POLAND

RADICAL AMERICA

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INTRODUCTION

The events in Poland since the summer of 1980 present a spectacle that we have rarely glimpsed in recent decades: a massive and powerful working-class revolt. We have to go back to the French general strike of 1968 and the Italian “hot autumn” of 1969 to find anything approaching this assertion of working-class power. And the victories won by the Polish workers have already been far greater than anything won in France or Italy.

This understanding of the Polish movement as a historic working-class rebellion has to be the starting point for any analysis. To see it in any other context is to fall into the quicksand of having to “choose” between Western capitalism and Soviet communism in world politics. To see it through the distorting prism of cold-war confrontationism is not only to betray the traditional ideals of the Left but to ignore obstinately the best hopes for a principled world peace.

To be sure, there are complications in the Polish rebellion, and we would like to discuss them here. The chief complications have to do with the role of the Catholic church, workers’ support for private farmers, and the noncapitalist nature of the Polish economy. They are vital to a complete understanding of the dynamics of the Polish events, but they should not be allowed to distract our attention from the central fact of the conflict: the affirmation by workers of their independent power in society. No workers’ movement will ever be spotless and pure from the standpoint of a well-developed socialist theory.

The religious overtones of the Polish strikes, together with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa’s ties to the Catholic hierarchy, have disturbed many left-wing observers in the West.
The Polish church’s historical conservatism and antisemitism are well known, as are the anti-communism of the “Polish Pope” John Paul II and the church’s worldwide role as an agent of sexual repression and male supremacy. But all this has to be seen in the specific context of Poland. It is similar in some ways to Iran under the Shah: in the absence of political freedoms, religious leaders became the sole legitimate poles for oppositional feelings in the society. This process went nowhere near as far in Poland as in Iran, of course. The workers’ movement in Poland represents, not a stalking horse for the church, but a new center of power capable of focusing energies that once had nowhere to turn except the regime and the church. Both the state and the church hierarchy seem to have recognized this dynamic, and the church’s persistent calls for “moderation” seemingly represent a self-conscious effort to keep the workers’ movement from developing a truly independent power of its own.

Solidarity’s insistence on supporting a “union” for Poland’s self-employed farmers — surely a contradiction in terms — again may be foolish and reactionary by the standards of socialist theory. From the standpoint of the workers, it may very well make sense. Not only are there family ties — Poland has a middle-aged and elderly peasantry and a young working class, which suggests that a great many workers have parents and grandparents still on the farms — but workers may feel that a revitalized small-farm sector is the only way they can get enough cheap food. The agricultural status quo has produced chiefly long lines in the urban markets.

The fact that Poland does not have a capitalist economy bedazzles a number of American leftists. A handful of groups seem ready to support a possible Soviet military intervention in Poland on the grounds that it may be necessary to prevent the restoration of capitalism. This standpoint rests on the assumption that there are two forms of social organization in the world, capitalism and socialism, and that a form that is changing can only change into the other. Even if we slide past the complexities of the question “What is Socialism?” we have to recognize that both capitalism and what is commonly called socialism offer a wide range of models with greatly varying degrees of workers’ power and of democratic freedoms. The fact that a country such as Poland has collectivized property does not tell us very much about the class relations that actually prevail there. In fact, as the events of the past year make definitively clear, only in the most mystical sense has the Polish government been a government of the working class. We can appreciate many good aspects of life in Poland — good health insurance, abortion rights, and a lack of unemployment, for example — while recognizing that a number of European capitalist countries have social programs that are equally attractive from the standpoint of an American leftist.

None of the demands of the Polish workers regarding the urban industrial sector of the economy have anything remotely to do with the reintroduction of capitalism. Reportedly, however, there are many misconceptions among strikers of what work life in the capitalist West is like, based on an association of “socialism” with the Polish status quo. The only hope that Western socialists have of countering those illusions, however, is within a framework of support for the Polish workers’ movement. For leftists in the capitalist world to identify with the discredited Polish state bureaucracy instead of with the workers’ movement would be to place ourselves on the wrong side of a profound historical struggle and forfeit any right to try to influence the
represented in one form by Cabral and another by Tanzania, for example, is not merely a nationalist slogan but a serious search for nondogmatic, independent roads to socialism based on popular traditions and democratic choices.

More particularly, another reason that awareness of African history and current events is important today is — South Africa. At stake there is not only the viability of socialism or independence in any part of Africa, but also the future of the world capitalist economy. No revolutionary movement faces a more brutal and seemingly impregnable state than does the South African. The repression that followed the peak of black strength in the early 1960s was unprecedented. But the South African state soon suffered a great blow from the liberation of the former Portuguese territories, and by the late 1970s it was in an inestimably weaker and more isolated position. The Soweto riots then arose as a rebirth of direct challenge to white power, and as a symbol of the literal indestructibility of the African demand for freedom. This most recent wave of opposition in South Africa, appearing as it does partly in the form of a youth rebellion, reminds us again of the unpredictability of social movements, the power of their very spontaneousness, and the error of despair.

Thirty years ago radicals and liberals were hauled before Congressional investigating committees and forced to purge themselves of current or past membership in the Communist Party. The central act in this process was to “name names” — to finger others besides yourself who attended certain meetings, worked in certain organizations, or were actually members of the Party. To refuse to cooperate in “naming names,” even though admitting one’s own past membership or par-

ticipation, would likely lead to the loss of one’s job, and a public branding as a traitor.

This process had one of its most dramatic chapters in Hollywood, when the famous and the obscure were brought before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), which was supposedly investigating Communist infiltration of the entertainment industry. Many people refused to talk, or drew the line in talking only about themselves. Most of these “uncooperative witnesses” were then “blacklisted,” and could no longer work in the film industry, or could do so only under a false name.

But many others did talk, and named “names” that were household words. The names themselves were almost always well known to the investigators. As Victor Navasky shows in his new book Naming Names, the purpose of this self-degrading ritual was not to obtain information, but to provide a public spectacle through which some of the “guilty” could rehabilitate themselves while others were cast out of the industry. As Peter Biskind points out in his review of Navasky’s book, the effect of the inquisition in Hollywood was far broader than denying work to several dozen individuals; in fact, it worked to significantly damage the liberal “popular front” culture that had secured a place for itself during the Depression and World War II.

Since Biskind’s review was written, developments in Congress have suddenly made the issue of “naming names” a relevant one once again. Though the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee — the Senate parallel to HUAC — was abolished in 1977, it has now been resurrected by the Republican-controlled Senate. Its new guise is the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, headed by born-again Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, a former POW in Vietnam. While it
is too early to tell how much support Denton’s committee will receive from the Republican leadership, its initial hearing was chilling. Playing on the Administration’s new code word for the world Communist conspiracy, “terrorism,” the Committee rambled through a mishmash of “terrorist” plots and organizations, lighting briefly on such domestic targets as Mobilization for Survival.

Whether the Terrorism Subcommittee remains only a sideshow in the Reagan administration, or assumes the central role that McCarthy’s investigations achieved three decades ago, remains to be seen. “Terrorism” has clearly been adopted by Haig and Reagan as the new phrase to describe any activity opposed to official US interests which might possibly be pinned on Moscow. It is so flexible a word, in the new official usage, that it is theoretically boundless. We must expect it to be used as a wedge to try to legitimize the repression of the Puerto Rican independence movement, of antinuclear and antimilitary organizing, or of left-wing tendencies in the labor movement.

We must also be concerned that “terrorism” will be the code word used to attack organizations working for gay liberation, abortion, or on other “family issues.” We need to recall that “McCarthyism” was not only a repressive campaign directed against the Communist Party, but that it also provided the climate and organizational framework for an attack on homosexuals during the 1940s and ’50s. Because so much of the Reagan right-wing coalition is based in groups that focus on abortion or other “family issues,” it is possible that the administration will include radicals of all kinds — and not just “political” radicals — in its anticipated crackdown on civil liberties. Reading Naming Names will help us to prepare ourselves for strange times ahead.

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Coming to Terms

Far Right not so far away
New Left getting old
Democrats not so social

Since we sprinkle terms so liberally
labelling the tendencies that form
lines under our eyes
right away or write
your congressman’s wrong cuz he’s
been drinking too much and is bloated
with power
lines going up all over killing plants
closing down and locking out
the air to breathe

new life stirring in the gathering
storm clouds hanging over the country
sides are taken based on little
feelings that change is due
and don’t give up yet

no matter what the papers say.

John Demeter
course of the Polish revolt.

In any discussion of Eastern Europe, the question of antisemitism is sure to arise. The Red Army in its westward push toward the end of World War II swept away not only the Germans but an indigenous fascism that in many cases had been just as deadly as Naziism. Thus it is not surprising that the specter of a revived antisemitism should present itself any time one of the Communist regimes is threatened. This is hardly applicable to the present situation in Poland, however, The Polish government itself carried out a campaign of harassment in the late 1960s that led to the emigration of all but a few thousand Polish Jews. The only public use of Jew-baiting in the recent events has been against Solidarity; the union’s response was not to deny Jewish participation but to denounce antisemitism. Meanwhile, General Moczar, architect of the antisemitic campaign of the late sixties, has reappeared on the scene — as a minister in the government.

Of course, given the state of world tensions and the threat of a catastrophic nuclear war, events such as those in Poland cannot be considered in isolation. Many supporters of arms control have argued that a precondition for bringing the arms race under control is the emergence of stability in the Eastern as well as the Western bloc. In effect, this view holds that the chances of disarmament are maximized if the number of conflicts in the world is reduced to only one, that between the US and the USSR. And in fact the present renewal of the Cold War could easily be viewed as the result of the loosening of both countries’ empires, with the consequent instability giving greater influence to the hawks in both camps. Yet there are grave dangers in any attempt to make our hopes for world peace dependent on the reconstitution of a bipolar alignment. In the first place, this would be to give a blank check to US interventionism in any noncommunist country it chooses to exert its power in. Secondly, the process of fragmentation — in particular, the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as powerful economic rivals of the US — has obviously gone too far to be halted even if this were desirable.

Realistic hopes for an easing of international tensions, thus, have to start with the reality of fragmentation. The leaders of the European Nuclear Disarmament movement have recognized this and have supported the Polish workers while demanding a hands-off policy by the Soviets. The policies advocated by the END, in fact, would make an invasion far less likely: END and other groups like it have mobilized powerful opposition to the deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union’s fear for its national security, and its desire for a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, have a basis in historical reality. Aside from support for democratic oppositional movements in Eastern Europe, the best way for concerned people in the West to help loosen the Soviet grip is to work to reduce the American military presence in Europe. That way, the exact course of events in Eastern Europe will have much less military significance to the Soviet Union.

Although we had not planned it this way, it seems to us fitting that Cedric Robinson’s analysis and appreciation of Amilcar Cabral, part of our biography series, appears together with the materials on the Polish uprising. Cabral was the leader of the independence movement of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands from the late 1950s to his assassination by the Portuguese secret police in 1973. One of the themes common to the Polish and Guinean experiences is that social move-
ments can emerge and grow unexpectedly and unpredictably. Part of Cabral’s contribution was his unorthodox perception of the importance of these spontaneous expressions of popular aspirations. Both the Polish movement and the African struggles against Portuguese colonialism also share an emphasis on the possibilities of popular self-determination and self-organization.

There is a tendency for Westerners to view East European as well as African struggles through the bifocal lenses of the Cold War, seeing these countries as mere turf for superpower conflicts and their movements as subordinated to those conflicts. One of Cabral’s major claims and challenges to non-Africans was that the movement he led was first a national one, a struggle for the Guinean and Cape Verdean people.

Cabral was probably the most important figure in the victorious struggle to end Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Although Guinea-Bissau is one of the smaller countries in Africa, its liberation movement was the strongest and earliest of all those in the Portuguese colonies; and it was the first to win independence, making it an inspirational example to FRELIMO in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola. Cabral was the organizer and leader of Guinea’s revolution.

Cabral was also the most important theoretician of this generation of African socialist leaders (although his contributions are sometimes not clearly discerned as they were so much a part of his practice). He made thoughtful contributions about the role of peasants and intellectuals, which Robinson addresses centrally in the article we publish here. Cabral also emphasized greatly the importance of a kind of prefigurative practice of democracy and self-government within the liberated territories of a rural guerrilla war; of women’s liberation; of the need to build a culture of independence and self-respect simultaneous with political independence. Indeed, he emphasized that political independence from Portugal did not guarantee the kind of social transformation the Guinean people needed. That the victories over Portugal have not produced easy roads for Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola would have been no surprise to Cabral.

There are many important reasons for drawing attention to Cabral and the African liberation movements here. It has been too easy for Africa almost to drop out of the consciousness of white US socialists. Before the late 1960s, despite a growing, militant, and rapidly learning antiimperialist movement in the US, New Left activists were remarkably ignorant of African liberation struggles. The early 1960s uprisings in the Portuguese colonies passed virtually unnoticed in this country and received no educational support; even the great wave of struggle in South Africa at that time was marginal to US leftists. Today the white-dominated Left is again relatively inactive regarding African events and struggles. The world situation today is complex, and there are so many antiimperialist movements that tracking them all is difficult. Still, this blindness toward Africa is part of a passive racism on the part of the American Left that is debilitating.

Thus one very important reason for radical education about Africa is its importance for Afro-Americans. Afro-American concern for Africa reminds us that what we have to learn about is not merely another arena of antiimperialist struggle, but other cultures and the importance of cultural transformation generally. Africa is important, also, (as Poland might become) as the site of important attempts to break with a two-model version — communism and capitalism — of the alternatives for social organization. “African socialism,”
Ireneusz Pierzgalski, from the series, The Reader
UNDERSTANDING THE POLISH REVOLT

An Interview with Daniel Singer and Marta Petrusiewicz

How would you compare the strike movement in July and August of 1980 with the uprisings in 1970 and 1976?

DS: When I went to Poland my purpose was to see as many people as possible who were participants in the events of the summer. I wanted to meet with both the workers' leaders in various places and the "experts" who were helping the workers in negotiations, so that I could get as much information as I could about the strikes.

What was most striking was the quiet self-assurance of the workers, and what I would call the ripening of the movement compared to 1970 and 1976. In the earlier uprisings, people responded to increased food prices by burning Party headquarters or, in 1976, stopping the railways. In 1980 people stayed in their factories and avoided a provocation.

One revealing example is the non-drinking. Now, Poland is not the most sober of countries. Since the events my friends tell me that they drink less, now that they have a more hopeful perspective. Whereas in the past, during general strikes, there was drunkenness, this time around the strike committees banned the sale of alcohol — not just in the factories, but throughout the town.

Another example. In Poland dislike of the Russians is by now something phenomenal. Yet in July and August there were no anti-Soviet speeches in public. There was no scribbling on the walls, no "Russians go home."

A third example is what happened in Gdansk itself between the first and second weeks of
the strike. On the first day of the strike, a Thursday, the only demands were the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz and some other people who were fired for political reasons, and 1,000 zlotys. That escalated very quickly; but there was no question at the time of asking for independent trade unions, except for a handful of people who belonged to the Committee for Free Trade Unions. Ten days later, when the so-called experts were coming from Warsaw to partake in the negotiations, it didn’t cross their minds that you could have independent unions. They were all coming with the idea that on this issue of free unions one would have to look for a compromise. But as soon as they arrived, the reaction they had, from the first workers they saw up to the presidium of the strike committee, was that everything else was negotiable but the independent unions were not.

What I found fascinating was that this evolution happened in ten days. On one side it shows the importance of active minorities. But I don’t think this is sufficient to explain it; there must have been something in the back of people’s minds. It shows how quickly ideas change in a social movement; and for us I think one of the lessons is that one shouldn’t say, “It’s impossible.”

I was also struck by the youth of the working class. If you take the strike committee in Gdansk, Walesa, its chairman, was a relatively old man at thirty-seven. His two vice-presidents were twenty-eight and twenty at the time of the events. The numerical strength of the movement was also striking, as well as the shoestring budget on which it was run.

MP: I would like to say something about the rapid development of the workers’ demands. What struck me was that in a very short time there was an incredibly rapid learning process. The workers involved had never had an independent union and were not used to the process of bargaining. They are too young to remember the union struggles before the war, and don’t have many ways of learning the prewar traditions of the unions. It’s like a new working class.

The articulation of the union’s basic structure was incredibly rapid. Workers quickly learned the language of bargaining: making demands, distinguishing between political and immediate demands, and organizing the broadcasting of news. This network, of course, was helped by the independent press, in existence since 1976, and the networks of individuals exchanging information, though I wouldn’t want to overemphasize the importance of independent papers like Robotnik or organizations like KOR.

DS: We should also comment on the role the government played in the strikes, and the difference between its attitude toward the events of 1980 and the earlier strikes. The government had taken on the working class in 1970, and to its great surprise found that they had to grant the working class a sort of veto power over price increases. Then, in 1976, this veto was confirmed; and it is clear that the government decided to bypass the working class to conceal the inflation in different ways, for instance setting up “commercial shops” selling at higher prices.

In 1980, the government didn’t want a confrontation. It gave orders to all factory managers: If you get workers who grumble, give in, give them wage increases so that we don’t have a new confrontation. What the rulers assumed was that they could isolate the strikes, that nobody would know about them.

But information did circulate, partly because of what happened in 1976, but also because people were telephoning Kuron of the KOR (the
Committee for Defense of the Workers) saying, “We’re going to have a strike....” This information was then passed on to journalists, and that same evening was broadcast by Radio Free Europe of the BBC. Therefore the effect of the government’s action was exactly the opposite of what it had hoped.

There arose a joke in Poland, that Lenin had got it wrong when he said, “He who doesn’t work doesn’t eat.” Here, in our more sophisticated country, he who doesn’t strike doesn’t eat meat. There was one special weapon in the arsenal of the government: whenever there was a strike, they would send trucks of meat. There was a story that when the strike started in Lublin the government sent lots of meat, and after the people got that meat, they ended the strike. But when they got home and finished eating, they thought, “We’re behaving like dogs; they’ve given us a bone and bought us off” — and they went back on strike the day after. It’s a rather nice story, and it’s half-true. The half that is true is that they did get meat, and it was marvelous. They hadn’t seen such veal before, and the shops were open after hours. They actually went on strike three times after that, but it wasn’t because of this incident, but because the government didn’t keep some of its promises. Yet, when I talked to people in that region, they explained the truth of the story to me. There were two periods. In the first the workers were so surprised by their victories that they would take whatever was given to them. Then the people began to think. Solidarity developed, and with it the growth of political awareness.

There was another way in which the government itself “organized” the strikes. The Gdansk agreement, giving the workers the right to form independent trade unions, was signed on August 31st. But the government was very ambiguous in its position on whether the agreement would apply just to the Gdansk region, or whether everybody would have the right to independent unions. Therefore it provoked strikes all over the country, which demanded wages and the solution of local grievances, plus the right to independent unions. Thus the government itself provoked a shifting general strike.

MP: To return to the question, one of the differences between the most recent strikes and those of 1970 and 1976 was simply the memory of those earlier victories. For the first time, in 1970, the workers had defeated the govern-
ment; and since then, 1976 and 1980, the workers were convinced that they would win and that the government couldn’t do anything to them.

