failures of spain and dauve
"the reason why there was no "Spanish October" was the absence in Spain of a true contradiction of interests between the proletarians and the State. "Objectively", proletariat and Capital are in opposition, but this opposition exists at the level of principles, which doesn't coincide here with reality. In its effective social movement, the Spanish proletariat was not compelled to confront, as a block, Capital and the State. In Spain there were no burning demands, demands felt to be absolutely necessary, which could force the workers to attack the State in order to obtain them (as in Russia where one had peace, land, etc.). This non-antagonistic situation was connected with the absence of a "party", an absence which weighed heavily on events, preventing the antagonism from ripening and bursting later." Dauve in Fascism and Anti-Fascism
What do others think of this argument?
my sentiment is mostly the same. it seems like antagonism is a dynamic thing, and the state in almost every circumstance tries to diffuse and obscure it. i think his example of Russia having that antagonism is less clear than he would like, but it's also an interesting attempt.
Quote:
This non-antagonistic situation was connected with the absence of a "party", an absence which weighed heavily on events, preventing the antagonism from ripening and bursting later."I don't think that Dauve's argument is correct to link the 'lack of antagonism' (which I can't really see to be honest - there seems to have been a fair bit of class antagonism) to the lack of a party. I do however think the lack of coherent libertarian socialist party in the Spanish civil war was a decisive factor in the failure of the revolution. I don't think that can be denied. The lessons of the turmoil within the FAI and their lack of political clarity and bullshit ideas are all too obvious.
saying that the failure of the revolution occured because of lack of a specific organization, party, or whatever is ridiculous. The entire working class was not revolutionary.
Or maybe Hitler would've stopped at the Pyrenees and allowed libertarian communism in Spain?
Quote:
This non-antagonistic situation was connected with the absence of a "party", an absence which weighed heavily on events, preventing the antagonism from ripening and bursting later."I don't think that Dauve's argument is correct to link the 'lack of antagonism' (which I can't really see to be honest - there seems to have been a fair bit of class antagonism) to the lack of a party. I do however think the lack of coherent libertarian socialist party in the Spanish civil war was a decisive factor in the failure of the revolution. I don't think that can be denied. The lessons of the turmoil within the FAI and their lack of political clarity and bullshit ideas are all too obvious.
I think that you may have misunderstood his point. Dauve points the absence of a party down to the level of class struggle, and 'antagonism'. For him the revolution didn't fail because there wasn't a party as much as there wasn't a party because there wasn't a revolution*.
Also, he certainly wasn't looking for a 'libertarian' party.
Devrim
*This is not to say I agree we him. I am just stating his position.
Note Dauve’s starting point re: the examples of Spain, Italy and Germany:
For various reasons, the revolutionary analyses of fascism and antifascism, and in particular the analysis of the Spanish Civil War which is a more complex example, are ignored, misunderstood, or regularly distorted. At best, they are considered as an idealist perspective; at worst, as an indirect support of fascism. Note, they say how the PCI helped Mussolini by refusing to take fascism seriously, and especially by not allying itself with the democratic forces; or how the KPD allowed Hitler to come to power while treating the SPD as the principal enemy. In Spain, on the contrary, one has an example of resolute antifascist struggle, which might have succeeded if it hadn't been for the deficiencies of the Stalinists - socialists - anarchists (cross out the appropriate names). These statements are based on a distortion of the facts.
