course of time, through modified classification." Joseph Dietzgen, *The Positive Outcome of Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 428.


22. "This materialism is enamored of mechanics, idolizes it, does not regard it as a part of the world, but as the sole substance which comprises the whole universe." *Ibid.*, p. 380.


26. Pannekoek noted in this connection that it was "a proof of the deep validity of a clear Marxist insight that Dietzgen, a layman and an amateur in the scientific area, fully clarified the basis of modern natural science long before the modern natural scientists themselves were able to do so... The most well known of them, Ernst Mach, has admitted his astonishment upon learning that many of his newly developed theories had been developed a quarter century earlier by Dietzgen." Anton Pannekoek,
"Twee natuuronderzoekers in de maatschappelijk-geestelijke strijd," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1919, pp. 300-314, 375-392. Throughout his career, Pannekoek consistently attempted to apply a Dietzgenian methodology to his own scientific research. For examples of this, see his works: De Evolutie van het Heelal (Leiden: Venn Boekdrukkrijt, 1918); De Astrophysica en hare moderne ontwikkeling (Amsterdam: J.H. Bussy, 1925).

27. Pannekoek's notes on this study are contained in the notebook entitled: "Wijsbegeerte en Politiek," Anton Pannekoek Astronomical Institute (Amsterdam).


30. Ibid., p. 28. Pannekoek adds further: "For this reason we owe to Dietzgen's theory of cognition the firm foundation of our world philosophy."


34. Ibid., p. 27.


37. Ibid., p. 29.

38. Ibid., p. 27.


41. To illustrate this, Pannekoek cited the case of ancient Egypt which, despite its clear skies, never fostered a science of astronomy since there was no practical need for it in either agricultural, social, or religious life. Anton Pannekoek, *A History of Astronomy* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969), p. 85.


43. Anton Pannekoek, *Lenin as Philosopher: A Critical Examination of the Philosophical Basis of Leninism* (New York: New Essays, 1948), p. 19. Pannekoek has elaborated elsewhere on the concept of technology: "The basis of society—productive power—is formed chiefly through technology, though in primitive societies natural conditions play a major role. Technology does not merely involve material factors such as machines, factories, coal mines and railroads, but also the ability to make them and it is science which creates this ability. Natural science, our knowledge of the forces of nature, our ability to reason and cooperate, are all important as factors of production. Technology rests not on material factors alone, but also on strong spiritual elements." Anton Pannekoek, "Het historisch materialisme," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, 1919, pp. 15-22, 51-58. By analogy, Pannekoek viewed "socialist politics" as the "technology of the proletariat," since it has a similar scientific and spiritual connection to their productive relationships. Anton Pannekoek, "Sozialistische Politik," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," May 1, 1909. From 1908 to 1914, while a full-time militant in the German SPD, Pannekoek wrote a regular series of weekly articles which were sent to subscribing local SPD publications. The dates cited are those of the proof copies contained in the Pannekoek Archives. These articles can be found most regularly in the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* and the *Bremer Bürgerzeitung*, usually several days to several weeks after the proof date copy.

44. Anton Pannekoek, "Klassenwissenschaft und Philosophie," *die Neue Zeit*, 1905, pp. 604-610. As an example of how science was used as a weapon in the social struggle, Pannekoek cited the case of the discovery of Neptune. In France, where the bourgeoisie was still locked in struggle against the ruling powers of the past—absolutism, the aristocracy, and the church—the discovery of the new
planet, which was made on the basis of theoretical calculations, was greeted with a wave of popular enthusiasm and hailed as the greatest event of the century. The reason for this was that the discovery was useful in demonstrating to the masses the certainty of science. It was a triumph of science that would impress even the most uneducated layman. In England and America, by contrast, where the bourgeoisie had long been fully in control, the discovery was greeted with calm indifference. Anton Pannekoek, "The Discovery of Neptune," Centaurus, 1953, pp. 126-137.


46. Anton Pannekoek (pseudonym John Harper), "Materialism and Historical Materialism," New Essays, Fall, 1942. This article was a revised version of his 1919 essay, "Het historisch materialisme," op. cit.


52. Anton Pannekoek, "Professor Treub over het historisch materialisme," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1904, pp. 87-97, 159-172, 295-308.

53. Kautsky has noted the formative influence of Anti-Dühring on his thought: "Judging by the influence that Anti-Dühring had upon me no other book could have contributed so much to the understanding of Marxism. Marx's Capital is the more powerful work, certainly, but it was only through Anti-Dühring that we learned to understand and read it properly." Quoted in: Friedrich Engels, Briefwechsel mit Karl Kautsky (Vienna: Danubia Verlag, 1955), p. 4.


60. Anton Pannekoek, "The Position and Significance of J. Dietzgen's Philosophical Works," op. cit., p. 34.

61. Anton Pannekoek, "Professor Treub over het historisch materialism," op. cit. Pannekoek argued that the dialectical mode of thinking provides truth only through its relative character: "Dialectical thinking corresponds to reality insomuch as it takes into consideration that the finite cannot explain the infinite, nor the static the dynamic world; that every concept has to develop into other concepts, or even into its opposite." Anton Pannekoek (pseudonym John Harper), "Materialism and Historical Materialism," op. cit.


64. Anton Pannekoek, "Der Marxismus," unpublished manuscript, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 158.


68. Anton Pannekoek, "Der Marxismus, op. cit.


70. Anton Pannekoek, Lenin as Philosopher, op. cit., p. 40.

71. Anton Pannekoek, "Inlichting," De Kroniek, August 31, 1901.


73. Anton Pannekoek to Maxmillian Ruhel, April 23, 1953, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108.

74. Anton Pannekoek, "Het standpunt der partij," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1903, pp. 94-104. Pannekoek later claimed it was on these grounds that he never studied Marx systematically. Anton Pannekoek to Maxmillian Rubel, July 21, 1951, Pannekoek Archives, folder 108.


80. Quoted in ibid. For a full discussion of the role of Darwinism in German social democratic ideology see: Hans-Josef Steinberg, Sozialismus und deutsche Sozialdemokratie: Zur Ideologie der Partei vor dem I.


82. Ibid., p. 35.

83. Ibid., p. 33.

84. Ibid., p. 22.

85. Ibid.

86. Anton Pannekoek, "Professor Treub over het historisch materialism," op. cit.

CHAPTER III

DUTCH LEFT MARXISM IN FORMATION:

THE NIEUWE TIJD LEFT, 1899-1906
From Romanticism to Marxism: The Origins of the Nieuwe Tijd Group

Pannekoek first attempted to apply his basic methodology to specific questions of socialist strategy in the context of a general ideological and political crisis of Dutch and European social democracy. Like the socialist movement elsewhere in Europe, the SDAP experienced, in the years following the turn of the century, a rapid process of political differentiation between Marxists and revisionists, although the circumstances and nature of this conflict took a specifically Dutch form.¹

The factional struggle in the SDAP developed slowly, almost unconsciously, before suddenly bursting forth into open political conflict in the spring of 1901. During its early phases, the history of this struggle is in large part a history of a small circle of intellectuals centered around the party's theoretical review, De Nieuwe Tijd. The origins of this group are directly traceable to a series of developments in Dutch intellectual life which led to the radicalization of a group of Holland's most prominent intellectuals.

Although the closing decades of the nineteenth century were a difficult time for the nascent Dutch socialist movement, they marked a period of renaissance for Dutch cultural and intellectual life. A prevailing feeling of general optimism, which coincided with the
growing momentum of industrial development, generated great intellectual ferment and propelled a cultural revival in all areas: literature, art, music, architecture, science, and philosophy. Within this context, there developed, in the 1880's, a group of young poets, writers, literary critics, and artists, informally known as the "tachtigers" ("eightyers"), who wanted to renew Dutch culture and restore it to a position comparable to what it had been in the seventeenth century. Although the "tachtigers" initial critique of Dutch society was based on romanticism and individualism, the movement laid the foundations for the emergence of a Marxist movement in literary circles after 1890.²

The "tachtigers" movement was first given specific form in 1885 when Frank van der Goes, then still a liberal, founded the literary review, De Nieuwe Gids. Iconoclastic in its orientation, the Nieuwe Gids was in touch with everything new and unconventional in Dutch social and intellectual life. In the eyes of Henriette Roland Holst, "every issue was an event for all the young writers and artists."³ Although its prime concern was with literary matters, the Nieuwe Gids served at the same time as the focal point for intellectual self-questioning in matters of art, politics, and science. Its orientation was based on two main points: the liberation of literature and poetry from all existing conventions; and the liberation of society and political life from all forms of conservatism.⁴
Under van der Goes' editorship, the *Nieuwe Gids* became the essential point of reference for a generation of Dutch intellectuals and introduced important themes which were later developed and extended in Dutch Marxism.\(^5\)

Throughout the late 1880's the political focus of the *Nieuwe Gids* shifted steadily to the left, echoing the evolving views of van der Goes and his close collaborator, the journalist Pieter Lodwijk Tak.\(^6\) This shift was closely connected to the larger interplay of social forces in Dutch society. The prolonged economic crisis which began in the mid-1880's generated widespread unemployment and poverty which received public attention in a series of well-publicized parliamentary inquests. Throughout the country, the socialists held numerous public meetings and demonstrations at which scathing criticisms were levelled at the economic structure of society. These were also the years of the great public orations of Domela Nieuwenhuis, in which he incessantly called upon the Dutch people to begin a new life. For van der Goes and many other young Dutch intellectuals, these events represented their first exposure to a systematic social critique of Dutch society.

As events pushed his political development forward, van der Goes moved from publishing short political and social essays sympathetic to the working class to an attempt to develop an aesthetic theory justifying the unity of art and social commitment. In 1889, he initiated, with his influential essay, "1789," a prolonged debate on
Marxism and literature. Throughout 1891 and 1892, the literary debate initiated by van der Goes was increasingly transformed into a debate over the merits of socialism and individualism. As a result, the "tachtigers" soon split into two hostile wings, with one group gravitating toward individualism and mysticism and the other toward Marxism.

From the group of young Marxist writers which first crystallized in the early 1890's, two individuals soon came to prominence: Herman Gorter and Henriette Roland Holst.

Born the son of a Calvinist pastor, Herman Gorter (1864-1927) was by the 1890's the foremost poet in the Dutch language. For Gorter, the transition to socialism came out of his incessant probing into the meaning of life. Prior to becoming a Marxist, the dominant influence on his thought had been Spinoza's philosophical writings, to which he was attracted by the emphasis on interconnectedness and the unity of physical and metaphysical forces. Like many other Dutch intellectuals, Gorter was first exposed to socialism through the essays of van der Goes (who was also his cousin by marriage). Gorter's acceptance of socialism arose from his conviction that only the working class was capable of creating a new cultural and moral order. In seeking a fundamental transformation of society, Gorter's "confidence in the creative capacity of the working class was infinite." At van der Goes'
urging, Gorter began a systematic study of *Capital*, followed by an intensive study of Kautsky, of whom he later became a friend and fervent admirer. Like his poetry, Gorter's socialism bore the imprint of an intense moral idealism and a search for unity coupled with a passionate commitment to action. Whereas his early verses combined a pansexualist inspiration with a vision of transcendental beauty, his later Marxist poems moved toward a lyricism celebrating the unification of mankind with the cosmos, in which a socialist universe was depicted as the final goal of humanity.  

Gorter found in socialism a vision of beauty that was "not something metaphysical," but a broad panorama of human development, in this case "the class movement of the masses in motion." The theme that united his poetry with his politics was his belief that poetry, as an "expression of the emotional and spiritual life of an era," must be a representation of the feelings evoked in the struggles of the era. For this reason, Gorter felt poets had the duty to merge with the working class in order to participate in "the currents of the future." A powerful orator in the grand tradition and an impassioned defender of the underdog, Gorter came to incarnate Marxism socialism for many Dutch workers.

In the theoretical development of Dutch Marxism, Gorter played a role second only to Pannekoek. It would be difficult to imagine a man more temperamentally different from Pannekoek than Gorter, yet together the two men
decisively shaped the character of Dutch left Marxism, giving it its distinctive ideas and style. Whereas Pannekoek's personality was serene and analytical, Gorter's was an unstable compound of deeply contradictory elements: gentleness and softness competing with a volatile temper, impulsiveness and exuberance followed by long periods of silence and reflection. Throughout nearly three decades of close friendship and political collaboration, Pannekoek and Gorter complemented each other admirably. Pannekoek, often absorbed in arduous theoretical problems, frequently ignored details of practical application, while Gorter often directed his energies to practical matters and questions of organization and propaganda. In Pannekoek's political insights, Gorter placed "unlimited trust."\(^{14}\)

Like Gorter, Henriette Roland Holst (1869-1952) was also a talented poet and writer with passionate and wide-ranging intellectual interests who came to socialism largely from "ethical-aesthetic motives."\(^{15}\) Of patrician origins, her manifold talents later made her the doyenne of Dutch literature for nearly a generation.\(^{16}\) Underneath her brilliant, subtle mind and boundless zest for action lay an undercurrent of mysticism, which surfaced only in her poetry, and often made "her Marxist polemics in reality a struggle with herself."\(^{17}\) Although influenced by van der Goes' essays, her socialism developed largely from her friendship with Gorter.\(^{18}\) Shortly after meeting Gorter in 1893, she immersed herself, at his suggestion, in a
systematic study of Spinoza and Dante, which served as a major source of inspiration for both her literary and political work. When Gorter began his study of Capital with van der Goes, she joined him. An equally important source of influence on her socialism came from William Morris, whom her husband had known, and whose work she began to translate. From Morris, she acquired the vision of a world organized on the basis of human fellowship and fulfillment in creative labor.\textsuperscript{19} For Henriette Roland Holst, socialism signified a "re-unification of the ideal and social reality," the coming of a new era in which "thought, contemplation, action, and life are brought to unity in the existence of the individual" through a new organizing principle of society.\textsuperscript{20}

In April, 1897, at the urging of van der Goes, both Gorter and Roland Holst joined the SDAP at the Congress of Arnhem. Troelstra, considering the two intellectuals potentially as valuable to the party as van der Goes, publicly greeted them with a long welcoming address.\textsuperscript{21} Although Gorter and Roland Holst attempted to serve the party in an agitational capacity by popularizing the principles of Marxian socialism in numerous speeches, pamphlets, and articles, the focal point of their activity soon became the party's theoretical review, the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd}.

The \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} was founded in 1896 after the SDAP mandated the creation of a publication specifically for
scientific and theoretical articles. Intended as a Dutch equivalent of the *Neue Zeit*, the *Nieuwe Tijd* was initially the personal organ of van der Goes, who established it and provided most of the financial support. In order to broaden the review, van der Goes invited Gorter and Roland Holst to join the editorial board upon their affiliation with the SDAP. A similar invitation was extended to Pannekoek when he joined the SDAP in 1899. Over the course of the next few years, this basic nucleus was expanded to include the essayist and pharmacist Pieter Wiedijk (pseudonym J. Saks), the patrician businessman and journalist F.M. Wibaut, and the historian Willem van Ravesteijn. Because of its private financing, the *Nieuwe Tijd* remained outside party control, which enabled it to develop from the beginning the critical, independent, interrogative spirit that helped give Dutch Marxism its unique character.

During the early years of its existence, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group was, to a large extent, still intellectually dependent upon German Marxism, particularly upon the works of Karl Kautsky. This influence was particularly pronounced in the economic essays of Frank van der Goes, who often attempted to give the basic conceptions of German Marxism a more voluntaristic interpretation. But by the turn of the century, a more independent outlook began to emerge among the *Nieuwe Tijdists* in which much of the emphasis of Marxism was shifted away from economics
toward psychological and cultural factors.

Ideologically, the *Nieuwe Tijdschr"ift* took as their point of departure the ethical and subjective idealism which had initially inspired their transition to socialism. In their search for an alternative to the degradation of the human spirit under industrial capitalism, the *Nieuwe Tijdschr"ift* were motivated by the vision of a rational socialist community, born out of a fundamental transformation of life. Their vision promised a new man in a new world and called upon individuals to look beyond their immediate interests and seek, both within society and themselves, a new moral, cultural, and intellectual order. The basis of this new society, they felt, lay in the working class solidarity, self-activity, and revolutionary energy that arose out of the class struggle. To help integrate their subjective idealism into revolutionary Marxism, the *Nieuwe Tijdschr"ift* appropriated the philosophical writings of Joseph Dietzgen, which they often gave varying interpretations. Pannekoek, for instance, emphasized the methodological and scientific aspects of Dietzgen's system, while Gorter and Roland Holst were attracted to the sublime, quasi-religious, and visionary foundations which they felt Dietzgen gave to socialism.²³ Pannekoek later contended that it was precisely this emphasis on Dietzgen that prevented Dutch Marxism from degenerating into "mechanism" and reformism.²⁴

Although most of the editorial board was well-versed
in all areas of Marxist thought, a limited form of specialization soon developed. Philosophy and science were handled by Pannekoek; theory by Pannekoek, Gorter, and Roland Holst; economics by van der Goes, Wiedijk, and Wibaut; aesthetics by Gorter and Roland Holst; and sociology by Roland Holst. From this complex interplay of personalities and ideas, the *Nieuwe Tijd* emerged as a beacon of critical Marxist thought which rivaled Kautsky's *Neue Zeit* in its richness and complexity. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, this "school" of Marxism exercised--through countless articles, books, pamphlets, speeches, and political contacts--an influence on European social democracy that extended well beyond the boundaries of Holland.\(^{25}\) As events in the SDAP pushed the *Nieuwe Tijdstijl*'s political development forward, this rich theoretical inquiry formed the basis of an increasingly integrated theory of revolutionary Marxism.

"First Life, Then Theory": The Trade Union, Agrarian, and School Debates

During the SDAP's formative years--when it was numerically little more than a sect--all sections of the party were concerned primarily with organization and growth.\(^{26}\) Within the party, the prevailing mood was one of optimism. Yet beneath this apparent harmony, the embryonic outlines of factional groupings were already present by the turn of the century.

The Marxist intellectuals grouped around the *Nieuwe*
Tijd were almost immediately forced to confront an entrenched reformist wing centered around the typographer Willem Vliegen and the parliamentarians J.H. Schaper and Henri van Kol. All were outspoken in their rejection of the revolutionary road to socialism and stressed the importance of achieving immediate social reforms through parliamentary action. Unlike their German counterparts, the Dutch revisionists had little interest in theory and would not admit to supporting revisionism. Only Vliegen would speak openly of the "close bonds of sympathy" he had for Bernstein.27 The sentiment of the majority of party activists was perhaps symbolized by Troelstra, the titular head of the party, who considered himself a Marxist and follower of Kautsky. While not ruling out the possibility of revolutionary action, Troelstra's admitted main concern was to "develop the party into a great power" by parliamentary means.28 In approaching questions of strategy, the centrist group around Troelstra was fully aware of the relative weakness of the industrial working class sector in the Netherlands and was prepared to appeal to non-proletarian elements in building the party's strength. During the intra-party debates, the Troelstra faction usually formed a common voting bloc with the revisionists, with whom they had few differences over policy and strategy.

Although open factional struggle did not develop until the spring of 1901, the first shadows of political
conflict were cast as early as 1899 over the question of the SDAP's trade union policy. The immediate issue was what type of policy to pursue in regard to the anarcho-syndicalist followers of Domela Nieuwenhuis, who had regrouped within the NAS labor federation. The NAS had been formed in 1892 by the SDB in response to a call by the Second International for the formation of social democratic labor secretariats. Although the NAS was organizationally independent of the SDB, its leadership and much of its membership had come out of the SDB. Like the French revolutionary syndicalists, with whom it maintained close contact, the NAS defined its mission in revolutionary terms. It rejected parliamentary action and centralized leadership and sought to psychologically prepare the workers for revolution by direct industrial action. 29 In the hopes of influencing the NAS-affiliated unions and their members, the SDAP affiliated with the federation in 1894. Following two years of increasingly hostile relations, the SDAP was expelled from the federation in 1896, which created a permanent adversary relationship between the two organizations. In key areas such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the NAS unions served as a formidable barrier to the development of a social democratic base in the working class.

By the late 1890's, a powerful ideological and organizational challenge to the NAS was rapidly developing in the form of the General Dutch Diamond Workers'
Federation (Algemene Nederlandse Diamantbewerkersbond-ANDB). The founder and leader of the ANDB, Henri Polak, who also played a key role in the formation of the SDAP, had made an extensive study of the British trade union movement while living in London from 1886 to 1896, and became firmly convinced of the superiority of the British model of disciplined trade unionism to the revolutionary model. In organizing the ANDB, Polak stressed the importance of compulsory dues, salaried officials, a large treasury, and a highly centralized leadership. To further underscore the differences between the ANDB and NAS, Polak appropriated the label "modern unionism" to convey the view that the revolutionary trade unionism of the NAS was an old-fashioned and unsuccessful approach to organizing the working class. So successful was this approach that by 1898, ANDB membership stood at 7,800, over three times that of the SDAP. That same year, Polak published a brochure portraying the ANDB as a possible model for a social democratic trade union federation.

At this point, the SDAP was forced to confront the question of whether to continue to pin its hopes on an eventual reform of the NAS or to attempt to build a new federation of its own. Although the creation of a new federation was proposed as early as 1898, most members of the party rejected it as premature. As the SDAP continued to wrestle with the problem of what type of
trade union policy to pursue, it became increasingly clear that a major difference in outlook separated the Nieuwe Tijdschrift from the party leadership. Troelstra, concerned mainly with building a labor movement willing to cooperate with the SDAP and augment its power, vigorously opposed any form of cooperation with the NAS unions. The Nieuwe Tijdschrift, on the other hand, maintained a more benevolent attitude toward the NAS unions and stressed their fighting qualities. For them, the fundamental issue at stake was the class struggle. In keeping with this view, Gorter argued at the 1899 party congress that the SDAP should actively support the NAS unions rather than continue to oppose them. To realize this aim, he proposed that the SDAP create a "mechanism for common struggle" between the party and the unions. Polak and Schaper, however, maintained that a common struggle was impossible due to the hostility of the anarcho-syndicalists.

In late 1900, Troelstra formulated a proposal for the formation of a new social democratic trade union federation. Gorter openly challenged this view and argued that the real task was to make conciliatory overtures to the NAS. At the 1901 party congress, Gorter introduced a resolution calling for more specific support in the form of subsidies for the NAS unions from the cooperative movement. Gorter's resolution was defeated in favor of a counter-motion by Troelstra which called for a loosely defined "cooperation" between the party,
cooperatives, and trade unions. What precisely this "cooperation" meant in practice was not spelled out and, in any case, the initiative for establishing it was left to the anarcho-syndicalists.\textsuperscript{39} By this point, however, the trade union question had been superseded by a larger debate over agrarian policy.

In contrast to the brief debate over trade union policy, the agrarian debate was particularly sharp and established for the first time the clear lines of factional cleavage. The roots of this debate are traceable to the weakness of the SDAP in the urban sector and its strength in the rural provinces of the north where much of the agrarian population had been radicalized by the prolonged economic crisis of the mid-1880's. The extent of the SDAP's dependency on its rural constituency was revealed in the 1897 elections in which the provinces of Friesland and Groningen accounted for 4,572 of the SDAP's total of 10,260 votes. By contrast, Amsterdam accounted for only 1,152 votes and Rotterdam 312.\textsuperscript{40}

In formulating an agrarian program, the SDAP was forced to confront an agricultural system based on labor-intensive small-holdings encompassing three groups: owners, tenants, and farm laborers. Within the complex social structure that developed in the countryside, the lines of division were often blurred by the fact that tenants frequently subleased parcels of their land or employed wage laborers to work part of it. What this
meant was that in order to preserve and extend its base in the agrarian north, the SDAP was faced with the tactical imperative of seeking support from the tenant and ownership class.\textsuperscript{41}

As originally formulated in 1895, the SDAP agrarian program stressed the creation of collectivist relations in the countryside and was addressed mainly to the rural proletariat.\textsuperscript{42} Shortly before the 1897 elections, Troelstra managed to secure a major revision in the agrarian program which emphasized the interests of tenants over wage laborers. The most important point in the revised program was a clause which provided for the leasing of municipal lands to tenants who could then employ wage labor to work it. In pursuing policies of this type, Troelstra envisioned developing the SDAP into a multi-class electoral bloc similar to the \textit{Frieze Volkspartei}.

By the turn of the century, many in the party had begun to question the SDAP's dependence on what was derisively referred to as "dung capitalism."\textsuperscript{43} Following a careful study of the question in 1900, Gorter came to the conclusion that Troelstra's revisions represented a fundamental deviation from Marxist principles. In order to initiate a discussion of this question, he placed a translation of an 1895 article by Engels on the agrarian question in the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd}.\textsuperscript{44} To buttress his case further, Gorter prevailed upon his friend Karl Kautsky to write a short article criticizing the Dutch program on
orthodox Marxist grounds. In response, Troelstra castigated Gorter for substituting an "appeal to authority" to conceal his "lack of knowledge." Seeking to strengthen his position in preparation for the upcoming Congress of Utrecht, Gorter published a blistering attack on Troelstra entitled "Troelstra contra Kautsky." The basis of Gorter's attack was his belief that Troelstra's revisions were an expression of a "confused and opportunist" politics which would transform the SDAP into a reformist party defending the interests of a class of "fanatical small property owners." In the aftermath of this attack, Troelstra invited Pannekoek to visit him in Haarlem, where he sought—unsuccessfully—to enlist Pannekoek's theoretical abilities in the struggle against Gorter. A series of polemics in the party daily Het Volk in April, 1901 brought the debate directly to the membership. For the Nieuwe Tijdschriften, the debate assumed a larger significance when Troelstra noted:

We have other things to do than promote the socialist mode of production; on the contrary, this task is more the work of economic development than of a political party. We have other things to do than to simply organize the workers for the class struggle, although this is our main work. We have to do whatever is necessary to alleviate their misery in order to steer their thoughts in our direction.

In Troelstra's view, the fundamental issue was quite simple: "First life, then theory." These remarks led
Henriette Roland Holst to charge him with pursuing a "program of philanthropy" rather than a program of social democracy.\textsuperscript{50}

The debate over agrarian policy dominated the entire proceedings of the April, 1901 Congress of Utrecht. Gorter opened the debate with a proposal for an amendment to the agrarian program limiting the granting of municipal lands only to those who would pledge not to employ wage laborers and to rely as much as possible on cooperatives. The discussion that followed was largely a re-echoing of the earlier polemics. After considerable debate, a compromise was finally accepted, which called for a special commission to examine the question of agrarian policy.\textsuperscript{51} By the time the commission finally reported in 1905, the agrarian question had long since been dwarfed by more important issues.\textsuperscript{52}

Unlike others of the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group, Pannekoek remained largely on the sidelines throughout the agrarian debate. In keeping with his basic methodology, Pannekoek chose to focus on the subjective aspects of the agrarian question. At the Congress of Utrecht, he warned that the leasing of municipal lands would create an attitude of competitiveness and envy among the tenant farmers and agricultural laborers at a time when they were beginning to develop feelings of solidarity. The principal task of the party in the rural areas, he maintained, was to build a socialist consciousness by disseminating information
explaining and analyzing the causes of rural poverty.\textsuperscript{53} When the question was referred to a special commission, Pannekoek used the opportunity to attempt some broader generalizations about the relationship of the party program to Marxist doctrine. He argued that since the party program represents a short, summarized version of the socialist world view, it should remain intact as long as the basic ideas of the party remain the same. As the party develops new insights and further clarifies existing realities, then the entire program should be revised in accordance with these new conceptions rather than just revising bits and pieces of the program to satisfy certain practical needs of the moment. In any case, such a task should not be delegated to a small commission concerned mainly with political expediencies. For Pannekoek, the point to be emphasized was that "the party must act on the basis of purity in order to maintain the best possible position in the spiritual struggle against the defenders of capitalism."\textsuperscript{54}

While the battle over agrarian policy raged, a parallel, but more complicated, cleavage was slowly developing over educational policy. Like the agrarian debate, this dispute had its roots in the SDAP's early dependence on its rural constituency in the north. The immediate issue was the question of state subsidies to religious schools. Although this question had been a major dividing point in Dutch political life, the SDAP
initially chose to ignore it. But by the turn of the century, the SDAP was facing a powerful competitor for its electoral bloc in the form of the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party, led by Abraham Kuyper. By a combination of associating Calvinism with a broad policy of reform measures and a demand for state subsidies for confessional schools, Kuyper was able to mobilize a large sector of agrarian, lower middle class, and even working class support. This meant that the SDAP was faced with the tactical imperative of developing a program to counter the growing appeal of the Anti-Revolutionary Party to its predominantly Calvinist constituency. 55

The SDAP first addressed itself systematically to the question of educational policy in February, 1901, when Troelstra called for state aid to confessional schools on the grounds that all groups should be allowed the right to form and run their own schools. 56 Throughout 1901, a discussion on this question continued without leading to factional strife within the SDAP. Indeed, van der Goes defended a policy similar to Troelstra's, which maintained that the working class had a right to determine where to educate their children. 57 Pannekoek seconded this argument by noting that both school systems were equally tied to bourgeois society and each were preferred by certain sectors of the working class. The real issue, he felt, was not religion or non-religion in the schools, but the broader question of ideological domination, of
which school education was just one part. To oppose state subsidies would only create a needless conflict between believing and non-believing workers.\textsuperscript{58}

The school issue became a source of conflict only in December, 1901, when the Amsterdam section of the Social Democratic Educators Union (\textit{Sociaaldemocratische Onderwijzersvereeniging}-SDOV) passed a resolution calling upon the SDAP to oppose any form of state subsidies to confessional schools. The leader of this move was Jan Ceton, the SDOV's national secretary, who was close to the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group. Troelstra quickly responded with an editorial in \textit{Het Volk} which condemned the motion as "reactionary" on the grounds that it would greatly hinder the activity of the party.\textsuperscript{59} Gorter and Roland Holst immediately drafted a joint letter affirming a preference for state schools and opposing the extension of subsidies for confessional schools.\textsuperscript{60}

Throughout the first three months of 1902, the debate raged almost daily in the columns of \textit{Het Volk}. On one side was Troelstra; on the other, Ceton, Gorter, Roland Holst, and Wiedijk; while Pannekoek and van der Goes remained neutral. The issue raised here was once again one of Marxist principle. Ceton, Gorter, and Roland Holst argued that the defined policy of the Second International favored free, compulsory secular public education and that any form of support for confessional schools would be a serious deviation from accepted Marxist principles.\textsuperscript{61}
Troelstra defended his position by contending that, while the German-developed doctrines were correct, they had to be applied in a Dutch context.\textsuperscript{62} Pannekoek, meanwhile, continued to maintain his earlier position that the real issue was ideological domination, although he now took considerable pains to distinguish his position from Troelstra's.\textsuperscript{63} An even more vehement debate followed at the Congress of Groningen in March, 1902, which finally culminated in a compromise resolution affirming the desirability of placing all education under state supervision, but at the same time supporting state subsidies to confessional schools on a parity with the public schools.\textsuperscript{64} Like the agrarian debate, the school debate had little immediate impact on party policy, and its principal effect was largely to poison personal relations between the party leadership and the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group.

\textbf{Class Struggle and Spontaneity: The Dutch Mass Strike Wave of 1903}

Prior to 1903, the factional struggle in the SDAP had revolved around specific questions of policy. This debate entered the arena of revolutionary strategy itself following the Dutch mass strike wave of 1903, which marked a watershed both for the evolution of the Dutch left and for Pannekoek's political thought. Whereas Pannekoek had played only a limited role in the earlier debates, he was now thrust directly into the limelight as the main spokesman of the left opposition.
The mass strike wave of 1903—which still represents the greatest labor dispute in the history of the Netherlands—took place against a backdrop of rapid trade union organizational growth and militancy. During 1902, a series of escalating labor disputes occurred among the Amsterdam diamond workers, the Amsterdam building trades, and the textile workers of the Twente district, which had a powerful impact on the consciousness of the working class. The strike wave itself began in early January, 1903, as a series of spontaneous work stoppages in the port of Amsterdam in response to an attempt by the shipping companies to enforce a wage cut by hiring non-union workers. When the employers refused to negotiate and discharged the striking workers, the NAS unions responded with a series of strikes which led to a two-week de facto general strike in the harbor. Almost immediately, the syndicalist strike actions spread to the railway workers in Amsterdam, who transformed what had begun as a sympathy strike into a parallel railway strike for higher wages. At a meeting of over 2,000 railway workers in the Hague on January 22, a resolution calling for a national transport strike was overwhelmingly approved despite strong opposition from the union's social democratic leadership. The crisis reached a new height when other NAS unions throughout Holland threatened to join any national strike movement that might develop. Confronted with this situation, the railroad companies and harbor
firms quickly capitulated on January 31, giving the
strikers virtually a total victory.

Among the Nieuwe Tijd group, the mood was one of
exaltation. Pannekoek captured this spirit when he noted:

It developed unexpectedly within the span of a
few days and appeared to us like a glowing fireball
descending from the sky. For a moment it illuminated
and magnified what had hitherto been perceived
only hazily and dimly; for many in the darkest
depths of the working class it represents the first
ray of light. Friends and enemies are easily
distinguishable to those who have forgotten their
true class position. . . . The contrasts between
the proletarian and bourgeois conceptions stand
sharply counterposed to each other. . . . Anyone
who now hesitates does not belong to us; everyone
who feels and thinks proletarian is being gathered
together. And out of all this there is developing
the highest degree of clarity which the party
must collect and systematize.\textsuperscript{69}

In their great enthusiasm, the Nieuwe Tijdists believed
that class solidarity and action would bridge the gap
between the party and the trade union movement and allow
the workers to rise above parochial interests under the
inspiration of socialism.\textsuperscript{70} Speaking jointly at a public
demonstration with Domela Nieuwenhuis, Gorter declared
to tumultuous applause: "Let us now forget everything
that has divided us in the past and unite ourselves
against capitalism."\textsuperscript{71}

This triumph of class solidarity, however, was soon
met by a counteroffensive by the employers. The clear
lines of a major national class confrontation were drawn
in February, when the Kuyper government began to draft a
package of anti-strike legislation prohibiting strikes in
the railroads and public sector. In an attempt to head off such legislation, a Resistance Committee was organized, composed of the SDAP, the NAS, and various independent trade unions. Over the course of the next few weeks, the committee began to organize a series of mass meetings and demonstrations in an attempt to exert extra-parliamentary pressure on the government. During this period, a protracted debate began in the Resistance Committee over the question of proclaiming a general strike, with the anarcho-syndicalists in favor, and the socialists and non-NAS trade union leaders hesitant. What finally emerged was a compromise tactic in which the committee was allowed to call a railway and dockworkers' strike at an opportune time in the parliamentary debate, but could expand it into a general strike only if it was necessary to assure the strike's success. In the meantime, the government began to prepare the police and military for a national confrontation.

Despite the objections of the SDAP leaders Troelstra and Vliegen and the railway union's socialist leader Jan Oudergeest, the Resistance Committee proclaimed a railway and dockworkers' strike for April 6. Several days earlier a number of spontaneous strikes had already broken out in certain small industries in Amsterdam. In contrast to January, the railway and harbor firms were now well organized, able to draw from a pool of strikebreakers, and in a much better position to intimidate their employees.
Sensing a major confrontation, the government also brought large numbers of troops to Amsterdam and positioned them throughout the city. At the same time, the Resistance Committee had undertaken no serious efforts to organize the strike, and, in fact, delegated this task to leaders such as Oudegeest, who had opposed the strike from the beginning. Additional confusion arose from the fact that the committee had never determined whether the strike would be a symbolic protest or an act of compulsion to force the government to withdraw its anti-strike legislation. In these circumstances, the railway and dockworkers' strike was poorly supported except in the port of Amsterdam. Nonetheless, other unions, particularly in the metal and building trades, began to spontaneously join the strike, often against the wishes of their leaders. On Wednesday evening, April 8, the committee proclaimed the general strike for the following day. Bakers, metalworkers, construction workers, municipal employees, cigarmakers, and diamond workers followed the call, but the threats of the employers kept enough workers on the job to keep the industries running. Only in the well-organized diamond trades was the strike complete. As a consequence, the committee voted to call the strike off the same day it began, despite the protests of many of the anarcho-syndicalist workers. If the January strike represented a near-complete victory, the April strike represented a near-complete failure.
The failure of the April strike had far reaching consequences for the Dutch working class. On the most general level, it destroyed the fighting capacity of the trade union movement for nearly a decade. From the railroads alone, 2,000 of the most militant workers were dismissed; in Amsterdam, 400 municipal workers met the same fate. Throughout the country as a whole, perhaps as many as 4,000 workers lost their jobs. For the NAS, which, in the enthusiasm of February and March, had gained 6,500 new members, the defeat resulted in a drop in membership from 17,000 to 8,000 in less than a year. From a political standpoint, this defeat also widened and made permanent the schism between the anarcho-syndicalists and the socialists. The anarcho-syndicalists accused the socialists of defeatism and betrayal, while the socialists charged that the anarcho-syndicalists were irresponsible and adventurist. In the aftermath of these events, the SDAP—through the efforts of Troelstra, Polak, and Oudegeest—began to direct its trade union activities toward the creation of "modern" unions modeled on the ANDB. These efforts culminated in the creation of an SDAP-dominated trade-union federation, the Netherlands Federation of Trade Unions (Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen-NVV) in 1905.

Within the SDAP, the failure of the April strike led to both a renewed attack on Troelstra's leadership and a full-scale theoretical debate over the question of the
general strike. Throughout February, Troelstra, in contrast to other SDAP leaders such as Vliegen and Oudergeest, had shared much of the *Nieuwe Tijd* group's optimism and enthusiasm for a general strike, in the belief that it would be useful as a pressure instrument for gaining universal suffrage. By March, however, his attitude had changed to one of caution and resignation, out of fear that the government might move to destroy the SDAP in the event of a general strike. Writing on March 17, in his capacity as editor-in-chief of *Het Volk*, Troelstra attacked the strategy of a political general strike, which the Resistance Committee had already approved. His reasoning was that the bourgeoisie was too strong to permit the success of such a strike; and that in any event, a strike could only be justified in a situation where the customary political channels no longer existed.

Troelstra's editorial, which had been completely unauthorized by the party, unleashed a storm of protest from the *Nieuwe Tijd* group. Pannekoek, leading the assault, responded with a caustic letter accusing Troelstra of weakening the determination of the workers and destroying their hard-won unity: "Your weak and hesitant attitude, which has nothing in common with the powerful force of the protest movement against the anti-strike laws, can only serve to encourage the ruling class and the government. . . . " Troelstra countered by
accusing Pannekoek of "unbounded superficiality" and suggested that he wanted the party "to be dragged along on an anarchist adventure." Pannekoek responded with uncharacteristic invective, charging that Troelstra had "betrayed" the movement and that his fears about the bloody consequences of a strike were "reminiscent of the fears often expressed by the petit-bourgeoisie over the disquieting effects of strikes." Troelstra, however, refused to print the article on the grounds that it lacked "consideration, honesty, and good faith." Pannekoek subsequently drafted still another article which Troelstra once again refused to print. After a bitter exchange of correspondence, Pannekoek announced his intention to bring the matter up at the upcoming party congress. Beyond this, Pannekoek felt that the SDAP's continued toleration of leaders like Troelstra was symptomatic of a larger lack of proletarian feelings and insights in the party. Pannekoek was soon joined in his attacks on Troelstra's leadership by Gorter and Roland Holst, although their criticisms were more temperate in tone.

Beyond the immediate question of Troelstra's leadership, there lay the more fundamental question of the legitimacy of the general strike as an instrument of socialist strategy. As early as 1902, a minor debate on this issue had arisen within the SDAP as an outgrowth of the national suffrage strike in Belgium. When, in 1903, the question assumed immediate practical significance
during the debates in the Resistance Committee, Henriette Roland Holst began the task of formulating a political strike strategy, first setting forth her arguments in favor of a general strike in an article in the March 24 issue of Het Volk.\textsuperscript{86} Despite the fiasco of the April strike, Roland Holst continued to affirm the potential importance of the political general strike as a new and exemplary form of class struggle.\textsuperscript{87} In 1904, she expanded these ideas in a major theoretical work, The General Strike and Social Democracy, which was widely circulated throughout Europe.

The Nieuwe Tijdists first attempted to carry the mass strike debate into the ranks of the party at the Congress of Eindhoven in May, 1903, when Gorter introduced a resolution calling for the SDAP's participation in future general strikes. Despite a spirited defense of their position, the Nieuwe Tijdists were forced to yield to a compromise resolution proposed by P.L. Tak which approved the general strike in vague terms, but pronounced the goal of universal suffrage more desirable.\textsuperscript{88} Undeterred by this rebuff, the Nieuwe Tijdists almost immediately began to focus their energies on changing party policy at the congress the following year.

In order to give their case a more solid foundation, the Nieuwe Tijdists selected Pannekoek to draft a report to be presented at the 1904 congress stipulating the conditions under which the mass political strike could be
used as a tactic of social democracy. Although Pannekoek explicitly posed the mass political strike as a "new form of struggle," he stopped short of advocating its use as a tactical end in itself. He argued that the mass strike was a necessary and useful supplement to other tactics which could be effective in achieving certain limited ends or resisting reactionary attacks on the workers. At the same time, Pannekoek warned that because the use of the mass strike would, in almost all cases, lead to a confrontation with the capitalist state, it was a "very dangerous medium" which must be used with extreme caution and must encompass the majority of workers into a fighting organization. Pannekoek claimed that this conception had nothing in common with the anarcho-syndicalist view of the mass strike as a substitute for political and parliamentary action. On the contrary, the real task was to prepare the working class for an eventual confrontation with the capitalist state by strengthening their organization and consciousness through political and trade union action. 89

A modified version of this report, which was more critical of the anarcho-syndicalists, was accepted by the party executive and was introduced at the 1904 congress by Henriette Roland Holst. After a heated exchange with the party right led by Vliegen, the report was ratified by a narrow four-vote margin, due in large part to support from the Troelstra faction. 90 Although the Nieuwe Tijdschr claimed this decision as a victory, it remained unclear
as to whether the resolution was passed as an affirmation of an executive bureau decision or as an endorsement of the Nieuwe Tijd group's formulations.

In spite of the fact that their efforts to influence party policy had only a limited political effect, the Nieuwe Tijdists, nonetheless, drew important lessons from the events of 1903 about the forms of working class struggle and the relationship between class and organization, which would later come to the forefront of their Marxism. Pannekoek boldly predicted that out of actions such as those of 1903, there would develop both a new movement and a new level of theoretical consciousness. 91

Class Struggle and Class Organization: The Debate Over the Nature of the SDAP.

With the mass strike wave of 1903, the parameters of the factional debate were clearly drawn. From the perspective of the Nieuwe Tijd group, what was at stake was nothing less than the nature of the SDAP, its leadership, strategy, and commitment to revolutionary principles. Already, during the course of the agrarian and school debates, a major controversy over the nature of the SDAP had begun to emerge in the form of a theoretical debate over the relationship of theory to the practice of the movement. This debate began in early 1902, when Henriette Roland Holst, attempting to assess the implications of Troelstra's recent policy shifts, published an influential article entitled "Principle and Practice." Roland Holst's
main thesis was that since the party's theory and tactics reflected certain laws of social development and specific historical experiences, rather than abstract dogmas, the practice of the movement must flow from principle. Firm adherence to empirically-derived principles, she felt, represented the shortest road to socialism. To compromise with another mode of thought or to adapt to existing circumstances for immediate short-term gains would only make the task of achieving socialism more difficult. In her view, Troelstra and an "opportunistic current" were seeking short-term electoral gains among non-working-class sectors of the population instead of attempting to arouse the consciousness of the working class.\textsuperscript{92} Roland Holst was joined in her attack on Troelstra by Pieter Wiedijk, who argued that adherence to a theory of irreconcilable class struggle was even more necessary in backward Holland. "What," he asked, "is the situation in regard to the Revolutionary Idea? Is the SDAP still what it was at the time of its birth, a revolutionary party?"\textsuperscript{93}

Troelstra, seeking to give his policies a more detailed theoretical justification, lost no time in elaborating his own conception of the relationship between theory and practice. Although admitting that practice is the adaptation of theory to particular forms of action, Troelstra stressed that it is practice, or the movement itself, which is primary. The tactical conclusion he drew
from this was that "pure theory" had failed to take into account the other classes exploited by capitalism, whereas the socialist movement was gathering them together on its own accord. The party, therefore, had the duty not to confine itself to exclusively social and economic issues, but to embrace larger moral issues as well.

Troelstra added to this the charge that the Nieuwe Tijd group's "intellectualist tactics" were turning the SDAP into a purely "intellectual club." The real task of theoreticians, he felt, was to unite behind the "men of practice"—who rarely have the time for theoretical studies themselves—and provide them with the best weapons for their struggles. In any case, concluded Troelstra: "We shall win because of our love for the proletariat."

The debate over the nature of the SDAP took a more practical turn when it became interwoven with a struggle against Troelstra's control of the party daily, Het Volk. As early as 1901, Pannekoek had privately criticized Troelstra for failing to use Het Volk to develop Marxist insights within the party. Although Pannekoek joined with van der Goes in an abortive attempt to remove Troelstra as editor in 1902, this question did not assume major importance until the appearance of Troelstra's 1903 strike editorials and his refusal to print Pannekoek's articles. By then, the Nieuwe Tijdists considered it of vital importance to have unrestricted access to the columns of Het Volk since it was the only medium through which
their views could be disseminated to the SDAP rank-and-file. Despite a lengthy campaign against Troelstra, which culminated in a heated debate at the 1903 party congress, Troelstra was reconfirmed as editor, though he was warned to be more tactful. The Nieuwe Tijdschr, nonetheless, intensified their efforts, and Troelstra, irritated by the attacks on him, announced his resignation in September, 1903. P.L. Tak was named as his successor. Although not of the left, Tak was trusted by them and was considered an acceptable compromise candidate. 96

The Nieuwe Tijdschr's critique of the SDAP was given an aggressive, revolutionary focus as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1905. Under the impetus of the Russian mass strikes, the Nieuwe Tijdschr became convinced that an era of revolution was near at hand and that the mission of the party was to prepare the Dutch working class for a revolutionary crisis by instilling a Marxist sense of class struggle. As in 1903, their mood was one of exaltation and extreme optimism. In Pannekoek's opinion, the Russian Revolution signified the end of a thirty-year period of peaceful parliamentary struggle and the beginning of a new epoch of "stormy revolutionary struggle." The events in Russia, he felt, would have their impact on Holland, first by way of Germany, where the powerful German working class was already beginning to stir:
And the agitation will arise here, growing stronger and stronger as it draws in the countless workers who in the past have remained aloof from our struggles. Our suffrage movement—which is the form this revolutionary energy will take—will suddenly flare up.97

Similar sentiments were echoed by Henriette Roland Holst, who foresaw a period of rapid class polarization: “Every socialist worker knows and feels this in his heart and in his entire body as a certainty.”98

The Russian events helped give a special sense of urgency to a new dispute that developed in the summer of 1905, over the question of supporting non-socialist candidates on the second ballot. Prior to the 1905 elections, a coalition had been formed to unseat the Anti-Revolutionary Party of Abraham Kuyper. For the Dutch working class, this question was of paramount importance since Kuyper was identified with the anti-strike legislation and repression of 1903 and was an irreconcilable opponent of universal suffrage. At the 1905 party congress, the SDAP accepted, in the interests of party harmony, a joint Pannekoek-Troelstra resolution which specifically rejected a strategy of supporting en bloc all anti-Kuyper candidates on the second ballot, except for those who publically declared themselves in favor of universal suffrage. This situation changed suddenly when the anti-Kuyper coalition gained a larger than expected vote on the first ballot, which opened up the possibility of a second ballot victory. Since it was
believed that the anti-Kuyper forces would attract a sizeable amount of working class support, the party executive and the editorial board of *Het Volk* both publicly reinterpreted the congress decision to mean that individuals were free to vote their conscience.\(^99\)

This unilateral decision triggered a sharp response from the left, with Pannekoek leading the assault. By now Pannekoek's role in the factional struggle was such that the *Nieuwe Tijdschr* were often informally referred to as "pannekoekers."\(^{100}\) Writing first in *Het Volk* on July 1, 1905, Pannekoek accused the party leadership of having "completely reversed the congress decision by a cunning exegis." The executive's "act of disobedience" he contended, was tantamount to a substantial change in the whole strategy and policy of the party. By presenting the run-off to the rank-and-file in terms of a struggle against the Kuyper regime and not in terms of the anti-thesis capitalism-socialism, the party leadership had set back the suffrage movement, weakened the political consciousness of the workers, destroyed party discipline, and promoted "a spirit of disorganization and political corruption in the party."\(^{101}\) Pannekoek attempted to give this issue a broader theoretical focus a short time later in a *Nieuwe Tijd* article in which he argued that the consciousness of the workers was the main issue and that the election was of little or no importance since all the parties were equally anti-working-class. Kuyper's
repressive actions in 1903 were not so much the actions of one person, but the "particular manner" in which the policy of a class was conducted. Rather than simply seeking a change of government, the party should address itself to "the countless workers who still cannot free themselves from the domination of bourgeois ideology, those who voted red on the second ballot but later ignore the warnings of those whom they supported and vote for their enemies."

The real task, Pannekoek maintained, was to prepare the workers ideologically for the coming suffrage struggles that might develop as an outgrowth of the Russian Revolution. This could not be done if the workers remained "blindly focused on the parliamentary struggle."\textsuperscript{102}

Troelstra countered these accusations with a full-scale offensive against the left, in which he charged that the left's distrust of the leadership was becoming a "mania" and called upon the next party congress to formally condemn the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group.\textsuperscript{103} The stage was set for a major confrontation when a special commission was created to examine Troelstra's accusations and issue a report for the upcoming congress.

The 1906 Congress of Utrecht turned into a debacle for the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group. After examining Troelstra's accusations, the special commission concluded that the \textit{Nieuwe Tijdists} had been guilty of a "misuse of the freedom of criticism" and had "undermined the unity of the party." After a heated debate, the report was approved overwhelm-
ingly. A second motion was also made and accepted which called for tighter party control of the *Nieuwe Tijd*. 104 Badly chastized, the *Nieuwe Tijds* protested these decisions with a boycott of all party activities. 105 This defeat, however, was to be only the prelude to a new and more dramatic stage of the factional struggle which would develop the following year.

As these events make clear, by 1906, a strong radical tendency had fully developed and consolidated itself in Dutch social democracy. From a romantic rebellion against bourgeois society and culture, the *Nieuwe Tijd* group had moved to a militant, activist conception of revolutionary Marxism which stressed the importance of class, the necessity of revolution, and the creation of a new social, moral, cultural, and intellectual order. In attempting to develop their revolutionary practice, they firmly rejected theoretical revisionism and practical reformism, maintained a deep mistrust of parliamentarianism, and advocated an active strategy of confrontation with the state and capital. At the same time, their strategic orientation revealed, even at this early date, a number of the fundamental flaws in Dutch Marxism. Although their subjectively oriented Marxism introduced new and unique categories to Marxist analysis, the *Nieuwe Tijds* desire for a fundamental revolutionary transformation was not matched by a clear conception of the social and economic reality they sought to transform. In formulating their
strategic analyses, Pannekoek and the Nieuwe Tijdists often preferred to argue by explication and in terms of general and abstract categories of universal validity rather than attempt a systematic and empirical analysis of Dutch social and economic development. In the domain of revolutionary practice, the Nieuwe Tijdists were limited by their inability to generate either a mass following or a grass-roots cadre to translate their views into practice. Despite their stature in the party, the Nieuwe Tijdists' influence in the party remained scattered and confined largely to their intellectual and propaganda activities. In the final analysis, however, the Nieuwe Tijdists' failure to radicalize the SDAP was less a consequence of their shortcomings than a reflection of the special features of the party's development. Formed initially as a reaction to the revolutionary doctrines of Domela Nieuwenhuis, cut off from the revolutionary sector of the working class, and dependent on a rural and middle class constituency, the SDAP was conditioned almost from its inception as a middle class reform party dependent on parliamentary tactics.
NOTES


2. The "tachtigers" movement has been examined in G. Colmjon, De beweging van Tachtig. Een cultuurhistorische (Utrecht: Het spectrum, 1963).


5. The central role of the Nieuwe Gids in Dutch intellectual life is analyzed in: Garnt Stuiveling, De Nieuwe Gids als geestelijk braandpunt (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1935). Additional material on this publication can be found in: Frank van der Goes, Litteraire herinneringen uit den Nieuwe Gids-Tijd (Santpoort: Mees, 1931); G.W.B. Borrie, Pieter Lodewijk Tak, op. cit.; M.H. Campen, "Het historisch materialisme in de litteraire critiek," De Gids, December, 1913.

6. Tak, who like van der Goes was a prominent figure in both Dutch socialist and intellectual circles, has received attention in G.W.B. Borrie, Pieter Lodewijk Tak, op. cit.


10. Rob Antonissen, Herman Gorter en Henriette Roland Holst (Antwerp: De Sikkili, 1948), p. 169. For additional information on Gorter, see: Herman de Liagre Böhler, Herman

11. Henriette Roland Holst, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 54.

12. Henriette Roland Holst, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 137. Gorter's most well known verses are his epic poems Mei (1889), Pan (1912), and De Arbeidersraad (1927).


15. Ibid., p. 22.


17. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., p. 127. By the late 1920's this mysticism had carried her to a form of Tolstoyan Christian socialism.


22. Ibid.

23. In addition to Pannekoek's work, other studies from this group dealing with Dietzgen include: Herman Gorter, "Marx en het determinisme," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1904, pp. 57-58; Herman Gorter, Het historisch materialisme voor arbeiders
verklaard (Amsterdam: De Tribune, 1908); Henriette Roland Holst, Joseph Dietzgen's Philosophy gemeenverständlich erläutert in ihrer Bedeutung für das Proletariat, op. cit. Dietzgen's philosophy also exercised considerable influence on the literary work of Gorter and Roland Holst. See in particular Gorter's epic poems, Pan and De Arbeidersraad. A useful discussion of Dietzgen's literary impact can be found in: Rob Antonissen, Herman Gorter en Henriette Roland Holst, op. cit.; Yves van Kempen, Materialistie Literatuurtheorie, op. cit.; and Adama van Scheltema and Carel Stefan, De grondslagen eener nieuwe poëzie. Proeve tot een maatschappelijke kunstleer tegenover het naturalisme en anarchisme, de tachtigers en hun decadenten (Rotterdam: Kerdijk, 1908).


25. The term "Dutch Marxist school" was first used in a special issue of Proletarier devoted to the writings of Pannekoek, Gorter, and Roland Holst. Proletarier, February, 1921.

26. In 1895, the SDAP had only 700 members, a figure which grew to 2,500 by 1899, and to 4,500 in 1902 which was still far less than the membership of the SDB in 1902. Erik Hansen, "Workers and Socialists: Relations Between the Dutch Trade Union Movement and Social Democracy, 1894-1914," European Studies Review, April, 1977.

27. Ger Harmsen, Historisch overzicht van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in nederland, op. cit., p. 47.


33. Henri Polak, Federatie van Vakverenigingen (Amsterdam: ANDB, 1898).


35. Ibid., p. 10.


39. Ibid., pp. 14-16.


42. This program is contained in: Willem Vliegen, Die onze kracht ontwaken deed, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 100-103.

43. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., p. 122.

44. Friedrich Engels, "Het agrarische vraagstuk en het socialisme," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1901, pp. 11-17, 100-110.


52. This report can be found in the Verslag van het elfde congres der S.D.A.P., gehouden op 23-24 en 25 April 1905 te S'Gravenhage (Amsterdam: SDAP, 1905).


57. Frank van der Goes, "De School kwestie," *De Kroniek*, March 23, 30, and April 6, 1901.


60. Henriette Roland Holst and Herman Gorter, "Verklaring inzake de Vrije School," Het Volk, December 24, 1901.


63. Anton Pannekoek, "De School kwestie," Het Volk, February 19, 1902; "Recht om recht?", Het Volk, February 20, 1902.

64. Verslag van het achtste congres der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij op 30 en 31 Maart te Groningen (Amsterdam: SDAP, 1902).

65. For example, during only a few short months in 1902, the metal workers' union doubled from 700 to 1,400 members, and a textile workers' union known as De Eendracht grew from 600 to 1,300. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., p. 122.

66. G.W.B. Borrie, Pieter Lodewijk Tak, op. cit., p. 144.

67. This account is based largely on the definitive work on the events of 1903, A.J.C. Rüter's De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903, op. cit. Also useful is: Albert de Jong, De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903 (Amsterdam: Anarchistieke uitgaven, n.d.).


70. Henriette Roland Holst, "De groote spoorwegstaking, de vakbeweging en de SDAP," Het Volk, February 19, 1903.


72. Albert de Jong, De Spoorwegstakingen van 1903, op. cit., p. 35.

73. Ibid.

75. For details on the formation of this federation see: Erik Hansen, "Workers and Socialists: Relations between the Dutch Trade Union Movement and Social Democracy, 1894-1914," op. cit.

76. Troelstra, writing the day after the January 31 strike victory, noted: "The lion has only shown his claws in a forceful and self-contained rebellion; we can only suspect what he is capable of doing when he discovers his full power." Pieter J. Troelstra, "De leeuw toont zijn klauw," Het Volk, February 1, 1903.

77. Pieter J. Troelstra, "Wat nu?", Het Volk, March 17, 1903.

78. Anton Pannekoek, untitled letter, Het Volk, March 26, 1903.

79. Pieter J. Troelstra, unsigned commentary appended to ibid.


82. Anton Pannekoek to Pieter J. Troelstra, April 14, 1903, Troelstra Archives, op. cit., folder 209.

83. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, April 22, 1903, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVIII, folder 385. Pannekoek's personal bitterness was motivated at least partly by his experiences in Leiden where he had been active in organizing strike support activities. For his role as chairman of a large strike support meeting, Pannekoek was threatened with dismissal from his Leiden Observatory post. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., pp. 92-93.


85. This debate began when the Nieuwe Tijd translated and published an article of Rosa Luxemburg's (Rosa Luxemburg, "Het Belgische experiment," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1902, pp.
317-323) which attacked the leadership of the Belgian Labor Party for attempting to limit the strike and affirmed the importance of the political general strike as an instrument of socialist strategy. This was followed by a condemnation of both Rosa Luxemburg and the general strike by Vliegen (Willem Vliegen, "De best stuurlijk staan aan wal," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1902, pp. 385-392). Gorter responded with a defense of both Luxemburg and the general strike (Herman Gorter, "De Algemeene werkstaking in Belgie," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1902, pp. 482-491).

86. Henriette Roland Holst, "Verandering van taktiek?", op. cit.

87. Henriette Roland Holst, "Ter Opbeuring," Het Volk, April 29 and May 5, 1903.

88. Verslag van het Negende Congres der Sociaaldemocratische Arbeiderspartij op 31 Mei en 1 Juni 1903 te Enschede (Amsterdam: SDAP, 1903).


90. Verslag van het Tiende Congres der SDAP gehouden op 3, 4 en 5 April 1904 te Dordrecht (Amsterdam: SDAP, 1904).

91. Anton Pannekoek to Frank van der Goes, August 9, 1903. Van der Goes Archives, op. cit., folder 701.


96. G.W.B. Borrie, Pieter Lodewijk Tak, op. cit., p. 151.


CHAPTER IV

BRINGING SOCIALIST INSIGHT
TO THE MASSES, 1906–1909
The Berlin Years: Theoretical and Propaganda Work for the SPD

From 1899 to 1906, Pannekoek distinguished himself as a prominent theoretician of Dutch Marxism and an uncompromising political opponent of revisionism. Pannekoek first began to receive wider European attention in 1906 when he moved to Berlin to teach in the newly-formed SPD school. This move was in large part an outgrowth of Pannekoek's close personal and political relationship with Karl Kautsky.¹

Pannekoek's relationship with Kautsky began in 1900, when he attended a lecture by Kautsky in Amsterdam, sitting below the podium with Gorter and Henriette Roland Holst, as he later noted, "at the feet of the master."² Following the talk, Gorter, who was already a close friend of Kautsky's, introduced him to Pannekoek.³ Regular contact was established in 1901, when Pannekoek wrote Kautsky to inquire about correspondence between Marx and Dietzgen in the SPD archives and to discuss with him the importance of Dietzgen for Marxist theory.⁴ Kautsky, by now fully aware of Pannekoek's theoretical abilities, responded by asking him to contribute articles to the Neue Zeit. This relationship was deepened during the course of the next few years through extensive correspondence and collaboration on a variety of theoretical projects. Through Kautsky, Pannekoek also developed contacts with others of the German anti-
revisionist left, such as Franz Mehring, who requested that he write regularly for the Leipziger Volkszeitung. Pannekoek's political views during this time were still firmly situated within the orthodox Marxism elaborated by Kautsky, although he felt this conception required the inclusion of Dietzgen's theory of understanding. To his mentor, Kautsky, Pannekoek declared: "Toward your work I feel only as your pupil." Kautsky's theorizing, he contended, "so greatly fills me with new thoughts, deep insights, and excellent instruction that it enables me to detect potential shortcomings I might never have seen." In a moment of extreme enthusiasm, Pannekoek noted: "I am probably not the only one who has thought at one time or another: if we didn't have our Kautsky how would we escape our misery?" In his correspondence with Kautsky, Pannekoek constantly underscored the importance of Marxist education in the political development of social democracy: "Education above all . . . is now urgent to save for our cause many unclear but revolutionary minds." Shortly after the failure of the 1903 mass strike he expressed the conviction that the defeat was an indication that "blind and unconscious forces were at work . . . almost as if Marxist theory, which scientifically explains the social forces at work, did not exist." Pannekoek felt that the problem of developing a proper understanding of Marxism was particularly
important in the ideological struggle against revisionism.

Starting in 1903, Pannekoek made it known to Kautsky that he was interested in moving to Germany to perform full-time theoretical and educational work for the SPD. Commenting on the relative absence of such positions in the SPD, Pannekoek bitterly noted:

However, it seems that the spokesmen for the cause of the proletariat . . . cannot see the need to spend more than a few thousand marks on theoretical schooling, while the bourgeoisie has at its disposal a vast number of professors and lecturers.9

Pannekoek's desire to leave Holland was based on his belief that the pressures of daily party work in Leiden and his leading role in the SDAP factional struggle were preventing him from pursuing his theoretical work:

I do not, for that matter, possess much in the way of a fighting nature; my inclinations are more those of a school master. Continually debating and seeking to win enough support and influence for a decisive majority for our side is not my vocation. What interests me is to teach, learn, explain, and enlighten whenever anyone is willing to listen to me.

This task, he felt, could not be fulfilled in the SDAP where theoreticians were an "object of mistrust."10

In early 1906, the SPD executive approved a resolution calling for the formation of a central party school in Berlin. This decision was partly a consequence of the revisionist controversy. Like Pannekoek, many on the German anti-revisionist left became increasingly convinced that the spread of revisionist ideology within the SPD
could be checked only by intensive theoretical education. The fundamental aim of the school, therefore, was to raise the ideological level of the party by bringing select party functionaries and journalists to Berlin for six months of intensive courses in political theory, political economy, history, law, and journalism.¹¹

Shortly after the decision was made to create the party school, Kautsky and August Babel wrote Pannekoek to offer him a teaching position.¹² For Pannekoek, the decision over whether or not to accept this position marked one of the first of a series of lifelong conflicts over his preference for the orderly, comfortable life of a successful intellectual and his commitment to an activist revolutionary Marxism.¹³ Although Pannekoek noted to Kautsky that "my thoughts are becoming increasingly bound up with Marxism and less with astronomy," he was still reluctant to give up the security of his observatory position.¹⁴ Following a trip by Pannekoek and Gorter to Berlin to discuss the matter, Kautsky managed to obtain for Pannekoek a salary offer of 3,600 marks per year, which was a 600 mark increase over his observatory position.¹⁵ This offer, however, drew opposition from a number of trade union functionaries who felt the salary was too high. Bebel, for instance, observed to Kautsky that many workers regarded it as an attempt by an intellectual to gain "an extra piece of wurst."¹⁶ In the end, Pannekoek accepted
the position partly out of a sense of optimism about the revolutionary prospects of social democracy in Germany, and partly out of his growing dissatisfaction with the outdated meridian work being performed at the Leiden Observatory.\textsuperscript{17}

Throughout the summer of 1906, Pannekoek corresponded extensively with Kautsky, Mehring, and Bebel about the exact nature of the party school and its relationship to the theoretical development of the socialist movement. Drawing on his experiences with popularized Marxist education in Leiden, Pannekoek called for a form of instruction based on a conceptual process which teaches the workers to distinguish and clarify the basic elements of socialism in their daily lives. From his Dietzgenian perspective, Pannekoek stressed that theoretical education was not simply a passive form of indoctrination, but an active process of self-education and clarification of reality with clear practical goals:

We must clearly understand the nature of capitalism not simply to incite the workingman to fight against it, but also to find out for ourselves the best method of fighting it. Wherever this knowledge is lacking, tactics will be governed by established tradition or by superficial empirics. Only the present, the immediate, will be taken into account, appearances will deceive, and we will lose sight of the deep-lying cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{18}

This analysis was bound up with his belief that the party school and the \emph{Neue Zeit} might together serve as the "spiritual center" of the international socialist movement.\textsuperscript{19}
Pannekoek arrived in Berlin on November 15, 1906, and stayed as a guest in the Kautsky household before finding permanent quarters in the suburb of Zehlendorf. On December 16, he began teaching a course entitled "Historical Materialism and Social Theory," which heavily emphasized the subjective factors in human development. Pannekoek's teaching career, however, ended abruptly, after only one term. Upon returning from vacation in Holland in September, 1907, Pannekoek learned that the police had barred him and the Austrian theorist Rudolf Hilferding from teaching on the grounds of non-citizenship. Shortly afterwards, the SPD executive replaced Pannekoek with Rosa Luxemburg and Hilferding with Heinrich Cunow.

Except for six months severance pay from the SPD, Pannekoek, for the first time in his professional career, was left with no regular source of income. Through Kautsky's efforts, Pannekoek obtained a temporary position organizing the Motteler archives in Liepzig. At about the same time, Wilhelm Pieck, secretary of the SPD in Bremen, offered him a position in a proposed local party educational program. Pannekoek however declined on the grounds that to move from a national position to a local position would be a "step backwards" and that, in any case, he preferred to remain in Berlin to continue his close collaboration with Kautsky.

Pannekoek's financial problems were finally resolved
when Mehring suggested that he write a weekly newspaper column to be sent to subscribing German socialist newspapers. For Pannekoek, these "correspondence articles" also provided him an opportunity to resolve in practice some of his longstanding criticisms about the inability of the socialist press to fulfill basic educational tasks. As he noted to Kautsky in 1904:

Great books are for the liberals who are concerned with specialized subjects; for them, I cannot write. Writing, in my opinion, is only useful for the masses . . . when it conveys the simple clarity of our theoretical concepts, so they will not be duped so quickly by bourgeois learning . . . Our basic truths must be brought to them in flesh and blood form, so they can immediately recognize the bourgeois character of this learning . . . Has not this task been somewhat neglected over the past few years?

Pannekoek began his "correspondence articles" in February, 1908, and continued them on a weekly basis until the outbreak of the First World War. By charging five marks an article to the small circulation papers and ten marks to the larger papers, Pannekoek earned a regular monthly income of between 200 and 300 marks. At the outbreak of the war, Pannekoek had 26 subscribing papers, along with a number of individuals, among whom the most prominent was V.I. Lenin. As in his educational work, Pannekoek sought to use his articles to deepen the theoretical knowledge of the working class by clarifying and amplifying their basic life experiences. Rather than Marxist exegesis or propaganda, Pannekoek constructed each
article to illustrate the application of Marxist methodology to analyzing day-to-day social, political, and theoretical questions. Like all of his writings, they were characterized by their clear, concise, and analytical prose and by an attempt to draw out the practical consequences for action.

Through Kautsky, Pannekoek also obtained a part-time position as book editor of the *Neue Zeit*. During his three years in Berlin, Pannekoek also distinguished himself as a frequent and popular travelling lecturer for the SPD, which familiarized him with party life throughout Germany. In addition, these years of full-time theoretical and propaganda work for the SPD also resulted in some of Pannekoek's most rigorous and systematic theoretical studies, including *Marxism and Darwinism*, and *Tactical Differences in the Labor Movement* (Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung).

