The making of an interethnic coalition: urban and rural anarchists in La Paz, Bolivia, 1946–1947

Kevin A. Young

Department of History, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA

ABSTRACT

The 1947 upheavals on haciendas outside La Paz, Bolivia, were facilitated by an interethnic coalition between indigenous peasants and urban anarchists, most of whom were mestizos and cholos (thus ‘non-indigenous’ by official definition). Three sets of factors were essential to this alliance. First, the urbanites’ own politics – their libertarian socialist vision, their attentiveness to both ‘ethnic’ and ‘class’ demands, and their organizational federalism – proved particularly conducive to coalition-building. Second, prior autonomous mobilization outside the city had created local leaders and networks which would form the rural bases for the coalition, and which would also help redefine the anarchist left starting in 1946. Finally, a series of coalition brokers bridged traditional divides of language, ethnicity, and geography. These three factors allowed anarchist organizers to exploit a limited political opening that appeared in 1945–1946. This account qualifies common dismissals of the Latin American left as mestizo-dominated and class-reductionist while also illuminating the process through which the alliance developed.

KEYWORDS

Anarchism; Bolivia; indigenous movements; ethnic relations; Latin American left; worker–peasant alliance

In late May 1947, a frantic telegram arrived in La Paz from Los Andes, the rural province of 20,000 located just northwest of the Bolivian capital. The Sub-Prefect of Los Andes, Luis Lahore Monje (1947), warned of grave threats to the social order:

Since January we have witnessed a series of troubles throughout the entire province of Los Andes, given that the entire indíada [Indian mass] is to be found in an attitude of subversion, continually threatening to unleash across the entire altiplano [plateau region], and later entering the city of La Paz, a total uprising aimed at destroying all the towns, especially in this Province, in order to then redistribute the Haciendas’ lands and name their own authorities.

Lahore Monje mentioned one hacienda in particular, in Carapata, located near the eastern shore of Lake Titicaca (Map 1). He alleged that indigenous workers there had attempted an unsuccessful uprising on 1 May and had again ‘started to make the rounds to all the Haciendas’ in preparation for a new attempt. The ‘indígenas’ of Carapata, who are the main instigators and leaders,’ were reportedly in touch with workers at about 36
different haciendas in the province. And the telegram made another alarming charge: the rebels were also ‘in direct contact with members of the Federación Obrera Local,’ the anarchist workers’ federation in the city (Lahore Monje 1947).¹

The telegram includes several tropes common in elite characterizations of popular rebellion. The rebels themselves are presented as a dark-skinned horde (the ‘indiada’). They are devoid of rationality, sweeping across the land like a force of nature. For the elite of La Paz and other cities, this language would have conjured memories of the past indigenous uprisings that continued to haunt their collective dreams, from the famous 1781 siege of La Paz by the forces of Túpac Katari to the hacienda strikes and land conflicts of recent years. The telegram’s reference to the Federación Obrera Local (Local Workers Federation, FOL) reflects another familiar claim, implying that the unrest afflicting the province was largely the work of outside agitators.

Hysterical rhetoric aside, however, the telegram actually contained much truth. In early 1947, Los Andes and several other provinces of La Paz, along with Ayopaya and other regions of Cochabamba, were the sites of tremendous upheaval targeting hacienda owners and the racial and economic system they represented. Hacienda workers had formed dozens of unions during the year prior, while hacienda workers and ‘free’ indigenous communities alike had also agitated for land, schools, and autonomy. And urban anarchists, most of whom would have been classified as mestizos or cholos (thus ‘non-indigenous’), were indeed assisting the indigenous workers in Carapata – and were doing the same throughout Los Andes and nearby provinces.²

Only recently has interethnic collaboration on the Latin American left begun to attract serious scholarly attention. Most commentators have instead emphasized the arrogance and ethnocentrism of urban leftists vis-à-vis rural peasants and Indians (Van Cott 2005; Warren 2004). There is certainly much evidence to support this characterization: ideology and practice on the left have often been marred by ethnic prejudice and the assumption that urban workers and intellectuals are the vanguards of revolution (Hale 1994; Soliz 2012). The overlapping history of twentieth-century indigenismo, which usually involved non-indigenous intellectuals debating how to ‘redeem’ the Indian, is likewise replete with paternalism.

Recent historical research, however, has begun to reveal a more heterogeneous set of left traditions, particularly in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. In many parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, urban Marxism and anarchism mixed with indigenous and Afro liberationist currents to produce interethnic coalitions, often across the urban–rural divide (Becker 2008; Carr 1987, 1998; Coronel 2011; Gould and Lauria-Santiago 2008; Hirsch 2015). During this period, the Soviet Union’s influence over radical thought was weak and indirect, and local visions of revolution were relatively heterodox.³ Several recent studies of Bolivia have highlighted interethnic collaboration in the 1927 Chayanta revolt and the rural organizing efforts of the late 1930s and 1940s (Gotkowitz 2007, 159–162, 247–256; Hylton et al. 2003). Though not totally free of traditional prejudices, the radical visions that animated these coalitions were relatively non-hierarchical compared with those that predominated on some parts of the left.⁴ They were also less class-reductionist, prioritizing the struggle against racism and internal colonialism alongside the class struggle, and doing so long before the rise of the more well-known indigenous movements of the late twentieth century.
This article examines the alliance between La Paz anarchists and indigenous hacienda laborers in the late 1940s, focusing on the upsurge in unionization and strikes in places like Carapata in 1946–1947 (see Map 1). In 1946, rural union leaders from the provinces of Los Andes and Pacajes formed the Federación Agraria Departamental (Departmental Agrarian Federation, FAD), and in December of that year formally affiliated with the urban FOL. Three characteristics of the participants themselves facilitated this development. First, ‘Folista’ politics, including their libertarian socialist vision, their attentiveness to ‘ethnic’ as well as ‘class’ demands, and their organizational federalism, proved particularly conducive to coalition-building.5

An inclusive ideology and democratic organizational structure were not enough, however. The second prerequisite for the coalition’s formation was the prior history of organizing in rural areas, which furnished local ‘movement infrastructures’ that formed the basis for the FAD (Andrews 2004). Past studies, as well as urban anarchists’ own recollections, have often exaggerated the urban impetus behind the coalition (Alexander 2005, 61; Antezana and Romero 1973, 159; FOL: Órgano de la Federación Obrera Local [newspaper publication, hereafter FOL], 1 May 1948). The alliance is more properly understood as a negotiated process in which rural Indians not only helped initiate ties but also helped shape the urbanites’ own discourse and priorities.

The final precondition was a series of brokers who could bridge linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and geographic divides. These individuals came from both urban and rural areas, were often bilingual, and enjoyed a certain geographic mobility stemming from their occupations and migration patterns. They acted as the proximate human links that wove the alliance together.

Together, these three ‘internal’ characteristics allowed organizers to exploit, and expand, the limited opportunities offered by their external context. The postwar conjuncture of 1945–1946 featured a brief but substantial relaxation of authoritarian rule, as in most Latin American countries (Bethell and Roxborough 1992). The coalition government of Colonel Gualberto Villarroel and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, MNR), in power from 1943 to 1946, proved more willing than its predecessors to permit challenges to landlord domination in the countryside. The FAD and FOL opposed the Villarroel–MNR regime but nonetheless benefited from the relative freedom to organize. By late 1946 the government had been toppled and repression by landlords and state forces had increased, but the anarchists had seized the moment to make crucial organizational gains.

