

Agrarian Collectives during the Spanish Revolution and Civil War

The history of collectivization during the Spanish civil war has been controversial from its inception. Contemporaries who were sympathetic to anarchism and hostile to Communism authored the first accounts of workers' and peasants' collectives.¹ Subsequent Republican and Communist authors dismissed or ignored this largely apologetic literature. The rise of the New Left in the 1960s revived interest and empathy for the revolutionary experience. In particular, Noam Chomsky's polemical essay renewed the debate. Like his libertarian predecessors, he accused liberals and Communists alike of hiding the successes of anarchists during the civil war.² Chomsky had no doubt that their collectives were 'economically successful,' and he attributed their difficulties to state hostility and the consequent restriction of financial credit.³ Although questionable, Chomsky's New Left perspective was a sign of fresh interest in the question of the collectives. More scholarly accounts, based on original research, followed.⁴ Some researchers synthesized serious investigation with political concerns that were usually associated with 1960s idealism.⁵ In the 1980s Spanish scholars, armed with new documents from recently opened archives, tackled the subject with critical distance.⁶ They adopted a local or regional approach which delved into collectivization's difficulties and dilemmas. Just as importantly, they began to move away from traditional political history from above to social history from below.

The following pages attempt to develop this recent trend in the historiography by focusing on agrarian collectives in Aragón, Catalonia, and Valencia. Aragón was part of what one agrarian historian has designated as the Interior, an area of relatively backward agriculture with low soil and labor productivity.⁷ The

Mediterranean region — Valencia and Catalonia — was more modern and market-oriented. The task of the Republic was to connect these rural economies to the urban and military sectors. The failure to resolve the conflict between urban and rural made the Republic's victory difficult, if not impossible. These findings are based upon a variety of underused primary sources from military and civilian archives. Minutes of collectives, letters from party and union officials, government inspectors' reports, and military officers' accounts will throw new light on the economic performance of peasants.

Collectivization

Immediately after the outbreak of the civil war in July 1936, peasants in the Republican zone confiscated the lands of 'fascists' and bourgeois. As in the French Revolution, the spectacle of joyful bonfires of property deeds and documents symbolized the end of the old economic order.⁸ One of the major Spanish unions, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), usually favored collective ownership and exploitation of the land. Its most important rival, the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), was more ambivalent about collectivization. Some of its members were as enthusiastic as CNT adherents, whereas others — influenced by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and its Catalan counterpart (PSUC) — were opposed to what they considered to be unwise revolutionary experiments. Although the theme of collectivization has fascinated historians because of its libertarian resonance, collectivization was a minority phenomenon even in the Republican zone. Only 18.5 % of the land in the Republican zone (and, of course, none in the Nationalist zone) was collectivized.⁹ Thus, individualists in Spain continued to be overwhelmingly important, especially in comparison to state-sponsored collectivization of Soviet agriculture in the same period. More than 300,000 Spanish peasants acquired land in one form or another. Half of these resided in the provinces of Albacete, Ciudad Real, Cuenca, Toledo, and Madrid. Perhaps the extent of land reform in the center helps to explain why in 1936 and 1937 the region resisted repeated assaults by Nationalist forces.

In March 1937 the Communist minister of agriculture, Vicente Uribe, announced that nearly 9 % of total Spanish farm-

lands had been distributed to the peasantry. By the end of the year, the Communist press claimed that over a third of private holdings had been redistributed or confiscated.¹⁰ The peasants, the party asserted, had largely opted for individual use. This assertion was not mere propaganda. In Catalonia, collectives were islands in a sea of medium- and small-property holders. An inquiry by the Generalitat (Catalan regional government) at the end of 1936 revealed that only sixty-six localities had taken some collectivist measures, and over 1000 municipalities had not. The relatively few collectives that did exist were, it seems, formed by small owners. The Generalitat's decree of 5 January 1937 reinforced the family farm by granting formal legal usufruct to those who had cultivated the land as of 18 July 1936.¹¹ Even in Aragón, supposedly the most revolutionary and anarchist of regions and where the CNT was often the dominant left organization, most of the land was not collectivized. Notwithstanding the presence of militias that encouraged or compelled communal ownership, perhaps only 40% of the land of the region was expropriated.¹² In February 1937, 275 Aragón collectives had a total of 80,000 members; in June, 450 collectives included 180,000 members, less than two-fifths of the Aragón population in the Republican zone.¹³

Collectivization occurred both spontaneously and unwillingly. The atmosphere of terror and assassination of 'fascists' encouraged obedience to radical authorities. Militias composed of urban militants, often from CNT unions of Barcelona, marched through Aragón and imposed their idea of libertarian communism or socialism.¹⁴ They believed that collectives were the best way to feed the troops. Their columns reinforced local militancy which, in most cases, was not powerful enough to collectivize by itself. Considerable numbers of property owners, sharecroppers, renters, and *braceros* felt compelled or coerced into joining collectives.¹⁵ In a number of towns, wealthier owners resented the threat to their property and the prohibitions, enforced in some villages, on employing wage labour or shopping in collectives' stores.¹⁶ They found that the collective, which in certain *pueblos* enrolled the majority of inhabitants, tended to boycott non-members. An anarchosyndicalist source reported that 'the small owners who don't wish to join a collective . . . had to wage a difficult struggle to survive.'¹⁷ In Aragón and Valencia, many individualistic peasants were obliged to join a union,

whether the CNT or UGT.¹⁸ A system of fines and sanctions compelled new members to attend assemblies.¹⁹ Sometimes tensions erupted publicly. On 2 January in Albelda (Huesca), strains between property owners and a 'thieving' antifascist committee stimulated an owners' street demonstration.²⁰ In retaliation, a few demonstrators were jailed.

In the small town of Cabra de Mora (Teruel) with ninety inhabitants, prosperous sharecroppers (*masaderos*) — who probably held long-term leases — were, according to their enemies, sympathetic to their 'feudal lords'.²¹ They strongly opposed collectivization. Nor was this town unique. Prominent landowners who offered long-term or advantageous contracts to the propertyless were elsewhere able to create loyal supporters.²² The proponents of collective farming were forced to call in the Aragón police to take over sharecropper land. In response, the sharecroppers left the village and put themselves under the leadership of a militia chief. In Aragón, the overwhelming majority of peasants leased short-term and owned some property but not enough to enable them to feed their families or to provide economic security. Aragonese Communist officials skeptically observed that 'the petty bourgeoisie, *medieros* [poor sharecroppers] and renters (*arrendatarios*) . . . don't have a revolutionary spirit and if they enrolled in unions or parties, they did so to defend their bits of property and their petty interests against the attacks and pillaging of elements [i.e. anarchists] that have dominated Aragón during the last year.'²³ Aragón Communists, at least among themselves in private, did not show any greater respect for the politics of many rural proletarians: 'Day labourers who were not in unions were always slaves of the rural bosses [*caciques*]. They feared losing their miserable wage or being thrown in jail.' 'The masses' of Monzón (Huesca) were 'extremely disoriented.'²⁴ Even some *braceros*, who feared confiscation of their few possessions, had no interest in joining CNT collectives.²⁵ Early in the Revolution, *braceros* were more concerned with receiving back wages of July and August than in plans for future collectivization.²⁶

In part, then, collectivization was forced. On the other hand, in comparison with the Soviet precedent — where a powerful state forced, literally at gunpoint, peasants to combine — Spanish collectivization appears largely to have been spontaneous and voluntary.²⁷ No one reported that Spanish peasants massively

slaughtered village animals. Many rural Spaniards may have been attracted by the 'welfare-state image of the good life' promised by various forms of communism or socialism.²⁸ Poorer peasants thought that collectivization might produce the perks that urban workers had gained. They were willing to give it a chance.

