"Now tell us what 'twas all about,"
Young Peterkin he cries;
And little Wilhelmine looks up
With wonder-waiting eyes;
"Now tell us all about the war,
And what they fought each other for."

"It was the English," Kaspar cried,
"Who put the French to rout;
But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out.
But everybody said," quoth he,
"That 'twas a famous victory."

"But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
"Why that I cannot tell," said he,
"But 'twas a famous victory."

—Southey

Now that Roosevelt has been triumphantly reelected by the Forces of Progress, which have even won back complete control of the House from the Forces of Reaction (unless those awkward Southern Democrats make some more of their wicked deals with the Republicans), now that the victory is won and the field of battle lies quiet and deserted save for a few gruesome campaign photos of Dewey, it seems a fitting time to answer little Peterkin's question. It goes without saying that we shall try in so doing to avoid the deplorable negativism shown by Old Kaspar.

To begin with, a superficial observer might imagine, from certain post-election developments that all the hard work and splendid organization of PAC had been in vain, that once safely reelected, Roosevelt had forgotten what he owed to labor, and was behaving in much the same way as it had been gloomily predicted that Dewey would behave if, by some calamity, he had been elected. An unscrupulous writer could even draw up what would appear to be a rather imposing tabulation of reactionary moves by Roosevelt in the few weeks since his reelection. Something like this:

Item: Labor has been trying for some time to purge from the Administration two top officials: Byrnes, the War Mobilization Director, and Davis, head of the War Labor Board. After the election, both submitted their resignations to Roosevelt, and not as a matter of form, either. Both wanted very much to get out. Roosevelt refused to accept their resignations and "drafted" them for the duration.

Item: The unions have insisted, with elaborate statistical arguments, that the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Cost-of-Living Index, which is used by the War Labor Board in...
deciding on wage rates, understates by almost half the real rise in such costs since the war began. On November 18, safely after the election, Roosevelt is advised by his special Cost of Living Committee that the BLS Index is accurate.

**Item:** Breaking the Little Steel Formula has been allegedly the main concern of the CIO leadership for over a year. To the reaffirmation of the BLS Index was added, a week later, an even more crushing blow to any such hopes: the War Labor Board finally decided the long-pending application of Phil Murray’s United Steel Workers for a general 17c-an-hour wage increase. It granted 5c an hour, and to night shift workers only. It also turned down the union’s petition for a guaranteed annual wage.

**Item:** On November 28, Hull resigned as Secretary of State. Roosevelt immediately appointed as his successor the present Under-Secretary, E. R. Stettinius, former head of the U. S. Steel Corp. It is regrettable but a fact that in so doing, Roosevelt ignored The New Republic’s formal nominee for the post: Henry Wallace. Washington gossip has it that Roosevelt sent a special emissary to Bruce Bliven to explain his reasons for this unprecedented slight and to propitiate, if possible, the powerful publisher to whose support he owed so much in the election. The emissary, by the way, is said to have been Henry Wallace.

**Item:** To direct the Surplus Property Board, which will dispose of some $100 billions worth of war supplies and equipment, $15 billions of plant, and 10 million acres of land, Roosevelt appointed two Democratic lame-duck politicians, both conservatives. But it might have been worse. He had originally planned to give the job to two henchmen of Jesse Jones. After considerable liblab pressure, he choose the lame ducks instead.

Leaving Roosevelt himself aside for the moment, it is sad to report that one can also make out a plausible case for the thesis that the Great Progressive Victory in the Congressional elections was largely ballyhoo, and that the future of the country would have been about the same whichever set of candidates won. Nat Glazer has made some computations on the voting records of the ten incumbent Senators whom PAC supported for re-election, and the four it opposed. “Since there were other Senators running,” he writes, “we may assume that only sterling liberals or black reactionaries were selected for support or opposition. I took the voting records of these Senators as compiled by The New Republic on fourteen domestic issues which involved a liberal-conservative clash (eliminating 15 other New Republic categories—5 on foreign policy, 6 on inflation control, 4 on special privileges for farmers—which didn’t seem to me to present any clear liberal-conservative issue). A liberal vote counts + 1, a reactionary vote — 1, no vote nothing. The best possible score is + 14, the worst — 14. My calculations show that the median scores are:

| PAC—endorsed Sterling Liberals | 4 |
| PAC—opposed Black Reactionaries | 5 |
| Difference | 4.5 (out of a possible 28) |

But on closer analysis, one would probably find that the facts have been taken out of their context and that the figures are distorted; and that there are many offsetting factors on the other side. (I regret I haven’t the time to make such an analysis, and I hope little Peterkin won’t ask me what those factors are.)

In any case, it is becoming more and more clear from the post-election think-pieces of eminent liberal journalists that one would be awfully simplistic, not to say crude, to expect anything much from the reelection of Roosevelt itself. They gave a rather different impression during the campaign, of course, but there is a time and a place for simplicity and one also for sophistication. We have now definitely entered the sophisticated era. As near as I can work out the new line, it is that it was necessary to reelect Roosevelt in order to continue to have a chance to put pressure on him from the left. For obviously, if he had been defeated, one could not have continued to do so, or rather there would not have been any point, since he would have been just a private citizen. It is true that Dewey would have been there for the liberals to exercise their wiles on—and it is hard to see how they could have been much less successful with him than they have been with Roosevelt—but somehow it wouldn’t have been the same. So it was Roosevelt or Ruin.

The clearest formulation of this line—which reminds me of Lieut. J. L.’s “perhaps they are fighting for the grace which enables them to fight for the grace for which they are fighting”—was by I. F. Stone in a recent Nation. Apropos the latest outrage committed by the newly re-elected People’s Friend, Stone wrote: “This is exactly what we could have expected of Dewey, and it dramatizes the fact that progressives have a double task ahead. One is to support the President; the other is to fight him. . . . Unless we organize quickly, all will be as it was before.”

It is thus plain that the election settled nothing, and that Armageddon is now to be fought all over again.

Just as this goes to press, the White House announces a great shake-up in the State Department, the most complete since Roosevelt took power. Foreign policy is today the crucial sphere of American capitalism, and Roosevelt’s reorganization puts the conservatives in full control. The new under-secretary is the career diplomat Joseph C. Grew.
former ambassador to Japan, who wants to keep Hirohito after the war. The five new Assistant Secretaries will be: Will Clayton, big cotton broker and close associate of Jesse Jones, who will have charge of American economic relations with the world; James C. Dunn and Julius Holmes, veteran State Department officials (i.e., rabid conservatives); Nelson Rockefeller, who was a large impressive blank as "Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs"; and Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress, who flopped badly as head of the Office of Facts and Figures. Doubtless Roosevelt intends this last appointment as a sop to the liberals, and they could hardly have a fitter representative than this empty-headed rhetorician. The score is thus 5 to 1, and at least two of the conservatives—Grew and Clayton—are extremely able men. No wonder PM asked in frontpage headlines: WHO WON THE ELECTION? If all of this leaves little Peterkin with a slightly confused feeling, and if little Wilhelmine's eyes are more wonder-waiting than ever, perhaps another post-election analysis by another eminent liberal will clear things up. Writing in The New Republic of Nov. 20, James Loeb, Jr., thus described the post-election liberal state of mind:

"No progressive could have listened to the radio or read the newspaper reports the following morning without a feeling of jubilation and a profound sense of relief. . . . Progressives fought hard and successfully to reelect an administration they had sharply and justifiably criticized in the past, an administration whose State Department has followed an almost consistently reactionary policy in its dealing with the forces emerging from the chaos of Europe, an administration which has as yet put forth no workable program for solving the postwar economic problems in this country and has not even put up a fight for those proposals which have come from its own agencies or Congressional supporters. . . . Unless these issues are fought through, the significance of this electoral victory will diminish as the months and years pass. It is now the obligation of progressives to strengthen their own ranks. . . ."

Does that make it all clear, Peterkin?

Comment

The War Gets Out of Balance

A growing imbalance in the war is beginning to worry those in Washington who have to plan the transition from war to peace. As every one knows, the European War has fallen behind schedule. Last summer, Washington optimists were predicting Germany would be beaten by November, while pessimists insisted it would take until the end of the year. Now the only chance for even the pessimists to be right is for the Anglo-American forces to score the kind of breakthrough on the Rhine line which they finally made in Normandy. But the heaviest offensive yet launched on the Western Front in the war is already, as this is written, almost two weeks old, and the gains have not yet been spectacular. If this drive is not decisive—and such an enormous weight of material and manpower probably cannot be kept in motion many days longer—the European phase of the war will probably last until next summer.

The Pacific War, on the other hand, seems to be ahead of schedule: the landings on the Phillipines were not originally planned to take place until next March or April. The reason officials are worried is because Washington had counted on a considerable time lag between the endings of the two wars to cushion the shock to the national economy. (Sherman was wrong: peace is hell.) If the two wars end within a month or two of each other, the effect on employment may be much more severe even than Mr. Oakes' article in the last issue indicated, since he accepted the hypothesis of a year interval between the ends of the two wars.

Footnote on the European Revolution

After World War I, the objective factors for socialist revolution were less favorable than they are today and the subjective factors more favorable. In 1919, the old ruling class was relatively intact throughout Europe, even in Germany, as were the old economic and political institutions; the masses were not in a revolutionary mood. In 1944, the German conquest of the continent and the political warfare waged by the Nazis have combined to destroy or hopelessly compromise the old ruling classes and to liquidate the property interests, political parties, trade unions and other institutions which formed the framework of pre-1939 European capitalism. In consequence, capitalism is everywhere discredited with the masses, who are pressing forward along socialist—or at least collectivist—lines.

On the other hand, in 1919 a successful revolution had just been made in Russia by a party whose slogans and ideology were Marxian socialist, and whose leaders, whatever else one might say about them, were revolutionaries whose dearest hope was to pass on the torch of socialism from Russia to her more advanced European neighbors. In 1944 the epigones of this revolution, long since evolved into a new ruling class themselves, manipulate the revolutionary sentiments of the European masses to the best advantage of the nascent Soviet imperialism, blowing now hot and now cold (but never very hot), prepared to sell out any popular movement for a little ready cash in the great game of imperialist power politics. And outside the Stalinist ranks, there is in Europe today very little experienced revolutionary leadership, very little clear political consciousness among the masses. The long series of defeats for the Left between the two wars has discouraged the mass consciousness and destroyed the leadership which might have easily seized on the present unparalleled objective opportunity.

Strikes Are Hard to Kill

Last winter and spring the number of strikes went steadily up month after month. Then came the landings in Normandy, and the total dropped away for a while to very low levels. Recently, as the psychological effect of the invasion effort has worn off, the strike figures are climbing again. "If walkouts continue at the present rate," Time comments, "labor will hang up a new record in 1944 of 5,200 strikes in one year. . . . Work stoppages despite labor's no-strike pledge, are occurring more frequently now than at any time during the past 25 years." These strikes are mostly "flash strikes", it is true, lasting only a few hours. But they are symptomatic of a restlessness which seems evident in the workers as they begin to think of the postwar period with its probable wage cuts and unemployment. At each of the conventions this fall of the major CIO unions—auto workers, shipbuilders, rubber workers, even the CP-dominated electrical workers—there was a vocal and aggressive
rank-and-file opposition group pressing for the abandonment of the no-strike pledge. These groups made more headway this year than ever before. This was especially true in the auto workers' convention: I attended last year's UAW convention and saw how the leadership was able to put off discussion of the no-strike pledge till the very last day, by which time the delegates were tired and thinking only of getting home; this year, however, the rank-and-file caucus, apparently much bigger and more militant than last year, was able to keep the strike issue in the forefront all through the convention and to force the leadership to submit the question to a referendum of the union membership. The facade of wartime "national unity" is beginning to show cracks.

All of this is interesting as a comment on the great difficulty, under democratic capitalism, of changing class behavior through Governmental action, whether legislative or administrative. The changes in the strike statistics since last spring seem to be related to changes in the psychology of the mass of workers, which in turn are related to phases of the war. Strikes mounted last spring as the war dragged on without all-out American participation; they slumped instantly when D-Day came, with its patriotic appeal; they are now climbing again as the workers, feeling the war is largely won, become conscious mainly of their peacetime prospects. This evolution has little to do either with the efforts of the War Labor Board, or with the Smith-Connally Anti-Strike law. At the time of the passage of this law, the Right exulted and the Left lamented with a violence which now seems to have been mistaken. For the Smith-Connally Act, despite the strictly dishonorable intentions of the reactionaries who put it across, has turned out to be almost a dead letter. In a survey of " Strikes in 1943", the Bureau of Labor Statistics comments that, although the Act was in force for the last half of that year, "only 34 of the 1,919 strikes occurring during this period took place after strike votes were taken under its provisions." And despite this practically universal violation of the law, I have noticed only a handful of prosecutions brought against strike leaders—practically all against United Mine Workers officials—and only one prison sentence: a UMW local president got a year last summer. There may be some prosecutions I've missed, but if so, they were kept pretty quiet by both the conservative and the liberal press.

In a society like ours, one must always distinguish between formal and actual degrees of control. It is one thing for Roosevelt to issue an administrative order or Congress to pass a law regulating some part of the system; it is quite another what actually happens. Somewhat the same phenomenon can be observed in the efforts of the War Manpower Commission to "freeze" labor this summer. Although the WMC's "job referral plan" seemed to establish far-reaching controls over the labor force—and was quite properly objected to by various leftist groups on that score—its actual effect apparently has not been very great. At least that seems a legitimate inference to draw from the persistence to date of frantic appeals from the WMC for more labor in certain key war industries. Like the Smith-Connally Act, the WMC's regulations clashed with established mores of the workingclass, mores which were implemented by institutions, and came out a bad second in the encounter. The same thing has happened in England, where, despite Governmental regulations against strikes which have been theoretically in force since 1940, last winter there were so many big strikes, especially in coal, that even more stringent measures had to be hastily rushed through.

In the last few weeks the manpower situation seems to have become crucial. Workers have been leaving war jobs in great numbers to take jobs in civilian industries, often at lower pay. They don't take seriously Roosevelt's promise of jobs for everybody after the war and want to get out from under. (People as individuals are much smarter than people as PAC.) On November 16, War Mobilization Director Byrnes threatened to suspend all new civilian production unless he could get "two hundred thousand additional able-bodied men" for certain key war industries. A few days later, Roosevelt himself denounced as saboteurs of the war effort workers who quit war jobs for civilian industry. ("He believed such workers needed reassurance, he said, that almost everybody who knows anything about it, individuals and industry, were working awfully hard to provide postwar jobs.") General Eisenhower sent by plane six front-line soldiers to bring a "message" for more production to the home front workers. No soap. Finally, on December 1, the War Production Board was forced to suspend for 90 days much of the new civilian production which had already been authorized. And all this hullabaloo is over the lack of from one to two hundred thousand workers in certain war industries, a shortage that any real system of controls would eliminate in a few days with ease. The conclusion is inescapable: administrative measures are not enough in themselves, unaccompanied by the destruction of existing institutions and the forcible changing of existing behavior patterns, to establish effective controls over the American labor force. Let us be duly thankful.

These situations will repeat themselves as long as labor in England and America is organized into unions which are (relatively) independent of the State. In totalitarian nations like Russia and Germany, where no independent unions or indeed any other groups exist, the gap between formal and actual control is much less. (Though it still exists, under different forms.) The danger of the CIO "Statist" ideology is that, in trying to use the State for labor's ends, it makes it easier for the State to use labor for its ends.

**So Are Property Interests**

The same thing is true of the relations of the State, under democratic capitalism, and business. In March of 1943, for example, the papers carried big headlines about a Presidential order establishing a compulsory minimum 48-hour work week in all industries in certain areas. The aim of the order was to ease the manpower shortage by forcing non-war industries to lengthen hours—the war industries were mostly already on 48 hours—and thus release men for war work. Since all hours over 40 a week must by law be paid for at overtime rates, this means (or rather would have meant) a considerable increase in the employer's wage bill. On the face of it, a tremendous extension of State control over industry.

The order is now forgotten, and was in fact forgotten with surprising rapidity after the initial excitement in the conservative press. It was forgotten because it proved to be as ineffective as the Smith-Connally Act. A year after the order had been promulgated, the *Survey of Current Business* reported that employers in general had not increased their work-week to 48 hours if that meant releasing men (the whole purpose of the order) but only if they could thus avoid having to look for new workers. In a word, the order caused that to happen which would have happened anyway. The number of men released for other work had been "very small." In the year after the order theoretically...
went into effect, the average manufacturing work-week rose only from 44 to 45 hours. In lumber and steel, where it was applied on an industry-wide basis, it had a negligible effect: in the former, weekly hours rose from 41.9 in February, 1943, to 42.8 in December, 1943 (five full hours under the required minimum); in steel the increase was even less, from 46.4 in June, when the order was applied to steel, to 46.6 in December. "The explanation," observes the Survey drily, "appears to be employer resistance to the payment of penalty overtime for hours beyond 40 per week."

The Meaning of the Socialist Vote

Ed Wynn says G.O.P. now means Getting Out of Practice, and the result of the Dewey defeat may be the disappearance of the Republican Party, as we now know it, from the scene. The cumulative effect of defeats year after year must be great, especially since in all this time the Republicans have not been able to evolve any positive alternative line for American capitalism to Roosevelt's reformist-imperialist one.

