The tragedy of Warsaw is over. For two months the Polish underground army, equipped only with light weapons, stood up to the mechanized fury of the Reichwehr's planes, tanks, and siege guns. Betrayed passively by two of their "allies", England and the United States, and actively by the third, Soviet Russia, General Bor's underground fighters have surrendered—such of them as are still alive—after 63 days of heroic battle. The Warsaw tragedy is over. But the treachery, the brutal calculation of Russian policy which delivered the Warsaw underground into the hands of the Nazis—the reckoning for this has not yet been presented. Let us attempt a bill of particulars.

The facts may be briefly stated.

At the end of July, the Red Army was approaching the city of Warsaw at the rate of from five to fifteen miles a day. By August 1, its advance lines were within ten miles of the city. That day the Polish underground army inside Warsaw, commanded by "General Bor", began open street-fighting against the German occupation forces. By August 3, General Bor's forces had captured strategic sections of the city and controlled perhaps 40% of the total area. As this is written, over two months later, the Red Army has not yet entered the city proper. Between August 1 and September 15, it stood still, not advancing nor (apparently, judging from its communique) attempting to advance; in those six weeks there was furious activity to the North, in the Baltic region, and above all to the South, in the Balkans, which were overrun by the Red Army in an offensive which rolled forward ten, twenty miles a day. But in the center: All Quiet on the Warsaw Front. No aid whatsoever, furthermore, was sent by Russia to the Warsaw fighters during this six-week period.

On September 15, the Red Army resumed its drive on Warsaw and began a battle for the suburb of Praga. After a few days, this offensive seems to have been abandoned also, and at the moment of writing, the Red Army has still not gotten inside Warsaw proper. In the two months interval, General Bor's underground fighters have naturally suffered terrible losses and have lost most of the area they controlled early in August. The Germans have rounded up 200,000 "hostages"—old men, women, and children—from the city and have sent them to a camp at Pruszkow, where they are being killed by slow starvation.

So much for the military story. One political fact must be added: General Bor and the bulk of his underground fighters are loyal to the present Polish Government-in-Exile in London; Stalin has refused to recognize this government and has set up in Moscow a rival government called the Polish Committee of National Liberation. The Kremlin states this is because the London Government is reactionary and has no popular support. This is more false than true: the London Government is a "national front" of all shades of political parties, from socialists to reactionaries. As for popular support, the Warsaw uprising itself shows a considerable degree of it. Much more, without question, than the Moscow Committee has yet commanded. One statement may be made quite definitely: the Moscow Committee is more subservient to Russian pressure than the London Government. It is, in fact, simply a Quisling outfit in no way different from those the Germans strewed about occupied Europe except that its allegiance is to Moscow instead of to Berlin.

What, then, lies behind these facts? Why did the Red Army fail to penetrate to Warsaw for two months, with devastating effects to the Polish underground and to the 200,000 "hostages" in Camp Pruszkow? The Russians and their friends say that the uprising was "premature" and against the wishes of Moscow and that General Bor wanted to make political capital for the London Government.

These claims are refuted by the following facts:

(1) According to the Manchester Guardian, the Union of Polish Patriots, a group with headquarters in Moscow, broadcast throughout July appeals to the people of War-
saw to arise and fight the Germans. As the Red Army drew near Warsaw, these appeals, which went out over the Koskiusko radio station in Moscow, became more urgent. On July 28, for example, Radio Koskiusko exhorted the inhabitants of Warsaw: "Fight the Germans! Do not doubt that Warsaw hears the guns of the battle which is to bring her liberation!" July 30: "Warsaw trembles from the roar of guns! . . . People of Warsaw, to arms! The whole population of Warsaw should gather around the Underground Army! Attack the Germans!"

(2) A dispatch in the N. Y. Times of August 15 stated: "The rising of General Bor's underground forces in Warsaw two weeks ago had been designed specifically to frustrate a counter-attack by four German armored divisions against the Red Army forces closing in on Warsaw from the East . . . Moreover, Premier Stalin, as well as the British and American High Command in London, had promised to send aid to the ill-armed Polish forces, and detailed plans for the delivery of arms and the bombing of German strongholds had been dispatched to Moscow."

(3) Leader of the Polish Government-in-Exile, as quoted in the N. Y. Times of Sept. 1, stated that (a) the Red Army was informed of the projected uprising through the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff; (b) he himself told Molotov while he was in Moscow on July 21 negotiating with the Kremlin, that the Warsaw uprising was imminent; (c) detachments loyal to the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation were fighting in Warsaw alongside General Bor's men. These allegations have not been denied by Moscow.

That the Kremlin knew of the uprising in advance and approved of it—or rather, a most important emendation, gave the impression it approved of it—would seem to be pretty conclusively established. But let us assume that all the above data is false, and that all the claims of the Stalinists are true as to the rising being "premature" and in conflict with the Red Army's plans. The apologists for the Kremlin must still answer an awkward question, a really terrible question: why did the Russians give no aid to the Polish underground fighters for a month and a half, despite repeated and frantic appeals from General Bor; and, even more, why did they sabotage the attempt of the British to give such aid?

Vernon Bartlett, a liberal British journalist and Member of Parliament, has revealed that the British and American high commands in August made "repeated" requests that the Russians would allow RAF planes to land on Russian soil after having dropped munitions to General Bor in Warsaw. (For months now British and American planes bombing the Balkans have been shuttling between Italian and Russian airfields instead of having to make the round trip without landing.) The Soviet Government refused these requests up through the middle of September. Consequently, the RAF planes used to supply the Warsaw underground army had to turn around and make a non-stop return trip all the way back to their Italian bases, instead of landing behind the Red Army lines a few miles outside Warsaw. By September 12, 250 RAF flyers had been lost on this hazardous route.

The Russians justified this incredible sabotage—and sabotage of their British "allies", note, as well as of the Warsaw fighters—by claiming Bor's forces held such small areas that supplies could not be parachuted to them accurately and would fall into the Germans' hands. This excuse, however, was exploded by the Russians themselves in mid-September when they for the first time opened their airfields to the RAF planes and also sent their own planes over Warsaw to drop supplies to the underground. For obviously if it is true that Bor's forces held such small areas in early August that supplies dropped to them would be likely to land inside the German lines instead, then today, when Bor has lost most of the ground he once held, the likelihood is much greater. The bogging down of the Red Army's offensive for six weeks, and its renewal (in token form, at least) in mid-September; the sabotage of aid to the underground during those same six weeks, and the reversal of this policy in mid-September—these events have nothing to do with military considerations, as the Stalinists and their liblab supporters claim, and everything to do with political considerations. The game that Stalin played here was as cool, brutal and treacherous a squeeze-play as even that master of the doublecross has ever perpetrated.

Writing in The Call for Sept. 8, Lillian Symes well analyzed the calculations behind it: "The chief obstacle to Moscow's 'successful' negotiations with the Polish Government-in-Exile (under constant pressure from London and Washington to accept any terms which Moscow might offer) was the strength and counter-pressure of the well-organized, democratic Polish Underground. This Underground had already reminded its harassed representatives in London that it would recognize no compromise which sacrificed the independence of the Polish people, and that any arrangements made with Moscow must be ratified in Poland itself. That it would refuse to ratify Moscow's last offer to Premier Mikolajczyk, in which the Poles would be permitted three representatives of their own in a puppet govern-
ment, was a foregone conclusion. So the Polish underground had to be blackmailed into submission, or liquidated. . . . The annihilation of the Polish Underground is the first major step in the annihilation of every independent or potentially independent social revolutionary force in Europe.

The Poles, whatever their other defects, are magnificent fighters and passionate rebels. Poland was the only country in Europe, including Russia, which did not produce a single Quisling leader of any standing; the Nazis were unable to find one university professor, one important businessman, one labor leader, one high military officer in the whole of Poland who would enter a Quisling government. In Russia's imperialistic plans for postwar Europe, a Moscow-dominated Polish regime is essential. But the Warsaw underground, skilled in the use of arms, toughened by years of struggle against the Germans, stood in the way of such a regime. The Kremlin's game is thus clear. First it provoked the uprising by radio appeals and by interposing no objection to it when Premier Mikolajczyk revealed it was being planned. Then it called off the Red Army's offensive for six weeks at the very gates of the city, and did its best to prevent arms reaching the insurgents, while the Germans mobilized tanks and heavy artillery to batter to pieces General Bor's ill-equipped fighters, and while 200,000 civilian inhabitants of Warsaw were slowly starved to death in Camp Pruszków.

As a Marxist, Stalin is well aware of the principle of division of labor: he saw a chance to let the Nazis do his dirty work for him. Every Warsaw fighter killed by the Germans was one less for his own firing-squads to liquidate. That the Kremlin finally sent aid and renewed, in token of at least the Red Army's drive on the city in mid-September was because even the Kremlin has to make some concession to world opinion, and the Warsaw situation had become too rotten to be prolonged further (part of Bor's forces, after all, were actually followers of the Moscow Committee; they were sacrificed along with the rest as far as Stalin dared, but there must have been some serious repercussions among his tame Poles in Moscow). Also, in six weeks of slaughter, the Nazis had "fulfilled" most of the plan anyway.

The press and the governments of this country and England behaved shamefully. Some aid had to be sent to Warsaw, if only because of the questions that might otherwise be asked in Parliament and the speeches that might be made in Congress. But the very minimum was sent—most of the RAF flyers detailed for the job, incidentally, were members of the Polish squadron—and not a word of criticism of the Kremlin's refusal to cooperate was made by any government official in either country. The American press has either passed over the whole affair in silence, or has accepted the Stalinist rationalization that the uprising was "premature." For not only are the Anglo-American authorities willing to condone almost anything to avoid a clash with Russia, but they must also regard the Warsaw street fighters with more alarm than enthusiasm. They, too, want an "orderly" postwar Europe.

But the tale is not told yet. On September 30, Chairman Osubka-Morawski of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Moscow) held a press conference which seems to indicate still another turn of Kremlin policy. Attacking General Bor as "a criminal against the Polish people", he stated that evidence had come into his Committee's hands that . . . the London Polish Government had ordered the Warsaw uprising. (Thus the uprising now has become an actual crime, and to this Stalinist leader it seems sufficient laudably merely to "accuse" the London Government of something which to a normal mind might seem a matter for legitimate pride: that it stimulated a popular uprising against the Nazis.) "If this is substantiated, he said, these persons also would be tried as 'criminals, as Bor will be if he falls into the hands of the Red or Polish armies.'" Here we might add that the London Tribune of September 1 reports that the Moscow Committee had dropped leaflets from airplanes to the Warsaw insurgents "threatening punishment and execution of the men they described as the guilty leaders of the uprising." Soviet planes could not be spared to drop supplies to the Warsaw fighters, but they were available to circulate propaganda whose only effect could have been to shatter the morale of the insurgents and make them easier prey to the Germans. The collaboration of Stalin and Hitler against the Warsaw underground fighters is thus complete: those leaders who survive the German Army will be executed by the Red Army.

The new turn of Kremlin policy would seem to be to call off once more the Red Army drive on Warsaw that began anew on September 15. It has been many days since reports have come of fighting around Warsaw, and Osubka-Morawski stated that the city could not be taken until sufficient forces were mustered completely to encircle it. "He admitted that those forces were not now available because they were tied up on other parts of the long Soviet-German front." When we add the facts that Osubka-Morawski gave his interview 24 hours after conferring with Stalin, and that his denunciation of General Bor as a "criminal" followed almost immediately on the announcement that the London Government had made Bor its war chief succeeding General Soskowski, the pattern begins to emerge. Stalin has declared all-out war on the London Government, probably because he has finally concluded he cannot make a deal. The Warsaw insurgents are therefore to be left to their fate, their leaders are threatened with execution, such token aid as they got from Russia two weeks ago will probably be no longer forthcoming (the Soviet press has, significantly, carried no news of this aid), and the heroic Polish underground is now smeared by Stalin's officials as "criminal" and "traitorous".

Comrade Osubka-Morawski ventured "the sad prediction that the people of Warsaw, of whom it was estimated 250,000 had already died in the uprising, must undergo still further suffering." This prediction will unquestionably be realized, for it is simply a statement of future Kremlin policy. But—

250,000 dead—and the Red Army sitting 10 miles away for two months!

250,000 dead—and the Soviet Government refuses to allow relief planes to land on its territory!

250,000 dead—and the leaders of this popular revolt against Nazi oppression are threatened with execution by the Soviet Government!

After Warsaw, whatever honest doubts one might have had as to the nature of the Soviet regime and the direction in which it is heading must be resolved. This butcher of popular insurrection, this doublecrosser of its own allies, this factory of lies and slander, this world center of counterrevolution can have nothing in common with socialism. We cannot compromise with it if we would achieve our aims as socialists. Our slogan must be, once more: Ecrasez l'Infame!

Footnote to History: "In Moscow a Soviet official remarked that the Kremlin would gladly cooperate with the Vatican in solving a problem that fills Stalin with concern—'the moral bankruptcy of Europeans'". (Time, Aug. 4, 1944.)
The Campaign Staggers on

The Presidential campaign becomes ever more sterile and trivial. In a time when private capitalism is giving way to State capitalism all along the line, both candidates base their appeal on the hoary middleclass illusion of a “free enterprise” economy. The Democrats have raised only one issue so far—an issue on which Dewey does not, incidentally, disagree: that stalest of demagogic devices in our politics—trust-busting. Roosevelt has heroically come out against international cartels, and his Department of Justice is now grappling with the hydra-headed monster of Monopoly in no less than 66 active anti-trust cases, including the recent suit against the Western railroads and their bankers, Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb. Trust-busting seems to fascinate Democratic politicians; I noted here some months ago Wallace’s preoccupation with it. The reason, of course, is the same reason it fascinated the first Roosevelt: because it affords a means of violently assailing Big Business without doing it the slightest damage. The result of fifty years of trust-busting is that America has the most highly concentrated monopoly capitalist set-up in the world.

The level of Dewey’s campaign, on the other hand, is something hard to believe. Not only does Dewey appear to have no new ideas, but he seems to have no ideas at all, no flavor, no personality. About the only definite character his campaign has had so far is given to it by the Old Guard Republicans who have gone in for some extremely simpleminded red-baiting. Their strategy, touching in its naivete, is to tie the Democrats up with the PAC, and then to tie the PAC up with the Communists, who are conceived of, naturally, as red-hot revolutionaries. A vote for Roosevelt thus becomes a vote for a man who is tearing down the very wellsprings of the American System.

Dewey himself steers clear of this approach, which is too definite to suit his book. His campaign is so stream-lined that it has no character at all. His opening campaign speech, for example, began with a bold attack on the New Deal for having failed to solve the unemployment problem. “It took a world war to get jobs for the American people,” he cried, in accents more suitable to Norman Thomas than to a Republican candidate. The irresponsibility of this trenchant criticism appeared in Dewey’s positive proposals, which were the old generalities about “encouraging” business, having “faith” in American capitalism’s future, and—grand climax—“We must have jobs, not doles!”

On foreign policy, it is the same. “I have been deeply disturbed by some of the recent reports concerning the Dumbarton Oaks conference,” intoned Dewey on August 16. “These indicate that it is planned to subject the nations of the world, great and small, permanently to the coercive power of the four nations holding this conference. . . . That would be the rankest form of imperialism.” It would indeed, but since it is so obviously what is being planned, how could a respectable American politician raise such an awkward question? The afternoon showed that Dewey was no more serious about the rights of small nations than he was about the unemployed. His foreign-policy adviser, a big-time corporation lawyer named Dulles, was promptly invited to confer with Secretary Hull, which he did with considerable publicity. Hull apparently was able to convince Dulles, and Dewey, that imperialism was the very last thing the Dumbarton Oaks conference had in mind: at any event, Dewey expressed himself as quite reassured, and dropped the issue. (If it can be called an issue—for Dewey never criticised Roosevelt’s present foreign policies.) The small nations, like the unemployed, had served their purpose: Dewey had gotten himself a share of the Dumbarton Oaks publicity. As an opposition candidate, Dewey finds it expedient to voice all kinds of protests which, carried out to their logical end, would undercut the whole status quo. He is no more serious about them, however, than an executive of Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn is serious about the merits of a breakfast food he advertises.

One Touch of Reality

About the only significant difference I can see between the effects of a Democratic victory this fall and those of a Republican victory is the shake-up the latter would cause in the Congressional committee system. The control which the South has exercised of these all-important committees—the real work of Congress is done in committee, and the real decisions are taken there—is little realized by the public. But it is a political fact of the first order, and explains to a large extent the reactionary nature of Congressional behavior of late years. Southern Congressmen load up the committees way out of proportion to their numerical strength in Congress, because membership and advancement in the committees are determined entirely by seniority. Since the South is, in practice if not in theory, as much a one-party region as Germany or Russia, Southern Democrats get re-elected year after year and even decade after decade, and consequently pile up huge amounts of seniority.

