The Working Class, National Socialism and War

Those of you who know me will be surprised to hear I've finally finished (a draft of) one of the articles I've been promising to write for ages (you'll get stuff on the Luddites and on the Captain Swing uprising one day John). Still very much at a draft stage (I've drunk too much wine to properly proof read it, the last few paragraphs are shit, bibliography is incomplete and I've only written footnotes for the first half) but I'd welcome feedback, corrections or just a decent argument. On reflection the formatting is all wrong when copied and pasted into here and it's tricky to read so I've shoved it up as a pdf elsewhere.

Luke

The Working Class, National Socialism and War

Up until November 1937 Hitler planned to begin a European war between 1943 and 1945, seeing this as the time at which Germany would have the greatest chance of achieving the victories he desired. Yet just two later, a full four years ahead of his previous schedule, Germany found itself in an unwanted war with Britain and France, the very countries that Hitler had been desperate to avoid military confrontation with.

The conventional interpretation puts the reasons for World War Two beginning in 1939 purely in the realms of high politics. Hitler's recklessness, encouraged by the breathtaking foreign policy successes that appeasement allowed him, led to Germany taking ever larger gambles. These culminated in the invasion of Poland, which was only possible due to a catastrophic misunderstanding of Britain's need for a balance of power in Europe.

None of this analysis is incorrect. What it does not though is place Germany's foreign policy within any domestic political context. The question must be asked of to what extent Hitler was free to make his foreign policy decisions, was he free to do as a pleased or were those choices constrained by economic and political factors in Germany itself.

This article aims to provide the briefest sketch of the role of the German working class in constraining German foreign policy in 1938 and 1939. To demonstrate that the German working class were not mere passengers in the 1930's but active historical players who's successful attempts to take advantage of their much stronger position bargaining position in the late 1930's forced a major economic crisis on the German state which could only be escaped through war. The hope is for this article to make people question their understanding of the position of the working class in the history of National Socialism and thus to encourage them to read the much more developed and well-informed writings on this topic by other writers, Timothy Mason deserving particular attention.

I shall not attempt to argue that this economic crisis was the primary reason for the timing of World War Two. There is a very reasonable argument that even if war was the only escape possible for the Nation Socialist state from Germany's crisis and that much of ruling elite was aware of the scale of the crisis, Hitler's decisions were to a significant extent made fortuitously and independently of these facts. TODO: I have neither the space nor the knowledge to argue against this and neither do I believe that this undermines the importance and significance of placing the working class at the centre of our history of National Socialism.

To describe the extent to which German foreign policy was constrained by an economic crisis created by actions of the working class it is necessary to first establish the basic features and causes of this crisis. The most important of these was the colossal labour shortage that German industry was suffering as a result of rearmament. This was undoubtedly the largest constraint on rearmament, and greatly contributed to all the other aspects of the economic crisis which we shall examine. Franz Seldte, the German Minister of Labour, estimated that in 1938 there were 1 million more jobs than there were workers. In the industries essential for rearmament this problem was particularly acute. Immediately before the war the Luftwaffe claimed to be in need of 2,600 additional engineers. The Ministry of Labour disputed this and after a detailed investigation reduced the figure to 1,500 but even then the need could not be met, a mere 153 engineers had been transferred to the Luftwaffe. In the Ruhr there was a shortage of 30,000 miners, enough to cause deliveries of coal to railways to be reduced. Krauch1 reported that in August 1939 there was a shortage of 13,000 construction workers in the chemical industry alone, revised upwards to 40,000 by November and this had a severe limiting affect on the German government's autarky policy. In August 1939 the Postal Minister stated that the telephone system, the vitality of which in war is obvious, was no longer fully functioning as a direct result of the labour shortage. Despite the Nazi state's reliance on police terror for its survival Hitler went as far as suggesting that 70,000 police officers be temporarily transferred to industry.

Agriculture was particularly hard hit, 250,000 labourers was the deficit by April 1938. The Nazi state was unable or unwilling to raise food prices (a point we shall return to later) meaning that farmers were unable to offer the rapidly raising wages that industry was forced to offer in order to obtain an adequate supply of labour. As a result of this in 1939 the Nazi state tried to reintroduce and reinforce the restrictions on agricultural labourers changing jobs2, but like the earlier attempts this was a complete failure; agricultural labourers ignored both the law and the constant propaganda stressing their place as part of the German Volk to move to the cities for the significantly higher pay on offer.

Despite the continued advances in agricultural farming and good weather agricultural production fell in 1938, and the 1939 harvest was only saved by the use of several divisions of German soldiers. The use of plundered Polish labourers was all that saved German agriculture from complete collapse in 1940.

