Martin Buber

JOHN ELLERBY

MARTIN BUBER, WHO DIED IN JERUSALEM ON JUNE 13 AT THE AGE OF 87, belonged to a generation of central European Jews for whom it was a privilege to die in old age, in bed. We discuss him in this issue of ANARCHY together with two of his contemporaries, the German anarchists Gustav Landauer and Erich Mühsam, who both died by violence, one murdered in the reaction to the revolutionary period after the First World War, the other, one of the first victims of Nazism. In a sense, looking back in the light of history, one could say that they were privileged too, in that their deaths were noticed. For, as Martin Buber wrote to Gandhi (who had suggested that the Jews in Germany should use satyagraha as a reply to Nazi atrocities), “Now do you know or do you not know, Mahatma, what a concentration camp is like, and what goes on there? ... An effecive stand may be taken in the form of non-violence against unfeeling human beings in the hope of gradually bringing them thereby to their senses; but a diabolical steamroller cannot thus be withstood... Testimony without acknowledgement, ineffective, unobserved martyrdom, a martyrdom cast to the winds—that is the fate of innumerable Jews in Germany. God alone accepts their testimony, and God ‘seals’ it, as is said in our prayers. But no maxim for suitable behaviour can be deduced therefrom...”

Landauer, Mühsam and Buber were all Jews in the racial sense, if indeed there is such a thing, but Buber was also a Jew in the religious sense: in fact he was world-famous as a religious thinker who transcends the limits of any particular faith. (Though he remarked in a television interview, “I must confess I don’t like religion very much”.) One might almost say that there is a “cult” of Martin Buber in the same way as there has been a cult of Simone Weil. We do not subscribe to this cult: we are simply interested in Buber’s social ideas, but at least it has meant that his works are available in translation—while none of those of Landauer, the close friend who deeply influenced his ideas, have been published in English.

Buber was hardly an anarchist, but the essay Society and the State, reprinted in this issue of ANARCHY, seems to me to have the greatest...
value for anarchists and especially for anarchist propagandists, because of the clarity of the light it throws on what we might call the sociological bases of anarchist thought: the idea of the social principle and the political principle and the inverse relationship between them in any society, and of the notion of the "political surplus" and the "latent external crisis" are surely more useful to anarchists than to anyone else in explaining the nature of the world we live in.

Again, Buber was not a revolutionary. "Just as I do not believe," he wrote, "in Marx's 'gestation' of the new form, so I do not believe either in Bakunin's virgin-birth from the womb of Revolution. But I do believe in the meeting of idea and fate in the creative hour." He was not a revolutionary, but his approach to the moral problems of revolution was identical with that of Malatesta (see V. Richards: Malatesta: His Life and Ideas). Buber, contrasting the revolutionary with the soldier, wrote that "the revolutionary stands, according to the situation, in the tension between goal and way, and within its responsibility, neither of which the soldier knows. His personal statement is not, 'I must here use force, but I do not want to do so'; but, 'I have taken it on myself to use as much force as is necessary in order that the revolution be accomplished, but alas for me and for it if more force is used than is necessary!'

The personal responsibility of the soldier stems from principle; he can carry the contradiction out to its logical conclusion in his soul, reaching perhaps a decision to allow himself to be killed rather than to kill; even if he does not follow this conclusion in practice, he at least achieves the fundamental formulation of it. But the personal responsibility of the revolutionary is, according to its nature, one of demarcation. The watchword of his spirit is 'Up to here', and for that 'Up to here' there is no fast rule, each moment presenting it with ever new face. The revolutionary lives on the knife's edge. The question that harasses him is, in fact, not merely the moral or religious one of whether he may kill; his quandary has nothing at all to do, as has at times been said, with 'selling his soul to the devil' in order to bring the revolution to victory. His entanglement in the situation is here just the tension between ends and means. . . ."

In his book Paths in Utopia (Routledge 1949), Buber relates the collective settlements in Palestine (he was writing before the establishment of the State of Israel) to the tradition of Proudhon, Kropotkin and Landauer. The book is a defence and restatement of that stream of socialist thought which was castigated by Marx and Engels as "utopian":

"Kropotkin summed up the basic view of the ends in a single sentence: the fullest development of individuality will combine with the highest development of voluntary association in all its aspects, in all possible degrees and for all possible purposes; an association that is always changing, that bears in itself the elements of its own duration, that takes on the forms which best correspond to any given moment to the manifold strivings of all'. This is precisely what Proudhon had wanted in the maturity of his thought. It may be contended that the Marxist objective is not essentially different in constitution; but at this point a yawning chasm opens out before us which can only be bridged by that special form of Marxist utopics, a chasm between, on the one side, the transformation to be consummated some time in the future, no one knows how long after the final victory of the Revolution—and, on the other, the road to the Revolution and beyond it, which road is characterised by a far-reaching centralisation that permits no individual features and no individual initiative. Uniformity as a means is to change miraculously into multiplicity as an end; compulsion into freedom. As against this the 'utopian' or non-Marxist socialist desires a means commensurate with his ends; he refuses to believe that in our reliance on the future 'leap' we have to have now the direct opposite of what we are striving for; he believes rather that we must create here and now the space now possible for the thing for which we are striving, so that it may come to fulfilment then; he does not believe in the post-revolutionary leap, but he does believe in revolutionary continuity."

When we examine capitalist society, says Buber, "we see that it is a society inherently poor in structure, and growing poorer every day." (By the structure of a society is to be understood its social content or community content: a society can be called structurally rich to the extent that it is built up of genuine societies: that is local communities and trade communes and their step by step association.) He compares Proudhon with Saint-Simon: "Saint-Simon started from the reform of the State. Proudhon from the transformation of society. A genuine reconstruction of society can only begin with a radical alteration of the relationship between the social and the political order. It can no longer be a matter of substituting one political regime for another, but of the emergence of a political regime grafted upon society, of a regime expressive of society itself."

Buber sees Kropotkin as amplifying Proudhon's thought in stating the simple antithesis between the principles of the struggle for existence and mutual help. He regards Kropotkin's earlier theory of the State as historically under-substantiated and regards as more correct the later view in Modern Science and Anarchism (French edition of 1913): "All through the history of our civilisation, two contrary traditions, two trends have faced one another; the Roman tradition and the national tradition; the imperial and the federal; the authoritarian and the libertarian." In his critique of Kropotkin, Buber declares that "As in his inadequate distinction between the excessive and the legitimate State, or the superfluous and the necessary State, so in another important respect Kropotkin's view, although perceiving many historical relationships unnoticed by Proudhon is not realistic enough. . . . The danger of collective egoism, as also that of schism and oppression, is hardly less in an autonomous community than in the nation or party, particularly when the community participates as a co-partner in production." He thinks that Landauer's step beyond Kropotkin consists in his insight into the State. "The State is not, as Kropotkin thinks, an institution which can be destroyed by a revolution. The state is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently." Therefore, says Buber, we
shall always be helping to destroy it to the extent to which we do in fact enter into other relationships.

He then examines the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and shows how in their changing and contradictory attitudes to the old Russian communal institutions, the Mir and the ArTEL, and in their attitudes to co-operatives and workers’ councils, they regarded them simply as a tool in the political struggle. “From the standpoint of Leninism,” said Stalin, “the collective economies and the Soviets as well, are, taken as a form of organisation, a weapon and nothing but a weapon.” One cannot in the nature of things, comments Buber, “expect a little tree that has been turned into a club to put forth leaves”. And he goes on to consider the history of the co-operative movement: “But for the most part the running of large co-operative institutions has become more and more like the running of capitalist ones, and the bureaucratic principle has completely ousted, over a wide field, the voluntary principle, once prized as the most precious and indispensable possession of the Co-operative movement. This is especially clear in countries where Consumer Societies have in increasing measure worked together with the State and the municipalities, and Charles Gide was certainly not far wrong when he called to mind the fable of the wolf disguised as a shepherd and voiced the fear that, instead of making the State ‘Co-operative’ we should only succeed in making the Co-operative ‘static’.”

Of the repeated attempts in the last 150 years in Europe and America to found co-operative settlements, he says he would apply the word failure not merely to those attempts, which after a more or less short-lived existence, either disintegrated completely or took on a capitalist complexion, thus going over to the enemy camp; he would also apply it to those that maintained themselves in isolation. “For the real, the truly structural task of the new Village Communes begins with their federation, that is, their union under the same principle that operates in their internal structure. Even where, as with the Dukhobors in Canada, a sort of federation itself continues to be isolated and exerts no attractive and educative influence on society as a whole, with the result that the task never gets beyond its beginnings and, consequently there can be no talk of success in the socialist sense. It is remarkable that Kropotkin saw in these two elements—separation of the settlements from one another and isolation from the rest of society—the effective causes of failure even as ordinarily understood.”

If the “Full Co-operative” in which production and consumption are united and industry is complemented by agriculture, is to become the cell of the new society, it is necessary, says Buber, that “there should emerge a network of settlements, territorially based and federatively constructed, without dogmatic rigidity, allowing the most diverse social forms to exist side by side, but always aiming at the new organic whole”. There is one effort, he concludes, “which justifies our speaking of success in the socialistic sense, and that is in the Jewish Village Commune in its various forms, as found in Palestine”. He calls it a signal non-failure, he cannot say a signal success, because he is too aware of the setbacks and disappointments, of the intrusion of politics, of the “lamentable fact that the all important attitude of neighbourly relationship has not been adequately developed,” of how much remained to be done. But of the importance of this non-failure he writes: “There can hardly be any doubt that we must regard the last war as the end of the prelude to a world crisis. That crisis will probably break out—after a sombre interlude that cannot last very long—first among some of the nations of the West, who will be able to restore their shattered economy in appearance only. They will see themselves faced with the immediate need for radical socialisation, above all the expropriation of the land. It will then be of absolutely decisive importance who is the real subject of an economy so transformed, and who is the owner of the social means of production. Is it to be the central authority in a highly centralized State, or the social units of urban and rural workers, living and producing on a communal basis, and their representative bodies? In the latter case the remodelled organs of the State will discharge the functions of adjustment and administration only. On these issues will largely depend the growth of a new society and a new civilisation.”

