Influx or Exodus? Anarchists and the Committee of 100

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It has been a common plaint in the nuclear disarmament movement over the last couple of years that the Committee of 100 has been infiltrated and taken over by the anarchists. This notion will probably continue until the Committee is finally in the ground, for the simple reason that there must be a certain bond between those who do not believe in government and law and those who oppose a particular government or governments and advocate breaking particular laws. The relationship is, of course, more complex and, as long as those who propound the ideas of infiltration refuse to examine it, they will remain unable to realise that many more anarchists came out of the Committee of 100 than ever went into it.

The Committee began as a purely breakaway movement from CND and arose from a disagreement over tactics rather than aims. Its intentions were the same, and according to a member of the CND Council who also became a founder of the Committee, it looked at one point in 1960 as if CND might be persuaded to advocate and organise civil disobedience as part of its activities. The Committee began then without any very developed ethos of its own—its supporters wanted to ban the bomb and probably in most cases to leave NATO and "become neutral", as did many CND supporters. Bertrand Russell and Michael Scott called on us to remember our humanity and forgot the rest, and the feeling of the immediacy of war which grew during the summer of 1961 made the movement feel that it must indeed act or perish. The call to civil disobedience however was hardly revolutionary: "Respect for the law is important and only a very profound conviction can justify actions which flout the law" and we were reminded of the Christian martyrs who had "in the end achieved victory". The whole image was far removed from that of the Direct Action Committee—though some people were supporters of both—and of the hundreds who took part in the first Committee sit-down outside the Defence Ministry probably only a fraction would have exchanged the comparative comfort of a Whitehall pavement for the mud of a Norfolk base.

There were exceptions to this "liberal" approach within the Com-
committee, but they did not come from "formal" anarchists: Ralph Schoeneman, in an article in *Peace News*, told us that we "must realise that we are conducting a resistance movement. We are seeking to obstruct systematically to the point where the authorities have to give way". And in direct conflict with the image of the respectable civil disobedient entering court to dispute politely with a bored judge the morality involved in breaking a nineteenth century highway regulation he wishes it to be "understood that the mass media, statements in court, the entire reliance on the institutions of the closed society, will never serve as the basis for reaching people; for these institutions legitimise and we must expose the fraud". It was not "out of any formal anarchy but out of a radical consciousness that civil disobedience must return to individuals the prospect of a vital participation in the public world. Our responsibility is to develop a movement which does not so much aspire to power as it does to present *any* authority with a populace to the state of its ability to use its most precious values".

His ideal method of fostering this consciousness was the ten thousand who would "be taken into court where they refuse to say a mumbling word; if ten thousand have to be jailed—then we shall realise the meaning of civil disobedience and I dare say so will the makers of the Bomb".

The anarchist movement itself was more sceptical, and, naturally, enough, the editorials in *Freedom* were hardly a reflection of the feeling in and around the Committee. The editors' attitude began as an aloof one, although they appear to have taken part in most of the major committee demonstrations held during the first year, but they were, if not convinced that these actions were particularly effective, at least happy to join their non-violent comrades in offering a type of resistance. Apart from being convinced of the worth of the sit-down as a tactic, *Freedom* argued strongly against any threat to civil disobedient's belief in the value of being jailed. The basic flaw in Schoeneman's ideal of the limp silent ten thousand was the pre-supposition that the State *has* to arrest everyone who breaks the law and that the forces of law would *have* to put themselves in the position of being disrupted, an illusion exploded most forcibly by the trial of the six after Wethersfield, and on practically every demonstration where arrests were made. *Freedom*, understandably, knew better and realised that the decision to go to jail was a personal one: they "would certainly not advocate anybody to accept a prison sentence resulting from a civil disobedience demonstration for the publicity it might be expected to receive, and, by implication, the influence it might have on the public". *Freedom's* attitude was, as it had been twenty years earlier: "We must always be reluctant to go to prison, which does not mean we should be reluctant to take actions which might involve us in arrest and imprisonment. We should be prepared to court imprisonment if by so doing we further our cause more effectively than we could otherwise, but we must be careful to distinguish between such action and that action which is intended to solve purely personal problems".

During the first year of its existence, however, the Committee took several steps in the direction of an anarchist position, both organisa-

tionally and in terms of action. John Morris, writing in *Peace News* in October 1961, described the Committee as made up of people who were "mostly inexperienced, unimportant and very young" and the discussions which took place were "often ragged, unorganized, and long-winded; but out of them has come a series of clear, simple decisions, usually almost unanimous, that have proved right and honest in the judgement of our fellows". To Dr. Morris, as to most supporters, it seemed that the Committee's "instinctive rejection of the apparatus of indirect democracy" and the "concepts of direct democracy are new to modern political thought". Though individuals, usually full-time workers, did for periods exert immense influence over the trend of the Committee's action, the Committee probably suffered less from "executive groupings" than the formal anarchist movement, if only because the rapid turnover in activists lessened the chance of acquiring permanent leaders. The anarchist principle of autonomous decentralisation was also new to most people, and the local Committees and Working Groups "ready to stand on their feet" looking outside for co-ordination and advice rather than direction were considered both radical and eccentric by people brought up in the traditions of the British Left.

In terms of action, too, there was a move further away from conventional demonstrating towards a more anarchist approach. After the "success" of the September 17th demonstration the idea naturally evolved of combining the direct action of the DAC with the numbers of "mass" civil disobedience, and for the first time it seemed possible to the Committee that sufficient numbers might be induced to take part to transform symbolic into direct action. The Wethersfield plan was radical, when compared with the Committee's previous activities, and its failure—quite apart from the obvious and serious deterrents presented by the State in its arrests, searches and cancellation of transport—must surely have been inevitable, given the markedly anarchistic assumptions underlying it (assumptions which the majority of supporters were obviously not ready to make): the disregard for property involved in climbing fences and walking on; the challenging of a law with more serious penalties than that of obstruction; and the real physical obstruction of the State's weapons of war as opposed to symbolic obstruction outside the ministries which ostensibly controlled the weapons. For many people it was too hard to break through the shell of conventional political thinking: the Committee relied on the 15,000 who had sat in central London being drawn out to sit on the runway at Wethersfield, but they overlooked the fact that many of these people had either come as observers and been forced to sit by police cordons or did not even countenance civil disobedience as such and had in fact demonstrated to protect the civil liberties threatened by the banning of the demonstration.

It is interesting to note too that the only well-known anarchists who were originally members of the Committee faded from it just at the time when the action envisaged turned in more anarchistic directions. Alex Comfort, who had been jailed for his part in the organisation of the September 17th demonstration and replaced on the Com-
mittee while he was in jail, turned to other activities in the movement, and Herbert Read resigned because he felt the action at Wethersfield had been “strategically foolish” and “a quixotic act of defiance directed against the Air Force rather than against the State” (two presumably entirely disconnected phenomena).

The arrest and trial of the six showed up still further how marginal the influence of anarchist thinking was on the majority of supporters—many of whom strongly disapproved of Pat Pottle going on the run before the Old Bailey trial and some of whom would, had he knocked on their door, have turned him over to the police with ease—consciences. The only action advocated to help the six was the rather ridiculous one of supporters lining up outside police stations to confess their shared guilt and ask for retribution, and the only protest a rally in Trafalgar Square, a long way from the scene of the crime. While for some this was the only action contemplated, for many, particularly in the provinces, this failure of nerve forced them to look beyond the confines of a still essentially bourgeois-minded movement and to seek other methods of thought and action.

By Easter 1962 the word anarchist was becoming frequently used, both by (predominantly young) people who had read and discussed the articles by Ralph Schoenmann, Nicolas Walter and Colin Ward in Peace News and by the people (usually older or in the YCL) who began to call them anarchists whenever they started to expound the theories they had evolved to underly civil disobedience. For the first time, at Aldermaston that year, the anarchist movement made a corporate appearance—with a banner and a tail-piece demonstration—and though, for many they formed a laughable minority, their appearance made others aware that “the anarchists” were more than a central European myth and were people (as normal as they) with whose views they might in fact agree. Apart from Committee activities these young people (particularly in the provinces, where activities tended to be less sectarian) were usually active in other groups than Committee ones and, while the Committee had seemed an alternative to the political scrambling of CND, YS or YCL groups it still led them inevitably to question the assumptions underlying these groups and in many cases to disillusionment with them. Some had already been through several political groups—Labour Party, New Left, Victory for Socialism and other fragments of British “socialism” and had ended up with a feeling of frustration which was not allayed by sporadic sit-downs and activities isolated, on the whole, from any context. Committee philosophy pointed a way—of direct democracy and direct action—but it did not point to any aim beyond “banning the bomb”, and while it largely created the view that the bomb was not an isolated phenomenon but was the logical outcome of a particular society, it did not examine that society or think in terms of a radically new one—other than the vague, beautiful “non-violent society”, which libertarians argued would have to be anarchist and non-libertarians saw as being ruled by a “non-violent government”. Many people were quick to sense the discrepancy in the last phrase, and an underground movement of isolated groups and individuals became so widespread that, at the disastrous demonstration at Greenham Common USAF Base, called by the Oxford Committee, out of the dozen or so marshals (most unknown to each other before hand) all but two called themselves anarchists and none had any apparent connection with non-Committee anarchist groupings; it was no coincidence that the “marshalling colours” for the demonstration were red and black. (The demonstration itself was a step back tactically: the immobilisation of a base should have seemed impossible after Wethersfield and the resulting demonstration could have been no more than symbolic “direct action”. The small numbers served to show that the sit-down was losing its popularity as a method of protest and this was in fact the last major demonstration to be a sit-down, pure and simple).