The extraordinarily low vote the Socialists seem to have gotten in the elections may presage a similar fate for them — and for much the same reason: they have been unable to work out an alternative, from the left, to Rooseveltism. Although the official count will not be in for some time, the Socialists themselves admit the Thomas vote will probably be an all-time low, perhaps less than 60,000. (This makes all the "realistic" pre-election arguments I used to hear about the necessity of Thomas's liberalistic line as a vote-getting device look pretty silly.) The main significance of this is probably as an index of the conservative mood of the American electorate today. But is there not another meaning also: that the S.P. approach did not differ enough from that of PAC Rooseveltism to draw out all the potential "protest" vote? In other words, Thomas fell between two stools: many of the liblabs approved his line but voted for FDR, while the discontented and radicals were not attracted by his line and didn't vote. Or voted for the Socialist Labor Party, which in New York City actually polled some 12,000 votes to Thomas's 6,000. (The "correction" which the N. Y. Times later printed on this, reversing the figures, turned out itself to be an error.) When a simon-pure Marxist sect like the S.L.P., running a completely unknown candidate, can get double the Socialist vote in New York City, we may infer that the famous "protest vote" lies much farther to the left than Thomas suspects. We may also infer that something drastic will probably happen within the S.P. before the next presidential election. Or should happen, anyway.

"Inter-Enemy Ethics"

Two recent news-items are of interest relative to Llewellyn Queener’s article elsewhere in this issue. On November 30, the House Military Affairs Committee issued a report on treatment of American prisoners by the Germans and the Japanese. The latter are said to observe the Geneva Convention (which they have never ratified) only "in part", while the former are said to observe it "in general", feeding their captives the same rations as their own base troops get, giving good medical care, allowing complete religious freedom, etc. All this checks pretty closely with Mr. Queener’s discriminations between the Eastern and the Western war theatres.

The other item is of great potential significance, and may indicate that as the Allied troops get deeper into Germany, some of them may behave as the Germans have in the occupied countries. On November 29, the French General Leclerc posted handbills throughout captured Strasbourg announcing that five German hostages would be executed for every French soldier killed by franc-tireurs. This is less than the usual German ratio of 50 or more hostages for one German life, but the principle is the same. At once the Allied High Command disavowed Leclerc’s action and reiterated its continued adherence to the Geneva Convention, and Leclerc’s division was rather suddenly sent away from Strasbourg. Apparently no executions were actually carried out.

To a civilian, the ironical thing about the whole affair is that what shocked Allied Headquarters was apparently not so much the idea of killing hostages as Leclerc’s incautious threat to take the victims from among war prisoners, if necessary. Apparently, the Geneva Convention sanctions the taking of civilian but not of military hostages, a distinction which to the layman would seem almost the reverse of just. Practically speaking, however, the reason for it is clear: both sides generally have prisoners, and thus reprisals are easy, whereas generally only one side is in possession of enemy territory, hence reprisals to enforce good treatment of civilians are usually not practical. Certainly in this war the total of civilian killed, if we include bombing victims and the millions massacred in the German death camps, must be many times the total soldier deaths.

Heil, Benes!

The October 13 issue of Tribune picks up a well-nigh unbelievable story from the London weekly, New Czechoslovakia. It seems that the Allied armies now include former members of Hitler’s S.S. Guards. These are war prisoners of Czech origin who were permitted to enlist in the Czech Brigade now fighting in France. Apparently, the British authorities required nothing more from these repentant Nordic heroes than willingness to fight on the other side. According to letters from some of their rather nauseated Czech comrades-in-arms, these thugs are extremely proud of having belonged to an “elite” outfit like the S.S. and frequently boast about how many Jews they have killed. Some of them, it is reported have even asked their officers for permission to wear their German Iron Crosses.

Churchill well remarked last spring: “As this war has progressed, it has become less ideological in character.”

The Pattern Emerges

That the British and American governments do not want social revolution in Europe or even a progressive modification of the pre-war status quo, has been obvious since the war began (to every one except the liblabs). Until lately, however, it has been possible for Churchill and Roosevelt to avoid direct, open intervention on behalf of European reaction, a policy which has clearly great drawbacks as compared to the subtler forms of coercion. Such intervention has now begun, however, in Belgium, Greece and Italy. This is an important milestone in Allied policy.

Belgium

The immediate cause of the Belgian crisis is that the situation of the workers in this most highly industrialized country in Europe has become worse since the Germans were driven out. Because they needed Belgian war production, the Germans winked at the black-market buying of food from the farmers, and even allowed foodstuffs to be
imported. But the Allies need Belgian production much less than they need shipping space; hence little food has been brought in by them. The first major action of the Pierlot government made matters even worse. Its finance minister, Camille Gutt, a veteran spokesman for big business, put into effect a drastic deflationary program to reduce purchasing power and to eliminate the black market. This meant health for Belgium’s finances, starvation for Belgium’s people. The government’s political program is equally reactionary: on the one hand, it gave the underground almost no representation (3 out of 19 cabinet posts) and called for the disarming and dissolution of the resistance groups; on the other, it took no action against important businessmen and officials who had collaborated with the Nazis.

A glance at the political composition of this government, as of November 14, explains its policies: 2 Communists, 5 Socialists, 4 Liberals (“of whom two are nominal only,” according to the N.Y. Times’ David Anderson), and 8 Conservative Catholics. No comment seems necessary.

On November 17, the two Communists and the one left-wing Socialist resigned from the government on the now classic issue of surrender of the underground’s arms. At once the Allied Supreme Command announced “its readiness to support the Belgian government with troops.” The next day the resistance leaders capitulated. The political struggle has continued, however, with increasing bitterness. The Allied general in charge, Major-Gen. Erskine, has played a prominent role in it. No actual use of Allied troops has yet been reported, although on November 19, when 15,000 demonstrators paraded through Brussels singing the Internationale, it looked for a while as though the Allied troops and armored cars held in readiness on side streets might get into action.

At the moment, after weeks of strikes and mass demonstrations on the one hand and increasingly severe repres­ sive decrees on the other, the Pierlot government seems to have surmounted the immediate crisis. The failure of the four remaining Socialists to resign has made it politically possible for the government to survive. But the crisis may reappear any time in a more severe form, for the government seems to have understandably enough, little popular support. The syndicalist trade unions are solidly against the government and have threatened a general strike. The Intersyndicale des Syndicates Uniques, an important federation of trade unions, is solidly behind the resistance groups, and has threatened a general strike. According to Tribune of Oct. 27, the Socialists have lost ground in the unions, and the Communists and Syndicalists have gained. The unions, adds Tribune, “express the radical mood of the Belgian workers much more adequately than any of the political parties.”

If it comes to a showdown between these popular forces and the Pierlot government, we may see Allied military power back up European reaction by deeds as well as by threats.

Greece

The struggle between the EAM, the Communist-led popular movement which almost monopolized the resistance against the Nazis, and the Papandreou government, composed mostly of more conservative politicians who have returned from exile, has been going on ever since the British replaced the Germans in Greece. On December 2, it came to a crisis over the key issue of disarming the EAM guerillas. When all six ministers belonging to the EAM resigned their posts, the British general in charge, Lt. Gen. Scobie, issued a message “to the people of Greece” promis­
is thus; a winter of starvation in the mountains, or quick death by going "home". The hero of this betrayal was rewarded a few weeks later by being promoted to Supreme Commander of the Mediterranean Theatre.

If Alexander's order had been issued for military reasons, it would have been bad enough. But was it? Recent reports from German-held Italy put the number of partisans at 200,000 and estimate it takes from six to eight German divisions to cope with them. Why, then, disband them? The Swiss paper, Libera Stampa, gives a plausible explanation:

"Italian circles wonder whether the change in the London policy is not due to what has been experienced with the French resistance movement after France's liberation and whether, far from encouraging the Italian partisans, London has not deemed it advisable to further reduce their role. The Italian people will then not be able to claim that they were the principal instruments in defeating fascism and can therefore not demand the political price and reward therefor." To which might be added that the Allied High Command may have decided, in the light of the present crises throughout Europe over the disarming of resistance movements, that 200,000 dead guerrillas would be cheaply bought even if eight new German divisions are able to swing into the Gothic Line. Here, as in Warsaw, a sinister parallelism of interests emerges between the Allies and the Nazis when an independent popular movement is involved.

(2) On November 27, the British government made the most direct intervention into Italian politics it has so far ventured: it vetoed the choice of all Italian parties for foreign minister, Count Sforza. It took this action because Sforza, although a confused, timid and opportunistic liberal politician, is not willing to be a complete Quisling, and specifically is not considered by Downing Street wholly "reliable" on the question of the monarchy. The veto of Sforza was an episode of the Italian governmental crisis, which is still unresolved as this is written. Since the Bonomi government was formed last spring, its conservative wing, led by Bonomi, has drifted toward the British and the king, while its three left parties—Action, Socialist and Communist—have resisted this trend. On November 26, Bonomi presented his cabinet's resignation to Crown Prince Humbert. (When the government was formed, it ignored Humbert and refused to take the oath of allegiance to the crown; now Bonomi insists on giving the crown its full due.) That day Bonomi (whom I am proud to have described last July as "a senile, third-rate ex-socialist with the valet-like servility of his kind") also paid a call on his other master: the British ambassador. The veto on Sforza followed.

Almost anything can happen now—and it is hard to see what difference it makes what happens. All the existing Italian parties are compromised by their participation in the Bonomi government and their timidity towards the king and the British. The level of Italian politics is extremely low these days, as may be seen by the fact that the question of the monarchy is still a crucial issue—indeed, the king seems actually to have gained ground since last spring. Action Party liberals seem to have all the classic liberal vices plus a few specifically Italian ones (cf. Chiaromonte's "Croce and Italian Liberalism" in the June POLITICS). The Socialists have almost merged with the Communists, who last year supported Badoglio on orders from Moscow and may now support Bonomi for the same reason. No major party has taken a sensible stand on the crucial war issue, despite the overwhelming war-weariness and defeatism of the Italian masses. In a word, the tight control exercised by the Allies, the impotence of the government, and the wretched condition of the people have all combined to strip current Italian politics of both dignity and significance.

THE AMERICAN ENIGMA

This issue goes to press just as the U. S. State Department makes its sensational announcement that it was not consulted about the veto on Sforza and does not approve of the step: "We expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside." The statement repudiates with even more emphasis current British actions in Belgium and Greece: "This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to governments of the United Nations in their liberated territories."

What is behind this dramatic (and rather unexpected, in view of past American policies) demarche is not yet known. The precipitating cause may have been the active support now being given by British regiments and tanks to Papandreou government's police and soldiery in the heavy street fighting now going on in Athens. ("SPITFIRES STRAFE LEFTISTS IN ATHENS" headlines today's Times.) The general cause may be the politically impossible situation created by the clash between Churchill's extreme line and the strong popular forces in Europe. Being less vitally concerned with European power-politics than England, American capitalism can afford a little democratic moralizing. The move may also be interpreted as a gesture of support for Russia against Britain. What, if anything, the State Department will do to back up its admirable sentiments remains to be seen.

Warsaw (3)

At this writing, it is just four months after the Polish underground began its heroic and tragic uprising against the Germans in Warsaw, under the illusion that the Red Army, which had arrived within ten or fifteen miles of the city, would join forces with them inside Warsaw in a few days. The Red Army has not yet taken Warsaw. Some of the story of the war's most shameful betrayal has already been told in previous instalments. Later data herewith.

With his customary energy in such matters, Stalin already had his puppet "National Committee of Polish Liberation" appoint a puppet "Lord Mayor of Warsaw." (The taking of the city by the Red Army is a mere military detail; plenty of time for that later; the important thing is that the political interests of the inhabitants of Warsaw—if any—are now in reliable hands.) On November 22, Radio Moscow carried the following broadcast by this official, one Spychalski, describing the interview he had just had with Stalin as one of a delegation of citizens of Warsaw. Any comment would be gilding the lily.

"Marshal Stalin and Foreign Commissar Molotov received us in an extremely friendly manner, and Marshal Stalin showed an almost brotherly interest in the condition of Warsaw and the needs of its population. He inquired about the destruction wrought upon the city by the Nazis and assured us that the Soviet Union is prepared to assist her ally, Poland, in the reconstruction of our beautiful capital. In giving this assurance, he said: 'And what the Soviet Union promises, it unfailingly carries out.' Our discussion lasted for more than two hours, and Marshal Stalin made many exceptionally valuable comments on the military as well as the political situation. While all of us were very grateful to the great leader of the Soviet people, we were hesitant to take up more of his time.

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But he insisted that he could 'always find time for the brotherly Polish people.'

"In our conversations, Marshal Stalin stressed particularly the need for friendship and alliance between all people of Slav nationality. . . . Our visit in Moscow has given us new inspiration for our efforts towards the speedy liberation of our country and all other tasks."

Reports are now coming out that during the Warsaw insurrection the Red Army arrested and disarmed many units of the Polish Underground Army which were marching toward Warsaw to help in the fighting. Some of them were actually imprisoned in the same prison camp at Maidanek where the Nazis executed hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews. Other Polish units which had fought side by side with the Red Army were later arrested after the worst fighting was over—notably General Filipowski's regiment, which had preceded the Red Army in the Lwow sector and which was disarmed and imprisoned by the Russians even when they had gained control of the district. General Filipowski has not been heard from since. These reports have been published in the London Dziennik Polski, official organ of the London Government-in-Exile. They have not been rebutted by the Russians to date.

The spinelessness and moral insensibility of present-day American liberalism appeared in the way the liberal press handled the Warsaw risings. The New Leader, of course, was an honorable exception; Liston Oak's columns printed much valuable material, often in advance of the daily press. So was Common Sense, whose September issue contained an honest editorial on the Russian policy towards the uprising. But those modern Pilates, our liberal editors, washed their hands of the whole business. ("What is truth?" said jesting Pilate and would not stay for an answer.) The dailies, PM and the Post, ignored the issue when they didn't print the usual Stalinoid rationalizations.

The Nation editorially took its notorious Moscow Trial Line—"We'll know the truth in a hundred years; until then, we must suspend judgment." In the September 23 issue appeared the only editorial I saw on the subject. Its classic beginning: "The full truth about the Warsaw patriots' uprising will not be known until after the war. Reports emanating from Moscow, from Lublin, from London and from beleaguered Warsaw itself simply do not jibe. The fate of the Warsaw fighters has been so dimly seen through thick clouds of political controversy." (It used to be the job of an editor of a paper like The Nation to penetrate "thick clouds of political controversy" and to decide, in case of conflicting reports, where the weight of evidence lay. But that was B.K.—Before Kirchwey. It is evident now that the complexities of the modern world have become too much for the good lady. Especially when she confronts the horrifying situation of the report which has the least factual evidence behind it being also the one which has the most state power behind it.) To preserve its liberal franchise, The Nation printed one excessively cautious article on Warsaw by W. R. Malinowski, an official spokesman for the London Committee who was so diplomatic that he ventured not a word of direct criticism of Russia; and two not at all cautious articles by the magazine's regular Moscow correspondent, the veteran Stalinist hack, Anna Louise Strong.

The New Republic also had little to say editorially about the affair, and what little it said was on The Nation plane. Its regular contributor, Heinz H. F. Eulau, gave a perfect specimen of liblab evasion when confronted by crimes committed by the wrong people when he wrote in the Sept. 25 issue: "The Soviet offensive may have been stalled before Warsaw, but aid by air might have been possible. Regard-
The nations entered this war with a well-developed body of inter-enemy law codified mainly in the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva conventions of 1929. To be sure, some of the laws have been wantonly broken, and all of them may be set aside in the interest of "military necessity." But they have important characteristics of law nevertheless: they have been agreed to by a great majority of the nations; they are known not only as "laws of war" but also as "laws and customs of war," and so represent practices already in general acceptance; and they enjoy enough popular esteem to be honored in the breach, as many a propagandist has appreciated and many an offender has regretted.

This general support and practice of inter-enemy law rests on a persistent, though often weak, inter-enemy ethic. Four instances of this ethic will illustrate. There is an ethic (1) that some justification should be had for making war, (2) that some warning should be given the enemy that war is upon him, (3) that the non-fighting enemy has certain rights, and (4) that even the fighting enemy is entitled to some considerations.

There is an ethic that some justification should be had for going to war.

When Mr. Oliver Lyttelton recently extemporized to the effect that "Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor," a warm denial came promptly from Secretary of State Hull: "the statement of the British Minister of Production is entirely in error as to the facts . . . ," he said. "This government from the beginning to the end was actuated by the simple policy of self-defense . . . ." In short, this government could not tolerate the suggestion that we might have "provoked" anyone to war, however well meant the suggestion. Mr. Hull felt called upon to reinforce our justification for being in war; we had invoked war's horrors in "self-defense," but we would never have provoked them.

The Secretary of State was doing what secretaries of state have been doing since antiquity, for governments have long expended considerable energy merely justifying their participation in war. It was the Hague "Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities" which made of war justification a modern law, requiring that a state shall preface war with a declaration "giving reasons."

Reasons given in this war have not differed much from those of World War I. Hitler, President Roosevelt, Tojo, and the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, for instance, made the following statements in their declarations of war. (Before seeing the next paragraph, it might be interesting to try matching statement and speaker.)
upon to connect himself with “peaceful regulation” as con-
trasted to the enemy against whose “weapons” he must
now hurl “the defense forces.”

The significance of this standardization of war justifica-
tion is not, however, the cynical conclusion that all gov-
ernments are equally moral or immoral. All governments
are not. The significant fact is that for some reason major
populations everywhere need an ethical shot in the arm
before indulging the extremities of war. It might be re-
vealing to know why.

2

Before considering the possible origins of the war-justi-
fication ethic, however, the remaining three instances of
inter-enemy ethics should be described; for all of them
appear to have common origins.

There is, secondly, an ethic that some warning should
be given the enemy that war is upon him:

Contrary to general opinion, the Axis practice of attack
without declaration—or, at best, of simultaneous attack and
declaration—is not new in modern war. One study of the
period 1700-1872, for instance, reveals that modern states
gave warning of their warlike intentions in less than ten
cases, the record for hostilities prior to declaration stand-
ing thus: “Britain struck thirty of these blows, France
thirty-six, Russia seven, Prussia seven, Austria twelve, and
the United States five at least.”*

Despite this record, though, the states had by 1899 found
the war-warning practice worth a “Convention Relative to
the Opening of Hostilities.” Says Article I: “The contracting
powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must
not commence without previous and explicit warning, in
the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or
of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”

That this law has the support of a fairly general ethic
is indicated by the fact that World War I declarations on
both sides rated “attack without warning” high in their
propaganda tables. In this war too the Allies have been
given ample opportunity by the Axis to exploit the ethic,
culminating in the clear case of Japan’s “sneak attack”
which did so much to unite American opinion.

