RADICAL AMERICA

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

This scene depicts:
a. police brutality
b. the Crimean War
c. a Polish wedding
d. an SDS convention

RA Conference Report

The first RA editorial conference was held in Madison, June 6-9, with the following participants: Mark Naison and Laura Foner (New York City), Bob and Susan Cohen (Buffalo), Dick Howard (Austin), Franklin and Penny Rosemont (Chicago) and from Madison, Dale Tomich, Enid Eckstein, Martha Sonnenberg, David Gross, Dave Wagner, Henry Haslach, Eliot Eisenberg, Mark Knopps, Andy Rabbinbach, Irene Fokakis, Paul Richards and Mike Meeropol.

The conference was generally successful, especially in terms of relating people's current political roles and their consequent attitudes and political positions to their various perspectives on the magazine's future development. It was commonly understood that the vacuum of New Left theoretical journals forced upon RA a conglomerate role; but no necessary contradiction was seen in producing a variety of issues with somewhat different functions, as the Labor Number, a Rock and Youth Culture Number, or a Surrealist Number. Similarly, participants shared the view that RA was not and should not be didactic, in the sense of Old Left journals, but was constantly in a process of development characteristic of activists in their mid-twenties (including nearly all those who attended).

The monthly or near-monthly schedule, with a gradual rise in circulation from the present 4,000, was seen as both necessary and possible. However, there was no doubt that RA needed to pull further into ongoing activity and commitment numbers of its present readers. The operation is in no sense 'closed', but rather expects to take on key figures from the people who volunteer to do work, especially outside Madison.

The schedule for Fall and Winter was left very much open to changes, but appeared something like the following:

September: 'Rock and Youth Culture' issue, edited by the Cohens, on the transition from the 1950s to the 1960s as seen through the development of rock music in all its variations. Insofar as it 'works', this issue was seen as paradigmatic for making 'culture' real as an analytical tool for our explanations of American society.

October: Black Issue, edited primarily by Buhle and Naison, includes Mark's lengthy study of Blacks and the 1930s Left, Locksley Edmondson's analysis of the international development of Black revolutionary culture, several cultural/political studies of jazz and blues development in the twentieth century, and a poetry series by Sam Cornish.

November: Women's Liberation Issue, edited by Edith Altbach and the Madison Staff. An elaborate prospectus has been written up and dittoed -- readers are asked to help distribute the prospectus to likely writers. The issue will in any case include a bibliographical essay on the order of the essay in the March/April number; a study by Mari Jo Buhle on women in the Socialist Party; some economic/cultural studies of women in the U.S.; and some translations from German SDS agitation around working class mothers.

February, 1970: A Political Economy number, edited by Mike Meeropol and the Madison Staff, streessing classical Marxian economic tools as well as analysis of current trends in the U.S. As with the Women's Liberation Number, Meeropol has drawn up a prospectus which will be available soon, on request, from the RA office.

Sometime in the Fall we will also publish, either as a pamphlet or single number, C.L.R. James' first anthology of works, edited by himself, covering his career from the 1930s until today. This is expected to be in the neighborhood of 75,000 words, thus comprising our first 'book', which we hope to sell for no more than $1 (but which will be sent to subscribers as a regular number). Similarly as a pamphlet or number a Surrealist Issue will be published in the Winter, edited primarily by Franklin Rosemont and seeking to draw on little-known American sources as well as French influence for a vision of total revolution.

Long articles, comprising parts of 'special' issues or the whole of one, include: Andy Rabbinbach on the perceptions of Walter Benjamin; Andrew Levine on an 'Althusserian' criticism of Marcuse and the Marcuseans; Barbara Kennedy on science and socialism; a series of European articles collected by Dick Howard (who returns to Paris in September), as a semi-regular feature of RA's work; and a 'Universities' series edited by Mark Knopps. Future issues, discussed by the Conference but put off until, say, Spring for publication, include: the Political Economy of Racism; Science and the Radical Movement; the University and the New Working Class; and studies emanating from Wilhelm Reich's analyses and achievements.

Finally, a pamphlet series has already been started, with the publication of d.a.levy's Stone Sarcophagous; future poetry pamphlets will include collections by Robert Head and Darlene Fife and by Franklin Rosemont. Later pamphlets, ready by Fall, include a document on Teaching Assistant Association negotiation for recognition as a union, in the midst of a threatened pay cut, at Wisconsin, by Henry Haslach (jointly published with the TAA). Such pamphlets, unlike the Surrealist or C.L.R. James pamphlets, will be limited in run to about 500, and usually directed at a limited audience. At least one series will be directed primarily toward SDSers, offering RA's stamp on documents written by those in and around us, beginning in the Fall. In the first year of the various types of pamphlets we might expect to produce ten to fifteen.

Overall, those attending the Conference were much encouraged. The kind of political differences which have often thrown SDS chapters and the organization as a whole into turmoil, were present, but led to very little hassling and seemed resolvable at least within the common production of Radical America. The Madison Staffers will remain, for practical reasons, in general direction of the magazine's ongoing evolution. But as a Rochester group around the Ewens has edited one issue, whole, of RA (May/June), so a Buffalo group around the Cohens will edit another (September), and both are expected to perform similar tasks in the future. Individuals like Dick Howard and Mark Naison are relied upon for aid and advice almost continuously, both in editorial and technical matters, and with the expansion of our activities their responsibilities continue to grow. Special credit is deserved by Hank Haslach, who has run the SDS Free Press in Madison that has made RA production possible since its second issue, and Don McKelvey, whose typesetting of the last two numbers has, alone, been equal to a substantial grant in funds. Within this group, which will certainly expand over the next months, we hope to have the foundation for a growing, and growingly important, RA.



Science Fiction in an Age of Transition

Arthur Maglin

> However fantastic art may be, it cannot have at its disposal any other material except that which is given to it by the world of three dimensions and by the narrower world of class society. Even when the artist creates heaven and hell, he merely transforms the experience of his own life into his phantasmagorias, almost to the point of his landlady's unpaid bill.
>
> Leon Trotsky
> Literature and Revolution

In an epoch when the continued world rule of the bourgeois order is meeting serious challenges everywhere, a genre of literature has arisen whose most general cultural characteristic is the promotion of speculation about the future of mankind. It should be no surprise that this particular mode of literary expression is either viewed with suspicion or held in contempt by the comfortable literati of the bourgeois academies and journals. That genre, of course, is modern science fiction.

When the subject of science fiction is brought up, the normal reaction of those imbued with the prejudices propagated by means of the bourgeois press and educational structures is to dismiss the whole thing as childish nonsense. There have been exceptions made for such works as George Orwell's 1984 or Aldous Huxley's Brave New World or Evgenii Zamyatin's We, all of which are readily classified as literature and all of which just happen, also, to bolster the hysterical cold war mentality. Nevertheless, the exceptions are explained as somehow not really science fiction. It is a case of what happens to art in the world of today: new genres are at first ignored, then resisted, and finally the attempt is made to co-opt them. Science fiction finds itself in the anomalous position of being resisted in the main and co-opted where possible. But co-optation presents difficulties since all speculation about the future need not include the continued existence of United States capitalism.

Neocapitalist ideology has only the smallest, ever-tightening margin of room for the expression of great hopes, great dreams, great visions of the future, great goals. In short, it has only the most constricted tolerance for the exercise of the imagination, especially for an enterprise that limits itself to realistic extrapolation.

What science fiction is

Science fiction can be considered a sub-category of the broader category of imaginative or speculative fiction, including fantasy as well. Science fiction is not fantasy. It is important to make the distinction between these two branches of imaginative fiction because they have decidedly different functions as literature. Science fiction grapples with and is limited to dealing with materialistic extrapolation from the present to future possibilities, whereas fantasy makes no pretense at reality. The distinguishing mark of fantasy is the assumption within the story of supernaturalistic premises.

Science fiction, unlike fantasy, promotes a social enterprise that inevitably involves a realistic speculation about the future of mankind. It raises questions on the order of: Is the type of society being depicted really possible? Is it better or worse than the one we've got? Is social progress possible?

Moreover, science fiction, again unlike fantasy, encourages an awareness of environmental change and motion. It points out the transitoriness of our present environment, including its political and social along with its scientific and technological aspects. Significantly, the almost universal treatment of racism in the literature of science fiction is in the mode of a passing reflection on the nearly incomprehensible or dimly remembered primitive ways of the past.

Fantasy promotes neither realistic speculation about the future of mankind nor an awareness of the transitoriness of the present. It deals with magic, witchcraft, supernatural entities, life after death and similar subjects in the vein of mysticism. What has been said about fantasy should not be taken to mean that fantasy can never have a social significance. On the contrary, fantasy may or may not have a direct social content just as any other form of literature, as for instance in Poul Anderson's novel Operation Changeling (serialized in the May and June 1969 issues of The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction). Anderson depicts a make-believe world very similar to our own in all ways except that by and large the laws of magic operate in the place of the laws of physics. Using this context of purest fantasy, Anderson presents us with a reactionary satire on the radical movement (which in the end we learn is the work of the Devil.)

In science fiction an obviously exaggerated or unlikely future development is often depicted for the purpose of satirizing or making a direct comment on the present. William Tenn has proven to be especially good at this sort of thing. His short story, 'Eastward Ho!', for example, is a direct attack on the racist anti-Indian mythology portrayed in the mass media and the general run of textbooks. Tenn constructs a future situation in which the Indian tribes regain the upper hand on the American continent and the vanishing white man is relentlessly driven from his traditional territories. Unlikely? Yes, but it is not intended to be convincing except as social satire in the vein of: How would you like it if it happened to you? Another Tenn story, 'The Masculinist Revolt', projects a future in which the myths of male supremacy and female inferiority get out of hand to the point where women and men divide into masculinist and feminist political parties to contend for the presidency. Tenn expertly exploits all the ashamed male feelings of masculine inadequacy that accompany the propagation of the male supremacist myth, particularly the fear of female dominance. In any case, the future political struggles he depicts are unconvincing as real possibilities, but right to the point as satire.