Not much can be done about this at-present, since there seems no chance that the Republicans will crack open the Solid South. But at least a Republican sweep in Congress would mean the end of Southern control of the committee chairmanships, which are immensely strategic posts. These chairmanships go to the majority party, again under seniority rule, so that they have been held since 1933 largely by Southern Democrats. (Almost all the really important committees, by the way, are packed with and chaired by Southerners, since the seniority rule also works there, a freshman representative or Senator being assigned to the Committee on Care of the Capitol Grounds or some such, while the veterans move up into Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, etc.) In the House, for example, a Republican victory would mean that 28 Southern Democrats who now head committees (there are 47 committees altogether) would be replaced by Republicans, of whom only three or four would be from the South (and even these not from the Deep South but from border states like Tennessee and Kentucky). The Southerners would also lose their present chairmanships of seven of the eight special and select House committees. It is true that the Republicans supplanting them will not be exactly plummed knights of liberalism. But the most rockbound Pennsylvania conservative, in my judgment anyway, is preferable to a Southern Democrat.

Dumbarton Oaks

The final draft of the World Security Council is still hung up, as this is written, by Russia’s objections (on which more presently). But the main outlines have been agreed on by the three powers conferring at Dumbarton Oaks, and they are pretty much what Churchill outlined in his important speech in Commons on May 25 (commented on here in the June issue). There will be a Council, dominated by the Big Four, which will control all the military force and will make the policy decisions; and an Assembly, in which all “peace-loving” nations will be represented, which will have merely advisory powers. The blueprint which served as the basis for the Dumbarton Oaks discussions seems to have been provided by the U. S. State Department. It has not been made public, and is not expected to be published for a very long time—remember Wilson’s “open covenants, openly arrived at”: what children our politicians were in
and that the above outline purposes to avoid those political consideration of domestic as well as international angles, quite outside the jurisdiction of the diplomatic technicians assembled at Dumbarton Oaks. These terms are being kept even more secret than the machinery for enforcing them; they were partly worked out at Teheran, and will doubtless take final shape in the coming Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference. These decisions are being reached by personal negotiations between the three men at the very top, without any publicity at all—we still don’t know what happened at Teheran—in the quintessential tradition of power politics.

"Design for Some Senators, notably LaFollette and Ratification" Vandenberg, feel that the peace terms should be negotiated and made public before the machinery is set up to enforce them. They are reluctant to vote powers to the World Security Council before they now what those powers will be used for. This would seem reasonable enough, but the State Department, for very good reasons, prefers the looking-glass logic of passing around the cake before it is cut. These reasons are analyzed by Frank C. Hanighen in the September 13 issue of Human Events:

"The 'great adventure' of constructing world organization is not commencing with the establishment of a 'just peace'. On the contrary, the U. S. government is apparently attempting to build from the top down, in the following sequence:

"(1) Submission of a plan to the Senate for world organization to enforce peace. This is the plan now under discussion at Dumbarton Oaks: its final draft will be framed by the Big Four Powers.

"(2) Next, assuming that the Senate passes this plan, it will receive another treaty similarly drafted, allocating the armed forces of the Allied nations to enforce the peace.

"(3) Later, perhaps after prolonged armistice, the details of the peace—boundaries, reparations, economic agreements, etc.—will be submitted to the Senate, probably as joint Allied treaties with individual defeated nations.

"This 'putting the cart before the horse', as Senator Shipstead describes it, did not simply happen: it was planned that way. . . . There is every indication that the government's close study of the 1919-1920 situation has included consideration of domestic as well as international angles, and that the above outline purposes to avoid those political reefs which wrecked the former League and treaties in the Senate. It is, indeed, a design for ratification.

"The great fight of 1919-1920 was . . . responsive to popular reaction against individual treaty provisions regarding new boundaries and territories. Senators Borah, Hiram Johnson, LaFollette and Norris inveighed against 'Shantung', 'Fiume', and 'Upper Silesia', as well as against 'Article X.' These objections, vociferously supported by various racial groups in the U. S., played a substantial part in the defeat of the treaties. And, since the League was incorporated into all the treaty structures, the League was inevitably defeated, too.

"Today . . . Secretary Hull states that the 'peace machinery' . . . and the 'peace treaties' will be considered separately; and he has given the machinery priority over the treaties. . . . In short, the government would by-pass one of the most important obstacles which prevented League ratification in 1919-1920.'

Fortress of With Dumbarton Oaks, and the Warsaw betrayal, the Soviet Union has staked out a convincing claim to the title Russia held in the 19th century: the chief stronghold of international reaction. From the beginning of the conference, the Russian delegation has tried to secure greater dominance in the postwar world to the Big Four than even Roosevelt and Churchill think expedient. The Americans proposed that the Council be made up of the Big Four as permanent members plus a rotating membership of seven other nations; decisions would be taken by majority vote, with the important proviso that no action could be taken if any one of the Big Four objected. This would seem to protect the interests of the Big Four pretty well—but not well enough for the Russians. They wanted "a much smaller number of Council members (N. Y. Times, Sept. 12). They have apparently yielded on this, but only to "raise the question whether the smaller powers should, under any circumstances, be in a position to veto any proposal supported by the four permanent members of the council."

Since it would take six of the seven smaller powers to veto an action agreed on by the Big Four, and since any one of the Big Four could singlehanded veto an action, the Anglo-American delegations seem to feel it would be a little on the crude side to deny any right of veto to the small powers. The Russians however worry little about crudity in such matters. They finally gave way, only to raise an even bigger issue.

For weeks, the Russian delegation hung up the conference on the question of whether the members of the Council shall have the right to vote on the use of force if that force is to be directed against themselves: i.e., what happens when one of the Council members is the peacemaker. The Russians insist that such a member must be allowed a vote, which would mean that Russia, as one of the permanent members whose single veto is enough to bar all use of force by the Council, would be able to prevent the Council from acting against her if she herself was the aggressor. If they carry their point, the Council will have the same weakness that wrecked the old League of Nations, where the facts that (1) aggressor nations could vote on their own cases, and (2) a unanimous vote was necessary to permit the use of force, made it possible for Japan to block League intervention in the Manchurian affair, and Italy in the conquest of Ethiopia. It would appear that Russia expects to find herself after the war an "unsatisfied" nation like Japan, Italy and Germany in the 30's. It may be significant that it is the Chinese delegation which has put forward the no-vote-to-aggressors formula; China will probably be the sphere in which Russia will most want a "free hand" after the war. England and the U. S. have gone along with the Chinese proposal.

The enormous significance Russia attaches to this point is shown by the fact that she refused all compromises and forced the Conference at last to break up with the issue still unsettled. The State Department announced on September 25 that "90 per cent agreement" had been reached, which was putting a good face on a bad business. For the "10 per cent" area of disagreement caused by Russia's intransigence is precisely the most important of all, from both the standpoint of the future of small nations and of the next war. We may be sure that Stalin would not insist
on a veto power over the World Council's use of force against future aggressors unless he considered it likely he would want to exercise it in his favor. The post-war world is already materializing as the pre-war world.

The Nouveaux It is a commonplace that no employers' Riches of World are more hard-boiled than those who have worked their way up from the bottom. The self-made man kicks around his former class comrades with a viciousness of which the boss's son is generally incapable. This fact throws some light on the policies of the present Russian ruling class: they are the great nouveaux riches of modern history—coarse, brutal, ruthless, cynical, crude to a degree impossible for the older exploiting classes of this country and England. If hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue, they refuse even that small homage. In this, as in many other things, they resemble those other political nouveaux riches of our time, the Nazis. At the Bretton Woods monetary conference, it is reported, the Russians pained other delegates by getting right to the point at the beginning of every discussion. Brushing aside the fine sentiments about the future of mankind with which the other delegates eased into the real bargaining, the Russians immediately asked: "What does Russia get out of it?"

There was a little more than hypocrisy in the other nations' attitude, not much but a little. For their delegates were responsible to some sort of informed and free public opinion at home: they knew that too crude a job would open their governments to attack from opposition newspapers and from political opponents. Even if this opposition were, as is almost wholly the case in England and America today, from forces which basically agreed with the political values of the government, the mere fact of discussion and opposition exercises some kind of check. The Senatorial opposition that is forming to Dumbarton Oaks, for example, is made up of former isolationists who object to Roosevelt's foreign policies as much because of those policies' internationalism as because of their imperialism. (Senator LaFollette is the only exception that comes to mind.) But this opposition seems to have been one of the factors which caused the American delegation to favor a wider representation for smaller powers than the Russians did. Stalin's movements in power politics, like Hitler's, are much freer than Roosevelt's; there is no "public opinion", in our sense of the word, in Russia; hence the Kremlin's policies can be shaped more "realistically", and covered by a thinner veil of ideology (or none at all).

The difference appears clearly in the now-celebrated article by a certain N. Malinin in the Leningrad monthly, Zvezda. Malinin's article is an unofficial summary of the plan which the Soviet delegation presented to the Dumbarton Oaks conference. It is much the most frankly outspoken argument for a postwar world dominated by the Big Four that has come from any official quarter. Malinin proposes what he calls an "International Organization of Safety." This "must be built on the basis of firm, active leadership of the great powers. These powers must organize the directive organ of the new organization. They must take upon themselves the obligation to counter any aggression and, if necessary, with their own armed forces independently from other members of the organization."

They must also see that the smaller powers accept the decisions of the I. O. S. "unanimously" (also, doubtless, with the spontaneous enthusiasm the Kremlin always insists on). This emphasis on the untrammeled action of the big powers, independent even of their own I.O.S. if necessary, is Malinin's keynote; it leads him later on to reject as "utopian" (a favorite term of abuse in the Soviet Union, incidentally) the idea of an international police force. However, Comrade Malinin does not forget the small powers. "In speaking about the dominating role of the great powers in overcoming aggression," he writes, "we do not exclude the small nations from acting for world safety. In nearly all cases, the great powers will need the help of small nations in using their sea and air bases and even in including small nations' troops in military maneuvers."

Thus the fact that the small nations will have to supply bases and troops for wars they very well may not approve of, this is actually presented as a concession! A similar instance is the recent reply of War and the Working Class to Dewey's protest about the rights of small nations; the editors rule any such criticism out of order on the grounds that "the small nations even more than the big ones need security and peace." (Quoted by the veteran Stalinist hack, Anna Louise Strong, in The Nation, Sept. 2.) The crudity of Soviet Russian political thought is almost as revolting as its anti-democratic content. But then nouveaux riches have never been noted for the delicacy of their sensibilities.

The Liberation One of the big surprises of the war has been the strength shown by the French underground. At the end of August, it was estimated that there were some half million men and women in the F.F.I. It is a heartening sign that the French people, in the vanguard of European revolution for so many generations, have recovered from the 1940 collapse and once more show themselves capable of spirited and effective action against an oppressive regime. To organize and arm a half million underground fighters under the noses of the German occupation troops was a remarkable achievement, and one possible only if the broadest masses of the people cooperated in the job. Huge areas in southern and central France were cleared of Germans by the F.F.I. single-handed, before the Allied troops arrived.

The climax came when the F.F.I. recaptured Paris itself, in advance of the Allied armies. The Allied high command was obviously taken by surprise; it had planned to capture Paris later, in an orderly, military way, with the proper fanfare of publicity; an "iron-clad arrangement" had been made for Supreme Headquarters to announce the capture of the world's greatest city, and when the F.F.I. acted ahead of schedule, the brass hats were obviously irritated and confused. (See the story, "Publicity Plan Muddled While Paris Frees Itself", in N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Aug. 24, p. 4.) The very fact that the F.F.I. had anticipated the Allied armies by some days might still be unknown were it not for a fluke: the only news story to get through reporting the fact was that by Charles Collingwood, of C.B.S., which accidentally escaped military censorship. (C.B.S. apologized the following day to Supreme Headquarters, which termed the episode "a pure but serious error.") The Allied High Command, like the Red Army High Command, does not approve of cities spontaneously liberating themselves without waiting for the duly constituted military authorities. Most irregular, most irregular!*

For some time following the liberation of Paris, the

*I do not imply, of course, that the F.F.I. could have liberated Paris, or any other part of France, without the Allied invasion. In fact, in fact, the F.F.I. apparently got into some trouble and had to appeal to Eisenhower for help, which was sent in the form of a French armored division. But the initiative and the brunt of the fighting was borne by the F.F.I., not the Allied troops, in big sections of the country.
atmosphere in the city was revolutionary: bands of armed F.F.I. members patrolling the streets; constant gun fights with collaborationists; the real authority in the hands of the F.F.I. not the police or the DeGaulle government. (See also Herbert L. Matthews remarkable dispatches on the Marseilles situation in the N. Y. Times of August 25-27; Matthews described a city in revolutionary turmoil, and it was perhaps the candor and detail with which he reported the facts that was responsible for his being pulled back to Rome by his employers after a few days.) Things in Paris reached the point where DeGaulle, who wants no more revolution than he can help, was alarmed. On August 31, two American divisions on their way to the front were detoured through Paris; Gaullist officials had requested them “to quiet the nervous populace, awe collaborators, strengthen the position of General DeGaulle and help in the solution of his particular problems.” (N. Y. Times, Sept. 1.) General Eisenhower told correspondents this action “was more a matter of necessity than ceremony” and took care to call it a “march” and not a “parade.”

All of this does not mean that a revolution has begun: the passion has so far been pretty negative, directed against the old collaborationists (who are hated by the people even more intensely than the Germans) and not in favor of any positive programs. But it is enormously encouraging that the French people retain so much vitality after the 1940 debacle and the years of German occupation. The reserves of a people are inexhaustible, it would seem. As the Italian uprising against Mussolini, and the socialist slogans which appeared everywhere after two decades of fascism, amazed the world, so here again in France.

The Italian revolutionary stream has run into a stagnant marsh. Will it be the same here? There are more favorable factors in France: the higher political level of the people; the fact France is an ally not an enemy of the winning side; the tradition of 1789, 1848, the Commune, the 1936 general strike; greater economic strength. Of one thing we may be sure: any French revolution is barely at its beginning. As Louis Clair showed last month, deep divergences exist within the DeGaullist and underground movements, which will express themselves in the months to come. Meanwhile, the popular revolution has recently received a serious, though perhaps only temporary, setback: the merging of the F.F.I. into the regular army. If the men and women of the F.F.I. accept this decree of the Gaullist regime and either surrender their arms or enter the regular forces, the counter-revolution will have scored a great tactical victory. For the possession of arms by the people is the first condition of revolution, as the American generals well knew who recently allowed the German divisions in central France to retain their arms after surrendering. Their reason was quite bluntly that otherwise “communists” might get hold of them.

What is a “nation” to begin with? It is a lot of different individuals who are organized—often against their will and even without their being conscious of it—into various groups, classes, and institutions; beside their individual differences, there are also marked group divergences, so that what one group favors another opposes. It is a collection of rocks and mountains and cities and rivers and schools and climate and other things, all of them interrelated in a certain economic pattern which in turn affects and is affected by legal, cultural, social, moral and political customs and institutions which have grown up over centuries. How anything as complicated as this can be thought to “love” or “hate” anything, or to have any of the characteristics of an individual human being is hard to understand. Yet it is, of course, a fact that most of us do think of “France” and “Germany” simply as gigantic individuals who can be praised or blamed like individuals. (Freud has shown us that the individual, also, is a complex of warring factors—but that is another story.) And the more totalitarian our own nation is, the more easily can we accept this method of thought, since the divergent and complicating forces are largely kept out of sight.

The meaning of “peace-loving” is even more obscure. If it refers to the common people, then it can be said that they are overwhelmingly peace-loving in all nations. One only has to recall the press dispatches that came from every European capital at the beginning of this war, including Berlin, stressing over and over again the dominant mood of apathy, anxiety, despair. There was no flag-waving anywhere, no cheering, no patriotic enthusiasm. If it refers to those at the controls, one may ask: what national leader is not “peace-loving” in the sense he prefers peace to war? A few neurotics and professional soldiers, possibly, but the serious foreign policy of a nation is not made by such types. Hitler has often stated he abhors war, and I have no doubt quite sincerely. The terrible risks of war are never welcomed by politicians; they would always rather get what they want without war. The difficulty was that England and France found it impossible to give Hitler peacefully all he “wanted”—a decision unavoidable in terms of their own systems, since Hitler wanted to replace their world hegemony with his own. The point is not that the Nazis were less “peace-loving” than the French and the British ruling classes, but rather that they were the out-group in world politics, and hence had to use war to gain their ends—while the in-group was well enough served by peace. As the world is now organized, this situation seems fairly certain to repeat itself in another generation or so, with perhaps Russia perhaps England perhaps this country in the out-group position. Whereupon the in-group ideologies will spin theories as to the essential warlikeness of the Russians (or the British or the Americans), and the innate peace-loviness of the British and Americans (or the Russians and British, or the Russians and Americans).

The only way to avoid all this is to make a basic change in the way the world is now set up—but it’s much easier, of course, to ring the changes on “peace-loving nations”. And What is Another concept, widely used in United “Sovereign “Sovereign Nations” propaganda today, is that of the Equality”? “sovereign equality” of all nations. Big and small. The two are combined in the foreign-policy plank of the Democratic Platform, a docu-
ment written personally by Roosevelt. The party pledges
"the establishment of an international organization based
on the principle of the sovereignty equality of all peace-
loving States." Now what does "sovereign equality" mean?
In defining the official American war aims last March,
Secretary Hull gave the concept its definitive formulation,
in words which were later borrowed for the Democratic
platform:

> Each sovereign nation, large or small, is in law and
under law the equal of every other nation. The principle
of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective
of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general
security will be the foundation stone upon which the future
international organization will be constructed.