Further, what is Dauve driving at in his analysis of the difference between communists and the left-wing of capital:
The revolutionary critique of these events does not arrive at an "all or nothing" conclusion, as if one insisted on fighting only for "the revolution" and only at the side of the purest and toughest communists. One must struggle, we are told, for reforms when it is not possible to make the revolution; a well-led struggle for reforms prepares the way for the revolution: who can do more, can do less; but who cannot do less, cannot do more; who does not know how to defend himself, will not know how to attack, etc. All these generalities are missing the point. The polemic among Marxists, since the Second International, is not concerned with the necessity or worthlessness of communist participation in reformist struggles, which are in any case a reality. It is a matter of knowing if a given struggle places the workers under the control (direct or indirect) of Capital and in particular of its State, and what position the revolutionaries must adopt in this case. For a revolutionary, a "struggle" (a word leftists delight in) has no value in itself; the most violent actions have often ended in constituting parties and unions which have subsequently proved to be enemies of communism. (italics mine – CW)
This part at the end of the Portugal section captures the essence of the problem with autonomy, as well as the movement of many an “autonomist Marxist” towards syndicalism, whether of the “base unions” in Italy or the IWW in the U.S. and Britain. The emphasis ends up being on “workers’ autonomy”, rather than on communist content:
The workers' struggle, even for reformist goals, creates difficulties for Capital and moreover constitutes the necessary experience for the proletariat to prepare itself for revolution. The struggle prepares the future: but this preparation can lead in two directions-nothing is automatic - it can just as easily stifle as strengthen the communist movement. Under these conditions it's not sufficient to insist on the "autonomy" of the workers' actions. Autonomy is no more a revolutionary principle than "planning" by a minority. The revolution no more insists on democracy than on dictatorship.
Only by carrying out certain measures can the proletarians retain control of the struggle. If they limit themselves to reformist action, sooner or later the struggle will escape from their control and be taken over by a specialised organ of the syndical type, which may call itself a union or a "committee of the base". Autonomy is not a revolutionary virtue in itself. Any form of organisation depends on the content of the goal for which it was created. The emphasis cannot be put on the self-activity of the workers, but on the communist perspective, the realisation of which alone effectively allows working class action to avoid falling under the leadership of traditional parties and unions. The content of the action is the determining criterion: the revolution is not just a matter of what the "majority" wants. To give priority to workers' autonomy leads to a dead end.Workerism is sometimes a healthy response, but is inevitably catastrophic when it becomes an end in itself. Workerism tends to conjure away the decisive tasks of the revolution. In the name of workers' "democracy" it confines the proletarians to the capitalist enterprise with its problems of production (not visualising the revolution as the destruction of the enterprise as such). And workerism mystifies the problem of the State. At best, it re-invents "revolutionary syndicalism."
On Spain specifically:
The complexity of the war in Spain comes from this double aspect; a civil war (proletariat vs. capital) transforming itself into a capitalist war (the proletarians supporting rival capitalist State structures in both camps).After having given every facility to the "rebels" to prepare themselves, the Republic was going to negotiate and/or submit, when the proletarians rose up against the fascist coup d'etat, preventing its success in half of the country. The Spanish War would not have been unleashed without this authentic proletarian insurrection (it was more than a spontaneous outbreak). But this alone does not suffice to characterise the whole Spanish War and subsequent events. It defines only the first moment of the struggle, which was effectively a proletarian uprising.
However, Dauve here focuses on what happened after the proletariat had risen up, created organs of power. The question then was: What to do?
After having defeated the fascists in a large number of cities, the workers held power. Such was the situation immediately after their insurrection. But what did they proceed to do with this power? Did they hand it back to the Republican State, or did they use it to go further in the direction of communism? They put their trust in the legal government, i.e. in the existing, capitalist State. All their subsequent actions were carried out under the direction of this State. This is the central point. It followed that in its armed struggle against Franco and in its socio-economic transformations, the whole movement of the Spanish proletarians was placing itself squarely within the framework of the capitalist State and could only be capitalist in nature. It's true attempts to go further took place in the social sphere (we shall speak further of this); but these attempts remained hypothetical so long as the capitalist State was maintained. The destruction of the State is the necessary (but not sufficient) condition for communist revolution. In Spain, real power was exercised by the State and not by organisations, unions, collectives, committees, etc. The proof of this is that the mighty CNT had to submit to the PCE (very weak prior to July 1936). One can verify this by the simple fact that the State was able to use its power brutally when required (May 1937). There is no revolution without the destruction of the State. This "obvious" Marxist truth, forgotten by 99% of the "Marxists" emerges once more from the Spanish tragedy.
The essential point, and this is not Dauve’s alone: “This was apparent to all by mid-1937, but the "bloody days of Barcelona" served only to unmask the reality which had existed since the end of July, 1936: effective power had passed out of the hands of the workers to the capitalist State.” This critical point will inform the comparison of Russia in 1917 with Spain in 1936, and the quote which started this discussion.