The working class used this increase in their market value to force wage levels back up to 1929 levels and even beyond. Between December 1935 and June 1939 the average hourly wage in industry rose by 10 per cent, and at an increasing rate. The average weekly salary increased even more sharply, rising by 17.4 per cent in this time period, due primarily to an increase in working hours.3 These rises were even larger in the industries connected with rearmament. Total private expenditure was actually higher in 1939 than in 1929, RM 66 billion opposed to RM 22 billion and this in the context of a reduction in living costs by around 10 per cent during that time. The population had increased by 5 million so this does not demonstrate that the working class were doing better economically in 1929. It does though show that, contrary to the normal assumption, the working class had returned to the same kind of economic condition as in 1929.4

This increase in wages had severe implications for both Germany's foreign currency reserves and her supply of the raw materials necessary for rearmament. Clothing made up 30 per cent of all imported industrial goods in 1938. The value of imported food5 was RM 2.39 billion in 1938, 39.5 per cent of total imports. Not until war began was the government able to redirect significant amounts of the foreign reserve expended on consumer goods to the raw materials whose shortage was causing numerous bottlenecks in the rearmament program.

The consumer industries did not merely compete for foreign reserves, they also took the manpower whose shortage we have already demonstrated. Higher inflation was also a consequence of the continuing inability of the Nazi state to reduce the proportion of national income spent on consumer goods by anything like the levels needed to allow for their strategic aims. High inflation then fed back into the system increasing again the inflationary pressures; the increase in prices of raw materials and labour reduced the competitiveness of German exports restricting the availability of foreign exchange.

Inflation also reduced the purchasing power of state, whose expenditure account for 50% of the German gross national product. The response of the German state to this was not to take the necessary measures to regain control of the economy. Instead credit was constantly expanded; the national debt tripled between 1933 and 1938. The 4 year plan represents a conscious decision to allow inflation to destroy the German currency, deferring the costs of rearmament to either the German people at some stage in the future or else to wealth obtained through plunder. The preferred option is not in doubt, Hitler himself expressed this explicitly in 1942:

“Since we brought back compulsory military service our armaments have swallowed huge deficit expenditures. Now there are just two ways: either this debt will be passed on in the course of time to the German people of the Reich, or it will be paid out of the potential profits from the conquered eastern regions. The last solution is obviously the right one”6.

From 1938 onwards many payments to armament companies were made in tax vouchers which again contributed to the need to either pursue wars of plunder or force the burden upon the German working class.

These four areas of crisis: financial policy, foreign trade, agriculture and the labour market combined to create a generalised economic crisis. The highest echelons of the Nazi Party were fully aware of the severity of the crisis, Göring remarked in 1938 to the Reich Defence Council, “Gentlemen, the financial situation looks very critical”.

The lack of real long term planning and the constant stress on immediate material results also contributed to the crisis. For example munitions production was severely constrained by a shortage in machine tools which had been created by the stress on the munitions production. In 1939 several major arms firms began to refuse orders from the government as labour and material shortages made them unable to begin to fulfil their current orders, let alone contemplate expanding production.

In the same period there was a gradual realisation that neither ideological propaganda nor police terror had created obedience among the working class. Even severe punishment of 'layabouts' and the presence of the Gestapo in factories did little to reverse the decline in productivity that occurred during the late 1930's . Their organisations might have been obliterated but the working class was no more willing to endure material hardship for the sake of the Nazi Party in 1938 than they were in 1933. As a response to this there was a deliberate 'kid glove' policy towards the working class where Hitler and the rest of the government refused to enact any measures that would hurt the working class.

The Labour Front enacted many concessions, the reinstatement of pay for national holidays in 1937 for instance. There were no tax increases before 19397, and the few measures that were put into place such as the introduction of coupons for food rationing and forced labour conscription8 were used extremely sparingly. Despite the clear economic need to restrict consumer industry and redirect its expenditure and manpower towards rearmament this was not even attempted; Göring stated to the Generals in 1938 that it simply not politically possible to shrink the size of the consumer sector.

The attempts that were made failed. In 1938 there was wage restrictions were finally enacted but average weekly and hourly wages rose more sharply in the the next year than in the preceding 12 months. Propaganda, punishment and bribes failed to stem the fall in productivity, the chorus of complaints from industry leaders about skiving off, a lack of punctuality, absenteeism, etc. grew louder in 1938 and 1939.

This crisis must be related back to the goals of National Socialism. They, and Blitzkrieg itself, required complete subordination of domestic needs to the demands of foreign policy. The Wehrmacht was to be free to pursue Hitler's foreign policy goals without constraints imposed from within. This was not the case though. The only successful part of Nazi attempts to transform the domestic population into an obedient servant to planned military attacks was the destruction and continued persecution of any left-wing resistance. Propaganda and economic bribes failed to generate enthusiasm for war or the regime itself among the masses. This made it impossible to put into place the measures necessary for the creation of a stable war economy and continued rearmament. Major-General Thomas and Darrê demanded that the state's priorities be stuck to and the necessary sacrifices forced upon the working class.

