Is there any point today in criticizing Marxism? Is there any point in making of a question that is practical, only too practical, namely what to do about the present rush of mankind towards disintegration, a theoretical question? And not only a theoretical question, but also a very narrow one, centered on pedantic queries about dialectical materialism, the exact character of the passage from the reign of necessity into the reign of freedom, and so on?

Would not our time be better spent in thinking of the real question, the question of today, in the real terms of today? Should we not rather accept once and for all the hard core of Marxism, the resounding call for a new society, the formidable realism, together with Marx's own rejection of "Marxism", and, by a relentless application of the "arms of criticism", restate in terms of the present world the question of social transformation—changing theories when theories fail, inventing new tactics where the old are proved useless; and, by so doing, do what probably Marx himself would do, if he were alive?

Every one of these interrogations implies problems far more complex than would appear at first sight. Generally speaking, however, the invitation not to criticize Marxism could be eagerly accepted, on one condition: that, for the sake of the common cause, not only criticism of Marxism be suspended, as not essential, but also the acceptance of Marxist notions. This is not a question of give and take, but one of method.

For the sake of the socialist ideal we can indeed agree
to start our examination from some primary fact, and not from the question of the greater or lesser validity of Marxist theories. But in order to make the examination as fruitful as possible, we have also to make sure that in the course of it we will not suddenly be confronted with the objection that one or the other of our assertions is at odds with socialism because it is not in agreement with the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or of the class struggle, or of any other of the seemingly well established notions expounded by Marx, and which very often are identified with the idea of socialism even by people who do not wish to call themselves Marxists.

In other words, there would be no real sense in agreeing not to raise certain questions, considered secondary in respect to a central one, if those questions, with all their implications, are then not actually suspended. And there is no point in saying that the question of Marxism is not the essential one if the theoretical validity of Marxism is not actually assumed to be inessential.

All this amounts to saying that it is impossible to avoid theoretical questions under pretext that the real question is a practical one. Because the question about practice is itself a theoretical question, and as such it involves all the questions of theory that can be relevant to it. Or else, more simply, one could say that no examination is genuine which presupposes in any way that some unquestionable truth has already been established once and for all about the subject examined.

There seems to be no escape from this, except by stating bluntly that a certain theory is indeed inescapably true. But if we admit, as we must, that a theory is by definition something that is not self-evident, then to question the validity of the theory appears not only legitimate but also preliminary to any serious examination of the problems which the theory claims to settle. And to the extent to which Marxism claims to state and solve correctly the problems of modern society, it is impossible not to question Marxism whenever questions about the social situation of man are asked in earnest, and the impulse appears to go back to some primary and self-evident truth, regardless of what happens to theories.

If from the level of logical argument we step down to that of current events, what we notice is certainly not the irrelevance of the question of Marxism today. The problem of socialism, or simply of a state of social affairs better than the present one, seems to be irretrievably tied up, in the minds of most people, with that of the truth or falsehood of the Marxist theory.

Today, those who think that socialism is dead, and that the only possible attitude is one of resignation to the worst (or to the lesser evil) imply that it is so because Marxism has failed. On the other hand the majority of those who believe that, in the Dark Age that has fallen upon us, socialism is still the only hope, think so because they are convinced that nothing of what has happened has really shaken the Cyclopean foundations of Marxism.

On the level on which the question is more often discussed today, those who think that, for better or worse, Socialism equals Stalin and its State, base their judgment on a Marxist pattern of interpretation. Some of them might think that because the fate of the socialist ideal has come to be identified with Stalin and his awesome machin-
The question of Marxism is indeed a real one. It consequently appears that the radical rejection or the wholehearted and definite acceptance of what is essential in the structure of the Marxist ideology is a very important intellectual step to take, today.

Marxism could be (and has been) criticized as having failed on various grounds. This immediately raises the question whether an idea is proved wrong when it is shown that it has not succeeded in forcing reality to satisfy its claims. The assumption is most general among Marxists themselves that ideas that fail are indeed wrong and valueless. But then, both the Marxists and those who criticize Marxism on grounds of failure, are confronted with the paradoxical situation of not being able to know whether the failure is a real one. This difficulty is even greater for those who assimilate Marxism to some kind of pragmatism. Be their ground the theory of crises, the proletarianization of the middleclasses, or some "miscalculation" (psychological, sociological or other) of which Marxism is supposedly guilty, it is always possible to show that, far from being general and essential, the failure is on the contrary local and temporary. That nobody can fail to see the increasingly catastrophic character of the crises caused by capitalism; that, in spite of appearances, the middle-class is indeed becoming more and more of an appendix of monopoly capital; that, if the proletariat does not, at the present moment, enjoy the historical privilege of a proper leadership, still its increasingly revolutionary impulse and function cannot seriously be denied. And so forth.

As for that most crucial, and apparently most hopeless question, the Soviet Union, wouldn't it be perfectly possible for a Marxist to grant that not only in the Stalinist era, but from the very beginning of glorious October 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution, although led by great Marxist chief-tains, never satisfied the scientific requirements of a truly Marxist revolution, certain conditions being sadly lacking? How would such an admission impair the validity of the Marxist analysis of modern society? There are devoted believers who call themselves Bolshevist while maintaining that never yet has Bolshevism had the correct historical incarnation. How much more possible it is to maintain this of Marxism which is, after all, a theory from which not only Bolsheviks, but all kinds of socialists have drawn their inspiration.

In these arguments about failure, we seem to have a first hint that, in spite of Marx' own philosophical assumptions, Marxism might after all be legitimately rejected or accepted on the basis of its own essential truth or falseness, and not on that of historical vicissitudes whose connection with ideas and theories seems to be ambiguous rather than simple and self-evident.

Marxism has also been criticized for not having solved, or having solved in the wrong way, the question of power; or, more generally, for not having developed a clear notion of freedom. What is the use of changing the label of power, it has been said, if, under the yearned-for dictatorship of the proletariat, and after, men shall continue to be the slaves both of the inscrutable and unmeasurable needs of economic reorganization (determined by technicians whose exclusive concern will be with a transcendental "whole"), and of the ruthless political power required to enforce and safeguard the new economic structure? An enforcement and a safeguarding that imply the repression not only of fiendish class enemies, but also of those objectively not less fiendish proletarians who would suffer from relapses into slothful pre-socialist habits. If socialism means the possibility for man to achieve real progress in society, and if the essential condition of social progress is freedom always to try new solutions—abandoning them, if necessary, as soon as they are proved to be either impractical or in any way inhuman, shifting and changing with a freedom at least similar to that of the experimenter in his laboratory—if this is socialism, how can there be not only socialism, but even the faintest beginnings of it, when State power is unrestricted? And State power is undoubtedly unrestricted where it is exercised in the name of a majestic, nay imperious, idea which, by its very nature, is entirely incommensurable with the needs, the desires, the actual experiences of the individual, and where the interest of the whole, and the majesty of the idea, being consistently contrasted to the whims and the shortcomings of the isolated person, do not leave him any alternative except a monstrously spontaneous "rush into servitude."

However strong such an argument might appear, it is to be noted that it can be considered final only from the point of view of those people who make of the question of power a question of principle, the one to which all others have to be subordinated. The people in question deny that the recourse to State power can have any good results whatsoever at any moment or for any reason whatsoever. But to the extent to which one refuses to make such an absolute stand, he is exposed to the well-known objection of the Marxist: that Marxism conceives of power as a means and as a temporary, although absolutely necessary, expedient; never as an end, or as a permanent basis of social organization. Marxism prescribes the use of power within the limits of clearly defined historical situations, namely the situations created by the revolutionary upsurge of the proletariat with the consequent necessity of consolidating the proletarian victory. Hence the question is not so much if power is an evil, but if, admitted that it is an evil, it can be avoided. And it seems that whenever a situation of force is created, no determined and clearminded revolutionist can in fact elude the dreadful responsibilities of power. Unorganized force is simply force without a purpose, by no means more human, or less corrupting. Now, generally speaking, the number of those who make of the question of power a question of principle is not very large. It shrinks considerably when the people who, although opposed to State power, still accept the necessity of revolutionary upsurges, civil wars, emergency measures, and other such things, are subtracted from it. The consequence is that the dictatorship of the proletariat might well be a confused notion, but the exigency from which the notion is born is by no means eliminated, and Marxism is not proved essentially wrong on this count either.

Sketchy as it is, this argument about power seems to indicate that, in order to be consistent, the acceptance or the rejection of Marxism has to be a radical one, meaning by "radical" the acceptance or the rejection not only of certain formulas, but also of all the notions that those formulas necessarily imply.

Many more are the problems raised by Marxism, or about Marxism. They involve practically all sciences, from econ-
omnics to biology, not to mention philosophy and history. Generally speaking, however, the examples here given seem to be typical enough, and sufficient to allow for one conclusion. The conclusion appears to be that nothing definite is said about Marxism as long as something definite and radical is not said about the propositions that are essential to it as a system and a method of thought, and without which Marxism loses its identity and, regardless of any other merit, becomes a series of scattered and discontinuous statements.

In other words, it seems legitimate to conclude that Marxism stands or falls with its foundations. If those foundations are proved essentially valid, then no sidewise or partial attack on the system will be conclusive, and Marxism will remain true. If, on the contrary, what is essential in the structure of Marxism appears equivocal and contradictory, then no partial acceptance, or "revision", will ever eliminate the fact that nothing will be left of Marxism as a system. However valuable Marx' own contribution to human culture and history, and however numerous the uses to which it can be put, it will remain illegitimate to adopt Marxism as a method, or as a basic doctrine.

By raising the question of the essence of Marxism as it is here raised, one is asking the most elementary question on the most elementary ground. The question is that of truth or falseness; the ground, Marxism itself, any other presupposition being excluded.

Surely, one does not take anything for granted by saying that what distinguishes Marxism from other socialist theories, is that Marxism claims to be scientific, as distinguished especially—with an opposition described as fundamental by Engels in a famous pamphlet—from the variety of socialism called "Utopian."

To state it briefly, the contention of the present essay is the following:

Whenever we examine without prejudice the scientific side of Marxism, we find that it is not based on simple and verifiable statements, but on generalizations derived essentially from a peculiar system of philosophy, the philosophy of Hegel. The only exceptions to this might be the historical section of Capital and the economic analysis. But, as far as their validity is concerned, these parts of Marx' doctrine are subject to the same reservations and the same limitations to which the science of economics itself, and historical knowledge, are subject. It is moreover questionable if from them no other conclusions except the socialist ones can be drawn.

Whenever, on the other hand, we examine the socialist side of Marxist thought—the appeal for social transformation and a better society by which Marxism is certainly inspired—what we find is by no means a "scientific" demonstration of the necessity of socialism (which supposedly distinguishes Marxian from Utopian socialism) but rather an ambiguous, ill-defined, abstruse Utopia which has no advantage over other Utopian phantasies except that of not being committed to anything definite or, one could say, of being based on a Utopian view of the world of Action, i.e., on the assimilation of the real world to an imaginary "dialectical" pattern. So far as it is possible to identify it, Marx' Utopia consists in the automatic abolition of class conflicts through the dictatorship of the proletariat. These two notions, it is here contended, are far from being clear, and their connection far from being self-evident.

Against the kind of socialism called "scientific", the contention is raised that no socialist idea or consistent line of action is conceivable if not based on the idea of justice, the very same idea at which Marx, Engels, and all their realistic disciples, including the idealistic Rosa Luxemburg, so consistently jeered.

In other words, to quote a sentence which the same Rosa Luxemburg meant as annihilating sarcasm: "We thus... return to the principle of justice, to the old hobby horse on which the reformers of the earth have rocked for ages, for lack of surer means of historic transportation. We return to that lamentable Rosinante on which the Don Quixotes of history have galloped toward the great reform of the earth, always to come home with their eyes blackened".

Against such thoughtless scoffing the present writer maintains that, as long as human reason has any relevance to human affairs, we do not need any "surer means of historic transportation" than consistent ideas consistently and uncompromisingly believed, and exposed to the test of reason and experience. That one might "always come home with one's eyes blackened", or not come home at all, will not be considered a deterrent, and not ridiculous in the least. It will be the normal price to pay for having firmly willed one thing, and for having refused to calculate what substantial crumbs one might steal from the dubious feast of history by shifting one's will according to expediency. On the other hand, it might indeed look ridiculous to come home with blackened eyes after having bluntly proclaimed that only a march to victory in a "sure means of historic transportation" is worthy of our efforts. And it might not be ridiculous, but it certainly is sinister, after having wanted to be victorious at all costs, to be left with a victory that cannot be preserved except by suppressing all the living realities in the name of which the battle was waged.

Such conclusions might or might not follow necessarily from Marxist principles. But it seems certain that they are only too natural consequences of an attitude which consists in viliifying the very motives by which one is inspired. Such an attitude has been that of men and women of conviction who believed in its superior effectiveness for the promotion of their ideals. But it can hardly be denied, on the other hand, that the attitude itself is better suited to those shrewd people who can openly, consciously, and consistently jeer at the very ideas they are supposed to hold because in fact they have no idea at all; the people who in practice, and not only in theory, consider ideas to be sheer instruments, and do not actually believe in any, but only in the profit they can get by holding one rather than the other. Namely, cheats, murderers and tyrants. By repudiating the idea of justice, nothing is gained except that the road is left wide open to what is ambiguous and deceitful, and also murderous and tyrannous, in human nature.

Against such a contradictory and equivocal attitude, the writer maintains that there is no socialism, i.e., no consistent striving for a better society, if it is not based on an experience of Justice. By Justice, the idea of Justice is meant. And the word "idea" is here taken in its most simple and most elementary sense, namely a reality that exists in human consciousness, and nowhere else.
As for the nature of what is here called an experience of Justice, it will be maintained that it is essentially complex. Its complexity can be briefly described by saying that an experience of Justice is real only insofar as it is the experience of a definite social fact, in a definite social situation; while, at the same time, the very moment that a distinction between the just and the unjust is experienced, the question is raised not only of what is just and unjust there and then, but also of Justice itself, i.e. of the idea of Justice—of Justice in the absolute. To make of Justice a relative notion, or a simple appendix, as it were, of a certain situation, means to deny and destroy the experience, and not at all to make it more concrete.

If we agree that socialism has no meaning except as the struggle for a better society, i.e. a society in which actually, and not theoretically, less violence will be done to man's body and soul: a society more just, then it would appear that socialist action consists fundamentally in the attempt to carry as far as possible as consistently as possible the content and meaning of what is here called an experience of Justice: to live through the experience. It also appears that there is no other norm of such an action than the idea of Justice on which the experience is based. Hence, an essential part of socialist action will be the elucidation and demonstration of what is actually meant by Justice. Without such demonstration, in fact, the accusation of injustice raised against any state of affairs will have no specific ground. To say it differently, the prerequisite for consistent socialist action is the clear and distinct description of the necessary characteristics and forms of the better society which is willed. If, in Marxist terms, this has to be called “Utopian” socialism, then it is here contended that there is no other form of socialism but the Utopian.

The challenge which is implied in the word Utopia will in fact be taken up to its fullest extent by stating that a socialist ideal is not firmly grounded if it does not accept at the very start the possibility of non-realization as one of its fundamental possibilities. The non-realization of a socialist ideal does not impair to any degree, it is contended, the reality either of the idea of Justice, or of the experience of the just and the unjust in the course of which the idea is revealed.

BEFORE starting the analysis of those assumptions which are generally considered to be the basic assumptions of the Marxist theory—the assumptions without which there is no Marxist theory in the proper sense of the word—two statements are necessary.

The first statement concerns the meaning given in the present essay to the terms “truth” and “falseness.” A proposition is here considered true insofar as it cannot be proved to be self-contradictory, false if it can be shown to contain some evident contradiction. On the other hand, a proposition which is proved to be ambiguous, will be considered neither true nor false, but simply unacceptable as a principle of method or as the means of basic approach to a problem.

The second statement concerns the point of view from which the analysis of the fundamental propositions of the Marxist theory will be carried out. The point of view will be that of a person who, being really interested in the questions dealt with by Marx and his disciples, wants to understand as fully as possible the meaning of the answers given by them. Nothing else is presupposed.

Finally, it must be stressed that the argument here offered concerns one specific side of Marx's doctrine, namely the consistency of its foundations. That Marx can be approached from other points of view (as an economist, as a Realpolitiker, as an historian, etc.) is fully granted in advance. To those, however, who would maintain that an analysis of the presuppositions of Marxist thought cannot be of any serious consequence, and that the ambiguity of its foundations does not really affect the validity of the theory, it must be answered that it is precisely against such a position that the present argument is directed, insofar as such a position consists in maintaining that in the field of ideas confusion and vagueness might have more value than clarity and distinctness.

The Communist Manifesto opens with the well-known sentence: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”

This proposition admits of at least two different interpretations.

The first, and most literal, interpretation would be one according to which it is possible to identify in every period of history a fact called “class struggle” consisting essentially of the antagonism between “Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed.” This fact, however, appears to be one fact among other facts, not endowed with any essential or determining character. Except for the words “oppressors and oppressed”, which imply and introduce a criterion not identical with that of the mere statement of fact, the class struggle would simply be a constant element in the development of history, and not in any sense a determining one, and even less the factor that determines all the others.

From Isaiah to Thomas Aquinas, from Thomas Aquinas to Thomas More and Rousseau, the fact that there always have been rich and poor, people who work and people who enjoy the fruits of the toil of others, has been differently evaluated, and different solutions have been offered for the problems that it raises. One might decide that it is a very important fact, worthy of special attention. One might even reach the conclusion that it is indeed the only fact worthy of attention when it comes to the problem of an orderly society. But it would be entirely arbitrary to reach such a conclusion simply on the ground that there is such a thing in history as the class struggle.

On the other hand, if one limits oneself to the admission of the class struggle as a historical fact, the scope of the first sentence of the Communist Manifesto loses all specific character, including that of being a “Marxist” statement.