The realistic gloss on this text was given by Hull's op-
opposite number, Anthony Eden, the following week. "Let
us admit," he said, with that frankness which seems to dis-
tinguish British politicians in this war, "Let us admit that,
though all states are equal in status, they are not equal
in power, and consequently their duties must vary . . . We
must recognize that those who bear the greater responsi-
bility . . . must have the greater voice in deciding any
action to be taken in the general interest. All independent
states must be free to declare their opinions and their
grievances. But when it comes to deciding on action which
only certain states by their military power are in a position
effectively to take, we cannot simply count heads. The
great powers have and must have special responsibilities
in the field of security." Recent developments show that
the gloss is more important than the text. What price
"sovereign equality" in Poland and the Baltic States? What
price in Europe, whose postwar shape is being forged by
the Big Three without consultation with the exiled govern-
ments? When the ineffable Hull was asked about this at
a recent press conference—after a particularly violent series
of protests by the French, Dutch, Polish, Belgian and other
small-power governments—he replied "with emotion" that
11) he has frequently endorsed the principle of sovereign
equality ("I have spoken of this often in my speeches.").
12) American statesmen have been making similar profesi-
ions for generations ("We have for 150 years preached liberty
to all the nations of the earth."). As for the par-
cular actions and policies complained of, Hull as usual
said nothing. He seems to have that curious kind of men-
tality, shaped by legal formulae and parliamentary ora-
tory, which thinks that conflicts between words and acts
can be resolved by repeating the words with emphasis.

Marx pointed out that in bourgeois revolutions, the phrase
goes beyond the content; in the State Department, the con-
tent never gets within shouting distance of the phrase.

Unlike the wicked Nazis, the leaders of the United Na-
tions show the tenderest concern for the sovereignty equality
of all nations. But at the same time, they possess,
and have made it clear that they will continue to possess, the
overwhelming weight of armed force. Universal disarm-
ament is today too patently absurd, in terms of the world
as it is, to be advanced even as a propaganda slogan. One
would not think it would take a profound mind to under-
stand that a world in which three gigantic states monopo-
lize the means of coercion is not going to be a world dis-

tinguished by the equality of nations. Yet this simple idea
seems beyond the grasp of our statesmen. Willkie, for ex-
ample, writes: "Naturally, the task of safeguarding the
world from aggression will have to rest mainly on the
shoulders of the great powers, since they alone possess the
military force. But the peoples of the small nations . . .
will not and should not permit three or four great powers
to continue to dictate their destiny." "Will not", "should
not" But how will they prevent it? Willkie was answered
two thousand years ago by the envoys of another great
imperialism, Athens, who told the representatives of the
small Mecelian nation: "You know as well as we do that right,
as the world goes, is only in question between equals in
power, while the strong do what they can and the weak
suffer what they must.

The reason our war leaders can get away with this kind
of nonsense—and with the liberals as well as with the
man in the street—is that American political thought is
still in the primitive stage in which state power, internally
and internationally, is regarded as something neutral and
impartial in itself, something which stands above all spe-
cific clashes of class or national interest and regulates things
for the general interest of society (or the world) as a whole.

The older, more sophisticated culture of Europe has out-
grown this illusion, which is one explanation of the greater
realism of British political speeches today. If one considers
the state a cooperative enterprise enforcing its rules for
the benefit of all citizens, rather than the organ of the ruling
class; if one looks on the police as the agents of classless
"law and order" rather than as the ultimate armed force
with which the rulers impose their will on the ruled; then
one will be able to see the postwar armies of the Big
Three as the police force to "arrest" all nations who try
to steal or kill (make war), rather than as themselves
the chief agencies by which war and plunder will be carried
out. It is going to take some very subtle theologizing to
discriminate in the postwar world—or, considering the
general expectation of a World War III, perhaps "prewar"
world would be more accurate—between "war" and "police
work". Thus Sumner Welles, after the usual criticisms
of the Big Three's present foreign policy as undemocratic,
writes: "The Major Powers, who assume responsibility for
the maintenance of world peace . . . must not be impeded
by the smaller powers . . . from freely reaching decisions
regarding the purely military aspects of their police func-
tions." Where is the Daniel who shall tell us when the
smaller nations are defending their rights, and when they
are "impeding" the necessary policing of world peace by
the Major Powers? Resisting a burglar is proper, while
resisting an officer is a serious offence. But what if the
officer is the burglar?

The Protocols: Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary
of the Elders, has published a book, The Time of
of Potsdam Decision (Harper, $3), which is no more
and no less beside the point than all the other books on the
postwar world. That is to say, Welles undertakes the usual
Herculean task of working out a humanly progressive
solution for postwar problems without changing radically
the present basis of society. (In their innocence, Messers.
Welles, Hoover, Gibson, Streit, Culbertson, Lippman, Laski,
Wallace, and Willkie are constantly attempting a task
which, intellectually, far outranks that to which Marx, for
example, devoted a lifetime of labor. For he, at least,
did not attempt to tell an exploitative society how to behave
cooperatively without giving up exploitation.) Reading
such works is in general a waste of time, except for the
extent to which—they often unconsciously—they express the
real plans and interests of those in control of things. The real
"point" of Welles's book thus seems to me to be neither
his proposals for certain organizational forms in the post-
war world nor his lofty and arid discussions of "sover-
eignty" and such matters, but rather the chapter on
What To Do with Germany.

Welles has some reputation as a liberal—a State De-
partment liberal, that is. While he was Under Secretary, he was supposed to be Roosevelt’s personal mouthpiece in the department (though what connection this had with liberalism was and is a little obscure). He was one of the architects of the Good Neighbor policy—after he and Berle had travelled to Havana, during the confusion attending the overthrow of Machado to see to it personally that the liberal Grau San Martin was kicked out and the Batista dictatorship installed. He favored full cooperation with Russia and was even rumored to have doubts about Vichy. Lately, he has expressed a Willkiean concern over the dominant position of the Big Three powers, and has urged that the small fry be given more influence in the postwar world order.

But what price liberalism in 1944? In his new book, Welles out-Vansittarts Vansittart on the German issue. Although historical research has shown that France was as “guilty” as Germany in starting the war of 1870, and that Russia, France, and Austria all played fully as important roles as Germany in the genesis of World War I, Welles lays these wars at the door of “the German people”, and throws in a couple of minor wars, several “incidents” that nearly led to war, and . . . , the Dreyfus case. (All that talk about antisemitism in the French army and upper classes was presumably just German propaganda which Zola fell for—but not Sumner Welles!) He therefore proposes that Germany be divided into three equal parts after the war, and kept divided by force of arms if necessary. Even more significant is Welles’ reaction to the possibility of an anti-capitalist revolution in Germany after this war. His ideas on this head must be read to be believed:

“In all probability, the first strategem of the German military command [after the armies are defeated] will be to stimulate throughout Germany the growth of Communism in its world-revolutionary form. Conditions will favor it. The establishment within Germany of Communism of the Trotskyist or world-revolutionary type would give the German general staff precisely the advantages it will seek. For after the war is over, all the occupied countries of Europe will be seething with social unrest. . . . A new German Communism . . . directed by the cold and ruthless brains of the German general staff would find in many parts of the world a situation made to order for the purposes of Pan-Germanism. The kind of governments, therefore, that the German people are to be permitted to install must be decided by common agreement between the United Nations with full regard for the dangers which may arise from any hidden military schemes of the general staff.”

Change “general staff” to “international Jewish capitalism” and the above is a reasonable facsimile of Hitler’s main line of attack on communism. (It is an exact facsimile, with no changes, of Stalin’s line against Trotsky.) The Elders of Potsdam replace the Elders of Zion as the Protean connivers of world disaster, capable of a secret alliance with a revolutionary working class in order to accomplish their dark ends. It is, of course, notorious that after the 1918 German defeat, the Spartacists and the German general staff were secretly working hand in hand, directed by the “cold and ruthless brains” of the latter, to sow communism throughout Europe. The murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg by German officers was part of the comedy, to give a touch of realism. Furthermore, was it not the Elders of Potsdam who in 1917 sent Lenin into Russia in their famous sealed train and are thus directly responsible for the whole Bolshevik Revolution? Article I of the new peace treaty should categorically prohibit the use of sealed trains.

But it is much more than a joke. That our former Under Secretary of State is as great an ignoramus as his chief is less significant than the fact that he expects and fears social revolution in Europe after the war, and is prepared to use any weapon against it, from amalgams with the general staff to military intervention. “The first U. S.-British objective after a German defeat,” reports the conservative U. S. News of July 21, “will be to prevent violent revolution, to prevent loss of political power by business-financial groups.” Between the German cartels and the German workers, and some such choice may have to be made, we may expect the present regimes in England, America and Russia to choose the former.

The Tyranny of the Clock

In no characteristic is existing society in the West so sharply distinguished from the earlier societies, whether of Europe or the East, than in its conception of time.

To the ancient Chinese or Greek, to the Arab herdsman or Mexican peon of today, time is represented in the cyclic processes of nature, the alternation of day and night, the passage from season to season. The nomads and farmers measured and still measure their day from sunrise to sunset, and their year in terms of seedtime and harvest, of the falling leaf and the ice thawing on the lakes and rivers. The farmer worked according to the elements, the craftsman for so long as he felt it necessary to perfect his product. Time was seen as a process of natural change, and men were not concerned in its exact measurement. For this reason civilizations highly developed in other respects had the most primitive means of measuring time, the hour glass with its trickling sand or dripping water, the sun dial, useless on a dull day, and the candle or lamp whose unburnt remnant of oil or wax indicated the hours. All these devices were approximate and inexact, and were often rendered unreliable by the weather or the personal laziness of the tender. Nowhere in the ancient or mediaeval world were more than a tiny minority of men concerned with time in the terms of mathematical exactitude.

Modern, Western man, however, lives in a world which runs according to the mechanical and mathematical symbols of clock time. The clock dictates his movements and inhibits his actions. The clock turns time from a process of nature into a commodity that can be measured and bought and sold like soap or sultanas. And because, without some means of exact time keeping, industrial capitalism could never have developed and could not continue to exploit the workers, the clock represents an element of mechanical tyranny in the lives of modern men more potent than any individual exploiter or than any other machine. It is valuable to trace the historical process by which the clock influenced the social development of modern European civilization.

It is a frequent circumstance of history that a culture or civilization develops the device that will later be used for its destruction. The ancient Chinese, for example, invented gunpowder, which was developed by the military experts of the West and eventually led to the Chinese civilization itself being destroyed by the high explosives of modern warfare. Similarly, the supreme achievement of the ingenuity of the craftsmen in the mediaeval cities of Europe was the in-
vention of the mechanical clock, which, with its revolu-
tionary alteration of the concept of time, materially assisted
the growth of exploiting capitalism and the destruction of
the mediaeval culture.

There is a tradition that the clock appeared in the ele-
venth century, as a device for ringing bells at regular in-
tervals in the monasteries which, with the regimented life
they imposed on their inmates, were the closest social ap-
proximation in the middle ages to the factory of today.
The first authenticated clock, however, appeared in the
thirteenth century, and it was not until the fourteenth cen-
tury that clocks became common as ornaments of the public
buildings in the German cities.

These early clocks, operated by weights, were not par-
ticularly accurate, and it was not until the sixteenth century
that any great reliability was attained. In England, for
instance, the clock at Hampton Court, made in 1540, is
said to have been the first accurate clock in the country.
And even the accuracy of the sixteenth century clocks are
relative, for they were equipped only with hour hands.
The idea of measuring time in minutes and seconds had been
thought out by the early mathematicians as far back as
the fourteenth century, but it was not until the invention
of the pendulum in 1657 that sufficient accuracy was at-
tained to permit the addition of a minute hand, and the
second hand did not appear until the eighteenth century.
These two centuries, it should be observed, were those in
which capitalism grew to such an extent that it was able
to take advantage of the industrial revolution in technique
in order to establish its domination over society.

The clock, as Lewis Mumford has pointed out, represents
the key machine of the machine age, both for its influence
on techincs and for its influence on the habits of men.
Technically, the clock was the first really automatic ma-
chine that attained any importance in the life of men. Pre-
vious to its invention, the common machines were of such
a nature that their operation depended on some external
and unreliable force, such as human or animal muscles,
water or wind. It is true that the Greeks had invented
a number of primitive automatic machines, but these were
used, like Hero's steam engine, either for obtaining 'super-
natural' effects in the temples or for amusing the tyrants
of Levantine cities. But the clock was the first automatic
machine that attained a public importance and a social
function. Clock-making became the industry from which
men learnt the elements of machine making and gained the
technical skill that was to produce the complicated ma-
achinery of the industrial revolution.

Socially the clock had a more radical influence than any
other machine, in that it was the means by which the regu-
larization and regimentation of life necessary for an ex-
ploting system of industry could best be attained. The
clock provided a means by which time—a category so
elusive that no philosophy has yet determined its nature—
could be measured concretely in the more tangible terms
of space provided by the circumference of a clock dial.
Time as duration became disregarded, and men began to
talk and think always of 'lengths' of time, just as if they
were talking of lengths of calico. And time, being now
measurable in mathematical symbols, became regarded as
a commodity that could be bought and sold in the same
way as any other commodity.

The new capitalists, in particular, became rabidly time-
conscious. Time, here symbolizing the labor of the work-
ers, was regarded by them almost as if it were the chief
raw material of industry. 'Time is money' became one of
the key slogans of capitalist ideology, and the timekeeper
was the most significant of the new types of official in-
trduced by the capitalist dispensation.

In the early factories the employers went so far as to
manipulate their clocks or sound their factory whistles at
the wrong times in order to defraud the workers of a little
of this valuable new commodity. Later such practices be-
came less frequent, but the influence of the clock imposed
a regularity on the lives of the majority of men which had
previously been known only in the monastery. Men actu-
ally became like clocks, acting with a repetitive regular-
ity which had no resemblance to the rhythmic life of a
natural being. They became, as the Victorian phrase put
it, 'as regular as clockwork'. Only in the country districts
where the natural lives of animals and plants and the
elements still dominated life, did any large proportion of
the population fail to succumb to the deadly tick of
monotony.

At first this new attitude to time, this new regularity of
life, was imposed by the clock-owning masters on the un-
willing poor. The factory slave reacted in his spare time
by living with a chaotic irregularity which characterized
the gin-sodden slums of early nineteenth century indus-
trialism. Men fled to the timeless worlds of drink or
Methodist inspiration. But gradually the idea of regu-
larility spread downward among the workers. Nineteenth
century religion and morality played their part by pro-
claiming the sin of 'wasting time'. The introduction of
mass-produced watches and clocks in the 1850's spread
time consciousness among those who had previously merely
reacted to the stimulus of the knock-up or the factory
whistle. In the church and the school, in the office and
the workshop, punctuality was held up as the greatest of
the virtues.

Out of this slavish dependence on mechanical time which
spread insidiously into every class in the nineteenth cen-
tury there grew up the demoralizing regimentation of life
which characterizes factory work today. The man who fails
to conform faces social disapproval and economic ruin.
If he is late at the factory the worker will lose his job or
even, at the present day, find himself in prison. Hurried
meals, the regular morning and evening scramble for trains
or buses, the strain of having to work to time schedules,
all contribute, by digestive and nervous disturbance, to
ruin health and shorten life.

Nor does the financial imposition of regularity tend, in
the long run, to greater efficiency. Indeed, the quality
of the product is usually much poorer, because the em-
ployer, regarding time as a commodity which he has to
pay for, forces the operative to maintain such a speed that
his work must necessarily be skimped. Quantity rather
than quality becoming the criterion, the enjoyment is taken
out of the work itself, and the worker in his turn becomes
a 'clock-watcher' concerned only with when he will be
able to escape to the scanty and monotonous leisure of
industrial society, in which he 'kills time' by cramming
in as much time-scheduled and mechanized enjoyment of cinema, radio and newspaper as his wage packet and his tiredness will allow. Only if he is willing to accept the hazards of living by his faith or his wits can the man without money avoid living as a slave to the clock.

The problem of the clock is, in general, similar to that of the machine. Mechanical time is valuable as a means of co-ordination of activities in a highly developed society, just as the machine is valuable as a means of reducing unnecessary labor to a minimum. Both are valuable for the contribution they make to the smooth running of society, and should be used insofar as they assist men to co-operate efficiently and to eliminate monotonous toil and social confusion. But neither should he allowed to dominate men's lives as they do today.

The U. S. is actually backward in invention in comparison to skillful propaganda of this sort, the average citizen comes to feel that Americans are the most inventive people on earth. This is a dangerous belief to hold, not only because it is false, but because it leads to a complacency in our dealings with other nations that will do us harm.*

Now the movement of the clock sets the tempo of men's lives—they become the servant of the concept of time which they themselves have made, and are held in fear, like Frankenstein by his own monster. In a sane and free society such an arbitrary domination of man's functions by either clock or machine would obviously be out of the question. The domination of man by the creation of man is even more ridiculous than the domination of man by man. Mechanical time would be relegated to its true function of a means of reference and co-ordination, and men would return again to a balanced view of life no longer dominated by time-regulation and the worship of the clock. Complete liberty implies freedom from the tyranny of abstractions as well as from the rule of men.