The testing time for the nuclear disarmament movement came with the Cuba Crisis in October 1962, and the realisation of hundreds of supporters that they were in fact powerless to do anything but rush around the streets led to two things: those who now felt the struggle to be useless faded from activity (the few remaining “names” went during the winter) and the feelings of those who were left on the Committee and its environs crystallised into greater hatred of the power politics which had created the crisis and greater determination to resist it. (Freedom editorials, incidentally, were particularly out of tune with the emotions of young anarchists and tended to give the impression that the serious anarchist should be above worrying over the trivialities of the statesmen).

On Aldermaston 1963, anarchists at last came into the open: the march-within-a-march which started from Reading and ended sitting round the bunker in Warren Row formed up behind two anarchist banners and, although the March Must Decide committee was ostensibly responsible for the actions undertaken independently of CND, the Spiro group and other groups of the black band of half a dozen men and a dozen women, the atmosphere of anti-authoritarianism combined to give the appearance of an anarchist minority grown so large it threatened to swamp the more conventional groupings. For weeks afterwards the papers featured articles on the anarchists, CND denounced the wreckers of “their” march and the network of anarchist groups spread throughout the country almost as quickly as the editions of Danger! Official Secret. It would probably be more accurate to say that many of these groups were libertarian rather than strictly anarchist (George Williamson, then secretary of the Scottish Committee who spent most of the summer travelling round the country, estimated that in any place where there was strong political activity one was likely to find an anarchist, Solidarist, Committee or even radical ILP group, but not usually more than one sort). These groups were no substitute for the mass support which the Committee had once commanded—their strength, in Committee terms, lay in their independence and the bloody-mindedness of the individuals in them—but they were active in uncovering further official secrets and they formed a hard core at the centre of such demonstrations as the one at RAF Marham, where an astonishingly high proportion of participants were prepared at one point or other to walk on to the base (with, after the Wethersfield trial, an even greater awareness
of the consequences of their action than could have been held at Wethersfield). The Committee's failure to take radical action in support of the six immediately after and indeed in the year following Wethersfield, was to some extent compensated for by the prompt calling of another Machia böyle demonstration and the resultant dropping of charges from Section 1 to Section 3 of the Official Secrets Act proved, for about the only time in the history of the Committee, that solidarity could work.

Summer 1963 was in fact the time when "Committee-created" anarchist thought did exert enormous influence within the Committee. The broadening of its spheres of action to include demonstrations against germ warfare (Porton, June) and political repression (Greek state visit, July) was offensive to many of the older Committee members, who saw banning the bomb as the Committee's raison d'être and civil disobedience as its only method of protest. Moreover the tendency for demonstrations to be less and less non-violent was blamed on the anarchists (still appearing to some in the guise of bombthrowers and assassins) but there is no evidence that this degeneration was any more the fault of the anarchists than the general degeneration of the Committee's standards. There were certainly a higher proportion of active believers in non-violence (as a tactic if not a way of life) amongst the anarchists on the Committee than in the anarchist movement, and, in fact, the skirmishes in Freedom on the subject of violence v. non-violence had the young Committee anarchists ranged pretty firmly on one side and the "old guard" anarchists on the other. In London, and to a lesser extent National, Committee meetings the anarchist view was put by a variety of people whose arguments on subjects like tax refusal and the forthcoming General Election were generally distasteful to the "respectable" purely civil disobedient group, and particularly to the Christian group. Despite the rather frenetic activity of the summer it was becoming obvious that the Committee, in that particular form any way, was disintegrating fast (neither London nor the regional Committees had their full complement of a hundred) and the friction between the anarchist-inclined and other sections was undoubtedly a factor in the decline. The decision to demonstrate at Ruislip at Easter 1964 was made after a long fight and with a narrow margin of support (a sad contrast with Dr. Morris' "clear, simply decisions, usually almost unanimous") and led to the withdrawal or resignation of large numbers of the more radical element who obviously wished to work for something more than an unimaginative demonstration, which, even at planning stage, roused little enthusiasm in its organisers. There was also a feeling of fatigue which overcame practically the whole Committee: the decision to demonstrate at Ruislip was made too automatically—because someone had to organise something for Easter rather than because there was a sense of need—and those with an anarchist bias were too volatile to become involved in the drudge of what was rapidly becoming little more than "Committee work". Moreover the imprisonment of Peter Moule and Terry Chandler had an effect probably even more profound than the imprisonment of the six. Peter Moule was a sad example of someone suffering for his part in a demonstration which he had not really believed in, and in Terry Chandler the movement lost the force which had driven it through the summer of the Committee's borrowed time.

To an anarchist it must be obvious why anyone who assimilated the philosophy underlying the Committee came in turn to assimilate some basic anarchist philosophy. The principle of mass participation in political affairs was, if thought through to the end, a principle which involved the ultimate dissolution of any form of government. The anarchism was basically evolutionary (a few talked in terms of the "non-violent revolution" but the action they proposed nearly always entailed the growth of a new society within the husk of the old and was in that sense evolutionary) and, after the first flush of Committee enthusiasts who thought that if enough people sat for long enough in Whitehall the government would have to give up and go home, the more anarchist theorists in the Committee thought in terms of a type of non-violent syndicalism, or in the usual depressed mood of anyone associated with the Committee for a long time, of permanent protest, but in general seemed to derive their form of undogmatic anarchopacism from Alex Comfort and Nicolas Walter.

Organisationally the Committee was based on anarchistic principles: a central group of a hundred people (drawn from a particular area who were equally responsible for decisions and a network of local working groups each with its system of convenors who were responsible for keeping localised groups of supporters informed of activities. (The system varied of course in its effectiveness over the years—the grass roots convenor system naturally being the first casualty when support melted during the winter of 1962-3—and in different areas: in London, where support was probably strongest, it seems initially to have worked well, but some regional committees, many without even their full complement of members, demanded more enthusiasm of supporters, who had, of necessity, often to travel long distances to attend meetings and demonstrations. The decentralised pattern of the local committees led to more local action (as it still does) but the independence of each committee often had disastrous effects on major demonstrations which, though "nationally sponsored" were often not nationally supported).

To those who believe, as I do, that anarchism is less an acquired philosophy than an integral part of one's character—a reaction to any given situation based on instinct rather than thought—experience gained in support of the Committee's activities led to emotions which were essentially anarchistic. It is not until you are arrested that you realise just how incompetent, stupid and unbalanced the majority of policemen are, how farcical the procedure of courts, how blind the judiciary, how filthy and degrading the jails—in short, until you are up against it in person, you do not realise the nature of the State and how impossible it is to condone as a necessary evil the system which is able to inflict such miseries. It is no wonder that some of those who experienced all this came out with a hatred of the state as bitter as the oldest anarchist's; they did not automatically become anarchists—some still
felt that “reform” would make the institutions tolerable—but they were more receptive to anarchist ideas than those who had only experienced more conventional political action could ever be.

Anyone who seriously imagined that the anarchist movement set out to take over the Committee cannot have taken a very close look at that movement: far from being in a position to take over anything it was not even ready to cope with those anarchists produced spontaneously by the Committee. The provinces were in a better position to form outward-looking anarchist groups, as they were formed basically of the new anarchists and worked closely with their local Committee groups, but in London young anarchists in search of anarchist discussion had only (usually rather sterile) weekly meetings, more social off-centre discussions and, in very rare cases, an invitation to join the then-elite of the London Federation of Anarchists; if they wanted anarchist action they looked to the Committee. It is only fair to say that many older anarchists did take part in Committee activities, often at considerable risk—the second Marham demonstration was a notable example—but FREEDOM, despite its many insights, often seemed out of touch and only ANARCHY had any formative influence (Nicolas Walter’s articles on Direct Action and Disobedience probably had a more widespread and immediate influence than anything else written at the time).

I have tried to argue that although the Committee of 100 evolved into a decisive and influential experiment in libertarian action this happened because the circumstances demanded it, not through any influx of anarchists who were, as a movement, incapable of organising such an influx, and that the Committee in fact created the younger anarchist movement. I am not pretending that the Committee produced a complete generation of well-trained anarchists, ready to promote revolution in any circumstances, but it was able, because of its widespread influence, to point a way, more effectively than the small anarchist movement, to a coherent philosophical outlook and to explain the rudiments of the tactics of resistance and self-organisation to a greater cross-section of a political generation. It is equally useless to pretend that the whole disarmament movement is at the moment anything more than dormant (I disagree with those who say dead) but if, when, it revives—when what are at present automatic reflexes become again emotional reactions—I think there will be a greater number of people in it with a common background who will be more aware of the implications and consequences of opposing any aspect of the state and, though we will probably make a lot of new mistakes and some of the old ones again, I think it will be evident that those of us who watched our friends being kicked and jailed and deported did learn something. This may be the time for the real anarchist infiltration.

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Discovering Malatesta

PHILIP HOLGATE

MALATESTA: His Life and Ideas. Edited by Vernon Richards. 309 pp and 16 pp of illustrations. (Freedom Press, cloth 21s., paper 10s 6d.)

