Comment

The End of the C. P.

The impending self-liquidation of the American Communist Party is one of the more spectacular results of Teheran. “Any realistic dealing with national and world problems today must begin and end with an evaluation of the agreements of Teheran, Cairo and Moscow,” said Browder. “The answer to all other questions will depend, in the final analysis, upon the judgment made of Teheran.” For a long time, the C. P. has been a branch office of the parent firm in Moscow rather than an American political party. When Stalin and Roosevelt, therefore, come to an agreement on postwar policies as broad as that apparently reached at Teheran, there is no longer any point for the American branch office to keep up even the formality of political opposition to Roosevelt and the social system he represents. As far as the Communists are concerned, there is nothing more left to struggle for.

In announcing the decision to liquidate, the Party’s Executive Committee took a very rosy view of the postwar future: “Not only a prolonged world peace without precedent in history, but also . . . a development of economic wellbeing and social reforms is the prospect open for the world.” This can all be realized through “full use of the democratic political machinery under our Constitution” and “under the system of free enterprise . . . within the two-party system traditional in this country”. Browder summed it up: “Capitalism and socialism have begun to find the way to peaceful coexistence and collaboration in the same world. . . . Our postwar plan is the continuation of national unity into the postwar period for a long term of years.” That is to say, the indefinite extension into peace time of the authoritarian, highly centralized kind of State capitalism which this country has adopted as a war measure. This Utopia will be reached through a National Front of all “decent”—Browder constantly uses the word as a political criterion—Americans, regardless of trivialities like class or economic status. “The policy of the supporters of Teheran must be to seek support from all classes and groups, with the working people as the main base, from the big bourgeoisie to the Communists.” To show he really means this, Browder strews his speech with assurances of esteem for big business, quoting the National Association of Manufacturers at length to show how progressively minded American businessmen really are. Thus first we had the United Front, limited to working class parties. Then we had the Popular Front, which included the liberal bourgeois parties as well. And now we have the National
One cannot but admire the thoroughness with which the F. P. follows out the logic of their line of the moment. The perspective sketched above is essentially that of the majority of liberals today, including the optimism about Teheran, but what liberal would have the nerve to put it all down? There is a madman's consistency about Com- munist political behavior, as when last year the New Jersey Governor Edison because Hague was closer to Roosevelt, the Commander in Chief of the great people's war. This extremism is a relic of their Bolshevik past, and produces comic results when it appears in conjunction with extremely un-Bolshevik actions.

Somewhat similar is their bizarre combination of Marxist ideology—in the midst of his speech, which was a laborious repudiation of practically every tenet of Marxism, Browder dropped in "we Marxists"—with totalitarian political tactics. These last are characterized above all by extreme flexibility, since decisions are made wholly at the top. The Party can turn on a dime—overnight. But these sudden shifts must always be rationalized with the ponderous apparatus of Marxist historical thinking, which is a very long-range affair. Hence Browder has to develop a detailed theory of a new "period" and a new conception of class relationships—new to Marxist thought, that is—in order to explain what is after all not so very complicated: that Stalin made a deal at Teheran.

However comic from an intellectual point of view, this procedure is quite sensible as a practical measure. Only the most case-hardened Party member could make such sudden and extreme shifts in cold blood. The ranks have to get hopped up on Marxology to endure the strain, and the dosage has to be increased precisely in proportion to the severity of the operation. Browder's speech was a massive dose. The papers reported that some of his audience walked out on him, but I venture to predict that the great majority of Party members will follow the Party right out of the Party. The effect of this sort of thing on the human mind and spirit after a few years must be appalling. The rank-and-filer who has been in the Party five years of more probably by now has his reflexes conditioned to accept anything, quite literally anything, including Christian Science, tea leaf divination and certainly Fascism, if it comes to him from the proper quarters in the familiar formulations.

The Inwardness of the Labor Draft

The very next day after the Communists announced their decision to fight inside the two-party system for such goals as "a total removal of all anti-labor laws", their leader, President Roosevelt, came out with his unexpected proposal for a national labor draft. It was unexpected because the manpower shortage has been easing off since last summer, and already cutbacks in war production are throwing tens of thousands of war workers out of their jobs.

Roosevelt gave three reasons for a labor draft: (1) "most democratic way to win the war"; (2) speed up war production; (3) stop strikes. (1) is demagogy. (2) has been denied by almost all the engineers, business managers and labor leaders that have testified before Congressional committees on the subject; they tend rather to think a labor draft would impede production because of the conflict and confusion it will cause. (3) disregards all previous experience, in this country and in England, with attempts to stop strikes through compulsion; they have never worked and have often, stimulated strikes, as the Smith-Connelly Act has.

What then is behind Roosevelt's proposal? It is partly 1944 politics, a gesture of appeasement to the increasingly powerful right-wing. (Though perhaps the term "appeasement" should now be dropped in describing such maneuvers of Roosevelt, since it implies he is "really" on the left.) It fits in with General Marshall's demagogic remarks about the railroad strike—remarks which Roosevelt took pains to indicate he fully approved. But there is something bigger involved: one more indication of the authoritarian character Roosevelt's war government has assumed. It is an attempt to extend the State power over labor relations, of the same nature as Roosevelt's ordering the Army to take over the railroads. This order was actually issued several hours after all the unions had notified the White House they accepted the President's terms and had called off the strike. It was thus a political demonstration, pure and simple. Nor is it just a question of weakening the unions. It is significant that the railroads themselves opposed having the Army take over, and that both the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers are on record as opposed to a national labor draft. (The only backing for a labor draft comes from the Army and Navy—and Roosevelt.) Business evidently fears the strengthening of State control of industry even more than it welcomes a blow at unionism. It is precisely to extend that control that Roosevelt plays with the idea of a labor draft, despite the political and economic dangers involved. This is the road towards a native totalitarianism which would conflict with very little in Roosevelt's political personality.

The Bolivian Pattern

The peculiar revolution in Bolivia is the fruit of that "Quisling policy" of the Roosevelt Administration which is described in Frank Freidel's article coming in the next issue. Here we have an anti-semitic, authoritarian putch, led by army officers of the same reactionary and pro-Nazi stripe as those who engineered the Argentinian coup, overthrowing the Penaranda government from the left. The street mobs stoned the offices of the big tin companies and the American embassy, shouting "Down with the Jews! Down with the North Americans!" The Bolivian tin magnates went into hiding, Jose Antonio Arze, leader of the Left Revolutionary Party, has been allowed to return from exile. The putchists are actually able to pose as the tribunes of the exploited Indian tin miners, at their program calls for better wages and retribution for la nation's notorious Castavi massacre. Nor is this necessary, all demagogy; a serious nationalist movement in a country as backward as Bolivia would try to improve the conditions of the masses as the necessary base for a stronger nation. This means fighting the tin barons, and fighting the American State Department which uses them as Quislings to betray their country's interests for the benefit of American imperialism.

Thus in Bolivia it is the fascists who play the socially
progressive role, the U. S. State Department which backs the anti-democratic forces. Similar coups are reported to be brewing in other Latin-American countries, and we can expect the masses there too to take their leadership against American imperialism wherever they can find it. The logic of political warfare is that if one side fails to occupy a strategic position, the other side—regardless of ideology—will seize it. Something similar seems to have happened in Italy, where Amgat keeps the unpopular king in power in the south while Hitler and Mussolini in the north set up a fascistic government they are careful to label “republican.” According to some reports they have been able to gain considerable support from the workers of the industrialized North by a demagogic program of socialization of the factories. The workers of Milan, Genoa and Turin must remember the Anglo-American reaction to their anti-Mussolini riots last summer: saturation bombing of those cities by the R.A.F. on the very days the popular anti-fascist demonstrations were at their height. This memory would not impair the effectiveness of Mussolini’s present use of the “Bolivian Patterns.”

Crossing the Ts The suicide of the American Communist Party comes after similar gestures by the Party’s real leaders (as against its formal leader, Browder). All friends of progress must be grateful to Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt for going out of their way, within three days of each other, to dispel any liberalistic illusions about their policies. That they were unsuccessful goes without saying, but at least they must be given credit for making an honest effort.

On December 20, Radio Moscow announced that the Internationale has been replaced as the Russian national anthem because “it does not reflect the basic changes which have taken place in our country”. Instead of the old-fashioned stuff about an “international Soviet” that will “free the human race” and the exhortations to “wretched of the earth” to arise (what if they should respond?), the new song celebrates “mighty Russia” and “the one great Soviet Union”. It promises nothing for the future beyond a succession of military victories. There is no question that this new song, as Radio Moscow claims, better expresses the present “socialist context of the Soviet Union”.

Three days later, Roosevelt remarked to a correspondent that he felt the “New Deal” was outmoded as a slogan and should be changed to “something like ‘Win the war’”. This suggestion was repudiated with indignation by Republicans and liberals alike. The former denounced the President’s attempt to evade responsibility for the horrors of his first two terms. “Can the leopard change his spots?” asked the Republican National Chairman—a little nervously, one suspects, for if spots can be changed, Roosevelt is the leopard to do it. The editors of The New Republic, on the other hand, insisted “THE NEW DEAL MUST GO ON”, stating flatly: “The President is wrong . . . wrong in fact and in strategy.” Then they proceeded to give Roosevelt one of those lessons in real politik with which liberal editors for some reason are constantly favoring the shrewdest and most amoral political strategist of our day. Their view is that the New Deal, far from being dead, is spreading all over the world. “Nothing can underline that fact better than the Cairo and Teheran conferences, which have given a new progressive impetus to the whole task of framing a people’s century.” If this is true, it seems odd that the first acts of Stalin and Roosevelt on returning from Teheran were to drop the Internationale and the “New Deal”. The mystery clears up, however, if we remember that Roosevelt and Stalin were present at Teheran—and the Editors of The New Republic weren’t.

Perhaps even more significant than Roosevelt’s dropping of the “New Deal” slogan was his explanation, a few days later, of what he meant. He talked for about half an hour, listing in great detail what he considered the permanent achievements of the New Deal: SEC, FDIC, Farm Credit Administration, PWA, Federal housing, etc. But he failed even to mention the Wagner Act and the Wages & Hours Law. It may have been an oversight, but Roosevelt does not usually make such slips.

New Shapes The railroad strike crisis suggests some rough generalizations about labor-vs.-capital today:

1. It is the Government, not the employers, which is now labor’s chief antagonist. The employers are making big money and are willing to shell out to avoid trouble. The coal operators agreed to the mine workers’ demands, but the War Labor Board threw out the contract. The railroads and the brotherhoods had a contract all drawn up ready to sign last May, when Price Administrator Vinson intervened to cut down the agreed-on increase. Thus wage rates have become matters of public policy, involved with inflation and other broad economic issues, instead of the old direct tug-of-war between employer and employee. The simple old days of bashing in scalps’ heads and scrapping it out with the boss are gone. Now it’s a wise union man who knows his own class enemy.

2. State-capitalist control of labor moves towards two extremes, the impersonal-bureaucratic and the personal-Caesarian. There is the slowmoving, incredibly complicated route of boards, hearings, mountains of testimony and data. Two special boards were created by the President during the year-long dispute over railroad wages: the unions estimate they spent 44 days and $100,000 in presenting their case before one of them. This cumbersome apparatus is used to wear down the unions and absorb the initial shock of their offensive. When the crisis develops to the point of a strike threat, this line of defense is abandoned and the Caesarian tactic comes into play—lightning decisions by individuals equipped with broad powers by the President. Bureaucratic impersonality yields overnight to the most extreme personal power. Vinson heard no arguments and is alleged not even to have reviewed the enormous record the unions spent $100,000 to compile; he simply used his anti-inflation powers to cut the award in half. The ultimate Caesar ex machina is, of course, Roosevelt himself. In the railroad case, he intervened to overrule both his two Presidential boards and also his personal representative, Vinson, in order to arrive at an entirely new formula for settling the issue. In the steel case, also under pressure from a threatened national strike, Roosevelt overruled his own War Labor Board to concede retroactivity.

3. The success of any union in extracting wage increases from this set-up has obviously nothing to do with either the “justice” of its demands or their “reasonableness”. There are no general standards of wages, no moral or rationalistic criteria; every group of workers, like other social groups, gets just as much as it has the strength and daring to extort. The fact that Roosevelt, confronted by the threatened steel and railroad strikes, broke the Little Steel Formula, however backhandedly, shows that labor’s greatest weapon is still the threat to withhold its services. John L. Lewis showed the way, in the masterly campaigns he has put on throughout the war, using blitzkrieg, war of nerves, fifth columnist (Ike’s, Steelman) and other advanced methods of warfare.

4. Strikes in wartime are either political manifestations or pressure-group tactics. Since our labor leaders have no
political program, and last summer were able to choke off the none-too-strong demand from the ranks for a Labor Party, their use of strikes has wholly the second character. How powerful labor could be as a pressure group if more of its leaders had the guts and brains of Lewis was indicated when the railroad unions got a reactionary Senate to pass a special act overriding Vinson's wage cut, and that too by a vote of 74 to 4. No Senator, however conservative, can be insensitive to the fact there are a million and a half members of railroad unions. But pressure-group tactics are a poor substitute for a Labor Party, especially in a period when labor relations are becoming ever more politicalized. The danger of Lewis's non-political pressure tactics, furthermore, is that even when they are successful and indeed especially when they are successful, they arouse the antagonism of other classes, which feel no common interest with labor. They tend to divide labor from the rest of society. A broad political program can unite other classes, whose interests are also considered, behind the lead of labor.

The Minneapolis Case

Eighteen men and women members of the Socialist Workers Party and the Minneapolis Motor Transport Workers Local 544 (CIO) have begun serving federal prison terms. They were indicted under the Smith-Connally "Omnibus Gag" Act of 1940, the most vicious attack on civil liberties since the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798. The Smith Act makes the mere advocacy of certain ideas a crime. The Trotskyists were found guilty—by a jury which included not a single trade unionist—of "conspiracy to advocate overthrow of the government by force and violence" and "counseling insubordination in the armed forces." (Italics mine). Although the constitutionality of the Smith Act is widely doubted, and although this is the first test case of the Act, the Supreme Court made legal history of a sort by refusing even to review the conviction.

The New Republic, of course, found the Court's action "inexplicable"—one more of the mysteries that swarm about the bewildered heads of liberal editors these days. The Court's refusal to review was perhaps surprising, but certainly not inexplicable. If the Court had heard the case, it would have confronted almost equally unattractive alternatives. If it reversed the conviction, it would have had to throw out the Smith Act, and the Smith Act is a very useful thing to have around in a global war. If it upheld the conviction, it would have had to repudiate explicitly the "clear and present danger" doctrine evolved by past liberal justices—and most of this Court are jealous of their reputation for liberalism—and also to think up some good reasons why the Smith Act is constitutional. By simply refusing to hear the case at all, the Court was able to preserve the Smith Act without putting anything on record.

The daily press acted with equal sagacity in reporting the Court's action. The encyclopedic N. Y. Times set a trap for future historians by failing to print the news at all, except as an item in a small-type daily digest of court decisions back among shipping notices and "has left my bed and board" items. PM printed a one-sentence report. It redeemed its reputation as a liberal crusader, however, by devoting three columns in the same issue, including one of Max Lerner's lushiest editorials, to the lynching of Leo Frank, an outrage which took place 26 years ago. The only paper to give the story any space was the Chicago Tribune, which asked why Roosevelt didn't put the Communists in jail too.

The Minneapolis case is the worst travesty on justice since Sacco-Vanzetti. The Civil Rights Defense Committee, at 160 Fifth Avenue, New York City, is conducting a campaign for unconditional pardons. Contributions should be sent there to help this campaign, and to provide food and shelter for the families of the eighteen prisoners.

Koestler: Some Political Remarks

The present vogue of Arthur Koestler is an index of the state of mind of the Left intelligensia. His books and articles seem to be discussed everywhere, from liberal cocktail parties to C. O. camps. There was a similar craze two years ago over Burnham's The Managerial Revolution. The essential reason for both, I think, is the same: they offer, in a grandiose historical style, two things very much lacking and very much wanted today: a sense of understanding the march of events, and consolation for failure to influence that march. Both authors take a determinist view of history compared to which Marx was positively an apostle of free will—which makes their toplofty remarks about Marxist "dogmatism" especially ironic. This determinism is morally comforting to those who have lost heart for further political struggle, since it absolves them of any guilty feelings. How can we help it if the Fates are against us? It is also intellectually reassuring, since both make a great show of realistically confronting the depressing Facts of Life of our times. There is a great deal to be said for the attitude of both Burnham and Koestler: realism, even pessimism, is a good antidote to the mechanical optimism of the more pious followers of Marx these days; and the emphasis both put on new ideas, fresh analyses is much needed. But it seems to me these writers reflect, and indeed exploit, this need rather than satisfy it.

Koestler's politics are expressed most clearly in his two much-discussed N. Y. Times Magazine articles: "A Challenge to Knights in Rusty Armor" (Feb. 14, 1943) and "We Need a New Fraternity of Pessimists" (Nov. 7, 1943). The thesis of the first article is:

... the nearer victory comes in sight, the clearer the character of the war reveals itself as what the Tories always said that it was—a war for national survival, a war in defense of certain conservative nineteenth century ideals, and not what I and my friends of the Left said that it was—a revolutionary civil war in Europe on the Spanish pattern. ... It must be admitted that we are beginning to look rather silly, and personally I am getting sick of my own and my friends' wailings and moanings.

From this, one would expect Koestler to continue: "I now realize that I had the wrong friends on the Left, and that the Independent Labor Party (or the Trotskyists) were right when they said this is an imperialist and not a revolutionary war. And so I am going to read Marx more closely and try and discover how the I.L.P. (or the Trotskyists) were able to know in advance what I am now painfully discovering from experience." But quite the contrary. He blames his illusions about the nature of the war on the fact he is a revolutionary socialist! "And there we stand in no-man's land, dazzled knights in rusty armor, with a well-thumbed copy of Marx-Engels quotations as our sole guide." I should say the trouble was that Koestler has thawed his Marx too little, not too much.

In the second article, Koestler develops his positive ideas a little. Again quite realistically, and eloquently, he confronts an uncomfortable truth: that nationalism is on the ascendant everywhere, and that the internationalist ("horizontal") visions of the twenties, from the League of Nations to the Third International, have faded. He makes a valid criticism of the British Labor Party for not having seized State power after Dunkirk. "Intelligent Tories have to this day not recovered from their surprise that capitalism survived the Dunkirk to Singapore crisis." But just as he
blames his disillusions about the war on the Left (variety not specified), so he blames the Labor Party's failure after Dunkirk not on the fact it has for many years been a bourgeoisified, pro-capitalist party but on its alleged socialist character.