History

Modern science fiction might best be called social science fiction and, as such, it can be conveniently dated as having a history dating no further back than 1938. Isaac Asimov separates the history of science fiction into four basic periods: (1) 1815-1926, (2) 1926-1938, (3) 1938-1945, and (4) 1945 to the present.(1) He terms the first era 'primitive' because 'although the concept of science fiction had been born, the economic basis for the support of science-fiction writers did not yet exist.'(2) There was no such thing as a specialist literature in the nineteenth century. Mystery stories, for example, were written simply as fiction by authors who also wrote other types of fiction. Literary specialities are thus an outgrowth of the mass literacy and mass production techniques of the twentieth century.(3)

In 1926, Hugo Gersback founded the first magazine specializing in science fiction and three years later coined the term 'science fiction' to describe its contents. Its birth as a 'specialized' field was stamped by the fact that Gersback had made it a practice to include some fiction in the earlier factual magazines he had edited, such as Modern Electrics and Science and Invention and so built up an audience for fiction with a heavy technological bent. The fiction in these earlier magazines and in Gersback's pioneering Amazing Stories was overwhelmingly gadget shop stuff, very boring to anyone but the technically minded. Low-level Buck Rogers rock-em sock-em type adventure stories also grew up in this period first as a means of providing a story line for the gadget shop fiction and then as a more and more dominant element in its own right.

However, all this began to change about 1938 when John W. Campbell, Jr., became the editor of Astounding Stories magazine. The history of what Asimov has dubbed 'social science fiction' can be dated from this year. Campbell began to promote the development of stories that brought the interaction of the characters with their social environments to the fore, which gave science fiction a more interesting, more relevant and more widely appealing role to play.

But it was not until the final phase of science fiction's development (1945 to the present) that it evinced the growing mass awareness of the relevance of the field prompted by the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and by

the H-bomb, sputnik, manned space flight, as well as automation and cybernetics. In this phase we have increasing amounts of the pablum-for-the-public expressions (or corruptions) of science fiction: monster movies, juvenile TV programs and unimaginative, sloppily written literature.

On the other hand, more and more writers can now support themselves by writing science fiction for a widening market of relatively discriminating readers. Given the quality of art under capitalism, this has led to an increase in the quantity of writing in the field. Writers of science fiction have generally been afflicted with the same problem that writers had in the last century -- Charles Dickens, for instance -- of being paid by the word. Like piece-work in any industry this has led to an increase in quantity at the expense of quality. With a wider market monetary rewards are greater. Consequently, writers can afford to take the necessary time to achieve higher levels of quality and are, at the same time, more or less forced to do so by the increased competition brought about by the greater financial returns available.

Nevertheless, the mechanics of the literary market have produced a rather anomalous situation for the science fiction genre in relation to literature as a whole. Damon Knight, in his book of critical essays on science fiction, In Search of Wonder, points out:

> Cramped and constricted as it is, the science fiction field is one of the best of the very few paying markets for a serious short story writer. The quality magazines publish a negligible quantity of fiction; slick short stories are as polished and as interchangeable as lukewarm-water faucets; the pulps are gone; the little magazines pay only in prestige.(4)

Why science fiction holds an attraction for radicals

Science fiction holds an undeniable attraction for many of those who are dissatisfied with their own time and place. It should not be surprising that a disproportionately high number of radicals are also science fiction enthusiasts. My personal estimate (conservative, I believe) is that at least 5-10% of all young radicals are relatively consistent readers of science fiction. It is, in any case, clear that more radicals proportionately read science fiction than the public generally does.

It is also true that, in one sense at least, science fiction is escapist literature. This is frequently considered the most damning charge levelled against it. Science fiction does provide a vicarious escape from the pressures and problems of capitalist society, including a relief from the unending tedium of its work and study reoutines. This is also true of every other type of fiction -- one escapes the facts of one's own life by entering into the fictions about someone else's. Science fiction does add a unique element of its own to this process of temporary mental liberation: it projects the possibility of a social environment that is more exciting and which possibly provides more of a scope for the individual's creative initiatives.

Sometimes the escapist impulse, a necessary feature of alienated class societies, can be run into dead ends. Detective stories which glorify the shrewdness and moral qualities of policemen, Western stories which propagate racist myths about the American Indians, and orgy stories which revel in the mystical delights of sexuality to the exclusion of all other values are familiar examples of how escape can be channeled into conservative direc-

tions. Within the field of science fiction the most frequent type of safe channeling is the space opera, a sort of Western in a space ship with only names and places changed. However, in its current phase science fiction presents a rather encouraging evolution. This may be why hippies as well as radicals are drawn to science fiction in large numbers. Both Kurt Vonnegut's The Sirens of Titan and Robert Heinlein's Stranger in a Strange Land have had big vogues in hippy-type circles. (On the other hand, there has only been one novel in the science fiction vein by a hippy about hippies: Chester Anderson's very amusing The Butterfly Kid.)

In any case, the argument is frequently raised that modern science fiction is anti-utopian, that it presents us with no hope for a change for the better, that its picture of the future is gloomy and pessimistic, and that its message is that the present is at least better than the future is likely to be, so that you might as well count your blessings while you've got some. There is no doubt that science fiction frequently does present an outlook on the future that is shaped by the pessimism of bourgeois ideology. However, two factors must be taken into consideration.

First, despite the fact that capitalism or some other form of stratified society is generally depicted as the society of the future (and generally in an authoritarian form at that), one tendency in science fiction is to use this social background as the dramatic setting for revolution and an exaltation of the revolutionary. Not to be misleading, it must be readily admitted that most science fiction writers do not write convincingly about revolution. Their idea of a revolution is shaped by their ideological limitations and tends to be somewhat romantic or melodramatic in results.

Second, some of the best writers in the field have written utopian novels and these are among their most famous works. For example, Stranger in a Strange Land, by Robert Heinlein, projects an imminent victory at the end of the book of a world-wide communism of integrated personalities ('water brothers'); A.E. van Vogt depicts an operating communist system of sorts made up of men who have been selected out by a testing process from the ranks of mankind in The World of Null-A; Isaac Asimov's famous trilogy, Foundation, Foundation and Empire, and Second Foundation, tells the story of the building up of a humane and scientific galactic nation on the ruins of a crumbling empire; and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., in his satirical novel, The Sirens of Titan, depicts the construction of a society where no man takes advantage of any other.

Two works by Cyril Kornbluth will serve to illustrate how the same author can hold contradictory viewpoints about the immediate future and the more distant future with the former being thoroughly reactionary and the latter being pro-socialist. To take the latter first, in The Syndic, Kornbluth outlines a working, socialistic society. Everything from economic security to matters of sexual morality and the family system has been moved onto a higher, non-oppressive plane. The novel is definitely utopian in the sense that it is a bit fanciful in its explanation of how this society was brought about; namely, that when the old society became too oppressive the gangster element rallied the masses against it. Thus, the title, which is a play on the words 'syndicate' and 'syndicalism'. Syndic territory is loosely organized by a beneficent and paternalistic clique and the whole population are considered members of the Syndic rather than as citizens because the Syndic does not consider itself a government.

The Syndic was published in 1953. A few years later, Kornbluth wrote Not This August, which deals with the nearer future. Here, the United States is taken over and occupied by Soviet and Chinese Communist armies. The people are starved and oppressed. The Chinese are even more ruthless than the Russians. The active part of the plot concerns the hero's efforts to make contact with the underground opposition and the solution involves a missile-launching spaceship built in a secret cavern by a left-over U.S. government research project.

When Kornbluth can write outside the context of present day social realities he can write sympathetically of socialism of a sort. However, race prejudice and fear of communism cause him to write reactionary stories about the nearer future. It is as much as we can expect. Greater consistency would have to come from radical writers, a scarce breed in the science fiction field.

Utopian and anti-utopian fiction

It should not be assumed that utopian science fiction is necessarily progressive and anti-utopian science fiction necessarily reactionary. Things never work out quite so simply in any field of art. There are reactionary utopian novels, the primary exemplification of this category being Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged, which depicts a laissez-faire capitalist utopian community composed of a supposed natural elite -- the people who allegedly are alone capable of making the decisions that make an economy work. This elite has withdrawn from society to their hidden mountain anti-commune (capitalune?) in protest against creeping socialism. Everything collapses in the United States when they withdraw and we are given to understand that if only the population throws the liberal socialist rascals out and throws itself gratefully on the mercy of the elite, then everything will go smoothly back to normal. Then the dollar sign will become the symbol of the new day for the nation as it already is back in the mountain hideout.

As ridiculous as Ayn Rand's plot outline is - and however one might wish that the capitalists would take her seriously and disappear - she and her numerous followers are dead serious about this unappealing view of society and its future.

There are also positive aspects to anti-utopian fiction from the radical standpoint. The alternatives to basic revolutionary social and political changes ought to be presented, for many of them are theoretically possible, and their presentation can serve as a warning. Jack London's anticipation of fascism in The Iron Heel is a novel of this type.

Both utopian and anti-utopian science fiction frequently displays an inadequate grasp of social dynamics. While this is by no means universally the case - Isaac Asimov is almost always an exception to this rule - it is especially unfortunate when one considers how frequently revolution figures as a plot element in science fiction. Still, the very concentration on the subject produces a certain general ferment that produces an occasional outstanding treatment of the subject of revolution. In anti-utopian novels, as Damon Knight points out:

> Revolution is a common theme, not to say a cliché, in stories of this type -- so much so that I've often wondered when the FBI is going to get around to compiling an index of science fiction writers. It's very nearly unavoidable, simply because it's the most dramatic sociological process...(5)

Anti-utopias almost always remind one of analogously oppressive situations in the present. Sometimes this is the intent of the writer, sometimes not, but the factor is inevitably there. This by itself is not enough to be classified as radical literature in today's world because it is compatible with the anti-communist's desire for a pro-capitalist 'revolution', i.e., counter-revolution, in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, etc. Nevertheless, it is also compatible with the desire of the revolutionary socialist for a social revolution in the West and a political revolution in the East. Most works are more compatible with the latter viewpoint since most of the future anti-utopias depicted are capitalist anti-utopias (just as most of the utopias are socialist utopias), differing from the present mainly by being more clearly authoritarian and oppressive.