There are two poles of socialism, Buber concluded, between which our choice lies, one we must designate—so long as Russia has not undergone an essential inner change—by the formidable name of Moscow. “The other I would make bold to call Jerusalem.”

Another crucial reason why he thought that the kibbutzim were the germs of a new form of social life was the variety to be found among them: “New forms and new intermediate forms were constantly branching off—in complete freedom. Each one grew out of the particular social and spiritual needs as these came to light—in complete freedom, and each one acquired, even in the initial stages, its own ideology—in complete freedom, each struggling to propagate itself and spread and establish its proper sphere—all in complete freedom. The champions of the various forms each had his say, the pros and cons of each individual form were frankly and fiercely debated—always, however, on the plane which everybody accepted as obvious; the common cause and common task, where each form was recognised the relative justice of all the other forms in their special functions. All this is unique in the history of co-operative settlements.”

At this point something must be said of Buber’s attitude to Zionism. According to the Jewish Chronicle’s obituary, it was when he was a student in Vienna that he became the spokesman of a group known as the Democratic-Zionist Fraction “which opposed the purely political trend of Herzlian nationalism and stressed the cultural side of the Jewish renascence. . . . But the rejection of the brand of spiritual and cultural Zionism favoured then by Buber disappointed him so much that he withdrew for some time from the Zionist political field. . . . Finding himself in agreement with many of the views on nationalism held by A. D. Gordon and his HaPoel HaTza’ir group, he gave his support to them and to the Chalutz movement . . . (but) it was not long before he saw, once more, that he could not agree with his fellow
Zionists and their militant nationalism.” (Hapoel Hamizrachi means “the young worker” and Aaron David Gordon, about whom Buber wrote movingly in his book Israel and Palestine was a kind of Tolstoyan anarchist.) Buber himself, who left Germany at the last possible moment in 1938, to become Professor of Social Philosophy at the University of Jerusalem, continued to hold unpopular views, he did not want a Jewish state, but like Judah Magnes and Ernst Simon, sought co-operation with the Arabs. The Guardian notes that “In Palestine his idea of binationalism caused him to be ostracised by the orthodox as ‘an enemy of the people’. It is 44 years since Buber warned his fellow Zionists that if the Jews in Palestine do not live with the Arabs as well as next to them, they will find themselves living in enmity to them, and he never ceased to give his support to Brit Shalom and its successor Huda, the organisations seeking co-operation with the Arabs.

In 1951 Buber was criticised for accepting the Goethe Prize of the University of Hamburg. Was he not, it was asked, in too much haste to forgive? His reply was to accept another German prize and in doing so, to say these words:

“About a decade ago a considerable number of Germans—there have been many thousands of them—under the indirect command of the German government and the direct command of its representatives, killed millions of my people in a systematically prepared and executed procedure whose enormity cannot be compared with any procedure I have seen in an event. I, who am one of those who remained alive, have only in a formal sense a common humanity with those who took part in this action. They have so radically removed themselves from the human sphere, so transposed themselves into a sphere of monstrous inhumanity, inaccessible to my communication, that not even hatred, much less an overwhelming hatred, was able to arise in me. And what am I that I could here presume to forgive! . . .

“When I think of the German people of the days of Auschwitz and Treblinka, I behold, first of all, the great many who knew that the monstrous event was taking place and did not oppose it. But my heart, which is acquainted with the weakness of men, refuses to condemn my neighbour for not preventing upon himself to become a martyr. Next there emerges before me the mass of those who remained ignorant of what was withheld from the German public, and who did not try to discover what reality lay behind the rumours which were circulating. When I have these men in mind, I am gripped by the thought of the anxiety, likewise well known to me, of the human creature before a truth which he fears he cannot face. But finally there appears before me, from reliable reports, some who have become as familiar to me by sight, action, and voice as if they were friends, those who refused to carry out the orders and suffered death or put themselves to death, and those who learned what was taking place and opposed it and were put to death, or those who learned what was taking place and because they could do nothing to stop it killed themselves. I see these men very near before me in that especial intimacy which binds us at times to the dead and to them alone. Reverence and love for these Germans now fills my heart.”

Buber was often described as a mystic, and parried this by declaring that he was in fact a rationalist, that being “the only one of my world views that I have allowed to expand into an ism”. For, he wrote, “my innermost heart loves the world more than it loves the spirit”. Nine years ago I heard him lecture in London on “That Which is Common”, relating his philosophy of dialogue, of “I and Thou” with his views on community and society. He took as his text an account of Aldous Huxley’s experiments with the drug mescaline, which became, in Buber’s slow and emphatic English, a parable of the disjointed society of Western individualism. Huxley, in his escape from the “painful earthly world” under the influence of the drug, found that his lips, the palms of his hands, and his genitals (the organs of communication with others, interpolated Buber) became cold, and he avoided the eyes of those who were present. For, said Buber, to regard the eyes of the others, would be to recognise that which is common. And after this flight from selfhood and environment, Huxley “met them with a deep mistrust”. Huxley regarded his mescaline intoxication as a mystical experience, but, declared Buber, those whom we call mystics, like those we call creative artists, do not seek to escape from the human situation. “They do not want to leave the authentic world of speech in which a response is demanded. They cling to the common world until they are torn from it.”

**OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 52: AUTOMATION, WORK, INDIVIDUALISM**

The two contributions on the subject of Automation in Anarchy 52 are interesting in that whereas one (Bosco Nedelcovic’s article) seems to be written with the narrow, exoteric pen of an economist, the other (Francis Ellingham’s effort) is the somewhat monastic expression of an esoteric philosopher. Nedelcovic, as with many anarchists, seems to equate personal freedom and maturity with the affluence which will likely be the fruit of automation and includes in this freedom the freedom from work; the chronic problem of every human struggle, he remarks, has been production or “scarcity”, but my fairly wide reading indicates that both anthropologists and social psychologists, while not denying the economic factor, would lay greater stress on face-to-face, inter-tribal, and national relationships. Again, Nedelcovic ignores, or seems to be unaware of the prime value of meaningful work in community as a means to personal maturity and personal freedom, whereas Ellingham seems to be aware of this high value.

A golden cross is heavier to carry than a wooden one, and the unproved theory that affluent leisure will mean that man will be free and society be free smacks of fantasy thinking which amounts to a hypnotic trance state induced by the glittering economic promises of automation. Alas, those who favour automation are “with it” all right, for its progress seems to be inevitable as is enslavement to its fruits. The detachment of which Francis Ellingham writes is detachment from possessions which would enslave us, and, in its inner aspect, is freedom from desire to possess either material wealth or the power over our fellows which such wealth can bestow.

My essay in Anarchy 47 was dubbed “mystical” in part; I shall not be surprised if someone comes along with a similar labelling of Ellingham’s writing but without adequate examination of the profound significance of what Ellingham is attempting to say.

Leeds

JAMES GILLESPIE
Society and the State

MARTIN BUBER

In Bertrand Russell’s book on Power, which appeared late in 1938—the author calls it a “new social analysis”—power is defined as “the fundamental concept in social science, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics”. This bold concept on the part of a distinguished logician, which reminds us of Nietzsche’s doctrine that he attacked so vigorously, is a typical example of the confusion between the social principle and the political principle even in our time, one hundred years after the rise of scientific sociology. It has long been recognised that all social structures have a certain measure of power, authority and dominion, without which they could not exist; in none of the non-political structures, however, is this the essential element. But it is inherent in all social structures that men either find themselves already linked with one another in an association based on a common need or a common interest, or that they band themselves together for such a purpose, whether in an existing or a newly-formed society. The primary element must not be superceded by the secondary element—association by subordination, fellowship by domination or, schematically speaking, the horizontal structure by the vertical. The American political scientist, MacIver, has rightly said that “to identify the social with the political is to be guilty of the grossest of all confusions, which completely bars any understanding of either society or the State”.

The defective differentiation between the social and the political principles, upon which the more or less problematical co-operation of all human group-existence rests, goes back to very ancient times. A classic example of mistaking the one principle for the other, though, to be sure, of a very different kind, is the well-known chapter in the Politeia, where Plato begins by tracing the origin of the polis directly from the primitive social fact of division of labour, and then, almost imperceptibly, goes on to include among the essential occupations that of the rulers, so that we suddenly find the population split up into two pre-eminently political sections: those who give orders and those who obey them; rulers and ruled; those who possess the instruments of coercion and those who are subject to them—all this under the harmless guise of the mere division of labour. We should take careful note of what Plato does here. He has his Socrates set his interlocutors the task of “seeing with their mind’s eye a polis in the making”. The readers of this dialogue naturally thought in terms of the contemporary Athens as it had emerged from the reforms of Kleisthenes; in other words, in terms of a society of free citizens who were hardly aware of the difference between the rulers and the ruled because of the constant interchange between the former and the latter within the citizenry, whereby the constituents of today became the representatives of tomorrow; and because, furthermore, the fact that the officials could be elected and dismissed obviated any feeling that an irksome bureaucracy might arise. This community, in which a firm foundation of slavery made it theoretically possible for every citizen to participate in the business of the Council while engaged in his private concerns, could, indeed, be deduced from an evolution of the division of labour—an evolution in which the vocation of politics was not specialised. However, the class—or rather the caste of the guardians—which Plato introduces into this discussion comes not within the scope of the historical polis but of that of his Utopia, where this caste, which has been represented to us as one vocation among others, actually stands in a political relationship to the rest of the community: that of a ruling society over against a society of the ruled. The term “society” and not a mere “group” is used here advisedly inasmuch as, in liberating its members from private property and private marriage, Plato raises it above the general community and constitutes it as a separate society.

