Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia

Gerson S. Sher
From 1964 to 1975 a group of dissident Yugoslav Marxist intellectuals collaborated on, and identified themselves with, the philosophical journal *Praxis*. In the early 1950s, inspired by the official Yugoslav critique of the Soviet Union and a relaxed cultural atmosphere, they began to develop a radical interpretation of Marxian theory. These writers maintained that concepts appearing in Marx’s early philosophical writings, especially praxis and alienation, formed the lifelong basis for his work of social criticism and remain applicable to all social formations. The author examines the philosophical assumptions of the *Praxis* writers and the manner in which they applied these theories to an outspoken, yet thoroughly Marxist, critique of contemporary socialist systems. The relatively progressive Yugoslav system of workers’ self-management, which has been viewed by orthodox Marxists of the Soviet bloc as a revisionist departure from Marxist-Leninist norms, is subjected to particularly close analysis by the *Praxis* Marxists; through their eyes, the achievements and failures of contemporary socialism are presented with clarity and force.

The author also describes how the *Praxis* heresy within a heresy brought its advocates into often intense conflict with Yugoslav authorities and how the group’s fate was influenced by many of the major events of post-war Yugoslav history. Most dramatically, the recent crackdown on dissident activity re-

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PRAXIS
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But if the designing of the future and the proclamation of ready-made solutions for all time is not our affair, then we realize all the more clearly what we have to accomplish in the present—I am speaking of a *ruthless criticism of all existing conditions*, ruthless in two senses: The criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be.

—Karl Marx to Arnold Ruge, September 1843

A society without visible complaints should automatically be an object of the gravest suspicions. Either its population is obtuse or its rulers cruel tyrants, or both.

—Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them*
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Much of this work was written at a time when the journal *Praxis* was a living reality and when it was still far from clear that, within a relatively brief time, what I was setting down could be read not only as a piece of contemporary history, but in a certain sense as a postmortem as well. Although I initially approached my study of the *Praxis* group with the intent of describing and analyzing an important, and in some respects unique, contribution to modern Marxian theory, it gradually became clear that at issue was a vital component of what now appears to be a closed chapter in Yugoslav political history, a ten-year period characterized by a degree of intense, open debate without precedent in postwar Eastern Europe. Two events better than any other marked the end of this era: the expulsion of the so-called Belgrade Eight from the University of Belgrade at the end of January 1975, followed soon after by the closing down of *Praxis* in mid-February 1975. These circumstances imposed on me the very sad duty of having to make certain changes in the manuscript for the sake of accuracy, such as altering verbal tenses in several instances from the present to the past. If parts of the text are still cast in the present tense, this is less a consequence of oversight than it is of my conviction that the history of the *Praxis* Marxists is even now still far from complete.

I would like to take this brief opportunity to express my deep gratitude to the many members of the *Praxis* collective who have given to me most generously of their time, patience, and friendship over the past several years. I shall always be in their debt for their help in acquainting me with important historical material of which I would otherwise have been unaware, for discussing with me many of the theoretical issues raised in this study, and
for invaluable assistance in correcting some of my most serious
misimpressions. In the case of a work such as this it is of course
especially important to add the usual disclaimers that any factual
inaccuracies are purely my own responsibility and that all in-
terpretive or evaluative statements, as well as the general con-
ceptual framework of the study itself and of individual sections,
represent solely and exclusively the views of the author. It is my
sincere hope, however, that by offering what I have sought to
make a careful and objective analysis I will be able to contribute
toward clarifying an exceedingly complex and tragic state of
affairs.

I also wish to acknowledge other teachers, colleagues, and
friends who have given me guidance, advice, and other kinds of
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Leonhard of Yale University pointed me in the direction of
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me. It is to her that I lovingly dedicate this work.
This work is devoted to an examination of the theory and practice of a group of contemporary Yugoslav intellectuals whose public life, between 1964 and 1975, centered around the Marxist philosophical journal *Praxis*. While some of these theorists have attracted international attention as a result of the repressive actions of the Yugoslav government at Belgrade University culminating in early 1975, there is still no thorough treatment of the philosophical and sociological significance of this group as a phenomenon of postrevolutionary socialist society. The few existing studies which have devoted only partial attention to the Praxis Marxists have as a rule neglected to consider the significance of their appearance as a distinct intellectual grouping, their history, the factors dividing them from other more officially “acceptable” currents of Yugoslav Marxist theory, and the problems arising from the peculiar mode of “philosophical” criticism which they have embraced. The present study has essentially two major purposes. It is based, first, on the premise that a clear understanding of these issues can contribute to a broader appreciation of important political and cultural trends in modern Yugoslavia. Moreover, it is offered in the hope that an analysis of this vital school of thought may represent a positive contribution to the widespread reevaluation of Marxian theory from a democratic, humanist perspective. For the *Praxis* Marxists are in fact Marxist heretics in a socialist country whose hallmark has been the rejection of Marxist dogma, prestigious intellectuals whose brand of outspoken criticism has put them at odds with the ruling institutions in Yugoslavia throughout the past decade. While they have considered themselves in the vanguard of the socialist intelligentsia, their history
suggests parallels with intelligentsias of an earlier age who believed that it was their calling, not to glorify the ruling classes through ideological mystification, but instead to expose the inadequacies of the existing order and to contribute to its transcendence by a new and better society.

The history of the *Praxis* Marxists is, in a very important sense, part of the history of the Yugoslav revolution. It is they, rather than its “official” protagonists, who have most adequately and eloquently represented the ideals of the Yugoslav experiment to the international community and to Yugoslavia itself. Their special role has consisted in the relentless confrontation of Yugoslav practice with the socialist ideals generated by the process of social change that has continued unabated in Yugoslavia for the past thirty years. Today, crushed as a group, they find themselves in a grave situation which threatens once and for all to extinguish their brand of “creative criticism,” which in consonance with Marx’s radical tone they have called the “critique of all existing conditions.” This situation itself bears tragic testimony to the abatement of revolutionary elan in modern Yugoslavia, a society increasingly absorbed by the need for stability rather than the need for change. Any further transformation, it has become clear, will be a transformation directed from above.

The problem of sustaining the revolutionary urge in the postrevolutionary age was not unfamiliar to Marx. “Proletarian revolutions,” he boldly asserted in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,”

> criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltrinesses of their first attempts. ..²

As would become evident from the history of the communist movements of the twentieth century, however, Marx’s faith in the capacity of the proletarian revolution for “permanent revo-
lution” through self-criticism was ill-founded. The revolutionary theories of the nineteenth century became the dogmas of the twentieth for much of the world. Yet just as in the history of religious doctrines, here too there would arise from time to time groups of individuals who would challenge existing orthodoxy and declare it to have been corrupted through its intimate association with ruling social institutions. That both the “orthodox” and the “heretics,” moreover, would derive their conflicting positions from the theory of Marx is one of the most significant and intriguing problems of modern intellectual history.

The eminent Polish philosopher Leszek Kotakowski has observed, in one of his undeservedly lesser-known works, that “whenever heresy arrives at an organized form, it in turn becomes orthodoxy and reinforces itself in the struggle with its own heresies; this process of proliferation can go on ad infinitum.” It is this dialectic of heresy—or more broadly, the dialectic of dissent—which will form the focus of my concern throughout much of the present work. For in discussions of the phenomenon of dissident thinking it has often been forgotten that the very activity of thought is an integral part of the world of action. To say this is not necessarily to make all truth relative to social interest as some traditional interpretations of Marxist doctrine would have us do, nor is it necessarily to diminish the value of the search for truths that transcend the level of everyday existence. It is rather to recognize that the specific form which dissident thinking assumes in a given historical instance may have a profound impact on its ability to persuade others and to sustain itself. It is not enough that the dissident intellectual think his dissident thoughts, he must also articulate them; and the manner in which those thoughts are articulated is a matter of some consequence. The dialectic of dissent thus involves a very subtle interplay between content and form, thought and structure, which is irreducible to neat and simple formulas.

The Eastern European intelligentsia has had a particularly
long history of experimentation with different “structures of dissent.” In the history of the Russian intelligentsia, for instance, one finds a rich variety of cultural forms designed to articulate intellectual dissent, from the informal “circle” to the fully developed and organizationally bound daily newspaper. In the middle of the continuum was the important “thick journal,” whose heyday, by Robert Maguire’s reckoning, lasted from 1839 to 1884—the dates of the rise and fall of the greatest of the thick journals, Otechestvenniye zapiski. As a genre, the thick journal was dominated by prose, but at its heart was the brand of literary criticism flavored heavily with “social” overtones made famous by the great Russian man of letters, Vissarion Belinsky. For many intellectuals the thick journal became not only a center of intellectual activity but also a crucial source of financial support more acceptable than the crass commercialism involved in “vending works of literature like pretzels or cattle.” Its audience was loosely defined, consisting of a general “literary public” wishing to keep current of cultural events in the capital and abroad. Each new intellectual trend would characteristically establish “its own” journal with a corresponding following, and by the 1860s and 1870s the proliferation of such journals was truly impressive. Above all it was the journals’ ability to conceal (however crudely) from the censors their “social” concerns beneath the respectable veneer of “culture” that enabled them to play a vital role in the formation of the Russian intelligentsia. In the words of one of the foremost contemporary authorities on the Russian intelligentsia, Martin Malia:

The old order in Russia was corroding, not so much at the bottom, as at the top. The most important revolutionary statistics of the reign [of Nicholas I] are not those for peasant disturbances but those for the circulation of periodicals.

The journal performed a similar function in the history of the South Slavic intelligentsias, which were somewhat slower to
flower than the classic Russian prototype. To some extent there was a direct line of influence from the Russian experience of radical publicism to the South Slavs, as in the case of the early Serbian agrarian socialist Svetozar Markovic, who fell under the influence of Chernyshevsky and others while in Russia and who returned to Serbia to found a vigorous populist press. By the mid-1920s, there had already been established in Yugoslavia a strong tradition of active publicism in which the thick journal—as in the Russian case, largely because of its ability to evade censorship through its ostensible preoccupation with general problems of culture—assumed considerable prominence. Indeed, it was not uncommon that such journals became centers of political sentiment as well as of cultural activity. Such was the case, for instance, with the Sрpski književni glasnik, which, under the guidance of the litterateur-statesman Jovan Skerlić, became one of the most influential organs of the liberal movement in Serbia on the eve of the First World War.

But it was above all in the Yugoslav communist movement in the interwar years that the thick journal acquired lasting significance. Its membership dominated by intellectuals and students up to the beginning of the Second World War, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia experienced serious internal tensions and occasionally open ruptures as it attempted, especially in the late 1930s under the influence of Tito’s leadership, to rein in the intellectuals and to establish its control over all matters of doctrinal importance. This “conflict on the Left” reached its culmination in 1939-40 with two events: the dramatic publication of a scathing essay entitled “Dialectical Antibarbarus” by the eminent Croatian writer Miroslav Krleza in the journal Pecat, and a massive rejoinder by the Party in what was to be the sole issue of another thick journal, Književne sveske. Indeed throughout the “conflict on the Left,” the thick journal emerged as a political symbol in its own right. The publication of a new journal—of which there was a whole succession in the interwar
years—came to signal the advent of a new stage in the conflict, a desire on the part of one side or the other to differentiate itself more clearly and to expound its viewpoint at greater length, the creation of a new public forum, and a recognition that previously obscure differences had grown into unbridgeable chasms. Just beneath the surface of a high-minded public debate on principles of literary criticism and philosophical interpretation raged serious political turmoil which threatened to shake the Party to its core. In this context, the founding of a new journal became an act of the greatest political significance, while the thick journal as a genre became an established mode of structuring political discourse in an ostensibly cultural form. As such, it continued to appeal to communist intellectuals well into the postwar years as a weapon which could be brought to bear in the numerous controversies, internal and external, which followed upon the victory of Tito’s Partisan forces and the formation of a socialist Yugoslav state.

The journal *Praxis*, established in 1964 as the culmination of a growing schism in the ranks of Yugoslav Marxist philosophy and an emerging confrontation between the dissident philosophers and the Party, followed firmly in the tradition of the “thick journals” described above. Like the line of Yugoslav journals that preceded it, *Praxis*, in the words of the editorial introduction to its first issue, was to be devoted to “key questions” of theory and society. Its founders conceived it as a forum for debate and controversy which would be committed to fostering open discussion in its pages, including “not only works by Marxists, but also works of all those who are occupied with the theoretical problems that concern us.” It would solicit contributions not only from philosophers, but also from “artists, writers, scientists, public figures, all those who are not left indifferent by the vital questions of our time.” The prime commitment of the journal would be to the idea of a socialist humanism, and especially to the creation of a theoretical groundwork for a truly
socialist consciousness. But at the same time the founders of Praxis boldly asserted that such a consciousness must be disencumbered of all traces of dogmatism and that truth must be allowed to emerge through the purifying flames of radical criticism rather than being inscribed by the brand of political authority. By raising this unprecedented challenge to the Party’s ideological monopoly, the Praxis Marxists set themselves irreversibly onto a collision course with Yugoslavia’s ruling political institutions.

But while the ultimate collision itself may have been visible from the outset, what was perhaps most remarkable about Praxis is that for nearly eleven years it was permitted to present to the Yugoslav intellectual public a thoroughgoing critique—from a Marxist standpoint, to be sure—of aspects of Yugoslav thought and practice which had never before been submitted to such intensive, continual, and open examination. Not only was Praxis unique in this respect within the Yugoslav context; while similar efforts had been made elsewhere in Eastern Europe, none enjoyed anything resembling the success of Praxis. Surely this circumstance in itself raises important questions about the Yugoslav political system, just as the history of Praxis’s rise and fall reveals and reflects the many contradictory tensions to which that system has been subjected since its inception.

With the founding of Praxis, the “dialectic of dissent” discussed in the preceding pages came into full play. So long as they lacked a common symbol, the dissident intellectuals who later united behind Praxis were highly vulnerable to individual attack and manipulation by the regime; once having given symbolic and public evidence of their unity, however, their individual positions drew upon that very unity for strength and reinforcement. Yet at the same time, their journal—the “structure of dissent” which they had adopted—itself became ever more highly visible and hence vulnerable to attack. In its struggle against the ideological orthodoxy imposed by the ruling institu-
tions in the name of Marxism, Praxis thus became nothing less than an institution of Marxist criticism. And all this is also to suggest that Praxis, by virtue of its attempt to articulate an alternative Marxist ideological framework and to offer a platform for responsible Marxist criticism, may sensibly be viewed on its own merits as a distinctive, if transitory, component of the political system of postwar Yugoslavia.

Only an approach, moreover, which seeks to appreciate Praxis as a nascent counter-institution in the borderline region between culture and politics can adequately account for the persistent efforts of the Party to undermine Praxis from within and without as well as the recurring feeling of frustrated isolation that was the Praxis Marxists’ lot. Those directly responsible for Praxis found it necessary, from time to time, to reexamine the journal’s orientation in response to major political developments. At all times, they took great care to define the journal’s boundaries in order to preserve its integrity as a preeminently theoretical organ and thereby to shield its activity of criticism from potential charges of partisan political involvement. And while “politics” was something in which most Praxis Marxists had fervently and repeatedly disavowed any active interest, it was by the same token true that insofar as theirs was a social institution—an institution of criticism—their adherence to that institution was a political act of the first order.

This work, then, attempts to understand the Praxis Marxists and their reformulation of Marxist theory as an important phenomenon in the postrevolutionary politics of Yugoslav society. It should not be thought, however, that the significance of the Praxis group has been confined to Yugoslavia alone, for in a broader context Praxis has represented just one branch of the general revival, in both East and West, of the humanist and critical dimension of Marx’s thought. Within Eastern Europe, Praxis and the various gatherings it sponsored provided, until the tragic year 1968, an important forum for like-minded phi-
losophers who wished to restore a “human face” to the theory which was so much a part of the political framework of the countries in which they lived. Kofakowski from Poland, Kosi'k and Prucha from Czechoslovakia, Lukacs and members of his circle in Hungary, were all active members of the outer ring of the Praxis collective and maintained continuing reciprocal contacts with the core group of Yugoslav theorists. The same was true of many eminent Western European and even American Marxists—Mallet, Lefebvre, Marcuse, Goldmann, Bloch, Fromm, among others—whose intellectual contributions and moral support were highly valued by the Praxis group. Thus Praxis, through its parallel Yugoslav and International Editions and its international symposia, came to represent a “bridge” between East and West and a landmark of Marxist humanist thought widely recognized throughout the world. So, too, the Praxis Marxists have addressed their message not to the Yugoslav audience alone, but to all the citizens of the world in the hope of a better and more humane future.
PRAXIS
The Genealogy of Praxis

In order to carry out our historical role in creating a socialist society in our country, we must spare no pains to that end, we must remain critical of ourselves and our work, be uncompromising towards all kinds of dogmatism, and stay faithful to the revolutionary creative spirit of Marxism. Nothing that has been created can be so sacred to us that it cannot be transcended and superseded by something still freer, more progressive, and more human.

—Closing passage of the 1958 Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia: The Arrested Revolution

No study of political and cultural life in modern Yugoslavia can afford to overlook the unique nature of the Yugoslav revolutionary experience. The Yugoslav revolution in fact consisted of three phases—the War of National Liberation, the Cominform break, and the complex of internal structural changes including the introduction of workers’ self-management, Party reform, and political and economic decentralization—which were mutually reinforcing and could not but leave their imprint deeply engraved on Yugoslav social structure and political consciousness. This transformational experience, to be sure, is far from complete even today, for Yugoslavia must resolve in one manner or another several crucial problems that face it in the immediate future, such as the nature of political leadership, political integration, economic viability, growing social and regional in-
equalities, and not least of all the cultural vitality of the Yugoslav community and the fate of the quarter century of socialist experiment and reform that has hitherto distinguished Yugoslavia from her East European neighbors.

What set the Yugoslav experience apart at the very outset from the appearance of communist power in the rest of Eastern Europe was that the Yugoslav revolution was the result of a genuine social upheaval. Interwar Yugoslavia was a society held together by extremely brittle bonds; its collapse was only hastened by external aggressive pressures from the Fascist powers. During the Partisan War of Liberation, Tito’s forces made it an integral part of their strategy to lay the groundwork for the new society, beginning with local Anti-Fascist Councils and People’s Committees and culminating in the proclamation of a new governmental structure in November 1943. Indeed, Tito’s dramatic success can be attributed to the fact that his was a popular as well as a truly national revolution.¹ The liberation of Yugoslavia by Tito’s Partisans was an independent effort accomplished with very little assistance (and often only discouragement and even sharp criticism) from the Soviet Union, the land of the October Revolution; and in the postwar period, Tito was beholden to no power save the Yugoslav people.

It is in this context that we must view the famous “Cominform break” of 1948. Much has already been written about the ultimate and proximate factors leading up to the Resolution of June 28, 1948 expelling Yugoslavia from the Cominform and we need not dwell on the details of these events in this space.² What is of importance for this study is the massive reorientation in Yugoslav theory and practice that resulted from this traumatic experience. Even these consequences, however, were not immediately forthcoming in 1948. The first reaction of the Yugoslav Communists after the initial shock of excommunication was, as Hoffman and Neal point out, not to nail their heretical theses to the door of the cathedral, but to seek to demonstrate their
adherence to Stalinist policies at the same time as they cleansed their ranks of all those who dared to voice explicit support of Stalin himself or of the charges in the Resolution. In a conscious effort to refute some of the charges of the Cominform Resolution, the Yugoslavs undertook in 1948 a crash program of forced collectivization which they would have to reverse less than five years later. The reigning atmosphere, Dedijer writes, was represented by the motto, “Refute the accusations by our deeds.” Recalling New Year’s Eve of 1949, he confesses that “we were still dogmatic, despite the six months of struggle behind us.”

At this crucial turning point in the second phase of the Yugoslav revolution, the movement was left floundering in want of a theory. The lack of an indigenous body of thought that could give a convincing explanation of the shock of 1948 was reflected in the tragic conflict between Tito’s loyalists and the so-called Cominformists, who persisted in their loyalty to Stalin and the USSR. This disorientation and confusion among dedicated participants in the revolution, some of whom had been among Tito’s closest associates in the days of the Partisan War, culminated in a massive, traumatic purge of Cominformists from the Party of such proportions and brutality that it remains a political issue in Yugoslavia to this day. This was the first instance of what might best be described as an “arrested revolution” in postwar Yugoslavia—in this case, a situation in which a revolution in practice, unexpectedly thrust upon the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) from outside but conditioned by the entire history of the Partisan movement, was for a time unaccompanied by a revolution in thought. A new way had to be found.

By late 1949, there were signs that serious reconsideration of long-accepted Soviet doctrines about state and society had been taking place in the highest councils of the Party. In September, Milovan Djilas published a long essay in the official Party journal
Komunist indicting Stalin and the Soviet bureaucracy for deviating from the Leninist principles of equality between socialist states in the manner of an imperialist power. A month later Mosa Pijade, the Party’s most venerable theorist, boldly declared that it was Stalin rather than the Yugoslavs who was guilty of the charge of “revisionism.” Finally, Edvard Kardelj issued a long statement in Komunist that contained the basic parameters of the official Yugoslav critique of the Soviet Union for many years to come, which was given its final form in the 1958 Program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the “Ljubljana Program”).

Some Yugoslav writers recall the 1948-49 period as the time of the “Back to Marx” movement. But it is perhaps more accurate to say, as Johnson points out, that the real slogan was rather “Back to Marx and Lenin.” “Even this exegesis,” Johnson writes, “was very fundamentalist and unsophisticated, resting primarily on . . . Lenin’s State and Revolution” and Marx’s comments on the Paris Commune. “Only much later did Yugoslav theoreticians turn to the ‘young Marx’ as a main source of legitimacy for their system of ‘self-government,’ ” while “the writings of earlier heretics held little attraction” for them. Indeed it was to be the philosophers, not the regime’s reluctant ideologists, who would eventually pave the way back to the young Marx’s writings. From the beginning, however, this particular “heresy” against Stalinism was entirely spontaneous and original to the Yugoslavs. They saw their “deviation” not as a deviation at all, but rather as a faithful interpretation of the founders of Marxism themselves.

The “official” Yugoslav critique of Soviet Stalinism had a great impact on the consciousness of an entire generation of Yugoslav thinkers, including a group of young philosophers who would later gather around the journal Praxis. It would therefore seem useful to summarize briefly the critique’s broad outlines. The first and most immediate concern of the Yugoslav
leaders in 1948-49 was the Soviet Union’s motivation in the conduct of its policy toward Yugoslavia. Not long after the June 1948 Cominform Resolution, once it had become clear that no mere “misunderstanding” was at issue, Yugoslav charges of “hegemonism” and “imperialism” began to make themselves heard. Djilas’s 1949 statement in Komunist was among the first that explicitly referred to the USSR’s “imperialist denial of equality between socialist states.” The positive corollary to this accusation was the principle of separate paths to socialism, entailing recognition of the diverse economic and cultural conditions among different countries and of the impossibility of a single country maintaining a monopoly over the policies and ideologies of worldwide socialist development. Almost immediately, however, the Yugoslav critique of what was seen as an aggressive Soviet foreign policy became linked with a new understanding of the internal structure of the USSR. “Hegemonism” in foreign affairs was seen as the external continuation of an internal bureaucratic, statist structure of power. As Kardelj wrote in his 1960 attempt to extrapolate the earlier analysis of Soviet foreign policy behavior to the Chinese, the consciousness of "bureaucratic etatiste conservatism” sees only the dimension of centralization and coordination, while it is blind to concurrent processes of individuation and increasing autonomy among nations.

While a general consensus may have existed with regard to bureaucracy as the dominant feature of Soviet society, a fundamental disagreement over the proper classification of the Soviet political system was evident from the very early stages of the critique. The dominant view associated with Kardelj was that the Soviet Union was politically a “bureaucratic despotism” in which the state bureaucracy had emancipated itself from the control of the working class and imposed its will on society as a whole. Kardelj, however, saw this change as a “degeneration” or a “deformation,” not as an irreversible social change of global proportions that could not be remedied by the subsequent
peaceful development of the forces of production. Djilas was more outspoken, insisting that the Soviet system was “state capitalist” in nature. In his view, this implied that state and economic interests had become so deeply intertwined that they were virtually identical; and the “state capitalist” label certainly suggested much more strongly than Kardelj’s version that there was something radically unsocialist and exploitive about this new social formation.

The difference between these two approaches, subtle as it may have seemed, nevertheless had clear political overtones which became fully evident only with Djilas’s quite unofficial New Class. At first, however, there was a generally shared reluctance to apply traditional Marxian class analysis to Soviet social structure. Both Kardelj and Djilas, in the early stages of the debate, agreed that the Soviet bureaucracy constituted a caste rather than a class (in a manner rather like that of Trotsky when he rejected the notion that the bureaucracy could be thought of as a class in its own right, insisting that it was instead a “stratum” or a “caste” on the grounds that neither private ownership of the means of production nor inheritance existed in the Soviet Union). Even as late as 1952, virtually the only Yugoslav theorist to claim that the USSR was a class society was Boris Ziherl, Director of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade and, curiously, a formidable dogmatist in matters of philosophy, later to become one of the staunchest Yugoslav defenders of “diamat” and one of the most ardent foes of Praxis and its class analysis of Yugoslav society. Thus an important question for any Marxian social analysis was left unsatisfactorily resolved by the early official critique. Whenever the “class” issue would be taken up in subsequent years, it would continue to have important political, as well as sociological, implications.

Perhaps the most difficult and sensitive problem in the Yugoslav reevaluation of the USSR was that of the Party. On the one hand, without the Party, the revolution would have been impossible; as Djilas put it, “the flame of the Revolution not only
burned within them, but they were the Revolution.” But it was also the Party and its massive administrative structure that constituted the core of the bureaucracy that had been responsible for the corruption of the Bolshevik Revolution, a fact that could hardly have been ignored. Although few of the Yugoslav Party ideologists agreed with Djilas’s later analysis linking the Party with “the beginning of a new class of owners and exploiters,” and while it is also possible to dispute on factual grounds the dominance of the Party apparatus itself under Stalin, still it was felt that the Party’s structure was at least partially responsible, if only in a genetic-historical sense, for the bureaucratic degeneration of the Revolution of 1917. And when critical Yugoslav Marxists eventually turned their attention inward to Yugoslav society itself, it was impossible for them to forget this important lesson.

To summarize, for a moment, the tremendous scope of the Yugoslav reexamination of socialism in the Soviet Union, a “socialism” which the Yugoslav leaders had always been convinced was the model for all future socialist societies, and to understand the jarring impact these revelations must have had on their sense of direction, it is well to turn to the words of the Praxis Marxist Predrag Vranicki:

It was necessary to reject directly an entire dogmatic heritage which had been carefully and relentlessly forged and imposed in the second period of the Third International by Stalin and his apologists. A clear demand was felt, in both theory and practice, for a genuine reconsideration of all the Stalinist values which had been propagated in the name of Marxism. Analysis of the tendencies of modern capitalism, the paths of socialist revolution, the theory of the state, the meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the party, and of man in socialism and his intellectual endeavors—all this, in the context of this struggle, was posed in a new light.

The Yugoslav critique of the Soviet system, however, was not restricted to the “negative” criticisms outlined above. In an im
important sense, the critique was a positive critique, involving elements of departure in practice as well. In the first five years after their expulsion from the Cominform, the Yugoslavs initiated two highly significant structural reforms, the introduction of workers’ self-management (1950) and a far-reaching revision of the Organization and tasks of the Party itself (1952). While these reforms will be examined at greater length in the pages that follow, it suffices to note here that each was in itself a revolutionary innovation designed to strike at the roots of the problems associated with the degeneration of the revolution in the USSR. In the case of these reforms, a revolution in thought went hand in hand with the revolution in practice.

Yet for this crucial “third stage” of the Yugoslav revolution, what was needed in the realm of theory was not simply a superficial critique of the more grotesque aspects of the Soviet experience, but a clear and complete alternative to the Stalinist philosophical system which at least formally provided the rationale for the entire structure. This was a task for which the new regime’s ideologists—bound by specific policies, often limited in their intellectual horizons, and wedded organically to the corpus of “dialectical materialism” no matter how bitter their attacks against Soviet practice—were not prepared. Thus it fell to a small but dynamic group of young university philosophers to return to the Marxist classics in search of a new theoretical framework, to which they found the key in the only recently discovered writings of the young Marx. But in so doing, they laid the foundations for a conflict between politics and philosophy that would erupt into the open only a decade later.

For while the sociopolitical critique of the Soviet system was grounded in a firm organizational base with its roots in the dominant power structure of the new society, the critique of philosophy—which quickly embraced all areas of consciousness under the general rubric of “culture”—had no such institutional support at the outset. The right to creativity in the sphere of
culture had to be earned by writers and philosophers after the war. As one Praxis writer recalls, it was something which “the state did not offer voluntarily to cultural workers; rather, it was they who imposed it on the state.” It is significant, moreover, that many of these “cultural workers” did not seek their autonomy as isolated individuals, but instead shared from the outset an awareness of their social importance as the core of a critical intelligentsia. In the early 1950s they would attempt for a brief time to formulate their concerns through the mouthpiece of a “thick journal” with only limited success, while from time to time they would engage their opponents in debates over Marxist philosophy at various symposia and discussions organized by regional and federal professional associations. Throughout this period, however, they grew and developed as a group until finally, in the early 1960s, they founded the journal Praxis, which was to be the culmination and most lasting achievement of this group’s search for an institution best suited to the need for a relentless “critique of all existing conditions” in the post-revolutionary society.

The “Struggle of Opinions”

One of the most significant political departures of the early 1950s issued from the Sixth Party Congress of 1952, when the CPY was redesignated the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. More than a change of name was involved here, however. The final Resolution of the Congress indicated what promised to be a major reorientation in the functions of the Party itself. Rejecting the traditional concept of the leading role of the Party, the Congress declared:

The League of Communists in its work is not and cannot be the immediate operational leader and commander in economic or in state or social life. Instead it acts in all organizations, organs, and institutions to have its line and positions, or the positions of its
members, accepted, by means of its political and ideological activity, primarily through persuasion.\textsuperscript{25}

Along with this redefinition of the Party’s role from one of direct political control to one of education and persuasion went a large-scale reorganization and decentralization of Party activities designed to parallel the already initiated reforms establishing workers’ self-management in the economic sphere.\textsuperscript{26} The Congress complemented its new view of the Party with a new conception of ideological struggle, declaring that without a democratic “struggle of opinions” the development of science and culture would be seriously impeded. The Party Resolution guaranteed that “every opinion having as its point of departure the struggle for socialism and socialist democracy... [would] have the right to fulfill itself and to develop.”\textsuperscript{27}

But the call for a “struggle of opinions” was not, on closer examination, without its problems. From the very beginning there was a fundamental tension in the nature of the League’s tasks: on the one hand, it had been charged with primary responsibility for ideological education and persuasion, and it had a definite “line” to propagate among the masses; at the same time, it seemed to welcome a truly open confrontation of views as the most effective means of developing socialist culture. This tension would later be reflected in the famous 1958 Program of the LCY. There it was stated that “tendencies towards ideological monopoly have always been an obstacle to the development of socialist thought, and a source of dogmatism and opportunist-revisionist reaction” and that in the spheres of Marxism and culture in general the “Yugoslav Communists make no pretensions to possessing any kind of monopoly.” Still it was insisted that

unity of outlook on fundamental internal and foreign policy problems, on essential questions in the struggle for socialism, is an
This tension between diversity and uniformity, between the new (the “struggle of opinions”) and remnants of the Stalinist past (the “unity of will and action”) had perplexing implications. In fact, in the balance which the League tried to establish in the sphere of ideology there was much that was reminiscent of the CPY’s dilemma in the 1930s in the “conflict on the Left,” and indeed of the problems encountered by the Soviet Communist Party in the 1920s. A “struggle of opinions” was to be tolerated and encouraged throughout Yugoslav society, but not within the League’s ranks, where unity was to prevail. The “struggle of opinions” was presented as the sole path toward the creation of a truly socialist culture, but at the same time it was felt that dissen­sion within the League itself would render it incapable of promoting that very cultural consciousness. In short, having formally relinquished the role of direct control, the League was still in many ways a party in the traditional Bolshevik sense, and it has remained so to this day. But in 1952, talk of more modest tasks for Yugoslav Communists and even of the “withering away of the Party” went largely unheeded or misunderstood by the bulk of “responsible” League members. In the words of Hoffman and Neal:

Some—particularly among the middle-level functionaries—met the new situation by ignoring it, continuing to act as before and to buck both Party and government reforms. Some read into the new line more than was there and actually came out against Party positions. Others just threw up their hands.

Whatever the reactions of Party functionaries, the call for a struggle of opinions was welcomed by intellectuals who quickly proceeded to put it into action. The way in which many of these
“cultural workers” interpreted the very concept of “culture” contributed to the latent tension between themselves and the Party. They refused to let the cultural sphere be neatly defined and restricted by the Party to suit its own convenience. Instead, the term “culture” was taken to have the broadest possible meaning, encompassing all aspects of conscious human social activity. Culture, as Rudi Supek defined it in a key essay in 1953, is universal, having as its subject man as a social being who creates and transforms the reality in which he lives. Paraphrasing Marx’s famous dictum on communism, Supek wrote that socialist culture in particular

is neither a state of affairs that we will realize in the distant future, nor some abstract ideal which we oppose to concrete social development in the present, but the real movement through which we transcend class society.

The creation of a socialist culture, moreover, was seen by Supek not as an automatic process of reflection of the base in the ideological superstructure as heretofore portrayed in “orthodox” Marxist theory, but as a “conscious, critical effort of raising human consciousness and sentiment to a higher level in the sense of emancipation from various forms of the alienation of man in class society.” Not only, then, does this concept of culture study man as an active, creative social being—it both presupposes man as such a being and sees it as its mission to contribute to the development of the free, creative personality. Instead of serving the function of preserving social values which perpetuate the existing order, this was a view of culture in which the cultural act is an historical act, one which prepares the way for substantively new ways of acting and seeing the world.

One of the sources for this new stress on the transformative aspect of culture was doubtless to be found in the ambiguous situation of Yugoslav intellectuals themselves after the Second World War. Most members of the prewar generation of com-
munist intellectuals had actively participated in the Partisan struggle. They gave themselves completely to the Revolution, but afterward found that they had to define a new role for themselves:

The intellectuals had previously been the principal agitators and vehicles of the idea to the masses; now, for better or for worse, they found themselves in a situation where the ideological dimension of their activity became their lot.... Despite sporadic hesitations, they had participated for the most part in the revolution and proved that they had no social and political interest save that of the working class. . . . But the situation in which they found themselves after the revolution was noteworthy insofar as the event that had been the most important [for them] had already taken place.31

In order to avoid being trapped permanently in this tragic position, many of these intellectuals came to conceive of their task as one of continuing the revolution which had taken place in the political and social spheres, extending it to the sphere of consciousness. But the transformation of consciousness is never a process which has any such inherent, clearly defined boundaries as does the transformation of political structure. It was therefore possible for the cultural revolution to run far ahead of the political (and social) revolution, with uncomfortable consequences for the self-ordained cultural revolutionaries themselves.

This situation was in many respects reminiscent of that of the writer after the bourgeois revolution as described by Sartre. The essence of the writer’s activity before the revolution was criticism and the appeal to freedom; in Sartre’s words, “his books were free appeals to the freedom of his readers.” But after the revolution,

the miraculous harmony which united the essential demands of literature with that of the oppressed bourgeoisie was broken as
soon as both were realized.... Once freedom of thought and confession and equality of political rights were gained, the defense of literature became a purely formal game which no longer amused anyone; something else had to be found.

In Yugoslavia, this “something else” was to be philosophy, although this too was fraught with danger. For to take a Final look at Sartre’s account, postrevolutionary culture, it seems, is always in a very delicate position; as with bourgeois art in its early period, “it would forbid itself to lay hands on principles, for fear they might collapse.”

It was precisely such principles which many young Yugoslav philosophers wished to reexamine in the early 1950s. For by doing so, they felt they could discover what made Stalinism work by discovering and identifying the principles which informed the behavior of actors in the Stalinist political system. These principles were, they thought, to be found most clearly formulated in the philosophical system known as “dialectical and historical materialism,” the Soviet regime’s reigning ideology, the validity of which the Yugoslav Communists did nothing to question during the early postwar years despite their profound political rupture with Stalin. And it was precisely in the struggle of opinions in philosophy that the conflict between the Party and the intellectuals within Yugoslavia was to have its most lasting impact.

Even before Yugoslavia’s rupture with the Cominform, there were already signs that young philosophy students in the universities were beginning to have their doubts about the Party’s policy of leaving the basic structure of dialectical materialism intact. Mihailo Markovic, at the time a 25-year-old ex-Partisan army officer studying philosophy at the University of Belgrade, recalls that many Yugoslav students, disturbed by the postwar attempts of Zhdanovism to regiment and systematize Soviet philosophy, began to question the coherence and viability of “diamat” in
The dynamism of these students and their views is attested to by Gajo Petrović, who at the time of the Cominform break, at the age of 21, found himself in Moscow where (as well as in Leningrad) he had been pursuing graduate studies in philosophy. Upon returning to Yugoslavia, Petrović observed that philosophy was attracting many students who found the appeal of conventional youth organizations to be generally unstimulating, breeding apathy rather than enthusiasm. These students, Petrović speculates, may therefore have directed their energies to the newly emerging struggle of opinions in philosophy, which promised to provide a great deal of intellectual stimulation and opportunity for social involvement. And it was from this generation—men and women who had been born in the mid-1920s and who matured both politically and intellectually during the days of the Partisan War—that many of the leading Praxis Marxists were to come.

What were only private doubts of philosophy students in the late 1940s became articulated publicly in the early 1950s when these students began to complete their formal studies and were able to formulate and articulate their doubts in published essays, often to the displeasure of their mentors and Party officials. Petrović was one of the first to experience such pressures. As the official representative of Zagreb University’s Philosophy Faculty on the University’s Party Committee, Petrović heard that body’s Central Committee criticize the Faculty for its unorthodox tendencies and independence; Petrović himself came under harsh condemnation and threats of expulsion when he refused to accept the Party’s criticism. Such incidents occurred with increasing regularity as young philosophers such as Petrović came of age and began to speak their minds in public.

By 1952, the year of the Sixth Congress and the formal announcement of the “struggle of opinions,” it was already evident that there existed a sizeable number of people who were prepared to meet the Party’s challenge in the field of
philosophy. In March 1951 Mihailo Markovic had spoken to the First Congress of the Serbian Philosophical Society about the Soviet “revision” of the foundations of Marxist philosophy, while in 1952 Predrag Vranicki published a book dealing with the Soviet treatment of the philosophical problem of the universal, the particular, and the individual. Also in 1952, the first issues of the journal *Pogledi* appeared, containing an unusual account by Petrović of the development of Marxist philosophy in the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1938. In 1953, Vranicki published an important study of Marx’s intellectual development and the first edition of Marx’s and Engels’ early works, including large excerpts from the 1844 manuscripts.\(^\text{37}\) These were all major events in Yugoslav philosophical and cultural life. In the following pages I shall attempt to review briefly the major features of some of these seminal works while giving the reader some idea of the climate in which they appeared.

The revitalization of Marxist philosophy in Yugoslavia began, and has continued to be characterized by, the resurrection of the subjective, human aspect of Marx’s thought and its contraposition to the traditional doctrines of the Third International as revealed by Stalin and accepted by the world communist movement. Markovic’s 1951 critique of current Soviet philosophy was infused throughout by a critique of the “false objectivism” not only of the Stalinist metaphysics which ascribed historical change to the independent operation of dialectical “laws,” but also implicitly of those Yugoslav critics (Djilas and Kardelj) who supposed that the degeneration of the Soviet system and the decadence of its theory and practice could be attributed solely to “objective conditions.” Markovic wished to emphasize that a “subjective” factor—theory—may have been equally responsible for this state of affairs, especially a theory which was dogmatically held to be the unquestionable frame of reference and guide to action for all responsible communists. He indicted Stalinist dialectical and historical materialism for its “revisionist” theory of the strengthening of the state in socialism, its
underestimation of the danger of bureaucracy, its reification of the dialectic into abstract formal method and ultimately into a gross form of pragmatism, and its growing fetishism of formal logic. At the same time, he stressed that the false “scientific” objectivism of Soviet philosophy was, from a social standpoint, actually a radical form of subjectivist idealism. As evidence for the latter charge he cited the following remarkable passage from the authoritative Soviet philosopher M. B. Midn:

It is necessary to purge brains fundamentally.... It is necessary to organize the true conversion of our cadres to the practice of socialist sodety.... If slave society, feudal society, and the bourgeoisie at the height of its flowering could point to their scientists and philosophers, who in numerous books glorified the exploitative state and the social structure of the epoch, so much the more appropriate is it for us to give our scientific cadres the task of singing the glories of our state, to celebrate it in serious research, the state of a new type, our society, which knows of no antagonistic classes, of no social and national oppression, our great Bolshevik party—the vanguard of the Soviet people, leader and inspirer of our entire development.

The brunt of Markovic’s rebuttal of Soviet philosophy, however, rested on the charge that it factored out of the dialectic the active role of man that so thoroughly permeated the works of Marx. In the rigidly formalized dialectic of Soviet Marxism, he claimed, it was the dialectic, not man, that thinks, knows, and acts. History, Markovic urged, is made neither by objective forces nor dialectical laws; it is made instead by people, who act to transform their world within the limits of historically defined possibilities. With this observation, which he claimed was completely consistent with the spirit and letter of Marx’s writings, he turned the charge of “revisionism” back against Soviet doctrine itself. And it was above all this humanist perspective on Marxian theory that was to be the hallmark of Praxis theory as it developed throughout the years.

Petrović’s critique of Soviet philosophy concentrated on the
historical perspective. In this, he had two concerns: to illustrate the increasing use of authoritarian methods in philosophy paralleling the rise of Stalinism in the USSR, and to plead for a subject-matter for philosophy distinct from those of other fields of intellectual inquiry, particularly science. Petrović skillfully traced the development of the debate between the so-called Mechanists and Dialecticians, and while expressing disagreement with both schools of thought (albeit with a certain preference for Deborin and his colleagues), he still condemned the manner in which both were suppressed. Especially in the case of the 1930 offensive against the “Deborinists” by Mitin, Yudin, and Stalin himself, Petrović found particularly repulsive the invocation of partiinost (“party-mindedness”) and the sinister accusations of “Menshevizing idealism,” which he condemned as a gross incursion of political expediency into philosophical discussion. In substantive philosophical terms, Petrović indicated that a false polarity had been drawn between the Mechanists, whose object had been to liquidate philosophy and to forge an identity between Marxist dialectics and the laws of natural science, and the Deborinists, who Petrović concedes were prone to “abstract, scholastic ‘philosophizing’,” resulting in an overly sharp distinction in their writings between philosophy and science. In retrospect, however, it almost seems that despite his detailed discussions of the issues which agitated these two parties, Petrović’s chief concern in publishing this critical essay was to direct public attention to the general problem of authoritarianism in philosophy and to the still larger issue of the freedom of cultural creativity. This concern would in turn form the context of the struggles of the 1950s as the young theoretical critics began to grasp with increasing clarity the scope of the issues that were at stake.

For all the controversy they aroused, the philosophical bases of both Marković’s and Petrović’s critiques—the return to the humanistic conceptions of the “authentic Marx”—were probably
only imperfectly understood by most of the “diamat”-trained philosophers who tried to come to grips with them in early 1952. But almost simultaneously in Zagreb, the 30-year-old Predrag Vranicki, whose intellectual background and involvement in the Partisan War gave him much in common with his contemporaries, published the first of three works that quickly earned him the reputation of being one of a new breed of unorthodox interpreters of Marx, On the Problem of the Universal, the Particular, and the Individual. Then in 1953 his Intellectual Development of Karl Marx reached the public, and together with the Early Works of Marx and Engels which he edited and published in the same year, these works furnished the conceptual foundations for a new and vital Marxism in Yugoslavia. Indeed, Vranicki’s study of Marx’s intellectual development was a noteworthy event in its own right. Although little known outside of Yugoslavia, this was among the first studies of Marx that argued for the fundamental unity of his thought, claiming that Marx had consistently carried over the humanist philosophical principles developed in his early writings (especially the Paris manuscripts of 1844) into his later work. While the term “socialist humanism” apparently came into use in Yugoslavia as early as 1948, Vranicki’s 1953 work was the first solid theoretical exposition of the foundations of this doctrine in Marx himself.

Vranicki’s works and those of his colleagues seem to have coincided with, if not in fact introduced, a new wave of interest in the question of human alienation within the Yugoslav philosophical community. Looking back over the journals of this period, one cannot fail to be impressed by the sudden explosion of attention devoted to the concept of alienation and its centrality to Marx’s thought as a whole, prompted in part by an awareness of the efforts of Western European existentialists such as Sartre to reinterpret Marxism in light of current philosophical trends. Not only philosophers were preoccupied with this theme; one of the first sparks, in fact, seems to have
come from the pen of Rudi Supek, a psychologist by training who had recently published a major work in literary history, *Psychology of the Bourgeois Lyric*. Shortly thereafter, Miladin Životić, a 22-year-old philosopher from Belgrade, published an essay dealing with Marx’s early philosophical development and the place of the concept of alienation in it, while another young philosopher-sociologist from Belgrade, Zagorka Pesic, wrote an enthusiastic review of Vranicki’s new edition of the Marx-Engels *Early Works* in which she focused explicitly on the alienation question. This apparently obscure review of the literature on alienation in 1952-53 might be meaningless but for one important fact: the individuals mentioned here—Petrović, Markovic, Vranicki, Supek, Životić, Pesic—were among those who constituted the core of a movement throughout the 1950s to bring philosophy back to Marx and Marx back to philosophy. They, along with a few other colleagues, some of whom were already quite active along similar lines, would later be the motive force behind *Praxis* and the movement for radical criticism in socialist Yugoslavia in the 1960s and early 1970s.

The rediscovery of the young Marx in the early 1950s was thus the accomplishment of a small group of young theorists, infused with the defiant spirit of the Yugoslav Revolution, whose first major steps in their profession were bold and significant departures from the path of accepted truth. The importance of their individual contributions to this process of reevaluation should certainly not be discounted. But they were also products of a time of transformation in all areas of social life, when reevaluation and criticism were the order of the day. It would indeed be difficult to imagine the development of critical Marxism in Yugoslavia without the impetus provided by the experience of the Cominform break and the subsequent political and social reforms which promised to be a source of continuing social innovation for many years to come. As Petrović has observed of the revitalization of Marxist philosophy in Yugoslavia, “it
would be incorrect to give philosophers all the credit for this. In the struggle to restore a right relationship between philosophy and politics, politicians were equally active, and today we all agree: philosophy is its own judge."43

The *Pogledi* Experience

The struggle of opinions in the realm of philosophy was not without its characteristic structure, one which developed very soon after it had become apparent to the young philosophical critics that they held in common a number of views that set them apart from the mainstream “official” interpretation of Marxist philosophy in Yugoslavia. Just as the thick journal, largely under the writer Miroslav Krleza’s influence, was the chief vehicle of creative thought and criticism in the communist movement of the 1930s in the absence of any other suitable institutional base for such activity, so in the early 1950s the thick journal emerged once again, but this time in a different cultural context.

As in other spheres of Yugoslav life in the late 1940s, so too in culture the Yugoslavs made an effort to outdo the Soviet Union itself in their adherence to Stalinist doctrine, in substance if not in name. This zeal manifested itself in a brief but intense ascendancy of socialist realist doctrine, associated with the name of the Party hack writer Radovan Zogovic, who to this day is remembered by his compatriots as the “Yugoslav Zhdanov.” It soon became apparent, however, that this type of cultural dogmatism was fundamentally inconsistent with the wave of profound reexamination and reassessment that swept over Yugoslavia in the early 1950s. The turning point for Yugoslav culture came at the Third Congress of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia, held in Ljubljana in 1952. Here, it fell to Krleza, who had isolated himself from the Party (in fear of retaliation for his earlier independence, some thought) ever since the beginning of the war, to deliver the major speech laying to rest once and for
all the specter of socialist realism—and with it, his old enemy Zogovic. No longer was the Party to rule cultural life by decree. Cultural workers, in consonance with the call for a “struggle of opinions,” were free to explore and utilize new forms of self-expression. Diversity and open discussion, rather than uniformity and enforced consensus, it was felt, were the surest ingredients for the development of a truly strong, dynamic socialist culture in Yugoslavia.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav cultural community to the new state of affairs was not, however, an immediate and spontaneous flowering of a vigorous new socialist literature, but instead a retreat into the doctrine of art for art’s sake, an attempt to insulate culture from other areas of social activity, and a general privatization of views. In response to the sudden absence of crude political pressure, the humanist intelligentsia’s ideal of social activity now turned inward, from a “bad reality” to a pure, good, impenetrable, and hence unchallengeable, inner subjective reality. The Slovenian philosopher Taras Kermauner writes: “One who before the war knew how to change a bad atmosphere now became a victim, a passive reflection of the atmosphere, a helpless pawn in the hands of fate.”

While intellectuals, to be sure, were still victims of the bureaucracy and its meddling in cultural affairs, many were also victims of their own apathy, bred partly by the bureaucracy itself but also, paradoxically, by the very fact of its absence. And Krleza himself, isolated and in disgrace only ten years before, was now catapulted into prominence, exercising an enormous amount of influence (especially in Zagreb) over Yugoslav cultural affairs.

The most significant attempt to inject a new sense of purpose into this cultural vacuum and to challenge Krleza’s influence was the journal Pogledi (Views), founded in Zagreb by Rudi Supek in 1952. Supek’s background, to which we have alluded earlier, was quite different from that of the bulk of the theorists engaged in the “struggle of opinions” in philosophy. He was, first of all,
older than his colleagues by about ten years, having been born in 1913. Partially by virtue of his age, he brought to the nascent group a wealth of experience which many of its younger members lacked. Unlike them, he was never a member of the Yugoslav Communist Party and did not experience at first hand the dramas of the Partisan War. Instead, having found himself in Paris at the outbreak of World War II, he enrolled in the French Communist Party and played an active role in the French Resistance, helping to relocate refugees from the Spanish Civil War to their native countries. With the Nazi occupation he was arrested and interred in Buchenwald, where he collaborated with Jozef Franck (later to be executed along with Slansky in 1952) in the leadership of a daring underground prisoners’ organization.45 After the war he returned to Paris, where he remained for a few years to complete his studies with Jean Piaget. He also familiarized himself with the intense debates in the French Communist movement about literature and culture, in which he seems to have been reservedly partial to Sartre’s position. Thus, sensitized to the social importance of cultural activity, and a proved fighter for principle by virtue of his resistance background, Supek quickly grasped the situation upon returning to Yugoslavia and issued the first number of Pogledi in November 1952.

The scope of Pogledi, reminiscent of that of the many interwar “thick journals” edited by communist intellectuals, included questions of philosophy, literature and art, sociology and history, economics and law, and the natural sciences. Yet Supek wished to be selective about the type of material published in Pogledi, avoiding the dull scholasticism of “cabinet pieces” and orienting the journal instead toward open advocacy of the position of socialist humanism. In the statement of purpose prefacing the first issue of Pogledi, Supek declared that the journal’s attention would be directed toward the “focal” problems of social and natural science, “but especially those problems that di-
rectly encroach upon the creation of a total scientific world-view and the construction of socialist culture.” Stimulating contributions were made to *Pogledi* by young philosophers such as Vranicki, Petrović, Marković, Vanja Sutlic, Vladimir Filipovic, Milan Kangrga, Danilo Pejovic, Danko Grlic, and Svetozar Stojanović, as well as by sociologists and literary critics such as Supek, Grgo Gamulin, Ante Fiamengo, Oleg Mandic, and Eugen Pusic. An enthusiastic but properly critical interest was manifested toward Western European thought and especially the vigorous development of existentialism and Marxism in France, while an important debate on formal logic and the dialectic was carried on in the pages of *Pogledi* in 1953-54.

As already noted, Supek’s main personal concern and primary motivation for launching *Pogledi* was the development of a vigorous socialist culture in Yugoslavia. In December 1953 he wrote a highly provocative essay for *Pogledi* denouncing the state of Yugoslav cultural life, a piece designed to sharpen the field of discussion and to bring into better focus the mission of the journal itself. From the extreme of “socio-dogmatic conformism,” he saw Yugoslav culture moving toward the opposite pole of “petty-bourgeois or anarcho-individualistic nonconformism” and wondered why cultural workers had suddenly stopped talking about “decadence” as if the phenomenon had ceased to exist altogether. The problem, Supek thought, lay as much in the impersonal institutionalization of cultural creativity, the privatization of cultural concerns, and the immaturity of cultural workers (as evidenced by their unwillingness to assume an autonomous public stance) as in the direct intervention of the political hierarchy in cultural life, which he condemned in the sharpest terms. To the question, “Why is there no struggle of opinions?” he answered that those responsible for publicizing viewpoints of social significance and provoking confrontation—in his view, essential elements of all true cultural activity—were avoiding their responsibility by retreating into their cabinets in con-
tinuing fear of the political and personal consequences of behaving otherwise. Supek, for one, was not about to yield to the threats of the bureaucracy nor to the temptation to remain silent. To do either would have been, in his view, to be false to the calling of the cultural worker, which is to stir controversy and to arouse the critical faculty of each individual member of society. Thus Supek’s aim, and that of Pogledi, was to extend the principle of criticism from philosophy to culture in general and to free that criticism from the strictures of political authority.

While Supek may have roundly condemned what he perceived as the cultural vacuum of the early 1950s, Pogledi did not, of course, appear in a political vacuum. It was overshadowed in late 1953 and early 1954 by the sensational “Djilas affair,” culminating in the expulsion of the prominent Party ideologist and activist from the Central Committee for his public essays advocating the radical democratization of the Party and criticizing the increasingly decadent morality of the ruling stratum. While the Djilas affair has become a cause célèbre in the history of communist heresy, one aspect of it seems to have been virtually lost in the wake of its sensation: the role of the thick journal. Djilas’s critical articles at first appeared in the Party’s daily organ Borba, which was an appropriate enough forum considering that Djilas was after all one of the Party’s chief ideological spokesmen. But Djilas soon became aware of the growing uncertainty of the relationship between himself and the Party and in late 1953 founded a new journal, Nova misao (New Thought), to serve as an independent mouthpiece for the growing wave of criticism for which he personally was in no small way responsible. It was in fact the appearance of what was to be the next-to-last issue of Nova misao, containing Djilas’s famous “Anatomy of a Moral,” that directly precipitated the Central Committee meeting of January 17, 1954 at which he was denounced by his colleagues and deprived of all his Party positions. A month before, the prominent politician Petar Stambolic (a political friend of police chief Aleksandar
Rankovic) was reported to have complained that Djilas intended to organize Yugoslav political life, or at least a segment of it, around this new journal. In any event it is clear that the January 1954 issue of _Nova misao_ constituted at least a partial basis for Kardelj’s charges of intra-Party factionalism against Djilas.\(^48\)

Even before the appearance of “Anatomy of a Moral,” Djilas had strongly hinted at his design to establish a new ideological tendency. At the end of 1953 he used a _Nova misao_ article in an attempt to discredit Supek’s _Pogledi_—clearly his chief rival at the time—by charging that _Pogledi_ represented the ideological “right” in Yugoslav cultural life, thus implying that _Nova misao_ and its editor were to be identified with the “left.”\(^49\) To a certain extent, moreover, Djilas’s attack on _Pogledi_ could be read—and was read by many at the time—as an attempt to gain Krleza’s support for what Djilas perceived as an imminent showdown within the Party. Djilas himself, to be sure, was shortly thereafter publicly discredited and his journal suppressed, but the ramifications of these events for _Pogledi_ were not what might have been expected. Instead of finding itself vindicated by the Djilas affair, _Pogledi_ now found itself the object of intensified pressure and criticism, for Krleza, who had refrained from taking sides with Djilas, now apparently felt that he had a free hand to dispense with _Pogledi_. For its part, the government gladly went along with Krleza, evidently being motivated by a desire to smooth over all the rough edges revealed by the recent turmoil and to restore tranquility and at least the appearance of unity to the ideological sphere.

But the attacks on _Pogledi_, from both Djilas and other quarters as well, seemed only to hearten Supek rather than to discourage him. At the very least, he argued in _Pogledi_, they demonstrated that he had “touched on something that corresponds to a definite cultural-social practice and a definite popular mentality.”\(^50\) In response to official pressure, however, Supek was forced to tone down the stridency of _Pogledi_ articles; the issues of
The Genealogy of **Praxis**

*Pogledi* published in late 1954 and 1955 contained relatively innocuous discussions in the theory of literature and esthetics. Public interest in the journal waned and in 1955 it was finally abandoned.

Even the demise of *Pogledi*, however, had its instructive aspects. First, it was revealed that bureaucratic repression was still very much a force to be reckoned with in Yugoslav cultural life; and second, that a journal with a social mission, even one written in a predominantly theoretical manner (as was *Pogledi*, and after it, *Praxis*) must sustain its tempo of criticism and radicalization, even at the risk of death by suppression, or else suffer the costs of losing its identity entirely and dying a slow and inglorious death of quiescence. These lessons were not to be lost on the future participants in the *Praxis* undertaking, many of whom, significantly, were among the major contributors to *Pogledi*. And the *Pogledi* experience was certainly deeply engraved in Supek’s mind when in 1966 he was called upon to help guide *Praxis* along with Gajo Petrović in the capacity of Coeditor-in-Chief, a position which Supek held for seven turbulent years. While the *Pogledi* experience may have had little lasting impact on the public at large, it did serve the important function of bringing together for the first time a group of young Yugoslav theoretical critics in the context of a true thick journal; and in several senses, *Praxis* must therefore be viewed as the legitimate heir of this initial venture. By the same token, the *Pogledi* and Djilas affairs only heightened the sensitivity of Party leaders to overly zealous journals and their editors. During the next few years of ideological vigilance, it would be impossible to resume the enterprise which Supek had so inauspiciously but boldly begun.

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1955–1960: Years of Reconsolidation

The subsequent period, characterized by relative inactivity in terms of overt and organized (or semi-organized) intellectual
criticism, was nevertheless not one of total cultural dormancy. After the Pogledi and Djilas episodes, as Kermuuner has observed, criticism reoriented itself to new conditions, for

insofar as this activity was public and clear, the bureaucracy would be able to designate it on the spot as a deviation in world-view and political heresy.... The manner of struggle had to be sly, underground, private, in small circles: the intellectual perspectives of this or that bureaucrat were undermined with small blows, now here, now there.... It was precisely this private quality that the bureaucratic dogmatist could not take by surprise.51

The Party’s Executive Committee was in fact deeply troubled by this state of affairs. In its important Circular Letter of February 1958 it complained that

individual Communists ... [are sometimes] irresponsible in their behavior, yielding to negative, non-constructive, and criticizing gestures which are fashionable. Very often Communists, cultural workers in particular, hold discussions which are not based on principles and thus form groups and make intrigues.52

The veterans of the Pogledi venture, from both Zagreb and Belgrade, continued to meet at professional gatherings and to collaborate with each other in their teaching and research capacities, pursuing old themes as well as developing new ones in their writings.53 Particular attention was devoted to the role of Hegel and his dialectic in Marx’s intellectual development, thus further enlarging on the theme of alienation and the interest in the young Marx which had been generated in the early 1950s. By the very openness and diversity of their work, these thinkers continued to chip away at the monolith of “diamat,” whose proponents had by no means conceded defeat in their struggle to impose the traditional orthodoxy on Yugoslav philosophy.54 But while in the mid-fifties the “diamat” school was still far from being totally discredited in the eyes of the Yugoslav public, this state of affairs soon came to an end as a result of two important
factors: the appearance of yet another unorthodox journal, and
the Bled Conference of 1960 on the theory of reflection.