Socialism, then, has failed, the working class is done for—but Koestler does not despair. "I believe the day is not far off when the present interregnum will end, and a new 'horizontal' ferment will arise—not a new party or sect, but an irresistible global mood, a spiritual spring tide like early Christianity or the Renaissance. This will mean the end of "the age of scientific formulations and quantitative measurements of utility values, of the ascendency of reason over spirit." This is pretty vague. The closest Koestler comes to anything concrete is: "All we can say is that the new movement will re-establish the disturbed balance between rational and spiritual values."

Since I do not know what "spirit" and "spiritual" mean, it is hard to criticize this postwar vision. But I do know that Koestler's program for action in the "interregnum" period—i.e., now—is so much hot air. "Does this mean that we should lie low and wait fatally until the time is ripe?" he asks. "I believe the contrary. What we need is an active fraternity of pessimists (I mean short-term pessimists)."

Two sentences further on, he writes that these pessimists will not "brandish the surgeon's knife at the social body, because they know that their own instruments are polluted. They will watch with open eyes and without sectarian blinkers for the first signs of this new horizontal movement." I.e., they will "wait fatally until the time is ripe." They will also "lie low," since Koestler continues: "Their chief aim will be to create oases in the interregnum desert." By this he means something like the monasteries in an earlier interregnum period, or Sweden or Switzerland today.

Even if one overlooks these painful contradictions, the "oasis" idea is self-liquidating. The oases are presented a method of keeping alive some spark of humane consciousness through the interregnum, which is characterized by a trend towards totalitarian organization along nationalistic lines. But why will the super-states of the interregnum refrain from using their centralized power to wipe out such oases? Koestler's program will be possible only insofar as the very trend it is supposed to combat does not develop—that is only to the extent it is unnecessary.

The next few decades require not an "oasis psychology" among Left intellectuals, but rather a more conscious, active intervention in the historical process. It will be a period of tremendous suffering, tremendous revolutionary possibilities, in Europe and in the colonial countries. One's endeavor should be not to withdraw into illusory "oases" but rather to go out into the desert, share the common experience and try to find a road out of the wilderness.

Koestler's politics turn out to be little more than a round-about way of accepting the status quo. He is disillusioned by both social revolution and the war, but his actions are not so impartial. For all his strong words about the real nature of the war, he still supports it and still hopes for good from it. "Now for the first time," he ends up his Times article somewhat unexpectedly, "it seems that we [and by "we" he means the Left] shall be on the winning side." In Arrival and Departure, Peter Slavek apparently purges himself through psychoanalysis of all political convictions. But it turns out that only his revolutionary beliefs were affected, for he ends up on the last page as a British agent floating down in a parachute behind the German lines. Compare Koestler with Silone if you would see how a profound rendering of disenchantment with revolutionary politics differs from an opportunist exploitation of that mood. Silone shares many of Koestler's political ideas—or perhaps the other way around would be more appropriate—but he has the clarity and courage to work out the full logic of his position. Koestler conciliates the Left by speaking as one of them, and he conciliates the Right by supporting the war. Silone has developed a really Christian personal-mystical approach which cuts under all political programs including socialism, and he has also maintained throughout the war the viewpoint of the "Third Camp" of the common people on both sides. Pietro Spina commits many infantiilities, but he does not don an R.A.F. parachute to help the poor and oppressed.

Wages in When two such conservative union groups as Wartime the steel workers and the railroad brotherhoods threaten nationwide strikes in order to break through the Little Steel formula, one can imagine the rank-and-file pressure on their top leadership. The conservative press attributes this pressure to immoral greediness, the Trotskyists retort the workers are being ground down by imperialist war. Some figures in the December Survey of Current Business suggest both views are wrong.

On the one hand, there is no basis for the old-fashioned radical idea that war is economically disadvantageous to the working class. The Survey's figures show that manufacturing payrolls, tripled between 1939 and 1943. Average real wages per worker increased 45% in that period, from $1240 (1939) to $1800 (1943). (This is based on an alleged 24% increase in the cost of living; this is probably too low, but even if we assume the increase was actually twice as much, 1943 wages would still be considerably higher than 1939.) Furthermore, unemployment, the greatest scourge of the modern working class, is now at an all-time low of 700,000. That workers have economically nothing to fear from war is one of the most sinister ironies of this age of irony.

What the workers do have to fear, however, is peace. The Survey points out that war-time wage increases are the result of "two temporary features of the emergency": over-time pay, and a shift from low-pay to high-pay industries. War industries are, of course, high-pay, and much higher-pay today than in 1939: the annual pay differential between war and non-war industries has increased from $375 (1939) to $750 (1943). After the war, even if we assume that full employment is maintained (a wildly optimistic assumption), there will take place an "automatic" reduction in payrolls: "Overtime pay will be abandoned as soon as a labor surplus permits return to the 40-hour week. The high-pay 'war' industries will release some of their surplus workers, who will return to the low-pay or 'non-war' trades. The magnitude of this automatic type of post-war reductions in manufacturing payrolls during the reconversion period could well range as high as 20%.

Thus the real "point" is not the total take-home pay, but the rate of pay, since the elimination of overtime and the down-grading of jobs after the war will erode away everything but the basic wage structure. The weakness of the top leadership of the unions is shown in their inability to push up wage rates, as against wages, during the war. The instinct of the rank-and-file is acute; all surveys of workers reveal as their dominant preoccupation the fear of what is coming after the war.

O BRAVE NEW WORLD! "The statement that we ought to prepare to bomb our enemies across the ocean directly from American soil still has a utopian ring."
Why politics?

A GOOD way to define what this magazine is “about” is to consider its name. In common American usage, “politics” has either mean or invidious connotations. It suggests ward politics—graft, baby-kissing, petty chicanery. Or else an illegitimate putting forward of special interests at the expense of society as a whole, as when the press used to accuse Roosevelt of “playing politics” with unemployment relief. The word “politician” is practically a term of abuse.

This would seem to be a curious attitude. “Politics” to the Greeks, who were experts at it, had no such connotation. Webster defines the word in Aristotelian terms as “the science and art of government”, which would seem unexceptionable enough. We can understand the bad odor of the word, however, if we consider the blunter contemporary definition: “who gets what, and how”. The conception of “politics” thus appears to be something like “sex” or “profits”, an overexplicit formulation of relationships polite bourgeois society prefers to keep hidden. It rends the fiction that all is harmonious and equitable within society. The bourgeois theory is that there is no necessity for politics, since the economic system distributes goods with Jovian impartiality, and every man has a chance to get precisely the amount of honor and possessions his individual qualifications entitle him to get. By definition, the interference of the politician must always be to pervert this self-adjusting system for the unfair benefit of some special interest. The ideal is, therefore, “A Businessman in the White House”.

This objection to politics is pretty old-fashioned, and is vanishing along with the antiquated laissez-faire ideology it expressed. (The sad experience of the last “businessman in the White House”, and the brilliant record of his super-political successor, helped along the demise of the conception—though it may be revived in future, anything being possible these days.) The modern attack on politics comes from another quarter: the ideal of national unity. In the United States at war, all respectable folk pay lip service to this ideal, and Roosevelt prefers the non-political role of Commander-in-Chief to the political one of President.

The National Committee of the American Communist Party, in recommending the party’s dissolution, invoked the “national unity” concept, defining the future function of Communists as “to aid the struggle for the unity of the people in support of the nation’s war policies, without partisan or class advantages.” In the totalitarian nations politics has vanished completely, at least in the sense of open, institutionalized contests between various interest groups. There are no parties because there are no parts, only the whole, and there are no elections, except in form, because only one choice is, even formally, presented to the voter. (That different candidates compete against each other in Russian elections does not alter the picture, since all candidates have the same program and choice among them is, at best, a question of choice among their individual qualifications. Such elections might be called “administration” rather than “political”.) In Nazi propaganda the term “politician” is even more invidious than in American usage. In Soviet propaganda, it has disappeared completely; the very conception has been expunged from the consciousness of the Russian masses.

Thus “politics” is a most unpopular term in a world in which ever-thicker veils of official ideology swathe the brutal realities of power. Yet as long as class societies exist, the only hope of the submerged majority to change things in their favor will rest on political action, breaking through the fiction of organic unity between the lion and the lamb and setting class groups off openly against each other. In a classless society, of course, politics would cease to exist because it would have no further function. “We are very well off as to politics,” says old Hammond in William Morris’s News from Nowhere, “because we have none.” The essence of reactionary politics is to try to get people to behave in a class society as though it were a classless society, i.e., to stop “playing politics”.

Actually, by one of these dialectical turns so common in history, the more the anti-political concept of “national unity” gains, the wider the power of the State can be extended and the more thoroughly can all of society become politicalized. In the totalitarian countries, where politics is most severely repressed, all aspects of personal and cultural existence have become subject to political control. The same process is going on over here. It would therefore seem useful to have a magazine which, beginning with its very title, will constantly emphasize the political reality of anti-political ideology and practices.

The Magazine’s Aims and Editorial Policies

In more concrete terms, the aim of POLITICS will be:

- to create a center of consciousness on the Left, welcoming all varieties of radical thought.
- to seek out the long-range trends in the welter of daily phenomena. Most political writing today is superficial because it limits “politics” too narrowly to the policies of certain parties and leaders, and because it concerns itself too largely with the immediate future, keeping basic principles in camphor, for use only on state occasions. POLITICS will try (1) to broaden political comment so as to include all kinds of social, technological, cultural and psychological factors; and (2) to measure month-to-month developments with the yardstick of basic values.
- to print work by younger, relatively unknown American intellectuals—economists, sociologists, critics, journalists, trade union and Government experts; and by those many leftist refugees who can produce informed analysis of European events but at present have no satisfactory means of communication with advanced American opinion.
- to consider art, music, literature as social and historical phenomena; to pay special attention to that vast “popular culture” so strangely neglected hitherto by American intellectuals.

Although POLITICS will not have a “line” on specific political issues, it will have an editorial policy. The as-
sumption will be that its readers and contributors are basically critical of existing institutions and feel the necessity for radical change. The magazine's political tendency will be democratic socialist. Its predominant intellectual approach will be Marxist, in the sense of a method of analysis, not of a body of dogma. (These terms, of course, means different things to different people. Not the least important task of the magazine will be precisely to elucidate these different meanings.) It will be partisan to those on the bottom of present-day society—the Negroes, the colonial peoples, and the vast majority of common people everywhere, including the Soviet Union. Its motto might well be Marx's words: "To be radical is to grasp the matter by the root. Now the root for mankind is man himself."

The editor has certain definite political ideas of his own. These opinions will no doubt influence his editorial judgment. His endeavor, however, will be to print material primarily for the new light it throws on the world and only secondarily for its political tendency.

The Editor's Political Views

It only remains to state my own political approach. Naturally, a not unimportant personal motive in undertaking to publish a new magazine was to express these views, and to afford some place where others with similar views might also write. There are two important questions on which my views conflict with those of large sectors of the Left, namely, the nature of the Soviet Union, and the proper socialist policy in the present war.

I do not consider the Soviet Union to be any sort of socialist or "workers'" State, whether "degenerated" or not, but rather a new form of class society based on collective ownership of the means of production by the ruling bureaucracy. This new kind of society, which might be called "bureaucratic collectivism," and which I see existing in modified form also in Nazi Germany, is a third alternative to capitalism and socialism. It will dominate the future if the masses fail to make a socialist revolution. It is not only not socialism, but it is a form of society profoundly repugnant to the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity which have been shared by most radicals, bourgeois or socialist, since 1789. That it is based on collectivised property, and that it is the heir of the first successful proletarian revolution (in much the same sense as Nazism is the heir of the Weimar Republic)—these facts call for a revision of traditional Marxist conceptions.

The most important attempt to apply traditional-Marxist theories to the development of Soviet Russia was, of course, Trotsky's. His analysis seems to me wrong in two major respects: (1) he expected the counter-revolution to come in the form of a restoration of capitalist property relations; (2) he saw a basic antagonism between the collectivised economy and the totalitarian political regime. These judgments flowed from his traditional-Marxist belief that capitalism and socialism are the only historical alternatives today. In the turning-point year 1928, Trotsky therefore considered the chief threat to the revolution to come from the kulaks and nepmen, with Bukharin as their spokesman. Stalin he actually termed a "centrist" who would soon be brushed aside once the nascent bourgeoisie had consolidated their position—or, given a more favorable turn, after the workers had rallied to Trotsky's own socialist platform. When the next year Stalin crushed Bukharin, began to liquidate the kulaks, and instituted the First Five Year Plan, Trotsky was compelled by the logic of his traditional-Marxist theories to salute all this as a "leftward" step. Actually, I think Anton Ciliga is right, in his remarkable book, The Russian Enigma, when he presents the First Five Year Plan as the foundation of the totalitarian society Stalin has built in Russia.

Because he saw a fictitious antagonism between collectivism and dictatorship, Trotsky insisted that the Stalinist bureaucracy were Bonapartist usurpers, a gang of bandits who had grabbed control of the collectivised economy but who were forced, in order to maintain their political power, to take actions which clashed with the needs of this economy. But it would now appear that there is no such conflict, that economic collectivisation and total dictatorship can exist peacefully side by side, their gears meshing in smoothly together. The very thing which today is to many people an indication of the progressive nature of the Soviet Union, namely the successful resistance to German invasion, seems to me to show something quite different: that the decisive contradictions Trotsky saw between collectivism and dictatorship do not exist. Trotsky always predicted that this alleged contradiction would cause great internal political difficulties for Stalin in the event of war, especially if the war began with big defeats. The strain of war would widen the alleged fissure between the masses and the bureaucracy, he thought. But the actual course of events has been quite different: although the war began with the most catastrophic large-scale defeats, not even a rumor has reached us of any political opposition to the regime at any time. This does not mean Stalin's regime is therefore progressive; Hitler also had wide popular support. Modern totalitarianism can integrate the masses so completely into the political structure, through terror and propaganda, that they become the architects of their own enslavement. This does not make the slavery less, but on the contrary more—a paradox there is no space to unravel here. The historical "point" is that the two great totalitarianisms, Germany and Russia, have met the supreme test of a modern class society, namely war, more successfully than the bourgeois democracies have. Bureaucratic collectivism, not capitalism, is the most dangerous future enemy of socialism.

It is admittedly much more difficult to take a clear position on the war than on the nature of the Soviet Union. For this war is an incredibly complex business. I think we can start out from the proposition that this war is not a struggle between Good and Evil, or Democracy and Totalitarianism, but rather a clash of rival imperialisms. This is now admitted much more widely in liberal-labor circles than it was at the beginning of the war. But to say it is an imperialist war does not exhaust the matter. For there certainly are important differences between fascism and democratic capitalism, and the outcome of the war certainly does "make a difference" to the workingclass in this country and elsewhere (including Germany). We of the Left cannot simply draw aside and say, it's none of our business, we don't care what happens.

From this, most of the Left, even those who agree as to the imperialist nature of the war, have drawn the conclusion that we must give support—"critical" support, of
course—to the United Nations. Alexander Herzen remarks of two Russian liberals who made their peace with Czar Nicholas I: “I shall be told that under the aegis of devotion to the Imperial power, the truth can be spoken more boldly. Why, then, did they not speak it?” So, too, with the critical supporters of the war—why, then, do they not criticize? The difficulty is that the war, like the Czarist system, is a phenomenon of such historical weight that to accept it, with whatever reservations, means one is paralyzed on apparently secondary issues. One might imagine, for example, a policy of all support to the war effort combined with uncompromising struggle, through strikes and political action, for a progressive conduct of the war on the home front and in foreign policy. This is formally imaginable. Yet it is a historical impossibility, which is why the impact of the lib-labs on the conduct of this war has been so negligible. The interests of the present ruling classes of England and America cannot be reconciled with those of the masses in those countries, and so long as the war is conducted within the framework of the status quo, it cannot be wrenched around to serve the interests of a “people’s century”. This war has its own logic and its own drive, which the labor movement submits to in supporting it.

The proper policy would have been to insist on taking the fight against Hitler into the hands of the workers, to press for certain policies by means of strikes and political action regardless of the immediate effect on the war effort. This would have involved the risk of a Nazi victory? Of course. But risks are involved in any course, and the present policy of the Left does not even offer risks: it is leading straight to postwar reaction on a world scale, the re-division of Europe and the colonial regions between the three dominant imperialisms. The great aim of Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill is to prevent “chaos” and “anarchy”—i.e., social revolution—in postwar Europe. But future hopes of progress will come out of “chaos”, not out of “order”.

It all comes down to: what are you interested in? If one is interested in basic social change, one weighs the risks and gains on one set of scales; if one is interested in buttressing the status quo as a “lesser evil”, then one uses another set. The British labor movement, for example, had the one chance this war has so far offered of making a basic social change, in the period after Dunkirk. Koestler describes it vividly:

If ever there was a chance for socialism in Britain, it was in the period from Dunkirk to the fall of Tobruk. Popular discontent against the conduct of the war was at its peak. In a dozen or so by-elections the Government was defeated. Even Masters of the Fox Hunt suddenly talked with popular soap box inflections. The Government had been invested with the power of nationalizing all individual property in the country; the transition to State-socialism could have been achieved merely by political pressure, without revolution or civil war . . . However, the workingclass lacked the political maturity to grasp its opportunity. Intelligent Tories have to this day not recovered from the surprise that capitalism survived the Dunkirk-to-Singapore crisis.

(N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1943).

Nothing came of this opportunity because the British Labor Party, socialist in words only, put the war ahead of everything else. The German Social Democracy showed what it was really “interested” in when it handed back the country to the Junkers in 1919. War is the supreme crisis of any class society; then as never in peacetime does the ruling class need the support of the ruled. Whether this crisis is seen as an opportunity or as a danger depends on where one’s political interests lie.

Dwight MacDonald

Stalin’s Policy in Europe

The now quite obviously reactionary aims of American imperialism in Europe (which have in no way been disavowed in Teheran) the frantic efforts to buttress tottering “legitimate” elements—the Vatican, Franco, Habsburg, Badoglio—and the plans for a de-industrialization of Germany, have recently led certain radicals to regard Stalin’s aims in Europe as more progressive or at least as a lesser evil. They argue that Stalinism would push the agrarian revolution in Eastern Europe, wipe out the semi-feudal property relations, industrialize countries which so far have been hardly touched by the Industrial Revolution; that it furthermore would introduce some kind of economic planning as opposed to the capitalist anarchy which the Allies propose to re-establish.

