THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
PART II
A HISTORY OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT: Volume III, Part II

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL
1889-1914

BY
G. D. H. COLE

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CHAPTER XII

AUSTRIA

In the Second International the Austrian Socialists, led by Victor Adler, held a position of high importance and respect. The Austrians were in many respects a model party: both their enthusiasm and their discipline were high; their relations with the Trade Unions were mainly satisfactory; they had no trouble at all with dissident factions of Left or Right — though they had plenty of difficulties over the question of nationalities. They were, moreover, a highly educated party; their principal newspaper, Arbeiter Zeitung, was justly celebrated for its uncompromisingly high standards; their cultural activities were at once widespread and intense; and they had shown great tenacity and courage in pursuing their aims under the trying and complicated conditions of the multi-national State, or Empire, within which they had to live.

For their own part, the Austrian Socialists were very proud of their party; and the greatest source of their pride was its internationalism. They liked to think of it, and to call it, a ‘Little International’ within the wider International to which it was attached. They pointed with high satisfaction to its success in holding together the Socialists of all the national groups of which the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or rather the Austrian part of it, was composed. Within the party, as within Greater Austria, there were Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Ruthenes — representatives of all the medley of peoples subject to Austrian rule; and each group was entitled to its own national organisation within the wider unity. The Austrian party prided itself on being internationalist almost by instinct; where other parties had to learn to transcend their national limitations, it found the knowledge ready-made for it in the daily struggle.

This pride was entirely genuine. Yet the Austrian Socialist Party was throughout its career essentially a German-inspired
SOCIALIST THOUGHT

party, though it included large contingents from other national
groups. Its leadership was mainly German, its thought and
its culture were German, it was subject to powerful influences
from the larger German Socialist Party beyond the frontiers of
the Austrian Empire. Its very conception of what a Socialist
party ought to be was a German conception, modified to suit
the conditions of a multi-national State, and also to take account
of the fact that the Austrian Empire was not a social unit
capable of arousing any feelings of passionate loyalty either to
itself or to the Volksgeist of its geographical population.

The Germans of Germany, including the German Socialists
— or most of them — while they fought against the German
State that Bismarck had unified under Prussian leadership, took
a pride in it too as the symbol of German achievement. But
the Austrian Germans had no more pride in Imperial Austria
than any of the other national groups subject to its rule.
Although, after the war of 1866, there was no longer any
immediate question of Austria being politically a part of
Greater Germany; though, for the time being, the Hapsburg
Empire had to be accepted as a fact, there was among its
peoples, outside the privileged classes, no sense of belonging to
it. Within its frontiers the working classes needed to find
means of living in union in order to fight against their rulers
and exploiters; but the union rested on convenience and
necessity, and not upon the sentiment of having a country or a
culture in common. Under these conditions their unity was
often difficult to maintain — as difficult as the unity of the
Austrian Empire itself. To be sure, the Austrian Socialists had
in one respect an easier task than the Hapsburgs. They were
not called upon to establish a common organisation with the
Hungarians as well as among the national groups under Austrian
rule. The Hungarians had their own national Socialist move­
ment, as far as the repressive rule of the Magyar aristocracy
allowed them to have any movement at all; and all the Austrian
Socialists had to do with this movement was to give it, from
time to time, a helping hand. But even without the Hungarians,
and without the Croats, and the Slovaks, and the Transylvan­
ians, and the other national minorities over whom the Magyars
of Hungary exercised an imperial authority, the Austrian half of
the Dual Monarchy presented enough of a medley of peoples

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to constitute a very difficult problem, especially in respect of the mutual relations of the Germans and the Czechs. These two national groups, though each had its homeland within the Austrian dominions, lived and worked side by side in many areas, forming part of a single labour force which could hope to protect itself only if it avoided quarrelling between its distinct national elements. There were extensive German districts in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as places where Germans and Czechs were intermingled — as in Prague itself; and in Vienna and other predominantly German cities there was a large Czech working population. The Poles, in Galicia, stood more apart, but there were Germans and Czechs there too, as well as Poles and subject Ruthenians; and there were Poles too — especially Polish Jews — in Vienna. Moreover, the Polish people were divided between three empires — the Austrian, the German, and the Russian; and Polish Socialism was accordingly rent asunder into separate movements, each compelled to work under the conditions imposed by its particular set of rulers and each torn between the sentiment of national unity and the need to make common cause with the workers of other nationalities within the State under which it lived.

In practice, within the framework of the Austrian Socialist movement, only these three national groups — Germans, Czechs, and Poles — counted for much. Neither Slovaks nor Ruthenians were advanced enough to be responsive to the Socialist call, or to find leaders of their own; and the Italians and Southern Slavs under Austrian rule played no great part either — the Italians because they were few and their eyes were turned towards Italy, and the Southern Slavs because they were both backward and divided between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy. The main problem of the Austrian Socialists was that of the terms on which the Germans and the Czechs were to work together, with that of the relations of both with the Poles coming in all the time, but less as a fundamental condition than as a complicating factor. Over the period studied in this chapter the problem of German-Czech relations became increasingly difficult as Czech nationalism developed into a more democratic movement. The 'Old Czechs', though many of them stood for the recognition of Bohemia as a kingdom in its own right and with its ancient institutions but would have liked
to achieve for it the status of an equal third partner as independent as Hungary and with an equal power to trample on the lower classes, could not hope to achieve this position in full in view of the intermingling of Czech and German elements in the Bohemian aristocracy as well as among the common people. Czech and German aristocrats had a joint interest in the Austrian State as the upholder of their class privileges. Czech, as well as German nobles, including Germans from Bohemia and Moravia, held high positions at court and in the governing bureaucracy. This intermingling of German and Czech elements in the ruling class simplified the task of the Socialists in organising a common movement against them — until there developed in Bohemia a Czech nationalist movement hostile to the aristocracy and finding its leadership among the Czech intellectuals and middle classes. These 'Young Czech' nationalists knocked away the foundation of the aristocratic semi-nationalism of the 'Old Czech' political leaders; and at the same time they raised up an awkward problem for the Austrian Socialist movement. Czech Socialists became divided between those who remained loyal to the idea of common organisation, with some measure of autonomy for national groups, and those who were not prepared to fall behind the bourgeois nationalists in their will to build up an independent national movement of their own. To a great extent, this division in the Socialist ranks was between those areas in which the population was mainly Czech, on the one hand, and on the other the German districts and those in which the two peoples were intermingled. The problem, as we shall see, became particularly acute in the field of Trade Unionism; for the Czech Socialists, headed by Antonín Němec (1858–1926), having built up their autonomous party within the federal framework of the wider all-Austrian party, went on to claim the right to build up their own Trade Unions as well, and this threatened to divide the industrial movement not only in Bohemia, but wherever Czech workers were found labouring side by side with workers of other nationalities. This challenge, however, came to a head relatively late — mainly after the deep disturbance caused throughout the Austrian dominions by the Russian Revolution of 1905, and after the winning of manhood suffrage in Austria that followed hard upon that great event. The Austrian
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Socialist Party was built up at a time when the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though confidently expected some day, still seemed too far off an event to serve as a foundation for current political combinations — or disjunctions. For a considerable time Czech Socialists were ready to play their part in a combined Austrian party, under predominantly German influence and leadership; and as long as Czech and German Socialists could act together without much jostling, the other national groups — except the Poles — were unlikely to present much difficulty, or indeed to play any very significant part.

As for the Galician Poles, they were very well aware of being a good deal better off under Austria than they would have been under Russia, or even under Germany. Austrian Poland enjoyed in the latter part of the nineteenth century a considerable measure of autonomy under its own aristocracy’s domestic rule; and when it developed a Socialist movement it could go its own way much more easily than the Czechs because the Poles occupied a compact area and were much less intermingled than the Czechs and Germans — except with Ruthenian peasants of whose claims none of the three more advanced nationalities, and least of all the Poles, were disposed to take much notice. The Polish Socialists quarrelled much more among themselves, between the groups under German, Austrian, and Russian rule, than with their fellow-Socialists in Austria, though they too became more restive after 1905, under the stimulus of the great upheaval in Russia.

The Austrian Socialist Party, unlike the German, had to make its way in a society in which the working class was, until quite late in the day, without political rights. Under the successive Austrian Constitutions in force up to 1896 the working classes had no voting rights at all: the electoral reform of that year retained the old system of separate voting by classes, but created a new class in which both industrial workers and peasants — but not workers in personal or feudal service — were entitled to vote. But the new class of voters was given only a very small representation in the Reichsrath, which continued to be dominated by the upper classes. Not until 1906 were voting rights extended to nearly all ranks on a basis of equal suffrage, and the separate classes of voters given up.

Throughout the period from the foundation of the Second
Socialist Thought

International in 1889 up to 1906 the Austrian Socialists were engaged, above all else, in the struggle for universal suffrage. They had indeed unified their party and set out upon this struggle only a few months before the Second International came into being on the hundredth anniversary of the great French Revolution. Previously they had been divided. The Socialist movement in Austria had originally taken shape in the 1860s as a German movement and under predominantly German influence. A branch of Lassalle's General German Workmen's Association had been established in Vienna, as the rival to an attempt to build up a Union of Workmen's Mutual Societies on the Liberal principles of Schulze-Delitzsch; and after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, when Austria had been definitely put outside the German Confederation, these movements had begun to develop on more independent lines. The Mutualist groups, founded in hostility to Socialism, had largely gone over to it; and the combined movement, though subject to considerable repression, received a stimulus from the constitutional developments of 1867, when Hungary acquired its right of independent government under the Dual Monarchy and it became necessary to institute some form of parliamentary representation for the Austrian part of the empire. In the reconstituted Reichsrath of 1867 the working classes were given no electoral rights and there was not even any system of direct election. The members of the Reichsrath were elected by the provincial Diets of the various parts of the Austrian Empire, and these Diets themselves continued to be chosen by means of a system of voting by classes which kept the preponderance of power in the hands of the landowning classes. Nevertheless, the establishment of a form of constitutionalism gave a stimulus to political discussion; and the Socialists, especially in Vienna, came under the influence of Marxism and established links with the new Socialist Party set up in Germany at the Eisenach Congress of 1869, on the basis of a fusion between the Marxist followers of Liebknecht and Bebel and the dissident section of the Lassallians. Delegates from German Austria actually attended the Eisenach Congress, and took part in establishing the German party. Viennese Socialists, led by Heinrich Oberwinder (1846–?), working with Marx's friend, J. P. Becker, at Geneva and with German and German-Swiss Socialists at
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Zürich and in other Swiss cities, took part in the later proceedings of the First International and, in particular, helped to provide Becker with his fictitious Marxist majority at the 'rump' Congress of the Marxist International held at Geneva in 1873. But the rival 'anti-authoritarian' International also had its supporters in Austria, especially in Vienna; and the united movement of 1869 soon fell apart.

The right to form Trade Unions had indeed been nominally conceded in 1866, and the concession had been followed by the contest, already mentioned, between the 'self-help' and the 'State-help' factions — that is, between the Mutualists and the Lassallians. But as fast as the latter faction got the upper hand and began to organise great workers' demonstrations in Vienna and other centres, the Government arrested the leaders and revoked the concessions that had been made as a sequel to Austria's defeat by the Prussians. 1869 is a critical date in the history of Austrian Socialism. In that year the Viennese workers held before the Parliament House their historic demonstration to present a petition in favour of the rights of public assembly and Trade Union combination. The small Social Democratic Party which took the lead in organising this movement had been set up in 1867, largely under Lassallian influence; and in 1869 Hermann Hartung (1842-?) founded the journal, Volksstimme, as the organ of the new movement. The great demonstration was a sequel to the establishment of parliamentary government in Austria on the morrow of Bismarck's victory over the Austrian forces at Sadowa; it was a protest against the continued persecution of the working-class movement, despite the nominal legalisation of Trade Unions, by the supposedly Liberal Cabinet formed to operate the new Constitution of 1867.

The right of combination was nominally restored for a short time in 1870; but again mass demonstrations were met by numerous arrests and police attempts to destroy the movement. The renewed struggle went on into the economic crisis of 1873, which almost destroyed the Trade Unions and drove what was left of them underground.

In that year of crisis the Austrian Social Democratic Party split into two rival factions, the one, known as the 'Moderates', led by Heinrich Oberwinder, and the other, the 'Radicals', led
by the brothers Andreas and Josef Scheu. This is the same Andreas Scheu (1844-1927) as later, having settled in Edinburgh, and thereafter in London, played a considerable part in the British Socialist League and Social Democratic Federation. The ‘Radicals’ were considerably influenced by the German, Johann Most, who had become an Anarchist and had been expelled from the German Social Democratic Party about 1880. Most, after he had been driven out of Germany, tried to establish his journal, Freiheit, first at Zürich and then in London, before he transferred his headquarters to the United States in 1882. Presently Most’s influence was reinforced by that of the Bohemian-born Anarchist, Josef Peukert (1855–1910), who in 1879 founded his own journal, Zukunft, in Vienna. Peukert, who was a very effective orator, carried on a vigorous propaganda among the Austrian workers, but was suspected by the Scheus, as well as by Oberwinder and the ‘Moderates’, of being a police spy and agent provocateur. At all events, during his period of influence a number of Anarchist outrages occurred in Vienna, and were met by violent measures of police repression which extended to the Socialists and the Trade Unions as well as to the small Anarchist groups. Before this crisis came to a height Oberwinder, in 1878, had left Austria and returned to Germany, where he had been born. He played no part in the subsequent history of the Socialist movement. Peukert himself left Austria in 1884, when the exceptional law against the Anarchists was enacted. He went to Germany, where he joined forces with Pastor Stöcker, the founder of the Protestant anti-Semitic movement. Subsequently, after a sojourn in Paris, he emigrated to the United States, dying in Chicago in 1910.

What was left of Austrian Socialism after the early ’seventies was sharply divided into the rival groups of ‘Moderates’ and ‘Radicals’ — the latter with a distinctly anarchistic tendency which was encouraged by the votelessness of the entire working class and by the difficulties in the way of open political and economic organisation.

Socialism in Austria had been from its very beginnings subjected to exceptional laws analogous to those which were later applied by Bismarck in Germany. The Sozialistengesetz of 1866, which remained in force until 1881, put severe restric-
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tions on the rights of meeting and organisation; and in 1884, as a retort to the activities of the Anarchists, it was supplemented by the Special Law (Ausnahmezustand), analogous to the sus­pension of Habeas Corpus in Great Britain. This put Vienna and Wiener-Neustadt under an emergency police régime until 1891. These measures made development difficult, but did not succeed in preventing the gradual recovery of the Socialist movement from its suppression in 1884.

Meanwhile, the Austrian constitution had undergone some revision. Under the system whereby the members of the Reichsrath were chosen by the provincial Diets, it had been easy for any discontented national group to embarrass the central Government by refusing to elect its quota, and then claiming that the Reichsrath’s measures could not legitimately be applied in its own area without the concurrence of its representatives — or even that its entire proceedings were invalid for want of a proper quorum. In 1868 the central Government attempted to counter this move by enacting that, when a provincial Diet failed to elect representatives to the Reichsrath, direct elections could be ordered — still under the class system, which gave the preponderance of power to the upper classes. The recalcitrant Diets, however, easily defeated this measure by electing their representatives to the Reichsrath, but instructing them not to attend its sessions. This led, in 1873, to a further law, by which elections to the Reichsrath were taken entirely out of the Diets’ hands, and direct election made general; but the voting qualifications were not altered, and the class system of representation was retained without change. It remained unchanged until 1882, when a new electoral law broadened the franchise to include all direct taxpayers of 5 gulden (about 10s.) and upwards, the new voters getting their electoral rights in the separate ‘class’ constituencies of the towns and rural districts. This reform brought in a considerable body of better-off peasants and also of urban middle-class voters, including Jews, who had been the victims of a growing anti-Semitic Catholic movement since the economic crisis of 1873. The anti-Semitic campaign, led by Karl Lueger in the 1870s, helped to arouse the Jews to make common cause with the other groups hostile to domination by the Catholic Church.

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The revival of Austrian Socialism, mainly under Viennese leadership, began in the later 'eighties. In 1886 the Vienna doctor, Victor Adler (1852–1918), who came off a well-to-do Jewish family and had already begun to make his name as a psychiatrist, founded a weekly journal, Gleichheit, as an instrument for reuniting the rival Socialist factions — possibilist and revolutionary — in a single party. Out of Gleichheit presently grew in 1895 the Arbeiter Zeitung, the celebrated daily paper which continued to be the principal organ of party opinion right up to its suppression by Dollfuss in 1934. Within ten years of this beginning the conditions had become ripe for the establishment of the unified party which was designed to imitate and to emulate the achievements of the united Social Democratic Party of Germany. Karl Kautsky, himself an Austrian by birth, took part with Adler in drafting its constitution and statement of policy, which were approved at a Congress held at Hainfeld in December 1888 and January 1889. The structure and programme of the new Social Democratic Workers' Party of Austria were based on those of the German party, which was still subject at the time to Bismarck's Exceptional Laws. It was accordingly designed to be a centralised party and to work in close association with a Trade Union movement, formally independent of it, but actually accepting a common leadership. At the time of its establishment it could hardly hope to win seats in the Reichsrath, in face of the narrowness of the franchise; but soon after it had been founded the situation was radically altered by the course of events in Bohemia. Throughout the 1880s Czech representation in the Reichsrath had been almost monopolised by the 'Old Czech' party, dominated by the Bohemian aristocracy and supporting the conservative forces within the Austrian State. This party stood for a policy of aristocratic federalism as against the centralising policy of bourgeois constitutionalism upheld by the majority of the German representatives. During the 1880s this 'Old Czech' party had been subject to increasing attack from the 'Young Czech' nationalists, who objected both to its aristocratic temper and to its subservience to Vienna and the imperial governing clique. The climax came in 1896, when the central Minister, Count von Taaffe, as part of an attempt by the Emperor to strengthen his position by uniting the more
conservative groups behind the central power, negotiated a compromise settlement of the Bohemian problem between the Bohemian Germans and the Old Czechs on terms which would have put powerful obstacles in the way of the realisation of the Young Czechs' demand for democratic autonomy within a 'Triple Monarchy' giving the Bohemian provinces an independent Government analogous to that of Hungary. The proposed settlement was so fiercely opposed in Bohemia that it had to be dropped, and on its failure Taaffe dissolved the Reichsrath and appealed for a rally of all moderate opinion behind the Government against the more extreme groups on both sides. In Bohemia this manœuvre utterly failed. Despite the narrow franchise, the Old Czech party was practically wiped out by its Young Czech rivals, who both in the Diet and in the Reichsrath appeared in force with a programme of intransigent democratic nationalism.

It must not be supposed that this new Czech nationalism was in any sense Socialist, or based on any large body of working-class support. It was a movement mainly of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois groups under the leadership of Czech intellectuals. Indeed, Taaffe attempted to counter it and the analogous developments of bourgeois nationalism in other parts of Austria by proposing a measure of franchise reform which would have abolished the property qualifications for voting in two of the four electoral classes — those of the cities and the rural districts, while leaving intact the privileged position of the landowning class and the special representation allowed to the Chambers of Commerce. His hope was that by bringing in a large new body of electors he would be able to swamp the bourgeois constitutionalists and nationalists, and still keep a sufficient safeguard for the aristocracy through its right to separate representation. The aristocrats, however, found this altogether too much to swallow; and this proposal in turn had to be withdrawn. Taaffe resigned from office in 1893; and there followed a short period of unstable equilibrium, with one Government rapidly succeeding another, until in 1895 a new Minister, Count Badeni, himself a Polish aristocrat, carried through a measure of franchise reform which for the first time admitted a large body of workers and poor peasants to the electorate.
The electoral law of 1895 was a very curious measure. Instead of abolishing the system of voting by separate classes, or enlarging the existing class electorates of the cities and rural districts, as Taaffe had proposed to do, Badeni left the entire class system of voting as it was, but added on to the existing four classes — aristocracy, Chambers of Commerce, cities, and rural districts — a fifth class, in which any male adult not specially disqualified could be enrolled. The principal exclusion was that of ‘personal servants’, including servants on the estates of the landowners. These were left out on the plea that they were not free agents — and of course in deference to aristocratic opinion. The new fifth class, consisting of electors excluded from the other four, had by far the largest number of electors, but was allotted only a small proportion of the total number of seats in the Reichsrath — 72 out of 425, whereas the landowners alone had 85, the cities and Chambers of Commerce together 139, and the rural districts 129 — all these latter groups continuing to be elected on the narrow franchise of the old law. It did, however, become possible after 1895 for the Socialists to win seats, though only a limited number, in the new fifth class. At the first election under the new law they won 14 seats. The Socialist victories of 1897 were won mainly in Bohemia and in Vienna, the two strongholds of the party. At the following election, in 1901, losses in Vienna brought them down to 10. In 1897, largely as a result of the electoral law, the Socialist Party decided upon a thorough reorganisation. As long as the workers had no votes it had been possible for it to fight as a united body, rallying the whole membership behind the demand for universal suffrage and priding itself on its solid front against the divided national factions of the aristocratic and bourgeois parties. But as soon as it found itself in a position to contest elections in the various regions, it had to take account of the national differences within its own ranks, at the penalty of losing support to other parties standing for nationalistic claims. Accordingly, at the Brünner Congress of 1899, the Austrian Socialists converted their party into an almost federal grouping of seven national sections — German, Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Italian, Polish, and Ruthenian — with a federal executive drawn from the seven sections and with provisions for the party to act in the Reichsrath as a
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United whole. Each section was to have its own local and regional organisation and was to be autonomous in the conduct of its own affairs; but of course in areas of mixed population the national groups were to act together both in elections and in their day-to-day work of propaganda for Socialism. The new form of organisation worked fairly simply in areas where each nationality occupied a compact territory of its own: it involved much greater complications where they were mingled together, as in parts of Bohemia and Moravia, in the Slovene regions, and in Vienna and some other industrial centres.

The new programme adopted by the Brünner Congress of 1899 embodied a demand for the reconstitution of Austria as a democratic federation of the constituent nations. It laid down that in place of the historic Länder, which did not correspond to national divisions, a number of autonomous national territories should be formed. For each of these territories there was to be a Chamber, elected by general, equal, and direct suffrage, with independent powers of legislation and administration within its area on national and cultural affairs. These national Chambers were to replace the old Diets. Territories inhabited by the same nation were to form national unions: in each territory the rights of national minorities were to be safeguarded by laws enacted by the Reichsrath as representing Austria as a whole. As no one nation was to be recognised as holding a superior status, there was to be no common state language. Each nationality was to be free to conduct its public proceedings in its own mother-tongue, and to organise its cultural activities on the principle of linguistic autonomy.

The new structure was accepted with reluctance by many Germans who strongly admired the unitary form and centralised power of the German Social Democratic Party; but it was recognised as the only possible alternative to the establishment of entirely separate Socialist Parties in Bohemia and Galicia, if not in other areas as well. It never operated without friction; but up to the winning of manhood suffrage in 1907 the continual struggle for equal and universal voting rights did a great deal to hold the party together in common opposition to the governing classes, which were also banded together, despite their national differences, to resist its advance. The necessity of accepting nationality as a basis of organisation within the party
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also set the Austrian Socialists thinking hard about the relations between nationalism and Socialism and trying to find means of reconciling nationalist claims with their conception of an overriding working-class solidarity transcending national differences.

In this they had a difficult task because certain of the national groups inside the Austrian Empire were strongly disposed to assert their claims not only to self-government for themselves but also to superiority over other groups which they regarded as more backward. In the other half of the Dual Monarchy Magyar nationalists seldom felt any scruples at exercising dominion over Slovenes or Rumanians or Transylvanian Germans, or, as long as they could, over the Croats, who had played a part in defeating the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. In Austria, nationalist claims were never pressed quite so outrageously as in Hungary, largely because Germans and Czechs were both claimants to superior status and intellectual leadership and were so intermingled that they could not, as the Poles largely could, localise their aspirations. The Young Czechs no doubt demanded an autonomous Kingdom of Bohemia, united to the rest of Austria-Hungary only by a personal union under a common monarch; but they could not hope to get this, or anything approaching it, if they had against them both the major part of the Bohemian aristocracy, in which Czech and German families were intermingled, and the large German minority in the middle and working classes in Prague and in many other parts of Bohemia. The Czech groups within the Social Democratic Party had to do their best to come to terms with the Germans; and the German Socialists, for their part, could not do without Czech support — which they needed the more because of the anti-Semitic feelings aroused by the large Jewish element in their ranks, especially in Vienna. The German Socialists needed all the support they could get from other national groups in their fight against this powerful anti-Semitic movement, which was seeking to build up Christian-Social trade corporations and political formations among the urban workers as well as in the country areas.

In accepting a federal-national basis for the Socialist Party, the Socialist leaders insisted on rejecting any parallel sectionalisation of the Trade Union movement, on the ground that workers of different nationalities were widely employed not
only in the same industries but also by the same firms or in competitive firms in the same areas, and that it would be disastrous to divide them into separate groups according to nationality. The Austrian Social Democratic Party had summoned a Trade Union Congress to meet in Vienna, despite legal obstacles, as early as 1890, and out of this had developed a Central Trade Union Commission, similar to that of Germany, divided into a number of separate Trade Unions for the various industries or occupations. This central body worked in close association with the central organisation of the Social Democratic Party; and when the party was reorganised on a basis of national sections there arose a demand for a parallel reorganisation of the Trade Unions. The Socialist—predominantly Viennese—leadership of the Trade Union movement was prepared to agree to the setting-up of national sub-commissions in the various areas, composed of the local branches of the all-Austrian Trade Unions, and also to the organisation in suitable cases of separate language branches of the same Union in a particular area. What it would not accept was the establishment of separate Unions for each nationality in each industry or occupation, with affiliation of each such Union to a national Trade Union centre of its own and only a confederal grouping of the national movements into a common super-commission.

The position was complicated by the demand of the Czech Socialists—or rather of a section of them—that there should be not merely a separate Trade Union movement in Bohemia, attached directly to the Czech Socialist organisation, but also a recognised right of the Unions belonging to the Czech centre at Prague to enrol Czech workers in other parts of Austria. The nationalists, as usual, were seeking to have matters both ways, by building up a Trade Union movement in Bohemia itself and also by claiming jurisdiction over workers of Czech nationality wherever they worked. The Germans could not admit this double claim; but they were also unwilling to admit the first part of it alone, on the ground that the Trade Unions needed to act under common control and leadership throughout the territories belonging to Austria. The Czech Socialist Party leaders disliked this, not only because it ran counter to their claim to the national allegiance of all Czech workers, but also because it meant in practice a Trade Union movement with its
centre in Vienna, and subject mainly to German influence.

When, in 1907, this question, unresolved by direct negotiation, was taken to the International Socialist Congress, and was also discussed at the International Trade Union Congress, the Austrian Socialist Party and the All-Austrian Trade Union Commission, spoken for by its strong man, Anton Hueber (1861–1935), received the overwhelming support of the delegates from other countries, headed by the Social Democrats and Trade Unionists of Germany. Karl Legien, the German Secretary of the Trade Union International and the leading Trade Union representative in the German Social Democratic Party, vigorously denounced the Czech separatists. It was pointed out that in fact the majority of Czech Trade Unionists, in Bohemia as well as elsewhere, had remained attached to the All-Austrian Central Trade Union Commission, and had accepted the existence of a sub-commission in Bohemia and the right to form language branches within the All-Austrian Unions as enough. As against this, the majority of the Czech Socialists, led by Antonín Němec, refused to admit that the International had any right to dictate to them, and took their stand on the accepted doctrine that the Trade Union movement in each country ought to be so constituted as to work in close alliance with the Socialist Party. This meant, they said, that the Czech Socialist Party, even if it worked as an autonomous body within a wider, federal, All-Austrian Party, must have its own Trade Unions directly connected with it and not subject to Trade Union bureaucracies located in Vienna and related directly to a centralised All-Austrian Trade Union Commission. The dispute was never resolved: it lasted until, as an outcome of the first world war, Czechoslovakia emerged as a separate sovereign State, entirely parted from Austria.

As we saw, up to 1906–7 the fissiparous tendencies in the Austrian working-class movement were held in check by the concentration of the movement’s attention, not exclusively but primarily, on the struggle for universal suffrage, which united it in a common crusade. In this long struggle, it was indispensable not only for the various national Socialist groups to work closely together, but also for the central party to have the assured support of the whole Trade Union movement. As long as the Socialists were excluded from voting rights and, even
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After many of them had got the vote, as long as the class system of voting put most of the seats in the Reichsrath beyond their reach, they had to make use mainly of non-parliamentary methods of pressure; and their principal weapon came to be that of the political general strike. This, of course, depended on Trade Union support; and, even short of strike action, the Socialists depended a good deal on the Trade Unions to bring the workers solidly out on the streets for mass demonstrations. From 1893 to 1907 the Socialist agitation for universal suffrage was continuous and occupied the central position in the party’s activities; and the repeated use of the strike weapon helped to bind the Trade Unions more closely to the party, by requiring the workers’ mass participation in political affairs through their industrial organisations. In Germany the Trade Unions were not called upon to play any similar positive rôle in the party’s work, and accordingly their acceptance of Social Democratic leadership was much more passive than active, and they played a much less important part in relation to the party. While the struggle for the suffrage lasted, Austria appeared to have achieved a model system of united party and Trade Union organisation and action; but this was in fact due much more to the absence of a democratic electoral system than to anything inherent in the structure or the fundamental ideas of the Austrian Labour movement. In Belgium and in Sweden the struggle for universal suffrage had, as we shall see, a somewhat similar effect.

In France and in Germany, on the other hand, universal—or rather manhood—suffrage came not as the result of successful Socialist agitation but at the hands of non-Socialists. The German Social Democratic Party built up its strength on the foundation of manhood suffrage introduced by Bismarck first in the North German Confederation and then for the Reichstag of united Germany. In the 1860s the Lassallians had set out to found a German Socialist Party with adult suffrage as its first objective; but they had speedily got what they demanded, not as the outcome of their own efforts, but because Bismarck himself wanted it as an instrument for solidifying and modernising the German State under his own control. After 1870 the German Socialists were engaged primarily in gathering in supporters who, if male, were already voters, and in making an
impressive demonstration of electoral power. They were under no need, because of their lack of means of political expression, to invoke the aid of the Trade Unions to bring industrial pressure to bear; and accordingly, having no use for general strikes themselves, they were inclined to look askance at their use by others. As for France, fear of ‘les ruraux’ and a lively memory of Napoleon III’s use of the plebiscite, took the magic out of the cry for universal suffrage, which had played so large a part in Louis Blanc’s propaganda in the 1840s. A wide franchise versus a narrow one was not an issue that divided Socialists from other parties: it was an assumption of republican politics, not a revolutionary change to be fought for; and because of its disappointing results, in 1871 as well as after 1848, French working-class opinion, or at least a large section of it, was apt to scorn democratic parliamentarism and to regard the general strike not as an instrument for strengthening the hands of a political party, but as a weapon in its own right, to be used for educating the proletarians for revolution, and perhaps even for bringing revolution about.

For the Austrians, on the other hand, the demand for universal suffrage was both a battle-cry against the reactionary and still largely feudal State and a means of unifying the national Socialist groups behind a common programme. The German Socialists looked forward to a Socialist Germany, and the French Socialists to a Socialist France; but hardly anybody looked forward to a Socialist Austrian Empire, at any rate as more than a possible makeshift. Many Austrian Socialists wanted an All-Austrian Socialist movement as a weapon against the Austrian State rather than as a means of making it Socialist and using it as the foundation for a durable Socialist order. Even if they were proud of the federal unity of the Austrian ‘Little International’ and urged that it was to be preferred, because it was international, to the break-up of Austria into a number of separate sovereign States, each dominated by a particular nationality, they did so without enthusiasm and hoped for the merging of the ‘Little International’ into a greater international after the expected victory of Socialism in Europe. Among the Austrian Germans many were already inclined to regard the reunion of German Austria with a transformed Socialist German Reich as the historic destiny
which would go with the re-establishment of Poland as a united nation and the emergence of a great Southern Slav State when the conditions for it were ripe. About Bohemia they had much more uncertain prognostications because of the mingling there of Germans with Czechs. Some of them hoped that Bohemia, too, would consent to become a partner in a Socialist Greater Germany; but, for the most part, they did not quite know what to expect, or even to hope for. For the time being, they knew that the Anschluss with Germany was not practical politics; and the complications involved in it could therefore be pushed aside.

Despite this lack of enthusiasm for, or ultimate hope in, Austria as a country of divers nationalities, the Austrian Socialists were for the time being committed to working, not only within it, but also for its preservation, if only because it could not, as matters stood, be broken up without war. The Austrian Socialist movement, at its core in Vienna, was strongly peace-seeking and anti-militarist, not only out of love of peace but also because war might easily worsen the position of Austria to Russia’s advantage. In this attitude the Viennese had the strong support of the Austrian Poles, who knew themselves to be much better off than their neighbours in Russian Poland, and had no wish to fall under the domination of the Czars. They had also the support of the Germans in Bohemia and in other parts of the Austrian Empire; and even the Czechs who demanded complete independence had for the most part no wish, by severing all political ties with Austria, to expose themselves to the danger of being annexed by another great power. Consequently, with the less advanced Slav groups counting for relatively little in the Socialist counsels, the national groups which made up the Austrian Socialist Party continued to rub along together, not without a good deal of bickering, but without falling altogether apart. Their unity, however, became more precarious after 1905, when the possibility that a Socialist revolution in Russia might start off a whole series of revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe brought to the fore the question of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and set each national group to considering its own attitude in such an event. The defeat of the Russian Revolution thereafter pushed the whole question back; but the effects on sentiment in Austria were
lasting. One great factor in holding the Austrians together was fear of Russia. This fear revived strongly at the time of the Balkan Wars, which brought the rivalry of Czarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in South-Eastern Europe to a head. But after 1905 the possibility of a successful Russian revolution could no longer be ruled out; and such a revolution was widely felt to be incompatible with the survival of Austria-Hungary as a single power, or of the Austrian part of it as a single sovereign State.

Apart from this, the very success of the Austrians in winning the vote necessarily weakened their sense of the need for close unity. The main plank in their common programme having been withdrawn, it was none too easy to find another to take its place. Now that they had become an important parliamentary party the emphasis tended to shift to the struggle for social and economic reforms, especially for improved labour laws regulating conditions of employment and for the development of social services on the German model. But these were poor substitutes because they tended to change the Socialist Party into a reformist party and to involve compromises with other parties in the Reichsrath and in the provincial legislatures, and even more because the pursuit of reforms within the existing structure tended to identify the Socialist Party with the Austrian State and to deprive it of its revolutionary force, which had been a powerful bond of union.

It is indeed unlikely that the Austrian Socialists would have won manhood suffrage and the abolition of class voting if they had been alone in wanting it. The electoral law of 1907 was due fully as much to the Government’s own wishes as to Socialist pressure. The Government hoped, by bringing in a great body of new voters and by depriving the privileged classes of their monopoly of a large number of seats, to render possible a solid majority which would rally behind it against the Socialists as well as against the contending national parties that had been making stable government impossible. During the years which immediately preceded the change the work of the Reichsrath had been reduced to utter disorder mainly by the obstructive tactics of the Czech nationalists and by the violent opposition aroused by controversy over relations between Austria and Hungary. The Government had been reduced to the necessity

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of carrying on affairs by imperial ordinances of very doubtful legality without the Reichsrath's assent; and the new law was designed both to placate the national groups and to remove some of the causes of conflict between them.

It was indeed a peculiar law. In place of the division of the electors into classes was put a new division into national constituency groupings. Each nationality in each area was to vote separately for its own representatives; and the constituencies were so arranged as to fix the numbers of deputies which each nationality would have. Thus German Progressives could stand against German Conservatives, or German Christian Socialists, or German Social Democrats; and Young Czechs could fight Old Czechs or Czech Socialists; but German could not stand against Czech — and similarly in the case of the other nationalities. The allocation of seats to the various national groups was not proportional to population: it was based on a mixture of factors, including economic and political development as well as population, and was considerably affected by manœuvrings for advantage among the groups. In its final form it was markedly favourable to the Germans and after them to the Czechs as against the other Slav peoples. It gave the Germans 233 seats, the Czechs 108, and the Poles 80, out of a total of 516 seats, leaving only 95 for all the rest.

This system, designed to go as far as possible towards preserving the German ascendancy, while recognising in particular Czech and Polish claims, necessarily made against the unity of the Socialist Party, which had previously aimed at transcending national differences in its electoral campaigns in areas of mixed population. In particular, it meant in Bohemia a sharper division between Czech and German Socialists, who had to conduct their campaigns for separate constituencies. It thus increased the tendency towards making the Austrian party a federation of national parties rather than a multi-national party. In a few constituencies the feeling for unity was strong enough to induce the local party groups to nominate candidates not of their own nationality; but this was a rare occurrence. In general, nationalistic tendencies were strengthened, and it became more difficult to hold the party together. The new constitutional arrangements also had some reaction on the relations of the party to the Trade Union movement.

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During the suffrage struggle the Socialists and the Trade Unions, headed by Anton Hueber and Heinrich Beer, of the Metalworkers, had acted most effectively together. The culminating points in their co-operation were the general strike which preceded the creation of the new class of voters in 1896, and the twenty-four hours' general strike of 1905, which was decided on after the news of the Russian Revolution of that year had reached the Austrian Party Congress while it was in session. The limitation of the 1905 strike to a single day was largely Victor Adler's doing. Adler's tactics were not to embark on a movement which would inevitably lead to serious clashes between the strikers and the police and soldiers, but to make the one-day strike the final stage in a process that was to begin with public meetings to prepare the workers and then to take the form of a sequence of more and more impressive orderly demonstrations in Vienna and other towns. The strike itself was thus only a demonstration on a specially large scale, held during working hours instead of at the week-end; but it was accompanied by the threat that, unless the demand for equal voting was met, it would be repeated and not necessarily limited on further occasions to a single day. In the heat of the excitement generated by the events of 1905 in Russia Dr. Adler had some difficulty in persuading the party to content itself with this programme; but his immense prestige with the party carried the day. When the Government still hesitated, the strike threat was renewed the following year; and the Government then finally decided to abandon the class system of voting altogether and to introduce manhood suffrage, in separate nationality constituencies, at the age of twenty-four. This fell short of the Socialist demand, which included both votes for women and a lower voting age. But the concession was big enough to bring the struggle to an end for the time being. The immediate effects were seen when, in 1907 under the new law, the Socialists won 87 seats in the Reichsrath out of a total of 501, as against only 10 at the election of 1900. Of the 87 the Germans numbered 50 and the Czechs 24; there were in addition 6 Poles, 5 Italians, and 2 Ruthenians. But the German Christian Socials, the leaders of Anti-Semitism, had 96 seats; and the Czech National Socialists, fighting as a separate party, had 9.

Between the two main phases of the struggle for universal
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suffrage the Austrian Socialist Party found time in 1901 to revise its programme, which had been drawn up shortly before the German Social Democrats replaced the Gotha Programme of 1875 by the Erfurt Programme of 1891. The Germans at Erfurt had expunged the Lassallian elements and had affirmed their complete adherence to Marxism. Then had come the Revisionist controversy, ending in the voting down of Bernstein's attempt to rewrite the Marxist doctrine in gradualist terms. As we saw, Karl Kautsky, who was one of the protagonists in this controversy, was Austrian by birth and had taken a leading part in drawing up the original Austrian Socialist programme of 1889. His influence was still strong in the formulation of the revised programme of 1901, which again largely followed the German example, except that there had to be much less emphasis on state-wide centralisation. The Austrians, like the Germans in Germany, equipped themselves with an immediate programme of demands for social and industrial legislation as a complement to their fundamental programme envisaging the complete conquest of political power and the transformation of the State; and after 1907, with their increased representation in Parliament, they were in a position to give greater prominence to their demands for reform within the existing system. They were, however, confronted in Austria with a much more extensive Catholic Social movement than the Germans; and this movement had a more reactionary character because of its ties with the feudal elements in the Austrian State.¹ There was no Kulturkampf in Austria to render the Catholic movement at any time an even potentially beneficent force. So-called Christian Socialism, as it developed in Austria, was closely linked with Anti-Semitism and altogether lacking in the liberal tendencies which had appeared in Germany under the influence of von Ketteler and his followers. In Vienna particularly, the struggle between a Socialist movement in which Jews played a leading part and a Christian Social movement deeply infected by Anti-Semitism was very bitter. The Christian Socials, under Karl Lueger, captured the Vienna City Council and also made rapid headway in the German-speaking rural areas.

¹ For the Austrian Christian Social movement in its earlier phases see Vol. II, p. 259 f.
This very bitterness helped to give Viennese Socialism a strong cultural tinge. Even more than in Germany, Socialism became, above all in Vienna, a way of life and developed its own cultural institutions in both the intellectual and the artistic fields. It had its own music, in a centre in which musical talent was highly developed and enthusiasm for music exceptionally strong. It had its own educational services, extending over a wide field; and its leading daily newspaper, the Arbeiter Zeitung, became under the editorship of Friedrich Austerlitz (1862-1931), not so much a purveyor of news as a medium for unending intellectual exposition and discussion of every sort of contemporary problem. The Austrian, or at any rate the Viennese, Socialists became the most highly cultured and instructed body of proletarians in the entire world; and they managed, on the whole, to make their intellectualism and their culture means to solidarity rather than sources of disruptive sectarianism. They liked going about together; they enjoyed mass demonstrations and celebrations; they had a high sense of comradely behaviour. When, in 1890, the Labour movements of the various countries began to celebrate May Day and to use it as an occasion for rallying their forces to challenge the established order, none took with greater enthusiasm to the new symbolism of the workers’ cause than they. The German Social Democrats never quite liked May Day, with its potential outcome in clashes with the authorities and political uses of the strike weapon. The Austrians, on the other hand, made the fullest use of Labour Day as an occasion for demonstrating, not only for the eight hours’ day and for other immediate domestic reforms, but also against war and in the name of international working-class solidarity.

The Austrian ‘Little International’ was indeed very proud of its loyalty to the cause of internationalism over a wider field. As the threat of war in Europe became greater on account of imperialist rivalries, the Austrians threw themselves energetically into the struggle for peace. The danger-point for them lay particularly in the Balkans, where Russian and Austrian ambitions clashed and the position was complicated by the German drive towards the Near East. The Austrian Socialists, especially the Germans and the Poles, were largely governed by their hostility to Czarist Russia; but they were also anxious to
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prevent the Austrian Government from embarking on perilous adventures in Bosnia and Herzegovina or from pushing its quarrel with Serbia, which was accused of stirring up trouble among the Austrian Southern Slavs, to extremes. When war broke out in the Balkans the Austrian Socialist Party took a leading part in the efforts of the Second International to end the struggle, or at any rate to prevent it from spreading so as to involve the great powers. They took a prominent place in the special Bâle Congress which the International summoned in 1912, and vigorously supported the Balkan Socialist Parties in their demonstrations of international solidarity in face of the rivalries of the contending States. They endorsed the Socialist demand for Balkan federation, and stood out against separatist national expansionism. Finally, when the Sarajevo assassination of 1914 brought Europe to the very brink of war, they did their best to check the Austro-Hungarian State from plunging over the brink by sending an ultimatum to Serbia.

It was therefore a shock to many Socialists when, on the actual outbreak of the European War, the Austrian Socialist Party gave its full support to the Austro-Hungarian State, on plea of the necessity of national defence. Already, in the line they had taken after Sarajevo, they had declared that the Austrian Government had a right to demand guarantees from the Serbs, and had foreshadowed what their attitude might be in the event of war. But, up to the actual outbreak, they had insisted that the dispute could be settled by peaceful means; and the undertone in their declarations had not been fully appreciated. When war had begun, they proclaimed the need for Socialists to defend their country against external attack, and justified their support of the war by reference to the menace of Russian invasion. They also sought to justify the attitude of the German Social Democratic Party by the same argument. The German Socialists, in the debates at the Second International, had always maintained that, because each people had a right to defend itself, Socialists in any country would be within their right in supporting their Government in a defensive war; and both the German and the Austrian majorities now contended that the war was, for their peoples, a matter of national defence. To the main issues involved in this contention we shall come later. We are here concerned only with

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the reasons that underlay the Austrian Socialists' volte-face. Undoubtedly, the two main influences that acted upon them — over and above the strong pressure which always exists for the sentiment of state solidarity to assert itself in time of war — were, first, the hatred of Russian autocracy and, secondly, the keen sense of German unity which pervaded the predominant section of the Austrian party. It appeared very plainly in 1914 how fundamentally a German-inspired and German-led party the Austrian Socialist Party was. Moreover, on this issue the German Austrians had the whole-hearted backing of the Austrian Poles, who not only hated the Russians but saw in the war the opportunity to use Galicia as a base for the invasion of Russian Poland. Józef Piłsudski was speedily at work, raising a Polish force on Austrian soil for this purpose in the name of the Polish Socialist Party.

There were indeed from the first dissentients from the line taken by the leaders of the Austrian party. Victor Adler himself took the lead in supporting the war; but his son, Friedrich Adler, was among those who regarded the attitude of the German and Austrian parties as a betrayal of internationalism. Robert Danneberg, the secretary of the Austrian party, took a similar view. The younger Adler was, indeed, to be driven later by his troubled conscience to the sensational act of assassinating the Prime Minister, Count Stürgkh, as a protest against the war policy. But in 1914 the main body of the party followed its old leaders, and accepted Victor Adler's plea that the war was one of national self-defence against aggression. The Austrians, like most of the Socialists of most of the belligerent countries, thus threw over the policy which the Second International had proclaimed at Stuttgart and at Copenhagen, and rallied to the side of their traditional enemy, the Dual Monarchy, and of the Germans.

It must, I think, be admitted that, from the moment when manhood suffrage was introduced in 1907, the Austrian Socialist Party had lost much of its impetus, and had not clearly known what its common rallying cry was to be. It had turned almost overnight from a mainly extra-parliamentary crusade into a parliamentary party; and the instinctive moderates in its ranks and the ageing leaders who commanded its respect had at last got the chance, previously denied them, of acting upon the
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State from within. After 1907 the main body of the party in the Reichsrath and in the central organisation had moved rapidly rightwards; and the differences between the right and left wings were threatening to become acute even before 1914, but were held in check by the need to take united action in relation to the Balkan Wars. 1914 ended their unity, though the extent to which it had been ended did not at once appear. The younger men who had been criticising the old leaders mostly found themselves called up for military service and could do nothing for the time being. Czechs and Poles became more concerned with thinking and planning for the future of their own national communities than with continuing to collaborate in the Austrian 'Little International'. There was a growing confusion of tongues until it had become clear that the days of Austria-Hungary were numbered, and that the Austrian party of the future would have for its domain only a mere residue of the multi-national State within which it had been accustomed to work.

Throughout the period dealt with in this chapter, Victor Adler was the unquestioned leader of the Austrian Socialist movement, and enjoyed an enormous prestige. In the Second International he was a great figure, alongside Bebel, Vandervelde, and Jaurès; and his voice was always that of a conciliator, urging the need for unity and citing his own party as an example of it in a State in which international unity was particularly difficult to maintain. In the controversies between orthodox Marxists and Revisionists, Victor Adler was on the orthodox Marxist side. He was against Bernstein because he held that what he called Reformism would involve any party that embraced it in the danger of forgetting its Socialist goal. He favoured reforms, but not Reformism. 'We have to keep in mind', he said, 'that all our wearisome work from day to day for the present derives its sanctity and dignity solely from its meaning in relation to the achievement of our ultimate goal.' In this view, as in much else, he was close to Karl Kautsky. But he was never willing to push his differences with the Revisionists to extremes. He always recognised their sincerity and searched for a way of coming to agreement with them by compromise — the more so because he was by temperament a reformer and not a revolutionary and had been forced into
theoretical revolutionism against his bent by the intransigent autocracy of the German and Austrian States. After 1907 even this theoretical revolutionism had been modified, though never abandoned altogether; like Kautsky and the main body of the German Social Democrats, Adler had managed to reconcile practical reformist activity with the profession of revolutionary Marxism.

Eminent as a leader, Victor Adler was no great contributor to Socialist thought. He was an organiser and a political leader, and not, save incidentally, a theorist. He played a large part in solving the practical problems of Socialist unity in a multi-national State, but he contributed little to theorising about the national problem. That was left to Otto Bauer. Nor did he make any significant addition to the Social Democratic theory which he took over, ready-made, from the Marxism of the German Social Democratic Party. In his speeches and occasional writings he showed both fervour and common sense, but no substantial originality. Indeed, the Austrian Socialists made their main contribution to Socialist thought, until Otto Bauer and Max Adler became important, mainly as Germans rather than as Austrians. Karl Kautsky, as we have seen, was an Austrian by birth; and so was Rudolf Hilferding, whose *Finanz Kapital* was one of the major writings devoted to the restatement of the economic doctrines of *Das Kapital* in twentieth-century terms. Among the other first generation leaders of Austrian Socialism, Engelbert Pernerstorfer (1850–1918) was notable for his advocacy of Greater German unity; and Wilhelm Ellenbogen (1863–1947) was outstanding as an exponent of the doctrine of the political general strike in its Austro-Belgian form; but neither takes rank as an original Socialist thinker.

Indeed, the distinctive Austrian contributions to Socialist ideology up to 1914, apart from Otto Bauer's work on the problem of nationalities, are not easy to disentangle from the contemporary movements of German Socialist thought. The phrase Austro-Marxism became current during the controversies of the period immediately before the first world war, largely in connection with epistemological disputes that were pursued much more energetically in Russia than in other countries. Plekhanov and, after him, Lenin denounced the Austrian as
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well as the Russian 'Empirio-Critics', such as Bogdanov, for building their fundamental philosophy on Kant and thus forsaking the materialist determinism which was an article of Marxist faith, and also for treating Hegel as a 'dead dog' and discarding Marx's dialectical approach. In Germany Bernstein, following the much-abused F. A. Lange, had invoked the name of Kant in support of his Revisionist approach to Marxism; and Lenin attacked Bernstein's great opponent, Kautsky, for saying that Socialists were not necessarily called upon to take sides in such philosophical disputes, and sought to brand him too as a renegade from the true materialism.

The Austro-Marxists developed their views chiefly in the journal, Der Kampf, founded by Otto Bauer, Karl Renner, and Adolf Braun in 1907, and in a series of volumes begun in 1904 under the collective name of Marx-Studien. In addition to Bauer, Renner, and Braun, the outstanding figures of whom account has to be taken in considering the growth of Austro-Marxism before 1914 are Friedrich Adler, son of Victor Adler, Rudolf Hilferding, Max Adler, and Gustav Eckstein.

The Austro-Marxists were never in fact a coherent school advancing a particular agreed theory. They were rather a group of highly intelligent individuals who set out from a general acceptance of Marxism and attempted to apply the Marxist system to a number of particular problems which in their view Marx had either not considered or had failed to solve — some of them because they were not ripe for solution, or even present as problems, until after his death. Thus, Otto Bauer set out primarily to tackle the problems of nationality and nationalism in their relation to the basic internationalism of the Socialist outlook. Karl Renner concerned himself with the theory of private law and with the functions of law in a Socialist society; Max Adler, in his work on Causality and Teleology, attempted a reconciliation between Marx's philosophical conceptions and those of Immanuel Kant; Rudolf Hilferding, in his Finanz Kapital, sought to develop Marx's theory of the working of capitalist society in the light of the development of capitalism from its industrial to its later financial stage, in which the dominant figures were no longer the industrial employers as much but rather the great financiers whose interests ramified through a host of separate enterprises, and whose primary
concern was not so much the production of any particular commodity as the extraction of sheer surplus value by means of financial monopoly and the pressure of high finance upon the States they increasingly controlled. Finally, Eckstein’s contribution to the *Marx-Studien* was a sociological study of the family, based mainly on a study of Japanese family law.

The collective product of this theoretical activity could hardly have been any common body of doctrine. As far as it had unity, this unity lay in a refusal to regard Marxism as a closed or completed system and in a determination to use it as a starting-point for fresh thought with a practical bearing on contemporary issues. Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941), who was one of the editors of the *Marx-Studien*, moved in 1907 from Vienna to Berlin, where he was made a leader-writer for *Vorwaerts* and became an influential figure in the German Social Democratic Party. He published his chief work, *Das Finanz Kapital*, in 1910. In 1914 he was in the minority which was against the voting of war credits, and he subsequently ranged himself with the anti-war group. In 1918 he became a German citizen; and in the post-war struggles inside Germany, as editor of *Freiheit* (1918–22), he opposed the Communists and became the leader of the Independent Socialists who in 1922 rejoined the Majority Social Democratic Party. He was Finance Minister for a short time under Stresemann in 1923, and again in the Müller Government of 1928. He was generally recognised from 1910 onwards as the leading financial expert of German Social Democracy.

Karl Renner (1870–1950), who was to become President of the Austrian Republic in 1946, was the son of a Moravian peasant. He became librarian of the Reichsrath, and was later elected as a deputy in 1907, and immediately began to play a leading part in the Austrian Social Democratic Party. With Otto Bauer, he was a strong advocate of cultural autonomy for the constituent nations of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, taking as his special province the legal and administrative aspects of the problem. By temperament Renner was a moderate, though during the years before 1914 he counted as a member of the advanced wing of the Austrian party. In 1918 he became the first Chancellor of the Austrian Republic; and after the return of the Christian Social Party to power in 1920 he was President
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of the Assembly. His book, *The Foundation and Development Aims of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*, which appeared in 1906, was the most comprehensive attempt to work out a basis for the reconstruction of the Dual Monarchy on a basis of national autonomy. Later he wrote works on *The Renewal of Austria* (1919) and on *Economic Planning and Socialisation* (1924).

Friedrich Adler (b. 1879), son of the leading figure in the pre-1914 Austrian Socialist Party, was trained as a physicist, and from 1907 to 1911 was lecturer on physics at the University of Zürich, where he established close connections with the Swiss Socialists. In 1911 he returned to Austria as Secretary of the Social Democratic Party and took over the editorship of *Der Kampf*. In 1914 he was among the Socialists who opposed the war. The break-up of the International disturbed him deeply. In October 1916, as a protest against Austria's war policy, he shot the Austrian Prime Minister, Count Stürngkh, and used his trial as an opportunity to make a powerful internationalist attack on the war. Condemned to death, he was reprieved and sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment; but the end of the war led to his release. He became Vice-President of the Social Democratic Party in the Assembly of the new Austrian Republic, and acted as Secretary of the 'Vienna Union', more commonly called the 'Two-and-a-Half' International, which attempted to bring the rival Socialist and Communist Internationals together into a united body. When this effort failed he became Secretary of the Labour and Socialist International which in 1923 reunited the parties of the Second International and of the Vienna Union.

Friedrich Adler, while he was at Zürich, lectured on the philosophical doctrines of the Austrian physicist, Ernst Mach (1836–1916), and subsequently, while he was in prison, wrote a book about them, entitled *Ernst Mach's Conquest of Mechanistic Materialism* (1918). Mach had no connection with the Socialist movement, but was regarded by Lenin and by other upholders of Dialectical Materialism as the chief inspirer of the attempt to undermine the belief in the ultimate reality of material objects, by going back to Kant and developing on a Kantian foundation a theory of knowledge which, while discarding all metaphysical conceptions, rejected outright Materialism as itself.
involving an assertion of the reality of 'matter' that could not be derived from sensual experience or verified by any scientific process of investigation. Mach, who was born in Moravia and became professor successively at Graz and at Prague, formulated what he called the 'principle of economy' as a rule of scientific method: what he meant was that the investigator should always choose the simplest methods of approaching a problem and should exclude all complicating factors that are not essential to its solution. In accordance with this principle he excluded Kant's conception of a 'thing in itself', necessarily outside human experience, as underlying the sensations which he regarded as supplying the entire content of man's knowledge. It is unnecessary, he held, and essentially 'metaphysical', to postulate entities behind the sensations men experience; and he proceeded on the basis of a 'positivistic' theory of knowledge involving no metaphysical assumptions. Such a view involved a denial that 'matter' really existed, or rather that it could be known to exist; and the thorough-going Marxian materialists were up in arms, because they held that to question the reality of matter was to relapse into idealism and to assail the Marxist doctrine of the priority of things over ideas about them. More particularly, Mach asserted that what were called scientific laws were properly to be regarded, not as laws, but merely as convenient ways of approaching the solution of a problem, and therefore as relative to the nature of the problem rather than true or valid in any absolute sense. This view Lenin held to be subversive of the Marxist doctrine, as involving a denial of its universality and reducing it to a mere tool of investigation. Moreover, Mach's method, as applied to social studies, appeared to involve a psychological approach by way of the sensational content of experience rather than by way of the material world as a whole; and this Lenin denounced as involving mere 'subjectivism' as against Marx's essentially objective approach. Much of Lenin's impassioned denunciation of 'Machism' in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, which was primarily an onslaught on the Russian exponents of the doctrine, now seems extremely crude and beside the point; for modern relativity doctrines and the general development of modern Physics have clearly proceeded largely along Machian lines. Nor is it easy to appreciate now why Lenin felt so vehemently
that to question the need for assuming the real existence of matter as a 'thing in itself' outside human experience was deadly sin. Mach's real error lay, not in this, but rather in confusing the two essentially different statements that 'all our experience is got in the form of sensations' and that 'all our knowledge consists of sensations'. To affirm the latter does indeed involve complete subjectivity and a denial of the knowable reality of any world outside ourselves; whereas to affirm the former involves no denial of the objective reality of that which we do experience through our senses and recognise as distinct from our sensation of it.

It does not appear that Mach's way of approaching problems had any influence on the thought of the group of Austro-Marxists who, from 1907, were developing their views in the Marx-Studien. They did undoubtedly influence Friedrich Adler; but his book on Mach did not appear until 1918, and his earlier lectures on Mach were barely known. The direct influence of Kantian philosophy on the Austro-Marxists was much more widespread: it extended markedly to Otto Bauer, and affected the formulation of his theory of nationality.

The most important figure in the pre-1914 Austro-Marxist group was undoubtedly Otto Bauer (1881-1938), whose work on The Question of Nationalities and Austrian Social Democracy, first published in the Marx-Studien, was the outstanding contribution to the problem of the co-operation of nationalities within a multi-national State. Bauer, born in Vienna, became at the age of 26 Secretary to the Austrian Parliamentary Socialist Party, and almost at once gained recognition as one of the party’s leading theorists. Called to the forces on the outbreak of war, he became a prisoner in Russia and was there during the Revolution, which strengthened his left-wing opinions. Returning to Austria, he was appointed Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the first Government of the Republic, and became Foreign Secretary almost at once on the death of Victor Adler. During the post-war years he was mainly responsible for shaping the new policy of Austrian Socialism. His pamphlet, The Way to Socialism (1920), which broadly defined the course which the party set out to pursue, was followed by two works on the agrarian problem, The Struggle in Wood and Pasture (1925) and The Agrarian
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*Programme of the Austrian Social Democratic Party* (1926), as well as by a further exposition of the party's general programme (1926). He also wrote an account at first hand of *The Austrian Revolution* (1923), two short works on Bolshevism and the Soviet Revolution, and a study of post-war capitalism published in 1925. Most of his work, except his study of the national question, thus falls into the period after the first world war and will have to be discussed in the next volume of this book.

Bauer's views on the problem of nationality, however, belong here. He and Renner were the two principal writers who attempted to cast into the form of a theory the actual policy which the Austrian Socialists had been led to adopt in reconstructing their movement in response to national claims. Their views had a good deal in common, but were not wholly the same. Both were greatly influenced by the desire not, if it could be avoided, to allow Austria to fall apart into a number of completely independent States, each resting on a foundation of national unity; and both were led, because of this, to emphasise the cultural and personal aspects of nationality rather than the political or economic aspects. But Renner went much further in this direction than Bauer, attempting to establish the possibility of a sharp separation between the cultural and the politico-economic aspects of society, and aiming at an extreme form of cultural nationalism combined with the preservation of a unitary economic structure and of an overriding political authority representing the common elements of citizenship. Bauer at any rate realised that no such sharp demarcation between cultural and political factors was really practicable, and was thus driven to make a much deeper analysis of the factors of nationality.

Nationality, according to Bauer, is essentially an historical concept. It rests, not on any single factor, such as race or language, but on a living tradition of unity based on many factors, and it sets up a demand for the freedom to carry on whatever activities have become embodied in the common tradition. Community of language ranks very high among these factors, but is not of itself enough to constitute a nationality. The view that language alone forms the effective foundation of nationality has as one of its consequences the extension of the nationalist claim to all those who speak the language. It involves...
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A conception of Pan-Germanism, for example, such as the Austrian Socialists wished for the most part to avoid — partly because it would have involved in addition the concession of similar claims to other linguistic groups, such as Poles, Italians, and Serbs. As against this, Bauer regarded a common language as rather a condition of nationality than a sufficient criterion, and was prepared to take account of anything that in fact marked off one substantial branch of people or families from other branches. In other words, he understood nationality mainly in terms of what sociologists call 'culture' or 'way of life'. On this foundation he thought of the problem of nationalities in Austria-Hungary mainly in terms of cultural autonomy — that is, of arrangements which would allow each nationality, in the areas in which it predominated, to conduct its own affairs in its own language and in its customary fashion in all matters which had primarily to do with its characteristic behaviour-patterns, above all in the fields of education, the arts, religion, and social observances and arrangements. This, however, at once raised the question of the rights of national minorities living in areas predominantly occupied by another nationality; and it was necessary, in accordance with the general conception of cultural rights, to extend similar concessions as far as was practicable to such minorities, by allowing them to have their own schools and cultural institutions side by side with those of the predominant group. This, of course, raised the question, where was this process of concession to stop? How large had a national minority to be, in a particular area, to enjoy the right of cultural autonomy? The extreme view, taken on the whole by Renner, was that nationality should be regarded as a personal attribute, and that every individual should have his place in a cultural institution of his nationality which would provide the means for his personal enjoyment of national freedom and self-expression. Renner argued that the cultural factors united men into a nationality without bringing in any factors of class-antagonism, and that the concept of class should be related exclusively to the economic and political aspects of society and not to its patterns of culture. Bauer was unable to accept this view, and saw that the cultural factors could not be thus separated from the economic and political factors; but he too recognised an element in nationality that
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was undisrupted by class-conflict, and wished to give recogni-
tion to this element.

As we saw earlier, the Social Democratic Party, in its
official policy drawn up in 1899, proposed that the traditional
provincial divisions of Austria should be replaced by a number
of new territorial units within each of which, as far as practi-
cable, a single nationality should preponderate, and that each
of these units should be legislatively and administratively
autonomous in its national and cultural affairs. Where more
than one such unit was occupied mainly by persons of the same
national group, such territories were to form a national union
for the co-ordination of their activities; and the functions of
the multi-national State were to include the enactment of laws
providing for the cultural rights of national minorities in all the
autonomous units. This was all very well as far as it went; but
it provided no definition of what were to be treated as ‘national
and cultural questions’ and were accordingly to be dealt with
autonomously by the constituent territories, and what were to
be treated as common questions falling under the authority of
the central State. The Socialists of German Austria wanted,
as far as they could, to get the whole range of economic ques-
tions treated as common to the entire State; but the other
major nationalities, especially the Czechs and the Poles, were
by no means prepared to accept this, even while they were still
prepared to work for the time being within the general frame-
work of the Austrian State. After the Russian Revolution of
1905 they were less prepared than ever to accept it, as they
began to believe more in the likelihood of a speedy collapse of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in their own prospects of
being able to set up fully independent national States.

Other nationalities within Austria-Hungary, however, were
a great deal less articulate and nationally self-conscious than
Czechs and Poles. Bauer in his book drew a distinction
between ‘historical’ and ‘unhistorical’ nationalities, the
‘historical’ being, broadly, those which had been able to main-
tain a differentiated class-structure of their own, with their
national aristocracies, middle classes, and intellectuals, and
perhaps artisan and farmer groups, marked off from the common
run of the people, whereas the ‘unhistorical’ were those which
in losing their autonomy had lost also their own upper- and
middle-class groups and had been reduced to dependent and exploited masses working mainly for the profit of ruling classes belonging to a different nationality. Bauer saw that gradually some of these depressed 'unhistorical' nationalities were beginning to regain consciousness of nationhood, and that under modern conditions the process by which this was brought about was the growth of élites in the form of a bourgeoisie and an intellectual class. He saw that the Austrian State, if it were to survive as a political unity, would have to take cognisance of this development of conscious nationality among the 'unhistorical' peoples. But, wishing to preserve the framework of economic unity, he, like other Austrian Socialists of German nationality, found himself necessarily at a disadvantage in competing with the propaganda of the bourgeois nationalists, because they were in a position to stir up xenophobic sentiments which the advocates of multi-national unity were bound to eschew. They could, of course, appeal against the bourgeois nationalists to the sentiment of class-solidarity, by insisting on the workers' common economic interests regardless of national differences; but they were apt to find this appeal ineffective in places where the working class was made up mainly of persons of the same nationality as the employers and other superior groups. In practice, cultural, economic, and political questions could not be kept apart; and although the shadow of a multinational All-Austrian Social Democratic Party survived in occasional All-Austrian Conferences of the constituent national parties and in some collaboration between the national Social Democratic groups of deputies in the Reichsrath, the disintegration of the Austrian Social Democratic movement went further and further as each national Social Democratic Party was pushed further along the road to nationalism by the need to compete with the less inhibited nationalist propaganda of the bourgeois nationalist movements.

The Russians had, of course, a similar problem to face; and Lenin attempted to face it in his series of articles on The Right of Nations to Self-determination published, mainly in answer to Rosa Luxemburg, in 1914. Lenin, in these articles, referred specifically to Otto Bauer and showed why it was that the Austrian Germans, intent on preserving and developing the unity of the proletariat in the whole Austrian State, took shelter
behind the conception of cultural self-determination in order to escape from recognising the right of political self-determination — which, he said, implied the right of secession in order to set up a separate national State. This did not mean that Lenin was a nationalist, or wanted the big States to be broken up into independent national sovereign units. He did, however, insist that Socialists must recognise the right of national self-determination to the point of secession and could not stop short arbitrarily at the recognition of a right to merely cultural autonomy. For Lenin, to support a right in principle was not to regard the actual exercise of that right as expedient in every case. All ‘rights’, in his view, were practically valid only in an historical context; and his practical view about national independence was based on consideration of the particular circumstances in each and every case. In making these judgments, the overriding consideration was for him the consequence on the campaign of the international working class for emancipation. He insisted that it had been shown to be an historical necessity for capitalism in every country, as it advanced, to seek to establish an autonomous national State as its political expression. This had been a characteristic feature of capitalist development in Western Europe; but in Eastern Europe the bourgeois revolution, already completed in the advanced Western countries, was still in the making, and accordingly bourgeois nationalism was still in the ascendant, and Socialists needed to ally themselves with it by recognising the right of the nationalities to set up in statehood for themselves by exercising, where they thought fit, their right of national secession from the ruler-States in which they found themselves incorporated. It did not follow that the exercise of this right was to be desired; for it needed to be reconciled with the major need to promote co-operative action of the proletariat internationally. But Socialists had to take their stand on the right, whether or not they wished to see it exercised in a particular case; for not to do this would involve making themselves partners to the claim of the nationalists of the master-nations to ride roughshod over the proletariats of the subject peoples. Lenin did not repudiate ‘cultural’ nationalism; but he stressed its insufficiency, and its potentially reactionary implications, where it was combined with a negation of the right of political self-determination up
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to the point of establishing separate national sovereign States. In this spirit he defended the Norwegians' 'right' to secede from Sweden, and applauded the support given to them by the Swedish Socialists. This support, he said, far from isolating the Swedish from the Norwegian working class, had actually brought them closer together in the fight against capitalist oppression in both countries.

The Austrian Socialists, faced by the intractable problem of national conflicts within the multi-national Austrian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, failed to find an acceptable solution because they were tied to the idea of preserving the framework of Austrian State unity in order to preserve the class-unity of the All-Austrian working class. They did, however, in attempting to solve an insoluble problem, make valuable contributions to the theory of nationality, particularly in its cultural aspects, and, though they failed to devise a workable structure for a democratic, federal Austria, they did provide valuable material for the handling of the problem of cultural autonomy in multinational States in which the forces making for national separation were less powerful. In particular, the Austrian theory of nationalities was of substantial help to the Russians in working out their own problem of self-determination within the general framework of the multi-national Soviet Union.

The remaining significant theorist of Austrian Socialism in the years before 1914 was Max Adler (1873–1940 or 1941), who was unrelated to the more famous Adlers, Victor and Friedrich, with whom we have dealt already. Max Adler wrote extensively about the philosophical problems of Socialism and particularly about the theory and actuality of class-relations in contemporary capitalist society. Max Adler's first important work, Causality and Teleology, appeared as one of the Marx-Studien published by the Bauer-Hilferding group. At this stage Max Adler was concerned mainly with an attempt to reconcile Marxism with Kantian philosophy. In 1914 Max Adler ranged himself with the internationalist opposition to the war policy of the majority section of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. In his later writings, after 1918, we shall find him attempting to build a bridge between Communism and Social Democracy. He set to work to study the actual development of class structures in the modern world and concluded that the advance of large-scale
industry, commerce, and finance, by creating a new black-coated proletariat altogether unlike the petite bourgeoisie of Marx's day, had made necessary a restatement of the doctrine of class-struggle in terms which must recognise the need for partnership of manual and non-manual workers, and must place special emphasis on the requirement that the manual workers are no longer capable, in the advanced economic societies of the twentieth century, of carrying through the social revolution alone, but must carry the other groups with them, on penalty of finding these groups range themselves on the side of Fascism.

Again, we find Otto Bauer, and also Max Adler, drawing a distinction between political and economic revolution and asserting that, whereas political power can be taken over by the workers at a blow, as the outcome of a single revolutionary victory, the same cannot be said of economic power, which calls for a prolonged process of training in the tasks of industrial and business control, and can therefore be accomplished only by gradual methods. Neither of these views is in itself original: what is significant is the importance given to them in the shaping of Socialist policy. In particular, the second of them turns the idea of Socialist revolution into that of a process rather than of a single revolutionary act, but does this without discarding the concept of the revolution as a single act in the political field, carrying with it the overthrow of the capitalist State, but not of capitalism in its economic character.

The full development of these views belongs to the period after the Russian Revolution of 1917, when left-wing Socialists in Western Europe were seeking to explain their differences both from right-wing Socialists and from the Communist Parties which had accepted the Bolshevik version of the doctrine of dictatorship of the proletariat. They can accordingly be better discussed later in this history, when we have to come to grips with the conflicts of Socialist doctrine which the Russian Revolution and the war upsets in Western Europe provoked. They have to be mentioned here because the controversy between Bolsheviks and Austro-Marxists had begun well before 1914.
THEODOR HERTZKA

In the foregoing account of Austrian Socialism no mention has been made of the movement launched in 1890 by the liberal journalist, Theodor Hertzka, who for a time attracted a substantial following, mainly among intellectuals, not only in Austria, but also in other countries. Hertzka was not in any ordinary sense of the word a Socialist and had no associations either with the Social Democratic Party or with the working-class movement. Nevertheless, his Utopia, with its remarkable blend of economic liberalism and of Socialist ideas, was a significant document of the period; for it represented, more than anything else that I have met with, the desire to escape from capitalism without class-war and to construct a new society free from exploitation by agreement among sensible men rather than by revolution or even by means of a political struggle. Hertzka denied the necessity of class-antagonisms, and believed in the possibility of a fundamental change in the social order by the action of men of enlightenment and goodwill. Appalled by the inefficiency, as well as by the immorality, of the existing social relations, he called upon men of goodwill, irrespective of class, to take steps for the creation of a new society, not by summoning Governments to bring it into being or by organizing revolt against the existing order, but by leading the pioneers into a chosen area still undeveloped by capitalist industrialism and there setting up a brand-new Republic which would combine the virtues of free enterprise and social control. There was of course nothing novel in the attempt to establish Utopia by leading the faithful out of the old immoral world into an unspoilt social environment in which they would be able to set up a new community. What was novel about Hertzka’s Utopia was that, far from repudiating the principles of free enterprise and competitive production, he sought to found his community upon these principles, by making their operation universal and by extending to the labourer the freedom which was denied to him under the institutions of capitalism.

In 1890 Hertzka (1845–1924) published his utopian novel, _Vol. III–20_ 559
Freeland, which was translated into English the following year. Hertzka was born of Jewish parents in Budapest, but began his career as a journalist in Vienna. He was economic editor of the Neue Freie Presse from 1872 to 1879. In the latter year he founded the Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung, which he edited until 1886. He then started a weekly, Zeitschrift für Staats- und Volkswirtschaft. In 1901 he returned to Hungary as editor of a Budapest daily newspaper. Meanwhile he had published a number of books on economic and monetary questions. His last important work, Das soziale Problem, appeared in Berlin in 1912.

Freeland is of special interest as the most complete development of a social doctrine which is a blend of economic liberalism and of Socialist ideas. Hertzka, who was a great student of the classical economic theories, had a profound belief in the virtues of free competitive enterprise. He wanted an economic system which would secure as far as possible that each individual was rewarded in accordance with the value of his contribution to production or of the services rendered by him to society; and he held that this could be achieved only by absolutely free movement of both labour and capital in response to market demands. But he held no less strongly that market demand must not be restricted by any force other than the limits of productive power, and that under capitalism it was so restricted by the poverty of the many, whose earnings were kept at or near subsistence level despite the great and ever-increasing advance in the technical powers of production. He was in fact an under-consumptionist, who attributed economic crises and the scramble for markets to the artificial limitation of the consuming power of the masses by the operation of the subsistence law of wages. The prevalence of this law he attributed to the private ownership of the means of production, which both enabled the owning classes to abstract from the workers a part of what they produced and gave them an incentive to restrict output in order to avoid glutting the market. He therefore advocated that all land should belong in common to the community, and that the State should supply capital on loan to anyone who asked for it, without interest, but subject to repayment if the capital ceased to be used for the purpose for which it had been advanced. Land should be similarly made available to anyone who wished
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to cultivate it. Hertzka considered that under this system the demands for land and capital would come mainly from Co-operative Associations, which would democratically appoint their own managers, and would be jointly liable to the State for the return of the capital entrusted to them. He contemplated some borrowing by individuals for small-scale enterprises, but held that capitalist enterprise would die out because no capitalist would find workers ready to work for wages when they could do better by becoming partners in Co-operative associations. The State itself was to undertake large-scale enterprises, such as the building of railways, docks and other public works, and no charge was to be made for the use of such public utilities. In advancing capital to those who asked for it the State Bank was not to exercise any control over the purposes for which the money was to be used, beyond the assurance that it would be employed in production. Hertzka believed that such control would be unnecessary, provided that there were no restrictions at all on entry into any occupation and that full competition was ensured. He said that if one type of production were pushed too far in relation to others, in the hope of higher earnings, competition would soon so bring down receipts as to drive surplus labour and capital out of it into other uses. In order to make the growth of monopolies impossible, the productive associations were to be completely open to any newcomer who wished to join, on terms of equal partnership.

As no rent or interest would be paid, there would be no costs of production other than those of the material and fuel used; for labour, including management, would be not a cost but a participant in the net return. There would be no wages, but dividends based on the net receipts of each enterprise, managers and skilled workers receiving higher shares in a proportion fixed by each association at its free will. The State, however, would levy on each enterprise a tax on its receipts, to be used for three main purposes — to cover the costs of government and of public services provided free of charge; to provide a fund for investment in new capital, to be used both for State enterprises and for interest-free loans to would-be borrowers; and to meet the cost of maintaining the non-producers at standards comparable with those of the producers, and therefore varying with the average incomes obtained by the latter.

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SOCIALIST THOUGHT

Hertzka argued that the productive power of a community was largely the outcome of the inventiveness and energy of past generations, which ought to be regarded as becoming the common property of the whole people and as available for meeting the needs of complete social security. He therefore wished to assign allowances out of public funds to all children and old people and to all who were unable to work; and to these he added all women, unless they chose to engage in work outside their households — which he thought few would do except in the arts, the liberal professions, and especially teaching and nursing services.

Under the proposed system, Hertzka argued, everyone would have a strong incentive to increase production by every possible means; for every increase would be reflected in a rise in everyone's disposable income through the equalising process guaranteed by complete mobility of labour and capital. He had a boundless belief in the possibility of increasing production by the unrestricted application of every technical device, in the potential economies of large-scale production for a practically unlimited market, and in the effectiveness of emulation in stimulating inventiveness and efficiency at all levels. He was strongly hostile to centralised planning, except for major public works, and to every sort of bureaucracy.

Politically, Hertzka advocated complete democracy, for men and women alike. But his conception of administration was essentially pluralistic. Instead of a single Parliament, he wanted a number of co-equal Functional Councils, all popularly elected, any voter being free to choose in which election he would vote. He believed strongly that parliamentary government led to decisions being taken by jacks of all trades, instead of knowledgeable persons, and urged that his functional system would ensure that people voted on matters which really interested them and would therefore result in the best representatives being chosen. In industry, he believed in giving the managers, once democratically elected, large powers, but in keeping them answerable to the bodies of associates by making them removable by popular vote.

Hertzka laid great stress on education, both general and technical, and on the place of the arts. He was also a strong upholder of family life, but held that marriages should be made
and continued only by the free consent of the parties. He had a
great faith that, when once the restrictions on free production
had been removed, wealth would rapidly increase so as to yield
a life of comfort and enjoyment to every citizen, not merely in
the more advanced countries but throughout the world.

As the site of the Utopia described in *Freeland* Hertzka chose
the Highlands of Kenya. He told of his Utopia as being
founded by an international association, which chose this area
as suitable for white settlement and as capable of immense
economic development because of the quality of its climate and
soil and because of its possession of large mineral resources.
He described his association as being started with the aid of
voluntary contributions from persons who wished to settle in
the new colony; and, strangely enough, he showed them as
proceeding to occupy the chosen area, and presently to spread
far beyond it, without the smallest interference from any of the
great powers. Nor did they meet with much opposition from
the native inhabitants, though at the outset they had to make
some use of their superior weapons to overawe them. Hertzka
was by no means unmindful of native interests; but he regarded
the African continent as capable of supporting a vast immigrant
population without any infringement of native rights, and indeed
with great benefit to the natives, whom the Freelanders not only
instructed in the arts of production and civilisation, but were
also ready to admit as full fellow-citizens subject to their
reaching a certain standard of literacy. When they stood out
against this civilising process they were given short shrift: his
book includes an account of a war in which Freeland made
havoc with the Emperor of Abyssinia’s armies when they
attacked its territory. Hertzka had no doubts about the
superiority of Western civilisation, or about the right of his
settlers to occupy, by force if necessary, the almost empty
spaces of ‘Darkest Africa’.

In Hertzka’s story, Freeland, thanks to its free institutions,
rapidly became the most powerful, as well as the wealthiest and
best educated, country in the world. He ended his narrative
with an account of a World Congress, elected from all the
countries of the world, which decided to introduce the Freeland
system everywhere—even the representatives of the most
reactionary States being convinced that the attitude of their
peoples left them with no alternative. It then became necessary to decide what should be done about the vested interests of the owning classes of these various countries. Freeland itself had not had such problems to face, because it had made a fresh start in an unoccupied area — or at any rate one with plenty of land and resources to spare. Hertzka represented his World Congress as deciding, on the Freelanders’ advice, in favour of compensating all owners for their loss of property rights, the compensation (subject in some countries to a maximum for any one person) to be payable at once or by instalments. The recipients, he pointed out, would be free to do what they liked with the sums they received; but they would be unable to earn profits or interest from them because no borrower would pay interest when he could get interest-free capital from the State, and no one would agree to accept wage-employment when he could become a partner in any Co-operative productive association he chose. Accordingly, the recipients would either consume what they were given, or would give it away.

This remarkable Utopia is a supreme example of what Marxists call ‘petit-bourgeois ideology’. Hertzka is entirely on the side of the poor against their exploiters, and denounces capitalism as roundly as any Socialist could wish. But he will have nothing to do with any notions of class-war, or appeals to class-solidarity. He believes a peaceful advance to Utopia to be fully possible through the rational conviction of a minority, reinforced by a successful demonstration of the practicability of his plan. His approach is at one and the same time ethical and economic: he argues his case both on the ground that his scheme will put an end to human misery and secure social justice, and on the ground that it will unloose the great powers of production which capitalism and feudalism are keeping in check. At bottom, his attitude is ethical: he is horrified by the misery of the many even more than he is appalled by the stupidity of the powerful.

The choice of Central Africa as the site for Freeland is, of course, not fortuitous. Hertzka was writing at a time when the partition of Africa among the great powers was proceeding fast, but when a great deal of the interior remained unappropriated. Leopold II had called his Conference and set up his International Association for the Exploration and Civilisation of
Africa in 1876, and this had become the International Association of the Congo in 1882. By 1890, when Freeland was published, Leopold had already gone far with the development of the Congo Free State on lines very different from those which Hertzka advocated: he was just about to embark on the series of wars against the Arabs and the native tribes which attempted to resist his exploitation. His measures had not yet provoked the great campaigns of protest which in the long run compelled him to hand over the government of his vast Empire to the Belgian State; but it had already become clear that the Congo was the least likely area in the world to serve as a model for the regeneration of society.

For a time Hertzka found a substantial following. Freeland Associations were formed in a number of continental countries, in Great Britain, and in the United States; and Hertzka's book is said to have influenced William Lane in leading his ill-fated followers to their attempt to set up a free society in Paraguay, though Lane's ideas were much more Socialist than Hertzka's. Later, many of Hertzka's conceptions found an echo in the form of 'Liberal Socialism', advocated by the German sociologist, Franz Oppenheimer, after the first world war. But Freeland was never founded; and to-day the book is little read — which is a pity, for it contains a great deal of sound economic sense.

1 See p. 635 ff. 2 See p. 863.
CHAPTER XIII

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Hungarian Socialism, until its brief period of authority at the end of the first world war, was always a repressed movement. It produced no thinker of much importance; nor did it ever achieve a mass following at all comparable with that of the Austrians. If it was not troubled, as theirs was, by the problem of nationalistic dissensions and insistences on establishing separate national parties, that was because it had so little strength in the areas inhabited by the non-Magyar elements of the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy. Among the Slovaks and Ruthenians of the north, the Rumanians of the east, and the Croats and Serbs of the south it had never more than the scantiest following. Its main strength was throughout in Budapest and to a much smaller extent among the rural workers of the central Hungarian plain. These latter were Magyars; but in Budapest its following was of mixed nationality, including many Germans and, especially among the leaders, a very high proportion of Jews. The Social Democratic Party of Hungary was greatly influenced by the Austrian party — that is, mainly by its preponderant German section, based mainly on Vienna. So much was this the case that in 1890 the Congress of Hungarian Social Democrats adopted bodily the new Hainfeld Programme of the Austrian party. Later, the Hungarian Social Democrats also co-operated with the Czech Social Democrats in opposing the Hungarian campaigns of Magyarisation in northern Hungary.

It must not be forgotten that the Hungary of the Dual Monarchy was a very much larger country than the Hungary of to-day. It included, in addition to the central Magyar area, Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia in the north and north-east, Transylvania and the largely German Temesvár area in the east, and Croatia, Slavonia and the Voivodena in the south-west. The Magyars, including the fully magyarised groups of non-
Magyar origin, though they held, except in Croatia, a virtually complete monopoly of power, local as well as central, formed less than half of the total population, but a minority whose higher classes had a very strong belief in their own superiority and no doubts about their right at one and the same time to insist strongly on their own national claims and to ride roughshod over those of their subject peoples, as well as of their own inferior classes. Only Croatia, which had helped the Emperor to crush the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, enjoyed rights of self-government which the Magyars were unable to touch; and even there the Ban, or Governor, was appointed from Budapest and held very extensive powers which enabled him to deal drastically with any subversive movement. For the rest, the only thing that qualified racial supremacy was that it was open for men of other races, especially if they were well-to-do, to become assimilated to the Magyars by adopting their language and ways of life and thought and, by changing their names as well as their habits, to become absorbed in the Magyar part of the population. By no means all ardent Magyar nationalists were of Magyar ancestry, at any rate unmixed. Germans, up to a point, could get recognition as not belonging to a subject race without surrendering their national habits or language, or their names; and, indeed, the long-established German element in central and northern Hungary — the Swabians — were often ardent Hungarian Nationalists and occupied many leading positions in the economic life of the country and in the armed forces. Nevertheless, unless they became magyarised they remained suspect. Jews dominated banking and finance, and were largely predominant in the professions and in commercial occupations; but as long as they kept their names and their religion, they were a tolerated group apart. Some became completely magyarised; and it was not uncommon for one member of a wealthy Jewish family to become a Christian and to change his name in order to give his house the standing and influence needed for business purposes as well as for social recognition. Jews, in fact, in addition to an almost complete domination in finance and large-scale industry, led not only the Socialist opposition, but to at least an equal extent that of the middle classes; they constituted a high proportion of the intellectuals, including the liberal professions, and this largely
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Jewish leadership of the left was naturally made much use of by its opponents to discredit it, by methods similar to those of the Christian anti-Semitic organisations in Austria.

It is, however, necessary to guard against the misconception that the Magyars constituted simply a master-race, ruling over subject peoples. The main body of Magyars consisted of rural labourers and peasants, with very small holdings, who were oppressed quite as much as the labourers and peasants of other nationalities. The Magyar aristocrat was not in the least prepared to regard the poor Magyar as having any claim to share his political power or to receive better economic treatment than other members of the lower classes. In his eyes, the national right and tradition were embodied in the landed class, or in those who could trace an aristocratic Magyar ancestry — with the usual de facto readiness to absorb a limited proportion of wealthy assimilated persons as 'honorary' Magyars.

The oppressed Magyar labourers and small peasants were easier to arouse by Socialist appeals than the Slav or Rumanian labourers and peasants living under Hungarian rule because they were not open to the appeal to join forces with their compatriots of other classes in resistance to alien oppression. They were being oppressed by fellow-Magyars, politically as well as economically, whereas their Slav or Rumanian opposite numbers, as they acquired political consciousness, tended to feel the attraction of nationalist movements which linked them to fellow-nationals beyond the borders of Hungary. The great agrarian troubles in Hungary in the 1890s took place mostly in the Magyar areas and, when they spread, more among the Germans of the Banat than among any other racial group.

The industrial workers' movement, on the other hand, contained a high proportion of non-Magyars; and so did the industrial employing and managerial classes. The upper-class Magyars had a contempt for industry and trade which caused those who could not live on the incomes derived from landed estates to crowd into the public services, in which they became important auxiliaries of the aristocratic, predominantly Magyar, Parliament and of the Magyar-dominated locally elected County authorities. The administrative as well as the legislative part of the Government was thoroughly Magyar, whereas in industry the German element held a much larger place, both at the
higher levels and among the skilled workers. The less skilled were much more mixed, including urbanised countrymen who had flocked to the towns in search of work from many racially different groups; and this inter-racial structure of the industrial working class prepared it to receive Socialism as an international gospel. It partly explains the very close links between the Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party, and also the strongly international outlook of the Social Democratic leadership.

Primitive up to the 1860s, Hungarian industry underwent considerable development during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was financed largely by foreign capital and conducted almost entirely by non-Magyars, including a very high proportion of Jews. Its skilled workers included a large German element, whereas the less skilled labour force was made up to a great extent of non-Magyars from Slovakia and other overcrowded rural areas. In Budapest and other industrial centres the conditions of housing for the working-class population were among the very worst in Europe; and a wide gap separated the skilled minority from the rest of the urban proletariat. In the towns as well as in the countryside, despite the development of industrial techniques, standards of living for the main body of the workers fell as prices rose without equivalent advances in money wages; for the continual influx of unskilled labour from the rural areas created a constant tendency for the supply of such labour to exceed the demand.

This flocking to the towns was the outcome, not so much of the attraction exercised by developing industry as of the growth of rural population. The prevalent agricultural system was one of large estates — often very large indeed — owned by the upper nobility and of smaller estates owned by the exceedingly numerous gentry, cultivated partly by peasant occupiers or tenant farmers — usually under very unfavourable conditions, but largely by wage-labourers whose status remained half-servile even after they had been formally emancipated. There was also a peasant class, largely German, cultivating its own land — including a small group of prosperous (some of them very prosperous) peasant farmers. But this class of peasant cultivators was relatively small, and because of the practice of dividing up the land among the sons the economic position of
the majority tended to get worse as population increased. From the 1860s there was for a time a rapid extension of the cultivated area through the reclamation of water-logged land, by work on rivers and canals. This land was largely bought up by speculators, put in order by large bodies of migratory labourers, and then resold at high profits. These operations helped to create a proletariat, part of which flocked into the towns when the land works were finished, while another part returned to the villages to spread new ideas. During the last decades of the century, an outlet was found for a considerable fraction of the surplus rural population in emigration, chiefly to America. This began mainly among the Slovaks of northern Hungary and then spread to other groups. It increased very rapidly in the 1890s and 1900s, and helped to strengthen the position of the urban workers as well as to check, though it did not prevent, the worsening of rural conditions. But, though it mitigated, it by no means solved the problem. Hungary remained a country of heavy unemployment, both industrial among the less skilled workers and agricultural, except at boom periods in industry and during the harvest peak in the rural areas, when much additional labour was needed. Skilled industrial labour was relatively scarce, and suffered much less than the unskilled: the main suffering in the towns fell upon the abominably housed immigrants from the countryside, who formed a large lumpenproletariat, above all in Budapest. Agrarian troubles usually occurred at harvest time—a state of affairs quite different from that of peasant countries, where they have usually occurred during the slack period between sowing and harvest.

Politically, the conditions remained, right up to 1914, entirely incompatible with the growth of any Socialist party capable of making effective use of parliamentary methods. They were also such as to prevent the building up of parties representing the national minorities, in the way in which such parties grew up in the Austrian Reichsrath. The Hungarian Parliament, as it was reconstituted after the so-called ‘Compromise’ of 1867, which restored Hungarian self-government, was not, and was not meant to be, a representative assembly even of the upper classes of Hungary as a whole. It was still an aristocratic Magyar-dominated Diet, in which non-Magyars could usually get seats only on condition that they accepted the
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Magyar ascendancy. Not only were the urban workers and the rural proletariat excluded from voting rights, even if they were Magyars: in addition the electoral system was so weighted as to give the Slavs and other inferior groups practically no share. In the areas of predominantly non-Magyar population, many of the constituencies were virtually 'rotten boroughs', in which a handful of approved voters returned safe supporters of the established régime. The Magyar constituencies had larger electorates, and gave rather more opportunity for real contests; but in general the incredibly complicated methods both of compiling the voters' lists and of carrying through the devious processes of election by estates enabled the Government first to ensure aristocratic and Magyar predominance by rigging the lists and then to disallow, almost at will, any suspect voter whose name appeared on them. Over and above this, open voting gave the fullest opportunity for intimidation. In the initial compilation of the lists, one principle was to exclude every person whose status was regarded as making him not a 'free agent'; and this was interpreted to disallow not only 'servants' on the landlords' estates, but by analogy anyone who was a 'servant' in industry or in any other form of manual employment. The voting system was much more illiberal even than that of Austria after 1867; for it was directed not only against the lower classes, but also against everyone who was regarded as an actual or potential opponent of Magyar rule.

This explains the curious paradox that support for a reform of the franchise came not only from the Hungarian middle and working classes but also from the King-Emperor and his ministers and from the friends of the Austrian connection, who upheld the 'Compromise of 1867' against the advocates of greater, or of complete, Hungarian independence. After the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 the country had lost for a time its internal autonomy and had been subjected to imperial rule. In 1867, when the Empire was weakened by its defeat at the hands of Prussia, and when Austria had been hung out of the German Confederation, the Magyars were in a strong enough position to reclaim their 'historic rights'. Hungary became again an independent kingdom, linked to Austria by having a common monarch, under whom was a federal army, to which Hungary had to contribute recruits and
a proportion of the cost; but the Magyars insisted on their right to vote — or not to vote — both the men and the money, as well as to keep a second-line territorial army, the Honvéd, in which the language used was Magyar. Austria and Hungary were also linked by a common Foreign Minister and by a trade agreement which was designed to open the Hungarian market to Austrian industry and the Austrian market to Hungarian food. There was constant bickering both about the conditions of army service and the men and money to be voted and about the terms of the trade agreement; and Hungarian politics were largely a matter of the disputes between the ‘Men of ’67’, who were prepared to work the ‘Compromise’, and the ‘Men of ’48’, who were trying to get it altered in the direction of more independence of the Imperial Government. With most of the Magyar upper classes, the Compromise of 1867 was very unpopular. Indeed, it found more support among the upper classes belonging to the other national groups, which favoured the Austrian connection as making against complete Magyar domination and found openings in the common services, particularly the imperial army. Whenever the ‘Men of ’48’ became too pressing, the Imperial Government became pro-Slav and threatened franchise reform and other measures making for nearer equality between Magyars and other national groups. Whenever the ‘Men of ’67’ went too far towards accepting the wishes of the Imperial Government—which tended, of course, to be predominantly German—the ‘Men of ’48’ went to work to stir up Magyar national feeling against the Austrian connection. Yet most of the Magyar aristocracy, even if they wanted to improve on the Compromise of 1867, did not want to break the connection altogether; for they were afraid of Russia and doubtful of their ability to maintain their mastery over their Slav subjects without Austrian help. The Austrians, for their part, needed Hungary as a source of military power and as a means of maintaining the unity of the Austrian multi-national State.

In 1848 the Hungarian Revolution had been destroyed, not only by the uprising of the Croats against it and by Jellacic’s invading army, which, in fact, did little, but also by the Russian army sent to help the Emperor, and by its internal dissensions. Louis Kossuth had been a nationalist of the left, with advanced
social views; but he had fallen foul of the Magyar aristocrats as well as of the Hungarian Slavs, and both had helped to compass his defeat. Up to 1867, Magyar nationalism tended to be united against Austrian rule: after the Compromise there were always conflicts between the advocates of an intransigent nationalism directed against Austrian interference and those Magyar aristocrats who feared Kossuthian democracy and preferred the Compromise to any agitation that might help to revive it. Thus developed the curious and confusing situation in which the Imperial Government often backed the Hungarian Slavs and sometimes favoured franchise reform for this purpose while its best friends in Hungary, the Magyar Conservatives, were the most bitter opponents of that very reform.

The struggle for a wider franchise in Hungary, in these circumstances, could not take shape mainly as a movement of the working and middle classes against the aristocracy. It had also the quite different character of a sword of Damocles to be kept hanging over the Magyar aristocrats who wanted to keep their monopoly of power over their non-Magyar as well as their Magyar subjects. There was, of course, a demand for manhood suffrage from the Socialists and from the middle-class Radicals; but neither of these groups was able to win any effective footing in the highly aristocratic Magyar Parliament, nor could either easily combine with the Slav and other nationalist groups which were so grossly under-represented in it.

Nationalism and national pride were in Hungary, more than in any other European country, not excepting Poland, obstacles to the growth of Socialism and of the working-class movement. Anti-Germanism, Anti-Slavism, and Anti-Semitism all played their parts in stirring up feeling against the internationalism of the Socialists and of the left intellectuals; and because of the strong hold of religious prejudice on the rural population and on a section of the town-dwellers Anti-Semitism was the most effective card to play against them. In face of all these obstacles a considerable working-class movement did develop, particularly in Budapest; and for a time it seemed that agrarian Socialism might also succeed in establishing a hold on the rural areas, at any rate in central Hungary. But not until the Dual Monarchy, and with it the Magyar control of the non-Magyar areas, crumbled at the close of the first world war did Socialism
emerge for a time as a really powerful force in the moment of defeat; and even then it did so only to be crushed by the White Terror of the aristocratic Magyar counter-revolution.

The first Trade Unions of which there is any record emerged in Hungary only in the 1860s, and no substantial movement appeared until after 1867. The Budapest Compositors had some sort of trade society as early as 1861. In 1867 the typographical trades held a convention, at which they conducted their proceedings in German and Italian. Thus, as in many other countries, the printers seem to have been the pioneers. Other Trade Unions followed, and in 1869 a General Union of Workers was formed under the leadership of Viktor Külföldi (1844–94), who had already started in 1868 the Workers' Journal, which became its organ. The following year a more definitely Socialist journal, The Golden Trumpet, was set on foot by Mihály Táncsics, an old warrior of 1848; but it soon got into trouble with the police and was suppressed. Up to this time the principal exponent of Socialist ideas in Hungary had been József Kritovics, whose doctrines were largely derived from Louis Blanc. He advocated the 'Right to Work' and the establishment of self-governing National Workshops provided with capital by the State, which was to be democratised by the introduction of manhood suffrage. This programme was, of course, also that of Lassalle; and in the late 'sixties Lassallian influence became considerable, with János Hrabie as its principal exponent. A battle royal then developed between the Lassallian Socialists and the advocates of friendly benefit societies formed to promote mutual thrift and social peace on the model of the societies set up in Germany under the influence of Schulze-Delitzsch. In 1870 there was a split between the two groups. Up to 1867 the right of combination had been governed by Austrian law, which severely restricted the right of meeting and disallowed strike action. For a few years thereafter the legal position was uncertain; and the Trade Unions were able to grow without serious molestation, though they usually concealed themselves under cover of friendly benefit activities and conducted their trade proceedings half secretly through auxiliary bodies. The law of 1872 recognised the right of combination, and even the right to strike; but it made incitement to strike a criminal offence and hedged
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recognition round with many restrictions. It was, indeed, an attempt to canalise the Trade Unions into peaceful benefit activities and collaboration with the employers on Schulze-Delitzsch principles, and thus to woo them away from the influence of revolutionary ideas and of the International Working Men's Association. The restrictions on the right of demonstration and public meeting were actually strengthened; and no rights of combination at all were granted to the rural workers.

Until 1872, the Hungarian workers took no part in the Congresses of the I.W.M.A. In 1869 an emissary from that body, Wilhelm Raspe, appeared in Budapest, but was promptly arrested. At the Hague Congress of 1872, however, a single Hungarian delegate, Károly Farkas, was present, and voted with the Marxist majority against the followers of Bakunin. He appears to have been, in fact, not a Marxist but a moderate, noted chiefly for his advocacy of sickness insurance. Well before this, the Hungarian Government had suppressed the General Union of Workers and had prosecuted its leaders for high treason, with the result that it broke up and disappeared. The movement, however, survived. In 1873 Viktor Külföldi, whose real name was Jakob Meyer, and Jakob Schlesinger started the Workers' Weekly Chronicle, and Külföldi, together with Antal Ihrlinger, attempted to launch a Workers' Party. The party was suppressed; but the journal, though in frequent trouble with the police, managed to carry on.

Up to this point direct Marxist influence had counted for very little in Hungary, though the Communist Manifesto had been translated (and suppressed) and some of the manifestoes of the First International had been published in the Labour journals. But in 1875 the Communard, Leo Frankel (1844–96), returned to Hungary and at once began to play an active part. Frankel, who had been born in Budapest, had been abroad during the later 'sixties and the early 'seventies: he had been in Paris at the time of the Commune and had been in charge of its labour and employment policies. On the fall of the Commune he had escaped to London, where he had met Marx and accepted his ideas. Frankel had not attended any of the Congresses of the International; but he was well versed in

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Marxism and set to work to build up a Social Democratic Party on the model of the United German Party that had just been established at the Gotha Congress. From 1876 to 1881 he edited the *Workers' Weekly Chronicle* at Budapest; and he was soon at loggerheads with Külföldi, who, on coming out of prison in 1877, started a rival organ, *The Voice of the People*. That year Frankel, as delegate from Hungary, attended the Socialist Unity Congress at Ghent; and in 1880 the Hungarians managed to get together a General Labour Congress of their own, which adopted a broadly Socialist programme. The following year Frankel was sent to prison on a charge of sedition for his utterances about the army; and while he was in gaol the quarrel between Social Democrats and Anarchists flared up, and throughout the 'eighties this dispute continued to dominate what movement there was. In the meantime the moderates continued their campaign for social insurance legislation and for some limitation on excessive hours of work. In 1884 the law relating to combination was to some extent liberalised; and, with industry expanding very rapidly indeed, Trade Unions developed fast. In 1885 the Unions launched a campaign for the abolition of Sunday work, which was brought under legal regulation in 1891. The same year a state scheme of sickness insurance, modelled on the German law, was introduced; and accident insurance followed two years later.

Meanwhile, Anarchist influence had been declining, and most of the Trade Unions had come under Socialist — mainly Social Democratic — influence. By 1889 they were able to hold their first open Congress — which was, in fact, mainly a Budapest affair; and that same year Frankel attended as Hungarian Socialist delegate the inaugural Congress of the Second International in Paris — the Marxist one. He came back fired with enthusiasm for the Congress resolution to make May Day 1890 the occasion of mass demonstrations in every country, primarily for the eight hours' day. At this time the Austrian Socialists had just united their forces behind the Hainfeld Programme; and in 1890 the Hungarian Social Democratic groups drew together to form a united movement and adopted the Austrian programme *en bloc*. From this point, Trade Unionism grew rapidly, and very close relations were built up between the Unions and the Social Democratic
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Party. Trade Unions, indeed, developed a curious triple form of organisation. Openly they were organised as friendly societies, within the law of 1872, which had been re-enacted in amended form in 1884. This open organisation served as cover for two forms of clandestine combination, on behalf of which subscriptions were collected from all the members — one for the conduct of industrial movements and the other for supporting the Social Democratic Party, of which the Unions thus became virtually branches. So far, the workers' movement had been entirely urban; but in 1890 a few rural delegates appeared at the Social Democratic Congress, and the party and the Unions set out on a crusade to enlist the rural labourers. In 1891 there were some rural disturbances in central Hungary at harvest-time, mainly over the question of harvest wages. These were bloodily repressed; but they recurred on a bigger scale three years later. Again they were put down with much bloodshed; but they recurred in subsequent years, reaching their greatest extension in 1896 and 1897, but still mainly among the Magyars of the central area, though there was some spread to other districts, notably Transylvania and the Banat. There were also many strikes in Budapest, met by strong repression and by the deportation of a number of the leaders to the country areas, where they helped to foment the troubles among the rural proletariat.

There was also at this point a split in the Socialist Party. In 1896 István Varkónyi (1852–1916) set up an Independent Socialist Party which drew its backing mainly from the rural areas and enrolled a good many smallholding peasants as well as rural labourers.

István Varkónyi, a horse-dealer from Czegled, made a small fortune out of cartage and other contracts. He was impressed by the wretched condition of the small peasants and rural workers, and, joining the Social Democratic Party, set to work to build up support for it in the rural areas. Presently he fell under the influence of the pacific Anarchist, Dr. Eugen Heinrich Schmitt, and began to preach a doctrine of Christian Socialism based on his ideas. According to Schmitt's teaching there is in every man, even in the worst of malefactors, a divine spark which is capable of irradiating his entire being with brotherly love for his fellow-men and of inducing him, without forcible
coercion, to live the good life and build the good community. But this natural element of goodness has been overlaid by the long traditions of misery on the one hand and oppression on the other, and the evil practices arising out of these traditions are not to be got rid of in a moment, or indeed at all, among those with whom the extremes of misery and oppression are allowed to remain in being. Accordingly, the first step towards regeneration is to arouse the divine spirit in those who are capable of responding and with their aid to set on foot a crusade for material betterment. Varkonyi applied this diagnosis especially to the small peasants and landless labourers of Northern Hungary, and called upon those who were better off, but not of the oppressing classes, to demand reforms which would raise the living standards of the rural masses and, by doing so, make them accessible to the appeal to their higher natures. Inspired by these ideas, he seceded from the Social Democratic Party and founded in 1896 an Agrarian Socialist Party which, for a time, commanded a substantial following. In land-owning circles there were fears of a general peasant uprising. Varkonyi's party was suppressed by law, but continued to exist underground as a rival to the Social Democrats, who actively continued their agrarian propaganda. Varkonyi's Socialism differed from theirs mainly in having no roots in Marxism, with its insistence on industrial leadership. It was addressed directly to the rural workers and had a good deal in common with the Narodnism of the Slav countries. Its mystical, half-religious element appealed to the religious feelings of the rural population. Varkonyi was sometimes accused of being an Anarchist; but he was, in fact, no more than an agrarian agitator of a type common in the less developed countries.

Despite the severe repression of the rural movement, considerable practical successes were won. In 1896 and 1897 large increases were secured in harvest wages, and regular wage-rates were also substantially improved in the troubled areas. These successes, however, only added to the zeal of the authorities in suppressing the movement by depriving it of its leaders and harassing both the Socialist parties. After 1897 the rural unrest died down for a time in face of the repression. It did not break out again on a large scale until 1905, when the general ferment which followed the uprisings in Russia spread to Hungary and
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affected the Slav and Rumanian as well as the Magyar and German peoples.

In face of the agrarian disturbances of 1896 and 1897, the Government resorted to severe measures of repression. Not content with breaking up the peasant meetings and proscribing Varkónyi's party, it enacted new repressive legislation. In 1898 a new law, commonly called the 'Slavery Law', came into force. This forbade all strikes, and laid down severe penalties for the crime of 'incitement to strike'. It also embodied special measures against the rural workers, who were not only forbidden to combine in any form, but were also subjected to compulsory labour. It was made a criminal act for a rural worker to absent himself from labour in the service of the estate-owner; and enforcement was put into the hands of the county authorities, which were exclusively controlled by the local landowners. At the same time fresh repressions were enforced against the Socialist parties and the urban Trade Unions, which were driven further underground but nevertheless continued to grow. In 1900 a second group of agrarian Socialists, headed by Vilmos Mezőfi, broke away and formed a 'Reorganised Socialist Party'. In 1903 the Social Democratic Party itself was reorganised, still on a basis of close alliance with the Trade Unions; and in 1905 the urban workers played their full part in the big strike movements which followed the outbreak of the Russian Revolution.

