Dialectical materialism vs Marx's original concepts

Big fan of Zizek's take on it, which is basically that the subject both arises from and is the split between the subject and object, or in Butler's terms,

This is a situation where I think talk of a dialectic is spot on.

Quantitative differences in hue or softness! What a cop out. Red and yellow most certainly exclude each other. I.e. you can't have two colors in the same space. They are "qualitatively" different.

In any case, what is considered "qualitatively" or "quantitatively" different depends largely on what aspects of the thing are being considered. For example, dialecticians like to talk about the change of water into ice as a "qualitative" change (referring, of course, to hardness!). From another perspective it is not a qualitative change since in both cases the substance is h2o. Or, to take my example, mashed potatoes and regular potatoes may seem to be merely "quantitatively" different from one perspective, but try throwing them at your friends' head -- they will be aware of a very qualitative difference.

Well yeah I think the issues is regarding differing levels of analysis. Certainly I don't think dialectics is something to be set up as a counter against standard logic.

Exactly. It's all in what you're trying to pull off, and dialectic and formal logic are not mutually exclusive, they both have their fields of application and limits.

Hmm, I think that's a bit of a strawman considering we have no dialectical materialists here, that's quite a difference.

okay, rev, so I think this is a variant of the "society is the condition of the individual's existence but also simultaneously the outcome of their actions" argument. my only objection would be what does the d-word bring to the analysis? to me it only obfuscates

Mikus, maybe it's because your jumping late on this thread, but nobody here seems to be interested in the sort of Engelsian dialectic you mention in the second paragraph. Of course that sort of thing is bullshit, and completely unrelated to dialectic as a method of presentatio.

Your example with red, yellow, and orange does not work at all. Marx is not saying that a commodity is a bit of a use-value, and a bit of a value, and therefore money. Your examples also lack any critical element – they do not point out mistakes in someone else's views – which I think was the main reason for Marx presenting the argument the way he did.

Oh I have no fetish for the d-word but I think if there is one place it is valid and not just posturing but a useful shorthand, it's in regards to the whole subject/object thing, since y'know Hegel is a pretty big deal in that one.

I was considering qualitative/quantitative changes. I don't think the dialectical materialists are even "wrong" per se (I can see how one might view the change from water to ice as a "qualitative" one), they just look at the matter from a particular angle whenever it suits them.

My point is that dialectical materialist or not, one can see the same changes as either quantitative or qualitative depending on what one is considering. In many (most!) cases there is no ultimate standard of what makes a change or a difference between two things "qualitative" or "quantitative". This fact will make it quite easy for jura to come along and say that any changes or distinctions I mention are not "qualitative" but only "quantitative". It also makes it quite easy for me to show that the differences are in fact qualitative.

And I'm not saying that something is a bit red and a bit yellow and therefore orange. I'm saying something is completely red and completely yellow and therefore orange.

I do agree with this being the reason Marx gives certain arguments a "dialectical" presentation. (The obvious big three are the section on the form of value, the chapter where he introduces labor-power as a commodity, and the section on accumulation.) But in several of those arguments he most certainly seems to have caused as much confusion as he solved!

You know that whole Engels claim about "quantitative tipping into qualitative" is stuck to by only the most stubborn diamat theologians.

And you know if you read my last post that this is irrelevant, since I wasn't accusing anyone of being a dialectical materialist but rather using it as an example of changes that some people might refer to as qualitative and others might refer to as qualitative.

Still not a good caricature. Marx is not saying that a commodity is a use-value and a value, and therefore money. Whatever you think of Marx's presentation, at least admit you cannot do a funny and fitting parody of it.

My mistake. I should've said that if we are told that something is both completely red and completely orange, the contradiction is resolved by the color orange. (This more closely parallels the introduction of labor-power as a commodity.)

XslavearcX, briefly, there is no "V" between Marx's dialectics and logic (neither in the sense of "versus" nor in the sense of a disjunction ). The "contradictions" that Marx speaks of are not logical contradictions, though they can be misdescribed by paradoxes (which are logical contradictions), which Marx sometimes does purposefully so as to point out inconsistencies in political economy, or to justify his own course of argument.

Dialectic in the sense of a method is a matter of argumentation. The same arguments that Marx makes could be presented as a stripped-down system of numbered propositions in a formal language, or perhaps as gangsta rap lyrics. The difference that Marx's method makes is that it adds a specific kind of persuasivness into the mix.

When someone says something like "A and B, therefore C and D", and you say "OK, let's suppose, for the sake of argument, that A and B are indeed true" and then go on to show that, in fact, C and D are not true (edit: and not entailed in A and B), then the argument you make is much more persuasive than if you just jump to the conclusion and state that C and D are false. If you can even show why the other person is led to think that A and B are true and how they arrive at the wrong conclusion about C and D, then that's even more persuasive. I guess this is very well known from arguments in everyday life. In modern theory of argumentation, completely unrelated to Marx, what I described is called a dialectical argument. And it's basically what Marx does in Capital and why it's called a critique of political economy and not "New political economy as a set of numbered propositions" or "Capital rhymez".