This trend of thinking is based on a fallacy which may lead to extremely dangerous consequences. What value is attached to technical and economic development if it is coupled with the physical destruction of all progressive independent forces, if it is linked with a reaction throwing culture back beyond the period of the Enlightenment? The term “progress” is meaningful only if it implies—apart from technical economic advance—more human relationships between men. Besides, Stalin does not favor even this emasculated form of “progress” everywhere. In Germany he is right now backing the most reactionary Junker elements of the army, SS-officers and other sectors of the Nazi apparatus. In Italy he supports a regency of the Prince of Naples.

A closer analysis reveals that Stalin’s aims in Europe are twofold. On the one hand, Russia’s sphere of influence must be expanded to realize the century old dreams of the Czars; a great part of the mainly agricultural East of Europe—the Balkans, Poland, the Baltic countries—must come under direct Russian domination. The rest of Europe—the industrial West especially—is to remain fragmented among different equally powerless nations. On the other hand, an even more compelling motive for Stalin’s active intervention in European politics is the danger of revolutionary outbreaks in the great industrial countries of the West. Any such outbreak would start the flame of opposition inside Russia. The sentiment of standing helplessly alone was a big factor in the defeat of Russian opposition. “Wherever we look we see only the black and hopeless void,” said Bukharin at his trial.

Stalin must avoid any grouping of powers on the European continent capable of mobilizing effective resistance to Russia. This explains his repeated declarations of opposition to federations in Central Europe, and also his backing of all sorts of “free” nationalist movements. These ot-
organizations are meant to serve two purposes: to split the different European nations, preventing any effective coordination, and, at least in the West, to strengthen reactionary elements as a bulwark against revolutionary claims. The various "free" movements and governments now existing or in the process of creation are skeleton organizations to flourish later with remnants of the old apparatus of domination and Stalinist agents. Stalin is as much afraid of the dangers of "anarchy" as are the other Allied statesmen (see the declarations of the Moscow conference), only his methods to avoid it are much more subtle.

Surely, Stalin is never embarrassed by contradictory promises: while he supports the German officers' claims for a strong and armed Germany, his Polish agency makes promises for a new Poland englobing a great part of a strong and armed Germany, his Polish agency makes promises: while he supports reactionary elements in Italy, France and Germany and especially Germany, he is allied with the militant peasant movements on the Balkans. For, in distinction to methods to avoid it are much more subtle.

In spite of these apparent contradictions, Stalin's main line in Europe is aimed at staving off any attempt at a Federation of European Nations and at a European socialist revolution. Since these two are the mainstays of any progressive solution of Europe's problems, Stalin's Russia—in this respect also the worthy successor of the Russia of the Czars—becomes the main pillar of reaction on the continent.

While the Western Powers and their Gauleiters, stepping into the den of European politics, will be bewildered, naive, inexperienced and therefore relatively less harmful, Stalin has at his disposal all over the continent an elite of experienced Fifth Columnists. He has the tremendous advantage of being able to "work from within." Myths die hard; today—especially in view of the open backing of the Anglo-Saxon powers—there are millions in Europe who believe that Russia is a socialist state. They will rid themselves of these illusions only through direct experience. In the meantime the Kremlin will utilize to the utmost these almost religious beliefs.

It has been said that, in a different political constellation, Stalin might resort again to a "revolutionary" tactic or at least phraseology in Western Europe. I do not think so. Propaganda is not made in a vacuum. Propaganda slogans express the ideologies and social relations of a society. Otherwise it would be a mystery why the Allies have not used more effectively the weapon of political warfare—as our naive liberals expected them to. The new Russian ideology and social relations have their reflections on international propaganda (the dissolution of the Comintern and the abandonment of the Internationale were not merely clever maneuvers, but the expression of the completion of a change in social relationships.) The Russia of the Five Year Plans could still use revolutionary socialist phraseology, the Russia of the Marshals, the "New Army" and the tradition of Alexander Nevy Sky cannot. It can call on the peasants of the Balkans clamoring for land, not on the socialist workers of the West. The Russian bureaucracy has developed a profound contempt for the masses and holds the conviction that they can be "manipulated" at will. This bureaucracy, like every bureaucracy, does not believe in spontaneous developments from below. It counts mainly upon deals and "arrangements" from above, and has no confidence in the effectiveness of revolutionary phraseology. It knows furthermore that revolutionary slogans are a double edged weapon: once the masses are in action, who will be able to stop them?

**THE BREADLINE AND THE MOVIES**

"... for that sovereign people that once bestowed military command, consulships, legions and all else, now bridles its desires, and limits its anxious longings to two things only—bread, and the games of the circus!"

**JUVENAL.**

The great dynastic formula of the ancient Roman Empire has never been lost in the West. Society and civilization were transformed, but neither Machiavelli nor the Medici had forgotten the classic strategy of social restraint and control in a metropolitan world. And in our own era of mass culture it was Thorstein Veblen who grasped the instrumental peculiarities of the ruling power, and examined the official mechanisms of "distraction" and "submission."

*Panem et circenses*—"the formula for the politicians of Imperial Rome on which they relied to keep the underlying population from imagining vain remedies for their own hard case"—Veblen rendered (and reformulated) as "The Bread Line and the Movies."* It was not quite a literal translation of the Latin motto, but the vernacular richly suggested the new varieties of modern statesmanship. For one thing, from the vantage-point of contemporary craft the bread-ration prodigality of the Imperial politicians seemed to be "weak and little-minded." The vested interests paid for the Roman pusillanimity. The "progress of

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*A recent survey of European underground movements conducted by the Foreign Policy Association arrived at the following conclusion: "The approach to post-war political and social democracy taken by underground leaders in western Europe is in marked contrast to that advocated in countries east of Germany. Whereas most Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and French spokesmen plan to proceed within their long-established constitutional framework and to perfect social reforms already well begun in their countries before 1939, many Polish, Yugoslav and Greek leaders believe that fundamental economic and constitutional changes must be made in their pre-war regimes. This divergence between the countries of western and Eastern Europe reflects the wide difference in the extent to which the economic and social problems of the two regions had been solved before the war."

† The New York Times correspondent A. C. Seligkew reported on January 1, 1943 that "the confusion caused by German propaganda [in Greece] is so great that many refuse to believe that Russia has announced her own divorce from the Comintern and changed the Internationale's words. There is a continued belief that Sovietism today is as it was before and as it was in 1917."
fiscal methods," however, as Veblen observed, made it possible in modern society for the first time to induce the underlying population itself to pay for the "mechanical appliances by which they are to be kept in hand."

But in the matter of circenses, too, there has been change and improvement during these intervening centuries since the Glory that was Rome. Political practice runs on a more economical plan in this business-like age. The Roman circenses appear to have cut somewhat wastefully into the ordinary 'earnings' of those vested interests for whose benefit the Roman Imperium was administered; whereas the movies of the twentieth century are a business proposition in their own right, a source of 'earnings' and a vested interest. And in ordinary times of peace or war the movies supply what appears to be required in the way of politically salutary dissipation . . .

What could be more adapted than the standardized day-dreams of the cinema "to distract popular attention securely and keep the underlying population from taking stock of the statesmen's promises and performance"? and "in the case of urgent need to stabilize a doubtfully manageable popular sentiment"? The manufacture of "pomp and circumstances," and "the rant and swagger of many subsidized heroes" were, of course, expensive—

but then the cost need not be borne by those vested interests that are to be safeguarded from the corrosive afterthought of the underlying population . . . It is a potent resource, capable of lifting the common man's afterthought into the upper air, instead of letting it run along the ground of material fact, where it might do mischief; costly, no doubt, but then the cost need not be counted so closely, since it is the common man who pays the cost, the same common man who is forever in danger of getting into mischief by reflecting unduly on what the statesmen have been using him for. And, of course, since it is the common man who is to be relieved of afterthought, it is only reasonable that the common man should pay the cost.

Panem et circenses: The Bread Line and the Movies.

Nor was all this the esoteric lore of a 'strange Norskie boy.'

From reconquered Italy this winter the accounts have been coming through of the crowded Allied food lines in Naples and Salerno and Sicily. The great white fathers have been dispensing white bread. And Marshal Pietro Badoglio as early as October put in an eloquent and reasoned plea in the Formula's behalf—

... People are excited and overwrought after the distress of war. If conditions are too bad and they are without hope, they turn to other presumed cures. Young men, trying to make political careers for themselves, go left rather than right.

The left offers opportunities for quick rise. It appeals to passions which are predominant when people mentally are in a state of flux.

The Allies must help us. . . . The people can live on very little if necessary. In Naples they survived on vegetables and fruit.

But I hope the Allies will give the Italian people the minimum which is necessary to sustain life. That is the safeguard against communism.

The very same day (New York Herald-Tribune, Oct. 18) another dispatch appeared:

ALLIES CONTROL FILMS IN ITALY

SOMEBYWHERE IN SOUTHERN ITALY (AP).—The Italian public, already flocking to see American films, was notified today that the Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Headquarters had assumed direct control of such entertainment.

An order published in Italian newspapers said all films must henceforth be authorized by the P.W.B. and that films which are "political or tendentious in character" will be barred.

The people were in the colosseums, and all would be right with the empire . . .

The Formula had been appropriated by the general staffs as a weapon of war. And, consistent with advanced military theory, instruments of discipline serve the command equally on either side of the lines.

For "the distress of war" is a creeping, insidious danger. The simplest responses of emotion and desire must be organized within the system of military routine. No personal escape may be permitted by the apparatus. The effective war machine is calculated to absorb liberating efforts of thought or raptures or spontaneity. All private realms are to be liquidated. The inner life is hopelessly caught in the mechanics of conformity . . . and the mass is totally coordinated in a dreamless adjustment.

"Give us more movies!"> General Eisenhower ordered from North Africa. "Motion pictures stimulate a healthy state of mind in my command," another general at the fighting fronts explained, "they are as necessary to the men as rations." And from a foreign correspondent: "These people are crazy for American movies. For two years Hollywood has been strictly illegal in French North Africa. I suspect that to many people the best thing about our presence here is that they can see American movies again. . . ." Motion-picture supply and exhibition has already become a vital, critical wing of army ordinance.

Total war has performed miracles of conversion. Soldiers have been transformed into machines. Traditional civilian formulae of social control have been effectively overhauled to serve as motorized and standardized army equipment.

For the conquering heroes, you see, there are the bonuses of wondrous Hollywood imagery. For the vanquished the appeasement of white bread, and two seats on the aisle in the dark.

MELVIN J. LASKY

Corp. Rodney M. Graham, 20, a quarter-breed Chipewa Indian told of a spirited exchange he had with a Nazi Oberleutnant on the "Aryan" question. The Nazi's feelings were hurt because over Sicily he had been shot down and wounded by an American Negro pilot, and he demanded of Graham that he explain how the Americans could let Negroes fly.

"I told him that a Negro was as good as him or any other white man—that if he had the education he could make as good a pilot as anybody," Corporal Graham related. "He didn't seem to like it."

N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1943

THE MILITARY MIND

14. The dimensions of a monument above the level of the ground shall not exceed the following:

a. For officers of the rank of major-general or higher, 7 feet in length, 4½ feet in width, and 5 feet in height.

b. For officers of the rank of major to brigadier-general, inclusive: 7 feet in length, 4 feet in width, and 4½ feet in height.

c. For officers of the rank of captain and lower: 7 feet in length, 3½ feet in width, and 4 feet in height.

4. For enlisted men: the dimensions shall conform to the monuments and headstones already erected in the section where buried.

—Office of the Quartermaster-General: "Regulations on Arlington National Cemetery, Oct. 27, 1923."
Toward a Permanent War Economy?
Walter J. Oakes

As World War II enters its climactic stage, it becomes increasingly clear that this is not the “War To End All Wars.” Already there have been many warnings of the “possibility of another war.” A growing cynicism is abroad concerning the prospects of durable peace. World War III is not only a distinct possibility, it is inevitable as long as the world’s social structure remains one of capitalist imperialism. As Dorothy Thompson puts it in her column of December 6, 1943, “All grand alliances (referring to the Roosevelt-Stalin-Churchill meeting) . . . have existed only as long as it was necessary to win a war, or protect themselves against the aggressions of other powers. Once all enemies are defeated, the only potential enemies left are members of the grand alliance themselves.” In more scientific terms—the contradictions which led to this war have not been eliminated; if anything, they have been intensified.

More revealing than any theoretical analysis concerning its inevitability are the obvious preparations that are now being made for World War III. One may dismiss the psychological preparations, designed to condition the population to accept the inevitability of the next war, as too intangible to evaluate. One may shrug aside the political preparations, which are clearly inherent in the power politics now being played by the leaders of the United Nations, on the ground that this is realpolitik in a materialistic world. But it is impossible to overlook the unanimity with which the business community approves the maintenance of a large standing army, universal military service and an air force second to none as preconditions of America’s “security” in the post-war world. Disarmament, the utopian pipedream of Geneva, is to be abandoned as a slogan after this war—except for the conquered enemy.

Important as are the above more or less obvious types of preparation, currently concealed economic preparations are decisive. In the United States, this question is intimately bound up with the problems of reconversion. Much more is at stake than the question of what to do with the huge government-owned war plants (estimated at $20 billion by the end of the war). A plan for reconversion, no matter how loose and flexible, must be guided by some indication of the type of post-war world that is desired. If war within the life of the next generation is a probability, then it must be planned for on the basis of the lessons learned from this war.

American imperialism, for example, has no intention of entering another war without adequate stockpiles of all critical and strategic military materials. And so we have Senate Bill 1562 (introduced early in December, 1943 by Senator Scrugham of Nevada) whose stated purpose is: “To assure an adequate supply of strategic and critical minerals for any future emergency by holding intact in the post-war period all stock piles surviving the present war owned by Government agencies and by necessary augmentation thereof primarily from domestic sources.” The “future emergency” is subsequently defined as “a total war of three years’ duration, or of any equivalent emergency.”

In the case of copper, an article in the National Industrial Conference Board’s Economic Record (November, 1943) reveals what would be involved. “As current usage of copper probably is at least 1.5 million tons annually, a supply for a three-year war, as proposed in the Scrugham bill, might require 4.5 million tons. This amount is nearly equal to the entire domestic output of new copper in the Thirties, or four years’ output at the peak mining rate of 1.07 million tons in 1942.” While the Scrugham bill leaves the question of cost open, it is estimated that the copper program alone would cost well above $1 billion. Clearly, economic preparations for World War III are beyond the stage of informal discussion.

The big question which all discussions of post-war economy try to answer is, of course: How to achieve full employment? The sad experiences following the last war, culminating in the world-wide depression of the 1930’s, give the problem an understandable urgency. Public interest in the question is certainly more widespread than ever before. What better tribute to American advertising genius, or what more fitting commentary on the political and economic naivete of the American people, could there be than the $50,000 contest now being held by the Pabst Brewing Company, in commemoration of its 100th birthday, for the best plans to achieve full post-war employment?

There is an urgent political necessity for capitalism to achieve the abolition of unemployment. It is motivated by...
a much more powerful stimulus than the increasingly-repeated question: "If we can employ everyone in wartime, why can't we do as much in peacetime?" The fact is that the capitalist system cannot stand the strain of another siege of unemployment comparable to 1930-1940. It does not require a far-seeing statesman to picture the revolutionary dynamite inherent in a situation where 10-12 million people are unemployed. And this is a conservative estimate of the size of post-war unemployment, if the traditional methods, such as those used after the last war, are followed this time.

The traditional methods (consisting essentially of trying to restore the status quo ante bellum as rapidly as possible) will not be followed. Whether Roosevelt presides over the transition period or not, too much water has flowed under the bridge to permit an uncontrolled post-war inflation followed by a resounding and catastrophic depression. This much, at least, the better minds amongst the capitalists see. The State will have to intervene. It is a question of how much and in what form.

Here we encounter a problem in semantics. State intervention, as I shall show below, must take the form of maintaining a Permanent War Economy. What is a "war economy"? In an extreme sense, involving the reduction of civilian standards of living to the bedrock minimum in order to permit the maximum expansion of war output, we have not, of course, a war economy today. Russia, since the consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship, and Germany, since the consolidation of Hitler's dictatorship, both in "peace" and in the period of military hostilities, have experienced this type of war economy. They are the only countries in modern times to have experienced a "genuine" war economy, with the possible exception of Japan.

A war economy, as I use the term, is not determined by the expenditure of a given percentage of a nation's resources and productive energies for military purposes. This determines only the kind of war economy—good, bad, or indifferent from the point of view of efficiency in war-making. The question of amount, however, is obviously relevant. At all times, there are some expenditures for war or "national defense." How much must the government spend for such purposes before we can say a war economy exists? In general terms, the problem can be answered as follows: a war economy exists whenever the government's expenditures for war (or "national defense") become a legitimate and significant end-purpose of economic activity. The degree of war expenditures required before such activities become significant obviously varies with the size and composition of the national income and the stock of accumulated capital. Nevertheless, the problem is capable of theoretical analysis and statistical measurement.

Until the present period, in America at least, only one legitimate end-purpose of economic activity has been recognized (in theory); namely, the satisfaction of human wants or, less euphemistically, the production and distribution of consumers' goods and services. In wartime, of course, the legitimacy of war expenditures is never questioned, except by those few who question the progressiveness of the aims of the war. We are now being prepared, however, to recognize as a legitimate economic activity peacetime expenditures for war of a sizable nature. Herein lies the real importance of the psychological preparations now under way for World War III.

The state will have to spend for war purposes as much as is required to maintain a "stable and safe" equilibrium. As a result, unemployment will be a thing of the past. Barring the immediate outbreak of World War III—I.e., within five years of the end of World War II—the size of post-war war outlays is not significantly influenced by the potential utility of such expenditures for war-making. The decisive consideration is the level of employment that it is desired to maintain. Based on preliminary estimates of national income and capital accumulation in the interim period between World War II and World War III, the United States will achieve a Permanent War Economy through annual war expenditures of from $10-20 billion. Thus, the inner functioning of American capitalism will have been significantly altered, with profound consequences for all classes of society.

Why these "balancing" expenditures on the part of government must take the form of war outlays rather than public works requires a brief excursion into the past history of unpaid (surplus) labor.