Although his influence in the SPD was at its zenith, Pannekoek felt that his isolation from the party rank-and-file impaired the effectiveness of his work:

I felt as if I were doing something useful, but had become accustomed to receiving little indication of its value . . . When someone saw a piece that was good it was always because it directly hit the mark in the factional struggle; I had little need of such laurels, since my main concern was with the larger theoretical issues that could never attract attention in the factional struggle. The absence of direct expressions of approval often discouraged me and I began to doubt whether what I did had much significance.
These feelings were compounded by the considerable financial uncertainties that his journalistic work carried with it. Speaking of the difficulties in selling his correspondence articles, he noted: "I felt like a grocer who continues to see his customers leave and notes the sharp contrast to the stable salaried man who has a fixed income to count on."\textsuperscript{32} For these reasons, Pannekoek later assessed his years in Berlin as "less than fulfilling."\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Intransigent Marxism on the Offensive: The Tribunist Left}

Throughout his prolonged stay in Germany, Pannekoek continued to play a prominent role as a theoretician of the Dutch left opposition, and the experiences of this group remained an essential point of reference for his thought. For Pannekoek and others of the Dutch left, the censure at the Congress of Utrecht had clearly demonstrated that the gap separating them from the SDAP leadership had widened into a chasm. Faced with the prospect of losing their influence in both the party administrative structure and press, the Dutch left gradually began to realize the need to move beyond the traditional intellectual channels of the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} and develop a vehicle for disseminating their views within the party. This realization provided the initial impulse for the emergence of a new and more militant left opposition group, which ultimately grouped itself around the weekly newspaper, \textit{De Tribune}. While the
older *Nieuwe Tijd* group still continued to function as an active opposition and the main center of theoretical analysis, the *Tribunist* left began to steadily displace it as the driving force of the revolutionary left within the SDAP.\textsuperscript{34}

Three individuals constituted the basic leadership nucleus of the new group of young activists: David Wijnkoop, Willem van Ravesteijn, and Jan Ceton. Foremost among the three was David Wijnkoop (1876-1941). The son of Amsterdam's head rabbi, Wijnkoop became a socialist while still a youth after attending a speech by Domela Nieuwenhuis.\textsuperscript{35} Following activity in the student socialist movement, Wijnkoop joined the SDAP in 1898, and, despite his youth and emotional temperament, began a steady rise to prominence.\textsuperscript{36} Owing to his superior oratorical and organizational skills, in 1902 he was elected chairman of the Amsterdam III section, the largest and most prestigious SDAP section in the country.\textsuperscript{37} Wijnkoop's most formative experience, however, was as a salaried propagandist in the Twente textile district during the strike wave of 1903. His existing dissatisfaction with the party leadership was exacerbated when Troelstra blocked his request to be placed in the position permanently.\textsuperscript{38} Like Wijnkoop, Jan Ceton (1875-1943) came out of the Amsterdam III section, where he served as secretary. A biology teacher by profession and head of the SDAP teacher's federation, Ceton helped initiate
the school debate in 1902. Although a skilled organizer and administrator, Ceton soon gained a reputation as the most militant and uncompromising of the three young activists.\(^{39}\) Unlike Wijnkoop and Ceton, Willem van Ravesteijn (1876–1970) was a scholar and theoretician by temperament.\(^{40}\) The first Marxist to receive a doctorate in history in the Netherlands, van Ravesteijn joined the Leiden branch of the SDAP in 1899 and almost immediately became a close personal friend and protege of Pannekoek.\(^{41}\)

In the aftermath of the Utrecht defeat, Wijnkoop, Ceton, and van Ravesteijn began to lay the groundwork for a separate Marxist weekly newspaper of the left. The idea of such a newspaper had been a long-standing concern of many oppositionists who felt that the Nieuwe Tijd reached only a small intellectual audience. As early as 1903, Wijnkoop, while a propagandist in the Twente, had proposed—with Pannekoek and Gorter’s support—the creation of a regional weekly newspaper modeled on the Leipziger Volkszeitung. When this project was rejected, Wijnkoop wrote bitterly to van Ravesteijn: "I think that something has been lost in the Twente, as well as the entire nation, for the propagation of a real, proletarian socialism."\(^{42}\)

Two years later, Wijnkoop proposed a weekly supplement to Het Volk to help bring Marxism to the working class, but this proposal was also rejected by the party leadership.\(^{43}\)

Finally, in June, 1906, the triumvirate began to seek
supporters and contributors throughout the country for an independent newspaper of the left aimed at instilling a Marxist sense of class consciousness in the working class.\textsuperscript{44}

This task acquired added urgency following the Congress of Haarlem in 1907. Despite a heated exchange between Gorter and Troelstra, the Congress was dominated by a spirit of resignation on the part of the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group. The congress culminated with the full-scale capitulation of the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group to the party leadership. Henriette Roland Holst declared in the name of the \textit{Nieuwe Tijdists} that their return to active participation in party activities was no longer dependent on withdrawal of the Utrecht condemnation. Seeking to stimulate a spirit of reconciliation, she declared: "A wall of mistrust has been slowly built up between us which now must come down."\textsuperscript{45}

For Wijnkoop, Ceton, and van Ravesteijn, as well as for Pannekoek and Gorter, the decision to capitulate was a deep disappointment. The conclusion they drew from this was that the left had no choice but to attempt to mobilize both the party's rank-and-file and the workers outside the party. In Pannekoek's opinion, the creation of a newspaper to aid this effort was now an "absolute necessity."\textsuperscript{46}

By July, 1907, most of the necessary financial support for an independent radical newspaper had been secured (much of it coming from Gorter), and publication was set for the fall.\textsuperscript{47} Pannekoek, for his part, agreed to write a regular
"Berlin letter" column discussing various theoretical and practical questions. At this point, the group had only three main bases of support in the party: the Amsterdam III section, Gorter's Bussem section, and Pannekoek's Leiden section. To help achieve the widest possible working class circulation, it was decided to sell the publication at a cost low enough for even the poorest worker to afford.

Following a number of delays, the first issue of the Tribune finally appeared on October 19, 1907. Contending that the party leadership lacked the proper insights and will to lead a revolutionary struggle, the Tribunists proclaimed their intention to provide "an internationally oriented national weekly for our class which seeks to clarify, improve, and enlarge the insights toward Social Democracy . . . and the deepening of socialist understanding of the struggle against capitalism in all its forms." Although denying that their main intention was to polemicize against the party leadership, the Tribunists announced their readiness to combat anything that stood in the way of free expression of Marxism in the party or the labor movement. In this spirit, the Tribune editors stressed the importance of accomplishing what the Nieuwe Tijd had never done: carrying the struggle for a militant Marxist policy directly into the ranks of the party and the working class. To help build the publication and translate their views into action, Wijnkoop and Ceton began to
use their extensive trade union and party contacts to organize "clubs" of supporters in the various sections.

The Tribunists' strategy was premised on the belief that the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the intensification of the Prussian suffrage campaign signified the beginning of a new and potentially revolutionary phase of the class struggle. Indeed, the Tribune's emergence coincided with a period of economic crisis, unemployment, strike activity, and rapid trade union growth in the Netherlands. In these circumstances, the Tribunists felt that an open rebellion against the party leadership, if not imminent, was at least a major possibility. This perspective was partially confirmed by the support that the Tribune received during the early months of its existence from a broad spectrum of men not usually associated with the left such as Henri Polak, Joseph Loopuit, A.S. de Levita, and F.M. Wibaut. 51

In their long struggle against the party leadership, the Tribunists accepted the German SPD as the model of a proper Marxist policy and formulated their basic ideological conceptions according to the orthodox Marxism of Karl Kautsky. 52 At the same time, their revolutionary activist practice remained firmly anchored to a larger tradition of what might loosely be termed intransigent Marxism. More an attitude than a conscious tendency, it was a Marxism which stressed a militant opposition to the
capitalist state in all its forms and an unrelenting proletarian struggle for its abolition. Pannekoek provided one of the Tribunists' first detailed theoretical statements in December, 1907, in the form of a four-part installment analyzing the nature of the SDAP. Pannekoek's analysis was formulated in response to a major statement by Troelstra criticizing European social democracy for its failure to develop a serious alternative to bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Although Troelstra did not state it explicitly, the logic of his argument implied that social democracy would eventually have to come to terms with parliamentary democracy. In replying to Troelstra's article, Pannekoek constructed an analysis around the proposition that Troelstra was no longer developing tactics on the basis of the class struggle, but was preparing the party for a future integration into the bourgeois political system. Wijnkoop expanded upon these criticisms by arguing that the party's slow membership growth was a consequence of its failure to pursue an active course of agitation in the urban areas.

The Tribunists' criticisms of the SDAP's increasingly reformist practice were paralleled by a critical analysis of the SDAP-dominated trade unions affiliated with the NVV. In December, 1907, Wijnkoop contrasted the militancy and willingness to struggle of the Russian unions with the passivity of the Western European unions. Drawing a
a parallel between the backwardness and weakness of both the Dutch and Russian trade union movements, Wijnkoop suggested that "quiet development" might not always be the case for Holland. During the course of the next year, Ceton, the Tribune's trade union specialist, began to articulate the theme that the SDAP had actively fostered revisionism in the trade union movement. The growth of a union bureaucracy, the failure to support strikes not organized by the NVV, the lack of socialist consciousness in the trade union press, the NVV's shift of support from the eight-hour day to the ten-hour day, and its passive attitude toward the suffrage movement were all cited by Ceton as the consequences of revisionist policies. Not content to confine themselves solely to an intellectual analysis, the Tribunists also made a determined effort to support and encourage spontaneous strike activity, which often brought them into direct conflict with the NVV leadership.

From the standpoint of revolutionary strategy, the issue that evoked the most concern among the Tribunists was the question of developing a proper Marxist policy for the suffrage movement. In pursuing the suffrage struggle, the SDAP had confined itself largely to participating in a broad Liberal-dominated coalition known as the Committee for Universal Suffrage. The question of whether the SDAP should conduct an independent agitation campaign of
its own had long been a major point of contention in the SDAP. Wijnkoop, writing in January, 1908, reaffirmed the importance of the SDAP and the trade union movement leading an independent class-based suffrage struggle. But the most significant theme in Wijnkoop's essay was his belief that "new and more powerful forms of struggle" must be allowed to develop within the suffrage movement so that it might assume a mass character. The revolutionary energy unleashed in a militant mass suffrage campaign, he felt, would be enough both to put the SDAP back on a proper Marxist course and enable the labor movement to establish firm roots in the Dutch working class. It would also place the workers' movement in a position to take offensive action in the economic crisis.59

During this period, Pannekoek brought the suffrage question into sharper theoretical focus with his reporting on the Prussian suffrage movement. Commenting on the January 12, 1908, mass demonstrations, Pannekoek spoke of the qualitatively new character of the movement: "This is only the beginning: the masses are setting themselves free and have gained a new feeling of power."60 For Pannekoek, these actions confirmed his view that Germany was entering a potentially revolutionary period in which the power of the state was breaking down while that of the working class was increasing. In assessing the strategic prospects for revolution, Pannekoek felt that the suffrage struggle would
ultimately culminate in a political mass strike:

In a revolutionary period the mass strike will play a great role. But the majority of trade union leaders will not participate, for their tactics are based on building up their organizations in the struggle against the employers within capitalism. The political mass strike shall come as a fire-storm which will throw into complete confusion their carefully prepared actions and tactical guidelines.61

During the first few months of the Tribune's existence, the party leadership chose largely to ignore it. This situation, however, changed suddenly following the publication of Henriette Roland Holst's stirring essay, "Turn of the Tide," in March, 1908. In her essay, Roland Holst divided the history of European social democracy into three periods. Prior to 1892, she argued, European socialism experienced a heroic period characterized by a militant struggle against capitalism. This was followed by a "high tide" of revisionism and reformism from 1892 to 1903, which had its origins in capitalist economic growth. The period which began in 1903, however, was defined by a "slowly developing world crisis" which would have a drastic impact on the living standard of the working class and lead to a polarization of class relations. On these grounds, she argued:

The economic basis once again exists for bringing to the forefront revolutionary class demands, which creates an implacable attitude, which is a precondition for the flaming enthusiasm that comes only from struggling. . . . There is as yet still no revolutionary fire, but the desire for it is beginning to arise.
In this situation, she felt, the party's task was clear:

The party is compelled to act on the basis of a Marxist standpoint; it is compelled to push the masses to victory through pure socialist propaganda, to revolutionize them through our suffrage demands, which must come from adherence to a pure class tactic. . . . Struggle, rising struggle, is everywhere in the atmosphere from which the social democrats must breathe.

Concerning the SDAP leadership, Roland Holst bluntly stated: "Neither the experience of 1903 nor the indirect effect of the Russian Revolution were strong enough to hinder the development of an anti-socialist tendency within the SDAP." 62

In response, the party leadership launched on April 1, 1908, a six-installment attack against the Tribune in Het Volk, aimed at laying the groundwork for a more concerted offensive against the left at the upcoming Congress of Arnhem. 63 At Troelstra's request, the party executive met on April 4, to consider the question of action against the Tribune. What came out of this meeting was a decision to present a motion at the congress declaring that, in the future, party members must consult with the executive before publishing a private newspaper. 64 Shortly before the opening of the congress, the Tribunists counterattacked by passing a resolution in the Amsterdam III section condemning the party leadership for not utilizing the economic crisis to arouse class consciousness and declaring the editors of Het Volk to be unfit for their position. 65
The question of the Tribune's relationship to the SDAP dominated the entire proceedings of the Congress of Arnhem. The issues raised, for the most part, had been debated repeatedly throughout the course of the previous several years. When the executive bureau's resolution was finally approved by the congress, the Tribunists claimed it as a minor victory since it avoided a direct condemnation of their publication. In the months following the congress, the struggle continued to intensify. Sensing that a final confrontation was unavoidable, the Tribunists focused their energies on strengthening their position at the local level. The main arena of conflict was the Amsterdam Federation of SDAP Organizations. Working from their stronghold in the Amsterdam III section, Wijnkoop and Ceton continued their efforts throughout the summer, gaining, if not a majority, at least a sizable base of support.

The conflict began to enter a decisive phase after a parliamentary interpellation of the government by Troelstra on the unemployment question in October, 1908. Wijnkoop immediately attacked the speech, contending that Troelstra failed to convey a socialist viewpoint but instead argued from a capitalist perspective: "A social democrat involved in practical politics must at least understand theory so he can defend it. This is perhaps too much to ask from a 'bourgeois,' but the working class can accept
nothing less from its leaders." Troelstra's unwillingness to defend Marxist doctrine, Wijnkoop charged, made him unfit to lead the SDAP in parliament.68

The question of free speech arose again when the Rotterdam Federation of SDAP Organizations placed a ban on selling the Tribune at party functions after Rotterdam supporters of the Tribune attempted to sell copies of the issue featuring Wijnkoop's attack on Troelstra at a meeting chaired by Troelstra.69 The conflict intensified two weeks later when Wijnkoop and Ceton sent Troelstra a curt note inquiring about his candidacy for the Amsterdam III seat.70 Troelstra responded with an equally caustic letter accusing them of using the Amsterdam III section to wage a war against him.71 It was at this point that Troelstra, fearing an attempt to undermine his candidacy, began to take action to have the Tribune editors expelled from the party.72

With this intention in mind, Troelstra sent a long letter to the party executive requesting that a meeting be convoked for December 5, 1908, to consider the "Tribune question." The Tribunists, he charged, were "an insignificant little club of dogmatically inclined propagandists," whose only goal was "to propagate against the party organs and party majority." Their actions, he felt, were demoralizing much of the party and jeopardizing its chances in the upcoming elections. Troelstra's proposed remedy for
the Tribune editorial board, the natural consequence of which will undoubtedly be a voluntary exodus of their closest sympathizers and the formation of something completely pure and international."  

In response to Troelstra's request, the executive decided to call a special joint meeting of the executive and the Tribune editors on December 12, 1908. Sensing the imminence of a split, van Ravesteijn made a special trip to Berlin in an attempt, with Pannekoek's help, to enlist the support of Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg. Both, however, chose to remain neutral. During the course of the December 12 meeting the Tribunists were accused of having violated the Utrecht and Haarlem resolutions and were asked to state what their behavior would be during the elections. Gorter, speaking for the Tribunists, declared that they were willing to stop their assaults on the leadership on the assumption that this act would be reciprocal. A dispute then developed over whether this was a firm enough assurance, and the meeting subsequently decided to reconvene on December 19 to resolve the matter. At the next meeting, a new dispute developed when the Tribunists changed their position and demanded that the executive also provide assurances that all attacks against them would cease. At the same time, they also reaffirmed their right to maintain and propagate their own conceptions and tactics in the party. In reply, Schaper and Vliegen
demanded that a special party congress be convoked to consider the Tribunists' expulsion. When this motion was defeated four to three, Schaper, Vliegen, and Helsdingen withdrew from the executive bureau and announced their intention to take their case to the party. After a heated debate, a compromise was finally reached which called for a referendum on whether to convoke an extraordinary congress.76

In the aftermath of this decision, events began to unfold in rapid succession. On December 20, a group of leading Marxists not connected with the Tribune met to draft a manifesto calling for party unity and opposing any action against the Tribune. The manifesto was subsequently signed by 48 prominent Marxists and appeared in the January 7, 1909, issue of Het Volk. Throughout January, this group made a determined effort to mediate the conflict. On January 31, a special conference, consisting of the executive, the parliamentary faction, and the editors of Het Volk and the Nieuwe Tijd, was convoked in a last-minute effort to resolve the dispute. The Tribune editors did not attend, since Troelstra had threatened to walk out of the meeting if they were present. At the meeting, Troelstra presented a plan to publish a weekly supplement to Het Volk, to be edited by two Marxists, which he saw as a replacement for the Tribune. This proposal was ratified by the executive at its February 5 meeting and
Henriette Roland Holst and F.M. Wibaut subsequently agreed to serve as editors.\textsuperscript{77}

These measures, however, did not blunt the edge of the opposition. On February 7, the Tribunists and their supporters held a meeting of their own, at which it was voted 75 to one, with eleven abstentions, to maintain the Tribune even in the event of expulsion.\textsuperscript{78} Throughout January and February, the Tribune maintained an increasingly belligerent attitude toward the party leadership. Wijnkoop set the tone on January 9, when he directly questioned the idea of maintaining unity for the sake of unity. Drawing heavily upon Pannekoek's conception of proletarian organization, Wijnkoop contended that organizational unity, which comes from working to achieve common goals, was not the same as unity of the proletariat: "The real unity of the proletariat . . . stands above the unity or phony unity of a socialist organization." A real proletarian unity can only be a "unity in struggle."\textsuperscript{79} Writing again on February 3, 1909, Wijnkoop accused the SDAP leadership of having "terrorized" the party to promote revisionism. The party leadership, he charged, desired a party where there was "no possibility Marxism could develop freely." The fact that they had to resort to pressure tactics only showed the weakness of revisionism.\textsuperscript{80} To this, Ceton added the charge that it was "not accidental" that the parliamentary faction was leading the
struggle to abolish the Tribune and that there was now "no place in the party for either socialist or Marxist propaganda." The referendum had approved the call for an extraordinary congress by an overwhelming margin of 3,268 to 1,719.

The Congress of Deventer opened on February 13, 1909 with the expulsion of the Tribunists already a foregone conclusion. Van Ravesteijn, writing to Pannekoek, noted: "In Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and in other places, we stand for all practical purposes already outside the party." Troelstra said as much when he remarked during the course of the proceedings: "Your position places you outside of the party." The heated showdown that followed was largely a re-echoing of the now-familiar accusations and counter-accusations that had characterized the past few years. Troelstra charged the Tribunists with seeking to allow "vague ideologies" to dominate the party and attempting to turn it into an "anarchist debating club." Gorter responded by accusing Troelstra of having turned the party into a "Roman Catholic church." Wijnkoop, leading the debate for the Tribunists, concluded with a warning: "It is an easy thing to expel the real, struggling Marxists from the party and thereby destroy it, but we will be compelled to go to the workers, to call upon their judgment, and form the proletarian party you were never able to develop." This task was imposed upon the
Tribunists when Troelstra's proposal for expulsion passed 209 to 88, with 15 abstentions. Shortly thereafter, another party referendum ratified this decision by a vote of 3,712 to 1,340.

Throughout all these events and developments, a deepening split had been taking form within the Marxist left between the loose groups centered around the Tribune and the Nieuwe Tijd. This split was to play an important role in strengthening the position of the party leadership and—as he later noted—was a conscious part of Troelstra's strategy. For the predominantly younger and more activist "pure Marxists" grouped around the Tribune, the impulse to withdraw from the SDAP was not a new one. As Wijnkoop later noted: "We 'pure Marxists' wanted the split as early as 1907, and in 1909, we were prepared not to shrink from the consequences." Opposing the "pure Marxists" were the so-called "peace Marxists" centered around the Nieuwe Tijd, and led by Frank van der Goes, F.M. Wibaut, and Pieter Wiedijk.

For van der Goes, the "spiritual father of the SDAP," the decision not to actively support the Tribunists arose from a conviction that a split in the SDAP would destroy his life work and that in a new party, he would be little more than a "satellite" of Wijnkoop. Van der Goes, perhaps, best summed up the basic position of the "peace Marxists" in his statement at the Congress of Deventer
when he warned Troelstra:

You are doing the party a grave disservice by expelling the Tribune editors. I recognize that the existence of the Tribune threatens the unity of the party. The existence of such a publication is an abnormality which no struggling party can accept. But at the same time expulsion is incorrect.

To the Tribunists, he could only admonish: "Abolish the Tribune and take your place in the ranks." Wijnkoop's rejoinder to this statement captured the basic difference in outlook between the two groups. The Nieuwe Tijdsists, he contended

. . . speak in a manner that the workers often cannot understand. We of the Tribune speak clearly, as our opponents have correctly noted. . . . We find it necessary to say to our teachers: as you must know, your language is the language of intellectuals and propagandists, while ours is the language that the workers understand. We shall continue with this language, either inside or outside the party.

In F.M. Wibaut's case, the decision not to back the Tribunists was less of a break since he had been moving steadily toward the center and was becoming identified more with Amsterdam municipal politics than with the Marxist left. Pieter Wiedijk, like van der Goes, took a position critical of both sides. Unlike van der Goes and Wibaut, however, Wiedijk later left the SDAP along with the Tribunists for reasons of solidarity and because of his personal friendship with Gorter.

For Henriette Roland Holst, the decision was an
agonizing one. Temperamentally and politically, her sympathies were with the Tribunists, with whom she had worked closely during the past two years. Her reluctance to side with them arose from a fear of cutting herself off from the organized socialist workers and from a deep-seated personal antipathy toward Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn. Her close friend Rosa Luxemburg, in an often quoted letter, summed up the basic dilemma when she counselled her to remain in the party at all costs:

A splintering of Marxists (not to be confused with differences of opinion) is fatal. Now that you want to leave the party, I want to hinder this with all my might. Your resignation from the SDAP simply means your resignation from the social democratic movement. This you must not do, none of us must! We cannot stand outside the organization, outside contact with the masses. The worst working class party is better than none.

In January 1909, Roland Holst made a special trip back from London to attend the January 31 conference. It was at this point that she accepted Troelstra's offer to serve as an editor, along with Wibaut (van der Goes had declined), of the proposed weekly supplement to Het Volk. Her rationale for this decision was based on her belief that such a publication might serve as a rallying point for regrouping the Marxist left. This was also reinforced by her belief that the left had disintegrated as a cohesive force. Upon learning of her decision, Pannekoek wrote to her lamenting: "You are on the wrong
side. You belong with us." 101

Although his political and personal activity was considered almost inseparable from the Tribune, Herman Gorter's position was also characterized by a fundamental ambiguity. In public, he was one of the foremost supporters of the Tribunists, but in private, he expressed doubt about their tactics and counselled caution and restraint. To Kautsky, he noted: "I have advised the Tribune editorial board as follows: we must do everything possible to bring others to our side, but if that fails, and after we have fought to the end and all of our attempts have failed, then we must give in." 102 Gorter had earlier raised the possibility to van Ravesteijn that if an insignificant number left the party, "it might be better if I remained inside." 103 During the February 7 meeting of Tribune supporters, Gorter spoke in favor of abolishing the Tribune if the ultimatum motion passed. 104 Behind his caution lay the fear that, in the event of a split, Marxism in the Netherlands, both inside and outside the SDAP, would be rendered powerless. 105

Pannekoek, although in Germany, adopted a position similar to Gorter's and sought to use his influence with both groups to avoid a split within the Marxist left. To Wijnkoop, he wrote: "Remain as a unified Marxist group and accept the ban on the Tribune. That way you will certainly be able to achieve the same goals in another
form." Pannekoek's advice was based in part on a pessimistic assessment of the prospects for success of a new Marxist party: "We can certainly agree that a split in the party would be completely useless and that a small Marxist party would not have a chance of becoming a force for years." At the same time, Pannekoek admitted to being caught off guard by the rapid course of events and the harshness of Troelstra's attack and was therefore "not surprised" when the Tribunists failed to follow his advice. To van der Goes, whom he felt alone had the power to prevent a split in the Marxist left, Pannekoek made a long appeal to back the Tribunists. In it, he voiced harsh criticisms of the Tribunists: "The cautiousness of the Nieuwe Tijd group, which was unsuitable for the times, only served to put the leadership in the hands of young, impetuous elements." But the primary thrust of Pannekoek's criticism was directed toward the Nieuwe Tijdl's:

You were esteemed propagandists who were deferred to with politeness, but were without support. . . . You were a general staff without an army. . . . Numerous persons maintained a vague respect for you, but you had no workers beside you who understood things and stood behind you with heart and soul. The minority was one of delegates, a head without a body. What the Tribune, which arose from the small masses of Marxist-inclined workers, sought to do was to organize this group behind you. . . . From the Tribune circle—which is much more than the editors—there could have come the officers and non-commissioned officers which might have brought your solitary general staff a reliable, conscious force; but this was not to be.
By this time, events had long passed the point where any type of compromise was possible, and Pannekoek and Gorter's efforts had virtually no impact.

A week after the Congress of Deventer, on February 21, 1909, 200 supporters of the Tribune gathered in Amsterdam and voted almost unanimously to form a new party. Only Gorter expressed a note of caution. A nine-member commission was then created to prepare for the foundation congress, which was scheduled for March 21, 1909, a date selected to coincide with the anniversary of Karl Marx's death. With this decision to split from official social democracy and create an activist party of revolutionary Marxism, the Dutch left embarked on a course fundamentally different from any other socialist movement in Western Europe.


3. Gorter's close relationship to Kautsky was such that he was known as "Uncle Herman" to Kautsky's three sons. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 23.

4. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, September 27, 1901, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVIII, Folder 376.


6. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, November 12, 1903, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVIII, folder 386.


8. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, April 22, 1903, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVIII, folder 385.


13. Pannekoek has provided a revealing glimpse into his lifestyle in a passage in his memoirs: "I remember that Henriette Roland Holst recommended to me the Hotel Frankfurt Hof (mainly because, as she later told me, it had nice flowers in the windows), but after two days I left because it was too expensive and too chic. I then went to a people's hotel the comrades had recommended to me, but it was too crude and simple. Finally, I went to one of the hotels behind the station catering to commercial travellers, and there I found everything I was looking for." Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 131.


15. Dieter Fricke, "Die sozialdemokratische Parteischule (1906-1914)," op. cit.


17. Pannekoek has discussed his growing disenchantment with his observatory position in his "Sterrenkundige herinneringen," op. cit., pp. 237-240.


21. These course notes are contained in a 284-page unpublished manuscript entitled "Historischer Materialismus," Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 284. Pannekoek had originally intended to turn this manuscript into a book.

22. Dieter Fricke, "Die sozialdemokratische Parteischule (1906-1914)," op. cit.


24. During the years prior to the First World War, it was a common practice in the SPD for theoreticians and
journalists to supplement their income by selling "correspondence articles" to subscribing papers. Among others doing so were Franz Mehring and Rosa Luxemburg. Dieter Fricke, Zur Organisation und Tätigkeit der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. Dokumente und Materialien (Leipzig: Verlag Enzyklopädie, 1962), p. 181.

25. Pannekoek first took note of this deficiency in: "Beantjesjagerij of uitbuiting," Het Volk, January 21, 1901.

26. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, April 24, 1904, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVIII, folder 388.


28. These papers and their approximate circulation figures are: Arbeiter-Zeitung (Essen); Bergische Arbeiterstimme (Solingen), 10,000; Berner Tagwacht (Bern); Fränkische Tagespost (Nuremberg); Hamburger Echo (Hamburg), 76,000; Markische Volkstimme (Cottbus), 14,000; Niederrheinische Arbeiterzeitung (Duisburg), 12,000; Arbeiterzeitung (Dortmund); Oberfränkische Volkszeitung (Hof), 24,000; Reussische Tribune (Gera-Reuss), 12,000; Sächsische Volksblatt (Zwickau), 24,000; Schlesische Bergwacht (Bad Salzbrunn); Schwäbische Tagewacht (Stuttgart), 26,000; Thüringer Volksfreund (Sonneberg), 5,300; Gothaer Volksblatt (Gotha); Volksblatt (Halle); Volksbote (Stettin), 11,000; Bremer Bürgerzeitung (Bremen), 21,500; Leipziger Volkszeitung (Leipzig), 48,000; Volksbote (Zeitz), 12,000; Volksfreund (Braunschweig), 16,000; Volkszeitung (Düsseldorf); Nordhäuser Volkszeitung (Nordhülsen); Volkszeitung (Zittau), 10,000; Weimarische Volkszeitung (Jena); De Tribune (Amsterdam). This list is contained in the Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 279. Lenin's address is found here as well. The circulation figures are taken from Kurt Koszyk, Die presse der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. Ein Bibliographie (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur, 1966).


30. One finds, for example, Pannekoek speaking to an audience of 700 on historical materialism in a talk sponsored by the workers' educational committee in Frankfurt during the fall of 1907. Verein für den Wahlkreis Frankfurt am Main, tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1. Juli 1907 bis 30. Juni 1908 (Frankfurt: 1908), pp.22-3.

32. Ibid., p. 139.

33. Ibid., p. 137.


36. Ibid., p. 48.

37. Ibid., pp. 57-58.


39. Sam de Wolff, En Toch!, op. cit., pp. 163-165.

40. Ibid., p. 133.

41. Willem van Ravestijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 7.

42. David Wijnkoop to Willem van Ravestijn, April 26, 1903. Published in Ibid., pp. 70-71.

43. David Wijnkoop, untitled letter to Het Volk, February 12, 1905.

44. Willem van Ravestijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 75.

45. Quoted in Ibid., p. 64.
46. Anton Pannekoek to Frank van der Goes, March 26, 1907, van der Goes Archives, op. cit., folder 1294.

47. Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 82.

48. Anton Pannekoek to Willem van Ravesteijn, September, 1907, van Ravesteijn Archives, International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam), folder 15.

49. Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 79. Pannekoek had long argued that the high price of Het Volk hindered its circulation in the working class. See, for example, his: "De abonnementsprijs van Het Volk," Het Volk, March 4, 1904.


51. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 37.

52. In this connection, Gorter noted: "We felt like, and perhaps were more like German than Dutch Marxists. Personally we were connected with most of the best German Marxists and Pannekoek was our best fighter, who for years took up the practical and theoretical struggle in Germany." Herman Gorter, "Die marxistische revolutionaire Arbeiterbewegung in Holland," Proletarier, February, 1922.

53. Pieter J. Troelstra, "Het politiek systeem der sociaaldemocratie" Het Volk, September 3 and 5, 1907.

54. Anton Pannekoek, "Troelstra's politiek systeem der sociaaldemocratie," De Tribune, December 21 and 28, 1907, January 4 and 11, 1908. In addition to the ideas expressed in the Tribune, many of their strategic concepts were also formulated and disseminated in brochure form. The most widely circulated brochures were: Anton Pannekoek, Theorie en beginsel in de arbeidersbeweging (Amsterdam: J.N. Fortuyn, 1907); Herman Gorter, Het Historisch materialisme voor arbeiders verklaard (Amsterdam: De Tribune, 1908); and Willem van Ravesteijn, Pseudo-socialism en echt-revisionisme (Rotterdam: H.A. Wakker, 1907).

56. David Wijnkoop, "De vakbeweging in de Russische Revolutie," De Tribune, December 14, 1909. These views, which ran counter to the standard social democratic division between political and industrial forms of organization and struggle, were given a more detailed theoretical analysis in David Wijnkoop's "Vakbeweging en Revolutie," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1908, pp. 217-223.


58. For a full-scale discussion of the SDAP's role in the struggle for universal suffrage, see: Tom van der Meer, et al., De SDAP en de kiesrechtstrijd. De ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse sociaal-democratie, 1894-1913 (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1981).


63. "Onze partij en haar aanstaand kongres," Het Volk, April 1, 3, 5, 9, 14, and 18, 1908.

64. Minutes of the Parti Bestuur for April 4, 1908, "SDAP Notulen boeken," SDAP Archives, International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam).


66. Ibid., p. 11. See also: Willem van Ravesteyn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., pp. 86-89.

67. Willem van Ravesteyn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 96.


70. This letter was later published under the title: "Troelstra's Kandidatuur in III," Het Volk, November 25, 1908.


72. Ibid., p. 108.

73. Troelstra's letter is reprinted in ibid., pp. 109-114.

74. Ibid., p. 115.

75. This trip is noted in a letter from Pannekoek to van Ravesteijn, December 8, 1908, Van Ravesteijn Archives, op. cit., folder 15.


78. Ibid., p. 285.


83. Willem van Ravesteijn to Anton Pannekoek, February 27, 1909, Van Ravesteijn Archives, op. cit., folder 56.


85. Ibid., p. 11.


90. Troelstra later noted: "My proposed conference, which excluded the Tribune editors, was directed precisely toward splitting the Marxist camp." Pieter J. Troelstra, *Gedenkschriften*, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 119.

91. Quoted in: Ger Harmsen, *Historisch overzicht van socialisme en arbeidersbeweging in Nederland*, *op. cit.*, p. 56. From another perspective, Vliegen also noted: "Had the Tribune editorial board consisted of persons such as van der Goes and Madame Roland Holst it is extremely likely that many would have backed away from voting for expulsion." Willem H. Vliegen, *Die onze kracht ontwakend deed*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 286.

92. Anton Pannekoek, "*Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging*," *op. cit.*, p. 143.


96. Herman de Liagre Böhl, *Herman Gorter*, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

97. Anton Pannekoek, "*Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging*," *op. cit.*, p. 143.


100. Henriette Roland Holst to Anton Pannekoek, February 20, 1909, Pannekoek Archives, *op. cit.*, folder 63.

102. Herman Gorter to Karl Kautsky, n.d. [February or March, 1909], Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXI, folder 241.


104. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 45.

105. Ibid., p. 47.


110. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 48.
CHAPTER V

CONSCIOUSNESS AND WORKERS' SELF-EMANCIPATION:

PANNEKOEK'S POLITICAL THOUGHT PRIOR TO 1910
Consciousness and Socio-Economic Reality: Pannekoek's Theory of Hegemony

Prior to 1910, Pannekoek's political views were still comparatively consistent with the orthodox Marxism of the Second International, as defined by thinkers such as Kautsky, Bebel, and Plekhanov. But Pannekoek's early intellectual investigations and his theoretical reflections on the historical events of 1903, 1905, and 1908, and on the process of political differentiation within the international socialist movement were gradually leading him to elaborate the outlines of a new revolutionary tactic, which would be developed and extended in his thought in the years after 1910.

What differentiated Pannekoek's political theorizing from the mainstream of social democracy during the first decade of the twentieth century was his attempt to apply his basic Marx-Dietzgen synthesis directly to the question of revolutionary strategy. Although he remained a convinced materialist, the major question which absorbed all of his attention and intruded itself into all aspects of his thought was the question of Geist, or more precisely the role of subjective ("spiritual") factors in human development. Pannekoek's interest in this question arose partly from his concern as a scientist with the relationship between theory and reality and partly from the prevailing consensus in Dutch intellectual circles about the necessity of a new
moral and cultural order.

In attempting to define the role of collective consciousness in social transformation, Pannekoek sought to fill a major gap in Marxist theory and tackle what he regarded as the ultimate political question. Marx had never addressed himself to the problem of consciousness in a systematic manner other than in generalized statements scattered throughout his writings. His views were governed by two fundamental assumptions: (1) that all consciousness is determined solely by social existence, and (2) that mental conceptions can be changed on a mass scale only through social praxis. Beyond these rather generalized assumptions, consciousness was implicitly seen as the natural outgrowth of the changing internal dynamic of capitalist development, with socialism the inevitable consequence. Marx often appeared to be assuming that the increasingly oppressive conditions of capitalism would be sufficient to move the working class towards full socialist consciousness. As a result of this theoretical preoccupation with the mode of production as the determining factor in historical development, classical Marxism failed to adequately explain, let alone confront, the problem of developing a mass revolutionary consciousness.

In grappling with this problem, Pannekoek sought to answer two primary questions: how do individuals and groups perceive the world and their relationship to it? Under what conditions can these perceptions change? From his Dietzgenian
starting point, Pannekoek attempted to situate consciousness in the realm of everyday thought and life. According to this perspective, consciousness, in its broadest sense, is a perception or "spiritual image" of the world, formed through interaction with that world and by the limitations and possibilities which determine this interaction. Human thought is above all practical: it is a tool for understanding and coping with the natural and social environment by the evaluation of the efficacy of various courses of action. Consciousness is "determined," only in the sense that it is circumscribed by the possibilities and limitations inherent in a given natural and social environment. Like Dietzgen, Pannekoek felt that the human mind perceives the world as a continuous flow of events and attempts to categorize and distinguish among these events as a precondition for actions. The actions that arise from these perceptions constitute experiences, which in turn serve as a basis for future actions and perceptions. If a certain action or pattern of behavior is continuously successful over a long time span, it will become habitual and the view of the world in which it is rooted will also become habitual or traditional. In this manner, traditional patterns of thought and action are preserved spiritually—in literature, science, art, religion, and philosophy—as culture.²

Pannekoek's investigation of the relationship of philosophy to economic and social reality led him, in 1901,
to view the material world and the world of consciousness as constituting an inseparable entity in which each reciprocally conditions the other. Without changing the structure of society, one could not change the structure of consciousness. But the converse also held true: a revolutionary upheaval in the economic and social structure of society was impossible without a revolution in the form of consciousness. Proletarian revolution must develop simultaneously in both the economic and "spiritual" spheres. While Pannekoek considered the material elements important, he envisioned the revolutionary struggle as an ideological process shaped by the gradual and diffuse flow of ideas and life experiences:

As never since the first advent of production of commodities there has been such a fundamental revolution, it must be accompanied by an equally fundamental spiritual revolution... The new understanding gains ground step by step, waging a relentless battle against the traditional ideas to which the ruling classes are clinging; this struggle is the mental companion of the social class struggle.3

Using such reasoning, Pannekoek argued that a socialist revolution must begin with the workers striving to overturn the barriers to proletarian thinking in their daily lives: men must think change before they can accomplish change.

Pannekoek stressed that while the outcome of a proletarian revolution would ultimately be determined by the physical power of the working class, it was not this power alone that was decisive, but the "spiritual power" which precedes it and determines its use. In an analysis which
strikingly anticipated many of the themes in the later theory of hegemony made famous by Antonio Gramsci. Pannekoek noted:

The material power which the proletariat possess through numbers and importance for the means of production, would be of little value for him when his spiritual superiority above his capitalist opponents did not have him use it . . . our power lies in the deep understanding of the laborer for every detail of capitalism, in other words in the socialist knowledge, in the theory of socialism.

This amounted above all to the belief that: "Spiritual emancipation, self-thought is the precondition for material liberation, for self-action." Revolution, from Pannekoek's standpoint, represented a victory of the mind, of historical understanding and revolutionary will. The consciousness of the proletariat was as much a factor affecting historical evolution as the material factors from which it arises. The class struggle, while corresponding to the material structure of society, was in reality a struggle of consciousness.

Pannekoek's belief that the subjugation of the working class was not entirely due to economics and force alone, was not solely the result of intellectual investigation. The problem which had most troubled him as a young socialist in Leiden was the widening gap between the expectations of Marxism and the actual beliefs of the workers. The apparent apathy and indifference of the masses to the appeals of the socialists expressed for Pannekoek the fact of their
subordination, not only to the force of the state, but also
to the "spiritual superiority of the ruling minority"
which "presides over all spiritual development, all science."
Through its control over institutions such as the schools,
the church, and the press, this minority "contaminates
ever larger numbers of the proletarian masses with its
conceptions." Pannekoek regarded this "spiritual dependence
of the proletariat on the bourgeoisie" as the "main cause
of the weakness of the proletariat." The proletariat is
totally dependent intellectually and culturally on the
bourgeoisie and acquiesces in its own enslavement.

In a broader context, Pannekoek's emphasis on the
subjective aspects of socialist transformation led him to
stress the importance of socialism as an enterprise to
raise the cultural level of humanity. In words that could
be taken from Gramsci, he contended:

These crude, tattered, and uneducated proletarians,
they are in reality the bearers of a higher
culture. . . . Socialist culture is distinguished
from bourgeois culture not only by the fact that
it is much broader, but also by the fact that its
inner content is completely different. This
culture is one which will place men in a completely
different relationship to nature, the external
conditions of life, and other men.

From this standpoint, Pannekoek argued that the real
significance of socialism lay not just in its ability to create
new mode of production, but in its capacity for a fundamental
cultural transformation. This emphasis on the creative,
constructive aspect of proletarian revolution, as opposed
to the destructive aspect of overthrowing capitalism, was to remain a constant theme in Pannekoek's thoughts.

Given the "spiritual superiority" of the ruling class and the need for a "spiritual revolution" of the working class, the corollary question arises: What is the precise nature of this proletarian consciousness and how is it developed? Proletarian class consciousness, according to Pannekoek's conception, was not an abstract realm of thought identified with a particular set of doctrinal beliefs, but a socio-historical mode of abstraction closely connected to a complex combination of ideas, beliefs, feelings, and sentiments that are integral to the concrete daily life experiences of the working class and are a defining characteristic of its political action. Proletarian thought, for Pannekoek, assumed a number of varying and interacting forms, all of which were "abstract, generalized expressions of reality." 10 Two such "thought forms" were of particular importance: ideology and theory (science). Ideology constitutes "a system of items, conceptions, and plans, a spiritual expression of the conditions of material life and class interest." 11 It arises when a specific class universalizes in consciousness what is particular to their economic needs. Since ideology arises directly from the daily practice of work and life, much of it rests on unconscious feelings, perceptions, and drives, which often do not correspond to the reality of their context. For
this reason, Pannekoek felt, ideology forms the basis of, but not the total content of, revolutionary class consciousness. Theory, on the other hand, represents the highest expression of developed class consciousness because it "turns blind, instinctive social actions into conscious well-thought-out social actions" by separating the particular, short term, individual interests from the general and long-term interests of the class and giving these general class interests concrete historical content. 12

Theory, in this capacity, enables men to "rise from unconscious drives to fully conscious, purpose-minded men." 13

Pannekoek maintained that out of the continuous interaction between theory and ideology there emerges a special set of "categories of understanding," which define the proletarian conception of reality and are unique to proletarian thought:

The proletariat have their own dialectical idea of necessary social development, whose stages can be grasped only in terms of antagonistic notions—for example, revolution and evolution, theory and practice, final goal and movement. Especially proletarian is the idea that all apparently opposed situations are simply movements in a major process of development. The proletariat does not reason along logical either/or lines—for example, either revolution or evolution—but sees in two such elements simply two aspects of one and the same development. 14

These categories differ fundamentally from bourgeois categories of understanding, which are static and able to consider only the present. Beyond these generalized statements, however, Pannekoek was far from clear on how these
categories arise and what precisely they meant.

In seeking answers to how latent class consciousness could be transformed into revolutionary consciousness, Pannekoek argued that this process begins with knowledge about the nature of capitalist exploitation. This knowledge is obtained through the day-to-day proletarian work and life experiences within the capitalist order which run counter to the dominant bourgeois ideology. Revolutionary consciousness, the realization by the workers that they are capable of managing society and production on their own, develops from this foundation. It involves, above all else, the construction of a "social ideal" or "mental picture" of a new social order:

Men must continually adapt their ideas and views about the possible and appropriate arrangement and organization of society to the progress of production, continuously creating new social ideas. . . . Since everything which man does must first exist in his mind as purpose and will, every new social order before it becomes a reality must first lead a spiritual existence as the conscious ideal of a coming society.

As an illustration of this historical principle, Pannekoek cited the cases of the invention of the steam engine and spinning machine, which were tied to the social ideal of the "unlimited possibilities of industrial development" and the "unlimited freedom of private enterprise" under capitalism. 15

From this point of departure, Pannekoek conceived of revolutionary consciousness as arising organically out of the interplay between socio-economic development and working
class self-activity. Since concepts and modes of behavior are based on perceived experiences of social reality, they are continually changing as the social reality underlying them changes. What was primary and decisive, he felt, was the impact of capitalist development on the mental experiences of the working class: "The development of modern giant industry destroys ancient traditions, throws down old customs, and makes a tabula rasa of minds, which then become capable of accepting absolutely new ideas."¹⁶ The new relationships and experiences under capitalism show the workers the possibility and necessity of a socialist order, and give them at the same time a sense of their own mass strength: "It gives them confidence in their own growing power and ability to conquer and rule society."¹⁷ But the real activating element of revolutionary consciousness, Pannekoek stressed, was "continuous struggle." Clear knowledge about the nature of capitalism, the state, society, and the bourgeoisie could be grasped practically and theoretically only by a fighting and politically organized proletariat engaged in the tedious day-to-day process of breaking down, differentiating among, and finally identifying the unity of the contradictory forces which define particular phases of social development. Through this continuous process of conceptualization and reconceptualization, each new struggle of the working class, each new confrontation with the bourgeoisie, becomes part of a progressive awakening that will ultimately lead
the proletariat to victory.\textsuperscript{18}

This process, Pannekoek felt, could be consciously accelerated by an organized socialist movement through its educational and propaganda activities. Propaganda, in this context, however, was viewed by Pannekoek as an "amplification and explanation" of what the workers already see, and perceive in their daily life and work, rather than something directed at them.\textsuperscript{19} The consciousness of the working class would not change in response to propaganda alone, whatever its content. Revolutionary class consciousness was not something that could be infused from outside the working class, because the workers would perceive it as irrelevant to their basic experiences: "Every class can shape its own ideas only on the elements of reality it knows directly; it does not understand, and therefore ignores, whatever is foreign to its own experience."\textsuperscript{20} In contrast to Kautsky, Lenin, and others, Pannekoek constantly de-emphasized the role of bourgeois intellectuals in educating the proletariat for socialism. That task, he felt, was "entirely a matter for the great laboring masses themselves."\textsuperscript{21} In cases where bourgeois intellectuals attempt to give theoretical advice, the workers would tend to mistrust it on the grounds that it was not based on experience and might potentially lead to disaster: "Only the hard lessons of self-experienced reality can clear the way for the penetration of theory." For those middle class intellectuals active in the socialist movement, the real
significance of their acceptance of Marxism lay in the fact that it enabled them to shed their bourgeois conceptions and their role as ideological defenders of capitalism.\textsuperscript{22}

In his analysis of the factors which impeded the development of revolutionary class consciousness, Pannekoek emphasized in particular the role of traditional ideas left over from the thought systems of the past. According to Pannekoek the time lag between the emergence of new material structures and the new modes of consciousness that correspond to them was likely to be extremely long, particularly in areas of limited capitalist development, such as Holland.\textsuperscript{23} For this reason, Pannekoek felt that many of the prevailing ideas in the workers' movement still bore the stamp of their bourgeois origins. This was particularly true, he argued, for the two main working class ideological and tactical divergences from Marxism: anarchism and revisionism.

Pannekoek attributed the ideological basis of both anarchism and revisionism to the heterogeneous character of the workers' movement. He maintained that because of the uneven character of social development, the workers' movement had initially developed as a coalition of different social groups adversely affected by capitalism. United only by a common opposition to the status quo, each of these groups had their own distinct, and often differing, interests, and a mental outlook shaped by the reality of their own daily experiences. This social and mental outlook,
he felt, was crucial in defining their approach to tactics:

In this case, both anarchism and revisionism represent bourgeois tendencies within the workers' movement. They combine a bourgeois view of the world with proletarian sentiments. Standing shoulder to shoulder with the proletariat, they mean to espouse their cause, but without assisting to effect radical changes in mental attitudes and substitute the knowledge which characterizes scientific socialism. They borrow their concepts and patterns of thought from the bourgeois world and are distinguishable from each other only by the fact they derive from different periods of history.24

Pannekoek emphasized that although both anarchism and revisionism were nominally polar opposites, they were both an expression of the mental outlook of the petit bourgeoisie, which was historically a class of discontents predisposed to oppose the existing social order:

Social development does not in effect favor this class. Left in the cold, it inevitably plunges from one extreme to another. Sometimes it is intoxicated with revolutionary slogans and tries to seize power by means of putsches; sometimes it crawls shamelessly at the feet of the upper classes and tries to wheedle reforms from them by cunning and deceit. Anarchism is petit bourgeois ideology gone mad; revisionism is the same ideology with its teeth drawn.25

From this perspective, Pannekoek maintained that anarchism represented the ideology of a declassed petit bourgeoisie squeezed out by capitalist economic development. Their ideology was merely a continuation of petit bourgeois individualism and the outdated tradition of bourgeois revolution. Unlike the socialists, the anarchists failed to recognize the need for a completely new mode of production and based their vision of a new society on nostalgia and
Revisionism, Pannekoek felt, had its socio-economic base in an alliance between the petit-bourgeoisie and a "labor aristocracy" within the working class which had achieved high wages through strong organization and a strategic economic position. The revisionists' conception of socialism was not based on a completely new proletarian world view, but was "merely a framework for achieving practical goals, while the earlier bourgeois goals continue to co-exist." Their peaceful evolutionary doctrines and narrow conception of day-to-day struggle remained unconnected to the larger goal of proletarian liberation. As a mental outlook, revisionism was grounded in bourgeois moral categories such as freedom, justice, and equality. But for Pannekoek, what was to be stressed was the subjective impact of revisionism on the working class. Revisionism, he argued:

... ruins the class consciousness so painfully won ... for, if the workers are induced to expect more from bourgeois good-will instead of enlightenment through their own efforts, they will be much less inclined to form strong organizations. The external, organizational strength of the proletariat and its internal, spiritual strength will both be weakened.

Like anarchism, revisionism was formulated within the framework of bourgeois hegemony and was incapable of achieving the revolution in consciousness and theory that was required for a full-scale proletarian emancipation.
Organization and Ideological Development: Pannekoek's Conception of Revolutionary Praxis

In the domain of practice, Pannekoek's concern with the question of consciousness led him to construct a revolutionary strategy based on the consciousness-raising capacity of various forms of proletarian action. This conception was rooted in his twin assumptions that conscious political action by the proletariat was indispensable to the creation of socialism and that the fundamental mode of creating class consciousness was through proletarian self-activity. Although Pannekoek began to formulate his ideas in response to specific issues from 1901 onwards, the earliest full exposition of a comprehensive revolutionary strategy came in his 1906 article and brochure, Theory and Practice in the Labor Movement, which was written in response to the factional struggle in the SDAP. These ideas were later expanded and developed more systematically by Pannekoek in his 1909 work, Tactical Differences in the Labor Movement.

Pannekoek's conception of the revolutionary process was rooted directly in the fundamental assumptions of the Erfurt program, the leading programmatic document of the Marxism of the Second International. Drafted by Kautsky and approved by Engels, the Erfurt program sought to synthesize day-to-day reform activity within the capitalist order with the broader revolutionary goal of socialism. At the core of this synthesis was a theory of capitalist development which saw a continuous progression of capitalism
toward disaster and collapse, and its revolutionary trans-
formation into socialism by a proletariat prepared for this
task by the same process of development and by its everyday
reformist practice.  

While Pannekoek nowhere explicitly challenged the
prevailing strategy of the Second International prior to
1910, he did seek to refine it and shift its main focus.
What Pannekoek stressed was the subjective factors within
the objective process of revolution and the direct link
between the maturation of these factors and development of
the forms of working class organization and self-activity.
Thus, in asserting the dialectical interaction between
immediate reformist goals and the final goal of socialism,
Pannekoek's main concern was with the subjective aspects
of this process, its effect on the consciousness, morality
and solidarity of the working class:

As a final goal, socialism helps the struggling
class gain awareness of the course of social
development; as a reality, destined one day to
become fact, it enables this class to judge
capitalist relations by comparison, while the
grandeur of this ideal urges them to fight
relentlessly, and gives a critical form to our
scientific knowledge of the capitalist system.  

Pannekoek's conception of proletarian revolution
revolved around what he termed the three basic "power
instruments" of the proletariat: its size and economic
importance, its class consciousness and knowledge, and its
organization and discipline. The immediate objective of
the class struggle, Pannekoek felt, must be to increase
the social power of the proletariat by strengthening its power instruments. The proletariat was faced with two key tasks: developing consciousness and building an organization to challenge the state. Unlike the purely objective factors such as the size of the proletariat, consciousness and organization were dependent upon human will and allowed choice and decision.32

Pannekoek remained generally committed to the basic orthodox Marxist premise that proletarian organization—in both its party and trade union forms—was a necessary counterweight to capitalist organization and the social corollary of economic development. He took it for granted that "a strong, tightly disciplined, compact body animated by a single will" was necessary to counter the main power instruments of the bourgeoisie: the state and the army.33 But in addition to their role as fighting instruments against the organizations of the bourgeoisie, proletarian organizations also represented an essential component of the new society. Writing in the aftermath of the Dutch mass strike wave of 1903, Pannekoek noted:

The disorganization of capitalism cannot be achieved without an organ. It is not simply a matter of desiring the disorganization of the old forms but also of organizing the new. The trade unions, political struggles, and cooperatives are the instruments for achieving this. They create new organs within the old organism in the same manner that the trusts and large-scale industries grew up inside the old body of capitalism.34

Through its organizational forms, the proletariat acquires the necessary strength and unity to act as a self-conscious
class: "Organization binds them together, unites their
diverse wills into a single will, behind which rests the
collective power of the masses." 35 From this standpoint,
revolutionary organization was conceived by Pannekoek in
the Dietzgenian sense as a process of interaction. Organiza-
tion, understanding, and struggle were not independent
factors mechanically separated from each other, but were, in
fact, different facets of the same process.

In theorizing the role of proletarian organization,
Pannekoek's primary concern was with the impact of these
organizations on the inner character of the working class.
What most sharply distinguished proletarian organization
from bourgeois organization, he argued, was its internal
or subjective qualities. Proletarian organization was a
means by which the workers develop the solidarity and
discipline necessary for their everyday struggles, and the
conviction that the collective interest must prevail over
personal interests. Through their participation in
proletarian organizations, the workers are transformed into
new men with new habits and new modes of thought. From
their organizations, the workers acquire a unity and sense
of purpose that transcends formal statutes and organizational
structures:

The real unity, of which the organizational unity
is only an expression, is spiritual in nature;
it lives in the hearts and minds of the proletariat,
in both conscious knowledge of the intellect and
spontaneous feelings of the heart. This form of
proletarian unity, which consists of both insight
and warm feelings, has a dual content and significance. It arises from both a feeling of opposition to the other classes and from a sense of belonging to their own class.\textsuperscript{36}

Pannekoek felt that the connecting link between the subjective and objective aspects of proletarian organization was discipline: "Discipline represents the root of organization itself, the spiritual mortar which unites scattered individuals into a hard, powerful collectivity."\textsuperscript{37} Unlike the compulsory discipline of a bourgeois army, however, proletarian discipline is freely granted and for this reason represents an integral part of proletarian consciousness and morality.

Pannekoek maintained that these internal qualities of proletarian organization would be the most decisive in the class struggle. Writing shortly after the Russian Revolution of 1905 and in the heat of the SDAP factional struggle, he declared:

No blows can destroy knowledge, insight, and class consciousness; on the contrary, every attempt at repression only aids in the natural growth of a spirit of resistance until it acquires the higher character of an irresistible revolutionary energy. Although the external form of the existing organizations might disappear, the organizational character, the discipline, and the willingness to subordinate personal egotism to a mood of greater class interest that has been inculcated by so many years of constant, hard struggle, will never disappear, but will be fully realized in spontaneous mass actions.\textsuperscript{38}

Taking up the question of the role of the party, Pannekoek argued that the task of the social democratic party was twofold: it was both the primary class instrument for
waging broad political struggles and a catalyst for "spiritual education." As an instrument of class struggle, the social democratic party unites diverse sections of the working class and allows them to rise above parochial interests by throwing them into a struggle against the capitalist system in its entirety.\(^39\) But, for Pannekoek, what was most critical was the radicalization of consciousness and the socialization of knowledge that comes from the party's theoretical and practical activities. Through its use of Marxism as a "spiritual science," the party serves as an instrument of clarification by ordering and systematizing experiences so that the working class can fully comprehend reality and can act to change it.\(^40\)

Pannekoek's conception of the relationship between party and class, as it emerged from these formulations, represented a major departure from the prevailing strategy of the Second International. Although Pannekoek acknowledged the party's primary role—both politically and theoretically—he held its function to be a subordinate one, once the masses have gained the necessary insight for themselves as to their historical mission. In Pannekoek's view, the masses were not the passive tool of the party, but the reverse: the party was the tool of conscious class action.

Like the mainstream of social democracy, Pannekoek accepted the "twin pillar" theory of organization which divided the workers' movement into separate political and economic wings. Within the framework of this analysis, he
viewed the trade unions as the "natural form of proletarian organization" which had the function of uniting the workers on the limited basis of craft or trade. Since their objective is not the overthrow of capitalism, the unions "fight only in skirmishes and with small detachments against various capitalists or groups of capitalists." To the extent that they help secure better conditions for the workers, and thereby reduce their misery and capacity for revolt, the trade unions act as a "conservative force consolidating capitalism."

But at the same time, Pannekoek's emphasis on the subjective and transforming qualities of proletarian organization led him to argue that the trade unions had an important revolutionary function as well. The critical factor, he felt, was the changing reality of capitalism which had the potential to turn the unions into "elements of revolutionary transformation" and "organs of revolution." Since capitalism was constantly required to maximize its profits by intensifying exploitation of the workers, the unions would be equally compelled to fight to defend the workers' interests. During these struggles, the unions would help awaken class consciousness, instill a sense of combat, break down old illusions, and generate discipline and feelings of solidarity. The "gigantic moral elevation" that occurs in these struggles, Pannekoek insisted, was "a necessary precondition for transforming the weak worker into a conqueror of capitalism."
From these passages, it becomes clear that for Pannekoek socialist revolution was conceived of as a slow and laborious conquest of political and economic power, through an incessant revolutionary struggle waged by a large, militant, well-organized, and class-conscious working class, to be achieved not by the imposition from above of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialization of the means of production, but by the consolidation of a new society from below, fighting step by step all the elements of the old society. In the process hypothesized by Pannekoek, the key element in the dialectical interaction between organization and consciousness was constant struggle:

The great medium which has been imposed upon us by social development rather than by choice is struggle. The workers' movement grows through continuous struggle against all the powers of the old society and their attempts at repression in the same manner that a young organism must struggle against its surrounding environment in order to grow and develop. The practice which gives the best knowledge of capitalism, the state, and society, and which encourages the growth of organization and discipline, is continuous struggle. The improved insights and strengthened feelings of power that result from these struggles lead in turn to new struggles which further clarify and bind men closer to their organizations.

And although the movement might suffer numerous temporary defeats and its material gains might be lost, the struggles would, nonetheless, have a lasting impact:

What can never be lost, and which for this reason represents the most important victory of
struggle, is the revolutionary drive, the spiritual character and qualities of the working class, which must be considered its greatest power instrument. 45

During this period, Pannekoek took it for granted that socialist parliamentary activity was an indispensable form of struggle for the working class. In assessing the historical possibilities and limitations of parliamentarism, Pannekoek felt that parliamentary activity was an expression of a "particular form" of the "general political action" of the working class. 46 While recognizing that "parliamentarianism was the normal form of domination by the bourgeoisie," Pannekoek felt at the same time that it represented "the best way to increase the strength of the working class." 47 In the parliamentary arena, class relationships appear in their true form. Socialist parliamentarians are compelled to struggle over practical day-to-day questions in a way that places these questions in their proper relationship to both the capitalist system and an alternative socialist conception of life. By arousing a sense of purpose and belonging, parliamentary conflict increases feelings of proletarian solidarity and morality and strengthens working class organization. Revolutionary parliamentarianism, when properly conducted, represents a powerful mechanism for pursuing a spiritual revolution by waging a relentless struggle against the traditional ideas of the ruling class:
If our representatives go into parliament, it is not primarily in order to make stirring speeches, but to combat the bourgeois parties there. Insofar as such a distinction is possible, seeing that we are discussing an activity which can only be verbal, it is by their actions and not their words that the workers are educated to socialism. . . It is by following the parliamentary debates attentively that the workers acquire the political awareness that they need. When day after day, delegates of every party, seeking to impose their views, attack the general theory and outlook of the workers' representatives, the workers gain a radical knowledge of their own attitudes in opposition to those of the others. The parliamentary conflict is not, of course, the class struggle itself; it does, however, constitute, in a sense, the essence of the class struggle. In the speeches of a small group of labor members of parliament, the interests and ideas of the masses are expressed in condensed form. 48

Pannekoek contended that such activity was more effective than ordinary propaganda since it was exercised in an arena where the whole country watches and because it makes a stronger claim on men's minds by clarifying the reality they know and experience most directly. 49 Rather than maintaining the "illusion that the electoral system can guide our ship through calm waters to the harbor of the future state," the historical task of socialist parliamentarianism was to help transform the working class into "a self-aware and organized class ready for combat." 50

This consciousness-raising capacity of parliamentarianism, Pannekoek felt, was particularly important during times of revolutionary upheaval. Thus, writing during the events of 1903, he sought to outline a revolutionary role for the SDAP's parliamentary delegation:
Our parliamentary delegation, although small in numbers, will be forced by the power of thousands of strikes and demonstrators to struggle rather than to plead. . . This social struggle, in which the social democratic parliamen-
tary faction represents the mouth of the entire organized working class, shall bring clarity where there was none. . . . Many, who were with us as a result of misunderstanding, shall depart and the boundaries between workers and petit bour-
goisie will become more sharply defined. Others, who avoided us out of misunderstanding, will join us as the lines between political and anti-
political workers will blur and vanish. This represents the first really serious struggle for the SDAP in which it has the opportunity to appear before everyone as a pure, revolutionary, proletarian party; this is its baptism by fire.51

Yet throughout Pannekoek’s writings on this question, there is continual equivocation and an acute awareness of the debilitating aspects of parliamentary struggle on revolutionary activity. As early as 1902, he addressed a series of criticisms to the SDAP executive about the party’s over-reliance on electoral methods. His main criticism was that the party’s organizational structure was built too much on electoral lines, which gave it the character of "little more than a gigantic election club." Pannekoek felt that this policy was particularly erroneous for a country with limited suffrage. His deep concern was that the improper use of parliamentary methods would jeopardize the party's revolutionary mission: "There is a real danger that the party will place itself in the service of politics, rather than placing politics in the service of the party."52

This line of argument drove Pannekoek to the conclusion
that what threatened the party was a specific "bourgeois conception" of parliamentarianism. This conception, Pannekoek felt, was based on the view that the parliamentary struggle is the struggle for power itself and that the actions of a small handful of representatives could be a substitute for actions of the entire class:

The party deputies thus take up a vanguard position; they become a special class, the guides. . . . The strength of our parliamentarians, therefore, does not reside primarily in the socialism which they profess and in the strength of the masses who support them, but in their personal qualities and political skills. By virtue of their technical knowledge in juridical and administrative matters, their familiarity with the petty combines, intrigues and calculations of day-to-day politics, they regard themselves as superior to the non-parliamentarians. In their eyes, they themselves are best able to judge as experts what are really matters to be approved by everyone. . . . When their ideas clash with the rank-and-file, they simply override all criticism: the comrades must remember that, since non-parliamentarians do not know enough about these problems, they must trust their "delegates" to reach such decisions in their "soul and conscience". . . . When the masses accept such tutelage, democratic sentiments are doomed to disappear from the party. 53

To use parliamentarianism in this manner, Pannekoek felt, was to erode the very foundations of working class organization. Once persuaded that their deputies will make all decisions for them, the workers would have no further reason for forming autonomous organizations and would confine their mental efforts to voting in election years. 54

Pannekoek's conception of revolutionary parliamentarianism was closely interwoven with his views on the suffrage
struggle. Once again, his main emphasis was on utilizing reform activity to activate class struggle and deepen class consciousness. Pannekoek made clear his central concern as early as 1902, when he outlined a new orientation for the suffrage movement. The main task of this movement, as Pannekoek saw it, was to awaken the workers from passivity and indifference by making the struggle a "living reality" in their lives:

They will only begin to believe, to join, and to develop enthusiasm when they notice that it is something which works; when they are able to see and believe that it is a living ideal in the hearts of powerful fighters; and the single-minded willpower and dedication of this army, which they shall feel, will communicate to them something of the certainty that we will be victorious in achieving our goal.\textsuperscript{55}

Pannekoek's activist conception of the suffrage movement was brought into sharp focus by the Russian Revolution of 1905. Under the influence of these events, Pannekoek called upon the SDAP to build a suffrage movement which would serve as a catalyst for future revolutionary mass struggles by waging "a continuous and powerful popular agitation."\textsuperscript{56}

To preclude the possibility that the bourgeoisie might co-opt the movement with certain limited concessions, he emphasized that such a movement must be strong "not only in numbers and supporters, but also in inner strength."\textsuperscript{57}

The Russian Revolution of 1905 not only inspired Pannekoek to develop a more radicalized conception of the suffrage movement, but also raised important questions in
his mind about the prevailing social democratic tactics. Although Pannekoek continued to assign a primary role to the party, trade unions, and parliamentary activity until 1910, a growing disenchantment with these methods began to surface in his writings after 1905. The Russian events, he wrote, had "pushed the masses into the forefront as instruments of war" and made it imperative to consider "new methods of tactical warfare." These feelings were reinforced and intensified by the Prussian suffrage demonstrations of January, 1908. Pannekoek immediately pronounced the demonstrations "a medium of struggle of the first rank which we must adopt." Noting that Dietzgen had spoken of the "natural inclination of men not to see the limitations of what they perceive as truth," Pannekoek cautioned in regard to the traditional tactics:

This truth is not absolute; it has its limitations. The workers' movement had adapted itself to the strategy of parliamentarianism far more than is really necessary and it is impossible to attain our goals through these methods alone. A revolutionary struggle by the masses themselves with other, more powerful, mediums is necessary.

Pannekoek's analysis was based on his assumption that "the age of splendid parliamentarianism is coming to an end." This epoch, he argued, began after the defeat of the Paris Commune had taught the workers the futility of using armed resistance alone. To counter the enormous spiritual and material power of the bourgeoisie, the workers were forced to use bourgeois institutions to strengthen their own power.
Pannekoek, however, maintained that in the present historical situation the bourgeoisie was becoming increasingly unable to rule by moral and spiritual power alone, and was being forced to resort directly to their "material instruments of power." Confronted with this new situation, the masses would have no choice but to mobilize their own power and struggle directly against the power instruments of the bourgeoisie. Pannekoek felt this had clear implications for the traditional working class organizations:

Conflicts between the "high statesman" perspective of the leaders and the clear proletarian class consciousness of the masses become unavoidable. They are symptoms of a more advanced stage of the class struggle.

Under the new conditions, the workers' "own insight and mass organizations" would become the decisive power factors rather than their leadership. 61

In historical terms, Pannekoek analyzed the coming revolutionary epoch along the following lines.

Political action and trade union action merge more and more into a unified front of the working class against the ruling class. This shows, therefore, that only temporary conditions peculiar to a particular phase of the class struggle were separating the first form of action from the second ... In the 'parliamentary' phase, the proletariat had to adapt its tactics of struggle to external conditions--in other words to the bourgeois hegemony within the state, a hegemony that has continued undisputed and without modification for a whole generation. Here, the tactics of struggle--in parliamentary and trade union forms--were able to develop in their own manner, so as to assume an independent existence. The conditions peculiar to this phase left so deep
an impression that many considered it foolish to suppose they would ever disappear . . . and to envision the shifting of the struggle to another terrain was regarded as a romantic illusion . . . The two modes of action, embodied in the leaders, remained distinct, and yet, at both levels, the masses were made up of the same workers. The organized masses themselves are now entering into the fray, endowed with class consciousness, discipline, and the strength gained in previous conflicts--their organization, the trade unions, their political knowledge, socialism.62

But these themes were as yet only fragments and outlines for the future which remained for the most part undeveloped in Pannekoek's thought prior to 1910. A more precisely articulated theory of mass action had to await the political and strategic debate that developed in German social democracy following the Prussian suffrage demonstrations of 1910.

Toward a New Moral Life: Ethics and Social Development

In attempting to develop a unified theory of social transformation, Pannekoek attached particular importance to the role of ethics in social development. Pannekoek's immediate goal was to formulate a specifically Marxist conception of ethics to counter the Kantian ethics of the revisionists, which he felt was an outgrowth of an ideological effort by a part of the bourgeoisie to develop an ethical capitalist alternative to socialism. In a broader sense, Pannekoek considered the question of proletarian ethics a key aspect of the struggle for proletarian hegemony. Although Pannekoek's treatment of the question of ethics was largely popularized and less systematically developed than other
aspects of his thought, his analysis nonetheless demonstrated originality and insight on a number of points.

Pannekoek regarded his efforts in this area as an extension of the ethical system worked out earlier by Dietzgen. On the basis of his theory of knowledge, Dietzgen had sought to develop a "scientific" or "inductive" theory of morals which avoided any pure speculation or a priori thinking. Dietzgen felt that moral reasoning, like all other forms of thinking, must rest on given, concrete materials or objects, which in this case are socially experienced needs and interests. Just as knowledge in general is derived from the demarcation of given sense objects to be classified and explained, moral reasoning works upon given needs and interests to distinguish the general from the particular, the essential from the transitory. Moral reasoning arrives at these distinctions by determining what is generally useful or appropriate to achieving a given objective, expressing the needs and interests of a particular group in particular circumstances. In this way, it distinguishes good needs from bad needs, true interests from assumed interests, and essential wants from accidental appetites.63

From this Dietzgenian starting point, Pannekoek viewed ethics, or morality, as an essential part of human mental activity, in other words, as "the spiritual element of social labor and human existence."64 Morals, in this case, meant the totality of principles of human conduct which regulates the behavior of individuals and groups in society. As an
integral part of social practice, moral beliefs represent "one of the foremost causes of human action." In defining the relationship of ethics to social development, Pannekoek stressed that the key element in the formation of ethical conceptions was social class. Each class, he argued, has different life experiences, aspirations, and practical needs, out of which it fashions its own distinct moral truths.

As an illustration of the differences in class morality, Pannekoek cited the Dutch mass strikes of 1903. For the bourgeoisie, the strikes represented a "criminal" act which was greeted with horror and indignation. Crime, in their view, was defined as anything which disturbed order in society, which in reality meant any disruption of the conditions of peaceful profiteering. The workers, on the other hand, applauded the strikers as courageous men who had sacrificed their own interests to class solidarity. Pannekoek, however, made it clear that although moral concepts arise out of class interests, the two were not always synonymous. In the case of the 1903 strikes, the Dutch workers were faced with a choice between a solidarity strike which jeopardized their organizations and a neutrality which made them in effect strike-breakers. By choosing the solidarity strike, the workers effectively destroyed their organizations. Taking up the question of why an action which was so harmful to the workers' interests was considered a highly moral act, Pannekoek noted:
Because, as a general rule, a show of solidarity is useful to the working class... not always, but nearly always it is useful and even indispensable to the extent that without it a definitive victory would be out of the question... The differences between class interest and the moral element are therefore plain: a moral act is not always useful to the class, except in the sense it is useful in general and generally serves its interests. A moral act is not always an act to be recommended, a rational act or a worthy act; in practice one must not give into the immediate feelings of the moment but must carefully analyze each act in terms of its suitability for given specific circumstances. 87

From this standpoint, the difference between class interests and ethics represented a difference between two types of interest: the temporary, short-term, particular interest, and the permanent, long-range, general interest. These distinctions, Pannekoek held, could only be made by a mode of thinking which was scientific and inductive.

In an analysis similar to that later developed by Georg Lukács, Pannekoek located the ethic of the proletariat in its class consciousness. For Pannekoek, this ethic could come to fruition only through the dialectical interaction between the proletariat and its self-activity:

In our day, new and vigorous moral motivations, new virtues, are developing within the working class. These motivations and virtues form a considerable source of power and are necessary for the transformation of the world, since without this power there can be no social upheaval of any magnitude; no passage to socialism. And if we now inquire into the source of this power, the answer is simple: it is not a power descended from the skies, but is the product of effective earthly conditions and shows quite simply that each member of the working class has a potential which can enable him to rise above his own personal
interests and to lift his mind from the particular to the general, to the level of what is demanded by class and by society as a whole.  

Chief among these new proletarian virtues, he felt, were the workers' capacity for solidarity, subordination to the collectivity, self-imposed discipline, and self-sacrifice for the class interest. Pannekoek counterposed this "new proletarian morality" to bourgeois morality, which was characterized by its wide gap between moral ideals and actual actions and by its increasing lack of connection to any form of social praxis. For him, proletarian morality, with its capacity for a fundamental transformation of attitudes, was expressive of the future development of humanity: "In the fighting proletariat there is a powerful new moral force arising."  

