Distinction between Marx and Engels
Following on from ther identity/unity of subject and object thread:
Does anyone have any particularly strong oppinions either way on the supposed differences between Marx and Engel's interpretation of dialectics? The stuff I'm looking at (Colletti, Rees and Levine at the moment) is fascinating stuff, and I wondered if anyone here had come to any conclusions on the issue
Marx died in 1883, before the Second International, that's for sure. But he fully supported the formation of the German social democratic party, which was to become its central nucleus, despite all his criticisms. How do you explain that?
Of course Marx's focus on Grundrisse and Capital is the capitalist mdoe of production. But there is a vast wealth of material, especially in the former, on pre-capitalist modes of production. And why did Marx spend so much time in his later years looking at primitive societies (the Ethnograpic Notebooks) if he was not seeking to locate capitalist society withn a general theory of the evolution of social forms?
I don't claim to be any great expert in such weighty matters but I was under the impression that Marx endorsed much of Engels work on dialectics. He even wrote (or supplied much of the material for) chapter 10 of Anti-Duhring, fulfilling his promise to help Engels after encouraging the other to attack Duhring. At Lafargue's request he wrote an introduction to Socialism: Utopian & Scientific and also supported Engels when he wrote to the editor of Vorwarts concerning Anti-Duhring: "not only simple workers but scientifically educated people can learn from Engels’s positive explanations" (Marx to Bracke, 11 April 1877).
If Engels works were a departure from Marx, it must been a rather subtle one for Marx himself not to notice.
Marx died in 1883, before the Second International, that's for sure. But he fully supported the formation of the German social democratic party, which was to become its central nucleus, despite all his criticisms. How do you explain that?
He did however point out some problems with with it though did he not? wink wink nudge nudge
To be honest I've a book at home on the early PDS that I have to read so I don't know that much about it.
Maybe if i look into my crystal ball (MECW) or pray upon the cruxifix (the 'proletariat') I won't need to read up on it though. I'm sure it will be revealed to me.
Marx died in 1883, before the Second International, that's for sure. But he fully supported the formation of the German social democratic party, which was to become its central nucleus, despite all his criticisms. How do you explain that?
This isn't really what I was referring to. I was referring to the philosophical/theoretical basis of Second International Marxism as it descends from Engels. Obviously the politics are not entirely separate from this question but they're not immediately identical either.
And in any case, Marx brutally criticized the Gotha Programme. Even though he supported its formation he certainly attacked its theoretical claims (and note also that they did not accept Marx's critique!).
Of course Marx's focus on Grundrisse and Capital is the capitalist mdoe of production. But there is a vast wealth of material, especially in the former, on pre-capitalist modes of production. And why did Marx spend so much time in his later years looking at primitive societies (the Ethnograpic Notebooks) if he was not seeking to locate capitalist society withn a general theory of the evolution of social forms?
Your conclusion does not follow from the premises. That Marx studied pre-capitalist societies doesn't prove that he was working on "a general theory of the evolution of social forms" in any significant sense. The Grundrisse, for example, arrives precisely at the conclusion that there are a number of different paths to the capitalist mode of production, i.e. a non-universal theory of history. Also, it seems that part of Marx's reason for studying pre-capitalist societies was the fact that not all societies in Marx's time were capitalist. I have seen it written (I forget where, but I'll check) that Marx's ethnographic notebooks were much more focused on contemporary (in Marx's time) non-capitalist societies rather than pre-capitalist modes of production (which Engels focused on in his Origins...). I can't confirm this since I have not read Marx's Ethnographic Notebooks (I figure I'll wait until the full English translation is published) but it is definitely something worth thinking about.
And I quote a (nowadays) well-known statement from Marx on precisely this topic, a statement which makes no sense from the standpoint of the epigones of Marxism: "Success will never come with the master-key of a general historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical." (From his letter to the editorial board of Otechestvennye Zapiski, in response to an article by Mikhailovsky, in pg. 136 of Late Marx and the Russian Road ed. Teodor Shanin. The date of its writing is unknown (according to Wada's article in the book) but is supposed to have been written either at the end of 1877 or 1878. I'm not sure what it's listed under in the Collected Works.)