The extensive agrarian uprisings of 1905 and the excitement caused by the Russian Revolution had as one of their effects the near-miracle that three Agrarian Socialists — Varkónyi, Mezőfi, and Andios Achin — were elected to the Hungarian Parliament. Achin was almost at once assassinated; but the other two remained in Parliament to put the peasants' case — and to be often howled down for doing so — and to play their part in the Reform struggle of the succeeding years. The Marxist Social Democrats, on the other hand, remained unable to elect a single member right up to 1914.

Side by side with the repression, attempts were being made throughout this period to fight the growth of Socialism by creating counter-movements on a Christian Social basis imitated from Austria. A Christian People's Party had been started in the 1890s; and in 1904 a Christian Workers' Party
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was set up in opposition to the reorganised S.D.P. A main feature of these movements was anti-Semitism, directed against the bourgeois Radicals as well as against the Socialists. The Hungarian Christian Social movement, though it did something to foster mutual aid and Co-operative Societies on a religious basis, and put forward a paternalistic programme of social reforms, never developed any Radical wing such as appeared in the Christian Social movements of the West. It was essentially, like Lueger's movement in Vienna, a fighting anti-Semitic organisation of the right, designed to safeguard the authority of the Church and to stir up feeling against the Jews and foreigners who played so large a part in Socialist and Radical groups.

Throughout the period discussed in this chapter the Hungarian Constitution remained unreformed. The workers, as we have seen, had no votes; and a high proportion of the middle classes were also voteless. In the non-Magyar areas many constituencies were, in effect, 'rotten boroughs', with hardly any electors: the Magyar areas had larger electorates, but were mostly under aristocratic control. Everywhere it was a great rarity for anyone who was not at least magyarised to secure election. The lower House, as well as the upper, was an aristocratic preserve, into which only a few outsiders ever penetrated. This did not prevent groups with a leftish tinge from appearing within the traditional Magyar parties, which were always rather fluid and loosely organised; but it did rule out all possibility of a real Socialist parliamentary party, or even of a strong bourgeois Radical party. Both Socialists and Radicals had to rely mainly on extra-parliamentary agitation, carried on under onerous police control. The franchise movement, as far as it came from the left, was organised mainly at first by the Social Democrats in informal alliance with the middle-class Radical Party headed by Oszkár Jásci (b. 1875), the historian who was later to write the story of the Hungarian Revolution and to find a home in the United States as professor at Oberlin College after the Revolution's defeat. Inside Parliament these parties found some support from the left wing of the Independence Party — the 'Men of '48'. This wing was gradually breaking loose from the aristocratic ultra-nationalists, and tended to favour alliance with non-Magyar elements that were
opposed to the Imperial Government and the Austrian connection. It passed presently under the leadership of the dissident aristocrat, Count Mihály Károlyi (1875–1955), who constituted himself the friend of agrarian reform and of the developing Co-operative movement. But for the most part even the Magyar left remained very much Magyar, with the traditional feeling of superiority over the other national groups.

The situation in Hungary was, however, considerably changed by the successive shocks administered to the established order by the Russian Revolution of 1905 and by the establishment of manhood suffrage in Austria two years later. This latter development meant the sudden growth of the Austrian Socialist Party into a large and powerful group in the Austrian Reichsrath. It was, however, as we have seen, accompanied by a disintegration of the Federal Socialist Party into separate national parties of Germans, Czechs, Poles, and lesser national groups, and by a rapid advance of nationalist feeling in the Slav areas. Austrian Trade Unionism, as we saw, was also affected, especially in Bohemia. These fissiparous tendencies, which seemed to threaten either the break-up of Austria or its reconstitution as a federation of national States, were bound to affect Hungary, especially the Slovak districts adjoining Bohemia, but also throughout the non-Magyar areas. They were bound also to intensify Magyar nationalism, and to create a cleavage between its right- and left-wing elements. It was widely recognised that some sort of franchise reform had become inevitable. Among the ‘Compromisers’ — the ‘Men of ’67’ — there was a growing willingness to accept some form of manhood suffrage, in the hope that it could be rigged by means of plural voting and other devices, so as to prevent the disintegration of the Hungarian Kingdom. But the strong man of the pro-imperial group, Count István Tisza, remained irreconcilably opposed to manhood suffrage. Among the ‘Independence’ factions the right wing was also strongly hostile to any change that might endanger Magyar supremacy, whereas the left wing wanted to enfranchise the poorer Magyars and to destroy the non-Magyar ‘rotten boroughs’ which were strongholds of the ‘Men of ’67’, but was also determined to resist any change that might hand over power to the non-Magyar majority of the population. The political situation thus became exceed-
ingly confused; but in face of increasing popular agitation it became impossible to do nothing. Accordingly, a sequence of Franchise Bills made their appearance, only to meet their fate at the hands of committees or to lapse with the fall of the Governments which had put them forward. In 1905–6 a Government representing the 'Men of 1867' tried to carry a Bill which would have given both the working classes and the Slavs some prospect of winning seats: the nationalist opposition successfully blocked its progress. At this time, a struggle was proceeding over the right of the Crown to increase the size of the armed forces and to demand from Hungary both a larger number of recruits and an increased financial contribution. The King-Emperor, unable to get either voted in face of a combination of the opposition parties, allowed these parties to form a Government under secret promise not to disturb the 1867 Compromise. The new Coalition Government thereupon introduced in 1908 a Franchise Bill based on a system of plural voting which would have counteracted a large increase in the number of electors by weighting the representation against both the working classes and the non-Magyar population. The Socialists took the lead in organising great protest demonstrations. There were serious riots in Budapest, met by the usual methods of violent repression. The Coalition Government, which had antagonised its own supporters by its promise, which had leaked out, not to upset the settlement of 1867, became exceedingly unpopular, and the King-Emperor dismissed it from office. The 'Men of '67' returned to power, and produced a new Franchise Bill embodying the principle of manhood suffrage; but this Bill was so mauled in the course of parliamentary discussion as to become manifestly worthless. Another Government and another Bill broke down in face of the obstinate refusal of the deputies to accept any measure that would endanger either the aristocratic or the Magyar ascendancy. In particular, there was very strong opposition to the secret ballot, especially in the rural areas, where open voting enabled the landowners to exercise very powerful pressure. The Magyars were also determined to preserve a distribution of seats and voters which would ensure a continued preponderance of their nation over the other national groups and would keep down the representation of the towns, with their propensity
to return Socialist or Radical members. The truth was that, when it came to the point, neither of the main groups really wanted to reform the franchise; but, the question having been raised and a popular movement having developed, neither side dared to let it drop.

These struggles over franchise reform coincided in time with a sharp conflict over military service. The Hungarian Parliament claimed that the Crown had no right to call up conscripts on Hungarian territory without its authorisation or beyond the numbers it was prepared to authorise. The Vienna Government, now allied with Germany, wanted to increase the size of the army in accordance with the terms of its agreement with the Germans: the Hungarians refused to authorise the larger call-up or to vote the funds for the increased military expenditure. 1912 was a year of acute disturbances in Croatia, where the Diet was suspended and the nationalist movement put down with a strong hand. It also brought back to power, to deal with the rising confusion, Count István Tisza, a leading opponent of manhood suffrage in the ‘1867’ party, who first as President of the House of Deputies and then as Prime Minister, carried the Army Bill through in face of tumultuous opposition by having the hostile deputies removed by force from the House. One of these, Gyula Kovácz, returned after his removal and attempted to shoot Tisza, missed, and shot himself. Then the Prime Minister, Lukács, became involved in a financial scandal, and had to resign. Tisza took his place, and carried Lukács’s Electoral Law through in 1913 by the same highhanded methods. But the new law satisfied no one — not even its author: the agitations continued on their confused course and were in full flood when the first world war broke out in August 1914.

It will be seen that throughout the period studied in this chapter it had been impossible for Hungarian Socialism to find any effective outlet in parliamentary action. There were a very few independent Socialists in Parliament; but they were isolated and ineffective figures. No orthodox Social Democrat ever secured election. Nor were the Radicals, led by Járási, in much better case. Both these groups had to rely on extra-parliamentary activities — on journalism, on spoken propaganda, and on street demonstrations. In Parliament, they had
allies, at any rate for some purposes, in the more advanced elements of the Independence Party — the ‘Men of ’48’; but whereas the Social Democrats were internationalists and the Radicals opposed to the Magyar monopoly of power, the ‘Men of ’48’ were Magyar nationalists, even when they held advanced social views. This situation, however, was to some extent changing during the years before 1914, as the left wing of the Independents moved further away from the nationalist right wing and developed into a virtually separate party led by Count Mihály Károlyi. Károlyi, who was a member of a great land-owning family, had come into prominence through his activities in support of agricultural improvement. He had been brought by way of these activities to take a keen interest in the Co-operative movement, of which his older relative, Count Sándor Károlyi, had been a pioneer. The Hungarian Co-operatives had been developing mainly in two forms — Agricultural Credit Societies and Consumers’ Societies which, in the rural areas, supplied farm requisites as well as household goods. Mihály Károlyi, after serving for a time as President of the Central Union of Landowners — a body concerned mainly with protecting the interests of the great landowners, but also with the introduction of improved agricultural methods — became President of the chief Co-operative body — Hangya (The Ant) — and built up a large following in the country. He then moved steadily towards the left, and became the central figure in the more radical section of the Independence Party, from which he finally seceded with his followers during the war, to act with the Radicals and Socialists at its close in proclaiming the Hungarian Republic. Up to 1914, however, he was still only a politician of the parliamentary left, regarded by his opponents as an ambitious demagogue and by the Socialists and Radicals with a good deal of suspicion because of his connections with the Magyar aristocracy. The Socialists, during this period, found no outstanding leader to replace Leo Frankel. Their most prominent figures were the saddler Ernő Garámi (1876–1935), who was to become a member of Károlyi’s Cabinet in 1918 and then to flee to Austria when the Communists took power; Julius Peidl, a Trade Union leader who was Prime Minister in the partly Social Democratic Government that had a brief existence after
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the fall of Béla Kun; Jakob Weltner, the outstanding Trade Union figure, a woodworker and a delegate at the International Socialist Congresses of 1907 and 1910; Zsigmond Kunfi (1879–1930), a schoolmaster and originally a Radical, who came over to the Socialist Party before 1914, became a member of the Károlyi Cabinet, and then led the Social Democratic Party into its fusion with the Communists, but was thereafter a strong opponent of the Béla Kun régime; Alexander Garbai, the stonemason who became President of Béla Kun's Republic; Desirer Bokányi, another stonemason, and Max Grossman, the leader of the Butchers' Union, both well-known figures at the Second International; and Louis Kassak (b. 1887), the ironworker poet and novelist, who was the central figure on the cultural side of the proletarian movement.

This cultural side was strong, both among the Magyars and among the Germans and Jews who formed a large section of the urban intelligentsia. Socialism, during the years before 1914, was gaining a strong hold over the students, especially through the Galileo Club, which, beginning as a society for scientific studies, developed into a powerful auxiliary of the Socialist movement. It was finally suppressed in 1918, and most of its leaders — many of whom had been imprisoned — reappeared as active figures in the revolutionary movement at the end of the war.
CHAPTER XIV

THE BALKANS

I. General

In the Balkan countries — Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Turkey — the Socialist movement remained small right up to 1914. In none of these countries was there a large enough industrial proletariat to provide a basis for any considerable growth of Trade Unions; and though the Socialists tried to build up support in the countryside their success was very limited. Over most of the area the predominant form of agricultural production was small-scale peasant farming of a very primitive sort. Except in Rumania there were few great estates and not many landless labourers. The condition of the peasants differed greatly from place to place; but, whether they were better or worse off, most of them cultivated their small holdings primarily for subsistence, with cash crops taking an important position only in a few districts — for example, in the tobacco-growing areas of Macedonia. Urban industries were chiefly on an artisan basis — handicrafts carried on in small workshops — with only a few factories, largely financed by foreign capital and producing mainly textiles. Foreign capital, however, was not an important factor except in Rumania, where the oil industry was being developed fast after 1900. Over most of the Balkans, mineral resources remained unused. Even in agriculture, though wheat-growing had declined, its place had been taken largely by maize, which formed the staple food for men as well as animals. There had been only a small development of specialised agriculture for export markets. Standards of living were exceedingly low, and precarious at that; and over the greater part of the region the peasants were subject to heavy and often arbitrary exactions from the tax-gatherers, and in Rumania from the landowners as well.

The soil, under these conditions, was liable to become
exhausted, and yields were generally low. Over-population involved serious under-employment, especially in the winter months. This was partly relieved by large-scale emigration, not only to the United States, but also to South Russia and, in the case of Greece, to Egypt and even to the Sudan. There had, however, been a substantial development of a kulak class, which used money-lending as a means of exploiting the poorer peasants; and the sons of these relatively well-to-do villagers infiltrated into the officer grades of the armed forces, especially in Serbia, where they became an important factor in the aggressive nationalist movement, especially after 1903. There were similar tendencies in Bulgaria, partly countered by the existence of a real Peasant Party, which was hostile to military adventures.

The absence of a landed aristocracy, however, mitigated the evil lot of the peasants, especially in Bulgaria and Serbia. This absence was due mainly to the driving out of the Turkish, or Turko-phil, upper classes as in one country after another political autonomy was achieved, even where a nominal Turkish overlordship remained. This expulsion left the peasant master of his own land, and poor chiefly because he could cultivate it only by the most primitive methods. There was indeed some development of agricultural Co-operation; but it was not on a large scale and was chiefly helpful to the better-off, rather than to the general run of peasants. In some areas, forms of primitive village community, carrying on production in common, survived; but they were being gradually superseded by individual cultivation.

It has to be borne in mind that all the Balkan States had risen on the ruins of the Turkish Empire, and that not one of them had been left to settle its accounts with Turkey without repeated intervention by the major European powers. In particular the Balkan region was the theatre of continual conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary, with the other great powers intervening, not for the most part in the cause of justice or freedom, but rather for the purpose of preventing either of the protagonists from achieving its desires. Nominally, on certain historic occasions, the defence of Christians against infidels was invoked, as on the celebrated occasion of the Bulgarian atrocities; but the Christians of the Balkans, far
from being united among themselves, were conducting a violent religious conflict as well as a struggle for national liberation, and the battles between the Greek Orthodox Church and its rivals continually confused the national issues. Moreover, all the new States had conflicting territorial and nationalistic claims, based on lively remembrances of long-past empires; and it was easy for the Turkish Government, as long as it retained any authority, to play off one group against another. This was a game at which the great powers could and did also play: so that the Balkan region was usually either at internecine war or plotting to engage in it, often at the instigation of one or another of the powers.

In a sense, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece were all democratic countries, in that they had no great landlord aristocracies. But their democracy hardly extended beyond the affairs of the village, and amounted to very little in terms of ability to control their politicians. In this respect it asserted itself only at moments when a strong upsurge of nationalist feeling displaced a Government, or a ruler, and compelled the State to follow — often to its own undoing — an extreme nationalistic line, usually by making war on one or more of its neighbours. The outcome was usually a settlement dictated by the great powers so as to serve, or to accommodate, their own interests rather than those of the Balkan peoples. The fleets of the great powers were always bombarding, or threatening to bombard, somebody; and Russian or Austrian armies were always marching or threatening to march. Settlements were often imposed by the appointment of alien rulers or alien commissioners: where they were not, and sometimes where they were, they often broke down or were never in fact enforced.

Fortunately, there is no need in this book to explore the labyrinths of either Balkan politics or great power intrigue and intervention in the Balkan region. I am concerned with these matters only as the background against which what Socialism did appear had to take its place upon the stage. Some sort of Socialist movement had developed before 1914 in all the Balkan countries except perhaps Montenegro; but nowhere had Socialism become a major influence, nor had any Socialist thinker of the first stature emerged. The nearest approach was Dr. Christian Rakovsky (b. 1873), who was himself an
international figure. Born in Bulgaria, he was brought up in the Dobruja and found himself a Rumanian when that area passed under Rumanian sovereignty. He began his Socialist activities in Bulgaria as a schoolboy, and was excluded from higher education on that ground. His parents sent him to Geneva, where he met Plekhanov and came under his influence. Thence he passed on to Germany, where he met Liebknecht and came under the influence of the German movement. Expelled from Prussia in 1894, he went to France and took his doctor's degree in medicine at Montpellier. Then in 1897 he returned to Bulgaria, where he took a leading place in the Socialist movement, attempting to reconcile its violently contending factions. There he published, in 1898, his first important book, *Russia and the East* — a strong attack on Czarist political ambitions. From Bulgaria he went to the Dobruja. In 1900 he served as a doctor in the Rumanian army. In 1907, on the occasion of the Rumanian rural rising, he was expelled from the country, on the pretext that he was not after all a Rumanian citizen. He represented Rumania at the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress of that year, having previously represented Serbia at the Amsterdam Congress of 1904. During the following years he was now in one country and now in another, including many periods of clandestine sojourn in Rumania. In 1911 he went back to Bulgaria as the emissary of the Socialist International, and made a renewed attempt to reunite the quarrelling Socialist Parties. In 1912 he was allowed back to Rumania; but after Rumania's entry into the war he was imprisoned, to be released by the Russians in May 1917. He then took part in the Soviet Revolution, and became a member of the Bolshevik Central Executive Committee. He headed the delegation sent by the Bolsheviks to treat with the Ukrainian Rada, and then, in 1919, became President of the Ukrainian Soviet Government. In 1924 he represented the Soviet Union in London, and negotiated the abortive Anglo-Soviet Treaty with the first Labour Government. From 1926 to 1927 he was Soviet Ambassador in Paris. Recalled in 1927 he became an active leader in the opposition to Stalin, and was presently expelled from the Communist Party and exiled to Stalingrad. In 1934 he made his recantation, and was allowed to return to Moscow; but in
1938 he was again in disgrace. He was among the ‘Twenty-one’ who were tried in March 1938. He was condemned, but not executed. His lot was penal servitude. He had first crossed swords with Stalin as an upholder of Ukrainian claims, had then differed with him about Soviet policy in China and in relation to the West, and had ended, like others who crossed Stalin’s path, with the label of ‘Trotskyist’. He was in fact a cultured, independent-minded revolutionary with a considerable capacity for seeing more than one side of a case, and with an understanding of Western as well as Eastern Socialism. Coming of an aristocratic family, he nevertheless inherited revolutionary traditions, with which he blended a strong humanism. Having in effect no country he could feel as his own, he was ardently internationalist, but at the same time a powerful advocate of Balkan unity, as a means of resistance to the domination of Balkan affairs by the rival coalitions of the great powers and also as a means of uniting the working classes against their several oppressors. He wrote much, in a number of languages, including historical and economic works as well as much journalism and some books about contemporary politics. Some of his books were published under the pen-name, Insarov. Among them were a study of Metternich and his Times and a work on Modern France, both published in Russia. He also wrote on medical subjects and on criminology.

No other Socialist spans the Balkans in the same way as Rakovsky: nor is there any other of comparable importance, even in a single country. Naturally, in the predominantly Slav countries, the principal influence was Russian, including both Narodnik and Social Democratic elements, but with a preponderance of Plekhanov, partly because not a few of the Balkan Socialists had been to Switzerland and there made contact with his group. This link was in general closest with Rumania, where it had a rival in the influence of French Socialism; for many Rumanians went to Paris as students and came back as carriers of Western ideas in French form. German influence counted not so much directly, through personal contacts, as because of the great renown of the German Social Democratic Party in the International, and indeed throughout the world. Austrian Socialist influence was not very great, though there were of course close contacts between the Southern
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Slavs under Austrian or Hungarian rule and the Balkan Slavs. Italian Socialist influence was negligible: British, outside Greece, was non-existent, except on the Bulgarian moderate, Sakosov.

2. BULGARIA

Bulgarians now regard as the pioneer of Socialism in their country the poet Christo Botev (1848–76), who went to Russia at the age of 15, was expelled from that country for revolutionary activities at the age of 17, and, after two years as a teacher in Bessarabia, came back home to follow his profession in 1867. The same year he had to leave Bulgaria on account of a fiery speech. He went to Rumania, where he earned his living as a printer and proof-reader and continued his revolutionary activities. In Russia he had imbibed Narodnik doctrines, which had made him a believer in the possibility of peasant Socialism; and he was also in contact with Nechaiev’s followers. In 1871, from Galatz, where he was then working, he sent a telegram of congratulation to the Paris Commune; and there he wrote his *Creed of the Bulgarian Commune*, the first Socialist manifesto of his country. He attempted to set up a Commune in Galatz, and had to leave. In Braila he started a newspaper for Bulgarian exiles, but it perished after five issues. Moving to Bucharest, he joined Ljubra Karavelov in publishing another journal, called first *Liberty* and then *Independence*, as the organ of the movement for an independent, democratic Bulgarian State. Both these journals were suppressed by the Rumanian Government. During the next few years he was active, with Levski and Karavelov, in organising revolutionary groups in Bulgaria. In 1873, after attempting to run a satirical journal, *The Alarm Clock*, he returned to teaching; and in the following year he succeeded Levski, who had been shot in 1873, as Secretary of the conspiratorial Central Bulgarian Revolutionary Committee, of which he soon became the head. With this body he tried to stir up a rising in Bulgaria, and, after several attempts had failed, a considerable rising did occur in 1876. Botev and his followers then seized an Austrian steamer and compelled its captain to transport them to Bulgaria, where he fell fighting in May of that year. He had edited several further journals after *The Alarm Clock*, and had published his poems,
which are strongly patriotic as well as democratic, in 1875.

Botev, whose poems are now in much favour, has no claim to rank as an original Socialist thinker. He was a democratic nationalist revolutionary who had come under the influence of Russian Nihilist and Narodnik ideas, but without becoming a Nihilist or even a Narodnik in any deep sense. His importance lies in the fact that he is the outstanding figure among the early carriers of Russian Socialist ideas into the Balkans. He left behind him, however, no Socialist movement. There was none during the years of struggle for Bulgarian independence and unification, though there were individual leftists who were influenced by Socialist ideas. In the absence of a wealthy landlord class exploiting the peasants, the social problem hardly existed as a political factor. The issues were those of nationality, of religious independence from the Greek Church at Constantinople, and of political democracy as against rule imposed from without, whether by Russia or by great power agreement. Only at the beginning of the 1890s did any sort of Socialist organisation appear; but the way for it was prepared in the 1880s by the return from abroad of the two men who were thereafter to dispute for leadership, as well as by Rakovsky's activities. The first of these two was Dimiter Blagoev (1856–1924), who in the early 'eighties was the leader of an extreme revolutionary group in Russia, where he published a clandestine journal, Rabochy, as its organ. When, in 1886, this group was broken up by the Czarist police, Blagoev returned to Bulgaria, where he had been born, and there restarted his journal. The other pioneer was the student, Ianko Sakosov (1860–1941), who went to London to pursue his studies, and came back much under the influence of Western, and particularly of British, ideas. He was directed particularly by the Darwinians and by Huxley and Spencer towards organic conceptions of society and towards evolutionary ideas of socialistic development; and his gradualism brought him speedily into fierce conflict with Blagoev's intransigent revolutionism. In 1891 Blagoev published a booklet in which he outlined his Marxist conceptions of Socialism; and the same year he and the young lawyer, Nikola Gabrowsky (1864–1925), set up a Socialist organisation, first at a secret gathering held indoors and then at a larger assembly held on top of a mountain in order to avoid
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police attentions. But almost at once the new movement split into rival factions. One group held that in view of the immaturity of the Bulgarian working class it was premature to attempt to establish a political party and that priority should be given to the organisation of Trade Unions and peasant groups under Social Democratic leadership, but open to any worker. The other main group, headed by Blagoev, demanded the constitution of a revolutionary political party and, while favouring the establishment of Trade Unions, insisted that they must be open only to those who accepted the full revolutionary Socialist gospel. There was also a third group, made up of Rakovsky's followers — he himself had been expelled from the country — which attempted to reconcile the other two. Each group started its own journal; and the first and second set up rival organisations, the Social Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party. That was in 1892.

Two years later the effective ruler of Bulgaria, the once-revolutionary Stambulov, who had been ruthless in suppressing advanced movements and had established a virtual dictatorship, fell from office; and with his fall it became possible for the Socialists to organise more openly and for Trade Unions to be formed on a less conspiratorial basis. The first effect of this was to bring the rival Socialist factions once more together and to set them to work organising Trade Unions and peasant groups. The following year the reunited party won 2 seats in the Sobranje, both in rural areas; and during the next few years the movement spread fairly rapidly, especially in the villages. In 1899 the party won 6 seats; but the same year, partly as a result of its success, a rival Agrarian Union was founded, on a non-Socialist, purely peasant-democratic programme; and a large part of the Socialists' rural following was lost. In 1901 it was able to hold only a single seat. By this time serious internal dissensions had broken out again. The question had arisen in 1899 whether the Socialists in the Sobranje should follow a policy of strict independence and make use of their representation only for purposes of propaganda, or whether they should be prepared to co-operate with other democratic parties in furthering reform legislation and putting a democratic Government into office. In 1900 Sakosov started a new journal, The Common Cause, in which he advocated the
second of these policies. In 1901 a Progressive Government took office under Professor Daneff, and a new and formidable figure, Alexander Stambolisky (1879–1923), appeared on the scene as editor of the *Agrarian Banner*, the organ of the peasants’ National Agricultural Union. At the elections the Socialists won 8 seats, some in the towns and some in the country. There were also a considerable number of strikes, signs of the growing strength of the Trade Unions. But the effect of these successes was to bring about a definite rupture between the two wings of the Socialist Party. The Blagoev faction, with Vassil Kolarov (1877–1950), later active in the Communist Party, as its principal spokesman, moved at the Party Congress a resolution directed against the ‘collaborationists’ and designed to place the Socialist deputies in the Sobranje under the orders of the Central Committee of the party. In Sofia, where Sakosov’s followers were in a majority, the followers of Blagoev set up a separate organisation and appealed to the Central Committee, which had a left majority, for support. The Central Committee thereupon expelled the old Sofia branch and the right-wing leaders from the party; and the expelled groups retorted by claiming to be the true party and by establishing a new organisation round the Sobranje group, which was mainly on their side. Moreover, each wing proceeded to establish a separate Trade Union Federation, one on broad lines, open to all, and the other on a strictly revolutionary and Socialist basis. George Dimitrov (1882–1949), the future leader of Communist Bulgaria, who had joined the printers’ Union in 1902, soon became the leading figure in the Trade Union movement which followed Blagoev. Gavril Giorgiev, G. Kirkov, and Vassil Kolarov were also among the founders of the Blagoev party, known from this time on as the ‘Narrow’ Social Democrats, whereas Sakosov’s followers were known as the ‘Broad’. Each faction claimed to be the Social Democratic Party: each sent its delegates to International Socialist Congresses to dispute the other’s credentials, and the ‘Narrows’ poured out, both in written reports and by word of mouth, a constant stream of vilification of their opponents.

The split of 1903, however, was not the end of the matter. The rigidly doctrinaire policy of Blagoev, which made it impossible for his party to build up effective mass contacts and in effect handed the control of most of the few Trade Unions
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there were over to his opponents, soon led to quarrels among the ‘Narrows’. In 1905 a section, calling themselves the ‘Liberal’ Socialists, broke away under Nikola Harlakov (1874–1927); and three years later there was yet another split, when Nikola Sakarov (1881–1943) seceded to form the ‘Progressive’ Socialist Party. The following year the secessionists united with the ‘Broads’ to form the ‘Unified’ Social Democratic Party, with the ‘Narrows’ still in bitter opposition.

Before this, in 1906, there had been further considerable strike movements, especially on the railways and in the mines. In 1908 Bulgaria had proclaimed itself a kingdom at the time of Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovinia; and as a sequel to the agitation all over the region and the imminent danger of internecine wars among the Balkan States, the Socialist Parties had called a joint Congress, at which they had denounced military alliances and great power intrigues and had called for a Federation of the Balkans for common defence and independence. The need for common action made a strong case for trying to heal internal dissensions; and the International Socialist Bureau sent a series of emissaries to Bulgaria to persuade the rival parties to unite. Among them was Rakovsky, who in 1911 founded a daily newspaper, Forward, in which he preached unity and common international action. The International Federation of Trade Unions sent Karl Legien, its secretary and the leader of the German Trade Union movement, on a similar mission to the Bulgarian Unions; but the splits remained. In the Special Sobranje elected in 1911 the ‘Broads’ won 5 seats, and the ‘Narrows’ only 1; in the Ordinary Sobranje which followed only 1 Socialist was returned. That was Sakosov, who found himself alone to state the Socialist case against war when the first Balkan War broke out in 1912. Then, in 1913, under a new electoral law, both parties won large successes; but thereafter, with the outbreak of the European War, the tide flowed in favour of the ‘Narrows’. Kolarov, on their behalf, participated in the Zimmerwald Conference of 1917; and after the Bolshevik Revolution, they turned into the Bulgarian Communist Party.

During the years before 1914, however, both ‘Broads’ and ‘Narrows’ had been increasingly overshadowed by the growth of Stambolisky’s Agrarian Party. Stambolisky was elected to
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the Sobranje only in 1908, having built up his following till then mainly outside parliamentary politics. In the following year he published his principal book, Political Parties or Class Organisations?, in which he set forth the doctrines he was to apply after 1918 as the effective ruler of Bulgaria and as the would-be inspirer of the 'Green International'. The future, he argued, lay not with political parties organised on an ideological basis, which became inevitably the prey of bureaucrats and self-seekers, but with organised class groups, resting on democratic foundations of neighbourhood and common economic interest. In the predominantly agricultural countries, this meant that power should rest with mass peasant movements, and not with the industrial proletariat any more than with the professional party politicians. Stambolisky’s movement, unlike most national agrarian movements, was definitely a movement of the left, resting on the support of the smallholders who dominated Bulgarian economic life. It destroyed the hopes of the Social Democrats of both wings of building up a powerful Socialist rural movement, and caused them to concentrate more on the urban workers and to quarrel more fiercely than ever among themselves because their field of political recruitment had been thus narrowed. In 1915 the ‘Broad’ Socialists and the Agrarians momentarily joined forces to issue a manifesto against Bulgarian participation in the war on the German side. Then both, together with the ‘Narrows’, were driven underground, to emerge again only after the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Central Powers.

3. Rumania

Whereas Bulgaria was a country of small peasants owning their own land and enjoying, even at a low standard of life and culture, an almost complete freedom from feudal oppression, Rumania was a country of great landed estates and of a peasantry subject to grossly excessive rents and taxes and also to the exaction of unpaid labour on the landowners’ estates. Moreover, though the country became rapidly more productive towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the introduction of more advanced agricultural techniques and with the beginnings of modern industrial development, especially in the oil wells, the
peasants, instead of getting any share in these advances, were thrust into deeper and deeper poverty as the prices of the goods they had to buy rose and their backwardness prevented them from emulating the increased productivity of the larger estates. Land reform was indeed always being talked about, and politicians, Liberal and Young Conservative alike, protested their will to make more land available for the peasants, who were crowded increasingly on inadequate holdings. But the land laws actually passed were always such as to deny access to the ordinary peasant and to facilitate purchase either by existing landowners or by those who had capital behind them. This doubtless made for productive use of the land thus sold; but it left the peasants' grievances wholly unredressed. Moreover, the Co-operative movement, which developed considerably under the patronage of progressive landowners such as Vissarion Roman, M. P. S. Aurelian, who was for a short time Prime Minister, and Vasily Kugalniceanu, also benefited mainly the larger farmers and the landowners, rather than the general run of peasants.

The semi-servile condition in which most of the peasants lived, the complete domination of local affairs by the landowners and their representatives, and the immense cultural gulf which separated the educated classes from the mass of the people, made the rise of a peasant movement, such as developed in Croatia, Bulgaria, and other parts of the region, almost impossible. The peasants themselves were too miserable and down-trodden to create such a movement; and the intellectuals were too remote from them to have provided the requisite leadership, even in the absence of the intense repression any such attempt would have encountered. Neither a Peasant Party nor any real Socialist Party could develop under the prevailing conditions. The Constitution of 1866, based largely on the Belgian Constitution of 1831, was formally liberal, to the extent that it laid down a number of excellent principles — freedom of conscience, of assembly, and of the press; equality before the law; the right to education; and so on. But much of it existed only on paper; and its electoral provisions were such as to assure the predominance of the wealthier classes. Voting was by classes, and was confined to taxpayers; the poorer electors voted indirectly, and were grossly under-
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represented. Even after the reforms of 1884 this system remained unaltered in essence. It allowed the professional classes to secure a limited representation in the towns, but not as the champions of any wider social group entitled to participate in the choice.

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that Rumania, though it was more open than the rest of the Balkans to Western cultural influences and more developed industrially because of its oilfields, had established no effective Socialist movement right up to 1914. A series of Socialist groups, made up almost entirely of intellectuals, with almost no working-class following, did spring up in the 1880s. Some of them were inspired by Western ideas, derived largely from France and Switzerland; others were influenced by refugees from Russia. Among the latter the outstanding personality was Dobrogeanu Gherea, Rumania's only Marxist of note, unless we count Rakovski, who was by birth a Bulgarian and by his actions an essentially international figure. Gherea wrote an important book on the agrarian problem in Rumania, and continued an active figure in the Rumanian Social Democratic Party right up to 1914. But, for the most part, the intellectuals who, in the 1880s and 1890s, espoused the Socialist gospel drifted away from Socialism into the parties of the bourgeois left, some of them to become in later life among the most active opponents of the Socialist and Radical peasant movements. Their rallying point in the 1890s was the review Lumea Nova, whose editor, Nadejde, together with V. Mortzun, both members of the Executive of the Socialist Party, became leading figures in the Liberal Party, and took with them, and appointed to various government offices, a large number of others. Among these was Encia Athanasiu, who in 1896 had been a delegate at the London Congress of the Socialist International. He became a leading civil servant and took an important part in suppressing the peasant revolt of 1907 and the workers' movements associated with it. Another of the founders of the Socialist Party, Constantin Mille, left it to become an influential Radical journalist. By 1900, largely by reason of these defections but also because of the expulsion from Rumania of the refugees who had been active in promoting the Socialist cause, the Rumanian Socialist Party had practically ceased to exist.
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Up to the late 'nineties, as we saw, the Socialist Party had been mainly a group of intellectuals. Then, failing to find any support among the urban workers, it had at length attempted to carry its message to the grossly exploited rural workers. It had organised a rural campaign and had set up a number of village social clubs, with a moderate programme of demands for land reform and improved social conditions. This campaign had been met with severe repressive measures. The clubs, despite the care of the leaders to keep to strictly legal methods, had been broken up by the police, and the leaders of the agitation, among them Banghereanu and Ficsinescu, two prominent figures in the Socialist Party, had been sent to gaol. These strong measures were effective in breaking up what was left of the party, and only a few isolated underground groups survived.

Revival began during the next few years with a growth of Trade Unions, due partly to the beginnings of modern industrial development and partly to the very steps which the Government took to prevent it. In small-scale and middle industry the Government set up a system of mixed corporations, including employers as well as workers, in which enrolment was compulsory. Through these bodies it operated a system of compulsory work-cards, without which employment could not be lawfully obtained. This made the corporations intensely unpopular, and large numbers joined the Unions which were organised secretly under Socialist leadership. Strikes broke out and, despite Government repression, met with considerable success, especially among the port workers and in the skilled trades, in which labour was scarce. The period was one of rapid economic development from small beginnings; and many employers preferred making concessions to facing repeated stoppages of work. The Trade Unions, in addition to organising strikes, soon began, under Socialist influence, to take part in the political struggle, organising demonstrations for electoral reform as well as against the corporative system. In close alliance with them the Socialists began to re-form their organisation by setting up local Political Circles, without re-establishing an open Socialist Party on a national scale. In this work of political organisation Christian Rakovsky played a leading part, while A. Constantinescu, who accompanied him
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as a delegate to the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, led the Trade Union side.

At this point, however, the re-created Socialist movement met with a further disaster as a sequel to the great peasant risings of 1907. These spontaneous outbreaks, which began in Moldavia and then spread rapidly over most of the country, were doubtless in part a belated expression of the widespread agrarian unrest that followed the Polish and Russian outbreaks of 1905. Even more than in Russia they were devoid of concerted leadership or of a common programme. They were sheer revolts against intolerable oppression, directed against the nearest objectives to which the peasants could attribute the blame for their increasing misery. At the outset they were mainly anti-Jewish, because of the unpopularity of Jewish traders and money-lenders, who were blamed for exorbitant prices and usurious rates of interest. Anti-Semitism was, indeed, deeply ingrained in the Rumanian peasantry as well as in the governing classes. The considerable Jewish population, engaged largely in retail trade and handicraft production, was denied all political rights. Jews were liable at all times to arbitrary arrest; and any Jew who made himself distasteful to the authorities could be expelled from the country without redress. If, in 1907, the peasants had limited themselves to pogroms, it is unlikely that the authorities would have done much to restrain them. But from attacks on Jews they proceeded to attacks on the houses and property of great landowners, burning down the dwellings of a number of influential proprietors and committing acts of violence against their agents. The governing classes, most of whom had not at all expected the peasant troubles to spread seriously to Rumania, took fright; and all the parties joined hands to stamp out the trouble. The Conservatives resigned, and the Liberals were put into office to deal with the situation, with General Averescu as Minister of War. Averescu mobilised an army of 120,000 men to crush the peasants, who had only the rudest arms. The whole country was divided into a number of theatres of war, and columns of cavalry and artillery were despatched with orders to adopt the severest measures. Villages were bombarded and destroyed; peasant bands which attempted resistance were butchered; peasant soldiers who refused to fire on
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their kith and kin shared the same fate. Within a few days more than 10,000 peasants had been slaughtered and large areas had been devastated to teach the insurgents a lesson. It is true that at the same time a royal proclamation was issued, promising the peasants redress for some of their grievances; but its terms were forgotten by the ruling classes when they had made their victory secure.

The only part played by the Socialists in the peasant uprising had been the publication of a manifesto calling on the peasants to refrain from violence and to limit themselves to lawful agitation for their demands—not very helpful advice, in view of the fact that no kind of peasant agitation was treated as lawful. The provision of the Constitution allowing the right of assembly, even if it had been observed, would not have helped them; for it explicitly excluded assembly out of doors, which was the only form open to the village population. The Socialists had almost no following in the country areas. The effect of the general excitement was indeed seen in a number of strikes among the industrial workers; but these had no other connection with the peasant risings. The governing classes, however, were not in a mood to discriminate. The authorities broke the strikes, and arrested most of the known Socialist leaders, of whom a number, who were not Rumanian citizens, were deported from the country. Among those deported was Christian Rakovsky, who had previously been shot at and wounded while he was addressing a workers' meeting at Galatz. It was conveniently decided that Rakovsky, though he had served as a doctor in the Rumanian army and still held a commission in the reserve, and though his father had been several times appointed to political positions in local government open only to citizens, was not entitled to Rumanian citizenship, because he had been born in Bulgaria. The Socialists were thus deprived of their outstanding leader, who had been mainly responsible for rebuilding the movement after its collapse in 1900. It did not wholly collapse again, because the Trade Unions had developed far enough among the urban workers to be able to survive the repression. But it had to take cover behind the Unions, and had hardly begun to re-establish itself as an independent entity when war broke out in 1914.

The panic aroused in the minds of the ruling classes by the
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peasant risings was such that even the progressive landowners who had encouraged the growth of Co-operative Societies came under suspicion. Vasily Kogalniceanu was among those arrested, though he was the son of a leading statesman and had certainly nothing to do with the peasant movement. So were a number of professors who had written about the need for land reform, and other intellectuals who were suspected of advanced opinions. The poet Babu Lajareanu was among the deportees.

Thus the peasant movement, by scaring the upper classes, plunged Rumania into deeper reaction than ever; but at the same time the continued rapid economic development increased the size of the industrial proletariat and stimulated Trade Union growth. The numbers of prosperous farmers increased; but the main body of the peasantry was left in its wretched half-servile condition. The urban workers were strong enough to organise mass demonstrations in defiance of the police during the years after 1905. But the countryside, where the mass of the people lived, had been taught its lesson.

4. SERBIA

Of the other Balkan countries not much needs to be said. Serbia, like Bulgaria, was a country of small cultivators: the Encyclopaedia Britannica described it, in its 1910–11 edition, as 'a land without aristocracy or middle class'. It had practically no industries, and no large body of landless labourers. Serbia was only a small country, with many Serbs outside its frontiers in territory still under Turkish or Austrian rule. It was divided from Montenegro, the other independent country of Serbian population, by the Sandjak of Novibazar, still under Turkish sovereignty, but occupied by an Austrian garrison. It had rival claims with Bulgaria and Greece to Macedonia, and designs to re-establish its ancient empire by driving the Austrians out of Bosnia ¹ and the Dalmatian coast. It was a very bellicose little country; and its internal politics were complicated by dynastic feuds. There was little chance for the social question to come to the front.

¹ There was also a small Socialist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Branko Hrisafović (b. 1879), and a General Trade Union Commission working in association with it. But these had closer connections with Austria than with the Serbian movement.
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A Socialist movement can hardly be said to have existed in Serbia until the very end of the nineteenth century; but Socialist ideas, and particularly those of the Russian Narodniks, had some influence on Serb Radicalism during the 1870s and 1880s. In 1872 the Radical leader, Svetozar Marcović, published a book in which he advocated a democratic federation of the Balkan peoples. In 1883 there was a peasant rising, under Radical leadership; it was suppressed, and a number of leaders were executed. Thereafter the Radical Party became more moderate, shed its Socialist ideas, and developed into a peasant party of the familiar Balkan kind, led mainly by lawyers and other intellectuals. Socialism died away, but began to revive at Belgrade about 1900, when a few Trade Unions were set up in fairly close association with the Socialists. But Trade Unionism was inevitably very weak. A Social Democratic Party was formed in 1903, and won a single seat in the Serbian Parliament, adding a second in 1905. But in 1904 the party’s report to the Amsterdam Congress of the Socialist International, at which it was represented not by a Serb but by the ubiquitous Rakovsky, said that it was ‘made up mainly of groups of exiles in all parts of Europe’. It managed to send a delegate, Herman Koschnia, to the Stuttgart Congress of 1907, and was able by that time to report some successes in local government elections. By 1912 it had 2000 members and had formed a Trade Union Federation closely linked to itself. Its leaders were J. Kaclerović (b. 1879) and Laptevčević (1864–?), its two parliamentary representatives, and its secretary, Duchan Popović (1884–1918). It had no outstanding theorist and no considerable body of intellectual support.

5. GREECE

Greek Socialism has a little more history than Serbian, but only because it produced one figure of some intellectual distinction. The first Socialist journal in Greece, Arden, was published at Athens in 1885. But no real movement started until Platon Drakoules became active in the 1890s. Drakoules, who had studied in the West, was fired by the activities of the Socialist International to organise the first Greek May Day demonstration in 1893. In 1895 he stood for the Greek Parliament, and got 4000 votes. This was at a moment when popular
excitement was running high in connection with the Cretan revolt of 1895 and the patriotic agitation conducted by the Ethnike Hetairea, a body inspired mainly by young military officers which established branches among Greeks, not only in Greece itself, but wherever there were substantial Greek communities. The Hetairea of course supported the Cretan risings; but its main purpose was to stir up insurrection in Macedonia, where rival propagandists were active on behalf of Bulgaria and revolt against Turkish rule appeared to be imminent. These nationalistic excitements stood powerfully in the way of the growth of Socialism. The renewed Cretan insurrection of 1897 and the sending of a Greek army to aid the insurgents led to the outbreak of war with Turkey, in which the Greek forces suffered disastrous defeat. The great powers intervened to mitigate the terms of peace; but in Greece the defeat was followed by acute popular discontents, including popular risings in the currant-growing areas; but the Socialists were too weak to play any large part.

In 1901 Drakoules founded a journal, Erevna (Research) and took the lead in setting up the League of the Working Classes of Greece — the first Socialist organisation of any size. Drakoules was elected to Parliament; but popular attention continued to be concentrated mainly on the agitation for military expansion. Greek bands resumed their activities in Macedonia, and war was again threatened with Turkey, then itself on the eve of the Young Turk Revolution. In 1908 the Cretan Assembly proclaimed reunion with Greece; but the Greek Government took a cautious line and, in 1909, was overthrown by a military coup. At the beginning of 1910 the military leaders summoned Venizelos, the outstanding figure in Crete, to come to Greece as adviser. Venizelos advised the convocation of a National Assembly to amend the constitution, and in 1911 took office and carried through a new constitution and a reorganisation of the armed forces with French and British help.

In the disturbances of 1909 the Socialists gave their support to the military leaders; and in 1911 they converted their League of the Working Classes into a Socialist Party. They also attempted to build up, in connection with it, a distinct Trade Union movement; but up to 1914 Greek Trade Union-
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ism, centred chiefly at Athens, remained very weak. Its main following was among the port workers in the Piraeus.

6. Turkey and Armenia

In Armenia, divided between Russian and Turkish rule, a Revolutionary Federation, known as the Dashnyaks, was founded in 1890, covering both the Turkish and the Russian areas. Its attitude was broadly Narodnik. At the time of the Russian Revolution of 1905 it split into two rival movements, one similar to the left wing of the Social Revolutionaries, the other further to the right. There was also a quite separate Armenian Social Democratic Party, wholly or mainly in Russian territory, but independent of the Russian Social Democratic Party. It was, I think, this party which sent two delegates — E. Palian and J. Bek — to the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress of 1904. No one from Armenia came to Stuttgart in 1907; but at Copenhagen in 1910 there were two delegates — M. Varandian and A. Barsegian — from Turkish Armenia. These came from the Dashnyaks, whose best-known leaders, in addition to these two, were Vartakes, Zorab, and the poet Aharonian. In European territory under Turkish rule the principal centre of Socialist activity was Salonika, which was also the birthplace of the celebrated Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, founded and developed between 1894 and 1896 by two remarkable young teachers, Damian Gruev (1871–1906) and Gotze Deltchev (1872–1903). Neither of these was in any full sense a Socialist, though Deltchev had been expelled from the Bulgarian Military College at Sofia for engaging in Socialist propaganda. They deserve a mention here because the Macedonian liberation movement which they built up was entirely free from the exclusive racial and religious limitations which characterised most forms of Balkan nationalism.

Macedonia, most of which remained under Turkish rule until the Balkan War of 1911, was coveted by the three countries which bordered upon it, and had achieved their political independence — Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. It was inhabited by a mixed population which had affinities to all three, and was continually the centre of disturbances fomented in
the rival interests, with the Bulgarians as the most active in seeking to stir up Macedonian revolt in hope of being able to annex the country. Against all the rival annexationists Gruev and Deltchev stood for an independent Macedonia open to all the intermingled peoples, and free from domination by any of the rival Churches through which a great deal of the campaigning of the rival claimants was carried on. I.M.R.O. thus found itself engaged in a bitter struggle not only against the Turks, but against the Bulgarian ‘Supremists’ — the annexationist party — and the Greeks and Serbs as well. Between them, Gruev and Deltchev managed to build up for a few years a most remarkable underground organisation. The Turkish Government’s writ hardly ran outside the garrisoned towns. In the villages I.M.R.O. built up what was in effect a parallel Government, levying its own taxes and holding its own courts, though it was continually being driven out of one area by Turkish troop concentrations only to establish itself in another. In 1897 the Turks engaged in large-scale operations in an attempt to suppress I.M.R.O. Many of I.M.R.O.’s supporters were killed in the fighting, or executed after capture, and a number of villages were burnt. But the movement survived, and re-established its control over a large area as soon as the troops were withdrawn. In 1901 Gruev was arrested and imprisoned, but Deltchev carried on. The troubles reached their height in 1903, when groups of young Macedonian terrorists caused a number of explosions and succeeded in blowing up the Turkish bank in Salonika. That year the Bulgarians tried to bring about a general rising, sending armed bands across the frontier to stir up local revolts. I.M.R.O. joined in, though it declared its opposition to the policy of annexation. Deltchev was killed in the fighting, and the revolt was suppressed; but I.M.R.O. lived on, to play its part in every subsequent outbreak of trouble in divided Macedonia, which was partitioned twice in the Balkan Wars, again after the first world war, and yet again in 1945.

I.M.R.O. was not itself a Socialist organisation; but most of its leaders were Socialists and such Socialists as there were in Macedonia mostly belonged to it. In Salonika itself there was a small Socialist group, which affiliated to the Socialist International. After the Young Turk Revolution Salonika sent the leader of this group, the Macedonian Socialist, Dmitar
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Vlahov (?-1954), to sit in the new Turkish Parliament. The Greek Government expelled him from Salonika in 1913; but his work continued. His following embraced persons of many national and racial origins, who worked amicably together in a common movement. Vlahov was an early convert to Communism. After years of exile in London, Paris, and Moscow he came back as representative of Macedonia in the Presidium of Yugoslavia, holding this position till his death. At Constantinople, too, there was a Socialist Education Group, with a journal, Ergatis (The Worker), published in Greek. The chief figure there, however, was a Frenchman, by name Coupette. The Russo-German Socialist Parvus¹ also lived for some time at Constantinople, and had some following. But in none of these areas was Socialism, up to 1914, a major movement. The Armenian organisation, the most powerful, was in fact much more nationalist than Socialist.

¹ See p. 956.
CHAPTER XV

SWITZERLAND

In Switzerland, as we saw in the second volume of this study, the development of Socialism was greatly influenced by the continual presence of groups of exiles and refugees, who either settled there or used the comparative freedom of conditions for the purpose of organising plans, or plots, for their return to their own countries. Over and above this, though connected with it, was the movement of German-speaking craftsmen who during their ‘wander-years’ often worked for a time in Swiss cities, especially Zürich. Such men came from Austria as well as from various parts of Germany; and some remained and became Swiss citizens. Working-class organisation began in the 1830s, mainly among these immigrant craftsmen, but soon spread among the native Swiss in the German speaking areas. In its early stages it took largely the characteristic German form of Workers’ Educational Societies. In 1838 appeared the first attempt at more than local political combination — the well-known Grütli Union, open to small masters and traders as well as to employed workers. The Grütli Union, which later, in 1878, adopted a socialistic programme, was at the outset a mixture of mutual aid society and Radical, predominantly working-class, pressure group. After the Civil War of 1847 and the adoption of the new democratic Federal Constitution of 1848 the Radical Party dominated both federal and cantonal politics; and the working-class and Socialist groups acted mainly within the Radical Party, or in close alliance with it.

What has been said so far applies mainly to German Switzerland, which is the largest constituent element, and to German, or German-speaking, immigrants or refugees. In the French-speaking areas organisation among the watchmakers began in the 1840s. Geneva was, from an early date, highly cosmopolitan, drawing much of its less skilled labour from other
areas and attracting a foreign colony from Russia and other Slav countries as well as many Frenchmen and a sprinkling of Italians. The Geneva building workers were, as we saw in connection with their famous strike in 1868, a peculiarly cosmopolitan group, wide open to left-wing propaganda and sharply marked off from the skilled craftsmen of the ‘Fabrique’, who were usually allied politically to the Radicals. In Lugano and elsewhere there were groups of Italian exiles, as well as Russians. Long before the streams of German and French exiles had begun to flow into Switzerland after 1848, Mazzini had used the country as a base for his nationalist republican movement; and his influence remained powerful in later days.

The Swiss Constitution of 1848 guaranteed the right of association; and though the Swiss had sometimes to compromise and agree to expel individuals who were peculiarly obnoxious to other States, on the whole the right of asylum for political refugees was well maintained, even against powerful Governments, such as Bismarck’s during the period of the Anti-Socialist Laws, when the German Social Democratic Party transferred its organisation and its publishing offices to Swiss territory. The first streams of political refugees arrived as the European Revolutions of 1848 went down one after another to defeat. The best known of these refugees was J. P. Becker (1800–86), who settled in Geneva after fighting in the Civil War in Baden, and became the leader of the German Swiss in that area and the chief organiser, for Marx, of the Swiss section of the International Working Men’s Association in its earlier stages. The I.W.M.A. held its first full Congress in Geneva in 1866; and thereafter, as we saw, Switzerland in general and Geneva in particular became the battle-ground between the International’s Marxist elements and the followers of Bakunin—not that Marxism as a creed was strong there, but because the Swiss Radical working-class groups were on its side against the Anarchists, even while they mostly dissented from Marx’s hostility to alliance with the middle-class Radicals. At one point even Becker broke with Marx; but after the Hague Congress of 1872 he came back to help Marx by organising the so-called Geneva Marxist Congress of 1873.

That same year the Swiss working-class groups set up their

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1 See Vol. II, p. 100.  
first national organisation based on Trade Union bodies from the main industrial areas — a Swiss Labour League, in which Herman Greulich of Zürich (1842–1925), who had come from Germany in 1865, became the leading figure. From that point Greulich was the outstanding person in the Swiss Trade Union movement, and presently in the Socialist movement as well. In the 1870s his journal, Tagwacht, was the principal organ of the movement in the German-speaking areas, and he was largely responsible for one attempt after another to establish effective national organisation. The other outstanding figure of those days was also in Zürich, but was not a workman. He was the master tanner, Karl Bürkly (1823–1901), who in 1858 took the lead in founding the Zürich Consumers’ Co-operative Society — the pioneer of the powerful Consumers’ movement that grew up in German Switzerland. Bürkly took an active part in the First International, attending its Congresses up to 1869, but dropping out before the great quarrel came to a head. He was a follower of Fourier, and wrote a number of works expounding Fourierism and Co-operation, of which The Gospel of the Poor is the best known. He was still active in the 1890s. The third figure of importance was Heinrich Scherrer (1847–1919), who became President of the Gritti Union and had much to do with bringing that body over to Socialism. Another early pioneer of Socialism was Johan Treichler (1822–1906), also closely connected with the Zürich Co-operative movement. In French Switzerland, as we saw in the previous volume, Dr. Pierre Coullery (1819–1903) of La-Chaux-de-Fonds was a pioneer of Co-operation and moderate Socialism in the 1860s. He was trying, in conjunction with the Belgians, to form an international workers’ association as early as 1863, when he went to Brussels for that purpose; and his journal, La Voix de l’avenir, began to appear in 1865. He too took part in the Swiss I.W.M.A. at the beginning; but, being a staunch partisan of the alliance with the Radicals and a strong opponent of the Anarchists who dominated the International in the Jura, he soon dropped out and occupied himself mainly with social reform and rural Co-operation.

At this point it is necessary to say something of the structure of Swiss society and of the changes which took place in it during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The country
as a whole was one of small farms, with no very considerable large estates or landed aristocracy. Its industries, in the mid-nineteenth century, were based mainly on handicraft, with few large factories. It had no coal, and was unsuited till the advent of electric power for any large growth of factory production. A high proportion both of its skilled and of its less skilled workers worked either in their homes or in fairly small workshops; and when factories did arise they tended to be scattered over the country, in quest of water supplies, rather than concentrated in towns. Some craftsmen were independent: others worked as virtual employees of urban merchants or of sub-contracting middlemen. From the 'fifties onwards there was a great battle proceeding, as the competition of factory-made goods, at first mainly abroad, but then at home as well, gradually threatened the standards of living and prospects of employment of the craftsmen, especially in watchmaking and in the textile and clothing trades. The Jura workmen in particular put up a long fight against the new methods of mass-production of clocks and watches: their militancy in the 'sixties and 'seventies is largely explained by the worsening conditions of this struggle. The long maintenance of the handicraftsmen's resistance would have been impossible had not a great many of them — most in the country areas — occupied small patches of land, and supplemented their industrial earnings out of its produce, resorting wholly to this means of subsistence when no industrial work was to be had.

The predominance of this mixture of industrial handicraft and work on the land severely hampered the growth of Swiss Trade Unionism, which was for a long time almost confined to skilled craft groups in the towns. It tended to foster, in both towns and country, the growth of a Radicalism based on unity between the craftsmen and the less wealthy self-employed groups and small master-farmers, master-craftsmen, and small traders — a Radicalism directed not so much against a landed aristocracy as against the wealthy merchants, middlemen, and financiers who were the principal representatives of Swiss conservatism. But it also fostered the growth, among the scattered industrial workers in the country districts and among the less skilled immigrants in the larger towns — especially Geneva — of left-wing movements strongly hostile to the
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Radical alliance; and these groups tended to Anarchism and what was later called Syndicalism rather than to Social Democracy or to Trade Unionism of the German type.

After the 1870s this Syndicalist Anarchism died gradually away as the factory system made increasing inroads on the scattered domestic crafts. It had been kept active in the 'seventies partly by the influx of French and Russian refugees after the Paris Commune and after the intensification of Czarist repression which followed the short 'liberal' period of Alexander II's early years. As France recovered its freedom the centre of Anarchist activity shifted there: as Bismarck rounded on the German Social Democrats, a fresh wave of exiled Germans arrived to implant their own brand of Socialism in the German-Swiss towns. The Swiss Labour League, after helping to win a Factory Act, adopted by referendum vote in 1877, collapsed in the depression of 1879–80, carrying away many of the Trade Unions in its fall. The Grütli Union, however, survived, and had already begun to veer in the direction of reformist Socialism. The surviving Trade Unions set up in 1880 a new Central Federation; but it was very weak. In 1886–7 the Reformists carried, again after a referendum, a measure nationalising the trade in spirits; but this was a temperance measure rather than a sign of Socialist advance. At the same time, however, a serious industrial struggle broke out in Zürich, in connection with a locksmiths' strike. The City Council called in soldiers to suppress the demonstrations held in support of the strike; and a wave of protests came from other towns. The Trade Union Federation and the Grütli Union, acting together, decided to set up a General Labour Reserve Fund, to be used in supporting workers on strike or locked-out, and to be financed by contributions from the members of both bodies. This led to dissension inside the Grütli Union, which, as we saw, though made up mainly of workers, was open also to small masters and traders. Some of its members seceded; but most remained, and the Union moved nearer to a Socialist position. There was at this time no Socialist Party at the federal level, though Social Democratic groups existed in a number of towns. In 1888 these groups united to form a Social Democratic Party on the German model, but with only a small following.
At the same time as the General Reserve Fund was established, a second important new departure was made. This was the foundation of an institution called the Labour Secretariat, which was to collect information and undertake research concerning Labour questions, including industrial legislation, and was to advise the Federal Government concerning measures of labour protection and industrial relations. The Secretariat was not exactly a government agency: it was managed and its director appointed by the working-class bodies. But it was founded in agreement with the Government; and Herman Greulich was put at the head of it without being required to give up his Trade Union connections. It became a very important body, and had much to do with the subsequent development of labour legislation in Switzerland and with the active part thereafter taken by the Swiss in the movement for international labour legislation. Greulich and Heinrich Scherrer were mainly responsible for organising the first conference on this matter, which was held in Switzerland in 1897. The establishment of the Labour Secretariat also tended to foster the development of Swiss Socialism in a reformist direction.

Very soon difficulties arose over the working of the General Labour Reserve Fund, largely because some of the larger Unions felt they were contributing too much to strikes organised by small Unions which had no funds of their own, and partly because of opposition in the Grüti Union. In 1891 the Grüti Union dropped out, and the whole Fund was put under the management of the Trade Union Federation. The Grüti Union, however, continued to become more socialistic, and adopted a new, largely Social Democratic, programme in 1893. The following year the Socialist and Labour groups joined forces to organise a referendum on the ‘right to work’, by which they sought to place on the Federal Government the obligation to provide work for the unemployed; but the voters rejected this. Four years earlier the introduction of a sickness and accident insurance scheme had been approved by referendum; and in 1898 a further referendum authorised the nationalisation of the railways — largely because under private enterprise there had been much jockeying and local contention over the proposed building of new lines through the Alpine barrier. At length, in 1901, the Grüti Union and the Social Democrats, who had
been growing steadily, amalgamated to form a single Social Democratic Party, within which the Union remained in being as an affiliated body carrying on its friendly and social activities. This fusion strengthened the reformist tendency in the Socialist movement, which for the rest of the period up to 1914 was on the extreme right wing of the Second International, though there remained within it, especially in French Switzerland, a left wing which was to reassert itself during and after the first world war.

Undoubtedly one factor making for the reformist attitude characteristic of much Swiss Socialism was the considerable strength of Christian Socialist influence. The principal exponent of this tendency was Leonhard Ragaz (1868–1945), who was a professor at the University of Zürich. The strength of Christian Socialism had a good deal to do with the failure of Marxism to gain as strong a hold in Switzerland as it did in other German-speaking countries. Swiss Socialism, on the whole, concerned itself more with industrial legislation and social reform than with theory. The leading part which it played in the movement for international labour legislation owed a good deal to Stephen Bauer (1865–1934), who was for many years the Secretary of the International Association for Labour Legislation, as well as to Greulich and Scherrer.

The formation of the unified Social Democratic Party was immediately followed by a further reorganisation of the Trade Unions. During the 1890s national Trade Unions had been growing stronger in a number of industries and trades; and as these Unions began to build up their own funds there was an increasing unwillingness to subscribe to the General Reserve Fund of the Trade Union Federation. From the Olten Congress of 1902 the General Fund was, in effect, maintained only by and for the smaller Unions; and in 1906 it was finally wound up. From 1902 onwards the reorganised Federation took active steps to promote amalgamations, mainly on industrial lines, in accordance with a general plan of organisation drawn up by Greulich; and considerable success was achieved, with rapidly increasing membership as a result.

The chief source of trouble in the working-class movement during these years was the persistent practice of city and cantonal authorities of bringing in soldiers to break strikes. This
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was the more resented because the Swiss Constitution prohibited a standing army, and the armed forces consisted of a citizen militia. In 1906 the working-class bodies held a special Congress to protest against the use of soldiers against strikers. If the Government refused to disallow this, the Congress advised soldiers to refuse to obey orders, and promised to indemnify those who did so from any fines they might incur and to maintain their families if they were sent to prison. A special fund was to be raised for this purpose. The Government retaliated by imprisoning and fining certain editors who gave publicity to these proceedings, and some Socialists who distributed propaganda among soldiers. But there was no decisive trial of strength until 1912. That year, strikes broke out at Zürich among the locksmiths and the painters: the employers brought in blacklegs and secured the services of soldiers to protect them. The Zürich workers retaliated with a 24-hour general strike, but did not succeed in gaining any concession from the Government. Thereafter, left-wing tendencies began to gain ground in the Trade Unions, but, because of war conditions, did not come to a head until 1918, when the collapse of Austria and Germany, following on the excitements engendered by the Russian Revolution, brought matters to a sudden crisis — again at Zürich. That year the Trade Unions had already adopted a new, more militant Olten Programme of Action; and when, on the occasion of a demonstration held to celebrate the anniversary of the Revolution in Russia, troops were again called in, the Unions throughout Switzerland retaliated with a general strike which stopped railways and public services as well as manufacturing industries. The Government took a strong line, ordering an immediate return to work and threatening the strikers with severe legal penalties — especially the railwaymen and other public employees, and all who had been concerned in appeals to the soldiers to disobey orders to blackleg or to break up Labour demonstrations. The general strike lasted only three days, in face of strong hostility from the rural areas, which threatened to cut off food supplies from the towns. The Government then embarked on a series of prosecutions, mainly of the leaders who had signed the appeal to the soldiers issued by the Olten Congress; and a number of these were sent to gaol, mostly for short
periods, and others fined. But, despite this defeat, at the General Election of the following year, 1919, held under a new system of proportional representation, the Socialists increased their representation in the federal Parliament to 41 out of 189 (as compared with 18 before the war).

In the affairs of the Second International the Swiss played their regular part; but they made no particularly active or distinctive contribution except when matters of labour legislation were being discussed, or when the International was debating its resolutions in favour of the establishment of citizen militias in place of standing armies. On the latter occasions they did not fail to remind the delegates that Switzerland's possession of a citizen army had by no means prevented the use of the armed forces to disperse demonstrators and to break strikes, as the Socialists of other countries seemed to expect it to do. The main body of Swiss delegates at International Congresses came from the German areas. Greulich was the outstanding spokesman, together with Jean Sigg of Geneva — the leading French-speaking delegate — Johann Sigg and Otto Lang (1863–1936), from Zürich, Carl Moor from Berne, and August Merk from the Trade Unions. At Copenhagen in 1910 Friedrich Adler appeared as a Swiss delegate — he was then a lecturer at the University of Zürich — and Robert Grimm (b. 1881), the future leader of the Swiss movement, made his first appearance.
CHAPTER XVI

BELGIUM: THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STALEMATE

In the second volume of this study some account has been given both of the part played by the Belgians — notably by César de Paepe — in the First International, and of the programme which the Belgian Labour Party adopted in 1893 — the year in which, as a consequence of the reform of the franchise, it was first able to put up candidates of its own for Parliament with any hope of success. We saw that in the First International the Belgians, or, at any rate, César de Paepe himself, occupied a position which distinguished them both from the Marxists and from the thoroughgoing Anarchists, and that de Paepe's reports to the International on the conduct of public services in the coming society embodied a serious attempt to formulate a plan of organisation resting on the two principles of functionalism and decentralisation. These principles, as we saw, reappeared in the Belgian Labour Programme of 1893 and distinguished it sharply from the Erfurt Programme adopted two years earlier by the German Social Democrats after the expiry of Bismarck's anti-Socialist Laws. Unlike the Germans, the Belgian Socialists laid great stress on the commune as the basic unit of social and political organisation: unlike the out-and-out Bakuninists they saw the need for organising certain essential services on a national and others on a regional scale. As against the Germans, they strongly emphasised the need to entrust economic and social administration, not to the State or Parliament, but to democratically chosen functional agencies which were to be made responsible for the conduct of each particular service, subject only to general co-ordination by the commune locally and by the Parliament at the national level.

With this stress on functional decentralisation went a corresponding conception of the Labour movement itself. For the Belgians the party was never a monolithic structure, designed
primarily as a massive instrument for the conquest of political power and using Trade Unions and other working-class bodies simply as its auxiliaries in the political struggle. The party, in the Belgian conception, was rather a federal organisation based on and arising out of the economic and social groupings of the workers, with Co-operative Societies, Trade Unions, and Friendly Societies (Mutualités) all playing integral parts in its organisation and control, so as to make it not only a political party but at one and the same time an expression of the aspirations of the workers in every aspect of their collective activities. That was partly why they decided to call it a Labour Party (Parti Ouvrier) rather than a Socialist Party — not because there was any doubt, such as existed in the early days of the Labour Party in Great Britain, about it being Socialist — but rather because its leaders wished to stress its inclusive character as the protagonist of the workers in their social and economic as well as in their political struggles.

The Belgian Labour Party assumed its distinctive form as a national organisation only in 1885, after the partial failure of a number of previous attempts. As we saw, there existed at the beginning of the 1870s a large and influential Belgian section of the International Working Men’s Association, with de Paepe as its outstanding leader. But this loose federation, based mainly on local or regional federations of Trade Unions in the principal centres and on the numerous producers’ Co-operative Societies founded during the period of high activity which had begun in the late ’sixties, fell to pieces as the First International itself dissolved after the split at the Hague in 1872. The Belgians continued to play some part in the mainly Bakuninist International which held together for a few years after the split; and a number of Belgian delegates attended the Ghent Socialist Unity Congress of 1877 — among them, Anseele and van Beveren, from Ghent itself, and Louis Bertrand from Brussels. De Paepe was also present, but represented an American group. By this time, however, the national movement had dissolved, leaving behind a substantial Anarchist movement in the Walloon area, as well as active local movements in Brussels, Ghent, and a few other centres.

Belgian Socialism was, indeed, already beginning to develop along new lines. The narrowness of the franchise gave no
opening for the emergence of a working-class electoral party, and Socialism could find expression in parliamentary politics only through middle-class sympathisers attached to the strongly anti-clerical left wing of the Liberal Party. Already in 1866 a group of young men, mainly university students or young university teachers, had published the *Workers' Manifesto*, which had launched the demand for social reforms and universal suffrage. Out of this group came such men as Paul Janson (1840–1913), who led the left-wing Progressives after their break with the Liberals, Hector Denis, the economist who subsequently became the leader of the Socialist parliamentary group, the lawyer and educationist, Edmond Picard, and Guillaume de Greef, the sociologist who spent the better part of his life as a professor at the New University of Brussels. Most of this group were strongly influenced by the doctrines of Proudhon, and took sides with the Proudhonists in the great controversy which rent the Socialist movement in the 1860s and 1870s. They were interconnected with the Rationalists and Positivists who, influenced by Colins and, to a still greater extent, by Auguste Comte, did battle with the predominant power of the Catholic Church in the press and in a number of active societies for the discussion of philosophy and science. In *La Liberté*, to which Hector Denis, Guillaume de Greef, and Victor Arnould were among the chief contributors, there were great battles in the early 'seventies about the question of private property and its place in the coming society, with César de Paepe and Désiré Brismée serving as links between the Proudhonist intellectuals and the working-class groups.

During the years 1871–3 there had been a great outburst of strikes, largely for the ten hours' day. These movements were vigorously repressed by the Government, acting in close alliance with the employers, and with the advent of depression in the middle 'seventies they died away and many of the newly founded Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies disappeared. In Brussels, César de Paepe, Louis Bertrand (1856–1943), and the Communard refugee, Gustave Bazin, succeeded in 1875 in reconstituting a local federation of trade societies, under the name *Chambre du Travail*; and Édouard Anseele (1856–1938) and Edmond van Beveren (1852–97) were mainly responsible for the establishment of a similar body in Ghent the following
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year. A local Trades Federation was also formed at Antwerp; and these three organisations together called a national Congress to consider the establishment of a Belgian Labour Union. The attempt broke down because the delegates from the Walloon areas were largely under Anarchist influence and refused to join any body which was intended to undertake parliamentary political action. The consequence was that instead of an inclusive Union, two distinct Socialist parties came into existence — a Flemish Socialist Labour Party with its centre at Ghent, and a Brabançon Socialist Party centred at Brussels. In 1879 these two joined forces to launch a new agitation for universal suffrage; but the Walloon areas continued to hold aloof and, after the final disappearance of the International Working Men’s Association, a number of the Trade Unions which had been connected with it became affiliated to the American Knights of Labor, and, with Jean Caeluwaert (1846–1918) as Grand Master, continued their opposition to political action under its auspices. This curious affiliation actually lasted, mainly in the coalfield area round Charleroi, until 1895, when the Charleroi miners at last joined up with the Belgian Labour Party and its affiliated Trade Union movement.

In 1880 the foundation by Anseele and his group in Ghent of Vooruit, the pioneer of modern Co-operation in Belgium, gave the movement a fresh start. Vooruit was set up, not merely as a consumers’ Co-operative Society, but as a common centre for the whole working-class movement of the district. It provided a meeting-place and a rallying point for all kinds of working-class societies—Trade Unions, Mutualités, and educational and cultural groupings; and it was definitely Socialist and prepared to use its funds for political as well as economic purposes. It became the model for a number of similar centres in other towns — notably the well-known Maison du Peuple in Brussels — and its success gave the Belgian movement a new and characteristic pattern of organisation. There were considerable differences from place to place in the exact structure and in the relations between the various agencies; but it became the common practice for the various forms of working-class activity to be gathered together in a common centre, which usually included a Co-operative Store, a set of clubrooms and halls for lectures and meetings, and office
accolommodation for a variety of special societies. In many places the Co-operative Society played the leading part; but in some the local Mutualité, or Friendly Society, took the lead, and in others the initiative came from a Chamber of Labour based mainly on the local Trade Unions and on such producers’ Co-operatives as had weathered the storm of the depression. These local groupings of the working-class bodies round a common centre formed the basis on which the Belgian Labour Party was subsequently built up.

The party itself was founded in April 1885 at a Conference called by the Vooruit of Ghent, the Brussels Federation of Workers’ Societies, and the similar Antwerp Federation. It was attended by delegates from a great diversity of local bodies — Co-operative Societies, Mutualités, Trade Unions, and Socialist groups. There were differences of opinion both about the name and about the character of the new party. Some wished it to be called ‘Socialist’, or ‘Socialist Labour’; some held that it should be confined to workers and should exclude the middle-class intellectuals who were among its most active promoters. The voting went against this exclusion, but in favour of a title that would emphasise its essentially working-class character and would not identify it too closely with the word ‘Socialist’, which was still regarded in some working-class circles as having too much of a bourgeois-intellectual connotation. There was, however, no dispute about its essentially Socialist character, or about its intention to take the field as a definitely political party, with universal suffrage as its principal immediate objective.

Within a few months of the foundation of the Belgian Labour Party, the Walloon Socialist leader, Alfred Defuisseaux (1823–1901) published a pamphlet, Catéchisme du peuple, which had a most astonishing success. It sold in thousands, especially in the industrial districts of southern Belgium; and its eloquent plea for universal suffrage had a remarkable effect. How far Defuisseaux was responsible for what followed remains in doubt. At all events in 1886 a great series of strikes broke out, first in the neighbourhood of Charleroi and then at Liège and over a large part of the Walloon provinces. The strikes began among the miners, who were very badly paid and worked under abominable conditions; but they spread almost at once
to the much better paid glassworkers, whose factories were scattered over the mining areas. The main demand of the strikers was for universal suffrage; but there were economic demands as well in some places, and in some it was not at all clear what was being demanded. The upheaval does not seem to have been deliberately planned: it was a spontaneous uprising, which spread from establishment to establishment as the crowds of men on strike went from place to place calling on those still at work to come out. Soon rioting set in, where bodies of workers hesitated to join in, or when the establishment of a particularly obnoxious employer was being visited. Damage was done; and one big glassworks at which conditions had been especially bad was burnt down. There were numerous clashes between strikers and police; and soon soldiers were brought in to quell the riots and to restore order. Mass arrests followed, not only of strikers, but also of working-class and Socialist leaders in the affected areas. Alfred Defuisseaux, held responsible because of his pamphlet, was arrested and committed for trial, but escaped abroad. Édouard Anseele, the leader of the Ghent workers, who were not involved in the strike, was gaoled for six months for calling upon the soldiers not to shoot down strikers. In the disturbed areas, sentences of up to twenty years’ hard labour were pronounced on the local leaders, including Oscar Falloux, the secretary of the glassworkers’ society.

No doubt the Anarchists and the other left-wing groups which were active in the Walloon areas joined in the strike movement of 1886, and did their best to spread it. But it does not appear that they, or, indeed, any group in particular, brought it about. It simply happened, in an area in which industrial relations and working conditions were very bad and unrest a standing circumstance. The left wing of the newly formed Labour Party in the area was, however, undoubtedly responsible for the next move. In 1887, under the leadership of Léon (1841–1906) and Georges Defuisseaux, brother and son of Alfred, a section of the Labour Party’s following, chiefly in the Walloon areas, broke away and formed a rival Socialist Republican Party, which adopted the general strike as its approved policy and accused the Ghent and Brussels leaders of the Labour Party of reformism and compromise. The following
year the Socialist Republicans, against the wish of the Labour Party which held the moment to be inopportune, declared a general strike for universal suffrage, and speeches were made which strongly suggested that the strike was intended to be the prelude to a revolutionary *putsch*. Undoubtedly, some of the leaders of the movement were Blanquists, who believed in the possibility of a seizure of political power by a revolutionary elite, whereas others were exasperated Trade Unionists reacting strongly against the forcible suppression of the movement of 1886. There was, however, a third element, made up of police spies and *agents provocateurs*, who played an important part in working up the 'grand complot', which they then denounced. This 'great conspiracy' received a vast deal of publicity, which made it easy for the Government again to resort to mass arrests. When the leaders of the Socialist Republican Party were put on trial, the able progressive lawyers who undertook their defence were able to show that at least one of the principal strike leaders, Loloi, had been throughout a police spy, and that deliberate provocation had played an important part in the affair. The prisoners were acquitted; and so much feeling was created against the methods used to provoke the movement that the persons convicted during the earlier troubles of 1886 were also set free in an attempt to promote improved relations and to stave off further trouble. A further consequence was that the Socialist Republican Party was dissolved in 1890 and most of its leaders returned to the Labour Party, though a considerable section of the Trade Unionists, especially among the miners, continued to hold aloof and retained its connection with the American Knights of Labor. Certain Anarchist, or near-Anarchist, groups, which disbelieved in political action, also stayed out, professing what came later to be called a 'Syndicalist' gospel. But from 1890 the reunited Labour Party was able to make steady progress.

The reunion left it an open question what the policy of the party was to be. The leaders of the Labour Party had opposed the general strike of 1888, not on principle, but because they held that it stood no chance of success and that, over most of the country, the workers were quite unprepared for it. In most areas Trade Unionism was still weak and the Co-operative movement only beginning to build up its power; and the
Mutualités, which formed part of the common movement, had only a small fraction of the workers in their ranks. The Catholics had a substantial working-class following, even in the factory areas, especially in the Flemish provinces; and the Socialists had little hold on the rural population, which constituted the great majority in these provinces. There was, in these circumstances, no prospect of a really general strike, or even of one widespread enough to paralyse the essential industries and services outside the main centres. On the other hand, there was no prospect at all of successful parliamentary action within the limits of the existing franchise, and hardly any of the franchise being extended save under strong pressure from outside Parliament — especially as constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority, which was most unlikely ever to be got in face of solid opposition from the Catholic parties. Inside Parliament the Socialists’ only friends were the Progressives, who were in process of dissociating themselves from the old Liberal Party, which had alternated in office with the Catholics, but was fully as reactionary in economic policy. No left-wing ‘Social Catholic’ movement had yet appeared; and the Liberal Progressives, though some of them were Socialists of a sort, included also Radical individualists who were keenly hostile to Socialism and were on the left mainly on account of their opposition to Catholic pretensions.

In face of the sheer impossibility of advance by the electoral methods of which the German Social Democrats had been making such effective use, the Labour Party’s leaders had to find some way of applying extra-parliamentary pressure, unless they were to rest content with simply building up their own movement as a ‘State within the State’. This they were, in fact, setting out to do, by making their Co-operatives and Mutualités into agencies of economic and social security for their members without State help. But the Labour Party leaders were agreed that such building of new social tissue within their own movement, though indispensable, was not enough. They wanted to emulate their fellow-Socialists in other countries by winning a position in Parliament and using it to promote social and industrial legislation as well as to bring nearer the day when they would be strong enough to take over political power. They did not see how this could be done with-
out a great extension of the franchise, or what means other than strike action were open to them for enforcing such an extension on the classes at present in possession of the State machine. Accordingly, they could not, like the German Social Democrats, oppose the use of the general strike as a political instrument: they could only insist on the need of adequate preparation for it, and reject the arguments of Blanquists and Syndicalists who put their faith either in the revolutionary capacity of a small, disciplined élite, or in the spontaneous action of the masses when the right time came.

In 1891, the year following the reunion with the dissidents, the Labour Party Congress, presided over by Léon Defuisseaux, decided in principle in favour of the general strike as a means of compelling Parliament to grant universal suffrage. But no date was fixed. The decision was rather to begin preparing for action than at once to undertake it. Again, however, a section of the movement refused to wait, and took matters into its own hands. On May Day the miners of the Borinage, the coalfield on the French frontier, declared a general strike which spread through the other coalfields. But the rest of the country refused to follow, and the strikers went down to inevitable defeat.

At the ensuing Congress of the Labour Party there were some recriminations; but they were not pushed to extremes. The miners had clearly acted against the decision of the previous Congress; and the party, in spite of this, had done its best to raise funds to maintain the strikers and to protect them against reprisals. By this time it was becoming evident that the Parliament would have to concede some kind of franchise reform; and the only question was what kind it would accept. The Liberals, except Paul Janson’s group of left-wing Progressives, who favoured manhood suffrage, mostly proposed some system of educational qualification. The Catholics, or rather their parliamentary representatives, were mostly hostile to reform altogether, or, if they recognised its inevitability, were considering how little they could concede and what safeguards they could introduce. They were, in fact, divided between an ultra-clerical group which was still opposing all change and a bourgeois-capitalist group prepared for moderate reform. But outside Parliament a strong Catholic movement in favour of reform had been growing up and was rapidly
taking formal shape. The Catholics had been busy forming Catholic workers' associations of various kinds—from Mutualités to Maisons des Ouvriers—in opposition to the Socialist Mutualités and Maisons du Peuple; and they found that they could not hold the allegiance of these groups unless they allowed them to pass resolutions in favour both of social and industrial legislation and of franchise reform—which, of course, some of the promoters of these movements sincerely favoured. In 1892 a Congress of Catholic Workers' Societies put forward a string of demands for industrial legislation closely resembling those of the Labour Party, but was prevented from pronouncing on franchise reform by a refusal to allow the question to be debated. But a growing section of younger Catholics refused to accept this ban and came out openly in favour of universal—i.e. manhood—suffrage. A number of older Catholics thereupon accepted manhood suffrage, but sought to modify its effects by advocating a voting age of 25 instead of the 21 demanded by the Socialists.

These developments, of course, meant that, in threatening to resort to a general strike for universal suffrage, the Socialists were no longer challenging a united governing class. Indeed, in some places there were even joint demonstrations addressed by Socialist and Young Catholic speakers, and in others separate meetings exchanged compliments. The Parliament had by this time formally resolved that the franchise should be reformed, without saying in what way; and it had been decided that the ensuing general election should be held for the choice of a Constituent Assembly empowered to pass a new constitutional law—which would require a two-thirds majority. At this election, held under the old voting system, the Labour Party did not attempt to run candidates of its own; and the new Assembly was practically a replica of the old. For some time it appeared that there might be a complete deadlock. Universal suffrage, either at 21 or at 25, was defeated by large majorities on the committee to which the matter was referred; and none of the numerous rival proposals that were put forward seemed likely to prevail. Gradually, however, Catholic and Liberal opinion veered round to a proposal to combine manhood suffrage with plural voting, by conceding a second vote to all heads of households, and granting additional votes to property
owners and to those with defined educational qualifications.

This, however, did not happen until the Labour Party, in accordance with its declared intention, had actually called a general strike, to which about 300,000 workers responded, including some who belonged to left-wing Catholic groups. The strike was the occasion of a number of clashes between demonstrators and police or soldiers, but was accompanied by much less violence than the more localised disturbances of 1886, 1888, and 1891. It was called off in view of the definite decision to grant manhood suffrage at 25 (not at 21), despite the Labour Party's dislike of the higher age and of some of the attached conditions. It should, however, be noted that the proposal to give heads of households a second vote, strongly supported by the Catholic groups, was not opposed by the Labour Party, which limited its disapproval to the other forms of plural voting.

The franchise reform of 1893 put the Labour Party in a position for the first time to contest seats in Parliament with some prospect of success in the big towns and industrial areas, but in view of their weakness in most of the small towns and rural areas offered no prospect of their winning a majority of seats. They were reinforced before the first election took place under the new system by the adhesion of a group of Socialist intellectuals who had hitherto worked within the Progressive Party; but that party as a whole did not come over, and its outstanding leader, Paul Janson, who had been the principal advocate of universal suffrage in the old Parliament, stayed with what was left of the Progressives. The Labour Party did, nevertheless, gain a number of important recruits — among them the educationist, Léon Furnémont (1861–1927), and the Senator, Henri La Fontaine (1854–1943). At the general election, held in 1894, it was remarkably successful, winning 27 seats. Among its M.P.s were Édouard Anseele from Ghent, Professor Hector Denis of Brussels University, Émile Vandervelde, Jules Destrée (1863–1936), and both Alfred and Léon Defuissetaux.

From 1894, then, the Belgian Labour Party became a parliamentary party, fighting its battles in Parliament much like other European parties, and directing a large part of its attention to demands for industrial legislation for the protection of
working conditions. It was, however, much less exclusively a parliamentary party than the German or any of the French parties because of the close integration in it of Co-operative Societies, Mutualités, and Trade Unions, and of its consequent attempt to treat parliamentary action as only one of a number of available instruments for furthering working-class claims. For example, its zeal in pressing the State to adopt schemes of social insurance was substantially diminished by its success in building up its own services and using them as means of attracting members and ensuring their loyalty to it. It was, indeed, to some extent held back from demanding State action by its fears that State-run or State-subsidised services would fall under the control of the Catholic Church. In the establishment of networks of Mutualités, of Co-operative Societies, of social centres, and even of Trade Unions, a keen rivalry rapidly developed between the Socialists and the Catholics, who after 1893 took seriously to the creation of an extensive social movement as a bulwark against Socialism. The Socialists, in the towns, were peculiarly successful in developing Co-operative or Mutual doctoring and sick benefit services; and some of their Mutualités and Co-operative Societies launched out into quite extensive systems of social security benefits in other fields. In comparison with these developments and with the growth of consumers' Co-operation, their efforts to improve Trade Union organisation lagged for some time behind. Not until 1899 did they realise the need to set up a separate Trade Union Commission, open not only to Trade Unions which were prepared to become full members of the party and to contribute substantially to its funds, but also to other Trade Unions which took their stand on the class-struggle and were prepared to work with the Socialists, even if they would not formally join the party. Thereafter, Belgian Trade Unionism became better organised; but the main backing of the party continued to come even more from its outstandingly successful Co-operative Societies — which drew together to form a Wholesale Society in 1900 — than from its affiliated Trade Unions.

In 1894 — and, indeed, at all times — the Labour Party's most conspicuous weakness was its failure to build up solid support in the rural areas. This weakness was fully realised and the Socialist leaders, notably Émile Vandervelde, devoted an
increasing amount of their attention to the agrarian question, just as Kautsky and Vollmar did in Germany, and Jaurès, among others, in France. In 1896, at a Conference over which Jaurès presided, Vandervelde gave an account of what was to become the policy of the Belgian Labour Party upon this matter. Vandervelde began by drawing attention to the fact that a high proportion of those who lived in the rural areas were not peasants or agricultural workers of any sort. Less than a third of the working population of Belgium, he said, was employed on the land. Factories and other industrial establishments were to be found scattered throughout many of the rural areas, and, in addition, many village-dwellers went daily to work in the towns. Rural Socialism must not be confused with peasant or with agrarian Socialism: in many places it was quite possible to win a majority without enlisting a single land worker. But he also pointed out that rural factory development was often closely connected with the growth of forms of agriculture which involved large-scale cultivation and the employment of substantial numbers of agricultural wage-labourers who, because of their conditions of employment, were laid open to Socialist and Trade Union propaganda. He dwelt on the rack-renting of tenants of small plots by landlords who found it more profitable to let out their estates in that fashion than either to cultivate them themselves or to rent them to big farmers; and he discussed the plight of peasant owners who used obsolete methods because they had not the capital needed for adopting better ones. He emphasised the effects of sugar-beet cultivation in increasing the amount of labour used on the land, in requiring more capitalistic methods, and in bringing with it factories for processing; and he seemed to expect that in most areas cultivation would tend to become more capitalistic and a growing number of workers would find themselves employed under conditions more like those of industrial workers, and would therefore become more amenable to Trade Union organisation and to Socialist indoctrination. For peasant areas he welcomed the growth of various types of Co-operative organisation — for processing and marketing, especially of dairy products, for purchase of seeds and other requisites and for common use of machinery, and for the provision of capital and credit. But he did not find anything very original to say, or succeed in proposing
any new methods for speeding up the conversion of the country-dwellers to Socialism. He was, indeed, fully aware that this conversion was bound to be a slow business, and was much readier than Kautsky to recognise how powerful were the factors making against the disappearance of peasant property and very small-scale tenant farming, and therewith against the speedy development of an agricultural proletariat at all fully assimilated to the industrial proletariat.

The Belgian Labour movement, in choosing a structure resting on the principle of close integration between its political, Trade Union, Co-operative, and Mutual organisations, necessarily gave up the possibility of a fully unified organisation in each distinct field of activity. If there were to be Co-operative Societies, Mutualités, and Trade Unions connected integrally with the Labour Party, there were bound to be other Co-operatives, Mutualités, and Trade Unions which rejected this intimate connection and either preferred to remain independent or became associated with rival movements — notably with the Catholic Social movement. Indeed, the entire pattern of working-class organisation in Belgium arose largely out of the struggle between the Socialists and their Radical predecessors on the one hand, and the Catholic Church on the other. As we saw earlier, the principal contestants for political power in the days before Socialism developed as a political force were the Catholics and the Liberals, who had close connections with Rationalism and with Freemasonry. The Liberal left wing, which developed into the Progressive Party, was strongly imbued with Rationalism and much influenced by Comtism as well as by the ideas kept alive by the disciples of Baron Colins — notably Louis and Agathon de Potter. The Socialist group of which César de Paepe became the central figure was also Rationalist: it became organised first in 1857 in the society of Les Solidaires, founded by de Paepe's father-in-law, the master-printer Désiré Brismée, on a basis of 'Rational Socialism'. Belgium had hardly any Protestant population: the Catholics' only antagonists were Rationalists or Positivists of various schools. One effect of widening the franchise was to bring the Socialists on to the parliamentary stage as an independent party: another, hardly less important, was to weaken the Liberals and

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1 See p. 263 ff.
to strengthen the hold of the Catholics by bringing into the electorate a great mass of rural and small-town poor voters whom neither Socialist nor any form of Rationalist propaganda had ever reached. This applied especially to the Flemish areas: in the Walloon districts religion had a weaker hold, and doctrines of social revolt, if not of Socialism, exercised a wider appeal. Thus, the antagonisms between the Flemish and the Walloon districts were to some extent strengthened when the wider franchise turned politics more into a mass-contest between the Socialists and the Church.

The close links between Socialism and Rationalism and the perpetual struggle between the Socialists and the Catholic parties both contributed to make education a particular battleground and to raise it to a position of high importance in the social contest. Before the rise of Socialism as a political force, the Liberals, including their Progressive wing, were the principal contestants on behalf of higher education emancipated from ecclesiastical control. The Catholic Church had an unshakeable hold over primary education; but the Liberals, during their spells of office, succeeded in establishing a number of centres of university and higher technical education under secular auspices—particularly at Brussels and at Liège, which became notable for its technical courses. The Free Universities of Brussels and Liège and the various specialised institutes of higher education became the happy hunting-ground of teachers of advanced opinions and the homes of left-wing student groups, often attached to the Liberals, but including many of the future intellectuals of the Belgian Socialist movement. As we saw, Hector Denis and Guillaume de Greef were both university professors; and Émile Vandervelde was one of many whose first contact with Socialism came to them as students. Liège University produced recruits not only for Belgian but also for French Socialism; and the development of medical Mutualités in connection with the Labour movement was made possible largely by men trained in the medical faculty of the Free University of Brussels. César de Paepe himself qualified there as a doctor while earning his living as a compositor in his father-in-law’s printing establishment.

Socialist preoccupation with the higher education of workers, as distinct from ordinary university or technical students,
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began in 1892 when the Circle of Socialist Students and Former Students started a series of adult classes at the Brussels Maison du Peuple. The original teachers included Vandervelde, Louis de Brouckère, and the lawyer, Max Hallet (1864–1941). The following year the professors of Brussels University, headed by Vandervelde and Léon Leclère, set up an Extension Movement modelled on that of England, with its teachers drawn exclusively from the University. Some similar movements were set on foot in other centres; but at Brussels a crisis soon arose when the University refused permission for a course of lectures to be given by Élisée Reclus, the celebrated Anarchist geographer. This refusal led to a split: a number of the more advanced professors and teachers broke away and set up the Brussels New University; and thereafter there were two rival Universities, both non-Catholic, the one predominantly Liberal and the other broadly Socialist, though it also included a number of left-wing Progressives. Prominent among the teachers who founded the New University was the sociologist, de Greef, concerning whose ideas we shall have something to say later in this chapter. Vandervelde, de Brouckère, Furnemont, Camille Lemonnier, Émile Verhaeren, and Paul Janson, as well as Réclus and a number of other distinguished foreigners, were on its staff. Only much later, in 1911, did the Labour Party set up, largely on the basis of the work done by these pioneer Socialist intellectuals, its own Centre of Workers' Education, with Henri de Man (1885–1953) as its first secretary: still later, this institution gave birth, after the first world war, to the Belgian Labour College.

The Belgian Labour Party, in the form which it adapted to the new conditions created by the franchise reform of 1893, rested on a federal basis. It was made up, locally, of 26 Regional Federations, each with its centre in a Co-operative Society or Maison du Peuple, which served as a general meeting-place and common home for all sections of the local movement—the Vooruit at Ghent, the Maison du Peuple at Brussels, and so on. Side by side with the Regional Federations were a number of Corporative Federations, grouping nationally Trade Unions in particular trades or industries, Mutualités, and other specialised bodies. Each Federation enjoyed a substantial autonomy in its own affairs, and was entitled to one representative on the
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General Council of the party. A full delegate Congress met annually, or when specially summoned, and had final authority in policy-making. The Congress and not the Council elected an Executive Bureau of nine members, drawn from the Brussels area, and this Bureau had charge of the day-to-day work. Up to 1899 there was no special co-ordinating body for Trade Union affairs; but in that year the party set up a Trade Union Commission, which subsequently called Trade Union Congresses open to Trade Unions which were not affiliated directly to the party. This change followed on the passing in 1898 of an Act regulating Trade Unions by according them legal personality. The Labour Party objected to the terms of this Act, and the Socialist Trade Unions refused to register under it, preferring to base their legal rights on the clause in the Belgian Constitution which guaranteed freedom of association. From 1900 the Socialist Co-operatives had a similar Federation of Socialist Co-operative Societies, but this was restricted to Societies associated with the Labour Party. Indeed, many of the Co-operatives had been set up by the party's Regional Federations, and had in turn set up Mutualités for the provision of social services, or had entered into close relations with existing Mutualités. No separate national organisation of Socialist Mutualités was established until 1912. The precise pattern of working-class organisation varied from place to place, but the main features were the same everywhere.

For political purposes the party was itself the operative authority, acting through its Regional Federations in matters of local or provincial concern. But in each Region there were informal Cercles Politiques for the arranging of discussions and propagandist activities. There were no separate Socialist organisations. For rural work, the Regional Federations set up special organising agencies: one widely used form of activity was the Cycling Club, modelled on the Clarion Scouts in Great Britain. These Clubs sent out parties of cyclists into the villages to hold meetings, undertake canvassing and recruiting, and try to establish village groups of Trade Unionists or Co-operators. They met with much greater success in the Walloon districts and round Ghent and Brussels than in the northern part of the country.

The Socialists were of course by no means satisfied with the
electoral law of 1893. They kept up a lively campaign for further revision both in Parliament and in the country; and they also made a vigorous attempt to capture control of local government. This attempt was promptly met by the Catholics with a reactionary measure of local franchise reform, popularly known as the 'Law of the Four Infamies'. Under this law, passed in 1895, the voting age was raised to 30, and certain classes of well-to-do electors were given a fourth vote in addition to the three allowed under the law of 1893. Even this measure did not prevent Socialists from getting a number of seats on local government bodies — enough to make it worth while to form a National Federation of Socialist Communal Representatives to co-ordinate policy; but it had considerable adverse effects. In 1899 the Catholic Government went further, and attempted to extend the law of 1895 to parliamentary elections; but the proposal excited so much opposition and was met by such big demonstrations in the country that the Government had to resign, and the project was dropped. The new Government, however, maintained its resistance to all projects of democratic reform and upheld the law of 1895 in its application to local elections. The Labour Party, unable to achieve anything in Parliament, resorted to a fresh campaign of mass-demonstrations; but the Government remained unmoved. At length, in 1902, party feeling became so strong that the leaders had to agree to the calling of a general strike for universal suffrage, though many of them had misgivings about the outcome. The response was large, though far from universal in face of the determined opposition of most of the Catholic groups. Well over 300,000 workers struck; but the Government stood firm, and the Labour Party had to admit failure and order the strikers back to work. A general election followed soon afterwards, and the Socialists suffered a setback. More serious was the effect on the Trade Unions, many of which withdrew from the party and proclaimed their political neutrality. There were similar Co-operative and Mutualist defections; and altogether the Labour Party underwent a very serious defeat. This setback was undoubtedly due in part to the efforts of the Social Catholic movement to build up a strong counter-organisation. The most left-wing Catholic group, headed by the Abbé Daens, who had been elected to Parliament for Alost,
was expelled from the Catholic movement, which passed increasingly under the control of the Clerical Party. The Catholics had been steadily intensifying their efforts to organise Christian Co-operative Societies and Christian Trade Unions in opposition to the Socialists, or, when they could not do this, to preach the virtues of political neutrality. Undoubtedly, these efforts achieved considerable success, especially after the failure of the general strike of 1902. In Parliament, one Catholic Government succeeded another; and the Socialists seemed to have reached an impasse. A number of laws were passed for the protection of the labouring classes against the worst forms of exploitation; but these went only a very little way, and Socialist pressure for the adoption of publicly organised social services was ineffective. The most that could be got in this field were small public subsidies to mutualist associations; and these tended to benefit the Catholic societies more than the Socialists, who could participate only on condition of separating their social service activities from their political and Co-operative work.

The Socialists also suffered because, after 1902, the main field of political controversy shifted over to issues much less favourable to them than either the campaign for universal suffrage or the demand for industrial and social legislation. During the period which followed the serious defeat of 1902 the attention of people and Parliament was transferred first to the controversy about the behaviour of King Leopold II in the private empire which he had built up for himself in Africa and then to the no-less-difficult question of the place of the Catholic Church in the conduct of the school system.

The dispute concerning the Congo was not, indeed, mainly a matter for controversy between the Belgian parties: it was a matter of the responsibility of the Belgian State for the abominations that were being done by the King of the Belgians in his other capacity as absolute monarch of the Congo Free State. The affair had begun as far back as 1876, when Leopold had called together at Brussels a private Congress of explorers, missionaries, and traders interested in Africa with the ostensible purpose of putting down slavery and the slave trade in the ‘Dark Continent’ and of opening it up to ‘civilisation’ by the development of missionary and trading enterprise. The original
body which Leopold set up was called the International Association for the Exploration and Civilisation of Africa; and it had at the outset no particular connection with the Congo and no pretensions to constitute a State. But Leopold’s attention was soon directed to the possibility of carving out for himself a highly profitable empire in the Congo Basin area, if the great powers would let him. In 1878 he established as an offshoot of the original association a new body, which presently took the name, International Association of the Congo. Under the auspices of this body the celebrated explorer, H. M. Stanley, spent several years in the Congo establishing posts for trade and missionary enterprise, and in effect building up a State by securing vast concessions of land and sovereign powers from the native chiefs. These manoeuvres coincided in time with the moves of several European powers to partition the continent of Africa into spheres of influences which speedily developed into colonial empires. Leopold had picked a great area in Central Africa in which he saw the chance of being allowed to operate without interference, if only he could come to terms with the European powers concerning the boundaries of his projected empire. Aided by his pretensions to be the missionary of Christian civilisation and by his family connections with European ruling houses, Leopold made the most of his great talents for intrigue. He persuaded the United States to recognise his Congo Association as an independent State, and then got a similar recognition in turn from France, Germany, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. In the course of these negotiations Bismarck called, in April 1884, a Conference at Berlin of the powers interested in African development; and out of this meeting emerged, early in 1885, a General Act dealing, among other matters, with the whole Congo Basin. It was laid down that within this area there should be complete freedom for the commerce of all nations, and that steps should be taken to suppress the slave trade and to protect missionaries and explorers. The Congo Association was recognised over a vast area as an independent State, and became a signatory to the General Act. There followed a series of negotiations which defined its frontiers and in effect partitioned most of Central Africa between it and the great European powers. At the same time Leopold obtained the sanction of the Belgian Parliament
to his assumption of absolute rule over the Congo Free State, and it was laid down that the union between it and Belgium should be ‘exclusively personal’. Leopold then set to work to establish his effective control over the vast area that had been assigned to him. There were bitterly fought wars against the Arabs in the interior and fierce struggles with the native inhabitants, whose resistance was ruthlessly suppressed. In 1889 Leopold made a will leaving the Congo to be a possession of the Belgian State after his death; but he proceeded to carve out within it a vast private estate — the Domain of the Crown — which he claimed as the private property of himself and his heirs. He also granted concessions to big capitalist companies, in which investors from many countries were interested; and he required that these concessions, as well as the ‘Domain’, should be respected when the State passed under Belgian control. He had begun, immediately on securing recognition of his empire, with a monstrous edict declaring all ‘vacant lands’ in the Congo to be the property of the State; and he now interpreted this edict as including all land not actually under native cultivation — that is, not only all jungle and forest and all mineral rights, but all areas over which native tribesmen roamed without establishing permanent agricultural settlements. In his own domain and on behalf of the companies to which he granted concessions he established a system of forced labour that soon became indistinguishable from slavery; and his troops — mainly native levies under European officers — committed horrible brutalities upon all who attempted to resist his tyranny and exploitation. The régime which he established became an international scandal — especially in the rubber-producing district controlled by a special Foundation which he set up for its exploitation. In 1904 Roger Casement, the British consul at Borea, in the Congo, produced a report exposing some of the appalling abuses that prevailed; and the British Government, which had already addressed a note on the matter to all the powers which were parties to the General Act, suggested rather tentatively that there might be a reference to the Hague Court. Under pressure from world opinion, Leopold, who had denied the charges, was forced to set up a commission of enquiry under Edmond Janssens, a leading Belgian judge. The Commission in its report recognised the existence of grave
abuses, and recommended a number of reforms; but it justified the use of forced labour and the system of concessions to private companies. Leopold then set up a further commission of his own to study the report, and carry out such of its recommendations as he was prepared to accept; but he continued to insist that his rights in the 'Domain of the Crown' and the concessions he had granted should be respected.

Already, from 1901, the Belgian Government and Parliament had been discussing a Bill designed to regulate the affairs of the Congo from that future date on which, at Leopold's death, it was to become a Belgian colony. But no progress had been made, because of the unacceptable conditions on which the King insisted. In 1906, after the commission's report, Leopold made matters worse by granting a number of new concessions to companies controlled largely by foreign capital, in the hope of getting the support of the capitalist groups in the leading countries against his attackers. There followed an acrimonious discussion in the Belgian Parliament, accompanied by increasing protests from abroad as it became clear that the alleged reforms introduced by Leopold were having no substantial effect, and that the régime of violence and cruel oppression in the Congo was continuing practically unchanged. The Liberal Government in Great Britain and the United States Government under Theodore Roosevelt joined in the chorus of demands for reform; and in 1907 Leopold was compelled to sign a treaty ceding the Congo Free State to Belgium and putting its affairs under the control of the Belgian Parliament. But Leopold was able still to insist that the Domain of the Crown and the Foundation he had established in it should be left intact, and that large sums from the operations of the Foundation should continue to accrue to himself and his family. These provisions led to further protests from Great Britain and other countries, as well as in the Belgian Parliament; and in 1908 a new treaty was made, abolishing the Foundation and most of the special privileges claimed by Leopold, but granting the King heavy compensation for the loss of his 'rights'. The Belgian State was also forced to recognise a number of the concessions which Leopold had granted, and to promise to pay large annuities to the Belgian royal family. But after long and acrimonious debates the Belgian Chamber was
induced to accept the revised treaty, and by the end of 1908 the Congo Free State had ceased to exist and had been transformed into a Belgian Colony.

The situation in the Congo confronted the Belgian Socialists with a difficult problem. They had no love for Leopold, and were ready enough to join in denunciations of his abominable régime and of the capitalist concession-hunters who were associated with him. They rightly regarded the Congo Free State as an extreme example of the evils of economic imperialism, and joined their voices to those of other Socialists in exposing the growth of imperialism as a stage in the development of capitalist exploitation. But it was not so easy a matter when it came to finding a solution for the problem presented by Leopold’s private empire-building exploits. The Belgian Socialists had no desire to see their own country following the great powers into imperialist adventures by acquiring a colonial empire: yet this was clearly what Belgium was in process of being committed to, at any rate from the moment when Leopold announced his intention of willing the Congo Free State to Belgium at his death. Moreover, the conditions under which Leopold proposed to do this, retaining his private Domain and insisting on the continuance of the concessions he had granted to various exploiting companies, were entirely unacceptable to the Belgian Socialists.

From 1901 onwards the question came before the Belgian Parliament in the form given to it in the Bill prescribing the form to be taken by the control to be exercised by the Belgian State over the Congo when it was handed over on Leopold’s death. Under this Bill, in its original form, the completely autocratic system of government in the Congo was to be left unaltered, and the Belgian Parliament was to have practically no say in the affairs of the colony. To this the Socialists naturally took strong objection, as they did to the maintenance of the royal Domain and to the terms of the concessions which granted the companies wide powers of police and military action against the natives. But many of the Socialists went much further than this, and were opposed to Belgium taking over the Congo on any terms. Some of them wanted the Free State to be put under international supervision and administration: some of them wanted to have nothing to do with the unclean thing on
any terms, and adopted an attitude of pure anti-imperialism without feeling called upon to put forward any positive proposal.

In the denunciations of the doings of Leopold in Africa, Hector Denis and Émile Vandervelde played a leading part. When, in 1906, the question took on a new aspect after the report of the commission and the evident failure to carry out even the moderate reforms which it had recommended, strong disagreements developed within the Socialist ranks. It was no longer a matter of legislating about what was to be done at an uncertain future time after Leopold's death, but of acting at once to bring to an end what had become an intolerable international scandal—intolerable not only to Socialists and humanitarians, but even to many advocates of imperialist policies. Vandervelde became convinced, after visiting the Congo in order to see for himself what was happening, that the only solution was for the Belgian State to take over the Free State under conditions that would give the Belgian Parliament full control over the affairs of the country and place on it the responsibility for enacting laws to safeguard native rights and liberties. Moreover, in order to secure this, he was prepared to make such concessions to the King's inordinate demands as seemed to be unavoidable if agreement was to be reached. Vandervelde, however, found himself on this issue in a minority in his own party. The majority of the Socialists felt that they were being dragged into becoming assenting parties to a system of economic imperialism of which they violently disapproved. Vandervelde, outvoted, offered to resign his position in the party; but the party refused to accept his resignation and, when he maintained his attitude, agreed to allow him to go on expressing his point of view in Parliament. A breach in the party was avoided by agreeing to vote against the Congo Bill on the ground that the concessions it made to Leopold's claims were unacceptable, without binding the party's representatives in Parliament to oppose the taking over of the Free State on any terms. The Bill, in its revised form securing to the Belgian Parliament control over the Congo régime and binding it to pass laws for the protection of the natives, was passed with the Socialists voting against it, but well knowing that it would be passed in spite of their vote. Thereafter, in effect Vandervelde got his way; for when the Congo had become a Belgian colony...
and the Belgian Parliament had become responsible for it, the Socialists had no alternative to doing their best to liberalise the régime, however much they disliked it on principle, or to acquiescing in the continuance of the exactions on which Leopold had insisted to the end.