In stressing the relationship between ethics and social practice, Pannekoek openly questioned the revisionist view that Marxism arose simply as a form of moral outrage against the miseries of capitalist exploitation:  

The praxis of the workers' movement has nothing in common with this ethical way of looking at the world. When we denounce the frightful crimes of capitalism against the life and health of the workers, and when we take a stand against governmental violence and injustice, our point of view is quite distinct from the redressor of wrongs who is morally indignant at such wrongdoing. It is the cry of indignation of the victims and the oppressed themselves, the cry of hatred and of menace against the torturer: it is the shout of the fighter calling on his comrades, still drowsy and crushed with anguish, to join with him, reminding them of the torments they are enduring. And this cry of indignation, this rousing battle cry, has as little to do with ethics
as has the anguished cry of a tortured animal or
the excited shouts of men fighting for their
freedom . . . A person who finds himself crushed
and mastered must defend himself, and cannot do
otherwise. There is no question of any moral
indignation whatsoever toward the oppressor;
such a person acts quite simply from the sheer
instinct of self-preservation . . . Far from
ethics being the basis of Marxism, it is the
latter which provides a materialist interpretation
of ethics. 71

What this meant for Pannekoek was that socialist propaganda
should not rest on indignation over the abuses of capitalism,
but on a clear scientific "knowledge of the inherent tenden-
cies of capitalist development." 72 To do otherwise would
lead only to being "pulverized by the enormous power of
Capital." 73 The question was not, therefore, simply one of
saying that capitalism must be abolished and replaced by a
better social order because it is bad and unjust, but rather
the reverse: because capitalism can be abolished and re-
placed by a better social order it is bad and unjust. 74

This line of argument led Pannekoek to the conclusion that
Marxism, by providing a scientific framework for shifting
the dominant mode of reasoning away from conceptions based
solely in terms of profit and individual gain toward thinking
in terms of self-conscious control of the productive process
itself, had its "greatest implications in the area of
ethics." 75

In his theorizing on the spiritual and ideological
dimension of proletarian revolution, Pannekoek clearly
distinguished himself in the years prior to 1910 as the
first Marxist to articulate the centrality of ideas and
consciousness to historical development. But for all the
importance and originality of his insights, Pannekoek's
formulations on consciousness and hegemony contain definite
limitations and lacunae which seriously impaired the effec-
tiveness of his theoretical work. Although the concept
of hegemony lay at the center of his strategic perspective,
Pannekoek—unlike Gramsci—failed to develop an in-depth
institutional and historical analysis of precisely how it
functioned in practice. His inclination was to view
hegemony less as a sociological category and more as an
ideological symbol. In his efforts to counter the reality
of bourgeois ideological domination, there is also a serious
lack of balance between the importance he attached to
developing an independent proletarian spiritual and cultural
outlook and the strategic perspective he offered the workers'
movement to attain it. Despite his activist and voluntaristic
conception of Marxism, Pannekoek, in the final analysis,
was forced to retreat to the comfort of a highly fatalistic
analysis which implied that a fundamental revolution in
consciousness would occur as a consequence of the pure
proletarian tendencies in the workers' movement asserting
themselves. Like most Marxists of the Second International,
Pannekoek remained firmly convinced that the rise of the
proletariat could not be halted precisely because of the
role it occupied in the industrial system of production.
This tension between the voluntarist and determinist elements
of his Marxism would permeate the entire corpus of his
theoretical writings.
NOTES

1. The main outlines of Marx's conception of consciousness and social development are contained in the German Ideology and the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.


5. Anton Pannekoek, Religion and Socialism (Detroit: Emancipator, n.d.).


10. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., p. 130.

11. Ibid., p. 121.

12. Ibid., p. 25.

13. Ibid., p. 132.


16. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., p. 34.

17. Ibid., p. 31.


19. Anton Pannekoek to Frank van der Goes, August 7, 1900, Van der Goes Archives, op. cit., folder 1803.

20. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., p. 122. Pannekoek, however, held that, unlike the proletariat, the peasantry could not escape the domination of traditional ideas by their own efforts: "Socialist thought, therefore, cannot develop and exist in these circles; it must rather be brought to them." Anton Pannekoek, "Die Ausgebeuteten," in: Anton Pannekoek, Der Kampf der Arbeiter: Sieben Aufsatze aus der Leipziger Volkszeitung (Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907), p. 10.


25. Ibid., p. 61.

26. Ibid., pp. 61-64. See also his "Sozialismus und Anarchismus," op. cit.

27. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., pp. 125-126. Although the concept of the "labor aristocracy" has a long pedigree in socialist theory, and is traceable at least as far back as Engels, Pannekoek was among the first to integrate it into a major theoretical and tactical analysis.

28. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

29. Ibid., pp. 44-45.


32. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
33. Ibid., p. 18.
34. Untitled [Anton Pannekoek], "Der politische Streik. Bericht der Redaktion von 'De Nieuwe Tijd' an den parteivorstand der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei hollands," op. cit.
39. Ibid.
41. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., p. 77.
42. Ibid., p. 90.
44. Ibid., p. 94. Pannekoek extended his criticisms of trade unionism to revolutionary syndicalism, noting: "This allegedly revolutionary practice is not at all successful in mustering the proletarian masses who are still without class consciousness—for this is something which can be achieved only by a persevering conflict aimed solely at small and gradual improvements. It presupposes in the worker a revolutionary attitude of mind
which can only be the final result of long practice. The syndicalists continue to be small groups of workers with revolutionary sentiments, whose fervor does not make up for weakness of organization."


48. Ibid., pp. 74-76.


50. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in die Arbeiterbegwgung, op. cit., p. 77.


52. Anton Pannekoek, "De reorganisatie de partij," Het Volk, August 30, 1902.

53. Anton Pannekoek, Die Taktischen Differenzen in die Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., p. 79.

54. Ibid., p. 83.

55. Anton Pannekoek, "De Kiesrechtbeweging," Het Volk, April 11, 1902.


75. Anton Pannekoek, "Bürgerliche und proletarische Ethik," *op. cit.*
CHAPTER VI

STRUGGLING MARXISM IN PRACTICE, 1910-1914
Break with the Marxist Center: Pannekoek Against Kautsky

For Pannekoek, the years 1910-1914 were extraordinary ones of intense practical activity at the base of German social democracy, which confirmed for him the new insights which had been maturing in his thought since 1903 and which by a painful process brought him into opposition to official social democracy.

Although he had developed into a theoretician of international stature during his stay in Germany, Pannekoek by 1909 was becoming increasingly disenchanted with activities at the summit of German social democracy. Living in the middle class suburb of Zehlendorf, where he was deprived of a local party section in which to participate, Pannekoek found his contacts confined to the heads and functionaries of the party and began to feel increasingly isolated from the active life of the movement. Commenting on this feeling years later, he noted:

"... this was a life among the gods, at a high level, but not amidst men. This made all of our thoughts and arguments somewhat abstract and sterile. I felt this in writing my correspondence articles, which often became difficult because they were not rooted in a living reality. The newspapers contained much about the workers and their meetings and demonstrations, but along with it were the speeches of the leaders, and all of it was expressed in the style of editors and educated men. And while I identified myself increasingly with the feelings and actions of the workers which were being expressed in mass actions, in contrast to the talk of the parliamentarians, I always felt something was missing from what I wanted to say because I never saw or encountered actual workers. We lived in a world apart that was different from the real world.¹"
Pannekoek went on to draw the conclusion that the leadership of German social democracy was little more than an "interest group of their own," completely detached from the base of the party:

This upper world of functionaries was never conscious of this; they only came in contact with other leaders, and then only during party congresses. Naturally, they could only think that they were the spokesmen of the workers and were saying what the workers wanted them to say. I had the feeling that the workers approved of much of it, but that their language was completely different from what these functionaries could feel and express.

During the same time as Pannekoek began to question the value of his work in Berlin, fissures were slowly beginning to emerge in his relationship with Karl Kautsky. Although Pannekoek continued to be a regular Sunday dinner guest at the Kautsky household, the close harmony that characterized the early years of their relationship was no longer present. In early 1909, Kautsky expressed major reservations about Pannekoek's view of Marxism and Darwinism. Kautsky also felt Pannekoek's basic Dietzgenian methodology and his emphasis on the "spiritual" factors in social development were incompatible with a Marxist perspective. But the issue that evoked the most controversy was Kautsky's refusal to support the Tribunists when they faced expulsion from the SDAP. Pannekoek accused Kautsky of having "deserted" Marxism:

If you had acted decisively it would have been questionable whether the party majority would have gone to extremes. But now that Troelstra sees that
he has nothing to fear from you he takes the most extreme measures against the Tribune.\(^4\)

These emerging differences between Pannekoek and Kautsky, however, were overshadowed by a more fundamental process of political differentiation which had been developing within German social democracy since 1905. What had hitherto been confined to latent theoretical differences crystallized suddenly into divergent strategic perspectives in a debate which received its impetus from the Prussian mass suffrage demonstrations of the spring of 1910. These events began on February 4 when the Bethmann-Hollweg government released the draft of its long-awaited suffrage reform bill, which proposed almost no changes. Demonstrations broke out almost immediately in Berlin and the Prussian provinces, and during February and March, spread rapidly throughout the larger towns in Prussia. Almost immediately, these actions escalated into clashes with the police, with the first casualties occurring on February 27 in Frankfurt. The high point of this movement came with the Berlin demonstration of March 6, which drew 150,000 persons despite a police ban.\(^5\) This mood of militancy and unrest received additional reinforcement from a set of parallel large-scale strikes in the economic sector, primarily in the mining and building industries. During the course of 1910, nearly 370,000 workers were involved in work stoppages due either to strikes or lockouts.\(^6\) From March onwards, the suffrage and strike movements began increasingly to overlap, leading
many to see the long-awaited merging of political and economic forms of struggle. To Pannekoek, it appeared that the prognosis he had been articulating since 1905 was at last being realized.

Even before the first mass demonstrations took place, deep-seated tactical differences in the SPD over the suffrage question were already apparent. In January, 1910, the Prussian SPD held a congress at which the revisionists proposed a suffrage movement centered around an alliance with the Liberals. Unexpectedly, a militant mood prevailed and the proposal was summarily defeated. Throughout February, pressure continued to mount on the party executive to call a general strike. The first major tactical confrontation came in late February, when Rosa Luxemburg submitted a long article entitled, "What Further?" ("Was Weiter?") to Vö rwarts, calling for intensification of the mass movement. Vörwarts, however, rejected the article on the grounds that party decisions precluded reopening discussions on the mass strike. Rosa Luxemburg then sent the article to Kautsky for publication in Neue Zeit. Although initially inclined to print it, Kautsky suddenly changed his mind, and argued that publishing it would only aid the opponents of social democracy. In response Rosa Luxemburg began a two-month speaking tour of Germany in order to bring the question directly to the rank-and-file. 7

This, however, was only the opening round of a bitter polemical dispute between Luxemburg and Kautsky, which lasted
from April to August, 1910, and which drew in Pannekoek as a leading participant. Seeking to justify the position of the executive, Kautsky launched the first of his verbal assaults on Rosa Luxemburg and the left with a serialized *Neue Zeit* article entitled, "What now?" ("Was nun?")*, in which he defended a return to parliamentary tactics. Only a year earlier, Kautsky had still been considered the foremost theoretician of the left when, in his book *The Road to Power*, he formulated the hypothesis that the era of proletarian revolution had already begun. Now, however, he argued that the excitement of the masses was not nearly sufficient for such an "extreme course" as the mass strike and advocated instead a "strategy of attrition" (*Ermattungsstrategie*). In his view, the real task of the party was to organize the proletariat for the Reichstag elections two years away. A victory in these elections, Kautsky felt, would create the conditions for a final "strategy of overthrow" (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*). To insure this victory, the party had the "duty" to "utilize the organization to prevent all attempts at a premature mass strike."*8 Rosa Luxemburg followed this up with a prominent *Neue Zeit* article defending the mass strike tactic. *9*

At Rosa Luxemburg's request, Pannekoek entered the debate in April, 1910, with a series of articles defending her position. Pannekoek declared openly that the key issue confronting the movement was the contradiction between the will to struggle of the masses and the inability of the
leadership to give expression to that will. Against Kautsky's "strategy of attrition," Pannekoek reasserted the need for an offensive strategy aimed ultimately at destroying the foundation of the capitalist state through intensification of mass movements.10 "Is the proletariat still not ready for such a struggle?" asked Pannekok. "Are not its organization, discipline, political capability and clear insight already great enough for the task which lies before it?"11.

For Pannekoek, the mass struggles of the spring of 1910 were qualitatively different from all previous forms of mass action since the proletariat possessed for the first time a conscious knowledge of both its situation and its mission. From a tactical standpoint, this "new revolutionary disposition of the masses" represented a critical turning point in the history of the socialist movement. Pannekoek went on to argue that the mass strike debate represented the theoretical expression of a fundamental struggle between opposing forces within the socialist movement. Seeking to locate both the material and spiritual sources of these opposing forces, Pannekoek argued that it was not accidental that a certain segment of the party remained steadfastly committed to the old tactics of parliamentarianism and trade unionism but a consequence of the very structure of the social democratic movement itself: "The constraining force of tradition is contained in the present tactics to which the organizations have
adapted and is based in the bloated bureaucratic apparatus and representative leaders." Since their position and power is tied to the old doctrines and tactics, this bureaucratic apparatus can act only as a constraining force during times when new methods and outlooks must prevail. During periods of upheaval, however, perceptions change rapidly and the power of tradition loses its force:

During a revolutionary epoch, when relationships are in constant flux, there arise completely new experiences which bring new thoughts to the mind, which then begin to clarify what have hitherto been only hazy presentiments. Out of these new experiences and thoughts deeper insights are obtained, new outlooks develop, and new theories are constructed.  

Pannekoek maintained that, in these circumstances, only the masses could feel the compelling necessity of the new situation since their position and perceptions were the least tied to the old doctrines and tactics: "For these reasons, the masses themselves must take the initiative and free themselves from the old attitudes, which were correct at another time, and drive their leaders forward on a new path."  

This task, Pannekoek felt, was not without its difficulties. Whereas parliamentarianism is a method which everyone knows how to use and has a giant organizational structure at its disposal,

The mass strike, on the other hand, represents a completely new terrain where everything is strange, unknown, and unproven. One can only conjecture on the basis of experiences in other lands about what kinds of results will follow
or even about which actions are appropriate. Dangers are often feared which turn out to be imaginary, while others which are more real are ignored. It is easy to take a wrong step on this new path which can bring defeat or a severe loss. Consequently, it is quite understandable why many are hesitant about the new methods and hold steadfast to the proven old ones. Thus, a theoretical discussion and clarification remains the most important task: the masses must understand clearly the relationship of this unknown praxis to their own situation and to the earlier forms of struggle, so that they will be able to act with firmness and certainty when the time comes.

As the 1910 mass strike debate drew to a close, it became clear that the SPD had divided into three main tendencies: the revisionists, the so-called Marxist center which was moving closer to the revisionists' position, and a new revolutionary left tendency, generally termed the left radicals (Linksrädrakale), of whom Pannekoek and Rosa Luxemburg were the foremost theoreticians. Whereas the previous division between Marxists and revisionists had been confined largely to matters of abstract theory, the new division extended to the very nature of revolutionary tactics itself. Pannekoek has described how, during a meeting at Kautsky's home on the morning of the March 6 demonstrations, he had his first perception of the definitive nature of the split:

Arriving there Sunday, I found him [Kautsky], Rosa, Eckstein, Hilferding and some others ..., and the conversation turned at once to the mass strike. Karl and Rosa were in complete disagreement. She felt, on the basis of her Russian experiences, that these actions must be allowed to develop outside the control of the party executive and assume their own form directly through the masses. He felt that it was absolutely necessary that the movement remain under the tight control of the executive. I agreed with Rosa and attempted to defend her standpoint with further arguments. But
the two of us were alone; everyone else agreed with Kautsky. I perceived here for the first time that a spiritual split had occurred, which would later on become deeper and more pronounced. This was only the beginning.15

Throughout the summer and fall of 1910, Pannekoek continued his theoretical reflections on the recent mass struggles in his correspondence articles, developing them into a new theory of mass action. Pannekoek's new orientation became the focus of another controversy when he journeyed to Stuttgart in October, 1910, to give an address on mass action. During the course of his remarks, Pannekoek contended that the struggle of the proletariat was not merely a struggle with the capitalist class for possession of state power, but a struggle against state power itself.16 These remarks were seized upon by the city's reformist leadership and became the subject of a series of polemics in the Schwäbische Tagwacht.17

The tactical debate was brought to a new pitch of intensity the following year when Kautsky launched another offensive against the left radicals in the form of a serialized Neue Zeit article entitled "Action by the Masses" ("Die Aktion der Masse"). Kautsky's aim was to provide a more comprehensive theoretical justification for his position by grounding it in a broad and detailed social and historical analysis of the role of mass actions in social development. While admitting that spontaneous street actions by the masses had often been a decisive revolutionary factor throughout history, Kautsky pointed out that such actions often served
reactionary ends as well. In any case, Kautsky felt these forms of intervention had been largely superceded by the newer and more highly developed forms of activity embodied in the party and trade unions: "For 40 years, our party has gone from victory to victory. To consolidate and extend these conquests, it is only necessary to continue along the same path." ⑩

It was at this point that Pannekoek—following an extended critique of Kautsky's position in his correspondence articles—proposed to Kautsky that they detail their different conceptions in a comprehensive and systematic manner in the Neue Zeit as a means of theoretical clarification. What inspired Pannekoek was his belief that the Neue Zeit was failing in its mission of clarifying issues and deepening and improving insights: "If the Neue Zeit is to remain the center of scientific life in our movement, it is necessary that it help develop basic principles. . . . This has not been the case these past few years." In order not to give Kautsky a pretext for rejecting the proposal, Pannekoek suggested that the debate take place after the elections. ⑪

Even before the debate could begin, however, the theoretical-tactical controversy became interwoven with a conflict of a more personal nature which threatened to destroy the remaining bonds of friendship between Pannekoek and Kautsky. During the winter of 1911, the secretary of the editorial board of the Neue Zeit, Gustave Eckstein, rejected one of Pannekoek's regular book review columns on the grounds
that it could be used by the opponents of the party in the elections. Pannekoek, mindful of the similar effort to censor Rosa Luxemburg two years earlier, suspected that Kautsky might have been involved in the decision and wrote him a blistering letter threatening to cease his collaboration on the Neue Zeit. 20 This incident, he charged, was "not accidental," but "a symptom that on important basic questions we are now completely opposed to each other." 21

The Pannekoek-Kautsky debate itself began in July, 1912, with the publication of Pannekoek's essay, "Mass Action and Revolution" ("Massenaktion und Revolution"), which was intended as a reply to Kautsky's "Action by the Masses." 22 Nothing shows more clearly than this debate how far Pannekoek's conceptions had moved from the party's official ideology. From a methodological standpoint, Pannekoek charged Kautsky with being ahistorical and unsociological in identifying mass action with sporadic and spontaneous "street actions" throughout history. In Pannekoek's eyes, each such action was different and had to be judged on the basis of its own particular social and economic circumstances. The contemporary form of extra-parliamentary activity was in no way reducible to mob action in the streets; it was, in fact "a new form of specific intervention by the organized workers." Far from being an accidental eruption, mass action was an indication of the rising strength of the proletariat and a strategic response to the new phase of capitalism known as imperialism. Pannekoek's deep concern,
therefore, was that the socialist movement first properly understand mass action as a prelude to a major strategic and "spiritual" reorientation:

Imperialism and mass action are new phenomena whose nature and significance it is important to understand. Our only means of doing so is through controversy . . . which provokes a lively exchange of ideas and feelings, thereby inducing a new orientation of mind.23

In the course of his essay, Pannekoek outlined the basic components of his newly developed theory of mass action. What Pannekoek envisioned was a continuous and expanding series of mass actions ranging from ordinary street demonstrations to the general strike. These actions would serve to educate, collectivize, and strengthen the proletariat for the coming struggle for power while simultaneously weakening the foundations of the capitalist state. In Pannekoek's view, the main rationale for these actions lay not in their objective aims, but in their subjective impact on the consciousness of the working class. This view was closely connected to his conception of the nature of working class organization:

The proletariat's organization—its most important source of strength—must not be confused with the present-day form of its organizations and associations, which are shaped by conditions within the still vigorous bourgeois order. The nature of this organization is something spiritual—nothing less than the complete transformation of the proletarian mentality. It may well be that the ruling class, through legal measures and the police, will succeed in destroying the workers' organizations; but for all that, the workers will remain as they were—
just as effectively stripped of the old individualistic self which responded only to egotism and personal interest. The same spirit, comprising discipline, cooperation, solidarity, and the habit of organized action, will live in them more vividly than ever, and will create new forms of action. 24

In emphasizing the internal dynamic of mass mobilization against Kautsky's attitude of "passive expectation," Pannekoek argued explicitly that, given the aggressive character of imperialism, the proletariat had no choice but to defend itself by a direct assault on the power instruments of capitalism. Once again, Pannekoek stressed as he had in 1910, the necessity of the ultimate destruction of the capitalist state by the power instruments of the proletariat: "They must be beaten, their power must be broken." 25 It was precisely this emphasis that later prompted Lenin, in 1917, to devote a major portion of State and Revolution to the Pannekoek-Kautsky controversy. 26

Kautsky responded to Pannekoek's criticisms with an article entitled "The New Tactic" in which he reproached Pannekoek for "simplifying Marxism" and "spiritualizing organization." Pannekoek's claim that the essence of proletarian organization lay in its subjective and spiritual qualities, Kautsky contended, was "a master stroke of social alchemy." Kautsky took special pains to attack Pannekoek's call for the destruction of state power, maintaining that it was not based on an analysis of "concrete relationships and real states," but on
"simplistic speculations about abstractions." The real task of the proletariat, Kautsky maintained, was to form a government responsive to its needs and interests: "The goal of our political struggle remains what it has always been: conquest of state power by winning a majority in parliament. . . . But this is not the destruction of state power." In the same way, Kautsky also felt that mass action could be justified "only in occasional, extreme instances when the masses no longer can be held back." Pannekoek, he charged, in extolling the dynamic of mass struggles as a constant process of growth that improvised its own structures, failed to understand that the goal of the workers' movement was not struggle in itself, but specific results. The indiscriminate use of struggle would not lead to ever greater strength, but to exhaustion and decomposition of the movement. Kautsky, noting that Marx once used the term "parliamentary cretinism" to denigrate over-reliance on parliamentarianism, concluded his remarks by suggesting that the term "mass action cretinism" might well be applied to Pannekoek's over-emphasis on mass action.27

Pannekoek, hoping to influence the upcoming party congress, first took up Kautsky's arguments in a series of articles in the Bremer Bürgerzeitung and Leipziger Volkszeitung,28 and expanded upon these thoughts several weeks later in a Neue Zeit article entitled "Marxist Theory and Revolutionary Tactics" (Marxistische Theorie
und revolutionäre Taktik". With this essay, Pannekoek placed the question of Kautsky's methodology squarely in the forefront of the discussion. Taking up Kautsky's argument that the masses were as unstable and unpredictable as the shifting sands of the desert, Pannekoek charged Kautsky with un-Marxist reasoning:

If in analyzing a phenomenon, you find that it takes on various forms and is entirely unpredictable, that merely proves that you have not found the real basis determining it. If, after studying the position of the moon, for example, someone "came to the very definite conclusion" that it appears in the north-east, sometimes in the south and sometimes in the west, in an entirely unpredictable fashion, then everyone would rightly say that this study was fruitless—though it may be, of course, that the force at work cannot yet be identified. The investigator would only have deserved criticism if he had completely ignored the method of analysis which, as he perfectly well knew, was the one which could produce results in his field.

Kautsky's method of analysis, he charged, was one which focused solely on external appearances and could discover only "fixed, ready-made entities." His error was that he did not seek to identify the social and historical forces behind the new phenomena of mass action.²⁹

But Pannekoek, however, went a step further and attempted to pinpoint the social and cognitive source of this error rather than attribute it to personal failure or dishonesty on Kautsky's part. The difference in outlook, he felt, was due primarily to a difference in perception based on different experiences in different stages of the workers' movement. In what was one of his
most unique insights Pannekoek noted:

It is only when taken together that the two statements "The actions of men are entirely determined by their material relations" and "men must make their history themselves through their own actions" constitute the Marxist view as a whole. The first rules out the arbitrary notion that a revolution could be made at will; the second eliminates the fatalism that would have us simply wait until revolution happens on its own accord through some perfect function of development. While both maxims are correct in theoretical terms, they necessarily receive different degrees of emphasis in the course of historical development. When the party is first flourishing and must before all else organize the proletariat, seeing its own development as the primary aim of its activity, the truth embodied in the first maxim gives it the patience for the slow process of construction, the sense that the time of premature putsches is past and the calm certainty of eventual victory. Marxism takes on a predominantly historicoc-economic character during this period; it is the theory that all history is economically determined and drums into us the realization that we must wait for conditions to mature. But the more the proletariat organizes itself into a mass movement capable of forceful intervention in social life, the more it is bound to develop a sense of the second maxim. The awareness now grows that the point is not simply to interpret the world but to change it. Marxism now becomes the theory of proletarian action. The question of how precisely the proletariat's spirit and will-power develop under the influence of social conditions and how the various influences shape it now come into the foreground; interest in the philosophical side of Marxism and in the nature of mind now comes to life. Two Marxists influenced by these different stages will therefore express themselves differently, the one primarily emphasizing the predetermined nature of the mind, the other its active role; they will both lead their respective truths into battle against each other although they both pay homage to the same Marxian theory.30

Pannekoek extended this analysis to explain Kautsky's
emphasis on the formal aspects of working class organization:

The contrast between Kautsky's views and our own also makes it clear how it is that we differ so sharply in our evaluation of the organization even though we share the same theoretical matrix. It is simply that our perspectives correspond to different stages in the development of the organizations, Kautsky's to the organization in its first flowering, ours to a more mature level of development. This is why he considers the external form of organization to be what is essential and believes that the whole organization is lost if this form suffers. This is why he sees the transformation of the proletarian character to be the consequence of organization, rather than its essence. This is why he sees the main characterological effect of organization upon the workers in the confidence and self-restraint brought by the material resources of the collectivity—in other words, the funds. This is why he warns that workers will turn their backs upon the organization in demoralization if it suffers a major defeat. All this corresponds to the conception one would derive from observing the organization in its initial stages of development. The arguments that he puts against us do, therefore, have a basis in reality; but we claim a greater justification for our perspective in that it belongs to the new reality irresistibly unfolding. . . . It therefore reflects the sentiments of the young generation of workers that has evolved over the last ten years. The old ideas still apply, of course, but to a decreasing extent; Kautsky's conception expresses the primitive, immature moments in the organization, still a force to be reckoned with but an inhibiting, retarding one. It will be revealed by practice what relationships these different forces bear towards each other, in the decisions and acts by which the proletarian masses show what they deem themselves capable of.

Kautsky, less reserved in his judgments, accused Pannekoek of advocating "syndicalist conceptions." His sharpest reaction, however, was reserved for Pannekoek's emphasis on the destruction of the capitalist state:
Up till now the difference between social democrats and anarchists has consisted in the fact that the former wanted to conquer state power while the latter wanted to destroy it. Pannekoek wants to do both.

Kautsky continued by citing numerous quotations from Marx and Engels to prove his point that state power was as much a mechanism for dispossessions of ruling classes as it was one of class domination. To this argument, he added:

Perhaps Pannekoek wants to abolish the state function of the officials? But we cannot do without officials even in the party and trade union organizations, much less in the state administration. Our program demands, not abolition of state officials, but their election by the people. . . . What ministry with its officials could be abolished? . . . No, not one of the present ministries will be removed by our political struggle against the government. . . . I repeat to avoid a misunderstanding: it is not here a question of what form a victorious social democracy will give to the "future state," but of how our opposition changes the present state.

As a final rebuke, he suggested: "I strongly suspect that Pannekoek is gathering material for a book whose title could be: 'Mass Action by Isolated Men'."\(^{32}\)

The debate was brought to a close with a short rejoinder by Pannekoek in which he accused Kautsky of substituting name calling for discussion of the issues. To Kautsky's charges of syndicalism, Pannekoek retorted: "If he is correct that these views are syndicalist then so much the better for syndicalism." Beyond this, Pannekoek pointed out that Kautsky's extensive use of
quotations from Marx and Engels revealed the basic contrast between their methodologies:

I have used almost no citations of Marx and Engels because the new science which they brought to us is completely self-contained and does not need to continually prove that it is following in their footsteps with citations from their work. . . . There is nothing better he could have done to highlight the differences in our method and views.

Such an approach, he felt, was the "direct opposite" of Marxism. 33 By now it had become fully clear to Pannekoek that the gap separating him from official social democracy had widened into a chasm.

Militants Against the Apparatus: The Bremen Left

Pannekoek's break with the theory and practice of official social democracy corresponded to, and was greatly reinforced by, his move to the heavily industrialized city of Bremen in the spring of 1910 to organize and teach in a local SPD school. In contrast to his years in Berlin, Pannekoek was fully immersed in the active life of the party. Pannekoek's four years within the organizational framework of Bremen social democracy provided a fertile ground for the elaboration of his thought and were to be among the most fruitful of his career. In Bremen, Pannekoek found himself within a bastion of the German left, to whose inchoate radicalism he helped give a coherent structure. During the years which followed, Pannekoek was to exercise "through his contacts with both
the membership and the functionaries, a decisive influence on the Bremen party." As a result of Pannekoek's organizational and ideological work, the Bremen left emerged, in the view of one historian, as "the best anchored grouping of the extreme left wing of the Social Democratic Party." 

Unlike their Dutch counterparts, the Bremen left enjoyed the support of a mass working class base of considerable proportions, which by all appearances seemed to correspond to the prognosis of Marxian social doctrine. Several features of the local economy combined to yield a distinct pattern of development for Bremen social democracy. During the period 1890-1910, Bremen transformed itself from a commercial center into a stormy, growing city of capitalist large-scale industry. Between 1888 and 1907, the number of industrial workers increased fourfold: from 8,463 to 33,825. The groundwork for this accelerated tempo of industrial development was provided largely by the growth of the shipbuilding industry, which soon became the mainstay of the city's economy. In 1895, this sector of the economy ranked seventh with 849 workers; by 1907, it had reached second place with 5,633 workers, a rise of 563.5%. Only the building trades, which owed much of their prosperity to the rise of this industry, counted more workers: their total rose from 3,988 in 1895 to 7,488 in 1907, an increase of 87.8%. These increases were paralleled by
significant, but less dramatic, increases in several
other modern industries: in metal processing, the number
of workers rose from 2,381 to 3,465 (or 45.5%); in
textiles, from 1,304 to 2,073 (or 58.9%); in the printing
trades, from 748 to 1,059 (or 41.6%). The contours of
this productive infrastructure were also reflected in the
high concentration of workers found in Bremen enterprises.
In the shipbuilding and machine-building industries in
1907, 66.3% of the work force worked in shops with more
than 200 workers; 13.1% in shops with 51 to 200 workers;
12.1% in shops with 11 to 50 workers; and only 8.5% in
ships with less than 10 persons. Two shipyards alone
accounted for 3,830 workers. Due to the accelerated
pace of industrial development, much of the work force
was drawn from outside Bremen. By 1907, 57.5% of the
work force had been born elsewhere. This pattern of
accelerated industrialization and concentration was
combined with a relatively low working-class standard of
living. In 1906, the aggregate income of the Bremen
working class, which constituted two-thirds of the
population, was twenty million marks less than the
aggregate income of the wealthiest 2.6% of the popula-
tion. Taken together, these socio-economic factors
combined to create an unintegrated, volatile, and class-
conscious work force, whose inchoate radicalism profoundly
shaped the course of Bremen social democracy.

Until 1903, the socialist movement in Bremen was
completely dominated by a reformist organizational structure based in the trade unions. Throughout 1903 and 1904, internal tensions within the party built up rapidly, resulting in the crystallization of separate reformist and intransigent Marxist factions. The initial characteristics of the left group that emerged were fashioned by the interplay of several key elements. This train of developments began in October, 1902, when Heinrich Schulz became editor-in-chief of the *Bremer Bürgerzeitung*, which gave the left a powerful mechanism for defining the political direction of the movement. A former teacher, whose Marxism was shaped largely by ethical and humanitarian considerations, Schulz had been a longstanding opponent of the traditional line of Bremen social democracy. Schulz's principal collaborator on the *Bürgerzeitung* was the former cigar maker Alfred Henke. Steadfast in his commitment, and genial and down-to-earth in his temperament, Henke personified the self-educated worker-intellectual of the turn of the century. Through his weekly "From the Factory" column, Henke sought to inculcate a radical Marxist spirit within the membership.  

Schulz's first opportunity to promote a radical Marxist tactic came during the 1903 Reichstag elections, when he campaigned in the *Bürgerzeitung* against a proposed SDP alliance with the Liberals. When the election unexpectedly resulted in the victory of the SPD candidate, it greatly strengthened his position. This victory was
due in large part to an extensive agitational and propaganda campaign by the left, during which they distributed a total of 565,000 leaflets, and 43,000 extra copies of the Bürgerzeitung daily. In the weeks following the election, the pages of the Bürgerzeitung began to be increasingly characterized by the terminology of intrasigent Marxism, with an emphasis on "class struggle," "seizure of power by the proletariat," the "end goal," and "separation from the bourgeoisie."

A second issue of demarcation arose during the summer of 1903 over the question of revisionism. By this time, a distinct revisionist faction had crystallized around Friedrich Ebert. The main power base of this group lay in the trade union organizational structure, the electoral societies, the consumer cooperatives, and the socialist representatives on the city council. Following the condemnation of revisionism at the Congress of Dresden in September, 1903, a battle raged in the Bremen section over how the resolution could be implemented on the local level. The left's insistence on adherence to the traditional principles of class confrontation was strengthened by a lengthy period of labor unrest and strike activity which culminated in a four-month strike of building workers in 1904. By January, 1905, it was becoming clear that the radicals were gaining the upper hand when the reformists suffered a major defeat over the question of continued SPD participation in a Liberal educational
society, the Goethebund, following a long campaign against it by Schulz in the Bürgerzeitung. It was this defeat that prompted Ebert to leave Bremen for Berlin to work in the party secretariat. 46

These issues, however, were dwarfed by the mass strike debate of the summer of 1905, in which the factional lines emerged with full clarity. Following an aggressive campaign to take their position to the rank-and-file, the left achieved a major tactical victory when a mass membership meeting of August 8, 1905 approved a resolution by Schulz terming the mass strike a "new medium of revolutionary struggle" which the party. "must study, and if the situation arises, utilize." 47 This debate continued into the following year and became increasingly interwoven with the question of the relationship of the party to the local trade unions. Although still in Holland at the time, Pannekoek contributed to the debate with a prominent article entitled "Revisionism and Anarchism." 48

These controversies, while not as yet signifying a decisive victory, nonetheless strengthened the radical position. What was crucial in the consolidation of a radical majority, however, was the left's growing influence in a number of key institutions of Bremen social democracy. Among the most important developments was the creation in May, 1906, of a local secretariat to administer the day-to-day affairs of the party over the
objections of the reformists. In the factional struggles which followed, this new institution, which was dominated by the left from the start, played a critical role in undermining the influence of the trade union leadership in the party. In June, 1906, the radical Wilhelm Pieck was selected to head the secretariat. A carpenter by profession, Pieck was an indefatigable organizer, who combined the qualities of both a bureaucrat and an agitator. Through Pieck's tireless organizing and propaganda efforts, the radicals built up a strong organizational base in Bremen and the surrounding districts. Pieck could count among his most impressive accomplishments a dramatic rise in party membership, from 3,912 to 5,610, within the span of a few weeks. In the ensuing tactical debates, Pieck's organizational skills played an indispensable role in confirming the line of the radicals among the rank-and-file.

Another important source of radical influence lay in the local SPD educational program which the radicals had been instrumental in developing. This program began in 1905 with the formation of a workers' educational committee which sponsored an extensive series of forums and lectures that fall for trade unionists (including a major lecture by Pannekoek). To a large extent, the educational committee was an outgrowth of the debate earlier that year over participation in the liberal Goethebund, which led many to see the need for a form of workers' education separate from
bourgeois education. As Schulz expressed it, the workers themselves must determine the nature and extent of their knowledge and "not let the enemy class be allowed to determine it." 50 A proposal to establish a more formalized structure with a paid permanent instructor, however, was vetoed for the time being by the trade union leadership. 51 The impetus for much of this emphasis on education came from a small nucleus of socialist educators organized within the Teachers' Society, of whom Heinrich Schulz was the most prominent. From this group came many of the key activists of the left. 52

In firm control of the Bürgerzeitung, the secretariat, and the party's local educational program, the left was by 1906 in a position to disseminate the conceptions of intransigent Marxism to the rapidly growing membership. Their position was also greatly enhanced by the longstanding practice of holding regular general membership meetings of all the local sections at which major political questions were discussed and debated. It was these forums, above all else, which insured that the radicals retained the confidence of the membership. The first major opportunity to translate their views into action came in March, 1908, when spontaneous street demonstrations over the suffrage question erupted in Bremen for the first time. During the course of these demonstrations, the Bürgerzeitung approvingly called them a "specific weapon" of the proletariat. 53 This marked the start of a long and intense agitational campaign for
the use of the mass strike and other extra-parliamentary methods, which the radicals pursued in the Bürgerzeitung and in mass membership meetings. Throughout 1908 and 1909, this issue became interwoven with a growing criticism of the SPD leadership. In July, 1909, the Bürgerzeitung reproached the executive for its attitude toward finance reform, its support for armaments bills, and its unwillingness to initiate mass struggles. After a heated debate, this position was ratified by a mass membership meeting. By September, 1909, the Bürgerzeitung was prepared to assert that only the "energy of the masses" and the elan of a revolutionary mass movement could animate social democracy with the "new spirit" necessary for its revitalization. On the basis of this perspective, it was clear by the fall of 1909 that the majority of the Bremen movement was already in what would later be termed the left radical camp.

Sensing the imminence of a new epoch of revolutionary struggles, the Bremen left resurrected its longstanding plan for a permanent, joint educational program with the trade unions. When this proposal was approved in late 1909, Wilhelm Pieck conveyed to Pannekoek an offer to organize the program and serve as "scientific instructor." Although Pannekoek had turned down a similar offer in 1907, his growing dissatisfaction with his situation in Berlin now led him to readily accept. For Pannekoek, this appointment was the culmination of a long informal relationship with Bremen social democracy. Pannekoek's first contact
with this movement came in September, 1905, when, at Schulz's invitation, he came to lecture on religion and socialism. This relationship was deepened the following year when he taught with Schulz in the SPD central party school. During the course of the next few years, the Bürgerzeitung became one of the most regular outlets for his theoretical writings, which in turn played a critical role in the development of the Bremen left's own strategic perspective.

Pannekoek's appointment provoked heated opposition from the trade union functionaries, who feared it would strengthen the position of the radicals. Since the unions were responsible for 1,500 marks of Pannekoek's 4,000 mark salary, their support was essential. The issue was finally resolved, however, only by taking it directly to the trade union membership. Twenty-three unions and 12,844 members voted to confirm Pannekoek as opposed to twelve unions and 8,362 members against his appointment.

The stated intention of the Bremen SPD in creating a permanent educational program was to acquaint the workers with the "thought world of socialism" by means of "regular, systematic schooling." For Pannekoek, the question of developing an autonomous form of proletarian education took on added significance as an essential component of the process of "spiritual liberation" required by the new period of mass actions. A properly conducted proletarian education, he felt, would help lay the groundwork for the
emergence of a new type of party and trade union official who would no longer be tied to a "corrupt and bureaucratic system." In structuring his coursework, which was centered around social theory and the history of the workers' movement, Pannekoek attempted to develop a more popularized version of the material he had used in the central party school. This task was not without its difficulties. "Everything must be newly developed, built up and sustained," he complained to Pieck, "without textbooks, models or methods, or extracted from abstract scientific works and popularized." Because of the elementary nature of much of the material, he felt "more like a schoolmaster than a scientist." Pannekoek's courses, which were always coordinated with a variety of practical activities, were held at night to audiences of rank-and-file trade unionists. During the turbulent political struggles of the next decade, this group of former students played a key role in defining the political direction of the Marxist left in Bremen. Of this group of shop floor militants, Pannekoek later noted:

The strength of the party section resided in the great number of ordinary comrades, workers, and also women, who went about their duties with firm conviction and a quiet certainty, continuing their development at every opportunity offered; it was they who attended courses most regularly and got involved in questions and discussions. . . . They were the ones who attended all party meetings and responded with clear decisions on difficult questions and who formed a firm nucleus from which the majority derived the insights to make a common front against the reformists.
To these rank-and-file workers, Pannekoek felt "bound as a comrade."  

Pannekoek's first year in Bremen coincided with the emergence of two other key figures in the leadership nucleus of the Bremen left: Karl Radek and Johann Knief.

In the elaboration of the Bremen left's strategic perspective, Karl Radek played a role second only to Pannekoek. Polish by birth, Radek had long been active in the Russian, Polish, and German social democratic parties. Thin, small, and nervous, with an often vitriolic temperament, Radek combined broad knowledge with sarcasm and wit. Radek's special talents lay in journalism, which found expression in countless articles for the Bürgerzeitung. Radek first developed extensive contacts with the Bremen left in 1911, and a year later moved to Bremen to work on the Bürgerzeitung and in the party organization. His contacts with the left elsewhere in Germany and abroad were to play a crucial role in cementing a network of the left.

Johann Knief, by contrast, had been a long-standing activist within Bremen social democracy. A teacher from a working class background and a talented musician, Knief combined an introverted, and at times melancholy, temperament with qualities of absolute sincerity and firm dedication to principles. Knief's earliest activities were in the Teacher's Society where he emerged in 1909 as the leader of the social democratic faction. During that same year, he attempted to develop a "Section for Scientific
Socialism" within the organization, which aimed at furthering the understanding of socialism among Bremen teachers by means of a program of intensive readings, lectures, and discussions. Knief's original intention had been to recruit Pannekoek to organize and direct this program, but his project failed to materialize. Knief first began to write for the Bürgerzeitung as a music critic in 1910 and within a year rose to assistant political editor. By 1912, he had begun to play a role equal to Henke's in the management and policy formulation of the Bürgerzeitung. Along with his journalistic activity, Knief's contribution to the development of the Bremen left fell in the area of theory and organizational work. In the years following Pannekoek's arrival, Knief became Pannekoek's closest friend in Bremen, and a regular dinner guest at the Pannekoek household, where he often joined Pannekoek's wife Anna in playing duets on the piano. Politically, Pannekoek and Knief maintained a "teacher-pupil" relationship; Knief later acknowledged that Pannekoek had been the major political influence on his life.

The significance of Pannekoek, Knief, and Radek for the theoretical development of the Bremen left became readily apparent in the political controversies which occurred after 1910. In the months prior to Pannekoek's arrival in April, 1910, the Bremen movement was caught up in the excitement generated by the Prussian suffrage demonstrations. The Bürgerzeitung set the tone by proclaiming
the demonstrations the "beginning of the German Revolution" in a February 16 front page editorial.\textsuperscript{70} The previous night a general membership meeting had approved a report by Henke calling for escalation of the movement into a general strike.\textsuperscript{71} This question, however, soon became interwoven with a local issue involving the dismissal of a socialist teacher who was also a leader of the Teachers' Society. The Bremen SPD responded swiftly by organizing mass demonstrations. These demonstrations—which incorporated a demand for suffrage reform as well—began in early March and continued until April, on occasion ending in clashes with the police. The largest of these was held on March 14 and involved 12,000 persons.\textsuperscript{72}

These actions were followed by a lengthy discussion of the question of mass action in the Bürgerzeitung and in membership meetings throughout the spring and summer of 1910, with Pannekoek's evolving formulations defining the parameters of the debate. By the time of the Congress of Magdeburg in September, 1910, the Bremen SPD had developed into the leading proponent of mass action within the SPD. Shortly before the congress opened, the Bremen delegates took the initiative and organized a caucus of the left which found expression in a resolution drafted by Pannekoek and Rosa Luxemburg, and later signed by 62 delegates, calling for "bold and thorough mass action of the working population, using every means available, including the mass strike."\textsuperscript{73}

The growing antipathy of Pannekoek and the Bremen left
toward the traditional forms of working class organization was heightened by a prolonged dispute with both the national and local trade union leadership. Pannekoek defined the parameters of this conflict shortly before his arrival in Bremen, when he published a passionate correspondence article entitled, "Social Democratic Junior Officers" ("Sozialdemokratische Unteroffiziere"). Carrying forward his concept of the labor aristocracy, which had already earned him the lasting hostility of the trade union leadership, Pannekoek placed the issue of the trade union bureaucracy and its relation to the workers and revolutionary action squarely in the forefront of the discussion. He characterized the struggle between masses and leaders in the trade union movement as an "irreconcilable opposition between revolution and authority, between subversion and order." Drawing upon military metaphors, Pannekoek advanced the proposition that the trade union bureaucracy served as a consolidating agent of capitalism:

There is a deep contrast between the masses and their leaders. . . . The social democratic junior officers do what the Prussian junior officers cannot do; they quiet the unruly masses, accustom them to discipline and divert them from revolution. . . . They preach to them the harmony of interest between Capital and Labor and act to deepen the difference in outlook between officials and workers.

Pannekoek argued that this "corruption of the movement" represented the "main hope" of the bourgeoisie: "Bourgeois society will continue to sleep peacefully as long as a bureaucracy retains power in the labor movement and deter-
mines its politics."^{74}

Pannekoek's accusations unleashed a storm of protest in the trade union movement. The main point of contention involved Pannekoek's use of the phrase "junior officers"—a term that was particularly insulting in working class circles since many workers, while in the army, had been subjected to abuse by junior officers. In the end, Pannekoek was forced to back down and admit that the phrase was ill-chosen.^{75}

Pannekoek's critique of the trade union bureaucracy was given added credence by a series of events which occurred during the course of a bitter three-month-long shipyard workers' strike in the fall of 1910. This strike was an outgrowth of several years of progressively deteriorating work conditions involving wage cuts, lengthening of the work day, and speed-ups, which were a response to growing foreign competition in the shipbuilding industry.^{76} The catalyst for this strike, however, was an attempt by the shipbuilding firms to destroy the shipyard workers' union in Hamburg by a general lockout. In response, spontaneous solidarity strikes broke out in virtually every German port and in related industries.^{77} Despite the reluctance of their leaders, the Bremen shipyard workers were among the first to respond with a solidarity strike, which they pursued with great enthusiasm. Almost immediately, a major conflict broke out between the rank-and-file and the leadership over whether to expand the solidarity movement and how vigorousl
to pursue the strike. This conflict culminated in a mass meeting of striking workers in Hamburg on September 28, which called upon their unions to initiate a series of demonstrations, strengthen the solidarity movement, and undertake other militant actions. 78

These sentiments, however, failed to affect the union leadership's conduct of the strike. On October 8, 1910, the executive of the metal workers' union made an offer to end the strike on the basis of an agreement which resulted in almost no gains for the workers. This decision unleashed a storm of protest from the rank-and-file. In Bremen, a mass meeting of the metal workers' union held to vote on this agreement turned into a stormy confrontation between strikers and union officials, forcing the leadership to call an abrupt halt to the proceedings. When another meeting was held several days later, the agreement was rejected by a vote of 1,748 to 1,177. 79 Although the agreement was eventually pushed through by the leadership, the strike experiences continued to serve as "a special ideological reference point for the organizational politics of the Bremen left radicals." 80

Several weeks later, one of the trade union leaders sought to justify their policies at a public talk in Hamburg under the title, "Masses and Leaders." During the course of his remarks, he charged that "the masses are capricious, unreliable, and incapable of making important decisions" and must, therefore, place their trust in the "reason of
the leadership." Pannekoek lost no time in taking up the issue with another prominent correspondence article entitled, "Trade Union Democracy" ("Gewerkschaftliche Demokratie"). Avoiding accusations of personal error or dishonesty, Pannekoek argued that the trade unions had experienced a bureaucratization process which was embedded in the very logic of capitalism. Since their praxis is limited to the daily struggle for improvements in wages and working conditions, the trade union leaders can never acquire a mental outlook beyond the perceptions which arise from localized struggles and negotiations with the employers. The masses of workers, on the other hand, he argued, "experience exploitation directly and are affected by all facets of the proletarian liberation struggle" which is manifested in their "clear class consciousness and revolutionary perceptions." In the emerging mass actions of the future, Pannekoek felt that the determining factor would no longer be the "special wisdom of the leaders," but "the clear insight and self-reliance of the masses." This line of argument drove Pannekoek to the conclusion that cleavages of the type which had emerged between leaders and masses during the shipyard strike were both "inevitable and necessary." To resolve this contradiction, Pannekoek called for the formation of independent organizations chosen directly from the workers themselves, which would be able to convey the mood and will of the masses and "form the ideal organs to lead and build the
political mass strikes." Although Pannekoek did not, at this point, use the term "workers' councils," the main elements of this conception were clearly present in embryonic form in this proposal.

Once again Pannekoek's comments aroused the wrath of the German trade union leadership, who responded with a series of blistering personal attacks. Typical were the remarks in the official publication of the General Commission of German Trade Unions, which, after noting that Pannekoek lived in an "aristocratic quarter" of Bremen under circumstances which no worker could ever hope to attain, charged:

Pannekoek is a theoretical rope dancer, a quarrelsome person and an incorrigible grumbler. . . . The trouble is that Pannekoek fashions his persons and officials in such a way as required for his theory. In reality, these are neither such officials nor such workers. 84

Pannekoek responded to this kind of reasoning by charging that personal attacks represented a bourgeois methodology which can analyze society only in terms of personal relationships. 85 The high point of this controversy came in March, 1911, when Pannekoek debated the German trade union leader Karl Legien before an audience of 3,000-4,000 in Hamburg. 86 Pannekoek followed this up with a speaking tour of various parts of Germany to defend his position before trade union audiences.

In Bremen, Pannekoek's conflict with the trade union leadership became tied to a direct clash of organizational
power. When the Bürgerzeitung polemicized in favor of Pannekoek's position, the local trade union leadership attempted to organize a boycott of his courses and deny union funding of his salary. Throughout March and April, 1911, the Bremen left and the trade union leadership held a series of public discussions in an attempt to resolve their differences. These meetings, however, turned out to be more tumultuous than conciliatory, often, as Henke noted, taking on the character of "a cockfight between Pannekoek and some of the trade union representatives."87 The conflict was temporarily defused at a meeting on April 14, 1911, when Pannekoek asked that his course load be reduced in return for a withdrawal of union financing.88

The issues posed by this controversy were revived with even greater intensity during the course of a second shipyard workers' strike in July and August of 1913.89 In contrast to the earlier strike, this one was a wildcat strike, organized and conducted expressly against the wishes of the union leadership. This strike was again precipitated by events in Hamburg, where 18,000 shipyard workers suddenly and spontaneously walked off their jobs in protest over a refusal of the employers to negotiate.90 Once again, the movement quickly spread to Bremen, where 3,000 shipyard workers immediately joined the strike on July 21, without authorization from their organizations. That same evening a mass meeting of shipyard workers was held which drew a crowd of over 2,500 persons. The mood
was highly charged and demands that the strike be officially sanctioned were overwhelmingly approved. The strikers were soon joined by the local woodworkers' union and within a few days over 9,000 workers were on strike in Bremen.\textsuperscript{91}

Almost from the strike's inception, the trade union leadership began to conduct a campaign to deny it official recognition, leaving the strikers to the mercy of the employers' strike breaking tactics. These efforts culminated in a hastily-called congress of the metal workers' union—the main union involved in the strike—in Berlin, on August 8, 1913, which passed a resolution declaring that it would never give recognition to "wild incendiary strikes."\textsuperscript{92} When the trade union leadership began to invoke disciplinary measures against the strikers, they had little choice but to yield. The final result was that several thousand of the most militant workers were blacklisted from their jobs.\textsuperscript{93}

While these events were in progress, Pannekoek set himself the task of providing a more solid theoretical justification for the strike actions. In his opinion, the wildcat strike tactic represented a "small-scale revolution."\textsuperscript{94} To those who argued that such actions constituted a break in proletarian discipline, Pannekoek maintained that the question of discipline was much broader than simply adhering to statutes. Because of the bureaucratic structure of the trade union movement, a purely
coercive form of discipline could only be used to limit the mass struggles of the coming period. The conditions for victory, on the other hand, required the very qualities that this leadership was attempting to suppress: the revolutionary energy of the masses, and their solidarity and willingness for self-sacrifice. Pannekoek felt that these qualities constituted the real essence of proletarian discipline:

Is it not, then, a good thing if this initiative leads the masses to take different paths? Was it necessary to condemn the initiative of the naval dockers simply because they did not conform to the prescribed forms? We need not fall out over this particular instance; but, generally speaking, when we see absolute respect for trade union discipline being exalted as a supreme end in itself, we must proclaim with the utmost urgency that this is a sure way to choke an essential source of the future proletarian victory.95

Although the tide of events turned against the strikers, their experiences only confirmed for many Bremen workers the organizational critique which Pannekoek and the left radicals had been articulating since at least 1908. The prevailing view of many was summed up by a resolution which was overwhelmingly accepted by a vote of 432 to 45 at a membership meeting of the Bremen woodworkers' union, the last of the striking unions to return to work:

It is not our belief that the matter is lost that has compelled us to take this action [return to work], but the callow bureaucratization of our executive, which has defeated every effort of support. We strikers are of the opinion that if
the executive had been willing to aid the struggle, our opponents would have been defeated. It was not our opponents who defeated us, but our own organization and the shortsightedness of our executive.96

Paul Dittman, one of the strike leaders in Hamburg, bitterly noted that the day would come when the workers would "settle with the central bureaucracy."97

While the battle raged between the Bremen left and the party and trade union leadership over the questions of mass action and rank-and-file initiative, another point of demarcation began to emerge over the question of imperialism. Although the concept of imperialism had broad currency on the left following the appearance of J.A. Hobson's Imperialism in 1902, this question first became an issue of concern for the Bremen left in the spring of 1911 when the Bürgerzeitung began to polemicize against the SPD Reichstag faction for spreading illusions about imperialism.98 Until 1912, however, the Bremen left's conception of imperialism had been largely a fragmentary outline of assumptions, rather than a full-fledged theory. A more precisely articulated analysis was provided by Karl Radek in March, 1912, in the form of a brochure entitled German Imperialism and the Working Class (Der deutsche Imperialismus und die Arbeiterklasse). Pannekoek--who used it as the basis of much of his own conception of imperialism--later pronounced it the best work on imperialism prior to the war.99 In this broad and sweeping
analysis of the economic basis of imperialism and its consequences, Radek viewed the main dynamic of imperialism as rooted in capital export and the expansionist politics it engendered. This expansionism, he felt, led to nationalist rivalries, of which intensified armaments production was an inevitable by-product. Radek's particular concern, however, was with establishing the aggressive character of German imperialism, which, he argued, was most directly manifested in its naval shipbuilding program. Radek went on to draw the tactical conclusion that the main arena of the Bremen left's anti-military work should be in the naval shipyards, the main base of German naval armaments production.

With their theoretical edifice firmly in place, the Bremen left began to increasingly turn their attention to influencing national party policy. Throughout the spring and summer of 1912, the Bremen left focused much of their energies on developing a comprehensive policy of organizational reform for the SPD to be presented at the Congress of Chemnitz. In July, a proposal by Pannekoek was approved, which called for the formation of two advisory bodies independent of the party leadership. One, a purely theoretical body, was to be composed of the "best political minds of the party," who would devote their time to analyzing the major political questions of the day. This body was to be supplemented by an organizational council composed of representatives from the large cities
and industrial districts, who would advise the executive on the mood of the masses. 101

At Chemnitz, Pannekoek's proposal for party reform became closely linked to resolutions on imperialism and armaments limitations. During the course of the proceedings, Pannekoek defended with relentless efficiency the left radical position that imperialism and armaments production would inevitably lead to war and could be effectively combatted only by revolutionary mass actions. In his speech, Pannekoek reiterated his opposition to any policy which relied on the existence of bourgeois anti-imperialist "counter-tendencies": "We therefore emphasize that in the struggle against imperialism the workers must not rely on any sort of tendency opposed to imperialism within the bourgeois world, but only on themselves. In themselves they will find the strength to defeat imperialism." 102 Once again, the left suffered a major defeat when the congress overwhelmingly approved a resolution submitted by the executive declaring that the dangerous effects of imperialism could be mitigated only through arms accords and free trade.

For Pannekoek, the events of Chemnitz only confirmed his view that the Marxist center was abandoning Marxist tactics and uniting with the revisionists to form "a gigantic kind of reformism." Chemnitz, he argued, marked only the preliminary stage of a "deep spiritual struggle" which would eventually be paralleled by a direct struggle
against the party apparatus. Strengthened by the
decisions of Chemnitz and by the emergence of a new
centrists faction in Bremen, the local reformists took the
opportunity to mount a two-month-long offensive against
the left. Since Pannekoek had emerged as the leading
spokesman of the left, the reformists attacked him with
particular vehemence, terming him a "syndicalist," and
a "great worshipper of the masses," and, in at least one
instance, demanded his expulsion.104

The debate over armaments and imperialism resumed
with new fervor at the Congress of Jena in September,
1913. At the congress, Pannekoek and the Bremen delegation
joined forces with Rosa Luxemburg and other left groups to
present sharply worded resolutions opposing the party's
recent support for the military budget and reaffirming the
use of the mass strike and other offensive tactics. This
debate, with minor variations, was substantially the same
as those of the past.105 In contrast to Chemnitz, however,
this congress was marked by significant gains for the left
radicals, who managed to obtain about 30 per cent of the
vote, including support from a part of the center.106
Pannekoek drew from this the conclusion that the left
radicals were not a decisive minority "bringing to
expression the driving spirit of the masses."107

During the same time that they were locked in combat
with the party leadership, the left radicals were torn by
a number of strategic and personal divisions of their own,
which greatly weakened their position. From a theoretical standpoint, the most fundamental division involved a series of theoretical differences over the nature of imperialism between the Bremen group and Rosa Luxemburg. The principal dividing point centered upon what constituted the driving force of imperialism. Rosa Luxemburg, in her classic work *The Accumulation of Capital*, argued that the main dynamic of imperialism was rooted in goods exports to newly penetrated colonial markets. Since these markets offered only limited prospects for expansion, the result would be an inevitable capitalist economic collapse. Pannekoek and Radek, however, considered Luxemburg's emphasis on the limits to capitalist expansion to be fatalistic and mechanistic and felt that it would lead only to political passivity. Their view was that the main dynamic of imperialism was located in capital export, which offered numerous possibilities for expansion. This increasing divergence ultimately led Pannekoek to formulate a sustained critique of Rosa Luxemburg's work, which was prominently featured on the front pages of the *Bürgerzeitung.*

The issue that evoked the most controversy, however, involved a parallel dispute between the Bremen group and Rosa Luxemburg over the activities of Karl Radek. This complicated controversy began in May, 1912, when the left radicals of the small south German city of Göppingen, in the midst of a factional dispute, brought in Radek as a
temporary editor of their local newspaper. When Radek began to use the publication to polemicize against the local and national party leadership, the executive launched a well-orchestrated defamation campaign against him aimed at laying the groundwork for his expulsion. After researching Radek's activities in the SPD, the executive concluded that there was some doubt about his membership status. More fuel was added to the fire on August 21, 1912, when Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches engineered Radek's expulsion from the Polish Socialist Party on the grounds of financial irregularities he was alleged to have committed while active in that party. Shortly afterwards, Rosa Luxemburg joined forces with the SPD executive to seek his expulsion from the German party as well.109

In response, the Bremen left began to take up Radek's cause and once again found itself locked in combat with the executive. Following a spirited defense of Radek at the Congress of Chemnitz by the Bremen delegation, a special commission was created to examine the charges against Radek and report to the next congress.110 At this point, the controversy shifted to Bremen, where the local reformists began a campaign to expel Radek from the party. During the course of this struggle, Pannekoek emerged as Radek's leading defender. In taking up Radek's case, Pannekoek stressed that what was at stake was not Radek's honesty, but the political development of the left. Radek, he argued, by helping to make the Bürgerzeitung a major
force in the SPD, had "rendered an important service for the spiritual development of the party." Partly through Pannekoek's efforts, Radek received a full vote of confidence from the membership following a series of meetings over the issue. This support, however, prompted Rosa Luxemburg, who had emerged as Radek's chief antagonist, to break off all relations with the Bremen left. It was largely in response to this move that the Bürgerzeitung chose to give prominence to Pannekoek's critique of her economic doctrines.

When the special commission concluded that Radek was guilty of the charges against him, the executive moved, at the 1913 Congress of Jena, to formally expel Radek from the party. Despite considerable behind-the-scenes maneuvering by Pannekoek, and a lengthy debate, the motion passed overwhelmingly. It now remained for the Bremen left to determine their own response. Although consideration was given to the idea of ignoring the decision, Radek announced at a membership meeting on October 14, 1913, that he would abide by it pending an appeal. Pannekoek, however, offered a resolution reaffirming Radek's position on the Bürgerzeitung, which was narrowly accepted by a vote of 182 to 181.

Inside the Bremen leadership nucleus, a series of conflicts developed between Henke and the other left radicals as Henke moved increasingly toward the center on a number of issues. The first of these disputes occurred
at a membership meeting on July 23, 1912, when Henke opposed a proposal by Pannekoek on party reorganization. In May, 1913, a conflict developed between Knief and Henke over the military financing bill when Henke wrote an article favorable to the executive's position. Knief, in a direct challenge to Henke's authority as editor-in-chief, accused him of attempting to discredit the left radical politics of the Bürgerzeitung. Henke thereupon suggested that Pannekoek and Radek were behind Knief's actions. These differences were aired at a series of membership meetings throughout the summer of 1913. During this same period, Henke also began to waver in his support for mass actions. When the wildcat shipyard workers' strike erupted in August, 1913, Henke joined the trade union functionaries in opposing it. Despite the fundamental nature of many of these differences, this process of differentiation did not reach full maturity until well into the war years when separate groups crystallized around Knief and Henke.

Whatever the extent of these differences within the left radical camp, it was clear that on the eve of the First World War, the Bremen left had embarked on a course markedly different from that of the SPD majority. During the course of their long struggle against reformism, they became convinced that the limits of parliamentary and trade union tactics could be transcended only by radical tactics, by the use of the mass strike and reliance on
rank-and-file initiative. Knief summed up this situation when he observed that "our threads to the organization are becoming looser and looser... and our connection with the motherbody increasingly lost." 119

"Sect or Party?" The Dutch SDP

While these developments were unfolding within German social democracy, a similar process of political differentiation was already well underway in Holland, though the form was completely different. Pannekoek, although in Germany, continued to be closely connected to these events and played a major role in placing them in theoretical focus. Forced out of the SDAP by the events at Deventer, the Tribunist opposition gathered in Amsterdam on March 14, 1909, to formally proclaim the Sociaal Democratische Partij (SDP). The prevailing mood was one of exuberant optimism. The shared assumption was that the workers of the large industrial centers--Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and the Twente textile district--would rally to them on the basis of their intransigent Marxist propaganda. Jan Ceton captured this buoyant sense of a new beginning when he observed: "The workers await us. If we delay, they will no longer listen to us." 120 As a theoretical starting point, the SDP adopted an orthodox Marxist program identical to that of the SDAP, which they claimed the Troelstra leadership had violated. Gorter declared in a passionate address that whereas the SDAP was like "a ship without a rudder," the
SDP would remain "firm and unshakeable, convinced of the truth of our principles."\textsuperscript{121} Despite these expectations, only about 400 persons (about 5% of the total membership) left the SDAP to join the new party. These included 160 from Amsterdam, 65 from Rotterdam, 56 from Leiden, and 25 from Utrecht.\textsuperscript{122}

Although confident of its future prospects, the SDP emerged from its first congress under conditions of considerable uncertainty and confusion. For several months, the split was far from definitive as groups in both parties continued to work for reunification. These efforts were led primarily by members of the now-divided \textit{Nieuwe Tijd} group. Of this group, Pannekoek, Gorter, and Wiedijk affiliated with the new party, while Roland Holst, van der Goes, and Wibaut remained in the SDAP. Henriette Roland Holst's support for the SDAP, however, was still highly qualified at this point. In early March, she addressed a letter to the SDAP executive which noted her "inner agreement" with the new party and warned that in the event of any further attempts to restrict freedom of expression the remaining Marxists also would withdraw.\textsuperscript{123} Roland Holst followed this up with a lengthy appeal in the \textit{Nieuwe Tijd}--which was unaffected by the split--for both parties to attempt to work out their differences.\textsuperscript{124}

The first significant step toward a compromise was taken when Roland Holst and Wibaut appealed to the International Socialist Bureau (ISB) to mediate the dispute.
On March 10, 1909, Gorter and Wijnkoop met in Brussels with the Belgian leaders of the ISB, Vandervelde, Anseele, and Huysmans. According to Gorter, the reception was surprisingly cordial and sympathetic, with the Belgians expressing annoyance over the expulsions and agreeing that the Tribunists' grievances were legitimate.\textsuperscript{125} Later that week, Huysmans formulated a proposal which embodied three basic points: (1) That the Tribunists carry out the decision of Deventer in regard to abolishing the Tribune; (2) That the SDAP appoint a third editor, drawn directly from the Tribune, to the new Marxist weekly supplement to Het Volk; (3) that the SDAP guarantee freedom of expression to the Marxist minority. Despite opposition from key leaders such as Vliegen, the SDAP agreed to accept the proposals; however, the SDP rejected them. Within the SDP executive, Gorter and Mendels favored accepting the proposals, while Wijnkoop, Ceton, van Ravesteijn, and two others were opposed. This decision was subsequently ratified by the membership by a vote of 257 to 135.\textsuperscript{126} In protest, Mendels resigned to rejoin the SDAP, while Gorter seriously considered doing so.\textsuperscript{127} Gorter, writing to Pannekoek about the vote, noted:

Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn did not want a compromise; they were so absorbed in the thoughts of their own party with themselves as leaders, that they no longer wanted to remain in the old organization. Wijnkoop is someone who sees two ways to reach a goal, a right way and a wrong way, and always chooses the wrong way because he doesn't trust the right way.\textsuperscript{128}
Shortly after the split had been finalized, the SDP filed a request with the ISB for admission to the International. This request was debated at a meeting on November 7, 1909. At this meeting, Lenin and the Bolsheviks emerged as the leading proponents of the SDP's admission, which marked the first of a long series of contacts between the two parties. Henriette Roland Holst also sent a letter supporting admission on the grounds that the SDP was based on Marxist principles and that its admission might help restore unity. In the end, the SDP was denied a seat on the ISB, but allowed to send delegations to international congresses.  

Although the day-to-day leadership of the new party rested with Wijnkoop, van Ravesteijn and Ceton, Pannekoek and Gorter played a crucial role in the initial formulation and dissemination of the SDP's ideology. Despite his initial hesitation, Gorter soon began to work for the SDP with full enthusiasm. During the first difficult years of the SDP's existence, Gorter was, as Henriette Roland Holst later noted, "a force whose significance cannot be overestimated." In addition to providing much of the SDP's financial support, Gorter, through his numerous speeches and writings, came to symbolize the new party for many Dutch workers. His stature almost immediately ranked him "first among equals" in the party leadership. Like Gorter, Pannekoek also abandoned his earlier reservations and gave the new party unqualified support. Writing to Henriette
Roland Holst, he noted:

What we earlier saw as a defeat, we now see differently. Now that everything is behind us, it appears as something completely natural and logical that could have developed in no other way. What we once perceived as a disaster and which brought with it sorrow and struggle, now represents liberation, a breath of new fresh life which carries with it new thoughts and new actions.  

At Gorter's request, Pannekoek journeyed to Bussum for several weeks to help draft documents for the new party. From this collaboration came two of the SDP's key formative documents: Gorter's *Social Democracy and Revisionism* (Sociaal-demokratie en revisionisme), and Pannekoek's *The Foundation of the SDP* (Die Gründung der SDP). Upon returning to Germany, Pannekoek began a campaign to promote the Tribunists' cause within German social democracy.  

During the first year of its existence, the SDP was guided largely by the principles which had characterized the Tribune from its inception, those of a militant, intransigent Marxism. This amounted above all to the belief that the primary duty of the party was to pursue a policy of "implacable" class struggle: "we are not preachers and teachers but fighters."  

Behind these views lay the assumption that the international class struggle had entered a new period of direct revolutionary struggle. These themes were developed into a coherent body of doctrine and popularized in Gorter's *Social Democracy and Revisionism*. In this widely circulated
brochure, Gorter stressed four key points of the SDP's strategy: (1) A direct class struggle aimed at establishing socialism through conquest of state power. (2) A struggle directed against the bourgeoisie in its entirety. (3) A policy of relying solely on the power of the working class rather than on interclass alliances with the bourgeoisie. (4) A strategy based on actions which strengthen the power and consciousness of the working class.\textsuperscript{136}

The first test of the SDP's strength came in the June, 1909 election. In the three districts—Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Leiden—where the party ran legislative candidates the result was a stunning defeat. Despite an extensive and aggressive propaganda campaign, the SDP received a combined total of only 542 votes, or about 1.5% of the total vote in each district.\textsuperscript{137} Even before the electoral campaign got underway, the SDP suffered a major loss when the majority of the Utrecht section and about ten members of the Amsterdam section left to rejoin the SDAP.\textsuperscript{138} In assessing this defeat, Gorter attributed it to the average worker's lack of knowledge about socialism: "He thinks too little of his own politics, of his own power, and too much in terms of bourgeois type politics." For this, Gorter's proposed remedy was only "propaganda and more propaganda."\textsuperscript{139} Henriette Roland Holst, commenting on the fact that the SDAP had drawn 8,200 votes in the same districts (up from 6,500 in the previous elections), viewed it as an argument for SDP members to return to the
SDAP: "These figures are a strong objective justification for our decision to remain in the old party; they open up the prospect of a gradual Marxist rejuvenation of the party."\(^1\) The SDP's electoral fortunes improved only slightly in the municipal council elections a month later when it obtained 1,888 votes.\(^2\)

With its membership base weak and its electoral prospects limited, the SDP's flagging optimism was sustained largely by the wave of mass actions which characterized the last years of the pre-war period. When the suffrage demonstrations broke out in Prussia in February, 1910, Wijnkoop pronounced them a matter of "direct significance for the workers' movement in Holland" and the beginning of an international revolutionary movement.\(^3\) In the months that followed, Pannekoek's correspondence articles in the *Tribune* brought the theoretical formulations of the German left to the SDP membership so that, in the eyes of one historian, "under his influence the SDP developed into a fiery propagandist of mass protest action."\(^4\) By the spring of 1912, the SDP was prepared to call upon the Dutch working class to turn large-scale economic strikes into "struggles against state power."\(^5\)

The first attempt by the SDP to intervene in a mass struggle came during a strike of Amsterdam construction workers during the winter of 1909-1910. Since the unions involved were affiliated with the anarcho-syndicalist NAS, both the SDAP and the NVV refused to lend their support to
the strike. Despite their ideological differences with the anarcho-syndicalists, the SDP readily offered active moral and material support to the strikers on the grounds that the unions were acting on the basis of the class struggle.\textsuperscript{145} This strike provoked a lengthy discussion in the SDP over what policy to maintain toward the trade union movement. Ceton, in a series of articles, summarized what later became the SDP's official position. The SDAP, he argued, had been captured by the trade union bureaucracy of the NVV and transformed into an organization limited to working for minor political reforms beneficial to the trade union movement. Both the NVV and the SDAP, he felt, were neglecting the fundamental tasks of organizing the unorganized and developing and strengthening class consciousness through involvement in the class struggle. These tasks, by contrast, were being fulfilled by the NAS-affiliated unions, whatever their other shortcomings.\textsuperscript{146}

What was increasingly becoming a \textit{de facto} alliance with the syndicalists was further cemented in 1911 during the course of a dockworkers' strike. In this strike, which was part of a larger North Sea harbor and shipping strike, the Rotterdam unions were affiliated with the NVV while the Amsterdam unions were affiliated with the NAS. Shortly after the strike began, the Rotterdam unions pushed through a settlement which resulted in only minor gains and left the Amsterdam unions to continue the strike on their own. Several days later, the SDAP executive--despite
formidable opposition from the remaining "peace Marxists"—voted to discontinue all support for the strike. As in the construction workers' strike, the SDP gave the strikers full and active support. By now, the SDP leaders were ready to appear jointly with the syndicalist leaders at strike support meetings. In Amsterdam, the strike turned into an increasingly bloody and dramatic class confrontation, culminating in a clash between soldiers and strikers. When the strike was finally defeated by the use of government-protected strike-breakers brought in from Germany, the SDP and the syndicalists accused the SDAP of sabotaging the strike.

