Transcendental materialism? No, thanks!

I believe I already demonstrated precisely THAT point, that the brain's material and determining power over the subject as a whole are limited, that genetic AND external determinism are precisely not-All with regards to the subject.

You are only able to think the Real as Real, and not as also imaginary and symbolic. The Real of the body and the brain IS conflicted, leading it to this previously stated not-All.

However as Symbolic Real, we re-encounter the notion that the Big Other of the socio-symbolic Real is simply inexistent.

Nature as a whole is a mid-point between contingency and necessity.

Dark matter is an interesting METAPHOR for the Real, in that its existence is only deducible by its very absence. I don't think anyone here established a DIRECT correspondence between the Real and dark matter. The Real is the always existing gap in the realm of knowledge. Man is constitutively unable to know all. There are singular questions which have been around since the beginning of time which science will simply not be able to answer. But THIS isn't the point of our discussion.

oh look it's some self important no mark academic wannabes trying to make a name for themselves by taking pot shots at the champ.

a fucking blog constitutes peer review?

I already explained the specific modulations of the brain, cellular death, etc., which clearly demonstrate this propos. But why should I feel any pressing need to stay exclusively within philosophy, rather than interacting precisely in what conditions philosophy? The axiom is logical, because it's an axiom. Proving an axiom is a ridiculous farce in itself, if you want to remain in philosophy. Axioms for philosophy are precisely axiomatic in that they aren't something provable. However, I would say science does in fact provide a material basis for thinking this.

You can only prove logically in philosophy, which Lacan in fact does, based on pre-logical axioms; this is how continental and speculative philosophy operate. However, I'm more concerned with its scientific verifiability, which again, I've already shown how that's the case. I can repeat it again if you feel the need for it. The arguments for TransMat are, as far as I'm concerned, already there in science. It has nothing to do with Lacan's word. Quite frankly, I think Johnston is more interesting in making that bridge to science, and going to the very bottom, in terms of philosophy, of any existence of any Big Other, whether merely symbolic, or even genetic.

You are incorrect in terms of dark matter. It was based more on mathematics than any lack of any verifiable explanation. It deals with a mathematical remainder that couldn't be accounted for in terms of measurement, it is something which prevents any whole from being realized.

No one's sucking Zizek's thumb. You may as well say a Kantian is sucking Kant's thumb. It's a ridiculous argument, and if that's the line you want to pursue I don't see the point in doing this. And I would agree, a blog isn't a peer-reviewed journal.

Accusing Zizek of not being a doctrinal Marxist is fine and well, but to insist that he's not a Marxist, you would have to be clear on precisely what operational definition of Marxist you are working with, and I would maintain that it would be your definition where the argument is. Zizek doesn't agree with Marx on everything. I don't agree with Marx on everything. I don't think that's the definition of a marxist, especially when Marx made clear his own distance from Marxism as a doctrine. I think there IS a break in Marxism, several in fact, and I think those breaks need to be pursued. But I'm betting you don't buy the discontinuity argument either. I know for a fact that you have argued for Marx using Marx's own words, without any attempt at logic or argument. So try acting like an adult for the remainder of this "debate".

I'm not sure how that's a misunderstanding when he was quite explicit on that point.

Now you want to bitch to me about giving you things to read, and here you are attempting to get me to read something. Consistency would be nice.

And as for your final quote, axioms are not provable, it's precisely what makes them axioms. They are fundamental assertions prior to any argumentation.

I don't consider what were posited as axioms as necessarily axiomatic, I think it was perhaps a poor choice of terms. In my view, science does prove what were called "axioms".

The more primal fundamental axiom is rather, and you can call me a maoist throwback or whatever, the simple debate between one divides into two, or two fuse into one. If you're arguing against one, you are implicitly arguing for the other one.

However I think you're assuming a lot when you say "transcendental materialists are" or "TM's methodology - I'm not sure you're really talking about anything or anyone that exists. This is a new paradigm we're talking about, and I don't know about you, but I don't think there are that many involved in the debates around it.