George Woodcock

American Technology: Myth vs. Reality

John J. Brown

With little or nothing in the way of consumer goods to sell, many manufacturers have ceased lying about their products, and have taken to lying about how their war weapons were developed. After being subjected to skillful propaganda of this sort, the average citizen comes to feel that Americans are the most inventive people on earth. This is a dangerous belief to hold, not only because it is false, but because it leads to a complacency in our dealings with other nations that will do us harm.*

The U. S. is actually backward in invention in comparison with other Western nations.

The history of American science and technology has never been adequately treated, because our culture has developed scientists rather than historians of ideas. The pace of science has been too fast in recent years for even the most nimble of historians to follow; and moreover, it is impossible to obtain unbiased information about modern industry, even in the large libraries. For these reasons, an imaginative advertising man can say just about what he likes about the history of invention, secure in the knowledge that he will not soon be disproved.

Some months ago General Electric took over an evening news broadcast which had previously been a competently run and satisfying affair. In a very short time they succeeded in ruining it by too liberal doses of mouthy and blatant advertising. They began by calling General Electric "world leaders in electronic research". Now this is a childish sort of lie, one which can be exposed by anyone with even an elementary knowledge of the science. Anyone who could say this with a straight face must have never heard of A.T. and T. or R.C.A. in America, of the Telefunken industries in Berlin, or of the many excellent English manufacturers of electronic devices. If General Electric is really a world leader in electronic research it is strange that the Signal Corps of the U. S. Army has to import most of its radar equipment from Canada and England.

Goodrich, following the same line, tells the world repeatedly that it is "first in rubber". Now the manufacture of rubber, especially the synthetic rubbers, is a branch of industrial chemistry in which the Germans are still admittedly superior. They began the study because they had to, and carried their research to a high state of development long before our natural rubber supply was cut off. Had Goodrich really been "first in rubber", one would think that Standard Oil would have bought basic patents from the American company, instead of getting its fingers burned trying to obtain second-rate processes from I. G. Farbenindustrie.

Men who write radio advertising for General Electric should know something about the history of electronic discoveries, and those who write for Goodrich should know something of the history of synthetics. Every scholar knows that error is like the plague. Once it slips into circulation there is no telling how far it will spread. This loose talk about American invention is now appearing on all sorts of broadcasts. On the Chesterfield program, which advertises cigarettes, and which therefore should be immune from talk of American inventiveness, we hear the same pitiful sort of lie. In a recent broadcast the Chesterfield booster told us that we ingenious Americans had good reason for pride, because the five greatest inventions of modern times, the telephone, submarine, automobile, telegraph, and airplane, were all invented by Americans. Even
if these really were the five greatest inventions of modern times (which is highly doubtful), to say that they are American inventions is sheer nonsense. Although it is difficult to say with certainty just when an invention was conceived, scholars are now fairly well agreed that not one of the devices mentioned was invented by an American. Bell, who may have been chiefly responsible for the telephone, was a Scot who happened to be living in Canada when the idea for the invention came to him in 1871. Ten years before, one Phillip Reis, a German, had built an instrument which, operating on the same principle, would transmit sounds over a wire. The submarine seems to have been invented in England in the seventeenth century, and the first naval submarine was built in France for the French government.

There is a controversy among historians of science as to whether the automobile was invented by an Austrian or a German, but there is no question of any American having had anything to do with it. An electric telegraph was in use in Switzerland before the American Revolution. Morse, an American, was merely the first to apply some of Faraday's discoveries to make the first practical recording telegraph. This is an accomplishment, but it is not to be confused with inventing the telegraph. The invention of the airplane is an immensely complicated question, and there is no doubt that the Wright brothers made some of the most important discoveries in aviation history. But many men were working on these problems at different places at about the same time, and it is almost impossible to say who was the first to apply a given principle. It is certain, however, the school text-books notwithstanding, that the Wrights were not the first to fly a successful model; that they were not the first to fly by mechanical means; and that they were not the first to get off the ground in a self-powered, heavier-than-air machine. Ability to invent is a rare gift—one which no reasonable nation would think of arrogating to itself. It is a gift that is held by a small minority in all civilized nations.

Advertisers in the magazines, although more guarded in their statements, have the same blithe disregard for truth. Some months ago we were told of a great new American invention, the deep drawing of steel to make cartridge cases. It seems that when the war broke out we were caught without enough brass for shell cases, so, with typical American ingenuity, we figured out a way to make them of something else. The true story of the making of steel cartridge cases, as told in Fortune, is something less heroic.

In 1941, the leading steel fabricators were invited, one by one, to try to make the cases of steel. For nearly a year they passed through Frankford Arsenal in melancholy procession, until one of the last men called finally had to admit that steel just was not suited to shell cases. As Fortune tells it:

"That's too bad", said Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Fletcher. "The Germans are making cartridge cases out of steel."

"The hell you say", said Mr. Patterson, (the steel man). "Give me a month." Once fighting spirit was aroused, it was not long before a practical method of deep drawing the cases had been developed, and soon dozens of companies were in produc-
inventive nations of the world. Men who are blessed with 
an abundance of natural products do not strain their wits 
learning how to make synthetics. Necessity, truly, is the 
mother of invention, and for twenty years Germany, and 
to a lesser extent all European countries, have had the 
necessity. Perhaps a typical example of how the incentive 
invent is lacking in America is found in the story of 
making steel suitable for ball bearings. For years Dr. 
Haakon Styri, the Norwegian metallurgist, fought to get 
U. S. steel mills to make a product good enough for his 
ball bearings, and for years he found it necessary to keep 
going back to Sweden for his steel. Only when the war 
cut off the Swedish supply entirely did our metallurgists 
get together and produce ingots of the required quality.12 

Not only has the volume of invention in America fallen 
far short of what might be expected, but we have failed 
to make quick and effective use of the inventions at hand. 
The reasons for this are many and various, and some of 
them are ticklish to discuss in war time, because they point 
up basic deficiencies in our economic system. Military 
conservatism is one important reason why we do not make better 
use of our inventions. F. M. radio, now in use on all 
fronts, was rejected by the navy as late as 1939! In 1941 
Armstrong was still publicly offering the use of it free to 
the army.16 Even the tank, which most of us consider to 
be a basic weapon of modern warfare, has not yet been 
adopted as standard by the War Department. At least, 
this is the excuse given for withholding $40,000.00 in 
royalties owed to J. S. Christie, said to be the inventor of the 
tank.

The state of the U. S. patent laws is another reason for 
our inability to make full use of our inventions.17 In 
England and Germany, the government, when it agrees that 
a device merits a patent, also agrees to defend that patent 
at its expense. In other words, these governments take 
full responsibility for the patents they issue. Under the 
U. S. law, it is left to the federal courts to decide whether 
or not a patent has been infringed, and as a result the 
benefits from an invention too often go to the corporation 
that can hire the best lawyer. Since his property is not 
adequately protected by the law, the inventor cannot be 
blamed either for suppressing his discovery, or for giving 
up invention altogether, and taking his talents to other 
fields.

But the main reason why we fail to make full use of 
our inventors is undoubtedly the breakdown of the "free 
enterprise" system.18 The large corporations, who do most 
of the talking about freedom of enterprise, are the ones 
who want it least. In the radio industry, up and coming 
young plants like DuMont, Sylvania, and Tobe Deutsch- 
mann are looked upon with distrust by the big three. 
Engineers who can think without their slide rules agree 
that one important reason for the slow development of elec- 
tronics in this country before the war was the fact that it 
was a monopoly of the large corporations.19 Major Arm-
strong who bated his brains out against a stubborn Con-
gress from 1936 on, trying to get them to allot space in 
the air for his F. M. radio, would agree to this.20 R.C.A. 
was chiefly responsible for the shelving of Armstrong's 
invention,21 which resulted in our being caught without a 

not prevent R.C.A. from advertising in glowing terms about 
its war effort. Fluorescent lighting is another example of 
an invention squelched by vested interests in the electronics 
industry.22 In spite of its "better light means better sight" 
advertising, and in spite of the fact that fluorescent bulbs 
give better light, General Electric has tried for years to 
discourage the use of this valuable invention. The trouble 
that is that fluorescent bulbs give twice as much light on a 
given amount of electricity, thus cutting into the sales of 
both the electric companies and the manufacturers of Mazda 
bulbs. The Department of Justice has recently filed indi-
ictions against General Electric, Westinghouse, and sev-
eral utilities companies for their part in this particular 
job. But this suit shares the weakness of all our anti-trust 
legislation in that it works only on the post-mortem level, 
trying to allocate blame after the damage has been done.

Most of the great corporations, in spite of their magni-
cent research laboratories, are highly inhibited when it 
comes to developing radical inventions.23 They must think 
in terms of stockholders and dividends, and basic changes 
caused by inventions often involve a loss. It will come as 
a surprise to most magazine readers to learn that just about 
all of the important inventions in this war came from civil-
ians and amateurs outside the large corporations. Moss 
practically peddled his turbosupercharger from door to 
door; Nieuwland of Notre Dame was chiefly responsible 
for our first synthetic rubber; none of the great radio com-
panies had anything to do with the invention of F. M. Here 
again, the list could be greatly extended. The plain fact 
seems to be that while the big industrial laboratories do 
excellent work in developing and perfecting other men's 
ideas, they very seldom come out with anything radically 
new.

Although this is the fact, the wartime advertising of most 
of the large corporations is dedicated to proving just the 
opposite. General Electric speaks of F. M. radio as if it 
had invented it; R.C.A. speaks paternally about its radar 
equipment; and the tire manufacturers to a man talk of 
synthetic rubber as if it were their own idea. Sometimes 
this advertising oversteps itself, as in this gem from Corn-
ing Glass:

"Right now, Corning and the rest of the American 
glass industry is engaged in showing Hitler what 
free enterprise can do."

To those who know how deeply Corning Glass is involved 
in the big anti-trust glass suit, this sentence has a double 
meaning that is highly ludicrous.

3

One reason for the fall of France was that she let the 
volume of her research work in the sciences fall off. From 
 motives of economy, she took to buying manufacturing 
rights to German patents, rather than to continuing to de-
velop her own. This was a risky business, even in peac-
time, because the Germans tended to sell only their second 
best, but when war came the supply was entirely cut off, 
with fatal results. We must encourage our inventors by 
changing the patent laws so that property is really pro-
tected by the government. But this alone is not enough. 
Some system of free trade in invention, or at least free 
access on the part of the government to the books of re-
search laboratories, is necessary to keep important dis-
Couriers from being suppressed. A radically new idea nearly always involves an immediate loss to the manufacturer; since new dies must be made, and new manufacturing techniques arranged. Suppression of new ideas has become such an accepted practice in industry that it now hardly arouses comment. In peacetime only the consumer loses, and the results of the practice are perhaps not very serious, but in time of war it costs us money, suffering and lives. The magnetic tape recorder, announced with so much fanfare in the U. S. press only a few weeks ago, was used by the Germans in the campaign in Poland. They had been made experimentally here for several years, and pictures had appeared in the technical magazines, but they could not buck the 40 million dollar record industry, and the idea was put aside. It is the same story with Major Armstrong’s F.M. radio, McMillen’s method of aerial navigation, fluorescent lighting, Sheridan’s intake ice Preventer, economical gasoline engines, and so on down the long and melancholy list.

As I see it, one of our greatest handicaps as a nation is our adolescent belief that we are the greatest, largest, best, most inventive, most important nation on earth, and nothing can change this divine plan. Someday we shall have to take a more enlightened and adult view of the world, and the sooner we arrive at this state of maturity, the better it will be for everyone. Since this war is a struggle of competing technologies, the nation with the most advanced technology at the end of the war (not now) will be declared the winner. Judging from the information available to civilians, it seems that our technology is now at least equal to the German, but at the present state of scientific progress it would take very little to turn the scale.

Just one invention stands between the Germans and total victory. The nation which discovers the secret of transmitting powerful electric charges through the ether will win the war hands down. This discovery is probably only a matter of time, because it is possible right now to light an electric bulb which has no connection with any source of electricity. A more powerful transmitter of this kind would interfere with the ignition system of all engines, and would automatically immobilize all enemy tanks, planes, and trucks. This would be the definite answer to bombing, and with this invention, Hitler’s roofless fortress would be roofed with steel. Technology is no less active in the development of offensive weapons. The search for new and more powerful explosives is now being carried on feverishly in Germany, and it should be carried on with equal fever here. Some chemists believe that a new super explosive was actually discovered at Oppau, Germany, in 1921. We shall never know for certain, because the inventor of the explosive died in the accidental blast. This explosion dug a hole fifty feet deep and 250 feet in diameter, and its concussion caused damage at a distance of 53 miles. What this explosive would do to a city like London is not pleasant to contemplate. There is no reason why German chemists should find this explosive before we do, except that German science and technology is fully mobilized for war, while ours is not.

Editor’s Postscript: Just as this issue goes to press, “Perinax,” writing in the N. Y. Times for Sept. 27, confirms in a striking way Mr. Brown’s last point. “Some experts,” he writes, “are inclined to believe that the ‘myth of the secret weapon’ so tirelessly spread by Dr. Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda perhaps reflects inordinate expectations fostered by German scientists at work in their laboratories, but expectations that may not be deprived of all factual basis. Those scientists would appear to have been engaged for months in a fantastic race against time. Hence the importance of bringing Germany to surrender at the earliest date.”

REFERENCES
2. In 1923 (an average year) Germany, with a population of 60 million, produced 27% of the total number of chemical abstracts published. United States (population 138 million), produced 32%. Crane and Patterson, The Literature of Chemistry, (New York, 1927) p. 6.
3. See Wm. F. Ogburn, Social Change, pt. 2, Chap. 5, on the normal probability curve which governs the distribution of brains and everything else.
4. Fortune, June, 1943, p. 76.
6. Outdoor Life, Oct. 1943, p. 50. See also Time, Nov. 15, 1943, p. 55, showing that U. S. Navy guns are chiefly of European design.
8. See the Engineering Index, 1940-43, art. “recording” passim.
10. Ibid., Oct., 1943, p. 139.
12. Holzwarth. It has been chiefly developed, however, by the Swiss firm of Brown-Boveri. Stodola and Loeweinstein, Steam and Gas Turbines, 2v. (New York, 1927), p. 1237.
15. Ibid., Oct., 1943, p. 129.
19. New York Times, 1938, Mar. 17, 11:2; Mar. 19, 7:3; April 7, 21:8, etc., etc.
20. Ibid.: April 1940, Mar. 17, X 12:1; April 7, IX, 12:8; etc.
22. Fortune, June, 1943, p. 76.
25. This is a hackneyed theme which has been definitely covered in Shaw’s The Apple Cart.

VAST U.S. SCHEME WILL HELP FRANCE

One Plan Will Give Immediate Aid to People Second to Reconstruct Economy

FRENCH WILL PAY FOR ALL

—Headlines in N. Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1944.
Class, Status, Party*

Max Weber

Translated and Edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills

A NOTE ON MAX WEBER—

Max Weber, a contemporary of Lenin and Richard Strauss, has been called the "Marx of the bourgeoisie." He inherited his central questions from Marx: How did Occidental capitalism come about? What is its character? Where is it going? With Marx he shared the perspective of world history and the interest in economics and society. Yet the role of ideas and of interests in history is the major theme of Weber's studies. He continually puzzled over the wide differences between the outcome of man's action and what the actor intended. The logic of history, he thought, does not coincide with the calculation of history makers—least of all with those of event-making men. Is man, then, doomed forever to fool himself? Why is it that modern industrial capitalism, one type among others, required a vanguard of middle-class Puritans, of saintly men who meant to serve God but who unwittingly promoted capitalism, which, once in the saddle, could dispense with religion? And why did modern capitalism arise only in the Occident? Why not in antiquity or in China, or India? In searching for answers, Weber went to the Prussian Junker's estate, to the latifundia of ancient Rome and the plantation of the old South, from the textile mills of Westfalia to the wool merchants of the city of London. Modern munition makers and Parsee traders, Roman bankers and the modern stock exchange, Indian castes and the Chinese mandarin bureaucracy, the salvation prophecies of world religions and the world's legal systems came under his sociological scrutiny.

Like Marx's, the work of Weber remained a torso; most of it was published posthumously. Even twenty years after Weber's death most of his work still waits to be assimilated. So far, Weber's methodological self-clarification and the justification of what he was doing in the face of Heidelberg philosophers has mainly concerned academic sociology. His substantive work is a challenging bequest and his influence is spreading.