The Belgian Socialists were thus forced, in the early years of the present century, to face the problem of defining their attitude to capitalist imperialism more directly and immediately than the Socialists of other countries; and they did not find it an easy matter. It was all very well on paper to urge the desirability of establishing an international régime pledged to the protection of native interests; but it was all too evident that no such régime was at all likely to be established in practice under the auspices of the States which had signed the treaties regulating their action in the Congo Basin. These States were at that very time still busily engaged in partitioning Africa among themselves, in authorising in the territories they had seized concessionary companies only less objectionable than Leopold's Congo concessionnaires, and in 'policing' the natives and grabbing their land under the pretext of advancing the cause of civilisation in Africa; and, even if some of these powers objected to Leopold's proceedings, they did so, not because they were against exploiting the natives, but only because they believed that less brutal methods would serve to secure much the same — or greater — results. There was no real possibility of establishing an international régime that would be carried on to serve the interests of the natives against capitalist exploitation: nor was there at that stage any possibility of handing over the areas to any self-governing native authority. Colonial nationalism hardly yet existed; and the Arabs, who alone possessed any more than tribal organisation, would have used power, had it been allowed them, to restore the slave trade in its older forms. There was thus no real alternative to the Belgian State taking over the vast empire which Leopold had created and assuming therewith the financial responsibilities involved in policing it; and, as the Socialists formed only a small minority in the Belgian Parliament and had no early prospect of becoming a majority — indeed, they were actually losing ground — this meant that Belgium would be transformed into an imperialist power governing an empire
in the interests of capitalist concessionnaires drawn from all over the world. It is not surprising that the majority of the Belgian Socialists shrank back from becoming consenting parties to such a development; but what were they to do?

No sooner had the Congo affair been settled — of course, with the struggle to frame the new laws for its government still ahead — than the educational question came to occupy the centre of Belgian political controversy. The Catholic Government was intent on strengthening the hold of the Church over the schools by making grants of public money available to private schools conducted under religious auspices on equal terms with the schools conducted by the communes. The Liberals, as the traditional champions of ‘laïcité’ in the educational field, came back into prominence as the antagonists of the clericals on this issue; and, in face of the Catholic majority in Parliament, the Socialists found themselves forced into an anti-Catholic alliance with the Liberal Party. In 1911 the Catholic Government brought in an Educational Bill which would have compelled the local authorities to pay grants on equal terms to the Catholic schools; and Socialists and Liberals united in a nation-wide agitation against the Bill. The Government thereupon withdrew the measure, but dissolved Parliament and appealed to the electorate for an endorsement of its policy. This put the Socialists in a difficulty. They had insisted up to that point on the need to fight independently of the bourgeois parties, and to enter into no electoral pacts with them. But in face of the apparently unshakable hold of the Catholics on political power as long as Liberals and Socialists continued to fight each other under the existing electoral law

1 Campaigns of protest against the Congo activities were organised in a number of countries. In Great Britain the lead was taken by Edmund Dene Morel (1873–1924), who became secretary of the Congo Reform Association in 1904. Morel’s numerous books and pamphlets — notably King Leopold’s Rule in Africa (1904) and Red Rubber (1906) — played an important part in arousing public opinion against Leopold’s misrule. After the outbreak of war in 1914 Morel took a leading part in organising the Union of Democratic Control, of which he became secretary. He edited Foreign Affairs. Up to 1914 he had been a Liberal, but he then joined the I.L.P. group. In 1922, defeating Winston Churchill, he became Labour M.P. for Dundee. During the war he was heavily attacked as a 'pro-German'; but he was in fact a passionate opponent of imperialism and of secret diplomacy and a fervent believer in the rights of man irrespective of colour or creed.
and of the failure to get the law changed by strike action, the majority of the Socialist leaders became converts to the view that Socialists and Liberals should temporarily sink their differences in order to fight together for 'laiicité' and franchise reform. This issue arose at a time when the Socialist International had been in sharp dispute over the question of Socialist participation in capitalist Governments in connection with the affaire Millerand. Jaurès, as we saw, had then appeared as the leading defender of the policy, when it furnished the only available means of defending the French Republic against reactionary forces. He had not been able to persuade the majority of the International; but he had succeeded in getting it to limit its censure to the adoption of the famous Kautsky resolution which, while hostile to participation under almost all circumstances, did in the interest of Socialist unity leave the door to it not quite closed.¹ The majority of the Belgian Socialists, conscious that their movement was in danger of being set back yet further unless they could expel the Catholics from power, became convinced that the emergency was serious enough to justify them at any rate in electoral collaboration with the Liberals. A section of the Labour Party, headed by Louis de Brouckère, strongly opposed this view, but was outvoted at the Party Congress, and, despite its misgivings, yielded out of party loyalty. The Congress did not indeed approve outright coalition, which would have run counter to the declared policy of the Socialist International. Émile Vandervelde, as Chairman of the International Socialist Bureau, which had its headquarters in Belgium, could hardly have accepted any resolution clearly inconsistent with the Kautsky resolution. That resolution, however, did admit that circumstances might arise in which Socialists would be forced to co-operate with bourgeois parties; and full advantage was taken of this clause in formulating the Belgian policy. The outcome, after much discussion, was the drawing up of a Liberal-Socialist election pact, under which, without precise commitments for the future, both parties took their stand on 'laiicité', universal suffrage, and a common programme of social reforms. The general election of 1912, fought on this basis, instead of overturning the Catholics, sent them back to Parliament considerably

¹ See p. 39 ff.
stronger than before. Many middle-class Liberals voted for the Catholics out of fear of Socialism; and the Catholics won a considerable amount of working-class support by denouncing the Socialists as the enemies of religion.

This second setback caused much heart-searching in the Socialist ranks. The policy of coalition with the Liberals was discredited; and the predominant view came to be that the Socialist cause could not make further progress without electoral reform. There was accordingly a return to the policy of the political general strike; and the party leaders followed, in many cases with reluctance, the demands made on them by the party activists for a more militant Socialist policy, but at the same time insisted that the general strike must be prepared for more carefully than it had been in 1902. There ensued a period of intensive preparation, including a special effort to win over more Trade Union support. At the same time, an attempt was made by mass demonstrations to induce the Government to offer concessions; but, when it stood firm, the Socialists found themselves in a position in which they had either to accept defeat or to act on their threats by calling for a general strike. They decided to call the strike for April 14th, 1913; and when the day came the response was substantially greater than it had been eleven years before. About 450,000 workers, as compared with about 300,000 in 1902, struck work. The Government under this pressure, agreed to set up a commission to study the question of electoral reform, but refused to promise any amendment; and on the strength of this doubtful concession, the party leadership ordered a return to work. It is impossible to say what would have happened if the commission had completed its work and the Government had been forced to act upon it. As things turned out, the outbreak of war and the invasion of Belgium the following year swept the entire issue away for the time being, leaving it to be raised again in a quite different atmosphere after the war had flung Socialists and their opponents together in a coalition Government in exile. Immediately, in 1913 and 1914, the calling off of the strike led to sharp differences of opinion within the Labour Party, many of the local activists denouncing the national leaders for their pusillanimous conduct. The advent of war, however, prevented these differences from being brought to an issue.
Among the strongest advocates of the policy of joint action with the Liberals had been the two outstanding survivors from the leadership of the Labour Party in its early days — Édouard Anseele of Ghent and Louis Bertrand, the principal founder of the Brussels Maison du Peuple. These two were the main links with the past of Belgian Socialism. César de Paepe, with whom Bertrand had worked closely, had died in 1890; and Jean Volders, who with Bertrand had founded *Le Peuple*, the principal Socialist newspaper, in 1885, had followed him to the grave in 1896. The new men who had come in as leaders in the parliamentary phase of the movement were largely moderates — some of them converts from Progressivism, others students and teachers who had entered ardently into the educational side of the party’s work. The party of course consisted mainly of workers; but its national leadership contained an unduly high proportion of intellectuals, and both the relative weakness of the Trade Unions and the nature of the electoral system, which gave intellectual or middle-class candidates an advantage in attracting votes, had stood in the way of a balanced leadership. In Belgium, where the Catholic Church was unrivalled by any other religious group, anti-clericalism had a strong hold on the intellectuals and on an élite of working-class activists, but relatively little on the mass of the workers, except in a few areas. The vigorous Rationalism of the working-class leaders furnished them with a powerful temptation to ally themselves with the Liberals as fellow-fighters for ‘laïcité’, but tended to blind them, and especially the intellectuals among them — with de Brouckère a notable exception — to the danger of allowing the Catholics to brand them as the enemies, not only of clericalism, but of religion itself. The alliance with the Liberals thus lost them many more votes among the workers than it gained them among the middle classes. Moreover, the situation of stalemate that had been reached after the great electoral successes of the 1890s tended to throw some doubt on the wisdom of the policy of attempting to organise the Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies as part of the Labour Party, in such a way as to hold aloof all such bodies that were not prepared to work wholly within it. Conscious of this, the party did its best after 1905 to build up a wider Trade Union Federation, into which could be brought Unions that were not prepared to become Corporative...
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Federations within the party. But this policy was set on foot too late and did not have much effect: nor was anything done to handle the Co-operative problem along similar lines. This, indeed, would have been very difficult, and might easily have done more harm than good. The party structure rested to such an extent on its very successful local Co-operatives, which it had made the centres of its entire local life, that to separate them from the party would have struck the whole movement a blow that might have been mortal. Nevertheless, the establishment of Socialist Co-operatives as an integral element in the Labour Party had as its necessary correlative the development of non-Socialist Co-operatives as their rivals; and the Catholics, in both the Co-operative and the Trade Union field, seized on their chance to build up a counter-organisation. Most probably, in view of the intensity of the struggle between the Church and the opponents of clerical power, the emergence of two great rival movements was unavoidable. Whether or no, it undoubtedly led to a stalemate. The Socialists were as far off winning political power in 1914 as they had been in 1894. By 1914, coalition with the Liberal anti-clericals had been tried, and had failed. It remained, under the impulse given to the idea of national unity by the war, to see what could be done by coalition with the Catholics.

Throughout the period discussed in this chapter, Émile Vandervelde (1866–1938) was not only the outstanding political leader of the Belgian Labour Party, but also its principal theorist. Eminent as an orator, both in Parliament and at countless meetings and demonstrations in many countries, tireless as an educator, and constantly preoccupied with the affairs of the Second International as well as of the Belgian party, he found time to set out in a number of books a body of doctrine, professedly Marxist, which diverged in many respects from the orthodoxy of the German followers of Marx and owed a great deal to César de Paepe and to the actual form which Belgian Labour organisation had taken in the hands of Louis Bertrand and Édouard Anseele. From de Paepe came the insistence on the rôle of the commune in the conduct of public services and industrial operations, and also the stress on the need to set up special functional bodies for these purposes rather than entrust their administration to primarily political
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agencies. From Bertrand and Anseele came the conception of the party, not as a monolithic political structure, but as a grouping of Co-operatives, Trade Unions, Mutualités, and other working-class bodies, with its foundations in local solidarity rather than in any central directing authority. Vandervelde's Socialism differed from German Marxism in being much less centralising and authoritarian and in rejecting the notion of the centralised party, organised mainly for the electoral struggle, as the supreme controller of the activity of the working class in every field. It was thus hostile to étatisme in a double sense — not only in regarding the capitalist State as the enemy which the proletariat was destined to overthrow, but also in carrying its hostility to étatisme into the future and taking its stand against State authoritarianism as an instrument for the building of a Socialist society.

Socialism against the State is the title of one of Vandervelde's best-known books: he conceived of the advance towards Socialism in terms not simply of a working-class conquest of political power, but equally of a process of Socialist construction to be carried on simultaneously in many fields — by Co-operatives, by Trade Unions, and by cultural agencies as well as by political action.

Vandervelde began his career as a writer with a series of studies of the history and actual structure of the Belgian working-class movement and of the development of industrialism and capitalism in Belgian society. From these studies he went on to a specialised study of Belgian agricultural conditions and to a consideration of Marxist doctrines in the light of the controversy provoked by the revisionist criticisms of Bernstein and of the French reformists of the 'Independent' school. These labours led to the writing of his best-known book, Le Collectivisme et l'évolution industrielle, which appeared in 1900. Then followed a host of occasional writings — on agricultural policy and the land system, on the Congo question and on colonisation and imperialism in general, on the artistic and cultural aspects of Socialism, on Socialism and religion, on the relative merits of Socialist and 'neutral' Co-operative Societies, and on various aspects of Marxist economic and philosophical doctrine. His next major work, Le Socialisme contre l'état, appeared only in 1918, during the first world war, which had carried him into office as a minister in a national
coalition. He pursued its theme after the war in *Faut-il changer notre programme?* (1923), in which he defended the continued validity of the Belgian Labour Programme of 1893, and in *L’Alternative : capitalisme d’état ou socialisme démocratique* (1933), his last important work, apart from his memoirs, *Souvenirs d’un militant socialiste* (1939). In all these books and occasional writings he cast his thought into a Marxist mould and energetically defended the validity of Marx’s essential doctrines, but at the same time repeatedly attacked dogmatic Marxism and insisted that Marxism should be regarded as a method, to be applied to changing circumstances, and not as yielding absolute doctrines. He was evidently much influenced from an early stage both by Bernstein and by Jaurès, but in relation to the controversies that rent the Second International he always took up a centrist position, moving to the right wing only in his later years, partly as a result of his experience of ministerial collaboration and partly out of reaction against Bolshevik doctrine and practice.

For the purposes of the present chapter it seems best to consider Vandervelde’s Socialism mainly in the light of his writing up to 1918, when he produced *Le Socialisme contre l’état.* That means taking as the principal source his work on *Collectivism and Industrial Evolution.* He there accepts as true in essence Marx’s account of the ‘socialising’ process going on within capitalist society, as manifested in the increasing subdivision of labour, in the concentration of capital, and in the growing interdependence of the processes of production both nationally and internationally. He accepts as broadly true Marx’s doctrine of surplus value, in the sense of regarding capitalism as resting on the exploitation of labour; and he does not reject the possibility of Socialism having to be brought about by forcible revolution. But he considerably qualifies his Marxism. Like Bernstein, he denies that the small-scale producer is being crushed out of existence nearly so rapidly as orthodox Marxists suppose; he draws attention to the continued vitality of small-scale ownership and cultivation in agriculture and to the assistance that the small-scale industrial producers can derive from Co-operative effort. He further stresses the fact that the increasing divorce between ownership and management in large-scale enterprise is raising up large
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new classes of administrators and technicians who do not own the capital assets they manipulate and to a growing extent control; and he discards altogether, as Bernstein did, the theory of ‘increasing misery’ and polarisation of economic classes. He regards Marx as having been unduly influenced by actual conditions in the 1840s into making an invalid generalisation about the effects of capitalist development on working-class standards of living and on class-relations; and he concludes that it is fully possible for working-class standards to improve as capitalist techniques advance and for many forms of small-scale enterprise, aided by Co-operative methods, to survive indefinitely, so as to pass over into the new Socialist society. He rejects the notion that all production will have to be ‘socialised’ according to any uniform pattern of nationalisation, and emphasises the advantages of diversity in the coming era of socially controlled production.

Even at this stage of his thought, though he did not wholly reject revolution by violent means, his attitude was essentially gradualist. He contemplated, save in countries where reaction was so strongly established as to be amenable only to violence, the payment of compensation to capitalists as they were dispossessed by the piecemeal taking over of large-scale businesses by the public; and he envisaged a long period during which considerable differences of income, corresponding as far as possible to the values of services rendered, would continue to be recognised. Following the Saint-Simonians and Colins, he assigned great importance to the limitation and ultimate abolition of inheritance of means of production as an instrument for the socialisation of property rights. He also attached a high value to reformist legislation, both for the protection of working conditions and for the development of social security services, and considered that orthodox Marxists set much too narrow limits to the possibilities of improving working-class standards by these means.

At the same time he was critical of any theory of historical development which put the whole, or almost the whole, emphasis on material economic factors. He denied that Marx meant to put forward a theory of social determination by the changing material environment to the exclusion of man’s own creative rôle; and he passionately upheld the importance of
ethical and idealistic impulses as lying at the very root of Marx's own social conceptions. Coming out of the liberal nationalist tradition that was strong in the Belgian intellectual Socialist movement, he set out to reconcile this tradition with Marxism as a method, and interpreted Marxist 'materialism' as being, in the final analysis, realist rather than determinist in any sense that involved a denial of the creative rôle of reason. His keen appreciation of and interest in the arts led him to an assertion of their highly significant contribution to the formation of social ideas and to an insistence on the need for the proletariat to develop its culture equally with its economic and political power.

In effect, Vandervelde was essentially what some Marxists call a petit-bourgeois utopian Socialist rather than a 'scientific' Socialist, though he made continual use of Marxist methods and concepts. He sought always, partly no doubt for tactical reasons, to minimise his differences with Marxism; and where he dissented most he was apt to keep silent, while bringing out as fully as possible his points of agreement. I am not suggesting that he was guilty of conscious dishonesty in representing himself as a Marxist. He came into the Socialist movement at a time when Marxism, in its German Social Democratic form, had made itself so much the pivotal factor in Socialist development in Western Europe that it was not only almost necessary but also natural for any continental Socialist who aspired to political leadership, especially at an international level, to accept the prevailing Marxist framework and adapt his thinking to it. Bernstein did this, no less than Vandervelde, though his deviations from Marxist orthodoxy were even greater. Vandervelde, situated in Belgium, at a key-point for the intersection of German and French ideas, and for playing a special rôle in the development of international Socialist organisation, could not have acted his part as reconciler of conflicting groups within the International unless he had been prepared to take his stand within the Marxist camp and to talk to the disputants in Marxist language. It was fortunate for him, as a leader of the International, that the great controversy over coalition between Socialist and bourgeois parties and over participation of Socialists in bourgeois-dominated Governments blew up over the affaire Millerand before the Belgian Socialists had been brought
Vandervelde was a man who was bound by temperament and political instinct to become a coalitionist as soon as the issue arose in a practical form. He was acute enough as a politician to realise that the situation of parties in Belgium held out no prospect at all of an early conquest of political power by the Socialists acting alone; and his zeal as a social reformer made him chafe at the prospect of a long sojourn in the political wilderness. His critical spirit, his distrust of dogma, and his essential moderation impelled him to see the good points in his opponents’ ideas as well as the faults in his friends’; and his conception of the advance to Socialism as requiring ‘integral’ activity spread over a number of separate fields, rather than a single political campaign, served as an inducement not to believe that everything could be done through the party, however widely constituted. Up to 1914 these elements in his make-up did not find full expression in his doings, though they appeared in his attitude both on the Congo question and on that of electoral relations with the Liberals during the controversy over education. Indeed, his leading position in the International and his mediatory rôle therein caused him to repress these elements in him as far as he could. For a time, after the Russian Revolution of 1917, his lack of Social Democratic dogmatism made him, despite his ardent support of *jusquaubou-tisme* during the first world war, less unfriendly to the Soviet Union than many of his Socialist colleagues in the West, though later he assumed, in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, the status of First Public Enemy. But we must leave consideration of this aspect of Vandervelde’s Socialism for a later section of this work.

Next to Vandervelde, the most significant Belgian Socialist theorist of the period under review is the sociologist, Guillaume de Greef (1842–1924). Originally a lawyer and journalist, de Greef became Professor of Sociology at the Free University of Brussels, from which he seceded later to help form the New University when the trouble arose over the invitation to Élisée Reclus to lecture. De Greef formulated in the 1880s a system of sociology which owed much to Comte and to Herbert Spencer, but differed from theirs in assigning fundamental importance to occupational groups as the principal formative
influences on social behaviour. Society, in his view, was shaped by a process of group pressures and accommodation between them, and tended to pass from a stage in which these pressures operated in terms of conflicting forces into one in which accommodation was achieved by mutual discussion and give and take. This part of de Greef's theory bears evident resemblances to Bagehot's conception of the development of the 'discussive' type of Society as the agent of social progress; and de Greef also laid stress on the transition from status relations to relations of contract which lies at the root of Maine's social theory. He differed, however, from both Maine and Bagehot in stressing the occupational basis of social pressures; and this led him towards a theory of the coming society that had much in common with Syndicalism. The influence of Proudhon also appears very plainly in his conception of social development as leading to the predominance of voluntary associations, linked together by contractual relations, as against the unification of society through an authoritative political organisation. De Greef followed Herbert Spencer in understanding progress as a process leading through increasing social differentiation towards, not unity, but co-ordination without coercive control; but, unlike Spencer, he stressed voluntary co-operation, and not conflict, as its primary characteristic. In his own day he had little influence on Socialist thought, though some on academic Sociology and among the advocates of occupational, as against geographical, representation.

In this special field de Greef was in agreement with his colleague and exact contemporary, Hector Denis (1842–1913), who was Professor of Ethics and Political Economy at Brussels and, later, leader of the Labour Party in Parliament. Denis came to Socialism from progressive Liberalism, and his views always retained large elements of Liberal idealism which caused him to reject orthodox Marxism while seeking to develop his doctrine by means of an inductive study of social facts. He wrote largely both on the history of economic doctrines and on the theory and practice of taxation, on which he became the Labour Party's leading expert. Like de Greef, who was his close friend, he was much influenced by both Comte and Proudhon, rather than by Marx; Socialism he regarded not as the end of the process of social evolution but as a stage in it.
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possessing only a relative value. He also made a special study of economic crises and their connection with the accumulation of capital, and had some influence on Vandervelde's revision of Marxism and on the thought of Henri de Man.

A further important figure in the development of Belgian Socialist thought is Louis de Brouckère (1870-1951) whom we have seen in a previous chapter reporting to the International Socialist Congress of 1907 on the relations between Socialism and the Trade Union movement. De Brouckère, as then appeared, was a strong upholder of the view that there should be close relations between the Socialist Party, the Trade Unions, and the Co-operative Societies, and that, though each had its special task and should be left free to carry it out in its own way, there were also common tasks of Socialist construction which required the close collaboration of the three wings of the working-class movement. What de Brouckère was opposing was the view, widely held among the Germans and their followers such as the French Guesdists and the Spanish Socialists, that the constructive task of Socialism was the peculiar property of the Socialist political parties, and that Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies had little to do with it, and should confine themselves to the protection of the workers under capitalism, in their special capacities as wage-earners and as consumers. As we saw, de Brouckère was also the principal opponent in the Belgian Labour Party of joint action with the Liberals, holding that the supreme need was to build up a working-class movement that would enlist the workers' loyalty over the widest possible field, and not merely in politics, and that this involved a close integration of the whole movement as a social force, concerning itself with the entire 'way of life' and fully as much with cultural as with political or economic action. De Brouckère was a very active educationist and a voluminous writer. His first important work was an historical study of the condition of the Belgian working classes during the nineteenth century; and he followed this with a series of books in which he dealt particularly with the functions of the Trade Unions, both under capitalism and in preparing the way for the control of the coming Socialist society. He also contributed to the philosophy of Socialism, taking his stand on

1 See p. 71 ff.
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a broad Marxism more to the left than Vandervelde’s but showing a like undogmatic quality. He wrote an important book on the conception of equality in relation to Socialism. De Brouckère was a great social idealist: he devoted himself unsparingly to the workers’ movement, and was one of the most deeply respected figures of international Socialism both before and after the first world war.

None of these four — Vandervelde, de Greef, Denis, and de Brouckère — has any claim to be regarded as a major figure in the development of Socialist thought; but they are all interesting secondary personages whose doctrines fit in with, and indeed arose largely out of, the peculiar situation of Belgium as a small, highly industrialised country which was a meeting-place for German and French influences and was torn opposite ways by its division into Flemish and French-speaking groups. Brussels, as a city of mixed population, as well as the capital of the country, was the focal point for the attempt to reconcile these often conflicting elements; and all four were ultimately connected with its University and with its intellectual life. If, in them all, the way of thought was fundamentally French rather than German, that was only natural; for in culture the French-speaking groups in Belgium were a long way ahead of the Flemish, and industrial development was much more advanced among them than in most of the Flemish districts. What is most notable in the social doctrine of all four is that, without being in any sense Anarchists, they thought of Socialism in terms not of a political conquest of power nearly so much as of a penetration of the working class, in all its associative activities, by the spirit of social constructiveness and of the building of the new social order as the outcome of spontaneously co-ordinated action through complementary institutions of different kinds. This was the conception which had found expression in the Vooruit at Ghent, in the Maison du Peuple at Brussels, and in the federal structure of the Belgian Labour Party as a whole. It was confronted by a rival conception of co-ordinated social activity under the authoritative leadership of the Catholic Church; and in the divided state of Belgian society neither of these conceptions proved strong enough to overthrow the other. They remained side by side, and remain to-day, contending for the mastery of the Belgian people, and
yet at times thrown together in hostility to the extreme individualism of capitalist Liberalism. The consequent social struggle was often confused; but it presents features that are of considerable help in rendering intelligible the confusion of European politics at the present day. Belgium was the country in all Europe in which Social Democracy, after a rapid advance in political influence, first reached a stalemate.
CHAPTER XVII
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Dutch politics, up to the 1870s, were dominated by the Liberals under the leadership of Jan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798–1872), who emancipated the Catholics and laid the foundations of a liberal trade policy. After his death, Liberalism lost ground with the development of confessional parties—the Calvinists under the leadership of the strongly reactionary Dr. A. Kuyper and the Roman Catholics organised by the more socially radical priest, Dr. Schaepman. Thereafter, political power alternated in the hands of the Liberals and of a coalition of the rival confessional parties, which were united in demanding equality of support by the State for public and for confessional schools. Culturally, however, the leadership of the nation remained chiefly with the Liberals right up to 1914. Thorbecke was by training a jurist, and wrote works of importance on legal and constitutional questions; and the influence of his ideas continued to be strong. The Catholics had shed their social radicalism by 1901, when they became partners with the Calvinists in the Kuyper ministry: the Liberals had a progressive wing which supported social legislation as well as the extension of the franchise.

The Dutch were later than their neighbours in developing a Socialist movement; and, when it came, dissensions rent it continually. Anarchists and Anarcho-Syndicalists fought a long and bitter struggle against Social Democrats, and within the Social Democratic forces the battle between rival factions was again and again renewed. Moreover, Socialism encountered powerful obstacles in the religious controversies which divided the working as well as other classes. To a much greater extent than in Belgium the question of denominational education dominated Dutch politics until it was settled—in favour of the churches—in 1919. The powerful Protestant and Catholic Parties, sometimes opposing each other, and
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sometimes in alliance against the advocates of 'laïcité', both
built up separate Trade Union movements in hostility to the
Socialists and Syndicalists; and these two factions also de­
veloped rival Trade Union Centres. In addition, there arose
two further 'neutral' Trade Union movements, one of which
wished to keep right out of politics, while the other aimed at
bringing the contending factions together into a common
movement.

These separate Socialist, religious, and neutral movements
were not organised in formal Federations until the early years
of the twentieth century; but their component elements
existed earlier. Similar dissensions prevented the growth of a
well-organised movement of Consumers' Co-operation. Only
Agricultural Co-operation on a strictly business footing was
able to develop largely unhampered by them. The first
Co-operative butter factory was founded in 1886; and there­
after the various forms of Agricultural Co-operation grew
steadily — creameries, bacon factories, marketing societies, and
credit agencies all achieving a powerful position in the country­
side. Consumers' Co-operation developed less rapidly until
after the first world war.

Until the late 'sixties Socialism had hardly appeared at all
on Dutch soil. The Dutch played only a very small part in the
First International. They sent no delegates to any of its
Congresses until 1872, when four of them, headed by H.
Gerhard, the pioneer of the Dutch working-class movement,
and by Victor Dave, appeared at the Hague and took a
fairly active part in the proceedings, especially in connection
with the great quarrel between Marx and Bakunin. All four
were on the Federalist side against the Marxists and seem to
have acted closely with the Belgian Federalists. None of them,
however, appeared at any of the subsequent Congresses of the
rump 'Anarchist' International. At the Geneva Congress of
1873 — the non-Marxist Congress — Holland was represented
by the Belgian, van den Abeele, and at the Berne Congress of
1876 César de Paepe held the Dutch mandate. There was no
delegate representing Holland at Brussels in 1874 or at Verviers
in 1877 or — more surprisingly — at the Ghent Socialist Unity
Congress of 1877.

There was in fact during this entire period no effective

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Socialist or even Trade Union movement in the Netherlands. There were a few Trade Unions, but they were heavily repressed. H. Gerhard (1829–86), the chief promoter of them and of the International, was a tailor, and built up a fairly strong organisation, especially in the garment trades, during the late 'sixties and early 'seventies. But it was almost snuffed out during the period of reaction after 1872. In 1878 Gerhard tried to make a fresh start, and new Socialist groups were formed in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. But the movement only began to take hold the following year, when Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis (1846–1919) established his journal, Recht voor Allen, and began his long crusade for a strongly ethical, humanitarian, and internationalist version of the Socialist creed. Nieuwenhuis was a pastor and the son of a pastor: he was in charge of a Lutheran church at The Hague, attended mainly by prosperous members of the middle classes, and had become celebrated as a preacher before he became a convert to Socialism. His conversion was due to an ardent desire to improve the condition of the workers, which was very bad in the absence of any effective Trade Union organisation. In 1879 he left the Church, and determined to devote the rest of his life to the Socialist cause. At the outset he was hardly more than a social reformer with a deep belief in human brotherhood and a hatred of every form of oppression; but this made him a strong internationalist and a doughty opponent of war and of militarism in all its forms. Nieuwenhuis was no great thinker; but his nobility of character and romantic idealism made him almost at once the outstanding leader of Dutch Socialism. In 1881 the Socialist groups in the four main towns joined together to form a Social Democratic League — known subsequently as the Socialist League. Nieuwenhuis and the League soon fell foul of the law, both on account of their anti-militarist propaganda and because of the efforts to organise the workers to demand improved conditions. Many of the League's propagandists were gaoled, including Nieuwenhuis himself, who spent some months in prison in 1886 for lèse-majesté. The following year a new franchise law raised the total electorate from 130,000 to 300,000; and this reform, though it left the franchise still narrow and subject to a property qualification, made it possible for Nieuwenhuis to win a seat in Parliament,
largely because of the sympathy aroused by his imprisonment. He sat in Parliament for three years, from 1888 to 1891, when he was defeated. The experience of these years left him a convinced opponent of parliamentarism. Parliament, he felt, was so dominated by reactionary and capitalist interests that nothing worth while could be achieved by attempting to use it for establishing a better society. The workers, he felt, must build up their own organisation and must set to work to achieve their emancipation by direct action in the industrial field. He became in effect a Syndicalist, though the name was not yet in use, and he was usually called an Anarchist even before he had become one in fact. The Socialist Union under his leadership was not at this stage an Anarchist body: it had in its ranks, besides those who agreed with Nieuwenhuis, advocates of parliamentary action, most of whom looked for inspiration to the German Social Democratic Party, and for some years longer the rival groups remained within a common organisation. At this point, in 1891, a big struggle was in progress over a proposed further extension of the franchise. The law of 1887 had left open the question of giving the vote to further groups of persons, subject to educational and other special qualifications; and the Liberal leader, Tak van Poortvliet, had proposed, by a very wide interpretation of the relevant clause in the law, to establish what would almost have amounted to manhood suffrage. The Protestant and Catholic Churches, as well as the Conservatives and a section of the Liberals, were up in arms against this proposal: the Liberals fell from office, and it was dropped; but it was recognised that some further extension would have to be conceded.

The franchise issue brought the differences inside the Socialist League to a head. In 1893, at its Groningen Congress, the League by a majority repudiated parliamentary action, and went over to Anarcho-Syndicalism. At the same time the Trade Unions connected with it set up a central body of their own, the Dutch Labour Secretariat, which continued to follow a broadly Syndicalist line, though it included Unions at variance with this policy. The Groningen decision was followed by the secession of the parliamentarians from the Socialist League. In 1894 a group known as the ‘Twelve Apostles’ set up a Social Democratic Party modelled on the German, with a programme
largely derived from the Erfurt Programme of 1891. The leaders in this move included A. H. Gerhard (1858–1948), son of the older Gerhard; Pieter Jelles Troelstra (1860–1930), who remained at the head of the party until the 1920s; H. H. van Kol (1852–1925), who had recently returned from the Dutch Indies; two actual workers, Willem Hubert Vliegen (1862–1947), who with Troelstra and van Kol became its principal representatives at the Congresses of the Second International; and Henri Polak (1868–1943), the chief organiser, with Jan van Zutphen (b. 1863), of the Diamond Workers’ Union, the strongest and most closely knit of all the Dutch Trade Unions. Another influential figure was Frank van der Goes (1861–1939), the pioneer of Marxist theory in Holland and the exponent of left-wing Social Democratic doctrines to the rising generation of ‘radical’ Socialists. Two years after the formation of the S.D.P., the Liberal van Houten Government adopted a measure of franchise reform which, though it fell short of Tak van Poortvliet’s project, again more than doubled the electorate — from 300,000 to 700,000 — and thus gave the Socialists a chance of winning seats in the industrial areas. The following year, 1897, the Social Democrats won 3 seats, and at the following election, in 1901, their number was raised to 7, in a house of 100 members.

Up to this point, though the Social Democrats were gaining strength, most of the Trade Unions which had any connection with the left remained under the influence of Nieuwenhuis and of the Labour Secretariat. Then came, in 1903, the greatest industrial conflict in Dutch history — in which, for once, the Social Democratic and Syndicalist workers acted together. It began as a railway strike: the immediate outcome was a victory; but the Government turned the tables on the workers by denying the right of the railwaymen to strike, by calling out the soldiers to occupy the railway stations, and by arresting a number of the leaders. The Trade Unions attached to the Labour Secretariat thereupon called for a renewed general strike in support of the railwaymen; but the response was small, and in face of severe government repression the whole movement collapsed. The Labour Secretariat had at this time only about 18,000 members, many Trade Unions having remained outside it. As a sequel to the defeat its member-
ship dropped to 8000 in 1908 and to a mere 3500 in 1910, when it had little support left except among the port workers. Henk Sneevliet, the railwaymen’s left-wing leader, was driven from his position and emigrated to Java, where he became active in the cause of Indonesian revolt against Dutch rule. Meanwhile, in 1905, the Social Democrats had taken the lead in forming a new body, the Dutch Trade Union Federation, which the following year had about 19,000 members and by 1912 had increased to 52,000. Its secretary was Jan Oudegeest (1870–1950), later Secretary of the International Federation of Trade Unions. In opposition to the Socialists, the Protestants had set up a Christian National Trades Federation, which in 1910 had about 6000, and the Catholics had founded a Trades Organisation Bureau, with about 10,000. All these figures are very small. There were a number of Trade Unions which refused to join any of the rival Federations; but a high proportion of the industrial workers remained altogether unorganised. After 1910 the Syndicalists regained some ground; but in 1914 they had only about 9000 members, still mainly at the ports.

The defeat of 1903 reacted very seriously on the Dutch Trade Union movement, and brought the period of Syndicalist ascendancy in it definitely to an end. Thereafter, the main conflict was no longer between Anarcho-Syndicalists and Social Democrats, but between militants and reformists within the Social Democratic Party and between Socialists and the rival Trade Union movements founded on a confessional basis. The Anarcho-Syndicalists, under the leadership of Christian Cornelissen (1864–1942), continued to play an active part in the attempt to build up a Syndicalist International in conjunction with like-minded groups in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and the United States; but in Holland their influence had greatly declined. Cornelissen was a theorist of international repute rather than a practical leader: he contributed to Hubert Lagardelle’s Mouvement socialiste while it was the principal organ for the discussion of Syndicalist doctrines.

In 1908 the Social Democratic Party split. A small left-wing group of revolutionary Marxists, gathered round the journal Tribune, was in revolt against the policy of the Social
Democrats in Parliament, whom it accused of compromising unduly with the Liberals. The Party Congress expelled the Tribune group, which, with other left-wing dissidents, formed in 1909 an Independent Social Democratic Party, headed by David Wijnkoop (1876–1941), who was subsequently the chief figure in Dutch Communism; Herman Gorter (1864–1927), its principal Marxian theorist; Henriette Roland-Holst (1869–1952), one of Holland's great poets and the Dutch translator of William Morris; Henri Polak, and F. M. Wibaut (1859–1936), an expert in finance who led the Socialists in the City Council of Amsterdam. The new party, however, carried with it only a minority. In 1919–20 most, though not all of its members, formed the nucleus of the Dutch Communist Party, of which Wijnkoop became the representative on the Comintern.

With the left wing removed, the main Social Democratic Party moved for a time sharply to the right. The great issue before it was whether it should enter into a coalition with the Liberals in order to oust the right-wing clerical Government from power. This issue had arisen in a practical form in 1905, when it would have been possible for the Liberals to form a Government with Socialist support. The Socialists had been intent on ousting the Anti-Revolutionary (Protestant-Conservative) Government of Dr. Kuyper, which had been responsible in 1903 for defeating the general strike and for passing the law which deprived the railway workers of the right to strike. They had campaigned actively against Dr. Kuyper at the general election, which had resulted in enough Liberal gains to make a bare majority with Socialist backing. The Socialists, however, influenced by the hostility of the Second International to participation in capitalist coalitions, had refused to take advantage of this chance; and after a period of minority Liberal Government a right-wing Government had taken office in 1908, without a clear majority, but with the support of the right-wing Liberals. At the next general election, in 1909, the Social Democrats greatly increased their vote, without winning any additional seats. Then, in 1913, they suddenly rose from 7 seats to 19, and found themselves again in a position to give the Liberals a majority, and of course to pitch their terms for coalition a good deal higher than would have been practicable in 1905.

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This situation led to a sharp cleavage of opinion within the party. The controversy over the church schools was at its height; and there were also keen controversies over proposed labour legislation and over the institution of a general scheme of health insurance and old-age pensions. After heated discussion and by a narrow majority (375 to 320) the Zwolle Party Congress of 1913 rejected coalition as contrary to Socialist principles, despite the advocacy of it by Troelstra, who made it the occasion of his most celebrated speech. It then proved impracticable to form any Government on a party basis, and a non-party Government, headed by a leading independent Liberal, took office. This Government enacted a considerable amount of social legislation, in which Holland had been behind other countries; and in the main the Socialists supported it. When war broke out in 1914 they gave backing to its policy of keeping Holland neutral, and were able to play an important part in keeping the International Socialist Bureau alive and in the efforts of the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee to promote a settlement of the conflict. The Bureau, with the Belgian Camille Huysmans as secretary, was transferred from Belgium to Holland; and in 1917, when it was transferred temporarily to Stockholm for the projected International Socialist Conference that was to call for peace in the name of the working classes of all countries, its delegates to the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee — Troelstra, J. W. Albarda (b. 1877), and H. van Kol, with W. H. Vliegen and F. M. Wibaut as substitutes—proceeded thither to join with the Russians in persuading the Socialists of the belligerent countries to come in.

The Stockholm Conference was destined not to meet, and the war to run its course. When war ended, and the German Revolution broke out, in November 1918, Troelstra in the Dutch Parliament made a speech in which he called on the Government to resign and make way for a Socialist Republic. There was no response: a large part of his own party was against him, and the Government took prompt measures which removed the chance of any outbreak. In truth, there never was a possibility of any revolution in Holland unless there had been successful revolutions already over most of Western Europe. The Dutch Socialist movement, even had it been united, was
not nearly strong enough to make a revolution; and most of its leaders had no wish to make one. Nor was Troelstra better cut out for the part of a revolutionary leader than, say, Ebert or Scheidemann, who had become revolutionaries of a sort against their will. Troelstra had been influenced for the time being by his participation in the Stockholm proceedings and more immediately by events in Germany. His party refused to follow him; and though he remained nominally its leader till his retirement in 1925, he never regained his influence over it.

The two outstanding figures in Dutch Socialism up to 1914 were first Nieuwenhuis and then Troelstra. Edo Fimmen (1881–1942), though active in the Trade Union movement from 1905, became Secretary of the Dutch Federation of Trade Unions only in 1916, and played a prominent part in the Socialist movement only after 1918. Next to Nieuwenhuis and Troelstra, Henriette Roland-Holst and, on the extreme left, David Wijnkoop, the future Communist, and the Syndicalist Christian Cornelissen are the principal figures of international significance. Polak, the diamond-worker, also made some intellectual contribution, but chiefly as translator and interpreter of British Socialism. He translated into Dutch works by Robert Blatchford, by H. N. Brailsford, and by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Henriette Roland-Holst, as we saw, translated William Morris’s *News from Nowhere* and other works and was a notable poet and imaginative writer of wide influence. Her Socialism, like that of Nieuwenhuis, was idealistic, ethical, and strongly internationalist. She wrote in 1905 a notable report on the general strike for the Socialist International, prompted by the easy defeat of the Dutch general strike of 1903. Her argument was that a great strike which inflicted serious inconvenience on the public could hope to succeed only if it met one of two conditions. Either it must have in view a limited objective which commanded wide public support beyond the ranks of the strikers, or it must be the prelude to revolution. Any other kind of general strike was bound to fail because, the better it succeeded at the outset, the greater resistance it would provoke among the middle classes — and indeed among all except the participants. She wrote:

The power of the modern State is superior to that of the working class in all its *material* bases either of a political or an economic character. The fact of political strikes cannot
in any way alter this. The working class can no more win economically, through starvation, than it can win by using powers of the same kind as the State employs—that is, through force. In only one respect is the working class altogether superior to the ruling class—its purpose. . . . [It] can break the physical superiority of the State only by its moral superiority.

The conclusion of her argument was that the general strike could hope to succeed only when the moral consciousness of the working classes had advanced far enough to make it impossible for any force to coerce them into obedience against their will and conscience. This view was, in its essence, at one with that of Nieuwenhuis, who also preached a gospel of ethical regeneration.

Nieuwenhuis wrote extensively, in both Dutch and German. His *My Farewell to the Church* is the best statement of the ethical foundations of his Socialist faith. He published later a *Life of Jesus* and other works of unorthodox democratic theology as well as works on Socialism and anti-militarism, of which the best known is his *The Future Social Democracy*. He moved towards militant Anarcho-Syndicalism largely against his nature and in revolt against what seemed to him the sheer shamness of the parliamentary battle of words and slogans. He was an unquenchable idealist. In the Second International, which he attended from its beginning in 1889, he was prominent in the anti-militarist struggle and as a protagonist of the idea of the general strike against war; and he was also the ardent advocate of an inclusive organisation, open to all tendencies from Anarchism to reformism of every shade. Excluded as an Anarchist from the Second International, he continued to carry the fiery cross of anti-militarism over Europe; and he persisted in this campaign after 1914. Although in Holland he lost most of his following after the general strike of 1903, he kept his immense personal popularity and remained a deeply respected figure, at whose funeral in 1919 opponents and supporters joined hands to do him homage.

Troelstra also is a significant figure, but only on the national plane—as an orator rather than as an original thinker. He, too, came from the middle classes and was converted to Socialism by his desire to better the wretched lot of the poorer classes—in
his case, not the industrial workers, but the rural proletariat of Friesland, where he was brought up. He began his career as a lawyer, and flung up a successful legal career to join Nieuwenhuis’s Socialist League. He then studied Marx and, more particularly, the rising German Social Democratic Party, of which he became a warm admirer. During the Millerand controversy at the Second International, he followed the German line in opposing Socialist participation in capitalist Governments, but joined forces with Jaurès to plead for a practical, gradualist programme of advance towards Socialism. His Marxism was of an unrevolutionary kind, akin to that of Vandervelde in that he regarded Marx, not as a prophet of revolution, but as the source of a method of studying concrete problems that needed continual adaptation as conditions changed. He was strongly ‘political’ in temper, and played the leading part in breaking with Nieuwenhuis and setting up the Dutch Social Democratic Party on the German model. Later, he urged war against the left wing of the party, and was the protagonist in the expulsion of the Tribune group in 1909. His great oratorical powers made him a prominent figure among the leaders of the Second International during the years immediately before 1914; but he cannot be said to have made any distinctive contribution in the realm of thought.

The Dutch, among the parties of the Second International in the advanced countries, had in certain respects the hardest task to face, because they were neither a tiny minority without immediate political influence nor a mass-party that could even appear to be well on the way towards the conquest of political power. They were confronted with a situation which held the working class hopelessly divided: they had to fight against a powerful Protestant, as well as a powerful Catholic, bid for working-class support, and to make their way in a Parliament made up of a number of parties between which religious as much as social issues constituted the dividing lines. With the Trade Union movement split up into warring factions, they lacked the solid foundation needed for building a party such as the German; and in a largely agricultural country their hold was mainly on a few towns which could give them at best only a substantial minority position in Parliament. This state of affairs was, of course, largely the reason for the persistence of
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anti-parliamentary tendencies and for the splintering off of left-wing groups whenever the frustrated parliamentarians showed signs of wishing to break the deadlock by allying themselves more closely with the Liberals. With the religious parties there was never, up to 1914, any possibility of alliance. Christian Socialism, of a latitudinarian variety, had indeed a strong following in the Social Democratic Party as well as among Nieuwenhuis's adherents; but both the Protestant and the Catholic parliamentary parties were vehemently anti-Socialist and conservative, and such progressive tendencies as existed in the confessional Trade Union movements had, up to 1914, little influence on them. The Socialists' choice in Parliament lay between close alliance with the Liberals, who could have been persuaded to take up some useful social reform measures, but certainly not to accept anything savouring of Socialism, and holding aloof in a situation in which abstention was very likely to put power into the hands of the most reactionary groups. What suited them best was the stalemate of 1913, when no coalition of parties could command a majority, and Holland was governed by a non-party coalition on which they could exercise a substantial amount of pressure for improved social legislation. But even this did not bring them nearer Socialism — if Socialism meant anything beyond the Welfare State. They were 'stuck', no less than the Belgians, and with even less prospect of escape.
CHAPTER XVIII

SCANDINAVIA AND FINLAND

I. DENMARK

The Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Denmark, were relatively late-comers to Socialism. In Denmark the record begins with the work of a young doctor, Frederik Dreier (1827-53), who in the late 'forties was chiefly responsible for introducing the Danes to French and German Socialist ideas. Dreier advocated the formation of a Workers' Party. With his premature death the movement largely disappeared, and there was no substantial revival till the 1860s. Many Danish craftsmen, however, spent their 'wander-years' abroad; and some of them brought back Marxist ideas and helped to lay the foundations for the establishment of a Danish Section of the First International.

Between about 1850 and about 1870 there is little to record. The Folk High Schools, which began in the 1840s under the influence of Nikolai Frederik Grundtvig (1783-1872), as far as they had a political character, were nationalist and liberal, but by no means Socialist. The Workers' High Schools associated with the Trade Unions and the Social Democrats started only much later, with the foundation of the Esbjerg High School in 1910. In the 1840s Rasmus Sørensen had conceived the idea of making the Folk High Schools a means of training young peasants and farm labourers as leaders of village opinion and local government; and there were other pioneers during the years before 1848 who had similar ideas. But the man who is generally regarded as the chief practical exponent of Grundtvig's conception — Christen Kold (1816-70) — began work in 1851, during the period of political reaction which followed the defeat of the European Revolution; and, though he stood in a sense for democracy, set out to make his schools above all else places of character-formation under the inspira-
tion of the broad, undogmatic Christianity of which Grundtvig was the great exponent.

In 1849 Denmark had won a Constitution, not democratic, but including a larger element of democracy than existed in most other parts of Western Europe at the time; and this made it suspect to the great powers. It enfranchised male householders, and thus opened the way for the workers and peasants to participate in political affairs. The Upper House remained, however, a preserve of the great landlords. Denmark had fallen foul of the German Assembly by trying to incorporate the Duchies of Slesvig and Holstein, which had been ruled by the King of Denmark under separate titles, into the Danish Kingdom. For the time being the Danish Crown retained the Duchies; but there was continual trouble over their administration, and the unification of the whole Kingdom under a common government proved impracticable. Various expedients were tried; and Danish politicians became divided between those who were prepared to let them have their separate institutions and those who were determined to carry at least into the whole of Slesvig the banner of Danish nationalism. South Slesvig was, then as later, a territory of mixed German and Danish population: one aim of the early High Schools was to convert its Danes to an ardent nationalism. This, of course, stirred up a counter-campaign on the German side; and at length, in the sixties, after defeat by the combined forces of Prussia and Austria, Denmark lost the Duchies, and Prussia, after turning on Austria, acquired them. Bismarck got, in Holstein, the naval outlet he needed to the North Sea. Denmark, which had been promised at the close of its own war that the fate of South Slesvig should be settled by a plebiscite, found the promise worth nothing and the Prussians firmly installed.

These facts are relevant to the subject of this chapter only because they form the background to Danish politics during the ensuing period. Denmark emerged from its defeat with a new Constitution, adopted in 1866, much less democratic than that of 1849. There was a Rigsdag of two Chambers — one elected on a wide franchise — the Folketing — the other almost completely controlled by the wealthy classes — the Landsting; and the two had formally equal powers, but in practice the Landsting, in alliance with the Crown, which

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remained the executive authority, had the upper hand. All the more progressive elements could do constitutionally was to seek a majority in the Folketing; but even when they got it they did not control the Government, which the Crown, allied with the upper chamber, could still nominate from among their opponents. The struggle between the two houses and the forces behind them did not come to a head until the 1870s, when the left parties, including the small Socialist Party, demanded the introduction of responsible parliamentary government, depending on a majority in the lower house. But this concession was not secured, even nominally, until 1901; and thereafter the struggle continued right up to the first world war. From 1864 till after 1914 it affected the entire course of Danish politics.

Moreover, after 1864 the whole political situation was infected by the quarrel between those who were prepared to accept the loss of Slesvig-Holstein as an inescapable fact and those who dreamed of war for the recovery of the lost lands. Nationalism, which had been on the whole a movement of the left, became more and more the hallmark of the right wing, and took shape as a quarrel about military expenditure. The left parties, when they became a majority in the Folketing, refused to vote for the budget because of its high allocation to the armed forces and to works of fortification. The right, acting under the royal authority and backed by the Landsting, put the taxes it wanted into force in defiance of the lower house. This remarkable situation lasted for nearly twenty years, from 1875 to 1894; and it was ended only because a substantial part of what had been regarded as the left broke with the more radical groups mainly on issues of home policy and went over to alliance with the right — so that the process of capturing a majority in the Folketing had to be set about all over again.

These were highly unfavourable conditions for the growth of a Socialist Party as a parliamentary force, and hardly less so for the development of a strong body of Socialist opinion. They were the more unfavourable because Denmark was primarily an agricultural country, with no really big town except Copenhagen, in which a very high proportion of the industrial and commercial workers were concentrated. Copenhagen could, and did, develop a remarkably strong and coherent working-
class movement; but, until much later, it got little backing from the rest of the country.

During the 1860s, within the reduced territory left to Denmark after its defeat, remarkable things began to happen. The Folk High Schools spread fast, and came to be closely linked by personal, though not by formal, ties to the middle party which primarily represented the farmers. This alliance became stronger in subsequent years: the Folk High Schools never attracted any large number of working-class students, or even of farm labourers, and their scholars came much more from the large and middle farmers than from the small-holders. There were, however, many more middle than large farmers, and their number increased relatively as well as absolutely. From the time of Monrad's leasehold enfranchisement law of 1861, passed under a liberal administration before the Constitution was revised, the number of smallish freeholders rose fast, not so much thereafter by direct state action as through the efforts of a private body, Hedeselskabitten — the Heaths Reclamation Society — founded in 1866, which set to work to bring waste lands under cultivation and established a host of additional smallish farms. This process, which was carried further under the Land Allotment Act of 1899, turned most of Denmark into a land of middle and small farmers and of small-holders. At the outset the farmers were mainly corn-growers; but when grain prices slumped in the 1870s they began to turn over to the highly intensive specialised farming for which Denmark has since become famous — to dairying and to the production of bacon chiefly for export.

This did not happen until well after, in Copenhagen, Socialism had had its first fling. Up to 1857 the old system of regulated Guilds had survived: then it was swept away, and by the middle 'sixties Trade Unions were developing among the skilled craftsmen, such as printers, bakers, and workers in the building trades. These pioneer Unions, however, were still under the influence of guild ideas; and new groups of skilled craftsmen formed the basis for a Danish Section of the First International, which was set up in 1871. The main driving force behind it was a young postal worker, Louis Pio, who published in that year two pamphlets, Socialistiske Blade, out of which arose a journal, Socialstjen. It will be remembered that
when, during the strike of the English engineers on the North-East Coast in that year, the employers tried to import blacklegs from Denmark, the I.W.M.A. sent James Cohn, a Dane living in London who was on its General Council, to Copenhagen to prevent their coming. Meanwhile, in Copenhagen itself, a round of strikes was beginning; and in 1872 the Danish I.W.M.A. threw its weight into a big strike of building workers, led by the bricklayers. A mass-demonstration in support of the strikers was broken up by the police; the editors of Socialisten, including Pio, were arrested and gaolwed, with Harald Brix, Poul Geleff, and a number of other leaders; and, the following year, the I.W.M.A. was suppressed by law, and its organisation broken up. A number of the constituent Unions, however, survived; and in 1875 Pio, released from prison, resumed his activities. During the next few years the Danes were not immune from the quarrels that were rending what was left of the International. No Danish delegates, however, appeared at any of the Congresses of the rump International after 1872. There had been one, Pihl, at the Hague that year; but at the Ghent Socialist Unity Congress of 1877 Denmark’s mandate was entrusted to the German, Wilhelm Liebknecht. By that time a new organisation had been formed in Copenhagen, at a joint meeting of Trade Unionists and Socialists held in 1876, with Pio as Chairman; but it collapsed when he emigrated to the United States the following year with Brix and Geleff. In 1878 a new attempt was made, on a different basis, with Social Democrats, rather than Trade Unionists, taking the lead. A Social Democratic Union was formed, without much Trade Union support at first, many of the Unions remaining aloof either under semi-Anarchist leadership or as isolated craftsmen’s societies. The new body took root slowly during the next few years. Then, in 1883, it received a big stimulus from the holding in Copenhagen of a Congress of the German Social Democratic Party, which had to meet abroad because of the Anti-Socialist Laws. The following year the Social Democrats won two seats in the Folketing and began their steady advance as a parliamentary party. Increased Trade Union support was secured as the Trade Unions recovered from the depression of the late seventies.
Their situation was, however, considerably different from that of the Germans. They entered the Folketing to find a United Left coalition, with a majority behind it, engaged in a hot struggle with the Government of the Conservative, Estrup, who was supported by the King and the Upper Chamber; and the natural course was for them to ally themselves with the left parties in the struggle, both against high military expenditure and for constitutional reform. In neither of these contests, however, could they hope to play a leading part; for they had little support as yet in the country areas or in the smaller towns. As for social legislation, they could of course press for it; but it was not yet an issue that divided the right from the left. Old-age pensions in 1891 and voluntary health insurance with state aid in 1892 were enacted under the Estrup Government, which was not unwilling to emulate Bismarck’s social policies, or even to go beyond them, in its search for popular support. Such measures divided the political left as well as the right.

While the Socialists were making their way into Parliament, the Trade Unions were re-forming their forces outside. In 1886 the Copenhagen Trade Unions formed a new Centre, independent of, though allied with, the Social Democratic Party; and thereafter similar Centres were formed in other towns, and in 1898 the Unions, which had been growing into nation-wide organisations, set up a National Trade Union Centre, which soon plunged into a big struggle with the employers. By this time the unity of the left parties had broken down. Estrup had resigned office in 1894, and a coalition of the right with the bigger farmers and the wealthier elements in the towns had replaced him and was trying to rally a majority in the Folketing behind it. In the industrial field the employers had formed a counter-organisation to meet the Trade Union challenge; and in 1899 they met a series of sectional strikes for improved wages and conditions with a great lock-out, in which 43,000 workers were involved. The Government called in a leading progressive industrialist, Ludvig Bramsen, as Minister of the Interior; and Bramsen worked out a plan for arbitration courts to deal with labour disputes. The employers, however, were set on breaking the power of the Trade Unions, and insisted on locking out the workers and trying to enforce the signing of a ‘document’ renouncing the Trade Unions’ claims.
The Trade Unions had been demanding not only recognition of the right to collective bargaining, but also, in some cases, the ‘closed shop’. The employers’ intransigent attitude stirred up so large a body of hostile opinion that they were forced to modify their attitude in face of the prolonged resistance of the workers, who received substantial help from abroad. Under the settlement, known as the ‘September Agreement’, each side agreed to recognise the right of the other to organise; and the employers agreed to collective bargaining, on condition that the Unions should give advance notice of intention to strike and should make full use of the negotiating procedure before doing so. In addition, an Arbitration Court was to be set up; and all cases in which there was any allegation that the agreed procedure was not being observed were to be referred to it for final settlement. It was not, however, given power to arbitrate on the substance of any matter in dispute, but only that of dealing with alleged breaches of agreement.

What this meant in practice was that, though negotiations were to take place separately for each trade, in the background of every dispute was the threat of resort to a general lock-out or to a general strike. The Danish employers had made up their minds that the effective counter to sectional strike action by the Trade Unions, backed by their Central Federation, was a general lock-out which would make it impossible for strikers to be supported out of the earnings of those who remained at work. As we shall see, the Swedish employers imitated the plan a few years later. No doubt it was equally open to the Unions to declare a general strike; but would their resources suffice for it? The employers thought not; and the event showed them to be right. The outcome was not, indeed, lasting industrial peace; but it was a state of affairs in which the employers gained an advantage for the time being. It was, however, also to spur the workers on to greater political activity, and at the same time to impel the Socialist Party into an alliance with the left parties, in the hope of breaking the rule of the right-wing coalition.

At this point we must turn back to consider what had been happening in the Danish countryside, which was always the predominant factor. Co-operation in Denmark began in the 1860s as a consumers’ movement, but fully as much among the rural population as in the towns. Agricultural Co-operation,
in the two forms of marketing societies and processing societies for agricultural produce, came only later, in the 1880s. Co-operative Credit Societies did not develop because the farmers were able to make satisfactory arrangements with the regular banks, as well as to get help from the State in the equipment of new agricultural holdings. From the 1880s onwards Consumers' Co-operation and Agricultural Co-operation developed rapidly side by side. Wholesale Societies linking the local Consumers' Societies were established and supplied farm requisites as well as ordinary consumers' goods; and in 1896 the separate Wholesales of Zealand (formed 1884) and Jutland (formed 1888) joined to form a single Wholesale Society, which became the central co-ordinating agency for the Consumers' movement. The chief inspirer of these developments was Severin Jørgensen (1842–1926), the first leader of the Jutland Society. Meanwhile, the formation of farmers' Co-operatives for handling the new specialised products of Danish agriculture had begun with the establishment of the Co-operative Egg Export Association in 1880. The first Co-operative Creamery was set up in the following year, and the first Co-operative bacon factory by Peter Bojsen (1828–1922) in 1887. By this time Denmark had become mainly a country of small freeholders. Such men as Stiller Anderson and Christian Sonne (1859–1941) played a leading part in the development of Danish Agricultural Co-operation, which was greatly influenced by the educational work done in the Folk High Schools. By the end of the century Denmark was the most strongly organised country in the world as a Co-operative community, not only in agriculture, but equally in the universality of its consumers' movement. This pervasiveness of Co-operation, both as a business movement and as a point of focus for social ideas, could not but have a great influence on the development of politics, though the Co-operative bodies kept out of formal activities in the political field, and even the consumers' movement developed no sort of partnership with the Social Democrats or the Trade Unions. The Co-operatives were dominated in most cases by the more substantial farmers, whom Social Democracy did not attract. The Socialists, however, found an increasing following among the small holders as well as among the rural labourers, and were thus able to become a nation-wide
party and steadily to increase their parliamentary strength.

Danish Socialism, however, produced no outstanding theorist after Frederik Dreier, who died too young for his work to leave a world-wide impression. In the Second International its most prominent leader was P. Knudsen, who became burgomaster of Copenhagen. Other leading figures were the feminist and educationist, Nina Henriette Wendeline Bang (1866–1928), who in 1924, as Minister of Education in Stauning’s Cabinet, was to become the first woman cabinet minister; her husband, Dr. Gustav Bang, who was the principal Danish interpreter of European Socialist ideas and movements, and Thorvald Stauning (1873–1942), originally a cigar-maker and then Chairman of the Cigar Makers’ Union, who entered the Folketing in 1906 and became leader of the Social Democratic Party a few years later. Subsequently, Stauning joined a wartime Coalition Government in 1916, and became Socialist Prime Minister in 1924. But none of these, except perhaps Nina Bang, made any distinctive contribution to Socialist thought. Danish conceptions of party organisation were moulded by economic conditions and especially by the predominance of small-scale farming of very high technical quality. Danish Socialist policy was experimental and severely practical in domestic affairs, and strongly anti-militarist in its international aspect.

After the Trade Union struggle of 1899 the Social Democrats linked up with the left parties in a new attempt to overturn the domination of the right and secure constitutional government based on the predominance of the Folketing over the upper chamber. In 1901 a left party Cabinet, headed by Professor Deuntzer, took office, with Socialist support, and set out on a programme of tax reform. But it was an uneasy alliance, as the bourgeois Left was made up of very mixed elements, some of them strongly hostile to Socialism. Gradually, between 1903 and 1905, relations became more strained; and when, in 1905, a new left Cabinet took office under J. C. Christensen, there was both a break with the Socialists and a split in the ranks of the non-Socialist left. The more advanced section of the left broke away under C. T. Zahle (1866–?) and formed a Radical Party. The Christensen Government, after passing in 1907 an Unemployment Insurance Act which
provided public subsidies in aid of benefits administered by the Trade Unions, collapsed in 1908 as a result of a scandal implicating one of its ministers, Alberti, in frauds connected with the administration of the Agricultural Bank; and Zahle then took office in a short-lived Radical Government, to which the Socialists gave their support.

Before Christensen's fall there had been, in 1908, a second serious clash between the employers and the Trade Unions. Faced with mounting wage demands, the employers' central organisation resorted to the lock-out which it had threatened; and the country was faced with a confrontation of two highly organised and apparently irreconcilable forces. After a considerable struggle the contest was settled by the drawing up of a new agreement amending that of 1899. The two sides agreed to attempt, whenever possible, to settle their affairs by peaceable collective bargaining and, where they failed to agree, always to submit to mediation on the demand of either party before resorting to a strike or lock-out. In 1901 this voluntary agreement was strengthened by the passing of two Acts, one establishing an Arbitration Court empowered to settle finally any dispute arising out of an alleged breach of a collective agreement, and the other establishing the office of Public Mediator in Industrial Disputes. These developments inaugurated a period of peaceful industrial relations. The Trade Unions, which were already strong and grew much stronger during the ensuing period, were able to win substantial concessions: indeed, by 1914 the Danish workers were among the best paid and strongly organised in Europe. The Unions were mainly on a craft basis, with a separate General Union catering for the less skilled, though some of the craft Unions also enrolled less skilled workers. Within the movement there were advocates of Industrial Unionism; but this issue did not come to a head until after 1914.

The Zahle Government fell in 1910; and the Socialists joined with the Radicals in an intensive campaign for constitutional reform. The new Government, headed by the former Folk High School teacher, Klaus Bernsten, represented the centre, and favoured moderate reforms; but the Landsting vetoed its proposals. Then, at the general election of 1913, the Radicals and Socialists together gained a clear majority in the
Folketing. The Landsting still obstructing, the Government obtained its dissolution, and this time gained a small majority in the upper house as well. The King thereupon withdrew his opposition; and the road to constitutional reform was at length clear. In June 1915 the King signed a new Constitution, which came into force three years later. Voting for the two houses was opened to women as well as men, on identical terms. The right to vote was made universal; but the age was fixed at 35 for the upper house, whereas for the Folketing it was to be reduced by stages from 30 to 25. The new Folketing was to be chosen over most of the country by single-member constituencies; but Copenhagen was to form a single constituency, with proportional representation, and a number of additional seats were to be allotted to the parties according to their total voting strength, so as to bring each party up to a number of members corresponding to its vote. The Landsting was also to be chosen by a proportional system, but by indirect voting; and there was a curious provision whereby the retiring Landsting was allowed to nominate a number of members to sit in its successor. The first elections held under the new order gave the Socialists and Radicals together a large majority in the Folketing, with the Socialists as the largest party. In the Landsting the Conservatives and the centre still had a substantial majority.

Denmark was thus, during the early years of the present century, one of the countries in which the question of co-operation between the Socialists and the bourgeois Radicals was posed in a very definite form. Of the parties which made up the left-centre majority in the Folketing, the Reform and Moderate Left Groups, which amalgamated in 1909, represented mainly the farmers, whereas the Radicals, after the split of 1905, were in the main the party of the middle-class intellectuals and townsmen, but had also some support from the smaller farmers. The Socialists, who included a considerable group of intellectuals, had much more in common with the Radicals than with the Reform-Left groups, which were to some extent antagonistic to the claims of the urban workers. From 1898, when a movement of University Extension was started on the model of the British movement, educational activities formed a link between workers and intellectuals, as the Socialists set out to build up
their own educational work as a counterpoise to the influence of the rural Folk High Schools. The Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Union were both busy organising study-circles and evening classes well before they founded their own Folk High School at Esbjærg under J. P. Sundbo in 1910. The Socialists also owed a great deal to their leading journal, *Social-Demokraten*, after Emil Wiinblad became its editor in 1881. Wiinblad was an influential political personality as well as an excellent journalist; and he laid the foundations of the extensive network of newspapers and journals which the Social Democrats established all over the country. This form of propaganda helped particularly in strengthening the Socialist hold over local government. The Radicals, who formed a separate party only from 1905, had a long tradition of struggle for democratic government, derived largely from the lawyer-journalist V. Hörup, who founded the very successful newspaper, *Politiken*, in 1884. To a great extent they provided the driving force for reform in the struggle against Estrup and the King; and they served as a bridge between the farming and the urban working-class interests in the various united fronts of the reform parties until the old order began to break down. When at length the King, in 1901, allowed a ministry of the left to take office, the unity of these allies soon disappeared, and it became clear that the so-called ‘Moderate Left’ — that is, in effect, the party of the larger farmers — were not prepared to push the constitutional question to the point of a sharp struggle with the King and the upper chamber. The Radicals, under Zahle, who had succeeded to Hörup as leader, with Ove Rode as their outstanding personality, then organised themselves as a separate party; and the Socialists had to choose between joining forces with them in a decisive campaign for democratic government and, if they refused to do this, destroying all prospect of early constitutional reform. They did not, like Millerand in France, enter a Coalition Government with Zahle: they preferred to remain outside the Radical ministry and to give it independent support — possibly because the Second International, in the Kautsky resolution, had declared against participation save under highly exceptional conditions. But they gave the Zahle ministry very complete support, which was to be repaid later when the Radicals supported the Social
Democratic Party, by that time the larger of the two, after the war. Indeed, the Radicals went further: Zahle himself became Minister of Justice in Stauning’s Coalition Ministry of 1929.

For this policy of joint action with the bourgeois Left, which went back to the struggles against Estrup in the 1880s and 1890s, the Danish Socialists were often criticised in the Second International, and were sometimes accused of hankering after office. They had, however, very little choice in the matter. The constitutional issue had to be settled; and the Radicals were real Radicals, and prepared to fight. The Socialists stood no chance of gaining a majority unless they could win over a considerable proportion of the smaller farmers as well as the urban workers; and they would have lost all chance of doing this had they stood aloof from the more progressive elements in the Folketing, and thus wrecked the prospects of democratic government. The whole situation in Denmark was quite different from that which existed in Germany or Austria-Hungary because the farmers constituted a powerful body of middle opinion. The reactionary conservative forces, though they managed to keep political power so long, had nothing like the strength of the Austrian or the German reactionaries. Socially, though not politically, Denmark, at least from the 1880s, was a highly democratic country, in which an economic revolution had occurred in the interests not of industrial capitalism but of the independent freeholding farmer using advanced productive techniques and exporting highly priced products to the world markets. No one could regard the Danish farmers — or the Danish small-holders — either as a declining class, or as at all analogous to the backward peasants of most European countries. Countrymen, as well as townsmen, were prosperous, highly educated, and politically conscious; and Danish Socialism had to adapt itself to the climate of a country in which talk about the Social Revolution was most unlikely to make any appeal.

2. Sweden

Sweden, which has often been held up to admiration in recent times as the model country of democratic Socialism as well as of
Consumers' Co-operation, was a late-comer to both these movements. In the days of the First International there was no stirring of any sort of Socialism, though Malmö, in Skåne, is only just across the Sound from Copenhagen, and there was much coming and going between the two. Skåne, indeed, had been, up to the seventeenth century, a Danish province, and retained much of its Danish character. It does so even to-day. When at length a Swedish Labour movement did begin to grow up, it was natural that Skåne, and Malmö in particular, should play a prominent part. What is somewhat surprising is that during the 'sixties and 'seventies there appears to have been no echo of the activities of Louis Pio and the Danish International Working Men's Association in any part of Sweden.

The explanation no doubt lies in the immaturity of Swedish industry. Until the 'seventies industrial development had hardly begun. The old system of regulative guilds, with power to issue credentials to craftsmen who had finished their apprenticeship and presented the required 'master work', lasted on until 1864, though the guilds had lost their monopoly in the 'forties. When they disappeared they left behind them — as in Denmark, where they were dissolved in 1862 — a tradition of craft organisation; and in both countries many of them turned into friendly societies, or were replaced by such societies, especially in the building and metal-working trades. Trade Unions of a more modern type came into being only in the 1880s; and at the same time a Socialist movement began under the influence of the tailor August Palm (1849–1922), who had worked in Germany and Denmark, and returned to Sweden in 1881 imbued with Socialist ideas. Palm soon found a brilliant ally in the young student, Axel Ferdinand Danielsson (1863–99), who helped him to start a Socialist journal, The Social Democrat, and to organise Socialist groups. They were soon joined by an even more notable recruit from Uppsala University, Hjalmar Branting (1860–1925), who after working from 1883 to 1887 on the staff of the Radical newspaper, Tiden, in Stockholm, and editing it from 1885, took over in the latter year the editorship of The Social Democrat, which he continued to edit until 1917 and made before long the principal organ of Socialist opinion. Danielsson, ousted from The Social Democrat, shifted his headquarters to Malmö, where he founded a
new journal, *Arbeitet*, and proceeded to lay about him with
great vigour and eloquence. Danielsson was a very effective
popular orator as well as a journalist of parts; and he was also
a person of considerable courage and pertinacity. He toured
Skåne making speeches and organising Trade Union and
Socialist groups, and in 1888 he produced a draft Socialist
programme which was widely acclaimed. At this period
Danielsson was an opponent of parliamentary action and a
believer in direct action based on class-organisation in the
industrial field. He soon fell foul of the law, and, after several
brushes with the law courts, spent eighteen months in gaol.
He emerged a convert to parliamentary action, and thereafter
played an active and often highly controversial part in the work
of the Social Democratic Party, which Branting had taken the
lead in organising in 1889. Branting himself became a member
of the Riksdag in 1896; and the S.D.P. adopted an official
programme the following year. The party programme of 1897
was based largely, under Branting’s influence, on the Erfurt
Programme of the German Social Democrats; but Danielsson’s
ideas also influenced it, particularly in the large place assigned
in it to the Trade Unions and to industrial action. Danielsson,
however, had become in his maturer years a strong opponent
of the Anarchists, against whom he waged relentless warfare.
He enjoyed immense popularity in southern Sweden, and,
had he lived, might well have rivalled Branting for the leader­
ship of the growing Socialist movement. He was, however,
quarrelsome, and popular more with the workers than with his
fellow-leaders, some of whom were probably not sorry when
death removed his turbulent personality in 1899. He was then
only thirty-six. A year later, another of the leading pioneers
died. This was Fredrik Sterky of Göteborg, whose *New Times*,
founded in 1892, had become a point of focus for the working­
class movement in western Sweden, hardly less important than
Branting’s *Social Democrat* or Danielsson’s *Arbeitet*. Sterky,
in addition to his work as a journalist, had been President of the
Trade Union Federation, which he had played a large part in
building up. Palm lived on, but was not a leader of stature.
The almost unquestioned chieftainship of Swedish Socialism
passed from 1900 onwards into the capable hands of Hjalmar
Branting.
The Social Democratic Party, as we saw, had been formally instituted in 1889 — the year of the inaugural Congress of the Second International. It was represented at Paris — at the Marxist Congress — by two delegates — S. Palmgreen and O. Allard — who also represented a Scandinavian Socialist League with headquarters in Paris, and may have been in reality delegates from the latter rather than from the newly formed Socialist Party. The party, at its inauguration, rested mainly on a Trade Union foundation. In 1889 the Swedish Trade Unions were still mainly local craft groups, which were beginning to join up in local Chambers of Labour, open to all trades, rather than in national Unions. The Stockholm Chamber had been founded as early as 1883. These local Chambers of Labour, without giving up their industrial functions, became the local units of the Social Democratic Party. Each Union belonging to a local Chamber was called upon to affiliate its members en bloc to the party; but after a few years this led to such difficulties that a system of voluntary affiliation, subject to the individual's right to contract out, had to be substituted. Even so, the connection between the affiliated Unions and the party remained very close; but not all Unions joined.

The party, immediately after its establishment, was plunged into a lively struggle between Social Democrats and ‘Anarchists’, as its historians usually say, but more correctly one should say between advocates of parliamentary and of direct action, or between Germanisers and Syndicalists. In 1891, following the lead of the International Socialist Congress, it defeated the so-called Anarchists, and endorsed the primacy of political action by parliamentary means. This, however, could not mean, under the conditions prevailing in Sweden, that it could entertain any hope of becoming a powerful parliamentary party until the constitutional system had been drastically reformed. Unlike the Germans or the French, but like the Belgians and the Austrians, it was confronted with the need to begin by conducting an agitation for parliamentary reform. It was, however, in a relatively weak position for carrying on such a crusade by itself; for Sweden was mainly an agricultural country, and it was evident that the urban workers alone were not nearly strong enough to enforce their will on the reactionaries who dominated the Swedish State.
Economic development was indeed already proceeding fast by 1889. Swedish agriculture had gone through a bad time in the 'seventies and 'eighties, in consequence of the fall in the price of wheat as supplies poured in from the New World. There had been heavy emigration from the country districts, largely to America, but also into the towns. In 1888 the free trade system was abandoned in the interests of the landowners and farmers, who dominated the Riksdag; and within a few years the urban employers had secured protection for industry as well. These changes meant higher costs of living, which gave an impetus to Trade Unionism and also to Co-operation; but their effects were mitigated by great changes in the structure of both agriculture and industry. Swedish farmers, from the 'eighties onwards, went over increasingly from wheat-growing to stock-raising and dairying and to the cultivation of sugar-beet; and there was a great development of forestry, to which a fresh impetus was given by the rapid expansion of the demand for wood-pulp and paper. This latter resulted in the establishment of an important new industry, and at the same time the iron industry of the north grew rapidly under the influence of the expanding German demand for high-grade iron. The country experienced a great accession of wealth, most of which flowed at first into the pockets of the big farmers, the landowners, and the industrial employers, who were able to recruit cheap labour, especially in the north and in the newly opened forest areas.

The Swedish Constitution, up to 1866, had rested on an antiquated system of estates, divided into four chambers, in such a way as to exclude not only the workers, but a large part of the middle classes. In that year it was reformed: a two-chamber Riksdag was set up, with an upper chamber chosen by indirect election on a franchise graded according to property or income, so as to assure its domination by the aristocracy of birth and wealth. The lower chamber was directly elected; but there was a property or income qualification here too, high enough to exclude the great majority of the workers and to throw the control in the rural constituencies — which were the majority — into the farmers' hands.

As in Denmark, the two chambers were given co-equal powers; and politics came to be largely a matter of continual...
struggle between the aristocracy and the farmers, whose Agrarian Party controlled the lower house. The struggle was particularly intense over military service, from which the farmers who owned their farms claimed to be exempt as long as they paid the special land tax levied as a contribution to the cost of defence. The rise of Germany, the European wars of the 1860s, and Russian aggressiveness in Finland had combined to create a strong demand for more and better arms; and other issues were pushed largely into the background while the farmers’ opposition to the Government’s military policy was being gradually worn down. During the 1880s the farmers had been split on the protectionist issue, and two rival Farmers’ Parties had been fighting each other; but when that issue had been settled they reunited and once more presented a solid majority in the lower house. Broadly speaking, they were in favour of electoral reforms, but only if they could be assured of the continued predominance of the rural constituencies, and for the purpose of fighting the aristocratic predominance in the upper house; and they could not combine with urban reformers because their main purpose was to unite large and small farmers against the claims of the towns.

In these circumstances, the fight for electoral reform had to be waged largely outside Parliament, and the protagonists in the struggle on the side of reform were the middle and working classes in the towns and also the workers in the timber industry and a section of the smaller farmers, allied with the wage-workers in the agricultural areas. The Social Democrats and the Radicals were rivals for the allegiance of these groups, but were also necessarily allies in the campaign. In 1893 the Radicals were still the leading element in the reform agitation. In that year the Social Democrats joined forces with them in a movement for the election by manhood suffrage of an unofficial Popular Chamber, which was to focus the demand for reform and mobilise public opinion behind it — rather after the fashion of the Chartist Convention in Great Britain. In this Chamber the Social Democrats had only one-quarter of the seats; but when it met a resolution was passed deciding to take into consideration the declaration of a general strike if the Government refused to grant universal suffrage. The Social Democratic Congress held at Göteborg the following year endorsed
this policy; but no immediate action ensued. In 1896, at the
time of the next Riksdag elections, the same method was
followed. Again the Socialists and Radicals joined forces to
elect an unofficial Popular Chamber; but this time the Radicals
opposed the general strike, and the Chamber narrowly defeated
a proposal to resort to it. This was the year in which Branting
won a seat in the Riksdag.

The dissensions over the general strike brought the Socialist-
Radical joint campaign for electoral reform to a stand; and
during the next few years attention was diverted mainly to
the Trade Union struggle. From 1886 onwards Congresses of
Trade Union delegates from the Scandinavian countries had
been held each alternate year in one or another of them; and
at these gatherings the questions of industrial action and the
general strike had been much discussed. The Congresses,
following the lead given by the Second International, had begun
to recommend the organisation of great May Day demonstra­
tions, especially to demand the eight hours' day; and in Sweden
the local Chambers of Labour had taken up this issue. But up
to 1898 the Swedish Trade Unions had no central organisation
except that of the Social Democratic Party. That year, in
pursuance of a recommendation passed by the Scandinavian
Congress, the Swedish Unions decided to set up a separate
central body, the Lands-Organisationen, usually known as
'L.O.' This was constituted, like the parallel body in Den­
mark, as a centralised federation, designed to make the com­
bined resources of the affiliated Unions available for helping
any one of them which found itself involved in a dispute it
could not successfully carry through alone. In the main, it
was meant to ensure financial aid for strikers or workers locked
out from the earnings of those at work; but in the background
was the idea of the general strike as a final weapon for bringing
the employers to heel. In 1899 L.O. found itself involved in
a series of disputes arising largely out of the refusal of the
employers in northern Sweden to recognise the rights of com­
bination and collective bargaining, which were already fairly
well established in the south. These industrial troubles lasted
on into the following year: then, in 1901, the franchise question
came suddenly again to the front, as a consequence of the
Government's insistence on a large increase in military expendi­
ture and in taxation to pay for it. The second chamber reluctantly accepted these measures, but demanded constitutional reform as a *quid pro quo*: the Conservative Government brought forward a limited Franchise Bill, in which it proposed to give votes to tax-paying males over 25 who had performed their military service and also a second vote to married men and to those over the age of 40.

This brought the Socialists into the field with a demand for universal, equal suffrage. Great demonstrations were organised in the towns; and the Social Democratic Party, supported by the Trade Unions, decided to call a general strike to coincide with the Riksdag’s debate on the Government’s Bill. This was to be only a demonstration strike: there was no intention of continuing it for more than a few days. When the time came there was a large response; but the Government had no intention of giving way to the Socialists’ demands. Its own Bill failed to pass: instead the Riksdag, on the motion of the upper chamber, decided in favour of an enquiry into the whole question. During the next two years, Governments changed rapidly, and a series of further reform proposals were advanced, on lines entirely unacceptable not only to the Socialists, but even to the Liberals, who had formed a new Liberal Party in 1900 and were becoming a considerable parliamentary force. Then, for a time, the whole question was sidetracked by the coming to a head of the long-standing dispute over the constitutional rights of Norway, still combined with Sweden under a common monarch, with autonomous institutions of which the limits had never been either clearly defined or agreed upon between the two countries.

The incidents of the decisive dispute which, in 1905, brought the Union of Sweden and Norway to an end and led to the establishment of an entirely separate Norwegian kingdom do not concern us here, except in their bearings on the Labour movement. The Swedish Socialists and the Trade Unions associated with them gave full support to the Norwegians in their claim to independence, which was finally accepted by the Swedish Crown and Government, after they had threatened a general strike. As soon as the crisis was over, its effects were felt in Swedish domestic politics. A Liberal Government was allowed to take office under Karl Staaff, pledged to introduce manhood
suffrage, in single-member constituencies. Staafl’s Bill passed the lower house, but was rejected by the upper one, which was prepared to accept manhood suffrage only if it were combined with proportional representation in large constituencies. The question whether women too should be given the vote was submitted to the King for his advice. The Liberals thereupon proposed a dissolution of the lower chamber in order to seek the opinion of the electors; but the King refused this, and the Government resigned. The Conservatives came back, and succeeded in carrying through both chambers, but only by a small majority in the lower, a measure establishing proportional representation for both, with manhood suffrage for the lower and a reduced property qualification for voters for the upper chamber. This measure became law in 1907.

Meanwhile, trouble had been blowing up in the industrial field. The Swedish capitalists, partly as a response to the establishment of L.O., had been busily organising their own forces in the industrial and financial field. The leading Swedish financier of the time was Knut Agathon Wallenberg, a member of a powerful family with fingers in many pies. He founded the Swedish Bankers’ Association, which became the principal spokesman of high finance. The big industrial employers also drew together in 1902 in a central organisation, known as S.A.F. — Svenska Arbetsgivere Föreningen — which soon passed under the masterful leadership of Hjalmar von Sydow. Von Sydow was in those days a ruthless opponent of Trade Unionism, and gained for himself the popular name of ‘the Boss’. He, more than anyone else, was responsible for the great struggle of the next few years. S.A.F. was modelled on the Danish body described earlier in this chapter, and had the same purpose — to meet the combined Trade Unions with the threat of a general lock-out if they persisted in their policy of sectional strikes. As we saw, the Trade Unions were organised on a local rather than a national basis, and acted mainly through local bargaining backed up by the local Chambers of Labour, with L.O. standing behind to give support when it was needed. As against this, the employers wanted national bargaining in each trade or industry, with S.A.F. in the background to threaten a general lock-out if any particular Union failed to accept terms the employers regarded as reasonable. The em-
ployers, however, needed time to perfect their organisation for the 'show-down' with L.O. on which S.A.F. had undoubtedly decided. Guerrilla warfare continued for the next two or three years; and then, while the Norwegian crisis was still at its height, a big strike broke out among the metal-workers and was met by a lock-out extending to the entire industry, which lasted from May to October, 1905, and ended in a partial victory for the workers, who secured a minimum wage. The Danish and Norwegian Trade Unions sent money to help the locked-out workers, and some help came from further afield.

The struggle of 1905 stirred S.A.F. to action. The Government introduced into the Riksdag a Bill restricting the right to strike; but it was rejected, after L.O. had threatened a general strike. A Mediation Act, similar to that already in force in Denmark, became law in 1906, but gave no compulsory powers. S.A.F., for its part, decided to strengthen its organisation and to take an aggressive line. It bound all the employers who belonged to it to follow a common policy under its direction. Every employer was to observe the principle of the 'open shop'—that is, was to refuse to employ only Trade Unionists—and no employer was to enter into a collective agreement without submitting it to S.A.F. and securing S.A.F.'s approval. Confronted with this powerful employers' combination, L.O. felt itself bound, in 1906, to sign an agreement with S.A.F. under which each party accepted the right of the other to organise and to bargain collectively, but also by implication accepted the 'open shop', against which the Trade Unions had been putting up a big struggle. This was similar to the agreement that had been made in Denmark, except that there were no provisions for arbitration or state mediation in case of disagreement.

So matters remained for the next few years. In 1907 a severe depression set in, bringing widespread unemployment and a serious loss of power to the Trade Unions. Wages were cut, and industrial relations grew rapidly worse. The Trade Unions attempted resistance: the employers got ready to teach them a lesson. S.A.F. threatened that, unless the Unions called off the strikes that had been declared in a number of trades, it would retort with a general lock-out of all workers
connected with L.O. The Trade Unions, though well aware of the disadvantageous economic conditions, decided to resist and, instead of waiting to be locked out, declared a general strike. There was a large response to the strike call. A special strike newspaper, Svarst (The Answer), was edited by Gerhard Magnusson; and there were great meetings, at which von Sydow and the Wallenbergs were roundly denounced. But S.A.F. stood fast, and had ample resources behind it; and trade was bad.

The Swedish general strike of 1909, unlike the political general strike of 1902, was a real trial of strength between the working class and its opponents. By no means all the Swedish workers belonged to L.O., and by no means all the employers to S.A.F. Outside L.O. were the railwaymen, the printers, and a number of other Unions: S.A.F. was essentially a league of large-scale industrialists. There was a separate organisation of employers, more loosely federated, with its main following in the building trades; and there was also a federation of small masters. Neither of these bodies was a party to the pact by which the big industrialists had bound themselves together: nor was there universal support among their members for S.A.F.'s militant tactics. On the workers' side, a number of Unions had preferred to hold aloof from L.O.'s attempt to build up a centralised movement. But the two big organisations covered enough of the field to make their conflict a very great affair, decisive in its effects on the future course of industrial relations and indeed on the whole future policy of the Swedish Labour movement. As we saw, the strike was launched at an unfavourable moment. The leaders went into it knowing they were likely to be beaten: a good many of them were against going into it, but yielded to the strong feeling among their members against the surrender which S.A.F. was demanding. In view of this feeling, it seemed best to take the initiative instead of waiting to be locked out, largely because, the longer the partial strikes and lock-outs already in existence went on before the final trial of strength came, the less money would the Unions have left when it did come, and the more tired the workers already out of employment would be. At any rate, there was no doubt about the determination of the local militants to make a fight of it; and so the general strike was called.

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As a general strike it lasted a month. Funds were collected once more from abroad, as well as at home. The Danes and Norwegians helped on a large scale; and many other foreign movements sent contributions. The employers tried to bring in blacklegs from Great Britain, especially for work at the ports; and there was considerable resentment at the failure of the British Unions to give financial help to the Swedes. This found expression at the ensuing International Socialist Congress, at which the British Trade Union delegates had rather a bad reception. At the end of a month funds were running out; and L.O. was forced to order back to work those groups which had struck in sympathy with those directly involved. The strike continued on a reduced scale for some time longer; but there was no avoiding defeat. The big industrialists had shown that, unhampered by the small fry on their own side, they could beat the Trade Unions at their own game. If it came to a trial of endurance between two great organisations of Capital and Labour, Capital could last the longer, especially when trade was bad, and always provided that the strike was simply a strike and did not turn into a revolution.

In Sweden, in 1909, with the new Constitution just coming into force, there was no question of the strike turning it into a revolution. There were revolutionaries in the Trade Union ranks; and when the struggle was over they seceded from L.O. and founded, in 1910, a separate Syndicalist Union, which built up a following mainly among the forestry workers, but was never strong enough to count for much elsewhere. The main effect of the defeat was to send many thousands of workers out of the Trade Unions and also seriously to reduce the numerical strength of the Social Democratic Party, which rested mainly on Trade Union affiliations. It fell from 112,000 in 1905 to 55,000 in 1910. Well before 1909, the old system of local Unions co-ordinated mainly by the local Chambers of Labour had been in most cases replaced by one of national Unions bargaining nationally with the employers' organisations. In 1907 there were 45 such Unions, with 230,000 members, and of these 28, with 186,000 members, belonged to L.O. After the strike total membership shrank to 114,000, and L.O.'s to 80,000. Thereafter, the Unions gradually recovered strength, to a total of 158,000 in 1915, when L.O. had 111,000. Then,
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during the war years membership grew fast, and by 1919 the Unions were stronger than ever before. But for some years immediately after 1909, despite a great improvement in trade, they could do little. They were not, however, broken; and the employers, having shown their strength, preferred to continue national bargaining to attempting to destroy them at the probable cost of driving the workers over to support of the rival Syndicalist Union.

There was one serious incident during the strike, at Malmö in Skåne, where a small group of young Syndicalists attempted to dynamite a vessel that was being used to house blacklegs who had been introduced at the port. The plot was discovered, and the leaders were caught and sentenced to death, but reprieved. The Socialists and L.O. of course repudiated them; and there were no similar incidents elsewhere. Much use, however, was made of the incident in an endeavour to discredit both the Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party.

In 1911 came the first general election under the new Constitution; and the Social Democratic Party, despite its fall in membership, doubled its representation in the lower chamber, securing the election of 64 Socialists as against 101 Liberals and 65 members of the right-wing parties. The Liberal leader, Staaff, came back to office, and held it till 1914. During these years the Liberals enacted some useful measures of social legislation, including old-age pensions (in 1913); but they became involved in a bitter struggle over the question of armaments, on which they had given a pledge of economy. The Right conducted an active campaign for increased military and naval expenditure; and, when the Government refused the funds, patriotic societies were formed to raise voluntary subscriptions for increasing the navy and for conducting propaganda. In the election of February 1914 the Liberals lost heavily to the Right; but the Social Democrats more than maintained their position, winning 73 seats against 71 for the Liberals and 86 for the Right parties. A new ministry dominated by the big employers took office, with Knut Wallenberg and Oscar von Sydow—not the S.A.F. leader, but the promoter of the Unemployment Commission 1—in the Cabinet;

1 This Commission, which controlled relief to the unemployed, was used in the 1920s as an instrument for reducing wages.
and this Government, on the outbreak of war, maintained Sweden's neutrality in face of a sharp division of sympathies in the country — the Right on the whole favouring the Germans, and the Left the Allies, but with cross-currents due to the strength of anti-Russian feeling. There was, however, despite these differences, an almost general feeling in favour of neutrality. The Social Democrats, who had opposed increased military expenditure throughout the pre-war years, were strongly neutralist. In 1917, when a new, mainly Liberal, Government came to office, Branting joined the Cabinet with the party's support. Just before this a section had broken away, and had formed a left-wing Independent Socialist Party; but the story of this split and its after-effects must be reserved for the next volume of this work.

After the serious setback of 1909 the Social Democrats had gone energetically to work to improve their organisation. The left-wing tendencies which had been stirring in the party up to the general strike lost ground; and the reduced party turned towards education as a means of rebuilding its strength. The main story of the now powerful Swedish Workers' Educational Association (A.B.F.) belongs to the period after the first war; but the foundations were laid before 1914, in close partnership between the Social Democratic Party, the Trade Unions, and the Co-operative Movement.

So far I have said nothing of Swedish Co-operation, which came late into the field and began to be an important social force only after 1900. The foundations of Swedish Co-operation were laid largely by G. H. von Koch, who had made a thorough study of the English and Scottish movements, and came back full of enthusiasm for the Rochdale system. Von Koch took the initiative in creating a central organisation for the whole consumers' movement, and became the first Secretary of K.F. — Kooperativa Förbundet — on its establishment in 1899. Thereafter, the movement came under the masterful leadership of Albin Johansson (b. 1888), who began his Co-operative career as a shop assistant in 1903, but did not become a director of K.F. until 1917. In the early days, after von Koch, the most influential figure was Martin Sundell (1879–1910), reinforced from 1910 by Anders Örne (b. 1881), who was editor of Kooperatören until he was succeeded by Axel Gjöres in 1920.
Another important leader was K. Eriksson (b. 1878), who became a director of K.F. in 1911 and played a large part in the development of Co-operative insurance. Swedish Co-operation became strong earliest in Skåne, under Danish influence: it then spread to central Sweden, and there took on, under Johansson, its special character of a struggle on behalf of the consumers against capitalist monopoly. Its central organisation, Kooperativa Förbundet, from the outset combined the functions which in Great Britain are shared between the Co-operative Wholesale Societies as trading and manufacturing agencies and the Co-operative Union as responsible for propaganda, education, and general co-ordination. K.F. expanded steadily, keeping aloof from politics and seeking to build up support in the countryside as well as in the towns, and among the farmers and the middle classes as well as among the industrial workers. In Stockholm one of the main consumers’ societies, Swedish Homes, was started in 1905 quite apart from K.F. as a Women’s Society under middle-class auspices, but subsequently amalgamated with the Stockholm Society associated with K.F. In 1908 the Co-operative Insurance Society began operations; and in 1909 K.F. launched its first big anti-monopolist campaign against the cartel which dominated the manufacture of margarine. The cartel broke up in 1911. K.F. reached a membership of 100,000 in 1913: by 1917 it had doubled its strength.

Meanwhile, the Swedish farmers had been organising separately — quite apart from K.F. — in a National Farmers’ Union which had developed its own banks and had started its own shipping services for the export of agricultural products. But this body, expanding beyond its strength, got into financial difficulties during the war years and collapsed. Johansson, in 1916–17, made his mark in connection with the affairs of the Stockholm Co-operative Society, which he completely reorganised. He then became a director of K.F., and drastically overhauled it too. He was already preparing for decisive battle with the Flour Millers’ Cartel, which had been formed in 1914; but that struggle did not come to a head until after the war. The famous Three Crowns Mill, which is a landmark across the water from Stockholm, was not bought by K.F. until 1922. In the meantime Johansson and K.F. helped some of
the farmers’ Co-operatives to reorganise, and negotiated mutual purchasing agreements between them and the Consumers’ movement. Johansson was also laying his plans with the Danes and Norwegians for the joint Wholesale Society — Nordisk Andelsforbund — which started under the management of the Dane, Frederik Nielsen, in July 1918. The further big battles against the monopolies came later, mainly in the 1920s. The other outstanding development of Swedish Co-operation — in the field of housing — began during the war, when the Trade Unions played a large part in starting the Stockholm Co-operative Housing Society in 1916. This was followed in 1923 by the establishment of H.S.B. — the Co-operative Housing Society, with Sven Wallander as its inspirer. This housing movement is entirely independent of K.F., and is independently affiliated to the International Co-operative Alliance.

The peculiar character of Swedish Co-operation became fully apparent only after 1918; but the leaders of K.F. had already stamped it firmly with their mark at the time of the battle with the margarine cartel in 1911. The attitude of the Swedish Co-operators was that which J. T. W. Mitchell had sought, in the name of the ‘Rochdale Principles’, to impose at an earlier stage on the British movement. They insisted that the Consumers’ Co-operatives should stick wholly to their job of defending the consumers against exploitation, should be run on strictly business lines, and should not allow themselves to be diverted into any idealistic practices that would hamper business success. Needing the farmers’ support, they were prepared to help Producers’ Co-operatives and to enter into bargains with them on a strictly commercial basis for buying their products. But they insisted on keeping K.F. as an exclusively consumers’ organisation; and they opposed all attempts to involve it in politics or in any formal alliance with the Trade Unions. Johansson in particular was a devout believer in voluntary membership and democratic control by the consumer membership. But he also thought of K.F. as the protagonist of the whole body of consumers, and not of its members alone. In his series of price-wars against the monopolists he expressed himself as most satisfied, not in capturing trade from them for the Co-operative Movement, but in forcing
them to bring their prices down. In this cause he was quite prepared to sell Co-operative products to private traders, as well as through Co-operative stores. He had many contests with those who wished to build up, on the Belgian model, a triple alliance of Socialists, Trade Unionists and Co-operators to wage a common struggle. He did not believe in Socialism or in giving Co-operation a class basis; he held it firmly to what he conceived of as its one exclusive task. Of course, the Co-operative Societies were largely made up of Trade Unionists and Socialists, many of whom were prominent in their affairs. But nationally they developed a leadership quite separate from that of either the Trade Unions or the Social Democratic Party; and the Farmers’ movement also developed in complete independence of the consumers’ movement organised in K.F.

The Social Democrats, under Branting’s leadership, were from 1909 onwards essentially a moderate party, though they had their left wing till it broke away just before the Russian Revolution. After 1909 the organic links between the Trade Union Centre and the Social Democratic Party became less close. L.O. declared its ‘moral solidarity’ with the S.D.P., but the two bodies became organically separate, though they built up an active collaboration, through the Workers’ Educational Association, in the educational field. The Liberals, when they came to power, invited the Socialists to form a Coalition Government; but the invitation was refused. Nevertheless, the Socialists for the most part supported them in the Riksdag. Apart from Branting their principal leaders included F. W. Thorsson, Värner Ryden, C. G. T. Wickman, who was secretary of the party from 1901, and A. C. Lindblad, and, on the Trade Union side, Charles Lindley (b. 1865), of the Transport Workers, Herman Lindquist, President of L.O. from 1900, E. Blomberg (d. 1911) of the Metal Workers, and Nils Persson of the Stonemasons. The future leader and Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson (1885–1946), of Malmö, was coming to the front in the years before 1914 as editor of Fram (Forward), the organ of the Social Democratic Youth. Trade Unionists were numerous in the ranks of the party in the Riksdag, and dominated its organisation in the country even after the formal separation at the centre. The Swedes, up to 1914, had not played, except for Branting, an outstanding rôle in the Inter-
national Socialist movement: they were to find new functions thrust upon them in wartime because of Sweden’s position as a neutral State. Stockholm was to win world celebrity as the appointed centre for the great projected Socialist Conference of 1917. But, even then, Swedish Socialism was still far from having acquired the status as an exponent of moderate Social Democracy which it won for itself in the period between the wars.

3. Norway

Up to 1905 Norway was attached to Sweden under a common monarch, but was entirely self-governing in its internal affairs. This did not prevent continual friction with Sweden and with the Swedish Government. Indeed, the Norwegian struggle for democracy came to be closely linked up with the struggle for national independence. The Norwegian upper classes supported the union with Sweden largely because they looked to the King and his aristocratic Ministers to back them in resisting democratic pressure; while the Left saw the best hope for democracy, some in cutting the Swedish connection altogether and others in restricting the King’s power to lay down a common policy within the narrowest possible limits. In social structure Norway, throughout the nineteenth century, was in comparison with the other parts of Europe a highly democratic country, mainly of peasant farmers, fishermen, and seamen, with very little industrial development till near the end. This soil, favourable to the growth of democratic nationalism, was unfavourable to Socialist, as distinct from Radical, ideas, precisely because it was favourable to a kind of Radicalism in which some socialistic ideas — for example, the demand for social legislation — could find a place. In 1848 Markus Thrane (1817–90) founded Workmen’s Associations among rural as well as urban workers. He demanded universal suffrage and laws for the protection of workers and peasants. But in 1851 he and his principal followers were arrested and imprisoned, and amid the general reaction of the ’fifties his movement was snuffed out. Thrane himself emigrated to the United States in 1863. He settled in Chicago and there took an active part in the First International.

The year before these arrests Johan Sverdrup (1816–92),
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who for the next generation was to dominate Norway's political life, was elected to the Storting. Sverdrup, a lawyer by training, became the unquestioned leader of a Radical Party of his own creation, which drew its main support from the small farmers but had also a considerable following among the town workers and middle classes. He was a Radical nationalist, much influenced in his thought by Francis Lieber (1800–1872), the German settled in the United States who made himself the exponent of national sovereignty against federalist conceptions as well as against foreign rule. Lieber's doctrines—he was a professor at Columbia University— influenced American thinking during the Civil War; and they provided the blend of nationalism and popular government which was just what the Norwegians wanted. Sverdrup was able to rally behind him in the struggle for Norwegian independence and parliamentary government the main body of literary, as well as of popular, opinion. Norway had already a tradition of literary support for democratic ideas, coming down from the republican poet, Henrik Wergeland. Wergeland had co-operated actively with Ohle Ueland, the peasant leader of the 1830s, who sat in the Storting until 1869. Sverdrup, in his turn, had the full support of an outstanding literary figure of the next generation, Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832–1910), whose stories of peasant life had begun to appear in the late 'fifties. Sverdrup's battle for an extended franchise and for fully democratic, responsible government did not effectively begin until the late 'sixties, and only in 1884 was the King compelled to make him Prime Minister; but from 1850 he had been actively agitating for national independence and on behalf of the small farmers.

In face of Sverdrup's ascendancy there was only a faint echo in Norway of the activities of the First International in Denmark. What Socialist tendencies there were developed inside the Radical Party. In the 'eighties, however, this party began to break up. Out of small Socialist groups started in 1885 there arose two years later an embryonic Social Democratic Party, at first purely as a propagandist body. Trade Unionism was also developing in a small way, and in 1889 a Central Socialist and Trade Union Federation was set up, based largely on local Chambers of Labour formed on the same lines as those in Sweden. The same year, Sverdrup's Radical
Party split into two groups — one Liberal and favourable to *laissez-faire*, the other Radical, both politically and in its demands for social legislation. Rapid economic development in Norway was just beginning, with the expansion of the timber industries and the mercantile marine; and this tended on the one hand to bring into existence a middle party favourable to capitalist enterprise and on the other to foster the growth of Trade Unions and of Socialist ideas. A good deal of social legislation was passed in the 1890s, under Radical influence. The Socialists put up their first candidate for the Storthing in 1894, but did badly, as most of the workers were still without votes. In 1898, however, the Storthing established manhood suffrage, defeating an amendment to extend the right to women; and in 1903 the Socialists were able to elect four members. Meanwhile, in 1899, the Trade Unions, which had been developing rapidly, set up a separate Centre, and the Unions, hitherto mainly local, began to link up into national federations, based on industry rather than craft. These national industrial Unions gradually ousted the Chambers of Labour from the control of economic action. The Socialists reorganised themselves as a Labour Party, still closely linked to the Trade Unions through the local Chambers.

In 1905 the national struggle for independence came to a head. The Storthing declared its complete independence of Sweden and of the Swedish King, and the Swedish Government sent several patrols into Norway. There was, however, no real prospect of the King being able to keep his power over the Norwegian people even if he defeated them in battle; and almost at once he halted his patrols and agreed to negotiate. The outcome was his abdication from the throne of Norway, which became entirely independent, and had to decide its future mode of government. The result of a popular vote was strongly in favour of choosing a new King, and against a Republic. The system of single-chamber government, which had existed since 1814, was retained; and the new King was given only narrowly limited powers. As we have seen, at the height of the struggle the Swedish Trade Unions, in close consultation with those of Norway, threatened a general strike if the King and the Swedish Government refused to give way; but they were not called upon to act. At the general election of
1906, following the establishment of Norway's full independence, the Labour Party won 10 seats. Three years later it added 1 more, after a measure of women's suffrage, subject to a property qualification, had been enacted in 1907.

At this point a sharp controversy had arisen, with Radicals and Socialists on one side and Liberals and Conservatives on the other, over the question of concessions to foreign capitalists for the economic development of Norway — especially of its timber resources. The right-wing parties opposed, and the left advocated, laws to prevent the alienation of national resources to foreign concessionnaires, and in 1907 such laws were enacted, only to be modified a little later when the Right returned to power. Meanwhile, in 1907–8, there had been a definite split between Liberals and Radicals, and a new Radical Party had been established. At the general election of 1912 there was a landslide to the left: the Labour Party doubled its representation, winning 23 seats. The following year the new Storthing established equal suffrage for men and women, removing the property qualification.

Then came the war, with Norway staying neutral — for, despite the sympathy of most of its people with the Allies, neutrality was clearly the best policy. This involved a drawing closer together of the Scandinavian countries for mutual protection. In Norway especially it meant also a great shortage of necessary supplies and, before long, a considerable incursion of the State into the economic field in order to ensure them. Prices rose sharply and caused widespread discontent; and in 1916 there was a great outburst of strikes, involving transport workers, miners, and industrial workers. The non-Labour Parties thereupon joined hands and passed an Act introducing compulsory arbitration, which remained in force, despite Labour protests, until 1923 (and was re-enacted in 1927). The industrial struggle and the action taken by the Storthing caused the Labour Party to move sharply leftwards. When the Russian Revolution broke out this tendency was accentuated, and in 1919 the Norwegian Labour Party threw in its lot with the Third International. This led to a split: the right wing broke away and set up a Social Democratic Party. Towards the end of the following year there was a railway strike, which was vigorously repressed by the Government. The railways were
publicly owned, and the strike constituted a double offence in its eyes, as being both a violation of the Arbitration Act and directed against the State. The railwaymen were defeated: a few months later the Trade Unions called a general strike, which was no more successful. Two years later, in 1923, the Labour Party quarrelled with the Third International and seceded from it. A section of the left broke away and founded the Norwegian Communist Party. Till 1927 there were three rival Socialist Parties in the field. Then the Labour Party and the Social Democrats amalgamated, leaving the Communists outside; and the amalgamated party won 59 seats in the Storting and formed a minority Government, which fell almost at once.

