Capital Accumulation and Global Warming
Is capital accumulation not the cause of global warming? I have heard it stated that workers' wage demands actually drive accumulation rather than hindering it. Of course the reproduction of capital requires consumption, but the expanded reproduction of capital would require an expansion of consumption beyond what is possible- the value of the wage must by definition be less than the value of the capital that is created in the production process and certainly always less than the expanded value of capital, bearing in mind the continuous imperative for growth (or “investment”)
If we look at the schematic of the production process
C=c+v+s
v is obviously less than c+v+s. But C, the value of the final product, is not a fixed quantity. It should rather be described as C ' or C+deltaC as capital must continuously grow and expand.
The commodities emerging from the production process must be exchanged for money which in its turn is further exchanged for commodities:
C '1 -M-C2 or to make it clearer, c+v+s=C '1 – M - C2
As this is an exchange of equivalent values then C2 must equal C'1 ( C2 which must be equal to the expanded value of C1 which is represented by the apostrophe.)
So to put it very simply (or perhaps simplistically) our capitalist enterprise churns out goods, somebody else buys the goods in exchange for money, the capitalist uses some of the money to pay his workers the equivalent value of their labour-power which they can then exchange for the necessities of life (such as food fuel etc. to ensure they are able to keep on working, there is another circulation diagram here, M-C-M the second M is the money received by those who produce and sell means of subsistence to the workers it should really be a closed loop but I don't know how to do it on my computer ) and the rest of it is used to purchase machinery, raw materials fuel etc. The machinery is not replaced all at once, but in increments to make up for wear and tear, and not all of the “constant capital” enters into circulation at once, but rather some of it (the “fixed capital” actual machinery the original investment ) only gradually transfers its value to the product, small bits of the initial investment in plant gradually entering circulation as “circulating capital”. Now, as the capitalist is continually compelled by competition to increase the value of his constant capital, to reinvest some of the surplus value in buying an ever increasing amount of machinery (this does not take into account the fact that the value of machinery may decrease, owing perhaps to increased productivity in the branches of industry that actually make “means of production”), it follows that there must be an equivalent increased value “out there” somebody must have enough money in other words to exchange for the increased value of the commodities, to buy the expanded output of the factory(s) This “somebody” is not of course a single person any more than our capitalist is a single capitalist. The question now arises, from where does this expanded equivalent value come, who is going to enable the producer to realise the value of his product? The worker in this particular branch of production (let us say, making baked beans) obviously cannot buy back the full output as v is always less than c+v+s. How about other branches of production, then? Divide the whole gizmo into two departments, department 1 making consumer goods ,and department 2 making actual “means of production”, machinery and the like:
Department 1 c+v+s =C consumption goods
Department 2 c+v+s=C production goods
Now it is obvious that in order for the size of c in dept 1 to grow(the case we started out with), dept 2 must provide increased output. It is not simply the case that you have to make the workers work harder to generate more surplus value. The finished product still has to be exchanged. (I am ignoring the fact that the exchange between the branches is much more complicated than this. For example the workers in dept 1 must provide means of consumption for dept. 2 as well as for themselves, likewise with means of production- dept. 2 must provide for both departments , i.e. the output of dept 1 must provide for v in both depts and the output of dept 2 must supply c both for itself and for dept 1) If the workers in dept1 produce expanded output in order to satisfy both 1 and 2 the question still remains who has the dough to buy the output of 2? Certainly not the workers in dept 1 who only have at their disposal v and likewise not the workers in dept 2 who have the same limited means.
The answer is of course that there must be an external market, one capable of providing, through intense exploitation, commodities whose value is equivalent to that of the expanded value of the commodities emerging from the production process, the expanded value of which facilitates capital accumulation-in other words, the foreign market, colonialism, slavery, and imperialism with its finest product, war, which involves scrambling for markets. This of course causes problems. Does there come a point when the planet itself is not big enough for instance? The drive for “growth” causes more and more materials to be mined more and more electricity to be generated to power the increased mass of machinery more fossil fuels to be burnt in driving transport and facilitating circulation....... the list is endless.
The above is quite schematic. It is easy to talk of “surplus value” and so on without really grasping what value means socially.
Comments are invited. Have I hit the nail on the head, am I totally wrong or somewhere between the two?
Hi Pingu
Interesting that you seem to be coming to Luxemburg's theory 'spontaneously' as it were - or have you read The Accumulation of Capital?
I don't think you are totally wrong, of course. I think there is a clear need to understand the 'ecological' problem in terms of the marxist theory of crisis. I think that Luxemburg's approach is a totally legitimate development of one aspect of Marx's theory (his recognition that the capitalist tendency towards overproduction was a fatal flaw at the heart of the system). But there are equally compelling passages in Marx which indicate that the problem of the falling rate of profit is the contradiction which most reveals the inherant limits of the capitalist mode of production. But neither Marx, nor Luxemburg or those like Mattick who focus on the falling rate of profit, argued that the system might break down because of its relationship with the natural environment, even if Marx in particular had a lot to say about the general problem of man and nature and the specific problem of pollution.