There is however a second interpretation of the opening paragraph of the Manifesto which is generally admitted to be the specifically Marxist one. It is the interpretation according to which the class struggle is indeed the essential fact in history, the one on which the meaning of all the other facts depends and by which the course of human history is determined as by an unfailling law.

Rigorously speaking, such an assertion cannot be proved except on the assumption of an absolute and absolutely
exact knowledge of the whole of human history. Such an assumption presents of course no difficulty from the point of view of the particular philosophy whose specific claim is that only in historical knowledge does the Absolute reveal itself, and that any other kind of knowledge is "abstract", fragmentary, and false by definition. But, except from such a point of view (which implies a most complex philosophical argument), the very notion of absolute historical knowledge appears self-contradictory. Because no matter how many facts we know about the past, no mass of accurate information can ever eliminate the fact that it is past, namely that the essential character of the event, the character of being there in its entirety to be lived, experienced and evaluated, is irretrievably lost.

In any case, there seems to be something about history which prevents us from speaking of historical laws in the same sense in which a physicist can legitimately speak of the laws of the physical world. An historical law seems always to imply something else than mere knowledge of facts and adherence to the facts: a personal insight into, or a philosophical decision about, the essential nature of history or of a certain historical period. If this is granted, then it follows that a historical law can have either more or less certainty than, let us say, a natural law, but never the same amount of certainty, or, more precisely, a certainty of the same kind.

Even if we grant that the initial statement of the Communist Manifesto is made on the basis of a reasonably adequate amount of historical knowledge (whatever this might mean), we would still have the problem that the statement itself (at least in the accepted Marxist interpretation of it) is not so much a statement about historical facts as about the essential factor in history or of a certain historical period. If this is granted, then it follows that a historical law can have either more or less certainty than, let us say, a natural law, but never the same amount of certainty, or, more precisely, a certainty of the same kind.

Very simply stated, the question is this: what shall be our approach to history once we accept the notion of the class struggle? Shall we, when examining historical events, look for all the facts that can possibly be classified under the concept "class struggle", assuming in advance that they are the fundamental facts, the facts that contain whatever truth might be verified about the period considered? Or shall we instead wait for the facts themselves to reveal to us the existence or inexistence, importance or unimportance, characteristics and specific role (if any) of the fact "class struggle"? In other words: are the existence and role of the class struggle in history proved once and for all, or should they be redemonstrated and revaluated all over again every time we proceed to a historical analysis?

This question is left unanswered by Marx. To the extent to which it is answered, it is certainly not answered in the second sense, which also seems to be, properly speaking, the empirical sense, i.e., among other things the sense in which the question remains a question of history that can be answered without abandoning the grounds of historical inquiry. What Marx accomplishes without saying it, is precisely a transition from the level of historical knowledge, where answers are always subject to questioning, to that of a "historical action", where they are assumed to have been obtained once and for all.

One must now ask: can a statement about history be proved on any other grounds but the grounds of history? And if the important statement of Marxian theory here considered cannot be proved on the grounds of history, what is its meaning? And is there any meaning at all, in it?

If we go back to the assertion "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles", and ask on what grounds it can be made, there seems to be one ground on which it can indeed be made without becoming meaningless. This ground is the ground of the decision to make of the question of the class struggle the fundamental question not so much of history as of life. Although undemonstrable in historical terms, such a decision is perfectly legitimate insofar as it eventually appears to be purely and simply a free choice.

A free choice, however, does not mean an arbitrary one. The motive of the Marxian decision to make of the class struggle the most important and central fact is made evident in the second paragraph of the Manifesto where, to the list of definite historical class contrasts, the phrase is suddenly added: "in one word, oppressor and oppressed."

Here, what is in question is not at all an historical distinction, but a moral qualification, and a choice. The choice is the primary, and absolutely free one, to side with the oppressed against the oppressors. And what can motivate such a choice except a vigorous, uncompromising, and thoroughly decided, sense of Justice? A sense of Justice, it may be added, whose legitimacy is proved not by any number of facts by which it would supposedly be rendered necessary, but, primarily and essentially, by its being there, not as an added and vague halo caused by a none-too-clear ferment of facts, but as an elementary, very firm, and original reality: the reality of the idea of Justice.

It seems that the firmness of such a reality can be denied only by making of it a kind of unsubstantial and sentimental echo of historical facts, i.e. by denying its intellectual nature. This is precisely what happens when the question of Justice, instead of being explicitly raised, is left vague. Because the question of Justice is not raised, the distinction between "oppressors" and "oppressed" made in the second paragraph of the Communist Manifesto remains a merely sentimental and arbitrary qualification, and the question why one should side with the oppressed against the oppressors, although implicitly raised, is not answered.

Within the limits of the present argument, it seems that insofar as the initial statements of the Communist Manifesto are considered to have a scientific character, 1) such a character is actually there only in a general and unqualified sense; 2) insofar as it is present, it does not necessarily lead to any conclusion that can specifically be called "socialist." While, to the extent to which the presence of a socialist content in those statements cannot be denied, such a content does not rest on any particularly scientific basis, but can be made clear only by assuming a deliberate choice to take the side of justice against injustice, i.e. the presence of an idea of Justice. It also seems clear, from the example given that, while Justice cannot be demonstrated in terms of historical necessity, the reality of such an idea asserts itself as self-evident as soon as the question of a specific human attitude toward the facts themselves is raised—that is to say, as soon as the facts themselves, instead of being taken for granted and, so to speak, put to sleep, are seen as subject to questioning by human consciousness.
IT is well-known that Marx and Engels did not derive the notion of the absolute importance of the class struggle in history from an idea of Justice, but exclusively from what they called the "materialistic conception of history."

This conception is boldly summarized in the famous assertion: "It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but on the contrary it is their social existence which determines their consciousness."

The question can immediately be raised in terms of what definite facts can a statement like this ever be proved right. That it has the character of a scientific statement is, in any case, highly debatable. The very presence of the term "consciousness" seems to raise a basic problem. In order to admit that this basic problem has been given a definite and unequivocal solution, a solution that can to any degree be called "scientific", we have to assume that the term "consciousness" is here meant in a very limited and specific sense. It should moreover be proved that such a specific and limited sense is the only possible one in which the word "consciousness" can intelligibly be used. But as far as one can see, no definition, and no demonstration, of what they mean by "consciousness" has ever been given by Marx and Engels. It is only very likely that they took for granted, generally speaking, the meaning given to "consciousness" in the context of Hegelian philosophy. In which case, before accepting the correctness of what the two great socialists say about consciousness in relation to existence, we should have to admit the absolute correctness of the Hegelian definition.

Much the same question can be asked as to the meaning of the word "existence." It may be noticed that, in the quotation given above, what is meant by "existence" is entirely relative to the meaning attributed to "consciousness." In fact, it looks very much as if, in this most famous of all Marxist general statements, what is meant by consciousness were actually "reality minus real existence"; while the actual meaning given to "existence" would be something like "reality minus unreal consciousness." A rather obvious tautology, and one that implies a definite prejudice against consciousness. It is true that in the Marxist notion of "reality" a certain reality of consciousness is also implied. What kind of a reality, is however not quite clear.

So far as the present writer knows, the clearest general statement of the "materialistic conception of history" is contained in a celebrated passage of the German Ideology.

The passage begins with the assertion: "The premises from which we start are not arbitrary, they are not dogmas; they are real premises, from which abstraction can be made only in imagination. They are the real individuals, their action and their material conditions of life. . . . These premises can therefore be verified in a purely empirical way."

If this were so, then the approach deriving from such premises would actually be a scientific one. The only question would be, in order to avoid dogmas, not to give a dogmatic definition of what is a real individual. Otherwise, a "verification in a purely empirical way" becomes impossible. Such is not the course chosen by Marx and Engels.

The passage continues: "Men may be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, or anything else. They begin to differentiate themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence."

Here, without any logical transition, a very dogmatic statement is made, not only, one might say, about "real individuals", but in their very name. With remarkable brusqueness, those "real premises", men, are deprived of any right to be heard, and reduced with one single stroke to the status of very peculiar premises indeed. Premises, one might add, that, after having been silenced, are immediately raised above discussion.

The irrevocable sentence here pronounced about human nature is made more specific, and more sweeping, by the authors' adding: "The mode in which men produce their means of existence depends on the first place on the nature of the means of existence themselves. . . . This mode of production . . . is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, their definite mode of life. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are therefore coincides with their production—what they produce as well as how they produce it. What individuals are therefore depends on the material conditions of their production."

A breathless sequence of assertions, and one about which it is difficult to decide whether to stress its final ambiguity or the complete impossibility of proving the steps that are so ruthlessly taken, if it be admitted that their general direction is clear.

What proposition shall in fact be taken as expressing the essence of the "materialistic conception of history?"
The one that says that "the mode of production is a definite form of activity of these individuals"—which seems obvious enough—or the one that so bluntly proclaims "What (individuals) are coincides with their production?" Or both, in spite of the fact that the second does not seem at all to follow necessarily from the first? Or maybe the conclusion: "What individuals are therefore depends on the material conditions of their production?" But this is completely ambiguous: very obvious in one sense, if the verb depends is taken in general to mean that individuals are influenced by the material conditions of their existence; very questionable and not obvious at all, if taken in another sense, which is also the generally accepted meaning of the Marxian theory, namely that individuals are absolutely determined by the mode of production, that the mode of production constitutes the essence of their life.

In any case, the transitions are far from clear. It can easily be granted that the mode of production constitutes "a definite form of expressing" individual life without granting at all that it is the essential, or determining form of life, and much less the only one. "As individuals express their life, so they are" is an acceptable, although uninteresting kind of statement. But it does not follow at all, from it, that "What (individuals) are coincides with their production."

No wonder that, after such ambiguities, for the "real individuals" of the beginning a new notion of the real individual is substituted: the "individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people's ideas, but as they really are, that is as they act and produce in a material way." A proposition that presupposes firmly established a priori the complete unreality of consciousness, and the illusory character of what the individual thinks of himself and of other individuals. Which, among other things, also reduces to pure illusion and empty make-believe all the relations which constitute what is usually called "human society". In fact, there is no reality left, but the dialectical mechanism of the productive forces. A mechanism that is, to say the least, impersonal. Any empirical verification which can be reached after such a thorough and unwarranted simplification would seem to have a rather dubious validity, at least so far as the real individuals are concerned: i.e. that mixture of reality and appearance of which the individual is admitted to consist even according to the text here discussed.

But however contradictory and ambiguous the "materialistic conception of history" might appear, it would not be legitimate to conclude that it is also senseless. There is in fact a point of view from which it can be considered meaningful. It is the decision to consider the economic structure of society as the fundamental problem of history. But the legitimacy of this decision cannot be a subject of scientific demonstration. As for its connection to the problem of socialism, it does not seem either immediately evident or necessary. It can nevertheless be granted that it was because they were looking for a way toward a better society that Marx and Engels decided to make of the economic problem the central problem of history.

If the argument here developed does not suffer from some fundamental contradiction, the conclusion is legitimate that, insofar as the "materialistic conception of history" has to be treated as a theory, and not as a vague general statement, its scientific character cannot be proved. While, on the other hand, its relation to the problem of socialism is not clear either.

If the "class struggle" can be proved on the basis of the "materialistic conception of history" rather than by having recourse to historical demonstration, the materialistic conception of history, in its turn, seems to find its only possible justification in the nature of the decision by which the economic structure of society is made to be the essential reality of history.

In the context of Marxian theory, such a decision appears to be founded on a will to change; more specifically, on a will to prove that historical change follows a definite direction. This direction is affirmed to be the direction toward socialism, i.e. toward the collective ownership of the means of production.

In the last analysis, everything, in the Marxist theory, depends on the possibility of showing without equivocation that the collective ownership of the means of production will necessarily constitute a change for the better, and also on the possibility of rendering reasonably clear in what this better will actually consist.

In Engels' words, the change from private to collective ownership of the means of production will constitute "the recognition de facto of the social character of the modern powers of production... harmonizing the mode of production, of appropriation and of exchange with the social character of the means of production." By the realization of this harmony—as everybody knows—mankind will be led from the world of necessity into the world of freedom. The instrument of this harmony is—as everybody also knows—the fact called "dictatorship of the proletariat."

It will be noticed that eventually the meaning of socialism in the Marxian theory seems to depend on the actual content, mode, and nature, of the harmony that will be realized thanks to the dictatorship of the proletariat. If there is no actual harmonizing, there is no socialism.

As for the nature of the process that will lead mankind toward socialism, everything apparently hinges on the notion of "change" or, as the Marxists say, "dialectics." If the notion of change, in the Marxian context, can be proved unequivocal, or "necessary"; if the result of such a development can be proved to lead necessarily to a real harmony, i.e. to a harmony necessarily endowed with a liberating character; if the nature of this liberating character is sufficiently clarified; if all this is unequivocally demonstrated on the basis of Marxist principles, then the Marxian theory, although not "scientific" in any ordinary sense, will be shown to be a meaningful theory, insofar as it will appear to be a call to action for a definite aim, an aim which will have been shown to be good and true on the basis of a superior insight into the nature of human development.

To prove, on the other hand, that Marxism, whatever its merits might be on the general grounds of culture, is untenable as a theory, and more especially as a theory of socialism, one must prove that the Marxian notion of dialectics is contradictory and ambiguous.

So far as the present writer knows, there are two foundations of Marxist dialectics: the first is the Hegelian notion of process (or "becoming"); the second, introduced by
Engels, Darwin’s theory of evolution considered as a scientific confirmation of Hegel’s main philosophical insight.

As to the first point, it is necessary to ask: is it legitimate, discarding the philosophical difficulties involved (or considering these difficulties settled once and forever—which amounts to the same), to take a fundamental philosophical thesis and treat it as if it were an established fact? It seems that, even if we take as final truth Hegel’s famous boast about his own philosophy: “This is the point reached by the Weltgeist in its development,” the question cannot be seriously solved by the affirmative, not even in Hegelian terms.

Moreover, even if we consider it fundamentally correct, is the Hegelian notion of “process” unequivocal? Does it allow for any definite conclusion as to what the progress of history must be, from a certain moment on? The question is a question of history of philosophy, a highly debatable one.

In a very clear exposition of Marxist theory, the essay on Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Friedrich Engels accepted the Hegelian view of history on the following basis: “(With Hegel) . . . the whole natural, historic and intellectual world . . . (was) presented as a process . . . Viewed from this standpoint, the history of mankind no longer appeared as a wild tangle of senseless deeds of violence . . . but as the process of development of mankind itself, a gradual march.”

By making such a statement, Engels obliges the reader who wants to understand what he is saying to ask a number of questions. The first question is: “Is it true that, once the Hegelian philosophy is rejected, ‘history appears as a wild tangle of senseless deeds of violence?’ Is there really no other point of view from which human history can make sense?” The second question is: “Admitted that such be the case, what about the possibility that human history is indeed ‘a wild tangle of senseless deeds of violence?’ Can such a possibility be rejected a priori?”

In fact, Engels seems simply to have started out with a definite prejudice against any view of history except one based on the idea of process.

The third question is, however, the most important: “Admitted that process be the real essence of history, what about the gradual march which appears to be its character?” Has this graduality a definite direction? If it does, then we can evaluate its course. Without such a measure, or criterion, process would in fact be just as senseless as the most senseless immobility.

But if such a measure, or criterion, is given, then the measure itself, and not process anymore, will constitute the true meaning of history. In fact, there will be no process any longer, at least in the sense of a complex and multifarious change; and history, far from consisting of development, will essentially consist of the realization of an extra-historical pattern, something like the Second Advent of Christ or, for that matter, like the Hegelian Kingdom of the Spirit.

On a higher and more complex level, this is an objection that can be, and has been, raised against the various philosophical attempts to eliminate the notion of Being by having recourse to the notion of Absolute Change. But the problem of Being versus Becoming is a purely philosophical one. Once again, the question must be asked: “Is it legitimate to consider the solution of such a problem one way or the other as an established fact?”

As for Darwin’s theory constituting the confirmation of dialectics on scientific grounds, it seems rather evident that there is no reason at all, either scientific or philosophical, to assume that what appears to be true of animals, and of man insofar as he belongs to the animal kingdom, must also be true of such specifically human facts as human history and society.

At this point, the objection could be made, in defense of Marxism, that Marx in fact never bothered to prove the truth of dialectics on philosophical grounds. What he accomplished, on the contrary, was the reduction of philosophy to “economics”, showing in detail what the laws of the particular mode of production which was his exclusive and passionate concern, namely capitalism, actually were. To object to Marxism on grounds of philosophical or logical consistency—it could be said—is not relevant at all. The only conclusive argument against Marxism would be the rigorous demonstration that the laws of capitalist production are not at all what Marx asserted them to be.

That such an objection begs the question of “economic determinism” seems fairly evident. It is, in fact, only to the extent to which it can be proved that the dialectics of production constitute the essential law of history that it can also be maintained that the crucial test of Marxism, and the only legitimate one, is the correctness of its analysis of the fact called “capitalism.” To judge Marx on the basis of the questions he himself raises does not seem either irrelevant or particularly “philosophical.” It is a question of elementary rigor, legitimate on any ground at all, and more especially on the grounds of a “scientific” theory. In fact, one could perfectly well admit the accuracy of the Marxist analysis of capitalism without in the least admitting that its validity goes beyond the field of economic facts.

What is really considered necessary by Marx is that “capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation . . . the negation of the negation.”

This is what Engels expresses by saying that “Productive powers urge with increasing vehemence the removal of the existing contradictions—they demand to be freed from their quality of capital, they urge the practical recognition of their character of social powers of production.”