I don't claim to be any great expert in such weighty matters but I was under the impression that Marx endorsed much of Engels work on dialectics. He even wrote (or supplied much of the material for) chapter 10 of Anti-Duhring, fulfilling his promise to help Engels after encouraging the other to attack Duhring. At Lafargue's request he wrote an introduction to Socialism: Utopian & Scientific and also supported Engels when he wrote to the editor of Vorwarts concerning Anti-Duhring: "not only simple workers but scientifically educated people can learn from Engels’s positive explanations" (Marx to Bracke, 11 April 1877).If Engels works were a departure from Marx, it must been a rather subtle one for Marx himself not to notice.
I'll address this more specifically later, since I'm looking through some material right now which discusses this issue.
But I do think that off the bat the implicit methodology used to support the claim in your final sentence is incorrect, for two reasons.
Firstly, it is entirely possible that Marx himself was unaware of the difference of his own method from that of Engels. Obviously, if it is concluded that this is the case, then this fact must itself be explained. But there is no a priori reason to dismiss this possibility.
Secondly, it is possible that Marx did know of the differences between himself and Engels, but for whatever reason he did not state them publicly. Take, for example, Engels' reviews of Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Engels describes Marx's categorical exposition as a mirror of the historical movement. This is the direct opposite of the general introduction to the Grundrisse, where Marx says that things are the exact opposite: "It would... be unfeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development."
Yet Marx never openly (or privately, so far as we know) rebuked Engels for this. Why? Who knows, but probably it did not seem worthwhile to Marx to oppose his closest colleague over a simple methodological issue. But the one thing that is absolutely certain is that it would be impossible to say that Marx and Engels agreed on this question! (I should also point out that this particular example has bearing on the issue of Engels' dialectic, discussed in the othe thread. Even his understanding of human history is such that the historical development mirrors the dialectical-logical development. In Marx the conditions of existence of reality and of logic are distinct issues; in Engels they are one.)
And we cannot be certain whether or not Marx criticized Engels in personal letters, since according to Engels' daughter, I believe, Engels burned quite a few of Marx's letters after Marx died.
Any actual discussion of this issue therefore supposes an examination of the texts of both Marx and Engels, rather than circumstantial evidence which proves little or nothing. It cannot be assumed, a priori, that they agreed or disagreed. This has to be shown through analysis, using evidence. And I have not seen any evidence of this sort (and in fact this is the only legitimate type of evidence) that Engels' and Marx's dialectic are substantially the same.
Mike
But Marx had no trouble in criticising Engels' views in other matters. For example, he questions Engels' dismissal of a book by a chap called Tremaux concerning evolution and geology. He had a deep interest in all scientific matters of his day and his letters show that he shared and discussed these matters with Engels regularly. At one point he even said (according to Mehring, I can't find the letter) that he lagged behind Engels in his understanding of science "everything for me comes late and I always follow in your footsteps".
You mention Marx ignoring Engels' criticisms on the Contribution. He also happened to ignore Engels' advice on writing Capital. The latter thought the presentation was too dense and too much remained of the Hegelian form of presentation. Engels was of the opinion that even by then, no-one knew or understood that form anymore and Marx was making a mistake in using it. Marx largely ignored Engels but - in my humble opinion at least
- Engels might have had a point!
So Marx ignored Engels' criticisms in certain regard and its perfectly possible Engels ignored Marx when he thought he was wrong (which, upon occasion, he undoubtedly was). But this didn't stop Marx from defending Engels, largely supporting his work and did not see Engels' work as constituting a serious enough misapplication of their method to prevent him from publically endorsing it.