WHEN THE LONDON ANARCHISTS OPENED A CLUB in the mid-fifties, the founder members decided to name it, not after Godwin the English writer who has contributed most to anarchist philosophy, but after Malatesta, the Italian anarchist militant, on the grounds that the approach to anarchism found in Malatesta’s life and writings was closest to that favoured by the English movement. It is interesting that that feeling should have existed at a time when hardly any of Malatesta’s writings were available in English. (His pamphlet Anarchy has been a standing feature of the Freedom Press publications list, and a short pamphlet Vote—What For?, an adaptation of In Tempi di Elezioni has been available, as has an American edition of A Talk Between Two Workers.) I think the reasons for this are twofold. Firstly the personal one that the editor of FREEDOM, which has been a centre of stability and continuity in British anarchism since the outbreak of the Spanish revolution, has been an enthusiastic advocate of Malatesta’s ideas. Thus readers of FREEDOM have always been sure of having the Malatestan view of any controversy put forward, critically and with comments on its applicability to the present situation, and I mention in particular the series of five articles written on the occasion of the centenary of Malatesta’s birth, and the section of “Conclusions” at the end of Vernon Richards’ study Lessons of the Spanish Revolution. It is of course this concern for Malatesta’s ideas which has crystallised in the production of the present book. Secondly, the kind of attitudes expressed by Malatesta are not those that are readily distilled into long philosophical works, but are the kind that are passed through movements verbally, from one comrade to a group of friends, perhaps partially understood and at times misinterpreted, but with a sufficient coherence for a large section of the movement to be able to call itself Malatestan without being able to point to a textbook in which Malatestan ideas are set out. I think this lack of a written exposition of these ideas has led to much misunderstanding of the position of anarchists in England, not only on the part of academic historians, but on the part of both friendly and unfriendly commentators in the national and political press.

The publication of the present volume is therefore an event of great importance for the anarchist movement and everyone sympathetic to, or interested in it. It contains altogether about 200 pages of trans-
lations from Malatesta’s writings, 40 pages of “Notes for a biography”, and 50 pages of discussion made up of a short introduction and an attempt to relate the writings presented in the main part of the book to the problems facing us today.

The translations appear not in the form of complete articles but as extracts put together under twenty-seven section headings. On beginning the book I felt considerable reservations about this technique, particularly since the introductory selection on “Anarchy and Anarchism” contains isolated paragraphs of as few as four to a dozen lines, interspersed with slightly longer ones, taken from articles in several journals written at different times. Most of these reservations have disappeared with further reflection and reading, for it is easy to remember how often a particularly clear expression of say, the attitude of anarchists to trade unions, can be written into a general article on what anarchists should be doing, or a discussion of a particular industrial dispute, and it is obviously that paragraph that needs preserving, even without its context. Nevertheless, since the point is continually being made by the editor, that the value of Malatesta’s writings is that they arose as propaganda in particular revolutionary situations, it would be interesting to see in precisely which context the paragraph was written, and the present edition will stimulate me, and I hope other readers who can read Italian to look further into what Malatesta was saying by getting hold of the volumes of his writings published in Switzerland before the war and in Italy in 1946.

The main impression that arises from reading the extracts from Malatesta’s writings is the straightforwardness of his anarchism, and I look forward to the good effect this will have on the present wave of young people who take an interest in social questions, just as the century series mentioned above had on me at a time when I had just begun to read freedom and was feeling rather bewildered by the philosophical dissertations and theatre reviews that filled its middle pages at that time. Malatesta wrote quite simply: “I prefer to discount uncertain philosophy and stick to the common definitions which tell us that Anarchy is a form of social life in which men live as brothers, where nobody is in a position to oppress or exploit anyone else, and in which all the means to achieve maximum moral and material development are available to everyone; and Anarchism is the method by which to achieve anarchy through freedom and without government, that is without authoritarian organs which, by using force even, possibly for good ends, impose their will on others”. And at another time: “I am an anarchist because it seems to me that anarchy would correspond better than any other way of social life, to my desire for the good of all, to my aspirations towards a society which reconciles the liberty of everyone with co-operation and love among men”.

It is this straightforwardness that eludes people today. If someone can produce a complicated philosophical or psychological explanation for being an anarchist, his writings may get wide publicity, and scholars who can discover such motives in other anarchists are also sure of a public, but to be an anarchist because one wants anarchy, and decides that the best way of moving in that direction is to propagate it, seems too simple. Yet it is that very simplicity of approach that needs emphasis in today’s world, and perhaps the disastrous failures in the postwar decades of trying to get socialism via bureaucracy, colonial liberation via demagogic politicians, freedom through supporting the lesser evils of western democracy, may provide more receptive listeners to Malatesta’s message.

The extracts presented in this book deal entirely with topics which are of interest to socially conscious people today. One of the most controversial is the question of anarchism and violence. Malatesta’s view was that violence was always evil, but in contrast to the historical pacifist approach he thought it necessary for revolutionaries to use violence to defend the revolution against the ruling classes. He wrote that “Anarchists are opposed to violence; everyone knows that. The main plank of anarchism is the removal of violence from human relations. It is life based on the freedom of the individual, without the intervention of the gendarme” but that, “This revolution must of necessity be violent, even though violence is in itself an evil. It must be violent because it would be folly to hope that the privileged classes will recognise the injustice of, and harm caused by, their privileged status, and voluntarily renounce it”.

Malatesta made it clear what the difference is between anarchists, both those who accept and those who reject the possible need for violence, and the apostles of non-violence per se, because he was quite clear about the objects of his social ideas, and was therefore in a position to discuss the means of achieving them as means, and not, like some modern pacifists, elevate them to the position of ends for want of anything better.

Another topic on which Malatesta had a lot to say is that of organisation, both as a problem that anarchists have to face in their own propaganda groups and federations, and as a problem for revolutionaries who, after the overthrow of a government will be faced with the reorganisation of social life, probably in the face of counter-revolutionary attacks and attempts by “revolutionary” politicians to seize power. In these matters Malatesta’s point of view was extremely practical and realistic. He was a strong believer in organisation of a voluntary co-operative kind, and argued that if free people neglected to organise social life themselves, then some authority would arise to fill the vacuum. He criticised the kind of anarchist propaganda which assumes that social organisation will just take care of itself after the overthrow of governmental power, and thought that anarchists should at least make concrete suggestions about how economic life could be run efficiently in a free society. His views on propaganda movements are of particular relevance in view of the current controversies about anarchist federations in Britain. A paragraph should suffice.

“In every case a particular organisation lasts so long as the reasons for union are superior to those for dissent; otherwise it disbands and makes way for other, more homogeneous groupings. Certainly the life and permanence of an organisation is a condition for success in the long struggle before us, and besides, it is natural that every institution should by instinct aim at lasting indefinitely. But the duration of
a libertarian organisation must be the result of the spiritual affinity of its members and of the adaptability of its constitution to the continuously changing circumstances. When it can no longer serve a useful purpose it is better that it should die."

Naturally, as a lifelong agitator, Malatesta was concerned above all with the relations between anarchism and working class struggles, a problem which causes anguished and heated controversy at all times. He believed that "Anarchists must recognise the usefulness and the importance of the workers' movement, must favour its development, and make it one of the levers for their action, doing all they can so that it, in conjunction with all existing progressive forces, will culminate in a social revolution which will lead to the suppression of classes and to complete freedom, equality, peace and solidarity among all human beings. But it would be a great and fatal illusion to believe, as many do, that the workers' movement can and must on its own, by its very nature, lead to such a revolution".

His emphasis throughout, in dealing with this problem was that anarchists must be active in the unions, working as anarchists and trying to develop the revolutionary consciousness of their fellow members, but must refrain from trying to dominate the unions or to foist an anarcho-syndicalist paper programme on them without the workers really accepting it. At various points he stressed the revolutionary potential of the working class, and the need for it to be developed by agitation and propaganda, and warned against the easy assumption that the working class would turn spontaneously to libertarian revolution of its own accord.

The biographical notes in the book are admitted by the writer to be short, but his style conveys a more vivid impression of Malatesta's life as an agitator than a detailed but slower account would have done. Despite the intention of soft-pedalling the man in order to concentrate on his ideas, it is inevitable that the greatness of Malatesta as a man comes through, as a real person and not the artificial "personality" that so many political figures become.