This is remarkable for more than one reason. It is remarkable to see how, for example, the reality denied to what the individuals think of themselves and of others, what is usually called their “personality”, is here attributed to the dynamics of the productive machinery. This would seem to require at least some specification as to the exact role played in the event by what Marx and Engels had called the “real individuals”, the real carriers of historical destiny. That they play a role, we know; namely we know that without an organized proletariat, the necessity of the event would become dubious. And although we also know that the presence of an organized proletariat is itself a necessary dialectical fact, we might grant that what people call the “human factor” is not absent in the process. It has to be noticed, however, that if such a factor is present, it is so as an integral part of the process, undis-
tistinguishable from it, and that finally only the global process itself is real, as behooves a truly dialectical occurrence. To what extent, and in what specific sense, "real individuals" influence and control the event is not made clear.

Now this is very serious. Because at that particular moment, the moment when "the negation of the negation" takes place, a very special task has to be carried out by somebody, namely the function of "harmonizing the mode of production . . . with the social character of the means of production." It would seem as if there were an urgent need for specifying some norms for this important task to be accomplished correctly, and also some principle according to which the norms given for the "harmonization" might be pronounced to be the right ones.

To this, there is no answer. Everything here can be rightly said to go on automatically. Which is one way of saying that everything is out of control.

No answer is given either to the question in what exactly constitutes the "social" character which is supposed to be the natural and, so to speak, inborn character of modern means of production. We know that if left in the hands of the capitalists they cause terrible crises. We also know that they must be collectivized one way or another. As for the principle according to which this should be done, nothing is said. We only perceive a kind of yearning, on the part of the productive machinery, for the full realization of an unspecified and innate social character.

All this becomes as clear as any fact can be from the well-known passage in which Engels describes what is supposed to take place after the death of capitalism: "The proletariat seizes the machinery of the State and converts the means of production first into State property. But by so doing, it extinguishes itself as proletariat; by so doing it extinguishes all class distinctions and class contrasts; and along with them the State as such . . . . The State appears as the real representative of the body social . . . . The State is not abolished: IT DIES OUT."

If this does not amount to saying that, from a certain moment on, everything will actually happen automatically, free from any impediment, with the same freedom from any resisting content with which propositions can be derived from one another in a purely formal logical argument, then it does not amount to saying anything at all.

This is the Marxist Utopia. And it certainly is an Utopia in the most disparaging and most Marxist sense of the word. In fact, it is the vaguest, the most general, the least logically justified and least clear Utopia in the history of socialism. No other socialist thinker but Marx seems to have thought that the very notion on which a socialist theory depends, the notion of Socialism, should be left in the state of a general implication.

It seems, in fact, that in order to be satisfied with the Marxian notion of socialism one has to transfer the Utopian character which some people deem to be the distinguishing character of ideas and ideals, from ideas and ideals on to events. It seems that only if one agrees that certain events will have one meaning and one meaning only (and a necessary one at that), i.e. if one is ready to attribute to events a thoroughly idealistic character, and to their succession the very same character that belongs to logical deduction, only in such a case can one say that there is a definite meaning in the Marxian notion of the advent of socialism and of socialism itself.

To this, some remarks on certain definite points can be added. The first point is the "dictatorship of the proletariat".

In 1900, Charles Péguy asked a pertinent question: "I should like to know who will actually be the persons who will exercise the impersonal dictatorship of the proletariat?" It is a reasonable question, and one that does not seem to have received any answer more definite than the answer that such persons will be those resolute individuals who will succeed in winning over the "masses" by correctly interpreting their state of mind and their needs at a particular moment. One could however go further, and say that the question is not of persons so much as of principles, norms and methods. What will be the principles, norms, and methods—it could be asked—by which the dictatorial nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat will be distinguishable from dictatorship pure and simple? What will be the principles, norms and methods—not to speak of actual guarantees—on the basis of which the proletarian will be able to judge his dictators? To this question there does not seem to be any definite answer in the Marxist theory.

The second point is the crucial one of "State power." It is a generally accepted notion that for Marx State power is not an end in itself, only a means, a necessary instrument to bring about the classless society. But, it could be countered, from Tutankhamon of Egypt to Stalin of Russia, never has State power been conceived as anything but an instrument to achieve stupendous aims. Only in the minds of certain philosophers has State power been identified with some kind of eternal essence and become a divine aim. But clever theoreticians, as well as powerful rulers—Machiavelli and Hobbes as well as Friedrich II and Napoleon—never seem to have felt the necessity of going beyond the assertion that State power is indeed only an instrument for definite aims, even when they added that it was an instrument rendered necessary by the very nature of human kind. In fact, the theory of State power as an emergency power has always been the theory of despots. Despots have always maintained that, the more stupendous the aims to be achieved, the more ruthless the use of State power has to be—and also that the more ruthless the use of power, the more limited it will be to a definite time, and to the specific necessities of a certain emergency. It would seem as if, once the use of power is justified on the basis of a not otherwise specified Socialist Ideal, it becomes very difficult, for the rulers as well as for the ruled, to determine the measure, the specific character, and the duration, of the emergency by which the use of power is supposed to be justified. In other words, the question must be asked in earnest: in what does the emergency theory of power accepted by Marx differentiate itself from that of the despots, if not in this, that it is less specific, more vague, and, in the Marxist sense, thoroughly idealistic?

SHALL we then say that there is no content at all in the Marxian notion of socialism? Certainly not. Besides the fact that Marx himself certainly wanted a better society, and that there is a substantial content in this very decision, there is also the fundamental fact that nothing can be explained in the Marxist theory except by the presence of this will, of the radical decision to take the side of the
future against the present, the side of the oppressed against
the oppressors. But what can be found in Marx in the way
of explicit statements, to substantiate the notion of social­ism which is also the corner-stone of his theory?

What it seems legitimate to say, insofar as Marxist theory
is concerned, is that the notion of socialism is essentially
ambiguous. Hence it cannot be taken as a basis either of
thought or of action. Marx does not tell us why, for what
esential and clear reasons, we should side with the op­pressed against the oppressor, why socialism is certainly
better than capitalism. Neither does Marx tell us what
socialism is.

Is the question as to why in fact the proletarian should
not only suffer from capitalism, and be recalcitrant to its
rule, but also revolt, and go on revolting until victorious,
answered in any clear way when Marx speaks of “indigna­tion against infamy, an indignation to which the proletariat
is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human
nature and the living conditions?” Indignation might in­deed be legitimate, against capitalism, and Marx’ indigna­tion is most resounding. Indignation, however, is a passion,
not a clear idea. As for the human nature which is sup­posed to be the driving power behind the revolt, shall we
interpret it as a kind of natural law, a superhistorical fact
which would be the real determining factor in history? Marx­ist theory should then be revised, and such a notion, in
any case, made as explicit as possible.

T HESE are the reasons why it is here contended that,
regardless of any other consideration, the Marxist doc­trine cannot legitimately be considered a sound basis—and
much less the only sound basis—for socialist thought and
action.

To many people who, although unwilling to accept re­sponsibility for “orthodox” Marxism, still are unwilling
to abandon what they consider to be the most solid theor­etical support for socialist action, this may seem too sweep­ing a statement. They might claim, for example, that
Marxism does not have to rest on dialectics, but that Marx’
fundamental ideas can be restated as empirical propositions
having equal validity with any other proposition of em­pirical science. Or, more generally, they could maintain
that Marxism would still stand if it were restated in such
a way as to conform more with the facts that have become
known to us.

Generally speaking, it is of course impossible to answer
such an assertion until the proposed operation of “re-state­ment” has been actually performed. As long as this is not
done, what would become of Marxism if it were restated
in empirical terms will remain doubtful. And even more
doubtful will be the consequences of such an operation
from the point of view of political action (which, in
Marxist terms, appears also to be the decisive side of the
question). From an empirical point of view, it might, among
other things, appear, as John Dewey maintains, that
the theory of class struggle is “an exaggeration”, and “to
say that all past historic social progress has been the result
of cooperation ... is more reasonable.” In general, from
an empirical point of view, “it is within the bounds of rea­son to assert that the presence of this social factor (co­operative and experimental science) demands that the pres­ent situation be analyzed on its own terms, and not be
rigidly subsumed under fixed conceptions drawn from the
past.”

If such were to be the results of an empirical restate­ment of Marxism, then they would not be very different,
as far as the Marxian theory itself is concerned, from those
of a “metaphysical” attack.

There is however a question of principle involved in all
this, which is preliminary to any other. The question is
why should Marxism be restated at all, and not simply
abandoned, once its original theoretical foundations are
found faulty? The only valid reason would seem to be
that some new essential truth, a foundation more solid than
the one on which Marx thought it expedient to support his
claims, has been discovered in Marx. The first step of any
“restatement” should then consist in pointing out what this
new and deeper truth, this foundation firmer than any other,
actually is.

If this were not done, the whole enterprise of “resteatement” could be suspected of not being different from those
attempts to “justify” dogmas with supposedly undogmatic
reasons which are rightly considered to be the very type of
intellectual deviousness and confusion. Such would be
the case, for example, if one attempted to justify Marxism
by saying that, whatever restatement it might need, Marx­
ism has to be maintained because it constitutes the best
analysis of “capitalist society” and the best available theory
of “social changes.”

A position of this type would in fact beg the whole ques­tion. Because it is only on the basis of the most general
Marxist assumptions that the identity between “capitalist
structure” (a Marxist notion) and the structure of society
in general can appear self-evident, and that a dialectical
theory of economic development can, without further con­sideration, be assimilated to a theory of social changes in
general. If there are legitimate doubts about Marxism, they
bear precisely on such points as these.

The truth of the matter might be that, precisely because
Marx’s theoretical effort was one of the most daring ever
attempted, Marxism cannot be taken piecemeal. And Marx
himself might have to be defended against the half-hearted
Marxists of our time in much the same way that Kierke­gaard defended Hegel against the wary Hegelians of his
time: “The frivolity with which systematists concede that
Hegel has perhaps not been successful in introducing move­ment everywhere in logic, as when a huckster thinks that a
couple of oranges more or less is nothing to worry about
when the purchase is a large one—this farcical complaisance
is naturally an expression of contempt for Hegel, which not
even his most violent antagonist has permitted himself ... .
For Hegel himself, and for everyone who is sufficiently
alert intellectually to sense what it means to have willed
something great, the fact that the fundamental principle
supposed to underlie and interpenetrate the whole is not
present at this point or that, cannot be a matter of indif­ference, as when a huckster and his customer squabble over
whether there is a little under—or over-weight. ... Let ad­mirers of Hegel keep to themselves the privilege of making
him out to be a bungler; an opponent will always know
how to hold him in honor, as one who has willed some­thing great, though without having achieved it.”

* * *

It is not in order to prove Marx wrong that the present
Frank Fisher:

Can Socialism Be Humanized?

N one of his lasting contributions to the analysis of our social order Marx describes the fetishism of the commodity: the product of human labor develops, as a commodity under capitalism, a reality of its own and becomes subject to its own laws. Eventually it dominates its creators and imposes its laws upon them. Human relations then appear as relations between things, exploitation of workers as purchase of the commodity “labor”. Men, alienated from one another and from the products of their work, become parts of a machine instead of using it as a means of saving effort; the quality of their working performance is replaced by the mere quantity measured by the time-clock. They take little pride in their work and strictly divide their day into “working”— done collectively and under the indirect coercion of hunger—and “living”, which is presumably the enjoyable part of the day, to be spent privately and away from the company of their fellow workers, even though in their “privacy” they only repeat the same pattern of domestic bliss and passive amusement which is the product of conformistic mass civilization. In his working hours, man has become a thing, and his frantic attempts at compensation in his leisure time only deepen his alienation. Likewise, capital, instead of appearing as the relation of exploitation between capitalist and worker, seems to be a thing, called means of production.

"Reification"

This reification (i.e. “thing-ification”) is characteristic of all phases of capitalism and its ideologies. One of its most important results is the breakdown of our social world into many apparently independent parts. Unlike the feudal craftsman, the worker does not see his product in its entirety, but only a special part of it. This partiality of view colors his outlook in every respect, and it equally applies to the capitalist who sees his business without a sufficient understanding of its function within the economic system as a whole, not to mention its human implications. The result is a partial clearness for certain details which are directly experienced, while the situation as a whole, in its social and historical context, is not fully understood. The great complexity of our social organization results in an ever increasing specialization and loss of understanding of the concrete totality. The specialists may be outstanding scientists who know a great deal about atomic power but have only the most rudimentary notions about reorganizing the world to save it from destruction by it. Or they may be Soviet technicians who know all about locomotive boilers but are ignorant of anything else regarding locomotives or nearly all other matters. “Facts” taken out of their context lose their meaning. The inhumanity of our social conditions appears as objective necessity, subject to external laws, and “realism” takes them into account instead of attempting to change them.

It is significant that Soviet Russia provides one of the examples of reification. Indeed, alienation is even more typical of contemporary Russia than of the capitalistic world. There, too, human relations have assumed the form of relations between things. Quantitative measurements have superseded the quality of human experience, and abstract production figures are admired, regardless of their meaning in terms of human happiness or suffering. Statistics replace the investigation of living conditions of real people. One of the outstanding characteristics of stalinism, inside and outside of Russia, is its contempt for people; they are tools toward certain ends and may be discarded when they are no longer needed. Lies and falsehoods, defamation of character and terrorism are accepted means of directing people toward aims they do not choose.

If in capitalism the commodity is God and the laws of its price and value reign supreme, so under the Soviet system the party and its bureaucracy have grown into the Supreme Being, to be blindly adored and obeyed. The tool developed by the communists for changing society has made its own institutional laws which rule over its creators. The hope for a new and better social order has been replaced by a charismatic faith in a powerful institution and its leaders. They have to be right by definition, and the true theology presents a complete black and white picture of the world, which is taught at school.

The stalinist understanding of the world is an extraordinary blend of sensitivity for certain social injustices and the determination to do something about them, with the complete disregard for others committed by themselves. It is precisely this partial clearness and partial blindness which makes them efficient tools of Soviet policy, regardless of the frequent changes of the party line. Their attitude is that of believers rather than rational observers; they have lost their critical faculties in this respect, and they believe in the tool, regardless of its use, instead of any final goal.

The attitude of socialist and labor parties toward planning and nationalization is somewhat similar to that of the stalinists. Both these steps are necessary means for changing society, but they are only techniques which may be used for different purposes. To some extent, the romantic belief...
in these techniques as the cure for all social evils has re-
placed revolutionary romanticism of earlier days, which
invested the soul-purging bloodiness of armed uprisings and
civil wars with equally mystical qualities. It is, of course,
possible to couple planning for welfare at home with colo-
nial exploitation abroad, or the nationalization of industry
in one country with the employment of domestic or foreign
slave labor to work in it. Such measures are not more
socialistic in character than the American War Production
Board. It is the final aim in human terms which decides
the character of such technical steps. And besides the
question of purpose there arises at once the question of
democratic participation and control. Whether an indus-
tivity is run by a corporate or a bureaucratic labor manage-
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**We Must Begin to Talk About Human Goals**

Those who want to give meaning again to a socialist move-
ment must take this into account. Their main principle
must be to restore humanism to its rightful place in a
regenerated movement. The curse of reification must be
removed; man must again become the measure. A situation
must be analyzed in its full context, and ultimate as well
as immediate ends and means have to be defined in human
terms.

This means, in the first place, a clear formulation of the
ultimate goal, a definition, in contemporary terms, of the
meaning of socialism. It is typical for the political mass
parties which profess to be socialistic or communist in
their aims that actually they have completely forgotten the
fundamental goals of socialism. Exposed to the environ-
ment of capitalism and subject to its laws, the socialist and
communist parties all over the world have become essen-
tially conservative and support a slightly modified status
quo. The inhumanity of life in a mechanized and stand-
ardized exploitative society is reflected in their attitudes.
They are content with political power as an end in itself.

It is largely the fault of Marx and his successors that a
discussion of the ultimate goals of socialism has been dis-
couraged by the socialist movement. Most of the party
members have rather vague ideas of the good society which
they would like to construct. The usual result of their
party affiliation is either cynicism or apathy. In their dis-
illusionment, they give up hope of changing capitalism and
often end as tools of a social order they dislike.

Ever since Marx and Engels branded their predecessors
and contemporaries as “utopian”, all Marx-inspired groups
have been wary of committing themselves on a final goal,
except in the vaguest terms. Socialism was largely con-
ceived as the negation of capitalism, without giving it much
specific content. The eyes of marxists were focused on
existing conditions and their criticism, and the broad aspects
of changing society and remaking man were all but neglec-
ted. However, socialism always had an implicit humanistic
tradition though it was played down. Human happiness
was the goal. The good society would reconcile freedom
with order, give every man his place and a sense of be-

longing and, at the same time, the freedom required for
the fullest development of his abilities. It would release
man from the drudgery of dull and drab machine work and
instead allow him to devote his energies to creative tasks.
In brief, it would provide conditions for the development
of a new human type. Though all this was rarely stated,
it gave the movement its emotional appeal.

Up to the bolsheviks’ seizure of power, and even after
the establishment of the Soviet power, the leading party
members carefully refrained from any specific statements
on the ultimate aim. Lenin made the naive remarks that
the state would become so simple that any cook could run
it, or that gold would be so unnecessary that it would only
be used for public toilets. His practical approach to pol-
itical questions defined socialism in slogans for immediate
objectives, such as “Socialism is Soviet power plus electri-
city”. He was more interested in building than in defining
it. This made it easy for Stalin’s theologians to develop
their talmudistic distortions of the meaning of socialism,
defining it as “inequality” (as opposed to the final stage
of communism), and carefully neglecting the one tangible
prediction of the founding fathers about this stage: the
gradual withering away of the state.