Within the SDAP, these events led to a renewed internal crisis, which offered new hope for the SDP. In the aftermath of the strike's defeat, the "peace Marxists" launched a full-scale attack on the SDAP and NVV leadership for their refusal to support the strike. This attack was led by Henriette Roland Holst and Henk Sneevliet, head of the Dutch Union of Railway and Tram Personnel. When the SDAP congress confirmed the executive's position, both resigned from the party in protest. Roland Holst, still harboring doubts about Wijnkoop's personality and methods, again refrained from joining the SDP. Sneevliet, a close friend of Roland Holst, who shared many of her doubts, nonetheless joined, becoming the first trade union leader of any consequence to affiliate with the new party.
Several months later, the SDP-syndicalist alliance was formalized as a cornerstone of SDP policy at the 1911 Congress of Rotterdam. Wijnkoop declared:

Not only the SDP but also the syndicalists... must become stronger, because the cooperation that is a necessary precondition for any meaningful kind of unity, arises only out of strength, when there is no longer a possibility of being destroyed.

Such unity, which could only be born out of struggle, he felt, would "open the door to socialism." In justifying this policy, Wijnkoop argued that the syndicalist unions were qualitatively different from the "bourgeois" unions of the NVV as a result of their willingness to struggle. For the SDP, this alliance had far-reaching consequences. As one of its leaders later noted, it "raised to a considerable extent the self-consciousness of the membership and the feeling of the invincibility of their organization, and earned them a certain name and reputation among the undoubtedly socialist-inclined, struggling workers, who were adverse to politics but found their reference point in the syndicalist trade unions."  

The SDP's first attempt to use this alliance as a means of developing a base in the working class came in late 1911, when it joined with the syndicalists to form a National Agitation Committee against the High Cost of Living. From a strategic standpoint, this organization was viewed as a mechanism for channeling discontent over rising inflation into a mass movement. This committee,
which was open to all organizations "willing to act from the standpoint of the class struggle," was composed of representatives from the SDP and about a dozen anarchist and syndicalist organizations and unions. The committee's main function was to organize a network of local coalitions to lay the ground work for a series of local and regional demonstrations leading up to a national demonstration on April 12, 1912. The results of these efforts, however, were unusually meager. Despite an intensive propaganda campaign, only about 400 persons participated in the national demonstration.

These achievements notwithstanding, the bright hopes which had sustained morale through the formative period increasingly gave way to an undercurrent of pessimism and self-doubt. A year after its formation, the SDP's membership had risen to only 505 and the new party was forced to admit that it still remained "totally unknown" to the working class. By 1911, this figure stood at a mere 575 and the bitter reality was clear: "Our small sections throughout the country have a difficult struggle ahead of them." A year later, the number had dropped to 511 and the party could only note: "Struggle, struggle, and still more struggle--that must be our watchword." In 1913, the figure was 533; in 1914, 525. In 1913 alone over one hundred members left the party, many to rejoin the SDAP. More troubling still was the low circulation of the Tribune, which had attained only 1,266 subscribers.
by 1914.\textsuperscript{161} Nor did the SDP show any improvement in the electoral arena. In the 1913 elections, the party drew only 1,340 votes in 18 districts, in contrast to 144,000 for the SDAP.\textsuperscript{162} Even Gorter fared poorly, obtaining only 196 votes as opposed to 5,325 for the SDAP candidate.\textsuperscript{163} These weaknesses were further compounded by the party's low proportion of working class members. Although the SDP's social composition remains difficult to gauge, it is clear that the "pure proletarian" element represented a minority. A survey made by the party in 1911 revealed that 56% of the members were either self-employed or white-collar workers, predominantly teachers and office workers.\textsuperscript{164} Only in the Amsterdam III section was there a sizable core of working class supporters.

This failure of the SDP to establish a working class base of any significant dimensions stood in stark contrast to the rapid growth of both the SDAP and the NVV during this same period. The economic growth which followed the economic crisis of 1908 to 1909 raised expectations within the working class of a major improvement in living conditions. They expected, however, that these improvements would be secured through traditional trade union and parliamentary channels.\textsuperscript{165} In the year after the split, the SDAP picked up 1,000 new members—over twice what it had lost to the SDP.\textsuperscript{166} Starting with 9,500 members at the time of the split,\textsuperscript{167} the SDAP attained 12,582 members by 1911;\textsuperscript{168} by 1913, this was up to 15,667;\textsuperscript{169} a year
later, following a spectacular rate of growth, it had reached 25,708. During the year 1913, the party's sections grew phenomenally, from 284 to 389, and the circulation of *Het Volk* from 23,519 to 30,149. By the eve of the war, the SDAP had become a full-fledged mass party of the Dutch working class. Significantly, much of this growth was concentrated in the large urban industrial centers—the very areas where the Tribunists had placed their highest hopes. A similar pattern of growth characterized the NVV, which grew from 18,960 members at its foundation in 1906, to 40,628 in 1910, 61,447 in 1913, and 84,434 in 1914.

The contrast between the SDP's small membership base and the high hopes and expectations of its founders led to a continuing internal debate over the nature of the party and its relationship to the working class. The issue that evoked the most controversy began in 1910 when the SDAP announced its intention to launch an extensive national suffrage campaign organized around collecting signatures for a petition to be presented to the government at a national demonstration. This campaign immediately triggered a full-scale debate within the SDP on whether to sign the petition. For many in the SDP, this gesture was viewed as opportunist action signifying support for the SDAP. In the end, a referendum approved signing the petition by a vote of 198 to 124.

The issues posed by this controversy extended well
beyond the immediate question itself, and were a source of one of the SDP's first sustained theoretical reflections about the party's relationship to the working class. Gorter—who had been the most prominent supporter of signing the petition—defined the basic parameters of the problem in a major article entitled "Sect or Party?" For him, the principal dividing point between a party and a sect was not in numbers, but in the qualitative aspects of working class organization:

Whenever a group, no matter how small, bases its actions on the development of society, then it is a party, yes, the party. . . . Science, theory, and the tactics which flow from it are what make a workers' party, not members. Conversely, a workers' party whose actions are not based on the knowledge of society is not a real party even if it has a hundred thousand supporters. It is only a crowd, masses of people gathered around a troop of demagogues.

By the same token, Gorter felt that there was a real danger that a small party based on doctrinal purity would isolate itself by rejecting serious political activity. To avoid this, Gorter felt that it was incumbent upon the SDP to attempt to lead broad-based political actions. Because the party lacked all the instruments of power except the power to propagate Marxist conceptions ("our only strength for a very long time"), it had no choice but to attempt to propagate these conceptions within existing movements. 175

Drawing heavily from Pannekoek's writings, the SDP began to focus increasingly on the subjective aspects of
working class organization. The prevailing view was that
the SDP was in a transitory stage similar to that of the
SDP during the period 1890-1897 in Holland, when the old
socialist movement had lost its strength and the new one
had not yet fully matured. This maturation would come
only in the course of the turbulent new struggles of the
future. In any case, the SDP argued that the SDAP,
despite its larger numbers, was still not representative
of the Dutch working class. As Ceton noted in response
to Het Volk's scornful remarks about the SDP's small
membership:

We will not repeat our old words "the workers
await us." They are awaiting socialism. You
laughed because you couldn't and wouldn't
understand this. At the same time, not even one
half a per cent of the Amsterdam dock and
transportation workers are organized in the Labor
Party [SDAP]; not even one per cent in the
metal and building trades and not even one sailor
in a thousand. . . . And yet you claim to
represent the proletariat which you clearly do
not. Through our program—a socialist program—we
are attempting to do what you deny in theory
and practice. Upon our shoulders rests the
difficult and backbreaking task of bringing the
workers to social democracy.176

For other SDP members, however, the party's feeble
membership base and limited prospects were problems which
could not be resolved. Sneevliet spoke for this group
when he left the SDP to rejoin the SDAP on the grounds that
the SDP's emphasis on disseminating Marxist principles
had led it to become little more than "a kind of Marxist
Fabian Society."177
As it grappled with the complex question of defining its relationship to the working class, the SDP began to see the relationship between the SDAP and capitalist society in a new light. On the basis of what it perceived to be the SDAP's growing rapprochement with the Liberals and increasing interest in governmental power, the SDP developed an analysis which held that the SDAP had become a "confirmed state party," which functioned as a mechanism for integrating the working class into the capitalist state. This issue was brought into sharp focus when, after the 1913 elections, the SDAP was offered three ministerial positions in a projected left-center coalition. When the SDAP began to debate this offer, the SDP attempted to influence the outcome with a fiery appeal to the SDAP membership:

"Your leaders have been steadily trying to convince you for a number of years that the most important struggle is being waged by them in parliament. They have misled you. You have obtained your seats, but lost your independence."

While the SDAP was coming increasingly to terms with the capitalist system, a new view of this system was beginning to take hold within the SDP. Like the left elsewhere in Europe, the SDP's strategy, from 1912 onwards, began to be dominated by the question of imperialism and militarism. When Radek's brochure on imperialism appeared, the Tribune serialized excerpts from it, and the party made it the basis of its own conception. This was supple-
mented by Gorter's writings on imperialism, which, like
Pannekoek's, stressed the ideological aspects of imperial-
ism and the necessity of an ongoing mass struggle against
it. Nothing symbolized the contrast in outlook between
the two Dutch parties over the question of imperialism and
militarism more than a public debate between Gorter and
Troelstra during Gorter's 1913 legislative candidacy.
For the first time, Troelstra was prepared to assert
publicly that in the event of the threat of war, the SDAP
would not resist the general mobilization and would defend
the country: "The ground where we were born and where we
struggled against the bourgeoisie is holy for us." Gorter,
by contrast, reaffirmed the SDP's position that under
imperialism there could be no such thing as a defensive
war and that socialists had the duty to mobilize actively
against it beforehand.180

Taken together, the SDP's views on mass action and
imperialism, its attempts to intervene in mass struggles,
and its growing range of international contacts, all
served to reinforce the conviction of the invincibility
of their cause. Pannekoek, in an article commemorating
the foundation of the Tribune, attempted to place the
party's existence in historical perspective. The SDP, he
was prepared to assert, was part of a larger current of
"international struggling Marxism," which was a political
tendency coming "increasingly to the forefront." What
distinguished this current was its willingness to wage an
active revolutionary class struggle against the capitalist state. The split within the social democratic movement in Holland, he felt, was only "an earlier and sharper form" of political differences that were beginning to emerge on an international scale.¹⁸¹
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 139.

3. Pannekoek discussed these criticisms in a letter to Kautsky dated February 4, 1909, Kautsky Archives, XVIII, op. cit., folder 308.

4. Ibid.


7. Ibid., pp. 418-421.


11. Ibid., May 2, 1910.


16. This talk was widely circulated in brochure form as: Die Machmittel des Proletariats (Stuttgart: Sozialdemokratischen Vereins Stuttgart, 1910), p. 3.


19. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, November 6, 1911, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., XVIII, folder 413.

20. This controversy is noted in Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, March 18, 1912, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., XVIII, folder 412.


22. This controversy occupied 116 pages in the Neue Zeit as compared to 93 pages for the 1910 Kautsky-Rosa Luxemburg controversy.


24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. While noting that Pannekoek's analysis had "very great defects" and "lacks precision and concreteness," Lenin went on to praise Pannekoek: "In this controversy it is Pannekoek, not Kautsky, who represents Marxism. . . ." V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: Intern-
national Publishers, 1932), p. 94. In the view of 
one historian, Pannekoek's conclusions about the 
attitude of the proletariat toward the state repre-
sented "a bridge between the reflections of Marx on 
the Paris Commune and the theses of Lenin in State 
and Revolution." Massimo Salvadori, Karl Kautsky and 

27. Karl Kautsky, "Die neue Taktik," Die Neue Zeit, 1911-
reprint see: Die Massenstreikdebatte, op. cit.

28. Anton Pannekoek, "Kautsky über die neue Taktik," 
Bremer Bürgerzeitung, September 10, 11, and 12, 1912; 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, September 9, 10, and 11, 
1912.

29. Anton Pannekoek, "Marxistische Theorie und revolu-
tionäre Taktik," Die Neue Zeit, 1912-1913, Vol. I, 
pp. 272-281, 365-373. An English translation of this 
can be found in: D.A. Smart (ed.), Pannekoek and 
Gorter's Marxism, op. cit., pp. 50-73.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Karl Kautsky, "Der jüngste Radikalismus," Die Neue 

33. Anton Pannekoek, "Zum Schluss," Die Neue Zeit, 1912-
1913, Vol. I, pp. 611-612. It was on these grounds 
that Pannekoek deliberately chose not to buttress his 
arguments for the necessity of smashing the capitalist 
state with citations from Marx's The Civil War in 
France.

34. Karl-Ernst Moring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in 
Bremen, 1890-1914 (Hanover: Verlag für Literatur und 
Zeitgeschehen, 1968), p. 115. This work represents 
the most comprehensive source of information on the 
Bremen movement. For a summary account of the origins 
and development of the Bremen left see: Josef Miller, 
"Zur Geschichte der linken Sozialdemokraten in Bremen, 
1906-1918," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 

35. Hans-Manfred Bock, Geschichte des "linken Radikalismus" 
in Deutschland: Ein Versuch (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1976), p. 78.

37. Ibid., p. 16.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 18.

41. Ibid., p. 20.

42. Ibid., p. 26.

43. Karl-Ernst Moring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Bremen, 1890-1914, op. cit., pp. 74-75.


49. Bremer Bürgerzeitung, August 16, 1906.


52. Pannekoek has noted some of the historical reasons for the emergence of this group: "The fact that in Hamburg and Bremen a movement of leftist instructors came into existence, whose dynamic nucleus was composed of a group of social democratic teachers, proves that the atmosphere in these towns is very different from that in Prussia. . . . The greater freedom and tolerance which characterized the old commercial cities . . . accompanied the economic
and political preponderance of mercantile capital."
Anton Pannekoek, "Der Bremische Liberalismus,"
"Zeitungskorrespondenz," March 1, 1913.

53. "Her mit dem Wahlrecht," Bremer Bürgerzeitung,
February 3, 1968.

54. "Die Sozialdemokratie und die politische Lage,"
Bremer Bürgerzeitung, July 23, 1909.

55. "Das Fazit des Parteitages," Bremer Bürgerzeitung,
September 23, 1909.

56. Karl Ernst Moring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei
in Bremen, 1890-1914, op. cit., pp. 103-113.

57. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeiders-
beweging," op. cit., p. 139.

58. This lecture has been published as: Anton Pannekoek,
Socialism and Religion, op. cit.

59. "Die Arbeiterbildung in Bremen," Bremer Bürgerzeitung,
September 29, 1909.

60. Karl-Ernst Moring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei
in Bremen, 1890-1914, op. cit., p. 115.

61. Anton Pannekoek to Wilhelm Pieck, October 28, 1909,
Henke Archives, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Bonn).

62. Ibid.

63. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, June 26, 1911,
Kautsky Archives, op. cit., XVIII, folder 412.

64. As a former participant in his courses noted: "In
our course we always discussed the political situation
with Pannekoek. . . . These experiences from
political life provided many opportunities for
integrating theory with practice." Karl Jannack,
Wir mit der roten Nelke (Bautzen, East Germany:
Domowina Verlag, 1959), p. 47.

65. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeiders-
beweging," op. cit., p. 149.

66. For a less than satisfactory biography of Radek see:
Warren Lerner, Karl Radek: The Last Internationalist

67. Gerhard Engel, "Die politisch-ideologisch Entwicklung
Johann Kniefs (1880-1919)," op. cit., pp. 79-80.


70. *Bremer Bürgerzeitung*, February 16, 1910.


73. Protokoll über die verhandlungen des Parteitages der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands abgehalten in Magdeburg vom 18 bis 24 September 1910 (Bremen: Vorwärts, 1910), pp. 181-182 (motion no. 100).

74. Anton Pannekoek, "Sozialdemokratische Unteroffiziere," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," November 27, 1909. Only two weeks earlier, Pannekoek had launched another polemic in which he maintained: "There exists an antithesis between Marxism and every other tendency in the trade union movement which seeks to divert the working class from the larger goal of socialism," Anton Pannekoek, "Marx und die Gewerkschaften," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," November 13, 1909.


86. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 161. The majority of those present, Pannekoek felt, were sympathetic to his position. On Legien, Pannekoek has noted: "...he was not the worst of the lot and still retained a considerable amount of socialist feeling inside him, which the younger generation [of trade union functionaries] completely lacked." Ibid. A transcript of this debate is contained in the Hamburger Echo, March 3, 1911.

87. Karl-Ernst Moring, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in Bremen, 1890-1914, op. cit., p. 139.


92. Ibid., p. 235.


97. Ibid., p. 245.


100. Karl Radek, Der deutsche Imperialismus und die Arbeiterklasse (Bremen: Bremer Bürgerzeitung, 1912).


104. Ibid., October 16, 1912.


106. The vote on the mass strike question was 333 to 142; on the military budget question, 336 to 140. Ibid., pp. 337-338, 515-516.


111. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Henke, September 11, 1913, Henke Archives, op. cit.


113. As Rosa Luxemburg noted in a letter to Henke: "For months now your paper has been insulting not me personally, but rather the Polish Social Democrats in an unheard-of manner. . . . You have insulted the party and its leadership--simply because of a certain individual and the insinuations of this individual. Though you pride yourself on being a pillar of radicalism in Germany, in your paper you have insulted leading Polish comrades whose radicalism is different from your own in that it has been proven for decades in prisons, hard labor and continual hunger. For a man such as you it would be appropriate to respectfully take off your hat when they pass. . . . In the same personal matter you also publicly engaged the Bremen membership in a way that a serious politician would never force upon his organization. . . . I do not call this serious radical politics, but rather the machinations of a clique, which is utterly alien to radicalism. . . . As a radical you often speak of the 'masses' and the 'self-regulation of the masses.' At the same time you automatically push through this Radek business in your paper, even though you know very well that the mass of comrades in Bremen feel embarrassed by this affair. As long as these conditions prevail in the Bremer Bürgerzeitung, my cooperation for the paper will remain out of the question." Rosa Luxemburg to Alfred Henke, November 15, 1912, in: Stephen Bronner (ed.), The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 149-150.

114. Pannekoek has stated that he had initially planned to note these differences in a personal letter rather than risk dividing the left radicals. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 76.


122. Willem van Ravesteijn, *De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925*, op. cit., p. 103.

123. This letter was published in *De Tribune* on March 6, 1909.


127. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorster, op. cit., p. 56.


137. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 58.

138. Ibid., p. 57.


143. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 108.

144. "De mijnwerkersstakingen," De Tribune, April 6, 1912.


147. These events and their consequences are covered in: De zeeliedenstaking (Amsterdam: Algemeen Nederlandsche Zeeliedenbond, n.d.); De stakingen in het havenbedrijf Amsterdam in 1911 (Amsterdam: Scheeps en Bootwerkersvereeniging, 1911); Henk Sneevliet, "De


149. Max Perthus, Henk Sneevliet, revolutionair socialist in Europe en Asie (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij Nijmegen, 1976), pp. 61-80. Sneevliet later gained international significance as a founder of the communist movement in Indonesia, and a key emissary of the Communist International in China. From the mid-1920's onwards he was a leading figure in the Trotskyist opposition in Europe. Sneevliet was executed by the Nazis in 1942 for his activity in the resistance. For two additional biographies of Sneevliet see: Sal Santen, Sneevliet, rebel (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1971); Fritjof Tichelman, Henk Sneevliet: Een politieke biografie (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1974).


151. Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 127.


160. Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 117.

161. Ibid.
162. Ibid., p. 118.

163. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 89.

164. De Tribune, May 6, 1911.


166. Ibid., p. 94.


168. Ibid.

169. Ibid., p. 582.

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid., p. 583.

172. Ibid., p. 385.

173. Ibid., p. 583.


178. Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 121. It was on these grounds that Gorter noted to Kautsky: "Until now no one has had the courage to recognize that the SDAP has developed exactly as the SDP predicted it would." Herman Gorter to Karl Kautsky, September 14, 1913. Quoted in: Herman die Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., p. 14.

179. De Tribune, August 9, 1913.

180. A transcript of this debate is contained in Het Volk, May 19, 1913.

CHAPTER VII

MASS ACTION AND REVOLUTION:
PANNEKOEK'S POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1910-1914
Revolution and Class Transformation: Pannekoek's Theory of Mass Action

The mass mobilizations of the spring of 1910 and the controversy they provoked in German social democracy marked a major watershed in Pannekoek's political development. In the aftermath of these events, Pannekoek gave explicit form to many of the fundamental conceptions which had formerly been only implicit in his writings. While Pannekoek's belief in the creative revolutionary energy of the masses had been a long-lasting motif of his Marxism, dating at least as far back as 1903, this theme began to dominate his strategic thinking in the years after 1910. Whereas he had previously viewed extra-parliamentary mass action and parliamentarianism as different aspects of the same process of reality and defended them as equal in importance for socialist strategy, he now began to denigrate the value of parliamentary activity altogether, posing it as an historically superseded form of struggle.

In shifting the decisive terrain of struggle from parliament to extra-parliamentary action, Pannekoek made use of the term "mass action" in such a way that he transformed what had been largely a vague expression into an all-embracing slogan and an increasingly integrated revolutionary strategy. Defining mass action as "an extra-parliamentary political act of the organized
working class, by which it operates directly and not through the medium of delegates," Pannekoek conceived of this new form of struggle less as a tactic, or even a series of tactics, but more as a total orientation toward revolutionary activity, based on a new process of interaction between the class, its power instruments, and political action. The unity of all these factors, he felt, was realized in the masses, in whom lies the power, the economic discontent, and the accumulated feeling of rebellion necessary to wage a decisive struggle for power. The central assumption underlying his conception was that the complex of militant actions generically termed "mass action" were both a product and a symptom of the new developments within European capitalism. In the process described by Pannekoek, mass action was viewed as defensive in the sense that it was the only viable proletarian response to the ruling class offensive known as imperialism, and offensive in the sense that it was a mechanism of direct revolutionary struggle and an indication of the rising strength and self-confidence of the proletariat. Pannekoek had come to believe that threatened with a declining standard of living and the dangers of imperialist war, and fighting to obtain more rights within the state, the working class was finding it increasingly necessary to assert itself with an intensity unknown in parliamentary
struggles and was doing so directly without the intervention of intermediary bodies. ²

What Pannekoek envisioned was a prolonged epoch of confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, characterized by a succession of graduated mass movements and struggles. These actions would serve to educate, collectivize, and strengthen the proletariat for the coming struggle for power, while simultaneously weakening the foundations of the capitalist state: "Each assault by the proletariat upon the individual effects of capitalism means a weakening of the power of capital, a strengthening of our own power and a step further in the process of revolution." ³ Pannekoek made it clear that a central aspect of this process involved the destruction of the moral authority of the bourgeoisie—its main source of power—so that all that remained were the "material instruments of force." The final phases of the revolution, he felt, would be characterized by a direct struggle between the instruments of force of both classes until "one of the two opposing sides in struggle lies vanquished, its power annihilated, and political rule falls into the hands of the victor." Compared to this conflict, the previous parliamentary struggles were but "skirmishes for forward position" during which the main power instruments remained in reserve. ⁴

Although Pannekoek considered the mass strike to be
the most important of the various forms of mass action, he viewed it as just one weapon in the social democratic arsenal, and definitely not the final act in the overturn of society. This tactic, he felt, was as multi-faceted as the class struggle itself and could not be adapted the same way each time like a pre-set mechanism or a recipe. The mass strike was no more a "wonder medium" than parliamentarianism. Although the mass strike allowed the full expression of proletarian power in a way that was possible with no other medium, it could never be used as a substitute for that power. In itself, the mass strike was a "dead mechanism," without "the will, the feeling of power, and the revolutionary energy of the masses" which precedes it and determines its use. What was decisive was not the objective consequences of the strike, but "the mood and feeling of strength of the men who are using the weapons—the embitterment, the exaltation which defies all danger, the enthusiasm, the steadfastness of conviction that is prepared for everything, the terse electric atmosphere. . . . the feeling that great things are occurring". Pannekoek maintained that it was the totality of these factors which characterize a revolutionary situation. During such a revolutionary period, a greater feeling of awareness arises in a few days than in years of normal times. As the creative capacity of the masses
comes to the forefront, the bureaucratic routine of the organization and of practical daily activity is swept aside and the abstract division between economic and political actions, immediate demands and end goals, is finally resolved. 8

At an even deeper level, Pannekoek felt that mass action and its dialectical opposite, imperialism, were both part of "a revolution in thought and feeling, a new orientation of the spirit" that corresponded to a certain stage of social and economic development. 9 Pannekoek's prime concern was that mass actions serve as an instrument to clarify the relationship between the daily lives of the working class and the broader socialist goal:

As long as socialism appears to the masses as an abstract theory or utopian dream, it will be considered strange and distant. But as soon as it appears part of all questions of immediate praxis, particularly that which defends the interests of the working class against the ruling class, then socialism becomes comprehensible and practical for the masses. 10

These arguments, however, were, with minor variations, the same as he had advanced prior to 1910 on the educational aspects of socialist activity.

In the practice of mass action, Pannekoek saw a continuous dialectic of consciousness and activity which would ultimately shape the new society: "The revolution is the culmination and decisive process of
transformation in which the character and nature of the exploited masses is completely changed.\textsuperscript{11} Pannekoek located the starting point of this process of transformation in what he termed "the revolutionary instincts of the masses." According to Pannekoek, these social "instincts" differ from the natural inborn instincts of animals in the sense that they evolve from the basic day-to-day perceptions embodied in working class life experiences and relationships. Through their work, the workers perceive that they are exploited by capital and are aroused by this misery and exploitation to rebel. In these social instincts of the class struggle, he felt, reside the driving force of social transformation:

Marxist theoreticians who know how class relationships determine outlooks recognize in these instincts, these class perceptions, the great power arising out of their economic situation, which drives the masses forward in great social struggles.\textsuperscript{12}

But what was important, indeed theoretically decisive, in Pannekoek's formula, was his concept of the "organizational spirit" (\textit{Organisationsgeist}). According to this conception, the real nature of proletarian organization comes not from the external organizational forms, but from the inner lives of the workers themselves, which generates feelings of solidarity, collectivity, commitment, self-sacrifice, sense of purpose, and class identity. This spirit, he felt,
was the real activating element of the workers' movement:

The organizational spirit is the living soul of the labor movement which derives its power and capability for action from its body. But, unlike the soul of Christian theology, this immortal soul does not float around lifeless in the sky, but remains, in fact, always grounded in an organizational body, living in the common organized actions of those it joins together. This spirit is not something abstract or imaginary, put forward in contrast to the 'real, concrete organization' of the existing organizational forms, but it is, in fact, something just as real and concrete as these forms. It binds individuals just as firmly together as any principles or statutes could ever do so that even if their external bond of principles and statutes were severed these individuals would no longer be loose atoms competing against each other.  

It was this spirit which creates the capacity to struggle, dissipates the fear of the state, and receives its fullest expression in mass actions. To ignore this principle, as Kautsky did, was to ignore what distinguished proletarian organization from any other form of organization.  

The conclusion Pannekoek drew from this was that the essence of socialist transformation was not the gradual attainment of a parliamentary majority, but the steady erosion of the bourgeois state and the simultaneous creation of a proletarian counter-state through the process of mass action:  

As the organization of state power degenerates and its strength ebbs away, so the new form of social organization, the self-created democratic
organization of proletarian struggle, develops into a greater and greater power in society, taking over the functions intrinsic to the general regulation of production.

Through mass action, the proletariat creates new unitary forms of organization, new organs of political power, and completely new values and human relationships:

It lays the foundations of an humanity which governs itself, decides its own destiny. . . . In it there grows up the only agency which can abolish the class hegemony of exploitation; the development of the proletarian organization in itself signifies the repudiation of all the functions of class rule; it represents the self-created order to the people, and it will fight relentlessly to throw back and put an end to brutal intervention and despotic attempts at repression which the ruling minority undertakes. It is within the proletarian organization that the new humanity grows, a humanity now developing into a coherent entity for the first time in the history of the world; production is now developing into a unified world economy, and the sense of belonging together is concurrently growing between men, the firm solidarity which binds them together as one organism ruled by a single will.

With this suggestion that the new working-class institutional forms would supplant existing institutional forms in the course of the revolutionary struggle and provide the framework for the future socialist state, Pannekoek broke new ground in Marxist theory. For the first time a Marxist theorist was prepared to assert that the essence of socialism lay not in the future state but in the process of socialist transformation itself.

These fundamental themes were built on a substratum
of ideas about the role and limitations of traditional working-class organizations and the relationship between leaders and masses. It was a corollary of Pannekoek's analysis that the existing working-class organizational forms were incapable of accomplishing the task of social transformation since they still reflected to a considerable extent the stability of capitalist society. He argued that because of the bureaucratic nature of the traditional working class organizations, the leaders were far less radical in terms of basic revolutionary perceptions and insights than the masses of workers. Unlike the workers, whose thoughts were derived from perceptions of collectivity, the party and trade union functionaries could think only in terms of themselves.¹⁷ For these reasons, Pannekoek's concern was increasingly focused on the masses as the direct instrument of social transformation:

As long as they continue to look to their leaders and wait for the word, the movement can never take its proper course. A continuous development of our struggles is possible only when the masses themselves seize the initiative and lead the organization along the new path, or in exceptional cases push them forward.

"Great revolutionary class movements," concluded Pannekoek, "cannot be led by a central body."¹⁸ For the workers, the first task was to "liberate themselves from the old view that their leaders will do everything for them at the correct time."¹⁹
At the same time, Pannekoek was careful not to advocate a general theory of spontaneity. He continued to assign the party a central role in preparing the workers for revolutionary mass actions. Pannekoek repeatedly made it clear that the party had the initial political task of unifying the masses: "The proletarian organization brings unity to the masses, previously fragmented and powerless, molding them into an entity with a conscious purpose and with power in its own right."\(^{20}\) Quite clearly, at this stage, Pannekoek still saw the party as synonymous with the masses, since it was the party which was assigned the task of channeling the "revolutionary energy of the masses" into constructive action and leading the assault on the state.\(^{21}\)

Certainly, all the energy comes from the masses, whose revolutionary potential is aroused by oppression, misery and anarchy, and who by their revolt must abolish the hegemony of capital. But the party has taught them that desperate outbursts on the part of individuals or individual groups are pointless, and that success can only be achieved through collective, united, organized action. It has disciplined the masses and has restrained them from frittering away their revolutionary activity fruitlessly. But this, of course, is only the one, negative side of the party's function; it must simultaneously show in positive terms how these energies can be set to work in a different, productive manner and lead the way in doing so. The masses have, so to speak, made over part of their energy, their revolutionary purpose, to the organized collectivity, not so that it will be dissipated, but so the party can use it as their collective will. The initiative and potential for spontaneous action
which the masses surrender by doing so is not in fact lost, but reappears elsewhere and in another form as the party's initiative and potential for spontaneous action; a transformation of energy takes place as it were. Even when the fiercest indignation flares up among the masses—over the cost of living, for example—they remain calm, for they rely upon the party calling them in such a way that their energy will be utilized in the most appropriate and most successful manner possible.22

For these reasons, Pannekoek felt that the party must never limit itself to a passive, restraining role, but must become an active catalyst of socialist revolution:

It cannot simply sit down and wait until the masses rise up spontaneously in spite of having entrusted it with part of their autonomy; the discipline and confidence in the party leadership which keep the masses calm place it under an obligation to intervene actively and itself give the masses the call for action at the right moment. Thus, as we have already argued, the party has a duty to instigate revolutionary action, because it is the bearer of an important part of the masses' capacity for action; but it cannot do so as and when it pleases, for it has not assimilated the entire will of the proletariat, and cannot therefore order it around like a troop of soldiers. It must wait for the right moment: not until the masses will wait no longer and are rising up of their own accord, but until the conditions arouse such feelings in the masses that large-scale action by the masses has a chance of success . . . The revolutionary potential for indignation aroused in the masses by the intolerable nature of capitalism must not go untapped and hence be lost; nor must it be frittered away in organized outbursts, but made fit for organized use in action instigated by the party with the objective of weakening the hegemony of capital.23
It was this organized and conscious element of mass action, Pannekoek maintained, that would most sharply distinguish the German Revolution from the Russian Revolution of 1905.  

From these passages it becomes clear that, for Pannekoek, the party exercises a leadership function only in the sense that it pursues an active socialist politics which shapes and leads the struggle of consciousness to its ultimate goal. A politics of this kind, he felt, requires a creative leadership capable of responding directly to the nuances of every revolutionary situation, stimulating and broadening the struggle, widening its goals, generating new tactics, all in the continuous dialectic of consciousness and activity which lies at the heart of the relationship between party and class. Such a leadership, however, cannot create the conditions of struggle, for these conditions are an elemental feature of the evolution of capitalism itself. Nor can it direct the struggle along lines predetermined by the leadership, for the revolution is a complex process spanning years or even decades, rather than a fixed-piece military engagement between the forces of labor and capital. While the party serves as a vital expression of the "developing thought" and "revolutionary spirit" of the workers, the workers can gain the necessary insights into their historical mission
only through the direct practice of mass action. In contrast to the theories of Kautsky, Lenin, and others, which viewed the party as the agent which stimulates the inert, unconscious—or "trade union conscious"—class into revolutionary struggle, Pannekoek reasserted what he felt was the central insight of Marx's historical project: that the proletariat develops its own awareness of itself in the course of a struggle rooted in the logic of capitalism.

Despite the breadth of his vision, there is a certain frustrating vagueness to many of Pannekoek's conceptions. Throughout his writings on mass action, Pannekoek seldom went beyond the general and the rhetorical. Although his ideas were based on a variety of different experiences of mass action in the pre-war period, Pannekoek deliberately avoided specifying the precise organizational and institutional forms which the struggling workers were likely to develop and utilize. This task he left instead to the creative capacities of the masses actually involved in the struggles of the future, since it was their character and forms of organization that would be transformed in the process. "Is it not obvious," he asked, "that a proletariat which has succeeded in building such exemplary organizations, in the face of every obstacle and despite the fiercest repression, will find it a simple matter to have an
apparatus capable of directing and administering public life within forty-eight hours?" In grappling with the complex question of how the capitalist state and its power instruments were to be destroyed, Pannekoek left unanswered key questions which his entire analysis by its very nature posed. What weapons and what type of military strategy would the workers' movement use? What would happen if imperialism attacked the workers' movement before it reached full maturity? His approach was marked by a constant overestimation of the factors which would render social democracy irresistible and an underestimation of the forces of capitalist domination. Although he acknowledged that violence would be initiated by the repressive forces of the state, Pannekoek conceived of the revolution largely as a non-violent process based on working class consciousness and stressed that armed force represented the "weak side of proletarian power." But as to what would actually happen when the capitalist state deployed its forces, Pannekoek could only hold out the possibility that in a phase of accelerating workers' power the rank-and-file soldiers of working class origin would refuse to fire on their class comrades.
Economics and Social Development: Pannekoek's Theory of Imperialism

Pannekoek's theory of mass action was closely linked to his theoretical assessment of imperialism. Like most Marxists of the Second International, Pannekoek felt that the increasingly powerful and aggressive nature of the capitalist states, the ideologies of militarism and nationalism, growing competition and heightened international tensions, were all tied to a fundamental change in the nature of capitalism, which was termed imperialism. For Pannekoek and for others, the question of imperialism was more than a purely abstract intellectual concern as Europe passed through a succession of crises in an atmosphere heavy with the threat of war.  

Pannekoek's unique theory of imperialism evolved directly out of his conception of the relationship between economics and social development. As early as 1900, Pannekoek, in a letter to Frank van der Goes, outlined the basic elements of this conception. In attempting to define the role of economics in social development, Pannekoek argued that while economic factors are undoubtedly primary, they are but one of many interrelated parts of the totality of the human environment. All human actions, no matter how independent they may appear, are "equal products" of this total process of development which is mediated through the
minds of men. Since he felt that it was the process of interaction itself that was critical, Pannekoek ruled out a sharp distinction between evolution and revolution, arguing that it was only their external appearances that gave them separate designations. The implications of this for Pannekoek's theory of social development were clear: the critical link between economics and revolution was not economic crisis or collapse, but the understanding and active intervention of the revolutionary class, which translates changes in the economic structure into "social reality" through conscious political action. 30

It was on this basis that Pannekoek chose to emphasize the non-economic aspects of imperialism. Unlike Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and others, Pannekoek did not regard imperialism as the "final phase of capitalism" resulting from intrinsic economic and structural changes, but as the outcome of an "active striving" on the part of the bourgeoisie. 31 As he defined the problem, imperialism was not simply a form of interest politics for the bourgeoisie or a defense mechanism against the proletariat--although both elements were present--but a full-fledged system of capitalist rule. 32 Pannekoek insisted that like all forms of social rule, the main source of imperialism's strength was spiritual. What was critical was the ability of imperialism to project
a powerful social ideal:

To the bourgeoisie as a whole is given a new world ideal, the vision of its own nation standing dominant among all the peoples of the earth. And this vision, it is hoped, will do something to inspire those who have found themselves powerless in the path of the overpowering ideals of humanity and world brotherhood represented by social democracy.33

These themes were brought into sharp focus in the course of a lengthy controversy with Rosa Luxemburg. Although Pannekoek had little interest in establishing a precise economic definition of imperialism, he accepted for the most part the theoretical framework of his collaborator Karl Radek, which located the main dynamic of imperialism in capital export. This view stood in sharp contrast to Rosa Luxemburg's conception, which viewed imperialism as the inevitable consequence of the constant expansion of capitalist production and the need to establish new market outlets to absorb it. Since this question had important implications for revolutionary strategy, Pannekoek undertook a detailed and penetrating critique of Luxemburg's position. Although he built his conception on the basis of a highly technical criticism of her analysis of capitalist reproduction, Pannekoek's overwhelming preoccupation was with the social, historical, and ideological aspects of imperialism. In challenging Luxemburg's belief that imperialism was an economic "necessity" of capitalism and
a prelude to its inevitable collapse, Pannekoek began by rejecting what he termed "mechanical necessity" in the laws of capitalist reproduction. What Rosa Luxemburg viewed as an unavoidable economic drive toward imperialism, he felt, was in reality only "a part of imperialism, but not imperialism itself." The history of capitalism, Pannekoek argued, had been characterized by various and continuous forms of expansion, much of which involved competition for world markets. Imperialism was only an intensification of this tendency and simply "the particular form of expansion for the era."

While making it clear that imperialism did not arise as an economic imperative ("mechanical necessity"), Pannekoek, nonetheless, maintained that it emerged out of "social necessity." By "social necessity" Pannekoek meant the ability of a group to consciously choose and carry out the long-range course of action that was most appropriate to their general needs within defined historical circumstances. Pannekoek considered "social necessity" to be neither a predetermined course of action nor pure voluntarism, but a form of active understanding and intervention which serves as a key connecting link between economics and the actions and desires of men. From this standpoint, imperialism was a "necessity" for capitalist development only in the sense that it was
something which the capitalist class understood as useful and desirable and had the capacity to attain. Imperialism emerged at this particular period because it corresponded to the needs and wishes of the newly dominant banking and monopoly sector of the bourgeoisie, which through its technological, ideological, and organizational power, had gained superiority over the other sectors within the capitalist class, and was, therefore, free to pursue its policies at will.

Pannekoek felt that the manner in which imperialism had developed as a manifestation of the will of the bourgeoisie provided an analogy for the emergence of socialism: socialism would come only when the working class understands that socialism is necessary and desirable, wills its creation, and has the power capability to establish it. For these reasons, capitalism could never be expected to end by some "great, fantastic final crisis," although temporary crises would instill in the workers the will to struggle and compel them to strengthen their forces.34

On these grounds, Pannekok charged that the emphasis on economic necessity and the inevitability of capitalist collapse in Rosa Luxemburg's analysis of imperialism "obfuscates more than it clarifies, the particular features of the world politics of capital."35 Taken strictly, such a position, he felt, would amount to
nothing less than the abolition of the need for theoretical work, for propaganda and agitation, for organization, and for the preparation for the conquest of political power.

From this perspective, it is clear that, for Pannekoek, imperialism implied a totality of interaction, in which a unity of politics, ideology, economics, and action come together as a conscious act of capitalist society. On this basis, mass actions stood in a close dialectical relationship to imperialism: mass actions were both a consequence of and the proletarian tactical response to the increasingly aggressive policies of imperialism.

Pannekoek's emphasis on interaction and totality also led him to view imperialism as a unified world process. From this, he derived another element of revolutionary strategy. The world-wide capitalist chain, he felt, might be broken at its weakest links, in the colonial and semi-colonial lands. A series of anti-colonial revolutions in Asia and Africa, he maintained, would "give the signal to the European proletariat for their struggle for freedom": 36

The political revolution in Asia, the insurrection in India, the rebellion within the Arab world, are imposing a decisive obstacle against the expansion of capitalism in Europe ...
bloody clashes are becoming more and more inevitable. There is a link between the Asian wars of independence and colonialism and the general struggles among European nations.37

Although Pannekoek, with these formulations, was among the first to argue the importance of colonial liberation movements for revolutionary strategy, this theme remained only a fragmentary and undeveloped part of his theory of revolution, due in large part to his inability to reconcile this belief with his views on the national question.

Class Struggle and Nation: Pannekoek and the National Question

Pannekoek's theories of mass action and imperialism were closely connected to his attempt to develop a conception of the role of the nation and nationalism in socialist theory and practice. For Pannekoek, the problem of developing a correct Marxist approach to the question of nationality was significant both as a major reference point in the debate over reform or revolution and as part of the tactical imperative of countering nationalistic imperialism and its drive toward war.

Although the question of the nation and nationalism impinged on the life of the socialist movement at numerous points, the movement had no firm attitude toward these questions, due in part to an ambiguous legacy in socialist theory. Marx and Engels gave neither a
systematic theory of nationality nor a precise definition of the concept of the nation. Their writings on nationality were for the most part unsystematic and largely ad hoc political positions on specific strategic questions. In their early writings, both showed considerable enthusiasm for large-scale political units, believing that small states were an impediment to economic development. While admitting that the bourgeois nation state had served an historically progressive function, they contended that it was a transitory phenomenon which bore the seeds of its own destruction. The extension and internationalization of the capitalist market, they felt, would lead to a rapidly growing similarity between nations at the expense of national identity. As early as the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels had posed the internationalism of the proletariat as the agency of the nation state's destruction, with the famous slogan: "The working men have no country." It was on these grounds that they rejected the right of nations to national self-determination as a universal historical principle and regarded national traits and national assimilation as natural stages in a historical process. In their later writings, however, both men—forced to confront the political realities of their era—showed much more hospitable consideration to the claims of small and oppressed nationalities, such as
the Poles, Irish, and Hungarians. 38

Due to the fundamental ambiguity and equivocation in their formulations, the writings of Marx and Engels could give no clear answer to the problem of the nation state as it presented itself to social democrats in Europe in the years before the war. Several major attempts were made to come to terms with this question theoretically. Among the first to deal with this question in a systematic manner was Karl Kautsky. Seeking a definition of nationhood, Kautsky argued that the idea of modern nationality arose with the bourgeoisie and corresponded to their economic needs. The most critical factor in the formation of nations, he maintained, was a national language, which was essential to social production, and which probably emerged from idioms used by traders. For this reason, he considered the mononational state to be superior to the multi-national state. Kautsky was evasive when faced with the question of the workers' relationship to the nation. While rejecting bourgeois nationalism, he maintained that the proletariat was the guardian of the genuine interests of the nation and suggested that the removal of class antagonisms would solidify national unity. At the same time, he believed, following Marx, that the internationalizing effect of capitalism would eventually allow the nations to merge into one another and develop a common
universal language. 39

The most sustained attempt to develop a Marxist
theory of nationality, however, came with the Austrian
theorist Otto Bauer's The National Question and Social
Democracy (Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemo-
kratie), a work that remains the major Marxist treatise
in the field. Bauer's intended aim was to provide a
theoretical justification for the nationalities program
adopted by the Austrian social democrats. Unlike other
orthodox Marxists, Bauer did not regard the nation as a
transitory mode of organization peculiar to bourgeois
society. Nor did he accept Kautsky's view that language was
a decisive factor for defining a nation. Bauer defined the
nation as a totality of people "molded by a common
destiny into a common type," so that they possess a common
national character. 40 By a "common destiny," Bauer meant
primarily a historical community sharing the same culture.
This assessment was bound up with his view that although
the origins of the nation were linked to certain relation-
ships of economics, politics, and social development,
the nation eventually became independent of these factors:
"The national community exists, even if the state should
collapse, for it is itself living in each and every
individual." 41 At the same time, Bauer emphatically
rejected the notion that national ties would merge in the
course of economic development and argued that national
differences would continue to exist even under socialism. As a substitute for the bourgeois principle of nationality, with its tendencies toward war, he offered an alternative socialist principle which stressed the democratization and full development of nationhood and the national culture under socialism. In terms of socialist strategy, Bauer called for a program of "intra-state nationality" based on national cultural autonomy. Carried to its logical conclusion, this meant that the class struggle was at the same time a parallel struggle for national emancipation and possession of the national culture.

Pannekoek was motivated to enter the discussion in a systematic manner largely on the basis of his belief that the type of "national opportunism" embodied in Bauer's writings represented a powerful obstacle to the development of the self-contained proletarian hegemony that would be necessary to confront international capital in the epoch of imperialism. Pannekoek originally intended his critique to appear as an article in the Austrian socialist publication, Der Kampf, but Bauer rejected it on the grounds that a non-Austrian had no right to intervene in internal party matters. In order to give his case a broader focus, Pannkeoek expanded his work into a lengthy brochure, Class Struggle and Nation (Klassenkampf und Nation). In a larger historical sense, this work can
be seen as one of the most precise formulations of a deeply rooted tradition of unconditional internationalism within the international socialist movement, which was based on a militant and uncompromising hostility to the nation state in all its forms.\textsuperscript{43}

In setting up his definition of what constitutes a nation, Pannekoek argued that the determining factor in nation-building was not language, but the process of political and economic development. Although language was the most important attribute of a nation, the two were not identical, as the cases of the United States and England with their similar languages, and Switzerland with its multi-languages, clearly illustrated. Pannekoek's principal thesis, however, was that through incessant mutations based on labor and economic life, historical development had produced a variety of different forms of social organization, of which the nation was only one. Among these were tribal organizations, empires, communal villages, regions, and religious orders. All of these, he felt, embodied the two key characteristics of Bauer's definition: a common destiny and a common character. As an even more pertinent example, Pannekoek cited the case of the medieval church, which, with its sense of community and culture, its common history and vast administrative structure, its own intelligentsia and language, constituted almost a nation in its own right. Like Marx,
Pannekoek also viewed the modern nation state as a transitory form of social organization peculiar to bourgeois society. The modern nation, he argued, is completely different from the earlier peasant nation. What distinguishes it is the institution of the state—"the combat organization of the bourgeoisie." While the nation represents an important community of interest for the bourgeoisie, the state is the real, solid instrument for protecting its interests.

Pannekoek enlarged upon this definition by criticizing Bauer's use of the category "community of destiny." While accepting the legitimacy of the category, Pannekoek felt that the forms constituting a particular "community of destiny" were different for each class due to the different experiences of social labor. From this standpoint, the peasants, for instance, of China, India, and Egypt had more in common with each other than with different classes within their own nation. For the proletariat, this meant that their "community of destiny" could never be defined by specific national characteristics and boundaries, but only by a common community of labor and struggle. In this context, the nation state signified little more than a form of "foreign domination" over the character and destiny of the proletariat.

Pannekoek extended this analysis into a critique of Bauer's category "community of culture." Culture,
Pannekoek felt, begins in the continuous restructuring of concepts that goes on inside the mind and evolves into a "community of ideas" or "forms of thought which have become historical." In other words, what can be considered a nation's culture is simply an abstract rendering of common experiences transmitted by a common language. There could, therefore, be no common "community of culture" between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat except in the most transitory sense, since the foundations of their thought and their vision of the world were so completely dissimilar. What often appears to be a commonly shared culture is in reality only a spiritual tradition of the past, which will disappear with the intensification of the class struggle.

In these circumstances, Pannekoek felt that the acceptance of bourgeois culture could only obscure class consciousness and weaken the self-confidence of the workers:

Our objective requires a new, bold type of human being, fully conscious of its role, and audacious in both thought and action. For this reason, the struggle requires that the workers be liberated from the paralyzing effects of bourgeois culture.

Pannekoek emphasized that the proletariat had the duty to pursue its own cultural destiny, which could become a living reality only in the context of the class struggle. The struggle for socialism, he felt, stimulates the spirit
of the workers to create their own values and forms of social and mental life, which are opposed at all points to bourgeois culture. Since this "community of struggle" is international in character and the aspirations and shared experiences are similar, both the destiny and culture of the proletariat would be world-wide in scope. What superficially appears to be a separate nationality and culture will disappear with the bourgeois society to which it is connected. As an organizational alternative to the nation state, Pannekoek envisioned a future transnational community of organization, production, and culture encompassing the whole of humanity.

At a higher level of abstraction, Pannekoek felt that the nationalist sentiment embodied in Bauer's writings was an expression of bourgeois ideology within the Austrian social democratic movement. The distinguishing feature of Bauer's approach, Pannekoek maintained, was his reliance on a bourgeois methodology, which analyzes everything in static terms as immutable and arbitrarily defined by nature. From this standpoint, national diversity is conceptualized as an expression of the natural differences between men based on race, origins, and language. By contrast, a Marxist methodology would view nations as the product of human social evolution subject to rapid and constant future development.

Pannekoek argued at the same time that nationalism,
when advanced by socialists, always retains a reformist component and that reformism is inherently tied to nationalism. Nationalism, in its essential aspects, represents the unification of fundamentally different class interests and the preservation of the status quo. The tactical conclusion Pannekoek drew from this was that "the concept of the nation can play no role in the theory and practice of social democracy." For Pannekoek, the point to be emphasized was that "nationalism is the most powerful of bourgeois ideologies." Pannekoek made it clear that while nationalism represented a major source of bourgeois ideological hegemony, it was not simply an artificial doctrine imposed by the rulers upon the masses. Like every system of thought and feeling, nationalism arises spontaneously out of the depths of society and proceeds on the basis of economic realities and necessities. The bourgeoisie, however, attempts to intensify these spontaneous feelings by artificial means. Pannekoek stressed that while the conceptual structure of nationalism was based on ideas and traditions of the past, it did not belong to those outdated ideologies which were gradually being extinguished by modern conditions. It was, on the contrary, a living ideology, drawing its force ever anew from fertile economic soil, and standing in the center of the class struggle.

Translated into practical terms, this meant that, in
Pannekoek's view, demands for national autonomy, or for the re-establishment of former nation states such as Poland, could have no place in socialist propaganda and tactics. National objectives and slogans, he felt, would only deter the proletariat from its real objective by dividing them into different nationalities and allowing class consciousness to degenerate into national hatred. To counter nationalist ideology, however, Pannekoek could offer nothing beyond a more-or-less routine call for programs and propaganda stressing class over nationality. Pannekoek took it for granted that nationalist sentiment would disappear as one of the side effects of the radicalization of consciousness that occurs through mass action. Pannekoek's rigorous internationalism was tempered only by his acknowledgement (in a position close to Bauer's) of the right of national minorities to autonomy in administrative and judicial matters and by his belief that national parties must continue to exist, in order to conduct propaganda and educational activities in different languages.

Although Pannekoek's prescription for dealing with the problem of the nation was rather ambiguous, he left no doubt about the immediate political relevance of this question. The growing accommodation to the nation and nationalist ideology, he felt, was only one aspect of a more general malaise affecting the socialist movement. Posed in its broadest terms, the historical choice, for the
socialist movement and for the future of humanity, was becoming increasingly clear: either a fundamental transformation of the existing social order through mass action and internationalism, or nationalism and war. \(^{50}\)
NOTES


9. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


21. Pannekoek defined the party as simply the nucleus of class-conscious social democratic workers who had the task of providing initiative and leadership to the struggles. Anton Pannekoek, "Partei und Masse," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," July 4, 1914.


23. Ibid. Pannekoek also noted: "What is necessary for us to do is launch an energetic offensive tactic in all areas; only this can bring the masses into motion. The initiative for such a tactic must be a conscious act of the party and all the workers who determine its life and work." Anton Pannekoek, "Partei und Masse," op. cit.


25. Anton Pannekoek, "Der Sozialismus als Fuhrer," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," July 29, 1911. It is also significant that although his emphasis was on extra-parliamentary forms of struggle, Pannekoek still viewed mass action and parliamentary action as complementary forms of struggle. Mass action, he felt, "endows parliamentary activity with a new, broader basis." Anton Pannekoek, "Marxistische Theorie und revolutionäre Taktik," op. cit.


27. Pannekoek stated his views on the non-violent aspects of proletarian revolution most forcefully in an article written during the war: "Proletarisch wapengeweld," De Tribune, February 2 and 5, 1918. This article led to one of the few political conflicts between Pannekoek and Gorter.

29. For a comprehensive treatment of the problem of imperialism and pre-war social democracy, see: H.C. Schröder, Sozialismus und Imperialismus. Die Auseinandersetzung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie mit den Imperialismusproblem vor 1914 (Hanover Verlag fur Literatur, 1968).

30. Anton Pannekoek to Frank van der Goes, August 7, 1900, Van der Goes Archives, op. cit., folder 1803.


34. Although Pannekoek first made this critique in 1913, he expressed it in fully developed form in his "De ekonomische noodzakelijkheid van het imperialisme," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1916, pp. 268-285.


37. Anton Pannekoek, "Weltrevolution," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," December 30, 1911. This article also appeared in French under the title: "La Révolution mondiale," le Socialisme, January 21, 1912. Other major writings of Pannekoek on imperialism include the following correspondence articles: "Abrüstungsfragen," April 8, 1911; "Der italienische Imperialismus," October 7, 1911; "Der Kampf gegen den Imperialismus," March 30, 1912.

38. For a representative sampling of Marx's thinking on this question see: Karl Marx, Karl Marx on Colonialization and Modernization (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968); Solomon Bloom, The World of Nations: A Study of the National Implications of the Work of Karl Marx (New


41. Ibid., p. 186.

42. Anton Pannekoek to Karl Kautsky, April 24, 1912, Kautsky Archives, op. cit., DXVII.

43. In Pannekoek's case, a militant anti-nationalism was already present in his pre-Marxist phase when he spoke of the dangers of "national fanaticism" and praised the cosmopolitanism of science. Anton Pannekoek, untitled notebook, entry for January 13, 1899, op. cit.


47. Ibid., p. 17.

48. Ibid., p. 49.

49. Lenin, in a review of Pannekoek's work, while pronouncing it an "excellent brochure," criticized Pannekoek for underestimating the differences between Eastern and Western Europe and incorrectly identifying the nation with the state. Cited in Anton Pannekoek, Nation et lutte de classe, op. cit., p. 26.
CHAPTER VIII

THE NEW SOCIALISM OF THE LABORING MASSES,
1914-1917
War Against War: Pannekoek and the Zimmerwald Left

Although Pannekoek was perhaps the most perceptive Marxist analyst of the crisis of social democracy prior to 1914, he, like most others of the Marxist left, was caught completely off guard by the sudden capitulation of the movement to nationalism at the outbreak of the war. For Pannekoek and his political collaborators, this capitulation marked the beginning of a new stage in their political development, in which they rapidly moved from being radicals within the social democratic movement to being revolutionaries outside of it and against it.

Forced back to Holland by the outbreak of the war, Pannekoek immediately began the painful task of analyzing and pinpointing the crucial characteristics of social democracy which had disarmed it at its moment of supreme challenge. Writing in the Tribune on August 26, 1914, Pannekoek took the position that the war was a clear indication of both the weakness of social democracy and the gigantic power of imperialism. Taking up the critical question of whether the German working class might have prevented the war, he acknowledged that although at least theoretically the possibility existed, it would have entailed sacrifices the movement was ill-prepared to make:

The workers were in no mood to struggle against the war; indeed, it can be said that the majority of the masses, both inside and outside the
party, strongly favored the war and easily allowed themselves to be misled by the bourgeoisie.

Pannekoek attributed this "spiritual weakness" of the party to a combination of "lack of knowledge and insight" and to the appropriation of initiative from the masses by a growing bureaucratic apparatus:

The development of the party has been for a long time toward an accommodation with capitalism and a reconciliation with a part of the bourgeoisie . . . The war has only accelerated what would have been a slow process of transformation.

Pannekoek went on to draw the conclusion that had the party attempted to pursue the suffrage struggle with mass demonstrations and strikes, then the ruling class would have been too preoccupied with its internal enemy to think of war. ¹

Pannekoek expanded and forcefully reaffirmed this assessment several weeks later in a major article entitled "The Downfall of the International" ("Der Zussamenbruch der Internationale"), which was widely circulated in German, English, Dutch, and Russian versions. In his analysis, Pannekoek took particular pains to stress the objective factors conditioning the process of capitulation. Unlike other left leaders such as Lenin and Trotsky, he felt that the real question was not one of treacherous leadership, but one of structural deficiencies and
changed circumstances. Explaining why the partisans of revolutionary tactics were consistently in the minority, he noted:

This was due in the main to the fact that among the workers themselves there was little revolutionary energy. This again is a direct result of the prosperity which furthered capitalist expansion as well as the growth of labor organizations. For in good times there is little unemployment, wages increase, the laboring masses are comparatively satisfied, are not driven to rebellion by hunger and unbearable misery. This is the underlying cause for the growth of reformism in Europe, for the indifference of the masses, for their unwillingness to adopt revolutionary measures, for the stagnation of the whole labor movement.

Under such conditions, the International was bound to degenerate. The congresses, once the scene of passionate tactical debates, "degenerated into bureaucratically organized theatrical performances staged by reformist politicians and bureaucrats." It was no accident, therefore, that the International could not deal with the question of war except in a rhetorical sense. Speaking of the Congress of Basel, the high point of the International's anti-war efforts, Pannekoek contended:

But behind this declaration there lay much more fear of war than firm determination to take up the fight against it. Its outward form, the session in the church, the ringing of the bells, the avoidance of all discussion as to how and with what means war was to be prevented—all these things betrayed the effort to mesmerize the government with words and outward appearances, instead of trying to
organize the real strength of the proletariat and preparing it for a struggle so difficult and requiring so many sacrifices. And when finally the governments really wanted war there was neither the strength nor the courage to take up the fight. Internationalism went up in smoke and the International lay in ruins.²

From this analysis, it was only a small step to the conclusion that the pre-war socialist movement was dead. Pannekoek remained firmly convinced that the war crisis posed directly the question of revolution and felt that the old movement with its passive bureaucratized structure was incapable of playing a revolutionary role. In the course of his remarks, Pannekoek became the first Marxist theoretician to signal the downfall of the Second International and to raise the demand for the formation of a Third:

The Second International is dead. But this ignoble death is no accident; like the downfall of the First International, the collapse of the Second is an indication of the fact that its usefulness is at an end. It represents, in fact, the downfall of the old fighting methods of the epoch. Not in the sense that they will disappear or become useless, but in the sense that the whole world now understands that these methods cannot bring the Revolution. They retain their value as preparation, as auxiliary means. But the conquest of power demands new revolutionary forms of struggle. To have pointed this out, to have put before us the new problems which it itself was incapable of solving--this is the bequest to us of the Second International. These will be fully developed by the new capitalist world that will grow out of this world war--a world of mightier capitalist development, increased oppression of the proletariat, more pronounced
antagonisms of the three great world powers, Germany, England and America. And out of these new conditions a new International of Labor will grow, more firmly founded, more strongly organized, and more powerful and more socialist than the one that new perished. Looking beyond this terrible world-fire, we revolutionary socialists boldly erect upon the ruins the standard of the new, the coming Internationalism.  

Of this assessment, Lenin noted several weeks later:

The only one who has told the workers truth--although not loudly enough and sometimes not skillfully--is Pannekoek . . . His words are the only socialist words. They are the truth. Bitter, but the truth.  

As Pannekoek began the task of analyzing the failure of the international socialist movement, he was forced to confront an equally uncertain situation in his own life. From a personal standpoint, the war years were to be among the most difficult years Pannekoek would experience--years of economic uncertainty and wandering. Like many others, he initially expected the war to be of short duration and planned on being able to resume his work in Bremen within a few months. During the first year of the war, Pannekoek lived with his in-laws in Arnhem and attempted to support himself as a journalist. His first job was writing articles for a British newspaper. Conflicts with the editors soon arose when they requested that Pannekoek provide details about personalities rather than theoretical interpretations, and after several months, he resigned.
He next found a part-time job writing on foreign policy for the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*. In the spring of 1915, strapped for funds and aware that the war would be of long duration, Pannekoek attempted to re-enter the profession of astronomy, with which he had maintained only peripheral contact since leaving Holland in 1906. Blacklisted for his political activities, he found his job prospects extremely limited and eventually accepted a job teaching natural sciences at a high school in Helmond in April, 1915. Later that same year, he transferred to another high school position in the old Zuiderzee port city of Hoorn. This was supplemented by a once-a-week lectureship on the history of astronomy at the University of Leiden, which he acquired through the intervention of a friend. To be close to Corter, in 1917 he moved to still another high school position in Bussum where he stayed until 1919. These positions were always precarious; Pannekoek has noted that he felt a constant pressure to avoid public talks or any type of activity that might be reported in the local press.5

Pannekoek's political activity in the aftermath of August 1914 was directly linked to a broader process of left regroupment within the international socialist movement. This process of regroupment derived its chief impetus from Lenin and the Bolsheviks and had its organizational base in what later became known as the Zimmerwald
movement. Lenin's first foray at left regroupment came at a conference of Italian and Swiss socialists at Lugano, Switzerland, on September 27, 1914, at which he presented his September 5 theses on turning an imperialist war between nations into a civil war between classes. The first significant step by the Bolsheviks in influencing events, however, came when they succeeded in organizing a conference of socialist women opposed to the war, which took place in Berne from March 26 to 28, 1915. This was followed by a conference of socialist youth a week later. At both of these gatherings a major division of opinion emerged between revolutionaries, who felt the main task was to use the war as a catalyst for socialist revolution, and the pacifists, who felt the primary duty was to end the war.

This division surfaced with renewed intensity when the Swiss and Italian socialists began to undertake preparations for an international conference of anti-war socialists. At this point, a major debate developed between the Bolsheviks and the conference organizers over who should be invited to attend the conference. The Bolsheviks took the position that the conference should be limited to the genuinely revolutionary elements, while the conference organizers favored a broader assembly of pacifists and groups of the center, in particular the Kautsky group in Germany. When the Bolsheviks were de-
feated on this question, Lenin began to focus his energies on building a strong revolutionary presence at the conference.

A key element of Lenin's strategy of revolutionary regroupment was his desire for an alliance between the Bolsheviks and the Dutch SDP, which he regarded as among the best of the revolutionary groupings. To facilitate this alliance, and prevent Kautsky and others of the center from dominating the upcoming conference, Lenin wrote Wijnkoop proposing that the two parties formulate a joint declaration and requesting that the SDP send representatives to the conference. Speaking of his fears that the German left was still too weak to counter the center, Lenin noted:

But you and we are independent parties. We must do something; work out a program of revolution, expose the idiotic and hypocritical watchword of peace, denounce and refute it, talk with utter frankness to the workers—in order to tell the truth. 7

This proposal was combined with an offer of financial assistance to help send delegates. Wijnkoop and others in the SDP leadership, however, remained skeptical and rejected Lenin's proposal on the grounds that the conference was opportunist in character and would not be a gathering of revolutionaries. 8 Lenin, however, persisted and again wrote to Wijnkoop, warning of the "great danger for the movement if his plan for an international declara-
tion by the Marxist left failed to materialize or was delayed.\textsuperscript{9} When this attempt proved equally fruitless, he wrote to Radek asking him to "insist" that the Dutch come.\textsuperscript{10} At Lenin's urging, Radek sought to have Pannekoek—who was a strong supporter of the proposed conference—play a mediating role. When Pannekoek failed to make headway, Radek sent Pannekoek a telegram on the eve of the conference requesting that he "come immediately" along with an offer to pay his way. Pannekoek, however, declined on the grounds that only Wijnkoop could represent the SDP.\textsuperscript{11}

The international conference which met in the Swiss mountain village of Zimmerwald from September 5 to 8, 1915, marked both the complete and clear segregation of minority and majority socialists into separate camps and the general consolidation of a distinct left current within the anti-war minority. Of the Dutch, only Henriette Roland Holst was present, representing her own newly-formed organization, the Revolutionary Socialist Society (Revolutionair Socialistisch Verbond--RSV).\textsuperscript{12} During the proceedings, Lenin once again offered a resolution calling for a direct revolutionary struggle against capitalism and the formation of a new International. Although Lenin's resolution managed to gain the votes of only about one third of the delegates, this was regarded as a minor victory by the left.\textsuperscript{13} More encouraging for
for the left was the creation of an International Socialist Commission in Berne to coordinate future activities. Lenin saw this as "a new International Socialist Bureau created against the wishes of the old one, the beginning of a new International."\(^{14}\)

In order to influence this body and to disseminate their own views, the left supplemented this commission with a coordinating bureau of their own. In the fall of 1915, this bureau, at the initiative of Karl Radek, began to lay the groundwork for the creation of a separate international publication of the left. Pannekoek had first broached the idea of such a publication in the spring of 1915, arguing that it might serve as a spiritual counterweight to Kautsky's *Neue Zeit* and an instrument of theoretical clarification.\(^{15}\) Following consultation with Lenin, Radek suggested in October to Pannekoek and Roland Holst that a German-language review be started in Holland. Radek proposed as well that Pannekoek and Roland Holst serve as co-editors, although it was understood that he was to be the real source of power. The initial editorial board envisioned by Radek was to consist of himself, Pannekoek, Roland Holst, Lenin, Trotsky, Mehring, Borchardt, and perhaps Grimm, Zetkin, and Frania. For Lenin, Pannekoek's cooperation was extremely crucial; one of his conditions for supporting the publication was that Pannekoek, "whom we see as our representative [of the
Zimmerwald left, be placed on the editorial board.  

As conceived by Pannekoek and Radek, the main focus of the review was to be on strategic and tactical questions arising out of the war, the causes of the collapse of the Second International, and the nature of imperialism. Financial support for the project came largely from Roland Holst.  

Pannekoek's willingness to edit the new publication was based in part on his desire to articulate his own conception of revolutionary regroupment. Although closely allied with Lenin on the Zimmerwald left, Pannekoek's strategic analysis diverged from Lenin's at several key points. At the most basic level, Pannekoek made it clear that his fundamental concern was with building a movement based on political consciousness and mass action, rather than, as he felt Lenin advocated, one based on splitting the existing socialist movement and a continuation of the traditional tactics. A regrouping of the socialist left, Pannekoek argued, was possible only on the basis of an "internationalism of deed" founded upon incessant opposition to the ruling classes in every country. To attempt to build a new international movement on the basis of conferences and delegates alone would lead to "nothing more than an International of Leaders." Here the germ of what would later be at the heart of Pannekoek's 1920 controversy with Lenin was already apparent.
The projected international review became reality in January, 1916, under the name *Vorbote*. In the initial introduction written by Pannekoek, the main aim of the publication was defined as one of providing theoretical support for the struggle against imperialism: "As an organ of discussion and elucidation this review is at the same time an organ of struggle." Pannekoek made it clear that this task involved, in the first instance, a "merciless analysis of the inadequacies of the old revisionist and radical socialism" as a prelude to a full-scale organizational break with social democracy. What was needed was a completely new spiritual orientation which could only arise out of a long hard process of theoretical clarification and struggle:

Now is the time to gather together everything in the way of new ideas, new solutions, new propositions, to inspect them, to prove them, to clarify them, by means of discussion and thus to make them of service to the new struggle . . . But this struggle is only made possible by a simultaneous struggle against all the elements of the former social democracy, which would bind the proletariat to the chariot of imperialism; against open imperialists who become ordinary agents of the bourgeoisie as well as social patriots of all tinges who seek to reconcile incompatible antagonisms and to keep the proletariat, by the most acute methods, from struggling against imperialism. The formation of the Third International will be possible only after a resolute break with social patriotism.22

Despite the high hopes of Pannekoek and others, *Vorbote* was plagued by a series of factional controversies
almost from the moment of its conception. Following the appearance of Pannekoek's introduction, Lenin charged that he had changed the character of the review and was evading his responsibilities as a representative of the Zimmerwald left. **Vorbote**, Lenin contended, was becoming the personal organ of Pannekoek and Roland Holst: "If comrades Pannekoek and Roland Holst have decided to make this change, then we must take notice of it." Lenin further demanded guarantees that in the future they would represent the positions of the Zimmerwald left. These differences were compounded by an even deeper conflict between Lenin and Radek. The immediate issue was the right of national self-determination which Lenin accepted and Radek rejected. Lenin also felt that Radek was guilty of "intrigues" against him and was attempting to remove his supporters from the editorial board. Lenin added to this the accusation that both Pannekoek and Radek were "incorrect" in their approach to the struggle against Kautskyism. Criticism from another quarter came from Trotsky, who felt that "the Russian and Dutch extremists" were attempting to build their own international. Trotsky also felt that the idea of using the publication to organize the workers and build a broad movement of the left was a "pure Leninist utopia." Due in part to the inability of the left to resolve these differences, **Vorbote** ceased publication with the second issue.
Despite the failure of Vorbote, the Zimmerwald left had established a momentum which could not be broken. By the time of the second conference of the Zimmerwald movement at Kienthal, Switzerland, in April, 1916, it was clear that the left was no longer an amorphous tendency. Although the left was still a minority, it, nonetheless, had a significant impact on the resolutions which were approved by the conference.26 For the left, Kienthal brought to the surface a new spirit of self-confidence and gave eloquent testimony to what was becoming a deepening fissure within European social democracy.27

From Sect to Party: The SDP and the New Internationalism

Although personal circumstances limited his active participation in the international movement, Pannekoek's theoretical work found fertile soil in the intransigent internationalist setting of the Dutch SDP and continued to play a vital role in the party's political development. Despite Holland's neutrality, the war opened a new epoch for the SDP, which both tested the party's commitment to left radicalism and offered new possibilities for realizing its goals and strategies. Drawing heavily from Pannekoek's conceptions, the SDP, during these years, attempted to assemble and guide a coalition of syndicalists, pacifists, and Christian socialists for the purpose of turning rising
dissatisfaction engendered by the war into revolutionary mass actions. 28

The SDP's commitment to the traditional principles of internationalism was manifested almost immediately during the tense days of July-August, 1914, when the party attempted to instigate a mass struggle against the threat of war. On July 26, the *Tribune* set the tone with a front page manifesto entitled "To Arms" ("Te Wapen"), which called upon the Dutch working class to mobilize with all its resources against the threat of war. Through its de facto alliance with the syndicalists, the party was able to avoid total isolation and act in a swift and unequivocal manner. Within the span of a few days, an SPD-sponsored ad hoc organization known as the Society for Labor Cooperation (*Samenkerkende Arbeidersvereenigingen*—SAV), which was originally set up to combat a proposed anti-labor act, began to shift its focus to anti-war action. On August 1, the SAV—which consisted of the SDP, the NAS, the Anti-Militarist Action Society, and the national unions of ship and dock workers, building workers, cigar makers, metal workers, and municipal workers—issued a manifesto calling for "war against war" to mark the start of an aggressive agitational campaign. During the course of only a few days, the SAV distributed over 100,000 copies of the manifesto and held its first street demonstrations, the largest of which drew over
7,000 persons. By contrast, the SDAP, during this same period, took a position fully supporting military mobilization, which came to be summarized in Troelstra's statement: "The idea of the nation must now prevail over national differences." In the turbulent days that followed the outbreak of the war, the Tribune steadfastly affirmed the SDP's conviction that a new period had opened in the history of capitalism in which the "bloody dawn of the communist society" was at hand. The clearest statement, however, of the party's position was set forth in Gorter's pamphlet, Imperialism, the World War and Social Democracy (Het Imperialisme, de wereldoorlog en de sociaaldemocratie), an eloquent and incisive analysis of the causes of the war and a passionate indictment of official social democracy. Gorter's work was written in collaboration with Pannekoek and Wijnkoop, who journeyed to Bussum in October to work with him. The main themes of this brochure were largely Pannekoekian in character. Gorter analyzed the capitulation of social democracy in terms of the bureaucratization of the workers' movement and its failure to pursue mass action. At the same time, he proposed a set of theses to lay the groundwork for the formation of a new International, which aimed at building a common proletarian front against world capital on the basis of mass actions and the clear demarcation of revolutionary from reformist
tendencies. As a concise and popular analysis of the causes of the war and a statement of socialist strategy, Gorter's brochure, which went through four editions, was well-received, both in Holland and abroad. Within the SDP, this work was hailed as a "new Communist Manifesto" and was widely circulated at meetings and demonstrations, which helped to disseminate the views of the SDP well beyond the confines of its small membership.