I have carried the account on to this point because it was difficult to break it off sooner. Up to 1914 the Labour Party, though it had been growing steadily and had received in 1912 a great accession of strength, had not been able to make any particular mark, and had been playing for the most part second fiddle to the Radicals. The Trade Unions, however, had been growing fast, and had been very successful in raising wages and improving conditions, mainly because of the exceedingly rapid advance of capitalist investment and the favourable situation of the trade in timber and timber products. Norway was still essentially an agricultural country; but it had a large mercantile marine and much of its industry was situated in rural areas. There was accordingly much less difficulty than in most countries in building up Trade Unions and winning support for Socialism outside the main towns — which were all ports and, with the exception of Christiania (now Oslo), all fairly small. There was much less conflict between town and country than in most places; the main conflict was between wealthier and poorer groups, with countrymen and townsmen in both camps. Norway, up to 1914, had made no very distinctive contribution to Socialist thought largely because it had so lively a democratic tradition that it was able to get along without developing a significant Socialist movement until the great influx of capital in the pre-war years had created a new set of problems.

Among the principal makers of the Norwegian working-class movement pride of place must be given to Christian Holtermann Knudsen (1845–1929). Born in Bergen, Knudsen
settled in Christiania as a compositor, and in 1876 became President of the Typographical Union, and in 1883 Chairman of the Central Trade Union organisation. In 1884 he started a journal, Our Work, and established his own printing office to produce it. The following year he was a founder, and first Chairman, of the Social Democratic Association, out of which the Labour Party developed. His paper changed its name to The Social Democrat, and later became the official organ of the party. Knudsen was elected to the Oslo City Council in 1898, and to Parliament in 1906. He became leader of the Labour Party and held this position till 1918, when he was ousted by the more radical section which gained the majority. He refused, however, to break away from the party with the right-wing Social Democrats, and did his best to prevent the split. In the debates of the Second International Knudsen was the leading representative of the Norwegian movement.

Closely associated with Knudsen from the 1880s was Carl Jeppesen (1858–1930), born in Denmark and apprenticed to cigar-making, but in adult life a brushmaker. Jeppesen settled in Christiania in 1878 and joined forces with Knudsen to found the Social Democratic Association. In 1887 he became editor of The Social Democrat, and in 1898 was elected with Knudsen to the City Council. In 1892 he gave up his editorship to start a tobacco shop; but in 1906 he returned to the paper, and again edited it until 1912, when he resigned on a difference of policy over temperance legislation. Jeppesen was Chairman of the Labour Party for five years during the 1890s. In the split of 1918 he sided with the defeated right wing, and thereafter joined the seceding Social Democratic group.

Before long Knudsen gained an important recruit in the Radical physician, Elias Gottlieb Oscar Egide Nissen (1843–1911). Nissen saw service as a doctor first in the Danish-German and then in the Franco-German War. He then settled in Oslo as a gynaecologist, and took up the causes of total abstinence and health reform. He was Chairman of the Total Abstinence Society from 1879 to 1887, edited its journal, and had much to do with making the question a leading political issue. In the late 'eighties he joined the Socialists, and from 1894–8 he edited The Social Democrat. Another recruit to Labour from the Radicals was the pastor Alfred Eriksen.
(1864–1934) who in 1902 started the journal, *Nordlys* (Northern Light), and was elected to Parliament the following year, and re-elected at two subsequent elections. Eriksen, however, presently quarrelled with the party, and in 1910 failed to secure renomination. In 1912 he was expelled from the Labour Party, and in his last years became a Conservative in politics, though he continued to hold advanced cultural and social opinions. In the 1890s and 1900s he was a powerful ethical force on the side of the working-class movement because of his eloquence as preacher and writer; but he was a social reformer rather than a Socialist.

Yet another leading figure was Olav Kringen (1867–1951). Beginning as an agricultural and forestry worker, Kringen went to the United States in 1887. He was there trained as a teacher and after teaching for some years turned to Labour journalism. He came under the influence of British Socialism and contributed to Keir Hardie's *Labour Leader*. Going back to Norway in 1897, he edited *The Social Democrat* for the next two years, and again for some years after an interval. He took an active part in the Second International, and was for some time a member of the International Socialist Bureau. In the Norwegian Labour Party he belonged to the right wing, and when the split came after the war he joined the Social Democratic group. Kringen wrote much—pamphlets as well as journals, and was, with Knudsen, the best-known Norwegian at the Congresses of the International.

On the Trade Union side, after Knudsen, the leading personality was Ole Olsen Lian (1868–1925). A sailor in adolescence, Lian became a printer and a Social Democrat. From 1907 he was President of the Trade Union Centre. Though a moderate Social Democrat, he fought hard against a split when the left wing captured a majority in the Labour Party and persuaded the Trade Unions to continue their co-operation with the party even when it joined the Third International. He remained President of the Trade Union Centre till his death. His leading colleague in the Centre was Ingvald Marius Ormestad (b. 1874), who in 1911 became manager of the Oslo Board of Sickness Insurance, and was the Labour Party's outstanding expert on matters of social legislation.
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By 1914 a new leader, Martin Tranmael (b. 1879), was rising to prominence. Tranmael was at first a printer in Norway; but in 1900 he emigrated to the United States. Returning in 1905, he became an active Labour journalist, editing Ny Tid (New Time) from 1912 to 1918. Tranmael stood from the first well on the left of the Socialist and Trade Union movements; and in 1918 he was the principal leader of the victorious left wing which carried the Labour Party into the Third International. In that year he became the party's secretary. From 1921 he edited *The Social Democrat* and its successor, *The Labour Journal*. An eloquent orator as well as an effective, hard-hitting journalist, Tranmael won a high respect among his opponents as well as among his followers and colleagues.

None of these leaders played any great part in the development of Socialist thought, which was for the most part derivative, at any rate up to 1914, and took on a distinctive character only during the years following the Russian Revolution.

4. FINLAND

Finland, up to 1917, was part of the Russian Empire. Until the twentieth century it had little industry, and was mainly a peasant country, with great timber resources that were only beginning to be exploited. From the 1880s, however, it began to develop specialised agriculture for export, especially dairying; and after 1900 its lumbering and timber industries were rapidly exploited. These changes resulted in a shift of trade towards Western Europe and in the growth both of an extensive Co-operative movement and of an industrial working-class. Rural Co-operative Societies began to spread in the 1880s, and by 1900 both Consumers' and Agricultural Co-operation had made great progress. A central organisation of Farmers' Co-operatives was established in 1899, and at about this time Professor Hannes Gebhard conducted an energetic campaign for Co-operative development. In 1903 the Consumers' Societies, mainly rural, set up a Co-operative Wholesale Society (S.O.K.) on a basis of political neutrality. The rival Progressive Wholesale Society, based mainly on the urban Co-operatives, did not come into being till Finland's independence was established in 1917.
Up to 1917 the Finns were engaged in a struggle for independence. Finland had been annexed by Russia from Sweden, in 1808, as a self-governing duchy with its own institutions and the Czar as Duke. Russia took over from the days of Sweden’s sovereignty a four-class Diet, which excluded the workers from the franchise; and this antiquated instrument remained in existence until 1905. For long periods, however, it was not summoned, and Finland was governed by a Russian-appointed Senate under a Russian Governor. Russian policy alternated between allowing a wide freedom to Finland to live under its own institutions and to use its own language and attempts at forcible russification; and there were repeated tussles over the terms on which the Finns were to be exempted from conscript service outside Finland in the Czarist army.

Except in the Co-operative field there was no working-class movement in Finland till nearly the end of the nineteenth century. In 1894, on the accession of Nicolas II, a renewed movement of russification set in. About the same time, a group of Finnish Socialists started a journal, Tyomies (The Worker), out of which a local Labour Party at Helsinki emerged three years later. The following year (1899), at a Conference held at Åbo, a Labour Party was set up, based mainly on Trade Union groups. The manifesto which it issued, largely derived from the German Erfurt Programme of 1891, was immediately confiscated. The same year the Czarist Government, in what was known as the ‘February Manifesto’, virtually abrogated the Finnish Constitution, and an intensified process of russification began. The Russian Governor, Bobrikov, was endowed with dictatorial powers; and the Government set to work to suppress the use of the Finnish language and to destroy the national movement, which went underground. The following year the young nationalist, Eugen Schaumans, killed the Russian Governor and shot himself; and the deed was widely acclaimed. Then came the sequence of Russian defeats in the Far East and the uprisings all over the Russian Empire which almost overthrew Czarist rule. The Finns took advantage of the troubles of Czarism to assert their demand for national independence. In October 1905 they launched a general strike which paralysed the country: it was not so much a workers’ movement as a general withdrawal of co-operation by all classes.
except those directly dependent on Czarist support. The Russian Government, with enough on its hands in combating revolutionary movements in Russia itself, gave way, after the Finns had defied its authority and set up what was in effect a rival Government of their own. Even the four-class Diet was drawn into the national rebellion, and demanded drastic constitutional changes. In November 1905, at the height of the trouble in Russia, the Czar promised to allow the Finns full freedom to govern themselves as they saw fit. A Diet elected under the old system was induced by the intensity of national feeling to adopt a new Constitution, establishing single-chamber government on a basis of universal suffrage extending to women as well as men at the age of 24. While the acceptance of this Constitution still hung in the balance, the Finns threatened a further general strike; and in June 1906 the Czar again gave way and allowed it to come into force. At the ensuing election, held under a system of proportional representation, the Socialists, who had hardly existed till then as a political force, won 80 seats out of 200 in the new Diet — including 9 women who, with 10 belonging to other parties, were the first to be elected as members of any Parliament. The Diet proceeded at once to enact a large volume of highly progressive social legislation; but practically none of it came into force. By this time the Czarist Government was getting the upper hand of the Revolution, and Stolypin's repressive policy was taking shape. The Finnish Diet found itself plunged into a renewed struggle with the Duma, as well as with the Czarist Ministry; for the later Dumas were no less hostile than the Czarist Government to Finnish nationalism. In 1909 and again in 1910 the Finnish Diet was dissolved by the Czar's ukase and the country governed by laws imposed by the Duma without Finnish consent. The working-class organisations which had come into the open during the Revolution were suppressed, and their leaders imprisoned or exiled. But the national resistance was never broken. In 1910 the Duma, by the Imperial Legislation Act, practically abrogated the legislative authority of the Finnish Diet, and tried to govern by imposing Russian laws. Finnish officials met this attempt with mass-resignations, which disorganised the administrative machine. The struggle was still in progress when war broke out in 1914; and it then took on a
fresh intensity when the Russian Government attempted to enforce military service outside Finland on the Finnish conscripts. The attempt failed; and the Finns, under the stress of war conditions, were able to maintain a certain amount of autonomy — including an exemption from control by the Russian police which enabled many threatened persons to find refuge in Finnish territory, as Lenin was to do in 1917 between the first and second Revolutions. The Kerensky Government made some effort to coerce the Finns: the Bolsheviks, immediately on their seizure of power, declared the independence of Finland, which thereupon proclaimed a Socialist Republic. Then came civil war and, as an immediate sequel, the occupation of Finland by German forces early in 1918. The Socialists were proscribed: a rump Diet from which they were excluded repealed the social legislation which had been rapidly enacted the previous year. Then the war ended in Germany’s defeat, and the Germans were expelled from the country. The new Diet elected in 1919 again contained 80 Socialists in a total of 200, and a new Constitution was adopted. But again, after an interval of constitutional government dominated by the right wing under General Mannerheim, the outcome was civil war between the reactionary ‘Lappo’ movement and the Left, complicated by the division in the Socialist ranks between the Communists and their supporters and the right-wing Social Democrats, who had their main backing in the Co-operative movement.

Finnish Socialism thus emerged suddenly and startlingly in 1905, at the time of the first Russian Revolution, as a powerful national movement controlling nearly half the Diet. It was faced immediately with an internal crisis when its most prominent leader, J. K. Kari, agreed to accept ministerial office from the Czar. The Socialist Party promptly expelled him; and Edward Walpas replaced him as leader and represented the party at the Stuttgart International Congress of 1907. Vaino Tanner (b. 1881), the Co-operative leader, soon became, however, the outstanding figure. The Trade Unions were still, at that stage, organised mainly on a local basis: only the printers and ironworkers had established national Unions, and for the most part the Unions acted under the co-ordinating influence of the Social Democratic Party. After 1905 a Trade Union
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Centre was organised, still closely attached to the party; but the repression which set in after the defeat of the Revolution made effective action difficult. Co-operation, rather than Trade Unionism, remained the leading force; but it was divided between the neutral Co-operatives which had their strength in the rural areas and the Progressive Co-operatives of the towns, which were closely associated with the Social Democratic Party, though not formally affiliated to it.

There were, moreover, very sharp divisions between those who, out of hatred of Russia, looked towards Germany for help and those who wished to throw in their lot with the Russian proletariat in its struggle, first against Czarism and then after 1917 against the Western attempts to overturn the Soviet Revolution. Up to 1917 the Right as a whole looked to Germany; but so did a part of the Left, which leaned towards the Germans as the counterpoise against the renewed attempts at forcible russification after the defeat of the Revolution of 1905. These antagonistic influences within the Finnish working-class movement were to persist right up to the second world war, and were to prevent the Finnish Socialists from winning the clear victory to which they seemed to have come so near in 1905; but an account of the long conflict of the period after 1917 must be deferred to the next volume of this work.
CHAPTER XIX

ITALY

Throughout the period covered by this volume Italy remained a battle-ground of rival Socialist, Anarchist, and Syndicalist philosophies, with the added complication of Catholic social movements deeply influenced by the quarrel between the Papacy and the new Italian State. Through most of the period the Vatican maintained its ban on participation by the faithful in the affairs of the State: only towards the end did a powerful organised Catholic Party begin to emerge. One effect of this was to throw much Catholic effort into the fields of social and economic action — Co-operative and Trade Unionist, as well as mutualist and benevolent. The Catholics were often fighting on a double front — against Socialism and against the State; and sometimes the more advanced Catholics were fighting the Papacy as well, for example, in Dom Romolo Murri's National Democratic League during the first decade of the present century. Italian Socialism, in common with Italian bourgeois Radicalism, had a strong anti-religious tradition which excluded any collaboration between it and the Catholic Left, even in the Trade Union and Co-operative fields.

Apart from the religious complications, there was the pronounced difference of conditions between south and north, or rather between the more advanced industrial centres of Northern Italy, on the one hand, and the entire south on the other, with the central part of the country, including Rome, somewhere in between. The appalling poverty of the south, primarily agricultural but including in the Sicilian mines perhaps the most terribly exploited industrial area in all Europe, involved conditions in which no stable Labour or Socialist organisations at all resembling those of the more advanced countries could possibly exist. There could be hunger riots and even insurrections; and from time to time temporarily extensive Leagues (or Fasci) of peasants and labourers could
be established; but such movements and organisations came and went and were never brought into organic relations with the more durable organisations of the northern towns. Only in areas where agriculture and industry were intermingled, and agrarian conditions bad, as in Emilia and Romagna, did the urban workers' movements succeed from time to time in establishing close contacts with the agricultural workers, especially on the great estates; and such combined agitations were soon crushed, though only to arise again, by violent repression in which the landowners and the public authorities made common cause.

Bakunin had begun his campaign among the Italian workers at Naples; and Naples, in close contact with the rural south and itself the home of a great lumpenproletariat and of little developed industry, was the natural centre for Italian Anarchism; whereas Milan, Genoa, and Turin were the cities in which the development of large-scale industry provided scope for Trade Union activity and for the growth of a Socialist movement more akin to those of Western Europe. But even in these cities, and still more in the lesser industrial centres of Emilia, much small-scale production remained, and there were close contacts with a countryside in which there continued to exist poverty and tyranny only less extreme than those of the south. Anarchism continued to have its following in Northern as well as in Central and Southern Italy; but to a greater extent in the north, and in the bigger cities of the centre, it was apt to be transformed into some form of Syndicalism, seeking a basis in Trade Unionism and greatly influenced by the development of Syndicalist ideas in France.

A further reason for the attraction exerted by Anarchist and Syndicalist ideas and policies, even in the industrial north, was the narrowness of the franchise during most of the period which is being discussed. Although the electoral laws were modified from time to time, notably in 1882, when the first Socialist deputies were elected to Parliament, the requirement of literacy and of a minimum tax contribution left the great majority of workers and peasants, especially in the south, without votes until Giolitti's reform of 1912 more than doubled the electorate. The constitutional laws put further obstacles in the way of working-class representation in the form of a property qualifica-
tion for those elected; and until 1912 deputies were unpaid. Consequently the early Socialist deputies were members of the middle classes. No actual workman was elected as a Socialist deputy until 1900; and the domination of the parliamentary group by lawyers, professors, and journalists was a constant source of suspicion among the class-conscious workers in the party, and fostered continual bickering between the group and the directing agencies of the party outside Parliament.

The Italian Socialist Party was, indeed, much richer in intellectual quality than in anything else; but its intellectuals, though many of them suffered exile and imprisonment in the Socialist cause, were apt to find themselves somewhat remote from the currents of feeling among their followers: the more so, because many of them had close links in many matters of opinion with the anti-clerical groups of the bourgeois Left, and were ready to uphold bourgeois Governments which stood for laicism and parliamentary institutions even when those Governments had no compunction about shooting down peasants or labourers in revolt against oppression, or even industrial workers who engaged in strikes or mass-demonstrations. Again and again the Socialists in Parliament were impelled to uphold a Government of the Left, or even of the Centre, in order to prevent a worse Government from taking its place; and again and again this policy had to be abandoned when bludgeonings and massacres of strikers and rural workers had roused the violent indignation of the rank-and-file members of the Socialist Party and the Trade Unions. Consequently there were continual oscillations of Socialist policy, and, towards the end of the period, a sharp break occurred in the formal unity which the party had for a long time maintained despite its internal differences.

Indeed Italian Socialism, though many of its leaders were by nature moderates and reformists, developed against a background of continual violence and disorder. The landowning classes, above all in the south, were prodigiously reactionary, and the rural workers prodigiously tyrannised over and exploited; and the rising class of financiers and industrialists was hardly less determined to stand upon its rights against every working-class claim to bargain or to exert municipal or national political influence. There were powerful Leagues of agricul-
tural and of industrial employers ranged against the Leagues of land-workers and the urban Chambers of Labour; and neither group of masters was slow to urge the authorities to shoot when troubles occurred. Apart from agrarian grievances, a tax system which bore heavily on consumers gave a continual stimulus to hunger riots whenever times were bad; and such blind outbreaks were invoked as reasons for suppressing Socialist and Trade Union organisations as well as for massacres of rioters. The Chambers of Labour, which became the focusing points for Trade Union activity in the towns, were again and again closed down by the public authorities; the Socialist Party was several times suppressed by law; and the organisations of the rural workers were still more remorselessly broken up. These suppressions, it is true, never lasted; Governments alternated between violent repression and a modified recognition of the right to organise, and the Chamber turned out Governments which went too far in either direction. But, through all the oscillations of public policy, there were always acts of violence and counter-violence occurring even in the more advanced parts of the country; and there was never any real let-up of repression in the south.

Against this background, Italian Socialism somehow succeeded during the last quarter of the nineteenth and the opening decade of the twentieth century in building up a powerful political movement which counted as a factor in the counsels of the Second International. On the other hand, the Italian Trade Union Movement remained relatively weak because of the less extensive development of large-scale industry and in face of the failure to create stable organisations — except Co-operatives — among the rural population. Italian Trade Unionism, partly under the influence of political Socialism, became towards the end of the period much less tumultuous and anarchistic than it had previously been; but the result was that it became less effective, because it alienated a good deal of its militancy through the break with the Syndicalist and Anarchist factions.

In order to follow the history of Italian Socialism from the point where we left it in the second volume of this work, we have to go back to the 1870s. The Italian Federation of the International Working Men's Association, formed just before
the Hague Conference of 1872, in which it refused to take part, was under predominantly Anarchist influence and so remained until its break-up in the early 'eighties. Against it were ranged, in the north, small Marxist groups under the intellectual leadership of Enrico Bignami (1847–1921) and Osvaldo Gnocchi-Viani (1837–1917); but these made no great headway. They received some reinforcement when Benoit Malon, in exile since the Paris Commune, after a sojourn in Milan, moved, about 1874, to Palermo in Sicily and there founded a journal, *Il Povero*, which had a considerable intellectual influence. Malon was later the foremost advocate, after his return to France, of what he called ‘Integral Socialism’ — by which he designated a doctrine based on the acceptance of all the various forms of action contended for by different Socialist schools of thought, from the seeking of immediate palliatives and reforms to outright revolution, and from the use of municipal and parliamentary methods to the general strike as the first stage in proletarian insurrection. This ‘integralism’ came to be an important element in Italian Socialist doctrine, serving as an argument for keeping the Socialists of all schools united in a common organisation on a basis of mutual tolerance and of recognition that there was some validity in all the contending points of view.

In 1879 Andrea Costa (1851–1910), till then an adherent of the Anarchist I.W.M.A., wrote from his French prison a letter, published in Bignami’s *Il Plebe*, announcing his conversion to the need for political action; and the following year, on his release, he returned to Milan and began to work for the creation of an Italian Socialist Party. That same year the expiring Italian Federation of the International, which had been legally suppressed in 1877 after the Benevento rising, called, at Chiasso in Switzerland, a Socialist Congress at which the battle was joined between Marxists, Anarchists, and other variants of Italian proletarianism, and the Anarchists again won the day. But at almost the same moment a new movement, headed by Erminio Pescatore, was started in Milan under the name Figli di Lavoro (Sons of Labour). The Figli were neither Trade Unions nor political associations in the ordinary sense of these words, but a mixture of both. Setting out to organise all types of workers, they divided their adherents into trade groups, and thus combined industrial with political agitation. They were
definitely working-class bodies, and prepared the way for a more definitely political organisation. This emerged in Lombardy two years later, in close connection with the franchise reform of 1882, which for the first time made working-class political action possible on the parliamentary plane.

The Italian Workers' Party, formed in Milan in 1882 under the leadership of Costantino Lazzari (1857–1927) and Giuseppe Croce (1853–1914), the one a compositor and the other a glover, was based directly on the Figli and the local Trade Unions and was open only to members of the working class. It was not able to elect any of its own candidates at the election of 1882; indeed, most of the Socialist candidates stood quite independently of it. Only Costa, who had transferred his activities to Imola, in Emilia, secured election as a Socialist, together with one working man, Antonio Maffi (1845–1912), who was elected as a Republican Democrat. But under the impetus of the new movement the Figli di Lavoro spread rapidly, in the northern countryside as well as in the towns, and by 1884 they were at the head of a considerable strike movement among both industrial and agricultural workers. In that year two more Socialist deputies secured election, but one of these, the former Internationalist, Luigi Castelluzzo (1827–90), was disqualified.

At this point the Italian Government began to embark seriously on a policy of colonial imperialism in North Africa. In 1879 it had acquired by purchase from a private concern the coaling station of Assab on the Red Sea, and in 1882 this port, with its hinterland, had been proclaimed an Italian colony. In 1885 the Government despatched an expeditionary force to Africa, with a mission of conquest and colonisation; and Costa, as leader of the Socialists, at once took up the challenge and set out to organise resistance to the policy of imperialist expansion. This agitation coincided with a further wave of strikes and agrarian movements, in which bodies of peasants and landless labourers attempted to occupy and cultivate unused public lands. The Government retorted with violent measures of repression, ordering the dissolution of the rural Leagues in the Mantua area, which was the principal centre of rural disturbance. There were mass arrests of leaders, most of whom were actually acquitted when they were brought to trial the following year. In the middle of the troubles the Workers'
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Party held its Congress at Mantua and proclaimed its complete independence of all other parties. The Government arrested a number of its leaders and put them on trial for incitement to strike action and for stirring up class-hatred. The effect was to give a great stimulus to the movement. The Lombard Labour Federation, which had been set up by moderates in opposition to the Figli, went over to the Workers' Party; and the Workers' Party moderated its opposition to the intellectual Socialists and joined hands with them in fighting the repression. At the election of 1886 the Socialists again returned 3 deputies. The Government ordered the dissolution of the Workers' Party and of the Figli, and many of the leaders of these bodies — Lazzari, Croce, and Alfredo Casati (†1921) among them — were sentenced to gaol. The Figli, however, soon re-formed their groups, and strikes continued on a considerable scale. The Workers' Party, too, was reconstituted.

At this point two things happened outside the Labour movement, but of considerable effect on its fortunes. The Italian forces in Africa suffered a serious reverse at Dogali, and the Prime Minister, Depretis, died and was succeeded by the much more reactionary Crispi. There followed a period of violent repression. At the Pavia Congress of the reconstituted Workers' Party in 1887 there was a lively debate concerning relations between workers and intellectual Socialists, with Lazzari urging against Casati that the two groups ought to join forces. Failing to persuade the 'class-conscious' group, Lazzari joined hands with the rising intellectual, Filippo Turati, soon to become the leading figure in Italian Socialism, to form a Milanese Socialist League. The following year, at Imola, Costa was threatened with imprisonment for his militant opposition to the African War and to the Triple Alliance Treaty with Austria and Germany, and had to take refuge abroad. In 1889 he, with Amilcare Cipriani (1844–1918), the Garibaldian semi-Anarchist, and Giuseppe Croce of the Workers' Party, represented Italy at the International Socialist Congress. That same year there were great demonstrations at Milan and elsewhere against the war and the Triple Alliance; and at the municipal elections held under a new franchise law the Socialists made considerable gains. This success was followed up by the winning of five parliamentary seats at the general election of
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1890. In accordance with the decision of the International Socialist Congress, there were great demonstrations on May Day. Rural disturbances broke out again in Northern and Central Italy, especially in Emilia; and by the end of the year a new movement in Sicily was well under way, with organisations called 'Fasci' taking the lead. The Sicilian landowners and ruling classes retorted with an attempt to blacklist all known members of the movement.

Crispi fell from office early in 1891, and was succeeded by Di Rudini; but the troubles continued. On May Day there were widespread riots, violently suppressed. At Milan the Workers' Party Congress voted in favour of broadening its basis to include intellectual workers, changed its name to Labour Party and appointed a special commission to draw up a programme. At the same time a Chamber of Labour, modelled on the French Bourses du Travail, was opened at Milan; and similar Chambers were soon set up in other northern cities to serve as federal agencies for the local Trade Unions, as labour exchanges, and as centres of local working-class life. This was a move in the separation of industrial from political organisation: it was carried further in 1892, when the Labour Party adopted a programme that excluded the Anarchists, and in 1893, when it adopted Socialism as the basis of its programme and changed its name to Socialist Party of the Italian Labourers. During these years the first attempts were made, by the railwaymen in 1890 and by the metal-workers in 1891, to form national federations of the local groups in their respective industries; but Italian Trade Unionism continued to develop mainly on a local basis, with the Chambers of Labour as its principal rallying points. The Chambers multiplied fast, and in 1893, under the leadership of Angiolo Cabrini (1869–1937), formed a National Federation, which became the industrial counterpart of the Socialist Labour Party. At the same time the Fasci spread rapidly in the country areas, in the north and centre as well as in Sicily.

This year, 1893, was one of widespread troubles. Giolitti had come to power the previous year, at the head of a Ministry representing the left-wing parties, and at the general election

1 The old name was Partito Operaio Italiano. It was changed to Partito dei Lavoratori Italiani.
the Socialists had won ten seats. But the Left Ministry fell from office early in 1893, and Crispi came back to renew his policy of repression. In Sicily the Fasci, led by Garibaldi Bosco (1867-?), spread fast and won many victories in the municipal elections. Many attempts were made by peasant groups to occupy unused communal land; and there were huge demonstrations in the towns against the excessive prices of bread and other foods. The Government retorted by proclaiming martial law in Sicily, and early the following year intensified its action by proclaiming a 'state of siege' and by arresting and gaoling the leaders of the movement under martial law. In the meantime the agitation against high prices had spread to the rest of Italy; and at the height of the troubles the assassination of President Sadi Carnot by the Italian Anarchist, Sante Geronimo Caserio, gave Crispi an excuse for an Anti-Socialist Law, modelled on Bismarck's, which decreed the dissolution of the Socialist Party and many other workers' organisations, including many of the Chambers of Labour. Many of the Socialist leaders were put in gaol. But despite the exceptional laws the Socialists were able to hold a Congress at Parma in 1895: they there decided to reconstitute the party on an entirely new basis, and to take the name Socialist Party without further words. The old party had continued to be based mainly on collective affiliations of Trade Union and political groups. For the future, it was decided that it should be based entirely on individual membership and should become a unified party with local branches throughout the country, with an elected Council empowered to direct the activities of the parliamentary group.

This change in structure was designed to save the Trade Unions and Chambers of Labour from being involved in measures of repression directed against the Socialist Party under the Anti-Socialist Laws; but it was also in part a recognition that the Trade Unions must be allowed to grow in their own way and that the exclusion of Anarchists from the party must not be allowed to result in the establishment of rival Trade Union movements under Socialist and Anarchist control. Under the new arrangements the working-class Socialists, though separated politically from the Anarchists, continued to work with them in the Trade Unions and Chambers of Labour.

At the end of 1895 the exceptional laws were allowed to
expire, and the bodies which had been suppressed under them were able to resume their activities in the open. Early in 1896 the defeat of the Italian Expeditionary Force at Adowa led to the fall of Crispi and to the conclusion by his successor, Di Rudini, of a treaty with the Emperor Menelik. At the general election of 1895 the Socialists had won twelve seats, and an advance had been made towards unity between north and south by returning some of the proscribed Sicilian leaders as deputies for mainland constituencies. The Socialist Congress of 1896 held a long debate on the question of the Co-operative movement, to which it decided to extend its support; and it also discussed universal suffrage, to which there was some opposition from a section of the party, on the ground that the main body of illiterate voters would probably support the reactionary parties. This year the Socialist Party started *Avanti* (Forward) as its national organ, with Leonida Bissolati (1857–1919) as editor.

After the Adowa defeat and the fall of Crispi there had been a short period of relative calm. But this was broken by the agitation of the monarchists for a revised constitution modelled on that of Germany, with executive power vested in the Crown and a Chancellor, and with reduced powers for the elected Chamber. This movement did not succeed; but a serious economic depression led to a widespread renewal of local riots, and the troubles mounted further during the ensuing year. 1898, indeed, has come to be known to Italians as the 'Terrible Year'. It was marked by great strikes and disturbances in both town and country and by many violent clashes with police and soldiers, culminating at Milan in a pitched battle in which artillery were brought into play against the workers. Martial law was proclaimed at Milan, Florence, and Naples. The Socialist Party, together with most of the Chambers of Labour and many other working-class organisations, was again dissolved. Many of the leaders were arrested and given heavy sentences — including Turati, who was sentenced to 12 years in gaol. Many more of the Socialist and Trade Union leaders fled abroad — chiefly to Switzerland. The following year the Government attempted to introduce yet more repressive laws, directed especially against the right of public meeting; but obstruction by the left parties prevented their passage.
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In this situation the Socialists were driven to make common cause with the parties of the bourgeois Left, from which they had hitherto declared their entire independence — a policy known in Italy as ‘intransigence’, in the sense of rejecting all electoral transactions with non-Socialist elements. In 1899 a left-wing bloc won substantial victories at the municipal elections; and at the beginning of the following year the same tactics resulted in a victory of the left wing at the general election, and raised the number of Socialist deputies to 33. Among these were two workmen, including the wood-carver, Rinaldo Rigola (d. 1954), of Biello. Previously, as we saw, the Socialist deputies had been drawn entirely from the intellectuals. The right-wing Government was succeeded by a left-centre coalition under Saracco. The Socialists returned from exile and re-formed their organisation: the Chambers of Labour revived and restored their National Confederation. But hardly had these victories been won when the Tuscan Anarchist weaver, Gaetano Bresci, succeeded in assassinating King Humbert. The new king, Victor Emmanuel III, came to the throne at a moment of high tension and, in face of the state of public feeling, made large promises of reform and of freedom for the Socialist movement. In Parliament, the Socialists denounced the murder and the Anarchists. The Socialist Party Congress, after a struggle, decided to allow the pact with the bourgeois Left to be continued, and drew up a new minimum programme of immediate reforms. The Government declared an amnesty covering all the leading political prisoners except the Anarchists. But there was, almost at once, a fresh clash between the Trade Unions and the authorities. Great strikes broke out, and a number of the Chambers of Labour were yet again dissolved. The workers retorted with mass movements of protest, and the Government was forced to repudiate the prefects who had been responsible. The Chambers were reopened, and the right of general Trade Union combination was effectively won. The following year Zanardelli formed a new Ministry in conjunction with Giolitti, and definitely put an end to the policy of repression in North Italy, though it continued to a large extent in Sicily and the south. In return the Socialists in Parliament supported the Government, which needed their votes against the strong opposition of the Right. There was a rapid growth of Trade
Unionism on a national basis, many National Federations of trades and industries being formed. Moreover, for the first time the land workers were able to establish a National Federation of their own. There were many strikes, mostly without much violence; but the shooting of strike pickets by soldiers at Berra Ferrarese in June initiated a fresh series of clashes between strikers and the military and police authorities. This put the Socialist deputies in a difficulty. They were convinced of the need to keep the Zanardelli-Giolitti Ministry in office and aware that the violent action taken against strikers and peasants was mainly due to the military and the prefects rather than to the Government. But the active Trade Unionists and Socialists outside Parliament became more and more restive as such incidents were repeated; and there was an increasing demand for a return to the policy of complete ‘intransigence’. A struggle developed inside the party organisation, and led in some places, especially Milan, to the formation of separate minority groups by supporters of the policy of collaboration.

At this time employers, retaliating against the successful strikes of 1901, resorted to numerous lock-outs, which drove the Trade Unions to consider means of drawing closer together for concerted resistance. Two rival tendencies appeared in the Trade Union movement — Federalists and Cameralists — the Federalists, who were the moderate party, wishing to build up strong national federations of the local societies in each trade or industry, whereas the Cameralists wished to base the movement mainly on the local solidarity of all types of workers, organised in the local Chambers of Labour. The Milan Trade Union Congress, without settling this issue, decided to set up a permanent National Secretariat of Resistance, open to both kinds of body, with Angiolo Cabrini as secretary. In practice, the Trade Unions began to turn strongly against the policy of supporting the Zanardelli-Giolitti Government, and advocates of the Syndicalist conception of the general strike gained ground rapidly. Meanwhile the Socialists, at their Imola Congress of 1902, gave the moderates, headed by Ivanoe Bonomi (1873–1951), a large majority over the left wing, led by Enrico Ferri (1856–1929). The action of the parliamentary group in sustaining the Government was approved, and the autonomy of the group in adapting its actions to this policy was allowed. At
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the municipal elections the Socialists won many seats, partly because of their advocacy of the municipalisation of the trade in bread as a means of keeping prices down.

In 1903, however, the policy of collaboration began to dissolve. Avanti launched a vigorous anti-militarist campaign. There were serious troubles in the country areas: the Agricultural Workers’ League broke down: in face of a renewal of massacres of strikers and peasants, chiefly in the south, the Socialists withdrew their support from the Government. At this point Zanardelli died, and Giolitti took his place as Prime Minister and offered Turati a place in the new Cabinet. Turati, in deference to the views of the Socialist Party, refused this offer; and at the Socialist Congress, held in April at Bologna, the struggle between the rival tendencies came to a head. The left wing, headed by Ferri from the parliamentary group and by the rising Syndicalist leaders, Arturo Labriola (1859-1904) and Enrico Leone, narrowly defeated the moderates, and took control of the party machine. The policy of supporting the bourgeois Left was definitely reversed, and the parliamentary group, despite the reluctance of many of its members, had to revert to a policy of complete independence of the Radical parties. The Socialist Left, in conjunction with the dominant group in the Trade Unions, launched intensive propaganda for a new worker-peasant alliance. In 1904 there were violent conflicts between strikers and the authorities in a number of areas, culminating in a series of massacres at Buggeru in Sardinia, at Castelluzzo in Sicily, and at Sestri Ponente in Liguria. In retaliation the Trade Unions decided to declare a general strike, which broke out simultaneously in Milan and Genoa and spread rapidly to Turin, Bologna, Mantua, Venice and other northern cities, and also to Rome and Florence. Many peasants and land-workers in Emilia and Romagna joined the movement — by far the most extensive ever known in the country.

The general strike lasted only a few days; but it definitely ended the left bloc on which Giolitti had attempted to base his Ministry. In face of it, he formed a new Ministry resting on an alliance with the Centre parties and the less extreme sections

1 Not to be confused with the Socialist economist, Antonio Labriola, who died in 1904. See page 737.
The policy of social reform, which had yielded certain results in social legislation during the years 1900-4, was brought to an abrupt end. At the general election held towards the end of the year the Socialists, bereft of their former allies, sank from 32 deputies to 28, and were lucky not to have heavier losses.

Although the Syndicalists were in the ascendant at this stage among the Trade Unions, their policy was not unchallenged. The railwaymen and postal workers had refused to join in the general strike of 1904, and at the Trade Union Congress of the following year there was a sharp struggle between revolutionaries and reformists. A split between the Federalists and the Cameralists was narrowly averted: the Congress carried a resolution affirming the right to resort to the general strike as a response to further massacres, but refrained from pushing its differences to extremes. Just afterwards, a new issue arose. The Italian railways, though publicly owned, had hitherto been leased to a number of private operating companies. The Government now proposed to take over their running and thus to convert the railway workers into public functionaries, which meant under the existing laws that they would be deprived of the right to strike. In protest against this deprivation, the railway workers first resorted to an obstructionist policy of ‘working to rule’, and then, as the Government refused to modify its attitude, declared a general strike, for which they demanded the support of the workers in other industries. The Secretariat of Resistance, mindful of the Railway Union’s failure to join in the general strike of the preceding year, refused its support; and the strike collapsed. As a sequel, the Syndicalists captured control of the Secretariat of Resistance, but were unable to make effective use of it in face of the opposition of the moderates, who were strongly entrenched in the national industrial Federations. Meanwhile, Giolitti had fallen from office and, after a brief tenure by Fortis, a new right-wing Government headed by Sonnino had come to power. There ensued a brief period of violent economic conflict, culminating in a further general strike, less extensive than that of 1904, but spreading from Turin to a number of other towns. There were again violent clashes with soldiers and police; and the Socialists, having failed to get the Chamber
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to take action, resigned their seats in protest, and stood for re-election — mostly with success. Sonnino resigned in May 1906; and Giolitti came back to power. As a consequence of these events the conflict within the Trade Union movement came to a head. The Metal-workers' Federation took the initiative in convening a general Congress of Trade Union bodies, with the object of setting up a new Confederation modelled on the French C.G.T. At this Congress the Syndicalists and Anarchists were in a minority, and after acrimonious disputes they seceded. The majority then set up an Italian General Confederation of Labour (C.G.L.) with headquarters at Turin and with the control chiefly in the hands of the Socialist moderates, who proceeded to enter into an alliance with the National League of Co-operatives and with the Federation of Friendly Societies for mutual defence and support. The Syndicalists, under the influence of the young director of the Parma Chamber of Labour, Alceste De Ambris (1874–1934), formed in 1907 a rival Committee of Resistance Societies, and tried to build up a new movement round a number of Chambers of Labour and local Trade Unions which were hostile to the centralising policy of the C.G.L. The railwaymen, still disgruntled with the C.G.L. leaders, rallied to this movement.

Before this, immediately after the setting up of the C.G.L., there had been a further struggle inside the Socialist Party. At the Rome Congress of October 1907 there were four rival factions — Reformists, Integralists, Syndicalists, and Intransigents. The Reformists, who had their main strength in the parliamentary group, favoured a policy of freedom for the group to enter into electoral or parliamentary alliances with other parties of the Left, and wished to use their parliamentary position for securing ameliorative labour and social legislation. The Integralists, headed by Enrico Ferri and Oddino Morgari (1865–1929), advocated recognition of all methods of struggle, from parliamentary activity to general strikes, as admissible according to circumstances; but under the pressure of the extreme Left the Integralists and the Reformists were drawing closer together in opposition to the Syndicalists. The Syndicalist group, headed by Arturo Labriola, while remaining within the Socialist Party, repudiated the idea of securing reforms through Parliament and followed the 'Direct Action'
doctrines of the French Syndicalists. Finally, on the extreme left, there appeared a Marxist faction, which was hostile to all forms of accommodation with other parties, and also to Syndicalism, and stood for the building up of a completely intransigent revolutionary party under centralised control. The outcome of the debate was a junction of forces between Reformists and Integralists behind an Integralist motion, which was carried by a very large majority — 27,000 votes, as against 5000 for the Syndicalists and a mere 1000 for the Intransigents. The New direction of the Socialist Party proceeded to enter into a treaty of alliance with the C.G.L., directed mainly against the Syndicalist groups and against the Anarchists, who, at their Rome Congress of 1907, attempted to rebuild their influence.

The years 1907 and 1908 were filled with economic conflicts brought on by a commercial crisis. There was a local general strike at Milan. The railwaymen, despite their status as functionaries, joined in; and there were numerous arrests of their leaders. The local Chamber of Labour advised the railway workers against striking, and there was much ill-feeling, which drew the Railwaymen’s Union into the Syndicalist group. Early in 1908 a great agricultural strike broke out in the area round Parma, where the Syndicalists were strong. The Reformists supported the strike; but the Government occupied and closed the Parma Chamber of Labour. There was serious fighting between strikers and police, and the strike collapsed. The matter was debated at the Congress of the C.G.L., which declared that the authority to call general strikes should be removed from the local Chambers of Labour and vested in the central Council of the C.G.L. itself. Accordingly, the Council of the C.G.L. tried to draw together the national industrial Federations under its centralised leadership in opposition to the Cameralist policy. The same year — 1908 — at the Socialist Party Congress there was a definite break with the Syndicalist faction, which was excluded from the party. The removal of the Syndicalists weakened the left wing of the party. Ferri, the Integralist leader, joined forces with the Reformists, under Turati, in a ‘Concentration’ group, which routed the Intransigents and the remaining Integralists. The Socialist Party moved definitely to the right, losing a substantial fraction
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of its old supporters. But, electorally, it was able to recoup these losses by getting support from elements of the bourgeois Left. At the general election of 1910, which resulted in a victory for the left parties, it won 42 seats — a gain of 16.

In face of this move to the right, the Syndicalists opened up negotiations for a reunion with the C.G.L. But the negotiations for unity broke down. Nevertheless, when the news of the execution of Francisco Ferrer, the Spanish apostle of Anarchism, reached Italy, a spontaneous general strike broke out over the whole country, including many parts of the south. This year — 1909 — the Catholics, who had been entering increasingly into politics despite papal opposition, formed a General Secretariat of Catholic Trade Unions. Dom Romolo Murri (b. 1870), the leader of the Catholic Democratic movement, elected to the Chamber with Socialist support, was excommunicated by the Pope; but his movement continued to expand.

Early in 1910 the veteran leader of the Socialists, Andrea Costa, died. Beginning as an Anarchist, he had been converted to Marxism and had been the principal founder of the Socialist Party, in which he had been the outstanding leader of the Left. But in the Chamber, of which he ended as Vice-President, he had moved gradually rightwards. He was in the chair at the party Congress of 1908, at which the victory of the right wing was consummated. His death left Filippo Turati as the outstanding leader of the party, together with Ferri, who was in rapid evolution from his original leftness towards the extreme right. Giolitti, who had fallen from office near the end of 1909 and had been succeeded by two short-lived Ministries headed by Sonnino and Luzzatti, came back to office in March 1911, and again offered Cabinet office to a Socialist — this time to Leonida Bissolati, who was by this time on the extreme right of the party but was not allowed by it to accept office.

The Socialists, however, gave support to Giolitti's Government. The 1901 party Congress had agreed to give full freedom to the parliamentary group to shape its own policy, and had also authorised its local branches to enter into electoral pacts where they saw fit. Edited by Claudio Treves (1869–1933), Avanti became definitely an organ of the right wing; and all seemed set fair for collaboration when Giolitti announced an electoral
reform bill designed to increase the electorate from less than 3½ to nearly 9 millions. Moreover, Syndicalist influence suffered a setback with the defeat of a big strike in the motor-car factories at Turin. But the situation changed abruptly when the Government announced its intention of occupying Libya and declared war on Turkey. The main body of the Socialist Party strongly opposed the Libyan war; but a group headed by Leonida Bissolati, Ivanoe Bonomi, and Angiolo Cabrini supported it on nationalist grounds. The Socialist Party Congress of 1911, while authorising the parliamentary group to keep the Government in office for the time being, declared against giving it any assurance of regular support. A split was averted for the moment; but the following year Benito Mussolini led an attack on the parliamentary group, and the Congress expelled Bissolati and other supporters of the African war. The autonomy of the parliamentary group was removed: local parties were forbidden to enter into electoral pacts; and the party as a whole went back to its old position of 'Intransigence'. At the same time Treves was displaced from the editorship of Avanti, and Benito Musсолini, as the new broom of the Left, was installed in his place. The expelled Socialists, under Bissolati's leadership, formed a separate Reformist Socialist Party.

The Syndicalists also found themselves in trouble over the Libyan war, which a section of them supported on nationalist grounds. In 1912 they formed a new central Trade Union organisation — the Unione Sindicale Italiana; but the railwaymen, though under Anarcho-Syndicalist leadership, refused to join, and the new Union, led by Arturo Labriola, did not attain to much strength.

Giolitti's electoral reform became law in 1912; and at the first elections held under it the next year the Left parties were victorious, and the Socialists, despite the split on the right, which had reduced them to 25, won 52 seats. The Reformist Socialists numbered 18; and there were 7 or 8 Independents, mainly from the semi-Syndicalist Left. These victories were secured despite the formation of a powerful Catholic bloc against the Socialists. Meanwhile, the war in Libya had ended, and the Balkan wars had begun. The Socialists pursued their anti-militarist campaign, with Mussolini coming more to the front as its leader. In the Balkan conflicts the Socialists stood
for a policy of strict neutrality; and in 1914 the party followed the same line upon the news of the Sarajevo assassination and the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. But throughout the years immediately before the first world war Italian Socialism was rent by a fresh sequence of internal disputes. The Syndicalists, though driven out of the party and of the principal Trade Unions, except the railway workers', had by no means lost their following. An attempt at a London Congress, held in 1913, to set up a Syndicalist International, with Spanish, French, and Dutch, as well as Italian, French, and British participation, came to nothing. The Libyan war had brought on an economic crisis; and in 1913 and 1914 there were renewed conflicts in many areas between strikers and armed forces. A massacre at Rimini in 1913 was followed by a widespread general strike; and in 1914, after the right-wing Salandra had succeeded Giolitti as Prime Minister, still more serious troubles occurred. In protest against the suppression of workers' demonstrations a general strike was declared at Ancona, where Anarchist influence was strong, and this spread through the Marches and the Romagna and to many of the larger cities. In the rural areas chiefly affected, the Anarchists, headed by Errico Malatesta,1 were strong enough to give the movement a revolutionary character. In the towns the workers' organisations held the streets against soldiers and police; and there was heavy fighting before the authorities regained the upper hand. The General Confederation of Labour disavowed the strikes, but was unable to prevent them.

This sanguinary affair had barely ended when the Sarajevo murder brought on the first world war. Mussolini, who had taken an active part in the strike movement, dissented from the Socialist Party's policy of neutrality and advocated Italy's intervention on the side of the Allied Powers. The Syndicalist Union split. A section, headed by Alceste De Ambris, followed Mussolini's lead and broke away to form a new Italian Union of Labour — the forerunner of the later Fascist Unions. The main body of Socialists, however, continued to favour neutrality. Mussolini had to leave Avanti, and founded his new organ, the Popolo d'Italia, to support his interventionist policy.

I have given in this chapter what may be regarded as an

1 For Malatesta, see Vol. II, p. 356 ff.
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food prices drove them to rise against their masters, often in conjunction with the starvelings of the great cities, such as Naples and Rome, in which there were to be found huge bodies of unemployed, or barely employed, lumpenproletariat on the verge of starvation. Land-hunger, on the other hand, was an affair of the countryside and not of the towns. It was directed most of all to the occupation of untilled lands belonging to the communes, or sometimes to absentee feudal landlords — much less often to attempts to occupy land already in use by the great pastoralists and farmers of big estates. But, whatever its objects, any such uprising of the rural workers was sure to be suppressed with great ferocity, almost irrespective of the political complexion of the Government in office. The local authorities holding the police power were consistently reactionary, even when the Parliament had a majority of the left-wing parties.

Italian working-class activities were further bedevilled by the religious problem. Up to the accession of Pio X to the Papacy in 1903, Catholics were officially forbidden, under the decree Non Expedit, to accord any recognition to the Italian State, or to take any part in its affairs. This boycott, resting on the claim of the Papacy to temporal power, did not in fact prevent many Catholics from voting; but it kept many away from politics, and effectively prevented the development of any Catholic Party in the State. The new Pope, though he did not renounce his claim to temporal power, ceased to treat it as a reason for boycotting the State, and came to an understanding with Giolitti under which a régime of mutual toleration was established, and Catholics, though still forbidden to form a party, were no longer discouraged from voting and were even allowed to present themselves for election as independents or to take part in the affairs of other parties — chiefly of the Right. The Italian Left, and indeed the major part of the Right also, were ranged against the claims of the Papacy, and supported the principle of ‘laicity’ in political matters. But as Socialism developed it became more and more difficult for Catholics to maintain their aloofness from political affairs. The more conservative elements wished to rally the faithful against the Socialists, whereas there developed in the rural areas a democratic Catholic movement which sided with the peasants in
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their struggle against the landlords and the public authorities. The Papacy emphatically took the side of the more reactionary Catholic groups, and did its best to suppress the Catholic Left, which gave its support to the peasants in their struggles against social oppression. The Pope, in an Encyclical of 1906, roundly condemned Dom Romolo Murri’s National Democratic League; and the clerics who had been supporting it, with the exception of Murri himself, were cowed into withdrawing from the movement. The League’s Congress of 1906, however, decided to persist in face of the Pope’s opposition, and Murri, defying the papal condemnation, continued to lead the movement. In 1907 the Pope issued a further condemnation, *Pascendi Domini*; and Murri was suspended from his religious functions (*a divinis*). When he persisted in his political activities and was elected a deputy in 1909, he was, as we saw, finally excommunicated from the Church.

This development of a Radical Catholic movement drew the Papacy further into politics on the reactionary side. In 1910 Murri’s followers, at the national Congress of the Christian Democratic League, declared for an advanced social programme including the abolition of landlordism and of the wage-system and decided to drop the word ‘Christian’ from their title on the ground that their movement was primarily political and ought not to have an exclusive confessional appeal. The Catholic Trade Union movement continued to grow, especially among the textile workers, and fell into sharp disputes between those who followed Murri and those who wished to preserve its confessional character. The Catholic groups hostile to Murri formed an anti-Socialist bloc which united with the secular bourgeois parties in support of Giolitti at the General Election of 1913, held under the new franchise law; but they still kept back from forming a separate political party. The Catholic Popular Party headed by Don Luigi Sturzo did not make its appearance until 1918, when the entire situation had been transformed by the war. From 1905 to 1914 the Papacy had become the ally of the reactionary parties against Socialism in all its forms, but had had to meet with a considerable opposition from Dom Murri’s followers, who stood for a democratic Christianity, hostile to Socialism, but advocating peasant ownership and small-scale property against the great landlords and
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the industrial and financial magnates. Sturzo, a Sicilian priest who came to Rome as organiser of the ‘Catholic Action’ group in 1914, took over and reorganised the movement initiated by Murri and, in the changed circumstances, was able to secure the rather half-hearted support of the Vatican for a Catholic Party of the Left, which had at least the merit, in official eyes, of keeping a large section of the Catholic working class away from the seductions of Socialism.

The Socialist Party, for its part, suffered seriously, throughout its career, from having to act as the spokesman of a working class at widely different stages of development in different parts of the country, and from the undue preponderance of intellectuals among its leaders. It was continually torn between its desire to uphold the ‘laic’ State against both Papacy and autocracy on the German model and its hostility to the bourgeois Left. Unlike the German Social Democrats, it was not confronted with a powerful State machine under the iron rule of a Bismarck: it had instead to adapt itself to the vacillations of a Parliament made up of many groups, in which the balance of power was constantly shifting between Left, Right, and Centre, so that the composition of the Government in power was often dependent on the vote of the Socialist deputies, few though they were. By supporting the less reactionary bourgeois parties and leaders it was often possible to mitigate, but never to prevent, violent social conflicts between the workers and the forces of ‘law and order’; and sometimes there was a chance of securing valuable social legislation. The majority of the Socialist deputies therefore usually favoured some sort of understanding with the bourgeois Radicals, both in Parliament in order to keep out or defeat right-wing Governments, and in elections in order not only to secure their own election, but also to procure some sort of Left majority. As against this, their supporters in the country were continually driven, by reaction against police repression and the breaking up of working-class organisations, into violent hostility to the Government, even when it was supposed to stand for the Left against the more extreme reactionary groups. The Socialist dilemma was all the greater because, in a predominantly agricultural country without more than patches of high industrial development, heavily over-populated in relation to its use and understanding of
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the powers of production, and suffering from the extremes of poverty over the greater part of its area, revolt against unbearable conditions necessarily took, to a great extent, the form of spontaneous hunger movements, which were more easily captured by Anarchists than directed into the channels of an organised Socialist agitation.

Italian Socialism, as the Mazzinist influence waned when it had become clear that the establishment of national unity carried with it no guarantee of freedom from oppression, almost inevitably asserted itself first in anarchic forms. It followed Bakunin not so much because it was influenced by his doctrines as because its natural and spontaneous ways of action fitted in with them. Not until there had been a sufficient development of large-scale industry in a few northern towns, such as Milan and Turin, could there be any solid basis for a Socialist movement resting on the proletariat in a Marxist sense; and even when this industrial revolution had made some headway, the growth of an effective Socialist Party continued for some time to be held back by the suspicions of the working-class leaders that the Socialist intellectuals were minded to treat them as mere pawns in the political game. In the long run, in the major industrial centres, these suspicions were partly dissipated, and the Trade Unions in the more advanced industries of the north did make common cause with the Socialist intelligentsia. But they were never wholly got rid of, even in such centres as Milan, Genoa, and Turin; and over the greater part of the country, still very backward industrially, they remained strong throughout the period reviewed in this chapter.

There was, then, ample ground for the development of a Syndicalist movement which, taking over a large part of the Anarchist attitude, but linking it to a highly localised Trade Unionism held together by the local Chambers of Labour, made of the general strike not a ‘social myth’ but an almost regular practice in protest against the repressive measures of the public powers. In Italy the general strike, far from being a utopian conception towards which the workers needed to be slowly attracted by persistent agitation, arose spontaneously out of the conditions under which the workers lived and suffered oppression. The theory of it came well after the fact. Again and again the same sequence of events recurred. To begin with,
there was either a local strike in a particular trade or factory or a demonstration to protest against the high price of bread, or a movement of the landless labourers or peasants in a particular village or rural area. The second stage was a violent clash between demonstrators or strike pickets and the police, or an eviction of peasants from land which they had occupied. At this stage there were often deaths by shooting, almost always serious woundings and numerous arrests. The third stage was usually mass demonstration, which brought into the affair workers in other occupations besides those originally involved and often extended the trouble over a larger area — for example, from country to town, or from town to the surrounding districts. Then came more clashes with police, often reinforced by soldiers, more arrests and shootings. At this stage, if a local general strike had not already broken out spontaneously, the local Chamber of Labour usually called the entire body of workers out by way of mass protest, sometimes only for a single day, sometimes for longer. There were yet further clashes, leading in some cases to pitched battles in the streets; and a general strike centred on one town often led to similar strikes elsewhere, partly in sympathy with the original strikers, but usually with plenty of local grievances to bring the workers out on the streets. These movements seldom lasted very long: the hunger of the strikers and the ferocity of the repression saw to that. But while they lasted they stirred deep mass-emotions and when they ended they left a legacy of hatred behind. France, where the doctrine of the general strike was presented so ardently by a host of Syndicalists and social revolutionaries of many types, had no such continuous experience as Italy of the general strike in action, as an expression of the violence of class feeling in a society in which there was no great stabilising force such as the peasants had been in France ever since the Revolution of 1789.

It has to be borne constantly in mind that, whereas in both France and Germany the right to vote was in the latter part of the nineteenth century possessed by the main body of workers and peasants, in Italy it remained, right up to 1912, the privilege of a section, with the illiterate majority of the peasants and labourers and the lumpenproletariat of the towns devoid of political rights. Largely similar conditions in this respect
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existed in other countries — for example, in Austria and in Belgium — and, as we have seen, the general strike came to be used in both these countries as a means of pressing the claim for universal suffrage. But the Italian general strikes were not used for this purpose; nor were they organised by the Socialist Party in conjunction with the Trade Unions, as were the Austrian and Belgian political strikes. They were essentially local uprisings prompted by a repression much more savage than any experienced in these countries. Moreover, there were special reasons why in Italy the general strike was not used as a weapon for exacting franchise reform. The plain truth is that universal suffrage ranked by no means high among the demands of the Italian Socialists, who were apt to see in it the danger of being swamped by the mass of illiterate and uninformed voters, especially in the south and centre; and, of course, the Anarchists, who were always a powerful force in the background, wanted not to reform the State but to destroy it root and branch. In this respect conditions in Italy were much closer to those of Russia than to those of the more advanced Western countries. If Northern Italy had stood apart from the rest of the country, a Socialist-Trade Union alliance might have developed, if not on the German model, at any rate on that of Austria or Belgium. Even as matters were, such an alliance did begin to grow up during the first decade of the twentieth century; but it never covered more than a fraction of the country, and could have little meaning under the conditions which prevailed in the south or in Sicily or even in Sardinia. The Italian Socialist Party, even after its parliamentary representation had ceased to be almost exclusively middle class, remained to a great extent a party of intellectual leaders with no close ties with the mass of the urban workers, and even fewer with the workers of the country areas. There were intellectuals, for example in Sicily, who made great efforts to establish such contacts with the most exploited and backward groups; but for the most part, in the rural areas and in the poverty-stricken towns of the south, from Palermo to Naples, the cross was too wide. Even in the northern cities, where the contacts between intellectuals and workers were much closer, it was not easy to break down barriers between a party represented chiefly by lawyers, journalists, and professors and a workers' movement which felt
the creature of the environment which men have made; but he is also constantly acting upon this environment, and is creator as well as creature in a process of continual reaction between cause and effect. His reactions are not in any way predetermined: he can slip back as well as advance and can fail to make good use of the opportunities that are open to him. The essential condition of progress is a realistic appreciation of the possibilities of the actual situations with which human societies are faced. Like Marx, Labriola dismisses utopianism, which is inconsistent with this realistic approach. We cannot see far into the future, or guide our conduct to good purpose by abstract conceptions of the good. We need to take our chances as they come and to limit our looking forward to what we can see in the past and present as continuing tendencies of which we can make practical use. On this basis Labriola embraces Marx's 'critical' method and finds the notion of proletarian revolution to be justified as an interpretation of actual historical trends. Similarly, he regards progressive socialisation of the means of production as a manifest trend of contemporary economic development and as carrying with it a movement towards a social structure in which the domination of men over men will give place to a classless society resting on equal justice between men and men.

Some may consider that this account of Labriola's views exaggerates his differences with Marx, of whose ideas he was for the most part an interpreter rather than a critic. The 'man' who makes his own history — and can fail to make it well — is, in Labriola's conception, not the individual, but the mass, subject to a common experience of the actual conditions of life. No writer is more severe in his strictures on the 'great man' theory of history. For Labriola, as for Marx, the creative forces in history are classes: it is in the clear statement of this concept above all that he sees the Communist Manifesto as a document of overwhelming historical importance, and he emphasises the point that Marx did no more than state plainly a concept which had its roots in the actual conditions of capitalist society and was bound to find expression in thought as the derivative of living experience. Labriola stressed the point that the bourgeoisie — the capitalist class — and the proletariat are two necessarily co-existent emanations of the capitalist mode of
production, intelligible only if each is studied in relation to the other. His doctrine, fully as much as Marx’s, rested on the conception of class-conflict, and looked to the class, rather than to the individual, to find its way to the new integrated society in which classes would disappear. He also shared entirely Marx’s conception of the State as an organ of class-domination, and looked forward to its disappearance. Indeed, despite his denial of the inevitability of progress, he often wrote as if he considered the advent of the classless society based on social ownership and collective administration as certain, and held only that the precise forms it would take could not be predicted: so that he often appeared to be in agreement on this question with the general run of Marxists. As much as Marx, he believed in ‘historical necessity’. He wrote: ‘Perfect theoretical understanding of Socialism is to-day, as it has been and will always be, in the comprehension of historical necessity, that is to say, in awareness of the manner of its coming to birth’. But he continued to combine this conception of necessity with a view of man’s creative rôle which, if it was not fundamentally different from Marx’s, was nevertheless differently expressed, and seemed to represent human action less as the necessary consequence of inexorable forces bearing upon men than as the outcome of an interaction between these forces and the creative spirit of man.

Labriola’s writings considerably influenced Sorel, and indeed the whole body of intellectual Syndicalist thought. His interpretation of history seemed to give greater scope than Marx’s for the creative rôle of man, and appealed to those who were repelled by the apparently rigid determinism of Marx’s doctrine as expounded in the Communist Manifesto. It also had perhaps some influence on Engels’s less rigid formulation in his later writings. Engels and Labriola corresponded; and some of their letters have been published.

Next to Labriola the most influential theorist of Italian Socialism was his fellow-professor, the criminologist Enrico Ferri (1856–1929), one of the founders of the school of ‘Positive Criminology’. Ferri, like Lombroso, with whom he worked, insisted that scientific criminology must begin by studying the criminal rather than the crime, so as to get down to the psychological and social roots of criminal behaviour. As a Socialist, he insisted that the cause of criminality was to be found largely
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in economic conditions and in the hereditary factors associated with them. As against Lombroso, he laid great stress on the possibility of reforming the criminal by helping him to achieve a better adaptation to his environment; and he also emphasised the importance of social measures designed to prevent crime by affording alternative outlets for potentially criminal drives instead of merely repressing actual criminal conduct. This he called the doctrine of ‘penal substitutes’. Ferri, as Professor of Penal Law at Rome, had a wide influence on criminological theory in Italy; and he also travelled widely spreading the knowledge of his ideas. As a Socialist thinker in other fields, he is much less important. His best known book, *Socialism and Positive Science* (1894), expounds the view that Marxism is to be regarded as the social complement to Darwin’s and Spencer’s teaching on evolution, and that these three men, taken together, constitute the great trinity of nineteenth-century enlightenment. In his evolutionary views, however, he was often nearer to Spencer and to Lamarck than to Darwin, stressing the possibilities of creative adaptation as against those of purely natural selection. Indeed, as we saw, this conception of creative evolution was used by him as the basis for a part of his criminological theory.

As a Socialist, Ferri appeared and made his name as the leader of the Left in the Italian Socialist Party, which he joined in 1893, in opposition to the reformism of Turati. Never a complete ‘Intransigeant’, he was the principal spokesman of the left wing of the ‘Integralist’ faction. For a considerable time he was editor of *Avanti*; but his views gradually changed, and he passed by stages first to the right of the party, and finally out of it. From 1897 onwards he was the leader of the main body of opponents of Turati’s reformism; but, antagonised by the rise of Syndicalism as a force within the party, he joined forces with Turati in 1908 to defeat the Left, leaving Morgari at the head of the Integralist group. In his last days he became a supporter of Fascism.

Filippo Turati (1857–1932), though he ranks among the leading figures of the Italian Socialist intelligentsia, has no claim to be regarded as an original thinker. The review, *Critica sociale*, which he conducted with his wife, the Russian Nihilist refugee, Anna Kuliscioff (1857–1925), was for a very
long period the journal in which Socialist ideas were most seriously ventilated; and Turati was himself no mean writer. But what he had to say was not much. He was convinced that revolutionary tactics were out of date, and that the way forward for Italian Socialism was through parliamentary action designed to ameliorate social conditions and to foster economic development. He believed in building up strong Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies on the Western model, and in forming a close alliance between them and the Socialist Party. His conception of gradualist political action necessarily made him, in view of the undeveloped state of the country, an advocate of co-operation with the bourgeois parties wherever he saw a chance of getting valuable social laws enacted with their aid; and in the Socialist Party he was constantly battling against the Intransigents who demanded that it should keep out of all entanglements with other parties, and also against the Syndicalists, whose conception of Trade Unionism was utterly different from his own. In the Second International his advocacy of joint action with the bourgeois Left threw him into opposition to the main body of Socialist opinion, dominated by the German Social Democrats. Always on the moderate side, he was often out of favour in his own party; but he was a convinced and faithful evolutionary Socialist, and remained so to the end. He opposed the wars in Africa, and differed sharply from the Bissolati group, which supported them. In relation to the Balkan wars he was for strict neutrality; and when world war broke out in 1914 he took the same line, while advocating the formation of an activist bloc of neutral countries to intervene and compel the belligerents to make peace. When Fascism came he opposed it strongly, remaining in Italy until 1926, when he escaped to Corsica and thence proceeded to Paris, where he died six years later.

On the Anarchist side the leading Italian thinkers were Errico Malatesta, whose views were briefly considered in the second volume of this work, and Francesco Merlino, who was praised by Sorel. Merlino was among the Anarchists who attempted to obtain admission to the Guesdist International Socialist Congress at Paris in 1889, but was refused credentials and expelled.

Merlino’s best-known work, *For and Against Socialism,*
appeared in 1897, and was followed by *The Collective Utopia* the next year. Sorel greatly admired Merlino, whose doctrine was a sort of Syndicalist Socialism highly critical of parliamen
tarism and laying the main stress on spontaneity and direct action. Malatesta also tried to secure acceptance as a delegate by the International, but was similarly refused. He was indeed the most uncompromising of all the Anarchists and the most persistent in endeavouring to stir up armed revolts, even when they had not the smallest prospect of success. His social philosophy was closely akin to Bakunin’s: it was Anarchist-Communist rather than industrialist, but with a strong emphasis on the need for positive rebellious action as a means of keeping the spirit of revolt alive.

Of the Syndicalist writers Arturo Labriola is the most important. His first work of substance was *Reform and Social Revolution* (1904), which was followed by a book on Marx as economist and theorist of Socialism (1908). His *Story of Ten Years* (1910), covering the period from 1899 to 1909, is an important historical source, and his *Contemporary Socialism* (1910) the best general exposition of his views. He also wrote a trenchant study on *Socialist Opinion and the War in Tripoli* (1913) and contributed descriptive articles on Italian Socialism to Lagardelle’s *Mouvement socialiste*. He had close connections with Lagardelle’s group in France. He was an advocate of the type of Trade Unionism favoured by Fernand Pelloutier, but was not an out-and-out opponent of political action, though he was very hostile to the kind of parliamentary Socialism repre
tented by such men as Turati.

For a time the great Italian Liberal, Benedetto Croce, (1866–1952), was deeply interested in Marxism; and he, too, was in close touch with Sorel and Lagardelle and with the *Mouvement socialiste*. He wrote in 1907 a celebrated article on Sorel, which appeared as an introduction to the Italian translation of *Reflections on Violence*. Croce’s well-known study, *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx* (1900), was translated into French with an introduction by Sorel and appeared also in English. Croce’s masters in historical thinking were, of course, not Marx, but Francisco De Sanctis and, further back, Vico. But he approached the study of Marx’s theory of history with much sympathy for its emphasis on the evolution of the
‘powers of production’ and for its attempt to formulate a scientific conception. His influence mingled with Antonio Labriola’s in giving a humanistic twist to a good deal of Italian Socialist thought.

An Italian economist who, though not a Socialist, was considerably influenced by Socialist ideas is Achille Loria (1857–1943), whose *Analysis of Capitalist Property* (1889) brought much grist to the Socialist mill. Loria was a strong critic of the capitalist system, and particularly of the exploitation of the producers by the extraction of rent. His remedies, however, were sought in the diffusion of property and in the abolition of rent, rather than in socialisation; and though he paid warm tribute to the Socialists for their critiques of capitalist society, he rejected their conclusions.
CHAPTER XX

SPAIN

Throughout the period of the Second International the Spanish Socialist Party, led by Pablo Iglesias, offered the altogether curious spectacle of an exceedingly moderate and constitutional party operating in an environment of extreme lawlessness and violence. Closely connected with it was a Trade Union movement — the General Union of Workers (U.G.T.) — which for the most part shared its moderation and did its best to follow peaceable methods of collective bargaining — when it was allowed to do so. But the U.G.T. had only a very limited following: in 1910 its membership was only 42,000 in all, and its influence was confined to certain particular areas — notably Castile, Bilbao, and the Asturias. Side by side with it was a much larger rival Trade Union movement, with its central point of focus in Barcelona and with important associations with the continuously revolutionary rural movements of Andalusia. This rival Trade Union movement went under a succession of names: not until 1911 did it become fully constituted as the National Confederation of Labour (C.N.T.), but it had existed for a long time before. At no time is it possible to say how much larger than the U.G.T. it was, for in relation to it statistics of membership have no real meaning. What can be said is that it was capable of very rapid growth and decline, and that at any moment its influence extended far beyond those who were actually contributing to its funds. Indeed, it hardly had any funds. It paid no benefits, employed practically no salaried officials, and conducted its affairs with the barest minimum of formal organisation. Its leadership was throughout predominantly Anarchist; and the Anarchists who inspired its policies acted together as a group. But there was no named or publicly constituted central Anarchist organisation: the celebrated Iberian Anarchist Federation (F.A.I.) was not established formally until 1927. Till then the Anar-
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Anarchists were organised in small, for the most part secret, groups, held together by a network of journals, which continually vanished and reappeared and were in many cases clandestinely circulated, and by entirely informal underground juntas of professional revolutionaries who made up in energy and determination for their deliberate want of systematic organisation.

During the latter part of the period dealt with in this chapter — that is, during the decade before 1914 — this second movement, centred upon the Trade Unions which went to form the C.N.T., was increasingly subject to French influences. Within the ranks of Spanish Anarchism there appeared a body of Anarcho-Syndicalists who sought to stress the need for building up continuous mass-support among the workers by active participation in an organised Trade Union movement, as against the policy of relying on a small revolutionary elite to put itself at the head of every spontaneous outbreak of industrial or peasant unrest. The main issue between the two schools of thought turned on the part to be played in the Trade Unions by the conscious Anarchists. The Anarcho-Syndicalists held that the Anarchists should participate in the day-to-day work of the Unions and should be prepared to make the compromises involved in representing the workers in their daily struggles; whereas the ‘pure’ Anarchists, though ready enough to throw themselves into industrial and peasant conflicts, held that this should be done always with the immediate purpose of giving such conflicts a revolutionary character. There was no sharp line between the two groups; but undoubtedly, under the influence of French Syndicalism, the emphasis shifted during the early years of the century more and more towards Anarcho-Syndicalism, and therewith towards the attempt to build up both a more comprehensive form of Trade Union, resting on an inclusive class-basis, and a more continuous structure of organisation within each large industrial establishment and between the distinct occupational groups within each centre of population.

In Spain, then, the left wing of the working-class movement was Anarchist or Anarcho-Syndicalist and the right wing Socialist. In Madrid, in Bilbao, in the Asturias, and in a few other areas the Socialists were predominant, though not
UNCHALLENGED. On the other hand, in Catalonia, the most highly industrialised part of the country, and for the most part in the rest of the east and in the south, Anarchism predominated, and was strong not only among industrial workers but also among peasants and landless labourers in the country districts — above all, in that perpetual home of misery and tumult, Andalusia. There were other areas in which neither Anarchists nor Socialists had much hold — for example, Catholic, Carlist Navarre and most of the Basque country and a good deal of the arid central part of Spain — Old and New Castile and León — and, save at exceptional moments, most of Extremadura in the west and Galicia in the extreme north-west. The hold of the Catholic Church on the people was much greatest in the north, except in Catalonia. This hold spread down into Aragon, but there met a strong Anarchist influence centred on Saragossa. Over most of the rest of the country the Church was intensely unpopular — even detested by the main body of the poor, as well as by a high proportion of the intellectuals. The Army was traditionally anti-clerical, though markedly less so after the Carlist Wars of the 1870s, at the end of which the Carlist officers were largely incorporated into the national army.

The conditions of agriculture and of land tenure were widely different from area to area. The south-west and the southern part of the central plateau (that is, Extremadura, Western Andalusia, and La Mancha) made up the area of the vast latifundia owned and farmed (or left uncultivated) by the great landowners, who could at any time starve out their wretched populations by refusing to make use of the land. The rest of the south, most of the east, and the northern part of the central plateau were mainly in the hands of landowners owning less vast domains, and letting most of them out in small farms on very short leases which gave the tenants neither the means nor the inducement to improve the land. Most of this area was short of rainfall and subject to seasons of destructive drought, which made arable cultivation highly precarious and exposed the unfortunate peasants to appalling hardships in bad times. But even in the south and still more along the east coast — the Levante — there were enclaves of well-watered fertile soil, especially round Valencia; and in these districts holdings were more productive, leases longer, and the tenants a great deal better
off than elsewhere. Similar conditions existed over a large part of the north — middle-sized farms and long leases; but in the north-west, in Galicia, the land was divided into tiny plots off which the tenants could barely live, and in the wine districts of Aragon and Catalonia there were special grievances connected with an obsolete system of leases that bore hardly on the security of the peasant growers. These differences of agricultural conditions and of land tenure go far to explain the widely different social attitudes and behaviour of the peasants in the various regions. Small farms on short leases, especially in areas subject to drought, meant the most violent forms of agrarian disturbance: great latifundia meant, because of the relative helplessness of the inhabitants, more occasional but no less violent outbreaks. More adequate holdings with better rainfall and reasonably long leases usually meant much less disturbed rural conditions, but also made the peasantry more capable of sustained organisation where they had a real grievance.

Spain was, of course, — and indeed is to-day — mainly an agricultural country, with most of its land worked, if at all, at very low standards of efficiency, because the landlords put no capital into the land, and the actual cultivators had none to put. The landowners, whether they were aristocrats or bourgeois from the towns, were mostly mere rent-takers: in the north, to a considerable extent, receiving their rents in kind as a share of the produce, but on the central plateau and further south more and more as money payments for short leases. Everywhere, save in a few fortunate areas, the land was grossly under-capitalised, and only the most primitive farm implements were in use. Huge tracts lay uncultivated, and peasants who attempted to use them were driven off again and again by violence. Agrarian warfare was endemic, and had been for centuries: the State confronted the peasant almost exclusively as the policeman of the landowning classes who controlled it.

Catalonia, we have seen, was the most highly industrialised part of Spain, and the main provider of consumers' goods to the Spanish market. The other important industrial centres were engaged principally in mining and metal-working — Bilbao and the Asturias mining areas in the north, Rio Tinto in the south-west, and the mining district near Cordova. Foreign capital was increasingly interested in mines and metal-working:
Catalonia was the centre of a native capitalism which invested its surplus funds outside as well as within its own region — for example, in banking and in electrical development. The Basques, too, were enterprising in finance as well as in industry, whereas the Castilians who dominated the central Government were essentially rentiers. Madrid was never a really important industrial centre: even its Labour movement tended to be dominated by the black-coated proletarians and the artisans of the older crafts.

Barcelona was, in a real sense, Spain’s economic capital; but the political centre was Madrid, not only in the sense that Madrid was the seat of government, but also because it stood for centralisation against the intense regionalism of a large part of the country. Castile was the unifying centre, always seeking to impress itself on the fissiparousness of the outer provinces. During the period under review in this chapter nationalism was gathering force not only in Catalonia but also in the Basque country. In other areas, what held sway was not nationalism but an intense localism which flared up at every moment of stress. In Andalusia, in the Levante, and in Aragon — and indeed in many other areas — there was an instinctive readiness in times of trouble to proclaim the entire independence of the local commune or of the region. That was what occurred in 1873, almost simultaneously with the proclamation of the Federal Republic after the withdrawal of Amadeo of Savoy. What was then proclaimed was indeed a federal State, and its first President, Francisco Pi y Margall, was the leader of a Federalist Party which upheld the principle of regional autonomy against the centralising tendency of the Castilian monarchy. Pi y Margall had himself translated Proudhon’s _Du principe fédératif_ and had written and spoken eloquently against the abuses of centralised power. But he did not want Spain to fall altogether apart into a number of separate States, or a much greater number of independent local communes. The instinct, however, of almost any group outside central Spain, on finding itself relieved of external pressures and momentarily master in its own house, was to declare itself entirely self-governing and to set about re-ordering its local affairs with very little regard for what might be taking place elsewhere. This statement needs qualification in relation to the
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Carlist areas — Navarre, the Basque country, and parts of Aragon — which were Royalist-Catholic as well as Regional-Nationalist, and wanted full autonomy under a Catholic monarchy. These areas were already in rebellion when the Federal Republic was set up: it was Eastern and Southern Spain that fell to pieces and, by its reversion to sheer localism, laid the road open to the army to bring back the monarchy in the person of Alfonso XII.

In the second volume of this work something was said of the history of the First International in the Iberian peninsula. We saw then how Bakunin’s emissary, the Italian engineer, Giuseppe Fanelli (1826-1877), visiting Spain in 1868, planted the seed of the International in both Barcelona and Madrid, at the very moment when the expulsion of Queen Isabella had put the entire future government of the country — and indeed its entire social structure — into the melting-pot. In that upset the workers in the towns acquired for the time being a large freedom to form associations openly, and in both Barcelona and Madrid there emerged federal groupings as well as clubs of particular trades. In and around Barcelona the textile workers took the lead in forming a federal combination: in Madrid the printers were the most articulate group. In both areas the I.W.M.A. Sections formed under Fanelli’s influence were at the outset quite small groups, distinct from the embryonic Trade Unions that were being started in a number of trades. But in Barcelona particularly the Trade Unions speedily began to identify themselves with the International. The Federal Centre of Workers’ Societies which had been formed there joined the I.W.M.A. in 1869, and two years later the Manufacturing Union of the Three Classes, the new society of the textile workers, declared its solidarity with the International. By 1870 a Spanish Regional Federation of the I.W.M.A. had been fully constituted, with its headquarters at Barcelona, and the inner circle of Bakuninists had founded some sort of secret Brotherhood or Alliance through which they hoped to direct and control the movement.

That year the Army and the Liberals made Amadeo, of the anti-clerical House of Savoy, King of Spain, and attempted to institute a constitutional monarchy. Early the following year there were big strikes in Barcelona, resulting in considerable
gains to the workers; but the Government, seeking to restore order, began arresting and prosecuting the workers’ leaders. The I.W.M.A. Council, in order to evade arrest, moved in a body to Portugal, where they succeeded in setting up a Portuguese Section. By August they were back again; and in September the Spanish Regional Federation of the I.W.M.A. held at Valencia a full Congress, at which it decided to subdivide Spain into five regions linked together by a common federal bureau and to establish Unions of particular trades and industries within the general organisation.

In January 1872 the Liberal Minister, Sagasta, ordered the dissolution of the I.W.M.A. as an unlawful organisation, as the legalisation of Trade Unions introduced in 1868 was limited to bodies which had no foreign affiliations. The I.W.M.A. leaders thereupon formed a secret body of Defenders of the International; but in practice the dissolution made little difference, and the Spanish Federation continued to operate openly as before. In April 1872 it held a Congress at Saragossa, at which a series of resolutions drawn up by Bakunin were passed.

Up to this point the Spaniards had been hardly affected by the great dispute that was rending the International asunder. The Spanish Region had been founded under Bakuninist influence, and no Marxist emissary had made his appearance. For once, Barcelona and Madrid had appeared to be working amicably together. That, however, was soon changed after the arrival in Madrid, near the end of 1871, of Marx’s Creole son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, as a refugee from the Paris Commune. Lafargue came to Spain with a definite mission from Marx and Engels to wage war upon Bakunin’s followers; and he began at once to intrigue against the dominant group. In Barcelona, where the heart of the movement was, he could make no headway; but he managed to bring over to Marx’s side a group of Madrid Internationalists and to secure control of the journal, La Emancipación, which they had started, under José Mesa’s editorship, in June 1871. Anselmo Lorenzo (1841–1914), who had represented Spain at the London I.W.M.A. Conference that year, was uncompromisingly Bakuninist; and the struggle was soon fairly joined in Madrid between the rival groups. At the Hague Congress of 1872 there were five delegates who purported to represent Spain. Only one of them,
Lafargue, voted on the Marxist side. The others—Rafael Farga-Pellicer (1844–90) (the former priest), Nicola Alonso Marselau, Tomás González Morago, and the Frenchman, Charles Alerini—were all Bakuninists. Two of them, Morago and Farga-Pellicer, went on to the International Anarchist Congress at St.-Imier.

Meanwhile, by June 1872, Lafargue and his group, known from their journal as the ‘Emancipation Group’, had been expelled from the Madrid Section of the I.W.M.A. and had established a ‘New Madrid Section’ of their own on Marxist principles. This New Section was in fact the direct ancestor of the Spanish Socialist Party. It included, besides Lafargue, most of the group who were to become the leaders of Spanish Socialism in its long struggle against Anarchist predominance. Among them was the compositor, Pablo Iglesias (1850–1925), who was to lead the Socialist Party for so many years; but at the outset the leading figure was José Mesa (1829–98), who later settled in Paris as a journalist and, becoming closely associated with Jules Guesde, fed Iglesias steadily with French Marxist material and largely stamped a Guesdist character on the new Spanish Socialist Party. Other leading figures included Francisco Mora, the historian of the Spanish Socialist Party and for some time its secretary, and Juan José Morato Caldeiro (b. 1864), who survived to write a life of Iglesias and a book about the party in 1931.

In December 1872, at the Cordova Congress of the Spanish I.W.M.A., this group unsuccessfully fought the Anarchists, who were headed by Lorenzo, Morago, Farga-Pellicer and Fermín Salvochea (1842–1907). The decision was unequivocal: the Madrid ‘Minoritaires’ found very little support elsewhere. But the Cordova Congress, though determinedly anti-parliamentary, was content to adopt a quite moderate programme, differing little in its main social demands from that of Pi y Margall’s Federalists. Its principal features were the eight hours’ day, improved sanitary conditions in factories, and universal free and secular education. Its Anarchism came out rather in its refusal to endow its elected central committee with any powers over its regional and local groups. Like the International Congress at St.-Imier, it would consent to no more than a central Correspondence Bureau, devoid of executive authority. Spontaneous local action, freely co-ordinated on
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the spur of the moment, was to be the order of the day.

The Marxists, seceding from the main Spanish organisation of the I.W.M.A., held a meeting of their own at Valencia in January 1873 and proceeded to set up a separate Spanish Federation, which held a Congress in May at Toledo, but speedily disappeared. Before this the elections held in March 1873 had yielded a Republican majority; and in June the Federal Republic was proclaimed with Pi y Margall at its head, only to dissolve almost instantly in face of the Cantonalist movement. There were risings over a large part of the country; and in many areas, including Barcelona and Carthagena, the local insurgents, instead of rallying to the Federal Republic, proclaimed the complete independence of their own communities. Pi y Margall was deposed from office, and the Government forces bombarded Carthagena, where the most energetic revolutionary movement had installed itself. In January 1874, on the morrow of General Pavia’s coup d’état, the Spanish I.W.M.A. was again dissolved, and what was left of it driven underground. Centres of working-class activity, such as the Workers’ Athenaeum, were closed down, and many local centres of Trade Unionism were broken up. In June the remnants of the I.W.M.A. were able to hold a secret Congress in Madrid; but before the end of the year military risings brought the Republic to an end. Alfonso XII was proclaimed king; and the moderate Conservative Antonio Canovas del Castillo began his long period of political ascendancy. Two years later the Carlist War ended, and Spain was reunited under monarchical rule.

During the period of the Savoy monarchy and of the Federal Republic there had been no unity between the Radical, anti-clerical, Republican politicians and the leaders of the chaotic working-class and peasant movements which found partial expression in the support given to the I.W.M.A. The principal difference between Federalists and Internationalists was one, not of programme, but of composition and method. The Federalists were politicians and drew their backing mainly from the intelligentsia and the middle classes: they had little popular following, though a good many of them were Socialists of a sort — largely disciples or half-disciples of Proudhon. The Internationalists, on the other hand, were essentially a
working-class group, though they included a few intellectuals. Their backing was at this stage mainly among urban workers, though they were already beginning to make links with areas of agrarian discontent. They were not politicians, and had for the most part no use for the intellectual bourgeoisie, though they shared, and indeed exceeded, its hostility to the Catholic Church. They were rebels against authority; and their chosen terrain of rebellion was the factory or the rural community, in which their strength lay, and not the political arena, in which they were nothing. They did not wish to make a new State, even on a federal foundation, but to destroy the political authority which had always trampled hard upon them and been used against them in the service of the landowning and employing classes. Pi y Margall and his Federals no doubt wanted quite sincerely many of the things they wanted — fundamental land reform, universal secular education, and the destruction of the central bureaucracy. But Pi y Margall believed in acting gradually and constitutionally, and without violence: he was distrustful of the effects of force, and prepared to wait. They, on the other hand, saw around them sufferers who could not afford to wait; and violence was the only way they knew of for getting any attention paid to them. Nor did they believe that Pi y Margall and his followers, however sincere they might be, were in the least likely to get their way with any sort of State or Parliament. At any moment a military pronunciamento might end the Federal Republic just as easily as it had driven Isabella from the throne. Accordingly their task, as they saw it, was to do all that in them lay to break and dissipate the central power and, by taking control into their own hands locally, to annihilate authority by sharing it out among all.

From 1874 to 1881 the I.W.M.A. maintained only a shadowy existence. Juan Oliva Moncasi’s (1855–79) attempt to kill the king in 1878 was followed by mass arrests of suspected Anarchists, and in Andalusia by a reign of terror. As at other times of severe repression, the left wing reacted by resorting to terrorist tactics. The I.W.M.A. Conferences of 1878 and 1879 endorsed terrorist action and reprisals against the ruling classes by burning buildings and farms. In 1880 there were extensive strikes and peasant disturbances in Catalonia and in the south; and in Catalonia the Government retaliated by suppressing the
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Trade Unions. But such suppressions never had any lasting effect. Early the next year Sagasta's Liberal Government again allowed Trade Unions. The old I.W.M.A., which had fallen into discredit and no longer had any real representative character, held a final Conference, and dissolved, only to be born again in September at Barcelona under the new name of the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region. The following year there was a rapid growth of organisation: the Seville Congress of that year was marked by sharp differences between Catalonian moderates and Andalusian terrorists; but no actual split occurred. The same year, however, a southern group, centred on Jerez, broke away under the name of 'the Disinherited'; but the Catalonian Manufacturing Union, the main organisation of the Barcelona factory workers, held firm. In 1883 came the much publicised affair of the Mano Negra (Black Hand) in the Jerez area. It remains uncertain to this day how much truth there was (or even whether there was any at all) in the allegations of a gigantic Anarchist conspiracy of murder and rapine that were made by the authorities and used as a basis for mass condemnations of Anarchist suspects; but it seems to be beyond question that agents provocateurs were very active and that a great many of the charges were entirely trumped up. At any rate, the survivors who were held in prison were at length set free in 1903. The Valencia Congress of 1883 condemned the terrorists, who thereupon seceded, and did their best to continue with their extremist policy.

In 1885 Alfonso XII died, leaving a small boy as his heir, and the Queen Mother, Maria Cristina, became Regent. The politicians, scared by the danger of a royal minority, entered into the Pact of El Pardo, by which they in effect agreed to share power through alternating Liberal and Conservative Cabinets. The Liberal, Sagasta, took office, and proceeded at once to adopt a conciliatory policy, which included greater freedom for the press and for the organisation of Trade Unions. Five years later Sagasta went on to institute manhood suffrage, whereas previously the workers, who were mostly illiterate, had been almost entirely without votes. But whereas in other countries the adoption of manhood suffrage profoundly altered the electoral situation, in Spain it had for a long time practically no effect. To all intents and purposes the Government continued
to manage the elections as it pleased, to the extent of deciding centrally who were to be elected, not only for its own party, but also to represent the recognised opposition groups. The methods by which this singular result was achieved differed from area to area. In the larger towns it was done chiefly by manipulating the electoral lists or, where that was not enough, by simply miscounting the votes and destroying unwanted voting papers. In the small towns and country areas the main method was that of straight intimidation. The Government used as its electoral agents local managers, who came to be known as caciques — usually landowners or other prominent citizens. The cacique’s business was to ensure that the electors voted for the candidates whom the Government wished to see returned; and he did this largely by threatening tenants with eviction and employed persons with the loss of their jobs if they voted amiss. So effectively was this intimidation practised that it was no rare event for districts seething with unrest obediently to return the very persons against whom they were in revolt. The system of political representation was reduced to a complete farce; and its discredit naturally reinforced the anti-parliamentary feelings that were already strong among the poorer classes. The few Radicals who were elected were those whom the Government wished to have in the Cortes to make opposition speeches, provided it could be sure that they did not represent any powerful forces in the country. This remarkable system, which depended on the virtually absolute power of the landlords in most of the rural areas and on the authority of the Government over the municipal councils which drew up the voting lists in the towns, actually lasted on right into the twentieth century, though in its latter days it became more difficult to work.

In the 1890s, despite the nominal existence of manhood suffrage, no working-class representative stood the smallest chance of being elected, even to a municipal council. Accordingly, for the most part, the working-class movement pursued its activities entirely apart from electoral politics, and was the more ready to accept Anarchist leadership. In these circumstances it is even remarkable that political Socialism was able to find any following, and that there developed in Spain a Socialist Party firmly committed to parliamentary and municipal
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action and doing its best to reproduce under utterly different conditions the policies and methods of German Social Democracy as interpreted in France by the Marxist followers of Jules Guesde. The Spanish Socialist Labour Party was actually founded, as a secret body, in 1879, largely out of members of the Madrid Compositors' Trade Union, in which Pablo Iglesias was the leading figure. It had also a small number of middle-class adherents, mainly doctors and journalists; but its main membership developed at first among the skilled artisans. In 1882, when Sagasta’s Cabinet took office, it emerged into the open, and adopted a formal constitution; but its spread was slow and mainly in the early stages in Castile and a few places elsewhere. In Catalonia it could find hardly any support. In 1886, after the period of repression associated with the Black Hand had ended, it came back into the open, and founded *El Socialista* as its Madrid organ. But at the same time it suffered a secession, most of its intellectual supporters, headed by the scientist Jaime Vera, dropping away. It was left as a small party mainly of manual workers belonging to small isolated craft Unions, and with very little influence outside the capital.

At this point, in accordance with orthodox Social Democratic theory, Iglesias and his group decided to set up a Trade Union organisation closely subordinated to the party, though nominally independent of it. In 1888 they persuaded a number of small Trade Unionist groups to establish a General Union of Workers — the U.G.T. The chief promoters of the new body, with Iglesias, were Francisco Mora, already mentioned, and García Quejido, both of whom lived on to pass over later into the Communist Party. But the U.G.T. was from the outset as moderate a body as the intransigence of the Spanish employing classes allowed it to be; and for a long time it was in effect much more an auxiliary of the Socialist Party than an independent industrial organisation. Only in the twentieth century did it become important industrially, when it had spread to Bilbao and the Asturias mining region in the north and to the southern mining areas. In Catalonia it never gained much hold. At the outset it made an effort to induce the Catalanian textile workers to come in; but they remained aloof, though the U.G.T. held its constituent Congress in Barcelona in an endeavour to enlist support.
Meanwhile, the old I.W.M.A. group was breaking up. The Anarchists held an International Anarchist Congress at Barcelona in 1885; but thereafter the movement disintegrated, and by 1888 the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region was extinct. But instead of joining the U.G.T., which had its headquarters, but little following, in Barcelona, the majority of the Catalonian Trade Unions came together in 1888 in a Pact of Union and Solidarity, which was in effect a new federal organisation on more definitely Trade Union lines; and at the same time the Anarchists founded a separate Anarchist Organisation of the Spanish Region, resting entirely on individual membership. This dual organisation was to continue in being under a succession of names throughout the ensuing period and indeed right up to the 1930s. Both the new bodies soon spread beyond Catalonia: the inaugural meeting of the Anarchists was held at Valencia, and the Pact of Union and Solidarity was soon extending to other areas in the east and south.

The year of Sagasta's electoral reform law — 1890 — was one of considerable unrest both in industrial Catalonia and in rural Andalusia. There were general strikes in Barcelona and in other centres for the eight hours' day — partly in response to the decisions of the International Socialist and Trade Union Congresses held in Paris in 1889; and there were also widespread rural strike movements based on demands for land reform. But no sooner had Sagasta passed his electoral law than he was forced by the Crown and the army leaders, under threat of a military putsch, to give place to a Conservative administration. Canovas replaced him at the head of the Government, and the familiar methods of electoral manipulation were used as fully as ever. In these circumstances the mainly Anarchist-led Trade Unions attached to the regional Pacts of Union and Solidarity invited the U.G.T. to a joint Congress to consider the calling of a nation-wide general strike. A few of the Socialist Trade Unions attended the Congress, but in accordance with the decision of the Socialist Party they opposed the political use of the strike weapon. The Socialists had decided in 1890, on the enactment of the new electoral law, to take part in parliamentary elections; and they now declared themselves hostile to the general strike as a political weapon and in due course sent their delegates to the Brussels
International Socialist Congress of 1891 with instructions to vote against it. During the next two years they proceeded to work out a municipal programme as a basis for the contesting of local elections. The Unions belonging to the Pact of Solidarity, on the other hand, went on to declare further demonstration general strikes for the eight hours’ day in Barcelona, Saragossa, and other centres in May, 1891.

At this point there began, chiefly in Barcelona, a series of bomb-throwings which led to severe repression of Anarchist activities. The incidents began with the throwing of a bomb at the Fomento, the headquarters of the Barcelona employers’ organisation; and this was followed by a sequence of disorders in the course of which rival gunmen murdered in the streets those whom they had been engaged to kill, and a surprising number of bombs went off in unlikely places — mostly without anyone being hurt. It was widely suspected that a good many of these singularly ineffective bombs were thrown, not by Anarchists, but by *provocateurs* in the pay of the employers or of the authorities, though it was clear that the shootings were inspired from both sides. They resulted in the passing, in 1894 and 1896, of new and more stringent laws against Anarchism, under which a number of leading Anarchists were executed, especially in Barcelona. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War produced a fresh crop of disturbances, partly anti-militarist and partly directed against sharply rising prices. The loss of most of Spain’s overseas empire cost the established régime much of its prestige, and stimulated the growth of both Anarchist and Socialist sentiment. In 1898 the Socialist Party put up its first candidates for the Cortes — without success; and in 1899 *El Socialista* was able to become a daily newspaper. In the rival camp a fresh Pact of Union and Solidarity was drawn up in 1900 at a Congress held at Madrid, which also decided to reconstitute the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region.

During the next few years there was a further series of strikes, mainly for higher wages to meet the rising cost of living and, on May Days, for the eight hours’ day. In 1901 a strike on the Barcelona tramways developed into a general strike, which then spread to other areas. In the following year the Barcelona metal-workers struck, but were defeated, and as a
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sequel to this defeat took the initiative in forming a fresh general combination, called Solidaridad Obrera (Labour Solidarity). In 1903 there were extensive strike movements in Andalusia. In the meantime, in 1902, Alfonso XIII, on reaching the age of 16, had assumed his royal powers, and at once began to assert himself, not so much in pursuance of any definite policy as against his ministers. He soon showed that he took a delight in power for its own sake and liked best to exercise it by keeping his cabinets on tenterhooks under continual threat of dismissal. One Government succeeded another in quick succession, and no consistent policy could be pursued. There was, indeed, during these years a considerable body of social legislation, largely drafted by an Institute of Social Reforms, which was set up in 1903; but most of it was never put into practical effect. With weaker Government action, Anarchist activity in the Trade Unions revived. In 1904 a Congress called in the name of the Federation of Workers of the Spanish Region discussed the question of the general strike, which was then under debate at the International Socialist Congress, and vehemently approved the policy; but the following year's drought brought with it widespread harvest failures and rural distress so acute as to bring the agricultural strikes to a halt. There were food riots in the towns, accompanied by more vigorous repression; and in 1906, on the pretext that the army had been insulted by the left-wing press, the military leaders insisted on the Government passing the Law of Jurisdictions, under which it was made possible for all offences against the armed forces to be tried by courts-martial instead of in the civil courts. About this time Solidaridad Obrera began to spread, first from Barcelona to the rest of Catalonia, and then to the neighbouring districts, and there was a renewal of industrial conflict. Thereupon ensued, from 1907 to 1909, an extraordinary reign of terror in Barcelona.

At this point it becomes necessary to say something of the special conditions which existed in Catalonia, which was both Spain's principal industrial region and the home of a strong movement of autonomist nationalism. Up to the end of the Carlist Wars in 1876 the country districts of Catalonia had been predominantly Carlist, and the upper classes throughout the region had taken the same side. After the defeat of the Carlists, both the gentry and the intellectuals tended towards Catalan
nationalism, which took shape first as a literary and cultural movement for the revival of the Catalan language and traditional arts. But soon the movement began to take, in addition, a political form. The Catalan industrialists, dependent on the highly protected Spanish market, had no wish to part company with the rest of Spain; but many of them came to share the desire for the restoration of the local liberties which had been reduced after the second Carlist War, and especially of full freedom to use the Catalan language in the schools. For the most part the nationalist movement which grew up in the 1880s and 1890s was traditionalist and conservative, and strongly hostile to the anarchistic, anti-religious movement which had its following among the industrial workers — many of them immigrants from other parts of Spain. But there was also a Catalan Nationalist left wing, headed by Valentin Almirall, formerly a follower of Pi y Margall — who was himself a Catalanian. In 1886 Almirall published his famous book, *Lo Catalanisme*, which became the gospel of popular Nationalism in the area; and in 1892 both wings of Catalanian Nationalists united to draw up a programme, the *Bases de Manresa*, of demands for regional autonomy. Two years later Enrique Prat de la Riba (1870–1917) founded his journal, *Renaixensa*, as the organ of the cultural movement. It was not, however, until after the defeat of Spain in the American War that Catalanian Nationalism became a powerful political force. It then became organised in the Lliga, led by the great industrialist, Francisco Cambo, who was both a banker and the head both of Fomento, the Union of Catalanian employers, and of Chade, the main Spanish electrical concern. The Lliga was a right-wing party, at war both with the Catalanian working-class and republican movements and with the centralisers of Madrid. In opposition to it there at once grew up a powerful, anti-clerical, Radical Party, led by the demagogue, Alejandro Lerroux (b. 1860); and this party was allowed to conduct, without police interference, a violent campaign in the hope that, as a force hostile to Catalanian Nationalism, it would hold the Lliga in check and thus serve the interests of the central Government. In 1903 Lerroux's Radicals succeeded in defeating the Lliga at the Catalanian elections; but two years later this verdict was reversed when the central Government, now in Conservative
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hands, withdrew its support. The Lliga, however, soon fell foul of the central Government, which, at the instance of the army, passed the Law of Jurisdictions, making all alleged offences against the armed forces subject to trial by court-martial. As the army was strongly centralist by tradition and bitterly hostile to Catalan Nationalism, this law put into the hands of the military forces stationed in Barcelona a most dangerous power, which could be used to suppress the freedom of speech of journalists and orators. The effect of its enactment was to drive the Catalan political parties into an alliance, Solidaridad Catalana, with the Lliga at its head; and this alliance swept the polls at the elections of 1907. The Conservative Prime Minister at Madrid, Maura, promised the Lliga a moderate measure of autonomy, and announced his intention of establishing a system of free national elections; but he could not get his bill through the Cortes, and his Home Secretary, La Cierva, far from acting up to his leader’s word, proceeded to carry electoral corruption still further and allowed the army and the special police at Barcelona to launch an extraordinary reign of terror against the autonomists. For more than two years Barcelona was at the mercy of gunmen who were, in many cases, found to be in the pay of the police. Leaders of the right-wing Lliga, as well as Republicans and Anarchists, were assassinated in the streets; and soon rival gangs drawn from the ranks of the unemployed were carrying out reprisals. The leading gangster, Juan Rull, was finally brought to trial and executed in 1908, and it was fully proved that many of his crimes had been committed while he was in police pay. In this atmosphere gangsterism spread from group to group. Lerroux’s Radicals, whose anti-clericalism was extreme, threw up a subsidiary organisation, the Young Barbarians, and launched attacks on priests and churches; and Anarchist groups also joined in, though they seem to have played only a minor part. The press, however, both in Spain and abroad, attributed the reign of violence to the Anarchists, who were, in fact, much more its victims.

After Rull’s execution there was a lull; but in 1909 matters were brought to a climax. The Spanish forces suffered a serious reverse in Morocco; and the Government, in order to replenish the ranks for the carrying on of the third Moroccan War, called
up the Catalonian reservists, who were mostly married men. This brought the working classes into the field; for the war was intensely unpopular. The Anarchists, Syndicalists, and Socialists formed a joint committee of resistance; and Solidaridad Obrera decided to call a general strike. There were great street demonstrations against the war; and the Young Barbarians joined in with an orgy of church-burning and attacks on priests and nuns. This was Barcelona's 'Bloody Week'. The police and the soldiers met the strike and the rioting with shootings and with mass-arrests, not only of those involved but of anyone they chose to suspect of spreading subversive opinions. Among those arrested was the celebrated anti-clerical educational reformer, Francisco Ferrer y Guardia (1859–1909), the founder and leader of the Spanish Modern School movement. Ferrer had actually been away in England at the time of the riots, with which he had nothing to do; but he was summarily court-martialled and shot in the Castle of Montjuich, the military stronghold which dominated Barcelona. Ferrer's execution, and the entire conduct of the authorities during the troubles, provoked a sharp revulsion of feeling. Maura's Government was forced to resign; and the Liberal Government under Canalejas, which succeeded it, compelled the army and the police to abandon their worst excesses. Canalejas also got through the Cortes a statute giving a measure of autonomy to the Catalonian Generalidad; and the excitement gradually died down.

One important consequence of the events of 1909 was to force the Spanish Socialist Party, which had hitherto rejected all alliances with the bourgeois parties, into an electoral pact with the Republicans. Another was to destroy the working-class following of Lerroux's Radical Party; and yet another was to induce the Anarchists, who had stood aloof from previous contests and had urged their followers not to vote, to do their best to bring the workers to the poll in support of the Socialist and Republican candidates. Under these changed circumstances the Socialist Party secured its first, solitary representative in the Cortes, Iglesias being elected in 1910 for Madrid with the support of Republican as well as Socialist and Anarchist voters. At this election the old system of Government manipulation of the voting lists and of intimidation through the
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The powers behind the Government — though not either most of the church dignitaries or the great landowners or employers — realised the need for making at any rate some concessions to popular sentiment. Canalejas passed some more industrial laws, which were little observed, and made some concessions to regionalist claims. But he found himself at once involved in a struggle with the Church over education and other issues; and in face of growing obstruction from the upper classes he was able to achieve very little. In 1912 he was assassinated, after he had attempted to take strong action against the growing Syndicalist movement.

The events of 1909 had a great influence on the working-class movement, especially in Catalonia. While the Socialist Party allied itself with the Republican Left in the struggle against the war and the Church, the Trade Unions went through a process of domestic reorganisation and rapid expansion. The Socialist U.G.T., which had been drawn into the common struggle, experienced a great increase of membership and spread into a number of areas in which it had previously had little or no following — especially into the mining areas of the Asturias and Rio Tinto, and into León and the country round Bilbao, but also into a number of agricultural districts in the central part of Spain. The U.G.T. did not change its essential character: it continued to be a moderate body, organised in separate craft or industrial Unions, wherever possible on a national basis, and modelling itself on the centralised Trade Union movements of the more advanced countries. But in the circumstances of the time it necessarily became more militant in response to popular feeling, and was drawn into movements launched by the more militant Syndicalist groups.

The great change, however, took place in the organisation of the much larger bodies of Trade Unionists who were outside the U.G.T. In Catalonia, and to a smaller extent in other areas, many of these had been loosely grouped in the movement known as Solidaridad Obrera, largely under Anarchist or semi-Anarchist influence. In 1910, as an immediate sequel to the events of the previous year, the great majority of the Unions outside the U.G.T. drew together in a nation-wide federation
— the National Confederation of Labour (C.N.T.), which thenceforth confronted the U.G.T. as a much more numerous body based on a radically different theory of Trade Union organisation and action. Even before the C.N.T. had been fully constituted there was a wave of strikes which spread rapidly over the country during 1911. Barcelona, exhausted by its ordeal, was relatively quiet; but near by, at Saragossa, an Anarchist stronghold, there was a general strike which turned into an insurrection, and was put down by armed force. Further south, at Valencia, the workers proclaimed an independent Commune. Relatively peaceable Bilbao had its first general strike; and there, as in a number of other places, the U.G.T. was drawn in against its leaders’ will. The Canalejas Government found itself forced to take strong measures against the strikers, and in September 1911 ordered the dissolution of the C.N.T., which had just been holding its constituent Congress at Barcelona. But the only effect of this was to drive the movement underground and to put the control of it more into the hands of the Anarchists’ secret groups. The following year was for the most part less disturbed; but the U.G.T. called out the railway workers in September, and after the assassination of Canalejas in November there was a further outburst of strikes. The Conservatives returned to power, but were unable to stem the tide. In 1913 the agricultural workers of Andalusia launched a National Federation of Spanish Agriculturists, under Anarchist leadership, and entered into close relations with the C.N.T. The Barcelona textile workers conducted a highly successful strike. Early in 1914 there were big strikes at the Rio Tinto mines and at Valencia. By that time the Government had abandoned its attempt to suppress the C.N.T., which came back into the open just in time to be confronted with a new problem in defining its attitude to the European War.