On other social levels, the initial demands were not very political. The universities had been purged in 1968 and 1969, and it will take some time to reach the level of political tension that existed in the 1960s.

DS: The 1970 strike, despite the dead and wounded, became a conscious symbol. Once the Polish nobility had a veto power over the king; this time, and this was more important, the workers had conquered veto power. The authorities were conscious of this, and knew
that price increases were something that could bring the working class into the streets. Faced with the riots that followed the price increases of 1976, the government surrendered at once.

Is the factory the exclusive center of organization for the working class, or are there community- or neighborhood-based organizations as well? And are other workers involved in the strike movement in addition to industrial workers?

DS: In an economy like an Eastern European economy only the workers have the strength to react. We could go on to say that in 1970 there were specific reasons why the strike began in Gdansk and at the shipyards. There were changes in production standards introduced in shipbuilding. The authorities decided that the economy needed to be streamlined, and since the workers were getting quite a lot of their wages on the basis of overtime, they were going to eliminate some of this overtime. Thus you had the combination of a cut in nominal wages for people working in the shipyards, at the same time that the government made its mad move to have sharp price increases just before Christmas, as if the rulers deliberately wanted to provoke the workers. No one knew at the time that the reaction by the workers would have such an immediate impact: the authorities reacted by shooting, and yet the political leadership collapsed within a week.

Solidarity today has become the biggest independent union in the world in proportion to the workforce. Nobody knows the exact figure, but it must be that nine out of ten who are employed for wages are in Solidarity. Though other groups in society are beginning to crystallize their own demands, the industrial workers were and still are representing the interests of society as a whole. From the beginning, Solidarity has created its own organized democracy. There were different ways of electing committees at this time, but each shop had its own representative or delegate to the general committee at the Gdansk shipyard, which increasingly represented factories throughout the area. At first there were three delegates per factory, but when they discovered how far the strike had spread, there was room for only one each. The workers very rapidly invented democratic organs with only a distant tradition to guide them.

MP: I would say that in Poland we don’t have community or neighborhood organizations. But what is very interesting is that from the beginning the strike committees and Solidarity chapters were representing not only the issues arising immediately at the workplace, but also those arising elsewhere. In many factories there were discussions of the conditions of work in hospitals, for example, or about issues concerning family life, education, maternity leaves, and the problems confronted by women.

Of course there are direct connections between “factory” and “community” issues. But there remain important differences between men and women in this regard. For example, after the government realized its mistake in raising food prices in 1970 right at Christmas, it became wiser; in 1976 it tried to increase prices in June, right before people were about to go away on vacation. For working men the increase in prices affects the family budget, the level of subsistence. They could be pacified by Giererek with promises of going back to piece-work, of not changing methods of production, and so forth. Most workers were willing to give in on the immediate problem of prices, but the strike became a symbolic question of defiance: they didn’t want to take it anymore. For women, it was much more of an immediate
issue. The women textile workers in Lodz, for example, told Jaroszewicz: “You try going to the store; you try to go to the empty shelves, and see that nothing is there!”

The question of white collar and professional workers is very complex. In societies like those of Eastern Europe, which are societies of scarcity, you have very different interests represented within these categories. Intellectuals in Poland, for example, have a fairly high degree of access to privileges. Their main issues concern freedom of speech, or the injustice and inequality in different degrees of access to information. Technicians have many obstacles to meet: they run into a lot of bureaucracy in their work, though on an economic level they don’t have the problems of the industrial workers. Nurses and teachers are in still a different category. Teachers have a special place in the history of Poland. They were the ones who maintained the values of national sovereignty during the years when the Polish nation was oppressed. There was also a really great socialist tradition among teachers. They have been especially humiliated in the years after World War II, very oppressed by dogma and bureaucracy. Nurses, hospital personnel, and clerks are almost all women, and are the worst paid. A nurse gets about 2,500 zlotys a month, while the average workers gets about 7,500. As these workers are mostly women, they suffer not only from low wages, but also from inadequate childcare, long lines and shortages in the shops, and shortages of nurseries and apartments.

So within the general category of “white collar worker” there are really several very different class situations. I think that among these workers the differences of goals, of demands, will emerge first in the course of the workers movement.

Let me elaborate a little on the situation of the intellectuals. There will be a split soon, I think, between those who can be satisfied on a pretty low level, and those — the “dissidents” — who would identify more with the general culture of the broad social movements. There has recently been some activity at the universities, where there are demands to remove some of the most hated people from the period of repression in the late 1960s. The chairman of the University of Warsaw has been removed, for example, and the new chairman was elected by the academic hierarchy, in quite a democratic way, with the approval of Solidarity “experts.” And recently there was a mass demonstration at the University of Warsaw on the thirteenth anniversary of the mass purges there. A plaque was put up in memory of the people removed in 1968.

DS: Solidarity has been very important in helping to link the different parts of the working class. For example, nurses were in a larger sense defended by the workers. If you look at the Gdansk charter and its twenty-one demands, for example, there is a very long passage about the social services. This is partly because one of the women on the strike committee was a nurse. Yet it is significant that the workers did fight for the interests of the nurses and health service workers, who are very badly paid. And I heard at a meeting in Walbrzych the representative of the miners was saying, “Why do we get special parcels and the nurses don’t?”

There is also a consciousness among many intellectuals that their privileges depend on the broader workers movement. I was at a meeting in Warsaw which included moderate oppositionists as well as open “dissidents.” One speaker (Karol Modzelewski) mentioned that it was possible that they would get certain privileges in the present struggle, and that these concessions might be quite interesting. We may
once again, he said, have the opportunity of choosing professors at the university, of having a certain autonomy there. It’s not negligible; but we should remember that we already had these privileges once and were deprived of them. Why we were deprived of them was as a result of changes in the balance of social forces, and therefore our position should be that we should never do anything that decreases the power of the social movement, because it’s only by the power of that movement that we are where we are today.

Given that Solidarity represents a broad social movement containing many different interests, what kind of strains is this coalition under, and how long can its unity last?

DS: Whatever the strains and divisions may be inside Solidarity, they don’t come to the surface now simply because of the government, which has been the unifying factor in the workers movement. Let us imagine a situation on the 31st of August, at the end of the strike. Forced to accept this fantastic historical compromise, the government could have turned to Solidarity and said, “Look, we’ve granted you political things, wage increases, and a reduction in working hours. Now we must sit down together and see what we can do about it.” You would then have had a situation where a lot of healthy strains and differences would have appeared in Solidarity. But the rulers did just the opposite. They would provoke the workers; and when the workers threatened to strike, the government would yield. That’s the story of the last six months, except for the period since the new government was chosen. The effect of this has been to unite Solidarity on the most radical positions. Among the workers there are those who say, “You can’t talk to those bastards, because they only understand when we threaten them,” while others were saying, “Let’s be wary, maybe this is too dangerous, and there’s always the danger of a Russian invasion.” Each time the day was carried by those with a more radical view. When you combine this with the fact that on the whole the rank and file is more radical than the leadership, then the cracks and shades of differences which exist will only come to the surface when the government tries to compromise.

MP: I think that people in the leadership of Solidarity, like Walesa, who are close to the

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Josef Mroszczak, *The Icon in Poland and Its Transmutations*, 1967
government because of their bargaining position, realize that it is not possible to solve all the problems of the country all at once, and that their solutions depend on national bargaining by a truly national Solidarity. That is why the leadership is more willing to accept participation in the government, sharing responsibilities, and why they are more willing to accept control of strikes in the interests of social peace. Yet when you go further from the center of the workers’ organizations, you find people striking over local issues by calling a regional strike.

The leadership of Solidarity feels that these strikes are dangerous and provoking. But while the government seems to get wiser in some ways, they continue to make stupid moves. For example, they fire five people from a hospital in Lodz. And Solidarity has to go on strike, because they know that if they start accepting the firing of people, that’s it, so they know that they can’t give in.

DS: When you look at conditions on the local level, you get a sense of the differences between the leadership and the rank and file. Nationally Solidarity knows that it can’t seize power, but locally they know that they can’t give in. This doesn’t mean that people at the top are more moderate or compromisers, but they are more aware of certain dangers. At the local level, on the other hand, there is a sense that the government is crying wolf. “If you do that, the Russians will intervene.” And after a certain point, people say that the Russians will never intervene. While I was in Gdansk somebody in Solidarity told me, “You know there are Russian military ships in Gdynia. It’s because there’s a meeting of the Central Committee in Warsaw. It’s to frighten them. It doesn’t apply to us; it’s something between the Central Committee and the Soviet Union....”

How has the radicalization process affected the farmers, and what connection does their movement have with that of the industrial workers?”

DS: What is the basis of the existing unity between the peasants and workers? At the moment this unity exists because the workers, as none will deny, have won a victory for everyone. At the same time the industrial workers in Solidarity are saying that peasant farmers must have the right to build their own association. In economic terms there is a latent conflict here, but the present collaboration comes from the leading role of the workers, who have won for everyone the capacity to maneuver, the room for freedom.

MP: The Polish peasantry is a conservative peasantry. But they constantly meet obstacles from the state. For example, the farmer is provided with land, but not the means to properly cultivate it. They don’t have medical assistance; a few years ago they had to sign a form leaving their land in inheritance to the state to get the right to pensions. Or they don’t have fertilizers, and to get them they have to sign papers saying they will sell their products to the state.

DS: To sign the agreement in Gdansk, the government had to say that the workers could have a union, independent of the party and employers. That was a lot to swallow, but settlements with the peasants, who are private property owners, that is another thing! So to save face they call it not a “union,” but an “association.” But the real question is, what room do they have to maneuver and organize? That is the difference, not the name. I would be surprised if in the next few months one of the main points of dispute isn’t over the development of Rural Solidarity, particularly because
the Church is backing them more than they are the other Solidarity.

Many people in this country are concerned about the growing power of the Church of Poland. How would you assess the influence of the Church and the importance of Catholicism in Poland at this time?

MP: Catholicism is nearly universal in Poland, and the Catholic Church has a unique history and position in Polish society. To be Catholic means to preserve Polish traditions and sovereignty against our German Protestant and Russian Orthodox neighbors.

For over 150 years the Polish Church was in the unique position of not being allied with the dominant powers in society. During the period when Poland was divided among other countries, when the Polish "nation" no longer existed (1795 - 1918), the Church was the preserver of Polish identity. True, during the brief period between the wars, when the Polish nation was restored, the Church did not behave so brilliantly. But it was a very short period; and again under the German occupation during World War II, the Church moved into opposition again and regained its virginity.

In the years immediately after World War II, because of the rapid urbanization of Polish society, the control of the Church over education and family life diminished somewhat, although people would remain nominally Catholic. But in recent years the number of people who consider themselves Catholics has been increasing, not diminishing.

In order to preserve the influence that it has regained, the Church has had to support the workers. Though the Church is theologically conservative, and against reforms or liberalization from within, it has had no option but to support the strikers. Church support for the dissidents was important; and its papers were the only ones in which dissidents could publish.

DS: I would go even further than Marta, and say that the second virginity of the Church was given to it by the Communist Party. As the Polish Party became an instrument of exploitation and oppression, the Church appeared to the masses of Polish people as the element of social resistance to that, and not as an institution allied with forces of social oppression. And Catholicism as an intellectual force and cultural institution is extremely strong, stronger than it's been before. For example, when we talk about the "experts," the advisers to the strikers, three of the seven were Catholics.

For these reasons, the Church is in a good but also in a very difficult position right now. It is stronger than it was before the war, because at that time there were elements of opposition to the Church in the Socialist Party and among the intelligentsia, and this has now disappeared. But there is the temptation for the Church to align itself with the Party, and if it does this too much it will lose the position that it has acquired. During the events of August, for example, the Church was very fearful of Soviet intervention. But when Cardinal Wyszynski tried to tell the strikers to end the strike, he was not followed. Similarly, there is the temptation for the Party to use the Church as a moderating influence and as a third partner in the stalemate. The risk for the Church here is that it would lose all the "moral" gains that it has made for the last twenty-five years.

MP: Since 1976 the Church has been given some recognition of its power in society. Gierek was pretty explicit about this when he said, "What we have in common is stronger than what is dividing us."
The question of how much the Party can give up to the Church is an absolutely unideological question. At this point the Church is not concerned with Marxism-Leninism, or with ideology, or even with the workers. The Church hierarchy wants to have something to say about education and morality. They want to be assured some freedom of publication. They want the security of the Polish borders. And then there are rumors of a Christian Democratic Party.

What the Church is defending is obedience, control of family life, and the defense of rigid social structures, because they ensure the norm of obedience. The Church hierarchy doesn’t like the Western model of religion, and fears the rebellion of youth and the disintegration of the family. I think the state would rather willingly give up all the problems of education or abortion to the Church.

On the issue of abortion, the fact is that the Polish economy cannot afford large families. Everywhere, but particularly in towns, there is a lack of housing. Family planning is due in part to the fact that families don’t have a place to live. Young couples wait ten years for an apartment, living with their parents. Despite all of the Church’s antiabortion propaganda, therefore, people cannot afford to have a child every year. A second problem is that the work of both parents is necessary for the subsistence of the family, so women can’t afford to have children. Another problem is the lack of kindergartens. There is no place to send children up to the age of three. When there is daycare, women often have to take a child very far away, traveling up to two hours to a center. The alternative to this is sometimes provided by older people, grandmothers, but this is a limited resource.

What are the implications of the Polish events for the rest of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union?

DS: I don’t think we’ll see Warsaw Pact troops coming in. But more importantly, sooner or later similar things will take place in the other Eastern European countries. Whatever the particularities of the Polish situation — the role of the Church, the continued existence of a large peasantry, and so forth — the main reasons for what has happened are economic. These reasons will arise again and again in the coming years, as economic crises affect all of Eastern Europe as well as the rest of the world. The economic measures the political authorities will try will have political consequences, and the Polish example will become historically contagious.

In my opinion, in the long run the only chance for survival of the Polish labor movement, and the only chance to avoid conflict, will be if the Polish example spreads to the Soviet Union itself. This will be the beginning of the final battle for the whole of Europe, West as well as East.


MARTA PETRUSEWICZ is a Polish-Italian historian currently living in the United States. She was active in the Polish student movement of 1968.
The Solidarity Strike Bulletin carried out a number of interviews with workers at the Gdansk shipyards regarding the start of the strike in August 1980. Here are two of the interviews, reprinted from Bulletin No. 11, August 29, 1980. The “Bogdan” referred to in the first interview is Bogdan Borusewicz, editor of Robotnik and activist in the Gdansk chapter of the Committee of the Free Trade Unions of the Gdansk Region, which had drawn up a significant “Charter of Workers’ Rights” in 1977.

FIRST INTERVIEW

How did the strike begin?

We agreed with Bogdan that on 14 August we would arrive at work an hour early. We wanted to hang up a number of posters in the cloakrooms about the sacking of Anna Walentynowicz and demanding a wage increase of 1,000 zlotys, together with a cost-of-living supplement. The posters with this information were made by the Movement of Young Poland. In total we had seven of them. I arrived first. Kajik arrived a little while later, with whom I had arranged the day before. Kajik works in Department W3. We went there first of all, where we hung the posters under the clocking-in clock, following which Kajik and a number of his mates stood around guarding the poster, so that no one would tear it down. In the meantime I went back to my department, where I waited for Bogdan. Because he was late I decided to begin on my own. I pasted up the posters and hung them on the doors of a
cloakroom, and then went into other cloakrooms where I also hung them. While I was hanging the posters up people started congratulating me.

**Did the people feel that there was likely to be a strike?**

No, but previously we’d informed a small group of trusted people. But in the morning there was talk in the shipyards of a strike.

**How did the people take this?**

Very well. They asked us detailed questions. Small groups of people started to form meetings with the foremen. I started to inform them that the strike had begun in the whole shipyard and we were meeting outside in the square.

**Did the foremen see the posters?**

Yes, clearly. Everybody could see them. Even the management.

**Did the management attempt to act against them in some way?**

No, because around the posters groups of workers stood around, so management was frightened to intervene. Despite that the first fifteen minutes were rather tense. The foremen did attempt to intervene. So I went to one of the brigades where I knew some of the people and started to explain what we were fighting about. The majority agreed with me. At the request of the foremen, who had started to feel that something was about to happen, we moved away and started to group by the cloakroom. Soon a group of around thirty people formed up, with a similar sized group next to it, by the cloakroom. Fearing that this group might disperse I went up to them and started to explain about the strike. I explained that the whole shipyard was beginning the strike and that the question was an increase in pay and the matter of Mrs. Walentynowicz, who had been thrown out of work unjustly. As I talked people began to gain in self-confidence.

“Let’s go,” I said to them. Then a group of around fifty people moved out. We made a banner, and just then the Director arrived and asked what the hell was going on.

“Director,” I replied, “we’re on strike.”

“Why strike? Why? What’s going on?” to which I replied, “Can’t you read?” and showed him the poster. I left him with a number of workers who had a declaration on the question of Anna. I went off trying to group other people. When I returned the Party Secretary of the department, Mazurkiewicz, had arrived and was attempting to take away the banner. But the lads were quicker than him and prevented him. The Secretary shouted, “What’s the meaning of this?,” to which they replied “none of your business.” Somebody shoved a number of leaflets into his hand, and everybody surrounded him and started to laugh, because it looked as if the Party Secretary was handing out leaflets. But I shouted at them to take them away, because I didn’t want the leaflets to be found in such unworthy hands. When the Secretary left I picked up the banner and led the lads outside into the square. All this had occurred on the terrain of our department.

People were sitting around the square. Suddenly the Deputy Director of the department, Bryczkowski, arrived. This mobilized people. They stood up and started to mill around in the center of the square. Others joined them. When a large group had been formed a signal was given from a crane. It was a small siren put on for a joke. The Director started to get angry. “What’s going on? Go back to work!” he shouted. But nobody wanted to listen to him. Somebody shouted, “Have a look at the banner and then you will know what is going on!” A locomotive arrived. It stopped beside us and the driver started to clap. With those formed up on the square we moved toward the hall of the prefabrication
department. We waited there for five minutes, when suddenly George and his group arrived. More and more people started to leave the hall. After a while the foremen arrived and started to push people back inside; but the whole of the hall had stopped work. People had left their hammers and were putting away their tools and joining us.

SECOND INTERVIEW

How did the strike begin?

I arrived at the shipyards at 4:15. Up until the day of the strike I hadn’t told anybody that it was due to begin. In my department there was a majority of Party members and I was worried in case somebody informed the authorities and the strike would fail. I waited, therefore, till the last moment. On the day of the strike I arranged to meet Ludwig. I was the only one from the department. I hung up seven posters and gave five to Ludwig. After doing that I arranged the leaflets, of which I had about five hundred, gave one to everybody who entered, saying, “Take one and read it. Today the whole shipyard is striking.”

Did the leaflet mention that today there was going to be a strike?