The first section below presents background on the pre-1946 political context, focusing on elite fears of an urban–rural and interethnic alliance. The second section summarizes the events of 1946–1947, including FAD–FOL organizing efforts, the hacienda uprisings of early 1947, and the ensuing repression. From there, the next three sections look backward in time to examine how the coalition was possible, analyzing each of the factors identified above and how they helped La Paz radicals take advantage of the brief political opening in 1945–1946. The conclusion suggests some of the broader implications for our understandings of the twentieth-century Latin American left, social movements, ideology, and coalition formation.
An Indian republic via communist instigation?

The growth of the FAD and its integration into the FOL seemed to confirm the worst fear of hacienda owners and their supporters in government: an urban–rural, interethnic coalition of radicals. In the days and months following the rebellions of 1947, the establishment press sounded hysterical warnings about urban agitators in the countryside (see La Razón, 27 May 1947). Even 2 years after the rebellions had been decisively repressed, the conservative Cochabamba daily Los Tiempos wondered whether ‘Bolivia and Peru will become Indian republics through communist instigation.’ The paper quoted a US author, Williard Price, who warned that ‘Indians are particularly susceptible to communist propaganda due to their long and satisfying tradition of communism prior to the Spanish conquistadors’ arrival’ (Los Tiempos, 21 June 1949).

Though hyperbolic, such warnings were partly based in reality. Cooperation between urban and rural activists had first begun in the 1920s. Urban artisans and leftist intellectuals had started providing legal and educational support to communal landholders (comunarios) in the mid-1920s, when struggles in defense of land and for indigenous schools became the key points of articulation. In Sucre, the socialist Ferrer School founded in 1922 had been in contact with indigenous community leaders in Chuquisaca and Potosí departments, and urban–rural collaboration played a significant role in the massive 1927 Chayanta revolt (Hylton et al. 2003). In La Paz, several future leaders of the FOL had given legal advice to indigenous communities as early as 1924. Santos Marka T’ula, the most famous of the caciques apoderados (a network of indigenous community leaders), stayed with La Paz mechanic and anarchist Luis Cusicanqui when he was visiting the capital (Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 40–41; Rodríguez García 2012, 55, 72). The writings of people like Cusicanqui and prominent socialist Tristán Marof also indicate that the urban left of the 1920s was starting to pay more attention to struggles against haciendas, land usurpation, and racism in the countryside.

Following the Chaco War with Paraguay (1932–1935), parts of the urban labor movement and the left looked to the countryside with renewed interest. Various labor federations passed resolutions condemning ‘exploiters of the labor of workers and of the Indian’ and calling for an ‘alliance between workers and peasants’ (cited in Antezana and Romero 1973, 72, 87). Some supported unionization efforts and sit-down strikes among hacienda workers (colonos) in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Antezana and Romero 1973, 79–100; Gottkowitz 2007, 159–162). Between 1942 and 1944, rural organizers and Sucre socialists linked to the Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (PIR) held three path-breaking congresses that drew indigenous delegates from five departments. The 1944 congress set forth demands for land, unionization rights, the abolition of forced servitude, maternity leave for female hacienda servants, literacy programs, and legal services (Antezana and Romero 1973, 86–88, 91–92; Los Tiempos, 5 April 1945). These three congresses were important precursors to the more well-known 1945 Indigenous Congress sponsored by the Villarroel–MNR regime.

The response from big landowners and the state provides some indication of the threat posed by these incipient ties. Anarchists Luis Cusicanqui, Modesto Escóbar, and Jacinto Centellas were imprisoned for a 1929 manifesto calling for indigenous insurrection (Lora 1970, 64–65; Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 43; Rodríguez García 2012, 79–83). Following the Chaco War, as many urban unions began to support rural struggles, the
government responded unequivocally. A Marxist delegate to the 1938 constitutional convention, Antonio Carvajal of Oruro, was expelled for criticizing hacienda owners (Delgado González 1984, 128–133). Various governments sought to criminalize urban–rural collaboration altogether. A 1938 executive decree by Germán Busch (1937–1939) outlawed preaching to ‘the indigenous class.’ A similar decree by the Peñaranda regime in 1943 declared that urban unions ‘must not address issues related to agrarian activities,’ noting with alarm how many union statutes advocated a worker–peasant alliance (Busch 1938; La Calle, 3 February 1943). 9

Nonetheless, by the mid-1940s the threat of such an alliance seemed more present than ever. Rural organizing efforts also received an unwitting boost from the Villarroel regime. The government-sponsored Indigenous Congress of May 1945 was intended to co-opt the growing militancy of the rural indigenous movement. Instead it had the opposite effect, raising the expectations of rural laborers and providing a set of official decrees that activists then invoked against landlords and local officials. Rural activists continued to cite the Congress as justification for their demands following Villarroel’s July 1946 assassination, which brought to power a series of more repressive regimes bent on restoring rural order (Antezana and Romero 1973, 101–123; Gotkowitz 2007, 192–232). While the state repression of the sexenio period (1946–1952) would deter many urban leftists from venturing outside the city, rural militancy continued to spread, and some leftists continued to pursue urban–rural coalitions. 10

The 1946 pact and the 1947 rebellion

FOL organizing efforts in the countryside commenced following a May 1946 decision by the federation to prioritize rural unionization (FOL 1946a). In August of that year, Foliista Modesto Escóbar began traveling across the Altiplano region, and the FOL soon established a Center for Anarchist Union Training (Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 84). The formal pact between the FAD and FOL was signed in December 1946 by FOL leaders and 21 FAD representatives from the provinces of Los Andes and Pacajes (‘La Federación Obrera Local y la Federación Agraria Departamental,’ 1946). Most of the FAD leaders were from haciendas in the cantons of Aygachi (Los Andes) or Topohoco (Pacajes). In both provinces, the haciendas greatly outnumbered the independent indigenous communities. 11 This reality, and the wave of hacienda-based mobilizations in the 1940s, made the haciendas the natural focus of FAD–FOL efforts. 12 Their principal demands were for unionization rights, the abolition of forced labor and other abusive practices, and the construction of new schools. Figure 1 shows a historic rally in La Paz on 1 May 1947, featuring both urban and rural anarchists.

In the first 6 months of 1947 there were several violent attacks on hacienda personnel in La Paz and Cochabamba departments. In La Paz, the two major sites of violence were the Anta hacienda in Pacajes, in May, and the Tacanoca hacienda in Los Andes in early June. At least four people were killed, including a hacienda owner, his niece, a supervisor, and a teacher. Both colonos and comunarios participated in the violence, though precise responsibility and motives are difficult to ascertain: the violence was partly driven by anger toward abusive owners and overseers, but inter-landlord rivalry may also have played an instigating role at Tacanoca (Gotkowitz 2007, 252–253; Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003, 106).
However, to focus attention on the occasional acts of violence, as the press did, would be to miss most of the story. The FAD leadership explicitly opposed violence, condemning ‘that sinister idea that the savage Indian is only capable of protesting against arbitrary actions and taunts through violent uprisings.’ We ‘organized peasants have no need to kill, to assault, nor to set fire to anyone’s house’ (FAD 1947a). While some of the violence occurred on or near haciendas that had FAD-affiliated unions – including at Carapata, Aygachi, and Tacanoca in Los Andes, and Caquiaviri and Topohoco in Pacajes – it is doubtful whether the FAD leadership planned it (Antezana and Romero 1973, 146–155; Rodriguez García 2012, 219–220; Gotkowitz 2007, 252–253). When violent protest did occur, anarchist leaders blamed landlords’ abuses for provoking ‘regrettable incidents that neither the FAD nor anyone else could control’ and argued that landlords and officials were using the violence as an excuse to repress rural organizing efforts (Comité de Defensa de la Federación Obrera Local 1947).