The Problem of Unpaid Labor

The root of all economic difficulties in a class society lies in the fact that the ruling class appropriates (in accordance with the particular laws of motion of the given society) a portion of the labor expended by the working class or classes in the form of unpaid labor. The expropriation of this surplus labor presents its own set of problems; generally, however, they do not become crucial for the ruling class until the point is reached where it is necessary to pile up accumulations of unpaid labor. When these accumulations in turn beget new accumulations, then the stage of "primitive accumulation" (designed to build up the physical stock of the country for immediate consumption purposes) ceases and the stability of the society is threatened. The ruling class is impaled on the horns of a most serious dilemma: to allow these growing and mature accumulations to enter into economic circulation means to undermine the very foundations of existing society (in modern terms, depression); to reduce or eliminate these expanding accumulations of unpaid labor requires the ruling class or sections of it to commit hara-kiri (in modern terms, the capitalist must cease being a capitalist or enter into bankruptcy). The latter solution is like asking capitalists to accept a 3 per cent rate of profit, because if they make 6 or 10 per cent they upset the applecart and destroy the economic equilibrium. This is too perturbing a prospect; consequently, society as a whole must suffer the fate of economic disequilibrium unless the ruling class can bring its State to intervene in such a manner as to resolve this basic dilemma.

Since a class society can support on a relatively stable basis a certain amount of accumulated unpaid labor, the problem becomes one of immobilizing the excess. State intervention is required precisely because no individual member of the ruling class will voluntarily give up the opportunity to accumulate further wealth. The State, therefore, acts in the interests of all the members of the ruling class; the disposition of the excess accumulated unpaid labor
is socially acceptable, and generally unnoticed by individual members of the ruling class.

Such, for example, was the role performed by pyramid-building in Ancient Egypt, the classic example of a stable economy based on the institution of chattel slavery. In feudal society, based on the accumulation of unpaid labor through the institution of serfdom, an analogous role was performed by the building of elaborate monasteries and shrines. These lavish medieval churches were far more than centers of worship and learning, or even than examples of conspicuous expenditure on the part of the ruling classes; they were an outlet for the unpaid labor of feudal society—an outlet which permitted a deadening economic equilibrium for centuries.

Capitalist society, of course, has had its own pyramids. These ostentatious expenditures, however, have failed to keep pace with the accumulation of capital. In recent times, the best examples have been the public works program of the New Deal and the road building program of Nazi Germany. Both have been accomplished through what is termed “deficit financing.” That is, the state has borrowed capital (accumulated surplus labor for which there is no opportunity for profitable private investment) and consumed it by employing a portion of the unemployed millions, thus achieving a rough but temporarily workable equilibrium.

While the Roosevelt and Hitler prewar “recovery” programs had much in common, there is an important difference. The latter was clearly a military program; all state expenditures were calculated with a direct military use in view. As such, they did not, for the most part, conflict with the direct interests of the capitalist class of Germany who wished to reserve for private capital all opportunities for profitable investment. In the United States, only a minor portion of the W.P.A. and P.W.A. programs possessed potential military usefulness. Consequently, as such expenditures increased, the opposition of the capitalist class rose (this was basically an economic development, although the psychological impetus afforded by recovery from the depths of depression undoubtedly aided the process). The more money the state spent, the more these expenditures circumscribed and limited the opportunity for profitable private investment. The New Deal was dead before the war; the war merely resuscitated its political expression and was, in reality, an historical necessity.

War expenditures accomplish the same purpose as public works, but in a manner that is decidedly more effective and more acceptable (from the capitalist point of view). In this, capitalism is again borrowing from the techniques employed by the more static class societies of slavery and feudalism. War outlays, in fact, have become the modern substitute for pyramids. They do not compete with private industry and they easily permit the employment of all those whom it is considered necessary to employ. True, this type of consumption (waste) of surplus labor brings with it a series of difficult political and economic problems. These, however, appear to be solvable; in any case, they can be postponed. The deluge may come but the next generation, not the present one, will have to face it.

A little matter, the tabulation of unemployment, signals the profound transformation that our society is undergoing. In prewar days, those employed on public works projects were officially counted among the unemployed. Today, however, not only are those engaged in producing the instruments of war considered to be gainfully employed; even those in the armed forces are classified as part of the employed labor force. It is only necessary to perpetuate into the post-war period this type of bookkeeping which classifies soldiers and munitions workers as “employed,” and then war (“national defense”) outlays become a legitimate end-purpose of economic activity; a Permanent War Economy is established and socially sanctioned; capitalist society is safely maintained—until the next war.

**Capital Accumulation and State Intervention**

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of capitalist society—in comparison with earlier class societies, and at the same time that which indicates its superiority over these earlier forms—is the rapidity with which wealth is accumulated. Alternating periods of rising and falling business activity have resulted and have come to be accepted as an inevitable and peculiarly capitalist feature of the accumulation of capital. This was, at least, the situation prior to World War II. To understand the basic laws of motion of capitalist society required the application of the fundamental Marxian concepts of the increasingly high organic composition of capital and the falling average rate of profit. With these tools Marx predicted, and one could analyze, the results of capitalist accumulation. The Marxian general law of capitalist accumulation may, for convenience, be expressed as two laws; namely, the inevitable tendencies toward the polarization of classes and the increase in unemployment.

Today, however, this analysis no longer holds good without certain modifications. The new element in the situation is clearly the fact that the entire present period (in the United States, beginning with the advent of the Roosevelt Administration) is one of increasing State intervention. New forces are set in motion and new laws or trends are discernible. The war both obscures and highlights these basic changes in the functioning of capitalism. The role of the State is obviously increased, but the conduct of the war gives rise to the illusion that this is a temporary affair. But the government cannot spend upwards of $300 billion on war expenditures, acquiring ownership of huge quantities of facilities, raw materials and fabricated goods, without having a profound and lasting effect on the body economic. How to dispose of an anticipated $75 billion of government assets at the end of the war is one of the more perplexing questions troubling the best minds among the bourgeoisie today.

If the Republicans are victorious in the 1944 elections, it is conceivable that they might try to restore the *status quo ante bellum*. Reversing an economic trend, however, is far more difficult than reversing a political trend. Destroying or immobilizing $75 billion of government assets is qualitatively a different proposition than the situation which existed at the end of World War I. It would be impossible to do this, and at the same time to maintain employment at a high level and to carry through the international plans of American imperialism. Any such Republican experiment will necessarily be short-lived. As for the Roosevelt Administration—it seems to be “sold” on the Keynesian proposition that public investment must take up
the inevitable slack in private investment in order to maintain the savings-investment equilibrium.

Assuming, therefore, that my major thesis is correct and that government balancing operations in the future will consist largely of socially sanctioned war outlays, the question arises: how will the future laws of capitalist accumulation differ from the past?

The Future Laws of Capitalist Accumulation

In the past, the dynamics of capital accumulation have caused a polarization of classes. (On the one hand, concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer monopoly capitalists; on the other, a steady increase in the size of the working class, both factory and non-factory, relative to other classes). The war, far from interrupting, has accentuated both these trends—in general, at the expense of the middle classes.

Although this law will still hold true in the epoch of Permanent War Economy, the increased State military outlays (as compared with prewar State expenditures) will have the effect of slowing up the rate of class polarization. This is due not so much to the different economic nature of these expenditures as to their political character. Their purpose, it must be remembered, is to stabilize the economy; i.e., by State intervention to freeze class relations and simultaneously the existing class structure. That is why the post-war size of the labor force and the national income will be considerably below that achieved during the war. Otherwise, the magnitude of post-war war outlays would be at a level so high as virtually to guarantee widespread political opposition on the part of the capitalist class.

The major revision that will have to be made in the Marxian analysis of capitalist accumulation is in the famous law that an increase in capital means an increase in the rate of class polarization. This is due not so much to the different economic nature of these expenditures as to their political character. Their purpose, it must be remembered, is to stabilize the economy; i.e., by State intervention to freeze class relations and simultaneously the existing class structure. That is why the post-war size of the labor force and the national income will be considerably below that achieved during the war. Otherwise, the magnitude of post-war war outlays would be at a level so high as virtually to guarantee widespread political opposition on the part of the capitalist class.

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The decline in the standard of living will be similar in nature to that which is just beginning to take place in wartime. For example, until about the middle of 1942 it was possible for the developing American war economy to support a substantial increase in military production at the same time that a small, but significant, rise occurred in average civilian standards of living. This was due, for the most part, to the fact that in 1939 there was considerable underemployment of both men and resources. Once more or less full employment was attained, however, further increases in military production could only be achieved at the expense of the civilian sector of the economy. Most civilians have not yet felt the full impact of this development because of the accumulation of huge inventories of consumers’ goods in the hands of both merchants and consumers. As these inventories are depleted and as consumers’ durable goods wear out, the standard of living begins to decline noticeably. If the war continues throughout 1944, with no significant over-all cutbacks in military programs, the decline is apt to become precipitate.

The Permanent War Economy will operate much the same way. At first, of course, there may be a rise in the average standard of living if the levels of national income reached are reasonably close to those now maintained and if, simultaneously, there is a sharp reduction in total military outlays (inclusive of expenditures for “relief and rehabilitation”). Within a relatively short period, however, assuming that the economy is stabilized at the desired level with a minimum of unproductive governmental expenditures, the maintenance of economic equilibrium will require a steadily rising curve of military outlays. The decline in the average standard of living of the workers, at first relative, will then become absolute—particularly on a world scale as all nations adapt their internal economies to conform with the requirements of the new order based on an international Permanent War Economy. Naturally, the decline will not be a descending straight line; it will have its ups and downs, but the long-term trend will definitely be downward.

Three major assumptions are implicit in the above analysis. First, any significant increases in real national income or total product beyond the reconversion equilibrium level are excluded, due to the capitalist nature of production. This ties in with the reasons why continued accumulation of capital is necessary and why these additional increments of capitalist accumulation require more or less corresponding (socially acceptable) economically unproductive State expenditures. Second, while a portion of the State’s consumption of accumulated unpaid labor may take the form of public works, for reasons previously stated only a minor portion of such public works will be capable of raising the standard of living; and these will decline in importance as direct war outlays increase. Third, the possible effects of alternative fiscal policies (financing through difference methods of taxation and borrowing) to support the Permanent War Economy are excluded as not affecting the basic analysis; although certain methods may markedly accelerate the inflationary process, while others may permit American entry into World War III without having experienced a violent inflation.

Capitalist society is forever seeking a “stable and safe” equilibrium—one which eliminates unemployment or, at least, reduces it to negligible proportions (“stable”); and one which is generally acceptable or, at least, politically workable (“safe”).

This is, of course, hardly a new problem. Instability has been a dominant characteristic of capitalism particularly since technological advances in industry have become marked, a matter of some fifty to one hundred years. It is only in recent years, however, especially since the Bolshevik Revolution plainly demonstrated that capitalism is a mortal society and can be succeeded by a different set of socio-economic institutions, that the problem has taken on a new urgency. Theoretical analysis indicates, and the observations of capitalists confirm, that capitalism would have great difficulty in surviving a depression comparable in severity to the recent one. This must be avoided at all costs, say the more enlightened members of the bourgeoisie, even if far-reaching structural changes are called for. True, this type of motivation has led to fascism and can easily do so again. It is assumed, however, that the ruling class prefers to stave off the advent of fascism as long as possible, and that there is sufficient evidence to indicate that what I have termed “a Permanent War Economy” is coming to be re...
garded as a feasible, even if temporary, alternative to fascism.

The P.W.E. in Action—A Look Ahead

How will the Permanent War Economy operate? Can it achieve the "stable and safe" equilibrium? It is possible to chart the major outlines of the functioning of the Permanent War Economy. The assumptions underlying this projection are listed below in outline form without any attempt at justification. They are grouped under three broad headings, as follows:

MILITARY
1. The European phase of World War II will end late in 1944.
2. The Asiatic phase of World War II will end late in 1945.
3. While some demobilization will take place with the defeat of Germany, the major transition will occur in fiscal 1946.
4. World War III will occur in 1960.

INTERNATIONAL
5. Conduct of world affairs in the interim period between World Wars II and III will be in the hands of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia, with American imperialism the dominant partner.
6. No successful proletarian revolution will take place.
7. Stalinism will successfully maintain itself in power in Russia.
8. A form of international "grossraumwirtschaft" will govern economic relations among the major economic regions of the world.
9. There will be a limited restoration of international trade based on direct and open State intervention.

DOMESTIC ECONOMY (all dollar figures in 1943 prices)
10. The national income will vary within the limits of $120-150 billion, averaging around $135 billion.
11. There will be a gross national product of $140-180 billion, with an average of about $160 billion.
12. The dangerous margin of excess capital accumulations (over and above private capital formation) will run between $20-25 billion.
13. Private capital formation will reach about $10 billion in 1947, declining to approximately $5 billion in 1952 and thereafter levelling off at this rate.
14. Government war outlays will average about $15 billion, with probable limits of $10-20 billion the trend will be toward the upper limit as World War III approaches.
15. The national debt in 1946 will be close to $250 billion, increasing thereafter at an annual rate of $5-10 billion.
16. The employed labor force will be stabilized at about 50 million persons additions; due to the growth of population of working age are ignored, as it is unlikely that they will be substantial enough to alter the picture.
17. While it is probable that productivity of labor will increase, this factor is omitted from consideration as being too difficult to estimate and, in any case, unlikely to affect the basic analysis.
18. There will be a steady, but somewhat falling rate of interest.
19. The propensity to consume will remain fairly constant.
20. The rate of profit will be sustained at a level comparable to the best prewar years, its tendency to decline being offset by increasing State intervention and a relatively minor increase in the rate of surplus value.

On the basis of these assumptions, the chart presented on page 15 of the movement of capital accumulation, government war outlays, the average standard of living and average real wages of the working class under the Permanent War Economy follows logically.

1947 is chosen as the base year, for this is assumed to be the first "normal" post-war year. 1946 is considered as a year of transition. The concepts are presented in index numbers in order to show basic trends under the Permanent War Economy. Thus, according to the chart, the critical period will be 1954-1956. It is at this time that the inherent contradictions of capitalism will begin to threaten seriously the newly-found economic stability, pushing society rapidly in the direction of World War III.

Minor divergences will not materially affect the validity of the assumptions. This is particularly true of assumptions 1-9 and 17-20, which are really political and economic generalizations. For example, the analysis still holds true even if World War III should take place in 1965 or 1970, rather than, as predicted, in 1960. Assumptions 10-16 are of a somewhat different character. Here, substantial differences in magnitude might render the forecasts useless. But 12, 15, 14 and 16 require explanation. The others conform rather closely to most predictions now being made.

The figure stated in assumption 12, taken together with that stated in assumption 13, is only slightly above the estimate made by Professor Alvin Hansen (one of the outstanding authorities in this country on the theoretical aspects of investment policy) of $20.25 billion as the amount necessary to be invested in the post-war period. The level indicated here would be $30 billion, hardly a significant difference. Assumption 15 provides for private capital formation comparable to the best prewar years starting with the first complete "peace" year after the present war. This, together with the projected decline in private capital formation, is perfectly consistent with the history of capitalism since it entered the stage of permanent crisis.

Assumption 14 will appear very high to those who view the post-war world in the same manner as the prewar situation. An interesting confirmation of the estimates made here appears in the October, 1943 issue of the National Industrial Conference Board's Economic Record in an article entitled Postwar Budget Prospects: 1945-1948: "While all the figures for future years are necessarily speculative, they are particularly so for national defense expenditures in the post-war period. Armed forces numbering 1 million men would constitute a smaller number than are assumed in some quarters. If the size of the armed forces should be nearer to 2 million, expenditures of about $7 billion would seem to be more nearly the level of our peacetime defense expenditures than the $4 billion shown for 1948. The nature and the extent of equipment that would be used by our armed forces in the post-war era could account for variations in expenditures of several billion dollars a year." (My italics—W.J.O.) A total military establishment of 2 million appears to be conservative in the light of plans for occupation and policing forces, plus conscrip-

The nature and the extent of equipment that would be used by our armed forces in the post-war era could account for variations in expenditures of several billion dollars a year. (My italics—W.J.O.) A total military establishment of 2 million appears to be conservative in the light of plans for occupation and policing forces, plus conscrip-

tion of the youth. Equipment and supplies for this size military force should easily reach $10 billion. Stockpiling and other military outlays, direct and indirect, appear to be quite capable of raising the total to $20 billion, the upper limit in the assumption.

The average of current estimates regarding the probable size of the post-war labor force is about 55 million persons. Assumption 16, therefore, is considerably below prevailing estimates; for if the difference of 5 million were to constitute unemployment in any genuine sense of the term, it is obvious that the Permanent War Economy would not be fulfilling its main function. 50 million is a more realistic figure than 55. It is higher than all prewar records, although it is some 13 million below the current peak of about 63 million (which includes those in the armed forces). The translation of those in the armed forces into active members of the labor force is subject to shrinkage which, depending on battle casualties and related factors, should run between 1 and 2 millions. Net retirements, due to the excess of over-age people leaving jobs as compared with new entrants, should be close to 3 million. The balance of 8.9 million represents women who are temporary war workers and are expected to leave the employed labor force once the war is over. This figure includes current child labor and is therefore not much higher than generally accepted "guess-estimates."

The assumptions upon which the operations of the Permanent War Economy are predicated thus appear to be realistic. Among the many problems which will remain are two outstanding and closely related ones: can class relations be frozen, and can disastrous inflation be prevented? Each requires a separate article, to be adequately discussed. The first, as I have indicated, is directly related to the process of capitalist accumulation in the post-war period. It depends not only on many political factors but on several economic ones, the most important of which is clearly the question of inflation.

It is not my belief that the Permanent War Economy will provide an enduring solution for capitalism. But it can work for the period under consideration; and there is likewise no reason why appropriate fiscal policies (from the point of view of the capitalists, which means anti-working class in essence) will not be successful in preventing outright inflation. The national debt, astronomical as it may seem, presents no serious problem. Assuming an annual interest burden of $7 billion, a very generous estimate, this will easily be covered out of current tax receipts. It is the type, as well as the amount, of taxes to be levied that will constitute one of the major areas of political and class conflict. The question is made still more acute by the fact that inflation appears to offer the bourgeoisie an easy way out to unload the cost of the war onto the backs of the working masses of the population. A policy of this kind, however, cannot be drifted into; it must be adopted consciously. If the die is now, or soon to be, cast in favor of deliberate and uncontrolled inflation, this can only mean that the decisive section of the ruling class is determined to establish fascism as soon as possible. I see no evidence, at present, to warrant this belief although, of course, there are many similarities between fascism and the Permanent War Economy. The danger of inflation is not diminished by a Permanent War Economy; on the contrary, it is steadily
increased. But it seems more probable that the inflation-fascism sequence is a contender for a prime place on the agenda after World War III than in the post-World War II period.