No, but I had asked the people I trusted the day before what they would do in the event of a strike. Many of them indicated that they would strike, and it was to those people I gave the leaflets, saying, “Hand them out to other people.” At 5:45 the group formed up by the cloakrooms, about thirty people. Some of them were worried and started saying that the strike would fail; “Why doesn’t a larger department begin the strike?,” to which I replied that departments K3 and K4 were already on strike. Then someone said, “We’re not standing here any longer. Let’s go back to the hall.” I tried to stop this, but couldn’t on my own. But I was aware that if they were to return to the hall where the foremen stood, where the First Secretary and member of the Central Committee Jan Labedzki was, everything could fail. People started to return to the machines and turn them on. I went up to them saying, “Let’s go to K3
and K4. They’ve both stopped.” It was a shot in the dark because I wasn’t certain that anything had happened yet... but I only wanted to get them to follow me.

At last the workers decided. “Okay, let’s go!” But even though they stopped the machines, they still hesitated. Finally, the urge to get out won the day. Thirty or so people gathered together and we left. I took the posters with me. We reached the canteen and then continued on our way throughout the shipyard. Everywhere people were coming out to see what was happening. We shouted to them: “Leave your machines and come with us!” A good number did join us, and our now rather larger group crossed the bridge. People were coming off the ships. They had already stopped work, and yet they hesitated to join us. “We’re not working,” they said “but we can’t join you yet.” It was obvious that they were afraid. We reached department K3, and there we saw a group of people gathered together. This boosted our morale: we were already sure of success, and shouted: “Hurrah! Hurrah!” People working in the construction offices looked at us through the windows. A crowd was gathered outside, and we went with it to department K3.

A crowd? That’s what, about a hundred people?

Oh yes! I wanted someone to speak to the people. That would have fired them more, but we weren’t in a hurry. We arrived with our banner at the far end of the shipyard, where the director, Wojcik, was already waiting. His first words were “What does this mean?” I answered, “It’s a strike!” “What’s it all about?” I said, “The sacking of Anna Walentynowicz.” “Anna Walentynowicz?” the director asked. “You know who she is? She was sacked without notice. Someone like her: she has three order of merit decorations, one in bronze, one in silver, and one in gold. She’s got thirty years’ work behind her, and she’s only got five months before she retires.” The director started to move back. Bogdan said to him, “We won’t talk to you for the moment, sir.” We went on and left the director in the crowd. We put our men on the bridge to see that the road was not cut. A lot of people joined our demonstration. We arrived near the gate, where we observed a minute’s silence in memory of the victims of 1970. Then we sang the national anthem. Then we went to the excavator, and after we climbed up it was immediately surrounded by the crowd. We gave a speech.
"We have to elect a strike committee. We need people we can trust, who have authority in the work brigades. Let them come forward." Then the director appeared with his retinue. Since the director was beneath the excavator, we helped him to climb up. But when the director started to speak, Leszek Walesa suddenly appeared. The director didn’t see him, for he had climbed on to the excavator from behind. Leszek went up to the director and asked him solemnly, "Do you recognize me? I worked for ten years in the shipyard, and I still consider myself to be a docker. I have been given the trust of all the workers. It is already four years since I have been without a job." And he continued, "We shall hold a sit-in strike!"

At these words, loud hurrahs echoed everywhere. Afterwards, we asked that the director’s car should bring Mrs. Anna Walentynowicz back to the shipyard. The director protested, but we imposed our will and the director’s car went off in search of Mrs. Anna. As for us, we went off to the local transmitting center. That is how the strike began.

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The Gdansk Agreement, August 31, 1980

(Here is the full text of the historic agreement between the Interfactory Strike Committee, or MKS, and the Government, ending the Gdansk strike on August 31, 1980. The subheadings were added by us. — eds.)

(This protocol was signed on behalf of the strikers by Lech Walesa (President of the MKS), Andrzej Kolodziej and Bogdan Lis (Vice-Presidents), Mr. and Mrs. L. Badkowski, W. Gruszewski, A. Gwiazda, S. Izdebski, J. Kmiecik, Z. Kobylniski, H. Krzywonos, S. Lewandowski, A. Pienkowska, Z. Pzbylski, J. Sikorski, L. Sobieszek, T. Stanny, A. Walentynowicz, and F. Wisniewski.

It was signed for the Governmental commission by: President Mieczeslaw Jagielski (Vice Prime Minister), M. Zielinski, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PUWP, T. Fiszbach, President of the Party committee of Gdansk Voivod, and the Mayor of Gdansk, J. Kołodzieski.)

The governmental commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), after studying the twenty-one demands of the workers of the coast who are on strike, have reached the following conclusions:

Trade Unions

On Point No. 1, which reads "To accept trade unions as free and independent of the party, as laid down in Convention No. 87 of the ILO and ratified by Poland, which refers to the matter of trade union rights," the following decision has been reached:

(1) The activity of the trade unions of People’s Poland has not lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the workers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create new union organizations, which will run themselves, and which will be authentic expressions of the working class. Workers will continue to have the right to join the old trade unions and we are looking at the possibility of the two union structures
cooperating.

(2) The MKS declares that it will respect the principles laid down in the Polish Constitution while creating the new independent and self-governing unions. These new unions are intended to defend the social and material interests of the workers, and not to play the role of a political party. They will be established on the basis of the socialization of the means of production and of the socialist system which exists in Poland today. They will recognize the leading role of the PUWP in the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances. Their aim is to ensure for the workers the necessary means for the determination, expression, and defense of their interests. The governmental commission will guarantee full respect for the independence and self-governing character of the new unions in their organizational structures and their functioning at all levels. The government will ensure that the new unions have every possibility of carrying out their function of defending the interests of the workers and of seeking the satisfaction of their material, social, and cultural needs. Equally it will guarantee that the new unions are not the objects of any discrimination.

(3) The creation and functioning of free and self-governing trade unions is in line with Convention 87 of the ILO relating to trade union rights and Convention 97, relating to the rights of free association and collective negotiation, both of which conventions have been ratified by Poland. The coming into being of more than one trade union organization requires changes in the law. The government, therefore, will make the necessary legal changes as regards trade unions, workers’ councils, and the labor code.

(4) The strike committee must be able to turn themselves into institutions representing the workers at the level of the enterprise, whether in the fashion of workers’ councils or as preparatory committees of the new trade unions. As a preparatory committee, the MKS is free to adopt the form of a trade union, or of an association of the coastal region. The preparatory committees, will remain in existence until the new trade unions are able to organize proper elections to leading bodies. The government undertakes to create the conditions necessary for the recognition of unions outside of the existing Central Council of Trade.

(5) The new trade unions should be able to participate in decisions affecting the conditions of the workers in such matters as the division of the national assets between consumption and accumulation, the division of the social consumption fund (health, education, culture), the wages policy, in particular with regard to an automatic increase of wages in line with inflation, the economic plan, the direction of investment, and prices policy. The government undertakes to ensure the conditions necessary for the carrying out of these functions.

(6) The enterprise committee will set up a research center whose aim will be to engage in an objective analysis of the situation of the workers and employees, and will attempt to determine the correct ways in which their interests can be represented. This center will also provide the information and expertise necessary for dealing with such questions as the prices index and wages index and the forms of compensation required to deal with price rises. The new unions should have their own publications.

(7) The government will enforce respect for Article I, paragraph 1 of the trade union law of 1949, which guarantees the workers the right to freely come together to form trade unions. The new trade union will not join the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). It is agreed that the new trade union law will respect these
principles. The participation of members of the MKS and of the preparatory committees for the new trade unions in the elaboration of the new legislation is also guaranteed.

The Right to Strike

On Point No. 2, which reads "To guarantee the right to strike, and the security of strikers and those who help them," it has been agreed that:

The right to strike will be guaranteed by the new trade union law. The law will have to define the circumstances in which strikes can be called and organized, the ways in which conflicts can be resolved, and the penalties for infringements of the law. Articles 52, 64, and 65 of the labor code (which outlaw strikes) will cease to have effect from now until the new law comes into practice. The government undertakes to protect the personal security of strikers and those who have helped them and to ensure against any deterioration in their conditions of work.

Freedom of Expression

With regard to Point No. 3, which reads "To respect freedom of expression and publication, as upheld by the Constitution of People's Poland, and to take no measures against independent publications, as well as to grant access to the mass media to representatives of all religions," it has been agreed that:

(1) The government will bring before the Sejm (Parliament) within three months a proposal for a law on control of the press, of publications, and of other public manifestations, which will be based on the following principles: censorship must protect the interests of the state. This means the protection of state secrets, and of economic secrets in the sense that these will be defined in the new legislation, the protection of state interests and its international interests, the protection of religious convictions, as well as the rights of non-believers, as well as the suppression of publications which offend against morality.

The proposals will include the right to make a complaint against the press-control and similar institutions to a higher administrative tribunal. This law will be incorporated in an amendment to the administrative code.

(2) The access to the mass media by religious organizations in the course of their religious activities will be worked out through an agree-
ment between the state institutions and the religious associations on matters of content and of organization. The government will ensure the transmission by radio of the Sunday mass through a specific agreement with the Church hierarchy.

(3) The radio and television as well as the press and publishing houses must offer expression to different points of views. They must be under the control of society.

(4) The press as well as citizens and their organizations, must have access to public documents, and above all to administrative instructions and socio-economic plans, in the form in which they are published by the government and by the administrative bodies which draw them up. Exceptions to the principle of open administration will be legally defined in agreement with Point No. 3 paragraph 1.

**Firings**

With regard to Point No. 4 which reads “To reestablish the rights of people who were sacked after the strikes in 1970 and 1976 and of students who have been excluded from institutions of higher education because of their opinions, (b) to free all political prisoners, including Edmund Zadrożyński, Jan Kozłowski, and Marek Kozłowski; (c) to cease repression against people for their opinions”; it has been agreed:

(1) to immediately investigate the reasons given for the sackings after the strikes of 1970 and 1976. In every case where injustice is revealed, the person involved must be reinstated, taking into account any new qualifications the person may have acquired. The same principle will be applied in the case of students.

(2) The cases of persons mentioned under point (b) should be put to the Ministry of

Justice, which within two weeks will study their dossiers. In cases where those mentioned are already imprisoned, they must be released pending this investigation, and until a new decision on their case is reached.

(3) to launch an immediate investigation into the reasons for the arrests of those mentioned (the three named individuals).

(4) to institute full liberty of expression in public and professional life.

**The Media**

On Point No. 5, which reads “To inform the public about the creation of the MKS and its
demands, through the mass media," it has been decided that:

This demand shall be met through the publication in all the national mass media of the full text of this agreement.

Economic Reforms

On Point No. 6, which reads "To implement the measures necessary for resolving the crisis, starting with the publication of all the relevant information on the socio-economic situation, and to allow all groups to participate in a discussion on a programme of economic reforms," the following has been agreed:

We consider it essential to speed up the preparation of an economic reform. The authorities will work out and publish the basic principles of such a reform in the next few months. It is necessary to allow for wide participation in a public discussion of the reform. In particular the trade unions must take part in the working out of laws relating to the enterprises and to workers' self-management. The economic reform must be based on the strengthening, autonomous operation, and participation of the workers' councils in management. Specific regulations will be drawn up in order to guarantee that the trade unions will be able to carry out their functions as set out in Point No. 1 of this agreement.

Only a society which has a firm grasp of reality can take the initiative in reforming the economy. The government will significantly increase the areas of socio-economic information to which society, the trade unions, and other social and economic organizations have access.

The MKS also suggests, in order that a proper perspective be provided for the development of the family agricultural units, which are the basis of Polish agriculture, that the individual and collective sectors of agriculture should have equal access to the means of production, including the land itself, and that the conditions should be created for the recreation of self-governing cooperatives.

Strike Pay

On Point No. 7, which reads "To pay all the workers who have taken part in the strike for the period of the strikes as if they were on paid holiday throughout this period, with payment to be made from the funds of the CRZZ," the following decision has been reached:

Workers and employees participating in the strike will receive, on their return to work, 40 percent of their wages. The rest, which will add up to a full 100 percent of the normal basic wage, will be calculated as would holiday pay, on the basis of an eight-hour working day. The MKS calls on workers who are members to work towards the increase of output, to improve the use of raw materials and energy, and to show greater work discipline, when the strike is over, and to do this in cooperation with the management of the factories and enterprises.

Minimum Wage

On Point No. 8, which reads "To increase the minimum wage for every worker by 2000 zlotys a month to compensate for the increase in prices," the following has been decided:

These wage increases will be introduced gradually, and will apply to all types of workers and employees and in particular to those who receive the lowest wages. The increases will be worked out through agreements in individual factories and branches. The implementation of the increases will take into account the specific character of particular professions and sectors. The intention will be to increase wages through
revising the wage scales or through increasing other elements of the wage.

White-collar workers in the enterprises will receive salary increases on an individual basis. These increases will be put into effect between now and the end of September 1980, on the basis of the agreements reached in each branch.

After reviewing the situation in all the branches, the government will present, by 31 October 1980, in agreement with the trade unions, a programme of pay increases to come into effect from 1 January 1981 for those who get the least at the moment, paying particular attention to large families.

Cost of Living

On Point No. 9, which reads “To guarantee the sliding scale,” the following decision has been reached:

It is necessary to slow down the rate of inflation through stricter control over both the public and private sectors, and in particular through the suppression of hidden price increases.

Following on from a government decision, investigations will be carried out into the cost of living. These studies will be carried out both by the trade unions and by scientific institutions. By the end of 1980, the government will set out the principles of a system of compensation for inflation, and these principles will be open to discussion by the public. When they have been accepted, they will come into effect. It will be necessary to deal with the question of the social minimum in elaborating these principles.

Food and Consumer Goods

On Point No. 10, which reads “To ensure the supply of products on the internal market, and to export only the surplus,” and Point No. 11, which reads “To suppress commercial prices and the use of foreign currency in sales on the internal market,” and Point No. 12, which reads “To introduce ration cards for meat and meat-based products, until the market situation can be brought under control,” the following agreement has been reached:

The supply of meat will be improved between now and 31 December 1980, through an increase in the profitability of agricultural production and the limitation of the export of meat to what is absolutely indispensable, as well as through the import of extra meat supplies. At the same time, during this period a programme for the improvement of the meat supply will be drawn up, which will take into account the possibility of the introduction of a rationing system through the issue of cards.

Products which are scarce on the national market for current consumption will not be sold in the “Pewex” shops; and between now and the end of the year, the population will be informed of all decisions which are taken concerning the problems of supply.

The MKS has called for the abolition of the special shops and the leveling-out of the price of meat and related products.

Special Privileges

On Point No. 13, which reads “To introduce the principle of cadre selection on the basis of qualifications, not on the basis of membership of the party, and to abolish the privileges of the police (MO) and the security services (SB), and of the party apparatus, through the abolition of special sources of supply, through the equalization of family allowances, etc.,” we have reached the following agreement:

The demand for cadres to be selected on the basis of qualifications and ability has been accepted. Cadres can be members of the PUWP, of the SD (the Democratic Party, which draws its membership from small private
enterprises), of the ZSL (the Peasant Party—these three parties make up the National Front), or of no party. A programme for the equalization of the family allowances of all the professional groups will be presented by the government before 31 December 1980. The governmental commission states that only employees’ restaurants and canteens, such as those in other work establishments and offices, are operated...

Retirement
On Point No. 14, which reads “To allow workers to retire at 50 years for women and 55 for men, or after 30 years of work for women, and 35 years for men, regardless of age,” it has been agreed that:

The governmental commission declares pensions will be increased each year taking into account the real economic possibilities and the rise in the lowest wages. Between now and 1 December 1981, the government will work out and present a programme on these questions. The government will work out plans for the increase of old age and other pensions up to the social minimum as established through studies carried out by scientific institutions; these will be presented to the public and submitted to the control of the trade unions.

The MKS stresses the great urgency of these matters and will continue to raise the demands for the increase of old age and other pensions taking into account the increase in the cost of living.

Pensions
On Point No. 15, which reads “To increase the old-style pensions to the level paid under the new system,” it has been agreed:

The governmental commission states that the lowest of pensions will be increased every year as a function of rises in the lowest wages. The government will present a programme to this effect between now and 1 December 1981. The government will draft proposals for a rise in the lowest pensions to the level of the social minimum as defined in studies made by scientific institutes. These proposals will be presented to the public and subject to control by the unions.

Health Services
On Point No. 16, which reads “To improve working conditions and the health services so as to ensure better medical protection for the workers,” it has been agreed that:

It is necessary to immediately increase the resources put into the sphere of the health services, to improve medical supplies through the import of basic materials where these are lacking, to increase the salaries of all health workers, and with the utmost urgency on the part of the government and the ministries, to prepare programmes for improving the health of the population. Other measures to be taken in this area are put forward in the appendix.

Childcare
On Point No. 17, which reads “To ensure sufficient places in creches and play schools for
the children of working women," it has been agreed that:

The governmental commission is fully in agreement with this demand. The provincial authorities will present proposals on this question before 30 November 1980.

Maternity Leave
On Point No. 18, which reads "To increase the length of maternity leave to three years to allow a mother to bring up her child," it has been decided that:

Before 31 December 1980, an analysis of the possibilities open to the national economy will be made in consultation with the trade unions, on the basis of which an increase in the monthly allowance for women who are on unpaid maternity leave will be worked out.

The MKS asks that this analysis should include an allowance which will provide 100 percent of pay for the first year after birth, and 50 percent the second year, with a fixed minimum of 2,000 zlotys a month. This goal should be gradually reached from the first half of 1981 onwards.

Housing
On Point No. 19, which reads "To reduce the waiting period for the allocation of housing," the following agreement has been reached:

The district authorities will present a programme of measures for improving the accommodation situation and for reducing the waiting list for receipt of accomodation, before 31 December 1980. These proposals will be put forward for a wide-ranging discussion in the district, and competent organizations, such as the Polish town planners association, the Central Association of Technicians, etc., will be consulted. The proposals should refer both to ways of using the present building enterprises and prefabricated housing factories, and to a thoroughgoing development of the industry's productive base. Similar action will be taken throughout the country.

Travel Allowance
On Point No. 20, which reads "To increase the traveling allowance from 40 to 100 zlotys, and to introduce a cost-of-living bonus," it has been agreed that:

An agreement will be reached on the question of raising the traveling allowance and compensation, to take effect from 1 January 1981. The proposals for this to be ready by 31 October 1980.

Free Saturdays
On Point No. 21, which reads "To make Saturday a holiday. In factories where there is continuous production, where there is a four-shift system, Saturday working must be compensated for by a commensurate increase in the number of holidays, or through the establishment of another free day in the week," it has been agreed that:

The principle that Saturday should be a free day should be put into effect, or another method of providing free time should be devised. This should be worked out by 31 December 1980. The measures should include the increase in the number of free Saturdays from the start of 1981. Other possibilities relating to this point are mentioned in the appendix, or appear in the submissions of the MKS.

After reaching the above agreements, it has also been decided that:

The Government undertakes:
- to ensure personal security and to allow both those who have taken part in the strike
and those who have supported it to return to their previous work under the previous conditions;
- to take up at the ministerial level the specific demands raised by the workers of all the enterprises represented in the MKS;
- to immediately publish the complete text of this agreement in the press, the radio, the television, and in the national mass media.

The strike committee undertakes to propose the ending of the strike from 5:00 p.m. on 31 August 1980.

