China

Let China sleep, for when she wakes, the whole world will tremble.
—Napoleon

Satellites Have Already Reached Heaven, but Democracy Is Still Stuck in Hell!
—Protest banner carried by researchers from Chinese Academy of Sciences

It's anarchy, but it's organized anarchy.
—Dan Rather, CBS News, May 1989

CHRONOLOGY

April 15, 1989  Party leader Hu Yaobang passes away; within an hour, workers gather in Tiananmen Square
April 18  About two thousand students sit-in at Tiananmen Square; workers begin to discuss forming organization
April 19  Autonomous student union forms at Beijing University; ten thousand students in Tiananmen Square
April 19  125 students sit-in at elite housing at Zhongnanhai for two days until dispersed by police
April 20  Beijing Normal University Autonomous Union organized, calls for citywide student organization
April 21  Boycott of classes begins in response to police clubs breaking up Zhongnanhai sit-in previous night
April 21  Sixty thousand students gather in a soccer field, march to Tiananmen that night for Hu's funeral
April 22
At Hu's funeral, over a hundred thousand attend, chant "We Want Dialogue"; heavy protests in Xian April 22; after the funeral, students kneel, holding a petition; no one comes forward to accept it

April 24
Autonomous Student Federation founded in Beijing

April 25
People's Daily editorial condemns antistate turmoil and chaos

April 27
Despite police blockades, more than a hundred thousand students march to Tiananmen Square

April 27
Fourteen-hour march; over five hundred thousand citizens defy police in a carnival-like atmosphere

April 29
Officially recognized student group meets with government

May 4
Rally attracts over one million people for seventieth anniversary of 1919 student movement

May 8
Some students return to class, others favor a boycott

May 10
Over five thousand participate in bicycle-demonstration supporting journalists' call for press freedom

May 11
Over the heads of the autonomous student unions, celebrity movement leaders plan action

May 13
Hunger strike begins and soon is joined by about two thousand people

May 14
Because televised talks were being prerecorded, not broadcast live, some hunger strikers disrupt them

May 15
Gorbachev visits, but ceremony in Tiananmen replaced by airport ceremony

May 16
Three hundred thousand people march in sympathy with hunger strikers, occupy Tiananmen Square

May 16
On behalf of central committee, Zhao Ziyang calls protest "patriotic"; hunger strike continues

May 17-18
More than three thousand hunger strikers, some dramatically fainting; more than a million people protest in support on both days; media reports sympathetically on hunger strikers; workers congregate in square; journalists demand, "No more lies"; people sing "We Shall Overcome" for the foreign press assembled for the Gorbachev visit; singer Cui Jian joins protests

May 18
Li Peng sternly lectures hunger strikers in meeting in Great Hall of the People; Outside Secondary Schools Student Autonomous Federation formed

May 19
Early morning visit by tearful Zhao to Tiananmen calls for compromise; martial law declared; army mobilized; Beijing Workers Autonomous Union calls for general strike against martial law

May 20
Hundreds of thousands of Beijing citizens peacefully block the army for food, drink, and six hundred cars involve more than a thousand motorcyclists in Sichuan as troop Ziyang set to struggle; troop Ziyang arrives; Organization of students, intellectuals, and workers on day; unusual flaw

May 27
Millions of do not concert; Ceremonies for democracy

May 28
Attempted at "commanders" may only ten thousand; May 30
New hunger strike begins again

June 2
June 3
Army again to be stopped by city; many stations on Chang'an ammunition taken and stop

June 4
Shooting continues

June 5-6
Government, seven thousand

IN 1989, STUDENTS activists in Beijing's Tiananmen Square rallied political leaders, the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) movement, workers were significan tation of Beijing, especially after a successfully demobilized what standing in army units to "sanitize" the saw in 1986 in Guangdong, students they often took refuge in their hesist surged to the forefront of the fury of the state.
Hundred thousand attend, chant angry protests in Peking April 22; after arrest, holding a petition; no one upset it.

Federation founded in Beijing
condemns antistate turmoil and
lies, more than a hundred thousand
Tianmen Square
over five hundred thousand citizens
unlike atmosphere
student group meets with government
millions people for seventieth anniv.
movement
to class, others favor boycott
participate in bicycle-demonstration
call for press freedom
autonomous student unions, celeb.lan action
and soon is joined by about two thou-
were being prerecorded, not broad-
striker disrupt them
mony in Tiantianmen not replaced by
and people march in sympathy with
Tianmen Square
committee, Zhao Ziyang calls protest
continue
hunger strikers, some dramatiz-
a million people protest in support
points sympathetically on hunger
egate in square; journalists demand,
sing “We Shall Overcome” for the
id for the Gorbachev visit; singer Cui
hunger strikers in meeting in Great
side Secondary Schools Student
formed
earful Zhao to Tiananmen calls for
w declared; army mobilized; Beijing
Union calls for general strike
s of Beijing citizens peacefully block

the army for forty-eight hours and provide the troops with
food, drink, and flowers; in more than eighty cities and at
six hundred colleges and technical universities, protests
involve more than 2.8 million people; “flying tigers” (citizens
on motorcycles) report on troop movements; Zhao
Ziyang out as Party general secretary; Premier Li Peng wins
struggle; troops pull back

May 21
Television broadcasts from Beijing are suspended; more
troops arrive; people continue to block them

May 23
Organization of all autonomous groups is formed; workers,
students, intellectuals, and citizens meet at noon every
day; unanimous decision to leave on May 30 (tenth day of
martial law)

May 27
Millions of dollars raised in Hong Kong racetrack benefit
concert; Central Art Academy students erect “goddess of
democracy”

May 28
Attempted abduction of Chai Ling and Feng Congde (the
“commanders”) by other activists at 4:00 a.m.

May 30
Only ten thousand students still occupy the square

June 2
New hunger strike by four people has huge impact; square
falls again

June 3
Army again tries to empty Tiananmen Square; buses
stopped by crowds

June 4
At 2:00 a.m., army units begin fighting their way into the
city; many soldiers killed; people gather at every intersection
on Chang an Avenue; disbelief that troops are using live
ammunition; 4:15 a.m.: with the square surrounded, vote is
taken and students leave square

June 5-6
Shooting continues in Beijing; casualties mount

June 8
Government spokesperson claims three hundred dead,
seven thousand injured

IN 1989, STUDENT activists in China sparked a national uprising for democracy that was only brought to an end after a massacre in working-class suburbs around Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. Despite accounts linking it to reform-minded political leaders, the revolt in China originated outside the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Though it was widely portrayed as a student movement, workers were significantly involved—as was nearly the entire population of Beijing, especially after May 20, when hundreds of thousands of people successfully demobilized what seemed like an endless convoy of trucks bringing in army units to “sanitize” the protesters’ base in Tiananmen Square. As we saw in 1980 in Guangxi, students initiated protests, but once dangers multiplied, they often took refuge in their homes and campuses, while working-class activists surged to the forefront of the movement and bore the brunt of the unleashed fury of the state.
Within the hallowed halls of the communist elite, as the global chain reaction of revolts against military dictatorships continued, significant support for reform emerged within the party. For sympathizing with protesting students, Hu Yaobang had been forced to step down as party general secretary in 1987, and two years later, Zhao Ziyang was similarly nudged from power. What distinguished the 1989 movement from previous episodes of dissent was the popular power wielded by spontaneously formed autonomous groups. No "commander-in-chief" or central committee controlled the whole movement, although several leaders claimed to do so. Rather, across the country, on university campuses and in workplaces, independent groups formed at the grassroots and united in action. Multiple and diverse tendencies simultaneously coexisted within the movement. While student leader Wang Kaixi famously intoned his desire for Western consumerism and Nike shoes, the Beijing Autonomous Workers' Federation (BAWF), along with a dozen other such formations, advocated more democracy within a socialist framework.

A significant difference between the Chinese movement and simultaneously occurring ones in Czechoslovakia and much of Eastern Europe was the near absence of calls for a market-based capitalism among Chinese dissidents. Beginning in 1978, Deng Xiaoping had initiated a whole series of such reforms from the top and encouraged the emergence of a market-Leninist system within the state controlled economy so carefully nurtured from the 1950s to the 1970s. In December 1978, when the Central Committee ordered the dismantlement of collectivized farms and authorized family farms to sell some goods on the market, one of the great accomplishments of the Maoist revolution was undone—and locally based party officials quickly enriched themselves. By 1980, Chinese citizens, if of any one opinion, were worried about high inflation and erosion in their standard of living that the new market-based reforms brought with them. "To get rich is glorious," Deng insisted, yet many workers found themselves less secure, while managers and the party elite become spectacularly wealthy. One of the world's most egalitarian societies became so stratified that the party eventually stopped releasing data measuring inequality.

The 1989 revolt was not limited to Beijing. By the time the insurgency had been brought to a bloody end, more than eighty cities experienced mobilizations of one kind or another involving millions of people as an act of a new self-sufficing the country. Years later, people spoke of a "Hundred Million Heroes" in reference to those who acted in 1989. Even though that is an astonishing number, it includes only about 10 percent of the country. When we consider four million out of Nepal's population of thirty million mobilized on the final day of protests in 2006 (more than 13 percent), and compare both those numbers with 300,000 of Guangxi's 750,000 citizens who mobilized on May 21 (or about 42 percent), we get a sense of the relative intensity of these mobilizations. While China's potential for political change was thwarted by overwhelming force in 1989 and blunted over subsequent decades by economic reform, the trajectory for China's future—as revealed in the actions and aspirations that emerged in the heat of events in 1989—provides a significant glimpse of the changing character of freedom in China.

While prolific, Western media coverage of the occupation of Tiananmen Square and subsequent reports on the Chinese democracy movement are suspect. Many Western observers have framed the uprisings in Eastern Europe that overlapped the context of Confucian culture and Asian imposition of anticommunist Western interventions in Korea and Vietnam as Chinese history in 1989.

For decades, the United States, long ally during World War II, Truman ordered fifty thousand U.S. military and light on Chiang's aide as he looked atambiance at their officers for a Christmas 1945, a U.S. Lieutenant reported that you can't tell a man that he's here the same railway with Japanese. M and sailors were stationed in China.

During the subsequent bloody Kai-shek and Kuomintang (KMT) of the Communist Party, After Chiang's forces massively intervened in neighboring states, and U.S. planes repeatedly attacked, finally the KMT authorized its army American ground forces face that naval warfare, U.S. troops in all probity to March 1952, a substantial body of China "spilt over" to Korea. In U.S. Air Force officers and men and aviators from Sweden, Italy, Brazil. When the bloodletting ceased, China or thousands—including Mao's old ally. It is no accident that both the Koreas borders.

Throughout the 1950s, U.S. islands of Okinawa and Guam. As home on the outskirts of Taipai, a dark near the remote bomb shelter was long-range U.S. artillery. As one of my friends did not return to him. His father and I, support to Chiang Kai-shek's, arm during his monthly rotation to the

This "ancient" history has been variously described by the press during U.S.-led NATO attacks in 1991, and the building set on fire.
Many Western observers have framed the events in China with synchronous risings in Eastern Europe that overthrew Soviet rule in 1989 rather than in the context of Confucian culture and Asian politico-economic developments. The imposition of anticommunist Western ideology—so destructive in shaping U.S. interventions in Korea and Vietnam as means to "contain" communism—distorts Chinese history in 1989.

For decades, the United States has waged war on Chinese communism, our erstwhile ally during World War II. After the defeat of Japan, President Harry Truman ordered fifty thousand U.S. Marines to China to work alongside Japanese soldiers and fight on Chiang's side against communists. U.S. troops immediately loosed assassin at their officers for explanations about their mission. Around Christmas 1945, a U.S. lieutenant reported, "They ask me, too, why they're here... but you can't tell a man that he's here to disarm the Japanese when he's guarding the same railway with Japanese." More than a hundred thousand U.S. soldiers and sailors were stationed in China by 1946.

During the subsequent bloody civil war, the United States aided Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang (KMT) while Western media vilified Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. After Chiang suffered ignominious defeat in 1949, the U.S. forces massively intervened in neighboring Korea's civil war the following year. As the war against communism intensified, McCarthyism polarized the United States, and U.S. planes repeatedly attacked China's side of their border with Korea. Finally the CCP authorized its army to drive back the United States. So badly did American ground forces fare that without air superiority and chemical/biological warfare, U.S. troops in all probability would have been overrun. From January to March 1952, a substantial body of evidence proves U.S. germ warfare against China "spilt over" from Korea—including testimony from thirty-eight captured U.S. Air Force officers and men and a six-hundred-page report coauthored by scientists from Sweden, Italy, Brazil, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. When the bloodletting ceased, Chinese casualties were estimated in the hundreds of thousands—including Mao's eldest son—while millions of Koreans were killed. It is no accident that both the Korean and Vietnam Wars were fought on China's borders.

Throughout the 1960s, U.S. forces aided Taiwan's shelling of the Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu. As a boy, I lived in Taiwan, and at night, from our home on the outskirts of Taipéi, we could see the sky light up if we walked in the dark near the remote bomb shelter adjacent to our house. My father explained it was long-range U.S. artillery. As a fifth-grade student in 1959, I remember when one of my friends did not return to our school. I asked my father what had happened to him. His father and mine were both U.S. officers providing artillery support to Chiang Kai-shek's army. He told me my friend's father had been killed during his monthly rotation to the islands.

This "ancient" history has modern counterparts: In 1999, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was intentionally targeted and hit by U.S. fighter bombers during U.S.-led NATO attacks on Serbia. At least three Chinese people were killed and the building set on fire. Today, it is no secret that U.S. world strategy
continues to encircle China with American bases. Few if any of these dynamics have been reported in the U.S. media. At the same time, in one of his final books, Samuel Huntington calmly discussed the possibility of a future U.S.-China war.

The Cultural Revolution's Contribution to the Movement of 1989
Very often, the origins of social movements are understood retrospectively in unlikely and auspicious events. This may well be the case of the seemingly insignificant appearance of people bringing white flowers to Tiananmen Square in April 1976, three months after the death of longtime leader Zhou Enlai. Within days of the first spontaneous commemoration of Zhou's life, thousands of people arrived to lay wreaths, leave poems, and otherwise mark the passing of a man whose significance the hard-line "Gang of Four" leaders sought to minimalize. Mourning Zhou was perhaps the only permitted public means of expressing displeasure with the continuing marginalization of conservatives like Zhou's protégé, Deng Xiaoping.

On Sunday, April 4, an estimated two million people visited the square. 4 The next day, police cleared away all the flowers and sanitized the memorial site, but people nonetheless returned. Ordered to disperse, the crowd fought back when police moved in with clubs, and in the ensuing scuffles, a police van was overturned. Soon, a workers' militia arrived and broke up the assembly of mourners, but the damage had been done: the April 5 events were characterized as "counterrevolutionary." Deemed responsible for motivating the protests from behind the scene, Deng Xiaoping was dismissed from all positions of responsibility, and Mao denounced Deng for a second time as an "unrepentant capitalist-roader." (The first time was in 1966 at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and Deng was banished for years to the countryside. Soon thereafter, radical Beijing University students incarcerated his eldest son. When Deng's son sought to escape by jumping from a fourth-floor dormitory window, he ended up paralyzed from the waist down—a tragedy for which Deng never forgave the student movement.)

Western analysts have long assumed that Eastern European and Chinese activists may only have had experience with democracy before communist rule, that China has no civil society—or that it is born in the 1989 turmoil. 5 In doing so, they posit specific European and the U.S. models as defining civil society and ignore cross-cultural realities. Chinese peasants' centuries of uprisings constitute a "dysfunctional cycle" (though which regimes came to power, increased their military budget to remain there, raised taxes to pay for the military, after which people revolted and overthrew the dynasty—leading to a reiteration of the cycle). Examples of more recent civil activities include the White Lotus rebellion from 1796 to 1801, the many public-minded literati networks in the late Ming dynasty, the Taiping rebellion of the 1860s, New Text Confucianism, the Reform Movement after the defeat by Japan, and the May Fourth uprising in 1919. Alongside this rich tradition, many examples of people's direct engagement with civil matters can be found since 1949. Through popular participation in movements of national political change—from the disastrous Great Leap Forward in 1957 to the Cultural Revolution a decade later—millions of Chinese people accumulated valuable experiences, as they drew upon previous history were enormous, yet through these they themselves to take an active role in the Middle Eastern world of U.S.-wing that proved such a fertile regime, the Cultural Revolution historians in both China and the U.S. yet it could also be viewed as "the first enlightened about the nature of Chinese form of direct democracy—of people a culture of resistance and became from the grassroots." 6 Mao's famous Cultural Revolution, promised to replace officials, basing his ideas on the 1871 Paris Commune (where all popular recall). From this perspective of civil society against the state but became a resource to draw upon in China.

Since Mao's denazification of the Cultural Revolution, China's state objective factors (number of study single-child policy of the government of everyday experiences, legacy of industriousness, students were positioned great popular acclaim in 1989. Initially acclaimed to be masters of the past and far-seeing transformation of the present.

In very specific ways, the Cultural Revolution was a way of giving a new identity to the Cultural Revolution. 7 Another expose of high officials' special business and businesses—a direct campaigns during the Cultural Revolution's bureaucratic cats get fat while tenants left behind centuries-old notions of heaven (which could be retracted the people have the right to petition for instance, the Communist ruthless to rebel against unjust dictates.