Occasionally, there are science fiction novels which definitely lend themselves to the cold war outlook. Although it was not George Orwell's intention, 1984 is one of these. There are mitigating circumstances which allow us to excuse Orwell, of course. When he wrote 1984 in 1948, Stalin was still in power and Hitler was not long out of it. Orwell thought that the whole world was moving towards the type of totalitarianism these figures represented. As Isaac Deutscher has pointed out, 'Orwell intended 1984 to be a warning. But the warning defeats itself because of its underlying boundless despair. Orwell saw totalitarianism as bringing history to a standstill.' (6)

THE FUTURE SOCIETY

In an alienated society people inevitably keep thinking about and longing for the condition of human solidarity. John W. Campbell, Jr., explains how this often works itself out in science fiction:

> 'In ordinary fiction, the individual is still able to accept the common cultural background as being truth; in science fiction, we can discuss robots or Martians of fiftieth-century people. It's simply a method of ruling out the basic fixed judgments of modern cultural beliefs, scientific beliefs, and everything else.(7)

For one thing unalienated individuals and social systems can be made credible by the devices of science fiction. Non-human intelligent life, robots, and people in the more or less distant future are utilized to depict this sort of personality or society. In Keith Laumer's novel, Retief's War, for instance, the nonhuman inhabitants of the planet Quopp live within the framework of a kind of free-wheeling libertarian socialism. The principal problem of the plot is that of preventing counter-revolution instigated by a foreign imperialism in a healthy socialist society. The Quoppina relate to one another in an engagingly innocent and childlike manner. As humans the Quoppina would be difficult for most people to accept; as nonhumans there is no special difficulty in their believability.

Although the situation is improving, a rather sizable portion of the science fiction which gets into print is still not very good. The formula story of the space opera variety still has a weighty representation in what finally gets into print. And it sells, because alienated, frustrated individuals like to act out vicariously the violent triumphs of an all-conquering hero. Sometimes our hero is just shrewd and a good athlete (the Western), sometimes he is just shrewd (the mystery story), sometimes he is just a good athlete (the sports story), and sometimes he is shrewd, a good athlete and armed to the teeth (the space opera).

On the other hand, as I have tried to emphasize, science fiction can have a very rich and subtle content and can be very rewarding as literature. It can also express rather directly a specifically anti-capitalist content. Take Robert Silverberg's Invaders From Earth, published in 1958, which describes in convincing detail how a public relations firm is given the job of selling the people of Earth on the desirability of wiping out the first intelligent beings discovered within the Solar System for the profitable benefit of the Extra-terrestrial Development and Exploration Corporation. Silverberg projects the realities of the present onto the possibilities of the future and in the process he has produced a work which is an effective indictment of imperialism and its paid apologists.

Science fiction, like any genre, has its superior works and its inferior. At its worst, science fiction can be dull, repetitious and unimaginative. At its best, it can be very much the opposite. In the last analysis, however, modern science fiction is a literary genre which - almost as a whole - reflects the transcience of the present society, the fact that change is in the air.

FOOTNOTES

1. Isaac Asimov, 'Social Science Fiction', in Reginald Bretnor (ed.), Modern Science Fiction: Its Meaning and Future, New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1953, p. 168.

2. Ibid.

3. Alleged pre-nineteenth century science fiction was not at the time it was written very clearly distinguished from fantasy in the minds of either writers or readers for the very good reason that the scientific foundation did not exist to make a voyage to the moon, for instance, any more realistic than a voyage to hell. This fact becomes evident when one reads of Cyrano de Bergerac's various contrivances for reaching the moon which included rising up by means of the evaporation of sacks of morning dew, on the one hand, and by means of something fairly closely resembling a ramjet, on the other. As far as de Bergerac was concerned, the various methods of locomotion were equally credible (or incredible), a conclusion inevitable on the basis of the scientific knowledge of his day. Before the nineteenth century no science fiction was written or could have been written. Asimov's arbitrary choice of 1815 will do as a convenient birthdate.

4. Damon Knight, In Search of Wonder: Essays on Modern Science Fiction, Chicago: Advent Publishers, 1967, p. 116.

5. Knight, p. 167.

6. Isaac Deutscher, Russia in Transition and Other Essays, New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1957, p. 244.

7. John W. Campbell, Jr., 'The Place of Science Fiction', in Bretnor, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

Some Comments on Mandel's Marxist Economic Theory

PAUL MATTICK

Marxist Economic Theory, by Ernest Mandel.
2 volumes. Pp. 797. 4 gns.

This is an ambitious book attempting, as it does, to elucidate Marxist economic theory within a framework that reaches from pre-historic times to the anticipated socialist society. Mandel deems this comprehensive procedure necessary because of the dialectical proposition that the lost social collectivity of primitive society will make its reappearance in the socialist future, albeit in a 'higher form'. Socialist attitudes presuppose socialism; according to Mandel, 'individuals must have acquired experiences that society has ceased to treat them as Cinderellas and become a generous and understanding mother, automatically satisfying all the basic needs of her children. This experience must have penetrated into the unconsiousness of individuals, there to encounter the echoes from the primitive-communist past which have never been completely buried by the effects of 7,000 years of exploitation of man by man.' (656)* Although these 'echoes of the past' are a mere assertion, it is quite clear that men will transform themselves by changing their relations to other men and, therefore, the conditions of their existence. There is no need to evoke a 'collective-unconscious' to support the possibility of a socialist consciousness. In any case, this has nothing to do with Marxist economic theory, which restricts itself to a critique of political, or bourgeois, economy and which, in Mandel's view, too, is bound to disappear with the disappearance of capitalist society.

Historical materialism is more and something other than economic theory. Whereas historical materialism elucidates social development as such, economic theory deals with the specific historical form this development assumes in capitalism. The difference is clouded in Mandel's exposition, which roams all over the world, and through all history, in an attempt to bring Marx's economic analysis up to date. Mandel does so, however, without 'quoting the sacred texts'. Against that, he says, 'we quote abundantly from the chief economists, economic historians, ethnologists, anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists of our time, in so far as they express opinions on phenomena relating to the economic activity, past, present and future, of human societies. What we seek to show is that it is possible, on the basis of the scientific data of contemporary science, to reconstitute the whole economic system of Karl Marx.' (17) In this way, Mandel wants to demonstrate that Marx's economic teaching allows for a 'synthesis of the totality of human knowledge' (17). He realizes, of course, that this is quite a task and claims no more than to have merely produced a draft 'which calls for many corrections and an invitation to the younger generation of Marxists, in Tokyo and Lima, in London and Bombay, and (why not?) in Moscow, New York, Peking and Paris, to catch the ball in flight and carry to completion by team work what an individual's effort can obviously no longer accomplish.' (20)

What Mandel was able to accomplish, however, was to read many books and a lot of more-or-less relevant statistics and thus to find the material which in one fashion or another validates his own interpretation of Marxist theory. Although this theory finds illustrations in more recent data it remains essentially

its familiar self. There is the division of labor into necessary- and surplus-labor, the evolution of the market economy, the use- and exchange-value relations, the theory of value and surplus-value, the transformation of surplus-value into capital, the accumulation process, both primitive and advanced, the rising organic composition of capital, and the various contradictions of capitalism which find their expression in its susceptibility to crises and in the tendential fall of the rate of profit. Special chapters deal with trade, credit, money, and agriculture. From there Mandel proceeds to monopoly capital, imperialism, and to the present epoch considered as one of capitalist decline. The rest of the book is devoted to the problems of the Soviet economy, the transition from capitalism to socialism, and to socialism itself.

Unless one wants to harp on unessentials, the larger part of Mandel's more descriptive than theoretical book does not call for critical appraisal. In fact, most of the material presented is of a non-controversial nature and so well done as to benefit anyone interested in social history and the economic problems of today. At any rate, what is of special interest to socialists are not so much the various mechanisms of the capitalist market economy, such as the money and credit functions, the role of competition, and so forth, but the system's historical boundaries which are the result of its internal contradictions. The latter are reducible to the exploitative capital-labor relations and therewith to the contradictions that beset capitalism down to the falling rate of profit as just another expression of the accumulation of capital. Disregarding all points of agreement, we will catch Mandel's 'ball in flight' only where we disagree with his interpretations of Marxism and of present-day reality.

Marx intended to discover the laws of capitalist development. Just as capitalism emerged out of another social system, so it is bound to make room for a different one. It cannot persist, in Marx's view, because its transformation is already indicated by the opposing social forces operating within it, and because of its own dynamic, which will lead this opposition to the point of social revolution. The general historical development has to work through the specific capitalist production relations with respect to both their real nature and their fetishistic appearances in the capitalist market and money economy. Marx's analysis yielded the conviction that capitalist development, as the accumulation of capital, has definite limits beyond which it ceases being a progressive social system. Attempts to maintain it nonetheless would find their reflections in political struggles which would finally bring capitalism to its end.

In economic terms, capitalist production is the production of surplus-value, that is, of unpaid labor power. Capital formation is the accumulation of surplus-value. It implies an increasing productivity of labor. In the process of accumulation, less and less labor will be employed relative to the growing mass of capital. This is characterized by Marx as the rising 'organic composition of capital', i.e., more capital is invested in means of production, or constant capital, than in labor power, or variable capital. Because only variable capital yields surplus-value, while the rate of profit is measured in total capital - variable and constant capital combined - the rate of profit must fall unless this fall is compensated for by a rising rate of exploitation, or surplus-value. Actually, so long as capital accumulates, the rising organic composition of capital implies a growing rate of surplus-value so that the decline of the rate of profit exists only in latent form.