Statement by the *Solidarity Strike Bulletin*

Since they are refusing, on one pretext or another, to let us broach problems termed political, we wish to clarify some of the ideas behind our demands. This seems all the more necessary to us, since the position of the government commission in this respect, as well as the attitude of the state, seems incomprehensible to us.

We consider that in the present situation there is no problem which is strictly economic, even when it’s a question of technical or immediate matters. Everything indeed which concerns the organization and the development of the economy leads inevitably to a changing of social relations. Each of us has only one life, limited in time, but in our enlightened, educated society, engaged in common matters, the consciousness of what social relations are is so great that lies and the omission of certain questions solve nothing. We therefore explain:

1. We know the world political situation, we know that we have duties linked to our membership in the socialist camp and the Warsaw Pact and that we have to stay loyal to them.

2. We believe that none of our allies has an interest in us having a badly organized economy or an ineffective and feeble social effort and system of labor. We think, on the contrary, that our allies will uphold our attempts to restore order to our economy and increase its effectiveness, which is our aim and one of the conditions of the improvement of our life.

3. We consider as a result that every allusion, more or less clear, to the anxiety of our allies and to the possible consequences of our action in the international sphere, constitute an offense to our allies and to our whole society. In our opinion such a way of posing problems may, whatever the intentions of those who make these allusions, serve the interest of a small group of evil-minded people.

4. The Polish worker of 1980 is a conscious, reasonable member of our society, whom one shouldn’t try to threaten or to calm down, for he can’t be frightened and he doesn’t create disorder. The calm, the moderation, and the discipline of the inhabitants of the coast during the last few days are the best proof of this. As for the support shown for our principles in spite of the inconveniences supported patiently by the population, it is the proof of the justice of our principles and the forms chosen to express them.

5. Our demands are designed neither to put in question the foundations of the socialist regime in our country, nor its position in international relations, and we support no one who wants to
exploit the present circumstances with this aim: on the contrary we would oppose them.

We do not demand culprits for the errors committed; but it is essential to take cognizance of these errors in order to eliminate them and avoid them in future. We will leave the punishment of the guilty to other tribunals. Our aim is to create the objective conditions which will make it possible to avoid these errors in future, errors committed equally because of bad policy by cadres.

6. We realize that all this necessitates long-term measures, efforts, as well as the changing of certain practices. We put our confidence in the socialist militants and the specialists who insist on the necessity of fundamental reforms in the system of planning and the way the economy is run. We know that it is necessary to transform the price system and the way prices are determined. This is certainly not easy, nor possible in the short term, but we must embark on the process of change by making our socio-economic view public, and by creating the conditions for the participation of all those who work and who have the right to receive the results of their activity, in the working out of the destiny of our country.

7. We know that this is impossible without a programme which includes our participation in decisions. The lack of such a programme and of a complete and generalized system of information has, once more, led to the systematic degeneration of the life of a very large section of our society — it has provoked economic problems which have been added to those which could not be avoided because they are of external origin.

It is for this reason that our essential demand is the creation of free trade unions, for it is the only chance of avoiding major errors in the future.

8. The social and wage-related demands do not come from the sole desire to have more money. The essential aim of these demands is to suppress the scandalous social injustices and to give immediate help to a large number of people, not only the workers.

The representatives of the state say that this doesn’t solve the problems. We know it well. We are often asked the following question: where can we find not only the paper money, but the material goods we demand? It is not for us to reply to these questions; it is the specialist who should do it. But before we have any solutions, we have to have people with the courage to say to the government something it doesn’t want to hear.

But since we are asked the question, we will reply: it is necessary, amongst other things, to eliminate wastage. It is in reality difficult to demand an effort from the workers without guaranteeing that it will not be wasted or exploited by others. We think that the rationalization of our economy will make it possible

K. Modzelewski, a Solidarity spokesperson. Spent seven years in prison after his 1965 Letter to the Party.
to satisfy our demands and also to recuperate the losses due to the work stoppages, which were necessary to make our voices heard.

9. Unfortunately, certain losses due to bad administration, notably the harm done to our natural environment, cannot be made good. In this sphere as well, we will not look for culprits, though this will be necessary. It is important first of all to create the conditions which will guarantee that these losses will not be repeated. This will be possible when the monopoly of power is no longer transformed by this power into a monopoly of intelligence, knowledge, and rationality. One cannot get there without decentralizing power, without creating the conditions which will permit the utilization of the professional knowledge of scholars and the collective intelligence of the working class.

10. No one denies that the aim of socialism is the transformation of social relations, but the results accomplished up to now in this sphere have been greatly reduced by the appearance of unjustly privileged groups, by the inequality of rights and obligations, by the gulf which exists between the extent of power and the limits placed on its utilization.

Among other things we cannot accept the present state of human relations and the way in which superiors treat their subordinates. We cannot tolerate the attitude of certain employees nor even that of shop assistants tired out by the bad working conditions in badly stocked shops.

We cannot accept the scorn which those who owe their positions solely to the labor of the workers and the efforts of the whole society often shown toward the workers.

It is because of this and solely because of this that our essential demand is the creation of free trade unions, for we have to start with them. All the rest will be achieved through the efforts of a well-meaning people, through true knowledge and hard work. By guaranteeing our right to a dialogue, and the conditions for it, we want the government to hear the authentic voice of the working class, and not just the echo of its own words. We are the true representatives of the coastal workers, and we think that the workers of the whole country share our views. We are ready to discuss all problems and to ensure all our responsibilities in undertaking joint actions, but we can do this only if we have the confidence of the workers, a confidence that the present trade unions have lost.

The editors (August 28, 1980)

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Phyllis Ewen

(Jerry Falwell, of the Moral Majority, has begun a campaign to censor Our Bodies, Ourselves. He sent a letter to his mailing list calling upon the "righteous" to pressure libraries and schools to ban the book. Excerpts from the book are quoted as evidence of its pornographic intent. This three-part collage piece, incorporating parts of his letter, is a personal response to this censorship. PE)
Please destroy this………Panel 3

Phyllis Ewen
AMILCAR CABRAL AND
THE DIALECTIC OF
PORTUGUESE
COLONIALISM

Cedric J. Robinson

INTRODUCTION
In the early 1960s, Amilcar Cabral emerged from the national liberation struggle of Guinea-Bissau* and Cape Verde as one of the world’s foremost revolutionary theorists. With respect to Africa and the struggles against imperialism and neo-colonialism, his published thought was ranked with the works of Frantz Fanon, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, and Patrice Lumumba.† His work on revolutionary organization, on the systems and structures of imperialist exploitation, and on ideology and consciousness placed him in the forefront of radical thinkers in the twentieth century.

The circumstance of Cabral’s work distinguished him from most of his African contemporaries in the post–World War II period. The struggles in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola were not those of independence movements. To the contrary, like the earlier movement in Algeria, these were national liberation struggles which were consciously revolutionary. They sought not merely a national identity but more importantly

* The Portuguese referred to the mainland area generally as Guine. Guinea-Bissau came to be the accepted designation among African nationalists and revolutionaries after World War II.
the command of their national resources for all their people. Cabral’s part in his country’s liberation has been put most simply by his comrade, Basil Davidson:

He raised an army, led and taught it how to fight, gave it detailed orders, supervised its every major action; but he did all this, by the habit of his practice, through a process of collective political discussion.  

In addition to his roles as party organizer, commander of the army of liberation in Guinea-Bissau, and theorist of national liberation, Cabral became an international diplomat. In forums ranging from the United States Congress to the Organization of African Unity, Cabral spoke for national liberation struggles the world over. From the moment on January 23, 1963, when his fledgling movement struck its first official blow at Portuguese colonialism, to November 14, 1972, when the UN General Assembly recognized the African Party of Independence of Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde (PAIGC) as the sole representative of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Cabral was the indefatigable intruder at the threshold of international attention and opinion. Finally, on January 20, 1973, Portuguese fascism claimed a transitory victory: Cabral was assassinated. The revolution, however, had already been won.

The beginnings of Amilcar Cabral’s life were as much rooted in the history of Portuguese colonialism in Africa as was the way he chose to live. He was one of those creatures — the assimilados — for whom Portuguese imperial authority had direct and conscious responsibility. In the colonial design, the assimilados were brought into being as a prop for the Portuguese system of domination and exploitation. Cabral would help to destroy that system. There was no particular irony in this, no reason for chroniclers to resort to the drama of human purpose betrayed by unanticipated and unintended deeds. Rather, Cabral’s development was shaped by the contradictions of domination, the dialectic of imperialism. Profoundly influenced as he was by the peculiar system of human and material appropriation for which the Portuguese state assumed management, Cabral fought it in the armed struggles of his comrades in Guinea-Bissau. More importantly (in his estimation), he exposed its character to the world, to his fellow Africans, and to the Portuguese people themselves. For these reasons, Cabral’s life, his work, and his thought form a tapestry of historical illustrations.

Cabral was born on September 12, 1924, at Bafata, a small town located at the confluence of the Colufe and Geba rivers in central Guine. However, his parents, Juvenal Cabral and Dona Iva Pinhel Evora, were natives of Santiago, the largest island in the Cape Verde archipelago. Juvenal Cabral, as his own name and his son’s may suggest, came from a family which had obtained elements of “classical culture” through Catholic education. Juvenal, indeed, was a schoolmaster from a family that included teachers and priests as well as farmers. Natives of Cape Verde, educated individuals living in a land in which the 1950 census classified only 2 percent of its half-million people as “civilized,” the Cabral family bore the stamp of a most peculiar colonial history.

**THE PORTUGUESE PRESENCE IN GUINE AND CAPE VERDE**

In the mid-1920s, when Cabral was born, Portuguese Guine was in the midst of the “final” phase of its colonization — what those who were to become the architects of Salazar’s fascist Novo Estado (New State) described as “pacification.” Though governments of Port-
ugal had laid claim to some part of Guine from 1434 on, it had been only at the very end of this five-hundred-year period that Portuguese authority had been secured. In fact, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the first years of a European presence in West Africa, the reverse had been true: African authority had imposed itself on Portuguese traders in the form of taxes and restrictions on trade and travel. From the seventeenth century on, as Portugal sought to realize actual sovereignty over the peoples of the area, African resistance had persisted. Even the years of Cabral’s childhood were scarred by recurrent campaigns of “pacification.” There were several bases for this capacity of Africans to resist Portuguese ambitions in Guine for more than half a millenium.

Perhaps the most important were those which had produced of Guine a multi-ethnic region with a variety of political structures and economic systems. Historically, many of the peoples had been subjects of the old Sudanic empires: Ghana from the fourth to the eleventh century and Mali from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. The rise and decline of these vast political entities had precipitated a range of reactions that included flight and resettlement in some instances, cultural integration and political adaptation in others, and resistance in still others. In the process, Guine had become a region of multiples: multiple ethnic groups, multiple languages and cultures, multiple religions, multiple political systems, multiple economic structures. Its topography, too, seemed to conspire in this diversity. Dominated by forests and intersected by rivers, the land had provided refuge for some and defensible boundaries for more, while shaping complex patterns of communication and trade. By the time that trade relations with the Portuguese began to develop in the late fif-

teenth century, systems of settlement and trade — and antagonisms — had been long established between the land’s diverse peoples: the Felupe, Baiote, Banhum, Cassanga, Manjaco, Cobiana, Brame, Papel, Balanta, Bijago, Beafada, and Nulu on the coast and near-hinterlands, and the Mandinga and Pa-jadincas in the interior. Only the Fula, who would occupy eastern Guine, had yet to appear. By the eighteenth century, they too were in place, partially repopulating a territory which Portuguese and Spanish slave traders had preyed upon since the early 1500s. The sum of it all was that throughout the long centuries of Portugal’s influence its military, commercial, and administrative representatives in Guine confronted a maze of political, cultural, and social entities, many of them powerful enough to resist absorption into dependent relationships.

In the early centuries, much of the hostility between Africans and Portuguese was over the terms of the slave trade. Separate wars against the Portuguese were fought by the Bijagos, the Papeis, the Mandingas, and detribalized slaves (grumetes) in 1589, the 1620s, 1679, 1696, and 1697. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the issue was not the slave trade, but conquest. For the next hundred and fifty years, the Portuguese imperialists sought to discipline through war the militant states which the exchange of slaves for arms (and other goods) had done so much to develop.

In the Cape Verde islands, to which the Cabral family returned in the early 1930s, Portuguese imperialism had written a very different history. The archipelago (ten islands and several islets) had been unoccupied when first visited by agents of the Portuguese crown in the 1450s and 1460s. Three hundred miles west of the African mainland, Cape Verde became a base for the trade between Europe
and Africa and ultimately, once the New World was located, for the triangular trade. The islands were colonized by populations both from Europe (Portuguese, Genoese, Castilians, and — once they were expelled from Spain — Jews) and from Africa (slave labor drawn from the Balantas, the Papeis, and the Bijagos). However, the redirection of Portuguese and Spanish settlement to the New World changed the social character of the islands dramatically. A mulatto population began to emerge, growing so rapidly that by the middle of the seventeenth century it numerically dominated the islands. Its increase was further accelerated by the arrival of fugitives and renegades. *Lancados*, the Portuguese called them: “men, that is, who had ‘gone in among’ the negroes, or had ‘run away.’”

These lancados and their mulatto descendants (*filhos da terra*), joined by a few officials and commercial agents, formed the base of the scattered Portuguese or European settlements on the coast of the mainland and upriver. Their corrupt trading practices often ignited wars over trade and undermined Portuguese domination of the commerce in slaves and gold.

On the islands themselves a plantation system arose, with African and mestizo slave labor, but erratic rainfall, drought, poor soil, official neglect, and maladministration limited productivity. For most of the first four centuries of colonization, the economy of the islands was dominated by their role as an entrepot for the slave trade to the Western Hemisphere. In the
late nineteenth century the decline of that trade, along with recurring drought and famine, forced many Cape Verdeans to emigrate. By the early twentieth century, Cape Verdeans could be found in substantial numbers in Angola, Guine, Mozambique, and the Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic. During this period also, many Cape Verdeans (especially from Brava) found their way to the United States through contract labor.

ONE CONTRADICTION: BOURGEOISIE/PETIT BOURGEOISIE

For most of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese bourgeoisie, which gradually came to constitute the ruling class, was ambivalent about the African colonies. But this attitude changed. Spurred by the European "scramble for Africa" in the 1880s and the emergence of an industrial and mercantile bourgeois faction which tied its own development to protectionism, the dream of a vast Portuguese empire was resurrected in the late nineteenth century. Basil Davidson summarizes the period that followed:

In 1880–82 there were campaigns against the Fula and the Beafada. In 1883–5, the Portuguese tackled the Balante for the first time. Other campaigns followed against the Pepel (1886–90), against the Fula at Gabu (1893), and Oinka (1897), the Bissagos (1902), the Manjak of Churo (1904–6), the Mandinka of Bega (1907–8), again against the Oinka (1910–13), again against the Mandinka of Churo (1914), again against the Pepel (1915).\

After a brief interruption for Portugal's participation in World War II, the "pacification" program in Guine continued. From 1917 to 1936 the Bijagos, Papeis, and Mandingas bore the brunt of attacks from Portuguese imperial forces. Armed resistance died down after that; for the next two decades African insurgency took other forms. For example, sporting organizations and the only labor organization, the Sindicato Nacional dos Empregados do Comercio e da Industria, were converted into proto-nationalist instruments during these years.

Not wealthy enough in human or material resources to administer and develop its vast colonies in Mozambique, Angola, the "Coco islands" (Sao Tome, Principe), Guinea, and the Cape Verdes, Portugal conceded privileges to French and British capitalists as well as its own. To administer the colonies, Portugal borrowed from the French the policy of "indirect rule": the use of native authorities to manage and control the populace, and the formation of an assimilado class to staff the civil administration, serve as noncommissioned officers, and perform the clerical duties associated with state and civilian enterprises.

The Cape Verdeans formed the largest single pool of assimilados (also referred to as "civilizados"). And while immigration to the colonies from Portugal was slight before World War II, Cape Verdeans could be found throughout the colonies, dominating the thin strata of "civilized" natives. Cabral was one of these assimilados. His early education on Santiago and San Vincente was typical. Even when he secured a university scholarship to the Lisbon Higher Institute of Agronomy in 1945, it only marked him as one for whom a more advanced role in collaboration and cooptation was intended. Indeed, on the surface, Cabral seemed well along in the process of native petit-bourgeois* development.\

* In this essay I will retain Cabral's use of the term petit bourgeois to indicate a Westernized African stratum whose origin was in the colonial era as state functionaries and facilitators of colonial rule.
There were, however, certain historical, ideological, and social conflicts which both Cabral and his generation were to confront. Ultimately, they were to help transform at least some of the children of the colonial petit bourgeoisie from collaborators to nationalists. The Cape Verdeans, in particular, had to face the destructive character of Portuguese colonialism starkly during the years of Cabral’s schooling. The islands were struck by drought and then famine during the years 1941–48. Something like fifty thousand Cape Verdeans died and thousands more had to emigrate during this difficult period. Amilcar learned from his father, who had long questioned the entire agricultural system of the islands, that the catastrophe could be traced directly to cash-crop production, large absentee landholdings, and lack of planning in irrigation and soil conservation. Cabral’s father blamed the islands’ corrupt and incompetent colonial administration for these failures. It was, it appears, largely due to his father’s influence that Cabral left for Lisbon in 1945 determined to be trained in agricultural (hydraulic) engineering.

Lisbon, too, had been momentarily shaken by events of those years. The war had stimulated the development of antifascist movements, especially among university students. Mario de Andrade, an Angolan, who first worked with Cabral in this period in Lisbon, recalled the significance of these movements for Cabral: “For a while [the Portuguese people] demonstrated openly. Repression speedily re-established ‘order.’ It was in this climate that Cabral became familiar with Portuguese resistance to Fascism. From his entry to the [Institute] he took part in the struggles for student demands.”

A third factor which was to have an immediate impact on the heirs of the native elite was the intensification of Portuguese colonialism proper. Following the end of the war, Portuguese emigration to the colonies — particularly Angola — increased greatly. To some extent this new colonization followed directly from Portugal’s wartime mobilization and military occupation of the colonies. But emigration was also part of the plan for Portugal’s postwar economic reconstruction. These colonials, of course, displaced the African petite bourgeoisie, making it an increasingly redundant class no longer comfortably distinct from the mass of the African populace. In the colonies, the parent generation of the petite bourgeoisie could no longer readily justify itself nor avoid the conclusion that its situation would soon be untenable. It was being betrayed by its Portuguese masters and was obviously alienated from those it had managed, coerced, and consequently despised. Cabral would write in 1966:

The colonial situation, which does not permit the development of a native pseudo-bourgeoisie and in which the popular masses do not generally reach the necessary level of political consciousness before the advent of the phenomenon of national liberation, offers the petty bourgeoisie the historical opportunity of leading the struggle against foreign domination, since by nature of its objective and subjective position (higher standard of living than that of the masses, more frequent contact with the agents of colonialism, and hence more chances of being humiliated, higher level of education and political awareness, etc.) it is the stratum which most rapidly becomes aware of the need to free itself from foreign domination. This historical responsibility is assumed by the sector of the petty bourgeoisie which, in the colonial context, can be called revolutionary, while other sectors retain the doubts characteristic of these classes.