The SDP first addressed itself to the question of formulating a specific anti-war program on August 8, 1914, when it proposed a series of economic demands for the SAV, involving payment of wages to those affected by mobilization or unemployment, a moratorium on rents and taxes, and price controls on food and other necessities. The focal point of the SDP's agitational work, however, centered around its call for military demobilization. To pursue this demand, the SDP initiated in December, 1914, a National Agitation Committee Against the War (Landelijk Agitatie-Comité tegen den Oorlog). On December 31, a major demobilization manifesto appeared in the Tribune together with a similar manifesto by the Russian Bolsheviks. The Tribunists' demand for demobilization was closely linked to their call for a "people's militia," which they felt would replace the standing army with a potential instrument of proletarian power.

The SDP's firm commitment to the principles of inter-
nationalism was not matched by a clear conception of international left regroupment. As the Zimmerwald movement began to gain momentum, a major debate developed in the SDP between the leadership triumvirate of Wijnkoop, van Ravesteijn, and Ceton, on the one hand, and Pannekoek and Gorter, on the other, over whether the party should participate in this movement. The triumvirate felt that the time was premature for the formation of an international revolutionary anti-war movement and argued that, in any case, such a movement could emerge only in the same manner as the SDP: by a firm insistence on revolutionary principles. In their eyes, the Zimmerwald conference was an "historical farce" which had no more significance than the earlier Congress of Basel. When Pannekoek accepted the editorship of Vorbote, Wijnkoop could not resist making the charge that Pannekoek had made this decision on the basis of his "unpractical, abstract, theoretical nature." 

Taking up the triumvirate's arguments, Pannekoek maintained that their insistence on purity of principles based on the Dutch model ignored the vital question of how the theoretical understanding that lay behind these principles came about:

We are the abnormal, the others are normal; in other countries internationalists engaged in struggle must undertake theoretical clarification which we already possess. An inter-
national spiritual split must still come, although it is beginning practically, but without clear insight.

The political consequences of abstention from the Zimmerwald movement, Pannekoek felt, could only be sectarianism and isolationism:

Our group can do nothing alone. And besides, how can someone who is an internationalist completely accept our standpoint? And think completely as we do? For these reasons, I have said we must unite with those who stand with us in practice, in other words, with those who desire an international class struggle against their governments and feel that mass action is necessary. There can be differences over methods, goals and the nature of actions. . . . 42

In the months following the Zimmerwald conference, Pannekoek undertook a major effort to persuade the SDP to participate in the Zimmerwald movement. The first indication that the SDP's attitude had softened came in January, 1916, when Camille Huysmans made a speaking tour of Holland in an effort to justify the policies of the International Socialist Bureau and condemn the Zimmerwald movement. Putting his own reservations aside, Wijnkoop followed Huysmans around the country in an attempt to defend the Zimmerwald movement. 43 Due in part to Pannekoek's urging, the SDP presented a program of action at the February, 1916 conference of the Zimmerwald movement's executive. 44 Although the program failed to win support even from the other left groups, 45 the SDP
continued to move closer to the Zimmerwald left. By the time of the Kienthal conference in April, 1916, it was clear that the SDP had at least entered into a tacit working relationship with it.46

The SDP's sectarianism in the international arena was not paralleled in its domestic activities. From the earliest days of the war, the SDP directed the main focus of its activities toward building alliances with other left groups outside the SDAP. For the internal development of the party, the most important achievement of this policy was the SDP's unification with Henriette Roland Holst's RSV. Formed in early 1915 on the initiative of Roland Holst, the RSV was composed largely of young left-wing members of the SDAP who were disenchanted with the party's pro-mobilization policies. The RSV was conceived of mainly as an intermediate organization between the SDAP and the SDP. Although parallel membership was allowed in both the SDP and SDAP, most of the two hundred members came out of the SDAP.47 The efforts toward unification gained momentum only slowly. Throughout 1915, the SDP and the RSV remained irrevocably divided over a number of major theoretical and personal differences. From a theoretical standpoint, the main source of friction involved the RSV's total opposition to any form of military mobilization, including a people's militia. The SDP regarded this position as a form of pacifism.48 This
divergence was exacerbated by the long-standing personal animosity between Roland Holst and Wijnkoop. As late as December, 1915, Wijnkoop labelled Roland Holst a "dangerous comrade" whom "we must be extremely cautious of." Roland Holst, in turn, noting the refusal of the SDP membership to support the reopening of discussion on signing the Zimmerwald manifesto, contended: "They are not men; they are puppets." The efforts for unification were begun largely on the initiative of Radek shortly after the Zimmerwald conference, when he wrote Roland Holst that "two sects are no better than one." At Radek's urging, Pannekoek agreed to play a mediating role.

Pannekoek's first significant step in bringing the two parties closer to a merger came in January, 1916, when he helped maneuver the *Nieuwe Tijd* into the left radical camp. Following the split of Deventer in 1909, the *Nieuwe Tijd* occupied an uneasy middle ground between the SDP and the SDAP. After the resignation of the two remaining SDAP members, van der Goes and Wibaut in December, 1915, a new editorial board composed of Pannekoek, Gorter, and Roland Holst was formed. The new position of the publication was announced in a circular drafted by Pannekoek: "Henceforth the *Nieuwe Tijd* shall be the scientific monthly of revolutionary Marxism in the Netherlands. It will be the organ of the new socialism
that is growing on the ruins of the old, discredited International." 52 This cooperation laid the groundwork for a softening of positions on both sides. Starting in April, the two organizations also began to act on the basis of a de facto unity. When the Tribune was turned into a daily that month, Henriette Roland Holst was appointed to the editorial board. Formal unification took place at the SDP congress in May and brought the party's total membership up to 700 and provided a new infusion of talent for the SDP. 53

During this same period, the SDP also established a close working relationship with the Union of Christian Socialists (Bond van Christen Socialisten—BCS). Originally formed in 1910 as part of the Dutch peace movement, the BCS, through the appeal of its evangelical, biblically-based anti-militarism, had developed into a force of considerable significance. 54 The first efforts at cooperation began in January, 1916, when the two groups opened discussion on running a joint electoral campaign. The outcome of these talks was a revolutionary electoral bloc of Christians and Marxists which fielded candidates in 37 of the hundred electoral districts. This electoral campaign was complemented by an aggressive joint anti-conscription campaign which centered around encouraging individuals to refuse military service. In
justifying this alliance, the SDP argued that the main antagonism was no longer between Marxists and non-Marxists, but between reformists and revolutionaries, nationalists and internationalists. Any action that brings revolutionary cooperation in actions against imperialism, they felt, had "more value than a dozen programs." The election itself marked a significant gain for the SDP. In comparison to a total of only 1,340 votes for the SDP in the 1913 elections, the joint bloc drew 21,408 (of which 4,120 were for the BCS). Wijnkoop alone drew 1298 in his electoral district.\textsuperscript{55}

These efforts, however, were dwarfed by the SDP's intensive anti-militarism campaign during the spring of 1916, which received its vital impetus from the steady deterioration of living conditions in the Dutch urban centers. The catalyst for this campaign came in late March, 1916, when the torpedoing of the Tubantia brought a renewed threat of Dutch entry into the war. On April 2, the SDP and its syndicalist, pacifist, and Christian socialist allies issued a joint manifesto denouncing both the threat of war and the deterioration of living conditions. This was followed by a large well-attended conference in Amsterdam chaired by Wijnkoop on April 24, which marked the start of a mass agitational campaign. Within ten days, four demonstrations against unemployment and food shortages were held in Amsterdam, which drew
large numbers of women and the unemployed. For the first time, the propaganda of the SDP began to have an echo within the Dutch working class. The high point of this campaign came with a national demonstration in Amsterdam on June 21, which drew 25,000 persons. "At last!" Wijnkoop shouted from the podium. 56

Taken together, the SDP's actions during the spring of 1916 provided a clear indication of the party's growing influence within the Dutch working class and laid the foundation for the rapid growth in membership that was to come during the latter months of the war. Through its alliances, its extensive propaganda, its intransigent internationalism, and its militant campaign against the war economy, the SDP had established a clear profile that distinguished it from the SDAP and underlined the need for its continuing existence.

Militants Against the Current: The Bremen Left and the Pre-History of German Communism

Although events forced him to remain in Holland during the war years, Pannekoek continued to exert, through his writings and personal contacts—in particular through his close friend Johann Knief—a decisive influence on the political development of the Bremen left. Drawing heavily on Pannekoek's analyses the Bremen left developed, during the war years, into one of the two opposing poles around which the early German communist
movement would gravitate.

Like their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, the Bremen left had no concrete strategy for resisting war. During the stormy days of late July and early August 1914, the Bremen left sought to uphold their internationalist principles with a series of public demonstrations against the danger of war. At the largest of these on July 28, Johann Knief summed up what was at the heart of the revolutionary intransigence of the Bremen left when he warned: "The rulers are playing with fire. They should not forget that a European war will be followed by a European revolution."

Shortly after his return to Holland, Pannekoek began to devise plans to bypass the German censors so that his theoretical work would continue to appear regularly in the Bürgerzeitung. By October, he was ready to outline, in a letter to Henke, a detailed strategic perspective for the left. The key question confronting the movement, he felt, was its orientation toward the party. Pannekoek took it for granted that the SDP was "no longer an instrument of socialism" owing to its capitulation to nationalism, and maintained that continued adherence to party discipline could only be a barrier to social progress. For these reasons, he felt the first and most difficult task must be to "liberate our minds from the old awe [for the party] which we have
grown up in." Pannekoek, however, stopped short of advocating an immediate break with the party and argued that the real issue was to struggle for position in preparation for an eventual split. In the meantime, Pannekoek could counsel the left radicals only to "continue to fight the same way we have always fought," by defending the principles of socialism, internationalism, and the class struggle. On a more concrete level, Pannekoek urged the Bremen left to take the initiative and create an independent publication of the German left. Rather than a purely theoretical review, he suggested that they develop a publication aimed directly at the workers. To help unify the left, he proposed that Rosa Luxemburg be given a position on the editorial board. 60 In March, 1915, under the pretext of retrieving his personal belongings, Pannekoek journeyed to Bremen in order to confer with the left radical leadership on implementing these ideas in practice. 61 Following extensive discussions, he concluded that little could be done in the short run. In Bremen, the usually optimistic Pannekoek encountered only a "quiet, muffled embitterment combined with a feeling of complete powerlessness, as if both hands and feet were tied and no leader was saying what to do . . . ." 62

For the Bremen left, the first year of the war was a year of confusion and despair. In the months following
August 4, the left lost its most prominent leaders: Pannekoek returned to Holland; Knief was mobilized and sent to the front; Radek was forced to leave for Switzerland. At the same time, many of their rank-and-file working class supporters were drafted. As a consequence, the left swiftly lost many of their positions of influence in the party and trade unions. Disorganized and under conditions of severe repression, the left did little more during the winter and spring of 1914-15 than occasionally distribute a clandestine anti-war leaflet.

The first step in building an organized anti-war opposition came in January, 1915, with the creation of a discussion circle for selected functionaries within the Bremen SPD. Composed of about fifteen members, this group held weekly meetings to discuss various theoretical and strategic questions. Although all political tendencies were initially represented, the circle moved rapidly to the left. A discussion in early March on imperialism and the "politics of capitulation" resulted in the departure of the more right-wing elements. In the weeks and months that followed, the circle began to focus increasingly on Pannekoek's writings as a basis for a strategic reorientation. Through the framework of this group, the left was able to develop a praxis for the anti-war struggle and resume an ideological offensive against the right and center. These discussions soon
became combined with a growing range of illegal activities, beginning with the extensive distribution of a leaflet entitled, "The Main Enemy is at Home."\textsuperscript{65}

The first major breakthrough for the circle came in March, 1915, when twelve soldiers from the front appeared at a circle meeting to present a leftist soldiers' platform rejecting national defense and calling for a revolutionary struggle against the war. This group was composed of Bremen workers from the Seventy-Fifth Infantry Regiment, who had been secretly meeting since the fall of 1914 and had established regular contact with the circle.\textsuperscript{66} During this same period, the left received another major boost when Johann Knief was able to resume his political activity after being discharged from the army for a nervous breakdown. In the upcoming months, Knief's leadership was to be crucial for the organizational and ideological regroupment of the left in Bremen. Following his release from a long hospitalization, Knief almost immediately went on the offensive. At meetings of the circle on December 4 and 11, 1915, he presented a detailed proposal for launching mass actions against the war. At the same time, Knief began to attack Henke for his unwillingness to help initiate such actions to such an extent that Henke withdrew from the circle.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite these gains, systematic anti-war activity remained confined to the small circle of activists
throughout most of 1915. The tense truce that had prevailed in Bremen in late 1914 began to unravel only during the winter of 1915-16. As signs of disaffection began to slowly surface, the left gained renewed confidence, and by the late fall of 1915, felt strong enough to start disseminating their views in broader circles. At an illegal meeting of fifty persons in November, a strongly-worded anti-war resolution presented by Knief was approved overwhelmingly. Later that month at a legal SPD meeting, another resolution was passed calling for parliamentary and extra-parliamentary struggle against the domestic consequences of the war.\footnote{68} In December, the left published an article in the Bürgerzeitung outlining publicly for the first time their differences with the right and center.\footnote{69}

These developments were only one element of a larger process of left regroupment going on in Germany at the time. Throughout 1915, the ranks of the anti-war opposition grew steadily. By the end of the year, left radical opposition groups held positions of power in Berlin, Hamburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, and Brunswick. In Berlin, Rosa Luxemburg and her collaborators came out in April, 1915, with the publication, \textit{Die Internationale}, which was immediately banned by the censor. Later that year they also began to issue the so-called \textit{Spartakus} letters.\footnote{70}

As the opposition movement continued to gain
momentum, the Bremen left began to develop an extensive network of national and international contacts. For Pannekoek, the actions of the Bremen left had the potential to serve as a model for the emerging new international revolutionary movement.71 Through Radek, close ties were developed with both the Zimmerwald left, and Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In Germany, a particularly close relationship was established with Julian Borchardt and his publication Lichtstrahlen, which served as a major outlet for the writings of Pannekoek, Knief, and Radek.72 The alliance, however, that had the most lasting significance for the Bremen left was with the group of left radicals in nearby Hamburg, led by Laufenberg and Wolffheim. During the early months of the war, Knief strongly criticized this group for not differentiating themselves clearly enough from the center and for rejecting Pannekoek's perspective on street demonstrations. Knief, nonetheless, took considerable pains to move them toward the Bremen group's position and within a year a close working relationship was established, which was to be of crucial significance for the later formation of German left communism.73 Relations with the Spartakus group in Berlin, however, remained cool due to a combination of pre-war animosities and deep-seated strategic differences. The principal dividing point involved the unwillingness of the Spartacists to break with the center and attempt to
build a new form of revolutionary organization. These differences were fully aired when Knief journeyed to Berlin in January, 1916, to participate in a national conference of the opposition.74

The year 1916 stands as a major turning point in the development of the anti-war opposition. As that year progressed, the movement grew from one of small, isolated groups of militants to a movement of mass proportions. The first signs of mass discontent began to arise over purely domestic questions as rations and real wages began to drop rapidly. In such an atmosphere, the demand for peace became widespread. This mood of discontent began to be translated into mass action following the arrest and sentencing of Karl Liebknecht for statements he made at an illegal May Day demonstration. On June 4, 1916, Knief journeyed to Berlin to participate in a conference called by the Spartakus group to coordinate actions against Liebknecht's sentencing and organize an agitational campaign against the domestic consequences of the war. In Bremen, mass actions began with a demonstration of socialist women against the rising cost of living on June 22. Several days later, 400-500 persons marched through the city center in solidarity with Liebknecht. Following Liebknecht's sentencing on June 29, several thousand workers took to the streets for several days shouting anti-war and anti-government slogans. On July 4--partly
on the initiative of the left—4,000 shipyard workers of the Weser firm went on strike against the wishes of their leaders. Although the strike was ostensibly for higher wages, the workers, nonetheless, declared their solidarity with Liebknecht. Following resumption of work on July 5, the police demanded increased censorship of the Bürgerzeitung, which Henke and others were willing to provide. Taken together, the events of the spring and summer of 1916 provided a clear indication that, although its activity was severely curtailed, the left in Bremen still retained a significant mass base in the working class and had the capacity to influence future events.

As the ranks of the opposition continued to swell, the conflict between the two main tendencies began to intensify in proportion. Starting in February, 1916, Knief launched an offensive against the centrist opposition grouped around Kautsky, Bernstein, and Haase, terming them "a much greater evil than the reformists." Following a lengthy campaign in the Bürgerzeitung and at party meetings, Knief, by mid-May, was ready to proclaim publicly what had hitherto been assumed in practice: that the SDP was divided into opposing parties and that a formal split was a necessary and inevitable historical step. This struggle became even more strident when Henke began to take measures to limit the influence of the left on the Bürgerzeitung on the grounds
that they were attempting to turn it into a purely oppositional organ. By now, it was clear that Henke and the left radicals were divided on most of the major strategic questions.

With their influence on the Bürgerzeitung drastically curtailed, the left radicals—following extensive consultations with Pannekoek—came out with their own publication, *Arbeiterpolitik*, on June 24, 1916. They had been preceded in this move by the right wing of the Bremen SPD which established their own publication, *Bremische Correspondenz*, in January, 1916. The defined aim of *Arbeiterpolitik* was to provide the workers with a new "spiritual orientation" and liberate them from the stultifying power of the organizational bureaucracy of official social democracy. Its opening editorial was clearly Pannekoekian in character:

This [the capitulation of August 4, 1914] was no accidental disaster; on the contrary, it was a logical step for a movement whose evolution since the Erfurt Congress has been in that direction. . . . The epoch of workers' politics is now beginning.

Under the editorship of Knief and his collaborator Paul Frölich; and with major intellectual contributions from Pannekoek and Radek, *Arbeiterpolitik* swiftly emerged as the leading theoretical organ of the revolutionary left in Germany.
Throughout the remainder of 1916, *Arbeiterpolitik* relentlessly pursued what had become the main theme of the Bremen left: the need for a complete break with the "politics of opportunism" and the organizational forms of pre-war social democracy. Far from being the product of rigid sectarianism or revolutionary impatience, the theoretical perspective of *Arbeiterpolitik* rested on a carefully constructed analysis, much of which was drawn from the theoretical writings of Pannekoek. This analysis began with the assumption that organizational unity had been effectively broken on August 4, 1914, and that the SPD, through its bureaucracy and its base in the labor aristocracy, had become a new social imperialist party fully integrated into the capitalist system. As a result, both the "social patriots" and the center had the same interests at stake. They represented, in effect, a "war party" which would do everything possible to mobilize the membership against the revolutionary tactics of the left. The vital question, therefore, was not one of uniting the left and center for a struggle against the right, but one of achieving "clarity" and drawing the sharp lines of demarcation for a direct struggle against the entire edifice of "social chauvinism." Such a struggle, they felt, was both a precondition for rebuilding the proletarian movement and an objective consequence of the class struggle. Only in this manner
could the full revolutionary energy of the masses be released. A new epoch in the history of the workers' movement was beginning which required a completely new spiritual and organizational orientation, which the center, irrevocably tied to the old forms of organization and struggle, was incapable of providing. 83

This assessment was bound up with their belief in the practical necessity of creating a new party of the left. Starting in the fall of 1916, the Bremen left began to lay the groundwork for the creation of such an organization. For the moment, however, their strategy was directed toward winning power positions within the old party and convincing the masses of the need for a break, rather than provoking a direct split. 84 As a first step in this direction, the Bremen left called for a united front of the entire German left against the center and right. 85 To further organizational cooperation between the various left groups, Knief invited representatives of the Spartacist group to write for Arbeiterpolitik. 86 This overture, however, failed to blunt the mutual hostility and suspicion between the two groups. 87

During this same period, major differences also flared up between the Bremen left and Lenin over the strategy for the Zimmerwald left. Under the influence of Pannekoek and Radek, Arbeiterpolitik rejected Lenin's support for national self-determination on the grounds
that the goal of the class struggle must not be a new
nation-state system, but a new mode of working class
organization and consciousness. Lenin charged that this
view was "half-anarchist" and engaged Radek in a series
of polemics. 88

Despite this disarray on the left, the climate in
Bremen continued to become increasingly favorable for the
left radicals throughout the last months of 1916. On
December 1, a membership meeting overwhelmingly approved
a resolution declaring that the SPD's capitulation at the
outbreak of the war was an objective consequence of the
party's entire course of development. In line with the
opposition's strategy throughout Germany, the resolution
also called for a boycott of all dues payments to the
executive. 89 In retaliation, the SPD executive expelled
the entire Bremen section several days later. Although
about 300 members of the right constituted themselves as
the Sozialdemokratischen Parteiverein Bremen on December
8, the overwhelming majority of the membership remained
with the expelled opposition. The firm that published
the Bürgerzeitung, however, was sympathetic to the
executive and awarded the publication to the right,
which led to Henke's removal as editor-in-chief and Knief's
expulsion from the editorial board. 90

The expulsion of the Bremen section by the executive
was only the prelude to a larger series of expulsions. On
January 7, 1917, the opposition from throughout Germany gathered to discuss their relationship to the party. During the course of this gathering, both the centrists and Spartacists proclaimed their intention to work within the existing party. Nonetheless, the executive, charging that the conference was illegal, responded by expelling the entire opposition. 91

In the wake of these developments, the Bremen left sought to unite the entire German left around a common platform, which would lay the groundwork for a new revolutionary party. Knief formally presented this program of revolutionary regroupment to the membership in February, 1917. This program embodied the principal themes the Bremen left had been articulating since 1914: the need for a complete "spiritual and organizational break" with the center and the old organizational forms. At the same time, it was maintained that the new party could not be mechanistically proclaimed at meetings and conferences, but must develop organically out of the actual struggles of the working class. For the moment, the Bremen left felt the most important task was to explain to the workers the reasons why a new organization was necessary. 92 In the hope of moving the Spartacists away from an alliance with the center, Knief journeyed to Berlin later that month for discussions with their leaders. 93 Although Knief was unsuccessful in influencing
the Spartacists, other attempts were undertaken to unite the left groups in northwest Germany. The fruit of these efforts was a joint declaration of left radical groups in Bremen, Hamburg, and Hanover on March 5, 1917, affirming the perspective of the Bremen left. 94

At Easter, the expelled opposition, both left and center, met for a second conference at Gotha to formally institutionalize the split. Shortly before the gathering opened, the Bremen left, at a caucus of other left groups posed the question of whether the left ought to form its own party or join with the centrists. The Bremen group and its northwest allies, along with the Borchardt group and Spartacist supporters in various cities, favored a separate party of the left, but were opposed by the majority of Spartacists and the Dresden left. 95 When the majority of Spartacists joined with the centrists to form the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands—USPD), the Bremen left accused them of attempting to restore the "old leadership politics." 96 The Bremen group and their allies thereupon withdrew to continue their efforts to form a separate organization of the left. Although their conception of the new revolutionary movement was never clearly defined, the Bremen left, on the eve of the great revolutionary upheavals of 1917-1918, had clearly differentiated themselves from both
the Spartacists and USPD on two key points: they demanded
an organization built on completely different lines than
the old forms being reproduced in the USPD; and, to make
the break from pre-war social democracy complete, they
wanted an action-oriented organization arising out of
the struggle itself.

_Socialism as Deed: Pannekoek's Political Thought, 1914-1917._

Pannekoek's theoretical work during the war years--
which was central to the strategy of both the Dutch and
Bremen left--was largely an expansion and reformulation
of his earlier analysis of 1910-1914. Aside from some
shifts in emphasis and a few new specifics, what was new
in these formulations was largely their tone and sense
of immediacy.

Pannekoek's point of departure was a bold and
sweeping political and sociological critique of German
social democracy. In an argument which closely
paralleled that of the German sociologist Robert Michels,
Pannekoek enunciated what he considered to be at the
heart of the failure of the "old socialism":

It takes the form of a gigantic and powerful
organization, almost a state within a state,
with its own officials, finances and press,
spiritual universe, and specific ideology
(Marxism). By its very nature, it is adapted
to the pre-imperialist peaceful era. The
thousands of officials, secretaries, agitators,
parliamentarians, theoreticians, and publicists—who already form a distinct caste, a group with very distinct interests—rule the organization on both the material and spiritual levels, and express its general character.\(^7\)

In Pannekoek's view, such parties came to embody not the negation of bourgeois society, but rather its extension and rationalization. Beneath its revolutionary self-conception, social democracy lay paralyzed by irreversible contradictions.

Pannekoek felt that the consequences of this for party life at the base were clear: pre-war socialism had little impact on the daily lives of the great masses of workers. Most party members were not active fighters for socialism; only five to ten per cent participated in party activities; the others did little more than passively pay dues. Such a proletariat was "neither ripe enough nor strong enough for political revolution." At best, it was an indication that they were "socialist but not revolutionary." The growth of imperialism, which produced a militant nationalism within large sectors of the working class, helped to reinforce this logic. For these reasons, Pannekoek concluded that the power of German social democracy was nothing more than a chimera.\(^8\)

As a corollary of his analysis, Pannekoek maintained that this de-radicalizing process could only unfold in a
period of economic and political stability, whereas the
war unleashed exactly the opposite -- crisis and polariza-
tion. This line of reasoning drove Pannekoek to the
conclusion that no form of alliance with the center was
possible. The center, which was based in the party
bureaucracy and led by Kautsky, could not wage a genuine
struggle against imperialism since their vital interests
were directly affected:

Kautsky's theory and tactics represent an
attempt to shield the whole bureaucratic
apparatus from the risks of social
revolution . . . For the officials, this would
be the end of everything; the organization
is their whole world and they cannot exist
or act outside of it. The instinct of self-
preservation, the interests of a specific
group, force them, therefore, to adopt a
tactic yielding to imperialism and making
concessions to it. 99

To his longstanding belief in the inability of
the center to wage a struggle for socialism, Pannekoek
added a new ingredient: the possible structural integra-
tion of social democracy into a new system of exploita-
tion. The war-time experiences with state control over
industries, he felt, had led a large part of the bour-
geoisie to place their hopes in a form of "state
socialism." Pannekoek maintained that from an economic
and technological standpoint, a centralized and national-
ized system of production would offer a number of
advantages over private ownership, such as technological
rationalization, increased production, lower prices, and regulation of wages and working conditions. It would also allow a speedy reconversion of industry to peacetime production and provide an easy solution to the problem of returning soldiers seeking employment. The reality, however, would be a new system of domination erected behind the "facade of socialism":

This state socialism can only aggravate the proletarian condition and strengthen oppression. In spite of this one can see that a large sector of social democracy will not oppose it, and will even support it. Its old ideology will, in effect, link social democracy with the new system of state exploitation.

These formulations led Pannekoek to place a renewed emphasis on the democratic aspects of socialist transformation. A constantly recurring theme in Pannekoek's wartime writings was his objection to equating nationalization of enterprises with socialism, a point he had raised as early as 1911. For Pannekoek what was at stake was nothing less than the emancipatory meaning of socialism itself:

Nationalization of enterprises is not socialism; Socialism is the power of the proletariat. But since, in the ideological world of present-day social democracy, socialism and state controlled economy are more or less synonymous, the party will find itself without spiritual arms when brought face to face with state socialist measures intended to reduce the proletariat to a condition of slavery.
In an article entitled "What is Socialism?", Pannekoek defined socialism as rational economic planning combined with democracy. Throughout the first half-century of its existence, Pannekoek noted, the workers' movement had been concerned mainly with the economic aspects of socialism as a result of the prevailing conditions of economic scarcity. Owing to capitalist development, however, the economy had become sufficiently organized and a new conception of socialism was slowly coming to the forefront:

Democracy has now become the main part, the most important side of socialism. In this period of economic development everything that strengthens democracy and the power of the proletariat is a step toward socialism. 103

Pannekoek felt that as the trend toward state socialism accelerated, the struggle for democratization—in the form of struggles for greater democracy both within the existing state and in the new self-administering organs of proletarian struggle—would take on a new intensity and significance. 104

Against the evolving "state socialism" of the center, Pannekoek counterposed what he termed "the new socialism of the laboring masses." 105 Although avoiding a precise definition, Pannekoek viewed this new socialism as residing in the capacity of the masses for spontaneous action and self-organization and distinguished it from the old, discredited party-based socialism of the pre-war
era:

The hope of socialism no longer lies in its gradualist and bourgeois side, the admirable socialist parties with their glittering speakers, their famous politicians, their noble feelings of human love, their nice programs, their good, proud, self-righteous workers. It lies instead in the dark poverty and misery of the masses, who, as they rebel against their misery, are hated, scorned, and persecuted as the enemies of state and society; out of their struggles and sacrifices will arise the full freedom of humanity.106

Pannekoek felt that the activating element of these struggles would be the deteriorating living conditions brought on by the war (rather than opposition to the war itself). But at the same time, Pannekoek failed to specify how the workers would mount the expected mass actions if they were still enrolled in the old organizations. On the contrary, he emphasized that the whole process would be largely spontaneous; as mass actions continued to spread and intensify, the party and trade unions would find themselves unable to play a restraining role:

From then on, their rigid leadership organs will increasingly form a subordinate sector within a larger class organization that welds the masses into a powerful fighting collectivity, not through the membership card, but through consciousness and common purpose.107

For the present, Pannekoek saw a state of "spiritual disorientation" in which the old norms had fallen and the
new had not yet broken through and must be prefigured by struggle. Under these conditions: "The old methods of struggle now appear more than ever as mediums for duping the workers rather than mediums of offensive action."  

The logic of this perspective led Pannekoek to place a renewed emphasis on the active elements of Marxism. In a prominent Lichtstrahlen article entitled "Marxism as Deed" ("Der Marxismus als Tat"), he argued that whereas the economic and determinist side of Marxism had received a disproportionate emphasis in the past due to the weakness of the proletariat:

Now, however, is the time to accentuate the other long-neglected side of socialism; the workers' movement must discard the narrowness and passivity of the old era and by its new orientation transcend the present crisis.

Pannekoek went on to argue that since historically the driving force of every great class movement had always been mass action, the "new orientation" was simply "a return to the old truth." The "new tactic" of mass action only appeared to be new because the long intermezzo of parliamentarianism had been conceptualized as reality. For Pannekoek, the war symbolized the beginning of a new epoch both for capitalism and for socialism, "in which the will and action of men will be primary."  

To buttress his case, Pannekoek undertook a systematic examination of the historical, conceptual, and
sociological factors that helped give a fatalistic coloring to socialism. Initially, the belief in the inevitable economic certainty of socialism played a powerful psychological role in giving the movement self-confidence at a time when it was weak. In part, this was a legacy of the utopian era when thinkers such as Owen, Blanc, and Lassalle saw in the sudden disappearance of small-scale commodity production an analogy for the disappearance of capitalism in its entirety. This "mode of thought" was reinforced by the events of the Paris Commune, which led to a view among the petit-bourgeois thinking masses that the capitalists were too powerful to resist and that nothing could be done except wait for economic development to run its course. In the ensuing decades, a series of severe economic crises seemed to offer empirical proof that capitalism had indeed exhausted its forces. Kautsky's works, in particular, were a reflection of these conditions. Pannekoek contended that this type of reasoning was the opposite of a genuine Marxist methodology which views human beings not only as the product of economic relationships, but also as the active agent of change in these relationships. 110

Pannekoek's assessment of the reasons for the failure of social democracy led him to make a number of key modifications to his earlier theory of nationalism.
Taking up the vital question of whether the nationalism of the workers was the cause of the party's failure to struggle against the war, Pannekoek argued that this nationalism was more a symptom than a cause of this failure. As capitalist foreign expansion created a new privileged stratum within the working class, it simultaneously generated strong tendencies toward national chauvinism and reformism, which corresponded to the bureaucratic interests of the party and trade union leadership. Hence, nationalism became the most easily manipulated ideological tool at the disposal of the bourgeoisie, and social democracy became one of its main conduits. At the same time, Pannekoek also felt that the party's capitulation was the consequence of an inherent weakness in the proletariat's internationalism. Proletarian internationalism, he maintained, had never fully developed and remained only a "tendency" rather than an actual practice. Pannekoek then proceeded to analyze this internationalism by distinguishing between three forms of internationalism within the workers' movement. The first of these was the "primitive internationalism" which characterized the early stages of the workers' movement and was still being propagated by the anarchists. In reality, this internationalism was nothing more than a powerless protest of the old peasant villages
and trade communities against the strong centralized community of the bourgeois nation state. The second type was the "abstract internationalism" of the intellectuals and the revisionists, which was combined with elements of nationalism and which desired simply a peaceful community of nations. Third was what he termed the "practical internationalism" of the industrial proletariat. This internationalism was rooted in the work life of the proletariat and their daily struggles against the bourgeoisie. Its hallmark was a "community of struggle," which—due to the nature of pre-war socialism—existed only in embryonic form:

These tiny socialist congresses, in which the leaders good-naturedly or vehemently discussed all sorts of questions and then went out together to drink beer could not, of course, be a community of struggle. A community of struggle develops only out of real struggles.

Because of this, proletarian internationalism was only an abstract feeling; there was in reality no community with the workers over the border. It was, therefore, not correct to say that the workers did not struggle against the war because they were not internationalist enough, but the reverse: because they did not struggle, their internationalism became a pale shadow. Only through the willingness to struggle directly against the bourgeoisie could the workers have come to a genuine internationalism. 111

Although his ideas were often more an expression
of hope than a practical guide to action, the trenchant logic and militant phraseology of Pannekoek's position could not be misunderstood; it was a clarion call to a new kind of socialism, free from the evasions, compromises, and ambiguities of the era of the Second International, one based on the single-minded waging of a total and world-wide class struggle. It was with these ideas and experiences that Pannekoek approached the great revolutionary upheavals of 1917-1919 and the formative period of a new international movement.
NOTES


3. Ibid.


12. Lenin's attitude toward Roland Holst, which was prompted largely by her close relationship to Trotsky, is revealed in a letter to Wijnkoop: "I see that we cannot in any circumstances accept solidarity with Mme. [Roland Holst] R.H., in my opinion is a Dutch K[autsky] or a Dutch Trotsky." V.I. Lenin to David Wijnkoop, n.d. [some time after July 24, 1915], op. cit.


14. Quoted in ibid., p. 74.


18. Anton Pannekoek to Willem van Ravesteijn, October 22, 1915, op. cit.


21. Similar reservations about Lenin were also shared by most of the other Dutch Marxists, Henriette Roland
Holst, while considering Lenin sympathetic as a person, felt he was "much more a modernized Blanquist than a revolutionary Marxist" and "somewhat narrow, scholastic, and with few ideas." Henriette Roland Holst to Anton Pannkoek, n.d. [1915], Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 63. Wijnkoop, for his part, noted that he was "never very much attracted to Lenin's 'theory,'" though he admitted to knowing "very little about it." David Wijnkoop to Willem van Ravestijn, September 21, 1915, in: Horst Lademacher (ed.), "Die Zimmerwalder Bewegung, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 114-116.


29. Willem van Ravestijn, De wording van het communisme in de Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 142.

31. Willem van Ravestijn, "De teerling is geworpen!" De Tribune, August 5, 1914.

32. This information is contained in a letter from Herman Gorter to David Wijnkoop, October 20, 1914. Reprinted in Kontrast, number five, 1964.


34. Willem van Ravestijn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 146.


41. David Wijnkoop to Willem van Ravestijn, October 2, 1915, in: ibid., pp. 143-144.


46. For further information on the SDP's relationship to the Zimmerwald movement, see: A.S. de Leeuw, "De S.D.P. en Zimmerwald," *De Communist*, March, 1931.


50. Henriette Roland Holst to Anton Pannekoek, n.d. [1915], Pannekoek Archives; op. cit., folder 63.

51. Karl Radek to Henriette Roland Holst, October 12, 1915; op. cit.


53. Ibid., p. 158.

54. Information on this movement can be found in: Daan van der Zee, *Een tijdverschijnsel de voormalige Bond van Christen-Socialisten* (The Hague: Kreuseman, 1966).


56. Ibid., pp. 154-158.

57. Erhard Lucas, *Die Sozialdemokratie in Bremen während des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Bremen: Carl Schuneman Verlag, 1969), p. 21. In addition to this work, the development of the Bremen left during the war is handled in


59. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Henke, August 28, 1914, Henke Archives, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, (Bad Godesburg), folder 46.

60. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Henke, October 29, 1914, Henke Archives, folder 50, op. cit., p. 184.


64. Ibid., p. 228.

65. Ibid., p. 230.


68. Ibid., p. 236.


70. For a detailed treatment of the German anti-war movement, see: F.L. Carsten, War Against War: British and German Radical Movements in the First World War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

71. Anton Pannekoek to Adolf Dannat, June 6, 1916, Staatsarchiv Bremen.

73. Ibid., pp. 219-220.


78. Ibid., p. 61. See also Knief's article "Die alte und die neue Internationale," Bremer Bürgerzeitung, March 31, April 12, 28, and 29, May 2 and 3, 1916.


80. For information on Pannekoek's role in the formation of Arbeiterpolitik see his correspondence with Adolf Dannat in the Staatsarchiv Bremen.


83. See in particular the following unsigned articles in Arbeiterpolitik: "Einheit oder Spaltung der Partei," July 15 and 29, August 5, 12, and 26, 1916; "Die alte und die neue Bewegung," August 26, 1916.


87. These differences were exacerbated by long-standing personality clashes. As Franz Mehring noted: "Rosa is so ill-disposed to Radek and Pannekoek that she hates them both with a passion and considers them gigantic asses." Franz Mehring to Alfred Henke, June 15, 1916. Reprinted in: Erhard Lucas, Die Sozialdemokratie in Bremen während des Ersten Weltkrieges, op. cit., p. 64.


89. The text of this resolution is contained in: Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 486-487.


91. See: Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy, 1905-1917, op. cit., pp. 312-313.

92. This program is contained in: Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 570-571.


94. This declaration can be found in: Dokumente und Materialien zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 573.


100. Anton Pannekoek, "Wenn der Krieg zu Ende Geht," Vorbote, number two, April, 1916. Pannekoek maintained elsewhere that "state socialism" was synonymous with "state capitalism," but failed to state why he preferred the former term. Anton Pannekoek, "Was ist Sozialismus?", Lichtstrahlen, May, 1915.
101. "Nationalization of the big industries would mean merely replacing the private capitalist with a much more powerful entrepreneur, against whom the workers would be far more effectively stripped of their rights. . . . Socialism is the power of the workers, self-consciously united within powerful self-administering organizations by the struggle against the capitalist class." Anton Pannekoek, "Sozialismus und Verstaatlichung," "Zeitungskorrespondenz," May 27, 1911.
103. Anton Pannekoek, "Was ist Sozialismus?", op. cit.
106. Pannekoek envisioned a process similar to the French Revolution whereby extreme misery produced mass actions, which in turn converged with the new ideas of the bourgeoisie to propel a revolutionary movement. Anton Pannekoek, "De sociaaldemocratie en de oorlog," op. cit.
109. Anton Pannekoek, "Der Marxismus als Tat," Lichtstrahlen, March, 1915. As part of his effort to understand the interplay between mass action and social
movements, Pannekoek also undertook a detailed study of the Chartist movement which found expression in his: "De Chartistenbeweging," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1916, pp. 554-571, 680-694.


111. Anton Pannekoek, "De sociaaldemokratie en de oorlog," op. cit.
CHAPTER IX

YEARS OF REVOLUTION:
PANNEKOEK AND THE FORMATION OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNISM, 1917-1919
Struggling Marxism Victorious: Pannekoek and the Russian Revolution

The activities of Pannekoek during the years 1917-1919 must be seen against a background of dramatic world events. In pre-1914 Europe, revolution had been largely a doctrine and a dream to which small groups of determined men dedicated their lives. By 1919, a revolutionary mood pervaded all of Europe. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the German Revolution of 1918 seemed at long last to mark the beginning of the world-wide proletarian revolution to which Pannekoek had dedicated the past twenty years of his life.

Like most of the other left radicals, Pannekoek was an ardent and enthusiastic supporter of both Bolshevism and the Russian Revolution. From the beginning of these events in February, 1917, Pannekoek attempted to follow the course of the revolution through garbled newspaper accounts and analyze its significance for the European socialist movement. Writing only a few days after the fall of the czar, Pannekoek argued that the February Revolution was "not a class-conscious proletarian revolution, but the first great independent peoples' movement to arise out of the war." Pannekoek felt that, paradoxically, its very success was due to the fact that Russia was not ripe for proletarian revolution:
Because the government was not capitalist enough and could not harness all the capitalist energies and organize the forces of society in the service of imperialism . . . they were not strong enough to prevent a popular rebellion against the miseries of the war and were therefore the first to fall.

Pannekoek's main concern, however, even at this early date, was focused on the system of proletarian councils, or soviets, which had played such a critical role in the revolution. Prior to 1917, Pannekoek and the other left radicals had spoken of the institutional forms in which the working class would realize its revolution only in vague and generalized terms. Virtually no attention had been paid to the Russian soviets of 1905, although Trotsky had discussed them extensively in his widely circulated history of the revolution of that year. In tracing the contours of the February Revolution, however, Pannekoek could not fail to note the epochal significance of the new council institutions for revolutionary development:

What has never occurred in earlier revolutions in Western Europe—where fragmentation and powerlessness always followed political action—has become an enduring reality in Russia; the revolutionary masses are forming a powerful organization. As in 1905, the delegates of factories and revolutionary regiments are building, in the form of workers' and soldiers' councils, an active force of revolutionary representation and mass democracy against the bourgeois government and exploiters.
The councils, he felt, represented both tactical instruments of offensive revolutionary warfare and the embryonic framework for the future socialist reorganization of society.²

In the interval between the February and October revolutions, Pannekoek unequivocally expressed his full solidarity with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. In his prognosis of the future course of the revolution, Pannekoek reversed his earlier position and denounced the Menshevik thesis that Russia was not ripe for socialism as "a form of quasi-Marxist dogmatism." Pannekoek took particular pains to praise the Bolshevik revolutionary program as an example of the dialectical unity of reform and revolution. Unlike other critics of Bolshevism such as Rosa Luxemburg, Pannekoek during this period was either unaware of, or more likely, chose to minimize Lenin's actual views on party organization. Pannekoek's confidence in the Bolsheviks was based in large part on what he perceived to be their uncompromising commitment to wage a revolutionary class struggle. He stressed repeatedly that the Bolsheviks' strength lay not in their organizational structure, but in their aggressive militancy and firm commitment to Marxist principles. It was precisely these qualities, he felt, that were enabling them to channel spontaneous protests over hunger into a powerful revolu-
tionary mass movement. The Bolsheviks fully understood that the "ripeness" of a society for socialism is determined to a considerable extent by the "ripeness of the proletariat for struggle and power."

For Pannekoek, the Bolsheviks' willingness to struggle captured the very essence of the new socialism that was slowly emerging throughout Europe:

The chief importance of the new socialism consists of the fact that it is based on the masses own deeds, on their own initiatives. Only through their own self-actions and struggles, using their own minds—not by being the appendage of another thinking body—and by mobilizing their own will and enthusiasm, can the proletariat learn to rely completely on itself, which is a precondition for ruling society and dispensing with all other forms of leadership. Both the class struggle against the ruling class and the organization of production must be pursued on the basis of the independence and initiative of individuals and small groups. Neither the class struggle nor the regulation of labor can be commanded from above. The revolution is nothing more than the process whereby the masses are ripened through struggle: struggle against the class which exploits them, struggle against the state which subjugates them, struggle against their own weakness, which lies in the thought forms the bourgeoisie condemns them to, and is responsible for their ignorance, their lack of collective feelings, strength and courage. Only when these weaknesses are overcome will the masses be able to win and be ready for the new forms of labor which must develop as part of the total political-economic process of revolution.³

As these passages make clear, Pannekoek's concern with the Russian Revolution was focused primarily on its
relation to the larger process of world revolution and the extent to which it represented a model for a proletarian reorganization of society. But even at this early date, Pannekoek stressed the different conditions under which the proletariat was fighting in the West. In Russia, he argued, the key factors were the opposition of the bourgeoisie to the czar and the discontent of the peasantry. In Germany and the rest of Western Europe, the revolution would have a completely proletarian character, but the workers would first have "to free themselves spiritually from social democracy" and a long and debilitating legacy of parliamentary and trade-union struggle.  

Toward a New Form of Political Life: The Bremen Left and the German Revolution

The year 1917 was a year of decision not only in Russia, but also in Western Europe as war weariness reached desperate levels. In no other country was the crisis more acute than in Germany, where popular discontent was heightened by an awareness of events in Russia. In Bremen, the outbreak of the Russian Revolution had an immediate impact on the situation of the left radicals. Shortly after the February revolution, a Bremen police report noted the "uncommonly strong influence in the working class of a small group of action-loving left radicals"
and the potential revolutionary danger it posed. In nearby Hamburg, the commander of the local military
district posed it more dramatically: "The wind has carried
across the seeds of the weeds, and there are many indica-
tions that they sprout in many places." One of the first
direct manifestations of the impact of the Russian events
came on March 31, 1917, when several thousand Bremen dock
and shipyard workers spontaneously left work to march
through the city center in solidarity with the Russian
revolution and in protest over the continuation of the war.

The Russian events also gave a powerful impetus to
the discussion which took place in the ranks of the Bremen
left during the spring of 1917 over the precise form of
organization to adopt for the future. With the expulsion
of the left from the SPD, this question was given a new
sense of urgency. From their Pannekoekian perspective,
the Bremen left maintained that the old forms of party
and trade union organization were unsuitable for the
revolutionary upheavals expected in the future and called
for new, direct class instruments of revolutionary
struggle. The model for the new type of organization they
envisioned was inspired in large part by the American
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Familiarity with
the IWW came from two sources: from the Hamburg left
radical leader Fritz Wolffheim, who had edited an
American IWW publication prior to the war; and from the activities of American IWW sailors, who had frequently distributed German-language literature in the ports of Hamburg and Bremen. In March, 1917, Wolffheim called in Arbeiterpolitik for the formation of a new "unitary organization" ("Einheitsorganisation") combining the function of party and trade union. His underlying assumption was that the centralizing and cartelizing tendencies of capitalism could be combatted effectively only by a localized, class-wide movement structured around a loose network of autonomous factory-level organizations. This view was immediately adopted by Knief who journeyed to Hamburg for extensive discussions with Wolffheim on how to develop the new organization.

The Bremen left's search for a new organizational structure coincided with, and received powerful reinforcement from, a spontaneous strike wave which broke out throughout Germany in April, 1917. While the strikes were primarily a response to the deterioration of living conditions, a marked revolutionary temperament began to show itself in many areas. In Leipzig, a workers' council was formed to coordinate the strike, which represented the first appearance of this institution on German soil. Although the strike movement has commonly been termed the Shop Stewards Movement, in fact, it went much deeper in
terms of the self-organization and participation of the working class. To circumvent the trade union leadership's ban on strikes, the workers organized a coordinating network of delegates from individual factories and industrial regions, which displaced much of the old trade union leadership. In place of the old leaders, the workers elected rank-and-file delegates who met in works' committees (Betriebsräte). Out of these committees emerged the embryonic structure for the workers' councils which arose throughout Germany the following year.11

In Bremen, the political character of this movement was determined largely by the left. During the course of over a decade of political struggles, the left had developed an extensive network of shop-floor militants in the largest industrial plants, which would play a pivotal role in the struggles of 1917-1919. While the left could not mobilize the workers at will, they could, however, focus their discontent on particular issues and give it a political form, turning, in many cases, elemental expressions of unrest into impressive demonstrations of strength.12

Encouraged by the April strikes and hoping to lay the foundations for a new "unitary" form of organization, the Bremen left helped launch another wave of strikes and demonstrations throughout June and July, 1917.13
When the government responded by mobilizing its full forces against the left, Knief was forced to go underground to avoid arrest. Intending at first to go to Holland to collaborate with Pannekoek, Knief changed his mind shortly before reaching the border and decided he could be more effective in Berlin.\textsuperscript{14}

Upon reaching Berlin, Knief resumed his efforts to form a new left radical organization. By July, he had managed to form an action committee out of a number of local groups from throughout Germany which issued a formal call for the formation of a new organization. The call affirmed with full clarity what was at the heart of both Pannekoek's and the Bremen left's conception of proletarian organization: the necessity of building a completely new type of organization that was "not a new leader party," but an instrument for "bringing into being a new form of political life."\textsuperscript{15}

In response to this call, thirteen delegates gathered illegally in Berlin on August 26, 1917, for the foundation congress of what was to be officially termed the Internationale Sozialisten Deutschland (ISD). The term international was used to signify that the ISD considered itself a member of both "the developing Third International" and the existing Zimmerwald left. In terms of its internal structure, the
ISD proclaimed itself to be a "unitary organization" and sought to build a decentralized network of autonomous local factory, residential, and trade sections.\textsuperscript{16}

The ISD's belief in an impending revolutionary upheaval received additional reinforcement when a second national strike wave broke out in January, 1918. These events began with the walkout of 400,000 metal workers in Berlin on January 28. Almost immediately, factory delegates were elected and a 400-member Workmens' Council created. This time the demands were broadened to include peace, democratization, and worker representation in any peace negotiations. Within a few days, the strike had grown to encompass over a million workers and was the largest manifestation of popular discontent in Germany up to that time.\textsuperscript{17} In Bremen, the ISD played a prominent role in helping coordinate a strike of several thousand shipyard workers, which was put down only through a two-week military occupation of the docks.\textsuperscript{18}

These strikes clearly indicated that, among the German working class, radical anti-war tendencies were gaining ground and that the mood of political unity which permeated the country at the beginning of the war was rapidly disappearing. Although eight months went by without a serious outbreak of working-class action, both economic conditions and the military situation continued
to deteriorate steadily. Following major defeats in mid-September and early October, the worsening military situation could no longer be concealed from the public, and the atmosphere of the country appeared to change overnight.\footnote{19}

The revolution itself began with a naval mutiny at Kiel on November 4, 1918, and spread like an avalanche throughout Germany. The initial course of events seemed to confirm the perspective of Pannekoek and the German left. The form of the German Revolution was almost exactly as they had predicted: mass actions and mass strikes, largely spontaneous in character, which found institutional form in the workers' and soldiers' councils. During the first days of November, over 10,000 such councils were elected in virtually all workplaces and garrisons, and power was temporarily in their hands.\footnote{20} While it is clear that the example of the councils (soviets) in the Russian Revolution played an essential role in propagating the idea of the council as an organizational form, this example was of less importance than the experiences of the German workers themselves during the preceding two years.\footnote{21} Due in part to the role of the SPD, which almost immediately became the dominant force in the councils and the government, both the collapse of the old state and the development of a proletarian council system were a less radical
process in Germany than in Russia. 22

In Bremen, the revolution began on November 4, 1918, with a strike of several thousand dock and shipyard workers. It was completed two days later, when revolutionary sailors arrived from Kiel to disarm the local military garrison. That same day elections were held in the docks and factories for a city-wide workers' council. 23 The council itself was composed of 180 worker and soldier delegates, most of whom were members of the USPD and ISD. 24 Henke, now the local leader of the USPD, was elected chairman. The first action of the council was to dissolve the existing municipal government and raise the red flag over city hall. 25 At the same time, local councils were also organized in the factories and docks, where the ISD often became the dominant force. 26

Although the ISD played only a limited role in the revolution itself, the party was prepared to move decisively in the days which followed. Through its control of the former SPD organization and its extensive network of factory militants, the ISD was well-placed to seize the revolutionary initiative. During the early days of the revolution, the ISD adopted two main slogans to summarize its strategic position: "All power to the councils!" and "From the bourgeois to the proletarian revolution!" 27 These themes were quickly brought into sharp theoretical focus by Pânekoek.
Although not a direct participant in the German Revolution, Pannekoek, nonetheless, played a central role in the elaboration of the ISD's strategic perspective. During the critical weeks of November and December, Pannekoek's theoretical analyses of the situation appeared regularly in Arbeiterpolitik and, in fact, outnumbered those of all other contributors, including Knief. Pannekoek's evaluation of the general situation turned on his assumption that the November revolution was a bourgeois revolution in which proletarian mediums had been used to accomplish bourgeois ends while the old institutions of state power still remained intact. On this point he bluntly stated: "The proletariat has no cause to be proud of itself. Only the smallest part of its task has been accomplished." The essential point of Pannekoek's analysis, however, was that a transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian stage of the revolution was possible only through the efforts of an active minority of the working class acting within the framework of the councils to arouse the class as a whole. Pannekoek, at the same time, cautioned against relying uncritically on the councils on the grounds that they were not yet pure proletarian institutions. The primary task, he maintained, was to insure that the councils serve as instruments of proletarian clarification and consciousness as a
prelude to a full-scale struggle for socialism.\textsuperscript{28}

In attempting to trace out a program of revolutionary action, Pannekoek stressed, as he had done throughout the war, the need for a complete break with the politics of the pre-war socialist movement as a necessary first step toward building a genuine form of proletarian power. The SPD, he felt, even more than during the war, had become an "enemy of the revolutionary proletariat and socialism." Although less hostile toward the USPD, Pannekoek was equally quick to reject it as an instrument of socialist transformation:

They draft nice plans for the building of socialist production on the basis of large-scale industry and agriculture; but they forget what is the main task: that of securing the power of the proletariat, which must stand behind all this. They cannot conceive—and there is nothing in the writings of Kautsky on this—that socialism is not a question of the nationalization of factories, but one of the power of the proletariat. The outcome of all this will be that when the bourgeoisie gets back on its feet again it will put an end to these plans or utilize them in its own manner as a form of state socialism.

Pannekoek warned that, for the proletariat, the type of state socialism embodied in the aspirations of the USPD would represent the "worst form of slavery."\textsuperscript{29}

The ISD's attempt to radicalize the revolution received a major boost on November 18 when Johann Knief, who had been arrested in Munich during the January actions,
returned to Bremen after being freed by the revolution. Appearing unexpectedly and dramatically at a session of the central workers' council, Knief opened his remarks with a terse statement which fully captured the aggressive militancy of the Bremen left: "The central question at the moment is the conquest of power." Knief at once embarked on a major campaign to mobilize the Bremen working class.

This campaign began on November 27 with an ISD-led demonstration strike demanding that the workers' and soldiers' councils be made into revolutionary organs. Two days later Knief led a demonstration of 20,000 workers to present a series of demands at a session of the central workers' council. These included: 1) the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the basis of the council system; 2) the removal of all non-proletarian elements (including the "social-patriots") from the councils); 3) the immediate arming of the workers and disarming of the bourgeoisie; 4) the transfer of control of the Bürgerzeitung to the central council. When Knief led a delegation into the council proceedings, about 70 right-wing delegates withdrew in protest, and the demands of the ISD were subsequently accepted overwhelmingly.

In line with its aggressive revolutionary commitment, the ISD changed its name to the International Communists
of Germany (Internationale Kommunisten Deutschlands—IKD) on November 23. To supplement the more theoretical Arbeiterpolitik, the IKD also created a daily agitational paper, Der Kommunist, which almost immediately gained a wide local and national circulation and was instrumental in disseminating the IKD's views throughout Germany.33 Despite the strength of the IKD, the first weeks of the revolution had few radical effects in Bremen. The central workers' council confronted many of the same problems as other city governments in Germany and adopted many similar half-measures to gain time until the confused political situation could be resolved. The former city administrative structure still continued to function under the supervision of the central workers' council. Officers were expelled from the soldiers' councils, but opposition from the troops prevented the formation of a Red Guard. The councils were active and purposeful in their daily work, but it was largely in their mood rather than their actions that they differed from councils elsewhere in Germany during the early weeks of the revolution.34

As the IKD continued and intensified its drive to mobilize the Bremen working class, the orderly, unremarkable course of the revolution in November began to give way in December to a more radical conception of the role of the councils. On December 12, the workers' and soldiers' council arrested bourgeois hostages only to set them free
after a day. On December 21, the council seized the 
Bürgerzeitung and turned it over to the USPD. On 
December 24, the council voted not to support the national 
assembly elections and reaffirmed its support for the 
council system. Five days later it began to distribute 
arms to members of the IKD and the USPD. The first 
trial of strength came two days later with the return 
of the Seventy-Fifth Infantry Regiment to Bremen. Fearing 
that it might serve as a Freikorps formation, a coalition 
of armed workers and revolutionary soldiers surrounded 
and disarmed the regiment. 35

While these developments were taking place in Bremen, 
the German Revolution was becoming increasingly polarized 
into two hostile camps. This conflict, which found 
symbolic expression in the opposing slogans—national 
assembly or council system—was a struggle based on two 
fundamentally different interpretations of the German 
Revolution. Almost immediately after assuming power, the 
SPD-dominated provisional government led by Friedrich 
Ebert allied itself with the apparatus of the old regime 
and moved quickly to undermine the power of the councils 
and disperse the forces which desired to drive the revolu-
tion to the left. This alignment of forces was institu-
tionalized in the Stinnes-Legien accords of November 15 
between the trade unions and the employers which
legitimized trade unionism and downgraded the councils.
Even more significant was the Ebert-Groener pact of
November 10 which guaranteed the authority of the German
officer corps in the new state. The future course of the
revolution was made clear when the provisional government
began to make preparations to convene a constituent
national assembly to determine the final political form
of the state. The left, convinced that this would have
the effect of placing the governmental structure in the
hands of the non-proletarian social classes, continued to
demand a government based solely on the council system.
By the time of the national conference of workers' and
soldiers' councils on December 16, it was clear that the
remaining power of the councils existed in name only.
Although nearly 250,000 workers and soldiers demonstrated
in the streets of Berlin in favor of the council system,
the SPD's domination of the conference insured that the
results were a foregone conclusion. When the crucial
vote came on December 19, the delegates declared the
powers of the councils to be transitional and surrendered
them to the future national assembly.36

In the chaotic first weeks of the revolution the
lack of unity between the IKD and the Spartacists weighed
heavily upon the left and darkened the future prospects
for driving the revolution forward. During this period,
Pannekoek took particular pains to stress the importance of left unity. As the pace of events developed momentum and an anti-revolutionary tendency began to consolidate itself, the IKD and the Spartacists began to draw increasingly closer. On December 5, the IKD announced that it would fully support whatever actions the Spartacists might undertake. On December 16, the Spartacists published Rosa Luxemburg's proposed program, which many regarded as a conscious step toward uniting the left. During this period, Karl Radek returned to Berlin from Moscow as an emissary of the Bolsheviks in an attempt to mediate the differences between the two groups. The actual process of formal unification began with a national conference of the IKD on December 24, which proposed that the Spartacists convene a foundation congress for a new communist party. The final barrier to unification was removed on December 29, when the Spartacists announced their intention to withdraw from the USPD.

The foundation congress for what officially became the Communist Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands-KPD) took place in Berlin from December 30 to January 1. The discussion which followed showed that the fundamental difference in outlook between the two currents of German communism still had not been resolved. The principal dividing point involved the nature of the
new organization itself. The IKD reaffirmed its position that the new party must be a loose federation of all communist-inclined groups, while the Spartacists demanded a fully centralized organization. From their Pannekoekian perspective, the IKD argued that the real basis of party organization must be a kind of "spiritual unity," which was summarized in their formula: "External independence of individual groups combined with inner unity of purpose."41

The IKD also demanded that the local organizations be "unitary organizations" combining party and trade union functions. This question merged into the related question of whether or not communists should participate in the existing trade union federations. The IKD instead favored having trade union functions performed by "unitary organizations" acting within the framework of the workers' councils. This position also received the support of a number of prominent Spartacist local leaders. In order to head off a serious controversy, Rosa Luxemburg intervened to have this question and the related organizational question referred to a special commission. The most controversial debate at the congress, however, turned on the question of participation in the upcoming national assembly elections. Paul Levi, speaking for the Spartacist leadership, justified participation on the basis of its agitational possibilities. Otto Rühle reaffirmed the IKD
position that the real task was to organize mass actions against the assembly. This time neither Rosa Luxenburg nor Karl Liebknecht were able to sway the membership and the motion against participation passed by a lopsided vote of 62 to 23.42

The KPD's first test of strength came within days of its formation. What has gone down in history as the Spartacist uprising began on January 4, 1919 when the Prussian government attempted to dismiss Emil Eichorn, a left-wing USPD member sympathetic to the Spartacists, from his post as Berlin police commissioner. In response, the USPD organized mass demonstrations on January 5, which drew an unexpectedly large turnout of 700,000 participants and soon evolved into a series of building occupations.43 Although the KPD was initially hesitant, out of fear of a premature showdown, it was swayed by the large turnout and mood of militancy and helped organize a revolutionary committee to coordinate a struggle for power. In the street battles which followed, few of those who had turned out for the demonstrations participated in the fighting. Within a week's time the full force of the government had been mobilized and the revolt crushed. The final blow came on January 15 when Rosa Luxemberg and Karl Liebknecht were arrested and brutally murdered.44

In Bremen, events took a different course when a
council republic seized and held power for three weeks. This action was in part a tragic misunderstanding based on the assumption that the events in Berlin marked the beginning of the second revolution. But behind this seizure of power lay weeks of discussions by the left, in the councils and in public meetings, on the need to proclaim a form of council power. Although Knief, who was slowly dying from complications following an appendectomy, advised against a seizure of power, the momentum established earlier could not be reversed. This ill-planned action began on January 10 with a KPD-organized demonstration calling for the replacement of the trade unions by unitary organizations, which led to an occupation of the trade union offices. This action swiftly broadened into an armed demonstration in front of the city hall at which the Socialist Republic of Bremen was dramatically proclaimed: "It is hereby declared that bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism are now past history. From this hour on the councils rule." To head the new council republic, a Council of Peoples' Commissars was created, consisting of representatives of the KPD, USPD, and the soldiers' councils, with Henke as chairman. Believing that their actions provided a model for socialist revolution, the council dispatched delegates to other parts of Germany to help
coordinate revolutionary activities. 47

The council republic's existence was precarious from the start. Its three weeks of tenuous rule were marked by demonstrative actions of the left's strength and widespread support for social revolution, but the localized conditions precluded substantial social and economic reforms and the elaborate new governmental structure remained largely a paper system. The first confrontation came on January 14, when, at the urging of the SPD, part of the military garrison launched a rebellion protesting attempts to disarm the army. Almost immediately, they occupied key points in the city and began to advance on the Weser docks in an attempt to disarm the workers there. Following several hours of indecisive street fighting, the soldiers agreed to a compromise which allowed them to keep their arms. Although the republic's existence was momentarily secure, its troubles continued to mount. The most serious problem was a credit boycott by the local financial institutions which the KPD attempted to counter with a general strike on January 21. During the next few days intermittent street fighting broke out again. At this point, the republic, searching for a satisfactory way out, declared its willingness to hold regular elections. On January 25, Noske, the SPD minister for internal security, announced his intention
to crush the Bremen revolt militarily as a means of demonstrating the authority of the central government. Two days later he gave orders to a Freikorps regiment to march on Bremen and establish a provisional government. The battle for the city began on February 3 and continued throughout the next day with heavy casualties. The final blow came on February 5 when the Weser docks, the main stronghold of the left, were occupied. In the aftermath of this bloody defeat, the councils were dissolved and a new SPD-dominated provisional government established. Despite defeat and demoralization, the KPD and the Bremen working class continued to engage in sporadic and widespread acts of resistance throughout 1919, including a two-week general strike in April.

This apparent failure of the German left dampened but did not destroy Pannekoek's belief in the possibility of a second revolution. Pannekoek's verdict on the tragic events of January and February, 1919, was that the left's defeat represented only a "small episode" in a whole period of revolutionary struggle. He felt that the January offensive—which he had resolutely opposed—was not a struggle for power, but a battle for certain power positions which had been shaped by the November revolution. Pannekoek steadfastly maintained that the revolution must either go forward toward conquest of new
power positions or face loss of those positions conquered in November. Pannekoek took it for granted that the time was not ripe for a full-scale test of strength, since the German bourgeoisie still had considerable military power at its disposal. But what was most critical for Pannekoek was the actual state of readiness of the German working class. In his view, the workers were ready and willing to struggle, but they still expected the call to come from above and continued to listen to the old social democratic leaders. Had the Spartacists broken from the Independents earlier, he maintained, then the workers might have had a better understanding of the situation and perhaps not acted so rashly. The Independents, he charged, were guilty of a form of "revolutionary verbalism" having no connection to revolutionary practice, owing to the fact that "their insight and understanding rested on the same premises as the social patriots."

Pannekoek concluded from this analysis that it was precisely these doctrines from the pre-war era that had become "the worst obstacle to socialist revolution."\(^{51}\) But what Pannekoek failed to clarify was why the workers continued to adhere to the old doctrines and organizations and what exactly could be done in practice to win them to the new ideas.

The programmatic ideas expounded by Pannekoek were
permeated by the assumption that the proletariat could regain the offensive only by a tactic of building the factory councils. Pannekoek steadfastly maintained that the proletariat could acquire the necessary inner strength to withstand all forms of military force primarily through the consciousness-raising capabilities of the councils. Although Pannekoek still viewed the party as an indispensable instrument of coordination and propaganda, he felt that the critical discussions about future strategy and actions must take place in the councils so that the workers might acquire the "unity of practical insight" required for a revolutionary transformation. Despite the new ingredient of the councils, Pannekoek's basic formula for revolution remained essentially unchanged: "The growth of communism in Germany is the growth of communist thought, of the will to conquer power, and of the preparation for revolution."52

The German left, defeated in their aims and reinforced in their opposition to the existing order, faced the immediate political task of reassessing their position in the new situation. For the KPD and the Bremen left, 1919 was above all a year of self-definition. Although the January offensive revealed the inability of the left to radicalize the working class and make a social revolution, their defeat did not end civil strife in Germany.
The remainder of 1919 was characterized by general unrest and scattered uprisings as rising expectations and deteriorating living conditions combined to create a volatile atmosphere. In Munich, another council republic was proclaimed and held power for three weeks in April. Troops were sent to quell disturbances in Hamburg, Leipzig, Halle, Brunswick, and the Ruhr. In Berlin, there was yet another general strike in March which was led by sailors and suppressed by mass executions. During the course of the year, nearly 5,000 strikes occurred throughout Germany. These developments helped give a special sense of urgency to a tactical debate that was rapidly developing within the nascent German communist movement in which Pannekoek was to become a major participant.

Despite their common participation in the events of January and February, the amalgamation of the IKD with the Spartacists did not go smoothly. The differences that had divided the two groups at the KPD foundation congress resurfaced in June at the first national conference of the KPD in Berlin. The first shadows of conflict were cast when Paul Levi, who had assumed leadership of the KPD after the deaths of Luxemburg and Liebknecht, attacked the Bremen and Hamburg organizations for their lack of discipline. Levi considered the left to be largely responsible for the KPD's defeat and felt the party's
first task was to restore authority through centralization. At the same time, Levi also reasoned that the only way the KPD could escape its isolation was to rid itself of its left wing and seek to attract the 800,000 members of the USPD. 54

The former IKD, for their part, tenaciously held to their Pannekoekian position that a transition to the socialist stage of the revolution was possible only on the basis of new forms of working-class organization and a complete break with the politics of the Second International. Throughout the summer and fall of 1919, a renewed discussion of the question of revolutionary organization dominated internal party life in Bremen and Hamburg. From this discussion, the former IKD left emerged more convinced than ever that the party must become a decentralized federation devoted to propagating the ideas of "unitary organization" and the council system. This view was directly linked to their assumption that once the council system was achieved the party had the responsibility to dissolve itself. 55 These themes were summarized in a program drawn up by Pannekoek, which outlined their differences with Levi and the KPD Zentrale and became the focus of a heated debate at a second national conference of the KPD in August, 1919. 56

Following this conference, Levi launched a full-scale
assault on the left opposition. This task was not an easy one, since in addition to their strongholds in Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin, the left possessed considerable strength in virtually all local KPD sections. Levi was aided in this endeavor by Karl Radek, who, although imprisoned in Berlin at the time, provided an in-depth theoretical justification of the Zentrale's position. While in Moscow, Radek had been impressed with the Bolsheviks' decisiveness and was now an ardent supporter of centralized party organization. Like Levi, Radek had come to the conclusion that the KPD could escape its isolation only by winning over the USPD and working within the existing trade union movement.