Weber, again like Marx, was deeply concerned with man's freedom. That is why he focused upon the compulsive character of institutions and the weight of political and military power. Personally, he was powerless, a solitary figure: the Jeremiah of German imperialism. In vain he scanned the German horizon in search of a stratum fit to lead Germany successfully through an age of imperialist rivalry, war, and revolution. The Bonapartist bombast of the Kaiser was debunked by Weber as the pose of a vain dilettante. The Prussian Junkers were seen as provincial agrarian capitalists masquerading as an "aristocracy" and putting the imprint of the parvenu upon German "society." He saw bourgeois liberalism, as emasculated by Bismarck, stuck in the local quagmires of petty interest and guild spirit. He condescendingly respected the Social Democrats as hard-working, well-meaning Philistines who disbelieved their own radical phrases and repeated for the left the phrase mongering of pan-Germanic literati of the right. Thus Weber felt "as if seated in an express train and in doubt as to whether the next switch will be set right."

He pitted those who needed illusions and "spiritual comfort"; he despised those who deceived others. Disillusioned in a disenchanted world, he was ready to face the "icy darkness" that he saw settling over Europe after the first world war. In the eighteen-nineties, Weber had set out as a monarchist; he ended as a sceptical liberal for whom democracy was a mere technique for selecting efficient political leaders.

He was, however, quick to criticise dreams of the "corporate state." The propagandists of such notions, he wrote, "fancy that 'the state' would then be the wise agent controlling business. The reverse holds! The bankers and capitalist entrepreneurs, so much hated by them, would become the unrestrained and uncontrolled masters of the state. Who in the world is the state besides this cartel machinery of large and small capitalists of all sorts, organizing the economy when the state's policy-making function is delegated to these organizations? . . . The profit-interest of capitalist producers, represented by the cartels, would then exclusively dominate the state." The competition between the rational bureaucratic state and the corporation bureaucracies of modern capitalism seemed to Weber a necessary condition for the survival of vestiges of personal freedom.

Weber addressed a similar argument to socialism. In 1906 he predicted bureaucratic socialism for Russia in a brilliant essay on the first phase of the Russian revolution. Socialism and the class struggle of the proletariat appeared to him as only a vehicle fostering the bureaucratization of modern civilization. The army of self-equipped knights had been superseded by armies of soldiers—separated from the means of destruction; socialism would merely complete this process of bureaucratic collectivization in the sphere of production. Socialism appeared to Weber as the very embodiment of rationalization, one more step in the "disenchantment of the world." Bureaucracies appeared to Weber as indestructible, the vital necessity of metropolitan masses. It is here that Marx becomes Weber's challenge.

*From Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, (Tübingen, 1922), pp. 631-40. The definitions of the following terms do not occur in the original German passage; we have taken them from other contexts of W. and G. and inserted them as parts of this text: "law," "societal action," "communal action." We have also inserted definitions of "class situations" and "class." One cross-reference, to a passage in W. and G., p. 277, has been omitted and one footnote has been placed in the text. Otherwise, the translation is as literal as grammar and clarity seemed to permit. G. & M.
For Marx, capitalism was an “anarchy of production.” Rationalism was not given; it was a task. Therefore, the pursuit of a rational society was identical with man’s liberation from “blind social fate.”

For Weber, capitalism was rationalized, and he thought of this rationalism with melancholia. The pursuit of personal freedom become private: a tarrying for loving companionship and for the cathartic experience of art as a this-worldly escape from institutional routines. For the rest, a fearless account of the impact of institutions upon man informed Weber’s work. He had no prophecy to offer, but he felt strong enough to face up to unvarnished reality without the intellectual sacrifice which he felt all credos demand.

The brutal punch and the delicate insight of Marx are quite fully retained by Weber. He was, of course, aware that his conception of the state was similar to that advanced by Trotsky. The excerpt which follows may be understood as a completion, from Weber’s own standpoint, of the unfinished chapter on class in Marx’s Capital.

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LAW exists when there is a probability that an order will be upheld by a specific staff of men who will use physical or psychical compulsion with the intention of obtaining conformity with the order, or of inflicting sanctions for infringement of it. The structure of every legal order directly influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise, within its respective community. This is true of all legal orders and not only that of the state. In general, we understand by “power” the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.

“Economically conditioned” power is not, of course, identical with “power” as such. On the contrary, the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only in order to enrich himself economically. Power, including economic power, may be valued “for its own sake.” Very frequently the striving for power is also conditioned by the social “honor” which it entails. Not all power, however, entails social honor: The typical American Boss, as well as the typical big speculator, deliberately relinquishes social honor. Quite generally, “mere economic” power, and especially “naked” money power, is by no means a recognized basis of social “honor.” Nor is power the only basis of social “honor.” Indeed, social honor, or prestige, may even be the basis of political or economic power, and very frequently has been. Power, as well as honor, may be guaranteed by the legal order, but, at least normally, it is not their primary source. The legal order is rather an additional factor which enhances the chance to hold power or honor; but it cannot always secure them.

The way in which social “honor” is distributed in a community between typical groups participating in this distribution, we may call the “social order.” The social order and the economic order are, of course, similarly related to the “legal order.” However, the social and the economic order are not identical. The economic order is for us merely the way in which economic goods and services are distributed and used. But, of course, the social order is conditioned by the economic order to a high degree, and in its turn reacts upon it.

Now: “classes,” “status groups,” and “parties” are phenomena of the distribution of power within a community.

**Determination of Class-Situation**

**By Market-Situation**

In our terminology, “classes” are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action. We may speak of a “class” when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. These points refer to “class situation,” which we may express more briefly as the typical chance for a supply of goods, an “external” life fate, and an internal life fate, so far as this chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or services in a market situation. The term “class” refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation.

It is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which disposition over material property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific life chances. According to the law of marginal utility this mode of distribution excludes the non-owners from competing for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to acquire such goods. Other things being equal, this mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals for all those who, provided with goods, do not necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in price wars with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer but their services in native form or goods in a form constituted through their own labor and who above all are compelled to get rid of these products in order barely to subsist. This mode of distribution gives to the propertied a monopoly on the possibility of transferring property from the sphere of use as a “fortune,” to the sphere of “capital goods”; that is, it gives to them the entrepreneurial function and all chances to share directly or indirectly in returns on capital. All this holds true within that sphere in which pure market conditions prevail. “Property” and “lack of property” are, therefore, the basic categories of all class situations. It does not matter whether these two categories become effective in price wars or in competitive struggles.

However, within these categories, class situations are further differentiated, on the one hand, according to the kind of property that is usable for returns; and, on the other hand, according to the kind of services that can be offered in the market. Ownership of domestic buildings; productive establishments; warehouses; stores; agricul-
According to whether he is constitutionally qualified for the task at hand to a high, to an average, or to a low degree. In the same way, the direction of interests may vary according to whether or not a communal action of a larger or smaller portion of those commonly affected by the "class situation," or even an association among them, e.g., a "trade union," has grown out of the class situation from which the individual may or may not expect promising results. Communal action refers to that action which is oriented to the feeling of the actors that they belong together. Societal action, on the other hand, is oriented to a rationally motivated adjustment of interests. The rise of societal or even of communal action from a common class situation is by no means a universal phenomenon.

The class situation may be restricted in its effects to the generation of essentially similar reactions, that is to say, within our terminology, of "mass actions." However, it may not even have this result. Furthermore, often merely an amorphous communal action emerges. For example, the "murmuring" of the workers known in ancient oriental ethics: the moral disapproval of the work-master's conduct which in its practical significance, probably was equivalent to an increasingly typical phenomenon of precisely the latest industrial development, namely, the "slow down" (the deliberate limiting of work effort) of laborers by virtue of tacit agreement. The degree in which "communal action," and possibly "societal action," emerges from the "mass actions" of the members of a class is linked to general cultural conditions, especially to those of an intellectual sort, and to the extent of the already evolved contrasts; it is especially linked to the transparency of the connections between the causes and the consequences of the "class situation." However strongly life chances may be differentiated, this fact in itself, according to all experience, by no means gives birth to "class action" (communal action of the members of a class). The fact of being conditioned and the results of the class situation must be distinctly recognizable. For only then the contrast of life chances cannot be felt to be an absolutely given fact to be accepted, but can be felt to be a resultant from either (1) the given distribution of property, or (2) the structure of the concrete economic order. It is only then that people may react against the class structure, not only through acts of an intermittent and irrational protest but in the form of rational associations. There have been "class situations" of the first category (1) of such a specifically naked and transparent sort in the urban centers of antiquity and during the Middle Ages; especially then, when great fortunes were accumulated by factually monopolized trading in industrial products of these localities or in foodstuffs. Furthermore, under certain circumstances, in the rural economy of the most diverse periods when agriculture was increasingly exploited in a profit-making manner. The most important historical example of the second category (2) is the class situation of the modern "proletariat."

**Communal Action Flowing from Class Interest**

According to our terminology, the factor which creates the "class" is unambiguously economic interests, and indeed, only those interests involved in the existence of the "market." Nevertheless, the concept of "class-interest" is an ambiguous one: even as an empirical concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability from the class situation for a certain "average" of those people subjected to the class situation. The class situation and other circumstances remaining the same, the direction in which the individual worker, for instance, is likely to pursue his interests may vary widely according to whether he is constitutionally qualified for the market, e.g., slaves, are not, however, a "class" in the technical sense of the term. They are, rather, a "status group."

**Types of "Class Struggle"**

Thus every class may be the carrier of any one of the possibly innumerable forms of "class action," but this is not necessarily so. In any case, a class does not in itself constitute a community. To treat "class" conceptually...
as having the same value as "community" leads to distortion. That men in the same class situation regularly react in mass actions to such palpable situations as economic ones in the direction of those interests which are most adequate to their average number is an important and after all simple fact for the understanding of historical events. Above all, this fact must not lead to that kind of pseudo-scientific operation with the concepts of "class" and "class interests," so frequently found these days, and which has found its most classic expression in the statement of a talented author,\(^1\) that the individual may be in error concerning his interests but that the "class" is "infallible" about its interests. But if classes as such are not communities, nevertheless class situations emerge only on the basis of communalization. But the communal action which brings forth class situations is not basically action between members of the identical class; it is an action between members of different classes. Communal actions which directly determine the class situation of the worker and the entrepreneur are: the labor market, the commodities market, and the capitalistic enterprise. But, in its turn, the existence of a capitalistic enterprise presupposes a very specific communal action to exist which is specifically structured so as to protect the possession of goods per se, and especially the power of individuals to dispose, in principle freely, over means of production. The existence of a capitalistic enterprise is preconditioned by a specific kind of "legal order." Each kind of class situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per se, will come to efficacy in the clearest way when all other determinants of reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their significance. It is in this way that the utilization of the power of property in the market obtains its most sovereign importance.

Now "status groups" hinder the strict carrying through of the sheer market principle. In the present context they are of interest to us only from this one point of view. Before we briefly consider them, note that not much of a general nature can be said about the more specific kinds of antagonism between "classes" (in our meaning of the term). The great shift, which has been going on continuously in the past, and up to our times, may be summarized, although at the cost of some precision: the struggle in which class situations are effective has progressively shifted from consumption credit toward, first, competitive struggles in the commodity market and, then, toward price wars on the labor market. The "class struggles" of antiquity—to the extent that they were genuine class struggles and not struggles between status groups—were initially carried on by indebted peasants and perhaps also by artisans threatened by debt bondage struggling against urban creditors. For debt bondage is the normal result of the differentiation of wealth in commercial cities, especially in seaport cities. The situation has been similar among cattle breeders. Debt relationships as such produced class action up to the time of Cataline. Along with this, and with an increase in provision of grain for the city by transporting it from the outside, the struggle over the means of sustenance emerged. It centered in the first place around the provision of bread and the determination of the price of bread. It lasted throughout antiquity and the entire Middle Ages. The propertyless as such flocked together against those who actually and supposedly were interested in the dearth of bread. This fight spread to involve all commodities essential to the way of life and to handicraft production. There were only incipient discussions of wage disputes in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. And slowly they have been increasing up into modern times. In the earlier periods they were completely secondary to slave rebellions as well as to fights in the commodity market.

The propertyless of antiquity and of the Middle Ages protested against monopolies, preemption, forestalling, and the withholding of goods from the market for the purpose of raising prices. Today the central issue is the determination of the price of labor.

The transition is represented by the fight for access to the market and for the determination of the price of products. These fights went on between merchants and workers in the putting-out system of domestic handicraft during the transition to modern times. Since it is quite a general phenomenon we must mention here that the class antagonisms which are conditioned through the market situation are usually most bitter between those who actually and directly participate as opponents in price wars. It is not the rentier, the share-holder, and the banker who suffer the ill will of the worker, but almost exclusively the manufacturer and business executive who are direct opponents of workers in price wars. This is so in spite of the fact that it is precisely the cash boxes of the rentier, the share-holder, and the banker into which the more or less "unearned" gains flow, rather than into the pockets of the manufacturers or of the business executives. This simple state of affairs has very frequently been decisive for the role which the class situation has played in the formation of political parties. For example it has made possible the varieties of patriarchal socialism and the frequent attempts—formerly, at least—of threatened status groups to form alliances with the proletariat against the "bourgeoisie."

### Status Honor

In contrast to classes, status groups are normally communities. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation" we wish to designate as "status situation" every typical component of the life fate of men which is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of "honor." This honor may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality. Also this honor can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways with status distinctions. Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity. In the subsistence economy of the organized neighborhood, very often the richest man is simply chieftain. However, this often means only honorific preference. For example, in the so called pure modern "democracy," i.e., one devoid of any expressly ordered status privileges for individuals, it happens that only the families coming under approxi-
Guarantees of Status Stratification

In content, status honor is normally expressed in that above all else a specific style of life can be firmly expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on “social” intercourse (i.e., intercourse which is not subservient to economic or any other of business’s “functional” purpose.) These restrictions may confine normal intermarriages to the status circle and may lead to complete endogamous closure. As soon as there is, not a mere individual and socially irrelevant imitation of another style of life but, an agreed-upon communal action of this closing character, the “status” development is under way.

In its characteristic way stratification by “status groups” on the basis of conventional styles of life evolves at the present time in the United States out of the traditional democracy. For example, only the resident of a certain street (“the street”) is considered as belonging to “society,” is qualified for social intercourse, and is visited and invited. Above all, this differentiation evolves in such a way as to make for strict submission to the fashion that is dominant at a given time in society. This submission to fashion also exists among men in America to a degree unknown in Germany. Such submission is considered to be an indication of the fact that a given man pretends to qualify as a gentleman. This submission decides, at least prima facie, that he will be treated as such. And this recognition becomes just as important for his employment chances in “swank” establishments, and above all, for social intercourse and marriage with “esteemed” families, as the “qualification for “duelling” among Germans in the Kaiser’s day. As for the rest: certain families resident for a long time (and, of course, correspondingly wealthy), families (e.g.: “F. F. V., i.e., First Families of Virginia”) or the actual or alleged descendants of the “Indian Princess” Pocahontas, of the Pilgrim fathers, or of the Knickerbockers, the members of almost inaccessible sects and all sorts of circles setting themselves apart by means of any other characteristics and badges ... all these elements usurp “status” honor. The development of status is essentially a question of stratification resting upon usurpation. Such usurpation is the normal origin of almost all status “honor.” But the road from this purely conventional situation to legal privilege, positive or negative, is everywhere easily travelled as soon as a certain stratification of the social order has in fact been “lived in” and has achieved a stability by virtue of the stabilization in the distribution of economic power.

“Ethnic” Segregation and “Caste”

Where the consequences have been realized to their full extent the status group evolves into the closed “caste.” This means that the status distinctions are guaranteed not merely by conventions and laws, but also by rituals. This occurs in such a way that every physical contact with a member of any caste which is considered to be “lower” by the members of a “higher” caste is evaluated as making for a ritualistic impurity and to be a stigma which must be expiated by a religious act. Individual castes develop in part quite disparate cults and gods.

In general, however, the status structure reaches such extreme consequences only where differences which are defined as “ethnic” lie at its bottom. The “caste” is, indeed, the normal form in which ethnic communities usually live side by side in a “societализирован” manner. These ethnic communities believe in blood relationship and exclude exogamous marriage and social intercourse. Such a caste situation exists with the phenomenon of “pariah” peoples which is found all over the world. These people form communities which have acquired specific occupational traditions of handicrafts or of other arts and which cultivate the belief in their own community. Such people then live in a “diaspora” strictly segregated from all personal intercourse except that of unavoidable sort; and their situation is legally precarious. But by virtue of their economic indispensability, pariah people are tolerated, indeed, frequently privileged, and they live in interspersed political communities. The Jews are the most impressive example in history.

The “status” segregation grown into the “caste” and the mere “ethnic” segregation differ in their respective structures: the caste structure transforms the horizontal and unconnected coexistences of the ethnically segregated groups into a vertical social system of super- and sub-ordination. Correctly formulated: a comprehensive societализатор integrates the ethnically divided communities into specific political and communal action. In their consequences they differ precisely in this way: whereas the ethnic coexistences condition the reciprocal repulsion and disdain but allow each ethnic community to consider its own honor as the highest one; the caste structure brings about a social subordination and an acknowledgment of “more honor” in favor of the privileged caste and status groups. This is due to the fact that in the caste structure ethnic distinctions
as such have become “functional” distinctions within the political societalization (warriors, priests, artisans that are politically important for war and for buildings, and so on). But even the pariah people who are most despised are usually apt to continue cultivating in some manner that which is equally peculiar to the ethnic and the status communities: the belief in their own specific “honor.” This is the case with the Jews.