The C.N.T. and the U.G.T. rested, I have said, on essentially different theories of Trade Unionism. The U.G.T. Unions had regular paid officials and offices: they paid strike benefits, and in some cases friendly benefits as well. The U.G.T.’s aim was to build up in each trade or industry a national Union with branches and centralised funds and, wherever possible, to bargain collectively with the employers and
to make use of the machinery of mediation which had been set up by Governments in the hope of promoting social peace. This, however, was difficult outside a very few trades; for most of the big employers were quite unprepared to accept regular bargaining machinery — and, of course, the owners of the great *latifundia* were hardly ever prepared to bargain at all. Consequently, the U.G.T. found it difficult to function industrially except within a very limited field; and its close association with the Socialist Party and with Madrid also stood in its way. For a long time it kept its headquarters in Catalonia despite its weakness there, which was due partly to local feeling against centralisation and partly to the inapplicability of its methods to the exacerbated industrial relations of the region. The Catalanian Unions alternated between framing ‘Pacts’ which usually fell under Anarchist leadership and falling apart into separate groups which attempted to act alone. By 1910 they were in a mood to come together on a bigger scale than ever before, and to establish a common organisation of a less loose and wholly autonomous character than the ‘Pacts’ into which they had entered on previous occasions. In their new mood, they were undoubtedly very much influenced by the example and doctrine of the French Confédération Générale du Travail, which was then at the height of its success. But in practice the C.N.T., which they created in the C.G.T.’s image, was a considerably different sort of body, and very much looser in its structure; and it was dominated by the Spanish Anarchists in ways in which the relatively weak French Anarchists were never able to dominate the C.G.T.

The French C.G.T. rested on a double structure — local Bourses du Travail embracing the Syndicats of all the local trades, and national Fédérations of particular industries, or in some cases particular crafts. These two kinds of organisation had at first existed apart, and had then been brought together.¹ The national Fédérations had, in most cases, been built up partly under the influence of the Guesdist and had worked in with the Guesdist Workers’ Party, or in some cases with the rival Possibilist Party. They had subsequently broken away from their political connections; but they had been shaped by them. Very roughly, they corresponded to the elements in

¹ See p. 347.
Spanish Trade Unionism that were enrolled in the U.G.T.
The French Bourses du Travail, on the other hand, had grown
up with the Syndicalist theory which had its centre in them,
and had never had, for the most part, any direct political
affiliations. French Syndicalism, at any rate in its earlier stages,
was a movement of local class solidarity, to which there became
attached a Trade Union organisation of a different character,
resting on the idea of national federation industry by industry.
In Spain local feeling was even more intense than in France;
but it had never, up to 1910, found expression through any
structure at all resembling the Bourse du Travail. Indeed, it
could not well have done so; for the French Bourses got their
hold by being recognised as employment bureaux and often
receiving subventions from favourable municipal authorities.
In Spain there could have been no question of municipalities
recognising or helping really independent workers' organisa-
tions. The nearest Spanish equivalent to the Bourse du
Travail — the Casa del Pueblo — developed only after 1910, in
conscious imitation of the Bourse; and actually the first Casas
were started, not by the Trade Unions, but by Lerroux's
Radicals in hostility to them. The typical Spanish expression
of solidarity was the 'Pact' entered into by a number of local
workers' societies for mutual defence or for the pursuit of a
common campaign — the Solidaridad Obrera — and such Pacts
and the organisations based upon them were usually evanescent
and practically devoid of any machinery except a co-ordinating
committee. This was partly because those who led them were
for the most part highly suspicious of formal organisation and
of constituted leadership, and were animated, even more than
the Syndicalists in France, by belief in the efficacy and virtue
of wholly spontaneous action. The Anarchists who were the
inspirers of Spanish mass movements, save in Castile and a few
other areas, did not want until 1910 to set up any form of Trade
Union organisation that would involve holding funds and
collecting regular contributions and keeping paid officials to
look after them. There were Trade Unions, even in Barcelona,
which were constituted in this way — for example, among the
textile workers — but they were exceptional. The typical
Trade Union in Catalonia, and wherever the Anarchist influence
was uppermost, was the spontaneous factory or field group,
ready to join up with others as occasion required, but conducted by volunteer committeemen and secretaries with a minimum of formality, and, when the members went out on strike, offering them not a penny of benefit to maintain them. Strikes, therefore, had to be short; and in order to win quickly the strikers had often to be violent, both with blacklegs and with the police who arrived to break them up. What leadership there was, transcending the spontaneous workplace groups, was provided by the small secret circles of Anarchists or near-Anarchists who devoted themselves to their self-appointed task of social revolution.

This conception of Trade Unionism, which was, of course, part and parcel of the old Bakuninist theory of the secret brotherhood and its action on the spontaneously surging mass, came increasingly under challenge under the impact of Syndicalist developments in France. The Anarchists fell to differing one from another — one section favouring the maintenance of the old ways as ensuring the purity of the revolutionary impulse, while another was prepared to compromise the austerity of the pure doctrine in order to throw itself more fully into the mass movement. The ‘Old Anarchists’ believed in holding themselves apart as a revolutionary élite, always ready to fling themselves into the mass-struggle when it developed of itself as an expression of mass-grievance, but to do so always for immediately revolutionary ends — using the mass, but never of it till the Revolution was well on the way. The ‘Anarcho-Syndicalists’, on the other hand, wanted to throw themselves right into the mass, to organise it and to take up its causes, even if they fell far short of revolutionary demands, and by identifying themselves with the mass to bring it over by stages to full revolutionary class-consciousness.

This second approach led to the establishment of the C.N.T. at a moment when the experiences of Barcelona during the troubled years had induced most Anarchists to perform the hated act of voting for left-wing politicians, and to see the need for collaborating with the Socialists and the U.G.T. in a common fight against the Moroccan War, the Church, and the Madrid State power. Most of them were ready, in this situation, to do all they could to strengthen their own following for the struggle and to get behind them a movement that
would enable them, rather than the left politicians, to call the tune. But even those who were influenced by the French example and saw the need to create the C.N.T. as a mass movement remained highly suspicious of anything that savoured of centralisation or professional leadership. Accordingly, they set out to establish the C.N.T. practically without paid staff or office equipment, as a very loose confederation of local groups run by volunteers, with similarly loose local and regional inter-trade federations and regional and national federations of particular trades, all carried on in much the same way without paid officials and practically without funds. There were still to be no strike benefits — and, of course, no friendly benefits either: there was to be no regular collective bargaining — only strike settlements which carried no obligation for the future; and there was to be no central imposition of a common policy, except a clarion call to the general strike when a moment of sufficient crisis arrived.

There was much debate inside the C.N.T. after its formation about the best form of basic Trade Union group. Opinion settled down in favour of the Sindicatos Únicos — by which was meant the local Union grouping all workers, at least in a particular establishment, independent of craft, and, in small places, the one primary Union enrolling all the workers in all occupations. This was a departure from the full Anarchist conception of spontaneous self-organisation; but it was the step most compatible with the Anarchist faith in the natural solidarity of the local commune. In practice, as contributions were unimportant and the Unions cost little to run, the C.N.T. Unions never knew, or greatly cared, how many members they had. What mattered was not paying membership but readiness to obey the call to solidarity when the occasion came.

In Catalonia the employers did not take the development of this type of Trade Unionism lying down. They did their best to organise counter-Unions — Sindicatos Libres they were called — which were not merely hostile to Socialism and Syndicalism, but definitely strike-breaking and even gangster formations. In addition, in a good many places, there were attempts to organise Catholic Unions and societies of Catholic land-workers and peasants in accordance with the conception of the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum*. These, however, were apt to be frowned
upon by the Catholic hierarchy as soon as they attempted to
take their social doctrines seriously. The more progressive
Catholics — for there were some, even in Spain — had better
success with various forms of Co-operative organisation,
especially in the rural areas, and in the northern regions with
Catholic Friendly Societies. The new Catholic Trade Union
movement, founded in 1912 by the Dominican Fathers Gerard
and Gafo, was concentrated mainly in Navarre and the Basque
provinces and in parts of Old Castile.

Spanish Anarcho-Syndicalism had not had time to produce
much theoretical writing during the period covered in this
chapter. It inherited the theory of Spanish and Italian Anar­
chism, and modified it with an infusion of French doctrine.
From the days of Bakunin there had been close contacts of the
Catalonian Anarchists with both Italy and Southern France;
and later Malatesta was an important influence, particularly in
Andalusia and the south, while the ‘Libertarian’ school of
Sébastien Faure greatly influenced the Anarchist intellectual
élites in Catalonia and Madrid. Native Spanish Anarchist
writing, as far as I know of it,¹ is of no great significance
theoretically. The most original of its writers appears to be
Tomás González Morago who, after taking part in the First
International, died young in a Granada prison. His writings
are scattered through periodicals; his main theme is that of
the indignity to the labourer’s personality involved in his
subordination to capitalist production, and the relative un­
importance of material considerations when they are weighed
in the balance against personal freedom of self-expression.
This low estimation of wealth and of material standards of
living ran through a great deal of Spanish Anarchist writing.

Both Farga-Pellicer and Anselmo Lorenzo, among the
Internationalists of the I.W.M.A. period, wrote much —
Lorenzo books as well as journalism. Lorenzo’s reminiscences,
El proletario militante, are an important source of information

¹ I admit I know rather little. Account has to be taken also of the
writings of the Spanish Anarchists of Latin America, some of whom were
refugees from persecution in Spain itself. When repression in Spain was
especially severe, Latin America tended to supply the place of Spanish
Anarchist journals and other publications, and the relations between the
movements in the two continents were apt to become very close indeed.
For Latin-American Anarchism, see Chapter XXII.
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for the entire period. He died in 1914. In the next generation, the most indefatigable of the Anarchist writers was the former army colonel, José López Montenegro, who produced novels as well as books and pamphlets: *El botón de fuego* (The Fire Button) is the best known. The Galician printer-Anarchist, Ricardo Mella (1861–1925), was another fertile theorist. Professor Tarrida del Mármond (1861–1915) produced a classic exposure of police methods in his *Les Inquisiteurs en Espagne* (in French, 1897). But as a theoretical basis for so widespread a movement as Spanish Anarchism the native writings of the period up to 1914 add up to little. The Spaniards produced a great many translations of Anarchist works — Kropotkin, Reclus, Malatesta, Malato, and many others; but they wrote little of significance except in their occasional journals. The Socialists produced even less: throughout the period dealt with in this chapter I am not aware of a single significant Socialist writing.

In a wide sense of the word Anarchism, I suppose Ferrer must be regarded as the most significant of its Spanish exponents. But the founder of the Modern Schools wrote hardly anything, though he edited and published many educational works which were used in his schools. Ferrer began his career as secretary to Manuel Ruiz Zorrilla (1833–95), the leader of the Radical Monarchists during the Revolution of the 1860s, and for a time Minister of Public Instruction during the reign of Amadeo of Savoy. Zorrilla was a strong anti-clerical and a rationalist. After the fall of the Republic he lived in Paris, plotting revolution; and Ferrer worked with him and subsequently stayed on in Paris as a teacher. He there fell in with a middle-aged lady, an unorthodox Catholic, who presently died, leaving him a substantial fortune with freedom to devote it to any cause he wished. Ferrer thereupon went back in 1901 to his native Catalonia and opened in Barcelona the first of his Modern Schools, in which he set out to give a strictly modernist, rationalistic education based on the teachings of contemporary science. He engaged leading rationalists to compose textbooks, which he edited; and he published numerous translations of foreign rationalist works. His original school was reproduced in a number of others in Catalonia and the neighbouring regions and found many imitators in other parts of Spain, where a great many rationalist schools were being set up.
during the early years of the present century to oppose the almost exclusive control of the educational system by the Catholic Church. Naturally, his movement aroused violent ecclesiastical hostility, and numerous attempts were made to suppress it. Ferrer himself was arrested in 1906, during the period of mass-arrests which followed the Anarchist attempt that year to kill King Alfonso and his bride. All the Modern Schools were closed by the authorities, and an attempt was made to implicate him in the affair. Despite the fabrication of evidence he was acquitted and set free a year later; but his principal Modern School remained closed by order of the authorities. Some of the others reopened, and Ferrer resumed his work, but was a good deal absent abroad or, at all events, away from Barcelona during the troubles of 1907-9. As we saw, he was away during the ‘Tragic Week’ of 1909; but that did not prevent him from being summarily arrested and shot on his return after the riots were over.

It is difficult now to recapture the quality of Ferrer’s appeal. He does not appear to have been an original thinker, and he certainly neither made, nor attempted to make, any contribution to Socialist or Anarchist thought. Except through his friendship with many leading Anarchists, he played no part in the Anarchist movement. He was an orthodox anti-clerical rationalist of a type familiar in many countries, with a passion for rescuing the young from indoctrination with religious dogmas and for teaching them the facts of science instead with a sharp materialistic moral. His Modern Schools naturally received the children mainly of active anti-clericals, and were the better known for the campaign of slander with which he and they were assailed. His private life was continually attacked: he and his wife had parted company and, divorce being unobtainable, he lived with a companion to whom he was not married. He was accused of having obtained his French legacy by undue influence, of having perverted it from the purpose for which it had been given him, and of having lived in sin with the donor. He was also accused, without a shred of evidence, of being the power behind the Anarchist assassins — and, indeed, of any offence that his enemies thought could be made to blacken his reputation. But he was not in himself, or save by the fortune of martyrdom, a person of very great importance,
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and there is nothing that can be pointed to as particularly original even in his educational views.

I end this chapter in some dissatisfaction with what I have written. The Spanish Anarchist and Socialist movements are hard to understand except on the foundation of an intimate acquaintance with the Spanish people and with Spanish history; and I am acutely conscious of the limitations of my knowledge of both. As between Anarchists and Socialists, the former are evidently by far the more interesting. Spanish Socialism, as far as it found expression in the Spanish Socialist Party, was a narrow-minded and unoriginal movement which never found its way to the heart of the people or even attempted to think out for itself policies and ways of action adapted to the conditions of the country as a whole. Strongly centralist and dominated by the conception of a centralised and disciplined party carrying a subordinate Trade Union movement in its wake, it entirely failed to find room for the strong regionalist and localist impulses which were the governing factor of working-class politics from Catalonia to the far south; and because of this failure it often appeared to Spaniards outside the central region rather as an emissary of Castilian centralisation than as a liberating movement. These characteristics were later to carry a considerable part of it, under Largo Caballero's leadership, into collaboration with the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and later still, by a no less centralising reaction, into the arms of Russian Communism during the Civil War. Throughout, it was consistent in its hostility not only to Anarchism and Syndicalism, but also to decentralisation; and it was the fate of the Spanish Labour movement, as of Spain itself, to be torn continually between the extremes of localism and centralism, so that centralisers and libertarians could not even unite to do battle with their common enemies, the landowning and capitalist classes and the Catholic Church. No doubt the Socialists were by far the most humane of the contending parties — for they were the 'Westernisers' in an environment in which barbarism was still a dominant force. No doubt the Anarchists and Syndicalists, like the ruling classes they were fighting, were often cruel and usually regardless of human life. No doubt the prevailing tone in rural conflicts, above all in the south, and even in the industrial battles of
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Barcelona, was that of primitive peasant *jacquerie* rather than of the modern class-struggle. Nevertheless, with all this, the Spanish Anarchists had many fine qualities besides that of courage. They were immensely idealistic: they lived in most cases lives of great austerity and self-sacrifice: they were severe moralists who lived up to their creed, and were always expecting other men to throw off sloth and self-interest and reveal their natural goodness. The movement they produced was the most unmaterialistic and the least self-seeking of all working-class movements; and it had none the less a remarkably wide appeal. The defect of their qualities was a sheer inability, indeed a refusal, to submit to the necessities of large-scale organisation or to plan and execute any coherent movement.

As for the followers of the Anarchists, most of them knew almost nothing of theory, and cared even less. In the rural districts Anarchism meant to most of its supporters land distribution, and hardly anything besides, except a great readiness to respond to rhetoric and a deep-seated feeling of solidarity in opposition to the ruling classes. The Anarchist leaders who counted for most with them were not the theorists but the travelling missionaries who made rousing speeches and read aloud extracts from the Anarchist journals. Outstanding among these were Fermin Salvoecho and José Sanchez Rosa, who were known all over the country; but there were countless local ‘fanaticos’ of the same type. These Anarchist orators were essentially preachers, who made of Anarchism a religious gospel of regeneration as well as a crusade.

Portugal

About Socialism in Portugal I must confess to knowing next to nothing. Fourierism had some influence there, derived mainly from Spain, at the middle of the nineteenth century; and the Spanish Section of the International Working Men’s Association, when its executive was driven to take refuge for a time in Portugal in 1870, set up a Portuguese Section. This cannot have survived for long; for in 1876 a new Portuguese Section was established as an affiliate of the Marxist Madrid International, which had been founded by Paul Lafargue. It,
too, soon expired. The solitary figure of any importance during the latter part of the nineteenth century seems to have been Azedo Gnecco, who also founded an ambitious Co-operative venture, the Lusitania, which came to grief. There was practically no Socialist movement thereafter until the Revolution of 1911, during which a Socialist Party took shape. A newspaper, O Socialista, was founded at Lisbon in 1912, and a single Socialist, the compositor, Manuel José da Silva, was elected to Parliament at Oporto about the same time. A small Trade Union movement also developed, largely under Anarcho-Syndicalist leadership; but up to 1914 neither Socialism nor Trade Unionism had developed any substantial strength. As far as I have been able to discover, no delegates from Portugal appeared at any of the Congresses of the Second International, though Gnecco was a member of the International Socialist Bureau.
CHAPTER XXI

THE UNITED STATES: CANADA

In the second volume of this work I discussed the development of Socialism in the United States up to the beginning of the twentieth century — that is, up to the foundation of the American Socialist Party in 1901. During the next dozen years the A.S.P. grew from small beginnings into a nation-wide organisation with an individual membership of 150,000, and a voting strength, in the presidential election of 1912, of not far short of one million. It was, indeed, never able to elect more than a single representative to the United States Congress — Victor Berger of Wisconsin — but it won a considerable number of representatives in the Assemblies of the various States and made a substantial showing in many places in the field of local government, especially in the smaller industrial towns, but also in a number of mainly agricultural areas. It did this despite (or was it because of?) its steady refusal to enter into electoral alliances with other parties, and also despite the continued existence of a rival Socialist Labor Party which was constantly denouncing it as a reactionary, time-serving body. It achieved its increased appeal, moreover, despite acute internal dissen­sions on fundamental matters, and despite a persistent internal struggle about the correct relation of the political party to the Trade Union movement and in face of the bitter hostility of the majority of the leaders of the American Federation of Labor, in which the great majority of such workers as were organised at all were enrolled.

During these years between 1901 and 1912 most of the leaders of the American Socialist Party, to whichever of its factions they belonged, undoubtedly held the view that the tide was flowing strongly in favour of Socialism in the United States as well as in Europe, and even that the victory of Socialism was only a matter of a few more years of successful Socialist prop­aganda. They regarded American capitalism as already far
advanced in its decay, and held that it could not be long before, in face of the rapid growth of anti-social monopolies, both the main body of the industrial workers and a large section of the agricultural population and of the small bourgeois and white-collar workers would become convinced of the necessity for an advance to Socialism as a means of escape from their common exploitation by the ‘feudal lords’ of American finance capitalism. They always believed themselves to be on the point either of capturing the American Federation of Labor, in which there was throughout these years a large Socialist minority, or of smashing it and replacing it by a new Trade Unionism under Socialist leadership. The bitterness of their internal faction fights seems in no way to have weakened their faith in the imminence of a Socialist victory.

Yet within a very few years of this rapid and confident advance the American Socialist movement lay in ruins: nor has it to this day ever been effectively rebuilt. This decline and fall has been attributed to the influence of the first world war; but in fact the decay had set in and had gone a long way before the war began, even in Europe. In 1913 the American Socialist Party was already tumbling down fast from the height which it had reached in 1912: nor was any alternative organisation even beginning to take its place. The De Leonites of the Socialist Labor Party were no more than an ineffective residue; and the ‘Industrial Socialists’ of the Chicago-centred Industrial Workers of the World had reached their culminating point of influence practically at the same moment as the Socialist Party, and were in 1913 already sharing in its decline.

Evidently it is of the greatest importance for the historian of Socialist development to discover why these things happened — both why American Socialism appeared to be making such swift headway during the early years of the present century, and why it suffered eclipse. The first question that confronts the historian is whether the explanation is to be sought mainly in the nature of the contemporary development of American society or in the attitudes and behaviour of the American Socialists themselves. It can, of course, be argued that the ways in which American Socialists thought and behaved simply reflected the changing phases of the social development of the United States, and that what did actually happen had to
happen and had little to do with the virtues or shortcomings of the various groups of Socialists who were trying to guide the movement into conflicting courses, or even towards conflicting conceptions of Socialism itself. But it is not easy for those who take this view to show either why Socialism actually gained so many converts between 1900 and 1912, or why its popular following ebbed so swiftly after 1912. Even if we come to the conclusion that the waning of Socialist influence was due primarily to changes in the structure of American society — with the war aggravating the effects of factors which were already at work before its outbreak — we shall have, I think, to allow that the actual behaviour of the American Socialist factions exerted a considerable secondary influence.

Undoubtedly one factor of very great importance in preventing the Socialists from gaining a position of leadership among the American workers was the growing strength of the Catholic Church, which waged unceasing war against Socialist influences in the Trade Unions as well as in the political field. During the period up to the 1890s the outstanding Catholic group was Irish; and Irishmen played a large part in building up the Trade Unions, as well as in the management of party politics at every level. But from about 1890 onwards the great stream of immigrants came to include a high proportion of Catholic workers from the less developed European countries — Italy, Hungary, Poland, and Croatia, for example; and the Catholic Church became a powerful obstacle to the enrolment of these immigrants either in the Socialist Parties or in Trade Unions with a Socialist or Syndicalist attitude — such as the Industrial Workers of the World. This did not prevent American Socialism from making, up to about 1912, rapid progress, chiefly among non-Catholics; but it did seriously impede attempts both to capture the Trade Unions which belonged to the American Federation of Labor and to build up rival Unions of a more left-wing complexion. At the very least, the growing political strength of Catholicism was of great influence in keeping the Trade Unions aloof from any movement wearing a Socialist label or ‘tainted’ with class-war doctrine or materialist philosophies of action.

Of course, every Socialist movement in the world has at all times its internal factions and its faction fights between them;
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and it is usually possible to describe these internal struggles in terms of a conflict between a reformist Right and a revolutionary Left, often with a Centre contending with both extremes or finding itself precariously in alliance with either against the other. Certainly the faction fights of American Socialism in the early years of the present century lend themselves readily to description in these terms — with the Industrial Workers of the World symbolising the attitude of the revolutionary Left, the Wisconsin State Socialists symbolising the gradualist, reformist Right, and the Hillquit faction which for some time dominated the American Socialist Party — and helped to hold it together — occupying the centrist position until in the latter stages it merged almost completely with the Right. No one who looks even with hardly more than a glance at the record of the American Socialist Party can help noticing the prominence of these three contending groups; but no attempt to interpret the history of American Socialism simply in terms of these divisions will achieve more than a superficial view of what was taking place. Right, Left, and Centre were present, as they were in the Socialist movements of other countries; but they were not related in the same way to the main body of the working class or of the organised workers as they were in any of the leading European countries.

We have seen already that Socialism, both in its earlier community-making phases and during the second half of the nineteenth century, made its appearance in the United States mainly as a doctrine imported from Europe — above all from Germany. Of all foreign immigrants into the United States between 1871 and 1895 more than one quarter were Germans, as against less than 16 per cent from Great Britain and less than 13 per cent from Ireland — the next largest contingents. The Italian and Slav contingents were throughout this period relatively small: the French, though they included a good many individuals who held strong Socialist opinions, numbered only 1½ per cent of the total — a mere 150,000 as compared with more than 2,600,000 Germans. These German migrants were numerous enough, in the areas in which they mainly settled, to establish their own Socialist movements, to maintain close connections with the Socialist movement in Germany, and, even when they had become thoroughly acclimatised to American
conditions, to preserve their national characteristics and outlook to a highly significant extent. They continued, among themselves, to speak German; they conducted their meetings largely in German; and they carried on their propaganda and their discussions on policy largely through German language newspapers, journals, and occasional pamphlets. A good many of them did not even learn to speak English, much less to write it; and many who did learn it continued for a long time to use it only as a second language. In some places they maintained their own Trade Unions, in others German branches, though as the American Federation of Labor gained ground in the skilled trades most of the craftsmen among them were gradually absorbed into the ranks of its constituent Unions, in some of which they were able to exert a very large influence. In most of the advanced countries the Socialist movement as it developed from the 1880s to 1914 was greatly influenced by the strength and prestige of the German Social Democratic Party: in the United States this influence was greatest of all because of the large immigrant German population through which it could be exerted. Its very strength was, however, a seriously limiting factor, for it hindered the adaptation of German Socialist doctrine to the conditions of American society and also tended to keep the German Socialists isolated as groups following their own ways of life and thought, and carrying on their propaganda largely among themselves or among the groups, such as the Austrians and Scandinavians, who stood nearest to them in habits and attitudes. The American Socialist Party, though the Germans were no more than a large minority within it in point of number, was from the first greatly under German influence; and when new elements came into it which had little in common with the predominant group that had set it on foot, there was no real fusion, no thinking out in common of a policy fitting the American conditions, and accordingly no coherence of either outlook or action. The American Socialist Party fell apart almost as soon as it began to make any notable impact because, when it came under strain, there was nothing to hold it together.

The German element in the party was especially at a loss in adapting itself to the conditions of Trade Unionism in the United States. The German Social Democrats in Germany
itself had a clear view of the correct relations between the party and the Trade Unions. Whether they were Marxists or Lassallians, they wanted to build up the Trade Union movement under effective Socialist leadership as the ally and auxiliary of the party. Marxists and Lassallians might differ about the power of Trade Unionism to secure improvements in wages and working conditions under capitalism; but they were agreed that Trade Unions were not in a position to bring about any fundamental change in the economic system, and that only a working-class conquest of political power could avail to achieve any change in the class-system, or to release the powers of production from their entanglements in the contradictions of capitalism. Bernstein and the rest of the Revisionists, though they believed that the great change could be brought about gradually, by a succession of piecemeal advances, were at one with the orthodox Marxists and with the Lassallians in proclaiming the need for a Social Democratic conquest of political power, and in regarding the Trade Unions mainly as auxiliaries of the party army. The German Social Democrats, after the fusion between Eisenachers and Lassallians, realised the expediency of not tying the Trade Unions formally to the Socialist Party — which would clearly both have exposed the Trade Unions to political repression and have hampered them in their struggle against rival brands of Trade Unionism under Christian or Liberal auspices. But they set out to bind the Trade Union movement none the less firmly to the party by informal ties of common leadership, and they succeeded to a quite remarkable extent in establishing this form of ascendancy.

In the United States, for a variety of reasons, nothing of the sort was even remotely possible. American Trade Unionism, although some sections of it developed under British influence, was in the main an indigenous growth. It arose out of specifically American conditions, which themselves differed greatly from one part of the country to another; and, save in a few places, Wisconsin above all, the Socialists had no chance of establishing over it an ascendancy in any way like that which the German Social Democrats had been able to win. This was partly because, in the United States as in Great Britain, the Trade Unions established themselves firmly before Socialism as a political doctrine had made any substantial impact. But
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it was also because in America the Socialists had to operate within a political and social structure which was entirely different from that of Germany. In the German Empire, and above all in Prussia, the working classes were face to face with a powerful, autocratic, militaristic State machine which, despite the adoption of universal manhood suffrage for the Reichstag, continued to rest on a basis of legalised class-privilege. The ruling class was still not the capitalist bourgeoisie but the land-owning aristocracy with its close connections with the military power. Executive authority was vested in the Chancellor as the agent of the Crown and not as the representative of any body of political opinion; and the legislative authority of the Reichstag was held in check by the large powers vested in the federal upper chamber. Moreover, in Prussia, the greatest State within the Reich, the class system of voting effectively excluded the main body of the people from any real share even in legislative authority, and put an insuperable obstacle in the way of working-class representation in the Diet. Under these conditions there were weighty factors making for the creation of a great mass party in opposition to the entire structure of government; and a working-class party which could constitute itself the symbol of the struggle against autocracy and class-privilege could hope to rally behind it the main body of the working class, at any rate except where it had to share support with the Catholic Church, which was, during the Kulturkampf, hardly less than the Socialists fighting the State for its right to live. In Germany the economic struggle of the workers remained secondary to the political struggle; the political leaders were in a position to persuade their followers that, even if Trade Unions could do something to improve the worker's lot and to protect him against extreme oppression, the first step towards real emancipation must be the capture of the State and its conversion into an instrument of social progress. There were German Anarchists, such as Johann Most and later Gustav Landauer, who rejected this view and urged that the State should be not captured but destroyed; but they found little support and were easily driven out of the Social Democratic Party and reduced to impotence in the Trade Unions, which for the most part were content to play second fiddle in the Socialist orchestra.
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In the United States, on the other hand, government was much less pervasive, and the State was neither an autocracy nor dominated by a legally privileged aristocratic caste. The President as well as the Congress was elected by a body of voters which included almost all male citizens save recent immigrants and negroes unconstitutionally debarred by Southern race-prejudice. The Legislatures and Executive Governments of the separate States of the Union were similarly constituted on a basis of popular election: the formal democracy for which the Germans were contending did not need to be fought for because it existed already. This did not prevent Governments — especially the Governments of certain of the States — from taking most violent action against strikers in times of trade dispute, or even against organisers accused of carrying on subversive anti-capitalist propaganda. But it did mean that the main body of the American workers became conscious of the State and the Government as their enemies only in special cases or on particular occasions — for example, when a league of capitalist employers had captured or bought the State authority, or some part of it, to help them keep the organised workers in subjection or to prevent their employees from becoming organised, or, more particularly, when they had invoked the force of State militia or of employer-dominated ‘citizen’ leagues to break a strike, or suborned State justice to ‘frame’ Trade Union leaders whose activities they desired to suppress. The history of the American Labor movement is made up, to a considerable extent, of violent and often bloody clashes between workers and the combined forces of employers and employer-dominated public powers. The movement's record of violent clashes stands in marked contrast with the habitual peaceableness of the German industrial struggles. Nevertheless, in the United States the main struggle was always between workers and employers and not, save incidentally and here and there, between the working class and the State.

In America, broadly speaking, the State did not rule, as it did in Germany; it only intervened for a particular cause. This remains true whether we consider only the Federal Government or the Federation and the States together. The main pattern of American society was that of a formally democratic community in which most issues — at any rate most economic issues
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— were left to be settled by a tug-of-war between the groups directly concerned, with the public power intervening as a rule only when it was brought in as the ally of some pressure group which had succeeded in getting control over it. There were, of course, many successive attempts to alter this situation by creating social reform parties which would rally popular opinion behind particular programmes designed to unite the little people against the powers of large-scale capital and finance; and these were often combined with movements to ‘clean’ governments at all levels of corruption and business graft. American ‘Populism’ assumed many forms and usually based itself, in a country still largely agricultural and having within its frontiers a great host of small agricultural and commercial entrepreneurs, as well as a great many small artisan concerns, on an attempt to induce the small farmers to join hands with the urban small bourgeoisie and the wage-earners in a common movement against the ‘monopolists’. Naturally, demands for free or liberalised credit, and sometimes for nationalised banking, took a large place in the programmes of the ‘Populists’, with the capitalist financier as the principal enemy; and naturally such demands won their greatest following in periods of economic depression and were apt to wane rapidly when economic conditions improved. They recurred again and again, but their sponsors never achieved stable success or succeeded in working out programmes which gave satisfaction to the diverse groups to which they were intended to appeal. Their promoters, in the name of the small man, denounced not only the restrictive character of the ‘credit monopoly’, but also the growing mass of finance-dominated large-scale industry and commerce, which they accused of holding up prices and of creating artificial scarcity at the consumers’ expense. But the last thing the small farmer wanted was that farm goods should be cheap; and the small-scale industrialist or retailer was disposed to blame the big capitalist firms rather for undercutting him than for making consumers’ goods scarce and dear. The small entrepreneur often abused the trusts and the big firms for overcharging him for the intermediate goods he had to buy from them, just as he abused the bankers for charging him too much for credit; but he had no similar enthusiasm for cheapening what he had to sell. He regarded the big business as a
dangerous competitor because its lower costs of production enabled it to encroach increasingly on his market, and not because it charged the consumer too much. There was, accordingly, a dualism of attitude even among the small business opponents of large-scale enterprise; and when these groups were brought into a common movement with the industrial workers or with the employees of capitalist forestry and farming enterprises still greater difficulties appeared. The industrial worker certainly did not want to have his wages cut for the purpose of reducing costs and thus making goods cheaper for the consumer. He rightly reckoned that he would do better by pressing as hard as he could for a larger share in the gross takings of his employer. He was prepared to join in the outcry against the capitalist profiteer who could be accused of practising monopoly; but his primary interest, in a society based on the assumption that everybody was out for all he could get, lay in organising in a pressure group of his own to exact the highest wages and the best conditions he could from any particular employer or group of employers with whom he had to deal.

In face of these 'contradictions' — to use the Marxist term — Populist movements always tended to disintegrate with the passing of the occasion that had called them into being, and particularly when the economic conditions improved after a depression. But the elements which were brought together in such movements did not find it possible to establish stable political organisations when they fell apart and attempted to act separately. Small farmers and small commercial and industrial entrepreneurs had divergent, as well as common, economic interests. They shared, no doubt, a common antagonism to financiers; but farmers wanted dear food and cheap industrial goods, whereas the urban traders and small-scale producers wanted just the opposite, and the growing body of salary-earners and professionals wanted both agricultural and industrial goods to be cheap, but their own services — for example, teaching or doctoring — to be more highly paid. All these groups tended, when a Populist movement expired, to rally to the Democratic Party, because, in most States and federally, the Republicans were the party to which big business and finance gave most of its support. But they were not powerful enough, save here and there, to control the Democratic Party,
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or united enough to act upon it as a coherent pressure group. Wanting to a great extent inconsistent things, they could be put off with piecemeal and for the most part minor concessions, where they were not rewarded only with high phrases which committed the politicians to nothing.

Labour, when it attempted to act politically on its own, was in an equal difficulty because of the lack of homogeneity in the wage-earning class and in the conditions under which it earned its living. It has often been pointed out that in the earlier stages, when the frontier was still being pushed forward and land was easily to be had, wages, at any rate for skilled workers, largely looked after themselves, subject to the considerable qualification that this ceased to be the case during depressions which affected industry and agriculture together. In an advancing economy in which natural resources were plentiful in relation to labour, it was easy for the skilled worker in good times to migrate and either settle on the land or find an opening for relatively well-paid employment in a new or rapidly expanding district; and accordingly such workers, like the small farmers and traders, were impelled towards Radical politics only in times of economic crisis or stagnation. But there was also the further obstacle to working-class political action that the skilled worker who had grown up in the United States did not, at that stage of American economic development, feel himself necessarily a wage-earner for life to nearly the same extent as did the skilled workers in Europe. Even the immigrant who had grown up in Western Europe and was a class-conscious proletarian when he arrived in the United States was apt, after reaching the 'land of opportunity', to shed a great deal of his feeling of class-solidarity with his fellow-workers, and to become divided in mind between his class allegiance and his hopes of rising in the socio-economic scale.

The cleavages within the working class, far from being eliminated with the gradual closing of the frontier in the 1880s and with the growth of large-scale capitalist enterprise, became positively much greater about this time. One reason for this was a change in the nature and destiny of the rapidly increasing mass of immigrants into the United States. From 1850 to 1880 the net inflow of immigrants, though varying substantially from year to year, had remained almost constant at a decennial total.
of approximately 2,500,000. In the decade 1881–90 it shot up to 4,300,000. In the following decade it fell back to about 3,200,000, and then over the years 1901–10 it rose to 5,600,000.\(^1\) Furthermore, the character of the immigration underwent a considerable change. Up to 1880 a high proportion of the immigrants went to the land, and a quite high proportion of those who went to industry were skilled workers, who took their places side by side with the existing bodies of craftsmen. There were, of course, even then, considerable numbers who found unskilled work in industry — for example, in the Chicago stockyards or in the mines — at relatively low wages. But in comparison with what occurred after 1880 the inflow of unskilled workers to industrial employment was small. The coming of much larger numbers from the less industrially developed countries of Europe, where standards of living were low, as well as of non-Europeans from Japan and China, radically altered the situation and led to the rapid increase of forms of employment which depended on a supply of cheap labour to be used in conjunction with highly capitalised instruments of large-scale production. It may be asked whether during this period the arrival of the immigrants stimulated the growth of large-scale capitalist industry, or the growth of mass-production technology stimulated the increased immigration. The evident truth is that each of these factors reacted on the other.

At all events, the advent of this horde of immigrants, mostly accustomed to very low standards of living, had a profound effect on the development of the American working-class movement, especially in the already settled industrial areas of the East and the Middle West. The existing Labor Unions had to choose between organising the newcomers and demanding for them an ‘American standard of life’, and closing their ranks against them in an attempt to exact a higher wage and better conditions for the native or already assimilated American skilled workers. In view of the sheer impossibility of the immigrants, hampered by barriers of language as well as by sheer poverty, building up effective Trade Unions of their own, it became clear that the pre-requisite of success in the first of

\(^1\) These are net figures: the gross immigration was of course much greater.
these policies was the creation of some sort of Trade Unionism that would give the American skilled workers the effective leadership of a combined movement, either by reorganising the existing craft Unions into industrial Unions open, industry by industry, to skilled and unskilled alike, or even by constituting a vast ‘all-in’ Union capable of making a mass appeal to the immigrants and of bringing to the support of each industrial section the combined resources of all.

The alternative policy was to make no attempt at organising the newcomers or at improving their conditions of employment, but to concentrate on holding a monopoly of the more skilled jobs and on exacting the highest possible differential wages for the scarce commodity of skill and acclimatisation to the conditions of American industry. This policy could best be secured in most cases by organisation on a basis of craft and by the adoption of bargaining methods directed to the establishment of monopoly control over the manning of the more highly skilled operations, or of those which could most easily be ringed round by regulations of apprenticeship or by other means of making them difficult of access.

Needless to say, neither of these policies was followed to the full by the American Trade Unions. But most of the Unions which during the 1880s were gathering under the banner of the new American Federation of Labor came much nearer to the second than to the first. In the 1860s and 1870s the Knights of Labor had set out to enrol all types of workers, irrespective of skill or occupation, in a single embracing Union, subdivided only for convenience and with authority concentrated in the hands of a central leadership. From the beginning of the 1880s this form of organisation had been challenged by a different type of Unionism, based on the separate organisation of each craft or group of crafts, and seeking to enforce its code of working regulations on the employers mainly for the protection and advancement of the skilled workers, without much regard for what might happen to the bottom dog. Under the able leadership of the English-born cigar-maker, Samuel Gompers (1850–1924), this type of Unionism made rapid progress and succeeded in exacting from a growing number of employers, large and small, collective agreements, or contracts, regulating wages and conditions and sometimes closing
employment to non-members of the Union concerned. This policy was not adopted in the first instance as a conscious device for keeping out the immigrants or dividing the American working class into two groups — privileged and unprivileged. It was indeed mainly a reaction from the failure of mass-Unionism to achieve the expected results. But it worked in very easily with the new situation, in which unskilled immigrants used to low living standards were coming to constitute a rapidly growing proportion of the labour force in large-scale industries employing mass-production methods; and it also squared with the tendency of American society to organise itself more and more in pressure-groups, each representing a fairly narrow and coherent interest.

This kind of Trade Unionism, designed to further the economic interest of each particular group of skilled workers, was inconsistent with any form of political action which rested on an appeal to the class-solidarity of the entire working class, or sought to rally it as a class against the entire capitalist class for the collective conquest of the State. It was by no means inconsistent with political action of a kind, in the form of pressure upon the State to withhold its support from the employers in industrial conflicts or to enact legislation favouring Trade Union claims. But the most natural form for political action to take in such cases was that of swinging the Trade Union vote to the side of any party or group or individual that could be induced to pledge support to the particular Trade Union demands that were uppermost for the time being, rather than that of lasting commitment to any one party. Least of all was it calculated to lead to Trade Union backing for a Socialist or Labor party; for such a commitment would have destroyed outright the power of the Unions to bring pressure to bear on the parties actually in power, or likely to obtain it in the near future. Pressure-group Trade Unionism — 'pure and simple' Trade Unionism, as it was often called — wanted to sell its support to the politicians who were most likely to deliver the goods; and, if the politicians were to be induced to respond to its pressure, it needed to be able to offer them something tangible in return.

From the 1880s onwards, under the inspiration of the American Federation of Labor, this type of Trade Unionism
gained ground rapidly. But it was never unchallenged, even from within; and there were continual attempts to challenge it from the outside as well. Inside the A.F. of L., there was always, up to 1914, a substantial Socialist minority, which included a sprinkling of leaders in most of the chartered Unions making up the Federation. This minority moved general Socialist resolutions at successive Federation Congresses, and sometimes mustered as many as a third of the votes. From time to time it challenged Gompers's leadership; and once, for a year, it succeeded in ousting him from the Presidency by allying itself with other sections of which he had temporarily fallen foul. Its struggles inside the Federation were closely tangled up with disputes concerning the right basis for Trade Union organisation. The policy of the A.F. of L. was that of giving to each Union which it accepted into membership a charter defining its 'jurisdiction' — that is, the types of workers it was to be entitled to enrol — and of ensuring that no affiliated Union should poach on another's preserves and no two Unions catering for the same groups of workers should be admitted. In the main these jurisdictional charters defined eligibility in terms of craft, and not of industry — as was natural where attention was being concentrated on the building up of monopolies of labour based on common skill. There were, however, a number of industries in which it was not easy to draw any clear line between skilled and less skilled workers; and in this group the rapidly developing extractive industries occupied a key position. They were joined only later by the modern mass-production industries, such as automobile-making and rubber manufacture. In coal-mining, in particular, effective Unionism was impossible unless the basis was industry rather than craft — the more so because the colliery owners, who often owned and controlled the entire towns or villages in which their employees had to live, put up a terrific fight against any recognition at all of the rights of collective bargaining and often used the utmost violence, through hired armed gangs of their own as well as through control of the local government and of the State authority, in breaking up Unions or in making it impossible for them to be organised at all.

In face of these warlike conditions, the coal-miners had to be allowed to organise, where they could, on a basis of industry
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— that is, skilled and unskilled together — rather than as a grouping of skilled workers only; and there were other instances in which the Unions attached to the A.F. of L. did not strictly observe the craft basis. In general, however, the A.F. of L. did insist on following occupational rather than industrial lines of division: so that, for example, maintenance engineers in a textile factory belonged to the Machinists’ rather than to the Textile Workers’ Union, and transport workers to the Teamsters even when they were employed by a manufacturing firm. For the most part, the Socialists in the A.F. of L. either favoured industrial as against craft Unionism, or at any rate held that wide latitude ought to be allowed to adopt the industrial basis where the conditions called for it, and that no obstacles should be put in the way of craft Unions, wherever they saw fit, opening their ranks to the labourers attached to the various crafts. The Socialists who were inside the A.F. of L. proclaimed that their policy was that of ‘boring from within’ — that is to say, of trying to win over their fellow-members to a policy of class-action and to promote the election of Socialists to key Union positions. But there were always other Socialists who, denouncing the A.F. of L. as an essentially reactionary force and deeming its conversion a hopeless task, stood for the rival policy of ‘dual Unionism’ — that is, of attempting to create new industrial Unions, or a comprehensive ‘One Big Union’ open to all workers, in opposition to the A.F. of L. and as the instrument of aggressive class-warfare against the entire capitalist system. In the 1890s, before the foundation of the American Socialist Party, this was the policy of Daniel De Leon’s Socialist Labor Party, which formed the Trade and Labor Alliance as its industrial wing in bitter hostility to the A.F. of L. In the 1900s the mantle of militant Industrial Unionism was taken up by the Industrial Workers of the World, which, starting with the united support of the De Leonites and of the left wing of the new Socialist Party, soon split asunder into De Leonite and anti-De Leonite factions on the issue of political action and became within the Socialist Party a cause of deep dissension between the A.F. of L. Socialists and the advocates of dual Unionism headed by E. V. Debs and W. D. Haywood.

In order that the nature of these quarrels and their effects
on American Socialism may be understood, it is necessary to
give some account of the conditions which gave rise to the
establishment of the I.W.W., with its initial support drawn
mainly from the mining and lumbering areas of the far West.
The I.W.W. at its inception in 1905 was based mainly on a
single Union — the Western Federation of Miners — which
was at loggerheads with the A.F. of L., partly because of juris­
dictional disputes, but mainly because of the violence of the
industrial conflicts in which it had become engaged. The
Western Federation of Miners — entirely distinct from the
United Mine Workers who organised the coal industry —
consisted primarily of metal-miners and smelter-workers in the
new industrial townships that were being rapidly developed in
the Western States. In these isolated districts, which were
being developed under the auspices of the capitalist concerns
virtually as company-owned and company-controlled town­
ships, industrial relations were of the roughest, and the com­
panies drew the line at nothing in their efforts to prevent
unionisation and to reinforce their power by buying the
support of the forces of ‘law and order’ and of the machinery
of local and State government.

Out of these conditions arose in 1893 the Western Federa­
tion of Miners, originally a constituent of the American
Federation of Labor, from which it broke away in 1897. The
W.F.M. then took the lead in forming a Western Labor
Union, made up of a number of mainly local ‘frontier’ Unions
which were engaged in a bitter struggle with the companies
controlling the industries and settlements of the huge mining,
lumbering, and oil-producing regions of the Western States.
The original centre of the movement was in Montana, at the
mining town, Butte; but it spread rapidly into other States —
Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, California, Oregon, and Washington
— and presently eastwards as well. In 1902 the Western
Labor Union changed its name to American Labor Union; and
three years later it was merged in the Industrial Workers of the
World, which was, in effect, a fusion between the Western
groups which it represented and the De Leonite and other
‘dual Unionist’ groups of the Middle West and of the Eastern
States. Throughout this period the Western Federation of
Miners was the one really solid constituent of the movement;
for though it came to include several other Unions which were nominally more than local, none of them was really strong or represented a majority of the organised workers in the trades concerned. The W.F.M., on the other hand, was within its area a strongly organised body commanding in its hard-fought struggles the allegiance of the main body of metal-miners and related groups; and the violent tactics followed by it were to a great extent the necessary outcome of the relentless opposition of the mining companies to any form of collective bargaining and of the violence which these companies used in their endeavours to suppress Trade Unionism. Indeed, when this attitude was modified after nearly two decades of intensive struggle, the W.F.M. soon lost its enthusiasm for extreme causes. In 1907 it seceded from the I.W.W., which it had helped to form, and in 1911 it returned to the A.F. of L.

The outstanding figures in the W.F. of M. were its President, Charles H. Moyer, and its chief organiser, William Dudley Haywood (1869–1925). These two were the central figures in a famous trial which was also a turning point in the history of the movement. Together with a third man, George Pettibone, they were indicted for the murder of a former Governor of Idaho, by name Steunenberg, who had taken a leading part in the use of the powers of the State against the Union. The affair began early in 1906 with the unlawful kidnapping of the three men in Colorado by the Idaho State police and their lodgment in gaol in Idaho to await trial. It ended in 1907 with their acquittal, after a celebrated defence by their attorney, Clarence Darrow. This sensational trial focused attention throughout the United States on the affairs and policy of the I.W.W.; but it also gave rise to deep dissections inside the Western Federation of Miners, and was largely responsible for the secession of that Union from the I.W.W. while its principal left-wing leaders were out of the way. For, although the accused men were guiltless of the murder, what came out in the trial threw a lurid light on the conduct of both parties during the bitter struggles of the preceding years, and brought a heavy barrage of public opinion to bear on both. The period of violence in Western industrial conflicts was, as we shall see, by no means brought to an end in 1907; but, as far as the miners were concerned, the intensity of the struggle
was from that point substantially modified and the attempt to smash the Union outright was largely abandoned.

In the Industrial Workers of the World, from its establishment at Chicago in 1905, there was a sharp conflict of tendencies. Its founders and supporters were in agreement that the basis of working-class policy ought to be revolutionary class-struggle directed to the complete overthrow of capitalism and to the assumption of power in society by the organised workers. They were also in agreement in condemning outright the notion of working within the American Federation of Labor and such independent Unions as the Railroad Brotherhoods in the expectation of converting their members to a more militant attitude and to an acceptance of class-war doctrine and practice. They were also wholly against those Socialists who looked to electoral success and gradualist reform as the means of advancing towards the new society, and accordingly set out to enlist the support of non-Socialist, or at any rate no more than half-Socialist, electors by putting forward moderate programmes of reform. But, united though the supporters of the I.W.W. were against both orthodox Trade Unionism and reformist Socialism, they were in sharp disagreement about the positive policies which were to lead to their revolutionary goal. There were among them at least four fairly definable groups. First, the De Leonites of the Socialist Labor Party and the Trade and Labor Alliance, who believed fervently in political action through a revolutionary party, but wished this party, working in alliance with revolutionary Industrial Unionism, to eschew all pursuit of reforms within the capitalist system and to make use of elections and of parliamentary institutions solely as means of educating and enlightening the workers in order to bring them over to revolutionary Marxism, and similarly to engage in the day-to-day industrial struggle only with the same purpose in view. The De Leonites believed that both the party and the Trade Union movement should be led by revolutionary Socialists and permeated by revolutionary ideas, and that the party should be a centralised policy-making body exercising a strong discipline over all its members and guiding the industrial workers towards united revolutionary action when the time was ripe.

The second group within the I.W.W., with W. D. Haywood
as its outstanding leader, did not, as has sometimes been suggested, repudiate political action altogether, but regarded it as of quite secondary importance. Haywood himself was an active member of the American Socialist Party until he was expelled from its National Executive in 1913; and he always repelled the charge of being against participation in politics. He held, however, that it was necessary to wage the class-war primarily in the industrial field and that the only effective way of making the working class revolutionary was by exercising its members in constant struggle against the capitalists in the mines, factories, and other places of work. He aimed therefore, first and foremost, at the creation of a militant and revolutionary Industrial Unionist movement, and regarded the function of the Socialist Party as subsidiary. Indeed, he went further than this; for he held that participation in electoral contests and in the work of government and local government bodies would inevitably corrupt the participants unless they were constantly impelled by, and kept responsible to, a Trade Union movement militantly and incessantly waging the class-war in the industrial field. Haywood's attitude had grown out of his concrete experience in the mines and lumber-camps of the expanding West. He could not repudiate political action altogether; not only because he wished to use Industrial Unionism as an instrument for continual pressure on hostile State and local Governments in alliance with big business, but also because he saw the need for capturing at any rate local government agencies as a part of the strategy of industrial warfare. He was, however, fully as hostile as the De Leonites to every sort of electioneering compromise and to all attempts to make use of existing Government agencies as means of achieving gradual reforms. Short of the Revolution, the only useful thing the workers could do politically was, in his view, to prevent government agencies from being used by the capitalists against the workers. Moreover, Haywood's view of the coming proletarian society was that it would be based upon the revolutionary Trade Union movement and not upon a political party. The workers themselves, through their industrial unions, would take over the control of industry from the capitalists and would replace parliaments and political executants by direct agencies of their organised industrial power.
This view, of course, comes close to that of the French Syndicalists in many respects; but it was not borrowed from them, nor was it identical with their beliefs. The key idea of the Haywood group in the I.W.W. was that of the 'One Big Union', uniting on a class basis every sort of worker over the whole country — and presently over the whole world — and bringing the entire mass under centralised direction in terms of a comprehensive plan. Haywood always insisted that the One Big Union must become the master planning agency of the new proletarian society, arranging for the right use and development of the powers of production to meet the workers' needs, and controlling the distribution of the product. In practice, the Industrial Unionists depended a great deal on the spontaneous initiative of local groups of militants; but, whereas the French Syndicalists were insistent on local autonomy as the necessary basis for a free society, the Haywoodites held that the centralising power of capitalism could not be fought effectively except by a centralised working-class power. Both schools of thought believed strongly in the conception of a revolutionary élite — which the French called the 'conscious minority'; but the Western Labor Federation and the Western I.W.W. sought to bring the élite under central control and to throw it into the struggle at each point at which an opportunity could be found.

This policy was exemplified above all in the methods used by the western sections of the I.W.W. (and by the Western Labor Union before it) in conducting their struggle for the right of free speech. Whenever a free speech fight started in a particular place, members of the I.W.W. came pouring in from other places to join in, courting arrest and choking up the local gaols. The practicability of these tactics was, of course, largely due to the extreme mobility of labour in the western frontier areas. The western labouring classes were used to moving often from place to place — usually without payment to the railways by which they travelled. They had not, like most of the French workers, or even like the main body of the workers in the more settled areas of the United States, local roots that were difficult to tear up. They were not citizens of the new towns or camps in which they happened to be working, but rather units in a migratory labour force that was as much — or as little — at home in one place or another. This led, among the
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militants, to an intense feeling of solidarity against their class-enemies, well expressed in their songs and in the argot which developed in their daily intercourse. But this solidarity was not localised; and that was one great reason why it took shape more easily in industrial than in electioneering action.

The third group among the adherents of the I.W.W. consisted of the out-and-out opponents of political action — the Anarchist Industrial Unionists with whom the Haywoodites were often confused. This faction was in its theories much more under European influences. Its Anarchism had been imported by immigrants from Europe, even if it had been modified by experience of American conditions. It went back to Johann Most (1846-1909) and the groups which had gathered round his journal, Freiheit, and to the Chicago Anarchists of the 1880s; and its following was greatest among foreign immigrants. It came largely to dominate the Industrial Unionist movement when the secession of the Western Federation of Miners had destroyed its strength in the Western States. The Industrial Unionism of the West, by contrast, was an indigenous attitude, born out of regional conditions in a frontier area, and owing little to European influence.

The Anarchists, or Anarcho-Syndicalists, of the I.W.W. set out neither to capture the State and transform it into a proletarian dictatorship, nor to create in its place One Big Union which would take over its centralised power, but to destroy all coercive government in favour of 'free' and spontaneous self-organisation of the workers on a local, communal basis, with 'free' federation of the local groups as the means of tackling problems over wide areas. There is no need to describe their essential doctrines here because they have been fully discussed in other chapters in relation to their European manifestations. It need only be said that in the United States the Anarcho-Syndicalists felt a strong impulse towards the organisation of the masses of immigrants who were pouring into the country from Europe, and particularly of those who came from the Latin countries, in which European Syndicalism had its strongholds, or from the less developed areas of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Whereas in the nineteenth century Germany had supplied many more immigrants to the United States than any

1 For Most and for the Chicago Anarchists see Vol. II of this work.

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other country, in the early years of the twentieth century the Italians were the most numerous, followed by the Russians and the Poles. The French were relatively few; and American Syndicalism was less influenced by them than by the Italians, who in many areas constituted themselves the leaders among the immigrants who settled in the big towns and became factory workers, shop and restaurant employees, or service employees in a wide variety of urban occupations. The Russians and Poles who entered largely into the needle trades were also, to some extent, responsive to the Syndicalist appeal.

The I.W.W. included yet a fifth element, of which the outstanding example was no less outstanding a person than Eugene Victor Debs (1855–1926), the candidate of the Socialist Party at a succession of presidential elections. Debs had come to the fore as the leader of an attempt to organise the railroad workers in a comprehensive Industrial Union in opposition to the conservative Railroad Brotherhoods, which were organised on a craft basis and ignored the claims of the less skilled workers employed in railway construction and maintenance. Debs was himself a railroad worker, and became secretary of the Brotherhood of Railroad Firemen, from which he resigned in 1892 in order to form the American Railway Union on inclusive industrial lines. At the head of the new Union he won an important strike against the Great Northern Railroad in 1894; but in the same year his Union instituted a boycott of a large number of railroads in support of the Pullman workers’ strike, and the companies retaliated by getting an injunction from the federal law courts and by inducing the Federal Government to send federal troops to Illinois to help in breaking the strike. Debs himself was charged with conspiracy, and acquitted, but was held in gaol for breach of the injunction while the strike, and with it the Union, were broken by the combined action of the companies, the law courts, and the Federal Government. This was the case which first introduced the injunction procedure as a means of defeating Trade Union action; and it was also remarkable in that the federal troops were brought to Illinois despite the protest of the liberal State Governor, John P. Altgeld, with whom we have met already in connection with the Chicago Anarchists.¹ These experiences made Debs

a convert to Socialism; and he took part in the establishment of the American Socialist Party and at once became by far its most popular leader. He stood at all times well on the left of the party, and remained an uncompromising advocate of Industrial Unionism. As the party's outstanding orator he commanded a large following, and he was nominated as its presidential candidate at successive elections despite his pronounced disagreements with most of its leaders. His feats of endurance as a travelling speaker on behalf of the party were prodigious; and he was for many years the one really popular figure in its ranks, able to command the support of a wide following outside it. Again and again the right wing of the party endeavoured to displace him from his position as candidate for the presidency: his popularity remained unassailable right up to the first world war, in which he took up a strongly pacifist attitude, and again suffered imprisonment. Though forthright in expressing his left-wing opinions, Debs steadily refused to become involved in the internal squabbles of the Socialist Party by serving on its executive: he preferred to keep a free hand, and refused to take directions from the party caucus. His Socialism was undogmatic and strongly ethical. He had not much use for theories, and was uninterested in the finer points of doctrine. Believing firmly in the necessity of the class-struggle and in the advent of the classless society, he was an uncompromising advocate of a kind of Trade Unionism that would bring skilled and unskilled together in a common organisation; and he was therefore strongly opposed to the American Federation of Labor and to craft Unionism in all its forms. He supported the Industrial Workers of the World; but he was neither a 'One Big Unionist' of the Haywood type nor a Syndicalist. The nearest equivalent to him in the Labour movement of any other country is George Lansbury, who had much the same broadly ethical approach and intensity of feeling for the wrongs of the bottom dog — and also the same capacity for infuriating right-wing Socialists and Trade Unionists who were compelled to recognise his sincerity and moral force. Into the I.W.W. movement Debs carried many Socialists who would otherwise have been repelled by its violent repudiation of capitalist morality and its justification of violence as an answer to capitalist oppression.
This repudiation of the prevailing ethical code was, indeed, the most vehemently debated matter among American Socialists, and the feature of I.W.W. behaviour which its opponents were constantly seeking to use as a means of making it unpopular. The repudiation was most fiercely expressed in the far West, where the Industrial Unionists were continually having battles with opponents who showed no moral scruples in the measures they were prepared to take. Shootings, illegal arrests, deportations, and beating up of ‘agitators’ were common practices in the frontier conflicts of the Western States; and the agents employed by the companies did not stop short of sheer ‘frame-ups’ of Union leaders whom they were minded to put out of the way. The Unionists retorted with violence, not only against ‘scabs’ and company spies and agents, but also, where they could, against policemen and politicians who were suborned by the companies to do their dirty work; and Haywood and other leaders, in justifying such action, were led to denounce the entire structure of justice and order as a mere travesty of true justice and freedom, and the ideas which it represented as mere ‘bourgeois morality’, of which the workers need take no account. Every utterance of this sort was received with shocked denunciations by the leading newspapers, and was made a justification of the repressive measures taken against the offenders. There was, of course, a large element of hypocrisy in these denunciations; but the rejection of the prevailing morality by the Industrial Unionists also shocked many Socialists — especially the considerable body of Christian Socialists who had rallied to the Socialist Party in its early years. Debs, though he defended the extremists as having been driven to acts of violence by the unjust, and often positively illegal, repression to which they were subjected, never went to the lengths of moral repudiation which gave the I.W.W. its bad name with the unthinking public and thus made the persecution of it easier. He remained on a somewhat lonely left-wing eminence; and his very isolation did a good deal to hold the Socialist Party together despite the intensity of feeling between its rival factions.

After the secession of the Western Federation of Miners, the contending factions within the I.W.W. soon came to a showdown over the issue of the place of politics, or rather of political
parties. The opening paragraphs of the Preamble to the I.W.W. Constitution, as adopted in 1905, ran as follows:

The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no peace, as long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few, who make up the employing class, have all the good things of life.

Between these two classes a struggle must go on until all the toilers come together on the political, as well as on the industrial field, and take hold of that which they produce by their labour through an economic organisation of the working class, without affiliation with any political party.

This rather enigmatic phrasing was the outcome of a compromise. The De Leonites would not have joined the I.W.W. unless it had come out in favour of political as well as of industrial solidarity; but they could not have demanded affiliation with a political party without raising the question with which of the two rival Socialist parties the industrial organisation was to be associated. Nor did those in the I.W.W. who favoured political action necessarily want the Trade Union organisation to become affiliated to any party; for this might have meant dilution of the party by elements which did not fully accept its gospel. Many of them preferred, indeed, the German structure, in which the Trade Union movement was not affiliated to the party, but accepted its leadership and was officered by party stalwarts. This, they hoped, was what would happen in the case of the I.W.W., as it had happened in that of the Trade and Labor Alliance which the I.W.W. was to replace. It did not happen, partly because at the time the new Socialist Party was growing very much faster than the De Leonite S.L.P., and partly because the De Leonites had no hold at all in the West, from which the I.W.W. was largely recruited in its early days.

The De Leonites in the I.W.W. attached key importance to the phrase in the Preamble which appeared to put as much emphasis on political as on industrial organisation. As against this, not only the Anarcho-Syndicalists but also the Western Industrial Unionists regarded industrial action as the primary and by far the most important form of revolutionary working-class activity, and were irked by the phrase about the political
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field, which the De Leonites and some of the Socialist Party adherents of the I.W.W. never wearied of rubbing in. Consequently, the Anarcho-Syndicalists and the Westerners joined forces in order to get this part of the Preamble amended by striking out all reference to politics.

In 1908 these groups, led by W. E. Trautmann of the Brewery Workers and Vincent St. John from the West, brought up and carried an amendment to the second paragraph in the following terms:

Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organise as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage-system.

The whole of the old paragraph was deleted, leaving no reference at all to political action and none to industrial action either in explicit terms. But the rest of the Preamble made it clear that class-organisation in the economic field was regarded as the primary objective, and further that this organisation was intended to be not only the instrument for carrying on the class-struggle but also the controlling agency in the administration of society after the Revolution. Political action was not explicitly ruled out — there would not have been a majority for doing so — but it was not affirmed either: it was simply passed over in silence.

The De Leonites could by no means stomach this. They at once seceded and, at a separate Convention of their own, formed a rival I.W.W., and reaffirmed the political provisions which the majority had struck out. Indeed, they went further, and drew up a new paragraph which embodied a much more definite assertion of their point of view. This ran as follows:

Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the toilers come together on the political field under the banner of a distinct revolutionary political party governed by the workers’ class interest, and on the industrial field under the banner of One Great Industrial Union to take and hold all means of production and distribution, and to run them for the benefit of all wealth producers.

Thus, from 1908 onwards, there were two rival bodies, each bearing the name, Industrial Workers of the World, and
each seeking to build up a mass revolutionary organisation of the working class. The majority group, with Haywood as its chief figure, had its headquarters at Chicago: the rival De Leonite W.I.I.U. operated from Detroit. Of the two, the Chicago body was much the larger and the more influential; but both were very small. At the time of the split the combined body had hardly 15,000 dues-paying members, and a year or so later the Chicago I.W.W. had fewer than 10,000 and the Detroit W.I.I.U. 4000 at most. Thereafter they both increased in membership, as their activists put themselves at the head of strike movements among the immigrant factory workers, especially in the textile mills. But the new recruits who flowed in during a strike commonly lapsed almost as soon as it was over; and even at the height of its influence the Chicago I.W.W., up to 1914, certainly never had as many as 20,000 members in good standing, or the Detroit W.I.I.U. more than about 10,000. The projected mass Union never came into being: the I.W.W. owed its world reputation and its positive influence to a handful of exceedingly energetic revolutionists, who were ready to rush at any moment to any place where industrial trouble was afoot. In this, it took over the tactics of its far western predecessors, the Western Federation of Miners and the American Labor Union; but it applied them chiefly not to the frontier conditions of the Western States, but to the immigrant communities of the East and the Middle West.

The excitement which was aroused by the activities of the Industrial Workers of the World was, I think, due much more to the publicity given to it by its opponents than to its own efforts. The strikes of textile workers at Lawrence and at Lowell in Massachusetts and at Paterson in New Jersey were no doubt important as signalling the beginnings of revolt among the immigrants, who were being exploited as a source of cheap labour and assigned to a position of social and economic inferiority to the ‘American’ workers. But they were on a fairly small scale, and would have attracted relatively little attention had not the American business interests been prepared to resort to any and every method in order to put them down. By the opening of the second decade of the twentieth century, American capitalism, in the sectors affected by the development of Trade Unionism among skilled craftsmen, had
taken the measure of craft Unionism and was prepared to come
to terms with it, though not without occasional reversion to
more primitive methods of jungle warfare. There were still
many big firms which employed labour spies and private forces
of thugs, and resorted to the suborning of the public authorities
to combat Trade Unionism; but for the most part these
methods were being practised only where skilled and less
skilled workers were attempting to make common cause. They
survived in the mining centres of West Virginia, as well as in
the far West; in Henry Ford's automobile plants, and in the
steel industry; in the oil-well and lumbering areas of California
and the neighbouring States; and wherever large bodies of
underpaid immigrant workers offered an opening for 'agitators'
to foment unrest. But as far as most of the groups organised in
the American Federation of Labor were concerned, capitalism
had learnt, however grudgingly, the lesson that it was safer to
divide the working class by coming to terms with the skilled
craftsmen than to make indiscriminate war on Labour combina-
tions in all their forms. Where Trade Unions of skilled workers
were content to act as pressure groups, exacting the best terms
they could for their own members without bothering about the
fortunes of those outside their ranks, it was usually safer to
meet them half-way than to wage war upon them in the name
of 'freedom of contract'. Moreover, the dollar-hungry cap-
italist understood the dollar-hungry craftsman, as long as he
sought only better conditions for himself and for his fellow-
craftsmen, without invoking nonsensical notions of working-
class solidarity and class-war. It was quite another matter
when there appeared Trade Unions whose spokesmen de-
manded the 'abolition of the wage-system' and proclaimed the
class-solidarity of the whole body of workers and the absolute
opposition of interests between the capitalists and the working
class. Agitators who preached such doctrines and organisations
which endorsed them were to be pursued relentlessly as enemies
of the 'American way of life' or, to use the jargon of the time,
as guilty of 'criminal Syndicalism'. A number of States
enacted laws which made the preaching of Syndicalist doctrines
a criminal offence; and there were witch-hunts less noisy and
irrational than those of to-day only because the world was then
less far gone in neurotic lunacy than it has since become.
The high point of the I.W.W.'s activity during the period after the split was the strike of textile workers at Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912. This was a remarkable example of successful improvisation among a body of workers who were seriously hampered by language barriers, as well as by the indifference of the main body of American Trade Unionists to their affairs. The I.W.W., in organising them for the conduct of the strike, made skilful use of language branches and of written and spoken propaganda in the various tongues. But its most successful improvisation was that of mass picketing, by continuous moving lines of workers obstructing the entry of blacklegs to the factories involved in the dispute. The law was invoked against the use of this method; but, aided by a large amount of public sympathy and monetary support, as well as by the preparedness of its militants to face arrest, the I.W.W. persisted in its strategy, and won a notable victory. This, however, was not achieved without the addition of yet another to the sequence of prosecutions of leaders who ventured to put their class-war principles to the test of practice. Two of the principal strike leaders, Joseph Ettor and Arthur Giovannitti, were indicted for murder in connection with incidents arising out of the strike, to be acquitted only when it was all over, and when the thousands of workers who had joined the I.W.W. during its course had nearly all lapsed from membership after pocketing their gains. The strikes at Lowell and at Paterson brought similar inrushes of members to the rival I.W.W.s; but neither was able to hold any considerable membership in the areas concerned when the momentary excitement was at an end. In the task of organising the immigrants more durably and in winning for them concessions that lasted, the less revolutionary Unions of Clothing Workers and Ladies' Garment Workers, led by Sidney Hillman (1887–1946) and David Dubinsky, were soon to achieve very much greater success. The I.W.W. remained essentially a league of militants, incapable of performing the everyday tasks of Trade Union organisation. It could score, on occasion, spectacular successes; but it could not lower its revolutionary tempo to meet the requirements of the daily round.

Throughout this period of Trade Union militancy, the
American Socialists found themselves sharply divided, not only on Trade Union issues, but also in respect of their fundamental objectives. In Trade Union matters, the advocates of 'dual Unionism' were in sharp opposition to the advocates of 'boring from within' the older Unions. Most Socialists favoured, on principle, union by industry as against craft Unionism, and deplored the lack of interest among craft Unionists in the welfare of the bottom dogs; but the question remained whether the craft Unions could be brought over to a more socialistic policy by concentrating upon their conversion from within, or whether they were so deeply committed to pressure group tactics as to be written off as hardly less capitalistic in outlook than the capitalists themselves. There were, moreover, a good many Socialists who, even if they theoretically preferred Union by industry to craft Unionism, were very little interested in Trade Union affairs and were disposed to dismiss them as almost irrelevant to the Socialist cause. This attitude was found especially among the Socialists of Wisconsin, who constituted the strongest and most solidly organised sector of the American Socialist Party, and were the only group strong enough politically to win for their leader a seat in Congress. Wisconsin, and above all the capital, Milwaukee, were inhabited by a large body of German immigrants who had come in during the earlier waves of immigration and were being continually reinforced by further waves of newcomers from Germany and from Scandinavia. The Germans, headed by Victor Berger (1860–1929), were strong believers in the virtues of a disciplined mass party, devoted to the conquest of political power and using Trade Unionism mainly as an electoral auxiliary. But, whereas in Germany the Socialists continued, at any rate in theory, to look forward to the Revolution and to be suspicious of measures calculated to increase the power of the capitalist State, Berger and his followers regarded the existing State, in America, as sufficiently democratic in its basic institutions to be safely used for the erection upon it of a superstructure of socialisation and piecemeal social reform. In their view, the United States did not need a revolution: the situation called only for the education of the electorate in Socialist ideas and for the creation of a mass Socialist Party strong enough to capture control of the existing legislative,
executive, and judicial machines. Berger was faithful to the ideas of the German Social Democrats in proclaiming the need for independent Socialist political action, free from alliances or entanglements with the bourgeois parties; but he was prepared, in order to win votes for the Socialist Party, to temper its immediate programme so as to arouse the least possible antagonism among the more progressive bourgeois voters, and to espouse any cause, such as the demand for 'clean government', which seemed likely to swell his immediate following. He was, however, strongly collectivist; indeed, in his mind Socialism and collective ownership and operation of vital industries and services were almost synonymous terms. He was fundamentally a State Socialist, but was prepared to express his immediate aspirations in terms of demands for the transfer to public ownership, national or local, of essential public utilities and of industries controlled by specially obnoxious trusts and monopolistic concerns. For industrial action he and his group had almost no use, holding that it could achieve almost nothing and that the key to the situation lay in the peaceful conquest of political power by electoral means. Berger had, moreover, a thoroughly German love of order and authority; and the turbulent course of left-wing activity repelled him. He was exasperated by Eugene Debs, who appeared to him to be utterly incapable of orderly rational thought, and to be imperilling the fortunes of Socialism by his sentimental support of every sort of formless revolt. Under Berger's leadership, the Wisconsin Socialists formed an almost solid right wing of the American Socialist Party; but they were a right wing of a peculiar kind. There were other right-wing groups which wished the Socialists to ally themselves with bourgeois progressive bodies in a reforming bloc, or hoped to bring the Trade Unions into a semi-Socialist Labor Party on the British model. The followers of Victor Berger would have none of such compromises: they were out-and-out Socialists in their peculiar way, and insisted that the bourgeois progressives must come to them and accept the Socialist label. To a great extent they took over the collectivist doctrine of Edward Bellamy's Nationalist movement;¹ but they differed from Bellamy in basing their policy on a right-wing interpretation of Marxism and in


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assigning to a mass Social Democratic Party the key function in bringing the new society gradually into being. In this they followed Eduard Bernstein rather than either Bellamy or the British Fabians; and they had no hesitation for the most part in accepting the 'Revisionist' label.

Against the gradualist collectivism of the Berger group were ranged, at the other extreme, the revolutionary Socialists who could find no satisfaction in Daniel De Leon's leadership. One of the principal groups which went to the making of the new Socialist Party of 1901 had broken away from the Socialist Labor Party largely because it disapproved of De Leon's 'sectarian' policy and saw in the failure of his Trade and Labor Alliance strong grounds for disbelief in the possibility of organising American workers on a programme which ignored the struggle for immediate concessions and postponed the prospect of real economic gains until after the Revolution. Many of these seceders wanted to throw themselves into the task of converting the members of the A.F. of L. to Socialism by participating in their daily struggles. Others, less interested in Trade Unions, rejected the De Leonite version of the Marxist gospel and hoped for a Social Democratic Party more closely akin to the mass parties of the German and Austrian Socialists, which combined immediate programmes of reform with the proclamation of impending Socialist revolution. These two groups, and the newcomers who joined them after the formation of the new party, constituted its centre; but they were by no means homogeneous, or at one save in their dissent from the extremists of the right and left wings. They included, on the one hand, progressive Trade Unionists such as Max Hayes of the United Mine Workers and James F. Carey of Haverhill, Massachusetts, and on the other the middle-class theorists of Marxism, whose leading figures were the New York lawyer, Morris Hillquit (1869–1933), and the writers, John Spargo (b. 1876) and A. M. Simons (b. 1870). Both these groups, beginning in the centre of the party, were impelled by stages rightwards by reaction against the Syndicalist and extreme Industrial Unionist tendencies of the left wing. By the time the I.W.W. had become active, they were coming to be the allies of Victor Berger and the right wing against the revolutionaries.
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These were not the only elements that went to the making of the American Socialist Party in the years before 1914. There was, during this period, a considerable inflow of writers and journalists, ministers of religion and other professional men and women, who, shocked by the corruptions and the crude contrasts of American capitalist society, began by supporting campaigns for clean government or against particular acts of violence or legal injustice, or against the anti-social practices of big business, and then became convinced that the entire system was rotten and needed to be swept away. There was also quite a group of so-called 'millionaire Socialists' — that is, of wealthy men who rallied to the Socialist Party as others before them had done to Henry George's Single Tax proposals. Not all converts of these types actually joined the party; but a good many of them did, and some of them played an active part in its counsels — the more easily because there were relatively few outstanding working-class leaders in its ranks. The writings of Jack London (1876–1916) and of Upton Sinclair (b. 1878) played a considerable part in winning recruits to Socialism. Sinclair's *The Jungle*, exposing conditions in the Chicago stockyards, appeared in 1906; Jack London's *The Iron Heel* the following year; and a few years earlier Frank Norris's *The Octopus* (1901) and *The Pit* (1903) had thrown a lurid light on the speculative elements in American business. Ida Tarbell's *History of the Standard Oil Company* (1905) and other anti-trust writings also helped to bring many recruits to Socialism; and such writers as W. D. P. Bliss (1856–1926), the founder of the American Fabian Society, and George D. Herron (1862–1925) were active in the cause of Christian Socialism. Among the journalists who underwent conversion were Charles Edward Russell and Robert Hunter, who both became active party members. Hunter, previously well known as a social worker, joined the Socialist Party in 1906, and contributed largely by his writings to spread a knowledge of European Socialism in the United States. The Second International then appeared to be advancing rapidly; and both the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the successful début of the British Labour Party in 1906 had substantial effects on American public opinion, which was further affected by the financial panic of 1907. These events occurred during the
period of Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘trust-busting’ policy; and when Taft succeeded Roosevelt as President in 1909 and the Republican Party shifted rapidly rightwards there was a further flow of disillusioned Progressives into the Socialist ranks. At the presidential election of 1900 Eugene Debs had polled less than 100,000 votes and the S.L.P. candidate only about 33,000. In 1904 Debs’s vote rose above 400,000; in 1908 it was hardly any larger at 421,000; but in 1912 it reached 900,000. Meanwhile the Socialist Party’s membership had been rising fast, from about 30,000 in 1908 to a peak of 150,000 in 1912.

Of course, many of these recruits were manual workers; but the party, lacking large-scale Trade Union support, was considerably dominated both at the centre and in many areas by its middle-class elements. It may be said that the situation was much the same in most of the Socialist Parties of Europe; and indeed most of the outstanding leaders of the Second International were drawn from the professional classes— for example, Jaurès, Victor Adler, Vandervelde, Hyndman, and Wilhelm Liebknecht, and also Plekhanov and Lenin. Keir Hardie and August Bebel were the outstanding exceptions. But in most countries the leaders, from whatever class they came, were operating in close association with the main body, or at least with a considerable section, of the organised working class, and were under the necessity of shaping their policies to take account of working-class reactions. The American Socialists, on the other hand, were struggling against the principal representative organisation of American Labor, and had with them only those working-class leaders who were in revolt against the predominant tendency in the Trade Unions. Moreover, the Trade Unionists who were in the party were sharply divided among themselves, between advocates of ‘boring from within’ the American Federation of Labor and supporters of the Industrial Workers of the World. This situation led many of the middle-class Socialists to argue that the Socialist Party ought to avoid becoming in any way embroiled in Trade Union conflicts; and this could be done only by standing almost completely aside from the day-to-day industrial struggle. Victor Berger and his exclusively political-actionist following did in fact largely adopt this attitude; but the ‘sentimental’ middle-class Socialists, who had become
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converts on account of the exploitation and injustice which they saw around them, were torn asunder by their sympathy with the bottom dogs on the one hand and their revulsion against the violence of speech and action which characterised the I.W.W. on the other. Some went one way, and some another; but in the last resort most of them sided with Victor Berger or at any rate with Morris Hillquit as against ‘Big Bill’ Haywood, while giving their support to Eugene Debs as a fighter for Socialism who stood above the day-to-day battle.

In strengthening the Socialist right wing against the left, the famous case of the McNamara brothers undoubtedly had a considerable influence. This case had nothing to do directly with either the Socialist Party or the I.W.W. The Union chiefly concerned in it belonged to the American Federation of Labor. The affair began in 1910 with a strike of members of the Association of Bridge and Structural Ironworkers at Los Angeles. The City Council tried to break the strike by issuing an ordinance forbidding picketing, and there were disorders leading to mass arrests of strikers and their supporters. At the height of the trouble the building of the Los Angeles Times was wrecked by an explosion which killed 21 persons. The Times, which had been taking a leading part against the strike, at once accused the Union of having caused the explosion. The notorious Burns Detective Agency was set to investigate the affair; and, early the following year, James B. McNamara, brother of John McNamara, the Secretary of the Union, and another man, named McManigal, were arrested without warrants in Detroit and brought to Los Angeles. John McNamara was similarly arrested at Indianapolis, where the Union had its head office; and all three were charged with murder. McManigal, in the hope of saving his own skin, was induced under pressure to confess to a number of dynamiting outrages instigated by the Union; but he denied any connection with the blowing up of the Times building. The A.F. of L. persuaded Clarence Darrow (1857–1938) to undertake the defence; but Darrow became convinced of James McNamara’s guilt and entered into negotiations with the prosecution in the hope of saving John McNamara, who had not been in California at the time and had clearly no connection with the Times explosion. James agreed to plead guilty, on condition that his brother was
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acquitted; but the prosecution insisted not only on a life sentence for James, but also on ten years' imprisonment for John; and Darrow, fearing the effects on the Union of a full trial, reluctantly agreed. These negotiations had taken place without the knowledge of the Defence Committee, on which the Socialists were active; and Debs and others had been conducting an extensive campaign in the belief that the prisoners were entirely innocent and had been 'framed' by the employers. Consequently, there was consternation when Darrow's actions became known; and matters were made worse when at the trial, despite James McNamara's plea, the judge insisted on John being sent to prison for fifteen years. James received a life sentence. The evidence made it clear that James McNamara had actually been concerned in a number of dynamitings prior to the Times explosion, though none of these had resulted in loss of life. On the other hand, John McNamara and the Union were shown to have been entirely unconnected with the Times affair. John, indeed, pleaded guilty to any part in the dynamitings only because this was represented to him as the only way of reaching a settlement that would save his brother's life.

The McNamara case naturally did great harm to the cause of left-wing Trade Unionism, even though the I.W.W. was in no way implicated, except by rallying to the defence. The affair was used to build up public feeling against Trade Unionism in general and militant Trade Unionism in particular; and many of the more moderate Socialists were scared by it into strong hostility to the left wing of the party. It had a great deal to do with the success of the right wing in securing the expulsion of W. D. Haywood from the National Executive on a referendum vote early in 1913, though Haywood had no connection at all with the McNamara case.

By 1913 the American Socialist Movement was beginning to slide downhill. The expulsion of Haywood led to considerable left-wing secessions, and members on the right wing also dropped out. The war thereafter hastened its decline; but the mischief had begun sooner. Up to 1912 the Socialists were gaining strength inside the American Federation of Labor; but in 1913 they suffered a serious setback there too, for the A.F. of L. was moving rightwards in response to the pressure
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of anti-left opinion in the public as a whole. It is easy to see in retrospect that the Socialists' chances of bringing the A.F. of L. over to any sort of Socialism were always very small; but up to 1913 many of them did not take this view. On the contrary the advocates of 'boring from within' were convinced that the swing of public opinion towards Socialism would speedily bring a majority in the A.F. of L. within their reach. In 1912 nearly a third of the votes at the A.F. of L. Convention had been cast in favour of some of the Socialist resolutions; but that peak was never to be approached again.

We have now to ask again why American Socialism, after making the quite substantial gains it did make between 1900 and 1912, slipped suddenly back, and why it failed to get the backing of the organised working-class movement. The answers can best be approached by considering in the first instance what lay behind the very great success of the Socialists in establishing their lead among the workers in certain European countries. In Germany and in Austria, where the Socialists' ascendancy among the workers was greatest, the Socialist parties were fighting not only the employing class but also powerful, autocratic, militarist States. They were fighting feudalism and militarism as much as capitalism, and indeed more. The political struggle against militarism and autocracy actually took precedence in the minds of leaders and voters alike over the struggle against the capitalist class; and the fact that in the last resort capitalists and militarists and feudalists were banded together against the workers solidified the working class into a political as well as an economic group. In France, where the situation was less clear, the Socialists were never able to establish the same ascendancy over the Trade Unions; and in Great Britain, where feudalism, militarism, and autocracy were not in the ascendant, the Trade Unions were brought over into alliance with the Socialists only by means of a Labour Party which was not committed to Socialism (until 1918) and of which they had the final control in their own hands. Even in Great Britain, however, the Trade Unions moved steadily towards acceptance of a sort of Socialism and did accept the Socialists as allies in a common struggle.

In the United States, militarism and feudalism were relatively unimportant factors; and the State lacked altogether the
autocratic, aristocratic character which it possessed in Germany and Austria. Governments did indeed often take sides against the organised workers and make ruthless use of the public powers in putting them down. But when this occurred, the Governments, federal or State or local, were acting as suborned auxiliaries of the employers rather than on their own behalf. The workers’ main struggle was against the employing class — not against the Government; and, in particular, it was against a section of the employing class — the great trusts, monopolies, and financial interests — rather than against the smaller employers or the employing class as a whole. The extreme ruthlessness of the struggle was for the most part confined to certain limited areas of capitalist enterprise — principally to the newly opened up mining and lumbering and oil areas, to the coalfields, and to the centres of mass-production industry, such as Chicago and Bethlehem and Detroit. In these limited areas the class-war was waged much more fiercely than in Western Europe — though France too had its savageries of industrial conflict. But ruthless class-war never existed over the United States as a whole, or so as to set its stamp on the entire Trade Union movement — much less on the entire working class. Moreover, because the basis of government was democratic, at any rate in a formal sense, and because the anti-labour interventions of government were sporadic and by no means universal, there was nothing to bring about a general rallying of working-class political sentiment against the State. The revolutionaries were the exceptions, whereas in Germany and Austria the main body of the workers looked forward to the coming, some day, of political revolution almost as an event assured. American industrial relations — like other elements in American life — had about them a tang of frontier lawlessness, and of lynch law; but lawlessness and revolution are two quite different things and proceed from different states of mind. The revolutionaries in the United States were largely, though not exclusively, persons who had brought their revolutionary principles with them from Europe: it was lawlessness, rather than revolutionism, that lay behind the bitter industrial warfare of the Western States.

Accordingly, Socialism in America could not go far as a revolutionary doctrine drawing its inspiration from the
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Communist Manifesto. In the view of most Americans, including most Trade Unionists, there was no need for a political revolution: at most the need was to put new men into control of the existing State machines, and then to make use of these machines to serve the workers' ends. But there was also a still deeper reason why the Trade Unions in particular were not prepared to accept the Socialists' lead. There was not one unified or unifiable working class. Even apart from the negro problem, there were two American working classes — on the one hand a relatively privileged aristocracy of labour, made up of native American skilled workers and of immigrants coming mostly from economically advanced parts of Europe and possessing similar skills, and on the other hand a growing mass of unskilled labour, drawn partly from peasant areas in the more advanced countries but also to an ever-increasing extent from countries in which standards of living were an immense distance below those of the majority of native American townsmen. Of course, no clear line can be drawn between these two groups: there were plenty of marginal cases. Nevertheless, the distinction between them was real enough to affect profoundly the class-structure of the United States and to prevent the growth of a unified working-class movement. One factor was language, which gave an immense advantage to the English-speaking workers over most of the rest — though not so much over the Germans, who were able to establish their own high-level communities in Wisconsin and elsewhere. As the flow of very poor, and for the most part industrially unskilled, foreign-speaking immigrants increased, the gulf grew wider. The Trade Unions, which had been relatively open — both to members and to European ideas — in the 1870s, began to close up into bodies mainly of skilled craftsmen who were seeking to establish and maintain positions of privilege and superiority, and were not minded to take the risks of fighting the battles of strangers. The tone and tempo of American society, in addition, fostered the tendency of the Trade Unions to develop into pressure groups. Government, in the United States, was not so much an enemy to be fought as an orange to be squeezed. Big business had shown the way; and the easiest course was to follow its example. The politicians, as a class, commanded neither hatred nor respect: they were rather go-getters who
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could sometimes be bribed, sometimes intimidated, and sometimes cajoled. Moreover, America was the country of economic opportunity; and that is not very different from saying that it was a country of men on the make. It was taken for granted that business men were out for dollars; and, as the workers wanted dollars too, the correct course seemed to be that of squeezing the employer hard enough to induce him to see that his interest lay in making concessions to those who could squeeze the hardest. It was clearly more difficult for the Trade Unions to attempt to do this on behalf of the whole working class than of privileged sections; and craft Unionism was accordingly in most cases the most rewarding form of organisation. It may be answered that it is not necessary to go to the United States to find examples of craft egoism and lack of care for the less skilled. Agreed; but the inducements in America were greater than elsewhere, and the policy easier because of the gulf between the American workers and the immigrants. Nor were there in the United States the factors making for political solidarity that in Western Europe helped to unify the working class in its industrial as well as in its political attitudes.

The I.W.W., as we have seen, after a start mainly in the far West, developed in practice chiefly as an organisation of small groups of revolutionary leaders who made their impact on larger bodies of ignorant and ill-paid immigrants. But it was never able to build these newcomers into an organised force capable of outlasting the immediate struggle. The opportunity for creating mass Unions in the United States came only when restrictions on immigration had reduced the inflow of unskilled workers and had allowed time for large-scale assimilation of those already there. Then the Congress of Industrial Organisations was able to break down the still formidable opposition to free Trade Union organisation in the mass-production industries and to establish itself side by side with the A.F. of L. But even then the legacy of the past remained to prevent the coalescence of the two groups into a single movement. Nor did the Unions of the C.I.O. accept Socialism along with Industrial Unionism.

It would carry me much too far ahead to enter at this stage into any discussion of these later developments. What concerns me here stops at the outbreak of the European war in 1914. I have been trying to show why, even after the epoch of 'free
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land’ had ended and the ‘frontier’ had been in effect closed, there was still no room in the early years of the present century for the growth of a really powerful American Socialist movement. The outstanding reasons, as I see them, are two — the absence of the political motive which rallied the working classes of Europe in hostility to autocratic, militaristic States, and the division of the working class into a privileged and an unprivileged group, between which was a wide gap both in standards of living and in ways of life, including the barrier of language. This second factor rendered impossible in America the half-way solution of alliance between the Socialists and the Trade Unions in a Labour Party prepared to champion the claims of the whole working class. It did this fully as much as the first factor ruled out the creation of a Social Democratic Party on the German model.

The weakness of American Socialism as a movement was reflected, during the period studied in this chapter, in the weakness of its thought. Henry George’s *Progress and Poverty* is the one really powerful contribution made by an American to the stream of Socialist thought — and it is not Socialist. Jack London’s *Iron Heel* has been praised, not only as a story, but as a remarkable foreseeing of Fascism; and so it is. Upton Sinclair’s novels, from *The Jungle* to *Oil*, contain much telling condemnation of capitalist society. Edward Bellamy wrote, in *Looking Backward*, a popular but not very attractive utopia. There were many fairly competent expositions of Marxism, and attempts to apply Marx’s ideas and methods to the study of American society. But nobody wrote anything substantial or original either about Socialism in general or about American Socialism in particular — unless one is to count Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), whose justly celebrated *Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899) was the first of a series of sociological works in which capitalist society in general and American capitalism in particular were most acutely criticised and evaluated. Veblen’s writings, however, are anti-capitalist rather than constructively Socialist. He predicted the coming disappearance of capitalism and of the ‘price system’ which is its economic foundation in contemporary society; but he offered no explicit remedy, unless, on the strength of his latest work, he is to be counted as a forerunner of the gospel of technocracy.
He certainly came to believe, as Saint-Simon had believed before him, that the future lay with the 'engineer' as planner and controller of the forces of production and that some sort of scientifically based social order was destined to supersede the existing chaos of acquisitive individualism. Marxism he disliked, as exaggerating the purely economic at the expense of the psychological factors in social evolution. His philosophical foundations were in Kant as against Hegel; and he envisaged social development largely in terms of the expansion of science as a body of applicable knowledge. Little read in his own day beyond a circle of devoted admirers, he has exerted a growing influence in recent years, but not mainly among Socialists, though a few, such as J. A. Hobson, have been considerably affected by his ideas.

Apart from Veblen, and from Henry George, American thought relevant to Socialism expressed itself during the period up to 1914 mainly in occasional writings and speeches about Socialist policy. In journalism indeed the American Socialists were remarkably prolific, and some of their journals reached a very wide public. Outstanding in this respect was Julius A. Weyland (1854–1912), with his *Appeal to Reason*, published from 1895 in Kansas, which reached a circulation of more than a quarter of a million round about 1910. Another popular success was *Wilshire's Magazine*, edited by Gaylord Wilshire (1861–1927) from Canada, but circulating mainly in the United States, with a reputed monthly sale of 100,000. Another notable journal, though with a much smaller circulation, was *The Socialist* of Herman F. Titus, first published at Seattle in 1900 and then transferred to Toledo, where Titus for a time edited it jointly with William Mailly (1871–1912), one-time Secretary of the Socialist Party. Titus was originally a Seattle physician; converted to Marxism, he became active on the left wing of the Socialist Party, attacking opportunist vote-catching and insisting on the need for sound theoretical foundations. Later, *The Socialist* migrated to Idaho, and then back to Seattle, where it continued to represent the left wing of the Socialist Party until Titus seceded from the party in 1909.

At the other extreme was the Wisconsin organ, the *Social Democratic Herald*, which, under a series of editors, stood for
the purely political policy of Victor Berger’s group. A more open forum, with a leftish tendency, was provided by the *International Socialist Review*, published by the largest Socialist publishing house, that of C. H. Kerr of Chicago. The *Review* began as a journal for discussion at a fairly high intellectual level, with A. M. Simons as editor; but in 1908 Kerr decided to reshape it on more popular lines, and handed the editorship over to Mary and Leslie Marcy. Mary Marcy was the author of the sensational success, *Letters of a Pork Packer’s Stenographer*—a position she had actually held—which appeared soon after Upton Sinclair’s *The Jungle*. The Marcys turned the *Review* into a popular illustrated magazine, and raised the sale by leaps to nearly 50,000 copies a month.

All this activity, however, made but little contribution to Socialist thought. Just as American Socialism produced in writing little that was new, so American Industrial Unionism produced no literature to compare with the outpourings of Syndicalism in France. American State Socialism, after Bellamy, has to be studied mainly in articles and speeches by Victor Berger and his Wisconsin followers. American Marxism produced Daniel De Leon,¹ whose writings Lenin admired; but, apart from De Leon, it was almost limited to second-hand expositions of European doctrines. The impression one gets from the study of a large mass of occasional writing is that there was no lack of men of good-will, who were ready to put the ethical case for Socialism in much the same way as it was put in Great Britain by Robert Blatchford and by the Independent Labour Party. But there was no real thinking group, such as the Fabians, to plan gradualist policies for the conditions of American society: nor was there any solid driving force to hold the intellectuals together and to keep them down to earth. Much right-wing Socialist writing was extraordinarily naïve; and the left wing was usually too excited, and fighting too hard for its life, to find leisure to reflect. A few writers, such as William English Walling in his *Socialism as it is* (1912), produced acute critical studies of European Socialism and its underlying ideas; and the young Walter Lippman with his *Preface to Politics* (1913) made a brilliant critical start, largely inspired by Graham Wallas, in the almost new field of Social Psychology.

¹ For De Leon see Vol. II, p. 374 ff.
But all this adds up to little enough in relation to the magnitude of the task of putting Socialism on the American map. Acute criticism and telling attack were possible, and were achieved; but the materials needed for construction were wanting, and no specifically American Socialism emerged.

I have included in the present volume no study of Socialism in Canada because there was very little significant development up to 1914. The Canadian Labour movement developed from the 1880s onwards largely under influences coming from the United States, at first mainly through the Knights of Labor, who founded their first Canadian Local at Hamilton, Ontario, in 1881 and by the late 'eighties had no fewer than 250 Locals in Canada. The Knights remained strong until the middle 'nineties, and then declined fast, though a few Locals in Quebec lasted on right up to 1910. Meanwhile, 'International' Unions, with headquarters in the United States, had been steadily invading Canada from the 1880s, either founding new Locals or taking over previously independent Canadian societies. A Canadian Labour Union, which attempted to link together all types of Trade Unions, had been founded as early as 1873, but lasted only a few years in face of serious trade depression. A new central body, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, was set up in 1886, at first with a following only in Ontario, but broadly enough based to include both the bodies affiliated to the Knights of Labor and the 'International' Unions connected with the growing American Federation of Labor. These latter steadily gained ground; and in 1902 the Trades and Labour Congress expelled both the groups which adhered to the Knights and also the independent Unions not connected with the A.F. of L. These latter proceeded to set up a rival, purely Canadian, central body, called at first the National Trades and Labour Congress and later the Canadian Federation of Labour, with its main strength in Quebec. In Nova Scotia a quite separate body, the Provincial Workmen's Association, had been established in 1879 among the miners, and had spread to other trades. The Knights of Labor and a little later the United Mine Workers
began to set up Locals in competition with it; and the P.W.A. rapidly lost ground. It survived, however, till 1917, when a regional United Miners’ Union was set up, only to merge into the ‘international’ U.M.W.A. the following year. There were also, especially in Quebec, a number of Catholic Trade Societies; but these did not join forces in a fully constituted Federation of Catholic Workers till after the first world war.

There were thus in Canada several rival Trade Union movements, with their main strongholds in different parts of the country. Much the largest of these was the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, closely linked to the American Federation of Labor. The Trades and Labour Congress had little to do with industrial action, which was controlled mainly by the ‘international’ Unions of the A.F. of L. It directed its main efforts to securing labour legislation, both at the Dominion level and in the provinces; and it also attempted to get laws regulating immigration, especially into the urban areas. From the mid ’nineties it favoured political action; but it left this entirely to the provincial Federations or to separately constituted Labour electoral bodies. A small number of Labour candidates were elected in several of the provinces; but no national Labour Party came into being till after 1918, though several attempts were made, especially after the establishment of the British Labour Party in 1906. A small Socialist Party of Canada existed in the 1890s, and for some years its local sections were admitted to the Trades and Labour Congress; but this connection was ended in 1902, and the Socialist Party never had at all a wide influence.

A new challenge appeared in 1902–3, when the American Labor Union — an offshoot of the Western Federation of Miners in the United States and a forerunner of the Industrial Workers of the World — began to establish branches in British Columbia. This was the body which sent Ben W. Baker to represent it at the Amsterdam Socialist Congress of 1904. This movement was soon succeeded by that of the I.W.W., which spread to Western Canada from about 1906. The De Leonite I.W.W. — the Workers’ International Industrial Union — also spread to Canada after the split; and both made some headway till they were dissolved in 1915 because of their anti-war activities. They revived for a while after 1918; but the main
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left-wing challenge of the post-war years came from the One Big Union set up in 1919 — the body responsible for the big Winnipeg general strike of that year.

The Canadian Labour movement, up to 1914, produced no outstanding leader. D. J. O'Donaghue (d. 1905), an Ottawa compositor and one of the founders of the Canadian Labour Union in 1879, came to be called the 'father' of Canadian Labour. George Dower of Toronto, also a compositor, in the 1880s and 1890s and P. M. Draper and Tom Moore from 1900 were outstanding figures in the Trades and Labour Congress up to 1914, together with Alphonso Verville, M.P. for Montreal from 1906, and J. G. O'Donaghue, who acted as its solicitor and parliamentary draftsman. But none of these made any independent contribution to Socialist or Labour thought. For the most part Canadian Trade Unionism followed United States models, while political activity outside Quebec echoed British demands for social legislation, but had to operate mainly province by province because most forms of labour legislation fell to the provinces under the constitution of the Dominion. At the Dominion level the chief issues were Trade Union rights and the control of immigration. The question of Socialism hardly arose till after 1918, except in British Columbia under the industrialist influence of the American Labor Union and the Industrial Workers of the World.
CHAPTER XXII

LATIN AMERICA: THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

Until after the first world war Latin America played but a small part in the Socialist movement. Only two countries — Argentina and Uruguay — were represented in the Second International, though observers appeared now and then at its Congresses from two others — Chile and Brazil. The whole area, from Mexico to Patagonia, was mainly agricultural, with patches of mining development and with some industrialisation in Buenos Aires and a few other cities, such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Moreover, the population, except in Argentina and Uruguay, was largely made up of Indians and half-castes, with a large admixture of negroes in some of the States. Argentina, up to 1914, had received about 2,500,000 Italian and 1,500,000 Spanish immigrants, with much smaller contingents from other parts of Europe: Uruguay too had been largely peopled from Spain and Italy, in roughly equal proportions. These were the only countries in Latin America which were inhabited mainly by persons of unmixed European stock. Brazil’s three million white immigrants had been absorbed into a population predominantly negro or of mixed blood. The greater part of South America was still under the rule of a mainly Creole aristocracy of landowners, some of whom owned estates much vaster than those of the grandees in Spain. The Indians and half-breeds worked under systems of land-tenure which were often still close to serfdom: the blacks, after their emancipation from the legal status of slavery, were largely in the same condition, or often still worse off. Mines and vast fruit farms owned by foreign concerns were better exploited technically than most enterprises directed by indigenous proprietors, and paid on the whole rather less abominable wages. But they were bad enough, and, aided by the Governments, put down rebellion or strike action with a high
hand. In Argentina and Uruguay labour conditions were substantially better; but there too they were pretty bad outside the capital towns. Everywhere the hold of religion was very strong among the people, and the Catholic faith was riddled, among negroes especially, with beliefs taken over from more primitive religions. The Church was a great landowner; and there was a wide gulf between its hierarchy, still largely recruited from Europe, and the common run of village priests. Illiteracy was very widespread — almost general in many areas among the Indian and negro populations. So was chronic under-nourishment, with its accompaniment of disease and premature death.

Taken as a whole, Latin America, though it included vast arid spaces, as well as vast tracts of uncleared jungle, could well have sustained a much larger population at a good standard of living had its productive resources been even moderately well used. In fact, only a fraction of its cultivable area was used at all, even including the great tracts over which herds of cattle and sheep ranged almost untended. Villagers, crowded upon tiny plots which barely kept them alive, were surrounded by wide areas belonging to great landowners, or to the Church, and left altogether unoccupied. There was almost no attempt over most of the continent to improve methods of land-use. Argentina and Uruguay were indeed great ranching countries, dominated by the meat-importing firms of Europe and the United States; and in the north fruit-growing was being developed under American control. Chile had its capitalist mining enterprises: silver and gold were mined in many areas, and from the 1890s the exploitation of Bolivian tin was beginning. Rubber was sought in the interior of Brazil, especially before the challenge of Ceylon and Malaya began in the final decades of the nineteenth century.

In such a soil there was not much room, up to 1914, for the growth of a Socialist movement at all resembling those of the countries of Western Europe. But, almost up to 1914, what movements there were were in the main imitative of European Socialism and especially of its Spanish and Italian varieties, though French and, to a smaller extent, German influences also played their part. Immigrants from these countries played an important rôle. American Socialism had almost no influence;
but Henry George’s ideas had much among those Latin Americans who attempted to face the great agrarian question that was in reality fundamental. Unfortunately these were all too few in most of the countries concerned: Latin American Socialism developed largely as an urban movement among the industrial workers and did not succeed until after 1914 in making much impact on the countryside. Even in Mexico, where the great Revolution that followed the fall of Porfirio Diaz was passing through its early phases during the years just before the first world war, there was no effective combination till a good deal later between the agrarian leaders and the urban working class.

Socialism, under the prevailing conditions, was bound to be mainly a movement of middle-class intellectuals reinforced by small groups of skilled workers such as printers, carpenters, bakers, engineers, and employees in the public and public utility services. The miners, mostly working in remote areas and subject to severe repression, could join in only later. The Socialists either appeared as a left wing of the middle-class reform parties, which were fighting against the dominance of the landed aristocracy and the Church, or, reacting against these parties, emerged as sects which fought out, in an alien environment, the European quarrels of Marxists and Bakuninists, parliamentarians and Anarchists, Social Democrats and Syndicalists, all the more bitterly because none of the contestants had any effective body of mass-support. Comtist Positivism, which had a deep influence on the Radical politicians and social theorists, partly contended and partly mingled with socialistic doctrines. Out of Catholicism there came no left wing and even no social reformist movement until between the two world wars a small beginning was made in Costa Rica under the leadership of Father Benjamin Núñez. In Mexico, indeed, many village priests took the side of the agrarian revolution; but the Church as an organised power was wholly the ally of the aristocracy against the people.

The story of Latin American Socialism in the nineteenth century, such as it is, begins with immigrants from Europe after 1848 and enters on its second phase with the arrival of more Socialist and Anarchist refugees after the Paris Commune of 1871. The earliest influences traceable, as in so many parts of
the world, are those of Fourier and Cabet. Robert Owen's passing fantasy in 1827 of a new Co-operative State in Texas, then Mexican territory, and his colloquy with General Santa Anna left no permanent memory. The solitary Socialist manifestation before 1848 was the foundation in Argentina by the Basque utopian poet, José Estebán Antonio Echeverría (1805-51), in 1838, of a 'May Association', for which he wrote a manifesto based on the ideas of Saint-Simon and Pierre Leroux. Echeverría was an exile, and settled in Montevideo, where he published his best-known work, *Socialist Dogma* (1846), expounding the doctrine of his manifesto. He also wrote works on Economic Planning and on Social Philosophy, which were republished in Buenos Aires, together with his *Socialist Dogma*, in 1915. Nothing came at the time of Echeverría's Socialist propaganda; but he is recognised as the founder of Argentinian social science and as the first social historian of Argentina. The next in order was a Frenchman, Taudonnet, who published a short-lived *Socialist Review* at Rio de Janeiro in 1845. A Socialist Club appeared in Colombia in 1849. Of greater importance was the Society of Equality founded in Chile in 1850 by Francisco Bilbao (1823-64). Bilbao had been an exile from Chile in the 1840s and had taken part in Paris in the Revolution of 1848. He returned with an enthusiasm for Co-operation and for Mutual Aid; and he and his followers, who subsequently merged politically with the Radicals, were very active in the promotion of Co-operative and Mutual Societies. They were able to lay the foundations of a considerable Co-operative and Mutualist movement, which has made Chile to this day the strongest centre of Co-operation in Latin America. Mexico too had a Mutualist movement in the 1850s.

Then came the Greek tailor Plotino Rodokanaty, who founded a Fourierist journal, *Falansterio*, in Mexico in 1861. Then in Cuba, at the beginning of the series of Creole risings against Spanish rule which lasted from 1868 to 1878, there appeared the first Anarchist groups, headed by Spaniards and reflecting, like the entire rising, the contemporary troubles in Spain. Their leader, Saturnino Martínez, succeeded in organising a Trade Union among the workers in the tobacco industry — the first widespread Union in the whole area.

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From the early 1870s development becomes more active. A large number of Co-operative Societies and Mutualities were founded in Mexico, and many of the latter began to function as embryonic Trade Unions. A Gran Círculo de Obreros de México — the first attempt at general organisation — was set up in 1872, and began to publish a journal, El Socialista. A Mexican Labour Congress was held in 1876; and in 1878 Alberto Santa Fé founded a Bakuninist League. Trade Unions and Anarchist groups had to operate mainly in secret under Díaz's dictatorship; but they multiplied rapidly. Some Trade Union groups became loosely attached to the United States Knights of Labor, and others imitated its methods. These movements, however, were mainly among artisans and the very limited groups of factory workers. They did not touch the miners, and they had practically no contact with the peasants, who constituted the vast majority of the population. They were movements of immigrants, rather than indigenous stirrings of the mainly Indian working class.