This confusion of the social principle with the political is typical of by far the greater part of the thinking of ancient times. There is no tendency whatever towards an ideological distinction between political and non-political social structures in most of the ancient empires, obviously because the latter were allowed no independent existence or development of any kind. The one exception in this respect is ancient China, where two civilisations existed side by side: the State-urban civilisation, which was centred in the royal court and based on the army, the bureaucracy and the literati; and the rural civilisation, which was based solely on the village community. The former was a political-historical civilisation in every respect, while the latter was absolutely unhistorical, being determined solely by the unchanging natural rhythm of the seasons and of the human generations, that is to say, a social civilisation in the strictest sense of the term. It was the latter civilisation, relatively self-sufficient and enclosed within itself that served as the foundation for Lao-tse’s doctrine. That doctrine interposed between the individual and the State (the single states which together constituted the empire) two purely social structures, namely, the home and the community. In the Confucian system, which was rooted in the urban civilisation, there remained, however, only one of these two social structures—the home, the family which, contrary to its status in the village, was in its urban form completely integrated into the State.

MARTIN BUBER’S lecture “Society and the State” was delivered at the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem in 1950. It was published in translation in World Review in the following year and subsequently appeared in his book Pointing the Way. We are grateful to Messrs. Routledge and Kegan Paul for permission to reproduce it here.
A similar ideological development took place in classical antiquity, but from very different causes. There—at all events in the *polis* where, in the main, discursive thought was evolved, that is to say, in that of Athens—the well-developed social principle had penetrated so deeply into political life and merged with it so completely that while, on the one hand, the Demos was almost like a social gathering, on the other the family receded into the background of social life, and corporate existence, however firmly entrenched, nowhere attained genuine autonomy. In this connection, as we have already seen in Plato’s thinking, no strictly ideological distinction was drawn between the State and the unions, which were not part of the State: The State, the *polis*, so completely coincided with society, or the community, the *koinonia*, that asocial persons, the *dyskoiniotai*, were regarded as the antithesis of the friends of the State, the *philopolides*, as though it were not possible for a man to be social and yet not political in his thinking. It was only with the decline of the *polis*, when it was fast disintegrating from within and servitude loomed on the historical horizon without, that the thinking finally drew a distinction between the two principles. Two hundred years after Lao-tse, Aristotle interposed the family and the community—by which term he, too, meant primarily the rural community—between the State and the individual; and to the community were joined various kinds of associations. But of the social category, that of the *koinonia*, he had only the most general notion, so that he could describe the State as a certain kind of *koinonia* though, indeed, one transcending and comprehending all the others, while all the others are regarded as mere preliminary stages to this society on the one hand, and mere means towards the ends of the State on the other. Thus, even here, no genuine categorical distinction between the social and the political principle can be drawn; and even though Aristotle in one passage calls man a *zoon koinonikon* and in another a *zoon politikon*, both terms mean the same thing. And though Aristotle explicitly tells us that man was not created solely for the political community, but also for the home, he sees in the *polis* the consummation of the *koinonia*, in which—and in which alone—men’s co-existence in a community has any purpose and significance. In fact, the *polis* is called the *koinonia* of all the particular *koinonia* within which all families and communities and societies and associations of all kinds band themselves together. Aristotle’s idea of the State is identical here with ours of society, that is to say, a unit comprehending all the different associations within a specific national entity. Such an idea of the State bars any approach to a strict and consistent differentiation and separation between the social and the political principles. Incidentally, it is noteworthy that of all the unions which Aristotle recognises as special forms of the *koinonia*, he attaches significance to the family alone and, unlike Plato, recognises it as the primeval cell in the process of the division of labour. In his view, the family alone is the foundation of the State, and he does not attach any permanent importance to the rural community, since it is destined to be absorbed in the *polis*, while he considers the associations important only because they have a place within the State. The restrictive process of thought, which was evolved from Lao-tse down to Confucius and from which all social structures that might successfully have resisted absorption by the centralising State are excluded, here comes to full flower in the thinking of a single philosopher.

The post-Aristotelian thought of ancient times did not remedy this defect in the ideological approach to the principles in question. Even the apparently more precise Latin idea which, for the “collectivity” (*koinonia*) substituted “society” (*societas*), did not serve the purpose. True, in those days there was no such thing as a society of citizens in the modern sense of an all-inclusive society existing side by side with the State and *vis-à-vis* the State; but sociability did exist in all its forms, which manifested itself in all the large and small associations; and the same principle of co-operation predominated in all of them, a principle which enters into all kinds of alliances with the political principle, but nevertheless possesses a specific reality of its own which strives for recognition. Even the *stoa*, which went furthest in this direction, did not explicitly recognise the social principle. In the last days of the *stoa* Marcus Aurelius did, indeed, give the Aristotelian definition a social stamp by saying that “We are born to co-operate”; but what was not achieved was just that which must be required of any ideological specification if it is to achieve the character of genuine apperception, namely: the search for, description, and interpretation of, those elements of reality which correspond to the newly-acquired specific idea. The new concept of society loses concreteness because it is deprived of its limitations; this occurs in the most sublime manner in that the ideal of universal humanism is formulated without any indication being given as to how it is to be realised. Whether the Stoic speaks in the new terms of a society of the human race (*societas generis humani*), or in the old terms of a megalopolis, it amounts to the same thing: a high-souled idea emerges to confront reality but cannot find a womb from which to propagate a living creature because it has been stripped of corporeality. Plato’s State which, though directed against the *polis*, was nevertheless derived from it, actually was a structure, though it existed only in thought. Zenon’s slogan—“Only one way of life and only one political régime”—as proclaimed a century later, was only a fine sentiment; and finally so little remained of it that Cicero could envisage the Roman Empire as the fulfillment of cosmopolitanism. Incidentally, there is no practicable universalism—universalism that is realisable, though with the utmost effort—except that adumbrated by the prophets of Israel, who proposed not to abolish national societies together with their forms or organisation, but rather to heal and perfect them, and thereby to pave the way for their amalgamation.

Medieval Christianity adopted the fundamental concept of the Stoic universalism in a Christianised form, in that at one time it designated the unified humanity to be striven for as a *res publica*. 
generis humani, a world State, and at another as an ecclesia universalis, a universal church. Nevertheless, the social principle as such is expressed now and then in this connection in a purer form than was ever conceived by the Stoics. Thus, for example, William of Occam, the great fourteenth-century thinker whose theory of intuition gave the quietus to scholasticism, said: "The whole human race is one people; the collectivity of all mortal men is a single community of those who wish for communion with one another". Every particular association is recognised by him as a part of this community. In general, however, medieval thought did not go beyond Aristotle's amalgamation of the social with the political. The flourishing corporations of the period were, indeed, taken into account in the legal ideology, but the legal recognition of the non-political associations as such was evolved. On the contrary: there was a growing tendency to include them, in theory, within the State and, in practice, to subject all of them to it; or, as the legal historian Gierke put it: "Exclusive representation of all community life by the State".

It was only in the late Renaissance that thinking reached the point of a vigorous stand in defence of the rights of the non-political unions in relation to the State. The most vigorous expression of this point of view is to be found in the book entitled Politics by the German jurist Althusius (1603). Even there these bodies do not stand between the individual and the all-inclusive society—this special concept is still lacking—but between the individual and the State, as in Aristotle's concept. Hence no difference in kind is recognised between the associations and the State except that each and every one of the farmers enjoys relative autonomy, while the State possesses exclusive sovereignty. Nevertheless, the State is faced by an "insurmountable barrier" (as Gierke phrases it) in relation to the unions; in other words, the State may not infringe upon the special rights of these social unions. Society is not yet, indeed, conceived as such in this view, but it is constituted in its idea; it is not society, but the State under its name, which appears as the "immortal and eternal society", as Grotius formulated it, or under its own name as a "composite society", in the words of Althusius—the association of associations. But the very fact that all of them are viewed as being linked with one another was in itself something definitely new in sociological thought. This new idea was suppressed for two hundred years by the idea of the unlimited power of the State, which took on a more logically consistent form than ever before.²

In Hobbes's system of thought the intermediate formations are missing as a matter of principle, since he recognises no stages precedent to the establishment of the State, in which the unorganised individuals unite for fear that otherwise they would destroy one another. Such a unification, which is achieved by means of the subjection of the wills of all the individuals to the will of a single person or a single assembly, is designated by Hobbes in his book De Cive as civitas sive societas civilis. Here, for the first time as far as I am aware, we have in the writings of a modern thinker the widely disseminated idea of the "civil society", which we find again late in the seventeenth century in Locke's essays, in the eighteenth century in Adam Smith's Lectures on Justice and in Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society, and which recurs, in the nineteenth century in the philosophy of Hegel and the sociology of Lorenz von Stein, as the antithesis to the State. In Hobbes's view, civil society is entirely identical with the State. Hobbes, too, is cognisant of the social principle—in the form of free contracts between individuals for the recognition and preservation of the rights of ownership; he is aware of its existence, and tolerates it in the above sense because he regards the political "Leviathan" as still incomplete. But the German sociologist Toennies doubtless apprehends Hobbes's ultimate meaning when he interprets his views in the following terms: "The State would carry out its idea to perfection if it controlled all the activities of its citizens, if all wills were directed in harmony with a single supreme will. So long as this has not come to pass, society still exists within the State." In other words, when the State finally becomes complete, it will annihilate the last vestige of society. Such a complete State has been approximated in a considerable degree in our own time by that known as the totalitarian type.