On first sight it might seem perfectly obvious that at-
tacked and even unattacked populations should be outraged
by “stabs in the back.” But it is perfectly obvious only
if one takes the war-warning ethic for granted. And it
cannot be taken for granted when carefully examined; for
just why in war, where surprise is held legitimate on all
hands, there should exist this strong ethic against one par-
ticular kind of surprise is by no means perfectly obvious.

3

In a press conference held after he had succeeded
von Rundstedt on Germany’s west wall, Marshal von Kluge
called for a war fought by “high standards of chivalry,”
and claimed to have stood “shocked” before the “half-
destroyed” Rouen Cathedral, “the same cathedral which in
1940 I saved from destruction.” Whether or not the mar-
shall himself cares much for either chivalry or the Rouen
Cathedral is of little significance. The significant point is

that all discerning militarists pay at least lip service to the
rights and immunities of non-fighting persons and places;
for there is an ethic that the non-fighting enemy has certain
rights and immunities:

In theory he is to enjoy these rights both before and
after he comes under his enemy’s control. Before he is
occupied, the law says that his undefended centers, build-
ings of art, religion, medicine, and charity are immune to
bombardment. And, according to the Hague “Convention
Concerning Naval Bombardment,” his undefended ports
are not to be shelled even though he has laid automatic
contact mines off his shores.

After he is occupied, the non-fighting enemy may expect
a law-abiding enemy to allow practically all securities
guaranteed by his own government: he cannot be pillaged
“even when taken by storm”; he cannot be forced to give
out information concerning his nation’s army; he is not
to be put under pressure to swear allegiance to his new
government; his “family honor,” life, religion and private
property are his own with but few exceptions in the latter;
and all things requisitioned are to be paid for.

So runs the theory, and it is a theory on which realists
might gag when the systematic pulverization of civilian
centers by both sides and the frequent mistreatment of oc-
cupied peoples by the Axis are so obviously the rule.
Even on paper the non-fighting enemy is not so respected
as the laws might indicate, for his immunities are fully
contingent on any commander’s interpretation of the omni-
elastic term “military necessity,” and his high places are
given no consideration if they aid his army’s defenses in
any way.

Nevertheless, there does exist an international ethic fa-
voring non-combatant persons and places. During the first
World War, for instance, both sides scrupulously claimed
only “military objectives” for their aerial bombing while
in this war the enemies have found that an enemy who
bombs “cultural centers” and civilians is worth his weight
in propagandic gold. If there existed no ethic at all on
this matter of non-combatants, the militaries could destroy
at will without giving any excuse to neutrals, the enemy,
and their own people.

4

The inter-enemy ethic does not end with the non-com-
batant, however. There is a fourth ethic that even the fight-
ing enemy is entitled to certain considerations:

Once in a great while a legal statement attains poetic
majesty by stooping to simplicity. Article XXII of the
Hague “Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land” is a case in point. It says simply: “The
right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited.” Article XXIII goes on to declare that
“it is especially forbidden” to use poison or poisoned
weapons, “to kill or wound treacherously,” to kill or wound
a defenseless man who has surrendered or laid down his
arms, to declare that no quarter will be given, or to employ
arms “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” Later
conventions declare specifically against expanding bullets
and asphyxiating gas.

The modern philosophy on which these laws are based
goes back to the “Declaration of St. Petersburg” (1868)

which reasons that in war “the only legitimate object . . . is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . .; for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; . . . this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which unusually aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death inevitable . . .”

No one, including the international lawyers, pretends that war is fought courteously. But when a Nazi soldier reportedly waved a white cloth and then shot the American who advanced toward him, a correspondent had one more incident to warm American blood. If the Nazi had killed the American in two-way combat, or even as a concealed sniper, U. S. citizens would have felt his kill as bad but legitimate. But “to kill or wound treacherously” is felt as deplorable; for there is an ethic that “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” And before this ethic civilized militaries cannot afford to show themselves wantonly cruel or treacherous either to the enemy, to neutrals, or to their own nationals.

These laws and ethics exist for the able-bodied fighting enemy. There are also ethics for the wounded, the captured, and even the dead fighting enemy.

*The Wounded:* Perhaps the ethic favoring the hurt enemy is the strongest. For unlike other inter-enemy law, it cannot be denounced until one year after war has ended, and is applicable even to non-contracting powers. Codified most recently in the Geneva Convention of 1929, it provides generally that one shall give his hurt enemy impartial medical attention or must allow his own medical corps immunity to do so. More specifically, it is said that the army holding the field is to aid and protect its wounded enemies; if no one holds the field, a local armistice may be called to remove the wounded. At all times the enemy’s marked medical personnel and materials are immune to attack unless they “commit acts injurious to the enemy”; and if any of the enemy’s medical personnel are by chance captured, they and their property are to be returned as soon as possible. The medical, then, is something of a trans-enemy guild, treating all impartially and being treated impartially by all.

The Allies in this war appear to have a good record on the treatment of enemy wounded.

We will not know the Axis record until some years after the war, of course, but isolated accounts of indifference indicate that it will not be as good as that of the Allies. Whatever the details of offenses, however, the important fact remains that there is a widespread feeling that the hurt enemy should be cared for.

*The Captured:* If a soldier were captured in an ancient Greek or Roman war, he might well expect to be killed or enslaved with only a bare outside chance of being exchanged. If he were taken in a medieval war, his best chance was to be held like a criminal prisoner for ransom. The captured man today is pretty well assured that he will at least be kept alive and finally returned to his home. Rousseau has developed incisively the ideal on which this modern treatment of prisoners is supposed to be built. “War,” he writes, “is a relation between state and state in which individuals are enemies only accidentally (and they can be hurt only) while they are bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender . . . they become once more merely men whose life no one has any right to take.”

The Geneva Convention of 1929 is the most recent codification of this prisoner ethic. To summarize, it says the prisoner is strictly in the hands of the detaining government—not of his immediate captors—and that he is to be “humanely treated” and protected by it “particularly against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity.” Broadly he retains his “full civil status,” for he cannot be forced to give information concerning his own army and country; his personal effects may not be taken, nor his money without a receipt and entry to his account. He can correspond with his home; can be imprisoned only when necessary; and is entitled to the same food, shelter, medical aid, recreation, work hours and wages as his captor counterpart.

Whatever work the prisoner does, it may not be of a military nature; if he commits an offense, there are laws to make his punishment commensurate with his offense; and punishment may be meted only after a trial in im-
portant cases, details of which must be given to representa-
tives of a "Protecting Power" such as, say, Sweden.

Even his beliefs, prejudices, and class distinctions receive
attention. Whatever religious service he prefers must be
allowed him, and as to his prejudices: "Belligerents shall
so far as possible avoid assembling in a single camp pri-
soners of different races or nationalities." If he is an
officer, he receives the same respect paid him in his own
army; retains all his insignia of rank, may be provided
with orderlies, can be put to work only at his own request,
and, in case of group discipline, is not to be imprisoned
with privates and non-commissioned men. Broadly speak-
ing, then, the law has it that the war prisoner retains all
his home rights with the exception of being detained and
of being subject to the enemy's standard of living.

The prisoner ethic has been generally respected by both
sides in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe.
On the Russo-German front, however, the record shows bar-
arous exceptions: the Germans appear to have slaughtered
numerous Russian prisoners; the Russians in turn have
killed ten to fifteen times more Germans than they have
captured in several battles. The ethic is practically non-
existent in the Pacific: the Japanese have murdered Amer-
ican and English prisoners in Hong Kong and Japan; the
Anglo-Saxons in turn have managed to take only a few
prisoners, the Americans taking only 377 up to January
7, 1944; and only 225 prisoners as against 12,233 Japanese
killed in the recent battles of Peleliu and Anguar.

How are these battles of extermination to be explained?
From the American and Russian standpoint, they are to be
explained largely by the fact that they are fighting ruthless
attackers who are also ruthless resisters. But explanation
must also include the facts that (1) the totalitarian systems
of Germany, Japan and Russia place less value on human
life than the bourgeois-humanitarian systems of England
and America; and (2) inter-enemy barbarism reaches a
high when widely disparate value systems clash as con-
tested to the clash of mere organizational divisions (e.g.,
a medieval war code forbids the crossbow in intra-Christian
wars but allows it in Christian-Mohammedan wars.)

If the barbarism found on these fronts of the war does
point to a new disparity in value systems, the disparity in
turn may well point to certain deep revolutionary develop-
ments of which the present war is symptomatic. Thus once
again there enters a new piece of evidence favoring the
"revolutionary" interpretation of this war. Of such an
interpretation there are of course many varieties repre-
sented by such writers as Mannheim, Burnham, Chamber-
lin, and Drucker, the last two dealing particularly in value
revolution. Perhaps Ernst Troeltsch, the German historian,
supplies a fruitful lead on German behavior when he says
that German thought was never really saturated with the
Stoic natural law concept which most Western thought in-
erited via Roman law. Consequently, he concludes, Ger-
man thought has not felt as strongly bound by universal
law as by folk thought. If his analysis is correct, it may
be, then, that folk thought has elected to throw off the
bourgeois ethos to which it tentatively submitted at the
Hague and Geneva, declaring some of its enemies practic-
ally below law and treating those enemies accordingly.
This same eruption of folk thought through a thin crust
of bourgeois ethics may be the case with Japan also. If
it is correctly reported that Japanese inter-enemy thought
declares all fair in war and further makes no allowance
for the enemy's "saving face," that interpretation of Jap.
anean atrocities would be tenable.

But what might be called a counter-revolution in values
by Germany and Japan exists in weaker form as a revolu-
tion in values in Russia especially and among also the
Anglo-Saxons, for it seems clear that all of us have imbibed
something of the "folk law" notion out of our strong
ethical relativism. In other words, major populations
everywhere may be on the verge of knowing what it is
like to live in a society where every group's ethical cri-
teron is merely "I like it." How far this revolution in
values will carry us into new barbarisms before the ethic-
makeing forces catch up is difficult to predict.

And the Dead: A few weeks ago a U. S. Navy chaplain
on Saipan held services over the graves of three hundred
Japanese. "When a man is dead," he commented, "he is
beyond human hatred." Apparently many Americans feel
with the chaplain, for many were reportedly shocked re-
cently when pretty girls began posing with souvenir Jap.
anese skulls and when President Roosevelt received a letter
opened carved from a Japanese arm bone. "The President
lit a cigarette, didn't touch it," says a reporter. And the
Catholic St. Louis Register spoke strongly: "Church law
declares that persons who violate the bodies of the dead,
with a view to ... any evil purpose shall be punished with
a personal interdict. The honor due to the human body
after death should indicate that the skull should be decently
buried. The fact that it is a portion of the body of an
enemy of this country makes no difference."

So an ethic extends even to dead enemies. A belliger-
ent shall make careful examination to confirm his enemies'
death, says the Geneva Convention, and then "shall also
see that they are honorably buried and that the graves are
-treated with respect and may always be found again." From
a practical standpoint, this ethic of the dead enemy is
relatively unimportant. But from a psycho-ethical stand-
point, it is highly suggestive: it is plainly an ethic based
on more than mere reprisal fear and so suggests that the
other ethics described are also generated by common inter-
enemy values as well as simple reprisal fear.

Chief among the limitations on inter-enemy ethics the fol-
lowing may be listed: A. "military necessity"; B. the weak
status of international law; C. the military desire to exploit
every technological advance, and D. what might be called
international "there's a mote in your eye" thinking.
A. During the Hague discussions of war declaration,
Dutch and Russian delegates proposed a minimum time
lapse of twenty-four hours between declaration of war and
actual hostilities. The proposal was turned down, for a
majority of the states did not wish to lose a maximum sur-
prise factor in some future war; and they further feared
what a highly mobile enemy might do in the twenty-four
hour hiatus. All the states were willing to give warning
of war, but considerations of "military necessity" forbade
commitment to any practical time lapse between warning and war.

The fine blade of "military necessity" is kept busy on every detail of inter-enemy lawmaking. Thus when the Austrians opposed a clause prohibiting any military use of civilians, it turned out that they expected campaigning in enemy mountains, and in the mountains one needs guides. Or when the question of soft-shell bullets was raised pointedly, the British responded defensively that they were forced to use such bullets for greater "stopping power" on certain fierce colonial rebels. That was "military necessity."

But however many sins "military necessity" may cover, it has its own limitations. General Eisenhower pointed this out during his Italian campaign when he warned his troops not to mistake mere "military convenience" for military necessity. And commanders not so conscientious as General Eisenhower must not overplay the excuse of military necessity, for the public conscience draws a line against military wantoness — and the support of the public conscience itself is a military necessity.

B. The present weak status of international law—a second limitation on inter-enemy ethics — is illustrated in nearly every inter-enemy convention. Two inevitable clauses illustrate. The first is one limiting the laws to contracting parties only. Thus a state may remain above the law by its sovereign decision, or a nation not included within the convention can be denied any protection of the law. The second limiting clause is one allowing a state to denounce the law usually one year after its announced intention of doing so. Such is the weak status of law in the international community. In a community of individuals these two clauses would mean simply that any individual could at will declare himself above fundamental morality. That is the meaning of "sovereignty."

C. It has been said that war ethics end where striking power begins—that states will not let ethics hamper a promising new weapon. This third limit on inter-enemy ethics is illustrated during every great revolution in armaments: The use of gun powder was declared immoral until its effectiveness was perceived by all. So was the torpedo. But the best illustration is the changed attitude toward aerial bombardment. In 1899 most states were willing enough to sign a "Convention Against Projectiles from Balloons." By 1907 they signed reluctantly. By 1923 a similar convention could not get a majority. In eight years the feeling against aerial bombing waned, and in sixteen more years was defeated. The states had trimmed the ethic to fit the new weapon.

D. Throughout this article there has run the logical assumption that every accusation made against the enemy commits the accuser to just opposite behavior. For example, when one belligerent condemns another before its public as one "little regardful of its pledged word," it logically commits itself to a high standard of international ethics—to being very "regardful of its pledged word."

But this logic cannot be pushed too far, for it is well known that nations like individuals more easily abjure mores in their neighbour's eye than beams in their own. This there's-a-mote-in-your-eye thinking constitutes a fourth important limit on inter-enemy ethics. Under it, Germans could be outraged by an accidental bombing of a large country hospital near Frankfurt, but apparently little upset by the "Coventryizing" of English cities. Under it Anglo-Saxons could be shocked by the bombings of London, but not generally upset by the "Hamburging" of German cities.

Nevertheless it is to be remembered that we all indulge mote-beam thinking in personal morality, and yet there is an inter-personal morality. One does not strongly commit his neighbour to an ethic without at least weakly committing himself, and one government does not commit another to an ethic without expending considerable propaganda persuading its own people and neutrals that it is living up to the commitment. Why must it do this? The reason must be that populations like persons feel at least weakly bound by the ethics binding their enemies.

The origins of inter-enemy ethics—of any ethics—are not clear. They may originate in two broad human emotions: (1) self-interest and (2) sympathy. It has been argued that a practice based on self-interest is no ethical practice at all. But the argument might well eliminate all "ethics" in human behavior, for self-interest probably lies behind every morality, and inter-enemy ethics is simply a case where this machinery of self-interest is ill-concealed.

On the other hand, it might be said that if self-interest moves every ethic, we cannot then speak of an ethic based also on "sympathy." But obviously there are ethics which individuals obey without any sense of immediate self-interest. Historically such ethics may have developed in self-interest, but for the individual they have become right in their own right. The ethical process has become short-circuited. The individual is not forever asking, "Now, is this in my interest?" He "feels" that something should or should not be done, and this feeling has been labelled "sympathy" in this case of inter-enemy ethics.

A case from American history will illustrate these two shadings of ethical motivation: A hundred years ago men of New England could feel deeply that a war between the South and Mexico was no war of theirs, for the ethos of Federation was still based largely on conscious, intermediate considerations of self-interest. Today every state responds spontaneously when another is threatened by an aggressor, for the ethos of Federation is now based on a feeling. Perhaps another century will give us a similarly spontaneous ethos in international relations.

Motives of self-interest are apparent in every one of the inter-enemy ethics described here. In the case of war-justification, to begin with, it is most likely that men require war slogans out of fear of being hurt by the enemy as well as out of dislike for hurting him. And when the slogans are pared to the core—even when they speak of "peace" and "justice"—it is apparent that most men mean largely "peace" and "justice" for themselves in which they may enjoy their own houses, homes, and institutions. This Walter Lippmann has called a "homely fact."

The war-warning ethic, according to the Hague convention's "purpose," is designed "to insure the maintenance of pacific relations." Presumably this law will help insure pacific relations by making the "war of nerves" a little less so, i.e., by allowing tense states a little more confidence.
and a little less armament in their relations with each other. It might also allow some chance for conciliation between declaration and action, and, as the impoverished (1899) Russian delegates pointed out, it would be a great savings to dispense with great standing armies. Thus for a degree of military security and economic advantage the lawyers codified the war-warning ethic.

And motives of self-interest are equally apparent in the ethics of the non-fighting and fighting enemy. Chief among the motives in this case is clearly fear of retaliation, or, positively, the bargaining power every belligerent holds in its potentiality for brutality. But other motives seem to be active also: There is the fact that today's enemy is tomorrow's customer and the evidence that troops are inclined to panic under conditions of "no quarter given." And finally, there are certain class values such as private property and officers' prestige which one does not want desecrated even among the enemy—a semi-conscious anti-revolutionary precaution perhaps.