Some might argue that the ecological crisis therefore invalidates the marxist theory of capitalism's demise since it is based on an analysis of its economic contradictions. But while I may have some points of disagreement with the way you pose the question (particularly because it seems to lack the historical concreteness that Luxemburg's work contains, remaining at an abstract level which doesn't follow the actual historical evolution of imperialism, war and crisis) I think it is perfectly valid to try to understand why a system that is being torn apart by its economic contradictions is also being led to tear apart the planetary environment.
Alf, I think I did read a book on the accumulation of capital ages ago, but it wasn't Rosa Luxemburg's one. What I did read gave me food for thought though. The above post is a modified version of a post for the Social Ecology Group, where this issue is being currently debated. I hope that the ecological crisis does not invalidate the marxist theory of capitalism's demise. I do have a problem with posing things in abstract terms, admittedly .
P.S. can somebody tell me how to post mathematical symbols on to Libcom, so I don't have to write "delta" instead of- well, delta?
pingu: As for the delta symbol, I've tried to test it and apparently the forums here don't support some special Unicode characters, so you'll probably have to stick with writing "delta".
Cant you just use Greek characters? like this Δ
Or does that not show up for you?
On mac I just change the input to greek, linux is the same as far as i remember, cant remember for windows you may need to instal an IME
I tried pasting in the Greek letter delta from the "symbols" font of OpenOffice.org Writer but it just comes up as the Roman letter "D" on this website.
I don't think you are totally wrong, of course. I think there is a clear need to understand the 'ecological' problem in terms of the marxist theory of crisis. I think that Luxemburg's approach is a totally legitimate development of one aspect of Marx's theory (his recognition that the capitalist tendency towards overproduction was a fatal flaw at the heart of the system). But there are equally compelling passages in Marx which indicate that the problem of the falling rate of profit is the contradiction which most reveals the inherant limits of the capitalist mode of production. But neither Marx, nor Luxemburg or those like Mattick who focus on the falling rate of profit, argued that the system might break down because of its relationship with the natural environment, even if Marx in particular had a lot to say about the general problem of man and nature and the specific problem of pollution.
But what does any of this have to do with ecological crisis? Even assuming Luxemburg was correct, I don't see how the need to exchange commodities with outside nations can be said to cause ecological catastrophes. The best argument you could possibly make here (so far as I can see) would be that the drive to transform non-exchange economies into petty commodity producing economies causes those economies to exploit the natural environment more.
But this would not be a very good theory of ecological collapse, as it is not the non-capitalist, petty commodity-exchanging societies that are causing ecological catastrophe. In fact, such societies mostly don't exist. The cause of ecological devastation today is largely the drive for raw materials, which has nothing to do with finding an outside market. There are other causes as well but they don't have anything more to do with outside markets.
I don't think any theory of economic crisis explains the way that capitalism affects the natural environment. It is really just a product of the general nature of the capitalist mode of production -- production for profit. If environmental destruction doesn't affect a capitalist's profit, it is of no concern to him. And if he is able to make a profit by exploiting the environment, he will do it. Fines billed to companies based on their "externalities" has its limits as well, since those fines are just factored into the capitalist's calculation of his cost-price. If it is worthwhile to pay the fine and continue to pollute the environment, he will continue to pollute. If not, then he won't. This is well known stuff. I don't see any need for some grand theory here.
I tried pasting in the Greek letter delta from the "symbols" font of OpenOffice.org Writer but it just comes up as the Roman letter "D" on this website.
That wont work (well you know that), the symbols font just uses different shapes for the same character codes, It uses a different picture for the D character, rather than using the computer code for the delta character.
But fonts are not preserved when you copy and paste or over the internet, all that is kept are the codes for the characters, so the computer just sees D.
You need to find a way of typing delta in a normal font, there should be some kind of list of special characters that you can access though edit? in open office its under insert, but you should be able to do it in you browser to.
I prefer to change the keyboard settings to greek so that I type D and get Δ
I think this is under keyboard settings in windows, you add a keyboard set up to the list and tell it to keep a icon in the task bar , then you can change between different lay out by clicking on the icon and choosing the one you want.
Theories of economic crisis don't explain the environmental crisis per se. What they can show is why capitalism is utterly incapable of doing anything about it, if only because economic pressure forces them to cut costs, etc. regardless of the effect it will have on the environment (and even their own future profits).
Actually, that's not necessarily correct, because I don't think it matters which theory of crisis you accept. It's the reality of the economic crisis that forces capitalism to do this. (That's not to say the drive to profit doesn't exist at all times, but crises or an increased tendency to crisis force the issue to extremes).
Some might argue that the ecological crisis therefore invalidates the marxist theory of capitalism's demise since it is based on an analysis of its economic contradictions.
Externalities are, imho, clearly an economic contradiction. They represent a failure of the market to represent the true costs of production. I'm not sure how it relates to Marxist theory, but essentially they are - at least in capitalism - a problem related to the nature of private property and the state.
Mikus: I am not arguing that Luxemburg's theory provides a mechanical explanation of the ecological crisis. I am saying that marxists, whichever theory of crisis they adhere to, need to incorporate the ecological problem into their overall analysis. I don't think this is just ABC, although you are obviously right to say that it's the hunt for profit which is the central issue in the despoliation of the environment. But this was the case from the very beginning of the system. But for some time we have seen quantity turning into quality, as it were, and the problem is posed on a vastly different scale than in capitalism's heroic days.