The age of Hobbes saw the rise of the Third Estate, which attempted to supersede the double society of the Middle Ages by a unitary society which did not, however, extend beyond its own bounds and which evoked a liberal attitude on the part of the State towards the individual, but an increasingly illiberal attitude on its part towards associations. The State was prepared to tolerate only a pulverised, structureless society, just as modern industrial capitalism at first tolerated only individuals without the right of association. A little over a century after the appearance of the "Leviathan", the physiocrat Turgot declared in the Encyclopædia (in an article entitled "Fondataions"): "The citizens have rights, rights sacred for the actual body of society (by which he meant nothing else but the State); they have an existence independent of it; they are its essential elements..." but the particular bodies do not exist in their own right and not for their own sake. They have been constituted solely for the sake of society, and they must cease to exist as soon as their usefulness is at an end." Turgot does not, however, include among his "particular bodies" all the free associations, some of which he lauds in the course of that same article. Yet only five years later Rousseau was writing in his Contrat social where, in his fundamental concept, the volonté générale, the social and political principles are again confused in the most dubious manner, though he was well able to distinguish between the social contract and the establishment of a State in a legal manner, thus: "So that the common will may be manifested, there must be no partial associations within the State." In other words, there may not exist within the State any society which is constituted of various large and small associations, that is to say, a society with a truly social structure, in which the diversified spontaneous contacts of individuals for common purposes of co-operation and co-existence, i.e. the vital
essence of society, are represented. But if "partial societies" already exist, Rousseau goes on to say, "their number should be increased and inequalities prevented". In other words, if it proves impossible to suppress the formation of free associations, their scope should be restricted by creating other associations determined entirely by the purposes and planning of the State; moreover, care must be taken that the free societies should never become stronger than the unfree ones.

In general, the French Revolution could content itself with carrying out the first of these two precepts, especially since it had abolished the right of association (an attempt in that direction had already been made under Louis XVI) because an "absolutely free State should not tolerate corporations in its midst" (resolution of the Constitutional Assembly, August 1791). On the other hand, both of Rousseau's methods were applied jointly in a large measure during the Russian Revolution.

Only after a fully-fledged bourgeoisie had sprung from the loins of the French Revolution did it become possible to attempt to set the State and Society, as such, over against one another. The first two attempts in this direction were far apart in every respect.

The first of the two attempts was suggested by Saint-Simon. The more or less chimerical plans for reforms of this highly-ingenious dilettante were based, in essence, on an accurate and important distinction between two modes of leadership, namely: social leadership, or Administration, and political leadership, or Government. Saint-Simon did not adequately define these types of leadership, but we shall convey his meaning correctly if we say that administrative powers are limited by the technical requirements implicit in the specific conditions and functions of the leadership, while governmental powers are limited, at any given time, solely by the relation between the power of government and that of other factors. Society—by which Saint-Simon means the subject of economic and cultural production—administers, in so far as it is organised; but the State governs. Saint-Simon's proposal to divide the conduct of the State—that is to say, to entrust the conduct of the national affairs to a select group of men, capable and well versed in the sphere of social production, thereby giving it an administrative character, while leaving to the political authorities only the responsibility for the defence and security of the country—this proposal need not concern us here. But it is worth while quoting what Saint-Simon said in this connection: "The nation went into the revolution to be governed less; but it achieved nothing except to be governed more than ever."

The other fundamental division between the social and the political principle, that of Hegel, is antithetical to Saint-Simon's in its evaluation of the two. But its very purpose is different. Unlike Saint-Simon, Hegel compares not two forms of leadership with one another, but civil society in general with the State in general. The two factors are not, however, placed in polar opposition: society stands between the family and the State, between a relative whole and unity and an absolute whole and unity, as an incomplete and disunited multiformity, between form and form as something formless, an offspring of the modern world, an aggregation of individuals in which each is an end in himself and concerned with nothing else whatsoever; and all of them work together only because each uses the others as a means towards his own ends; and the groups and classes composed of individuals obsessed with their own ends get into conflicts which society, by its very nature, is unable to resolve: such power inheres in the State alone, because it prevails over the "waves of passion" by means of the "Reason that illumines them". The State is the "moderator of social misery" because its substance is not a private matter like that of society, but generality and unity, while its foundation is "the force of Reason manifesting itself as will". Such is the result of the most unequivocal distinction ever made between the two principles: a glorification of the State that reminds us of Hobbes. Hegel's critical portrait of society lacks everything that is still to be found in our own age, such as social consciousness, solidarity, mutual aid, loyal comradeship, spirited enthusiasm for a common enterprise; there is no trace whatever of creative social spontaneity which, though it is not concentrated like the power of the State, nevertheless exists in numerous single collective phenomena and, within the social sphere, very quietly counter-balances the conflicting forces. On the other hand, a State is seen here which we know, not from world history, but only from Hegel's system.

He tells us, indeed, that in pondering the idea of the State we must not have any particular State in mind, but that "the idea, this true God, must be considered for itself". A given historical State exists, so says Hegel, "in the world, hence in the sphere of arbitrariness, accident and error". And just as a cripple is a living man for all that, "the affirmative, life, exists" in spite of the defect; and it is this "affirmative" which is the essential thing here. But if we apply this to society as well, the whole picture will be completely changed.

With Saint-Simon and Hegel we find ourselves on the threshold of modern sociology. But the society known to this sociology has become something different, namely, the society of the modern class struggle. Two men at that time undertook, each after his own fashion, to create a synthesis between Hegel and Saint-Simon. One was Lorenz von Stein, the founder of scientific sociology, and the other Karl Marx, the father of scientific socialism. The thinking of both men was so deeply rooted in the new situation that, on the crucial issue of the relationship between the social and the political principle, they were unable to take over the heritage either of Saint-Simon or of Hegel. Stein, who was a disciple of Saint-Simon's, could not share his belief that control of the State should be taken over by the leaders of social production because he regarded society only as the main arena of human conflict. He tried to hold fast to Hegel's views concerning the overmastering and unifying function of the perfect State, but did not really succeed. Marx, who adopted Hegel's mode of thought, objected to such a function on the part of the State because, as a "super-structure"
the latter was necessarily a tool in the hands of the ruling class of society, and he strove to set up in its stead a State that would pave the way for a classless society by means of a dictatorship of the lowest social order, which would then be absorbed into the classless society. Stein, who held that "the movement of opposition between the State and society was the content of the whole inner history of all the peoples", attributes supremacy to the State in terms of philosophical abstraction; but in dealing with the concrete reality he affirms society, which is shaken through and through by conflicts; his concern is with that society. Hence the science of social reality begins with Stein (and not with Comte, as some think, because the latter lags behind his master Saint-Simon in distinguishing between the social and the political principle). Marx, who evinced no particular interest in the State in his theoretical thinking, could suggest nothing but a highly centralised, all-embracing and all-disposing revolutionary State which leaves no room for the social principle and so thoroughly absorbs the free society that only in a messianic vision can it be merged in it. That is why a Socialist movement began with Marx in which the social principle is found only as an ultimate aim, but not in the practical scheme.

Even nowadays, in the midst of wide-ranging and extremely detailed social knowledge and planning, sociology is faced ever and again with the problem of the relationship between the social and the political principle. This relationship must not be confused with that between Society and the State because, as Tarde rightly says, there is no form of social activity which cannot, on some side or at some moment, became political; we must realise that social forms on the one hand and State institutions on the other are crystallisations of the two principles. But it is most essential that we recognise the structural difference between the two spheres in regard to the relationship between unity and multiplicity.

The society of a nation is composed not of individuals, but of societies, and not, as Comte thought, of families alone, but of societies, groups, circles, unions, co-operative bodies, and communities varying very widely in type, form, scope and dynamics. Society (with a capital S) is not only their collectivity and setting, but also their substance and essence; they are contained within it, but it is also within them all, and none of them, in their innermost being, can withdraw from it. In so far as the mere proximity of the societies tends to change into union, in so far as all kinds of leagues and alliances develop among them—in the social-federative sphere, that is to say—Society achieves its object. Just as Society keeps individuals together in their way of life by force of habit and custom and holds them close to one another and, by public opinion, in the sense of continuity, keeps them together in their way of thinking, so it influences the contacts and the mutual relations between the societies. Society cannot, however, quell the conflicts between the different groups; it is powerless to unite the divergent and clashing groups; it can develop what they have in common, but cannot force it upon them. The State alone can do that.