So what does Dauve mean when he says that the Spanish proletariat never formed itself into a “party”?
First, he does not have in mind that the Bolsheviks formed the proletariat or became a mass organization, but that the Bolsheviks became a vehicle for the concentration of the vanguard of the Russian proletariat into a ‘party’ in the sense of a coherent, centralized political force. The Bolsheviks saw their task as the overthrow of the state, as the breaking of the power of the bourgeoisie and all elements of the state, not in counterpoising the Republicans (in the form of the Social-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Cadets) to the Czarist regime. This alone is enough to separate them from the Spanish Left, who marched off to fight the fascists and left the state intact behind them.
Second, the “party” must also include the soviets and factory committees’ growth into organs of proletarian power antagonistic to capital. After July of ’36, the Spanish Revolution was over and the Spanish Civil War between the democratic and dictatorial elements had taken over, exactly because the possible organs of proletarian power did not take social power and smash the bourgeois “party” (that is, the Stalinists, the democrats, the Socialists, the anarchists in bed with the state, etc. and the state.)
Therefore, “party” here in Dauve’s text, though still under-developed, is the notion of the organic centralization of the class into a political force with a communist content, a unity of communists, class and organs of power.
What Dauve then tries to explain is the reason that a “party” never forms in Spain. It is a question he is trying to answer to this day, as are we all (this is in fact a key argument between Theorie Communiste and Dauve recorded in his “When Insurrections Die” and their review of it.) His answer seems to me quite sensible: the proletarians rose up against fascism more than against capitalism and were not primarily animated by the drive to put an end to capital. Were that the case, the organs of workers’ power would have become the basis of social power in Spain. The bulk of the vanguard, much less of the proletariat, did not see that having beaten the fascists initially in some cities, it was necessary to take power, that is, to destroy or render impotent the left wing of capital as well as the right, to smash the state, etc., not to pick up the banner of anti-fascism. There is also the question of the transformation of everyday life in all spheres which would necessarily have to go along with this, what has in the French milieu been referred to as communization, but also taken up, for example, by riff-raff and others. But essentially, communization which has not taken on the elementary task of the destruction of the bourgeois state will be recuperated or destroyed. It will not have the room or the impetus to develop to its fullest extent.
That is how I take Dauve’s comment in context of the whole piece.
Chris
the elementary task of the destruction of the bourgeois state
dumb question, but what is the bourgeois state?
The state. I think it'd include those sections of capital which might reconstitute a state even if it was formally overthrown as well.
Yeah but it's also a phrase used by those who like to maintain some ambiguity on the possibility of a non-bourgeois state (if they don't say that explicitly).
Yeah but it's also a phrase used by those who like to maintain some ambiguity on the possibility of a non-bourgeois state (if they don't say that explicitly).
That too.
There is also another issue with the term 'the state', which is that it denotes not so much any particular state, and yet is only a meaningful category in relation to the multiplicity of states. the problem is to conceive of 'the state' not as a genus under which we put the various species of states, but to understand why an analysis of 'the state' is meaningful to all particular states. 'The state' or 'the capitalist state' or 'the bourgeois state' is not just a container, but a determinate abstraction pointing to something essential in all capitalist states, something that makes them 'capitalist', but essence which can only exist through multiple states, the particular or form of appearance of 'the state'. Holloway and others have argued that what we should really refer to at that level is more 'the political', that is, that separation of social force and law from the realm of exploitation and into its own sphere.
It is exactly against Orthodox Marxism's use of 'the state' as a genus to denote all states that ever existed as if they had meaningful universal properties, and of course to justify the idea of a "workers' state", that the discussion of this developed in the 1970's in the German 'State Debate'.
Chris




I don't think that Dauve's argument is correct to link the 'lack of antagonism' (which I can't really see to be honest - there seems to have been a fair bit of class antagonism) to the lack of a party. I do however think the lack of coherent libertarian socialist party in the Spanish civil war was a decisive factor in the failure of the revolution. I don't think that can be denied. The lessons of the turmoil within the FAI and their lack of political clarity and bullshit ideas are all too obvious.