The Destruction of the Aragón Collectives

Communists and historians sympathetic to them have argued that the CNT and its followers coerced peasants into unproductive collectives. Thus, in the summer of 1937, PCE-dominated units of the Popular Army thought that they had a perfect right to attack and dissolve the Aragón collectives, even though the Republican government had legalized them in June 1937. Communists made specific charges that, for example, in Albalate de Cinca and in Poleniño (Huesca) collectivists destroyed trees and were responsible for sharp declines in production.²⁹ Militiamen enrolled in the Battalion Largo Cabellero accused the CNT-dominated town council of their hometown, Cantavieja (Teruel), of forcing smallholders into collectives and expropriating the property of their friends and families in an effort to impose 'libertarian communism'.³⁰ Because of poor management and corruption, Cantavieja's meat supply and animals had disappeared. Food in the village was scarce. To end the 'terror' five militiamen planned to return to their village and shoot the councilmen. The town council denied the charges and claimed that it had acted in accordance with the directives of the Council of Aragón, which was dominated by the CNT and the FAI (Federación Anarquista Ibérica). The councilmen asserted that meat had become rare not because of their own expropriations but rather since militia columns had consumed too much of it.

The new policies imposed by the PCE-dominated army were more favorable to private property and encouraged some owners to reclaim their land from the collective.³¹ Counter-revolutionary and conservative peasants triumphed regionally. The dissolution of the collectives largely coincided with that of the Council of Aragón which the government announced on 11 August. Anarchists counter-charged that Communists had illegally jailed antifascist militants and disrupted production. In many villages,

CNT militants were imprisoned or forced to flee. In October 1937, the CNT Peasants' Union estimated that 600 of its Aragón militants remained incarcerated. The Communist-inspired repression spread nationwide. In Castile and La Mancha, the CNT Peasant Federation of the Center needed significant financial contributions from its members to defend itself against repression.³² Tensions between libertarians and Communists continued into 1938.³³ Repression rendered some collectives leaderless for a considerable period. The absence of CNT activists was said to have disrupted the *status quo* and, in certain cases, production. This is not surprising since after more than a year of operation, many villagers had reached a *modus vivendi* with their collective. Aragón peasants were less intent upon building a socialist or libertarian future than using the collectives for their own purposes. For example, members of an extended family might join a collective not because they believed in its communitarian principles but rather to obtain its rations.

A dispassionate examination of anarchist and Communist charges and counter-charges leads to the conclusion that both were correct. The former used illegal coercion to initiate collectives, and the latter used it to destroy them. Oddly enough, some CNT and FAI militants repeated Communist criticisms. By the summer of 1937, the Council of Aragón realized that it was counterproductive to force 'individualists' to remain members.³⁴ By that time, many of them had already abandoned collectives. Their defections created sticky problems of property rights since it was sometimes difficult to assess how much land and, in particular, labor the former collectivists had contributed to the general effort. For example, Spanish collectives — like Soviet ones — had to confront the issue of ownership of the harvest from a field which had been 'donated' to the collective, sowed by it, and then reclaimed by its former owner.³⁵ Even after more than a year of collectivization, an FAI member complained that villagers remained 'materialistic' and 'uncivil'.³⁶ For anarchists, there remained the 'painful task' of educating workers who acted selfishly.³⁷ The growing influence of the Communists and their alliance with propertied peasantry undermined the few collectives that remained in this area.

Historians have highlighted the tensions between the individualists who wanted to leave the collectives to farm on their own and the collectivists who supported communal management of

the land. In a number of towns, the sociology was predictable. Small property owners desired independence, whereas the propertyless preferred to support the collective. The poorest villagers of Castellote (Teruel) protested to the governor of Aragón that Communist-inspired changes had destroyed the collective and forced it to return property to former owners.³⁸ The four or five reactionary absentee landlords, who had owned nearly the entire village, had retaken control of it. Their sharecroppers (*medieros*) had recaptured the exclusive right to farm, thereby 'dispossessing half the village and leaving it without means of support'. Merchants, all of whom were rightists, resumed their commercial monopoly. Prosperous farmers in other areas of Spain did not relish the fact that they were forced to market their products through the collective and were less favored with loans from the Agrarian Reform Institute (IRA).³⁹ Nor could landlords — either big or small — appreciate the Republic's official moratorium on rent payments, decreed in August 1937 and lasting until September 1938.⁴⁰

Collective Selfishness

Undoubtedly, struggles concerning collectivization were central issues in many villages, but these conflicts have hidden another dimension. The collectives contributed to organized selfishness on a local level. This local solidarity helps to explain why large numbers of villagers remained committed to them even after the Communist sweep into Aragón. In other regions, such as Valencia and Castile, the number of collectives grew in 1937 and 1938. Prosperous collectives frequently refused to aid less affluent ones.⁴¹ Early in the revolution some agricultural collectives quickly turned toward self-sufficiency. Collectives' autonomy became in the words of CNT leader, Horacio Prieto, 'permanent egotism'.⁴² Ironically enough, collectives — which were seen as part of a socialist or libertarian future — frequently encouraged a return to the self-sufficiency of an earlier era. The minister of economy of the Council of Aragón complained about the increasingly 'autarkic nature' of the Aragón villages.⁴³ It is paradoxical that this complaint came from an official of a council which itself was accused of attempting to establish an autarky.⁴⁴ Collectives intransigently refused to share the vehicles at their

disposal, thus aggravating a grave transportation shortage.⁴⁵ For example, beets destined for sugar-processing plants had to be left in the fields and eventually used as animal feed because of a lack of transport and containers.