**Labor's Responsibility**

It is not likely that the above analysis, necessarily presented in sketchy, outline form, will meet with any enthusiastic reception. For one thing, it runs counter to all currently organized and clearly defined bodies of political thought. Orthodox Marxists (Trotskyists) have convinced themselves that only a successful proletarian revolution can end this war; otherwise fascism will rule the post-war world. New Dealers want to restore "free competition" and make capitalism humane; the only practical note amidst their absurdities is the attempt to win a fourth term for Roosevelt. Social Democrats are still for socialism in theory and capitalism in practice. In fact, all capitalist (and Stalinist) political thought will deny the possibility of a Permanent War Economy, although they will support measures leading toward its establishment.

Moreover, the imagination, courage and capacity of the human mind to project itself forward in an hour of deep social crisis and deal with reality instead of illusion has not been a very noticeable characteristic of the human species. Nevertheless, this war, which has already destroyed so many cherished illusions, will destroy many more before it is consigned to the history texts. The drift of events is toward a Permanent War Economy. What better solution has capitalism to offer? And what likelihood of an anti-capitalist solution is there at present? What may now seem fantastic to many, as the present war draws to a close, appear to be obvious as the evidence piles up.

Upon the shoulders of the labor movement rests the real responsibility for preventing World War III. This universally-approved objective can never be achieved by the Roosevelts, Churchills, Stalins, or Chiang Kai-Sheks of this or the next decade. For the labor movement, especially its socialist-minded sector, to stand a chance to prevent the atomization of society as a result of repeated wars requires much closer and more realistic study of what is actually happening in the world today than has yet been evidenced. The basic strategic aim of socialism as the only rational alternative to capitalism needs no revision except that of modernization. It is in the field of tactics that substantial revisions are needed. A declining standard of living under a Permanent War Economy cannot be successfully fought by a labor movement whose most powerful organizations are trade unions, no matter how powerful these may be. The important battle areas will be abstruse (to the masses) economic questions, such as the size and composition of the Federal budget, taxation and fiscal policy, investment alternatives, and the like, rather than wages, profits and working conditions for specific industries or factories. These latter will still be important, to be sure, but they will largely be determined by the decisions affecting the former. This points to the necessity not only of widespread mass economic education, but of the vital need for an independent political party of labor. Only a labor party, independent of capitalist political machines, and based upon trade unionists, is capable of coping with the problems of living under a permanent war economy.

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**The Attempt To Invent An American Style**

Since the early thirties, such major arts as music, literature, painting have been pre-empted by American themes in American idiom. By American themes I mean local characters, regional politics, Lincolniana, and folk melodies. By American idiom I mean catalogues of place-names, sentences without subordinate clauses, and rhythms and intervals easy for lay choruses. The concept of America is sometimes extended, for obvious reasons, to include Pan-America.

The attempt seems to be to discover, or failing that to invent by main force, an American Style for major artistic creation. During the first quarter of the century, such American themes and idioms belonged to smaller genre studies; now they are thought of as adequate to the resources of intellectual and self-conscious art. The movement is not spontaneous, but encouraged by well-known critics, defended by esthetic arguments, and supported by publishers, performers, exhibitors, and public clients. (Both the cause and the purpose of all this is obvious in the social situation.)

Such an American grand style is an impossible monstrosity and its encouragement is a calamity. For a national style to be capable of profound expression, there is required a culture, both in idiom and characteristic subjects, slowly matured and humanized, thru long periods of history, feeling, and thought. So it was in the French or Italian national styles. America too had the first beginnings of a national style in the New England writing crossed with frontier ideas. But the continuity of this culture was violently interrupted by the revolutionary technological changes that overwhelmed the mores at the end of the century. It is now impossible to continue the tradition as if it had not been broken.

In general it is now impossible for any folk-culture tothowt the world, or for any backward part of an advanced culture, to enjoy the relatively isolated maturation necessary for a humane national style, a style integrated although regional, historical rather than parochial. For the modern technology is overwhelming that folk-culture with its flood; and the culture of the technology itself, whether in science or invention, is not national but international or supranational.

Nations already possessing an integrated culture when they have come to meet the new techniques and altered ways of life have thereby suffered a cultural lag and a hopeless resistance. But on the other hand, just these nations—though no longer in a national way—have the greatest chance of selecting from, and humanizing, and giving meaning to the techniques. (An example of this is the French and German *International* style in architecture.)

But America received the techniques both sooner and in greater quantity than any other nation, and before it had ever developed a secure national culture. And this paradox, of a revolutionary technology without a culture, has left the Americans what they are today: by and large the most ignorant of any major people in history. It is certainly not from American concerns as *American* that anything humane will be forthcoming. And the most remarkable proof of our misfortune is that America, the youngest of the great peoples, is already the oldest, the most spiritually
exhausted, and the most depoliticalized. The first to become a technological giant, it is the first to cease to look for humane possibilities in the technology, just because it has lacked the skepticism, the tenacity, and the experience that come from the habit of thought and meaning. It is the first, and perhaps the only, people the new looks to the techniques merely to raise the standard of living and increase the quantity of goods and services, without regarding this as just the means to utopian cultural aspirations. In comparison, even the British are political and full of hope.

Several times recently the hopeless attempt has been made to write the history of some American art, e.g., the American novel. But the attempt is impossible because in fact the chief influence on each surrounding generation, the influence that makes the succession become a history, has been some European movement, French naturalism or Marxism, etc. However much an American stylist professes allegiance to his American forbears, he is not such a fool as not to draw from the greater stream; but now he refuses to contribute to the greater stream. (Such was not the attitude of Hawthorne, James, Ryder, or the young Gershwins.)

The necessarily thin productions in the American style will have no influence among other peoples longer in memory and richer in hope. Quite the contrary, the fact is that precisely the American arts that have had a cultural influence are those without any cultural pretensions, the pure expressions of technical finesse, where the inventive novelty has superseded any attempt at meaning: namely, Hollywood cinema and skyscraper architecture.

PAUL GOODMAN

The Montreal Police Strike

On December 14, 1943 a successful police strike was conducted in Montreal, Canada, in the course of which all the policemen and about 75 per cent of the firemen left their posts. A successful, and, in this case, virtually unopposed strike by policemen is so unusual an event in labor annals that it is worthwhile to examine the special circumstances of this case.

The original objectives of the police and firemen were for a general wage increase of $500 together with cost-of-living bonus. Their salaries before the strike ranged from $1290 - $1900 for Constables to $2360 for Captains. Also they asked for recognition of the Canadian Congress of Labor as their collective bargain agent with the municipality. On the day before the strike was called the wage demands were met, leaving the demand for union recognition as the real strike issue.

Immediately preceding the strike, the Montreal Star declared in a special "Warning" that the "public is threatened with a menace of the gravest kind. In the event of this menace materializing, the citizens must be prepared to act. Industry must get busy and organize to cope with a situation that will be packed full of dynamite. . . . We dare not wait for political authority—either Municipal, Provincial or Federal. We found that in the street railway strike, and in the second strike of public works employees shortly afterwards, when garbage was left in the streets, threatening disease throughout the entire community . . . We must make sure that there is no bungling this time . . . Industry must organize and play its part."

The Star reported that "there were no policemen on the beats", and that "none of the men who walked out left any of their equipment, taking their revolvers with them as they left at 11 o'clock, not even forgetting their fur hats"

Soon after the strike was called the municipal authorities made a canvas of the police forces of neighboring communities as to their attitude on the strike action. "The response in every case was similar," reports the Star. "Summed up it was that whatever the Montreal police did was their own business . . . and the other police forces on and near the island would attend strictly to their own affairs and not meddle one way or another."

Despite the dire predictions of the Star, the strike period passed virtually without incident. There was no increase in lawlessness nor any attempts at sabotage of war plants. Traffic control was handled fairly well by volunteers from civil defense groups. Some businessmen stayed in their establishments overnight to guard them personally against possible robbery. There were no overt indications of any general hostility toward the strikers, and many expressions of support and approval were received from other union bodies.

Though units of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and army authorities stood by, they were never called upon. The strike lasted less than 24 hours and was concluded by a union victory to the accompaniment of a chorus of "disgraceful surrender" from "citizens' committees."

Most outstanding fact to the observer was the refusal to try to break the strike, utilizing the very ample forces available for that purpose. Key to this situation is the fact that the strikers were almost all French-Canadians in a French-Canadian city (75 per cent of Montreal). The French-Canadians have a long history of antagonism to British rule and specifically they have opposed and obstructed full participation of the Dominion in the war effort. Use of RCMP and Dominion troops would symbolize British domination and serve to aggravate hostile attitudes. Therefore the Provincial and Dominion authorities not only did not act to break the strike (as they had done elsewhere), but even overruled the municipality and granted recognition to the Canadian Congress of Labor in the police and fire departments.

The successful police strike was followed by strike threats from other Montreal municipal workers, who presented similar demands which were subsequently met.

However odd all this may appear at first glance, it does make sense in the light of special conditions in French Canada. This strike was part of a series of workingclass actions in Montreal. Were the authorities to smash them with whatever methods necessary, the national French-Canadian front would give way to two class fronts, in the minds of the working class, as the main divisions in their society. The police strike was unusually delicate, for the widest public attention was focussed on its development.

Conspicuous by its complete non participation in this matter was the Catholic Church which yields enormous power in the Province of Quebec. Still the absence of the church influence is only true from a superficial viewpoint. Actually the church plays a mighty and continuing role as defender of private property rights and the status quo. It presses consistently against unionism and particularly against association with the CCF party. Altogether it is probably the single most influential institutional force acting as real brake on class organization and action by French-Canadian workers. Still the church did not dare to interfere with the police strike, for such action, as indicated, would have tended to break up the French-Canadian front (which is equivalent to a Catholic front) into class fronts.

WILLIAM MEAD
A Letter from Petersburg, Va.

Dear X:

I was awfully glad to hear from you, and although I would like to assure you that the reports about my life here were exaggerated, I can not. I have never seen such a place, such people, such conditions. The wage scale is the lowest I have ever heard of, food and lodgings terrible. Virginia is a dry state—nothing but beer and wine is sold and you can't get these on Sundays. Of course, you can get a liquor ration book, but I mean if you are terribly patient and try awfully hard you can get one, but they make it pretty difficult. If you can prove citizenship, good standing in the community, and can show without a doubt that you are over twenty-one, and if you can catch the rationing board when it's doing business (it does business twice a week), why you can get a quart of liquor a month. All over town are big signs about Trusses. It seems that everybody goes around trussed up, and here they drink cola-cola for breakfast. (I put these two facts together for it seems to me they have a sinister connection.) Once I had eggs. The hens don't lay around these parts.

If you would come here on Saturday night you would think it quite a gay little place. Sycamore, the main street, is noisy and bright and the stores stay open late. But it's almost impossible to get into a restaurant, and every keg of beer in town is sold out by nine o'clock. This is because almost every one of the 30,000 soldiers from Camp Lee come to town on Saturday. These boys are repeatedly warned of the dire consequences if they spend their weekend dissipating in Petersburg. I wonder if anybody ever dissipated in Petersburg, Sunday the citizens pray. It's the churchgoingest town I have ever seen. The churches don't look like churches to me, but more like office buildings and this businesslike appearance is illustrated by a sign I saw on a church lawn which read: IF YOU'RE ITCHING FOR SUCCESS START SCRATCHING. I saw a little cannon that fired on us in the Civil War during the Siege of Petersburg. Although the citizens seem to be proud of being Southerners and Virginians there is no real Southern spirit. You might think this is a good thing but it really only shows their terrible apathy. There is no civic pride. Houses are in terrible repair, all the trees need operations and I see no gardens. Even the funeral parlors look run down. I would hate to die in Petersburg but it is quite common, and my landlady spends most of her time running around to funerals with angel food cakes.

I went to the United States Employment Service for a job. They took down my experience and previous salaries and in a few days called me in. The job they offered me was working in a department store 48-hours a week for $13. I said how much would I get. He said how much did you make. I stood on my feet eight hours a day measuring outing flannel, and last night I was fired.

I went to the U. S. O. to get a list of rooms. They gave me one address and when I asked for more saying that I wished to save them extra trouble they told me I could have one address only. So I was more or less forced to take this room although it is much too expensive. The wallpaper is peeling and it is full of flies that bite. Here is an example of Southern hospitality. The first night I was here I heard someone pounding on the door long after I had gone to bed. It was the landlady carrying a large enamel pot. “You need this,” she said, I use it for red leaves.

Everything in the town is khaki colored. Even the Appomattox river and the Trusses. I always read the sign Abominable Trusses. I noticed in the library file that Silas Marner was written by Adam Bede. You find Freud in fiction. They have one book of modern poetry, “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” which is of course in the music section. Once you get the hang of things, you can find anything. They did have “Dubliners,” and I knew right away where to find it. In the history section (Irish history) They just hate to see me coming.

The cigarette factory pays the best wages in town. Here a girl can average about $24 or $25 a week which is considered quite sinful. But the girls in the factory are a jolly lot who sing while they work, and are entirely different from the sallow and respectable “well-bred” girls who toil in nice dresses in Petersburg offices and department stores at from $12 to 18 a week. I wonder where the men workers are for you just don’t see any. All you see are Southern Business Men. Southern Business Men all look exactly alike and have shiny pants. They are a very villainous lot. They put up their prices whenever they see a soldier coming. An army wife I know here took her husband’s wrist watch in to be repaired. The Southern Business Man noticed the khaki strap and said five dollars. She didn’t leave it and later got a friend to take it in again—after she’d removed the strap. One dollar, said the S. B. M. And don’t think the S. B. M. has overlooked the hundreds of wives who follow their husbands about from camp to camp. They’ll get it really take almost any wages and put up with any conditions just to be near their men. So dozens of small plants have sprung up all around here for their special benefit. $12 and $13 a week, full-time.

I have never seen anybody except the Negroes laugh. Some of the farmers whose wives have just had babies would come to my store for outing flannel and they were very nice. They spoke with a mountain accent and used very picturesque language, like one man said “money jest hates me.”

Before I went to Petersburg I read up on it and discovered that it had been headquarters for Cornwallis and Lafayette during the Revolutionary War and for General Lee during the Civil War. I pictured it as a warm little town full of the past with bronze plaques on every doorstep and innumerable statues of generals on horseback. The horses always had the left foot lifted. I remembered how when I went to Fredericksburg, Maryland, I ate Barbara Fritchie salad and stayed in a tourist cabin that was shaped like a hoop skirt. But outside of a very few matter-of-fact little signs and the scraggly cannon I find no landmarks in Petersburg, no history. I’m amazed at these Southerners. They don’t fight the Civil War and they’re hardly conscious of the present one. Here is an example of their consciousness. One day I was measuring some outing flannel to a Southern lady and a friend came up and greeted her. “Have you heard from your son lately?” asked the friend. My woman put on a tremendous beam. “Do you know,” she said happily, “he’s been reported missing—we’re all so proud.”
The News-Dispatch prints shabby little accounts of the war. There is no original comment and the editorialists have to do mainly with rationing cards. Two Negro babies were bitten by rats in a Richmond hospital, and the Dispatch thought this should be stopped. The reporters have been working for this paper, most of them, for twenty-five years or so, and they also look like Southern Business Men.

I'm rather enjoying parts of the life. I went to a church supper with an old lady I know and they asked me to give a little speech on New York. I said oh New York is a terrible place, they have shower baths and sometimes people eat three times a day, but nobody laughed or cried and when I'd finished there was applause.

I asked a few soldiers about the redlight section and they said it is pretty depressing. In fact one of them said he rather wait an hour and a half to get into a movie.

It seems funny but there are no rich people in Petersburg. There is nothing deluxe here. The middle class came and it came to stay. There are no bright people, no culture, no concerts, no forums. Once there was a college, a girl's school, but it closed up for lack of business. Now the buildings are rooming houses and just as run down as all the other places. Sometimes I just think to forget everything and settle down and be a Post War Character.

There are a few Jewish businesses, especially the military stores, but the anti-Semitism is rather funny. Jews are considered only the worst kind of Yankees and people pronounce “Cohen” with the accent on the last syllable, sounding the “h.”

There's a nice state park in Petersburg (that's where I saw the cannon), and although I have been there almost every Sunday, I have yet to see anyone else there. I don't know what they do on Sundays. The churches are open until quite late Sunday night so perhaps that's where they all are. I'll write to you again when I've gone to Hopewell, a big company town six miles away. There's a big gunpowder factory there and I understand wages aren't quite so bad. There is tremendous antagonism between Petersburg and Hopewell. Hopewell people are considered poor white trash. I also mean to go to Richmond and look at some statues of generals riding on horses. In New York I never looked at statues of generals on horseback but I expected this of the South and I do not mean to be frustrated. I am sick to death of this part of the world and I rustle with these complaining letters. I have never heard anybody laugh in Petersburg. I was told a joke one day by a cop (they are pretty friendly). This was the joke. A man told a friend “I've come clean from Pittsburgh.” The friend said “how did you do it?” I laughed so long and heartily at this that I left the cop looking very puzzled, scratching his head and staring after me. Somebody could write a really funny book about the South. And I think it should be occupied before Germany.

Best,

Mary.

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Popular Culture

A Theory of “Popular Culture”

Dwight Macdonald

FOR about a century, Western culture has really been two cultures: the traditional kind—let us call it “High Culture”—that is chronicled in the textbooks, and a “Popular Culture” manufactured wholesale for the mass market. In the old art forms, the artisans of Popular Culture have long been at work: in the novel, the line stretches from Eugene Sue to Lloyd C. Douglas; in music, from Offenbach to tin-pan alley; in art, from Currier & Ives to Norman Rockwell; in architecture from Victorian gothic to suburban Tudor. Popular Culture has also developed new media of its own, where the serious artist rarely ventures: the movies, the radio, the comics, the detective story. Nor is there any reason to limit our definition to esthetic expression, any more than culture is so limited. We now have Popular Economics (Stuart Chase), Popular Science (Paul de Kruif), Popular Psychiatry (Dale Carnegie, the Goodwill Hour), Popular History (Hendrik Van Loon), Popular Philosophy (Will Durant), and Popular Politics (Max Lerner, Dorothy Thompson).

The historical reasons for all this are well known. Political democracy and universal education broke down the old upper-class monopoly of culture. Capitalist enterprise found a profitable market in the cultural demands of the newly awakened masses, and the advance of technology made possible the cheap production of books, periodicals, pictures, music and architecture in sufficient quantity to satisfy this market. Modern technology also created new media like the radio and the movies which were specially well adapted to a mass audience.