By this time it was clear to both sides that the Congress of Heidelberg on October 24 would be the decisive test of strength. In preparation, Levi and the Zentrale prepared a set of "guidelines" for party policies which denounced the opposition as "syndicalist" and called for the "strictest centralism" in party affairs. These guidelines were also, in effect, an ultimatum, for they stated that those who failed to abide by them would be expelled.

The congress itself was tightly controlled by Levi from the beginning. Many of the delegates were handpicked and it is doubtful whether the convocation of the congress
conformed to party statutes. The proceedings were also held under clandestine conditions which did little to facilitate discussion or democratic procedure. Following acceptance of the guidelines by a vote of 33 to 18, Levi maneuvered to have those who voted against them expelled. Wolffheim, who had acted as the main spokesman of the opposition, responded by declaring that henceforth there existed two communist parties in Germany.60

With the expulsions of Heidelberg, the first phase of German communism had abruptly come to an end. By now it had become clear that the differences between the two currents of German communism went much deeper than a simple disagreement over tactics, but involved a fundamentally different conception of communism itself. In the aftermath of these events, Pannekoek began an extended theoretical reflection on the failure of the German Revolution which would play a key role in defining the nature of the new organization that would emerge the following spring.

From Left Radicalism to Communism: Dutch Marxism in Transition

Pannekoek's growing disillusionment with traditional party organization received additional reinforcement from a factional dispute which had developed earlier within the Dutch SDP. In contrast to Germany, where the lines of factional cleavage were clearly drawn and tied to a
specific organizational practice, the differences that emerged in Holland were as much a matter of personality as political principle.

This conflict, as it initially developed, was overshadowed by the SDP's rapid political development and the climate of working-class radicalization prevailing in the country. Although Holland never experienced a revolutionary upheaval, the years 1917 and 1918 were marked by rising discontent and unrest, which took the form of food riots, demonstrations against scarcity, and a growing mood of militancy among many garrisoned soldiers (to which the SDP catered with a semi-legal paper, De Soldaten Tribune). During this critical period the SDP attempted to mobilize the Dutch working class through its militant propaganda and alliance with the syndicalists. Believing that the Dutch revolution would develop only as an outgrowth of revolution in Germany, the SDP also devoted considerable energy during the last year of the war to aiding the German left through the network of ties originally developed by Pannekoek. These efforts involved a variety of clandestine activities such as surreptitiously smuggling literature into Germany, aiding German deserters, and publishing a German-language newspaper.61

Through these efforts, the SDP, although still small in numbers, continued to evolve into an increasingly
influential force within the Dutch working class. Following the suffrage reform of 1917, the SDP drew 17,000 votes in the elections for the lower house that year. An even more significant breakthrough came the following year when the SDP, in a joint electoral front with the syndicalists, received over 50,000 votes and elected Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn to the lower chamber. In Amsterdam, Wijnkoop drew 14,000 votes in his district, which was equal to about half the SDAP total for the entire city. The growing popularity of the SDP and its radical policies was also evidenced by the rise in party membership, which increased from around 700 in the spring of 1917 to over 1,800 by the spring of 1919. In the Endschede section alone, membership rose from six to 125 in the course of only five months. The SDP's rapid growth, however, was only one element of a larger under-current of working-class militancy. During this same period, the syndicalist NAS federation doubled its membership from 11,000 to 23,000.

Although domestic developments were the driving force, this mood of militancy drew much of its vital impetus from the Russian Revolution. In the months following the Bolshevik seizure of power, the SDP swiftly gained the reputation as the "official outpost" of the Russian Revolution in Western Europe. To keep the
membership informed of events in Russia, the Tribune provided a regular Russian supplement. The impact of the Russian Revolution was also manifested in the SDP's 1918 election program, which was taken verbatim from the Bolshevik transitional program. At the Congress of Leiden later that year, the SDP changed its name to the Communist Party of Holland (Communistische Partij Holland-CPH), which gave it the distinction of being the first party in Western Europe to use the designation communist.

Like Pannekoek, most members of the CPH interpreted Russian Bolshevism primarily through the prism of their own experiences and traditions, which, in fact, had little in common with Bolshevik theory and practice. Along with Pannekoek's extensive writings, the CPH's main ideological reference points during the years 1918 and 1919 were Gorter's World Revolution and Henriette Roland Holst's Mass Action and Revolution. Both of these works were largely popularized versions of Pannekoek's theoretical formulations, which stressed the imminence of the world revolution and the centrality of the workers' councils, mass actions, and internationalism in the revolutionary process. These were also the years during which the party "paid special attention to the IWW as a new and original form of militant trade unionism." This attention was due in no small measure to the activities of the Dutch
engineer S.J. Rutgers, who had come under the influence of the IWW while living in the United States during the war years. In his reports to Dutch readers, Rutgers stressed that the IWW was completely distinct from syndicalism and maintained that its main conceptions "are certainly no less than the concepts most of us have developed over the past few years." These themes emerged with striking clarity at the Congress of Groningen in early 1919, which firmly established the "council system" as the fundamental instrument of socialist transformation.

Although no group within the SDP disagreed with its basically Pannekoekian perspective, internal tension within the party began to build up rapidly during the period 1917-1918. As in most instances of serious political disagreement, this controversy did not arise overnight but developed over the course of several years. The origins of this complex factional struggle are traceable, at least in part, to a dispute that flared up during the early days of the war between Pannekoek and the leadership triumvirate over what type of war victory would be most beneficial for the left. Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn took the position that a German defeat would be more desirable due to the oppressive nature of German militarism. Their attitude was based largely on traditional anti-German sentiment—an obsessive theme in Dutch culture—which had little to do
with Marxist ideology. Indeed, van Ravestijn himself later admitted that they were partisans of a "rigorous anti-German politics." Pannekoek, despite his close personal friendship with van Ravestijn, promptly charged that their position represented a dangerous deviation from proletarian internationalism.

Due to opposition from the membership, van Ravestijn and Wijnkoop were forced to retreat from their stand and the issue remained dormant for the next two years. In the spring of 1916, however, van Ravestijn once again took a strongly pro-Entente position, which led another executive committee member, Barend Luteraan, to charge that he was promoting Dutch intervention on the side of the Entente. These differences were aired in a lengthy series of polemics between Luteraan and van Ravestijn in the Tribune throughout the remainder of 1916 and much of 1917. Luteraan, at the same time, started to build a base of support in the Amsterdam section of the party and began to tie the issue increasingly to the question of more active participation in the Zimmerwald movement.

Although Luteraan frequently cited the writings of Pannekoek and Gorter to justify his position, neither of them played a significant role in his opposition movement during the early stages of its existence. In Pannekoek's case, this was due to a strong personal animosity toward
Luteraan. This situation, however, began to change as Pannekoek and Gorter's relations with the triumvirate continued to deteriorate over the question of more active participation in the Zimmerwald left. In May, 1917, Gorter charged van Ravestijn and Wijnkoop with being concerned mainly with agitation against Germany and afraid that an international revolutionary anti-war movement might lead to lenient peace terms with Germany. This tension was aggravated later that summer when van Ravestijn condemned Lenin's acceptance of German transportation to Russia and drew an approving parallel between Kerensky's offensive against Germany and the French revolutionary war of 1793. Both Pannekoek and Gorter responded with polemics. Pannekoek, for his part, maintained that van Ravestijn's attitude was similar to the social patriots. Gorter, however, went a step further and made an uncharacteristically abusive personal attack on van Ravestijn and Wijnkoop. Shortly afterwards, Gorter excoriated Wijnkoop in a blistering personal letter, telling him flatly that he was no longer connected to the future world revolution. With these actions, Gorter placed himself irrevocably in the camp of the Luteraan opposition. Gorter lost no time in assuming a leading role. In October, he sent two articles to the Tribune. One, a condemnation of the manner in which the SDP leadership had handled the Luteraan
opposition, was denied publication entirely. The other, a criticism of the SDP's foreign policy, was not printed until February on the grounds that it would damage the party's electoral prospects. 84 When Gorter inquired about publication, van Ravesteijn wrote back terming the opposition "a collection of morally and mentally defective individuals." 85

By the end of 1917, the opposition movement against the SDP leadership was at its height with no less than four separate opposition groups in existence which had the sympathy of about a third of the membership. 86 In addition to the Amsterdam group centered around Luteraan, there was a group in Rotterdam, the entire Hague section, and a group terming itself the "Propaganda Society of the Zimmerwald Left." During the months which followed, the focus of the opposition's critique began to shift increasingly toward other issues. In March, 1918, the leader of the Hague opposition, W. van Reesema, published a pamphlet which attacked the SDP for its growing reliance on electoral methods and passive attitude toward the trade union movement, and charged that the triumvirate's pro-Entente sympathies were a disguised form of support for Wilson's concept of a League of Nations. 87 The underlying source of the opposition's discontent, however, was with van Ravesteijn's high-handed leadership methods. Of these
methods, a factional supporter of van Ravesteijn later noted:

The meetings were under the strict control of van Ravesteijn. No opposition was tolerated except for details on day-to-day propaganda. When opposition seemed imminent, the faithful were commanded to attend and swing the vote. For van Ravesteijn the party had to be his obedient tool (he actually used the expression: "the party? it is a tool"--it shocked me), hardly an association of comrades.\textsuperscript{88}

In May, 1918, the various opposition groups gathered together for the first time at a national conference to build a coordinated opposition movement.\textsuperscript{89} The most important achievement of this conference was the elaboration of an opposition platform centered around four main points: 1) a direct struggle against all forms of imperialism on the basis of the program of the Zimmerwald left; 2) an uncompromising struggle against Dutch capitalism; 3) an active campaign against reformist tendencies in the labor movement as a preparatory step to launching mass strikes; 4) full freedom of expression within the party.\textsuperscript{90} Modeling itself on the initial Tribunist opposition, the opposition sought to appeal directly to the membership and the working class with its own publication, De Internationale. Although invaluable as an instrument for defining the differences with the party leadership, this publication never managed to achieve the scope and dynamism of the Tribune. Edited entirely by the Hague opposition, De
Internationale lasted only seven months and never acquired more than two hundred subscribers.  

By the summer of 1918, the conflict had reached a new pitch of intensity with Gorter leading the assault. The enmity between Gorter and the triumvirate had now grown to a passionate hatred. Between July and November, Gorter published three serialized Tribune articles attacking the leadership on a variety of issues. In one of these, an article entitled "Troelstra-Wijnkoop," he charged Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn with being part of a larger current of "international reformism." At the same time, Gorter announced that he would lead a struggle against Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn with the same fervor he had once led the struggle against Troelstra. To make a comparison with Troelstra, who was considered to be the arch-betrayer of Marxism, was regarded as one of the worst insults in the SDP and even Pannekoek objected to Gorter's use of the parallel. In reply, the triumvirate declared that their bonds with Gorter were "irrevocably broken" and that, henceforth, the columns of the Tribune would be closed to him. Van Ravesteijn followed this up with an abusive letter to Pannekoek in which he directly questioned Gorter's sanity. Carrying his attack a step further, van Ravesteijn also accused Pannekoek of being "not merely an accomplice, but the person actually responsible for this political and
intellectual suicide."\(^{95}\)

Although van Ravesteijn later claimed that Gorter's assault threatened to bring a "catastrophe" for the party, it was clear by the November 1918 Congress of Leiden that the intensity of the opposition's polemics could not be translated into organizational strength.\(^{96}\) For many oppositionists, Gorter's polemics were more a source of embarrassment than clarity. Except for circulating a declaration by Gorter, the opposition made virtually no attempt to carry the debate to the congress. With the coming of peace, the opposition had also lost its most compelling issue. As a result, much of the opposition's strength rapidly dissipated and most of 1919 was characterized largely by a factional stalemate.\(^{97}\)

In the months that followed, Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn took full advantage of the situation to consolidate—in a manner reminiscent of Levi in Germany—their organizational base in the party. The triumvirate set the tone when it declared shortly after the congress:

\begin{quote}
In cases when the party membership fails to show sufficient initiative, then the executive must determine the line of action itself, and it goes without saying that it will be somewhat dictatorial, perhaps even more so than at present.\(^{98}\)
\end{quote}

As part of their campaign against the opposition, the triumvirate conducted a year-long smear campaign against
Gorter, which extended even to attacks on his poetry. 99

The leadership's position was greatly strengthened by the relative isolation of Pannekoek, Gorter, and Roland Holst from the party rank-and-file. At the 1919 Congress of Groningen, strong criticisms were made of their failure to participate in daily party life. The young activist Dirk Struik undoubtedly spoke for many when he accused them of acting like a "Party Olympus." 100

Throughout the long course of the factional struggle, Pannekoek's response was complex and not uniform. Although sympathetic to the opposition's cause, Pannekoek, unlike Gorter, avoided direct participation, due to his distaste for the increasing personalization of political relations and a growing involvement in astronomy. Gorter has also noted that during this time Pannekoek had little interest in the affairs of the Dutch left and was mainly concerned with the German and world revolutions. 101 This situation led Luteraan at one point to publicly rebuke Pannekoek for his failure to play a more active role and accuse him of suppressing material favorable to the opposition's cause. 102 Like Pannekoek, Henriette Roland Holst--despite her longstanding dislike of Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn--also avoided playing an active role in the opposition out of a conviction that such action would be divisive. Both Pannekoek and Roland Holst confined their oppositional
activity largely to writing for the *Nieuwe Tijd*, which in van Ravesteijn's words had once again become an "oppositional organ."\(^{103}\)

In August, 1919, the remnants of the opposition attempted to regroup with a new publication, *De Roode Vaan*, which was edited by Luteraan and financed by Gorter. In order to give what was essentially a personal dispute a broader justification, the opposition began to increasingly take up the main themes of the German left opposition. On this basis, the new publication was defined as a "paper of the workers" rather than a "paper of the leaders."\(^{104}\) Gorter summed up what he considered the main issue when he declared that bureaucratization was not something confined to the pre-war socialist movement, but was becoming equally characteristic of the new communist movement. The party leadership, instead of striving to bring clarity to the masses, was attempting to strengthen their own power by demagogic means: "The leadership is not concerned with making the party suitable for communism, but is instead using communism as a means to make the party and its leadership large and powerful." Frustrated and embittered, Gorter also announced his resignation from the party and proclaimed his intention to work directly among the masses, "in that other area of communism which is real and living."\(^{105}\) Although Luteraan continued to
work within the CPH, the opposition—lacking an organizational practice or political base of any consequence—was unable to regain the strength it enjoyed during 1917 and 1918. By the spring of 1920, this struggle had become inextricably interwoven with a larger conflict within the emerging international communist movement, which would ultimately play a major role in determining the outcome.
NOTES


15. Ibid., p. 360.


20. Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, La Gauche communiste en Allemagne (1918-1921), op. cit., p. 180. The greater majority of the local councils, however were controlled by the SPD.

21. As one of the main historians of the German Revolution has noted: "The councils were a rapidly improvised elementary form of self-government which expressed the popular will at a time when the government lost the nation's confidence . . . The sailors' councils started as a continuation of the food committees set up in the Navy during the war. The workers' councils stemmed from the strike committees formed in the factories during the strikes of 1917 and 1918 . . ." A.J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918, op. cit., p. 148.


26. At the workers' council for the Weser docks, the city's largest employer, the ISD held 28 seats to eight for the USPD and thirteen for the SPD. Josef Miller, "Zur Geschichte der linken Sozialdemokratie in Bremen 1906-1908," op. cit.

27. The first programmatic statement of the ISD is contained in: "Aufruf an die Arbeiter und Soldaten Deutschlands," Arbeiterpolitik, November 9, 1918.


33. Within a few weeks the circulation of Der Kommunist exceeded 300 in at least five cities. Peter Kuckuk, "Bremer Linksradikale bzw. Kommunisten von der Militärrevolte im November 1918 bis zum Kapp-putsch im Marx 1920," op. cit., p. 68.

34. Ibid., pp. 1-67.


38. Der Kommunist, December 8, 1918.


42. Ibid., pp. 9-14.


45. Although Knief lived until March, and was elected to the post of Peoples' Commissar, he played no active role in the council republic.


48. "Noske... was not satisfied with achieving a political goal, he wanted in addition a demonstration of the unconditional authority of the government—even at the price of a growth in the power of ultra-rightist circles and the alienation of many workers from the SPD." Eberhard Kolb, *Die Arbeiterräte in der deutschen Innenpolitik 1918-1919*, op. cit., p. 345.


56. This program is contained in: Anton Pannekoek, "De strijd over de Kommunistisch taktiek in Duitschland, *De Nieuwe Tijd*, 1919, pp. 693-699.


61. Among the many German deserters who took refuge in Holland was Wilhelm Pieck, who was a frequent guest in Pannekoek's home from March to November, 1918. Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 185.

62. Willem van Ravesteijn, *De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925*, op. cit., p. 163.

63. Ibid., p. 180.

64. Ibid., p. 187.

65. Ibid., p. 185.

66. Ibid., p. 200.

67. Ibid., p. 201.

68. Ibid., p. 169.

69. Ibid., pp. 170-171.

70. Ibid., p. 187.


74. Willem van Ravesteyn, "De roman van mijn leven," op. cit., p. 322. Van Ravesteyn's position was stated in: "De Oorlog," De Tribune, September 26 and November 18, 1914. Significantly, van Ravesteyn later admitted that he had contact with the French intelligence service for part of this period. Willem van Ravesteyn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., pp. 174-175.


76. Herman de Liagre Böhl, Herman Gorter, op. cit., pp. 148-150.


78. Pannekoek later described Luteraan as "sharp of spirit and aggressive," and a "good-for-nothing who frequently manipulated Gorter for his own ends." Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 190.


80. Ibid., p. 163.


82. Herman Gorter, "De taktiek der Russische Maximalisten," De Tribune, September 18, 1917.

83. Herman Gorter to David Wijnkoop, September 12, 1917. This letter is reprinted in: Kontrast, number five, 1964.

84. Willem van Ravesteyn, De wording van het communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 189.

85. Willem van Ravesteyn to Herman Gorter, October, 1917. This letter is contained in: Willem van Ravesteyn, "De roman van mijn leven, op. cit., p. 395.


88. Dirk Struik, *'Years of Revolution,* op. cit., p. 12.

89. This information is contained in a document entitled: "Rapport van de Conferentie van der oppositiegroepen der S.D.P., gehouden den 29sten September 1918 te Rotterdam." Van Ravesteijn Archives, op. cit., folder 77.

90. *'Ons Orgaan,'* _De Internationale_, June 15, 1918.


93. Anton Pannekoek, *'Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging,'* op. cit., pp. 189-190. Pannekoek also noted: "I suspect that Wijnkoop felt that the article did him more good than harm in the party, and although he had no hesitation about antagonizing Herman, he made no effort to listen to his arguments."

94. Note appended to Gorter's *'Troelstra-Wijntkoop,'* _De Tribune_, September 18, 1918.

95. Willem van Ravesteijn to Anton Pannekoek, September 20, 1918. This letter is reprinted in: Willem van Ravesteijn, *De wording van het communisme in het Nederland, 1907-1925*, op. cit., pp. 191-192. It might be noted that Gorter had earlier suffered a nervous breakdown and was undergoing deep psychological stress over his wife's death. Pannekoek felt that van Ravesteijn was doing everything possible to provoke Gorter and broke off all personal relations with him after receiving his letter.

96. Willem van Ravesteijn, *De wording van het communisme in het Nederland, 1907-1925*, op. cit., p. 189.

98. De Tribune, November 21, 1918.

99. Henriette Roland Holst, commenting on this smear campaign, later noted: "But I knew better than you how vulnerable, shaky and off-balance he [Gorter] was and I therefore found your actions against him cruel and completely inexcusable." Henriette Roland Holst to Willem van Ravestijn, December 26, 1929, Van Ravestijn Archives, op. cit., folder 16.


103. Willem van Ravestijn, De wording van het communisme in het Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., p. 201.


CHAPTER X

THE LEFT COMMUNIST ALTERNATIVE,
1920–1926
West European Marxism on the Offensive: The Amsterdam Bureau

A new epoch in the history of European Marxism began with the formation of the Communist International in March, 1919. Although Pannekoek and the Dutch and Bremen left had been among the most enthusiastic advocates of a new International, the triumph of the Bolsheviks in Russia insured that it would be formed under Russian auspices. In spite of his longstanding differences with Pannekoek over the nature of the new international revolutionary movement, Lenin, nonetheless, made it clear long before the International was formed that he envisioned a leading role for both the Dutch and Bremen left. Writing on the possibility of forming a new International in 1917, Lenin noted: "the Bolsheviks within Polish Social Democracy, the Dutch, the 'Arbeiterpolitis' group and 'Demain'--this is a sufficiently large nucleus." 1

During the early months of the Comintern's existence, significant Western involvement was precluded by the disruption of the usual avenues of communication between Russia and Western Europe. The task of involving Western Europe was first approached in practical terms in September, 1919, when a decision was made to create a Secretariat for Western Europe in Berlin and a Western European Bureau in Amsterdam. To organize the
Amsterdam Bureau, Lenin chose the Dutch Marxist S.J. Rutgers, who was residing in Moscow. An engineer by profession, Rutgers had spent several years in the Dutch East Indies prior to the war and in 1915 went to the United States where he, along with his close friend and political collaborator, Louis Fraina, played a key role in disseminating many of Pannekoek's ideas within the American socialist movement. After the war, he travelled across Siberia, then ravaged by civil war, to Moscow, arriving in time to represent the CPH at the foundation of the Comintern. Rutgers was given a three-fold mandate by Lenin: to establish relations with various communist groups in Western Europe and America, to set up a communist propaganda center, and to organize an international conference. Rutgers was also instructed by the Comintern executive to staff the Bureau with Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland Holst, Wijnkoop, and van Ravesteijn.

Rutgers' mission, however, was complicated by the internal divisions within the CPH. Although Pannekoek Gorter, and Roland Holst immediately agreed to serve on the Bureau, Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn declined, declaring they could not work on the same commission as Gorter. A compromise was finally reached in which the two groups agreed to consult separately with Rutgers.
The Amsterdam Bureau first began to function in January, 1920, with the immediate goal of organizing an international conference in Amsterdam, which many viewed as the equivalent of an international congress of the Comintern. This conference, which was held in Amsterdam from February 3 to 6, 1920, marked the high water mark of the Bureau's activity and its first attempt to serve as a de facto West European International. While Dutch delegates predominated, the conference drew delegates and observers from at least a dozen countries and was a more representative gathering than the earlier foundation congress of the Comintern.

Although the conference was poorly organized and broken up prematurely by the police, it, nonetheless, managed to articulate, for the first time, a specifically West European conception of communism. The manifesto adopted by the conference included an explicit critique of parliamentarianism and trade unionism and emphasized the significance of the workers' councils as the new principle of proletarian organization. Of particular significance were the theses Pannekoek drafted on parliamentarianism, which openly challenged Comintern policy:

But this line laid down by the Moscow Secretariat is now no longer a sufficient guide in any and every actual situation. . . . We wish to assert, and we are convinced
that in this all communists agree with us, there can be cases in which it is necessary to boycott parliamentary action... It is not within the province of an international conference to decree whether this or that country is in a revolutionary state. The communists within each country should decide that for themselves. 8

Pannekoek—who almost immediately emerged as the Bureau's "spiritual leader"9—took an equally intransigent position in the theses he drafted on trade unionism, which declared that the trade unions in the West had become nothing more than "organs of the capitalist system of power deployed against the workers in their revolt against capital."

For these reasons, the workers' movement had the duty to struggle against the trade union bureaucracy with "all the forces available." While in certain cases this meant forming a "revolutionary opposition" within the existing unions, the real task was to "develop new organizations animated by a new spirit" such as the IWW in America and the "workers' unions" in Germany. 10

The Amsterdam Bureau's antipathy toward parliamen-
tarianism and trade unionism, and its emphasis on autonomy for the component parties was only the first open indication of a major difference in outlook between the leadership of the Communist International and the Dutch leftists. While serious differences between the Bolsheviks and the Dutch left can be traced back to the years of the Zimmerwald movement, both parties preferred to gloss over them in the
revolutionary ferment that followed the Russian Revolution. Thus, when Rutgers spoke at the founding congress of the Comintern about the CPH's close relationship with the syndicalists, it was considered a positive feature of the party, consistent with the desire to bring all revolutionary elements into the new organization. In the months that followed, Pannekoek, Gorter, and Roland Holst all wrote ideologically acceptable articles for the review Communist International. When Rutgers left for Amsterdam, he carried with him an offer from Lenin for Pannekoek to work in Moscow as a full-time theoretician and propagandist for the Comintern. The Dutch, for their part, had initially taken it for granted that both the Bolsheviks and the Communist International rejected parliamentary tactics. This assumption, in fact, seemed to be borne out by the few writings of Lenin available in translation—in particular by State and Revolution with its paean to Pannekoek—and by the early formative documents of the Comintern. What was not generally known, however, was that Bolshevik theory and practice had also long stressed that parliamentary institutions should be used by revolutionaries to arouse the masses, to attack bourgeois parties, and eventually to undermine the state itself.

Despite the factional differences within the CPH, all members of the Bureau were united in their desire to
see the Bureau become the main center of revolution in Western Europe. For Wijnkoop and van Ravesteijn, who held day-to-day power in the Bureau, this was motivated as much by their desire to become leaders of a "Western Comintern" as by their political principles. In keeping with this view, the Bureau focused much of its energies on a bold attempt to consolidate a revolutionary left tendency throughout Europe. Through Henriette Roland Holst's extensive travels, close ties were forged with the Committee for the Third International in France, Sylvia Pankhurst and the Workers' Socialist Federation in England, and left groups in the Swiss and Belgian socialist parties. The closest relations, however, were reserved for the German left opposition, with whom Pannekoek remained in close contact. Support for the German opposition first found expression in the Bureau's theses on parliamentarianism and trade unionism. Shortly afterwards, Pannekoek took up the opposition's case in a detailed article in the Bureau's official publication. For these acts, the Bureau earned the lasting hostility of the West European Secretariat.

The Bureau's aggressive militancy and independent outlook were again demonstrated with striking clarity when it attempted to organize a sub-bureau of its own, the Pan American Provisional Bureau, which was set up in the
United States by Rutgers' collaborator, Louis Fraina, to coordinate revolutionary activity in North and South America. The sub-bureau, however, soon became entangled in the factional disputes raging within the American communist movement and never managed to achieve more than a paper existence. A more audacious step was taken when the Bureau also maneuvered to downgrade the Berlin Secretariat by passing a resolution reassigning its duties and designating it "a section of the Amsterdam Bureau." With one stroke, the Bureau boldly attempted to subordinate a branch conceived and organized by Moscow. Taken together, these plans, conceptions, and policies all clearly reveal that, far from viewing themselves as instruments of a central authority, the Amsterdam Bureau regarded itself as a major revolutionary center for the future European revolution.

Although the Bureau's independent revolutionary outlook was in large part a reflection of a specifically West European conception of communism it was also greatly facilitated by the lack of communication between Amsterdam and Moscow. From the time it started functioning in January 1920, until late April, when Rutgers established a regular courier link through Stockholm, the Bureau had virtually no direct communication with Moscow. By this time, however, the Bureau's policies and actions had
become well known in Moscow and the Comintern leadership considered the situation extremely embarrassing. The breaking point came when the Bureau began to take up the cause of the newly formed German KAPD. The response from the Comintern leadership was quick and unequivocal. On April 30, Radio Moscow made a terse announcement that the Bureau had been closed down and its functions assigned to the Berlin Secretariat. The decision had been reached without either consultation or a chance of appeal. With this action, what has been described as "the only opportunity ever given the Western communists to form a subsidiary communist center of their own" abruptly came to an end.

Working Class Organization of a New Type: The KAPD and the AAUD

What Pannekoek and the Amsterdam Bureau were saying in a general way about the need for a specifically West European conception of revolution, the militants of the German left were asserting directly in practice. The spontaneous creation of workers' councils in Germany during the period 1918 to 1921 was only one aspect of a larger process of working class mobilization and radicalization, which was marked by several attempts to develop anti-bureaucratic alternatives to the traditional forms of party and trade union organization.
Within the German labor movement, a new movement of revolutionary industrial unionism arose which owed little to formal socialist doctrine or practice. Like the workers' councils, this movement had its origins in the factory committees which emerged during the war and proliferated rapidly after November, 1918. Based almost entirely on local factory or shop organizations, the industrial union movement appeared almost spontaneously, without any precise ideological definitions or attachments. The local organizations that emerged were defined largely by their dissatisfaction with the existing trade unions and a common anti-bureaucratic impulse. Their highly decentralized character was initially neither premeditated nor a matter of principle, but a consequence of their origins in localized wildcat strikes.  

In the process of ideological differentiation that followed, many of these local organizations began to look increasingly to syndicalism as a model, which led to the formation of the Free Workers' Union of Germany (Freie Arbeiter Union Deutschlands-FAUD) in late 1919. Within a few months of its formation, the FAUD had grouped together nearly 200,000 workers. Other groups, however, began to turn their attention toward forming a new type of revolutionary factory organization, which they termed "workers unions" (Arbeiter-Unions) to distinguish
themselves from the traditional trade unions. The theoretical cornerstone of the "workers' unions" was the concept of "unitary organization" which had been articulated by the Bremen and Hamburg left since 1917. Although the "workers' unions" appeared spontaneously, the ideological form they assumed can be attributed in part to the continuous and intensive propagandizing for the idea of "unitary organization" by left radical activists. This concept was systematically elaborated and popularized in Fritz Wolffheim's widely circulated 1919 brochure, Factory Organization or Trade Unionism?, which drew heavily from Pannekoek's critique of trade unionism. While the first "workers' union" appeared as early as 1918, they began to emerge on a large scale only during the course of the great wildcat strike wave of Ruhr coal miners in April, 1919 and proliferated rapidly throughout the spring and summer. Although modeled in part on the IWW, the "workers' unions" differed from the syndicalist factory organizations by their willingness to affiliate with the communist movement and their acceptance of a future state organized on the basis of the council system.

In the consolidation of these localized "workers' unions" into a national federation, the Bremen left played an organizationally and ideologically decisive role. The first step toward creating a national organization was
taken in August, 1919, when the Bremen left drafted a set of provisional statutes for a proposed federation to be termed the General Workers' Union (Allgemeine Arbeiter Union—AAU). Starting from the Pannekoekian premise that the existing trade unions had become an essential component of capitalism and a counter-revolutionary force, the Bremen left defined the proposed federation as "an economic organization of struggle" in solidarity with the KPD and the Third International. Its aim was to encourage revolutionary agitation in the factories directed toward the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of a council republic: "The General Workers' Union considers the introduction of the council system to be the first and foremost medium for the destruction of the capitalist mode of production." The federation was to be organized along territorial lines around enterprises, with the basic unit being the factory or workshop; these were then to be tied to a network of local, regional, and national bodies, which would merge into "One Big Union." Although the proposed federation was conceived of as a class-wide instrument of struggle, each affiliated unit was to have maximum independence and freedom of choice in determining tactics. 29 To build the new federation, two national conferences of shop stewards from various independent revolutionary factory organizations were held in Bremen
during the fall of 1919, which mandated the Bremen group to coordinate the formation of a new federation and to begin publication of a national newspaper.\textsuperscript{30}

The vigor of the industrial unionism movement in Bremen during this period was demonstrated by the spectacular growth of the local AAU. Although not officially constituted until October 22, 1919, the Bremen AAU had led an informal existence since the summer of 1919 when organizing efforts first began. By the beginning of October, it already had 3,000 members; by mid-October, 3,500; and by mid-January, 1920, it had reached its high point of 7,000 members. Its main stronghold was in the docks, where over 70\% of the dockworkers were affiliated with the AAU by the end of December. At the Weser docks alone, 3,000 workers were members.\textsuperscript{31}

Pannekoek gave qualified support to the revolutionary industrial union movement in January, 1920, in a major article in Bremen's \textit{Der Kommunist} and in the theses on trade unionism he drafted for the Amsterdam Bureau. Arguing that the traditional trade unions had become an "instrument of the leaders against the masses," Pannekoek maintained that the "workers' unions" represented a powerful revolutionary alternative: "Every movement which weakens the inner firmness of the centralized unions does away with some of the obstacles to the revolution." At
the same time, however, Pannekoek cautioned that the new organizations could escape the logic of bureaucratization and avoid becoming de facto trade unions only in times of direct revolutionary struggle:

As long as capitalism stands firmly upright, these new rank-and-file formations can attain but a limited state of development, except under very special conditions . . . It is only during the revolution, which awakens the actions of the masses, that the trade unions are undermined, and that their character changes entirely.32

The foundation congress for what officially became the General Workers' Union of Germany (Allgemeine Arbeiter Union Deutschlands-AAUD) finally took place in Hanover from February 14 to 16, 1920. The proceedings of the congress revealed almost immediately a major division over the movement's basic mission and structure. One wing of the movement, the so-called "federalists" led by Wolffheim and Laufenberg of the Hamburg left, took a position close to syndicalism and maintained that the AAUD represented "the coming state organization" of the proletariat. For them, the principle of local autonomy signified not only the complete autonomy of every economic district or factory unit, but also the right of self-determination for each individual. Another wing, the so-called "centralists" led by the Bremen and Berlin groups, contended that the AAUD could not be the organiza-
zational form for the new society and stressed its role as an instrument of industrial agitation. The "centralists" insisted that the AAUD must not allow itself to become a network of "localized syndicates," but must act as a catalyst for a revolution based on the councils. 33

Despite its inability to resolve its basic organizational structure, the AAUD, nonetheless, grew rapidly in the highly charged atmosphere of 1920. 34 Its greatest successes were due to the large influx of members from the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD. In many cases, whole FAUD affiliates went over to the AAUD, including the FAUD's entire eastern region. 35 Within a month of its foundation, the AAUD's membership had reached 80,000; by the spring of the following year, the number of members was perhaps as high as 200,000. 36

While the "workers' unions" were taking root within the German labor movement, a parallel attempt was underway to develop an anti-bureaucratic alternative within the German communist movement. Levi's expulsion of the left opposition at the Congress of Heidelberg had grave consequences for the KPD. Almost overnight, the party was reduced from an estimated 107,000 to 50,000 members. 37 The KPD's strongest sections, those in northern Germany, the Rhineland, parts of Saxony and virtually the entire Berlin section, all joined the expelled opposition. In
Berlin, where the KPD had 12,000 members, only 36 persons were present when Wilhelm Pieck delivered his report on the congress; in Essen only 43 out of 2,000 members supported Levi and the Zentrale.

Once the smoke of factional battle had cleared from Heidelberg, the expelled left opposition began the immediate political task of redefining its organizational practice. The most immediate and pressing problem was whether or not to form a new revolutionary party, and, if so, what the nature of the new party would be. This question was first confronted at a national conference of expelled oppositionists in Bremen on October 30, 1919. Although the majority of delegates eventually voted in favor of working to restore party unity, the discussion revealed three main currents of opinion. The Hamburg group led by Wolffheim and Laufenberg, which had been the driving force of the opposition prior to the Heidelberg expulsions, favored the immediate formation of a new party. Another group centered around Otto Rühle of Dresden favored dispensing with the party form of organization altogether and working exclusively within the AAUD. The majority, led by the Bremen and Berlin organizations, however, felt that the KPD could be revitalized by waging a resolute struggle against the Levi leadership. Their position—which was shared by Pannekoek—was
premised on the belief that they would ultimately win the support of Lenin and the Third International.\textsuperscript{40}

Shortly after the Bremen conference, Wolffheim and Laufenberg, seeking to put the movement on a broader basis, began to articulate a new strategy of "national bolshevism" which called for a common front between the German nation and the Soviet Union against the Entente powers.\textsuperscript{41} This move isolated them from other elements of the opposition and as a result the main locus of the left opposition shifted to Bremen. The Bremen left's central role was formalized at a district conference of the opposition on November 30, 1919, which mandated them to serve as a communication center for the movement.\textsuperscript{42} Three weeks later, a Bremen membership meeting created an official opposition "information bureau," which, in the months that followed, played the role of a "counter-Zentrale" to the expelled oppositionists.\textsuperscript{43}

These events coincided with a lengthy discussion in the pages of \textit{Der Kommunist} over the opposition's fundamental orientation, to which Pannekoek contributed several key articles. Pannekoek's analysis was fully consistent with the position he had maintained since the war. Seeking to put the left's anti-parliamentarianism into theoretical perspective, Pannekoek made it clear that opposition to electoral democracy was not an abstract
principle, but a practical necessity rooted in the strategic requirements of the new period. The hallmark of the epoch, he wrote, was the contradiction between the objectively revolutionary nature of the post-war situation and the passivity of the masses. The fundamental task of the movement, he felt, was to overcome this passivity by mobilizing the working class through action. To revert to parliamentary tactics in an era of class polarization would immobilize the movement and lay the foundation for its ultimate defeat: "More important than the fact that the workers do not rule is the deeper and more decisive fact that they must rule if they are not to be crushed."

Pannekoek's opposition to parliamentary tactics was closely linked to his support for the council system as the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stressing that proletarian democracy was the essence of socialism, Pannekoek maintained that parliamentary democracy represented only the semblance of democracy and constituted one of the main instruments of capitalist hegemony. He argued that, unlike parliaments, the workers' councils would unite the entire working class in a cohesive system of political and economic democracy. Pannekoek insisted that the fundamental problems of revolutionary strategy and a socialist reorganization of
society could no longer be resolved by the traditional "leader politics":

These problems cannot be solved by clever leaders, a solution can only be found, first by the communist vanguard, and then by the masses themselves taking them in hand, searching, propagating, struggling, trying, venturing, persevering, bearing the responsibility and recognizing it. All this is hard and painful and as long as the working class imagines there is an easier way, as long as the workers are told that others will do it for them, will carry on the propaganda from a high platform, will take the decisions, give the signal for action, and then decide on the legislative measures, as long as they are not compelled by iron necessity, the workers will hesitate from an innate inertia and will remain passive, mired in old modes of thinking and traditions.

Reduced to its most essential element, parliamentarianism represented nothing less than "the spiritual power of the leaders over the masses." Pannekoek felt the consequences of this for party policy were fully clear: the struggle for the self-enfranchisement of the masses could only begin by abandoning parliamentarianism. 44

Shortly afterwards, Levi responded to Pannekoek with an article which outlined an analysis based essentially on the theses that under the prevailing conditions of capitalist offensive, parliamentary tactics represented "the most acute form of revolutionary action." In the course of his remarks, Levi constantly referred to the opposition as "adventurists," "putschists," "Blanquists" and "Bakuninists" and drew an approving parallel between his actions at
Heidelberg and Marx's attempt to expel the anarchists from the First International. 45

These accusations prompted Pannekoek to reply with another article entitled, "The New Blanquism," in which he attempted to put Levi's charges into historical perspective. Pannekoek began by noting that when conditions for revolution are ripe and the masses still continue to remain passive, then other doctrines often come to the forefront which offer easier ways than revolution to achieve the same goals. In France prior to 1870 two such tendencies emerged: Proudhonism, which aimed at peaceful revolutionary transformation through economic arrangements; and Blanquism, which substituted the conspiratorial actions of a small, determined minority for proletarian self-emancipation. Both tendencies were rooted in the traditions of an earlier movement and retained a petit-bourgeois mentality because they could not perceive the powerful force in the developing class struggles, which was then being theorized in Marxist doctrine. Pannekoek went on to maintain that this division had reappeared in a new and more highly developed form in post-war Germany. Noske and Ebert's belief that the workers could gain power peacefully through their participation in the workers' councils without revolutionary struggle, he felt, represented a form of neo-Proudhonism, while Radek and Levi's belief that power could be seized by a centralized and disciplined
revolutionary minority signified a form of neo-Blanquism.

This assessment was bound up with Pannekoek's belief that Levi and Radek's policies amounted to nothing less than a crude attempt to create a dictatorship of the Communist Party. On this point, Pannekoek bluntly stated:

And it also follows from this theory that it is not just the entire Communist Party which exercises dictatorship, but the central committee, and this it does first within the party itself, where it takes it upon itself to expel individuals and uses shabby means to get rid of an opposition.

Pannekoek took it for granted that such a party could never confront the critical question of bourgeois ideological hegemony. To attempt to substitute the actions of a small revolutionary minority for a spiritually prepared working class could only lead to the type of disaster that occurred in the council republics of Munich and Hungary:

In the case of capitalist countries with a spiritually powerful bourgeoisie ... any deviation in the direction of a Blanquist tactic is impossible and objectionable. The doctrine of a revolutionary minority and a Communist Party dictatorship represents an understimation of both the power of the enemy and the amount of propaganda work necessary ... 46

Throughout this controversy, Pannekoek still remained firmly convinced that Levi and Radek's tactics were the result of particular circumstances, and that the policy of the German opposition had the support of Lenin and the Third International. 47
As both sides struggled to give their case a theoretical foundation, events in Germany helped give the debate a special sense of urgency. From December, 1919, onwards there was a sudden resurgence of industrial unrest which began to assume increasingly political forms. Although economic demands were important, the issue underlying much of this turmoil was an attempt by the Ebert government to weaken the power of the workers' councils. In order to stimulate production and maintain industrial discipline, a bill was introduced which greatly limited both the role of the councils and worker participation in them. Working class protest against this measure culminated in a turbulent demonstration in front of the Reichstag on January 13, 1920, in which 42 participants were killed by the police—the bloodiest incident since the revolution.

These events led to a new divergence of aims within the opposition. Confronted with the possibility of a major revolutionary upheaval, the Bremen section of the opposition began to place a renewed emphasis on reunification with the KPD. By this time, a new faction headed by Karl Jannack and Karl Becker had come to prominence which, while still opposed to the Heidelberg theses, began to de-emphasize the opposition's differences with the Zentrale. Throughout February, 1920, Jannack and Becker led a drive
to modify the Bremen left's anti-parliamentarianism by stressing its conditional character. On February 29, a district conference repudiated anti-parliamentarianism entirely. The final step in this process of reconciliation came on March 11, when a Bremen membership meeting voted to re-enter the KPD. With this move, the opposition was deprived of many of its best and most politically experienced militants. Although a minority of the Bremen membership remained with the opposition, the information bureau was dissolved and the main center of the movement immediately shifted to the Berlin group centered around Karl Schröder.50

Only two days after the Bremen opposition voted to return to the KPD, Germany was engulfed in the great military revolt known as the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch.51 The particular circumstances of the Kapp Putsch created a stark confrontation between the workers and their most hated enemy, the military, which brought to the surface a subterranean revolutionary torrent. In Berlin, the general strike called by the trade union leader Karl Legien was so total that the counter-revolutionary regime could not function. Before the crisis was over, certain regions saw armed proletarian action of a kind Germany had not known even during the civil war of early 1919. In the Ruhr, resistance to the putsch led to the formation of factory-
based workers' militias, which grouped together to form the Red Ruhr Army, which at its height involved perhaps as many as 80,000 to 100,000 workers. Throughout all these events, the KPD leadership was paralyzed by uncertainty. The Zentrale's first response was to call upon the working class to refuse to defend the republic. When most KPD affiliates ignored this directive, the party was forced to reverse itself.

The readiness of the working class to resort to militant actions and the KPD's initial failure to support these actions, greatly stiffened the revolutionary resolve of the opposition and convinced them that the party was no longer an active instrument of revolution. Sensing that the time was appropriate for a new party, Schröder's Berlin group called a national conference of the opposition on April 4 to 5, 1920, out of which emerged the Communist Workers' Party of Germany (Kommunistischen Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands-KAPD). The KAPD's initial manifesto opened with the affirmation that the organization was "not a party in the traditional sense," but a tactic to enable the working class to liberate itself from all forms of domination by leaders: "The liberation from the treacherous counter-revolutionary leader politics is the real medium for unifying the proletariat."

This perspective was enlarged upon in an extensive--
but rather generalized--program drafted a month later, which was inspired largely by Pannekoek. 56 Within the context of this document, the KAPD sought both to define a revolutionary strategy and articulate their conception of a socialist society. The cornerstone of the KAPD's strategy was their belief that the objective conditions for revolution were "over-ripe" and that the real question was one of subjective development: "Subjective movements will play a decisive role in the German revolution. The main problem for the German revolution is the self-conscious development of the German proletariat." The KAPD made it clear that this new consciousness must revolve around the category of "council thought," in other words, the recognition of the historical significance of the councils as instruments of revolutionary struggle and the institutional form of the new society. Recognition of the council principle entailed, above all else, a willingness to struggle against all the institutions of capitalist hegemony. To revert to a traditional trade union and electoral practice would be nothing less than "sabotage of council thought." The KAPD saw its role as one of uniting the most advanced elements of the working class and acting as a leaven within the masses, spreading propaganda, organizing discussions, and, when necessary, opposing the illusions of the masses. Unlike the Leninists, the KAPD stressed that the party must be a catalyst of ideas rather
than a direct instrument of revolutionary action. The task of revolutionary organization and action was instead left to the AAUD, which was viewed as complementary to the KAPD: "The development of the revolution will be the main determinant of the AAUD and not program, statutes, or detailed plans." The AAUD's struggles in the factories, the KAPD felt, would create the necessary atmosphere and consciousness for the self-mobilization of the working class, which would assume final form in the workers' councils.

With the formation of the KAPD, the basic contours of the left communist alternative were firmly established. The new conceptions of working class organization and activity that found expression in the KAPD and the AAUD were in part the product of particular circumstances, but they also show a high degree of continuity with the concepts Pannekoek and the left radicals had developed both before and during the war. Their far-reaching critique of trade union and party-centered socialism grew out of a longtime conviction that bourgeois ideological hegemony could be transcended only by a direct confrontation with the state and capital by a militant and class-conscious working class organized from below on the basis of new structures of proletarian rule. By the spring of 1920, it had also become increasingly clear that the logic of this position was moving them irrevocably toward a major confrontation with the Communist International.
Pannekoek Against Lenin: Left Communism and the Comintern

Until the appearance of Lenin's "Left-Wing Communism": An Infantile Disorder, left communism had not been proscribed by the Comintern. Prior to this time, the nature of Leninism and its significance for the West had not been firmly established. For Pannekoek and others, Lenin's name had been associated with world revolution, uncompromising class struggle, and militant anti-parliamentarianism. Although he expected opposition from others in the Comintern, Pannekoek still continued to believe that left communism would find a steadfast ally in Lenin, the defender of world revolution. With the hope of influencing Comintern tactics, Panenkoek drafted in March, 1920, a major brochure addressed to the International entitled World Revolution and Communist Tactics (Weltrevolution und Kommunistische Taktik). Widely circulated in both brochure and article form, this document almost immediately became the fundamental text of left communism.

Attempting to set forth a conception of revolution "commensurate with a highly developed capitalism," Pannekoek's analysis embraced a whole complex of broad theoretical, economic, social, and historical questions. From his Dietzgenian starting point, Pannekoek saw the revolution as a complicated process of interaction which at first appeared to deny any pattern of logical coherence:
These various forms and phases of the process of development do not, moreover, follow in the abstract, logical succession in which we have set them down as degrees of maturation: they all occur at the same time, become entangled and coexist in a chaos of tendencies that complement, combat each other, and dissolve each other, and it is through this struggle that the general development of the revolution proceeds.

Pannekoek felt that what was decisive and primary in this process of revolutionary development was the act of clarification that arises from the practice of revolutionary self-activity:

Each new phase of the revolution brings a new layer of as yet unused leaders to the surface as representatives of particular forms of organization, and the overthrow of each of these in turn represents a higher stage in the proletariat's self-emancipation. The strength of the proletariat is not merely the raw power of the single violent act which throws the enemy down, but also the strength of mind which breaks the old mental dependence and thus succeeds in keeping a tight hold on what has been seized by storm.\^59

Within this unified process of world-wide revolutionary development, Pannekoek distinguished between separate Eastern and Western forms of revolutionary practice, both of which were equally suitable to the historic mission of the liberation of humanity. In the East, he maintained, the key factor in determining tactics was the predominance of a collectively oriented peasant society and culture. Unlike the workers of the West, the masses of Russia and
Asia had not experienced the paralyzing effects of bourgeois culture and traditions and their inner character was thus completely different. Because of their longstanding traditions of village communalism, the peasants were able to relate to communism in a primitive, open manner.

In the West, on the other hand, a longstanding bourgeois civilization had thoroughly penetrated the thoughts and feelings of the masses. For the German revolution this had particularly tragic consequences:

But in November 1918 state power slipped from the nerveless grasp of the bourgeoisie in Germany and Austria, the coercive apparatus of the state was completely paralyzed; the masses were in control; and the bourgeoisie was nevertheless able to build this state power up again and once more subjugate the workers. This proved that the bourgeoisie possessed another hidden source of power which had remained intact and which permitted itself to re-establish its hegemony when everything seemed shattered. This hidden power is the bourgeoisie's ideological hold over the proletariat. Because the proletarian masses were still completely governed by a bourgeois mentality, they restored the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with their own hands after it had collapsed.60

Pannekoek treated it as axiomatic that the main tactical problem in Western Europe was to eradicate the spiritual immaturity of the proletariat through a long, arduous, revolutionary struggle.

Pannekoek further maintained that the low level of working class consciousness and the slow tempo of revolutionary development in Western Europe had given rise to
two conflicting tactical currents which were present in
every country:

The one seeks to revolutionize and clarify
people's minds by word and deed, and to this
end tries to pose the new principles in the
sharpest possible contrast to the old,
received conceptions. The other current
attempts to draw the masses still on the sidelines
into practical activity, and therefore emphasizes
points of agreement rather than points of
difference in an attempt to avoid as far as is
possible anything that might deter them. The
first strives for a clear, sharp separation
among the masses, the second for unity; the
first current may be termed the radical tendency,
the second the opportunist one.61

In attempting to identify the main elements of the
current he labelled "communist opportunism," Pannekoek
focused on the methodological and sociological factors
that gave rise to it rather than resorting to a routine
condemnation:

Opportunism does not necessarily mean a pliant,
conciliatory attitude and vocabulary, nor
radicalism a more acerbic manner; on the contrary,
lack of clear, principled tactics is all too
often concealed in rabidly strident language; and
indeed, in revolutionary situations it is
characteristic of opportunism to suddenly set all
of its hopes on the great revolutionary deed.
Its essence lies in always considering the
immediate questions, not what lies in the future,
and to fix on the superficial aspects of pheno-
mena rather than seeing the determinant deeper
bases. When the forces are not immediately
adequate for the attainment of a certain goal,
it tends to make for that goal by another way,
by roundabout means, rather than to strengthen
those forces. For its goal is immediate success,
and to that it sacrifices the conditions of
lasting success in the future . . . But power in such cases always turns out to be an illusion, personal power exercised by individual leaders and not the power of the proletarian class; this contradiction brings nothing but confusion, corruption and conflict in its wake. Conquest of power not based upon a working class fully prepared to exercise its hegemony would be lost again, or else have to make so many concessions to reactionary forces that it would be inwardly spent.62

Pannekoek's emphasis on proletarian consciousness led him to reject both the amorphous mass party formations of social democracy and the elitist vanguard of Russian bolshevism as inadequate for the task of revolutionizing the masses:

A revolution can no more be made by a big mass party or coalition of different parties than by a small radical party. It breaks out spontaneously among the masses; action instigated by a party can sometimes trigger it off (a rare occurrence), but the determining forces lie elsewhere, in the psychological factors deep in the unconsciousness of the masses and in the great events of world politics. The function of the world party lies in propagating clear understanding in advance, so that throughout the masses there will be elements who know what must be done and who are capable of judging the situation for themselves. And in the course of revolution the party has to raise the program, slogans, and directions which the spontaneously acting masses recognize as correct because they express their own aims in their most adequate form and hence achieve greater clarity of purpose; it is thus that the party comes to lead the struggle.63

The logic of this position led Pannekoek to raise the possibility that the vanguardist model of party organization being championed by the Comintern might at some point
become a major obstacle to revolutionary development. Pannekoek, reiterating elements of the analysis he had used against Levi, argued that to attempt to gain power without the active understanding and intervention of a united working class could have potentially fatal consequences for the revolution:

No "resolute minority" can resolve the problems which can only be resolved by the action of the class as a whole; and if the populace allows such a seizure of power to take place over its head with apparent indifference, it is not for all that, a genuinely passive mass, but is capable as far as it has not been won over to communism, of rounding upon the revolution at any moment as the active follower of reaction.64

At an even deeper level, Pannekoek stressed that such an approach to revolution negated what was the very essence of socialism:

But if the most important element of revolution consists in the masses taking over their own affairs--the management of society and production--in hand themselves, then any form of organization which does not permit control and direction by the masses themselves is counter-revolutionary and harmful; and it should therefore be replaced by another form that is revolutionary in that it enables the workers themselves to determine everything actively.65

In outlining the tactical choices for Western Europe, Pannekoek took considerable pains to underline the differences between left communism and syndicalism. The principal dividing point, he maintained, lay in their
different attitudes toward the structure and superstructure of society. Stripped of its revolutionary rhetoric, the fundamental aim of syndicalism was simply a government based on the trade union bureaucracy and a radical section of the old state apparatus, which essentially left the capitalist state intact. Unlike the left communists, the syndicalists were also content to leave the intellectual and cultural spheres of society to the bourgeoisie. By failing to dissolve the material and spiritual elements of capitalist rule, a syndicalist government would allow the possibility for a later capitalist regroupment:

And . . . because a government of trade union leaders of this kind cannot resolve the problems which society is posing; for the latter can only be resolved through the proletarian masses' own initiative and activity, fuelled by the self-sacrificing and unbounded enthusiasm which only communism, with all its perspectives of total freedom and supreme intellectual and moral elevation, can command. A current which seeks to abolish material poverty and exploitation, but deliberately confines itself to this goal, which leaves the bourgeois superstructure intact and at the same time holds back from revolutionizing the mental outlook and ideology of the proletariat, cannot release these great energies in the masses; and so it will be incapable of resolving the material problems of initiating economic expansion and ending the chaos. 66

Although his differences with the Russian leadership of the Comintern, as they emerged in this discussion, were deep and indicated a substantial ideological split, Pannekoek, nonetheless, still continued to believe
profoundly in the world-transforming significance of the Russian Revolution. Pannekoek's distinction between separate Eastern and Western forms of revolutionary development allowed him to contend that the Russian Revolution had ignited the spiritual and material energy of the Russian masses and was enabling them to build and sustain a new society. Pannekoek remained firmly convinced that the Russian Revolution would be both the catalyst for the European revolution and the opening round of a larger Asian revolt against Western capital. This assessment led Pannekoek to de-emphasize the Russian Revolution's proletarian character and stress its significance as a movement of national liberation. Pannekoek saw the revolutionary developments in Russia and Asia as the ascendancy of a new world civilization which, by combining a communal spirit with historical materialism and modern technology, would challenge Western supremacy in culture, technology, and economic development.67

With the tone of exuberant optimism characteristic of the years following the Russian Revolution, Pannekoek boldly predicted:

When the German revolution takes a decisive turn and connects with Russia, when revolutionary mass struggles break out in England and America, when revolt flares up in India, when communism pushes its frontiers forward to the Rhine and the Indian Ocean, then the world revolution will enter its
next mighty phase . . . When the English working class, backed by the rest of the European proletariat, attacks its bourgeoisie, it will fight doubly for communism, clearing the way for communism in England and helping to free Asia. And conversely, it will be able to count on the support of the main communist forces when armed hirelings of the bourgeoisie seek to drown its struggle in blood—for Western Europe and the islands of the coast are only a peninsula projecting from the great Russo-Asian complex of lands. The common struggle against capital will unite the proletarian masses of the whole world. And when finally, at the end of the arduous struggle, the European workers, deeply exhausted, stand in the clear morning light of freedom, they will greet the liberated peoples of Asia in the East and shake hands in Moscow, the capital of the new humanity. 68

While Pannekoek was advancing these arguments, Lenin was developing, in preparation for the Second Congress of the Comintern, his own strategic analysis to refute the left communists, which took the form of his famous essay, "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Described as "perhaps the most powerful thing Lenin has ever written," 69 this work almost immediately became the cornerstone of communist strategy and tactics. 70 Lenin took as his starting point the assumption that the slow tempo of the revolution in the West necessitated a period of retrenchment for the international communist movement. Under these new conditions of protracted warfare, communists must learn to instill class consciousness in the workers by working and maneuvering wherever the masses are found—even in the most reactionary institutions. "Into the trade unions and
parliaments" was Lenin's cure for the "infantile disease" of leftism. To refuse to work in the trade unions and parliaments, he maintained, would only mean leaving the backward workers under the influence of their reactionary leaders. In keeping with this view, Lenin called for extraordinary measures to penetrate mass organizations:

We must be able to withstand all this, to agree to all and every sacrifice, and even—if need be—to resort to various stratagems, artifices, illegal methods, to evasions and subterfuges, only so as to get into the trade unions, to remain in them, and to carry on communist work within them at all costs.\(^1\)

Having established the importance of working within mass organizations, Lenin outlined the manner in which it was to be done:

The more powerful enemy can be vanguished only by exerting the utmost effort, and without fail, most thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully, using every, even the smallest "rift" among the enemies, of every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who fail to understand this, fail to understand even a particle of Marxism, or of scientific, modern socialism in general.\(^2\)

Throughout his polemic, Lenin attempted repeatedly to generalize the Bolshevik experience into a universal model of revolution, stressing in particular "that absolute
centralization and the strictest discipline are the fundamental conditions for victory over the bourgeoisie." 73

In language that was often acrimonious—"out-and-out idiocy," "muddle-headedness," "mere babblers," were only a few of the phrases he used—Lenin excoriated the Dutch and German left for their lack of tactical finesse. Lenin singled out Pannekoek's theoretical work as "particularly solid and particularly stupid." 74 Lenin made it clear that he considered the left's rejection of the vanguard model of party organization to be "tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat in the interests of the bourgeoisie." 75 After noting that the Dutch position arose from the "misfortune" of having been born in a country where illegality was unnecessary, Lenin concluded that they could never become more than "a circle, not a party of the masses, but a group of intellectuals and a few workers who imitate the worst features of intellectualism." 76

Pannekoek responded to Lenin's arguments and accusations with only a short afterward to subsequent editions of World Revolution and Communist Tactics, in which he laconically noted that the significance of Lenin's formulations lay not in their originality and content, but in the fact that it was Lenin who made them. The real task, Pannekoek felt, was not to oppose Lenin's arguments with other arguments, but to comprehend the historical circumstances that gave rise to his policies. Lenin's defense
of the traditional tactics of parliamentarianism and trade unionism, he maintained, was rooted in the contradiction between the Soviet Union's role as a nation-state and the revolutionary vocation of the Third International. In analyzing this contradiction, Pannekoek pointed to the Soviet Union's urgent need for economic reconstruction, which he felt could be realized only on the basis of a modus vivendi with the capitalist world:

What this requires is not a radical communist party preparing a root-and-branch revolution for the future, but a great organized proletarian force which will take the part of Russia and oblige its own government to pay it heed. The Soviet government needs the masses now, even if they are not fully communist. If it can gain for itself their adhesion to Moscow, it will be a sign to world capital that wars of annihilation against Russia are no longer possible, and there is therefore no alternative to peace and trade relations. 77

Pannekoek felt that the logic of this situation dictated that the political requirements of the Soviet Union would increasingly become the key factor in determining communist tactics in the West and that the Comintern would be reduced to a tool by which the Soviet Union intervenes in West European politics. Pannekoek also expressed the fear that the Soviet Union might potentially become "a reactionary impediment to revolution" and perhaps--by demoralizing the working class--unleash the forces for the triumph of the counter-revolution as well. 78 With these remarks, Pannekoek
emerged as the first communist theoretician to publicly question the identity of the Russian Revolution with the one expected in Europe.

The main task of replying to Lenin was left to Gorter, who responded with his famous Open Letter to Comrade Lenin. Of all the Dutch Marxists, Gorter had enjoyed the closest relationship with Lenin and seemed the least likely to become involved in a polemic against him. While in Switzerland during the war, Gorter had known Lenin personally and later translated State and Revolution and a number of his other writings. Only two years earlier, Gorter had dedicated his World Revolution to Lenin, terming him the only leader of the proletariat who could be compared with Marx, and indeed had surpassed him by his seizure of power.79 Like Pannekoek, Gorter structured his argument around the differences between Eastern and Western communism, noting: "Your tactics were brilliant for Russia, and the Russians were victorious because of them. But what does this prove for West Europe?"80 In his analysis, Gorter traced the differences to the dissimilarities between the agricultural sectors of the two regions. Gorter argued that unlike the communally oriented peasants of the East, the peasants of Western Europe were individualistically-minded petty capitalist entrepreneurs who saw the workers as the class enemy.81 In the West, the workers
would have to make their revolution alone against an entrenched bourgeoisie. In posing the question of tactics for Western Europe, Gorter vehemently asserted that the Third International was guilty of the same kind of opportunism which had characterized the Second International:

Of what use are the impressive principles, the brilliant theses of the Third International, if we are actually practicing opportunism? The Second International also had the most beautiful principles, but it failed because of its deeds.82

Against Lenin's emphasis on instilling class consciousness through participation in parliaments and trade unions, Gorter emphatically reiterated the left communist tactic of building consciousness through a direct confrontation with the capitalist state on the basis of the councils and factory organizations:

In all the larger cities and villages, they see us act: our strikes, our street fights, our councils. They hear our slogans. They see us go forward. That is the best propaganda and it does the most convincing.83

Although Gorter's analysis was similar to Pannekoek's, it also displayed some elements that were different. Unlike Pannekoek, who attributed the slow tempo of the revolution in the West to the predominance of bourgeois ideology, Gorter argued that the proletariat's main obstacle was the gigantic material power of capitalism. This view led Gorter
to stress the importance of firm Marxist principles, party centralization, and "iron discipline" (although of a different type than that advocated by Lenin and the Comintern). 84

The essential strategic aims advanced by Pannekoek and Gorter were not confined to the Dutch and German left. By the spring of 1920, a powerful left communist challenge to the rapidly consolidating Leninist communism had surfaced throughout Europe. 85 Although it represented the most formidable challenge to the Comintern in 1920, left communism was never a coherent formation, but more a loose association of factional groupings, parties, and journals which encompassed widely divergent positions. They were linked not only by their repudiation of the Russian model for Western Europe, but by a common anti-bureaucratic impulse and emphasis on uncompromising revolutionary activism. After the dissolution of the Amsterdam Bureau, the international center of left communism shifted to another recently established Comintern bureau in Vienna and its journal Kommunismus. Under the editorship of Georg Lukács, Kommunismus served as a major forum for the loose network of left communists, publishing Pannekoek, Gorter, Roland Holst, Sylvia Pankhurst, and many others, along with the essays that later composed Lukács' History and Class Consciousness. Like Pannekoek, Lukács
was a theoretician of the spontaneity of the masses, who saw class consciousness as the driving force in history and the decisive factor in the self-liberation of the proletariat. Indeed, Lukács' approach to Marxism had been shaped in part by a systematic study of Pannekoek he made shortly before becoming a Marxist in 1918. Another major center of left communism emerged in Italy, where the anti-parliamentary communists led by Amadeo Bordiga represented a considerable political force. Although Bordiga's anti-parliamentary position had been strongly influenced by Pannekoek's theoretical writings, which appeared regularly in his publication, _Il Soviet_, he rejected the left communist theory of organization. Bordiga's activist Marxism led him to stress the importance of a rigorous and disciplined Leninist-style party and condemn the councils and factory organizations as a syndicalist deviation. Still another major theoretical center of left communism surfaced in Britain, in Sylvia Pankhurst's Socialist Workers' Federation and their publication, _Workers' Dreadnought_. The left communist trend was also visible in the Swiss and Austrian communist parties, both of which were resolutely opposed to parliamentarianism. Within Russia, the Workers' Opposition developed a forceful critique of bureaucratic proletarian organization and maintained a close relationship with the KAPD.
The KAPD's formation in April, 1920, set the stage for a major confrontation between the left communists and the Comintern. Despite their opposition to Leninist tactics, the KAPD continued to remain firmly committed to the cause of the Third International. Shortly after its foundation, the KAPD dispatched a delegation led by Jan Appel to Moscow to negotiate the party's affiliation to the Comintern. Upon their arrival in early May, the delegation was met at the station by Lenin, who read them several passages from *Left-Wing Communism*. Following two meetings between the delegation and the Comintern executive, Zinoviev issued an open letter to the KAPD membership setting forth four conditions for affiliation with the Communist International: immediate expulsion of Wolffheim, Laufenberg, and Rühle; unconditional submission to the decisions of the Second Congress; creation of a committee of reconciliation to seek reunification with the KPD; KAPD participation at the Second Congress. While the Appel delegation was returning to Germany, a second KAPD delegation led by Otto Rühle arrived in Moscow without knowing what the first delegation had discussed or having had a chance to read Zinoviev's open letter. After lengthy discussions with Lenin and the other leaders of the Comintern, Rühle made a dramatic announcement on July 18, the night before the opening of the Second Congress, stating the KAPD would
neither participate in the congress nor join the Third
International. 93

The KAPD's absence from the Second Congress did not
prevent the main issues the left communists had raised from
being aired. The backdrop to this debate had already been
provided by the distribution to the delegates of the respec-
tive texts of Pannekoek and Lenin—the last time the
work of a foreign oppositionist was publicly disseminated
by the Comintern. The most dramatic confrontation came
when Amadeo Bordiga presented a set of theses reaffirming
this anti-parliamentary perspective of the left. In the
course of his remarks, Bordiga defended with relentless
efficiency the intransigent Marxism that lay at the heart
of left communism:

The Marxist task of the Marxist party, which
ought to have spoken on behalf of the whole
working class and remembered its old historical
tasks, has therefore been almost completely
forgotten. A new ideology has been fabricated
which has nothing in common with Marxism, which
rejects violent measures and ignores the
dictatorship of the proletariat in order to put
in its place the illusion of a social develop-
ment on peaceful and democratic paths. 94

Like the Dutch and German left, Bordiga also criticized
the growing Russian domination of the International and
maintained that the experiences of the Bolsheviks in the
East could not be mechanically transposed to the West.
Despite Bordiga's spirited defense, the congress in the
end approved resolutions supporting parliamentarianism, trade unionism, and centralized party organization. 95

In the aftermath of the Second Congress, a vigorous debate developed within the KAPD over its future relationship to the Third International. A minority position was taken by Otto Rühle, who rejected any form of collaboration with the Comintern. Rühle, however, was formally condemned by the party in August for his abrupt departure from the Second Congress. 96 The feelings of the majority of the KAPD were undoubtedly expressed by Gorter when he announced his intention to organize a revolutionary opposition within the Third International. Still hoping to convince Lenin of the erroneous nature of Comintern tactics, Gorter, along with the KAPD leaders Schröder and Räsch, journeyed to Moscow for further discussions with the Comintern executive. Although Lenin met personally with Gorter, he remained indifferent to his admonitions. 97 Trotsky, however, was more direct and responded to Gorter's defense of a West European conception of revolution with ironic scorn:

Comrade Gorter didn't simply express the views of his own particular tendency—he lectured us, poor orphans of Eastern Europe . . . Unfortunately, I haven't seen Comrade Gorter's mandate and so I can't tell whether he was really delegated by Western Europe to give us his edifying lecture . . . We can't possibly forget that Comrade Gorter is the spokesman of a very small and scarcely influential group in the labor movement of Western Europe. 98
The outcome of these talks was a decision by the executive to provisionally admit the KAPD to the Comintern as a "sympathizing party" with consultative status on the condition that they seek reunification with the KPD. Although the KAPD had serious reservations about this arrangement, they accepted it with the expectation of building a revolutionary opposition within the Third International. 99

The KAPD first approached the task of organizing a revolutionary opposition in May, 1921, when it dispatched still another delegation to Moscow, consisting of Appel, Schwab, and Meyer, to build support among the delegates to the upcoming Third Congress of the Comintern. Although conversations were held with left-leaning delegates from a number of countries, the KAPD was unable to organize a cohesive opposition faction for the congress. At this point, the executive issued an ultimatum to the KAPD to either merge with the KPD or face expulsion. The KAPD rejected it immediately and in September was formally expelled from the Comintern. 100

As the conflict with the Comintern intensified, Pannekoek and the left communists began to increasingly focus their attention on the larger underlying issue of the meaning of the Russian Revolution itself. Throughout 1920 and early 1921, both Pannekoek and Gorter deliberately
avoided any type of personal attack on Lenin and remained firm in their belief that Russia had inaugurated a new communist society. Both failed to perceive, or ignored, the steady erosion of the power of the soviets, and took considerable pains to differentiate themselves from those who opposed the Russian Revolution and the Third International. Within the KAPD, the first public criticism of the Russian Revolution came from Otto Rühle, who, upon his return from Russia in June, 1920, began to argue that the councils in Russia were only a "shadow" of proletarian democracy and that a counter-revolutionary party dictatorship had assumed power. 101

In the interval between the Second and Third Comintern congresses, the situation in both the Soviet Union and Western Europe had changed dramatically. In 1920, Soviet Russia was virtually isolated from the outside world and its leaders still believed that revolution in the West was imminent. By 1921, it had established trade and diplomatic ties with a number of countries, and if the Russian leadership still believed that revolution in Europe was a possibility, they no longer considered it imminent. Within Russia, this altered perspective found expression in a policy of economic retrenchment known as the New Economic Policy. 102

These changes led Pannekoek, starting in May, 1921,
to undertake a major re-evaluation of the Russian Revolution. Pannekoek's analysis was initially marked by the conviction that communism in Russia was not a concrete, economic relationship, but a "spiritual reality" embodied in the popular measures that the Bolsheviks were pursuing in improving education, health care, housing, and in raising the cultural level of the masses. Pannekoek at the same time, also held out the possibility that the Soviet Union might eventually evolve into a system of small-scale capitalist production. The chaotic economic conditions in Russia, he felt, provided the objective basis for a new class struggle between workers and peasants such as had occurred in the Kronstadt uprising. Since neither the weak and demoralized working class, nor the atomized peasantry were capable of exercising power by themselves, the most likely outcome of such a struggle would be a new bureaucracy exercising power in their name. Only a revolutionary offensive in the West, he felt, could provide the spiritual impetus for a revitalization of the Russian Revolution.103

By July, 1921, Pannekoek was fully prepared to assert that what he had two months earlier suggested was only a possibility had now become reality: Soviet Russia had degenerated into a bureaucratic elite ruling on behalf of the peasantry. What had occurred in Russia since the
revolution was not the conquest of power by the proletariat, but a change of government from the capitalist rulers to a party dictatorship presiding over a system of production in which the capitalists were restrained only by certain forms of worker control. Pannekoek felt these changes were partly traceable to the growing penetration of the Soviet Union by Western capital, which for the first time put the Western capitalists in a position to influence the Soviet bureaucracy. This whole process, he felt, was best exemplified by the shift in Soviet foreign policy toward conciliation with the West and the extension of this policy to the tactics of the Comintern. From the perspective of the Soviet leadership, a revolutionary offensive in the West would bring only destruction and economic dislocation which would jeopardize the reconstruction of the Soviet economy. Under these conditions, the Comintern was not conceived of as the beginning of a new workers' movement, but simply an effort to gain control of the old movement and use it to defend Soviet Russia. For the workers of the West, this meant that the main task was to defend the Soviet Union by helping to rebuild their own capitalist economies instead of building their own proletarian hegemony.\footnote{104}

Pannekoek's hostility towards the Bolsheviks became even more pronounced after the expulsion of the KAPD from
the Comintern. By November, 1921, he had reached the drastic conclusion that the Soviet regime had been transformed into a repressive and counter-revolutionary bureaucracy that had reduced the proletariat to a new condition of servitude:

The workers work in the factories for a meager wage under the supervision of state officials and directors. Do they determine their work collectively? No, they are directed from above in the same manner as in a state.