Mikus: I am not arguing that Luxemburg's theory provides a mechanical explanation of the ecological crisis.
And I didn't argue that Luxemburg's theory doesn't provide a "mechanical" explanation of the ecological crisis. I argued that it doesn't provide any explanation (whether mechanical, complex, holistic, or mystical), and that that would be the case even if her theory were correct.
I don't think this is just ABC, although you are obviously right to say that it's the hunt for profit which is the central issue in the despoliation of the environment. But this was the case from the very beginning of the system. But for some time we have seen quantity turning into quality, as it were, and the problem is posed on a vastly different scale than in capitalism's heroic days.
Global warming, which seems to be one of the main if not the main environmental problem of the day (although peak oil people might jump on me for this), is the result of a cumulative effect, not some sudden change in recent capitalist history. So it very well could be, and probably is, the result of simply the drive for profit. Other environmental problems like deforestation are also largely the result of cumulative effects. I still don't see anything difficult about this issue.
As for Demogorgon: I can sort of see some validity to what you're saying, but you go too far in saying that it's the theory of crisis that proves the necessity of ecological crises. I don't think you even need the theory of crisis in order to do that. The general theory of accumulation (of which the theory of economic crisis is just a part) shows why capitalists are motivated to destroy the environment (assuming that it increases their ability to generate profit). This may be intensified during a crisis (although I'm not aware of any evidence of this, so I wouldn't even be so certain of this) but it is not as if this tendency disappears during upswings. China's national economy is expanding at an enormous rate and their relationship to the natural environment is not exactly a healthy one. And the capitalism of the industrial revolution was not too friendly to the environment either.
As for Demogorgon: I can sort of see some validity to what you're saying, but you go too far in saying that it's the theory of crisis that proves the necessity of ecological crises. I don't think you even need the theory of crisis in order to do that. The general theory of accumulation (of which the theory of economic crisis is just a part) shows why capitalists are motivated to destroy the environment (assuming that it increases their ability to generate profit). This may be intensified during a crisis (although I'm not aware of any evidence of this, so I wouldn't even be so certain of this) but it is not as if this tendency disappears during upswings. China's national economy is expanding at an enormous rate and their relationship to the natural environment is not exactly a healthy one. And the capitalism of the industrial revolution was not too friendly to the environment either.
I think perhaps you've misunderstood me, but given my original post was a bit of a mess, it's not that surprising. I said the crisis explained their inability to actually do anything about it. And by "crisis", I mean the general period of crisis we've been living with since the end of the 60s, not just the conjunctural recessions that have punctuated it. I'd also situate it in a context of "decadent" capitalism but I realise you don't accept this proposition.
China is expanding, but its industrial growth has been a response to the decimation of industrial production in the West precisely because China offers cheaper labour and absolutely no "environmental" restraints (among other things). Incidentally, I don't mean to imply this is just a like-for-like transfer, the move has allowed accumulation to continue after a fashion and global industrial production has obviously risen in the last three decades. In other words, China is able to accumulate precisely because its free to destroy the environment.
But, if China was suddenly forced to provide the minimal protections to both labour and the environment that we "enjoy" in the West, I'd imagine their marvellous growth would come to a shuddering halt. (There's some evidence this was happening already, in fact, thanks to rising real wages along with other factors and now the credit crunch).
Of course, capitalism has polluted throughout its history but it has also developed remarkable technologies to compensate for it. When the system is expanding and profits are healthy (I mean in a historic rather than contingent sense), it's more capable of implementing these technologies (e.g. carbon capture for coal-fired stations) just as with any other reform. I don't think this stops in decadence, but the gap between the technically possible and the economically possible (i.e. compatible with continued accumulation) widens more and more.
So you aren't saying that there needs to be an actual crisis for environmental destruction to intensify, just that the possibility of crisis intensifies environmental devastation because in order to make profits the capitalists can't follow environmental regulations and all that. (That is why I brought up the theory of accumulation. If in fact capitalists didn't strive after profit and/or if in fact profits were made out of thin air, it isn't hard to imagine that environmental problems would be easy to overcome within capitalism.)
Which seems to me a roundabout way of saying the same thing I said above.
I didn't mean to imply I necessarily disagreed with you, I think we were just approaching the question from different angles. But you were attributing a stronger claim to me than I actually made, hence my response. However, I do think the epoch that we're in is characterised by an increased tendency towards crisis, which pushes the pressure on capitalism towards fever pitch. The result of this is that capitalism cannot tackle the ecological crisis without putting its own existence into question - which, of course, it cannot do. So in an historic sense - if not strictly economic - there's a sense in which the crisis does exacerbate the ecological crisis.