Economic Reform
The month after Mao Zedong moved quickly to remove from power...
bases. Few if any of these dynamics are understood retrospectively as they drew upon previous history as a resource to mobilize. The human costs were enormous, yet through these historical events, millions of people prepared themselves to take an active role in the country's political development.

In the Manichean world of U.S. anticomunism (including its Trotskyist wing that proved such a fertile recruiting grounds for neoconservatives in the Bush regime), the Cultural Revolution was purely an abomination. Mainstream historians in both China and the United States condemn it in no uncertain terms, yet it could also be viewed as "the history of Chinese youth gradually becoming enlightened about the nature of Chinese society." Evidence persists that as a form of direct democracy—of people taking power into their own hands—it built a culture of resistance and became a source of encouragement for speaking out from the grassroots. Mao's famous "Sixteen Points," the seminal document of the Cultural Revolution, promised more democracy. Mao advocated elections to replace officials, basing his ideas upon democratic currents in Marxism like the 1871 Paris Commune (where all electe delegates were subject to immediate popular recall). From this perspective, the Cultural Revolution was a mobilization of civil society against the state bureaucracy, and people's experiences during it became a resource to draw upon in the heated moments of 1989.

Since Mao's demobilization of the Red Guard in 1968 at the height of the Cultural Revolution, China's student movement slowly rebuilt itself. In both objective factors (number of students, their concentration on campuses, and the single-child policy of the government) as well as subjective factors (the quality of everyday experiences, legacy of past struggles, and desire for new forms of liberty), students were positioned for the leading role they would assume with great popular acclaim in 1989. In similar ways, the country's working class—officially acclaimed to be masters of the nation—was groomed to carry out a thorough and far-seeing transformation of the country.

In very specific ways, the Cultural Revolution schooled thousands of people in the ethics and etiquette of street protests. At one critical moment in 1989, only a day before the shooting began, soldiers and demonstrators who were locked in confrontation began a singing competition—a technique commonly used during the Cultural Revolution. Another carryover came when workers issued a detailed expose of high officials' special privileges—from families' trips abroad to limousines and businesses—a direct descendent of antilollism and anticorruption campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. As one of their leaflets put it, "The bureaucratic cats get fat while the people starve," Cultural Revolution experiences enriched centuries-old notions that the Emperor ruled through a mandate of heaven (which could be retracted if power was wielded in unjust ways), that the people have the right to petition for redress of grievances and officials a concomitant responsibility to respond intelligently, and that everyone has the right to rebel against unjust dictates.

Economic Reform

The month after Mao Zedong died on September 9, 1976, party conservatives moved quickly to remove from power the "Gang of Four" and hundreds of others...
aligned with them. By November 1978, Deng Xiaoping had been restored to a high
position, and the April 5, 1976, incident was reclassified as "revolutionary." After
the party recognized the righteousness of the 1976 events, the change in climate
was immediate: wall posters began to appear in Beijing. The "Democracy Wall
Movement"—as this spurt in spontaneous grassroots initiative became known in
the Western media—was initially encouraged by top party leaders, but as it spread
to other cities, many became worried they might again be targeted, especially
since economic reforms began in earnest in December.

With the purge of the Gang of Four, hundreds of thousands of banished Red
 Guards returned to the cities after a "lost decade" in rural areas, and thousands
of prisoners incarcerated during the Cultural Revolution were freed. Among those
released from prison were three longtime democracy activists from Guangzhou
known collectively as Li Yizhe, who had long advocated legal protection for indi-
vidual rights. Radical factions from the Cultural Revolution that had been broken
up in 1968 began to reconstitute themselves in the mid-1970s and organize against
what they perceived as a restoration of capitalism by Deng and the new party
elite. A legacy of the Cultural Revolution, this enduring culture of resistance
appears to have been one of the key forces behind the 1978 movement, espe-
cially through groups like Huabei's Big Dipper Study Group and Yangtze River
Commentary, Beijing's April 3rd Faction (which called for working people and not
bureaucrats to be "masters of society"), and Hunan's Provisional Revolutionary
Great Alliance Committee.

In those heady days, a young electrician and former Red Guard, Wei
Jingsheng, signed his name to a poster attacking Deng (then a party leader)
and calling for democracy ("the fifth modernization"). Wei helped found one
of China's first independent magazines, Exploration. Soon others published dissident
poetry and essays in Beijing Spring, Enlightenment, and Today. That winter,
rural people streamed into the capital in a torrent of dissent. A ragtag assort-
ment of peasants camped outside government offices to protest rapes, thefts, and
even murder at the hands of powerful local communist authorities. One rape
victim organized one of the largest marches. Unemployed young people militantly
sought entry into Zhongnanhai—the exclusive compound where many of the
party elite lived. On March 25, Wei called Deng a "fascist dictator." Having twice
been purged in the past, Deng moved resolutely to prevent any new recurrence
of his banishment. Within days, thirty activists had been arrested, and Democracy
Wall was shut down.

In early 1979, as the official celebration of the April 5 incident approached,
Wang Xizhe (one of the three original Li Yizhe members) ended a rousing speech
by calling on more than a hundred intellectuals and cadre to "grasp their pens
and use them to struggle to bring real democratic rights to the masses." Not
one to let words alone speak, Wang helped organize a campaign against Deng's
plan to abolish constitutional protections of the "Four Greats" (free speech, full
articulation of viewpoints, public debates, and large character posters). Wang
publicly encouraged opposition leaders to protest the detention of other dissid-
ents, and he participated in an underground activist conclave in Beijing in June
1980 to discuss the need for a Chinese organized proletarian party). In mit-
autonomous magazines called for a successful bureaucratic elite. Although
current of resistance continued to ftc
Needless to say, the group soon
the crackdown came in 1981, more it
was subsequently sentenced to four
cates of democracy received smal
Officials worried that if protesters in
they might substitute themselves for
party leader Hu Yaobang attacked t
illegal organizations . . . have been
within the party who . . . think so
over the country."

No matter how much the go
lishers and isolated outspoken ac
be espoused. Within three years,
the Party's Writers' Association, f
freedom." The technical intellec
t discussion is a prerequisite of the
academic freedom was discussed.
University of Science and Technol
ment with educational reform. So
on campuses at the forefront of ref
t to select department heads and sh
July 1986, Li Honglin, president to
for concrete regulations to safegu
Shanghai-based magazine public
"If socialist society cannot offer a
can it display its superiority? . .
derogatory words, associated with
munist did not want democracy

On December 5, 1986, at He
of nominations for the People's spread to more than a dozen oth
dents into the streets of Shanghi
resentatives from fifteen universal
Wall posters at Beijing University
we support the university study
Technology." Among the list of

1. A ban on discussion of
   in Guangzhou
2. Beijing University's pc
Xiaoping had been restored to a high
acclimated as "revolutionary." After
the 1976 events, the change in climate
in Beijing. The "Democracy Wall
assorted initiative became known in
by top party leaders, but as it spread
might again be targeted, especially
December.

hundreds of thousands of banished Red
Cadre" in rural areas, and thousands
Revolution were freed. Among those
democracy activists from Guangzhou
advocated legal protection for Indi-
Revolution that had been broken
in the mid-1970s and organize against
atmosphere by Deng and the new party
this enduring culture of resistance
behind the 1978 movement. espe-
cer Study Group and Yangtze Riv-
ch called for working people and not
Huinan’s Provisional Revolutionary

cian and former Red Guard. Wel
acknowledged Deng (then a party leader)
nization*). Wel helped found one of
rallies. Soon others published dissis-
tement, and Today. *That winter, tor-
rent of dissent. A ragtag assort-
t offices to protest rapes, thefts, and
communist authorities. One rape
employed young people militantly
ive compound where many of the
ng a "fascist dictator." Having twice
y to prevent any new recurrence of
had been arrested, and Democracy

of the April 5 incident approached,
members) ended a rousing speech
ials and cadres to "grasp their pens
ocratic rights to the masses." *Organize
campaign against Deng's
the "Four Greats" (free speech, full
and large character posters). Wang
protest the detention of other dissi-
d activist conclave in Beijing in June
1980 to discuss the need for a Chinese Communist League (to function as a "newly
organized proletarian party"). *In mid-1980, a national association of twenty-one
autonomous magazines called for a mass democratic movement to counter the
enforced bureaucratic elite. Although Democracy Wall had been shut down, the
current of resistance continued to flow.

Needless to say, the group soon drew the ire of Deng and top leaders. When
the crackdown came in 1981, more than twenty activists were rounded up. Wang
was subsequently sentenced to fourteen years in prison, and other leading advoc-
cates of democracy received similar rewards for their services to the people.
Officials worried that if protesters in different parts of the country linked together,
they might substitute themselves for the leading role of the party. In January 1981,
party leader Hu Yanzhang attacked the dissidents: "These illegal magazines and
illegal organizations... have behind the scenes backers... There are people
within the party who... think some young people are so smart they can take
over the country." *No matter how much the government repressed small magazine
publishers and isolated outspoken activists, democratic sentiments continued to
be espoused. Within three years, calls for free expression were heard within
the Party's Writers' Association, where some believed that "creation requires
freedom." *The technical intelligentsia articulated the notion that "freedom of
discussion is a prerequisite of the pursuit of truth." In many places, the need for
academic freedom was discussed. In May 1985, the government granted Hefei's
University of Science and Technology (UST) a measure of autonomy in its experi-
ment with educational reform. Soon thereafter, a new wave of protests appeared
on campuses at the forefront of reforms, around issues such as permitting faculty
to select department heads and students to sit on presidential advisory boards.
In July 1986, Li Honglin, president of the Fujian Academy of Social Science, called
for concrete regulations to safeguard constitutionally protected rights. That fall, a
Shanghai-based magazine published an exposition on two concepts of freedom:
"If socialist society cannot offer the individual more and greater freedom, how
can it display its superiority... democracy and freedom very easily become
derogatory words, associated with the bourgeoisie, as if our proletarians and com-

On December 5, 1986, at Hefei's UST, students protested the closed process
of nominations for the People's Congress. Within two weeks, protests in Hefei
spread to more than a dozen other cities, bringing nearly a hundred thousand
students into the streets of Shanghii. *After five days of public turmoil, student
representatives from fifteen universities negotiated their demands with city leaders.*
Wall posters at Beijing University read, "We want democracy, we want freedom, we
support the university student movement in the University of Science and
Technology." Among the list of complaints that arose across China were:

1. A ban on discussion of sexual liberation at Zhongshan University
in Guangzhou
2. Beijing University's policy of lights out at 11:00 p.m.
3. Incompetent librarians who retained their positions only because of their connections to powerful party officials

4. Poor food service in campus canteenas.

During six hours of negotiations with Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin, student representatives pressed four issues: democracy, recognition of their movement as benefiting China, no retribution against participants, and freedom to publish their own newspapers. Three years later, these would remain key issues for students who occupied Tiananmen Square.

Although the 1986 protests brought some reforms, especially electoral changes that opened the selection process for candidates to the People's Congress, the government again cracked down. The president of the Writers' Association lost his party membership. The president and vice president of UST were transferred to other posts and expelled from the party. Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang—who had opposed the 1980 upsurge—was linked to the new protests and forced to resign in early 1987—as were two other “leading lights of the party.”00 Hu's dismissal made him a hero to students and democracy activists—despite the fact he had opposed them a decade earlier.

At the same time as grassroots demands for more rights were being articulated, the government moved away from central economic controls. From 1979 to 1988, state planning’s control of output declined from 77 percent to 47 percent of steel, from 85 percent to 26 percent of timber, and from 59 percent to 43 percent of coal.01 As private industry was encouraged, many workers in state-owned enterprises faced hardship. In the spring and summer of 1988, factory layoffs affected four hundred thousand people in seven hundred Shenyang plants alone. White-collar workers were not directly benefiting from economic liberalization. The educated elite saw the country as increasingly mismanaged and corrupt. Work stoppages increased in the same period, as did the crime rate.02 In early June, some two thousand Beijing University students protested in Tiananmen Square after one of their fellow students was murdered. They wanted the government to protect them from local criminals.

To be sure, between 1979 and 1984, people's standard of living improved. From the onset of economic reforms in 1978 to 1987, more than 38 times as many citizens owned televisions, more than 131 times more refrigerators were in people's hands, and about 5.7 million washing machines were in use—up from only about 1,000.03 Urban workers' total compensation more than doubled. Yet by 1988, troubling signs appeared. Rather than “trickling down,” wealth generated by new construction of hotels and capital investment schemes brought inflation. Almost unknown in previous decades, inflation grew from less than 3 percent before 1985 to more than 18 percent in 1988—some believed the actual rate was as high as 27 percent by the beginning of 1989.04 With real wages stagnating, the cost of living rose, believed by many to be caused by officials who took their cut out of every transaction. In 1988, more than one in three urban families experienced a sharp decline in their earning power.05 In the first four months of 1989, coal prices rose 100 percent, while food prices also rose significantly: vegetables went up 48.7 percent, for example.06 A
...ritional economic controls. From 1979 to 1981, the rate of real growth and inflation was quite high, but from 1982 to 1983, the rate of real growth and inflation was low. This was due to the fact that the government had implemented a series of economic reforms to reduce inflation.

Table 5.1: Rates of Real Growth and Inflation, 1983-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate of Real Growth</th>
<th>Rate of Inflation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The populace used to decades of low and stable prices and nonexistent unemployment painfully experienced the insecurities of the "free" market.

To increase efficiency, the state implemented Taylorist production techniques and introduced piecework wages. When material incentives failed to provide the jump in labor productivity they sought, the party expanded management powers. A new 1987 law gave managers more power over workers without providing any simultaneous mechanism for workers to redress grievances. The new legislation also permitted layoffs that affected hundreds of thousands of workers by August 1988. Some fifteen to twenty million other workers classified as "underemployed" worried they, too, might be laid off. Suddenly, decades of rising expectations were dashed against the cold reality of insecurity and impotence—the very conditions sociologists identify as producing progressive social movements.

Simultaneously, the gap between elite and working people widened. For the elite, times had never been better. Party functionaries made huge profits on resale of commodities bought at low, state-mandated prices. They were able to buy luxury goods from abroad, send their families on foreign tours, and live in top housing. Party members received special consideration in courts if they were charged criminally. Both Deng and Zhao's sons were thought to be engaged in corrupt practices. Last but not least, while all youth had to compete for scarce seats in higher education, top party members' children were granted special admissions.

The contradiction between the official ideology of equality and workers' subordination became unbearable. Nationalization of industry and property undermined economic equality—especially after the onset of Deng's reforms. Long nourished on a steady diet of government propaganda about the proletariat as the most advanced class, China's workers found that the reality of their everyday lives stood in sharp contrast to that of wealthy leaders whose silk suits and limousines were all too conspicuous signs of their rule over people who wore Mao suits and rode bicycles. China's economy was contained within social relations of a bygone era, the era of Maoist empowerment of peasants and proletarians. As workers took actions to improve their lot, strikes were increasingly their weapon of choice—officially counted at more than seven hundred in the first ten months of 1988—and...
not necessarily peaceful ones. Between January and July of that year, more than 297 managers were injured during 276 incidents of beatings meted out by angry workers, in Shenyang (Liaoning) three city managers were killed by subordinates.  

Like the proverbial genie that can't be put back in the lamp, China's culture of protest continued to grow. While in the United States and Europe, consumerism had tamed avant-garde art's subversive appeal by transforming it into another commodity, Chinese artists continued the rebellious antistablishment upsurge. Although many abandoned China when a campaign against "spiritual pollution" was waged, by the mid-1980s, a multifarious confluence of streams coagulated as the New Tide movement. "Dada" performances were held in Xiamen and Beijing University in 1986. The new cultural opening included a television series, River Elegy, which emphasized the producers' desire to rid China of traditional civilization and become modern and westernized. A prominent magazine introduced a new series on "avant-garde art" in May 1988, and the opening of a "China/avant-garde" exhibition took place in early 1989. This "first modern art show" was brought to an early end after pistol shots were fired as part of a telephone booth installation piece. Officials punished the artists with a two-year ban on modern art, but the movement was about to emerge on a larger scale than anyone had dreamed possible.

The 1989 Crisis

On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang suddenly died from a heart attack. Within an hour, people began congregating near the revolutionary heroes' monument in Tiananmen Square, just as they had during the movements of April 5, 1976. That evening, as groups huddled together in animated discussions, many people decided inflation eating into their meager incomes. About 4:00 a.m., the first organized contingent marched in: twenty employees of the Ministry of Textiles placed a wreath at the base of the monument. Not until more than twelve hours later did the first group of students arrive (late on the evening of April 16), when some three hundred from Beijing University brought eight wreaths to the growing altar dedicated to Hu. Thus, it was workers who initiated the autonomous commemoration of Hu and unleashed an escalating spiral of events that reached its bloody denouement forty-eight days later on June 4.

More than anyone else, students took the lead in provoking a confrontation with the government that would spark urban uprisings all over the country, but to characterize the movement of 1989 as a student movement fails to appreciate the popular character of the uprising. Chinese speak of "one hundred million heroes" when they describe the events, yet in 1988, the government counted only two million students (alongside 110 million workers—70 percent of the nonagricultural labor force). Students first took decisive action on April 17, when more than a thousand people brought a petition criticizing officials' corruption to Zhongnanhai. During the next two days and two nights, no one would meet with students to accept their petition, so they remained sitting there.

