Thesis, antithesis, synthesis

That's entirely self-contradictory. 1) You like Hegelian dialectics when applied by Marx as described in that passage, which is essentially once all the difficult words have been taken out; 2) you want to 'terminate [Hegel's] influence amongst Marxists - in line with Marx's own trajectory.' You like dialectics, but you don't like dialectics

Your epic project of crushing Hegel under the iron heel of your website would be greatly informed and would considerably benefit from a greater familiarity with that which you seek to crush - and considering the numnber of references you've made to language and logic in this thread, I'd imagine some sort of familiraity with Hegel's won views on language wouldn't go amiss. You also need to familiarise yourself with the distinctions between Hegel's dialectic and Marx's (at times you view them as identical, implying that Marx needs to be cured of this infection - at others you describe Marx as having purged himself already), or at least make that far clearer - and you certainly need to spend some time looking at the extent to which the Hegelian Marxist tradition, after Engels' daft dialectics of nature, ends up crashing into the vrick wall of diamat. If you were to compare that with what Hegel actually says you may perhaps want to think about crushing diamat under your website's iron heel, rather than Hegel, with a view towards cleraring away some of the stupid crap that Hegel'd been (incorrectly) associated with.

Hegelism is like a mental disease--you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you have got it.

Firstly the site is trying to grapple with why socialist governments based on Marxism have not succeeded. I think a more useful and fruitful starting point would have been to undertake a critique of Leninist organisational methods.

Einstein said that even one experiment that was counter to his theory would prove him wrong, so it should not take thousands of words to counter Engels--just a few examples, or even one good one. [Rosa Lichtenstein] contends that Engels is wrong in arguing that all change requires "the addition or subtraction of energy or motion". Rather than denounce that claim, it would be a simple matter to provide some examples of change that do not require addition or subtraction of energy or motion.

The site mentions that dialectical materialism somehow supports the concrete and ignores the abstract. To me this is the opposite of dialectical thinking--i.e. seeing only one side of a contradiction rather than both concrete and abstract, theory and practice, general and particular, etc. So it may be that the site is attacking a straw man.

I notice that the anti-dialectics site takes issue with the catastrophic view of palaeontology. It was the fashion for many years in palaeontology to believe that change happened gradually rather than in qualitative leaps. This belief was overturned when it was recognized that the impact of an asteroid near Yucatan about 65 million years ago undoubtedly led to global cooling and the sudden demise of the dinosaurs. The anti-dialectics site is still arguing that the extinction of the dinosaurs occurred over tens of thousands of years and was not a relatively sudden event. I think this is counter to all the scientific evidence.

The site claims that gravity is not dialectical, however:

Gravity is always experienced as the attraction between two objects and there are always countervailing forces--the molten core of the earth resists further collapse by gravity, the nuclear furnace at the core of the sun resists collapse, the motion of the moon keeps it from falling to earth, etc. Each of the four fundamental forces--weak and strong nuclear forces, electromagnetic, and gravity--act through the exchange of particles--photons in the case of electromagnetic forces, and gravitons in the case of gravity. So all of that seems pretty dialectic. The tricky part is that gravity distorts space and time, which gets into black holes and the general theory of relativity. I love thinking about all that, but I do not pretend to fully understand it.

But not having a complete understanding of something is not the same as agreeing that it is not dialectical. I don't see any reason to draw that conclusion.

an attempt to find the law governing phenomena: an attempt to get at the inner workings behind apparently contingent appearances (you'll note the mass of references to appearance [erschient] in Capital). For Hegel this is an attempt to uncover the workings of the Concept, thus identifying the rational law implicit within phenomenal reality. For Marx this is an attempt to get at the inner workings and concept of capital, so as to understand the seemingly random movement of phenomena on the 'surface' of capitalist society (a metaphor that Marx often uses).

Understanding the inner workings behind appearances allows an understanding of change. This is slightly different to Hegel; Hegel declares that philosophy cannot predict, but can only concern itself with what exists or what has happened. He talks about the inner necessity of history's unfolding as it has happened as far as the point at which he is writing, but is careful not to make any further predictions. Marx, on the other hand, misses or rejects this aspect of Hegel. he wants to understand the inner workings of society (note society, not reality itself - that's Engels' concern) so that he can understand the way in which it will change and develop in the future, or at least so that he can understand and give adequate voice to the potential for change that has emerged. Both, however, are concerned with the development of sequential stages.

As above, with added emphasis on the effectively unconscious movement of history (see Hegel's cunning of reason)

For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it.