However, for Marx as well as Mandel, 'an equivalent increase of the rate of surplus value and of the organic composition of capital is in the long run impossible to achieve.'(167) But Mandel's reasons for this capitalist impasse dif-

ier from those of Marx. Whereas Marx derives them from the strict application of the labor theory of value to the accumulation process, Mandel thinks that 'with the increase in the productivity of labor there often comes an extension of workers' needs and a corresponding increase in the value of labor power, which in turn encourages the development of the labor movement, thus restricting the growth in the rate of surplus-value.' (167) Mandel mistakes the growth in real wages for 'growth' in the value of labor power. But real wages can rise even with a 'decline' in the value of labor power, and, in fact, generally do rise in this manner, which is to say that a growth in real wages presupposes a still faster increase in the rate of surplus-value. For Marx, 'the diminution of unpaid labor can never reach a point at which it would threaten the system itself... Accumulation is the independent, not the dependent, variable; the rate of wages, the dependent, not the independent variable.' (Capital, Vol. I, p. 679) Marx may be wrong, of course, and Mandel right, but this would have to be proven empirically. There is no such evidence. The very fact of capital accumulation despite increasing wages indicates an increase in the rate of surplus value, even though this increase may not suffice to guarantee a rate of accumulation that assures conditions of prosperity.

Because real wages have risen, Mandel holds that Marx's theory of accumulation is not a 'theory of impoverishment' and that to assert the contrary would discredit Marxism. By being based on the labor theory of value, on the assumption, that is, that labor always receives the value of its labor power, i.e., its reproduction costs, there is indeed no increasing impoverishment as regards the laboring population. But this does not alter the fact, as Mandel himself points out, that the decreasing number of workers relative to the growing capital implies a growing number of unemployables and therewith an increasing pauperization -- not to speak of the increasing misery in periods of depression and the enormities of capitalist warfare. As a world-market system, moreover, capitalism shares in the responsibility for the world's increasing impoverishment. At a time when even the bourgeoisie has to recognize these facts, it is rather strange that Marxists should find it necessary to deny that capital accumulation is also the accumulation of misery.

To be sure, Mandel is not inclined to minimize the contradictions of capitalism. He seems convinced, however, that proletarian impoverishment has been successfully forestalled by way of wage-struggles at the expense of profits. 'At the peak of the boom,' he writes, 'if full employment is actually achieved, the demand for labor greatly exceeds the supply, and the workers can bring pressure to bear to push wages up, the reduction in the rate of profit which results being one of the causes of the outbreak of crisis.' (144) Actually, however, at periods of high prosperity prices rise faster than wages, so that the declining profitability cannot find a cause in the supply-and-demand relations of the labor market. At this point, Mandel sacrifices Marxist theory to bourgeois theory, which naturally will put the blame for crisis on high wages. Marxism does not derive its crisis theory from supply-and-demand relations but from underlying changes in the organic composition of capital and the changing productivity of labor.

Mandel's whole concern with Marx's law of the falling rate of profit was clearly wasted as far as he himself is concerned, for he is not able to connect it in any meaningful way with the crisis-cycle of capitalist development. His extensive reading in current economic theory, particularly the Keynesian brand, has led him astray, for in order to utilize this material he has often to violate Marx's own theories. The capitalist crisis, according to Mandel, 'is due to inadequacy not of production or physical capacity to consumer, but of mone-

tarily effective demand. A relative abundance of commodities finds no equivalent on the market, cannot realize its exchange value, remains unsaleable, and drags its owners down to ruin.'(343) Although Mandel holds that the increase in the organic composition of capital and the downward tendency of the average rate of profit are the general laws of development of the capitalist mode of production, he also says that 'they create the theoretical possibility of general crisis of overproduction, if an interval between the production and sale of commodities is assumed.'(346) According to Marx, however, the crisis results from the general laws of capitalist development even if there were no interval between the production and sale of commodities. It is not the difficulty of realizing surplus-value, but the recurrent difficulty of producing it in sufficient measure which brings about crisis.

This is not to say that there is no realization problem, for actually the production and realization of surplus-value have to go hand-in-hand. Rather, the final source of all capitalist difficulties must be looked for in the sphere of production and not in that of the market, even though the problems of profit production do appear as market problems. With a sufficient profitability, capital accumulates rapidly and creates its own market in which surplus value can be realized; with an insufficient profitability, the rate of accumulation slackens, or disappears altogether, and contracts the market, thus making the realization of surplus-value difficult. The 'interval' between production and sale is based on the difference between the actual rate of profit and that rate of profit which would be required for an accelerated capital accumulation.

In Marx's theory, the crisis-cycle finds its explanation in a discrepancy between the organic composition of capital and the rate of profit associated with it, as soon as the latter precludes an accelerated rate of accumulation. The dilemma is resolved by an increase in the productivity of labor sufficient to allow for a further accumulation of capital despite its higher organic composition. Since the crisis finds its source in the sphere of production, it is in this sphere, too, that it is overcome. All the crisis elements appearing in the market must be traced back to this basic crisis situation in the sphere of production.

The more deeply that Mandel involves himself with the phenomena of crisis, the more obscure his exposition becomes. While he is correct in insisting that 'capitalist production is production for profit' and that 'the variations in the average rate of profit are the decisive criteria of the actual conditions of capitalist economy'(346), and while to him 'the cyclical movement of capital is nothing but the mechanism through which the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall is realized'(349), the crisis remains for him nevertheless a crisis of overproduction, due mainly to disproportionalities between the two great sectors of production, i.e., the production of capital goods and of consumption goods. 'The periodical occurrence of crisis,' Mandel writes, 'is to be explained only by the periodical break in the proportionality (of the two sectors of production) or, in other words, by an uneven development of these two sectors.'(349) Although Mandel knows all about the competitive equalization of profit rates, he links 'the periodical disproportion between the development of the capital goods sector and that of the consumer goods sector with the periodical difference between the rates of profit in the two sectors.'(350) In a great effort to make Marx's abstract crisis theory concrete, Mandel finally accepts in some measure elements of almost all existing crisis theories, Marxist or other, and even spurious concepts such as 'the multiplier' and the 'acceleration principle', while at the same time berating their authors for their failure to consider the factor of the 'uneven development of different sectors, branches and countries drawn

in the capitalist market'(371), which, to his mind, is not only 'a universal law of human history'(91), but also the key to the proper understanding of the capitalist crisis mechanism. Instead of leading, however, to a synthesis of all the partial knowledge hitherto evolved with respect to the crisis-cycle, Mandel's endeavor leads only to an amalgam of contradictory ideas which are, at times, hardly comprehensible.

In contrast to Mandel's interpretation of Marx's theories, his chapters on monopoly capital, imperialism, and the decline of capitalism are clear and concise, and if they are disappointing it is only because they deserve more of a theoretical background. The facts presented speak for themselves, of course, yet they would be even more eloquent if they were brought in closer contact with Marxist theory, which makes it clear that monopoly and imperialism are not capitalist aberrations but the inevitable consequences of capital production. The material here tells the familiar story of capitalist concentration and centralization on a national and international scale and related state interventions in the economy. What appears to some as a further expansion and extension of capitalism, and as the consolidation of the system through a direct merger of business and government, seems to Mandel sufficient proof that capitalism finds itself in a state of decline, because 'the increasing practice of intervention in the economy by the state is an involuntary homage rendered to socialism by capitalism.'(541)

Mandel points out, of course, that state interventions operate within the framework of capitalism in order to consolidate capitalist profit; yet, they have at the same time, the long-run effect of undermining the foundations of the regime. Because it is less and less possible to make profitable use of all capital, Mandel writes, 'the bourgeois state becomes the essential guarantor of monopoly profits'(502), which involves the 'transfer to private trusts of public property' (503), and the 'growing importance of armaments and a war economy'(521) as a substitute 'market'; a process which, if 'carried to its logical conclusion necessarily implies a process of contracted reproduction'(524). If not carried that far, however, 'state contracts stimulate production and expansion of productive capacity not only in the directly "militarized" sectors, but also in the raw material sectors, and even, through the increase in general demand thus created, in the consumer goods sectors. So long as there are unused resources in society, this "stimulant" will tend to ensure full employment of them, while in the long run undermining the stability of the currency.'(534)

This is undoubtedly true, regardless of whether or not there are unusued resources. The 'unused resources' in capitalism, that is, constant and variable capital, are capitalist property and will be set in motion only when profits are promised and capital is augmented. 'Public consumption', i.e., public works, armaments, and war, subtract from the available surplus-value destined to be turned into additional, surplus-value-producing capital. A progressively increasing non-profitable production implies a declining rate of accumulation and eventually its demise, thus destroying the rationale of capitalist production. In so far as it is not extracted from the mass of the population by way of inflation, the expense of 'public consumption' piles up in the national debt for which there is no profit-counterpart. Just as the enlarged 'market' is a pseudo-market, so the prosperity released by it is a pseudo-prosperity, which can postpone, but not prevent, the return of crisis conditions. The policy's applicability is limited, so that even under conditions of government-induced production, unused resources are bound to grow.

An enlarged production is no aid to capitalism. What it needs is a larger production of profits to counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. In dealing with the mixed economy, Mandel forgets his Marxist learning altogether, and his exposition becomes self-contradictory. While pointing out that state interventions are necessary to ensure the profitability of the monopolies, he asserts, at the same time, that 'trusts no longer suffer from a shortage of capital but rather from an excess of it' (512), and that this 'overcapitalization' is due to 'monopoly super-profits' (517), which find no outlet in new investments. But if there are such 'super-profits', why should the monopolies require government support to enable them to produce profitably? Obviously, if they are having difficulties finding profitable investment opportunities, these difficulties cannot be alleviated through non-profitable government-induced production. It is precisely because of the fact of insufficient profitability, relative to the existing capital, that investments taper off and thus require government-induced production to forestall economic crisis.