Finally, the last section of the book which needs to be studied in detail, in conjunction with continuous re-readings of the extracts from Malatesta, is an assessment of the relevance of his ideas today. In his introduction Vernon Richards states that "Part III then, is not directed to the 'outsiders' who have 

no chance on this volume, to all revolutionists, and in particular to anarchist comrades and friends wherever they may be". In other places he refers to the book as being not academic but frankly propagandist, and as being intended to present Malatesta's ideas to the world. I think that if the book has a fault, it is a confusion of emphasis arising from the dual need to present Malatesta to other anarchists and to the world at large, to deal with questions of tactics and principles, and to show that they are relevant to the world outside the anarchist movement; perhaps even the hope that the book will be read by masses of ordinary people and the realistic knowledge that it will be read mainly by those who are already involved in generally socialist movements. As an example I quote the long discussion on the idea of the general strike. Never having been able to com-

prehend how merely going on strike would in itself bring about anarchism, I am grateful to learn that Malatesta had the same difficulties and answered them by reiterating the need for an insurrectional seizure of the land and factories by the armed people. However, although the logic of Malatesta's views on this point is unassailable, it is hard to imagine the ordinary man in the street, who is almost as likely to vote Tory as Labour, who would never dream of devoting an afternoon to a protest march or political meeting, being concerned about points which are of such a revolutionary-technical nature. Although Vernon Richards obviously scorns the "academic" outlook on life, he, like the rest of us, cannot always escape the anarchist equivalent of it, which is to argue at length in specialist journals about problems constructed by the readers and contributors and in which they are deeply interested, and in a language which only they understand, without much relevance to the world outside. I would have much preferred to have read Vernon Richards' exposition of what Malatesta would have been saying to the people in England in 1965 if he had been here, taking account of the specific problems which we have to face, and which, despite the editor's assertions, differ considerably from those in Italy in 1920. We are told that Malatesta's anarchism "was not in his head but his heart, but to achieve his ends he was guided by his 'head'—that is by his observations and understanding of the human and material problems to be overcome". I am only convinced Malatesta had a heart, in the sense that I would like to see an anarchist society come into existence in the near future as a result of the insurrectionary overthrow of government and the reorganisation of social and economic life on the basis of free co-operation, and reading this book increases the aspirations of the heart in that direction. What I find difficult to accept intellectually is that this theoretical possibility is enough of a practical possibility to make the advocacy of this kind of anarchism a justifiable way of using time, money effort and talent which comrades feel prepared to devote to generally progressive ideas, when there are so many more practical if less intoxicating causes to be supported.

Altogether this book represents a specific view of anarchism which has perhaps been neglected lately in favour of sociological and psychological interests, and of which both Malatesta and his editor are enthusiastic advocates. It is a view which is extremely appealing in its straightforwardness and common sense, and I think it is the approach to anarchism by which the whole idea must stand or fall. It is the best introduction to anarchist ideas which is currently available in English, and I share the editor's hope that it will be widely read by anarchists and by all those in progressive, left-wing or pacifist movements which have some connection with the anarchists, and most of all by people who are attracted to anarchist ideas by reading what anarchists have to say about specific issues like education, democracy in work, children, etc., and who may want to find out about the generating ideas behind these approaches. I also share his hope that the publication of this book will result in a ferment of anarchist ideas and resurgence of genuine, vigorous and comradely discussion both inside the movement and among the people it hopes to reach.
A postscript to the anarchists

IRVINH OROWITZ

Perhaps an ultimate test of vital ideas is their capacity to reappear in many guises to lead us once again to reaffirm and re-examine our fundamental commitments. The extent to which an "ism" claims a stake in universal truth is often measured by the heat it generates, by the sacrifices of its adherents, by the needs, in one way or another, filled by its presence. That presence may come in the form of a resounding mass following or a single undying voice against the wind. It may or may not find the proper soil in which it will be nourished for any length of time. But it stubbornly reappears to signal the continuing nature of the problem it addresses. In this way, as such a presence, anarchism is preserved from the graveyard, for it speaks to the human condition in all of its phases. Neither lingering questions nor dubious answers can bury its claim to being one among the significant intellectual postures of the modern world.

As a postscript to these selections, we might survey the anarchist past from the safety of the present. In working on the anarchists in the preparations for this collection of essays, I could not help but note the kinds of questions raised about anarchism and the frequency with which the same kind of objections are voiced. It indicates to me the need to confront directly critical sentiment. I should add that my answers are highly personal, and this might be considered incorrect by "purists" and "pragmatists" alike. Nevertheless, the dialogue is all important and the issue a lively one.

One of the founding fathers of modern sociology, Leonard Hobhouse, once wrote that "there are other enemies of liberty than the State and it is, in fact, by the State that we have fought them." If this is correct, wouldn't the basic premise of anarchism be decisively undermined?

I am inclined to agree with Hobhouse on this. It is certainly the case that liberty can be thwarted by forces other than the State; and that under very special circumstances, the State has functioned to expand the liberties of men. Perhaps this is far truer of English political history, with its pluralistic emphasis and liberalist background, than of other societies. But it must also be noted that State power as coercive power is far more customary than State power as public administration. From an empirical vantage point, the anarchist argument does not rest so much on the exceptional conditions under which the State may curb its coercive tendencies, but on the general conditions under which the State exercises its power over and against public desires.

Were the State a useful and good social instrument, there would be little need to rationalise its existence. As a matter of record, even those who have held that the State is necessary, rarely, if ever, go so far as to say that it is also good. The perfect example of this is the great number of social-contract theories—particularly those of Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel—that seek to justify the existence of the State by rejecting the possibility of men's living without it in social comity. Underlying social-contract theories is a philosophical-ethical bias in favour of utilitarianism, of the selfish egoism of men: men must surrender their private sovereignty in order to preserve the commonweal. The anarchist, arguing from altruistic premises, is just as entitled to argue that the State corrupts the naturally co-operative inclinations of man, precisely because of the social contract.

The anarchist rejects all theories of social contract, all theories in which there is a notion that men contract out certain freedoms in return for prearranged guarantees that the State renders. The reason for the rejection is, first, that there is no real contract made between men. This is only a convenient myth for the maintenance of the status quo or the maintenance of State authority. No one consciously enters a contract to apportion his rights. The second reason involves a justification of the need for State power because of the hedonistic utilitarian acceptance of the selfishness, brutality, and warlike character of men, which really exposes its hypocritical claims about original goodness. In the purest Hobbesian or Machiavellian forms, contract theory involves the preservation of the ego, not the preservation of the society. Because of this convenient myth of social contract, the ego is persuaded that society is indeed set up to protect the person from injury. But as a matter of fact, society severed from its nature by class divisions, gives birth to the State precisely for the reverse reason. The State and not men in general is coercion, brutality, war, force. So that not only is there a mythology but a topsy-turvy mythology in which properties that are taken to be intrinsically human are in effect those of the State. The human qualities of goodness, sacrifice, control, order, protection, all of these somehow become mistakenly enshrined in the general theory of the State. Anarchism categorically rejects any theory based on the principles of contract to an impersonal bureaucratic force. On the other hand, anarchism also rejects revolutionary doctrines that project a theory of ultimately overthrowing the State. It insists that all theories that consider the State a necessary, even if temporary evil as justifying the existence of the State. There is a kind of shrewdness about the

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anarchist view. The anarchists were virtually the first to criticise the bolshevik or Leninist theory of a transitional dictatorship of the proletariat, which would then abolish itself, since this would violate the law of self-perpetuation of bureaucracy that the anarchists, even prior to the sociologists, raised to the level of a principle of modern industrial life. Roberto Michels, who along with Max Weber, was the father of the general theory of bureaucracy, was an anarchist and makes his criticisms from the point of view of the psychological insights gained from sympathies with (and ultimate rejection of) anarchist ideology. To say that the proletarian State is a temporary or necessary device in which the bourgeoisie can be permanently eliminated, is from the point of view of the anarchist inadequate reason to recreate the State in any form, since as an inherently evil thing it will reproduce in new ways all of the old exploitation. The frequently heard bolshevik claim that the anarchists are naive is readily turned upon the bolsheviks. From the anarchist point of view, the bolsheviks are naive because they mistook the purpose of revolution to begin with, which is to liberate from rule and not to replace it in new guises. For their part the anarchists minimise the fact that, although revolutions never take place on schedule or according to blueprints, they do nevertheless open possibilities of emancipation otherwise impossible. But this dialogue between communism and anarchism can hardly be at an end—as long as the liquidation of the State is the professed aim of the communists.

It must be said on this point that the anarchist is more astute in his appreciation of the State than is commonly understood. Aside from the firm distinction between coercion as necessary to define the State and administration as necessary to define society (which is mysteriously usurped by the State), there is another, and more forceful argument. The State, precisely because it accentuates both coercive and administrative functions, suffers a schizophrenic condition that accounts for its rare moments of genuine protectiveless as mentioned at the outset.

A forceful argument against the State is adduced by Proudhon. In his rebuttal of the classical power school of political theory, against that line of thought that held that the State functions to protect human rights and property relations, Proudhon points out that perhaps the State does indeed have such a twofold purpose. However, by virtue of that, the State is lending its weight to “political incompatibilities” that accentuate rather than alleviate social conflict. The centralisation of authority for the classical anarchist is also a polarisation of power—separating the ordinary citizen more thoroughly than ever from the sources of power and therefore leading to an intensification rather than a diminution of class struggles. And the State, sworn to uphold both people and property finds itself in a logical impossibility: to support people against property is to support its own overthrow directly; while to support property against people is an invitation to revolution. In any circumstance the State, far from being the coercive cement of society, is really the irritant of society.

Isn’t it true, as Plekhanov and others have insisted, that anarchism is simply a form of utopianism, longing for a world of human perfection independent of the agencies for getting to such a perfect condition?

And therefore, would it not be more rational to conceive of anarchism as a religious expression, a messianic critique, of the social world as it is?

The social philosophy of the anarchists would have to be described as a form of naturalistic millenialism or messianism. It has elements that are customarily associated with utopianism. There are, however, some important distinctions. Probably one of the best ways of finding out what anarchism is would be to distinguish its special features from utopianism as a general category, precisely because of its similarity.

Three basic distinctions have to be noted. First, there is in anarchism a rejection of those utopianisms that stress reforming, parochial or partial solutions. Utopianism applied to community-level organisation is restricted to miniscule size and effect. Anarchism strives for total reorganisation with little attention paid to preliminary model communities for persuasive purposes. The establishment of such communities among the anarchists has been the practice merely of small factions within the general mid and was never, as among the utopianists, the professed aim of the movement. It criticises the utopianists for fashioning a perfect community as an end in itself, thereby narrowing the range of possibilities and deliberately involving a small number of people and always withdrawing from the field of social life as such.