The means which it employs for this purpose are not social, but definitely political. But all the facilities at the disposal of the State, whether punitive or propagandistic, would not enable even a State not dominated by a single social group (that is to say by one relatively independent of social divergences) to control the areas of conflict, if it were not for the fundamental political fact of general instability. The fact that every people feels itself threatened by the others gives the State its definitive unifying power; it depends upon the instinct of self-preservation of society itself; the latent external crisis enables it when necessary to get the upper hand in internal crises. A permanent state of true, positive and creative peace between the peoples would greatly diminish the supremacy of the political principle over the social. This does not, however, in the least signify that in that event the power to control the internal situation of conflict would necessarily be lessened thereby. Rather is it to be assumed that if, instead of the prevailing anarchical relationships among the nations, there were co-operation in the control of raw materials, agreement on methods of manufacture of such materials, and regulation of the world market, Society would be in a position, for the first time, to constitute itself as such.

Administration in the sphere of the social principle is equivalent to Government in that of the political principle. In the sphere of the former, as of the latter, it is essential that experts demonstrate how the wishes and decisions of the union or the association are to be carried into effect; and is also essential that those appointed to carry out the experts' instructions should follow those instructions, with everyone doing his share. By Administration we mean a capacity for making dispositions which is limited by the available technical facilities and recognised in theory and practice within those limits; when it oversteps its limits, it seals its own doom. By Government we understand a non-technical, but "constitutionally" limited body; this signifies that, in the event of certain changes in the situation, the limits are extended and even, at times, wiped out altogether. All forms of government have this in common: each possesses more power than is required by the given conditions; in fact, this excess in the capacity for making dispositions is actually what we understand by political power. The measure of this excess, which cannot of course be computed precisely, represents the exact difference between Administration and Government. I call it the "political surplus". Its justification derives from the external and internal instability, from the latent state of crisis between the nations and within every nation, which may at any moment become an active crisis requiring more immediate and far-reaching measures and strict compliance with such measures. Special powers must be accorded to the government even in States under a parliamentary régime when a crisis arises; yet in such States also it is in the nature of the case that the "political surplus" should be indeterminate. The political principle is always stronger in relation to the social principle than the given conditions require. The result is a continuous diminution in social spontaneity.
Yet the social vitality of a nation, and its cultural unity and independence as well, depend very largely upon the degree of social spontaneity to be found there. The question has therefore been repeatedly raised as to how social spontaneity can be strengthened by freeing it as much as possible from the pressure of the political principle. It has been suggested that decentralisation of political power, in particular, would be most desirable. As a matter of fact, the larger the measure of autonomy granted to the local and regional, and also to the functional societies, the more room is left for the free unfolding of the social energies. Obviously, the question cannot be formulated as a choice between “Centralisation” and “Decentralisation”. We must ask rather: “What are the spheres in which a larger measure of decentralisation of the capacity to make dispositions would be admissible?” The demarcation would naturally have to be revised and improved continually to conform to the changing conditions.

Apart from this change in the apportionment of power, it is also in the interest of a self-constituting society to strive towards a continuous change in the nature of power to the end that Government should, as much as possible, turn into Administration. Let us put it in this way: Efforts must be renewed again and again to determine in what spheres it is possible to alter the ratio between governmental and administrative control in favour of the latter. Saint-Simon’s requirement, that a society productive in the economic and cultural spheres should have a larger share in shaping public life, cannot be fulfilled, as has been suggested in our own days, by having the administrators seize the government (which would certainly not lead to any improvement), but by transforming Government into Administration as far as the general and particular conditions permit.

Will Society ever revolt against the “political surplus” and the accumulation of power? If such a thing were ever possible, only a society which had itself overcome its own internal conflicts would ever venture to embark upon such a revolution; and that is hardly to be expected so long as Society is what it is. But there is a way for Society—meaning at the moment the men who appreciate the incomparable value of the social principle—to prepare the ground for improving the relations between itself and the political principle. That way is Education, the education of a generation with a truly social outlook and a truly social will. Education is the great implement which is more or less under the control of Society; Society does not, however, know how to utilise it. Social education is the exact reverse of political propaganda. Such propaganda, whether spread by a government or by a party, seeks to “suggest” a ready-made will to the members of the society, i.e., to implant in their minds the notion that such a will derives from their own, their innermost being. Social education, on the other hand, seeks to arouse and to develop in the minds of its pupils the spontaneity of fellowship which is innate in all unarranged human souls and which harmonises very well with the development of personal existence and personal thought. This can be accomplished only by the complete overthrow of the political trend which nowadays dominates education throughout the world. True education for citizenship in a State is education for the effectuation of Society.

*This does not mean that in that epoch there was no further development of Althusius’ ideas, particularly in the doctrine of Leibniz.

OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 52: NON-VIOLENT DEFENCE

WHilst agreeing with the substance of Colin Johnson’s article “The Fallacy of Non-Violent Defence”, and with his conclusion that technological totalitarianism must be fought now, not when it finally arrives, I would like to take issue with him over the phenomenon of “sub-concious perception”.

This phenomenon (also called subliminal perception, or subception), is supposed to relate to the effect on our behaviour of visual or aural inputs to our sense-organs, which are below the level of conscious awareness. Thus it was thought that advertisement pictures, of too short a duration to be recognised, could be flashed on a cinema screen during a film to stimulate sales. But the early tests, such as Dr. Poetzlel’s mentioned by Colin Johnson, have subsequently come in for criticism. It is difficult to be sure that a perceptual stimulus really is below the awareness threshold. This threshold is defined as the exposure time at which accuracy of reporting presence or absence of the stimulus is 50%, thus threshold is really a statistical estimation, not an absolute entity. The problem is brought about because when there are only two responses: “yes” and “no”, random guessing when one is unsure will quite often be right.

Without going further into the details, I can only state somewhat dogmatically that many psychologists today dispute the existence of a genuine subliminal perception. C. W. Eriksen has summarised the relevant experiments (in the Psychological Review, Vol. 67, 1960), and concludes that although we may be influenced by perceptual stimuli which we don’t notice, it is probably only those which we could notice if we paid enough attention that can influence our behaviour.

This seems to suggest that although we are open to the “hidden persuaders”, we can combat them if our determination is great enough. It may be a cliché that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, but so far it appears to be a true one, so the solution is really in our own hands.

Bristol

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attacked them abusively and got a motion carried limiting membership to trade unions and to parties and groups who accepted political action. “There was incredible commotion: Werner and Landauer were hustled from the room shouting ‘We protest!’” and on the following day 15 other delegates including Rosa Luxemberg were excluded. They were joined by Amilcare Cipriani who resigned his mandate saying, “I go with those you have banished; with the victims of your intolerance and brutality”.

In 1896 the International Socialist Labour Congress was held in London at the Queen’s Hall, and there were many anarchists among the 750 delegates, including Landauer and Malatesta (who had come armed with mandates from trade unions in Spain, France and Italy). Once again the SPD sought to exclude the anarchists.

“The Germans tried to steamroller the Congress on this question so ruthlessly that it infuriated a great many delegates. The Chairman on the second day was Paul Singer, a member of the Reichstag. He tried to stop the discussion, and said he would take the vote on the question. But Keir Hardie of the ILP, who was deputy chairman of the session, got up and making himself heard above the uproar, told Singer that people didn’t conduct meetings like that in England. Before the vote was taken both sides must be given a hearing. So Malatesta and Landauer were allowed to speak.”

Landauer addressed a report to the Congress (which was published as a leaflet by Freedom Press), attacking the SPD in terms which its subsequent history showed to be correct. Only in Germany, he declared, could such a severely disciplined and pattern-cut labour party exist, exploiting in the most shameless way the imperialist and military spirit, the dependence and obedience of the masses “as the basis upon which an extremely strict party rule could be constructed, strong enough to crush on every occasion the rising germs of freedom and revolt”.

“I, as a German revolutionist and anarchist, consider it my duty to-day, as three years ago at Zurich, to tear off this painted mask and solemnly declare that the apparent splendour of the labour movement in Germany is but skin-deep, whilst in reality the number of those who fully and conscientiously go in for a total regeneration of human society, who struggle to realise a free socialist society, is infinitely smaller than the number of Social Democratic voters . . . The laws (at the elaboration of which the Social Democratic deputies work with great assiduity in parliament and in the various committees) merely strengthen the State and the power of the police—the German, Prussian, monarchist and capitalist State of to-day—and it becomes more and more a question whether our Social Democracy thinks that some mere finishing touches applied to our centralised, tutelary, ceaselessly interfering police state, are all that is necessary to transform the German Empire into the famous State of the future.”

He appealed to the delegates to allow the anarchist case to be heard:

“What we fight is State socialism, levelling from above, bureau-
cracy; what we advocate is free association and union, the absence of authority, mind freed from all fetters, independence and well-being of all. Before all others it is we who preach tolerance for all—whether we think their opinions right or wrong—we do not wish to crush them by force or otherwise. In the same way we claim tolerance towards us, and where revolutionary socialists, where working men of all countries meet, we want to be among them and to say what we have got to say... If our ideas are wrong, let those who know better teach us better. . . .” (G. Landauer: Social Democracy in Germany. Freedom Press 1896.)

But the anarchists were expelled. A protest meeting was addressed by Kropotkin, Louise Michel, Elisée Reclus, Landauer and Malatesta, and, among non-anarchists, by Tom Mann and Keir Hardie, who declared:

“No one could prophesy whether the socialism of the future would shape itself in the image of the social democrats or of the anarchists. The crime of the anarchists in the eyes of the Congress majority appeared to be that they were a minority. If they agreed with that attitude then the Socialist movement as a whole had no right to exist, because it represented a minority.”