Local independence and egotism made information gathering impossible: 'In spite of our appeals, no one, absolutely no one' in the villages responded to requests for statistical information.⁴⁶ The flow of knowledge did not improve even though on 28 January 1937 the Council of Aragón threatened to confiscate all unreported stocks. At times, the regional government made good its threat and seized unauthorized goods and fined their owners, even if cooperatives or collectives.⁴⁷ The refusal to provide statistics and the concealment of goods enabled the villages and collectives to avoid paying debts. 'The most typical case' of debt and waste was the village of Angüés (Huesca) which had received important credits for a large quantity of fertilizers and used only a third of what it was loaned.⁴⁸ The town squandered both fertilizer and transportation. Collectivists wasted large quantities of subsidized bread and other items provided at below-market prices.⁴⁹ Individual collectivists often had to be forced to pay their own personal arrears.⁵⁰ Peasant reluctance to provide revenue and information was caused by a variety of fears. As has been seen, *campesinos* felt that the products of their labour might be unduly expropriated. Union locals, like the collectives, could not or would not provide reliable statistics on production. Spanish Republicans learned, as had the Bolsheviks, that 'the class war was primarily a war for information.'⁵¹

Antagonisms between union officials and collectivists were mutual. Villages feared — sometimes with good reason — that union officials would exploit them.⁵² The head of the CNT's Agricultural Section of the Center, a veterinarian who wanted to reform Castilian grazing, concluded — like many agricultural reformers before him — that peasants were 'supremely ignorant', 'stuck in their routines', and resistant to 'modern techniques'.⁵³ CNT collectivists in Liria lamented the 'ignorance' and 'egotism' of their peasants.⁵⁴ The Spanish experience was by no means unique. During their civil wars, the French Jacobins and the Russian Bolsheviks had experienced similar problems controlling centrifugal forces in the countryside.⁵⁵ They both concluded that only iron centralization could combat localism. Perhaps this localism is why observers held such varied views of

collectives. They may have been productive locally but were less so regionally or nationally.⁵⁶

Inflation and Transportation

It is important to place this rural egotism in the context of the wartime economy. The Republican state had little desire and few means to offer financial credits to collectives. Just as significantly, currency devaluation affected collectives as much as individuals. In the first year of the war, the Republican *peseta* lost approximately half its value on foreign exchange markets, but this decline abroad was less important than domestic loss of confidence.⁵⁷ Prices in Catalonia rose 6–7% every month, and barter often had to be used to obtain needed items. Collectives could and did directly exchange items which they produced. Barter enabled them to adhere to the officially established price (and thus not break the law) and, at the same time, avoid the effects of devaluation of Republican currency.⁵⁸ Yet barter also meant a regression to a more primitive economy where the local took precedence over the national and even the regional.⁵⁹ The simplified exchange of goods between producers replaced the more sophisticated and complex money economy. The revival of barter abandoned those without direct access to real goods — including employees of the secondary and tertiary sectors. The devaluation of Republican or ‘red’ money put urban dwellers and non-producers in a precarious position.

Compounding the problem of inflation, by the spring of 1937 transportation had become the most acute bottleneck in certain regions. As in the Russian Civil War, the failure of the transport network intensified the crisis of the market and ultimately of political authority.⁶⁰ It was difficult to convey victuals to the troops, and it became nearly impossible to supply civilian populations, especially the more than one million refugees in the Republican zone.⁶¹ Civilians were starved enough to become ‘an enemy within’ and thus to create ‘serious conflict’. Many inhabitants of Valencia, the capital city after November 1936, were hungry, fearful, and depressed.⁶² At the end of the year, women, tired of spending hours in queues, engaged in street protests against high prices. To overcome supply problems, officials recommended that one flour mill be employed exclusively for the

needs of civilians but worried whether enough transportation was available to carry out the plan. Only if automobile use was rigorously curtailed and 'frivolous trips' avoided, could the shortage be eased. Lack of transport caused the rotting of Valencian citrus and rice in the fall and winter of 1937. The shortage of trucks led to the abandonment of food shipments destined for troops defending Madrid.⁶³ The same insufficiency made it difficult to collect milk for dairy production. Drivers could easily take advantage of the situation by demanding higher pay and engaging in illegal trading activities.

Price and Wage Controls

Price controls propelled economic difficulties. Agrarians felt that the political economy of the Republic discriminated against them by setting maximums on agricultural goods but not on industrial products. Communist militants noted 'the discontent of the peasants concerning the price of olives'.⁶⁴ Agricultural wage laborers in Aragón further objected to low wages. Workers, including some from the UGT and probably many females, fought against the officially set wage scale and apparently had refused to work or, at least, had slowed output until a new agreement was reached. Communists found themselves in an uncomfortable position, as to support the government and its official wage scale meant risking unpopularity among wage earners. They came down on the side of production, calling for 'shock brigades' and 'piecework to stimulate the output of day laborers'.⁶⁵ The PCE was joined on this issue by the rest of the Popular Front, which included all the parties and unions of the Left, not excluding the FAI. The entire spectrum called for Stakhanovites to sow and harvest in the countryside. Despite controlled wages, rural workers used the labor scarcity in the countryside to push their own agenda. The peasants and laborers in Mas de las Matas (population: 2300) and more generally in the district of Valderrobres (Teruel), where anarchists were the principal political force and often enrolled majorities in CNT collectives, were not reticent about making bread-and-butter demands a top priority. They felt they were not being adequately compensated for their labors and seemed to be reluctant to work the fields.⁶⁶

To stimulate peasant production, the CNT Regional Federation of Peasants requested that prices for agricultural goods be raised.⁶⁷ Without increases, it implied, peasants would not produce. The decreasing purchasing power of the peasantry, at least of those peasants who were not black marketeers, would continue in Aragón throughout 1937.⁶⁸ For example, by the end of the year, a pair of sandals, which had cost the equivalent of one kilo of oil, was worth four.⁶⁹ Everyone — whether collectivists or individual owners — worried that the government would confiscate their olive oil — which they could profitably use for barter — and compensate them with devalued paper money. Union members asked that the government pay for the collectives' oil (a commodity valuable not only as food but also as lighting fuel) not with paper money but rather in kind. The desire for real goods and the corresponding economy of barter were not limited to Aragón but occurred throughout the war in towns and villages of Alicante.⁷⁰ During the first two years of war, peasants in the Interior and Mediterranean regions must have felt victimized by a 600%–800% price increase of manufactured goods (such as textiles) and a mere 30%–40% price increase of agricultural produce.⁷¹

Urban priorities continued to dominate the countryside and to provoke divisions between rural and urban interests in both the CNT and UGT.⁷² To avoid 'egotisms', union peasant organizations wanted to fix higher wine prices.⁷³ A new rate well above the price maximum (*tasa*) was necessary since producers, it was claimed, had to sell other crops well below the cost of production. For example, in Sueca (Valencia) which claimed to produce one-sixth of the rice in Spain, growers in the UGT protested the government's fixing of what they considered to be overly modest prices for rice.⁷⁴ Collectives took matters into their own hands and became black marketeers. The CNT collective of Oliva (Valencia) sold potatoes at Pta 0.75 per kilo, considerably above the *tasa* of Pta 0.55.⁷⁵ Alert authorities confiscated and sold its supply.