The nature of the threat to the environment has qualitatively shifted in the last few decades. This is certainly the result of cumulative changes, but the 'globalisation' and acceleration of the problem is now at a very different level than it was in capitalism's early days. At that point it didn't constitute a threat to the survival of the system or even of humanity itself. Furthermore, this is not only the result of capitalism getting 'bigger' and thus producing more pollution but of coming up against fundamental contradictions that hold back its expansion, In other words, in a world of armoured nation states fighting over a diminishing economic cake, each one of them is compelled to pillage its own natural resources in order to compete on the world market. The destruction of the Brazilian, African and Indonesian rainforests is a prime example of this. I agree with Demogorgon that we can't say that either theory of economic crisis is the only one able to explain this, but I do think that a conception of capitalist decadence is essential for placing the problem in its historical framework.
diminishing economic cake
is this that metaphysical cake again that's in decline whilst expanding?
each one of them is compelled to pillage its own natural resources in order to compete on the world market.
i don't see the qualitative distinction between this and industrial revolution era capitalism. fossil fuel dependency and over-exploitation of natural resources have been there since the start. the qualitative transformation of the ecological crisis is a result of a quantiative accumulation of 'externalities' rather than a qualitative shift in the nature of capitalism itself (if anything there has been a shift towards minorly reducing emissions amongst the most 'advanced' economies, although offset by china/india etc industrialising along the historic model).
is this that metaphysical cake again that's in decline whilst expanding?
A cake can get bigger in absolute terms while declining in relative terms if the consumers of the cake need more of it in order to survive.
i don't see the qualitative distinction between this and industrial revolution era capitalism. fossil fuel dependency and over-exploitation of natural resources have been there since the start. the qualitative transformation of the ecological crisis is a result of a quantiative accumulation of 'externalities' rather than a qualitative shift in the nature of capitalism itself (if anything there has been a shift towards minorly reducing emissions amongst the most 'advanced' economies, although offset by china/india etc industrialising along the historic model).
You haven't listened to the argument. The passage into decadence is not necessarily the cause of the environmental crisis - decadence means the bourgeoisie are increasingly unable to do anything about it. To give an example, early capitalism wreaked such destruction on the working class that many a bourgeois worried about destroying this "natural resource". As a result, through all sorts of methods, the bourgeoisie co-operated with efforts to protect the working class from the worst ravages of capitalism - as long as it was compatible with the continuing demands of accumulation, of course.
Today, it has no prospect of doing this any longer. Instead it is making it increasingly impossible for the working class to reproduce itself - not necessarily on a physical level (although working class birthrates are declining in Britain at least, and I wouldn't like to imagine the conditions in the 3rd world) but above all on a cultural level. The bourgeoisie needs a working class with a certain level of educational and cultural development - and is becoming increasingly incapable of actually producing this. Instead, for all the continual talk about skills and "life-long learning", companies cut back training opportunities while the education system is more and more starved of funding. They are shooting themselves in the foot, the more lucid sectors of the bourgeoisie realise this, and yet they show their total incapacity to stop the overall decline.
The environment is in a similar issue. The technology, expertise, etc. is all there to solve global warming. The Stern report estimates that an investment of 2% of world GDP would be able to solve the worst aspects of this problem. This is just under the total the world economy pumps into military expenditures (2.5% of global GDP in 2007). The bourgeoisie can see the problem - they write reports about it constantly. The bourgeoisie knows how to solve the problem - the science is there, the technology is there). But they are totally unable to do anything about it. Why?
Economic conditions offer at least a partial explanation. As Alf mentioned, in order to remain competitive in ever more adverse conditions ("because there is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce"), the bourgeoisie is both forced to cut as much expenditure as it can to the bone, while increasing other expenditure (guns, police, etc.) to defend themselves and their system.
The fact that China and India are industrialising on the old model is, in itself, a sign of the desperation of the system. When Germany industrialised it used the best of British technology and engineers - in other words, it industrialised using the most advanced techniques of the day. Part of the reason for British decline was its slowness in adopting its own "best practice" across its whole economy, whereas the newer powers adopted them much more quickly. Germany also, especially under Bismark, consciously created one of the first welfare states (adopting parts of the SPD platform while also banning it) in order to sustain the productivity (and loyalty) of the working class.
Today China, India and the other "emerging economies" are not following the Bismarkian model but the exact opposite: the utter degradation of labour, the use of older polluting technologies which degrade the environment and everything else. When real wages start to rise, this isn't a factor in pushing forward capitalist development (as it often was in the 19th century) but is seen as a direct threat to future "competiveness". In recent years, China itself has seen competition from other countries who have managed to keep their wage rates down, while those in China have risen slightly.
So I think there has been a historic change in capitalism's forms of development. I also think this change springs from economic and social contradictions that are embodied in capitalism itself whose effects have now become restricitve. Whatever the exact mechanisms that have driven this change are, it seems increasingly obvious that this social system has absolutely no capacity at all for any form of progressive development and the development that does occur is to the detriment of humanity and even the ulitmate future of the system itself.
Instead it is making it increasingly impossible for the working class to reproduce itself - not necessarily on a physical level (although working class birthrates are declining in Britain at least, and I wouldn't like to imagine the conditions in the 3rd world) but above all on a cultural level.
so decadence is primarily a cultural lament?