Meanwhile, in Brazil, where slavery lasted on until 1888, the main attention of progressives was concentrated on the emancipation movement, led by Luís Alves and Joaquim Nabuco. In Argentina immigrants from Europe became very active in founding Socialist and Anarchist groups — French, Italian, German, and Spanish, for the most part separately organised. The Frenchman, Émile Dumas, who later returned to France and became a deputy there, founded in 1872, in Buenos Aires, El Trabajador and set up a French section of the International Working Men's Association, led subsequently by Charles Mauli. S. Poureille, a little later, founded El Revolucionario, and the Germans began to publish their own Vorwaerts. In 1878 the Argentinian printers succeeded in setting up a regular Typographical Union, which became a powerful body and gave the lead to other trades. The following year the Anarchists established an International Socialist Circle, which was reinforced by the visits of the Italian Anarchist, Errico Malatesta, during the 1880s. The Anarchists also became active in Peru, where they founded in 1884 a Universal Union open to workers of all occupations.

In 1887 came the first socialistic political party — in Chile, where manhood suffrage, subject to a literacy test which greatly
restricted its scope, had been conceded in 1874. The new party was called the Democratic Party, but had a broadly Socialist programme and substantial support from the Co-operative and Mutual Societies. It was led by Rafael Allende, and found its native theorist in Malaquias Concha, who gave it a definitely Socialist orientation which it later lost. Out of its activities arose the strikes in 1890 among the saltpetre-miners and other groups previously untouched by social movements. It pointed the way to the activities of Luis Recabarren (b. 1924), who was to become the outstanding leader of Chilean Trade Unionism and left-wing Socialism in the new century.

Meanwhile, to the accompaniment of lively disputes between Anarchists and Social Democrats, the movement in the Argentine was taking shape. The Argentinian groups answered the call of the International Socialist Congress of 1889 by launching a campaign for the eight hours’ day and by setting up a Federation of Workers of the Argentine Region and a journal, El Obrero, edited by Ave Lallemant. The Germans, grouped round their journal, Vorwaerts, edited by A. Uhle, took the initiative in organising great May Day demonstrations in 1890, in which numerous Trade Unions and Co-operatives took part. The French group, too, had its journal, L’Avenir social, edited by Achille Gambier. Largely as a result of this movement, the various Socialist groups, as distinct from the Anarchists, drew together in 1894 to form the Argentine Socialist Party, which joined the Second International and was represented at its Congresses. The leadership of the new party was at once taken by two middle-class men, who became for the ensuing period the outstanding figures in the Argentinian Socialist movement — Palacios and Justo.

Alfredo L. Palacios was the movement’s orator — a great figure on the platform, and a romantic who enjoyed high popularity. He was also an inveterate duellist. Later in life he was to become the Rector of Buenos Aires University and a senator; but in the 1890s he was young and enthusiastic, and a powerful influence among the students and younger intellectuals. His collaborator, Juan B. Justo (1865—1925), was a skilful young surgeon, already much under the influence of Marxism, and more writer than orator. He translated Das Kapital into Spanish, and made his journal, La Vanguardia, the principal
organ of Social Democracy of the German type. Palacios was elected deputy — the first Socialist so chosen — in 1904. Justo followed him only some years later. Other leaders at the outset included Achille Gambier and Uhle; and they were soon joined by A. S. Lorenzo, who became secretary and presented a report on Migration to the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress of 1904, and by the young poet, Manuel Ugarte (1878–1932), who lived for some time in Paris and represented Argentina on the International Socialist Bureau.

The establishment of the Socialist Party stimulated the Anarchists to fresh efforts. The Socialists wanted to make use of the Trade Unions as auxiliaries in the parliamentary struggle: the Anarchists were set on winning them away from the compromising seductions of parliamentary politics, but were divided among themselves between the ‘pure’ Anarchists, who were uninterested in mass organisation and believed in the mission of a revolutionary band of brothers, and the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who hoped to create a mass-movement of revolutionary Trade Unionism with the general strike as its principal weapon. When the Federation of Workers of the Argentine Region was set up in 1890, the ‘pure’ Anarchists refused to co-operate, and many of the Anarcho-Syndicalists were half-hearted because the lead had been taken by the Socialist groups and especially by the Germans. In 1892 the Federation fell to pieces: it was reconstructed under Socialist leadership and lingered on for four more years, but then definitely broke up. This, however, did not prevent considerable strike activity, mainly under Anarcho-Syndicalist influence. During the closing years of the nineteenth century the Buenos Aires Trade Unions, in a sequence of separate movements, gained considerable concessions — not, indeed, the eight hours’ day, but the 54 hours’ week, in a number of the main occupations. This was a big reduction on the hours previously worked; and there were also substantial gains in wages.

In 1898 the Italian Anarcho-Syndicalist, Pietro Gori, spent some time in Argentina attempting to persuade the dissident Anarchists to swing their influence behind the growing Trade Union movement, in order to ‘dish’ the political Socialists and unite it under Anarchist leadership. The effects were remarkable. In 1901 most of the Trade Unions joined forces in a new
body — the Argentinian Regional Federation of Workers, known as F.O.R.A. From 1902 onwards F.O.R.A. launched a series of strike movements of increasing generality. Trade was bad and unemployment most severe; and these movements, fiercely repressed by the police, took on an increasingly militant character. Meanwhile, in 1902, the Trade Unions which rejected Anarcho-Syndicalist leadership had formed a rival federation — the General Union of Workers (U.G.T.) — and this body came gradually into close relations with the Socialist Party. The Government attempted to resort to special legislation against the strikers, but in face of huge demonstrations withdrew its bill. The disturbed conditions reached their culmination in the great demonstration of May 1st, 1909, which was broken up by the police with many casualties and was followed by a general strike by means of which substantial further concessions were secured. But in November of that year the Polish Anarchist, Simon Radowitzki, killed the Buenos Aires police chief, Colonel Falcón, with a bomb. Severe repressive measures followed, including an Anti-Anarchist Law which also affected the non-Anarchist Trade Unions and the Socialist Party. Up to 1906 many Syndicalists had been members of the Socialist Party, which, however, then cast them out. Many remained in the U.G.T., which had become a battleground between reformists and revolutionaries — the former insisting that the Unions should concentrate on immediately practicable claims for improved conditions, whereas the latter were broadly sympathetic to F.O.R.A.'s policy of fomenting general strikes as a preparation for social revolution. The moderates in the U.G.T. also strongly favoured Co-operation, and engaged actively in promoting Co-operative shops and housing settlements as well as Co-operative production, of which they made a considerable success. But after the troubles of 1909 both wings were subject to persecution. Many of the workers' organisations were suppressed or driven underground: many leaders were arrested or deported from the capital, or had to flee abroad: the Socialist printing press which produced Justo's La Vanguardia was wrecked. In 1910 the Socialist Party had to hold its Congress at Montevideo, in Uruguay, out of reach of the police. During the next few years wages and conditions were substantially worsened, while the Trade Unions
slowly re-formed their forces and regained their strength. On the whole, the immediate effects were favourable to the moder­ates, as the U.G.T., less severely repressed than its rival, was able to recover more quickly, and the Socialist Party gained ground at the expense of the Anarchists. Organisation also began among the agricultural workers in the northern part of the country, and the Socialists were able to make some headway with their agrarian policy.

In 1909 the Italian Socialist leader, the criminologist, Enrico Ferri, paid a long visit to Argentina and fell into hot dispute with the leaders of the Socialist Party, which he accused of being in reality no more than a middle-class radical group. Ferri maintained that in a country as industrially backward as Argentina there could be no scope for a truly Socialist Party, because such a party could be based only on a sufficiently developed industrial proletariat subject to capitalist exploitation. Justo retorted that Ferri had failed to understand the situation. He argued that the ruling landlord class in Argentina and in other parts of Latin America had been rapidly creating an urban proletariat, not by establishing industries adequate to provide it with employment, but by excluding it from access to the land and thus causing it to fester in the cities. He contended that the development of a proletariat was not necessarily dependent on the technical progress of capitalist industry, as Ferri had argued, but could begin — and had, indeed, begun in Europe — with the violent expropriation of the workers from the means of living on the land: a process which had been followed, not preceded, by the development of the factory system and of steam power. He appealed to Marx's account of the origin of the 'primitive accumulation' and of the supply of exploitable labour that had made industrial capitalism possible, and urged that, in the twentieth century, the message of Socialism needed to be carried directly to the half-starving surplus population of the towns no less in undeveloped than in industrialised countries.

The question then was, What sort of message? To what gospel would these surplus workers and their impoverished fellows in the countryside be likely to respond? The Socialists of Argentina — and also those of Uruguay and to a considerable extent those of other Latin-American countries — found part of the answer in an agrarian policy which owed more to Henry
George than to Karl Marx or Bakunin. They demanded a form of land taxation that would give back the sums appropriated as rent by the landlords to the whole society and would at the same time tax unimproved and uncultivated land at the value it could yield if it were rightly used. This was, in effect, the 'Single Tax' doctrine; and the Argentinian Socialists wished to apply it as a means of bringing about an enforced opening up of the land to settlement by small-scale agricultural producers. Peasant cultivation, aided by State provision of capital and equipment and by Co-operative credit and marketing, became the central feature of the Socialist agrarian programme; but it won the party, up to 1914, only scanty support among the actual peasants and rural workers: its appeal was mainly to the landless, and often workless, proletariat of the swollen city.

There were within the Socialist Party some who denounced this agrarianism as a dangerous deviation from Marxism; and this faction found a leader in the solitary Socialist senator, Enrique del Valle Iberlucea (1877–1921), who later went over to the Communist Party. But there were also more immediately serious dissensions within the party over the issue of nationalism, which was becoming acute in face of the invasion of foreign capitalist enterprise. The Socialists were in two minds about the line they ought to take towards industrial development which carried with it the danger of foreign capitalist control. On the one hand, most of them wanted industrialisation as a means of strengthening the industrial proletariat, as well as of providing more employment: on the other, they resented the power exercised by British and American capitalist groups with the support of the British and American Governments, and accused the foreign concerns of monopolistic practices and of gross exploitation of the native inhabitants. The payment of much higher wages and salaries to workers brought in from abroad than to indigenous employees was keenly resented; and there was a growing demand for compulsory wage-equalisation and for industrial legislation directed against the foreign firms. Up to this point the Argentinian Socialist movement, and, of course, the Anarchists too, had been strongly internationalist, taking their cue from the declarations of the Second International and of the loose Anarchist International. But during the years before the first world war a sort of democratic nationalism
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had been gaining ground; and it was destined to develop much more rapidly during and after the war. For the time being it produced only a minor secession from the party, headed by Manuel Ugarte, but leading to no lasting rival organisation. It was only during the first world war that the Socialist Party suffered a serious split when, in 1917, its left wing broke away to found an International Socialist Party which subsequently became the Communist Party of Argentina. This later dispute arose, not over 'nationalism' in the sense in which the phrase has just been used, but over the question of the party's attitude to the war and to the Russian Revolution. The party leaders mostly favoured Argentinian intervention in the war on the side of the allies, whereas the majority of the rank-and-file favoured neutrality. To discuss this issue would, however, go beyond the scope of the present volume: it belongs, with the whole development of Latin-American Socialism after 1914, to the epoch inaugurated by the Russian Revolution of 1917.

During the early years of the present century the political situation in Uruguay underwent a dramatic transformation. Ever since the establishment of Uruguayan independence the country had been the scene of almost continual civil wars between the partisans of the rival parties — the Colorados and the Blancos — and one presidential dictatorship had succeeded another. There had been no room for the existence of a Socialist Party, and not much for Trade Unionism: the two parties, of which the Colorados usually held the power, were rather agglomerations of family groups than exponents of any definite political ideas; and each contained its relatively left-wing as well as its right-wing factions. Then, in 1897, after the assassination of the Colorado President, Idiarte Borda, the President of the Senate, Julian Cuestas, assumed power and attempted to pacify the country. Civil war continued intermittently until, in 1903, the Radical newspaper-owner, José Battle y Ordóñez (1856–1929), was elected President. Battle had founded his newspaper, El Día, as far back as 1880, and had built it up into a powerful organ of Radical opinion. His policy had a strongly socialistic element. He first defeated a Blanco rising, and then set to work on a programme of fundamental reforms, which was continued under his successors and largely embodied in the new Constitution of 1919. This
Constitution was not to prevent — indeed, it was in part to cause — great troubles later; but during the period of Battle’s ascendancy Uruguay passed rapidly from being among the worst-governed and turbulent of South American States to being socially the most progressive, with the most advanced labour laws (including the eight hours’ day) and a remarkably efficient system of public education. These changes were not accomplished without a great struggle with the Church: Battle’s following was strongly anti-clerical, but he was himself a conciliatory influence and managed to rally behind him the better elements in both the traditional parties. The changed conditions made it possible for a Socialist Party to develop under the leadership of the poet and university-teacher, Emilio Frugoni (b. 1880), who founded it in 1910 and became its first parliamentary representative the following year. Till then there had been only small immigrant Socialist groups of varying tendencies. Battle’s following, however, included a number of sympathisers with Socialist ideas, and the legislation passed under his influence had a substantial socialistic tendency.

Brazil, up to 1914, had practically no Socialist movement, though it was no stranger to negro revolts and experienced in 1910 a naval mutiny which extended to most of the fleet. The mutineers, whose demands dealt purely with pay and conditions, bombarded Rio de Janeiro and compelled the Congress to accept most of their demands. The marine corps then also mutinied, but was suppressed. These disturbances, however, had no political content: there was, in effect, no national political movement of the left, though there were Anarchist and Socialist groups, made up mainly of immigrants, in some of the towns — notably São Paulo and Rio. The population in the northern States of the Republic, mainly negro and half-caste, lived in deep misery, but found no leaders except an occasional religious fanatic of purely local influence. The white immigrants were concentrated chiefly in the south, especially round São Paulo, and confined their activities mainly to local politics. The Germans had a Socialist group at São Paulo, which published its own Vorwaerts from 1912; and at Bahia, in central Brazil, the Italians had their Avanti from about the same time. At Rio de Janeiro the main influence was Anarchist. The Anarchists were organised during the years before 1914 in a Sociocratic
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Union which published there a journal, *O Libertarista*. The Brazilian Socialist Party was not founded until 1916; and it was only during the first world war that any effective movement began to take shape. Such Trade Unions as existed were local, with only very loose connections through the Anarchist groups. In the rural areas a movement was just beginning in 1914, under the influence of a newly formed Agriculturists’ Union.

Chile, where, as we have seen, Socialism had made a beginning much earlier, is very awkwardly shaped for the establishment of any working-class or peasant movement covering the whole country. Most of the population is, indeed, concentrated in the central region, especially round Santiago and Valparaiso; but the main mining areas are either in the north, in country that is otherwise waterless desert, or, in the case of coal, a long way south, in the district of Concepción. The northern areas in which the main deposits of nitrates and other mineral wealth are found were not part of Chile until they were seized during the War of the Pacific (1879–83) from Bolivia and Peru; but their development under Chilean auspices with the aid of foreign capital had begun earlier, under extremely bad and unhealthy conditions, which contributed later to make the miners the most persistently militant labour group, not merely in the country, but in all Latin America.

Despite the universal existence of manhood suffrage, subject to a literacy qualification, from 1874, Chile continued to be governed by a narrow oligarchy, supported by foreign capitalist interests, until 1886, when José Balmaceda (1840–91) was elected to the presidency. Balmaceda was a Radical aristocrat, of fairly advanced social views and an enemy of the strong hold which the Catholic Church still exerted over the country. In the course of his conflicts with the Church and the landed aristocracy he was driven to the assumption of dictatorial powers: this provoked a rebellion, and he was overthrown and committed suicide in 1891. The succeeding so-called ‘Democratic’ régime lasted until after the first world war. The period was one of rapidly changing Governments based on various combinations of right and centre parties, and economically of rapid developments in mining and especially in the output of nitrates, which provided most of the exports and the public
revenue. The conditions were, however, such as to allow a considerable Labour movement to develop. We have already noted the foundation of the Democratic Party, with a broadly Socialist programme, in 1886; but of greater significance was the growth of Trade Unions, mostly under the guise of Mutual Benefit Societies, and of a substantial Co-operative movement. The oldest Trade Union — the Typographical — had a continuous existence from 1853. Up to 1900, Trade Union strength lay mainly among non-manual workers and in the transport services; but thereafter the miners played an increasing part, and the whole movement began to take on a more militant character. Apart from the miners, there were considerable strikes of tramwaymen and dockers in Santiago and in Valparaiso in 1902 and the following year; and in 1905, in a period of economic crisis, a general strike broke out in Santiago, and spread to other areas, including the mining districts. The Government took strong repressive measures, and several hundred strikers were shot down before the strikes collapsed. Four years later the movement had recovered enough to organise a Central Trade Union Federation (known as F.O.C.H.), covering all the industrial areas and including both the older Benefit Societies and the newer, more militant industrial Unions, which gradually gained control, and worked side by side with a smaller body of militants that had been organised under the leadership of North Americans associated with the Industrial Workers of the World. The I.W.W. became a considerable force among the port workers in particular. The outstanding figure in F.O.C.H. was Luis Recabarren, who was also active in the Democratic Party and conducted its journal, La Reforma. In 1906 the Democratic Party decided to join the Socialist International, but did not maintain the connection. In 1912 the left wing broke away from the Democratic Party, which had moved rightwards, and Recabarren became the leader of a new Socialist Labour Party which was to play an important part in the Popular Front movement of the years after 1918. In 1912 he was elected to Parliament, but was unseated because he refused to take the oath of loyalty to the constitution. F.O.C.H. remained the main Trade Union organisation up to the early 1920s, when, after joining the Red International of Labour Unions, it was broken up by secessions.
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During the first world war its power was seriously weakened by the adverse effect of war on the export trade. Many mines had to be closed down, and unemployment became severe. But both Trade Unions and the Socialist Party were able to maintain their existence and to emerge with fresh vigour when the war was over, though the decline of the nitrates industry in face of the competition of synthetic nitrates continued to affect adversely both the economic condition of the country and the ability of the Trade Unions to exact social reforms. The growing development of copper-mining provided, however, an alternative point of focus for Trade Union militancy.

During the early years of the twentieth century there were beginnings of Socialist activity in a few other Latin American States. In Bolivia a Workers' Social Centre was founded in 1906 at La Paz, and conducted large May Day demonstrations at which it demanded the eight hours' day. Out of this developed in 1912 an International Workers' Federation, later renamed the Workers' Federation of Labour, which became of importance only after 1918, with the tin-miners as its principal source of strength. There were also small movements in some of the Central American Republics; but there, too, the main developments came only after 1918. In 1912 the Argentinians called together at Buenos Aires the first attempt at a general Latin-American Labour Congress, attended by delegates from Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Chile, and Peru; but no lasting organisation arose out of it. The attempt of the American Federation of Labor, and the disputes between this body and the major Trade Unions of Central and South America, belong to the period after 1914.

In Cuba the first wave of nationalist revolution had spent its force in the ten years of struggle from 1868 to 1878; and new forces of revolt did not develop on any considerable scale until about 1890. The leading figure in the Cuban revolutionary movement during the intervening years was José Martí (1853–95), who had been imprisoned for his revolutionary journalism in 1870, at the age of 17, and had been deported to Spain the following year. In Spain he studied at Saragossa and Madrid, where he took his degree in 1874. He also published pamphlets exposing the prison system in Cuba and attacking
the Spanish Republic for its failure to grant Cuban independence. In 1875 he went to Mexico, where he worked as a journalist; and later he taught in Guatemala. Returning to Cuba in 1878, he was again deported to Spain the following year; but in 1880 he settled in New York and set to work to build up a Cuban nationalist movement among the exiles. He wrote poems and a novel, and engaged in much journalistic work in the cause of Latin-American independence. In 1890 he formed a League among the Cuban exiles in New York; and this developed in 1892 into the Cuban Revolutionary Party, with Patria, which he founded, as its organ. The new party developed close links with the Porto Rican nationalists. During the next three years Martí, in association with General Máximo Gómez, who had been a leader in the earlier struggle, was busy preparing for revolt; and in 1895 he and Gómez issued a manifesto calling the Cuban people to arms, and with a small force, landed in Cuba in April. The following month Martí was killed in a skirmish, leaving Gómez and Antonio Marco to carry on the revolutionary campaign.

Meanwhile, in Cuba, the poet Diego Vicente Tejera (1845-1905) had founded, in 1890, a Socialist Propagandist Club and had resumed the work of Trade Union organisation begun by Martínez in the 1870s. The signal for revolt was given by the disastrous fall in sugar prices which followed the American depression of 1893. The rising was initially successful; but in 1896 General Weyler, placed in command of the Spanish forces, resorted to a brutal policy of suppression by herding many thousands of Cubans into concentration camps in order to clear the affected districts. This led to United States protests; and Spain was induced to grant a form of autonomous government at the beginning of 1898. But at this point the blowing up of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbour led to the armed intervention of the United States, and the landing of American forces in Cuba. At the close of the Spanish-American War Cuba became a dependency of the United States. It was under American military government from 1899 to 1902, when a new Cuban Constitution came into force, making Cuba an independent State, but reserving to the United States rights of intervention which were subsequently exercised on several occasions. During the following years there were big strikes
among the plantation workers, amounting in 1911 to a large-scale revolt. In 1912 there was a negro rising, and the United States landed troops to quell it. The strike movement began in 1902, mainly as a protest against the payment of wages in depreciated paper money. It was repressed; and during the ensuing years the Trade Unions, though they put up a hard fight, gradually lost ground. The American Federation of Labor intervened, with an attempt to reconstitute them on the United States model; but nothing much happened, and the Socialist movement, never strong, lost its hold under the new régime, in the course of a prolonged struggle between parliamentarian and Anarcho-Syndicalist factions.

Throughout the period from 1895 to 1914 the country had been in a disturbed state, and the United States had repeatedly intervened, usually on the reactionary side. In 1917 there was a Liberal rising against the Conservative President, General Menocal, who had established a corrupt dictatorship. The Americans landed marines to protect property; and the Liberals were defeated. Internal struggle and United States intervention persisted into the 1920s; but we cannot pursue the story further here.

The Cuban Revolutionaries were hardly Socialists; nor did their principal theorist, José Martí, put forward any specifically Socialist doctrine. He was a revolutionary nationalist rather than a Socialist; but his nationalism was very Radical and rested on a conception of racial equality which links him to the later developments of Socialism and Communism in Latin America. He recognised the need to base his revolutionary movement mainly on the working classes, and especially on the plantation workers; and he consistently rejected the programme of the Cuban autonomists, who wished the island to be rescued from Spanish oppression by being put under the protection of the United States. He was a strong opponent of 'colonialism', and during his residence in New York had written vigorously in condemnation of American capitalism, especially in its imperialist aspects. His policy, however, was one of collaboration between the working classes, on whom he chiefly relied, and such middle-class nationalists as could be induced to join hands with them against the planter aristocracy on a basis of no discrimination between the races. He was also an advocate of
advanced social legislation; and on these grounds he deserves a place in this history.

I have left until last the Latin-American country in which the most important developments in the Labour and Socialist movement were taking place during the years immediately before the first world war. Mexico, up to 1900, had played hardly any part in Socialist or even in Trade Union activity, though, as we saw, there had been a limited development of Co-operative and Mutual Societies at an early stage. Under the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz, until it began to break down, there had been no scope for political activity and not much for Trade Unionism. Trade Unions had existed underground, especially among the railwaymen and textile workers, and had conducted occasional strikes; but the extensive movement of the 1870s had almost disappeared. The oil workers, isolated in the north, had been too heavily repressed to be able to form any stable organisations. Peasant revolt was endemic, but it had no power to pass beyond purely local resistance and no policy beyond mere protest against the appalling conditions under which the main body of the people lived under the feudal rule of the great estate-owners, who were largely foreigners from Europe or absentees not living on their vast, neglected territories. The policy of Díaz was one of economic development with the aid of foreign capital: there was little native capital even in the textile factories, which were founded in considerable numbers, and virtually none in the oil-wells, in which British and American capital played the dominant part.

One great obstacle to the growth of an effective Labour movement, apart from the dictatorship, was the sharp cleavage between the industrial workers and the country population. Standards of life for the main body of the rural population, which was predominantly Indian, were quite appallingly low. The white immigrants could not settle on the land unless they were capitalists who could work it with Indian labour. They settled in the towns, and there tried to exact tolerable living conditions for themselves by constituting a labour aristocracy of skilled workers, between whom and the unskilled workers there was a great gulf in culture as well as in earning power. The separation of the two groups was aggravated by the power of the Church among the main body of the population; for
the prevalent forms of religion included a high admixture of sheer superstition and belief in magic which had little in common with the Catholicism of the educated classes, while the rationalism of the intelligentsia shocked and alienated the devout. The great basic need of Mexico was for agrarian reform; but the urban workers and the miners, with plenty of grievances of their own, were in no position to lead, or easily to ally themselves with, any agrarian movement. The type of agrarian propaganda conducted by Dr. Justo in Argentina could make no appeal to the town-dwellers of Mexico: the last thing they wanted was to be settled on the land as competitors of the Indian peasants, to whose standards it would have been impossible to conform, low though their own were in comparison with those of more advanced countries.

The revival of socialistic propaganda in Mexico began in 1900, when the three brothers, Enrique (1877–?), Jesús (1871–1930), and Ricardo Flores Magón (1873–1922) started their journal, Regeneración, which was immediately proscribed. They then produced it in Texas, across the frontier, and smuggled it into Mexico. The Flores Magón brothers were Anarchists, but of an Anarcho-Socialist rather than a ‘pure’ Anarchist type. They were not hostile to all forms of political action—only to parliamentarism of a reformist kind. In 1906, from St. Louis, Missouri, they published a Manifesto constituting a ‘Liberal Party’, which was, in effect, not so much a parliamentary party as a centre of propaganda designed to rally the left groups behind a common programme. This programme was a call to revolution, in order to overthrow the dictatorship and the power of the Church and to institute a liberal régime which would socialise the vast estates of the Church and the uncultivated lands belonging to the great landowners, would abolish compulsory labour, and would establish a minimum wage for rural as well as urban workers. The St. Louis Programme further demanded the eight hours’ day, universal secular education, wage-equality between foreign and indigenous workers, municipal self-government, and the replacement of the standing army by a citizen militia.

The Flores Magón Manifesto had a considerable effect, especially in the oilfields and in the eastern districts of Mexico down to Yucatán. A Liberal Fraternal Union, organised in
1906, spread rapidly from the American-owned mines of Cananea, near the United States frontier, where a strike for equal pay for Mexican and foreign workers broke out in 1906. United States troops, requisitioned by the company, violated the frontier to suppress the movement; and this helped to stir up national feeling. During this and the following year there were many strikes in the textile factories; and Díaz retorted by declaring strikes illegal and by instituting a system of good conduct certificates for workers who did not take part in them—a form of indirect black-list. At the beginning of 1907 a big textile strike at Rio Blanco was ended by a promise to meet the strikers' demands; but when, on the strength of this, they resumed work, a savage repression followed, and no concessions were made. Fierce conflicts continued in the industrial areas; and many of the liberal leaders took to the mountains and attempted to organise revolts among the peasants. Meanwhile, under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata (1869-1919), a formidable peasant revolt was developing among the Indians and half-castes in the south of Mexico, and the Flores Magón brothers did their best to establish relations with it. The dictatorship was also meeting with an increasing challenge from the more liberal politicians, headed by the landowner, Francisco Indalecio Madero (1873-1913).

Madero was a large landowner and mine-owner in northern Mexico. He had been educated largely in France, where he spent the years from 1889 to 1895, and at the University of California. After 1900 he became active in politics, organising the Benito Juárez Democratic Club, with branches in most parts of the country, in an attempt to build up an advanced party to struggle against Díaz's dictatorship and for agrarian reform. He organised Democratic Conventions in the various States, and then a National Convention, with the object of opposing Díaz's re-election when the President's term of office expired in 1910. As part of his campaign he published, in 1908, a book, *The Presidential Succession in 1910*, in which he argued the case against the dictatorship and put forward a programme of constitutional and social reform. Díaz suppressed the book, but it continued to have a wide clandestine circulation. When

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1 After Benito Pablo Juárez (1806-72), Mexican Radical President and national hero, who promoted the liberal federal Constitution of 1857.
the time for the election arrived, Madero was put forward as presidential candidate and campaigned actively against Díaz. He was imprisoned at the height of the campaign for libelling the dictator. When the election, in which Díaz claimed the victory, was over, Madero was released. Madero’s partisans claimed that the election returns had been faked. Madero then crossed the frontier and, from Texas, issued his ‘Plan of San Luis Potosí’, with a call for insurrection. The Plan included, besides constitutional government and the ineligibility of any President for re-election, large projects of social and economic reform — universal education free from Church control, distribution of land to the peasants, the abolition of the system, borrowed from Spain, of village caciques who controlled the peasants in the interests of the Government and the landed aristocracy, and the restoration of the collective rights of the villagers to the forests and the supplies of water. Madero’s Manifesto declared the election void, as having been procured by corrupt means — which it certainly was, through the caciques: he proclaimed himself Provisional President and, recrossing the frontier, joined up with the rebel forces which were already gathering in the northern provinces under Pascual Orozco (1888–1916), a former muleteer, and the brigand, Francisco Villa, known as Pancho Villa (1877–1923), who had for some time maintained himself in the mountains against Díaz’s attempts to dislodge him. With these auxiliaries Madero set up a Provisional Government at Ciudad Juárez. Zapata rose in the south; and there were numerous uprisings in other provinces. Díaz, faced with overwhelming opposition, then sued for peace; and Madero came to an agreement with him that he should resign in favour of a constitutionally elected President and that the revolutionary forces should be disbanded in order to allow free elections to be held. Zapata, however, refused to disband his peasant troops until land reform had been definitely accomplished; and most of the rival armies remained in being. A presidential election was nevertheless held, and in 1911 Madero was chosen as President by an enormous majority; but the old Congress elected under Díaz was allowed to remain in being, and most of the dictator’s old officials and generals were not displaced. The Congress at once began to obstruct the enactment of the reforms called for.
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in the 'Plan of San Luis Potosí', and Madero found himself denounced from both sides — by the advocates of the old order for his subversive projects and by the revolutionaries as a backslider who had compromised disastrously, with the opponents of reform. Zapata, from the south, issued in 1911 his 'Plan of Ayala', demanding Madero's resignation and the immediate distribution to the peasants of all uncultivated lands, and also the confiscation of the estates of Díaz's supporters. In the north Orozco put himself at the head of a new rising, with a broadly similar programme; and Richard Flores Magón, who had made himself master of the outlying province of Southern California, set up there a Socialist Republic. Madero sent General Huerta, the army leader, against Orozco, who was defeated. But Huerta was preparing, in association with the reactionary elements hostile to the Revolution, to turn against Madero. In February 1913 there was a counter-revolution in Mexico City. Huerta joined it, with most of the old army. He captured Madero, had him assassinated with the Vice-President, J. M. P. Suarez, by his guards on their way to prison, and declared himself President. Huerta was promptly entertained at a congratulatory banquet by the United States ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson; but the killing of Madero was too much for President Woodrow Wilson to swallow, and Huerta's Government was refused American recognition. In any event, it did not control the country: Zapata remained undefeated in the south, and there were many States in which Huerta's writ did not run. In particular, Madero's old supporter, Venustiano Carranza (1859–1930), provincial Governor of Coahuila in the north, refused to accept Huerta and, enlisting the support of other State Governors and of such guerrillas as Pancho Villa, prepared for civil war. Carranza tried to come to an agreement with Zapata; but Zapata was suspicious of him, and the negotiations broke down. Huerta, meanwhile, engaged in a veritable reign of terror in Mexico City, executing many senators and deputies of liberal or radical views and behaving towards foreign interests in such a way as to provoke the active intervention of the United States. In order to protect United States interests, President Wilson sent a fleet which, after stiff fighting, occupied Vera Cruz, the port of Mexico City, with a force of marines. Meanwhile, Pancho Villa rose again in the north; and Madero's
old associate, Alvaro Obregón (1880–1928), who had already shown his military capacity in campaigns against Orozco and others on behalf of Madero, took the field against the counter-revolutionaries on the side of Carranza, and defeated first Félix Díaz, the old dictator’s nephew, and then Huerta himself, capturing Mexico City in August 1914. Huerta fled abroad, but his elimination by no means ended the confusion. Both Zapata and Villa had marched into central Mexico and were insistently demanding the immediate distribution of land to the peasants, whereas Carranza wished to give precedence to constitutional reforms and to deal with the agrarian problem only after a new constitutional régime had been established. Carranza was driven out of Mexico City, which was occupied first by Zapata’s and then by Villa’s forces. But the peasant leaders failed to come to terms with the working-class leaders in the city, who had formed in 1912 a central organisation called the Casa del Obrero Mundial. The urban Trade Unionists, though they favoured agrarian reform, were frightened of the peasant armies, and preferred Carranza to either Zapata or Villa. To a greater extent they preferred Obregón, who was a sincere supporter of Madero’s social programme; and when Obregón decided to support Carranza his decision was of great influence on the attitude of the organised working-class and left-wing political groups. Early in 1915 Obregón’s forces inflicted a severe defeat on Zapata, who retreated to his own area in the south. Obregón then marched on Villa and drove his forces back into their retreats in the northern mountains. Carranza re-entered Mexico City, and established himself as President with Obregón’s support. Under pressure from Obregón he issued in 1915 far-reaching ordinances dealing with agrarian reform. The most important provided for the restitution to villagers of the ejidos (village communities) which had been destroyed under the Díaz dictatorship, for the expropriation of lands to be used for setting up new ejidos, and for the return to the ejidos of their traditional rights in the forests and sources of water. At the same time Carranza signed a pact, known as the ‘Pact of Vera Cruz’, with the Casa del Obrero Mundial, under which the Casa agreed to form Red Battalions for the defence of the Revolution and to place these battalions at his service for the suppression of his opponents.
Thus reinstated in power, Carranza was able to consolidate his position and to obtain recognition from the Government of the United States. But fresh troubles lay ahead. Villa was still at large in the north; and in January 1916 a body of his supporters at Santa Isabel raided a train and killed eighteen Americans who were on it. Confused fighting followed, and in March Villa sallied into United States territory, and raided Columbus, in New Mexico, killing another seventeen American citizens. The United States Government thereupon sent an army, under General Pershing, to pursue Villa into Mexican territory, with orders to destroy his force and him; and this army, advancing far into Mexico, finally clashed with Carranza's forces in a skirmish, which almost led to war between the two countries. A number of American soldiers were captured, and released only after sharp protests, met by counter-protests against the occupation of Mexican territory by American forces. Meanwhile, Villa's death was reported — falsely — and the American army at length withdrew at the beginning of 1917.

During this period Zapata retained his hold on the south; and in several States there were attempts to run ahead of Carranza in carrying through the agrarian changes he had promised. In Yucatán, in particular, under Salvador Alvarado (1888–1924), the State Government declared all private property in land abolished and enacted a very advanced labour code — measures which Carranza disallowed. Yucatán remained a centre of Socialist rebellion under the leadership of Filipe Carrillo Puerto (b. 1872) up to his death in arms in 1924.

By the beginning of 1917 the country was sufficiently under Carranza's and Obregón's control for a new Congress to set to work on the drawing up of a Constitution based on Madero's programme. This proved in the event to be a highly advanced document. It established, at least on paper, a completely democratic system of government; but even more important were its economic and social clauses. It declared the land and the minerals under it to be public property, and thus started off the great conflict with the oil companies and the foreign Governments which supported their claims, as well as with the native land-owning interests. It embodied in the same clause guarantees of tenure to small proprietors, and limited the amount of land an individual could occupy under the overriding
dominion of the State. It declared for universal, free, secular education and for the abolition of religious control of the schools, and thus started off a fierce contest with the Church and its supporters. It prescribed a maximum working day of eight hours and a minimum wage to be revised periodically to meet changes in the cost of living; and it also laid down the basis for a protective labour and sanitary code, and provided for complete wage-equality as between foreigners and indigenous workers, and between men and women. It guaranteed full freedom of association, and the right to strike; and, finally, it promised freedom of speech and writing.

Thus, under the Constitution of 1917, both the land reformers and the Trade Unions got—on paper—all they wanted, and a great deal more than was pleasing to many of Carranza's supporters—or to Carranza himself. The economic and social parts of the new Constitution, however, as distinct from the political provisions, were merely declaratory: they were for the most part without practical effect until they could be translated into positive laws. Carranza, who was trying to conciliate both his less intransigent right-wing opponents and the foreign Governments whose recognition and support he wanted, was in no hurry to see them carried into effect. He was at once involved in an acrimonious struggle with the foreign oil companies, which refused to recognise the expropriation of their properties as valid, and appealed to their Governments for support. When the Constitution was through, mainly under pressure from Obregón and the Casa del Obrero, Carranza leaned more and more to the right, and steadily lost influence with the forces that had put him in power. Especially, he quarrelled with Obregón, who continued to press for action. He managed to hold on through most of the period of four years for which he had been elected to the presidency. But his attempts to put the brake on social legislation and his interferences with the State Governments made him increasingly unpopular. Throughout the first world war he maintained a policy of neutrality, and came to be regarded as favouring the Germans—a further cause of internal division. Then, at the beginning of 1920, he gave way to the pressure of the oil interests to the extent of suspending the decrees under which they had been required to accept the nationalisation of the sub-
soil, the payment of royalties, and the right of the Mexican Government to regulate labour conditions. Carranza did not abandon these claims; but he suspended their operation, and allowed the oil companies to continue working the oilfields under the old conditions — thus antagonising much of his working-class support. Finally, Obregón broke with him, retired to his native State, Sonora, and entered into a pact with other discontented generals to overthrow him in order to prevent him from procuring the election of his own nominee at the forthcoming presidential election of 1920. Obregón marched on Mexico City and occupied it: Carranza, in flight to Vera Cruz, was assassinated on the way. After a period of provisional rule, Obregón was elected as President in December 1920.

Well before this, in April 1919, Zapata’s long defiance of authority had been brought to an end — not by defeat, but by assassination. He was trapped to an assignation with an officer, Guajardo, who pretended to be coming over to his side, and was shot down by Guajardo’s soldiers. With his death the movement which he had inspired and led broke up, and the territories he had controlled were brought back under federal control. Villa survived until 1923, when he, too, was assassinated; but he did not count as a serious force after his defeat by Pershing in 1916.

Obregón, coming into power in 1920, made a serious attempt to carry out the revolutionary programme, especially in its agrarian aspects. He set to work to make land available for peasant occupation, to restore the ejidos and to render back to the peasant communities their rights in the forests and water-supplies, and to support the Trade Unions in their efforts to implement the provisions of the labour code. But he met with formidable obstacles, and his agrarian reforms were applied only over a small part of the country; and after his period of office little further advance was made under his immediate successors. It was left for President Cárdenas, in the 1930s, to take up the cause of the Revolution afresh, and to carry it a long stage further by his resumption of land distribution and the extension of the ejido system to further areas.

The story of these later phases of the Mexican Revolution belongs, not to the present volume of this work, but to the next. It was, however, impossible to break off the record at an earlier
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point, because there was no convenient stopping place short of the disillusionment which followed the big promises made at the beginning of the Carranza period. In my fourth volume I shall pick the story up from the Constitution of 1917, which embodied formally, though by no means fully in its actual working, the achievements of the Revolution during its initial phases.

It remains to enquire how far, up to 1920, when Obregón came to power, the Mexican Revolution had succeeded, where it had failed, and why it had gone as far as it did and no further. Its success was undoubtedly due much more to the strength and persistence of the peasant revolt than to any other cause. Above all, it was due to Emiliano Zapata, who, though no thinker himself, was quite clear about what he wanted to do in order to improve the lot of the villagers. The problems of government concerned him only in their impact on the lives of the village people. Zapata had begun his career as the defender of the peasants under Díaz, and because of his revolutionary activities had been compelled to serve for ten years in the Mexican army. On his release in 1910 he made an attempt to get the land of his own village, where he was himself a tenant farmer, restored by legal process to collective village ownership. When this attempt failed he organised a rising and led the villagers to attack the great haciendas and seize the land by force. At the beginning he supported Madero; but when land reform failed to occur he resumed direct action over a larger area and made himself master of the State of Morelos and of a considerable neighbouring territory. In his Plan of Ayala he demanded the breaking-up of the great estates and the restoration of the land to the village communities. Zapata was an exceedingly effective peasant leader and received intellectual support from the writings of Antonio Díaz Soto y Gama (b. 1874). Had not Zapata kept his peasant forces in the field year after year, defying every attempt to suppress him, and had he not practised actual land distribution and destroyed the great estates in the areas under his control, the politicians at Mexico City would never have enacted the Constitution of 1917— or at any rate the parts of it dealing with the land; and in all probability the workers would have been much too weak, had not Carranza badly needed their help against Zapata, to secure the advanced code of labour protection which the Constitution
laid down. Yet the urban workers did little enough to back up Zapata or the other peasant leaders: indeed, they fought with Carranza's forces against them. Therein lies the key to an understanding of the first phase of the Revolution, which achieved its success despite the deep gulf between the urban working-class movement — or most of it — and the peasants. This gulf did not, indeed, exist between the 'liberal', semi-anarchistic movement of the brothers Flores Magón and the peasants; but it was deep between the organised Trade Unionists of the towns — factory workers, craftsmen and black-coats, mainly of European, or largely European, stock — and the Indians and half-breeds who constituted the peasant armies. The relatively civilised and literate workers of Mexico City and the older towns were afraid of the illiterate, priest-ridden, half-savage peasants, not only physically, when their bands ranged over the country and most of all when they occupied the towns, but also economically, as potential competitors who might be used to drag down their own all too low and precarious standards of living. It is true that Zapata, when his forces occupied Mexico City, was able to prevent all looting and by sheer force of personality to induce good conduct; but Zapata had good advisers and a policy, and was much more than the chance leader of a peasant uprising. Pancho Villa and some of the others had in them much more of the brigand; and their bands were much less to be trusted. The followers of the Flores Magón brothers were, of course, of a different type — class-conscious Socialists or Anarchists leading not large peasant armies but only small groups which set out to establish Socialist Republics in particular areas and did not move far afield from their bases; but even they were regarded with some suspicion by the Trade Unionists and Socialist politicians of the capital city.

Zapata, above all other leaders, impressed himself on the imagination of the Mexican peasants, not only in the areas he had controlled, but to a great extent over the whole country. In southern Mexico he has become a legendary hero; and his tomb is regarded as a sacred monument. To the outside world he is best known to-day as the hero of a very successful film, which was shown in many countries a few years ago. In his own day he was known in reactionary Mexican circles as the
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‘Attila of the South’, and lurid stories were told of the excesses practised by his peasant bands. The Mexican peasant war was undoubtedly fought with much ruthlessness on both sides, and involved great destruction of both life and property. But whose fault was that? It can hardly be blamed on the unfortunate peasants, or on Zapata, who had to lead his men according to their lights, as well as his own, in order to hold their allegiance.

The Mexican Revolution, in its first phase, found no leader capable of unifying its forces. Zapata was a fine leader among the peasants of the south; but he had no great hold in the north, and no capacity to come to terms with the urban working classes. The Flores Magon brothers had too small a following, too narrowly confined to a few areas and too remote from the capital, to be able to make any bid for national leadership. Madero was too weak and showed too little capacity for organisation: nor had he any clear ideas beyond the establishment of constitutional government. Carranza became the leader, with Obregon behind him, and carried through the new Constitution and the Agrarian Law, less by virtue of any personal qualification for policy-making than because he had the capacity to size up the situation and was prepared to let the new Congress have its way with law-making, though not to carry out the laws it made. Obregon, when he came to power in 1920, did make a real effort towards land reform; but he was not able to carry it very far.

Consequently, what the Mexican Revolution achieved, up to the 1920s, was the undermining of the old order rather than the construction of any new order to replace it. Socialism, as distinct from the semi-Anarchism of the Flores Magons, was very weak indeed. Until 1910 there was no Socialist Party — only a group of Socialists acting within the Liberal Party formed by Madero in 1907. This group, headed by J. Sarabia (1882–1920), split away to form a Mexican Socialist Party in 1910, continuing to co-operate with Madero — and subsequently with Carranza — but it had no hold at all in the countryside or in the oilfields. Socialism was rather a tendency of Radical politicians and the creed of a few very small immigrant groups than a movement. The Socialists had no clear agrarian policy: the Socialist element in the Revolution came rather from the strength of national feeling against foreign exploitation in the
mines and factories, and against the privileges conceded to foreigners by Díaz and the preferential wages paid to foreign workers, than from any Socialist sentiment or conviction of international working-class solidarity.

The question of the oil-wells was, of course, of key importance in this connection. In 1884 Porfirio Díaz had issued a decree which conferred on the landowners the ownership of mineral resources under the land. This was contrary to the Spanish legal tradition, which makes the subsoil public property. It was done in order to encourage foreign capital and to get pickings out of the foreigners who were given concessions and at the same time to secure the support of the wealthy classes at home; and it resulted in the acquisition of much oil-bearing land by foreign companies, British and American, as well as in the enrichment of Mexican landowners who were able to appropriate mineral rights. Díaz's concession was revoked by the Constitution of 1917, which made the subsoil national property and required the oil concerns to submit to national laws governing the exploitation of mineral resources. The new Constitution also required them, as a condition of getting their concessions renewed, on any terms, not to appeal to their own Governments against such laws as the Mexican Government might decide to enforce. Both British and American companies, with the support of their Governments, refused to accept the relevant clauses of the Constitution of 1917 as valid. They argued that the concessions made by Díaz under the old Constitution were irrevocable. They also refused to apply the laws relating to wages and working conditions, and attempted to hold their properties by means of privately enrolled armed guards which defied the powers of the State. They prevented Trade Unions from being formed, except underground, and took a strong line with agitators who attempted to defy the ban. When, in 1920, Carranza gave way to foreign pressure and agreed to suspend the operation of the laws of 1917, without prejudice to the future, the great desire of the oil companies was to make hay while the sun shone. The quantity of oil extracted shot up to record level, as the companies made haste to get all they could before fresh troubles arose over their rights. They exploited their concessions to the utmost, knowing that many of the existing sources were
approaching exhaustion and unwilling to embark fresh capital in opening up new sources of supply. In the 1920s Mexican oil production sank rapidly: the dispute lasted on until Cárdenas finally tackled it with resolution in the 1930s.

The Mexican Revolution was thus left, at the close of its first phase, less than half achieved, with the deep gulf between the mass of the peasants and the urban working classes still unbridged. The urban workers profited most by it: they got freedom of association and the right to strike, accompanied by a considerable amount of labour legislation and a real improvement in wages, working hours and conditions. They were able to constitute themselves as a labour aristocracy, ill enough off by European standards, but raised an immense distance above the living standards of the mass of the people — the Indians and half-castes of the rural areas. Those among them who were political Radicals or Socialists — or, of course, Anarchists — profited also by the great inroads that had been made on the power of the Church. Not that only the rationalists and atheists hated the Mexican Church: it was hated with a deep hatred by the peasants, who knew it as a tyrannous ally of the landed aristocracy and itself a great land-owning oppressor which kept the poor from the land. The difference was that the peasants hated the Church, but not religion nor, as a rule, the parish priest, who was usually almost as poor as they were, and often took their side. The peasants were for the most part deeply superstitious, and easily turned against the atheistical intellectuals of the towns. It had been a count against Díaz that he was surrounded by wicked, atheistical advisers; and after the fall of Díaz, the Church did its best to turn the same mistrust against his successors in power. The Church hierarchy was, however, far too unpopular ever to get the peasants on its side; and the weakening of its authority after 1917 was an important factor in enabling Cárdenas, nearly twenty years later, to take up the task of making the new Mexico where Obregón’s successors had let it drop.
CHAPTER XXIII

LABOUR AND SOCIALISM IN AUSTRALIA

Australia and New Zealand, remote and quite different in social structure from any country in Europe, played hardly any part in the affairs of the Second International. They had active Labour movements, resting largely on a Trade Union basis, and especially after 1890 the Australian Trade Unions took a lively interest in politics and set up Labour parties, under various names, in the separate States; but these parties were not in any full sense Socialist and for the most part were but little affected by Socialist ideas from outside. Queensland was in this respect an exception, Socialism having there, thanks largely to William Lane’s propagandist efforts, a greater influence than elsewhere. In the other Australian States the Labour Parties began by acting as third parties, upholding or deposing Governments formed by the older parties, but staying out of office till they grew strong enough to form Governments of their own. Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the Liberals under John Ballance, and then under Richard Seddon, succeeded in keeping the allegiance of the Trade Unions, and no separate Labour Party was formed until 1904.

This, of course, does not mean that there were no Socialists in Australasia. There were Socialists, and Socialist organisations; and there was more than one attempt to form a Socialist Party. The Labour Parties themselves often declared for Socialist objectives, such as the nationalisation of the means of production. Nevertheless Socialism remained, for most Australians, a foreign doctrine: it never attracted mass support. Even when the Australian Labour Parties put forward Socialist proposals they generally preferred to avoid using the word. Their political activities were centred on immediate objectives; even their leaders were for the most part very little interested in theories of a new social order. This does not imply that they were necessarily moderates: there was a great deal of very bitter fighting between employers and workers, and the Trade Unions — especially among the shearers and in the mining
and waterfront industries — were often accessible to very radical doctrines and responded readily to class-war slogans and arguments. Among these groups Leftism often took the form of strongly worded declarations of class-solidarity and class-hostility, with the declared aim of overthrowing the capitalist system. But, even so, in practice the militant sections of the industrial workers set out to control their capitalist employers, rather than to abolish them; and in politics the great fight began mainly over land settlement and was directed against the great graziers and towards the establishment of family farms rather than towards any Socialist objective. Apart from the groups of industrial militants, Henry George's single-tax proposals found a much greater response than Marxist Social Democracy; and the Labour Parties were much more concerned with taxing the rich, who were for a long time grossly undertaxed under a system of predominantly indirect taxation, than with expropriating them.

Nor must we forget, in relation to Australia, the powerful influence exerted from first to last upon the Labour movement by the great strength of Irish immigrants and their descendants and through them by the Roman Catholic Church — always the determined opponent of Socialism. At all times a remarkably high proportion of the leaders, both local and central, of Australian Labour have been Irish Catholics; and there have been endless conflicts arising out of the conflict of loyalties in the minds of such leaders between their Catholic allegiance and their allegiance to Labour Parties which have tended towards a Socialist faith. Often these struggles have taken the form of personal or group rivalries for the control of key positions; and many non-Catholic leaders have repressed impulses to declare themselves Socialists out of fear of forfeiting Catholic working-class support, or even of being officially anathematised by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. The Irish, even if they were socially radical and anti-imperialist, mainly held aloof from Socialism; and this kept the Labour Parties, even when their policy was in fact up to a point socialistic, from accepting the Socialist label or linking up with the Socialist movements of other countries either by direct contacts or by affiliating to the Socialist International.

In Australia there is a sharp line in 1850, and another in
1890 — the first drawn by the gold discoveries and the second by the defeat of the great maritime and shearer's strike. Up to 1850 there were only a few isolated Trade Unions. The furniture workers organised as early as 1833, in order to maintain the London price-list and also to provide friendly benefits. The coopers and the compositors also had Unions at Sydney in the 1830s, and there was a seamen's strike in 1837, followed by the establishment of a regular Union two years later. In 1839, at a time of serious unemployment, a United Association of Sydney collected relief funds and tried to set up a bakery. By 1840 there were also Unions of coachmakers and engineers. The Australian Society of Compositors, set up in 1840, ran a strike in Sydney that year. The tailors and the building workers also became organised during the 'forties. There were also, during the period before 1850, disputes arising out of the use of 'ticket-of-leave' convicts as cheap labour. The gold discoveries denuded the labour market of skilled workers, who went off in large numbers to the goldfields. At the same time it led to a very sharp rise in prices: so that the workers who were left had to demand large wage increases and were very favourably placed for getting their demands accepted. Wages rose rapidly; Trade Unions became very active; and a number of these Unions were successful, with or without strike action, in establishing the eight hours' day. At the goldfields the diggers fought their battle against the abuses of the licence system, culminating in 1854 in the pitched battle of the Eureka Stockade; and the same year the miners at Ballarat set up a Reform League. But this bitterly fought contest had nothing to do with Socialism or with any regular sort of Trade Unionism; and when the licence fees had been reduced and their administration amended the movement died away.

The following year — 1855 — saw the beginning of the eight hours' movement in both Melbourne and Sydney. It started under the influence of the former Welsh Chartist, James Stephens, among the building workers, particularly the stonemasons, who had established Trade Unions at Melbourne in 1850 and at Sydney three years later. In 1855 the masons' leader, Hugh Landreth, moved his famous resolution calling on the workers to cease work after eight hours; and when the employers refused to accept this, the Melbourne masons,
followed by other trades, struck in 1856 and won an easy victory. That year T. W. Vine organised the Carpenters and Joiners’ Progressive Society at Melbourne; the Trade Unions came together in an Eight Hours League, and the concession was soon extended to a number of other crafts. In Sydney, after a no-less-promising beginning, the movement broke up for a time, and the eight hours’ day was not fully secured for nearly twenty years. But in Melbourne the Unions remained strong enough to hold what they had won; and thanks to their success the eight hours’ day gradually became firmly established among the skilled workers, and came to be looked on as the first great achievement of Australian Trade Unionism. The practice of holding an annual gala day in celebration of it began, however, only in 1872, first at Sydney, with other centres soon following suit.

Victoria also took the lead in sending Labour representatives to the colonial Assembly. Peter Lalor (1827–89), who had lost an arm at the Eureka Stockade, was elected for Ballarat in 1856; and a leading Trade Unionist, Charles Jardine Don (1820–67), won a seat in 1859. In 1858 the Melbourne Trade Unions formed an Operatives’ Board of Trade, which developed two years later into the Trades Hall Committee, the first of the Trades and Labour Councils which were soon to become established in all the State capitals. Meanwhile the miners had been organising. The Newcastle coal-miners formed a Trade Union in 1854; and by the beginning of the ’sixties both coal and other miners had entered on a period of active industrial struggle. James Fletcher (d. 1891), the Scottish leader of the Newcastle Coal-Miners’ Union, persuaded them to start a Co-operative Colliery under his management in 1863; but after a few years it was sold to a company, on behalf of which he continued to manage it. Later he became a member of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly, and continued to play an active part in the Labour interest. The Miners’ Unions had their ups and downs in the ’sixties and ’seventies. The coal-miners won a big strike in New South Wales in 1872; but not until the ’eighties did the various groups join forces in an Amalgamated Miners’ Union covering New Zealand as well as all the Australian mining areas.

It can be said, broadly, that the ‘good times’ of the Aus-
Australian Trade Unions lasted till 1890. There were, of course, ups and downs, and battles were lost as well as won. There were attempts by employers to substitute cheap Chinese or island labour for white labour; and there were many complaints about government-assisted immigration of white workers. But on the whole the conditions of the labour market were favourable, at any rate to the skilled workers; and the Unions learnt to use their power in exacting as much as they could from employers who were in general making high profits. In particular, the craft Unions learnt to maintain their monopoly of skill by enforcing limitation of apprenticeship and by concerted refusal to work with non-unionists. For most of this period the employers were not strongly organised to resist the Trade Union claims; and the Unions, though they had no effective organisation covering the whole continent, acted fairly closely together within each State through their Trades Hall Committees or Trade Union Councils in the principal towns, and occasionally co-operated in movements extending across State frontiers.

Angus Cameron, the Secretary of the Sydney Labour Council, seems to have been the first Trade Unionist to be elected to a Legislative Assembly with Trade Union financial backing. He was elected for West Sydney in 1875. The first All-Australian Trade Union Congress met in 1879, and the second, held in 1884, demanded payment of Members in order to make effective Labour representation possible in the colonial assemblies. This Congress also set up Parliamentary Committees in the various States to undertake lobbying in the Labour interest, the main demands being for the amendment of the law of master and servant, for factory inspection, for protection to local industries, and for the abolition of plural voting. In 1885 the Victorian Trades Hall Council declared in favour of Labour representation, and the following year the fourth All-Australian Trade Union Congress adopted the same policy, also reaffirming its demand for payment of Members. During this period many Trade Unions had rules which precluded them from interfering in politics — that is to say, in elections. This did not prevent them from exercising pressure on politicians where labour interests were directly involved; but they saw no need to set up independent Labour Parties as long as they could
get most of what they wanted immediately by industrial action, reinforced by sending a few Labour men to the Assemblies of the various States, where they acted in alliance with the more Radical politicians who favoured the ‘small men’ against the wealthy pastoralists and the wealthier employers.

Then in 1890 the position abruptly changed. The period of rapid economic expansion, which had been financed mainly by means of imported capital, came to an end, and there was a scurry for solvency by capitalists and heavily indebted Governments alike. Employers cut wages right and left; Governments abandoned their public works and instituted large economies in the public services. Moreover, the bigger capitalists and pastoralists, seeing their chance in the altered state of the labour market, drew together to fight ‘Trade Union tyranny’. In particular, they agreed to offer combined resistance to the Union policy of refusing to work with non-unionists and proclaimed the principle of ‘free contract’ between master and man — that is, the employer’s right to refuse to be bound by collective rules about wages and conditions and to make such bargains as he thought fit with individual employees. This question came to an issue simultaneously in the shipping and waterfront trades and between the pastoralists and the strongly organised Shearers’ Unions, which had been among the most successful in their refusal to allow their members to work where non-unionists were employed.

W. G. Spence, who had begun reorganising the miners in 1878 and after becoming Secretary of the Victoria Miners’ Association in 1882 had rapidly expanded it into an all-Australian amalgamation, was the outstanding figure in the development of the Trade Union movement during this period. He went on in 1886 to establish the Amalgamated Shearers’ Union, which spread rapidly from Victoria to other States and worked in close conjunction with the similar Union that had been set up in Queensland. These two Shearers’ Unions succeeded, during the next few years, in establishing standard agreements under which alone the shearers would consent to work. These included the ‘closed shop’, to which the great pastoralists took strong objection. As a consequence, the pastoralists established organisations of their own to resist the Unions’ claims; and by 1890 these had formed a Pastoralists’
Federal Council with a common programme of 'free contract' — that is, of concerted refusal to deal with the Unions or to recognise their terms. The shearsers, who moved in groups from station to station during the shearing season, lived in their own camps, and offered a strong front to the pastoralists. It was Spence's Manifesto of 1890, insisting on the full maintenance of the 'Union Contract', that precipitated the great strike of that year, usually known from its beginnings as the 'Maritime Strike'.

The great Maritime Strike actually began over the question of the right of the ships' officers' Trade Union to be affiliated to the Melbourne Trades Hall and thus federated with the Unions of seamen, cooks and stewards, and waterfront workers. From small beginnings the dispute spread from State to State and from trade to trade, largely through sympathetic action and through the attempt to apply the rule that no Trade Unionist should handle 'tainted goods' or do anything to help any firm in which blacklegs were employed. First in New South Wales and Victoria and then in Queensland, the maritime strike became mixed up with that of the shearers through the attempt to enforce a refusal to handle wool consigned from sheep-runs where the shearers were on strike against the employment of non-union labour. It was the practice of the shearers, in such disputes, to set up 'strike camps' near the affected workplaces, and to endeavour to hinder the bringing in of blacklegs and the work of non-unionists already on the spot. These tactics often led to violent clashes, and the pastoralists invoked the help of police and soldiers to put the shearers down. Similar help was called for by the shipowners and wharfingers to deal with attempts to interfere with blackleg labour; and there were violent clashes at the ports. Many Trade Union leaders were arrested and sentenced to gaol.

With trade bad and unemployment widespread, the employers were strongly placed, even without the help given them by the State Governments. In 1890 as week followed week the funds of the Shearers' Union melted away till they were forced to call the strike off, and leave their members to make the best terms they could, holding as many as possible of the pastoralists to the conditions of the Union contract, but abandoning the attempt to refuse to work with non-unionists or to prevent the
blacklegs from working. Scarcely had this struggle ended when, at the beginning of 1891, the separate Queensland Shearers’ Union, which was connected with Lane’s Australian Federation of Labour, became involved in a precisely similar contest. This turned into a much more violent affair than the New South Wales and Victoria struggles of the previous year. The Queensland Government was exceptionally reactionary, being dominated by the pastoral interests: the Queensland Pastoralists’ Association was the most militant of all; and perhaps by reason of these facts the Queensland Labour movement was also the most aggressive. The pastoralists at once organised corps of blacklegs from the towns; and the State Government mobilised the troopers as well as the police to put the shearers down. The Australian Federation of Labour called on other Unions to support the shearers by refusing to handle blackleg wool; and the Government retaliated by arresting a number of their leaders and charging them with conspiracy under the British Combination Act of 1825, which had been long repealed in Great Britain, but was ruled to be still in force in the Australian colonies. The judge summed up against the prisoners in highly hostile terms: the jury disagreed at first, but finally, after being shut up without food, agreed to convict ten of them, with a strong recommendation to mercy. The judge then administered stiff sentences, mostly of several years. Throughout this dispute the law courts behaved with great severity and with evident bias against the strikers; and in the end the strike collapsed.

Nevertheless, the shearers continued to struggle for some time longer to preserve the Union contract where they could. In 1894, however, the pastoralists in all the States felt strong enough to enforce a still stiffer ‘free contract’ and to refuse to have any dealings with the Unions, which had by that time become too weak to put up further resistance, though the Queensland men struck once more that year before they finally admitted defeat. This was the point at which Spence converted the Shearers’ Union into the Australian Workers’ Union and set out to rebuild his forces on a foundation of wider solidarity.

This was the situation in which Labour Parties were rapidly brought into existence, under various names, in the different States. The Trade Unions were drawn further into politics by
the realisation that their industrial power did not suffice to safeguard their interests in face of adverse trade conditions and of a determined co-ordination among the employers to defeat them by invoking the Government's aid.

The two outstanding figures in the Australian working-class movement at the time of the great strikes of 1890 were W. G. Spence and William Lane. William Guthrie Spence (1846–1926) was born in the Orkney Islands, but was taken to Australia as a boy. He worked as a shepherd and as a miner and, as we saw, in 1882 became Secretary of the Amalgamated Miners' Association in Victoria. Then he set to work to organise the shearsers, whose Union, formed in 1886, had immediate success and played a leading part in the struggle of 1890. Spence, however, was not content with these considerable achievements in Trade Union organisation. He was a firm believer in concerted industrial action, and his ambition was to build up an effective organisation covering every type of worker, industrial or agricultural, and bringing the strength of all to the aid of each section that might need it. He never realised this ambition; but he used the Shearers' Union in the hour of its defeat as a nucleus for establishing by far the largest Trade Union in Australia — the Australian Workers' Union. This Union was by its rules open to all wage-earners; but it was for a long time restricted in practice to the pastoral industry, within which it included a wide variety of workers in a great many different occupations. Later on, it spread beyond the pastoral industry to many other occupations, absorbing other Unions such as the Amalgamated Workers in Queensland. Spence was in fact the pioneer, well before the British Unions, of the 'general' type of Trade Union organised on a class basis. The A.W.A. under his leadership stood somewhere between the type represented by the Gasworkers' and Dockers' Unions set up in Great Britain in 1889 and the 'One Big Union' favoured by the American Industrial Unionists. Still later, it approximated much more closely to the first of these types; but in its earlier stages many militants looked to it — long before the I.W.W. came into being — to become the one great fighting organisation of the Australian working class.

Spence was elected to the new South Wales Parliament in 1898 and to the Commonwealth Parliament on its inception in
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1901; but he continued to give his main attention to Trade Union affairs, and did not become a Cabinet Minister until 1914. In 1916 he supported Hughes against the Labour Party on the conscription issue, and lost his seat. Soon after he retired from politics. Spence was no great theorist; his immense reputation rested on his organising capacity. He believed strongly in working-class unity and in the most inclusive type of Trade Unionism as a means to it.

The other leader, William Lane (1861–1917), stands in sharp contrast to Spence. He is indeed the one Socialist connected with the Australian Labour movement with any pretensions to be regarded as a theorist. Born in England, Lane went to Canada at the age of 14. He became a journalist and, migrating to Australia in 1885, started a journal, The Boomerang, which won a considerable working-class circulation, chiefly among miners and rural workers. In 1889 he was largely responsible for the campaign which raised more than £30,000 in support of the London dockers; and the same year he took the lead in setting up the Australian Federation of Labour, which was intended to serve as both a political and an industrial centre for the Labour movement of the whole continent. In fact, it operated only in Queensland, and never succeeded in establishing itself on a large scale elsewhere, though it had the support of Spence and his group of Trade Unions. Out of the A.L.F., which had a forthright Socialist programme, grew, under Lane’s influence, a distinct political organisation, which became the Queensland Labour Party and set out to retrieve by parliamentary action what had been lost in the course of the industrial struggles of 1890–94. In 1890, under the auspices of the Queensland Section, Lane had founded The Queensland Worker, which preached a much more advanced gospel of Socialism than any other considerable journal in Australia. Lane had written before this a number of tracts in favour of Socialism and of Henry George’s Single Tax ideas. After the defeat of the maritime and shearers’ strikes he grew convinced that it was impracticable to establish Socialism in Australia in face of the strength of capitalism and the prevalence of industrialist money-making ideas. He reverted to utopianism, and conceived the idea of leading a group of the faithful to establish a colony in a new country on communistic lines. He
fixed on Paraguay, where the wars of the dictator López had
gone far towards wiping out the adult male population. Obtain­
ing a large grant of land from the Paraguayan Government, he
succeeded in raising in Australia a fund of £30,000; and in
1893 he acquired a ship and set out with 240 fellow-Socialists
to settle in his colony, which he called New Australia. A
second shipload of 260 followed. The colony was soon in
trouble, both on account of internal dissensions and because
the unfavourable climate killed off a good many of the settlers.
Lane moved to a new centre, Cosme, and made a second
attempt; but that, too, fell into difficulties, and in 1899 he
himself abandoned it. Many of the surviving settlers were
brought back to Australia with the aid of the Queensland
Government; but some stayed on, breaking up into smaller
groups and giving up their communistic way of life. Lane
himself went back to journalism, settling in New Zealand,
where from 1913 he edited the New Zealand Herald.

During the eight years he spent in the Australian Labour
movement Lane impressed himself powerfully on the imagina­
tion of his contemporaries; and he has become a legendary
figure — the only romantic in its whole history. He was a good
and forcible writer; and at a critical point in the development
of the Australian movement he did much to urge it in the direc­
tion both of Industrial Unionism and of political action —
regarding them as equally necessary and stressing the need for
a combined movement which would make use of both weapons
under a common control. His utopian phase came later, and
had nothing very original about it. He seems to have owed
something to the Austrian utopian, Theodor Hertzka,¹ whose
novel Freeland, published in 1890, described the founding of
an imaginary Socialist community in Equatorial Africa. In
Hertzka's utopia production was to be carried on mainly by
Co-operative Associations under elected managers, receiving
their capital from the State and producing for a competitive
market. This conception had something in common with
those of Louis Blanc and of Lassalle. Lane made some rudi­
mentary attempt to apply these ideas in Paraguay; but his
New Australia lived too much from hand to mouth for any real
test of their value to be possible.

¹ See p. 559.
Lane's Paraguay venture did something to denude Australia of its most active Socialists just at the time when the Trade Unions were turning to politics in the hope of repairing the losses incurred in their industrial defeat. In adopting their new line the Trade Unions did not convert the existing Trades and Labour Councils into political bodies. They realised the need, for political purposes, to appeal to many who were not Trade Union members, including not only those who had dropped out of the Unions on their defeat, but also many unorganised less skilled workers and as many as possible of their potential sympathisers outside the wage-earning class — black-coats, who were weakly organised, if at all, small farmers, tradesmen, and so on. Accordingly, they organised political associations on a basis of low individual subscriptions, with a branch in each electoral area. To begin with, in some States, the name 'Labour' was avoided, and the label 'Progressive' used instead. There was no thought, among any considerable groups, of using the name 'Socialist': nor were the programmes mainly of a Socialist character, though they included in some cases a general demand — which was subsequently modified — for the nationalisation of the means of production. Most of them included the abolition of plural voting, the taxation of land values, with careful safeguards for the owner who improved his land; graduated direct taxation; the legal eight hours' day (and in some cases the legal minimum wage); the prevention of colonial immigration and the cessation of State-aided immigration in all its forms; the reform of the laws relating to masters and servants, and the granting of full Trade Union rights; improved industrial legislation, and a number of other reforms, varying from State to State. Most of them also favoured protectionist fiscal legislation to safeguard the workers against cheap imports which might adversely affect wages; but on this issue there was a strong division of opinion in New South Wales, which was by tradition the 'Free Trade State' — and the State programme hedged. The only widespread specific demand for any sort of socialisation was the proposal to set up State Banks to break the private monopoly of credit. In most cases the programmes also called for free universal education, higher as well as elementary, and for increased provision for technical training.
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Although the new political associations were set up as distinct bodies from the Trade Unions, in practice they were at the outset largely dominated by the Trade Union Councils of the big cities. Trade Unions and Trade Union branches, as well as the local political groups, sent delegates to their conferences and for the most part determined their policy. Troubles, however, soon arose between the new political organisations and some of the members who won seats in the State Legislatures under their auspices. From the very start the new parties met with very substantial electoral success and, with the older parties fairly evenly divided, found themselves before long holding the balance of power — except in Queensland, where the class struggle was most acute and the other parties combined against them, so that the Labour Party became the opposition. Elsewhere, they became in most cases part of the majority supporting the Government and in a position, by changing sides, to put the other faction into office. The existing political parties in the various States were not as a rule divided by any clear principles. They were more often groups following particular leaders; and there were a good many Independents, who were liable to shift their allegiance. In New South Wales, the most populous State, the traditional party battle was between free traders and protectionists; but on other issues there was no sharp difference between the parties. State politics were largely a matter of politicians currying favour with particular pressure groups; and there was already a good deal of petty corruption, especially in connection with land grants and the arrangement of public contracts. Up to the 1890s Labour had been content for the most part to act as an outside pressure group, with only a few of its own men in the Legislative Assemblies, sometimes as Independents and sometimes associated with one of the older parties. When Labour decided to form parties of its own there was no particular reason why it should wish to see one of the old parties rather than another in power; and it was therefore free to make and unmake Governments by shifting its allegiance from side to side. This made it possible to exact considerable concessions from the various State Governments; and this power was used to secure, in one form or another, protective labour legislation, including the repeal of the obsolete Trade Union laws, as well
as changes in the tax system favourable to the poorer classes. In relation to wages, the Trade Unions at this period, having suffered industrial defeat, were for the most part in favour of compulsory arbitration in trade disputes or alternatively of some form of legal wage-regulation; and it was partly under Labour influence that the various systems of Wages Boards and Arbitration Courts were developed. They were, however, by no means of Labour's invention. They were brought forward by Governments of varying complexion, and in most cases included provisions to which the Trade Unions objected, even if they did not oppose them in principle. It is unnecessary here to tell in detail the often-told story of the development of these forms of wage-regulation in the various States. New South Wales led the way with an Arbitration Act passed in 1892, but did not introduce compulsion until 1898; and thereafter the system was amended in 1901 and again in 1908 by introducing elements borrowed from Victoria. The Victoria Wages Boards Act was passed in 1896, and other States followed suit. The Commonwealth Arbitration Court, restricted to inter-State matters, began to operate in 1906, but was at first greatly hampered by judicial interpretations which caused many of its awards to be declared void. At the outset these forms of state intervention in the regulation of wages and conditions were undoubtedly favourable to the workers, who used them to win back a good deal of what they had lost after 1890. They were also favourable to the growth of Trade Union membership and to the extension of Trade Unionism into occupations in which it had been weak or non-existent. Only when the Unions had exacted as much as Arbitration Courts or Wages Boards were prepared to give did state regulation come under heavy criticism from the Trade Union left wing, which accused it of stabilising capitalism, of taking the militancy out of the Trade Unions, and of fostering false ideas of a community of interest between employers and employed.

Indeed, when the initial concessions had been secured, it gradually became clear that there was a close connection between the wages which arbitrators and Wages Boards were prepared to grant, the protective taxes designed to keep out imports, and the cost of living of the Australian population.
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After the establishment of the united Commonwealth in 1900, the protection of Australian industry, especially against imports produced by underpaid labour, became part of the Federal Labour Party's policy; and the free trade opposition, which had been strong in New South Wales, died away. The official policy was called the 'New Protectionism'; and it rested on a recognition that the wages and conditions that arbitrators could be expected to grant depended in practice on the level of protective duties as well as on other factors affecting the prices of consumers' goods. It took some time to establish the new Commonwealth Arbitration Court firmly in face of the marked desire of the law courts to restrict its jurisdiction in the name of 'State rights'; but gradually, under the presidency of Mr. Justice H. G. Higgins, the Court established its position and began to apply its living wage policy over a widening field. The importance of the wage-fixing machinery in the separate States did not on that account decline; and the State Labour Parties continued to uphold it despite the growing attacks of the Trade Union militants. The defeats of the 1890s had left behind them a deep unwillingness among many groups of workers to trust to industrial action alone; and few Labour politicians had a good word to say for the Industrial Unionists who demanded a resumption of the old fighting Trade Union methods.

The 'White Australia' policy also played an important part in Federal Labour politics. In 1901 the first Commonwealth Ministry passed with solid Labour support the Immigration Act which excluded coloured immigrants in the interest of maintaining the 'Australian standard of living' and Australian 'racial purity'. The Labour Parties in the several States had traditionally favoured the 'White Australia' demand. There was indeed a strong element of nationalism about the whole movement. Only a very few, mainly immigrant, Socialists opposed the exclusion of coloured immigrants on grounds of international working-class solidarity.¹

Thus, from 1890 onwards, Australian Labour developed a policy and a programme in which the emphasis was laid on the preservation and if possible the improvement of the workers' standards of living with the help of the State. What the Trade

¹ For this issue at the Socialist International, see pp. 33 and 74.

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Unions had sought to gain, and had largely succeeded in gaining for a time, by industrial action they now sought to recover and to maintain by using the political weapon, first in the particular States and then in the Commonwealth as well.

While the Trade Unions were thus creating their own political parties, and endeavouring to find allies outside their own ranks for the political struggle, a number of minority groups, especially in New South Wales and Queensland, were trying to win support for Socialism, both as a social doctrine and as a basis for working-class action. But for some time these groups, though they made converts, had very little influence on the immediate policies of either the State Labour Parties or the Trade Unions. It is true that when Ben Tillett, well remembered for his triumph in the London Dock Strike, to the success of which the Australian workers had made a very important contribution,\(^1\) toured Australia in 1898 he received a rapturous reception for his Socialist eloquence; but he was accepted much less as a Socialist than as the representative of the New Unionism, and the effect of his propagandist tour was much more to increase Trade Union membership and to reintegrate the Trade Unions after their defeat than to make any strong Socialist movement. Similarly, Henry Hyde Champion, who had shaken the dust of England from his feet and come to settle in Australia in 1894, though he made a substantial contribution to rebuilding the Labour forces, did not do much towards making them Socialist. Tom Mann, who came later, in 1903, after a year in New Zealand, and spent more than six years in the Australian Labour movement, did more; but his attempts to convert the Australian workers to Socialism had much more effect in stirring up industrial militancy than in winning them over to Socialist politics.

In the 1840s the arrival of a number of British Chartists — some as transported convicts and others as voluntary immigrants, had done something towards endowing the Australian workers with a radical tradition; but there had been no inflow, such as there was to the United States, of Socialist refugees from continental Europe. After 1848 the working-class immigrants from Great Britain had brought with them, not Socialism, but the 'New Model' Trade Unionism of the

\(^1\) See p. 862.

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Amalgamated Societies. Branches of the British Societies of Engineers and Carpenters and Joiners were formed in Australia almost as early as in Great Britain, and helped to set the pattern for the development of Trade Unionism in the developing Australian economy. Practically nothing was heard of Socialism in Australia until after 1880; and even then the message was brought by migrants from continental Europe rather than from Great Britain. In the early 'eighties a group of French and Italian immigrants tried unsuccessfully to establish a belated Australian Section of the International Working Men’s Association — by then defunct in Europe; and about 1886 two groups of Germans set up Social Democratic Unions at Adelaide and Melbourne. Then, in 1887, a group of immigrants from Great Britain founded at Sydney the Australian Socialist League. There were only six of them; but they started a journal, The Australian Radical. Then they quarrelled. The proprietor of The Radical became an Anarchist, and the League repudiated him and started a new journal, The Socialist. Neither had a long life.

Then came the great strikes of 1890 and the subsequent years, followed by a spread of interest in Socialism. A number of Trade Union branches joined the Australian Socialist League, and the Socialists threw themselves into the campaign for the formation of a Labour Party in New South Wales, but then withdrew and tried to set up a Socialist Labour Party. In 1892 they convened at Sydney an All-Australian Socialist Congress, attended by delegates from New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland, and including the German Social Democratic groups. This Congress, small though it was, decided to set up an Australian Socialist Federation, and sent a delegate, F. Scensa, to represent it at the Zürich International Socialist Congress of 1893. But quarrels soon broke out. The Social Democrats, headed by the Germans, seceded and formed a Social Democratic Federation; and the Anarchists set up a group of their own, with a journal Justice. The Social Democratic Federation lasted only until 1896; and by that time the Socialist League appeared to be moribund. But after that year the League, led by Charles M. Barlow (d. 1900), revived: it published at Newcastle, the centre of the New South Wales mining industry, The Collectivist and then later The People, and
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fell into a lively dispute with the Trade Unions. Newcastle became the stronghold of the Socialist League, which conducted a violent campaign against the Trade Union leaders. It accused them of betraying the workers to the coalowners on account of the cautious policy they had followed after the serious defeats in the strike of 1896. In 1898 a group of Italian immigrants formed in Sydney the International Socialist Club, which was joined by Scandinavian and German contingents. This body fell into a dispute with the Socialist League, which included in its programme a clause opposing immigration that might reduce the standards of living of the Australian workers. The Club objected to this clause, citing the Socialist International in support of its views in favour of the open door; and the League agreed to its deletion. Meanwhile, the League had spread to Victoria, where a branch was formed in 1897; and at about the same time a Socialist body, called the Social Democratic Advance Guard, was founded in Queensland, where William Lane had done a great deal earlier to popularise Socialist ideas. In 1900 the Socialist League moved its headquarters back to Sydney, where it continued to publish *The People*. In 1902 there was a split in Victoria, where a separate Social Democratic Party was set up.

In 1901, at the first Commonwealth elections after the union of the Australian colonies, the Socialist League ran six candidates for the Senate without success. It fell into a sharp dispute with the new Federal Labour Party and with the Trades and Labour Council at Sydney, and refused to allow its members to serve on such Councils. The League survived to send Claude Thompson to represent it at the Amsterdam International Socialist Congress of 1904; but its influence was waning. Then came a fresh start, mainly under the influence of Tom Mann, who, after becoming editor of the Melbourne *Socialist* in 1906, succeeded in 1907 in establishing a Socialist Federation of Australasia, designed to include New Zealand, with H. E. Holland, then of the Sydney International Socialist Club, as its Secretary. This new body sent Victor E. Kroemer to represent it at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907. At the outset it was supported by a number of Labour Members of Parliament, headed by J. P. Jones (1872–?) and Frank Anstey (1865–

1 See page 900.
1940); but most of them were driven to resign when the S.F.A.,
captured by the left wing, decided to forbid its members to
associate with the Labour Party. After Tom Mann's departure
from Australia in 1909 it sank rapidly into insignificance,
though some who had worked closely with Mann, such as
H. E. Holland, Robert S. Ross, who succeeded Mann as editor
of The Socialist, and Frank Hyett, Secretary of the Socialist
Party of Victoria and of the Railwaymen's Union, carried on
the Socialist tradition.

Charles Eyre, of the Socialist League, in reporting on the
condition of Australian Socialism to the Amsterdam Socialist
Congress of 1904, explained its backward state by the still
mainly pastoral and agricultural character of the country and
by the distances separating the main industrial centres. In his
view, there had been a great increase in recent years in the
intensity of capitalist exploitation, which he described as 'not
much less than that which exists in England'. He dwelt on
the sudden and rapid spread of Socialist ideas after the maritime
strike of 1890 and, speaking mainly of New South Wales,
attributed to the Socialists a large part in the creation of the
political Labour Leagues which fought the elections of 1891
with great and, for the most part, unexpected success.

He described how this success had been rapidly followed,
in New South Wales, by a split in the Labour Party over the
protectionist issue and how dissensions had arisen over the
connection between the elected members on the one hand and
the Trades and Labour Council and the Political Labour
League on the other. He said that the initial Socialism of the
local Leagues had been watered down by the infusion of
members interested only in immediate objectives, and that this
pressure had become so strong that the Socialists were forced
to withdraw from the Labour Party and to set up a separate
Socialist Party based on the conception of the class struggle,
and including in its programme the abolition of private owner­
ship of the means of production, distribution, and exchange.

In 1907 the Australian report to the International Socialist
Congress at Stuttgart was signed by J. P. Jones as President
and Tom Mann as Secretary of the Victorian section of the
Australian Socialist Party. It was optimistic in tone, and
represented a tendency very different from Charles Eyre's
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report of 1904. Jones and Mann described the Labour Parties both federally and in the States as consisting mainly of Socialists, many of the M.P.s being actual members of Socialist organisations. They agreed that Socialism was not yet widely understood among rank-and-file Trade Unionists and Labour voters, but said that energetic propaganda was being carried on, and appeared to anticipate a rapid conversion of the Labour Parties into definitely Socialist bodies. This report was written shortly before the establishment of the Socialist Federation of Australasia, and of course before the split which drove Jones and the other Labour M.P.s to resign.

The truth behind these two conflicting statements was that in the early 'nineties the Socialists, though few, had been able to play a very active part in the Political Labour Leagues, which they had helped to establish, and had profited by the bitter class-war feelings engendered by the defeat of the Trade Unions to get Socialist objectives written into their programmes. This was the case particularly in New South Wales, where the League had declared unequivocally for the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange. Such declarations, which were repeated when the Commonwealth Labour Party was set up in 1900, did not mean that the various Labour Parties in practice did anything about nationalisation or included it in the platforms of immediate demands on which they fought elections. Their Socialism, as far as it meant nationalisation, was only an aspiration for an uncertain future time, when they would hold power. But the nearer they got to power the more they became inclined, despite the protests of the active Socialists in their ranks, to discard Socialism from their programmes for fear of frightening off those electors who could be induced to vote for Labour's immediate demands, but were hostile to Socialism as a creed suggestive of revolution and confiscation. Their opponents were continually playing on their commitment to Socialism in the hope of influencing the doubtful voters.

In New South Wales, where the Socialists were relatively strong, the question came to a head almost as soon as the Labour Party was formed; and thereafter Socialists were in and out of the party — or rather, some in and some out fighting it — continuously. W. A. Holman, the coming leader of the
New South Wales Labour Party, who had belonged originally to the Socialist wing, but had not followed its extremists out of the party, turned against the Socialist clause in the programme as soon as he saw that it might interfere with his prospects of getting a majority. In 1905, after a considerable struggle, he persuaded the Labour Conference to strike it out and to put in its place as an object of the party ‘the securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and municipality’. This did not prevent him, in his celebrated debate of 1905 with Sir George Reid, who had come forward as the great antagonist of Socialism, from arguing strongly in favour of the merits of State and municipal enterprise; nor did it stop him, when he had become the chief figure in the New South Wales Government, from co-operating with Arthur Griffith (1864–1946) in setting on foot a number of State enterprises, beginning with the State brickworks opened in 1910. This venture was followed, after he had become State Premier in 1911, by State metal quarries, State pipe and concrete works, State sawmills, and a State trawling fleet. Some of these enterprises were set on foot after Holman had been driven out of the Labour Party in connection with the conscription crisis of 1917. He was, and remained, a believer in the economic advantages of State and municipal enterprise, which he advocated as good business rather than as a means of abolishing capitalism, and felt no wish to extend beyond a limited field. His idea of nationalisation was indeed rather anti-monopolistic than Socialist; and it was also directed against the prevalent corruption when the State bought its supplies from capitalist firms or entered into contracts for public works with private entrepreneurs, instead of carrying them out by direct labour.

William Arthur Holman (1871–1934), the son of a touring actor from England, came to Australia at the age of 17 and settled in Sydney. He had a great thirst for knowledge and great natural oratorical power; and he became the foremost orator of the Australian Labour movement. At first he was on the Left, and a strong supporter of the small Socialist group in Sydney. Elected to the New South Wales Assembly in 1898, he soon became its outstanding figure, after Hughes had
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transferred his activities to the Commonwealth Parliament. In 1910 he was Attorney-General in the first New South Wales Labour Government, headed by James McGowan (1855–1922), who soon let him become effectively leader. After his break with the Labour Party in 1917, he remained as Premier until 1920, when he was defeated and retired from politics, returning to the bar. He made a late reappearance as a Commonwealth M.P. in his last years, but exerted no influence. In his day, however, he was a big figure in Australian politics, with considerable influence in Federal Conferences as well as in his own State.

An intelligent Frenchman, Albert Métin, who wrote a book about the Australasian Labour movement at the beginning of the century, called his work *Le Socialisme sans doctrines*. He accepted the various Labour Parties which then existed as 'socialistic' in tendency, but observed that the out-and-out Socialists were few and had little influence on the Trade Unions which dominated the Labour Parties. He said that he had found the word 'Socialist' to be commonly used in Australia in a pejorative sense, and Socialists to be spoken of as 'extremists' even in Labour circles. He noted the narrowness of the programmes of the Labour Parties and the narrow lines dividing many Labour members from those of other parties; and he attributed the scant influence of European Socialist ideas to the fact that hardly any of the Labour leaders spoke any language other than English. He recorded the very great success which the Labour Parties had met with, even before 1900, in securing the legislation they wanted from the Governments in power, and clearly admired these achievements. In the second edition of his book, published in 1911, he hardly modified these judgments, though by this time Socialist propaganda had received a considerable renewed impetus, there had been a big growth of industrial militancy, and the Labour Parties had greatly increased their parliamentary strength. In 1904 the first Commonwealth Labour Government, headed by John Christian Watson (1867–1941), held office for a few months, and ten years later Labour Governments were in office in the Commonwealth and in five out of the six constituent States. During the war years the movement was to be split asunder and set back politically by the struggle over compulsory military
service, in which W. M. Hughes played the leading part. But
up to that point it had been steadily increasing its influence
under the leadership of the Scottish coal-miner and engine-
driver, Andrew Fisher (1862–1928), who had emigrated to
Queensland in 1885 and had been influential there as politician
and journalist before his election to the Commonwealth
Parliament in 1901. In 1907 Fisher became the party’s leader
and the following year Prime Minister. With brief intervals
he remained Prime Minister up to 1915, when he resigned and
came to London as representative of the Commonwealth.
Fisher was a canny leader, who believed strongly in the policy
of pursuing limited, clearly formulated objectives and avoiding
theories and longer-run commitments. He was mainly respons­
ible for introducing a progressive land tax and for the establish­
ment of the Commonwealth Bank, though the terms on which
the Bank was allowed to be set up bore little resemblance to
what had been the traditional Labour demand for a structure
of public banking that would drive the capitalist banks out of
business and control credit in the interests of the small man
and of the Labour organisations. Nor did Fisher succeed in
carrying into effect an important part of the policy of the
‘New Protection’, under which it was proposed not only to use
import duties for the protection of Australian standards of
living, but also to discriminate in relation to them against
employers who failed to pay fair wages and grant satisfactory
conditions of work. Such discrimination was disallowed as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

When Fisher went to London, William Morris Hughes
(1864–1952), who had served under him as Attorney-General,
took his place. Hughes was London-born: he emigrated to
New South Wales in 1884, and became founder and Secretary
of the Sydney Hotel, Club, and Restaurant Workers’ Union.
In 1894 he was elected to the New South Wales State Assembly,
in which he played a prominent part. In 1900 he transferred
his services to the Waterfront Workers of Sydney, becoming
Secretary of their Federation in 1902. He was elected to the
Commonwealth Parliament in 1901, and was Minister of
External Affairs in the short-lived Watson Labour Ministry of
1904 before serving under Fisher. Hughes was an excitable
demagogic politician. His support of conscription in 1916
caused his expulsion from the Labour Party and led to his appearance as the leader of a national anti-Labour coalition. He held office until 1923, playing a leading part with Lloyd George in the later stages of the war and in the Peace Conference. Thereafter he lost his influence, though he came back to ministerial office under Lyons in 1934 and remained in it until the Labour Party’s return to power in 1941.

From the formation of the Commonwealth the separate Labour Parties of the various States held fairly regular joint Conferences for the development of a common policy; and in 1905 the Conference defined the Party’s objectives as follows:

(a) The cultivation of an Australian sentiment, based on the maintenance of racial purity and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community.

(b) The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers, by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the State and municipality.

To these objectives the Conference added a ‘Fighting Platform’ of nine points. These were: (1) Maintenance of a White Australia; (2) Nationalisation of Monopolies; (3) Old Age Pensions; (4) Tariff Referendum; (5) Progressive Tax on Land Values; (6) Restriction of Public Borrowing; (7) Navigation Laws; (8) Citizen Defence Force; (9) Arbitration Act Amendment. The fourth of these points was the outcome of a deadlock between those who wished the party to commit itself to Protectionism and those who were against this. They agreed to compromise on a proposal that the matter should be settled by a referendum of the whole people.

At the same Conference of 1905 a decision was taken that, should the Labour Party be called on again to take office, ‘the Labour Ministry should be recommended by the Party in Caucus’. Thus was established the principle that the choice not only of the Prime Minister but also of his Cabinet colleagues should rest with the party as a whole. The Conference, however, did not set up any executive committee to act for it between its meetings. The constitution of such a body was repeatedly proposed; but not until 1915 was it actually estab-
lished under the name Australian Political Executive — two years after the Trade Unions, after many abortive attempts, had at length set up a similar co-ordinating agency. There had been, indeed, great reluctance on the part of the State organisations, both political and industrial, to create any common executive instrument. The Trade Unions had long been accustomed to meet in general Congresses representing all the States; and, as we saw, the Labour Parties had followed their example. But though the need for such meetings was recognised there was much opposition to the setting-up of any common agency endowed with executive power.

There was also much trouble over the position of Members of Parliament in relation to the Labour Parties responsible for their candidatures. As we saw, this trouble had arisen first in New South Wales in the 1890s. There the attempt of the party outside Parliament to control its M.P.s had led to the secession of more than half of those elected under Labour auspices, and to their absorption into the older parties. In face of these defections the Labour Parties adopted varying forms of ‘pledge’, which they exacted from their candidates, binding them to vote in accordance with party decisions on policy and to accept the verdict of a majority of the parliamentary group on how they should vote in any particular division. For this purpose the parliamentary groups were instructed to hold meetings of their own to decide in advance what line to take. The pledge varied a good deal from one organisation to another, sometimes allowing latitude on matters that did not form part of declared party policy, and sometimes requiring unconditional adherence to majority decisions.

The development of the Commonwealth and State Labour Parties after 1900 took place to the accompaniment of growing labour unrest as the Arbitration Courts and Wages Boards yielded decreasingly favourable results. It was widely agreed that, at best, the system of compulsory arbitration and state wage-regulation was doing no more than maintain working-class standards of living in face of rising prices, and that under it the power of the Trade Unions to enforce satisfactory working conditions was much less than it had been in the good days before 1890. Except in the case of the worst-paid groups, which benefited from the application of the ‘living wage’ notion,
this was probably true; for up to 1890 the Unions had been in a highly favourable position, not only for improving wages but also for enforcing their own rules in such matters as the regulation of apprenticeship, the eight hours’ day, and the ‘closed shop’ and ‘Union Contract’. These advantages had accrued, no doubt, mainly to the skilled craftsmen and to such well-organised groups as the miners and shearsers; and much less had been gained by most of the less skilled male workers or by the women. But the skilled workers and, above all, the miners and shearsers were acutely conscious of what they had lost during the years of defeat and depression after 1890, and saw no chance of the Arbitration Courts or Wages Boards giving them back the power to force the employers to obey their unilaterally imposed regulations.

In these circumstances an increasing body of feeling grew up against the Arbitration system, though it continued to be defended both by many of the older Trade Union leaders, who had been through the defeats of the 1890s, and by the Labour Parties in the various Parliaments. The moderates, like their opposite numbers in Great Britain, pointed to the gains that had been secured in fairer taxation, improved social services, and freedom from being crushed by the big capitalist combines; and in Australia they argued, too, that it was necessary, in the consumers’ interests, to set limits to wage-advances that would adversely affect the cost of living. The Labour Parties had to collect votes from other persons besides Trade Unionists: they had to be mindful of country voters and of the ‘small men’ in the towns if they were to win majorities; and they were quite definitely afraid that a return to Trade Union militancy might provoke a reaction fully as dangerous as that of 1890. Consequently the political leaders clung to Compulsory Arbitration as a means of preserving industrial peace.

As against this policy of compromise, which suited the employing classes increasingly well after the breakdown of Andrew Fisher’s New Protectionism, militant Industrial Unionism began again to raise its head, this time not as an indigenous doctrine but to a considerable extent under influence from the United States. From the establishment of the Industrial Workers of the World in the United States in 1905 Industrial Unionist propaganda began to make headway in
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Australia, especially among the miners and the waterfront workers.

When the I.W.W. split, most of its Australian following took the side of the De Leonites — that is to say, it refused to repudiate political action altogether and demanded the creation of a revolutionary Socialist Party as well as the reconstitution of the Trade Union movement on a basis of industrial amalgamation and class-war doctrine. The movement had its main strength in New South Wales; and its leaders made repeated efforts to get the Preamble of the I.W.W. adopted as the basis of the State Trade Union movement. These attempts were defeated, but the Industrial Unionists did get resolutions in favour of amalgamation adopted, and had some success in securing the fusion of a number of craft Unions into Unions of an industrial type. They also did their best to undermine the Arbitration Acts by stirring up unlawful strikes. The I.W.W. reached its highest point of influence in Australia only after 1914, under war conditions; but from about 1908 it was very active in fighting the Labour Party’s policy of industrial peace through arbitration and state regulation of wages.

The great disputes at Broken Hill in 1908-9 were attributed largely to the influence of Industrial Unionist ideas. The trouble began when two mining companies which had demanded wage-reductions countered the opposition of the miners with a lock-out. The Unions regarded this as unlawful under the Arbitration Act, but the Commonwealth Arbitration Court decided that the law prohibiting strikes and lock-outs could not prevent employers from shutting down their mines altogether, as these companies had done. The wages question was then referred to arbitration, and the Court gave the miners most of what they wanted; but the companies refused to re-employ a number of the active left-wingers, and the miners refused to resume work without them. During the renewed struggle that followed, rioting occurred, and the police arrested a number of the miners’ leaders, including Tom Mann, who had been engaged as organiser by the Miners’ Union during the dispute. In the ensuing trials Mann was acquitted, but a number of the others were sent to gaol. The miners’ leader, Peter Bowling, was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment for incitement to strike, and even heavier sentences were passed on some of the
pickets who were accused of rioting and of attempting to intimidate non-unionist workers. In protest against the sentences the Miners’ Union called upon the New South Wales Trades and Labour Council for a general strike, but the Labour Congress, while protesting against the conduct of the authorities, was not prepared to take drastic action, and nothing was done.

The next great industrial disturbance which led to a sharp dispute between Right and Left was the Brisbane strike of 1912. The Brisbane trouble arose out of the rejection by the Tramway Company of a request by the employees to be allowed to wear their Trade Union badges while on duty — the object being to achieve a closed shop by bringing pressure to bear on non-unionists. The tramwaymen struck and took their case to the Queensland Labour Federation, which called for a general strike in their support. The strike was at first confined to Brisbane, but was subsequently extended to the entire State. An attempt was made to extend it further, to New South Wales; but the New South Wales Trade Unions would not go beyond financial support. The Queensland Government applied to the Commonwealth Government, then headed by Andrew Fisher, for troops to quell the rioting in Brisbane: but Fisher refused to intervene. This, however, did not prevent the Queensland Government from taking drastic action against the strikers, and again the courts dealt severely with the arrested leaders. The Queensland Labour Federation after a few days called off the strike in the country districts, and in Brisbane the tramway and other public services were remanned by blacklegs and the strike was broken. Its defeat was followed by much mutual recrimination, and helped to widen the differences between the right and left wings of the Trade Union movement.

During the years immediately before 1914, and also there-after till their suppression after the conscription struggle, the leaders of the Australian Industrial Workers of the World kept up a furious battle against the Labour Party and the Trade Unions which supported Arbitration. Their principal spokesman was Tom Barker, who edited their journal, Direct Action. He was finally deported to Chile in 1918, and went thence to the Soviet Union, where, with his former ally in the I.W.W., John
Benjamin King, he settled down and acquired an official position. With them, during the war years, was Peter Larkin, brother of James Larkin of Dublin. They all received heavy sentences under war-time legislation. Up to 1914 the I.W.W. as an organisation was always small: it worked chiefly through its influence on certain Trade Unions, and acted as the extreme exponent of a left-wing policy which attracted a growing amount of sympathy from Socialists and Industrial Unionists who did not fully share its views. Even with these allies it never came near commanding a majority among Trade Unionists, except among the miners and on the waterfront. The railwaymen and most of the craft Unions stood aloof, and continued to support the Labour politicians whom the I.W.W. so roundly denounced.

Meanwhile, in the celebrated Harvester Award of 1907, Mr. Justice Higgins, the second President of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, had proclaimed the principle of the living wage. Thereafter the Court, under Higgins's guidance, set itself to work out, by its treatment of individual claims sent up to it, a system of case-law for fixing wage-relativities in the various occupations that came within its jurisdiction. If the workers' ambitions had been limited to holding the existing standards of living for the skilled workers while achieving a moderate betterment of wages and conditions for the worst-paid groups, they would have found little to complain of in Mr. Justice Higgins's proceedings, which he proudly described in his book about them as the establishment of A New Province for Law and Order. The writ of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, however, did not run except in disputes extending to more than one State; and there were many complaints about the awards issued by the Courts of the separate States. Moreover, the mere stabilisation of real wages was not at all what the left wing wanted. It knew that real wages for the skilled workers had barely got back to the levels of 1890, and that the Trade Unions were a good deal less powerful in enforcing their will than they had been before their humiliating set-backs in the 1890s. They hated the truce which the Labour Party had in effect declared on their behalf with the great capitalists, and resented the stronger discipline to which they had been subjected since the 'bosses' had organised against them. They
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were revolutionaries, not reformists; and if there was no very clearly defined Socialist doctrine behind their revolutionism, the lack did not make it any the less intense.

Why was it, we may now ask, that, despite the development of a very powerful Labour movement, which often showed signs of considerable militancy and fought a number of bitter industrial conflicts, Australia failed to produce a Socialist movement of any sustained strength? The answer, I think, is to be found in the fact that Australian society had made its approach to democracy by a different road. Great struggles had been fought over access to the land in the movements for 'closer' settlement, which dominated Australian politics during most of the period of colonial self-government. The successive Land Acts by which land was made available for small farms at the expense of the vast estates accumulated in the hands of the great pastoralists occupied the largest part of parliamentary attention; and the battle on behalf of the 'small man' needed to be fought in its earlier stages by Liberal or Radical rather than by Labour or Socialist parties. The urban workers, in the meantime, were for some time in a strong position to get most of what they demanded by industrial action without greatly needing to invoke the aid of political action — or at any rate to form a political party of their own. They — or at least the more skilled among them — were able to build up what was probably the highest standard of life attained by any working class in the nineteenth century, and to enforce a system of Trade Union regulations which, in the rapidly advancing economy, employers had to accept. When the crash came, in 1890, and the employers took advantage of it to break the power of the Trade Unions, the workers turned promptly to political action, but rather as a means of restoring the position they had lost than of changing the basis of society. They had rich men to fight against, but in effect no aristocratic class with pretensions to control the State by hereditary right, no monarch on the spot to affront their democratic ideas, and no military caste or burden of armaments to weigh them down. They could not possibly regard the State, even when it took strong action against strikers, as Marx had regarded it, or even as the German Social Democratic Party professed to regard it. When they did enter politics they found the older parties, in most of the
States, and particularly in New South Wales and South Australia, only too ready to meet them half-way and to bid one against another for their support. Almost at once they found themselves holding the balance of political power and able, if not yet to form Governments, to make and unmake them at their will. They were able, even before they formed Governments of their own, to win large concessions in the field of industrial and social legislation; and presently, in the famous Harvester Judgment of 1907, they got the recognition of the living wage principle as the basis on which the determination of Commonwealth Arbitration awards was to rest. Practically everything that was included in the Labour Party's earlier Platforms was won; and, although militant Trade Unions continued to suffer defeats and the gains from arbitration grew smaller and smaller after the first successes, on the whole many Australian workers saw much to be content with in the moderate constitutional policies which the extremists denounced. The situation changed as, both in the Commonwealth and in the States, the Labour Party drew near to winning majorities that would enable it, instead of getting concessions by supporting now one of the older parties and now another, to form its own Governments. The effect of its challenge was to impel the other parties to coalesce against it, in the hope of driving it back; and this policy met with considerable success at the outset. It did not, however, avail for long to prevent the Labour Party from gaining absolute majorities in most of the States, and in the Commonwealth. But these majorities were gained at the cost of a considerable dilution of its programme in order to attract the marginal electors. The Labour Parties ceased to talk about Socialism and limited themselves for the most part to immediately attainable demands. In the Commonwealth the Federal Labour Party was confronted with a particular difficulty because the Federal Constitution gave only very limited powers in economic affairs, which remained chiefly in the hands of the separate States.

Andrew Fisher, in 1910, found himself unable to put into effect a large part of the new Labour ‘Platform’ without over-riding the constitution so as to endow the Commonwealth with wider powers. He submitted to the people a series of proposals which were voted on by referendum in 1911. Fisher required
full powers to regulate commerce (and not only foreign or inter-State commerce), powers of control over profit-making corporations, full power to regulate wages and conditions of employment, within the States as well as in inter-State business, and powers of control over monopolies and combines of every sort, including the power to take them over and operate them as public concerns. These proposals were decisively rejected, every State except Western Australia showing a hostile majority. This decision was regarded by Fisher as a clear indication that the Labour Party had no mandate from the people for a constructive Socialist policy, as distinct from a policy of labour protection within the existing economic order. In this view he was undoubtedly correct. Despite the presence of a lively and energetic left wing, especially in the mines and at the ports, the main body of Australians — and of Australian workers — did not want to endow their Government with powers to introduce a new social system: they wanted only to be able to invoke it as an instrument for helping them to attain immediate and limited changes which they believed to be compatible with the continuance of their highly individualistic traditions.
CHAPTER XXIV

NEW ZEALAND

The history of Labour and Socialism in New Zealand is a bundle of paradoxes. The country became noted as the home of a sort of empirical Socialism before it even possessed a Socialist Party. It practised a system of compulsory arbitration in labour disputes, introduced by a Socialist Minister sitting in a Liberal Cabinet; but it was also the scene of some of the bitterest industrial conflicts ever fought between Capital and Labour. It was for a time the very stronghold of militant Industrial Unionism; but for the most part the men who led the extreme left during this phase lived on to become the leaders of a New Zealand Labour Party which became famous for the adoption of a system of social security legislation very far removed from their earlier aspirations — or at any rate achieved by very different methods.

The Labour movements of Australia and New Zealand were linked closely together, especially in their earlier phases. Many of the men who made their mark in the New Zealand movement were Australians or had worked in Australia; and there was a good deal of coming and going of propagandists as well as of workers. Foreign visitors who came to Australia were apt to visit New Zealand as well. Tom Mann was there from 1902 to 1903, and again in 1908; and earlier Ben Tillett made two propagandist tours which exerted a substantial influence. The journalists Robert S. Ross and H. E. Holland both came from Australia to edit *The Maoriland Worker*; and Holland, who was a New Zealander by birth, went on to become the leader of the New Zealand Labour Party. Settlers from England and Scotland also played a considerable part; but there was hardly any influence from continental Europe. There was, however, a good deal from the United States, brought mainly by Australians or New Zealanders who had worked there, and chiefly inspired by the I.W.W. and its
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forerunner, the Western Federation of Miners. Moderate United States influence was represented by W. T. Mills, who spent some years before 1914 in New Zealand as a propagandist.

In considering the background of the Labour movement it is necessary to bear in mind the very great change that came over the New Zealand economy in the 1880s and 1890s and was carried much further thereafter. Up to the 1880s New Zealand was mainly a wool-growing country of large sheep-runs, offering very scanty opportunities to the small farmer. It had a growing population of miners and underwent some manufacturing development, for export as well as for the home market. But it was dominated by its pastoral activities, and economically by the wealthy station-owners, most of whom had acquired their vast estates on ridiculously favourable terms, and were not at all eager to share their privileged position with others, or to encourage opportunities for land settlement that would raise the price of labour or render the labouring classes independent. Australia was from an early stage largely democratic in a social sense. New Zealand emphatically was not. It was deliberately developed as a paradise for Englishmen, and was meant to reproduce without fundamental alteration the class structure of the ‘old country’.