When *Nose teme* (Our Themes) first appeared in 1957 under
the editorship of Vjekoslav Mikecin, the country was still in the
grip of the reign of Party discipline that had been imposed
shortly after the Sixth Party Congress and the Djilas affair. But
by early 1958 it was already becoming apparent that an ideologi­
cal change was in the air, for the League of Communists, in
preparation for its Seventh Party Congress to be held in Ljubljana later that year, published its provisional theses for the new
Party Program, an event which stirred controversy and wide­
spread criticism of Yugoslavia throughout the communist
world. Thus with *Na.se teme*, the thick journal made its reap­
pearance at a propitious time. The goal of *Nase teme*, whose
young Editorial Board included most of those who had been
active in *Pogledi* and who would later be actively involved in
*Praxis*, was similar to that of *Pogledi*—to stimulate open public
discussion of focal questions of society and theory. Although
many of the essays in *Nase teme* were no less provocative than
those in *Pogledi*, they were now in step with the political mood of
the country and its leadership, which seemed to have recovered
much of the ideological dynamism that it had lost in the mid­
1950s as a result of the Djilas affair. The themes of humanism,
alienation, self-management, and ideology were once again
openly articulated from a critical perspective. Now, when the
Editor of the journal addressed himself to “our critics,” he had
in mind the Soviet and Chinese communist parties and their
attitudes toward Yugoslavia rather than any domestic foes of the
journal itself. Something of the old solidarity of the days of
1948-52 had been regained in the flush of enthusiasm gener­
ated by the 1958 Party Program. Mikecin could now speak with­
out too much exaggeration of the identity of interests between
intellectuals and the political sphere, which had once again be­
come infused with a revolutionary and experimental elan.
Armed with a new sense of confidence, the group of philosophers who had originally collaborated on *Pogledi* now gathered their strength for what they foresaw as the final offensive against dogmatism in Yugoslav Marxist philosophy. Some preliminary skirmishes took place in two discussions in 1959, one in Sarajevo on contemporary problems in Marxist philosophy organized by the Yugoslav Association for Philosophy and Sociology, and the second in Zagreb, organized by the Croatian Philosophical Society, on the “young” and the “old” Marx. Both discussions were primarily concerned with a question which since that time has become one of the most widely debated issues among students of Marxism: is there an essential continuity in Marx’s thought from his early manuscripts to *Capital*? Or should a distinction be drawn between a “young Marx” who was preoccupied with Hegel and humanism, and in particular with human alienation, and a “mature Marx” whose concern was to elaborate a strictly scientific view of social life comparable in method to that of the natural sciences, a Marx who abandoned his “immature” passion for humanism and vague “philosophizing”? The division between dogmatists and proponents of “creative Marxism” in these discussions coincided with disagreements over this central issue, with the former group insisting that the “mature Marx” was the only authentic Marx. The indecisive conclusion of these debates, perhaps a consequence of the very breadth of the issues themselves, was disappointing to the contenders from both sides.

Thus for the major confrontation, set for November 1960 at Bled, it was agreed that the central theme should be the so-called theory of reflection, which had been touched upon by both sides in the earlier discussions. The Bled conference, organized by the Yugoslav Association for Philosophy and Sociology, was in fact the most dramatic—and final—direct confrontation of the “innovators” (so the core of the future *Praxis* group was designated at this conference by their opponents) and the proponents
of dialectical materialism in postwar Yugoslavia. Here the vital and most sensitive nerve of “diamat” was probed in the open—the theory of reflection itself, as well as its underlying assumption of the existence of a totally objective world of matter with a structure of its own, prior to and independent of man and human activity. While this ontological assumption and the epistemological position growing out of it will be examined more closely in the context of a broader discussion of the theory of praxis and alienation in the next chapter, there are nevertheless a few noteworthy features of the Bled conference that should be recorded here.

This conference, first, was not simply a polar opposition of two internally homogeneous “camps” of Marxian thought. Among the defenders of the theory of reflection there were those who seriously attempted to modify it by emphasizing the role of an active, human, knowing subject, or who at the very least attempted to engage in serious dialogue (Veljko Ribar, Dragan Jeremic, Andrija Stojkovic, Bogdan Sesic); some of their colleagues, on the other hand, were apparently unable to bring their remarks above the level of empty sloganeering, name-calling, phrase-mongering, disgraceful conduct, and poor philosophy at best. By the same token, even the “innovators” disagreed seriously among themselves in terms of substantive matters regarding the scope and validity of the theory of reflection, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of the diversity of philosophical approaches they applied to the problem at hand. While Markovic, for instance, criticized the theory of reflection from an epistemological standpoint, pointing out that all statements about reality have only tenuous truth value at best, Kangrga strongly objected to the epistemological position itself and made this objection the basis of his critique of the theory and its assumptions. This apparently subtle difference in approach between Markovic and Kangrga in turn suggested a fundamental, underlying disagreement between the two and the intellectual
traditions under which each matured. It is therefore all the more significant that both thinkers found it possible to agree in their rejection of the theory of reflection, a coincidence which derived from their common vision of a nondogmatic Marxism critically incorporating the most valuable insights of all major intellectual traditions, both “positivist” and “idealist.”

Indeed the differences among individual members of the two major parties to the discussion paled in significance before the principal theoretical issue of the Bled conference, which was whether a Marxian revolutionary theorist could hold that matter and its objective, autonomous structure is “primary” and that consciousness is “secondary,” merely reflecting material reality without simultaneously transforming it and creating new forms of reality. The defenders of “diamat” clung rigidly to Engels’ formulation in “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy” that “the paramount question of the whole of philosophy” is that of the relationship between existence and consciousness and the primacy of one with respect to the other. The “innovators,” in contrast, were unified in suggesting that as posed this question was overly simplistic. The real concern of philosophy, they insisted, is (or should be) with human praxis as world-transforming and self-transforming activity, embracing both the subjective and objective aspects of human existence.

The absence of agreement over these issues, however, was only the surface expression of an even more far-reaching divergence. Part of the task of all social institutions, it may be argued, lies in the need to claim that the existing social order is based on the common acceptance of a set of norms and assumptions about social existence that have objective and universal validity. Especially in a social system where philosophy is traditionally seen as a handmaiden to politics, philosophy is given the special task of constructing an ontological and epistemological picture of reality conforming to the dominant institutions’ need to impose their norms on society in this way. While by 1960
most Yugoslav philosophers had outgrown the Stalinist view articulated by Mitin that the immediate task of philosophy was that of “singing the glories of our state,” there were still those who felt compelled to defend the doctrine of dialectical materialism lest the movement’s unity of thought be allowed to crumble and fall prey to “bourgeois deviation” and “revisionism.” Deprived of its claim upon exclusive knowledge of the truth, these philosophers feared, the movement’s very legitimacy would be cast into doubt. When Bogdan Sesic asked at Bled, “Why is the theory of reflection fundamental?” he echoed the convictions of his colleagues when he answered, “Because only on the basis of it can we solve the problem of the true cognition of reality.” And it is precisely this “true cognition of reality” which communist parties have traditionally invoked since the time of the Second International, and with increasing vigor as they have assumed the role of ruling parties, in affirming their historical justification.

For this reason, the theory of reflection was seen by its Yugoslav skeptics as having crucial ideological implications. As Supek wrote twelve years after the Bled conference, the theory of reflection “leads to a positivist, passive, conservative, and apologetic stance toward one’s own social reality, while the introduction of the category of praxis means the establishment of a critical and creative dimension in the socialist world.” The apologetic element in the theory of reflection becomes evident, Supek claimed, when it is pragmatically assumed that by creating “material conditions” and an “institutional base” for socialism, an emancipatory socialist consciousness will automatically follow as a direct outgrowth of these “objective” factors, while all contrary ideological manifestations are seen as evidence of subversion or the importation of “alien conceptions.” The implications of this mode of thinking are readily apparent. Since it is allegedly only the Party that possesses anything approximating “objective” knowledge about the social world, it is only within the
Party that the individual can hope to attain such knowledge and to employ it in the service of the working class and the new social order. When individuals, on the contrary, seek to liberate social consciousness from this institutional base, they are portrayed by defenders of the ruling institutions as promulgators of heresy and advocates of social anarchy.

The traditionalists at the Bled conference were unsuccessful in their endeavor to salvage the theory of reflection. Indeed, the Praxis Marxists look back on the Bled conference as the moment of their victory over dogmatic Marxism in Yugoslav philosophy, and rightly so—not so much because of anything specific that happened at Bled, but because in a very real sense Bled and 1960 marked the end of one era of postwar Yugoslav philosophy and the beginning of another. Before 1960 dialectical materialism was still an extremely influential school in Yugoslav philosophy, even though its hegemony gradually came under challenge by a loosely defined group of “innovators.” After the Bled conference, however, orthodox philosophers refused to participate in the same conferences and symposia as their critics and assumed an increasingly defensive and reactive posture which was to remain characteristic in subsequent years. It rapidly became obvious that their grip on the Yugoslav philosophical establishment was yielding to that of the group of upstart insurgents, and that what was once a philosophical and ideological heresy was on its way to becoming something of a new orthodoxy. By 1964, for instance, it came as no surprise to read that Gajo Petrović had been elected to succeed Andrija Krešić, himself one of the sharpest critics of philosophical dogmatism, as President of the Yugoslav Philosophical Association (Krešić, in turn, had succeeded Mihailo Markovic, who had been President of the Association since 1960), with Petrović carrying along with him into office a slate largely composed of many of his long-time colleagues. In delayed reaction to the founding of Praxis in 1964 and its unexpected popularity, the “diamatists”
two years later established their own journal, *Dijalektika* (under the editorship of Sinisa Stankovic and Andrija Stojkovic), which would from time to time earn the praise of Soviet philosophers citing it as the exception in a sea of revisionism and deviationism.69 But in the wake of the Bled discussions, dialectical materialism ceased to occupy the dominant position in Yugoslav philosophy, certainly an unusual state of affairs for a country that in 1960, despite the reforms of the previous decade, still retained many of the features of the traditional communist one-party state. With this provisional resolution of the debate over the nature of Marxian philosophy, the philosophical struggle of opinions moved into new areas of social life in the heightened political atmosphere of the early 1960s, as the “innovators” further attempted to define themselves and the implications of their theoretical victories.

1960-1964: The Birth of an Institution of Criticism

After the demise of *Pogledi* in 1955, the Young Turks of Yugoslav Marxist philosophy had found themselves lacking both a coherent structure in which to articulate their own position and a well-defined audience receptive to their critical orientation. Throughout the latter part of the 1950s, they were continually reminded of the importance of such structures of dissent by the Polish journal *Po prostu* and the Hungarian Petofi Circle, both of which played significant roles in the rebellions of 1956, as well as by the French dissident communist journal, */argumenti*.70 *Nase teme*, by now a very successful and widely read journal, had its original critical edge somewhat blunted (although not completely) by its commitment to represent a broad diversity of standpoints without advocating any single theoretical, ideological, or methodological approach. The Belgrade *Filosofija*, which had generated considerable interest by publishing the proceedings of philosophical debates organized by pro-
fessional societies since 1957, was also unsuitable as a vehicle for the “innovators” for much the same reasons as *Nase teme*. A Ljubljana journal, *Perspektive*, briefly attempted in 1961 to devote its major attention to critical Marxian theory but was promptly banned by governmental authorities; for their efforts, both of *Perspektive*’s chief editors, Veljko Rus and Dusan Pirjevec, lost their chairs in sociology at the University of Ljubljana. The repercussions of the *Perspektive* affair did little to encourage the critical intellectuals of Zagreb and Belgrade, increasingly doubtful about the inadequacy of *Nase teme* and *Filosofija* to their purposes, in their hopes of acquiring funding and a sponsor for a journal of their own.

The need for such a journal was only underscored in their minds by the magnitude of the task which they had set for themselves. They sought more than a place to publish—this they were not denied; what they desired was a journal under their own control that would represent a more permanent and structured way of reaching a large sector of the general public and of articulating a position which over the course of the 1950s had grown to embrace virtually all areas of inquiry in the humanistic disciplines. In 1963 and 1964 these intellectuals—the veterans of the *Pogledi* experience and of the Bled conference—published two provocative collections of essays that were well received by a broad readership. They attended three more important conferences at which they rapidly became the center of attention and in the summer of 1963 organized their own small conference, the first of what was to be a series of “Korcula Summer Schools.” Still, painfully aware of Marx’s dicta that “material force can only be overthrown by material force,” but also that “theory itself becomes a material force when it has seized the masses,” they knew that neither published collections nor conferences were capable of developing into genuine vehicles of cultural change. What both of these forms lacked above all were the crucial elements of continuity over time and access to the broad
public consciousness, transcending their own narrowly professional domain. Mindful of the role which journals had played in the cultural sphere both before and after the war, they felt that a new journal could satisfy these requirements of continuity and access while adding a new dimension to Yugoslav cultural life in general.

But by 1963 journals of various sorts were proliferating at a formidable rate in Yugoslavia. Ivan Babic, writing in a special issue of Nase teme dedicated to Krleza about “the journal as an instrument of cultural action,” referred to a “journal crisis” that had been developing for some time in Yugoslav cultural life.75 While the volume of printed matter was certainly impressive, the confusing variety of orientations represented within each journal was felt to be debilitating precisely from the standpoint of the journal as an instrument of socially oriented cultural activity. Surely these considerations weighed heavily in the minds of critical Marxist intellectuals such as Petrović, Supek, and others when they surveyed the cultural landscape in search of a journal with which they could unqualifiedly identify.

A second set of pressures impelling these critical intellectuals to find a vehicle through which they could clearly express their identity was imposed by the political climate of the early 1960s. 1963 and 1964 were years of intense public debate in anticipation of the Eighth Congress of the LCY, which had been assigned the task of developing a new set of Party statutes. One of the most vital issues in this context was whether the principle of “democratic centralism,” which had been directly incorporated into the theory and practice of the Yugoslav Communist Party in the days of the Third International and had remained virtually intact since that time, was in need of revision in view of the Party’s new tasks as defined over the past decade. Svetozar Stojanović, a young (born 1931) colleague of Mihailo Markovic from the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Belgrade with experience in Party ideological work in the 1950s, contributed to
the work of a Party commission examining the statutes and attempted to argue for a relaxation of the principle through provisions for open debate and criticism at all levels, and between all levels, of the Party hierarchy. At the heart of the matter was the question of whether the Stalinist view of the “unity of will” as the necessary precondition for the “unity of action” retained equal validity for Yugoslavia, where the Party had undergone significant changes since 1952. Formally, more liberal conditions were ultimately incorporated into the Party statutes. But subsequent events were to show that the real intent of the Party leadership pointed in other directions—to silence and isolate a growing movement of disaffection from within the Party’s own ranks.

The true feelings of the Party summit about democratic centralism became particularly evident at a symposium held in June 1964 in Novi Sad, organized by the Institute for the Study of the Workers’ Movement. In a controversial presentation, Stojanović called for a thorough democratization of the entire Party apparatus, involving not only the rotation of cadres and open discussion, but also use of the referendum, respect for the rights and opinions of the minority, democratic nomination and election of all Party officials, and full accessibility of the work of Party organs to public scrutiny. Stojanović’s colleague Ljubomir Tadić (also from the Belgrade Philosophy Faculty), who had just a year earlier been involved in the preparation of the new Constitution, argued similarly that in a society espousing workers’ self-management as its basic structural principle, the Party itself must be structured as a paradigm of democracy. In even stronger terms, Tadić spoke of the necessity of a thorough purge of all careerists and opportunists from the Party and active recruitment from the working class and the “socialist intelligentsia.”

These remarks did not sit well with the chief Party representative at the symposium, Veljko Vlahovic, Chairman of the
Central Committee’s Commission on Ideological Work. Vlahovic characterized the demand of Stojanović (and by clear implication, that of Tadić as well) for “self-management within the Party” as “a serious mistake,” and even went so far as to liken Stojanović’s criticism of the existing structure of self-management in Yugoslavia to that of the Chinese—in the conditions of the early 1960s, a serious indictment indeed. The conclusion drawn by Vlahovic from this confrontation was unambiguous, setting the Party’s tone in its relations with that “socialist intelligentsia” of which Tadić had spoken for many years to come:

Our society will not benefit if within the League of Communists and in the name of communist thought individuals appear who do not stand on scientific ground and who will be blown by the winds in all directions like a weathervane. The League of Communists has no need of this kind of intellectual.79

The Party’s attitude was further confirmed a few months later in the context of a symposium of the Yugoslav Philosophical Association on the theme “Socialism and Ethics,” held in Vrnjacka Banja. Preliminary drafts of papers presented here by Stojanović and Markovic on moral aspects of the revolution and revolutionary culture so horrified Party observers that the rapporteurs received ominous warnings before the symposium about the possible consequences of their actions—indeed, at one point the Party summit tried unsuccessfully to call off the symposium entirely.80 Clearly, the Party leadership was not prepared to leave any room for such ideological “deviation” within its own institutional domain.

The climax of this confrontation between the Party and the intellectuals took place at the LCY Eighth Congress in December 1964, where there occurred, in the succinct words of a Praxis editorial commentary some months later, a “lively discussion” about Yugoslav philosophy and its relation to the Party.81 The
discussion was organized by the Party’s Commission on Ideological Movements and was apparently an official part of the Congress agenda. A highlight of the debate was a defense of the radical philosophers by the veteran Party theorist Makso Bace, who had himself been in the forefront of the Yugoslav reexamination of Soviet theory and practice over fifteen years before. While critical of the philosophers’ alleged utopianism and their treatment of various philosophical problems, Bace pleaded for tolerance and debate in the place of suspicion and exclusion in terms that must have been as irritating to the politicians as they were gratifying to the philosophers:

On the one hand, the fact is that our philosophers have understood, maintained, and developed this point [that Yugoslavia’s political system has shown itself capable of generating a more humane society—gss], and are continuing to struggle for it. Their best intentions ... ought not to be put into doubt.... A common language must be found.... Members of the League of Communists should ... not be overly sensitive when philosophers say something new, or if philosophy refuses to be an “ancilla politicae,” for if philosophy becomes a handmaiden, it ceases to be philosophy.... Only free, creative philosophy can ensure development; only aspirations toward self-management, free discussion—in the press, at congresses, in the League of Communists—dialogue, and the struggle of opinions can make possible development in all spheres.82

Among the philosophers themselves present at this discussion, there seems to have been a clear sense that a critical turning point was about to be reached in the opportunities offered for criticism within the Party’s ranks. This issue had been made all the more urgent in view of their general impatience to move from narrow theoretical exegesis to concrete social criticism. Markovic, while quite optimistic in tone, voiced the feelings of his colleagues:

Our League of Communists has a great opportunity in this respect, not only because it has found a path to guarantee a requi-
site degree of democratism in our entire social structure as well as in scientific life, but also because it has succeeded in creating a new, progressive, humanist intelligentsia which is rather independent in its work but which is prepared to commit itself most adequately and creatively to the fundamental values of socialist society. There are few countries in the world, including socialist countries, that can boast of such an achievement. Therefore it is possible to look on the future development of our social-scientific thought with a great deal of confidence and optimism, all of its temporary weaknesses notwithstanding.\textsuperscript{83}

That one of those weaknesses was a clear hostility on the part of upper levels of the Party hierarchy to a common understanding with this humanist intelligentsia seems to have gone without saying. Nor was it indeed likely that many Party leaders felt very happy with Markovic’s suggestion that the humanist intelligentsia was to some degree their own creation.

The results of the Congress were disappointing. The new Party Statute, while providing for the election of all Party officials, adhered to the principle of democratic centralism as traditionally understood. The Statute failed to mention the “rights of the minority” to articulate dissident views after a decision had been reached, nor did it define any framework to guarantee that Party decisions themselves would be arrived at in a truly democratic manner.\textsuperscript{84} In major speeches, moreover, high Party leaders such as Rankovic and Vlahovic explicitly and emphatically rejected the thesis that the League of Communists should be structured according to the principle of self-management, emphasizing instead the need for ideological unity and strongly implying that those who were insisting on the right to criticism should not expect to remain welcome much longer within the Party.\textsuperscript{85} The time had clearly arrived for intellectuals committed to criticism as a mode of social activity to make a painful choice: either to submit to Party discipline and to abandon any ideas of “permanent revolution” through intra-Party criticism, or to attempt to carry on their critical activity beyond the boundaries of
the Party’s institutional structure. The true dimensions of this difficult decision had been anticipated by Markovic a few months earlier when he asserted that the “moral integrity of the individual has primacy over the demand for pure discipline or loyalty.”

It is in this immediate political context that we must view the appearance of the journal *Praxis*. To be sure, the actual decision to publish *Praxis* was made in late 1963 with its first issue appearing in September 1964, while the final verdict on intra-Party criticism was delivered only in December of the same year. Yet a climate of hostility to this mode of criticism had been mounting steadily over the past two years. Sensing a serious challenge to the Party’s hegemony in ideological affairs in 1963, the influential dogmatist Boris Zipherl had stated that “the bearer of such criticism ... must be only the progressive forces of society”—i.e., the Party itself. The Party simply could not tolerate any source of criticism which did not view itself as accountable to the Party’s own designated bodies for ideological affairs. From this time forward, this would be the position of the Party leadership toward social criticism—welcoming only that criticism which could be safely identified as being associated with “responsible” Party officials and organs. Tadić would later characterize this attitude in the following way:

All other forms of criticism are seen not only as incompetent but as illegitimate as well, insofar as they are not put into motion within the framework of parameters which have been affirmed, planned, and prescribed beforehand. Every humanly spontaneous criticism is denounced as “fault-finding” [kritizerstvo]. Accordingly, any unofficial, non-institutional attempt to transcend a contemplative, passive stance toward social reality is qualified in principle as ideological diversion, if not as subversive activity as well.

Thus a variety of interrelated pressures, some of which had been generated by the internal logic of the development of
Yugoslav postwar Marxian philosophy and yet others which had been externally imposed by the political system, combined in 1963 and 1964 to encourage the philosophers and sociologists committed to a critical Marxian social theory to define clearly their role vis-a-vis other schools of thought and society at large. They finally persuaded the Croatian Philosophical Society to sponsor a journal exclusively under their editorship, which in line with their chief “theoretical” preoccupation they named *Praxis*. The Society’s role was to be almost purely ceremonial, designed to meet the requirements of Yugoslav law and to exempt the Editorial Board from the need to make a detailed accounting of its aims to governmental authorities. The two Editors-in-Chief and the Editorial Board were to have full control over editorial policy and discretion, while for its part the Society would not directly provide any operational funds. Financial support would derive instead from funds for culture administered by the government as well as from proceeds of sales and subscriptions. As subsequent experience would show, however, neither the required yearly affirmation of sponsorship by the Croatian Philosophical Society nor the procurement of operational funds would always be routine affairs when external political pressure was brought to bear.

The first issue of *Praxis*, appearing in September 1964, was prefaced by a four-page pronouncement describing the goals of the journal. It began by referring to the “journal crisis” of the early 1960s discussed earlier in this chapter: “There are so many journals today, and so few people who read them!” Gajo Petrovic, who was responsible for this editorial statement, went on:

> Because in all this overabundance, it seems that we do not have a single journal that corresponds to our desires: a philosophical journal that is not narrowly “specialized,” a philosophical journal that is not only philosophical but which also treats current problems of Yugoslav socialism, of the modern world and of man. What we desire is not a philosophical journal of the traditional
character, nor do we desire a general theoretical journal deprived of a central idea and offering no defined physiognomy.

Instead, Praxis was conceived as the mouthpiece of a distinct orientation, simultaneously intellectual and social, which aspired to establish the cultural foundations for further revolutionary transformation in the profoundly humanist spirit of Marx’s teachings. On behalf of his colleagues, Petrović set forth the following profession of faith:

Socialism is the sole humane outlet offered to mankind to the difficulties with which it is struggling, and Marx’s thought is the theoretical basis of, and the most adequate inspiration for, revolutionary action. One of the principal causes of the lack of success and deformation of socialist theory and practice in the course of the past few decades is to be sought precisely in the lack of attention accorded to the “philosophical dimension” of Marx’s thought, in the overt or dissimulated negation of its humanist essence. The development of an authentic, humanist socialism cannot be accomplished without the revitalization and development of the philosophical thought of Marx, without more profound study of the works of all important Marxists, and without an approach to the open question of our time that is truly Marxist, revolutionary, and undogmatic.91

The complex nature of the task of cultural revitalization which the Praxis Marxists had set for themselves was reflected in the distinctive, careful balance which the editors of the journal sought to strike between theory and practice—or more accurately, between the critique of theory and the critique of practice. Time and again, in editorial statements and in substantive essays, the Praxis Marxists sought refuge in the formulation that Praxis was “only” a philosophical journal, that its purpose was merely to discuss important issues and not to resolve them, and that the journal constituted in no way a platform of political opposition. Yet the term “philosophical” was employed by Praxis Marxists in a special sense. “What we desire,” it was stated in the
editorial preface to the first issue, “is a philosophical journal in the sense in which philosophy is the thought of revolution: the merciless critique of all existing conditions, the humanist vision of a truly human world, and the force that inspires revolutionary action.”

To be sure, not all philosophy fits this description; and because an understanding of the specific meaning assigned to philosophy by the Praxis Marxists is so central to a full appreciation of Praxis itself, their attitude toward philosophy will be a recurring topic of discussion throughout this study. If for the moment, however, we draw a rough identity between philosophy and criticism, or more specifically posit that a consistently humanist philosophy may serve as a systematic basis for the critical evaluation of social reality, then it is possible to understand how the frequent Praxis recourse to the excuse that their discussions were “merely philosophical” often failed to satisfy their more astute critics. For when the principles of social practice are dictated authoritatively by political forums, then philosophy—which we can tentatively define with Sheldon Wolin as involving “truths publicly arrived at and publicly demonstrable”—and a format based on philosophical discussion can be one of the most effective weapons against dogmatism and all reified thinking based on relationships of domination and subordination. The experience of Praxis set forth in the following pages demonstrates that, without violating the requirements of rational and systematic thought, philosophy can indeed be a powerful instrument in “the merciless critique of all existing conditions” as well as a practical instrument in the struggle for socialism and a more humane society.

In another more immediate sense, the insistence of the Praxis Marxists on the exclusively theoretical nature of their undertaking may be appreciated if we consider that the founding of the journal itself was in fact a symbolic act of a deeply political nature in a political culture that does not view such acts with indif-
ference. The establishment of *Praxis* in the early 1960s was a step directly comparable to the establishment of other “thick journals” in Russia a century before and in Yugoslavia in more recent memory. It signified that an important step had been taken toward the institutionalization of ideological differences within the Yugoslav communist movement that had become increasingly irreconcilable with the passage of time. It is of course possible and even probable, judging from Tadić’s above-quoted reference to “non-institutional” criticism, that in 1964 the *Praxis* Marxists did not actually perceive themselves as creating an institution of criticism to exist alongside of, if not in opposition to, the Party. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the *Praxis* Marxists wished to compensate for the Party’s apparent inability to absorb critical Marxian thought by providing a channel for such thought on the fringes of Party life. By stressing that their goal was theoretical clarification rather than political action, they hoped to be able to convey to the Party and the public at large that *Praxis* was not an organ of a nascent political opposition in the classical sense of the term. While it was clear to the *Praxis* Marxists that the Party needed to submit itself to intense reexamination and thorough democratization, they were far from challenging the basic parameters of the one-party political system, nor did they ever do so despite their total rejection by the Party. The Party and the country, they were convinced, could only be strengthened through the type of open criticism and debate among Marxists and communists which *Praxis* was designed to foster.94

These subtleties of *Praxis’s* self-image notwithstanding, it was not long before the Party, sensitized to serious attempts at dissent by the Djilas affair ten years before, began to suspect *Praxis* of being the basis of an outright oppositional movement. A relatively young but rising figure in the Croatian Party organization, Mika Tripalo (later identified as the leader of the Croatian nationalist movement and purged in 1971), stated a few months
after the appearance of *Praxis* that positions taken in *Praxis* articles

create the objective conditions, regardless of the intentions of the individuals concerned, for *Praxis* to become the core of an oppositional group about which all the oppositional and dissatisfied elements of our society are gathering.  

Certainly in this alarmist statement Tripalo may have been overestimating the capabilities of *Praxis* as well as totally misconstruing the goals of the journal’s adherents. Yet if social institutions can be defined by a relatively fixed set of actors, a commonly accepted set of purposes, a distinct social identity, and a reasonably consistent mode of activity, then *Praxis* can be said without reservation to have constituted a social institution in its own right. And it was precisely this ambiguity about *Praxis* and its role in Yugoslav society that was responsible for *Praxis*’s brilliant success as well as its ultimate demise.

*Praxis: A Profile*

Before proceeding to discuss the *Praxis* Marxists’ critique of philosophy (Chapter II) and of politics (Chapters III and IV), it would be useful to give the reader some idea of the general features of the journal itself, its editorial policies and composition, and the various functions engaged in by the Editorial Board not directly connected with the actual publication of the journal. One of the more unusual features of *Praxis* is that it was issued in two editions, one in Serbo-Croatian and one directed primarily toward Western readers. The International Edition, first published in 1965, appeared quarterly (often biannually in double-numbers), with articles in English, French, and German, the language determined by the particular audience which the author of a piece wished to address. The Yugoslav Edition had six numbers each year, and in both editions each number con-
sisted of approximately 150 pages (double-numbers usually ran to about 300 pages). While articles by both Yugoslav and foreign authors appeared in both editions, the content of the two editions was not always identical, although considerable overlap did exist. It would appear that the editorship determined in which edition a given essay or review would appear on the basis of anticipated interest among the respective readership. With a few notable exceptions, the International Edition carried essays of general philosophical interest, while the Yugoslav Edition was supplemented with discussions and polemics more readily understandable to the domestic audience. Regrettably for the non-Yugoslav readership, however, it was the latter type of contribution which gave Praxis its distinctive tone and style, not to mention its political notoriety.

Each issue of Praxis featured a special theme to which six or more essays were usually devoted. These themes varied from very general problems of philosophy (e.g., “What is History?” “Socialism and Ethics,” “Phenomenology and Marxism,” “Creativity and Reification,” “Hegel and Our Times”) to more topical questions of politics, society, and culture (“The Meaning and Perspectives of Socialism,” “Art in the Modern World,” “Yugoslav Culture,” “Bureaucracy, Technocracy and Liberty,” “Philosophy in Contemporary Society,” “Culture and Science,” “The National, International and Universal,” “Marx and Revolution,” “Power and Humanity,” “The Moment of Yugoslav Socialism”). From time to time issues would be oriented toward in-depth consideration of individual thinkers, such as Marx himself, Bloch, Lukacs, Gramsci, or Trotsky. By establishing this thematic unity, the editors succeeded in endowing each issue with a dynamic and provocative character.

The same tension between the general and the particular was to be found in other rubrics of Praxis as well, and it was indeed the diversity of topics treated in Praxis that made it a vital center of intellectual life in Yugoslavia and abroad and literally a
critique of all existing conditions. In “Portraits and Situations,” contributors critically discussed the ideas and experiences of major world thinkers, both Marxist and non-Marxist, such as Lukács, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Goldmann, Fromm (a self-portrait), Carnap, Nietzsche, Simmel, Heidegger, and Husserl. The heading “Thought and Reality” tended to be more topical and controversial, often including general essays on the problem of dogmatism and criticism in socialist society, while under “Discussion” were to be found for the most part extremely provocative essays and polemics on topics of particular political sensitivity (e.g., coexistence, the state of Yugoslav social theory, the gap between proclaimed ideals and social reality in Yugoslavia, the Party, bureaucracy, ideology). The desire of the editors of Praxis to make the journal a genuine focal point of intellectual and cultural life was further reflected in such regular features as “Philosophical Life” (reports of Yugoslav and international professional conferences), “Brief Announcements” of such meetings and small symposia, “Echoes” (in the Yugoslav Edition only, this section consisted of reactions to Praxis in the foreign press), and “Chronicle” (a rather comprehensive report on reactions to Praxis within Yugoslavia and occasional editorial evaluations of the journal’s activity and its current position on the Yugoslav scene).

Robert Maguire has written that literary criticism was the heart of the Russian thick journal, and mutatis mutandis, Praxis was no exception. The Book Review section of Praxis, sometimes covering as much as ten to twenty pages, was a central point of interest in each issue. Often more could be learned about the orientation of the journal and its contributors from the reviews than from more extended essays. “Through the reviews,” Supek once reflected, “we come into contact with the most important intellectual achievements in the world, we can define ourselves toward them and interest our readers in them, i.e., lead them into an intellectual world.” The reviews were generally
oriented toward both domestic and foreign readers, and their scope and quality revealed a desire to consider and to appropriate critically from all significant intellectual currents to the extent that they coincided with or enriched the commitment of the journal to rational and universal Marxian criticism. In the first issue of *Praxis* alone, books by Alfred Schmidt, Ernst Bloch, Henri Lefebvre, Kostas Axelos, Robert C. Tucker, Sveta Lukic, and Eugen Fink were reviewed, covering Marxian thought, Yugoslav literature, the philosophy of Nietzsche, and current sociology. In subsequent issues the same breadth was maintained in reviews of works by Serge Mallet, Andre Gorz, Herbert Marcuse, Lucien Goldmann, Edgar Morin, Marek Fritzhand, Erich Fromm, Georg Lukacs, Jose Ortega y Gasset, John Kenneth Galbraith, and in reprints of reviews originally published elsewhere of works by *Praxis* Marxists themselves. Thus through the reviews a constant interchange was established between foreign and Yugoslav authors and their opposite audiences. The content of the reviews—usually objective, but always critical and provocative—made this section one of the most stimulating and important for any reader who wished to get a feeling for the journal and its concerns, and certainly for the reader who simply desired a rich guide to some of the most important developments in contemporary Marxian philosophy and socialist thought.

The original Editorial Board of *Praxis* was composed of philosophers (with the possible exception of Rudi Supek, who views himself as a sociologist) from the University of Zagreb—part of the core group of “innovators” whose development we followed earlier in this chapter. The first Editors-in-Chief were Gajo Petrović and Danilo Pejovic (the latter replaced by Rudi Supek in 1966), while the original Editorial Board consisted of Branko Bosnjak, Danko Grlic, Milan Kangrqa, Pejovic, Petrović, Supek, and Predrag Vranicki." Even though the editorship was composed exclusively of Zagreb intellectuals, however, Petrović emphasized in the very beginning that *Praxis* would have a
strongly internationalist orientation. He asserted that

one cannot treat the problems of Croatia separately from those of Yugoslavia, nor can the problems of Yugoslavia today be isolated from the great problems of the modern world. Neither socialism nor self-management is something narrowly national, and Marxism cannot be Marxism, nor can socialism be socialism, if they are enclosed within narrow national frameworks.\(^\text{100}\)

In line with this commitment to internationalism and partly in response to domestic political pressures, an Advisory Council to Praxis was created in 1966 and announced in the first issue of 1967. The Advisory Council was without doubt one of the most impressive collection of significant Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers of the mid-twentieth century—including Yugoslavs such as Mihailo Djuric, Vladimir Filipovic, Veljko Korac, Andrija Krešić, Mihailo Markovic, Vojin Milic, Zagorka Pesic-Golubovic, Veljko Rus, Svetozar Stojanović, Ljubomir Tadić, and Miladin Životić, as well as such internationally known figures as Costas Axelos, A. J. Ayer, Zygmunt Baumann, Norman Birnbaum, Ernst Bloch, Thomas Bottomore, Erich Fromm, Lucien Goldmann, André Gorz, Jurgen Habermas, Agnes Heller, Leszek Kofakowski, Karel Kosfk, Henri Lefebvre, Georg Lukacs, Serge Mallet, Herbert Marcuse, Enzo Paci, David Riesman, Kurt Wolff, Aldo Zanardo—and others. Nearly all the members of the Advisory Council took an active interest in Praxis and Yugoslav philosophy, frequently contributing essays to the journal and attending philosophical conferences in Yugoslavia. Thus the Advisory Council was more than a mere showpiece for the sake of domestic and international prestige. Similarly, the International Edition of Praxis itself was intended, in the words of the original editorial statement of purpose, “not to ‘represent’ Yugoslav thought to the foreign scene, but to encourage international philosophical collaboration for the study of the crucial questions of our time.”\(^\text{101}\)

A problem of particular delicacy for the Praxis Editorial
Board was that of editorial responsibility for the content of individual *Praxis* articles. It was clear that *Praxis* was to be no ordinary journal and it was certainly to be anticipated (if not actively desired) that a given issue of *Praxis* might contain any number of assertions offensive to the authorities. It was hardly the wish of the Editorial Board to exert anything resembling pre-censorship on contributors to the journal, yet at the same time it was obvious that failure to maintain a reasonably moderate tone could provoke severe government repression and jeopardize *Praxis'*s very existence. While facing this possibility without illusion, the Editorial Board established an official policy designed to protect the journal by assigning full responsibility to the contributors as individuals. In the introduction to one of the early *Praxis* issues it was stated:

> Is it necessary to add that all the essays published here are above all the expression of the points of view of their authors? It is self-evident, in our opinion, that the positions frequently diverge, and the Editorial Board does not see anything in this that detracts from their value. And it is precisely in the hope that they may generate discussion, perhaps even misunderstanding, that the Editorial Board presents them to the public: Our journal declares itself ready to open its pages to any worthy theoretical reply, and even to controversy.102

By far the most important extracurricular activity of the *Praxis* Marxists was the Korcula Summer School, an annual series of talks and discussions lasting about ten days in late August held in the relaxed setting of the charming Adriatic island of Korcula. The first school was a small gathering of Zagreb and Belgrade Marxists held in August 1963 at the suggestion of Rudi Supek (whose modest summer house is located across the channel from Korcula in the town of Orebic), but in 1964 invitations were sent to intellectuals in the rest of Europe and America to participate in the meeting. The result was an impressive volume of papers and discussions entitled “The Meaning and Perspec-
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fives of Socialism,” printed in both the International and Yugoslav Editions of *Praxis*. The 1964 Korcula Summer School was marked by lively and bold discussions by Lefebvre, Kosič, Marcuse, and Mallet, as well as by several Yugoslavs, on problems of Marxism, self-management (Markovic and Rus), freedom and democracy (Stojanović), and mass culture (Životić), while Marcuse and Mallet engaged in a stimulating exchange over the integration of the working class into capitalist society and the future of socialism in the highly industrialized countries. In subsequent years a high level of discussion was generally sustained, with 1968 standing out particularly with the presence of Marcuse and Bloch following the revolutionary outbursts in Western Europe, America, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Attendance at the Korcula Summer School ranged consistently in the hundreds. After 1968 the presence of Marxists from the other countries of Eastern Europe dropped off sharply, but this was more than compensated for by increased participation of Yugoslavs, Western Europeans, and Americans, including increasing numbers of students. While the links between the Korcula Summer School and *Praxis* were formally only indirect, their goals and collaborators were identical. Together they earned Yugoslav Marxism a respected place in the ranks of the world philosophical community.¹⁰³

In its first phase, the primary task of *Praxis* was the demystification of theory as the necessary precondition of the demystification of practice. Even in 1963, Milan Kangrga wrote in anticipation of such an undertaking that

> at first it will be necessary, perhaps even with the help of quotations (only of another sort!) to point to the essential, significant, and above all creatively interpreted and reinforced passages from the classics, passages which for socialism are decisive.¹⁰⁴

And while contextual analysis and exegesis (to be sure, in a new form) had already, in fact, become an established method
among these thinkers for the revelation of deviations from the “authentic” thought of Marx, not even Marx himself would be immune to the universal sweep of radical criticism. For if, as even the dogmatists maintained (however reluctantly), it is necessary to “develop” Marx’s thought, then as Danko Grlic wrote in the first issue of Praxis,

the question of authority, of supreme ideological authority, is today an open question facing Marxist philosophy. For how... are we to develop Marxist thought at all if we cannot, in principle, have different, even divergent views on some issues from those held by the classics?105

No idols, then, were to be spared the penetrating gaze of criticism from the standpoint of revolutionary praxis and humanism. The critical philosophers of Pogledi, the “victors” at Bled, had finally achieved their first goal—to establish a journal of their own. Their task was now to demolish all dogmatism and the authority of truth based on political power. While this course would soon bring them into direct conflict with the representatives of the power structure in Yugoslavia, individuals who not long before had found themselves in a similar position with respect to the Soviet Union and before that with respect to the bourgeois regime, the intellectuals of Praxis now felt that they had a more secure basis for their crusade than at any time in the past. They were now as well prepared as they ever would be for conflict in the name of the ruthless critique of all existing conditions, ruthless “in two senses: The criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be.”106 These words of the young Marx would be both the motto of the Praxis group and their chief source of inspiration in the difficult years that lay ahead.
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Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from the chain, not in order that man shall bear the chain without caprice or consolation but so that he shall cast off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of religion disillusions man so that he will think, act and fashion his reality as a man who has lost his illusions and regained his reason; so that he will revolve about himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does not revolve about himself.

—Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction”

We must cut off by the roots a tree that has always borne poisons.

—Voltaire

Philosophy and the Principle of Criticism

Both logically and chronologically, the *Praxis* “critique of all existing conditions” proceeded from the critique of philosophy to the critique of politics. For the *Praxis* Marxists, as for Marx himself, the “criticism of religion”—in this case, the criticism of a body of once revolutionary thought, imbued with a truly religious tone by decades of institutionalization and invested with the authority of absolute Truth—was “the premise of all criticism.” But unlike Marx, for whom the Feuerbachian “criticism of religion” had provided a ready-made path to his own “criticism of politics,” the *Praxis* Marxists were obliged to take on
both tasks at once. Deeply committed to Marxism as the sole means of attaining an adequate understanding of man and his world, they realized that their first challenge would be radically to rid Marxism itself of all encrustations of dogma and to reconstitute it as a living, critical theory. To apply that theory in a critical manner to postrevolutionary socialist society, and thereby to gain insights of the same quality as did Marx with respect to capitalism, meant that they would first have to devote their critical faculties to an examination of Marxism and to purge it of all its ideological aspects. Indeed their work of the 1950s, beginning with the writings of Vranicki, Supek, and others on the thought of the young Marx and the significance of the concept of alienation, and ending with the Bled symposium of 1960, was in large part dedicated to this very purpose. Throughout the years of Praxis itself, the continual clarification and development of the Marxian philosophical system would be the cornerstone on which the entire edifice of social and political criticism would rest.

When we speak of the “ideological aspects” of Marxism, it is important to bear in mind that the concept of ideology itself was central to all of Marx’s thought. It was in The German Ideology that Marx offered a theoretical framework which could even account, a hundred years later, for how his own preeminently critical theory of society eventually came to play a conservative, ideological role:

> For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.²

For Marx, the critique of capitalist society began with the critique of its false and self-perpetuating concepts, of its ideology. In fact, Marx’s entire theoretical opus can be thought of as a
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vast labor of criticism—criticism of the speculative philosophy of Hegel, followed by criticism of Feuerbach and Left Hegelianism, a critique of the “true socialists,” of Proudhon, of an entire succession of currents of radical thought and practice, consummated in the famous “critique of political economy” which is all too often understood independently of Marx’s other works. In all these cases it was Marx’s object to penetrate the veil of appearance, illusion, and deception—either deliberate or unintended—surrounding statements about the human condition, to expose all fetishes and frozen principles, and to show how these fetishes exist in intimate connection with various social and historical interests in the preservation or strengthening of the existing set of social relations. This act of demystification was the essence of Marx’s method of radical criticism, which proceeded from the simple proposition that while “to be radical is to grasp things by the root,. .. for man the root is man himself.” At all times it was a fundamentally humanistic view of the world and a positive vision of the virtually limitless capacity of man to transcend the narrow limits imposed on him throughout history by both nature and society that constituted the guiding spirit of Marx’s critical work. And it was this spirit which the Praxis Marxists hoped to recapture from the Stalinist past by subjecting Marxism itself to a critical analysis.

The scope of the task of philosophical reevaluation and reconstruction which the Praxis Marxists set for themselves was formidable. In 1964, in the midst of the French Communist Party’s self-conscious reexamination of Stalinism, Merleau-Ponty described this undertaking as a “Herculean task”:

To remain faithful to what one was; to begin everything again from the beginning—each of these two tasks is immense. In order to state the precise respects in which one is still a Marxist, it would be necessary to show just what is essential in Marx and when it was lost. One would have to point out the fork at which he stood on the genealogical tree if he wanted to be a new shoot off the main branch, or if he thought of rejoining the trunk’s axis of growth, or
if finally he was reintegrating Marx as a whole into an older and more recent way of thought, of which Marxism was only a transitory form. In short, one would have to redefine the relationship of the young Marx to Marx, of both to Hegel, of that whole tradition to Lenin, of Lenin to Stalin and even to Khrushchev, and finally the relationships of Hegelo-Marxism to what had gone before it.\textsuperscript{4}

The actual project undertaken by the \textit{Praxis} Marxists was no less far-reaching. Their revolt against a dogmatic, institutionalized theory parading the name of Marx involved a painstaking reappraisal of the origins of Marx’s thought and particularly its relationship to the Hegelian dialectic. It involved bold reconsideration of current schools of philosophical thought in the West that had been reviled by the spokesmen of official Marxism but which seemed to be of particular importance to the revitalization of Marxian thought, as well as a new look at the thought of many Marxian thinkers who had been anathematized as “renegades” and “bourgeois philosophers” by regime ideologists. In all this the \textit{Praxis} Marxists were not, of course, unique. Landshut and Mayer in the 1930s and Calvez in the 1940s had explicitly stressed the importance of Marx’s early writings for a complete understanding of his later works. In 1960 Sartre had published his massive \textit{Critique de la raison dialectique}, in which he proclaimed that he viewed existentialism as “an enclave inside Marxism, which simultaneously engenders it and rejects it.”\textsuperscript{5} And with regard to some of the more unorthodox Marxian thinkers, the Yugoslavs certainly have had no monopoly over the heritage of Gramsci, Bloch, and Lukacs, especially since the latter two were still very much alive in the 1960s. The distinctive contribution of the \textit{Praxis} Marxists lay in their persistent attempt to mobilize all these elements selectively into a systematic philosophical theory which could in turn serve as the cornerstone for the “critique of all existing conditions” in a country where Marxism has served, at least formally, as the basis of the dominant ideology.

The importance of the philosophical aspects of Marxian
theory for the Praxis Marxists, moreover, was reflected in the specific mode through which they attempted to establish the “unity” of theory and practice. Indeed, the full name of their journal was *Praxis: A Philosophical Bimonthly* (in the Yugoslav Edition; the International Edition was called *Praxis: Revue philosophique*), and on balance, the bulk of their unity of theory and practice fell squarely on the side of theory. As argued in preceding pages, this “theoretical” resolution was important for Praxis as a means of institutional rationalization and self-preservation. Yet the very notion of philosophy, especially in Marxian theory, is itself replete with particularly subtle connotations which added meaning and substance of a higher order to the Praxis Marxists’ “philosophical” undertaking. While some of the specific problems presented for the Praxis theorists by the Marxist concept of the “transcendence of philosophy” will be treated toward the end of this chapter, it should be kept in mind throughout the following discussion that regardless of internal differences of opinion about the role of philosophy, none of the Praxis Marxists would wholly embrace the view that philosophy is an eternally fixed entity to be valued for its own sake. Thus when I speak of the “philosophical” system of individual Praxis Marxists, I shall do so only as a shorthand for their theoretical constructions which in turn should always be thought of as a prelude to the larger work of creative social criticism. Yet as will be seen below, for some Praxis Marxists even a theoretical construction—especially under certain social and cultural conditions—may be a creative act, as the very word “construction” suggests. Indeed, without this in mind it is difficult to appreciate the significance of the “power of the word” in the life of many contemporary socialist societies.

The Return to the Revolutionary Subject

In order to locate the Praxis Marxists on the historical continuum of the development of Marxist thought over the past
century, it is useful to recall the theoretical legacies of thinkers such as Lenin, Luxemburg, Gramsci, Lukacs, and Korsch. What all these theorists shared, despite the great dissimilarities of their political histories, was the partial or total rejection of the rigid doctrines of the Second International which assigned the motive force in history to a set of universally valid laws of social development that act with the same inexorability as the laws of nature. To them, the broad impact of Eduard Bernstein’s revisionism was only proof that for years a serious misconception about Marxism had been reigning in the socialist movement, a misconception of which Bernstein’s “revisionism” was only a logical, if ill-conceived, consequence. Instead of devoting their efforts (as had the proponents of orthodoxy in the German Social Democratic movement) to a celebration of the historically inevitable victory of the working class and to an empty rhetoric of revolution which would only have belied the movement’s reformist path, these pivotal figures sought insights into two major questions which seemed to plague the movement’s very existence: How was it that the working class had thus far failed to overthrow the capitalist order; and more fundamentally, what is the role of class consciousness in the revolutionary process?

Their common conclusion was that it was no longer possible to take for granted the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat and that it was of the utmost urgency to direct all the energies of the movement toward the radicalization of working class consciousness as the best means of preparing for the revolution itself. Their ways of implementing this imperative, however, often diverged dramatically. For Lenin, the solution was to be sought in a tightly structured vanguard party with a highly restricted membership, while Luxemburg actively agitated for the general strike in the firm belief that the self-organization of the proletariat, “the direct, independent action of the masses” and the revolutionary consciousness generated by the experience of active struggle, were constitutive of the revolutionary
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proletariat itself. Gramsci stressed the cultural maturation of the working class through its participation in workers’ councils and later, in his prison years, emphasized the necessity of what Romano Giachetti has called a “subjective revolution” in human nature itself.\textsuperscript{8}

Korsch and Lukacs articulated their concerns in a somewhat more theoretical vein by devoting themselves to a philosophical reconstruction of Marxism, a task which was also partly undertaken by Gramsci in the development of his “philosophy of praxis.” The purpose of this reconstruction was to gain an appreciation of the active role of the historical “subject” in the changing of reality, in contrast to the dominant view of orthodox Marxism which held that “objective conditions” were always the primary factor determining both the course of historical change as well as the subjective desires of human actors. The practical implications of this new perspective were well summarized by Lukacs in his \textit{History and Class Consciousness}, where he asserted (reminiscent of Lenin) that

\begin{quote}
the class consciousness of the proletariat, the truth of the process “as subject,” is itself far from stable and constant; it does not advance according to mechanical “laws.”... The superiority of the proletariat must lie exclusively in its ability to see society from the centre, as a coherent whole. This means to act in such a way as to change reality.... In other words, when the final economic crisis of capitalism develops, the fate of the revolution (and with it the fate of mankind) will depend on the ideological maturity of the proletariat, i.e. on its class consciousness.\textsuperscript{9}
\end{quote}

What emerged from Lukacs’s reexamination of the philosophical structure of Marxism was a fundamentally new theory of human existence in society, “new” at least in the sense that it had heretofore been lost in the still undiscovered manuscripts of the young Marx. Lukacs’s conceptual point of departure was not, accordingly, the young Marx’s theory of alienation, but instead the theory of commodity fetishism set forth by Marx
in the first volume of *Capital*; his method consisted in analyzing the subject-object relationship as it had developed in classical German idealism from Kant to Hegel and its metamorphosis in Marx’s theory of human praxis. It was this kind of Marxism, Lukacs stressed, that was alone capable of recognizing the dialectical unity of subject and object and that could be considered truly “orthodox” in the sense of its authenticity to Marx. For Lukacs “vulgar materialism,” by which he referred to both orthodox and “revisionist” understandings of Marx’s work, grasped only the reified illusion produced by capitalist society itself that economic relations, the relations between things, are constitutive of the ultimate causes governing human behavior in society. Lukacs argued that the “objective” forms assumed by economic categories only “conceal the fact that they are the categories of the relations of men with each other,” and that it “is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point of view of totality.” And to see the world from the standpoint of totality meant to understand “objective conditions” as existing in intimate relationship with the active human subject who transcends these conditions through historical praxis. Lukacs tried to capture this subjective dimension of human action by positing a rather stark opposition between it and a cold, “natural,” objective world:

Man finds himself confronted by purely natural relations or social forms mystified into natural relations. They appear to be fixed, complete and immutable entities which can be manipulated and even comprehended, but never overthrown. But also this situation creates the possibility of praxis in the individual consciousness. Praxis becomes the form of action appropriate to the isolated individual, it becomes his ethics.10

It was only natural that this revival of interest in the subjective aspect of the revolutionary act should have been accom-
panied by a reevaluation of the relationship between Marx and Hegel. Lukacs and Korsch both understood the importance of establishing the link with Hegel that had been increasingly scorned by orthodox and revisionist theorists alike. After World War II, it was Ernst Bloch who attempted to direct attention to Hegel’s dialectic of subject and object in the context of the totally ossified doctrines of Stalinized Marxism and its negative and condescending attitude toward Hegel. For in the canons of Soviet philosophy, Hegel, together with German idealism as a whole, represented no more than “the aristocratic reaction to the French revolution.” Bloch, in contrast, sought to stress the revolutionary dimensions of the Hegelian dialectic and to demonstrate that only a proper evaluation of the dialectic could yield a true appreciation of Marx’s work. But while Lukacs, Korsch, and Bloch all stressed the importance and positive value of the study of Hegel for Marxism, it would not be accurate to call them Marxian “Hegelianizers” or “Hegelo-Marxists”: Their common position was that while Marx transcended Hegel critically, he never abandoned the dialectic in its humanized form nor did he ever lose sight of the reality-constituting role of the active human subject—perhaps the most important lesson that classical German idealism had to offer.

It was in this tradition, one which concerned itself above all with the restoration of man to his rightful place in Marxian theory as the subject of revolutionary action, that the Praxis Marxists followed. To be sure, it would be an oversimplification to characterize Praxis Marxism as a whole as a mere imitation or a direct development of the idea of Lukacs, Bloch, or indeed of any single school of thought. Praxis Marxism was instead the result of the independent efforts of several theorists to come to grips with the most challenging problems of Marxian theory from the perspective of often quite diverse philosophical traditions. Gajo Petrović, for instance, first studied Soviet dialectical materialism in Moscow and Leningrad in the late 1940s and
moved on to a critique of Plekhanov and British positivism in the 1950s; yet on the whole, Petrović (like his Zagreb colleagues Milan Kangrga and Danko Grlic), especially after the late 1950s, was perhaps most deeply influenced by the thought of Heidegger and German existentialism. The methods of British positivism and analytical philosophy have left significant traces in the work of Markovic and Stojanović, both of whom spent extended periods for pre-doctoral study in British universities. The astute intellectual historian will find evidence of other schools of thought as well, including the “critical theory” of the Frankfurt School, French existentialism, a touch of Kantian ethics, and even dialectical materialism.

Indeed it is tempting to make sense out of the extraordinary diversity within Praxis Marxism by searching for some convenient intellectual scheme that would enable one to undertake an orderly theoretical analysis. Howard Parsons, for instance, points to geographic distinctions among the Praxis Marxists, with the Zagreb philosophers leaning toward “humanism,” philosophical anthropology, and German existentialism, and the Belgrade contingent occupying itself more with the philosophy of science, the theory of knowledge, logic, and an attempt to “combine” these with Marxism. But such a simplistic characterization, while appealing, is not altogether satisfactory. Thus Gajo Petrović, from Zagreb, has devoted a great deal of attention to questions of epistemology, while the Belgrade philosopher Veljko Korac is distinctly Hegelian in orientation and his Belgrade colleague Miladin Životić is almost militantly antagonistic to all forms of logical, positivist, philosophy. Sweeping generalizations of this sort are not possible, nor are they particularly helpful in the final analysis.

To be sure, there are grounds for perceiving significant differences in orientation among the Praxis Marxists. The Czech philosopher Milan Prucha has observed that
philosophical anti-Stalinism from the very beginning was divided ... into discussions that were not always public, but passionate just the same. How is the true significance of Marxist philosophy to be interpreted? How are the contradictions between “scientism” and philosophical anthropology to be bridged?  

It is certainly true that within the Praxis group there are some philosophers more inclined toward positivist thought than others, just as others are intellectually closer to the tradition of classical German philosophy. Over the years, these very differences have stimulated vigorous debate among the Praxis Marxists and have added to their thought a degree of depth which would have perhaps been otherwise unattainable. It should at least be clear from this brief exposition that what we are about to investigate cannot be approached as if it were a single closed and exclusive theoretical system. In this sense, at least, there is no such entity as “Praxis Marxism.”

But while philosophers of the Praxis group may issue from different intellectual traditions, they agree on two essential points. First, they are unified in their belief that the revitalization of Marxism can be effected only by returning to the critical theory of praxis and alienation and to the profound humanism that inspired Marx’s work throughout his life; and second, they are commonly convinced that such a revitalized Marxism is the most effective tool that man has at his disposal for understanding and transforming the world in accordance with his needs. To devote undue emphasis to divergences in theory between individual Praxis Marxists is to lose sight of their binding commitment to these goals.

As the history of Marxian thought has shown, the “return to the revolutionary subject”—the rediscovery of the human actor as a being of transforming praxis—even in the realm of theory alone, has required that its proponents be prepared to confront
serious obstacles in the realm of political action as well. Indeed the very effort to reexamine Marxism independently of all dogma in a socialist country is itself, it would seem, a kind of praxis bearing closely upon key questions of cultural vitality, ideological credibility, and hence even political legitimacy. In this context the practice of philosophy becomes something more than “mere” philosophy. The Praxis Marxist Danko Grliceloquently expresses his conception of the mission of Marxist philosophy in the following terms:

For if we, Marxists, tranquilly let it be said that Marxism is what certain dogmatic chaplains serve to students in their manuals, we are working against our vocation, and this indifference will boomerang against us.... We cannot evade a critical attitude to these sermons, which are boring to the point of death and scholastic to the point of nausea, if we want to prevent the general compromise of Marxism, not only for the sake of our own philosophical existence... but also for the sake of the young generations which today, so many years after the revolution, have the right to be offered philosophical thought more profound, authentic, rich, and capable of moving and involving them.... And it should not be surprising... that students, the future protagonists of our cultural life, repelled by this vacuum of general ideas, should sometimes become voluntarily involved in an excess of anarchist ideas inspired by hooligans, or even return to the Church.18

For the-Praxis Marxists, then, the vocation of Marxist philosophy has both internal and external dimensions—the transformation of Marxian theory from within, and the transformation in turn of that theory’s relationship to social action and consciousness. The theory of praxis is the foundation of both.

Praxis and Alienation

“The rediscovery of the writings of the young Marx,” Albert W. Levi has written, “has had the same effect on Marxist revisionism as the discovery of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* had on the
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thirteenth century.” Yet the initial effect of the discovery of Marx’s early works, including the *Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’*, the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, and *The German Ideology*, can hardly be called explosive. The Soviet philosophical establishment, in the increasingly oppressive atmosphere of the 1930s, attempted to diminish the significance of the “young Marx” by driving a wedge between his “early” humanism and the “scientific Marxism” of his later years, as interpreted by those who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Marx by virtue of the birthright bequeathed by the Party. As Petrović points out, the philosophers of Stalinism may well have seen something inimical to the very structure of Stalinism in the attempt to “revise” dogmatic Marxism by reexamining it from the standpoint of the young Marx’s militant humanism: “the attempt to discredit the ‘early’ works of Marx was really an attempt to prevent the understanding of his whole work, its basic intentions and guiding ideas.” Of Stalin, it is often quipped by Marxist humanists that his sole contribution to Marxian theory was the liquidation of D. K. Riazanov—the Russian scholar responsible for discovering the “early works” in the Marx-Engels archives and bringing them to light—in the purges of the 1930s.

After the Second World War, a variety of circumstances combined to reopen the issue of the young Marx. In Yugoslavia, as described in the preceding chapter, a cautious interest in emancipating Marxism from its old and tired forms was given encouragement by the complex set of conditions and events commonly subsumed under the rubric of the “Cominform break” as well as by subsequent internal developments in Yugoslav political and cultural life. In other countries as well, scholars began to reexamine Marxism in the fresh light of Marx’s early writings on alienation contained in the 1844 manuscripts, although it was not really until the 1960s that this new interpretation began to gain a significant degree of acceptance. Once it did, however, its effects were felt well beyond the narrow boun-
daries of Marxismusstudien, helping to bring about something of a revolution, although in some areas more gradual than in others, in the way in which social science regards itself as well as its object of study.

The return to the young Marx, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, has been characterized above all by the rehabilitation of Marx’s theory of alienation. It is here that the main battles over Marx’s mantle have been waged. Advocates of the heterodox “one Marx” view have generally maintained that the theme of the alienation of man from his “species-being” was Marx’s lifelong concern, and that while in later works such as Capital Marx may have drastically reduced his use of the term “alienation,” several of the central concepts of Capital (the fetishism of commodities, division of labor, exploitation) cannot be fully and properly understood without reference to this seminal theme. Among the Praxis Marxists this “one Marx” position is universally accepted. None of them would have any trouble in agreeing with Petrović’s statement that the “theory of alienation is not only the central theme of Marx’s ‘early’ writings; it is also the guiding idea of all his ‘later’ writings.”

In Soviet philosophy, on the other hand, the generally accepted position holds that Marx rejected the alienation theme shortly after he wrote the 1844 manuscripts, an interpretation also embraced by the French Marxist Louis Althusser when he speaks of an “epistemological break” in which Marx abandoned the “anthropological problematic” of his so-called young Hegelian period. For the Praxis Marxists, however, it is precisely Marx’s humanism, the humanism which Althusser treats with such disdain, that is the very touchstone of the critical power of Marx’s work. Any attempt to factor humanism out of Marxism is for the philosophers of Praxis to deprive Marxism of its critical thrust and to transform it instead into an uncritical form of ideology. Indeed Petrović views Althusser’s writings on Marxism
as “basically attempts to save Stalinism by giving it apparently a more ‘learned’ and ‘Western’ form.”

The theory of alienation, in turn, is intimately linked to a theory of praxis, and it can be argued that for Marxism it is indeed the latter which is the more fundamental. The word “alienation” indicates, literally, an artificial separation of one entity from another with which it had been previously and properly conjoined. The question then arises in the case of human alienation—alienation from what? While it might be tempting to respond with phrases such as “alienation from human nature,” “alienation of man from his essence,” or “alienation from man’s species-being,” the Praxis Marxist Milan Kangrga warns that the greatest care must be taken in this regard since Marx himself constantly warned against viewing human nature as an abstract, fixed category. Marx’s own answer is hinted at in his important manuscript entitled “Alienated Labour,” where he writes:

> For in speaking of private property one believes oneself to be dealing with something external to mankind. But in speaking of labour one deals directly with mankind itself. This new formulation of the problem already contains its solution.