But listing these elements of self-interest at work in inter-enemy ethics does not answer the real question of the ethics' origins at all. Obviously self-interest is at work. The important question is, How does self-interest turn into enlightened self-interest? How does it happen that even in the heat of war, states maintain enough enlightened self-interest to stay just above total barbarity? The best statement of this question arises in connection with the war-justification ethic: If men do fight wars mainly out of self-interest, by what process has self-interest come to be so broadly interpreted? How does it happen that, until recently anyway, the slogans had to offer men for their risks not just plunder, the security of their own bodies, families, or even nations, but more—"peace" and even a "just peace." The psycho-historian who can discover how self-interest thus expands into enlightened self-interest will make a basic contribution to the cause of international peace.

The role of sympathy—short-circuited self-interest—is not to be underestimated either. Evidence of a transnational and even of a transenemy sympathy comes in from various directions.

To begin with, there is the very nature of an ethic itself. An ethic is not a purely intellectual code to be taken up and laid down at the order of some government. It is also a deep-rooted habit and emotion which clings to those problems out of which it was developed. Most societies, for example, have developed a strong ethic against homicide; and, from what we know of ethics, it would not be expected that men could easily lay down this ethic even though their government has declared war. Such is the case. Although most men do accommodate themselves to legalized killing, many report considerable conflict in doing so. Some refuse to accommodate at all and so become "war resisters." The in-group ethic has thus extended in dilute form to even the out-group enemy.

A second evidence of inter-enemy "sympathy" rises out of this sort of thinking: "It is in accordance . . . with the spirit of loyalty which nations owe to each other" that war-warning should be given, a French Hague committee-man argued. Here is left behind the level of international convenience. The committee-man is now arguing in terms of personal sportsmanship; he is thinking in terms of the dueling code and is transferring a code for personal antagonists to National antagonists. This transfer goes on constantly in the common man. Brought up in a culture which despises the ambush, the "sneak attack," between individual enemies, he at least weakly transfers the same ethic to his national enemies. It is another instance of moral man and less moral society, and is probably operative in most inter-enemy ethics.

But knowing that inter-enemy ethics are based partly on a "sympathy" transferred from in-group and inter-personal sympathies does not really explain the sympathetic origins of these ethics. We do not know the real origins of sympathy itself. To explain it as "a kind of imaginative flinching" is simply to ask how such "flinching" comes to be, how it comes to be in some people more than in others, and how it comes to extend even a little to the enemy.

In periods of international peace, the international ethos broadens into a wide belt of agreements ranging all the way from the international control of certain river systems through radio wave band allotments to the control of white slavery and scores of other welfare activities. In periods of international war, of course this international ethos is sharply reduced. But it is never completely reduced, for a thin core persists even through war in the form of these "laws and customs of war."

How does such international ethos as we do have come to be? How particularly do we happen to have some ethics so tough as to survive even the rigors of war? If we could understand how international ethos is being generated on such a small scale, we might know much better how to generate a great deal more of the same thing in the service of international peace. Considerable study has been given to the causes of war. Something might be learned now by studying the causes of peace.

Not all of the international body politic is diseased. There are some shreds of health persisting even through war. How, then, does self-interest become enlightened self-interest? And how does "sympathy" arise and expand? The social scientists have here a vast and practical problem.

FOOTNOTE ON "FREE ENTERPRISE"

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15.—Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge . . . referred to an exchange of letters proposing adulteration of the plastic, methyle methacrylate, to make it unsuitable for use in dental plates. He testified that the plastic, which has industrial as well as dental uses, was controlled by "a monopoly clique" which included the du Pont Company, Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia, and the Vernon-Benshoff Company.

Methyl methacrylate was sold for industrial purposes at eighty-five cents a pound, but cost forty-five dollars a pound for dental use, Mr. Berge testified, Mr. Berge continued. The dental profession learned there was no difference of the plastic, methyle methacrylate, to make it unsuitable for use in dental plates. He testified that the plastic, which has industrial as well as dental uses, was controlled by "a monopoly clique" which included the du Pont Company, Rohm & Haas of Philadelphia, and the Vernon-Benshoff Company.

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Mr. Berge asserted, and quoted from a letter he said was written by the Vernon-Benshoff Company on March 15, 1940, suggesting that manufacturers of the commercial molding powders might add some ingredient which would not affect the molding properties, but which would disqualify it under the Pure Food and Drug Law.

Mr. Berge testified that Rohm & Haas replied March 21, 1940, that they were in agreement with the general principles presented in the letter "and that they would turn their research department to work on the matter."—N. Y. Times", Oct. 16, 1943.
Notes on Neo-Functionalism

PAUL GOODMAN

Author’s Note: The esthetics of Functionalism is in many ways an expression of capitalist industrialism and a system of efficiency for profits. By extending the functionalist criterion, however, to cover the ends of production as well as the means, it is possible to come in sight of a more humane style. This extension I have called “Neo-Functionalism.”—P. G.

FUNCTIONALISM is design of the means simply for the end. Such design cannot fail to have a certain beauty, of either directness or of ingenuity, and always the beauty of clarity. But these beauties are consequences of functionalist designing; they are not implicit in the artificial object itself; indeed we may often turn away from the object—once we see how it works—in boredom or disgust. But beauty is a resting in the experience of the object.

In functionalist design, the experience of the means leads us directly to the end or use, but there is no reciprocal relation by which the experience of the ends turns us back to the renewed experience of the means. The form expresses the content; the content never expresses the form: it is not a content formal in itself.

To be sure, no true functionalist ever leaves the use or end or content uncriticized. On the contrary, the practitioners of this method of design are perhaps too intensely social-conscious to have the playful freedom that is the prerogative of art. But the criticism of the end is in terms of the grand social utility, efficiency, and satisfaction; it is not immediately and directly turned back on the production itself of the object, but only comes to this indirectly thru considering the health, labor and happiness of all the working class; but then we are far from the easy, immediate satisfactoriness of art.

The neo-functionalist goes further and reciprocally criticizes the end in terms of its producing means: Is the use, he asks, as simple or ingenious or clear as the efficient means that have produced it? He insists on a much closer scrutiny of the utility of the ends than does the functionalist; he keeps his eye more immediately on the object itself and asks, is it worthwhile? Obviously his scrutiny is much too close for our complicated civilization which requires that almost everything be overlooked a little, that it is not immediately and directly turned back on the production itself of the object, but only comes to this indirectly thru considering the health, labor and happiness of all the working class; but then we are far from the easy, immediate satisfactoriness of art.

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Yet even on political and ethical grounds, our friend is not such a fool, for he asks (a little quizzically): If the usefulness of your immense productive machine is the happiness, the pleasure, the welfare, and the intellect of all mankind, why not start here now with this man making, using, and experiencing this object that we are considering? (In character the neo-functionalist man seems at the same time crotchety and easy-going: he takes exception to much that is universally accepted; he stops to praise many things universally disregarded, such as the custom of sitting-on slum sidewalks with or without chairs. Some persons interpret his tastes as simple laziness; but he sees no reason to be busy so long as he is not bored.)

This esthetics which asks both for the efficiency of the means toward the end and of the human appropriateness of the end to its means, is the trained feeling of the truth that in ethics one cannot ultimately distinguish means and end, for the means also consumes one’s time of life, and the end of life is to live well also during that time. Any end is prima facie suspicious if its means too do not give satisfaction.

Meantime the neo-functional object stands before us expressing an humane appropriateness thru and thru: an easy body for the breath of the creator spirit to bring alive.

The Uniforms of Nurses

At a great municipal laundry in New York is done the washing and ironing of all the city’s hospitals. Now it comes out on investigation that most of the work is done by a small part of the labor and machinery, but the small remainder of the work requires all the rest of the labor. This is the kind of situation that at once puts our neo-functionalist friend on the alert.

He finds that most of the labor goes into ironing the uniforms of the doctors and nurses, but especially into ironing the frilly aprons and bonnets,—for all the washing and the flat-work is done by machine and mangle, but these require hand-finishing.

Now if these nurses’ uniforms were made of seersucker, for instance, they would not have to be ironed. If the hats were in the form of colored kerchiefs they would equally well indicate the school from which the nurses have graduated.

These considerations are presented to the city-fathers who decide that they are impractical, but who at the same time want a functional laundry to be designed.

The Museum of Art

And suppose that a number of mighty masterpieces of painting and statuary (we mean such works from which the creator spirit speaks in a kind of universal and timeless language, and why should he not one morning therefore speak also to you or me?)—suppose they were decentralized from their museum and placed one in this neighborhood church and one on this fountain in a local square, wherever there is a little quiet or a place to pause. A few of the neighbors would soon come to have a friendly acquaintance with, and a somewhat proprietary feeling for, their priceless masterpiece. What! They are not to be trusted so close with such a treasure?

These pieces of thread and dust do not exist except one by one in the soul of a man, no matter how much you heap them up together before a crowd.

A stranger, who has heard from afar of the fame of this work and already he loves it in prospect, will come to visit the local square where he would otherwise never have adventured.

The Theory of Packages

In general, when the consumption of a product is far removed from its production,—removed by the geographical distance between factory and home, removed by the economic distance of sale and resale up to the retail, and removed by the temporal distance between making and use,—the product is encased in a series of Packages. There is the shipper’s crate and the wholesaler’s case and the middleman’s carton and the retailer’s box, and the waterproof airtight cellophane wrapper that must be kept in-
violates and intact except by the ultimate bridegroom, the eater.

These packages are the career of the physical goods as a salable commodity; and once the last wrapper has been broken, the commodity is destroyed, it is no longer marketable. It has been corrupted by all the moisture and air and germs of life; it has been corrupted by the passionate fact that some one actually desires the thing enough to dare to touch it rather than sell it. Economically then, this is the sacramental moment, when the man or woman brutally breaks the wrapper and takes the bread out of circulation. (From any point of view, the first insipid taste is less important.)

The theory of Packages is a corollary of Ralph Borsodi's blanket principle that: As the cost of production per unit decreases by mass production, the cost of distribution increases because of intermediary services involved in mass-distribution. From this principle he derives the paradox of Prosperity and Insecurity, for the apparent copiousness of commodities entails the subordination of the consumer to a large economical machine which can become deranged in many of its parts and leave him without the most elementary necessities. But Borsodi's principle must be closely interpreted or it is obviously fallacious: It must not be taken to mean that machine-production and labor-saving devices are humanly inefficient in themselves, but only when they become too geographically centralized, instead of tending to become community appliances or domestic appliances; and only when the machines become foreign to and unworkable by the citizens, who are then helpless if they are deranged. Borsodi himself is an enthusiast for the domestic machine and for home-industries, but he does not seem to be aware of the possibility of a reasonably large community of integrated industrial, agricultural, cultural, and domestic life such as we have been describing—where the efficiency of machines can be exploited without their inefficiency.

**Time**

In the present economy, a man's time of life is also put into packages; and we speak, as George Woodcock, pointed out in the October POLITICS, of "lengths of time as if they were lengths of calico". And he concluded that the clock, and especially the time-clock that the worker aggressively punches, is the chief machine of industrial exploitation of the capitalist regime, for it enables human labor to be quantified and priced as a commodity in the calculation of the cost and the surplus-value of the other commodities on the market.

This commodity-time is the time of not-life that people step into when they take leave of their hearts and their homes and their time of life, early in the morning. It is the time of the secondary environment ruled over by the inner and forgotten but still authoritative voice of parents who seemed to wish (so children get to think) to deprive one of pleasure and simple ease. Especially in the morning at 20 to 8, and late in the afternoon at 20 after 4, the fatherly face of the clock is frowning, deeper first on the right side, then on the left.

**The Theory of Home Furnishings**

The theory of Home Furnishings is that the furniture limited to a private house expresses, in its quantity and kind, a certain division of the concerns of the soul; and that in different community arrangements this division will fall in different places.

On the principle of neo-functionalist, the place where the chief material outlay is made should give the chief satisfaction of the soul. If this rule is neglected, the material outlay will be a dead weight, discouraging both by its initial cost and its continuing presence any satisfaction that could be gotten elsewhere.

Now in the communities we see everywhere in our country (except in the most isolated wilds), the chief material outlay is the public city itself with its services. But these streets and squares and public highways do not pretend to compete in satisfaction with the private homes or the theatres of fantasy. They are a dead weight on these other satisfactions: one emerges from the theatre into an environment that is not more but less exciting, and one emerges from home into an environment that is completely impersonal and rather uninteresting. Even where, by exception, the streets and squares are beautiful, they charm the eye, they do not arouse the energies of the soul. Yet, given our economy and politics, it is always necessary to emerge, not as if one were a medieval baron or a farmer on a relatively self-subsistent farm.

Let us rather take a lesson from the Greeks, who were most often practical in what concerned the chief end, and did not complicate their means beyond what was animating. An Athenian (if free and male) experienced in the public places of the city—the market-place, the law-court, the porticoes, the Gymnasia—many of the feelings of ease, intimacy, and personal excitement that we reserve for home-gatherings and private clubs; he lived in the city even more than at home; and these feelings had for their objects the affairs of an empire as well as the passions of private friendship. There was no sharp distinction between private affairs and public affairs.

Correlated with this, both as its cause and its effect, and also being the very same thing, was a system of direct democracy, in which each man participated personally, not thru representatives, in vast legislative bodies and mass juries.

On these civic places and public institutions they lavished an expense of architecture, mulcted from an empire, which with us would be simply deadening—but the thousands of free men were there, as if at home, personally making political decisions (such as they were) for that empire.

An Athenian home was not, therefore, the refuge, the asylum of a man's personality; leaving it he did not cease to be himself. It did not therefore have to be so filled with the furniture, the mirrors, the keepsakes, the curios, the games, that are the comfort and distraction of a soul pent-up.

But a bourgeois gentleman, when he is about to leave his home in the morning, kisses his wife and daughter; then he steps before the mirror and adjusts his tie; and then, the last thing before emerging, he puts on his public face.

The most curious examples of these heavily furnished homes that are the insane-asylums of the spirit frozen and rejected in the city-square, can best be found among the middle-classes at the beginning of the present century. And the most curious room of this most curious home is not the bedroom, the dining-room, or the parlor, where all there existed natural and social satisfactions, but the master's den, the jungle and the cavern of his reveries.

"Public Faces in Private Places"

It is always a question whether the bourgeois den is worse or better than no personal home at all, this latter
being the norm of those states ancient and modern wherein men are public animals and homes dormitories or barracks. But it has remained for our own generation to perfect the community arrangement that is incontestably the worst possible: namely, the home of the average American. This home is liberally supplied with furniture and the comforts of private life; and these private things are neither made nor chosen by personal creation or idiosyncratic taste, but they are made in a distant factory and distributed by irresistible advertising. At home they exhaust the energy by their presence (the energy that a bare cell would at least force back inward into sublimation); and they print this experience with a public meaning. But if we turn to read this public meaning, we find that the only psychological aim of the society is the provision of private satisfactions, called "the standard of living". It is not in politics or humane culture or even war; aims which are genuinely public. This is remarkable! The private places have public faces, but the public faces are supposed to imitate private faces. Where can anything salty or characteristic accidentally happen in this booby-trap? But boredom will set us free.

A Japanese House

"One of the surprising features that strikes a foreigner as he becomes acquainted with the Japanese house is the entire absence of so many things that with us clutter the closets, and make squirrel nests of the attic. The reason for this is that the people have never developed the miserly spirit of hoarding truck and rubbish with the idea that some day it may come into use." (Edward Morse).

"Swallows are encouraged to build nests in the home, in the room most often used by the family. A shelf is built below the nest. The children watch the construction of the nest and the final rearing of the young birds." (Ibid).

"One comes to realize how few are the essentials necessary for personal comfort... and that his personal comfort is enhanced by the absence of many things deemed indispensable. In regard to the bed and its arrangement, the Japanese have reduced the affair to its simplest expression. The whole floor, the whole house indeed, is a bed, and one can fling oneself down on the soft mats, in the draught or out of it, upstairs or down, and find a smooth, firm and level surface upon which to sleep." (Okakura)

"When a tea master has arranged a flower to his satisfaction, he will place it in the tokonoma, the place of honor in a Japanese room. Nothing else will be placed near it which might interfere with its effect, not even a plant; unless there be some special aesthetic reason for the combination. It rests there like an enthroned prince, and the guests or disciples on entering the room will salute it with profound bows..." (Okakura)

The Japanese house is essentially one big room, divided by sliding screens into as many or as few units as desired. Exterior and interior are also one.

"UPON WHAT MEAT DOTH THIS OUR CAESAR FEED...?"

"One hundred years from now, the people of the world will worship at the shrine of Franklin D. Roosevelt."

—Dean Alfange at Liberal Party rally, Oct. 31, 1944.

"In the years to come, the people of Italy will hail this day for Columbus the Navigator and Roosevelt the Liberator."

—Attorney-General Biddle at the Columbus Day dinner of the Italian-American Labor Council.

EUROPEAN NEWSREEL

Greece—Reasons Why

Britain's strategic interests in the Mediterranean demand that Greece must always remain in the British sphere of influence. Churchill remained adamant on this score at the recent Moscow conference. The City, however, has additional reasons why it cannot allow those misguided Greeks to oust their king and set up a popular regime. PM's Selwyn James has revealed a part of the story. The City holds the greatest part of the Greek National Debt. The original loans which date back from the 19th century have actually been paid back several times over but the interest rate of about 8% keeps Greece chained to The City. It had been stipulated by London that one-third of the Greek budget had to be set aside for the service of these loans. Thus even during the depression year 1930-31, 3,150,000,000 drachmas out of a total budget of 9,970,000,000 went to pay interest on the debt. Moreover, this debt had always to be serviced in gold, at a time when Britain paid her own debts in depreciated pounds. Some months ago the British Foreign Office presented a memorandum to the Greek government in exile demanding that it continue to "safeguard the rights and securities at present enjoyed by Greek external loans and to protect the interests of the bond holders."