Trotsky is, to my knowledge, the only one of the major
marxists who has attempted to talk about socialism in more
specific terms. In *Literature and Revolution*, he unfolds a
noble picture of a socialist future. He sees a society in
which humanity is released from the dull monotony of
repetitious work, except for short periods of the day, and
can create a world in which not only an occasional genius
can grow to enlighten his fellow men, but which will lift
all of humanity to the level which formerly only geniuses
could attain. This new mankind would devote its energies
no longer to struggle and exploitation but to free associa-
tion and cooperation in pursuit of higher goals set by the
arts and sciences. This seems to be the only time when
Trotsky “let himself go”. Afterwards, he was too busy
proclaiming himself Lenin’s true heir and therefore de-
defending some bolshevik principles he had formerly at-
tacked, to give any more thought to ultimate goals. He
even adopted the inhuman bolshevik means of suppression,
exaggeration of discipline and orthodoxy, and discour-age-
ment of criticism. This, incidentally, was inherited by his
followers, and it may be said parenthetically that regard-
less of their criticism of Soviet policies, as human types
many of them show all the shortcomings of the stalinists
and are not better suited to change society.

**Program Notes**

The fundamental aim of humanistic socialism is to re-
move reification, to create conditions under which man and
his relations are no longer things but human again; no
longer alienated from his work and other men; and able to
use his creative abilities. This means, for instance, that
the unnatural split between unpleasant work and pleasant
leisure has to be overcome. Work should carry its own
compensation in the satisfaction it gives. This means also
that the economic sphere will not be strictly separated from
the cultural one. The exaggeration of the importance of
individual freedom outside his working time is a product of
reification. Even Herberg’s “Personalism” seems to suffer
from it when he quotes Berdyaev: “The socialization of economics ought to be accompanied by the individualization of men and women.” As formulated here, personalism would be the reverse side of collectivism in which the individual counts as nothing. The human way is the free association of individuals who cooperate both in their economic and cultural work and play.

The enjoyment of work can be increased though it is unlikely that all drudgery can ever be eliminated. It can be reduced by better use of existing sources of energy and those new ones which are now being developed, and by better use of machinery, not according to efficiency but with a view to make work more pleasant. Decentralization of our overgrown industrial giants may contribute somewhat to this effect. Even more will be achieved if we stop the manufacture of many useless goods which now absorb the time of many workers and seem essential to us only because of our “education” through a commercial civilization. Advertising and similar services will be unnecessary and thereby reduce the amount of work to be done. In general, a social system directed toward creativeness will not make the amount of goods produced its final criterion. A clearer understanding of what is the true amount of goods will be the result of planning both from the top and from the bottom. Workers in a factory should make a plan for their unit, which through progressive stages of regional and functional coordination was eventually supposed to be integrated, perhaps in a revised form, in the overall plan. Actually, it has mostly worked in the opposite direction, which is largely due to Russia’s economic backwardness. But plans can be made to more creative initiative. Every man’s work in its context, gives meaning to it, and process, and it adds time to the working hours. But it puts the entire nation and the world as a whole. It is a cumbersome institution, such as producers’ and consumers’ cooperatives. This applies for instance to elementary education. As far as science, art, higher education are concerned, whatever planning is done, may originate with many different autonomous bodies which are the result of voluntary association of people of similar interests. The central authority can support these activities to some extent, without limiting them.

It is obvious that the guarantee of free expression and criticism of existing institutions as well as the right of free association is inherent in such a system. As unanimity is undesirable by definition, the right of minorities is implicitly recognized.

To-morrow’s ideal society is partly determined by our actions of today. While living under inhuman conditions we must prepare for the better society we want. In changing society we shall change ourselves. Our means must be human if we want to achieve human ends, yet they must be possible under existing conditions. It is therefore not possible, simply to withdraw from a way of life we do not approve of, for instance to found ideal cooperative communities in the midst of capitalism. They will, of course, degenerate and not achieve their ends. Likewise, it makes no sense to blame people for not working at jobs that “realize our human powers and transcend the inhuman subdivision of labor” (Paul Goodman). While this is true for a few intellectuals, it certainly does not apply to most workers who cannot choose their jobs. We cannot expect to transcend capitalist conditions under capitalism; only a free, i.e. socialist society will provide such conditions. However, in our daily lives we can stress those cooperative functions which are possible now, and participate in community actions of this nature. This is an effective preparation for changing society if we are always conscious of the limitations which our present social setup imposes upon such activities.

In general, it is consciousness of contemporary conditions and their full understanding which is now most needed. We must analyze our own actions, understand the reasons for our defeats and overcome our inadequacy for the tremendous job that lies ahead of us by recognizing our limitations and taking such small steps as we can. This process of self-education should lead to a program in more specific terms than those stated here. This will be the next step toward the regeneration of the socialist movement.

New Roads

Discussion

In view of the virtual monopoly recently established in the pages of Politics by the rising cult of Marx-baiters, I hope I may be permitted to answer one of these, Will Herberg (Personalism Against Totalitarianism, December issue).

The new obscurantist trend numbers many former Bolsheviks in its ranks, who having made a religion of the Leninist interpretation of Marx, no doubt find the transition to a new mysticism easy to make. The distance between Herberg and Louis Budenz is not very great, despite the better record of the former. The retreat of the intellectuals seems to be a by-product of the disillusionment which
engulfs their species after each major defeat of the revolutionary movements. The same trend was observed in Europe after 1848, 1871, and 1905, and continued each time until a new resurgence of the working class movement either re-enlightened them or pushed them aside.

Herberg attributes the totalitarian pattern of our times, especially in Continental Europe, to nothing less than the socialist movement itself, with its all-embracing system of cultural and recreational organizations. This is an echo from people like Hayek, who resent socialist competition with capitalist culture. Let us look however at the United States, where no such set of organizations under political auspices has ever achieved mass roots. From whence is the totalitarian tendency in America derived? Why does Herberg ignore the standardized minds produced by Hollywood, the radio, the press, the public schools, and the armed forces? Where has the American government learned the totalitarian methods it is embracing? What are the roots of these tendencies, if not in capitalist society itself? If socialist cultural organizations as a counter-force to capitalist culture lead us into the same pitfalls, what does he propose as an alternative? The Boy Scouts? Or if it is the church, how independent has this institution been? If the church is not subject to the same cultural values and state pressures of the society of which it is a part, how do we account for the civil war split between the Methodist and Baptist southern and northern memberships? How do we account for the almost unanimous endorsement of the recent war by the American pulpit?

Another amazing attribute of the intellectual whose theories are divorced from experience is the naive belief that the state and large organizations such as unions and political parties (but not including the church) are the main foe of personalism. (The latter term is replacing the discredited "individualism" of the rugged type.) It may be that the greatest stagnation of minds and bodies today is taking place in a locality our intellectuals seldom see—the inside of the factory. This might explain why the discourses on the dangers of totalitarian culture find so little response from the average worker. At least half of his time when he is not sleeping, for the greater part of his active life, is spent within the walls of a prison house where totalitarianism and de-individualization are represented by the time clock, a badge, the factory whistle, foremen and time-study men, and the machine which possesses him for eight hours, day in and day out, until he is too worn out to enjoy what is left of his life, or to appreciate the higher culture the intelligentsia talk about. This applies with equal force to the majority of office and white collar workers. It is to the eternal credit of Marx that he gave his main emphasis to the "assassination of men" in the modern, militarized, disciplined factory. Most intellectuals who know anything about it try to escape its debilitating effects by getting jobs as professors, writers, or union officials, and then turning their thoughts to more pleasant matters.

I have yet to see any writer give an adequate program to make life brighter inside the factories. All we have seen are proposals from some to revert to handcraft and the land, which is unfeasible today for most people.

Lewis Corey's program to disperse economic control, with a system of checks and balances, is not necessarily a solution to the barren existence workers lead inside the factories. The beauties of a well-ordered society outside may leave his working day unchanged. There is no small number of "personalists" who forget this problem entirely. Regarding the section of the economy which Corey would leave in private hands, these questions might be asked: (1) Is it not true that the most miserable working conditions, the lowest pay and longest hours, are in those small businesses and private farms that he would preserve unchanged? Union organizers know this. The only way the "little guy" can compete with low-cost large concerns is by greater exploitation of labor power. It is understandable why a chicken company rather than U. S. Steel fought NRA, and why small business is most vigorously opposed to minimum wages. (2) How can the wage standards and conditions be improved in small business without putting them at such a disadvantage in competition with the rest of the economy that they will be forced out of business, thus ending the ideal dream of a "mixed economy". (3) Assuming that the above problems could be solved, how does one prevent the growth of these businesses, through the normal working of economic laws, into large corporations and even monopolies? By government regulation? But this is state regimentation, which must be avoided at all costs, you know.

Mixed economy is something to be embraced by people who think society can be made to operate according to theoretical blueprints, invented by fertile minds in college libraries, without reference to economic laws, class forces, or historical experience. Unfortunately, or otherwise, a new society cannot be forged in the same way a child fashions a house from blocks of wood. "The 'golden mean' cannot be maintained in any revolution. The law of its nature demands a quick decision; either the locomotive drives forward full steam ahead to the most extreme point of the historical ascent, or it rolls back of its own weight again to the starting point at the bottom; and those who would keep it with their weak powers half way up the hill, it but drags down with it irredeemably into the abyss." (Rosa Luxemburg)

Herberg reaches the nadir of his argument in attributing to Christianity the virtue of helping to liberate mankind from the state, and introducing for the first time "in our civilization, true reverence for personality." By the reference to "civilization", he neatly avoids mention of the period in which human personality was most highly regarded within a given group at least: namely, the period of savagery and barbarism, so-called, when communism was universal and there was no private property or state apparatus as we know it today. Herberg begins instead with classical antiquity, when there was no recognition of the individual's status as an "autonomous personality." The latter held true, then as now, only for the oppressed classes. Classical antiquity was the first exploiting society, resting on conquest, slavery, private property, and the state power. Since that time exploitation under serfdom has been supported by the Catholic Church, and under capitalism by all churches. Where is the liberty of the individual member of the oppressed class in the feudal state, whether it be small or large, whether governed by princes or by archbishops? This was the age in which Christianity exerted its greatest power—a period characterized by illiteracy, superstition, dynastic wars, and an exploited class only slightly in advance of chattel slavery. Where was individual liberty for Wyclif and Hus, burned at the stake, or Galileo and Copernicus, forced to hide or recant scientific discoveries which conflicted with church dogma?

Protestantism has equally little to boast about. How many better examples of despotism exist than Calvin's dictatorship over Geneva, where Servetus went to the stake; Tudor England, where More lost his head; or Cromwell's "Protectorate"? What was Luther but the instrument of despotic princes thirsty for church wealth? Where
was greater conformity demanded from the individual than in Puritan New England?

Neither Judaism nor Christianity could tolerate the totalitarian view, declares Herberg, “since both insisted that man belonged primarily to God, who is the god not merely of this or that society but of the entire universe.” This god, however, happens to reside in a supra-earthly place called heaven, which is far enough away so that the homage, obedience, and offerings due him can be safely entrusted to his early representatives, the clergy. The old saw attributed to Christ, “Give unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s” is not “the ultimate challenge to totalitarianism”, but rather a formula for a partnership between church and state in the mental and physical enslavement of people. The church taught obedience to lawful authority, divine right of rulers, and all that was necessary to help its partner the state. Its resistance to the state has been limited to those occasions when the state invaded traditional spheres of church influence and power, such as assuming the education of the youth, confiscating or taxing church property, or in other ways taking what did not, according to the church, belong to Caesar, but to God’s terrestrial agents. This was simply a family feud. There are still too many people who assume that one of the protagonists in intra-class feuds is the spokesman for human liberty.

The above partnership continued until some evil totalitarians called rationalists broke the bonds of the alliance. The early rationalists of course were not true democrats, as Herberg correctly points out. They were the idealogists of the rising capitalist class, the more radical sections of which saw in the church, especially the Catholic church, a bulwark of the old order. Its power was to be replaced by their own, and the power of the latter, in turn, will be swept out by the socialist revolution. Herberg’s quotation of Niebuhr is interesting: “Ideal religion makes reverence for personality the end of human action.” Niebuhr was one of those who, along with the majority of churchmen, supported actively the greatest of all blows to human personality, World War II.

It is startling that one with Herberg’s background fails to note the effect on “personalism” of the huge network of religious cultural organizations. Literally the preachers follow us from birth to the grave. If it is delusory to individuality for party organizations to engulf a person’s whole existence (outside the factory), why is the same not true for church societies of all denominations? Is it simply because some of them sing a song about the individual soul, in words, while in practice they try to mould everybody in their pattern from infancy? How much free development of personality is there in parochial schools, the last stronghold of corporal punishment? Perhaps only one who has been taught the virtues of unquestioned obedience to nuns, priests, superiors, and “lawful civil authority,” as I have, can appreciate this question.

In conclusion, Herberg declares: “Fundamentally, only the personalist mystique of vital religion can supply the spiritual resources to resist totalitarian diabolism.” In the article “Buchenwald Before the War” (POLITICS, June, 1945) Jan Levick on the authority of Dr. Maurer, the Vienna Socialist leader, states that out of 6,000 persons at Buchenwald in September, 1938, roughly one third were there for political reasons, and about one fifth were religious pacifists. If Buchenwald was typical, the rationally-motivated German politicalcs were much better represented among the foes of the Nazi state, and far better in proportion to the relative size of their respective organizations, than the religious prisoners. This article, as well as Bruno Bettelheim’s “Behavior in Extreme Situations” (POLITICS, August, 1944) indicates that the political prisoners maintained their morale relatively well, compared to non-politicals. Also, is it very heartening to see mystically-motivated people like Jehovah’s Witnesses courageously resisting the state only to accept without question a totalitarian regime in their own organization, in addition to being blind to all evils in society other than war and certain transgressions called sin? (See Jacob Jaffe’s review in the November POLITICS.) One could praise the many heroic deeds of Stalinists with just as much, if not greater reason.

Of course it might be argued, as it is by many, that a political program involving personal sacrifice is a “personal religious mystique.” However, Herberg gives no indication that this is his belief. Those who do make this assumption, can only do so by redefining terms and depriving them of all meaning. With such facile toying with words, anything can be proved; it is an interesting game for those who wish to resolve contradictions the easy way. Marx didn’t offer the answer to all our problems, but it is annoying to see such a useful person get the blame for almost everything short of syphilis. There may be a more logical analysis of history and social development than his, but I haven’t seen it in the utter nonsense produced by the latest contributors to POLITICS.

VIRGIL J. VOGEL

BLUSHING-VIOLET DEPT.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27—Gen. Brehon Somervell, in his farewell report as commanding general of the Army Service Forces, declared tonight that never before in human experience had any group been called upon to do more work in less time, but that the gigantic organization which he headed during the war had accomplished it efficiently.


WITH THE HEAVY THINKERS: Department of Literary Criticism

"A vast canvas in comparison with which that of 'War and Peace' seems almost provincial . . . a really great work." (Manchester Guardian)

"For this great work, as well as for the great body of work which preceded it, a great spirit deserves well of this world. Long live Upton Sinclair!" (Fred T. Marsh in "N. Y. Herald-Tribune Book Review")

"Dragon Harvest" is both a liberal education and an education in liberalism." (Charles Lee in "Philadelphia Record")

"With the ease and aplomb of a Tolstoy introducing Napoleon into his 'War and Peace', Sinclair presents the historical giants of our era. The Lenny Bude series will be read and admired when most of the diseased little men who aspired to greatness in our time are to be dead as Torguemada and as dishonored." (Sterling North in "N. Y. Post")

—from an advertisement for a trashy novel by a sixth-rate novelist.
The Mestizo Clique

A Letter from Manila

Today January 5, our cable office received a wire directing that the redeployment of troops from this area be held up until further notice. Yesterday the U S S. Cecil sailed for the states with over 600 bunks vacant. The navy has withdrawn 103 of the 353 troop carriers used for the stateside run. Unless the point system is again lowered, ships which are now clustered in Manila harbor will continue to leave for the states with empty berths.

The 86th infantry division is being reorganized along battle lines and all men in the 96th division with less than 40 points will be transferred to the 86th within the next few days. How does the army explain this? Col. Wesley W. Yale says that this move is essential to cope with possible unrest which may grow out of the political crisis in the Philippines. He claims "that the purpose of the reorganization is to protect U S property and that the army would not interfere in Philippine internal affairs."

Although I myself am a G.I. who is anxious above all to return home I have tried to view the situation as impersonally as possible.

First, I am curious to know what U.S. property the colonel had reference to. Any plans to return the equipment now in supply depots here to the states would be an expensive campaign and I doubt that it has received much serious contemplation. . . . Could the Colonel possibly have had reference to civilian property? U.S. citizens do have large holdings in the islands. Gen. MacArthur’s holdings alone are sizeable enough to warrant protection of some sort.

For years U.S. interests have banded with the interests of certain powerful and wealthy Spaniards and Mestizos (half-Filipinos) here in the islands. This circle of interests is referred to by Filipinos as the "Mestizo Clique" and its spearhead is a triumvirate comprising Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Manuel Roxas, and Andres Soriano. They and their satellites have a monopoly on the nation’s economy and their stocks and financial interests are so closely interrelated that to protect American interests would be to protect the holdings of the Mestizo Clique. Shall we examine the records of the two less familiar figures in the triumvirate?

Manuel Roxas is now the president of the Philippine Senate but he has announced his candidacy in the coming presidential elections. During the Japanese occupation he was a minister without portfolio. He helped draft the constitution of the puppet republic, was in charge of food distribution and was one of the signers of the declaration of war against the United States. In answer to charges of collaboration he was recently quoted as saying, "There is no such thing as a collaborator." Directly owned by Roxas is "The Daily News", a tabloid printed in English, "Light", a magazine published bi-monthly, and "Ilang-Ilang", a Tagalog weekly. The "Philippine Press", one of the only newspapers in Manila which openly defy Roxas, went out of print last month because he bought the presses.