In this passage, it is labor which Marx identifies with “mankind itself,” and this apparently independently of particular socioeconomic formations. “Labour” is defined by Marx in the same manuscript as “life activity, productive life . . . life creating life.” As distinguished from the animal, man “makes his life activity itself as an object of his will and consciousness.... It is not a determination with which he is completely identified.” Labor, or production, is furthermore that process by virtue of which nature appears to man as “his work and his reality,” as a result of which man “sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed.” Alienation, on the other hand, is a perversion of this process, whereby the product of man’s labor not only
“assumes an external existence” (i.e., is objectified), but also “exists independently, outside himself, and alien to him ... stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force.” Even the process of labor itself now becomes imposed upon man by external necessity rather than being consciously and freely willed; it is “forced labour ... a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification.” From all this it should be evident that in order to understand the concept of alienation it is first necessary to understand what it is that is being alienated—and for Marx, this is precisely man’s capacity for production: praxis.

The category of praxis, however, includes more than “labor” in the industrial or economic sense alone. In the First Thesis on Feuerbach, Marx speaks of praxis broadly as “human sensuous activity,” while in the Third Thesis he states that the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising practice.” Indeed it is Petrović’s argument that for Marx, man’s very activity as an economic animal, including his labor, is alienated insofar as it is torn out of the context of the totality of human existence. And it is precisely this point which is the very cornerstone of Marx’s critique of alienated labor:

What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfill himself in his work but denies himself. It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs.

“Praxis,” then, is much broader than the sphere of what is normally defined as “productive labor” within the confines of capitalist society, where productivity is considered to be an attribute of labor power only after the products of labor have been alienated from the laborer and transformed into commodities. Praxis, as Petrović argues, is “the general structure of his
relationship toward the world and toward himself,” “a universal-creative self-creative activity ... by which man transforms and creates his world and himself.” Markovic, similarly, argues that praxis embraces more than material labor alone, on the grounds that not all practical activity occurs within spatial coordinates nor can it be readily observed as can industrial labor—activity such as observation, the production and interpretation of statements and emotions, the selection of values, and so on. What is definitive of praxis as a general category, for Markovic, is that by means of it man purposefully changes his natural surroundings, creates various forms and conditions of social life, and creates himself precisely by changing his environment. Thus Markovic defines praxis as “conscious, goal-oriented social activity,” that activity “in which man realizes the optimal potentialities of his being, and which is therefore an end in itself.”

It ought to be noted at this point, moreover, that it is the concept of praxis that sets Marxian philosophy apart from other schools of thought where the concept of alienation in itself often fails to suggest such a distinction. Marxism differs most emphatically from existentialist philosophy, for instance, in that the former finds no necessary identity between alienation and human existence itself. In his early manuscripts, Marx took special care to distinguish between the objectification of essential human powers and their alienation, understanding this alienation to be the consequence of particular social formations but never a consequence of human activity alone. As the Polish Marxist Adam Schaff has pointed out, Marx investigated alienation “from the point of view of his search for ways of overcoming it,” not with an eye to proclaiming alienation an essential feature of the human condition. Indeed for Marx it is the very consciousness of their alienated condition that drives human beings toward a praxis that is both world-transforming and self-transforming:
The real, active orientation of man to himself as a species-being, or the affirmation of himself as a real species-being (i.e. as a human being) is only possible so far as he really brings forth all his species-powers (which is only possible through the co-operative endeavours of mankind and as an outcome of history) and treats these powers as objects, which can only be done at first in the form of alienation.\textsuperscript{33}

In this sense, Marxism may be thought of as optimistic where some schools of existentialist thought might be seen as fundamentally pessimistic; and in this sense it is instructive that the Praxis philosophers should value so highly the work of Ernst Bloch, who well merits the title “the philosopher of hope.”\textsuperscript{34} In contrast to the existentialism of Heidegger, for instance, which holds alienation to be a structural element of human existence insofar as man lives “in-the-world,” Petrović finds it possible to respond that it is precisely this “in-the-worldness” that makes the transcendence of alienation through praxis a real and concrete possibility.\textsuperscript{35} In the same way, the principle of praxis distinguishes the Marxian theory of alienation from fundamentally religious interpretations of alienation that see in the mind-body antinomy an eternal basis for alienation and seek a spiritual solution to the dilemma. Marx somewhat condescendingly spoke of this viewpoint as representing an embodiment of “the Christian-German principle,” the struggle by man “against his own internal priest.”\textsuperscript{36} From the very beginning, it was Marx’s contention that the contemplative posture would not suffice to reconcile the two warring parties, for the “internal priest” is hardly man’s sole adversary in “this vale of tears.” And not only did Marx argue that spiritual struggle would not suffice—he also insisted as early as 1843 that the real struggle against alienation inheres in the revolutionary praxis of the proletariat. Thus there is no critical Marxian theory of alienation independent of the theory of praxis. Praxis and alienation exist in Marxian theory in
a close, symbiotic relationship, each being a condition of the
other; together, they are the heart of the Marxian dialectic.

The theory of praxis assumes in Marx an anthropocentric
perspective: it is man who makes his own history. Beyond this,
the theory of praxis posits a basic structure of human existence
that involves relationships between both man and nature and
man and man. The following pages will attempt to set forth a
composite picture of the basic principles of this theory of praxis
found in the writings of the Yugoslav Praxis philosophers. It
should be kept in mind, of course, that any discussion of this sort
must necessarily contain several elements of oversimplification,
but that on the other hand to present in detail the several
perspectives of all the Praxis philosophers would require far
more space than is available in this study. Thus it will be my
procedure to present (by way of an exegetical interpretation of
Marx) the most representative elements of Praxis philosophy
where they can be found, and to point up differences and dis-
agreements among Praxis philosophers where I feel that such
discussions would contribute to a better understanding of the
matter at hand.

The relationship between man and nature is one of the most
important and complex in Marx’s writings and can be fully ap-
preciated only by keeping in mind that in his later works Marx
was using concepts that he had developed much earlier in his
life. To judge from the Preface to the First Edition of Capital,
Marx conceived of “natural” laws of capitalist production and
social development, laws which work “with iron necessity to-
wards inevitable results.” Here nature seems to be presented as
an entity which “naturally” (in the Aristotelian sense) stands
apart from and above man, dictating to him actions and pro-
cesses that are preordained by the whole previous course of his-
tory. In the Third Volume of Capital, however, we learn that this
is not a “natural” relationship at all, for in communist society,
freedom “can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature.” Indeed it is for Marx precisely the fact that man in capitalist society is governed by economic laws whose making and execution are entirely independent of him, giving way to economic crises and the misery of one part of the population at no expense to the other, that this society must be transcended and the man-nature relationship subordinated to the conscious and rational control of the producers. As Petrović states, a society in which “natural laws” of social production reign supreme is not a truly human society.

It was in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* that Marx laid the philosophical groundwork for his view of nature and its relationship to man. Here Marx asserted with Feuerbach that man is a natural being, a sentient being, one that has sensuous objects existing “outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects of his needs [such as hunger—css], essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties.” Like animals and plants, man is conditioned by nature and his natural needs; thus in a sense it may be said that he, too, is an “object” that has other “objects.” What distinguishes man from other “natural” beings, for Marx, is that man “is a human natural being ... a being for himself, and, therefore, a species-being; and as such he has to express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought.” In *Capital* Marx clarified this point in an often-quoted passage: “But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination before he erects it in reality.” It is not, therefore, the simple attribute of consciousness which makes man peculiarly human, but rather the unity of consciousness and practice—the conscious objectification of human pow-
ers and needs in sensuous reality. The material for this process of objectification is provided by nature.

Accordingly, the man-nature relationship in Marx is simultaneously characterized by both harmony and opposition. More accurately, man “opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, heads and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s production in a form adapted to his own wants.” In his effort to transform nature—to create, through the application of free, conscious activity, a new nature, but now a nature corresponding to his needs—man humanizes nature and distinguishes himself from other living beings. Through praxis, man negates the alien and threatening properties of brute nature, “appropriating” it to himself and bringing it under his control. It is this process of transcending nature and human limitations imposed by nature that Marx calls “history.”

This process of praxis, of producing history, is not, however, undertaken by man as an individual existing in isolation from other men. “The first premise of human history,” Marx wrote in *The German Ideology*, “is, of course, the existence of living human individuals,” while “the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.” In his later writings, Marx would often ridicule the Robinson Crusoe paradigm of the isolated producer and emphasize time and again the social nature of production, pointing in part to the simple empirical fact that in nearly all existing and historical societies production has taken place in a framework of interrelated functions and a division of labor. But in order to understand fully the philosophical basis of Marx’s conception of man as a social being we must return to his philosophical idea of man as a “species-being.” “Activity and mind,” Marx asserted, “are social in content as well as in their origin. The human significance of nature only exists for social man, because only in this case is nature a bond with other men, the
basis of his existence for others and of their existence for him.”

Nature itself is a bond between men because its appearance as the raw material for human labor only conceals the fact that it is passed on from one generation to another, some of it transformed already many times by human productive activity, some of it untouched. Thus when Marx later wrote that the “tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” he was making a statement that could be extended to all areas of human activity. Even what is to all appearances the most isolated and individualistic act involves a bond—often unconscious—with the rest of humanity:

Even when I carry out scientific work, etc., an activity which I can seldom conduct in direct association with other men, I perform a social, because human act. It is not only the material of my activity—such as the language itself which the thinker uses—which is given to me as a social product. My own existence is a social activity. For this reason, what I myself produce I produce for society, and with the consciousness of acting as a social being.

Lest it seem that “my own existence is a social activity” merely asserted what should have been demonstrated, it ought to be emphasized that this statement was grounded in the mode of existence that Marx posited in the theory of praxis. When man objectifies his powers in the object of labor, he reproduces himself “actively and in a real sense, and he sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed.” Thus the very act of production, the act which Marx considered the essential characteristic of man, is one in which man becomes aware of himself as an object, and as a potential object for other men. In his application of the Feuerbachian “transformational” method to Hegel, Marx argued:

For as soon as there exist objects outside myself, as soon as I am not alone, I am another, another reality from the object outside me. For this third object I am thus an other reality than itself, i.e., its
object. . . . As soon as I have an object, this object has me for its object.\textsuperscript{51}

Thus we return to the structure of man’s existence in the world—praxis—as the locus of his species-being. As we shall see in the next chapter, it was in the profoundly social nature of human praxis that the \textit{Praxis} Marxists found their most solid basis for constructing a critique of alienated political life.

In the previous few pages I have provided only the barest outlines of the concept of praxis in order to set forth a basic theoretical standpoint which can safely be considered to be common to all \textit{Praxis} Marxists, difficult though it may be to make generalizations of this sort. Predrag Vranicki, speaking on behalf of the Praxis school, confirms this general description in the following disarmingly simple statement:

\begin{quote}
We see man as \textit{par excellence} a being of practice, a being who freely and consciously transforms his own life.... Man exists and develops only by transforming his natural and social reality and ... in this way he transforms himself also.\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

While this assertion is in fact characteristic of \textit{Praxis} Marxism as a whole, there have also been several highly individual attempts within \textit{Praxis} Marxism to come to terms with what was described in the programmatic introduction to the first issue of the journal as the “fundamental concept of Marx’s thought.”\textsuperscript{53} One of the most unique and systematic approaches to the problem of praxis is to be found in the thought of Milan Kangr ga.

For Kangr ga, the concept of man as an historical being—more accurately, as \textit{the} historical being—takes on key significance. Kangr ga’s philosophical vocabulary is full of reference to time and movement in time, and in this sense is quite reminiscent of Bloch: concepts which constantly recur in Kangr ga’s writing such as “the existing,” “the not-yet-existing,” “the future,” obviously owe a great debt to Bloch’s philosophy of hope. “The
existing” (or “the present”—postojeci) is presented as the state of gross factuality, of the “given” world as it appears to man as separate from and standing over him. To appreciate the inadequacy of “the existing,” we would have to start from the question that Kangrza, assuming the centrality of the praxis-alienation nexus, poses in Kantian fashion: How is alienation possible? Alienation is inconceivable in a world that has only “the present”:

We “don’t know” about alienation when and if we situate ourselves in this present as in our own single truth, meaning and possibility, or in other words if we “feel good” in it, or when (as Marx says) we have “made ourselves at home” in it.54

Thus Kangrza argues that the praxis-alienation problematic has meaning only with reference to the future, within a framework of becoming. Here, once again, he demonstrates his affinity with Bloch and the larger movement back to the Hegelian origins of Marxism. Human existence itself is revealed as constant movement, man in the process of becoming:

Man alienates himself from this “not-yet-himself” when he ceases to want to be that which he is not yet, when he ceases to be in action, when he ceases to be authentically. But this [the “not-yet-himself”—gss] is never given, and no one or nothing can ever give it (just as truth cannot be handed over whole like banknotes—as Hegel says in The Phenomenology of Spirit): he can and must choose, produce and create it for himself as man.55

Man, for Kangrza, is thus the being of the future. His essential life activity (his species-being) is a movement toward the future, or as Kangrza prefers to formulate it, an historical movement “from the future through the present to the past.” Praxis is the very motivating principle of this movement, “negativity following from the creative principle of negativity,” by virtue of which
man is what he is not yet, and is not what he already is or what he was, neither past nor present time but the active, practical-critical, “revolutionary” (Marx) negation of that which he is and was; a turning toward his future which he realizes and infuses with truth in his actions, today, now, here, every hour. Man as man lives and acts now: in future time, for he negates the present through the future and only in this way is he a truly and really historic being who transforms the existing (natural and social) into a human future full of meaning and potential.56

The act of negating the present as a “mere given,” moreover, reveals new possibilities for the expression of human powers, possibilities immanent in that present but hitherto unrecognized. This recognition, of course, takes place not in the realm of contemplation alone but in the world of sensual objects, in and through a conscious effort to change that world.57 Still, the utopian element in Marx’s thought is afforded a place of great importance in Kangrga’s interpretation. Indeed, the only fault Kangrga seems to find with the slogan of the French students in May 1968—“Soyons realistes; demandons l'impossible”—is that it was not rather: “Soyons realistes; demandons le possible”?58

While Kangrga’s rendering of the theory of praxis can be compared within the Praxis group only to that of Petrović in terms of its internal consistency and distinctiveness, another approach worthy of note is that of Danko Grlic. In this case, the approach matches the man, placing a premium on the individualistic nature of praxis and the role of personal creativity (accordingly, Grlic’s strongest area is the theory of esthetics). Indeed, instead of defining what praxis is, Grlic seems to prefer to specify what it is not:

Human practice stands in opposition to all that is passive, merely mediative, non-creative, all that is adaptation to the world and to its particular social conditions.... [It is] an active interference with the structure of reality.... It seeks to attain no ultimate and final
“results,” no life of bliss in this or any other world, in paradise or some promised land.\textsuperscript{59}

In a highly provocative paper presented at the 1967 Korcula Summer School, Grlic attempted to draw a conceptual distinction between “creativity” and “action,” the former referring to the individual personal activity of negation and praxis in the ontological sense in which it has been discussed above, and the latter designating a collective attempt by members of a group to achieve a common goal. Grlic seemed to think of these individual and social moments of praxis as mutually exclusive, especially when he argued that

the obligations that proceed from a common desire, which are often accompanied by a peculiar yet comprehensible moral pathos . . . obligations which force [on us the standard of] the success of an action, are always—in my opinion—an obstacle to individual creativity.

Not surprisingly, a few pages later Grlic turned to Nietzsche, who in his view was a philosopher who spoke preeminently for the creative power of individual human negativity, to support his argument.\textsuperscript{60} To be sure, Grlic went on to assert that on the “social” plane (as opposed to the individual-psychological or -ethical plane), the same dilemma between creativity and action was recognized by Marx, notably in his skepticism of “public opinion” and the meaning this term had acquired in nineteenth-century England. Yet after reading the entire essay, one is still left with the impression that if Grlic’s head was with the author of \textit{Capital}, then at least his heart was with the lonely and angry author of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}.

In the discussion following the presentation of his paper, Grlic came under sharp criticism from the Belgrade sociologist Vojin Milic, himself a frequent contributor to \textit{Praxis}, for what Milic described as an “aristocratic attitude toward everyday
human life.” The antinomy between individual and collective action, Milic argued, is not nearly as sharp as Grlic would have had it seem. For one thing, the boundaries between the two are in turn a function of historical and social factors: some societies, for instance, have valued the effectiveness of given actions, both individual and social, less highly than others, suggesting that the tension decried by Grlic between individual creativity and collective success is not a historical constant. Moreover, Milic claimed, the social ideals arising from “plebeian” movements have been historically more progressive and worthwhile than the aristocratic “nihilism” which Nietzsche and others have advocated. To return to Grlic’s paper, however, it was precisely to the problem of radical social movements that its main thrust was directed, concealed though this may have been by the rhetoric of individual creativity. Grlic had posed the question concretely in the following way:

If a plan, an organization, or an institution always repress human freedom in some way, then must nevertheless the struggle against such institutions, and against such a plan, itself be planned and institutionalized? Must the struggle against bureaucratism itself necessarily become bureaucratized? Is the struggle against God possible—as Nietzsche would have said—without itself becoming God? It was thus the vital historical problem of the institutionalization of revolutionary movements that Grlic was in fact addressing in his paper. In this context, the theoretical antinomy that he drew between individual creativity and collective action was, if overstated, readily understandable. It was, after all, to be the goal of the socialist revolution to guarantee “the all-round development of the individual.” But what kinds of institutions are consistent with that goal? Is it not the very nature of institutions that they seek to fix, order, preserve, and routinize certain human relationships and faculties and to prevent the develop—
ment of others? We may conclude that when Grlic so radically
opposed the individual and the collective he was doing so not as
an incorrigible pessimist, but rather as a social critic who had
formulated the problem of the revolutionary movement in its
sharpest and most unmistakable philosophical form. Although
Grlic did not attempt to provide a clear answer (beyond broad
references to the principle of self-management) to the question
of what specific institutional form is appropriate to the socialist
revolution, he did state the minimal condition that such an in-
stitution would have to satisfy: it must be an institution free of
dogma. Dogma, for Grlic is the very antithesis of praxis:

Practice is . . . opposed to everything established, dogmatic, rigid,
stauc, once-and-for-all determined, fixed, standard: to everything
which has become dug into the past and which has remained
hypostatized.... Man cannot... have the ambition to transform
the world if he does not at the same time transform his own ideas
and principles.64

Grlic’s philosophical individualism, although perhaps ex-
treme, is hardly unique among the Praxis Marxists. Indeed one
of the primary goals of “socialist humanism” throughout Eastern
Europe has been to demonstrate that seated in the very foun-
dations of Marxism is a profound concern for the human indi-
vidual and to advocate a society where the “free development of
each” is truly a necessary condition for the “free development of
all.” While Lukacs had emphasized the epistemological impor-
tance of the category of “totality” for Marxian social analysis,
asserting that “facts” neither exist in isolation nor stand in simple
isolated relationships with each other, the Praxis Marxists
additionally find an ontological principle of totality pervading
Marx’s writing on the human individual, the cornerstone of all
societies. “Totality,” writes the Belgrade Praxis philosopher
Miladin 2ivotić, “is not a demand for knowledge of the existing
structure of facts but a programmatic totality, a demand for the
conquest of the authentic world, i.e., the world of authentic man.” Vranicki, moreover, draws an intimate link between the category of totality and the theory of praxis:

Not one of man’s activities exists by itself and for itself alone. Not one can be understood without taking into account whole historical epochs, man’s historical experience as a whole, the integrity and polyvalence of his fundamental existence as a being of practice.65

Of all the Praxis Marxists, Rudi Supek has most comprehensively elaborated the ontological principle of totality in all its ramifications for the study of the human individual. Marx, he stresses, conceived of the individual as “the ideal totality of society.” Conscious of the Hegelian origins of this concept of totality, Supek here refers not to a simple static entity but instead to the dialectical interaction of moments of a single whole which is constantly in the process of becoming. In this sense the human individual is to be conceived as a “concrete universal” of his generic species-being, as suggested by the following passage from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts:

Though man is an unique individual—and it is just his particularity which makes him an individual, a really individual communal being—he is equally the whole, the ideal whole, the subjective existence of society as thought and experience. He exists in reality as the representation and the real mind of social existence, and as the sum of human manifestations of life ... The particular individual is only a determinate species-being and as such he is mortal.66

This “species-being,” the social existence of man, is the vital link between the individual and the larger totality of society. Thus Supek claims that for Marx there are “two totalities standing in a concrete dialectical relation to each other, and whose nature can be determined only by the science of society.”67 Neither totality, however, is historically static or eternal; rather,
each is a function of the existing social relations of production and the possibilities which they offer for further human development. In revolutionary praxis, the individual engages in an act of “totalization” and “universalization”: he seeks to reach beyond his actual determination and the limitations imposed on him by the existing structure of society to possibilities offered by that same society for the full development of his powers as a complete human being. In this sense, indeed, man as a “totality” is what Supek has referred to elsewhere as “man without social measure,” the being of praxis. Without this category of totality, as Supek argues, “the entire theory of alienation is meaningless.” The theory of alienation, he explains,

above all presupposes a determinate “individual nature,” a certain individual and social psychology, and finally a definite social structure in which that individual nature becomes apparent, is realized, objectified, and also reified or alienated. In other words, man is a social being but also a socialized being, and between man as a social being and man as a socialized being there is a certain dialectical relationship which Marx expressed in his theory of alienation.69

It is precisely the category of totality that Supek finds in a completely different form in the Stalinist mind. Here, he asserts, “the individual as ‘total man’ or ‘the ideal totality of society’ does not exist.”70 The totality of society, as hypostatized in the existing structure of the party-state and its highest organs—and ultimately in the person of a single man—demands the total obedience of the individual to an external authority and cannot tolerate the existence (even if dialectical in form) of the individual as a rival “totality.” With reference to Hegel, Marx once wrote that “it is above all necessary to avoid postulating ‘society’ once again as an abstraction confronting the individual.”71 But the Stalinist conception of totality, Supek points out, goes beyond even the Hegelian rational unity of the individual, particular, and universal, where “the unity of the person with the other
must essentially be examined not as a real limitation of the individual, but as his prolongation.”

Thus the ideology of Stalinism, in rejecting the theory of alienation, finds itself attracted to a kind of distorted super-Hegelianism when it ventures to make even the most basic statements about society. As Supek and many of his *Praxis* colleagues have argued, the basic shortcoming of Stalinism is that it fails to understand the crucial role played by the human individual in making society itself a living reality.

**From Marx to Stalin: The Reification of the Dialectic**

In the decades between the publication of *Capital* and the popularization of Marx’s early works, the chief concerns of Marxist philosophy centered not on the concepts of praxis, alienation, and totality, but rather on the nature of the dialectic: Is it materialist or idealist? Is it directly applicable to the natural sciences? What consequences does it have for the theory of knowledge? These questions, furthermore, arose not in an isolated academic framework but in the context of the development of Marxism as an ideological system for a series of organized social movements. And in the view of the *Praxis* Marxists, this reformulation of the fundamental issues of Marxist thought had fateful consequences for Marxism’s ability to perceive both the world and itself in a critical manner. Hand in hand with the progressive institutionalization of the revolutionary movement went the process of the reification of the Marxian dialectic of praxis, and this theoretical revision—a “revisionism” whose roots lay deep in the revolutionary experience—could not fail to have a profound reciprocal effect on the nature of revolutionary practice.

Marx insisted that the Hegelian dialectic had to be liberated from its existence as a pure form of thought and given substance by linking it essentially with the social existence of man. Indeed Marx even suggested a basic affinity between the Hegelian
dialectic, which in and of itself was only “a concealed, unclear and mystifying criticism,” and the actual structure of human praxis:

... in so far as it [the Hegelian dialectic] grasps the alienation of man (even though man appears only as mind) all the elements of criticism are contained in it, and are often presented and worked out in a manner which goes far beyond Hegel’s own point of view. The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phenomenology—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle—is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-objectification of man as a process, objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and transcendence of alienation, and that he, therefore, grasps the nature of labour, and conceives objective man ... as the result of his own labour.

Thus the locus of the dialectic in Marx’s understanding was none other than man himself, and the “dialectic of negativity” nothing but the real act of negation and transcendence in which man engages as a being of praxis. Any conception of the dialectic which considers the dialectic to be a form existing independently of and above man must therefore be viewed as a departure from Marx’s own intentions and a misunderstanding of the humanist core of Marx’s thought. Even in the very same Afterword to Capital where Marx approvingly quoted the words of the enthusiastic Russian reviewer who had likened Marx’s social science to a natural science of rigid laws, Marx invoked (but now more obliquely) the same understanding of the dialectic that he had put forward some thirty years before. Here he again credited Hegel with discovering and presenting the form of the dialectic, but insisted that it “must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.” This “rational kernel” was precisely the theory of praxis that Marx had elaborated in a more abstract form in the early manuscripts, and that he was now endowing with living substance in his massive study of the capitalist system. Only because
the very structure of praxis is one that involves human negativity and creativity, alienation and its transcendence, could Marx state with full confidence that the dialectic is “in its essence critical and revolutionary.”

Over the years, however, this human and profoundly critical content of the dialectic gradually gave way to another, more impersonal dialectic which stressed above all the disembodied form of dialectical “laws” and sought to apply them to the most diverse phenomena, both natural and social. Engels particularly comes to mind in this regard with his illustrations of the working out of the dialectical “laws,” using examples such as the grain of barley, the orchid, the butterfly, the geological history of the earth and the calculus, only followed by illustrations from social history. The “negation of negation” for Engels was much more than one of the component principles of human praxis, finding its meaning precisely as part of the structure of praxis. For him it was rather “an extremely general... law of development of Nature, history and thought; a law which, as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy...” It was Engels’ concept of a “dialectic of nature,” furthermore, that Lukacs categorically rejected, inducing him to differentiate sharply between nature and society and the applicability of the dialectic to each.

On the surface, Lukacs’s objections seemed quite persuasive: the dialectic of nature “in itself” is a fantasy, a reification brought about by a profound misunderstanding of the human essence of the dialectic; hence, the dialectic should be restricted in its application to the study of society alone. The implications of this man-nature distinction were of great consequence for the philosophy of science in general, since it suggested that human history differs in some essential way from natural history, and that therefore as objects of study they must be approached from quite different perspectives and with different tools. While social science may thus outwardly resemble natural science in some re-
pects, Lukacs seems to have suggested, the study of man must still have its own categories in order to be adequate to its object.79 At no point, however, would it seem that the *Praxis* philosophers wish to posit concepts of man and nature as mutually exclusive as they were for Lukacs. For Markovic, for instance, the dialectic of nature and the dialectic of human history are “one and the same dialectic,” in the sense that the link between nature and man is necessarily presupposed by the theory of praxis, which establishes the unity of the world as an object of human activity (but not, as in diamat, as “pure matter”). Nature and man do not exist as separate entities “in themselves”—nor, in Markovic’s view, did Engels really suggest that this was the case. Where Engels may have erred was in neglecting, as Lukacs himself stated, to treat explicitly and systematically “the dialectical relation of subject and object in this historical process,” without which “the dialectical method ceases to be a revolutionary method.”80 Far from stating that natural objects exist independently of man, Engels, as Markovic notes in his defense, most eloquently stressed that “nature as such” can have little meaning for man beyond his *practical* relationship to nature, as in the following passage:

> But it is precisely the alteration of nature by men, not solely nature as such, which is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought, and it is in the measure that man has learned to change nature that his intelligence has increased.81

While the theory of praxis may indeed presuppose objects initially existing independently of man, Markovic suggests that this fact is immaterial and even logically incapable of being substantiated, since everything that we can say about them [such objects], and everything that we in fact say about them in ontology and the particular sciences, is knowledge about them as products of practical activity. ... Our knowledge about them is the result of our practical
experience, the result of description and explanation that de-
veloped from that experience.\textsuperscript{82}

Thus while Engels, in Markovic’s view, might justly be accused of
having diminished the significance of human praxis in his con-
siderations of the form of the dialectic, Markovic finds little else
with which to fault Engels on matters of substance. Indeed, the
general tendency of \textit{Praxis} Marxism is to find the roots of the
degeneration of the dialectic not in Engels himself\textsuperscript{83} but in a
much larger and more far-reaching problem of revolutionary
praxis: the institutionalization of the revolutionary movement.

Among the \textit{Praxis} Marxists the strongest case for this connec-
tion between revolutionary theory and praxis is made by Miladin
Životić. Životić argues that there was a natural affinity between
the dialectic of nature, which he characterizes as a “conversion of
a humanistically engaged dialectic into a positive science of the
existing world order,” and “bureaucratic motives of maintaining
the existing world.”\textsuperscript{84} Indeed the posture of bureaucracy (as the
end result of institutionalization) toward the world surrounding
it is one which apparently differs sharply from the idea of
praxis. Where the latter involves the simultaneous transfor-
mation of the external world as well as a transformation of self,
bureaucracy adopts a purely manipulative attitude toward the
world and an uncritical attitude toward itself. It does not ques-
tion its own existence, having persuaded itself that it performs a
necessary and vital function for society. This world-view is
characteristic not only of fully developed bureaucracies, but also,
albeit perhaps to a lesser degree, of revolutionary organi-
zations that may be only partially bureaucratized. The ideological
legitimacy of such institutions often depends on the extent to
which they can claim to possess correct knowledge of the existing
state of affairs; under such circumstances, the “unity of thought”
takes on as much importance to the revolutionary movement as
the “unity of action.” This development of an intra-institutional
ideology, particularly in Marxist movements, has had important
epistemological consequences as well. As Životić contends, in an atmosphere where a heavy premium is placed on the truth-value of organizational knowledge, dialectics are transformed into “ontological categories which only help to ‘learn’ (and not to destroy revolutionarily and critically) the most general structure of the world. According to Marx’s view we can know reality to the degree that we change it.” Rather than seeking ways of changing the world, the revolutionary movement begins to look for evidence of stability and permanence in the world surrounding it; it becomes concerned with the search for “eternal truths.” Thus, according to Životić, did the workers’ movement beget a theoretical framework which ultimately hindered its ability to perceive the world in a critical and revolutionary manner.

The new needs of the institutionalized Marxist movement were reflected in its theory in the purely secondary position which practice acquired in relation to the act of cognition. Ironically, the thesis of the primacy of matter over consciousness adhered to by the proponents of “diamat” seemed to result in the primacy of the knowledge of truth over practice and thereby in a step backward from Marx’s revolutionary theory of praxis to the contemplative stance of German idealism. Petrović finds this problem as having first arisen with Engels, who in his essay on Feuerbach posed too strict a dichotomy between materialism and idealism, matter and consciousness, with the questions: “Is our thinking capable of the cognition of the real world? Are we able in our ideas and notions of the real world to produce a correct reflection of reality?” Petrović observes:

The formulation of the question clearly indicates Engels’ reply. The theory of reflection belongs to dialectical materialism not only because it was endorsed by Engels and Lenin but also because it seemed to be the most adequate complement to the materialist primacy of matter over consciousness.

Practice, Petrović suggests, entered into Engels’ thought about the truth or falsity of human knowledge only as an a
The critique of Marxism as ideology. The *a posteriori* criterion of truth, as the most adequate and certain mode of verification of knowledge which is acquired prior to that practice on the basis of sense-perception. The principle of practice was thus relegated to a position where practice is merely a means of attaining more certain knowledge, rather than being a constitutive element of knowledge itself, while cognition took on the appearance of being an essentially passive activity. Whereas Marx (and the early Engels) had ascribed to cognition an active and even normative character, in the later Engels there were signs of a reversion to what Vranicki calls “a pre-Marxian theory of reflection which totally vulgarized the entire problematic.” The idea of practice as the criterion of truth, moreover, was most amenable to institutions whose legitimacy was based, partially or wholly, on a claim to true knowledge of the world. It also tended, as Stojanović points out, to be self-perpetuating and self-serving. One might well ask, with Stojanović, how practice can be a neutral arbiter of truth where “the evaluation of practice is subjected to the hierarchical principle,” and where the organization claims to exercise by right a monopoly over the revolutionary practice of the movement.

It was with Lenin, however, that the question of cognition became vitally and explicitly linked with that of the fate of the communist movement. In his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin insisted on the existence of an objective reality completely independent of man and his perceptions, with a corresponding objective truth which can only be approximated by human knowledge. Lenin cast these doctrines as articles of faith for all Marxists and went on to describe a cognitive theory of reflection further elaborating this view of reality. Paraphrasing Engels, Lenin stated that “the basic question for materialism. . . [is] the question of the existence of things outside our mind,” while

the materialist theory, the theory of reflection of objects by our mind, is here presented [in Engels’ Introduction to the English edition of *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*] with absolute clarity:
things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images... is given by practice.\textsuperscript{90}

Lest there be any doubt in the minds of his readers about the centrality of the theory of reflection, Lenin made this \textit{ex cathedra} pronouncement:

From this Marxian philosophy, which is cast from a single piece of steel, you cannot eliminate one basic premise, one essential part, without departing from objective truth, without falling prey to bourgeois-reactionary falsehood.\textsuperscript{91}

Why was Lenin so adamant on this point? As Kangrga pointed out in the 1960 discussion at Bled, the very question of the objective existence of an external world independent of man is religious in tone and rests ultimately on a theological solution (as in Descartes), demanding faith rather than knowledge:

This is not at all a question! For Marx this was not at all a philosophical question... .. For the existence of the external world presupposes religion as well; God created the world. Therefore the world exists.\textsuperscript{92}

The “religion” which Kangrga seemed to have in mind here was that of the Leninist vanguard party, whose authority ultimately rested on the degree of correctness which its adherents attributed to its pronouncements about social reality. This especially held true for the workers, whom Lenin took to be incapable of conceiving of the class struggle within a framework more general than that presented by their immediate experience.\textsuperscript{93} Lenin’s theory of reflection described in \textit{Materialism and Empirio-Criticism}, furthermore, closely corresponded to this conception of the formation of class consciousness—if one derives consciousness only from “reflections” of the external world transmitted to the mind through sensual contacts with that reality, then the scope of individual consciousness is inevitably limited by the very finiteness of human existence; it is the responsibility
of the Party, as a collective thinker and the vanguard of the working class, to endow the movement with a more general perspective by drawing on its multifaceted experience in all areas of the workers’ struggle. As Petrović observes, Lenin eventually came to realize the inadequacy of a simple reflection theory when he stated in his *Philosophical Notebooks* that “man’s consciousness not only reflects the objective world, it also creates it.”

Still, Lenin’s earlier formulated cognitive theory remains an integral part of traditional Marxist philosophy in the USSR and Eastern Europe to this day. As the Bled debates and subsequent polemics between the *Praxis* Marxists and their adversaries have shown, it is this conception above all on which Marxist dogmatists have stubbornly refused to yield and to whose sanctuary they have always desperately returned when under attack.

It was under Stalin, however, that the dialectic in its reified form reached its zenith. Here again, there was an important connection between philosophy and social history. In the words of Zivotic (who in the following passage evidently has in mind specifically the Stalinist “victories” in philosophy in the early 1930s):

> Everything that happened to philosophy was a reflex of what happened to the working class as the subject of history: it was when a particular stratum of people, who had abandoned the ideas of social self-government and who had raised themselves above the [working] class, took over the historical mission of that class that historical materialism was transformed into an organismist positivism prohibiting criticism of the global social structure.

With the advent of Stalinism and the simultaneous total subordination of Soviet philosophy to the immediate goals of the Party and ultimately of one man, the dehumanization of the dialectic became complete. In Stalin’s famous “Dialectical and Historical Materialism,” Chapter IV of the *History of the All-Union Communist Party (b): Short Course*, we find a scholastic and eclectic
synopsis of the most unfortunate pronouncements of Engels and Lenin on the dialectic presented in an extremely dogmatic fashion. Here there is no room for doubt: there are but four “features” of “the Marxist dialectical method” (the interrelatedness of all phenomena; the doctrine of continuous motion and change in nature; the change from quality to quantity; the struggle of opposites) and three “features” of “Marxist philosophical materialism” (the unity of nature in matter; the existence of nature as “an objective reality existing outside and independent of our mind” and the primacy of matter over consciousness, which is but a reflection of matter; the possibility of having true, objective knowledge of the world and its laws). These properties of the dialectic seem, in this version, to exist independently of man or even of any specific natural referents in the pure form in which they are described; instead they are “illustrated” by examples from nature and “extended” to the study of society. The truth of Petrović’s observations about the conceptions of Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin is ever more certain with Stalin:

Dialectics ... is neither only a method nor only a logic or theory of knowledge, but also ontology. Its essential aspect or element is the conception that there are certain most general, “dialectical” laws according to which everything that exists changes and develops.

What Petrović finds most characteristic in Stalinist Marxism is that it has no explicit philosophy of man; instead, it is “a combination of ‘dialectical materialism,’ an abstract philosophical ontology-gnoseology, and ‘historical materialism,’ an unphilosophical, economistic understanding of history.” Petrović argues that the concept which Stalin’s philosophy does hold implicitly of man is purely one of man as an economic animal who is totally subject to certain absolute laws of social development. This theory is diametrically opposed, in Petrović’s view, to the Marxian theory of man as a free, creative being of praxis: They
are simply “two different conceptions, which neither logically complement each other, nor are simply indifferent to each other, but at least in certain essential points are mutually exclusive.”

Other *Praxis* Marxists find similar faults with the Stalinist philosophical system. Supek contends that the very structure of Stalinism, from Stalin’s first venture into theory in “Anarchism and Socialism” to Chapter IV of the Short Course, is such that the human individual, his personality and his needs, are totally subordinate to the demands of society as an abstract entity confronting him externally. The thesis of man’s existence as a social being is distorted beyond recognition in Stalinist Marxism into an “organicist positivism” more characteristic of the classical conservatism of the French eighteenth-century thinkers De Maistre and De Bonauld and the positivism of Comte than of any genuine element of Marxian theory. Another deficiency commonly mentioned by *Praxis* Marxists is that in Stalin’s essentially metaphysical setting forth of the features of the dialectic, one “feature” is totally absent which even Engels had mentioned explicitly—the negation of negation. The reasons for this omission, it would seem, stem from Stalinism’s completely uncritical attitude toward itself as a social system. Supek suggests that at the root of Stalinism’s failure to understand the humanist essence of the dialectical in theory is precisely the same aversion to real, substantive self-criticism:

Why can this Marxist orientation not tolerate the theory of alienation? The reasons are quite simple: the theory of alienation contains within itself a humanistic critique of statism, in addition to a critique of the positivistic subordination of the personality to the mass or to society. Stalinism, however, can tolerate neither!

The rearguard action of Soviet philosophy against the theory of praxis and alienation, which at times even assumed the form of an offensive against *Praxis* itself, has been waged on two
fronts. One type of objection is political, consisting of an effort to restrict the analytical-critical category of alienation to bourgeois society; elaboration of this side of the question is best left to the next chapter of this study. The philosophical objections of “diamat” to the theory of praxis are of a different order. First, the claim is often made that the anthropological approach to alienation, with its talk of “human nature” and “human essence,” elevates alienation to the level of an abstract theoretical category devoid of any social and historical content. Proponents of this view see “philosophical anthropology” as closely akin to the ideas held by Feuerbach on human nature which Marx criticized in the Theses on Feuerbach, tending moreover to identify any theory of alienation with modern existentialist philosophy. If *Praxis* Marxism were to consist solely of theoretical musings on human nature, these might indeed be valid observations; but the fact is that there is no lack of social content in the writings of the *Praxis* thinkers, as will become evident in subsequent sections of this study. Indeed it might be said that the disdain with which discussion of “human nature” is treated by Soviet philosophers testifies only to their own static, undialectical concept of “nature.” Thus the Stalinist heritage of the reification of human activity and its products reappears in the manner in which Soviet philosophy relates to other schools of thought.

In explicating other theoretical objections of Soviet philosophy to *Praxis* Marxism, at least one Soviet philosopher is reasonably accurate in her allegations:

They see Marxist philosophy not as the science of the most general laws of the development of nature, society and human thought, as a method of scientific knowledge and the revolutionary transformation of the world, but as a philosophy of “free creative activity”.... It is formally possible in such a case not only that the very existence of the objective world might be ne-
gated, but also that the primacy of the material over the ideal might even lose its principal, root significance, and that the problem of philosophy be reduced above all to the knowledge of the internal, anthropological essence of man.\textsuperscript{104}

Certainly this characterization is reasonably close to the facts. That it should be intended as criticism only speaks of the rigidity of Soviet philosophy itself. And that “revolutionary transformation” should be seen as being at odds with “free creative activity” only substantiates Petrović’s statement quoted earlier, that what is involved here is the confrontation of “two different conceptions, which ... at least in certain essential points are mutually exclusive.” Indeed, they would seem to be irreconcilable, for according to Markovic, “the basic question of philosophy according to Marx is not the relationship between matter and mind, but the relationship of man toward the world.”\textsuperscript{105}

“The dialectic,” Vranicki writes, “is eminently critical and that is its absolute characteristic. Any retreat from its critical nature means abandoning the essence of the dialectic.”\textsuperscript{106} The \textit{Praxis} perspective on Soviet philosophy might reveal the converse to be true as well: any retreat from the essence of the dialectic—which is at base humanist in character and which derives from the very structure of human activity—means abandoning its critical nature. To be sure, the “material” forces behind the loss of the capacity for genuine self-criticism have carried far more weight than mere deviations in theory. It seems clear, however, that the reification of the Marxian dialectic—its radical divorce from the process of human praxis, alienation, and the transcendence of alienation through praxis—has also contributed toward depriving the dialectic of its critical cutting edge which it found in the works of Marx, and at the very least seems to represent a reasonably good measure of the degree to which “Marxism” has become entrenched in many countries as the ideology of the ruling political institutions.
The same spirit that builds philosophical systems in the brain of the philosophers builds railroads in the hands of the workers. Philosophy does not stand outside the world any more than man’s brain is outside him because it is not in his stomach; but philosophy, to be sure, is in the world with its brain before it stands on the earth with its feet, while many other human spheres have long been rooted in the earth and pluck the fruits of the world long before they realize that this world is the world of the head.

—Karl Marx, “Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kölnische Zeitung”

In the preceding pages the term “philosophy” has been used rather loosely, giving the impression that for the Praxis Marxists “philosophy” is understood as virtually synonymous with “theory” or with conventional philosophy and its various subdisciplines, such as ontology and epistemology. Neither the Praxis philosophers nor Marx himself, for that matter, speak of philosophy in such simple terms. The former are quite aware that at the very core of Marx’s revolt from Hegel and his maturation as an autonomous thinker lay his rejection of the contemplative attitude of Hegelian philosophy, its passive faith in the “cunning of Reason,” and its illusion that “it could realize philosophy without abolishing it.” Unlike Marx, however, the Praxis Marxists’ attitude toward philosophy has been conditioned by their need to arrive at a definition of philosophy that is not inconsistent with their vocation as philosophers. Indeed at the hands of the Praxis Marxists, the “abolition of philosophy” has taken on connotations which Marx might have found difficult to anticipate.

Marx himself, in fact, seems to have had mixed feelings about philosophy. While he felt that philosophy is capable of presenting only an inverted, warped view of the real world, on the other hand he did not proclaim philosophy or its insights to be without value; philosophy and its language, he wrote, are in a
certain sense “manifestations of actual life,” although to be sure not simple “reflections” of an external reality. When Marx discussed German philosophy in the context of German social history, for instance, he did not simply dismiss the former as irrelevant banter, but instead viewed it quite seriously as an important part of the entire complex of German social relations. The “German philosophy of the state and of right” Marx called not an “original but... a copy,” yet a copy with enough plausible resemblance to the original that Marx devoted not only this essay but the much longer *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* to demonstrating how and why the copy was misleading. Marx saw the distortions inherent in philosophy as a consequence of the need of the ruling classes for elaboration of an ideological picture of the world, the division of labor, and especially the “exclusive, systematic occupation with these thoughts on the part of ideologists and philosophers.” In this sense philosophy is a form of alienation, a fragmentation of the real world:

> The philosophical mind is nothing but the alienated world-mind thinking within the bounds of its self-alienation, i.e., conceiving itself in an abstract manner... The *philosopher*, himself an abstract form of alienated man, sets himself up as the *measure* of the alienated world.

It is not so clear, however, what Marx meant when he spoke of the *abolition* of philosophy—especially when at the same time that philosophy was to be made worldly, the world was to be made “philosophical.” For if Marx’s claim that “you cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it” is to be taken seriously, then it must mean that philosophy will remain—in some form, although perhaps not in its “alienated” form—as a standard by which reality may be judged. Rudi Supek points in the direction of a possible answer to the dilemma when he asserts that Marx was referring specifically to the abolition of philosophy as a *mystification*, specifically the mystification of social reality.
inherent in the “bad consciousness” of the Hegelians and Young Hegelians alike. Clearly, then, if philosophy is to remain as a criterion of the real world it must lose its ethereal and purely contemplative character, abandoning its posture of remoteness from the actual problems of humanity and planting its feet firmly in the world in which man lives. “Actually,” writes Markovic of this problem,

what is at issue is the abolition of that particular form in which philosophy has existed in class society as a particular, isolated theoretical sphere of social consciousness, the object of the attention of a particular profession—the profession of pure thinkers who are in no way linked with practice.

Petrović, too, emphasizes the practical implications which the abolition of philosophy had in Marx’s view. While the abolition of philosophy is impossible without its realization, Petrović states in an inverted aphorism characteristic of Marx’s own style that “there can be no realization of philosophy without the realization of socialism, nor can socialism be achieved without the help of philosophy,”

What kind of philosophy can fulfill this role of remaining philosophy while being more than “mere” philosophy? Marković gives one indication in his general definition of philosophy, which is evidently as programmatic as it is descriptive: “philosophy is the total, rational, and critical consciousness of man about the world in which he lives and the basic goals of his activity.” The possibility of philosophy, in Marković’s view, derives from the fact that man is “the only being who can have an ideal”; accordingly, Marković asserts that in addition to representing a “synthesis of knowledge” (to which orthodox “diamat” simplistically reduces all philosophy once it has been cleansed of “idealist” impurities), “philosophy is the theoretical expression of the human ideal of an entire historical epoch ... an effort to give meaning to human life as a whole.” In this sense philosophy is “a
project of what man desires to create, of what, in his opinion, he ought to be.” For Marković, then, philosophy is, or can be, not merely speculative and passive toward the world, but can assume an active role in the sense that it formulates and gives expression to the ideals of human existence. It is also historically concrete, since—as indeed with Hegel’s “spiritual quintessence of the age”—the ideals which it formulates are those of a particular historical period. Unlike Hegel’s phenomenology, however, “true” philosophy for Marković gives expression to ideals that are simultaneously calls to action based on a critical analysis of concrete forms of human existence in society.

To an even greater degree than Marković, Petrović stresses the activist nature of philosophy and its intimate link with practice. He defines philosophy as

a separate form of mental activity through which a man not only discovers his own essence and his place in the world, his capabilities for changing the world and for enriching his own nature, but also stimulates the deed of transforming the world, and participates in it in a creative way.

In another passage (where his use of the term “philosophy” evidently presupposes the reader’s understanding of this term as denoting the philosophy of praxis), Petrović establishes a fundamental connection between philosophy and revolution by means of a series of questions—and in so doing, suggests in passing that the question is in fact the basic form of philosophical discourse:

Is not revolution the most developed form of creation, the most authentic form of liberty? . . . Is not revolution the “essence” of existence itself, of being in its essence? And if revolution is existence itself, is not philosophy, by virtue of this very fact... the thought of revolution? . . . Can philosophical thought be content to reflect upon revolution without participating in it? . . . In short, is true philosophy only the thought of revolution, or is it thought-revolution?
It is this identity between philosophy and revolution, which is in fact no less than an identity between philosophy and praxis, that is one of the most intriguing features of Petrović’s thought. It is easy enough to see why “true philosophy,” i.e., philosophy which has as its object man as a being of praxis, should be thought of by Petrović as a precondition of praxis itself under certain circumstances, particularly where human alienation has proceeded so far that it is necessary simply to bring man back to a consciousness of himself as an integral and creative being. But in what sense is philosophy in itself “thought-revolution?” Is this not inconsistent with Marx’s own attitude toward philosophy, as expressed in the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it”? It would seem that this is where Petrović parts ways with Marx. Indeed, Petrović has gone so far as to challenge the first half of Marx’s dictum. “Is not,” Petrović asks, “every philosophical interpretation necessarily a certain change and even a creation of the world?” Later he argues:

An interpretation of the world that does not change the world is both logically and empirically impossible. When man interprets the world, by this very fact he changes at least his conception of the world. In changing his conception of the world he cannot help changing his relationship to the world as well. And in changing his conception and his behavior, he influences the conception and actions of other people with whom he is in different relationships. ... Is he [man] in the world only when he eats, sleeps, and carries out his animal functions, and outside the world when he thinks and interprets the world?

But Petrović suggests that this line of argument is a departure from Marx only if it is supposed that Marx held a simple reflection theory of consciousness—which in Petrović’s view, he did not. To make clearer what Petrović leaves only implicit, it might be pointed out that Marx conceived of thought itself as a form of production, as one of the several forms of appropriating the “object,” and hence of appropriating human reality.
become conscious of an object is to put oneself into a relation with it and to transform something that may once have been dumb matter into a potential object of further human labor. It may also mean to become conscious of an object as an *artifact* of man where previously it was mistakenly (perhaps as a result of ideological motivations) perceived merely as being part of brute nature and therefore immune to human control. Both acts of consciousness are in fact acts of creation; but the second, in particular, is an act of *demystification* which is an organic part of the process of transcending human alienation: the discovery by man of his products as his own. Philosophy—more specifically, the philosophy of praxis—thus has as its most fundamental task *criticism*, which is nothing more than the discovery of alienation and of the possibilities of transcending it, and above all of making man aware of himself as a being of praxis.

An important difficulty remains with the idea of the identity of philosophy and praxis. As we have argued, this thesis can be understood as implying a special mission for philosophy itself. Is the revelation of society to man as a being of praxis and of the alienated state of human existence to be reserved by right to philosophy and its practitioners, even if this philosophy is Marxist-humanist in character? Is philosophy—because of its broad scope, its professional concern for the general problems of human existence, and indeed its very remove from the immediate practical problems confronting man in society—in some way better suited to inform men of their condition than are other spheres of inquiry, or indeed than are those men themselves through their own self-activity? Is the philosopher’s role, then, analogous to that of the Leninist vanguard—to bring consciousness to the workers of their own condition from without, on the basis of its superior insight? Petrović and several of his colleagues would seem to disavow such a conviction and instead to claim, with Marx, that “reality must also strive towards thought,”\(^{121}\) which for *the Praxis* philosophers seems to mean no less than that all men must become philosophers;\(^{122}\) or, to re-
phrase Rousseau, that one must make man a philosopher in order to make him a man!\textsuperscript{123} In reply to this criticism, most Praxis Marxists would seem to assert that with the transcendence of philosophy, philosophy would lose its character as a special sphere of social existence divorced from other spheres; it would henceforth be possible, according to Branko Bosnjak, only to speak of a “mode of philosophical existence” which “is not a privilege of professional philosophers but an intellectual relationship to reality which can be applied by those who are not concerned specifically with philosophy.” The philosophy that would remain, in Petrović’s words, would be “the critical thought of man about himself... a form through which he achieves the wholeness of his personality.”\textsuperscript{124} As Gramsci had put it, the first task of a reconstituted philosophy must be “to demonstrate that ‘everyone’ is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing a scientific form of thought into everyone’s individual life, but of renovating and making ‘critical’ an already existing activity.”\textsuperscript{125} The duty of the philosopher, then, is to awaken in the human individual his latent faculties and to encourage him to define himself in a critical way toward the surrounding world.

Petrović does recognize some limits, if perhaps of a temporary nature, to his program of what might be called the “universalization of philosophy.” At the very minimum, he suggests, the transcendence and universalization of philosophy has important implications for the mode of philosophical discussion:

This does not mean that all people can or must become great philosophers, but it does mean that philosophy must break its narrow limits, that it must turn to the essential human questions of its time and develop through broad, free, and equal discussion among all those who think about these questions.

Not only does this mean that philosophers must cease to be concerned solely with their own thinking, but also implicitly that philosophy as a preeminently critical field of inquiry will tolerate no authoritative dicta “from above” on either the form or con-
tent of philosophical activity. Just as Petrović asserts, “I do not think that political acts could or should be prescribed by any philosophy or philosophical forum,” he stipulates the same relationship in reverse on the part of the political forum toward philosophy.

Does this signify, then, that a “division of labor” between philosophers and politicians, which as we have seen earlier in this study was an important factor in the appearance of Praxis Marxism itself, is acceptable to the Praxis Marxists at least in the short run as a matter of principle? This was always one of the most difficult issues for the Praxis Marxists to resolve, even among themselves. For while as a collective they may have actively shunned conventional political involvement, many of them, as leading individuals in their profession and widely respected, well-connected figures in society at large (and even in the Party), regarded it as sheer folly to renounce every vestige of public life and to accept total, self-imposed political isolation as the price of integrity. On the other hand, there were those such as Životić who argued in highly convincing terms for the need to preserve the chastity of philosophy from the encroachments of politics:

To believe that politicians will become philosophers ... is a beautiful illusion ... but one which should be destroyed, for it can only commit us to seek the impossible. The philosopher should even less desire to be himself occupied in immediate practical politics. Insofar as he undertakes this, he ceases to be a philosopher. All who have tried this, who have become integrated into the institutionalized forms of social life, have ceased to be philosophers... by the very logic of the relationship of philosophy to practice. This logic, the existential position of philosophy in society, must commit philosophy to preserve its own manner of thought lest it cease to be philosophy.

Under minimal conditions, as we have suggested, the “universalization” of philosophy implies free and open dialogue among philosophers and even between philosophers and politi-
dans. Yet it would seem that to maintain the kind of essential distinction that Životić draws between these two spheres of activity bears the danger of reinforcing and legitimating the particular standards which each sphere sets for itself. A politician who would address philosophers about “philosophical” matters would naturally be expected to satisfy certain standards of philosophical discussion, such as clear, public, and rational argumentation. But does this convention mean, by the same token, that when philosophers address politicians about “political” matters, the former become subject to whatever criteria—no matter how crassly pragmatic and “unphilosophical”—which the latter may demand of philosophers or indeed of their own performance in the execution of their political duties? The balance between philosophy and politics under such conditions must be a very fragile one indeed.

In any event, the Praxis Marxists have not hesitated to speak to Yugoslav society about itself, and this must be seen as their distinctive mixture of theory and practice—one in which, to be sure, theory confronts practice on its own territory. There are of course good reasons for the location of the field of battle in the realm of theory, reasons which stem as much from the philosophical vocation of the Praxis Marxists as they do from the cultural legacy of Stalinism, which even today has not yet disappeared from the Yugoslav social scene. It should be sufficient to note, however, that the appearance of the journal Praxis coincided with the increasingly urgent feeling shared by several Yugoslav Marxist thinkers, regardless of whether they defined themselves professionally as philosophers or sociologists, that Marxian philosophy must reach beyond the traditional concerns of philosophy in order to merit Marx’s name. What was perhaps the most important passage in the editorial introduction to the first issue of Praxis read as follows:

But if contemporary philosophy aspires to contribute to the solution of the contemporary world crisis, it cannot be reduced to the
study and interpretation of its own history; neither can it be a scholarly construction of encyclopaedic systems, much less the analysis of the methods of modern science or the description of the modern usage of words. If it desires to be the thought of revolution, philosophy must orient itself toward the essential human concerns of the modern world and of modern man; if it desires to reach the essence of the everyday, it cannot hesitate to extend itself in appearance, plunging into the depths of “metaphysics.”

All this is to say, in Henri Lefebvre’s enigmatic words, that the “truth of philosophy ... is discovered in politics.” To what extent, on the other hand, the truth of politics can be discovered by philosophy seems to be largely a function of the way in which philosophy relates both to man’s life in society and to itself as the “ideal expression” of that social existence.
THE CRISIS OF POLITICS: POLITICAL ALIENATION AND STALINISM

Authority is an historical category whose necessity is conditioned by the very nature of social organization and social life. But in so far as social organizations are not eternal, neither are forms of authority relations. In this light, subordination to authority has been reasonable precisely to the extent that the structure of authority has left room for the development of human freedom, happiness, and dignity. And vice-versa: as soon as the authority relation has become void of this human content, subordination becomes senseless, since mere heteronomy as a basis for authoritarian power has no human support and therefore deserves to be wiped from the face of the earth. The sooner the better.

—Ljubomir Tadić, “Authority and Authoritarian Thinking”

Mihailo Marković, in a recent work, has distinguished between politics as it is and what he calls “political praxis,” or politics as it “could be.” To a Marxist, this distinction must come as something of a surprise. Marx had nearly always spoken of politics not as a sphere of genuine praxis but as a sphere of alienated activity, in which a perfidious, artificial distinction is imposed between the actual life of man in society and his existence in the sphere of political convention. While in his everyday life an individual may subjugate others on the basis of his material power or himself be subjugated by others, in his political life he takes part in the fiction that he is an equal and autonomous
member of society. These myths of the political sphere, Marx stressed, only perpetuate the existing relations of domination and subordination in society as a whole. Is not, then, the expression “political praxis” for a Marxist a senseless contradiction in terms?

A positive answer to this question would be in order only if we were to view politics narrowly as comprised solely of the sphere of political alienation criticized by Marx. It is possible, however—as indeed the great political theorists of the past have done in one manner or another—to distinguish between the practice of politics and the idea of politics. The latter is often represented through the medium of terms such as “community,” “justice,” “autonomy,” and the like; each of these terms deals with aspects of the idea of a right social order. And while Marx may have written little in a concrete way about socialism, it is difficult to deny (although Marx himself might have denied it vigorously) that his critique of past and present social formations was informed throughout by a vision of a right social order, a decent and humane society which would extend to all individuals a full opportunity for their complete development as human beings. Such a vision, too, has inspired the political writings of the Praxis Marxists.

It would thus seem unwarranted to dismiss the possibility of “political praxis” without first asking whether politics itself is necessarily a sphere of alienation or whether it contains certain elements which, although perhaps imperfectly, express authentic human needs and strivings. And just as all human praxis is capable of becoming alienated but is not destined to be, so political praxis, too, can become alienated activity under certain circumstances. Perhaps, indeed, one may even be justified in arguing that political praxis, by virtue of the great complexity of the ends to which it aspires and the instrumentalities through which it is pursued, is more likely to become alienated than other types of praxis. But this is far from asserting that “politics” has no
place in a Marxian theory of praxis, or that the ends of politics are somehow irrelevant to Marxism as a whole, or that they are necessarily ideological in character. To be sure, concepts such as community, justice, and autonomy may be (and are) manipulated ideologically for inhuman ends, but it is difficult to conceive of a great social theory that would dispense with them entirely for that reason alone.

This chapter is devoted to a clarification of the concepts of politics and political alienation suggested by the above distinction, with special attention to the way in which these concepts have appeared in the writings of the Praxis Marxists. The first section will attempt briefly to sketch the theme of political alienation through Marx’s thought and to use this framework to gain an understanding of the thought of several of the Praxis Marxists about the nature of the world of politics. The second section considers Stalinism as a social system which, for the Praxis Marxists, represents the historically most extreme form of alienated politics. Indeed it was the insistence of the Praxis Marxists on subjecting Stalinism itself to a rigorous and critical political analysis, an analysis based on a profoundly humanist view of life in society, that decisively molded the character of all their subsequent social criticism and was most responsible for placing them among the most ardent foes of power relationships in all areas of Yugoslav life.