The phenomenon is thus peculiar to modern times. It is true that Popular Culture is to some extent the continuation of the old Folk Art, which was hitherto the culture of the mass of common people, but the differences are more significant than the similarities. Folk Art grew from below. It was a spontaneous, autochthonous expression, shaped by the people themselves, pretty much without benefit of High Culture, to satisfy their own needs. Popular Culture is imposed from above. It is manufactured by technicians hired by the ruling class and working within the framework of High Culture. It manipulates the cultural needs of the masses in order to make a profit for their rulers. (It is very different to satisfy popular tastes, as Robert Burns' poetry did, and to exploit them, as Hollywood does.) Politically, Folk Art was the common people's own institution, largely independent of their masters' culture; while Popular Culture is an instrument of social domination, not only exploiting the masses as consumers but also integrating them into upper-class culture (in a debased form). If one had no other data to go on, a study of Popular Culture would reveal capitalism to be an exploitative class society and not the harmonious commonwealth its apologists say it is.
The separation of Folk Art and High Culture in fairly watertight compartments corresponds to the sharp line between the common people and the aristocracy. The irruption of the masses onto the political stage in the last two centuries has broken down this compartmentation, with disastrous cultural results. Whereas Folk Art had its own special field, in which it was often excellent, Popular Culture is merely a vulgarized reflection of High Culture. And whereas High Culture formerly could ignore the crude tastes of the masses and seek to please only a relatively enlightened minority, it must now compete with Popular Culture, as I shall establish presently. The exceptional areas in which Popular Culture has been good are those in which the old compartmentation is restored and it becomes one thing or the other, either Folk Art (comic strips like Krazy Kat and Thimble Theatre, jazz, Disney's early stuff) or else Avant-gardist High Culture (the pre-1930 cinema of Griffiths, Stroheim, Chaplin, and the Russians).

The effects of this cheapening of cultural production are by no means limited to Popular Culture. What began as an instrument of social domination has come to have a profound effect on the culture of the dominators. The infection cannot be localized. (The same irony may be observed in the political sphere—cf. fascism.) Folk Art perished speedily at the hands of Popular Culture; the death struggles of High Culture are more protracted, but they are taking place. Good art competes with kitsch, serious ideas compete with commercialized formulae—and the advantage lies all on one side. There seems to be a Gresham's Law in cultural as well as currency circulation: bad stuff drives out the good, and the worst drives out the bad. For the bad is more easily enjoyed than the good—in fact, it is this facility of access which at once sells it on a wide market and also prevents it from achieving quality.*

Until recently, this competition has taken the form of Academicism, which might be called "Popular Culture for the elite." Academicism is spurious High Culture, outwardly the real thing, actually as much a manufactured article as the cheaper cultural goods produced for the masses. It is recognized at the time for what it is only by a minority of Avantgardists. A generation or two later, its real nature is understood by every one and it quietly drops into the same oblivion as its franker sister-under-the-skin. Examples are painters like Bougereau and Rosa Bonheur, critics like Edmund Clarence Stedman, the Beaux Arts school of architecture, playwrights like Briex and Pinero, poets like Stephen Phillips, novelists like Arnold Bennett, James Branch Cabell and Joseph Hergesheimer.

The significance of the Avantgarde movement (by which I mean poets like Rimbaud, novelists like James Joyce, composers like Stravinsky, and painters like Picasso) is that it refused to compete. Rejecting Academicism—and thus, at a second remove, also Popular Culture—it made a desperate attempt to fence off some area where the serious artist could still function. It created a new compartmentation of culture, on the basis of an aristocracy of talent rather than of social power. It was remarkably successful: to it we owe almost everything living in the art of the last fifty years. In fact, the genuine High Culture of this period is pretty much identical with Avantgardism. This movement came at a time (1890-1930) when ruling-class values, social as well as cultural, were being vigorously challenged. There was little sympathy between the social and the esthetic rebels: the former were rather conservative in their esthetic tastes—cf. Rosa Luxemburg's various "letters from prison" and Clara Zetkin's Reminiscences of Lenin—and the latter fully returned the compliment. (The reasons for this are too complicated to go into here.) For a few years at the end, in the early thirties, the two streams flowed together under the aegis of the Communist Party, after both had spent their real force, to sink together in mid-decade into the sands of reaction.

The rise of fascism and the revelation, in the Moscow Trials, of the real nature of the new society in Russia inaugurated the period we live in now, when men cling to the evils they know rather than risk possibly greater ones by pressing forward. In this deeply reactionary period, the Avantgarde and the revolutionary movements have both withered, the academicism of the orthodox Trotskyists today perfectly matching the egotism of the New Directions list, where the "new" directions are those of Ezra Pound, W. C. Williams and E. M. Forster.

In this new period, the competition between Popular Culture and High Culture is taking a new form: as in the business world, competition is now resulting in a merger. On all but the lowest levels—the pulps, the comics, soap opera—Popular Culture is more and more taking on the color of both varieties of the old High Culture, Academic and Avantgarde, while these latter are increasingly watered down with Popular elements. As in politics, everybody and everybody are being integrated—"coordinated" the Nazis call it—into the official culture-structure. Cf. the talented writers absorbed by the Luce organization since 1930, and currently, the appearance of Kay Boyle as a Saturday Evening Post serialist, Edmund Wilson's taking Fadiman's place at the New Yorker, and above all the recent invasion of the N. Y. Times Sunday book section, immemorially the province of Rose C. Feld and Percy Hutchinson, by all sorts of writers drawn from Avantgarde circles.*

The type creator of kitsch today is an indeterminate specimen. There are no widely influential literary critics today so completely terrible as, say, the late William Lyon Phelps was. Instead we have such grey creatures as Carl Van Doren and Henry Seidell Canby. The artless numbers of an Eddie Guest are drowned out by the subtler but equally commonplace strains of a Stephen Vincent Benet. Maxfield Parrish yields to Rockwell Kent, Arthur Brisbane to Walter Lippmann. We even have what might be called

*No implication of "selling out" is implied here. Potholing is necessary for the most high-minded writer if he lives by his writing. It is only when the fire under the pot becomes the writer's main concern that criticism is in order, and it is too early in most of the above instances to draw conclusions. The future is gloomy, however, quite regardless of the personal qualities of individual writers, since (a) Popular Culture is becoming sophisticated enough to offer a market for more serious stuff than in the past; and (b) the collapse—for who knows how long?—of the Avantgarde leaves almost nowhere else to go but into the commercial field. The problem this tendency—which applies to political writing too—raises for the future of a magazine like POLITICS is obvious.
“l'avantgarde pompiere” (or, in American, “phoney Avantgardeism”), as in the buildings of Raymond Hood and the poetry of Archibald MacLeish. All this is not a raising of the level of Popular Culture, as it might superficially appear to be, but rather a corruption of High Culture. There is nothing more vulgar, in fact, than sophisticated kitsch. Compare Conan Doyle’s workmanlike and unpretentious Sherlock Holmes stories with the bogus sophistication of Dorothy M. Sayers, who, like many contemporary detective-story writers, is a novelist manque who ruins her stuff with literary attitudinizing.

Or consider the relationship of Hollywood and Broadway since 1920. In the twenties, the two were sharply differentiated, movies being produced for the masses of the hinterland, theatre for an upper-class New York City audience. The theatre was High Culture, mostly of the Academic variety (Theatre Guild) but with some sparks of Avantgarde fire (“little theatre,” “experimental theatre”). The movies were definitely Popular Culture, mostly very bad but also with some leaven of Avantgardeism (Griffiths, Stroheim, Chaplin). With the sound film, Broadway and Hollywood drew closer together. Plays are now produced mainly in order to sell the movie rights, with many being directly financed by the big film companies. The merger has standardized the theatre to such an extent that even the early Theatre Guild seems vital in retrospect, while not a trace of the “little” or the “experimental” theatre remains. And what have the movies gained? They are more sophisticated, the acting is subtler, the sets and direction in better taste. But they too have become standardized. Movies are never as awful as they used to be in the old days, but they are never as good either. They are better entertainment and worse art. The cinema of the twenties occasionally gave us the fresh charm of Folk Art or the intensity and violence of Avantgardeism. The coming of sound, and with it Broadway, degraded the camera to a recording instrument for an alien art form, the spoken play. The silent film had a least the theoretical possibility of being artistically significant. The sound film, as exploited within the limits of Broadway taste and sophistication, has removed this possibility.

Up to now, surprisingly little attention has been paid to Popular Culture by American intellectuals. In the mid-twenties it is true, there was something of a cult for what Gilbert Seldes called “the seven lively arts” in his book of that title. Chaplin’s pathos was piously celebrated, a ballet was made out of Krazy Kat, and the American Mercury crowd packed the National Winter Garden to see Sliding Billy Watson and Bozo Snyder. The objection to this sort of appreciation is not that it was unfounded—the excellence was there all right—but that it was too limited. Limited in the sense that nine-tenths of Popular Culture was excluded by it, that being roughly the proportion of fake to genuine in the field; and limited in that it ignored the meaning of Popular Culture as a historical phenomenon.

The Europeans have been far more adventurous in this field. And yet it is in America that Popular Culture has been most extensively developed and has competed most effectively with High Culture. The blurring of class lines over here, the absence of a stable cultural tradition, and the greater facilities for manufacturing and marketing Popular Culture—such factors account for its peculiar dominance in this country. A single instance will suggest the difference: compare the Nouvelle Revue Francaise (pre-1940, of course) with our own Harpers. Both are published by big commercial houses as part of their regular activities. Yet in cultural level, it is not Harpers that is the counterpart of the N.R.F. but rather such non-commercial “little magazines” as Kenyon Review and Partisan Review. (It is intellectual quality—not Avantgardeist tendencies—I am concerned with here.) In a word, what could be done in Paris as part of the normal workings of capitalist culture, over here can be done only marginally, by “outsiders.” I cannot resist one other instance, the fact that Horizon, the English counterpart of the above-mentioned “little magazines,” is sold on railroad station newsstands. Space on such stands over here is so valuable that it would cost more to put a small-circulation magazine on station stands—assuming the companies controlling them would make the deal—than it does to publish them. For this and similar reasons, Horizon has three times as big a circulation as its biggest American counterpart—in a country three times smaller.

The serious critic, writer and artist in America may thus ignore Popular Culture, but it does not ignore him. So also with those interested in political change. The masses are exploited culturally as well as economically, and we must look to Popular Culture for some clue as to the kind of response we may expect to socialist ideas. The deadening and warping effect of long exposure to movies, pulp magazines and radio can hardly be overestimated. This is not to say that this effect cannot be slowly worn away by economic and social changes, or suddenly (and temporarily) negated in some great crisis. If it were otherwise, our situation as radicals would indeed be hopeless. But this culture-pattern stamped deep into the modern personality, much deeper than conscious political ideas, is a factor always to be reckoned with. One of the reasons for the sterility of socialist politics since the last war is its too narrow conception of politics. Hitler had more imagination. (He was aided, of course, by the fact that fascism can exploit the psychological effects of Popular Culture on the masses, whereas socialism can only allow for them—and try to counter-act them with its own pathos and myths.) Marx also showed more imagination. Here as elsewhere his thought is broader, more sensitive to non-economic factors than that of his epigones.

Radicals, today, for example, might well pay some attention to such synthetic folk-heroes as Superman, Judge Hardy, Sherlock Holmes, Tarzan, and the Lone Ranger. These are folk-heroes because they are not individuals, each with a unique life story, but rather incarnations of certain abstract qualities. Judge Hardy’s wisdom, Sherlock Holmes’ scientific method—these may be exhibited in literally innumerable fables. One thing they all have in common, and also with heroes of remoter times like Robin Hood and Roland, is that they are men of great powers. And these powers give us an important clue to the deepest, and least satisfied, cravings of our age. Judge Hardy shrewdly copes with the problems of bringing up offspring, and his success reassures parents anxious over the breaking-up the family; Superman and Sherlock Holmes use science for worthy ends, which is reassuring in a world of
The whole problem of Popular Culture involves one's conception of the role of the common people in modern history. It is, basically, a political question. Reactionary prophets like Otega y Gasset argue that since the "revolt of the masses" has led to the horrors of the Nazi-Stalinist plebescitary dictatorships—and of California roadside architecture—the only road to sanity is to rebuild the old class walls and bring the masses once more under aristocratic control. Culturally, this would mean a restoration of the old High Culture—Folk Art compartmentation. (There may be a clue here to the reactionary politics of the cultural Avantgarde, which also tried to solve the problem by excluding the masses.)

It would seem more accurate, however, to blame the rise of Popular Culture on the peculiar historical situation created by the persistence of intense class exploitation throughout a century of mass education and expanding political democracy. Either the exploitation or the democracy must be removed if culture is to recover its health. Since my own convictions are democratic, I believe that the trouble with the revolt of the masses is that it has not been rebellious enough, just as the trouble with Popular Culture is that it has not been popular enough. The standard by which to measure Popular Culture is not the old aristocratic High Culture but rather a potential new human culture, in Trotsky's phrase, which for the first time in history has a chance of superseding the class cultures of the present and past.

Only court test of military Jimcrow to be made so far in this war. It is based squarely on Section 4(a) of the 1940 Draft Act, which specifically forbids discrimination in the selection and training of draftees. The original brief, which was prepared by Winfred Lynn's brother, Conrad Lynn, is in the great tradition of the "social brief" first introduced by Brandeis in the Oregon Ten-Hour case in 1908. It does not confine itself to legal technicalities, but cuts to the heart of the issue, arguing in broad social and historical terms.

For further information on the Lynn Case, cf., my article in the "Nation" of February 20, 1943, "The Novel Case of Winfred Lynn"; or write to the National Citizens' Committee for Winfred Lynn, 1 West 125th St., New York 27, N. Y.

Conrad Lynn was himself drafted last winter, and the case has since then been in the hands of Arthur Garfield Hays. As this goes to press, a decision is momentarily expected from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City, the final step before it reaches the Supreme Court. —ED.

**Free and Equal**

FREE & EQUAL is to be a regular department devoted to the most dynamic social issue of today. The economic and cultural advances which the American Negro has made since the last war have brought him more and more into conflict with the old restrictions, both institutional (Jimcrow laws) and psychological (race prejudice), imposed on him by the Whites. The manpower demands of this war have accelerated the "upgrading" of Negroes on the job, while the official ideology of a democratic war against Nazism has both stimulated the colored people to insist on equal treatment and made it awkward for the Whites to deny this to them. The Roosevelt Administration has resorted to Fabian tactics, like the FEPC, hoping to stall off the threat at least until the war crisis is over. The more reactionary sections of the general population have used cruder methods, culminating in race riots.

The result is an extremely complex and tense situation, out of which may come vast good or vast evil. The Negro in America is the great proletarian. The white worker can dream of rising to middleclass status, but the Negro is a worker in uniform, so to speak, a uniform he cannot take off: his skin. When such a group, deliberately kept for generations at the bottom of the social structure, begins to stir and raise its head, the whole edifice feels the shock.

Nowhere do the colored people of America feel more keenly the contradiction between ideology and practice in this war than in the armed forces, where they are segregated, by an agency of the Federal Government itself, with a thoroughness they had previously experienced only in the Deep South. No better document could be found, therefore, to lead off this department than the original brief in the Winfred Lynn case. The Lynn case is the only court test of military Jimcrow to be made so far in this war. It is based squarely on Section 4(a) of the 1940 Draft Act, which specifically forbids discrimination in the selection and training of draftees. The original brief, which was prepared by Winfred Lynn's brother, Conrad Lynn, is in the great tradition of the "social brief" first introduced by Brandeis in the Oregon Ten-Hour case in 1908. It does not confine itself to legal technicalities, but cuts to the heart of the issue, arguing in broad social and historical terms.

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**United States District Court**

**Eastern District of New York**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex. rel. WINFRED WILLIAM LYNN, Relator

against

COLONEL JOHN W. DOWNER, Commanding Officer at Camp Upton, New York, Respondent

**BRIEF FOR RELATOR**

The relator duly registered under the Selective Service Act in 1940. After classification as IA in June 1942 he
Point I

The Draft Board's Action Is Reviewable by Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The relator asks the court to review the arbitrary action of Local Board 21 in Jamaica, N.Y., in selecting him as a member of a 'Negro quota' for service in the army. The principle involved is fundamental. The interest a Negro citizen has in being selected serially by the draft board without regard to color is at least as important as the right of a citizen to be classified correctly by occupation or religion in accordance with law.

The relator is making no merely technical objection. "Here is an importation of the numerus clausus practice of Europe, a practice made notorious toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, when the Czarist Government fixed a quota to govern the admission of Jews to the Russian universities and schools of higher learning. That this is a denial of the very essence of democracy is in part shown by the fact that every Anti-Semitic government has made use of it.

Very quietly this obnoxious practice has been introduced in the United States, in the very institution created to defend our democracy. It is wrong in itself and as a precedent, dangerous to everyone who can be identified as a member of a racial or religious minority, and to every American who prides his heritage of freedom and equality... (M. R. Konvitz, "Legal Status of the Negro in the New Army," The Guild Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 10, Dec. 1940, pp. 4, 5.)

Point II

The Selective Service Act Does Not Provide for Classification by Race.

The Selective Service Act of 1940 (50 U. S. C. A., App. Sec. 301, et seq.)... details a comprehensive method of selecting males for service in the United States Army by classification. Sec. 304 provides:

(a) The selection of men for training and service under Sec. 3 (303) of App.) shall be made in an impartial manner under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe from the men who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified, but not deferred and exempted: Provided that in the selection and training of men under this act and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this act there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color...

Point III

Segregation Is Discrimination.

The dictionary defines segregation as "a separation from others..." and quotes in illustration William Wetmore Story's unequivocal judgment: "The very name of ghetto, signifying segregation and disjunction, is opprobrious." (Webster's Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1935, p. 1504.) In a primary sense this definition bears weight. (Browder v United States, 312 U.S. 355; Caddy v IRT Co., 195 N.Y. 415.) It can hardly be disputed that in the common speech of men race segregation is one of the most humiliating, if not the chief form of all social discrimination. (See "The Commonwealth," Sept. 26, 1941, Jan. 23, 1942, Oct. 11, 1941.) The prevalent manner of denoting the inferiority of a person is to force him to associate only with others of his kind in color or race whether that separation be the back seats of buses, the rear of a restaurant or the railroad section of a town. The stigma of restricted development is affixed to this lone racial group marked for a separate life in the army. The military uniform becomes, then, not a badge of honor but a mark of shame. "Words are symbols, and we must compare them with things and persons and events." (Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222.) The law does not enunciate a system in vacuo. It envisions men in their total environment.