I think the problem with this whole debate is that it reduces us to behaving like biblical scholars, poring over minute discrepencies in letters or forms of presentation, trying to decide who deviated from some divine from the prophet's vision. Einstein and Bohr had considerable disagreements over the import of quantum theory - Bohr was largely proven right, but you don't hear scientists arguing over which one was a proper scientist or not! Their respective theories are considered in their own right.
So I think trying to make Marx and Engels identical in every respect is flawed, it's clear they often disagreed. It's also mistaken to try and split them with implications that Engels wasn't a "proper" Marxist. The method Marx developed does not "belong" to him any more than mechanics belongs to Newton - it seems to me to be quite acceptable to "deviate" if that deviation can be justified by reality. At the end of the day, Marxism, dialectical, historical, scientific materialism, whatever you want to call it is a tool for understanding that reality. If it fails to do so, it should be criticised and modified - if the failure is complete, throw it away.
As regards pre-capitalist society, Marx fully endorsed (as fully as he endorsed anyone)Lewis Henry Morgan's Ancient Society, the book that Engels based his "origins" on.
mikus - I welcome your last posts becuase they do offer the possibility of debate. There is much to think about in what you write (in particular the quote from Grundrisse). I haven't read Carver's book and in fact have only heard of it recently, but it looks as though it is essential reading. I am in a rush but three quick points:
- it seems impossible to read the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy except as a summation of a general theory of the rise and fall of forms of class society. Of course each mode of production has its own specific 'laws of motion' but Marx is precisely trying to draw out what is common to the whole movement - in particular the onset of phases in which the relations of production enter into increaisngly violent conflict with the forces of production, thus pointing the way towards the overcoming of capitalist society;
- what Marx certainly opposed was a purely linear and pre-determined succession of modes of production (caricatured in particular by Stalinism). The debate on Russia was especially important in this respect, since Marx was engaged in a polemic with Russian 'marxists' who argued that Russia would inevitably have to go through a bourgeois epoch before it would be 'ripe' for socialism, a mechanistic and narrowly national method which Marx rejected
- I agree with Demo's post that looking for tiny differences isn't the main point here. But I have noticed that those who argue that there was a serious gulf between Marx and Engels often grudgingly accept that Marx and Engels 'were of course good friends'. As indeed they were. But this approach downplays the degree to which Marx and Engels also saw themselves as a 'party' (more accurately, a fraction...) which was committed to theoretical/political unity and coherence in the face of very widespread levels of confusion in the workers' movement of their day.
In the Ethnograqphic Notes Marx certainly looks at "contemparary non-capitalist societies " as Mikus says, but he doesn't "focus" on them. Given the enormous advances today in archeology and science is not hard to forget how in the dark one could be in relation to previous societies around the mid-1800s. And looking at contempary non-capitalist societies even today is a useful tool to understanding the evolution of the past, as long as the qualifications and limitations of such a task are taken into account. But in looking at Scottish clans, the celtic gentes, the Irish septs, the Germanic gens and so on, Marx was looking at pre-capitalist society, its egalitarian structures and the grounds for its development into private property and the state: "The political relation (ie, the development of the gentes, the family, private property and the state) is the negation of the collective primitive relation..."(KM). And with the Communist Manifesto, jointly signed by Marx and Engels and largely outlined beforehand by Engels in "The Principles of Communism", the potential for "the negation of the negation" was laid bare.
Marx and Engels both embraced "Ancient Society Or Researches in the Lines of Progress from Savagry through Barbarism to Civilisation", written by a US union army official after his work with the Iroqois particularly. Given the feebleness of archeological and ethnographic evidence at the time, Lewis Henry Morgan's work is a great insight into the depths of pre-history and the history and development of the family and society. Such was its weight and method - it took Morgan 40 years to write - that the author was forced by his own conclusions, to adopt a materialist and revolutionary perspective. This was most definitely a "general theory of the evolution of social forms" and was enthusiastically taken up by Marx and Engels.
Sorry this has taken me so long to respond. I've been busy trying to find work, mostly unsuccessfully.
