Transcendental materialism? No, thanks!

Okay...nowhere did I make such a nonsensical claim.

Sorry if I wasn't clear, but the problem is so obvious I don't know why I didn't bring it up sooner.

How does TM explain the fact that animals do NOT have consciousness, even though their brain lacks hard-wiring just as the human brain does?

The fact that mammals' brain lack hard-wiring would according to TM mean that the internal processes in their brain don't follow the laws of nature either, which is patently absurd.

I know there's no academic work by any TMists on animals, which is understandable, as animals don't have consciousness, which is what TM is principally about after all.

I never said animals have the same number of affects as humans. I agree with you that animals do NOT have consciousness or language.

Although Johnston and Zizek aren't working on animals, the fact nevertheless remains that the brain of mammals lacks 'hard-wiring'. So in Zizekian terms, we can say that the onto-genetic base of an animal is corpo-Real, non-all, just like the human brain. Do you agree?

Yet animals don't have consciousness, so why don't they, if according to TM they should, as their brain plasticity gives them the possibility for consciousness?

The fact that animals have a non-all onto-genetic base yet no consciousness, disproves Zizek's claim that the non-all, corpo-Real status of the material in the human brain accounts for the possibility of consciousness. There is no reason to wait for future academic work to be done, as the non-all status of the onto-genetic base is an absolute claim: you can't say the brain of rodents is a little bit non-all, while monkey-brains are more non-all, and human brains are fully non-all. Well you can, and then I guess I again didn't manage to 'get' TM. I hope you won't though, because either nature is lacking a mandate or it ain't.

The mechanisms of plasticity are completely determined by the laws of nature, e.g. if a scientist adds some special neurochemicals to the brain of rat, the rat's behavior will change. Same for humans with the effects of alcohol.

Zizek knows this, because as an 'intelligent conservative' who looks critically at the possible changes the new technology brings with it, he's afraid that some day people's behavior can, unknowingly to them, be totally controlled by outside manipulation through chips or some other science fiction-shit. But he's not worried about losing free will because he comes up with the Real, the deathdrive and a 'beyond of the pleasure-principle' that saves the day for free will, though not really, because Zizek remains worried.

Fuck, transcendental materialism can function as the perfect legitimation for a government to install computer chips in all of our brains, because Zizek's concept of the deathdrive guarantees free will.

You are not sure, but science is sure. Since like the 1970s, there is no doubt mammals and even fish have brain plasticity.

So, would you agree that according to TM, one has to say that their brain is non-All, internally conflicted, corpo-Real, lacks a mandate, etc.? Yes you would have to say this, and yet they don't have consciousness, so human brain plasticity doesn't prove the axioms of TM, because brain plasticity is found in non-consciousness living beings, like rats.

The point of TM-axioms though is that it tries to explain the possibility for the emergence of the 'signifier' out of nature by making the claim that the material (internal) nature is non-all. The fact that, in Zizekians terms, the brain of (non-consciousness) animals is non-all, invalidates your claim that plasticity is the scientific proof for the 2 axioms of TM.

So its supernatural? This video should be a wake-up call. It's another obscurantist jumping on plasticity; Brain Plasticity and Transcendental Meditation with Dr Fred Travis

Transcendental meditation? No thanks!

For the record, Zizek doesn't claim that plasticity proves the TM-theses and neither does Johnston; they merely proclaim that philosophy must take into account new discoveries in the field of biology, which is fair enough. It would be a bit strange if they'd argue that philosophers are allowed to just make claims that flat-out ignore or contradict science...

The point is that plasticity does not prove (even 'in part') the TM-theses because animals also have plasticity, but no 'excess', aka internally-conflicted libidinal economy (first axiom). You're on your own here, and the only reason I'm following your point about plasticity is simply because you already admitted that there were no philosophical arguments for the TM-theses.

You agreed that Zizek doesn't claim that science proves his philosophy. You do however say that Johnston thinks science can prove the TM-theses. I can imagine its possible that Johnston does believe this, but in the articles you referenced, he didn't make that claim. I do not have access to the inside of Johnston's brain but from what he wrote one has to conclude that you're on your own here with this 'plasticity-proves-TM' plea.

The TM-argument puts forward that there is a gap, an excess or an internally conflicted libidinal economy in the ontogentic base of the subject (first axiom). The subject then emerges out of an effort at taming this disturbing discontent of the corpo-Real (second axiom).

I don't understand though how plasticity exactly proves that there is a gap in the ontogentic base or/and that the subject is split. This is what I understood by your 'plasticity-proves-TM' claim. Now you mention the 'signifier' as another necessary factor for consciousness, but note, you're talking about factors for consciousness, not proofs for the TM-theses.

Strictly speaking you indeed never argued against animal plasticity, but it's still not clear if you accept the fact that animals have brain plasticity. Are you prepared to accept this as a scientific fact now? As a precaution to any slowdown tactics, please don't ask me to do your research or to stop the debate until the time when you'll do the research or when you'll be positive about animal plasticity, etc.