The bourgeoisie needs a working class with a certain level of educational and cultural development - and is becoming increasingly incapable of actually producing this.
i really don't think this is true. the cuts to/marketisation of education in the west is happening alongside an unparalleled expansion of access to knowledge via the internet and what have you. the call centres full of graduates would suggest capital isn't short of educated wage slaves - if anything the 'cognitive worker' celebrated by bourgeois theorists is somewhat in contradiction with the very nature of the capitalist division of labour, outside a minority of jobs. just cos they say they need everyone highly educated doesn't make it so - literacy and numeracy yes, a degree in philosophy and it's hello temp admin work.
The environment is in a similar issue. The technology, expertise, etc. is all there to solve global warming. The Stern report estimates that an investment of 2% of world GDP would be able to solve the worst aspects of this problem. This is just under the total the world economy pumps into military expenditures (2.5% of global GDP in 2007). The bourgeoisie can see the problem - they write reports about it constantly. The bourgeoisie knows how to solve the problem - the science is there, the technology is there). But they are totally unable to do anything about it. Why?
because capital rarely takes a hit voluntarily and competing national capitals are unable to cut military expenditure. i'm not convinced this is more the case today than during the napoleonic wars for example, without lapsing into Negrian fantasy if anything we're closer to global bourgeois co-operation now than ever (although of course this is short-circuited by the power of national capitals, most notably the US).
the bourgeoisie is both forced to cut as much expenditure as it can to the bone, while increasing other expenditure (guns, police, etc.) to defend themselves and their system.
i wouldn't so readily accept their pleas of poverty. of course they say they have to cut the social wage, the same way wage cuts are always 'regretably necessary, with a heavy heart.' they're going to cut our wages and social wage if we don't have the power to resist it, it isn't evidence of their poverty.
When real wages start to rise, this isn't a factor in pushing forward capitalist development (as it often was in the 19th century) but is seen as a direct threat to future "competiveness".
this is because of a fallacy in the 'development' paradigm, simply copying the first industrialisers doesn't work because they were world-economic leaders, and still occupy a strong position in the world economy as markets for chinese etc goods.
it seems increasingly obvious that this social system has absolutely no capacity at all for any form of progressive development and the development that does occur is to the detriment of humanity
capitalist development has always been progressive and regressive at the same time. capitalism progressively swept away feudal relations whilst enslaving millions in the factories, yes this created future economic growth from which future workers could gain a slice, but are you saying this hasn't happened since 1917 (or whenever)? No, this seems to be where you retreat from material decadence to cultural decadence. 'oh sure, many workers are better off than their great grandparents materially, but the culture of the youth of today...!' 
without lapsing into Negrian fantasy if anything we're closer to global bourgeois co-operation now than ever (although of course this is short-circuited by the power of national capitals, most notably the US).
Closer to global bourgeois co-operation? Really? I would say we are further from it than even during the cold war when they at least had blocs that by and large followed their leaders. The entire history of the failure of the capitalism to deal with global waming over the last few decades is testimony to their inability to cooperate globally in any real sense.
You are quite right (though self-contradictory) to say that global cooperation is "short-circuited by the power of national capitals". This is one example of the social relations acting as a fetter on the productive forces, the conflict between the global nature of capitalist accumulation and the narrow national units in which it is imprisoned. A contradiction noted by marxists in 1914 when the first world war broke out.
Perhaps you are clinging to the hope that "global bourgeois cooperation" will make light work of global warming. And perhaps this makes you think we are only talking about decadence as a period of cultural decline and not as one of catastrophe hanging over the heads of humanity.
disclaimer: i'm only slogging this one out again cos i'm bored at work and, due to economic decline don't have much to do.
You are quite right (though self-contradictory) to say that global cooperation is "short-circuited by the power of national capitals".
not self-contradictory, because i said 'if anything' - i'm simply saying you could argue there's more international bourgeois co-operation today than during the napoleonic wars, say.
Perhaps you are clinging to the hope that "global bourgeois cooperation" will make light work of global warming.
i think you're mistaking me for george monbiot. on another thread recently (the climate camp one i think) i argued that despite the improbable odds global communist revolution is the only realistic solution to climate change, either by being successful outright or threatening enough to force massive changes onto capital at its own expense.
And perhaps this makes you think we are only talking about decadence as a period of cultural decline and not as one of catastrophe hanging over the heads of humanity.
the problem here is you start with the axiom of decline and then seize upon any topical example which then confirms your axiom. is everyone who thinks drastic action is needed to avert catestrophic climate change a decadence theorist? or are you playing the usual soft/hard trick of 'decadence just means capitalism does bad stuff and workers can make it better through revolution' that everyone here would agree with, then saying 'oh by the way it also means...'
i really don't think this is true. the cuts to/marketisation of education in the west is happening alongside an unparalleled expansion of access to knowledge via the internet and what have you. the call centres full of graduates would suggest capital isn't short of educated wage slaves
Knowledge available via the internet is no substitute for academic training. As far as graduates are concerned, there is a constant battle between universities and the commercial sector over graduates not having the right skills set. Overeducation is as much a symptom as the skills crisis as undereducation.
literacy and numeracy yes, a degree in philosophy and it's hello temp admin work.