My claim about scientific verifiability is based around the fact that science is a condition of philosophy, and we have to think through it. If you want to say "then you aren't a philosopher/marxist/etc." then don't bother, because that's not the point of the discussion here. Cerebral plasticity and cellular death do provide a way of thinking transcendental materialist theory. I do not think philosophy needs to simply busy itself with science, nor does philosophy NEED to busy itself with politics. But it DOES work under particular political/scientific/etc. conditions.

The point of cerebral plasticity points precisely to a conflicted "onto-genetic" base for the human subject. And this is built not in pointing to a hard kernel of the Real, but the very absence of it. Neither genetic nor cerebral NOR external features are capable of absolutely determining the subject. To me, that is evidence of inherently conflictual nature, hence one divides into two, and not vice versa.

Science I'm sure at this moment, or parts of science, DO refute these claims, but that is why we must think about philosophy as a "combat against corruption", in science as much in politics. The scientific debate surrounding these ideas I think, personally, would be more worthy of discussion than mere philosophical claims, which again operate within particular conditions. But that's a personal preference, not a statement of objective fact. I would add, lastly, that logic is itself axiomatic, and that shouldn't impede its use.

At a certain point there can be no argumentation - at a certain point it becomes a fundamental choice with no ground that offers proof. That fundamental choice is, again, one divides into two, or two fuse into one.

Also, thank you for your renewed diplomacy. I will do my best to uphold it as well. However, I'm not a reader of Schelling, and that's simply an area of debate I cannot participate in until I have read it.

Then you'll need to define your terms. You say it's anything but radical, my reply would be, "So what?" What do you mean by radical? Because it only sounds like radical chic and posture to me. It's not new, that's true. You use the term Real, and yet you call it jargon. I don't understand how cerebral plasticity is jargon. Jargon actually refers to real things and concepts, so you're just dismissing it for no defensible reason. Had you done research on transcendental materialism, you'll see that it has a lot to do with dialectical materialism. They are nearly identical. I never said it had anything to do with Maoism. And if you want to say it has nothing to do with Marxism, then you, again, need to provide the operative definition of marxism you're choosing to work with, and why.

Again, I've provided numerous reasons why transcendental materialism is a worthy adventure, you're simply uninterested for personal reasons. But philosophy isn't about your personal taste. So why don't you reply with something substantial?

I don't see you raise the alarm when you expect other people to accept Marx on Marx's word.

I don't see how it's exactly tautological, it only depends on your rhetoric. It's a fundamental assertion that the subject is pure negativity. That's not tautology. This pure negativity is what explodes determination. There is the "minimum distance" between the subject and its relating. I think it's very presumptuous to say that the project and purpose of transmat is simply to think free will. Saying it's not radical is just a rhetorical device, and I don't know that Zizek presents it as being radical. It's certainly a divergence for dialectical materialism.

To say the concept of Real is obsolete in TransMat axioms because it just means determined, again, is just a simplified and reductive reading of the Real. Plasticity is a concept from Malabou, but she's not the first to talk about it, that's true. And she actually uses it primarily as a philosophical and NOT biological concept. There was ONE venture she made into biology.

Zizek doesn't say what dialectical materialism is. And? But how can you say he doesn't say what it is and yet redefines it to mean something else, when those would be mutually exclusive. I have yet to see DiaMat brought up as being radical or authoritative by any of these previous mentioned authors. This is just more rhetoric on YOUR part, not theirs.

Lacanian theory doesn't have anything to do, in itself, with anything in Marx. However other philosophers successfully link up Lacanian psychoanalysis and contemporary Marxism, in ways you clearly don't think are successful, but I would disagree. I don't see this incompatibility you claim to be explaining.

The Maoist principle of dialectical materialism isn't at all simply a POLITICAL maoist principle at all. Nor is it presently as being merely political, sorry.

Defining marxism IS necessary, and it seems you're incapable of doing so. Many marxists disagree on the definition and conceptual apparatus around Marxism, so it's very necessary actually.

Perhaps. concerning Robinson's quotation, that they are opposed. So far, I don't see the evidence of it. And if that's true, I would argue that Zizek's are an improvement over Marx's. But I don't see how that's the case. As for the labor theory of value, it simply hasn't been applicable for the good part of a century already. And it's metaphysics any how. Someone like Althusser seems to categorically reject revolution anyhow, but he's still Marxist, no?