Andres Soriano has attempted to become a citizen of three nations within the past five years. Up till 1940 he was a citizen of Spain and his Falange activities in the islands were notorious. He is considered as having been influential in persuading Franco that it would be unwise of him to join the war. Today he is a colonel on MacArthur's personal staff. Both Roxas and Soriano carry letters from MacArthur as testimony of their loyalty and the aid they have given in the past. When MacArthur first arrived in the islands he commended Roxas as being the "spiritual" head of the guerrillas although all the larger guerrilla groups denied all knowledge of any aid he had given.

Colonel Yale was careful to assure the public that the U S Army would not interfere in local politics but has that been the army’s record to date? When the Americans first landed, the most open assistance given them came from a band of guerrillas that had been notably successful in their campaigns against the Japanese, the "Hukbalahap" or "People’s Army against Japan." The Hukbalahap was a well-organized band of peasants under the leadership of "Taruk". They are located in Pampanga, which has long been the seat of the labor movement in the islands due to the agrarian unrest in the area caused by rotten landlord-tenant relationships. The peasants there have long demanded agrarian reforms and that problem indeed promises to be the crux of the coming elections. Shortly after the Americans arrived, Taruk was arrested and imprisoned for several months. The land-owners and the Mestizo Clique succeeded in convincing our military authorities that the Hukbalahap was a dangerously armed dissatisfied faction that might revolt and delay the progress of the war. Taruk’s protests and the Huk’s denunciation of Roxas’ collaboration activities went unheeded. The Huk will exert influence in the coming elections but they are still an army of peasants, politically disorganized and knowing only that their status of serfdom must be changed. "Time" magazine recently asserted that the Huk was headed towards communism. Truthfully they are completely unenlightened politically, and, like the millions of peasants throughout the land will only head towards whatever will seem to give them some promise of liberation. There have been a few demonstrations and no one could deny that the possibility of a revolution is likely. To say that they are serfs is a bold understatement. They put our share-croppers to shame. Statistics claim that approximately 70% of the population had an income below one peso (fifty cents) a day before the war.

There have been cases of armed raids against our supply depots. The army chooses to refer to them this way. In most cases it consists of pílfering made by a few men armed with some weapons but cases of blood-shed have been unreported as yet. The fact that American troops are training again along battle-lines will increase the crisis. Already there is scarcely a barrio (small town) in the islands that is without arms, mostly weapons retained by the guerrillas from their Jap-fighting days.

It would be hopeless to attempt to report the cruelties that have been perpetrated on these people by a few wealthy landlords, not the least among whom is Luis de Leon, brother-in-law of Manuel Roxas and owner of one of the most wealthy and criminally heartless haciendas. The people of Manila are visualizing barricades put up in the streets and the American army joining with the Philippine Army in quelling the riots that are sure to spring up as elections draw closer. Our interference in China and the rest of the east has already aroused much criticism from American civilians and servicemen alike. Must we, then, employ American troops further in the causes of Fascism and Imperialism? Whatever the cause, we are reluctant to
politics

Note: The following letter was written by K. L. N. Sinha, a leader of the Kisan Sabha (Indian Peasant Movement), to a friend in England, who has passed it on to us. Mr. Sinha is at present editing a Kisan Sabha paper in Southern India. His British correspondent notes: "How strong the Colonial People's Freedom Front may be I would find it very hard to say. Before the war, the Kisan Sabha was about the biggest organization in India after the Congress, to which it served as a left wing and often as an irritant; but it was so far in unison with Congress that it never received independent limelight outside of India. It worked with the Communist Party and with the Congress Socialist Party. It was possible for a Kisan to be a member of either of these as well as of the Kisan Sabha. At the time of the Gripps argument, the CP, by coming out in favor of acceptance and against Congress, dealt a very bad blow to Left unity. Many of the Kisan leaders were CPers. It was in 1940 that I first heard of the Colonial People's Freedom Front, and I see from this letter that it remains a live idea. I am pretty sure that it represents the general trend of peasant feeling—to fight, and in fighting to strike a blow against both Nazism and Imperialism; and to strike it as a vanguard action for the freedom of colonial peoples."

Thank God, Europe is soon going to be rid of Nazism. We can especially understand the glamour, happiness and splendid sense of release that the people of Italy, France, Belgium, Holland must be experiencing on the fall of this awful monster.

We are expecting one or two big things. (If Japan should) face the prospects of defeat, she may decide upon declaring her newly conquered areas "Free" and withdraw to her island fortress. Will she do such a thing? She is cunning. So she may do that, not so much for the sake of freedom as to embarrass the United Nations. Then what shall the United Nations do? Of course they have to defeat Japan; without defeating her, there can never be any peace in Asia or the Pacific. She is so treacherous that no one can trust her to be content to live peacefully in her islands. But will they also recognize, honour and safeguard the freedom of these Pacific and East Asiatic countries? That is the crucial question. They may not, if Eden is to have his own way. They may, if America-cum-China are to have their way. Anyhow, the ambitions of the peoples of these countries will have risen high enough to grasp the conception of their national independence and freedom and, once roused like that, even these long-submerged peoples will be so much transformed by the alchemy of national self-confidence and cumulative mass hopes that in post-war years their very being will be suffused with a new meaning and power. That also helps the colonial's freedom cause.

Acharyajee thinks that in post-war years, India, China, Egypt, some Latin American States are going to lead in the world's struggle for freedom of all coloured, colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Our Colonial People's Freedom Front must get ready from now on to shoulder a part of that responsibility.

There is a book called Living Space by Stoyan Pribichovich published by William Heinemann in 1940. He has anticipated quite a number of our Acharyajee's findings. He also says peasants are revolutionary; they are exploited by towns, markets, industrialists and imperialists. Even in Soviet Russia, he says, they only play second fiddle. Throughout history peasants failed because they could not realize the necessity for capturing and wielding political power. But he says a change is coming over the Balkan peasant. So far he covers only a part of our ground. We go further. We espay the exploiter of the peasant not so much in the townsman and the town but in the World Market which takes all the towns in its stride and the industrial and commercial classes as a whole which includes the proletariat. The peasant can no longer think in terms of his village market, but he must become class and world conscious and learn to unite with his kindred all over the world. We realize that the wealth he produces is spirited away from him through the unequal exchanges that are imposed upon him by the world market in favor of the industrial and commercial interests. Because the latter control the world markets, finances, transport, and in Russia the supply of machines like tractors and harvesters to the collectives. The biggest modern enemy of world peasantry is not any isolated national capitalism but the integrated world force of capitalism and its projections: imperialism and fascism. Peasants must learn to fight against these forces. What the strike is for workers, a grain strike on a program of national self-sufficiency is for peasants. What an international proletarian solidarity is for the working classes, the Colonial Peoples' Freedom Front is for the
peasants. What a socialist approach is for the western proletariat the colonial national revolution is for the peasant. Balkan peoples are as much colonial as the South Americans, the Chinese.

It is with this perspective that we have to see into the future prospects of the world. Will the whole world be split into the Soviet and the Anglo-American camps or will there be a Green or Peasant co-operative belt of nations trying to help the peoples of the world to save themselves from the one-sided proletarian dictatorship or the bourgeois dictatorship? Acharyajee seems to feel that the Balkan peasantry will refuse to accept the proletarian dictatorship either of Russia or of Russian type. They will insist upon democracy but not of the bourgeoisie as in England and America and pre-war France but of peasants, workers and professionals (intellectuals). The peasants will be the major factor in agrarian, the proletariat in industrial countries. They will also favor the development of basic industries in all countries or in a group of small countries and build around them a concentric circle of decentralized industries rising from the village reaching out to the boundary of a country or a group of countries. They will insist that labor in agriculture must be remunerated to the same extent as labor in the factory or in the office, and that the present unequal exchanges must be put an end to, and that the village be made as live, progressive, happy a centre as the town, and peasant’s place in politics as well assured as that of the proletariat or the intellectual.

If such a development is likely in the Balkans and if our Colonial People's Freedom Front broadcasts these ideals and gives them organizational and ideological strength—Acharyajee's books, Challenge of the World Peasantry and Colonial Peoples, attempt to do this—then Soviet Russia may not be able to have all its own way either in China or in the Balkans or in India. It is also possible the United States may come to realize that it will have more in common with such peasant commonwealths (states) than with the one-class dictatorship of Soviet Russia and such an alignment between the United States and peasant commonwealths may help the fulfillment of the partial objective of the Colonial Peoples' Freedom Front—i.e., the achievement of political freedom of colonies, especially of Asia and Africa. Of course in the economic sphere there will still be contradictions between America, England, etc., and the Colonial peoples. It is by finding their way through these contradictions that colonial peoples and peasants can in future gain more and more power, political and economic, and freedom from imperialism and capitalism. So we may not be surprised if for a time say after 1950 India too may be co-operating with the Anglo-American rather than with the one-party dictatorship...

September 23, 1944
K. L. N. Sinha.

CULTURE IN THE RUINS

1. "A Beginning Must Be Made."

EDITOR’S NOTE: What follows is a translation of the editorial by Karl Jaspers in the first issue of "Die Wandlung" ("The Transformation"—or perhaps our English expression, "change of heart", would be better), which appeared in Heidelberg on November 30, 1945. "Die Wandlung" is the first cultural magazine to reappear in Germany since the war. The editor of "Die Wandlung" is Dolf Sternberger, the publisher is Lambert Schneider, and the Editorial Board consists of Werner Krauss, Karl Jaspers and Alfred Weber. It is a monthly, costs 2 marks, and the first issue, which is typographically most attractive, is 96 pages long. Among the contents are T. S. Eliot's "East Coker" (in German and English), and the full text of the Potsdam Agreement. A note prefixed to the latter states that the editors feel that their fellow-Germans need to know exactly what was decided at Potsdam, and that they have therefore had the text translated into German. The implication, which I am unable to verify, is that this is the first complete text of Potsdam to be published for German readers, a rather interesting sidelight on Allied occupation policy.

We have lost almost everything: State, economy, the physical conditions of our life. Even worse, we have lost our values, our common bonds, our moral dignity and our sense of unity as a people.

And yet, did we really lose everything? No, for we the survivors are still here. We have no property, not even a stake in the past; we are living on the ragged edge... and yet that we are alive at all may be given some meaning. Facing nothingness, we pull ourselves together.

The only unambiguous aspect of our situation is the course of events: the silent disappearance of the dictators, the end of an autonomous German government, the dependence of all activities on the will of the occupying authorities which have freed us from Nazi bondage. Our initiative is limited to the opportunities they grant us.

Such an opportunity is the permission given to publish our magazine. We are permitted to talk among ourselves in public. Let us see what we have to say to each other.

During the last twelve years we have changed, inwardly and outwardly. We are still changing, and we don't yet know when and where this transformation will end. But we want to join with and act with our fellow-Germans by asking them to speak, to communicate their thoughts, to formulate their ideas, to let it be publicly known that they exist and how they exist. We want to listen, also, to the voices of the rest of the world and to make them heard in Germany.

A beginning must be made. As we start to define the transformation, and to encourage it, we hope to also progress towards the laying of a new foundation. We begin so much at the beginning that we are not even yet sure of...
any fundamentals. We have no program, for we feel that today nobody should presume to hand down from on high some total solution, pointing to one road as though he knew it to be the only right one. We want to prepare the ground, thinking and arguing, reporting and formulating.

Since we can once more speak freely among ourselves, our first duty is to talk openly and honestly, with each other. This is not at all easy. None of us is a leader, none of us a prophet who can pronounce authoritatively on what is and what ought to be. All our “leaders” were evil phantoms, which first took away the inner freedom of their adherents and then the outer freedom of everybody. They were possible only because so many people no longer wanted to be free, to be responsible. Today we confront the consequences of this renunciation. We must again dare to assume responsibility, each one for himself; if we don’t, not only the Reich but Man himself is lost. We want to seek together as free men who begin to see truth if they have confidence in each other. Knowing how difficult this confidence is in Germany today, we shall learn to be severe with ourselves and tolerant with others, suspicious of our own dark urges, which we shall examine with utmost severity, but lovingly prejudiced in favor of others. We do not believe in any “ultimate points of view” incompatible with each other, but simply in our common origin as human beings. And so we hope, even in the sharpest clashes of opinion, to retain a certain human solidarity.

Familiar though we are with dreadful realities, with the most extreme forms of human behavior, we nonetheless reject nihilism, we reject contempt of Man and cynicism. But the rejection of evil and the freedom of the individual are not enough to make life possible. The individual is himself only if his fellows are themselves also, and freedom exists only insofar as all are free. For even the state, embracing millions, begins with the individual.

But the individual, powerless, needs a sense of community, and it is this sense which is the responsibility of all of us. Through public discussion, we want to become conscious of the conditions under which we live. One of the possible roads to this consciousness is through history: we have not lost everything if we do not throw away, desperate, our inalienable property—the deep foundations of history, first for us a thousand years of German history, then the history of Western humanity, and finally the history of all mankind. For Man as a human being these deeps are open, and we may go down, down to the most remote memories. We shall find everywhere not only horror and hopelessness but also things that may encourage us. We shall recognize the experiences of other men, also living in “extreme situations”, in other countries and times. Many a German found himself in this broad human tradition when he was proscribed in his own fatherland. What and how we remember, and which of these memories we recognize as guides—that will be one of the factors that determine our future. For there we shall find the historical ground, the original foundations on which we can build: “no one can lay foundations different from those that were there in the beginning.” But as we persist in exploring these origins, they become infinitely equivocal. Only by earnestly listening to this equivocality may we arrive at a certainty which makes no exterior pretension, which may not be achieved from without, which no one may claim for his own exclusively, and yet by which every one, if he is sincere, lives: the certainty that lies in obedience to God.

Memory, however, will not be enough. Memory will only inspire our present task, which is concerned with the present and future. All disciplines related to this task—politics, economics, technology, law, the sciences, art and poetry, theology and philosophy—will find a place in this magazine. We hope that not history but the present will occupy most of our pages. Our efforts should not exhaust themselves in superficiality, but rather our thinking should rise from depths we cannot fully know even when we wish to be guided by them.

This is what we want, and it is thus we must try to orientate ourselves in the our present distressing conditions.

KARL JASPER

for the editors and the publisher

2. The Rebirth of the University

(Speech of Professor Karl Jaspers on the occasion of the reopening of the medical faculty of Heidelberg University, August 15, 1945.)

THIS is the first time in twelve years that we have freely elected our President. The faculty of medicine will resume its classes today, a great day for our university. We may hope that other faculties will soon follow and that the university will be fully reopened in the not too far future. It is a new beginning after the suspension which followed the collapse, and after the ruin into which our university had fallen for twelve years.

True, the inner core of the university, though in concealment, resisted. There were professors and students who remained inwardly free and true to their calling. Something survived, in spite of the mass dismissals, in spite of the interference with both instruction and scientific investigation, in spite of the destruction of our ancient constitution and of our self-administration in favor of methods of education that were ideologically and politically corrupt and that resulted in the gradual debasement of the educational system. Because it actually had not been possible to destroy the spirit of scientific investigation, the university—as yet with limitations—can today resume its course.

We owe it to the occupation authorities that we are allowed to resume our work. We have no lawful claim in this respect, after the unconditional surrender, after the silent disappearance of the leaders of the regime, after the end of any German statehood. We live in a condition of sae victis. However, we face not barbaric peoples but nations who base their lives on human rights—those Rights of Man which they once in their history solemnly proclaimed. It is thanks to their active belief in these rights that they permit us, the vanquished, to enjoy the tolerance and perhaps even the aid of the victors in our task of reconstruc-
tion of the University. They have declared that the German people will not be destroyed and that it shall be educated.

We can make full use of these rights which they have granted us. If there is still something in the world in which we are willing to trust we should trust in this.

But the revival of our University cannot simply be a resumption of what had been before 1933. Too much has happened, the catastrophe has been too profound.

We ourselves have changed since 1933. It was possible to seek death when human dignity was lost in 1933, when, after the shattering of the constitution by a pseudo-legal government, a dictatorship was set up which swept away every resistance to the accomplishment of the intoxicated applause of a great part of our people. We could have sought death when the crimes of the regime came into the open on June 30th, 1934, or with the plundering, deportation and murder of our Jewish friends and fellow-citizens, when in 1938, to our indelible disgrace and shame, the synagogues burned all over Germany. We could have sought death when right from the start of the war, the regime acted against the precept of our greatest philosopher, Kant, who had demanded that as the basis of international law nothing must occur during the war that may make a later reconciliation of the belligerents plainly impossible. Many thousands sought, or at any rate found, death in Germany in their resistance against the regime—most of them remain anonymous.

We, the survivors, did not seek death. When our Jewish friends were led away, we did not go into the streets and cry out until they killed us too. We preferred to remain alive with the weak though justifiable excuse that our death would not have helped any.

That we are still alive is our guilt. We know before God our deep humiliation.

Something has happened to us in these twelve years that has remolded our innermost being. In mythical terms: the devils have closed in on us and have dragged us along into a confusion that blinded our eyes and deafened our ears. We have had vistas of the realities of world and humanity and of ourselves which we shall not forget. It is as yet impossible to fathom how this has affected our thinking.

That we have survived until now is almost a miracle. But it is also due to our own decision, because of which we must accept the consequences of an existence under given conditions. The only dignity left to us amidst all these indignities is, first, truthfulness and, second, infinitely patient work in spite of all obstacles, in spite of all failures, as long as it is granted us. We want to deserve this life which was saved us.

We have to break with a past that is in us and around us. But we do not seek revenge if necessities now take their course and demand our assent. The chain of evil must be broken for once. We do not want to draw our strength from the No opposing the evil, but from a Yes to the good, from the depth of our real past which is our support. We are true to our parents, our native country, to our fatherland which we see in Kant. Goethe and Lessing and the other towering figures, in all that was noble among us in obedience to the eternal ethical demands, in our German language, in our forests and mountains, in our rivers and our sea.

In such a situation, men such as we have now become must rebuild the University. In so far as externals are concerned, we can hope that our old constitution and self-administration again will be affirmed, that our clinics and institutes and seminars again will exist, that our students will be able to live, that adequate though modest facilities for research and teaching will be restored. But all this is not yet a rebirth.