However, Mandel mistakes the lack of private investments, due to a deficient profitability, for an 'abundance' of capital relative to the 'effective demand', and holds with the Keynesians that government-induced 'effective demand' acts as a 'stabilizer' of the economy. 'Frequently,' he writes, 'expanded reproduction may even continue in all sectors, on condition that the rate of expansion is stable or declining, that is, that the armaments sector absorbs the bulk or the whole of the additional resources available in the economy.' (525) Stability is assured, in his mind, through a limitation of capital accumulation and not through its resumption and acceleration. In this way, he says, 'the capitalist economy tends to ensure greater stability both of consumption and of investments than in the era of free competition, or than during the first phase of monopoly capitalism; it tends toward a reduction in cyclical fluctuations, resulting above all from the increasing intervention of the state in economic life.' (529)

To describe this state of bliss by way of government interventions and arms production as an 'epoch of capitalist decline', is understandable only on the basis of Mandel's assumption that the enlargement of the government-induced sector of the economy is a step towards socialism -- seen as a state-controlled economy. In this respect, of course, government ownership would be even better than government control and Mandel does not fail to point out 'that nationalization of sectors of industry... can constitute a veritable school of collective economy, provided that the compensation payments to capital are reduced or cancelled, that it is not limited to sectors run at a deficit, that the representatives of private capital are removed from the management, that workers' participation in the management is ensured, or that this management is subject to democratic workers' control, and that the nationalized sectors are used by a workers' government for the purpose of all-round planning, especially to achieve certain objectives of high priority, either social or economic.' (503) In view of the relative stability achieved by state interventions, Mandel foresees a change of objectives for the proletarian class struggle. 'Socially and politically,' he writes, 'the period of capitalist decline educates the working class to interest itself in the management of enterprises and the regulation of the economy as a whole, just as "free competition" capitalism educated the working class to interest itself in the division of social income between profits and wages.' (536)

Workers' control of production presupposes a social revolution. It cannot gradually be achieved under the auspices of a workers' government which 'nationalizes sectors of the economy' -- not to speak of the impossibility of 'all-round planning' in a partly nationalized and partly private-enterprise economy. To

be sure, Mandel is not opposed to social revolution; yet, already before its occurrence, he envisions its result as a managed economy with 'workers' participation', not as an economy managed by the producers themselves. This brings us to the last parts of the book, dealing with socialism and the Soviet economy.

Acording to Mandel, all the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production' can be summed up in one general and fundamental contradiction, that between the effective socialization of production and the private, capitalist form of appropriation.'(170) The latter is a consequence of the private ownership of the means of production. Capitalism evolved as a system of private ownership of the means of production in a market economy which finds a kind of blind 'regulation' through value relations which dominate the exchange process. Recent history has shown that capitalist relations of production can exist without private ownership of the means of production and that, with regard to the working classes, a centrally-determined appropriation of surplus-labor by government will not lead to a 'socialist appropriation' of the products of labor. In both systems, of course, there is 'effective socialization of production' due to the division of labor. But socialization of production in the Marxian sense implies that the means of production are no longer separated from the producers, so that the latter may themselves determine how to employ their labor and how to dispose of their products. If they continue to be separated from the means of production, that is, if the control of the latter remains the privilege of a separate social group organized as the state, the social relations of production continue to be capitalist relations of production, even though individual capitalists no longer exist.

On this point, Mandel misses a chance to bring Marxism 'up-to-date'. He still insists that capitalism can mean nothing other than private-enterprise capitalism, and where it no longer prevails, there will not be as yet socialism but a transition to socialism. He is not always consistent, however; frequently he refers to 'socialist countries' as if they were already a reality, while at other times, and particularly with respect to Russia, he sees socialism as only in progress and still tarnished by remnants of the capitalist past. Still, for him, 'the Soviet economy does not display any of the fundamental aspects of capitalist economy'(560), it is merely marked 'by the contradictory combination of a non-capitalist mode of production and a still basically bourgeois mode of distribution'(565).

According to Marx, the relations of production determine those of the distribution of both labor and its products. A bourgeois mode of distribution could not exist without a similar mode of production. There are, of course, differences between private-enterprise capitalism and state-capitalism, but they relate to the ruling class, not to the ruled, which finds itself in an identical social position in both systems. To a capitalist, state-capitalism may indeed appear as 'socialism', for it does deprive him of his customary privileges, but to the workers this 'socialism' merely signifies a different set of exploiters. To the new rulers, the system is of course different from capitalism simply by the fact of their own existence and the economic and institutional changes wrought to consolidate their new position. State-capitalism seems the most appropriate designation for this system, and if Mandel objects to it, he must be reminded that Lenin and the old Bolsheviks referred to Russia in these terms. In their views, state-capitalism was superior to capitalist monopoly-capital and for that reason closer to a socialist future. Only later was this wrongly-presumed 'transition to socialism' falsified as socialism itself.

It should be clear on theoretical grounds, as well as by fifty years of Bolshevism, that state-capitalism is not a road to socialism. It may be considered as such only on the false, non-Marxist assumption that its new ruling class (or caste, according to Mandel) will of its own accord, and by a series of 'revolutions from above', eliminate its own privileges and therewith the 'basically bourgeois mode of distribution' in favor of a form of appropriation more akin to its 'non-capitalist mode of production'. Because the Bolshevik rulers failed to do so, Mandel maintains that they have 'betrayed' socialism and the working class, have ceased being real communists, and should be replaced by more consistent revolutionaries. There must also be a more efficient system of 'workers' control' to prevent the excessive growth of the bureaucracy and to limit its powers. In Russia, Mandel explains, 'management was increasingly carried on by a bureaucratic apparatus, at first through a sort of delegation of power, later more and more by usurpation. The Bolshevik Party did not understand in good time the seriousness of this problem, despite the many warnings sounded by Lenin and by the Left Opposition.' (572)

When Mandel speaks of Russia's bureaucratic distortions and the state's brutal, arbitrary, and terroristic methods of rule and exploitation, he blames them not on Bolshevism and its concept of authoritarian party-rule, but on Stalinism and the Russian working class itself, 'which began to show less and less interest in direct management of the state and the economy' (572). He tries to make believe that he is unaware of the fact that it was the Bolshevik Party under Lenin and Trotsky which deprived the working class of both control and management of production, and replaced the rule of the soviets by that of the party and the state. All the terroristic innovations associated with the Stalinist regime, including forced-labor and concentration camps, had been initiated under Lenin's leadership. In his wide reading, Mandel cannot have failed to note the Bolshevik Revolution's early history down to Lenin's death, and he must thus be aware of the dictatorial and terroristic methods employed at that time against both the bourgeoisie and the working class. To restrict Russia's dilemma to its Stalinist period can only be regarded as a falsification of history.

What is of greater significance, however, is that Mandel even now regards the Bolshevik Revolution as an example of a working-class revolution which could have been prevented from going astray by a better leadership than that which followed in Lenin's wake. He cannot conceive of future socialist revolutions except in terms of the Bolshevik Revolution. And he assumes that the problems of socialism will everywhere be similar to those encountered in Russia. 'The contradiction between the non-capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois norms of distribution,' he writes, 'is the fundamental contradiction of every society transitional between capitalism and socialism.' (572) And this is so, because 'a shortage of use-value prolongs the life of exchange-value' (567), for which reason commodity production cannot be abolished but can only 'wither away' through the growing mastery of 'scarcity'. Therefore, the economic categories of capitalist economy, value, price, profit, wages, money, etc., will have to be retained to be utilized in a 'planned economy' which 'must make full use of the market, without yielding passively to it. It must, if it can, guide the market by means of incentives; it must, if need be, coerce the market by means of injunctions, every time this is required for the realization of its primary aims, as freely decided by the working-people.' (636) The evolution of the workers' decision-making power will be characterized by a change from 'workers' control', i.e., supervision of the management by the workers, to 'workers' participation' in management, and, finally, to 'workers' self-management' (644) in the completed socialist society.

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GENETIC ECONOMICS vs. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Dick Howard

Paul Mattick rightly criticizes Mandel for a loose application of Marx's labor theory of value, and tries to show some of the consequences of this uncritical methodology. Though Mattick sees that Mandel confuses historical materialism and economic theory, his own exposition does little to clarify the difference between the two. Mandel's encyclopedic book is the most important study of Marxist economic theory to appear in English since Paul Sweezy's The Theory of Capitalist Development in 1942; and, like Sweezy's book (1), it suffers (though in a different way) from the same failure to understand Marx's dialectical method.

As an orthodox Marxist, Mattick attacks both Mandel's insistance that Marx held to a theory of relative pauperization, and Mandel's crisis theory which follows, in large part, from his analysis of the role of the working class in modern capitalism. The problem of capitalist crises, and of the necessary breakdown of the capitalist system is one of the most difficult aspects of Marx's analysis.(2) Mattick insists, correctly, that in the last analysis the origin of capitalist crises lies in the relations of production. That is, although it is possible to talk about crises of under-consumption and crises of overproduction, both of these forms are only deceptive appearances; to consider either as the cause of capitalist crises veils the root realities of the capitalist system.

A quasi-Marxist analysis of under-consumption crises looks to a combination of circumstances in which the capitalists invest their profits in 'labor-saving' machinery, thereby lowering the number of workers that they employ (and increasing the reserve army of the proletariat), lowering the real wages of those workers still employed, and increasing the total amount of goods produced. In these circumstances, the workers are unable to buy (back) from the capitalists the total product; the stocks of the capitalists build up; they are forced to lay off more workers; and the crisis sets in. In these circumstances, the 'logical' remedy is a kind of Welfare State Socialism which through a combination of social measures (even going so far as the guaranteed annual income) attempts to boost the 'buying power' of the consumer sector of the society. This is certainly not a socialist solution to the problem of capitalist crises; in fact, since it misplaces the cause of the crisis, it is doubtful that the Welfare State is a solution at all (not to speak of its other negative aspects).