Except that basic numeracy and literacy is a chronic problem, in Britain at least. Recent SATS tests revealed one-in-five 14 year old boys are reading are below the level expected of an 11-year old. I also regularly see applications from graduates as part of my job and the level of illiteracy, even in people doing essay-based subjects, is absolutely appalling. Graduate employers regularly complain about the standard of applications they receive. If this is the level of the most educated sector of the working class, the level of less educated sectors must be even worse.
This isn't some "youth of today" rant against the young, it's a real problem that the bourgeoisie themselves see is holding back productivity. Hence this continuing rubbish about the "knowledge economy". The fact that they need graduates in call-centres because these are the only sector of the working class that meets their requirements in terms of minimum literacy standards, the ability to communicate effectively, work in teams, etc. is itself frightening. I've personally had meetings with recruitment agencies that staff call centres who recruit graduates for precisely those reasons - one told me that, these days, if she looks at a CV for a call-centre job and they don't have a degree, she puts it to the bottom of the pile. In terms of labour resource, all the conversations I've had with recruiters, personnel units, etc. in the course of my work point to a shortage of basic work skills.
Both China and India also have serious problems in educating its workforce properly, as this article from Wall Street Journal examines. Paradoxically, the opposite problem is also the case. There's a shortage of unskilled labour in Chian because more workers are going to college and don't (surprise surprise) want to work in factories. As a result, many low-cost operations are moving to countries like Bangladesh, etc.
because capital rarely takes a hit voluntarily and competing national capitals are unable to cut military expenditure.
So all that 19th century bourgeois philanthropy, the roll out of education, etc. and Bismarkian social welfare systems are just a figment of my imagination? Come on, they were once more than capable of adapting the system when it was necessary. The whole political movement of liberalism was predicated upon this!
wouldn't so readily accept their pleas of poverty. of course they say they have to cut the social wage, the same way wage cuts are always 'regretably necessary, with a heavy heart.' they're going to cut our wages and social wage if we don't have the power to resist it, it isn't evidence of their poverty.
Except that they're cutting our wages and social wage even despite the fact they know it's generating increased resistance. And, increasingly, they're doing it in more open and massive ways. They did this in periods when class struggle was actually very high i.e. in the 70s.
this is because of a fallacy in the 'development' paradigm, simply copying the first industrialisers doesn't work because they were world-economic leaders, and still occupy a strong position in the world economy as markets for chinese etc goods.
You've missed the point. Germany was able to (and did) copy the contemporary world leader, Britain and rapidly overtook it in industrial development. China and India's strategy - as much in partnership with Western capital as in competition with them - was to use the massive rates of exploitation possible for them to shift manufacturing from the West to them. They didn't adopt the most advanced technologies and social forms of capitalism that the West had developed, rather the opposite.
yes this created future economic growth from which future workers could gain a slice, but are you saying this hasn't happened since 1917 (or whenever)? No, this seems to be where you retreat from material decadence to cultural decadence. 'oh sure, many workers are better off than their great grandparents materially, but the culture of the youth of today...'
Strawman argument. I did not say there was no economic growth from 1917, I said that growth was increasingly at the expense of the working class. Firstly, in terms of relative exploitation this is most certainly true as the vast increases in productivity show. Nor am I saying that every worker has the material living standards of a worker in 1917 either - that has got nothing to do with how Marx defined the value of labour power which, for him, had historic, cultural and moral elements to it as well. Anyway, this only holds if you consider the conditions of workers in the West. When you look at China, India, etc. where the living standards for many workers are probably just as bad at the 19th century the argument starts to look somewhat hollow.
The question of whether workers (mainly young workers in the West) are worse off these days was discussed on this thread a while ago. As Devrim says, this seems fairly uncontroversial until a left-communist says it.
People can argue for revolution without being 'decadence theorists' at all. But if they argue for revolution as the only hope of averting catastrophe, they are already half way to becoming one.....if accepting decadence means anything at all, it means recognising that the bourgeois mode of production has outlived its usefulness and that its mere continuation brings no further benefit for humanity. The argument that capitalism is both progressive and regressive at the same time does not stand up very well in a situation where the diseased 'growth' we are witnessing today is visibly piling up disaster upon disaster, and not only on a local or time-limited scale - China being the prime example of this.
I did not say there was no economic growth from 1917, I said that growth was increasingly at the expense of the working class. Firstly, in terms of relative exploitation this is most certainly true as the vast increases in productivity show.
so you're saying decadence means capitalism has become more and more productive? riiighht...
Anyway, this only holds if you consider the conditions of workers in the West. When you look at China, India, etc. where the living standards for many workers are probably just as bad at the 19th century the argument starts to look somewhat hollow.
more to the point, how are Chinese workers conditions compared to 100 years ago? why was capitalism 'progressive' when it did the same thing in britain but now isn't when it does it in China? if your answer is 'because it's decadent' you're just repeating a tautology.
[Decadence] means recognising that the bourgeois mode of production has outlived its usefulness and that its mere continuation brings no further benefit for humanity
if you were around during the enclosures would you have been leafletting the dispossessed with 'to the workhouses comrades, our historic mission awaits!'?
so you're saying decadence means capitalism has become more and more productive? riiighht...