A second significant feature is the critique anarchism launches against utopia as an ultimate refinement of benevolent despotism. All non-anarchist utopias attempted to demonstrate to the ruling caste the power of benevolence and enlightened self-interest. They were efforts to persuade and not to overthrow a ruling caste. They were reforming rather than revolutionising agencies. The anarchist communities were attempts to persuade the masses to emulate them so as to isolate and render dysfunctional their bureaucratic and class tormentors. Voluntary associations were never really the central focus of anarchist activity. At most, they represented some of the occasional experiments in community living engaged in by the more pacific anarchists. The anarchists steadfastly viewed utopias to be microscopic reproductions of the frictions and fictions to be found in organised nation-states. The Owenite community does not effect a revolution in society and even tends to reproduce elite and mass divisions by relying upon the great man’s guiding genius for institution reform and establishing procedure. This despite the tendency of the anarchist communities to suffer from similar if not the same difficulties. With the stress of these communities on reform, they tend to blunt rather than stimulate desires for revolution and have incurred the criticism of the anarchists.

Anarchist belief, except for its Tolstoyan variety, is a form of scientism. It shares with socialism a naturalistic orientation in contrast to the metaphysical predilections of more religious types of utopian thought. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Marxists were far more hostile to utopian reform communities than the anarchist because they took the tenets of realpolitik and the science of politics more seriously considering such efforts as a mere preliminary to scientific socialism and therefore historically transcended. To return to such efforts was the mark of empty nostalgia. Other marks of theoretical friction between the utopists
and anarchists are summed up perhaps by taking note of the fact that the utopian communities demanded an extremely high degree of consensus, of agreement in principle, while anarchism insists on co-operation, on agreement in practice.

The utopian might say that because of its very totality, anarchism does not engage in a meaningful or possible struggle. The anarchists, for their part, declare that partial solutions, whether based on utopian communities or factory workshops, are doomed to failure precisely because of their partiality. To conclude this point, reform utopianism is an attempt at a total solution in a partial context, whereas anarchism is an attempt at a limited solution in a total context. For the utopian, the economic system determines behaviour, hence this idea of solving problems in a limited sphere of operations is realisable. For the anarchist, psychological factors tend to be dominant, so that the solution is going to come to men individually, and at the same time it will occur to many at the same moment in history. Utopianism has no requirement for principles of revolutionary action. The basic requirement for utopia is that a group of like-minded spirits form a social compact. This does not carry any obligation to confront the society outside utopia. It should be stressed that the similarities between community utopianism and anarchism are very strong. Anarchism did lend itself to the attempt at restructuring communities. But these did not define the anarchist movement and were always of secondary importance in relation to the larger revolutionary efforts of the anarchists.

By setting the example the utopianists hoped to create the models that would gradually increase in number and influence. The assumption of gradualism is that things will get better, even if they get better slower. The utopian tradition and practice was an attempt to enshrine the theory of liberalism as a theory of emancipation. The anarchist counterclaim is willing to grant a degree of progressive improvement. His case really rests on the progressive and overall deterioration of the many as against the improved comforts of the few. These progressive advances are seen to have been paid for by the many whose fibre has been damaged in the process. Utopian theory does collapse in the face of the historical fact that little evidence exists that things get better simply because there are more efficient instrumentalties of control. In this the anarchist critique anticipates the contemporary scientific attitude on this question, namely that the utilisation of instruments may work for or against the benefit of man. The existence of the harmonious "perfect" society is no guarantor of the general elevation of civilisation.

Is it not so that the anarchist view of the contradictions between principles and power is simply an abstract formulation of a simplistic model of a world in which everyone is either good or evil? That is to say, don't the criticisms offered by Marx on Proudhon apply to anarchism in general? For example, the quasi-Hegelian phrasing of all problems in terms of irreconcilables—between proletariat and bourgeois, propertyless and property owner, individuality and collectivism, value exchange value, all of which are resolved in a grand metaphysical synthesis of pure negation, "phrases which lack common sense."

It would be difficult, and pointless, to deny that anarchism is indeed highly moralistic in both phraseology and practice. But to criticise it for being politically impracticable does not perhaps do it justice. There can be no doubt that anarchism was doomed to failure. And it is also undoubtedly the case that Marx was to some extent correct in viewing anarchism as a theory that glorified contradiction because contradiction is the basis of anarchist appeal, since this appeal is directed to the petty bourgeois, who is by nature, "a socialist on one side and an economist on the other." But if we ignore the class invective, and even if we assume that anarchism in industrial societies stems from petty-bourgeois origins, we must still examine its claims—since these claims are matters of verification and not to be condemned by virtue of origin.

Every age confronts its own crises, and therefore it is difficult to speak of any particular time as being one of crisis. The modern world, however, has a particularly unique consciousness of crisis. Part of that consciousness originates with the critique offered by anarchist and various radical thinkers, of the paradoxical features of modern social organisation. One would have to say that the basic philosophic premise, the critical schism of the modern world, as the anarchist sees it, is the contradiction between power and principles. Every specific interest dividing man is a reflection of that "contradiction"—since interests are themselves embodied in the State principle.

There are other ways of examining this. It can be framed as a struggle between reason and freedom, between the rationality of pure reason as it manifests itself in the forms of bureaucracy on one hand and the absence of freedom, which has been in effect a consequence of the rise of this new form of rationality. There are other possible perspectives. One could pose this as a problem of individualism versus collectivism. Nevertheless, the profundity of the anarchist critique is evident because there will be this paradox of power and principles under any conditions. Only at that point when power cannot enforce involuntary obedience can this particular form of crisis be resolved. It is possible to reconcile the antagonisms between individualism and collectivism without resorting to the anarchist call for total human transformation. It is even possible to settle the relationship between political action and bureaucracy without having to overhaul human nature. So there is something ultimate in the anarchist formulation. Anarchism is not so much a universal theory of social change as it is a description of the contradictory nature, the paradoxical results of this change. Little wonder, therefore, that anarchism itself would be invested with all forms of dualistic self-contradiction that would cause great skepticism in the minds of politically oriented men as to its worth.

When one argues with anarchism, one argues with an absurd point of view in a way. But its very absurdities and deficiencies seem to be not so much unique consequences of the anarchist position as they are consequences of a way of life in the twentieth century. The criticisms that can be made and will be made of anarchism are perhaps more profoundly criticisms of the society as we know it, and of the incapacity of humanity to rationalise and control its destiny as a universal human community.
Anarchism is committed to the seizure of political power whether it be by means of the General Strike, mutual aid societies or the setting up of voluntary soviets. This doctrine has a theory of seizure of power. It would be naive to assume that these are simply people who are good-hearted and good-natured. They are by and large dedicated to the uses of violence on one hand and civil disobedience on the other. At the point of seizure anarchist perspective seems to fail. That is to say, in relation to socialism, which is based on a general theory of planning and political rule, anarchism stops at the point where socialists begin. There is an apocalyptic note that looks forward to the dissolution of the entire old society upon the seizure of the State apparatus. A most cogent criticism of anarchism states that, even if it were to reach a position of being able to seize power, the very fact that the anarchist is committed to a defence of principles rather than to the use of power tends to make him someone who is intrinsically incapable of rule, of maintaining power. The dilemma for the anarchist is therefore the contrasting demands between the seizure of power and overthrowing the old on the one side, and the maintenance of power and construction of a new society on the other. Maintenance implies the existence of stability, order and consensus. The anarchist, committed as he is to the permanence of the revolutionary state of flux and to the impermanence of all social order, is caught in a contradiction between his principles, which are those of permanent revolution, and political needs, which are those of order and stability.

Marx and the Marxists had an advantage that the anarchists tried vainly to incorporate in its later stages. The Marxists viewed technology and industry, the very productive process itself, as a determining factor in social change. It was from the productive base of society that the need emanated for certain consonant changes in the human administration of the productive process. The anarchist never confronted the problems of a vast technology and ignored them by trying to find his way back to a system of production that was satisfying to the individual producer rather than feasible for a growing mass society. The Marxist regards the present technological level, mass production, as fettered by individualistic (petty-bourgeois and capitalist) modes of control and presages for a type of social ownership that is in keeping with a mass and highly rationalised machinery of production. The anarchist is pressing for social reorganisation in terms of a work integration principle of human relations. He could never comprehend "readiness" for revolution as readiness for the smooth governance of humanity over the instruments of gaining its livelihood. This is why anarchism appears unconcerned with technology and indeed, anti-technological. The anarchist literature contains a strong element of nostalgia, a harkening back to a situation where workshops were small, where relationships were manageable, where people experienced affective responses with each other. Technology and the material benefits of science were never seriously entertained by the anarchists, except in a ministerial contempt for that which destroys the natural man.

Technology has not merely expanded. Its demands transform the prevalent concepts of work. We are in a technological era that is qualitatively different, that brings forward entirely new forms of social behaviour and social existence. Much as we prefer not to breed fragmented specialists, it is impossible to envision the era of hydrogen power and mass electrification in terms of simple, spontaneous association of individual craftsmen. The forms of technology moving from craft to a network of minutely separated functions have, therefore, tended to undermine the idea of the anarchist Everyman.