The so-called crisis of over-production, which Paul Mattick finds Mandel espousing, has its origins in the disproportionality theory of the early 19th century French economist, J-B. Say. Marx's discussion of it in Volume II of Capital has given rise to numerous conflicts, probably the most important of which center around the notion of 'imperialism' as presented by Rosa Luxemburg. Marx schematically divided capitalist production into two sectors, that producing the means of production and that producing consumption goods. Though it is easy for Marx to show that under conditions of simple reproduction (where capitalist profits are not re-invested) the exchange between the two sectors is easily accomplished and production need never be interrupted, he is hard-pressed to show how this exchange would take place when, as is normally the case, profits are re-invested. What seems to happen is that the production goods sector grows more rapidly than the consumption goods sector, and no market can be found for all of the heavy machines, etc., produced. As the imbalance grows rapidly, a breakdown seems in the offing. Rosa Luxemburg tried to show that 'imperialism' was necessary for these excess means of production to be consumed, and that once the whole world became capitalist there would be no more chance to sell these production goods -- and capitalism would enter its final crisis.

Those who hold to the over-production crisis theory today have to argue that there is a growing disproportionality between the production and consumption goods sectors of the economy. This means that in fact the real 'conspicuous consumption' today takes place in the production goods sector and not in the consumer goods. The 'logical' solution to this problem is a series of 'pump-priming' measures coupled with unproductive military spending and the like. This type of remedy, as well as the Welfare State Socialist one, is obviously being applied today. What both remedies mean is that rather than talk, as did Marx, about a necessary breakdown of the capitalist system, one is forced to talk about its 'stagnation', its 'irrational patterns of consumption', its 'imperialist oppression of the Third World', and so on. And, by the same token, it is necessary to adapt one's political tactics to this analysis, a problem which will be discussed below.

Marx held that the cause of capitalism's downfall lay in the nature of capitalism itself. To avoid the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, capitalism must increase the amount of surplus-value produced. Up to certain limits it can do this through such methods as the speed-up, forced over-time, increased work intensity and so on. Beyond those limits (which depend, in large part, on the strength of the labor movement) it is necessary for capitalism to resort to the production of relative surplus-value, that is to technological changes which will increase the workers' productivity by shortening the necessary part of the working day relative to the total time worked. In so doing, however, capitalism increases its total investment in fixed capital (machines, factories, and so on). Since the rate of profit is calculated as a percentage of total investment, beyond a certain point the rate of profit need not rise due to technological advance, and may even begin to fall. The tendency of the rate of profit to fall will be exacerbated by the fact that, with advanced technological production, fewer workers will be needed to produce the same amount of goods. Since the rate of profit is a function of the total amount of surplus-value (i.e. the rate of surplus-value multiplied by the number of workers), if the number of workers falls beyond a given point the total amount of surplus-value may not rise sufficiently for profit rate to rise, or even to remain constant. If, on the other hand, the same number of workers are maintained as before the technological innovations, then

the total product is augmented, and the capitalist may have the incumbent problems of selling that product. To begin again the production cycle, he would have to resort to credit, etc.

The Marxist point, then, is that capitalism is by its own nature doomed. Though it is possible for its apologists - who now become out and out pragmatists with the single goal of saving the system - to come up with solutions to the symptoms of the capitalist contradiction (such as over-production or under-consumption), it is inherently impossible to salvage the capitalist mode of production. This does not mean, it should be stressed, that socialism is inevitable. There is a choice, Marx always insisted. The choice is between SOCIALISM AND BARBARISM.

*** *** ***

It is important to understand the grounds on which Marx bases his assertion of the necessity of socialism. Several of Paul Mattick's points serve as spring-boards for a discussion.

Paul Mattick notes that Mandel confuses historical materialism with economic theory, but does not elaborate on this point beyond asserting that historical materialism is the elucidation of social development as such, while economic theory deals with the historical form of this development in capitalism. As I see it, the key to understanding Marx's analyses, and his insistence on the necessity of socialism, lies in the dialectical method. In fact, I suspect that the terms 'materialism' and 'historical materialism' lead to great errors when the dialectic is not correctly understood (as seems to have been the case with Engels himself, for example in his Dialectics of Nature). Without this method, Marx's Capital can only appear, as Heilbroner recently expressed it in his New York Review of Books article on Mandel, 'either impossibly difficult to understand or... terribly boring to study.' The reason for this is that without the dialectic 'There is no discernible orderly progression within the work.' (3)

Mandel does not stress the dialectical nature of Marx's analyses; he prefers to talk about a 'genetic' analysis. Consequently, in his book he tries to reconstruct Marx's categories in the order of their historical genesis, beginning with the most primitive economies and showing how the growth of an economic surplus made possible exchange among tribes, how this exchange was in fact carried out in terms of the labor theory of value, how trade led to the division of labor, the development of money and finally to the formation of capital. His treatment next follows the growth of capitalism to the stage of monopoly capitalism, imperialism and the decline of capitalism. The economy of the Soviet Union is treated and criticized, and the problem of the period of transition between capitalism and socialism receives an important sixty page discussion. Finally, Mandel treats the nature of a truly socialist economy, and concludes (as does the fourth volume of Capital, the Theories of Surplus-Value) with a discussion of the origins, nature and disappearance of political economy.

In this organization of Marx's theory, Mandel is following in the line of those who feel that Capital's beginning with a very abstract discussion of the nature of a commodity is too difficult for the reader, and that Marx's theory becomes clearer if one begins with the last chapter of Vol. I of Capital, the discussion of 'The so-called Primitive Accumulation'. Yet

Marx very deliberately placed this chapter at the end of Volume I, and apologized to the reader for the difficulty of the beginning, a difficulty which he felt was necessary.(4) The reason for this is that Capital is a theory of the capitalist form of economic production, while the primitive accumulation is 'an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its starting point.' (Capital I, p. 713) That is to say, it itself is not capitalist but only a premise on which capitalism is based. This means that the categories which Marx develops in Capital - the labor theory of value, the notion of surplus-value, the rate of profit and its tendency to fall, etc., etc. - do not hold for the primitive economic situation. Yet, Mandel's historical or genetic account holds that they do in fact hold for all economic situations -- at least until socialism. This may then mean that the labor theory of value, for example, as Mandel derives it from primitive societies, is different from the relationship under capitalism and confuses the analysis.

In the discussion of methodology in the Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx indicates clearly the way in which a dialectical theory of the capitalist economic form must operate. He says:

> It would thus be impractical and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the order in which they were the determining factors in the course of history. Their order of sequence is rather determined by the relation which they bear to one another in modern bourgeois society, and which is the exact opposite of what seems to be their natural order or the order of their historical development. What we are interested in is not the place which economic relations occupy in the historical succession of different forms of society. Still less are we interested in the order of their succession 'in idea' (Proudhon), which is but a hazy conception of the course of history. We are interested in their organic connection within modern bourgeois society. (my stress, D.H.)

Marx's point here is that though labor may well have been the measure of exchange values in primitive societies, the form of this measure is not the same as it is under capitalism; it occurs within a different historical situation, a different organic whole. The labor which served as a measure during the days of the Roman empire was slave labor; the labor which serves as a measure under capitalism is that of the 'free' laborer. It was not until the laborer became 'free' - having to sell his labor power as a commodity - that capitalist economy could develop.(5) What counts, Marx stresses, are the determinations of the form of a given object or measure (6); and this changes under different economic totalities. Thus, in Wage Labor and Capital (1847) Marx had already noted that 'A Negro is a Negro; only under certain economic conditions does he become a slave.' Or, to give another example of the importance of the social form, it is striking that though usury is, historically, one of the sources of capital, and though the first part of Capital I is devoted to a development of the theory of money, it is not until near the end of Volume III of Capital that it is possible to correctly understand the role of credit and interest in capitalist society. The reason for this lies with the dialectical method. Interest is a derivative form, an appearance, which can only be understood after the general nature of capitalist production has been explained; if the dialectical order is not followed it is too easy to fall prey to the illusion that money 'produces' or 'earns' interest, whereas in fact interest must be understood in terms of the equalization of the profit rates in the various branches of industry.

Writing in Neue Kritik, the theoretical journal of German SDS, Wolfgang Muller is able to illustrate Mandel's failure to apply the dialectic in his discussion of the problem of commodity-fetishism. Muller's detailed discussion criticizes Mandel for stressing 'merely the "historical genesis" of the economic categories, and notes that by trying to 'objectively register the naked facts', Mandel is unable to see the dialectical nature of the phenomena that he is studying.(7) The point to be stressed here is that, for a dialectical analysis, there exists no such thing as a 'fact'. Georg Lukacs is correct when, in History and Class Consciousness, he insists that the point of view of the dialectic demands that one understand the present as history. No fact is unaffected by its context. This means that a genetic account of the type offered by Mandel in fact deals only with the genesis of the appearances of capitalist society; the reality of that society can only be explained by the 'organic connection within modern bourgeois society', by the context which gives life to the facts. History is not merely a series of unconnected events; it is a whole, and must be understood as such. This organic or wholistic view of history is the second aspect of a dialectical understanding of the present as history, explaining the structure of Marx's Capital(8), and leading to Marx's theory of relative pauperization as an illustration.

Paul Mattick argues against Mandel's assertion that Marx does not hold a theory of absolute impoverishment. The discussion of this point needs some clarification, since it has been a point of dispute among socialists since the time when Lassalle formulated his so-called 'iron law of wages', which Marx strongly criticized in the Critique of the Gotha Programme. Three aspects of this problem must be considered, the last of which leads to a discussion of political tactics today.

1) In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx argued that one reason that wages were low was that competition among workers prevented them from uniting to use their force to win better conditions. Yet, added Marx, even if they did press forward and win higher wages, the capitalists would either invest their money in other sectors of the economy, leaving the workers to starve, or replace these higher paid workers by machines. Still, Marx felt that union activity was a positive fact and should be encouraged; if nothing else, it helped to prepare and educate the workers for the coming revolution. Marx seems here to believe, then, that wages will be pushed to a bare subsistance minimum, though, at another point in the Manuscripts he does say that in prosperous times it is possible for the workers' wages to rise (though never as much as the profits of the capitalists).(9)

By 1847, when he wrote Wage Labor and Capital, Marx seemed convinced that wages need not remain at subsistance levels. He already gave here the basis of the theory of relative pauperization, talking for example about the way in which a tiny little cottage appears to be a hovel when a palace is built next door to it. By 1857, 58, when the Grundrisse was written, Marx was already arguing that the major difference between a worker and a slave was that the worker could expand his sphere of enjoyments and needs.(10) That is, to the bare notion of a physiological minimum wage, Marx is adding a psychological variable. This psychological variable is given historical significance too. In the Grundrisse, Marx wrote of the development of capitalist production and productivity as creating new historical needs and a new kind of worker. What this finally means is, as Marx put it in the 1865 Address to the General Council of the First International, Value, Price and Profit, the tendency of capitalism itself is to push wages to their minimum; yet historical and social factors enter into the determination of this

minimum, and the most important of these is the strength of the unions; and 'the question resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants,' as Marx concluded.