But Marx had no trouble in criticising Engels' views in other matters. For example, he questions Engels' dismissal of a book by a chap called Tremaux concerning evolution and geology. He had a deep interest in all scientific matters of his day and his letters show that he shared and discussed these matters with Engels regularly. At one point he even said (according to Mehring, I can't find the letter) that he lagged behind Engels in his understanding of science "everything for me comes late and I always follow in your footsteps".
The first two sentences are misleading. Yes, Marx criticized Engels on one rather trivial issue. This doesn't imply that Marx was open to criticizing Engels on issues that had to do with communist revolution. In addition, the fact that Marx didn't understand natural science as well as Engels doesn't lend support to your argument. It would even possible to use this as an argument against the view that Marx supported the dialectic of nature -- if Marx's method was really what Engels said it was, then one would think that Marx would have spent more time studying natural science, since in Engels' interpretation of Marx the dialectical worldview (including the dialectic of nature) is necessary for Marx's theory of capitalist production.
You mention Marx ignoring Engels' criticisms on the Contribution. He also happened to ignore Engels' advice on writing Capital. The latter thought the presentation was too dense and too much remained of the Hegelian form of presentation. Engels was of the opinion that even by then, no-one knew or understood that form anymore and Marx was making a mistake in using it. Marx largely ignored Engels but - in my humble opinion at least- Engels might have had a point!
You have misunderstood me here. Engels never criticized Marx's Contribution. Rather, when Engels attempted to explain Marx's method in the Contribution, he explained it in a way directly contrary to the way that Marx explains his own method in his Introduction to the Grundrisse. There is simply no way to reconcile the two views: Engels says that the logical progression of categories is the same as the historical progression of categories; Marx says that the two proceed in the opposite direction. One can see that Marx stood by his claim in the Grundrisse in Capital insofar as he treated merchant's capital and interest-breaing capital after industrial capital, although they historically preceded industrial capital. This cannot be reconciled with Engels' interpretation of Marx.
And yet, Marx never openly spoke out against Engels on this issue; nor, so far as we know, did he criticize Engels in private. Clearly Marx held his tongue for one reason or another. It is this combination of facts (the fact that they disagreed, and the fact that Marx did not openly criticize Engels) that must be examined. Since these two things are facts, it is impossible to argue that because Marx didn't criticize Engels openly on this issue, they must have agreed (i.e. Marx must have supported Engels' dialectical worldview).
As far as Engels' criticism of Marx's initial presentation of Ch. 1 of Capital goes, that is a different issue and so far as I can tell not relevant to the present topic. There's nothing mysterious in that exchange between the two.
So Marx ignored Engels' criticisms in certain regard and its perfectly possible Engels ignored Marx when he thought he was wrong (which, upon occasion, he undoubtedly was). But this didn't stop Marx from defending Engels, largely supporting his work and did not see Engels' work as constituting a serious enough misapplication of their method to prevent him from publically endorsing it.
This does little good for us today. In Marx's day, Engels' weltanschuuang could not have been seen as a major issue. Today, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that it is first of all simply wrong (no scientist would accept Engels' view of natural philosophy), and secondly damaging insofar as it makes it impossible for Marxists to reconcile themselves with natural science, leading to the twin errors of Lysenkoism and the anti-scientific theories of Western Marxism (and here I support the thesis that Western Marxism and diamat are not so different in spite of the former's rejection of the dialectic of nature).
I think the problem with this whole debate is that it reduces us to behaving like biblical scholars, poring over minute discrepencies in letters or forms of presentation, trying to decide who deviated from some divine from the prophet's vision. Einstein and Bohr had considerable disagreements over the import of quantum theory - Bohr was largely proven right, but you don't hear scientists arguing over which one was a proper scientist or not! Their respective theories are considered in their own right.
Okay, I have no problem with evaluating Marx's and Engels' respective theories in their own rights. In fact, this is a necessary corollary of what I've been arguing. But before one tests the two theories against reality, one must understand that there are two different theories, and that if one falls down the other doesn't necessarily fall down with it.