Political Alienation and the Crisis of Politics

In Our Present Crisis, a book of essays published during the now famous “Prague Spring,” the Czech philosopher Karel Kosik indicates that the question, “What is politics?” is of vital importance for the modern age. Our present crisis, Kosik warns, is less a political crisis than a crisis of politics itself, a crisis whose resolution hinges on socialism’s ability to endow politics with new meaning and substance, and specifically on the fate of socialist
democracy in its struggle with bureaucratic dictatorship. In the latter, Kost'k argues, the roles of leadership and guidance have been confused with the role of ruling:

The identification of leading and ruling roles has been the source of one of the greatest mystifications in the history of socialism. Politicians talk about the leading role of the party, but think about the ruling position of a group in power.²

Certainly the crisis of politics of which Kosfk writes is not peculiar to existing socialist societies alone. Modern political theory tends to speak in terms of two conflicting modes of political life: the participatory and the instrumental.³ The first is concerned primarily with the type and degree of contribution which each member of society makes toward decisions affecting the general welfare and the quality of life in society, while the second studies the means by which decisions are implemented and given goals—whether of an individual, a group, a nation, or cross-national entity—are achieved. While the emphasis of the first tends to fall on community as a normative and operative concept, the latter model may be said to be more oriented toward problems of control. At first glance it would seem sensible to view the contrast between these two models in terms of an antinomy between ends and means; yet it is well to note, as proponents of the participatory model often point out, that the problem with the instrumental model is precisely that it tends to convert what should be only a means—the pursuit of power—into an end in itself. What is worse, the instrumental model, while taking specific goals into account, does so only by uncritically accepting them as given and abandoning itself to the study of strategy and tactics, indifferent to whatever moral content these goals themselves may involve. The less subject to question are the goals of a given society or of its component groups, moreover, the more appropriate and attractive the second model of politics seems to become to conservatives and radicals.
alike. Sheldon Wolin has observed:

Today the tactical manipulative approach defines the politics of those who would sell presidents as well as of those who would "make" revolutions. What unites these apparent opposite tendencies is an exploitive approach toward things, relationships, and persons that make up the political world. The revolutionary and the mainstream politician are alike in viewing the political world as composed of manipulable objects. Political knowledge signifies the techniques of manipulation that will bring power to the manipulator.4

With this in mind, it is possible to characterize the crisis of politics above all as the radical separation of politics as an instrumentality from the true ends of politics and its hypostatization into a mode of political life which develops principles and goals of its own entirely of, and often opposed to, those ends. And those ends are none other than the pursuit of "the good life" on the part of the whole community for each of its members.5

It was on the basis of this gap between the reality and the idea of politics, it may be argued, that Marx founded his conception of politics as alienated social activity. Marx’s state, as the illusory and purely formal locus of human community, stands opposed to the individual in civil society, where private interest dominates all human relationships. In drawing this distinction between the state and civil society Marx of course displayed his intellectual debt to Hegel, for whom the state represented the concrete embodiment of the Idea and as such the real universality of social life. But for Marx, Hegel’s conception represented one of the latter’s characteristic total inversions of social reality, in which the real subject—man in society—becomes a mere predicate and the real predicate—the state—becomes an illusory subject dictating its own requirements to man:

Instead of having subjects objectifying themselves in public affairs Hegel has public affairs becoming the subject. Subjects do not
need public affairs as their true affairs, but public affairs needs subjects for its formal existence. It is an affair of public affairs that it exists as subject.

Not only does this picture of public affairs assume the divorce of the state from society; it also tends to make the conduct of public affairs the affair of a private few. Hegel’s allgemeine Stande—the bureaucracy—was revealed by Marx to be nothing more than a hierarchy of self-interested careerists who represent their private interests as the public interest. The bureaucracy, moreover, makes inaccessible the conduct of public affairs to the public by its jealous watch over knowledge relating to those affairs, as Marx (anticipating Kafka, it would seem) described in the following passage:

The aims of the state are transformed into aims of bureaus, or the aims of bureaus into the aims of the state. The bureaucracy is a circle from which no one can escape. Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge.... As a result everything has a double meaning, one real and one bureaucratic.... The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the secret, the mystery, preserved inwardly by means of the hierarchy and externally as a closed corporation. To make public the mind and the disposition of the state appears therefore to the bureaucracy as a betrayal of its mystery.\(^6\)

In the end, Hegel’s state makes the “being of the state”—the conduct of public affairs—into its own “private property.”\(^7\)

In his subsequent writings, Marx seems to have taken Hegel’s conception of the state as paradigmatic of the real alienation of the state from civil society in bourgeois politics. Indeed even as early as in the *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx asserted that “Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for presenting what is as the essence of the state.”\(^8\) Especially after 1844 Marx came to believe that the “essence of the state” would be realized not through the introduction of such formal steps as universal suffrage and legislation (which would only represent a perfection of Hegel’s for-
malistic model of the state), but rather through basic and far-reaching changes in the structure of civil society itself. Accordingly, Marx turned from his critique of the state to a critique of civil society. Where Hegel had seen particular interest alone reigning in civil society, Marx saw decisive changes occurring in the heart of that society prefiguring a new era of social relationships based on the principle of community. The agent of this change was to be the revolutionary proletariat, “a sphere of society which ... cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society, without, therefore, emancipating all these other spheres,” a social class whose total emancipation would be predicated on the totality of the conscious self-alienation of its individual members.\(^9\)

Marx’s critique of civil society, however, rested on more than a purely philosophical vision of the proletariat, as the above lines might seem to suggest. His critique of the conception of civil society held by classical political economy (and shared by Hegel) rested on the premise that beneath the veil of private interest and the model of an atomistic society lay relations of production that are inherently social in nature. The illusion of complete personal independence had been created by the capitalist system of exchange, in which the products of human labor (itself social in character) stood opposed to the producer in the form of commodities to be bought and sold on the market:

The general exchange of activities and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual—their mutual interconnectedness—here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things.... Exchange ... presupposes the all-round dependence of the producers on one another, together with the total isolation of their private interests from one another, as well as a division of social labour.\(^10\)

The development of the forces of production under capitalism, in Marx’s view, tends to create conditions that in-
creasingly emphasize the social nature of production and the powerful social bonds inexorably binding the workers ever more closely together into a tightly knit community. The concentration of capital, accompanied by the development of monopolies, the emergence of a global economic market, and the creation of new technologies involving the application of many hands and minds to a single process of production, all tend to create a “working class ... disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.” In the place of the competitive and falsely individualistic relations of capitalist production, Marx perceived the simultaneous development of new, cooperative social relations which no longer set that which is common to all men apart from them in another sphere, be it that of community exchange or the state. In place of the “illusory community” of the state and the deceptive atomism of civil society, Marx envisioned the development of a new form of authentic community having its roots firmly planted in the productive process itself.

The foregoing interpretive sketch makes it possible to appreciate the observations of many Praxis Marxists about Marx’s critique of politics. For them, first and foremost in this critique is the concept of human community. Indeed Rudi Supek states that the aspiration toward “an authentic community of equal and free people” is the “existential” element in the definition of communism. The alienation of man from his product, Supek argues, is in the final analysis nothing less than man’s self-alienation “as a being of community,” as that ideal totality of society for whose existence society is an historical and logical precondition. True community, in contrast to the “illusory community” of class society, is in turn the precondition for total human emancipation, as Marx himself argued in The German Ideology:

The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general ideal of it from one’s mind, but only by
the action of individuals in again subjecting these material powers
to themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not
possible without the community. Only in community with others
has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all di-
rections; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom
possible.\textsuperscript{13}

It is precisely this quest for community that the Belgrade
political philosopher Ljubomir Tadić sees as constituting the
main thrust of Marx’s writings on society. Socialism, in Tadić’s
view, draws critically upon both the classical idea of the\textit{polis} and
the liberal ideas of individual freedom and equality, molding
them into “the contours of a new socialist community as an ob-
jectively possible model of the new world order.”\textsuperscript{14} Tadić argues
that for Marx (and Hegel) the beauty of \textit{the polls} was that in it, at
least in theory, the political and civil lives of the citizen became
indistinguishable; in ancient Greece, as Marx wrote, “the politi-
cal state as political was the true and sole content of the citizen’s
life and will.” In bourgeois society, the realm of the political
becomes sharply set apart from civil society, the realm of com-
munity existing in one purely formal sphere of activity while
flesh-and-blood human beings seem to pursue their private ends
in the brutal reality of their social and economic relations;

\begin{quote}
Man, in his \textit{most intimate} reality, in civil society, is a profane being.
Here, where he appears both to himself and to others as a real
individual he is an \textit{illusory} phenomenon. In the state, on the con-
trary, where he is regarded as a species-being, man is the imagi-
nary member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real,
individual life, and infused with an unreal universality.
\end{quote}

Even the abstract political community represented by the
bourgeois state is flawed, however, since it is colored by the
separation of the state from civil society. The rights of man
guaranteed by the bourgeois state “are simply the rights of a
\textit{member of civil society}, that is, of egoistic man, of man separated
from other men and from the community. ... It is the right of such separation.”

Thus it may be said that while in one sense Marx embraced the idea of community as one of the primary goals of human activity, he rejected the idea of community when used in an ideological sense to manipulate perceptions of the existing state of social relations. Marx’s dualistic attitude toward this central problem of politics is also reflected in his approach toward the Aristotelian idea of man as a “political animal.” Supek points out that Marx rejected such a conception insofar as it implies that men associate into society merely in order to pursue their several particular ends and that the *polls* ought to be conceived of as existing independently of other types of human associations and superior to them. On the other hand, it was also Marx who wrote in the *Grundrisse* that man “is in the most literal sense a *zoon politikon*, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society”—a social being by virtue of the social relations necessarily involved in all human praxis. What distinguishes these two conceptions of the political nature of man is that in the first an artificial boundary, one which Marx felt is a necessary outgrowth of a specific stage of historical development, is drawn between general and particular interests, each of which are assigned to separate sectors of social activity. In bourgeois society in particular, production—the objectification of man’s species-powers—takes on the character of being pursued only for private ends, while the pursuit of public ends is made to appear indifferent to the actually differing social positions of men in society. The state seeks to represent man to himself as a social being, to abstract from the social relations of production and to enshrine the goal of human community in a realm distinct from that of man’s activity as an immediate producer. The idea that the latter is governed solely by egoistic private interest was seen by Marx as the great mystification of bourgeois society and one that had to be destroyed.
before human freedom could truly be realized. At the end of his essay on “The Jewish Question,” Marx asserted:

Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power.\(^{18}\)

Socialism, therefore, becomes nothing less than the dissolution of the boundary between the state and civil society, the transcendence of the most comprehensive aspect of human alienation—the alienation of man from himself as a social being of praxis. Politics disappears as a special sphere of activity reserved only for the few in which decisions concerning the social life of the many are made in a context divorced from the social activity of production; the core of the new community consists of the “associated producers” collectively subjecting nature and history to rational control. Politics, as the pursuit of the genuine human community, is thus returned to human beings as they actually live in society and not to the “political man” of bourgeois society, whom Marx sees as merely “abstract, artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person.”\(^{19}\)

In the course of this revolutionary process, the very categories in which politics is conceived undergo radical change.\(^{20}\) For instance, where civil society and political society become identical, Marx holds, the traditional concept of representation is given new meaning:

The legislature is a representation in the same sense in which every function is representative. For example, the shoemaker is my representative in so far as he fulfills a social need, just as every definite social activity, because it is a species-activity, represents only the species; that is to say, it represents a determination of my own essence the way every man is the representative of the other.
Here, he is representative not by virtue of something other than himself which he represents, but by virtue of what he is and does.21

In the modern political state, however, the concept of representation affirms a framework of alienated social life: the professional politician takes it upon himself to represent his constituents’ social powers on their behalf, while the citizens themselves are assumed to follow their own private interests in their everyday lives. In the final analysis, the realm of political affairs emancipates itself from its constituents, adopting a manipulative attitude toward them: as with Hegel’s bureaucracy, public affairs comes to “need subjects for its formal existence,” and the question of the actual community of the real subjects of politics becomes the private concern of the stratum of “public servants.”

Thus the crisis of politics is at least in part a crisis of political meanings, generated by a society which artificially distinguishes between public and private spheres of activity. This crisis of meanings is illustrated by Tadić in the way in which contemporary social science approaches the problem of power. Whereas classical Greek political thought had as its goal the conceptualization of the good state founded on a notion of justice, Tadić criticizes modern elite theory for its primary orientation toward power and authority and its preoccupation with political efficacy rather than political virtue. Tadić bases his critique of modern elite theory on the argument that ever since Hobbes, political theory has used an undifferentiated concept of power which presents the drive for power (conceived in terms of the ability to manipulate one’s human environment) as an historical constant grounded in the human psyche. This concept of power is for Tadić an ideological one in several senses. First of all, as in Hobbes, it fails to distinguish between power as the human capacity to transform the world (including “natural” human abilities such as strength and wisdom) and power as an instrumentality used to manipulate other people (Hobbes thus also
spoke of wealth, friends, reputation, and servants as “powers”). Secondly, in its psychological reductionism, this ahistorical concept of power severs the cooperative life of human beings in society from any rational grounds: obedience and compliance come to be seen as dictated by expediency rather than by any genuine consideration of the common good. Finally, the modern concept of power conceals the domination of man by man in the realm of social production by presenting that relationship as an entirely normal feature of all social life, calling ‘political’ all phenomena that have the common feature of the struggle for power. Thus the artificial distinction between political and economic relations is shown to be a consequence of the ideological tendency to neutralize the moral implications of market society.

Tadić’s argument certainly places him in implicit agreement with the proposition, put forward by Robert C. Tucker, that the merit of Marx as a political theorist is that he drew attention to the “political” aspects of economic relations (i.e., as authority relations). Tadić is also saying more, however: that the very idea that politics is, or should be, primarily concerned with power and authority is an idea characteristic of a society in which the conduct of social relations is not subject to the control of the individual but is instead divorced from his actual life as a producer and imposed on him externally. It is, in short, a concept characteristic of the bourgeois distinction between state and society. A political science with “power” as its basic term of reference, Tadić argues, is better conceived of as a science of political pathology:

Need there be any doubt that they [elite theorists such as Weber and Pareto] must make that extraordinary, exceptional state of siege into the usual or normal political state, and the normal state of peace into an exception? Is it really surprising that political pathology is preached as the normal order, political life presented as a military camp, and war as utopia? The military camp and the concentration camp, as the tangible and obvious symbols of naked power and of the struggle of man with man, perhaps ought to be
placed at the top of the hierarchy of legal (if it is permissible to speak of law at all) institutions.

Once political theory and the problem of power are seen in this light, Tadić concludes, the question is no longer how to destroy power but

precisely the return of alienated \textit{forces propres} as social forces to the realm of true democracy, which is solely in a position to prepare the paths and conditions for the establishment of the classless society.\textsuperscript{26}

Another concept of cardinal importance in modern elite theory is that of the “mass.” The “mass” is a term reserved for the large majority of the population, the “non-elite,” which elite theory perceives as atomized by the private concerns of its individual members, people incapable of formulating on their own any public demands beyond the horizons of their immediate experience and who are thereby made susceptible to manipulation and demagogy. The concept of the mass, Tadić points out, was first put forward in its modern form in the profoundly conservative sociology of theorists such as De Maistre, De Bonauld, and Le Bon, who saw the mass as “a dangerous crowd that could be subdued by force, be it with the aid of deceit, faith, prejudice, obedience, or fanaticism.”\textsuperscript{27} “Public opinion” for these theorists represented no more than the spontaneous, uneducated, and dangerous ravings of those incapable of assuming public responsibilities of any kind. In essence, Tadić argues, there is little difference between this notion of public opinion and that held by modern social science. The public opinion survey approaches its respondents as a faceless multitude whose views on public affairs are to be sampled at random; it is concerned only with the relative frequency with which certain responses occur rather than the reasons for which those responses are given. In the case of theorists like De Maistre, the capacity of the citizens for rational participation in public affairs is radically
discounted; for modern social science, it is simply not of interest. In both cases, “public opinion” is turned back on the public for purposes of manipulation. The problem with public opinion, Tadić writes, is precisely that it is “only opinion”:

The very concept of “opinion”... relates to something private, particular, and politically irrelevant, as opposed to “thought,” which has the character of publicity, universality and officiality. At best it has ... the meaning of “being publicized.” Opinion does not contain in itself an intelligibly expressed judgment, but rather an undefined, unobligeratory, and unarticulated voice, which is closer to a whisper or a ripple. Opinion is the voice of the multitude, the crowd, the mass. It has always been the voice of those who are ruled.\textsuperscript{28}

To be sure, many Praxis Marxists, including Tadić, do not dispute the applicability of the model of mass society to contemporary Yugoslav reality, especially with respect to the fragmentation and atomization of public opinion. Indeed it is Yugoslavia’s unique mixture of bureaucratic centralism (be it located primarily in the federation or in the individual republics) and market spontaneity in which they see powerful forces contributing to the heteronomy and privatization of the social consciousness of the Yugoslav public. While they may reluctantly concede the descriptive validity of the concept of the “mass” for the existing Yugoslav public, however, they certainly do not see a society characterized by elites and masses as a healthy one, much less as one that is either socialist or democratic. “True or direct democracy,” Tadić writes,

cannot be imagined without an imperative mandate and the possibility of recall, or the “permanent agitation” (Rudi Dutschke) of those who execute public functions. The condition for the existence of democracy, furthermore, is solidly founded only in a climate of popular mistrust toward the executors of public functions or, which is one and the same, the permanent verification of their public activity. Therefore democracy will tolerate no form of paternalistic guardianship and bases itself upon the coming to age of the citizens in public life.\textsuperscript{29}
Thus if socialism is truly to be the realization of democracy, it cannot tolerate the atomization of public opinion, but must instead promote and encourage a vigorous, critical public opinion—perhaps, indeed, through the “struggle of opinions”—which resists all attempts to deprive it of its autonomy. As Tadić writes in another essay, socialism cannot view the popular masses as an amorphous crowd which is fatalistically subordinated to active leaders. The primary task of socialism is the political activization of the people and democratic public opinion. The role of the proletarian party also changes in an essential respect. As opposed to all bourgeois parties, its aim is not to organize the masses which blindly follow it, but to be the concrete mediator between man and history.\(^{30}\)

To a certain extent, this characteristic emphasis on the “subjective” as opposed to the “objective,” or structural, preconditions of socialism has led the Praxis Marxists to a natural skepticism of all institutional frameworks, including that of workers’ self-management, as sufficient guarantees of the elimination of human self-alienation. “The ‘Yugoslav path to socialism,’” Supek writes, “constitutes above all a rehabilitation of the category of community (with workers’ self-management and social self-government) and of the category of the personality (with the freedom of scientific and artistic creation).” But he also warns that the best ideas and intentions, fixed at the level of social institutions, can be disfigured, altered, and alienated in the guise of social pragmatism and routine if they are not supported by the personal character of human relations from day to day.\(^{31}\)

Supek’s suspicion of institutional forms that suppress the authentic content of human relations is shared by several of the Praxis Marxists who have directed their attention to social problems. Stojanović, for instance, sees no necessary reason to assume that “the socialist character of decisions is ensured by the
fact that they are made by organs of self-government,” while Tadić asserts:

In workers’ self-management I see the sole social form capable of guaranteeing the preservation of these values [human dignity and solidarity], but I strictly distinguish between relations of self-management and organs of self-management and view critically the tendency to institutionalize the latter as a rigid mechanism in our society.\textsuperscript{32}

Perhaps the crux of the problem is to be found in an antinomy pointed out by Ernst Bloch to which Tadić refers in his felicitously entitled book, \textit{Order and Freedom}. Socialism, writes Bloch, is both a “realm of freedom” and a ”realm of freedom.”\textsuperscript{33} In this unity of opposites is expressed succinctly one of the most difficult questions that Marxian theory and practice has had to face ever since Marx’s writings on the Paris Commune and Engels’ essay on the role of authority in industrial organizations: the problems of conceiving a mode of social organization that is consistent with the emancipatory goals of the revolutionary movement. For institutions are indifferent to the adjectives attached to them. Be they described as “bourgeois,” “socialist,” or even “communist,” they all share the common features of routinizing human relations, imposing organizational goals distinct from those of their members and often opposed to them, and providing certain external standards of human behavior that tend to dull human creativity and to transform active political subjects into objects of manipulation. Surely these effects of institutionalization are in themselves inconsonant with the basic humanistic vision of Marxian theory.

Indeed it would hardly seem that this kind of alienation—the political alienation of social organizations from their members—could ever be definitively eliminated from human society, no matter what the stated goals of those organizations may be. While there is little reason to take issue with Vranicki when he writes that there are no necessary grounds to assume
that alienation will be at the root of every social conflict in the future society, there is just as little reason to assume that institutions, with their naturally alienating attributes, will cease to find a place in the future as well. Indeed the conflict between the two modes of politics discussed earlier in this chapter, the participatory and the instrumental, has been a permanent feature of human society as long as “politics” itself—which the Praxis Marxist Andrija Krešić sees as originating with the decline of the primacy of natural communities and the introduction of the social division of labor—has been a subject of human concern. Given these generic conditions, the conflict does not seem likely to disappear.

Perhaps, however, we are misguided when we seek such a definitive solution to the problem of political alienation. The real point, as Petrović observes, is not so much to produce a society free of all alienation (which would only be to posit yet another “end of history”) or to agonize over the “permanence” of alienation, as to generate a society composed of individuals who will critically perceive their self-alienation and who will seek to revolutionize the society in which they live, thereby transcending their alienated condition. In his critique of Heidegger he writes:

Man is not man when he passively and patiently awaits the inescapable burden that time brings with us, but [only] when he acts and Fights to realize his real human individual and social Being. And truly human Being is not the proud expectation of nothingness, but free creative activity through which man creates his world and himself.

Echoing his colleagues’ skepticism toward instant institutional solutions, Petrović warns that

it is possible to create a social system that would enable and even stimulate the development of de-alienated individuals, but it is not possible to organize a society that would automatically produce such individuals.
In a similar vein, Tadić stresses the educational tasks of socialism. He writes that “in addition to the organization of freedom in the sphere of material production,” true politics also implies “the necessity of discussion and thought based on dialogue as necessary instruments for the reconstitution of democratic and socialist public opinion.”

Thus the Praxis Marxists have come to hold that the cultivation of man as a critical being of praxis is the sine qua non of socialism, without which the transcendence of alienation can be only a dangerous illusion. In this sense they see socialism as a society characterized by “permanent revolution,” not only in the traditional political sense of the term, but more importantly in the sense of a continual demystification of all social and political relationships which have been distorted by ideological thinking. This notion of permanent revolution, Tadić claims, was for Marx implicit “in the critique of all existing conditions in its basic expression, which extends from the letter to Ruge of 1843 to the Afterword to the Second Edition of Volume I of Capital.” Any scheme in which communism is measured by the passage of individual “stages” is unacceptable to the Praxis Marxists insofar as the totality and continuity of the revolutionization of man and society are thereby overlooked. Marković, endorsing Gramsci’s insistence on the development of the revolutionary movement, warns that

If culture is vulgarly understood as a mere social superstructure, this would only serve to divide the revolution into phases: the first, political; then economic; and finally, cultural. Then the revolution is reduced to the seizure of power, and the cultural revolution is degraded to mere educational and ideological work in the framework of the peaceful construction of the new society.

At no point, then, can the socialist revolution—which is an ongoing process rather than a single event—afford to lose sight of its responsibility of transforming the human individual into a critical being capable of perceiving and overcoming alienation at
the same time as it transforms social structure as a whole. And if “to be radical is to grasp things by the root” where “the root is man himself,” then socialism can never afford to neglect the human values on which it is founded, nor can its institutions repress a critical awareness of those values. “A society is socialist,” Petrović writes, “to the extent to which it opens possibilities for the free creative development of every man.”

How is it possible to judge whether these conditions have been fulfilled in any given society? For the Praxis Marxists, the most effective critical tool is none other than the concept of alienation. The existence of alienation in any of its forms—economic, political, cultural—is for them a clear indication that whatever may be said by the defenders of the existing order, that order is still subject to the same type of penetrating criticism which Marx directed against all social formations characterized by commodity production, class conflict, and ideological manipulation. By using alienation as their principal tool of social analysis, the Praxis Marxists consciously set themselves apart from the immediate practitioners of political power, whose interests are more bound up with the short-range success of various political programs and who tend to measure success in terms of the achievement of proclaimed goals. As Stojanović argues, the latter procedure, which he identifies with the Stalinist political mind (but which need not be limited exclusively to Stalinism), tends to neglect spheres of activity other than that of “material construction” and reduces itself to an extreme variant of the commodity fetishism characteristic of bourgeois society. He points out, moreover, that to compare achievements only with stated goals implicitly contains a strong ideological element as well:

Stalinists ... avoid comparing practice with alternative goals and means... Consequently they conclude without much difficulty that practice, the highest criterion, has confirmed the correctness of their course, every measure of which supposedly represents a
link in the chain of the historical necessity of progress. Because of the monopoly of the Stalinist oligarchy, however, other points of view have not had a chance to be verified in practice, much less to confront official policy theoretically. But the essential question is not whether there has been progress... but whether there has been the maximum possible degree of progress in existing conditions.40

“Orthodox” Marxist theory seems well aware of the capacity of the concept of alienation to penetrate this and other mystifications. Soviet Marxism, for instance—when it does not dismiss outright the philosophical value of alienation for Marxian analysis—brings into play a second line of defense, asserting that alienation is a characteristic of bourgeois society alone and thus cannot be invoked in the analysis of socialist society. This argument is founded on the traditionalistic Soviet identification of socialism with the socialization of the means of production, as well as a further identification of the latter with the elimination of private ownership and the establishment of state control over the means of production.41 Of course, an objective reading of Marx’s works will reveal that in his critique of “crude communism” he opposed the simple elimination of private property to what he called its “positive abolition,” comparing the former with the idea of the community of women as a type of universal prostitution. Instead of eliminating exploitation and alienation, this “crude and unreflective communism,” Marx warned, merely universalizes them.42 The main point, however, is that the elimination of private ownership, which in the Soviet view is sufficient for the elimination of alienation, is a purely formal and juridical act which in no way guarantees an end to human misery, exploitation, and alienation. In fact, in Stalinism, as Vranicki points out, alienation attains even higher levels than in bourgeois society, taking on new forms in the process:

Man as a producer finds himself again in the alienated position of hired labor if he has been wholly deprived of participation in the
management of production and in the distribution of the resultant product under ... a system consisting not only of total state planning, but also of the disposal of surplus value by the state. The only difference in this instance is that capitalist monopoly has been supplemented by the universal monopoly of the state....

Since inhuman acts cannot be the consequence of a humane socialist movement, we can only say that the essential relation in all such countries is not socialist in nature. This is all to say that on the basis of the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the nationalization of the means of production, a new social relation was created, heretofore unknown in history, in which the system of political and social alienation has reached the highest possible level.

In the final analysis, the reluctance of many regime ideologists to use the category of alienation in their social analysis is perhaps best accounted for by the simple proposition offered in a Praxis essay by the Hungarian Marxist Mihaly Vajda: “Those who see socialist society as already humanized are forced to deny the existence of alienation in socialism.”

Thus there can be little doubt that the “crisis of politics” is at least in part a function of the blindness of the adherents of large-scale social organizations to all but institutional definitions of reality, which tend to be particularistic and self-serving rather than universalistic and in the interests of the larger social community. As noted above, however, the alternative to such social institutions is not at all clear. It does not seem altogether trivial to comment, with Istvan Meszaros, that “the total abolition of human institutions would amount to... paradoxically, not the abolition of alienation but its maximization in the form of total anarchy.” What Meszaros proposes in place of the total deinstitutionalization of society is a critical attitude toward even the most apparently perfect of institutions. It is this attitude of constant, watchful criticism that was most characteristic of the Praxis approach to Yugoslav political life. Whether by maintain-
ing this posture the *Praxis* Marxists have been able to make a significant positive contribution to the quality of politics in Yugoslavia is a question which would seem to have important implications for the fate of all social experiments which sooner or later must confront the puzzling dilemma of the “realm of freedom.”

**Stalinism and Its Legacy**

If the concept of human community forms the positive basis for a Marxian critique of politics in the eyes of the *Praxis* Marxists, they find the antinomy of that community in the social structure commonly referred to as “Stalinism.” Andrija Krešić has observed that Stalinism, with its extreme centralization of social initiative and control, can be thought of as a grotesquely perverted form of the realization of the Hegelian idea, which Marx had so profoundly rejected as a total inversion of the right relationship between the individual and society:

Persecuted in *words* ... Hegelianism factually reigned in the form of the tyranny of the absolute political mind-subject over the society-object. Society was so deprived of its sovereignty that one sovereign leader sincerely imagined that he was himself the personification of popular sovereignty.45

The critique of Stalinism, for the *Praxis* Marxists, was from the very beginning the medium through which they developed the concept of alienation as a critical tool for examining questions of social significance in general, precisely because of the extreme forms which alienation assumed in Stalinist society; as Max Weber might have said, in Stalinism they felt they had discovered alienation in its “ideal” form. Their obsession with Stalinism sensitized them, moreover, to the legacy of Stalinism in their own society as well, endowing their critique of bureaucracy and class structure, the role of the Party, and charismatic leadership in Yugoslav social life with urgent implications. Indeed a
proper understanding of the origins and character of the *Praxis* Marxists’ long-standing conflict with the Yugoslav regime cannot be gained without a prior appreciation of the importance of the critique of Stalinism in their intellectual and political matura-

The Praxis Marxists follow in the footsteps of a long tradition of radical communist criticism dating at least from Bakunin in locating the roots of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the structure of the revolutionary party itself. But unlike Bakunin and, more particularly, the later left-communist critics of Lenin, many of the Praxis Marxists have made certain concessions to the argument that the model of a vanguard party, characterized by tight organization and strict discipline, may be justified in light of the primary task of the seizure of power and concrete social conditions forcing the party into illegality and struggle. They are also generally more cautious and moderate with respect to Lenin and Leninism than those who would seek to present Stalinism as the necessary consequence of Leninist practices. Vranicki, for instance, points out that despite his vision of a strictly disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries, Lenin did not take severe measures against Bukharin in reprisal for the latter’s opposition to the peace strategy of Brest-Litovsk, while Tadić stresses the vast differences in method and scope between Leninist and Stalinist party purges. At the same time, however, a suspicion of the political implications of the concept of the vanguard party is clearly present in the writings of the *Praxis* Marxists, closely paralleling their discomfort with Lenin’s identification of truth and the party discussed in the previous chapter. “Because of the conditions in which the party operates,” writes Stojanović, “monolithism, discipline, hierarchy, duty, responsibility, and appointment [from above] develop at the cost of diversity, initiative, democracy, rights, and choice.” Surely this is not a picture of an organization whose structure might serve as a model for the new society of free individuals.

Where the *Praxis* Marxists are unanimous is in their insis-
tence that the Leninist party is inappropriate as a political structure once the political revolution has been accomplished. With Stojanović, they assert that after "the consolidation of power" there is the danger that the party will become a self-perpetuating institution which seeks to impose its own internal norms and structure over the rest of society. Stojanović describes this dilemma in the following terms:

The communist party is characterized by the division of professional leaders, who make decisions, from the membership which executes those decisions. This model of party life conflicts with the scheme for a society which itself makes decisions concerning itself. Communists, in order to triumph, must associate into an organization which is led by professional revolutionaries. But after their victory they become professional wielders of power. The dominant part of the communist party is composed precisely of the possessors of state power: political, economic, and military functionaries, civil servants, et al. Thus the party’s social composition itself tends to create a statist society.  

Both Stojanović and Marković, moreover, find a moral dimension as well in this problem, which they identify, in part, as a problem of the conduct of the members of the revolutionary elite. Stojanović sees one of the principal factors in the "degeneration" of the revolution in the "finalization of revolutionary means," including revolutionary violence and organization, which tend to become ends in themselves. In a similar vein, Marković states that while socialism is in need of a transformational elite consisting of "rational, socialized, and human persons who understand the major aim of the social process," the question of elite behavior after the revolution is also of utmost importance:

Will this elite, when these preconditions are realised, find within itself the moral strength and consistency to pass voluntarily to the basic element of the socialist revolution, i.e., the realisation of self-management and consequently the gradual setting aside of itself as a power elite...
Where, precisely, is the threshold beyond which the party ceases to be a truly revolutionary organization and becomes the core of the new bureaucratic order? Clearly, to declare only *post factot* that the threshold has been transgressed is intellectually unsound as well as politically dangerous, as Trotsky and many others discovered only too late. Nor are the *Praxis* Marxists very clear on this point. Many historians of the Soviet political system have pointed to the Tenth Party Congress and the suppression of the Workers’ Opposition as a crucial turning point; the *Praxis* Marxists’ lingering and somewhat paradoxical attachment to Lenin as a maker of revolution, however, often seems to hinder them from taking a firm position in this respect. Apparently unable to reconcile Lenin’s earlier support of the “fabzavkomy” (the factory committees, which Lenin viewed as important instruments for the radicalization of working-class consciousness) with the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress, “political” writers such as Stojanović and Tadić weakly appeal for further study of Lenin’s role in the treatment of the Workers’ Opposition, rather uncharacteristically refraining from passing judgment on this important issue. Thus we are left with the line drawn by Stojanović between the periods before and after the “consolidation of power.” But it would certainly seem that the structural consequences of the enormous growth of party-state bureaucracy during the period of the Civil War are adequate demonstration that to use such a vague historical standard as the “consolidation of power” creates more problems than it resolves.

A similar problem of historical interpretation is evident in the only study by a *Praxis* Marxist completely dedicated to the political history of the USSR, Andrija Krešić’s *Political Society and Political Mythology: Contribution to the Critique of the “Cult of Personality.”* Krešić’s main contention is that the Soviet critique of Stalin’s “cult of personality” is inadequate since it ignores the serious structural and historical conditions which engendered bureaucratism throughout Soviet history, even during Lenin’s lifetime. The exhaustion and decimation of the best elements
of the Russian working class during the Civil War was in Krešić’s view one of the primary factors in the growing alienation of the Party from the working class. The rule of the working class thus yielded by default to the rule of the Party, which “relatively quickly was itself transformed into a centralized bureaucratic machine.” The revolutionary principle of democratic centralism gave way to the rule of a purely administrative type of centralism. Of the Stalinist thesis of the “sharpening of the class struggle” under socialism, Krešić comments that throughout the campaign for rapid industrialization the regime did indeed intensify the class struggle—between itself and the rest of Soviet society. He suggests that the decisive turning point came at the time of the “Great Break” of 1929, once the Party had emerged as the unquestionable ruling factor in Soviet society:

... at the end of the period [i.e., approximately the first decade of Soviet power] there was no longer a social need for an extremely centralized state organization, for the concentration of enormous power at the top of the political organization, [in the same way] as this had been socially necessary when the revolutionary party was only organizing the new state for the sake of preserving the first achievements and for the fateful struggles of the future.

The state ultimately became “an end in itself and preserved itself against the social forces which it had at one time served.”

Krešić’s peculiar historical determinism—his insistence that by 1927-29 the centralized Soviet state apparatus had clearly outlived its usefulness—is in itself hardly more convincing than the equally deterministic arguments of those who have insisted, however regretfully, on the necessity for Stalin’s dictatorial rule in the context of rapid economic industrialization. The “social necessities” of the day were not nearly as clear to the participants in the struggles of the 1920s as Krešić would have it seem. Perhaps the major significance of this line of argument, however, lies in the political and moral implications drawn from it by
Krešić and his colleagues for future generations of communists who would have the advantage of hindsight which the Russian Bolsheviks lacked. The ability of Krešić’s model to account in concrete terms for the enormous growth of the power of the Soviet state after 1929, in any event, is certainly not one of its strongest points.

Perhaps, however, these shortcomings are not as serious as they might seem. Just as in the previous chapter we have seen that the philosophical emphasis of the Praxis Marxists tends to fall on the “subjective” rather than the “objective” dimension of the revolutionary experience, so here it might be more instructive to turn to their thoughts on the transformation of party norms in the postrevolutionary period as an indication of where the crucial turning point is to be found. On this score, the Praxis Marxists are much less ambiguous. A constantly recurring theme in their writings is that the “great break” between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary phases of Party hegemony—in the case of the USSR, between Leninism and Stalinism—occurs in the moment that criticism is excluded from the ranks of the revolutionary movement itself. The responsibility for Stalinism in the USSR is placed by Tadić not with Leninism and the Tenth Party Congress per se, but with Lenin’s heirs’ lack of sensitivity to the new demands of the postrevolutionary era:

Above all, Lenin’s followers completely overlooked the necessity of changing the function of the Party in the sociohistorical conditions which arose after the political victory. The principles of illegal work and tactics which were necessary in the period of “direct assault” were totally inappropriate for resolving the key problems of socialist construction.... In the new conditions, the emphasis should have shifted from centralism to democracy, along with the simultaneous use of all those democratic instruments which the old revolutionary democracy had created (introduction of the binding mandate, public control and criticism of all political activities. . .). . .Instead of all these measures, Stalinism literally transposed the principles of military discipline into the
political movement, along with the binding imposition of theoretical principles in the event of even the slightest disagreement with the policy of the “general staff,” as Stalin used to refer to his leading cadres.\textsuperscript{57}

With this in mind, it was suggested at the June 1974 Novi Sad symposium by a young legal theorist from Sarajevo (who would later briefly become an occasional contributor to \textit{Praxis}) that the break between Leninism and Stalinism should be dated to 1924, the year of Lenin’s death and of the Thirteenth Party Congress.\textsuperscript{58} “In 1924,” Robert Daniels has written,

\begin{quote}
official Communist politics and thinking became both monolithic and monotonous. The very dullness of the Thirteenth Congress and those that followed ... was indicative of the rapid change in the Soviet intellectual climate. The empty platitudes, the dogmatic assumption of the infallibility of the party, and the insistence on absolute unity have remained constant features of Communist thought. The substance of party doctrine has changed, but its permanent forms date recognizably from this time.\textsuperscript{59}
\end{quote}

While the historical accuracy of Daniels’ argument may be open to question, it is this image of routinization, embodied in the doctrine of ideological unity as the precondition for decisive action, that the \textit{Praxis} Marxists see at the root of the revolution’s degeneration. “In such conditions,” writes Tadić, “the party increasingly transforms itself from a revolutionary and democratic organization into a bureaucratic-centralist apparatus with police functions.”\textsuperscript{60}

Turning to the \textit{Praxis} critique of Stalinism itself, one of its most striking features is its apparent similarity to Western interpretations of Stalinism as a “totalitarian” society. Tadić, for instance, decries the “total politicization of social life” under Stalinism, while Vranicki devotes much attention in his \textit{History of Marxism} and elsewhere to Stalin’s “tragic” identification of socialism with the state and his insistence on the political direction
from above” of all types of social activity. In his critique of Stalinism, Krešić claims that Stalinism can best be understood as a “political society” characterized by a total alienation of the institutions of politics from the producers and the voluntaristic rule of those institutions in what Krešić calls—in the most literal sense—a “political economy.”61 By the same token, many of the most important themes of totalitarian theory do not appear in the Praxis theory of Stalinism, such as the basic identity between “communism” (Stalinism) and fascism (principally Nazism), as well as the elite-mass model of society which totalitarian theory presupposes in preference to a model of class struggle. Instead, the Praxis Marxists argue that Stalinism—and in this they see its real tragedy—was the product of a genuine class revolution gone sour, a revolution overpowered by its own instruments. Moreover, they insist that the class model of society may continue to be valid even after the revolution has run its course. This latter point, in particular, is a source of continual irritation for the apologists of existing “socialist” societies.

As we have already noted, many representatives of “official” Marxist theory, in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia as well, have argued that socialism should be considered immune to the phenomenon of alienation. An even more widely shared, but related, position among orthodox Marxists holds that the traditional Marxian method of class analysis is by definition inapplicable to socialist societies since, in this view, class conflict presupposes the existence of private property, which is presumably abolished in the new socialist order. Indeed, Edvard Kardelj, the regime’s chief theoretician, has gone so far as to assert that to view the struggle for socialism in the postrevolutionary period through the prism of the struggle of two basic classes is both ideologically absurd and politically reactionary.62 In a somewhat more moderate tone Miroslav Pecujlic, a political theorist and former member of the LCY Executive Committee, has insisted that class conflict is an historically specific form of social conflict.
With the dissolution of private property in socialism, Pecujlic asserts, the nature of social conflict changes accordingly. With respect to bureaucracy in particular, Pecujlic writes that as a “phase” of socialism, it is an

*historically specific, sui generis category; it is not identical with “class.”*

The bureaucracy has a monopoly of rule, but this monopoly is based on the delegation of rights instead of the right to property. The bureaucracy does not have an independent economic base in private property. The fact that its power is based on representation (delegation) puts it in a different relation to those whom it rules. It must be more cognizant of their consensus and interest. The bureaucracy enjoys privilege not as a consequence of its own legitimate right as a property-owner, but as a result of the abuse of power.

The difficulties with Pecujlic’s position are readily evident. If, as he states, its “emancipation from its class basis (the working class), of which it is the representative, is ... the essential constitutive element of bureaucracy as a system of social relations,” then the delegation of rights in fact ceases to be the real basis of bureaucratic power in any but the purely chronological sense. The bureaucracy’s pretensions to represent the social consensus, or even the consensus of the working class alone, then simply become elements of bureaucratic ideology. Indeed it should not be forgotten that the bourgeois state also derives formal authority from the principle of representation through delegation, and it certainly does not publicly found its legitimacy on any specific right proceeding from the possession of private property, as Pecujlic suggests. But there are even more powerful reasons for skepticism toward Pecujlic’s line of reasoning, relating to the nature of property itself. The category of property, as noted earlier in this chapter, is not exhausted by the existence of formal legal title to a particular material object. Property is, more fundamentally, a social *relationship* inhering in the exclusive monopoly over the exercise of a particular function or the use of
a specific resource; a relationship, furthermore, which is generically and ontologically bound up with the existence of alienation and which indeed presupposes alienation, as Marx himself observed. In principle, as Tadić writes, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that “state property can become a specific type of private property.” “Not only does the wage relationship not disappear under the rule of state ownership in stagnation,” he observes; “this rule can become a most brutal form of exploitation.”

“The working class,” wrote Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy, in the course of its development, will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society.

In the Praxis view of the Stalinist bureaucratic society, however, this antagonism, rather than disappearing, was only intensified. The existence of political power was no longer only an “expression” of class conflict; it now became its direct form. And with respect to the fact of class conflict, a form of conflict based on the extraction of surplus value from the producer in conditions of commodity production, Marković writes:

It does not matter whether the surplus of labour of the working class is usurped by capitalists in the form of profits and on the basis of ownership of the means of production, or by bureaucrats in the form of excessive salaries and privilege on the basis of unrestricted control of social objectified work.

Lest it be thought that a mere fine point of social theory is at issue here, it should not be forgotten that in the history of the communist movement, insistence upon the validity of a class model for the analysis of conflict in postrevolutionary socialist societies has almost always been interpreted by those in power as
a political provocation of serious proportions. The celebrated case of Milovan Djilas is instructive in this respect. Along lines very similar to those followed by many Praxis Marxists, he argued in a famous passage that

ownership is nothing other than the right of profit and control. If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting class.69

To this it should quickly be added that the Praxis Marxists have strenuously dissociated themselves from several aspects of Djilas’ political program, especially his advocacy of multi-partism;70 and certainly their continuing commitment to the ideals of the socialist revolution and to Marxian theory markedly sets them apart from Djilas’ own sense of embittered realism. For all this, however, in their social analysis the basic Djilasist thesis about class and social structure has remained intact, retaining, as with Djilas, ominous political overtones.

To what extent this is true was illustrated by the sharp debate touched off by the appearance of Stojanović’s 1967 essay, “The Statist Myth of Socialism,” which stands among the clearest and most uncompromising statements of the Praxis Marxists on the existence of class antagonism in socialist society. Throughout “The Statist Myth” ran a simple thread of demystification graphically summarized in this passage:

Beginning with the bloody collectivization of the peasantry in the u.s.s.R. at the end of the 1920s, through the mass extermination of Communists in the 1930s, the Stalinist offensive against Yugoslavia from 1948 on, the military intervention in Hungary in 1956, and concluding with the occupation of Czechoslovakia ... Marxists have despairingly asked themselves the same question time and again: How is all this possible in socialism? ... “Socialism” in which debureaucratization, economic decentralization, the elimination of political terror and censorship, the introduction of workers’ self-management, the attainment of national sover-
eignty, and so on—in which all this represents counterrevolution, can hardly be called socialism in Marx’s sense of the term.

Rather than speaking of what he claimed to be such self-contradictory ideas as “state socialism” or “bureaucratic socialism” (two of Kardelj’s favorite euphemisms) or even “statist communism,” Stojanović suggested that a new category must be added to the traditional framework of Marxian class analysis—that of “statism”:

In statist society . . . the ruling class is the collective owner of the means of production. The share of surplus value appropriated by its members is defined by their position in the state hierarchy. Actually, the nature and degree of their participation in all decisions about production and the distribution of surplus value is defined in this manner.... In the specific case of the statism which developed in the wake of the degeneration of the socialist revolution, the state apparatus coalesced with those of the communist party and the other political organizations constituting its transmission mechanisms. As the collective owner of the means of production, this apparatus employs the labor force and exploits it.

To be sure, this concept of “statism” is itself quite problematical. Its chief theoretical shortcoming, it would seem, lies in its very comprehensiveness. It is not at all clear at first glance, for instance, how various societies characterized by state domination—from “oriental despotism” to many modern African political systems, for instance—would usefully, if at all, be distinguished from the sort of statism typified by Stalinism. But perhaps this is not the point. As Stojanović himself suggested in this essay, one of the most important aspects of the concept of statism is the conclusion for practice that it suggests in the context of Marxian theory: “With respect to the statist class, as well, we must speak in the true Marxist spirit of the prospects for expropriating the expropriators and for socializing the means of production.”

Words such as these could not but evoke sharp reactions
from Party leaders, and these were not long in coming. Miroslav Pecujlić disputed Stojanović’s thesis in an article given broad circulation through the official journal *Socijalizam*, in which he repeated his assertion that state property is only a transitional form of ownership and that bureaucracy, far from being a class, is a “sui generis category and in its essence contains elements of the transcendence of class rule.” On this basis he concluded that “bureaucratized state socialism” should still be considered a “type of socialism.” Shortly thereafter, Kardelj himself joined in the rebuttal, characteristically choosing to emphasize the practical side of the problem. After reiterating his accustomed position that the bureaucracy is a mere “fraction” of the working class, he issued what might well be interpreted, in the light of future events, as a veiled threat to the proponents of a class analysis of socialism:

> If we accept the thesis that antagonistic classes exist and that a political settling of accounts among them is unavoidable, then we orient ourselves toward a struggle for power among political cliques, toward the creation of a political society and toward the negation of the leading role of the working people. The development of the Hungarian political crisis in 1956 confirms that such a struggle for power eventually leads to the surrender of the socialist state to counterrevolutionary forces.

Still, Kardelj was in agreement with Stojanović on at least one important point: that the issue of conceptualizing social structure and conflict is as much a practical question as it is a theoretical one. Beyond this point, however, they diverged—as it would seem, irreconcilably.

From this exchange it should be more than evident that in Yugoslavia the question of class antagonism in socialism continues to hold the most serious political implications. For the legacy of the “statism” at issue here is, as nearly all Yugoslavs are well aware, one of the most important elements of the Yugoslav political culture and one which, as the *Praxis* Marxists have re-
peatedly emphasized, continues to be felt keenly in modern Yugoslav social life. With reference to the preceding discussion of the role of the party in the genesis of the Soviet bureaucratic class, it is especially interesting to note that as Praxis social criticism grew more intense over time, the question of the responsibility of the structure of the Yugoslav revolutionary vanguard for social divisions in contemporary Yugoslavia came increasingly to the fore. The open articulation of this issue in fact revealed a significant shift in the stance of Praxis Marxism as a whole not only toward the Leninist party as a form of prerevolutionary organization, but also toward the Yugoslav revolutionary experience itself.

For some Praxis Marxists, the new position seemed to represent only a slight change of emphasis. Stojanović, for instance, had written in the pre-1968 period about the Yugoslav revolution in quite positive terms, viewing the Leninist party as perhaps a necessary evil, but nonetheless an appropriate form of revolutionary organization in conditions of illegality. But after the disappointments of the aborted student revolts of 1968 and the increasing frustration of Stojanović and his colleagues with the effects of the economic reforms and the concurrent reappearance of the old “administrative methods” toward social critics such as themselves, even the Partisan experience came to be viewed in a new light. While previously Stojanović and others had limited themselves to discussing the moral tragedy of the professional revolutionary,74 in 1972 Stojanović addressed himself much more unequivocally to the lasting significance of the Party’s Stalinist origins:

Unfortunately, we are still far from a true picture of the CPY and the Yugoslav revolution.... In the official version... there is hardly any evidence of the intimate connection between Stalinist forms of social organization and the Stalinist dimension of the CPY before and during the revolution. Therefore it is particularly urgent to examine the process of the “Bolshevization” of the
Party . . . sectarianism in the Party, the Party’s policies toward the Left intelligentsia, the suppression of internal opposition to Stalinization within the Party, the relationships between Yugoslav communists who were in the USSR—particularly during the Stalinist purges—and revolutionary terror during the war and after victory.\textsuperscript{75}

The younger generation of \textit{Praxis} Marxists has been even less cautious in subjecting the Yugoslav revolution to criticism. The Belgrade sociologist Nebojša Popov, a veteran of the student radicalism of June 1968 (but not, as some of his senior \textit{Praxis} colleagues might point out, of the Partisan struggle), locates the burden of responsibility for the emergence of a political class—the “politocracy”—after the war with the institutional and manipulative nature of the Party’s tactics, even at the height of the war, toward allies of the Partisan cause and the Party’s crude orientation toward the seizure of power as the overriding political goal. The events of 1948, Popov contends, served only to stimulate a circulation of the political elite and effected no serious transformation in the relationship between the Party and the people; indeed, he points out that it was precisely in the wake of the “Cominform break” that the political police, under Aleksandar Rankovic, managed to accumulate much of its power. Popov is also singularly unimpressed by one of the most spectacular events in postwar Yugoslav political history—the ouster of Rankovic in 1966—and claims that such events are upheavals only within the narrow council of the “politocracy,” their effects on society at large being felt only in the most indirect manner.\textsuperscript{76} To be sure, this interpretation of Yugoslav history is itself “partisan” in many respects.\textsuperscript{77} By the same token, it can itself be interpreted as one more indication of the extent of disillusionment and impatience of many \textit{Praxis} thinkers with Yugoslav socialism toward the end of the first decade of their “critique of all existing conditions.”

But no better sign of their increased frustration with the
this period—save, perhaps, their growing frustration with the practice of self-management in Yugoslavia, discussed below\textsuperscript{78}—can be found than in their changing view of the charismatic leader. The \textit{Praxis} critique of Stalinism as a bureaucratic class society bears striking resemblance to Trotsky’s theory of the bureaucratic Thermidor in many respects. One of the potential consequences of the Trotskyist argument is to diminish the role played by any single individual in the process of counter-revolutionary transformation. Krešić, for instance, argues in his counter-critique of the Soviet analysis of Stalinism that to confine the sources of Stalinism to a single personality is to overlook the systemic aspects of the monstrosity that grew out of the revolution’s degeneration. Instead of a single cult of personality, Krešić asserts, Stalin’s cult was merely the apex of an entire system of political-bureaucratic \textit{cults} of personality—beginning with the principle of “\textit{edinonachalie}” and culminating in the apotheosis of “the most general Director-Generalissimo.” While Krešić does concede that in its advanced stages the “Stalinist” political system was at times decisively influenced by the imprint of Stalin’s own personality, he observes that “the idea that everything depends \textit{primarily} upon the leadership is \textit{primarily} the idea of the leadership about its own significance in society.” And Marković, even less equivocally, states that “the myth of Stalin was built up by a bureaucracy which needed him. . . . Thus, Stalin created [the] bureaucracy. And [the] bureaucracy created him.”\textsuperscript{79}

To be sure, even this “traditional” \textit{Praxis} view of the role of the leader has its ambiguities. When Praxis thinkers such as Vranicki and Supek, for instance, decry the several serious errors in Stalin’s political thought, they clearly imply that these personal views of one man carried enough weight, and that the individual who held them carried enough personal influence, for them to be of such fateful historical significance.\textsuperscript{80} Tadić, on the other hand, characterizes Stalinism as a \textit{combination} of bureaucratic
and charismatic domination. But even here Tadić’s use of the term “charismatic” is not unambiguous, for in the context in which he uses it, “charismatic” evidently refers in a Weberian sense to the irrationalism of a bureaucracy which considers itself above principles of legality, a contradiction which is often convenient to conceal by appealing to a deified leader as the fictitious representative of the political system as a whole.\textsuperscript{81} In this manner, Tadić points up one of the problems of the concept of “charisma” in general—that it is not necessarily an attribute of a person only, but might be thought of as a characteristic of an entire system (or collectivity) as well\textsuperscript{82}—and seems to suggest that the preeminence of one leader in the Stalinist system is little more than a necessary illusion fostered by the bureaucracy itself.

After the crucible of the years 1968–71, however, there was a significant if subtle shift in the attitude of some of the leading Praxis Marxists toward the problem of charisma and the charismatic leader. The new emphasis, exhibiting increased sensitivity in particular toward the problems posed in a period of political instability by the charismatic leadership of one man—Tito—for the immediate future of Yugoslavia, was indicative of a generally increased willingness to discuss ever more sensitive issues in an open and provocative manner. Characteristically, it was Stojanović who played the role of provocateur on this occasion, just as it was he who in 1963 broke open the issue of intra-Party democracy and who later formulated the question of statism in its most penetrating form.

Noting that “nearly nothing has been done in the real study of the phenomenon and role of charismatic leaders in socialist revolutions and post-revolutionary development,” and commenting on the difficulties involved in evaluating the role of the charismatic leader while he is still alive, Stojanović proceeded to treat the problem quite directly. Once again he articulated the theme of the charismatic leader as an artificial construction of the bureaucracy, but he now also struck much closer to home by
stating rather perversely that “as distinguished from Stalin’s charisma, which was to a certain extent spontaneously grounded in his association with the leadership of the October Revolution, the cults of the Eastern European leaders were totally fabricated.” “Fabricated or indigenous,” he conceded, “the cult of the leader ... gradually becomes an enormous material force” in its own right. The nature of this material force is a function of the peculiar position occupied by the charismatic leader with respect to the rest of society: precisely in order to perpetuate the social rationale for charisma and to present society with a need for strong leadership from above, the charismatic leader is driven to create new social crises—so that he can resolve them. The position of the charismatic leader thus has an internal logic which is antithetical to the goal of democratization:

The charismatic summit accurately suspects that it would have no ground to stand on if, in the process of democratization, it would fail to secure for itself the role of savior. Therefore it will at times even stimulate tensions, disagreements, and even conflicts in the party-state hierarchy—and in society as well.... [Yet] the charismatic summit will try not to extinguish the seeds of future crises in the hierarchy by too radically doing away with these... conflicts, for only in such crises can it renew its charismatic power.83

Stojanović seemed to suggest, in a thinly veiled way, that many of, the sharp zigzags in recent Yugoslav political life—as examples, one might mention the failure to transform economic into political liberalization, the deceptive political decentralization that culminated after 1971 in a drastic reassertion of Party discipline, or even more specifically the toleration of nationalistic expressions in Croatia until a clear crisis point had been reached in late 1971—could be attributed at least in part to the requirements of charismatic rule struggling to find a place for itself in a changing social universe. At the same time, Stojanović’s argument itself implied that the view of the charismatic leader as
a mere creature of the bureaucracy is inadequate insofar as it
fails to take account of the possibility that the leader—who may
indeed begin as the creature of the bureaucracy—may at some
point overpower not only the bureaucracy but also the entire
political system which gave birth to him.

From the discussion in this chapter it should be evident that
the Praxis critique of Stalinism was a critique in movement rather
than a static doctrine which, once set forth, was complete. As the
views described here on the revolutionary party and the charis-
matic leader should remind us, the problem presented by
Stalinism was not, for the Praxis Marxists, a purely theoretical
one of historical or “Sovietological” interest. Many of modern
Yugoslavia’s political institutions did have their origins in
Stalinist models, and the initially sporadic but now intensifying
use of “administrative methods” to suppress critical thought
both within and outside of the Party can only serve to illustrate
the stubborn resistance which these vestiges of “the old” in
Yugoslav political culture offer to attempts to excise them. By
the same token, as the 1960s drew to a close and there was
increasing evidence suggesting the evolution of Yugoslavia away
from Stalinism toward a fundamentally new system of political,
economic, and social relations, the orientation of the Praxis
critique began to shift accordingly, from a critique of statism to a
critique of market society. The focus of both critiques, however,
was and always has been the problem of self-management and
the fate this social ideal has suffered as a result of the contradic-
tory strains to which it has been exposed since its introduction
onto the Yugoslav political scene.
The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for a society a certain material ground-work or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development.

—Karl Marx, *Capital*, Volume I

The Idea of Self-Management

The idea of the free association of producers is as old as socialism itself. Owen, Proudhon, Fourier, and others—those forerunners and contemporaries of Marx whom he contemptuously dubbed “utopian socialists”—all dreamed of a society in which production and exchange would take place in an atmosphere free of external compulsion, greed, and misery. Marx inherited this aspiration but warned that its realization was far from imminent and that it was predicated, as he asserted in the above-quoted passage from *Capital*, on material conditions that must themselves be the “spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development.” As if to emphasize the point, in his writings he devoted nearly all his attention to that very process of development, giving little indication of what the new forms of association might look like when they finally appeared.

Only in one historical instance—the Paris Commune—did
Marx recognize anything even remotely resembling what he called the "self-government of the producers." The political and administrative structure of the Commune represented for Marx the thorough realization of the democracy of which he had written nearly thirty years earlier in his *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right.'* The popularization of the armed forces, the establishment of universal suffrage and rotation of delegates, the provisions for strict accountability and the merging of executive and legislative functions, and perhaps most importantly the provision that public servants receive no more compensation than an ordinary worker's wage—all were received by Marx with the highest praise. While the Commune did not provide directly for democracy in the sphere of production, Marx seemed to think that something on this order was immanent in the very nature of the Commune. "Its true secret," he wrote in *The Civil War in France,* was that it "was essentially a working-class government, the produce [sic] of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour." Indeed without this last condition, he stressed, the entire formal political structure of the Commune

would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. With labour emancipated, every man becomes a working-man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute.\(^1\)

With the death of the Commune, the idea of the "self-government of the producers" was adopted by radical syndicalists who insisted that the organization of production should be carried out directly by the workers through their trade associations. It was more or less in this form that the idea surfaced in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s in the famous intra-Party
debate over the “Workers’ Opposition.” The Workers’ Opposition, Kollontai asserted,

supports the thesis that the management of the economy is the affair of the trade unions, and in this its thinking is more “Marxist” than [that of] the theoretically schooled Party summits.... The leading economic organ in the workers’ republic must, in the present transitional period, be an organ elected by the producers, the workers. All other soviet apparata which act in the area of production and the economy only carry out the economic policy of that main economic organ of the workers’ republic.²

It is significant for subsequent Soviet history that these ideas about workers’ councils developed out of the growing mistrust of Party activists of an increasingly ponderous central bureaucracy. To be sure, their suspicions were not unfounded. But Lenin, in his rejoinder to the Workers’ Opposition, refused to confuse what he perceived as two distinct issues. The struggle against bureaucratism would proceed with ever greater vigor, he insisted at the Tenth Party Congress, while the trade unions would function as “schools of communism.” As for direct management of the economy by the workers, however, he dismissed the idea for the time being as a luxury which the Party, at a time when the country was in the grip of serious threats from abroad and continual crises from within, not to mention the still relatively uneducated state of the Russian working class itself, could ill afford.³ The issue was closed for the foreseeable future.

Thus when Tito boldly proclaimed the introduction of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia on June 26, 1950, this small country was embarking on a largely uncharted course. Conditions in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s were hardly more favorable than they had been in Russia three decades before. Yugoslavia was still a backward country with a rather small industrial base; it had recently suffered through a costly war in which it lost a greater proportion of its population than any other European country, including the USSR; it was under severe external
pressure—both military and economic—from all sides; and it had just experienced the trauma of estrangement from the Soviet Union which itself was the cause of serious internal conflicts throughout the Yugoslav Party. With all this in mind, Tito’s daring and imagination seem all the more remarkable in retrospect. The proclamation of workers’ self-management was designed precisely to mobilize and unify the population in the face of these serious strains, internal and external. In addition, workers’ self-management was intended to lay the groundwork for a far-reaching social transformation by cultivating the awareness of the broad working populace of its right to control the processes and products of its labor while simultaneously struggling against the evils of bureaucratism. And to root out bureaucratism meant no less than to strike at the very foundations of the Stalinist political order, many of whose features were closely replicated in Yugoslavia in the immediate postwar years.

In his speech announcing the self-management reform, Tito clarified the purposes of the experiment:

The transfer of the factories and mines, etc., to management by workers’ collectives will prevent the infectious disease known as bureaucracy [from] becoming endemic in our economy.... Bureaucracy is among the greatest enemies of Socialism for the reason that it is drawn in unnoticed at every pore of social activity, without people being aware of it at first. ... It is imperative that we enlist the assistance of the broadest masses to fight against it and not allow this menace to Socialism to get under way.4

The introduction of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia can be described without exaggeration as a revolutionary departure. Still, this was a revolution from above. In prerevolutionary Russia, for example, the movement for factory control seems to have been at first the result of the spontaneous action of Petrograd workers, only later embraced by the Bolsheviks and then only temporarily, while in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 demands for workers’ councils came
from below with dissident intellectuals acting as catalysts. In Yugoslavia, in contrast, workers’ self-management appeared as the result of a political decision made at the highest levels and quickly became an integral part of the established system. As a plaque on a Yugoslav factory building reads, “the party—state leadership gave the factories to the management of workers’ collectives.” These circumstances would have important implications for the subsequent development of the Yugoslav model of workers’ self-management.