It is hard to know to what extent the price controls and confiscations protected the consumer, but the legislation and its enforcement undoubtedly diminished production. Those who had a surplus to sell on the market were alienated by the political economy of the Republic. The 'farmer who works without stopping' (*el labrador que trabaja sin cesar*), as several villagers

put it, inevitably came to dislike a regime that discouraged profits and might take away their rice, wine, or animals. Peasants during the Russian and Spanish civil wars concluded that hard work was counter-productive in a period when the state or troops could confiscate their produce without 'fair' compensation. Controls and their accompanying bureaucracy — for example, difficult-to-acquire travel documents — encouraged relatively well-off peasants and even collectives to return to subsistence farming.⁷⁶ In Valencia, farmers discontinued growing oranges and planted only what their own families could consume.⁷⁷ The few observers — largely diplomatic personnel — that were able to travel in both zones reported that Republican farms were relatively neglected compared to the Nationalist ones.⁷⁸ In one Aragón town, Sariñena (Huesca), merchants simply closed their businesses and lived off their stocks.⁷⁹ In the province of Castellón, merchants and restaurant and bar owners were fined Pta 1000 for overcharging. The inability of the economy to supply basic tools, fertilizers, and energy supplies discouraged individuals and groups from participating in the market. The contraction of available commodities hardly motivated peasants to produce more than they themselves needed.

At the same time, the state had difficulty enforcing price controls. Soldiers with access to commodities speculated in them and in Republican currency.⁸⁰ Some stationed in isolated grazing areas worked out mutually satisfying deals with local peasants and forgot the needs of the rest of the country.⁸¹ In Barcelona, police and those with access to food supply were tempted to use their position for their own private advantage. Some in the Agrarian Collective of Barcelona, which possessed both irrigated gardens and over 100 retail stands in markets throughout the city and its suburbs, profited from the high price of food to engage in illegal deal making. One member had worked out his own private arrangement with a *carabiniro*, who would expropriate the vegetables he wanted from the collective's fields.⁸² Other members of the collective seemed powerless when they tried to stop what they considered to be theft by police. The forces of order responded to their protests with abuse, insults, and threats. Collectivists themselves engaged in clandestine sales with individual merchants who ignored the *tasa*.⁸³ Those who were involved in the 'straperlo' that is illegal trafficking in commodities subject to price controls, were suspended without pay. They

included a supervisor, a chauffeur, and female sales personnel. By August 'the fields which were close to the city were constantly assaulted . . . More than 40,000 kg. of vegetables were lost or damaged. The poor — and perhaps others — continued their old-regime practice of gleaning. These losses were caused not only by direct theft but also because we have to pick crops [to avoid pilfering] before they are ripe.'⁸⁴ The stealing of mature plants made it impossible to obtain seeds for next year's crop. The shortages provoked new problems: animals began to perish because of the lack of feed or means to transport it. These material difficulties were compounded by growing and competing bureaucracies — Comité Regulador de Precios (Price Regulatory Committee), Comisión Nacional de Abastos (National Supply Commission), Ministerio de Agricultura, and other organizations — all of which fixed prices.⁸⁵ The failure to coordinate their actions led to an 'economic catastrophe'. The Generalitat, realizing the difficulties of enforcing the maximums, wanted to permit greater flexibility of pricing, but its liberal policies conflicted with those of the national government.⁸⁶

Hoarding

Price controls encouraged hoarding and inspired fears of scarcity and shortage. Hoarding also reflected the traditional agriculture of the Interior and its closed, family-based production.⁸⁷ Concealing commodities hindered efforts to feed other regions. Inadequate reporting encouraged smuggling and black marketeering by merchants and traders, especially those from Catalonia. Catalan merchants supposedly made enormous profits buying Aragonese agricultural products at low prices and then exporting them abroad.⁸⁸ The Catalans then used the foreign currency to purchase Spanish goods at a discount. As early as November 1936, fears of profiteering motivated the Department of Agriculture of the Council of Aragón to prohibit all wheat exports without its consent.

Aragón officials also forbade the export of meat and took measures to ensure the region's own supply.⁸⁹ Meat became scarce for civilians and even front-line soldiers. *Labradores* (middle-class farmers) and shepherds who engaged in unauthorized trading of animals were arrested and fined.⁹⁰

Whatever its intentions, the prohibition on meat exports disrupted the economy of certain districts. In a sparsely inhabited area of Benabarre (Huesca), inhabitants customarily lived off the proceeds of livestock, especially goats.⁹¹ When the number of animals surpassed the capacity of the land to support them, they were sold to those outside the district. Furthermore, wise land-management practices dictated the reduction of the number of goats to preserve recently planted trees. Nevertheless, restrictions on sales were strictly enforced. Police, or at least those posing as police, caught a widow and her son trying to sell nine goats. They forced them to pay immediately a Pta 2000 fine. When the unfortunate lawbreakers opened their safe deposit box in the presence of the alleged 'officers,' the latter expropriated its entire contents, which amounted to at least Pta 2500. In some towns bordering Catalonia, the Council of Aragón's interdiction seemed to have hindered the normal trade of agricultural products for manufactured goods.⁹²

In September 1937, the Governor-General of Aragón, José Ignacio Mantecón, ordered an all-out battle against 'speculators' and 'monopolists'.⁹³ He argued that the 'unchecked egotism' of hoarders had caused high prices and scarcities in cities and towns where food was normally abundant in the fall. The governor believed that the treatment of black marketeers, speculators, and monopolists had been too lenient and demanded that they be subject to the same punishments as other enemies of the Republic. In addition, he suspected the collectives of conducting economically and morally shady activities and forbade them from 'trading in food'. Municipal authorities would be responsible for controlling, inspecting, and, if necessary, confiscating the stocks of the collectives.

Looting

Towns hid what they possessed and the knowledge of it for fear that Republican police or soldiers, like the militias of the early days, would confiscate it.⁹⁴ The fear was not unrealistic since, as has been seen, police and soldiers sometimes did 'abusively' take what they wanted.⁹⁵ Their belief that peasants were price gougers tended to justify such behavior.⁹⁶ Peasants were more than happy to sell troops whatever they wished above the price of the

maximum.⁹⁷ Towns suspected agents of the political police of acting in their own personal interest by excessively requisitioning possessions from 'fascist' villagers.⁹⁸ Police arrested and fined large numbers of residents, leaving to town councils and collectives the responsibility and expense of feeding and clothing the families of those detained. Police of the Aragón Council were accused of a series of abuses involving transportation. At gunpoint, they had forced the attendant of the gas pump of the Antifascist Militia Ebro Column to fill up their tank.⁹⁹ Three incidents of police extortion during one day convinced the militia to station a machine-gunner to guard the pumps. Police also requisitioned the car of the physician of Arén (Huesca), a small town which, like many in rural Spain, had few private automobiles and lacked telephones and telegraphs.¹⁰⁰ In general, the Council of Aragón won a reputation among some for corruption and favoritism.¹⁰¹

In Tardienta (Huesca), the CNT, UGT, and IR (Left Republican) members of the Antifascist Committee accused a militia column, which seems to have been composed of PSUC members, of completely trashing and looting the town.¹⁰² Tardienta, which possessed an anarchist collective and between 100 and 500 CNT members who had played a major role in defeating rebellious civil guards in July, had agreed to house the militiamen in peasant homes. The latter used the furniture and tools of the peasants as fuel for cooking and heating. They stole what they could easily sell, ate the animals, and shipped dozens of wagons of wheat to Catalonia. In Ribaroja (Valencia) soldiers gratuitously destroyed a collective's trees and ate its nuts, olives, fruit, and vegetables.¹⁰³ In June 1937, the Ministry of Defense lamented soldiers' looting of civilians and warned that such acts would be severely sanctioned.¹⁰⁴ Pillaging may have been linked to devaluation of the Republican currency and the inability of the Popular Army to pay its troops at regular intervals. Soldiers may have felt that they had earned the right to supplement their wages through pilfering.