At dusk on April 19, 1989, at Beijing University (Beijing Daxue or Peking, for short), hundreds of students shouted approval for formation of a planning committee to create an autonomous student union. Other campuses soon declared their own autonomous unions, and a committee of five to seven members was set up to coordinate these groups into a citywide coordinating group. The government, however, passed a line of no return. By formulating government and university regulations, they had unwittingly incited the protest. During the same night that some tens of thousands of other students were marching in the city, groups were mobilizing. Workers and intellectuals associated with the magazine organized an academic forum to reverse the government's incursions. The next morning at Beijing (Beishida), three activist friends rented an apartment. Without elections, the three called the dormitory residence of the Beijing University "Peking" to reverse the government's incursions. That night, on April 20, police clubs put a brutal drawing of first blood that propelled classes that would last for weeks at

The clusters of workers in all four students had been beaten at Zhongnanhai by officials, and their workers' board to form their own autonomous committees in Tiananmen. rose to his denouncing the violence. Two days after forming their own organization, the informal group published a two-page pamphlet and the so-called "money say it" had one of Deng Xiaoping's "Zhang" pay for his golf excursions, fancy Western suits? How many visits? Alongside such questions, the "modest actions, the Beijing born. The autonomous form of art small significance. This central inspiration for self-government—i

In the weeks of upheaval that followed the protests on April 20, those who had activist experience fled the city. Authority surged forward their most articulate spokesperson for a day in the northwest corner of the Workers' Federation continue
In February and July of that year, more than 200 students of beatings meted out by angry managers were killed by subordinates. The storm back in the larger, China's culture, United States and Europe, consumerism and the anti-Communist campaign against 'spiritual pollution.' The consequence of streams mingled as were held in Xiamen and Beijing included a television series, River. To rid China of traditional civilization, a magazine introduced a new opening of a "China/avant-garde," modern art show" was brought to an end by a telephone booth installation piece, an on modern art, but the movement none had dreamed possible.

ied from a heart attack. Within an evolutionary heroes' monument in the movement of April 5, 1976. That climatic discussions, many people voked. About 4:00 a.m., the first employees of the Ministry of Textiles 1976, the government claimed only workers—70 percent of the nonagricultural action on April 17, when more criticizing officials' corruption to two nights, no one would meet with sprouting sitting there. University (Beijing Daxue or Beida, for all for formation of a planning comm. Other campuses soon declared their own autonomous unions, and activists at each university selected a standing committee of five to seven members—which linked with other standing committees into a citywide coordinating group. Without knowing it, students had thereby passed a line of no return. By forming autonomous student unions parallel to government ones, they had unwittingly sown the seeds of a coming conflagration. During the same night that some students at Beida were organizing a new union, hundreds of other students were miles away, sitting in at Zhongnanhai. All over the city, groups were mobilizing. Workers were huddled in Tiananmen Square, and intellectuals associated with the World Economic Forum and New World magazine organized an academic forum to discuss a reevaluation of Hu Yaobang and to reverse the government's inclination to oppose political liberalization.

The next morning at Beijing Normal University (Beijing Shifan Daxue or Beishida), three activist friends resolved to create an autonomous union at their campus. Without elections, the three simply appointed themselves officers and called the dormitory residence of Wuer Kaixi their office. Later that evening (April 20), police clubs put a brutal end to the two-day sit-in at Zhongnanhai, a drawing of first blood that propelled students at Beida to initiate a boycott of classes that would last for weeks and spread to many campuses.

The clusters of workers in Tiananmen Square were surprised to hear that students had been beaten at Zhongnanhai. They knew that students shared their frustration with officials, and their conversations quickly turned to the need for workers to form their own autonomous organization. Hearing about the bloody end to the students' peaceful sit-in, one worker among the two dozen people clustered in Tiananmen rose to his feet and roused the group with a fiery speech denouncing the violence. Two days earlier, the group had broached the idea of forming their own organization, and after the police action, they edged closer to it. The informal group published two leaflets exposing leaders' wealth, their families' corruption, and the shortsighted impact of their economic policies. How much money had one of Deng Xiaoping's sons bet at a Hong Kong racetrack? Did Zhao Ziyang pay for his golf excursions from his own pocket? How could he afford his fancy Western suits? How many villas did the party elite maintain for their private use? Alongside such questions, they provided their views of the problems caused by Deng's economic reforms—especially in the form of higher inflation. With these modest actions, the Beijing Autonomous Workers' Federation (BAWF) was born. The autonomous form of both students' and workers' organizations is of no small significance. This central characteristic of contemporary freedom—people's aspirations for self-government—is evident everywhere in insurgences.

In the weeks of upheaval that followed, BAWF slowly moved from periphery to center of the protests. On April 20, they were seventy or eighty people—one of whom had activist experience. As soon as the group issued its first handbills that day, new faces surged forward to join, one of whom, Han Dongfang, became their most articulate spokesperson. As a means to continue, they resolved to meet every day in the northwest corner of Tiananmen Square. By the final phase of the insurrection, that is, after martial law had been declared and students melted away, the Workers' Federation continued to grow by leaps and bounds.
Students Take the Initiative
With Hu Yaobang’s funeral scheduled for April 22, government leaders wanted Tiananmen Square kept clear, and they thought it would be a simple matter to do so. They planned to close the square before the funeral, but autonomously organized students outmanned them. On the night of April 21, about sixty thousand students gathered on a Shida soccer field and marched to Tiananmen. While underway, the march from Shida was joined by contingents from Beida and the University of Politics and Law. The first group to arrive was from Qinghua University. Without a plan to do something once they got there, they sat down and rested. Soon the soccer field assembly, tens of thousands strong, marched in singing the Internationale and chanting, “Long Live Freedom!” and “Down with Dictatorship!” At dawn, a meeting of representatives from each school was convened, and to everyone’s surprise, nineteen colleges were present. The group approved a petition that included:

- Reassessment of Hu Yaobang
- Punishment for those responsible for the beatings at Zhongnanhai
- Permission to publish autonomous newspapers
- Publication of government officials’ incomes
- Discussion of national education policy and fees
- Reconsideration of the “anti-spiritual pollution campaign”
- Accurate media portrayal of the new student movement.

As party leaders exited Hu’s funeral in the Great Hall of the People, only a few even bothered to glance at the assembled students. Trying to get officials to meet them, tens of thousands of students marched around the square, chanting “We want dialogue,” but they were ignored. A trio of Beida students knelt on the steps of the Great Hall and held the seven-point petition above their heads for about forty minutes. When there was still no response, many students began weeping in frustration.46

By themselves, the seven points were not revolutionary demands—indeed they were supplications to the government and recognized the power of the system. Yet by autonomously challenging the sole discretion of the party to make policy, students crossed a dangerous line. Furthermore, by honoring the long-standing Chinese tradition of petitioning authorities for redress of grievances, students acted within the set of values central to Chinese civil society. By ignoring them, officials’ actions broke with people’s expectations of proper behavior. Already enraged by a student sit-in at their elite housing complex, government leaders wanted nothing to do with uppity youngsters who dared reproach them. That same day, protests in Xian turned violent and many people were hurt. Some reports claimed eleven people were killed and hundreds injured amid a cluster of attacks on police.47

As early as 542 BCE, even before China became Confucian, student protests had occurred.48 Over ensuing centuries, Chinese students played central roles in stirring the nation to act, resisting corrupt authorities, and supporting rulers they considered kind and just. Central to China’s civil society and governing bureaucracy, scholars have long been reciprocated the public’s esteem with clarity, “A scholar worries over the people’s happiness only after all of humanity!”

Seen in the best light, student and high-minded fairness. They were opportunities for university graduates to be most qualified to hold. One and the brightest are refused party members upon their return to their alma mater. The party is being made decent party members lack of faith in this “vanguard,” as many as 75% of the students.

Two days after Hu’s funeral, at the Autonomous Student Union of rotating delegates democratically (forty-one) universities, the ASU had only done it have a much wider be sanctioned student union, it took to undertake—or ones they thought elected Zhou Yongjun chairperson Wuer Kaixi’s six. The ASU quickly worked out an agenda and strategy limiting demonstrations down to the was viewed by student activists at the same night ASU was formally four in Xian and Changsha, where sho

For years, previous attempts discovered and broken up before created political space opened by neu centrally mobilized, and the ASU. During the next six weeks, much recognition of its right to exist. I April 25, Central People’s Radio as “illegal organizations” and pr right of legal organizations.” Puto total became a major sore point.

On April 25, Deng Xiaoping people to “prepare ourselves for turmoil.” The following day, university student movement. . . . They having been influenced and encompassed Poland, Hungary, and the Sov
April 22, government leaders wanted night it would be a simple matter to fore the funeral, but autonomously in the night of April 21, about sixty thou-
sen joined by contingents from Beida's group to arrive was from Qinghua who they got there, they sat down around hundreds of thousands strong, marched, "Long Live Freedom!" and "Down representatives from each school were present. The group

the beatings at Zhongnanhai newspapers 
comics
kcy and fees
6 pollution campaign” student movement.

be "Half of the People, only a few students. Trying to get officials to meet around the square, chanting "We of Beida students kneel on the steps setion above their heads for about nse, many students began weeping for revolutionary demands—indeed and recognized the power of the sole discretion of the party to make furthermore, by honoring the long-

itudinal sign of a Lucid, and thus, to Chinese civil society. But ignore-

lonial reports about the human rights of Chinese students who dared repel them. and many people were hurt. Some nd hundreds injured among a cluster

became Confucian, student protest

Chinese scholars have long been held in high repute, and they have often reciprocated the public's esteem with concern for the well-being of ordinary people. A famous Song dynasty scholar, Fan Zhongyan, is still remembered for his insight, "A scholar worries about the world before the world worries itself; a scholar is happy only after all of humanity has achieved happiness."

See in the best light, students act in this tradition of generosity of spirit and high-minded fairness. They wanted an end to officials' corruption and greater opportunities for university graduates. Students felt excluded from positions they were most qualified to hold. One wall poster written in mid-April read, "The best and the brightest are refused party membership, while the creeps are admitted in droves. The party is being manipulated by a bunch of 'phony'." Another decreed party members lack of formal education: "Of the 47 million members of this 'vanguard,' as many as 75 percent have no more than elementary school education."

Two days after Hu's funeral, about thirty-five students, including many of the activists who had stepped forward to formulate the seven-point petition, created the Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Universities and Colleges (ASU). With rotating delegates democratically selected from fifteen (and soon thereafter from forty-one) universities, the ASU reflected a bottom-up representative system. Not only did it have a much wider base of popular support than the government-sanctioned student union, it took actions mainstream organizations were afraid to undertake—or ones they thought were incorrect. At their first meeting, they elected Zhou Yongjun chairperson of the standing committee by a vote of nine to Wu'er Kaixi's six. The ASU quickly became the "decision-making body that could work out an agenda and strategy for the movement as a whole." Besides organizing demonstrations down to the finest details like slogans, times, and places, it was viewed by student activists as a representative to the government. The same night ASU was formally founded in Beijing, heavy protests turned into riots in Xian and Changsha, where shop windows were smashed and looting occurred.

For years, previous attempts to construct independent organizations were discovered and broken up before they could build a base. Within the newly liberated political space opened by the eros effect of 1989, many groups simultaneously mobilized, and the ASU was able to emerge as a major political player. During the next six weeks, much focus would be put upon obtaining government recognition of its right to exist. By the right of the group's second meeting on April 25, Central People's Radio read an editorial attacking autonomous unions as "illegal organizations" and promising to "stop any attempt to infringe on the right of legal organizations." Published the next day in People's Daily, this editorial became a major sore point for students—and an unveiling threat to them.

On April 25, Deng Xiaoping took to the airwaves and called for Chinese people to "prepare ourselves for a nationwide struggle and resolve to crush the turmoil." The following day, he warned Premier Li Peng that "this is not an ordinary student movement... These persons have arisen to create turmoil after having been influenced and encouraged by liberalization elements in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union... The more the Poles gave in, the
greater the turmoil became. Deng was not entirely wrong: students had discussed the idea of naming their new organization “Solidarity” in honor of the Polish workers’ movement. Moreover, the ouster of Marcos from the Philippines and capitulation of Chun Doo-hwan in South Korea inspired people, while the transformation of Taiwan from a martial law garrison state to protodemocracy (see the next chapter) gave people reason to believe the time had come for China to open its political system. As one observer described the scene in Tiananmen Square, “Many emulated the white headbands worn by South Korean dissidents and flashed the V sign favored by anti-Marcos activists who fought for people’s power in the Philippines.” Chinese people had assimilated a new tactic in the arsenal of insurgency: the massive occupation of public space as a means of rallying the population. While this tactic first appeared in the era of the global movement of 1968, Filipinos used it to overthrow Marcos in 1986, and in 1987, South Korea’s June Uprising compelled the dictatorship to grant democratic reforms.

It would be wrong however, to attribute the Chinese movement simply to spillover or “snowballing” from other countries. The simultaneity of China’s movement and a dozen more in 1989 speaks to an occurrence of the era effect, to the intuitive and spontaneous awakening of need for freedom. China’s protests erupted months before the Berlin Wall came down, before Poland’s Solidarity came to power, and before the Czech “Velvet Revolution”—all of which transpired in a process of mutual amplification.

Chinese wall posters and placards drew inspiration from Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and Abraham Lincoln; they mentioned Kent State and Gorbachev. Inspired by King’s speech, a Nanjing University student composed a poem, “I Have a Dream,” which became a big character poster, Eyes on the Prize, an award-winning television series on the U.S. civil rights movement, had been available at her university. Someone photocopied the People Power book from the Philippines and plastered it on a prominent situated wall. In the context of a worldwide continuation of 1968, with protests spreading in Hungary, East Germany, and many other countries, an editorial in China’s People’s Daily on April 26 condemned “anti-state turmoil and chaos,” branding both students and workers in unsavory terms—a “conspiracy by a handful of unlawful elements” who had even taken over the broadcasting facilities of colleges and universities. As in so many other revolts in this period—the media coverage in Guangju and Thailand readily come to mind—protesters were deeply troubled by hostile and somewhat inaccurate media assessments of their movements and demanded retractions. The difference is that in China, they ultimately did receive a high-ranking leader’s public praise as well as promises of no retaliation—but they came too late (on May 16) to change the trajectory of the protests.

Students Under Attack
Densely concentrated on campuses and afforded time and space to study, students mobilized quickly. Under attack on radio, television, and newspapers, students knew the state’s iron fist was clenched and ready to strike. At their next meeting, the ASU hotly debated who Committee unable to decide, they call the forty schools present agreed to class boycott already in place, state rivalled the party for people’s loyalty, and Deng’s hardline position became brought heavy pressure to bear on the System not withstand it. On the night of April, but it was too late for one per: 100,000 students converged on police blockades and marched in co of thousands of Beijing residents. In more than half a million citizens went on protests became meaningless, at marching to Tiananmen Square in a “carnival-like atmosphere.” Cat many workers mingled among the t of the greatest events in history.