And here it is obvious that Marx's theory stands up while Engels' doesn't -- the main theses of Capital have been shown to be correct while the development of natural science has become no more dialectical and yet its knowledge has greatly progressed. As I said above, no scientist would defend the dialectic of nature in its original form (of course, one can refer to real oppositions as "dialectical contradictions" but this is mere wordplay and does not support the substance of what Engels is saying).
The problem is that when one brings up Engels' mistake most Marxists defend Engels by saying "Marx agreed with Engels, so if Engels is wrong Marx must have been as well!" My argument is therefore twofold: Firstly, there is no reason to think that Marx and Engels agreed on the dialectic of nature, and secondly Marx's general theory is valid while Engels' isn't.
So I think trying to make Marx and Engels identical in every respect is flawed, it's clear they often disagreed. It's also mistaken to try and split them with implications that Engels wasn't a "proper" Marxist. The method Marx developed does not "belong" to him any more than mechanics belongs to Newton - it seems to me to be quite acceptable to "deviate" if that deviation can be justified by reality. At the end of the day, Marxism, dialectical, historical, scientific materialism, whatever you want to call it is a tool for understanding that reality. If it fails to do so, it should be criticised and modified - if the failure is complete, throw it away.
See above. There is no justification for the dialectic of nature "in reality". Its justification lies only in the dogmatism of Second International influenced Marxism.
- it seems impossible to read the Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy except as a summation of a general theory of the rise and fall of forms of class society. Of course each mode of production has its own specific 'laws of motion' but Marx is precisely trying to draw out what is common to the whole movement - in particular the onset of phases in which the relations of production enter into increaisngly violent conflict with the forces of production, thus pointing the way towards the overcoming of capitalist society;
But what a "general theory" is is precisely the issue. Marx presents his guiding thread as the result of his investigation. It isn't an a priori logical analysis as it is with Engels. Certainly the conflict between forces and relations of production is the most general form of antagonism within a mode of production. (For the record, I support Derek Sayer's interpretation of Marx in The Violence of Abstraction and thus not the technological determinist orthodox reading of Marx.) But this is precisely a general form of antagonism. In itself it provides no insight into the capitalist mode of production or its economic law of motion. This abstraction "forces of production" is similar to Marx's abstraction of "labor" in general, which he discusses in Part I of Ch. 7 of Capital Vol. 1 as well as the Introduction to the Grundrisse. It is what is common to all modes of production and therefore tells us nothing about any specific mode of production.
So I see no sense in which Marx's 1859 Preface is teleological or even a theory/philosophy of history in the usual sense. Marx has only summarized the most general results of his specific investigations into various human societies (with the emphasis obviously on capitalist society).
- what Marx certainly opposed was a purely linear and pre-determined succession of modes of production (caricatured in particular by Stalinism). The debate on Russia was especially important in this respect, since Marx was engaged in a polemic with Russian 'marxists' who argued that Russia would inevitably have to go through a bourgeois epoch before it would be 'ripe' for socialism, a mechanistic and narrowly national method which Marx rejected
Agreed. But I don't see how this can be reconciled with a reading of the 1859 Preface as a theory or philosophy of history in general. You can say the contradiction is in the two texts and not in your interpretation of them, but this seems far-fetched given the fact that it is possible to read the two consistently without distorting either of them, and moreover my interpretation of the 1859 Preface accords with what Marx says in that same Preface: the contradiction between the forces and relations of production is "the general conclusion at which I [Marx] arrived".
- I agree with Demo's post that looking for tiny differences isn't the main point here. But I have noticed that those who argue that there was a serious gulf between Marx and Engels often grudgingly accept that Marx and Engels 'were of course good friends'. As indeed they were. But this approach downplays the degree to which Marx and Engels also saw themselves as a 'party' (more accurately, a fraction...) which was committed to theoretical/political unity and coherence in the face of very widespread levels of confusion in the workers' movement of their day.