Again, Marx departs from Hegel, or at least thinks he does. Marx constantly characterises Hegel as being concerned only with pure thought,, and in distinction from this declares that thought arises from material conditions. Hegel, however, states that both human thought and material reality derive from the inner rational nature of existence (the Idea), and indeed states explicitly that consciousness arises from experience. See Marx's account of species being in the Paris manuscripts and compare that to th account of subjectivity and will given at the beginning of the Philosophy of Right.

Again, Marx's 'inversion' of the Hegelian dialectic: thinking Hegel to be purely concerned with the interaction and contradiction between concepts, Marx is concerned with the interaction of the material. Their interaction and development are to studied, leading to a conception of the true nature of the object under enquiry. See the text 'on the method of political economy' in the Grundrisse.

Marx then goes on to slag off people like yourself, who view Hegel as a 'dead dog', talks about his own dialectic and then praises the merits of (his version of) dialectics.

Well, I'm not expert in dialectics (far from it), but I did find this quote where Marx himself underlines what he sees as the correctness of part of Hegel's method.

Seems fairly unequivocal that Marx, at that point at least, saw something of value in Hegel.

I'm unsure what you aim to achieve through playground name calling.

Read essay seven could not see an example of a change which does not require "the addition or subtraction of energy or motion".

Nevertheless, Engels's 'First Law' is at best only partially true; as we shall see, many processes in nature 'disobey' it, so it cannot be a law (in any sense of that word). Even where it seems to work, it does so only because Engels left several key terms totally undefined -- in which state they remain to this day.

Engels's 'First Law' is supposed to work discontinuously (i.e., "nodally"), allowing nature and society to develop by making "leaps" (a term all DM-fans like to use, but, as we are about to see, they clearly do not look before they appeal to 'leaps'). This is how Plekhanov explained things:

"[I]t will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…." [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163.]

However, many things in nature change qualitatively without going through a DM-inspired "nodal point" -- or even so much as a tiny "leap". [Engels (1976), p.160.]

These include the following: melting or solidifying plastic, metal, rock, sulphur, tar, toffee, sugar, chocolate, wax, butter, cheese, and glass. As these are heated or cooled, they gradually change (from liquid to solid, or the reverse). There isn't even a nodal point with respect to balding heads! In fact, it is difficult to think of many phase transformations (from solid to liquid (or vice versa)) that exhibit just such "nodal points" -- and these include the transition from ice to water (and arguably also the condensation of steam). Even the albumen of fried or boiled eggs changes slowly (but non-nodally) from clear to opaque white while they are being cooked.1

Naturally, all this depends on how the duration of a "nodal" point is defined; unfortunately DM-fans have to this day failed to define it (nor have they even so much as mentioned it -- indeed, in discussions on the Internet, this objection wrong foots most DM-acolytes, so they either ignore it, or call it "pedantic"). Because of this, dialecticians can safely indulge in some sloppy, off-the-cuff, a priori Super-Science here (as they all seem to do -- nary a one fails to come up with their own favourite/idiosyncratic example, tested, of course, only in the laboratory of the mind, and studiously un-peer reviewed; remember this is Mickey Mouse Science!).....

The difficulties the 'First Law' faces do not stop there. For example, when heated, objects change in quality from cold to warm and then to hot, with no nodal point separating these particular qualitative stages. The same happens in reverse when they cool. Moving bodies similarly speed up from slow to fast (and vice versa) without nodal punctuation marks affecting the transition. In like manner, the change from one colour to the next in the normal colour spectrum is continuous, with no nodal points evident at all -- and this is also the case with the colour changes that bodies experience when they are heated to red or white heat. Sounds, too, change smoothly from soft to loud, and back, in a node-free environment. In fact, with respect to wave-governed phenomena in general, change seems to be continuous rather than discrete, which means that since the majority of particles/objects in nature move in such a manner, most things in reality seem to disobey this aspect of Engels's unimpressive 'Law' -- at least at the macroscopic level.

To be sure, some wave-like changes are said to occur discontinuously, but this is not the result of continuous background changes. For example, quantum phenomena are notoriously discontinuous, but such changes are not normally preceded by continual quantitative increases. They occur suddenly.

Several more comments on the application of this 'Law' to microscopic and/or quantum phenomena will be considered in detail here at a later date.

In that case, at best, the 'nodal' aspect of this 'Law' is either only partially true (of certain phenomena), or it fails to be true (of others).