After witnessing the joyous leaders finally realized they need not ignore or pressure protesters. On A primarly with members of the ge thereby accomplishing two goals. I willing to talk and listen—which, it to dictators like Marcos in the Phill Korea, King Gyanendra in Nepal, i bullets rather than words to respon party’s highest levels were listenin with students in the reform proc to reach a consensus on whether t autonomous discretion to decide i After their successful mobilizat selves, Zhou Yongjun was forced Wiere Kai Zi became the new pres Two days later, Wuer failed to atten Riding the enormous energy gone decided to mount another protests the newly formed organization. T enth anniversary of the 1919 an students’ rally, which attracted 5 More young workers than studen marchers broke through police lin movement. The two dismissed fr public statements as if they were boycotts, and Wuer read a long de
entirely wrong: students had dis-\textit{zation} "Solidarity" in honor of the\n\textit{raster} of Marcos from the Philippines\n\textit{th} Korea inspired people, while the\n\textit{w}\textit{garrison state to protodemocracy}\nbelieve the time had come for China\nr described the scene in Tiananmen\n\textit{worn} by South Korean dissidents\n\textit{activists who fought for people's}\n\textit{had assimilated a new tactic in the}\n\textit{ation of public space as a means of}\n\textit{t appeared in the eros effect of the}\nto overthrow Marcos in 1986, and in\n\textit{dictatorship to grant democratic}\nthe Chinese movement simply to\n\textit{tries. The simultaneity of China's}\nto an occurrence of the eros effect,\no\textit{need for freedom}. China's protests\nto down, before Poland's "Solidarity}\n\textit{Revolution}"—all of which transpired\ny inspiration from Martin Luther King's\ntioned Kent State and Gorbachev.\n\textit{student composed a poem, "l}\n\textit{carrier poster. Eyes on the Prize, an}\n\textit{S. civil rights movement, had been}\ntooled the \textit{People Power} book from\n\textit{minent situated wall. In the context of}\n\textit{protests spreading in Hungary, East}\n\textit{editorial in China's \textit{People's Daily} on}\n\textit{chaos," branding both students and}\n\textit{by a handful of unlawful elements"}\nfacilities of colleges and universities.\n\textit{the media coverage in Guangju and}\n\textit{were deeply troubled by hostile and}\n\textit{of their movements and demanded}\n\textit{a}, they ultimately did receive a high-}\n\textit{promises of no retaliation—but they}\n\textit{jectory of the protests.}\n\textit{afforded time and space to study, stu-}\n\textit{dio, television, and newspapers, stu-}\n\textit{ed and ready to strike. At their next}\n\textit{meeting, the ASU hotly debated what course of action to take. With the Standing}\n\textit{Committee unable to decide, they called a general assembly to vote. Nearly all of}\n\textit{the forty schools present agreed to organize a major protest on April 27. With a}\nclass boycott already in place, students overnight became a powerful force that}\n\textit{rivied the party for people's loyalty. With Zhao Ziyang on a trip to North Korea, Li}\n\textit{and Deng's hardline position clumsily handled the burgeoning movement. They}\nbrought heavy pressure to bear on ASU leader Zhou Yongjun, who evidently could not\n\textit{withstand it. On the night of April 26, he unilaterally called off the demonstration,}\n\textit{but it was too late for one person to change anything. The next day, more than 100,000}\non\textit{s converged on Tiananmen Square. As they circumvented police blockades and marched in contingents, they were cheered on by hundreds of}\n\textit{ischens of Beijing residents. As the seemingly endless procession passed, more than half a million citizens watched from sidewalks. The government's ban on protests became meaningless, and more than 350,000 people defied police by}\n\textit{arshing to Tiananmen Square, where they remained for some fourteen hours in}\n\textit{a carnival-like atmosphere.} Cardboard boxes were filled with donations, and}\n\textit{many workers mingled among the throng. Later one student leader called it "one of}\n\textit{the greatest events in history."}\n\textit{After witnessing the joyous civil disobedience of April 27, government leaders finally realized they needed to do something more creative than simply}\n\textit{gnore or pressure protesters. On April 29, they held a widely publicized meeting}\n\textit{primarily with members of the government-sanctioned student organization,}\n\textit{thereby accomplishing two goals. The dialogue made it appear that the party was}\n\textit{illing to talk and listen—which, it must be said, was remarkable when compared to}\n\textit{dictators like Marcos in the Philippines, Ne Win in Burma, Chun Doo-hwan in}\n\textit{orea, King Gyandendra in Nepal, and Suchinda in Thailand—all of whom used}\nbullies rather than words to respond to their youth.}\n\textit{Significant forces within the}\n\textit{party's highest levels were listening, especially Zhao Ziyang, who sought to work}\n\textit{with students in the reform process. The "dialogue" also split the ASU. Unable to}\n\textit{reach a consensus on whether or not to attend, the group granted individuals}\n\textit{autonomous discretion to decide whether or not to participate in the meeting.}\n\textit{After their successful mobilization on April 27, students reorganized them-}\n\textit{selves, Zhou Yongjun was forced to resign for his unilateral "cancellation" and}\n\textit{Wuer Kaixi became the new president—but with a more limited set of powers.}\n\textit{Two days later, Wuer failed to attend a meeting and was replaced by Feng Congde.}\n\textit{Riding the enormous energy generated by the recent civil disobedience, the ASU}\n\textit{decided to mount another protest on May 4, no easy task given the pressure on}\n\textit{the newly formed organization. The government's official rally on May 4, the}\n\textit{seventieth anniversary of the 1919 anti-Japanese protests, was dwarfed in size by the}\n\textit{students' rally, which attracted 50,000 students and more than 250,000 others.}\n\textit{More young workers than students were present. Once again, the autonomous}\n\textit{marchers broke through police lines, this time while singing songs from the 1939}\n\textit{movement. The two dismissed former leaders of the ASU each made individual}\n\textit{public statements as if they were still leaders: Zhou announced an end to class}\n\textit{boycotts, and Wuer read a long declaration that few outside the media even heard.}
Significantly, these individuals felt empowered to speak on behalf of the movement as a whole, and their words were taken by the media as representing the ASU. Such individualism would be the last time organizations of the student movement were undermined by self-proclaimed leaders.

In the heady atmosphere following two successful massive protests, campus activists were uncertain how to proceed. On May 5, thousands of students at nearly all universities except Beida and Shida returned to classes. On many campuses, the ASU began to be viewed negatively—whether because of its internal power struggles or its changing positions on class boycotts. When campus representatives assembled on May 5, despair rather than optimism characterized the meeting. At least one standing committee member resigned, and many others were simply no-shows. The movement seemed stuck at a low point, and no one knew what to do next. By now, students’ key demand was for dialogue with the government—a measure that carried within it implicit recognition of their autonomous organizations. To that end, they spun off a Dialogue Delegation and hoped to secure a positive response from the government.

While the ASU stagnated, students by the hundreds continued to hang wall posters, and other groups mobilized. On May 11, more than five thousand bicycle riders supported journalists’ call for press freedom. Unlike 1960s movements in the United States, activist students had a core of older activists around them who could offer advice and provide insight into the character of the society they were attempting to change. Even more importantly, younger activists often listened to their elders. With experiences accumulated from years of struggle and analysis gained from study, a hundred flowers of ideas bloomed, some fragrant, others short-lived. One young teacher at People’s University displayed a big character poster detailing continuity in the history of Chinese administrations by comparing the power structure in 1989 with that in China’s feudal past. See Table 5.2. The political critique evident in the poster is incisive, but it does not represent growing public dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic conditions.

The Hunger Strikers’ Coup d’État
On May 11, a small group of celebrity activists including Wang Dan and Wang Dan met at a restaurant to discuss the movement’s impasse. Looking for a way to maintain momentum, they resolved to appeal to students to join a hunger strike without the approval of the autonomous student unions. None was a spokesperson for any organization, and they soon helped spawn a dynamic inside the movement through which the fruit of students’ efforts—the autonomous unions for which they had so mightily sacrificed—was thrown to the wayside and replaced by the media appeal of leaders willing to “fast to the death”—as they insisted they would do.

On May 13, just before beginning their hunger strike, dozens of students guised down a last bunch of beer and sausages. Gathering in Tiananmen Square before sympathetic media, they were quickly joined by hundreds more people. It was only two days before Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s historic visit marking an end to three decades of Sino-Soviet animosity was to take place. The

| Table 5.2: Comparison of the Present Power
| Control of state power | Feudal
| Ideology | Single
| Doctrine regarding source of power | Mandate
| Power base | Army
| System of officials | Appoint
| Principles of organization | Father
| Ruler
| Husband
| Political tactics | Highly
| Assumption about human nature | None
| Status of the individual | Doctrine

Strikers realized they occupied a key win in their demands—which include the April 26 edict banning protests against the government. Around 5:00 p.m., Chai Ling led the crowd in an oath of prosperity of any country. I will listen to our goals. Nearby, Westerners no organization existed to hunger strikers milling around the now as celebrity activists, leaders characters on them and moved around signing autographs as they passed. Communist leaders continue whether convinced by the sincerity of the resonance and sympathetic Mao Mingqi, head of the CCP’s united students on May 11. He promised the autumn harvest—that is, that the once student movement had died of wearing hospital clothing and bodies—burst into the hull and the cries and weeping heard it. So. This charade took place one
ered to speak on behalf of the movement by the media as representing the actual organizations of the student leaders.

In the days ahead, thousands of students at the university campus returned to classes. On many campuses—whether because of its internal class boycotts or the actions of the authorities or because the implicit recognition of their autonomy—there was a dialogue delegation and a hope for reform.

The tension continued to hang heavy, with many students and teachers demanding dialogue with the authorities. Some universities displayed a more confrontational approach, while others displayed a more conciliatory one. The Chinese government was facing a critical moment.

Table 5.2: Comparison of the Present Power Structure and Feudal China's Power Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of state power</th>
<th>Feudal System</th>
<th>Present System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By single emperor</td>
<td>By single person</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>One only: Confucianism</th>
<th>One only: Communism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrine regarding source of power</th>
<th>Mandate of Heaven</th>
<th>Class struggle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power base</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System of officials</th>
<th>Appointed posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles of organization</th>
<th>Ruler guides subjects</th>
<th>The organization (the party) directs the individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father guides sons</th>
<th>Husband guides wife</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political tactics</th>
<th>Highly sophisticated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption about human nature</th>
<th>Doctrine of inherent virtue</th>
<th>Doctrine of the perfect proletariat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status of the individual</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Extremely low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: Han Minfu, Class for Democracy, TSS.

strike leaders. They occupied a key strategic position from which they might set their demands—which included including the April 26 edict banning protests and televised talks between students and the government. Around 5:00 p.m., a slender psychology graduate student named Chai Ling led the crowd in an oath: “I swear, that to promote democracy, for the prosperity of my country, I willingly go on a hunger strike. I will not give up until I realize our goals.” Nearby, Wang Dan was using a bullhorn to hold a press conference. No organization existed to make decisions on behalf of the eight hundred hunger strikers milling around the Monument to the People’s Heroes. Working now as celebrity activists, leaders wore shirts with their names written in large characters on them and moved around the square inside a phalanx of bodyguards, signing autographs as they passed through the crowd.

Communist leaders continued to seek ways to hear students’ concerns—whether convinced by the sincerity of their hunger strike or troubled by the wide resonance and sympathetic media they enjoyed among citizens. Top leader Yan Mingfa, head of the CCP’s unified front department, sat down to meet with students on May 4. He promised there would be no “settling the account after the autumn harvest”—that is, that the regime would not retaliate against the students once their movement had died down. In the midst of the talks, hunger strikers—wearing hospital clothing and some with intravenous feeds attached to their bodies—bust into the hall and disrupted the conversation. They were angered because the televised version was being prerecorded, not broadcast live. Putting an end to the dialogue, they demanded to read their “last words” to their parents. Amid cries and weeping heard in all corners of the room, they proceeded to do so. This charade took place one day after the beginning of the fast!
The hunger strike marked a turning point in the movement, a shift from righteous indignation to arrogant self-promotion. Among the public, the hunger strikers elicited great sympathy, but by undercutting students' autonomous organizations and seizing the center of attention for themselves, a few media stars emerged who drew the entire movement down the road to their spotlight—and to the movement's demise. Later that day (May 14), twelve of China's most famous writers appealed to the hunger strikers to leave Tiananmen Square so that the grand ceremony honoring Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit the next day (the first by a Russian party leader since 1959) would not have to be cancelled. The intellectuals also called for the regime to recognize the autonomous student organizations, to consider protesters a patriotic, democratic contribution to society, and to take no action against them after the matter was settled. Nevertheless, students refused to budge. Gorbachev was met at the airport by senior Chinese leaders—and was never able to visit Tiananmen Square.

By circumventing the organizations their movement had only recently created, the hunger strikers set a dangerous precedent, one that ultimately doomed the movement to fall short of its possibilities. The autonomous unions did not agree to the hunger strike, and according to some sources, hoped it would fail.24 When the ASU did not suit their agenda, its more famous members simply circumvented it. From that moment, it was only a short hop to the creation of a "Headquarters of Tiananmen Square" with a "commander-in-chief," who led the entire movement willy-nilly down the path of "holier-than-thou" radicalism and straight into a bloody confrontation on June 4. The strategy of escalation involved rejecting compromise, who movement colleagues, and thereby abject failure. The hunger strike willy-nilly of people, in eliciting "an unprophesied" citizens of Beijing, young and old, literate," but since it cut the maverick huge strategic error.27

For three weeks, workers quit factories and offices. Only after the announcement of their presence publicly, members. By May 13, when huge de the clearly visible BAWF contingents owned factories, which had also cations. Party leaders vainly sought. early May, the top party office in Eers instructing them to take all fea coming together. On May 10, the P six thousands miners' families in later, both Premier Li Peng and Z leaders, yet the outcome was not in Tiananmen with the words one during the meeting: "The party sh national debt." On May 15, Beijing devoted to the problem of how to.

Although considered an illegitimate to grow, both in numbers martial law approached, they an the lies of the rulers. There is another public statement, they a lovable yet pathetic and tragic years, and are still being deceive people; we should restore ourselves our generation is fated to carry or then it is better to die in battle I flooded into the city to join the hundred hunger-striking student managed and privately owned e Corporation and Yanshan Petroc of trucks, cars, and buses, singular red flags and portraits of "The demonstration today was t nightmares—organized worker 7. Unlike students, BAWF war demands included price stabiliz
involved rejecting compromise, whether with Zhao and other moderates or with movement colleagues, and thereby doomed the movement in its arrogance to object failure. The hunger strike was a great tactic in terms of gaining sympathy of people, in eliciting "an unprecedented outpouring of sympathy from the citizens of Beijing, young and old, rich and poor, highly educated and semi-literate," but since it cut the movement from democratic organizations, it was a huge strategic error.\(^7\)

For three weeks, workers quietly organized and spread the word to large factories and offices. Only after hundreds of thousands of students occupied Tiananmen Square did the Workers' Federation (BAWF) feel safe enough to announce their presence publicly. On May 2, they had two thousand registered members. By May 13, when huge demonstrations were mounted almost every day, the clearly visible BAWF contingent marched prominently among many state-owned factories, which had also created their own autonomous worker federations.\(^6\) Party leaders vainly sought to keep workers from joining the protests. In early May, the top party office in Beijing issued a directive to all factory managers instructing them to take all feasible steps to keep workers and students from coming together. On May 10, the Party Politburo received a report that a third of six thousands miners' families had taken part in the movement.\(^3\) Three days later, both Premier Li Peng and Zhao Ziyang held special meetings with labor leaders, yet the outcome was not to their liking. On May 14, banners appeared in Tiananmen with the words one of the workers was rumored to have shouted during the meeting: "The party should sell off its Mercedes Benz to pay off the national debt."\(^8\) On May 15, Beijing officials huddled in an emergency session devoted to the problem of how to "stabilize workers."\(^9\)

Although considered an illegal organization by the authorities, BAWF continued to grow, both in numbers and in their systematic critique. On May 17, as martial law approached, they announced, "The people will no longer believe the lies of the rulers... There are only two classes: the rulers and the ruled." In another public statement, they sounded a battle cry: "Ah, the Chinese! Such a lovable yet pathetic and tragic people. We have been deceived for thousands of years, and are still being deceived today. Not! Instead we should become a great people; we should restore ourselves to our original greatness! Brother workers, if our generation is fated to carry out this humiliation into the twenty-first century, then it is better to die in battle in the twentieth!"\(^2\) On May 17 and 18, workers flooded into the city to join the protests, at whose symbolic center sat several hundred hunger-striking students. From state-owned enterprises to collectively managed and privately owned ones, from large factories like the Capital Steel Corporation and Yanzhan Petrochemical to small shops, they arrived in columns of trucks, cars, and buses, singing, drumming, beating gongs, and carrying enormous red flags and portraits of Mao. On May 18, the New York Times reported, "The demonstration today was the realization of one of the government's worst nightmares—organized worker participation in what began as student protests."

Unlike students, BAWF wanted a more democratic form of socialism. Their demands included price stabilization, the right to change jobs freely, and an end
to hiring that discriminated against women. One BAWF activist subsequently declared: "In the factory, the director is a dictator, what one man says goes. If you view the state through the factory, it's about the same: one-man rule. . . . A factory should have a system. If a worker wants to change jobs, they only have a system of rules to decide how to do it. Also, these rules should be decided upon by everybody." Here in nutshells is a vision for a higher form of socialism, not a desire for consumerism. While many students criticized their exclusion from elite circles and demanded entry to off-limit state stores where Western goods were sold, workers sought to abolish the elite entirely and developed a vision for improving everyone's lives. "New hotels have gone up and changed the city's face, but the people still lack decent housing space," they wrote. "There's a craze for banquet at the top," they complained. As they organized, they articulated the belief that their autonomous organization represented workers better than the official All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) that they felt was controlled by the party, not the workers. Although many ACFTU members (including some officials) hung out at the BAWF convergence point in Tiananmen, the ACFTU refused to endorse the BAWF, whose stridency and independence threatened their complacency.

During the 1989 insurgency, students found a mentor and advocate in Zhao Ziyang, and like Zhao, many sought to play the role of loyal opposition. Many workers, however, tired of Zhao's fancy Western suits and matching policies, often shouted "Down With Zhao Ziyang!" As the movement developed and workers increased their presence, they called for ordinary citizens to oversee officials and challenged the special privileges enjoyed by the communist elite. They sought to curtail arbitrary power of managers in factories and to stimulate autonomous unions that could help to formulate national policy and to craft specific agreements governing workplace relations. Far from rejecting the communist revolution, they sought to reenergize it on the basis of Marx and Mao. One of their wall posters was quite explicit: "We have calculated carefully, based on Marx's Capital, the rate of exploitation of workers. We discovered that the 'servants of the people' swallow all the surplus value produced by the people's blood and sweat. . . . But history's final accounting has yet to be completed."*4

As the movement spread across China, preliminary assessments of the movement's scale indicated that 4,340 big cities in China. 157 reported student protests, including thirty-two with participation of autonomous workers groups. *5 Years later, a more complete compilation counted demonstrations in 341 cities. *6 In Xi'an, one thousand hunger strikers sat down in New City Square. *7 Delegations traveled to nearby factories to gain support. As many as two thousand students rode trains to Beijing on May 18 and 19. In Chongqing, eighty-two students began a fast in front of City Hall on May 18, copying both the Beijing tactic and the demand for a dialogue with officials. *8 In Nanjing, tens of thousands of workers and students demonstrated, and some joined a hunger strike there. *9 A "Goddess of Democracy" was erected in Shanghai before art students did so in Beijing.