If we look closely at the anarchist paradox of power versus principles, we find that in the more generic sense the contradiction he finds between power and principle is really perhaps a bit more dramatic than it is descriptive. He is too willing to surrender principled strategies for principled ends as political compromise. The anarchisms formulations are therefore highly romantic and at the same time unsatisfactorily explanations of the actual character of society. But politics, the goal of political behaviour, asserts itself at this point. The anarchist, committed as he is to anti-politics, is therefore also cutting himself off from the possibility of developing the kinds of strategies that could lead to implementation of an anarchist social order. Their ambivalence over pacifist or violent tactics divides into absolutistic defences of one or the other as a matter of principle rather than strategy. This problem is irreconcilable since both are elevated from strategies to the level of principles, and both involve commitments exclusive of the other. This leads to the surrender of critical judgment over choice. The advocates of violence demand a surrender of critical judgment when they call for the general strike. Perhaps Sorel was more candid than his colleagues when he referred to it as the "myth of the general strike", albeit a necessary myth. It had to be believed in suspension of judgment. It is likewise with the pacifist wing of anarchism. Pacifism was no longer a tactical device, it was the end itself. Lacking the instrumentalities of achieving the end, the instruments become the end. In the absence of strategies, the actors are compelled to live the part as if their example would achieve it, but their own conviction does not of itself achieve the sought-after end. For the "violent wing", violence becomes end and instrument and moreover, a heroic form of human fulfilment. It embodies all the "great" human qualities. The very attempt, therefore, to evade the problem of power control becomes a form of corruption rather than a restoration of principles to human society.

Anarchism is plagued by sociological dualism. There is its militantly anti-religious scientism, but this tends to have its sources and resolution not in the scientific enterprise, but in a mythical notion of the struggle between good and evil. The result is a super-mythology or a more religious religion than that of any enthusiastic sect. The same kind of thing occurs in turning over the problem of individualism versus collectivism. A return to individualistic patterns on the part of all humanity is what is sought after, but this is conceived in such rarefied individual qualities that such transformation is in fact accessible only to the most unusual of people. What was looked toward as the broadening of democracy becomes the basis of a new elitism, since it idealises charismatic over more prosaic natures. Benefit of political solutions to political problems, idealising individualistic rebellion, anarchism reflects
the extent of our difficulties rather than effects significant alteration of them, but the will to criticise the excesses of organisation is the positive note of fresh air when the breathing of these organisms becomes laboured and stifling. Despite muddled inconsistency, frozen contradiction, oversimplified polarisation of problems, the sense that negation ultimately makes lies in its capacity to neutralise the more prevalent excesses super-rationalised organisational life imposes.

From an historical perspective anarchism is a reactionary doctrine. Isn't it the case, as Hermann Rauschnigg long ago pointed out, that anarchism is the pure expression of nihilism—simply the will to universal unsettlement, an unbounded dynamism that is dangerous because it has nowhere to go?

The ideas of such modern-day anarchists as Sorel did serve as an intellectual tributary for fascist activism. However, it might just as readily be pointed out that Malatesta's view served as an intellectual source for communism; and Emma Goldman's pioneering efforts on behalf of birth control, less stringent laws governing divorce and migration, and widening the avenues of free speech, created a climate conducive to liberalism. From an intellectual point of view the character of anarchism is certainly ambiguous. But the practices of anarchism have been less ambiguous. Its leadership continually opposed World War I as being futile from the standpoint of labouring-class interests. It fought the rise of reaction and fascism in Italy and Spain. It was the first to single out and oppose "rightist" trends in the Russian Revolution. Since the import of this question is not the effectiveness of anarchism but its principles, it seems singularly unfair to saddle them with reaction.

Parenthetically, it might be noted that the implicit or tacit support given by anarchism to fascism in its early stages stemmed from the fascist proclamations of its rise as a revolutionary form of socialism based on syndicalism. Only at the later stages, in the period of Hitlerite consolidation, did Italian fascism shift its base to corporativism. With that shift, anarchism became decidedly anti-fascist. And while Berkman and Goldman denounced the subversion of the Soviets, the smashing of the Kronstadt rebellion, they remained convinced of the necessity and possibilities of the Russian Revolution. If it is true that anarchism is an unbridled activism with nowhere to go, it is at least not an unbridled activism that is so convinced of where it is going that it is blinded to the dangers of totalitarianism.

Because anarchism is antipolitical it has rarely, if ever, been able to establish firm lines of organisation. It is inhibited from being reactionary by the nature of the assumptions it makes about the wickedness of Behemoth. Nihilism is the personal condition of uncommitted men suffering a purposeless rage against the irrationalities of the prevailing system of nation-States. The belief in the possibilities of life unhampered by instruments of coercion reveals the rationalistic bias of most forms of anarchism in the exaltation of human reasonableness and goodness, and contempt for the irrationality of the State. In any of its varieties, even those more pregnant with irrationalism, there is of course a marginality shared with nihilism. This derives from a willful opposition to social integration and social order. But designations such as reactionary, progressive, etc., depend entirely upon specific activity concentrated on specific issues, or in other words, the role it plays rather than what it thinks.

In the history of anarchism, there are two definite trends in its approach to historical change, trends that coincided with the pervasive optimism of enlightenment in the nineteenth century, and the equally widespread disillusionment with the idea of progress in the twentieth century. The assumptions of Godwin, as an illustration, state that the rationality of men will triumph over the irrationalities imposed by external State authority. The perfectability of society was underwritten by the ability of men to make choices based on knowledge. For that reason, legislation and education were potential curatives to the worst infections of the social order.

But the world of class struggles, the world of competition between ruling and ruled classes rested not on knowledge but on interests. The change in the direction approaching nihilism reflected a general disillusionment by revolutionists in the ability of masses to make spontaneous choices based on reason. It was a shift from the patient optimism of a new-born insight to the restless pessimism of an old struggle. It was seen that class membership did not ensure class action. The post-Marxist anarchists did not assume man's rationality and the State's irrationality. This mechanical picture no longer corresponded to a social world defined by the bureaucratic State.

The new anarchist emphasis stated that society is rational, and its very rationality grinds men down. Bureaucracy is the rationalisation of what is humanly unreasonable. And if the purpose of the State is to redefine reason as mechanical rationality, nihilism may perform an antiseptic function. Where the bureaucratic apparatus defines reason, human freedom must become unreasonable. The classical definition of freedom as reason hence gives way to an "irrational" view of freedom as the absence of contraint or obligation. The crossover in anarchist beliefs from a political to a psychological guide reflects the fact that politics has become increasingly scientific. But it has increasingly reflected an expression of individual needs. Mass society and mass culture become a permanent feature of the State apparatus. So that anarchism, because of its nihilistic elements, becomes a cry against manipulation. The anarchist is a man who won't be manipulated. The *de facto* separation between ordinary men and the political apparatus becomes a *de jure* defence of individual integrity. The paradox of the modern State is that, while politics more completely regulates the lives of men, participation in the decision-making process has become increasingly restrictive.

Earlier forms of anarchism fought a distinctive and indentifiable class protagonist. The politics of protest of any kind have been floundering in general—anarchism being but one protest doctrine to suffer confusion of target. In the search for the class enemy, since class lines have generally been if not blurred, then at least oversubordinated by other social divisions, the casting about led to an attack on authority *per se*. Anarchism defends the individualist stance in more psychological terms
by virtue of the difficulty of identifying the purely economic class enemy as the source of social oppression. The absence of a class enemy also means the absence of class friends. Anarchism never had consistent class lines and certainly at a time when the problem of economic classes itself had become vitiated by contemporary considerations of prestige and power is this even less the case. Anarchism becomes more free-floating and less representative of a class. For that reason it has at least the pretence of being universally applicable and appears to rise above class bias. It may well be that anarchism has descended from an ideology to a form of therapy—less nihilistic than merely isolated.

Even if we make the assumption that anarchism is politically progressive, may it not be reactionary in yet another sense? Is there not a nostalgic element attached to the anarchist conception of man—an attempt to restore Gemeinschaft modes of living involving a preference for the community against the larger society, for the simple rural life over the complex urban life, for organic relations in preference to contractual relations, and finally for integrative patterns over differential patterns. In short, is there any feature of anarchism as a faith?

An explicit theory of history runs through classical anarchism that preserves it from a simple yearning for the past glories of man. Any struggle against authority is taken to be evidence for the principles of mutual co-operation. Feudalism, based as it was on the iniquitous relations of lord and serf, priest and flock, could only herald the future in a distorted way. The Guilds showed the value of organic labour, but distorted this value as a result of an economy of scarcity. The movement from a system of mutual aid based on scarcity to a system of social egoism, and then finally a return to mutual aid at a “higher level” of abundance, is of course, an ideal typification of society. It represents, as does Marxism, not so much a series of historical observations, as the use of history to develop a philosophy of history. And like all such meta-historical doctrines they tend to be overly abstract and contradictory. In anarchism this manifests itself in an undulation between névité and cynicism.

Man is always, if given the opportunity, a good fellow. On the other hand, when he has been given the opportunity, he has been exploitive and sometimes evil. The attributions are paradoxical. Perhaps more so in anarchism because of the assumption that, left in his natural state, man is co-operative. And yet, this natural state is as metaphysical an assumption as underlies the theories of social contract that anarchism scorned.