In 1932, the Greek Republican government reduced the service on the debt. The City was in an uproar. This temerity was to be punished. Thus in 1935 King George was brought back to Greece with the aid of the British. Interest payments were resumed...

The City realizes that for the moment Greece is bled white; Britain is even ready to supply some temporary aid to put the country on its feet again. But after a while Greece is expected to resume payments: 8% plus King George—no wonder that the British are not exactly popular in Athens.

P.S.—Nearly all the Greek Public Utility Companies are in British hands—there again, what a catastrophe for the City if they were to be nationalized as the Greek Resistance has been demanding.

On September 14, the new French Minister of Information, Henri Teitgen, declared: "The Ministry of Information is a Ministry of liberty of the press. We know what liberty is." On October 17, the Paris paper Combat stated: "At the head of this column should have appeared an important news item. It has been censored although it had no relation to military operations." On November 10, France-Soir appeared with one blank column—deleted by the censor. The same day, the left-wing Franca-Tireur appeared without an editorial "for reasons beyond our control," while the conservative Figaro announced that "the censor has seen fit at the last minute to defer publication of our editorial."

Political Re-grouping in France

The National Liberation Movement which includes the strongest non-Stalinist Resistance organizations (Franca-Tireur, Combat, Libération, etc.) held a congress in Paris at the end of October. The congress decided to open negotiations with the French Socialist Party and with the National Front (which is under Stalinist control) "with the view to formulating a common doctrine which would permit
common action.” At the same time, the congress rejected the Stalinist proposal to present a “single list” of the entire Resistance movement at the municipal elections to be held next February. The Stalinist Humanité has severely criticized this decision while the Socialist Populaire has welcomed both resolutions. There seems to be a decided rapprochement between the Socialist Party and the National Liberation Movement, which is not altogether surprising since many leading Socialists, like André Philip and Pierre Bloch, have played an important role in Libération and Franc-Tireur.”

On the other hand, a large number of young men with a right-wing background, in Combat for example, have also acquired what in traditional party terms would be described as a Socialist outlook. They have been most active in pressing for the full program of action of the National Council of Resistance, which includes the nationalization of all trusts and complete democratic liberties. It is noteworthy that the struggle of liberation has not turned their eyes toward a narrow chauvinism but toward a European outlook. They have rejected all tendencies toward a “single party.” It is to be expected that there will be eventually a merger between many of these elements and the Socialist Party. As the government shows ever more openly its reactionary character, they as well as the Socialist Party will be forced to choose between De Gaulle and the democratic-socialist ideals to which they subscribe. It is significant that Franc-Tireur as well as Libération have protested very vigorously against the dissolution of the Patriotic Militia by the government, while all the right wing papers like Aube, France Libre, Parisien Libéré, Défense de la France, have applauded.

Here and There

BERLIN, 1944: Contacts between German Volksgenossen and racially inferior foreign workers is strictly forbidden and will be severely punished. Officials have been perturbed about increasing sympathy between German and foreign workers.

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, 1944: The recent order from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower prohibiting American troops from fraternizing with the Germans in occupied territory is being enforced so rigidly that the doughboys now refer to chatting with civilians as “the $65 dollar offense.” The order is being interpreted in such a way as to make casual conversation with a German “unnecessary contact” and punishable by fines of $25 to $65. This strict disciplinary procedure, which even prohibits soldiers from asking for street directions or playing with children was instituted after high Administration officials became disturbed at reports that American soldiers were dining and talking with German civilians in occupied territory.

The character of a regime appears in its financial measures. The Belgian government—God knows not too progressive—decided to stop runaway inflation by freezing bank accounts and by a forced confiscation of all banknotes in larger denominations. The De Gaulle government proceeded differently. Its late Minister of Finance Lepercq (of whom we wrote last month—and who was recently killed in an accident) saw to that. It was decided not to confiscate any hoarded banknotes (an estimated 200,000,000,000 Frs.) or to freeze accounts, but rather to issue a 3% Liberation Loan with the hope that all the hoarders and blackmarketeers would subscribe so that hoarded notes would thus flow back and inflation be halted. An astounding solution, indeed. The Vichy profiteers are not only to go unpunished but will even be guaranteed a safe government investment at 3%. The Lyons radio, in line with the National Committee of Resistance, has been attacking these measures sharply and has called for large scale confiscations of hoarded notes. It estimates that French taxpayers will have to pay some 120,000,000 francs every year in order to pay the interest on the new loan. The loan is called a “Liberation Loan”. In reality it marks a triumph of blackmarketeers and collaborationists over those who fought for liberation.

There is Forced Labor and Forced Labor

At the recent annual meeting of the British Trade Union Congress, the president of the TUC restated in his opening speech that body’s previous stand on the German question when he said: “Policies of vengeance and nationalism as distinct from economic well-being are based on capitalist theories and not on Socialist fundamentals . . . German workers will not be excluded from world labor organization.”

There was, however, a difference between this TUC congress and last year’s: this one included representatives from the country that used to be known as “The Workers’ Fatherland.” And so, before the congress was over, the president’s policy had been reversed, and a report by the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee had been adopted. This report, for which the delegates from the “Workers’ Fatherland” bear chief responsibility, states that the German people share in the guilt of their rulers for Nazi atrocities and should therefore be punished also.

Some difficulties arose, however, on the matter of forced labor. The TUC majority cheerfully accepted the principle of forced German labor after the war—for rebuilding Russia, at least. But they had qualms about its effect on the British labor market. Jack Tanner, head of the big Amalgamated Engineering Union—according to Keith Hutchinson in the Nation—rose grandly to the occasion and “appealed to the Russians to recognize the difference between using forced labor in a socialist country and in a capitalist one . . .”

And who can deny that Russia is at least the forced workers’ fatherland?

Stalin Is Like That

People interested in Polish affairs have been wondering why the voice of Mrs. Wanda Wasilewska, vice-president of the Polish Committee of Liberation (made in Russia) has not been heard recently over Radio Moscow. Mrs. Wasilewska, whose horror story, The Rainbow, is a best seller here, is the best known among the pro-Stalinist Poles. Edgar A. Mowrer now reveals the reason for her disappearance. Says Mowrer: “It appears that Stalin decided to confer upon General Berling, commander of the Poles fighting with the Russians, the supreme Soviet military decoration, the Order of Suvorov. General Berling was prepared to accept. Wanda reminded him who Suvorov was. For Suvorov, after storming the Warsaw suburb of Praga in 1794, murdered 32,000 Poles in cold blood. When Berling remained obdurate, the indomitable Wanda went straight to Stalin and explained to him why Suvorov was anathema to all decent Poles. Stalin grew angry. Wanda Wasilewska has hardly been heard since.” (Berling finally got the Order of Lenin instead). The party hacks who have been praising Wanda’s The Rainbow had better watch out!
"We Want to Be Exploited"

The Russian Tass agency reports from cities in the Russian-occupied North of Iran that mass demonstrations against the government of Premier Mohamed Said are taking place because of its refusal to grant oil concessions to Russia. Tass adds that in many cities more than 20,000 persons had thronged the streets, among them trade union leaders, officials and members of parliament. Moscow papers charge that "reactionaries in Iran have set Premier Said to the task of smashing workers' and democratic organizations."

That Iran has a semi-feudal authoritarian government is not news. It is strange, however, that the people of Iran should find no better occasion to stand up against their government than the rejection of a demand for foreign infiltration.

The Russia of Lenin renounced all concessions in Iran. The Russia of Stalin—here also following Czarist tradition—demands concessions. Stalin's new policy in Iran resembles all too closely the classical methods of those whom Lenin used to call "imperialist robbers", with the only difference that Stalin has yet further improved these time honored methods. Nobody as yet conceived the possibility of organizing "trade-union popular manifestations" in favor of the imperialist exploitation of one's own country.

Since the US and Britain are apparently backing the Iran government, the Russian press has begun to attack these powers as well. It was even stated in the Russian press that the US had really no business to stay in Iran, since she had not signed a treaty with that country. As Dwight Macdonald remarked recently in his comments, the "Nouveaux Riches" show a bluntness which the older brethren have long abandoned.

The final touch was given by a statement of the Russian Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs in charge of the oil negotiations. He pointed out that "advantages would accrue to Iran by her granting the Soviet Union the right to exploit these oil reserves. Thousands of Iranian workers would be employed." He also expressed the belief that "the oil survey might uncover iron, steel, copper and other mineral resources which might in the future be utilized to develop Iran's national wealth." In other words, the chief national wealth—oil—will have to go to Russia; but should Iran worry: many other good things may be found in the process!

Cartels

The International Business Conference which has been meeting here during recent weeks received very little publicity, although its proceedings would really deserve at least as much attention as other recent international gatherings. The reasons are obvious. Those who have been meeting here are representatives of the great business interests from all over the world, they prefer quiet dealings to front-page coverage. The little that has been reported about the conference pictures the conflict between American representatives on the one side and British, French and Belgian interests on the other, as the clash of the virtuous Free Enterprisers with the naughty Cartel Boys. Nothing is farther from the truth. The American representatives of Big Business, for example Messrs. Edward Riley of Gen. Motors and Curtis Calder of the American & Foreign Power Co., are by no means opposed to cartel agreements as such. What they oppose is government control in world commerce. The representatives of the "have-not" nations are convinced, on the contrary, that they will be able to compete against the American colossus only if backed by their governments. Because of these fundamentally different attitudes, the conference was a complete failure. The post-war world is likely to see a life and death struggle between American business and the strictly directed "command economies" of Western Europe.

A quaint proposal was made by the head of the English delegations, Sir Clive Bailleul, who proposed that "the word 'cartels' be abandoned in favor of 'trade accords'; a group participating in such an accord could simply be called a trade accord group." So, there's some hope for the liblabs: they haven't yet gotten around to abolish cartels, but the abolition of the word is underway.

Of course, as everybody knows, officials of the Allied Control Commission—beg your pardon, Allied Commission now—are in Italy only to help rebuild the country. Perish the thought that they intervene in things Italian. For example: Recently the Italian government adopted some timid land reform measures strengthening the part of the sharecroppers as against the landholders and providing for the taking over the uncultivated land by agricultural cooperatives. Here is the official reaction of Lt. Col. Hartman, director of the agricultural subcommission of the Allied Commission:

"The taking over of uncultivated land by the farmers' cooperatives leads to the total revolution of the concept of ownership. . . . I refuse to believe that owners would work against their own interests to such an extent that they would not try to get the best possible results from their lands. . . . The change of the law concerning the Mezzadria (a form of sharecropping) is most inopportune at this delicate stage. The existing contracts are based on an age-old experience and up to now have proved to be the most efficient. To make changes, several years of study would be necessary."

How to Tell Progress from Reaction

"America's leading Lib-Lab weekly," the New Leader, is a curious paper. While Algernon Lee, lifelong Socialist, pours his scorn on those who by voting the Socialist ticket "throw their vote away" to—just imagine—a Minority Party, a number of "European Specialists" are assigned to the somewhat embarrassing job of whitewashing all sorts of European reactionaries for the sheer pleasure of hurting the Stalinists. This procedure has of late brought forward some rather startling discoveries. It all started with Michailovich who was praised as an outstanding democrat; then the Greek government of King George and The City was stoutly defended against the shameful attacks by those unruly leftist guerilla fighters who didn't want to join up for National Unity; now it is General Charles De Gaulle who is slowly emerging as the Knight of democracy as against those dirty Communists in the popular Committees of Resistance.

This writer is as much opposed to Stalinism as any of the New Leader experts, but he submits that "to tell progress from reaction" is a somewhat more difficult job than just to look where the CP has some influence and then throw one's weight into the other camp. King George, De Gaulle, William Bullitt and General Michailovich are rather uncomfortable bed fellows. Whether we like it or not, Stalinist influence in all popular movements in Europe will be strong. Backing of reactionaries by Socialists can only make the Stalinist grip on the masses stronger. As
the Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party recently said: "I know of only one way to be stronger than the Communists, and that's to bring about a revolution before they do." Alliances with the last remnants of the forces of the old Europe or with authoritarian elements are a sure way to bury the chances of democratic Socialism in Europe. It is in the French popular liberation committees, in the FFI and in the workers militia that democratic socialist elements are to be found, and not among the Paris ministerial bureaucracy or in the ranks of over-aged former parliamentarians.

Who Says Americans are Not Liked in Europe?

ITALY: "Italian conservatives are wining and dining American and British officials—absolutely convinced that Britain and America will really rule Italy, and that the way they can save themselves and their property is to curry favor with Englishmen and Americans. They love us." (Allen Raymond in Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 23, 1944)

BELGIUM: "Allied forces will assist the government with the view of insuring respect for law and maintenance of order. The orders recently given by the government for the handing in of arms have the approval of the Supreme Command. Allied military forces at the request of the Government, would assist in restoring law and order." (Statement by Gen. Erskine, head of the Allied Military Mission in Belgium).

FRANCE: "Many worried Frenchmen question whether it is time for withdrawal of all Allied military control." (Anne O'Hare McCormick, N. Y. Times, October 28, 1944) "There are some even among De Gaulle's officials—and more outside that circle—who regret that De Gaulle's defense of French sovereignty against the Allies went so far as to prevent the Allies from making in France even the moderate contribution to order that they made in Belgium, where Americans insured the disarmament by Belgians of doubtful elements of the population." (N. Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1944)

"American officials in France greatly hinder and delay the much needed collaborationist purges on the well-intentioned grounds that hasty action now will be regretted later. . . . Meanwhile collaborationists make no attempt to conceal their joy at being protected." (Gazette de Lausanne, Nov. 15).

If the people do not support us, at least the better people do.

Some reactions to current criticisms of Russia

TO a middle-aged, mid-western factory worker like me, few features of the present situation are as puzzling as the frenzied campaign which is being conducted by our disillusioned radicals to convince me that there is nothing admirable, hopeful, or even tolerable about the present regime in Russia. For years, Hearst and the Chicago Tribune and the other leaders of reaction have insisted that the great enemy was not Fascism but Communism: their motives were as obvious as their misrepresentations, and their hatred was probably as high a tribute as they could have paid to the revolution. For twenty years, anyone who felt doubts as to the essential soundness of the Russian experiment has only had to read our more reactionary papers to be reassured: one look at his enemies was enough to convince anyone that Stalin was on the side of the angels.

And now, suddenly, we learn that our local Fascisti have been right all the time. They are surrounded by herds of tired liberals and embittered radicals, all heating their breasts and confessing error. Stalin is a stinker, the revolution has been betrayed, and there is no good in Russia.

What is most amazing about this spectacle is the evidence presented to support these claims, and the abjectly disillusioned tone in which it is presented—amazing because there is almost nothing, in all the evidence that could not have been predicted and which should not have been taken for granted by any thinking observer. That the recognition of the obvious could cause such demoralization and surrender would seem to mean that these self-proclaimed radicals must have been incredibly naive and tender-minded.

The main charges leveled at the present Russian government seem to be: (1) It has failed to provide a high standard of living for the people. (2) It has had little regard for civil liberties or the rights of opposition groups. (3) It has contained unpleasant people who have done indiscriminate things. (4) It attacked Finland. (5) It is not behaving as we would wish with regard to Poland. (6) It caused the present war by signing a pact with Germany.

This is all supposed to prove that the present government of the Soviet Union is that worst of all possible governments and that the revolution has obviously failed. I can't see that it proves anything of the sort.

There is almost certainly a low standard of living in Russia. There is not the slightest doubt that there are cold people and dirty people and hungry people there. It is very probable that many people are worse off now than they were before the revolution. Compiling elaborate statistics to prove as much would seem to be a waste of time, for it certainly would be a miracle if it were not so. The U.S.S.R. has, for all practical purposes, been at war since 1914. It is true that we finally withdrew our armies, and even finally ceased to finance counter-revolution, but there never was the slightest doubt that Russia would have to continue the war at any moment. It was openly as an enemy of Communism that Germany was built up as an industrial and military power and that Japan was given what she needed for her career of imperial conquest. To meet this situation, it was absolutely necessary that Russia should build up her industry and revolutionize her agriculture at a rate that could only mean great privation— and which could only be accomplished by arbitrary and ruthless decrees. We, who now criticise the Russians for their low standard of living and lack of regard for human

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Llewellyn Queener is now completing his B.D. at the Yale Divinity School and working toward a Ph.D. in social ethics. He took his B.A. at the University of Tennessee. "Inter-Enemy Ethics" is his first published work. . . . Paul Goodman's notes are from a book he has written in collaboration with his brother, Percy Goodman, the architect. Its title is "The Means of Livelihood and the Ways of Life" and it will appear this spring. . . . William Palmer Taylor, who got his B.Sc. twenty years ago from the U. of Chicago, works in the research department of a large paper mill in Hamilton, O. "While I have written a great deal," he writes, "my output has consisted almost entirely of melancholy little reports suggesting that my employers write off, as a complete loss, some process in which they have invested a lot of money, and proceed to invest a lot more in some other process." . . . Wilfred Kerr is co-chairman of the Lynn Committee to Abolish Segregation in the Armed Forces. . . . Harold Orlansky is a Conscientious Objector who is now serving in a C.P.S. camp in Maryland.
values, did all that we could to make the difficult impossible: instead of extending the credits which would have made industrialization relatively painless, we led a financial boycott. Not only did we refuse to lend money to the Soviet Union, but our ambassador Bullitt boasted that he had prevented the French from doing so. It takes about $8,000 worth of equipment to supply an American industrial worker with his means of production. We forced the Russians to squeeze that much out of the workers themselves in about ten years—and those workers had a far lower standard of productivity than American workers. That it could have been done as well as it was done—that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to fight against the whole industrial potential of Europe when Germany finally attacked—is almost incredible. Anyone who is surprised and disillusioned that such a program should cause great hardship is certainly ignorant of the most elementary facts of industrial development—so ignorant that he will probably be equally surprised when this same industrialization makes possible very great and very rapid improvement in living conditions after peace comes.