It appeared that everyone was pulled in by the "magnetic attraction" of the protests—even police officers, Foreign Ministry workers, bankers, and People's Daily reporters. *10 One estimate said twelve were in the streets every day due to police. The revolt was so jammed that Gorbachev never even mentioned the Forbidden City, or even the opera, for everyone, and of thousands of thousands, China. The Beijing Military Canteen state-owned pharmaceutical company, more than twenty-five hunger strikers. Some established artists sold pieces to raise money. Despite the usually ten to twenty cases of disease, hunger strikers gathered in a "carnival" of protest remained peaceful at Tiananmen. At 2:00 a.m. on May 19, and there were piles of filth, decay types of rubbish everywhere, with splinter groups. Parents who had come to the street around the place and after they emulated a foul odor. *11

For some people, the hunger strikers were observed sympathy to them, nonetheless openly admitted: he was eating rice, it's not really food. *12 Furthermore, relay hunger strike, fasting a day for them. For some unknown reason, others might die after seven days on a rations only one of many who have racy activists before he became the pre-twenty-three days on a water-only support for Gwangju citizens' dictatorship.

Students' dignified role in the nation to recognize in most of the time—be accounted for. The cream of the crop who spearheaded the hunger strike of the nation—did as the public did fast, some forty-one of China's amusement, disguised a great deception around the water strikers. *13 It has described how. "As the s is a type of circumambulation. Conversion around it. People often burst strikers huddled in the seats of the V sign." *14
One BAWF activist subsequently dictated, what one man says goes. If it was the same; one man rule, ... a wants to change jobs, they ought to.

Also, these rules should be decided for a higher form of socialism, activists criticized their exclusion from it state stores where Western goods were entirely and developed a vision for people gone up and changed the city's face, etc., they wrote. "There's a craze for them organized, they articulated the represented workers better than the ACFTU that they felt was controlled by ACFTU members (including some point in Tiananmen, the ACFTU's availability weakened and independence threatened.

and a mentor and advocate in Zhao by the role of loyal opposition. Many to dressing suits and matching policies, often a movement developed and workers many citizens to oversee officials and the communist elite. They sought stories and to stimulate autonomous policy and to craft specific agreements rejecting the communist revolution of Marx and Mao. One of their cards carefully, based on Marx's Capital, read that the 'servants of the people's blood and sweat... But pleaded.

Preliminary assessments of the movement in China, 107 reported student protests of autonomous workers groups. Borrowed demonstrations in 341 cities. Won in New City Square. Delegations. As many as two thousand students marching eighty-two students began the Beijing tactic and the angry, tens of thousands of workers join a hunger strike there. A "Godlike" was art students did so in Beijing, by the "magnetic attraction" of the art students, bankers, and People's Daily reporters. One estimate said 10 percent of Beijing—about a million protesters—were in the streets every day during the three-day visit. The city was so jammed that Gorbachev never made it to the Great Hall of the People, the Forbidden City, or even to the opera. In this "urban Woodstock" there was room for everyone, and hundreds of thousands of people streamed into Beijing from all parts of China. The Beijing Military Command sent over one thousand quilts, and state-owned pharmaceutical companies contributed to the square's medical tents. More than twenty-five hunger strikers came from the Central Academy of Fine Arts. Some established artists sold pieces to raise money. Even the Communist Youth League sent over twenty cases of drinks. Modeling themselves on the Beijing scene, hunger strikers gathered in more than thirty other cities. Beijing's festive "carnival" of protest remained peaceful, yet it had its downside. Walking through Tiananmen at 2:00 a.m. on May 19, Germaine Barné observed, "The place stank, and there were piles of filth, decaying food, plastic and glass containers and all types of rubbish everywhere, with students huddled asleep all around the monument. Parents who came to the square with their children had let them freely urinate around the place, and after some days of this, large parts of the plaza emanated a foul odour.

For some people, the hunger strike also emitted a strange aroma. Many hunger strikers were observed eating secretly by foreign journalists who, while sympathetic to them, nonetheless subsequently reported these facts. One student openly admitted he was eating sweetened yogurt—claiming, "Snacking is okay. It's not really food." Furthermore, it appears many of the students were on a relay hunger strike, fasting a day at a time after which someone else replaced them. For some unknown reason, Chinese people believed that the hunger strikers might die after seven days on a water-only diet, when in fact Dick Gregory is only one of many people who have fasted for many times as long. As a democracy activist before he became president of South Korea, Kim Young-sam fasted twenty-three days on a water-only diet beginning on May 18, 1983, to express his support for Kwangchü citizens' continuing struggle against the Chun Doo-hwan dictatorship.

Students' dignified role in the China—a society in which everyone worked incessantly for the nation to recover its greatness—meant they lived on a pedestal for most of the time—a position they demanded the government also accord them. The cream of the crop of a single-child nation, Beida students who spearheaded the hunger strike considered themselves the future leaders of the nation—as did the public that supported them. On the first day of their fast, some forty-one of China's future elite collapsed. Such theatrics, when not amusing, disqualified a great deception. Tibetans' circles of protest were recreated around the water strikers' "altar." Without comprehending its Tibetan roots, Barné described how, "As the space was a circle it immediately encouraged a type of circumambulation. Crowds of observers and delegations edged their way around it. People often burst into tears as they moved past the young water strikers huddled in the seats of the bus, sometimes raising their hands or flashing the V sign."
“Commander-in-Chief of the Headquarters of Tiananmen Square”

On May 14, Chai Ling left the meeting with government officials due to “exhaustion,” but at 8:00 a.m. the next morning, she announced the formation of a Hunger Strike Command with herself as chairperson. Her new position also brought her control of a broadcasting center in Tiananmen Square acquired with Hong Kong donations. Her husband and fellow activist, Feng Congde, personally refused to let ASU representatives have access to the station. Thus in a single evening, Chai Ling and her husband managed, in effect, a coup d’état that put her in the position she later called “Commander-in-Chief of the Headquarters for Defending Tiananmen Square.” In her mind, the occupation of Tiananmen Square necessitated a new organization—the “Headquarters for Defending the Square” (HDS)—and it quickly constituted committees for finance, liaison, information, secretariat, and resources as well as action-teams for food and water distribution, medical care, picketing, and security.

Two of the original hunger strike conspirators, Wu'er Kaixi and Wang Dan, were among the most upset by Chai Ling’s ascendance to sole possession of such exalted status, particularly since they had not been present at that meeting. The next day, they insisted that leadership should be reconstituted. After a new standing committee again selected Chai Ling as chair, the first task they undertook was to set up a security perimeter. Activists cordoned off their inner circles, this time with transparent fishing line held by trusted students who kept even the most ardent citizen-supporters from reaching the increasingly isolated and arrogant leadership.

To counteract their marginalization, ASU representatives along with Qinghua University students set up a second broadcasting center (with its own security guards). “The Voice of the Student Movement.” This new station’s amplification was much more powerful and competed with HDS. Needless to say, the two had poor relations. More than $100,000 in donations had been raised to support the student movement, but Chai Ling controlled much of it, as did Beida’s ASU, which had come to act independently of the citywide ASU.

On May 16, speaking on behalf of the party’s Central Committee, Zhao Ziyang sought compromise and publicly called student protests “positive” and “patriotic.” He promised no prosecutions if they would simply leave. Despite the government’s generous offer, no one accepted it. On that fourth day of the hunger strike, about 200 of the 3,100 participants fainted. Demonstrations continued and more than 300,000 people marched in sympathy. On both May 17 and 18, more than a million people attended protests. Hunger strikers continually fainted despite being fed intravenously. Unconstrained by party directives, media reported sympathetically at the same time that journalists publicly insisted, “No more lies.” A rising number of workers congregated in the square. People sang, “We Shall Overcome” for the assembled throng of foreign reporters—as many as a thousand strong—who were in Beijing for Gorbachev’s visit but spent the bulk of their time covering the “story of their lives” in Tiananmen Square. Whether delirious from the hunger strike or inspired to speak his true motivations, it was at this juncture that leader Wu'er Kaixi uttered his most famous lines: “We want Nike shoes, lots of free time to take on an issue with someone, respect from

While no doubt most hunger strikers were aware of the promise of a hungry, China Television recently revealed another “secret” story. Stockholmer John Pontfret claims to have been a hunger striker. Andrew Higgins of England’s The Changing World said he had been a hunger striker too. His strength because he was a lead Sincere or not, reading the Beida decisions to call off their strike lay in their intentions: “We do not want to promise age. We do not want to promise our motherland is so impoverished; it death is not what we seek. But the to live better, and can make our m to cling to life. As we suffer from health, from our life, in the blood, written, although other of

Already elite and expecting to students excluded from their ranks. Workers in particular were the inner circles of power. In Beijing, prevent ordinary citizens from John Tuananmen, concentric rings of se reached by workers and other north and BAWF both sought to send del clashed them off. According to on “construction workers from the v keep nonstudents out, students: black band or to pin a white flag to themselves from any violence and legality. Some obey their own choosing, but in fact, I continually rebuffed, at least until” struggled to ensure their status was

From the workers’ perspective elite, such as secrecy, exclusivity and privileges, could be found within the already had mattresses to sleep on tents. Student leaders took on workers remained opposed to I including students. While workers, “they had little of the cock collective leadership rather than in student circles.
rof Tiananmen Square government officials due to "exhaustion." she announced the formation of a chairperson. Her new position also in Tiananmen Square acquired with allow activist, Fang Congde, personal access to the station. Thus in a single ged, in effect, a coup d'etat that put rander-in-Chief of the Headquarters mind, the occupation of Tiananmen be "Headquarters for Defending the committees for finance, liaison, informas action-teams for food and water security.

spirators, Wuer Kaixi and Wang Dan, s ascendance to sole possession of had not been present at that meeting, should be reconstituted. After a new ng as chair, the first task they undertak cordoned off their inner circles, I by trusted students who kept even aching the increasingly isolated and J representatives along with Qinghua testing center (with its own security nt. This new station's amplification th HDS. Needless to say, the two had tions had been raised to support the much of it, as did Beida's ASU, which de ASU.

a party's Central Committee, Zhao led student protests "positive" and f they would simply leave. Despitecepted it. On that fourth day of the pants fainting. Demonstrations coned in sympathy. On both May 17 and rosters. Hunger strikers continually nstained by party directives, media tat journalists publicly insisted, "Regatered in the square. People sang, of foreign reporters—as many as Gorbatchev's visit but spent the buke in Tiananmen Square. Whether to speak his true motivations, it was ed his most famous lines: "We want Nike shoes, lots of free time to take our girlfriends to a bar, the freedom to discuss an issue with someone, respect from society."79

While no doubt most hunger strikers were sincere, Wuer apparently was not. Television reports later revealed footage of him eating at a Beijing Hotel, and AP reporter John Pomfret claims to have shared a meal with him during the hunger strike. Andrew Higgins of England's Independent saw him gulping down noodles in the back seat of a car, and Wuer told a friend he "needed to eat to conserve his strength because he was a leader and because he had a heart condition."80 Sincere or not, reading the Beida manifesto in light of students' subsequent decisions to call off their strike leaves me skeptical of their commitment—if not their intentions: "We do not want to die; we want to live, for we are at life's most promising age. We do not want to die; we want to study, to study diligently. Our motherland is so impoverished; it feels as if we are abandoning her to die. Yet death is not what we seek. But if the death of one or a few people can enable more to live better, and can make our motherland prosperous, then we have no right to cling to life. As we suffer from hunger, Papa and Mama, do not grieve; when we part from life, Aunts and Uncles, please do not be sad."81 This plea was not in the words, although other oaths were.

Already elite and expecting to become powerful as they grew older, Beijing students excluded from their ranks in Tiananmen anyone not part of their campuses. Workers in particular were chased off as soon as they sought entry to the inner circles of power. In Beijing, students marched with hands linked to prevent ordinary citizens from joining their "pure" protests. Once they occupied Tiananmen, concentric rings of security prevented their inner circles from being reached by workers and other nonstudents. The Construction Workers Union and BAWF both sought to send delegations for discussions but student marshals chased them off. According to one worker-activist, students locked down on "construction workers from the villages, saying they're convict laborers."82 To keep nonstudents out, students secretly told each other to wear sneakers or a black band or to pin a white flower and school emblem on their clothes. They distanced themselves from any militant resistance—instead emphasizing nonviolence and legality. Some observers took the separation of workers to be of their own choosing, but in fact, they tried to access students leaders and were continually rebuffed, at least until late May.83 Tuned into elite discourse, students struggled to ensure their status within it—and reproduced it within the movement.

From the workers' perspective, many of the same corrupt practices of the elite, such as secrecy, exclusivity, factionalism, struggles for power, and special privileges, could be found within the student movement, whose leaders reportly had mattresses to sleep on and wads of cash from foreign donors in their tents. Student leaders took on absurd titles like "commander-in-chief" while workers remained opposed to hierarchy and let anyone join their meetings—including students. While workers considered themselves the "most advanced class," they had little of the cockiness students exhibited, and they worked with collective leadership rather than under "commanders" who seemed to multiply in student circles.
Most workers of China supported the seven initial student demands. Railway workers reportedly permitted thousands of students to ride the trains to Beijing without money so they could join the movement. During the hunger strike, as many as two hundred thousand students may have flooded into the capital to check on the scene.  

Crime rates for all types of offenses plummeted from mid-April to mid-May in an unprecedented drop. Vegetable vendors kept prices down, despite the opportunity to charge more, because, "At such a time, everybody must have a conscience." As one observer wrote, "The self-organization of the Beijing citizens temporarily ended the 20th-century myth that improvements in the Chinese standard of living had suddenly depoliticized the population, but also disproved, to the permanent discomfiture of our masters everywhere, that the population of one of the largest cities on the planet can organize its affairs without the interference of the government, the state, and any of its institutions."

The students gave protests their start, and their courage inspired others to stand up, yet they were ultimately reform-minded. While students generally supported Deng's market liberalization and wished to see privatization proceed, workers opposed excessive marketization and worried they would lose their jobs and past gains from the planned economy. While people in the streets may have called for an overthrow of the bureaucracy, no major student organization did so. Rather, they wanted dialogue with, and recognition from, the government—which is why the designation student "rebellion" is inappropriate. A rebel feels excluded from power and wants inside, while revolutionaryaries want to destroy the power structures themselves. Students wanted to be part of the reform process that Deng was leading, while workers marched with giant photos of Mao and wanted to oust Deng a third time. At best, students wanted reform; workers wanted revolution.

Farmers were never part of the movement in significant numbers—a reason why it cannot be said that the urban-based movement captured the overwhelming majority of Chinese citizens' loyalty. During the Great Leap Forward, farmers had resisted attempts at collectivization, resulting in severe shortages and famines that killed millions of people. In 1989, a material basis for farmers' political apathy can be found in benefits the countryside received during years of Maoist policy. While Deng's reforms would ultimately lead back to severe city-countrywide economic disparities, in 1989 economic liberalization had yet to severely impact the countryside, and farmers did not rise up against Deng as workers did.

On May 17, believing Zhao's efforts at compromise had failed, Deng authorized martial law. Although Li Peng believed any further exhibition of regime weakness would have handed the country over to the students, he scheduled a meeting with students for May 18. Only on that morning did students receive word that government officials would meet them at 11:00 a.m., and they hastily assembled a delegation that included meeting in the Great Hall of the People autonomous organizations since Li to face with student leaders. Nonetheless, Li Peng lectured the hunger strikers by: "Although students finally got Li Wuer Kaidi (who at that moment did the proceedings, castigated Li Peng contempt: "We don't have much time. Let's get to the main you who invited us—and you were camera, a medical team rushed in grabbed his oxygen bag, Wuer up, public, a talent he availed himself.

At 5:00 a.m., on May 19, Party an early morning visit. He tearful to no avail. That was the very last he reached. After his visit, autograph from public view. He did not allow memoirs were published in 2009. On the time, no one knew exactly wath Li Peng's hard line was the public thought about the political affairs, the People's Congress of the Central C the 1989 movement in Tibet, Hu Jintao.