I wouldn't even say that logic has "its limts". Logic does what it sets out to do. There can be no good argument that is invalid, i.e. logically contradictory. Unless we start cherrypicking rhetorical devices that have their specific argumentative purpose and are not part of the core argument, then Marx's arguments are not invalid and therefore in no contradiction (no pun intended) with logic. However, critical reasoning does not end with the basic criteria of logic, as any textbook on argumentation will tell you. They are fundamental, but arguments can be more or less persuasive, destructive etc. depending on their other properties. This is the area that Marx's dialectic taps into.

Well I think there is a link between quantity and quality, but usually they are not consecutive but mutually determining.

Consider abstract labor and its social generality. In ancient Greece there were commodity producers, but it was not capitalism since abstract labor was not the social general form of concrete labor1 (since commodity production filled a niche and was not the prevailing mode of production).

With primitive accumulation, abstract labor did acquire the social general form of concrete labor since now value production is the way to acquire your means of subsistence (aka the advent of wage labor).

Thus there was a quantitative and qualitative change at the same time, and not quantity first, quality later.

• 1. That's how Dieter Wolf for example defines value. Concrete and abstract labor have always existed in human society, but in pre-capitalist societies concrete labor was the social general form of how products of labor related to each other and how socially necessary labor was distributed - as concrete labor. In capitalism, this did a 180 and concrete labors relate to each other exclusively as abstract labor; products of labor thus acquire the value status. This sounds a lot better in German, I assure you!

Sorry I should have made it clear I was talking about "in the natural world2" as Engels was pushing it.

• 1. That's how Dieter Wolf for example defines value. Concrete and abstract labor have always existed in human society, but in pre-capitalist societies concrete labor was the social general form of how products of labor related to each other and how socially necessary labor was distributed - as concrete labor. In capitalism, this did a 180 and concrete labors relate to each other exclusively as abstract labor; products of labor thus acquire the value status. This sounds a lot better in German, I assure you!
• 2. Not that I'm so crude as to imagine some unmediated nature ;)

I love how fucked up footnotes are See what I mean?" href="#footnote1_oedsjss">1

Dialectic, always good for confusion and frothing at the mouth!

• 1. See what I mean?

Thanks very much for that post Jura. Because im doing formal logic at the moment and ive just about finished capital, ive been wondering about the relationship between dialectics and logic.

What do people think of the notion of dialectics as overdetermination?

I think I am finally getting your point.

This is an excellent point. Can you suggest a less nonsensical way to present labor-power as a commodity.

Labor-power as a social relation is crucial phenomena. Chapter I is historically important for presenting it. But the presentation by dialectics is simply unhelpfully opaque rather than "deep".

No, I'm not joking. Mikus has convinced me here.

No problem, xslavearcx. These things are a pain because much of the "standard" texts and authors on Marx's dialectic are ignorant of or, even worse, opposed to formal logic. This is due to the Hegelian heritage, as I and mikus pointed out above. But one should remember that in Hegel's times "logic" meant something else than at the end of the 19th century or from what logic came to mean roughly from the interwar period onwards. So it's not Hegel we should blame, but late 19th century marxists themselves. (I should add that even though Hegel may have been wrong about this and other things, I think he made a lot of genuine insights, though perhaps in a mystified way – the recent revival of interest in Hegel, even inside analytic philosophy, by authors like Brandom, seems to prove this.)

Anyway, Trotsky's descriptions of the dialectic are particularly horrid in this respect:

"Under a lens", duh.

Can't help with overdetermination, sorry. All I know is how to pronounce the French original "surdetermination" in what I consider a very Left Bank way .

See my post quoting Butler, which some git has down voted.

I like it, though not the Althusserian form, whilst Foucault's is interesting but he never really has the conviction of it and seems to fall back into a continuous loop of power/knowledge. Zizek busts that loop up via "the real" and is well worth a read. I'd recommend The Ticklish Subject.

Well, here we are. If anyone disagrees with this post, fine, but criticise the ideas, not me, by calling me an 'idiot', 'troll', etc. This is supposed to be a Libertarian Comunist site, remember? Let's have some comradely criticism, eh?

Following on from my position that critical realism can help us to understand 'dialectics' in a simpler way, and using the concept of 'levels' of reality, I propose the following example.

A tin of peas is both a use-value (food) and an exchange-value (commodity). But which can't be decided from looking at the tin of peas. This can only be decided by the social relationships within which the tin of peas is regarded. Within a family meal for consumption with a dinner, it is 'food'; within shop for purchase by a consumer, it is a 'commodity'.

