Praxis - ontology and epistemology
Jul 4 2009 08:17
I'm currently fiddling around with a philosophy problem and have no formal training in philosophy. I'm assuming that some of you do, so if I'm making a fundamental error here please say so:
I'm trying to say a little about what the role of a radical philosophy might be, and following Althusser to a (limited) extent, I'm trying to to tie it to an ongoing political project, and thereby suggesting that it consitutes an ongoing process of evaluating and reformulating that project's 1) discourse, bodies of knowledge (e.g. Marxism, etc.), 2) concrete objects and objectives (society, goals, etc.) and 3) the relationship between the two (thus allowing for praxis: the outcome of concrete action provides the basis for re-formulating knowledge, guiding further enquiry and further action. 3 - evaluating the relation between discourse and its objects - thus becomes coterminous with 1 - evaluating that discourse).
However, the objects of enquiry for this philosophical practice would therefore be both concrete and real (society, data, etc. in 2) as well as ideal bodies of knowledge (evaluating discourse in knowledge in 1). Now, if my use of the phrase 'object of enquiry' refers to both ideal and material entities, am I still doing ontology? Do I need an ontology capable of dealing with the 'being' of both - or am I rather blurring epistemological questions about truth and validity with ontological questions as to the status of concrete objects?
I guess the answer is to look further at issues pertaining to intentionality and intentional objects; but I'm not sure if that would have the required purchase on the real needed for any kind of socilogical, economic etc. analysis. What would seem to be required is an ontology that grounds an intellectual, ideal process of conceptual reformulation within a concrete process of material activity.
Jul 4 2009 17:24
#2
english motherfucker, thou speaketh it?
Jul 4 2009 20:40
#3
verily
Jul 4 2009 20:41
#4
Wellclose Square wrote:
I'd drop Althusser for a start. I can't help you on anything else I'm afraid.
yeah, I'm not a fan either
Jul 4 2009 20:49
#5
seriously, I have no idea what you're asking in the OP, but then I'm not a philosophy student.
Jul 5 2009 11:24
#6
I'm not a philosophy student either, which is why I suspect I'm asking silly questions. I'll try and rephrase it:
For reasons which I won't bore you with, I'm using the term 'objects of enquiry' to refer to both real and conceptual entities (i.e. real stuff on the one hand, and ideas about that stuff on the other). This means thinking about the world, and also thinking about what we know about the world. Consequently, I would seem to be dealing with both ontological issues (ideas about being, properties of objects, etc.) and epistemological issues (ideas about knowledge, truth claims, etc.) on the same level. What problems arise from bracketing both together under the term 'objects of enquiry'? Do I need to think about the ontological status of knowledges, or do I in fact end up collapsing into idealism?
This no doubt seems a very odd and perhaps misguided question. In short - and this may seem like more impenetrable philosophy speak, in which case I apologise - I'm trying to play around with the dialectical relation involved in the concept of praxis (i have ideas, I act on the world on that basis, I change the world, I change my ideas on that basis, I act again, ideas change again, etc.). I'm also trying to deal with issues relating to the correspondence between thought and real (which in many schools of thought pertaining to Marxism and dialectics is dismissed in favour of a unity between the two; e.g. for Lukacs the supposedly unknowable 'in-itself' of being is in fact its own becoming, which consciousness will actualise by working on it).
I'm interested in (although not convinced by) the idea of importing a kind of Kantian split between thought and reality into that dialectical relation. This is because I really like Adorno's idea of negative dialectics, according to which thought can never really capture and grasp the real; reality always exceeds its concept, ensuring that there can never be any absolute truth claims (thus meaning that all assertions are permanently open to question). However, Adorno - insofar as I understand him - is largely concerned with the operation of thought. So, is there some way in which these ideas can be related to action and praxis? ...hence the need to introduce that split between thought and real into the dialectic of praxis (which is the kind of move that ought really to invite charges of 'bourgeois!' 'idealist!' - but that makes me want to do it more, just to be perverse). In order to incorporate that split into a dialectical relation which would seem to preclude it, I'm wondering whether it might be possible to say that the praxis relation does not deal with the real per se, but rather only with (Kantian) appearances and concepts of the real, e.g. I have concepts about the real, I act, I know the results through further concepts, I think again, I act, etc. - at no point during which sequence is there any identity between consciousness and reality, but rather only a limited correspondence. ...hence the question above
I'd drop Althusser for a start. I can't help you on anything else I'm afraid.