While it was originally applied only to factories and similar industrial enterprises, the principle of self-management was by the mid-1950s broadened to apply to other social sectors as well, eventually embracing social self-government (services and consumption), communal self-government (on the basis of territorial political units), and, on a much more restricted scale, rural self-management. The functions assigned to the units of self-management, as well as the degree of autonomy of those units from external control, varied over time but grew steadily throughout the subsequent decade. There is no question that by the mid 1960s the role of these self-managing collectives in the national economy as a whole was significant, but as Albert Meister suggests, their net social and economic impact was still rather difficult to assess:

Since their introduction, the effects of the workers’ councils—and of their new liberty—have made themselves felt [in the following areas]: struggle against waste, increased productivity, reduction of manpower. These positive effects, however, have been counterbalanced—true, to a lesser degree—by negative tendencies: the economism of enterprises, a lack of morality in market behavior, excessive abuse of personnel..., and an excessive degree of individual profit-sharing to the detriment of productive investments and the social or collective utilization of profits.

At the same time, and perhaps precisely because of these difficulties, the regime sought to confine the principle of self-
management as much as possible to the lower levels of the political and economic system. Basic decisions about national investment policy have been handled not by organs of self-management in the productive sectors of the economy but either by central federal organs or, more recently, by banks and other commercial concerns. Indeed this and related problems, as we shall see below, is one of the major weak links which many Praxis Marxists have found in the practice of self-management in Yugoslavia. But for the time being, it is important to observe that insofar as self-management is a working part of the Yugoslav political system as a whole, it is subject to the same pressures toward idealization and rationalization as are all social ideas which lend their support to the formal political structure of a society and its perpetuation. In short, self-management, too, has had a sort of ideology constructed around it, and along with this there has developed an implicit but mandatory pecking order of criticism. Meister writes:

Before [criticism] is expressed by the Chief or major leaders, the institutions and their functioning are not presumed to be subject to criticism; one closes one’s eyes to that which is not going well, one maintains silence about the evidence. Officially, the institutions are the best and most democratic that the people have had since the beginning of their history.... But later, criticism appears, the Chief speaks; and immediately everyone speaks, criticizes, and even demolishes.  

It does not seem overly exaggerated to say that Meister’s observations have generally held true with but one significant exception—the Marxists of the journal Praxis. In this context, Stojanović provides a valuable supplement to Meister when he writes that “after an official acknowledgment of the existence of a deformation” previously criticized independently by intellectuals, “it is the critics of these phenomena who are expelled from the party rather than those who are really responsible.”
Indeed, in their critique of workers’ self-management in Yugoslavia the *Praxis* Marxists often failed to conform to this protocol of criticism. And perhaps this, above all, was their most serious offense.

For this reason it is all the more important to emphasize that both within Yugoslavia and on the international scene, there have been no better or more persuasive spokesmen for the principle of workers’ self-management than the *Praxis* Marxists—precisely, perhaps, because of their critical stance. To be sure, official opponents of the *Praxis* Marxists have been loath to concede this point. At international symposia, in lectures abroad, in translations of their works, and through the vehicle of the Korcula Summer School and finally through *Praxis* itself, these intellectuals—of whose broad international reputation Tito himself has spoken publicly with much suspicion—have eloquently and forcefully spoken on behalf of workers’ self-management as the sole form of social organization capable of resolving the contradictions inherent in both bourgeois and existing socialist societies and as most consonant with Marx’s vision of a “free association of producers.” Marković’s enthusiasm for the principle of self-management is representative of that of his colleagues:

Eight decades after the Paris Commune and Marx’s analysis of its experiences, the socialist movement rediscovered the forgotten principle of self-management. In so doing it returned to its soul, its profound human value, and its universal-historical character at a time when it had seemed that its hour had passed in the West.... For only *democratic* socialism—more specifically, a society of self-management—signifies a radical negation of modern capitalism and its ultimate radical humanization, and accordingly the necessary path for the further development of incipient transitional forms of post-capitalist society.

Marković’s colleague Ljubomir Tadić expresses a similar conviction:
I see the essence of self-management, as immediate democracy, as primarily the real possibility of submitting necessary public functions to the effective and public control and critique of the mass of workers, radically excluding professional functionaries and their privileges, since every parasitic form is alien to socialism.\textsuperscript{34}

The \textit{Praxis} Marxists have been careful, however, to distinguish between self-management as an immanent principle and self-management as an existing reality. They have consistently reaffirmed the appropriation and control by the producers of the means of production as the most worthy goal of a truly socialist society. But they have also shared a conviction that without a frank, critical, Marxist evaluation—all whatever its conclusions—of the practice of self-management in Yugoslavia, this revolutionary principle of social organization would represent nothing more than an empty ideological justification for a new system of class oppression.

Self-Management Between Bureaucratism and Economism

As Yugoslav society underwent dramatic changes in the decade from 1965 to 1975, and especially since the effects of the economic and political reforms of the mid-1960s came to be felt, the emphasis of the \textit{Praxis} critique of Yugoslav self-management tended to shift accordingly. In general, the Praxis Marxists have seen embryonic and fragile forms of self-management as threatened by the twin dangers of bureaucratism and market-induced atomization, by too much integration and—paradoxically—too little. But over time, the \textit{Praxis} Marxists tended to exhibit increasing concern with problems of excessive decentralization and the rise of a new bourgeoisie, which in their view were simply superimposed over the more long-standing legacy of bureaucratic domination. Above all, it was the very dynamism of the \textit{Praxis} critique, with its internal roots in a
humanistic philosophy of man, that prevented it from fixating on any single dimension of self-management and that in fact contributed to the critique’s ability to anticipate problems (such as the localization of economic conflict and the degeneration of the self-managing organization into a political subordinate of the technocratic infrastructure) that were only later grasped—and even then not in their entirety—by those in authority.

In the first major Praxis article devoted to a critical evaluation of self-management in Yugoslavia, Mihailo Marković stressed a basic discontinuity in the structure of the Yugoslav political system. While the principle of workers’ self-management had been introduced a decade and a half before, in its actual implementation self-management had turned out to be an institution existing only alongside of the state rather than in place of it; an institution, furthermore, “which embraces only local organs of social power.” At higher levels of the political structure reigned the bureaucratic principle, effectively curbing democratic tendencies in the base while exerting real power where important social decisions were at issue. This situation led Marković to assert:

Self-management cannot be reduced to its initial historical forms which at present exist in our country.... It cannot be limited only to production relations at the level of the enterprise and to the local organs of social power. The complete and definitive surpassing of bureaucracy is possible only when self-management reaches the top: when the central organs of the state are converted into organs of self-management.15

At the same time, Marković suggested that this bipolar model of Yugoslav society was oversimplified to the extent that it overlooked the formation of bureaucratic cliques at the local enterprise level, composed of Party, technical management, trade union, governmental, and even workers’ council leaders, who by virtue of their position in the hierarchy wield the balance of
power in both the commune and the enterprise and who use that power to gain substantial personal benefits.\textsuperscript{16} The existence of such oligarchic cliques and their negative influence on the level of workers' formal participation in, and their information about, decisions at the enterprise level has been amply documented by sociological investigations. Studies from 1960 to 1969 by the Ljubljana sociologist Veljko Rus\textsuperscript{17} confirmed the relative lack of opportunity for worker participation in the decision-making process and the consequent alienation of the workers from the institutional structure of self-management. All of this seemed to indicate a basic lack of progress since at least 1964, when Rus reported to a session of the Korcula Summer School:

Sociological analyses bear witness to the fact that the structure of power within workers' organizations, in spite of structural changes, have remained essentially the same. In spite of the significant degree of decentralization of competence, we find that the influence of the central organs of the enterprise is still predominant. In spite of the fact that the collegium is formally only an advisory organ of the director, we find that this organ has a dominant role in workers' organizations. These findings can be generalized with a great degree of certainty. But this means that all the previous structural changes have not sufficed to guarantee a fundamental democratization within workers' organizations.\textsuperscript{18}

In order to appreciate the significance of these assertions it may be useful to sketch a broader picture of the relationship between participatory democracy and self-management as perceived in Praxis theory. In what was probably his most important essay on the problem of self-management Supek indicated that the goal of self-management is no less than the transcendence of the alienation of the producer by overcoming the harmful aspects of the division of labor which have been responsible for antagonistic class divisions in all previously existing societies save the most primitive.\textsuperscript{19} In this connection, both Supek and his
Zagreb colleague Ivan Kuvacic have been convinced that the automation of production will contribute significantly toward a reintegration of the technical aspects of the productive process and an attenuation of the distinctions between labor and managerial functions, in addition to generating free time for the pursuit of cultural values.\textsuperscript{20} To be sure, their technological optimism has been tempered with caution. They are aware that the integration of technical functions will not \textit{necessarily} contribute to the de-alienation of labor from the standpoint of the individual producer nor will it \textit{automatically} extend to spheres of social activity outside of the enterprise. Indeed beyond the goal of control by the producers over their immediate productive activity, Supek has described the primary function of self-management as the “integration of the productive community into the civil community”\textsuperscript{21}—by giving the workers experience in the art of self-government during their labor time while extending the boundaries and competences of the self-managing collective beyond activities immediately associated with material production to include educational, social, and cultural activities as well. Thus the importance of worker participation in self-management lies in more than the immediate satisfaction that may be derived from such participation. Participation in the decisions of the enterprise should serve as a basis for the simultaneous mastery of the productive process, the integration of political and economic functions, and the complete development and humanization of the individual personality.

Considering the central importance attributed to the concept of participatory democracy in \textit{Praxis} theory, Veljko Rus’s 1970 \textit{Praxis} essay entitled “Self-Management Egalitarianism and Social Differentiation” seemed to indicate a clear intellectual rupture between Rus and the \textit{Praxis} group. Here, he explored the implications of recent sociological findings suggesting that the goal of participation in self-management institutions had be-
come less salient to Yugoslav workers after 1967:

While from 1962 to 1967 it was found that employees wanted the distribution of power which is closer to normative than to actual structures of power, in the past two years we have found that employees’ aspirations approach closer and closer to actual structures and move further and further from normative ones.\(^{22}\)

According to Rus, the explanation for this deradicalization of workers’ norms was to be found in the distribution of power within the enterprise brought about by increased differentiation in the technical-functional division of labor. What should be sought under such circumstances is, he contended, a “pluralist centralism” consisting of a distribution of “active” and “passive” power (corresponding to positions in the functional hierarchy) and a mode of conflict resolution characterized by both bargaining and participation.\(^{23}\) This argument seemed to presuppose a Saint-Simonian vision of a natural hierarchy of social functions which, although distinctly antiegalitarian in its thrust (and perhaps because of this very factor), enjoyed increasing support in Yugoslavia in the wake of the liberal economic reforms of the mid-1960s.\(^{24}\) It was precisely, however, this antiegalitarian impulse, at least in terms of the distribution of power, that was most sharply at variance with the social vision held by the “mainstream” Praxis theorists. Indeed Rus concluded his 1970 essay by remarking that the chief failing of Praxis criticism lay in its romantic fixation on democratic norms whose time was long past:

This radical criticism of everything that exists was [sic—GSS] dogmatic in the sense that it had never attempted a “revision” of fundamental values in the name of practice but rather merely emphasized the fact that social practice is far removed from proclaimed ideals ... It was not creative to the extent that it did not point out the necessity of certain reinterpretations or redefi-
Rus’s disenchantment with *Praxis*, then, derived intellectually from an observed shift in workers’ attitudes and the broader implications for the political structure of self-management which they seemed to suggest. For Rus, *Praxis*’s commitment to participatory democracy through workers’ self-management—indeed, the entire traditional Yugoslav theory of self-management, which had served for nearly two decades as the cornerstone of the official ideology—had been outmoded by industrial progress and technical specialization. Self-management in its classic, participatory form, Rus suggested, is basically a preindustrial utopia whose feasibility retreats with the advance of modern, industrial society.

It should be noted, however, that Rus’s skepticism, at least in a methodological sense, is valid only to the extent that the articulated political norms of industrial workers (or for that matter, of any members of any political unit), expressed in responses to inquiries of a sociological investigator, can be universally accepted as “realistic” in a given historical context. In fact this is a dangerous assumption to make, for it at least potentially neglects the ideologically stultifying effects that existing structures can have on political attitudes. Even as early as 1965, Supek had maintained that attitudes expressed at the level of immediate production are not necessarily accurate measures of “public opinion,” since for Supek, the very concept of public opinion is one which has programmatic as well as descriptive aspects:

Opinions on the role of workers’ self-management have even been advanced recently that are more Fourierist than Marxist, for example when it is maintained that in our country “public opinion is formed at the level of the structure of society and workers’ self-management,” concluding that we have no need of institutes.
for the sounding of public opinion. This would mean that society is transformed into a system of atoms or molecules in which each thinks and decides according to his own criteria. But we know that Marx was a fierce adversary of localism and of enclosing man within socially determined limits. For him, development necessarily proceeds in the sense of the universal consciousness of man, the identification of the individual with all of humanity.  

While for Rus, then, the accommodation of participatory norms to structures in economic enterprises represented an important step on the road to democracy without illusions, most Praxis Marxists would have argued that this accommodation was a sign of something much more serious—the illusion of democracy—whose roots lay deep in the still incomplete nature of the self-management system.

Supek’s comments on “localism” bring to light another dimension of the Praxis critique of Yugoslav self-management. For the Praxis critique of bureaucratism does not preclude an aversion to the opposite extreme of undiscriminating decentralization. Mere decentralization from below may represent, as Markovic warns, a type of “polycentrism without decrease in the total amount of the alienated political power”; while Zagorka Pesic reminds us in this connection that “bureaucracy as a constituent element of political power can be transcended only through the transcendence of politics as a distinct and professionalized sphere of social decision-making; that is, through the ‘socialization of politics.’ ” With respect to self-management, the decentralization of economic decision-making power to the enterprise level may not, as we have seen, necessarily imply any greater access to these decisions for those affected by them. Numerous studies of Yugoslav self-management have shown that workers are often presented with decisions by the technocratic infrastructure of the enterprise as virtual *faits accomplis* ready for ratification and that workers are generally very poorly informed
about the issues in each case, having no independent basis to evaluate alternative courses of action.28

A potentially more serious consequence of this type of decentralization, however, is the potential gap between the interests of the enterprise and those of the community at large. This disparity has been reflected in the increasingly exclusive nature of the interests of each enterprise vis-a-vis other enterprises, as well as in renewed interest in the territorial-political commune as an alternative instrument for the political integration of conflicting interests.29 To be sure, the “localism” of the self-managing enterprise is not necessarily inconsistent with bureaucratic statism. So long as “social” interests are authoritatively dictated by the state, it may be expected that individual social components will naturally tend to pursue selfish interests so long as it is in their power to do so (“The liberty of a subject, lieth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted”—Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chapter 21). And as Stojanović suggests, the reverse relationship holds as well:

Self-government based exclusively on groups will reinforce the power of the state rather than negating it.... So long as integration, coordination, regulation, and planning are not inherent in self-government, these functions will have to be performed by an alienated part of society—the state. When there is no real community, a surrogate for it becomes indispensable. The Yugoslav experience shows that the state can easily manipulate atomized self-government.30

The behavior of individual enterprises does, in fact, seem to be guided by selfish motives of a purely economic nature, with feverish competition, rather than cooperation and coordination, characterizing inter-enterprise relations. The attitude of the enterprise toward the productive resources within its own domain is, as Stojanović points out, more aptly described by the term “group ownership” than anything approaching “social owner-
ship,” while an entire ideology—which Stojanović has called “‘socialist’ anarcho-liberalism”—has grown up around this subsystem of relations. This ideology, as Stojanović explicates it, is one which has several features in common with the ideology of liberal capitalism: a belief in the spontaneous integration of private interests through the independent economic mechanisms of the market; fear of all coordination, regulation, and planning; a bourgeois doctrine of freedom which defines freedom as “the right to do everything which does not harm others”; and finally a commutative concept of justice in which “each person ought to receive as much in social distribution as he has earned on the market,” to the exclusion of more egalitarian notions of distributive justice.

The resemblance of these assumptions to the doctrines of Proudhon has been pointed out by more than one Praxis Marxist. Yet the experience of Yugoslav self-management would seem to demonstrate the ultimate futility of Proudhon’s stateless system of associations bound together only by contracts and a spirit of “mutuality.” “Especially in our ‘Balkan conditions,’” writes Supek, economic development left solely to the market “will need continual compromises and a single arbiter in the resolution of continual disputes.” In Yugoslavia, this function of integration is performed by that institution which still maintains hegemony over the “vertical organization of social power”—the Communist Party. As Supek’s vision of a system of self-management based on collectives whose social functions extend beyond the purely economic sphere reminds us, confinement of the enterprise’s interests to economic interests alone may play a large role in the inability of self-managing collectives to establish an adequate framework for integration on a cooperative basis. Be that as it may, the existing system is torn between statism from above and the market from below, these two elements being present in proportions which have varied over time but which have characteristically shifted in favor of the former in
periods of acute national crisis. It is in this connection that Stojanović speaks of a “vivid dualism in practice” between “self-managing groups in the base and a rather strong statist structure above them”\(^{35}\)—neither of which seems to hold much hope for the future of a democratic socialism.

The Economic Reforms and the Emergence of a Market Society

The economic reforms of 1965 played an important role in the decentralization of functions discussed above. The reforms were primarily aimed at reducing the power of the state and its central bureaucratic apparatus in the coordination of economic affairs. Advocates of the reforms claimed that they would stimulate a general shift in the balance of power from the state to the individual enterprise, thereby bringing social power closer to the immediate producers. And indeed, as a result of the reforms, individual enterprises obtained broad, if still limited, control over profits and investment. They were even allowed, under certain conditions, to sell bonds to the public and plan their own growth and future needs, as well as to sign contracts directly with foreign corporations for joint economic ventures. Thus while the doctrine of the “withering away of the state” certainly has yet to be accomplished in Yugoslavia, the withering away of the state’s functions in the field of direct economic planning and control seems to have been brought significantly closer to realization by the reforms.

Nevertheless, the overall impact of the reforms has been mixed at best. The luster of increased consumer production and the new attraction that Yugoslavia holds for foreign investors have been dulled by strong inflationary tendencies, an unusually high rate of chronic unemployment and a large foreign labor force, together with new patterns of social stratification and regional rivalries which have fed the flames of nationalist send-
ment. Indeed one is tempted to turn back the clock to the reaction of former Polish Party chief Wtadyslaw Gomufka to demands by Polish and Hungarian workers for factory self-management in 1956, when he warned that “if every factory became a kind of cooperative enterprise of the workers, all the laws governing capitalist enterprise would inevitably come into effect and produce all the usual results.” And for Yugoslavia’s leaders, the problem of how to reap the fruits of liberal economics while avoiding its pitfalls has represented a major concern over the past decade.

The foregoing is not to suggest, of course, that the position of the Praxis Marxists on self-management should in any way be compared to that of Gomufka, although their detractors often tried to blur the popular mind by identifying the Praxis thinkers with “bureaucratic centralist forces” on the basis of the openly expressed Praxis opposition to “market socialism.” The extent of the Praxis Marxists’ opposition to the market system is in fact matched only by their mistrust of the state-controlled economy on the Soviet model insofar as both, in their view, tend to deprive the producers of control over the products of their labor and especially over surplus value. What the Praxis Marxists would seem to advocate, instead, is a mixed system of market and plan on the basis of workers’ self-management—a system, however, in which neither market nor plan would have the alienating consequences that they have in existing societies. This view of a socialist economics, they are convinced, is the most thoroughly Marxian approach inasmuch as it fetishizes no specific set of economic relations and is most consonant with Marx’s own critique of the alienation of labor.

Very little has been written by the Praxis Marxists concerning the problem of planning from a strictly economic standpoint. To be sure, their critique of the political and human aspects of Stalinism has strong implications which carry over into the economic area as well. In general, however, “planning” in the sense
of coordination or redistribution of investment resources (Praxis Marxists from Zagreb are perhaps less enthusiastic with respect to the latter) has been supported by several Praxis Marxists as a mechanism that would help to counteract the centrifugal forces of regional economic differentiation.³⁹ Marković, however, has stressed that in whatever measure planning is present in the economy, it must be a type of planning that is democratic in nature. Thus he has proposed a system of central planning organs constituted through local, territorial, and regional self-managing councils, which would exist independently of the state apparatus. Through this mechanism, he contends, it would be possible to determine democratically the general economic and social goals that should be pursued by enterprise and the economy as a whole. “Analytical groups and centers,” responsible only to these planning organs, would be responsible for offering alternative methods for achieving these goals. In this way, the monopoly of the technocratic infrastructure—which tends to define both goals and methods, presenting society with a single plan to which there can be no alternative at all—would be decisively broken and control of the economy would be returned to the producers and their organs of self-management.⁴⁰

Indeed, even in a society without formal planning, it is Marković’s fear that the alienation of the producers may be just as great as in a totally planned economy as a consequence of the monopoly over economic decision-making exercised by technocratic forces, which act according to their own very restricted notions of rationality and efficiency. Neither in the planned economy or in the market economy, therefore, do the producers have a real opportunity to evaluate alternative courses of action in accordance with their human needs. Thus when Marković, along with other Praxis Marxists, speaks of the need for rational direction and coordination in the economy, it suffices to say that he has in mind a humanistic notion of rationality which may differ substantially from what a federal planning official or a
local managerial specialist may see as being “rational” from a purely economic standpoint.

_The Praxis_ Marxists are more commonly associated in Yugoslavia, however, with their critique of the market economy and the consequences of the economic reforms of the mid-1960s. Yet in spite of their theoretical predispositions, they are not totally intransigent toward the market as an economic mechanism nor toward commodity production as a temporary, if distasteful, necessity. Stojanović, for instance, has conceded that insofar as the market tends to reveal imbalances and concealed inertia in the statist economic system and stimulates a healthy competition, it performs a vital social function. Furthermore, he maintains that for the foreseeable future, the production of “use values” mediated through “exchange values” is the sole hope of progress toward material abundance. At the same time, however, he warns:

So long as it exists, the market will try to impose itself over society as the supreme regulator and criterion of human relations.... The market reacts mainly to the existing level of demand and ... creates artificial and even harmful demands. It thus comes into conflict with the mission of socialist community, which seeks to humanize existing need and develop new, human needs.... Without rational control of economic tendencies by the associated producers, socialism in Marx’s sense is out of the question.

Elsewhere, Stojanović observes that the market can lead to the discovery and rejection of statist and other kinds of privilege. However, it also facilitates the development of another kind of privilege, based upon monopolistic position, speculation, the accidental influence of circumstances, and so on. The anarcho-liberals oppose all corrective measures and plead for the totally free operation of the market.... Even capitalism began attempting long ago to prevent the accumulation of super-profits based on monopoly.⁴¹
Thus it is not the market itself—properly kept within bounds—that the Praxis Marxists fear so much as the unrestricted action of the market and the hegemony of the market principle when extended indiscriminately to all areas of social life. It is in this connection that Marković warns against the ideological system of “economism,” which, he contends, was given new vigor by the economic reforms. He describes “economism” (a close relation to Stojanović’s “‘socialist’ anarcho-liberalism”) as a set of assumptions about social life which depict man as an economic being motivated entirely by selfish and consumption-oriented interests. This economism, Marković contends, visualizes the maximization of income as the highest goal of socialist society and asserts (in Marković’s words) that “the most important thing for socialism at this moments [sic] is complete liberation of economic laws and the undisturbed development of commodity-money relations.” The fetishization of the market principle is also evident in the officially accepted notion of “socialist commodity production,” which is rejected by the Praxis Marxists as a contradiction in terms that cannot provide a suitable basis for a socialist economy, however unavoidable commodity production may appear in the short run. Nor are they persuaded by those who invoke the necessity of developing a strong material base as the absolute precondition of socialism, thereby justifying the free action of economic laws and even the development of social inequalities. Such arguments, in their view, differ little in substance from the demagogic appeals of Stalinism to the citizenry to forgo immediate material satisfaction in the interest of the future communist society: both ideologically justify alienation in this world with the promise of salvation in the next.

Similarly, the much-vaunted “socialist” principle of “distribution according to work” has come under Praxis criticism for its insensitivity to the human values of solidarity, equality, and jus-
tice. Stojanović and Životić, for instance, have devoted much effort and passion to arguing for a moral principle of equality which would counteract the inherent inequalities built into the principle that a producer should be paid fairly for commodities produced, i.e., without the extraction of surplus value by others who convert this material surplus into social privilege. Apart from the purely moral dimension, the principle of equal pay for equal work is, as Životić notes, at best a bourgeois principle of equity of which Marx wrote: “This equal right is an unequal right for unequal labour. ... It is therefore a right of inequality in its content, like every right.” The equality inhering in this principle is one determined by the impersonal laws of the market and presumes by its very nature the alienation of labor that Marx so roundly condemned. In this connection Deborah Milenkovitch observes:

The traditional socialist [sic—css] principle of distribution—“to each according to his work”—has been revised by the Yugoslavs, becoming “to each according to the factors of production supplied by the human agent or to which the human agent has access, as valued on the (imperfect) market.” This principle is scarcely distinguishable from that of private enterprise.

What the Praxis Marxists find particularly objectionable in this respect is the reification of the market principle and its enshrinement at the level of permanent moral truth. For the eminent Belgrade sociologist Radomir Lukic, for instance, the principle of distribution according to work is “intimately linked to the very principle of socialism,” and to violate it out of egalitarian motives “would signify no less than a desire for exploitation—for the appropriation of the surplus of the better producers.” It is this confusion between socialist ends and essentially bourgeois means that Stojanović rejects when he refers to people who in the guise of reform are intensifying their efforts to liquidate communism in general along with its more immature
manifestations. Reform and modernization are the slogans not only of those people who are oriented toward socialism; they are employed by “socialist” anarcho-liberalism and technocratism as well.48

The question of the market principle in the sphere of culture, as an area of activity which is naturally of great concern to the Praxis Marxists, is a case in point. One of the consequences of the broad sweep of the economic reform was to put all cultural enterprises, as well as industrial ones, at the mercy of the market, evidently with the intention of eliminating statist domination in this area. The eminent Zagreb sociologist, Josip Zupanov, replying in 1968 to the critics of commercialism in culture, supplied part of the rationale behind these measures, albeit with an important caveat:

When commercialism is frontally attacked, the only thing that is demonstrated is a misunderstanding of the market mechanism. The market is precisely a daily plebiscite of a great number of people about the values and uses of various products and services. If as a result of such a plebiscite intellectual products come out badly, then the evil lies not in the fact of the plebiscite but in the inadequate position of those who make the products.49

The exponential growth of the dime-novel and pornographic market since the mid-1960s in comparison with other areas of Yugoslav publishing activity bears adequate testimony to the fact that “intellectual products” have indeed “come out badly” in recent years: Stojanović complains that “individual groups (self-governing, now) can use the market to encourage the most uncultured of needs and make quite a bit of money in the process.” And while recognizing the undesirability of eliminating all market elements from the spheres of cultural production and distribution, Marković at the same time observes that

it would be wrong to think that the market in socialism ought to be the sole and exclusive regulator of relations in the area of
culture. For after all, such is not the case even in capitalism: benefactors, powerful private foundations, churches, and the state have never ceased to intervene energetically in the area of science, art, and cultural creativity in general. Without such important correctives of commodity-money relations, it is problematic whether bourgeois society would have created even a small part of what it was able to create.\textsuperscript{50}

Rudi Supek, who of all the \textit{Praxis} Marxists has generally displayed the greatest concern in questions of cultural creativity and awareness, takes the argument one step further by contending that there is a basic inconsistency between culture and the market principle—the former stressing universal human values, and the latter involving what are essentially private and selfish interests. The problem is not only, writes Supek, that the ideas of particular groups or persons tend to be presented in the world of commercialized culture as the only “true ideas,” but also that every \textit{general idea} evokes suspicion, mistrust, and questions as to whether all that is at issue is some sort of mystification or dissemblance. Thus people are ashamed of such ideas, and the universal and the international increasingly retreat before the particular, the ethnocentric, the nationalistic, and localistic; clannish thinking takes the place of class thinking; and the “end of ideology” in this case represents no more than the end of common ideals and the need to sacrifice something for them.\textsuperscript{51}

In contrast to Zupanov, then, Supek suggests that the market principle is itself profoundly at variance with the ends of cultural activity. To be sure, Supek would not find it difficult to agree with Zupanov’s proposition that the real problem may lie in the “inadequate position of those who make the [cultural] products.”\textsuperscript{52} But what Supek wishes to warn against here is principally the fetishization of the market principle of socialism. The “humanist” critique of the economic reform, he asserts, is directed mainly toward the “\textit{transformation of certain economic measures into a social ideology.}” Insofar as the reform’s measures were
designed to achieve greater economic efficiency and to crush “centralistic parasitism,” they were laudable; but once they became cast as ends in themselves, the results obtained were counterproductive and harmful for the prospects for socialism, to wit:

profit proceeding not from greater devotion to one’s work and better organization, but rather from a greater ability to manipulate the market, speculation, pseudocompetition which in Yugoslavia customarily reduces itself to the rule: “Fleece the consumer!”

Just such negative consequences of the economic reform became evident shortly after its introduction in 1965. The social basis of the new mentality, according to some Praxis Marxists, was to be found in a new and burgeoning economic class with all the markings of “petty-bourgeois capitalism”—without, however, the aspirations toward universal cultural values which ordinarily endow bourgeois ideology with much of its persuasive force. In a controversial 1971 article, Milan Kangrga presented this new “middle class” as having its historical roots not in the relatively weak interwar Yugoslav bourgeoisie but in the development of Yugoslav society after 1945—in a class hostile to Marxian and all leftist thought and to the aspirations of the working class, a class which in fact viewed true Marxists as “class enemies.” This new class, wrote Kangrga, aspired “to constitute itself economically, to become socially established, politically situated and ideologically and intellectually shaped and reinforced on the level of—the liberal bourgeoisie.” Kangrga described this class’s rise to power in the following terms:

For a good many years we can follow this quickened process, from day to day, of the birth, growth, entrenchment, stabilization, penetration, and consolidation of the middle class, which dizzyingly (in the course of our specific and prolonged “primary accumulation of capital”) strengthens itself economically, augments its wealth, takes the conduct of the affairs of the entire society into its own hands, attracting in its wake other social elements and
strata, corrupting them, spreading the ideological influence, and
drawing itself into all the pores of society—political, economic,
social, cultural, theoretical, and philosophical—and even further
becoming an ever more dominant intellectual and ideological
force in our society... It is even attempting to transform the
League of Communists into its own mass party (which from year
to year is statistically, in terms of numerical composition and so­
cial character of its membership .. ., becoming ever easier to
demonstrate).\textsuperscript{55}

Underlying the growth of this new “middle class” was the
growth of new institutional centers of economic power indepen­
dent of both the state and the workers engaged in production.
The dramatic increase in the power of large commercial firms
and banks, the latter coming to play a major role in investment
allocations concurrently with the atrophy of central and local
planning mechanisms, was indeed perhaps the most important
large-scale structural legacy of the economic reforms.\textsuperscript{56} The
much-debated constitutional amendments of 1971 represented
a consolidation of the position of those enterprises, granting
them the status of “self-managing organizations” with the right
to increase their income and to dispose of “profits” in accor­
dance with their own wishes.\textsuperscript{57} Supek noted in this connection
that the

economic reform has led many production organizations into a
difficult situation and has facilitated the rapid rise of the financial
organizations to their monopolistic position. While the banks and
commerce previously served the development of industrial pro­
duction, now industrial production serves the strengthening of the
economic power of the financial centers, [which is] of course as
contrary to the interest of the working class as it is harmful to the
policy of economic development.

This juridical identification of productive and intermediary as­
associations was also decried by Vranicki on the grounds that the
latter do not produce surplus value and hence merely dispose of
the capital produced by others. This confusion, he added, did
“serious harm to several essential principles of socialist relations and solidarity.”

Nowhere was the harmful impact of the reforms of the mid-1960s on “socialist relations and solidarity” more evident than in the reappearance of severe national conflict within the Yugoslav federation. For after nearly two decades of relative tranquility and national amity so uncharacteristic of the troubled Balkans, the late 1960s and early 1970s saw a rekindling of national animosities of sufficient intensity to put into question the viability of the Yugoslav multinational idea. For the Praxis Marxists, the resurgence of the explosive “nationalities question” represented the culmination and crisis of the economic-political reforms. This is not to say, however, that the Praxis Marxists saw the solution of this issue in a new set of economic or political measures, since they recognized that the problem of nationalities conflict had become so entangled with moral and ideological overtones that a purely economic or political approach (such as introduction of a greater degree of central planning and resource allocation, coupled with political recentralization) would serve only further to confound the issue. Indeed, with their uncompromising critique of political and economic alienation in mind, it would seem clear that in the Praxis view any solution that relies principally on “merely” political or economic measures would serve in the end only to perpetuate and compound an alienated condition that is sharply at odds with the fundamental goals of socialism.

Nationalism and the Nationalist Mystification

“La patrie des philosophes, c’est la patrie de la liberte”
—Title of Danko Grlic’s contribution to Praxis (IE), no. 3-4, 1968

The concept of nationalism as the ideology of an ascendant middle class has always been an integral part of Marxian theory.
It was in *The German Ideology* that Marx observed, in connection with his discussion of the modern nation-state, that “the bourgeoisie is forced to organize itself no longer locally, but nationally, and to give a general form to its mean average interest.” The *Praxis* Marxists have maintained that this concept of Marxian social analysis remains every bit as powerful for the analysis of socialist as of capitalist societies, and they have not hesitated, regardless of the serious risks to which it has exposed them, to bring such analysis to bear upon Yugoslavia’s present difficulties. For it has been their contention that the new Yugoslav middle class—the beneficiary of postwar Yugoslavia’s economic progress, consisting, according to Ivan Kuvacic, of “employees of enterprises, offices, commercial and several other social service organizations”—a class in search of an ideology, has found its ideology in nationalism. This nationalism, like its classic predecessors of the nineteenth century, links the interests of the class with those of the state, which in turn is presented as embracing the interests of society at large. It is this deliberate ideological misrepresentation of narrow economic interest as general social interest which is the key, for the Praxis Marxists as for Marx himself, to understanding and exposing nationalism for the collective fiction—the modern “opiate of the masses”—which it is.

To be sure, modern Yugoslav nationalism thrives on other elements than economic conflict alone. What we today call Yugoslavia is the result of decades of dedicated effort, struggle, and bloodshed toward the goal of transforming age-old rivalries and hatreds into the basis of a peaceful and prosperous multinational community. An invisible line crudely dividing the country between north and south testifies to deep historical conflicts that are reckoned by the centuries—between Catholic and Orthodox, Christian and Turk, European and Slav, “West” and “East.” For a while after the end of the Second World War, it had seemed as if these tensions had been all but submerged by the urgent need
for national unity in the face of economic isolation and military threats from abroad. But with the gradual abatement of these dangers, the idea of a “Yugoslav nation” as the ideological cornerstone of national harmony began to decline in popular acceptance. To this cultural vacuum there were eventually added sources of economic conflict which reinforced and aggravated traditional cultural animosities, yielding a sure formula for renewed political tension which, if unattended, would inevitably break out into the open.

Interregional economic rivalry, it is true, is nothing new to Yugoslavia. Her northern regions, once provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, historically enjoyed a higher level of economic development and prosperity than her southern territories, which had been among the most backward dependencies of the Ottoman Empire. The pattern of Yugoslav economic development after 1919 and into the post-World War II era only tended to aggravate these disparities, although especially in the latter period efforts were made to reinvest excess “northern” returns into the southern regions. But the decentralizing reforms of the mid-1960s, while perhaps a step forward from the standpoint of economic efficiency at the local level, sowed the seeds of serious interrepublican conflict. One of their effects was to encourage the growth of antagonistic national centers of economic power by transferring the responsibility for much hitherto federally-controlled capital to the republican level. Control over much of the country’s productive industrial resources reverted to Croatian and Slovenian interests, while the traditional center of commerce and banking, Belgrade, firmed its grasp on these valuable resources, but now at the level of the republic. Economic decentralization was simultaneously reinforced by a decentralization of political decision-making power, with the growth of substantial republican bureaucracies to cope with the new responsibilities bestowed on them. Finally, in order to articulate the competing interests bred by this new state of
affairs, there emerged reinvigorated nationalist ideologies and their spokesmen in republican political structures. Thus modern Yugoslav nationalism may be understood as the result of a peculiar conjunction of two important factors, to a critique of which the Praxis Marxists have devoted much of their writing on political and social issues—the negative side-effects of the growth of a market economy, along with the still incomplete debureaucratization of Yugoslav political life. And it should not be surprising, then, to find that the Praxis Marxists have reserved some of their most passionate rhetoric for discussions of the controversial “nationalities question” and for acerbic and provocative critiques of the obfuscations of nationalist ideology.

The nationalist spirit has found expression in the economic sphere in the militancy with which spokesmen from the economically more developed republics, principally Croatia and Slovenia, have decried the funneling of excess profits from their economies to the underdeveloped republics where investment resources are desperately needed. Such profits would be better and more efficiently utilized, they maintain, in reinvestment in their own republics, while they portray the less economically developed republics as a burden on the development of the national economy as a whole.61 The Praxis Marxist Miladin Zivotic alludes to this attitude when he deprecates various particularisms, localisms, duplication of economic facilities, and other forms of anarchy, profiteering appetites, investment in economically unjustified projects, and the tendency to forget the Yugoslav community as a whole...62

although it is not so clear whether the “moral principle” of equality which he advocates would do much to alleviate the situation. And Rudi Supek, more directly addressing the dangers of the kind of regional autarky advocated by the most extreme nationalist spokesmen, warns that attempts to establish economic independence from forces within the community on a weak eco-
nomic basis openly invites a state of semi-dependence on foreign capital similar to the situation which prevailed in Yugoslavia prior to the Second World War.63

This is not to say, however, that the Praxis Marxists have adhered to an absolutely unified position with respect to intra-Yugoslav regional economic rivalries. Indeed, a close reading between the lines might reveal that some Zagreb Praxis theorists (Supek, for instance) have occasionally made certain concessions to the claims of their regional compatriots by deploving the growth in power of the Belgrade banks, whereas their Serbian colleagues (e.g., Marković, Stojanović, and Životić) may often have tended to give greater emphasis to the egoistic behavior of wealthy industrial enterprises and to the need for greater regional equality in economic development, perhaps even at the cost of falling short of optimum efficiency. Despite these minor differences in emphasis, however, the most important contribution of the Praxis Marxists to this picture has been their common insistence that what is at issue in regional economic clashes is not the allocation of resources to entire national communities which are internally homogeneous, but rather the competition for these resources among different segments of essentially the same economic class—a class which crosscuts republican boundaries—at the expense of other segments of the same class and of the working class as a whole.

The statist element in Yugoslav interrepublican nationalism has been closely tied to the autarkic tendencies noted above. The incomplete decentralization of real political power, stopping at the level of the republican bureaucracies, paralleled and reinforced the regionalization of economic interests, to the extent that the Croatian League of Communists itself was an important locus of nationalist sentiments, especially from 1969 to 1971.64 The Croatian Party leader Mika Tripalo, deposed in 1972, formulated Croatian political aspirations under the slogan of “republican statehood,” which involved, in George Schopflin’s
words, “very far-reaching powers over political and economic matters ... the proclamation of a barely veiled nationalist ideology that in practice regarded the national interest as higher than that of class.” (Indeed at the height of nationalist sentiment in Croatia in 1971, the increasingly influential group around the journal *Hrvatski tjednik* and the Matica Hrvatska publishing house began to agitate for Croatian independence even in the areas of foreign affairs and defense.) Tripalo’s idea of national “statehood” gained a great deal of popularity because of the common heritage it claimed with both the Croatian national struggle of the nineteenth century and the Yugoslav anti-Stalinist struggle of the twentieth. In his effort to strengthen the power of the Croatian republican bureaucracy, Tripalo even drew at times on the rhetoric of self-management by expanding it to embrace the nation as a whole, irrespective of class divisions within particular national communities.

The *Praxis* Marxists reacted vigorously against such transparent attempts to depart from Marx’s teachings about nationalism in the cloak of Marxist phraseology. Milan Kangr-ga’s comments about nationalism in contemporary Yugoslavia could easily have been written by Marx himself a century before:

The nation is precisely *par excellence* the political creation of the bourgeois class. ... It is nothing other than the politically constituted people in the state. It is thus at the same time necessarily a class creation, which assumes and implies the power of the bourgeoisie over the working class and all other classes... and strata of society. There is no nation without its own state ... that is abundantly clear. But it is just as clear that the modern state ... is only the state as the political instrument for safeguarding the ruling interest... of the bourgeois class and the bureaucracy and simultaneously for the oppression and exploitation of the working class of the very same nation.66

It has been precisely this effort to conceal class division by appealing to the concept of the nation in which the *Praxis* Marx-
ists have seen the most unmistakable sign of the ideological nature of the new nationalism. “The national state,” writes Ljubomir Tadić, “may be a free state while man may not be a free man.” A younger *Praxis* Marxist from Zagreb, Zarko Puhovski, recalls the past extremes to which the fetishization of the nation has been taken in the statement made by the fascist leader of the puppet “independent” Croatian state during the Second World War, Ante Pavelic:

“Our internal political structure will be such that the nation, without so-called democracy, without the speculation of politicians, will itself make sovereign decisions in its own essential and vital interests.”

All this is to say that the new Yugoslav nationalism embodies the same ideological fiction as its classic predecessors in representing the territorial consolidation of state power as the liberation of the nation. Tripalo’s concession that the concept of republican statehood does contain elements of “republican etatism” (although, to be sure, an essentially progressive form of statism) only serves to lay bare the “concealed statism” which Mihailo Marković believes is “much more resistant and dangerous” than statism in its classical, centralist, Stalinist form. The former, he holds, is an “invisible and uncontrolled statism which often conceals itself behind the slogan of decentralization and the struggle against statism.”

For the *Praxis* Marxists, this nationalist ideology also has important philosophical implications which are most evident in the way the nationalist consciousness approaches the human individual. Supek distinguishes between progressive and reactionary nationalism on the basis of two criteria: the relationship which each posits between man and time (history) and between the individual and the larger community (politics). Any progressive nationalism (such as the rationalist ideology of the ascendant bourgeoisie at the time of the French Revolution or the ideology...
of a national liberation struggle) must view man as primarily future-oriented and creative, rather than bound by past loyalties and identifications. With respect to its political world-view, Supek argues that conservative nationalism (he offers the examples of De Maistre’s traditionalism, the “School of Historical Law” as represented by Burke, Von Savigny, and Stahl, in addition to Montesquieu’s geographic determinism and Social Darwinism) is basically irrationalist in outlook, postulating a total subordination of the individual to general metaphysical forces not subject to human control. That nationalism may at times play a progressive historical role, however, Supek does not rule out; indeed, he observes that the “national sentiment was born as an expression of the extension of the humanity of man.”

Supek’s thoughts may be summarized in the following way: when nationalism broadens human perspectives and provides an increasing number of individuals with an awareness of their common social interests, it is “progressive” and to be valued. When, however, nationalism is restrictive and exclusive, artificially aggravating conflict in order to aggrandize the position of privileged social groups, it is reactionary and opposed by its very nature to the development of a more humane society.

Similarly, Supek’s colleague Danko Grlic does not deny that in its struggle against reified “supranational structures,” nationalism has its positive aspects. Once this goal is achieved, however, nationalism loses its historical justification as a progressive ideology and serves only to blur the lines of class conflict and to submerge the individual personality in the national myth. Turning to contemporary Yugoslavia, Grlic observes that even the political recruitment of leaders in the alienated nation-state becomes subject to nationalist mystification. The selection of cadres takes place less on the basis of universalistic criteria of merit than on the basis of purely ascriptive criteria, generating political leaders and functionaries “who are no more
than members of a nation,” which Grlic condemns in no uncertain terms as the “valorization” of “moral and intellectual zeroes.” It is above all the false and uncritical universalism of nationalism—the presentation of the “national community” as the only basis for true community—which the Praxis Marxists have found most deplorable in the nationalist phenomenon. And by the vehemence and consistency of their attacks on nationalism in general, they have left little doubt as to where they stand with respect to nationalism and its spokesmen within the Yugoslav community of nations.

By the same token, certain pronouncements of the Praxis Marxists give one the impression that in their view, their preeminently philosophical vocation somehow uniquely qualifies them to speak out critically on the problem of nationalism. Their vision of true philosophy as both rationalist and universalist distinguishes their position radically, they maintain, from the “‘pure philosophy’ propagated by various nationalist dandies” in Croatia who call for the “definitive liquidation of ‘clearly national philosophy.'” It is a cosmopolitan vision summarized by Tadić when he writes that

The nature of the thing is that philosophers speak the language of international entente, the language of universal human interest, and not of particular interest.

The radical, critical posture of true philosophy is sharply contrasted by Grlic, in his characteristically graphic style, to the spirit of nationalist fetishism:

You do not reason or theorize about the nation; for the nation you only struggle and die; you love the nation as the flesh of your flesh, as the essence of your being, drinking it with your mother’s milk; it is body and blood, the heritage of our ancestors, the holy of holies, a call to militancy; it cannot be the subject of conceptual conclusions or of peaceful and dispassionate analysis.
With this in view, it is certainly no wonder that Supek, in the course of an analysis of the structural origins of nationalism, should have written in 1971 that

historical experience shows that nationalists are incapable of solving the question of equal relations between nations. And now it is clear why they are not.77

It is not nearly so clear, however, that philosophy itself—even a truly critical philosophy—is capable of “solving” this important question either. Surely the issue of nationalism cannot be resolved entirely by “peaceful and dispassionate analyses,” nor does the general Praxis position on philosophy, discussed in Chapter II, suggest that this is the case. There is no question among the Praxis Marxists that only practice can deal effectively with the national question—specifically, revolutionary praxis, informed by critical theory, that would destroy entrenched centers of bureaucratic and economic power by realizing the principle of self-management in all areas, and at all levels, of social life.

Perhaps it was the very farsightedness of this vision, however, that was responsible for repeated accusations against the Praxis Marxists of “centralism” and “unitarism” on the part of suspicious critics (especially in Croatia)—whose number even included one of the former editors-in-chief of Praxis78—whose commitment to various nationalist ideologies blinded them to the main thrust of Yugoslav Marxist humanism. To be sure, the Praxis Marxists gave their detractors ample ammunition in various editorial statements and articles on the national question, to which one entire issue of Praxis in 1968 and large parts of other issues (especially no. 3-4 of 1971) were devoted.79 On the other hand, Praxis’s intensely antinationalist stance was one of its most well-known attributes within Yugoslavia and perhaps its chief immediate asset in surviving as long as it did in the face of strong official antagonism. Indeed it is one of the great paradoxes of
Praxis’s tragic history that it was the very success of the official campaign against nationalism which presaged the end of official tolerance for Praxis as well. For if it is true that the radical critique of nationalism was Praxis’s saving grace for so many years in the eyes of the authorities, then the official victory over nationalism may well have divested the journal of its utility to the professional manipulators of power, leaving it to stand, instead, as nothing more than a source of constant discomfort to the regime.

Toward a Closed Society?

Socialism is propagated, popularly explained, and its faithful gather in the newspaper columns, but no one thinks about it, since it has long ago been proclaimed as being beyond doubt.

—Milan Miric, “Feuilleton on the Current Moment of Socialism,” Pram, no. 3-4, 1971

To follow the flow of articles in Praxis from its appearance in 1964 throughout the subsequent decade is to observe an unmistakable, rising pessimism about the future of socialism in Yugoslavia among the Praxis contributors. The fate of the 1968 student uprisings, the appearance of a strong pseudo-liberal ideology in response to the economic reforms, the disappointing outcome of the debates on the constitutional amendments in 1970-71, the resurgence of a divisive nationalism and the reassertion of a repressive apparatus in the cultural sphere—all these factors combined in the early 1970s to dampen the hopes of the Praxis Marxists for the future of the Yugoslav experiment in self-management—which in 1972 Stojanović even went so far as to label, in a Marcuseian twist, “repressive self-management.” For Supek, the indomitable crusader for self-management both at home and abroad, it must have been especially painful to write the following lines in the editorial introduction.
to the 1971 issue of *Praxis* dedicated to “The Moment of Yugoslav Socialism”:

We should immediately add that the failures of Yugoslav economic policy and instances of the crisis of the working-class movement [in Yugoslavia—css] have not been able to damage this evolution in creative Marxism and self-managing socialism [which, as Supek presents it here, originally grew from the Yugoslav experience and spread to the larger European community—css],..., Although it is our sincere wish that our country will truly contribute to the growth of socialism as a system, it is just as encouraging for us to know that the victory of workers’ self-management no longer depends upon our internal success or failure, regardless of the serious harm that this failure may do to the worldwide working-class movement (especially after the shock it experienced in 1968 in Czechoslovakia).  

Similar notes of discouragement were sounded by other *Praxis* Marxists. A year earlier, Marković, whose reputation for political moderation among his *Praxis* colleagues was otherwise noteworthy, had publicly shifted his main hopes for revolutionary changes from the socialist East to the more developed West, asserting that

fundamental internal changes in the socialist countries cannot be expected in the foreseeable future: they will continue to industrialize, produce an ever greater abundance of commodities, services, and the most diverse kinds of institutions. But because of their bureaucratization, they have ceased to be a model of a more human and more rational society and can no longer exert a direct influence on world history merely by virtue of their very presence and competition with the opposing capitalist camp. They may liberalize themselves to a certain degree, but the real conditions for more decisive debureaucratization will be created only by means of possible revolutionary processes in the leading powers of the West.

Finally, Kuvacic’s lament should suffice to demonstrate the de-
spair of the Praxis Marxists as a group about the “Yugoslav path” to socialism:

That our present social system does not represent a real basis for a qualitative change in the manner of life... and that one must not be given over to hoping that anything will issue from the present state of affairs, is today more than obvious.82

What is presented in all these passages is a picture of an increasingly closed society—a society, that is, closed to prospects for further revolutionary praxis, whose institutions have entrenched themselves to such a degree that such transformation is, at least for the time being, out of the question. It is a “one-dimensional” society where even radicalism becomes firmly integrated into the status quo and dissolves into powerless rhetoric and aimless gestures of despair.

All this stands in marked contrast to the outlook of the Praxis Marxists in 1968. The 1968 Korcula Summer School was a truly remarkable event, calling together radical Marxists from all parts of Europe to examine what seemed at the time to be the beginning of a new revolutionary upsurge, encompassing both Western and Eastern Europe as well as the United States. Bloch and Marcuse addressed the meeting, the latter appearing to modify his theses on the revolutionary potential of the working class, perhaps not a little surprised by the broad support shown by French workers for the students in Paris and the initiative which the workers took in demanding workers’ self-management in the factories.83 A flush of revolutionary enthusiasm was in the air, and it was given expression by the Praxis Marxists in their presentations. Supek declared triumphantly at the opening of the session that the workers’ movement in Europe in fact shows, in the capitalist countries as well as in the socialist countries, that the socialist revolution is returning more and more to the line and framework of Marx’s original anticipations.84
But this elation was only short-lived. Even while these declarations were being made, Soviet tanks rolling through the streets of Prague cast a dark shadow on the hopes of the Marxists assembled in Korcula to celebrate the promising events of the preceding months. Czechoslovakia, where before the occupation, in Supek’s words, “Yugoslav philosophers and sociologists felt more at home than anywhere else, even including their own country,” had been turned into an armed camp, and in this development Supek saw somber omens of what he feared was a “new stage of socialism.” The participants of the Korcula Summer School addressed appeals to world opinion deploiring these events and sent a personal telegram to Tito urging him to bring his great influence to bear. And in an ominous indication of things to come, the Hungarian delegation to Korcula, headed by Lukacs’s brilliant student Agnes Heller, sent a separate telegram of protest to Janos Kadar and returned home only to find severe reprimands in store for each of them. Less than six years later, when the campaign in Yugoslavia to remove all Praxis influence from Belgrade University was just beginning to gain real momentum, these courageous Hungarian philosophers had already found themselves expelled from their university positions and unable to disseminate their views in public.

Within Yugoslavia, the somewhat delayed repression of the June 1968 student movement served only further to demonstrate to the Praxis Marxists that the existing institutions of socialist society were incapable of serving as vehicles of meaningful social change by subjecting themselves to revolutionary modification from below. This theme began to appear with increased regularity in Praxis essays, such as the young Nebojša Popov’s discussions of the relationship of the working class to official institutions of self-management. Popov interpreted the steadily increasing incidence of strikes in Yugoslavia since 1958 as a sign of a widening gap between workers and their representative institutions, noting in this connection the recent
emergence of several wildcat strikes accompanied by the “self-organization” of the workers independent of formally established institutions. He decisively rejected the sophistic line of reasoning that such strikes cannot be of a class character since they take place within a society in which the working class (allegedly) maintains dominance, and that therefore the very idea of a strike is absurd in such a society since the working class cannot strike against itself. Still, it is to be noted that the strikes analyzed by Popov—including the student strikes—were no more than poorly organized, isolated outbursts whose effectiveness was further impaired by the atomization of broad working-class consciousness so deplored by other Praxis thinkers such as Supek and Kangrga. Indeed Kangrga has pointed out only somewhat facetiously that at present there are six working classes in Yugoslavia rather than one. In a more serious vein, he has lamented that the most that has been accomplished by the existing institutions has been to generate a fragile “self-management consciousness”—without, however, substantive evidence of even the promise of approximating self-management in practice. And it was in the decline of the Yugoslav working class’s ability to control its own destiny in the face of hostile economic and bureaucratic forces that the Praxis Marxists found the ultimate tragedy in the present state of affairs. Marković lamented that

at this moment it is impossible to perceive the identity of those social forces who will diminish existing class inequalities, eliminate the monopoly of power, ensure the power of the workers’ councils from the level of the enterprise to that of the federation, and create anew the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity which was destroyed just when it had seemed that its moment of historical triumph was at hand.

Perhaps this picture—drawn, it is true, in the early 1970s, when tensions were beginning to surface which would only a few
years later culminate in the expulsion of Marković and his colleagues from Belgrade University and the closing of Praxis itself—is unwarrantedly discouraging. One of the central features of Marx’s critical method, it will be recalled, was its ability to penetrate the surface appearances of existing civil society and to find in that same society signs of tendencies presaging new and more human modes of social interaction. It is perhaps with this in mind that Kangrga has spoken of the development of a “self-management consciousness”—not in the negative sense of the failure of reality to mesh with ideals, but in the positive sense that these ideals may become truly meaningful and urgent to the Yugoslav working class, rather than being proclaimed loudly from above and falling only on deaf ears. That these aspirations have been formed by the interaction of the workers with institutions of workers’ self-management—and by their reaction to the inadequacies of those institutions—may itself be seen as an indication of a hidden positive potential which may yet one day rise to the surface. In the same sense, Popov’s observations about the alienation of the Yugoslav working class from its institutions, and its response in the form of strikes, may well have been a secret source of encouragement for him. Indeed he wrote elsewhere:

A gloomy picture of human life in contemporary society can be a peculiar kind of ideology in so far as one fails to examine the concrete, historically determined nature of the given state of affairs ... and the open possibilities of changing it.

Kangrga concurred, adding:

Only public and argued, resolute and militant Marxist criticism can liberate minds from the nightmare which daily oppresses people and sends them into apathy and resignation, or privatization, or confusion and disorientation, which then operates to the advantage of politicians and manipulators of all calibers, [who
seek to] impose themselves upon this society and all areas of social life.  

For all this, however, one cannot help thinking that while a methodological optimism may be appropriate to Marxian social analysis, the *Praxis* Marxists might have been somewhat better prepared for the travails that lay ahead had they embraced a healthy pessimism to guide them in their dealings with the world of political realities. By the time *Praxis* entered into its final, although prolonged, confrontation with the authorities, it had been in existence for over six years. During that time it had managed to establish itself as a uniquely respectable public forum for the sort of Marxist criticism which Kangrga described in the above-quoted passage, a dissident forum which seemed to have a remarkable capacity for withstanding hostile confrontations with the authorities in the face of formidable odds. But as the writings of the *Praxis* Marxists, assuming ever more provocative tones, probed ever more deeply into the workings of an increasingly disturbed Yugoslav society, they would find to their frustration that their forum had not been built upon the most stable of foundations.
The formalities which attest that philosophy has achieved this importance, that it is the living soul of a culture, that philosophy is becoming worldly and the world philosophical, have been the same in all times: we may open any history book and will find with stereotyped Fidelity the simplest rituals again and again unmistakably marking the introduction of philosophy into drawing rooms and priests’ studies, into the editorial offices of newspapers and the antechambers of courts, into the hatred and love of the people of the time. Philosophy is introduced into the world by the yelling of its enemies who betray their internal infection by their noisy call for help against the blaze of ideas.

—Karl Marx, “The Leading Article in No. 179 of the Kiïlnische Zeitung”

A Provocation

Rudi Supek relates the following conversation, which took place one day in 1972 with one of his “young colleagues” in Zagreb:

“It’s fine, professor, to talk about Marxist education, but doesn’t it seem to you that it would be useful to know, first of all, which Marxism is in question?’

‘Why “which” Marxism?’

‘Why, you know very well that there is no single Marxism, just as there is no single concept of socialism?’

‘Of course. We are talking about our Marxism. We parted
ways long ago with the dogmatic and positivist Marxism which we inherited from the Soviet Union after the war.’

“You said, “our Marxism.” Can you really say which is our Marxism?’ (I did not detect the catch in the question.)

‘Certainly. Our Marxism is that which you have heard our Marxists, philosophers and sociologists, speak to you about at all our conferences, Marxism which we call creative, humanist and democratic, because it best corresponds to Marx’s idea and vision of socialism. It is rather well-known today thanks to the fruitful creative activity of my comrades gathered around the journal Praxis.’

‘Apparently, professor, you do not follow the Party press. Otherwise you would know that while in the most authoritative political places you are indeed seen as Marxists, you are not at all considered representatives of “our Marxism.” Tell me, then, what is “our Marxism”?’

This interchange, Supek recalls, “left me astonished, even though it was quite clear to me that my young colleague was pronouncing what was known as the ‘official position’ toward the ‘praxisisti’.” For Supek was painfully aware that he and his Praxis colleagues, despite their profound commitment to Marxism and democratic socialism, had been and continued to be targets of increasingly severe domestic criticism and repression. He was aware of the existence of blacklists in publishing houses and the mass media which, especially since the student disturbances of 1968, excluded the dissemination of works and appearances by Praxis Marxists with a fair degree of success. But the question, “What is our Marxism?” left him puzzled. Was it not that Marxism which had been developed in conjunction with the Yugoslav critique of the Soviet Union throughout the course of the previous two decades, a Marxism which he and his colleagues had always insisted was most adequate to the concept of self-management and the “Yugoslav path to socialism?” Was it not
that Marxism propounded by the most eminent spokesmen of Yugoslav philosophy, eminent by virtue of both their international reputation and their institutional positions within the Yugoslav academic establishment? What, indeed, was the answer to the perplexed question so often put to Supek by foreign intellectuals with an interest in Praxis, “naive” as Supek calls it: “how to explain the fact that while in the Marxist world we are considered the theoretical interpreters of self-management socialism and its philosophical and sociological bases, in our own society we are singled out for suspicion and persecution?”

To ask all these questions is really to ask, in a broader sense, why social institutions construct conservative ideologies even when those ideologies have their generic roots in revolutionary thought and experience, and why these same institutions feel that they must protect themselves against groups which question the basis of the social order by questioning the soundness of the ideological system. It is to ask why, as Gramsci might have put it, the ruling culture seeks to maintain its ideological “hegemony” by making superficial adjustments to defuse social criticism and often by suppressing the critics themselves. And not least importantly, it is also to ask why, from time to time, there arise certain institutions of cultural dissent—the religious sect, the salon, the thick journal—which seek to give that dissent a certain degree of continuity and an internal identity, often taking upon themselves the “vanguard” mission of instilling in the public mind alternative visions and standards of alternative ways of living. Such an institution was Praxis.

Some Praxis Marxists, most notably Supek himself, might take exception to this characterization. If Praxis was an institution, they might ask, then where were its office and full-time staff (it had none)? Did not, moreover, the spontaneity of discussion and independence of initiative characteristic of gatherings such as the Korcula Summer School stand in marked contrast to the routinization of revolutionary consciousness? And
if social institutions ordinarily generate self-perpetuating ideologies, did not the openness of *Praxis* Marxism to all creative currents of world thought and its intolerance of all dogma exclude it from the category of “institutions”?

These objections, on closer examination, are not really to the point. While the first two objections confuse institutions in general with a specific kind of institution (bureaucracy), the third somewhat ingenuously overlooks the fact that while the *Praxis* group may have deplored the link between doctrine and authority, its members were nevertheless united by a doctrine of their own—the critical Marxian theory of praxis and alienation. It was moreover precisely because this philosophy of praxis had found, through the journal *Praxis*, a culturally legitimate institutional base in Yugoslav society that it could, speaking with a voice of collective strength, embark on the “critique of all existing conditions” with a surprising degree of impunity and a record for longevity truly enviable by Eastern European standards. And as will be suggested in the pages that follow, the history of *Praxis* as an institution of social criticism was an important cultural and political dimension of the third decade of Yugoslav socialism whose ultimate fate can tell us a great deal about the future evolution of Yugoslav society.