Only with the negatively privileged “status groups” does the “sense of dignity” take a specific deviation. The sense of dignity is the precipitation in individuals of social honor and of conventional demands which the positively privileged “status group” raises for the deportment of its members. The sense of dignity which characterizes positively privileged status groups is naturally related to their “being” which does not transcend itself, that is, to their “beauty and excellency” (The Good and The Beautiful). Their kingdom is “of this world.” They live for the present and by exploiting their great past. The sense of dignity of the negatively privileged strata can naturally refer to a future lying beyond the present, be it of this life or of another. In other words, it must be nurtured by the belief in a providential “mission” and by a belief in a specific honor before God as the “chosen people,” that is, by beliefs either that in the beyond “the last will be the first” or that in this life a messiah will appear to bring forth into the light of the world which has cast them out the hidden honor of the pariah people. This simple state of affairs, and not the “resentment” which is so strongly emphasized in Nietzsche’s much admired construction in the Genealogy of Morals, is the source of the religiosity cultivated by pariah status groups. In passing, we note that this trait, resentment, may be accurately applied only to a limited extent: for one of Nietzsche’s main examples, Buddhism, it is not at all applicable.

Incidentally, the development of status groups from ethnic segregations is by no means the normal phenomenon. On the contrary, since objective “racial differences” are in no way basic to every subjective sentiment of “ethnic” community, the ultimately racial foundation of status structure is rightly and absolutely a question of the concrete individual case. Very frequently the “status group” is instrumental in the production of a thoroughbred anthropological type. Certainly the “status group” is to a high degree effective in producing extreme types and consists in a selection of personally qualified individuals (e.g., the Knighthood selects those who are fit for warfare, physically and psychically.) But the selection of persons is far removed from being the only, or the predominant, way in which status groups are formed: Political membership or class situation has at least as frequently, in all times, been decisive. Today the class situation is by far the predominant factor. For the possibility of a style of life expected for members of “status groups,” is, of course, usually conditioned economically.

**Status Privileges**

For all practical purposes, stratification by status everywhere goes hand in hand with a monopolization of ideal and material goods or chances in the manner which we have come to know as typical. Besides the specific status honor, which always rests upon distance and exclusiveness we find all sorts of material monopolies. Such honorific preferences may consist of the privilege to wear special costumes, to eat special dishes denied others by taboo, the privilege to carry arms which is most palpable in its consequences, the right to pursue certain non-professional dilettante artistic practices, e.g., to play certain musical instruments. Of course, material monopolies do provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of the status group, although, in themselves, they are rarely sufficient. But almost always they come into play to some extent. Within a status circle there is the question of intermarriage: the interest of the families in the monopolization of potential bridegrooms is at least of equal importance and is parallel to an interest in the monopolization of daughters. The daughters of the circle must be provided for. With an increased enclosure of the status group, the conventional preferential opportunities for special employment grow into a legal monopoly of special offices for the members of these delimited groups. Certain goods become objects for monopolization by status groups. In typical fashion these everywhere include “entailed estates”; frequently they also include the possessions of serfs or bondsmen and finally special trades. This monopolization occurs positively or negatively:

Positively: when the status group is exclusively entitled to own and to manage them;

Negatively: when, in order to maintain its specific way of life, the status group must not own and manage them. For the decisive role of the “style of life” in status “honor” means that the “status groups” are the specific bearers of all “conventions.” In whatever way it may be manifest, all “stylization” of life either originates in status groups or at least is conserved by them. Even if the principles of status conventions differ greatly, they reveal certain typical traits, especially among those strata which are most privileged. Quite generally, among privileged status groups there is a status disqualification which operates against the performance of common physical labor. This disqualification is now “setting in” in America against the old tradition of esteem for labor. Very frequently every rational economic pursuit, and especially “entrepreneurial activity” is looked upon as a disqualification of status. Artistic and literary activity is also considered to be degrading work as soon as it is exploited for income, or at least when it is connected with hard physical exertion. An example is the sculptor working like a mason in his dusty smock as over against the painter in his salon-like “studio” and those forms of musical practice which are acceptable to the status group.

**Economic Conditions and Effects of Status Stratification**

The frequent disqualification of the gainfully employed as such is a direct result of the principle of status stratification peculiar to the social order, and of course, of this principle’s opposition to a distribution of power which is regulated exclusively through the market. These two factors operate
We have seen above that the market and its processes "knows no personal distinctions": "functional" interests dominate it. It knows nothing of "honor." The status order means precisely the reverse, viz.: stratification in terms of "honor" and of style of life peculiar to status groups as such. If mere economic acquisition and naked economic power still bearing the stigma of its extrastatus origin could bestow upon anyone who has won it the same honor as those who are interested in status by virtue of style of life claim for themselves, the status order would be threatened at its very root. This is the more so as, given equality of status honor, everywhere property per se represents an addition even if it is not overtly acknowledged to be such. But if such economic acquisition and power gave the agent any honor at all, his wealth would result in his attaining more "honor" than those who successfully claim honor by virtue of style of life. Therefore all groups having interests in the status order react with special sharpness precisely against the pretentions of purely economic acquisition. In most cases they react the more vigorously the more they feel themselves threatened. Cal- deron's respectful treatment of the peasant for instance, as opposed to Shakespeare's simultaneous and ostensible disdain of the "canaille" illustrates the different way in which a firmly structured status order reacts as compared with a status order which has become economically precarious. This is an expression of a state of affairs that recurs everywhere. Precisely because of the rigorous reactions against the claims of property per se, the "parvenu" is never personally and without reservation accepted by the privileged status groups, no matter how completely his style of life has been adjusted to theirs. They will only accept his descendants who have been educated in the conventions of their status group and who have never been smirched the honor of the status group by their own economic labor.

Hence, as to the general effect of the status order, only one consequence can be stated, but it is very important. It is that the hindrance of the free development of the market occurred first for those goods which status groups directly withheld from free exchange by monopolization. This monopolization may be effected either legally or conventionally. For example, in many Hellenic cities during the epoch of status groups and also originally in Rome the inherited estate (as is shown by the old formula for induction against spendthrifts), was monopolized just as were the estates of knights, peasants, priests and especially the clientele of the craft and merchant guilds. The market is restricted and the power of naked property per se which give its stamp to "class formation" is pushed into the background. The results of this process can be most diverse. Of course, by no means do they necessarily take the direction of weakening the contrasts in the economic situation. Frequently the reverse holds. In any case, where stratification by status permeates a community as strongly as was the case in all political communities of antiquity and of the Middle Ages, one can never speak of a genuinely free market competition as we understand it today. There are wider effects than this direct exclusion of special goods from the market. There is a circumstance which follows from the above mentioned contrariety between status order and purely economic order. It is that in most instances the notion of honor peculiar to status absolutely abhors that which is essential to the market: higgling. This notion of honor abhors higgling among peers and occasionally it taboo higgling for the members of a status group in general. Therefore, everywhere there are status groups, and usually the most influential, who consider almost any kind of overt participation in economic acquisition as absolutely stigmatizing.

Thus, with some over-simplification, one might say that "classes" are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas "status groups" are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special "styles of life." An "occupational group" is also a "status group." For normally, it successfully claims social "honor" only by virtue of the special "style of life" which may be determined by occupation. However, the difference between classes and status groups frequently overlap. It is precisely those status communities most strictly segregated in terms of "honor," viz., the Indian castes, who today show, although within very rigid limits, a relatively high degree of indifference with regard to pecuniary "income." However, the Brahmins seek such income in quite heterogeneous ways.

As to the general economic conditions making for the predominance of stratification by "status" only very little can be said in general. When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored. Every techno-economic repercussion and transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the "class situation" into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical-economic transformations. And every slowing down of the shifting of economic stratifications in due course leads to the growth of "status" structures and again makes for the resuscitation of the important role of social "honor."

**Parties**

Whereas the genuine locus of "classes" is within the "economic order," the locus of "status groups" is within the "social order," i.e., within the sphere of the distribution of "honor." From within these spheres, classes and status groups influence one another and they influence the legal order and are in turn influenced by it. But "parties" live in a house of "power."

Their action is oriented toward the acquisition of social "power," that is to say, toward influencing a communal action no matter what its content. In principle, parties may exist in a social "club" as well as in a "state." As ever against the actions of "classes" and "status groups," for which this is not necessarily the case, the communal actions of "parties" always mean a societalization. For party actions are always directed toward a goal which is striven for in planned manner. This goal may be a "cause"
(the party may aim at realizing a program for ideal or material purposes), or the goal may be "personal" (sires, power, and from these honor for the leader and followers of the parties). But usually the party action aims at all these simultaneously. Parties are, therefore, only possible within communities which are somehow societalized; that is to say, which have some rational order and a staff of persons available who are ready to enforce it. For parties aim precisely at influencing this staff, and if possible, to recruit it from party followers.

In any individual case, parties, may represent interests determined through "class situation" or "status situation," and they may recruit their following respectively from one or the other. But they need be neither purely "class" nor purely "status" parties. In most cases they are partly class parties or partly status parties, and frequently they are neither. They may represent ephemeral or enduring structures. Their means of attaining power may be quite varied, ranging from naked violence of any sort to canvassing for votes with coarse or subtle means: money, social influence, the force of speech, suggestion, clumsy hoax, and so on to the rougher or more artful tactics of obstruction in parliamentary bodies.

The sociological structure of parties differs in a necessarily basic way according to the kind of communal action which they struggle to influence. Also parties differ according to whether or not the community is stratified by status groups or by classes. Before all else, they vary to the structure of "domination" within the community. For their leaders normally deal with the conquest of a community. They are, in the general concept which is maintained here, not only products of specially modern forms of domination. They are, in the general concept which is maintained here, not only products of specially modern forms of domination. We shall also designate as parties the ancient and medieval "parties," despite the fact that their structure differs basically from the structure of modern parties. By virtue of these structural differences of domination it is impossible to say anything about the structure of parties without discussing the structural forms of social domination per se. Parties which are always themselves structures struggling for domination are very frequently organized in a very strict "authoritarian" fashion. . . .

Concerning "classes," status groups," and "parties" it must be said in general that they necessarily presuppose a comprehensive societalization, and especially a political framework of communal action, within which they operate. This does not mean that parties would be confined by the frontiers of any individual political community. On the contrary, at all times it has been the order of the day that the societalization (even when it aims at the use of military force in common) reaches beyond the frontiers of politics. This has been the case in the solidarity of interests among the Oligarchs and among the democrats in Hellas, among the Guelfs and among Ghibelines in the Middle Ages, and within the Calvinist party during the period of religious struggles. It has been the case up to the solidarity of the landlords (international congress of agrarian landlords), and has continued among princes (holy alliance, Karlsbad decrees), socialist workers, conservatives (the longing of Prussian conservatives for Russian intervention in 1850). But their aim is not necessarily the establishment of new international political i.e., territorial, dominion. In the main they aim to influence the existing dominion.

[The posthumously published text breaks off here. An unfinished draft of a classification of status-groups follows.—G. and M.]

Thomas for President?

Several readers have asked me whom, if any one, I am going to vote for this fall. Regretfully, I have to reply: no-one. Three of the five presidential candidates can be eliminated at once: Roosevelt and Dewey for reasons already expressed in this department, and the prohibition Party candidate because I am in favor of alcoholic beverages. The Socialist Labor Party is, formally at least, revolutionary socialist. Unfortunately, however, the SLP is a sect with little relevance to the present, frozen in the tradition of De Leon so completely as to make the most orthodox Trotskyist seem positively liberalistic by comparison. (If the Workers Party, incidentally, had a candidate for president, I would probably vote for him.) That leaves Norman Thomas.

My objection to Thomas can be put briefly: he is a liberal, not a socialist. A "socialist", as I use the term anyway, is one who has taken the first simple step at least of breaking with present-day bourgeois society. Despite an undoubtedly sincere personal belief in socialism, Norman Thomas has been unable, either intellectually or politically, to take this step. His role has always been that of the left opposition within the present society, the fighting crusader in small matters (like Hagueism and other civil liberties issues) and the timid conformist in big matters (like the present war). His own campaign material describes him, accurately, as "America's Conscience." It seems a great pity that Norman Thomas did not become the editor of The Nation instead of succeeding Debs. Both The Nation and the Socialist Party would have gained: the former would have had a better chance to develop into a revolutionary party.

The essential liberalism of the man comes out in (1) the manner in which he makes his criticisms of the status quo, and (2) the way he met the greatest political issue of today, the war, both before and after Pearl Harbor.

(1). Thomas' favorite approach is to assume that Roosevelt and the others in power are honest, reasonable men trying just as earnestly as he himself to work out things for the best interests of humanity; to assume, furthermore, that it
is somehow possible for things to be worked out that way by these leaders (which implies within the bounds of the present economic setup) and then to address to them plaintively helpful questions along the lines of: "Why, Mr. President, don't you implement the Atlantic Charter?" The tone is precisely that of the liberal intellectuals, who also are fond of asking such questions. It is true that Thomas, as a professional socialist, is much more sceptical of the leaders and often throws in formal statements to the effect that only socialism can give the right answer to his questions. But this merely makes him intellectually less consistent than the liberal editors, since, if he, unlike them, knows the answers in advance, there is no point in asking the same kind of questions (and in the same tone of voice). The political effect of this approach is most confusing, since it implies that Roosevelt and Churchill have the same goals at heart that Thomas does and hence either that they are "mistaken" or that Thomas did not quite catch their real meaning and would be delighted to be set right.

**Thomas on the War Issue**

Up to Pearl Harbor, Norman Thomas was violently anti-war, but as a middleclass isolationist rather than as a socialist. With his characteristic opportunism in such matters, he went as far as to speak from the platform of America First. Thomas, for all his idealism, seems willing to go to almost any lengths to increase his audience.* When Pearl Harbor was attacked, Thomas revealed instantly and conclusively that it was isolationism and not international socialism which had been the mainspring of his opposition to the war. At once he shifted—along with America First and the rest of the isolationist movement—to a "critical" pro-war position. This instantaneous shift once Japan had "attacked" us—the shallowness of Thomas's socialism appears in his being so overwhelmed by the physical fact of military aggression—contrasts painfully with Debs's behavior in the last war. It also contrasts painfully with the views Thomas himself expressed in a famous symposium in the *Modern Monthly* in June and September, 1935. To the query, "What will you do when America goes to War?", Thomas replied: "... If and when America enters new wars I shall keep out myself, do what I can to bring about prompt peace and take whatever advantage I can of the situation in order to bring about that capture of power in government by the workers which is the true basis of freedom, peace and plenty." And to the even more pointed query, "Would a prospective victory by Hitler over most of Europe move you to urge U.S. participation in opposition to Germany in order to prevent such a catastrophe?" Thomas replied: "I suppose my answer to your third question is 'No'. ... The victory we want over fascism must be won by the workers themselves on other than the basis of nationalistic war. I view with profound regret the recent acts of the Communist International in going back to the position of the majority Socialists in 1914: that is to say, the position of supporting a possible "good war", in this case a war against fascism, as that was allegedly a war against imperialism.

It is true that Thomas's support of the war is extremely "critical", so much so that there is actually a great deal of confusion as to whether he supports it or opposes it. This fact does not seem to me in Thomas's favor, however; it appears rather to be an opportunistic strategy designed to appease both sides of public opinion on the war, and specifically designed to prevent the Socialist Party from splitting. For a sizable minority of the S.P., whose socialism, unlike Thomas's was more than skin-deep, stuck to its anti-war position after Pearl Harbor. The gyrations of the S.P. on this issue are too complex to go into here; suffice it to say that the formula adopted was sufficiently elastic and ambiguous to permit pacifists, anti-war socialists and pro-war socialists to continue together inside the party. This failure to split on the war issue has always seemed to me an indication of a certain lack of political seriousness in all the S.P. factions.

It has meant, in any case, that only a few special scholars can say offhand just what the party's line on the war is. Since a party like the S.P. is primarily, at present, an educational organization, this means a gross failure to do its job of clarifying a major issue. I think Thomas fails constantly at this educational job in other matters as well, because he lacks any method of political or historical analysis, and because he reacts to issues always in the typical liberal fashion: what would I do if I were in Roosevelt's shoes? He therefore constantly gives the erroneous impression that Roosevelt, Churchill and the rest make "mistakes" and fail to "understand" things. The superficial and misleading nature of his approach may be seen if we follow his commentary on international affairs over the past year.

"Why, Mr. President...?"