To get back at what you wrote in the quote, true, more than plasticity is necessary in order for subjectivity itself. From this however it does not follow that 'plasticity-proves-TM', which you seem to think it does by using the word 'so'. Now you weakened your claim to 'plasticity-alone-doesn't prove-TM', but still, you're conflating proofs of the TM-theses for necessary factors for consciousness.

But biologists understand that plasticity implies what you call a missing mandate, gap or void; it's what the concept is about. Saying that plasticity proves there is a gap doesn't add any information to what biologists understand by plasticity. This lack of hard-wiring is a fact; it is not an argument asserted by TMists. I hope you realize that pointing to a factual aspect of plasticity isn't an argument. Furthermore, without forgetting this last point, plasticity certainly isn't an 'argument' for the first TM axiom, which is, from what I understand, still your claim (though you haven't made this claim in your last post and told me to be patient). Do you still claim that plasticity, i.e. lack of hard-wiring, or 'gap' if you like, proves the first (and/or second) axiom of TM?

Do you admit it's only you who makes this argument, not even Johnston? If you do admit this, with all due respect, I don't see the purpose of continuing on this road with you any further, as I'm interested in weighing over Zizek's arguments and claims (and to a lesser extent Johnston's arguments), not yours.

One last try. The first axiom isn't the claim that there is a missing mandate, i.e. plasticity. I repeat, if the first axiom just was this fact, there wouldn't be a need to make it into an axiom. The first axiom states that:

There is no scientific proof for this claim.

You agree its an unprovable assertion philosophically.

This is just tautological reasoning. The validity of the notion of the act comes to rest, in a short-circuit, on an act itself. You don't have to be some kind of anti-totalitarian liberal (or capitalist roader in maoist jargon) to see the problem of a tautology.

For biologists plasticity implies cellular death, which is what you called a gap. So, no, despite your misreading, I don't agree with the axioms (or your claim that you proved them). Sure, I can (not that I actually will) go along with your idea that plasticity is not only about missing information, but that in a different modality, its also about language. For one thing, there can't logically be both a gap and an excess, but these are just details.

The only point that you have been repeating through-out is that plasticity implies/proves/demonstrates what Lacanians call the non-all/gap/void/internally conflicted base/corpo-Real (first axiom).
The question is, what do you call a void? In TM it isn't specified what is called a gap. TM does not say what is meant by 'internally conflicted'. In what way is there an internally conflicted base? There is no explanation. There can't be an explanation of the Real. In that sense, plasticity can imply the gap, but it can also not imply it. There is no way of empirically telling the difference between a non-all and an 'all' brain structure, because all and non-all are metaphysical categories. You can call the brain non-all, and I can call it 'all'; you call it a void, and I don't. I decide to call a rock's make-up void. Also, the material base of strawberry icecreams is non-all. It really depends what you mean by the terms 'gap/void/conflicted' and it turns out they mean everything and nothing. I'm done with showing the invalidity of YOUR 'plasticity-proves-TM'-plea.

You did claim there were some philosophical arguments for the TM theses. Maybe its time you started thinking some up.

With the phenomenon of 'plasticity' Johnston focuses on the corpo-Real. The corpo-Real is not the Real tout court. I'd say the corpo-Real is not even a proper species of the genus 'Real'. The TM-theses are not about Zizek's concept of the Real tout court. It's important to stress where you are in disagreement with Zizek. You frankly said that you prefer Johnston's notion of the Real. That means you agree with Johnston's criticism of the idealism in Zizek's notion of the Real (e.g. when Zizek says things like, nature doesn't exist).

The discussion on this thread has thus not exactly been about Zizek's philosophy. You will say that Johnston provides an 'elaboration' or a 'deepening' of Zizek's thought or maybe Johnston's philosophy could better be seen as a split-off from Zizek's philosophy. Like you, I also find Johnston's philosophy 'better'. That's why it's important that here I also have been evaluating Johnston's case.

I understand your original claim to mean that plasticity proves the theses of TM. However tbf to Johnston, only you have made this claim. Johnston is more careful, so I praise the fact that you've sticken out your neck. To be clear, the discussion on this thread has thus not even been about the way Johnston makes his case for TM.

So where were we in the debate? Ah, yes.

I was saying that the fact of plasticity in mammals' brain invalidates this specific claim of yours, because animals don't have an 'internally conflicted libidinal economy' (first axiom), nor are they consciousness

You have the option to say that they do have a 'gap' and that mammals' onto-genetic base is corpo-Real. It's an unattractive option because, well, it would mean that you believe in animals having internally conflicted libidinal economies. This option also would mean that your claim is that plasticity proves only the first axiom of TM, not the second.

The strategy which you seem to have chosen consist in distinguishing different sorts of plasticity:

You gave 2 meanings to plasticity ('missing mandate' or lack and 'signifier' or excess) and you left yourself the space to invent further modalities of plasticity. This allows you to carry on claiming that plasticity proves both axioms of TM. It's fairly far-fetched and arbitrary, but okay, that's how you argue.