*Praxis* 1964-1975: A Narrative History

In the very first issues of *Praxis*, the primary purpose of the journal was explicated in a number of seminal theoretical essays: to undertake a thorough Marxian critique of all aspects of modern human existence, irrespective of national boundaries or definitions of social reality prescribed by institutions of social authority. In his essay on self-management and bureaucracy, Mihailo Marković emphasized that criticism involves not merely an abstract negation in the name of “chimerical ideals of the distant future,” but rather a complex, dialectical act of simul-
taneous negation and affirmation “in the name of the origin of [the] human future in the present.” Marković’s essay, through its concern with problems of self-management, itself demonstrated that there was no question of “criticism in general” in his mind. Instead, it was clear from the beginning that he and his colleagues were vitally concerned with the application of a critical consciousness based on Marx’s theory of human alienation and praxis to concrete problems of social life.

In another important early essay, Milan Kangrga took a more rigorously philosophical approach to the problem of criticism. Criticism, he argued, is that faculty which enables man to change the world through praxis by anticipating the future on the basis of the existing world and the obstacles which that world presents to further human development. In this sense criticism is organic to the very essence of human existence; indeed, the critical relationship of man to the world is the presupposition of the possibility of praxis itself. But while his essay was principally devoted to seeking a general, ontological basis for criticism, Kangrga noted that the majority of tracts about criticism “in general” were produced not by those who practice criticism, but instead by individuals interested, for more instrumental reasons, in restricting criticism to prescribed forms and boundaries. In these circumstances, the discussion about criticism tends, Kangrga complained, to concentrate on “pure” criticism isolated from and opposed to other types of social activity, as if the “object of criticism had ceased to exist.”

Indeed, the first broad frontal attack on Praxis took the form of precisely the kind of discourse decried by Kangrga. The first public attacks against Praxis can be traced back as far as February and March 1965, when Mika Tripalo, then Secretary of the Zagreb City Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Chairman of the LCC Ideological Commission, took Praxis to task for what was alleged to be its
“destructive” attitude toward the task of social criticism. Parallel with these attacks, the Zagreb daily press, complained some Praxis contributors, kept Praxis under what Supek called “ideological quarantine” by giving it unusually short shrift in the customary review articles devoted to cultural events. In late 1965 a series of articles signed by prominent Party publicists in the daily press and in the Party’s Central Committee’s official journal, Socijalizam, cautioned against an overly broad interpretation of “the critique of all existing conditions,” testifying to genuine concern over Praxis in high Party circles. The most influential of these attempts to discredit the Praxis Marxists on their own theoretical ground was that of Kardelj himself. His arguments merit close attention not only because of Kardelj’s high political position, but because of all the published attacks on Praxis during the course of the forthcoming decade, Kardelj’s 1965 polemic was the most consistently presented and the most thoroughly revealing of the official political mentality of the day.

The main thrust of Kardelj’s tract was to warn that the “destructive criticism” of the Praxis Marxists was having a disorienting effect on the “conscious forces of social development” (by which he referred to the Party), opening “the door wide to criticism which consciously works for the restoration of this or that element of the old society.” Their “alchemistic mixture of abstract eternal truths about humanity and freedom,” according to Kardelj, bypassed “the objective laws of social life.” To this Kardelj added—reconfirming his traditionalistic approach to Marxian theory—that Marx was only secondarily a critic, while his “greatest significance is to be found in his discoveries of a series of social regularities which enable man ... to exert a conscious influence on ever broader areas of social events.” Kardelj also took this occasion to resurrect the sectarian logic of dogmatic Marxism, according to which behind all criticism there always
stand class determinants, insinuating that the humanist critics were in some way representative of elements of the old class order of bourgeois society.¹⁰

Permeating this attack on the Praxis Marxists was the spirit of a crass pragmatism which tolerates theoretical digressions only to the extent that they do not complicate the world of action. Just as it was Kardelj who had written urgently twenty-five years before, in the context of the Pecat debates between the Party and the Krleza faction, that “this is not a time for lengthy theoretical discussions but for quick analysis and complete unity in that analysis,” he now wrote:

Society is not a debating club.... Society is life itself. It is struggle, creation, constant action, a material relation between people, and involves simultaneously the making of decisions and the assumption of responsibility in given objective and subjective conditions and possibilities.¹¹

Kardelj voiced his impatience with those “subjectivistic social critics ... [who] do not ask themselves about the place of this or that element of ‘the existing’ in the process of socio-historical development,” as well as his utter disdain for criticism divorced from the mainsprings of political power. These lines were perhaps the most important in Kardelj’s entire philippic:

Moral-political education in society and social criticism from the standpoint of ethics will be successful in so far as it relies as consistently as possible on knowledge of objective necessity and those social functions which are alone capable... of changing those circumstances in which man lives.... Subjectivist criticism on the basis of eternal moral truths or priestly sermons have in themselves never, in the course of history, changed a thing.

Philosophy, he added, “will be really anticipatory only when its point of departure is the objective movement of society rather than mythology.”¹²
For Kardelj, an integral aspect of this “objective movement of society” was constituted by the position of the Party as the ideological vanguard of the working class. “Social criticism,” he observed,

is not separate and cannot be separated from the political struggle, nor can the freedom of criticism be discussed while ignoring the real relation of social forces. The democratic efforts of socialist society to create conditions for ever freer criticism, moreover, must necessarily be linked with the efforts of the socialist forces to create all the other conditions for pure, creative Marxist criticism as leading and progressive social criticism.¹³

In effect, Kardelj seemed to be saying that the most dangerous aspect of *Praxis* criticism lay in the conscious gap which the “critique of all existing conditions” had created between itself and the Party. Kardelj was certainly well aware that in the absence of a strong link between the critics and the Party, the former would often in fact be reduced to nothing more than a moralizing posture and their theories to what he had contemptuously called an “alchemistic mixture of abstract principles.” By the same token, it seems just as true, recalling the nature of the conflicts between the critics and the Party during the early 1960s, that it was the Party’s very inability to absorb this critical activity which ultimately forced the *Praxis* Marxists into a position of profound political isolation. It was thus far from clear that the alleged gap between *Praxis* theory and social practice was actively willed, much less created, by the *Praxis* Marxists themselves.

Only with the foregoing in mind, moreover, did Kardelj’s most serious political charge against the *Praxis* Marxists hold any real meaning: that the “real” aim of these abstract philosophers of truth and morality was power. The sentiments motivating their “destructive criticism,” Kardelj maintained, resided in irresponsible individuals “who are not in a position to understand
the essence of social relations, egoists, demagogues ambitious for power, the disoriented man who wants to be original at all costs.” “The fundamental question,” Kardelj wrote,
is whether our social criticism will educate democratic public opinion, whether it will influence the creation of a democratic consciousness in the direction of democratic methods of self-management ... or whether it will introduce ... methods of political struggle between political cliques. For the political struggle is a struggle for power, and the struggle for power is a characteristic of a society in which class rules over class and man dominates over man.¹⁴

Thus it was not so much their goal of creating a new socialist culture to which Kardelj objected as the immanent danger (especially if they should meet with obstacles along the path to their primary goal) that the Praxis Marxists would constitute a political faction prepared for political struggle. In this struggle the adversary, Kardelj feared, was to be the Party itself. And to Party-minded individuals like Kardelj, a struggle with the Party signified no less than an outright struggle for power and a grave challenge to the basic structure of socialism in Yugoslavia.

Certainly any imputation to the Praxis philosophers of a will to power was capable of generating a deep mistrust toward them in the popular mind, where visions of the total rule of a secular dogma could easily conjure up old fears of Stalinism and “Cominformism.” In response to such allegations, which began to proliferate at about the time of Kardelj’s article,³⁵ the Praxis Marxists felt themselves forced in turn to disavow all interest in “politics” in the sense in which that term is commonly understood. The following editorial statement, issued in the midst of a later rash of attacks on Praxis, became characteristic:

Our criticism is not (and does not aspire to be) political criticism, one which is situated exclusively in the sphere of direct, everyday, current political action oriented toward the pure actuality of the
existing. For—we are not, and do not want to be, political! This is why we are not nor can be a “political opposition”.... The struggle for power, is not our domain nor is it our intimate preoccupation, much less is it our sole obsession. We are for the power of the working class in the traditional sense.... We do not want to exercise power in anyone’s name because we do not want to exercise it at all.\(^\text{16}\)

The ingenuousness of this passage is startling. Indeed, perhaps the most telling point of all is to be found in the affectedly lofty, condescending posture toward that distasteful “sphere of everyday, current political action oriented toward the pure actuality of the existing.” Taken at face value, this statement would almost lead one to suppose that in tacitly accepting Kardelj’s equation of politics with power, the authors of the statement were acknowledging by default the legitimacy of the monopoly of the holders of power over all questions of “political” import. It would suggest, moreover, that the leading *Praxis* Marxists were somehow unaware of the fact that the very creation of their journal and its commitment to the “critique of all existing conditions” had in fact been a political act of great significance, the culmination of their efforts to find a place for consistent, radical criticism in a socialist society, and the final mark of their frustration with the unwillingness of political institutions—principally the Party—to accommodate such criticism in their own ranks. For is not, after all, radical social criticism, even if predominantly theoretical or philosophical in form, a type of politics?

But what kind of politics? As the discussion in Chapter III has indicated, many of the *Praxis* Marxists have held that to identify politics and power is profoundly at variance with the true nature of political activity. Indeed, Tadić has suggested that “the ‘irresponsibility’ of the intelligentsia is the consequence of the monopoly of responsibility retained by the man of political action.”\(^\text{17}\) For with the means of political action under the jeal-
ous watch of the state and its representatives, intellectuals such as the Praxis Marxists may often find themselves excluded from the realm of political power *perse*, viewing it merely as a realm of political alienation, precisely because of its exclusiveness and artificiality. By charging that the Praxis Marxists were motivated by visions of power, Tadić has argued, the bureaucracy only betrays its own preoccupation with a corrupt vision of politics. The bureaucracy, he writes,

cannot conceive of any other sort of dissatisfaction which might be, for instance, socially motivated, i.e., guided by solidarity and an ideal of general interests. For this reason the party bureaucracy sees all dissatisfaction and criticism from the standpoint of its own situation and its own psychological position. And it ascribes the lowest motives to the communist intelligentsia, projecting onto it its own mentality.¹⁸

As Victor Brombert has observed of accusations linking intellectuals with the will to power, however, “the importance of such accusations cannot be limited to the intentions of those who formulate them: it is precisely such comments, such judgments which help situate existentially the intellectual and define him to himself.”¹⁹ In fact, as early as 1964, the intellectuals of Praxis had already been “situated,” only partially by choice, outside of the Party. Since that time their politics consisted of the politics of culture—more specifically, the effort to generate a broad critical consciousness as the precondition for any truly “political” community in the classical sense of the term. And as Brombert’s remarks also suggest, the early frontal attacks on Praxis by Kardelj and others served only to make the journal more prominent in the public eye and further to strengthen the resolve of its adherents to pursue their originally charted course in the face of all obstacles.

Therefore while in late 1965 and 1966 Praxis continued to be a target of official criticism,²⁰ a variety of more subtle pressures
began to be applied by the government as well. One such approach was to withhold financial support. Since its sponsor, the Croatian Philosophical Society, had no funds of its own for publications such as *Praxis*, the journal was dependent on the proceeds of sales and subscriptions, but most heavily of all on contributions from various social funds maintained by the government.\(^2\) Even in 1965, the Fund for the Promotion of Publishing of the Republic of Croatia furnished only half of the journal’s requested sum of 26 million (old) dinars, while the Federal Fund for Scientific Work contributed a meager 3 million dinars toward the remaining half of the journal’s costs not covered from other sources. The first of *Praxis*’s chronic financial crises then ensued, at one point leading its Editorial Board to despair that continued publication of *Praxis* did not seem possible. The difficult financial situation was further compounded in 1966 when the Croatian fund for publishing assistance was dissolved in accordance with the official new social philosophy, generated by the economic reforms, of forcing all cultural products to compete on the open commodity market. With this source of support extinct, in late 1966 *Praxis* turned to the Croatian Republican Fund for Scientific Work with a request for 17 million dinars, while the Federal Fund which in 1965 had contributed 3 million dinars now refused to give *Praxis* even a token sum. For eight months in mid-1966 *Praxis* was forced to cease publication altogether for lack of funds, desperately concentrating its resources on a triple-number of the Yugoslav Edition toward the end of the year. This story would repeat itself regularly, with variations, in the coming years.\(^2\)

The weapon of financial pressure proved to be a weak one, however. Even in the face of chronic difficulties such as rising costs only partially offset by price increases, as well as the additional financial burden of the parallel International Edition, the *Praxis* editors and contributors almost always managed to ensure continued publication through a variety of extraordinary
appeals to their readers and considerable self-sacrifice. While most Yugoslav scholars write in journals principally in order to supplement their incomes, the *Praxis* collaborators received only token honoraria for their contributions and on more than one occasion forwent remuneration altogether in the interests of perpetuating the journal. (No honoraria were given for contributions to the International Edition.)

Appeals to readers to commit themselves to long-term subscriptions appeared regularly since the journal’s inception, and in one instance the publication of an issue of the Yugoslav Edition was made possible only by virtue of a special collection taken up by Zagreb University Philosophy students. Through efforts such as these, *Praxis* managed to limp from issue to issue, and from debt to debt, without seriously interrupting its continuity.

Another tactic employed against *Praxis*—only once, and without success—was that of internal sabotage. The 1966 anti-*Praxis* campaign had its source, according to Francois Fejto, at the very summit of the Croatian Party organization in the person of the veteran Party leader Vladimir Bakaric. While Fejto finds the motivation for this campaign in the shock administered to the Yugoslav political system by the “Brioni Plenum” of the *LCY* (July 1, 1966) ousting Rankovic from power, events of the previous month had already signalled a turn for the worse for *Praxis*. In June the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) had erupted into heated debate over the award of the Bozidar Adzija prize for scientific research to two *Praxis* collaborators, Kangrga and Petrovic, with the Chairman of the Sabor’s Awards Committee losing his post for what was judged to be his poor taste. Most outspoken of all on this matter was Bakaric, who complained that the *Praxis* Marxists all express agreement with Yugoslav socialism and the Yugoslav path but at the same time view as “scientific” those [elements] with which Yugoslav socialism publicly disagrees.... Comrade Gace
asked who pays for this. We have provided and continue to pro-
vide Praxis with Financial support.... I plead for no more than “to
call a spade a spade,” i.e., if something represents political action,
then it is political action, while scientific action is another mat-
ter.27

Bakaric’s speech certainly provided the official rationale for
withholding financial support from Praxis. But it is also worth-
while to note that in the midst of the ensuing uproar Praxis
Coeditor-in-Chief Danilo Pejovic suddenly transformed himself
into the chief internal obstacle to the continuation of Praxis’s
activities. Indeed, as already noted, the next issue of Praxis did
not appear for another eight months, while the 1966 Korcula
Summer School failed to take place at all because Pejovic, as
President of the School, refused to cooperate.

That the Brioni Plenum, as Fejto argues, was the main con-
tributing factor to the 1966 anti-Praxis campaign certainly can-
not be doubted. There is a peculiar political mentality in Yugo-
slavia which seems to dictate that when the Right suffers a severe
political setback—as in the case of Rankovic, or of the repression
of the nationalistic student disorders in Zagreb in 1971—the
critics of the Left must be publicly punished as well in order to
ensure that the latter are not able to take undue advantage of the
situation. (This in itself, it might be noted, is testimony to the
extraordinary elasticity of the Yugoslav political system, where a
certain degree of pluralism is recognized and is able to operate
within the confines of what is still formally a one-party system.)
In addition to the Rankovic affair, however, a matter of some
significance was the arrest, in August, and subsequent impris-
onment of the writer Mihajlo Mihajlov, who had publicly called
for the establishment of an explicitly anti-Marxist, anti-socialist
journal basing itself on the ideology of “Djilasism” and forming
the foundation of a new, legitimate political opposition move-
ment.28 While the substance of Mihajlov’s “historic proposal”
was in many respects diametrically opposed to the scope and goals of the Praxis experiment, it added fuel to the fire of those who, like Bakaric and Tripalo, feared that Praxis itself represented the core of a potentially broad oppositional movement. Indeed their deepest cause for concern may well have lain in a perception that efforts such as Mihajlov’s were being encouraged by the very success of Praxis in surviving for over two years in spite of the adverse circumstances which it confronted. The specter of an opposition press was becoming an imminent reality.

As the post-Brioni backlash built to a climax, Danilo Pejovic’s internal obstructionism only intensified. On September 2-8, when Pejovic refused any further collaboration with Praxis, the Editorial Board voted to replace him as Coeditor-in-Chief with Rudi Supek. A week and a half later Pejovic, as President of the Croatian Philosophical Society, together with cps Vice President Ante Marin, issued a public statement in which it was claimed that Pejovic had been removed involuntarily from his editorial post. In the name of the Croatian Philosophical Society, Pejovic and Marin publicly rejected any further responsibility on the part of the Society for Praxis, a move which Petrović and others protested vigorously on the grounds that it was taken without proper authority. The issue was finally settled at the Society’s Annual Meeting in December, when the great majority of the Society’s members gave the Praxis Editorial Board a strong vote of confidence, thereby repudiating the actions of Pejovic and Marin.29

Rather than having a moderating influence on the Praxis Marxists, however, this complex episode of 1966, and subsequent crises as well, seemed only to strengthen their resolve. Some months later a statement of the Editorial Board, referring specifically to the Rankovic affair but no doubt reflecting as well on their own more immediate problems of the recent past, asserted:
The events of the past few months in Yugoslavia have demonstrated that the dangers threatening our socialist development lie precisely where we have seen them.... Contrary to those who pretend that the problems treated by Praxis are already solved and that the journal has lost its rationale for existing, we can affirm that these problems have become even more complex.... This is why the journal henceforth has an even more difficult mission as well as a greater responsibility.30

Of a far more serious nature than the Pejovic resignation—and perhaps even than the Rankovic affair—was the spate of student revolts which took hold of Yugoslav universities, most dramatically in Belgrade, for a brief seven days in June 1968. The genesis of the student movement, curiously, was in many respects more closely akin to Western student radicalism than to the type of student discontent hitherto familiar to the countries of Eastern Europe. The initial moment of student radicalization came in late December 1966, when a demonstration against the Vietnam War (prompted by the commencement of American bombardment of Hanoi) turned into a violent confrontation with police when a large crowd of student demonstrators attempted to march from the University on the nearby American Reading Room in a sign of protest. For the next year and a half student passions were kept at a subdued pitch although they occasionally surfaced publicly in response to student demonstrations in other countries, most notably in Western Europe in the spring of 1968. But it was a relatively innocent event, an overflow crowd at a workers’ benefit performance in the student quarter of Novi Beograd (New Belgrade) on the rainy evening of June 2, 1968, that sparked off the most serious wave of spontaneous protest which Yugoslavia had witnessed since the Second World War. The student crowd was encountered by a police detachment armed with batons and firehoses; with no avenue of retreat, the crowd panicked and a bloody clash ensued. Hardly one day later, the students had occupied the University building
housing the Faculty of Philosophy and issued a list of demands calling for major political and social changes in all areas of Yugoslav life.31

Ideologically, the 1968 student revolt was leftist in character, which is only to say that the students, agitated over the adverse consequences of the economic reforms and frustrated by the inability of Yugoslav society to rid itself of the vestiges of authoritarianism, clamored for direct implementation of those ideals of social equality and justice for which the revolution itself had been waged. In this sense their demands did not represent a truly “radical” departure from officially articulated norms; much more serious breaks with revolutionary traditions, they stressed, inhered in the increasing gaps between various sectors of the Yugoslav community and in proposals—such as a stock-sharing scheme introduced in the press just prior to the student outbursts32—that would, in their eyes, have represented no less than a return to the ways of bourgeois society. The major political document and rallying-point of the revolt, the so-called Action-Political Program of the Belgrade students, addressed itself to such pressing problems as social differentiation and privilege, unemployment and political sinecures, real as opposed to merely formal self-management, the democratization of all social organizations and especially of the League of Communists, land speculation, the commercialization of culture, and the quality of university life.33 Even Tito, in his celebrated television address of June 9, 1968, was compelled to concede the justice of the students’ demands and the authenticity of their motivations, as this strongly worded passage from that speech attests:

The revolt, so far as it went, is partially the result of the fact that the students perceived the same problems to which I have repeatedly pointed but which still have not been solved. This time I promise the students that I will wholeheartedly press for their solution, and in this the students must help me. Furthermore, if I
prove incapable of resolving these problems there will no longer be any need for me to remain in my position.\textsuperscript{34}

The nature of the involvement of the \textit{Praxis} Marxists themselves in the 1968 student demonstrations is difficult to determine. To be sure, the echoes of many \textit{Praxis} ideas were audible in the students’ demands, while the Faculty of Philosophy, in Belgrade as in Zagreb, was the epicenter of radical student activity and debate during the stormiest days of protest. On the other hand, it is just as true that the social and political ideals invoked by the students derived directly from the legacy of the socialist revolution and were not the property of any single group of intellectuals. Indeed, the “events” of June 1968 taken cumulatively may be seen as representing the political coming of age of a new generation—one which had not passed through the purifying flames of the Partisan War—and its affirmation of the revolution’s goals, an affirmation as intense and spontaneous as it was short-lived. Neither were the conditions generating this explosion of indignation—unemployment, inflation, increasingly evident signs of social differentiation and increasingly strident articulations of divisive nationalist ideologies bred by competing regional economic interests and reinforced by bureaucratic pressures—products of the activity of a small group of philosophers and sociologists. Nor, finally, was it true, as some unfriendly “observers” claimed, that the \textit{Praxis} Marxists encouraged the students to engage in anarchic street demonstrations and acts of wanton destruction. Indeed in several instances, it was these same \textit{Praxis} Marxists who successfully urged restraint and moderation on agitated and frustrated student gatherings.\textsuperscript{35} No doubt the ability of these individuals to dissuade the students from potentially damaging physical confrontations with the authorities was at least partially a function of the strong moral support they enjoyed among the most concerned participants.

Thus while many students may have derived part of their
intellectual inspiration from the *Praxis* Marxists, it cannot be said that the students were in any way incited by them, as it was then and later claimed in the popular press. It is perhaps more accurate to say that while the *Praxis* Marxists may have actively sympathized with the students and their concerns, their identification with the students was limited insofar as they felt that the students, as individuals, must assume responsibility for their own actions. Indeed the *Praxis* editorial statement circulated in March 1968 protesting the dismissal of six philosophers including Kofakowski, Morawski, and Baumann from their posts at the University of Warsaw (a statement not, however, reproduced widely in the Yugoslav press) can well be read retrospectively as being generally representative of the attitude of the *Praxis* “fathers” toward their own intellectual “sons”:

> When one speaks of Marxist scholars as “protectors and defenders” of the organizers of student agitation, we ask ourselves what is meant by the protection of students who are grown men, adults, and in their majority. Is it still possible that in a socialist country social sanctions are taken against the fathers, fathers in blood or in spirit, for what their grown sons have done in availing themselves of all their rights as citizens?\(^{36}\)

Whatever the extent of their direct involvement, however, official Yugoslavia lost little time in proclaiming the political and moral responsibility of the *Praxis* Marxists for the students’ actions. On June 9, the day of Tito’s speech, Gajo Petrović and Mladen Caldarovic were expelled from the Party in Zagreb for having “sharply advocated very extreme demagogic anarcholiberal positions... [and] attempted to destroy the League of Communists as well as the rest of our self-managing institutions.”\(^{37}\) In Belgrade, while attempts to deprive individual *Praxis* collaborators of their Party membership initially failed for legal reasons (primarily because the Party organization of the Philosophy Faculty boldly refused to sanction the decision of higher
Party organs), in July the Party organization of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology was abruptly and unceremoniously dissolved. A press campaign against “hostile” and “alien” elements which had allegedly infiltrated the student movement was climaxed by a speech by President Tito on June 26, barely two weeks after he had addressed the protesting students in such a conciliatory tone. Tito’s speech on this second occasion demonstrated the real depth of his concern over the student movement as an embryo of something much more ominous. It also marked the official beginning of the concerted and prolonged campaign to rid the Yugoslav scene of the Praxis Marxists and their influence once and for all.

Tito’s June 26 remarks were aimed specifically at a group consisting, in his words, of “individual professors, some philosophers, various praxisovci and others, various dogmatists” whom he insinuatingly lumped together with “those who were responsible for various deformations in the Administration for State Security” (a barely veiled reference to the Rankovic affair) in a unified desire “to create chaos and to fish in troubled waters.” “We must,” he continued,

offer them decisive resistance, say a decisive “no”.... For them the working class and its role are transcended. For them the League of Communists means nothing. They think that some wise men, some technocrats ought to stand on a pedestal and give orders by waving their wands.... There is no place for them.... Do such people educate our children in schools and universities? There is no place for them there!... We must, moreover, reduce such people to impotence.... And, if it ultimately comes to this, it will sometimes be necessary to use administrative measures as well__ We must preserve our socialist self-managing society.

The new strategy, as the tone of these exhortations suggested, was to dissociate the students from those professors perceived as their “ringleaders” and to discredit and ultimately destroy the latter. Tito’s rhetoric was immediately amplified
upon in a hostile press campaign involving many of the country’s leading political figures, charging the “infiltrators,” among other things, with a “reactionary political conspiracy.” But it proved much more difficult to convert these charges into concrete political actions. Indeed, the actual campaign to rid the universities of the Praxis Marxists did not begin with full force until 1972, a full four years after the President of the Republic had spoken—an extraordinary state of affairs which at least on one occasion led Tito publicly to express his dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in the matter. During these four years, it seems likely that the Praxis Marxists must have been under the protection of sympathetic officials in high Party circles. Otherwise, it would be difficult to account for the fact that Tito’s demands went unheeded for so long.

Clearly, what most alarmed the Yugoslav political establishment about the affinity between some of the students’ demands and views expressed by Praxis Marxists was that the June revolt seemed to offer the long sought-for conclusive proof that the latter had gained a highly articulate and potentially explosive following. Whereas previously the Praxis Marxists could be discounted as unusually vocal intellectuals whose readership was restricted to narrow professional circles, the simplistic political calculus of the moment now urgently pointed to the uncomfortable conclusion that the fears of the most strident critics of Praxis had been right all along: Praxis indeed represented the core of a movement of political opposition. Students exposed to the teachings of the Praxis Marxists at the nation’s leading academic institutions, it was feared, would soon take jobs in some of the most responsible positions of social authority and would be able to use that leverage to effect fundamental changes in the general social and political structure, to the detriment of the nation. Courses in Marxist philosophy, which in traditional “socialist” polities have always served to affirm the framework of the existing order and to provide an eschatological world-view which, however
paradoxically, confirms a logic of political pragmatism, were being divested of their conservative ideological function and in fact working contrary to the official purposes of the society. Above all, the frightening vision of an organized oppositional political movement, whose very existence could legitimize the formation of other, non-Marxist, oppositions, seems to have been the regime’s greatest cause for concern. It was this fear that made so ominous Tito’s claims—completely unfounded, so far as the Praxis Marxists themselves were concerned—that these individuals wanted “to create some kind of embryo of a multi-party system and to establish themselves as a factor in it, which would negotiate on an equal basis with the Skupstina and with other [bodies].”

For all this, the student movement did have a profound, if somewhat delayed, impact upon Praxis itself. Student radicals, their self-confidence perhaps somewhat inflated by their recent show of strength, began to criticize their Praxis elders for being overly “philosophical” and abstract in their approach to concrete questions of Yugoslav life. Some Praxis figures, most notably Supek, did not react well to such barbs. A tension, first noted by the French Marxist literary critic Lucien Goldmann in 1968, was chronically present at gatherings such as the Korcula Summer School between activist students seeking to use the occasion as a political platform and some of the more established Praxis collaborators who preferred to stress the educational purposes of the gathering. (In the case of the Korcula Summer School in particular, Supek, the School’s organizer, no doubt also had in mind the entirely pragmatic consideration that as little cause as possible should be offered to watchful officials to discontinue the School’s operation.) This tension was manifested with increasing regularity in the years that followed. On one occasion, a student meeting at the August 1970 Summer School protesting the persecution and imprisonment of several radical student leaders ended in a rather unfriendly confrontation between
Supek and many of the assembled students. Indeed this event had serious repercussions, nearly leading to a permanent rift within the Praxis collective, since some prominent members of the group who had particularly close sympathies with the students, especially Životić and Pesic, were so distressed at Supek’s performance that they resolved to boycott the Summer School in subsequent years. Thus the student movement, an explosive issue for Yugoslav society at large, proved to be a volatile source of friction even within the Praxis group itself.

Yet it is worth noting that the Praxis editors and contributors, apparently fearful of bringing down the regime’s full wrath upon the results of their hard-fought struggle to establish a public forum for their views, avoided all discussion of the student movement in the pages of Praxis throughout 1968 and 1969. As a consequence, for all the widespread accusations against the “praxisovci” which appeared in the popular press during those two years and the bitter polemics in which the Praxis Marxists themselves engaged in other forums,46 not a single issue of Praxis was confiscated until 1971, a remarkable record as compared with that of other Yugoslav journals (such as Razlog and Delo) that lacked Praxis’s notoriety. At the meeting of the Praxis Editorial Board in Korcula in the summer of 1969, Stojanović, one of the most sympathetic among his colleagues to the student cause, expressed his concern that

Praxis and Filosofija have anticipated in a certain way the ideas of the new democratic left [in Yugoslavia], but when it appeared on the scene, we did nearly nothing toward a critical analysis of its experiences.47

This meeting of the Editorial Board must be viewed as a critical breaking point between the still somewhat aloof Praxis of the 1960s and the much more socially engaged Praxis of the 1970s. All those present, with the possible exception of the Belgrade legal philosopher Mihailo Djuric (later to be imprisoned),
sensed that Praxis was dangerously nearing a point of intellectual stagnation if it had not already reached it, and that as Supek himself suggested, some collective “change of personality” was now indicated. Part of the problem involved the generational issue. Most of the members of the Editorial Board were by now senior scholars, the composition of the Board having remained virtually unchanged ever since 1964-65. Thus ^ivotic warned that Praxis had not “opened itself up sufficiently to the younger generations” even though the journal’s survival, as he intimated, was dependent precisely on that generation’s radical spirit. The deeper question, however, was one of content and orientation. Had the critique of Stalinism run its course, even though, as Branko Bosnjak cautioned, manifestations of Stalinism had far from disappeared in Yugoslav political and cultural life? Was it true, as Tadić asserted, that “Praxis has lost its initial rhythm and intensity of ideas that have attracted the attention of the Yugoslav and foreign public”? Had the student movement and the concurrent resurgence of nationalist forces made it incumbent on the Praxis Marxists to address themselves more explicitly to the political issues of the day; and if so, would it be possible to maintain a balance between what Djuric somewhat contemptuously called “political publicism” and the high level of discourse hitherto maintained as a matter of editorial policy and professional conscience? Had it not been, after all, the theoretical cast of the journal which was responsible not only for its great intellectual appeal and soundness, but also for its apparent invulnerability to direct acts of repression? One participant in the discussion, having in mind Veljko Korac’s observation that “the journal would ... commit suicide if it were to swim in the peaceful waters of scholasticism,” summed up the predicament in the following terms:

Praxis has not even to this day enjoyed the favor of socially influential circles. Intensification of its critical activity would definitively place the journal in disfavor, with the consequence of
putting into question its very existence. The journal obviously faces a dilemma: how to exist?

In response to these concerns, a new orientation gradually began to emerge in subsequent issues of *Praxis*. In number 3-4/1970 of the International Edition (but not in the Yugoslav Edition) several provocative articles appeared containing material of a much more directly political nature than ever before. The issue included translations of some articles that had already been published elsewhere in the Yugoslav press, such as Nebojša Popov’s groundbreaking study of worker and student strikes in Yugoslavia, along with Stojanović’s above-mentioned analysis of the 1968 student movement in Yugoslavia and even (“for discussion”) Steven Vracar’s highly controversial essay calling for a multi-party political system. In subsequent issues, outspoken contributions by young men of the new generation—Nebojša Popov and Trivo Indjic of Belgrade, Bozidar Jaksic of Sarajevo, 2arko Puhovski of Zagreb—many of whom had taken an active part in the student movement in both publicism and action, became increasingly frequent. The heightened tempo of radicalization was also evident in the choice of themes discussed in *Praxis* articles. While the official editorial policy continued to assert that “in a theoretical journal every author is responsible for his own statements,” it was nevertheless clear that the nature of the content of the essays was itself changing dramatically. Nationalism and class society, the political dismemberment of the working class and police repression, the role of the Party and the charismatic leader—all these tender points of Yugoslav society were probed with ever greater intensity in topical issues of *Praxis* beginning with number 3-4 of 1971. This change, to be sure, may have been less a factor of any explicit editorial policy than of the general, spontaneous intellectual radicalization of individual members of the *Praxis* collective.

The 3-4/1971 issue of *Praxis* was significant for another rea-
son as well. This was the first issue of *Praxis* which the authorities directly attempted to suppress through judicial proceedings. Initially, the District Prosecutor of Sisak (the industrial Croatian city where *Praxis* was printed) sought to ban the entire issue because of what he claimed were “false, distorted and alarming assertions which evoke the agitation of the citizens and [disturb] the public order and tranquility”\(^5\) made in the editorial introduction and in articles by Popov, Supek, Pesic-Golubovic, and Kangrga. Judging from the decision of the Sisak District Court, it was evident that the most offensive piece of the lot was Kangrga’s “Phenomenology of the Ideological-Political Advance of the Yugoslav Middle Class.”\(^5\) It was in this essay that Kangrga delivered the most searing indictment hitherto printed in *Praxis* of the rising nationalist movement in Yugoslavia (and especially in Croatia), linking it intimately with the efforts of a new middle class to consolidate its position. The assertions contained in Kangrga’s article, according to the District Judge, were “distorted ... do not correspond to the present system of workers and social self-management and ... are certainly likely, in the judgment of this Court, to evoke the agitation of the citizens.” While the District Judge restricted the ban only to Kangrga’s article instead of upholding the District Prosecutor’s request in full, eventually an appeal to the Croatian Supreme Court succeeded in lifting the ban altogether.\(^5\)

The significance of the coincidence of the attempted ban on *Praxis* with the appearance of Kangrga’s provocative article cannot be ignored. It was in 1971 that national feeling throughout Croatia was building to a fever pitch, stirred on by the rhetoric of republican Party leaders such as Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar (long-time foes, it will be recalled, of *Praxis*), and that new amendments to the Constitution giving greater powers to the republics were topics of heated debate in all public forums. *Praxis*, with its relatively small but select audience, represented at the time one of the chief obstacles to the politics of
nationalism. The consistently outspoken and hostile attacks of the Praxis collaborators on the spirit of nationalism had made it increasingly urgent for the nationalist ideologues to discredit Praxis in the public eye and to impair, insofar as possible, its further activity. For it was precisely the audience which Praxis did attract—the intelligentsia—which had historically formed the core of the great nationalist movements of Eastern Europe. Indeed, it was no doubt precisely those “citizens” who had invested the most political capital in the nationalist movement whose “tranquility,” to quote the language of the Sisak District Prosecutor, was most profoundly disturbed by essays such as Kangrga’s. It is unlikely, therefore, that Praxis’s strategic value in the struggle against “nationalist deformations” went unnoticed by the federal authorities, and it cannot be doubted that calculations such as these played some role in the Croatian Supreme Court’s 1971 decision to overturn the Sisak District Court’s ban on the contested issue of Praxis.

The Croatian nationalist movement reached its zenith with the student demonstrations that shook Zagreb in November and December of 1971. In their aftermath, the Croatian Party organization underwent a massive purge of the most outspoken representatives of the nationalist movement, with leaders such as Tripalo and Dabcevic-Kucar falling into total disfavor. At just about this time Praxis seems to have acquired an ally in the highest councils of the League of Communists of Croatia (lcc), when the Zagreb sociologist Stipe Suvar was designated President of the lcc Ideological Commission. Only a few months before, Suvar, in the pages of Praxis, had called for full working-class representation in all political organs, including the Party, and for an “intense ideological confrontation with the protagonists and theses of petit-bourgeois nationalism.” Suvar repeated this demand at a March 1, 1972 meeting of the Ideological Commission shortly after he assumed his new duties. At the same time he explicitly disowned any attempts to
subject publications such as *Praxis* to financial harassment. Of *Praxis* in particular he stated:

> It is obvious that *Praxis* and the [Korcula] Summer School ought to continue to be financed, since the basic ideological platform of this journal is correct and it is anticipated that its editorship will become further committed to a responsible approach to all questions. ... The basic Marxist orientation of this journal cannot be questioned.\(^{57}\)

A few months later, an even more noteworthy event took place in Zagreb, this time in the heart of the academic community. An election was to be held in Zagreb University for a successor to the previous Rector, Ivan Supek, a noted Yugoslav nuclear physicist and brother of *Praxis* Marxist Rudi Supek. After a vigorous campaign and University-wide debate, the “nationalists” suffered a serious setback with the election of Predrag Vranicki, for years one of the most active and respected members of the *Praxis* collective if one of its most moderate representatives. To be sure, this victory for Vranicki, a widely admired scholar in his own right known as much for his gentle and conciliatory personal manner as for his humanist commitment, did not necessarily signify a victory for the *Praxis* Marxists as a group, for in spite of his *Praxis* activity Vranicki had managed not only to retain his Party membership but also his seat on the Party’s Zagreb City Committee. But Vranicki’s new position and the support he enjoyed throughout the University community at the very least represented a guarantee that any outside efforts to apply pressure through the University against the Zagreb *Praxis* group would meet with very stiff opposition. As subsequent events would show, however, neither Suvar’s kind inclination toward *Praxis* nor Vranicki’s presumed ability to protect the personal fates of the Zagreb *Praxis* collaborators would constitute, in the final analysis, sufficient guarantees that *Praxis* itself would be allowed to continue publishing indefinitely.
While in Croatia Praxis may, for the time being, have found valuable guardians in Suvar and Vranicki, the significance of local developments was now overtaken by policies dictated at the federal level. The purge of the Croatian League of Communists was an integral part of a general reassertion of federal over republican prerogatives, symbolizing the beginning of a profound structural reorientation of the balance of power within the federation as a whole. The impact of these larger developments began to have ominous overtones for Praxis, and in particular for its Belgrade representatives. As already noted, in January 1972 Tito had called for a redoubled effort to remove the recalcitrant professors from their teaching positions, an appeal which he had first sounded after the student demonstrations of 1968. In a major speech in which he also addressed himself to the more recent nationalist outburst in Zagreb, Tito lashed out at the opposite pole as well:

I was glad to hear some professors, university delegates to the Conference, stress that there should be no place at the universities for those who do not agree with the policy of the League of Communists and with our social system in general. This is evident. We have said so long ago. And yet we pay them.... And yet such people are working against our social system. And it is they who are educating our youth.... I am now waiting for practical measures, for action, for those who are corrupting our youth to be removed from their posts. I have spoken of these matters long ago. But any words went largely unheeded. There was even some slightly ironic comment.... Now we shall act. As for those who refuse, and are responsible as political leaders, we shall ask them why they have failed to act accordingly.

Tito’s motive was not solely one of vengeance against those whom he called “wiseacres who say: Why was this not done much earlier?” In addition, in his speech Tito wished to sketch out a new course that would re-cement the Yugoslav community to its ideological moorings, one component of which was, in his words,
to have “Marx to return to the university.” Concurrently with the elimination of hostile theories from the academic environment, Tito wished to restore the old Marxism with which he and his companions were familiar—and to restore to Marxism what he saw, from his traditionalist standpoint, was its proper ideological function. “Marxism,” he asserted,

must provide the basis of the theoretical education of our youth, of our young cadres, regardless of the profession they may choose. Well, then, these young people of ours who have such flimsy connections with Marxism, what do they know of dialectics? Not very much. And in our country there is so vigorous a process of social change that some knowledge of dialectics is essential.58

The “dialectics” of which Tito spoke here were of course the same “dialectics” that the Praxis Marxists had been criticizing, well before their intellectual tendency was formalized by the creation of Praxis itself, as metaphysical, dogmatic, and apologetic. In effect, Tito was attempting to turn back the clock, at least in a cultural sense, to a period when the ideological foundations of the political order were unquestioned and when internal party discipline held its own in the face of external challenges. What Tito did not, perhaps, realize with sufficient clarity was that in this case, the challenge confronting the Party had developed organically from within the communist movement itself and that it represented but a further development of the continuing quest for a “new path” to socialism. Tito’s reaction, however, was to seek refuge in the old ways.

It was in such an atmosphere of growing official hostility toward the Praxis Marxists that an incident occurred in Belgrade that further clouded their prospects for a balanced hearing. At a professional symposium at the Law Faculty of Belgrade University held on March 4, 1972 devoted to the controversial constitutional amendments, the legal theorist Mihailo Djuric, a member
of the *Praxis* Editorial Council, made some remarks that were publicly interpreted as being inflammatory of Serbian nationalist sentiments. For these statements Djuric received a harsh two-year prison sentence in a widely publicized proceeding, over the strenuous objections of his colleagues. The *Praxis* Editorial Board published a protest about the incident, defending Djuric's right to speak freely in academic discussions, although delicately refraining from defending the content of his remarks. This article was in turn quickly banned by the Sisak District Court, with the Croatian Supreme Court this time upholding the lower court's ruling.

The Djuric affair had even broader implications, however, for the *Praxis* Marxists. In another editorial statement in the same issue of *Praxis*, the Editorial Board aired its suspicions that the harsh sentencing of Djuric was part of an intense and more general campaign to repress the *Praxis* group as a whole. They pointed to the discontinuation of funds from the Croatian government, a decision apparently reached over Suvar's head in the Ideological Commission; the “blacklists” of “undesirables” who were not permitted to appear on radio and television broadcasts; the revocation of the passports of four *Praxis* associates in Belgrade (Vojin Milic, Zaga Pesic, Dragoljub Micunovic, and Nebojša Popov) while “various plunderers of social property” were free to come and go as they pleased; the arrest and sentencing of activist students on the basis of spurious charges of “Trotskyism”; and finally, the ominous precedent set by the Djuric case with regard to removing scholars from their teaching positions on the basis of views expressed in professional debates with their colleagues. It seemed paradoxical to the *Praxis* collective that there had evidently been an escalation of repressive measures against creative Marxism ... and this precisely when some people, in the name of political power, speak of unsatisfactory “Marxist education” as one of the causes of the lack of socialist construction of our society.
The Editorial Board was not mistaken in its fears. In the ensuing months, direct attacks on the Praxis Marxists would intensify along the broad front of methods deplored in this editorial statement. Subsequently it would become even more difficult than before for “praxisovci” to publish their works; the journal would find itself in an increasingly serious state of chronic financial crisis; more passports would be revoked in Belgrade (including those of Stojanović, Marković, 2ivotic, Tadić, and Trivo Indjic); and efforts to remove the Belgrade Praxis Marxists from their teaching positions on the basis of “moral” and “political” criteria would be greatly intensified. Meanwhile this editorial statement, along with the statement specifically addressed to the Djuric affair, was banned by the Croatian authorities. It might be noted that in upholding the ban, the Croatian Supreme Court, when speaking to the specific charges enumerated in the editorial statement, called them “distorted” but cautiously refrained from using the term “false” except in the most general connection. Apparently the Court knew better.

By the same token, Praxis was permitted to continue its publishing activities in Croatia. Provocative articles condemning the nationalist syndrome that might well have been banned a year before were now left untouched by the attentive hand of the Sisak District Prosecutor. Clearly, the new constellation of political forces in Croatia found itself in strange alliance with Praxis and this circumstance seemed to dictate forbearance from direct measures against the journal in the interests of a united front in the struggle against nationalism. And so long as a resurgence of nationalist feeling would continue to be a major threat in Croatia, Praxis itself would remain safe from coarse attempts at total repression.

In Serbia there existed no such obstacles, save one: resistance in the top ranks of the Serbian Party apparatus to the effort to remove the university professors who were “corrupting” the na-
tion’s youth. Serbian Party President Marko Nikezic, in particular, was reputedly inclined to be lenient toward the Belgrade Praxis collaborators and encouraged the growth of democratic relations within the Party’s ranks. Tito, however, had not forgotten his pledge to discipline Party leaders who failed to cooperate in the campaign against the dissident intellectuals. In late October 1972, after the circulation of a “Letter” to all Party organizations calling, among other things, for increased ideological vigilance against “all ideological and political adversaries of the League of Communists,” Nikezic and Serbian Party Secretary Latinka Perovic were forced to hand in their resignations. Before the year was out the gravity of the situation was emphasized with the voluntary protest resignations of several prominent Yugoslav political leaders, such as the popular Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac, the equally popular member of the Federal Presidency and Partisan hero Koca Popovic, and the leaders of the Slovenian and Macedonian party organizations (Stane Kavcic and Slavko Milosavleski, respectively). The outward complacency with which Tito reacted to these major losses bore striking testimony to his characteristic unity of purpose in pursuing his goal.

At the same time, persecution of the Belgrade philosophers and sociologists accelerated rapidly, eventually culminating in concrete actions designed to force the dismissal of eight of them—Stojanović, Marković, Tadić, Pesic, Životić, Popov, Micunovic, and Indjic—from their posts. The dramatic affair of the “Belgrade Eight,” while perhaps formally distinct from the fortunes of Praxis itself, was the culmination of a confrontation between the government and the Praxis Marxists which had been building for many years. On October 9, 1972, the University Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia demanded, in an open letter to the Philosophy Faculty’s Party Organization, that the “Eight” be dismissed from the University. The grounds for dismissal were a set of “moral-political” criteria
for university professors, including conformity to the Party line, which had been only reluctantly accepted by the University in the face of intense pressure from above. No action in response to the Party’s demands was taken by the Philosophy Faculty for several months, prompting a letter from the LCS University Committee angrily stating that the Faculty was sheltering a group of dissident professors “in open conflict with the party.”

Finally, the Faculty’s Party organization issued a bold statement in sharp defiance of the Party initiative. “The Communists of the faculty of philosophy,” the resolution asserted, “oppose implementation of administrative measures against the instructors criticized in the letter of the university committee.” With this the conflict was now in full view of the public, which witnessed at the same time the mounting of an increasingly abusive press campaign against the now notorious “Eight.”

Parallel with these developments, the government began to apply pressure on individual Praxis Marxists in ever more blatant ways. An entire book by Mihailo Marković entitled Reappraisal, consisting of no more than articles previously published freely in Praxis and other journals such as the Belgrade Filosofija edited by Tadić and Pesic, was banned by the Belgrade District Court in November 1972. This decision was only partially reversed the next month by the Serbian Supreme Court, sustaining the suppression of Marković’s essay, “The Structure of Power in Yugoslavia and the Dilemma of the Revolutionary Intelligentsia,” which had appeared unhindered in Praxis at the end of 1971. It will also be recalled that it was in the summer of 1972 that Mihailo Djuric was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for his allegedly nationalistic statements, while the young Praxis Marxist from Sarajevo, Bozidar Jaksic, was tried and sentenced for his 1971 Praxis article on “Yugoslav Society Between Revolution and Stabilization” the following autumn.

The main thrust of the Party’s attack, however, was reserved for the sole remaining protection available to the Belgrade Praxis
Marxists—the long-standing tradition of the autonomy of Belgrade University from outside interference. Ironically, it was this very tradition that had been responsible for permitting Belgrade University to become one of the greatest strongholds of communist organization and agitation in the 1930s. Now the Party attempted to reverse all this. In December 1972 it managed to push through a new university law over initially stiff opposition which formalized the so-called moral-political guidelines, gave political organizations the right to initiate proceedings against any faculty member if he or she was suspected of being in violation of the guidelines, and instituted “self-managing” councils within each faculty consisting half of faculty representatives and half of “outside” members, some of whom were appointed by the government and Party and some elected by professional societies. Naturally, it was the last provision which gave the “Eight” at the Philosophy Faculty the greatest cause for concern, and the composition of the Faculty’s Council quickly became a topic of heated controversy. By packing the Council with their own representatives and by exercising a combination of persuasion and intimidation over the other members, the authorities evidently expected that they would finally be able to get their own way. Finally the Council was constituted and in January 1974, as required by the new law, it solicited reports from forty leading Yugoslav scholars from all parts of the country on the moral and political fitness of each of the “Eight” in response to the continued insistence of Party organs.

The Party took advantage of this pause by attempting to create as much hostility as possible among the members of the Council and their constituents. Since it apparently believed it a foregone conclusion that the instructors would vote as a block with the besieged professors and that the “outsiders,” on the other hand, would vote with the Party, the Party concentrated its efforts on harassing the students in the hope that the professors—now in a very delicate position—would fail to come
to their aid, alienating their student allies and weakening their own position. In this, the Party evidently hoped to play upon the latent, and sometimes open, tensions that had existed in the past between the radical professors and their even more radical and impatient “proteges.” An attempt in November 1973 by the University’s submissive student organization to provoke an open confrontation in the Philosophy Faculty in fact had the opposite of the desired results.\(^{70}\) Arrests and interrogations of students failed to persuade them that they would be able to save themselves by disowning their mentors. Finally, in impressive demonstrations of solidarity, all 800 students of the Philosophy Faculty threatened in December 1973 and March 1974 to strike \textit{en masse} if the persecution of the “Eight” was carried through to its destined end. A sympathy demonstration by students in Zagreb even erupted briefly into violence when students ejected Party spokesmen who had come to speak against the philosophers.\(^{71}\)

What the Party feared most of all, a repetition of the revolts of 1968, was becoming an increasingly likely prospect. And this time, the Party would have no one to blame but itself.

In the months between January and July 1974 while the reports on the “Eight” were being prepared, the Party mounted an unusually vituperous campaign against them in preparation for the Tenth Party Congress, which was expected to result in major changes in the direction of greater Party unity in response to the regional divisiveness which had plagued the country in recent years. In a widely publicized speech delivered in February, the prominent Party Executive Secretary and favorite of Tito, Stane Dolanc, devoted an unusual degree of attention to the affair in Belgrade and made the following confident prediction:

\[\text{I have mentioned the example of these philosophers only in passing as I do not consider the struggle against them one of our more important tasks. They will fall by the wayside of themselves for the simple reason that their concept has nothing in common with} \]
the broadest political and ideological concept that has been adopted by the vast majority of our working people. I mentioned them only because I feel that in the preparations for the Tenth Congress, communists and all the other socialist and progressive forces of Yugoslavia may look back with pride on the road they have traversed.72

Indeed the Tenth Congress of the LCY, held from May 27 to 30, 1974 and billed as the “Congress of Unity,” accomplished in broader terms what the Party’s aim had been all along in focusing on the “Belgrade Eight”: to strengthen the Party ideologically, to restore unity on all major questions of political orientation, and to situate Marxist criticism in a framework where it would no longer be able to jeopardize the Party’s hegemony. Surprisingly little explicit attention was given at the Congress to the struggle with the dissident Marxists themselves. But in resolution after resolution, the crucial importance of a proper understanding of Marxist fundamentals was stressed. In particular, one resolution ominously recalled the “moral-political” criteria established over a year before at Belgrade University for the appointment of faculty, extending it to educational institutions throughout the country:

The League of Communists attaches special importance to the professional abilities and moral political qualities of teaching personnel. ... The choice of teachers necessarily becomes a matter of general interest; therefore social criteria must be established for the election of teachers, leading professional personnel in particular, whereby the present composition of professional personnel will be improved.73

With its now official endorsement of the moral-political guidelines, the Party turned to the long-awaited reports on the eight Belgrade Praxis philosophers with an air of confident expectation. But when the reports finally arrived in early July, the Party was stunned. Not only were they all highly favorable, but
they were accepted virtually unanimously by the 154 members of the Philosophy faculty, with only one abstaining vote. A few days later, on July 5, the Faculty’s “self-managing” Council convened amidst considerable Party pressure to postpone the meeting and followed suit in adopting the reports’ favorable conclusions regarding the “Eight,” to all appearances closing the issue. In a hasty effort to save face, the government restored to all eight professors their passports with the right to travel abroad, proposing in turn that the professors agree to refrain temporarily from their undergraduate teaching responsibilities in order to cool off the heated passions which the affair had aroused. The “Eight” confidently countered with a list of their own conditions, insisting that two (Stojanović and Pesic) be allowed to accept teaching positions abroad, two others (Marković and Tadić) concentrate on teaching graduate students, the two youngest members of the group (Indjic and Popov) be given leaves of absence to complete their doctoral studies, and not least notably, that 2ivotic and Micunovic continue to teach undergraduates. While the last condition remained unacceptable to the authorities, for the time being it seemed that for the “Eight” the worst was over.

That, however, was not to be the case. With the resumption of the fall semester, harassment of students was resumed in full force, resulting in the sentencing of several students to long prison terms on spurious charges of spreading “hostile information.” Those Party-appointed members of the Philosophy Faculty’s Council who had voted in favor of the “Eight” in July were recalled, while the Party continued to attempt to exert pressure on the other Council members through a series of low-key “interviews.” This, however, proved to be no easy task. Thus in November, 1974, exasperated in its attempt to use even a semblance of democratic procedure in ousting the “Eight,” the Party obtained passage of legislation in the Serbian Parliament which made all “outside” representatives on faculty councils subject to direct governmental appointment, furthermore allowing the
Parliament itself (should the former tactic fail) to expel university professors unilaterally should it find that their activities threaten “social interests.”

For two months the new law was allowed to sit idly while speculation abounded as to whether such a draconic and unprecedented measure would actually be brought to bear. Then, Finally, on January 28, 1975, the Serbian Parliament, riding roughshod over the entire university structure which had earlier been established at the government’s insistence to arbitrate such matters, decided to issue its own verdict and sentence. The “Eight” were formally dismissed from the University by legislative decree.

These events were but the most dramatic expression of a growing conservative mood in high Party circles. The period preceding the Tenth Congress was one of intense reflection for the Party, not only about the relatively minor problem of the fate of the Praxis Marxists, but also about the very nature of the relationship between the Party and society at large. It was sensed that it was time to reassess the role which the Party had fashioned for itself after the Sixth Congress in 1952, when it virtually abandoned the traditional doctrine of the “leading role” of the Party in all major political and organizational matters in favor of a less commanding educational and ideological role. As early as October 1972, Tito himself had publicly expressed his doubts about this historic transformation, opening the way for further discussion on this vital issue. In an important speech in late March 1974, Kardelj repeatedly stressed the importance of “the leading ideological and political role of the in society,” remarking that “we were too permissive towards various theories and practical actions in the itself” that questioned this role. The political disorientation occasioned by over-decentralization in the economy and the polity, he suggested, was to some degree directly attributable to the Party’s loss of influence over “key positions” in society. Not only ideological hegemony, but now once again political hegemony,
must be the goal of the League of Communists:

These and like experiences are convincing as a warning that in [the] future we shall have to be far more alert and resolute towards all attempts at undermining the role of the LC in society. We must also candidly state that communists will not waver in fighting for key positions in all areas of the social system to be in the hands of progressive socialist forces, of those who really uphold the positions of socialism, Marxism, self-management democracy and the national freedom and equality of our peoples.77

Kardelj’s analysis of the rise of dissident groups, having in mind primarily the Praxis Marxists themselves, ran along similar lines. He spoke of certain inadequacies of the economic reforms of 1965, specifically the failure to introduce “a new concept of social planning in line with the system of expanded reproduction in associated labour on the grounds of self-management” as well as the unprecedented growth of finance capital as contributing to the “growth of destructive criticism levelled against self-management in its entirety.” He perceived the major flaw, however, in the lack of vigilance within the Party itself:

Moreover, a vacuum developed wherever the LC, bowing before the pressures of opportunism and nationalism, wavered or even withdrew from the fight for the interests of the basic strata of the working class and working people. This vacuum soon began to be filled in by the so-called “new leftists” whose ideology is a melange of Stalinist dogmatism and ultraleftist anarchy.

To correct this state of affairs, Kardelj asserted, it would be necessary to endow the Party with a degree of ideological unity corresponding to its restored political responsibilities. Once again he repeated a position he had taken often in the past, but now with a new urgency:

Party bodies cannot be debating clubs for the confrontation of attitudes from positions that differ in principle. Party leaderships
must be operational, action leaderships. And they can achieve this only if they are unified.

In order to ensure this unity, the Party needed to provide some guarantee that journals such as *Praxis* would no longer be able to publish freely and become platforms for consistent social criticism and intellectual opposition as had been the case in the past. “In the first place,” Kardelj warned,

we must be quicker about developing the entire system of information activities, for which provision is also made in the new Constitution. It would probably be most fitting for that system to be built up as a specific community of interest [i.e., for all publishing activities to be organized within a single political framework—*gss*] involving all the factors in society that are concerned with these matters. We also need popular, up-to-date publications which will not only offer the required information and statistics but also reply to questions and counter destructive and lying criticism. We have recently neglected this kind of publication. Moreover, the opponents of our system and of the *lc* have proclaimed such type of information as being used by the bureaucrats to popularize and vindicate themselves.78

On the last point, Kardelj offered no rebuttal, and perhaps for good reason. There can be little question, however, that by following Kardelj’s advice the Party would strike much more deeply at phenomena such as *Praxis* than by concentrating its efforts on individual personalities and their livelihoods. By consolidating its control over all public discussion of social issues and instilling it with an explicitly ideological mission, the Party would deprive the radical intelligentsia of its primary instrument of reaching the public and of defining itself as a distinct sociocultural force. Without access to a public audience—whether through the underground newspaper, the illegal duplication and dissemination of manuscripts, the control of one or more publishing houses, or the “thick journal”—any modern intelligentsia which wishes to challenge the existing order is con-
demned to impotence and dissolution. This surely is the reason why the underground press network in the USSR (“samizdat”) and the vicissitudes of the underground publication, the Chronicle of Current Events, have assumed so much importance in the life of dissident Soviet intellectuals.79 When doubts are shared only in whispers and in strict confidence, a dictatorial government need have no cause for concern. But when these same doubts are expressed publicly and in printed form, it becomes possible to speak of the formation of a distinct intelligentsia. Both the doubts and the means of their expression then take on a political significance which no government living in fear of the truth would dare ignore.

These considerations bring us naturally to the events and controversies leading up to the closing of Praxis itself. The Yugoslav Edition of Praxis in 1973 and 1974, in issue after issue, contained some of the most acrimonious exchanges between Praxis and its opponents which the journal had ever witnessed. Three of the Belgrade group—Pesic-Golubovic, Stojanovic, and Popov—unable to publish elsewhere in the country, turned to Praxis to print their responses to press attacks which they would otherwise have been powerless to refute.80 Gajo Petrovic, abandoning his serene philosophic pose and revealing himself as a formidable polemicist, battled on two separate fronts. In an “open letter” to the inveterate dogmatist Boris Zihrl, he defended himself masterfully against Zihrl’s clumsy but insinuating attacks which had been published in Borba in late January 1974.81 On another occasion, Petrovic involved himself in a heated debate with the Ljubljana philosopher Vojan Rus (the brother of Praxis associate Veljko Rus) and three of his colleagues after it had been proposed that the League of Philosophical Societies of Yugoslavia, which had been acting since 1969 as a cosponsor of Praxis’s International Edition as the League’s official publication, ease Praxis out of this role and instead found a new and more “representative” philosophical
journal which could presumably better speak on behalf of Yugoslav philosophy as a whole. Petrović suspected, perhaps with some reason, that this initiative was in fact an attempt to undermine *Praxis* itself by cutting it off from one of its most important sources of funds. Still, Petrović’s extremely bitter and strongly worded reply to Rus did little to elevate the overall tone of the debate and left the unpleasant aftertaste of personal warfare which the *Praxis* editors, including Petrović himself, had done so much in the past to avoid.  

It is difficult to determine how much significance should be attributed to the departure in late 1973 from the post of Coeditor-in-Chief of *Praxis’s* Yugoslav Edition of one of the journal’s foremost personalities, Rudi Supek. The announcement in *Praxis* about Supek’s decision to relinquish his post was brief, thankful, and to the point, noting that “since Comrade Supek remains a member of the *Praxis* Editorial Board, he will continue in the future to collaborate intensively in the work of the journal.” A reference in the announcement to “overwork” no doubt referred to Supek’s time-consuming duties as President of the Yugoslav Sociological Association as well as his newly found interest in ecological matters. Although Supek came to his coeditorship of *Praxis* only two years after the journal’s founding, in 1966, for seven years thereafter he made an indelible imprint on *Praxis* although his role in terms of technical editorial work was rather limited. Through his prolific contributions it was he who played perhaps the largest role in steering the journal toward what I have called elsewhere the “politics of culture,” helping *Praxis* to avoid the pitfalls of conventional political involvement. His moderating influence at times had to be quite vigorously introduced into debates with his colleagues, which always remained warm and friendly nevertheless. But this same moderacy often put him in opposition to more radical elements both inside and outside the journal, especially some members of the student movement, who tended to view *Praxis* as
an instrument which could be used for their own ends; not un­expectedly, Supek’s reserved attitude toward the student move­ment also generated occasional tensions within the Editorial Board itself. Partly because of the confusion resulting from this state of affairs, Supek seems to have come to believe by 1972 that it was time for the radical Marxist intelligentsia to formulate a focused political program, as if to answer the sweeping (and often self-contradictory) attacks of its critics with a clear ray of light. Many of Supek’s colleagues rejected this idea—and, given the framework of a “thick journal” such as Praxis, they may have been right. Supek’s recognition of the inappropriateness of Praxis as a vehicle for such a program may, therefore, have convinced him that for him to continue to occupy a leading role in Praxis would be of limited value. His Zagreb colleague Ivan Kuvacic, a capable sociologist but nonetheless a somewhat less dominant personality, took over Supek’s duties as Coeditor-in­Chief of the International Edition. It is not altogether likely, moreover, that Supek’s departure and Petrović’s unprecedented polemical outbursts were sheer coincidence. For these and a variety of other reasons, Praxis was beginning to move onto very shaky ground, as indeed the strident tone of Petrović’s defensive tirades itself seemed to suggest.