Capitalism's viability isn't measured in terms of productivity, but in terms of profitability. Capitalism can become more and more productive while the profit rate falls. That's the reason behind the tendency to the falling rate of profit. That's not say that increased productivity can't also mean an increase in the rate of surplus value, but the two are not identical. If they were, there would never be a crisis! Needless to say, increased productivity also exacerbates the problem of overproduction.
So, yes, it's perfectly possible for capital to become more productive and more crisis prone and one of the major Marxist crisis theories is predicated on it!
more to the point, how are Chinese workers conditions compared to 100 years ago? why was capitalism 'progressive' when it did the same thing in britain but now isn't when it does it in China? if your answer is 'because it's decadent' you're just repeating a tautology.
Except that capitalism is a global system with the creation of a world market and the value of wages is thus determined on a global scale. It was not simply wages and working conditions in Britain that rose dramatically during the 19th century but a pattern repeated all over the world, although in an uneven manner (by 1930 wages in Japan were still lower than the US for example, but still rising).
Today, the exact opposite is the case. At the risk of repeating myself, China represents the lowering of wages of the global working class. It is the opposite pole of the devastating de-industrialisation of the West and the violent attack on real wages in the whole of the Western economy since the 1970s. As development has brought a local rise in wages in China, production has shifted elsewhere to where wages are even lower. China will soon find itself in the exact position as the Western economies: higher wages than elsewhere, but with creeping deindustrialisation and massive unemployment. Once they reach this stage, they will be in direct competition with the older powers and new advancement will come only at the price of massive decline of the older economies.
And you're still dodging the point. Why was Germany able to establish itself as a capitalist power, in advance of Britain, in the 19th century while today no new power has been able to do that without impoverishing and degrading the working class as opposed to developing it?
if you were around during the enclosures would you have been leafletting the dispossessed with 'to the workhouses comrades, our historic mission awaits!'?
Another strawman argument and, I think, a deliberate one, when you know Alf's position was that reforms were possible in the 19th century. It was perfectly possible to be against workhouses and not be a revolutionary.
And you're still dodging the point. Why was Germany able to establish itself as a capitalist power, in advance of Britain, in the 19th century while today no new power has been able to do that without impoverishing and degrading the working class as opposed to developing it?
i wouldn't say the US working class has been particularly "impoverished and degraded" in the post-war period, beyond the usual proletarian condition, although US power does now appear to be waning. it will be interesting to see how China's economy moves from world sweatshop to something else, and i agree that China's rise is likely to mean the decline of the US etc, although this won't neccessarily be zero- or negative sum.
in terms of the local/global point, capitalism was not a fully-developed global system in the 19th century, and nor is it today, with vast swathes of the world population barely proletarianised. the use of contemporary globalisation made possible by transport and telecoms to create a 'race to the bottom' in labour conditions is not part of some inexorable historical arc but a historically contingent strategy reliant on proletarianising those still outside the labour market who will work for peanuts.
Another strawman argument and, I think, a deliberate one, when you know Alf's position was that reforms were possible in the 19th century. It was perfectly possible to be against workhouses and not be a revolutionary.
whilst i admire the intellectual gymnastics, it appears to make no difference at all given as i'm not advocating asking for reforms but struggling in our own interests. if you're right and it's impossible for capital to make any concessions short of communism, then woohoo.
i wouldn't say the US working class has been particularly "impoverished and degraded" in the post-war period, beyond the usual proletarian condition, although US power does now appear to be waning.
Are you being serious? There was a limited but real growth in living standards in the immediate post-war period across the Western world, but the US working class has been under continual attack since the 70s - at exactly the time, China began its development.
i agree that China's rise is likely to mean the decline of the US etc, although this won't neccessarily be zero- or negative sum.
And I didn't say it would be. Accumulation may continue in some form or other, as long as the bourgeoisie can hold off the dynamic of open crisis. But their capacity to do this seems to be more and more in doubt, as the funds for state intervention dry up. The other method of doing this is to continue to assault the working class at the global level, which will reach levels which will make the past 30 years look like an oasis of prosperity. It will be a period of deep instability.
in terms of the local/global point, capitalism was not a fully-developed global system in the 19th century, and nor is it today, with vast swathes of the world population barely proletarianised. the use of contemporary globalisation made possible by transport and telecoms to create a 'race to the bottom' in labour conditions is not part of some inexorable historical arc but a historically contingent strategy reliant on proletarianising those still outside the labour market who will work for peanuts
Except that it is now deproletarianising those already within the labour force, which is a major factor in the "lumpenisation" of major sectors of the working class in the developed countries. And besides, if what you say is true then revolution is impossible according to Marx: "The proper task of bourgeois society is the creation of the world market, at least in outline, and of the production based on that market. Since the world is round, the colonisation of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan would seem to have completed this process. For us, the difficult question is this: on the Continent revolution is imminent and will, moreover, instantly assume a socialist character. Will it not necessarily be crushed in this little corner of the earth, since the movement of bourgeois society is still, in the ascendant over a far greater area?".
whilst i admire the intellectual gymnastics, it appears to make no difference at all given as i'm not advocating asking for reforms but struggling in our own interests. if you're right and it's impossible for capital to make any concessions short of communism, then woohoo.