This rebirth can be realized only through the work of each individual, of the scholar and of the student in the community of their intellectual life. This community must be inspired by the everlasting idea of the University, the idea of a school which serves both instruction and investigation by proclaiming freedom to teach and freedom to learn as the conditions of responsible self-reliance, by rejecting mere routine teaching and self-contained specialization, in order to lead—through living communication and intellectual striving—to an ever-renewed affirmation of the unity of all sciences.

The effect of such a revival will show in the spirit prevailing in our halls, be they seminars, institutes or clinics, in the manner in which work and scientific discussion will be carried on. Publications and manuals will radiate this spirit in their whole character. This task is ours alone.

But we do not yet share a common public orientation. We have not yet attained the common ground on which we must stand if we want to speak to each other. The idea of the University has not yet really been revived. Many residues of questionable habits dominate thinking and values.

Once we Germans had the strength to rely on ourselves as individuals, to remain inwardly free and unerring, in spite of all formal dependencies. In this today too, and as a point of departure, lies our only chance. Everybody on this campus must take anew this risk, while he listens to others and seeks for communication: only thus can the idea of the University grow again.

The rebirth of the University thus is determined by the following conditions: the political and economic impotence of our country; our condition of vae victis, the recasting of our individual being through twelve years of distress and indignities, the task of us the dispersed survivors, who settle down in the ruins; the obligation imposed by the idea of the University.

All this will be on the order of the day, once the humanities again will be allowed to arise.

It would seem as if medicine were remote from these considerations. Is it not both science and art, universal, independent of politics, concerned only with the health of body and mind? This is so in appearance only. We have witnessed how far it has been possible to intervene even in a-political a domain.

Doctors who based themselves on an insufficient knowledge of the laws of heredity created the basis for a legal code which left them only with the alternative either to support its application in their capacity as experts or to restrict it partially in its inhuman consequences. Doctors were forced to perform operations (sterilizations) which in the majority of cases they could not justify before their conscience. Some doctors even stooped to the murder of the mentally ill.
We have lived to see something that corresponds to the witch hunts of the late Middle Ages: the race frenzy, together with all the aberrations based on a so-called biological Weltanschauung. The manifestations are the same today as they were then: Reason; the twisting of counterarguments into support of the thesis; replacement of reasoning by sophistcs, terrorism and tortures; a fearful credulity of the well-meaning who think that “there may be something to it after all”, and a sadistic satisfaction of others who call for ever more ruthless, more cruel methods.

Has all this been brought about through National Socialism? It was evidently possible only because potentials existed already before. There is something in our previous history that broke out so disastrous only then. This is why we have to understand the germ of the evil sown inadvertently long before. Here lies one of the great tasks of our search for the roots of our historical self.

Just an example with respect to medicine: A psychiatrist, a man of great critical awareness and who in his day had a considerable standing, wrote a pamphlet, in collaboration with a legal expert, on the destruction of life “not worth living.” This was in tune with the thinking of a Godless, positivistic world. These ideas later found their practical consequence in the killing of the insane, although at the time they certainly were not meant to serve this purpose. The point, however, is that such demands as to kill the insane under certain conditions and on the basis of certain rationally fixed indications were in fact neither science nor the result of science,—that the motives for human action had become blurred,—and that these demands seemed plausible even to people who would be called “rational” according to the criteria of our age. The whole complex, indeed, is not a simple one. Every doctor knows how, for example, in the case of the terrible pains caused by cancer, the relieving injections are increased in such a manner that the patient does not wake up any more and that at the end there is a smooth transition to the lethal injection.

One thing we can learn from this: there are questions that are unsolvable. If one tries to draw them into the spheres of calculations and principles, one touches on something that should be reverently left untouched. There are a number of such unsolvable problems—for example, those concerning free will, those concerning legislation with regard to accidents, yes even those concerning every-day therapy. But it is possible to have clarity as to the existence of such unsolvable questions. This clarity can be obtained where the two pillars on which medicine is based are firmly rooted.

These two pillars are truth and respect for the human being, or: science and humanity. If these two pillars had stood firm, national socialism could not have invaded medicine.

Science is to know what one knows and to be aware of what one does not know. Dogmatic knowledge is not science. To be scientific means to know the sources of knowledge; the acceptance of ready-made opinions is unscientific. It is scientific always to be aware of the specific limitations of knowledge; all claim of “total” knowledge is unscientific—as if we could know the whole. Limitless criticism and self-criticism, ever-renewed questioning—that is scientific method, not the concern that doubt may be paralyzing. Methodical progress proceeding step by step on the ground of experience to resolve the problem—that is science; the interplay of manifold opinions, possibilities and vague feelings is unscientific.

I dare say that there is a stream of unscientific thinking permeating the greater part of our scientific and medical literature. The spirit of un-science opened the doors to national socialism which thus could meet with its sympathetic understanding. For example. The race theory concerns something which probably plays a considerable role in the depth of human existence. But not even the concept of race has been cleared up. Most of what has been taught in the schools through all these years as “racial science” is fraud. But the consequences were, first, a pernicious pseudo-scientific myth that turned upside down the ideas of the essence of man; and then those murderous deeds of annihilation of races proclaimed inferior.

The theory of heredity belongs to the most grandiose scientific developments of recent decades. A study of the outstanding works of geneticists arouses us to amazed admiration of the power of our intellect. But man, for a number of reasons, is an especially unsuitable biological object for the study of heredity. All one can do is to attempt to apply to him the results of such studies obtained elsewhere. These applied insights may have yielded results in some special cases, though even there the exactness of the geneticist was almost never attained. But generally, especially in psychiatric theories of heredity, it became a fashion to play with all sorts of mathematical niceties, with the result that these unproductive investigations more and more degenerated into endless speculations whose results were so poor that their practical application—quite apart from the inhuman point of departure—was in most cases scientifically unscrupulous.

The other pillar, next to scientific investigation, is humanity, i.e. respect for the human being.

Every individual is an infinite world in himself. No scientific approach can attain the whole of man for he is always more than can be known of him. This is why the doctor, and especially the psychiatrist, must never be unaware of the inexhaustible potentialities and the riddle that every human being represents. This awareness should be with him even in dealing with every-day cases.

This inexhaustibility is the hidden essence of man, and it is impenetrable to scientific knowledge. The freedom of man is his most decisive reality, but for empirical science there is no freedom. Therefore there is no humanistic view without an image of man transcending the knowable and revealing what man is and could be. This image of man must be the concern of all faculties. The effort to attain it in all its implications provides everybody, including the medical doctor, with the field from which flows guidance in his special sphere of knowledge and action. The image of man had been too frequently lost and was blurred especially in large parts of the medical literature. There can be no true image of man without God. It is our task to reconquer this image of man.

Science and humanity are in quest of each other. The truly human physician does not expect science to give more than it can offer, but he wants the scientific contribution
to be complete and conscientious. The doctor as a scientist must know that in his practice he needs more than pure science. At the limits of science he is helper and companion of the suffering in the community of human existence.

Science and humanity are indissolubly linked. Where science is abandoned, fantastic tricks and delusions become a substitute for beliefs and the misled cling to their fanaticism instead of being bound to God. Un-science is the soil on which inhumanity can thrive.

The whole University is needed to make these two pillars, science and humanity, firm again. Medicine, like all knowledge and skill, must live in the realm of all-pervading truth, which constitutes itself in the universe of sciences and in the living communication of searching men. If instruction and investigation in the specialized departments is to be fruitful, then the whole university must live. There should be no dismembering.

The world-renowned surgeon, Billroth, wrote in the seventies that theology really does not belong in a University. A medical student would not go to theological lectures and a student in divinity would be in danger of losing his faith if he went to medical classes. But Billroth's feeling of piety nevertheless urged him not to speak up for the exclusion of the theological faculty. The heart of Billroth, a man with a humanistic education, could not yet be made to acquiesce in the disastrous ideas of division which then were common property and still are active today. But without God and the soul one is led to the murder of the insane.

Originally the University was a whole. Three faculties were created for the fundamental needs of man: the theological faculty for the salvation of the soul, the law faculty for the organization of the earthly community, the medical faculty for the sanity of the body. These three, in turn, were supported by the philosophical faculty which embraces the whole cosmos of the sciences, the fundamental sciences, those on which all practical action is based.

It was disastrous that in the second part of the 19th century this unity was lost—first in the general view of education and then in the structural aspects of university life. The consequences were: on the one hand the separation of the sciences and thus the invasion of unscientific thinking, because every department claimed to represent the whole, a decomposition which finally culminated in the hallucinations of national socialism; on the other, the inability to integrate the new effective forces of the century, especially techics, into one harmonious whole, and to permeate them with the spirit of the university.

A rebirth of the University based on its original foundations would have to extend its sphere. It would have to embody all the human concerns of our age and to reconquer their unity. It would have to make up for all that has been neglected for nearly a century. The task of such a renewal touches upon the essence of our profession.

The foundation of a technical faculty at the side of that of theology, law and medicine, and the re-establishment of the old unit of the philosophical faculty may prove to be the main problems of the outer shaping of the University, problems which can be solved only if the whole of our world is a living reality for each individual scientist.

Then the specialized professions can again march together, united in a common spirit. Then the theological faculty again really will be the highest faculty. Then all those who labor in their special fields will do so in a common awareness of the whole and with the view directed to the symbols of this whole. Then the physician again will be the doctor in the sublime sense of Hippocrates: The physician who is a philosopher is an equal of the gods.

Such a revival of the University, through the intellectual and moral atmosphere which it creates, would take hold of the whole of man. Thus a dependable spirit of citizenship could develop and spread. A truly humane state embodies power but also the self-limitation of power because it makes law a reality. The essence of such a state is rooted in the every-day thinking of its citizens, in their solidarity. Such a state, like all intellectual life, always is in the process of self-correction. Its freedom manifests itself in the lawfully-limited conflict of opinions—opinions that remain welded together in the common task in spite of the most radical differences. Such a state satiates itself with all knowledge and thus must find in the work of the University not only its clearest self-consciousness but the source of education of its citizens.

But this can succeed only if the University is an all-embracing whole and not an aggregation of vocational schools and specialized departments. National Socialism has shown that the idea of the University and that of dictatorship are mutually exclusive. The idea of the University participates in the rule of law of a state of free citizens. These are high aims. If we, in our situation, think of the revival of the University, we may well envisage them. Because even under limiting material conditions the mind is still open to the highest goals. But the road will be a long one. At present we can but make the very first steps.

We shall not jubilantly speak of the New Departure. We shall not again fall prey to a false pathos. We shall not pretend that from now on all will be splendid and wonderful and that we will be excellent men in excellent surroundings. Many fell prey to such illusions in 1918 and 1933. We must beware of such self-deception while ruin yet pursues its course. What remains is simply to shoulder the burden of our fate and to do what we yet are able to do: hard work for aims whose realization lies far ahead, with little hope for immediate happiness, but blessed by the service to an idea, and—especially with regard to the youth—with the stimulating experience of intellectual progress, the feeling of growing freedom and independence in the assimilation of the sciences, the widening and deepening of the soul.

May we who travel this road in the presence of a terrifying reality be granted confidence and courage.

(Translated by Rose and Lewis Coser.)

3. The Academic Scene

EDITOR'S NOTE:—The writer of these notes is an American who recently returned to this country after spending several weeks in Germany last fall.

It is hard to estimate accurately the degree of antifascism in German universities under Hitler. On the one hand, the only protests against the anthropology of racism and
the ecology of Lebensraum came from those who fled. On the other, a recent report from a liberal professor in the Philosophy faculty at Marburg claims that the academicians were surpassed only by the Church and one other group in their antifascist activity.

From another source, the Journal de Genève of Nov. 13, 1945, high praise was distributed among all the German universities, in an article entitled "The Crisis of the German Universities", for "the furious struggle during 13 years" against the Nazi hegemony. Goebbels polemicized against the intellectuals; and for their own part, the intellectuals in the review, Deutsche Justiz, took issue with the official organ of the S. S., Das Schwarze Korps on the nature of Nazi justice. A high point in this battle was reached when the Gauleiter of Saxony threatened to close the law and theology faculties in Leipzig during the war. The article notes: "Following the attempt of July 20th on Hitler's life, several professors sacrificed their lives or their liberty . . ." Since this is the only example of their political activity that the article can give, it becomes significant, considering the political character of the attempted July 20th coup.

The general political apathy of the German people is a fact agreed upon. The nonexistence of the German revolution—indeed, the virtual nonexistence of any sign of revolutionary tendencies—has removed the greatest obstacle to the ascendance of the reaction. The most powerful grouping today, both within and without the universities, is the Church Democrats, a grouping that roughly corresponds to the Hindenburg-Papen party of pre-Hitler days. Nie-moeller, the Bishop of Münster, the Junkers, big business and the royalties are joined in this proto-party structure.* The attempt of July 20th came from this group, and hence we can regard the viewpoint of the article cited as corroboratory of information from other sources as well.

A student at Göttingen wrote a letter at the end of October, shortly after the opening of the academic year, describing the life there. A Dr. Nebel gave a lecture on October 26th on "The Moral, Political and Economic Foundations of the Hitlerian War", from a more or less liberal viewpoint. 400 students were present at the beginning of the lecture, of whom 350 walked out, first in small numbers, then in larger groups. Noise and protests were so great that the lecture was not completed. Göttingen was not known as the most reactionary of German universities before Hitler.

The total student body at Göttingen this year is about 1500, the successful candidates selected from among 6000 applicants. The enormous disparity between applications and acceptances holds true for Hamburg and elsewhere; in Hamburg 2000 students out of 8000 applicants were admitted. The number of admissions has not materially changed from earlier days.

These high figures hold despite the fact that not all faculties were reopened as of November, 1945. The first news of a change in this situation appeared in the New York Times of January 9, 1946, which announced the reopening at Heidelberg of all five faculties. Among those universities from which I have seen reports: Hamburg, Marburg, Frankfurst, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Munich and Leipzig—with the exception of the last, all in the Western zones—the theological faculties were usually the first to be reopened. Medicine, Law, Science and Philosophy were opened later, and approximately in the order named, and not throughout Germany as yet. This is in part the result of decisions made by the military governments, in part the result of internal decisions made by the universities themselves.

The rector of each of the universities named above have been specifically characterized as members of the Kirchliche Demokraten, i.e., the Junkers Royalist-Church bloc. Moreover, the theological faculties discourage all liberal opinion in their midst, for the present at least.

Academic life is active today, as far as circumstances of life in Germany permit. Numerous publications in every faculty are being planned, to the end of restoring the former position of German scholarship. The only outspoken elements, with rare exceptions, in the universities, are the reactionaries, possibly with the sub rosa support of the military regimes, certainly with the open support of the vast majority of the students.*

The lack of a leftist current in the German people as a whole, has for its image the strong rightist movement in the world of scholarship. But with this difference, that whereas the people are generally listless and inactive, both the students and the university structures as a whole are active and relatively channelized in their political expression.

L. K.

* But let us not forget the Munich student revolt of 1943.—ED.

**WITH THE MARXICOLOGISTS**

Obviously Freud is not a Marxist . . . Those who help us most to understand the calibre of Freudianism are the petty-bourgeois intellectuals who spend their time jitters barging first toward the revolutionary movement and then away from it . . . Usually, their knowledge of Freudianism is embodied in the one monotonous query, "You haven't any inhibitions, have you?" . . . Freudianism amounts to little more than the paraphernalia of the art of sex appeal . . . Freud is simply the 20th Century's outstanding magician and entertainer. To call him scientific is to heap fuel on the fires of despair . . .

Freud sets up consciousness and unconsciousness as two polar opposites . . . (but in reality) they are opposites that demonstrate the dialectical nature of the material world in that they penetrate one another, so that the one is always becoming the other. To set the unconscious mind up as an independent entity, Freud exposes himself as unscientific and unmarxian in another sense, i.e., as a dyed-in-the-wool Formalist, which in turn is just another evidence of his bourgeois training . . .

Sigmund Freud never knew the proletariat. He is a product, direct, of the upper crust in the "Society" he presumes to analyze. Otherwise, he would find a graphic distinction between the "sexual life" of the perfumed degenerates of the Aristocracy and that of the proletariat. It is common knowledge that the vices of the overlords of industry, of the State, and of the church are imposed upon the workers principally by means of the whip of hunger.

—"Sigmund Freud, Houdini of the Libido," an unsigned article in "International News," August, 1945. It is important to note that the editors explicitly state that this article "does not necessarily represent the position of the International Contact Commission." The importance of this will be evident when it is recalled that the affiliates of the International Contact Commission include the Revolutionary Workers League of the U.S., the Leninist League of Great Britain, and the Central Committee of the Red Front of Greater Germany.
The Soldier Reports

The G. I. “Basic Personality”

Spending several years in the army is very discouraging to the socially-conscious American. Aside from the hardships of Army life and the difficulties of military living, there is the great revelation resulting from his living with other Americans of different backgrounds. When you come into the Army from a background of progressive thinking, you are at first astounded, then disturbed, then disgusted with the ideas you find so prevalent among soldiers, officers and enlisted men alike.

Many books have been written glorifying GI Joe as the good-natured, happy-go-lucky American, differing only in the O.D. color of his clothing from his countrymen. All of these books hold out the promise of a return-to-normalcy on the part of everything and everybody, intimating that this is good. But little has been told of a darker side of the story. In many respects the GIs are not the good guys they are painted to be. They are bitterly individualistic, certain that they are alone in their struggle for survival. They are full of hates against Jews and Negroes. They have shown that they lack any understanding of the plight and problems of foreign countries, and, found in these situations without the proper equipment in facts and feelings, they do much to build ill-will.