By the middle of May 1938, small groups of between ten and twenty well-armed deserters were daily demanding food and assistance from CNT collectives and isolated farms in the district of Liria (Valencia).¹⁰⁵ The Liria collectives and in general those in the Valencian region had had a history of tension with regular army troops who had requisitioned food and shelter without

proper authorization.¹⁰⁶ Armed and hungry deserters, even if not ostensibly 'fascist,' represented a serious challenge to order in the Republican zone. They also reinforced fears among owners that the Republic was unable to secure property. To halt desertions from the front and to protect farms, CNT officials recommended intensive patrolling of the countryside.

In this context, assaults on the collectives can be viewed from a new angle. As has been seen, historians have often interpreted the attacks by certain units of the Republican Army in political terms. Communist troops, it is said, wanted to destroy the revolution in the countryside. This may be true, but these assaults were also another episode in a secular history of peasant/military confrontations. If some soldiers were convinced Communists, others were mere looters. In June in Aragón, they held up lorries at gunpoint and confiscated the vehicles themselves and their contents.¹⁰⁷ As the CNT Peasants' Union put it: 'The outrages against the collectives must stop. The government should take the necessary measures so that the military quartermaster or another official body can reimburse the collectives and individual farmers for the products that troops of the Popular Army have requisitioned without the approval of the quartermaster.'¹⁰⁸ For CNT peasants, the violation of property rights was as scandalous as the repression of libertarian militants.

Internal Functioning

The pressures of the outside world intensified internal difficulties. As the war endured, collectives became more selective about their membership. Perhaps this explains, in part, the decline of the ratio of members per collective. From mid-1937 to the end of 1938 the number of collectives increased by 25 % while the number of collectivists dropped by 50 %.¹⁰⁹ New collectives in the summer of 1937 issued rules designed to limit the number of unproductive members. They excluded those past the age of sixty who had not previously joined, widows without children in collectives, and minors whose parents were not members. All who joined were required to stay for at least a year and had to become union members. At a meeting of CNT peasant organizations of the Center, a delegate from Toledo believed that support for the unproductive — that is widows, orphans, physically

impaired, and elderly — was the most divisive issue among members.¹¹⁰ The CNT Regional Peasant Federation of the Center debated the issue of incentives versus the fixed (family) wage. The latter was viewed by many as the guarantee against the revival of pre-revolutionary inequalities. In the fall of 1936 the CNT regional unions of Catalonia and Levant had introduced the 'family wage' paid to the father according to the number of children.¹¹¹ The Graus (Huesca) collective had begun with a family wage but by the fall of 1937 felt compelled to introduce an incentive based on production.¹¹²

On both collective and private lands, regional CNT officials reported that 'agricultural production is declining and livestock is being rapidly consumed.'¹¹³ In the area east of Valdepeñas (Ciudad Real), 'in the middle of the harvest, the union locals that controlled all the wealth of these towns did not do their job, and local union leaders had to be forced to work'. Men and machinery were unprepared or inadequate. One farm, whose electrification and mechanization reflected militants' desires to rationalize agrarian production, was abandoned even though — with proper treatment — it could have become the breadbasket of the province. The productivity of laborers and harvesters had fallen well below the level it had reached during 'the era of the bosses . . . Almost all workers don't care about anything but getting their daily wage. They treat the controlled economy as though it were privately held.' To increase output, incentives and piecework were recommended. CNT regional authorities also suggested assigning a devoted militant to each union and collective to control the 'egotism . . . of some comrades' which was reputedly destroying the economy. Given this debate over monetary incentives and discipline, it is fruitful to re-examine the common program signed by the CNT and the UGT on 18 March 1938. Observers have often interpreted it as a sellout by the CNT which agreed to Communist and UGT demands to end the family wage.¹¹⁴ However, the desire of the Confederation's militants and leaders to motivate the base and compel it to work harder was also responsible for the decision tying pay to productivity.

Labor shortages further hindered production. The civil war created what may have been the first significant scarcity of hands in the history of modern Spanish agriculture. Many men had been conscripted into the army; others were attracted to urban

areas because of higher salaries and greater opportunities in certain professions, such as chauffeurs, who had ample occasions to engage in profitable petty trading.¹¹⁵ Women, according to male trade unionists, 'held such deep prejudices' against wage labor that an active campaign by female militants was necessary to get them into unions and working the fields. Perhaps one of the reasons for this reluctance to labor was that, as winter approached, both female and male peasants lacked clothing and shoes. By early 1938, as the shortage of workers became even more severe, the female presence was dominant in many villages. Unions continued to discriminate against women by paying them less and even, in the village of Berbegal (Huesca), of expelling single females from the collective.¹¹⁶ In many collectives, they could not vote.¹¹⁷ Yet the most lucid union leaders realized that female cooperation was absolutely essential in a period of labor scarcity. Union leaders supported professional training programs and new opportunities for women, although new jobs should be 'biologically' suitable and not contribute to the 'degeneration of the race'.¹¹⁸ Despite their sexism, collectives sometimes found women to be their strongest defenders. In Peñalba (Huesca), they protested when local authorities confiscated the collective's milk.¹¹⁹ Young women might also prefer the relative freedom from religious domination, especially with regard to sexuality and co-education, that collectivization brought to certain villages.¹²⁰ Parents appreciated the emphasis on childhood education and literacy in many collectives.¹²¹

The Lérida collective, which was the only one in this town of 35,000–40,000, is one of the few agrarian collectives for which fairly complete documentation remains. In the fall of 1936, the CNT was the moving force behind its formation on land which had been expropriated from or abandoned by 'fascists'.¹²² Apparently, in Lérida CNT followers usually held less land than UGT adherents, who were relatively uninterested in joining collectives. Until the end of 1936, the collective seems to have operated without great friction. By the spring of 1937, it comprised 100 families, 400 members, 300 hectares planted with corn and grain, and access to tractors, trucks, and other machinery.¹²³ Members performed their jobs satisfactorily, but soon problems appeared. For example, before the Christmas of 1936, a woman — who had to tend the feeding and clothing of ten to twelve comrades — complained about overwork. Conflicts

over labor led the collective to pass more rules: Any comrade who was absent during work hours would be expelled from the collective on the third violation. The reluctance to sacrifice made the imposition of local foremen a necessity, and the leadership was given authority to discipline those who did not do their duty.