Most of the FAD and FOL organizers’ time and energy in 1946 and 1947 went into forming unions on the haciendas, building schools, and circulating revolutionary manifestos. By May 1947, the FAD included an estimated 20 member unions with 20,000 total members, most of which were in Pacajes and Los Andes. The two organizations had also helped establish dozens of schools. Even the confrontations in the first half of 1947 were mostly limited to work stoppages, land occupations, petitions to government officials, and other nonviolent tactics, only occasionally involving physical assaults. Just a handful of owners and administrators were killed, compared with scores of indigenous victims.

In May–June 1947, between 1000 and 2000 people were arrested, the FOL’s office was raided and shut down, and FAD leaders like Marcelino Quispe and Evaristo Mamani were tortured. Soon after, dozens of FAD organizers were sent to a tropical prison camp in

Figure 1. Anarchist rally in La Paz, 1 May 1947. The addition of rural affiliates in 1946–1947 more than doubled the total FOL membership. Note the presence of several banners mentioning labriegos, or rural laborers. Source: Archivo Luis Cusicanqui, Tambo Colectivo Ch’ixi, La Paz. Used with permission.
Santa Cruz department, where at least 30 of them perished of starvation and disease. The FAD and FOL would survive in weakened form until around 1953, but neither organization recovered from this repression. The elite response offers an indication of the unique threat posed by the FAD–FOL alliance. One Trotskyist historian not particularly sympathetic to anarchism remarked that the 1 May 1947 march in La Paz (shown in Figure 1), which included thousands of FAD members, ‘constituted a novelty. At this moment the authorities decided to put an end to anarchist activities in the countryside’ (Lora 1970, 98).

The march was indeed a novelty: it reflected Bolivia’s largest urban–rural and inter-ethnic coalition in decades, and a remarkably horizontal one. Though the coalition was soon suppressed, its formation merits closer scrutiny.

**Libertarian socialism in La Paz, 1920s–1940s**

Part of the background to the alliance lies in the growth of anarchist organizing in La Paz over the prior two decades. Bolivian anarchism and Marxism both underwent substantial growth in the 1920s. While the line between the two was often blurry, anarchism was arguably the more influential prior to the war. It found especially strong support among the artisans, vendors, and employees in small-scale manufacturing who comprised the bulk of the pre-Chaco workforce in La Paz (Figure 2). Anarchist organizing reached a new level in 1927 with the foundation in La Paz of two anarchist labor federations, the FOL and a sub-federation, the Federación Obrera Femenina (Women Workers Federation, FOF). Although repressed and temporarily decimated during the war, both federations re-emerged in 1935 and remained significant players on the left until the 1952 revolution, bucking the global trend of anarchism’s decline relative to Marxism. As late as 1947, the FOL may have been the biggest labor federation in La Paz, largely due to the FAD’s affiliation, which more than doubled the FOL’s total numbers (Alexander 1947).

Figure 2. Anarchist rally in La Paz, 1930. Source: Archivo Luis Cusicanqui, Tambo Colectivo Ch’ixi, La Paz. Used with permission.
Ideologically, La Paz anarchists’ vision of a just society shared much in common with the Marxists’: they sought the socialized ownership of all means of production and the abolition of class distinctions. But the FOL and FOF distinguished themselves from most Marxists in two ways. First, they advocated a greater degree of decentralization in economy, government, and political organization. Production would be controlled not by a centralized state (not even in the short term) but by the producers themselves. Politically, they envisioned a decentralized, ‘federative system respecting the independence and autonomy of the last village and the last citizen’ with ‘free speech and press’ (FOL 1938). Second, they declared themselves ‘apolitical,’ by which they meant abstention from electoral and party politics, but not from politics in the broader sense.

La Paz anarchists’ notions of liberation were also somewhat more expansive than those of many Marxists in the Leninist, Trotskyist, and Stalinist traditions. Many defined revolution as more than just the overthrow of capitalism: it meant an end to all illegitimate hierarchy, including gender, ethnic, and political subordination as well as class exploitation. This expansive focus was evident in a 1946 woodworkers’ manifesto, which spoke of ‘a better world, free of masters and executioners:’ ‘We the working class, who for the bourgeoisie are nothing but cannon fodder, fodder for exploitation, and fodder for pleasure, have to defend ourselves through the permanent political Strike, religious Strike, military Strike, and Strike of the womb’ (Unión Sindical de Trabajadores en Madera 1946). A 1948 FOL statement similarly declared that ‘we are at the side of all the humble ones who struggle,’ not only ‘the tireless worker in the factories and workshops’ but also ‘the laborer who fertilizes the land with their tears and their pain’ and ‘the proletarian mother who cries in misery’ (FOL, 1 May 1948).  

FOL critiques of women’s oppression were largely the result of women’s leadership in the FOF, which was part of the FOL umbrella federation. After the war, the FOF women emerged as a leading force within the FOL, with the formation of woman-led cooks’ and flower vendors’ unions in 1935–1936. At the national workers’ congress in late 1936, FOF delegates were instrumental in pushing through resolutions on the 8-hour day, the 6-day work week, and equal pay for men and women. Over the next two decades, the FOF would also spearhead struggles for daycare, the right to divorce, and equal legal rights for legitimate and illegitimate children (Delgado González 1984, 182–183; Dibbits, Peredo Beltrán, and Volgger 1986, 8–9; Lehm Ardaya and Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 153–181; Wadsworth and Dibbits 1989, 138–139). In doing so, anarchist women also pulled the men in more feminist directions. Anarchist ideology certainly frowned upon women’s subordination and domestic violence: as one male anarchist exclaimed, ‘How could an anarchist beat his wife?!’ (José Mendoza Vera cited in Medinacelli 1989, 162). Nonetheless, ideology alone did not eliminate all gender hierarchy. In one 1947 meeting, for instance, a FOF member accused her male comrades of refusing to help with the publication of a women’s manifesto (FOL 1947b; see also Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 80). Gender relations within the FOL were relatively horizontal, but women’s active intervention was necessary to produce that result.

In the 1920s, some FOL members also began developing explicit critiques of racism and internal colonialism. In a fiery manifesto, Luis Cusicanqui (1929), one of the few early Folistas who self-identified as indigenous, addressed himself to his ‘INDIAN brothers of the American race’ and called for ‘revolution to do away with this vile society’ led by the ‘powerful mestizos of the State.’ He defined indigeneity in political terms, as the shared
marginality of the oppressed. As analyst Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1988) comments, ‘The Indian identity that [Cusicanqui] postulates is inclusive: the manual workers of the cities and the comunarios and colonos of the countryside would make common cause against the caste system and the exclusionary and oppressive political system.’ The manifesto reflected the loose affinity between anarchist ideology and longstanding indigenous struggles. The FOL’s federalism and attacks on the national state appealed to many rural Indians seeking to defend their communal land and autonomy, while their emphasis on the dignity and freedom of the worker dovetailed with the demands of organized hacienda workers.