Thomas shocked even the members of his own party when, in the *Call* of November 12, 1943, he summed up his reactions to the just-concluded Moscow Conference: "The agreements reached were much more extensive, forthright and encouraging than I along with most others had expected. ... What we have looks toward a very definite cooperation, including China, reaching indefinitely into the postwar period and pointing the way to 'an international organization of all peace-loving states'. ... All this justifies hope, but it is by no means a guarantee, etc. etc. etc." (It may or may not be significant that Thomas, in signing this slap-happy blurb, was identified not as the leader of the Socialist Party but as "Chairman, Executive Committee, Postwar World Council.") What can one say of a socialist politician who thinks that an advance in cooperation between the major imperialist powers is a gain? What in God's name was "encouraging" about the Moscow agreements? And to quote seriously, not ironically, the propaganda phrases about "International organization of peace-loving nations"? Shades of Eugene Debs! One would have expected Thomas, logically, to have been even more pleased by Teheran than by Moscow, since Teheran clearly represented a much greater advance toward cooperation. But Thomas is rarely logical and he had probably been impressed by the reactions to his blurb for the Moscow Conference. At any rate, he titled his radio speech on Teheran: "The Big Four Lose a Great Opportunity." This began: "The whole world waited breathlessly for the word that would come out of the conference of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. For that word might by its power shorten this war, help to forestall the next and bring healing to the nations. Well, we heard the
word; and it was but a reiteration of high-sounding generalities, already fairly well understood. But what about their application? The answer is silence. And without knowing what the Big Four have concealed under a secrecy more successful than that surrounding their conferences, I assert that however helpful their meetings in terms of their personal relationships and military strategy, they have not told our enemy or ourselves what we are fighting for. Not thus is democracy served or peace brought nearer.

This is an advance over the estimation of the Moscow Conference: at least Thomas, unlike the liberal editors, suspected something rotten. But how absurd for a socialist to talk of Teheran as a "lost opportunity" for progress! The opportunity the imperialist chieftains gathered there were interested in was of quite another nature—and it wasn’t lost. How infantile to wait "breathlessly" for Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin to bring forth a "word" which would miraculously "bring healing to the nations", What kind of social systems does Thomas think exist in those countries anyway? Nor is the ever-hopeful leader of the Socialist Party completely discouraged even yet: he dares go no farther than to "assert" not that the Big Three reached any bad agreements at Teheran but that—gods give us patience!—"they have not told us what we are fighting for." (The liberal weeklies used to have that editorial in standing type: "Mr. President, What Are We Fighting For?") They never got an answer.

In the March 10, 1944, issue of The Call, Thomas deplored the "pattern of Allied plans for Europe which strip the war of any idealism or respect for democracy or understanding of the conditions of peace." Again, the usual question: "How long will the American President, Congress and people be hypnotized into underwriting these things with their money and the lives of their sons?" Again the implication is the usual liblab nonsense that Roosevelt and Congress are somehow "mistaken", that they don’t know what they are doing when they adopt imperialist policies. A kind of imperialism by amnesia, apparently. Freud might explain this strange mental disease; not Marx.

In a radio speech on July 7, Thomas gyrates even more dizzily than usual. He begins "by gladly assuming the sincerity of the President’s belief in his Four Freedoms. He then negates this assumption by marshalling data—in his favorite question form, of course—to show that Roosevelt by a "Machiavellian process" tricked the country into the war, that he is playing cynical power politics, and that he doesn’t dare reveal the country’s real war aims because they are imperialistic. He then negates this negation, in true dialectical form, by returning to his first line: "I raise these questions, Mr. President, from no desire to stir up old controversies, but because we have a right to know now—not too late for correction—the commitments you have made to our Allies." It is never "too late for correction" with Thomas—note again the assumption it is all a ghastly mistake. Note also the implication that it is not the United States’ own imperialistic ambitions but rather the pressure of its Allies which causes Roosevelt to depart from the straight and narrow path. The superior rectitude of democratic America, the pathetic victim of those wicked European powers—this is good isolationist doctrine, but it sounds strangely in the mouth of the Socialist candidate for president.

No one could ever accuse Norman Thomas of being an economic determinist, or of possessing, indeed, any theory of historical development. Nothing is excluded as impossible: one might call him a typical American pragmatist were it not that he refuses to learn from experience. Every time an international conference is held, he goes through the same routine: first, the last-chance build-up ("We must seize this opportunity... It is not too late... Let us hope...!"); next, the questions ("Why, Mr. President...? What are we fighting for, Mr. Hull...?""); finally, the sorrowful conclusion: bitched again! (In more elegant language, of course.) Like liberal editors, Thomas seems to have an infinite capacity for disillusionment, and for avoiding any practical conclusions from his experience. He has already begun the weary round again with Dumbarton Oaks, which, he said on August 25, "may come close to determining whether we will have another world war within a generation." As this is written he is winding up the question period and is sadly preparing to write off one more "last hope." But there is always, of course, the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference. It is not too late, Mr. President...

Still and All...

But granting all the above and more about Norman Thomas as a political leader some will say (and have, in fact, said to me in conversation), granting he is not an "ideal" and not even a satisfactory candidate, are there not still some strong reasons for voting for him this fall, to wit: (1) he is superior to any of the other candidates; (2) the general press and public regard Thomas as a symbol of socialism, and a big vote for him this fall would encourage the forces of the left and bring progressive pressure to bear on the successful candidate; (3) you advocate a third party movement of labor, farmers and middleclass elements on the lines of the Michigan Commonwealth Federation and would presumably vote for its presidential candidate, but would not such a party, in the beginning at least, be much less progressive on the war and on most other issues than the Socialist Party now is?

To deal briefly with these three points:

(1) This is really a variant of the "lesser evil" argument, and I see no more reason to vote for a pro-war liberal simply because he is the best of five unacceptable alternatives, than to follow the lesser-evil policy in other matters. One need never choose between existing bad alternatives; one can reject them all in order to work towards the materialization of a good alternative.

(2) Thomas is truly a popular symbol of socialism, just as Wallace is a popular symbol of liberalism. Or, for that matter, just as the Soviet Union today is considered by millions of people the international fortress of socialism. But these symbolizations seem to me to be erroneous, and the first step toward achieving the realities they distort is to strip them away. If one makes one’s political criterion not the reality but the momentary effect on popular consciousness of a certain development, then a very good case can be made out for the P.A.C.’s battle for Wallace at the Democratic convention. Certainly the nomination of Wallace would have been widely interpreted as a victory for the left, certainly he was supported by the labor, liberal and Negro movements and opposed by the reactionaries. And yet, as I tried to show in the August number, the Wallace issue was a false one and the struggle to nominate him a waste of energy. Likewise, a big vote for Thomas might well be temporarily encouraging to the left today, and might well impress the bourgeois political leaders, but its more lasting effects, considering Thomas’s political deficiencies as a socialist leader, would be confusing and demoralizing. On the other hand, a dramatically small vote this fall for Thomas might damage his prestige sufficiently to reduce his present dominance in the S.P. and...
to impair his effectiveness as a popular symbol of socialism. These would be, in my opinion, healthy developments.

(3) It is true that a progressive third party would have a much more radical program than the Socialist Party now has, and also that its candidate might well be politically even less desirable than Norman Thomas. It is also true that I would nonetheless vote for him. One forgives immaturity things one cannot forgive a grown-up man, and such a party would be a young, inexperienced, unformed cub compared to the venerable organism that is the Socialist Party today. It would represent possible growth in a radical direction, whereas the S.P. is the end result of evolution, not its starting-point. More important, when a national third party materializes, it will be the expression of a broad moving-forward of the American masses, just as the rise of the CIO was; and when there is some dynamism in mass politics, it is safe to put up with a lot of things in the present in the knowledge that they will probably be corrected in the future. The rushing stream of events brushes aside after a while the false trends; the main thing is to keep the stream pushing ahead, keep the masses acting and learning. A third party with a farmer-labor orientation could survive a lot more confusion and compromises than the Socialist Party can. A liberal leader evolving in a socialist direction is a very different proposition from a socialist leader evolving (or rather, long since having completed the evolutionary process) in a liberal direction.

Dwight Macdonald

BRITISH CAPTAIN QUILTS IN WAR-AIM PROTEST

LONDON, Sept. 27 [U.P.]-A British Army captain, descended from thirteen generations of earls with a fighting tradition dating back to Flodden Field in 1513, has resigned his commission and risked sacrificing his army career because he said, he could not lead men into battle and to death “shouting a war cry which I regard not only as foolish but as one of the outstanding examples of criminal neglect in British Empire history.”

The war cry that Capt. the Hon. William Douglas-Home, 33-year-old younger son of the thirteenth Earl of Home, does not like is “unconditional surrender.” A letter that he wrote on scraps of paper below the hills that ring Le Havre told the story today when it was published in his hometown newspaper, The Maidenshead Advertiser. He said:

“I do not believe a negative war aim to be the words of one British granadier. Yet *** I am to charge forth not as captain of my soul but as captain of the Royal Armored Corps, not for my conception of the truth but for what I regard as being a deliberately false reading of international politics by statesmen playing the old game of power politics for the second time in twenty years. An I and those who think like me not to be allowed to choose whether to live or to die for a negative of ideals of two very tried old men?”

—’N. Y. Times”, Sept. 28, 1944.

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The Esthetics of Bombing

Bernard Lemann

Author's Note: The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, functioning under the State Department, has not only the cachet of official status but also the authority of an imposing membership. It prepares marked maps and tabulated lists of highspots rated according to estimated importance; issues technical manuals and an illustrated lecture on First Aid Protection for Art Treasures and Monuments; provides expert field workers as artistic advisers to highranking military officers. It assumes the threefold task of safeguarding, supervising salvage, and recording instances of damage and pillage for future reference in postwar settlements. It works on the principle (as enunciated by General Eisenhower in his letter to all commanding officers last December) that "we are bound to respect... so far as war allows... monuments which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate, the civilization which is ours."

A REFUGEE scholar once remarked that in the last war, whenever there was a question of survival, the lives of people were given precedence over works of art. He added thoughtfully that perhaps this was right and proper. The momentary questioning, a disturbance in the habitual pattern of thought, startled his listeners into uncertain silence, but only passingly since most of the group present, familiar by this time with the old-world professor's ideas, understood what he had in mind.

Cultural objects grow out of life. The conception and shaping of the thing, the very fact that results from the action of the manipulating hand—these reflect a particular manner of thought and living. The various physical aspects (tallness, roughness, weight, color, movement, light, etc.) are determining factors for certain psychological effects or traits (such as poise, selfassertive power, mystical aspiration, inner struggle) peculiar to the predominating collective psyche, the culture that is ultimately the prime mover in the process of output. Man cannot lay a hand to raw materials without giving them a new set of patterns inevitably human in content—though also inevitably an overlying reflection of nature's own patterns and forces. In this way, all examples of the plastic arts are involved in the wider scope of the art of living. This holds true not only for the broader aspects of design: canals, dams, cultivated land, roads, towns with churches, market squares and backyard gardens; it applies as well to art in the more restricted and familiar sense—as individualized self-conscious expression or as production exclusively subservient to a class; the latter-day beggared, emancipated art of the picture-galleries or the portraiture and princely trappings of palaces. In one sense art works are the concentration points, the archetypes in which men's dreams are consecrated; in another, they combine to make up the setting in which men act out their dreams.

Hence, considered objectively, the destruction of a work of art in which a man has put the essence of one phase of his life, or of all his years, is like destroying the best part
of his immortal soul, which he has sought to crystalize in a more or less permanent form. This may be a much more regrettable occurrence than the death of the man himself, after he had fulfilled his purpose or outlived his fruitfulness. In the cases of some communal efforts, their loss means the blighting out of more than one generation of toil, artisanship, science, love, searching—the absorbing motive of many lives which, viewed in long retrospect, hardly seem to have had any other reason for being. To some, this would be almost the only immortality that men have: their spiritual selves stored up in art forms whereby inert matter becomes vibrant with a pervading life-force.

Furthermore, when historical objects are injured, once the original facture is erased, the object as a true document is irretrievably defunct; it passes over into the realm of memory or oblivion. Once it has crossed this frontier, it cannot be recalled by any degree of pious cherishment or scientific reconstruction.

And yet—should any of us have to face as an actuality the hypothetical problem of choice between preserving an old building or the lives of men, it is not likely that any of us would hesitate in deciding—in favor of the men. Quite apart from considered debating of the matter, quite aside from any controversial marginalia that may have some bearing—such as capital punishment, euthanasia, ahimsa, contraception—any man would undoubtedly act on spontaneous impulse, his deepest impulse of self-preservation of the species. It is evidently such an impulse that helps to keep alive—even today when all old practices are disappearing—a certain amount of chivalry or sportsmanship in warfare. Because of this innate tendency, even when existence seems so cheap and uncertain, this spectacle of death among human beings still has some human-interest appeal; and in most minds—the supersensitive as well as the brutalized—still receives a kind of emphasis over and above the obliteration of the treasured relics of human endeavor. And evidently it is right and proper, as the good professor opined, that this should be so. Only the most supercilious esthete, now a rare survivor of a more enlightened age, would insist, with any real conviction, that even our most valued cultural treasures were not less to be respected than the columns of unknown marching men and the derelict masses that move among the shaken rubble and boiling asphalt of European cities.

A PRESS release of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe (ACFPASOAHMIE, henceforth to be designated AHMIE) indicates that the setting up of the salvage machinery is evidence of the concern felt by the United States government and by artistic and learned circles in this country for the safety of artistic treasures in Europe. It is also evidence of the government's intention that, when military operations have been concluded, there shall be restitution of public property appropriated by the Axis Powers. It is expected that the Commission will use its good offices toward this end and will advocate that, where it is not possible to restore such property either because it has been destroyed or cannot be found, restitution in kind should be made by the Axis Powers.

The official guardians have taken on a task of bewildering size. How are the losses to culture to be assessed against the offenders? The matter of restitution is a baffling problem—one that can be solved only with a fiercely disinterested sense of justice, rare in times when feeling runs high. None but a divine judge could arbitrate the relative value of the destroyed hydraulic project of the Dneprpetrovsk for example, or of the fabulously valuable Venus de Milo stolen by the Nazis from the Louvre, a dismembered figure whose original context, oft debated by specialists, is forever lost yet whose broken contours have become a fixed image, for many the symbol of all art. If we try to add Coventry, Plymouth and Rotterdam, then subtract them from Nuremberg, Mainz, Torino, Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), somewhere along the way the mathematics will become unworkably complicated. It is unfortunate that the note of vindictiveness has crept into the worthy idea of restitution, in the demand of repayment in kind for public properties, irrevocable losses to mankind.

One noted scholar has illustrated his article on the salvage programs with a large photograph showing "Wilful Destruction by the Nazis. . . In an attempt to block a street and impede the advance of Canadian tanks pursuing them", runs the caption (possibly written by the editors?), they "deliberately blew up the church". On the page opposite, as if to underscore this flagrant name-calling, appears the quotation (from Eisenhower's communiqué): "If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the building must go". The author of the article observes that the Germans have paid the AHMIE commission a "compliment of imitation" when they took pains to remove the contents of Monte cassino to Rome, with much publicity. Information trickles in, however, to show that the enemy had a program similar to AHMIE well organized when they entered the war. According to Newsweek (February 21, 1944) "it is well to know that trained experts accompanied the invading armies to select important art works to be 'protected'." Even more startling is the recent announcement from the Vatican that its vaults now contain artworks collected for months past from various Italian cities and moved for safekeeping through delicate negotiations with Nazi military officials who provided rail transportation for hundreds of large cranes. (Time, July 17, 1944). We have many reports on Hitler's gallery at Linz, crowded with celebrated masterpieces, the spoils of many countries. But when the parvenus of the Nazi regime became rapacious amateurs, their appreciation of value in art properties is given an interpretation usually not accredited to our industrial barons who have generously enriched public or semipublic collections. According to one of our leading art officials, another collaborator in the work of cultural treasures, "the looting of Europe springs from no spontaneous love of art but from a greed fed upon the consciousness that since the German is incapable of producing what other men cherish, he must either appropriate it or destroy it. We have not seen as clearly as we might the dreadful pattern of hatred and despair that has driven the diseased German mind to order the annihilation of culture and beauty wherever they may exist."

Until now the practices of education and research con-
nected with art history and cultural heritage have been a means of contributing toward good-will and mutual understanding. It would be a regression if the arts were brought into service as avenging weapons during the period of reconstruction. Some of us with a fanaticity tenacious belief in tolerance and the recultivation of harmony are likely to see ghosts at any turn: the least hint of retribution will loose an avalanche of protest. And why not, since no greater crime could be committed in the name of culture, nor have less to do with it?

CONNOISSEURS and historians are likely to react more poignantly than others to the devastations of war. However, though far from rejoicing in it, they do have, it must be admitted, a sort of field day in this unaccustomed work to which they willingly bring their service. Just as warriors between wars spend their days chiefly in discussing campaigns, so scholars normally lead comparatively sedentary existences. Now with their stored up knowledge they spring into action. Ironically, however, wholesale destruction provides the preservers with a large-scale operation. Grand smashups of entire facades that would make the missing arms of Venus seem like a minor disfigurement, will keep them occupied for a long time to come piecing together sculptural fragments. Some scholars have been known in the past to devote an entire career to restoring a single building (usually on paper, for which praise be) that has been levelled to the ground for ages. Now they must busy themselves with art objects of all kinds, many buildings, large towns.