In these last months, the thin boundary between philosophy and politics took on vital significance for the journal and its adherents. On two occasions the Editorial Board spoke out boldly in defense of the Belgrade Eight, once directly and the second time by reprinting its reply to the vicious anti-Praxis at­tacks of 1968 (but this time in bold type, “for easier reading”). In this context Branko Bosnjak wrote for Praxis a lengthy and provocative exposition of the Praxis group’s attitude toward the distinction between (conventional) politics and philosophy. “If the philosopher seeks power,” Bosnjak contended, “then he is not a philosopher, because the problem of action involves not power but the humanization of human relations.” “The critical
relationship toward reality,” he continued, “is nobody’s privilege, nor do there exist philosophers who might consider themselves called upon to pass judgments about everything.” But “the philosopher can teach people to think, to understand that which is in its essence.... Such understanding can never be opposed to the interests of the working class.” Poignantly summarizing the dilemma, Bosnjak noted that the charge that the Praxis Marxists have used their platform in the universities for their own political ends is a little reminiscent of the content of the accusation against Socrates. It was the charge against him that he was corrupting the young; the charge that he did not believe in the gods in which the State believed may here be left to one side. Socrates entered into a logical polemic and after its conclusion even admitted the possibility that he was indeed corrupting the nation’s youth, “but if I am corrupting them, it does not logically follow that it is you who makes them better.”

It was indeed becoming painfully apparent by this time that the Socratic analogy was not at all inappropriate. A year later, the prominent Serbian litterateur Dobrica Cosic argued in one of the most compelling and even poetic essays ever to appear in Praxis that to be true to the intellectual calling in Yugoslavia under current conditions was an exceedingly dangerous affair. “The classical dilemmas”—

creativity or nihilism, egoism or belonging to the people and the nation, conscience or immorality in public life, personal dignity or submission in the face of power, action or apathy—in our times have assumed fateful significance and tragic resolution.

The critical and independent intellectual, who could stand and say (as, at one time, did Maksim Gorky), “No matter whose hands the power is in—it is my human right to relate to it critically” was now pressed in on all sides by the “honorable intelli-
gentsia, that reserve army of the political bureaucracy,” whose main loyalty was to the “privileges attendant on expertise.” Warning of the danger of a “consumerist Stalinism,” Cosic lamented that

traditional historical optimism, faith in the constancy of progress, that most cunning form of conformism, must be abandoned to the ideologues and the hedonists, if it is wished to sustain hope in socialism as a possible society of freedom and justice, reason and conscience.

And as for the charge that certain intellectuals had abused their freedom, Cosic retorted that “in the history of the world and of this country, the greatest abuse of freedom has always been committed by people of power and political ambition.... The most fatal social act is to deprive a person of his freedom.”

This issue of *Praxis* was to be its last. Toward the end of the issue the editorship inserted a copy of the decision of the Council for the Coordination of Science and Technology in the SFRY regarding the funding of journals; *Praxis* was at the top of the list of those journals which, with no additional explanation, were not to receive any further support. There can be little doubt, however, that the generally worsening political climate, aggravated by *Praxis'*s published defenses of the “Belgrade Eight” as well as its increasingly strident tone in its last months, was prominent among the immediate factors leading to this decision. At about the same time as the “Eight” were ousted from the university in Belgrade at the end of January 1975, the trade union organizations in Sisak were ordered to cease work on the printing of *Praxis*. Finally, on February 21, 1975, it was announced in Belgrade that *Praxis* had been closed after its Editorial Board had rejected an ultimatum from the authorities.

The *Praxis* Editorial Board addressed these final poignant words of explanation and farewell to the readers of the Yugoslav Edition:
We inform our readers and subscribers that the Yugoslav Edition of the journal *Praxis* no longer enjoys the opportunity to be published. The difficulties with which we have been confronted have grown especially in the past year, when the journal was deprived of all financial support, and recently our printer ... sent us written notice “that the political *activ* and management organs [of the enterprise] has decided not to perform the service of printing the journal *Praxis* in the future” . . .

At this time, when the Yugoslav Edition of *Praxis* ends its existence after a ten-year period of publication, one might expect that the editorship would offer an analysis and assessment of its work and activity. But as it does not appear that such an analysis could be published at this time, we have no choice but to defer an assessment of our activity to the future.

We once again wish to affirm that the members of the Editorial Board of *Praxis* in their activity have stood and stand on the principles of the critical and open Marxism and the humanistic and self-managing socialism which they clearly proclaimed in the first issue of the journal and which they attempted to defend and develop in the course of the ten years of its publication.91

Whatever the ultimate fate of the *Praxis* Marxists, the events of recent years summarized above plainly demonstrate the truth of Marx’s observation quoted at the beginning of this chapter: “Philosophy is introduced into the world by the yelling of its enemies who betray their internal infection by their noisy call for help against the blaze of ideas.” Indeed *Praxis* was never so widely circulated and avidly read as after the bannings of 1971-72 and the public surfacing of the affair of the “Belgrade Eight.” As efforts at repression intensified, so did the *Praxis* group become a *cause célèbre* on the Yugoslav scene. Each additional newspaper report of a court decision or a Party resolution only served to spread the notoriety of the “praxisover” much more effectively than they could ever have done themselves on the pages of their cumbersome, often dense, and predominantly
professionally-oriented journal. Whatever the Yugoslav public’s feelings about the theoretical and political views expressed in Praxis, it was the courageous response of the Praxis collaborators to measures taken against them that increasingly earned them and their journal the reputation proclaimed by one of their number:

Real power needs not only potentates but also those who bow down in the face of power, and obedience demands not only those who command but also those who peacefully listen, slumber, and nod their heads. But these latter qualities, this reverent and self-effacing humility, cannot, I think be ascribed to Praxis.⁹²

At the very least, then, the spectacle of Praxis, insofar as it penetrated public consciousness through protests, scandals, and official attacks whose intensity increased in direct proportion to their desperation, provided the Yugoslav public with an object lesson in the art of self-management. The “praxis” of Praxis spoke to that public perhaps more eloquently than all its discourses on Marxism, the content of socialist culture, and its critiques of the existing order could ever hope to do. In the final analysis, Praxis’s popularity was due largely to forces beyond the control of its individual contributors. The clumsy actions against the “Eight” in Belgrade and the closing of Praxis itself, taken in the broader context of the politics of the 1970s, appear to confirm that the Yugoslav revolution is entering decisively on a conservative phase. Tito, refashioning Yugoslavia so that it might survive without him, has set the country on a new course. While it seems clear that post-Tito Yugoslavia will remain united, prosperous, and most probably independent, it appears that it will be a Yugoslavia in which spontaneous, honest social debate and critical thinking—elements which were manageable during Tito’s lifetime by virtue of his own immense authority and prestige—will become mere memories of a past age: the age of Praxis.
You should judge—to that end you have been given your eyes and your understanding. . . . We humanists have all of us a pedagogic itch. Humanism and schoolmasters—there is a historical connection between them, and it rests upon psychological fact: the office of schoolmaster should not—cannot—be taken away from the humanist, for the tradition of the beauty and dignity of man rests in his hands. The priest, who in troubled and inhuman times arrogated to himself the office of guide to youth, has been dismissed; since when, my dear sirs, no special type of teacher has arisen.

—Settembrini, in Thomas Mann’s
*The Magic Mountain*

Since 1945, Yugoslavia has been in a state of constant and at times dramatic social change, regardless of the formal continuity of political leadership at the highest level. Indeed, the rapid progression in the past thirty years of substantive constitutional changes, and even of new constitutions, has been merely the formal expression of more far-reaching changes in general social structure. It is only natural, moreover, to expect that social changes of such magnitude should be accompanied by the erosion of old values and symbols and the articulation of new ones. But while the Yugoslav ruling political stratum has responded to structural change and dislocation in a relatively flexible manner and has even been responsible for many highly imaginative new approaches in the institutional sphere, its ability to respond to
change in the sphere of cultural values has been somewhat less impressive. While the Party leadership did assume the early responsibility for destroying isolated aspects of the Stalinist theoretical system as part of its more profound restructuring of the Yugoslav polity, the task of formulating a new, integrated world-view adequate to the new concept of democratic, self-managing socialism fell to professional academics, philosophers and sociologists. Over the years, these theorists did indeed develop a new world-view, but one which rejected in its entirety the very core of the old ideological system which served as the basis for a highly authoritarian society, that paradoxical blend of metaphysics and coarse pragmatism known as “dialectical materialism.” The new world-view, based on a profoundly Marxist, humanist vision of man liberated from all forms of alienation, carried its proponents by its own internal logic from a critique of theory to a critique of practice—of the Party, bureaucracy, and social structure—within Yugoslavia. Resistance from traditionally-minded official sources only served to strengthen the resolve of the new critics to confront the pressing social issues of the day with a keener eye and with the total honesty that they felt befitted the intellectual in a socialist society.

Yet for all this Praxis, which became the mouthpiece of the Yugoslav Marxist-humanist intelligentsia, never did become—the claims of its detractors notwithstanding—the core of an outright oppositional political movement. Instead, the Praxis experience may perhaps more sensibly be viewed as a particularly vigorous reappearance of the classical intelligentsia, so important to the history of Eastern Europe in particular, in the modern context.

To appreciate the historical significance of the intelligentsia it may be useful to have reference to two alternative models of intellectual activity. In one model, characteristic of the “sociology of knowledge” school of analysis, the intellectual is seen in the more or less passive role of “guardian of truth,” whose sep-
aration from the sphere of social action is understood as being desirable both for the integrity of the intellectual and for the good of society as a whole. A second model, more typically employed in historical analysis, presents the intellectual as dedicated by virtue of the historical context in which he lives to certain ideas of social justice and human dignity, which have been only incompletely realized in the course of his society’s development and to whose realization he is committed. On closer inspection, these models may in turn correspond broadly to two different types of societies: the first, to societies in which change is gradual or at least contained and where there exists a broad consensus about the pace and boundaries of change; the second, to societies where cultural development is for one reason or another permitted to run far ahead of changes in social structure and where inadequacies in the latter become increasingly intolerable with the passage of time. It is societies of the second type that are prone to give birth to intelligentsias, conscious collectivities of intellectuals that formulate and articulate the ideals of the age to the rest of society and urge their immediate realization. The institution which most adequately accommodates the role of the intellectual in the first type of society, in the modern age, is the university; for the intelligentsia which finds itself in the midst of profound processes of social change, a variety of forms can mediate between it and society at large—the circle, the journal, the newspaper, the political party, or even the conspiratorial organization—depending upon the diverse factors giving rise to the intelligentsia in each instance and upon the extent to which the intelligentsia has had the opportunity to develop as an independent social force.

Throughout their history, the subjective identity of the Praxis Marxists as intellectuals was an important factor in their self-definition with respect to the society in which they lived. As they were progressively excluded from officially sanctioned forums, their gaze turned inward and they became increasingly preoc-
cupied with the question of the intelligentsia and its role in the postrevolutionary society. Their numerous writings on this theme testify to the depth of their concern and moreover offer us a valuable insight into their collective personality and goals. Therefore in this concluding chapter we shall discuss the Praxis view of the intelligentsia in the modern world and try to assess the effectiveness of Praxis itself as an institution of intellectual criticism in a socialist society.

**The Concept of a Humanist Intelligentsia**

The heightened importance of the “man of knowledge” in the contemporary world, Rudi Supek argues, is to a large extent the product of the growth of industrial society. While such societies may assume varied political forms, they exhibit certain common sociological characteristics such as the growth of the tertiary sector, the demand for higher qualifications in all occupations, the increased significance of research, and consequently the demand for increased levels of training and education. Education becomes a primary factor in social mobility. Lipset and Dobson connect similar observations with the further assertion that “certain features inherent in the role and social organization of intellectual life give rise to critical activity,” and that

the rising prestige of the institutions of knowledge production and creative intellectuals, along with the interdependence between these social units and other key institutional structures, leads to the rapid diffusion of critical ideas and values, thereby amplifying the impact of such activity.

While this latter line of argument seems to account persuasively enough for the growth of intellectual dissidence in modern society, it does little to account for resistance to such movements of dissent—without which, indeed, words such as “dissent” and “criticism” would pertain only to empty categories.
Again, setting aside important differences in political structures, it is possible to argue that much of the critical initiative emanating from the university may be fundamentally at odds with the ethos, if not the goals, of industrial expansion, which, through its seemingly insatiable demand for ever higher levels of technical sophistication and training, has in Lipset and Dobson’s view so enhanced the prestige of the university. The very “interdependence” of which Lipset and Dobson speak between “institutions of knowledge production” and “key institutional structures” may in fact constitute reason for pessimism, rather than optimism, about the future of intellectual dissent in the modern world.

One of the most common fallacies in the study of intellectual movements seems to lie in the simplistic assumption that the “intelligentsia” can be conceived of as a more or less homogeneous social category consisting of all people engaged in those professions which demand the application of mental, rather than physical, skills. In fact, no assumption can be more misleading. In the modern world the man of learning is as often the legitimator of accepted social values and practices as he is a skeptic; certainly in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union this is no less true than anywhere else. A corollary fallacy seems to be that the “intellectual” professions have a uniform tendency to generate critical intellectuals, regardless of the proximate concerns of each individual field of study. To be sure, the “democratic movement” in the USSR seems to provide grounds for such an assertion, drawing on professional scientists as well as on writers, artists, and scholars in the humanities. But to offer the Soviet intelligentsia as a paradigmatic case would be to overlook the very peculiarities of Soviet society—above all, the imposition of strict regulation in all fields of intellectual endeavor—which have generated an intelligentsia that has been able to focus on the very minimum conditions of all intellectual activity: the freedom of inquiry and expression.
With respect to Eastern Europe, however, Francois Fejto has evidently extrapolated from the Soviet case, arguing that it is “the technological intelligentsia and the scientific and literary elite” which is the major force behind reform and economic development. Fejto is thus led to reduce the goals of these distinct groups to the following oversimplified assertion:

The main argument of the revisionists, from the Petofi Circle in Hungary to the Praxis group in Yugoslavia, and the Polish periodical Po Prostu to the Czechoslovak Literarny Noviny, is that neither the working class, nor its vanguard (the party), nor even the vanguard’s vanguard (the “new class”), are equipped to manage a modern industrial society efficiently.6

For the Praxis Marxists, at least, efficiency is actually only a secondary concern, bowing before the larger issues of human fulfillment and equality. While they are certainly not alone in holding this conviction, the skepticism of the Praxis Marxists toward efficiency as a social value is considerably more marked than that of most intellectuals living in the neighboring countries of Eastern Europe. This fact itself doubtless reflects the unusual origins of Praxis Marxism as well as the unique nature of Yugoslav socioeconomic development with respect to the rest of the socialist world. At best a means to the higher goals of the elimination of misery and alienation for all men, efficiency—it is the Praxis contention—all too often takes the place of these ends in the minds of technocrat and bureaucrat alike, who view human beings as mere objects to be manipulated for the sake of higher production figures or for the ambiguous aim of “social control.” There is a sober awareness in Praxis theory that increased technological sophistication and industrial output are not in themselves sufficient conditions for the development of a more just and humane society, even though they may be vitally necessary for the achievement of the material abundance which can bring such a society closer to realization.7
In many Praxis essays the confrontation between the ethic of efficiency and the ethic of self-realization has been personified in a conflict between two categories of intellectuals—the technical intelligentsia and the humanistic intelligentsia. The former term seems to apply, in occupational terms, to natural scientists, engineers, managers, functionaries, and all those involved in the generation and application of techniques of manipulation and control—be it of the physical or of the human world. The “humanistic intelligentsia,” on the other hand, is composed of workers in the arts and humanities whose primary activity involves the articulation and evaluation of cultural symbols and the general quality of social life. Perhaps the most radical distinction between the two is made by Tadić, who focuses simultaneously on the social role and the nature of knowledge sought by each. The technical intelligentsia, he writes,

is situated in a social climate created by bourgeois society.... Its exact, rational knowledge is legitimized either on the basis of its application in immediate production and for technical ends, or of its useful commitment to the provision of various social services. ... Being situated in a wage relationship similar to that of the bureaucracy, the natural scientific and technical intelligentsia serves the mechanism of industrial competition and social service, while attractive rewards and the nature of the work... make it indifferent toward all that happens in social life.

But “writers and philosophers,” Tadić continues,

are in a different position. Despite the peculiar type of rigor involved in its manner of thinking, this type of intelligentsia is “handicapped” by the fact that it cannot put its knowledge directly to profitable use. This is the source of its difficulty in achieving equal status and acknowledgment in modern society. ... The role of writers and philosophers, in this sense, is primarily negative and destructive rather than positive and creative.
Certainly in the historical context of industrializing and industrialized societies, this distinction between two intelligences—one positivist in outlook, the other by definition critical—is on the surface quite appealing. But on closer scrutiny it becomes untenable in this severe form. What sense can it make, for instance, of the scientist with a “social conscience” or the historian who writes textbooks celebrating the present? While such examples, to be sure, can be found in Western societies, the question becomes all the more pressing when we consider the problem of intellectual dissent in countries such as the Soviet Union. Indeed in that society, where the fields of the natural and precise sciences are most immune from the direct imposition of political standards, the scientific intelligentsia has been in the forefront of the dissident movement. As Lipset and Dobson observe, it was three physicists—Sakharov, Tverdokhlebov, and Chalidze—who in 1970 established the Moscow Committee for Human Rights in an attempt to bring some manner of coordination and unified purpose to the movement’s often disparate activities. And as Sakharov himself tells us in his brief preface to Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom:

The views of the author were formed in the milieu of the scientific and scientific-technological intelligentsia, which manifests much anxiety over the principles and specific aspects of foreign and domestic policy and over the future of mankind. This anxiety is nourished, in particular, by a realization that the scientific method of directing policy, the economy, arts, education, and military affairs still has not become a reality.

The almost naive faith expressed in this passage in the capacity of science to resolve the problems of the world is what many Praxis Marxists find most suspect in the claims of the technical intelligentsia. As Tadić points out, “the progress of technique and of science resting on technique is not equivalent to human
Životić, in particular, takes Sakharov to task for holding a technocratic vision of the future founded on the belief in the unlimited power of science... [in which] the two superpowers will undertake an organized struggle for “geohygiene,” for a higher standard of living, for the solution of the famine problem, etc.... An affluent society might emerge but, in the framework of the existing bureaucratic structures, it would be a society without personal freedoms.

In reply to Životić’s latter contentions, it suffices simply to point to the adamant insistence of Sakharov and other like-minded Soviet intellectuals—scientists, for instance, like Zhores Medvedev, Tverdokhlebov, and others—on the freedom of thought, the elimination of censorship and police repression, and the exposure of Stalinism, in order to demonstrate their radical aversion to “the existing bureaucratic structures” and their commitment to individual freedom. The suspicion lingers, however, that Sakharov’s advocacy of the freedom of thought is at least generically derived from his abiding belief in the power of science, and, what is more disturbing, that many of his scientific colleagues might well be content with a freedom of thought limited to the scientific community itself. For the mainstream of the “democratic movement,” however, the urge for the freedom of scientific inquiry seems to have merged with the strivings of other intellectuals to a point where the particular claims of each group have become nearly indistinguishable from the whole.

If sense is still to be made of the distinction between the “humanist” and “technical” intelligentsias, perhaps it should be sought not so much in the nature of the intellectual’s professional interests as in the relationship of the intellectual to his labor. Any occupation, Supek stresses, is “technical” if it involves merely the application of a means or a method to a predeter-
mined end defined independently of the immediate producer. Indeed, he argues, “there are purely ‘technical occupations’ in all the humanistic and social sciences, these occupations being defined by the limited nature of their research arrangements and the diverse application of scientific discoveries.” The decisive factor, he concludes, is the nature of the relation of the producing subject to the object, process, and outcome of intellectual production:

The humanist intelligentsia possesses a developed sense which links human creativity—regardless of whether it lies in the field of natural, social, or technical science—with the goals of that creativity, and accordingly it possesses a sense of personal responsibility in the formation of human conditions of life. The humanist intelligentsia has a certain “relation of craftsmanship” toward its work, which is to say that it takes account of all phases of production, conceptualization, conduct and application.... The technical intelligentsia, on the other hand, is a typical product of industrial society, a developed division of labor, a routine relationship toward one’s own production. It does not ask itself about the totality of its production, but only about the phase for which it is immediately responsible ... abandoning personal responsibility for the goals of the person who issues the orders, and concerned only with fulfilling the order according to norms of quality.13

Whether the scientist or the philosopher is more inclined to assume this sense of responsibility now becomes a secondary concern, for as we have seen, the issue can be argued either way under different social and political conditions. The hallmark of the “true intellectual” becomes the sense of obligation to examine ends as well as means and the refusal to be content with the greater sophistication of technique and method as the sole end of one’s own activity.14 For the communist intellectual in particular, any other ethic would represent a betrayal of responsibility, an act of concession to those who possess the resources which
enable them to impose their own goals on the rest of society. In Nebojša Popov’s words, “to be undefined means to be on the side of the stronger.”

By the same token, there is no inherent reason, in the Praxis view, why each member of the social organism in a socialist society cannot possess the critical consciousness characteristic of the humanist intelligentsia. Indeed the entire Praxis theory of socialism departs from the premise that the right of criticism is a necessary feature of any developed socialist society, for it is only by exercising this right that the individual, no matter what his place in the social division of labor, can begin to exercise his full powers and responsibilities as an autonomous decision-maker equal to the challenge of self-management in all areas of social life. This critical spirit, however, does not arise spontaneously nor under all social conditions. It is this important point, in fact, which is at the core of the Praxis critique of the situation of the Yugoslav working class. It would also be well, therefore, and completely in the spirit of the Praxis “critique of all existing conditions,” to observe with Karl Mannheim that “it is not until we have a general democratization that the rise of the lower strata allows their thinking to acquire public significance.”

There are special circumstances, however, under which the effects of social structure on ideas can be reversed. One such circumstance is to be found in the existence of a strong, self-conscious intelligentsia which has assumed as its mission the preservation and articulation of the ideals of a social movement. In this situation, the intellectual can become the “living leaven that leads an economically conditioned revolt to consciousness of the class and historical mission of the proletariat”—“the spark,” as Lenin might have put it. But what Lenin failed to understand, in his profound, organizationally motivated suspicion of the independent intellectual, was that the revolutionary intellectual cannot play this catalytic role for long with any significant degree of success without the essential preconditions of
free thought and expression within the revolutionary movement itself. Otherwise, what may begin as a revolutionization of consciousness may end tragically in an educational dictatorship. The intellectual, like Sartre’s writer, “gives society a guilty conscience,” revealing society to itself “as seen”—but can do so only so long as those in power can afford the luxury of considering their own complicity.

**Praxis as an Institution**

To the casual observer, the ability of *Praxis* to have survived for over ten years in an increasingly hostile domestic environment must seem comprehensible only in the light of the remarkable courage and tenacity displayed by its individual contributors and the relatively open nature of the Yugoslav political system in the years between 1964 and 1975. It would certainly be impossible to deny the importance of either factor. Yet there is also little doubt that without strong bonds of personal friendship and a common awareness of the identity of their concerns—and of their fate—the *Praxis* Marxists would not have enjoyed such success in testing the limits of the Yugoslav system and would probably each have found his or her own individual efforts drowned quickly in a sea of personal tragedy. The face that they presented to the world was one of a fellowship of philosophers and sociologists—all powerful theorists in their own right and intellectually responsible only to themselves—who, while they must be read and understood individually, collectively compensated for each other’s weaknesses, both personal and professional.

While it is possible to view the group as a whole as consisting of various roles, these roles were played naturally, without the prescribed behavior patterns and sanctions for deviance characteristic of the great majority of social institutions. There were those (such as Petrović, Kangrga, Tadić, Marković, Stojanović,
Krešić, and Grlic) who viewed themselves as dedicated primarily to the pursuit of philosophy, but for whom philosophy as a way of seeing the world made urgent demands on that world and on the philosopher as an individual; sociologists (such as Supek, Kuvacic, Popov, and Pesic) for whom the analysis of society cannot be approached independently of human perspectives and values; provocateurs (Stojanović, Grlic, Popov, Životić, and occasionally Kangrga) and men of caution (at various times, Supek, Vranicki, Marković, and Petrović); and not least importantly, those such as Danko Grlic whose faculty for wit and jest often enlivened discussions and cooled heated passions. Their diversity, to be sure, often generated very serious internal disagreements in theory and in practice, the latter often being manifested, for instance, in varying degrees of commitment to the student cause. By the same token, it was this very diversity which permitted their response to attacks on their common symbol—the journal *Praxis*—to be extremely flexible and at times evasive. Their peculiar unity of theory and practice, as much the result of a union of independent personalities and temperaments as of a unity achieved within each personality, was probably the most important key to the success of their common undertaking.

Thus if *Praxis* is to be thought of as a kind of social institution, an institution of social criticism, this was a very special kind of institution indeed. While there were always two individuals nominally designated as coeditors-in-chief of the journal, all important editorial decisions were made on the basis of strict collectivity at weekly meetings of the Editorial Board. And while certain individuals, particularly Gajo Petrović, may have invested far more personal effort and time in the journal than others to the point of experiencing a deep sense of personal identification with it, at no time was it possible to identify the journal with the views or personality of any single individual. For *Praxis* was an institution without leaders—or perhaps more accurately, an institution consisting only of leaders. It was an institution small
Conclusion

enough to be based primarily on ties of personal friendship of long standing, one in which collaboration, free from jealousy and suspicion, was organic and spontaneous rather than enforced. It was an institution whose dogma consisted in the struggle against all dogmatism and whose chief object was to make itself superfluous by dissolving the concerns of the professional intellectual into the critical consciousness of the public at large.

Peter Gay’s description of the nature of association among the *philosophes* of the French Enlightenment is remarkably applicable to the *Praxis* Marxists as well. He calls the *philosophes* a “philosophic family” who

did not have a party line, but... were a party ... Moreover, harassment or the fear of harassment drove the philosophes to remember what they had in common and forget what divided them. The report of a book banned, a radical writer imprisoned, a heterodox passage censured, was enough.... Critics trying to destroy the movement only strengthened it.  

Indeed, the *Praxis* Marxists, like the *philosophes*, were unquestionably at their best when under attack. Instead of lowering themselves to the level of everyday political declamation and insinuation, they insisted on maintaining a consistent tenor of reasoned and public discourse. To defend themselves against charges of making politically suspect and “alarming” assertions they took refuge in the argument that their statements were “only theoretical,” although as suggested in earlier discussions, their view of “theory” was a uniquely dynamic one, lending itself to flexible, if at times facile, interpretation. And certainly the persecution of a colleague, even for the expression of views with which they may have profoundly disagreed (as in the case of Mihailo Djuric), never failed to evoke among the Pram Marxists a united front and a redoubled sense of common commitment. These various reactions may sensibly be viewed as mechanisms directed toward protecting the integrity of a common undertak-
ing. When a collectivity begins to act in such a way, it becomes possible to speak in terms of institutional self-preservation.

In the above pages, however, it has often been asserted that *Praxis* was not only an institution, it was *apolitical* institution. If this is true, then it would seem appropriate to determine the political program advocated by the *Praxis* Marxists. And at this point we abruptly discover that *Praxis* had no single political program to offer. Some observers of the Yugoslav scene have in fact perceived the absence of such a prescription for action as a vital flaw. William Dunn, for instance, has spoken of “an inability among humanists to articulate a program which will reconcile and integrate self-management and some system for the cultural direction of socialist development.” On the other hand, it has been argued from within the *Praxis* group that for the Left to have a defined program would be for it to establish reified goals for the future which would then tend to dictate certain pre-determined courses of action, creating a fundamental contradiction between the practice of the movement and that free activity which is “the substance of the new world” and the true goal of the Left as a social movement. Whichever view may be correct in the long run, it is well to point out that the longevity of *Praxis* itself was at least partially attributable to the fact that its adherents were never so insensitive to their immediate political environment as to attempt to present a common set of concrete political objectives, even if this had been possible. To do so would have been to divest themselves of their sanctuary in the realm of theoretical criticism and to step out irrevocably onto the slippery ground of politics as that art is understood by the practitioners of power.

This is not to say, however, that individual *Praxis* Marxists did not advocate specific changes in the world of political institutions. Stojanović and Tadić, for instance, repeatedly focused their attention on the Party as (normatively) composed of people who represent “the most advanced and resolute section” of the
proletarian movement who “have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.” It might be noted in this connection that neither Stojanović nor Tadić (and this is true of their colleagues as well) have embraced any notion of a pluralist or multi-party political system based on the concept of the direct representation of social interest. Indeed, this is most clearly the point at which the Praxis Marxists have explicitly distinguished themselves from Djilas’s political thought. Tadić, for instance, rejects the “institutionalized,” “petrified pluralism of bourgeois democracy” in the same breath as he rejects Stalinism: both, he maintains, assure the reign of reified political forms over and against the real political community. Similarly, Stojanović’s entire critique of group-dominated decision-making in the economic sphere certainly implies the rejection of pure pluralism as a structural principle as inconsistent with the basic goals of socialist democracy. Elsewhere he has observed that in a practical sense as well, multi-partism would generate a very tenuous political situation in Yugoslavia, since it would certainly result in the crystallization of national enmities along formal political lines and even legalize the formation of both pro-Stalinist and pro-bourgeois parties. Such an “interparty struggle for power in Yugoslavia,” he cautions, would result in political instability,

which would in turn imperil further democratization.... A multi-party system in Yugoslavia as it is today would most probably be only to the advantage of the most treacherous statist forces and [would] help them to strike a blow under the pretext of “saving” the revolution.

Indeed nowhere else than in their ideas about alternative political models is it so clear that the thought of the Praxis Marxists lies squarely within the bounds of communist political culture, although with the passage of time they did move perceptibly further away from positions acceptable to ruling elites. In the
pre-1968 period, the Praxis Marxists tended to concentrate on more traditional—and, they felt, more fruitful—issues such as democratic relations and the presence of criticism and genuine working-class representation within the party itself. A Praxis editorial from 1968 was unambiguous on this score, reading in part:

We consider that outside of or alongside of a Marxist-communist ideological basis and perspective, outside of or alongside of the program of the LCY, there exists today no ideological-political force capable of safeguarding the integrity of this country. Secondly, the problem of socialism is not and cannot be in the dilemma of a one-party or multi-party system, but rather in the question of the character and role of the proletarian party.27

After the crucial year 1968, the Praxis Marxists generally grew more openly critical of the Party, taking it openly to task for not having outgrown its authoritarian origins. By 1975, only Vranicki and the young Zarko Puhovski retained their Party membership, others having renounced it or having been deprived of it in the preceding years. Yet not even this bitterly disappointing experience led the Praxis Marxists to renounce all personal ties with Party officials or to deter many of them from their obsession with the concept of the Party, much less to embrace alternative modes of political organization. This latter reluctance was surely a function of the genuine skepticism of many Praxis thinkers toward all forms of institutionalized political activity as adequate vehicles for the free, creative, and critical spirit of human praxis. In their rejection of bourgeois liberalism as well as Party dogmatism in the name of the proletarian movement, they should perhaps be thought of not as deriving so much from the tradition of Nagy, Dubcek, and Djilas, but instead from that of such radical communist theorists as Lukacs, Gramsci, and perhaps most of all, Rosa Luxemburg.28

On the broader sociopolitical plane, the consistent and thorough realization of the goal of workers’ self-management
was the overriding passion of the Praxis theorists. Perhaps none of them has written so extensively and provocatively on this theme as Mihailo Marković, and a close examination of Marković’s work reveals a very definite political program in this regard. Marković’s proposal to create independent information centers for the formulation of decisional alternatives for self-managing units was briefly noted in preceding pages. While the immediate goal of this innovation would be the democratization of economic decision-making, in the long term, in Marković’s view, such impartial information centers would constitute an important step toward the systematic elimination of the sphere of professional, alienated political activity. In its broad outlines, his blueprint for the deprofessionalization and democratization of politics shares the same optimism, and some of the same faults, of Lenin’s antibureaucratic realm of bookkeepers sketched out in State and Revolution. Marković’s bookkeepers, to be sure, are the instruments of the cybernetic age. “All routine administrative operations,” he asserts,

including the analysis of information and the search for optimal solutions within some given programs, will be performed much faster and in a more accurate way by electronic computers. A considerable part of [the] bureaucracy would thus lose any raison d’etre.

Yet these analytic functions, Marković emphasizes, can and must be subject to strict popular control:

Even today everybody could share in decision-making and management, and the present unlimited competences of professional politicians could be reduced to the activity of experts who analyze data, propose alternative solutions, and work out practical measures, leaving to elected members of self-managing organs to adopt vital decisions.

And in order to instill these decision-makers with a clear sense of value, as well as to counteract the dulling effect of the raw data
that would be provided them, Marković furthermore proposes the establishment of critical study groups within each self-managing collective and at all levels of social decision-making—itself a striking attempt to universalize the institutionalization of criticism beyond the relatively narrow boundaries of the humanist intelligentsia.31

In more general terms, Marković seems to favor a Fabian-esque global strategy of what might best be described as “creeping self-management.” While he warns that it would be a serious mistake to attempt to achieve the total democratization of a modern industrialized society overnight, it is possible to commit oneself, in his words, to

a series of continuous changes in all the micro-cells of society which taken as a whole could represent a discontinuous change of the total system. This has already happened once in history: the English bourgeois revolution was not made, but it nevertheless ended in 1688. Under the wing of feudal society, islands of the new bourgeois society were [permitted to] develop)—the free cities. Today the universities, tomorrow the factories, might similarly become the self-managing atoms from which the new democratic, socialist society will be constituted.32

Marković’s optimism, to be sure, should be tempered by the observation that democracy confronts different types of obstacles in industrial and educational settings. But irrespective of these differing contexts, democracy is predicated everywhere, in both East and West, on the cultivation of the questioning, critical mind. This consideration, rather than any specific program of action in the political sphere, is the most important contribution which the Praxis Marxists have to offer to democratic theory in general as well as to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia. As Supek cautioned in a 1972 newspaper interview,

when we talk about the relationship of philosophers and of the Praxis group toward politics, I would put the accent not on those
activities which we perform as citizens who live in specific organizations ... where we can be concerned about the practical problems of our system’s functioning, but on problems of social consciousness in a socialist direction, for which we as intellectuals ... are directly responsible.\textsuperscript{33}

Indeed when closely examined, even the “political” platforms advocated by thinkers such as Stojanović, Tadić, and Marković deal with institutional questions only insofar as institutions such as the Party or the “technocracy” infringe on the free development of a socialist culture adequate to the demands of the new society. No one more than Rudi Supek has articulated so clearly and persistently the need for a vigorous socialist culture. Supek’s concern over the lack of a genuine “struggle of opinions” in the \textit{Pogledi} period and his long-standing demand for self-management in the spheres of cultural production and distribution\textsuperscript{34} formed the basis of his numerous \textit{Praxis} essays on the problem of socialist culture. For him, this has been the central problem of socialism in the post-revolutionary stage. “The goal of socialist culture,” Supek wrote in an early article, “is to make man free.”\textsuperscript{35} This socialist culture is distinguished above all by its critical content, which affirms future possibilities derived from the present as well as representing “a merciless analysis and condemnation of all forms of inhumanity and dehumanization.”\textsuperscript{36} Such an understanding of socialist culture is inconsistent with a notion of “Marxist education” which, in Supek’s words, “in the spirit of the theory of reflection, operates through the mechanism of conditioned reflex, [believing that] it is enough to repeat one thing constantly in order for people to adopt it, without any consideration of the critical relationship of the individual toward reality.”\textsuperscript{37} It encourages instead what we might call, with Tadić, a “negative... ‘pedagogy’”\textsuperscript{38} which cultivates the critical faculty and whose primary goal is to present the “student” with a total view of the world in which he lives. It calls for a science of society which discovers what is rational in human
relations and which shatters ideological myths surrounding relationships of exploitation and power, rather than a science which complacently observes and describes in the blissful state of value-neutrality, absolving itself of all social responsibility.\textsuperscript{39} And perhaps most importantly, it is a call for openness and dialogue in the sphere of culture in the place of bureaucratic rigidity and dogmatism. As Supek urges, “without the freedom of cultural action ... it would be impossible to arrive at a conception of the new socialist culture and the new profile of man.”\textsuperscript{40}

To be sure, this approach to culture is itself thoroughly political in nature, although on a higher plane of politics than the everyday pursuit of political power. While it calls for autonomy in the creation and articulation of cultural values, it understands those values as intimately related to the kind and quality of social life enjoyed by the members of a community. It is this kind of culture which the Enlightenment \textit{philosophes} represented in their time and whose impact, it would seem, has been virtually dissipated by the sheer diversity of mass culture characteristic of postindustrial society. In the countries of Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world, however, where the articulation of alternate cultural symbols and values is heavily regulated by the ruling political elites, the “word” seems to have retained its former political significance. Here, official repression and popular discontent, stirred by the catalyst of intellectual dissidence, have often combined in an explosive compound.

Modern Yugoslavia seems to represent an unstable cross between these two polarities. Appeals for the open “struggle of opinions,” somewhat modified in the mid-1960s by the ideology of the economic reforms encouraging the struggle of opinions in the marketplace, have competed with the periodic reassertion of the hegemony of the ruling political institutions at times of real or perceived social crisis. The relatively open ideological situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1950s, when the freedom of cultural creativity was formally embraced in official theory and to a
limited extent encouraged in practice as well, stimulated the critical intelligentsia to seek new and more daring avenues in which to challenge official symbols. As a consequence, philosophy and social theory became the new battleground in the struggle for cultural hegemony, and the open advocacy of “criticism” gradually acquired a respectability (if not always an acceptability) unparalleled in the other countries of Eastern Europe.

In all this, the journal *Praxis*—it is this study’s main contention—played a vital role, offering the proponents of criticism a concrete sense of their own identity. To some outsiders, especially in the political sphere, the journal became a symbol of intellectual recalcitrance and, even more-threateningly, of political opposition. But it was this same journal, however paradoxically, which also offered the *Praxis* intellectuals a measure of protection as well, for the regime—in its eagerness to present the appearance of encouraging the free discussion of views, particularly those that were undeniably Marxist in character—long displayed a reluctance, at decisive moments, to force Praxis to cease publication altogether or to invoke severe sanctions against its adherents. As we have seen, in the period following the 1974 LCY Tenth Congress this situation changed dramatically, as official Yugoslavia prepared to unify itself for life after Tito. At that time, it seemed that the degree of the *Praxis* Marxists’ future success in continuing their public criticism would be a revealing indication of the path Yugoslavia would follow in the post-Tito era: toward a new strengthening of one-party rule and a partial or total negation of Yugoslavia’s achievements of the past thirty years, or toward further revolutionary social transformation true to the spirit of its previous history of socialist experimentation. With the closing of *Praxis* and the repressive measures against its contributors—these only among the most publicized in a series of acts directed toward consolidation of the regime’s overall control—the shape of Yugoslavia’s future seems somewhat clearer than before.
What of *Praxis*’s impact? In seeking an answer to this question it is first necessary to note that *Praxis*’s immediate audience was rather small: in the court decisions on the 1971 bannings, for instance, both the District and Supreme Court judges seemed somewhat mollified by the fact that the 3-4/1971 issue had been printed in only 3,000 copies and could hardly have been considered a massive assault on Yugoslav public opinion.\(^{41}\)

Not only was *Praxis*’s readership small, it was very select as well, consisting principally of other philosophers and sociologists, a segment of the general university population, and—the bureaucracy. In the words of the District Court’s opinion of August 1971:

> It is obvious that the number of persons who familiarize themselves regularly with the content of this philosophical bimonthly is quite limited. According to the testimony of witness Gajo Petrović, its subscribers are members of the [Croatian] Philosophical Society ..., while it is also received by the highest political representatives, as well as by the libraries of the LCY Central Committee, the Central Committee of the republican Leagues of Communists, and the leadership of the Trade Unions, Youth, and Socialist Alliance [organizations].\(^{42}\)

This court statement, intended to minimize the extent of *Praxis*’s immediate influence, nevertheless contained an important clue to the question of its overall effect on Yugoslav social life. The types of readers mentioned here were not, after all, representative of a broad cross-section of Yugoslav society. Instead, the readers of *Praxis* derived, for the most part, from political, cultural and educational elites responsible either for the making of decisions vital Yugoslavia’s future or, perhaps even more important, for the preparation of its future leaders. The *Praxis* group’s ability to reach beyond these social strata to the general public was impaired not only by restrictions on public appearances\(^{43}\) or blacklists maintained by the mass media, but also by virtue of the high social position which its members oc-
cupied in the most prestigious institutions of learning in the country, the lofty theoretical level of their published works, and the relatively restricted orientation and appeal of their journal. While the universalization of the critical consciousness may have been the *Praxis* Marxists’ ultimate goal, *Praxis* itself may be seen as having had, not necessarily by design, a more modest role in Yugoslav social life: to engage in an unremitting dialogue with the bureaucracy, to wage a practical struggle to legitimize unofficial intra-Party Marxist criticism, and to provide a forum for the open and rational discussion of unorthodox ideas by otherwise “mainstream” thinkers whose initial exposition may not have been welcome within the ranks of the organized institutions of social power. Even one of *Praxis*’s most prominent arch-enemies, Mika Tripalo, was compelled to acknowledge *Praxis*’s success in achieving these objectives when in 1966, at the height of one of the many anti-*Praxis* campaigns, he stated that the “merit of *Praxis* is to have provoked all of us, and perhaps even the League of Communists, to an intensive theoretical discussion on a number of open questions.”

Of this semi-incestuous relationship with the bureaucracy several *Praxis* Marxists seem to have been more or less aware. Danko Grlic, for one, once observed that the bureaucracy—imperfect as it is—does have “pores” through which opinions expressed in critical journals can penetrate, at least until such time as adequate precautions are taken to protect the bureaucracy’s ideological integrity and to shut off the flow of ideas. And Miladin Životić has spoken reproachfully of an “illusion” apparently shared by some of his *Praxis* colleagues that we need merely offer a model of genuine, true socialism to the bearers of bureaucratic resistance to the development of self-management and they would accept that model sooner or later. There were illusions that in this manner of enlightenment, by pointing the way to a genuine socialism, it would be possible to influence the bearers of political bureaucracy.
To 2ivotic and most likely to others as well, the repressive aftermath of the student revolt of 1968, culminating in the drastic anti-Praxis measures of early 1975, must surely have demonstrated that such an illusion, if in fact it was ever openly shared in exactly this form, was indeed hopeless.

For their part, there were times when the Yugoslav rulers seem to have been aware that, as Leszek Kotakowski has observed, “the spiritual domination of any class over the people, far more than its material domination, depends on its bonds with the intelligentsia.” In times of crisis the ruling elites did, in fact, recognize (if only obliquely) the strategic importance of the Praxis intellectuals, as in the wake of the 1971 nationalist outburst in Croatia. There have also been indirect echoes of several Praxis theses in statements of official position and even in far-reaching policies adopted by the government. The anti-statist rhetoric of Praxis has been absorbed by such eminent regime theoreticians as Kardelj and was even utilized, ironically, in defense of the controversial 1970-71 constitutional amendments decentralizing the federation. Similarly, Praxis’s appeal for a thorough application of the principle of workers’ self-management—perhaps its central political prescription of lasting significance—was clearly reflected in the language of the new Yugoslav constitution adopted in early 1974.

To be sure, those ideas which the Yugoslav government did appropriate from the Marxist-humanist intelligentsia were carefully tailored to the needs of the ruling elites, while their original proponents were characteristically denounced all the more vigorously as “anti-socialist” in order to set a healthy distance between the source of those ideas and the final result. Nevertheless there was a constant interplay between the radical Marxists and the bureaucracy, for both were aware (and to a certain extent continue to recognize) that they originally issued from the same political culture and social conditions. This circumstance gave birth to a bizarre symbiotic relationship between the two
major ideological offshoots of the Yugoslav revolution (excluding the Stalinists), each of which seemed dependent on the other for the sake of its own legitimacy. For many years the bureaucracy seemed to have feared that by decisively rejecting the radical Marxist critics, it would do itself irreparable political damage in the eyes of socialist and liberal public opinion not only in Yugoslavia, but in areas well beyond its boundaries; subsequent events seem to have borne this out. The *Praxis* Marxists, in turn, aware of the dangers of reification and institutionalization which belie all radical social movements, had a convenient target for precisely such charges in the bureaucracy. At the very least, the bureaucracy spoke a shared political language with the *Praxis* Marxists and it responded to their criticism in a manner which seems to have proved that the two parties inhabited a shared symbolic universe. The conflict between *Praxis* and the bureaucracy represented, in more general terms, a fundamental clash between two rival political cultures with common roots in the Yugoslav revolutionary experience. And even in the light of all the bitterness and disillusionment caused by the government’s repressive course of action embarked upon in the early 1970s, neither side yet seems willing to take the final step of renouncing their common heritage.

The Zagreb literary critic and *Praxis* sympathizer Milan Miric spoke in the late 1960s of “reservations for thought and action” which, in his view, characterized the cultural-political situation in Yugoslavia. These “reservations” were areas of relatively free activity whose impact was confined by the bureaucracy and the more impersonal forces of the marketplace within fairly well-defined boundaries. For the workers, their “reservation” lay in the domain of a parcellized system of self-management, while the “reservation” of the intelligentsia consisted of journals around which they gather, their books, their professional and protest meetings, their offices and institutes in which they
act; [their] reservation is all which by its true nature should be directed toward the destruction of every constraint and which should revolt before the slightest suggestion of conformity from within, much less the sense of imprisonment which arises as a result of institutional pressure from without.\textsuperscript{50}

Until the demise of \textit{Praxis}, the idea of an invisible “reservation” for the intelligentsia was quite appealing in the amount of light it shed on the situation of the \textit{Praxis} Marxists and on \textit{Praxis} itself as an institution of criticism. The \textit{Praxis} Marxists indeed resided in a separate sphere of social action, aspire as they might have to penetrate to the broader public consciousness. In part their isolation was imposed by the bureaucracy, through repression, public misinformation, and the attempt to portray them as hopelessly abstract theorists whose active intervention in public affairs could only have had disastrous consequences. These tactics seem to have enjoyed a limited degree of success outside of the academic community. Within the university, however—and especially among the students as well as the academic professions—for all its efforts the regime was remarkably unable to tarnish the reputation of the \textit{Praxis} Marxists or to gain widespread acceptance of its final, desperate acts to remove their influence altogether.

What the “reservations” idea did not adequately convey was that the isolation of the \textit{Praxis} Marxists was to a significant degree self-imposed as well. Their principled refusal to lower themselves to the plane of everyday political combat was perhaps most important in this regard, for in addition to matters of principle, the \textit{Praxis} Marxists were keenly aware that to engage in this sort of activity would have exposed them to dangers far more serious than those which they actually encountered. The enterprise that was \textit{Praxis} represented no less than an only half-disguised attempt to institutionalize social criticism by providing for it a secure harbor where it could be protected from precisely the dangers of political institutionalization which its adherents


most feared. Yet perhaps their natural resistance to any suggestion that *Praxis* belonged in the category of “institutions” blinded the *Praxis* Marxists to their main purpose, causing them to mistake tactical issues for matters of principle. Thus the frequently employed institutional self-defense that the assertions contained in *Praxis* were “only” theoretical ultimately took on a reality accepted all too readily by friends and foes of *Praxis* alike, while the larger social mission of *Praxis*’s critical theory came to be obscured by a misconception for which the *Praxis* Marxists themselves bore a significant burden of responsibility.

These travails of the modern radical Marxist intelligentsia in Yugoslavia, when viewed in a larger historical framework, seem but to confirm the tragic fate of all intellectual movements whose quest for justice at some point comes into conflict with their commitment to principle. In the words of Victor Brombert, writing of the French tradition of the “literary hero”:

> For his condemnation of bad faith ... is inextricably bound up with the tragic awareness of his own guilt and complicity. Obsessed by the suffering of others, convinced that man’s salvation lies in solidarity, he is equally convinced of the walled-in nature of human consciousness and paralyzed by his very lucidity. Dreaming of his high social and spiritual mission, he knows his efforts doomed to defeat, yet blames himself for his own futility. Concerned with the regeneration of mankind, driven on by the urge to speak for and with others, he also flirts with catastrophe and yearns for his own destruction. He is in fact the hero, the victim and the buffoon of a tortured era which has experienced politics as tragedy, freedom as necessity, and where history has assumed the urgent voice of a *fatum*.

This existential despair, however, is not characteristic of the *Praxis* Marxists, who remain firmly committed to the positive task of creating the cultural basis for the new society. Well aware of the dangers of bureaucratization inherent in the process of directed social change, they are convinced that only a strong,
critical sense of public awareness will be capable of resisting these trends. So long as this public consciousness is still young and fragile, Marković asserts,

the most important means are truth, bold demystification of existing social relationships, dethronement of deified persons and institutions, and above all a great moral strength.... What is needed in this phase is a critical science: a new revolutionary culture, a powerful democratic public opinion. Above all a new morality is needed—a morality of human dignity, solidarity, stoic persistence [sic—gss], and spiritual superiority which can struggle with a strong material force.52

As the history of the Praxis Marxists suggests, the bearers of such a “new revolutionary culture” may find themselves in a highly vulnerable position by virtue of their isolation and the very scope of their ambitions. They may be perceived popularly, and not, perhaps, without some reason, as cultural elitists who do not feel that the masses by themselves are capable of attaining the moral heights of the new socialist man, while by the political elite they may be suspected of harboring sentiments antithetical to the very basis of the social order. The Praxis Marxists have met this challenge fully conscious of these pitfalls and hopeful that with time the necessity for a critical vanguard will itself be abolished. In the eloquent words of Mihailo Marković:

By working for them [ultimate revolutionary goals—gss], by participating in the creation of a new faith of millions of people, we take an enormous responsibility: there is no certainty that our undertaking will not bring about a considerably different society from the one anticipated, or raise quite new and unsuspected problems, or eventually turn out to be a tragic defeat and the loss of noblest human energy. However, only by taking such a risk can we consciously create possibilities which could never be brought to life by blind economic and social forces.53

“The problem of the intelligentsia in socialism,” writes Ljubomir Tadić,
is part of the more general problem of the tasks unaccomplished by the socialist revolution. It is a question, primarily of socialist praxis that has not succeeded in facing up to political alienation. The return of the legitimacy of negative reason... constitutes one of the essential elements of the socialist renaissance.\textsuperscript{54}

The question of intellectual responsibility, then, dissolves into the much more far-reaching question of the responsibility of a society to its own ideals. And to this question not even the \textit{Praxis} Marxists have found a ready answer.
NOTES

Introduction


6. Ibid., pp. 53-54.


I. The Genealogy of Praxis


3. Hoffman and Neal, p. 140.


8. For the text of the 1958 Program, see *The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists Adopted by the VII Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists held from 22 to 26 April, 1958 in Ljubljana* (Belgrade, 1958). For documentation of the controversies in the international communist movement generated by the 1958 Program, see *The Second Soviet-
PRAXIS


9. See, for instance, Stojanović, Between Ideals and Reality, p. 50.


11. Svetozar Stojanović writes of the early critique: “While I am rather indebted to this tradition ... it was precisely its difficulties which above all prompted me to follow the argument to its logical conclusion—to my position on statist society” (Stojanović, p. 40).

12. Djilas, “Lenjin ... c i t e d in Hoffman and Neal, p. 150.


14. While this term was often used interchangeably with “imperialism,” “hegemonism” was reserved for relations between socialist states, while “imperialism” was seen as an attribute of the foreign policy of bourgeois states.


16. Much of what follows is based on Johnson, pp. 155-190.


18. See Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (New York, 1965), pp. 248-252. While Johnson (pp. 180-190, 382-383) insists that Trotsky, Kollontai, and Rakovsky were unknown to the Yugoslav ideologists and political leaders, his claim must be treated with at least a degree of skepticism. It is difficult to believe that the Yugoslavs innocently steered clear of these figures during their painful period of reexamination, especially considering the very close parallels of the critiques of Kardelj and Djilas with that of Trotsky in one of the latter’s most famous works.


22. See Johnson, pp. 317-352.


26. See below, Chapter IV.


33. In his Report to the CPY Fifth Congress in 1948 as Secretary for Agitation and Propaganda of the Party’s Central Committee, Milovan Djilas did not hesitate to refer to Stalin’s *Short Course* as a “classic of Marxism-Leninism.” In the same Report, Djilas warned those who sought to detract from Soviet Marxism, on the grounds that it was no longer relevant to Yugoslavia in light of the Cominform break, that dialectical materialism remained every bit as relevant as it was before (Milovan Djilas, *Izvestaj o agitacionopropagandnom radu Centralnog komiteta Komunistiche partije Jugoslavije: Referat na V kongresu KPJ* [Belgrade, 1948], pp. 7, 31-32). For a useful summary of the nature of Yugoslav philosophy in the early postwar period, see Svetozar Stojanović, “Contemporary Yugoslavian Philosophy,” *Ethics*, vol. LXXVI, no. 4 (July 1966), pp. 297-301.

34. From a personal discussion with Mihailo Marković, 21 September 1972, Belgrade.


36. From a personal discussion with Gajo Petrović, 30 August 1972, Korcula.

37. Mihailo Marković, *Revizija filozovskih osnova marksizma u Sov-

40. Ibid., p. 44.
43. Petrović, *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, p. 19. The last assertion, one hastens to add, remains to be proven.
45. The above information is from Rudi Supek, “Policija, birokracija i struktura Staljinizma: Uz knjigu Artura Londona *Priznanje*,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1969, p. 508m
47. Rudi Supek, “Zasto kod nas nema borbe misljenja?” *Pogledi*, no. 12, 1953, pp. 9-3-9! •
48. According to Abraham Rothberg’s introduction to *Anatomy of a
Moral, p. xii. (For further discussion of the Djilas affair, see Hoffman and Neal, pp. 186-196.) It might be noted that one of the dissident philosophers discussed above, Mihailo Marković, was a member of the *Nova misao* circle. In 1953 he published an article in *Nova misao* criticizing the traditional Marxist theory of determinism and especially its application to natural science, leading to a heated polemic with a prominent orthodox theorist, Dragisa Ivanovic, a physicist by training. See Mihailo Marković, “Teorija verovatnoce i problem determinizma u savremenoj nauki,” *Nova misao*, no. 6, 1953, pp. 818-835.

49. From a personal conversation with Rudi Supek, 22 November 1974, Zagreb.

50. Rudi Supek, “Kultura i socijalisticko samoupravljanje,” *Pogledi*, no. 3, 1954, p. 267. In this article, in addition to replying to his critics, Supek fully developed the theme of expanding self-management to the previously exempted sphere of culture, a demand that had been implicit in the *Pogledi* venture from the very beginning.

51. Kermauner, p. 82.


54. In addition to the work of Ziherl, the following two works were the most important of this genre in the 1950s: Ilija Kosanovic, *Dijalekticki materijalizam* (Sarajevo, 1956), and Ilija Kosanovic, *Istorijski materijalizam* (Sarajevo, 1957). The content of these books showed little more imagination than their titles, except for the fact that they attempted eclectically to integrate into the body of dogma the authoritatively pronounced Yugoslav state doctrine of many paths to socialism while halfheartedly rehashing the more innocuous aspects of the critique of Soviet bureaucratism.

55. Hoffman and Neal, pp. 184-203.

56. For documentation see *The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, passim.
58. The text of the latter discussion was published in *Nase teme*, no. 1, i960, pp. 63-127.
59. The proceedings of the Bled conference are contained in *Neki problemi teorije odraza: Referati i diskusija na IV strucnom sastanku udruienja* (Belgrade, n.d.). Papers were delivered by Marković, Petrović, Kangrga, Stojanović, Milan Damnjanovic, Andrija Stojkovic, Dragan Jeremic, and Veljko Ribar, while Vuko Pavicevic, Dusan Nedeljkovic, Dragoljub Micunovic, Ljubomir 2ivkovic, Branko Bosnjak, Bogdan Sesic, Bozidar Debenjak, Ivan Focht, Danko Grlic, and Rudi Supek were present as discussants.
60. While this description may seem overly colorful or even irrelevant, it is neither. Even a dispassionate reading of the conference’s proceedings will reveal that the conduct of the discussion was almost as significant as its content. At one point, one “diamat” faithful (Debenjak) was forced by the moderator to apologize for his unprofessional conduct, while one of the foremost and oldest defenders of “diamat” in Yugoslavia (Nedeljkovic) had no argument to bring against the “innovators” other than that what they said constituted a violation of professional canons, without even once specifying what those canons were or attempting to come to grips with their remarks (*Neki problemi teorije odraza*, pp. 101-102).
61. This thesis was explicitly affirmed by Stojkovic, in *Neki problemi teorije odraza*, pp. 45 and ff.; and by Ribar, ibid., pp. 69-70. It is basic to the theory of reflection in general.
64. *Neki problemi teorije odraza*, p. 114.
66. Even those who tried to modify and retain the theory of reflection had no response to Petrović’s argument that a “modified” reflection theory allowing for human creativity can no longer legitimately be called a theory of reflection at all and is simply a confused and eclectic patchwork (see Gajo Petrović, in *Neki problemi teorije odraza*, pp. 27-32;
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this seminal essay was later published in English translation in Petrović, *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, pp. 190-198).


Lest the impression be conveyed that with the Bled conference the *Praxis* Marxists ceased their polemic with their dogmatist opponents, the reader is referred to two illustrations that even over a decade after Bled the rivalry was still quite lively—indeed, as *Praxis* fell into increasing disfavor toward the end of its life, the old polemics acquired a new vigor. In 1973 the *Praxis* Editorial Board attacked Stojkovic for his vulgar attempts at popularization, which *Praxis* contended (by quoting extracts from Stojkovic’s recent works) were infused throughout with Serbian nationalistic overtones (see “Mala enciklopedija ‘dijalekticko-materijalistickog’ nacionalizma,” *Praxis* [YE], no. 5-6, 1973, pp. 759-762). This attack on Stojkovic was particularly felicitous, since by this time *Praxis* had become a target of suspicion in some quarters because of its role in opposing the Croatian nationalist movement (see below, Chapter V). Also see Gajo Petrović’s polemical reply to Boris Ziherl’s equally polemical attack on him in early 1974: “Otvoreno pismo drugu Ziherlu,” *Praxis* [YE], no. 1-2, 1974, pp. 205-211. Ziherl’s article can be found in *Borba*, 27 January 1974.

71. From an interview with another former member of the Perspektive Editorial Board, Stefan Udovic; Korcula, 11 August 1970. Perspektive, it might be noted, was hindered somewhat by the linguistic and cultural isolation of Slovenia from the rest of the country. Still, its fate did not bode well for the “innovators.”

72. Under Yugoslav law, journals were required to submit for approval a statement of purpose to the respective republican government before the start of publication. Such requests for journals which lacked officially recognized sponsorship by established social or professional organizations were more closely scrutinized.

73. The two collections were *Humanizam i socijalizam*, ed. Branko Bosnjak and Rudi Supek (Zagreb, 1963), 2 vols.; and *Crvek danas*, ed. Milos Stambolic (Belgrade, 1964). Documents from two of the conferences (Belgrade-Arandjelovac, December 1963; and Novi Sad, June 1964) are contained in *Marks i savremenost: Povodom 145-godisnjice rodjenja i 80-godisnjice smrti Karla Marksa* (Belgrade, 1964), vols. I and II. The third conference was held in the autumn of 1964 in Vrnjacka Banja and is discussed briefly below.


76. In 1965, R. V. Burks erroneously referred to Stojanović as an “official gloss” on the Party position: see his “Yugoslavia: Has Tito Gone Bourgeois?” *East Europe*, vol. 14, no. 8 (August 1965), p. 12. The following discussion will presumably help to dispel this misapprehension.

77. For proceedings of this symposium, see *Marks i savremenost*, vol. II.


79. In “Diskusija o politici i politickoj nauci,” in ibid., pp. 135, 137. Gajo Petrović’s decimation of Vlahovic’s critical remarks on the theory
of alienation at the same gathering apparently did litde to assuage Vlahovic: see Veljko Vlahovic, “Neka zapazanja u tretiranju otudjenja,” in ibid., pp. 471-479; and “Diskusija o problemima filozofije u socijalizmu,” in ibid., pp. 563-569.

80. Even before the June Novi Sad conference, Stojanović had received admonitions which a friend summarized in the following words: “Leave these vulgar themes alone and mind your own business” (see Vukasin Stambolic’s comments in the discussion on politics, in Marks i savremenost, vol. II, p. 144).