That civil rights have been disregarded, that brutal and arbitrary decisions have been made, and that dishonest, unscrupulous, and even psychopathic individuals have done very sickening things in the name of the revolution is so probable that it hardly seems worth arguing about. It certainly would have been the case here, under similar circumstances, and it seems improbable that all Russians are so much better than Americans that it did not happen there. All this should, of course, have been avoided: there should have been no government agents who were not intelligent, educated humanitarians, with a thorough knowledge of applied psychology and modern educational techniques. With a few hundred thousand of such people, a few generations to work in, and the cooperation of the outside world, the revolution could have been almost painless. Unfortunately, the Communists never had this choice. They took over an economy in almost complete collapse, in which an illiterate, diseased, hungry mob was more or less dominated by a government and industry notorious for degeneracy, demoralization, dishonesty, and incompetence. There were not enough administrators, not enough technicians, not enough time. People who are stupid, dishonest, selfish, cynical, or perverted do not change overnight just because they hear that there has been a revolution.

When we come to the international field, the Russian-Finnish conflict is so wrapped up with the carefully culti

vated myth of Finland as a peaceful, friendly, democratic state which pays its war debt that it is probably desirable to begin by referring those whose hearts bleed for Finland to the Encyclopedia Britannica or some similar relatively disinterested source of facts. They can there satisfy themselves that the Finnish ruling group was put in power largely by the German army and has nothing but contempt for democracy, that Finland under this group has been in effect a German military outpost for operations against Leningrad, and, far from being peace-loving, has attempted to join an attack on Russia on two occasions besides the present Nazi crusade. As long as Finland insisted on serving as an advance outpost of German milit

tarism, it was inevitable that Russia should attempt to neutralize the threat, by peaceful means or otherwise. They tried peaceful negotiations and were rejected, leaving them the choice of military action or probably eventual conquest by Germany.

As for Poland, it is very puzzling to hear the claims of the present Polish government in exile defended in the name of justice and democracy. After the last war, Poland took advantage of Russian weakness to seize territory containing a large non-Polish population. Her claim to this territory was simply military conquest. She governed it abominably for twenty years, giving the population all the blessings of dictatorship, anti-Semitism, poverty, incompetence, ignorance, and feudalism. She was then overrun by Germany and collapsed, whereupon the Russians took back a large section of the territory that had been taken from them. The Germans then took this from the Russians, who seem, as this is written, to be on the point of taking it back. The Polish government in exile feels that the Russians should do that which the Poles are unable to do and take back from the Germans the territory which the Poles took from the Russians. They then feel that justice and democracy demand that the territory be returned to the control of Polish reactionaries who have never had the least regard for either justice or democracy and who frankly propose to use it to strengthen an anti-Russian regime. I must admit that the argument fails to impress me.

Similarly, the argument that Russia caused the present war by signing a non-aggression pact with Germany seems to me to be incredibly naive. At the time that the pact was signed, everything had been done that was necessary to insure war—and done, largely, over the loud and continuous protests of the Russians. The signing of the pact may have touched off the explosion, but it also saved us from ourselves: there is not the slightest doubt that if Germany had not been encouraged to attack Poland—and, through her, England and France—that the war would have had a very different course. Had Hitler done what he was put into power to do and attacked the Soviet Union before he attacked any of the rest of us, the pattern would certainly have followed that of the Spanish betrayal. We should all have enthusiastically aided Hitler in his extermination of the regime that had failed to satisfy either our conservatives or our radicals—possibly reenacting the farce of nonintervention—and should have regarded the fact that he had some trouble in overcoming the red rabble as proof that the German military machine was too weak to fear. When he turned upon the rest of the world, the conquest would have gone with even more lightening speed than it did, and would have been conducted from a base impregnable in its vastness and well-supplied with all natural resources. We should have found ourselves alone and helpless in a Fascist world. That we were saved from this was far better luck than we deserved.

It may be wondered why I, who have never been a communist or a Russian, should feel that all this is important. It seems important to me because our understanding is confused if we select incidents which typify only the weakness and fallibility of the human race and analyze them as typical of Communism or Russia or a planned society. It is such confusion that seems to be leading to the division of our radicals into two camps: those who discover that Russian communism does not change all human beings overnight, and who therefore conclude that there is no difference between revolution and counter-revolution, and those who discover that action in an imperfect world implies compromise, and who therefore give up the action to avoid the compromise. It is always possible to avoid both disappointment and compromise by accepting hopelessness and ineffectuality. So what?

Some day we may have a revolution here, and things may be very bad, and everything may be discouraging. When that time comes, we may expect that Victor Serge and Louis Clair and Dwight Macdonald will prowl about the ruins collecting nasty little items that will make con-
In the April POLITICS, a letter from Mr. Taylor appeared which objected to the magazine's attitude toward Russia. In replying, I wrote: "Finally, I shall be glad to print any serious and competent article by Mr. Taylor, or any one else, which argues the case, from a socialist viewpoint, for the present Government and social system in Russia." Mr. Taylor has taken me up on this, as the foregoing communication shows. I think he has put the case about as strongly as it can be put. That this is a very modest concession indeed, I shall try to show in what follows. Let us begin with a few of the more noticeable fallacies in his reasoning, fallacies which are characteristic of pro-Soviet apologetics today.

1

Fallacy of the Pot and the Kettle: if the pot is black, the kettle has a "right" to be black, too. Taylor argues that because Finland and Poland have attacked Soviet Russia in the past, and because their governments are reactionary, therefore socialists cannot object to anything Russia now does to those nations. His facts are incomplete: Baron Mannerheim does not exhaust the roster of Finnish leaders; there is a strong Social Democratic movement there, and powerful trade unions; and in the Polish Government-in-Exile liberals, socialists, and peasant leaders outnumber the reactionaries. Even if this were not true, socialists used to be able to distinguish between peoples and their rulers. And even if this distinction is not made, it seems a modest defense of the Soviet Union to say it is no more imperialist than other imperialisms.

Fallacy of "Oppositional Thinking": Taylor maintains that Soviet Russia must be OK because our reactionaries oppose it. Again, his data is incomplete: Captain Rickenbacker's encomium of the USSR was printed in our August issue; Thomas W. Lamont, active head of J. P. Morgan & Co., has for several years been an ardent Sovietophile; President Eric Johnston of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce recently returned from a "goodwill tour" of Russia full of... goodwill. Only simple souls like Colonel McCormick and Westbrook Pegler still abominate Russia as a socialist nation; our more sophisticated reactionaries have long since overcome this cultural lag. But again, even if his data were correct, the conclusion would not follow. Did the fact that the German General Staff gave Lenin a sealed train in which to reach Russia mean that the revolution he led was a Junker plot? Or must all good socialists now rally to the defense of the present Japanese government because Colonel McCormick and William Randolph Hearst oppose it?

One might also note that the Oppositional Fallacy is by no means limited to supporters of Soviet Russia. One finds that the Social-Democratic weekly, The New Leader, for example, discovers all kinds of progressive merits in such unlikely places as the U. S. State Department, the Chiang Kai Chek regime in China and the Mikhailovitch forces in Yugoslavia, simply because these forces are indubitably anti-Soviet. An extreme example in the elections was the series of articles in the Scripps-Howard papers by such ex-radicals as Max Eastman, Eugene Lyons and Benjamin Stolberg which argued that since the Communists allegedly dominated PAC, and since PAC allegedly dominated the forces trying to elect Roosevelt, therefore a vote for Roosevelt was a vote for Red Ruin. Just as Taylor sees the choice in terms of Moscow or McCormick, they say it in terms of Moscow or Dewey.

Fallacy of Half-a-Loafism: I have already dealt at length, in replying to George P. Elliott's letter in the September issue, with the arguments raised by Taylor as to the alleged necessity of compromising on basic principles in order to act more effectively. I would add here only (1) it is odd to be accused of "spreading confusion" about Russia because one insists on printing unpleasant facts about it; (2) the "tired liberal" shoe seems to me on the other foot, fitting snugly those who like Mr. Taylor are so disheartened by the defeats of recent years that they are now willing to swallow Stalinism as the best of the human race is capable of in the way of intelligent political behavior. We shall never advance on the road towards a more decent human society if we are not uncompromising on basic principles. Yes, let us be "Utopian." Let us insist on the whole loaf or we shall not even get the half loaf. Oscar Wilde put it well: "Progress is the realization of Utopias."

The Historical Fallacy: throughout Taylor's letter runs the notion that because it can be shown that there is a historical reason for Stalin's policies, therefore they are justified. This kind of determinist thinking, which seems increasingly common today, is a curious blend of cynicism and Victorian optimism: cynical in its "whatever is right" flavor, and Victorian in its assumption that the course of history is automatically upward and so anything historically determined is bound to be progressive. (A Spenglerian, for instance, might also insist that Stalin's course was historically inevitable, but would not regard this as a defense.) To insist that there is a distinction between historical necessity and socialist values is not to deny that Stalinism is a product of the backwardness of Russia and of her international isolation rather than of any personal diabolism on Stalin's part. The question is, however, to what extent was there a historical alternative to Stalin's attempt to "build socialism in one country" (an attempt which Trotsky, with remarkable prescience, foresaw would produce the kind of totalitarian dictatorship...
it has in fact produced) and to what extent have Stalin's policies themselves made this alternative impossible? And even if one concludes that Trotsky's internationalist course would not have been successful (as I, personally, do not), even then one will have explained Stalinism but not justified it. A dictatorship based on lies does not become socialist simply because there was no other way out for Russia.

“Our understanding is confused,” writes Taylor, “if we select incidents which typify only the weakness and fallibility of the human race and analyze them as typical of Communism or Russia or a planned society... All the sound and fury of our tired liberals has not convinced me that the Russians have not done about as well as could be expected under very difficult circumstances — or that there is not hope for the revolution in spite of everything.”

“I find myself both more optimistic (about humanity's capacities) and more pessimistic (about Stalin's Russia). In fact, it is precisely because I have more faith in men's ability to create a decent human society that I am able to remain hopeful about socialist revolution without having to close my eyes to the realities of what has happened in Russia. I repeat that it is Mr. Taylor and his friends, not myself and other POLITICS writers, who are the “tired liberals”. We don't expect men to be demigods, nor are we unaware that revolutionary change is a brutal and bloody business. On the other hand, we do insist that no system can call itself progressive which is not at least moving in the direction of certain goals. For myself, I would define the most important of these as:

1. The reduction and eventual liquidation of that coercive apparatus known as “the state”.
2. The participation of every one on an equal basis in running the society — “Every cook must be a politician,” said Lenin.
3. The equalization— at first — of incomes, and the ultimate realization of the formula: “From each according to his abilities; to each according to his needs.”
4. The creation of a culture in which the intellectual, emotional and esthetic requirements and powers of the individual will find, respectively, satisfaction and free expression.
5. Internationalism: the brotherhood of all human beings everywhere.
6. The abolition of private ownership of the means of production and the control of these means by those who do the actual work.

Now the point is that Soviet Russia since Stalin took supreme power in 1929 has been moving not towards but away from these goals. The state power has become more repressive and all-pervading; the common people have less to say about how things are run; inequality of income, which has recently been formally proclaimed as the official ideology (see Peter Meyer's article in the June POLITICS), has reached extremes which surpass even those of this country; the brutality and lifelessness of post-1929 Soviet culture is an old story to any one who has followed its manifestations in such fields as the movies; the old internationalist point of view of Lenin and Trotsky, and of the whole Marxian socialist tradition, has been abandoned in favor of a frankly nationalistic outlook; private ownership has indeed been abolished (before 1929, of course) but the workers have been subjected to an iron discipline and a speed-up system which has been unknown in capitalist nations for generations. And all of these anti-socialist tendencies have become more pronounced, not less, as the years have gone by.

Yes, Taylor will retort, but those were necessary measures to prepare the nation for the world war which Stalin and his colleagues saw coming. Granted, if one assumes that Stalin's “socialism in one country” (which really means “build a mighty Russia by whatever means and let the rest of the world go to hell”) was the correct policy. But not granted if one assumes, as I do, that an internationalist policy could have saved socialism in Russia, that the ruinous policies of the Kremlin in China in 1928, in Germany just before Hitler, in France in 1935-6 and in the Spanish Civil War played a big part in the defeats suffered by the popular forces in all those crucial situations, and that if the outcome of some or all of them had been different, the whole course of modern history, including World War II (if any), would have been different and different in a way favorable to socialist tendencies both inside and outside Russia.

The hopelessness of the “socialism in one country” perspective appears if one considers Russia's post-war prospects. Taylor predicts that Stalin's industrialization policy will make possible very great and very rapid improvements in living conditions after peace comes. There will probably be some improvement over the wartime level, since it would seem no people could sustain for more than a few years the suffering the Russian people are now enduring. But why does he assume conditions will be better than they were in the pre-war period? I should say they are more likely to be worse. A big percentage of Russian industry has been destroyed in the war, her most fertile agricultural areas have lost almost all their machinery and livestock, many of her greatest cities have been ruined, millions of her young men have been killed or crippled. All this will have to be made up. Unless Germans are imported to do some of the work in slave gangs on a scale unparalleled in modern history—a solution which I must admit seems to have a slightly unsocialist odor about it—it will be made up by the Russian masses in the same way they originally created the destroyed capital: namely, by having their personal consumption reduced to permit larger investment in steel mills, railways and other capital goods.

Furthermore, not only will the war damage have to be restored; but a new armament effort will have to be made on a much bigger scale than that of 1929-1939. We may be sure that Stalin has no illusions about lasting peace. He sees as clearly as any of us the Third World War that is so obviously building up between the imperialist victors of World War II. And even if he hopes it may be averted, even if he thinks it may be, he would be careless and foolhardy—and no one has accused him of those defects—not to prepare for the worst, which means building a war economy able to withstand a war which promises in mechanical power and massed destructiveness to be to World War II as World War II is to World War I. Now that Soviet Russia has given up any attempt to mobilize the world working class on her side by taking the offensive in favor of international socialism, now that she must rely only on her own nationalistic power, there is no escape for her from the squirrel-cage of preparing for war, fighting, and then preparing for an even bigger war. She is, in short, in just the same position as the other great imperialist powers. As far ahead as we now see, there will always be the very real threat of war for the Soviet Union. If the low living standards and lack of democracy of the pre-World War II period can be justified on grounds of
military necessity, why will it not be the same in the pre-World War III period?

That it will be so we have on the very best authority, that of Stalin himself. In the October Reader's Digest, Eric Johnston has an extremely interesting account of his recent three-hour interview with Stalin. Not the least significant parts are those about precisely this question of the post-war Russian standard of living. When Johnston suggests that Soviet distribution methods might be improved, citing the time-wasting food queues he had noticed throughout Russia, Stalin replies: “But in order to distribute, there must be something to distribute.” “You will have something to distribute after the war,” answers Johnston. “How do you know?” asks Stalin. The cheerful Johnston then gives a glowing picture of Russia turning “her ever-increasing capacity to the production of consumer goods” after the war, observing that “production of consumer goods always increases after wars.” This seems to drive Stalin into a veritable stupor of boredom. “He had shifted his position in his chair two or three times,” writes Johnston; “I even felt that I had heard a sigh; I therefore changed the conversation.”

Later on, Johnston asks, “How long will it take you to complete your program of industrialization?” “Such a program,” replies Stalin, emphasizing the point with his hands, “will never terminate.”

Taylor explains the brutality of Stalin’s dictatorship as due to the fact that when the Bolsheviks made their revolution in 1917, they had a shortage of competent technicians and administrators and had to work with inferior human material—“an illiterate, diseased and hungry mob.” That Russia was a backward nation is true, and was indeed Trotsky’s strongest argument against Stalin’s “national socialist” policy. But it seems odd that the illiterate mob of the first revolutionary years, beleaguered by the capitalist armed intervention, lacking administrative personnel should still have created a system which, for all its rigors, was more democratic, more cultured and less brutal than the system that has grown up under Stalin. There is nothing in the worst period of War Communism as bad as the Moscow Trials, the mass starvation of the forced-collectivization program, the great purges of 1937-1939, the millions of Russians who have perished in the vast forced-labor camps of the GPU, the slow death inflicted on hundreds of thousands of Polish deportees after Russia took over half of Poland in 1939. The building up of an administrative personnel and an effective army supported by vast war industries—these advances in efficiency have been accompanied by political regression.

The Bolsheviks of 1917, whatever one’s criticisms of their policies, were conscious and devoted revolutionary socialists; the Russian masses of that period, however ignorant and backward, were pushing forward to play an active role in politics for the first time. Today a new ruling class has emerged in Russia, and the masses have been pushed into their traditional place in the background. It is not a case of Stalin making as much progress as the original poor start will allow, but just the reverse: the drift has been away from the great ideals of 1917, not toward them.

The whole trend of recent Soviet foreign policy emphasizes this. Take one very small example: the attack on Finland which Taylor justifies. A socialist nation confronted by the threat Taylor alleges Finland was to Russia would not have launched a simple military attack on the threatening nation. Such an attack simply solidifies all classes behind the ruling class. It would have attempted, by the force of its own example and by revolutionary appeals across the border, to try to divide Finland, to make allies of the Finnish masses against their rulers. Such a policy, of course, would have been impossible for Stalin, even if he had wanted to try it. For Soviet Russia is not a socialist nation, but a dictatorship; life for the common man is not better there, but much worse. The Finnish masses clearly preferred Mannerheim to Stalin. When the Red Army finally occupied part of the country, the inhabitants almost to a man fled before them deeper into Finland, preferring to leave their homes and possessions rather than remain to enjoy the blessings of Soviet citizenship. This mass exodus is perhaps the ultimate commentary on “the essential soundness of the Russian experiment.”