Zizek doesn't simply reject this one thesis on Feuerbach. His point is that there is no proper conceptual apparatus yet for understanding the organization of present world processes. Here, Marx himself is simply insufficient.

As for true, you'd have to way your options. I can't see a logical difficulty, especially given speculative/continental philosophy's ultimately axiomatic nature.

And you, what's your conceptual apparatus? You've been entirely negative throughout this entire debate. So what are you actually putting forward? Straight Leninism? Trotskyism? Do you simply want to repeat Lenin, move for move?

Fine.

I said that they weren't really axiomatic. The proof I choose to offer is scientific. You're asking for philosophical proof? I don't know enough Schelling to give you adequate proof for Schelling. I would argue the scientific - that there is a lack of genetic and cerebral programming, and this lack becomes corollary to the excess which IS the subject, the mediating agent between internal and external factors.

I told you before I thought "axiom" in that argument was a bad choice of words, as I would argue the more fundamental and therefore non-argumentable axiom is either one divides into two, or two fuse into one, whether you lie on the side of consistency or inconsistency. This is the axiom, and this is the axiom which remains unprovable. Is there no argument in philosophy? I'm sure it could be argued otherwise, though not by me. Again, i would say you would argue the "axiom" scientifically.

Calling them axioms as Zizek or Johnston does doesn't suffice. And I'm not hiding behind speculative philosophy, I'm IN speculative philosophy. If you want provable foundations, then analytic philosophy might be more to your liking. I don't see how it's self-contradictory to say that science proves the "axioms".

Ultimately, in terms of the fundamental contradiction I highlighted earlier, there is no reason for believing in TransMat. It's a choice without any basis or foundation, and you simply choose one side or the other.

"The problem with TM is that the first axiom is made SOLELY in order to account for the second axiom, which is what Zizek basically says in the introduction to the Parallax View. Without asserting the gap [..] as inherent to humanity itself, as the gap between humanity and its own inhuman excess (first axiom) you cannot properly account for how the gap between thought and being emerges (second axiom)."

By (1) preforming various actions, we make a situation that affects our (2) thoughts.

This is nothing that requires philosophy - this is not even in the sphere of philosophy - it is a reiteration of Marx. The word transcendental is not used metaphysically.

A man alone needs food - for him food has "use value." A man situated in a group must demand food since we now need to know who has the right to have their needs met. "Exchange value" and money enter into the constellation of ideas that include "comodity fetishism" - so we have entered a real/actual transcendence of the given/natural use value situation - the problem is that we take this situation as a given/natural one and forget it was man made by us ourselves and so enter a kind of denial/false consciousness or ideological mystification.

Hegel DOES accept axioms in philosophy. The subject as fundamental negativity is axiomatic, unless you have another explanation. Speculative philosophy, again, sorry, relies on axioms. That's how it works. The axioms are logical, their basis is groundless. That's how they work. Tough.

So far, scientifically, I don't see how it's impossible to verify the Real in terms of lack. I've shown how again and again and again. So I don't see this imaginary disagreement. I am very much claiming science verifies certain principles of TransMat, that's precisely what I'm doing. I do concern myself with scientific verifiability. What you're missing is that science is OPEN. Some people might argue against it. But that doesn't really mean one thing or the other. Some scientists believe in God, some don't. Some scientists believe the Hadron collider will destroy our universe, some don't. I've merely chosen sides. This says nothing for scientific verifiability. It says more for the struggle against corruption in philosophy itself.

