N. A. Anarcho-syndicalists

got to have fexibility.

Just a question for clarification - I don't want to divert this thread onto european problems. Is this section of the IWA goals and objectives something that was added following the disputes in Spain and France etc. or did it already exist in some form?

Thanks for the information. I'll let you get back to talking about North America.

I think that paragraph was added at the 1996 congress, that is the one that excluded CNT-Vignolles and USI-Roma. At the same time the statutes were also changed so there can only be one section per country. So it was clearly directed against the "reformist" splits from the IWA in Europe.

I think the hardliners in the IWA would argue it applies to NLRB elections in the US also, and will use this as a criticism of the IWW.

Felix: "I think the hardliners in the IWA would argue it applies to NLRB elections in the US also, and will use this as a criticism of the IWW."

These folks can assert whatever they like but the fact is that:

1. NLRB elections, or use of NLBR, does NOT presuppose "participation in state corporate schemes". If a union in the USA wins an NLRB election, the union itself negotiates directly with the employer. There is no government intermediary entity like the Spanish comite de empresa.

2. Use of the NLRB for union elections or defense of worker rights does NOT involve any subsidies to unions by the government.

3. Use of NLRB for elections or whatever does NOT presuppose use of any "paid union professionals." A union that is entirely a rank-and-file controlled union could file for an NLRB election or file unfair labor practice charges.

Now, the fact is, many unions in the USA, including quite mainstream ones, tend nowadays to boycott the NLRB whenever possible because the NLBR has been stacked by the Republicans with all sorts of pro-employer representatives, and the NLBR is notoriously slow in responding to union requests for elections or complaints of illegal firings for union activity. Penalties to employers for breaking the labor laws are notoriously minor...employers see it as just a cost of doing business and are quite willing to thumb their noses at the law.

On the other hand, it is equally true that there are fewer union strikes for recognition since the 1970s -- the main legal method for union recognition other than NLRB elections -- because the companies in the USA have been taking a very hostile, intransigent line against the unions and hire all sorts of anti-union cosultants to help them break unions, and this has made union recognition strikes more difficult.

t.

The overwhelming trend in the IWW, these days, is to eschew the NLRB as a strategy, but not necessarily as a tactic. As one fellow worker said to me, when labor law can be used as a shield we use it, but it can't be used as a sword so we don't try.

For example as Gato mentioned, the fines are incredibly small for illegal employer action. However, they prefer passive workers who do not file complaints at all - going through the courts costs them money on a lawyer, and negative rulings could cost them some very small amount of money, as well as ruin their reputation and strengthen the unions. However the overwhelming trend is to completely ignore the NLRB, unless we are already engaging in some direct action which it could add to (for example: if workers workers were pulling a slow-go to announce the union and the boss received a call from the local labor board informing him that complaints have been filed on all of his illegal actions for the past six months).

Other than that, the only other time when most wobs would advocate using the NLRB is from a position of weakness - i.e. an organizer gets fired before they've had a chance to start organizing with fellow workers; if no direct action on the job is possible to reinstate them, a complaint might be filed to get back wages/the job (hopefully combined with aggressive picketing by the local branch).

2 points:

1. Gato is right about the NLRB not falling under those exclusions. I'd say though that unions that rely too heavily on things like arbitration, ulps, and nlrb elections probably would be, but the context in the US is way different so it would be a case-by-case basis. Part of this I imagine is that for us concerted activity with or without a union, with or without a contract is legal. This is not true in Canada, many industries in Germany, etc.

2. I agree with these points personally for the US, and think they express well an anarchist perspective (communist and syndicalist). That being said I actually don't totally understand the whole encorporation scheme thing.

practices that can spoil the anarchosyndicalism.

The IWA makes me love the IWW.

I knew it was possible.

A comment on the state-corporate schemes and some food for thought about N. American conditions.

It is absolutely necessary here to have clear views on these schemes since they really can spoil even the function of the union, not to mention anarchosyndicalism. In Poland, for example, you do not have to work at all after you have signed a certain amount of people and this exemption from working hours is propotional, so it is possible to be exempted from 10 or 20 hours per week as well with a modest-sized union. This has created a clearly pathological situation in which people make careers as paid union functionaries and then their main concerns are to maintain the status quo in the workplace (which is basically paying 100% salary for no work, only union representation) and to maintain the position as long as possible, discouraging the rotation of tasks. It also leads to many manipulations concerning members - for example, gathering dead souls in the union or even buying subs just to maintain this liberated status. In terms of worker representation on the management boards, the worker representatives are also often given a bonus, so they have an economic stake in corporate austerity measures.

In terms of the US situation, the NLRB comparison seems way out of line with this. I would argue that for the US, the question should be about paid union organizers. Although their relation to the state or the bosses is not the same than what I described above, the dynamic of having paid union functionaries, many of whom can have executive powers or are not recallable or rotated, is problematic. The question of the shop steward is also important in terms of what discretionary powers s/he has.

BTW, off-topic, but we see that the question of paid unionists is very current for some unions outside the IWA. For example, the recent split in the Vignoles where most of them left to pursue the opportunity to have paid union officials etc.

Someone paid as admin for example is a very different world to paid officials. How would the instantly recallable come into play when you bin some goon of a full-timer and then the union is taken to a tribunal?!
No to full timers and no to creeping reforms, imo.