The Nazi party did not feel able to enact any real measures until war arrived. Without war as justification it was impotent in the face of working class action and fear of its expansion into political resistance. Many measures which had been postponed for years were bundled together into the War Economy Decree which aimed to finally bring the economy under control. Among it's measures were the long planned reduction in wages, between 10% and 35% depending on occupation and a host of other measures:

Greater control over prices

Reduction in the ability of workers to change jobs

Penal power for the Trustees of Labour to allow them to punish those accused of sloth without needing to go through the bureaucracy of the courts

A wartime income tax with a threshold low enough to affect 40% of industrial workers

The lapsing of holidays

Removal of various protections for workers

Other planned sections of the War Economy Decree were scrapped before it was enacted, Hitler personally had the plans to rationalise German industry, which still had a significant part of its production based in very small and inefficient firms, removed from the document.

Only war made these measures possible, in a complete reversal of doctrine war became necessary for rearmament rather than rearmament being performed to allow the prosecution of war. If these measures had been put into place in 1936 then by 1939 the German army would have had unquestionable superiority on the European continent. In reality the Wehrmacht did not have the even possess adequate fuel or munitions for an invasion of France until the Spring of 1940.

The lack of aggressive pursuit of rearmament at the expense of the material conditions of the German working class was blamed on timidity by some Generals but the response of the working class to the War Economy Decree demonstrated that it wasn't simply a lack of political will: the working class was simply unwilling to accept such sacrifices for a regime it didn't support. Rather than accepting that war meant these measures were necessary there was a wave of resistance. Indiscipline, absenteeism and even actions described by one official as 'bearing the mark of sabotage'. As a result the entire decree was hastily dismantled.

By the end of 1939 all but two measures had been removed. The two remaining were softened, the wartime income tax was reduced to make overtime more appealing and overtime supplements for all but the ninth and tenth hour were reinstated. Even these were finally put back into place in September 1940.

Hitler's statements became increasing more concerned with morale and the home front. He ordered massive fortresses built in Berlin, telling Speer that “It is not out of the question that I shall some day be forced to take unpopular measures. These might possibly lead to riots.” The economic problems and the necessity of war for their solution was stated explicitly by Hitler in May 1939.

“The ideological problems have been solved by the mass of 80,000,000 people. The economic problems must also be solved. To create the economic conditions necessary for this is a task no German can disregard. The solution to the problems demands courage. We must not allow the principle to prevail that one can accommodate oneself to the circumstances and thus shirk the solution of problems. The circumstance must rather be adapted to suit the demands. This not possible without breaking into other countries or attacking other people's property.”

This necessary retreat made it impossible to meet the demands of the Wehrmacht. Funk, who had the task of explaining these retreats to the Wehrmacht remarked that “to live through this mess one has to be either mad or drunk: I prefer the latter”. Nazi fear of low moral within the armed forces meant that they gave extremely high allowances to the families of soldiers. This led to a mass desertion of the wives of soldiers from their work, and as female industrial workers were concentrated in the unskilled sections of the armament industries vital areas like munitions were hit. The numbers were huge; over 450,000 women left the workforce between September 1939 and March 1940. The government was forced to consider the extremely unpopular move of conscripting those women back to industry, and was only saved from being forced to do so by plundering the French economy.

Without the plunder first from Poland then from France the German economy would have melted down. In supporting the economy through these acts of plunder greater need for plunder was created. From 1940 onwards the German economy was entirely dependent on plundered manpower, food, raw materials and capital. By the end of the war a massive 10 million Polish workers were working, unwilling, in Germany. A vicious circle was created where the continued existence of a war economy and even the Nazi state itself, was dependent on yet the plunder of war. War was pursued for plunder, and plunder was obtained for war.

The strategic concepts of the Third Reich completely failed, instead of Blitzkrieg being the means to fulfil long term goals it was only strategy available. The causes for the Second World War (in the sense of long term historical development) the desired racist and anti-Communist expansion East and the imperialism of German industry are not under question here. We are concerned with the results of these motivations, and the role of the resolution of internal problems in the list of causes for war beginning in 1939 and the subsequent course of the Second World War.

War of plunder followed its own inexorable logic, it fuelled the expansionism of the Nazi regime yet also constrained in diplomatically. Slowly all purpose removed itself from Nazi actions and planning. Policies were pursued which made long term survival of the Third Reich impossible, its fundamental irrationality results in its own destruction, as well as that of much of Europe, all in pursuit of ever more illusory goals. The victories in the first half of the war create the false impression that the actions of the Nazi party in 1939 followed a carefully ordained plan, in reality they were the chaotic outcome of a self-destructive system, an economic crisis forced on the regime by the refusal of the working class to sacrifice themselves for the state and diplomatic miscalculations.

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