Except you think they are, but refuse to accept the political implications of this (reformism). Anyway, I've responded in greater detail on the Social Revolt thread on this question.
the US working class has been under continual attack since the 70s - at exactly the time, China began its development.
exactly what we'd expect with the transition from one centre of world accumulation to another. e.g. Giovanni Arrighi has traced this pattern back over 600 years from the italian city states.
Except you think they are, but refuse to accept the political implications of this (reformism)
in what way is for example, Tea Break reformist? i was involved with that, and the other contributors are probably politically closer to me than decadence theory. it sounds a lot like you're saying 'if you don't agree with me you must be a reformist.'
Except that it is now deproletarianising those already within the labour force, which is a major factor in the "lumpenisation" of major sectors of the working class in the developed countries.
really? has there being a long-term growth in unemployment since the 70s, say? i'm not sure how the massive expansion of the service sector in place of manufacturing is 'lumpenisation,' and anyhow last time i checked the world proletariat was growing overall, so even a local reversal wouldn't matter much, by your prior reckoning.
if what you say is true then revolution is impossible according to Marx
well for starters his Word is fallible, gasp. look at for example vast swathes of africa where proletarianisation is far from complete. there are many who are largely dispossessed but not involved in wage labour - this is what i referred to with regard to capitalism being incompletely global, clearly today the world labour market is not complete, whatever marx wrote in 1858. and what came of Marx's prophesised "imminent socialist revolution" on the eurpoean continent in 1858? surely it wasn't possible for another 60 years! was marx being idealist?
With understandable impatience, Marx several times miscalculated the degree to which capitalism had exhausted its historic 'mission'. First in 1848, in the Communist Manifesto, then, to a lesser degree, in the statement above. But what's interesting about the statement is the underlying method or approach: the recognition (against the atemporal views of the anarchists, for whom capitalism simply 'does bad stuff') that bourgeois society had a "proper task", which was the creation of a global capitalist economy; and the necessity for capitalism to have completed its ascendant phase for the socialist revolution to be a real possibility. Note that in 1871, despite his understanding that bourgeois society was still largely "in the ascendant" , this did not prevent Marx from supporting the Commune.
exactly what we'd expect with the transition from one centre of world accumulation to another. e.g. Giovanni Arrighi has traced this pattern back over 600 years from the italian city states.
So you seriously expect the average Chinese worker to ever achieve the living standards the average worker has enjoyed in the West? An economy that has to create 10 million jobs a year just to stand still?
in what way is for example, Tea Break reformist? i was involved with that, and the other contributors are probably politically closer to me than decadence theory. it sounds a lot like you're saying 'if you don't agree with me you must be a reformist.'
Strawman argument. I did not say you were a reformist. I said that if you accepted the political implications of your arguments you would be a reformist. You can be an inconsistent revolutionary and still be very much a revolutionary. If total theoretical coherence is a criteria for being a revolutionary, I'll be the first to thro
There is a huge literature on the reproduction schemas. You are wrong about a few of the central things which you mention.
This issue was debated at length between me and some others, on one side, and the ICC'ers (following Luxemburg), on the other. Read the debate and make up your own mind. http://libcom.org/forums/thought/fictitious-capital-beginners-imperialism-anti-imperialism-continuing-relevance-rosa-luxemburg-27082007
This is not true. It may be the case that Dept. 2 grows in output (in value terms) along with Dept. 1, but there is no necessity here. In fact, in a transition from simple to expanded reproduction (imagine a developing economy, for instance), Dept. 2 must actually shrink relative to Dept. 1. (If Dept. 1 doesn't increase in absolute size, then Dept. 2 will have to shrink not only relatively, but absolutely.) This is also the case if there is a transition from a slower to a faster rate of accumulation of the total social capital.
Andrew Kliman proved what I said above, here: http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/Reprod.%20schemes%20web.doc
"The Reproduction Schemes as Unbalanced Growth Model"
This question is more or less the same as what you brought up at the beginning of the post, and was debated on the same thread.
Again, this was debated on the previous thread. You can decide for yourself once you read the thread but for my own part I think you are wrong and I think I demonstrated this satisfactorily on the thread I've linked to.
Also, Henryk Grossman has an excellent empirical argument against Rosa Luxemburg, which is not contained in the English translation of his book. I've been meaning to translate it for a while but still haven't gotten around to it. To my mind it completely gets rid of any notion that there is or was some kind of "outside" that purchased the capitalistically produced commodities. I'll try to translate it soon.
None of this has anything to do with the need for an outside market, strictly speaking. An outside market, in the Luxemburgian theory, is just a source of money outside of the capitalist nations which is necessary to realize the value of the commodities produced by them. Even if you were to accept the Luxemburgian theory, the growth that you describe would be a result of accumulation, not the outside market itself, which is just a source of money. And since the Luxemburgian theory is wrong, and there are no significant non-capitalist markets today, then those non-existent non-capitalist markets cannot explain anything.
Totally wrong. (You asked!)