It may be that the establishment of a Negro quota might confer some incidental benefit upon a registrant. It may be that he is called less quickly. Aside from the doubt that priority in call should be construed as a disadvantage, a statutory prohibition cannot be, therefore, "brushed aside as a form of words, its commands reduced to the level of cautions, and the duty to obey attenuated into an option to conform (Per Cardozo, J., Martin v Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164. California v Desert Water Co., supra.) The proviso is the result of experience gained in the last war when no guard against discrimination was inserted in the draft law. It is a response to a felt and present need for democracy for the men in the armed forces who are called upon to sacrifice their lives, if need be, that democracy might live.

Nor is the petitioner unmindful of those rulings of the courts which have refused to invalidate race segregation. Without exception these decisions represent the refusal on the part of the Supreme Court to interfere with the exercise by the individual states of their police power in regulating intra-state racial relations. Kentucky orders a religious college to keep Negro and white students apart. (Berea College v Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45.) Louisiana provides separate train coaches for Negroes. (Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537.) Oklahoma neglects to provide a dining car for Negroes. (McCabe v Atchison, &c., 235 U.S. 151.) Missouri denies to a Negro graduate educational facilities. (Missouri ex rel Gaines v Canada, 305 U.S. 337.) In all these cases the Supreme Court held that the various Southern state laws which provided for a segregation of Negroes were not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the Fed...
eral judiciary could not presume to say that the state legislatures had no reasonable basis for the discrimination made law.

Closer examination of the legal sanctions behind race segregation in these Southern states reveals this. The Constitution of Missouri, Art. II, sec. 3 provides: "Separate free schools shall be established for the education of children of African descent." See also Sec. 9216 Missouri Statutes Annotated, p. 7087.

"It follows therefore that the established public policy of this state has been, and now is, to segregate the white and negro races for the purpose of education... There are differences in races and between individuals of the same race, not created by human laws, some of which can never be eradicated. These differences create different social relations, recognized by all well-organized governments." (State ex rel Gaines v Canada, 113 S. W. 783, 785. See Lehen v Brummell, 103 Mo. 546.)

Article 12, Sec. 1 of the Louisiana Constitution likewise provides for race segregation. It is illegal in Louisiana to serve Negro and white in the same building though the several places of serving may be separated by rooms or partitions. (State v Falkenheimer, 123 La. 617.) The Mississippi Code (1930) Sections 1115, 6132-6153 sets forth a comprehensive list of disabilities affecting the Negro. Soon after the turn of the century Kentucky enacted its segregation laws. (Kentucky Acts of 1904, Ch. 85, p. 181.) In defiance of the provisions of her Constitution submitted upon admission as a state, Oklahoma passed a separate "Coaching Law" in 1910 which was upheld as not within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment in McCabe v Atchison, &c., supra. This has been the consistent ruling regarding state race segregation statutes even since the federal government was found powerless to secure the civil rights of the freed men by prohibitive legislation. (Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3.)

But no case has been discovered in which the government has been sanctioned in introducing race segregation as a part of national policy. Indeed, the practice of many governmental agencies indicates that race segregation has no place in the federal program. The National Housing Agency not only has Negroes and whites inhabiting the same housing units in the North but that practice is followed by it in the South. The Federal government through the War Production Board makes a policy of withholding contracts from manufacturers who insist on maintaining race lines in their plants. The Fair Employment Practices Committee of the War Manpower Commission is devoted exclusively to the task of uprooting age-old racial bars in industry and government, pursuant to the President's Executive Order, No. 8802.

Segregation has long been the shame of one section of the United States—the South. As a regional habit, the courts and the laws have done little to disturb it. However, an attempt is now being made through the Selective Service System to fasten a social anachronism, a loathsome denial of equality, upon the practice of the national government.

"... we still tread paths marked out for us by the outmoded steps of the dead, increasing the tortuous mileage of the living." (P. E. Jackson, "Look at the Law," E. P. Dutton, 1940, p. 44.)

Instead of boldly vindicating the right of the National government to treat all its citizens equally, we are confronted here with behavior patterned after a reactionary social code nurtured in the hatred and bigotry following Civil War. And this, despite the clear mandate of the statute indicating a new road.

The Supreme Court has recognized in times past that segregation is discrimination. (Buchanan v Warley, 245 U. S. 60.) There an ordinance of the city of Louisville which allowed Negroes to dwell in only certain areas of the city was condemned as a denial of that due process and equal protection of the laws which the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to ensure. On like facts this decision has been reaffirmed. (Harmon v Tyler, 275 U. S. 668; City of Richmond v Deans, 281 U. S. 704.) From being merely a protection for the demands of real property it is time its concepts were made to cover the fundamental interests of the citizen. Certainly where there are no countervailing influences of 'states rights' to consider, a public policy affecting Negroes may be freely expressed. Democracy in crisis requires this extension.

POINT IV
Military and Industrial Efficiency Are the Primary Ends of Classification.

To assert that classification by race is impermissible under the law is not to hold that any segregation of men for service is unlawful... “Classification sorts out those whose withdrawal from domestic and industrial activity creates the least disturbing effect on the national life.” (6 Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Ed., 285, "Conscription"—E. H. Crouder.)

But the placing of Negroes in a separate quota does not further this aim. As a matter of current observation, race segregation is endangering the war effort. It has afforded prejudiced whites an opportunity to single out and assault Negro military units—to humiliate them in myriad ways—to shake their morale generally. It has engendered race hate, contributing to the Detroit housing riots, the Fort Dix disorders, the Louisiana and Texas shootings and beatings of Negro troops, and the herseker savagery of the recent Mississippi lynchings.

POINT V
The Method Unlawfully Interferes With the Liberty of the Person.

The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution enjoins the National authority from depriving a person of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." It is true that there is no expressed intent to include "equal protection of the laws" within the concept, "due process," but the trend of Supreme Court decisions make it evident that equal protection of the laws has become an integral part of due process...

But equal protection cannot mean in the instant case separate but similar treatment as has been the construction of that term in passing on the segregation statutes of Southern States. Apart from the fact that such construction represents a compromise between the interest of the Negro in achieving full citizenship and the hostility of dominant groups in the South, the petitioner as a citizen of New York has enjoyed in this state the same treatment and
accommodations afforded all other citizens regardless of race or color. (Civil Rights Law, (N. Y.) Sections 40, 40a, 41, 42, 43; Penal Law (N. Y.) Sections 514, 515.) The gradual enlightenment of public opinion has brought the same status to Negroes in New York as exists for any of her other citizens. At one time, too, New York law provided for separate schools for Negroes but the provision was repealed in 1938. (Education Law, sec. 920, 921. See also People v. King, 110 N. Y. 418; Woolcott v. Schubert, 217 N. Y. 212; Insurance Law, Sec. 209, subd. 3.) Equal treatment means the same treatment. Senator Tom Connally of Texas, a vociferous champion of 'white supremacy,' admitted this in the debate preceding the non-discrimination amendment of the draft law. (Congressional Record, Pt. 10, Aug. 23, 1940, p. 10789.) Many states have embodied the principle in judicial decision. (Jones v. Kehrlein, 194 Pac. 55; Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138; Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N. W. 718; Brown v. Board of Education, 106 W. Va. 476.)

The petitioner asks that the national government sustain him in the status he enjoys as a citizen of New York state when conscripting him to defend the country. The law is, after all, "a history of the moral development of the race," (Attorney General Francis Biddle, "Mr. Justice Holmes"—Harper's, October, 1942, p. 477) and where a choice may be made it should at least be made on the side of the United Nations in this war. How shabby is the conduct of an agency of the government which bends all its efforts to aid in establishing the 'Four Freedoms' abroad while maintaining a rigid barrier to achieving them at home? After long endeavor the Negro citizen of New York has been afforded those general rights of personality which enable him to assert "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." (Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, Harlan, J., dissenting.) These rights have become vested in him by virtue of his citizenship in the state. "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained." (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722; Hekking v. Pfaff, 82 Fed. 403.) To deprive the petitioner of the same recognition that he receives as a citizen of New York is to deny him equal protection of the laws in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. . . .

POINT VI

A Race Quota Violates the Spirit of Conscription.

The draft law represents the democratic nation in arms. With the ending of feudalism and the increased participation of the common man in government, the concept of a national levy arose. Machiavelli and Maurice of Nassau had conceived the idea of universal service as long ago as the sixteenth century. "Conscription," however, "in its modern sense dates from the French Revolution and was exactly adapted to the environment of its times, namely equality of service, liberty of popular opinion backed by force, and the fraternity of all classes of society." (Encyclopedia Britannica, 283.) The preamble of the current conscription law in the United States binds it inescapably to this tradition. "The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service." (50 U. S. C. A., App. Sec. 301(b).)

The administration of the law is at war with this expressed intent. Nowhere in the published regulations is there mention of a "Negro quota." Only on the 'Requisition for Examination-Induction' sent to the draft board by the New York City Director of Selective Service detailing the men by number and race to be called up in a particular month is the method revealed. This practice casts doubt on the pledged aim of the United States of fighting for democracy and equality throughout the world. It affords material for harmful propaganda among our allies among whom the colored peoples bulk large.

By objecting to the order of induction the petitioner performs a service not only to his race but to the nation as a whole. An unconstitutional act of a federal agency like an unconstitutional law cannot command either obedience or respect. (Buchanan v. Warley, supra.) A citizen is required to heed the call to arms only after selection according to law. Any other course would be a waiver of the wrong. (U. S. v. Rappeport, 36 Fed. Supp. 915 (1941.)) The petitioner should be discharged from custody.

Respectfully submitted,

December 12, 1942.

CONRAD J. LYNN,
Attorney for Relator.

WITH THE LABOR STATESMEN

"We speak with frankness. We act in the same way. We face all issues courageously. We proclaim our virtues and we admit our faults...."

"We hold business management in high regard. We feel that business, as a whole, had made a good record during the war. We do not denounce industry as a whole because of the sins committed by some managers or some directors of a corporation. Consequently, we do not denounce industry as a whole because some greedy employers of labor have sought to make unreasonable profits out of this war emergency."

"Is this world without sin? Do the members of the church always live up to the high standards set for them?...I will venture to say there are sinners in the American Legion...."

"The American Federation of Labor has never officially ordered or approved a strike of one, five, ten or a hundred men since that dastardly attack upon us at Pearl Harbor."

"We kept the faith and are keeping it...."

"We have supported the regimentation of workers during this war in a very large measure because the winning of the war stands over and above every other consideration." —President William Green, of the AFL, speaking at the October, 1943, convention of the American Legion.

In "North Star", the Internationale is played right out loud, as it conspicuously wasn't in 'Mission to Moscow'. No matter what you sentiments about the lyric may be, the fact remains that they do admire the thing over there, and no good will come of hushing it up. It's a nice tune in any case. — Movie review in the New Yorker, Nov. 14, 1943.

It's still a nice tune, and we don't have to worry about the lyric any more, do we?

INGERSOY GOT TO THROW HAND GRENADES AT FASCISTS

Gosh!

— Front-page headlines in P. M., March 31, 1943.
NAPOLEON III: AN INTERPRETATION. BY Albert Guérard. Harvard University Press. $3.50.

This rehabilitation job is part of the ransacking of the past now going on among sedentary people who look for some scheme to insure the future against class warfare. Mr. Guérard, like the late Ferrero and others, feels enough responsibility to go back no further than the Nineteenth Century. But it is not only because he is afraid and because he has no serious capacity in political and social matters that he goes to the past. He is also penetrated by an unconfessed nostalgia for the attractive culture of the Second Empire, and he would have done better to have admitted it.

Marx and many others called Napoleon III a horse-thief, loafer, swindler, rōté, and what not. But Mr. Guérard says that “Within the last fifty years, Napoleon III has won the respect and sympathy of practically every critical historian.... He was a better European than Bismarck or Gambetta, and a better socialist than Karl Marx, because he was less narrow than they and not poisoned with hatred and pride.” I wish some of these critical historians had been quoted. Anyhow, Napoleon III stood for “Caesarian” or “direct” democracy—the will of the majority of the people expressed directly through a single individual—for “Romantic Humanitarianism”—he was a Saint Simonian socialist—and for the principle of nationalities—he wanted Poland to be independent.

The facts Mr. Guérard himself cannot help mentioning refute these assertions so utterly that it becomes almost of greater interest to discover the source of these hallucinations in his own mind than to investigate the evidence. What made Mr. Guérard think it possible to accept Napoleon on his own say-so, which is what his vindication amounts to?

Political meetings were banned under the Second Empire until almost the last. But Napoleon III did represent the interests of the numerical majority of Frenchmen during most of his reign. That much of Mr. Guérard’s interpretation is true—but it is still far from making a democrat of Napoleon le petit, for he never believed in rule by the people, which is what democracy means. The most numerous class in French society was and still is the peasants and small proprietors, who enjoyed order and security under the Second Empire. They were Napoleon’s basis, but what energy his regime manifested came from the financial aristocracy and the rising industrial entrepreneurs, the latter of whom were guaranteed freedom from interference and given access to the credit so essential to their ventures. This was Napoleon III’s “Saint-Simonism.” Meanwhile the working class was being sat on so that capital could be accumulated from its hide. Here indeed is the historical logic of Napoleon III’s career. The unrest among the proletariat in France and England during the first half of the Nineteenth Century did not represent socialist aspirations so much as it did resistance to the bitter exploitation compelled by young industrialism’s need to accumulate capital for its expansion. England controlled the situation, after 1850, by a mixture of main force and concessions, the means to the latter coming from imperial prosperity.

Napoleon III was the answer in France’s case; and he did provide a temporary solution that enabled economic life to flourish and industrialism to get on its feet without interference from the “ground.” French capitalism required a dictatorial regime at that moment because the liberal bourgeoisie of 1848, by calling for the aid of the proletariat, had set loose something they could no longer control. Certainly nothing in all this demonstrates Napoleon III to have been anything other than what he is generally termed: an opportunist adventurer whose chief aim was power and who ingratiated himself with the forces in society best able to assure it to him. His career until 1848 seems to have been designed to form just such a man; and only such a man could have exploited the political impasse French society had reached by the middle of the last century.

Mr. Guérard’s reasons for calling Napoleon a socialist are that he himself said he was one, that he wrote a pamphlet advocating work relief for the unemployed, that he deplored poverty, and that he was first and above all for Order—and “the first step toward Socialism is the restoration of order.” In addition to this Napoleon encouraged cooperatives in a mild way and in the sixteenth year of his rule abrogated an article requiring courts to accept the word of an employer against that of an employee. In the same year trade unions began to be “tolerated.” Mr. Guérard’s conception of socialism can be excused only by referring to the general idiocy of these times. Yet it is a hopeful sign that he finds it so necessary to attach socialism to his hero—cost what it may in intellectual scruples.

The heart of Mr. Guérard’s apology is that Napoleon III, with his kindly personality and good intentions, had everything settled correctly in theory and is not to be blamed if application always turned his theory into its opposite. But why go on? The value of Mr. Guérard’s book is symptomatic, and only that. It offers the case of a respectable American liberal apologizing for the “right” kind of totalitarianism and offering it as a contemporary program. It is also symptomatic of the present state of political discussion that political illiteracy such as Mr. Guérard’s can find the confidence to write a book and offer a program. The program, I should hasten to say, is offered to France, not to us. Mr. Guérard writes in his closing chapter: “It might be well for France, when she resumes the normal course of her destiny, to borrow her inspiration from the United States rather than from England. If she did so, the Constitution of 1852 would be for her a better starting point than the Constitution of 1875. And she would be fortunate indeed if she found again, under such a regime, a leader with the unyielding gentleness and quiet intellectual courage, the profound generosity, of Napoleon III.” The Constitution of 1852, according to Mr. Guérard himself, puts autocratic power, both legislative and executive—far, far more than the American president wields—into the hands of the chief of state, and reduces deliberative bodies to impotent symposia. Such a regime is to defend “collective domestic security” and be the “greatest common denominator of all private interests. . . . Automatically it will be devoted to the welfare of the most numerous class, which is also the poorest.” And “it is the business of the state to prevent famine, but not to provide luxuries.” All this and heaven too, for Napoleon III was also a religious man. If only capitalism weren’t around.

CLEMENT GREENBERG.

REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME. By Harold J. Laski. Viking. $3.50.

It is a commentary on the level of British political thinking today that Laski has a big reputation as a socialist theoretician.

There used to be at least this much intellectual honesty about theoretical disputes among socialists, that one either believed capitalism could be reformed or one stood for its revolutionary overthrow. Laski touches the depths of the
The debasement of socialist theory today when he expounds his "Revolution by Consent." "We cannot build a more just society now unless the forces of privilege are willing to cooperate in the task." He tries to talk the ruling class into expropriating itself.

The chapters on Russia are especially trying. Laski's combination of ignorance and naive enthusiasm produces such thoughts as: "The Red Army is, in structure, a democratic army..." And: "Planning in the Soviet Union has been harnessed to the service of the masses." While Nazi totalitarianism appears to Laski as a regression to barbarism, Russian totalitarianism is just a passing blemish on an otherwise beautiful experiment. The British working class must sacrifice its political independence and support Churchill because only thus can fascist dictatorship be destroyed. But "the decline of dictatorship in the Soviet Union is above all, dependent upon the growth of a wide popular faith in its security."

The book is unbelievably wordy and repetitious. It is significant only as a document attesting the simpleness of "socialists" like Laski. The political climate today is just not suitable for such songbirds. One recalls Mirebeau's remark on Lafayette: "Good easy man! And he would make a revolution!"

LOUIS CLAIR

SOCIALISM AND ETHICS. By Howard Selsam. International Publishers. $2.00.

Neither students of ethics nor of socialism, and certainly no student of both, is likely to learn anything from these little pictures of good and evil. The book may be considered as a tract of the times and as a treatise on ethics. As a contemporary tract, its object seems to be to show how "everything depends upon the outcome of the mortal military conflict between the United Nations and the fascist forces of the Axis." That "all is evil on one side," while "not all is good on the other" is a "superficial" comment. (Indeed, it may be.) Anyhow, "a new ethics is needed... free from taint of an exploiting economic class and of a ruthless acquisitive society." Since the United Nations are taken as the forces of good, and the forces of good ("the only truly human ethics") are carried around by the "working class," the class struggle of yore assumes now the form of a struggle between nations. The Nazis will be no "the champion of the underdog because of his own deep insecurity which made him hate the powerful"; Marx "con­tributed to the contemporary deterioration of political standards in Europe"; Hitler "became acquainted with" Marx's teachings; "our age of unreason" ensued. Surely this is an account not of a development in human society but of a development in the sense, say, that a compulsive neurosis develops from a feeling of guilt. Here the psychiatric view leaves out whole contexts of interrelated influences. It doesn't help much to apply psychiatry to the study of society if, in the process, society evaporates before our eyes.