The precision of Cabral’s analysis reflected not only his understanding of history, but also his experience.
THE PETIT BOURGEOISIE
AND NATIONAL LIBERATION

The ideological history of the revolutionary sector of the petit bourgeoisie of Portuguese Africa could be traced back quite directly to the second half of the nineteenth century. From 1870 to his death in 1890, the Angolan João de Fontes Pereira had in his writings challenged the foundations of Portuguese imperialism: its slavery, the hypocrisy of its "civilizing" mission, its racism, its administrative corruption and incompetence, and persistently, its discrimination against his class, "the sons of the colonies." Others followed Fontes in the first decades of the twentieth century. In Angola, Mozambique, and the Cape Verdes, petit-bourgeois nationalists continued their rhetorical offensives against the Portuguese state and its instruments, the colonists. Some of these reform nationalists went so far as to organize political parties, such as the Liga Africana (1919) and the Partido National Africano (1921) in Angola.

The reconstitution of the Portuguese Republic into the Estado Novo in 1926 by military coup put an end to such organizations. In postwar Lisbon, Luanda, Lorenzo Marques, and Bissau, however, nationalist elements among the petit bourgeoisie once again emerged, encouraged by the revival of antifascism in Portugal itself and the dynamic of historical events in the late 1940s. At first, their character was somewhat disguised by the ideological weapons at their disposal. Viriato da Cruz, for instance, organized in 1948 a cultural journal, Mensagem (Message), which published emotionally nationalist poetry and literary essays challenging the "values of the West."
In Lisbon, three African students residing at the Casa dos Estudantes do Imperio, Amilcar Cabral, Augustino Neto, and Mario de Andrade, were allowed by state officials to organize a Center of African Studies. Neto, an Angolan, was in Lisbon studying medicine. He would soon become a leader of the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) — Cabral was a cofounder — and ultimately head the first government of an independent Angola in 1975. Andrade, a literature student at the University of Lisbon (and later the Sorbonne in Paris), was also active in the antifascist movement in Portugal. Later he would head the MPLA while Neto was in prison, and represent all the Portuguese African national liberation movements in their attempts to secure support from the West (only Sweden responded).

During the early 1950s these three were joined in their work in Lisbon by Eduardo Mondlane and Marcellino dos Santos of Mozambique, Lucio Lara and Deolinda Rodrigues de Almeida of Angola, and others. Together, utilizing the short-lived Center of African Studies and subsequent organizations, they set about establishing the political and ideological character of the national liberation movement(s) of Portuguese Africa:

This kernel of students in Portugal was engaged in feverish activity on two complementary levels. First came ideological and political training, extended into the absorption of knowledge in all fields, and the training was acquired in the crucible of more or less clandestine meetings, through reading Marxist works, or through personal contacts.... The second level of activity lay around the safeguarding of identity or to use Cabral’s phrase the struggle for the “re-Africanization of minds.” At the same time as this group of students became acutely conscious of their specific situation as assimilated and colonized persons, rationalized their feelings and searched for anchorage points in African culture to revive it, they were receptive to analogous experiences worked out in the universe of oppression... the American new negro... negritude... So has written one of them, Mario de Andrade. It is he who has laid stress to the collective nature of their development.

Cabral, like the others, carried his professional training in Lisbon through to completion. In 1952, he returned to Guine. He and his comrades had concluded that Portuguese imperialism had to be ended but that the Marxism they had encountered in Portugal was inadequate to the task. They required further preparation, further development, further study. “The political plan was clear,” Andrade writes. But “the social ground of the struggle” still had to be uncovered.

Cabral had been an outstanding student of agronomy in Portugal. He returned to Guine under contract to the Provincial Department for Agricultural and Forestry Services of Portuguese Guine, and during the next two years he planned and executed the first agricultural census of the colony. The report, published in 1956, remains the primary source on Guinean agriculture. Moreover, it provided Cabral with an acute understanding of the land’s political economy: not only its distortion by colonialism (he found one-eighth of the surface area under cultivation and saw that ground nuts, a cash crop, were transforming Guine into a one-crop economy), but also the complex ethnic organization of land use. For his political purposes, he discovered that the Fula — Islamic and hierarchically organized, with their native authorities intimately linked to the colonial administration — were the least likely to serve as a base for the struggle, while the Balantes — Islamized animists, he called
them, “without any social stratification” — the most likely. Later he would recall:

These groups without any defined organisation put up much more resistance against the Portuguese than the others and they have maintained intact their tradition of resistance to colonial penetration. This is the group that we found most ready to accept the idea of national liberation.”

For the moment, however, it was to other groups that Cabral turned.

In the towns of Guine, Cabral, like his contemporary Frantz Fanon writing of Algeria, recognized two distinct groups: the African and the European, the native and the colonizer. Among the Africans, Cabral surmised three classes: the petit bourgeoisie (civil servants, technical professionals, contract employees, small farmers, and the like); wage earners (noncontract workers, domestic servants, and factory, shop, transport, port, and farm workers); and finally, the declasses whom he divided into two categories: jobless country youths who had recently moved to the towns and were living off their relatives, and a more permanent group of beggars, prostitutes, and the chronically unemployed. K. Opoku observes, “From Cabral’s analysis of social structure, we notice that two classes, on which most analysis in modern political thought concentrates, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, are missing.” But more of this momentarily. In his political work, Cabral first turned to his own class, the petit bourgeoisie. “The majority took fright,” Andrade tells us, but “those rare few who responded positively were twenty years later to become the leaders of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.”

With this cadre, Cabral next sought for his revolutionary base among the wage earners, working most closely with those workers at the experimental agriculture unit of Pessubé Grange. But he was also attracting official attention:

Already in 1953 his “talking against Portuguese rule” had begun to cause him trouble with the authorities.... The governor at that time chanced to be a man of liberal inclinations. He called in Cabral and said to him, more or less in these words: “Look, never mind about my opinions. If you start making trouble for me, I shall jail you. Shut up, or leave the country.”

Cabral accepted a transfer back to Lisbon in 1954. The next year he was reassigned to Africa, this time to Angola, where he worked on sugar irrigation and soil studies. For the next three years he divided his time and energy between organizing and engineering, pursuing each in Angola, Portugal, and Guine (where he was allowed to return once a year to visit his family).

The cadre still in Guine — including Aristides Pereira (now president of Cape Verdes), Luiz Cabral (Amilcar’s brother and successor), and Abilio Duarte — continued to work, focusing on wage earners and organizing a militant trade union, the clandestine Uniao Nacional des Trabalhadores da Guine (UNTG). Later, on September 19, 1956, during one of Cabral’s authorized visits to Guine, the Cabral brothers, Pereira, Julio de Almeida, Elisee Turpin, and Fernando Fortes met secretly to form the African Party of Independence, or PAI. (Three years later, the PAI would take its present name, PAIGC, adding the initials of Guine and Cape Verdes to its acronym.) Three months later, back in Angola, Cabral took part in a similar meeting at which the MPLA took form. The PAI pressed on with its trade-unionist tactic, eventually organizing successful strikes among seamen.

On August 3, 1959, the colonial administration struck back. It ordered its soldiers to fire on the workers striking at the Pidjiguiti quay near Bissau. Fifty were reported killed. Cabral
would later write: "In the beginning, we thought it would be possible to fight in the towns, using the experiences of other countries, but that was a mistake. We tried strikes and demonstrations, but... realized this would not work." Cabral returned the next month to Guine, and during the next several days the PAI cadre, traumatized by the violence of the authorities, reviewed its entire political program.

Having reviewed these three past years of clandestine political work and analysed the political situation, the enlarged meeting of 19 September concluded, in the light of the Pidjiguiti experience and the nature of Portuguese colonialism that the only way to liberate the country is through struggle by all possible means, including war.

Further, and just as momentous in its significance, the party decided to "without delay mobilize and organize the peasant masses who will be, as experience shows, the main force in the struggle for national liberation." Unity would be sought among "Africans of all ethnic groups, origins, and social strata." Organization in the towns would remain underground, while recruiters would work among emigrés as well as in Guine itself, and the party’s general secretariat would be transferred outside the country. Cabral moved to Conakry with other members of the party secretariat. There they trained, recruited, organized, and prepared an
expanded nucleus of the movement. For the next three years, this was their revolutionary project.

In 1962 the PAIGC entered a preliminary guerrilla phase: sabotaging communications and transportation and capturing weapons from the Portuguese forces. Spurning the PAIGC's efforts to negotiate, the Portuguese government of Salazar sent more troops and began destroying villages thought sympathetic to the national liberation movement. By 1963, the first year of open warfare, ten thousand Portuguese troops were in the country. At that time the PAIGC claimed to have secured 15 percent of the countryside. In January 1964, the Portuguese launched their first large counter-offensive at Como island. After a seventy-five-day engagement, the Portuguese military, suffering severe losses and humiliation, cut off contact with the revolutionists. The Portuguese commander of the campaign committed suicide.

In February 1964, the PAIGC held its first Congress within Guinea and a regular army of 900 soldiers was established. By 1965 the PAIGC claimed to have liberated 40 percent of the countryside. It had initiated "people's stores" and was campaigning to increase rice production in the secured areas. By 1966, with 50 percent of the interior in the hands of the revolutionary forces, the Portuguese military began turning to helicopters and other aircraft, later supplemented with chemical and bacteriological warfare. In November 1970 the desperate Portuguese initiated an invasion of the former French Guinea, hoping to assassinate both that country's president, Sekou Toure, and Cabral. The plot failed. In June 1971, the PAIGC forces launched attacks on the two major towns, Bissau and Bafata. Despite the presence of 30,000 Portuguese troops in the country, the PAIGC organized elections and established schools and hospitals in the liberated areas; in August 1971 the National Assembly of Guinea was formed. A United Nations mission traveled to Guinea-Bissau in April 1972 and reported that the Portuguese no longer controlled most of the country. On November 14, the UN General Assembly voted to recognize the PAIGC as the sole representative of the people of Guinea-Bissau. Cabral was assassinated in 1973. Guinea-Bissau became independent in September 1974. Through years of logistical preparation, training, and political education, the PAIGC had assumed its place in the history of African resistance to Portuguese colonialism. Within six months of the beginning of the armed struggle, the movement controlled 15 percent of the country. Within seven years it had liberated two-thirds of the land and half the population. Within eleven years, the nation of Guinea was declared independent.

CABRAL'S REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT

At the beginning of his commitment to the liberation movement, Cabral's intellectual expression was shaped by the historical categories he had absorbed in Lisbon from Portuguese Marxists. This was only natural since it was in these terms — the critiques of capitalism and imperialism — that he and other Africans from the "overseas territories" had first discovered their common historical experience. Here were the conceptual terms that suggested bonds between the working classes of Europe and Africa, and here also was a language of international solidarity that punctuated efforts at practical support for the liberation movements in Africa. At this point in his development, Cabral could stridently assert the existence of an identity between imperialism and "the monopolistic stage of capitalism," or just as unequivocally declare that "the October
Revolution [was] the definitive implantation of socialism on one sixth of the world's surface."23 On occasion, in the early sixties, Cabral could be just as cavalier with the history of the people of Guinea: At least once he declared that "the peasantry [of China] had a history of revolt, but this was not the case in Guinea."24

However, the task before him and his comrades compelled their further development. As Richard Handyside has observed:

Guinea had none of the elements on which revolution in Europe and Asia had been based. There was no large proletariat, no developed working class, no large peasant mass deprived of land. . . . A successful revolutionary strategy for Guinea could not be based on any wholesale adoption of other revolutionary experiences — what was needed was a strategy based on African conditions, on the conditions within Guinea itself.25

The historical and social materials immediately available to Guinea’s revolutionary intelligentsia conditioned the formulation of theory and program. Cabral would combine the development of revolutionary strategy and theory in his thought on the peasantry, on the culture of resistance, and on the national liberation movement.

In his very earliest writings, a certain gift for criticism and for reordering the presumptions of revolutionary theory to conform to the needs of his struggle could be observed in Cabral. In 1961, for example, he declared:

There can be no doubt that, even more than the class struggle in the capitalist countries and the antagonism between these countries and the socialist world, the liberation struggle of the colonial people is the essential characteristic, and we would say the prime motive force, of the advance of history in our times.26

And regarding his own presumptions, he was no less critical. Following the early defeats of party work in the towns of Guine, Cabral and his colleagues came to recognize that their almost exclusive reliance on the intelligentsia and urban wage earners was mistaken and that peasants were the social base, the physical force of the revolution. But the peasantry, he believed, was not a revolutionary force as Fanon had surmised. The peasants’ exploitation was hidden from them by the mediation of traditional institutions of trade and social authority:

Among the Fula and Manjaco . . . the broad mass who suffer in fact are at the bottom, tillers of the soil (the peasants). But there are many folk between them and the Portuguese. They are used to suffering, to suffering at the hands of their own folk, from the behaviour of their own folk.27

The mobilization of the peasantry and their evolution into a revolutionary army would have to occur in three successive stages: political action, armed struggle, and national reconstruction. And for two years before taking to the field of armed struggle, Cabral and his colleagues engaged in preparatory political teaching in the countryside, training the revolutionary cadre which in its practice would help discover with the peasants the movement's "own formula for mobilizing for the struggle." Cabral recalled that "we avoided all generalizations and pat phrases."28 And in time, the peasants "came to understand that a tremendous amount of exploitation exists and that it is they themselves who pay for everything, even for the profits of the people living in the city."29

Cabral's attention to the less immediate but still profound aspects of revolutionary thought was just as constant, just as imaginative, and perhaps just as correct. Indeed, one of his most
important contributions to revolutionary theory concerned the importance of history and culture in the projects of domination and liberation. Culture, he argued contains shared historical memories, “the seed of opposition” which it is imperative for the security of colonialism to destroy. Cultural oppression, the denial of African culture, is consequently not aberration, not racial arrogance, but a necessity. None of the colonialists — the British, the French, the German, the Spanish, the Belgian, the Dutch, or the Portuguese — had a choice in the matter short of annihilating the native population. All their acts of domination, whether in Asia, Africa, or the New World, compelled the attempt to suppress the native cultures.

But [Cabral wrote] cultural resistance of the African people was not destroyed. Repressed, persecuted, betrayed by some social groups who were in league with the colonialists, African culture survived all the storms, taking refuge in the villages, in the forests and in the spirit of the generations who were victims of colonialism.¹⁰

In the process of this futile project, the colonial regimes created for this end and others the native petit bourgeoisie, a deracinated, culturally alienated, and Westernized elite. The
interests of this intelligentsia and the ruling class, however, were not identical. Indeed, the interests of the two classes were opposed, each presuming for itself a natural right to exploit the masses. When inevitably the two classes clashed, as they did in the Portuguese colonies after World War II, rebellious elements of the petit bourgeoisie had nowhere to turn except to the people, and no ideological rallying point except that provided by the native culture. The more difficult the situation of the whole petit bourgeoisie, the more likely it was that nationalist and revolutionary nationalist elements would emerge from it. This materialist understanding of the petit bourgeoisie kept Cabral from overestimating the honesty of class as a whole.

For Cabral, national liberation required the complete destruction of foreign domination. National liberation was the nation reclaiming its productive forces and its birthright, "the inalienable right of every people to have a history of its own." Having reacquired their freedom to choose the path of their development, the people of the nation were also responsible for the further development of their culture, integrating it with even the "positive accretion from the oppressor and other cultures." "No culture is a perfect, finished whole," Cabral warned. "Culture, like history, is an expanding and developing phenomenon." "Tell no lies, claim no easy victories," he had told his PAIGC cadres in 1965.

To the petit bourgeoisie of his own land, Cabral attempted to speak with comparable precision. In Havana in 1966, Cabral declared:

In order not to betray [the objectives of the national liberation], the petty bourgeoisie has only one choice. . . . The revolutionary petty bourgeoisie must be capable of committing suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong. This alternative — to betray the revolution or to commit suicide as a class — constitutes the dilemma of the petty bourgeoisie in the general framework of the national liberation struggle. The positive solution in favour of the revolution depends on what Fidel Castro recently correctly called the development of revolutionary consciousness. 31

The revolutionary petit bourgeoisie were to be the ideological and political catalysts of the national liberation movement. Colonialism had halted the historical development of classes in Guine, resulting in the lack of any true proletariat. No factories, no centers of industrial production had arisen to expand and concentrate a proletarian class. In the absence of this social formation, and given the vulnerability of the towns to colonial violence, the revolutionary petit bourgeoisie had to enlist the peasantry in the struggle. It could not accomplish this task without coming to terms with its class-specific tendency to evolve into a bourgeoisie. The revolutionary petit bourgeoisie, itself emergent from the "reality of life in Guine," now had to choose between class illusion and national liberation. Only by arming itself with the resolve that its historical existence was transitory could it hope to mobilize the peasantry. The peasantry had only experienced its exploitation indirectly and was not inherently revolutionary. It would constitute the physical force of the struggle when the revolutionary petit bourgeoisie had destroyed itself by becoming physically, ideologically, and politically integrated with it.

Cabral spoke constantly to the Portuguese people, declaring that his movement was in opposition, not to them but to Portuguese colonialism. He spoke of a necessary interrelationship between the nationalist liberation movements in the colonies and the struggle
against dictatorship in Portugal itself. Events proved him right. The struggle in Guine, as Cabral expected, spawned the revolutionary movement in Portugal. In April 1974, when the Portuguese military led the revolution against the dictatorship, many of its leaders were officers who had served in Guine. One was Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, “the leader of the military planning group... much influenced by the theories of guerilla struggle in Guine where he had worked in psychological warfare.” General Antonio de Spinola, who headed the first revolutionary government and whose book *Portugal and the Future* (1974) first detailed for the Portuguese public the extent of the war and the fact that Portugal was losing it, was the former governor and commander-in-chief of Guine. The “Officers’ Movement” that planned the revolt was formed during July 1973 in Guine. Just as Cabral had predicted, the struggle against fascism in Portugal advanced as the wars in Guine, Angola, and Mozambique compelled the Portuguese ruling class to reveal itself. As the “overseas” wars progressed, the Portuguese state began to exhaust its instruments of coercion at home and abroad. The military, which once reserved its officer corps for the sons of the ruling class *latifundia*, was forced to recruit officers from the universities and noncommissioned officers from the peasantry. It was these university-trained *milicianos* and their low-born mates who prosecuted the wars while the sons of the proper families secured military posts in Portugal or in headquarters far removed from the fighting. Saddled with an incompetent general staff whose class and racial arrogance shielded it from the realities of the wars (and the realization that they were being lost),
weakened by official censorship at home which tended to demoralize a military without popular support, and threatened by the growing recognition that their professional military careers were limited by their social origins, the junior officers organized and rebelled. The Portuguese people, suddenly struck by the revelations of gross deceptions perpetuated on them and already conscious of their material, political, and social privations, responded. The coup of the Officers' Movement expanded into a democratic revolution. National liberation in Africa, following Cabral’s sense of its dialectic, had precipitated the Portuguese revolution.