Dwight Macdonald

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**Free and Equal**

"Negroism" Once More

Sir:

Wilfred Kerr's article "Negroism: Strange Fruit of Segregation" (August, 1944) demands an answer because of its pertinence to white friends of the Negro people and because of its impertinence to the Negro people.

In considering the pertinence of this article the question arises: why are liberal whites alarmed when Negroes vote for an occasional all-Negro organization? The various religious and ethnic groups that have gone into the American melting pot had organizations (cultural, fraternal, cooperative and workers’ center, hangover from the past). One wonders were there cries that the Finns were trying to build a Finnish economy in America. When Greek immigrants formed the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association did the Irish demand membership so they could "guide" the new arrivals?

What can justify the charge of chauvinism applied to Negroes, the least of the American people, so humble they are classed with dogs? Is not chauvinism applied to those who feel superior and seek to exploit and enslave? It would seem that those whites who whine "chauvinism" live in glass houses. . . . What can justify the paternalistic motive that causes some whites to feel their physical presence is required. Is this some almost forgotten feeling of superiority?

Let us assume that our white friends are free from any of the above ulterior motives or unfriendly emotions. Rather let us say it is the Negro’s fault that the white liberal cannot see the needs and purposes of all-Negro organization. When the scales have fallen from a leader’s eyes he should point the way. That means clearing the road of the debris of cluttered minds that deny any group the right to stand as men. A great barrier to understanding is the "enlightened" Negro who thinks the way out is to walk hand in hand with a few liberal whites. . . .

Now consider the impertinence of Mr. Kerr’s article. Impertinence because he denies Negroes the means of assimilation, yet accuses them of "no hope or interest in the American system"; referring to "low class unassimilated" Negroes.
Sir:

In Mr. Roberts' letter, I am accused of impertinence to my own race, the Negro people, and of being anti-Negro. Why? Because I sabotage the fight against lynching? Because I accept segregation and discrimination in the Armed Forces and am an Uncle Tom in general? No. I am accused of these crimes because I advocate the inclusion of whites in our struggle for racial equality. This and nothing more. It is true that my critic says that I deny Negroes the means of assimilation and think that they have no hope or interest in the American system; referring to low-class unassimilated Negroes. But this is pure bunk. In the only part of the article in which I used the words "the low-class unassimilated Negro", I used them in a comparison with the more educated Negro, the professional Negro, the upper class Negro, the Negro who votes, etc. Any fair-minded person would understand what I meant.

Mr. Roberts' attitude, in spite of his protestations that his letter is written in the spirit of understanding and brotherhood, ought to clearly reveal the difficulty of the inter-racialist seeking to work with the Negroist. We are damned before we open our mouths. "This habit of Negroes' thinking they are what they ain't extends to their acceptance of progressive movements." What on earth does Mr. Roberts believe I think I am? Does he not know that no Negro, no matter how fair skinned, can ever escape insult and humiliation, if not brutal exploitation in this unfair land of ours?

What program does he have to offer? Wading through a mess of irrelevant stuff about Finnish co-operatives, Jewish labor unions and the American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association, we came across the meat: "For Negroes to become assimilated they must become conscious of their true status and whites must become receptive to change. A realization of the circumscribed area in which Negroes must move is of prime importance. If the facts of limited opportunity and innumerable impasses are ignored, Negroes can be dismissed as a group having the same chance as whites but unable to make the grade. Many Negroes subscribe to this belief. They are so well educated by public school, radio, newspapers and black lobbies, posing as leaders, they think they can become full-fledged Americans. But just let them try their wings! They can't fly everywhere and some places they dare not leave the nest!"

This habit of Negroes' thinking they are what they ain't extends to their acceptance of progressive movements. Twenty-five years ago when Russian events started to inspire Americans, looking for a way out, Randolph and others leaned toward socialism. However, changing events caused these men to espouse some of the ideas of Garvey and other men they once scorned; for those ideas sharpened into truth...

If Negroes are honest, sooner or later they discover that socialism and such are not just around the corner. Moreover they cannot unite with their white brothers because they really aren't "in there". To the average whites, as well as to themselves, Negroes are freed men and not free men. So the question occurs: how to become integrated as Americans? The solution comes, as it did to Irish, Jewish, Finnish—to each immigrant group in turn. But—no sooner is the question posed (for the Negro) than the bell sounds for white axe-grinders and their black lackeys to start selling their hokey pokey charges of chauvinism, semplicity, black economy and all the other messes cooked to order for Negroes only...

Mr. Kerr appears to be well informed; however his interpretation of his experiences and observations has not settled in his mind. He is either unwilling or unable to resolve this problem as a Negro. He is anti-Negro. As such, with his information and concepts, he is a logical candidate for membership in the Communist Political Association. It would welcome his viewpoints.

What can an all-Negro organization do? It can attempt to increase opportunities for Negroes. The March-on-Washington Movement (Randolph's group) is now trying to convince the Metropolitan Insurance Company that people who contribute to its wealth ought to be able to profit from it without dying—even though they aren't white. Is this setting up a black economy?

What is to prevent fair-minded whites from functioning apart as a "brain trust" and among their own; using their money, their knowledge, their tools of education, their power, to work along with the all black group as well as they do with inter-racial groups?

This letter is written in the interest of understanding—the only path to brotherhood.

NEW YORK CITY

H. ROBERTS
cover that unless they succeed in winning a large body of sympathetic whites to their side, their fate is sealed.

The statement that whites tend to dominate inter-racial organizations is one of those half-truths more dangerous than the lie. Of course whites, because of their superior education and experience, will appear to take over in the beginning of things, but as matters begin to go and the Negroes begin to feel themselves, becoming more confident and less inclined to sit on their hands this seeming advantage melts away. That this is a real problem, I do not deny. But to kick the whites out is no answer, and Roberts' own solution of a white "brain trust" pushing things from behind will be resented by all self-respecting Negroes, I am sure.

BROOKLYN, N. Y.

WILFRED H. KERR

Periodicals


A curiously uneven article which suggests both the cultural backwardness of India (in Western fields like economics, at least) and the stimulating effect, on the intelligentsia, of intense foreign oppression. Mr. Iyengar rambles all over the place, stuffs his piece with half-digested quotations, and seems to be conservative to the point of reaction. Yet he has some original ideas and he makes his main points effectively, despite his wanderings, because they are clearly of intense importance to him. And he has many lapses into reality which the more complacent economists of the West rarely permit themselves. As, for instance:

Although there are no official per capita income figures for India (what a commentary on British rule that fact alone is!), a recent estimate is 62 rupees (about $19) a year. But millions live far below even this average: the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry found that "in the village of Launa the expenditure on food, clothing and shelter per head worked out at 3 pies a day or about 6 rupees per annum." That was 1938, when the British per capita income was 90 pounds (about $400). Six rupees a year is less than $2.

We get a glimpse of Sir Jogendra Singh, the Honorable Member of the Government of India for Education (i.e., a native Quisling who gets a fat salary for being ignored by the Viceroy) outlining the agricultural problem to a conference. He throws out six questions, in a style reminiscent of the Indian intellectuals of A Passage to India, beginning with "Why is our agricultural production so low?" and ending with a poetic sigh: "Why does poverty haunt the countryside?" Still in Forsterian character, Sir Singh "pathetically concluded": "I leave it to you to answer these questions." The author not unreasonably complains that these questions have been asked so often for so long that it is really time for some one to try to answer them.

The British are as ineffectual as the Indian intelligentsia at solving India's innumerable "problems." Fifteen years ago Lord Linlithgow presided over a Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture which wrote that "the worst policy towards agricultural debt is to ignore it and do nothing." The noble lord ruled India as Viceroy for many years after that. But "practically nothing has been done for rationalising the debt burden on the agricultural land."

Poverty is such that the penal code allows "a person to rob a shopkeeper in broad daylight up to four plantains and not become liable to conviction and sentence."

The author's conclusions are conservative. He is skeptical about grandiose schemes of quick industrialization such as the business-men authors of the recent "Bombay Plan" have put forward. His own 10-year Plan calls for investment of about half as much per year as the Bombay Plan does. He argues in favor of cottage industry against big-scale plants on the grounds that India's problem is too many workers not too few, and he thinks that agriculture, and small-scale agriculture at that, should be the base of the Indian economy for some time to come. After the horrors of the first Five Year Plan and the forced collectivization in Russia, one is inclined to listen to this conservative counsel with some respect. Perhaps those grim experiences were in Mr. Iyengar's mind when he wrote: "The champions of industrialization in India would be helping in further tightening the belt 'when there was less than no slack to take in.'" Yet how can the economic problems of India be resolved without industrialization? Perhaps it is more a question of tempo than anything else; the author's own "plan" also calls for the development of industry, but at a much slower rate. His emphasis is on measures to immediately raise the standard of living.

His section on "The International Mirage" is especially telling. He points out that India has already had enough experience, in the present war, to have lost any illusions about its status in any international set-up, instancing Churchill's exclusion of India from the scope of the Atlantic Charter, the insistence of UNRRA on at once levying a contribution on India and refusing any aid in the Bengal famine, and "the indefinite postponement of direct relations between the USA and India with regard to lend-lease." India's place on the world scene will be a low one, he concludes, and she had better give up any ideas about help, or even equal treatment, from the big powers. It is a pipe dream for her to think she can get very far in world power by self-industrialization. Quite the contrary: "Industrialization . . . presumes ability to command distant parts of the world—politically as well as economically—through adequate shipping and enterprise. . . . For India to emulate Britain . . . would be like the fox unsuccessfully and painfully burning its skin in order to develop the tiger's stripes."

Politically, one would conclude, Mr. Iyengar is either a feudal reactionary or a fanatical disciple of Gandhi.


More evidence rebutting the leftist cliche that a war economy is economically disadvantageous to the masses. In this country, at least, the opposite seems—unhappily—to be the case. Worldwide slaughter means an improved standard of living for those not conscripted into the armed forces, and it is the horrors of peace that the workers must fear.

The author estimates that "on the average every man, woman and child in the country will spend $510 in retail stores this year compared with an expenditure of $430 in 1941 and $320 in 1939." It is true that 70% of the increase since 1939 is due to higher prices, but the real rise is still 30%. It is also true that the all-time quantity (as against dollar) peak of purchases was reached in 1941, in-

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dictating belt-tightening as the war has progressed. But purchases are still above the peacetime level. Furthermore, the fact that some millions of Americans are now fighting overseas means that the 1944 volume is split among fewer consumers than in 1941, so that this year's sales, on a per capita basis, are probably "almost equal" to 1941.

The only reason wartime buying has not been enormously greater even than it has been is, of course, the shortage of goods, especially durable goods like automobiles and iceboxes. Statisticians have found that the volume of retail buying (which includes everything, by the way — food, clothing, etc.) is closely related to the level of national income. Paradiso estimates that if consumers had been able to buy goods as freely as they did before wartime shortages, they would have bought $50 billions more in the war period to date. Unable to buy, they have put aside almost exactly that amount in savings (cash, war bonds, reduction of debt). This $50 billions is really a further addition to the high wartime standard of living, in the form of deferred spending.


It has become a commonplace of liblab journalism that the enormous expansion of American industry during the war offers a great "opportunity" for higher peacetime production. Will the war plants be used or will they be junked? — thus is the problem posed. Progressives want them used for a higher living standard; reactionaries want them junked to keep the goods from breaking the postwar market. In either case, it is a serious problem, with possibilities of great social progress or of capitalist crisis (or both, perhaps).

Like many commonplaces, this may be erroneous. At least Wilson's article suggests that, although wartime investment has been at a rate double that of peace, the effects of this huge increase have been greatly exaggerated by such liblab popularizers as Stuart Chase.

First of all, much of the new investment has been for things which will have no use (or little use) in a peacetime economy. (The degree to which the USA maintains its present military establishment after the war will, of course, affect this; but no serious proposals have yet been put forward to maintain permanently more than a quarter, at most, of the present armed forces.) Thus 25% of the new wartime construction has been in military and naval installations, and about the same proportion of new plant and equipment has been for specialized munitions making.

Even more important is the fact that wartime investment has been channelled into a few special fields, leaving the great bulk of industry relatively unexpanded. Thus 90% of all peacetime construction has been in housing, roads, commercial buildings, railroads and utilities. These categories have, in total, actually declined during the war period, the huge construction increase being due entirely to industrial and military plant, which normally account for only 10% of the total. So, too, a third of the wartime expansion in manufacturing facilities has been in aircraft, ships and combat vehicles. The extent to which this sector is now overbuilt, in relation to normal patterns, is shown by the fact that in the 3½ war years $4,500,000,000 was invested in new facilities to produce those goods, whereas in the 3½ years immediately preceding the war the total of such investment was less than $200,000,000. On the other hand, there has been an actual decline in certain industries which in normal times account for about half the total new investment: i.e., food, textiles, lumber products, paper and printing, stone, clay and glass products, and leather products.

The reconversion problem is thus at once more and less serious than a mere undifferentiated total would suggest. More serious industrially: i.e., much if not most of the new plant will be useless in peacetime and an actual lag in many civilian industries will have to be made up. Less serious capitalistically: i.e., the new war plant will not overload the postwar market as much as one might fear (or hope), and there will be a considerable backlog of profitable new investment in outfitting war-starved civilian industries.

"It has been estimated," concludes Wilson, "that the full utilization of the post-war labor force would mean a national output 40 to 50 per cent above 1940. In view of the specialized nature of much of the war expansion, there has been no such increase in productive facilities if that labor is to be employed efficiently."


Professor Clark of New York University here reports the results of interviews with 67 colored residents of Harlem, selected as a representative sample. The interviewers, who were all colored, found that 30% of those interviewed "accepted or justified" the riot. This is a big percentage if one considers that not a single prominent Negro leader dared to defend the riot publicly, and that all those who made public statements condemned it. (See "Negro Leaders and the Harlem Riot," in politics for May, 1944.)

The riot-justifiers were, in general, better educated and less church-going than the rejecters. They were also older — an unexpected finding, since it is the young Negroes who are generally considered more militant. "This may reflect a crystallization of cumulative social disillusionment into a more structured resentment as the individual grows older." The editorial stand of the newspapers read by the interviewees, incidentally, seemed to make little difference in their attitudes toward the riot. "Ironically," notes Dr. Clark, "the one subject who claimed to be a reader of the Daily Worker was classified among the conservatives." Why "ironically"?


A thorough-going reply, in philosophical terms, to the "positivist fallacy" in history-writing, as represented most completely by Pareto: that political behavior can be scientifically described only in amoral non-qualitative terms. Hallowell shows how this notion is inconsistent and leads ultimately to the destruction of science itself. Positivism is a 19th century idea, he argues, based on that century's uncritical faith in the methods of the physical sciences as a universal instrument in all cultural fields. Actually, speculation and metaphysics are necessary to positivists also, the difference being just that they are not conscious of this.

The conclusion is eloquent: "The positivist who, in the
cloister of his laboratory or den, exercises such noble and 'scientific' restraint as to deny the faith that has overturned dynasties and bathed nations in the blood of revolution may some day awake (upon the coming of a very different sort of revolution) to find his own essential quality challenged by barbarians who may insist, to his own chagrin, that he was, indeed, right. And, lest the possibility seem remote, let us simply recall that such things have come to pass in nations whose cultural traditions would have seemed a few decades ago to belie just such a possibility. As political scientists, we can refuse to make ethical judgments only by denying our responsibilities as human beings . . . and if we are persuaded by some false loyalty to science, or by some false conception of its nature, to forsake our human obligations, we may end by denying not only our humanity but our science."

"The Man from Missouri" by Grace and Morris Milgram. Common Sense, October 1944.

Now that the election is over, Harry Truman will probably be generally forgotten for four years—unless Roosevelt dies, of course. And indeed he is of not the slightest importance in himself. It is, however, precisely as a typical product of American politics that he is enormously significant. This article is therefore a political document of some importance. With the thoroughness of the old muckraking school, the Milgrams have brought together a great amount of data, most of it dug up by themselves, on Harry Shippe Truman, 34th Vice-President of the United States.

They travelled out to Kansas City, Truman’s home ground, and got from old records and from personal interviews the whole story of the Pendergast machine and Truman’s intimate association with it. They also talked at length with Truman, with very interesting results. He defended Pendergast, the most corrupt boss in modern political history, in these terms “He is a fine gentleman. . . . He was always helping people. . . . You could trust him. His word was his bond. . . . He was a boss, an American political boss. . . . You’ve got to have leadership in politics, and a boss is only a leader.” (This last in reply to a question whether he would advise a young man entering politics in Jersey City, Memphis or Chicago to work with Bosses Hague, Crump or Kelly.)

Truman’s color prejudices are those to be expected from a resident of Missouri. As:

“The most remarkable of Senator Truman’s beliefs is his delusion that Negroes have organized ‘push days.’ Negroes, he told us, ‘are going too far in St. Louis. There Negroes have started a ‘push day’ once a week, when they shove white people out of the bars. Why, St. Louis is sitting on a keg of dynamite! And they’ve got a push day in Washington, too! I won’t let my daughter go downtown on streetcars on Thursday, any more. It’s not safe. They push people off the streetcars.”

The point about Truman—and the significance of his choice as Roosevelt’s running-mate this year—is that all his opinions and convictions are on this provincial, mildly reactionary level. “There is little to distinguish him from millions of other middleclass Americans,” the Milgrams write, “He shares their interests, their ideas and many of their limitations. He is a member of the Masons, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars and of the Baptist Church. He is a plain, personally honest man who is not dead sure of what is happening to him. He has no political philosophy except that of the machine.”