The marriage of psychiatry and sociology presupposes a workable theory of the relation between the individual and society. Without such a theory, the marriage is not likely to be much more than a shotgun wedding. Meanwhile, there is no service in talking about the human psyche as if it had been deduced from the editorial pages of The New Republic or by talking about society as if it were a realm of being which is unembarrassed by external events.

RICHARD V. CHASE

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR NATURAL HISTORY. By Wilfred E. BINKLEY. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.75.

The persistence and essential irrelevance of our two-party system constitute a phenomenon most frequently explained—both by frustrated American radicals and by European leftistson the basis of a cultural lag. There are really two lags: (1) between an expansive, fluid and variegated past and a contractive, largely stratified present; and (2) between the sectional-economic interest-groupings of an earlier period and the class-economic realities of today—a hangover best illustrated by a still solidly Democratic South.

Professor Binkley's natural history of American parties illuminates the complexities, both past and present, behind this over-simplification and contributes another, an institutional explanation which, while sound enough within its own limitations, helps to explain how rather than why American politics got and remains that way. Like the
February, 1944

PROFESSOR BINKLEY seems to ignore those developing factors.

Professor Binkley is aware of the economic-environmental

Beard (whose disciple he is) of the

continuity of that “exceptionalism” in terms of its own peculiar

institutions. No one can quarrel certainly with his

characterization implicit rather than explicit—of our great

parties as multigroup combinations of variegated interests

based upon a minimum and frequently shifting common
denominator—since any bold or comprehensive policy
would quickly disintegrate the combination. Nor with his

discovery that the outstanding quality of American political
leadership, from Andrew Jackson through Abraham Lincoln to
FDR, has been a “clairvoyant opportunism” which has
enabled it both to manipulate and nullify the contradictory
grievances and aspirations of the American voters. But

in his apparent acceptance of the immutability of this twoparty system—based upon its flexibility and opportunism
—Professor Binkley seems to ignore those developing factors
which are already straining that flexibility to the breaking
point. His final Willkie-ite advice to the Republican Party
would destroy what little meaning our two-party system
now has. The break-up of that system by the emergence
of a mass third party is an alternative which the author
apparently rejects on the basis of an “exceptionalism” that
has lost all validity.

LILLIAN SYMES

THE FINANCING OF LARGE CORPORATIONS 1920-1939.
By Albert R. Koch. National Bureau of Economic
Research. $1.50.

This is a segment of one of those long-range cooperative
research projects characteristic of contemporary econom­ics and especially of the output of the wealthy National
Bureau of Economic Research. “Meticulously factual” and
leaving the “broader interpretive studies” to others, the
book’s avowed purpose is to ascertain the changes in financing
processes of large (over $10,000,000 assets) inte­grated
corporations by an analysis of the sources and uses
of their funds.

The major significance of Koch’s study should lie (1)
in his findings on the sources of funds for capital expendi­tures, and (2) in his analysis of the characteristic methods
of security financing. His material on other phases of
 corporation financing such as the volume of capital ex­penditures and the make-up and amount of current assets
either does not pretend to any novelty or has little bearing
on business cycles or the development of the corporate
economy.

As to (1), if Koch presented us with findings at variance
with those of the TNEC, which depended almost wholly
upon general estimates for all the business economy, we
might have to revise our assumption of the unimportance of
the capital market as a source of new funds. Koch ap­pears to think that he has upset some current notions on
this point. However, it is undisputed that the railroads,
utilities and trade corporations have depended much less
on funds from investors for their fixed capital expendi­tures in the decade 1930-1939 than in the previous ten
years. The fact that Koch’s sample of manufacturing cor­porations obtained a larger proportion of new funds from the
capital market in 1938 than in 1929 does not negative
the general conclusion that American business finances the
major portion of its capital expenditures from internal
sources. In view of the fact that 1938 was a year of depres­sion, it seems somewhat pointless to compare it with
1929. Furthermore, in fairness to the secular stagnationists
it should be remembered that Altman testified in the TNEC
hearings to the importance of internal funds in the period
1923-1929 and did not attempt to play up the relationship
as a new development of the ’30s.

Even though one expects little more than cautious foot­notes to columns of figures from the National Bureau, the
study is also disappointing in its handling of point (2),
methods of financing. Its limitations arise in part from a
failure to explore fully certain areas which the title gives
promise of covering. The chapter on the securities market
obviously fails to live up to its intent of discovering
“whether the capital market has shifted its functions or
changed in importance between the two World Wars.”
Koch neglects to develop any individual or industry cor­porate histories which might help to explain, for instance,
whether the divorce of the utilities from the capital
market in the ’30s is permanent or only a temporary phe­nomenon caused by the holding company debacle. In his
rare generalizations Koch is sometimes inaccurate or con­fused even where he is dealing with financing. For instance,
the statement is made that the Clayton Act ended
Sherman Act encouragement of intercorporate security
holdings of securities whereas the Northern Securities case,
decided in 1904, was responsible for the cessation of ac­quisition of competitors’ securities. Nor is there any basis
for the author’s bland assertion that public utility oper­ating companies in the ’20s obtained the major part
of their new capital from holding company parents. Koch
made no inquiry into this process; an investigation of Elec­
tric Bond and Share subsidiaries by the SEC, of which he
is evidently unaware, shows that no funds whatever were
derived from the parent.

JOEL B. DIRLAM

UNION RIGHTS AND UNION DUTIES. By Joel Seidman.
Harcourt, Brace & Co., $2.00. DEMOCRACY IN TRADE
UNIONS, A SURVEY, WITH A PROGRAM OF ACTION.
American Civil Liberties Union, 25 Cents.

One of the favorite indoor sports of well-meaning liberals (and not so well-meaning Congressmen) is the prop­osal of reforms for an often undemocratic labor move­ment. Characteristically, the liberal of our day turns to
a new Government agency. Such an agency, Joel Seidman
argues, might regulate the admission and disciplinary prac­tices of unions, as well as police both unions and manage­ment in the field of labor relations. As a further step in
what he calls “responsibilizing” organized labor, he would
legally forbid strikes in “essential services”.

Like most other “friendly critics” of the unions today,
Seidman takes too much for granted the permanent en­trenchment of unions in American life. The experience
of the “Open Shop” drive after World War I, not to men­tion more recent European events, should suggest that a
furious anti-union campaign may well break out after this
war is over. No deadlier weapon in the hands of a “return
to normalcy” Administration could be imagined than an
established policy of Government intervention in union
affairs.

The American Civil Liberties Union offers a refresh­ingly naive approach to the same problem. Concentrat­ing its attention on the formal aspects of trade union con­stitutions, the ACLU offers a “Bill of Rights” to eliminate
racial discrimination in unions, provide frequent conven­tions, full financial reports, etc. But in its intense study
of union constitutions, the ACLU should have discovered
that the formal provision of the constitutions of some of
the most dictator-ridden unions are extremely democratic.
Like Seidman, the ACLU looks to the benign influence of
the State to back up its reforms.

Both studies are superficial. Unions are part of the
warp and woof of an oligarchical society, so that even the
best of them often manifest undemocratic tendencies (although compared to corporations and major political parties, they come off quite well). Oligarchical tendencies, after all, characterize all modern power-organizations, and it seems likely that they can be legislated out of the labor movement without greatly weakening the unions. The alternative method of democratising the unions would be a radical change in the society which produces this oligarchical pattern—but this is a possibility quite outside the frame-of-reference of these two studies.

ELY MOORE

Periodicals


A "conservative liberal" approach to Rousseau, whose doctrine is criticised as dissolving traditional institutions and individual rights with the acids of state power. "Rousseau is the philosopher of democracy, but never of liberalism." It is not despotism, according to the author, that is the distinctive feature of modern totalitarianism, but "rather it is the far-reaching extension of the state structure into the realm of traditional society. . . . The effect of totalitarianism, whether in its Bolshevist or Fascist forms, is to impose upon the pluralism of traditional society the centralization which is native to the political state." Rousseau was the great popularizer of state power. It was society, not the state, he hated. He is thus a more direct ideological ancestor of modern totalitarianism than Machiavelli, Hegel, Hobbes or Nietzsche because these last did not attack the structure of social life, however authoritarian their conception of the state was. He sees the citizen as "compelled to be free" (his words) by the state. After the traditional bonds of society—church, family, religion, social classes—are destroyed, Rousseau's state power takes the center of the stage. He writes: "Each citizen would then be completely independent of all his fellow men and absolutely dependent upon the state. . . . for it is only by the force of the state that the liberty of its members can be secured." According to the author, Rousseau's individualism is really the atomization of society, through the destruction of all traditional institutional bonds, until each citizen votes as an individual, not as a member of any caste or group or party. (The parallel with Nazism is obvious.) These individual votes combine into Rousseau's famous "General Will," the supreme criterion of what is politically good. The General Will can never be wrong. Again the modern parallels need no stressing.


These two studies by former inmates of German concentration camps attempt to analyze the psychological reactions of prisoners' in patterns broader than the intensely personal accounts of writers such as Malraux or Koestler. Bettelheim's article is particularly successful in this regard. Most interesting is his statement that old prisoners, including politically educated ones, eventually adopted the values of the Gestapo: first their vocabulary, then their leisure-time activity, finally their race doctrine, costume, and bodily aggressions. "It was not unusual to find old prisoners, when in charge of others, behaving worse than the Gestapo." Aware of the inexorable character changes induced by camp life, one prominent radical politician committed suicide on the sixth anniversary of his imprisonment. "He declared that according to his experience nobody could live in the camp longer than five years without changing his attitudes so radically that he no longer could be considered the same person he used to be. He asserted . . . that he could not endure developing those attitudes and behaviors he saw developing in all old prisoners."


MacLeish is a master of the "forcible-feeble" style. As: "Wilson's mistake was not, as some of us seem ignobly to have concluded, that he hoped too much. Wilson's mistake was that he hoped too little." Or: "What the final answer to that question will be no living man can know. But of one answer even the living can be certain." It takes a long time to say anything when you write like that. The only definite point made in the article is that Teheran shows that Roosevelt is already "winning the peace" in a progressive sense, as contrasted to Wilson, who concentrated too much on the military struggle. This seems to me practically the reverse of the truth: the Wilson of the Fourteen Points used liberal ideology with success to back up the military effort, while Roosevelt's political warfare has been without practical effect—except on his Librarian of Congress.

The author also sets forth a theory of war and peace which he develops as follows:
1. "We do not propose . . . to 'win the war first' and talk about peace afterward." (p.660.)
2. "If the peace and the war are made together as parts of a common action, both can be won." (p.661.)
3. "A modern war is itself a political action." (p.662.)
4. "Really to win this war . . . our victory . . . must be a victory not only for our wealth and strength but for our consciousness and truth." (p.663.)

The O.P.A. has ordered all periodicals to cut their 1944 paper consumption.

"The Regimented Economy—and the Future of Socialism" by Sebastian Franck. SOCIALIST REVIEW (Monthly Discussion Supplement to The CALL), November, 1943, pages 1 and 4.

An important study of changes since 1942 in Nazi war economy, based on original sources. Franck shows that the "de-bureaucratization" program initiated in 1942 under the slogan of "self-determination of industry" in actual practice has meant just the opposite—a characteristic, by the way, of totalitarian ideology. (Cf. the ultra-democratic 1936 Soviet Constitution as a prelude to the Moscow Trials.) Most of the old cartels were liquidated, and all industry reorganized into twenty "Fields of Activity," each headed by a Reich Commissioner. These Commissioners have more direct and sweeping powers over industry than the Nazi State has ever before assumed. The leaders of the old cartels and employer-groups were elected by the industrialists themselves, but these new leaders are appointed from above. That some of them are businessmen means little since "they have a wholly different social function than they had before. Their power now emanates from their position in the State apparatus, and not from their economic positions."

Franck also discusses the new kind of economic crisis characteristic of this economy, a crisis not of overproduction but of badly adjusted production that "begins when
the even supply of raw material, auxiliary material and manpower to the factories is disturbed. As soon as the supply stops at one point and doesn’t continue according to schedule, all plans are upset and the priorities system cannot function.” Hence the stimulus for the State to more and more disregard private property rights in the interests of an over-all productive plan.

The author’s political conclusion is provocative: “The irony of history has forced the most dangerous foe of socialism to develop the industrial organization of Germany which alone can make socialism possible. . . . Thus the problem of the socialist transformation of society has become primarily a political one. . . . Once the realization of socialism seemed to be largely an economic task: the establishment of a planned economy. The defenders of capitalism objected that a planned economy would never ‘work.’ Now the question is not whether it can work, but how can it work democratically so that its obvious efficiency can be made useful to all?”


An analysis of the post-war constitutional assembly proposed for China by the Kuomintang. The auditors find the New York Times account inaccurate. “In spite of the seeming progress involved in the action of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, China’s progress toward democratic government is not further advanced than it has been for the past four years and has, in fact, retrogressed from the high point reached in 1938.” This is not merely a protest that the Chinese Communists are not given representation in the Kuomintang in proportion to their numbers. The military effectiveness. “The real conflict is between the reactionary but powerful right wing of the Kuomintang on the one hand, (the landlord, merchant, money lender faction) and those parties and groups of all political shades, both within and outside the Kuomintang, who favor greater political democracy and immediate agrarian reforms similar to those which have been instituted in the guerrilla areas of North China.” AMERASIA, April 25, 1943: “Democracy vs. One-Party Rule in China” is a good account of these “little parties.”


Northrup’s article documents one of the most sordid chapters in American labor history, comparable only to the revelations in the recent FEPC railroad hearings. It must be added, however, that the AFL is alone to blame here; the CIO’s Marine & Shipbuilding Workers Union comes off rather well in the face of the ugly racial set-up in the industry.

Bailar’s excellent study should be read in conjunction with Frank Winn’s article on the UAW’s racial program (Antioch Review, Fall issue). Its most significant conclusions are: (1) Negroes in auto plants, with the notable exception of Ford’s River Rouge plant, are concentrated in the dirtiest, hardest or most dangerous jobs. (2) “All of the industry’s major employers of Negro labor report that Negro employees have proved, in general, as capable as white workers.” (3) Poles and Southern whites are the most anti-Negro groups of workers; the former thus compensate for their own humiliations (“Polacks”, “Hnuckies”). (4) The auto companies and reactionary rank-and-file elements of the UAW have been able to prevent Negroes being upgraded in anything like the proportion of white workers of similar ability; such advances as have been made are due to the insistence of the UAW leadership. (5) If the union and the company work together in educating the workers on the racial issue, Negroes can be upgraded without friction. In 1942 the Briggs plants, which had hitherto discriminated against Negroes, changed its policy and cooperated with the UAW on a carefully worked-out plan whereby Negroes were introduced gradually throughout the plant. “In recent months several hundred Negroes have been hired into semiskilled and skilled positions . . . without race friction.”


An analysis of Reichstag election returns for the period 1871-1933, to find what light they shed on the assertions now being made that the Germans are nationalist and militaristic as a people. Chief findings:

(1) Between 1871 and 1921 the proportion of the popular vote cast for “militaristic or imperialist parties” (Conservatives, Empire Party, National Liberals, Anti-Semitic Party) declined from 53% to 26%. In the same period the Social Democracy increased its vote from 3% to 35%.

(2) Between 1918 and 1933, the popular nationalistic vote fluctuated violently, rising in times of economic crisis and falling off in more prosperous periods. In January, 1919, before Versailles, the nationalist parties got 15%; labor parties 46% of the vote. In May, 1924, after Versailles, the Ruhr occupation and inflation, the nationalists rose to 39%; the labor parties fell to 34%. In May, 1928, after a period of moderate recovery based on American loans and the Dawes settlement, the nationalist vote slumped to 30%, while labor rose to 40%. It was the economic crisis which finally put the Nazis in power—though even by July, 1932, they had only 37% of the popular vote.

Dr. Mellen’s conclusion: “There is no evidence that the Germans have a greater-than-average predisposition towards militarism and aggressive nationalism, or a smaller-than-average natural capacity for democratic self-government. There is plain evidence that when social and economic conditions are tolerable, their political tendencies are preponderantly democratic . . .”

“Labor in the War—and After.” Special issue of THE ANTIQUC REVIEW, Fall, 1943.

Mostly the usual kind of inspirational hand-outs an editor gets when he is unwary enough to solicit articles from Clinton Golden, James Carey and other union big shots.

Two articles of value:

1. “Labor Tackles the Race Question,” by Frank Winn, editor of the UAW’s Ford paper. A detailed account of the UAW’s (relatively) successful attempt to integrate its employees by July, 1932, they had only 37% of the popular vote.

2. “Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions,” by Will Herberg, formerly a leading Lovestoneite and now employed by the ILGWU. Although his article suffers from a diplomatic vagueness as to names and specific instances, Herberg ventures to deal realistically with the trade union. He points out that a modern union has a dual nature, being at once “a businesslike service organization” and an expression of the submerged masses’ democratic aspirations. As the former, “the union requires efficient bureaucratic administration, very much like a bank or insurance company”; its members are clients, who pay trained administrators to run it and naturally don’t in-
interfere. As the latter, "the union is an idealistic, quasi-religious collectivity . . . of which the members, the masses and their democratic self-expression are the very essence."

The problem of union democracy arises today because the business aspect has become dominant. Power tends to concentrate at the top of unions not primarily because of any power-lust on the part of union officials but because "the very process of institutionalization, of organizational expansion and stabilization generates a powerful bureaucratic potential." The ranks usually take little part in the union, except during a factional struggle. Far from objecting to his officials usurping power, "the ordinary member sees no particular reason for 'wasting' his time at meetings. 'Let the officials run the union, that's what they're getting paid for' just about expresses his attitude."

What to do? The author suggests legal guarantees of the members' 'civil rights' within the union, public financial reports, more delegation of authority. But he puts small hope in such institutional changes. "What is most needed is a profound transformation in the moral atmosphere . . . the creation of a labor conscience." Socialism once supplied this conscience. "Today, with the decline of the socialist faith, labor is left without a conscience, without a moral dynamic."