One of the problems with this last argument is that your second sort of plasticity, namely the signifier or excess (strikingly vague btw), still does not prove the second axiom of TM. It hardly relates to it at all:

This is an axiomatic claim because there is no philosophical proof for it. I don't rule out that there are arguments for it; one can after all make arguments for any ol' proposition. As you admitted there is no way to prove the TM-theses with philosophy, does the lack of scientific proof for the second axiom mean you'll reject TM?

I understood your original claim to mean that plasticity is the scientific proof for the TM-theses (both of them). Even if you'll say this wasn't your claim, I think now we agree that such a claim would be false.

It's fine for you to explain that the signifier is also required for subjectivity and that the signifier creates the parlêtre. These aren't scientific proofs for the TM-theses though. TM makes claims about the ontology of the subject, e.g. that subjectivity consists of (failed) efforts at taming the corpo-Real. To be clear, I'm not asking you to give scientific proofs for this assertion, I wrote it's impossible. It seems it's only you who (still?) believe that it is possible (and achieved?).

Of course I don't believe humans' onto-genetic base has a conflicted libidinal economy either. My point was that if the argument is that plasticity proves the first axiom, one would have to say animals have a corpo-Real as well, which is absurd.

Because you (still?) insist that science bears the TM-theses out, I followed your positivist road. Btw, I use that word 'positivist' because I see little difference between TMists and the empirio-critics against whom Lenin a century ago wrote his MAEC:

I hope we can agree that there isn't exactly scientific proof for either of the TM-theses. You should withdraw this assertion and replace it with the weaker claim of Johnston, i.e. as you wrote, "science provides a material basis for thinking this".

And as I have reiterated numerous times, Hegel attacks Schelling because his philosophy consisted of axioms. Hegel would turn in his grave if you called his philosophy axiomatic. Instead of arriving at an understanding of the object by dialectically working it through, Schelling asserted propositions by intuitive reason. Schelling then, like Zizek, applies his schematical axioms on to nature, instead of beginning with an investigation of nature. Engels in Anti-Duhring also attacked Duhring's new socialist philosophical system for its axiomatic nature.

It's not possible for you to elaborate the gap, as there is nothing to elaborate on.

I think it would be best if we just drop this plasticity-topic, for this is indeed boring.

I propose you or anybody else bring up a quote from Zizek's writings on a different topic than neurobiology, to see if he succeeds or not in making the case for his philosophy there.

To respond to communistingoodfaith's lingering doubts about my good intention with this critique of TM, I should clarify that I did for some time hold to Zizek's philosophy, but that I always had my doubts and that I changed my mind definitively after reading the critique of Zizek in Bosteels' article 'The recommencement of Dialectical Materialism', (might load slow, but that text is here).

Of course, I expect to now be accused of never having been a real Zizekian in the first place in proper religious fashion .

As Althusser said - Marxist-Leninist theory includes a science (historical materialism) and a philosophy (dialectical materialism).

Yes I support dialectical materialism in the following sense; that nature exists outside and independently from all thought, and that 'the truth or falsity of a statement is determined only by how it relates to the world, and whether it accurately describes (i.e., corresponds with) that world' (wikipedia on the correspondence theory of truth).

As Ilyenkov wrote in his 'Leninist Dialectics and the Metaphysics of Positivism': The ‘essence’ of materialism consists of the recognition of objective reality existing independently of human cognition and reflected by it.

Dialectical materialism should exclude of course Stalinist/Maoist dialectics (which is mysticism, e.g. One divides into Two ) but also the limitations of Engels and Lenin when in some places they argue for a reflection theory of perception. Over all though, Engels and Lenin's materialism comes with a correspondence theory of knowledge, which is sound and is part of dialectical materialism.

TM on the other hand busies itself with a creation of a ‘general theory of being’.

First, it is Zizek's claim that Hegel thought the subject was pure negativity. I don't remember the exact the passage from the phenomenology, but it's not the final word of Hegel on the subject (pun not intended). Hegel goes on further, he doesn't stop there, so at most, negativity is a stage in the subject. I doubt that it's necessary and that it includes madness, as Zizek claims Hegel thought. Certainly Zizek thinks it does.

Hegel develops a historical explanation of how the political terror of the french revolution becomes internalized by the individual bourgeois subject and how this subject differs from the one in feudal times. That is the opposite of positing an axiom out of the blue without argument (Zizek's argument for his claim 'subject is negativity' is an appeal to Hegel's authority, not so much Hegel's argument, as to 'Hegel's conclusion', which conveniently fits Zizek's TM).

Philosophical investigations of nature are not a task of dialectical materialism (I'm lazy so, again, see Ilyenkov or Althusser, who elaborate on this mainstream view of marxism).

Bosteels once pondered whether the growth of leftist ontologies (from the 80s onwards) is not rather a sign of crisis and decline...

I was just happy that you gave me the opportunity to make a small clarification, even though apparently you didn't understand a word of it.

I mentioned the relevant passage for Zizek's claim that subject is negativity (in Tarrying with the negative) is when Hegel discusses the Jacobin terror. The quote from the Preface which, again (unless you can show otherwise) only YOU are giving, is not relevant to Zizek's interpretation of Hegel.