Like other organizations the world over, the PAIGC had to face egotism, sexism, jealousies, regional and ethnic hostilities and suspicions, and dogmatism. Cabral brought to problems like these a profound common sense, analytical insight, and wit. With the publication of his field notes, lectures, and seminars in Unity and Struggle, we have a sense of Cabral’s style as a political tactician. He taught, he cajoled, he disciplined, and he demonstrated by his actions.

It is now eight years since Cabral was struck down by the bullets of Portuguese agents. On that night, January 20, 1973, in Conakry, the Portuguese dictatorship sought to destroy the movement by killing its leader. But it was Cabral, not his assassins, who would have the final word:

Nobody is indispensable in this struggle; we are all needed but nobody is indispensable. If someone has to go and goes away and then the struggle is paralysed, it is because the struggle was worthless. The only pride we have today, that I myself have, is the certainty that, after the work we have already done, if I were to go away, to be stopped, to die or disappear, there are those here in the Party who can carry on the Party’s task. If this were not so, then what a disaster; we would have achieved nothing. For a man who has an achievement that only he can carry on has not yet done anything. An achievement is worth while to the extent that it is an achievement of many, and if there are many who can take it up and carry it on, even if one pair of hands is taken away.14

POSTSCRIPT

On November 14, 1980, while this article was still in preparation, Major Joao Bernardo Vieira, the prime minister of Guinea-Bissau, effected a coup which removed President Luiz de Almeida Cabral, brother of Amilcar, and many other senior members of the PAIGC from the government. The Lisbon-based reports on the coup which were repeated in most of the Western press ascribed the motives of Vieira and the army to “a long power struggle between the blacks of Guinea-Bissau and the mixed-race people from the Cape Verde Islands” and to the adoption of a new constitution a week prior to the coup which “eliminated the powers of the Prime Minister.”35 Not one of these reports alluded to the drought which since 1977 had reduced Guinea-Bissau from near self-sufficiency in rice and maize production to the importing of more than 70,000 tons of rice in 1980; the mismanagement of the People’s Stores which has resulted in severe shortages in fabrics and other basic commodities in the south and center of the country; the failure of Luiz Cabral’s government to construct an appropriate transportation infrastructure to integrate the country’s economy; or its misuse of foreign aid. Nor did the reports note Vieira’s promise to check the accumulation of wealth and luxury goods by party and government officials and to return to the more spartan and politically dedicated style of leadership which characterized the PAIGC during the war.36
On the other hand, Amilcar Cabral, sixteen years earlier, had discussed the difficulties that would face Guinea-Bissau after the war of liberation:

In colonial conditions it is the petty bourgeoisie which is the inheritor of state power (though I wish we could be wrong). The moment national liberation comes and the petty bourgeoisie takes power we enter, or rather return to history, and thus the internal contradictions break out again. . . . The petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and the reactionary strata in its own country to try and preserve itself as a petty bourgeoisie or ally itself with the workers and peasants . . .

. . . to hope that the petty bourgeoisie will just carry out a revolution when it comes to power in an underdeveloped country is to hope for a miracle, although it is true that it could do this. 37

He also warned the (European) Left of a too-quick criticism of Third World movements when the Left itself had retreated from revolution, had developed certain apathies, and been the subject of false hopes. Instead, he argued, the European left has an intellectual responsibility to study the concrete conditions in our country and help us in this way, as we have very little documentation, very few intellectuals, very little chance to do this kind of work ourselves, and yet it is of key importance: this is a major contribution you can make. 38

The revolutionary struggle continues for the people of Guinea-Bissau. The “rice coup,” as it is apparently known in Bissau, has no precedent in modern African history. Though the people of Guinea-Bissau have once again disappeared from the front pages of the Western press, their struggle remains a centerpiece for Africa, the Third World, and the forces of liberation the world over.

NOTES

1. For English readers, the most ready access to Cabral’s thought is through the several collections of his lectures, papers, party directives, and field notes; see Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, (Monthly Review Press, 1969), Return to the Source, (African Information Service, 1973), and Unity and Struggle, (London: Heinemann, 1980.)

2. Basil Davidson, Introduction to Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle, p. xvi.


5. In 1960 only eleven Africans from Guine had received graduate training. See Davidson, Liberation, p. 28.


7. Ibid., p. xx.

11. Ibid., pp. 151–56.
16. Adrada in Unity and Struggle, p. xxv. A nationalist petit bourgeoisie opposed to the PAIGC did develop. Some chose to participate with the Portuguese military in the struggle against the revolution; others, and specifically the nationalist exiles residing in Senegal, organized into a front which consistently collaborated with the Portuguese authorities: "In response to Cabral and the PAIGC... they established their own movement based in Senegal and led by clearly identified traditional ethnic leaders and members of the urban elite who had broken with Cabral and his more radical vision... In fact, this movement began as several parties, each with a purely ethnic base. These three parties were the largely Manjaco-based Movimento de Libertacao da Guine, the Fula-led and oriented Uniao Democratica da Guine, and the Mandinga Rassemblement Democratique de Guine... There were also a number of small groups founded by members of the commercial-civil service elite... in 1962 [they] came together to found a common front... the Frente de Luta pela Independencia Nacional de Guinea-Bissau (FLING)..." (Judson Lyon, "Marxism and Ethno-Nationalism in Guinea-Bissau, 1956–76," Ethnic and Racial Studies, April 1980, p. 160) Lyon's article makes the case that Cabral, "like almost all liberationists," was "blind... to the strength of ethnic attachments" and failed to come to terms with "ethnonationalism." Lyon contrasts what he takes as the PAIGC's doctrinaire impotence with the "success" of FLING. He admits, though, that "FLING did nothing at all after 1963 except tend to the needs of the refugees in Senegal." (161).
18. Rafael Barbosa, a former president of the PAIGC in the earliest period, is included in this group by Richard Gibson (African Liberation Movements, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 235). Gibson, apparently basing his report on American intelligence sources, is contradicted by Andrade. Andrade, however, may have expunged Barbosa's name from those of the founders because Barbosa defected to the Portuguese in 1969 after seven years of imprisonment (and, Gibson suggests, torture).
20. Davidson, Liberation, p. 32.
28. Cabral, “Towards Final Victory,” in The Revolution in Guinea, p. 159. Cabral wrote: “Remember always that the people do not fight for ideas, for things that only exist in the heads of individuals. The people fight and they accept the necessary sacrifices. But they do it in order to gain material advantages, to live in peace and to improve their lives, to experience progress, and to be able to guarantee a future to their children.” Cited in Henriksen, “People’s War,” p. 381.
38. Ibid., p. 74.

CEDRIC J. ROBINSON is director of the Center for Black Studies and a member of the Department of Political Science at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He is author of The Terms of Order: Political Science and the Myth of Leadership and has written for Black Scholar, Race and Class, and other periodicals. He is currently working on a study of black Marxists.
'M NO COMMUNIST
THE PAST IS PROLOGUE:

The Blacklist in Hollywood

Peter Biskind

Most people’s view of the blacklist of the 1950s has been largely the work of cold-war liberals like Stefan Kanfer (A Journal of the Plague Years), Walter Goodman (The Committee), and Murray Kempton (Part of Our Time). These writers viewed the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) and the noncooperating “Hollywood Ten” screenwriters rather the way Harry Truman viewed Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union: the antagonists deserved each other. Although much cold-war scholarship was challenged during the sixties, the New Left shared (for different reasons) the cold-war liberals’ disdain for the Old Left, so that in 1971, when Brecht scholar Eric Bentley, a New Left fellow traveler, brought out a compendious anthology of HUAC testimony entitled Thirty Years of Treason, he too equated the Hollywood Ten with HUAC (“bullshit equals bullshit”) and attacked the Old Left for its “lack of candor.” All these books not only dismissed the blacklistees as timeservers and hacks, but also failed to explain the blacklist, make sense out of it, tell us what it meant. They found it was easier to make fun of both sides: HUAC was a circus and the unfriendly witnesses were balky performers who refused to jump through hoops. When they did venture into the treacherous quicksands of interpretation, they tended to use unhelpful metaphors of disease (“plague”) of Kafkaesque absurdity.

It was only a matter of time, however, before the revisionism that rewrote the history of the Cold War turned from foreign to domestic affairs, and took a second look at the red scare in general and Hollywood in particular. We now have two important books: last year
The Inquisition in Hollywood, by Larry Ceplair and Steven Englund, and this year Victor Navasky's Naming Names.* The former was the first book to adopt the sensible idea that the blacklist was the end of the story, not the beginning. It placed the blacklist in the context of the Hollywood Left of the thirties and forties, and in so doing made clear what we always suspected: that it was not an aberration, accident, disease, or hysterical outburst, but simply another episode in the perennial struggle between the Right and the Left.

The focus of Naming Names is somewhat different; its scope is much larger than the title suggests. It is nothing more nor less than "a moral detective story," as Navasky calls it, an effort to find out why "good men do things they know or suspect to be wrong." He focuses on the "friendly" witnesses who informed on their friends and acquaintances, those who cooperated withHUAC: those, in short, who "named names." The idea of interrogating the friendly witnesses is on the face of it a peculiar one, because in the fifties theirs were virtually the only voices raised in public, not only in the Committee's chambers, but in the torrent of confessional articles they were obliged to place in influential magazines like the Saturday Evening Post, Colliers, Life, and Look, as proof of their contrition. The reasons they did what they did always seemed self-evident: to continue working in Hollywood. Q.E.D.

As is often the case, however, a closer look reveals that the truth is more complicated. They did become informers in order to get work, but they also did it because everybody they knew told them to do it, and in this case, "everybody" meant almost the entire liberal community. Thus Naming Names turns into an anatomy of collaboration, a look at what Navasky calls the "culture of informing." He has read the fascinating (and neglected) informer literature of the fifties, which itself deserves a full-scale study, and he shows how the image of the informer evolved from the pathetic Gypo Nolan in John Ford's The Informer (1935) to the heroic Terry Malloy in Elia Kazan's On the Waterfront (1954). In between, Dostoevskian oddballs like Whittaker Chambers and Harvey Matusow emerged from underground to become national heroes. The city of Pittsburgh even declared a Matt "I Was a Communist for the FBI" Cvetic Day.

What makes this book so fascinating is that Navasky has discovered an important truth: the key to understanding the collapse of the liberals lies not so much in the reasons they informed, as in the rationales in which these reasons were cloaked, the explanations they gave themselves and others. Navasky examines these rationales with some sympathy and a scrupulous regard for nuance, but at the same time with a keen eye for cant and evasion, a willingness to measure moral fiction against historical fact, and ultimately to judge the one by the other. In so doing, he methodically analyzes and puts to rest the favorite alibis with which friendly witnesses simultaneously comforted themselves and regaled anybody who would listen: members of the Communist Party were dangerous spies; Marxists and fascists were the same — both totalitarian; the horror of the gulags justified repression at home; Communism was a religion; "I only named those who were already named"; "if they were in power they would stamp out freedom of expression"; and so forth.

The informers we meet in Naming Names are not so much moral grotesques as they are hostages of forces beyond their control, people weak and vulnerable to hurt and deprivation — even if it was only the loss of a swimming pool or a limousine. But as Navasky never allows us to forget, there were other captives of the same

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*Victor S. Navasky, Naming Names, New York: Viking, 1980; 482 pages, $15.95 hardback.
circumstances (the ratio was approximately one informer to two resisters) who made the opposite decision, choosing instead to fight, so that ultimately this excuse won’t do at all. Many of the cooperative witnesses Navasky interviews, including screenwriters Isobel Lennart and Michael Gordon and actors Lee J. Cobb and Sterling Hayden, have since repented their volubility before HUAC. Some, like the perennially evasive Elia Kazan and the belligerent Budd Schulberg, are far from contrite. Schulberg, for example, still insists that “those people — Lillian [Hellman], Dalton [Trumbo], and Ring [Lardner, Jr.] . . . are Nazis.”

More interesting than Kazan and Schulberg, however, are the liberals who collaborated in the name of resistance to McCarthyism. Liberal Joe Mankiewicz defeated reactionary Cecil B. DeMille in a bitter struggle over whether members of the Directors Guild should be required to sign loyalty oaths, only to turn around and adopt the oath himself, to prove the liberals weren’t red. Powerful Jewish organizations like the Anti-Defamation League, which should have detected the odor of antisemitism emanating from HUAC, chose instead to hold their noses and defend the Committee against those, usually Communists, who did detect the odor. The American Civil Liberties Union piously refused to defend accused Communists while at the same time some of its executives were carrying on a friendly correspondence with J. Edgar Hoover. New York Post editor James Wechsler
denounced McCarthy, but named names anyway. National Lawyers Guild attorney Martin Gang encouraged his clients to confess on the grounds that they shouldn't be penalized for beliefs they no longer held. And, best of all for blacklist bluffs, there was a shadowy psychiatrist who was reputed to have convinced his celebrity patients (Sterling Hayden and John Garfield, for example) to inform in the name of therapy. This legendary figure turns out to be alive and well in Santa Barbara, and to possess the name "Phil Cohen."

Navasky gives the fullest account to date of these episodes (and indeed, in the case of Cohen, the only one). My only quarrel with Naming Names is that the "moral detective story" occasionally obscures the political drama. Navasky must distinguish the situation of the blacklisted screen personnel from cases like those of the Rosenbergs and Alger Hiss, in which the significance of proven guilt might justify informing. According to Navasky, "If Whittaker Chambers told the truth at the Alger Hiss trial, he helped to uncover a plot to steal state secrets. If David Greenglass told the truth at the Rosenberg trial, he helped bring espionage agents to justice." But "the actors, directors, writers, and publicity people called as witnesses beforeHUAC had no atomic secrets to steal, no vital war materials to leave unloaded on the docks, no opportunities to 'poison' young minds in the classroom. It might be argued that the Hollywood people were in the ideal spot to create and distribute Communist propaganda to the American people. But... the collective nature of work in the Hollywood studio system and in the broadcast networks precluded individual attempts at agitprop."

While true, this somewhat misses the point, and makes it harder to understand the real purpose of the Committee. One of the reasons students of the blacklist have always considered the hearings a farce and the Committee members no better than louts is thatHUAC so conspicuously failed to find any Communist propaganda in Hollywood movies, with the possible exception ofWorld War II films like Mission to Moscow and Song of Russia, which were sympathetic to our then ally. We can conclude from the testimony of friendly witnesses like Ayn Rand, however, that the Committee defined Communist propaganda much more broadly than did the mostly liberal scholars who, in their eagerness to discreditHUAC, later defined propaganda narrowly as pro-Soviet sentiment and thus concluded that since there was very little of that,HUAC was therefore barking up the wrong tree. Rand, in her Screen Guide for Americans, saw the Communist Party line in films that "knocked success," ridiculed bankers, and so on. It seems likely thatHUAC was no more interested in CP propaganda narrowly defined than it was, as Navasky demonstrates, in names for names' sake. As the testimony of the cooperative witnesses indicates, it was interested in progressive, New Deal values that did in fact permeate American culture and were prominent in the films of the thirties, World War II, and the late forties. Thirties films like Grapes of Wrath were followed not only by the pro-Soviet films of the war years, but then by a cycle of films condemning antisemitism (Crossfire and Gentlemen's Agreement, both in 1947) and racism (such as Pinky, Home of the Brave, Intruder in the Dust, and Lost Boundaries, all in 1949). Then there was a group of anti-success films like Rhapsody in Blue (1945), Humoresque (1947), Body and Soul (1947), Champion (1949), and Force of Evil (1948), along with the sizeable number of films in which hard-driving capitalists were villains. In Undercurrent (1946), for example, industrialist
Robert Taylor stole the invention on which his fortune was based and murdered the inventor; other examples are Edward G. “Play-to-win—that’s-my-motto” Robinson in All My Sons (1948); Charles Laughton as a Henry Luce–like magazine tycoon in The Big Clock (1948); unscrupulous financier Zachary Scott in Ruthless (1948); Robert “Only-nice-guys-lose” Ryan in Caught (1949); and Gary “I-get-what-I-want” Cooper in The Bright Leaf (1950). Finally, there was film noir. While not at all progressive, these films were so sullenly preoccupied with the dark side of America that even liberals like Norman Cousins suggested they ought to be censored. It was films like these, and the impulse which produced them, that disturbedHUAC, not the occasional Song of Russia or Mission to Moscow. The red scare in Hollywood, as elsewhere, was a means to an end, and that end was to destroy not only the Communist Party, but far more important, the left wing of the New Deal, along with its cultural paraphernalia.

Navasky knows all this; at one point he calls HUAC’s investigation the “McCarthyism of culture.” What Naming Names lacks, however,

is an appreciation of cultural struggle, of combat in the cultural zone, and so he wanders off into trauma psychology, victim anthropology, survivor guilt, and stigmatization sociology, when the answers to the questions he asks lie a good deal closer at hand. Once we recognize that Hollywood films did contain “Communist” propaganda in the senseHUAC meant it (for “brotherhood” and “equality,” against “success” and “big business”), then HUAC’s strategies become clear. People were forced to name names simply because this was a good way to sever them from their old comrades and irrevocably divide the Left. For the origins of this strategy, we need look no further than Arthur Schlesinger’s The Vital Center, that Whole Earth Catalogue of corporate liberalism. The informers were the domestic counterpart of the Third Force, the Non-Communist Left (NCL), the “responsible” elements of Europe and Third World countries that had to be identified, wooed, and wedded to the center. The rebellious dissident community had to be divided into two factions. One faction was absorbed by the center; the other was expelled. And the best way to guarantee the loyalty of the former was to force them to betray the latter.
We repeatedly find this strategy at work in the movies of the period. Consider a "liberal," pro-Indian western like Delmer Daves’s *Broken Arrow* (1950), applauded at the time as an adult, humane departure from the B-westerns in which Indians were regularly mowed down like nine pins. When the film begins, Cochise (Jeff Chandler), at the head of a united Apache nation, is engaged in a protracted struggle with the US government which the narrator calls a "bloody, no give, no take" war. Force has failed to bring Cochise to heel. The problem, then, is how to make him make way for American history. Enter Jimmy Stewart, as the Indian-loving liberal hero. He learns to speak Apache, defends the Indians against the white racists (the film’s villains), and even goes so far as to marry an Apache maiden. Stewart persuades Cochise to make peace, beguiling him with offers of "foreign aid," in this case, free cattle courtesy of Washington. But not all the Indians go along with Cochise, and two factions develop: good Indians and bad Indians, Cochise and Geronimo — who emerges as the leader of the dissidents. The difference between the good Indians and the bad Indians is, of course, that the former accommodate themselves to the "realities" of the American move west, while the latter resist. Cochise and the good Indians are the Third Force, the "responsible" elements within the Apache nation, while Geronimo and the bad Indians are "irresponsible," "immature," "unrealistic" reds.

Not only does Cochise agree to make peace but he, not the whites, polices the bad Indians. In defiance of a three-month armistice, Geronimo’s rebels attack the stagecoach at the very moment Stewart happens to be riding alongside it. While the driver and passengers are pinned down in a hail of arrows, he rides off for help. For the cavalry — as in a conservative John Ford western? No — for Cochise! After the good Indians have chased off the bad Indians, the driver, shaking his head in disbelief, says, "Apaches protecting Americans! And I’ve lived to see it." Indians killing Indians for Americans. They called it Vietnamization in the sixties but the strategy was devised in the fifties.