The foundations of human emancipation, for the anarchist, do not entail a separation from concrete and immediate political goals, since concrete political aims are said never to be realised in the form in which they are anticipated and since the functioning of history is essentially a paradox and a mystery that does not yield its secrets in advance of the occurrence. Thus attempts to unite social and political emancipation tend to be doomed. Emancipation is seen in terms of the transformation of the social basis of life. The reorganisation of that life eliminates all forms of human exploitation. But the consequences of this is not a unified description of sociology and psychology, or social man and private man, or public life and private problems, but only a permanent dualism, a kind of inner creative tension between these elements. Anarchism is in effect a description of historical tensions more than a theory for the overcoming of these tensions. It encourages man to act because of the psychological propensities of the actors rather than any accurate prevision of the drama. Anarchism does not demonstrate that a release from this tension will result in the practical surmounting of these problems. The anarchist is always suspicious of resolution. He is a rebel with a cause and not a programme. He is always assuming the partiality of the revolutionary occurrence, whether it be Berkman commenting on the Russian Revolution, or Kropotkin on the Paris Commune. These are necessary but only first steps. And indeed how can they be total? The real Sisyphean element in anarchism is to pose the problem of social life as something that cannot be resolved. To see society as a permanent contradiction and to see revolution as a particular expression of that contradiction, is a far cry from the idea of permanent revolution since it allows for no positive judgment of every revolution per se. It may very well be that anarchism can provide an intellectual guidepost by its watchfulness over the improper function of every political act.

The difficulty with socialist theory is that it tends to be, despite all of its claims, utopian. Once achieving a socialist state system, socialists abandon the principle of contradiction for a mellow doctrine of “nonagonastistic contradiction”. It thus becomes a theory of social preservation of the status quo, much like capitalism. The anarchist, in his more sophisticated thinking, states that there is no social system that does not produce its genuine contradiction and therefore the possibility of further social change. Perhaps theories based on social class are more practical in that they pose possibilities of resolution. Yet resolution makes the problem obsolete. To advance it beyond a certain point is reactionary.

Of course, in a sense, any critique of Gesellschaft relations—of the rise of the over extended bureaucracy, depersonalised and detached from human problems—must run the risk of making an appeal to a Gemeinschaft world that was. And there is little doubt that anarchists look approvingly and longingly on the organic solidarity feudalism was supposed to have had. This yearning was especially heightened in the late nineteenth century under the persuasive barrage of John Ruskin, William Morris, and Brooks Adams. On the other hand, to make power manageable does in some sense mean to decentralise it—to restore to the people most immediately affected by power decisions the rights and responsibilities for making such decisions. In this sense, anarchism is no more and no less nostalgic than the sociological theories of Durkheim, who saw in social solidarity the solution to the deterioration of human bonds; Mannheim, who insisted that social planning be organic and not overridden by rigid bureaucracy; and by Tönnies himself, who felt that although the shift from community to society was historically necessary, that we ought not to lose sight of
the advantages of community life, precisely because historical evolution dulls the senses to past patterns of human organisation. In short, the anarchist response to the dysfunctional properties of large scale organisation and the bureaucratic State, while surely touched by nostalgia, has as its essential core the same kinds of social criticism now being offered by the leading figures in social science. It was a rejection of ritualism in work, overconformity in response, lack of adaptability to change, self-protection of the organisation in place of social service, etc., that was at the base of anarchist rejection of the super-State, rather than a longing for feudal honour or medieval craft.

The anarchist belief in the evil power of State authority has received considerable support in the knowledge that State bureaucracy often turns out to be dysfunctional in operation and disgusting in its repressiveness. The anarchist insistence on the values of mutual aid has been transformed into a celebration of the worth of voluntary associations. The anarchist belief in the potential co-operation of all men as equals has received support in the new psychological understanding of the plasticity and viability of human character. The anarchist insistence on the posture of the outsider has been reinforced by the rise of strong and positive “subcultures” with norms of their own.

Anarchism may exaggerate the role of individual participation and underestimate the values of struggle for realisation of partial goals. And the healthiest society in the world is one that recognises that the tasks of society are not to insist on perfection, but to assist in the arts of perfecting. For this long-haul undertaking the ability to absorb the anarchist double insight into the need for revolutionary change and the possible cost of such change may yet turn out to be the strongest recommendation for democratic “politics”.

When all is said on the subject, must it not be frankly admitted that anarchism is not so much a doctrine as a mood; and not so much a social and economic credo but an elaborate form of psychological therapy for the politically alienated and the intellectually disaffiliated? In short, must not anarchism be accepted or rejected as an act of faith by virtue of its being beyond confirmation, independent of any evidence as to its actual worth?

One of the frequent charges against the socialist tradition is that it lacks a fully developed psychology of “socialist man”. This is natural since it makes much of the emergence of a new man in support of its revolutionary claims. Apart from the early neo-Hegelian writings of Marx on the alienation of the worker from the sources and uses of his labour, the socialist tradition has tended to substitute organisational directives for a theory of behaviour. In this sense, the charge that anarchism is more a mood than a doctrine makes total reaction to this situation, an attempt to pick up where Feuerbach, Stirner, and the young Marx left off. From the anarchist viewpoint, socialist man has become bureaucratic man. The perfect socialist is undeviating in principles, flexible in political tactics, geared to the tasks of construction once political victory over capitalism has been won. The contrast be-

tween fact and expectation was stark. The anarchist, perhaps in virtue of his “petty-bourgeois character”, thought more deeply about the type of man the future ought to produce on a mass scale. As the socialist became political, the anarchist became philosophical.

The anarchist was less intent on future political victories than he was on present psychological overhauling. This was well expressed in the statement by Lefrancais, one of the coworkers of Elisee Reclus in the Paris Commune. Speaking of his associates in the International, he said that “I cannot work with such fools as you are, but I cannot work with anyone else. Because you fools are still the men I love best. What with you one can work, and remain one’s self”. The anarchists gave up their fortunes to the cause like Christian ascetics. Men like Cafiero and Malatesta, an aristocrat and a medical student respectively, took a strict Christian view of money as a corrupting influence on the person. Like Luther, the anarchists saw money as a diabolical symbol through which corruption became inevitable.

The personal hardships of the anarchists—imprisonment, exile, loss of family—all served to reinforce the revolutionary impulse. Personal hardship became something of a test of personal worth. Like Christian reformers, no man was beyond redemption. Thus if anarchism is a mood, it is so in the same sense as other world historic forces of moral redemption that are at the same time politically unHINGED.

As anarchism becomes historically “obsolete” its orientation becomes increasingly psychological. And the attraction of followers probably derives from the influence of people of extraordinary charismatic dimensions. They function to bring attention to the present existence of moral and at the same time secular men. Our special interest in them consists in evaluating their contributions to an secularised ethic. And, who, after all, is concerned with a secular ethic if not the disengaged and disillusioned intelligentsia? The modern intellectual increasingly comes to define the concept of intelligence as such as being moral, i.e. intellect in itself has a responsibility to the world. It is thus precisely as a mood rather than as a political doctrine that anarchism derives its attraction for a sector of the intelligentsia. As an instrument of political analysis it has become sterile and scholastic. Yet the anarchists are admired if not emulated for their outstanding qualities as people. Revolutionists, whatever their suasion, have had outstanding moral characteristics in addition to a high degree of political skill. What sets the anarchist apart is his belief in the absolute importance of the individual in history. As in Stirner’s work, history is confronted and confounded by morality. For it to be otherwise is to convert history into predeterminism and morality into opportunism. The anarchist’s taste for spontaneity as a revolutionary quality of higher integrity than organised political revolution reveals the extent to which the qualities of charisma, moral stature, are exalted among the anarchists. Spontaneity is romantic and apocalyptic, allowing for the fullest display of personal herpism.

This adherence to spontaneity of political action strongly flavours the nature of personal heroism, since the heroism this entails is not
merely an illustration of the "laws of history" but a directly personal and lived experience. Revolution conducted by parliamentary means or party apparatus cannot command the same romanticism of heroic rebellion. This is further glamourised by extreme risks and dangers. The individual's highest faculties are sharpened in such a confrontation. In this sense anarchism adopts a therapeutic view of revolution.

The appeal of the outsider as such to the romantic imagination certainly finds the modern anarchist mood an attractive one. He does not accept social norms since they are man-made and arbitrary. Communist revolutionaries have gone to great length to adopt publicly acceptable norms in an effort to court popular acceptance. For the anarchist this is an extreme hypocrisy, and he could not compromise the romantic outsider to this extent. What in the political realm emerges as anti-politics, so in the personal realm marginality is also a virtue. The outsider's posture is of course not unique with the anarchists and certainly not confined to them. But it is a necessary feature in anarchism. It affects political activity to the extent that practical coalitions are forsaken as compromises with norms.

Criminality, aside from the popular use of the word, is another word for someone who strives to rearrange the norm through unsupervised means. Criminality often pervaded the anarchist movement—not merely because the anarchist relined on theft, assassination, insurrection, but because of his elation of lawlessness. Everyone in some measure is lawless. But shame and hypocrisy insist that laws are inviolable when everyone knows that they are violent and violated with immunity. So that the claim for a higher morality on the part of the anarchist lies in his honesty. He is willing to assert lawlessness as a principle in opposition to the concept of law as such.