Pannekoek made it clear that he considered communist doctrine in Russia to be nothing more than a legitimizing ideology adapted to mask the increasingly bourgeois function of the bureaucracy. This situation led Pannekoek to conclude that the first steps toward a full-scale capitalist restoration had already been taken; others would follow out of inevitable necessity.\(^{105}\) Pannekoek extended his analysis to argue that the Third International now represented a continuation of the basic policies and tactics of the Second International, in which communist slogans camouflaged an objective convergence in function. Despite their professed ideological differences, both social democracy and communism represented nothing more than mechanisms for integrating the working class into capitalist society.\(^{106}\) Confronted with these new realities, Pannekoek could only conclude: "Never has the necessity of
unlearning what we have so recently learned been as great as now."107

Between Deventer and Moscow: The CPH and the Comintern

The full implications of the left communist confrontation with the Comintern became apparent only slowly within the Dutch communist movement. Although the CPH was torn by internal dissension, the party was taken completely by surprise by Lenin's formulations in Left-Wing Communism and his attack on Pannekoek.108 Throughout 1920 and much of 1921, Pannekoek's conceptions still exercised considerable influence within the party and were at least partly shared by the triumvirate.109 At the Second Congress of the Comintern, Wijnkoop put aside his own differences with Pannekoek and Gorter to champion the cause of the KAPD and criticize the growing Russian domination of the International. For these actions, the CPH was stripped of its seat on the executive and Lenin was moved to note: "Wijnkoop, it is true, has declared that he does not share Comrade Pannekoek's ideas, but his speeches prove just the opposite."110

In the months following the Second Congress, a tripartite division began to increasingly characterize the CPH. At one pole was the leadership triumvirate of Wijnkoop, van Ravesteijn, and Ceton and their supporters,
who continued to dominate the party's organizational structure. At the other pole was the loosely organized opposition divided between the Nieuwe Tijd intellectuals, the Roode Vaan group of Luteraan, and several fractious local groups. Between these two poles, lay an intermediate group composed predominantly of young activists who had joined the party during the war years and whose main political reference point was the Russian Revolution. Few members of this group had been involved in the pre-war SPD and their distinguishing characteristic was a rejection of theory for the lessons of everyday struggle. Although they shared a common dislike of the triumvirate's leadership methods and approved of much of the opposition's political perspective, they were open to the doctrines of Bolshevism and the influence of the Comintern in a way that the pre-war leaders of the SDP could never be. Included among this group were men such as Jacques de Kadt, Jan Romein, G.J.M. van het Reeve, Dirk and Anton Struik, Louis de Visser, and A.S. de Leeuw, who with a few key additions and subtractions would soon constitute the basic leadership nucleus of the CPH for the next two decades.

For the CPH, the Second Congress of the Comintern marked the first sustained contact with the Russian leadership and a new phase in the party's development.
Following Wijnkoop's chastisement at the congress, the triumvirate—although continuing to maintain an independent and leftist outlook—began an attempt to bring the party more in line with Comintern policy. The first indications of a change in policy came when van Ravesteijn proposed to modify the CPH's trade union program by shifting the main focus of the party's trade union activities from the syndicalist NAS federation to the SDAP-dominated NVV. Despite an intensive campaign by the triumvirate, van Ravesteijn's proposal was overwhelmingly rejected at the party congress that November.

Undeterred by this rebuff, the triumvirate turned their attention toward centralizing the party along Bolshevik lines. When, in May, 1921, the Endschede section passed a resolution condemning a decision to have the delegates to the Third Congress of the Comintern chosen by the executive rather than the membership, the entire section was expelled en bloc and party members were forbidden to have contact with them. The full implications of this move became apparent when the Zwolle and Deventer sections were expelled for supporting the Endschede section. Shortly afterwards Luteraan met the same fate.

At this point, a major debate developed in the opposition over whether to follow the German example and build
"workers' unions" and a new party along the lines of the KAPD. Following his return from Moscow in late 1921, Gorter raised the possibility of forming a new party and in February began to propagandize openly for such a move. Pannekoek, however, cautioned that in Holland, unlike Germany, conditions were not ripe for the creation of new forms of working class organization. Holland, he maintained, was largely unaffected by the crisis of capitalist society and ideology that came with the war, and as a result "the old thought patterns remained unaltered." Pannekoek stressed that the German left's emphasis on workers' councils and anti-parliamentarianism was not a reliable guide to tactics in Holland. The most the left could do was to propagate their significance for future developments. Pannekoek's readiness to continue working within the framework of the CPH was also grounded in his assumption that the divisions in the party were more a "technical" matter related to the triumvirate's heavy-handed leadership and the growing influence of Moscow, rather than fundamental strategic differences. To withdraw from the party would only cut the opposition off from the predominantly left-leaning membership and preclude the possibility of adapting the CPH's tactics to future revolutionary developments. Gorter and Luteraan, however, rejected this strategy and began to
undertake preparations to form a new party.

These efforts culminated in the formation of the Communist Workers' Party of the Netherlands (Kommunistische Arbeiders-Partij Nederland—KAPN) in September, 1921. The initial manifesto drafted by Gorter stressed the imminent collapse of capitalism and affirmed the necessity of forming workers' councils. It defined the party's main aim as one of propagating "council thought" and proclaimed it to be a provisional organization that would disappear once the councils appeared. Although modelled on the KAPD, the KAPN lacked both the social base and dynamism of its German counterpart. At its high point in late 1921, the party numbered less than 200 members, organized in eight sections. While Pannekoek chose not to join, the KAPD received the wholehearted support of Gorter, who acted as its main spokesman, edited its publication, provided much of its financial support, and attempted to mediate its never-ending factional disputes.

Throughout all these events and developments, the independently-owned Nieuwe Tijd remained firmly in the hands of the left. For the CPH leadership, Pannekoek's defense of the KAPD and his increasingly hostile assessment of the Soviet Union was an acute source of embarrassment and threatened their already strained relationship with the Comintern. Confronted with this situation, the
triumvirate began to take measures to bring the Nieuwe Tijd under party control. Pannekoek responded to this drive by reaffirming the Nieuwe Tijd's importance as an instrument of socialist clarification and announcing his intention to fight any attempt at party interference. Following the decision at the Third Congress that all communist publications must be brought under strict party control, the leadership began to pursue its campaign with renewed intensity. At this point, the opposition suffered a major loss with the defection of Henriette Roland Holst. The first indications of a change in attitude came in early 1921, when she republished an earlier Nieuwe Tijd article in Kommunismus with a deletion of many of the passages critical of Leninist-style party organization. Although she emerged as the KAPD's leading defender at the Third Congress and continued to pay tribute to the principles of the Amsterdam Bureau, Roland Holst's position shifted decisively in late July, when she began to polemicize against Pannekoek for joining a "reactionary assault on Russia." With Roland Holst's support, van Ravesteijn maneuvered to have a declaration published in the Nieuwe Tijd on September 5 announcing that the publication was under party control and that Roland Holst had assumed all editorial responsibilities. Van Ravesteijn now felt confident enough to declare to
Moscow that the left had been removed from all positions of influence in the party. Although Pannekoek had initially been pressured into supporting this arrangement, he responded a few days later by resigning from the CPH. Pannekoek, however, continued to remain on the editorial board of the *Nieuwe Tijd*, and convoked a board meeting to discuss the declaration. Following a heated debate between Pannekoek and van Ravesteijn, the board deadlocked, with van Ravesteijn and Roland Holst supporting party control, and Pannekoek and J. Rogge, the son of the publisher, opposed. In the ensuing days, the Comintern executive made it clear that Moscow would not permit the CPH to co-edit a review with Pannekoek. Pannekoek, by now completely isolated, tenaciously held to the position that rather than allow the *Nieuwe Tijd* to lose its independent status, he would dissolve the review and put up a sign declaring: "Closed by order of Moscow." When van Ravesteijn persisted in his demand, Pannekoek and Rogge ceased publication on December 20. Shortly afterwards, the CPH came out with its own publication, *De Communistische Gids*, which was edited by van Ravesteijn and Roland Holst. The triumvirate's triumph, however, was short-lived. Within five years, both they and Roland Holst would be outside the CPH. For the Dutch left,
the dissolution of the Nieuwe Tijd brought to a close a quarter century of theoretical creativity and innovation. Although the publication's outward form remained intact in the Communistische Gids, its substance became a mere shadow of what it had been in its dynamic years. For Pannekoek, this event marked his final break with the international communist movement. 128

From Movement to Sect: Left Communism in Decline

While the battle within the CPH raged, the newly formed KAPD was embroiled in its own internal turmoil. The initial circumstances for the KAPD were highly favorable. Born in a period of proletarian radicalization, the party incarnated the German left radical tradition—albeit in a modified and more radicalized form. Membership at the party's foundation stood at an estimated 38,000, which was several thousand more than the KPD, and nearly double what the Bolshevik party had been at the beginning of 1917. 129 In addition, the KAPD possessed an extensive range of regional, local, and factory publications. Yet the party's strength still had significant limitations, of which its amorphous organizational structure was the most serious. Like the AAUD, the KAPD was never more than a loose federation of different ideological and regional tendencies which were capable of sudden disintegration. During the war years, Arbeiter-
politik and Pannekoek's theoretical work had played a central role in the consolidation of a specific left communist current. But by 1920, other theoretical tendencies and publications had emerged as independent ideological centers in their own right. The KAPD's basic structural weakness was compounded by the changed political and economic situation prevailing in Germany after 1920. The initial stabilization (or apparent stabilization) of the Weimar regime, combined with the ebbing of the council movement and the withdrawal from political involvement of much of the working class, while it did not weaken the determination of the left communists, did set limits to their appeal. What remained of the council movement was either organized through state initiative or subsidiary to the trade unions with specialized tasks. With no revival of the council movement at hand, empty rhetoric and sectarian logic swiftly took hold.130

The first of the KAPD's many ideological disputes occurred at the party's foundation congress when a conflict developed with the "national bolshevik" tendency led by Wolffheim and Laufenberg. The question of their continued presence in the KAPD was particularly important since the Comintern had demanded their expulsion as a precondition for admission. Pannekoek responded to this
sharpening conflict with a letter to the KAPD accusing Wolffheim and Laufenberg of attempting to tie nationalist ideology to council doctrine and thereby weakening clear Marxist insight. Following several months of heated controversy, the "national bolsheviks" were expelled at the KAPD's second congress in August, 1920, as "nationalist saboteurs of the German revolution."

Among all the theoretical problems confronted by the left communists, the question of revolutionary organization was the thorniest and most divisive. Even before the KAPD's foundation congress, a group led by Otto Rühle and Franz Pfemfert expressed their opposition to any type of centralized party structure. At the congress, Rühle strenuously objected to designating the new organization a party and the statement in the KAPD's program that it was not a party in the traditional sense was made largely in deference to his position. Rühle's experiences in Russia as a KAPD delegate to the Second Congress gave a powerful impetus to his developing critique of party organization. In numerous articles, and in his widely circulated brochure, Revolution is Not a Party Matter, Rühle argued that the main goal of the revolutionary workers' movement must be to assume direct control of social production on a factory-by-factory, industry-by-industry basis, through unitary organizations, bypassing political
parties altogether. While much of this was the common stock of left communist ideology, Rühle went a step further and suggested that all types of party organization were historically outdated and simply another form of domination. Taking a position close to syndicalism, Rühle maintained that party centralism embodies the same principles as the bourgeois state and that the politics of every party inevitably leads to opportunism.\textsuperscript{135} To remain consistent with this perspective, Rühle and his East Saxony organization voted in November, 1920, to withdraw from the KAPD and merge into the AAUD.

Rühle's decision added fuel to a debate that was already raging within the ranks of the AAUD over its relationship to the KAPD. These differences were brought dramatically into the open for the first time at a national conference of the AAUD in December, 1920, at which a faction favoring close relations with the KAPD led by Karl Schröder won control. When it became clear at the next national conference of the AAUD in June, 1921, that the pro-party tendency was firmly entrenched, Rühle and his followers set up an information bureau to propagate their policies. In December, the bureau held a national conference which led to the formation of the AAUD-Einheitsorganisation (AAUD-E).\textsuperscript{136}

Taking as their point of departure Rühle's opposition
to any form of political party separate from the factory organizations, the AAUE-E criticized the KAPD for being a centralized party of professional leaders, distinguished from the KPD only by its rejection of parliamentarianism. In developing its organizational structure, the AAUD-E affirmed that it would be governed solely by the federalist principle, with no centralism, no "outside" leadership, and no interference from intellectuals not belonging to the plant. Instead of building bureaucratic organizations, they declared that the main aim of the movement must be to instill class consciousness and solidarity through agitation; once the councils make their appearance then the movement must dissolve itself. Never numbering more than a few thousand supporters, the AAUD-E proclaimed its intention to work within the local factory organizations affiliated with the AAUD.\(^{137}\) Although reluctant to get directly involved in this ideological turmoil, Pannekoek modified his earlier position and now declared that "unitary organizations" were superfluous. While conceding that the special circumstances prevailing in post-war Germany initially justified the formation of such organizations, Pannekoek affirmed that political power could be conquered only by the workers' councils acting in concert with class-conscious communists, grouped in a loosely organized party, directing the movement
toward clear goals and waging an intense spiritual struggle. Without clear Marxist insight, he felt that the movement would degenerate into syndicalism.\textsuperscript{138}

Rühle's expulsion from the KAPD did not end internal strife in that organization. Shortly before the KAPD was expelled from the Comintern, a debate had developed within the party over whether to form a new left communist International. The most prominent proponent of a new International was Herman Gorter, who was supported organizationally by Karl Schröder.\textsuperscript{139} Although the majority of the party clearly opposed such a move, Schröder maneuvered in late July, 1921, to have the KAPD set up an international information bureau to lay the groundwork for a Fourth International.\textsuperscript{140}

The division of opinion over the question of forming a new International was, for the moment, less divisive than a parallel cleavage that emerged over an attempt to develop a new theoretical basis for the KAPD's activity under the prevailing conditions of capitalist stabilization. Theorizing on the basis of Rosa Luxemburg's theory of accumulation, the Schröder group constructed an argument which maintained that capitalism, despite its apparent stability, had entered a "death crisis" (\textit{Todeskrise}) from which it could not recover. The tactical conclusion that Schröder drew from this was
that although the situation in Germany was objectively revolutionary, the working class still remained under the influence of their reformist leaders, which required that the KAPD maintain firm revolutionary principles in order to win the workers at a later point. This amounted above all to the belief that KAPD militants should not participate in traditional trade union struggles, which many in the KAPD and AAUD were urging as a "flexible tactic."

The anti-Schröder tendency, while agreeing that capitalism was in a state of collapse, chose to de-emphasize the objective or economic aspects of the crisis and stressed instead a confrontation based on a Pannekoekian process of spiritual struggle. From their standpoint, the movement's main task was to develop in the working class, through struggle, the theoretical insight and consciousness necessary to confront the regrouping capitalist forces. While this group did not specifically endorse "flexible tactics," it did maintain a more open attitude toward them.141

These theoretical controversies were aggravated by what many perceived to be Schröder's increasingly dictatorial leadership methods. When in March, 1922, Schröder won a factional vote under questionable circumstances, his Berlin district expelled him. Schröder and his followers responded by forming their own KAPD, complete
with its own AAUD affiliate, which became known as the "Essen tendency" to distinguish it from the majority "Berlin tendency." Consequently, from 1922 onwards there existed two KAPD's and three AAUD's. At the beginning of the split, the Berlin-based KAPD had 2,000 members, plus another 11,000 in its AAUD, which compared to 450 in the Essen-based KAPD and 1,600 in its AAUD. The "Essen tendency" did, however, manage to acquire much of the KAPD's most experienced political leadership, along with its leading intellectuals, Gorter, Reichenbach, and Goldstein. The most important achievement of the Essen KAPD was the formation of the Communist Workers' International (Kommunistische Arbeities Internationale-KAI), which became almost the sole focus of its activities during the 1920's. Despite the high hopes of its founders, the KAI led a largely shadow existence, with the Dutch KAPN and Bulgarian Communist Workers' Party as the only active affiliates. Unlike Gorter, who became an active proponent of the "Essen tendency," Pannekoek, by now thoroughly disillusioned with the movement's factionalism, chose not to take sides, although his sympathies were with the Berlin group. Throughout all this ideological discord, Pannekoek continued to maintain that in spite of its factionalism and the often crude character of its propaganda, the left communist movement represented
the conscious expression of a new principle of proletarian organization and was struggling to develop and deepen new insights. 145

Despite the revolutionary optimism of Pannekoek and others, the years after 1922 were ones of catastrophic decline and disintegration for the once-powerful left communist movement. Badly fractured by sectarian turmoil and bereft of a mass base, the entire movement could count on no more than 20,000 supporters in 1923, and only a few hundred by the time Hitler seized power in 1933. 146 Although the left communists continued to maintain an extensive press and an active and vocal presence in the working class throughout the 1920's, their political history during these years is largely a chronicle of loose and proliferating congeries of splinter groups, lost for the most part in obscurity.

The most prominent of the left communist groups, the KAPD-Berlin, deprived of much of its theoretical leadership, soon confined its main activities to issuing fruitless and dogmatic appeals for insurrection. Their only organizational success came in 1927 when they developed close ties with a dissident left group in the KPD led by Karl Korsch known as the Entschiedene Linke. The two groups finally merged only when the Korsch group lost most of its members. By this point, the KAPD-Berlin had been
reduced to only a few hundred members. Shortly afterwards, the party became embroiled in a dispute with its AAUD affiliate over the question of supporting traditional economic strikes. When the KAPD accused the AAUD of returning to trade union practice, the AAUD declared that it had assumed the tasks of the party. 147

The disintegration of the Essen-based KAPD was even more rapid. The first major defection came in 1923, when a Leipzig-based faction, charging that the party was dominated by a "literary circle," detached itself to form the League of Council Communists (Kommunistischer Rätebund). Since their principles were already close to the AAUD-E's, most of the Rätebund's members joined that organization in 1924. The most far-reaching crisis, however, occurred in 1925 when the KAPD-Essen's main leaders--Schröder, Goldstein, and Reichenbach--left to rejoin the SPD, arguing that a revival of the council movement was unlikely. With Gorter's death in 1927, the "Essen tendency" lost its last theoretician of any consequence. By 1929, the party could no longer afford to publish its own newspaper, although it continued to maintain a tenuous formal existence until Hitler's seizure of power. 148

This whole process of sectarian fragmentation and marginalization was perhaps best exemplified by the fate
of Rühle's AAUD-E. Throughout 1923, a series of defections and expulsions took place over the questions of amalgamation with the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD, participation in wage struggles, the extent of autonomy for individual factory units, and the degree to which congress resolutions were binding. In 1925, its leading theoretician, Otto Rühle, resigned, contending that the climate of political reaction was too strong for an active revolutionary politics. Two years later the AAUD-E merged with a left group expelled from the KPD and a factory organization known as the Industrial Union of Transport Workers to form the Spartakus League of Left Communist Organizations (Spartakusbund linkskommunistischer Organisationen). But by 1931, when the Spartakusbund joined with the AAUD-Berlin to form the 343-member Communist Workers Union of Germany: (Kommunistische Arbeiter Union Deutschland-KAUD), it could contribute only 31 members. By now, however, the remnants of left communism no longer had any pretensions of being a mass movement and viewed themselves primarily as groups of propagandists fighting to maintain the council ideal.

Despite their best efforts, the left communists had clearly failed to translate their theories into a permanent revolutionary anti-bureaucratic alternative to Leninism and social democracy. In the highly-charged
atmosphere of the immediate post-war period, the extraordinary militancy and active involvement of the left communists had made it possible to create new forms of working class organization and a distinctive political consciousness. But with the decline of the council movement after 1921, their theories lost their immediacy and took on an increasingly abstract character. At the same time, the failure of left communism cannot be explained simply by historical events. This failure was, in part, traceable to the inadequacy of left communist theoretical analysis. In formulating their strategies, the left communists consistently refrained from analyzing in-depth key questions such as the exact composition of the council movement, the factors behind its sudden decline, and the reasons why social democracy and Leninism so easily retained their hold on the working class. On the contrary, the left communists emphasized the universal nature of the council form of organization and failed to view the councils as the product of specific historical circumstances. Nonetheless, although their exertions had done little to clear the path for a genuine self-governing socialism, they were not entirely without effect. If nothing else, the left communists had at least outlined the possible form that an anti-bureaucratic socialism might take and helped to identify the main
obstacles to its realization. Out of this theoretical legacy would emerge a new school of council communism, which would find its clearest theoretical voice in Pannekoek.
NOTES


2. Although lacking in scope and objectivity, the best source of biographical information on Rutgers is: G.C. Trinch N. Rutgers and K. Trincher, Rutgers, Zijn leven en streven in Holland, Indonesia, Amerika en Rusland (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).

3. Information on Rutgers' activities in the United States, where he played a pivotal role in the formation of American communism, can be found in: Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism, op. cit., pp. 70-72, 89-90. Pannekoek's influence can be seen in Rutgers' article: "The Left-Wing: Mass Action," International Socialist Review, October, 1916.


13. This theme was most prominent in Lenin's theses on bourgeois democracy and proletarian dictatorship, the initial call for the formation of the Communist International, and the manifesto of the First Congress.

14. For instance, in *State and Revolution*—perhaps the most anti-parliamentary of his writings—Lenin reproached the anarchists for seeking to destroy the existing bourgeois institutions without utilizing them to seize power.


16. For information on the relationship between the German opposition and the Amsterdam Bureau and Pannekoek's role in it, see: Peter Kuckuk, "Bremer Linksradikale bzw. Kommunisten von der Militär-revolte im November 1918 bis zum Kapp-Putsch in März 1920," *op. cit.*, pp. 350-351.


20. This resolution is contained in the March, 1920 issue of the *Bulletin of the Sub-Bureau in Amsterdam of the Communist International*.


27. This brochure has been reprinted as: Fritz Wolffheim, "Organisation d'entreprise ou syndicats?", in: Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, *La Gauche communiste en Allemagne (1918-1921)*, op. cit., pp. 276-285.


31. Ibid., p. 322.


43. Ibid., pp. 407-408.

44. Anton Pannekoek [pseudonym Karl Horner], "Taktische und organisatorische Streitfragen," Der Kommunist, December 13, 14, 15, and 16, 1919.


48. For a detailed summary of this bill, see: Peter von Oertzen, Betriebsräte in der Novemberrevolution (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1962), p. 158.


51. These events are covered in detail in: Johannes Erger, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1967).

53. For background information on the KPD's policies during the Kapp putsch, see: J. Walcher, "Die Zentrale der KPD (Spartakusbund) und der Kapp-Putsch," Die Kommunistische Internationale, July, 1926.


56. Hans Manfred Bock has contended that this program was largely a paraphrase of Pannekoek's theory of social revolution. Hans Manfred Bock, Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918-1921, op. cit., p. 230.


61. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

62. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

63. Ibid., pp. 100-101.

64. Ibid., p. 107.

65. Ibid., p. 116.

66. Ibid., p. 128.

67. On this cultural shift, Pannekoek noted: "This will not be the first time in history that the center of the civilized world has shifted in the transition to a new mode of production or one of its phases. In antiquity, it moved from the Middle East to Southern Europe, in the Middle Ages, from Southern to Western Europe; with the rise of colonial and merchant capital, first Spain, then Holland and England became the leading nation, and with the rise of industry, England." Ibid., p. 136.

68. Ibid., p. 141. While conceding that the Asian liberation movements might degenerate into purely nationalist movements seeking a national capitalist order, Pannekoek felt that the decline of Europe and the spiritual influence of Bolshevism would
inspire them to adopt a communist world view and wage a struggle on the basis of a workers' and peasants' alliance against world capital.


70. Zinoviev, for instance, noted at the time: "For the tactics of the Communist Party this work is no less important than Marx's Das Kapital for Marxist theory." Quoted in: Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern, op. cit.*, p. 260.


76. Lenin's attack on the CPH prompted Wijnkoop to protest that Pannekoek's position was not characteristic of the whole party, which led Lenin to substitute "some members of the Dutch Communist Party" for "Dutch Tribunists" in later editions. *Ibid.*, p. 125.


81. Gorter, in his correspondence with Lenin, had repeatedly warned of the reactionary character of the West European peasantry. See in particular his letter to Lenin of May 26, 1918, reprinted in: Mathijs Wiessing, Die Holländische Schule des Marxismus--Die Tribunisten, op. cit., pp. 72-74.


83. Ibid.


85. For a detailed account of the international left communist movement, see: Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, La Gauche communiste en Allemagne (1918-1921) op. cit., pp. 189-216. An excellent general evaluation of the relationship between left communism and the larger tradition of Western Marxism is contained in Russell Jacoby, Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).


87. During this period, Pannekoek's writings outnumbered those of all other foreign contributors to Il Soviet, while virtually none appeared from the Bolsheviks. Bordiga, for his part, termed Pannekoek "A remarkable theoretician of Marxism." Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, La Gauche communiste en Allemagne (1918-1921), op. cit., p. 214.


91. Ibid., p. 179.


97. For an account of these negotiations and Gorter's activities in Moscow, see: Jenne Clinge Doornboos, Wisselend Getij. Dichterlijke en politieke activiteiten in Herman Gorters leven (Amsterdam: Querido, 1964), pp. 44-52.


104. Anton Pannekoek, "Sovjet-Rusland en het West Europese Kommunisme," De Nieuwe Tijd, 1921, pp. 436-438. The logic of this perspective led Pannekoek to condemn the Soviet Union's acceptance of food aid from the West as "a violation of the most elementary principles of the class struggle." Anton Pannekoek, 'Hulpaktie en Klassenstrijd,' De Nieuwe Tijd, 1921, pp. 518-523.


111. The rise of this group is traced in: Willem van Ravesteijn, De wording van het Communisme in Nederland, 1907-1925, op. cit., pp. 215-218.

112. For an overview of these developments, see: A.A. de Jonge, Het Communisme in Nederland (The Hague: Krüesman, 1972), pp. 34-41.


119. Gorter's role in the KAPN is examined in: *ibid.*, pp. 260-264.

120. Anton Pannekoek to J. Rogge, June 6, 1921, Rogge Archives, International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam).


123. Willem van Ravesteijn, "Verklaring," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, 1921, p. 497. Ironically, only a year earlier, on the review's twenty-fifth anniversary, Roland Holst had declared that its survival and vitality had been due largely to the absence of party control. Henriette Roland Holst, "Bij de vijf en twintigste jaargang," *De Nieuwe Tijd*, 1920, p. 1.

125. Henriette Roland Holst to J. Rogge, September 23, 1921, Rogge Archives, op. cit.

126. Anton Pannekoek to J. Rogge, October 1, 1921, Rogge Archives, op. cit.

127. Henriette Roland Holst remained in the CPN until 1925 when—owing in part to her longstanding friendship with Trotsky—she became a prominent member of the international Trotskyist opposition and helped form the Bond van Kommunistische Strijden Propagandaclubs. Following a short return to the CPH during 1926-27, she came under the influence of the religious socialist, L. Ragaz, and became a Christian socialist, which she remained until her death in 1952. After losing a power struggle with the new group of young activists, van Ravesteijn, Wijnkoop, and Ceton left the CPH to form the Communistische Partij Holland—Central Comité, which for a time was larger than the official Communist Party. For details of this split, see: A.A. de Jonge, Het communiste in Nederland, op. cit., pp. 41-46.

128. Pannekoek has analyzed the historical significance of the Nieuwe Tijd in: "Overgang," op. cit. In contrast to the 800 subscribers the Nieuwe Tijd had at the time of its dissolution, the Communistische Gids had only 200 during the early months of its existence. Bertus Mulder, "Theorie en scholing in de vroege SDAP: Die Nieuwe Tijd, sociaal-democratisch maandschrift 1896-1921," Het tweede jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1980), pp. 42-80.


130. For a detailed discussion of the failure of the council movement, see: Carl Boggs, "Marxism, Prefigurative Communism and the Problem of Workers' Control," Radical America, November, 1977; February, 1978; Sergio Bologna, "Class Composition and the Theory of the Party and the Origin of the Workers' Council Movement," Telos, Fall, 1972; Brian


134. Next to Pannekoek and Gorster, Otto Rühle was probably the most seminal and well-known left communist theorist. A professional educator with a deep interest in pedagogic and psychological problems, Rühle had gained fame as SPD deputy during the war by joining Karl Liebknecht in March, 1915, to vote against war credits. Coming to the KPD by way of the IKD, Rühle immediately became part of the left opposition and took virtually his entire East Saxony organization with him into the KAPD. For biographical sketches of Rühle, see: Paul Mattick, "Otto Rühle and the German Labor Movement," In: Paul Mattick, Anti-Bolshevik Communism (London: Merlin Press, 1978), pp. 87-116; Friedrich Herrmann, "Otto Rühle als politischer Theoretiker," Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz, December, 1972.

135. Rühle expressed his dissatisfaction with party organization according to the following formula: "Revolution is a party matter. The state is a party matter. Dictatorship is a party matter. And further: The party represents iron discipline. The party represents rule by leaders. The party represents extreme centralization . . . Put more concretely, this schema means: the leadership on top, the masses on the bottom. Above, authority, bureaucracy, the cult of personality, the dictatorship of leaders . . . " Otto Rühle, "Die Revolutie ist keine Parteisache," reprinted in: Frits Kool (ed.), Die Linke gegen die Partei herrschaft, op. cit., pp. 329-337.


139. Gorster summarized the case for a new International in his "Why We need the Fourth Communist Workers' International," *Workers' Dreadnought*, October 22, 1921.


142. Fritz Kool (ed.), *De Linke gegen die Partei herrschaft*, *op. cit.*, p. 142.


146. Denis Authier and Jean Barrot, La Gauche communiste en Allemagne (1918-1921), op. cit., p. 222. This precipitous decline was not confined to the ranks of left communism: during the period 1923-1924, the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD lost two-thirds of its membership. Hans Manfred Bock, Syndikalismus und Linkskommunismus von 1918-1921, op. cit., p. 319.


148. Ibid., pp. 224-225.

149. Ibid., pp. 223-224.
CHAPTER XI

A NEW WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN FORMATION

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL COMMUNISM, 1927-1945
From Left Communism to Council Communism: The Origins of the GIC and GCC

In one sense, Pannekoek's active political career terminated with the demise of the non-Leninist revolutionary left after 1921. He was never again able to participate in any social movement with a recognizable influence on public events. Nonetheless, Pannekoek never at any stage retired from his vocation as a revolutionary theorist and, except for a brief period between 1921 and 1927, wrote without respite almost until his death. The lengthy works he undertook as the pre-eminent theorist of council communism, destined for the eyes of a mere handful, were composed with the same intellectual acumen and thoroughness as the works he once wrote for millions.

Although his political perspective remained substantially unchanged, the ebbing of the revolutionary tide after 1920 caused Pannekoek to experience a profound and distressing disillusionment, which led him to confine his political activity largely to personal contacts. According to his own testimony, when the Nieuwe Tijd was abolished in 1921 he considered it "from a personal standpoint just as well" since it enabled him to devote his full attention to astronomy. While political frustration provided a powerful impetus, Pannekoek's withdrawal from active political involvement was also motivated by the difficulties he was having in resuming
a full-time career in astronomy. Until 1921, Pannekoek's career prospects were, at best, tenuous. The precarious nature of Pannekoek's position was made particularly clear in 1919, when, after a heated parliamentary debate, the conservative government of Ruijs de Beerenbrouck blocked his appointment as co-director of the prestigious Leiden Observatory on the grounds that he might use the position to conduct "Bolshevik propaganda." Shortly afterwards, Pannekoek was appointed lecturer in mathematics and astronomy at the University of Amsterdam, which was a municipal university not controlled by the state. Pannekoek's first major career breakthrough, however, did not come until 1921, when the university granted him funds to establish an astronomical institute. During the course of the next two decades, this institution provided the framework for much of his pioneering work in astrophysics.

While Pannekoek was becoming increasingly preoccupied with astronomy, the foundations for what later emerged as Dutch council communism were slowly being laid. Council communism did not emerge full-blown as a tendency distinct from left communism, but slowly evolved from a prolonged intellectual inquiry. The theoretical roots of council communism are directly traceable to the body of ideas the left communists had developed on five major
questions: 1) the nature of working class organization, 2) the appropriate tactics of struggle, 3) the relationship between leaders and masses, 4) the nature of the state and society, 5) the meaning of communism as an economic and political system. What initially differentiated council communism from left communism was its refusal to identify with the international communist movement, its rejection of party organization, and its emphasis on developing a fresh theoretical approach to the problems of socialist transformation. Although small in scope and lacking any capacity to translate their ideas into practice, the council communists, nonetheless, have been termed, on the basis of the depth of their theoretical analysis, "the most comprehensive ideological challenge to Soviet Leninism in the inter-war period."  

During its initial stages, the transition from left communism to council communism took place largely under the impetus of the ex-KAPN leader Henk Canne Meijer. A former metal-worker turned teacher, Canne Meijer had joined the CPH in 1918 under the impact of the Russian Revolution and almost immediately became a supporter of the opposition. When the KAPN was formed in 1921, Canne Meijer was elected to the executive committee and served as an editor of its newspaper. In 1924, Canne Meijer and several others, objecting to Luteraan's
leadership and the KAPN's growing sectarianism, resigned from the party, charging that it had become a "stinking cesspool," and called for a new movement "not rooted in German relationships." In the months which followed, Canne Meijer organized a small informal discussion group for the purpose of integrating the basic conceptions of left communism into a new theoretical analysis. Canne Meijer's theoretical inquiry received a major boost in 1925 when the former KAPD leader Jan Appel moved to Holland and joined the group. A former shipyard worker and leader of several wildcat strikes, Appel had been active in the Hamburg left during the war where he came under the influence of Pannekoek's theoretical writings.

Until early 1927, the discussion group led a largely informal existence. At this point, a decision was made to formally constitute the group as the Group of International Communists (Groep van Internationale Communisten - GIC). The initial political perspective of the GIC centered around three broadly defined principles: 1) anti-parliamentarianism, 2) replacement of the trade unions by self-governing factory committees, 3) direct control of these committees by the workers themselves. In using the designation "group," the GIC consciously rejected the principle of party organization and defined itself primarily as a small "work group" charged with clarifying
basic insights about the nature of the class struggle and the council system within the working class. While proclaiming its intention to actively support working class actions and to work to increase the participation of the workers in all decisions, the GIC stressed that it would not act as a factional grouping.12

The decision to formally constitute the GIC was made partly in response to a major tactical debate that began in 1925 among the remnants of left communism about the movement's fundamental orientation. The issue underlying this debate was the problem of how to resolve the contradiction between the movement's revolutionary aspirations and the practical need to maintain a constituency among the workers. What triggered this debate was a decision by the KAPD-Berlin approving limited use of parliamentary tactics, following their merger with the Entschiedene Linke and its two parliamentary delegates in 1927. The opponents of parliamentary tactics attempted to defend their position by reaffirming that capitalism had entered a "death crisis" which would generate a revival of the revolutionary workers' movement. At about the same time, the AAUD-Berlin, seeking to breathe new life into the council movement, attempted to set up action committees to launch strikes over economic issues.13

These developments prompted Pannekoek to break six
years of self-imposed political silence with a prominent article entitled "Principles and Tactics" ("Prinzip und Taktik") which sought to define a role for the non-Leninist revolutionary left under the prevailing conditions of capitalist stabilization. Although not as yet affiliated with the GIC, Pannekoek enunciated some of the main issues that were to dominate its early development. In analyzing the prospects for revolutionary development, Pannekoek attacked both the efforts to modify the left's opposition to parliamentary and trade union tactics and the attempt to derive a tactic from the "death crisis" theory. Pannekoek's position was based on his distinction between principle-centered tactics and opportunist tactics. What distinguished an opportunist tactic, he maintained, was its emphasis on short-term goals and its inability to take anything into account beyond the present. All forms of opportunist tactics--whether based on parliamentarianism, trade unionism, or "death crisis" theory--are concerned primarily with developing a practice for the moment and increasing the immediate strength of the movement instead of raising the consciousness of the workers for a future upheaval. By contrast, a principle-centered tactic is based on a conception of the total process of revolutionary development and seeks to develop a long-term practice for the future. While
opportunist tactics might attract supporters in the short run, clear and proven principles represent a key source of the movement's spiritual power and the basis for a fundamental revolutionary transformation. Pannekoek argued that whereas opportunism thrives in times of prosperity, the picture changes completely in revolutionary periods when the workers turn to those who are able to articulate a clear revolutionary alternative. While paying tribute to the importance of the KAPD and the AAUD as vehicles for conserving the lessons of 1918-1921, Pannekoek felt that these organizations would continue to be bogged down in sectarian politics until they could develop a fresh theoretical approach to the new phase of capitalism that began in 1918. The situation, he maintained, was analogous to the period between the failure of the revolutions of 1848 and the emergence of the socialism of the Second International: "The old revolution has passed; it remains to prepare for the new."  

Pannekoek's insistence on the need for a new ideological orientation was fully consistent with the intellectual focus of the GIC. The first full exposition of the GIC's position came with the publication of its book-length document, Grundprinzipien kommunistischer Produktion und Verteilung (Basic Principles of Communist Production and Distribution). Although not formally
published until 1930, the Grundprinzipien evolved out of a document Jan Appel had written while imprisoned in Germany during 1923-1925. Through a systematic study of Marx's writings, Appel sought to investigate the main problems in creating a new socialist society. Appel's principal concern was with providing a theoretical framework for resolving what he felt were the two key questions arising out of the failures of the Russian and German revolutions to develop into an emancipatory socialism: 1) What are the economic conditions and changes necessary for the abolition of exploitation? 2) What are the political and economic conditions that will allow the proletariat to maintain power once it has been won and prevent a counter-revolution? Following Appel's arrival in Holland, the manuscript was revised by Canne Meijer and presented to the group for several years of discussion and revision. 15

The Grundprinzipien was postulated on the assumption that the workers' self-activity and self-organization, by themselves, offered no guarantee of proletarian emancipation. This emancipation, the GIC felt, could only be realized and maintained through the abolition of the capital-labor relationship in production by establishing a council system which would destroy all class divisions and prevent the rise of a new exploiting class. The GIC
argued that it was not enough simply to suppress private property—as the Russian Revolution had clearly demonstrated. The GIC's solution to the problem of extending the political conquests of the revolution to economics was to devise an elaborate hypothetical system detailing how the councils could organize society in a way that would allow distribution to conform to labor expended until a stage is reached in which social consumption outweighs individual consumption. Once social consumption predominated, both value exchange and the wage system would be abolished and the basis for a genuine communism firmly established. To replace the exploitation inherent in the wage system, the GIC developed the idea of a new computing unit of average social labor time, which they felt would be capable of embracing all categories of production and distribution in a communist society. These measures, they maintained, would transform production from a process of capital expansion into a labor process in which society draws from nature the means of consumption it needs, in a manner consistent with Marx's famous dictum: "From each according to his ability; to each according to his need."16

Although his writings served as a major point of departure for the GIC's theoretical work, Pannekoek had no formal contact with the organization until 1929, when Canne Meijer visited him with a request to write an intro-
duction to the *Grundprinzipien*. Pannekoek, however, declined on the grounds that he considered the *Grundprinzipien* to be "somewhat utopian and unreal." 17 Nonetheless, Pannekoek almost immediately established a close working relationship with the GIC, which was soon complemented by a close personal friendship with Canne Meijer. 18

With their ideological cornerstone in place, the GIC's theoretical and political development was rapid and purposeful. Through their rigorous theoretical activity, the GIC soon gained a reputation out of proportion to their small numbers. 19 Although still hoping for a revival of the council movement in the near future, the GIC's overwhelming preoccupation was with analyzing the long-term features of revolutionary transformation, which led their political opponents to label them the "cloister friars of Marxism." 20 In the realm of daily practice, the GIC structured its work around a variety of educational and propaganda activities such as forums, literature distribution, and publishing several publications. 21 In addition, the GIC also attempted to serve as a national and international clearing house for council communist activities. In Holland, the GIC worked to spread its ideas among the other non-Leninist left organizations. By 1932, three other such organizations were in existence
along with the GIC: the KAPN; a split-off from the KAPN known as the Groepen van Radencommunisten (Groups of Council Communists); and an offshoot from the NAS known as the Linksche Arbeiders Oppositie (Left Workers' Opposition). In November, 1932, the GIC organized a conference of these groups to discuss the question of unification, but they were unable to agree on a common program. Until Hitler's seizure of power, the GIC also maintained close ties with the remnants of the German left communist movement. During these years, Meijer and Appel were frequent contributors to the German left communist press and regularly attended their conferences. Links were also forged with left groups in England, France, Denmark, Hungary, and the United States. On the initiative of the GIC, an international conference of these groups was held in Copenhagen during June, 1935. Although the gathering affirmed a set of basic principles, a dispute developed between the Dutch and German delegates over whether to emphasize theory or the practical necessities of struggle. When the Germans extended this debate to the question of forming an international council organization, the Dutch charged that "the new fifth or sixth International is here in crudely revised edition." Of the GIC's international contacts, none were more important than those with the American group centered
around Paul Mattick, which by the mid-1930's had emerged as a major theoretical center of council communism in its own right. A metal-worker and former member of the KAPD, Mattick had emigrated to the United States in 1926 and immediately joined the IWW.\textsuperscript{24} In early 1927, Mattick entered into a long period of collaboration with the GIC when he wrote Canne Meijer requesting Pannekoek's address.\textsuperscript{25} Throughout the late twenties and early thirties, Mattick focused his work on bringing the ideas of council communism to the IWW and to the local councils of the unemployed in Chicago which he had helped organize. In 1931, he embarked on a year-long effort to revive the once influential \textit{Chicago Arbeiter Zeitung}. Dissatisfied with the IWW's anti-Marxist orientation, Mattick in 1934 joined with a group expelled from the Leninist-oriented Proletarian Party to form the United Workers' Party.\textsuperscript{26} To reflect the group's council communist orientation, the name was later changed to the Groups of Council Communists (GCC).\textsuperscript{27} Directly modeled on the GIC, the GCC was conceived of primarily as a theoretical and propaganda group seeking to recognize and elucidate major patterns of development.\textsuperscript{28} Like the GIC, the GCC's main strength lay in the high caliber of its theoretical work. Its theoretical review \textit{International Council Communism} (later renamed \textit{Living Marxism} and New
Essays) featured, in addition to the extensive works of Mattick, regular contributions from Pannekoek and Karl Korsch.  

Pannekoek's willingness to collaborate with the GIC and the GCC was premised on his belief that the two organizations represented models of proletarian self-education. It was partly on these grounds that shortly after International Council Correspondence first appeared, Pannekoek reproached Mattick for the publication's intellectualism, contending that "it often looks like an intricate and difficult splitting of hairs, and sometimes I wonder how such clear and simple a theory as Marx's can be made so difficult by misunderstandings and learned or quasi-learned complications." These criticisms were reiterated in another form a few years later when Mattick announced his intention to replace the mimeographed International Council Correspondence with the printed review Living Marxism. Pannekoek felt that this decision shifted the publication's main function from workers' self-education to abstract theory:

Perhaps it means also that the emphasis of the propaganda is turned somewhat more towards intellectual circles. Here in Holland such a change would meet with considerable opposition among the workers; now the cyclostyled periodicals mean to them that they do it themselves and have it entirely in their hands;
as soon as it would be replaced by a printed review they feel that it comes from intellectuals who would try to dominate them mentally.31

In the political development of both the GIC and the GCC, Pannekoek played a key role as a theoretician, mentor, and financial supporter, but avoided any direct involvement in the day-to-day functioning of the movement. From a political standpoint, this lack of practical activity often made it difficult for Pannekoek to predict political developments and the mood of the masses in whose name he wrote. Pannekoek justified his unwillingness to play a more active role by arguing that a movement dominated by intellectuals contradicted the basic task of self-education.

Pannekoek's role as an external theorist often led to a strained relationship with both groups. Speaking of Pannekoek's relationship to the GIC, Canne Meijer noted in a revealing comment:

Pannekoek is a "pure theoretician"; he is not a fighter in our sense. He offers analyses and conclusions, but doesn't attempt to carry them out. He won't participate in the organizational life because he "doesn't have enough time."

... He provides his analyses and we fight it out about what they mean. He is an extraordinarily modest man without the slightest trace of self-conceit, but he won't take a position on anything he is not absolutely certain about. For these reasons, we often think: "Pannekoek says it so it must be true,
but is it indeed really true?" But praxis involves decisions about which one can never be entirely certain. This is the real difference between a "pure theoretician" and a fighter.32

When similar criticisms were voiced in the GCC about his theoretical domination of the group, Pannekoek felt compelled to reply:

So if theoretical insight has to help and to lead us in this, it is not strange that one person sees it better and clearer than another, and that theoretical knowledge, which is often a personal result, must be relied upon and will be of use . . . And because I probably have more years than most of you and was working theoretically and practically in the socialist movement my whole life. I think—though I am less acquainted with American conditions and though I acknowledge that everyone brings in a certain personal different view of things—that my opinion about the value of a paper, and about what should be propagated and included in it, deserves some attention and may be accepted also when I cannot explain it to you in person.

Using such reasoning, Pannekoek concluded that his and the council communists' theoretical writings were "part of those forces by which the material world transforms the mind of the workers . . . ."33

The Permanent Crisis: The Theoretical Development of Council Communism in the Inter-War Period

The themes most frequently stressed by both the GIC and the GCC were essentially those which had been articulated by Pannekoek and the left communists since 1920.
In place of the "leader politics" of the trade unions and parties, the council communists sought to build a new movement based on the principle of workers' self-management, which they felt was realized in the workers' councils. Despite the predetermined character of their views, the council communists repeatedly maintained that it was not their intention to create a new ideology in regard to the organizational forms of the future, but simply to comprehend the self-emancipatory movement of the working class and to elucidate it theoretically. For this reason, they contended that building their own organizations had little relevance to this process except to serve as instruments to clarify and publicize the necessary course of action. Active intervention in the sense of attempting to get the workers to follow specific policies was regarded as only one step removed from Leninism.

These ideas were brought into sharp theoretical focus by Henk Canne Meijer in a seminal article—inspired largely by Pannekoek—entitled "The Rise of a New Labor Movement." The essential point of Meijer's analysis was his argument that the "workers' movement" no longer coincided with the "movement of the workers." The real movement of the workers since 1917, he insisted, lay in the workers' councils, which would again come to the forefront as capitalism continued its economic decline. What
still remained of the old workers' movement in the form of trade unions and parties was a "capitalistic movement of workers" so completely integrated into capitalist society that it was unable to function other than as an instrument of that society. Canne Meijer argued that because the old organizations were based on the principle of dominance by leaders, they were a faithful reproduction of the capitalist state and would be a steadfast ally of the bourgeoisie against the proletarian revolution. A rebirth of the workers' movement was possible only on the basis of a rebellion of the masses against the old organizations: "The destruction of the state signifies, above all, the destruction of these organizations." In attempting to build a new workers' movement based on the principle of "self-leadership of the masses," the workers would have to destroy the very features of the old workers' movement that were considered its strengths. While praising the earlier left communist movement for its attempt to apply these principles, Canne Meijer criticized it for its lack of theoretical finesse, sectarianism, impatience, ill-considered actions, revolutionary verbalism, and a general lack of insight ("The revolutionary language cannot replace what the class lacks in the manner of insight"). At the same time, he made it clear that the GIC was not identical with the new workers' movement, but merely a
theoretical reflection of a certain stage of social development.\textsuperscript{36}

In theorizing how the new workers' movement would emerge, the council communists accepted, for the most part, Pannekoek's theory of consciousness which held that the workers organically develop class-consciousness as part of their self-activity within the class struggle.\textsuperscript{37} But the council communists sharply diverged from Pannekoek in their attempt to tie their strategy to a new version of crisis theory. In 1929, the German economist Henryk Grossmann, in a detailed work entitled \textit{The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System (Die Akkumulations-und Zusammenbruchgesetz des Kapitalistischen Systems)}, sought to "reconstruct," through a critique of Rosa Luxemburg's theory of underconsumption, Marx's law of accumulation in a way that would demonstrate the inevitable necessity of collapse inherent in the mechanisms of capitalist production.\textsuperscript{38} Grossmann made it clear that because of its importance for revolutionary practice, the theory of capitalist collapse represented "the portal column of Marx's economic thought."\textsuperscript{39} Against Rosa Luxemburg's view that capitalism would eventually break down in the circulation of goods, through a lack of markets, Grossman argued that the collapse of capitalism would originate in production itself, through a decline in
profits. On the basis of an abstract theory of value bound to labor time, Grossmann constructed a rigorous schema of the accumulation process, showing how it was destined to culminate in a crisis brought about by a breakdown of the necessary proportionality between the production of surplus-value and the needs of accumulation. This meant that capitalism's inevitable drive toward collapse was not rooted in any external contingency, but in the system's own "cellular form," the commodity.\textsuperscript{40}

Published during the first year of the depression, Grossmann's work almost immediately became a theoretical cornerstone of the council communist movement. Canne Meijer, while critical of the term "death crisis," immediately called Grossmann's work to Mattick's attention, contending that it provided, for the first time, a correct and useful crisis theory.\textsuperscript{41}

The widespread acceptance of Grossmann's work within the council communist movement prompted Pannekoek to undertake a detailed critique of Grossmann's analysis. Pannekoek's critique was marked by his conviction that the problem of capitalist collapse was the "most important of all questions" confronting the working class—particularly during a time when economic conditions were helping to prepare men's minds for the possibility of a full-scale collapse. Although Pannekoek utilized his
formidable mathematical talents to demonstrate the quantitative fallacy of Grossmann's arguments, his critique was largely an extension and reaffirmation of his long-standing objection to any form of economic fatalism. Taking up first Grossmann's claim to have "reconstructed" Marx's original theory in the face of social democratic and communist distortions, Pannekoek charged that Grossmann's work was nothing more than a "patchwork of quotations from Marx, incorrectly applied and stuck together by means of a fabricated theory." Grossmann's analysis, he insisted, was founded on a fundamental methodological error: an inability to comprehend the total economic, ideological, and political nature of capitalism. As a counter to the crisis model proposed by Grossmann, Pannekoek reaffirmed what had been at the heart of his criticism of Rosa Luxemburg in 1913:

Economics, as the totality of men working and striving to satisfy their subsistence needs, and politics (in its widest sense), as the action and struggle of those men as classes to satisfy those needs, form a single unified domain of law-governed development. The accumulation of capital, crisis, pauperization, the proletarian revolution, the seizure of power by the working class form together, acting like a natural law, an indivisible unity, the collapse of capitalism.

Grossmann's main error, Pannekoek declared, was therefore, "that of a bourgeois economist who has never had practical experience of the struggle of the prole-
tariat and who is consequently not in a position to understand the essence of Marxism." Theories of economic catastrophe, Pannekoek maintained, were ready-made for intellectuals desiring a planned economy built in accordance with the reproduction schema they have invented. Such theories often have considerable appeal to large numbers of revolutionary workers who see an economic catastrophe as the only possible means for activating the passive masses. In place of a final catastrophe, Pannekoek envisioned a long series of crises, each leading to new struggles, in which the illusions and passivity of the workers would progressively collapse, as they discover their true aims and struggle for control of social production itself. The tactical conclusion Pannekoek drew from this analysis was that: "The self-emancipation of the proletariat is the collapse of capitalism."42

Pannekoek's critique of Grossmann triggered a counterpolemic from Paul Mattick, who embarked on a lengthy effort to refine and expand Grossmann's analysis. According to Mattick, Grossmann's chief merit was to have developed a theoretical model of crises which, through its analysis of value, was capable of enabling the workers' movement to move from an abstract theory of capital development to concrete revolutionary practice. Mattick made it clear, at the same time, that he considered the theory of collapse
a major point of demarcation between reformists and revolutionaries. During the course of this controversy, Pannekoek received the support of Karl Korsch, who offered a similar "subjectivist" criticism of Grossmann. In the end, however, Pannekoek and Korsch's views failed to sway majority sentiment in the council communist movement.

The council communists' emphasis on the permanent crisis of capitalism was closely bound up with their assessment of the function of the state in advanced capitalist societies. Within a general process of capitalist dissolution, the council communists identified a world-wide counter-trend of capitalist concentration and state intervention which took two forms: fascism and monopoly state capitalism.

From the council communist perspective, fascism was seen as a modified and more aggressive version of the traditional capitalist deflationary solution to relaunching the accumulation process: compression of wages, suppression of trade unions, and limitation of consumption. In contrast to the old capitalism, in which the state was a necessary instrument of industry, the new fascist stage of capitalism had achieved a merger of the state and production whereby industry was subordinated to the state. While stressing that fascism was a response to capitalist disorder--both economic crisis and working class revolt--the council
communists maintained that fascism was not a new form of social organization, but simply a new phase in the history of the capitalist division between the producers and the means of production.\textsuperscript{46} Reduced to its most essential aspects, fascism represented merely the "fully matured and self-realized capitalist state."\textsuperscript{47}

The same trend, they felt, was present in different form in the non-fascist countries as a growing tendency toward monopoly state capitalism, which found its clearest expression in the American New Deal. Unlike fascism, however, the New Deal was an inflationary solution to capitalist stagnation based on state-financed production, public works programs, and the transformation of the trade union movement into a pillar of a new Keynesian system. Essentially, the New Deal paved the way for the development of monopolies by introducing trade unions into large factories and exempting the price of labor from the laws of supply and demand, thereby ruining small businesses and encouraging the process of concentration required for increasing capital accumulation. Despite their outward differences, both fascism and the New Deal had essentially the same goal: the establishment of a state-controlled economy which would no longer experience the disequilibrium that capitalism was unable to eliminate on its own. By eliminating competition and centralizing the means of pro-
duction, monopoly state capitalism had also created the preconditions for a later emergence of a totalitarian political and ideological dictatorship. 48

In pointing to the changes in the state brought about by the stagnation in the accumulation process, the council communists attempted to tie their case to a historical analysis of the role of the state in capitalist society. During the early stages of capitalism, they argued, the prevailing theory of economic liberalism, which opposed any form of state intervention in the economy, corresponded to the practice of unrestrained capitalism. Even at this early stage, however, certain bourgeois intellectuals dissented from the prevailing ideology of laissez faire capitalism. In the 1940's, the economist Friedrich List, for instance, developed a theory of state socialism which assigned the state a central role in expanding the internal market and supporting production for the general welfare. With the emergence of cartels and monopolies in the period after 1870, the capitalists began to enter into a closer economic relationship with the state. This relationship went hand in hand with imperialism and its conquest of world markets. During this stage, the state increasingly became the maintainers of certain capitalist interest groups who used the state to increase their monopolization of the domestic market and to help dump their goods on the inter-
national market. The First World War initiated a new phase of direct state intervention in the economy, which provided the model for both state capitalism and fascism. Social democracy reinforced this process by viewing the growing state intervention as the beginning of socialism and identifying socialism with nationalization. In suspending the market's competitive laws and assigning the state direct responsibility for production, both fascism and state capitalism marked merely the culmination of a process long underway. In Mattick's view, these changes amounted to nothing less than a "Second Industrial Revolution."50

While agreeing that fascism and state capitalism represented a major alteration of the state, Pannekoek dissented from the prevailing view that they were a consequence of economic crisis and thus a necessary precondition for proletarian revolution. He felt that although fascism and state capitalism corresponded to the needs of an economically distressed capitalism, they were not the only options available to resolve the crisis, and, in fact, were probably less effective as a long-term strategy than the normal form of bourgeois democracy. What was most critical, Pannekoek insisted, was that fascism and state capitalism were an expression of the will of the capitalist class, a political decision made in response to
a certain stage of the class struggle. For these reasons, the evolving new workers' movement must not allow the belief in the inevitability of fascism and state capitalism to become the basis of its strategy. The key factor for revolutionary development, he argued, was the constantly growing power of capital and the inability of the old workers' movement to confront it. 51

The council communists' assessment of the statist tendencies in advanced capitalism was closely linked to their analysis of the class character of the Russian Revolution. This view was summarized in a set of theses Pannekoek drafted on Bolshevism, which argued that Soviet Russia was merely another expression of the logic of capitalist development and part of a world-wide counter-revolutionary process. Building on the analysis he and the left communists had developed in the early 1920's, Pannekoek maintained that a socialist transformation was precluded by the predominantly feudal and agrarian socio-economic structure of Russia. Although the Bolsheviks' practice was based on Marxist principles, their political behavior was shaped by essentially the same tasks which had earlier defined the bourgeois revolutions in the West: the destruction of an absolutist, agrarian, feudal system and the creation of a political and administrative apparatus capable of responding to a modern, commodity-based
economy. The Russian bourgeoisie, numerically small, and politically dependent on czarism through state subsidies, was incapable of fulfilling this task. What this ultimately meant was that the bourgeois revolution in Russia had to be carried out not only without, but directly against, the bourgeoisie. The solution to this problem was provided by the unique set of social conditions prevailing in Russia. In attempting to pinpoint the main dynamic of the Russian Revolution, Pannekoek singled out the peasantry, which, because of its majority status, had passively determined the social character of the revolution. Owing to their atomized character, however, the peasants were unable to fight for their class interests on their own. The numerically smaller working class, on the other hand, while possessing a proper fighting spirit and the rudiments of a communist consciousness, lacked the social strength for victory, and were compelled to subordinate themselves to a group of petit-bourgeois intellectuals not organically bound up with their class interests. Whatever their subjective intentions, the special genius of the Bolsheviks, therefore, was to have resolved the historical problem of bourgeois revolution in Russia by forging, through their leadership tactic, a seemingly contradictory alliance between a peasantry fighting for property and a proletariat fighting for socialism.
Pannekoek made it clear at the same time, that although nationalization clearly differentiated the Bolshevik system from Western capitalism, it did not alter the social relations of production, which in both systems was based on the divorce of workers from the means of production and the monopolization of political power by the state. It was no longer private capital but state-controlled capital which now opposed the working class and perpetuated the wage-labor form of productive activity conducted according to capitalist standards of profitability, while allowing the appropriation of surplus-labor through the agency of the state. Although the Soviet state expropriated private capital, it did not abolish the capital-labor relationship upon which modern class rule rests. Under these conditions, it was therefore only a matter of time before the emergence of a new ruling class whose privileges depended upon the maintenance of a state-controlled system of production and distribution. The implications of this for the future development of the working class, Pannekoek felt, were fully clear:

Bolshevism is therefore not only unserviceable as a directive for the revolutionary policy of the international proletariat, but is one of the heaviest and most dangerous impediments. The struggle against the Bolshevik ideology, against the Bolshevik practices and hence against all groups seeking to anchor them anew in the proletariat is one of the first tasks in the struggle
for the revolutionary reorientation of the working class.\textsuperscript{52}

In their prognosis for the future, the council communists felt that the various state capitalist solutions to the problem of capital accumulation were only temporary and unstable expedients. Although a certain amount of order had been attained, production remained restricted and social development hindered. The economic limits of fascism and state capitalism, they felt, would intensify the contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, leading to new working class upheavals.\textsuperscript{53} Owing to their inclination to treat state power as an essentially homogeneous entity and to their inability to analyze fascism in anything other than classical Marxist terms, the council communists failed to perceive the possibility that fascism represented a new and unscrupulous force capable of mobilizing the whole society for its designs. Without providing a comprehensive and in-depth analysis, Pannekoek remained firmly convinced that the triumph of fascism had put the class struggle on a completely new basis. What fascism had destroyed, he insisted, was not the workers' movement but only its historically outdated forms. Unlike parties and trade unions, the class struggle was something which could not be destroyed or forbidden. By destroying the old movement
and the illusions connected to it, fascism had restored the workers' natural class unity and compelled them to think and feel in class terms without any mental or organizational barriers. Pannekoek's incorrigible optimism led him to argue that under fascism every struggle would become a direct revolutionary struggle.54

The outbreak of the Second World War led to no changes in the theory and practice of council communism. The council communists' attitude toward the war was fully consistent with the positions they had worked out earlier. In an unusually indifferent and undifferentiating analysis, the council communists argued that the war was a conflict between two basically similar social systems. The war, like the depression, was seen as only another sign of the permanent crisis of capitalism. Although both fascism and monopoly state capitalism had tried, with different tactical tools, to resolve the crisis of capitalist accumulation, the concentration of capital continued to slow down until it had to be bolstered by violent methods. The war, they felt, had clearly revealed that the new productive forces unleashed by the various forms of state capitalism were not compatible with a world market system still based on competition. Despite their common elements, the new ruling classes had developed in a manner that excluded the possibility of sharing in
world exploitation. By creating a condition of near permanent war, the capitalists had replaced the "anarchy of the market" with the "anarchy of planning."^55

While in agreement about the intrinsically capitalist character of the war, the council communists differed about its eventual implications for social development. Mattick and Korsch felt that in a situation characterized by the absence of any autonomous action by the workers, the war would lead, no matter who won, to a "fascistization" of the world. In Mattick's words: "All roads lead to the totalitarian state."^56 While still holding out the possibility of spontaneous working class revolt, they maintained that an international fascist world order was neither a prelude to a genuine revolution, nor an intrinsic part of the revolutionary process itself. Pannekoek, however, stubbornly insisted that the war would bring about a general exhaustion and impoverishment which would be accompanied by new and more violent revolutionary upheavals. The failure of the working class to prevent war and fascism, he felt, was due solely to the legacy of a half century of Marxian reformism under the "leadership principle," which had produced a workers' movement incapable of acting in its own interest and inspiring a fighting working class. Pannekoek's hopes were founded on his conviction that with both private capitalism and Marxian
reformism broken down, the revolutionary alternative would become increasingly clear: either state capitalism and intensified exploitation or workers' freedom and mastery over production. 57

Faced with the reality of the Second World War, the council communists' already small numbers continued to decline rapidly. In the United States, the GCC had largely ceased functioning by 1940, although Mattick continued to publish New Essays until 1943. In Holland, the GIC disbanded itself in the wake of the Nazi occupation. Part of the GIC, however, put aside their objections to party organization and joined forces with Henk Sneevliet's quasi-Trotskyist Revolutionair-Socialistische Arbeiders Partij in July, 1940, to form the clandestine Marx-Lenin-Luxemburg Front. Shortly after the arrest and execution of Sneevliet in August, 1942, differences developed over the question of support for the Soviet Union, which prompted the former GIC members to leave to form the Communistenbond Spartacus. With only a handful of members, however, the Communistenbond remained inactive throughout the duration of the war. 58

As they wrestled with the complex of theoretical and practical problems posed by the war, fascism, and economic crisis, the council communists, like the left communists, had clearly failed to resolve the concrete problems of
revolutionary transformation. From an historical standpoint, it was the council communists' chief merit to have helped pioneer new theoretical work in several areas. In their extensive analyses, they mounted a detailed and penetrating critique, not only of the function of the state in advanced capitalism and of the general trend of capitalist development, but also of the predominant forms taken by the socialist movements in the past. Through their rigorous criticism of state-dominated systems in all forms, the council communists had provided invaluable theoretical tools for a critical re-elaboration of Marxian analysis. But for all the importance and originality of their theoretical insights, the council communists' formulations were completely inadequate as a guide to practice. Blinded by the categories of classical Marxism and lacking any organic contact with the social reality they sought to transform, the council communists were unable to conceive of any strategy for democratic transformation outside of the workplace and, in the end, were forced to fall back on an illusory confidence in an heroic industrial proletariat engaged in spontaneous struggles at the point of production. In the final analysis, a strategy premised on non-participation and theoretical purism unwittingly served only to undermine the very strategic and theoretical reorientation which the council communists had worked so hard to attain.
NOTES


3. Anton Pannekoek, "Sterrenkundige herinneringen," op. cit., pp. 245-249. Pannekoek's affiliation with the University of Amsterdam did not, however, end political discrimination. Pannekoek has recounted how, in order to gain permission to take an astronomical expedition to Sumatra to observe an eclipse in 1927, he was required to sign a statement declaring that he would not engage in "communist propaganda activities." Anton Pannekoek, "Herinneringen uit de arbeidersbeweging," op. cit., p. 212.


6. For biographical information on Canne Meijer, see: B.A. Sijes, "Henk Canne Meijer," unpublished manuscript, B.A. Sijes Archives, International Institute of Social History (Amsterdam).


11. Henk Canne Meijer to Paul Mattick, February 25, 1927, Canne Meijer Archives, op. cit., folder 100 A.


18. Following Pannekoek's death in 1960, Canne Meijer served as executor of his will.

19. B.A. Sijes, a former participant in the GIC, has noted that in the GIC's largest local section, in Amsterdam, the number of active participants never exceeded ten. Of these, most were unemployed workers. B.A. Sijes, "Anton Pannekoek, 1873-1960," in: Anton Pannekoek, Herinneringen, op. cit., p. 19.


21. The GIC's publications included: Persmateriaal van de groepen van Internationale Communisten; Radencommunisme: Marxistisch maandschrift voor zelfstandige klassenbeweging; Rätekorrespondenz: Theoretisches und Diskussionsorgan für die Rätebewegung; and the Esperanto review, Klasbatalo.


23. "On the Resolutions Adopted by the Brussels Conference," International Council Correspondence, December, 1935. Although the conference was termed the "Brussels conference," in fact it took place in Copenhagen.


27. The reasons for this name change are discussed in the January, 1936 issue of International Council Correspondence. Mattick contended that the GCC was composed entirely of factory workers and that International Council Correspondence had a circulation of 1,000 copies. Mattick to Anton Pannekoek, March 18, 1935, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 43A.

28. The best source of information on the GCC is Paul Mattick's introduction to the reprinted volumes of New Essays (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Reprint Corp., 1970). Also useful is: Gabriella Bonacchi, "The Council Communists: Between the New Deal and Fascism," op. cit. In addition to the group of former IWW members and German exiles centered around Paul Mattick in Chicago, the GCC had affiliate groups in New York City, Buffalo, and Washington, DC.

29. For information on Korsch's collaboration with the GCC see his correspondence with Paul Mattick, which has been published in: "Karl Korsch: Briefe an Paul Partos, Paul Mattick und Bert Brecht, 1934-1939," in: Claudio Pazzoli (ed.), Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung, op. cit., Vol.II.


32. Henk Canne Meijer to Paul Mattick, n.d. [1930?], Canne Meijer Archives, folder 100A.


35. The GIC's focus on intellectual activities did not go unchallenged. In the summer of 1935, a group within the GIC presented a resolution calling for more practical activity and charged that the GIC had become a "dead organization." When this resolution was rejected, the Leiden, Groningen, and Hague sections withdrew from the GIC. Cajo Brendel, "Die 'Gruppe Internationale Kommunisten' in Holland, op. cit.


37. In this connection, the GIC reprinted and distributed a mimeographed version of the collection of Dietzgen's writings with Pannekoek's introduction.

38. Henryk Grossman was a former social democrat connected with the Frankfurt "Institut für Sozialforschung" who later became a prominent economist in East Germany.


40. For a more detailed exposition of Grossmann's theory, see: Gabriella Bonacchi, "The Council Communists: Between the New Deal and Fascism," op. cit.

41. Henk Canne Meijer to Paul Mattick, May 28, 1930, Canne Meijer Archives, op. cit., folder 100A. Canne Meijer felt the term "death crisis" was unscientific and only confused the workers about a process that might take decades. Henk Canne Meijer to Paul Mattick, May 9, 1934, Henk Canne Meijer Archives, op. cit., folder 100A.


43. Unsigned [Paul Mattick], "Zur Marx'schen Akkumulations und Zusammenbruchstheorie," Rätekorrespondenz,


45. Mattick later attributed this focus on the economic element of capitalist collapse to the particular historical circumstances prevailing during the 1930's: "Notwithstanding the fact that we were perfectly aware of the possibility of always new highs and lows, we still believed that the class struggle in general would intensify and finally break out in revolution. With this experience we lived in a more or less conscious way through the Great Depresseion. We felt the total collapse in our flesh and blood, considering that the system then still did not have the adequate means to meet a crisis of such proportions. In that situation we had the collapse, so to speak, before our very eyes; we saw millions of men in motion. We thought that if the crisis had continued, it would have been a fatal crisis since it seemed impossible to find a solution. One acts much better in such a situation than when one is convinced that the crisis taking place is not the definitive one. To consider every great crisis as the final one means to seek to use it in a revolutionary sense. According to Marx, and also according to historical experience, every great social crisis can, in determinate circumstances impossible to foresee, lead to a situation liable to become a fatal crisis." Quoted in: Gabriella Bonacchi, "The Council Communists: Between the New Deal and Fascism," *op. cit.*
46. The council communist conception of fascism is summarized most succinctly in: "Verband tussen staat en economisch leven onder het fascisme," Persmateriaal van de Groepen van Internationale Communisten, September, 1934. See also: "Fascisme en arbeidersklasse," Persmateriaal van de Groepen van Internationale Communisten, July, 1935; Karl Korsch, "The Fascist Counter Revolution," Living Marxism, Fall, 1940; Paul Mattick [pseudonym Luenkia], "From Liberalism to Fascism," Living Marxism, Spring, 1941.

47. Unsigned [Paul Mattick], "The War is Permanent," Living Marxism, Spring, 1940.


50. Unsigned [Paul Mattick], "The War is Permanent," op. cit.


52. "Theses on Bolshevism," International Council Correspondence, December, 1934. This work appeared under Pannekoek's own name as: The Bourgeois Role of Bolshevism (Glasgow: Anti-Parliamentary Communist Federation, n.d.). Mattick carried this analysis several steps further when he argued that Bolshevism provided the model for fascism and that the two contained identical elements. Unsigned [Paul Mattick], "The Struggle Against Fascism Begins with the Struggle Against Bolshevism," Living Marxism, September, 1939.