2) In the first period of its life cycle, capital sucks up all the available labor power in a nation, destroying the old feudal relations of production, making it impossible for the old agrarian way of life to continue. Even agriculture becomes capitalist; the cities begin to grow and are flooded with an ever-present labor force, ready to work for any wages at all. At first, capitalism is able to provide work for any and all comers -- except, of course, during crisis periods. During this phase of its life, capital draws its surplus-value out of the workers through a high rate of physical exploitation, long working hours, and so on. If the rate of profit is to be increased, all that is necessary is the more 'hands' be hired, that they be worked longer and harder; this is the production of absolute surplus-value.

Soon, however, it becomes necessary to produce surplus-value by more refined, technological methods. Beyond a certain point it is cheaper to mechanize part of the production process than it is to hire additional labor-power. The cause of this may be the heavy competition among capitalists who strive to undersell one another. Or, as Marx notes, it is very probably due to the strength of the unions which force capital to pay higher wages than it finds profitable. In all events, what happens here is that as capital begins to produce more and more relative surplus-value it has need of fewer and fewer workers. From this follow two consequences:

a) Though those workers who retain their jobs may receive a higher wage, not only in relative but in absolute terms, their position relative to capital becomes worse. This is what Rosa Luxemburg, in 'German Science behind the Workers', calls 'the law of the tendential fall of relative wages'. It means that the working class as a whole sees that its position relative to the capitalists is worsening, despite the fact that some of the workers may be relatively better off than others. Marx expresses the significance of this notion in his Critique of the Gotha Programme when he argues against the Lassallean view that wages must follow the 'iron law'. Marx says:

> It is as if, among slaves who have at last got behind the secret of slavery and broken out in rebellion, a slave still in thrall to obsolete notions were to inscribe on the programme of the rebellion: Slavery must be abolished because the upkeep of slaves in the system of slavery cannot exceed a certain low maximum!

Marx's point here is that it is not for mere economic reasons in any immediate or 'factual' sense that a revolution is made. The socialist revolution is a positive act which demands the total freedom of man from the wage system, as well as from the hierarchical relations of production enforced by capitalist industry. The 'tendential fall of relative wages' shows that the only real solution for the workers is revolution.

b) It follows from this, and the increasing production of relative surplus-value through technological 'labor-saving' devices, that the number of workers directly employed in the production of surplus-value will decrease as capitalism continues its spiralling flight from the declining rate of profit. There will be the growth of what Mandel calls a 'new middle class'(11), the service sectors of the society, whose role is to pacify and control the working class and, perhaps more importantly, the reserve army of labor.

Though the potential for a revolt from desperation is obviously and painfully present among these victims of capital's expansion, it is for Mandel questionable whether their revolt - unless, of course, it forms part and parcel of an ongoing socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist West - can itself alone become a socialist revolution. On the other hand, a Marxist analysis of the relative tendency of the wages to fall indicates a revolutionary potential to be tapped in the heartland of capitalism.

3) The tendency towards relative pauperization sets in under very specific conditions, and its negative effects are by no means limited to economic ones; on the contrary, along with the economic effects on the workers' wages go a host of 'psychological' problems which arise from the great contradiction between the vast potential created by technology and the fact that 'in its capitalist form, it reproduces the old division of labor with its ossified particularizations' (Capital, I, p. 487). It is worth citing Marx at some length on the importance of the continuing technological revolution of the bourgeois mode of production, a phenomenon to which he and Engels had already pointed in the Communist Manifesto.

> Modern industry... imposes the necessity of recognising as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the labourer for various work, consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law (i.e. of the variation of work--D.H.). Modern Industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of today, crippled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to a mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers... (Capital I, pp. 487-8)(12)

It is important to remember the 'revolutionary role' which capitalism plays -- in spite of itself. The first section of the Communist Manifesto, for example, offers a powerful tribute to this mode of production. The point is that for the dialectical mode of thought, the present must be understood within the organic whole of history, as a becoming and not as a mere fact. Capitalism has its negative effects on the working classes of all nations, of course; Marx would be the last to deny this. But it has positive aspects too, and the dialectical thought is interested in developing and understanding the positive for it is out of this that the strategy for a revolution will flow. Capitalism creates the conditions of the possibility - of the necessity - of its own suppression.(13) The proletariat which it creates is a universal class, the 'class with radical chains', the 'class which is nothing and which can say "I must become everything".'(14) The proletariat may appear impoverished and miserable, incapable of taking its own fate, and that of mankind, into its own hands. Yet this is only an appearance; the dialectical thought shows the reality of the proletarian condition -- for example in the following section of the Grundrisse:

> ...the production of relative surplus-value, that is, the production of surplus-value based on the multiplication and development of the productive forces, the production of new consumers... First, quantitative extension of the present consumption; second, creation in this way of

new needs which are propagated to a large audience; third, production of new needs and discovery and creation of new use values. This, in other words, in order that the surplus labor which has been achieved does not remain merely a quantitative surplus but equally increases the range of the qualitative differences of labor (and thus of surplus labor), multiplying them and making them in themselves more differentiated. For example: Through the doubling of the productive forces it is only necessary to invest a capital of 50 where before 100 was needed, such that a capital of 50, and the corresponding necessary labor, is freed. Thus, a new, qualitatively different branch of production must be created for the capital and labor which have been freed, (a branch) which satisfies and brings forth new needs. (Marx continues for nearly a page concerning these new needs, the extension of capitalism, etc.)

Thus capital first creates civil society and the universal appropriation of nature, and that of the social connection itself through the parts of society. Hence the great civilizing influence of capital; its production of the material of a society against which all early ones appear only as local developments of humanity and as idolatry of nature. For the first time, nature is a pure object for man, a pure thing of utility; it ceases to be recognized as a power for itself; and the theoretical knowledge of its independent laws itself appears only as the cunning to subordinate them to human needs, either as object of consumption or as means of production. (Grundrisse, pp. 312-3)

In order to understand the full significance of this positive dialectical thought, it is necessary to turn back for a moment and to look at the evolution of Marx's thought, particularly his notion of praxis. When the young Marx confronted the Hegelian system for the first time, he was both attracted and repelled by it. Here was a completed philosophy, one which covered all aspects of human knowledge and action. Yet, Hegel's philosophy had not changed the world; it had only reconciled itself with the world, claiming that 'there is less chill in the peace with the world which knowledge supplies.'

In order to better understand Hegel, and his own relation to the Hegelian system, Marx decided to write his doctoral Dissertation on the post-Aristotelean philosophy. He felt that there must be an analogy between the completed system of Hegel and that of Aristotle; from an analysis of the reaction of the post-Aristoteleans perhaps he, Marx, could learn how to cope with Hegel. In the 'Preparatory Work' (Vorarbeiten) for the Dissertation, Marx notes that:

> Titenlike, however, are the times that follow an implicitly total philosophy and its subjective forms of development, for the diremption (between thought and the world) - its unity - is tremendous. Thus, Rome came after the Stoic, Sceptic and Epicurean philosophies.

Once it has achieved completion, philosophy has to turn to praxis; its function is to make the world philosophical, and to make itself worldly. This is the theme which stretches throughout and unites all of Marx's work.

The theme of making the world philosophical and philosophy worldly is most clearly articulated in the third of the 1844 Manuscripts. Here Marx sees, for example, 'how the history of industry and the present objective nature of industry, is the open book of man's essential powers, the sensibly present

human psychology...' (All stress in the quotes from Marx is his, except when otherwise indicated.) Man externalizes himself in nature, objectifying himself through his praxis; that is, man creates himself in creating his world. Under capitalist production relations the world that he creates is not his own; it stands against and dominates him. This situation, which Marx calls alienation, has to be overcome by communism, the coming society whose arrival is already heralded in the present. 'Just as the coming society finds at hand all the material for this cultural development through the movement of private property, its wealth as well as its poverty, both material and spiritual, in the same way, the fully constituted society produces man in the entire wealth of his being, produces the rich, deep, and entirely sensitive man as its enduring actuality.' Marx's point here is that just as, objectively, the economic conditions of capitalism are leading to communist society, so too, subjectively, the life in capitalist society leads beyond itself, to communism.

Communism, for Marx, is the solution to the theory-praxis problem. As Marx defines it, 'This communism, as the completed naturalism = humanism and as the completed humanism = naturalism, is the true resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man; it is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the genus. It is the riddle of history solved, and knows itself to be this solution.' Communism is the result of all of the past of human history.' It is the beginning of a new history, a truly human history. Freedom is won through the strength of the capitalist development. Thus,

> One sees how in the place of the political economic wealth and poverty steps the rich man and the rich human need. The rich man is at the same time the man in need of a totality of human manifestations, the man in whom his own premise of socialism, not only the wealth but also the poverty of man equally acquire a human and hence a social meaning. This is the passive bond which lets man experience the greatest wealth, the other man, as need.