Only a liberal like Stewart could have factionalized the Apaches and turned Cochise against Geronimo, whereas the conservative generals who employed force only succeeded in uniting the Apaches against them. Stewart is the Martin Gang, the Phil Cohen of this film, while Cochise is the friendly witness and Geronimo is the unfriendly one.
The Cochise/Geronimo pattern appears again and again in films of the fifties. In *On the Waterfront*, Cochise is Marlon Brando, who sings to the Crime Commission, while Geronimo is the waterfront boss Lee J. Cobb, who keeps mum. In *Blackboard Jungle*, Cochise is Sidney Poitier, the hood who sides with teacher Glenn Ford against hard-core punk Vic Morrow, Geronimo. In *Rebel Without a Cause*, Cochise is James Dean, who returns to the bosom of his family at the end of the film, while Geronimo is Sal Mineo, who has to be shot. In all these films the social-control figures, the people who mediate between the authorities and the dissidents and persuade the friendly faction to betray the unfriendly one, the Gangs and Cohens of the big screen, are seldom cops. They are liberal professionals instead: the priest in *On the Waterfront*, the teacher in *Blackboard Jungle*, the juvenile officer in *Rebel Without a Cause*.

This, in a way, is the solution Navasky finds to his moral detective story. The liberals did it — collaborated in their own destruction, sacrificed their friends to the witchhunt lest they be crushed themselves. We knew all this before, of course, but like many detective stories, the great interest of *Naming Names* lies in the hunt, and the subtle complication of the plot, not the solution. *Naming Names* is a very fine book, and a real contribution to our understanding of repression.

PETER BISKIND has written widely on politics and film and is editor of American Film. He is an associate editor of Radical America.
no strike for more than forty years.

The women were ostracized. Townspeople viewed the strike solely as one over "women's rights" and, in this bastion of old-line conservatism, it became a threat to traditional authority. The camera doggedly and vainly pursues the residents in hopes of getting beyond "No comment." One woman who left her husband during the strike recounts on film the pressure of her pastor's sermons on "authority under freedom."

With support from only the small Willmar NOW chapter, the women persisted, however, and drew strength from their relationships with each other. The Willmar 8 became a union and a consciousness-raising group. Feminism had not been a subject for their discussions at work; politics had been seen as "only voting." The strike changed all that.

The state AFL-CIO and the UAW offered some financial aid and even participated in a solidarity march through the town; no national union, though, was to offer the women the critical strength that affiliation would have provided. The union officials' evasiveness on camera parallels the reticence of the townspeople. After the national media and feminist journals picked up the story, the group did receive letters of support and contributions from office workers around the country but the support was made incidental when the NLRB ruling finally came down.

In a mixed ruling, the NLRB effectively undercut the union — providing for back pay but not reinstatement, on the grounds that the action was over "economic reasons" rather than "unfair labor practices." The women knew further struggle was futile and ended the strike. One teller was eventually rehired, returning at lower pay and position, and to repeated harassment on the job. The remaining seven now have other jobs, most of them part-time or at minimum wage. Women at the other banks in town, however, have reported higher wages and better conditions. As one striker recounts, "In that way, we've won." Surprisingly the Citizen's National Bank then began reporting losses for the first time in its history; eventually, the bank was to change ownership.

The Willmar 8 16 mm, color, 55 min., directed by Lee Grant, produced by Mary Beth Yarrow and Julie Thompson, 1980, distributed by California Newsreel, 630 Natoma St., San Francisco, CA 94103, (415) 621-6196.

Willmar 8 is a powerful statement of the fusion of feminism and trade unionism that informs the movement of women office workers. Ironically but not surprisingly, the film has been drawing the increasing attention (and rentals) of bank and insurance company personnel offices who view it as an ideal "how not to" film in their efforts to skirt unionization and equal employment rulings.

The story behind the film began in December 1977 when eight workers at the Citizen's National Bank of Willmar, Minnesota charged their employers with wage and sex discrimination and organized a union. The women had passed many coffee breaks discussing low wages ($425-700 a month), being passed over for promotion (for more recently hired men), and the intolerance of the bank president to their demands ("We're not all equal, you know"). The final straw came when the bank hired a man and asked them to train him for a management position. They filed a grievance with the National Labor Relations Board and began a strike that was to last for nearly three years, through two of the coldest winters in the history of the state.

Beyond the rigors of the picket line, the women faced a second front: the disapproval of their friends, families, and other residents of this conservative "Christian" town of 18,000, where there had been
One particularly well-edited exchange typifies the
film’s ability to convey both the internal and external
effects of the eight women’s action. A group of
housewives, immersed in a weekly poker game,
refuse to comment on the strike as they add dollar
bills into the game’s kitty. Pushed by the camera-
woman, they open up and reveal conflicting
appraisals of the right of the women to push for
better conditions. Intercut with this scene is the
union’s deliberation over the paltry strike fund
and the group’s support for one young striker who
hesitatingly reveals her need for a larger share. It is a
quite effective use of a probing and observing
camera.

This film should prove extremely useful for union,
workers reminiscence about previous efforts to organize
women’s and community groups. Beautifully pro-
within the eighty-five-year-old “family” business on
duced and edited, it offers a perceptive introduction
the outskirts of industrial Gary, Indiana.
the struggle of working women for recognition

The Steelworkers local, like the city of Hammond,
and dignity in the office and service sectors.

*Willmar 8* is part of a very good selection of
current films on work, unions, and economics that
California Newsreel has put together in its “Media at
Work” project. Write them for details and a catalog.

*Taylor Chain: Story in a Union Local* 16 mm, black
and white, 33 min., produced by Kartemquin Films,
1980, distributed by Kartemquin Films, PO Box
1665, Evanston, IL 60204, (312) 869-0602.

The United States government and media seem to
feel that unions are a wonderful thing for Poland,
but that here in America they are corrupt bureaula-
cies bringing the country to the edge of inflationary
catastrophe. Well, things may not be rosy in every
union local in the country but *Taylor Chain*,
produced by Gordon Quinn and Jerry Blumenthal of
Kartemquin Films, is a much more realistic portrait
of the state of contemporary labor than the network
offerings.

The film is a modest but stimulating inside view of
a small union local in Hammond, Indiana, as it
deliberates the latest contract offerings from the
management of Taylor Chain Company and decides
to strike for the first time in its five year history. The
relative youth of the local does not preclude a strong
sense of rank-and-file militancy as many of the older

The style is cinema verite and the content is
without the action, romance, or “big event” that
other documentaries, like *Harlan County*, have
provided. It is no less a useful film. As filmmaker
Gordon Quinn commented, “There’s a lot of criti-
cism to be made of big labor today. But big labor is
the basic defense of the worker. There’s a lot wrong
with unions, but also a lot right — and the film shows
them both.

The strike at Taylor Chain took place in 1972. Due
to funding problems and production delays (as
Kartemquin finished *The Chicago Maternity Center
Story*), the film was not completed until the fall of
1980. Kartemquin is now producing a ten-minute
update on Taylor Chain (recently most of the
workers were laid off — victims of the current reces-
sion) that can be shown with the longer film.

John Demeter
LETTERS

To the Editors:

In the May–June 1980 issue of *Radical America* Carl Boggs has an essay on “Gramsci and Eurocommunism” which ostensibly is a defense of Gramsci against the distortions of Eurocommunism. In fact, the essay is an attempt to stigmatize Eurocommunism as a new version of classical social democracy: “Not Gramsci, but Bernstein emerges as the first creative theoretical genius behind the Eurocommunist dream of a democratic road.” Eduard Bernstein (1850–1932) was, of course, the father of revisionism in the Second International.

Boggs argues by assertion:

Eurocommunism has sought to depict [Gramsci] as the *inventor* of the “democratic road to socialism” — that is, of a peaceful, gradualist strategy rooted *primarily* in electoral, parliamentary, and trade union struggles.... This *appropriation* of Gramsci by Eurocommunism and *social democrats*, however, rests upon a mystification of the actual historical and theoretical record.... Gramscian revolutionary concepts — for example, “ideological hegemony,” “social bloc,” “war of position,” and “democratic transformation,” — have been taken over by Eurocommunist leaders, integrated into a limited, moderate, *social-democratic* framework, and thus robbed of their initial meaning as a guide to revolutionary praxis. (italics added)

No evidence is presented for these assertions, some of which are demonstrably false. No social democratic group has “appropriated” Gramsci, quite the contrary. For example, German Social Democracy has officially abandoned Marxism and Bettino Craxi, leader of the Italian Socialist Party, claims Proudhon, not Gramsci, as his party’s theoretical fore-runner. Social democratic parties, despite socialist phraseology, are out to manage capitalism; Eurocommunist parties are out to change it. Ruling classes are well aware of the difference, while accepting social democratic parties, they fight bitterly against Eurocommunist parties. In Italy, for example, Gianni Agnelli, head of FIAT knows that the PCI is working towards socialism and has said so: “We are faced with the attempt of new social forces to assert their hegemony. The stakes are high for all concerned.” Indeed they are: the stakes are *class* rule.

Boggs asserts that Eurocommunists claim Gramsci as the “inventor” of their movement. They do not. Eurocommunists are well aware that Gramsci was a “Leninist” — that in Boggs’s own words, “Gramsci insisted that the transition to socialism required the sweeping overthrow of bourgeois political institutions.” Eurocommunists are well aware that in Gramsci’s theory of a “war of position” — the attrition of the bourgeois power structure — there would come a time for a decisive leap to the “war of movement” — the insurrectionary seizure of power. No Eurocommunist denies or obfuscates these aspects of Gramsci.

Eurocommunists claim Gramsci not as the “inventor” of their movement, but rather as its precursor in the sense that Erasmus was a precursor of Luther. They see Gramsci as a profound student of the nature of the state and the revolutionary process, whose insights contributed to the origins of Eurocommunism ten years after his death. Boggs undermines his own thesis when he writes that while the term “Eurocommunism” dates from 1975, “the theory has much earlier origins... in the years 1944–47.” Precisely! Palmiro Togliatti, if anyone, is the “inventor” of Eurocommunism.

The Italian CP is the most advanced of Eurocommunist parties in its theory and practice, and Boggs’s abstractions have to be measured against the reality of Italy today. Boggs writes: “Concretely, the Eurocommunist... ignores the role of collective organs of struggle — workers’ and community assemblies, action committees, and grassroots movements of feminists, students and others.” He does not seem to realize that this is exactly what is going on in Italy — formation of neighborhood councils *outside* the parties, of factory councils *outside* the unions, of farm collects *outside* the ministries’ bureaucracies — all nourished, if not initiated, by the PCI. I spent months traveling in Italy, covering all major cities and much of the countryside, participating in scores of meetings, talking with hundreds of people of all
strata — cardinals and atheists, students and professors, union leaders and workers on the picket lines, leaders and rank-and-file of the major parties as well as the smaller groups on the Left (Manifesto, Lotta Continua, etc), feminist groups, radical groups, autonomous groups, farm collectives. It was an exhilarating, unforgettable experience. Boggs's assertion that Eurocommunist strategy "is rooted primarily in electoral struggles," is false, for that strategy is rooted primarily in the mass mobilization of the people and in the fostering of their class consciousness.

The electoral struggles are important: they serve both as a barometer of class consciousness and as ratification of power relationships. But that power lies not in the vote, but in the fusion of electoral and extraparliamentary struggles as Rosa Luxemburg tirelessly urged. Communist-Socialist coalitions govern more than half the population — all the major cities, hundreds of towns and villages, many of the provinces and regions. Among Italian workers and intellectuals Marxism has established a cultural hegemony heavily influenced by Gramsci. Gramsci is a national hero and his writings a national resource.

Gramsci was a "Leninist," but his writings have nuances and insights that distinguished him from Lenin. Lenin himself was conscious that Russia differed markedly from other Western nations and, in his last writing, warned other parties against a "Russification" of strategy and tactics within their own countries. Eurocommunists contend that Gramsci went beyond Lenin and Boggs seems to agree with them. He writes: "The concept of 'hegemony' enabled Gramsci to advance beyond Lenin's narrow and one-sided vanguardism.... [Gramsci's] guiding principle was the 'democratizing' of Leninist strategy to fit the more complex conditions of European capitalism." Gramsci succeeded in his task, and that is why his ideas are so relevant to our country today. There is no space here to present those ideas. They are given thoroughly and brilliantly in a recent book, Gramsci's Politics by Anne Shawcross Sassoon (St. Martin's Press) and they are summarized by Boggs. I do not disagree with his presentation of Gramsci's ideas. We differ on the interpretation of the use of those ideas: he thinks Eurocommunism stultifies and distorts Gramsci; I think it brings his ideas to fruition under contemporary conditions.

The crux of the argument is the Gramscian distinction between the war of position (attrition of bourgeois power) and the war of movement (insurrection.) In contrast to Lenin, Gramsci has little to say about the tactics of insurrection; his analysis is directed to the war of position in modern societies before the conquest of power. Again and again, Gramsci argues that the working class must develop and demonstrate its ability to govern and establish its cultural hegemony before it achieves political and economic hegemony. Cultural hegemony requires a working class sufficiently educated and sufficiently organized to create its own intellectuals and sufficiently powerful to attract intellectuals from other classes (for Gramsci, the term "intellectuals" covers professionals, politicians, engineers, managers, etc.).

This perspective entails a mass party which can permeate the whole population rather than the elite party of professional revolutionaries proposed by Lenin. In a country of fifty million, for example, a mass party would have one or two million members, not the five, ten or twenty thousand which usually would characterize a Leninist party.

For Gramsci the war of position was a prelude to insurrection. But if insurrection is a priori impossible, then the war of position becomes the only game in town. Eurocommunists believe this to be the case; they believe that an insurrection in a developed capitalist country would almost certainly lead to a civil war with the probable involvement of the superpowers and the danger of thermonuclear war. The superpowers can show restraint in Angola or Nicaragua where their vital interests are not at stake, but can they look on with equanimity if Germany or Japan became either communist or fascist? No responsible left movement in a developed capitalist country can project a political strategy based on insurrection.

Critics of Eurocommunism have evaded this problem. The ablest critic, Ernest Mandel, in his book From Stalism to Eurocommunism devotes the last page and a half of his 220 pages to this
question and his italicized contention is that it would be "politically impossible" for the United States to intervene militarily if there were a real revolution in Italy. But his premises are flawed; he projects "a repitition of a Vietnam-style adventure," whereas a more fruitful analogy would be the Spanish Civil War. Of course, the threat of a Franco-style military coup gives the bourgeoisie a degree of political blackmail, but this can be greatly minimized by adroit politics, vigilance, and mass mobilization of the whole people.

Eurocommunists do not believe they have done away with class struggles. Eurocommunists are well aware that revolutionary situations may arise, but they do not believe that insurrection is a solution. This does not mean a surrender to the bourgeoisie; it does not mean a refusal to take power. It does mean that power can be achieved and maintained only if a substantial majority of the population is with them. In this scenario, Gramsci's ideas are fully applicable and relevant.

In our own country, Gramsci and the politics of Eurocommunism have much to teach us. They present a coherent set of ideas, a strategy, a political actuality, which could do much to bring together our fragmented Left. The emphasis of Eurocommunism is on a full, untrammeled democracy for the masses, well beyond the limits of bourgeois democracy. This emphasis would end the isolation of the various splinter groups and would find great resonance in our country. The Reagan election is no cause for panic; it is the result of anger, frustration, and disorientation, but these very sentiments can be channeled into a huge progressive surge which could dwarf the New Deal and the CIO. Our people need an antidote to apathy and despair. This indeed is the promise, and the task, of Eurocommunism.

Carl Marzani

To the Editors:

In his "Gramsci and Eurocommunism" Carl Boggs attributes to me, among others, the notion that Gramsci was "the main inspiration of Eurocommunist strategy." Boggs is inaccurate. In the article he cites, I declared only that Gramsci contributed a legacy hostile to dogma in the application of revolutionary socialist theory. ("Too often in our party," Gramsci reportedly told fellow prisoners in 1930, "there is a fear of any and every idea not sanctified by inclusion in the old maximalist dictionary of cliches.") Gramsci, we note below, was aiming at a "maximalist" outlook typified in Boggs's article assailing the idea of kinship between the revolutionary Gramsci and "reformist" Eurocommunism.

The difference between my position and Boggs's interpretation of it is significant. I have repeatedly maintained that American Communists in 1956-57 strenuously argued the basic themes now associated with Eurocommunism. These themes marked a sharp break with Comintern orthodoxy, which persisted long after the Comintern's dissolution. They were debated here independently of the Italian CP (PCI), though simultaneously with its debates following Khrushchev's secret report on Stalin's crimes at the Soviet party's 20th Congress. We were then unfamiliar with Gramsci.

For reasons not relevant here, the break with Comintern dogma did not prevail in the US party, a failure that has been disastrous for the CP and the American Left. But over the years, nearly every significant Communist party in the developed capitalist world has adopted some or all of the basic themes involved. As emphasized by both Marx and
Engels, the transition process for developed bourgeois democratic nations will differ from that in other societies. That difference was ignored in the Comintern’s concept of revolutionary dynamics, as it is in Boggs’s argument.

The point here is that “Eurocommunist strategy” grew out of decades of Communist experience and profound changes in world society, reinforced by a less selective study of Marx, Engels, and Lenin than that dictated by Comintern dogma. In Boggs’s world, no reexamination of strategy and tactics is required by the massive growth of fascism in the 1930s and its deadly impact on working-class movements, the bloody war that ultimately destroyed fascist power, the breakup of the colonial empires, the huge technological advances during and after the war, the separation of vast populations from the direct capitalist orbit, the expansion of working-class power and influence in several capitalist nations, developments in Communist-led nations, or the long experience of working-class movements. Carl Marzani, in a new book on Eurocommunism, explores specific influences that led to the development of its basic theoretical outlook.

Marzani demonstrates how Gramsci’s creative concepts influenced Eurocommunist theory. For while this theory developed out of wide experience chiefly after Gramsci’s incapacitation, Boggs is wrong in his insistence that it traduces Gramsci’s revolutionary teachings. Boggs’s argument is peculiar. It is predicated on Gramsci’s embrace of the Soviet model of insurrectionary seizure of state power and the institution of proletarian dictatorship. Hence, Boggs argues, Gramsci was antagonistic to the alleged “social democratic” themes now associated with Eurocommunism.

Of course he was. So were his intimate coworker, Togliatti, and all other Communists in parties affiliated with the Comintern. Boggs documents at length what needs no documentation — that Gramsci, at least until his imprisonment in 1926, adhered to the Comintern’s ideology. How does this prove that he would not have arrived at the same conclusion as Togliatti did from the disastrous Italian and world experience of 1926–45, the changed circumstances after World War II, and the consequent realization that Western Europe was not Eastern Europe? On the basis of Togliatti’s pre-1935 writing, it can readily be shown that he, too, was antagonistic to the basic themes of Eurocommunism.