Because of this — that is, because of the land monopoly and the comparative scarcity of jobs on vast pastoral holdings, the New Zealand working classes were not able to achieve in the middle decades of the nineteenth century anything like the gains which fell to the lot of the Australian workers. New Zealand gold workings came later, were not on a comparable scale, and were largely exploited by capitalist methods. The numbers of immigrants tended to exceed the openings for employment, and unemployment reached great heights in bad years and caused great distress, which very little indeed was done to relieve. The social attitudes of the dominant classes were most hostile to labour claims; and, though the skilled workers began to organise benefit societies in the 1860s and Trade Unions in the early ’seventies, organisation remained weak till the 1880s even among the skilled, and almost non-existent among the rural workers and the large casually employed proletariat of the towns. In the ’eighties Trades and Labour Councils grew up in the towns, linking up the small
local Unions of craftsmen; but distances were great and communications very difficult, and accordingly there was little tendency towards amalgamation or federation of Unions in the same trades over the country as a whole. Bargaining and strike action remained local; and the Trades and Labour Councils, conscious of existing in a mainly agricultural environment, acted rather as sectional pressure groups than as representatives of a united movement with any clear policy. Their chief demands were for land settlement, taxes on income, protection for industry, technical education, and the eight hours' day.

Then, during the 1880s, the New Zealand economy began to be transformed, largely as a result of refrigeration, which made it possible to export meat and dairy products to the whole world. Mutton replaced wool as the principal export; and then butter and cheese followed on an ever-increasing scale. Great estates remained, but many were broken up, either by law or by the operation of economic forces. The way was opened to the small farmer, and the prosperity of the whole country was rapidly advanced. As we shall see, the advances were not extended to the mass of the people without great struggles; but New Zealand ceased to be a country divided into gentlemen and labourers, with only a small intermediate class, and became a country of farmers, large and small, with a considerable industrial working class, especially in the mines and at the ports, and with a sharp division running through its working-class movement between a generation brought up to alliance with the Liberals against the aristocrats and a younger generation eager to try out the most militant strategies of Socialism and Industrial Unionism.

During the late 'eighties the organisation of the American Knights of Labor spread to New Zealand, as well as to Australia. J. J. Scanlon, of Waihi, who became a member of Parliament in the 1890s and was subsequently President of the Miners' Federation in the 1900s, belonged to it. The New Zealand Knights had a wide programme. Their aim was a great federation of the world's workers, open to all regardless of occupation, in order 'to secure for the workers the full enjoyment of the wealth they create'. They demanded nationalisation of land and of public utilities, public banking, Co-operative organisation of production, old age pensions,
equal pay for equal work, votes for women, and shorter hours of labour. They spread abroad the writings of Henry George and, later, of Edward Bellamy; and in New Zealand they attracted many Radicals who were opposed to the dominant oligarchy, including the Liberal leader, John Ballance. In the 'nineties they faded gradually away; but they had a good deal to do with giving the New Zealand Labour movement a start.

At this point, John Ballance (1839–93) is an exceedingly significant figure. Born in Ireland, the son of a small tenant farmer, he came to New Zealand as a youth, started a store, then ran a newspaper, and in 1875 entered politics as the champion of the 'little man'. By 1878 he carried a law for the taxation of land values; but the Government which enacted it was short-lived, and the Conservatives repealed it the following year. Coming back to office, he carried between 1884 and 1887 a number of measures for land settlement on small farms; and then as Prime Minister between 1891 and 1893 he went much further, initiating large schemes of land settlement, graduated land taxes with exemption for small owners and discrimination against absentee owners, and also with exemption for improvements, and alienation of crown lands on perpetual lease. The reforms carried through under his influence — some of them enacted only after his death — also included votes for women, abolition of plural voting, graduated income tax, and better treatment of the Maoris. His Minister of Labour, William Pember Reeves, carried through, partly under him and partly under his successor, Seddon, a series of labour laws for the protection of working conditions and a compulsory Arbitration Act which, designed to benefit the workers, came to be the main bone of contention between the right and left wings of the New Zealand Labour movement.

John Ballance was undoubtedly a most remarkable man. He was the architect of the Liberal-Labour alliance which dominated New Zealand politics in the 1890s and well into the new century. The first Labour M.P.s were returned to Parliament as his supporters, and he had the firm allegiance of most of the Trade Union leaders and of the Trades and Labour Councils. It was perhaps fortunate for him that he came to power at a moment when the New Zealand Trade Unions, in common with those of Australia, had just suffered a very serious defeat.
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The connections between New Zealand and the Australian colonies were at that time in some respects closer than they became after the constitution of the Commonwealth; and the great Maritime Strike of 1890 which began in Australia spread to New Zealand, where it developed into a similar struggle between Trade Unions attempting to regulate industrial conditions and employers asserting the 'freedom' to make individual contracts with whom they pleased.

In 1889, under the leadership of J. A. Miller (1869–1940), the seamen's secretary, who later became a Liberal Cabinet Minister, a number of Trade Unions had formed at Dunedin a Maritime Council which included railwaymen, miners, and other groups in addition to the seamen and port workers. This Council aimed at becoming a militant combination of all types of workers throughout New Zealand. It set out to enforce its will by bringing the united pressure of its affiliated groups to bear on any employer with whom any of them had a dispute. In pursuance of this policy it launched in 1890 a boycott of a firm of printers—Whitcombe and Tombs—who were employing compositors at less than the standard rates. The Council called on the railwaymen to refuse to handle 'tainted goods' consigned to or from this firm, and approached the Railway Commissioners to invoke their acquiescence. The Commissioners refused, and suspended a large number of men who acted under the Council's orders. The Council then called on the railwaymen to strike; but they, fearing Government action, refused, and the Council, which had been threatening a general strike, had to call it off and accept defeat.

This, however, by no means ended the matter. The great Maritime Struggle in Australia had already begun; and the chief New Zealand shipping company—the Union Steamship Company—belonged to the Australian Shipowners' Association, which was determined to crush the port workers' and seamen's Unions. The New Zealand Maritime Council was similarly linked to the Australian Maritime Trade Unions; the New Zealand employers made common cause with their fellows in Australia, opened recruiting offices for emergency labour throughout the country districts, and, with the support of the farmers, brought in large squads of blacklegs to work the ports. The Liberals tried to stop this recruiting, but with little success.
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The Railway Commissioners ordered the railwaymen to do work ordinarily done by men who were on strike; those so ordered struck, and were dismissed. The Government then intervened and tried to get the employers and the Railway Commissioners to meet the Trade Unions. The Commissioners refused to attend, and so did most of the employers' representatives, unless the Trade Unions would agree in advance to their right to employ non-union labour. The attempt at negotiations broke down; and the strike was overcome by the recruitment of blacklegs and by the continued refusal of the railwaymen to do more than refuse to replace workers on strike. The effect was to crush the power of the Trade Union movement, as it was being simultaneously crushed in Australia, and to turn the attention of the workers' leaders to an endeavour to regain by political action what they had lost in industrial conflict.

The political situation in New Zealand was, however, different from that in Australia because the Liberals, headed by John Ballance and Richard Seddon, had taken the workers' side to the extent of trying to stop the recruitment of blacklegs. Accordingly the Labour men who were put forward at the election of 1890 stood as supporters of Ballance and not as an independent party, as happened for the most part in Australia. This combination of Liberals and Labour men won a remarkable electoral victory, with six Labour representatives in the ranks of the majority. John Ballance ousted the Conservatives and in 1891 formed a Government in which he offered a position to William Pember Reeves as Minister of Education and Justice. The following year Reeves was transferred to the new Ministry of Labour, and in 1894 he piloted through Parliament the Compulsory Arbitration Act which at first rescued the Trade Unions from the rout that had befallen them in 1890 and, in effect, after bringing into existence a new kind of Trade Unionism, led to the renewed revolt of the left wing that began in 1906.

William Pember Reeves (1857–1932) was a New Zealander by birth. Trained as a lawyer, he took to journalism, and then entered politics. He became a Member of Parliament in 1887 and in 1890 published his first book, *Some Historical Articles on Communism and Socialism*, in which he surveyed the writings of the Socialist pioneers. His political career in New Zealand was
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brief. In 1896 he accepted the position of Agent-General for the colony in London, and he held this office until 1908. During this period he made himself the interpreter of New Zealand to the British public, publishing his general account of the country, *The Long White Cloud*, in 1898, and following this up with a study of the development of policies of State regulation in Oceania, under the title *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand*, published in 1902. He also connected himself with the Fabian Society, in which his wife, too, was active. Both of them wrote Fabian tracts. In 1908 he was called on by the Webbs to become Director of the London School of Economics, where he remained until 1919. Meanwhile, in 1917, he had become Chairman of the National Bank of New Zealand in London; and he held this office for the rest of his life, devoting his full time to it after 1919. Reeves was an ardent believer in a sort of ‘State Socialism’ which involved the public regulation of labour conditions, the abandonment of the strike weapon, and the nationalisation of key enterprises wherever this seemed necessary in order to secure their conduct in accordance with the public interest.

Reeves began his work in New Zealand under Ballance. When Ballance died in 1893 Richard John Seddon (1845–1906) succeeded him as Prime Minister and continued to hold that office right up to his death. Seddon was Lancashire-born; he had emigrated early to Victoria, and had come to New Zealand during the gold rush of 1866. Setting up as a storekeeper, he had become very active in local politics and had built up a big following among the gold-miners as well as among the farmers. From 1881 he sat in Parliament for the gold-mining constituency of Westland. In the House he became Ballance’s principal lieutenant, advocating much the same general programme, but with special stress on the provision of employment through public works to be carried out under collective contracts with Labour Co-operatives on the model of what had long been a practice in France and Italy. He was also a strong advocate of Old Age Pensions, of improved hospital and sanitary services, and of the development of local government, and a great believer in ‘closer settlement’ on the land and in bringing this about by public purchase of large estates and the breaking up and re-equipment of them for small farmers. After Ballance’s
death he continued the policy inaugurated in 1891, and gave full backing to Reeves's labour legislation. In certain respects he was a good deal less radical than Ballance — for example, he carried through the law giving votes to women with considerable misgivings — but he believed in giving his supporters what he thought they wanted, unless he felt sure it would do harm. He was highly skilled in discovering the mood of the electorate, and as long as he lived to guide the Liberal Party its ascendancy continued almost unchallenged. He had a great following among the leaders of the older Unions, who remembered the struggle of 1890; and he held the allegiance of most of them even when the younger men began to criticise strongly the working of the arbitration system on the ground that the wages awarded under it were failing to keep up with rising prices. In 1898, faced with a movement for the formation of an independent Labour or Socialist Party, he formed a Liberal and Labour Federation to maintain the alliance between the Liberal Party and the local Trades and Labour Councils.

Pember Reeves's Arbitration Act was definitely meant to help Trade Unionism — indeed, it had a sub-title definitely affirming that object. It was intended to be worked with the aid of a system of Conciliation Committees, chosen by the Trade Unions and the employers, with arbitration by a high court judge in reserve if they failed to agree. The conciliation plan, however, failed to work because the employers refused to nominate representatives: so that disputes were either settled by agreement, sometimes brought about by the friendly offices of the Labour Department, or referred to arbitration. Reeves had not meant the Arbitration Courts to work under rigid legal rules; but in fact they did, and a very intricate body of case law was built up by judges who were usually hostile to Trade Union claims. The system under which Unions, in order to make use of the Act, had to register under it encouraged, in view of the scattered and localised character of New Zealand industry, the growth of a host of very small, local craft Unions; and the officials of these Unions spent most of their time on Arbitration Court business, and, in effect, owed their livelihoods to it, because the procedure made it almost indispensable for each Trade Union to have a paid official as its advocate. Accordingly, the Trade Union officials had a strong vested

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interest in the arbitration system, which tended to grow continually more complicated. The officials of these local Arbitration Unions dominated the Trades and Labour Councils of the various centres and were for the most part strong supporters of the Liberal-Labour alliance. Under the Act there were penalties against strikers who stopped work in violation of an award, or against Unions which sanctioned strikes while they were registered under it. In practice, until about 1906 there were no strikes, though the arbitration system had been working less and less favourably. During the early years Reeves and his successors had tried to work closely with the Trades and Labour Councils, consulting their Annual Conferences regularly about proposals for labour legislation or for administrative innovations. But, as time went on, there was less and less consultation, particularly after the Councils, influenced by Labour’s political successes in Australia, set up the New Zealand Political Labour League in 1904, and the Liberal-Labour alliance began to break down.

Until 1901 the task of proceeding against employers for breach of arbitration awards was entrusted to the Trade Unions, which kept the fines or distributed them to their members. The Amending Act of 1901 transferred this duty to the factory inspectors, and thus took away from the Unions a source of income. This lessened the Unions’ favourable attitude to the Act; and they were also antagonised because the Court became less ready to incorporate in its awards the principle of ‘preference to Unionists’ — that is, the prior Trade Union right to fill vacancies when they could supply suitable workers — or hedged this preference, when it was allowed, with increasingly stringent conditions, and so made it easy for employers to evade. It was throughout a condition of ‘preference’ that the Unions receiving it should observe the principle of ‘open membership’ — that is, of allowing any qualified worker to join. But there were disputes about who were ‘qualified’ workers, as well as about what men were ‘suitable’ when the Union could not supply a ‘qualified’ man; and there were increasing difficulties over the refusal of Unionists to work with non-unionists. The employers were trying to prevent the ‘closed shop’; and on the whole the Arbitration Court was taking their side. The Trades and Labour Councils pressed for legislation to make the granting
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of ‘preference to Unionists’ compulsory instead of optional; and a Bill with this purpose was introduced by the Labour members in the Assembly in 1903. Seddon voted for it; but it was defeated. This had something to do with the decline in the popularity of Arbitration, which after 1901 undoubtedly failed to increase real wages or to help the growth of the Trade Unions. By 1906 D. McLaren (1872–1939) was attacking the Arbitration system, and was getting support at the Trades and Labour Councils’ Conference. But there was still no widespread desire to break away from it altogether, and most of the small Unions still gave it full support because their leaders knew their very existence depended on it. The Trades and Labour Councils did not commit themselves to support the Independent Political Labour League when it was set up in 1904, though such of their affiliated Unions as wished to were free to join it. The Councils, as such, held aloof, and many of their members continued to support the alliance with the Liberals.

Nevertheless, until about 1906 the Trade Unions nearly all accepted the Arbitration system; and dissatisfaction extended only to the wish to amend it and to get it worked more favourably. In 1908 it was amended, but not at all as they wished. A new Conciliation scheme was introduced, with Consultative Councils for each industry; and at the same time the penalties against strikes were made much more severe as a response to the considerable outburst of strikes in 1907 and 1908.

Thus Ballance and Seddon between them were mainly responsible for the fact that in New Zealand the working-class movement, when it was driven into politics, remained attached to the Liberals instead of setting up an independent party. The move for independence came in the first instance not from the New Zealand Trade Unions but from immigrants from Australia and Great Britain, and from some New Zealanders who came home after working in the United States.

These groups, or some of them, founded a Socialist Party at Wellington in 1900, and similar bodies sprang up in other towns. There was a considerable importation of Socialist books and pamphlets from Great Britain and the United States. The Socialists had no great electoral strength: their immediate concern was with propaganda rather than with electioneering.
They did, however, run F. E. Cooke (1866-1930) without success as a Socialist candidate in 1905. Their propaganda was considerably helped by Seddon's strongly imperialist attitude during the South African War; and hostility to imperialism took a high place among their slogans. Seddon's imperialism may also have had something to do with the vote at the 1904 Trades and Labour Councils' Conference in favour of setting up an Independent Political Labour League. The main movers in this were the Australian-born Otago journalist, J. T. Paul (1874-?), who had come to New Zealand in 1899, and provided in his regular articles in the *Otago Daily Times* the best running commentary on labour events, and with him D. McLaren, a Glasgow-born boot operative, who became Mayor of Wellington in 1908 and was elected to the House of Representatives the same year. The Socialists stood aloof from the League, which petered out within a few years, in 1909, after putting 11 candidates in the field in 1908, with only a single success. The Socialists had 5 candidates, who all did badly, whereas 7 out of 11 Lib-Labs were elected. In 1904 the Liberals had altered the election law to provide for the second ballot, in the expectation of getting Labour votes when the Labour or Socialist candidate failed at the first ballot — an innovation which was reversed by the Conservatives in 1913. For the time being it worked, and the Liberal-Labour alliance remained in existence despite the constitution of the Labour League.

The real challenge to this alliance came when P. H. Hickey (d. 1926), who had been away in the United States and had been active both in the American Socialist Party and in the Western Federation of Miners, returned to New Zealand in 1906 — the year of Seddon's death — joined the New Zealand Socialist Party, and set to work to organise a militant Industrial Unionist movement modelled mainly on the W.F.M. Hickey at once became the centre of a group, mainly composed of miners, who made it their chief concern to oppose the Arbitration Act. The Act, they declared, far from furthering the workers' interests, was being used to hold wages down and to tie the workers to unfavourable contracts in face of high and rising prices and profits. The struggle took shape in 1907 at Petone, where the slaughtermen struck in defiance of the Act.

1 See p. 791.
and won an advance of 15 per cent. Other strikes followed, with similar success; and in 1908 came the Blackball miners’ strike, in which the original issue was whether the lunch-time break should be lengthened from 15 minutes to half an hour. The Arbitration Court fined the miners for striking against the award fixing the shorter period and, when they refused to pay their fines, distrained on their goods. The miners met this challenge by organising the bidding at the sale of the seized goods and buying them for a few shillings in all. Other mining areas then rallied round the Blackball men, and in August Hickey and his friends formed the New Zealand Federation of Miners, with P. C. Webb (1886–1950), as President, H. Timothy Armstrong (1875–1942) of Waihi as Vice-President, and Robert Semple (1878–1955), an Australian from New South Wales, as organiser in chief.

These men, and a number of others connected with the new left-wing movement, were destined to play a leading part, not only in the struggles of the next few years, but in the subsequent history of the Labour Party in New Zealand. P. C. Webb, who became President of the New Zealand Federation of Labour on its formation in 1910, was elected to the House of Representatives in 1914. During the war he played a leading part in the anti-war movement, and was imprisoned. After the war he resumed his position in the party, and became Minister of Mines in the Labour Cabinet of 1935. Armstrong, too, became a prominent member of the House; and Robert Semple also went on to become a member of the 1935 Cabinet.

The New Zealand Miners’ Federation based its organisation and methods largely on the American Western Federation of Miners, the chief begetter of the I.W.W. It insisted on a strong centralisation of control in the hands of its Executive, and tried to avoid the dissipation of its energies in local strikes in order to conserve its resources for struggles of key importance, in which it called on the workers to act on the principle that ‘an injury to one is an injury to all’, and did not hesitate to make the fullest use it could of the sympathetic strike. The aims of its leaders were by no means limited to a single industry; and Hickey and his friends, as soon as they had got the miners organised, proceeded to convert the Miners’ Federation into the New Zealand Federation of Labour, which they appealed
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to all Unions to join. By the beginning of 1910 the new body was in action, with the I.W.W. Preamble as its declaration of principle, and with the socialisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange laid down as one of its fundamental objects. The Federation of Labour proclaimed that the proper basis of organisation was industrial as against craft Unionism and appealed to all Unions to cancel their registrations under the Arbitration Act and to adopt a militant policy of class solidarity. Its attitude towards political action was ambiguous. Hickey and Semple had been busily organising branches of the Socialist Party wherever they could, side by side with Miners' Unions and other Unions they were bringing into their Federation of Labour; and the political programme adopted by the Federation at its 1910 Conference was practically identical with that of the Socialist Party. But the Federation included Industrial Unionists who were hostile to all parliamentary action; and the Conference decided to defer its decision on the question whether it should itself engage in such activities. Hickey and his friends were followers of Daniel De Leon rather than of the Chicago I.W.W. They favoured political action, provided that it was revolutionary rather than reformist in aim; but they assigned much greater importance to militant industrial action.

While Hickey and Webb and Semple were building up the Federation of Labour and the Socialist Party, the moderates had also been attempting to reorganise. In 1907 the Trades and Labour Councils' Conference decided to set up a loosely organised Federation of Labour, with very limited powers, to act as a co-ordinating agency between its annual meetings; and a Dominion Executive was elected to act on its behalf, but achieved very little. In 1909, in face of the practical disappearance of the Political Labour League, the Conference also voted in favour of a fresh attempt to set up a Labour Party; and McLaren, on its behalf, went on a tour of the country to build up support both for the new Federation and for the projected party. In 1910 the Trades and Labour Councils' Federation was definitely constituted, almost at the same moment as Hickey's rival Federation; and it too declared in favour of 'public ownership' of the means of production, deliberately preferring the words 'public ownership' to the word 'socialisation',

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and making clear that what it had in mind was a gradual extension of public ownership, especially of monopolies, and of public control, and not a revolutionary seizure of power. It also set up a Labour Party to act in close alliance with it, and to work 'by purely political means' as opposed to the 'direct action' favoured by Hickey's Federation. At the elections of 1911 this party put up 20 candidates, of whom only 3 were elected, plus one unofficial Labour man. The Socialist Party had 8 candidates, who were all beaten; and there were a number of other unofficial candidates who were defeated. The Federation of Labour itself put up Webb and Hickey; and the future Prime Minister, M. J. Savage, stood as a Socialist. At this point, in 1911, the Trades and Labour Councils' Federation and the Labour Party engaged the services as propagandist of the American Socialist, W. T. Mills of Wisconsin, a follower of Victor Berger, who had written in the United States an enormous textbook of Labour organisation, called The Struggle for Existence, which he now proceeded to hawk round New Zealand. In June 1911 Mills started what was called his 'Unity Campaign'. He had drawn up a grandiose plan of organisation, by which he proposed to merge all Trade Unions and Labour political organisations into a single body, divided industrially into a number of departments and politically into a number of regional agencies, with special provision for the representation of the professional classes and the small employers and farmers. This plan was at once vehemently attacked by the partisans of Hickey's Federation, and was also laughed at by some of the leading figures in the Labour Party and the Trades and Labour Councils. But Mills was persuasive as well as energetic, and he managed to secure a large body of support.

At this point a new figure of importance came upon the scene. This was Peter Fraser (1884–1950), an emigrant from Scotland, who had been in the I.L.P. before coming to New Zealand in 1910. Settling at Auckland, he became a waterside worker, and was soon elected as Secretary of the Auckland General Labourers' Union. In 1911 this Union organised a strike against the form of contract work in force at the docks, and won a rapid victory. It then joined Hickey's Federation. Immediately afterwards the Auckland tramwaymen came out
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with a demand for higher wages, and won a further victory after Hickey had pledged the support of the Federation of Labour. Fraser thereafter played an active part in the Federation's affairs. In 1913 he became Secretary of the newly established Social Democratic Party. In 1918 he was elected to the Legislative Assembly, and he went on to become, in due course, leader of the New Zealand Labour Party and Prime Minister.

By 1911 the Hickey Federation had become possessed of its own newspaper, *The Maoriland Worker*, originally started by M. Laracy's Shearers' Union, and had fetched the well-known Australian left-wing journalist, Robert S. Ross, to edit it. The following year the Federation encountered its first serious setback. The Auckland dispute broke out again on a demand for higher wages, the Union having cancelled its registration under the Arbitration Act. The employers met the strike by procuring the registration of a new, rival Union under the Act, and getting the Arbitration Court to make an award on its application, thus rendering the strike illegal. The Federation threatened sympathetic strike action, even to the extent of a general strike; but the other Unions would not come out, and it had to accept defeat. This was the first occasion on which use was made of this device to defeat the Anti-Arbitrationists: it was soon to be used in other cases, and played a great part in destroying the militant movement. As against the defeat at Auckland, the Federation won a victory in the Wellington tramway strike, in which it was supported by the Trades and Labour Council.

By 1912 Mills's propaganda campaign had prepared the way for the proposed Unity Conference, under the joint auspices of the Trades and Labour Councils' Federation and the Labour Party. Despite the strong hostility of the Federation of Labour, this Conference was widely attended, and Mills persuaded it to endorse his plan and to merge the two bodies into an United Labour Party with both industrial and political functions. The U.L.P. adopted the Labour Party's gradualist Socialist programme, with special emphasis on the public control of utilities, and decided to set up the proposed Industrial Departments, leaving political action mainly in the hands of the Trades and Labour Councils. Paul was chosen as
President and Mills as organiser; and McLaren and Tregear were on the Executive. Immediately afterwards the Federation of Labour held its rival Conference and reorganised itself in a number of Industrial Departments on I.W.W. lines. It called on all its affiliated Unions to cancel their registrations under the Arbitration Act, rejected an appeal for unity from Paul, who came on behalf of the U.L.P. to plead for amalgamation, and endorsed the resolution for a general strike against war put forward by Hardie and Vaillant at the Copenhagen Socialist International Congress of 1910. The question of its attitude to political action was again raised on an appeal from the Socialist Party for help; and the Federation resolved to keep out of politics itself, but to leave its local organisations free to do as they pleased. H. E. Holland (1868–1933) was brought from Australia to succeed Ross as editor of *The Maoriland Worker*; and the ‘Red’ Federation, as it was widely called, thus contributed yet another notable figure to the New Zealand Labour movement. Holland had been a printer in Sydney, and had begun his public activities in the Salvation Army, before going over to the left wing of the Socialist movement. Imprisoned several times for his utterances, he became a considerable journalist, and also a poet. In New Zealand, after the collapse of the ‘Red’ Federation, he became the leader of the Labour Party during its long period of opposition, dying two years too soon to share in its victory of 1935.

Under the Arbitration Act any Trade Union having 15 or more members could apply to be registered by the Arbitration Court and could then bring its claims before the Court, which had power to make an award binding not only on the members of the Union and their employers but on all workers and employers in the trade and area concerned. This meant that, if a Trade Union followed the N.Z.F. of L.’s advice and refused to register, or cancelled its registration, even a small group of dissentients could form a rival Union and apply to be registered in its stead. The Court did not have to accept such applications, but it had full authority to do so; and, beginning in 1912, it again and again met the N.Z.F. of L.’s campaign against it by this method. The employers, determined to crush the new militant movement as they had done in 1890, drew closer together and formed a common Defence Fund for fighting the
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‘Red’ Federation. In 1912 the struggle came to a head in the well-known strike and lock-out at the Waihi gold mines. The Waihi Miners’ Union was one of those which had cancelled their registration and joined the N.Z.F. of L. Its President, W. E. Parry (1878–1952), was active in the ‘Red’ Federation. He was subsequently M.P. for Auckland and became Minister of Internal Affairs in 1935. In 1911 the Waihi Union had won, under the Federation’s auspices, a substantial victory; but the following year the employers succeeded in organising a ‘scab’ Union of enginemen, which obtained registration under the Act. The miners then refused to work with members of this Union, and the employers, breaking the agreement made the previous year, then locked them out and announced that they would have no dealings with any Union that did not accept the arbitration system. They then proceeded to organise a second ‘scab’ Union of actual miners, and, with the help of the Employers’ Federation, began a mass-importation of blackleg labour, and also secured the aid of a special armed police force, including mounted police, to protect the blacklegs’ right to work. Violent scenes followed, in the course of which much property belonging to the miners was destroyed, the Miners’ Hall was captured and looted, many were injured, and one striker was killed by the police. Hundreds of arrests of leaders and strikers were made; and severe sentences were passed on men whose only offence was that they were organising strike action. Finally, in a pitched battle, police and blacklegs drove the strikers out of the town. The strike collapsed.

At an earlier stage in the Waihi dispute, proposals had been put forward for calling a general strike in its support. But the N.Z.F. of L. had rejected this proposal, well aware that the Unions would mostly refuse to come out, and deeming it better to keep the other trades at work and to collect money from them for maintaining the men on strike. Large sums were raised, in both New Zealand and Australia; but the Government procured a Court ruling that Unions registered under the Arbitration Act could not lawfully give money to support strikes, and this checked the flow of contributions.

The strong measures taken by the Government against the Waihi strikers were largely due to the fall of the Liberal Ministry and the return to power of the Conservatives, who called
themselves the Reform Party. The new Government threw itself energetically into the job of breaking, not only the Waihi miners' resistance, but the power of the 'Red' Federation, which the politicians roundly denounced as the apostle of Anarchism and revolution. So, no doubt, it was, in theory; but in practice its methods were not violent until it was provoked. At Waihi there was no disorder until additional forces were drafted in and an anti-Union Citizens' Defence Corps instituted; and thereafter the violence appears to have been much more on the side of the police and the blacklegs than of the strikers. But the newspapers did not print the strikers' case: most of them fulminated against the 'Reds', and public opinion was largely influenced to accept the official version of the affair.

Nor was the Labour movement united in support of the strikers. Many Trade Unions outside the N.Z.F. of L. contributed to the support of the Waihi men; but the United Labour Party and most of the Trades and Labour Councils opposed the movement and tried to dissuade the Unions from supporting it. When it was over, however, there was a big revulsion of feeling in favour of the Waihi men and against the action of the Government and the police, and, above all, against the use that had been made of the Arbitration Act to defeat the strike. It was widely realised that the power of the Court to admit to registration what were, in effect, blackleg Unions, and to make on their application awards binding on whole trades, exposed the Unions to grave dangers, especially with a Conservative Government strongly hostile to Labour in office. Consequently when, in January 1913, the defeated N.Z.F. of L. summoned a Unity Conference and sent out invitations to all types of Unions to attend, there was a good response. The United Labour Party itself accepted an invitation to participate; and that opened the door to participation by the Socialist Party as well. Some of the 'Arbitration' Unions and some Trades and Labour Councils stood aloof; and on the extreme left the small New Zealand section of the Chicago Industrial Workers of the World refused to come in, on the ground of its outright opposition to parliamentary action.

The January Conference resulted in an astonishing immediate victory for the left wing. It agreed to form a United
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Federation of Labour including all the factions; and the N.Z.F. of L. succeeded in inducing it to adopt as its provisional basis the militant Preamble borrowed from the I.W.W.

The Conference passed a resolution demanding that the Arbitration Act should be amended so as to prevent the registration of ‘minority’ Unions where the main Unions had ceased to be registered. It also decided that there should be two bodies instead of the one set up under the Mills scheme — one for political and one for industrial affairs; and it dropped Mills’s proposals for special representation of the professional and small farmer and employer classes. It decided to leave each Union to decide for itself whether or not to register under the Arbitration Act; and it modified the centralised control of strike policy on which the ‘Red’ Federation had insisted in favour of a system giving greater autonomy to the individual Unions, as long as they did not call upon the Federation for help. The unity which found expression at this Conference, after all the abuse that the rival factions had been showering on each other, was due mainly to resentment at the Government’s behaviour and to the sense that unity was essential to the very survival of the movement; but it was also greatly aided by a volte-face on the part of Mills, who, attending as a delegate from the U.L.P., gave his support to the Federation of Labour’s scheme. Side by side with the new United Federation, the Unity Conference decided to set up a Social Democratic Party, into which the Socialist Party as well as the Labour Party was to be merged, with the socialisation of the means of production, distribution, and exchange as its object.

The January Unity Congress could only recommend. Its decisions had to be accepted by the bodies affected before its new plan could come into force. At a further Conference in July 1913 the essentials of the January plan were endorsed; but after a keen debate the I.W.W. Preamble was struck out by 175 votes to 161. Instead, the Conference committed itself to ‘organisation on an Industrial Union basis in order to assist the overthrow of the capitalist system and thus bring about a Co-operative Commonwealth based on industrial democracy’ — which was remarkably militant in view of the past attitude of many of the bodies represented. The Conference further recommended all Trade Unions to support the new Social
Democratic Party, and elected Semple as organiser and Hickey as Secretary-Treasurer of the new Federation of Labour. W. T. Young, of the Seamen's Federation, was chosen as President.

For the Social Democratic Party, the veteran Edward Tregear (1846–1931), former Secretary of the Labour Department, was elected as President. Tregear had been Pember Reeves's right-hand man in establishing the system of Arbitration, and had long been its upholder, always seeking to use it as a means of strengthening the Trade Unions, and provoking strong protests from the employers at his partisan administration of the Department. He had now retired from the Civil Service, and had become more and more critical of the way in which the Arbitration Act was being perverted from its original purpose of encouraging Trade Unions into a weapon against strikes and wage demands; and in retirement he had come to play an outspoken part as a Socialist. Widely respected by both wings of the movement, he was an ideal choice for the presidency of the new party. With him, as party secretary, was Peter Fraser; and Mills was chosen as organiser.

There were, however, many on the right wing of the Labour movement who strongly disliked the decisions of the Unity Conference. The United Labour Party, formed the preceding year, refused to disband or merge with the Social Democratic Party, and under Paul's leadership decided to maintain its separate existence. McLaren also refused to come in, and soon dropped right out of the Labour movement.

The Social Democratic Party had been assigned by the Unity Conference, among other objects, the task of promoting a Right to Work Bill, a maximum working day of six hours, and the establishment of a democratically organised Citizen Army, paid at standard rates of wages and not in any circumstances to be used for dealing with industrial disputes.

It is not surprising that the right wing of the United Labour Party refused to accept the Conference verdict and decided to remain in being. The Railway Servants' Union also withdrew; but most of the Trade Unions accepted the new constitution, which had been so drawn as not to exclude Unions which continued to work under the Arbitration Act.

Almost at once serious trouble broke out. The shipwrights
at Wellington struck against a new form of wage-payment which they held would reduce earnings, and the waterside workers held a meeting in working time to consider whether to support them. The shipowners thereupon cancelled their agreement with the waterside workers and locked out those who had attended the meeting. The rest then struck; and the shipowners brought in blacklegs and barricaded the port. The Trade Unionists stormed the barricades and drove out the black-legs. The new Federation, anxious to prevent a spread of the trouble, tried to reach a settlement; but the employers demanded that the Waterside Union should deposit £1000 as a security against further breaches of agreement. The Government again intervened forcibly on the employers’ side. It enrolled a large force of special constables, brought in more blacklegs from the countryside, and instructed the Chief of Police to make sure that their right to work was secured. The Waterside Workers then rejected the employers’ terms and handed over the conduct of the dispute to the new United Federation of Labour. The Federation approached the Government and asked for a meeting of all parties; but at the meeting the employers not only demanded guarantees against future strikes, but also refused to deal with any Union not registered under the Arbitration Act. While the meeting was proceeding, the Government took further steps to mobilise forces against the strikers.

At this point the dispute began to spread. There were sympathetic strikes at the other ports and among the miners. Hundreds of farmers, enrolled as special constables, were brought into the affected areas and came into serious conflict with the town populations. There were barricades in the streets of Wellington; for the most part the fight was carried on with stones and batons, but there was some shooting with revolvers. Naval vessels were brought to the ports to overawe the strikers, and a field-gun was installed on the wharf at Wellington. The special constables increased to thousands, and sailors with fixed bayonets were landed and marched through the working-class areas. Police and special constables occupied the waterfront at Auckland, and the workers responded with a general strike which paralysed the city, even the Arbitrationist Unions joining in. The Federation called sympathetic general strikes
at Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin. The United Labour Party issued a manifesto opposing the general strike. Before long the strike began to crumble. Many blackleg Unions were formed and registered; and the Supreme Court issued its decision that registered Unions could not contribute to the strike funds of unregistered Unions. A drift back to work set in, and many employers refused to take back men who were not members of registered Unions. These Unions blacklisted many active Trade Unionists, thus depriving them of work even after the Federation, admitting defeat, had called the strike off. The Government rapidly enacted a new law against picketing, and also a Labour Disputes Investigation Act, making sudden strikes illegal. The United Federation of Labour was utterly defeated; and the Social Democratic Party was dragged down by its fall, though both bodies continued to exist.

That was the situation in 1914. The left had won a victory over the right wing at the Conferences of 1913, only to be completely defeated before the year was out. Confronting them were a very hostile Government, a militant employers’ federation, and a powerful and triumphant Citizens’ Defence Organisation strongly supported by the farmers as well as by the employers. Most of the established Trade Unions had lost their bargaining rights, which had been largely transferred to new ‘Unions’ formed with the employers’ help and upheld by the Arbitration Court.

At the General Election of 1914 the Social Democrats and the United Labour Party both entered the lists, in some cases with rival candidates for the same seat. Each had only 2 successes, out of 9 and 8 contests respectively; 1 Independent Labour candidate was also elected.

Then came the war, and with it a rapid revival on the political side. In 1916 the Social Democratic Party, the United Labour Party, and a number of local Labour Representation Committees joined forces to form the New Zealand Labour Party, and the leadership of the party, which was soon to become a great power in the land, was drawn mainly from the old left wing. The socialisation objective was retained. But by 1918 the party was declaring that its immediate platform was not Socialism, but ‘in the line of advance towards Socialism’, and that ‘the Labour Party is experimental rather than doctrinaire’.

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The old militants, or many of them, had given up revolutionism in favour of the quest for the Welfare State, with Socialism as only a long-run objective. The Trade Union movement continued longer without effective leadership or organisation. In 1915 the miners seceded from what was left of the Federation of Labour, and joined the Australian Miners' Federation as an affiliated Union. Many of the old industrial leaders were opposed to the war, and set themselves to fight against conscription and the pro-war section of the Labour movement; and dissensions on the war issue delayed the regrowth of Trade Union organisation. Gradually, however, full employment restored the Unions' strength, and in 1919 a new alliance of Labour was formed to take the Federation's place.

Why was it that in 1890, in 1907–8, and yet again in 1913, when it came to a show-down, the New Zealand militants went down to defeat? The immediate reason is clear: the employers, in fighting them, could rely on the support of the main body of the farmers, who by providing blacklegs and a sufficient force of special constables could, with the aid of the police, in the final resort break any big strike. In addition, the terms of the Arbitration Act, though meant originally to help the workers after their defeat of 1890, could be, and were, turned heavily against them by the Court's use of its power to register blackleg Unions. The legal prohibition of strikes did not of itself matter greatly. The fines that could be inflicted on strikers were usually small, and as striking had been ruled not to be a 'continuing offence', when they had been paid it was quite lawful to remain on strike. What did matter was the power of the Court, on the motion of blackleg Unions, to make awards binding upon whole trades and thus to intimidate the less intransigent workers into obedience. The use made of this power converted some staunch upholders of the arbitration system into active opponents—for example, Edward Tregear. The basic factor in the situation was that New Zealand was a farmers' country, in which industry played only a secondary rôle, and that it was becoming more and more a country of small farmers, to whom it was of vital importance that the ports should be kept at work to carry away their produce to the markets of the world. Earlier, New Zealand had been a land dominated by great graziers and absentee owners; and it had
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been possible to rally the small men against them, as Ballance and Seddon had done in the Liberal-Labour alliance of the 1890s. But when Ballance and Seddon had done their work the farmers they had helped to prosperity changed sides and became strong opponents of the Labour left wing.

The Left, for its part, helped to wreck itself by its own extremism — which was partly attributable to the youthfulness of its leaders. In its zeal against the arbitration system it was led into courses which disunited the workers, though their only hope lay in unity. Having its strongholds among the miners and waterfront workers, it did little to conciliate other groups of workers, less well organised, less amenable to influences from the outer world, and less dissatisfied with the working of arbitration. It was paid out in its own coin, by employers who were also adept at the militant game, and could usually rely, except during the Ballance-Seddon period, on the Government to support them, above all after the Conservatives had come back to office in 1912.

The Liberal-Labour alliance, as long as Seddon remained alive, continued to command the support of a considerable section of the Trade Unions, though it was losing ground from the time of the Boer War — that is, from the moment of Seddon’s appearance as an active supporter of imperialism. The movement to form an Independent Labour Party had been growing for some years before he died; but there were acute disagreements about the form the new party should take. H. E. Holland, the outstanding leader of the Socialist Party, was far on the left, and worked hand in hand with Hickey and the New Zealand Federation of Labour. After 1918 he was to emerge as the outstanding figure in the new Labour Party, with most of the leaders of the pre-war Left beside him and standing for a policy, not indeed moderate, but definitely parliamentary and not industrialist. The irreconcilable industrialists passed over for the most part into the Communist Party. The rest had learnt the lesson that industrial Labour could not, in New Zealand, hope to carry the day unless it made itself the champion of a considerable part of the farming population as well.
CHAPTER XXV

SOUTH AFRICA

In South Africa a Labour movement can hardly be said to have existed before the beginning of the twentieth century. Then came a rapid growth, chiefly among the miners of the Witwatersrand, culminating in the extensive disturbances of 1913 and 1914, which were quelled by the high-handed action of the South African Government, with General Smuts as the chief strike-breaker. In its early stages the movement was almost entirely in the hands of skilled workmen who had come to South Africa from the United Kingdom. It began with the formation of branches of British Trade Unions, such as the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, followed by the establishment of South African Unions of engine-drivers and compositors. Until the end of the nineteenth century the skilled white labour force in South Africa was composed mainly of immigrants, chiefly from Great Britain, with contingents from Ireland, Germany, Italy, Russia, and other European countries. There were also in the mines a number who had worked previously in the United States; and a few branches of the Knights of Labor were set up in the 1880s, but failed to take root. Afrikaners were not numerous in industrial work until after 1900, when their advent in the mining industry greatly affected the character of the Trade Union movement by bringing into it a strong element of nationalist and racial feeling.

Socialism, on a small scale, developed during the 1890s, in the same way as Trade Unionism, mainly through the foundation of branches of the British Socialist societies. The Social Democratic Federation established branches at Cape Town and Durban, while the Independent Labour Party established an organisation in the Transvaal, with headquarters in Johannesburg. The Fabian Society also had a small following, chiefly at Grahamstown; and in Johannesburg there arose German, Italian, and Russian Socialist groups. As early as 1904 the
South African Socialists sent a delegate, Edward B. Rose, to the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam; and at Stuttgart in 1907 Mark Lucas represented a newly formed South African Socialist Federation with its centre at Johannesburg. At that time the Cape Town Socialists were issuing a journal, *The Cape Socialist*, in English, with a supplement in Afrikaans; and three Social Democrats had recently been elected to the Natal Assembly. There were also a few Labour men in other Assemblies, in the Transvaal and at the Cape, but they had not yet formed themselves into an organised party.

The South African Labour Party was actually formed in 1907 or 1908, largely as the outcome of a strike among the Rand miners. Its leading promoter was the engineer, W. H. Andrews, who was to play the outstanding part during the ensuing years as the exponent of left-wing ideas and was to attempt to bring white, Indian, and native workers into a common movement. Andrews’s principal co-workers at the outset were H. W. Sampson of the South African Typographical Association and Peter Whiteside of the Engine-Divers’ and Firemen’s Trade Union. Almost at once they gained an important recruit in Colonel F. H. P. Cresswell (1866–1948), who had quarrelled with the Chamber of Mines and became the champion of the claims of the white miners against the companies’ attempts to employ a higher proportion of native and Indian workers. The wages paid to the white workers were many times larger than those of the non-whites, who were wholly without protective organisation and were not admitted to the white Unions. The mining companies maintained that the mines — especially the gold-mines — could not be worked economically unless they were allowed to reduce the number of white workers, and their attempts to do this, coinciding with the entry of large numbers of Afrikaners into the industry, were the main cause of the great upheaval of 1913 and 1914.

Cresswell was chosen as leader of the newly founded Labour Party, which in 1910 won 4 seats in the Union Parliament and the following year elected 13 members out of a total of 30 to the Johannesburg Municipal Council. The party had at this time an affiliated Trade Union membership of about 75,000.

The strike of 1907, which led directly to the establishment of the Labour Party, was an aftermath of the discontinuance of
the employment of Chinese labour. Having been compelled to repatriate the Chinese, the mining companies were in search of an alternative source of cheap labour, partly among Afrikaners and partly among natives. The Afrikaners, equally with the natives, lacked any Trade Union organisation, and many of them were prepared to accept work at considerably lower rates than the British workers. The companies demanded a reduction of 15 per cent on the wage-rates in force for white employees and, when the British-controlled Unions refused, brought in Afrikaner blacklegs to replace them. The struggle, which was bitter, ended in the defeat of the Unions, which thereupon set to work to organise the Afrikaners in order to present a common front. Meanwhile, the mining companies were negotiating with the Portuguese Government for the right to import native labourers from Mozambique, and in 1909 the signing of the Mozambique Convention put at their disposal a large additional supply of native workers, and enabled them to push further their campaign for reducing the ratio of whites to natives.

No important further development occurred until 1913, when a strike at the Kleinfontein mine against the introduction of a longer Saturday shift spread spontaneously until the entire Rand mining industry was brought to a stop. The Trade Unions had so far been drawn along by the course of events rather than controlled them; but at this point the Transvaal Federation of Trades began to consider the possibility of a general strike in support of the miners. It was decided in the first place to organise a mass demonstration in Johannesburg; but General Smuts, on the pretext that the strike had caused serious disorders, banned the demonstration and called upon the Governor-General to lend him the services of the British army to put the miners down. The prohibition came too late to prevent the workers from assembling; and on July 4th, 1913, there was a massacre. The soldiers fired on the demonstrators, and 21 persons, largely quite unconnected with the strike, were killed and 83 wounded. The Government's handling of the situation caused a wave of indignation throughout South Africa. The strike was settled on terms favourable to the miners; but the companies refused to honour the terms, and procured public money to compensate the blacklegs whom they were compelled to dismiss. Moreover, they refused to re-employ
many of the strike leaders, and almost at once resumed their attempt to undercut the established wages by bringing in Afrikaners at lower rates.

Almost immediately further troubles broke out. The railways reduced their employment of white workers; and in January 1914 the Natal coal-miners came out on strike, partly with demands for improved conditions, but also in protest against the victimisation of some of their leaders. The railway workers followed suit, when the Government refused to meet them to discuss their grievances; and the railway strike spread rapidly over the whole country. The Government, with General Smuts in command, met the strike by the most outrageous counter-measures. On this occasion Smuts did not invoke the aid of British soldiers: he had equipped himself with a citizen force of armed defence guards and strike-breakers, recruited mainly from the Boer farmers. These he mobilised to aid the police forces, and, within a few days of the outbreak of the railway strike, declared martial law. The entire committee of the Railwaymen's Union was arrested, and then the entire Council of the Transvaal Federation of Trades. Almost every well-known Labour leader, including Colonel Cresswell, the leader of the Labour Party, was put in gaol. Meetings were suppressed with much violence; and a reign of terror was set on foot in the disturbed areas. Even this was not the limit to Smuts's furious activity. He took nine of the arrested leaders out of gaol, rushed them to Durban by night, and deported them under guard to England on board a vessel called the Umgeni. There was no legal basis at all for this action: nor did Smuts even pretend to be acting within the law. He procured an indemnity subsequently from the South African Parliament by special enactment.

The immediate sequel to Smuts's behaviour in 1913 and 1914 was that the Labour Party won a clear majority, which it held until 1917, on the Transvaal Provincial Council. But Smuts had succeeded for the time being in smashing the left-wing Trade Union movement. The outbreak of war later in the year led to a split. The great majority of the Labour Party, still mainly British, supported the war; but a group headed by W. H. Andrews and S. P. Bunting broke away and presently formed an International Socialist League in opposition to the
pro-war majority. Archie Crawford, an engineer who had been the outstanding figure among the deportees, changed his views and returned to South Africa as Secretary of the new central Trade Union organisation, the South African Industrial Federation, which took up a moderate position. The war-time demand for labour and the rising price-level created conditions under which wages advanced rapidly after 1914, and the employers were glad to recognise and bargain with Trade Unions for the sake of industrial peace. Only after 1918 was there a recurrence of industrial troubles, first at Johannesburg and Durban in 1919 and then on the Rand in the great struggle of the following years. In 1922 Smuts once more tried to break the general strike movement by violent measures, and there was civil war on the Rand, with many killed and wounded on both sides. Fordsburg, the chief working-class suburb of Johannesburg, was bombarded by artillery; and besides those killed in the fighting, a number of working-class leaders were executed, and many more imprisoned. It took an army of 60,000, with guns, tanks, and aeroplanes, to drive the workers back to work. All this, however, belongs to a period subsequent to that which the present volume is intended to cover. It is mentioned only because the troubles of 1919–22 were a direct sequel to those of 1913 and 1914.

The events of these pre-war years considerably altered the character of the South African Labour movement. Up to 1914 practically no attempt had been made to organise the native workers, and the rapidly increasing body of Afrikaners had been very little touched by Trade Unionism. During the war, however, the hitherto mainly European Unions of white workers set to work effectively to organise their fellow-whites, both industrially and politically, and the Trade Union movement gradually lost its predominantly British character and came to be a combined movement of white workers, aiming at the maintenance of white standards and conditions and at preventing the employers from reducing the proportion of white to native workers. Among the natives organisation began, apart from the whites, with the foundation of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in 1919, and with strikes of dock workers and native miners the following year. There was, however, no common action between whites and natives:
indeed, the white Unions became more reactionary as the Afrikaners played a larger part in them, and the Labour Party in the 1920s lost ground to the Nationalists and failed to hold the considerable political gains it had made before and during the war. Meanwhile, Socialism almost disappeared. The group round W. H. Andrews, which had formed the International Socialist League, went over in 1920 to the Communist Party: the South African Industrial Federation broke up in the troubles of 1922; and the entire movement fell into a decline.
CHAPTER XXVI

CHINA: SUN YAT SEN

To-day, in any general survey of Socialism as a world force, Chinese Socialism would occupy a very important position. But during the period dealt with in the present volume it can hardly be said to have existed at all. China had no organised Socialist movement until after 1914, and took no part in the affairs of the Second International. The Chinese Revolution of 1911-12 was not in any sense a Socialist revolution: indeed, it occurred at a time when Socialism, regarded as an essentially Western doctrine, had hardly begun to be restated in terms applicable to China or to any part of Asia except Japan. The leading personality of the Left, Sun Yat Sen, has sometimes been described as a Socialist, and had undoubtedly been influenced by Socialist ideas — and even more by those of Henry George, — but even in his latter years he was much more a nationalist and anti-imperialist revolutionary Radical than a Socialist in any ordinary meaning of the term. It is nevertheless in his writings that such socialistic ideas as existed in China before 1917 are mainly to be found.

Sun Yat Sen (1866-1925) was the son of a Kwantung peasant. He rebelled in childhood against the traditional observances of his environment, and was sent to join his elder brother, who had settled in Hawaii and had become a prosperous farmer and storekeeper. There he was sent to a Christian school and was converted to Christianity, much to the scandal of his family. Sent back to China, he again outraged the village conventions and was allowed to go to school at Canton and Hong Kong. He fell in with British and American missionaries, was trained as a surgeon, and practised surgery for a time at a hospital in Macao, till he was excluded under Portuguese law, which restricted medical practice to Portuguese citizens. Thereafter he devoted his life to revolutionary propaganda, living and travelling mainly abroad and
building up revolutionary groups among the Chinese emigrants throughout the world. In 1895 he took part in his first revolutionary act—an attempt to seize Canton and thence to launch a rebellion against the Manchus. The plot was discovered, and he barely escaped abroad with a price on his head. He went to America, and thence to London, where, the following year, he was decoyed to the Chinese Legation and there held prisoner, with the intention of shipping him secretly back to China for execution. His English friends found out what had happened, and after some delays the British Government insisted on his release. Thereafter, except when he was journeying round the Chinese communities abroad, he lived largely in Japan until the Revolution, and built up an immense influence among the Chinese students who thronged there in search of modern education during the last period of Manchu rule.

During this period a great struggle was proceeding in China between the upholders of the traditional order and the reformers. The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 had created a feeling of national humiliation, and many Chinese intellectuals had become 'westernisers', because they saw in the adoption of Western techniques and ideas the only means open to China of protecting itself against destruction and partition at the hands of the great powers. There were, however, others, headed by the Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi, who held the opposite view that the Chinese should reject all Western notions and should set themselves to the task of driving out the foreigners by every means at their command. In 1898 a learned Confucian reformer, Kang Yu-wei, obtained the ear of the young Emperor, who under his influence issued a series of edicts proclaiming extensive modernist reforms, including the abolition of the traditional Chinese examination system, the modernisation of military training, the establishment of a modern university at Pekin, the conversion of many temples into schools, the translation of foreign works into Chinese, and the abolition of a great many sinecure offices. The Dowager Empress retorted by seizing and imprisoning the Emperor and assuming power herself. She caused many reformers to be executed, and others fled abroad. This reaction led up to the fanatical anti-foreigner rising of the Boxers in 1900. The German Minister and other foreigners were
murdered at Pekin, and the Legation quarter was besieged. Many missionaries in North China were also killed. An international army made up of contingents from the powers interested in China occupied Pekin, put down the Boxers, and exacted a large indemnity and other humiliating terms; and China became subject to ever increasing pressures for concessions of territory and trading and investment rights from the rival powers which were at one only in seeing in the decay of Chinese authority opportunities for imperialist aggrandisement. In face of this pressure even the Dowager Empress and her reactionary friends began to realise the need for some modernisation; and the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904–5 caused many Chinese to believe for the first time that there was no real reason why the country should not equip itself to reassert its independence. That was largely why so many students were sent to Japan to study, with the result that they came under the revolutionary influence of Dr. Sun Yat Sen.

In 1908 the Dowager Empress and the imprisoned Emperor both died suddenly, whether from natural causes or not nobody seems sure. The new Emperor was a child, and there was great confusion while rival leaders intrigued for power. Yuan Shih-kai, who had played an important part in bringing the Dowager Empress to power and in sustaining her authority, was the ‘strong man’ of the régime; but he was widely unpopular and was forced into retirement by his rivals. Local war-lords asserted their independence, and the central administration, badly shaken already by the effects of the Boxer Rising, began to dissolve. On the ‘Double Tenth’ (the tenth day of the tenth month) of 1911 a local revolt broke out at Wuchang, close to Hankow; and the general in command of the troops fled, mistrusting their loyalty. His forces joined the rebels, who won a practically bloodless victory. Further revolts followed in one place after another, until most of the southern and central parts of China were in the hands of the rebels, who had as yet no common leadership. The Manchu Government, still in control in the north, found itself forced to appeal to Yuan Shih-kai to come to its aid; and Yuan responded to the call. Meanwhile the rebels sent a summons to Sun Yat Sen to return to China to take over the leadership of the revolution, which had been so little planned for in advance that Sun was
touring the United States when it broke out. Sun, however, instead of going at once to China, paid a hasty visit to London, where emissaries of Yuan and the Manchus were trying to negotiate an international loan from a bankers' consortium in order to crush the rebellion. Sun was successful in inducing the bankers to hold their hands — presumably by convincing them that the Manchu dynasty was past praying for. This done, he hurried back to China in time to be chosen as President of the Chinese Republic, which was proclaimed, with Nanking as its capital, early in 1912.

Sun Yat Sen found in China a situation of much confusion. Feeling against the Manchus was running high, largely because of the humiliations which followed the Boxer Rising; and there was also a strong current of anti-foreigner feeling directed against the imperialist great powers. But the democratic nationalist movement of which Sun was the apostle had little hold in the north; and it looked as if the alternatives were a civil war, of which the outcome was doubtful, and a partition of China, which revolted nationalist sentiment. Sun espoused the third alternative of opening negotiations with Yuan on the basis of his agreeing to procure the abdication of the Manchu dynasty and joining forces with the Republic. If Yuan would do this, Sun offered to resign the presidency to him and to become the head of an economic organisation for promoting the development of the country. Yuan accepted these terms; and Sun resigned office in his favour, becoming instead director of a new Railway Administration with wide terms of reference for the economic improvement of China and especially for its unification through rail and road construction. Such development projects had for a long time played an important part in Sun's propaganda, and he hoped that the international loan, to which he withdrew his opposition as part of the settlement, would be applied mainly to this purpose. Under the agreed terms Yuan was to become President of the Republic with strictly limited powers, working with a Prime Minister approved by the revolutionary Parliament and subject to parliamentary control. The Republican Government transferred its headquarters from Nanking to Pekin, the Emperor was made to abdicate, and a number of Yuan's adherents were appointed to high positions side by side with the leaders of the revolution.
Sun Yat Sen, as we saw, had up to 1911 been building up his following mainly among the Chinese who were living and studying outside China, though he had also been able to establish substantial movements at Hong Kong and in the International Settlement at Shanghai. He had made some secret visits to China since he had become an outlaw, but when he was not touring the world in search of converts he had lived chiefly in Japan. His name carried great prestige, but he was not well known personally to many of the heterogeneous leaders who had actually carried through the Revolution, and, though he succeeded in getting his basic ideas accepted by the Republican assembly at Nanking, it is doubtful how far they were understood. His revolutionary society, founded in 1894 and called at first Hsing Chung Hui (Association for the Regeneration of China) and then from 1905 T'ung Meng Hui (Revolutionary Alliance), had found its main strength among the Chinese outside China. From 1911 onwards, reorganised as the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, it won a large membership in China itself; but it was loosely knit and consisted of a wide diversity of elements, united only against the Manchus and by hostility to foreign interference in Chinese affairs. Nor had it any hold on the new elements that came into the Republic with Yuan Shih-kai. Sun himself and the group that followed him stood for the ‘Three Principles’ proclaimed for many years by Sun as the necessary foundation of the Revolution — Nationality, Democracy, and Livelihood. But to Yuan and to many more who had come over to the winning side only the first of these principles made any appeal. They were Nationalists, of a sort; but they had no belief in democracy, and no intention of putting into practice Sun’s demand that a tolerable standard of living should be assured to all — which was what he meant by his third Principle.

Accordingly dissensions were certain to break out. Sun, at the head of the Railway Administration, found himself sidetracked and without funds. Many of his friends were ousted from their positions by Yuan, and replaced by conservative or reactionary personages on whom Yuan could rely for support. It was Yuan, and not Sun or the Kuomintang, that received the backing of the great powers and the international bankers as the man most likely to restore law and order and to be amenable
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to their requirements. It was with Yuan that the bankers resumed the loan negotiations and that the representatives of the powers at Pekin preferred to deal. Yuan, for his part, though he had accepted the Republic and obtained the Emperor's abdication, had no belief at all in the machinery of democratic government and parliamentary control that the Kuomintang leaders were trying to force upon him; and he set to work steadily to undermine it and to increase his own power. Before long a serious dispute developed over the conditions to be attached to the loan which Yuan was negotiating with the foreign bankers. As security for this loan the bankers demanded a lien in the proceeds of the salt tax, which was to be collected in future by the Maritime Customs Service. This service, which had been administered by an Irishman, Sir Robert Hart, as the employee of the Chinese Government, had been used before to secure foreign loans; but it was now proposed in effect to transfer control of it from the Chinese Government — still unrecognised by the foreign powers — to the bankers, and to insist that the entire sums collected by it should be transferred to the centre, nothing being reserved for the provincial Chinese administrations.

To these terms the Kuomintang leaders, the Prime Minister, and the Parliament most strongly objected. So did the United States Government under President Wilson, on the ground that they involved illegitimate interference with China's freedom to manage its own affairs. The American bankers were forced to withdraw from the consortium, but the rest went ahead with the plan. So did Yuan, who had his Prime Minister, Sung Chiao-jen, the nominee of the Kuomintang, assassinated because of his denunciation of the proceedings. Upon this Sun Yat Sen, who had for a long time held back from attacking Yuan, roundly denounced both the assassination and the terms on which Yuan had accepted the loan. Sun and his followers set up a rival Republican Government at Nanking and repudiated Yuan's authority; but Sun had no considerable armed forces behind him, and Yuan succeeded in driving him out of Nanking to the south. Yuan then dissolved the rump that was left of the Republican Parliament, and set to work to re-establish autocracy, with himself as Emperor. Sun Yat Sen went back into exile. However, Yuan's attempt to make himself Emperor
stirred up so much opposition that his foreign advisers took alarm, and counselled him to wait. The ceremonies were postponed, and Yuan continued to rule as a dictator with the backing of the reactionary leaders.

At this point the situation was abruptly changed by the outbreak of world war in 1914. The consortium broke up through the expulsion of the Germans; and Japan took the opportunity to seize the German concessions in Shantung and to demand considerable additional rights in that province. The following year the Japanese followed up this action by delivering to Yuan Shih-kai an ultimatum — the Twenty-one Points — so far-reaching in its requirements as to be clearly designed to reduce China to a vassal of Japan while the other great powers had too much on their hands to be able to intervene effectively. Yuan tried to get the terms modified, but he was well aware that he was in no position to offer armed resistance and, after vain discussions, he was driven to accept the greater part of them. This surrender made an end of his authority over most of China. He was regarded as a mere instrument of Japanese aggression, and the strong anti-imperialist feeling of the Chinese was turned against him. His control over the greater part of the country melted away, as the provincial war-lords, or vice-roys, refused to obey his orders. He made a bid for support by promising to restore parliamentary government and to reinstate the Kuomintang leaders. But no one trusted his promises. The Republicans, headed by Sun Yat Sen, set up a new Revolutionary Government in the south of China.

At this point, in June 1916, Yuan Shih-kai suddenly died, and with him what was left of his Government perished. China broke up into a number of independent areas, each under a war-lord who paid no attention to any central authority and either ruled his province without interfering with others, or combined with neighbouring war-lords in attempts to establish a wider authority. This period of sheer confusion lasted for ten years, right up to the victory of the second Nationalist Revolution in 1926. For the greater part of it Sun Yat Sen was at the head of a Kuomintang Government in Canton, accepted now over a wide and now over a quite narrow area and more than once losing control even in Canton itself. North China, meanwhile, was dominated by changing groups of war-lords,
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of whom the Manchurian Chang Tso-lin and the Christian General Feng were the most important. After the end of the world war the great powers refused to recognise Sun’s Government, and presently the Kuomintang turned for help to the Russians, who had taken the lead after the Soviet Revolution in renouncing all special privileges, such as extra-territoriality and concessions in Chinese territory. With the aid of Russian advisers, headed by Borodin, the Kuomintang was reorganised as a strongly disciplined national party, and steps were taken to train and equip a Kuomintang national army with modern weapons and ideas of strategy under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, then regarded as belonging to the left wing of the Republican Nationalist movement. In the meantime, in North China, a bewildering sequence of Governments had come and gone. In 1922 Wu Pei Fu had defeated Chang Tso-lin, and had recalled the Parliament of 1913 and reinstated Li Yuan-hung as President; but within a few months Li had fled from Pekin, and the war-lords had resumed their struggle. In 1922 Feng changed sides and helped Chang Tso-lin to defeat Wu. Tuan Chi-jui, another war-lord, was then put at the head of a provisional administration and issued a summons to the contending factions to send representatives to Pekin for a Reorganisation Conference to settle the future government of China. In 1925 Sun Yat Sen went north to attend this gathering and reached Pekin, but fell ill there, and after a few weeks in hospital died of cancer with nothing achieved. He left behind him a ‘Testament’ which became the basis of the new Kuomintang Revolution of the following year.

These events belong, of course, properly not to the present volume of this study but to the next. It has been necessary to summarise them here because it would be impossible otherwise to give a proper account of Sun Yat Sen’s contribution to the Chinese Revolution or to explain the background of his social ideas. I need, however, say nothing in this volume about the much-disputed question of Russian Communist influence on the course of the Chinese Revolution, as that belongs entirely to the period after 1917. Sun Yat Sen’s social and political ideas had been fully worked out in most respects long before the great Russian Revolution and owed nothing to Russian inspiration, however much he may have been influenced by
Russian example in his last years in the reorganisation of the Kuomintang as a disciplined party. Sun Yat Sen’s social philosophy had nothing in common either with Bolshevism or with Marxism. He was a nationalist who entirely repudiated the conception of the class-struggle and refused to regard capitalism, as distinct from foreign imperialism, as the enemy the Chinese people must set out to fight. He was an ardent believer in popular democracy, and an opponent of centralised power except in the actual course of the revolutionary struggle. What he looked forward to as the direct consequence of the Revolution was not the rule of a class or a party, but a functional distribution of the powers of government designed to establish a system of checks and balances in the interests of the common man. Though his essential doctrines were expressed in a variety of ways, and often very loosely, in his writings, their main content is quite clear and shows a marked consistency through all the phases of his adventurous career.

Sun’s best-known work is called San Min Chu I (The Three Principles of the People). In the form in which it has been translated into English it consists of a series of lectures delivered in 1924, the year before his death. These lectures were delivered impromptu and taken down by a shorthand writer. Sun passed the text for publication, but did not substantially revise it. The lectures consist largely of a repetition of what he had been saying and writing for many years: the enunciation of the ‘Three Principles’ — nationality, democracy, and livelihood — can be traced back to a lecture which he delivered in Brussels in 1905. More than once he had set out to write a comprehensive treatise expounding them; and in 1922 he had got some way when his manuscript with all his notes was burnt in 1922, on the occasion of a raid on his headquarters. In the lectures, as we have them, there are many factual inaccuracies and the expression is often very loose; but the main ideas stand out clearly and are at one with what he wrote elsewhere. Of his other writings, the most important are A Programme of National Reconstruction, published in 1918 in three volumes, and his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1924). In his Testament he commended these works, together with The Three Principles of the People and the Programme adopted by the Kuomintang National Congress of 1924, as his legacy to
the Chinese people, to serve as the basis for the building of the new order.

Sun, though a rebel against the ossified traditions of the Chinese culture of his day, was a deep believer in the cultural greatness of the people of China and in their capacity for creating a civilisation at least the equal of any other. He believed that for this to be done it was necessary to get rid of the Manchus, who had distorted the ancient culture, to reassert full national independence and to restore the national pride and solidarity of the people by getting rid of foreign control, and to learn the lessons of Western development without imitating them slavishly, as the Japanese had done. He had a confident belief that China was potentially the wealthiest country in the world, possessed of inexhaustible natural resources; and he was intent on the development of these resources with the use of all the available Western industrial and agricultural techniques. He was well aware of the difficulties in the way of doing this without the aid of foreign capital; and his projects involved the provision of large loan resources from the wealthier countries. He saw nothing against such borrowing, provided only that the country to which the loans were made was well enough organised and independent enough in its attitude to stand out against any conditions that it could not honourably accept as an equal. Sun did not see why the economically advanced countries, which needed markets for their goods and fields for the investment of their surplus capital, should not be prepared to grant loans on acceptable terms as soon as the Chinese people, by expelling their corrupt rulers and establishing their truly national State, had shown that they would no longer submit to be treated as inferiors or to be exploited by foreign capitalists. Included in his conception of national independence was that of the power to resist violent aggression from without; and he accordingly wished to build up an efficient and well-equipped national army as an instrument of the Revolution. But he was also very much alive to the fact that a nation's power to resist foreign exploitation and aggression is a matter not only of the armed forces at its disposal but also of the spirit of its people — as appeared plainly in the success with which the boycott was used by Chinese Nationalists as a weapon against both the British and the Japanese.
When the League of Nations was set up at the end of the first world war, Sun appealed to the Governments which had combined to form it to take up, as its most important field of service, the development of the economically backward countries with the aid of capital resources provided by the more advanced. He was one of the earliest preachers of the gospel of world-wide 'war upon want'; and he found it incomprehensible that his appeals for a great humanitarian crusade met with so little response. The whole matter seemed to him so simple; and he was so sure that the League of Nations could achieve nothing for world peace unless it began by tackling the great question of human misery in the midst of potential plenty.

In his schemes for national economic development Sun had no fear that the adoption of Western techniques would destroy the distinctive character of Chinese civilisation. On the contrary, he saw that only their adoption could rescue Chinese civilisation from the threat of being obliterated by conquest, or could offer the hope of extending it to the entire people. Nor had he any fear that the participation of Chinese capitalists would reproduce in China the class-struggles of the West. He insisted, indeed, that both the foreign and the native capitalists must be compelled to work within a strong framework of democratic political control and that the State must accept the responsibility of protecting the common people against exploitation and of ensuring good working conditions. In respect of agriculture he followed Henry George in his advocacy of a tax on land values equal to the unimproved value of the land, and therewith proposed a redistribution of holdings in the interests of the landless and of those whose farms were too small or too poor to provide reasonable family subsistence. He wanted a great campaign for the improvement of agricultural techniques and an adoption of Co-operative methods in the utilisation of farm implements as well as in marketing and purchase of requisites. In industry he was fully prepared to let the capitalist have his head, subject to his acceptance of the regulative codes laid down by the State for the protection of the workers' interests. He envisaged employer and worker alike as accepting the 'Three Principles' and as looking on themselves as co-operating servants of the nation, ready to do its bidding and
bound together by community of service. On that basis he repudiated, as a Nationalist, the whole idea of class-war as involving a negation of the common national purpose.

It is true that Sun sometimes spoke of his ideas as in the last resort identical with the basic ideas of Socialism, or even Communism. He claimed in his book on the 'Three Principles' that his Third Principle, Livelihood (Min-Sheng), 'is Communism, is Socialism'; but he also explained that he had deliberately chosen the word 'livelihood' in preference to 'Socialism', which he called the 'Western' word, in order to distinguish his attitude from that of the Western Socialists, with its emphasis on class-differences. He may have supposed that in course of time capitalism was destined to die out; and he certainly envisaged that a large part of the investment needed for China's economic development would need to be made directly under public auspices. But he was firmly convinced that in the existing situation China could not do without capitalists. In the Manifesto issued jointly by him and Joffe, the Soviet emissary, on the occasion of the acceptance of Soviet help, his attitude in relation to Communism was clearly laid down.

Dr. Sun Yat Sen holds that the communistic order, or even the Soviet system, cannot at present be introduced into China because there do not exist the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence.

Sun would clearly have said the same about Socialism. His aim was to unify all the Chinese people, except the inveterate war lords and the traitorous servants of foreign powers, under the banner of Nationalism, not to divide them into warring classes.

Immediately after the Three Principles came, in Sun's social doctrine, the advocacy of the 'Fivefold Constitution'. In place of the familiar division of government into three elements — legislature, executive, and judiciary — he put forward a fivefold scheme by adding two more. These were to be concerned respectively with 'examination' and with 'control'. The 'ex-
amining' body was to be entrusted primarily with the choice of candidates for public positions — that is to say, it was to succeed to the function of the old examining boards of the Manchu régime, but was to reform its methods to take full account of all useful forms of modern knowledge, including the technical 'know-how' of the West. The 'controlling' body was to be responsible for the impeachment of dishonest or unworthy officials and for scrutiny of the entire conduct of public business.

Each of these five parts of the structure of government was, under Sun's plan, to be put into the hands of a separately elected Council (Yuan); and each Council was to have equal authority within its assigned sphere. Sun's conception of government was thus essentially pluralistic; but behind the five Councils was to lie the direct authority of the whole people, embodied in the institutions of initiative, referendum, and recall of any representative with whom they might feel dissatisfied. He regarded this combination of direct popular authority with functional administration as embodying the only satisfactory reconciliation of the expert with democracy.

Sun, however, did not propose the immediate establishment of his new system of government. The creation of the new social order would involve, he said, three successive stages — revolution, tutelage, and achievement. During the first stage, which would have to be carried through under military control, the Revolution would defeat its enemies and establish the Republic. As soon as the struggle for the Republic was over, the military phase would need to give way to that of tutelage, during which the leaders of the victorious party would establish the new fundamental institutions, and engage in a great campaign of teaching the people the new social attitudes and techniques. This second stage would then rapidly give place to the third, in which the people would become fully and democratically self-governing under the 'Fivefold System'. It will be seen that the second of these stages bears some resemblance to the Communist conception of 'dictatorship', especially in the rôle assigned to the party during its continuance. But Sun's 'dictatorship' was certainly not meant to be that of a class; and his idea of it was that it would need to last only for a few years, while the institutions of the 'Fivefold Constitution' were
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being brought into existence over the immense territory of the
Chinese Republic.

In Sun’s latest exposition of the three stages by which the
Fivefold Constitution was to be brought to birth there appeared
a modification of his earlier doctrine. He had envisaged each
of the three stages as running its course and reaching its end
simultaneously over the whole of China. In the revised version
given in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1924) he
came over to the view that the transition might have to take
place at different times in different areas, and substituted for a
conception of centralised control of the transition one in which
much greater importance was given to building up from below,
through the development and democratisation of local and
provincial institutions as a preparation for central reorganisation.

This idea of the three stages was not borrowed by Sun from
the Russians, though he was doubtless familiar with the earlier
phases of the controversy among Marxists concerning the
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. Still less was it the fruit of
Russian advice after 1917. It was already expressed in full in
Sun’s Programme of National Reconstruction, published in 1918,
and had been developed by him considerably earlier. Indeed,
it had led to controversy between him and a number of his
fellow-revolutionaries in 1912, when he had accused them of
pressing on too fast with setting up the institutions of democratic
parliamentary government, without first accustoming the people
to the idea of them, which was entirely unfamiliar, or consoli­
dating in advance the foundations of the Republican régime.
He had wanted them, when the fighting ceased, to accept the
need for a period of tutelage under party-appointed leadership,
and had warned them of the danger that the democratic system
would break down if it were thrust on the people without any
period of prior instruction in its use. That he was overruled
on this issue was, by his own account, one factor in making him
ready in 1912 to lay down the presidency and concentrate on
the task of economic reconstruction.

I have given this amount of space to Sun Yat Sen’s ideas,
though I do not regard him as a Socialist, because his influence
undoubtedly made strongly in a socialist direction and because
many of his disciples were, or became, actual Socialists. More­
over, as we shall see in the next volume of this study, there is an
inextricably close connection in the economically backward countries between Nationalism and Socialism. This connection became plainly embodied in actual movements and currents of thought only after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and largely as its consequence. But Sun Yat Sen had realised its importance long before, by reason of his experience of the impact on China of the conflicting imperialist policies of the great powers and of his conviction that the colonial and semi-colonial countries could hope to rescue themselves from conquest and exploitation only by building up strong States which would take the lead in the introduction of modern techniques and would use against the imperialists all the weapons of cultural and ideological resistance with which Nationalism would arm them, as well as the weapons of economic organisation and armed revolt. Sun Yat Sen, more than any other social thinker, worked out the conception of democratic Nationalism as the instrument for the emancipation of the oppressed peoples, and attempted to rally all classes, save the irretrievably reactionary, behind the Confucian slogan, 'All under heaven will work for the nation's good'. He explicitly rejected, not only 'class-war', but the entire Materialist Conception of History, as put forward by Marx, insisting that national and cultural factors were no less influential than economic factors in settling the course of development, and that the understanding of social forces must be based on treating man as a 'whole being' and not only in his economic relations. This does not mean that he underestimated the importance of the economic factors; but he regarded them not as impelling men towards a predetermined goal, but as forces to be controlled and guided by the human spirit as expressed in the traditions and in the creative will of the national community.
CHAPTER XXVII

JAPAN

JAPAN had no widespread Socialist movement before the first world war, and what there was suffered almost complete eclipse in 1911, when the Government arrested most of the Socialist leaders and executed a good number of them, after secret trial, for crimes against the constitution. The executed men were accused of being Anarchists and of engaging in terrorist activities: they seem, in fact, to have been mostly Direct Actionists influenced by the American Industrial Workers of the World. D. Kotoku, the best known among the victims, had worked in the United States for some years and had come back as an apostle of Direct Action and an opponent of parliamentary activities; but the persecution of 1911 was by no means confined to his group, though they were the principal sufferers. The opportunity was taken by the authorities to break up all the Socialist and most of the Trade Union organisations, to suppress the Socialist journals, and to imprison many who escaped execution; and no recovery of the movement was possible until well after 1914, when strikes began to break out against high costs of living. Only after 1918 was there any considerable Socialist revival.

Japanese Socialism had two distinct beginnings — among the intellectuals and among the voteless workers. It had been preceded by a Liberal movement which centred upon the struggle for responsible parliamentary government; and the earliest expressions of Socialist ideas came mainly from Liberal intellectuals who had learnt them from Europe or the United States. There were also followers of Henry George, headed by Ukichi Taguchi, the economist, owner and editor of The Tokyo Economist. The old Liberal politician, Firmio Yano, turned Socialist in 1902 and wrote his book, The New Society, which had a very large sale. Another Liberal leader, Count Itagashi, founded the Dokai Club in 1900, with largely socialistic
ideas. The year before that the well-known novelist, Rokwa Tokutomi, had written his socialist story, *Kuroshio* (Monsoon), which also produced a considerable effect. Another influential socialist novelist was N. Kinoshita, whose *Pillar of Fire* appeared in 1903: he had been one of the founders of the Socialist Party two years earlier.

This intellectual Socialist movement, beginning rather before 1890, reached its height during the first decade of the present century. But from the time of the Russo-Japanese War, which most of the Socialists strongly opposed, it receded fast, except among the students; and many intellectuals who had expressed sympathy with Socialism and had stressed its congeniality to the Japanese spirit turned strongly against it when it appeared as an internationalist doctrine. Such 'Socialists' had been attracted to the idea when it seemed to emphasise the service of the State as against individualist egoism, and had even in some cases asserted that Japan was already Socialist in spirit and needed only democracy to make it so in fact. When the main body of organised Socialists affirmed their solidarity with the Russian people against the autocrats and imperialists of both the warring States these persons broke sharply away from Socialism; and some of them turned into persecutors.

Side by side with this 'Socialism' of the intellectuals there grew up in the 1890s a small proletarian Socialist movement. Japan had long been a country of strongly organised craft guilds, for trade protection as well as for friendly benefit purposes; and during the 1890s some of these guilds converted themselves into Trade Unions on the Western model under the leadership of such men as Sakenobu Ota, of the plasterers, and F. Saito, of the ship carpenters. The Tokyo printers formed a Trade Union in 1890. No great development, however, occurred until the time of the Sino-Japanese War, which was followed by many strikes for higher wages to meet the rising costs of living. Then Sen Katayama (1858–1933), one of the outstanding figures of the ensuing period, came back from the United States and set to work to create a Socialist movement with a basis in Trade Union organisation. Katayama, of peasant parentage, had been a printer in Tokyo and then janitor in the University. In 1884 he went to California in search of higher education and, while maintaining himself by daily
labour, followed a succession of courses in a number of American Colleges and Universities. Graduating in 1892, he spent three years in further studies and then, about 1895, returned to Tokyo and set out upon his self-appointed task. By 1897 he had become Secretary of a newly formed Ironworkers’ Union, had founded a journal, *The Labour World*, and had established a society called Rodo Kunaii Kiseikai (Society for Founding Trade Unions). The following year a big strike broke out on the Nippon Railway, and he succeeded in organising a Railway Workers’ Union and also in converting a number of the guilds in the building and woodworking crafts into Trade Unions. Other Unions were formed in the government dockyards and arsenals and among the waterside workers. Side by side with the Rodo Kunaii Kiseikai, Sen Katayama and Professor Isowa Abe, his principal intellectual collaborator, founded in 1897 a Socialist Association in Tokyo, and they also set to work to establish, in close connection with the Trade Unions, a number of Consumers’ Co-operative Societies, some of which were able to survive when the Unions were suppressed.

Up to this point the movement had been allowed to proceed with but little interference from the authorities, though Katayama’s *Labour World* was sometimes in trouble with the censorship. In 1899 a number of professors, alarmed at the growth of a militant workers’ movement, set up a Social Reform Union, partly intended to canalise socialistic intellectuals into less dangerous activities; and this body helped to secure a law legalising Co-operative Societies the following year. That same year, however, the authorities took alarm and put into force a Public Peace Police Law, which prohibited incitement to strike and put severe limitations on the rights of political organisation, demonstration and public meeting, and Trade Union combination. From this time onwards the police were armed with very extensive powers to suppress working-class and Socialist movements. These powers were not used with uniform severity; but they could always be invoked when the Government had a mind to resort to them. In particular, women and students were forbidden to join political associations or to attend political meetings: the police were entitled to attend any political or Trade Union meeting and to close it down when they thought fit; and there was very heavy censor-
ship of working-class and Socialist newspapers and journals, which were liable to confiscation if they printed 'subversive' articles, and could be completely closed down, and the printing plant confiscated, in case of repeated offence. These regulations made the lives of 'agitators' and of left-wing journalists exceedingly precarious. Almost every leader was repeatedly in and out of gaol; and journals were again and again suppressed and restarted under new names. The repression became particularly severe at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904–5. It was then relaxed for a time after the fall of the Katsura Ministry, when the new Saionji Ministry allowed for a time much greater freedom of propaganda and organisation. But this relative freedom was short-lived. There was a renewal of the repression in 1908, and the persecution reached a height in the great 'Anarchist’ trials of 1910–11, which for a time practically annihilated the Socialist movement.

The new Police Law of 1900 did not immediately damp down the activities of the Socialists. The new Constitutional Law of 1899, which was supposed to usher in a form of parliamentary government — but with a restricted franchise and with the Ministers still appointed by and responsible to the Crown and not to Parliament — was followed in 1900 by the formation of an Adult Suffrage Union; and the following year the Socialist groups held a Conference and decided to set up a Social Democratic Party, with the intention of contesting elections, though there was scant hope of winning seats until the franchise was extended. The new party issued a Manifesto, largely based on Western Socialist ideas. The Government at once retorted by prosecuting the editors of the four daily newspapers which ventured to print the Manifesto and by suppressing the party, which thereupon converted itself into a Socialist Propagandist Association (Shakai Shugi Kyokai), in order to evade the ban. The principal leaders at this stage were Sen Katayama and Professor Abe, the journalists K. Kawakami, D. Kotoku and Sakai, K. Nishikawa, who worked closely with Katayama’s group, and the novelist, N. Kinoshita. A popular newspaper, Nikoru, gave its support by publishing a series of articles on Socialism by Abe and calling a great open-air demonstration at which resolutions were passed in favour of factory legislation and universal suffrage. The police at first
prohibited the demonstration, but subsequently gave permission for it on condition that not more than 5000 persons should be allowed to attend. Actually ten times this number appeared, and the police could do nothing. When the Socialist Party was suppressed, another popular newspaper, Yorozu, organised a new body, Risodan (the Progressive League), with a programme embodying most of the Socialist demands. Kotoku and Sakai were the leading writers on this paper, which for the next two years took the lead in advocating an advanced policy and enlisted a great deal of support among students as well as workers. In 1903, however, as the war clouds began to gather on account of the Russo-Japanese disputes in Korea and Manchuria, the proprietors of Yorozu took objection to the anti-war attitude of their leading contributors, and Kotoku and Sakai were driven to resign. In 1902 Katayama had for a time published his Labour World as a daily newspaper; but he had been unable to carry it on, and it had gone back to publication as a fortnightly magazine. When the breach with Yorozu occurred, the Socialist groups, with the help of Dr. Tokyiro Kato—who was later Japanese delegate at the Stuttgart Socialist Congress of 1907—joined forces to set up a new newspaper, the Heimin, to be edited by Kotoku and Sakai; and this paper at once became the principal rallying point for the Socialist movement, not only in Tokyo but throughout the industrial centres. This same year the Socialists held a national Congress at Osaka, and issued a further Manifesto, which seems to have been left alone by the police. Indeed, this year Socialism reached the apex of its influence among the intellectuals, but was also faced with its first great crisis, arising out of the dissensions over the threatened war with Russia.

The Congress of 1903 delegated Katayama to attend the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam the following year; and in November 1903 he left Japan to tour the United States on a propagandist mission before proceeding to Europe. In his absence the Socialist Association and Heimin carried on an energetic propagandist campaign. Heimin published a translation of the Communist Manifesto, which was promptly confiscated by the police, and a number of other Socialist books and pamphlets. The Association organised a number of separate meetings for women, who were not allowed to attend
men's meetings, and the student Socialist movement made rapid advances. When war broke out, the Socialists sent a message of greeting and solidarity to the Russians; and this was published in *Iskra*, with a fraternal reply, probably written by Lenin. At Amsterdam Katayama publicly shook hands with Plekhanov as a token of the solidarity between the Russian and Japanese workers.

These events started an intensified police persecution in Japan. Many of the Socialist leaders were arrested and imprisoned — Nishikawa for seven and Kotoku for five months — and the *Heimin*, after repeated confiscations, was totally suppressed. It was at once replaced by a new journal, *Chokugen* (Straight Talk), which was in its turn put out of action by the police before the end of 1905. The occasion for this second suppression was the series of riots which, beginning in Tokyo in September 1905, rapidly spread to other towns. These were spontaneous movements not definitely caused or led by the Socialists. They arose out of general dissatisfaction due to war conditions and to dislike of the war policy of the Government. Soldiers were called in, and they were ruthlessly suppressed. Again there were many arrests, and the Socialist Association was broken up. But they led to the fall of the Katsura War Ministry, and to the resort to a more liberal policy under Saionji.

Taking advantage of the change of Government, the Socialists started a number of new journals and in February 1906 formed a new Socialist Party under Dr. Kato's leadership, and began to found branches in the leading towns. In March the Tokyo street-car workers came out on strike, held up the entire traffic, and won a complete victory. Before the end of the year the daily newspaper, *Heimin*, had been restarted, with Kotoku and Sakai back in control. Then came, in February 1907, the big strike of the Asio copper miners, headed by Nagaoka, who had built up a position of influence through his journal, *The Miners' Friend*, and as a writer of working-class songs which were circulated widely in the form of fly-sheets. The miners' strike was the occasion of serious rioting, and much damage was done to the companies' property. The soldiers were called in, and there was hand-to-hand fighting before the workers gave way. More than 200 strikers were arrested;
and the Miners’ Union, formed in 1903, was suppressed. The companies refused to re-employ the strikers and succeeded in replacing them with blackleg labour. While the strike was in progress, the Socialist Party held a Congress for the purpose of revising the policy laid down the previous year, and there was a vehement contest between Left and Right. Kotoku had paid a visit to the United States in 1905, and had come back an out-and-out supporter of Direct Action and Industrial Unionism and an opponent of political action. In his absence the Socialist Congress of 1906 had included in its programme a clause pledging it to act only ‘within the limits of the law’. At the 1907 Congress he and his group, in Katayama’s absence, succeeded in getting this clause deleted, though not in carrying their own positive proposals. The compromise programme adopted pledged the party to ‘a radical and fundamental change of the existing society, to anti-militarist and anti-religious propaganda, and to the campaign for adult suffrage’. Kotoku’s proposal to delete the reference to adult suffrage, and Tazoye’s to affirm the need for parliamentary action were both defeated.

These resolutions were enough both to cause the Government to suppress the Socialist Party and to set going a vigorous faction fight between the Parliamentarians and the Direct Actionists. Katayama, returning to Japan from America just after the Congress, put himself at the head of the Parliamentarians, who started a new society (not a party) called Doshikai. Kotoku and Sakai founded a rival society, the Kinyokai; and each group started a new journal to support its views. Katayama’s group, while urging the need for parliamentary action, was not opposed to Direct Action — Katayama himself had voted at Amsterdam in favour of the general strike. Kotoku’s group, on the other hand, was violently anti-parliamentarian.

At this point, in June 1907, another group of copper miners, employed in the Bessi mines, came out on strike, and the events that had occurred at Asio a few months before were repeated. Again there was rioting, with great damage to property: again, the soldiers were brought in to suppress the movement and many of the miners were gaoled. The Bessi strike, like the earlier Asio affair, was spontaneous: it arose out of very bad working conditions and out of protests against the despotic conduct of the mine foremen. In face of the riots,
many moderate Socialists took fright, and the alarm was increased by the extreme attitude taken by the Kotoku group of Socialists. While the faction fight was at its height, Katayama and his principal associate in the Doshikai, K. Nishikawa, quarrelled. Nishikawa had persuaded Katayama to accept his friend, Akabu, as a joint editor of their journal, Socialist News; but soon Katayama was denouncing Akabu as an Anarchist, and two rival papers, both called Socialist News, were appearing in Tokyo, while the Kotoku group were publishing at Osaka a new Heimin, edited by the local leader, Morichika. Then the Government arrested Nishikawa, who remained in prison for three years, during which he repented of his Socialist activities. He emerged in 1911, when the movement was being completely repressed, to write his recantation in a book called Confessions. Katayama, after his removal, tried to reorganise the Socialist Party in conjunction with Fujita, a strange character who had become the unchallenged leader of the Tokyo newsvendors and had a remarkable power of getting together sudden demonstrations and making himself a nuisance to the authorities. It was by this time impossible openly to preach Socialism; but Katayama and Fujita toured the country making Socialist speeches while avoiding the use of the word. In June 1908 the rival factions joined forces in a mass-demonstration to greet the Socialist journalist, Yamaguchi, on his release from prison. The demonstrators carried red flags, which were seized by the police in the course of violent struggles. Again there were numerous arrests, followed by sentences of from twelve to thirty months' imprisonment on most of the leaders. Sakai was among those gaolled for two years. The so-called Red Flag Riots were the signal for a great press campaign against the Socialists and for an intensified police campaign against Socialist meetings, especially in Tokyo. Katayama, and those who escaped arrest, carried on their propagandist work thereafter largely outside Tokyo. But the repression grew steadily more severe; and in May 1910 it culminated in a general round-up of Socialist agitators and in the placing of a number of them, after long questioning by the police in order to secure incriminating answers, on trial as Anarchists on charges of treason against the State.

The trials, held in secret and carried up to the highest
court, went on through the rest of the year. In January 1911 most of the accused were condemned to death, and the sentences were carried out immediately by strangling, without the customary interval between sentence and execution. The attempts of the Socialists who had remained at large or been set free to organise protests were put down. All Socialist journals were suppressed and all Socialist meetings prohibited.

These events almost killed the Japanese Socialist movement. Kotoku, the leader of the Left, was among those who were executed. Katayama, who had been released after arrest and questioning, was gaol ed in January 1912 for supporting a successful strike of the Tokyo street-car workers; and the Trade Unions which had any connection with the Socialists were mostly suppressed and their funds confiscated — only the Co-operative Societies which they had founded being allowed to remain in being. It was, however, realised by the authorities that suppression was not by itself enough, and that some outlet for working-class action must be provided if the militant movement was to be prevented from arising again. Accordingly, some of the employers helped the Trade Union right wing and the surviving Craft Guilds and Friendly Societies to organise a central body with a moderate programme of social and industrial reform. The leadership of the new body, the Yuai kai, or Workers' Society, was taken by Bunji Suzuki, who, denounced by the remaining Socialists, became the leader of a tolerated working-class movement proclaiming industrial peace as its object. This, from 1912 onwards, was the sole permitted workers' organisation. During the war years, from 1914 to 1918, despite its pacific intentions, strikes recurred on an increasing scale in face of sharply rising prices. The Yuai kai was affected by these developments, changed its name to the Federation of Labour, and began to work more on Trade Union lines. The employers then withdrew recognition from it, and founded a rival organisation, called the Association for Humanising Labour and Capital. When the International Labour Organisation was set up after the war, the Yuai kai claimed the right to appoint the delegates to represent Labour in accordance with its tripartite structure; but the Government rejected the claim and insisted on appointing its own nominees to represent the workers. The account of the ensuing struggle
belongs, however, to the next volume of this history.

The story of Japanese Socialism up to 1914 brings out, in an extreme form, the problems which confronted Socialist and Trade Union propagandists in countries in which there was neither any tradition of democratic freedom nor any revolutionary tradition among the poorer classes. Japan's revolution had come not from below but from above, and had been thoroughly successful in transforming the country from economic backwardness and social conservatism to the adoption of highly advanced productive techniques. It had also rendered the mass of the people literate, so as to open the way to the extensive use of the written word as an instrument of propaganda. But it had not therewith liberalised the system of government or made the mass of the people responsive to democratic doctrines. What, above all else, held the Socialist movement in check was that the internationalism of its intellectual leaders put them into sharp opposition to the main currents of national feeling at a time when Japan was establishing in successful warfare its position as a great power. The antimilitarist attitudes of the Socialist leaders rendered them intensely unpopular with the main body of opinion outside a few particularly oppressed groups, such as the miners, and cost them a large part of the theoretical backing they had gained, up to 1904, among the intellectual classes. They struggled hard to make headway against these obstacles; but the Government was altogether too strong for them, especially when they fell out among themselves. It is not at all surprising that the quarrel between Social Democrats and Direct Actionists, which was rending European and American Socialism asunder, had its echoes in Japan; but under the prevailing conditions it was fatal, as Katayama saw, for the Socialists to make open profession of extremist doctrines which gave the Government the opportunity, with the support of a wide body of public opinion, to stamp on moderates and extremists alike, and to put an end to what had appeared for a few years to be a rising force in Japanese affairs.

Japanese Socialism produced no thinker of substance—unless indeed there be some genius whose significance has hitherto escaped not only the outside world, but also his own people. Katayama never professed to be a theorist: he was
indeed rather inclined to disparage his own intellectual powers in his eagerness to be accepted as a proletarian rather than an intellectual. He was well aware that Socialism in Japan would remain powerless as long as it was no more than a matter of left-wing intellectuals playing with ideas borrowed from Europe or America; and he set to work from the first to persuade the industrial workers to organise in Trade Unions and struggle for improved conditions as the necessary foundation for any effective Socialist movement. He was a ‘parliamentarian’, not so much because he believed in the possibility under the existing conditions of building up a Socialist Party that could play any significant part in national affairs as because he saw that the profession of constitutionality was necessary to give the chance of bringing an organised working-class movement into existence, and understood that Kotoku’s revolutionary professions were bound to give his enemies just the chance they wanted of suppressing it altogether. Doubtless he shared the view, derived mainly from the Germans, that it was indispensable for the success of the Socialist revolution to establish a mass-party on a constitutional basis; but he saw that, in Japan, this could be done only by beginning with Trade Unions, because the workers neither had votes nor could hope to get them except by making themselves formidable in the industrial field. There was no possibility in Japan, as there was in many other countries, including China, of building up Socialism as the best expression of the sentiment of popular nationalism, because Japan had already achieved the status of an independent great power and Japanese nationalism was the property of the very groups which Socialism had to fight. In Japan, Socialism had to be internationalist and anti-militarist and had to set itself in opposition to an exceedingly powerful jingo patriotism which was more and more assuming imperialist forms. This made its task very hard: indeed the real chance of creating a powerful Socialist Party came only when, in 1945, the Japanese people found itself faced, at any rate for the time, with the defeat of its expansionist hopes.
CHAPTER XXVIII

CONCLUSION. REFORM AND REVOLUTION

Throughout the period covered by this volume there was, both internationally and in most of the countries with which I have had to deal, a continuous debate about the issue of Revolutionism and Reformism. Neither of these words was given a consistent meaning by the disputants: nor would any attempt to classify all the Socialists under the one heading or the other make sense. Nevertheless the controversy was obviously of the greatest importance, and went again and again to the heart of the matter. There were two sharply contrasting ways of attempting to establish a Socialist society in place of capitalism, though there were also a number of possible intermediate positions into which entered both revolutionary and reformist elements.

At one extreme were those who maintained not only that Socialism was not to be got except by revolution, but also that no valuable or worth-while reforms could be got without it. 'The working class and the employing class have nothing in common', the I.W.W. proclaimed in its well-known Preamble; and there were Socialists who, taking the theory of 'increasing misery' au pied de la lettre, contended that everywhere in capitalist societies the workers were, and must be, getting worse off and more and more of the intermediate classes being flung down into their ranks. That, in any literal sense, this was plain nonsense and a travesty of the facts was, of course, no obstacle to some people believing it. It was, however, a considerable obstacle to inducing many people to act on the assumption of its truth: so that extreme militant movements which were based on accepting it were always movements of very small minorities, though occasionally for a short time they were able to draw a considerable body of dissatisfied persons in their wake.

Most of the advocates of revolution did not take this
 extreme view. They held that Socialism was not to be had without revolution; but they did not deny that the material condition of the workers, or at any rate of many workers, had been improving under capitalism. Some of them held that it could be further improved, but only within restricted limits. Others argued that capitalism had already reached, or was reaching, the limits of its power to provide improvements, because it had reached, or was reaching, the zenith of its expanding power and was falling, or would speedily fall, a victim to its own ‘contradictions’ and be compelled to worsen working-class conditions in the course of its struggle to survive. If the limits had not yet been reached there was room for further successful day-to-day struggles to win concessions; and both the struggles and the concessions would strengthen the workers for the Revolution when the time arrived. On this view, the Revolution was not an event to be expected immediately: there was still a period of preparation ahead, during which more converts could be made and the proletariat stiffened for its coming task. But — for we are now speaking only of the believers in revolution — at the close of this period the Socialist society would be still to win, and would have to be won by revolution. There was no way by which capitalism could be transformed into Socialism by a mere accumulation of piecemeal reforms. Nor was there any way by which capitalism itself could become stabilised, or solve the riddle of perpetual progress, so as to avoid its necessary doom. This was, on the whole, the orthodox German view — the view of Wilhelm Liebknecht, of Bebel, and of Kautsky — echoed by a host of Social Democratic voices in many of the advanced capitalist countries.

If, on the other hand, capitalism had already reached, or had almost reached, the limits of its advance and therewith of its power to make concessions; if it was already facing increasing ‘contradictions’, or was on the point of having to face them; then the Revolution had to be looked on as an event much nearer at hand, and, in as far as it was at all worth fighting for further concessions under capitalism, the value lay rather in the fight than in the concessions themselves, which could not be retained in face of the coming capitalist decline. On this view, ‘increasing misery’ was either already beginning, or was
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just round the corner, and would become a means of converting the workers to revolutionary policies; and the supremely important task for Socialists was that of preparing the workers to wage the Revolution well and boldly when the time came, as it soon would. This was, on the whole, the view of the Social Democrats who stood to the left of the official majority in the German Social Democratic Party — of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg — and also of a considerable part of the Syndicalist and industrialist left wing in France and in other countries affected by the French influence.

Among those who believed that capitalism would speedily collapse on account of its contradictions there was no agreement about the forces that would actually precipitate this world event. Some put the main emphasis on impending economic crises of increasing severity, leading to mass-unemployment and pauperisation, and reiterated Marx's prophecies to this effect. Others, such as Rosa Luxemburg, put the stress on the rapidly developing imperialist rivalries between the great capitalist powers and expected the signal for the Revolution to be given by wars in which they would destroy one another and bring the system down about their ears. These explanations were, of course, not necessarily inconsistent, and they were often combined, or used indiscriminately as occasion served. As international crisis deepened during the ten years or so before 1914, more and more weight was given to the explanation in terms of imperialist rivalries, and the other argument, with the stress often given in it to under-consumption as the final source of capitalist-crisis, dropped rather into the background, except in text-books of Marxism, in which it kept its familiar place.

It was, at all events, part of the established orthodoxy that, sooner or later, capitalism was doomed and Socialism destined to take its place, and that the main agency in establishing Socialism on the ruins of capitalism was to be the proletariat — the working class acting as a class in fulfilment of its historic mission.

The various groups I have been speaking of so far, all believed that the establishment of Socialism involved revolution. But what did they mean when they used the word? They could have meant several different things; and quite
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often it was not clear, either to others or to themselves, precisely what they did mean. They could have meant — and some of them did mean — only that the establishment of Socialism would be a Revolution, irrespective of the means by which it was won. Just as the establishment of capitalism on the ruins of feudalism had been a Revolution, even though nobody could assign to it a precise date or identify it more than partially with a single event, so would the victory of Socialism over capitalism be a Revolution, however it might come about. On this basis even a strict Reformist could be at the same time a Revolutionist; for if Socialism is Revolution, every Socialist is entitled to be so called. But not many who called themselves Revolutionists would have been content to have the question considered on the basis of this definition. Most of them, when they declared that Socialism involved Revolution, had in mind that it could not come without, at some point, a sharp break with the established order and the conscious refoundation of society on a new basis, involving a new set of values and a drastic change in the class system.

Most of them believed there would have to be, at some point, a sharp break with the old order and therewith a shift in the basis of power; and this break and shift were what they thought of as constituting the Revolution. Did this mean that they envisaged the Revolution in terms of fighting and killing, with the old order resisting in arms, the armed forces, or enough of them, changing sides or refusing to shoot, the enemies of the working class being shot down or disarmed and disciplined, the streets running with blood, and so on? Not necessarily, though nearly all Revolutionists, except the Tolstoyans, envisaged the Revolution as involving some element of physical violence. The amount and the degree of violence might be great or small: that would all depend. Moreover, whereas some of the Revolutionists liked, or even gloried in, the thought of violence and of the ‘Bloody Revolution’, others disliked it more or less intensely, and regarded violence as an unwelcome necessity, to be kept down to the lowest point consistent with the Revolution’s success.

This was a temperamental difference of the highest importance, and of course most Revolutionists were at neither extreme. Many who would have shrunk from personal violence
unless they had been stimulated by mass excitement, did not shrink from using language which was meant to excite violent feelings, or from letting themselves go with violent thoughts and expressions when their tempers were roused. Especially in the more phlegmatic countries and where the police were not the natural enemies of the people, the Revolutionist's bark was often a good deal worse than his bite. Readiness to resort to violent behaviour was usually greatest either in backward countries or in frontier areas, such as the western mining districts of the United States or the mining areas of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Chile, or where racial as well as economic differences were involved.

The temperamental difference was, above all, between those who had a tendency to think in terms of catastrophe and those who had not. Revolutionism is always more dramatic than Reformism; and some like drama, while others are repelled by it, at any rate when it threatens to affect their own lives. In the more advanced countries the Revolutionist is usually something of a romantic: in the backward countries he may not be—he may be a man infuriated by tyranny or oppression, or desiring vengeance, and going coolly and rationally about his self-chosen task.

It is, of course, in the less advanced countries that 'the Revolution' most often means to those who espouse it 'the Bloody Revolution'; for there is usually much less chance of accomplishing any sort of revolution without the letting of blood. In Russia, in the Balkans, and in most parts of Latin America 'the Revolution' could hardly be thought of except in connection with letting off guns, executing enemies, and generally coercing people by making them fear for their lives. The actual amount of blood shed might or might not need to be great; but it was certain that the old order would offer forcible resistance to the new as long as it could, and that the Revolutionists would need to be prepared to use force if they were to stand a chance. Even Gandhi was able to entertain the idea of successful non-violent revolution in India only because his revolution was directed against an alien rule that might give way rather than start shooting, and not towards the victory of one class of his own people over another. In countries that are ruled by an indigenous governing class and have no tradition of
democracy the ruling class does not get off the backs of the people without being pushed — and pushed hard. In such countries it is barely possible to be a Socialist without being a forcible Revolutionist as well. Czardom had left no other way open. True, Russia had its 'legal Marxists' of the type of Peter Struve, but even they did not rule out the use of force. Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Left and Right Social Revolutionaries were not divided on the question of the need for revolution, but only about the best means of working for it.

On the other hand, in the more advanced countries and especially where there was some experience and tradition of bourgeois democracy and constitutional government, 'the Revolution' did not necessarily mean blood. It was possible to envisage it as coming in a bloodless or almost bloodless fashion, something like the following: (a) the building up of a body of mass-support behind a parliamentary party; (b) the winning of a parliamentary majority by that party; (c) the voting in the Popular Chamber of a measure proclaiming a new Constitution, or summoning a Constituent Assembly to make one; (d) the rejection of this measure by the Upper Chamber and by the Crown or the executive authority; (e) the presentation by the Popular Chamber of an ultimatum to these resistant powers, backed perhaps by the threat of a general strike, or even of insurrection; (f) the surrender of the ruling classes in face of this ultimatum because they realised that the popular movement was too strong for them to resist; and (g) the meeting of a Constituent Assembly to pass a new set of basic laws which would destroy the old order and lay the foundations of a Socialist society.

This, surely, was how, in their more optimistic moments, most of the leading German Social Democrats, and indeed most of the leaders of the Second International in Western continental Europe, where they proclaimed themselves Revolutionists, did think of the Revolution. They did not exclude the possibility that the governing classes would offer some resistance when they delivered their ultimatum; but they hoped it would not go to the length of shooting, or at any rate of much shooting, and they greatly hoped that a large part of the armed forces would refuse to shoot their fellow-workers down. At all events, they envisaged the first five of the above stages as the necessary stages
of preparation for the Revolution, and hoped that the sixth and seventh stages would follow. That was what Liebknecht and Bebel and Kautsky thought, and made the basis of their action after the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Laws. That was what Jules Guesde and his followers thought in France. That was, in effect, what the majority of the self-styled Revolutionary Socialists in all the Western continental Social Democratic parties wanted to think, and made the basis of the policies they set out to pursue. They were democrats as well as Socialists: they felt that they had no right to make the Revolution without the backing, or at least the assent, of a majority of the people. They thought of the proletariat as being, or as in process of becoming, the majority of the people; and they envisaged the mass-conversion of the proletariat to the Socialist cause as a necessary preliminary to the Revolution.

At least, this is how they envisaged the Revolution if it came about without the complicating factor of international war; and one element in their hostility to war was the sense that, if a great war did occur, it was not easy to see the Revolution coming about in quite that orderly way, with a Socialist conquest of a parliamentary majority in each separate country preparing the way for it. The debates at the International about the course to be pursued by Socialists in face of the imminence, or of the actual outbreak, of war brought out very clearly the extent to which the Germans in particular were scared of anything that required an unparliamentary approach to the making of the Socialist society. They hated the thought of the Socialists resorting to any sort of force until force had already been used to bar their way; and they hated the general strike against war, not only because they correctly regarded it as impracticable, at any rate in Germany, but also because they saw that it could not possibly succeed without turning into positive insurrection. They preferred to put such inconvenient issues aside, and to go on relying on what they knew they were good at — the organisation of a mass-party and the widening of electoral support, without asking themselves, as the extreme Left was continually asking, whether their mass-party and their millions of voters would really stand up to fighting if, when they presented their ultimatum, the ruling classes fought back instead of surrendering, dispersed their Parliament by force, seized their buildings
and their funds, disbanded their organisations, gaoled or killed their leaders, and in general behaved as thwarted ruling classes have usually behaved in the past.

In the hope of making such conduct less likely, they espoused with zeal the idea of a citizen army to replace the standing army, though there was not the smallest chance of their getting such a thing until after the Revolution had won the day. In the same hope, they took over all the projects of bourgeois pacifism — universal arbitration, agreed disarmament, and the rest. The Revolution had to come by parliamentary, democratic methods, or at all events these methods had to be used up to stage five, and it was inexpedient to consider any others.