I admit that my statement that they "were of course good friends" was an understatement. But I still have not seen any evidence that they agreed on all substantive issues. Furthermore, referring to the differences between Marx and Engels as "tiny differences" assumes what you're supposed to be demonstrating. If you're acknowledging a difference between Engels' transhistorical dialectical worldview and Marx's historically specific dialectical conception of the capitalist mode of production, then you should try to show that the difference is minor. As far as I can tell there is a giant gulf separating a philosophy of history from a historically specific analysis of a given mode of production which takes the concrete as its starting-point and end-point.
Mike
Mike: there are a lot of issues raised in your posts which I can't do justice to right now. But I would like to reply to the following passage:
"But this is precisely a general form of antagonism. In itself it provides no insight into the capitalist mode of production or its economic law of motion. This abstraction "forces of production" is similar to Marx's abstraction of "labor" in general, which he discusses in Part I of Ch. 7 of Capital Vol. 1 as well as the Introduction to the Grundrisse. It is what is common to all modes of production and therefore tells us nothing about any specific mode of production.
So I see no sense in which Marx's 1859 Preface is teleological or even a theory/philosophy of history in the usual sense"
Some brief comments:
- I seriously don't understand why defining what is common to all modes of production tells us nothing about a specific mode of production. Marx surely tried to understand how the specific social relations of production in bourgeois society - wage labour, generalised comodity production - were bound to turn from "forms of development" into "fetters", so that wage labour, as he put it (I think in the Grundrisse) would stand in the same relation to historical development as serfdom and slavery had stood in relation to previous social forms. The concrete, specific translation of this general approach was the investigation of contradictions specific to the capitalist mode of production, hence the examination of the tendency towards overproduction and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall as particular manifestations of the wage labour relationship. As Bordiga once put it, Marx's work is the 'necrology' of capital: in other words, its fundamental aim is to demonstrate why the seemingly triumphant bourgeois society of his day was doomed to go the same way as vanished forms of social organisation like classical slavery or oriental despotism.
- I doubt whether Marx would have termed such a general historical theory a 'philosophy' given his view that, to all intents and purposes, the proletarian movement had already overcome philosophy, at least in its traditional sense. As I understand it, the issue is not whether marxism is an all-encompassing 'weltanshcauung' (which it isn't), nor whether it is 'teleological' in the metaphysical sense of the term. The issue is whether Marx's method can lead us to a grasp of the historical process that takes us further back than bourgeois society, and it seems evident to me that Marx thought that it did.
Quick question (don't have time to reply to the more substantial stuff going on here):
In Anti-Duhring, Engels explains that the diversity and specialisation of the sciences have brought about the exigency for their unification. Science, he claims, is to be united by and to proceed through theory. Whilst the content of science proper is to be derived from scientific practice, its theoretical form is to be found in philosophy – and as the contemporary philosophy of the day seemed to be of little use in this regard, Engels came to the conclusion that “…only dialectics could be of assistance to natural science in negotiating the mountain of theory.”
So, theory unites and articulates science. The source of theory is philosophical practice. Is it not therefore reasonable to suggest that Engels thinks dialectics to simply be the best option at the present time - and that implicit within the Dialectics of Nature is a sense in which dialectics might well be superseded one day as a mode of organising scientific knowledge? In other words, could it not be suggested that Engels is not saying that reality is absolutely, undeniably dialectical in itself - but that dialectics just happens to describe it better than anything else at the moment.
If this is the case, 1) the implicit identity of thought and matter in Engels disappears; 2) Engels theory of natural science becomes much, much closer to Marx's historical materialism, in that it tends towards (or at least implies) a developing history of theories about the natural world.
“...an acquaintance with the historical course of development of human thought, with the views on the general inter-connections in the external world expressed at various times, is required by theoretical natural science for the additional reason that it furnishes a criterion of the theories propounded by this science itself.”