Around this time Landauer was beset with a problem that always faces anarchist editors. He had made Der Sozialist a paper of a high intellectual standard but with little propaganda appeal and this caused continual argument. In the end he agreed to publish also a propaganda paper Der Arme Konrad edited by Albert Weidner, who, says Rocker, “did his best... but it did not satisfy Landauer’s opponents. They started a new large paper, and Landauer’s Sozialist slowly died. The new paper was poorly edited and badly written, and it was little consolation to plead that it was produced entirely by ordinary working men. For Landauer it was a tragedy. It deprived him of a valuable activity, for which he was supremely fitted, and in which he rendered splendid service.”

In 1901 he edited with Max Nettlau, a volume of selections from Bakunin. “I have loved and admired Bakunin,” he wrote, “from the first day I came across him, for there are few dissertations written as vividly as his—perhaps that is why they are as fragmentary as life itself.” But in fact it was Proudhon and Kropotkin who influenced him more. In 1905, echoing Kropotkin’s views on the integration of agriculture and industry, he wrote:

“The socialist village, with workshops and village factories, with fields and meadows and gardens... you proletarians of the big cities, accustom yourselves to this thought, strange and odd as it may seem at first, for that is the only beginning of true socialism, the only one that is left to us.”

And two years later he declared that:

“It will be recognised sooner or later that, as the greatest of all socialisms—Proudhon—has declared in incomparable words, albeit forgotten to-day, social revolution bears no resemblance at all to political revolution...”

This was in his essay Die Revolution, written at the request of Martin Buber, who, forty years later was to bring Landauer’s ideas back into circulation in Paths in Utopia. In Buber’s view, Landauer’s step beyond Kropotkin consists in his insight into the nature of the State, which is not, as Kropotkin thought, an institution which can be destroyed by a revolution, but rather, Landauer says:

“The State is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships by behaving differently... One day it will be realised that socialism is not the invention of anything new but the discovery of something actually present, of something that has grown.”

He wants to displace the State by uncovering, bringing to the surface, the ancient communal institutions of society, and the instinctive mutual aid which, rather than State organisation, makes social life possible, preserving, renewing, and expanding them, “releasing the spirit that lies captive behind the State”.

“We want to bring the Co-operatives, which are socialist form without socialist content, and the trade unions, which are valour without avail, to socialist, to great experiments.” All true socialism, he says, is relative and never absolute. “Communism goes in search of the Absolute and can naturally find no beginning but that of the word. For the only absolute things, detached from all reality, are words.”

“Everything comes in time, and every time after the revolution is a time before the revolution for all those whose lives have not got bogged in some great moment of the past.”

Everything that Landauer thought and planned and said and wrote, declares Buber, was steeped in a great belief in revolution and will for it. But the struggle for revolution, Landauer insists, can only bear fruit when “we are seized by the spirit, not of revolution, but of regeneration”. For the strength of revolution lies in rebellion and negation; it cannot solve social problems by political means. Studying the meaning of the French Revolution, he observed that:

“When a revolution ultimately gets into the terrible situation that this one did, with enemies all round it inside and out, then the forces of negation and destruction that still live on are bound to turn inwards and against themselves, fanaticism and passion turn to distrust and soon to bloodthirstiness, or at least to an indifference to the added terrors of killing, and before long killing becomes the sole possible means for the rulers of the day to keep themselves provisionally in power.”

And ten years later, he wrote of the same events:

“Thus it happened that the most fervent representatives of the revolution thought and believed in their finest hours—no matter to what strange shores they were ultimately flung by the raging winds—that they were leading mankind to a rebirth; but somehow this birth miscarried and they got in each others way and blamed each other because the revolution had allied itself to war, to violence, to dictatorship and authoritarian oppression—in a word, to politics.”
Soon afterwards Landauer was to find himself the victim of such a situation, a revolution wrecked in violence and politics. In the German elections of 1912, the SPD became the largest single party in the Reichstag, and in the following year the Social Democrats without exception voted for the Recessition Bill. On the eve of the First World War the Socialist International met in Brussels and Jean Jaurès put his faith in the strength of the SPD. “Don’t worry,” he said to a friend, “four million German Socialists will rise like one man and execute the Kaiser if he wants to start a war”. But Landauer had not shared the optimistic hopes, writing in July 1914: “Let us be under no illusions as to the situation in all countries to-day. When it comes to the point, the only thing that these revolutionary agitations have served is the nationalist-capitalist aggrandisement we call imperialism; even when originally tinged with socialism they were all too easily led by some Napoleon or Cavour or Bismarck into the mainstream of politics, because all these insurrections were in fact only a means of political revolution or nationalistic war but could never be a means of socialist transformation, for the sufficient reason that the socialists are romantics who always and inevitably make use of the means of their enemies. . . .”

On August 4 the Socialists unanimously voted for the government’s war credits. “The SPD, loyal to its reformist past, bound the destiny of German labour to that of the German Reich.” Opposition to the war, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg did not begin until 1916. In the following year, Ernst Toller, who had been profoundly influenced by Landauer’s Aufruf zum Sozialismus, went secretly to see him at Krumbach. Toller described the visit in his autobiography I Was a German: “I couldn’t understand why, at a time when everybody was waiting for the voice of truth, this ardent revolutionary kept silent. But when I put this question to him he said: ‘All my life I have worked for the downfall of this social system, this society founded on lies and betrayals, on this beggarly and suppression of human beings; and I know now that this downfall is imminent—perhaps to-morrow, perhaps in a year’s time. And I have the right to reserve my strength until that moment. When the hour strikes I shall be ready’.”

On November 9, 1918, with defeat in the field, mutiny in the Navy, hunger at home, and Soldiers’ and Workers’ Councils being formed everywhere, the Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, handed over his office to Karl Ebert, the leader of the Social-Democrats, who had told him two days earlier, “Unless the Kaiser abdicates, social revolution is inevitable. But I will have none of it. I hate it like sin.” And at a time when dynasties were falling, the High Command decamping, and the people rising, the socialist government of Ebert, Scheidemann and Noske, sought at all costs to preserve the militarism of the officer corps, the feudalism of the Junkers and the capitalism of the industrial magnates.

In Munich on November 7, soldiers and workers deposed the Government and proclaimed the Republic of Bavaria, and the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner formed a cabinet. Of the rôle of Erich Mühsam, and of Landauer who had come to Munich at the beginning of the revolution, Willy Fritzenkotter, writing on “The Council-Republic of Munich” in FREEDOM (26.9.53) described the events:

“The first action of the two anarchists was to organise the ‘Revolutionary Workers’ Council’. This council then took the initiative and formed in every workshop the ‘Revolutionary Workshop Organisation’. These councils were to be organised in every city, and form (in connection with the ‘Sailors’ and Farmers’ Council’) the administration of every city and village. All these councils in the country were to elect representatives and send them to a ‘Council Congress’ in Munich. According to the plan of Mühsam and Landauer these councils and congress should work on a federative basis, and not be centralised. Against this revolutionary movement Eisner and Auer worked in conjunction with the reactionary forces. They were for a Parliamentary election. The Parliament they aimed at making the real law-maker in Bavaria, forcing the ‘Workers’ Council’ into insignificance.

“Eisner had Mühsam and 11 other revolutionaries arrested on January 10, 1919 because he feared they would frustrate the election for parliament which should take place on January 12. Yet Mühsam and his comrades were on the next day liberated from prison by the ‘Workers’ Council’ which forced Eisner to set them free.”

Eisner was assassinated in February by a Bavarian aristocrat, and his place was taken by Johann Hoffmann, a Social Democrat who began negotiations with Berlin. “But the workers of Munich were not amenable to this, and on the night of April 6-7 they proclaimed a Soviet Republic. It was acclaimed with cries of Los vom Reich.” Hoffmann’s government fled to Bamberg in North Bavaria. Ruth Fischer gives this account of the Council Republic (in her book Stalin and German Communism):

“Erich Mühsam proposed to the Munich Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council that they proclaim a socialist republic. This proposal was adopted by 234 votes to 70 with the Spartacists voting against it. . . . The first Bavarian council government has always been depicted as a half-crazy adventure of literati and intellectuals. . . . All of them later proved to be serious militants, who suffered loyalty for the cause they had adopted.

“At the head of this group was Gustav Landauer, a cultured humanitarian anarchist. He visualised socialism as an anti-autocratic co-operative. Landauer was an outspoken individualist, a defender of socialist morality, an opponent of terror and violence against the class enemy. Erich Mühsam, the other anarchist writer in the cabinet, had a following among intellectuals and young workers. Ernst Toller, the third writer in the government, was in 1919 a young man uncertain of his politics. He also was what the Germans call an ethical socialist. . . .”

The Communists condemned what they called this “pseudo-soviet” and demanded the resignation of the Central Council, and the Social Democrats, with the aid of the Monarchist garrison arrested several
members of the Council on April 13 and took them to North Bavaria. Communist troops then defeated the garrison, and the Revolutionary Council formed a new Soviet cabinet. Then Noske's army of 100,000 men, commanded by Gen. von Oven moved on Bavaria.

Rudolf Coser, in _The Failure of a Revolution_ says:

"His army was not to crush a handful of men; it was to crush any idea that the substance of the German State could be changed in any way whatever...what was to be done to them was to serve as a warning to all the millions of Germans who wanted to eliminate militarism by different means.

"The revolutionary councils realized the hopelessness of fighting against Noske's army and declared their solidarity with the survivors of the first Soviet government and were negotiating with Hoffmann in order to avert a catastrophe and forestall the Prussian invasion."