But are we certain it is restoration that we need most, rather than rehabilitation or perhaps reorientation? Why should we dwell among the ashes of our lost causes perpetuating the traces of calamity, clutching at the flying fragments? Already it has been pointed out that some blockbusting raids have accomplished slum clearance more effectively than any of the more systematic attempts. In this darkly grim humour there is a flash of truth. Can it ever be that planless damage, even with all its evil, could have some salutary results? Might there not be a time when the clutter approaches an impasse, when it would be an advantage to have a clean sweep of everything—the good along with the bad? Perhaps the struggle to rebuild, in the face of dire necessity and unhampered by remains, might create an impetus and a freedom of activity that would compensate for the losses. There is a kind of hopeful healthiness in a fatalistic attitude: it’s gone, let it go, God bless it.

A British counter-proposal carries the habit of the cluttered attic plunderroom to its preposterous rockbottom extreme. In the Architectural Review the suggestion has been made that a few bombed churches be chosen to serve as eloquent war monuments, “to remain with us as ruins, essentially in the state in which bombing has left them”. The plan provides for cleanup and landscaping so that such places could be used for outdoor worship, meditation, and rest. Evidently the idea springs partially from a desire to keep alive national sentiment (like the French custom of parading companies of mutilés de la guerre on every state occasion). Partially too it carries on the amiable British practice (common among our own halls of learn-
generations would grow to manhood with only a dim knowledge of traditional art forms and with very little equipment to create new ones. Even so, culture would still have good chances of survival. So long as there is one to hammer old tin into tinpans, split a reed, plant hedgerows, tie knots or sharpen a blade; so long as there are still a few people not too psychotic for normal understanding, only just odd enough to be tantalized occasionally by an interesting new idea, then prospects for culture will be fair—yes, even without benefit of connaisseur.

Finally, prospects will be not merely fair but bright if we may assume the survival of one other factor. Always we must remember the spirit in which the memorable treasures have been produced. Recall that in France a person well acquainted in the arts was known as an *amatueur*, and the Italians say a thing done truly well is done *con amore*. Whoever has studied and analysed, haunted the shrines, sought out the stores of sensibility and wisdom in the arts, cannot have overlooked their message of harmonious living, as though in all inspired works the creators called out some appeal to all the rest of humankind. If our association with cultural relics has not produced the mere mockery of mercenary feeling for quality, then we must have deep in our second memory the universal sentiment that flows from many pieties we have seen, the plious awe of tombstones, the thankfulness of sunny fountains, the expression of delight in dozens of reclining Venuses, the plaintive faces of pale clowns, the brotherly deeds of the Franciscan cycle, enfolding landscapes with lovers, workers, saints. Each of us will recall his own experiences, quick moments of response. These things register an endless straining for contact with other human beings. In them are incised the gnawing hunger of men and women for being understood and received by others, the pain of aloneness among the world's alienations. In spite of everything the culture cult may do to cheapen Truth into truism, the truth remains that our art-forms cannot have nothing to do with retaliation, repayment in kind, or the destructive forces that spread havoc and trauma. If we let these things replenish themselves within us, then the undying sources can give and refresh, and ten times ten of all available bombloads cannot obliterate the good parts of the civilization that is ours.

DON'T CHEER, BOYS. THE POOR DEVILS ARE DYING!

"As liberals, it is our sacred duty to hold ourselves together." —Henry A. Wallace, Speaking in Buffalo, N.Y., Sept. 25, 1944.

QUICK, WATSON, THE NEEDLE!

The editors of "The Nation" appeal to President Roosevelt to send a special message to Congress asking the passage of the Chavez-Scanlon bill for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee. They believe that the President would thereby invigorate the campaign for his reelection. "A courageous insistence on the application of the principles for which we fight abroad would give his supporters a lift their spirits badly need. A certain assertion is visible in their ranks. We are not unmindful of the necessities of so-called practical politics, but a combination of excessive caution and dubious expediency in domestic policy may turn out to be highly impractical. The invocation of Mr. Roosevelt's past achievements is running into the stage of diminishing returns, and the moment has come for a move with some admixture of the heroic."


The Tucson Strike

There are not many instances of successful action by colored soldiers against military Jimcrow. The following releases from the Tucson Committee for Inter-Racial Understanding are, therefore, of special interest.—ED.

Tucson, Arizona, Sept. 12:

With a determination which may well dramatize a nationwide problem, fifty seven Negro soldiers working as Kitchen Police at the Marana Army Air Field near Tucson, Arizona spontaneously went on strike. At 4:00 A.M. on the morning of September 11, the first shift of sixteen men reported to the mess hall and announced they were no longer going to work without the extra pay to which each was entitled. In the face of the most dire punishment, they sat down. The Military Police were immediately called and the strikers were imprisoned in the Guardhouse.

The Executive Officer of the Field, Major Tilden, and the white commanding officer of the Negro squadron, Lieutenant Shoupe called a meeting in the Day Room of the second shift which was supposed to report at 1:00 P.M. The members of this shift told the officers they would not report for work either. These men too, were sent to the Guardhouse.

The remaining two shifts did not report but so far no disciplinary action has been taken against them.

The strike was really the desperate protest of men who have suffered many abuses and had no recourse to remedial action. Most of the soldiers in question have been on K.P. for upwards of nineteen months, performing day in, day out, the most dreary and menial work in the Army Air Forces. They have been under constant abuse of "pushers" who are notorious for their speed-up methods.

For the last nine months, they have been serving cadets without being paid the extra 50% of base pay to which each is entitled.

For punishment of minor infractions, they have been obliged to serve their extra duty in the mess halls instead of their squadron area. This policy was recently declared illegal by an Administrative Inspector after having been in operation for over eighteen months.

The profound resentment which fathered this strike becomes clear when it is understood that those men can be tried for mutiny if the higher officers choose to be severe. It is not yet known whether rigorous punishment will be meted out, or if some concerted effort will be made to render the lives of these Negro soldiers tolerable.

Tucson, Sept. 23:

The 57 Negro soldiers stationed at Marana AAF, Tucson, Ariz., who went on strike Sept. 11 returned to work two days later. The soldiers, assigned permanently to Kitchen Police, have been granted the extra pay which they asserted was their due when working for cadets. None of the men has been punished.

The outcome of the strike is as follows: all Negro KP have been assigned to the cadet mess hall where they will draw $25. per month in extra pay. However, they now work 84 hours a week as compared to the 56 hours a week they formerly worked in the General mess hall.
Abolish Segregation in the Armed Forces and the CIO War Relief Committee, the case of the 19 Seabees who were discharged from the Navy last year for objecting to Jimcrow treatment is making progress. It has received some publicity in the New York daily press, and the Lynn Committee has announced that an appeal to Washington has been taken under the new “G.I. Bill of Rights,” which provides that all servicemen discharged otherwise than honorably without a hearing must be given a hearing if they now ask for one. The Seabees’ case will probably be the first to be taken up under this provision. Arthur Garfield Hays and Gerald Weatherly are representing the Seabees.

Re: The Lynn Case
A Chicago branch of the Lynn Committee has been formed. Executive Secretary is Henry D. Spaulding, 438 Tremont St., Chicago. The branch’s chief present activity is supporting and publicising a suit similar to the Lynn case that was recently brought in the Chicago Federal Court by Perry H. Hansberry, a 23-year-old pre-Pearl Harbor father. Perry Hansberry is the son of Carl A. Hansberry, a Negro real estate dealer who successfully fought the famous Lee v. Hansberry Restricted Covenant case through the Supreme Court. The Lynn case, it will be recalled, was turned down last spring by the Supreme Court because Lynn is no longer in the custody of the original respondent, his colonel at Camp Upton. (Lynn’s lawyers are now trying to get the Court to change its mind.) To avoid this, the Hansberry suit is directed against President Roosevelt, General Hershey, Secretary of War Stimson and other high government officials.

Re: “The France of Tomorrow”
France is not the only European country in which there seems to be a general rejection, from both left and right, of private capitalism. The Netherland News Agency released on July 31 the text of a manifesto jointly published by two underground newspapers, Het Parool, representing the left, and Vrij Nederland, representing the right. This calls for, among other things, “a radical rejuvenation of the nation’s life in a political, social and cultural sense”; the representation of workers and consumers in industrial management; and far-reaching social security legislation. Most extraordinary—considering the adherence of conservative elements to the program—provision of all this is one:

“Liberal, capitalist production methods do not guarantee people social security and should, therefore, be replaced by a system of national and international management abolishing production for profit.”

Also interesting, in the light of Clare’s description of the French situation, is the conclusion of an article in the U. S. News of Sept. 15: “In several countries, there is a strong drift toward public ownership, or at least comprehensive national planning. The U. S. and British governments both want to encourage the restoration of private enterprise in Europe. But there is recognition that the necessities of the situation will limit severely the field of such enterprise, at least for a time.”

SIDES TO A QUESTION
Sir:

The implication that to see two or perhaps three or four sides to a question is a mistake, indicates a dangerous tendency. A just and powerful article by Thomas Mann in the May Atlantic might explain Max Lerner’s point of view in regard to Germany.
In general, in order to bring about improvement in conditions, the absolute necessity for seeing all possible sides of every question is shown in an unanswerable way in John Dewey's Logic, Chapter 24.

The magazine must be immensely useful as it is. But surely more breadth of vision would make it more so.

DENVER, COLO.
M. B. ROBINSON

—Without doubt one must see 2, 3, 4 or more sides to a question if one is to explore it at all profoundly. But there is a way of exploiting this fact in an opportunistic way—i.e., so as to avoid the responsibility of taking a stand, and also to please as many people as possible. This exploitation is what I object to in Lerner's stuff. It can be seen to be exploitation, and not the real thing, by the fact that Lerner does not reconcile his contradictory analyses on some higher (or more profound) level. The real use of the many-sides-to-a-question approach is to find a more inclusive truth in which the "sides" appear in a more significant relationship than merely "pro" and "con" or "good" and "bad." But Lerner's contradictions remain on the same level he found them on, and so his analysis is simply illogical. —D. M.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AGAIN

Dear Macdonald:

Your rejoinder to my July article on C.O.'s seemed to me to point up well the problem involved in conscientious objection as a left-wing technique. It would be simpler if we all could—as some people do—decide this and similar problems on a purely moral basis (i.e., considering only the intrinsic merit of the action involved). Fortunately or unfortunately, most of us feel impelled to try, at least, to foresee some of the more predictable results of our actions, and it is at this point that we reach our varying judgments. It was this problem which I had chiefly in mind in writing the article, endeavoring to show that conscientious objection is at least as relevant a position politically as the army, as well as being a clearer stand morally. If the remarks which follow emphasize points of disagreement rather than agreement, it is purely because of space limitations.

I think I take issue most strongly with your argument that, in a total war, the C.O. is as much implicated as the soldier. The editor of the Christian Century has made a great deal of this argument, to the general confusion of almost everybody, himself included. It seems to me one of those arguments which is particularly dangerous because there is a small degree of truth in it. Liberal non-C.O.'s may not see much difference between the degree of cooperation given by the C.O. and that given by the ordinary soldier, but the distinction certainly isn't as obscure to the American Legion and the chauvinistic fringe in general, or for that matter to Selective Service. They see a clear difference in degree, perhaps in kind, between the man who supports the war, even critically, or even refuses his intellectual endorsement, and the man who refuses to enter the army, buy war bonds, take a job specifically created by the war, or contribute in various and sundry ways to war morale. There seems to me a very real difference between giving military service and buying war bonds, i.e., cooperating where there are clear, possible, and direct alternatives, and refusing to give service or buy bonds. There seems also to be a very real difference between participating in the war at those tangential points where there is no alternative except committing suicide, and participating, even under protest, at those central points where there is a choice open.

On specific points of fact, on the basis of what information I have, I can agree with you only on the conscientious objector in the army (the I-A-O), whom I think you describe correctly as being "an integral part of the military machine." In general, the men in mental hospitals seem to be raising the attendant-patient ratio in badly depleted staffs, that is doing jobs which otherwise wouldn't be done, rather than releasing men for the army. The "work of national importance" in CPS camps also seems to be work most of which would not be done if C.O.'s didn't do it, save perhaps for fire-fighting, which would probably be done by conscription of jail inmates and drunks off the streets were the C.O.'s not at hand. Some of the men in prison seem to be doing work related to the war, but one can say at least that for a given number of C.O.'s who go to jail, a guard must be held out of the manpower pool to watch them.

As for the direct political effectiveness of conscientious objection, I have made no extravagant claims for it, any more than I would for the alternatives. I did suggest that while conscientious objection alone is negative (there is where the left winger should pitch in and help give the movement a positive character), it is the only movement which even potentially can do an absolutely essential job, namely, shake the confidence of the state in its ability to make war when it chooses. Your dismissal of the possibilities of educating the farmer and the religious person seems to me both hasty and unfortunate in view of the obvious role which the farmer must play in any effective left-wing movement, and in view of the potential present in certain left-wing church groups, such as the younger Methodists (a potential of which I am afraid the more secular radicals are unaware). I don't expect that C.O.'s are going to revolutionize public opinion, but I do think that if a given number of left-wingers could get to work revolutionizing the group of C.O.'s into an alert and conscious group (a job which I am afraid would require more understanding and adaptability than most left-wing C.O.'s have yet shown), they would do as large a job as I see any reason to think the same number could do in the army.

As I see it, almost the sole explicit reason you advance for going into the army (and it seems to me that for a person who opposes this war the reasons must be almost overwhelming) is that there is a chance that an American army of occupation, by refusing to obey its officers some time in the post-war years, may be able to aid revolution in Europe. I agree with you that revolutionary movements are possible, even likely, in Europe. It seems to me possible that the American military authorities, partly through the influence of pressure at home, partly through sheer inability to do anything else (as in the cases of Bonomi and De Gaulle), might keep hands off. But as far as effective support from the ranks of the occupying army is concerned, I am afraid I should have to guess that if any army in the world is unlikely to engage in mass refusal to obey orders, it is the American army. That is, I don't think that the fact of the left-winger's being on the scene is going to be very relevant.

The four pages of discussion in the July issue represent a type of discussion which I think is extremely important and which it is difficult to imagine appearing elsewhere than in a magazine such as Politics. I hope that the exchange of opinion may help a few people to make this Hobson's choice more thoughtfully, whichever way they make it, and will give occasion for revaluation of opportunities and implications for those who have already made it.

SEATTLE, WASH.

DOR CALHOUN
"FEARFULLY MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS ..."

I enjoy your magazine very much, although "enjoy" might not be the best word for it. Like most of the others of my age who grew up during the depression, I still consider the Soviets to be the homeland of the proletariat, and no amount of logic has yet driven that out of our subconscious. You are fighting a myth with the weapons of enlightenment, and, as you are probably finding out, it is rather slow progress. You are being helped by Russia, though—as yet no one has appreciated the shock that the dissolving of the Comintern was to us. People like you didn't dare face the importance of that act, and the orthodox Communists I know didn't know enough about Marxism to realize that the basis of their orthodoxy had been taken away. So that very important act went unnoticed by default.

Many times, though, your magazine has the fearfully moral righteousness of the pure in heart. You will have a difficult time convincing me that this is an imperialist war so long as Germany has an official anti-Semitic program. I know that this shows that I confuse the words "imperialist" and "unjust", but I feel that my basic objection is sound. I may show traces of the victorian feeling that recognized acts of evil are worse than unrecognized ones, but with the state as the organ of expression, that is the only view that one can take today.

Nevertheless, the worth of your publication is guaranteed by articles like the recent ones on the Anglo-American condominium, and the review of the new Laski book. List's articles, too, are excellent. But the graduate student prose of some of the other articles is a bit too much.

I wish you luck in your publication, and hope that the "pre-post-war" reaction will not clip you. As long as you can realize the absurdity of phrases like "the only moral persons are . . .", you will not be tempted to become smug in your possession of the Truth. And no one can be more smug than a socially conscious person with the truth in his personal possession.

FORT SILL, OKLA.  A. MCTAGGART

IN DEFENSE OF "POLITICS"

Sir:

I have read POLITICS with such satisfaction since its first issue that I feel impelled to defend it from such attackers as George Elliott. I believe that he objects to POLITICS mainly because it does not wave some banner to rally the mob.

That is precisely why I like POLITICS. I am sick to death of "causes". Not because I have no social conscience but because it is not enough just to "want" to rectify evil. Causes no matter how good, simply run into newer evils unless very carefully and astutely considered. This cannot be done when you are rallying a mob to immediate action. Then Humanity simply jumps out of one ditch only to fall into another. What it needs is to carefully step around precipices. This requires critical astuteness of the best sort and never "emotional surging".

Critical action may often take the form of inaction but by doing so it gathers strength and momentum. It commits less and less stupidities. If your critics are contending it is better to act stupidly than not to act at all, then they are, as I suspect, the sort of folk who must act from admitting their complete impotence. These naive sentry cannot bear to face a world of hard facts and keep their sense of humor and objectivity. They cannot boldly admit their helplessness without somehow losing "face" to themselves. So they either rush into the arms of the bureaucrats or embrace the Stalinists.

I believe that POLITICS represents the opinion of the mature disciplined and fearless modern who has read widely and observed closely. Moderns who are able to "take" reality, even when they don't like it and can't alter it, even when it is most distasteful they can still think it out and laugh at it without losing either their nerve or their integrity.

More and more, society will need cells of unimpassioned but socially ethical intellects who will provide islands of sanity in the surging seas of the future when race will be pitted against race, class against class, brother against brother.

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