Anarchist organizational structure also facilitated the expression of ethnic (and gender) demands. The Federación Agraria Departamental retained its own decision-making power after it affiliated with the FOL in 1946, just as the FOF had done since its foundation (Dibbits, Peredo Beltrán, and Volgger 1986, 22). This federative structure reflected an ideological and strategic emphasis on autonomy and self-organization. In an early article decrying ‘the situation of subordination and slavery’ facing Bolivian women, anarchist Jacinto Centellas (1926) directed himself directly to women, saying that ‘the hour of your emancipation has arrived’ and ‘is in your hands.’ Calls for autonomous organizing were also heard in discussions of indigenous oppression, among both anarchists and Marxists. One Marxist delegate to the 1927 workers’ congress proclaimed that the ‘liberation of the Indian will be the work of the Indian himself’ (Víctor Vargas Vilaseca, cited in Lora 1970, 25; see also Hylton et al. 2003, 168–177).20

Such statements contrasted with the more standard Marxist and Leninist prescription for revolution under proletarian direction, a view which would become dominant on the left by mid-century. This ‘workerism’ was reaffirmed in Bolivia by the famous 1946 Thesis of Pulacayo adopted by the mineworkers’ federation, which saw the urban proletariat as the ‘caudillo’ (Cornejo 1949, 316). The Trotskyist Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers Party, POR) and Stalinist PIR espoused variants of this view, as did much of urban labor more generally.21 Workerism and intellectual elitism often translated into a vertical approach to organizing, which alienated at least some peasant activists. Peasant leader Antonio Alvarez Mamani later recalled how Trotskyist intellectuals of the 1940s sought to dictate ‘the orders of the party’ to peasant organizers, who were invited to meetings but ‘without voice or vote’ (cited in Hylton and Thomson 2007, 78). The PIR, founded in 1940, did initially place a priority on rural organizing, but its adherence to Popular Front politics and alliance with conservative forces by the mid-1940s soon led it to oppose most agitation. Its leaders tended to view the Bolivian peasantry with caution, much like the MNR did; both parties’ positions on land redistribution were ambiguous and inconsistent throughout the 1940s (Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003, 108–109; Soliz 2012, 40–44). To be sure, the Marxist parties often spoke of the need for a worker–peasant alliance, and the POR, the PIR, and the non-Marxist MNR all had varying degrees of involvement with peasant organizing in the late 1930s and 1940s (Gotkowitz 2007, 159–162, 215, 241; John 2009, 78). But prior to 1952, none succeeded on the scale of the FAD–FOL coalition. One reason is that workerism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarian practices were less present in the FOL than in most other left and nationalist circles.

While anarchist ideology and strategy were relatively conducive to alliance building, the Folistas’ May 1946 decision to ‘go to the countryside’ was also influenced by several
conjunctural considerations (Clavijo 1985). At that moment, the federation was facing a difficult situation in the city, due partly to regime opposition and partly to political competition from other leftists. One Folista, José Clavijo (1985), later described a sense that ‘we are being isolated’ and that the revolutionary struggle was ‘falling behind.’ This perception of organizational stagnation made coalition building more imperative. He recalled telling his comrades, ‘We are going to ossify because we no longer have organizations with which to collaborate. The only sector still open to us is the peasantry’ (Clavijo 1985).

Another fleeting circumstance further encouraged this reorientation. The aftermath of the government’s 1945 Indigenous Congress opened a limited window of opportunity for rural organizing. Despite the mutual animosity between the FOL and the Villarroel–MNR regime, it seems that the Folistas enjoyed considerable ‘freedom to go organize’ in the countryside (Clavijo 1985). The window was shut in the months after Villarroel’s 21 July 1946, public hanging. But the brief relaxation of repression was well exploited by the Folistas, whose analysis, vision, and organizing strategy (and accurate reading of the situation) helped them establish lasting rural ties.

Yet these factors are only part of the explanation for the alliance. Rural-based Indians themselves were not only the vast numerical majority in the strikes and mobilizations of 1947, they would also make vital contributions to the alliance itself. In the process they helped to reinvigorate and redefine – if temporarily – the left in La Paz.

**Stirring up the Indians?**

The Bolivian press of the 1930s and 1940s often featured accusations against urban radicals for ‘stirring up [soliviantando] the Indians’ (La Calle, 29 July 1942). Coming from conservative voices, these characterizations are hardly surprising. But more sympathetic observers, including both urban anarchists and historians, have also emphasized urban Folistas’ initiative in forming rural unions and schools. A 1948 statement of the FOL-affiliated woodworkers’ union said that FOL organizers ‘went to establish unions and schools for our fellow laborers’ in the countryside (FOL, 1 May 1948). Among historians, Alexander (2005, 61) refers to the FOL’s ‘organization and maintenance of the Federación Agraria Departamental.’ Antezana and Romero (1973, 159) go farther, arguing that the FOL ‘served to further awaken among the Indians the spirit of rebellion, and to make them aware of the system of exploitation to which they were subjected’ (emphasis added).

These assessments are partly accurate: the urban Folistas did make a decision in May 1946 to prioritize rural organizing, and consistently supported that organizing for the next 6 years. But the growth of the FAD and the alliance of the late 1940s depended on much more than just the Folistas’ views and actions. The actions of rural organizers were also central to these processes, in three ways. First, the prior history of autonomous mobilization in Los Andes and Pacajes provinces had established a series of organizations and leadership networks, both formal and informal, which served as the local foundations for FAD–FOL mobilization in 1946–1947. The individuals in these networks did not require ‘awakening’ by others. Second, the presence and participation of rural representatives within the FOL starting in 1946 helped produce a subtle shift in discourse compared with the organization’s earlier
periods. Third, rural-based brokers had helped forge the alliance in the first place – a process examined in the next section.

Resistance, both organized and unorganized, had been a steady feature of both provinces over the previous several decades. Pacajes was a center of organizing for the networks of caciques apoderados that formed in the 1910s and 1920s to combat land usurpation by haciendas and infringements on community autonomy (Gotkowitz 2007, 46–49). Later, during the Chaco War, the province never ceased to frustrate state officials in charge of military recruitment. One 1934 military telegram reported that ‘in Pacajes province, especially in Callapa and Ulloma’ – also key sites of the apoderados – ‘it has not been possible to carry out recruitment due to the rebellious spirit of the Indians’ (see Map 1) (Prefecto de La Paz 1934; cf. Arze Aguirre 1987). Similar reports were common throughout La Paz provinces during the war, including in Los Andes. Among the locales where official telegrams warned of ‘night-time meetings’ to plan an ‘indigenous uprising’ were the Aygachi and Tambillo cantons of Los Andes, which would again be centers of unrest in 1947 (Aygachi featuring a strong FAD presence) (Subprefecto de Los Andes 1933). Many future FAD organizers had reached adulthood by the early 1930s, and some were likely involved in this earlier organizing (of a list of 15 FAD members who died in captivity in 1947–1948, 13 were aged 32 or older, and 6 were over 60 [FOL, 1 May 1948]).