Unfortunately for DM-apologists, if we now mischievously apply this non-nodal aspect of the 'First Law' to Capitalism (as dialecticians themselves do, but only with respect to the liquid/gas phase change, in a bid to illustrate by analogy the revolutionary transformation from one Mode of Production to another, as quantity allegedly builds into quality, at some point initiating a sudden revolutionary 'leap' into a new form of society), then since Capitalism is clearly not a liquid, but a solid of sorts, the transition to socialism should, on this analogy, go rather smoothly (as is the case with phase changes experienced by most solids).

Interpreted that way, it looks as if the 'First Law' is of little use to revolutionaries since it clearly suggests that they are not needed, and that Capitalism can be reformed away non-discontinuously -- a bit like the way metal, say, can slowly melt, or in the way that heads can slowly turn bald as they lose hair. But, if dialectical revolutionaries are not needed, their antiquated theory won't be either.

In that case, this aspect of dialectics seems to be responsible for issuing its own auto-redundancy notice.2

This 'Law' is in difficulties in other respects, too. Clearly not every change in quantity "passes over" into a change in quality. But, one way of reading the "vice versa" codicil attached to this law suggests that they should:

"The first law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63.]

If this is so, then we should expect all changes in quantity to "pass over" into changes in quality (or there would seem to be no point to the vice versa codicil).

However, I have not been able to find a single DM-theorist who interprets this 'Law' in this way, so perhaps I am the only one who has ever noticed this loop-hole (but it's more like a Grand Canyon) in this 'Law'. But, even if this were not so, it would still be difficult to explain why only some changes in quantity "pass over" into changes in quality. One will look in vain for any attempt to address this problem in the highly clichéd and repetitive writings of DM-fans (where quantity definitely does not morph into quality) -- or even for a vague recognition that such a difficulty exists.

As we devote more thought to this 'Law' problems mount up: for example, the same number of molecules at the same energy level can exhibit widely differing properties/qualities depending on circumstances. Think of how the same amount of water can act as a lubricant, or have the opposite effect, say, on wet clothes; the same amount of sand can help some things slide, but prevent others from doing so; the same amount of poison given over a short space of time will kill, but given over a longer period it could benefit the recipient -- Strychnine comes to mind here. To be sure, the effects of quantitative stasis of this sort (supervenient on qualitative change) are sensitive both to temporal constraints and to levels of concentration (of the substance in question); but this extremely vague 'First Law' said nothing of these. Try as one might, it is not easy to see how these eminently material aspects of nature can be accommodated to the Ideal dialectical universe Engels inherited from Hegel.
But, what sort of scientific 'Law' leaves details like this out? In fact, if a Mickey Mouse 'Law' like this were to appear in any of the genuine sciences, it would be treated with derision -- even if it had been aired in an undergraduate paper.

However, other recalcitrant examples rapidly spring to mind: if the same colour is stared at for several minutes it can undergo a qualitative change into another colour (several optical illusions are based on this fact). Something similar can happen with regard to many two-dimensional patterns and shapes (for example the Necker Cube and other optical illusions); these undergo considerable qualitative change when no obvious quantitative differences are involved. There thus seem to be numerous examples where quantity and quality do not appear to be connected in the way that DM-theorists suppose.3

In fact, there are so many exceptions to this 'Law' that it would be wise to demote it and consign it to a more appropriate category, perhaps along with the trite rules of thumb that sometimes work -- a bit like "An apple a day keeps the doctor away", or even "A watched kettle never boils". Indeed, given the fact that this 'Law' has no discernible mathematical content it is rather surprising it was ever called a "law" to begin with.

Nevertheless, the situation is even worse than the above might suggest; there are countless examples where significant qualitative change can result from no obvious quantitative difference. These include the qualitative dissimilarities that exist between countless different chemicals for the same quantity of matter/energy involved. Isomeric molecules (studied in stereochemistry) are a particularly good example here, especially those that have chiral centres (i.e., centres of asymmetry). In such cases, the spatial ordering of the constituent atoms, not their quantity, affects the overall quality of the resulting molecule (something Engels said could not happen): a change in molecular orientation, not quantity, effects a change in quality.

To take one example of many: (R)-Carvone (spearmint) and (S)-Carvone (caraway); these molecules have the same number of atoms (of the same elements), and the same bond energies, but they are nonetheless qualitatively distinct because of the different spatial arrangement of the atoms involved. Change in geometry, change in quality.