It was hardly possible for any Russian to think like that. For the Russians the Revolution was not the last stage in a process that began with a number of constitutional stages, but the necessary first stage for setting the whole process going. The Russians had to begin, or thought they had, by winning a Constitution which they knew they could not win except by revolutionary means. But the Russian Social Democrats, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, knew, or thought they knew, that they were not ready to make a Socialist Revolution; so they resorted to the idea that the coming Russian Revolution would be not Socialist, but bourgeois — a belated French Revolution in a backward country not yet industrialised enough to leap straight to Socialism. There were several varieties of this attitude. On the extreme right were those who envisaged the Socialists co-operating closely with the Liberals in making the Revolution, and then either taking a subordinate place in a bourgeois revolutionary Government or supporting such a Government from outside over a period long enough to carry industrialisation to the requisite point for the Socialists to take power by the same democratic process as the Germans had in mind. In the centre was the main body of the Mensheviks, who held that the Socialists should help the Liberals to get power and to keep it, but should on no account contaminate themselves by entering into coalition with them. Among the Mensheviks there were varying views about the probable duration of this phase of bourgeois constitutionalism; for some believed that the Socialists could so act from outside the Government as to
speed up industrialisation and to shape it towards a rapid increase of proletarian power; whereas others envisaged, like the right wing, a long period of bourgeois rule. Finally, on the left were the Bolsheviks, whom Lenin persuaded to the view that the Socialist Revolution could be made to follow swiftly on the heels of its bourgeois predecessor, and that Socialists should not shrink from entering a bourgeois coalition in order to prevent the Liberals from ‘ratting’ on the bourgeois Revolution before it had been carried through to victory, but should stand ready, the moment they felt strong enough, to stab their bourgeois allies in the back — and if necessary the Mensheviks too — and make the Socialist Revolution without waiting for the country to have been industrialised, or for the proletariat to have become anything like a majority of the people.

Lenin’s conception of the two Revolutions necessarily raised, as a crucial question, the place of the peasants in both. Of course, all the Revolutionists wanted to win the peasants over to support of the Revolution at every stage. That was not the point at issue. The question was whether the peasants were to be regarded as potential partners of the urban proletariat in the making of the new order, or as mere instruments whose miseries and discontents could be exploited to strengthen the Revolution — either Revolution — or as something betwixt and between. After 1905, at any rate, it was clear that peasant uprisings would have to play a most important part in the first, bourgeois Revolution, and that the Socialists could by no means afford to ignore them in making their preparations. It was also obvious, at any rate after Stolypin’s agrarian reforms, that the peasants would not solidly support anything more than a bourgeois Revolution, and that many of the better-off peasants — the kulaks — would be positively hostile to the Socialist Revolution when the time for it arrived. Accordingly, Lenin had to consider very seriously not only the peasants as a whole, but also the class divisions among them, and to draw distinctions between quasi-proletarian peasants and quasi-bourgeois peasants, and lay plans in terms of dividing the village against itself, if not in the first Revolution, at any rate well in advance of the second. Indeed, this process would have to be begun even before the first Revolution; for it would be the poorer peasants who would bring about the uprisings in the villages that were a
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necessary part of the machinery for overthrowing Czarism.

The peasants were, moreover, of crucial importance because they made up the main part of the army, and it was necessary to induce as many as possible of them to refuse to obey orders to shoot the revolutionaries down. All this meant that the Socialists must offer the peasants something they could clearly understand as promising them — all except the best-off — a concrete and immediate gain. The thing to offer was obviously land. The trouble was that what the peasants wanted was land they could cultivate for themselves in small patches, and feel sure of keeping; whereas the Social Democrats believed not only in land nationalisation but also in large-scale cultivation and in the industrialisation of the countryside. ‘Never mind’, said Lenin, ‘the Revolution is what matters. If, in order to win the peasants for the Revolution, they must be given the land to occupy as they wish, we must give it them, or rather we must promise it them, and tell them to occupy it for themselves without waiting to be given it. Nationalisation and industrialised agriculture can wait. The immediate task is to win the first Revolution with the peasants’ help.’

‘That is all very well’, said Lenin’s critics. ‘But, if the peasants once get the land, will they ever give it up? Will they not in fact, having got the land, become the most determined opponents of the second, Socialist Revolution?’ ‘We must risk that’, said Lenin. ‘Our task is to make the first Revolution; and for that we must have all the allies we can find. We will face the further question when we have won the first round.’ ‘But it is against our principles to set up a backward, reactionary peasant régime’, said the critics. ‘Look what happened in France after 1789. The peasants are the great majority: how shall we be able to achieve the Socialist Revolution democratically if we have the peasants against us?’ At which Lenin perhaps winked.

There was no doubt in the minds of the Russian Social Democrats, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike, that the leadership of the Socialist Revolution would have to rest with the industrial workers, even if they succeeded in making the main body of the peasants their allies. They did not believe the peasants to be capable of leading or guiding the Revolution at any stage. In the first, bourgeois, Revolution it was of vital
importance to the Social Democrats — and especially to the Bolsheviks — to rally the peasants behind them as far as possible in order to prevent them from becoming, under kulak leadership, part of the bourgeois bloc. As the kulaks were certain to make common cause with the bourgeois parties, this meant trying to wrest the village leadership from them by organising the mass of poor peasants under proletarian influence and setting them to redistribute the land without waiting for State commissioners or for anybody else to come and do it with legal authority. Such a proposal shocked many Mensheviks, who wanted everything to be done in due order, and held that the peasants should be told to wait till the Constituent Assembly had passed a new land law. But a much greater obstacle in the way of Lenin’s policy was that the Social Revolutionaries had a much greater peasant following than the Social Democrats; and it was a question whether the correct policy was to make allies of them or to set out at once on an attempt to destroy their influence. The immediate answer was clear. In the first Revolution, at any rate, it was necessary for the Social Democrats to work with the S.R.s, and therefore, while doing all they could to strengthen their own position in the villages, to come to terms with them about encouraging the peasants to seize the land at once.

This was easy; for the S.R.s wanted the peasants to have the land, and were not, like the Bolsheviks, urging them to seize it only reluctantly, and for tactical reasons. There was a right wing of the S.R.s that wanted to work in with the liberal landowners and the progressive Zemstvos, and was opposed to stirring up the poorer elements in the villages against the more prosperous peasants. This group, for the most part, favoured peasant Co-operation — marketing and purchasing societies, credit societies, societies for sharing implements, and so on — and Agricultural Co-operation appealed mainly to the peasants who were better off. But the main body of the S.R.s consisted of advocates of peasant revolution, who believed that the old village community could be brought back to life in a changed form and that Russia could be transformed into an agrarian Socialist society without passing through the phase of capitalism. This type of S.R. was strongly in favour of the peasants seizing the land. His difference from
the Social Democrats was that he did not, like them, want to help the bourgeois Revolution to succeed first, and only then to go on to make the Socialist Revolution. For him there was only one Revolution, and he wanted to make it at once and relied on the peasants to do most of the making by spontaneous uprisings all over the country.

The S.R.s were strong among the national minorities of the Russian Empire — in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, among the Moslems of Asia, and generally in the outlying areas. It was necessary to come to terms with them; but this meant that the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries would be working together in order to make not one and the same Revolution, but two different Revolutions. That was why, both in 1905 and in 1917, real co-operation was so difficult.

The Revolution, whatever its nature, had to capture the countryside as well as the towns. In the countryside it was bound to result, if it succeeded, in the setting up of a number of regional Governments, some of which would represent national groups revolting against Russian imperial rule, and most of which would be inspired by the idea of a predominantly agrarian Socialism and would be much more concerned with their local affairs than with those of Russia as a whole. At the centre, on the other hand, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks would be working together to put the liberal bourgeoisie into power, and would need the support of the S.R.s for doing this. But most of the S.R.s hated the liberal bourgeoisie, and did not at all want to put it into power. They were, however, less divided from Lenin than from the Mensheviks, because Lenin envisaged the second Revolution as following rapidly upon the first, hated the bourgeoisie as much as they did, and made no secret of his intention of stabbing them in the back as soon as they had done what was required of them in overthrowing the Czarist autocracy. Lenin, therefore, could work with the S.R.s in the earlier phase of the Revolution, more easily than the Mensheviks, and indeed than many of his Bolshevik colleagues.

For Lenin did believe that the peasants could play a vital part in the Revolution, whereas there were others besides Trotsky who feared that, if they were allowed their head, they would wreck the Revolution's chances and merely break up the Russian Empire into a number of backward peasant States

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which would become bulwarks of oriental barbarism.

I have discussed the problem of the peasants’ part in the Revolution entirely in Russian terms; but it was of course by no means exclusively a Russian problem, or even a problem of the predominantly peasant countries. Every Socialist Party had to take account of it, and it assumed widely differing forms from country to country. In Rumania and in Hungary it was fairly like the Russian problem, except for the existence in Hungary of very large bodies of landless labourers: in Bulgaria and in some other parts of the Balkans it was essentially different, because there was no considerable class of great landowners to excite the peasants’ hate. In Austria, as in Russia, it was tangled up with the problem of autonomist movements of national minorities; in Germany it was one thing in the south and quite another in the east, with large bodies of relatively prosperous peasants in Bavaria, Baden, and the Rhineland, for example, and great masses of impoverished landless workers on the great estates of the east. In France, too, there were wide regional differences, for example between vine-growing and arable areas; but on the whole the French had to face a large class of relatively well-to-do peasant owners who owed their lands to the great Revolution, and wished to conserve the Revolution rather than to carry it further. Spain was a land of sharp contrasts between a few fertile areas cultivated by relatively prosperous peasants, other areas where very poor peasants were grossly overcrowded on minute holdings, and yet other areas where vast estates lay largely uncultivated and a great landless mass of peasants existed precariously at the landowners’ mercy. Italy had similar contrasts between the southern areas of the great latifundia and the north; but in the north and centre also there were districts, such as Emilia, of large estates and large, landless wage-earning populations. Each country had its own peasant problem to face, and in each the Socialists had to attempt to formulate an agrarian policy — and found great difficulty in doing so.

The peasant problem was by no means the only one that presented difficulties to the Russian Social Democrats in deciding on the kind of Revolution they meant to make. For the Mensheviks, as we observed, there were two Revolutions, to be separated by a considerable interval during which
industrialisation would go on under bourgeois government until the time was ripe for the Socialists to seize power. Then only would come the Socialist Revolution. But what sort of Revolution would this second Revolution be? I think most of the Mensheviks envisaged it much as most German Social Democrats thought of their Revolution — that is to say, in terms of the stages described on page 946, and not in terms of the violence of which they had to recognise the necessity in the first Revolution. The Mensheviks were Westernisers, and great admirers of German Social Democracy: they looked to the first Revolution to assimilate Russia to the West, so as to allow the second Revolution to be accomplished in the Western way. Lenin, on the other hand, though he too admired the German Social Democrats — whom up to 1914 at least he quite misunderstood — thought of the second even more than of the first Revolution in terms of a violent seizure of power by a minority. Lenin was not at all prepared to wait indefinitely while Russia became industrialised under bourgeois control before launching the second Revolution. At first, it was by no means clear what his criteria were for assessing the point at which the Socialist Revolution would become possible in Russia; but presently he arrived at the essentially new idea that, although Russia would have to become a developed industrial country in order to become ripe for Socialism and would therefore have to pass through a capitalist stage, there was no necessity for this stage to be passed through under capitalist government. Lenin conceived the notion of 'State Capitalism' — that is, of the practice of capitalistic methods and techniques by a Communist Government, which would exercise a workers' dictatorship, but would hold back from introducing actual Communism until the conditions for it had been made ready under a 'State Capitalist' régime.

This made it possible to advance the date of the Socialist, or Communist, Revolution so that it could speedily follow the bourgeois Revolution. For, on this view, the function of the bourgeois Revolution, in the economic field, became entirely negative. It had only to clear Czarism and autocracy out of the way, leaving the Communists, when it had done this, free to overthrow it and take power at once. Lenin's two Revolutions, then, were to be both quickly over, and were to be followed by
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a long process of industrialisation under Communist control. This long phase of transition was sometimes spoken of as ‘Socialism’ in distinction from the ‘Communism’ which would in due course follow it — the distinction resting on certain passages in Marx’s *Critique of the Gotha Programme* dealing with the abolition of unearned income but not of earned income differences during the period of transition.

This brings us to the distinctive view of the nature of the Revolution formulated by Leon Trotsky, who was neither a Bolshevik nor a Menshevik, nor something betwixt and between, but an essentially independent thinker. Trotsky’s view, partly formulated before the 1905 Revolution, but much more clearly and fully restated in the light of his experiences in 1905, has two main aspects — internal and international. Internally, he did not, like Lenin, draw a sharp distinction between two Revolutions: indeed, he rolled the two into one. He insisted that the Liberal bourgeoisie of Russia had neither the guts nor the strength to make any real Revolution, and that the proletariat would need, not to help them into power, but itself to assume the leading part and to carry through the Revolution on its own account. Taking a poor view of the peasants as allies, he had to put almost the entire emphasis on the industrial workers, few though they were, to stress the intensely modern character of what large-scale industry Russia possessed, and to attach great weight to the Soviets of the urban workers as the creative forces of the Revolution. Trotsky looked to the Soviets to take over the administration of the towns and of the areas round them, and in collaboration to constitute themselves the Government of the new Socialist society. He, like the rest of the Social Democrats, regarded rapid industrialisation as essential to the establishment of a Socialist society; and his view implied that this process would have to be carried through under Socialist, and not under bourgeois, control. Indeed, his hostility to the peasantry caused him to go further than Lenin in this respect, and to insist that the victorious Revolution must not only industrialise at top speed, under Socialist control, but must also make haste to socialise agriculture as well as industry, and to apply industrial methods to land cultivation, in order to convert the reactionary peasant as speedily as possible into a modern man.

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This was the internal aspect of Trotsky's doctrine. Its international aspect was of even greater importance. The name given to Trotsky's views on this matter is the rather misleading one of 'the Permanent Revolution', and he is often said to have borrowed it from the Russo-German Socialist, A. L. Helphand (1869–1924), better known by his pen-name, Parvus. Parvus had settled in Germany, and had become a leading writer on the German Left, contributing regularly to the *Neue Zeit* and to other German Socialist journals and also to *Iskra* and other Russian periodicals. Parvus had kept out of the controversy between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, and had tried, like Trotsky, to play the part of conciliator. But his views had much more in common with Bolshevism than with Menshevism. In 1904 Trotsky, having quarrelled with the Mensheviks as well as with the Bolsheviks, joined Parvus in Munich, and for some time lived and worked in close collaboration with him. This was at the time of the outbreak of the war between Russia and Japan; and this event was the text for a series of articles on 'War and Revolution' which Parvus published in *Iskra* in 1904. Parvus looked on the Russo-Japanese War as the first of a series of imperialist wars between the great Nation-States. Marx in 1848 had announced the impending downfall of the Nation-State and had proclaimed the essential internationalism of the workers' Revolution; but during the second half of the nineteenth century the Nation-State, instead of disappearing, had steadily increased its strength and had turned, wherever it was powerful enough, into the centre of an imperialist State system. Moreover, submerged nationalities had increasingly asserted their claim to have Nation-States of their own; and Socialism, while rebutting Nationalism as a creed, had become to some extent its ally where it was asserting the claims of an enslaved or subjugated people. The Socialists in Austria-Hungary, and in the Russian Empire particularly, had been wrestling rather unhappily with the national problem, torn between their sympathy for the cause of national self-determination and their desire not to see the working-class struggle broken up on national lines; and no satisfactory solution of the problem had been reached.¹

Parvus now entered the field by arguing that the develop-

¹ See Chapter XII.
ment of capitalism and colonialism had made the world into a vast arena of commercial and imperial rivalries, so that not only between countries but also between continents there was so much interdependence that the Nation-State, even in its expanded imperialist form, was becoming wholly obsolete. This growth of interdependence, however, was leading, not to cultural or economic unification, but to an increasing clash between the rival States, which was bound to result in mutually destructive wars. The Russo-Japanese War, said Parvus, was a war, not so much for Korea or Manchuria, as for hegemony in Eastern Asia. It would be followed by similar struggles in other parts of the world. What happened to Russia in Asia would affect Russia’s fortunes in Europe. Russia’s economic backwardness had already caused it to fall under the control of French finance. The internal strains set up by the attempt to play the great imperialist power despite the weakness of the economic and social structure would lead to revolution in Russia. ‘The Russian Revolution will shake the bourgeois world . . . and the Russian proletariat may well play the rôle of vanguard of the social revolution.’ This, it must be borne in mind, was written in 1904.

Thus Parvus was already thinking in terms of World Revolution, rather than of separate national Revolutions, and was suggesting that the Russians might become the leaders in the World Revolution, not in spite of Russia’s backwardness, but because of it.

Trotsky was undoubtedly much influenced by these ideas. Towards the end of 1904, when revolution in Russia seemed to be already well on the way, he was at work on a pamphlet in which he was attempting to define the course it should follow. He finished this pamphlet immediately after the massacre of Father Gapon’s demonstrators at St. Petersburg in January 1905, which is commonly regarded as the actual beginning of the Revolution; and he called it *The Period up to the Ninth of January* — the date of the massacre. Trotsky’s pamphlet was mainly a violent attack on the Liberals for their vacillations and their lack of clearly defined objectives, and an insistence that there would be no Revolution unless the industrial proletariat assumed the leadership of it. He envisaged the Revolution as beginning with a general strike that would get the working
class out on the streets, occupying the towns, seizing key buildings, and constituting their own revolutionary administration. The towns, he said, would be the main centres of revolutionary activity; but they could not make the Revolution alone. The peasants, too, must be brought in as a ‘source of revolutionary energy’: the agitation must be carried immediately into the countryside as well. Propaganda must be carried into the mainly peasant army, so that the soldiers, who had no lack of grievances of their own, would refuse to shoot the demonstrators. ‘We must develop the most intense agitation among the soldiers so that at the moment of the strike every soldier who is sent to suppress the “rebels” will know that what faces him is the people demanding the summoning of a Constituent Assembly.’

Parvus wrote a preface to Trotsky’s pamphlet, in which he stated, much more unequivocally than Trotsky had done, the case for the single Revolution. ‘The Revolutionary Provisional Government of Russia’, he wrote, ‘will be the Government of a workers’ democracy. . . . As the Social Democratic Party is at the head of the revolutionary movement . . . this Government will be Social Democratic.’ It was to be a ‘coherent Government with a Social Democratic majority’—not a Government composed of, or dominated by, the bourgeoisie. This conclusion was acceptable to neither Mensheviks nor Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks insisted that, as the Revolution would necessarily be bourgeois in nature, the bourgeoisie should be left to control it, with the Socialists in opposition. Lenin insisted that Parvus’s conception was impossibilist, because such a revolutionary dictatorship of the workers could have no stability unless it were based on a great majority of the people, whereas the Russian proletariat was only a minority. Accordingly, the Revolutionary Government would have to be set up by a coalition, in which the petty bourgeois and half-proletarian elements would have to take part, or even predominate. ‘It would be most damaging’, said Lenin, ‘to entertain any illusions at all about this matter.’

Probably neither Trotsky nor Parvus was at this stage clear how far these doctrines carried them. Neither had explicitly challenged the view that the function of the Revolution—of what Lenin would have called the ‘first Revolution’
— would be mainly destructive, and that Socialism would be still to build after its success. But Trotsky insisted that the brunt of the revolutionary struggle was bound to fall on the industrial proletariat and that this would force it to take power whether it would or no. He went on to say that it was inconceivable that the proletariat, having once taken power, would voluntarily give it up — which amounted to saying that they would retain it and use it to make the Socialist Revolution.

There the matter stood while the Revolution of 1905 was going through its phases, with Trotsky at the head of the St. Petersburg Soviet. But the Revolution failed, and Trotsky was arrested. In prison he had leisure to reflect upon it, and to reformulate his ideas about the successful Revolution that was still to come. The results of his reflections appeared partly in the History of the St. Petersburg Soviet which he edited. He there proclaimed that next time there would be Soviets in all the towns all over the country, taking governmental power into their hands, and Peasant Soviets in the countryside, to carry through the rural revolution. ‘It is easier’, he wrote, ‘to formulate such a plan than to carry it out. But if victory is destined for the Revolution, the proletariat cannot but assume this rôle.’

The main part of Trotsky’s doctrine was embodied in an essay, ‘The Balance and the Prospects’, which was published as the final section of his book, Our Revolution. It was written in 1906, but the book did not circulate widely, and the essay was not well known until after 1917. In it Trotsky argued that the industrial proletariat, having borne the burden of the Revolution, would be forced to carry it on to Socialism, even in the absence of a Socialist Revolution in Western Europe. He contended that the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which unfitted it for revolutionary leadership, was due to the fact that in Russia the State had subordinated everything to itself, so that capitalism had developed, not as an independent force, but as the State’s servant. The Russian towns had been centres, not of production, but of consumption. Industrial crafts had developed mainly, not in the towns, but scattered over the villages. There was, accordingly, in the towns, neither a large productive bourgeois class nor a large number of skilled artisans. What modern industry they contained was chiefly in
the hands of foreigners: it therefore generated a proletariat, but not a native middle class. But the proletariat it created was highly concentrated, and well capable of strong organisation. These facts dictated the pattern of revolution in Russia.

Trotsky then went on to consider the Revolution internationally. There had been three outstanding revolutionary dates — 1789, 1848, and 1905. In 1789 the French bourgeoisie had masterfully led the way, and there had been no coherent proletarian movement. In 1848 in the key-centre, Germany, the bourgeoisie had lacked the courage and self-confidence to carry through the Revolution; and the working class, though already strong enough to scare the bourgeoisie, was not yet strong enough to assume the leadership. In 1905, in Russia, the workers had taken the lead, in face of a still feeble bourgeoisie; and though they were being beaten back, it would not be long before they carried the Revolution through to victory.

Against those who spoke of the immaturity of Russia for Socialist Revolution, Trotsky said: ‘In an economically backward country the proletariat can take power sooner than in countries where capitalism is more advanced’. He wanted the industrial workers, minority though they were, to seize governmental power, to draw the peasants into the Revolution under their leadership, and to establish a dictatorship in which they would be given a subordinate share. ‘The proletariat’, he said, ‘will appear before the peasantry as its liberator’; and the peasants, having been encouraged and helped to seize the landlords’ estates, would accept the proletariat as their leader. Thus the proletarian minority would gain majority support for its dictatorship. Thus Trotsky, in 1906, was in advance even of Lenin in favouring the seizure of the land by the peasants. At that time only Stalin, among the leaders of Bolshevism, took the same line. Both men saw, as Lenin was soon to see, that this was the only way in which the Revolution could triumph in the countryside and so make possible its durable victory in the towns. But Trotsky’s insistence on this did not make him believe that the peasants could become a truly creative force in the Socialist Revolution. He thought that only the proletariat could be that. He expected a sharp conflict with the peasantry to follow the success of the Revolution; and he believed that the peasants would at that stage defeat the Socialist Revolution.
unless it had become international. 'Without the direct governmental support of the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and transform its temporary rule into a stable and durable Socialist dictatorship.'

This is, of course, the crux of Trotsky's doctrine. He was arguing that the Russian Revolution, which he held must be a Socialist Revolution, could not last unless it gave the signal for World Revolution and became, in his own words, 'the initiator of the liquidation of capitalism on a world-wide scale'. Trotsky then went on to say that fear of the proletariat would induce the European bourgeoisie to make frantic efforts to avoid internecine war, because 'European war inevitably means European revolution', but that they would necessarily fail because nothing could get rid of the mutual antagonisms of the great powers, or prevent them from issuing in armed conflict.

Trotsky, then, shared Rosa Luxemburg's view that capitalism was more likely to be brought down by internecine war than by its inherent economic contradictions resulting in the exhaustion of its expansive capacity. But the essential part of his argument turned, not directly on this point, but on his anticipation of what would be the course of a renewed, initially successful Russian Revolution. He was convinced that this would come soon; but he was also convinced that, as soon as the proletariat tried to make it Socialist, the peasants would turn against it and, aided by forces of reaction from outside Russia, would be able to destroy it unless the proletariat of the more advanced countries came to its defence. 'Left to itself, the Russian working class will inevitably be crushed by the counter-revolution at the moment when the peasantry turns its back on the proletariat. Nothing will remain for the workers but to link the fate of their own political rule, and consequently the fate of the whole Russian Revolution, with that of the Socialist Revolution in Europe.' As Trotsky put the case, it was not only that the workers of Europe would save the Russian Revolution, but also that the Russian workers would throw their great power and energy 'into the scales of the class-struggle of the entire capitalist world'. The Russian Revolution would thus turn into a World Revolution, in which Russian and Western Socialists would fight side by side.
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Trotsky’s doctrine of Permanent Revolution did not, at the time, attract much attention. At a later stage, the view that Socialist Revolution in Russia could not hope to maintain itself without the help of revolution in the West came to be practically an agreed tenet of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks alike; but in 1906 hardly anyone except Trotsky had discussed it, though, of course, much had been said about the probability of war precipitating World Revolution, and such leftists as Rosa Luxemburg had already been insisting on the need to give the revolutionary movement an international character and to think in terms not of a series of national revolutions but of a World Revolution on a class-basis, transcending national frontiers. The World Revolution was already a familiar idea; and it was usually thought of in terms of actual fighting, and as most probably coming about as a consequence of international war. The idea was, however, in the main the property of the extreme Left. Save when they were explaining that they did not wish war to break out even though it might help to precipitate World Revolution, most of the Western leaders said practically nothing about it.

So far, in this chapter, we have been considering only the opinions of those Socialists who regarded themselves as Revolutionists, in the sense that they held that some sort of revolution would be necessary for bringing the Socialist society to birth. We have now to review the position of the Socialists who rejected this view, and either described themselves as ‘Reformists’, or did not repudiate the label when it was fastened upon them. Among these were the German Revisionists and Reformists, headed by Bernstein and Vollmar, the British Fabians and most of the British I.L.P. and Labour Party, most of the Scandinavians, the main part of the American Socialist Party (but not, of course, the Socialist Labour Party or the I.W.W.), the Swiss, a section of the Italians, the bulk of the Australian Labour Parties and a part of the New Zealand Party, the French Millerandists (but not Jaurès or the main body of French Socialists), and, perhaps, the Russian ‘Legal’ Marxists. The French moderates, except Millerand and his like, cannot be put into this category because the words, ‘la Révolution’, had for them a special reference to the great French Revolution of 1789, which they regarded it as their mission to preserve and
to complement by achieving ‘la révolution sociale’. They had their own doctrine, derived from Proudhon, of the ‘permanent’ or immanent revolution; but in many respects they agreed with those who in other countries accepted the Reformist label.

The Reformist doctrine, as stated, for example, by Sidney Webb in *Fabian Essays*, rested on an alternative version of Marx’s Conception of History. The Reformists saw the powers of production being continually advanced by scientific and technological discovery, and saw these advances bringing about changes in the structure of society. Like Marx they descried in social development a continuing tendency towards the ‘socialisation’ of the processes of production, which destroyed the identity of the product of the individual worker and converted him into a mere contributor to a social process of production. This ‘socialisation’ also took the form of increasing scale of production, increasing integration between factory and factory, industry and industry, market and market. They expected it to go on further and further, with increasing concentration of control in the hands of great trusts and combines, till presently these were taken over and made public property, to be administered for the common benefit. So far, they agreed with Marx; but they differed from him in believing that, as production increased, the workers would be able to improve their conditions and standards of living, partly by exacting higher real wages and partly by securing from the State, which they would democratise, an expanding system of social welfare services and a redistribution of incomes and property through taxation designed to confiscate ‘rent’ and appropriate it to bettering the condition of the people and to the further development of productive power.

The political side of this Reformist doctrine was that the State was not, as Marx had asserted it to be, of its very nature a class institution, existing to serve the interests of a particular class, but was to be regarded rather as of its essence neutral, as an instrument ready to be used by any class or group or collection of human beings who could get control of it. Thus, if by the establishment of electoral democracy and of responsible government the State were brought under the power of the majority of the people, it would become, said the Reformists, the instrument of that majority; and if the democratic system
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were brought into being by constitutional changes, without resort to violence, the capitalist State would be turned without revolution into the People's State, and could be used for the introduction of Socialism. The Reformists did not deny that States had often been in practice the instruments of a governing class: they denied that this need be so, or that the State could be properly defined as an organ of class-domination. The Marxists, on the other hand, insisted that the State should be defined only in this way, and added that a State which had been the instrument of one governing class could by no means be taken over and made the instrument of a different class. The old State would have to be smashed, and a new State, corresponding to the needs of the new dominant class, would have to be put in its place.

This was, of course, in part a quarrel over words; for none denied that the State would need to change its character in order to become the instrument of a different class. But the Marxist conception implied that this change had to take place all of a sudden, with the new State suddenly replacing the old, whereas the Reformists thought in terms of a gradual transformation of State functions in which it would be impossible to point to any one moment when the State had ceased to be one thing and become another. The real issue was thus between gradualism and catastrophism rather than between alternative definitions of 'the State'.

Of course, the Reformist view implied that the existing social and economic system was neither such as to engender conditions of 'increasing misery' for the main body of the people nor destined to be laid suddenly low by its inherent 'contradictions'. The Reformist might argue that capitalism was becoming less and less suitable as a means of making the most of the available powers of production; but he usually assumed that, on the whole, the output of goods and services would go on increasing faster than the population, despite capitalist inefficiency, and that it would continue to be possible to increase welfare without causing economic breakdown. He might hold that welfare would increase very much faster as further advances towards Socialism were brought about; and he might argue that partial breakdowns would occur unless certain parts of the productive structure — for example,
railways — were brought under public operation. But he held that cracks in the existing structure could be mended by piece-meal methods — by socialisation of particular industries, by the development of protective laws and social services, and by transferring more and more of the ‘surplus’ in the hands of the rich into the hands of the whole community.

Thus the Reformists were on the whole optimists, and the Revolutionists pessimists, about the prospects of production and living standards without a revolution. But, whereas the Revolutionists drew a sharp distinction between ‘increasing misery’ under capitalism and ‘increasing prosperity’ under Socialist planning and construction, the Reformists recognised no such sharp distinction. Socialism was, for most of them, a matter not of an absolute, but of more or less. They thought, as Bernstein said of himself, more of the process than of the result. Socialism, in a complete sense, might never come: more Socialism would and could come without the need for a sharp break at any one point. Of course, many Reformists recognised that there might, in fact, be a sharp break; but instead of greeting this prospect with pleasure, as ‘the glorious Revolution’, they hoped to avoid its occurrence, and laid their plans on lines designed to make it less likely.

The Reformists were of many sorts and kinds. At one extreme there were philanthropists whose entire concern was with the increase of social welfare, and who concerned themselves mainly with the improvement of social legislation and with getting the rich taxed to pay for it. These shaded into the Reformists who argued that there were narrow limits to what could be achieved by these methods, unless the State also took at least the key industries into its hands and thus put itself in a position to dispense with profit-incentives in relation to them, and to remove the fetters on output which the search for private profit imposed. There were arguments between ‘eleemosynary’ Socialists and ‘socialising’ Socialists, and also about how much actual ‘socialisation’ was indispensable in order to provide a secure basis for Socialist economic planning — and how far ‘control’ could be made to do instead. Then there were out-and-out socialisers who wanted the State or the municipality to take over everything in the name of ‘consumer democracy’, but wanted this to come about gradually, by a
sequence of Acts of Parliament dealing with each particular industry or service, and insisted that, as a matter of equal justice, gradual socialisation involved compensation to the existing owners. Some of these added, as Shaw did, that the compensation paid must be derived entirely from taxes on the owners of property, so that they would be, in effect, compensating one another without cost to the community. Some favoured, instead of compensation, only terminable annuities to ease the transition, and some rejected compensation altogether in certain cases — for example, land — on the ground that there could be no right to private property in the gifts of nature, but only a limited right in man-made capital assets.

The dispute over compensation often occupied, especially in Great Britain, a large place in the disputes between the Left and the Right. The Left pointed out that the payment of compensation, unless it were accompanied by at least equivalent transfers of property to the public by means of taxes on capital — e.g. on inheritance — would reduce nationalisation to a mere change from private to public management and would carry with it no necessary diminution of private property. It would merely substitute interest payments for profits, and would leave the workers in the transferred industries subject to much the same exploitation as before. The Left ridiculed the notion that the rich could be made to pay through higher taxes on income or consumption the sums required for public purchase of industries, without rendering it impossible to tax them more heavily at the same time for the expansion of redistributive social services; and they argued that publicly administered industries, if they were required to earn interest for the former owners, would inevitably continue to be carried on in an essentially capitalistic way. The Right was not greatly troubled by these criticisms, fundamentally sound though they were; for the gradualists were mostly quite prepared to postpone expropriation of the owning classes to an undated future, provided they were allowed to advance towards nationalisation, or some variant of it, by the easiest road. As for terminable annuities, the Right argued that their adoption would make no real difference, because in equity they would have to be made high enough to represent the full value of the assets transferred; whereas the Left denied this necessity and wanted
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the annuities to continue only for the time it was expected to take to make socialisation general, and to be regarded as notice to quit, given in advance to the entire class of capitalists, who would thus receive fair warning what to expect. The Right, of course, rejected this view because its adherents neither had in their minds any date for the completion of the socialising process nor even contemplated that it would be completed, or private ownership of the means of production ended, within any predictable term of years.

The Reformists were all gradualists, if they were politicians. But there were some who were not. Hertzka, for example, proposed to establish in Central Africa a brand-new State set free from the toll of rent and interest on the producers, to serve as a model which presently all the States of the world would copy when it had proved its superior efficiency. It may be said that Hertzka was not a Socialist, even of a reformist kind; but he had at any rate taken over quite a number of Socialist ideas. The foundation of ideal Communities was not, for the most part, a characteristic of the period studied in this volume, except for a few groups which set out not so much to regenerate the world as to live the 'good life' away from its evils and trivialities — for example, Tolstoyans. William Lane's Paraguay experiment was an isolated instance, and not encouraging in its results; and Lane can certainly not be described as a Reformist. For the most part the Reformists were not at all disgusted with the world, or desirous of escaping from it, even if they thought much of its behaviour rather silly. They were advocates of the Welfare State who believed that, given a democratic franchise and a Government responsible to the electors, the State could be used as an instrument for the diffusion of the means to the good life.

The Reformist Socialists were, moreover, nearly all ardent political democrats. They did not consider that they had a right to establish Socialism, or to advance towards it, without a popular mandate; and they wanted to act on the mandate of a majority of the whole people, and not of a class. They disliked the idea of the class-struggle, even when they accepted it as a social fact. They were opposed to exclusive class-appeals, and utterly hostile to the notion of class-dictatorship. This word,
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‘dictatorship’, was, in fact, seldom used by the Marxists, except in Russia — and not a great deal even there till Lenin got busy with it. When the Germans used it they did not as a rule mean by it any exclusive system of working-class rule, but only that, in a democratic society, the proletariat, as the most numerous class and the best organised, would actually rule the roost without any need to disfranchise or discriminate against other people. We have seen how much emphasis the Germans put on the winning of a majority under universal suffrage as a necessary pre-condition of Socialism; and we must not forget that even the Bolsheviks demanded a Constituent Assembly for which other people, equally with workers, would be entitled to vote. It may have been partly because he accepted this condition that Lenin insisted so strongly on the distinction between the two Revolutions, of which the second — the Socialist — could come only when the proletariat had become a majority, or at any rate only when the proletariat plus the other elements of the people it had managed to assimilate to itself had become a majority. The Reformists were even more insistent that the Socialists must march forward only in accord with what the majority would support. They took the parliamentary vote very seriously indeed, as an expression of the will of the people, and relied on winning majorities gradually for more and more advanced socialistic measures.

On this issue there were throughout our period groups which were strongly opposed to both the Revolutionists and the Reformist ‘democrats’. This opposition, too, had its right and left wings: it included at one extreme the Voluntarists of the Co-operative movement, and at the other the apostles of Anarchist-Communism and of Revolutionary Syndicalism. What bound all these discordant groups together was opposition to the extension of the State’s powers to cover the ordering of all the major collective activities of society, whether the State was envisaged as a dictatorship or as an open democracy. They argued that, though industrialist profit-seeking was evil, it was undesirable, in destroying it, to make the State — even the electorally democratic State — the universal master. Many of them argued that parliamentary democracy was not real democracy because the elector had no real power to control any representative whom he elected, not to do something specific,
but to exercise universal power. Some of these anti-parlia-
mentarians wanted to do away with government altogether;
but what they really meant was that, instead of concentrating
authority over everything in one place, they wanted to divide it
up, both functionally and locally, so as to limit it to the exercise
of particular functions and in doing so make it more amenable
to control by those it was supposed to represent, and at the same
time so as to decentralise it and keep it near to, and in close
touch with, those who were to be called upon to observe its
regulations.

Thus the Co-operators for the most part looked forward
to a gradual taking over of the economic work of society by
voluntary associations of consumers and producers, managing
their own affairs with a minimum of interference from the
State. The Syndicalists, on the other hand, regarded the Trade
Union as the primary organ of democracy, arguing that what a
man was at his work he would tend to be in his whole way of life,
and that unless he were free and self-governing as a producer,
in association with his immediate fellows, socialisation would
lead to a Servile State in which politicians and bureaucrats, in
the name of an unreal democracy, would tyrannise over the
common man. The Anarchist-Communists, with a different
emphasis, wanted to put power in the hands of local com-
unities of friends and neighbours, who would manage their
affairs with a minimum of bureaucratic machinery, and would,
as far as possible, act directly rather than transfer their power
to representatives, as had to be done where social organisation
was on a large scale. Guild Socialists, as distinct from both
these schools of thought, put great emphasis on functional
organisation, holding representation to be real where the
representative was chosen for a definite and limited task, but
unreal where he was supposed to stand in the place of the
‘whole man’, and to express his will in relation to everything.
All these critics of parliamentary democracy were ‘pluralists’,
except perhaps the Anarchist-Communists. They all wanted,
instead of an omnicompetent State, a variety of agencies of
social control, each with its own particular job to do, and none
authorised to ride roughshod over the rest.

As against these pluralists and libertarians, the Social
Democrats, whether of the Right or the Left, were advocates
of unitary State Sovereignty, and most of them of centralisation as well. Both Bolsheviks and parliamentary Social Democrats regarded increasing centralisation of power as an unmistakable characteristic of progress, and regarded themselves as the destined heirs of capitalist concentration and of the centralised power of the modern State. They identified the growth of 'socialisation', in the broadest Marxist sense, with the growth of scale and the accumulation of power in larger units of both production and government. On this issue the Reformists were divided; for some of them were ardent nationalisers, while others favoured municipalisation in the hope of lessening the concentration of power; and some of them looked forward, not to State Socialism so much as to a situation in which the State, while acting as the co-ordinating planner, would use a diversity of self-governing agencies for the execution of its social purposes rather than concentrate administrative authority in its own hands.

When, some pages back, I made an attempt to classify the Socialists of a number of countries in respect of their attitudes to Revolution and Reform, there were certain countries which I deliberately left out of the analysis. Among these were, in particular, Austria and Belgium. I left out Austria because, for the Austrian Socialists, the issue was inextricably mixed up with the question of the survival of the Austrian Empire and with that of Nationalism. The Austrians had to contemplate the possibility of the Austrian State being broken up by national Revolutions, which might or might not be Socialist, or half-Socialist, Revolutions as well. Some of them, mainly among those who belonged to the non-German groups, wanted such Revolutions to occur: most of the German-Austrian Socialists rather hoped that the Austrian State could be held together by the establishment of some form of cultural national autonomy that would not destroy its economic or political unity. This tended to make Austrian Social Democracy reformist in practice; but it could not, in face of the reactionary character of the existing Austrian Empire, declare against Revolutionism. It was therefore, even more than German Social Democracy, in two minds. The Belgians faced a less complicated, but still a sufficiently difficult situation. They certainly did not wish to break up the Belgian State into separate Flemish and Walloon
States; but the strength of Catholicism in the Flemish part of the country confronted them with a situation in which the winning of a Socialist majority looked most unlikely, and they were therefore unable to accept the optimistic view of the Germans about an early victory for Socialism by parliamentary pressure. This forced them to put great stress on creating, among their own supporters within the existing system, as much of a Socialist way of life as they could. It led them to establish, and to cling to, the close association of Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, and Mutualities with the political party, and to accept the corollary that, if they established such a structure, the Catholics would be bound to do the same, so that there would be rival Trade Unions, Co-operative Societies, and social institutions, and a divided working class. I called my chapter dealing with Belgium ‘The Socialist Stalemate’ because it seemed to me that the Belgians were the first Western Socialists who realised that parliamentary democracy would not avail to carry them to victory as the representatives of a clear majority of the people.

There were others, no doubt, who might have realised this, for different reasons. Again and again in the Socialist writing of the period one finds the assumption that the proletariat either constitutes, or will soon come to constitute, the majority—even the great majority—of the people. The Germans were continually asserting this, and speaking as if the majority of the electorate they hoped to win to their cause would be a proletarian majority, even while they were eagerly wooing the non-proletarian electors. But was it true either that the proletariat was already a majority, or that it was in process of becoming so? The denial of this came chiefly from certain of the Syndicalists, such as Robert Michels, Georges Sorel, and Hubert Lagardelle, and also from many of the Reformists, who did not wish to rest their Socialism on a foundation of class-war. These critics insisted that the advanced capitalist societies, far from becoming polarised into two hostile classes of bourgeois and proletarians, were, in fact, becoming more and more differentiated, with a falling proportion of manual workers, a rising proportion of blackcoats and administrators, and a rising proportion of persons possessed of enough property to have something to lose besides their chains. We have seen how Kautsky and his
opponents fell out about the facts concerning the disappearance of the peasantry, and how critics of Marxism fastened on the theory of ‘increasing misery’ as contradicted by the actual course of development under capitalism. It was a plain fact that, if ‘proletariat’ meant only industrial manual workers, it was most unlikely that under capitalism it would ever come to constitute a majority of the people, and highly probable that the further advance of capitalism would decrease its relative size. This decrease would not, of course, occur in backward countries, where the relative as well as the actual number of such ‘proletarians’ would go on increasing for a considerable time; but it would apply to the countries which most Socialists regarded as most nearly ripe for Socialism.

This difficulty could be got round by re-defining the term ‘proletariat’ so as to include the growing mass of salaried persons, and, if necessary, also the peasants, to the exclusion of the more prosperous farmers. But such re-definition made the ‘proletariat’ much less a homogeneous class, and much less capable of unified organisation and class-solidarity in action. It made the very characteristics which were held to endow the proletariat with its Socialist elan the properties, not of the whole proletariat, but of a section. This section could still be regarded as the ‘vanguard’, which by its cohesion and capacity for organisation would rally all the other elements behind it in the struggle for Socialism; but that amounted to saying that the force making for Socialism was not the proletariat as a class, but rather an élite within the proletariat — certainly not a majority of the whole people. If this élite was to dictate, the dictatorship would be that, not of a majority, but of a minority swaying a majority. If there was to be no dictatorship, but whatever government the majority wanted, the Socialists, in order to get and hold a majority, would have to dilute their policy to meet the wishes of the marginal electors.

This was the real Socialist dilemma of the years before 1914, which had brought with them the rise of large Socialist parliamentary parties in Western Europe, but had nowhere — not even in Germany — brought these parties within sight of a majority that would enable them to introduce Socialism with a democratic mandate. The Germans, like the rest, had been

1 See p. 260 ff.
forced to dilute their immediate programmes in order to get even as far as they had got, and it looked as if further dilution lay ahead, despite the theoretical repudiation of Revisionism and Reformism in all their varieties.

What, then, was to happen next? Many Socialists, especially those with leftish sympathies, found a way out by prophesying that capitalism would soon collapse, either in a 'final' economic crisis of mass-unemployment and under-consumption or under the stress of inter-capitalist, imperialist war, and that this collapse of the old order would either convert the mass of the people to the cause of Socialism or endow the Socialists, as the one power standing upright amid the dissolution of the old order, with the strength to establish Socialism without waiting for the mass-conversion of the people, and to win and hold majority support by confronting the disorganised non-Socialists with an accomplished fact. As against this others, whose sympathies were with the Reformists, moved towards the idea that perhaps Socialism was not a system after all, so much as a tendency, and that the task of the Socialist Parties and movements was not, after all, to set up a Socialist society, but rather to move steadily in the direction of the Welfare State. But most Socialists did not commit themselves to either of these attitudes or expectations. They went on hoping for the best.

In some countries the question of revolutionary action hardly arose at all, though in all at least small groups of Revolutionists, or of persons who supposed themselves to be Revolutionists, were to be found, just as there were usually small groups of Reformists even in countries where the existing State structure allowed practically no scope for reform without revolution. In Great Britain, for example, the Social Democratic Federation talked a great deal about revolution, and abused the Fabians and the Labour Party for rejecting it; but there was never the smallest possibility of revolution being even attempted in practice. Keir Hardie advocated the general strike against war not as a Revolutionist but as an ardent pacifist; and the turbulent scenes at Liverpool and elsewhere during the great unrest of 1910–14 had nothing to do with revolution. Ireland, of course, was another matter; but the Irish Revolutionists were Nationalists, and mostly by no means Socialists, and even in Ireland the main threat of revolution,
up to 1914, came from the Ulster Unionists and not from the Left. The British Labour Party, to which the I.L.P. and the Fabians were attached, was not even professedly Socialist until 1917 or 1918, though it had passed a number of Socialist resolutions.

Nor did the question of revolution really arise, as a practical issue, in the United States, or in Australia or New Zealand, though in all these countries the Industrial Workers of the World combined the advocacy of it with very militant industrial activity. In these countries the Socialist and Labour Parties included Revolutionists in their ranks; but, except De Leon’s Socialist Labour Party, they were not revolutionary parties. Revolutionists and Reformists were able to work together in them because revolution was not a practical issue. In all of them the franchise was wide, though women were still voteless, and the parliamentary system was worked on a basis of responsible government which made the way open, not only to piece-meal reforms, but also to structural changes in the social system, if a majority of the electorate clearly wanted them or gave persistent backing to the politicians who demanded them. In such countries, under the conditions that existed up to 1914, revolution could not be practical politics, except for a national minority such as the Catholic Irish — and not at all easily even for them.

There were countries in continental Europe as well where the question of revolution hardly arose as a practical issue. Norway had its national, but not a social, Revolution; but elsewhere in the Scandinavian countries, despite the narrow franchise, there was hardly any revolutionary movement. There was more in Holland; but it was based on weakness rather than strength, and was more a reaction against the futility of parliamentary politics than an expression of revolutionary will. Nor was revolution really ‘practical politics’ in Belgium, though strong pressure for parliamentary reform by means of strikes and demonstrations was. There were Revolutionists, especially among the Walloons; but the Belgian Labour Party had no large revolutionary element in its ranks. There were a few Revolutionists in French, but very few, except exiles, in German Switzerland. In all these countries, even in Switzerland, there were sharp industrial struggles, and in the
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Scandinavian countries, one after another, the massed forces of Capital and Labour met in organised conflict; but there was never any prospect of the Danish, or Norwegian, or Swedish general strikes turning into Revolutions.

Nor, in truth, was there ever any real prospect of revolution in Germany. For the main body of German believers in 'the Revolution' had definitely postponed it to a day when Socialism would have won a parliamentary majority and, even then, looked forward to carrying it through by constitutional parliamentary procedures. The Germans, except a very small minority, were in practice and in attitude as reformist as the British. The leading Revolutionist among them, Rosa Luxemburg, was not a German but a Pole and was at least as much concerned with the Russian as with the German Revolution: indeed, she regarded them as one. Revolution, or at any rate Social Revolution, was an East European affair, and in its social aspect predominantly Russian.

There remain France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Portugal had a Revolution, but practically no Socialist movement. Spain was always seething with potential revolution, but could never combine its forces into a single movement; and Spanish Social Democracy, under Iglesias, was no more revolutionary in fact than German. Italy was always liable to émeutes; but the Socialists had little strength in the down-trodden south, and a gulf separated the industrial workers of the northern cities from the turbulent lumpenproletariat of Naples, or even of Rome. Finally, in France the Guesdists were like the Germans, the followers of Jaurès were defenders of a past Revolution rather than advocates of a new one, the Blanquists under Vaillant had shed their zeal for conspiracy, and most of the Syndicalists, even if they called their movement 'le syndicalisme révolutionnaire', had no immediate intention of endeavouring to overthrow the bourgeois Republic by violence. France had a large supply of Revolutionists, on the Right as well as on the Left, and there might have been some attempt, beyond Boulanger's, at a revolutionary coup. But such an attempt was, in fact, more likely to come from the Right than from the Left: the idea of a Syndicalist Revolution was never more than an idea: it never became a 'complot'.

In effect, West European Socialism, whatever it called itself,
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was a reformist and not a revolutionary movement. In some countries it was still striving for universal (or at least manhood) suffrage and for the establishment of responsible government, and was using the demonstration general strike as one of its instruments for this purpose. In other countries these conditions existed already, and it was occupied mainly with demands for social legislation or with Trade Union affairs. The only issue that compelled it to face at all the question of revolutionary action was that of war; and it found this confrontation embarrassing and did not know how to deal with it. Finally, it allowed itself to be persuaded — by Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, be it noted — to endorse at the International Congress of Stuttgart and to reaffirm at Copenhagen and Bâle the final operative paragraphs of its resolution prescribing the duty of Socialists in face of the threat and of the actual outbreak of war. These paragraphs fell short of clarity: otherwise they would not have been accepted at all. However interpreted, they committed the international Socialist movement to a great deal more than in 1914 it found itself able, or with any united desire, to perform. The Second International fell in ruins; and only in Eastern Europe did war fulfil the prophecy, so often made, that European War would mean inevitably European Revolution as well.

CHAPTERS I AND II

Until Mr. J. B. Joll’s promised work appears, the only book in English dealing entirely with the history of the Second International is J. Lenz, *The Rise and Fall of the Second International* (New York, 1932). This is straight Communist stuff, with no half-tones. There is a much more balanced account in L. L. Lorwin, *Labour and Internationalism* (1929). See also R. W. Postgate, *The Workers' International* (1920); Rosa Luxemburg and F. Mehring, *Die Internationale* (n.d.); B. Malon, *L'Internationale* (1895); and the following volumes
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The principal source is, of course, to be found in the Reports of the various Congresses of the International. The best set of these is in the Library of the International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam. The London School of Economics has a number of them, but nothing approaching a complete set. I have had to make use of copies in English, French, and German, according to what I could find. I have not seen a full Report of the Paris Possibilist Congress of 1889. The Marxist Congress of that year I have found only in German. It is not in the School of Economics collection. This does, however, include the Report of Brussels (1891), but not of Zürich (1893) or London (1896), both of which, as well as the 1889 Report, I was able to borrow from the Socialist International. L. S. E. has Paris (1900), Amsterdam (1904), and Stuttgart (1907), but not Copenhagen (1910) or Bâle (1912). These two I was able to borrow from the Socialist International, together with the volume issued in 1918 in Stockholm (in French) concerning the projected Stockholm Conference of 1917. The special Reports on the Socialist movements in the various countries issued by the International have been mentioned in the introductory book-list.


CHAPTER III

(i)

See E. R. Pease, *History of the Fabian Society* (revised edition, 1925); G. Bernard Shaw, *Early History of the Fabian Society* (Tract 41, 1892) (originally published as *The Fabian Society: What it has done and how it has done it*); G. Bernard Shaw (ed.), *Fabian Essays in Socialism* (1889), and Introduction to later editions (e.g. 1908), and *Sixty Years of Fabianism* (1948); G. Bernard Shaw, *Essays in Fabian Socialism* (1932); W. Knight (ed.), *Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar* (1907); G. D. H. Cole, *The Fabian Society, Past and Present* (1942, and various revised editions).

There are bound collections of the *Fabian Tracts*, issued at various dates and with varying contents. Among the more important for the early period are — Numbers 2, *A Manifesto* (Shaw, 1884); 4, *What Socialism Is* (Mrs. Wilson and others, 1886); 5, *Fabian Essays in Socialism* (1889), and Introduction to later editions (e.g. 1908), and *Sixty Years of Fabianism* (1948); G. Bernard Shaw, *Essays in Fabian Socialism* (1932); W. Knight (ed.), *Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar* (1907); G. D. H. Cole, *The Fabian Society, Past and Present* (1942, and various revised editions).
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(Webb, 1887 and many subsequent editions); 6, The True Radical Programme (Shaw, 1887); 7, Capital and Land (Olivier, 1888); 8, Facts for Londoners (Webb, 1889); 11, The Workers' Political Programme (Webb, 1890); 29, What to Read (Wallas, 1891); 40, Fabian Election Manifesto (Shaw, 1892); 42, Christian Socialism (Headlam, 1892); 45, Impossibilities of Anarchism (Shaw, 1893); 49, A Plan of Campaign for Labour (Shaw, 1894); 51, Socialism True and False (Webb, 1894); 61, The London County Council (J. F. Oakeshott, 1895); 67, Women and the Factory Acts (Beatrice Webb, 1896); 70, Report on Fabian Policy (Shaw, 1896); 75, Labour in the Longest Reign (Webb, 1897). See also the unnumbered Government Organisation of Unemployed Labour (Webb and Podmore, 1886).

For the Webbs, see Margaret Cole, Beatrice Webb (1945) and (ed.) The Webbs and their Work (1949); Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship (1926), Our Partnership (1948), and Diaries, 1912–1924, edited Margaret Cole and Barbara Drake (1952, further volume in preparation); see also M. A. Hamilton, Beatrice and Sidney Webb (1932).

Of the Webbs's own writings, apart from Fabian Tracts already mentioned, the most important for their earlier period are S. Webb, Socialism in England (1890); The London Programme (1892); B. Webb, The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (1891); S. and B. Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (1894, revised 1920); Industrial Democracy (1897); Problems of Modern Industry (1898).

Later references to the Fabian Society, the Webbs, and Shaw are given under Chapter IV. See also A. Besant, Modern Socialism (1890); H. Cox, Land Nationalisation (1892).

(ii)


For the background see Joseph Clayton, The Rise and Decline of Socialism in England (1926); H. M. Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party (1954); H. Scott Holland, A Bundle of Memories (1915);
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(iii)


For Keir Hardie’s writings, see Emrys Hughes (ed.), *Keir Hardie’s Speeches and Writings 1888–1915* (3rd ed. 1928); J. Keir Hardie, *From Serfdom to Socialism* (1907); *India* (1909); and a number of pamphlets, including *Can a Man be a Christian on a Pound a Week?* (1901); *My Confession of Faith in the Labour Alliance* (1909); *The I.L.P.: All about it* (1909); *Socialism* (1907). See also the files of *The Miner* and *The Labour Leader*.

The Annual Reports of the I.L.P. are an important source; and so are the numerous pamphlets issued by it.

For Edward Carpenter see *Towards Democracy* (1883, revised 1905); *Civilisation, its Cause and Cure* (1889); *My Days and Dreams* (1916). *Towards Industrial Freedom* (1917).

(iv)

See the files of *The Clarion*; L. Thompson’s *Robert Blatchford: Portrait of an Englishman* (1951); H. M. Pelling, *The Origins of the...*
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Of Blatchford’s own writings see My Life in the Army (1915); Merrie England (1893); Dismal England (1899); Britain for the British (1902); God and My Neighbour (1903); Not Guilty (1906); The Sorcery Shop (1909); Tommy Atkins (1895).

Of A. Neil Lyons see particularly Arthur’s (1908).

See also R. B. Suthers, Common Objections to Socialism Answered (1908).

CHAPTER IV

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For the general history, see my British Working-class Politics, 1832–1914 (1941), which is continued in my History of the Labour Party from 1914 (1948). See also F. Williams, Fifty Years’ March (1950); A. W. Humphrey, History of Labour Representation (1912); K. Hutchison, Labour in Politics (1925); M. A. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson (1938), and, under the pseudonym, ‘Iconoclast’, James Ramsay MacDonald (1925); G. Elton, Life of James Ramsay MacDonald, vol. i (1939); L. M. Weir, James Ramsay MacDonald (1938); W. Stewart, Life of Keir Hardie (1920). See also works by or about Hardie given under Chapter III.

Other important biographies include, R. Postgate, Life of George Lansbury (1951), George Haw, Life of Will Crooks (1908); S. Gwynn and G. Tucknell, Life of Sir Charles Dilke (1917); and, of autobiographies, G. Lansbury, My Life (1928), P. Snowden, Autobiography (2 vols., 1934); J. Hodge, Workman’s Cottage to Windsor Castle (1931); J. R. Clynes, Memoirs (2 vols., 1937); J. Paton, Proletarian Pilgrimage (1935) and Left Turn (1936); Hugh Dalton, Call Back Yesterday (1953); C. R. Attlee, As It Happened (1954).

The Labour Party’s Annual Reports are a main source of information. So is The Labour Year Book, 1916. The I.L.P.’s Annual Reports should also be consulted, and, up to 1909, The Labour Annual, latterly renamed The Reformers’ Year Book.

For the Women’s Suffrage movement see E. Sylvia Pankhurst, The Home Front (1933) and The Suffragette (1911); M. W. Nevinson, Four Years’ Struggle for Freedom (1913).

For the Irish, see D. Ryan, James Connolly (1924); W. P. Ryan, The Irish Labour Movement (1919); R. M. Henry, The Evolution of Sinn Fein (1920); A. Wright, Disturbed Dublin (1914); J. Connolly, Labour in Irish History (1914) and Socialism Made Plain (1909).

See also A. Reid (ed.), The New Party (1894); Conrad Noel, The Labour Party (1906); F. H. Rose, The Coming Force (1909); C. H. Hayes, British Social Politics (1913); The Book of the Labour Party (3 vols., 1925); The Encyclopaedia of the Labour Movement (1928); G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (1936);
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For J. R. MacDonald see Socialism and Society (1905); Socialism and Government (1909); Socialism, Critical and Constructive (1921); The Socialist Movement (1911); Parliament and Revolution (1919); Socialism after the War (1917); The Social Unrest (1913); Labour and the Empire (1907).

For Philip Snowden see The Socialist Budget (1907); Socialism and the Drink Question (1908).

For the general background see also J. A. Hobson, The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (1907); Imperialism (1902); The Industrial System (1909); The Science of Wealth (1911); The Crisis in Liberalism (1911); Work and Wealth (1914); C. F. G. Masterman, The Condition of England (1909); B. Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty (1901); L. G. Chiozza Money, Riches and Poverty (1905); The Triumph of Nationalisation (1920).

For hostile criticism see J. Ellis Barker, British Socialism (1908).

(ii)

For the Fabian Society after 1900 see some of the works mentioned under Chapter III and add Annual Reports (from 1889); Fabian News (from 1891); T. Bolas's The Practical Socialist (1896–7); and Fabian Tracts, especially the following: 106 (Webb), The Education Muddle and the Way Out (1901); 107 (Shaw), Socialism for Millionaires (1901); 108 (Webb), Twentieth-Century Politics (1901); 114 (Webb), The Education Act, 1902: How to Make the Best of It (1903); 116 (Shaw), Fabianism and the Fiscal Question (1904); 125 (W. S. Sanders), Municipalisation by Provinces (1905); 146 (Shaw), Socialism and Superior Brains (1909); 150 (E. Davies), State Purchase of Railways (1910); 162 (Mrs. Pember Reeves), Family Life on a Pound a Week (1912); 170 (Pease), Profit-sharing and Co-partnership: A Fraud and a Failure? (1913); 171 (Slesser), The Nationalisation of Mines and Minerals Bill (1913); 172 (Webb), What about the Rates? (1913).

Shaw's Fabianism and the Empire (1900) was a small book, not a Tract. So was his Commonsense of Municipal Trading (1904). H. G. Wells's The Faults of the Fabian (1906) was not published; and most of the very amusing documents of the Wells controversy were also printed only for circulation within the Society.

The Webbs started The New Statesman in 1913, and published their early Reports to the Fabian Research Department as supplements to it. See especially Co-operative Production and Profit-sharing, The Co-operative Movement, State and Municipal Enterprise (all in 1914), Professional Organisation, and English Teachers and their Professional Organisations (1915). Their What Syndicalism Means appeared as a supplement to The Crusade in 1913. The more important of the Webbs' later works bearing on Socialism include The State and the Doctor (1910); The Prevention of Destitution (1911); A
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Shaw's later writings on Socialism include Socialism and Superior Brains (1910); The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (1928); Everybody's Political What's What? (1942). See also the volume edited by C. E. M. Joad, Shaw and Society: an Anthology and a Symposium (1953). See also A. Henderson's George Bernard Shaw (1911) and Frank Harris's Bernard Shaw (1932).

H. G. Wells was a very prolific writer on themes related to Socialism. His chief works of straight Socialist propaganda are New Worlds for Old (1908), the Fabian booklet, This Misery of Boots (1907), and his A Modern Utopia (1905). But many of his other works, including some of his novels, are highly relevant; for example, Anticipations (1901); The Discovery of the Future (1902); Mankind in the Making (1903); Socialism and the Family (1907); The Great State (ed. 1912); The Salvaging of Civilisation (1921); The Open Conspiracy (1928); The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind (1932); The Anatomy of Frustration (1936); The New World Order (1940); Guide to the New World (1941); The Outlook for Homo Sapiens (1942) — and, among his novels, The Sleeper Awakes (1899); Kipps (1905); Tono-Bungay (1909); The New Machiavelli (1911), with satire on the Webbs as Mr. and Mrs. Bailey; Marriage (1912); The World Set Free (1914); Joan and Peter (1918), about education; The Shape of Things to Come (1933). See also his Experiment in Autobiography (1934).

For the Fabians and the Insurance Act of 1911 see Fabian Society, The Insurance Bill and the Workers (1911). See also the numerous publications of the National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution, including a number by Beatrice Webb and its journal, The Crusade (1910–13), edited by Clifford Sharp (1883–1935), who became the first editor of the New Statesman in 1913.

See also H. D. Harben, The Rural Problem (1913) — a Fabian report.

For the general background of the years before 1914 see my World of Labour (1913); G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (1936); G. D. H. Cole and R. Postgate, The Common People (revised 1946); G. D. H. Cole, Short History of the British Working-
CHAPTER V

Reports of the Congresses of the German Social Democratic Party — Halle (1890), Erfurt (1891), Berlin (1892), Cologne (1893), Frankfurt-on-Main (1894), Breslau (1895), Gotha (1896), Hamburg (1897), Stuttgart (1898), Hanover (1899), Mainz (1900), Lübeck (1901).

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For Kautsky see also Einfluss der Volksvermehrung (1880); Karl Marx’s ökonomische Lehren (1887, translated as The Economic Doctrines of Karl Marx, 1925); Thomas More und seine Utopie (1888, translated as Sir Thomas More and his Utopia); Vorläufer des Sozialismus (1894); Bernstein und das sozialdemokratische Programm (1899); Die Agrarfrage (1899); Handelspolitik und Sozialdemokratie (1901); Die soziale Revolution (1902, English translation, 1903); Der Ursprung des Christentums (1908); Der Kampf um die Macht (1909); Parlementarismus und Demokratie (1911); Der politische Massenstreik (1914); Die Diktatur des Proletariats (1918); Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (1927); Krieg und Demokratie (1932); Sozialisten und Krieg (1937).

For Bernstein see Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (1899, translated as Evolutionary Socialism, 1909); Die heutige Sozialdemokratie in Theorie und Praxis (1906); Sozialismus und Demokratie in der englischen Revolution (1908, English translation, 1930); Erinnerungen (vol i, 1917, English translation, 1920); vol. ii (1926); vol. iii (1928).

See also the files of the Neue Zeit (ed. Kautsky) from 1883, and of Sozialistische Monatshefte (ed. Bernstein) from 1897.

See also the following: A. Erdmann, Die christliche Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland (1907); P. Göhre, The Evangelical Social Movement in Germany (1898); G. von Vollmar, Über die nächsten Aufgaben der deutschen Sozialdemokratie (1891); G. von Vollmar, Die Bauern und die Sozialdemokratie (1893); A. Bebel, Zukunftstaat und Sozialdemokratie (1893); A. Bebel, Gewerkschaften und politische Parteien (1900); W. Liebknecht, Über die politische Stellung der Sozialdemokratie (1893); Parvus, Die Gewerkschaften und die Sozialdemokratie (1896); Rosa Luxemburg, Sozialreform oder Revolution (1899); Kurt Eisner, Wilhelm Liebknecht (1900); W. Liebknecht, Erinnerungen (1900 — French translation, 1901); and Victor Adler’s Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, edited by Friedrich Adler (1954). This last contains a series of letters discussing the Revisionist controversy.

CHAPTER VI

Reports of Social Democratic Party Congresses — Munich (1902), Dresden (1903), Bremen (1904), Jena (1905), Mannheim (1906), Essen (1907), Nuremberg (1908), Leipzig (1909), Magdeburg (1910),
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Jena (1911), Chemnitz (1912), Jena (1913). Also reports of Trade Union Congresses, especially Hamburg (1905).

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For Bebel see *Gewerkschaftsbewegung und politische Parteien* (1900); *Akademiker und Sozialismus* (1905); *Sozialdemokratie und Antisemitismus* (1906); *Die Sozialdemokratie im deutschen Reichstage* (1907); *Aus meinem Leben* (3 vols., 1911—abridged English translation of volumes one and two — 1912). Bebel's *Die Frau* was first published in 1883, and went through many editions (English translation, 1885).

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For Kautsky's position after the Revisionist controversy see particularly *Der Kampf um die Macht* (1909), which is largely a reply to Rosa Luxemburg's *Der Massenstreik* (1906). For Rosa Luxemburg, see the bibliography to Chapter XI.


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**CHAPTER VIII**

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For Pouget, see É. Pouget, Le Parti du travail (1905); Le Syndicat (1905); Les Bases du syndicalisme (1905); La Confédération Générale du Travail (1908); Le Sabotage (1910—U.S. translation by A. Giovannitti); and É. Pataud and É. Pouget, Comment nous ferons la révolution (1909, English translation, as Socialism and the Co-operative Commonwealth, 1913); and the files of Le Père Peinard (1889–94 in Paris and 1894–5 in London).

For works by other C.G.T. leaders see V. Diligent, Les Orientations syndicales (1910); L. Jouhaux, Le Syndicalisme français (1911) and Le Syndicalisme français contre la guerre (1912); G. Yvetot, ABC syndicaliste (1908) and Manuel du soldat (n.d., 1903).

For Lagardelle, see the files of the Mouvement Socialiste and H. Lagardelle, Le Socialisme ouvrier (1911); L'Évolution des syndicats ouvriers en France (1908); and the following symposia, which he edited, La Grève générale et le socialisme (1905); Syndicalisme et socialisme (1908).

For Sorel, see G. Sorel, Les Illusions du progrès (1906); La Décomposition du marxisme (1908), L'Avenir socialiste des syndicats (1898, reissued 1901); Réflexions sur la violence (1908); Introduction à l'économie moderne (1903); La Ruine du monde antique (1901); La Révolution dreyfusienne (1909); Lettres à Paul Delesalle (1948).

For Berth see É. Berth, Les Méfaits des intellectuels (1914); Dialogues socialistes (1901); and Les Nouveaux Aspects du socialisme (1908).

For Hervé see G. Hervé, Leur Patrie (1905) and Mes Crimes (1912).
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See also the following memoirs and biographies: A. Balabanova, My Life as a Rebel (1938); L. Trotsky, Mein Leben (1930) and Lenin (English translation, 1925); A. F. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism (1919) and The Crucifixion of Liberty (1934); N. K. Krupskaya, Memories of Lenin (1942); K. Zetkin, Reminiscences of Lenin (1929); V. Figner, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (1925); L. Krasin, Leonid Krasin: his Life and Work (1929); Marx-Engels Institute, Lenin: a Political Biography (n.d.); V. Moren, Lenin (1928); M. Eastman, Leon Trotsky: the Portrait of a Youth (1925); I. Deutscher, Stalin: a Political Biography (1949) and The Prophet Armed—Trotsky 1879–1921 (1954); B. D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin) (1948).

On the agrarian question see, in addition to works already cited, P. Maslov, Die Agrarf rage in Russland (1908); V. Chernov, Zemlya i Pravo (1917), and his memoirs, Pered Burey (N.Y. 1953, in Russian); M. Gorki, Lénine et le paysan russe (1924).

Of Lenin's writings up to 1914 the following are the most important. Most of them are to be found in the two volumes called The Essentials of Lenin (1947); Who the Friends of the People Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats (1894); The Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats (1898); The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899); What is to be Done? (1902); One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (1904); Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution (1905); The Agrarian Programme of the Social Democrats in the First Russian Revolution (1907); Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908); The All-Russian Conference of 1912 (1912); The Right of Nations to Self-determination (in Prosv eschenije, 1914). See also his Collected Works, vol. iv, The Iskra Period, 1900–1903 (in 2 vols., 1929). See also J. Stalin, Leninism (2 vols., 1940); V. I. Lenin, Briefe an Maxim Gorki, 1903–12 (1924); and The Letters of Lenin (1937). Lenin's Imperialism did not appear until 1917.

For Trotsky see further Die russische Revolution, 1905 (1923); The Revolution Betrayed (1937).

For G. V. Plekhanov see his In Defence of Materialism (1895); Anarchism and Socialism (English translation, 1918); and Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908). See also his N. G. Chernishevsky (in German, 1910).

For Empirio-Criticism and its derivations see A. Bogdanov, Empirio-Monism (3 vols., 1905–6); The Psychology of Society (1904); and The Science of Social Consciousness (1914) — all in Russian.

For the Legal Marxists see P. B. Struve, Critical Notes on the Question of the Economic Development of Russia (in Russian, 1894); M. Tugan-Baranovsky, Modern Socialism and its Historic Development 992
CHAPTER XI

There is almost nothing in English, or as far as I know in any language except Polish or Russian, about the Socialist movement in Poland. I have had to pick up my material from many scattered sources. I have made much use of Paul Fröhlich’s *Rosa Luxemburg: her Life and Work* (1940). See also W. J. Rose, *The Rise of Polish Democracy* (1944); *The Cambridge History of Poland* (vol. ii, 1941); A. B. Boswell, *Poland and the Poles* (1919); O. Halecki, *History of Poland* (1942); S. Konovalov (ed.), *Russo-Polish Relations* (1945); and W. J. Rose, *The Rise of Polish Democracy* (1944). There are reports on the Polish Socialist movement in the following volumes issued by the Socialist International: *L’Organisation socialiste et ouvrière en Europe, Amérique et Asie* (1904) and *L’Internationale ouvrière et socialiste* (1907).

For Lithunia see A. Bossin, *La Lithuanie* (1933).


Rosa Luxemburg’s most important writings are the following: *Die industrielle Entwicklung Polens* (1898); *Sozialreform oder Revolution?* (1899, French translation, 1932); *Massenstreik, Partei und Gewerkschaften* (1906, French translation, 1909); *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (1913); *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals oder was die Epigonen aus der Marxschen Theorie gemacht haben* (1919); *Die Krise der Sozialdemokratie* (*The Junius Letters*, 1916, English translation, 1918); *Die russische Revolution* (ed. Paul Levi, 1922); *Briefe aus dem Gefängnis* (1922, English translation, 1923); *Briefe an Karl und Luise Kautsky* (ed. L. Kautsky, 1923, English translation, 1925). There is a collected edition of her works in German, edited by Clara Zetkin and Adolf Warski (1923–8). Much of her important writing appeared in *Neue Zeit*.

See also Karl Radek’s *Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo
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Jogiches (1921) and the essay on her in Paul Louis, Cent cinquante Ans de pensée socialiste, nouvelle série (1953).

CHAPTER XII

There is very little in English about the Austrian Socialist movement. Julius Braunthal’s In Search of the Millennium (1945) gives a good picture of it, from an autobiographical standpoint, for the period before 1914 as well as of the ‘Little Austrian’ movement after 1918; and the general books about Austro-Hungarian history have, of course, a little to say about it, but mostly not much. The 1901 Programme of the Austrian Social Democratic Party is translated in R. C. K. Ensor’s Modern Socialism (1903; third edition, 1910). See also Braunthal’s edition of a collection of articles by F. Austerlitz of the Arbeiter Zeitung, entitled Austerlitz spricht (1931); and R. Danneberg, Das sozialdemokratische Programme (1914).

For the history of the franchise see the chapter in A. L. Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe (2 vols., 1896), and the article Austria in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1910). For the general background see Wickham Steed, The Habsburg Monarchy (1913); A. J. P. Taylor, The Hapsburg Monarchy (1948); B. Auerbach, Les Races et les nationalités en Autriche-Hongrie (1898); O. Jászi, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy (1929); R. Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (1945); A. Decruis et Delabarre, Les Conditions du travail en Autriche-Hongrie (1890).

In German the standard work is Ludwig Brügel, Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie (5 vols., 1922–5). See also K. Schwechlers, Die österreichische Sozialdemokratie (1907), and J. Deutsch, Geschichte der österreichischen Gewerkschaftsbewegung (2 vols., 1927–8). Consult also the reports of the Austrian Socialists in L’Internationale ouvrière et socialiste: rapports soumis au Congrès Socialiste International du Stuttgart (2 vols., Brussels, 1907) and the similar report in the corresponding volume issued for the Amsterdam Congress under the title, L’Organisation socialiste et ouvrière (Brussels, 1904).

For Victor Adler see the collection of his Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe (5 vols., 1939) and the biographical article by L. Brügel in Neue österreichische Biographie, vol. iii (1926). There is also a study by Max Adler in Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus for 1923. See also Victor Adler’s Briefwechsel mit August Bebel und Karl Kautsky, edited by Friedrich Adler (1954)—important for the Revisionist controversy.

For Friedrich Adler see his Ernst Mach’s Überwindung des mechanischen Materialismus (1918); and also Vor dem Ausnahmgericht (1923)—a full report of Adler’s trial for the assassination of Stürghkh. Adler’s speech embodies a strong criticism of the Austrian Party.
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For Otto Bauer see his study, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*, first published in 1907 when he was only 25. See also his short work, *Der Weg zum Sozialismus* (1919), translated into French as *La Marche au socialisme* (1919). See also his *Weltbild des Kapitalismus*, published in 1924 in the second volume of *Der lebendige Marxismus*, a collection of studies presented to Kautsky on his seventieth birthday; and also his *Die österreichische Revolution* (1923), of which there is a badly abridged English translation (1925), and his *Bolschewismus und Sozialdemokratie* (1919). There is a study of his thought in Paul Louis, *Cent cinquante Ans de pensée socialiste* (nouvelle série, Paris, 1953). See also the chapter on him in Braunthal, op. cit. Louis's essay relates mainly to his post-1918 writings. Much of his work was published in *Kampf* and the *Neue Zeit*.

For Karl Renner, see his *Grundlagen und Entwicklungsziele der österreichischen-ungarischen Monarchie* (1906); *Der Kampf der österreichischen Nation um den Staat* (1903); and *Der deutsche Arbeiter und der Nationalismus* (1910)—in English is *The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Functions* (1929).

For Max Adler see the following among his many works: *Kausalität und Teleologie; Marx als Denker; Kant und der Marxismus; Marxistische Probleme*. See also, in French, his *Démocratie politique et démocratie sociale* (Brussels, 1930) and *Méthamorphoses de la classe ouvrière* (Paris, n.d.).


CHAPTER XIII

The best book on the Hungarian Labour movement is G. Rézler, *A Magyar Nagyipari Munkásság Kinlakulása, 1807–1914* (1938). As I cannot read Hungarian I asked my friend Thomas Balogh to translate some vital passages for me, and also to check this chapter, both of which he most kindly did. Another useful book is J. Bunzel,
SOCIALIST THOUGHT

Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftspolitik Ungarns (1902) — especially for the agrarian movement.

See also R. W. Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary (1908); H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (1950); C. A. Macartney, Hungary (1934) and Hungary and her Successors (1937); J. Andrássy, The Development of Hungarian Constitutional Liberty (1908); F. Ehchard, A Short History of the Hungarian People (1931); E. Horváth, Modern Hungary, 1660–1920 (1923); Tibor Mende, Hungary (1944); P. Teleki, The Evolution of Hungary (1923); A. Vanberg, Hungary (1887); A. B. Yolland, Hungary (1917); V. Concha, La Gentry, sa genèse et son rôle en Hongrie (1913); J. de Vargha, Hungary: a Sketch of the Country, its People, and its Conditions (1907).

For E. H. Schmitt see his Katechismus der Religions des Geistes (1895).

CHAPTER XIV

For the general background see J. Ancel, Peuples et nations des Balkans (1926); F. Fox, The Balkan Peninsula (1915); G. Hanotaux, La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe, 1912–13 (1914); F. W. L. Kovacs, The Untamed Balkans (1941); W. Miller, The Balkans (1892) and Trade and Politics in the Near East (1898); R. Rankin, The Inner History of the Balkan War (1914); J. G. Schurman, The Balkan Wars, 1912–13 (1915); H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (1950) and Eastern Europe between the Wars (1945); D. Warriner, The Economics of Peasant Farming (1939); R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (1917) and The South Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy (1911).

For Bulgarian Socialism see T. Tchitchovsky, The Socialist Movement in Bulgaria (1931); various articles on Blagoev and other pioneers in Free Bulgaria. See also G. C. Logio, Bulgaria Past and Present (1936); K. G. Popoff, La Bulgarie économique, 1879–1911 (1920) and La Bulgarie coopérative (1927); I. Sakasov, Bulgarische Wirtschafts-Geschichte (1929); N. Stanoff, Histoire de Bulgarie, 1878–1912 (1924).

For Rumania see I. C. Atanasiu, Pagini din istoria contimporană a României, 1881–1916 (1932); V. Bercam, La Réforme agraire en Roumanie (1928); D. Mitran, The Land and the Peasant Reform in Rumania (1930); J. L. Evans, The Agrarian Revolution in Rumania (1924); G. C. Logio, Roumania: its History, Politics and Economics (1933); T. W. Riker, The Making of Roumania (1934); R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Roumanians (1934); H. L. Roberts, Roumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State (1951); Anon., La Situation économique et sociale du paysan en Roumanie (1895); A. Bellessent, La Roumanie contemporaine (1905).

For Serbia see H. Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia (1922); L. F. Church, The Story of Serbia (1914); R. G. D. Laffan, The Guardians of the Gate (1918); V. M. Petrovitch, Serbia: her History and her
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Customs (1915); H. W. V. Temperly, A History of Serbia (1917); J. Mallat, La Serbie contemporaine (2 vols., 1902).

For Greece there is nothing in English apart from general works. See A. Sidens and others, Rapport succinct sur le mouvement syndicaliste et socialiste en Grèce (1918). Refer to G. F. Abbott, Turkey, Greece and the Great Powers (1917); A. R. Burn, The Modern Greeks (1945); G. N. Cafinas, La Grèce économique (1939); E. S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece (second edition, 1946); K. Gibberd, Greece (1944); A. W. Gomme, Greece (1945); J. Mavrogordato, Modern Greece (1931); W. Miller, Greek Life in Town and Country (1905); A History of the Greek People, 1821–1921 (1922); and Greece (1928).

For Turkey and Macedonia see T. L. Jameson, Turkey (1935); H. Kohn, Nationalism in the Near East (1929); H. Luke, The Making of Modern Turkey (1936); E. G. Mears, Modern Turkey (1925); J. Parker and A. Smith, Modern Turkey (1940); Sir Mark Sykes, The Caliphs' Last Heritage (1915); A. J. Toynbee and K. P. Kirkwood, Turkey (1926); B. Ward, Turkey (1942); W. W. Wright, The Process of Change in the Ottoman Empire (1937); H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia (1906); C. R. Buxton, Turkey in Revolution (1909); W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire (1913).

CHAPTER XV

There is very little in English or French. C. Thomann’s Le Mouvement anarchiste dans les montagnes neuchâteloises et le Jura bernois (1947) deals mainly with the period covered in the second volume of my work. I did not know of it when I published that volume. See also E. Weckerle, The Trade Unions in Switzerland (1947); E. Arago, Les Conditions du travail en Suisse (1890); R. Grimm, Geschichte der sozialistischen Ideen in der Schweiz (1931); G. Moynier, Les Institutions ouvrières de la Suisse (1867).

For the general background see also G. Baker, The Model Republic (1895); F. Bonjour, Real Democracy in Operation (1920); R. C. Brooks, Government and Politics of Switzerland (1920); A. Hill, Switzerland Past and Present (1924); W. S. Dawson, Social Switzerland (1897); H. D. Lloyd, The Swiss Democracy (1908).

CHAPTER XVI

For the earlier history of Socialism and working-class movements in Belgium there is a whole series of books by Louis Bertrand, the founder of the Brussels Chambre du Travail. These include Histoire de la démocratie et du socialisme en Belgique depuis 1830 (2 vols., 1906–7); Histoire du socialisme (1906); L'Ouvrier belge depuis un siècle (1924); Histoire de la coopération en Belgique (2 vols., 1903); Les Précurseurs du mouvement coopératif; and also his short biographies of César de Paepe (1909) and Edward Anseele (1925) and his reminiscences,
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Souvenirs d'un meneur socialiste (1927). Jules Destrée and Émile Vandervelde collaborated in a volume, Le Socialisme en Belgique (1898, revised 1903). Vandervelde also wrote Le Parti ouvrier belge, 1885-1925 (1925); his other important writings are mentioned below. For the history of the movement see, in addition, Joseph Devalte, Histoire du mouvement socialiste belge (1931); N. Masson, Histoire du mouvement ouvrier belge; C. Mertens, The Trade Union Movement in Belgium (1925); Delsinne, Le Mouvement syndical en Belgique (1936); Louis de Brouckère, Les Syndicats et le parti socialiste (1907); La Grève générale en Belgique (1907, with Vandervelde and Vandermissen); Victor Serwy, La Coopération socialiste (n.d.); E. Dutillend, La Coopération (1930); A. Jauniaux, Cent Années de mutualité en Belgique (1930) and L'Évolution et les conquêtes de la mutualité (1923). The Centrale d'Éducation Ouvrière issued in 1953 a very useful booklet, Évolution et structure du mouvement ouvrier socialiste en Belgique. For the Defuisseaux brothers see A. Defuisseaux, Le Catéchisme du peuple (1886) and Le Grand Catéchisme du peuple (1886); L. Defuisseaux, Les Hontes du suffrage censitaire (1887); and the biography of Alfred Defuisseaux by Léo Collard.

Of Vandervelde's writings the most important are Enquête sur les associations professionnelles d'artisans et d'ouvriers en Belgique (2 vols., 1891); Le Collectivisme (1893); La Question agraire en Belgique (1897, revised 1905); Le Collectivisme et l'évolution industrielle (1900, English translation, Collectivism and Industrial Evolution, 1907); La Propriété foncière en Belgique (1900); L'Exode rural et le retour aux champs (1902); Essais socialistes (1906); La Belgique et le Congo (1911); Coopération neutre et coopération socialiste (1913); Trois Aspects de la révolution russe (1917); Le Socialisme contre l'état (1918); Faut-il changer notre programme? (1923); Le Parti ouvrier belge, 1885-1925 (1925); L'Alternative (1933). See also Émile Vandervelde, L'homme et son œuvre (by a number of hands, 1928); and Vanden-berghe, Émile Vandervelde: sa doctrine, son action.

Among the writings of Louis de Brouckère the following are worth a mention: La Misère intellectuelle en Belgique de 1830 à 1905 (1905); Le Travail et la pensée (1945); La Notion sociale de l'égalité (1945); Les Syndicats et le parti socialiste (?); Le Contrôle ouvrier (1924); La Coopération et les pouvoirs publics (1951); La Place rationnelle des syndicats dans les sociétés modernes (1934).

For Hector Denis see his Histoire des systèmes économiques et socialistes (1897, revised and enlarged in 2 vols., 1904-7). See also his L'Impôt (1889); La Dépression économique et sociale et l'histoire des prix (2 vols., 1895); and his collected Discours philosophiques (1919).

For Guillaume de Greef see his Introduction à la sociologie (2 vols., 1886–9); L'Économie sociale d'après la méthode historique (1923); La Structure générale des sociétés (3 vols., 1908); and La Constituante et le régime représentatif (1892). See also the study of him by D. W. Douglas, Guillaume de Greef: the Social Theory of an Early Syndicalist (New York, 1925).
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For the Congo see also E. D. Morel, *Red Rubber* (1906) and *The Black Man’s Burden* (1920).

CHAPTER XVII


CHAPTER XVIII


(i)


(ii)

There is not much in English about the Swedish Labour movement before 1914. There is a good chapter on the Trade Unions in W. Galenson, *Comparative Labour Movements* (1952). See the chapter on the Swedish General Strike in my *World of Labour* (1913), and the official report (in French) on *La Grève et les lock-out en Suède en 1909* (1912). There is a little information, but only a little, in M. W. Childs, *Sweden: the Middle Way* (1936) and in *Social Sweden* (1952), published by the Swedish Social Welfare Board. See also S. Hanssen, *The Trade Union Movement in Sweden* (1927).

See also C. Lindley, *Le Mouvement ouvrier en Suède* (1900); J. J. Robbins, *The Government of Labour Relations in Sweden* (1942);
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P. Norgren, The Swedish Collective Bargaining System (1941); H. Tingsten, Den Svenska Socialdemokratiers Idéntveckling (1941); N. Lamming, Sweden's Co-operative Enterprise (1940); A. Montgomery, The Rise of Modern Industry in Sweden (1939); E. Nylander (ed.), Modern Sweden (1937); R. Svanström and C. Palmstierna, A Short History of Sweden (1934); J. W. Ames, Co-operative Sweden To-day (1952); H. Key, La Vie économique de la Suède (1913).

(iii)

See W. Galenson, Labour in Norway (1949); K. Gjerset, History of the Norwegian People (1932); G. Gathorne Hardy, Norway (1925); F. Nansen, Norway and the Union with Sweden (1905).

(iv)

There is practically nothing in English on the Finnish Labour movement. There is a pamphlet in French — La Finlande et le socialisme finlandais (1923).

For the background see J. Hampden Jackson, Finland (1939); A. Rothery, Finland: the New Nation (1936); A. M. Scott, Suomi: the Land of the Finns (1926); J. H. Wuorinen, Nationalism in Modern Finland (1931); E. Young, Finland: the Land of a Thousand Lakes (1912); K. Gilmour, Finland (1931); E. van Cleet, Finland: the Republic Farthest North (1929); T. W. Atchley, Finland (1931); J. V. Hannula, La Guerre d'indépendance de Finlande, 1918 (1938); E. Kuusi, L’Œuvre de protection sociale en Finlande (1928); T. Odhe, Finland: a Nation of Co-operators (1931); V. Tanner, Die Oberflächengestaltung Finlands (1938); J. L. Perret, La Finlande (1931).

CHAPTER XIX

There is a dearth of books in English about the Italian Socialist Movement. The two most recent are H. L. Gualtieri, The Labour Movement in Italy, 1848–1904 (New York, 1946), and W. Hilton Young, The Italian Left: A Short History of Political Socialism in Italy (1949). The latter covers the years from 1892 to 1948. Both deal with Anarchism and Syndicalism as well as with Socialism. In Italian, see Robert Michels, Storia critica del movimento socialista italiano dagli inizi fino al 1911 (Firenze, 1926), and in French the same writer's Le Proletariat et la bourgeoisie dans le mouvement socialiste italien des origines à 1906 (Paris, 1921 — original edition in Italian, 1908). See also F. Meda, I congressi socialisti italiani dalla Prima alla Terza Internazionale (Milan, 1920), and the same writer's Il partito socialista italiano (Milan, 1921). I have not read A. Angiolini and E. Ciacci, Socialismo e socialisti in Italia (Firenze, 1919), or G. Cortese, Il partito socialista dalla fondazione al 1900 (Milan,
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1951), or P. Gentile, Cinquant' anni di socialismo in Italia (Ancona, 1946), or R. Rigola, Storia del movimento operaio italiano (1946), or G. Zibordi, Saggio sulla storia del movimento operaio in Italia (1939). L. Valiani has not yet published the second volume of his Storia del movimento socialista, of which the first volume deals with the period of the First International, roughly to 1880; and his Storia del socialismo nel secolo XX begins only in 1900. The scope of both is international, but the Italian slant is useful.

The following references are to works covering a narrower field: P. Orano, Andrea Costa (Rome, 1900); O. Gnocchi-Viani, Il partito operaio italiano (1885) and Il movimento operaio socialista italiano, 1882–1894 (Milan, 1946); and also his Dieci anni di camere del lavoro (1899) and Ricordi di un internationalista (1909); P. Mantovani, Osvaldo Gnocchi-Viani (Verona, 1948); Enrico Ferri, Le Socialisme en Italie (Brussels, 1895); Andrea Costa, Il gruppo parlamentare socialista (Imola, 1902); R. Mondolfo, Introduzione alla storia del partito socialista italiano dalla origine al congresso di Imola (1921); G. A. Belloni, Socialismo mazziniano (Rome, 1895); N. Roselli, Mazzini e Bakunin (Turin, 1927).

For the Anarchists see M. Nettlau, Errico Malatesta (New York, 1922); R. Bonghi, I partiti anarchici in Italia (Milan, 1878); E. Malatesta, L' anarchia (Milan, 1921); E. Sernicoli, L' anarchia e gli anarchici (Milan, 1894); P. Valera, Amilcare Cipriani (Milan, 1920). See also references given under Anarchism in Volume II of the present work.

For Catholic Social movements see Romolo Murri, La democrazia cristiana italiana (Rome, 1904) and Dalla democrazia cristiana al partito popolare italiano (Florence, 1920); E. Vercesi, Il movimento cattolico in Italia, 1870–1922 (Florence, 1923); L. Riva Sanseverino, Il movimento sindacale cristiano (Rome, 1950); F. S. Nitti, Catholic Socialism (Turin, 1891, English translation, 1895).

For the Trade Union movement, see A. Lanzillo, Le Mouvement ouvrier en Italie (Paris, 1910); Paul Louis, Le Syndicalisme européen (Paris, 1919); Rinaldo Rigola, Storia del movimento operaio italiano (to 1926; Milan, 1947) and Cento anni di movimento operaio (Milan, 1935); I. M. Sacco, Storia del sindicalismo (Turin, 1947); A. Loria, Il movimento operaio (Palermo, 1903); G. Candeloro, Il movimento sindacale in Italia (Rome, 1950); G. Spadolini, La lotta sociale in Italia, 1848–1925 (Florence, 1948); G. Sacerdote, Storia del primo maggio (Milan, 1946).

For Socialist doctrines see Antonio Labriola, In memoria del manifesto dei comunisti (Rome, 1895); Del materialismo storico (Rome, 1895–6, French translation, 1897); Discorrendo di socialismo e di filosofia (Rome, 1898); Scritti vari di filosofia e di politica (Bari, 1906); Lettere a Engels (Rome, 1949). See also Enrico Ferri, Socialism and Positive Science (Rome, 1904, English translation, 1905); O. Gnocchi-Viani, Il socialismo moderno (Milan, 1886) and Dal mazzinianesimo al socialismo (Milan, 1893); F. S. Merlino, Pro e
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For Loria see, in English, his Economic Foundations of Modern Society (1899) and his Economic Synthesis (1914).

Alfonso Leonetti’s Mouvements ouvriers et socialistes (chronologie et bibliographie): l’Italie, des origines à 1932 (Paris, 1952) is much more than its title shows. It contains an excellent annalistic narrative and a very full list of books and articles.

For general background see also Bolton King and T. Okey, Italy To-day (1901).

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Much the best book in English is Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (1943). The following, dealing mainly with a later period, have only a few relevant passages: F. Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit (1937); G. Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (1938); E. Conze, Spain To-day (1936); J. Langdon Davies, Behind the Barricades (1936) — interesting on Co-operation in agriculture and fishing.

See also Sir G. Young, The New Spain (1933); J. B. Trend, Origins of Modern Spain (1934); S. de Madariaga, Spain (1930); J. A. Brandt, Towards the New Spain (1933) — for the Spanish Revolution from 1868 to 1874; R. Shaw, Spain from Within (1910) — for the Catalanian workers. See also, for the Bakuninists, K. Marx and F. Engels, Revolution in Spain (1939) — a reprint of articles and letters.

In French there is more available. See particularly A. Marvaud, Le Mouvement catalan (1913); L’Espagne au XXe siècle (1913); and La Question sociale en Espagne (1910); P. Cambon, Les Conditions du travail en Espagne (1890); A. Germain, La Révolution espagnole (1931); G. and J. P. Moch, L’Espagne républicaine (1933); C. Benoist, Cánovas del Castillo (1930); Tarrida del Marmol, Les Inquisiteurs en Espagne, 1835-1897 (1897 — an account of persecutions by a Spanish Anarchist). H. E. Kaminsky’s Bakounine (1938) is also useful, and G. Pirou’s Georges Sorel (1927).

In Spanish see J. J. Morato, El partido socialista obrero (1918); El partido socialista (1931); and Pablo Inglesias (1931); F. Mora, Historia del socialismo obrero español (1902); A. Lorenzo, El proletario militante (vol. i [— 1881] 1901; vol. ii, 1923).
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For Catalonia see also V. Almirall, *Lo catalanisme* (1886).

For Portugal see G. Young, *Portugal Old and New* (1917) and A. Marvaud, *Le Portugal et ses colonies* (1912).

CHAPTER XXI


For the history of the American Socialist Party see, from a left standpoint, W. Z. Foster, *The Crisis in the Socialist Party* (historical, 1936); *From Bryan to Stalin* (1937); and *Pages from a Worker’s Life* (1937) — the two latter forming Foster’s autobiography; also Morris Hillquit, *Loose Leaves from a Busy Life* (1934).
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For expositions of American Socialist doctrines see Morris Hillquit, *Socialism in Theory and Practice* (1909) and *Socialism Summed Up* (1913); G. D. Herron, *Why I am a Socialist* (1900); W. J. Ghent, *Mass and Class* (1904); W. Gaylord, *Socialism is Coming — Now* (1912); W. T. Mills, *What is Socialism?* (1901); John Spargo, *The Common Sense of Socialism* (1908); Forces that Make for Socialism in America (1905); Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles (1906, revised 1913); *The Substance of Socialism* (1909) and *Applied Socialism* (1913); C. D. Thompson, *The Constructive Programme of Socialism* (1908); Edmond Kelly, *Twentieth Century Socialism* (1913); C. E. Russell, *Why I am a Socialist* (1910); V. D. Scudder, *Socialism and Character* (1912); A. M. Simons, *The Socialist Programme* (1908) and many other booklets and pamphlets; J. M. Patterson (The ‘millionaire Socialist’), *Confessions of a Drone* (1905) and *The Socialist Machine* (1905). For more left-wing views see A. M. Lewis, *Evolution Social and Organic* (1908), and E. Untermann, *Science and Revolution* (1905), and also W. E. Walling, *Socialism as it is* (1912) and *Larger Aspects of Socialism* (1913) — but for Walling’s later views see *American Labor and American Democracy* (1926).

For Weyland and the Appeal to Reason see J. A. Weyland, *Lessons of Life: a Story of Twenty Years of Socialist Agitation* (1912), and for Gaylord Wilshire, *Wilshire Editorials* (1906) and the second series, entitled *Socialism Inevitable* (1907).

For Clarence Darrow see I. Stone, *Darrow for the Defence* (1943); and for the McNamara case, M. Mayo, *Los Angeles* (1933), and O. E. McManigal, *The National Dynamite Plot* (1913) — by the man who turned informer.

For Jack London see *The Iron Heel* (1907); *The Valley of the Moon* (1914); and other stories. See also P. S. Foner, *Jack London, American Rebel* (1947). For Upton Sinclair see *The Jungle* (1906); *Oil* (1927); *Jimmie Higgins* (1919); and other stories, and also *The Industrial Republic* (1907).

For Canada see *Socialist Party in Canada: Constitution and By­laws* (c. 1905); C. M. O’Brien, *The Proletariat in Politics* (1907); A. H. Logan, *The History of Trade Union Organisation in Canada* (1928).

See also D. G. Creighton, *Dominion of the North* (1944).

CHAPTER XXII

Much the best source is Victor Alba, *Le Mouvement ouvrier en Amérique latine* (1953). Naturally, most of the books are in Spanish, of which I know very little. I have ‘used’, rather than read them through. The Mexican material is the most abundant: for example, L. Araquistain, *La revolución mexicana* (1931); A. Cue, *Historia social y económica de México* (1940); E. J. Dillon, *Mexico on the Verge* (1921); P. Foix, *Pancho Villa* (1952); A. A. López, *El movimiento obrero en...*
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For the Mexican background see P. F. Martin, Mexico of the Twentieth Century (2 vols., 1907); R. J. MacHugh, Modern Mexico (1914); Hamilton Fyfe, The Real Mexico (1914); J. Sierra, Mexico: its Social Evolution (3 vols., 1905).

For other countries see, in general, T. M. Poblete, El movimiento obrero latinoamericano (1946); R. A. Humphreys, The Evolution of Modern Latin America (1946); J. F. Rippy, Historical Evolution of Hispanic America (1932); F. G. Calderón, Latin America: its Rise and Progress (1913); G. Clemenceau, South America To-day (1912); C. R. Enock, The Republics of Central and South America (1913); W. H. Koebel, South America (1913).

For the Argentine, and for Uruguay, see J. Ingenieros, Sociología argentina (1913); E. Garzon, La République Argentine (1912); A. S. Pennington, The Argentine Republic (1911); J. Oddone, Historia del socialismo argentino (1940); R. Levine, A History of Argentina (1938); W. B. Parker, Argentines of To-day (1920); J. F. Rippy, Argentina, Brazil and Chile since Independence (1935); W. H. Koebel, Modern Argentina (1907) and Cuban Liberation (1953); J. R. López, Socialismo en el Uruguay (1928); W. H. Koebel, Uruguay (1912).

For Brazil see F. Bennett, Forty Years in Brazil (1914); P. Denis, Brazil (1910); E. Levasseur, Le Brésil (1899); M. R. Wright, The New Brazil (1901).

See also J. P. Canto, Chile: an Account of its Wealth and Progress (1912); W. H. Koebel, Modern Chile (1913); F. J. G. Maitland, Chile: its Land and People (1914); M. R. Wright, The Republic of Chile (1905).

CHAPTER XXIII

J. T. Sutcliffe’s History of Trade Unionism in Australia (1921) is good and informative. B. Fitzpatrick’s Short History of the Australian Labour Movement (second edition, 1944) is lively, and covers a wider ground. No less lively is his book, The British Empire in Australia 1834—1939 (1941). Sir T. A. Coghlan’s four volumes on Labour and Industry in Australia from 1788 to 1901 (1918) contain a mass of information. The author (1857—1926) had great experience as Government Statistician and in other civil service capacities over many years. E. W. Campbell’s History of the Australian Labour Movement: a Marxist Interpretation (1945) is what it says it is. Albert Métin’s Le Socialisme sans doctrines (1901) is an interesting survey by a Frenchman: its title has become almost classic. V. S. Clark’s The Labour Movement in Australasia (1906), by an American observer, is not bad, though rather superficial. See also J. Norton, The Australian Labour Movement (1886). For the economic background, E. O. G. Shann’s Economic 1005
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History of Australia (1938) is indispensable. See also A. G. L. Shaw's The Economic Development of Australia (1944); M. Willard, History of the White Australia Policy (1923); S. H. Roberts, History of Australian Land Settlement (1924); the Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. vii (1933); W. K. Hancock's Australia (1930, revised 1945); A. N. Smith's Thirty Years: The Commonwealth of Australia 1901–1931 (1933); P. Leroy-Beaulieu, Les Nouvelles Sociétés anglo-saxonnes (1901) — which covers New Zealand and South Africa as well as Australia.


For William Lane see his The Working Men's Paradise (1892), and the biography by Lloyd Ross, William Lane and the Australian Labour Movement (1938). See also C. A. Turnbull, Bluestone: the Story of James Stephens (1945) — an account of the early days of the Eight Hours' Movement.

For the Australian Labour Party see G. H. Reid and W. A. Holman, Socialism as defined in the A.L.P.'s Objectives and Platform (1906) — the report of a famous debate referred to in the text. See also A. Brady, Democracy in the Dominions (Toronto, 1947).

For wage regulation see H. B. Higgins, A New Province for Law and Order (1922), and the biography of Higgins by N. Palmer (1931); G. Anderson, The Fixation of Wages in Australia (1929); and the British Blue Book by E. Aves, Report on the Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts of Australia and New Zealand (1908); W. Pember Reeves, State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (2 vols., 1902).

CHAPTER XXIV

In this chapter I have been immensely helped by the loan, in typescript, of Mr. D. W. Crowley's at present unpublished book, The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1894–1916. I had written the chapter before I saw this; but I have revised in the light of it — fortunately, though I added much to my knowledge, finding no need to revise my major judgments. I have also used Sid Scott's very brief Outline
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History of the New Zealand Labour Movement (Auckland, 1941 — later revised edition, n.d.). I have not seen R. Scott’s Early Labour History or Dr. Salmond’s unpublished History of the Labour Movement in New Zealand until 1894, to both of which he refers. I have, of course, used W. Pember Reeves’s The Long White Cloud (1898, revised 1924) and his Fabian pamphlet.

Several of the works given under Australia cover New Zealand as well. These include V. S. Clark’s Labour Movement in Australasia; A. Métin’s Le Socialisme sans doctrines; E. Aves’s Report on Wages Boards, etc.; W. Pember Reeves’s State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand (1902); and A. Brady’s Democracy in the Dominions.

Other useful works include H. D. Lloyd, Newest England (1903); G. S. Schofield, New Zealand in Evolution (1909); A. Siegfried, La Démocratie en Nouvelle Zélande (1904, English translation, 1914); J. C. Beaglehole, New Zealand: a Short History (1936); J. Drummond, The Life and Work of Richard John Seddon (1907); H. H. Lusk, Social Welfare in New Zealand (1913); J. B. Condliffe’s New Zealand in the Making (1930) and Short History of New Zealand (1935); W. B. Sutch’s The Quest for Security in New Zealand (1942) and his Poverty and Progress in New Zealand (1941); J. A. Lee’s Socialism in New Zealand (1938); P. H. Hickey’s first-hand and very left-wing ‘Red Fed’ Memoirs — being a brief survey of the birth and growth of the Federation of Labour from 1908 to 1915 and of the days that immediately preceded it (New Zealand, 1925); Tom Mann, What is Socialism? Does New Zealand Stand in Need of it? (pamphlet, 1902); H. E. Holland, The Tragic Story of the Waihi Strike (1913).

There are also some interesting historical articles by H. Roth in Here and There for 1952.

CHAPTER XXV

I have been able to find very little dealing directly at any length with the Socialist movement in South Africa. M. H. De Kock’s Economic History of South Africa (1924) has two chapters on Labour problems. There is an important South African Government report on European Employment and Labour Conditions (1913). The Choice before South Africa, by E. S. Sachs (1952), has brief references to the period before 1914. See also the article on ‘The South African Strike’ in The Round Table for March 1914.

For a highly partisan view see J. C. Smuts, The Syndicalist Conspiracy in South Africa (1914). For the early period see J. W. Root, The South African Labour Question (pamphlet, 1903); E. B. Rose, White Labour in the Transvaal (pamphlet, 1901); T. Burt, A Visit to the Transvaal (1905).

For the economic background see G. C. R. Bosman, The Industrialisation of South Africa (1939); D. M. Goodfellow, A Modern Economic History of South Africa (1931); L. C. A. and C. M. Knowles,
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Other useful works include W. C. Ballinger, Race and Economics in South Africa (1934).

CHAPTER XXVI

Sun Yat Sen's writings are only available in part in English. The Three Principles of the People (1924) was published in English at Shanghai in 1927. A Programme of National Reconstruction (1918) has not been completely translated. Part I has appeared in English in Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary (1927) and Part III as The International Development of China (1922). Outlines of National Reconstruction (Nanking, 1929 — in English) is the later work, referred to in the text as Fundamentals. It was written in 1924. See also Sun Yat Sen, Kidnapped in London (1897) and 'My Reminiscences' (in Strand Magazine, March 1912).

There are a number of studies of Sun Yat Sen in English. See particularly Bernard Martin, Strange Vigour: a Biography of Sun Yat Sen (1944); H. B. Restarick, Sun Yat Sen, Liberator of China (1931); Tai Chi-tao, Die geistigen Grundlagen des Sun Yat Senismus (1931); P. Lineburger, Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese Republic (1925) and The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat Sen (1937); L. Sharmen, Sun Yat Sen (1934); G. S. de Morant, Soun Iat Senn (1932); Dr. Sun Yat Sen: His Life and Achievements (Shanghai, 1925 — issued by the Kuomintang); J. Cantlie and C. S. Jones, Sun Yat Sen and the Awakening of China (1912); L. S. Hsü (ed.), Sun Yat Sen: His Political and Social Ideals (1933); P. M. D'Elia, The Triple Doctrine of Sun Yat Sen (Wuchang, 1931).

For the general background and for the Chinese Revolution see H. A. Giles, China and the Manchus (1912); W. E. Soothill, China and the West (1925); Sir F. Whyte, China and Foreign Powers (1927); T'ang Leang-li, Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (1930); E. R. Hughes, The Invasion of China by the Western World (1937); Sir John Pratt, War and Politics in China (1943); E. J. Dingle, China's Revolution (1912); A. N. Holcombe, The Chinese Revolution (1930); B. L. Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic of China (1918); H. B. Ruttenberg, Understanding China (1942); H. T. Hodgkin, Living Issues in China (1932) and China in the Family of Nations (1928); Joyce Reason, Chiang Kai-shek and the Unity of China (1943); P. S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (1922); K. S. Latourette, The Chinese (1934); G. W. Keeton, China, the Far East and the Future (1943); J M. D. Pringle, China Struggles for Unity (1939); J. Rodes, La Chine nationaliste 1912-1930 (1931); J. C. H. Lynn, Political
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CHAPTER XXVII

There is almost nothing in English about the pre-1914 Labour movement in Japan, except Sen Katayama's The Labour Movement in Japan (Chicago, 1918) and The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan, published by the Japan Chronicle (1921). See also F. Challaye, Le Mouvement ouvrier au Japon (1921).


For the general background see also I. O. Nitobe, Japan (1931); J. Murdoch, A History of Japan (2 vols., 1925).
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