Throughout the mid-1940s, officials reported ‘a serious wave of discontent’ throughout the department of La Paz. Even in provinces like Murillo where major unrest did not occur, authorities warned ‘that the indigenous class in general is to be found in a state of belligerence, directed against the owners and administrators’ of the haciendas (Corregidor de Cohoni 1945; Subprefecto de Murillo 1945). The situation intensified in the months before the much-anticipated 1945 Congress, and even more so afterward as indigenous communities and hacienda workers invoked President Villarroel’s new decrees in their struggles against landlords and local officials. ‘The damages and the demands on the part of the indigenous population are constant,’ wrote the Prefect of La Paz (Arancibia 1946) late the following year.

Union organizing in Los Andes began prior to the FOL’s May 1946 decision to promote it. An April 1945 petition testifies to the existence of a peasant union in Collantaca even before the 1945 Indigenous Congress (Salinas and Narváez 1945). While Folistas later helped initiate unions in other locales, rural organizing had certainly begun prior to May 1946 in many of the places where those unions eventually appeared. A September 1945 telegram reported that ‘the Indians of Carapata hacienda’ – who would later play a key role in the FAD – ‘have their meetings night by night on said hacienda.’ The author alleged that the meetings were held ‘with the premeditated goal of invading Puerto Pérez,’ a nearby town, but the subsequent course of events at Carapata suggests that the meetings probably focused more on labor rights on the hacienda (Saavedra 1945).

Demands tended to focus on workers’ rights, but also involved questions of land and self-determination. According to one local official in Sewenaki (Pacajes) just prior to the 1945 Congress, agitators had been circulating a manifesto saying that ‘we will rule as in past times. Starting with the Indigenista [sic] Congress, there will no longer be mestizo or white authorities. We will rule by ourselves’ (cited in Fuentes 1945). The colono-comunario boundary was often blurry, especially in the Altiplano, where there was significant overlap between hacienda- and community-based struggles. Comunarios played a
bigger role in the 1947 revolts in La Paz than in Cochabamba (Gotkowitz 2007, 253; Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003, 105). Many La Paz hacienda residents, meanwhile, had only recently seen their land taken and retained a sense of communal identity. The colonos on the Muncana hacienda in Aygachi, for example, still possessed the legal title to their land and were ‘seeking its restoration’ (Iñiguez 1947).

Even on those haciendas where community restoration and land redistribution were not central to colono demands, the activists’ actions and words often revealed a desire for greater autonomy. Resistance often centered on schools, which for rural workers signified both an obligation of government and hacienda owners and an instrument for the exercise of autonomy (for a similar pattern in the lead-up to the 1927 Chayanta revolt, see Hylton et al. [2003, 157–162]). In early 1946, a colono at the Tomarapi hacienda in Topohoco filed a complaint against the owner for failing to comply with Villarroel’s May 1945 decree requiring owners to build schools. At roughly the same time, colonos in the Caquiaviri canton of Pacajes refused to accept the teacher appointed by their hacienda owner, demanding to name their own. At other times hacienda schools were deemed instruments of oppression and boycotted, as when the FAD’s Evaristo Mamani and others sought to organize a boycott of the Kella-Kella hacienda school in Caquiaviri (‘Denuncia sentada en el Ministerio de Gobierno,’ 1947; Eduardo 1946a, 1946b; on education see also Salazar Mostajo 1983; Choque et al. 1992; Larson 2005; Maldonado Rocha 2015). Although the rural organizers of the 1940s focused more on labor rights than their predecessors had, their simultaneous concern for autonomy represented continuity with earlier struggles.

We do not know the exact circumstances under which rural indigenous workers came into contact with urban Folistas. As noted previously, initial meetings seem to have occurred in mid-1946, and may have been facilitated by preexisting ties between rural organizers and Folistas like Modesto Escóbar. Decades later, José Clavijo (1986) suggested that it was rural leaders who had approached the FOL, though he seemed to contradict this memory in another interview (Clavijo 1985).23 What is clear is that organizers who were based primarily in the countryside were the main driving force behind the rural organizing, with urban-based Folistas playing an important but supporting role.

Elite rhetoric notwithstanding, rural Indians were also ‘the main instigators and leaders’ in the rebellions of 1947, as Luis Lahore Monje’s May 1947 telegram suggested. In fact, government and newspaper reports sometimes acknowledged rural activists’ leading role in the agitation in Los Andes and Pacajes. Reportage on the January ‘uprisings’ at the Quilloma hacienda in Topohoco and at Carapata and several other haciendas in Los Andes included no mention of urban instigators. In Los Andes, 4000 Indians were alleged to be ‘threatening Pucarani [the capital] and other nearby towns’ (Los Tiempos, 18 and 9 January 1947). Following unrest at Carapata and Caquiaviri in May, state forces took several hundred indigenous prisoners at the former and perhaps a thousand at the latter.24 Correspondence from the time suggests a generalized state of subversion throughout the two provinces. In May, one town resident of Los Andes wrote in terror that ‘the Indians from all the haciendas have risen up’ (La Razón, 17 May 1947).

In conjunction with organizing efforts on the haciendas, FAD leaders helped draft a number of public statements published in the name of the FAD, the FOL, or jointly. These statements are notable for their more explicit affirmation of Indian identity as
compared with most of the earlier FOL discourse. Racism, they suggested, worked in conjunction with other systems of oppression to keep the Indian in bondage. A February 1947 manifesto observed that ‘when we come to the city, everyone has the right to offend us: the chola, the mestizo, the police officer, the rich, and even those Indians poisoned by capitalist values; everyone abuses the yayas’ (FAD 1947a). Another FAD statement emphasized the federation’s Indian identity as essential to its organizing role, arguing that only the FAD, as an ‘organization composed of INDIANS, could understand the rebellious and just hopes and dreams of its class so long enslaved’ (Soto and Choque 1948). Authors would often mock the racism of elite discourse, inverting categories of civilization and barbarism. In a June 1947 manifesto following the Tacanoca uprising, the FAD and FOL referred sardonically to accusations of rebels’ ‘theft’ and ‘violence’. Instead, it was the ‘civilized whites’ who behaved barbarically: ‘The bosses [patrones] are the direct descendants of the conquistadors who, having arrived in these lands, assumed their comfortable position of societal parasites, and ultimately owners, on the exclusive basis of THEFT and VIOLENCE against Inca populations’ (Comité de Defensa 1947).

These documents obviously raise questions about authorship. Were urban intellectuals ghost-writing manifestos for the FAD, many of whose leaders were illiterate? The FAD’s short-lived newspaper, La Voz del Campo, was authored by its ‘Cultural Section,’ but the paper did not give names. Historian Huáscar Rodríguez (2012, 218) suggests that urban anarchist Liber Forti was responsible for most of the FOL’s own manifestos in 1947, since he worked as a typographical worker and had access to a printing press. Yet rural organizers played an important role in crafting FAD statements, whether or not they themselves put pen to paper. FOL meeting records from 1946–1947 confirm that rural FAD organizers were regularly present at meetings in the city (see FOL 1946b). Some documents were signed by specific individuals with common indigenous surnames, as with the 1948 statement stressing the FAD’s identity as ‘an organization composed of Indians,’ co-signed by FAD Secretary of Relations Sebastián Choque. Other statements spoke from the perspective of ‘we Indians’ (La Voz del Campo, October 1950). Such phrasing does not automatically prove Indian authorship, but the strong assertion of indigenous identity marks a contrast with other documents that are known to have been written by urban Folistas. The latter often wrote in what Rodríguez (2012, 291–292) calls a ‘civilizing tone’ that reflected their continued assumptions about ‘western cultural supremacy’ (Cusicanqui’s 1929 manifesto was a notable exception). While FAD statements occasionally employed this tone as well, it was counterbalanced by a forceful ethnic consciousness. Moreover, the presence of a ‘civilizing tone’ in some FAD statements does not necessarily indicate non-indigenous voices: Indians sometimes employed this discourse, often for strategic reasons. FAD leader Esteban Quispe was presumably doing so when he declared from jail that ‘we Indians know that we are ignorant, and we are because the State and the laws have deprived us of literacy and of education from time immemorial’ (FOL, 1 May 1948).