From Martial Law to the Bloods
On the afternoon of May 19, as Bejiing Gorbachev, word spread that Chai Ling called an emergency v White security prevented Wuer K hunger strike, a message they brought of hunger strikers to discuss the heard the announcement, they did eight schools gathered, an r force to check their credentials, some 80 percent vo of representatives didn't really a had already announced an end gates insisted the strike would student leaders were split into 17 students from campuses outside 2
an initial student demands. Railway students to ride the trains to Beijing. During the hunger strike, as 
y they have flooded the campus to face the students and the People's Daily with bananas and potatoes, and 
ever had agreed to a two-day strike a rates for all types of offenses plummeted.8 Vegetable vendors 
charge more, because, "At such a 
As one observer wrote, "The self 
sub feelings of committees that organ 
sing of thousands of students and 
ists, printed and distributed public 
Western myth that improvements in 
y depoliticized the population, but 
time of our masters everywhere, that 
the planet can organize its affairs 
state, and any of its institutions,“ and 
their courage inspired others 
reminded. While students generally 
ished to see privatization proceed, 
worried they would lose their jobs 
while people in the streets may have 
o major student organization did so 
ision from the government—which 
appropriate. A rebel feels excluded 
ionaries want to destroy the power 
part of the reform process that Deng 
nt photos of Mao and wanted to oust 
reform; workers wanted revolution. 
nt in significant numbers—a reason 
ovement captured the overwhelming 
the Great Leap Forward, farmers had 
ng in severe shortages and famines 
ial basis for farmers' political 
did receive during years of Maoist 
ly lead back to severe city-country 
liberalization had yet to severely 
se up against Deng as workers did. 
romise had failed, Deng authorized 
any further exhibition of regime 
ver to the students, he scheduled a 
that morning did students receive 
1:30 a.m., and they hastily 
assembled a delegation that included many celebrity leaders. Televised live, the 
meeting in the Great Hall of the People provided de facto recognition of student 
autonomous organizations since Li Peng, the top government official, met face- 
to-face with student leaders. Nonetheless, the encounter failed miserably. Li Peng 
sharply lectured the hunger strikers and insisted the party "would not stand idly 
" Although students finally got the nationally televised meeting they sought, 
Wu'er Kaixi (who at that moment did not represent anyone but himself) took over 
the proceedings, castigated Li Peng for being late, and treated him with utmost 
contempt: "We don't have much time to listen to you. Thousands of hunger 
strikers are waiting. Let's get to the main point. It was we who invited you to talk, 
not you who invited us—and you were late." Seconds later and plainly visible on 
camera, a medical team rushed in to rescue an apparently fainting Wu'er as he 
grabbed his oxygen bag. Wu'er apparently had a knack for "strategic fainting" in 
public, a talent he availed himself of more than once.29

At 5:00 a.m. on May 19, Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang paid students 
an early morning visit. He tearfully called for students to evacuate Tiananmen, 
to no avail. That was the very last moment when a compromise could have been 
reached. After his visit, autograph hunters mobbed Zhao before he disappeared 
from public view. He did not comment on the events until his posthumous 
memories were published in 2009. Clearly a split in the party had occurred, but 
at the time, no one knew exactly why. In retrospect, Zhao Ziyang was forced to resign 
and Li Peng's hard line was upheld. Within a year, Jiang Zemin (who, as mayor 
of Shanghai, had skillfully defused protests in 1986 and subsequently purged 
the newspaper World Economic Herald) replaced Zhao on the standing committee of the Politburo and as general secretary of the central secretariat. By March 1990, 
Jiang was also chairperson of the Central Military Commission of the National 
People's Congress of the Central Committee.29 The man who led the repression 

From Martial Law to the Bloodshed of June 4
On the afternoon of May 19, as Beijing emptied of the foreign media that accompa 
nied Gorbachev, word spread that a massive government crackdown was coming. 
Chai Ling called an emergency meeting of her headquarters in the command bus. 
While security prevented Wu'er Kaixi from attending, the group voted to end 
the hunger strike, a message they broadcast without bothering to wait for hundreds 
of hunger strikers to discuss the matter. When hunger-striking students finally 
heard the announcement, they demanded reconsideration of the issue. Delegates 
from eighty schools gathered, and it took more than an hour for Chai Ling's security 
force to check their credentials. Finally, when the meeting was allowed to 
commence, some 80 percent voted to continue the strike. By that time, the vote of 
representatives didn't really make much difference. Chai Ling's headquarters 
had already announced an end to the strike. The democratic gathering of del 
egates insisted the strike would continue. The BASSU called for unity, while 
the student leaders were split into bitterly divided factions. So frustrated were 
students from campuses outside Beijing by being excluded from decision-making
in Tiananmen that they eventually called a meeting in front of the Museum of History and formed their own organization, the Outside-Beijing Autonomous Student Federation.

With martial law imminent, students began drifting away, but BAWF called for a one-day general strike to begin the next day. In a widely distributed handbill that first appeared at 9:30 on the morning of the May 19, BAWF exhorted workers to use 'vehicles from every work unit to block main transportation arteries and subway exits, and to ensure the normal operations of the China Central Television and China Central Broadcasting stations.' Amazingly, they were able to persuade the All China Federation of Trade Unions, which had donated 100,000 yuan—about $25,000—to join in the call for a general strike for May 20.26

On the evening of May 19, in a televised solo encore, Li Peng declared "chaos" in the capital and promised "resolute and decisive measures." The very next morning, with Zhao Zhongzhi, unable to stop him, Li signed the martial law order and sent tens of thousands of troops into the city. It was one thing to declare martial law and another to enforce it. Party leaders ordered troops into Beijing, but the army refused to fire on mobilized citizens who peacefully blocked them with every available means. The army took over major media outlets like Central Television and Radio, Xinhua News Agency, and People's Daily, thereby ending mass media expression of opinion to protest martial law—and squelching reports of soldiers who promised not to use force. No more photos of conversing soldiers and citizens would be published in major media outlets. When soldiers tried to approach Tiananmen Square, however, they discovered that thousands of citizens had erected barricades all around its outskirts using everything from city buses and construction cranes to dumpsters and construction equipment. Responding to the call of BAWF, the people of Beijing had come to rescue their young people. As Jan Wong described the scene: "Elders lay down in front of tanks. School children swarmed around convoys, stopping them in their tracks. After the first tense night, the soldiers began to retreat as the crowds cheered and applauded. Some bystanders flashed the V sign. Others wept, and so did some of the soldiers. One commander shouted, "We are the people's soldiers. We will never suppress the people." Subsequent reports told of the commanding general of the Thirty-Eighth Army refusing to obey orders to move on the capital, requiring Deng to summon the Twenty-Seventh Army from Hebei province. 77 Troops arrived in Beijing from Chengdu, Shenyang, and Jinan.

On May 20, popular forms of dual power emerged to contest the government's authority. Autonomous organized groups of protesters formed in factories and government work units, police precincts, hotels, law courts, CCP organs and youth groups, government ministries (including at least eight national government agencies), official media agencies, and university departments.59 Contingents of "Flying Tigers" motorcyclists reported on troop movements. China's only two living Army Field Marshals praised public students' patriotism. Seven other generals—including a former minister of defense and a veteran of the Long March—circulated a statement that over one hundred senior officers signed calling on the army not to resist Standing Committee circ to repeal martial law.60 BAWF relied on ASU that invoked the memory working class thank these students of them. History will remember the We will use our bodies to protect th others. We will build another Wall of I For forty-eight hours, hundres blocked the army. People fed th movements, sang songs for them, and implored them to be on the side of Social Science called on the gove of the National People's Congress six hundred colleges and technical million students. In Shanghai, 65 students, and in Xian some three With victory inspiring them thousands of Beijing's citizens re blocked renewed army attempts f all over China, people mobilized, In Hong Kong on May 21, TABLE 1 the protests.

As people continued to bloc BAWF distributed an open letter
meeting in front of the Museum of fine arts held in the Outside-Beijing Autonomous
region drifting away, but BAWF called the May 29, BAWF exhorted workers to main transportation arteries and stations of the China Central Television
Amazingly, they were able to persuade, which had donated 100,000 in the call for a general strike for
son encore, Li Peng decreed “chaos” decisive measures.” The very next
rum, Li signed the martial law order for the city. It was one thing to declare
leaders ordered troops into Beijing, izes who peacefully blocked them at major media outlets like Central
and People’s Daily, thereby ending martial law—and squelching reports of more photos of confronting soldiers
more media outlets. When soldiers tried to discover how the 100s of ists using everything from
outskirts using everything from fences and construction equipment of Beijing had come to rescue their
case: “Elderly women lay down in and convos, stopping them in their
ers began to retreat as the crowds shed the V sign. Others wept, and so said, “We are the people’s soldiers.
quant reports told of the commanding to obey orders to move on the
Seventh Army from Hebei prov-
Shenyang, and Jinan.
ver emerged to contest the govern-
rousps of protesters formed in facto-
hotels, law courts, CCP organs
cluding at least eight national
ies, and university departments.
its reported on troop movements.
praised publicly students’ patriot-
mother of defense and a veteran at over one hundred senior officers
signed calling on the army not to open fire on people.” The National People’s
Congress Standing Committee circulated a petition for an emergency meeting to
repeal martial law. BAWF released a joint statement with hunger strikers and ASU that invoked the memory of the Paris Commune: “We members of the
working class thank these students and think the Chinese nation should be proud
of them. History will remember them. Tiananmen Square will be our battlefield.
We will use our bodies to protect the students, hunger strikers, and sit-in protesters. We will build another Wall of the Communards with our life’s blood.”

For forty-eight hours, hundreds of thousands of Beijing citizens peacefully
blocked the army. People fed the soldiers, passed them cases of liquid refresh-
ments, sang songs for them, and bought them popsicles and flowers—as they
imposed them to be on the side of the people. A banner at the Chinese Academy of
Social Science called on the government to resign and for an emergency session of the
National People’s Congress to be convened. In more than eighty cities at
six hundred colleges and technical universities, protests involved more than 2.8
million students. In Shanghai, half a million people marched in support of the
students, and in Xian some three hundred thousand people mobilized.

With victory inspiring them and giving them new confidence, hundreds of
thousands of Beijing’s citizens remained at the barricades on May 21 and 22
and blocked renewed army attempts to reach Tiananmen Square. As Beijing held out,
all over China, people mobilized, including four hundred thousand who marched in
Hong Kong on May 21. Table 5.3 offers an indication of the national scope of
the protests.

As people continued to block troops from entering the center of the city,
BAWF distributed an open letter on May 21 calling for an indefinite general strike
and insisting workers, "as the most advanced class," should form the "backbone" of resistance. So popular was their growing leadership that in the two weeks from May 20 to June 3, some twenty thousand Beijing workers signed their names to membership rolls. They set up an office to interface with factories, campuses, and grassroots groups. By the end of May, they had printed a daily newspaper, broadcast stations in the square, picket corps, and "dare-to-die" security brigades ready to fight police incursions, and a constitution specifying a general assembly, standing committee, and executive committee.

Beginning on May 20, they organized autonomous daily demonstrations and worked in tandem with the array of groups protesting martial law. They called for work stoppages to maintain its own self-organization, lest authorities invent a pretext to intervene by force. In Beijing, workers at Capital Steel Corporation, construction workers, Beijing Citizens Dare-to-Die Corps, and the Flying Tigers Motorcycle Brigade (with about three hundred members) formed. In China's northeast, the Manchurian Tigers Dare-to-Die Corps and Mountain Dare-to-Die Corps were similarly organized along autonomous lines. Among writers, the Beijing Union of Intellectuals was established, attributed by one Western observer to be the "first such autonomous sign of a civil society since the 1940s." On May 23, BAWF helped form a new confederation of all autonomous groups, including workers, intellectuals, citizens, and several student groups. As the student movement receded, workers took the initiative to form autonomous federations across China—in Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton, Xian, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Shenyang, Cumiing, Lanzhou, Guiyang, Changsha, and Xining. In this period, many other organizations formed, but none more potentially important than one formed on May 23, which sought comprehensively to unify all opposition currents. They called themselves the Joint Conference of All Persons of All Circles in Beijing and included about forty representatives of workers, intellectuals, and students. A series of meetings beginning on May 20 included BASU activists, members of the Outside Beijing Autonomous Student Federation, individual activists like Wang Dan, BAWF members, older intellectual-activists from the 1976 and 1978 movements as well as representatives of all autonomous groups, a pot the group resolved to meet daily to obey the decisions of the Joint Conf. More as advisors than leaders, Wh inghouse and decision-making body helped set up a "student parliament and herself as chair.

As movement leaders huddled arrived from Hunan, Mao's body threw bags of ink at the Chariot and immediately grabbed the trio (a sc newspaper editor) and turned them ranging from sixteen years for the By 2006, all were released after se. Here is just one example of betrayal movement. Yesterday "even the th but today, the student security team police, "Betrayal" and "sabotage" e activists. Some students went to th soldiers under the orders of self for day took place at the loudspeakers attempt was made on Chai Ling an and his cronies tried more than h. her rivals, Chai Ling declared: "I a promise, resist these traitors." She will see in Thailand in 1992, a sing leadership of the movement out of organizational representatives, Li to propel himself into the center, tendencies, these demagogical po attention and made stardom into. Still the citizens of Beijing try to clear the streets, the govern if anything was possible. On May that Zhao Ziyang was technica Committee. Some one hundred t Square took to chanting, "Step do its long process of reorganizing dwindled, and the revived group and media stars who made main diction, "troops will successfully
movements as well as representatives of the Federation of Intellectuals. The group grew rapidly in size. On May 22, even representatives from the Hong Kong Student Union attended, but Chai Ling refused to come. By bringing together representatives of all autonomous groups, a potential Commune was created. The next day, the group resolved to meet daily at noon. They asserted that everyone should obey the decisions of the Joint Conference, but many students thought of them more as advisors than leaders. While they attempted to create a central clearinghouse and decision-making body, others talked of multiple centers transferring power and parallel "command" structures. Acting independently, Chai Ling helped set up a "student parliament" with representatives from each campus—and herself as chair.

As movement leaders huddled in seemingly endless meetings, three citizens arrived from Hunan, Mao’s home province. As soon as they had a chance, they threw bags of ink at the Chairman’s giant portrait. The Dare-to-Die Squad immediately grabbed the trio (a schoolteacher, a factory worker, and a town newspaper editor) and turned them over to police. (They later received sentences ranging from sixteen years for the worker to life in prison for the schoolteacher. By 2006, all were released after serving from ten to more than sixteen years.) Here is just one example of betrayal of the incredible sense of community in the movement. Yesterday “even the thieves were on strike for the common good,” but today, the student security team turned overtly freshly arrived activists to the police. “Betrayal” and “sabotage” emerged as words employed to describe fellow activists. Some students went to the train station and recruited new arrivals as soldiers under the orders of self-appointed commanders. Three or four “coup” per day took place at the loudspeaker broadcasting stations; at least one kidnap attempt was made on Chai Ling and Feng Congde by other activists; one student and his cronies tried more than half a dozen times to seize power. Referring to her rivals, Chai Ling declared: “I am the commander in chief. I must resist compromise, resist these traitors.” She called for overthrow of the government. As we will see in Thailand in 1992, a single individual, Chamlong, was also able to take leadership of the movement out of the hands of a more democratic committee of organizational representatives. Like Chai Ling, Chamlong used a hunger strike to propel himself into the center. Circumventing and marginalizing democratic tendencies, these demagogical politicians turned personal charisma into media attention and made stardom into power.

Still the citizens of Beijing blocked the streets. Unable to deploy its military to clear the streets, the government hesitated. For a moment, it seemed as if anything was possible. On May 25, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained that Zhao Ziyang was technically still general secretary of the Party’s Central Committee. Some hundred thousand workers and students in Tiananmen Square took to chanting, "Step down Li Peng!" That same day, the ASU completed its long process of reorganizing itself. Its massive student base had considerably dwindled, and the revived group worked in the shadows of the hunger strikers and media stars who made major decisions. For his part, Li Peng publicly predicted, "troops will successfully impose martial law."
On May 26, BAWF wrote to all Chinese abroad: “Our nation was created from the struggle and labor of worker and all other mental and manual laborers. We are the rightful masters of this nation. We should be, indeed must be, heard in national affairs. We absolutely must not allow this small handful of degenerate scum of the nation and working class to usurp our name and suppress the students, murder democracy, and trample human rights.” Another of their public statements exhorted Chinese people to “storm this twentieth-century Bastille, this last stronghold of Stalinism!” Immediately, international networks mobilized. Organizers in Hong Kong threw a racetrack benefit concert and raised millions more dollars on May 27. Tents and supplies arrived that very night in Beijing, along with wads of cash. Almost immediately, a dispute broke out among student leaders about who should control the funds. Final agreement was reached to share them, with Chai Ling openly insisting she should control the largest share.

Chai Ling finally joined the daily meetings of the Joint Conference. On May 27, after an especially long discussion from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., a unanimous decision was reached to leave Tiananmen on May 30, the tenth day of martial law. Delegates called a unified press conference and announced their decision to leave. Little did they know that Chai Ling’s assembly of two to three hundred university representatives later voted at their nightly meeting by over 80 percent to stay. However painstakingly the Joint Conference decision had been made, it was overruled by Chai Ling’s “student parliament.” Once again, movement leaders released self-contradictory statements. While Wu Er and Wang announced people’s intentions to leave, Chai Ling insisted she had changed her mind, that the hunger strikers would stay. While many people may have thought about it, no one seriously proposed that their group abandon their comrades illegally occupying the square. Many individuals, however, simply voted with their feet and left. On May 29, some thirty thousand students departed by train from Beijing while only 150 entered; by the end of the month, many campuses had returned to quiet.