The fighting men returning from the front lines are bitter. In conversation they will tell you that they are convinced that it was they themselves who took care of them when they were up there. To show their intense individualism, they boast of the slogan which they are sure is the theme of every other American: “Hooray for me and f— you.” Nobody cared for them and they are sure that they care for nobody except their immediate family. They tell of friends and cousins working in war plants, not caring about the soldiers. So the GI is very bitter against those who went out on strike while they were “up there”. (They read about these strikes in their papers from home and in the Stars and Stripes. Yes, the volley of anti-labor publicity did hit its mark and had the desired results.) The GIs are sore at the unions for the things they read about while they were overseas. And nobody takes up for unions, not even the men among them who were trade union members—you hear them express their sentiments thus: “Now I’m a union member, but I’ll be damned if I can—.” Nobody takes up for the unions, that is, except for an isolated urban intellectual.

Their feeling of bitterness also causes them to question their patriotic ideals. Many derogatory remarks are overheard regarding the flag and patriotism. The rasher ones of these soldiers don’t care who knows their opinions on the flag, and will readily tell you what to do with Old Glory, should you mention it. He feels that these symbols die flag, and will readily tell you what to do with Old Glory, should you mention it. He feels that these symbols are just so many slogans used by civilians to urge him on to his duty. (Again the resentment against civilians.) This is serious because, despite the blinding-to-reality effect that such idealism has for those who do not think, it was still possible for liberals to use the symbols of the flag and the “American way” as It-mustn’t-happen-here leashes on certain more violent attitudes of intolerance and hate.

The Jewish soldier is soon impressed with the amount of “matter-of-fact” anti-Semitism, i.e. the hate seems to be part of the normal thinking. It is also easy to observe how this feeling increases and becomes vocal in direct proportion to the degree of discomfort of the situation in which the soldiers find themselves.

The official handling of Negro soldiers is merely a recognition of the great amount of sentiment against them found among white GIs. The army is the breeding ground for some of this. There is the well-known attitude of Southern white soldiers. The prejudices of the northern white soldiers, latent or non-existent, are aggravated by contact with Southern whites. The difference between Northerner and Southerner in the treatment of and attitude toward Negroes is a difference in degree rather in quality. Many times over the writer was given the same answer when he asked why usable guns were being shipped home as souvenirs: “After the war, you know, to keep the niggers in their place.” This from Northerner and Southerner alike.

The lack of sensitivity to other peoples’ problems prevented the average soldiers from regarding the foreigners whom they met as equals, and, with their “free” manner, the GIs made the Frenchmen and Englishmen feel this contempt for the way they lived. The American soldiers could see the differences in the wealth of their country compared with that of the land they came to, and they ascribed such differences to the deficiencies of the inhabitants. The sons of Polish and Italian immigrants returned to Europe and laughed at the people, treated them as inferiors, and created an unlimited amount of ill will.

There have been many explanations of these attitudes and actions. True, they were away from home. The English people tried to help out in the situation. The earliest soldiers were welcomed heartily and (early GI arrivals aver) English hospitality was offered to those who came to help. However, the GIs built up an antipathy toward the English. This was at once a reaction to the unfamiliar, to the restraint in English manners, and to the absence of many of the home comforts. Its origin was often the poor conditions on the English boats which were used in transporting the troops. Among the soldiers themselves there were those who came prepared to negate any effort at building amity: the Irish-American spoke with authority of the undemocratic English way of life; the former America First sympathizer brought his Chicago Tribune arguments. Soon the grumblings and discontent built on homesickness found another target: the English people, who conspired to “do” the GI out of all he had. It was the English, who, it was rumored, were charging exorbitant fees for every breath taken by American soldiers on this soil; so many thousand dollars for such very small items, money which the GI would have to pay when he returned to civilian life after spending his time to save “the British Empire”. It was the English store—and pub-keeper (especially the latter) who kept two scales of prices, one for his countrymen and one for the Yanks. It was the English who did not understand the inferiority of Negroes and even welcomed them to their homes; surely a nation of “nigger-lovers” couldn’t be on a par with a country of white men who knew the difference between whites and blacks. And then, look at the low moral standards: on the one hand. GIs sneered at how easy it was to “make” every woman who went out with them (the last five words being the clue to this problem); on the other hand, they spent most of their pass time with a lady-friend they “met” in Piccadilly or in a pub while handing out what soon came to be known as a “snow” job.

When they came to France the GIs found things a little different. Speaking to the civilians was a sore problem, for these people didn’t even speak English. The new medi-
um and basis for communication was what the soldiers had to sell on the black market. Despite official notices prohibiting such practices, there was large-scale dealing with foodstuffs, clothes, and luxuries. France did not have these things and there was ready cash on the black market, ready to pay prices which made the soldiers' heads whirl with thoughts of easy riches. It was the French who were paying. Completely absent was the reasoning that made the poorer classes, who had suffered under the Nazi occupation, so resentful toward this dealing: that the black market and its prices favored those Frenchmen who had a lot of cash, most of it cash made through collaboration with the Nazis. (For the poorer classes, collaboration by certain of their countrymen had meant that foodstuffs would be available only for the high prices the Nazis could pay, and so food producers became wealthy while their countrymen had little to eat.) The GIs never clearly understood this problem of collaboration.

There were many poor Frenchmen to be seen as the soldiers walked through the old streets to the local Red Cross, where they met and enjoyed the company of well-dressed young ladies who even spoke English. Soon there were homes they entered where they found comfortable living so like home. They were offered with a wink foods that they thought could not be found in French homes. The GIs were seated as guests of honor—probably in the same place where Germans had sat a year before. They never sought the reasons for the retention of such wealth through the occupation, when so many Frenchmen had suffered. The American soldiers listened as the host proclaimed the glories of Franco-American amity and explained why a republic worked for America, but France needed a monarchy.

Back at the army installations GIs found other Frenchmen working. Frenchmen who were so unlike the people they had met through their acquaintance with the finely-dressed girls. These people here looked so dirty. They ate the army chow so ravenously. And then they would dare to strike for more pay. Who did these Frogs think they were? They ought to appreciate . . .

The writer was never in Germany but stories returning to France showed another interesting point. (Army readers will please verify.) The GIs had a certain respect for the Germans that they did not have for the English and the French, a respect inspired by the higher standard of living they found in Germany. They could appreciate the things that were more like home—cleaner streets and houses, better-dressed and better-fed inhabitants. Such a milieu made the enforcement of the non-fraternization orders an impossibility. Yes, there was a lack of understanding that even confused the distinction between the handling of Allies and of the Enemy.

The politics of the countries visited proved to be mysteries to the GIs. They came from the land of Democrats and Republicans. They came to countries where they saw and heard the terms "Labor", "Cooperative", "Socialiste", and "Communiste" everywhere they went. The existence of strong parties bearing such names were to them only further proof of the "backward" (read "un-American") way these foreigners lived.

Those of us who take an interest in the problems of building a better society should consider the materials and manpower at hand for the task. There are obstacles rooted in the very character of the soldier, and therefore in the American citizen. These form strong bulwarks of the status quo.

The attitudes which did not permit the soldiers to understand the people and problems of other countries also form handicaps in understanding other Americans and American problems. Our progressives should investigate the rooted nature of these attitudes and seek ways to develop more understanding among our citizens. Perhaps adult education is needed. Or perhaps it is too late to effect the attitudes of adults. Perhaps the education of children in other, better values should be the aim of those groups and agencies whose existence depends on democratic life and thinking in this country.

ROGER REINGOLD

**Popular Culture**

**Hospitals - Some Letters**

EDITOR'S NOTE: There appeared in the October issue a modest little article by Nancy Macdonald on her experiences as a patient in a large New York hospital. Few, if any, articles in Politics have provoked so many long letters of comment and elaboration. As may be seen from the selections printed below, other patients evidently have suffered in the same way in hospitals and hasten to express themselves now that one of the humble fraternity has taken the trouble to put it all into print. (Most people's instinct, when unhappy or irritated in a hospital environment, is probably to blame themselves for being "difficult", since the hospital is so obviously antiseptic, highly organized and scientific. Actually, these traits should suggest to them just the opposite conclusion.) The most unexpected, and encouraging, response was from the nursing profession itself. The nursing division of the New York City Department of Hospitals ordered a bundle of the issue, for distribution among head nurses. And The American Journal of Nursing plans to reprint "extensive excerpts" in an early issue.

Your article on hospitals was a good job. I've worked at the Massachusetts General Hospital for three years in various capacities as a member of a CPS unit here. Here are some supplementary thoughts for you to mull over.

Remember that hospitals grew up either as Catholic or military institutions. They're still trying to out-grow an essentially authoritarian tradition. Some of the newer hospitals are doing it. But the big ones are usually old ones, and old habits die hard.

Probably as a private patient, you came in contact primarily with graduate nurses. Too many graduate nurses are tough and from the human point of view very unfunctional. Toughness is an occupational disease of graduates. They can't break down and cry over every patient that comes along, so some of them go to the other extreme. In wards the patient comes in contact with student nurses most of the time, and student nurses make up in humanity what they don't have in skill. Hence the ward patient is liable to have a less unhappy time in the hospital.

Doctors are snobs. And transmit that snobbery down the line frequently, to the nurses and orderlies. But when you see doctors trying to examine a patient that hasn't taken a bath in several months, you wonder that they aren't worse snobs than they are.

Out-patient departments, not the wards, are usually the places where those who cannot afford to pay get the worst
break. Outpatient departments can be inhuman beyond belief. It's common practice that a woman in OPD who has an interesting gyn case of some sort shall be examined pelvically by five, ten, or even fifteen medical students. Waits—just to see a doctor—can go on for two, three, even four hours.

I'm proud to say that I've seen at Massachusetts General both a colored intern and two colored student nurses. There are also a number of colored orderlies. The "library" around the hospital staff are trying to get the ratio increased rapidly and make it into an honestly interracial hospital.

A lot of the incredible amount of bureaucracy you see around a hospital, particularly in terms of the patients, is an outgrowth of the medico-legal responsibilities of the hospital staff. Everything they do has to be absolutely above board, signed, sealed, and stamped in case of legal suits. Hospitals can be wrecked by a couple of good suits. In hospitals—as a contrast to the rest of the world—human life is a very important matter.

BOSTON, MASS. WALLACE HAMILTON

I have spent the past nine weeks with polio in a public hospital and have reason to agree with the article wholeheartedly. I am trying to write an article about the vicious ignorance of child welfare as demonstrated here. This also is a hospital of fine standards; my recognition of the inadequacy of psychological principles especially relative to child care found a happy corroboration in the Macdonald article.

SEATTLE, WASHINGTON ELZA JAHN

Perhaps it reflects a fascination with the enormous that on first reading Nancy Macdonald's hospital article, I felt she had, with no evident knowledge of the problems involved, dealt with petty peeves, not even linking them with the grander destinies of man. . . . However, I found in her hospital this basic defect in common with the hospital where I work: that both are run from the top down, in a strict class system, with the most numerous class, the patients, in every sense at the bottom. From this I generalized that our institutions, even those run most purely for service, not profit, fit this authoritarian pattern. . . . Having now arrived in the safe and familiar field of human life is a very important matter.

BOSTON, MASS. WALLACE HAMILTON

I'd like to offer my appreciation for Mrs. Macdonald's article. I could match the incidents she gives with many more. In medical practices, greater emphasis is being made every day upon the connection between the fears of the larger problem to which politics has devoted much attention: that of making government responsible to its citizens. I've just spent two years working in a colony for feebleminded boys, and have talked at length with friends working in many other mental institutions. Almost universally we have found very low employee morale, as shown by intra-institutional feuds, disgust with their jobs, lack of any growth in understanding of their work, and of responsibility. . . . The administration clearly shows that it doesn't trust its employees, but hems them in by rules, checks up on them continually, treats them, indeed, as though they were inmates—and treats its inmates as though they were thoroughly depraved, completely irresponsible prisoners. . . . This attitude is not accidental but purposeful—and the purpose is to make absolute the authority of the superintendent.

We need to give some form of democratic control of their lives to both employees and inmates. But we need also to study the administrations, to discover the causes of the insecurity which makes them fear their employees so much that they sacrifice the purposes of their institutions to gain utter dependence of these employees.

MUNCOS, COLORADO CRANE ROSENBAUM

Your article will be welcome to many a brow-beaten patient. . . . Your "subhuman tools and insufferable gaul­citers" struck me as being especially suited to the girls in the X-Ray rooms I've been in. I am nearly sixty-four and consider myself fairly intelligent. Yet the head nurse of a clinic recently gave me the following instructions, in a loud impersonal voice with her eyes fixed on a point just above my head: "Go down this hall till you find a door marked 'Toilet'. Go in and empty the bladder; do not save contents—just empty it. Come back to this room (pointing). Take off all your clothes, and I mean all, lie down on the table with sheet over you."

HOUSTON, TEXAS MRS. WILLIE E. MILLER

Your article on hospitals is interesting for the light it throws on bureaucratic irresponsibility, which is one aspect of the larger problem to which politics has devoted much attention: that of making government responsible to its citizens. I've just spent two years working in a colony for feebleminded boys, and have talked at length with friends working in many other mental institutions. Almost universally we have found very low employee morale, as shown by intra-institutional feuds, disgust with their jobs, lack of any growth in understanding of their work, and of responsibility. . . . The administration clearly shows that it doesn't trust its employees, but hems them in by rules, checks up on them continually, treats them, indeed, as though they were inmates—and treats its inmates as though they were thoroughly depraved, completely irresponsible prisoners. . . . This attitude is not accidental but purposeful—and the purpose is to make absolute the authority of the superintendent.

We need to give some form of democratic control of their lives to both employees and inmates. But we need also to study the administrations, to discover the causes of the insecurity which makes them fear their employees so much that they sacrifice the purposes of their institutions to gain utter dependence of these employees.
The following are the total figures to date (Jan. 26):

- 730 people are sending packages or donating money.
- 419 European families are receiving regular packages.
- 1,316 packages have been sent.
- $3,224.40 cash has been received, which has been spent, without deductions for salaries or administrative expenses, on food and clothing packages.

As these figures show, the tempo has increased this month; the number of packages sent, for example, has almost doubled since January 1. (The actual total of packages sent to date is higher than the figure given here, since senders sometimes fail to mail in the cards to us stating they have sent off a package. The figure of 1,316 packages is the number we have sent from here plus the number indicated on the cards sent in to us.) In the last week, however, there has been a decided falling off in new persons offering to take on families. As we hear more from our friends in Europe (see letters below), we get more addresses of families and individuals in great need. It would be well, therefore, if those who are now sending packages would canvass their friends and attempt to interest them in the project. A folder is available describing the need and outlining the project. We shall be delighted to send to any reader as many copies as he thinks he can distribute.

The great majority of the European friends with whom we are now in contact live in France, many of them as refugees. It is, therefore, important to note that in the past month the shortage of food has grown very much worse in France (in contrast to most other European countries, where it is slowly improving). The political crises which was climaxd by DeGaulle’s resignation came about largely because of the government’s failure to solve the food supply problem. Judging from the letters now coming in from France, the importance of food packages from America has become even greater than it was last fall.

We have begun to send regular packages, through an agency which guarantees delivery, to over thirty families in Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the food situation is even worse than in France. We were able to arrange for a seaman friend to deliver to the family of a Polish refugee now in this country two huge suitcases of warm winter clothing as well as some personal letters—it was the first contact our Polish friend had made with his family in a very long time. Another seaman has been distributing vitamin pills in France for us. The most disheartening aspect of the Project so far is the refusal of the U. S. State Department to open the mails to Germany, thus preventing us from expressing in concrete form our fraternal feelings for the German people.

Since it takes almost two months for a package to reach an address in Europe, as well as another couple of weeks for letters to come back from there, we are only just beginning to hear from friends abroad who have received packages. (Many of the senders, who are in direct contact with “their” families abroad, no doubt are getting news now of the receipt of packages.) We are hearing, however, from many of the families who got our letter announcing the dispatch of packages. Some excerpts:

From Amsterdam, Holland (written in English): “My mother-in-law asks me to acknowledge your letter. . . . I can tell you it was a great surprise to learn about your solidarity. Her man was shot on April 13, 1942, by the Nazis; she herself was sent to a concentration camp in Germany until the end of the war in Europe. Her life was saved by Dutch friends who sent regularly packages to her and it is an agreeable thought that friends abroad are doing now the same.”

From Toulouse, France: “We were very glad to get your letter. The same mail brought us letters from Mrs. . . . of Washington and Mr. . . . of Toronto. These letters touch us to the heart. After so much persecution, it is good both morally and materially to find international solidarity. In Spain in 1939, after years of struggle and sacrifice, we had to flee, leaving everything behind. Again in France, in 1940, the German advance forced us again to escape with what we could carry. And finally, in February, 1941, the first organizers of the French Resistance fell into the hands of the police—my husband among them. He was imprisoned in France for three and a half years at hard labor, after which he was handed over to the S.S. and sent to Germany, to Allach and Dachau. “He came back ill and weak. He will need a good deal of rest and care before he can take up his work again, and begin to live once more. And so your help will be very useful for us. We do not presume to ask you for particular things. We are already pleased enough with this proof of international fraternity . . . Everything is equally necessary for us—we who have lost all and who no longer have anything . . . My husband lacks even a winter overcoat . . . Here are the addresses of two Spanish comrades who need help. . . .”

From Paris: “We were delighted to get your letter saying packages are being sent us; this fraternal gesture touched my husband and myself very deeply. (We are militant trade unionists.) My husband’s health is bad, and
your packages will be especially helpful for him. We have received a very sympathetic letter from Mr. . . . . . . of Chicago, which we answered at length, for we now consider him a friend. . . .

From Antwerp, Belgium (written in English): “This morning I received your letter, with which I am very glad. It makes thankful to know that among the American people there are families who think of us. Yesterday I received already a package with food and of course I’ll write that family to thank them. The package was very welcome.