This un-dialectical aspect of matter is especially true of the so-called "Enantiomers" (i.e., symmetrical molecules that are mirror images of each other). These include compounds like (R)-2-clorobutane and (S)-2-chlorobutane, and the so-called L- and D-molecules, which rotate the plane of polarised light the left (laevo) or the right (dextro)) -- such as, L- and D-Tartaric acid. What might at first appear to be small energy-neutral differences like these have profound biochemical implications; a protein with D-amino acids instead of L- will not work in living cells since all life on earth uses L-organic molecules. These compounds not only have the same number of atoms in each molecule, there are no apparent energy differences between them; even so, they have easily distinguishable physical qualities. Change in quality, identical quantity.4

Moving into Physics: if two or more forces are aligned differently, the qualitative results are invariably different (even when the overall magnitude of each force is held constant). Consider one particular example: let forces F1 and F2 be situated in parallel (but not along the same line of action), but diametrically opposed to one another. Here these two forces can exercise a turning effect on a suitably placed body. Now, arrange the same two forces in like manner so that they are still parallel, but act diametrically along the same line. In this case, as seems clear, these forces will have no turning effect on the same body. Change in quality with no change in quantity, once more. Since there are many ways to align forces (as there are with other vector quantities, like velocities and accelerations, etc.), there are countless counter-examples to this rather pathetic 'First Law' here alone.4a

Perhaps more significantly, this 'Law' takes no account of qualitative changes that result from (energetically-neutral) ordering relations in nature and society. Here, identical physical structures and processes can be ordered differently to create significant qualitative changes. One example is the different ordering principles found in music, where an alteration to a sequence of the same notes in a chord or in a melody can have a major qualitative impact on harmony, with no quantitative change anywhere apparent. So, the same seven notes (i.e., tones and semi-tones) arranged in different modes (Ionian, Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian, Mixolydian, Aolean and Locrian) sound totally different to the human ear. Of course, there are other ways of altering the quality of music in an energetically neutral environment over and above this (such as timing).

Another example along the same lines concerns the ordering principles found in language, where significant qualitative changes can result from the re-arrangement of the same parts of speech. For instance, the same number of letters jumbled up can either make sense or no sense -- as in "dialectics" and "csdileati" (which is "dialectics" scrambled up; but, which one of these two makes more sense I will leave to the reader to decide).

Perhaps more radically, the same words can mean something qualitatively new if sequenced differently, as in, say: "The cat is on the mat" and "The mat is on the cat". Or, even worse: "It is impossible to understand Marx's Capital, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic", compared with "It is impossible to understand Hegel's Logic, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Marx's Capital." Here there is considerable qualitative difference with no quantitative change at all.

[What are the odds that Engels would have tried to alter his 'First Law' to counter that awkward fact?]

There are many other examples of this phenomenon, but a few more should suffice for the purposes of this web site: a successful strike (one that is, say, planned first then actioned second) could turn into its opposite (if it is actioned first and planned second). Now even though the total energy input here would be ordered differently in each case, the overall energy budget of the system (howsoever this is characterised) need not be any different. So, the addition of no extra matter or energy here can turn successful action into disaster if the order of events is reversed. Of course, we can all imagine situations where this particular example could involve different energy budgets, but this is not necessarily or even always the case, which is all I need.

There are literally thousands of everyday examples of such qualitative differences (with no obvious associated quantitative changes involved), so many in fact that Engels's 'First Law' begins to look even more pathetic in comparison. Who for example would put food on the table then a plate on top of it? A change in the order here would constitute a qualitatively different (and more normal) act: plate first, food second. Which of us would jump out of an aeroplane first and put their parachute on second -- or cross a road first, look second? And is there a sane person on the planet who goes to the toilet first and gets out of bed second? Moreover, only an idiot would pour 500 ml of water slowly into 1000 ml of concentrated Sulphuric Acid, whereas, someone who knew what they were doing would readily do the reverse. But all of these have profound qualitative differences if performed in the wrong order (for the same energy budget).5

How could Engels have missed examples like these? Is dialectical myopia so crippling that it prevents dialecticians using their common sense?

How does this one observation confirm that? The whole of his method in this one 'law'???

There is no mention of the dialectics here, merely a confirmation of the one place in Hegel that could be made consistent with a materialist view of the world -- namely an increase in matter and energy underlies all change.

Strawman argument. I said it confirms that Marx thought there were was some value in Hegel's method, on this particular point. I didn't say it constituted either Hegel's or Marx's whole method.

If the quantity-quality thing is not part of dialectics, why are you wasting your time attacking it as if it is? Marx doesn't merely say an increase in energy or matter underlies change. He talks about "the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one" and "quantitative differences beyond a certain point pass into qualitative changes". Engels uses the same basic terminology in his Dialectics of Nature. If all this simply means that a "an increase in matter and energy underlies all change", why identify it with Hegel at all? Unless we assume that Marx is simply unaware of any philosophy or science except that of Hegel ...