There are anarchist justifications for this concept of lawlessness. Civilisation creates a whole superstructure of law and legal edifices that as a matter of fact, are superfluous in the functioning of the life of an ordinary human being. Natural man requires no regulation and suffers under the burden of those imposed, and this is alien to his deeper nature. In fact, for the anarchist it would be true to say, as many have who have addressed themselves to the nature of human morality, that making certain behaviour illegitimate is the very cause of its performance. Forbiddensness has an attraction all of its own and to treat deviation by other means than outlawing it would reduce the impulsion toward it.

The mental development of anarchism has been in an ever-increasing direction away from a mass based notion or even a class based notion to one of deracinated man. The appeal of anarchism, where any is exerted, exists for the consciously alienated worker, separated as he is from the fruit of his labour, for the anomie middle-class man isolated from life's growth processes, for the intellectual conscious of outrageous infringements that organisation imposes on individual rights. Naturally anarchism does not supply the sought-after guides for the many who seek identity but it serves this mood, occasionally in half-conscious form, and answers the quest of a socially conscious few. It delineates the possibilities of a new personality, one that is assertive and in a condition of harmony with other men, where the will to assertion is sublimated in the common good.

Anarchism is an optimistic mood in contrast to much that passed for the irrationalist thought of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Man can be reformed, man is plastic, and above all, consciousness itself becomes the very machinery at the disposal of men to overthrow the ballast of manipulative rule. The anarchist feels very positive about the future if for no other reason than that consciousness, anarchist consciousness, becomes a moral force advancing science and morality. Perhaps then the social psychology of the anarchist rests on the idea of self-consciousness acting as an improving force in the evolution of man.

What kind of man is yearned after by the sufferers of modern industrial society? He is much like an Apache, that is to say, he would probably be given to violence, active and not passive in the pursuit of his goals. He is a "natural man". He sheds certain features of historical civilisation. During the summertime he goes nude. He is generous insofar as there is abundance. His "Apache" qualities are most fired by attempts to impose exploitative relations. His social world is in a state of permanent revolution, and change continually refreshes his life. His skills and ingenuity are embodied in the whole product he creates for the common good. Very important to social balance is the like mindedness of the community. He wants to restore a truly "Christian" being with little covetousness for material things. Ideas are freely exchanged without threatening the "powers that be". His contribution is heard and is part of the overall community decision-making. Competition based on invidious comparisons by class or nation is outmoded. He has a possibility of living an existence in keeping with his nature. Spurious power conflicts do not command him to take up arms against strangers. His critical capacities are not blunted but welcomed. These ideal qualities enable the seeker to envision a realisable man since these are universally longed-for qualities and in part, men from time to time exhibit them. The anarchist is one who believes that, but for the accursed State, they will reassert themselves as man's truly human self. It gives the seeker and the converted believer the faith in the great horizons of human potential. And for the present he possesses the sharp and much-needed weapon of criticism. And this keeps him alert as the guardian of humanity's better self. He lives without pretence and above all without superficial reverence. He is no jingoist. For those who define themselves as anarchists the self-definition performs the task of showing up our absurdities. And these criticisms are very clever. Why not use the label "Anarchy"? Why not use a designation that implies an extreme criticism of the social order, and also an extreme celebration of the human being?

Let us not become so complacent about the possibilities of change that we scorn serious, even if erroneous, attempts to bring it about. Let us not become so clever that we smirk at every doctrinal inconsistency at the expense of opposing social injustices. The anarchists are a romantic, absurd breed that cannot, thank goodness, come to terms with some of the oppressive excesses of civilisation.
A basic fallacy?

(perpetrated, possibly, by parts of the Curtis Report which imply that any kind of care is preferable to residential child care)

A preconceived notion of any situation or circumstance must have examples to prop it up or illustrations to give it the apparent substance of truth. Leila Berg’s article in ANARCHY 48, “A Week-end Case”, therefore, would have cheered many a Treasury official—if only on grounds of economy; heartened certain town and county councillors—as for example the Midlands city father who asked, “Why do we have to send housemothers on courses?”; his mother had brought him up without a course!; and innumerable harassed ratepayers—“Why cannot they be made to bring up their own kids?”

It was a pathetic story Leila Berg told. Here were two poor children, deserted by their mother, orphaned by their father’s suicide, ill-clad and meagin—if not cruelly—treated in a children’s home; permitted to visit their kind social aunt and uncle—who had known them for several years—only once every three weeks to enjoy the comforts, pleasures and amenities of the strange environment of a normal home. Presumably, at the large children’s home where they had lived for a similar period, all the housefathers had beards and the single housemothers didn’t sleep with men! Although strongly worded, the article perhaps should have been entitled “The end of a weak case”.

The fact that this diatribe might have been the truth—if not the whole truth—would dismay any residential child care worker; the apparent intention to depict the story as typical of a local authority children’s home should alarm and outrage every houseparent who read it. The picture presented is wholly inadequate and, one would hope, unconvincing; but we should bear in mind that the public is largely uninformed of the child care service and may be excused if they make their assessment on such unfortunate articles as the one quoted.

None the less I am sure that many readers who have had any contact whatever with the service have some knowledge of the hours, work and interest which housemothers devote to the clothing of “their” children; housemothers, who would regard it as a personal reflection if the boys and girls in their care appeared shabbier than the children from the next cottage or those of local families in the area. Nor is this standard low, because children’s homes are often located in areas of good housing conditions—very different sometimes from the town and city districts where the children were born.

That there are inherent disadvantages for a child having to grow up in a children’s home is well known and clearly recognised and every endeavour is made by authority and staff alike to compensate. Yet, the one feature of the system that we may applaud surely without reservation is the material standards—the mechanics of living in these establishments. Good food and regular meals; adequate clothing and wellshod; good beds and domestic hygiene; facilities for games and recreation unknown to children in the city streets; these are minimum standards and some establishments improve on them considerably.

I recall a housing estate being built around a children’s home: “Won’t it be difficult now?” someone asked “the children will always want to be ‘out of bounds’”. Sure enough, they did sometimes, but the greater difficulty was keeping the local youngsters out! When children leave the children’s home to go to a foster home, or even to their own homes, it is a fact that they miss the amenities of the establishment which, of course, no ordinary flat or house could supply. As they grow up and some revisit the home these are some of the things they often remember and talk about.

The good social aunt and uncle are a boon to any children’s home, if only because the child in care is a happier child when regularly visited and taken out. They are welcomed with open arms by houseparents who realise their value and the contribution they make to the fuller life of the growing child. In my experience children have often been taken to visit these useful friends when for some reason they could not be collected; on one occasion I made a detour of over 60 miles to accompany a child to such a home for a holiday; child care officers do this sort of thing as a regular part of their normal duties. These contacts when maintained over the years are invaluable and have the support and blessing of residential workers everywhere.

Naturally, not all social aunts and uncles are so satisfactory in practice. Some regard the child as a sort of animated doll; others have a fantasy of perfect bliss if there could be a child around the home. The reality situation of a “naughty” boy or “hysterical” little girl may shatter this dream after a while and the first clouds ofanger rejection appear on the horizon; difficulties arise, excuses are made until they finally shrink from the child as from a dangerous explosive. Sometimes the social aunt and uncle status is taken a step further and the couple foster a child. There are many such fosterings which are eminently successful with “parent” and “child” mutually satisfied and normally happy. But there are other cases of break-down fostering—far more, I believe, than we ever know about—where the child would have been better off, certainly less confused and disturbed had he or she been left to continue life in a children’s home.

None would pretend that the child in care, living in an establishment, is as happy as he could be at home with his own stable family; but the very reason he is in care has already discounted this fortunate state, and society is striving to provide a “second best”. Family life in his own home has broken down; parents are separated or have deserted; the mental or mental state of a remaining parent may be responsible for the child being out of control or neglected; there is no stable family life for him and the local authority has had to step in to care for and protect him.
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 47

What is ANARCHY playing at? "Towards Freedom in Work" was an interesting sociological essay, but you can find interesting sociological essays in New Society. Is ANARCHY intended as an anarchist propaganda magazine? If it is, it is not fulfilling its purpose. Surely it should be spreading the revolutionary idea of workers' control, not the reformist idea of industrial democracy under capitalism. People are liable to read it and say, "Ah, this is what anarchists believe", which it certainly is not. If it is not an anarchist propaganda magazine but one of non-anarchist ideas of interest to anarchists, then it ought to abandon the title ANARCHY which it has no claim to.

MICHAEL BUCHANAN

EDITOR'S COMMENT: As every propagandist for workers' control will bear out, the objection that is always raised is that it is simply a beautiful dream which has been made impossible by the scale and complexity of modern industry, and the subject is then put aside without further examination. We want to get beyond this stage, we want to reach the point where people will examine the idea and its possibilities, and not dismiss it out of hand. The actual evidence that workers' control is technically and organisationally feasible in modern industrial conditions, has to be gathered together from people with particular and specialised experience. We see this as an important function of this journal—collecting the raw material for the anarchist propagandist. This is the point of the articles in ANARCHY 2, 10, 30, 40 and 47.

When the experiments described by James Gillespie first came to our notice, PS wrote in FREEDOM, "Out of this sort of development can grow the desire for complete workers' control and the circumstances, the knowledge and confidence necessary to ensure its success. At the moment, like everything else, it is being used to further the interests of capitalism, but the anarchists have always maintained that the organisations for the new society must grow within the shell of the old. This new development in industry looks like being one of them."

WILLIAM JOHNSON

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