In this example, the tin of peas is the 'unity', and its 'aspects' are as 'food' or as a 'commodity'.
'Unity' is its objective, external reality, and 'aspects' are its subjective, social creation. Of course, the 'unity' can have more 'aspects': hitting someone over the head with the tin of peas shows its social aspect as a 'weapon', in a violent relationship.

On a related note to what has been argued on this thread, I don't think 'the dialectical method' is simply a 'method of presentation': I think it is also a 'method of enquiry'. On this, I'm following Lakatos, and think that 'theory comes first', followed by practical investigation and then presentation. I think that the 'dialectical method' encompasses all these facets, and if we want evidence of the method of 'laying out axioms' followed by investigation and description, we need look no further than Marx's Capital.

There is more to what I'd like to say, especially about the political relationship between the democratic proletariat, truth, science and dialectics, but I'll leave it there for now, and see how this post is received.

Once again, comrades, if you don't agree (or just don't like) what I've written, that's fine: criticise away, and then we all learn.

But, ffs, let's not go down, once again, the 'abuse road'.

eerrrmmm...what exactly does the application of the "dialectical method of enquiry" add to our understanding of this tin of peas? none of the explanatory concepts you have employed (use value, exchange value etc) are based on "the dialectic" which appears rather as an extraneous imposition.

CRs empasis on "levels of reality" / ontological depth is AFAIK more about emphasising the difference between observable patterns of events and the underlying structures and mechanisms that produce them. Again, you can present these arguments without using the d-word so I don't see the need to shoe horn it into the argument

Firstly, thanks for the comradely tone, andy.

It places the 'tin of peas' in a social context. It stops being merely an object, but also becomes part and inescapable parcel of social relationships. One now cannot just look at a 'tin of peas' and think one has any understanding of it outside of society.

Once we have taken this step (and it's only an example, remember, it's not meant to be profound or mysterious, quite the opposite), we can start to appreciate that we have to locate all 'objects' within our social relationships. The political aspect of this is that we, too, are not merely 'individual beings', like a tin of isolated peas, but 'social animals', as Marx maintained.

Well, since no-one seems able to explain just what "the dialectic" actually is (and you yourself are justifiably wary, as you have said), that's what the whole post is about. Once we 'get with the program' at a simplistic level of understanding, we can move on to more complex versions of it: that is, 'Marx's dialectical method'.

Yes, this issue of 'underlying structures' is completely on target: these 'underlying structures' are social structures, not physical objects, like tins of peas or biological entities like a person.

This is what we need to discuss: 'does the d-word help us to understand reality?'. Let's continue to explore these issues all together, like the comrades we say we are.

this, to me, is an argument to stop talking about dialectics at all, not to carry on with it.

Don't think anyone is arguing that value is anything other than a social relation but again, what's this got to do with dialectics? critical naturalism has produced a pretty coherent account of the philosophy of social science without relying on Hegel. Why not concentrate on that rather than trying to relate everything back to "Marx's method"? Surely we need to develop a defensible theory without worrying if Marx would have agreed....

That's fair enough, andy.

But my efforts are directed at understanding the dialectical method, not rejecting it, as I've made plain on this thread and the previous one. That's why I've spent much time reading, thinking, discussing and writing about it.

Perhaps this is not possible, but I still want to give it a try. If you are already convinced that it's not possible, you might prove to be right!

I think you're conflating dialectics with Hegel. I think that they can be separated, as I've tried to show above.

Because I think Marx's dialectical method was a forerunner of critical realism. If I'm correct, I think we can use CR to understand Marx and Capital. Again, I might be wrong, but that's what I'm trying to do. If it can't be done, I'd like an explanation 'why not'.

My aim is to make Marx's work more accessible and thus understandable. Generations have read, but not understood, Capital. We should be trying to change that experience for future workers.

then I think you should have come out with a definite statement of position when this thread first started not ask dubious questions like "what is a unity?". if you think Marx is a precursor of CR that's fine but elaborate the CR position first and then argue back from there. More importantly, if you can express CR without referring to "dialectics" then they/it are theoretically redundant

Perhaps that's true, andy, but unfortunately 'dialectics' and Marx are not historically redundant. 'Men make history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing' - if we ignore the 'dialectical method', it will be filled by others. I still think it's worth a go.

my point is precisely that the (indefinable?) "dialectical method" should be replaced with something rationally defensible and coherent. you haven't given me any reason to think otherwise and quite why you think "it's worth a go" remains a mystery.

that's me done on this one

I read that and to be honest i felt a bit thick for not really understanding it. i suspect though its something to do with the fact that i know next to nothing about lacan and concepts like the real and whatnot. sometimes this whole learning process seems like an infinate regress in books that im gonna have to read....

I came across the concept of dialectics as overdetermination in richard wolfs book neoclassical versus marxian economics which after a google search i think has come from althusser (another part of the infinite regress of books ive gotta read). Cant really remember it much but it seemed fairly straightforward. Will go over that section again tommorrow.