“My husband was taken away by the Gestapo in 1941. He did not yet return. . . . Dear friend, if it is possible to send some clothes and shoes, I should be very thankful. It is not easy to ask, but my children need all.”

From Paris: “We got your letter yesterday, also two letters and one package from two of your readers. . . . Do ask us any questions about affairs over here; we shall try to answer them all. My own profession of history teacher imposes on me an objectivity which is not always consoling but which seems to me necessary. . . . We are all the more responsive to your efforts because over here the lack of everything one needs for civilized living causes individuals to isolate themselves from each other. There are even moments when we ask ourselves if we deserve your sympathy. . . . Pardon my uneven handwriting. It’s very cold and our little topfloor apartment—which dates from 1790—is badly heated.”

From Rotterdam, Holland (written in English): “The help of American friends means very much for us. Of course the great hunger is over now and we have personally enough bread and pulses, but there is a shortage of all other food—fat, butter, oil, sugar, meat, cheese, milk, fruits and vegetables. Holland has become very poor, and will remain so in spite of all propaganda. . . . It is not the first time that parcels are a benefit for me. During the German occupation, I was imprisoned in concentration camps for 4 years. In Dachau my life was saved by the help of German comrades, and afterwards Dutch comrades gave my wife the opportunity to send parcels to Dachau regularly. . . . We now see again such a splendid example of international solidarity. It is not pleasant to be casted on the line, glycerine, bandages, etc. We are completely out of socks, gloves, shoes, dresses, suits, jackets, handkerchiefs, linen, towels. Also: soap, dental cream or powder, vaseline, glycerine, bandages, etc. We are completely out of fats and grease, jams, rice, chocolate, cocoa, porridge, and every kind of fruit. We have about 60 children here. If your friends could assist them, we should be ever so grateful to you all.”

(Note: Readers who have extra children’s clothes, or who know groups which might send regular packages to this school, are invited to write in to "POLITICS" for its address and for mailing instructions.)

From a Parisian schoolboy, who decorates his letter with a colored drawing of the Eiffel Tower shaking hands with the Statue of Liberty: “With what joy I read and reread the translation of your nice “Letter from America.” That word makes me remember all the descriptions I have read of your great country, to which I hope to travel some day. Meantime, till such dreams come true, do you think you could satisfy my immediate wish by sending me some chocolate bars, which I have gone without for a long time and which I love dearly?”

From Paris: “Thank you for arranging to have one of your readers send me packages (Miss. . . . . . . of Tucson, Arizona—how poetic that is for us, Arizona!). I shall write her directly. In general, we lack almost everything—I say ‘we’, but the rich somehow manage to find the means to make life agreeable—and this winter is no joke in Europe.”

From Marseille (written in English): “My husband and I are professors of classical literature. . . . We have a little girl of 4 for whom I buy milk with great difficulty and expense. I wait a baby for June and I have never my ration of milk (a pint) though I should get it. No milk, no butter, no cheese, no soap, no tea, sugar extremely rare, no honey in this part of France. I cannot get diapers that can be boiled, and any woolen article is awfully expensive—a sweater for baby costs 800 francs ($16). A man’s suit costs $200, and that’s my husband’s monthly wage. Books are very rare and expensive. A Greek dictionary costs $40.”

From Paris: “Thank you for your letter. Mr. . . . . of Los Angeles writes he is sending a package—it will be the first I get. Some of my friends among the political refugees have received some, and they are delighted. I have to eat out, and cannot afford black-market meals. Right now it is very cold in Paris, and no heat in the rooms. It’s sheer black misery. But so long as solidarity is still alive, there’s no reason to despair.”

Stalinism It is often difficult for people who have Means Murder not followed Stalinist activities over a period of years to realize that Communism today is a movement just as ruthless, brutal and amoral as Nazism was—and even more dangerous, since it commands wide workingclass support. Even those of us who do understand this intellectually at times fail to grasp it imaginatively—in our solar plexus, so to speak. Even we sometimes forget that there is literally nothing, right up to murder, which the more conscious followers of Stalin will not resort to, if it seems likely to gain their ends.

This important commonplace of modern politics is given new meaning by two frightful pieces of information which have come to me recently from individuals whose authority and integrity cannot be questioned. The first is from Victor Serge. He writes:

“According to first-hand information that has just reach-
ed us here, the Stalinists of EAM-ELAS have murdered some hundred of the best militants of the Greek Archo-Marxist Party. A leader of this party—which is a left-wing socialist group corresponding roughly to the POUM in Spain and including a number of Trotskyists—writes us that the Communists took advantage of last winter's fighting to indulge in "a real massacre" of their leftwing opponents in the trade unions and in various parties. I might add that the Archo-Marxists' line on the recent civil war was close to that of POLITICS."

(To this may be added Louis Clair's report in The Call of November 19, based on information from Vitte, one of the Archo-Marxist leaders (erroneously reported killed by the Nazis in Athens). "Vitte states that the terrorist methods employed by the Stalinists in Greece were worse than those used in Spain. He thinks an independent international trade union delegation should be sent to Greece to investigate Stalinist crimes.")

The second is from Jean Malaquais:

"One of my friends, named Blasco, whom I have known since 1929, died under especially revolting circumstances. He was a Trotskyist. Arrested by the Vichy police in May or June of 1942 at Marseille—while I was still there myself—he was badly beaten and tortured. (He was an Italian, very robust, an old workingclass militant.) After the Germans occupied the "free zone", he was transferred to a Gestapo prison, where he was again tortured for several months. There was a group of Communists in this prison, and naturally there were some political discussions. Around the middle of 1943, Maquis forces took the prison by storm, freed all the prisoners, and took them off to the mountains.

"As soon as they had reached a place of safety, Blanco was at once murdered by the Stalinists who had been his comrades in prison. He had survived the tortures of Vichy and of the Gestapo, only to die at the hands of the Stalinists (who had seen him suffer so terribly). Alas, his theories about 'defending the USSR' did not soften the hearts of his killers."

The Intelligence Office

IN MEMORY: BORIS VOLINE

Sir:

Early in October, Boris Voline (Eichenbaum) died of typhus at the age of sixty in France. He was one of the most remarkable figures of Russian anarchism—completely honest, rigorous in his thinking, full of talent, of eternal youth and joy in struggle. During the 1905 revolution, he was one of the founders of the Petersburg soviet. There was a group of Communists in this prison, and naturally there were some political discussions. Around the middle of 1943, Maquis forces took the prison by storm, freed all the prisoners, and took them off to the mountains.

"As soon as they had reached a place of safety, Blanco was at once murdered by the Stalinists who had been his comrades in prison. He had survived the tortures of Vichy and of the Gestapo, only to die at the hands of the Stalinists (who had seen him suffer so terribly). Alas, his theories about 'defending the USSR' did not soften the hearts of his killers."

by getting the personal intervention of Lenin. While he was in prison, the Bolshevks offered him the post of Commissar of Public Instruction for the Ukraine—which he refused. In 1921, through the efforts of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, he was freed and exiled from Russia. He went to live in Berlin, then in Paris. . . . I met him again in Marseille in 1940, working in the ticket-office of a small movie house, living on practically nothing, and finishing his History of the Civil War in the Ukraine. Although Jewish, he refused to cross the Atlantic, hoping to take part in coming events in Europe, about which he cherished a romantic optimism.

Frail, rather short, his expressive face finished off with a small white beard, emphatic in gestures, with a ready wit and shattering repartee—he made me think often of the old rebel, Blanqui. We seldom agreed, but we were able to maintain cordial relations for twenty years. Have his precious manuscripts been saved? I do not know. Let us hope posterity will do justice to this intrepid and devoted revolutionary, who remained always—in prison, in the wretchedness of exile, as a fighter and as an editor—a man of real moral greatness.

MEXICO CITY

VICTOR SERGE

FREE SPEECH IN FRANCE

On January 18, the following cable was sent to the President of France:

It has been brought to our attention that La Verité, the central organ of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste of France is still refused authorization to appear as a fully legal newspaper. It is refused the purchase of paper, and all of the rights of a newspaper including circulation and distribution.

We understand that La Verité was among the first labor papers to be published in the underground in resistance to the Nazi invaders. It has an outstanding record of struggle against fascism.

In view of the declarations of your government that it observes the principles of democracy, we cannot understand why this working-class newspaper is being deprived of its rights of expression and circulation.

The attitude of your government seems all the more inexplicable since the Parti Communiste Internationaliste participated as a legal party in the recent French elections.

On behalf of the rights of free speech and free press, we urgently request your government to correct this injustice and grant immediate freedom of publication and circulation to La Verité.

Signed:
Roger Baldwin, Director, American Civil Liberties Union
Morris Milgram, Secretary, Workers Defense League
Liston Oak, Managing Editor, New Leader
Herman Singer, Editor, The Call
Dwight Macdonald, Editor, Politics
George Novack, Secretary, Civil Rights Defense Committee
Farrell Dobbs, Editor, The Militant
Max Shachtman, Editor, Labor Action

THE ATOM BOMB AND INSURRECTION

Sir:

I hope that a comment from this side of the Atlantic on your interesting series of articles on the Atom Bomb (September) will not be too late for publication. It seems to me that Harold Orlansky misses one point.

He says: "The atomic weapon will be zealously guarded by the armies of reaction. . . . Physical insurrection becomes impossible." There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in this—insurrection in the sense in which we have
used the term in the past will become impossible, since no revolutionary party can afford the money to make atom bombs, or can build a secret factory in which the manufacture of these huge weapons can take place.

But individual insurrection, in the sense in which it has been used by some of the anarchist intellectuals, is as easy as it ever was. You cannot use an atom bomb against Conscientious Objectors, unless you herd them together in masses and drop the bomb on them in the middle of a desert. Against individual rebels, working for the brotherhood of their fellow-men, you can use only rifles and handgrenades, as you have done in the past. From this it would appear that it will be necessary for those who wish to fight against the mass-tendencies of the time to work out a new technique of resistance suitable for the atomic age.

The real danger, as I see it, is that military conscription will so condition our children that there will be no progressive or revolutionary nucleus around which the forces of resistance can crystallise. If our children are to be psychologically conditioned by the militarists, it is of little use for us to work out ways in which we can fight against the totalitarian tendencies of the day. And that is why I feel that the first dominant need of the day is a satisfactory anti-conscription policy. There is our first job. When once we have succeeded in doing something which will stop us and our children from being engulfed in a vast military machine, we can get on with the development of a technique of revolt.

RADELL, ENGLAND  JOHN BROWLAND

REPLY BY PHIL HELLER

Sir:

Without wishing to enter into a fruitless polemic with Dwight Macdonald, I should like to add the following remarks on the International Solidarity Committee.

Our committee was organized on a wide basis to include trade unionists and progressives, as is evident from the list of sponsors. Among them are Sidney Hook, Louis Nelson, James T. Farrell, Israel Feinberg, Luis Arquizistain, Dr. William Bohn, Norman Thomas, Samuel Wolchok, M. J. Coldwell, Angelica Balabanoff, Felix Gross and Haakon Lie.

Our aid goes to all democratic anti-fascists. Typical of the list we have received is the case of Spain. The names include members of the UGT, CNT, POUM, and PSOE. This range holds true of other countries.

When Dwight announced his plan to form a separate and independent committee, we urged him to join ours, emphasizing that there was no need for an additional committee since we made no political distinctions among anti-fascists (we had previously received a list of anti-fascists from Nancy Macdonald).

We offered to accept any ideas, suggestions or constructive revisions Dwight might present to the committee. Dwight however, refused, and insisted on having his own committee.

Specifically Dwight mentions two points (see December issue p. 383-4):

(1) That Heller told him not to mention the Solidarity Committee. What did happen was that I outlined three possible courses of action for Dwight: (a) that he be part of the International Solidarity Committee; (b) that he organize a POLICIES section of the International Solidarity Committee, closely cooperating with us; (c) that he have his own separate and distinct committee. I strongly urged upon him course (a), even offering to resign as executive director in his favor. Dwight however, stated clearly that he would adopt course (c), but then added that he would say that he is cooperating with the International Solidarity Committee. I saw no reason for stating something that wasn't so.

(2) That Dwight and his readers do not have a sufficiently "ardent sympathy" with the Socialist Party "to make me want to merge". I doubt very much whether Dwight can speak for all his readers, or even for his contributors. The point, of course, is that this is not just an SP matter, even though it was initiated by a group of Socialists.

We believe that on all issues where agreement can be obtained, the cooperation of all democratic Socialist elements is desirable. Certainly the mobilization of relief for anti-fascists is such an issue.

In any event, every effort to send aid to our anti-fascist comrades is all to the good. Best wishes for the success of your project.

PHIL HELLER
Executive Director
International Solidarity Committee

COLLABORATION WANTED FROM C.O.'S

Sir:

The draft act has placed several thousand Conscientious Objectors, some hundreds of them POLICIES readers, in intimate contract with two of the more unhappy institutions of our society: the prison and the mental hospital. Both institutions have developed extensive facades of respectability and public service, but their functioning betrays an oppressive reality and conditions that even a stolid citizen would call scandalous.

Coming from a different social background than that of the average inmate or employee, and not obliged to make a permanent adjustment to the institution, the C.O. preserves a fresher and more critical view of it. It would be valuable to record this view for the light it throws on both the particular institution and the general society.

The writer is planning to edit a book designed to serve this purpose, and seeks contributions from Conscientious Objectors relating to prisons and hospitals. Some groups in or around C.P.S. are collecting similar material for further objectives of limited reform. The primary aim of this project, however, is not reform but description and critical analysis on the broadest possible scope. Among the questions that may be dealt with are: what is the administration's code of ethics—ideally, and really? How does this contrast with the code of employees? of inmates? what is the behavior of administrators, employees and inmates in relation to each other? to visitors from outside? what are the attitudes of members of the institutional hierarchy to their work? Contributions should be factual and unemotional.

May I invite any fellow C.O.'s who have material that might be suitable for such a collection to send it to me, care of "POLICIES"? And any others who think they might want to work something up on their own experiences to get in touch with me also?

HAROLD ORLANSKY

WHO SAYS THE RESISTANCE IS DEAD?

The French Chamber of Deputies has been cleared to receive the newly elected Assembly members on November 6th... The most thorough scrubbing in the history of the Palais Bourbon... Little physical damage had been done by the Germans during their years of occupation, but the Nazi influence, which had soiled the famous palace, had to be washed away.

politicking

Extracts from Karl Jaspers’ speech at the reopening of the University of Heidelberg have been published in German-language papers over here, but this is the first time the complete text appears. Dr. Jaspers, who began his career as a psychologist and later become one of the foremost living philosophers, is the founder of the “existential” school of philosophy which is enjoying considerable vogue today. His *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, completed in 1919, was the first important existentialist work. Other books include: *Psychopathologie* (1916), *Philosophie* (1932), *Neitzsche* (1938). He is now completing a book on Proust.


The second series of discussion meetings will be held in April and May, and not in March and April as previously stated. Speakers and topics will be announced next issue.

The pamphlet, “Shall Europe Starve?”, is going well and—from certain indications which I may be able to write about later—may have started something in the way of pressure on the Government. Some 7,000 of the original printing of 10,000 have been sold to date. It will probably be reprinted, in which case it will be possible to make an even lower price than the present 5¢ a copy on orders for 500 or more. Readers who might be able to place such quantity orders are requested to consult us on a wholesale price, and also to give us some idea of how many they and their organizations could use of a second edition.

I am embarrassed to report that my own article, “The Root Is Man”, is once more postponed, to the March issue. The article was originally announced, as I am sure many readers remember all too clearly, just two years ago—in the intrinsic difficulties of an extremely broad subject (the problem being largely what is the subject), partly by the hectic tempo which editing politics is acquiring as the enterprise expands, and mostly by my own incompetence and dilatoriness (perhaps also I am not too happy about the conclusions being forced on me by reality as I see it). There is a limit to putting off the evil day, however, and the article will definitely and finally appear next month.

D. M.

**SHALL EUROPE STARVE?**

by Dwight Macdonald

A 32-page pamphlet that exposes the facts about Europe’s urgent need this winter and our own Government’s callous indifference to the problem.

10c a copy; $1 for 20; $5 for 100

**Wanted! More Package Senders**

Last fall we ran the appeal printed below. The response from our readers has been prompt and generous. BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH! Already our files contain the names of over one hundred families to whom we are able to send only inadequate help—or none at all. And every week we get letters from abroad telling us of new families in desperate need. The food and clothing crisis in France (where most of the families are) is getting worse, according to the newspapers.

Therefore, we venture to ask such of our readers as have not hitherto taken on a European family, to do so now if at all possible.

Those now sending packages themselves can help by either giving us the addresses of friends who might be able to send packages, or, better yet, canvassing their friends themselves. A descriptive leaflet is available, in any quantity desired, on request.

We have collected from our own files and from friends of the magazine, the addresses of a number of families abroad who desperately need food and clothing this winter. These people are fighters for the ideals the readers of “Politics” believe in. Some of them have returned from years of imprisonment in German concentration and death camps, all of them have suffered and struggled for our cause. They are Socialists, Trotskyists, Anarchists, leftists of every shade. They are French, Italian, Dutch, German, etc.

There is no point in sending them money, since money will buy little in Europe today. (It costs $20 to get a pair of shoes resoled in France.) Food, clothing, soap, needles and thread—this is what is needed.

**WILL YOU UNDERTAKE TO SEND FOOD PACKAGES REGULARLY TO A EUROPEAN FAMILY?**

If so, fill out the blank below and we will send you one of the names in our files, together with full instructions as to size and weight allowed, how to mail, foods most needed, etc. We hope to arrange for each family to receive one food package a week (the maximum permitted). You may undertake to mail once a week, twice a month, or once a month, depending on the time and money you can spare. (The cost of each package, of course, depends on what you include. An average price, including postage, would run around $5.)

If you cannot, for any reason, send packages yourself, send us the money and we will buy the supplies and mail them ourselves.

Categories: *Politics*