About 700 people were butchered by Noske's army, among them Landauer. A workman who was arrested with him described his death:

"Amid shouts of 'Landauer! Landauer!' an escort of Bavarian and Wurttemberg infantry brought him out into the passage outside the door of the examination room. An officer struck him in the face, the men shouted 'Dirty Bolshevik! Let's finish him off!' and a rain of blows from rifle-butts drove him out into the yard. He said to the soldiers round him: 'I've not betrayed you. You don't know yourselves how terribly you've betrayed.' Freiherr von Gagern went up to him and beat him with a heavy truncheon until he sank in a heap on the ground. He struggled up again and tried to speak, but one of the men shot him through the head. He was still breathing and the fellow said: 'That blasted carrion has nine lives; he can't even die like a gentleman.'"

"Then a sergeant in the Life Guards shouted out: 'Pull off his coat!' They pulled it off, and laid him on his stomach. 'Stand back there, and we'll finish him off properly,' one of them cried, and shot him in the back. Landauer still moved convulsively, so they trampled on him till he was dead; then stripped the body and threw it into the wash-house."

Toller and Mühlsam were each imprisoned in a fortress for five years. In 1934 Mühlsam was killed by the Nazis in Orienberg concentration camp.

In 1933 the Nazis dug up Landauer's remains and sent them to the Jewish community in Munich. Some years ago Mrs. Adama van Scheltema of Amsterdam told me how in 1939 she visited Landauer's daughter and son-in-law, living in fear in a Rhineland town, to get his papers and manuscripts which she smuggled across the frontier for the International Institute for Social History.

Gustav Landauer failed, said the philosopher Fritz Mauthner, "because he was no politician, and yet was driven by his passionate compassion for the people, to be active politically; too proud to join a Party, not narrow enough to form a Party round his own name". Landauer failed, but was not the failure of the political socialists more ignominious? In the struggle for the soul of the socialist movement in the 1890's, like that between Marx and Bakunin in the First International in the seventies, his forebodings on the nature of German Social Democracy were ignored, but were shown to be correct in every detail by the events of 1914, by the crushing of the revolutionary hopes of 1918 and by the final collapse before the Nazis. Is his vision of "a society of equitarian exchange based on regional communities, rural communities which combine agriculture with industry" any more ridiculous than the vision of a society of machine-minders and bureaucrats which is all the "realistic" socialists can offer?

But what are we to say of the Munich Council Republic? Was it in fact "the embodiment of impractical romantic anarchism" that James Joll calls it in his book on _The Second International_? From the fragmentary and contradictory accounts that are all one can find, it is hard to come to any firm conclusions, but a number of points need making. It is variously referred to as the Bavarian Soviet Republic and the Bavarian Council Republic (Bayrische Raterepublik). This in itself has no significance. Soviet is the Russian word for Council, and the slogan "All Power to the Soviets", usurped by the Bolsheviks to gain support for an exactly opposite policy, had a wide currency in the years immediately after the Russian Revolution. The Communists were opposed to the Raterepublik. Why then did they form a "second soviet cabinet" to succeed it? "Very simply, the Communists could not resist the drive of the Munich workers, who, irritated after the garrison coup, wanted to defend Munich", explains Ruth Fischer.

Was the Landauer cabinet a government? This is a matter of nomenclature. It was the "soviet" installed by the Bavarian Central Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. Fritzewescher regards the Council Republic as lasting for six months, _i.e._ the whole period from the abdication to the suppression by the German army and the Freikorps. For him the term is synonymous with the period of the effective existence of the Workers' Councils. Landauer regarded the task of revolution as "the setting up of society 'outside' and 'alongside' the State".

Was there any chance of success? Mrs. Fischer, as an ex-Communist, deprecates the Communist attitude that it was simply an "adventurist folly". She points out that it took place in the context of general unrest in Germany, especially in neighbouring Saxony, and of the setting up of Bela Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic. Moreover Bavaria had only been incorporated in the German Empire in 1871, and had a strong separatist tradition. It was widely thought that "Berlin would not dare invade Bavaria". In Bavaria, unlike most of Germany, Peasants' Councils had been formed at the end of the war. Rudolf Coser says:

"The majority of them were non-revolutionary. Nevertheless they supported the revolution because they feared Bavaria would become a battleground after the defection of Austria, and because they regarded the war as a private business between Prussia and Hanover. After the war was over, the Bavarian peasants' councils remained important; they wanted to have a say in the administration of their
country... However, although one of their leaders was in the Soviet government, they blockaded the capital; no victuals were delivered to Munich.

The Council Republic failed because not enough people supported it, because it failed to win over the peasantry, and to win over the returning soldiers from the reactionary Freikorps, because it failed to alienate people from their allegiance to political parties and political violence, and because German Social Democracy itself was so deeply wedded to German reaction. "Socialism", Landauer had written years before, "is possible and impossible at all times; it is possible when the right people are there to will and do it; it is impossible when people either don't will it or only supposedly will it, but are not capable of doing it."

This is the sense in which the Council Republic was doomed to failure.

In his "Recollection of A Death", reprinted in Pointing the Way, Martin Buber concludes: "Landauer fought in the revolution against the revolution for the sake of the revolution. The revolution will not thank him for it. But those will thank him for it who have fought as he fought and perhaps some day those will thank him for whose sake he fought."

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Thoughts on Revolution

GUSTAV LANDAUER

Our task is to consider revolution from the standpoint of social psychology... The best way to prove that a subject cannot be treated in a particular way is to make a genuine attempt to treat it in just that way, and to go on until this becomes impossible. So I shall begin by describing revolution in a strictly scientific and deductive way, and I ask the reader to pay careful attention and make sure I do this properly, for I must confess at the start that I am convinced the task is hopeless...

To begin with, we must establish a scientific terminology, for the current terms all derive from the experience of single events, and are therefore unsuitable for scientific use. In which field does the phenomenon of revolution occur? Revolution concerns every aspect of human life—not just the State, the class-structure, industry and commerce, arts and letters, education and learning, but a combination of all these social factors which is at a given moment in a state of relative stability. This general combination of social factors in a state of relative stability I shall call the topia.

GUSTAV LANDAUER'S essay Die Revolution from which we publish extracts was first published in 1909 in a series called Die Gesellschaft, edited by Martin Buber. The most recent edition is a Spanish translation published in 1961 by Editorial Proyección, Buenos Aires.

The topia is the source of wealth as well as hunger, of housing as well as homelessness. The topia rules all the details of human existence. It fights wars abroad, it exports and imports goods, it opens and closes frontiers. The topia encourages intelligence as well as stupidity, good behaviour as well as bad, happiness as well as unhappiness, satisfaction as well as dissatisfaction. The strong hand of the topia is felt even where it does not belong, in the private life of the individual and the family; the borderline between individual and family life on one hand and the topia on the other is not fixed.

The relative stability of the topia gradually changes until it reaches a point of delicate equilibrium. This change in the stability of the topia is caused by the utopia. The utopia belongs by nature not so much to social as to personal life. It is the combination of individual efforts and wishes which usually exist singly and separately, but which in a moment of crisis and under the influence of intoxicating enthusiasm can unite and organise themselves into a whole, into a form of social life, with the purpose of creating a perfect topia which will have no unpleasant or unjust features at all.

But the utopia leads to a new topia, which is essentially different from the old topia, but is still a topia. Thus we can derive the First Law of Revolution: that every topia is followed by a utopia, which is followed in turn by a topia, and so on... And the corollary is that there is an equal number of topias and utopias.

So the utopia is the sum of all aspirations in a pure and refined state, none of which can achieve its end, and all of which can only bring about a new topia. Revolution is the period between the end of the old topia and the beginning of the new topia. It is therefore the path from one topia to the next, from one relative stability to another, through chaos and revolt, individualism, heroism and bestiality, the loneliness of the great, and the total disappearance of the atom in the mass...

We can see that every utopia has two aspects—the reaction against the topia it comes from, and the memory of all previous utopias. Utopias are never more than apparently dead, and when their coffin—the topia—is shaken, they come back to life. In the same way, every topia contains the successful elements of the utopia it comes from, based on a desire for reality, as well as the surviving elements of the previous topia.

But this is not all we can say about the new topia, for its existence is influenced by a new factor which must be taken into account—the practical demands deriving from the period of revolution. This factor is so important and general that we can derive the Second Law of Revolution: that the practical demands of social life during the period of revolution lead to some form of dictatorship, tyranny, provisional government or delegated power, which leads in turn to the new topia. The first corollary is that although the new topia is formed to save the utopia, it foreshadows its destruction; and the second corollary is that the practical demands which eventually lead to the new topia derive not only from the economic disturbance of the revolution, but often from hostile interference from outside...
So the utopia is never realised, and revolution is merely a period of transition between one utopia and the next, the borderline between two utopias. But, as we said, every utopia contains a powerful element of the exciting memory of all known previous utopias. Nature is more complicated, but suppose for a moment that every wine was fermented by a yeast from existing wine, and so on. Then the yeast would always be new, but would still have the reality, the power, the memory—they are all the same thing—of all the previous yeasts. In the same way, the utopia comes to life but always dies again, dissolving and disappearing in the alien substance which it has fermented and brought to a lasting tranquillity. It is always old and always new, surviving underground when there is a relatively stable utopia, and coming to the surface again to mix memory, will and feeling into the whole which we call revolution. Looked at in this way, revolution is not a period of time or a borderline, but is itself a principle stepping over vast distances of time—the utopias. In this sense revolution makes nothing of our rules and laws, although they are valid, and becomes a principle which in a few huge steps bridges the centuries between the distant past and the future.