The irony is that, in Boggs’s terms, Gramsci in jail “deserted” his insurrectionary ideology years before Togliatti did, by projecting an all-embracing anti-fascist struggle for the restoration of bourgeois democratic freedoms. He did this in 1930, five years before the Comintern adopted the Popular Front as official policy. According to Boggs, “a good case can be made” for pinpointing the Popular Front as the origin of Eurocommunism. What, then, becomes of Boggs’s insistence that it is blasphemy to claim Gramsci as a progenitor of Eurocommunism?

At least two works on Gramsci in English, both mentioned in other contexts in Boggs’s own book on Gramsci, describe Gramsci’s 1930 prison lectures, as later reported separately in writing by two of the seven Communist participants. The lectures were given after a historic meeting of the PCI’s executive in March 1930, which approved by a 4–3 vote a Togliatti resolution rejecting unity with all other antifascist forces and collaboration with any bourgeois democratic regime resulting from Mussolini’s overthrow. The resolution followed the 10th plenum of the Comintern’s Executive Committee (ECCI) in mid-1929, at which Stalin tightened his line of pressure for imminent “revolutionary upsurge,” naming “social fascism” as the main foe and demanding the elimination of all “conciliators.” The plenum criticized the Italian party for insufficient diligence in pursuing this line and in purging critics. The three who had opposed the March resolution, arguing instead for unity with the Socialists against Mussolini, were soon expelled.

At the time, only Gramsci’s brother Gennaro could see him in jail. Gennaro later told Fiori that Antonio opposed Togliatti’s resolution and was shaken by the expulsions, though Gennaro hid this from Togliatti because he feared Antonio’s expulsion. Fiori summarizes Gramsci’s reported views in his lectures: (1) the party had no more than six thousand activists; (2) the most suitable tactic was thus not sectarian isolation but a search for class alliances; (3) it was necessary to promote and try to
lead a wide popular antifascist movement. All antifascist elements needed to be mobilized in such a movement, the goal of which was restoration of the freedoms destroyed by fascism.¹⁰

Like the Comintern’s later Popular Front strategy, Gramsci did not drop the eventual goal of proletarian revolution; the proposed alliance for restoration of bourgeois democracy was an intermediate step. But Gramsci’s proposals explicitly undercut Boggs’s repeated insistence that Gramsci scorned any approach not directly embracing power seizure and proletarian dictatorship as the immediate goal. In fact Gramsci rejected the idea that proletarian dictatorship would follow fascism, declaring that the Italian class struggle “is bound to develop along the lines of the freedoms which fascism has destroyed.”¹¹

Gramsci reportedly told his class that he undertook the lectures in part because he wanted to combat the “maximalism” infecting the party. He complained of “a fear of anything and every idea not sanctified by inclusion in the old maximalist dictionary of cliches... Any and every tactic not corresponding nicely to the vision of this dream-world is considered an error, a deviation from proper revolutionary tactics and strategy.” One ends up talking of revolution, he declared, with no idea of what to do about it, “a tendency to prefer words to political action or to confuse the one with the other.”¹²

Gramsci was immediately confronted with a sample of the accuracy of his observations. A participant denounced his views in Boggsian terms, labelling them social democratic and charging that “Gramsci was no longer a Communist... that his sabotage should be denounced to the party...”¹³

John Cammett claims a continuity between Gramsci’s Lyons Theses of 1926 and the Popular Front.¹⁴ Boggs vehemently denies such a link. Yet if one recognizes the compulsion upon Gramsci to reconcile his concepts of hegemony, historic bloc, war of position and maneuver, etc. with Comintern policy, the continuity would appear inescapable. Certainly these Gramscian contributions to revolutionary theory, which involve the struggle for working-class power, are applicable whether the struggle is peaceful or ultimately insurrectionary.

A further word on the Popular Front issue. Boggs tells us that at the PCI Congress in 1930 Togliatti called for insurrection, destruction of fascism and capitalism by revolution (Boggs’s emphasis), setting up of Soviets, and proletarian dictatorship.¹⁵ Gramsci was then denouncing such “maximalist” bombast as empty cliches replacing effective action. Boggs notes Togliatti’s later “dramatic shift” to the Popular Front and leaves no doubt of his disapproval of this shift. Gramsci and Togliatti thus eliminated the gap between them, leaving Boggs out in the cold. Who was right?

In 1930 the PCI had been reduced to some six thousand members with most in exile. No organized center existed within the country and every effort to establish one while the party operated in isolation — that is, until 1934, was quickly smashed by the police.¹⁶ What conceivable sense did calls for insurrection by this tiny, isolated party make?

In June 1934, the French party, after losing almost half of its membership and most of its electoral influence through “third period” tactics (while Socialist strength grew) consummated a united front with the Socialists, later expanded into the Popular Front. Immediately its fortunes were reversed, and by 1936 it doubled its vote and surged in membership.¹⁷ The PCI followed by consummating a unity pact with the PSI in August 1934. This resulted, a liberal historian reports, in a “quick upsurge in Communist strength.”¹⁸

The Comintern’s “third period” tactics, based on a prediction of a “revolutionary upsurge,” led to the destruction of the powerful German CP and heavy Communist losses everywhere in Europe. The Popular Front rescued and resuscitated the movement. Yet there are still those who embrace the “revolutionary,” irrelevant bombast and adventurism of the profoundly sectarian “third period”
and assail "frontist" alliances. Such thinking, pervading numerous US sects today, seriously hampers the development of a viable socialist movement.

Space limitation prevents a discussion of Boggs's confusion concerning social democracy. He evidently believes that the thesis of peaceful, democratic transition is Bernsteinian revisionism. If so, Marx and Engels were the first "revisionists." For in their rare references to the mode of transition in developed capitalist democracies, they made clear their view that such transition was possible there.19

Max Gordon

Footnotes

5. The Promise of Eurocommunism (Lawrence Hill & Co., 1980), passim.
8. Fiori, pp. 251–52; Cammett, pp. 183–84.
10. Ibid., pp. 256–57; Cammett, pp. 184–85.
18. Delzell, p. 130.

RESPONSE

To the Editors:

Judging from the responses of Max Gordon and Carl Marzani, it would appear that the Left in the advanced capitalist countries is faced with a rather simple choice: either the parliamentary road or the "Soviet model" of violent insurrection; either bourgeois pluralism or the dictatorship of the proletariat; either Eurocommunism or "sectarian isolation." Since I was so bold as to question the viability of the first alternative, I must be condemned to the hopeless irrationality and obsolescence of the latter — even if my article expresses nothing of the sort. But at least poor Gramsci was rescued from the depths of a maximalist extremism to take his rightful place alongside the modern proponents of a sane and realistic "democratic road" to socialism.

The purpose of my essay was to explore the relationship between Gramsci's Marxism and Eurocommunist politics — to show how the PCI leadership has invoked the revolutionary legacy of Gramsci for its own instrumental (and increasingly social-democratic) ends. I tried to demonstrate that the Eurocommunists have chosen to legitimate their structural reformism in part through Gramscian concepts that have taken on distinctly new and in some cases contrasting meanings versus the original.
(I never said that Gramsci invented Eurocommunism, only that PCI theorists claim their strategy has origins in Gramsci's thought.) I was not interested in replaying old Comintern debates. Nor did I set out to establish the relevance of Gramsci for contemporary political struggles, although my argument did contain some implicit assumptions. I was concerned above all with the theoretical content of Gramsci's work, which I argued was distinct from the early Leninist-Comintern tradition and also consistently antagonistic to later PCI themes. Unfortunately, both Gordon and Marzani made no effort to confront the source of this theory; instead of even cursory references to the Prison Notebooks, for example, there is only Gordon's appeal to Gramsci's brief prison "lectures" delivered in 1930.

The Gramsci that emerges from the Gordon and Marzani critiques is either an apostle of "Comintern ideology" or a staunch advocate of the Popular Front. How Gramsci is supposed to have made the leap from one to the other remains mysterious. Missing is the essence of Gramsci's unorthodox and powerful theory — a theory that pointed beyond the strategic confines of both parliamentarism and vanguardism, that envisaged the unfolding of a democratic socialist state. To illustrate this outlook I cited a number of passages from Gramsci's political writings. In particular I referred to passages that reflected Gramsci's strong antipathy toward electoralism and trade unionism as strategies of socialist transformation; there is no reason to believe that Gramsci ever changed this viewpoint, which already prior to the Comintern years distanced him from the "democratic road" current exemplified by Bernstein and Turati. In opposition to this Gordon and Marzani produce nothing whatsoever to show that Gramsci endorsed such a strategy, much less that he theoretically formulated one. The only "evidence" that is furnished comes from the testimony of Gramsci's brother and from the prison "lectures," which reveal nothing more than Gramsci's opposition to the Comintern's "third period" policy and his support for a broad antifascist movement (which Gordon, following Fiori, incorrectly interprets as a commitment to Popular Front-style politics). To this is added Gordon's conjecture that Gramsci might have swung over to Togliatti's structural reformism had he lived to achieve a new wisdom by observing postwar changes in Italian society.

On the second point, all we have are projections which are of course impossible to sustain; no one knows for certain how Gramsci would have responded to the postwar situation or to the phenomenon of Eurocommunism. We do know, however, that Gramsci was uncompromisingly critical of those political forces (e.g., the leadership of the Italian Socialist Party) that during his own time advanced a similar "democratic road" strategy, which ended in paralysis. And we also have a record of the sharp differences — precisely around the role of electoral politics — that often divided Gramsci and Togliatti as early as 1918-19, when Togliatti was a figure within the "electoralist" wing of the PSI. Moreover, the foundations of structural reformism were built by Togliatti in the late 1930s and 1940s, when he was living not in Italy but in Paris and Moscow, as a response to the dictates of Soviet foreign policy rather than to indigenous forces in Italian society. The fact is that the movement which finally emerged from the struggle to overthrow fascism was not frontist; on the contrary, it was insurrectionary, shaped by the mass mobilization and armed partisan struggles of the Resistance.

Gordon's attempt to prove that Gramsci really switched to a Popular Front orientation in 1930 is really a diversion from the main issue. In the first place, no clear evidence exists to support this contention: Gramsci's opposition to the "turn" of 1928-30 was motivated by his fear of sectarianism and Stalinization within the party organization, not by his embrace of a policy that would only be introduced several years later. More significantly, even if Gordon were able to demonstrate conclusively that Gramsci advocated the Popular Front (or whatever was understood by that), this fact alone is quite meaningless. For the Popular Front was designed as a tactical maneuver against fascism, concerned essentially with the defense of bourgeois democracy, rather than as a strategy for socialist transformation. Given the flexibility of tactics, it would have been possible for the PCI to temporarily adopt frontism without at the same time shifting to a long-term
strategy of parliamentarism. After all, frontism never advanced any coherent program; still less did it produce any original theory or strategy for achieving socialism in the West. Under Togliatti, of course, the tactics did become elevated into a strategy of structural reforms when, in the aftermath of the Resistance, the PCI (under pressure from both the Soviet Union and the Allies) adopted the "new course."

There is considerable irony in this. Gordon claims that with only six thousand members, most of whom were in exile, PCI calls for insurrection against the Mussolini regime made no sense; presumably frontism was the only conceivable response. Yet the logic of the situation was exactly the reverse of what Gordon suggests, and consonant with Gramsci's theory of a revolutionary "national-popular" movement: the very absence of bourgeois political institutions in Italy (unlike France) made preoccupation with a frontist defense of liberal democracy irrelevant on the terrain of tactics and methods. The choice was a false one, as the Resistance movement (which transformed the PCI into a mass party) clearly demonstrated.

Anyone familiar with Gramsci's theoretical and political perspectives should not be surprised by his rejection of the extreme maximalism pushed during the "third period." This issue was already at the core of Gramsci's debates with Bordiga in the early 1920s. What maximalism signified for Gramsci was obsession with the conquest of state power (the "war of movement") devoid of any sustained prior efforts to transform civil society and create the consensual underpinnings of socialism (the "war of position"). Maximalism assumed that the overthrow of capitalism (which it saw as imminent) would be followed immediately by a proletarian dictatorship, without the need for intermediate struggles and broad alliances. Against this mechanistic and one-sided strategy Gramsci opposed his famous *doppia prospettiva* (dual perspective), which stressed the latter without abandoning the former. To see electoralist or frontist implications in Gramsci's attack on "third period" politics is thus to completely overlook the central thrust of his contributions. It misreads the concept of "social bloc," for example, because it assumes that the only alliances possible are electoral-parliamentary coalitions. But then little else can be expected from the crude Gordon-Marzani model, which poses only the most stark alternatives: either immediate seizure of state power or parliamentary road.

Marzani's discussion of the "war of position" suffers from precisely this sort of one-dimensionality. True, this concept points to the necessary development of a majoritarian socialist presence within bourgeois society as the precondition for a transfer of power. But whereas Gramsci viewed the "war of position" as unfolding primarily within *civil society*, through the struggle for popular control over the system of production and life of the community, the Eurocommunists look almost exclusively to the state. Working-class governance for Gramsci meant collective self-management through local structures that would gradually become the basis of an entirely reconstituted state — not simply the capture of a majority of parliamentary seats and ministerial positions within the bourgeois political system, which is the cornerstone of social democracy. (It should be obvious here that the differences revolve not around conflicting assessments of historical conditions — or degrees of willingness to reexamine and reapply basic theories — but around questions of fundamental strategic choice.)

As I argued in my article, the "war of position" corresponds logically to a non-Leninist, non-social-democratic strategy that subverts bourgeois social and authority relations. It follows that the "war of movement" is something other than the impulsive maximalism, with elitist attachment to vanguard solutions, that Marzani correctly wants to jettison as
"a priori impossible." Thus for the kind of political strategy Marzani has in mind — one where the "war of position" (Eurocommunist-style) is the "only game in town" — Gramsci becomes totally superfluous. Bernstein will suffice perfectly.

Marzani contends, while the "war of movement" is outmoded, the PCI today is nonetheless an organization committed to political mobilization. But mobilization of what kind, and around what ends? Given the undisputed fact that the PCI devotes the overwhelming bulk of its human and financial resources to electoral politics, both nationally and locally, it is hard to see how the PCI's "mobilization" functions differ qualitatively from the same functions carried out by the Christian Democrats and Socialists. Marzani is convinced that the PCI has established a broad presence in Italian society, that it has "nourished if not initiated" the growth of local structures such as councils. Once again, the question is: what kind of presence? What makes the PCI fundamentally distinct from other electoral parties that compete within the rules of pluralist democracy? Marzani supplies no answers. As for the councils, they were mainly the outgrowth of the radical Left in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and generally assumed an identity hostile to the left parties and trade unions. With the decline of local forms in the mid-1970s, the PCI and CGIL made every effort to absorb them into their own bureaucratic structures, with the result that the councils (where they exist) have been reduced to instruments of electoral campaigning.

The motivating force behind the Gordon and Marzani responses really involves conflicting evaluations of the PCI more than differences over Gramsci. They see in Eurocommunism a new promise for socialist transformation in the advanced capitalist countries — one that is simultaneously realistic and "democratic." Like many within the Italian Left (including even large sectors of the PCI's rank and file), I see the party leadership as having abandoned de facto the historic commitment to socialist goals, as now presiding over an institutionalized opposition for which Marxism has increasingly become a ritualized ideology. I find it hard to ignore the strategic parallels between traditional social democracy and Eurocommunism; in the earlier instance, of course, the failure to seize the initiative in a phase of crisis ultimately turned the parties into victims of that crisis.

Where is the PCI moving today? Consider that it has been in the forefront of imposing strict "austerity" measures upon a rebellious working class; that it endorses, even welcomes, the continued presence of multinational corporations in Italy so long as they are regulated; that it has dropped its opposition to the Common Market and NATO; that it supports the full development of nuclear power; that it has embraced a strong "law and order" posture, while agreeing to extension of the fascist legal code; that it has often sided with landlords in their battle against impoverished squatters; and that it has commonly moved to contain and even repress urban social movements of workers, women, youth, the unemployed, etc. And we are asked to believe that all of this constitutes a necessary stage in the transition to socialism, just as Gramsci would have anticipated had he only lived a little longer. Beyond that, we are urged (by Marzani) to look to Eurocommunism as an inspiration for our own struggles insofar as it "presents a coherent set of ideas, a strategy, a political actuality, which could bring together our fragmented left."

This curious mixture of cynicism and naive faith appears to be the response of Gordon and Marzani to the challenge of the 1980s. Perhaps it makes sense if the only alternative is defined as an obsolete insurrectionary model associated with a Stalinist Comintern. But if Gordon and Marzani have such limited vision and imagination as to believe that we can hope for nothing more than that under present conditions — if, in effect, capitalism has stabilized itself indefinitely — then Gramsci the theorist (as opposed to Gramsci the legitimating hero-figure) will be only a source of embarrassment.
To the Editors:

On June 13, 1980, Dr. Walter Rodney, a historian of international prominence and a leader of one of the opposition parties in Guyana, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA), was killed when a bomb exploded and wrecked the car in which he was riding in Georgetown, Guyana. The Associated Press report on the incident stressed the fact that Rodney was the third senior member of the WPA to have been killed in seven months, the others having been killed by the police.

The killing took place while Rodney and others were on trial for a variety of political charges, which centered on charges of arson. Independent observers at the trial have asserted that the proceedings were clearly going against the government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham and the trial had been suspended for a two month period in order to give the government opportunity to “improve” its case. At the same time the government had indicted seventeen people associated with the WPA on a charge of treason. All of this occurred after Prime Minister Burnham had personally vetoed the appointment of Dr. Rodney to a position at the University of Guyana. A representative of Amnesty International present in the court during the preliminary examination on these charges declared that Amnesty International will formally adopt the case as a subject of its inquiry into political repression in Guyana.

Dr. Rodney had held academic positions at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica, at the University of Michigan, at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and at the State University at Binghamton. He was the author of a number of outstanding works on African history, including *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* which probed the impact of the slave trade and colonialism and imperialism upon African development. His *Groundings with my Brothers*, written versions of popular talks on African and contemporary West Indian politics, penetrated deeply into the struggles of the West Indian people. The first volume of Dr. Rodney’s history of the Guyana labor movement, finished shortly before his death, will be published in 1981 by The Johns Hopkins University Press, with an introduction by George Lamming.

The circumstances of Dr. Rodney’s death and his preeminence as a scholar and political activist who united scholarship and politics and who had gained the respect of serious intellectuals throughout the world and of thousands of working people in Africa, England, America, and the West Indies, demand that an International Commission of Enquiry into the death of Walter Rodney be created.

Those having ideas as to the composition of such a commission and who wish to contribute funds for this effort may write to the Los Angeles Committee for Academics in Peril (LACAP), P.O. Box 25722, Los Angeles, California 90025, which is helping to coordinate information and activities concerning Dr. Rodney’s murder.

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The author spent several weeks in Poland in the fall of 1980 interviewing principal figures in SOLIDARITY (the new union) and in KOR (the organization of intellectuals). He was born in Poland, and was exiled along with his parents. He was educated in London, Geneva and Paris, and for eighteen years he was Paris correspondent for The Economist, (London) specializing in Eastern European affairs.

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