As the number of people remaining in Tiananmen dwindled, students sent outreach teams to recruit new constituencies. One of them went to Daxing County, where they were attacked and jailed by local police. Unable to get the arrestees released, students approached BAWF for help on May 28, and a contingent of workers consisting of at least six trucks and a motorcycle contingent was dispatched to Daxing. They confronted local officials, but were unable to get the students released, so they returned to Tiananmen. Two days later, police in Beijing responded to the incursion into Daxing by arresting three BAWF leaders, among them Shen Youqian, and eleven Flying Tigers motorcyclists. Hearing the grim news, Han Dongfang and some thirty workers went to the Ministry of Public Security and demanded the prisoners be freed. Refusing to comply, the authorities insisted BAWF was an illegal organization and refused to negotiate with anyone other than students. Several thousand people gathered, yet officials would not relent. The next day, however, BAWF organized a press conference for foreign media, a sit-in at the ministry, and a demonstration in Tiananmen; the police suddenly freed all the arrested. When we compare this treatment of workers with the fact that no student April 15 to June 4, we begin to get an idea of the two groups.

Not only did the authorities within the movement, the line divvied up indelible ink. The same day workers expressed their desire to call for a movement, and you have to obey it. Some workers felt, “By the end, at the students anymore. . . . We deem government but the students would crusade, stupid, reckless, and unah activists did, in fact, reach out to teams to Capital Steel to encourage ASU gave some funds to BAWF. Students were tant enough to share the spotlight. After the Daxing action, as B declined, student leaders finally designated the main part of the square—a ban on movement “true.”

Comparing the organizations included that students were far more by and large unable to build their own factories. The newly for and skeletal, involving a small minority facilitated by free train rides also blessed with sympathetic movement. Beijing students were Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xian, technologies like fax machines could control. From 1978 to 1987 than doubled, and photocopy was strata of literati around universities.

Flush with funds, ASU men Academy of Fine Arts and commotion scheduled for May 30. All principle, but they insisted on the of the Statue of Liberty in New days earlier. Such a copy seemed was raised that a mere copy of notions of creativity, so they pro bands holding aloft a torch. One adjusting such a model based on Muhina, whose monumental sc had adorned the top of the USSF
abroad: "Our nation was created from a handful of destitute workers. We should be, indeed must be, heard."

Another of their public demonstrations was held on May 30, the tenth day of the conference and announced their "student parliament." Once again, students assembled by the thousands. Two days later, police in protective gear arrested three BAWF leaders, and two motorcyclists. Hearing the news, students went to the Ministry of Public Security to protest, then gathered to negotiate with officials. BAWF organized a press conference and a demonstration in Tiananmen Square. Finally, agreement was reached that the student leaders would be released. The movements seemed to have outlived their usefulness.

Not only did the authorities see students as workers in different lights, within the movement, the line dividing them may as well have been written in indelible ink. The same day workers had been asked to help in Daxing, the BAWF expressed their desire to call for a strike, but students told them, "This is our movement, and you have to obey us." Without the consensus needed for action, some workers felt, "By the end, after May 28, we didn't advocate sympathy for the students anymore.... We demanded to participate in the dialogue with the government, but the students wouldn't let us. They considered us workers to be rude, stupid, reckless, and unable to negotiate." Many individual campus activists did, in fact, reach out to factory workers. Shida has sent as many as five teams to Capital Steel to encourage autonomous workers organizations, and ASU gave some funds to BAWF.110 Student leaders, on the other hand, were reluctant to share the spotlight with each other—let alone with common citizens. After the Daxing action, as BAWF grew distant and the number of students declined, student leaders finally eased their prohibition on workers entering the main part of the square—a ban initially enacted to keep students' democracy movement "pure."111

Comparing the organizations of students and workers, many observers concluded that students were far more developed: "In contrast to students, workers were by and large unable to build effective autonomous organizations within their own factories. The newly formed municipal federations were at best small and skeletal, involving a small minority of workers."112 Students enjoyed mobility facilitated by free train rides (courtesy of railroad workers) and they were also blessed with sympathetic media coverage that helped spread their movement. Beijing students were sighted in universities and colleges in Harbin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xi'an, and Changsha. Students also adapted new technologies like fax machines faster than the regime's repressive apparatus could control.113 From 1978 to 1987, the number of telephone lines had more than doubled, and photocopy machines became widely available—at least to the strata of literati around universities.

Flush with funds, ASU members contacted students at Beijing's Central Academy of Fine Arts and commissioned them to create a statue by the demonstration scheduled for May 30. About fifteen undergraduate art majors agreed in principle, but they insisted on reworking the ASU proposal for a larger version of the Statue of Liberty in New York—"as had been unveiled in Shanghai a few days earlier. Such a copy seemed too "pro-American." An additional objection was raised that a mere copy of an existing work did not resonate with artists' notions of creativity, so they proposed a more difficult figure, a statue with two hands holding aloft a torch. One of the students had fortunately been working on adapting such a model based upon one produced by Russian female artist Vera Mukhina, whose monumental sculpture "A Worker and a Collective Farm Woman" had adorned the top of the USSR's pavilion at the 1937 Paris World's Fair."
While the ASU worked on the statue as a means to draw people back to Tiananmen, Chai Ling scheduled a secret interview with journalist Philip Cunningham, during which she admitted, "What we actually hoped for was bloodshed. Only when the square is awash with blood will people open their eyes." Maintaining she "did not care if people say I'm selfish," Chai Ling called for people to "overthrow the illegal government of Li Peng." On May 28, the World Bank suspended negotiations with China for further loans. At dusk on May 29, fewer than ten thousand students remained in the square. No one could yet tell in which direction the country was headed. Some feared chaos, others authoritarianism.

On May 30, the arrival of the thirty-foot-high Goddess of Democracy brought a fresh attraction to the square, enticing some three hundred thousand viewers to review the installation over the next forty-eight hours. Whether thought to be Guanyin, the Statue of Liberty, or a synthesis of the two, the sculpture enlivened the dismal scene and brought new hope to people. By Friday, June 2, the square seemed almost to have recovered when a new hunger strike by four people, including rock star, Hau Dejian, had a large impact, and Tiananmen again filled. The new hunger strikers released a statement that was highly critical of "internal chaos" of students' organizations, "Their theories call for democracy," they wrote, "but their handling of specific problems is not democratic." The end was near, and even injecting new celebrity energy could not hold it off much longer.

During the night of June 2, troops began to infiltrate Beijing. Before dawn, people blocked troops and overturned trucks. Hundreds of soldiers were surrounded, some beaten and others arrested by people. A little after noon on June 3, troops used tear gas on protesters who had captured an ammunition truck near the southwest corner of Zhongnanhai, but the crowd refused to disperse. The army again tried to enter Tiananmen Square from the Great Hall of the People. Some came out of tunnels under the Great Hall, and engaged in a singing contest with demonstrators using versions of "Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China." At day's end, those troops went back into the Great Hall. While many people celebrated their victory, still believing that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would not fire on people, a full-scale military assault was underway.

Around 5:00 p.m., BAWF started to distribute weapons (steel chains, clubs, cleavers, and sharpened bamboo poles). They organized people to break down a wall at a construction site in Xidan to take beans and bricks to use for self-defense. That evening in the working-class area of Muxidi, west of Tiananmen, huge crowds blocked lightly armed troops who tried to advance. As stones flew, breaking some of their fiberglass helmets, heavily armed soldiers of the Thirty-Eighth Army behind them opened up with their AK-47s. In the ensuing confusion of battle, many people were killed, including soldiers of the Thirty-Eighth Army who were crushed to death by armored units of the Twenty-Seventh Army.

Resistance was massive and militant. Assaults were reported on seven separate troop formations during the night of June 3. As army units began fighting their way into the center of the city, people gathered at intersections on Changan Avenue. Amid disbelief that troops were using live ammunition, pitched battles involving barricades, stones, and Molotovs along Changan Avenue. Around troops fired volley after volley. Ambulances, and pedicab drivers ferried the injured and tried to drive buses into the assembly of gunfire. Citizens swarmed hospitals for donors.

As the soldiers reached Tiannamen their first assault was on the West central meeting point. About five uncontrollably, other singing, remembrance. People's Heroes, Workers gathered in knaves on the monument and that nowhere in sight, having left a sign on the front of the building along the southern side.

At dawn on June 4, Tiananmen was a sea of flowers. A crowd of citizens took to the streets to protest the Peking government. "Rioters swarmed at Liebukou and snatched machinery Dongdan and in the Tiannamen area and beaten. On the Liangmao a severely beaten." The mayor was hit by flingsgong of some we Department of the CCP Central (Ministry of Radio, Film, and Tele the "Federation of Autonomous W and overthrow the government," the soldiers and police in five different taken in Hugosi. A police ambulance inside was beaten to death and damage to 1,280 police cars, 13,000 helmets, and buses. At Shuan machine guns from armored cars.

Many reports of mutineers in the east of Xidan intersection, w in Fuchengmen, a soldier's corps. In Changwemen, a soldier was overpass, while people cheered. Near the Capital Cinema on West shot four people. The crowd became angry, and hung him on a car.

In many cities, people fought out, reports filtered out of Beijing were posted in several cities, In-
involving barricades, stones, and Molotovs versus the armed military were fought all along Changan Avenue. Around 13:30 in the morning, fighting intensified as troops fired volley after volley. Ambulances raced to hospitals as quickly as they could, and pedicab drivers ferried many wounded as well. Around 2:30, someone tried to drive a bus into the assembled soldiers, only to be stopped by a volley of gunfire. Citizens swarmed hospitals to donate blood as soon as the call went out for donors.

As the soldiers reached Tiananmen Square, at least one report tells that their first assault was on the Western reviewing stand where the BAWF had its central meeting point.122 About five thousand students, many of them crying uncontrollably, other singing, remained crouched around the Monument to the People’s Heroes. Workers grew angry with students who broke captured guns and knives on the monument rather than use them to fight the military. Chai Ling was nowhere in sight, having left around 3:30 a.m.123 At about 4:45 a.m., students took a vote and decided to leave. Twenty minutes later, they filed out peacefully along the southern side.

At dawn on June 4, Tiananmen was in the hands of the army. As the city awoke, outraged citizens took to the streets. Around 7:00 a.m., according to Beijing’s mayor, “Rioters swarmed over military vehicles which had been halted at Liaobou and snatched machine guns and ammunition. From Jiangwomen to Dongdan and in the Tianning area, martial law troops were cut off, surrounded, and beaten. On the Jiangwomen flyover, some troops were stripped and others severely beaten.”124 The mayor went on to claim that soldiers were so badly beaten around Huafanggao that some were blinded. “Mobst attacked the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, the Great Hall of the People, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, and two gates of Zhongnanhai, while the “Federation of Autonomous Workers’ Unions” urged people to “take up arms and overthrow the government.” The mayor’s report details “bestial” attacks on soldiers and police in five different locations. He claims submachine guns were taken in Huosi. A police ambulance was stopped and one of the eight injured soldiers inside was beaten to death. The intensity of the fighting resulted in arson and damage to 1,280 police cars, military vehicles (including 60 armored personnel carriers), and buses. At Shuangjing Intersection, insurgents took twenty-three machine guns from armored cars the crowd had stopped.125

Many reports of mutilations of soldiers’ corpses were made, including to the east of Xidan intersection, where a soldier was killed and his body burned; in Fuchengmen, a soldier’s corpse was hung in midair near where he was killed; in Chongwenmen, a soldier was burned alive and his corpse suspended from an overpass, while people cheered and described it as “lighting a heavenly lantern.” Near the Capital Cinema on West Chang an Avenue, platoon leader Liu Guogeng shot four people. The crowd beat him to death, burned and disemboweled his corpse, and hung him on a burning bus.

In many cities, people fought the military takeover. Despite the media blackout, reports filtered out of Beijing. Faxes from Hong Kong portraying the massacre were posted in several cities, including Shenyang and Shanghai.126 In Chengdu,
violent resistance was crushed. In Hangzhou at 2:00 p.m. on June 4, throngs attacked the railroad station and tied up traffic. Fighting there continued until June 7 as people put wood, rocks, and steel on the tracks to block traffic. Sit-ins at major intersections blocked traffic, and a contingent of art students lowered the national flag on the provincial government building. Acts of heroism abounded, most famously by Beijing’s anonymous “tank man”—a citizen who stared down a tank column and held them off on June 5. In Nanjing, ten thousand people marched to mourn the killings in Beijing. In Shanghai, after a train ran over protesters occupying the tracks, killing six people and wounding others, people set fire to train cars and tied up railway traffic for hours.

Overall, the army remained firmly under the control of the government, although in an unknown number of cases, soldiers refused to obey orders. General Xu Qinxiang, Commander of the Chinese Thirty-Eighth Army, was subsequently court-martialed for a failure to carry out martial law orders; on June 4, Beijing’s deputy military commander was relieved of authority. On June 6 and 7, army units reportedly fought each other, but the government’s forces overwhelmed and crushed all opposition. More than one hundred PLA officers were later charged with having “breached discipline in a serious manner,” and 1,400 enlisted men were found to have thrown their weapons and run away in the final hours.

The Aftermath of the Uprising
Initial government reports about the crackdown maintained that a total of 300 soldiers and civilians were killed and seven thousand injured. Yet over the years, estimates of the number of people killed ranged to 1,000 or more. On behalf of the government, Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong counted several dozen soldiers and police killed and 6,000 wounded. Among civilians, he tabulated 200 killed—including 36 college students who lost their son to the violence, closest relatives of deceased persons. At the end of June 200 people who had been sentenced to death, Ding passed on.

Hundreds of known activists proceeded step-by-step. By June taken into custody. Two days later yet for all the difficulties endure repressive power came down on damaging tools in Shanghai, which burned train cars, were executed 2,500. Two “rioters” in Chengdu as ten thousand people being do.

In video testimony from students sleeping in their tents while they set the final Western media reports.
ou at 2:00 p.m. on June 4, through traffic. Fighting there continued until the tracks to block traffic. Sit-ins at prominent art students lowered the riding. Acts of heroism abounded, "a citizen who stared down a man"—a citizen who stared down a man. In Nanjing, ten thousand people

Shanghai, after a train ran over people and wounding people, people set or hours.

under the control of the government, soldiers refused to obey orders. Those Thirty-Eighth Army, was sub-

out martial law orders; on June 4, believed of authority. On June 6 and 7, the government's forces overwhelmed an hundred PLA officers were later serious manner," and 1,400 enlisted is and run away in the final hours. 179

own maintained that a total of 300 thousand injured, yet over the died ranged to 1,000 or more. On Xitong counted several dozen sol-

Among civilians, he tabulated 200 killed—including 36 college students—and 3,000 wounded. 114 One of the mothers who lost her son to the violence, Professor Ding Zilin, spent years locating the closest relatives of deceased people. By mid-1995, her list included more than 130 names. At the end of June 2006, Ding and a group of relatives of the deceased named 186 people who had been killed. Although the government has yet to compensate the dead, Ding passed on financial help from abroad to bereaved families.

Hundreds of known activists were arrested in major cities as the crackdown proceeded step by step. By June 11, more than one thousand people had been taken into custody. Two days later, a wanted list for student leaders was released, yet for all the difficulties endured by student activists, the brunt of the state's repressive power came down on workers. On June 15, three workers convicted of damaging tools in Shanghai received death sentences, and on June 21, three who burned train cars were executed. 132 By July 5, the number of arrested reached 2,500. Two "rioters" in Chengdu were sentenced to death. Estimates were as high as ten thousand people being detained.

In video testimony from Hong Kong, Chai Ling told of tanks running over students sleeping in their tents in Tiananmen Square, after which troops doused them with gasoline and set them afire. The story was false. 113 Contrary to continual Western media reports, careful examination of video and eyewitness
testimony reveals that no students were killed in Tiananmen Square. Most of the killings took place in the working-class suburbs on the outskirts of Beijing. While many people blamed Li Peng, in a subsequent posthumous memoir, Zhao Ziyang maintained Deng Xiaoping ordered the crackdown on protesters without even taking a leadership vote. In the fall of 1989, a new law mandated that all Beijing University students must undergo one year of military training before entering college, and the entering class was cut from two thousand to eight hundred. All together in the country, some thirty thousand enrollments in humanities and social sciences were axed before the end of 1990.

One of the few surviving vehicles for public expression of protest sentiment was modern art, whose surge continued after 1989. With the success of Deng’s market oriented reforms, commercialization tainted the art scene. Late in 1992, with market opportunities in Hong Kong, a third wave emerged. Ironically appropriating socialist realist images and slogans, artists were able to subvert serious state art. Mixing Cultural Revolution images with Western consumer script, Wang Guangyi created “political pop” art with Coca-Cola—fawning tribute to the accomplishments of the 1989 uprising.

China’s Prosperity amid Repression
With the retrospective space of more than two decades, we can today appreciate how close China was to a revolutionary situation in 1989. No one applauds the application of state violence on citizens, yet the government has yet to apologize for its overwhelming use of force. Repression was its line of first defense, but the main thrust of government’s two decade long response to the challenges posed by the uprising has been to provide unparalleled opportunities for prosperity and economic growth. Since 1989, evidence abounds of an increasing number of state enterprise workers and university students becoming members of the CCP. In the decade after the crackdown, ten times as many students joined the party as in the previous decade; in 2011, as many as one-third of all students applied for membership, only slightly less than the 28 percent of graduate students who were already members. More than 8 percent of all students were party members in 2007, compared with less than 1 percent in 1989.