If authorship is difficult to verify, we can safely conclude that FAD statements were at least written with the participation of rural Indians – whether direct, through the writing or dictating of content, or indirect, through their presence in FOL circles. Either way, the struggles of rural Indians helped shape the discourse and actions of their urban comrades, infusing them with a more conscious antiracism and a greater focus on rural
exploitation (much as anarchist women infused the FOL with a more feminist orientation). The urbanites’ own flexibility, meanwhile, facilitated that shift.

Coalition brokers

Indigenous mobilization in rural La Paz did not automatically lead to an alliance with the urban FOL. The articulation of that alliance was brokered by individual organizers who straddled the urban–rural and mestizo–indigenous divides. These individuals came from both sides of those divides and tended to possess skills and characteristics that allowed them to communicate and build trust with people on the other side. Recent research has explored the role of such individuals in social movement coalitions. Frank (2004), for instance, notes the key role of border-crossers, or ‘carrier pigeons,’ in transnational solidarity campaigns (see also Rose 2000; Bandy and Smith 2005). FOL ties to the countryside in the 1920s had largely depended on border-crossers like Luis Cusicanqui – who, as mentioned, had a close relationship with cacique Santos M’arka Tula. Cusicanqui’s first language was Aymara and he was proudly indigenous, as his 1929 manifesto suggested. The case of the FAD–FOL alliance of the 1940s further highlights the importance of this type of organizer in interethnic and cross-sector mobilization.

One of the anarchists arrested with Cusicanqui for circulating the 1929 manifesto was plumber Modesto Escóbar (Figure 3). Although Cusicanqui grew disenchanted with the FOL after the war, Escóbar remained involved through the 1940s and played a central role in the development of relations with the FAD in 1946–1947. He was fluent in Aymara, and although he was probably raised in the city, he had many contacts in the rural Altiplano. Within the FOL, he served as one of two ‘Secretaries of Agrarian Relations’ and at meetings he regularly gave reports on the situation in the countryside. In August 1946, Escóbar toured various haciendas and communities promoting union formation. After the cycle of protest and repression began in early 1947, he led FOL...
delegations to visit peasants jailed in the city and may have helped coordinate a hunger strike in protest. When the May uprisings occurred, he himself was arrested and soon imprisoned on the island of Coati, in Lake Titicaca, where he spent over 2 years. He was kept in prison even after most of the other prisoners had been released (though he escaped the wretched fate of dozens of his rural comrades, many of whom were killed). Escóbar was probably the urban Folistas’ strongest link to rural workers, though several other urban FOL organizers including Juan Nieto, Santiago Ordóñez, Francisco Castro, and Hugo Aguilar were also especially active in supporting the FAD (Clavijo 1985; FOL, 1 May 1948; Rodríguez García 2012, 206).

While the histories of rural-based coalition brokers remain more obscure, there is evidence of individuals filling a similar function on the other side of the alliance. Marcelino Llanque, a cacique apoderado who had led a 1921 rebellion in Ingavi province, was present at the May 1946 meeting that discussed rural organizing, and he was credentialed to ‘take the FOL delegation to the peasantry around the country’ (FOL 1946a). Rural organizers like the brothers Marcelino and Esteban Quispe seem to have played a similar role. In a later interview, José Clavijo (1986) suggested that one factor in the spread of the FOL’s rural visibility was that peasants who had come to the city to find work were exposed to ‘the FOL’s message’ and then helped spread word of the FOL upon return visits to their places of origin. He singled out construction workers, loaders, hat makers, and bakers as being particularly important. These occupations drew large numbers of rural migrants because they required little prior training, involving ‘jobs that are learned in practice’. Workers in these industries were naturally ‘more linked to the countryside’. Clavijo contrasted these sectors with the factory workers, who often ‘slipped away from the countryside’. It is possible that the FOL connections in places like Carapata were nurtured by prior migration (Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003, 107). The specific urban ties of people like the Quispe brothers nonetheless remain a matter of speculation.

The slow process of building mutual confidence is also apparent in Clavijo’s recollections. Asked about the difficulty of urbanites ‘organizing unions in the countryside’, Clavijo said that rural Aymaras were initially somewhat ‘distrustful’ due to their ‘experiences’ with the city (‘the calamities they have suffered, the abuses they have received’). Folistas had ‘to demonstrate’ their good will, and only after some time did ‘they have confidence in us’. Clavijo felt that rural migrants, plus bilingual urbanites like Escóbar, had been crucial in this process.

One notable characteristic of the formal brokers, both urban and rural, is that virtually all appear to have been male. In fact, all of the 21 FAD representatives who signed the 1946 pact seem to have been men. This pattern is interesting given women’s relatively prominent place in the urban FOL. Anarchist women occupied formal leadership positions and frequently spoke in public, including about rural oppression. At a May Day rally of the FOL in 1938, for instance, a journalist remarked on ‘the speech in Aymara of an indigenous woman, who proclaimed the need to save Indians from the slavery of the haciendas’ (La Calle, 3 May 1938). There is also evidence that women were important in many instances of rural mobilization and revolt. But nearly all of the formal leaders in rural unions and communities were men, and it was almost always the formal leaders who were in charge of communication with the urban Folistas. One reason may have
been that rural men were more likely than women to speak Spanish, reflecting a gender hierarchy dating back at least to the Inca conquest.

The predominance of male formal leadership in the countryside may also have limited the ability of urban women to serve as formal liaisons. In some cases, women still may have played this role. In the massive Ayopaya hacienda revolt that shook Cochabamba in February 1947, the pollera-wearing, trilingual (Spanish, Aymara, Quechua) ‘wife of a miner’ by the name of Lorenza Choque reportedly helped inspire rebellion with her ‘graceful oratory’. In many social movements, women excluded from formal leadership have played critical informal leadership roles, often serving as the primary organizers at the community level (Robnett 1997). Women are often central to coalition building as well (Roth 2003). Unfortunately, the role of women organizers and brokers in the 1946–1947 rural mobilizations remains unclear.

Though the evidence is fragmentary, we can conclude that the formal liaisons between city and country shared three basic characteristics: they were relatively mobile, often bilingual, and almost always men. On the urban side, most, like Modesto Escóbar, were artisans; this status would have afforded them greater freedom to travel outside the city. Fluency in Aymara also helped a great deal, both for practical purposes and because it probably helped foster trust among Aymara activists; on the rural side, Spanish-speaking ability may also have been important. Urban women held formal leadership positions in the FOL, but their rural counterparts were usually confined to informal leadership roles, and there is scant evidence of women playing any formal brokerage role.