This is the end of our scientific exposition. It breaks on the rock of a future we know nothing about, and this shows the significance of the past we also know nothing about. I am convinced and do not doubt for a moment that for a science which was joined with experience, the future would be a mathematical problem which could be solved, and the results of its formulas could be confidently predicted, if only we knew enough about the past.

WHAT do you understand then by the hard objective facts of human history? Certainly not the soil, houses, machines, railroad tracks, telegraph wires, and such like. If, however, you are referring thereby to tradition, custom, and complexes of relations, which are the objects of pious reverence, such as the state and similar organisations, conditions, and situations, then it is no longer possible to dismiss them by saying they are only appearances. The possibility and the necessity of the social process as it fluctuates from stability, to decay, and then to reconstruction, is based on the fact that there is no organism that has grown up that stands above the individual, but rather a complex relationship of reason, love, and authority. Thus again and again there comes a time in the history of a social structure, which is a structure only as long as individuals nourish it with their vitality, when those living away from it as a strange ghost from the past, and create new groupings instead. Thus I have withdrawn my love, reason, obedience, and my will from that which I call the "state". That I am able to do this depends on my will. That you are not able to do this does not alter the decisive fact that this particular inability is inseparably bound up with your own personality and not with the nature of the state.

(From a letter of Gustav Landauer to Margarete Stimmann, reprinted in: Gustav Landauer, sein Lebensgang in Briefen, edited by Martin Buber (Frankfurt 1929).

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MARGARETE BUBER, IN HER BOOK Under Two Dictators, about her experiences in Russian and German concentration camps, from Karaganda to Ravensbrück, describes her meeting with Zensl Mühsam:

"Zensl was about 60, but she was slim and upright and she moved like a young woman. Her grey hair was worn in a neat plait around her head. Her spirit was completely unaffected by her experiences and she never complained about her fate. Her husband still played a tremendous part in her life, and his name was constantly on her lips. . . . And she told us calmly of his sufferings in Oranienburg and of her constant attempts to secure his release which had ended only on the day they had led her to see his dead body. . . ."

"Zensl's husband, the famous anarchist, Erich Mühsam, was murdered by the Nazis in Oranienburg concentration camp in 1934. He was slowly tortured to death. Zensl had left Germany the same year to lecture abroad about the horrors of Nazi concentration camps and prisons. . . . In Prague she had worked together with the Communist Red Aid, which had assisted her to get her material published. The leader of the International Red Aid, Stassova, then invited her to go to Moscow. Zensl, who had joined the Communist Party, had not been spoiled by it. She was an upright character who spoke her own mind once she had made it up. She lived in Moscow as Stassova's guest and had a room in the Hotel Novaya Moskaya. She had not been in Moscow long before many things became clear to her, and then she did not hesitate to criticise openly. The end, of course, was inevitable. From being an honoured guest, she became a prisoner. . . ."

After the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, Margarete Buber and other German prisoners in Russia were handed over to the Nazis, and the same would probably have happened to Zensl Mühsam, but for the Nazi invasion of Russia. She was released from prison after the war and was later sent back to East Germany, severely ill. Given medals and a state pension as a "veteran anti-fascist militant", her name was used on various manifestoes of Ulbricht's government. When she died in 1962, the obituaries in the East German press did not mention that she had
spent many years in Soviet prisons and concentration camps.

Erich Mühsam was born on April 6, 1878, in Berlin, the son of a Jewish chemist who moved shortly afterwards to Lubeck. In his early twenties he met Gustav Landauer, the major influence in his life, and became known as a poet and a violent critic of Prussian militarism. In 1908 he settled at Munich, writing for the satirical journals Simplicissimus and Jugend and in 1911 started a review Kain which was closed down in August 1914. During the First World War he was arrested and imprisoned at Traunstein for inciting strikes in munition factories. Kurt Eisner, the independent socialist, imprisoned for the same reason, was released on November 3, 1918 and Mühsam was set free two days later, and promptly threw himself into revolutionary agitation. On November 8, the King of Bavaria abdicated and the republic proclaimed. Mühsam's part in the Munich Council-Republic is described in the accompanying account of Gustav Landauer. He was sentenced to 15 years' hard labour, of which he served more than four years before being released under an amnesty in 1924.

On his release he became active in the Red Aid, for assisting political prisoners, in the agitation in defence of the German revolutionary Max Hötz, and the campaign to save Sacco and Vanzetti, about whom he wrote the play Staatsrådion. From that time until his arrest in 1933 when the Nazis came to power, Mühsam edited a monthly anarchist review, Fanal, and during this period he travelled all over Germany trying to rouse the workers against the menace of Nazism. Zensl Mühsam has told in a pamphlet (published in an Italian translation by Edizioni RL—Volonta) the terrible story of Mühsam's prison life from February 1933 to his death on July 9, 1934 at Oranienburg, when his murder was disguised as suicide.

When Zensl Mühsam took to Moscow those manuscripts and papers of her husband's which had not been seized by the Nazis, she hoped they would be published there. They passed into the Soviet archives and all that has appeared since are his selected poems and a volume of "Unpolitical Memoirs". In an article on Mühsam in Freedom in 1947, "W.R." remarked that, "One of his last works was The Liberation of Society from the State in which, as a pupil of Gustav Landauer, he contributed valuably to the discussion of the problem of socialism and the state." It would be interesting to know if the text of this book, linking Mühsam's thought with that of Landauer and of Buber, still exists.

OBSERVATIONS ON ANARCHY 51: BLUES, R'N'B, POP, FOLK

I THINK THAT CASSANDRA VAUGHAN'S BRIEF PIECE ON Bob Dylan (ANARCHY 51) misses its target slightly, although the problem it deals with is accurately described.

The apparent shift in Bob Dylan's personality and attitudes is a little bewildering in terms of public image, but much more readily understandable in terms of artistic growth. When Dylan first came to New York, he had quite literally neither friends nor money and subsisted on cheap wine and very little else. His sole artistic stock-in-trade was the Woody Guthrie tradition, and he sang nothing but Guthrie songs and his own imitations of them. To complement these, he had a semi-mythological personality, composed partly of what he was, partly of what he wished to be, and partly of whatsoever suited his fancy. It was a very effective front to maintain against a very cold world.

In his first year in New York, Dylan broadened his skill and knowledge in contacts with other musicians, and in particular managed to assimilate the blues tradition—at first clumsily, then with increasing mastery as a component of his own individualistic "style". He was already a radical, and his close contact with other radical singers (notably Dave Van Ronk) did nothing to lessen this. It was only natural that much of his early work should be political, a fairly direct (if more urbanized) continuation of the Woody Guthrie tradition.

The problem of commercialization, and in particular of pressure to continuously produce new material, is a serious one, and it would be foolish to make predictions about Dylan's ability to resist it. As Miss Vaughan wisely notes, a Columbia contract has been the kiss of death for more than one musician. More serious are the problems of an adulant mass audience (Dylan has a flock of teenage fans in some areas who are unmatched for enthusiasm even by the Beatlemaniacs), and of the small cliques of cyphants who are attracted to most "successful" artists.

Against these pressures should be set the fact that his greater success (both artistically and financially) relieves Dylan of any necessity to maintain an artificial "front" and may allow his work to develop in a much more solid fashion. Certainly a piece such as Motorpsycho Nightmare is far superior to much of his earlier work. If his talent is stifled by commercialism, he will still have left an impressive body of song. If it continues to develop, it will probably be in ways which Irwin Silber will like even less. Art is always subversive, and especially to those who would enclose it in rigid party lines.

In concluding, I'd like to note that a turning from political protest into one's private world is not always a sign of a "retreat from reality", especially in an artist. Social engagement is too often a cover for personal disengagement, and a strategic "withdrawal" into one's private world is frequently a precondition of future advance.

San Francisco

TOM CONDIT
BUBER, LANDAUER, MÜHSAM

THIS issue of ANARCHY discusses the philosopher Martin Buber, and two German anarchists Gustav Landauer and Erich Mühsam, and their part in the ill-fated Munich Council-Republic of 1919. Why did this revolution fail? Was the Munich Council a government?

Martin Buber has left this recollection of those days: "About two weeks after Landauer's memorial address on Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, I was with him, and several other revolutionary leaders in a hall of the Diet Building in Munich. Landauer had proposed the subject of discussion—it was the terror. But he himself hardly joined in; he appeared dispirited and nearly exhausted—a year before his wife had succumbed to a fatal illness, and now he relived her death in his heart. The discussion was conducted for the most part between me and a Spartacus leader, who later became well-known in the second communist revolutionary government in Munich that replaced the first, socialist government of Landauer and his comrades. The man walked with clanking spurs through the room; he had been a German officer in the war. I declined to do what many apparently had expected of me—to talk of the moral problem; but I set forth what I thought about the relation between ends and means. I documented my view from historical and contemporary experience. The Spartacus leader did not go into that matter. He, too, sought to document his apology for the terror by examples.

"'Dzertshinsky,' he said, 'the head of the Cheka, could sign a hundred death sentences a day, but with an entirely clean soul.' 'That is, in fact, just the worst of all,' I answered. 'This "clean" soul you do not allow any splashes of blood to fall on! It is not a question of "souls" but of responsibility.' My opponent regarded me with unperturbed superiority. Landauer, who sat next to me, laid his hand on mine. His whole arm trembled...."