Multiparty democracy and expansion of civil liberties are not yet on the horizon, yet the Chinese system has undergone significant reforms. Within academia, more room has opened for debate and airing of unpopular opinions. Repression has certainly continued. In 2008, Wang Dan—by then a Harvard alumnus—counted three hundred thousand political prisoners in reeducation camps. Compared with more than two million Americans who languish behind bars, China’s poor human rights performance in the eyes of U.S. citizens is strongly indicative of the power of the mass media.

Many reforms have been made to soften the system. By the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, more than half of the Central Committee retired, and an important transition occurred. Officials are now rotated in an attempt to reduce corruption, mandatory retirement by age has been implemented for government authorities, permission was given in one-third of China’s richest cities and intellectuals have been invited to provide advice to top officials. Despite efforts to improve goods and travel options, political intervention and arbitrariness continue to plague the 1980s, official travel privileges required approval centrally allocated.

Of all the changes since 1989, shattering constant economic growth and even amid the IMF crisis of 2001, China’s second fastest GDP growth rate is expected to reach the same level. China is today regarded as a great miracle. With WTO membership in 2001, China’s GDP growth in 2002 to the first half of 2004 is from less than $77 billion trillion. So much money has流出 in Shanghai rose from $100 million of 7,500 percent in just six years—country’s 70 largest cities from 4 to more than 10 percent every mont rise in 2008.

In the process of this phase than three hundred thousand m members or government officials has increased so rapidly that th of the Gini Coefficient (a measure
ed in Tiananmen Square.\(^{138}\) Most of the suburbs on the outskirts of Beijing, sequent posthumous memoir, Zhao 4e crackdown on protesters without that all Beijing University students fore entering college, and the enter-trended. All together in the country, cities and social sciences were axed public expression of protest sentiment in 1989. With the success of Deng's turned the art scene. Late in 1992, third wave emerged.\(^{136}\) Ironically oga's, artists were able to subvert on images with Western consumer art with Coca-Cola—fawning tribute to decades, we can today appreciate the importance. No one applauds the government has yet to apologize was its line of first defense, but the response to the challenges posed by the rising number of people's petitions, the number of petitioners is of growing concern among people's leaders. As many students joined the party as one-third of all students applied for percent of graduate students who of all students were party members 1989.

Of civil liberties are not yet on the to significant reforms. Within and airing of unpopular opinions,\(^{159}\) Wang Dan—by then a Harvard d political prisoners in reeducation million Americans who languish in the eyes of U.S. citizens and media. The system, by the Sixteenth Party Committee reeled, and an impor-tated in an attempt to reduce car-ereen implemented for government authorities, permission was given for entrepreneurs to join the party (resulting in one-third of China's richest citizens being CCP members), and professionals and intellectuals have been integrated into positions of power to provide expert advice to top officials. Despite efforts to curb it, corruption increased after 1989.\(^{144}\) Consumer goods and travel options are more widely available, and the scope of political intervention and arbitrary intrusions in everyday life has decreased. In the 1980s, official clearance from work unit leaders was required to get married; travel privileges required approval from authorities; and even theater tickets were centrally allocated.

Of all of the changes since 1989, the most significant may well be China's astonish-ing economic growth rate. From 1980 to 1996, it was 9.6 percent, and even amid the IMF crisis of 1997, it remained robust at 9.3 percent.\(^{145}\) As shown in Table 5.4, China's double-digit expansion from 2003 to 2006 has continued to propel the country forward. Now the world's second-largest economy, it is expected to reach the same level of output as the United States in 2035.

China is today regarded as another "miracle" in a string of Asian economic miracles. With WTO membership since 2001, the spectacular rise in living standards is due in no small part to export-oriented production for the U.S. market. From 2002 to 2006, China's foreign reserves increased by $354.7 billion.\(^{146}\) From less than $17 billion in 1987, by June 2010 they approached $2.5 trillion.\(^{146}\) So much money has flooded into the country that real estate investment in Shanghai rose from $100 million annually in 1990 to $7.5 billion in 1996—a rise of 7,500 percent in just six years—before climbing to $19 billion in 2002.\(^{146}\) In the country's 70 largest cities from December 2007 to April 2008, housing prices rose more than 30 percent every month before slowly decreasing to only a 5.3 percent rise in August 2008.\(^{146}\)

In the process of this phenomenal growth, seven billionaires and more than three hundred thousand millionaires have been created—most either party members or government officials, or with close ties to them. By 2005, inequality has increased so rapidly that the government stopped releasing its calculation of the Gini Coefficient (a measure of inequality), but it did note that it was higher
than for all developed countries and nearly all developing countries. Before the reform, it stood at 0.20 in cities and slightly higher in rural areas, at 0.22–0.24. By 2002, the national figure had reached 0.434—one of the world’s highest. In 2002, the top 20 percent of the population held 59.3 percent of the country’s wealth, while the bottom 20 percent possessed only 2.8 percent. No significant middle class has yet to be built: the bottom 50 percent of economic strata held only 14.4 percent of wealth, and the bottom 70 percent less than 20 percent.

China’s reputation as the “world’s workshop” was built on the backs of a reserve army of labor of tens of millions—a floating population of more than a hundred million that brought tens of billions of dollars in investments by transnational firms bringing labor-intensive operations with workers paid the “China price.” With working conditions still rivaling those of any underdeveloped country, Chinese laborers suffered 14,625 workers killed on the job in 2003. By contrast, only 1,456 workers were counted as killed on the job in the first nine months of 2008. Unskilled industrial laborers in China make a pitance. Even India paid 50 percent more to its workers than Chinese employers did in 1998—and the United States paid 47.8 times as much, South Korea 12.9 times as much.

While white-collar employees in large cities recorded significant gains in income, the unskilled suffered as the economy grew. Of all the secrets behind the Chinese miracle, the country’s exploitation of its vast pool of unskilled rural emigrants is at the top of the list. Others include imperial exploitation of Xinjiang and Tibet’s vast mineral and oil deposits and their people’s labor; state intervention in currency exchange, which limits international speculators’ power; and an ideology of manufacturing’s primacy, which orients all to production. By guiding investments, China provides another example of East Asian “developmental states”—precisely the kind of government dismantled by the United States in South Korea after the Gwangju Uprising. Finally, a unique feature of China’s demographic transition from 1985 to 2007 was the decline in the number of young people, from a ratio of forty-five children (fifteen years old and younger) per hundred workers in 1985 to only fifteen youths per hundred workers in 2005. The consequent freeing up of financial resources provides a boost to savings and capital outflows. Despite the small number of entry job seekers, in 2009, only half of all graduating college seniors were able to sign contracts for employment by May—meaning at least three million people remained looking for work after finishing college.

**Continuing Resistance and State Incorporation**

Alongside economic growth came a mushrooming of NGOs—or what should be called GONGOs (government-organized NGOs) because of funds received from and links to the state. In 1994, the party granted legal status to private citizens’ groups, and environment groups are one key focal point of those initially formed. While the national government formally calls on local groups to report environmental problems, local authorities are encouraged to accomplish high growth rates—a disincentive to maintain high standards for environmental protection. From 1992 to 2007, more than three hundred thousand NGOs were registered. Unofficially, as many as two million may exist.

**Chinese people’s culture of dissent remains a significant feature of the increasing scope of unrest.**

Other estimates of the number spontaneously surged for development, problem so glaring that the gove of grassroots conflicts involve “Jan Dongzhou” (a coastal town outside the bloodiest confrontation since 1 were taken, the first time for civil wind power plant.

**Can China’s central planning from the cycle of booms and busts**

That may well be the critical quest: As economic prosperity quieted in turn could spark another movement that-China is close to collapse. In 2002, for example, Gordon Chao that the “People’s Republic has in it was Western capitalism that ne China’s Tibetan and Uighur although in both cases, the over Han Chinese favors the government in Tibet began China’s march too

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>74,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: China Ministry of Public Security as noted in Political Change (Cornell University January 2009), as quoted in “Chinese Quietly Takes Protests Every Day.”
Chinese people's culture of direct action and resistance to unjust authority remains a significant feature of the political landscape. Table 5.5 illustrates the increasing scope of unrest.

Other estimates of the number of protests are even higher. Land is routinely usurped for development, whether for golf courses or power plants, a problem so glaring that the government acknowledges that the vast majority of grassroots conflicts involve land enclosures. In 2006, police opened fire in Dongzhou (a coastal town outside Shanwei) and killed as many as thirty people—the bloodiest confrontation since 1989. This was the second time Dongzhou lands were taken, the first time for construction of a coal plant and the second for a wind power plant.

Can China's central planning and control of finance capital keep its economy from the cycle of booms and busts that Western capitalism compels us to endure? That may well be the critical question determining the character of modern China. As economic prosperity quieted many voices from 1989, a major economic downturn could spark another movement for change. Some in the West delude themselves that China is close to collapse, a fate they similarly project onto North Korea. In 2002, for example, Gordon Chang predicted in The Coming Collapse of China that the "People's Republic has five years, perhaps ten, before it falls." In 2008, it was Western capitalism that nearly collapsed.

China's Tibetan and Uighur minorities are also sources of instability, although in both cases, the overwhelming sentiment among the vast majority of Han Chinese favors the government's claim to these lands. The 1989 crackdown in Tibet began China's march toward repression and was many steps backward.

Table 5.5: Incidents of Social Unrest, 1993-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Protests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>8700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>32,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>50,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>58,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>74,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

on a path to democracy, but their hard lines also catapulted Tibet Governor Hu Jintao and Shanghai Mayor Jiang Zemin into positions of central importance by the beginning of 1990. (Jiang became general secretary of the CCP in June 1989 and Hu succeeded him in 2002.)

A different narrative in the political relationship between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the mainland may prove to be a future stimulus to progressive change. Both Taiwanese and Hong Kong activists played minor roles in the mainland’s 1989 movement. Former National Taiwan University Professor Chen Ku-yung and legislative candidates Huang Hsun-hsin and Chang Chun-man all found homes in China but left after the debacle of Tiananmen Square. Along with the Hong Kong representative to the People’s Congress in Beijing, Huang was the only other representative to oppose the use of troops on students.

In 1989, repression was the result of the uprising inside China, but in neighboring Taiwan, Bangladesh, and Nepal, the next acts in the unfolding drama of regional democratic movements were sparked by people’s resistance.

NOTES
1 Although the government claims few, as many as seven hundred people may have been killed.
2 Bloom, Killing Hope, 22.
3 Ibid., 26.
5 Jan Wong, Red China Blues (New York: Anchor Books, 1997), 44.
7 A good counterexample can be found in Jack Goody, “Civil Society in an Extra-European Perspective,” in Civil Society: History and Possibilities, eds., Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), besides pointing out the importance of guilds in medieval China and other specific examples of civil society, Goody also argues that “the capacity and the desirability of Eastern rulers has often been exaggerated while that of the West has been underplayed” (195).
8 Frederic Wakeman insists these events left residues that persisted in the Cultural Revolution. “Boundaries of the Public Sphere in Ming and Qing China,” Daedalus 127, no. 3 (1998).
10 Apparently even in China, the backlash against the Cultural Revolution was severe as well. Ten years after it ended, Shaoguang Wang interviewed eighty-five people in Wuhan and asked them if they would participate in another Cultural Revolution. All said no, but when he asked the same question about a movement against corrupt officials, all said yes. Shaoguang Wang, “From a Pillar of the Community to a Force for Change: Chinese Workers in the Movement,” in Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989, eds. Roger Des Forges, Luo Ning, and Wu Yen-Bo (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 377.
also catapulted Tibet Governor Hu
positions of central importance by
al secretary of the CCP in June 1989

entship between Hong Kong, Taiwan,
timulus to progressive change. Both
or roles in the mainland's 1989
ity Professor Chen Ku-ying and leg-
hang Chun-nan all found homes in
Square. Along with the Hong Kong
ijing, Huang was the only other rep-

uprising inside China, but in neigh-
next acts in the unfolding drama of
by people's resistance.

as many as seven hundred people may

The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge:
Books, 1997), 64.

movement," in Chinese Democracy and the
ig, and Wu Yen-bo (Albany: SUNY Press,

noel Goody, "Civil Society in an Extra-
y and Possibilities," eds., Sudipta Kavurlu
iversity Press, 2001). Besides pointing
a and other specific examples of civil
the despotism of Eastern rulers has
t been underplayed" (155).

resides that persisted in the Cultural
in Ming and Qing China," Daedalus 127,

Movement in Cultural Revolution
1985); 28.

not the Cultural Revolution was severe
Wang interviewed eighty-five people in
ate in another Cultural Revolution. All
on about a movement against corrupt
or a Pillar of the Community to a Force
, in Chinese Democracy and the Crisis
Yen-bo (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993),
its," in The Pro-Democracy Protests in
an Unger (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993),


13 In a society where family honor is important, what is considered "just" and "unjust" are particularly significant. In the United States, such civil continuity is practically nonexistent. Few Americans know of the Bush's family's collaboration with Nazi Germany during World War II, a family legacy that would be politically disastrous if honor mattered.


15 Wong, Red China Blues, 188-89.


17 Ibid., 25.


20 Quoted in ibid., 139.


29 Bachman, "Planning and Politics," 303; Baum, "Road to Tiananmen," 420-21.

30 Han, Cities for Democracy.

31 Wang, "Pillar of Community," 186.


33 Walder and Xiaoxia, "Workers," 2.

34 Quoted in Ian Bui et al., Chinese Democracy, 180. Thompson, Democratic Revolutions, 146.


36 Wright, Perils of Protest, 35-36.

37 Wong, Red China Blues, 227-28.

38 Wright, Perils of Protest, 38.

39 For details of events in Xian, see Joseph W. Esherick, "Xian Spring," in Pro-Democracy Protests, 83-91, and Han, Cities for Democracy, 100-101.

Hsu, *Cries for Democracy* 37.

Ibid., 43.


Ibid., 905. The ASI was officially founded on April 26. The group’s “highest platform” was the seven demands of the sit-in at the gate Zhongnanhai district (including freedom of the press and assembly, more funds for education, crackdown on corruption, release of income reports of high officials, and fair reappraisal of Liu Yaohong).


Walder, "Political Sociology.,” 52; Selden, “Limits,” 177.

At the end of August 1989, a Solidarity-led coalition government was formed in Poland; the Berlin Wall was broken down on November 9, 1989; and Czecho-Slovakia’s Velvet Revolution began three days later. Also see Rudolf Wagner, "Political Institutions, Discourse and Imagination in China at Tiananmen,” in James Manor, ed., *Rethinking Third World Politics* (New York: Longman, 1991).

Walder, "Political Sociology,” 52.

Han, *Cries for Democracy*, 318-20.

Tsou, "Tiananmen Tragedy," 216.

Wright, *Perils of Protest*, 68.

For a law-reaching and visionary explanation of the tendency of Marxist regimes to be open to reform, see Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). Given their own self-understanding as products of revolution, communist regimes proved themselves particularly persistent in dealing with protest movements arrayed against them in comparison to their counterparts in the West or the South. In the USSR, the system was effectively overthrown in part because of the regime’s ideology embracing social transformation and change as part of the historical process.

Weng, *Red China Blues*, 231.

Tsou, "Tiananmen Tragedy," 224.

Wright, *Perils of Protest*, 60.


Barnes, "Beijing Days,” 37.

Wang, "Pillar of Community,” 118.

"Letter to Workers of the Entire Nation," quoted in Walder and Xiaotian, "Workers," 8. Note here the call to “return to original greatness”—a key part of Chinese Middle Kingdom identity, that is, China is the center of the world.

Wang, "Pillar of Community,” 179.

Dated May 17, as quoted in Walder and Xiaotian, "Workers," 8.

Fik Wong, "The Pro-Chinese Democracy Movement in Hong Kong," in *The Dynamics of Social Movements in Hong Kong*, eds., Stephen Wing Tai Chiu and Tai Lok Lai (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2000), 58.


Esherick, "Xian Spring,” 52.


Eggleston, "You Are Dead," 52.

Wong, *Red China Blues*, 223.

Ibid., 223-24.


Wong, *Red China Blues*, 233. As it so often was over which they alone look into protest, a recent book on sexual April, over twenty thousand Muslims of Geneit, and in the middle of May, 10: Xiaing, the capital of Qinghai, w Morgan, Wuhan, and Yunnan. (See Definition, Religion and Ethnicity in the government to ban the book.) to articulate their own visions, even impetus.

Barnes, "Beijing Days,” 54.


Tsou, "Tiananmen Tragedy," 223.

Barnes, "Beijing Days,” 54.


Captured in the film *The Gate of Hr*.


Han, *Cries for Democracy*, 201.


Francis, "Progress of Protest," 913.


Eggleston, "You Are Dead," 45.

Shen Tong, *Almost a Revolution* (8)

"Crime in Selling This Month Exe 6, as quoted in Francis, "Protests reported that the rate of crimes, percent lower than the year before.


*Premo Wang*, June 14, 1989, 4-1.


Joseph E. Kain, "Better Fed than..."


Wang, "Pillar of Community," 17 obtained agreement from the National Council of Trade Union Houhe, who was forced to step down.

Wong, *Red China Blues*, 238.


Baum, "Road to Tiananmen," 45.