55. These themes received a full exposition in Paul Mattick's unsigned article: "The War is Permanent," op. cit.


57. Anton Pannekoek, "Why Past Revolutionary Movements Failed," Living Marxism, Fall, 1940.

CHAPTER XII

THE WORLD OF THE WORKERS' COUNCILS:

PANNEKOEK AND THE THEORY OF COUNCIL COMMUNISM

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The Workers' Way to Freedom: Class Struggle and Council Organization

Although his energies were primarily devoted to astronomy after 1920, Pannekoek played a vital role in giving the basic ideas of council communism theoretical depth and comprehensiveness. Pannekoek's ideas were repeatedly articulated and systematically developed in numerous articles and in three book-length works: Workers' Councils, Lenin as Philosopher, and the unpublished "The Workers' Way to Freedom." In his collaboration with the council communist movement, Pannekoek's primary intention was to provide a body of popularized theoretical literature to be disseminated within the working class as part of the task of developing a "new orientation." His point of departure for this "new orientation" was a bold and sweeping critique of the "statist" and "leader" oriented politics of both social democracy and Leninism:

Socialism as inherited from the nineteenth century, was the creed of a social mission for leaders: to transform capitalism into a system of state directed economy without exploitation, producing abundance for all. It was a creed of class struggle for workers, the belief that by transferring government into the hands of these socialists they would assure their freedom ... Now it is seen that socialism in the sense of state-directed planned economy means state capitalism, and that socialism in the sense of workers' emancipation is possible only in a new orientation. The new orientation of production is self-direction of production, self-direction of the class struggle by means of workers'
councils . . . The workers educated in the belief in socialism stand bewildered now that they see its very opposite, heavier slavery is the outcome. To grasp that socialism and communism now both mean doctrines of enslavement is a hard job. New orientation needs time; maybe only a new generation will comprehend its full scope.¹

As conceived by Pannekoek, the main focus of this new orientation was to be on elucidating the idea of council organization as the creative and dynamic element of socialist transformation. The elements of consciousness and political activism which Pannekoek perceived in the workers' councils were, in large part, merely an extension of his longstanding conception of proletarian organization:

Economic and spiritual power are made an active power through organization. It binds all the different wills to unity of purpose and combines the single forces into a mighty unity of action. Its outer forms may differ and change as to circumstances, its essence is its new moral character, the solidarity, the strong community-feeling, the devotion and feeling of self-sacrifice, the self-imposed discipline. Organization is the life principle of the working class, the condition of liberation.²

At the same time, Pannekoek argued that while the councils represented a higher stage of proletarian organization, they were not simply replacements for the old organizations, but the very negation of the principles underlying these organizations. Pannekoek stressed repeatedly that the councils would resolve the conflict between leaders and followers by eliminating the professional leadership bodies which had gained power over the rank-and-file.
Instead, in the councils, the entire function of leadership was to be abolished and everyone actively incorporated into the decision-making process:

Such an organization is a body of self-determining people. There is no place for professional class leaders. Certainly there is obeying; everybody has to take part in the decisions which he himself has taken part in making. But the full power always rests with the workers themselves.3

Although the councils stood at the center of Pannekoek's vision, he steadfastly maintained that they could not be mechanically proclaimed or arbitrarily willed into existence by revolutionary groups. At the most, such groups could only propagate the idea and necessity of council organization. The councils, moreover, were suitable only for revolutionary periods when the working class was on the offensive. Pannekoek felt that in cases where the workers were unable to complete the revolution, the councils would no longer serve a useful social function and would immediately lose their status as instruments of proletarian warfare.4

In keeping with this view, Pannekoek maintained that the councils could only emerge spontaneously and organically out of actual working class practice and were already present in embryonic form in actions such as wildcat strikes:

Thus in the wildcat strikes some characteristics of the coming forms of fight make their appearance: first the self-action, the self-initiative,
keeping all activity and decisions in their own hands; and then the unity, irrespective of old memberships, according to the natural grouping of the enterprises. These forms come up, not through shrewd planning, but spontaneously, irresistibly, urged by the heavy superior power of capital against which the old organizations cannot fight seriously any more.5

In attempting to trace out how wildcat strikes could evolve into workers' councils, Pannekoek argued that the key factor in this transformation would be the strike committees that would emerge spontaneously to coordinate strike actions. These committees, he felt, embody the direct proletarian democracy that lies at the heart of the council system:

In a big strike all the workers cannot assemble in a meeting. They choose delegates to act as a committee. Such a committee is only the executive organ of the strikers; it is continually in touch with them and has to carry out the decisions of the strikers. Each delegate at any moment can be replaced by others; such a committee never becomes an independent power. In such a way, common action as one body can be secured, and yet the workers have all decisions in their hands.6

In the same vein, Pannekoek felt that the limited sphere of decision-making power vested in these committees precluded the possibility that they might develop into bureaucratized leadership bodies in their own right:

Such committees are not bodies to make decisions according to their own opinion, and over the workers; they are simply messengers, communicating the opinions and wishes of the groups they
represent, and conversely, bringing to the shop meetings for discussion and decision, the opinion and arguments of the other groups. They cannot play the role of leaders because they can be momentarily replaced by others. 7

Pannekoek believed that the preconditions for the emergence of workers' councils were also present in the tactic of factory occupations. By preventing strike-breakers from being brought in and helping keep the work community intact, factory occupations represent a higher form of struggle than wildcat strikes. But for the consciousness and political development of the working class, these occupations represent much more:

In it, as in a light flash at the horizon, a glimpse of future development springs up. By shop occupations the workers unwittingly demonstrate that their fight has entered a new phase. Here their firm intervention as a shop organization appears, a natural unity not to be dissolved into single individuals. Here the workers become conscious of their intimate connection with the shop. To them, it is not another man's building where only at his command they come to work for him till he sends them away. To them the shop with its machines is a productive apparatus they handle, an organ that only by their work is made a living part of society. It is nothing foreign to them; they are at home here, much more than the legal owners, the shareholders who do not even know its whereabouts. In the factory the workers grow conscious of the contents of their life, their productive work, their work community as a collectivity that makes it a living organism, an element of the totality of society. Here, in shop occupations, a vague feeling arises that they ought to be masters of production, that they ought to expel the unworthy outsiders,
the commanding capitalists, who abuse it in wasting the riches of mankind and in devastating the earth . . . Compared with the natural connection of workers and shops the command of capital appears as an artificial outside domination, powerful as yet, but hanging in the air; whereas the growing hold of the workers is firmly rooted in the earth. Thus in shop occupations the future forecasts its light in the growing consciousness that the shops belong with the workers, that together they form a harmonious unity, and that the fight for freedom will be fought over, in, and by means of the shops. 8

Pannekoek stressed repeatedly that unless wildcat strikes and shop occupations were expanded into a class-wide movement, they would rarely bring victory since their focus is too narrow and they are easily suppressed. The chief importance of these actions, he felt, lies in their capacity to generate fresh fighting spirit, increased self-reliance, and class consciousness. In cases where such movements are able to develop into national and class-wide movements they will immediately come into conflict with the capitalist state, which forces them to assume a directly political role. It is at this point that the workers' councils first begin to make their appearance, expanding their role simultaneously with the revolution:

When, then, it takes such dimensions as to seriously disturb the social order, when they assail capitalism in its inner essence, the mastery of the shops, the workers will have to face state power with all their resources. Then their strikes must assume a political character; then their strike committees,
embodying their class community, assume wider social functions, taking the character of workers' councils. Then the social revolution, the breakdown of capitalism comes in sight.9

From these passages, it becomes clear that for Pannekoek the workers' councils, shop occupations, and wildcat strikes were not considered to be tactical objectives in themselves, but merely represented the transitory organizational form of the class struggle and the embodiment of the principle of workers' control over production. What was primary and decisive, Pannekoek felt, was the spirit of rebellion underlying them, or what he chose to call in popularized terms "the fight."10 This amounted above all to the belief that the fighting capacity of the working class represents the means of individual and collective transformation by which the passive, dependent worker of capitalism becomes the active, independent member of a future socialist society:

The working class has to find out and to develop the forms of fight, adapted to its needs. Fight means that it goes its own way according to its own choice, directed by its class interests, independent of, hence opposed to the former masters. In fight its creative faculties assert themselves in finding ways and means. Just as in the past it devised and practiced spontaneously its forms of action: the strike, the ballot, the street demonstration, the mass meeting, the leaflet propaganda, the political strike, so it will do in the future. Whatever the forms may be, character, purpose, and effect will be the same for all: to raise their own elements of power, to weaken and dissolve the power of the foe.11
Although Pannekoek believed that the preconditions for workers' control of production existed in the daily work life of the proletariat, he felt that their perception of this possibility was greatly circumscribed by the prevailing spiritual hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In the absence of an alternative conception of society, the workers' thoughts and actions are governed by a cautious realism which recognizes only a limited range of options open to them. It is this situation that makes the workers reluctant to act upon the anti-capitalist attitudes which arise from their social position as wage earners. As a result, the workers' immediate needs can only be satisfied by submitting to the conditions of capitalist exploitation:

Among the various dispositions in man those which are most adapted to secure life in the existing circumstances will prevail and develop. In the daily life of capitalism it is impractical, even dangerous, for a worker to nurture his feelings of independence and pride; the more he suppresses them and tacitly obeys, the less difficulty he will encounter in finding and keeping his job.\(^{12}\)

Since the consciousness of the working class is essentially practical and not concerned with speculative truths or moral imperatives, the idea that they are capable of managing society and production on their own can arise from their daily experience of the work process only in a very limited sense. Because adaptation to existing circumstances yields predictable results, consciousness, under
normal conditions, will remain within the traditional categories of bourgeois society.  

This pattern of adaptive behavior, Pannekoek felt, was also legitimized by a highly structured code of values and beliefs which has been passed down from preceding generations as tradition and collective memory. What this ultimately meant for the development of proletarian consciousness was that because of the predominance of the traditional thought systems from the past, the immediate material situation often has little influence on the workers' thought process. According to Pannekoek, the time lag between the emergence of new material structures or new modes of production and the moment the workers' consciousness becomes aware of them and adapts to them was likely to be of long duration:

... traditional ideas hamper the spread of new ideas that express new realities. ... every tradition is a piece of reality, just as every idea is itself a part of the real world, living in the mind of men; it is often a very powerful reality as a determinant of men's actions. It is a reality of an ideological nature that has lost its material roots because the former conditions of life which have produced them have since disappeared. ... important is what may be termed the social memory, the perpetuation of collective ideas, systematized in the form of prevailing beliefs and ideologies and transferred to future generations in oral communications, in books, in literature, in art and in education. The surrounding world which determines the mind consists not only of the contemporary economic world, but also of all the ideological influences derived from continuous
intercourse with our fellow men. Hence comes the power of tradition which in a rapidly changing society causes the development of ideas to lag behind the development of society. 14

Pannekoek attempted to resolve this contradiction between social development and the predominance of traditional ideas by arguing that the lagging consciousness would eventually be revolutionized as the consequence of a severe crisis of the system. In a crisis situation, the foundations of the system begin to collapse and the real nature of the system is suddenly exposed for all to see. Under these conditions, the workers' conformity to the traditional belief systems no longer yields predictable results:

When, however, in times of social crisis and danger all this submissiveness, this virtuousness, is of no avail to secure life, when only fighting can help, then it gives way to its contrary, to rebelliousness and courage. Then the bold set the example and the timid discover with surprise of what deeds of heroism they are capable . . . When then they perceive what forces are present in themselves and in their comrades, when they feel the happiness of this awakening of proud self-respect and devoted brotherhood, when they anticipate a future of victory, when they see rising before them the image of the new society they help to build, then enthusiasm and ardor grow to irresistible power. Then the working class begins to be ripe for revolution. Then capitalism begins to be ripe for collapse. 15

But what was most critical for Pannekoek was the active role of the working class in responding to the
crisis and activating a mass transformation of consciousness. Once the material and spiritual basis of the system have been weakened and the dynamics of the "workers' fight" come into play, then those elements of proletarian consciousness which are antithetical to the dominant bourgeois categories begin to develop. Notions of solidarity, community feeling, collective action, creativity, and self-reliance, all of which have long been present in the daily work experience and struggles of the working class, immediately come to the forefront. As the struggle intensifies, and the workers gain new experiences in solidarity and self-management, these concepts are greatly expanded:

The forces of solidarity and devotion hidden in the workers only want for great fights to develop into a dominating life principle. Then even the most suppressed layers of the working class, who hesitatingly join their comrades, will soon feel the new forces of community growing also in themselves. They will perceive that the fight for freedom asks not only their adherence but the development of all their powers of self-activity and self-reliance.

Pannekoek treated it as axiomatic that this period of social crisis—like all the great revolutionary epochs of the past—would be a time of intense spiritual activity:

It is an illusion that once awakened from submissiveness, the masses will be directed by one common clear insight and go their way without hesitation in unanimity of opinion. History
shows that in such awakening an abundance of new thoughts in greatest diversity sprouts in man, expressions all of the new world, as a roaming search of mankind in the newly opened land of possibilities, as a blooming richness of spiritual life. Only in the mutual struggle of these ideas will crystallize the guiding principles that are essential for the new tasks.17

Despite his prevailing optimism about the ability of the working class to resolve the problems associated with revolutionary consciousness, Pannekoek at certain points seemed acutely aware of the actual complexity of this process. In his analysis of the factors which would activate a spirit of rebellion, Pannekoek raised the possibility that the working class might be unable to escape from the domination of bourgeois ideology:

And the time will come when the evil of depression, the calamities of unemployment, the terrors of war will grow ever stronger. Then the working class, if not yet revolting, must rise and fight . . . Will they fight? Human history is an endless series of fights; and Clausewitz, the well-known German theorist on war, concluded from history that man is in his inner nature a warlike being. But others, skeptics as well as fiery revolutionists, seeing the timidity, the submissiveness, the indifference of the masses, often despair of the future. So we will have to look somewhat more thoroughly into psychological forces and effects.18

But Pannekoek failed to follow up on this insight and devoted no further attention to the question of whether the working class might be permanently incapable of transcending bourgeois ideological hegemony.
Of the various questions confronting the international council communist movement, none was more important than the question of forming a revolutionary organization separate from the councils. Pannekoek's writings on this question reflect the confusion and ambiguity existing within the movement. His basic position was summed up in 1927 when, after the KAPN asked him to clarify whether or not he was a member, he bluntly stated: "I consider the notion of the party and the conception of party membership to be in large part a remnant of the earlier socialist era of the workers' movement, which, however inevitable it may be, is extremely harmful. For these reasons, I remain outside it." 19 From the 1920's onwards, Pannekoek repeatedly argued that political parties, as instruments for gaining and holding power, were by their very nature rigid structures with strict discipline and tight admission and expulsion procedures. Their task was not to develop the initiative and self-activity of the workers, but to train loyal and obedient followers. Whereas the struggle for the liberation of the working class requires unlimited intellectual freedom, parties seek to suppress all opinions except their own. Because of their commitment to the leadership principle, parties represent a powerful obstacle to the realization of a genuine self-governing socialism. 20
Despite his resolute hostility to traditional party organization, Pannekoek was far from clear and categorical in his views on the question of organization separate from the councils. At other points in his analysis he maintained that parties were "necessary elements in social development" which express unavoidable differences of tactical opinion within the working class during revolutionary periods.  

In keeping with this view, Pannekoek called for the formation of special kinds of groups which "might be called parties, but they would be parties in an entirely different sense from those of today." Pannekoek, however, was frustratingly vague on what the precise outlines of these new formations would be, except to note that they would preform exclusively theoretical and educational functions:

Groups of common opinion will be formed, to discuss and propagate their ideas, to fight the scientists of the capitalist class, to wage the spiritual contest with other groups. This is the way of self-education for the working class. Parties in this sense must be called the scouting groups in the capitalist jungle. They have to investigate the ways, to study science and circumstances, to discuss these in mutual debate, to lay their advice, their explanations, their ideas before their fellow workers. In this way they are necessary instruments to build up the intellectual power of the working class.

As conceptualized by Pannekoek, these new organizations were to be "think groups" charged with the task of
stimulating discussion within the working class for the purpose of choosing "orientations" for future revolutionary developments:

The important function of the parties, then, is to organize opinion, by their mutual discussion to bring the new growing ideas into concise forms, to clarify them, to exhibit the arguments in a comprehensible form, and by their propaganda to bring them to the notice of all. Only in this way can the workers in their assemblies and councils judge their truth, their merits, their practicality in each situation, and take the decision in clear understanding. Thus the spiritual forces of new ideas, sprouting wildly in all the heads, are organized and shaped so as to be usable instruments of the class. This is the great task of party strife in the workers' fight for freedom, far nobler than the endeavor of the old parties to win dominance for themselves.24

Pannekoek's militant hostility to traditional party organization was paralleled by his critique of trade unionism. Expanding upon the conceptions he had been articulating since at least as early as 1906, Pannekoek argued that trade union development occurs in two broad stages: an initial period of radicalization followed by a gradual integration into the capitalist system. During their initial formative period, the trade unions represented a natural form of proletarian organization and struggle which helped generate class consciousness, solidarity, discipline, and the spirit of organized fighting. Although the trade unions initially emerged as
an opposing social force in capitalist society, their aim was not to replace capitalism with another system of production, but to raise the workers from their misery and secure for them an acknowledged place in capitalist society. As they developed along with capitalism, the unions lost whatever proletarian identity they had during the earlier period and became one of the most powerful barriers to working class self-emancipation. In their basic structure, the unions began to resemble corporations with thousands of members, branches, and executives. In terms of income, status, lifestyle, and modes of reasoning, the union executives came to have more in common with the corporate executives than with the rank-and-file workers. Under these conditions, the trade union was transformed into a highly organized, hierarchical body, with its own policy, its own character, its own mentality, its own traditions, its own functions:

It is a body with its own interests, which are separate from the interests of the working class. It has a will to live and fight for its own existence. If it should come to pass that unions were no longer necessary for the workers, then they would not disappear at once, but continue their existence as elements of the organization.²⁵

Throughout the course of his analysis, Pannekoek adhered uncompromisingly to his longstanding thesis that in advanced capitalism the trade unions came to embody
not the negation of bourgeois civilization but rather its extension and rationalization. In their most essential aspects, Pannekoek insisted, the unions are "the apparatus by means of which monopolistic capital imposes its conditions upon the entire working class." By regulating class conflicts and helping to secure industrial peace, the unions play a vital role in stabilizing capitalism and establishing a universal norm of exploitation. Through their bargaining within the framework of capitalism, the trade unions serve as the intermediaries by which the labor force is put on the market and regulated. The unions help establish a level of wages which allows the basic necessities of life to be met so that the workers will not be driven to revolts which interrupt production. By regulating working hours, the unions help preserve the vitality of the working class for future exploitation. Without this equilibrium provided by the unions, Pannekoek felt, capitalism would be incomplete.

Pannekoek, however, was convinced that this equilibrium could not be maintained indefinitely. The continuing development of capitalism, he felt, would create increasingly unfavorable conditions for the working class. Strengthened by the growth of monopolies and employers' associations, the capitalist class would feel
a new sense of power and self-confidence, causing it to attempt to dominate the working class completely. The stability created by the alliance between capital and the trade unions, he felt, would be replaced by a new ascendancy of capital. In the bargaining over wages and working conditions, the unions would increasingly find themselves the weaker party. Since the union leaders are reluctant to take actions that might jeopardize the existence of the organizations and their own positions, the unions would be forced to accept a lowering of the workers' standard of living. Under these conditions, the trade union leaders would be forced to assume the task of assuaging the discontent of the workers and defending the proposals of the bosses as important gains. The workers, however, would be unlikely to accept it as self-evident that their standard of living must be lowered and a contradiction of viewpoint would swiftly arise:

The officials seem to have common sense on their side; they know that the unions are at a disadvantage and that fight must result in defeat. But the workers feel by instinct that great fighting powers still lie hidden in their masses; if only they knew how to use them. They rightly realize that by yielding again and again, their position must grow worse, and that this can be prevented only by fighting. 28

In these changed circumstances, "the workers discover that the organizations they considered as part of
themselves stand as a power against them." For the working class, it would become clear that fighting capitalism means at the same time rebellion against the trade unions. Only in this way, insisted Pannekoek, could the narrow field of trade union struggle be broadened into the wide field of class struggle and a socialist transformation based on the council system.  

**Organization and Production: The Council State**

In Pannekoek's model of revolutionary transformation, the workers' councils serve a dual purpose. They represent, in the first instance, the direct organs of struggle, and hence the material base of revolution, in a specific phase of capitalism; and, in the second instance, they constitute the infrastructure and organizational arrangement of the new society. In his book, *Workers' Councils*, the most comprehensive statement of his council communist position, Pannekoek attempted to detail exactly how the council system would function in practice. In comparison to the bulk of his theoretical writings, this analysis was unusually speculative and futuristic in character. Pannekoek justified this approach by arguing that the criticism of the old conceptions could be effective only if they conveyed a positive image which could be used to compare the
principles of the old world with those of the new. What Pannekoek envisioned was a network of autonomous factory-level councils in which the entire plant gathers to discuss matters relating to their common work. These assemblies would be vested with full decision-making power. In plants too large to assemble all the workers, delegates would be selected from the various work groups who would be subject to instant recall. They would not be experts, nor would they be responsible for the administration of the factory. Their main function would be to carry out the decisions of the workers, facilitate discussions, and to serve as a liaison between the various work groups and factories. As hypothesized by Pannekoek, the local factory councils would be merged into a variegated network of collaborating regional, national, and industry-wide councils, so that production constitutes a single interconnected entity. To help coordinate the work of the local councils, central councils would be formed on the same structure as the local councils (i.e., on the principle of shop floor delegates subject to immediate recall). Although the central councils were to be responsible for coordination, collection of data, and dissemination of information, they would not be planning bodies. That task was to be left to the workers themselves who, once in
possession of the necessary information, would be in a position to make the critical decisions and convey them to the delegates to the central council. Beyond this, the central councils were to be responsible for maintaining horizontal cooperation between factories in the same branch of industry and vertical cooperation between the factories that provide them with materials or use their products. To supplement this network of factory councils, Pannekoek envisioned a parallel, but more localized, network of councils for consumer and professional groups. But what Pannekoek failed to clarify was how this network of functional units would combine to create an effective structure of administration. How would a fragmentation of administrative resources be prevented? How would an even representation of groups be insured? What would be the criteria for assigning administrative responsibility? What would be the role for non-proletarian social strata?

Pannekoek never addressed the specific problems of administration and instead constantly underscored that the council system was not a new form of government, but the complete negation of governmental authority:

The councils are no government; not even the most central councils bear a governmental character. For they have no way to impose
their will upon the masses; they have no organs of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves.33

Whenever power is needed, Pannekoek felt, it would come directly from the collectivities of workers in the shops and be entirely under their control. The councils would be nothing more than "messengers" conveying the will of the workers.34

Pannekoek's paradigm of the future society was also postulated on the assumption that this new structure of workers' self-management provided, for the first time, the possibility for transforming production into a "mentally dominated process." As envisioned by Pannekoek, this transformation was to be accomplished by an elaborate new system of statistics and bookkeeping which would make all aspects of the economic process fully accessible to the producers. Through a network of interconnected computing offices, each branch of production would have responsibility for collecting and disseminating statistical data and rendering it into easily comprehensible form, by means of tables, graphs, and pictures, as a precondition for discussion:

As a plain and intelligible numerical image, the process of production is laid open to everybody's views. Here mankind views and controls its own life. What the workers and
their councils devise and plan in organized collaboration is shown in character and results in the figures of bookkeeping. Only because they are perpetually before the eyes of every worker the direction of social production by the producers themselves is rendered possible.35

Pannekoek went on to draw the conclusion that once the council system was firmly established the division between politics and economics would also disappear. Since society and production would form an interconnected totality, there would no longer be any need for a group of specialists and managers divorced from the great body of producers to regulate the social and legal conditions of production. In the council organizations, Pannekoek felt, the dominance of representatives over their constituents would disappear because its basis, the separation of productive functions, has also disappeared. Under the new conditions of proletarian democracy, the management of production would be organized on a collective basis and the abolition of the distinction between those who command and those who obey would be sufficient to motivate the workers to devote their full attention to the totality of social production.36

Pannekoek took it for granted that this new structure of democratic self-management, combined with the changes in the productive sphere--increased productivity and rapid technological development--that
would accompany it, would completely revolutionize the nature of work. He assumed *a priori* that the continuing development of the council society would undermine the traditional division between intellectual and manual labor, transforming work from a means of survival into a means of self-expression: "Whereas the abundance of life necessities, the universal prosperity, represents the passive side of the new life, the innovation of labor itself as its active side makes life a delight of glorious creative experience." 37 In Pannekoek's hypothetical schema, the role of labor in the new society had almost quasi-religious significance: "For the free worker of the future the handling of the perfectly constructed machine, providing a tension of acuteness, will be a source of mental exaltation, of spiritual rejoicing, of intellectual beauty." 38

In exploring how the council state would function in practice, Pannekoek maintained that the councils would manifest themselves not merely as a form of proletarian organization and action, but also as a principle for the liberation of the mind from the fetters of subordination and domination. The advent of a network of councils, he argued, would signal a highly advanced state of proletarian consciousness and the prelude to a "total revolution in the spiritual life of man." 39 In Pannekoek's
view, the "world of the workers' councils" would transform the mind from a concern with self to a concern with the community and society at large. The task of the councils was to draw out and make coherent the latent aspirations and potentialities already inherent in working class organization. It was on these grounds that shortly after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Pannekoek criticized the workers' councils that emerged for their failure to articulate a new level of consciousness and for their emphasis on "pure practice." 40

This assessment of the consciousness-raising capacity of council organization was bound up with Pannekoek's belief that the council system would lead to a new organization of knowledge based on the acquisition of new intellectual tools by the producers. But in defining the exact content of this new organization of knowledge, Pannekoek became exceedingly vague and contended only that it would be based on an all-encompassing scientific world view, which would form the basis for the social organization of production in the same manner that the natural sciences formed the basis for the technical organization of production. Through an understanding of the basic structure of society and the labor process, and their role in it, the workers would acquire, for the first time, the ability to consciously manage society. For Pannekoek,
there was no doubt whatsoever that once the workers began to act on the principle of self-management their innermost character would be completely transformed: "From obedient subjects they are changed into free and self-reliant masters of their fate, capable to build and manage their new world." 41

In the hypothetical schema described by Pannekoek, the picture that emerges is a highly problematic one. Deriving his views less from a practical understanding of social reality than from a Marxist metaphysic, Pannekoek constantly assumed that the council state would automatically resolve fundamental questions such as the relation between leaders and masses, the unification of diverse social strata, the division and specialization of labor, technological innovation, and the concrete problems of political administration and democratic self-management. Convinced as he was that the control and continuing development of productive forces alone would form the basis of a new spiritual life, Pannekoek refrained from analyzing in-depth precisely how culture, art, literature, science, and education would be produced in the council state. In theorizing the dynamic of the new state, Pannekoek neither questioned the basic structure and social content of capitalist industrialization, nor attempted to place the development of productive forces in a framework
that fundamentally challenged the class division of labor and the nature of existing productive roles. On the contrary, he insisted that under the council system the rate of growth and economic progress would reach levels unheard of in capitalist society. His vision of the new society was, in the final analysis, firmly rooted in the basic categories and assumptions of capitalist economic development: unlimited industrial production and growth, rationalization of production, cost efficiency, and exaltation of the work ethic.

_Ideology and Social Reality: Pannekoek's Philosophical Critique of Leninism_

Pannekoek's theory of council communism was complemented by his view of the Soviet Union as a state capitalist society based on a bourgeois revolution and sustained by a pseudo-Marxist ideology. Although others had advanced similar theories, justified on social and economic grounds, Pannekoek sought to go a step further by giving his theory a rigorous philosophical base as well. To show what he felt the Marxism of the Russian revolution really implied, Pannekoek undertook a detailed critical examination of the philosophical basis of Leninism, which was published as _Lenin as Philosopher_ in 1938.

Lenin's philosophical ideas were first expressed
systematically in his 1908 work, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, which later became a canon of Soviet Marxism. The specific questions to which Lenin addressed himself were inspired principally by a series of developments within the Bolshevik party. Shortly after the turn of the century, certain intellectuals in the Russian socialist movement had taken an interest in Western natural philosophy, particularly in the ideas of the physicist Ernst Mach and the Swiss philosopher Richard Avenarius. Although their views were not identical, both Mach and Avenarius felt that the main task of philosophy was to elaborate a "natural concept of the world" based on "pure experience." To this end, they attempted to develop—in a conception which had many similarities to the ideas of Joseph Dietzgen—^4^2—an epistemological theory based on the premise that all knowledge consists of the description and ordering of sensations and experiences, which became known as empiriocriticism. Mach went on to demonstrate how the phenomena of physics could be adequately explained without recourse to the concept of physical matter. By 1908, a kind of "Machism," with Bogdanov and Lunatcharsky as the leading spokesmen, had emerged as an influential trend within the Bolshevik party, which Lenin sought to undermine in *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*.

Characterizing the empiriocritics' view that reality
is composed primarily of mental elements as a form of subjective idealism, Lenin attempted to defend his conception of historical materialism on what he regarded as the chief points at issue: the status and character of matter and the nature of knowledge. In response to the empiriocritics' belief that matter is a construct of sensations, Lenin argued that matter is ontologically primary, existing independently of consciousness and representing the objective world. Lenin maintained, at the same time, that because the movement of matter is governed by unchangeable natural laws, space and time were not subjective modes of ordering experience, but objective forms of the existence of matter. On the question of knowledge, Lenin affirmed a "copy theory" of perception which contended that sensations depict or mirror the real world exactly. From this perspective, Lenin defended the possibility of obtaining objective truth and emphasized practice as its main criterion. Lenin's materialism had the further consequence of entirely separating being and consciousness, making one the reflection of the other, which led him to reject any form of class consciousness that was independent of and did not flow from those who knew how to interpret the laws of scientific socialism—the class of professional revolutionaries.
In developing his critique of Lenin’s position, Pannekoek’s main aim was to confront the scientific and philosophical content of Leninism by a consideration of the methodological and social background out of which it emerged. Believing that the underlying source of Lenin’s errors lay in his conception of historical materialism, Pannekoek sought to anchor his critique in an analysis of the relationship between Marxism and modern physics. Taking up Lenin’s claim that matter was an exclusively physical concept based on atoms and molecules, the movement of which was governed by unchangeable natural laws, Pannekoek maintained that the physical matter so central to Lenin was in reality nothing but an abstraction. The whole course of modern physics, Pannekoek declared, had replaced the material notion of matter with an abstract mental concept:

Atoms, of course, are not observed phenomena themselves; they are inferences of our thinking. As such, they share the nature of all products of our thinking; their sharp limitations and distinctions, their precise equality belong to their abstract character. As abstractions they express what is general and common in the phenomena that is necessary for predictions.

From his Dietzgenian perspective, Pannekoek broadened this definition to define matter as everything which actually exists, whether in nature or in the human mind:
If . . . matter is taken as the name for the philosophical concept denoting objective reality, it embraces far more than physical matter. Then we come to the view . . . where the material world was spoken of as the name for the entire observed reality. This is the meaning of the word materia, matter in Historical Materialism, the designation of all that is really existing in the world, "including mind and fancies" as Dietzgen said.46

From this standpoint, human ideas were just as much a part of objective reality as tangible objects. For the science of Marxism, this had clear implications:

If in our science, needed to direct our activity, we wish to render the entire world of experience, the concept of physical matter does not suffice; we need more and other concepts: energy, mind, consciousness.47

Lenin, therefore, in criticizing Mach and Avenarius (and for that matter Dietzgen to whom he devoted a chapter entitled "How Could Joseph Dietzgen Have Found Favor with the Reactionary Philsophers?") for their alleged subjectivism, had failed even to reach the conceptual sophistication of their system. While admitting that Marxist criticism of Mach and Avenarius was clearly needed, Pannekoek made it clear that it had to be on different grounds than that given by Lenin.48

Pannekoek, however, was not content to demonstrate the distance between Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-criticism and the developments in modern physics, but sought to pinpoint the source of these errors and assess
their significance for the revolutionary movement. Pannekoek argued that the basic fallacy of Lenin's position lay in his inability to transcend the philosophical categories of bourgeois materialism:

To Lenin, nature and physical matter are identical; the name matter has the same meaning as objective world. In this way he agrees with middle class materialism that in the same way considers matter as the real substance of the world. 49

According to Pannekoek, Lenin's conception of nature, like that of the bourgeois materialists:

... consists not only in matter but also in natural laws directing its behavior, floating somehow in the world as commanders who must be obeyed by the things. Hence to deny the objective existence of these laws means to him the denial of nature itself; to make man the creator of natural laws means to him to make mind the creator of the world. 50

For Pannekoek, the central methodological principle to be applied was a distinction between bourgeois materialism and historical materialism. Bourgeois materialism, he insisted, had initially developed as an ideological weapon of the bourgeoisie in their struggle against the aristocracy. Consequently, it was a type of materialism whose main point of reference was individualistic, a materialism whose principal tool was natural science, and whose main enemy was the religious ideology in which the absolutist status quo rationalized itself.
According to this doctrine, all phenomena of human life, including ideas, have their origins in the chemical and physical processes of cellular substances and ultimately can be explained by the dynamics and movements of atoms. Historical materialism, on the other hand, arose as a weapon of the proletariat in the struggle against the bourgeoisie. Its main reference point is society, and its science is a social rather than a natural science, which reveals to the proletariat their true relationships within the capitalist system. For these reasons, it considers ideas a social rather than a physical problem. Thus, for example, in the case of religion, historical materialism seeks to explain its social base and does not fight it directly, but attacks the economic structure of society.

According to Pannekoek's reasoning, it was neither an accident nor an aberration that Lenin used an outdated, mechanistic, bourgeois materialism for his point of departure, but a natural outgrowth of the prevailing socio-economic conditions in pre-revolutionary Russia. In czarist Russia, the revolutionary intellectuals, Lenin among them, were confronted with essentially the same task and problems as had been the bourgeois revolutionaries of an earlier historical epoch: the overthrow of an absolutist, land-based ruling class which was impeding
the development of modern industry. But in Russia the
bourgeoisie was too weak and too dependent upon czarism
to carry out this revolutionary task itself. This role,
therefore, fell to the intelligentsia, a class composed
of technical and professional people of non-noble
origin, often employed by the state. For the development
of the proletarian movement in Russia, this fact had
serious and lasting consequences:

Thus the proletarian class struggle in Russia
was at the same time a struggle against
czarist absolutism, under the banner of
socialism. So Marxism in Russia developed as
the theory of a fighting working class; but
this class had to first fight, and foremost,
for what in Western Europe had been the
function and work of the bourgeoisie, with the
intellectuals as its associates.51

These themes were not entirely new in Pannekoek's thought.
As early as 1909, he had argued, in an undeveloped
analysis, that Marxism was serving as the ideology of
the revolutionary bourgeoisie in Russia, and had concluded
that: "Only Marxism can serve as the ideology and fighting
theory of bourgeois revolution in the twentieth century."52

Within this process of bourgeois revolution,
Pannekoek felt that Lenin's chief contribution was to
have provided both the organizational form (the vanguard
party of professional revolutionaries) for carrying out
the revolution and a philosophy suitable for revolutionary
activity. Since religion served as a major ideological prop of czarist aristocracy, the militant wing of the rising Russian bourgeoisie felt it was necessary to devote first priority to waging a resolute campaign against it. Lenin's reversion to the militant bourgeois materialism of a past historical epoch provided the necessary ideological and philosophical basis for this struggle. Indeed, through Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Lenin seemed to suggest that the most important ideological struggle in the world was between materialism and religion. What this meant, Pannekoek felt, was that: "To the Russian Marxists the nucleus of Marxism is not contained in Marx's thesis that social reality determines consciousness but in the sentence of the young Marx inscribed in big letters on the Moscow People's House that religion is the opium of the people." Both in his obsolete materialist philosophy and in his theory of revolution, Lenin hid himself from the historical truth that the Russian Revolution was bound to remain a belated successor to the great bourgeois revolutions of the past. Lenin's "Marxism," Pannekoek insisted, did not express the practical necessities of the workers' fight for freedom, but was a response to specific Russian conditions. Russia required not so much the emancipation as the creation of a modern industrial proletariat; not so much the end of
capitalist accumulation as its acceleration. On these grounds, Pannekoek concluded that "the alleged Marxism of Lenin and the Bolshevik party is nothing but a legend. Lenin never knew real Marxism." Capitalism he knew only as colonial capitalism; and social revolution he knew only as the annihilation of large-scale land-ownership and czarist despotism. The problem was not so much that Lenin was wrong or that his logic was fallacious, but that his mode of thought was bourgeois. Leninism represented, therefore, the theory of a new state capitalist middle-class revolution installing a new ruling class which signified for the workers just another form of slavery and exploitation. This was the true significance of Lenin as philosopher. Had Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism been known in the West in 1920, Pannekoek concluded, then the development of West European communism might have taken an entirely different course.
NOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 103-104.


4. Ibid.

5. Anton Pannekoek, *Workers' Councils*, op. cit., p. 68. A similar emphasis on the role of wildcat strikes is also found in Otto Rühle's 1924 work, *From the Bourgeois to the Proletarian Revolution*.


10. This theme of rebellion as the driving force of working class development became the principal focus of Pannekoek's unpublished book-length manuscript, "The Workers' Way to Freedom." Pannekoek originally wrote this work for the GCC, but Mattick was unable to raise the funds to have it published. Anton Pannekoek to Paul Mattick, February 2, 1938, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. Pannekoek later incorporated much of this work into *Workers' Councils*, but with a greater emphasis on council organization.

11. Anton Pannekoek, *Workers' Councils*, op. cit., p. 105. Pannekoek has summarized the workers' "fight" in historical terms: "This fight cannot be compared with
a regular war between similar antagonistic powers. The workers' forces are like an army that assembles during the battle; they must grow by the fight itself, they cannot be ascertained beforehand, and they can only put forward and attain partial aims. Looking back on history we discern a series of actions that as attempts to seize power seem to be so many failures: from Chartism, along 1848, along the Paris Commune, up to the revolutions in Russia and Germany in 1917-1918. But there is a line of progress; every next attempt shows a higher stage of consciousness and force. Looking back on the history of labor we see, moreover, that in the continuous struggle of the working class there are ups and downs, mostly connected with changes in industrial prosperity. In the first rise of industry, every crisis brought misery and rebellious movements; the revolution of 1848 on the continent was the sequel of a heavy business depression combined with bad crops. The industrial depression about 1867 brought a revival of political action in England; the long crisis of the 1880's, with its heavy unemployment, excited mass actions, the rise of social democracy on the continent and the 'new unionism' in England. But in the years of industrial prosperity in between, as 1850-70, and 1895-1914, all this spirit of rebellion disappeared. When capitalism flourishes and in feverish activity expands its realm, when there is abundant employment, and trade union action is able to raise the wages, the workers do not think of any change in the social system. The capitalist class growing in wealth and power is full of self-confidence; prevails over the workers and succeeds in imbuing them with its spirit of nationalism. Formally the workers may then stick to the old revolutionary catchwords; but in their subconsciousness they are content with capitalism, their vision is narrowed; hence, though their numbers are growing, their power declines. Till a new crisis finds them unprepared, and has to rouse them anew."

Ibid., pp. 91-92.

12. Ibid., pp. 93-94.


14. Ibid.

15. Anton Pannekoek, Workers' Councils, op. cit., p. 94.
16. Ibid., p. 71.

17. Ibid., pp. 100-101. Pannekoek took it for granted that this process of spiritual struggle required unlimited freedom of speech: "So unlimited freedom of discussion, of expressing opinions is the breathing air of the workers' fight . . . To restrict the freedom of discussion is to prevent the workers from acquiring the knowledge they need. Every old despotism, every modern dictatorship began by persecuting or forbidding freedom of the press; every restriction of this freedom is the first step to bring the workers under the dominance of some kind of rulers . . . Only by standing open to all ideas that the rise of a new world generates in the minds of man, by testing and selecting, by judging and applying them with its own mental capabilities, can the working class gain the spiritual superiority needed to suppress the power of capitalism and erect the new society." Ibid., p. 100.

18. Ibid., p. 93.


29. Ibid., p. 227.


33. Ibid., p. 52.

34. Ibid., p. 48.

35. Ibid., p. 27.

36. Ibid., p. 49.

37. Ibid., p. 56.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 50.


41. Anton Pannekoek, *Workers' Councils*, op. cit., p. 34.

42. Ernst Mach, in a letter to Dietzgen's son Eugen, noted that he had read the elder Dietzgen's writings with "the greatest interest" and was "astonished" to discover how similar Dietzgen's methodology was to his own. Ernst Mach to Eugen Dietzgen, July 16, 1906. Contained in the Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 60.

44. Before developing his critique of Leninism, Pannekoek had attempted to establish the relationship between Marxism and the new physics in two unpublished articles: "De wereld," and "Mach de Ekonomie der Wetenschap," Pannekoek Archives, folders 286 and 287.


46. Ibid., p. 83.

47. Ibid., p. 61.

48. To this end, Pannekoek criticized Mach and Avenarius on the grounds that their basic reference point was individualistic: "The essential character in Mach and Avenarius, as in most modern philosophers of science is that they start from personal experience. It is their only basis of certainty, to it they go back when asked what is true. When fellow-men enter into the play, a kind of theoretical uncertainty appears, and with difficult reasonings their experiences must be reduced to ours. We have here an effect of the strong individualism of the middle class world. The middle class individual in his strong feeling of personality has lost social consciousness: he does not know how entirely he is a social being. In everything of himself, in his body, his mind, his life, his thoughts, his feeling, in his most simple experiences he is a product of society; human society made them what they are. What is considered a purely personal sensation: I see a tree--can enter into consciousness only through the distinctions given to it by names. Without the inherited words to indicate things and species, actions and concepts, the sensation could not be expressed and conceived. Out of the indistinctive mass of the world of impressions, parts come forward only when they are denoted by sounds and thus become separated from the unimportant mass. When Carnap constructs the world without using the old names, he still makes use of his capability for abstract thinking. Abstract thinking, however, by means of concepts, is not possible without speech; speech and abstract thinking developed together as a product of society." Ibid., p. 63.
49. Ibid., p. 54.

50. Ibid., p. 55.

51. Ibid., p. 68. In this connection, the British historian Eric Hobsbawm has observed: "For at this time in the West Marx was taken seriously only within the international labor movement and especially the growing socialist movement of his own country, and his intellectual influence there was as yet slight. However, the intellectuals of the increasingly revolutionary Russia immediately read him avidly. The first German edition of Capital (1867)—a thousand copies—took five years to sell out, but in 1872 the first thousand copies of the Russian edition sold out in less than two months." Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital (London: Sphere Books, 1977), p. 308.

52. Anton Pannekoek, "Marx der Liberale," "Zeitungs- korrespondenz," January 9, 1909. Pannekoek's criticisms, however, were not at this point directed toward the Bolsheviks.


54. Ibid. Pannekoek adds further: "Marxism, however, at the same time shows the necessity of the legend; every middle class revolution requiring working class and peasant support needs the illusion that it is something different, larger and more universal."

55. Pannekoek's analysis of the philosophical basis of Leninism possesses close affinities with the analysis developed contemporaneously by Karl Korsch. Although Korsch, like Pannekoek, concluded that Lenin was the philosopher of an essentially bourgeois revolution, he arrived at his conclusions from a completely different starting point and through entirely different theoretical formulations. See in particular: Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1970); and his review of Pannekoek's Lenin as Philosopher in Living Marxism, November, 1938.
CHAPTER XIII

REVOLUTION AND REALITY:
THE COUNCIL IDEAL IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
"Hope is Far Distant": Pannekoek and the Dilemma of the Independent Left

The period following the Second World War marked the final stage of Pannekoek's political career. During the last decade and a half of his life, increasing age and occasional nagging ill health did not diminish either the extent of his writings or the intensity of his political commitment. In his numerous essays and letters, Pannekoek kept busy with the task that had always concerned him the most: to discover and propagate the conditions and method by which the working class can become its own master. Although Pannekoek continued to analyze with great acumen the major questions confronting the workers' movement, his work found only a limited response, and his political ideas even less, in a social climate shaped by preparation for war and the defeat, either actual or by default, of virtually all revolutionary aspirations. Powerless to act beyond the scope of a few scattered individuals, Pannekoek continued to write after 1945 largely out of a personal, moral conviction.

During the first four decades of the twentieth century, Pannekoek had shared the revolutionary optimism of the left, but in the post-war period this optimism was tempered by his belief that the working class had failed to fulfill its historical task. Although he initially
felt the war would be followed by a wave of wildcat strikes, a new mood of despair began to appear in Pannekoek's writings toward the end of the war. In an update to his book *Workers' Councils*, written in 1944, the usually optimistic Pannekoek felt compelled to note:

> In this Second World War the workers' movement has fallen much deeper than in the first. In the First World War its weakness, so sharply in contrast with former pride and boasting, manifested itself in that it was dragged along, that deliberately, by its own will, it followed the bourgeoisie and turned into the underlings of nationalism... In the present war, the working class had no will of its own any more to decide on what to do; it was already incorporated into the entirety of the nation. As they shuffled to and fro over factories and shops, uniformed and drilled, commanded to the fronts, mixed up with the other classes, all essence of the former working class has disappeared. The workers have lost their class; they do not exist as a class anymore; class consciousness has been washed away in the wholesale submission of all classes under the ideology of big capital. Their special class vocabulary: socialism, community has been adopted by capital for its dissimilar concepts.  

Pannekoek made it clear throughout his post-war writings that this defeat of the working class was the natural legacy of over a half-century of traditional Marxist theory and practice. Rather than acting to destroy the capitalist system, the Marxist movement had actually served to bolster it:

> Thus it was impossible that the old methods should bring victory and freedom; the depression
of the revolutionary movement in which we are living is the natural outcome of a necessity and difficulty of finding new ways instead of the old. . . . The lack of a clear outstanding goal, now that the old goals have collapsed or have been discredited, seems to me to be a major reason why, among the critical minds and discontented workers, there does not appear a new rising of a class struggle movement.\textsuperscript{4}

The first half of the twentieth century, Pannekoek contended, had witnessed not the decay of capitalism, but the decomposition of the revolutionary dynamic in Marxism. Whereas Marxist theory and practice had become totally disfigured and stagnant, capitalism had modified itself and thereby survived the shocks of depression and two world wars. But in confronting this situation, Pannekoek never deviated from his belief that the defeat of the working class was a necessary precondition for the emergence of a new workers' movement based on the principle of workers' self-management:

To put it into one specialized point: when I was in the German SP I wrote for tens of thousands; I felt part of a movement apparently on the verge of victory; now we see that it was all preliminary, without consciousness of the real fight to come--though our small opposition groups got glimpses of it; this big movement for state socialism had to succumb, to make place for the fight for real self-determination and mastership that now is to come.\textsuperscript{5}

In his analyses of the post-war situation, Pannekoek repeatedly articulated the view that developments in both the East and West were leading to a final convergence of
centralized, state capitalist political systems with increasingly totalitarian aims: "Everywhere governments assume a totalitarian character, seek to lead production, make alliance with the party and trade union leaders to form a united power over the working class." In the West, he felt, the governments would be transformed—through democratic institutions—into completely dictatorial power bodies. In these circumstances, the trade unions would become almost pure instruments of big capital, perhaps through the mechanism of a "capitalist-fascist" labor party. At the same time, Pannekoek hardened noticeably in his attitude toward the Soviet Union. For the first time, he was prepared to assert that, for the workers of the West, Soviet-style state capitalism would be a dangerous regression since the possibilities for autonomous working class action were more severely limited. Such an outlook led Pannekoek to increasingly pin his hopes—at least privately—on a future pax americana: "I am increasingly mindful of the fact that the new revolutionary struggles that will occur through the medium of the councils will first come, and can only come, after American capitalism establishes its supremacy on a world scale." Pannekoek's mood of radical pessimism was most clearly evident in his belief that the rivalry between
the two state capitalist power blocs—reinforced by a crisis of overproduction—made a Third World War almost inevitable. In this situation, he felt that the working class—paralyzed by fear and irrevocably bound to the old forms of struggle—would be completely powerless to act:

We cannot expect that the working class, in its present weakness, will be able to prevent a Third World War by thwarting it with revolutionary counteractions; but after the devastation it will stand before the choice of building up the free world or fall into a deep slavery under a united world capitalism.10

If in the past Pannekoek had no doubts about the tide of history, he now contemplated, at least for the short run, a future lying in ruins. For both the working class and the future of humanity, he felt, "only slavery and destruction seem near; hope is far distant."11 It was in this spirit that Pannekoek embarked on the last major intellectual project of his career, his uncompleted "The Future of Civilization" ("De toekomst der beschaving"). Although Pannekoek had originally conceived of this work as an examination of the development and role of mental concepts throughout the entire course of human history, his fear of an impending collapse of contemporary civilization, either through nuclear war or world-wide totalitarianism, led him to shift his attention to drawing a parallel
with the collapse of ancient civilization, the Dark Ages, and the rise of capitalism.\textsuperscript{12} Despite four years of intense intellectual activity and almost 800 pages of notes, Pannekoek managed to complete only a fragment of what he initially envisioned.\textsuperscript{13} In late 1954, discouraged by the lack of interest in his work, Pannekoek abandoned the project entirely, noting to Henk Canne Meijer:

There is no longer a public who would read something like this, and, in any case, it is highly improbable that it would be published. Everything we have written in the past few years had remained completely unsold and unread.\textsuperscript{14}

Pannekoek's growing pessimism was heightened by a political isolation even more pronounced than during the 1930's. In Holland, the former GIC, now partly regrouped in the \textit{Communistenbond Spartacus}, underwent a major crisis in late 1946 over the question of whether to form a party similar to the KAPD or to organize an international federation of factory organizations.\textsuperscript{15} When it became clear in mid-1947 that this dispute could not be resolved, Henk Canne Meijer, Ján Appel, and several other supporters of a federation withdrew from the organization to establish their own publication, \textit{De Vlam}.\textsuperscript{16} But in contrast to the pre-war GIC, neither group was able to generate a significant body of theoretical literature. While supporting the idea of an international federation of factory
organizations, Pannekoek objected to the sectarianism of both groups and defined his attitude as "objectively critical but without personal opposition." Conditions were even less favorable in Germany for a revival of council communism, where only a small circle around the former KAPD activist Alfred Weiland was active. In the United States, Paul Mattick made no effort to revive either the GCC or his publication New Essays, and began to confine his activities almost exclusively to economic theory. Mattick undoubtedly captured the isolation of post-war council communism when he noted: "At present there is not a single human being in New York with whom I could cooperate on anything."18

Although the pre-war council communist movement had collapsed, Pannekoek continued to disseminate his ideas through a network of independent leftist intellectuals and groups. His most extensive contacts were in Germany where, in addition to his close collaboration with Alfred Weiland, he wrote regularly for the independent left publications, Volk und Zeit, Funken, and Neues Beginnen. In England, Pannekoek remained in close contact with the Independent Labour Party leader F.A. Ridley, a group in the Socialist Party of Great Britain, and the publication Left. In France, ties were maintained with the Socialisme ou Barbarie group and the syndicalist
La Révolution prolétarienne.

Pannekoek's only success in converting an independent left group to council communism came with the small Australian group centered around James Dawson. A former metal worker turned shopkeeper, Dawson had been active in the Socialist Party of Australia (an affiliate of the eclectic and sectarian World Socialist Party) until he was forced to resign in 1945. Upon his resignation, Dawson founded his own review, the Southern Socialist Digest, which moved rapidly from a dissident version of the Socialist Party of Australia's ideology to syndicalism. Following correspondence with Pannekoek in late 1946, Dawson shifted to council communism and renamed his publication the Southern Advocate for Workers' Councils. Although the Southern Advocate soon drew regular contributions from Pannekoek, Mattick, and Korsch, it never achieved the scope and dynamism of the pre-war GIC and GCC publications, and remained largely a personal and eclectic organ of James Dawson.

Unlike others of the independent left, Pannekoek did not attempt to re-examine or modify his basic strategy in any substantial way during the post-war period. His main hopes were still centered around a spontaneous council movement emerging out of the practice of wildcat strikes and shop occupations. Yet when such
a movement failed to appear, Pannekoek made no effort
to analyze the reasons why. Pannekoek's only concession
to the post-war situation was to place a renewed emphasis
on the relative and tentative nature of the council form
of organization:

Workers' councils does not designate a fixed
form of organization whose lines have been
established once and for all, and for which all
that remains is to perfect the details. It is
concerned with a principle—that of workers'
self-management of enterprises and of production.
This principle can never be realized through
a theoretical discussion of the best actual
form it might take. It is a question of the
practical struggle against the apparatus of
capitalist domination. In our era, "workers'
councils" is synonymous with the class struggle
itself (where fraternity plays a part), with
revolutionary actions against state power . . .
Thus the idea of "workers' councils" has nothing
in common with a program of practical objectives
to be realized tomorrow or next year. It serves
solely as a connecting thread for the long
hard fight for freedom that still lies ahead
for the working class.\textsuperscript{22}

As in the past, Pannekoek made it clear that the
small number of council communists could have no influence
on the immediate course of events, but could only act to
prepare the workers spiritually for future developments.\textsuperscript{23}
Within this process of spiritual development, Pannekoek
envisioned a key role for his book \textit{Workers' Councils}.
Following his dismissal from the University of Amsterdam
by the German occupation authorities in 1941, Pannekoek
immediately began to devote his full attention to this
work, which was completed in 1942, with major additions in 1944 and 1947. Assuming at the time that the war had opened a "new epoch for the workers' movement," Pannekoek conceived of Workers' Councils not as a program for action, but as a tool which would enable the worker to gain a clear understanding of the wider aspects of their actions. With this expectation, Pannekoek prepared separate Dutch, German, and English editions. Despite Pannekoek's high hopes, only the Dutch edition appeared in print in 1946. In Germany, Pannekoek initially arranged for Alfred Weiland to secure publication, but no funds could be raised. For the English edition, Pannekoek first approached Paul Mattick, but once again no funds were available. Pannekoek next approached the Independent Labour Party and the Socialist Party of Great Britain, but was turned down for ideological reasons. At this point, the task of publishing the English edition fell upon James Dawson in Australia. Although parts of Workers' Councils were serialized in the Southern Advocate for Workers' Councils in 1948, financial difficulties and Dawson's mounting personal problems prevented full publication until 1951. In the end, Pannekoek had to personally provide most of the financing.

One of Pannekoek's few opportunities to deepen and develop the theory of council communism came during a
polemic with the French Socialisme ou Barbarie group throughout 1953 and 1954. Like many other independent left groups and journals of the post-war period, Socialisme ou Barbarie emerged as an attempt to create a revolutionary alternative to Stalinism and social democracy. Although they initially began political life as an opposition group within the Trotskyist Parti Communiste Internationale, the Socialisme ou Barbarie group began to rapidly articulate their own version of council communism. Unlike the council communist mainstream, however, they defended the need for an anti-bureaucratic, avant garde revolutionary organization distinct from the working class to help give direction to the spontaneous struggles of the workers. The immediate occasion for a theoretical exchange came when Cornelius Castoriadis, the main theoretician of the group, presented a detailed outline of how such an anti-bureaucratic party could be organized.

These formulations prompted Pannekoek to draft a lengthy criticism of Castoriadis' position. While paying tribute to Socialisme ou Barbarie for having reached a councilist perspective by independent means, Pannekoek argued that it was impossible to reconcile self-governing with leadership by a small external group or party. To attempt to do so, he felt, would be to
reproduce Leninism. In reply, Castoriadis maintained that some type of centralized revolutionary organization would be necessary both to facilitate a revolutionary seizure of power and to insure that the council viewpoint prevails. Since the councils would reflect the character of the working class—which would change little during the course of the revolution—some form of "avant-garde minority" would be necessary to prevent them from being dominated by hostile forces such as Leninism or from succumbing to a process of bureaucratization. Using this reasoning, Castoriadis maintained that the sole guarantee against bureaucratization was to demonstrate in practice that an avant-garde but non-bureaucratic organization with organic ties to the working class was possible. The fundamental error of Pannekoek's position, he felt, was his belief that Leninist and Stalinist type organizations were the only kind possible. Castoriadis also objected to Pannekoek's view that the main task of the council communists was theoretical and spiritual. He argued that, on the contrary, the council communists must actively intervene in struggles, proposing to the workers modes of action, and combatting the influence of the bureaucratic organizations. A dozen resolute, organized, avant-garde workers, he contended, could, in certain instances, launch strikes involving
thousands. 32

Pannekoek responded to this argument by maintaining that during proletarian class actions certain persons stand out by virtue of their courage and clarity of vision, and that such persons together constitute a de facto avant garde which appears in every mass action. In this manner, they become leaders who can rouse the activity of the masses and by their broader view give good advice for these actions. Pannekoek, however, cautioned that once such leaders combine into fixed groups or parties these fluid relations become petrified. Then as ex officio leaders they feel themselves in command and wish to be obeyed. Pannekoek concluded by reiterating his longstanding belief that what was real and lasting in proletarian struggles was the change that takes place in the inner character of the entire class—a change that can occur only through their own activity and initiative, not by following others. Only this transformation, he insisted, could guarantee a meaningful self-emancipation of the working class. 33

Re-thinking Marx: Pannekoek and the Reconstruction of Revolutionary Theory and Practice

Although Pannekoek never wavered in his basic commitment to council communism, elements can be found throughout his post-war essays and letters of an awareness
of the need to develop a new approach to revolutionary theory and practice. From his criticism of the failure of the Marxism of the Second and Third Internationals, Pannekoek moved to a reconsideration of the meaning of Marxism itself. For the first time, he was prepared to assert that the terminology of Marxism had long since lost its meaning and that, applied in an orthodox manner, the doctrine of Marxism stood as a powerful barrier to working class self-emancipation:

So I think we must make a close with the old slogans and traditions of socialism and make a new start. And even with the slogans and doctrines of Marxism. The science of Marx, the true lasting part of his work, remains the basis of all our opinions and thoughts. But, to put it crudely: the word Marxism should disappear from our propaganda. Everything we tell is based upon what we see and what every worker can see. Every explication based on "Marxism" floats over the heads of the masses and disappears.34

Pannekoek felt that for the purpose of developing a "new life conception" based on the principle of workers' self-management of production, appeals to Marxism would have no significance because the workers know nothing of it or have seen it used by the communist parties to turn them into obedient followers.35 Through its use by the communist and social democratic parties, Marxism had degenerated into a mere system of knowledge which no longer represented the consciousness of a revolu-
tionary practice. What in Marxist theory and practice had appeared as anti-capitalist at one stage of capitalist development became incorporated into the capitalist mode of production at another stage. What had once seemed to be the road to socialism led merely to a new type of capitalism. 36

Pannekoek remained firmly convinced that before Marxism could again serve as an instrument of emancipation a fundamental reconceptualization of its meaning must take place. From this, he arrived at the conclusion that the key to a possible rebirth of the proletarian movement was not ideological adherence to Marxist doctrine, but action by the working class on its own behalf, which would be accompanied by the emergence of a new social consciousness: "The CP position, expressed in Lenin's word: socialism had to be brought by the intellectuals to the workers . . . is entirely reverted by us into the opposite: free communism is brought by the fighting workers to the intellectuals." 37 But in contrast to other post-war theorists such as Korsch and Castoriadis, Pannekoek's re-evaluation of Marxism remained highly tentative. Having demonstrated the inadequacies and limitations of traditional Marxism, Pannekoek did little to develop a conception of social transformation appropriate to advanced industrial society. Instead, he retreated to the comfort
of historical analogy. He insisted that the evolving struggles for a "new life conception" and for "new principles" were comparable to similar struggles that took place during the formative period of the socialist movement and during Galileo's seventeenth-century struggles in astronomy. The fact that Marxism had hitherto been used only in a mechanical and dogmatic manner, he felt, was due primarily to the "primitive spiritual mentality" which still prevailed in a tradition-bound world. In the end, Pannekoek continued to place his hopes in Marxism largely because it offered an explanation of the nature of modern society that satisfied his highly rationalistic and scientific inclinations, which had been shaped in the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century.

Pannekoek's reconsideration of Marxism did, however, lead him to take a fresh look at anarchism. When James Dawson criticized the anarchists in the *Southern Advocate for Workers' Councils* for their individualism, Pannekoek wrote a short article in their defense. In contrast to his earlier view that anarchism was a manifestation of petit-bourgeois ideology, Pannekoek now maintained that both anarchism and social democracy had developed as complementary responses to the conditions of nineteenth-century capitalism:
One took its necessity from the exploitation and capitalist competition, the other from the entire enslaving and suppression of the personality of the workers; one found its force in the need for, and propaganda of freedom. Since the former was felt most immediately and overwhelmingly by the workers, social democracy won the masses and anarchism could not compete with it.40

Both anarchism and social democracy, Pannekoek felt, reflected the primitive social consciousness of the nineteenth century. For anarchism, this meant that freedom was conceptualized on the basis of middle-class laissez faire notions of freedom; for social democracy, freedom was perceived solely in terms of organization. But for a genuine emancipatory socialism the real task was to combine freedom with organization. This task, he felt, could not be accomplished in the nineteenth century because it required a higher stage of proletarian consciousness. Instead, a synthesis between freedom and organization had to await the emergence of the council form of organization. From his Dietzgenian perspective, Pannekoek argued that what had once appeared as opposites had given way to a new set of distinctions: on one side now stood dictatorial capitalism; on the other, the revolutionary class fight based on workers' councils.41 For these reasons, Pannekoek was now prepared to accord the anarchist theorist Bakunin an equal stature with Marx
in the formation of the nineteenth-century workers' movement. In keeping with his changed attitude, Pannekoek contributed articles to the anarchist review *Retort*, and to the syndicalist publications, *Industrial Worker* and *La Révolution prolétarienne*.

With revolution no longer on the immediate historical agenda, Pannekoek, during his final years, saw his task largely as one of preserving what was most important in the heritage of council communism for future generations. What the council communist tradition had achieved, he felt, was less a set of doctrines or accomplishment than a method of proletarian self-emancipation. In summing up his political legacy, Pannekoek noted what he considered to be most essential in his life work:

> I rather doubt that I can be very useful as a guide for the younger generation. The world develops so swiftly that they will acquire from an entirely different milieu and experience, doctrines that are completely different from those we acquired from an earlier era. Just as we obtained our doctrines through many difficult struggles, they too will have to do the same, and the most we can do is to help them see the variegated possibilities in everything, in order that they can form their own judgments. To teach them to use their own brains is the best doctrine that can be handed down. It is also a doctrine that could well be applied in the present workers' movement.

Ultimately, he felt, the task was still the same: to
overcome the traditional division of humanity into two
groups: a small ruling elite and subordinate and
exploited masses. 43

**Pannekoek in Historical Perspective**

Nearly six decades separate Pannekoek's first
writings from his last. In the years between, Pannekoek
served both as an impassioned participant in the
political and social struggles of the era and an
illuminating interpreter of their significance. His long
sojourn in the socialist movement resulted in some of the
most significant contributions to twentieth-century
Marxism. In formulating his ideas, Pannekoek conceived
of his work less as a finished theory in itself and more
as a critical methodology open to all new social develop-
ments, in which all hypotheses are admissible, all
conclusions tentative. But if the trend of his thought
is considered as a whole, Pannekoek's work contains a
collection of elements of critique, analysis and construc-
tive conceptions with sufficient coherence to fit
together into a single conceptual framework. What
emerges is a broad theoretical synthesis which suggests a
particular orientation toward the main questions of
socialist transformation. It is a theory which has
inspired new ways of thinking about revolutionary politics
and established a whole new set of priorities.

Yet for all the intensity and originality of his effort, Pannekoek never succeeded in theorizing his ideas into a cogent political practice or in developing a permanent alternative to the social democratic and Leninist models—although elements of his doctrines have surfaced intermittently in movements such as the Eastern European revolts and the New Left. If judged by the conventional criterion of success, Pannekoek, as a practical revolutionary, can almost certainly be termed a failure. But, as Pannekoek himself noted, the conceptual categories which define success or failure are socially and historically determined:

Looking back at the political history of the past century we find two political methods constantly standing in opposition to each other, both of which are expressions of the class struggle. Why is it that one is called "good politics" and the other "bad politics"? Clever politicians direct their efforts to "reforming," in other words to buttressing the old system of domination—this is called "good politics." Others direct their efforts to aiding the exploited masses acquire the force to emancipate themselves from all forms of domination and exploitation—and yet in parliamentary jargon this is called "bad politics."44

Although he was a seminal figure in the development of Western Marxism and pioneered many important new insights, Pannekoek's theoretical work was not without
serious flaws. Abstracting from the bewildering particulars of experience, he often projected large generalizations and then attempted to qualify them by an unduly literal use of analogy and social metaphor. Even during his best moments as a theorist, broad schematic patterns on the decline of capitalism and the rise of socialism clouded the more immediate strategic realities he sought to elucidate. For all his concern with updating the class science developed by Karl Marx, Pannekoek's thought remained permeated with the worst features of the orthodox Marxist paradigm: its strict philosophical materialism, optimistic evolutionism, supreme rationalism, theoretical dogmatism, and narrow productionism. In spite of the importance he attached to consciousness and self-activity, Pannekoek--like most Marxists of his generation--remained firmly anchored to a nineteenth-century faith in science and a linear view of historical progress. To the end of his life, Pannekoek never lost his faith in a romanticized, homogeneous, and heroic proletariat as the sole agent of socialist transformation. His productive worker of the council state was, in the final analysis, modelled on standards of capitalist efficiency rather than any hegemonic alternative. Throughout the entire corpus of his writings, Pannekoek never examined the possibility of an alternative conception
of industrial and economic development. Nor did he attempt—in contrast to others of the Western Marxist tradition—to broaden his work to include a critique of capitalist society outside the factory or to question materialist logic in general. Pannekoek's "productionist Marxism," it has been noted, never escaped the historical phase of capitalism in which it was formulated. For Pannekoek, bourgeois society was always viewed as an immense factory. 45

Whatever his limitations, Pannekoek's great achievement was to have reaffirmed with unmistakeable clarity a goal of socialism that has often been neglected. It is a goal of democratic transformation starting from the shop floor and extending to the whole of society. From his work it becomes evident that democracy cannot exist in the abstract, but must serve as both an internal means and an external end in any meaningful project of human emancipation. Without democracy, true socialism is impossible; without socialism, true democracy is impossible. In attempting to recover the democratic and egalitarian core of the socialist ideal, Pannekoek adhered with unparalleled persistence to the hope and faith that people can still create their own history. In a century where Marxism has failed to deliver human emancipation, Pannekoek's critique of the extreme statist tendencies
inherent in the entire Marxist tradition and his vision of a radically free and democratic society, if nothing else, has provided a direction for others. One ought not to expect more from political theory.
NOTES

1. In addition to his numerous social and political commentaries, Pannekoek embarked on several major intellectual projects, including his History of Astronomy, and a projected trilogy to be entitled: The Origin of Life, Anthropogenesis, and the Future of Civilization. Of this trilogy, only Anthropogenesis—which was an attempt to trace the relationship between the evolution of man and the social origins of thought—was completed.

2. The intensity of Pannekoek's political commitment is illustrated by the acceptance speech he gave when he was awarded the gold medal of the Royal Astronomical Society (the highest award in astronomy), which focused on the class basis of astronomy. His remarks prompted the president of the society to note: "I suppose what strikes us first about the subject of this lecture which we have just heard is its remoteness from the kind of paper which we have usually heard at our meetings." "Address Delivered by the President, Professor W.M. Smart, on the Award of the Gold Medal to Professor Antonie Pannekoek," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 1953, pp. 245-256.


10. Anton Pannekoek to F.A. Ridley, February 27, 1949, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. These considerations led Pannekoek to contemplate, for the first time, the possibility of building a multi-class coalition against war. Anton Pannekoek to Cornelius Castoriadis, September 3, 1954, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. See also his article: "The Scientists Revolt," Retort, Spring 1948.


19. This biographical information was conveyed in a letter from James Dawson to Anton Pannekoek, January 28, 1948, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 16.

20. In announcing the publication's name change, Dawson described its main aim in the following terms: "This paper is an independent publication under my sole control--but I am cheerfully prepared to hand it over to any constituted body of workers organized along the lines of the policy I have enunciated." "No Change in Policy," Southern Advocate for Workers' Councils, May, 1947.


23. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Weiland, August 9, 1950, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 240.

24. Pannekoek has described how he was compelled to write Workers' Councils under wartime conditions with only a candle for light, without heat, bundled up in several layers of clothing. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Weiland, December 3, 1948, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 240.

25. Anton Pannekoek to Alfred Weiland, August 26, 1948, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 240.

26. Pannekoek's difficulties in publishing Workers' Councils are traced throughout the Pannekoek-Dawson correspondence, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 16.

27. Pannekoek's financial contribution is noted in letters to Dawson of March 4 and September 3, 1949, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 16.


32. Cornelius Castoriadis [pseudonym Pierre Chaulieu], "Réponse" au camarade Pannekoek," Socialisme ou Barbarie, April-June, 1954. Castoriadis also objected to Pannekoek's view that the Soviet Union was state capitalist and argued instead that it was based on a new class of bureaucratic exploiters.

33. Anton Pannekoek to Cornelius Castoriadis, September 3, 1954. Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. This letter was never published in Socialisme ou Barbarie, but later appeared in the May, 1971 issue of Cahiers du communisme de conseils. Within the Socialisme ou Barbarie group itself, a minority faction led by Claude Lefort held views similar to Pannekoek, arguing that party formations of all types constitute a form of external leadership, regardless of their internal structure. See in particular: Claude Lefort, "Organisation et parti," Socialisme ou Barbarie, November-December, 1958.

34. Anton Pannekoek to Paul Mattick, June 11, 1946, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108.


36. Pannekoek's reconsideration of Marxism is most clearly stated in his extensive correspondence with the French Marxologist Maxmillian Rubel, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. See also his two essays: "What About Marxism?" op. cit.; "Marx and Utopia," unpublished manuscript, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 160.


38. Anton Pannekoek to Maxmillian Rubel, April 30, 1952, Pannekoek Archives, op. cit., folder 108. From this standpoint, Pannekoek felt that what was most critical was not immediate political actions, but the underlying changes in society; "It is not so much that we expect 'the Revolution' in a few years, but that the past and upcoming decades already signify a revolution in humanity and we must be ready
to participate with open eyes." Anton Pannekoek to Maxmillian Rubel, August 7, 1953, Pannekoek Archives, *op. cit.*, folder 108.


42. Anton Pannekoek to Kenafick, May 26, 1949, Pannekoek Archives, *op. cit.*, folder 108. At the same time, Pannekoek attributed the differences between Marx and Bakunin to the different social conditions that shaped them: "Bakunin came from Russia where czarist absolutism kept down all social and spiritual progress; Marx was formed by the rising Western industrial capitalism. For Bakunin therefore liberty was the great idea; he saw state power as the basis of the slavery and poverty of the masses. Marx saw in capitalist exploitation the cause of misery and slavery; political freedom he saw present in England, where, however, the workers' misery was greatest; and since at that time capitalism was a mass of separate competing small businesses, unorganized, he considered organization as the chief demand, which could be ascertained only by a central dominating power, democratic state power, dominated by the working class. So their basic ideas stand against one another; Marx saw that Bakunin's political freedom was not sufficient (*vide* England); Bakunin saw that Marx's organized state power would bring worse slavery. Bakunin had studied and assimilated, as had many Russians, Western science and knowledge, and different from the Russians, applied them to take part in the struggle of the exploited masses in Western Europe, thinking that their grievances were the same as his. Marx revolutionized Western science and put in this way, by his historical materialism and his economic theory of capitalism, a new basis to all further class struggle . . . It was not simply the clash of two opposite characters,
here the fiery spirit who appealed to the rebellious feelings to fight for freedom, there the fundamental scientist trying to arouse the awakening working class. It was the problem of how to unite organization and freedom into one form and method of revolutionary action."

43. Anton Pannekoek to B.A. Sijes, January 21, 1953, Sijes Archives, International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam).

44. Anton Pannekoek, "La politique de Gorter," La Révolution prolétarienne, August-September, 1952.

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