For me, the major distinction between Marx and Engels is in terms of their personality types and development as Human beings, and not in the content of their ideas.
Marx is fundamentally a poet and philosopher who got into mathematics and economics.
Engels is fundamentally a scientist, economicist, and officer who got into philosophy.
They both embraced the dialectic, but Engels is much more of an, for lack of a better word, "equtian - ist". As an equationist, Engels always sought to find the perfect mathematical equations to plug things into, and then illustrate the dialectic. He categorized things quickly, and had no problem seeing things as such.
Marx was much more of the philosopher, and what he would do was refrain from equations, and illustrate the dialectic of things through example.
Compare Engels "Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy" with the rest of The Paris Manuscripts (EPM of 1844). These very early works contain the nucleus of what will be the major differences between the two.
Engels follows the empirical model much more than Marx. For Engels, the theories and formulas are very important, whereas for Marx, the methodology is key. The information that he digs up and illuminates is his gift to the world.
This is how I remember it:
Marx had whiter hair...Engels had a more prominent hairline.



What is there to say? I don't think those who claim a unity of the two thinkers are able to find any supportive evidence at all other than that Marx and Engels worked together on many things. So what? You won't find any of Engels' grand Weltanschauung in Marx. Even if certain statements of Marx's can be construed in this way, it is impossible to use these isolated quotes as evidence of diamat in Marx unless one begs the question and supposes that Marx supported diamat! Take, for example, the quote about the tranformation of the law of the transformation of quantity into quality (which is in foonote 5 of Ch. 11 of Capital, Vol. I, and presumably not in the supposed letter referred to on the other thread, since it is almost word for word a citation from Capital). Even this, in itself, does not support the dialectic of nature. Marx has only accepted that Hegel has understood, in a very abstract sense, something that holds good in nature and in society. So what? This is miles away from Engels' works on dialectics, which are much more significant than simple statements like these. The only way to interpret this statement as a support of dialectical materialism would be through outside evidence of dialectical materialism in Marx. But there is no outside evidence! This quote, which is taken as self-evident support of diamat, is not at all self-evident, but in fact begs explanation. The dialectical materialists fill this explanation in with a dose of Engels, but the validity of doing such a thing is precisely what is in dispute, and it is therefore not an acceptable operation.
Even a natural scientist could presumably agree with Marx's claim. But no natural scientist would accept Engels' philosophy of contradiction and his refusal of the law of identity. And much of Marx's work (particularly his critique of Hegel from 1843 and on) can only be understood as a direct attack on this kind of grand philosophical theory.
I'll look over Terrell Carver's book again soon and give you a more in depth answer but I think it's clear from examination of Marx and Engels' correspondence that Marx always interpreted the dialectic of nature as Engels' project, and Marx was always ambiguous about it and never attributed any significance to it.
Besides, if Marx had a grand theory that applied to both nature and society, why didn't he write something about it? Why are all of his major works (the Grundrisse, the three volumes of Capital as well as its various drafts) particular historical examinations of the capitalist mode of production? Why does the General Introduction to the Grundrisse attack the conception of the real concrete as a result of the self-movement of the abstract concept? None of these questions can be answered within the framework of the dialectical materialist dogma. This is why the readings of these texts by dialectical materialists are always so laughable and reductive. They have to twist and turn trying to explain everything away Marx's entire theory.
The ICC's article that was posted is a perfect illustration of the kind of (non)scholarship used by those who see Engels and Marx as essentially identical. No evidence is presented; there is only an attack on the supposed vulgarizers who dare separate the two godfathers of Marxism. There is no attempt to actually refute the claim that the lineage of their much-beloved mechanical pseudo-materialist Second International Marxism (and no matter what they say, that is what their theory boils down to) comes from Engels and not from Marx. There's little to do but ignore such people -- people who are not at all inclined to making scientific claims. Or to put the matter differently, these people are not friends of hypothesis but only hypostasis which, as such, cannot be falsified. Their purely "scientific" theory is little more than religious dogma.
Mike