87. It is also pertinent to take note of the appearance at the same time of the journal Gledista in Belgrade under the stewardship of Svetozar Stojanović. Gledista was from the very beginning more explicitly oriented toward concrete social issues than Praxis. Perhaps for this very reason, however, its contributors tended to issue from more diverse theoretical backgrounds than the Praxis group, and consequently the journal began to lose a distinct sense of direction. In 1967, Stojanović, who had also been collaborating extensively with Praxis, relinquished the editorship of Gledista.


91. “A quoi bon Praxis?”, p. 3.
93. Ibid., p. 4.
94. In this respect as in many others, there are some close affinities between the Praxis Marxists and the celebrated Soviet dissident historian, Roy Medvedev. The latter’s On Socialist Democracy (trans. Ellen de Kadt [New York, 1975]) presents persuasive arguments on behalf of the development of intraparty democracy and criticism, freedom of press, speech, and association, and even the institutionalization of political opposition. Yet on close reading it is evident that Medvedev advocates these liberties not out of any affection for “bourgeois” democratic forms per se, but on the basis of a conviction that open discussion of all political issues holds the only hope for a reinvigoration and strengthening of the Party itself.
95. From a speech delivered by Mika Tripalo at a City Conference of the Zagreb Branch of the League of Communists of Croatia held on 10 June 1965 as reported in Vjesnik, 11 June 1965: see Miodrag Protic, “Povodom izjave o Praxisu” (text of a newspaper article appearing in Politika, 1 February 1968), Praxis (YE), no. 1-2, 1968, p. 220.
96. In 1969 Praxis launched its “Pocket Edition,” which was actually a series of books, almost all by individual Praxis authors, published in the guise of a separate edition of the journal. Evidently this step was prompted by the increasing difficulty that many Praxis contributors were encountering in publishing their works through regular publishing houses; the Praxis editors responded by establishing their own extraordinary in-house organ. The following works were released in the Praxis Pocket Edition:

No. 1: Branko Bosnjak and Mijo Skvorce, Marksist i krscanin (Zagreb, 1969)
No. 4-z: Ivan Kuvacic, Obilje i nasilje (Zagreb, 1970)
No. 6: Milan Kangrka, fuzarlosljenja o etici (Zagreb, 1970)
No. 7-8: Milan Damnjanovic, Estetika i razocaranje (Zagreb, 1971)
No. 9: Danko Grlic, Contra Dogmaticos (Zagreb, 1971)
No. 10-11: Gajo Petrović, *Ceml Praxis* (Zagreb, 1971)


97. Maguire, p. 43.


99. In 1967 Ivan Kuvacic was added to the Editorial Board, and in 1973 Veljko Cvjeticanin and Zarko Puhovski were also elected.

100. “A quoi bon *Praxis*?”, p. 5.

101. Ibid., p. 6. In 1969 it was decided to add the most important Belgrade associates of *Praxis* to the Editorial Board of the International Edition, in the words of the Editorial Board’s announcement, for the sake of “a better division of labor.” The new editorial structure of the International Edition was occasioned by a proposal that *Filosofija*, edited in Belgrade by Tadić and Životić and until 1969 the official journal of the Yugoslav Philosophical Association, publish its own international edition. By agreement with the *Praxis* editorship, however, *Filosofija*—which shared in great degree the same orientation and even writers engaged in *Praxis*—withdrew this proposal and the *Praxis* International Edition itself was designated the Association’s official journal. In view of this compromise with *Filosofija*, it was decided that the *Praxis* International Edition should reflect roughly equal roles of the Zagreb and Belgrade components; each group would be responsible for preparing two issues of the International Edition (which was a quarterly journal) a year. Officially, then, the *Praxis* International Edition now had two cosponsors in the Association and the Croatian Philosophical Society. In the years after 1971 the Association, later renamed the League of Philosophical Societies of Yugoslavia, itself became the scene of attempts to undermine *Praxis*. See Gajo Petrović, “O medjunarodnom izdanju *Praxis* (1970-1973),” *Praxis* (YE), no. 5-6, 1973, pp. 745-757.


103. Major papers and excerpts from discussions of Korcula Summer Schools were published in both editions of *Praxis*, usually in the first issue of the year following the given session. Themes of the annual sessions were:

1963: Progress and Culture
1964: The Meaning and Perspectives of Socialism
1965: What is History?
1966: (School Cancelled)
1967: Creativity and Reification
ig68: Marx and Revolution
ig69: Power and Humanity
1970: Hegel and Our Times; Lenin and the New Left
1971: Utopia and Reality
1972: Equality and Freedom
tg73: The Bourgeois World and Socialism

Periodically, the Editorial Board of Praxis itself organized discussions on topical questions in Zagreb, in addition to the annual December symposia of the Croatian Philosophical Society.


II. The Critique of Marxism as Ideology

1. Marx, Early Writings, pp. 43-44.
3. Marx, Early Writings, p. 52.
10. Ibid., pp. 14, 27, 19.

11. Gramsci and Lenin, too, sooner or later recognized the importance of Hegel’s influence on Marx. In his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci called the “philosophy of praxis” a “reform and a development of Hegelianism”; while in his celebrated statement from the *Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin asserted that “one cannot fully understand Marx’s *Capital* and especially its first chapter if one does not study and understand the *whole* of Hegel’s ‘Logic.’ Accordingly, not a single Marxist has understood Marx for the past half-century!!” See Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, 1971), p. 404; and V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1958), vol. 38, p. 171.


13. In his famous *Subjekt-Objekt* (1949), Bloch even went so far as to claim, in a strongly Hegelian vein, that in a theory of praxis “the subject must possess superiority within the historical-dialectical subject-object relation”; otherwise, he argued, “there would be no measure precisely for externalization, for alienation in objectivity, and there would be no active contradiction of the subjective factor which in this measure could destroy inadequate objectivity in alliance with the contradictions within it” (cited by Dusan Stosic in “Citajud Blocha,” *Praxis* [YE], no. 3, 1966, p. 378).

14. The impact of Heidegger in Petrović’s work is most clearly evident in his seminal inquiry into the concept of praxis, “Praxis and Being” (in *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, pp. 171-189). His concern with analytic philosophy is reflected in his studies of British philosophy (*Od Lockea do Ayera* and *Engleska empiristička filozofija*), while his major essay on the theory of reflection (also in *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, pp. 199-198) bears a strong imprint of the analytic method, although its argument differs in several respects from both traditional and modern schools of British philosophy. See also Petrović, *Filozofski pogledi G. V. Plehanova*.


17. In this connection, one of the most interesting contrasts is to be found in the way in which different *Praxis* Marxists approach the problem of positive science. Marković, with his proclivities toward the study of logic and the philosophy of science, is inclined to accept, within
certain limits, the validity of scientific laws based on empirical generalizations about the existing world, always keeping in mind the inability of positivism to free itself of its own philosophical assumptions and its basically conservative nature. Within these bounds, however, Marković does feel that science can at least inform man of the likely consequences of given actions and offer to him alternative courses of action among which only the human individual or collectivity is able to choose (see “Diskusija o politici i politickoj nauci,” in Marks i savremenost, vol. II, pp. 202-204). Marković has also attempted to demonstrate the possibility of modifying the notion of causal determination by tempering it with probability theory (see his 1953 article, “Teorija verovatnoce”; and Mihailo Marković, “Uslovljavanje, uzrocnost i determinantizam,” in Marks i savremenost, vol. III, especially p. 415) and the ideas of “uni-determinism” and “multi-determinism” (see Marković, Humanizam i dijalektika, pp. 24, 101, 153). (For a profoundly informed analysis of similar attempts in the USSR to redefine causality in light of recent scientific advances, see Loren R. Graham, Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union [New York, 1972], pp. 89-91, 98-99, 109-110.)

Kangrga, on the other hand, is generally much more suspicious of positive science as such, stressing what he claims to be this kind of science’s exclusive orientation to the world as a given, fixed entity and its consequent inability to perceive conditions of alienation and reification (see, for instance, Milan Kangrga, “Sto je postvarenje?” Praxis [YE], no. 5-6, 1967, p. 591). Other Praxis philosophers are even more adamant on this point, such as Korac, who has drawn a seemingly irreconcilable opposition between humanism in general—and the humanist dialectic in particular—and the idea of analytical reason (see Veljko Korac, “Fenomen zvani ‘Teorijski antihumanizam,’ ” Filosofija, no. 1-2, 1968, p. 106). As noted in the text, however, these differences are well overshadowed by the common commitment of all these philosophers to a critical, humanist, antidogmatic, and nonexclusive theory of praxis.

21. This argument can be found, for example, in Istvan Meszaros, Marx’s Theory of Alienation (London, 1970), pp. 217-253; Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (Cambridge, 1969); and Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd rev. ed. (Cam-
bridge, 1972), pp. 165-176. In Tucker’s work, however, the argument is somewhat weakened insofar as he suggests that “the alienated self-relation ... transformed ... into an alienated social relation” (p. 176) represents a perversion of the substance of the philosophy set forth in the 1844 manuscripts.

22. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 32.

23. See Louis Althusser, For Marx (New York, 1969), pp. 49-86. For a Soviet philosopher’s discussion of this issue, see L. N. Pazhitnov, U istokov revoliutsionnogo perevorota (Moscow, ig6o).


26. Marx, Early Writings, p. 133.

27. Ibid., pp. 127-128, 122-123, 125. In these and subsequent passages from Marx, all emphases are in the original.

28. Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 107-108. In general, the clearest exposition of Marx’s concept of praxis of which I am aware is to be found in Avineri, pp. i24ff.

29. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, pp. goff.; Marx, Early Writings, p. 125.

30. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 78.

31. Marković, Humanism i dijalektika, pp. 130-133; Marković, From Affluence to Praxis, p. 64.


35. See Petrović’s argument in Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, pp. 86f.

36. Karl Marks i Fridrih Engels, Sveta porodica (The Holy Family) (Belgrade, 1964), p. 3; Marx, Early Writings, p. 53.

37. It is tempting in this connection to speak of a theory of “human nature,” and indeed it is possible to find passages where Marx explicitly refers to such a concept with approval. As Vranicki points out (Predrag Vranicki, “Marginalije uz problem humanizma,” Humanism i socijalizam, vol. I, p. 292), in the 1844 manuscripts Marx speaks of communism as the “real appropriation of human nature through and for man” (Marx, Early Writings, p. 155), while in Volume III of Capital Marx
speaks of freedom in communism as the achievement of rational common control over human interchange with nature attained “under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature” (p. 820). In addition there is the famous footnote in Volume I of *Capital* where Marx complains that in elaborating his notion of utility, Bentham failed to consider its relationship with human nature (p. 609). On the other hand, Kangrga persuasively argues, in the vein of Marx’s Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, against all “essentialist” doctrines of human nature in the Marxian context on the grounds that such doctrines are insensitive to the historical dimension of man’s world and his existence (Milan Kangrga, “Smisao Marxove filozofije,” *Praxis* [YE], no. 3, 1967, pp. 292, 298-299). In the middle ground we find yet a third position occupied by Pesic, who puts forward the thesis that both a “general human nature” and a “historically modified human nature” are present in Marxism (Zagorka Pesic-Golubovic, “What is the Meaning of Alienation?” *Praxis* [IE], no. 3, 1966, p. 358). While Kangrga is perhaps too adamant in his broad assertion that there can be no Marxian philosophical anthropology (Kangrga, “Smisao Marxove filozofije,” p. 299)—a claim seemingly analogous in motivation to the Hebrew prohibition on articulating the name of God, since to define a thing is in a sense to negate it—his rejection of ahistorical schema of human nature is nevertheless well taken. Yet even Kangrga does seem to imply that there is a general structure or mode of human existence—the mode of praxis. It should be noted, moreover, that when Marx speaks of communism as the “appropriation of human nature,” for instance, he may be taken to mean “human nature” in the dynamic sense of “humanized nature,” i.e., nature transformed by man but not yet necessarily recognized or utilized by man as his own.

38. In the following exposition I am conscious of making a potentially misleading distinction between the “man-nature” and “man-man” relationships. With regard to the former pairing, which I see as the possible source of confusion, I should reassert that the category of “nature” can include human nature as well. In this way praxis can be sensibly understood as the changing of both nature and man.


44. Jean Starobinski makes a similar point with respect to Rousseau, in his J.-J. Rousseau: Le transparence et Vobstacle (Paris, 1971), pp. 346ff. and passim. A comparison between the views of Rousseau and Marx on nature and labor is of more than passing interest, since Rousseau seems to have played an important role (if secondary to that of German philosophy) in Marx’s intellectual development, and there is much to be learned from a parallel analysis of the two. For such an analysis, see Meszaros, pp. 49-61, 105-107.


46. Marx, Early Writings, p. 208. For an especially clear and useful summary of this argument, see Petrović, “Histoire et nature,” passim.


48. The following line of argument is suggested by Marković, Humanizam i dijalektika, pp. 142-143. See also Tucker, Philosophy and Myth, pp. 129-132.

49. Marx, Early Writings, p. 157.


58. Milan Kangrga, “O utopijskom karakteru povijesnoga; ili, Kako to stoji s utopijom?” Praxis (YE), no. 5-6, 1969, pp. 799-810. See also Milan Kangrga, “Zbilja i utopija,” Praxis (YE), no. 1-2, 1972, pp. 9-35. Kangrga hesitates even to draw the line indicated by Bloch between the “utopian” and the “utopistic”—the latter consisting of the abstract fabrication of abstract realities bearing no relation to historical conditions
and having no actual referents. To make even this distinction, Kangrga claims, is to violate the very “historical character of the utopian” (ibid., pp. 17, 12); in other words, insofar as man is the history-making being, he creates those very “objective conditions” to the absence of which the critics of the utopistic might appeal.


60. Danko Grlic, “Kreacija i akcija,” Praxis (YE), no. 5-6, 1967, pp. 569. 573-574- Grlic’s fascination with Nietzsche is by no means restricted to this piece; indeed he may be said to have a minor obsession with Nietzsche. See his Ko je Nice? (Belgrade, 1969).


64. Grlic, “Practice and Dogma,” p. 52.


66. Marx, Early Writings, pp. 158-159. On the “concrete universal” as a methodological concept in Marx’s thought, see Schaff, pp. 6off.

67. Supek, Sociologija i socijalizam, pp. 95-96.


69. Supek, Sociologija i socijalizam, pp. 96-7.

70. Ibid., p. 96.

71. Marx, Early Writings, p. 158.


75. For such an argument, see the paper presented to the 1964 Korcula Summer School by the Czech philosopher Karel Kosi’k, “Dijalektika morala i moral dijalektike,” in Smisao i perspektive socijalizma, especially p. 296.

78. Lukacs, p. 246m
81. Engels, *The Dialectics of Nature*, p. 172. Similarly, in *Anti-Dühring* (pp. 45-6), Engels argues that all science arose as a consequence of human needs.
83. With the possible exception of Kangrga, who at the 1960 Bled conference on the theory of reflection decried what he described as Engels’ return to an eclectic mixture of eighteenth-century mechanism and classical idealism. Kangrga asserted that “the dialectic is not self-movement ... but the self-activity of historical man” (here in substantive agreement with Marković) and furthermore that any materialism that forgets this is no more than an “animal materialism” (Milan Kangrga, “O nekim bitnim pitanjima teorije odraza,” in *Neki problemi teorije odraza*, pp. 40-41).
85. Ibid., pp. 259-60.
87. “If man derives all his knowledge and emotions from the sensual world and his experiences in it, then the empirical world must be arranged so that he can experience it and appropriate in it that which is truly human, so that he can experience himself as man” (Marx and Engels, *Sveta porodica*, p. 161).
90. V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (New York, 1927), especially pp. 94-142; quotations are from pp. 110, 106. In fairness to Engels, it might be pointed out that it is not quite clear whether he really did hold to a strict reflection theory of the type which Lenin ascribed to him. In *Anti-Dühring* Engels described ideology as “an image which is distorted because it has been torn from its real basis and, like a reflection in a concave mirror, is standing on its head” (p. 107). Even socialism, apparently, was not for Engels an exact image of reality reproduced in the minds of its adherents, but rather the “ideal reflection” of
the conflict between the productive forces and the mode of production “in the minds of the class which is directly suffering under it—the working class” (ibid., p. 293; emphasis inserted). In some of Engels’ later works, such as “Ludwig Feuerbach” and “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific,” there may in fact be grounds for maintaining that Engels did embrace a more mechanistic theory of reflection.

91. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, p. 363.

92. “Diskusija,” in Neki problemi teorije odraza. Kangrga evidently was referring to Marx’s polemic with the hypothetical doubter who insisted upon a satisfactory solution to the riddle of the Prime Mover in order to substantiate the thesis of the independent existence of man. Marx’s reply was that the “question is itself a product of abstraction.... Ask yourself whether your question does not arise from a point of view to which I cannot reply because it is a perverted one.... If you ask a question about the creation of nature and man you abstract from nature and man. You suppose them non-existent and you want me to demonstrate that they exist. I reply: give up your abstraction and at the same time you abandon your question” (Marx, Early Writings, p. 166).

93. See Lenin, What Is To Be Done?, pp. 67-76 and passim.

g4. Quoted in Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 29. For Petrović’s argument that Lenin actually rejected the theory of reflection in his later philosophical work, see ibid., pp. 13, 25-26, 191.


97. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 64.

98. Gajo Petrović, "Humanizam i revolucija,” Praxis (YE), no. 4, 1970, p. 635; Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, pp. 23, 90-114.' See Stalin, “Dialectical and Historical Materialism,” pp. 415-416. It might seem strange that the Stalin of the 1930s, who is often described in such vivid terms as a “voluntarist” and a person who constantly made decisions which dangerously overreached the capabilities of the Soviet system (see especially Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism [New York, 1973], pp. 71-109) should have adhered to a philosophical system in which man is inextricably bound to inexorable laws of social development. Životić attempts to explain this anomaly by pointing to the pragmatic and self-justifying nature of the Stalinist dialectic, which applied the category of necessity to itself only a posteriori: “the voluntarism of [charismatic] rule ... cloaks itself in objec-
ativism: all that happens takes place according to a law of necessity” (Životić, “Socijalisticki humanizam i jugoslovenska filozofija,” p. 117). Z. A. Jordan similarly argues that in dialectical materialism, voluntarism in practice and idealism in theory are mutually reinforcing elements (see Z. A. Jordan, The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism [New York, 1967], pp. i4ff.). A sociological explanation—that is, just by the time of the appearance of Stalin’s “Dialectical and Historical Materialism” Soviet society had entered into its posttransformational stage—is also helpful in accounting for this apparent discrepancy.

99. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 59.

too. Supek, Sociologija i socijalizam, pp. 38-43.

101. This shortcoming was discussed by Mihailo Marković as early as 1951 in his Revizija, pp. 54-60. See also Zagorka Pesic, “Diskusija o problemu negacije negacije,” Filozofski pregled, no. 2, 1953, pp. 24-33; Životić, “The Dialectics of Nature,” pp. 261-2; and Rudi Supek, “Dialectique de la pratique sociale,” Praxis (IE), no. 1, 1965, p. 60. Gustav A. Wetter in his Dialectical Materialism also notes that the principle of negation of negation fell out of favor in about 1938 and remained in obscurity until Stalin’s death. In the late 1950s it seemed to be making an uncertain comeback in certain Soviet philosophical circles (see Gustav A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism [New York, 1953], pp. 355-362). In the authoritative Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism written by O. Kuusinen et al. (Moscow, 1961), the negation of negation is only to be found in partially concealed form under the heading, “Dialectical Development from the Lower to the Higher” and not discussed at any length at all (pp. 101-102). It should also be noted that at least in this modern Bible of Soviet philosophy, the fundamental theses of Stalinist “diamat” about the character of matter, nature, and the dialectic are preserved almost in their entirety (see ibid., pp. 22-141).

102. Supek, Sociologija i socijalizam, p. 34.

eminences grises of Soviet philosophy, complains of “philosophical re­
visionism” that in discussing “praxis,” too much attention is devoted to
“the internal world of man,” and that “it does not connect man with
nature but instead presents him as something self-sufficient, primary,
in relation to theoretical activity and the external world. Further. Prac­
tice loses its concrete-historical form” (ibid., p. 333). In this way, he
claims, philosophical anthropology reverts to “bourgeois individualism”
(idem). For comments in the same vein by a Polish “diamat” adherent,
see Sewerin Zurawicki, “‘Stvaralacki’ marksizam ili ljevicarski
‘radikalizam’?: Na marginama zagrebackog casopisa Praxis," Praxis
(YE), no. 1, 1971, p. 151 (this article originally appeared in Studia
Filozoficzne, no. 6, 1970, pp. 103-118, as “‘Tworczy’ marksizm czy
lewacki ‘radykalizm’”).

104. Ivanova, p. 873.
106. Predrag Vranicki, “Glavni pravci marksistickie filozofije u XX
stoljecu,” Praxis (YE), no. 3-4, 1972, p. 324.
107. Marx, Early Writings, p. 51.
108. Schaff nicely points up this tension in Marx’s thought about
philosophy in Marxism and the Human Individual, pp. 116-117.
110. Marx, Early Writings, p. 44.
112. Marx, Early Writings, p. 200.
113. Ibid., p. 50.
114. Rudi Supek, in the discussion held by the Editorial Board of
the Belgrade journal Gledista, “La philosophic dans la societe contem­
poraine,” Praxis (IE), no. 4, 1967, p. 494; Marković, Humanizam i dijalek­
tika, p. 13; Gajo Petrović, “Philosophy and Socialism,” Praxis (IE), no. 4,
1967, p. 545; emphases in the original.
115. Marković, Humanizam i dijalektika, pp. 11, 12.
116. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 164; Gajo Petrović,
“Philosophic et revolution: Vingt faisceaux de questions,” Praxis
(IE), no. 1-2, 1969, pp. 95-96 (emphases in the original).
117. “Socialism,” wrote Marx, “. . . begins from the theoretical and
practical sense perception of man and nature as essential beings” (Early
Writings, p. 167). On these grounds it would seem that Petrović would
find himself in disagreement with Avineri’s thoughts on Marx as a
philosopher, for the latter sees Marx’s philosophical activity merely as a
prelude to praxis—but not as a mode of praxis itself:

“The dialectical crux of the matter is that the abolition of philosophy presupposes a prior development of a philosophy that will be sophisticated enough to comprehend reality adequately... Before Marx could move into praxis he had to perfect philosophy—only in order to transcend it” (Avineri, pp. 136-137).

118. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, pp. 20, 196.
119. Ibid., pp. 2of.
120. See Marx, Early Writings, p. 159. The following argument is made in more elaborate form in Kangrga, “Praxis et critique,” passim.
121. Marx, Early Writings, p. 54.
122. See Marković, Humanizam i dijalektika, p. 30.
125. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 330-331. The role of philosophy as criticism is also emphasized by the French Marxist Henri Lefebvre (The Sociology of Marx [New York, 1968], p. 6) with regard to the transcendence of philosophy:

“The speculative, systematic, abstract aspects of philosophy are rejected. But philosophy does not just vanish as if it had never been. It leaves behind it the spirit of radical criticism, dialectical thought which grasps the ephemeral side of existence, dissolves and destroys it—the power of the negative... it opens up the possibility of a full flowering of human potentialities—reconciliation of the real and the rational, of spontaneity and thought, and the appropriation of human and extra-human nature.”

In his treatise on Marxist humanism, Leszek Kofakowski has the same conception of philosophy in mind when he writes that philosophy
“is the eternal effort to question all that is obvious, and thus the continual disavowal of existing relations” (Leszek Kofakovski, Toward a Marxist Humanism [New York, 1968], p. 20).

126. Petrović, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century, p. 166.
129. Lefebvre, p. 4.

III. The Crisis of Politics: Political Alienation and Stalinism

4. Ibid., p. 355.
5. Levi (op. cit., pp. 14-15) speaks in terms of a tension between “power divorced from value” and “power grounded in value,” and observes that “the very form in which ‘politics’ is to be defined is itself a ‘humanistic’ problem” (p. 15).
8. Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, p. 64.
9. Marx, Early Writings, p. 58.
10. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 157-158; see also pp. 163-164. It is of interest that Marx speaks here specifically of a “division of social labour,” rather than of a social division of labor, emphasizing once again the inherently social nature of the productive process.
17. Marx, *Grundrisse,* p. 84.
20. For a similar argument, see Marković, *From Affluence to Praxis,* p. 229.
24. As in the seminal work of one of the chief spokesmen of modern American political science, Robert Dahl. In his *Modern Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), Dahl states clearly: “Political analysis deals with power, rule, or authority. Economics concerns itself with scarce resources or the production and distribution of goods and services. ... It has proved intellectually fruitful to distinguish some aspects of life as ‘economic’ and other aspects as ‘political’ ” (hence, Dahl argues, an economic system cannot be described as either “democratic” or “dictatorial”) (p. 7).
27. Ibid., p. 68.
29. Ibid., p. 76.
30. Ibid., pp. 261-262. The last phrase is borrowed from Lukacs’s essay on the party in *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 318.
33. Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung,* p. 619; see Tadić, *Poredak i sloboda,* p. 29m.
40. Stojanović, *Between Ideas and Reality*, pp. 9-12; passage quoted here is from pp. 10-11.
43. Predrag Vranicki, “Socialism and the Problem of Alienation,” in Erich Fromm, ed., *Socialist Humanism* (Garden City, 1965), pp. 305-306 (this essay was also printed in *Praxis* [IE], no. 2-3, 1965, pp. 307-318); Predrag Vranicki, “Moral i historija,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 6, 1971, p. 923; Mihaly Vajda, “Otudjenje i socijalizam: Diskusije Madjarskih marksista,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 5-6, 1967, p. 82g; emphasis in the original. The debate about the applicability of the concept of alienation to non-capitalist societies is by no means confined to theorists from the “socialist” countries of Eastern Europe. Isaac D. Balbus makes an argument similar to that of the *Praxis* Marxists in a polemical reply to the West German Marxists Haupt and Liebfried, in his “The Negation of Negation: Theory of Capitalism Within an Historical Theory of Social Change,” *Politics and Society*, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1972), pp. 61-62. See also
Ernst Mandel, *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx* (New York, 1971), pp. i37ff-
44. Meszaros, pp. 245, 246-248.
46. See Stojanović, *Between Ideals and Reality*, p. 78; Tadić, *Poredak i sloboda*, especially pp. 133-134-
47. Predrag Vranicki, in “Diskusija o politici i politickoj nauci,” in *Marks i saurenemost*, vol. II, p. 155; and Ljubomir Tadić, in ibid., p. 171.
49. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
50. Ibid., pp. i78ff., and especially pp. 186-195; Marković, “Socialism and Self-Management,” p. 179. In a later essay, Marković is obviously less sanguine about the elite’s ability to set itself aside voluntarily, especially if it happens to be dominated by a strong personality. Here, Marković advocates some rather bold preventive measures: "Analogously to the norms of ancient democracy it should be a matter of revolutionary ethics to remove potential charismatic leaders from the positions of power and influence and to transfer them to other important social functions" (*From Affluence to Praxis*, p. 204).
51. See Stojanović, *Between Ideals and Reality*, pp. 41-42; and Tadić, *Poredak i sloboda*, p. 132. Even Supek, one of the most ardent proponents of self-management among the *Praxis* Marxists, seems to defend Lenin’s reasons for rejecting the demands of the Workers’ Opposition—the lack of historical conditions in backward Russia—while adding somewhat lamely that Shliapnikov was, “to be sure,” proved correct by “subsequent development” (*Sociologija i socijalizam*, pp. 182-187). In more measured terms, Vranicki also endorses Lenin’s rationale for rejecting the imminent establishment of workers’ councils: see his *Historija marksizma*, vol. I, p. 391.
52. Krešić does not, however, assign the responsibility for these abuses to Lenin. Indeed, Krešić attaches considerable importance to Lenin’s increasing concern with bureaucratism toward the end of his life: Krešić, *Politicko drustvo i politicka mitologija*, pp. i3ff.
53. As evidence, Krešić points to the rapid growth of the staff of the chief Party Secretary after the death of Sverdlov: ibid., p. 152.
54. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
55. Ibid., pp. 24, 25.
56. Although not explicitly acknowledged by the *Praxis* Marxists, the Trotskyist interpretation of Stalinism as a bureaucratic Thermidor
is maintained largely intact in their critique of the USSR. See, for instance, Tadić (*Poredak i sloboda*, pp. 118-119), who describes the advent of Stalinism as a “bureaucratic counterrevolution.”


64. Ibid., p. 86.

65. See Marx, *Early Writings*, p. 13iff.


69. Djilas, *The New Class*, p. 35. Even Trotsky, it might be recalled, did not go this far inasmuch as he balked at identifying the social relations of Stalinism as class relations on the grounds of the absence of private ownership and the right of inheritance: see Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York, 1965), pp. 248-252.

70. See below, Chapter VI.


76. Nebojša Popov, “Oblici i karakter drustvenih sukoba,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 331-333. Also of note in this connection is an article by another young *Praxis* Marxist, Bozidar Jaksic, for which Jaksic received a harsh two-year prison sentence from the conservative authorities in Sarajevo. While Jaksic took a less severe view than Popov of the conduct of the Party during the war, he criticized the lack of Party interest after the war in the peasantry, whose role in the resistance was of crucial importance, and argued that the Brioni Plenum of 1966 (at which Rankovic was relieved of his duties) did not affect the basic political and social structure of Yugoslavia, which remains essentially a class society of the classic type. See Bozidar Jaksic, “Jugoslovensko drustvo izmedju revolucije i stabilizacije,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 413-424. On Jaksic’s trial, see “Dokumenti o istrazi i sudjenju protiv Bozidara Jaksica,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 1-2, 1973, pp. 255-272.

77. It is biased, it seems to this writer, particularly in its “underestimation” of the Yugoslav revolutionary experience. Considering the strongly hierarchical and institutional nature of the CPRY before, during, and after the war—and here Popov is surely right—it is all the more remarkable that the Partisan leaders found the initiative and the foresight to begin building the foundations of the new society during the war (in the form of the institutional infrastructure of the Anti-Fascist Council of Popular Liberation—AVNOJ) and that after the war they were able to stand the strain of excommunication. That all this did help to consolidate the political position of the Party summit as Popov contends is, however, beyond doubt.

78. See below, Chapter IV.


82. In Weber’s discussion, at any rate, this issue is hardly one-sided: see *From Max Weber*, pp. 245ff. A “broad constructionist” of Weber might argue that “charisma” applies to political *structures* as well as to personalities, structures which, in contrast to bureaucratic and patriarchal forms of authority, lack any clear “institutions of daily routine.” While Weber certainly did not underestimate the importance of the personality of the charismatic leader, he also stressed the dependence of the leader himself on his “machine” in the following words:

“The leader and his success are completely dependent on the functioning of his machine and hence not on his own motives.... What he actually attains under the conditions of his work is therefore not in his hands, but is prescribed to him by the following’s motives, which, if viewed ethically, are predominantly base” (ibid., p. 125).

In any event, Tadić certainly points up (however indirectly) a problem in Weber’s thought about charisma, particularly with respect to the latter’s assertion that “charismatic domination is the very opposite of bureaucratic domination” (ibid., p. 247).


“on the one hand ... represents the collapse of the norm, both in a substantive sense, for it constitutes a global injection of change in a previously immobile system, and in a general sense, for it corresponds to a collapse of the ‘delicate balance of terror’ which exists in routine relations. ... On the other hand, crisis authority performs a function for the system rather than a change of system. ... The function it performs is double: crisis leadership is both the agent of social change in the system, and the preserver of the system against the moral threat of either destruction by immobility or a change of system.”

IV. The Critique of Yugoslav Socialism


7. Meister, p. 41.

8. Ibid., p. 258.


12. In this connection W. N. Dunn has rightly observed that the “socialist humanists are the only [ideological] group [in contemporary


17. Rus, a close associate of *Praxis* for many years and a member of its Editorial Council throughout its history, nevertheless remained somewhat aloof from the journal’s fundamental ideas, as the following discussion will suggest. In his “Problem participativne demokratije” (*Smisao i perspektive*, pp. 204-216), Rus presents a summary of the 1960-64 findings of the Kranj Institute for Labor Organization and the Serbian Republic’s Center for Workers’ Self-Management in Belgrade on the hierarchical structure of industrial enterprises. Subsequent studies of interest in this connection done by Rus are: “Socijalni procesi i struktura mod u radnoj organizaciji,” *Sociologija*, no. 4, 1966, pp. 95-112; and “Odgovornost u nasim radnim organizacijama,” *Sociologija*, no. 3, 1969, pp. 441-461. Also see the interesting study by Josip Ob-radovic (not a *Praxis* contributor), “Distribucija participate u procesu donosenja odluka na temama vezanim uz ekonomsko poslovanje poduzeza,” *Revija za sociologiju*, no. 1, 1972, pp. 15-48.


20. Ibid., pp. 288L; Supek, *Sociologija i socijalizam*, pp. 127-288, passim; Rudi Supek, “Izraz i tehnika: O nekim prvidnim dilemama,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 2, 1966, p. 229; Ivan Kuvad, *Marksizam i funkcionalizam* (Belgrade, 1970), pp. 154-161ff. Supek and Kuvacic have pointed out that while Marx viewed the development of technology as an alienating force within the capitalist system of production, he envisioned it as an emancipatory force once freed of the shackles of competition and private property. Indeed Marx wrote the following of automated production:

“Labour no longer appears so much to be included within the production process; rather, the human being comes to relate
more as a watchman and regulator to the production process itself.... No longer does the worker insert a modified natural thing as middle link between the object and himself; rather, he inserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor. In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body—it is, in a word, the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth. *The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new one, created by large-scale industry itself*” (Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 705).

8i. Supek, “Le sort de la communauté productive,” p. 293.

22. Veljko Rus, “Self-Management Egalitarianism and Social Differentiation,” Praxis (IE), no. 1-2, 1970, p. 253. The studies cited by Rus are: Veljko Rus, “The Status of Staff and Line Management with Respect to Communications, Power and Responsibility,” *Moderna organizacija*, no. 5, 1968; Veljko Rus, “Comparative Analysis of Communications, Power and Responsibility in Two Industrial Enterprises,” Institut za sociologijo in filozofijo pri Univerzi v Ljubljani, ig68; Stane Mozina and Janez Jerovsek, “Determinants Influencing Effectiveness of Leadership in Industrial Organization,” Institut za sociologijo in filozofijo... , 1 g6g. The same adjustment of norms to practice is reported in Veljko Rus, “Moc i struktura mod u jugoslovenskim preduzećima*Sociologija*, no. 2, 1970, pp. 191-207. Rus’s conclusions are supported by Obradovic (“Distribucije participacije,” passim) who reports results of investigations between 1967 and 1971 showing that the degree of participation on the enterprise level does not have a significant effect on positive attitudes toward work and varies directly only with such secondary factors as satisfaction with income and working conditions. These latter variables, in turn, are apparently only reflections of the higher status of those who participated more often.


24. The most prominent spokesman against the egalitarian con-
sciousness as inconsistent with industrialization has been the Zagreb sociologist Josip Zupanov. See his *Samoupravljanje i drustvena moc* (Zagreb, 1969), especially pp. 26714.; and his “Industrijalizam i egalitarizam,” *Sociologija*, no. 1, 1970, pp. 5-45.


26. Supek, “Le sort de la communaute productive,” p. 295. (It is of interest to recall Tadić’s remarks about the concept of “public opinion,” which run in a similar vein: see above, Chapter III.) Later, Supek would speak more accurately of “Proudhonist” rather than “Fourierist” deviations in the Yugoslav concept of self-management.


28. See especially Meister, pp. 43ff.


30. Stojanović, *Between Ideals and Reality*, p. 119. In the same connection, Milan Miric (editor of the Zagreb journal *Razlog* and a *Praxis* sympathizer) has compared what he calls the Yugoslav system of “distributional self-management” with the subdivision—with grand philanthropic gestures—of a great latifundium to landless peasants in parcels small enough to guarantee the continual and “voluntary poverty” of the peasants themselves. The landlord, on the other hand, “takes a part of the proceeds of the land in order to modernize and strengthen what remains to himself” (Miric, *Rezervati*, p. 56; see also Milan Miric, “Les territoires reservees pour la parole et pour faction,” *Praxis* [IE], no. 1-2, 1969, pp. 271-272).

31. Stojanović, *Between Ideals and Reality*, pp. 118-125. As Zagorka Pesic points out, however, in actual practice Yugoslav enterprises cannot really be said to enjoy group ownership since, by law, they are not at complete liberty to dispose of their capital resources or of all their income: see Zagorka Pesic-Goiubovic, “Ideje socijalizma i socijalisticka stvarnost,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 379-380. For an interesting general discussion of the juridical status of property in Yugoslavia by a

32. Stojanović, Between Ideals and Reality, pp. i25ff.

33. In addition to ibid., p. 120, see especially: Supek, “Protivurjecnosti i nedorecenosti,” pp. 351 ff.; and Rudi Supek, “Anarholiberalizam i marksizam,” Praxis (YE), no. 1-2, 1973, pp. 273-282, where Supek calls attention to the real content of the perversely misused term “anarcho-liberalism” in attacks by eminent Yugoslav political figures—including Tito and Kardelj—on the Praxis Marxists.


35. Stojanović, Between Ideals and Reality, p. 121; emphasis in the original.

36. Gomulka, writing in Nowe drogi in 1957; as quoted by Karl Reyman and Herman Singer in “The Origins and Significance of East European Revisionism,” in Labedz, ed., Revisionism, p. 220. Perhaps more to the point, Marx once remarked that “the competition among workers is only another form of the competition among capitals” (Grundrisse, p. 65).


38. On the general terms of the debate on this important issue, see Milenkovitch, Plan and Market, passim.

39. This problem is discussed at greater length later in this chapter. Reference may be made at this point, however, to Stojanović, Between Ideals and Reality, pp. 215-222.


41. Stojanović, Between Ideals and Reality, pp. 131-132, 133, 132; 217.

42. Mihailo Marković, “Economism or the Humanization of Economics,” Praxis (IE), no. 3-4, 1969, p. 452. In this passage Marković is not conjuring up merely a fictional straw man; in fact, he reasonably accurately summarizes the argument of an influential article in a 1965
issue of *Nose teme* that sparked a long debate on the question of the market simultaneously with the promulgation of the economic reforms: see Adolf Dragicevic, “Radnicka klasa i ekonomsko oslobodjenje rada,” *Nose teme*, no. 4, 1965, pp. 513-535.

43. This concept has been a part of regime ideology since the introduction of self-management itself: see Boris Kidric, “Teze o ekonomici prelaznog perioda u nasoj zemlji,” *Kumunist*, no. 6, 1950, pp. 1-20; cited in Dunn, p. 32^6.


46. Ibid., p. 398; Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* (New York, 1966), p. 9. “Quite apart from the analysis so far given,” remarked Marx, “it was in general incorrect to make a fuss about so-called ‘distribution’ and put the principal stress on it” (ibid., p. 10).


52. See Supek, *Sociologija i socijalizam*, pp. 408-432, where he pleads for the thorough application of the principle of self-management to the sphere of culture, and especially to that of the distribution of cultural products.


57. See Amendment XXII, Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1972), pp. 166-170.


64. See Schopflin, pp. 126—132. What is said here with respect to Croatia only represents the most extreme instance of a general malaise throughout Yugoslavia, one which seems to have been alleviated through the Party upheavals since 1972. Indeed what the Sisak District Court, in its 1971 decision to ban the 3-4/1971 issue of Praxis, found most offensive about Kangrga’s article about the “ideological-political advance of the Yugoslav middle class” was the latter’s contention that the factual existence of at least six leagues of communists in the country (corresponding to the six republics) demonstrated that Yugoslav advocates of multi-partism need look no further than present political reality. See Kangrga, “Fenomenologija,” p. 44on; and “Rjesenje Okruznog suda u Sisku,” reprinted in full in Praxis (YE), no. 5, 1971, p. 771.

65. Schopflin, pp. 139, 142-143.


67. See, for instance, Kangrga, “Fenomenologija,” pp. 439E This argument is very widespread in Praxis writings. Kuvacic, in fact, refers to at least one study which suggests that Yugoslav workers—especially the more militant ones—are little concerned with nationalism as a major economic or political issue: See “Fizionomija jednog strajka,” Pogledi
(Split), no. 3, 1970; cited in Ivan Kuvacic, “Jos jednom o odnosu sin-
chronije i dijahrenije,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, p. 3ggnl. See also
Danko Grlic, “Marginalije o problemu nacije,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4,
1971, pp. 554-555, for a characteristically strong stream of abuse di-
rected against the attempt to transcend class differences by invoking the
concept of the nation.


1941”; as quoted in Đarko Puhovski, “Filozofija politike ‘novog stanja,’”
*Praxis* (YE) no. 3-4, 1971, p. 6o8n6.

70. See Schopflin, p. 139.


72. Rudi Supek, “Entre la conscience bourgeoise et la conscience
proletarienne,” *Praxis* (IE), no. 3-4, ig68, passim and especially pp.
264-268, 271.

73. Grlic, “Marginalije,” pp. 553-556. See also Branko Bosnjak, “Za
jasnou pojmovna,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 513-521, passim.
With respect to the loss of personality, Grlic cites Gramsci’s dictum that
“it is useful to a person who has no personality to declare that he is
essential to the national being”: see Danko Grlic, “La patrie des
philosophes, c’est la patrie de la liberte,” *Praxis* (IE), no. 3-4, 1968, p.
328.


75. “It has quickly been forgotten that Serbian and Croatian
nationalism have been and remain, in both their Roman Catholic and
Byzantine forms, militant ideologies of a despotic type which have
lacked political and cultural creativity”: Ljubomir Tadić, “Nationalisme

76. Grlic, “Marginalije,” p. 549 and n. Grlic’s wrath in this part of
his impassioned denunciation of nationalism is directed specifically to-
toward the Zagreb philosopher Hrvoje Lisinski’s contribution to *Hrvatski
tjednik*, no. 2, 1971, entitled, “Povrtak filozofije—obnova tradicije.”

77. Tadić, “Nationalisme et internationalisme,” p. 314; Grlic, “Mar-

78. Namely, Danilo Pejovic. See Gajo Petrović’s account of the “An-
nual Meeting of the Croatian Philosophical Society,” *Praxis* (IE), no. 1,
1967, especially p. 121; on Pejovic, see also below, Chapter V.

79. In its programmatic pronouncement on the possibility of a
Yugoslav culture alongside of the various national cultures—a rather
unpopular position, particularly in Croatia—the editorship drew special

91. Popov, “Sociologija i ideologija,” p. 437; Milan Kangrga, in
Politika (18 September 1971), responding to a questionnaire on the administration of justice and politics. For the text of Kangrga’s statement, see “Mislenje jednog od urednika Praxisa,” Praxis (YE), no. 5, 1971, p. 802.

V. The Praxis of Praxis

2. Ibid., pp. 328-329.
3. From a personal discussion with Rudi Supek, Korcula, 20 August 1972.
9. Kardelj, Beleske, p. 7; see also pp. 11-13, 43.
10. Ibid., pp. 63, 36; 98E, 167.
11. Ibid., p. 41. The preceding passage is quoted from Josip Sestak [pseudonym], “Nekoliko opciih primedaba povodom pecatovskih revizionistskih pokusa"a Knjizevne sveske, no. 1, 1940, p. 237.
13. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
15. Directly prior to this event, the Zagreb City Committee of the Croatian League of Communists held a meeting to discuss the Praxis problem. It was here that Tripalo expressed his fear that Praxis might become “the core of an oppositional group about which all the oppositional and dissatisfied elements of our society are gathering” (see above, Chapter I).


20. Most notably that of President Tito, who is reported to have stated at the Third Plenum of the LCY Central Committee of 25 February 1966, “We must fight against various ideological deviations as for instance, in the periodical Praxissee Ionescu, p. 215020.

21. This and the following information about the finances of Praxis has been extracted from Petrović, “Deux ans et demi de Praxis,” pp. 149-50.

22. In 1968 and 1972, the Editorial Board evidently decided that rather than ceasing publication during periods of great financial stress, they would instead publish symbolic issues of Praxis to dramatize the journal’s plight. Praxis (YE) 3/1968 was symbolic in two senses: while only 28 pages long, its main attention was devoted (with the exception of a brief statement about the financial situation of the journal) to the persecution of Marxist philosophers in Poland. Praxis (YE) 5-6/1972 was only somewhat less dramatic, being only 16 pages in length, of which one quarter was devoted to the topic, “Why a Double-Number of 16 Pages?” (“Zasto dvobroj na 16 strana?” Praxis [YE], no. 5-6, 1972, pp. 619-621).


25. See Fejto, p. 140.

27. Vjesnik, 26 June 1966.


31. See Praxis (special issue), Jun-Lipanj 1968: Dokumenti, which is the most complete compilation of documents relating to the student revolt to be found anywhere. Nebojša Popov’s introduction to the volume, entitled “Prologomena za sociolosko istrazivanje drustvenih sukoba” (pp. xi-xxiii), is also of particular value and insight. Other analyses of the June 1968 student revolt are: Popov, “Oblici i karakter drustvenih sukoba,” pp. 335-337; Stojanović, “The June Student Movement,” passim; Ivan Kuvacic, “Jos jednom o odnosu sinhronije i dijahronije,” passim; D. Plamenic, “The Belgrade Student Insurrection,” New Left Review, no. 54, 1969, pp. 61-78; Dennison Rusinow, “Anatomy of a Student Revolt,” American University Field Staff Reports (November 1968); and Slobodan Stankovic, “Analysis of the Belgrade Student Riots,” AFT Reports: Yugoslavia, 4 June 1968.

32. One of the few concrete achievements of the June student movement was to put an end to discussion of this project, which entailed the introduction of stock certificates within economic enterprises as a means of cementing the workers’ interests to the success of the given production unit, as well as the establishment of a limited stock market for foreign investors. See “Smernice o najvajnijim zadacima Saveza komunista u razvijanju sistema drustveno-ekonomskih i politickih odnosa” (Resolution adopted by the Presidency and Executive Council of the LCY Central Committee on 9 June 1968), in Dusan Bilandzic, Barba za samoupravni socijalizam u Jugoslaviji (Zagreb, 1969), pp. 133-137. See also Svetozar Stojanović, “The June Student Movement and Social Revolution in Yugoslavia,” Praxis (IE), no. 3-4, 1970, p. 399.
33. “Akciono-politicki program,” in Dokumenti, pp. 139-141. Publication of the Action-Political Program was responsible for court proceedings against the Dokumenti, which were undertaken simultaneously with the court action to ban Praxis (YE) 3-4/1971.


35. See, for instance, Dokumenti, pp. ig5ff. In “Kronika političke bitke” (originally published in Vjesnik u srijedu, 19 June 1968), the already vocal nationalist economics instructor Marko Veselica claimed that Petrović was the “ideological leader and chief strategist of the Zagreb ultraleftist extremist movement,” whose “followers” “sought to incite disturbances and incidents at all costs” (Dokumenti, pp. 197-198). In a reply (originally published in Vjesnik u srijedu, 26 June 1968), Petrović pointed out that in fact on two occasions he and Kangrga were responsible for preventing unruly street demonstrations. In Belgrade, where student activity was much more prolonged and intense than in Zagreb, an important role in channeling protest into nonviolent forms was played by Dragoljub Micunovic, later to be purged from the University’s Philosophy Faculty along with other Praxis Marxists in the case of the “Belgrade Eight.”


37. Reported in Vjesnik, 10 June ig68; article reproduced in Dokumenti, p. 213.

38. By decision of the Belgrade City Conference of the League of Communists of Serbia, 19 July 1968; see Dokumenti, pp. 416-422.

39. Speech of President Tito at the Sixth Congress of the League of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, printed in Barba, 27 June 1968; reproduced in Dokumenti, pp. 376-79 (above passage is from ibid., p. 379).

40. See, for instance, the speech delivered in Kosovo by Milentije Popovic, Chairman of the Federal Skupstina, published in Barba (1 July 1968) and reprinted in Dokumenti, p. 380.


42. In Serbia, where the situation was the most precarious for the Praxis Marxists, the chief resistance of this sort to pressure from above seems to have been offered by Serbian Party President Marko Nikezic, who was ultimately forced to hand in his resignation, under strong pressure from Tito, in late 1972.
43. Tito, Speech of 26 June 1968, Dokumenti, p. 379.
45. From personal notes of the author.
51. “Rjesenje Okruznog javnog tuzioca Sisak,” Praxis (YE), no. 5, 1971, p. 758. This offense is proclaimed by Article 52, Paragraph 1, Point 2 of the Law on the Press and Other Forms of Information to be grounds for the banning (confiscation) of a publication. The same language was taken over in a 1969 Serbian law passed in the wake of the student unrest, making the expression of “false information or assertions which evoke the hostility or agitation of the citizens” punishable by a 500 dinar fine or thirty days’ imprisonment; see “Zakon o prekrsajima javnog reda i mira,” Article I, Paragraph 4, in Sluzbeni glasnik SRS, no. 20 (14 May 1969), p. 564; as quoted in Dokumenti, p. 452.
52. See “Rjesenje Okruznog suda u Sisku,” Praxis (YE), no. 5, 1971, pp. 769-775. For discussion of some of the points raised in Kangrga’s essay, see above, Chapter IV.
54. In 1971 it was asserted by the traditionalist ideologue Bogdan Sesic that the leftist movement, represented by Praxis and its student “constituency,” had actually been responsible for the rightist backlash in the form of nationalism (see his polemic with Životić in Student, nos. 12,
13-14, 15, 16-17 *n April-May 1971; cited in Popov, “Sociologija i ideologija,” p. 437n42). Stojanović’s reply to this line of argument closely parallels his analysis of party inertia in the Hungary of 1956 and the Czechoslovakia of 1968:

“When in a social crisis the exit to the Left is closed off, then there will be with complete certainty a movement to the Right. Therefore the historical responsibility for the breakthrough of the nationalist Right on our political scene falls on those Party circles who in 1968 and thereafter decided to suppress the leftist student wave.... This was one of those crossroads in the history of the LCY which might [prove to] be as far-reaching as the suppression of the ‘Workers’ Opposition’ in the Bolshevik Party” (Stojanović, “Od postrevolucionarne diktature,” p. 397).


59. Criticizing the extreme decentralization of power foreseen in the new constitutional amendments, Djuric had expressed his concern that internecine feuding among the various nationalities would come to play an ever greater role in the future, facetiously remarking that Serbs might well become concerned about their own national boundaries and about the fate of Serbian minorities in other republics, especially in Croatia. For many, these comments raised images of the interwar period and of the suffering of Serbs at the hands of Croatian *ustasi* during the Second World War. Although the newspaper *Student* and the journal *Anali pravnog fakulteta*, where Djuric’s remarks were initially published, were banned, official court opinions quoting those same remarks at length were not: see “Rjesenje Okruznog suda u Sisku” (31 July 1972) and “Rjesenje Vrhovnog suda Hrvatske” (15 August 1972), published (in full) in *Praxis* (YE), no. 1-2, 1973, pp. 243-247, 252-253. The direct concern of these court documents was the banning of the
3-4/1972 issue of *Praxis* containing the protests of the journal’s Editorial Board over the Djuric affair.


61. “*Uvod*,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1972, pp. 308-310; passage quoted is from p. 308.


63. In particular, Ivan Kuvacic’s “*Ideologija srednje klase*” (*Praxis* [YE], no. 3-4, 1972, pp. 351-375), which made specific reference to Kangrga’s “*Fenomenologija*” and boldly expanded on themes set forth in that essay.

64. *Le Monde*, 17, 18, 20, 27, 31 October and 3 November 1972.


68. Idem.


70. “*The Repression at Belgrade University*,” p. 33.


Another ominous portent offered by the Tenth Congress was the election of the formidable Bosnian conservative, Todo Kurtovic, to the post of Secretary for Ideological Work and Publicity of the Executive Committee of the LCV Presidency (Ibid., p. 312). A few months earlier Kurtovic, who had just been designated Chairman of the Editorial Board of a revamped Socialist Thought and Practice, had begun to use that international forum of the Yugoslav Government to print some of the most disgraceful attacks against the Praxis Marxists which the international community had had the opportunity to contemplate. The authors of these pieces compensated in feverish polemic for what they lacked in rational discourse. See, in particular, Fuad Muhic, “Exponents of the Destruction of the Proletarian Party: Who Are the Non-Marxists?” Socialist Thought and Practice, no. 1, 1974, pp. 75-92; and “The Extreme Left—Actually the Right” (discussion organized by the editorial offices of the Sarajevo daily newspaper, Oslobodjenje), Socialist Thought and Practice, no. 3, 1974, pp. 83-108. In the latter piece, the Bosnian philosopher Fuad Muhic made the stunning logical assertion that “in Yugoslav society there can be no force more left than the LCV; consequently, the appearance of every opposition represents the juncture at which it necessarily turns into the ‘right’” (p. 94). For Kurtovic’s own published views on the “left” Marxists of Praxis see his “Communists and Current Questions of Struggle for Socialist Self-Management: The Further Strengthening of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,” Socialist Thought and Practice, no. 8, 1974, pp. 3-53, especially pp. 12-17.

74. See Politika, 12 November 1974.
76. See Vjesnik, 8 October 1972.
78. Ibid., pp. g, 11,5, 19, 27. In subsequent months, publications of the sort called for by Kardelj quickly came into being. In mid-1974, the venerable Sarajevo journal Pregled initiated an international series, Survey: Periodical for Social Studies, apparently the regime’s answer to the popular International Edition of Praxis. (Significantly, Survey’s back cover noted that it is published “in conjunction with” the international
series, Social Thought and Practice.) In late 1975, Tanjug’s English-language bimonthly, Yugoslav Life (no. 10-11, 1975, p. 4) proudly noted the establishment of a new Belgrade journal, Marksisticka misao (Marxist Thought), published by the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists, which was to be “a response to the need for more engaged, integral and systematic deliberation on and clarification of the evermore complex questions of Marxist theory and self-management practice in the modern Yugoslav society.... In cultivating open and unbiased criticism, this new journal hopes further to develop Marxist thought through positive and constructive analyses and papers and thus curb conservative thought in all its aspects, while constantly following creative practice.”


84. One of his most recent monographs, Ovajedina zemlja: Idemo li u katastrofu ili u Trecu revoluciju? (Zagreb, 1973), was a first of its kind in Yugoslavia, being devoted in its entirety to the world ecological crisis.

85. See the discussion on the August 1972 meeting of the Praxis Editorial Board in Korcula, below, Chapter VI.


89. The decision was relayed to Praxis by the Croatian Republican Council for Scientific Work. See “Dopis Republickog savjeta za nauci rad,” Praxis (YE), no. 3-5, 1974, pp. 565-566. Other journals on the same list as Praxis were Zavarivanje (Welding), Psihoterapija (Psychotherapy), Stocarstvo (Cattle-Breeding), Fragmenta Herbologica Jugoslavica, Marketing, Veterinarstvo (Veterinary Science), Acta Facultatis Medicae Fluminensis, and Acta Stomatologica Croatica.


VI. Conclusion: The Intellectual and Social Responsibility


2. See, for example, the discussion in Nettl, “Ideas, Intellectuals, and Structures of Dissent,” passim.


5. Indeed in official Soviet theory, the “new Soviet intelligentsia” is defined in precisely such occupational terms; it is said to be “a social stratum consisting of people who are occupied professionally with mental labor.” See Leopold Labedz, “The Structure of the Soviet Intelligent-
sia,” in Pipes, ed., The Russian Intelligentsia, p. 64 and pp. 63-79, passim.


8. Tadić, Poredak i sloboda, p. 205.

9. Lipset and Dobson, p. 151.


18. This is one reason why Supek applauded so strongly the 1966 Resolution of the French Communist Party recognizing the importance of freedom of creativity for the intellectuals as of significance “not only [or] the strategy of the workers’ movement but also for] the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat” (Rudi Supek, “Francuska komunisticka partija i intelektualci,” Praxis [YE], no. 4-6, 1966, p. 793; emphasis in the original). See “Rezolucija cr KP Francuske” (13 March 1966), in Praxis (YE), no. 4-6, 1966, pp. 801-809.


22. Danko Grlic, “Osam teza o djelovanju danas,” Praxis (YE), no. 1-2, 1969, pp. 110-112. For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that not all Praxis Marxists shared this view over the years. At a meeting of the Editorial Board held at the 1972 session of the Korcula Summer School, a heated discussion arose between Grlic and Supek, the latter having come to the conclusion that the articulation of a distinct political program was finally a necessity. Grlic, on the other hand, continued to protest that such a course of action would be suicidal and would violate
the very emancipatory consciousness to the cultivation of which Marxists must be dedicated. No resolution to this debate, it is nearly superfluous to say, was reached (from personal notes of the author).


24. See, for instance, Predrag Vranicki, Historija Marksizma, 1st ed. (Zagreb, 1961), p. 572m


27. “A l’occasion des critiques les plus recentes,” p. 513. It is worthwhile to read this passage further:

“The party cannot be its own end (as is sometimes believed): it is rather the function and the self-organization of class consciousness and proletarian consciousness, communist and socialist, of which the ultimate perspective is the disappearance of its own class self-organization and of its conscious self-organization in the form of the party.... Criticism and self-criticism within the party itself and toward its own activity is the strongest weapon of the proletarian party in the struggle for the self-emancipation of the proletariat.”

28. On this central issue, the Praxis Marxists can usefully be thought of as the Yugoslav analogue, if not forerunner, of dissident communist tendencies in many other one-party states. The most prominent Soviet representative of this tendency is Roy Medvedev (see his On Socialist Democracy), although the Praxis Marxists do not share Medvedev’s advocacy of multi-partism as an antidote to orthodox sectarianism.

29. See above, Chapter IV.


33. In Telegram, 8 September 1972, p. 12.

34. See particularly Supek, Sociologija i socijalizam, pp. 408-432.


38. Tadić, Poredak i sloboda, p. 206.
39. Regrettably, I have been unable to devote much specific attention to *Praxis* thought on this very important question within the confines of this study. In general, the “critique of politics” outlined in chapters III and IV is a living example of the type of “science” which the *Praxis* Marxists would like to see pursued in the humanistic disciplines. They have also published a number of essays critical of the direction of contemporary social science in Yugoslavia; among the most noteworthy of these are: Zagorka Pasic-Golubovic, “Zasto je danas funkcionizam u nas pozelniji od marksizma,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 339-350; Popov, “Sociologija i ideologija”; Rudi Supek, “Historicitet, sistem i sukobi,” *Sociologija*, no. 3, 1971, pp. 323-340. Ivan Kuvacic has also written extensively on Western (primarily American) sociology: see his *Marksizam i funkcionizam*, passim. See also Bozidar Jaksic, “Culture and Development of the Contemporary Yugoslav Society,” *Praxis* (IE), no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 657-664.


41. See “Rjesenje Okruznog suda u Sisku” and “Rjesenje Vrhovnog suda Hrvatske,” *Praxis* (YE), no. 5, 1971, pp. 77a, 788.

42. “Rjesenje Okruznog suda u Sisku,” p. 772.

43. Prior to ig68, several of the *Praxis* Marxists even appeared at discussion sessions held in factories; such visits were prohibited after the “June days” of student revolt.

44. This distinction between the immediate goals of *Praxis* and the long-term goals of its contributors is reflected in the 1964 editorial preface to the first issue: “If our journal ‘appropriates’ a right to criticism that is limited by nothing except the nature of the object of criticism, this does not mean that we seek a privileged position for ourselves. We feel that the ‘privilege’ of free criticism should be universal” (“Cemu *Praxis*?” p. 6).

45. On occasion *Praxis* served as such a forum for thinkers outside of its own ranks. See, for instance, the debate on educational reform in *Praxis* (YE), no. 4-6, 1966, pp. 597ff.; see also the unusual articles by the Zagreb political scientist Antun 2van, such as “Samoupravljanje i avanguarda” (*Praxis* [YE], no. 5-6, 1967, pp. 812-823), “Ekstaza i mamurluk revolucije” (*Praxis* [YE], no. 3-4, 1971, pp. 455-465), and “Estatisticki paternalizam ili samouprvaljanje” (*Praxis* [YE], no. 6, 1971, pp. 939-947); see also Stipe Suvar, “Tri rjed o trenutku jugoslavenkog socijalizma,” op. cit.


47. Danko Grlic, “O romanticnoj fazi razvoja birokracije i o


53. Ibid., p. 212.

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For the sake of convenience, this list of sources consulted in the writing of this study has been divided into the following categories:

I. *Praxis* Articles
II. Other works by *Praxis* Marxists
III. Yugoslavia: Primary Sources
IV. Yugoslavia: Secondary Sources
V. Marxian Theory (non-Yugoslav)
VI. Other Works

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suited in the closing of *Praxis* itself and the ouster of eight of its contributors from Belgrade University in early 1975. Sher contends that the most important source of friction between *Praxis* and the League of Communists was the latter’s perception that in its attempt to institutionalize Marxist criticism on the fringes of Party life, *Praxis* represented a direct challenge to the Party’s ideological dominance and hence political viability.

The study thus contributes to an in-depth understanding of the political dynamics of present-day Yugoslavia and presents a timely prognosis for its future, as Yugoslavia prepares for life after Tito. It is also an important contribution to the literature of dissident movements in Eastern Europe and to our growing awareness of the struggle for human rights in the world today.

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