The most important difficulty concerned how much collectivists should work. Some argued for infinite sacrifice; others wanted to define specific working hours. When the latter were set in January 1937, they were ignored by 'those who did not show any real interest and came late or left early'. The problem of tardiness continued throughout the year. In fact, in Foucauldian fashion, lateness stimulated new control and accounting procedures. A comrade was given the task of recording all comings and goings of personnel. One member noted 'we need statistics for those who do not know what work is and do not want to work.' The assembly assigned one person 'who could more or less read or write' from every farm (*finca*) to catalogue its possessions and register daily entrances and exits of its wage earners. By June 1937, the cooperative store was tightly monitored. The divide between 'those who work a great deal and others who hardly do anything' became the major impediment in this and other collectives.¹²⁴ The obligation to labor was universal in collectives, but in Lérida certain farms were notorious for doing little. Throughout 1937, workers left early and abandoned tools by the roadside. Propositions for elimination of the work-shy proliferated: 'They all should be expelled for not doing their work. They don't have the right to do what they want.' Those who claimed that they were sick were told to get medical proof of it. At the end of May, the general assembly decided to award itself the right to discharge 'comrades who don't do their work' and 'those who are intoxicated'. One of the latter was excluded in August 1937. The assembly also banned workers who made false accusations and had to expel a violator on at least one occasion.

Some members did not declare the income of their children who worked outside the collective. They wanted the cash that wage labor provided but, at the same time, did not wish to lose the benefits of collective membership. Their furtiveness violated rules on reporting of income and resulted in their expulsion. Other collectives enforced strict rules concerning the reporting of outside income, and demanded that members turn over all wages in excess of the standard collective salary.¹²⁵ In August 1937

several members who worked undeclared second jobs were excluded. A few collectivists appropriated collective food for non-collectivist family members.

By April 1937, tensions, which reflected the growth of the refugee population in the provincial capital, had developed between old and new members. The original members — who felt that they possessed the true collectivist spirit, that is ‘everything is for everyone without any class distinctions’ — believed that newer members ‘did not understand what a collective is’. They complained that the laborers referred by the Placement Office of Lérida were ‘not conscientious in their work for the collective’. The collective, it was said in June, ‘should not become a sanctuary’. By July, it had ‘too many people’. For their part, the newer members, who were refugees, felt that they were victims of discrimination. When in the summer of 1937, they organized their own clandestine meeting, the leadership reacted aggressively. The general assembly removed refugees’ right to speak and to vote, and permitted their expulsion. Tensions continued into the fall of 1937 when several members circulated a petition, which they sent to the Generalitat, that accused the leadership of stealing and corruption, a frequent complaint of collectivists about their officers.¹²⁶ The leadership credibly refuted the charges and won firm support from the CNT’s local federation. Management was helped by the family history of one of its detractors: His wife and daughter had been caught at the border trying to flee with ‘thousands of *pesetas*’. The petition’s defenders were excluded from the collective.

A veteran militant, who was one of the most active and respected of the collectivists, proposed that ‘we expel the gypsies. They are very young and have a lot of children.’ Gypsies, of course, had never adopted the productivist lifestyle propagated by activists of various modern ‘isms’. As George Orwell noted, they continued to beg on the streets of Barcelona during the apex of the revolution.¹²⁷ Given the family wage scale, large families were financially burdensome for the collective. Struggle erupted between big families who took advantage of the collective’s social and medical services and those with fewer or no offspring. A similar problem concerned the exertions of the elderly and their contribution to the community. The assembly approved a complex wage scale which aimed to tie pay to the needs of various age groups and genders. Still, gender strife continued. A

female comrade refused wage labor that was paid less than Pta 8 per day. On one of the collective's farms, women struck to protest the order to sleep on straw. However, it should be mentioned that mattresses were scarce in a number of collectives, and in certain cases, a woman had to be pregnant to obtain one.¹²⁸ Sexist male leaders concluded that 'the problem of women is similar in all collectives. It is a result of egotism and lack of spirit of sacrifice. Unfortunately, there are few that are conscientious collectivists. Female comrades must do certain jobs, such as cleaning and washing.' A woman who refused to work in the dairy was threatened with expulsion. Females were warned that if they did not attend an assembly (to be held on a Sunday in August 1937), they would be penalized.

By May, the problem of political purity arose. The collective was CNT-AIT (First International), but it was hard to find militants who had belonged to the Confederation throughout their adult lives. To elect officials, one member recommended that 'we took forward not backwards because if we look towards the past, we shall find only four comrades who have been loyal to the Confederation.' The relationship between workers and those who were in charge of output and quality was hostile. The former continually insulted the latter, calling them 'bourgeois' or 'dictators'. Some workers threatened managers, and others complained that the delegates in charge made them work as hard as the bourgeoisie had. Managers' and delegates' authority was undermined by their own irresponsible acts. Some abandoned their jobs for the attractions of town. Another hid gasoline and motor oil in his home, justifying himself by claiming that obtaining the proper documentation was too difficult.¹²⁹ The assembly was obliged to pass measures to control and inspect the work of its own delegates and managers.

Conclusion

Historians have often attributed the difficulties of collectives to outside forces, that is to the pressures of the war and the attacks of the Confederation's political enemies.¹³⁰ Certainly, without the support of an efficient and united government, it is difficult to see how collectives could have prospered. However, internal divisions amongst the workers themselves compounded political

tensions and economic deficiencies. Many, if not most, members gave priority to their own needs first and then considered those of communities larger than themselves and their families. Activists devoted to a cause had to confront a relatively selfish rank-and-file. Village requirements provoked more solidarity than region, Republic, or revolution. The degree of commitment declined as the group became bigger or the cause more abstract. In striking ways, productivist militants and managers in Spanish collectives came to resemble their Soviet counterparts who, despite the assistance of a powerful and centralized state, also reported problems of motivation and discipline. As in the USSR, many collectivists expressed a strong distrust of all those — in the Spanish case, women, elderly, gypsies, and sometimes even soldiers — who were not considered fully fledged producers.

Hoarding goods and information showed that collectives were not beehives of solidarity. Bartering and black marketeering abandoned many urban residents and much of the Popular Army to their hungry fates. The Republic proved incapable of sufficiently mobilizing peasant energies to win its life and death struggle. Its wage and price controls and the indiscipline of its troops backfired by reinforcing agrarian egotisms. A social-historical approach from below shows that the conflict between rural and urban was as consequential for the Republic's decline as the political and social divisions which have often been the traditional focus of much Spanish civil-war historiography.

Notes

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1. Alardo Prats, *Vanguardia y retaguardia de Aragón* (Buenos Aires 1938); Gaston Leval, *Collectives in the Spanish Revolution*, tr. Vernon Richards (London 1975); Agustín Souchy and Paul Folgare, *Colectivizaciones: La obra constructiva de la revolución española* (Barcelona 1977); George Orwell, *Homage to Catalonia* (New York and London 1980); José Peirats, *La CNT en la revolución española*, 3 vols (Paris 1971).

2. Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York 1969), 72–126. Chomsky was highly critical of the accounts of the 'liberal historians', Gabriel Jackson and Hugh Thomas.

3. *Ibid.*, 105.

4. Stanley Payne, *The Spanish Revolution* (New York 1970); Hugh

Thomas 'Anarchist Agrarian Collectives in the Spanish Civil War', in Raymond Carr, ed., *The Republic and the Civil War in Spain* (London and Basingstoke 1971); Jacques Maurice, 'Problemática de las colectividades agrarias en la guerra civil', *Agricultura y Sociedad* (April-June 1978), 53-85; Walther L. Bernecker, *Colectividades y Revolución social: El anarquismo en la guerra civil española, 1936-1939*, tr. Gustau Muñoz (Barcelona 1982).

5. Frank Mintz, *La autogestión en la España revolucionaria* (Madrid 1977); Encarna and Renato Simoni, *Cretas: La colectivización de un pueblo Aragonés durante la guerra civil española, 1936-37* (Alcañiz 1984); Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War* (New York 1986); for an anti-Communist perspective, see Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution* (Chapel Hill and London 1991).

6. Aurora Bosch Sánchez, *Ugetistas y Libertarios: Guerra civil y revolución en el país valenciano, 1936-39* (Valencia 1983); Vicente Abad, *Historia de la Naranja, 1781-1939* (Valencia 1984); Julián Casanova, *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936-1938* (Madrid 1985); Julián Casanova, ed., *El sueño igualitario: Campesinado y colectivización en la España republicana* (Zaragoza 1988).

7. James Simpson, *Spanish Agriculture: The Long Siesta, 1765-1965* (Cambridge 1995), 55.

8. Franz Borkenau, *The Spanish Cockpit* (Ann Arbor 1963), 102.

9. Total seizures may have amounted to approximately one-third of arable land. Payne, *Spanish Revolution*, 240-1; Luis Garrido González, 'Producción agraria y guerra civil', in Casanova, ed., *El sueño*, 100. Anarchist sources, however, claimed that nearly half of the peasants in the Republican zone were 'collectivists'. See Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 111.

10. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 146-8, 194-6.

11. Payne, *Spanish Revolution*, 259.

12. Julián Casanova, 'Campesinado y colectivización en Aragón', in Casanova, ed., *El sueño*, 51.

13. Figures in Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 348; Mintz, *La autogestión*, 102; Simoni, *Cretas*, 122. For much larger estimates of collectivists and collectives see Bernecker, *Colectividades*. 108, 196-250. He states that there were 300,000 collectivists in Aragón comprising 70 to 75 % of the Republican population; CNT apologists, Prats, *Vanguardia*, 81 and Peirats, *La CNT*, 1: 286, provide even higher figures of 450 collectives and 433,000 collectivists in Aragón. Thomas 'Agrarian Collectives', 242, follows Prats' and Peirats' Aragón figures. In Levant, the collectivization of 20% of the land affected 40% of the population or 130,000 people.

14. Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 96, 111, 122, 195; Prats, *Vanguardia*, 48, notes that the soldiers stationed in Aragón spoke Catalan.

15. En el departamento 5 August 1937, AASM-512-42, Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Madrid.

16. Los compañeros, 24 November 1936, Barcelona 839, Archivo Histórico Nacional-Sección Guerra Civil (henceforth AHN-SGC), Salamanca; Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 355.

17. Souchy and Folgare, *Colectivizaciones*, 27.

18. CNT-UGT, 20 April 1937, Aragón R 51, AHN-SGC.

19. Caspe, 2 July 1937, Aragón R 51, AHN-SGC.

20. Informe, 4 January and 19 April 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
21. CNT, 5 April 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
22. Georges A. Collier, *Socialists of Rural Andalusia* (Stanford 1987), 42.
23. Acta, 28 November 1937, Madrid 542, AHN-SGC. On peasant ownership, see Simoni, *Cretas*, 16, 31; on *medieros*, see Leval, *Collectives*, 122.
24. Informe, n.d., Madrid 542, AHN-SGC.
25. CNT, 18 January 1938, AASM-514-10, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
26. Borkenau, *Cockpit*, 156.
27. Libertarian historians, of course, emphasize spontaneous collectivization. See Leval, *Collectives*, 91, 160, and Prats, *Vanguardia*.
28. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants* (New York and Oxford 1994), 10.
29. Informe, n.d., Madrid 542, AHN-SGC.
30. Personado, 27 April 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
31. Sr Delegado, 18 January 1938, AASM-514-10, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
32. Actas, 26 December 1937, PS Madrid, 2467; AHN-SGC. The funds were mainly devoted to legal expenses for imprisoned militants.
33. Informe, 24 March 1938, ZR, rollo 93, Servicio Histórico Militar (henceforth SHM), Avila. Many activists went into hiding; others sought refuge with CNT forces at the front. Desde, n.d., AASM-510-40, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
34. El Departamento, 5 August 1937, ZR, a. 47,1. 71, c. 3, SHM.
35. Informe, 16 June 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC; con fecha, 27 November 1937, Barcelona 1329, AHN-SGC. Mintz, *La autogestión*, 219, and Peirats, *La CNT*, 281, report that individuals had total freedom to enter and leave certain collectives. Leval, *Collectives*, shows that rules on returning property varied from one collective to another. Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants*, 64.
36. Informe, José Carrasquer, 3 November 1937, AASM-514-21, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
37. Ibid.
38. Sr Gobernador, n.d., ZR, a. 47,1. 71, c. 6, SHM.
39. Natividad Rodrigo González, *Las colectividades agrarias en Castilla-La Mancha* (Toledo 1985), 82.
40. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 149.
41. For a critique of collectivist 'neo-capitalism,' see *ibid.*, 133.
42. Quoted in Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 280.
43. Para el Comité Regional, Caspe, March 1937, AASM-512-48, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
44. Maurice, 'Problemática', 76.
45. Consejo Regional de Defensa Aragón, n.d., AASM-512-49, Fundación Pablo Iglesias; Informe, September 1937, ZR, a. 47, l. 71, c. 3, SHM.
46. Para el Comité Regional, Caspe, March 1937, AASM-512-48, Fundación Pablo Iglesias; Cf. Prats, *Vanguardia*, 95.
47. La Cooperativa Obrera, n.d., AASM-514-14, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
48. Para el Comité Regional, Caspe, March 1937, AASM-512, Funda-

ción Pablo Iglesias.

49. Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 354; Simoni, *Cretas*, 114.
50. Informe, Barbastro, 24 August 1937, AASM-510-41, Fundación Pablo Iglesias; Leval, *Collectives*, 221.
51. Quoted in Lars T. Lih, *Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921* (Berkeley 1990), 159.
52. A la federación, 20 June, 1938, PS Madrid, 2467, AHN-SGC.
53. Informe, [Fall] 1938, PS Madrid 2467, AHN-SGC. On peasant resistance to reform in the countryside, see Jerome Blum, *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton 1978), ch. 13.
54. Federación, 25 May 1938, Barcelona 811, AHN-SGC.
55. Lih, *Bread*, 126; Richard Cobb, *The People's Armies*, tr. Marianne Elliott (New Haven 1987).
56. See Leval, *Collectives*, for a view that emphasizes both the social and economic achievements of collectives.
57. Cf. Fernando Eguidazu, *Intervención monetaria y control de cambios en España, 1900-1977* (Madrid 1978), 171, who finds the collapse of the Republican *peseta* on foreign exchange markets insignificant since it was not used for foreign trade, which the Republic conducted exclusively in foreign currencies and precious-metals reserves. Angel Viñas, *El oro de Moscú: Alfa y omega de mito franquista* (Barcelona 1979), 197, also emphasizes the inconvertibility of the Republican *peseta* on international markets.
58. Leval, *Collectives*, 141-2, sees barter as a rational method of exchange among villages and collectives. CNT militants were, in theory, against trading with 'individualists' and the state.
59. See Georg Simmel, 'Money in Modern Culture,' *Theory, Culture, & Society* vol. 8, no. 3 (August 1991), 18.
60. Lih, *Bread*, 57: 'If it is true to say that the breakdown in transport was a central cause of the food-supply crisis, it is just as true to say that the food-supply crisis was a central cause of the breakdown in transport.'
61. Figure from *Rapport de la mission sanitaire de la Société des Nations en Espagne* (Paris 1937), 28.
62. Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 132.
63. Informe, 11 October 1937, ZR, a. 64, 1. 935, c. 3, SHM.
64. Acta, 22 November 1937, Madrid 542, AHN-SGC.
65. El Frente, 29 September 1937, AASM-512-19, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
66. Informe, 25 October 1937, AASM-514-21, Fundación Pablo Iglesias; Simoni, *Cretas*, 119; cf. Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 127, and Mintz, *La autogestión*, 176.
67. Informe, 20-3 October 1937, AASM-512-25, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
68. Segunda Sesión, 11 December 1937, AASM-510-38, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
69. Acta, 5-6 December 1937, AASM-510-37, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
70. José Miguel Santacreu Soler, *La crisis monetaria española de 1937* (Alicante 1986), 68.
71. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 162.
72. See Leval, *Collectives*, 315, who describes the Valencian millers,

organized by the CNT and UGT, and their demands for requisitions and price controls.

73. Acta, 28 November 1937, PS Madrid 2467, AHN-SGC.
74. Al camarada, 20 September 1937, Barcelona 624, AHN-SGC.
75. Colectividad, 11 November 1937, Barcelona 1329, AHN-SGC.
76. On the collectives' tendency toward self-sufficiency, see Maurice, 'Problemática', 53-85.
77. Abad, *Historia de la Naranja*, 356; cf. J. M. Santacreu Soler, *L'Economia valenciana durant la guerra civil: Protagonisme o estancament agrari* (Valencia 1992), which emphasizes economic dynamism.
78. Gabriel Jackson, *Spanish Republic and the Civil War* (Princeton 1965), 417.
79. Informe, n.d., Madrid 542, AHN-SGC.
80. Informe, n.d., ZR rollo 45, SHM.
81. Informe, 10 October 1938, rollo 45, SHM.
82. El Consejo, 11 July 1938, PS Madrid 2436, AHN-SGC.
83. Colectividad, 19 October 1938, PS Madrid, 2436, AHN-SGC.
84. Informe, 15 August 1938, PS Madrid, 2436, AHN-SGC. On the 'failure' of the CNT agrarian collective in Badalona, see Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 449.
85. Company, 15 August 1938, Madrid 542, AHN-SGC.
86. Josep Maria Bricall, *Política econòmica de la Generalitat (1936-1939)*, 2 vols (Barcelona 1978), 1:113-14.
87. Casanova, *El sueño*, 12.
88. Federación, 1 May 1937, Castellón 624, AHN-SGC.
89. Simoni, *Cretas*, 123.
90. Comisaría, 26 July 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
91. A la presidencia, 4 May 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
92. Informe, 26 February 1938, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
93. El Sr., 23 September 1937, Vinaroz 5/12, AHN-SGC. On Mantecón's political history, see Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 223.
94. Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 173, 181.
95. Informe, 20-3 October 1937, AASM-512-25, Fundación Pablo Iglesias; Simoni, *Cretas*, 155.
96. Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 174; Colectividad, 5 April 1937, Castellón 254, AHN-SGC.
97. Caspe, 25 July 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
98. Informe, n.d. Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
99. The Column claimed that gasoline should be used exclusively for the war effort. En Caspe, 9 January 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
100. A la Consejería, 27 May 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC.
101. Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 393.
102. Reunidos, 29 March 1937, Barcelona 839, AHN-SGC; Mintz, *La autogestión*, 100; Borkenau, *Cockpit*, 108; Casanova, *Anarquismo*, 24.
103. IV Cuerpo, 26 June 1937, a. 70, 1. 1075, c. 5, SHM.
104. Ibid.
105. Informe, 6 June 1938, Barcelona 811, AHN-SGC.
106. Federación, 25 May 1938, Barcelona 811, AHN-SGC; Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 312-27.

107. Leval, *Collectives*, 334–5.
108. Informe 20–3 October 1937, ZR, a. 47, 1. 71, c. 4, SHM.
109. Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 393; See Mintz, *Autogestión*, 148.
110. Actas, 26 December 1937, PS Madrid, 2467, AHN-SGC.
111. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 185.
112. Actas, 26 December 1937, PS Madrid, 2467, AHN-SGC; Informe, 15 August 1937, PS Madrid 542. Cf. the idealistic picture of Graus presented in Prats, *Vanguardia*, 89.
113. Acta, 11 October 1937, PS Madrid, 2467, AHN-SGC.
114. Cf. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 137.
115. Acta, 13 September 1937, PS Madrid 2467, AHN-SGC.
116. Informe, n.d., AASM-512–34, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
117. Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 356.
118. Consejo Regional, January 1938, AASM-515–7, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
119. Sr Gobernador, 20 January 1938, AASM-514–10, Fundación Pablo Iglesias.
120. Thomas, 'Agrarian Collectives', 252.
121. Prats, *Vanguardia*, 93.
122. Much of the following is from the libro de actas, 1936–7, PS Lérida, AHN-SGC. The lack of information concerning collectives has often been attributed to rural illiteracy, but it may also be due to a desire not to wash dirty laundry in public. Cf. Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 191–2.
123. Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 111; Peirats, *La CNT*, 1: 277.
124. For the problem in Valencia, see Bosch, *Ugetistas*, 203.
125. Souchy and Folgare, *Colectivizaciones*, 151.
126. See Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, 368–9.
127. Orwell, *Homage*, 6.
128. Compañeros, n.d., PS Madrid 2467, AHN-SGC.
129. The growing state bureaucracy and 'its innumerable laws' were common complaints of peasants — whether collectivist, individualist, CNT, or UGT. Actas, 26 December 1937, PS Madrid, 2467, AHN-SGC.
130. See Bernecker, *Colectividades*, 130.

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