Again, please read. I never said either Zizek or Johnston claim the Real is similar to Mao's one divides into two. Never, not once did I say that. Nor is it interpretation. That is the axiomatic decision that one will make sooner or later. I have simply chosen to move on the side of inconsistency against consistency, because I have much more interest in its struggle. I chose TransMat because it accounts for negativity, subjectivity, and freedom. You don't think it does, I get that. But I do. My understanding of TransMat is very simple. This relachement of cerebral or genetic data creates a fundamental and transcendental condition for freedom where the (human) subject is not wholly determined by internal or external nature, and whose freedom relies precisely in their relating to relating. In fact, the subject can't be NOT free even as much as it wants to. It is ultimately troubled by its own innate freedom, and therefore the only way for the subject to be submitted is by abdicating his own freedom. Science here DOES bear me out. There is a lack of genetic programming, a lack of any natural mandate. Sorry, that's just how it is.

http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuLend.htm

"He would not arrive at the Real, without first presupposing there exists such a thing as the Symbolic."

The symbolic is not a mythical dimension. It just means what we see as people in culture that would be meaningless to a rabbit or a bear - like a police man's uniform or the emperor's new clothes.

This whole thread is a long woeful misunderstanding of the material.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/zizek/#H4

Zizek is always only dealing with physical theory - he never enters philosophy.

"The subject is not a special type of Thing outside of the phenomenal reality we can experience, for Zizek. As we saw in 1, e above, such an idea would in fact reproduce in philosophy the type of thinking which he argues characterises political ideologies, and the subject’s fundamental fantasy. (see 3a) It is more like a fold or crease in the surface of this reality as Zizek puts it in Tarrying With the Negative, the point within the substance of reality wherein that substance is able to look at itself, and see itself as alien to itself."

Zizek loves to piggy back his theory on physics and has done so for decades - this "fold or crease" is the same that we are told by physicists may be the extra-dimensional space where "gravity is hiding" - a space or fold posited as less then the size of an atom.

I'll forgo Terminus for right now.

The Zizek you're referring to isn't saying freedom is a necessary choice, or merely the recognition of necessity. This refers to a particular stage, not to freedom as a whole. I don't think the dialectical materialist slogan is freedom is the recognition of necessity. I think when you're talking about the subject choosing himself, it is here that you find freedom as the recognition of necessity, but he's not speaking of freedom tout court.

Freedom can mean anxiety, this is the anxiety Sartre often moves along, but it can also mean courage as well. There is a terror to freedom, absolutely, can't do without it.

I think what we're looking at, and I'm not trying to be a name-dropper, is the same sort of thing Nietzsche was getting at when he talks about turning every "it was" into a "thus I willed it". And I would agree that freedom is also self delimitation.

And just because a subject has a relative level of autonomy from his material base, this doesn't, in my view, come into conflict with a certain knowledge of necessity, which is the same thing about knowing limits and possibilities, between contingency and necessity. But there can be also a reversal of cause and effect. What is contingent is often thought to be necessary, and what we think is necessary can often turn out to be contingent. I think here there is a dialectic. Remember, outside of a Lacanian atmosphere the subject, for example for Badiou, is something that's a rare occurrence, something that occurs when a mechanism of determination shows a breakdown or weakness. Indeed, Engels says point blank that freedom isn't independence from natural laws, what I'm arguing is that there are no other natural laws governing the genesis of the human being. There is no physical law of dominance of the genetic material or of external nature. We cannot expect to be free from gravity (barring the use of jet engines, etc.). But I don't think the two should be simply conflated and left to their respective poles.

Additionally, I think the point repeatedly argued by both Badiou and Zizek is a full endorsement of the position you question - there IS NO determinate ground for making decisions on a course for action. This notion of wager is already there in Lenin, among other places. However I don't see why that means the subject isn't free. I'd say that's why he's often unbearably free.

I think the notion of unconscious choice makes a bit of sense, to be fair. Take for example an extreme sexual fetish. This isn't something that's chosen, nor is it genetic. It deals with a unique relationship with a sexual object or fetish. This relationship isn't imposed. It is chosen, albeit retroactively when we find ourselves confronted with the objects of our fantasies.

The tension I think between Johnston and Zizek deals with competing understandings of what Lacan does to Schelling. However they seem to be in agreement in terms of death drive, which could be formulated in a Hegelian way as self-sundering and dissolving of all stable positions/states.

I'd be curious to read that Merleau-Ponty if you can point out where I might be able to find it.

No one take Anti Duhring seriously, it's a piece of shit.