Conclusion

The worker–peasant alliance had been a dream of leftist revolutionaries since the nineteenth century. But with few exceptions its realization had remained hampered by a lack of real commitment, the ethnic and ideological prejudices of urban leftists, and all the structural, geographic, and organizational obstacles to uniting urban workers, rural workers, and small farmers within a single coalition. These barriers were starting to erode in Bolivia in the three decades prior to 1952, however. The short-lived alliance between rural and urban anarchists in La Paz in the late 1940s suggests that the obstacles were not insurmountable.

Several factors enabled organizers to take advantage of the momentary political opening of the mid-1940s. La Paz anarchists’ politics and organizing approach proved more conducive to coalition building than those of certain other leftists forces. Their emphasis on the dignity and autonomy of the worker coincided with hacienda workers’ desire for less abusive work conditions. Their ideological critiques of state authoritarianism and various other ‘non-class’ forms of oppression also resonated among many rural Indians, both colonos and comunarios. And their federative organizational structure eschewed the workerist vanguardism of many Marxists and was less paternalistic vis-à-vis the peasant and the Indian.

The alliance also depended on a history of mobilization in the locales where the FAD took root. Historical research has now shattered the image of an inert peasantry awoken by the 1952 revolution, highlighting deep traditions of rural organizing and their long-term impact on Bolivia (Gotkowitz 2007; Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003). By 1947, prior
struggles in La Paz provinces had already politicized many rural Indians, who did not need urbanites to ‘make them aware’ of their oppression. Preexisting leaders and organizational networks served as the bases for the FAD. In turn, rural indigenous voices influenced anarchist discourse and practice, imbuing anarchist struggle with a more explicitly antiracist thrust. By early 1947, FAD members comprised the bulk of the FOL and were helping to reinvigorate it after years of slow growth. In this context, whether or not rural organizers were directly writing the FAD’s public statements, the urban Folistas felt compelled to listen to them.

Finally, individual brokers were also central to the alliance’s development. Surviving documentation provides clues about some of these border-crossers, while others remain nameless. We know little about the role of more informal brokers or women in building the coalition, though some evidence (and reasonable speculation) suggests that these groups aided with both the transmission of ideas across the urban–rural boundary and with local mobilization.

The impact of the coalition and the larger series of revolts in 1946–1947 is difficult to measure, and the links to later agrarian mobilizations in 1952–1953 (and the indigenous organizations that emerged starting in the 1970s) are hazy. Why was this coalition, like most others of its kind, so ephemeral? In explaining the rise of the FAD–FOL alliance, I have emphasized the anarchists themselves, but external conditions also set limits on their ability to organize. State and landlord actions were clearly important: a brief window of opportunity appeared in 1945–1946 but shut violently in 1947. Repression killed many of the key organizers and intimidated many others. A second change in the external context was the growth of a major ideological competitor, the MNR, which turned its eyes to the countryside in the late 1940s, especially after its defeat in the civil war of 1949 (Rivera Cusicanqui [1984] 2003, 107–108). The MNR’s association with the martyred Villarroel gave it credibility among many peasants, while its control of the state after 1952 meant that it would preside over the 1953 land reform, helping it to secure peasants’ allegiance and deprive leftists of potential support. Thus, while a less competitive organizational field had favored the FOL’s initial inroads in the La Paz countryside, the field soon shifted against them. Here the anarchists’ own antipathy to party politics and state power put them at a unique disadvantage.

Beyond its impact on Bolivia, however, the coalition is important for both historical and theoretical reasons. Historically, it shows that ‘the left’ in twentieth-century Latin America was more diverse, both politically and ethnically, than implied by standard narratives that focus on paternalistic mestizo males. This case was not the only exception: many countries and regions witnessed moments of radical interethnic mobilization, as a growing body of revisionist work has shown. Furthermore, those coalitions were often quite democratic and sensitive to ethnic oppression (Becker 2008; Carr 1987, 1998; Coronel 2011; Gotkowitz 2007; Gould and Lauria-Santiago 2008; Grandin 2004; Hirsch 2015; Hylton et al. 2003; Konefal 2010; Webber 2012).

From a theoretical perspective, the coalition examined here highlights the contingent nature of revolutions and other social movements. Far from being predetermined by ‘opportunity structures’ or other external forces, these phenomena are internally contested processes shaped to a great extent by human agents whose ideologies, political cultures, social networks, and choices matter a great deal. The La Paz mobilizations of the 1940s suggest the need for close attention to movement actors and ideas, in
addition to structures and external environments. External factors like repression or the presence of competitors usually play a limiting role – as they did in this case – but movements also help determine the limits of the possible.

A related theoretical issue concerns the connection between ideology, praxis, and success. While the politics of Bolivian anarchists were especially suited to building interethnic (and inter-gender) alliances, anarchism was not the only ideology capable of doing so. Many of the most notable coalitions of the early- and mid-twentieth century – in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia itself – involved communists and socialists.31 Organizers’ application of ideology – their conceptual emphases, their arrogance or humility, their personal integrity and behavior, and so on – may matter at least as much as the ideology itself in determining success. In most of these cases, including the one analyzed here, urban organizers’ interpretation of ideology was partly influenced by their reading of the national scene (for instance, a recognition that the urban proletariat was small or hard to crack, and that the rural poor showed signs of militancy) as well as by their dialogical interactions with the constituencies they sought to organize.

This case also raises a broader set of questions about coalition formation. How are coalitions constructed? How are traditional boundaries transcended? What Hylton and Thomson (2007, 10) call the ‘infrequent moments of convergence’ in Latin American history merit further scholarly scrutiny (cf. Bandy and Smith 2005; Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001; Harris and Albó 1975; Rose 2000; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Conversely, the absence of popular coalitions also demands explanation. In Bolivia in the 1960s and 1970s, a stark divide between urban workers and rural smallholders helped buttress a series of right-wing military regimes, which drew substantial support from the latter group. The urban–rural coalition of 1946–1947 is thus all the more remarkable, and raises the question of whether later ruptures were inevitable.

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Notes

1. Data on Los Andes comes from Prefectura de La Paz (1945).

2. The term cholo defies easy definition, but refers broadly and most commonly to urban residents who display certain cultural markers (such as the pollera skirts often worn by women) that set them apart from both the dominant creole/mestizo groups and from rural indigenous people. It has historically been pejorative but can also be neutral or – in the case of the female chola or cholita – even positive at times (Rodríguez García 2012, Appendix). A study of female anarchists in La Paz argues that most were of Aymara descent but shared many aspects of chola identity (Dibbits, Peredo Beltrán, and Volgger 1986, 25).

3. The ‘Third Period’ of Soviet Communism (1928–1935) also differed from later Stalinism in that it encouraged worker–peasant alliances and was more attentive to the concept of ‘oppressed nationalities’ (Becker 2006). On the US context, see Kelley (1990). On interethnic left activism in later periods, see Grandin (2004); Konefal (2010); and Webber (2012).
4. In Bolivia, the shift toward more hierarchical practices was especially apparent following the 1952 revolution (Hylton and Thomson 2007, 78). The revolution brought to power the MNR party, a mix of frustrated middle-class elements and more radical worker and peasant forces. By 1952, the MNR, the Marxist parties to its left, and urban labor unions all tended to be less respectful of peasant and indigenous autonomy than the anarchists and some of the earlier Marxists.