I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker [Hegel], and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."

Exactly what do you think the "rational kernel" in Hegel's thought which Marx refered to is? Earlier in the same text he states "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite." Once again, he is clearly stating his method is dialectic, albeit in a different form from Hegel.

Later on he says "That crisis is once again approaching, although ... the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire."

If you want to dispute the truth of dialetics, I don't have a problem with that. The problem is that you go further and say - against all the evidence - that Marx completely disavowed the dialectic and it's quite clear (in his own mind at least) that he did not.

to make Hegel rational is to ignore him totally

With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

That's really funny

You honestly think that the sum total of Hegel's influence on Capital comes down to a few Hegel-ish words?

and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite

Now, if you want to understand that dialectical content as being so radically distinct from Hegel as to be completely unrecognisable, completely divorced from Hegel, so distinct in fact that it bears no relation to Hegel and is in way influenced by Hegel - then you're mad. Marx clearly states that he offers an 'inversion' of Hegel

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

To deny that Marx is in any way distinct from Hegel would be clearly stupid. But to deny the influence of Hegel - an influence which is clearly essential to Marx's 'method' - is utterly laughable.

...as is much of the rest of your response:

No I don't, and neither did Hegel

...and yet this is in a section of text that Marx refers to as an account of dialectics, and which immediately precedes an account of the merits of Hegel's philosophy

"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

Grundrisse means ground work. It is the basis of Capital. Sure, his ideas changed and developed, but when looking at the Grundrisse you're looking at basis of Capital. A basis that has an undeniable Hegelian influence. Deny that if you want, but it's kind of comical to do so

YOu love this one, don't you? Let's look at Marx's actual words:

Marx uses the past tense because he's talking about a particular trend, at a particular point in time, of treating Hegel as a 'dead dog' (which is precisely what you aspire to). Thinking this to be "peevish, arrogant, [and] mediocre", marx openly, i.e publicly declared himself to be a pupil of Hegel, i.e. he admitted to admiring and learning from Hegel His admiration was so great that he even used a few Hegelian phrases. Marx even says that Hegel presented an accurate account of the dialectic, albeit in an inverted form. You go from this to the assertion that this is a 'put down' of someone Marx dscribes as a 'mighty thinker.' ...and that's just bizzarre

and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him.

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

Madness.

OK. Rosa, do you think a dialectic is Hegelian just because it uses Hegelian catchphrases?

What would make a dialectic 'Marxist or 'materialist'?

...and just one more quick one: the phrase referring to 'coquetting' seems to be a pretty core base for your argument. What exactly do you think Marx means in that phrase? Do think it simply means that he used a few Hegelian words? If so, why do you think he did that? If he's spent the last few pages slagging off hegel (according to your wierd reading), why would he then 'pin his colours to the mast' as you put it by announcing that he used hegelian words?

Madness.

splendid. do keep it up everyone.

Makes no sense at all.

As such, he openly declared himself to be a pupil of that mighty thinker, and even - just to really get that point home - used a few Hegelian buzz words in the opening chapter.

Now, please do reply to my first question.

do you think a dialectic is Hegelian just because it uses Hegelian catchphrases?

As you have, apparently, completed and passed a PhD project in which you sought to eradicate the poison of Hegel from Marxism, one would assume that you are reasonably well versed in exactly what this poison is. This is not a test - I'm not trying to catch you out - I just want to understand what it is that you dislike in Hegel, and what it is you think Marx to be doing instead. What exactly is "historical materialism minus the Hegel"? What does that mean?

Rosa, do you reject the dialectic per se or simply Hegel's version? And are you arguing Marx rejected all dialectics too?

I personally reject every single confused idea Hegel invented, and all of 'materialist dialectics', all of 'dialectical materialism', and all of 'systematic dialectics' (i.e., academic Hegelianism) -- root and branch, 100%.

Quite; what is correct in Hegel is the stuff he filched from Ferguson, Millar, Smith and Hume (and probably from Vico and Herder, too).

Marx was happy to return to that rational form of historical materialism, and to develop it, hence he needed nothing at all from Hegel.

Same with me.

I reject all of traditional philosophy as ruling-class clap trap.

see this part just shows what an utter cretin you are. Do you think philosophers just invent ideas, that they aren't adaptions, reworkings of previous ideas, problems etc?