Books


Demobilization is already an important issue, serving in the social sphere, as reconversion in the economic, to point the way to capital’s post-war world. In 1945 and ‘46, demobilization will be the major concern of every service­man, since it is the point at which the state releases him from bondage and offers him his life again.

That release is dangerous both to the social structure which must absorb and control the violence and frustration of its massed conscripts, denied love and trained to effi­cient murder for several years, and to the conscripts them­selves, whose lives will then be frighteningly free. Society will meet the danger by special dispensations to veterans in jobs, education, hospitalization, dole, etc., and in social status. But how will soldiers react, how do they, how do ordinary people, civilians, feel about this society and its future?

Unfortunately, the answers to these questions can only be guessed at in the United States. Our main source of information, the commercial press, reports chiefly those attitudes favorable to the status quo; and the opinion­sampling techniques of journalists, advertising agencies, and highly-touted polls are generally superficial and self­satisfying. A “yes-no” reply to a Gallup interviewer can scarcely reveal all the anxieties and doubts that hedge in the answer and are more significant indicators of popular attitude than either “yes” or “no.” Some earnest psycholo­gist may study these anxieties in the Journal of Social and Abnormal Psychology; or they may burst the threshold of censorship in a riot or mass demonstration; but mean­while we are reduced to guesses.

In England, a unique organization of social scientists has attempted to survey the intimate daily fears and hopes of the common people, thus writing a new sort of personal history to replace the traditional abstractions of dates and Great Events, and the tyranny of names. Mass-Observa­tion which is, unfortunately, almost unknown in this country, was founded in 1937 by Tom Harrison, a young anthropologist, and Charles Madge, a reporter-poet, to apply the distant, scientific techniques of ascertaining social facts to the immediate problems of the day, and to popularize its findings to the widest possible extent. In addition to the usual modes of opinion research—questionnaires, inter­views, and the like—it emphasizes the importance of simple observation in deducing attitude, and for this pur­pose has organized a national panel of thousands of “observers” in all walks of life who report their findings regularly to a central office, as well as detailed, introspec­tive material of their own such as letters, diaries, and dreams. The results are published widely in books, bul­letins, broadcasts, and articles.

Mass-Observation has not been uniformly successful. At its worst, the omnivorous drive for factual accumulation has led to the publication of unorganized, and often trivial data; and analysis has been avoided where it might show a bias in any direction. Then there are the statistical and methodological pitfalls common to all sociological investiga­tion. But M-O must be credited with a brilliant idea, occasionally realized: to tap the well-springs of contem­porary society at its source of attitude formation; and
M. O.'s left-wing leaders have been conscious of the power of facts to fashion social change. 

The Journey Home contains some illuminating information on the Englishman's attitudes toward his social system and the future he will face after armistice day.

The most pronounced and omnipresent attitude is a growing apathy, increasing down the income scale: "nagativism for the future, the virtual collapse of the idea of inevitable progress . . . Apathy and fatalism, expressed largely as cynicism, are particularly strong among the unskilled working class. . . . Thus the expectation of large scale unemployment after the war is most frequent among the unskilled working class. It is least frequent among the middle-class, the only group among which there was appreciably more optimism than pessimism."

The cause of this apathy is not an indifference to the future. People want radical social change—M. O. surveys reveal the following as among the changes hoped for by the English people: educational reforms, nationalization of various industries, increased social services, increased town planning, less class distinction, less unemployment, higher standard of living. But they expect "compromise measures of change in the spheres in which they hope for radical ones."

Thus, "People want full-scale Beveridge. Nearly half mention basic changes along Beveridge lines among their hopes. The same proportion expect a bit of Beveridge, a compromise Beveridge, an emasculated Beveridge, and these are mainly the same people as hope for full-scale reform."

The apathy that has developed stems from a distrust of leadership and authority, which has emasculated and perverted the people's desires: "the belief that the few are keeping a tight hold on the reins of power, and will be in a position to reconstruct on the old world model has increased. Big business, Conservative (and Labour) leaders, Munichers, old men and the 'old gang' have become the predominant cause for depression. In particular, the soldier, because of his closer contact with authority, is "more cynical about post-war affairs, less trustful of the goodwill of authority, than the rest of the public. . . . It is this feeling that those in authority just aren't trying to change things, or make them better, which is at the back of the soldiers' cynicism."

The distrust of authority and the feeling of separation between leadership and the people finds its popular expression in the talk, especially among members of the lower classes, of "We" and "They." A young officer reports as follows of political discussions with his men:

The general line that is always taken is the We and They line. Here is a typical sort of argument: "What can I do about it all? I may elect a Labour M.P., but as soon as he gets into Parliament he does nothing about the things he says he is going to do. They hold all the power and they always will. We can't get away from Them. They have all the money and newspapers and everything. It has always been like that and it always will."*

*In The Road To Wigan Pier, George Orwell describes this same manifestation: "A thousand influences constantly press a working man down into a passive role. He does not act, he is acted upon. He feels himself the slave of mysterious authority and has a firm conviction that "they" will never allow him to do this, that and the other. Once when I was hop-picking I asked the sweated pickers (they earn something under sixpence an hour) why they did not form a union. I was told immediately that "they" would never allow it. Who were "they"? I asked. Nobody seemed to know; but evidently "they" were omnipotent." (p. 49)

It is significant that, although there has been a marked trend toward the left among the mass of common people, this trend is not toward any existing party: the distrust of leaders is associated with all leaders, including those of the left:

About two out of every five people today feel that their political outlook has changed since war began. So far as it has any direction at all, this change is predominantly leftward, hardly ever rightward. But much of it is a change from vague apathy, to equally vague unrest and disquiet; and little of the leftward change is party-ward. Overwhelmingly it is a change towards wanting things different, as yet directed on to no party, no person, no leader.

An investigation in 1942 showed about as much criticism of the Labour Party as of the Conservatives. Asked whether they thought that any party would get things done as they wanted them after the war, 64% thought that no existing party would do so. . . .

In the Services all the signs indicate that the lack of focus for forward-thinking is even more urgent. A survey among members of the forces showed that four out of five thought no existing party would do things as they wanted after the war.

This political attitude favors the emergence of a new, radical party really representative of the people's wishes. It also favors (as must be platitudeous by now) some form of dictatorship. M. O. surveys clearly charted the rise of this latter sentiment during periods of wide frustration, particularly in the summer and fall of 1942 when "people were exceptionally exasperated with what they felt to be the slowness and inefficiency of leadership here in Britain, compared with that in Russia and Germany. On two occasions during this period Mass-Observation surveys of the type of Government wanted after the war showed over 10% in favour of some form of dictatorship. At other periods of the war the proportion had been only 1-3%.

It is difficult to estimate precisely how much of this picture of wartime Britain is applicable to America. In one particular, however, an exact parallel can be established; this is in the reactions of veterans as a result of their army experience.

To the rootless, frustrated personalities that the uncertain, difficult life of modern society has bred, the impressive mechanism of a great army advancing upon discernable goals offers certainty, security, and purpose. Concomitantly, demobilization stirs anew the anxieties resolved by war, raising again the fears of insecurity and purposelessness inseparable from civilian life today.

These anxieties have provoked a rise in escapism among returning soldiers: the desire to leave the country, to travel, to move to a different city, to change jobs, or (for the city-dweller) to settle down on a simple farm is evidenced both in England and America. (Life reports in a recent issue that only 25% of U. S. veterans thus far discharged have gone back to the same work they were doing before the war, and that fully 75% of soldiers do not want to return to their old home towns.) The Journey Home advances an additional explanation for these trends:

It seems quite probable, from much of the information which Mass-Observation has collected during this war, that many post-war ideas and fears and plans are rooted in war-guilt, in a sort of diffuse underlying belief that collectively and individually the sin of war has to be expiated. We may not be going nearly deep enough in explaining the desire to "get away from it all" as pre­dominantly individualistic, opportunist or self-centred. There is an element of self-immolation and fatalism about many post-war ideas which is not explained entirely satisfactorily by external factors, but which private expiatory motives might largely illuminate.
This escapism, together with the apathy* described above, indicates the powerful threat to social stability now submerged beneath private channels of personality. The question must arise, when will these channels merge and burst the surface of our times?

No answer can be given immediately. The history of depression, fascism and war bears evidence of the accomodative powers of the human animal; it appears there is almost no reality so extreme but the domesticated human, properly directed, will accept. Society guards her treasures well, in vaults of guilt and fear.

But, for the aging revolutionist, there are a few consolations. As Mass-Observation observes, "people can be temporarily palmed off with very little, and feel thankful to those who gave it them. But compromising with people's ideals does not resolve them ... the old hopes will remain rankling beneath the surface." In particular, it is to be doubted that veterans, freed from the army's shackles, will remain content with the bones they are thrown.

The old hopes will remain rankling. Apathy, escapism are outs for the year, but the year will change; a generation can not escape its time. The people will endure, and the people will remember. There is something satisfying and terrifying in the strength of this memory. It took nineteen years for the Italian people to avenge Matteotti's murder. The crimes of a whole society will not be avenged sooner.

HAROLD ORLANSKY

The Intelligence Office

Norman Thomas Again

Sir:

In my opinion your magazine is one of the finest publications on the whole left. ... POLITICS analyzes the important issues of the day instead of supporting the "lesser of two evils" ... However, I must protest against your unfair and unjustified attack upon the Socialist Party and its candidate, Norman Thomas. In particular, I want to protest the timing of your article, since no reply will be able to be published before the election. Even though I agree with much of what you had to say, I still believe you were vague and the reasons given ... weak. You might question Mr. Thomas's views on Socialism, but it is important that a large protest vote be rolled up in this election.

CHICAGO, ILL.

LAWRENCE TEPPER

Thanks

Sir:

Thanks very much for Don Calhoun's article and for your rejoinder in the July issue of Politics. In no other publication, pacifist or otherwise, has such a clear presentation of the cases for political objection to the war been found.

*In this country, the election apathy is surely a comparable phenomenon to that observed in England. The frenzy of all parties to arouse voters to the "importance" of the ballot, when non-voting is clearly a more significant alternative than the choices presented on the ballot, appear then as efforts to stimulate enthusiasm by intoxication.

We spent last night here discussing the two points of view, and the group to a man appreciated your giving space to what we feel is most helpful to us and others concerned with the problem. We were also very relieved to have had such a competent writer as Calhoun represent our point of view. We would have felt undone if it had been otherwise (and it could easily have been otherwise). Most surprising of all to us was Macdonald's penetrating knowledge of the C.O. We frankly did not expect such understanding from an "outsider."

Again thanks for publishing these particular articles and for the courage of Politics in general.

C. P. S. CAMP 76
GLENDORA, CALIF.

What's Wrong with a Satisfied Ego?

Dear Readers of POLITICS:

What is the point of all this bellyaching because Dwight Macdonald is "satisfying his own ego" by "putting down in editorial comment the thoughts that occur to him during the month"? Of course he is satisfying his own ego. What would you want him to do? Satisfy somebody else's ego?

When people go to jail for their pacifist convictions they're satisfying their own egos; when they work in the French underground they're satisfying their own egos. It's people who live dishonestly because they have to or be shot for desertion, or because they're hopelessly caught in the wheels of industry, or because they want more than their share of the spoils—it's these miserable people who are not satisfying their own egos. I am a socialist because I believe every man should be allowed the human right to satisfy his own ego and I would (egotistically) contribute all my energies to attain this end if I were sure where the seeds of a real revolutionary movement were being sown today.

And I'm willing to wager that Mr. Macdonald would too. If a revolutionary situation arose in this country, I do not doubt that he would be among the first to offer his anonymous and impersonal services. True, he might also be among the first to be liquidated when the post-revolutionary struggle for power set in—as Babeuf was liquidated after the French Revolution and Trotsky after the Bolshevik Revolution. But that fact doesn't make him any the less functional at a given moment in history.

It is certainly a tragic (but morally and philosophically explainable) fact that reactionaries stick together these days while radicals bicker among themselves. The Communists split from the Socialists in 1919 (?); then the Trotskyists split from the Communists; then the Shacht­manites split from the Cannonites (or vice versa?). Mr. Macdonald is a split from a split from a split. He can't split any further except into two or three bickering Dwight Macdonalds (as so many disillusioned radicals have split themselves into warring and contradictory fragments.) I would hate to see him do that...

Meanwhile, I think the individualistic stamp of POLITICS should be encouraged. We should all thank God that there is one person, with enough money to satisfy his own idiosyncratic little whims, who is doing just this by getting his neck out month after month and courageously putting down thoughts that infuriate the more complacent elements of our contemporary Left. ...

POLITICS is adolescent. (Who was it said, "The artist is the eternal adolescent through whom the human race matures"?) It has the faults as well as the virtues of impetuous and not always clairvoyant youth. But it has.
Dear Friends and Comrades:

For some time, I have been disturbed by two articles which have appeared in your pages, "How the Trotskyists Went to Jail" by Joseph Hansen (February, 1944) and "A Defamer of Marxism" by Harry Frankel (May, 1944). I have decided to send you this public protest against them.

What is most lamentable in Joseph Hansen's article is the gross emotional reaction to events which it reveals. Such an attitude must be condemned. There are fine models of Marxist writing: there are other fine models of writing such as the letters of Vanzetti. Instead of learning from these, it seems as if Hansen imitated the very worst of bourgeois journalism, the sob sisters. I cannot escape the conclusion that Hansen used the Marxist conception of history and the Marxist conception of morality as a means of mere sentimental personalization. If such is not adulation of leadership, I do not know what it is. I admire the fine example which the 18 showed during the trial: I admire them for the way in which they have preserved their morale while in jail. But this does not mean that I should adulate them, no more than that I should hope for them or anyone else to adulate me for any reason whatsoever. I also wish strongly to object to the assertion that only the Trotskyists are moral. When party leaders and leading party journalists make such assertions in public, the time has come for such a party to turn a sharp lens of criticism on itself. Hansen's attitude can only create distorted images of reality. I consider it dangerous.

The other criticisms of Hansen's article—his bad taste, his sloppiness, his bathos—which one can make—are secondary to its dangerous orientation. I deem it absolutely necessary to criticize that—the emotional reaction to events, and with it, the emotional conceit of history.

I reject the theory of bureaucratic collectivism. But I consider that Harry Frankel's review of Max Shachtman can well be described as literary apache work. It was not principled in its arguments. It substituted vituperation for argument and analysis. In consequence, it destroyed the effect of the good points which it made. For instance, Frankel indicated that during the Finnish War, Max Shachtman used the low morale of the Red Army as one argument substantiating his position. Thereby, he established morale as a criterion of argument. In consequence, it should be obligatory for him to explain the high morale of the Red Army in repulsing the Nazi invasion. But the fact that I agree with some of the points made by Frankel does not mean that I should defend his unfairness, his uncouth efforts to strip his adversary of all dignity, all honor, all sincerity. I consider it highly objectionable to polemicize with shabby arguments. And that is precisely what Frankel did in this article. For instance, he wrote that Shachtman had issued "a new edition"
of Trotsky’s “The New Course.” Here is an innuendo which helps Frankel to discredit Shachtman, to call him, in the manner of a fishwife, a black market charlatan. Now, where is the old edition of “The New Course”? Who sells it? When has it been advertised in your press? When I read this book, I immediately regretted that it had not been available sooner: I regretted, in particular, that it was not available during the period of the struggle against the Moscow Trials. Among other things, this book contains a brilliant description of the methods of Leninism, one which I hope will be widely read. I hope Harry Frankel will read it again. For I am convinced that he has much to learn from it. Also: Harry Frankel asked an empty question as a means of discrediting his opponent. Issuing a challenge, he asked why Max Shachtman did not re-publish “The Revolution Betrayed” First of all, there is easy access to this book for all who want to read it. Second, it is a known fact that the publication rights to this book are owned by Doubleday Doran & Co. If Max Shachtman published it, he, undoubtedly, be faced with a lawsuit. And if that happened, I am rather sure that Frankel, or one of his comrades who is equally rigid in attitude, would then write of this lawsuit in order to prove the low morals of Max Shachtman. When one indulges in such cheap argument, what moral right has one to call anybody a black market merchant in tripe? Why ask empty questions as a means of destroying the character of an adversary? Also, Harry Frankel would have us believe that in the United States, Max Shachtman has abandoned the Marxist conception of a trade union: in other words, that he is a scab and a strike breaker. I wonder who will believe that? And while he indulges in such miserable means of refutation, Frankel is, at the same time, guilty of one serious omission. Trotsky conceded that it might happen that history will prove Bruno to have been correct, and that if this turns out to be the case, then Marxists will have to reorientate themselves totally. But, Trotsky added, he was not convinced that events had, as yet, justified Bruno, and that therefore, it was wrong for Marxists to abandon their programme. This concession was a very important one. Frankel should have discussed it. It would have been more important to have discussed it than to have wasted space in the cheapest of abuse. The fact that I reject Max Shachtman’s acceptance of the theory of bureaucratic collectivism does not, in my eyes, justify me in approving of unfair, unprincipled, utterly unjust attacks upon him and his character. I consider such methods to be unworthy of Marxism.

I am, as is well known, not a member of your party. But I have collaborated with you on defense cases. I have expressed sympathy with you. On more than one occasion, I have made it clear to Max Shachtman and his collaborators that I did not agree with the theory of bureaucratic collectivism. The fact that I have done this causes me to feel all the more imperatively that it is my duty to send you this protest. Also: I admire the organized will which your party has shown. I admire your spirit of optimism and confidence. I admire the many examples of dedication to ideals and sacrifice for super-personal loyalties which your party has displayed. But none of these virtues can, in any way, excuse the Frankel attack.

I am fearful that if articles such as these two continue to appear, their only effect will be that of working harm, not good. Gross sentimentality, unbending rigidity, unfair attacks on opponents—these are all dangerous. I hold them to be indefensible.

Fraternally yours,

JAMES T. FARRELL