5. It is often impossible to classify a particular demand as purely ethnic- or class-based. Ethnic identities, which are socially constructed, relational categories based largely on cultural and spatial differences, are frequently politicized given the hierarchies usually associated with ethnic typologies and their historic overlap with other forms of domination and resistance (Wade 1997). For instance, a peasant struggle for land may build solidarity by labeling participants as indigenous and large landowners as white or mestizo; meanwhile, ‘ethnic’ campaigns against discrimination often involve demands for material resources.

6. The idea that indigenous people were uniquely ‘susceptible’ to socialist ideas was common among US and Latin American elites in the twentieth century (see Becker 2008, 47; Grandin 2004, 14; Pike 1992, 226–228).

7. Marof (1926, 32) popularized the slogan ‘Lands to the people, mines to the state,’ which was later often repeated as ‘Lands to the Indian, mines to the state.’ Marof was a political comrade of Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui, who promoted the adaptation of Marxism to Latin American contexts (Becker 2006).

8. Peasant is the conventional translation for campesino. Here I use peasant in a loose sense to mean rural laboring peoples who lived near the subsistence level, including small private or communal landholders as well as estate laborers, many of whom were only semi-proletarianized. Both the structural position and subjective identity of rural workers were fuzzy, since many retained communal ties and sought land in addition to labor rights.

9. The MNR also prohibited urban–rural collaboration after 1952; see El Pueblo (Cochabamba), 5 April 1957.

10. Discussing the trials following the February 1947 Ayopaya revolt in Cochabamba, Dandler and Torrico (1987, 368) note that ‘[n]ot a single political or university group openly involved itself in their legal defense, given the repressive character of the “sexenio”.’ The situation was different in La Paz, as described below.

11. As of 1945, Los Andes had 121 haciendas with 5900 colonos and 15 communities with 600 taxpayers; in Pacajes the ratio of haciendas to communities was less dramatic but still nearly 2 to 1 (99 haciendas and 52 communities as of 1934); see Prefectura de La Paz (1945) and Subprefecto de Pacajes (1934).

12. Though Gotkowitz (2007, 253) rightly questions the sharp distinction between communities and haciendas, noting that ‘many recently formed estates remained de facto communities.’ See also note 8.

13. Alexander (1947). Interviewed later, José Clavijo (1985) estimated between 20 and 40 FAD unions. The number of schools is unclear: in March 1947 the FAD petitioned the Ministry of Education for funding for 51 schools that it had founded; a 1948 report claimed that ‘the F.A.D. founded around ONE HUNDRED SCHOOLS’ (Comité de Defensa 1947; FOL, 1 May 1948; see also Maldonado Rocha 2015).

14. At least 30 victims died in the Ichilo prison, where many were sent in 1947 (FAD 1948). Many other violent reprisals likely happened: one statement mentioned the killing of seven of Quispe’s relatives and the rape of 31 indigenous women by soldiers and a priest (Comité de Defensa 1947). Repression of peasant organizers had in fact started earlier, following Villarroel’s death (Gotkowitz 2007, 256–260). The FAD did not invoke Villarroel the way many other rural Indians did, but the organization suffered the aftermath of repression all the same.

15. Many scholars have suggested an affinity between artisanal labor and anarchism. On Bolivia see Rivera Cusicanqui (1988) and Rodríguez García (2012).
These labor federations were preceded by several individual unions of anarchist inclination, such as the woodworkers’ Unión Sindical de Trabajadores en Madera founded in 1926, and by several groups of anarchist ‘artisan-intellectuals’ who published revolutionary propaganda (Rivera Cusicanqui 1988, 24–25). Anarchist counterparts to the FOL and FOF were established in Oruro soon after (Rodríguez García 2012, 90–93).

Bolivia’s low level of industrial development may have been one factor; the fact that Marxist and nationalist groups were generally not prioritizing rural organizing also played a role. For histories of other anarchist movements, see Ackelsberg ([1991] 2005; Bookchin (1977); Hart (1978); Marshall ([1992] 2010); and Suriano (2010). Feminist scholars have rightly noted that denunciations of women’s oppression can be intended to mobilize working-class men, who understand the oppression of ‘their’ women as an affront to their masculinity. Often leftists have deployed discourses of gender equity for both instrumental and feminist aims: if some have not been not genuine feminists, there have also been many – mostly women – who have utilized those discourses for liberatory ends (see Tinsman 2002). In the case of the FOL, it is at least clear that there was a strong current, led by female FOF members, which denounced women’s subjugation for more than simply instrumental reasons.

For studies of women and gender relations in other anarchist movements, see Ackelsberg ([1991] 2005); Fernández Cordero (2015); Hutchison (2001); and Kaplan (1971). Scholarly attention to race and ethnic relations in these movements is less common; Hirsch (2015) is an exception.

As this example suggests, many Marxists of the 1920s were more sensitive to racial/ethnic oppression and the need for non-authoritarian organizing than later Marxists.

The Central Obrera Boliviana created in 1952 would also deem the proletariat ‘the natural leader of the Revolution’ (COB 1954, 10).

Paradoxically – and arguably, recklessly – the FOL supported the regime’s overthrow in July 1946, presumably unaware that successor regimes would prove considerably more repressive.

Clavijo suggested that the relationship between urban anarchists and rural organizers in the 1920s had begun similarly, when Santos M’arka Tula and another cacique approached Luis Cusicanqui. Elsewhere Clavijo (1985) stressed FOL initiative in organizing the FAD; this apparent contradiction might indicate merely a difference of emphasis, reflecting the fact that both urban and rural brokers played initiating roles. His recollections also came four decades after the fact.

FAD General Secretary Marcelino Quispe and his brother Esteban were singled out for arrest prior to other leaders. See Gotkowitz (2007, 258–259); La Razón, 24, 27, and 29 May 1947; Pando (1947).

Yaya is Quechua for ‘father’ but here probably refers to indigenous people in general.

Seven of 21 FAD signers of the December 1946 pact signed with fingerprints rather than signatures (‘La Federación Obrera Local y la Federación Agraria Departamental,’ 1946).


See for instance the 1934 episode on the Jayuhuma hacienda in Corocoro (Pacajes), where ‘more than 50 women’ reportedly attacked the owner, seizing the hacienda’s salt deposits and stealing ‘more than 300 animals.’ Telegram transcribed in Ibáñez (1934). For a similar example, see El Diario, 7 January 1934.

One rare clue that rural women might have played a formal brokerage role comes in a FAD manifesto denouncing the 23 May 1947, government raid on the FOL office in La Paz (FAD 1947b). It mentions that ‘three peasant women’ were among the 72 FOL and FAD members arrested inside the office. Were they participating on behalf of their unions, or merely accompanying male family members?

Choque’s alleged role is recounted in the testimony of jailed organizers Hilarión Grájeda and Antonio Ramos; while the men had reason to exaggerate the role of outsiders, it is...
unlikely that their story was completely fabricated. See Los Tiempos, 3 April, 30 March, and 23 September 1947.

31. The POR would play a significant role in peasant mobilizations in 1952–1953, especially in Cochabamba (John 2009, 138–147). Of course, interethnic alliances can also be highly conservative, and authoritarianism did not always prevent alliance building – as MNR and military alliances with peasants would demonstrate in the decades after 1952.

Notes on contributor

Kevin Young is an Assistant Professor of History at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. His book Blood of the Earth: Resource Nationalism, Revolution, and Empire in Bolivia is forthcoming from University of Texas Press.

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