Contrary to the liberal assertion, recently become so popular, that the 'Young Marx' expresses a truly 'ethical' and 'democratic' world view, and that the 'Old Marx' is a dogmatist who left behind his humanist predilections and became a positivist dogmatist, this stream of thought to which I have pointed runs through Marx's mature work as well. The 'humanism' of the 'Old Marx' expresses itself in the 1857-8 Grundrisse in the stress on the creation of new and truly human needs. To dispel illusions, another long citation from the Grundrisse:

> It is just as certain that individuals cannot subordinate their own social interrelations to themselves until they have created these relations. But it is silly to think that this merely objective relation is a natural one, indissociable from the nature of the individuality and immanent in it (as opposed to reflected knowing and willing). It is its product. It is an historical product. It belongs to a determinate phase of its development. The alienness and autonomy which it conserves against the individuality shows only that the latter is still in the process of creating the conditions of its social life instead of having begun from these conditions... The universally developed individuals whose social relations have been submitted to their own collective control as being their own collective relations are not a product of nature but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of the capacities (of the productive forces)

> which makes possible such individualities presupposes precisely production based on exchange-values which, with the universality (of this relation) produces the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also produces the universality and all-sidedness of his relations and capacities. At earlier stages of development the single individual appeared more complete precisely because the fullness of his relations had not been developed and (these relations) had not yet opposed themselves to him as social powers and relations independent of him. It is just as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original plentitude as it is to believe that it is necessary to remain with the complete void (of today). (Grundrisse, 79-80)

In this last quotation, which introduces the theory of money as developed in the Grundrisse, Marx re-affirms the assertion of the 1844 Manuscripts that under capitalist conditions man is alienated from himself and his fellows, but that alienation is a necessary development which creates the historical conditions of its own suppression. Marx explicitly refuses to return to the primitive state of man and his immediate relation to nature; such a state is what, in the Manuscripts, was derided as 'crude communism'. Rather, Marx envisages the creation of a new man whose nature will be the 'solved riddle of history', the solution to the old philosophical problem of theory and praxis. In the Grundrisse, Marx attacks Adam Smith's view of 'economic man', and proposes an alternative:

> 'Rest' (for Smith) appears as the adequate condition, as identical with 'freedom' and 'happiness'. That the individual 'in his normal condition of health, strength, activity, skill and dexterity' has also a need of a normal ration of work... seems not to enter A. Smith's mind. In all events, the measure of work seems to be given externally (for Smith), though the goal to be reached and the obstacles which must be overcome to reach it. But Smith never suspects that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself practical proof of freedom, and further that the external goals must be stripped of their appearance of simple natural necessity and be posed as goals which the individual sets for himself, such that they become the realization, the objectification of the subjects and hence of real freedom, whose action is precisely work. (Grundrisse, 505)

Communist man is the man of free creative praxis. He can become free only when he takes control of the social forces which he has created and turns them to his own use. This comes with the communist revolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Sweezy's discussion of Marx's 'method of abstraction'.
2. Besides Mandel's Chapter 11, the reader should check Paul Sweezy's The Theory of Capitalist Development, Part III (pp. 133-236), especially the historical presentation of the various Marxist positions, pp. 190-213.
3. It isn't worth the trouble of criticizing Heilbroner's review of Mandel here. Heilbroner makes the typical liberal objections, but thinks that in Mandel he sees a 'liberated mind', though Mandel doesn't make enough use of the market mechanisms in his model of a socialist society as Heilbroner would like.
4. Cf. the Preface to the first German edition, and the Preface to the French edition.

5. After discussing this point in the 'Introduction' to the Grundrisse, Marx notes: 'This example of labor illustrates strikingly how even the most abstract categories, in spite of their validity for all epochs - precisely because of their abstraction - are still in the determination of this abstraction itself the product of historical relations and have their complete validity only for and within these relations. (Grundrisse, p. 23)

6. The stress on form in Marx is clearest in Vol. II of Capital's analysis of the nature of fixed and circulating capital. However, this is also seen in the way in which Marx deals with the use-value of commodities, especially that most important of all commodities, labor power. Cf. Rosdolsky, Chapter 3, pp. 98-125.

7. Neue Kritik, February 1969, #51/52, pp. 76-77.

8. In his extraordinary study, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen 'Kapital' (Europaische Verlag, Frankfurt, 1968), Roman Rosdolsky, elaborates in detail the dialectical structure of Capital by means of a systematic study of its relation to the 1857-8 manuscript called the Grundrisse. Rosdolsky shows that the first two volumes of Capital deal only with 'capital in general', that is, with capital in its pure form, before it enters into contact with the 'many capitals' and is influenced by competition. Capital in the real world, the 'many capitals', is an appearance of 'capital in general', and can only be understood as a variation of this latter and its laws. Thus, for example, there is no contradiction between the first two books of Capital which assume that the value of a commodity equals its price, and the third book which shows that, in reality, price differs from value due to the effects of competition, the equalization of the profit rate, etc.

9. Cf. the first Manuscript; also Mandel, La formation..., p. 32.

10. Cf. the following quote from the Grundrisse: '... and the part which the worker takes in higher, also in spiritual enjoyments -- agitation for his own interests, subscribing to newspapers, listening to lectures, raising children, developing tastes, etc. -- his sole partaking of civilization, that which differentiates him from slaves, is only economically possible in that in times of prosperity he widens the sphere of his enjoyments...' (pp. 197-98) Note the stress on increased needs. For Marx, in the 1844 Manuscripts and throughout his life, it is the breadth of man's needs which is the measure of the degree of his humanness. Cf. also below on needs.

11. Cf. La formation..., p. 146.

12. Compare this with the 'New Working Class' thesis which I elaborated in Radical America, Vol. III, #2 (issue on 'Working Class Culture').

13. Cf. Communist Manifesto: 'The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers due to competition by their revolutionary combination due to association. The development of modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie produces therefore, above all, are its own gravediggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.

14. Cf. the definition of the proletariat given by Marx for the first time in the 'Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'.

from stone sarcophagus

R. E. Vision #8 / part II -for art kleps

an exodus in autumn/the white tiger has returned
the thunder & lightening is a shock for 100 miles
GOOD FORTUNE

AK of the AdirondAKs : the SPINing concepts
frighten me
it is sad to be a dreamer, unable to dream
a lover unable to love
a builder denied materials
All Three rowed out to sea in a sieve
gone, gone, gone, to the other shore/
landed on the other shore, SVAHA!

GATE GATE PARAGATE PARASAMGATE BOHDI SVAHA!

oh well/ if the government wants to live on a
war economy
i guess we can give them a war----------i feel
a dream
death approaching, the anxiety is a bitch.
-(*)-
AMERICA WAKE UP!
GOD DOESNT WANT YOU TO KILL HIS ANGELS a
if you knew the price you will pay for this small
WAR ECONOMY NATION OF DEATH prophecy
STOP THE KARMIC MURDER PIE NOW
Worse than worshipping the golden calf you
are killing for it
consider the weight of yr
possessions
america, twice this weight you
will
carry when you die
for the innocent & pure of heart
i am raising the flags/ a warning of storms
Be Prepared to GO HOME LAMBS







i do not have the courage to say
this may be your last sacrifice

they will not weep on wall street
until it is too late & the tears have no meaning

there is no reason to play with death
this is not your country
when i smelled love burning/ i cried
& NOW i smell the horse of the Angel of Death

go home lambs

you are trying to build
a temple in a graveyard
YOU/have years to plan, my days are numbered
LAUGH at my fears & ignore my love
yet love & fear are the only wings to move on

when you have visited your own death
everyday is the last
GO HOME LAMBS
let yr children be born in the sun
"this country is insane"
GO HOME LAMBS
in the world of the spirit one does not
lose what he has gained.

d.a. levy

38

STONE Sar cophagus

25¢

stone sarcophagus by d.a.levy is the first in a series of poetry pamphlets

There's nothing but tissues & transplants in this selection. What there is of social thought & criticism in levy's work is finally inextricable from the whole body of it--as whole as it had grown by the time he was 26. Right now a lot of people can't understand why he had to hack thru the quotidien to explore the other side, the "mind's antipodes," using Buddhism as the vehicle. From that point, they say, how can you see the society, the war, the repression correctly? & how will the poetry of the future come out of poems which are written far enough back in the mind to criticize the situation of the human being in the universe ("the angels are cocksuckers too").

Maybe the future can't arrive without a vision big enough to demand that the entire condition of life be ransacked for information --from the spirit to the belly--to find out how large a criticism the "correct" one must be to destroy what now is hateful and to make room for what will be complete.

If we are in the last place it is possible to go in a dying, strung-out culture, no matter how hard we try to imagine the new one it will be impossible to see it until it is won.

These are the bones, this is a last look around.

from the introduction

Where is America Going?

Ernest Mandel

Today, profound forces are working to undermine the social and economic equilibrium which has reigned in the United States for more then 25 years, since the big depressions of 1929, 32 and of 1937-38. Some of these are forces of an international charcter, linked with the national liberation struggles of the peoples exploited by American imperialism -- above all the Vietnamese Revolution. But from the point of view of Marxist method, it is important in the first place to stress those forces which are at work inside the system itself. This essay will attempt to isolate six of these forces -- six historic contradictions which are now destroying the social equilibrium of the capitalist economy and bourgeois order of the United States.

I. THE DECLINE OF UNSKILLED LABOUR AND THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF BLACK RADICALIZATION

American society, like every other industrialized capitalist country, is curently in the throes of an accelerated process of technological change. The third

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industrial revolution—summarized in the catchword 'automation'—has by now been transforming American industry for nearly two decades. The changes which this new industrial revolution has brought about in American society are manifold. During the fifties, it created increased unemployment. The annual growth-rate of productivity was higher than the annual growth-rate of output, and as a result there was a tendency to rising structural unemployment even in times of boom and prosperity. Average annual unemployment reached 5,000,000 by the end of the Republican administration.

Since the early sixties, the number of unemployed has, however, been reduced somewhat (although American unemployment statistics are very unreliable). It has probably come down from an average of 5,000,000 to an average of 3,500,000 to 4,000,000: these figures refer to structural unemployment, and not to the conjunctural unemployment which occurs during periods of recession. But whatever may be the causes of this temporary and relative decline in structural unemployment, it is very significant that one sector of the American population continues to be hit very hard by the development of automation: the general category of unskilled labour. Unskilled labour jobs are today rapidly disappearing in US industry. They will in the future tend to disappear in the economy altogether. In absolute figures, the number of unskilled labour jobs in industry has come down from 13,000,000 to less than 4,000,000, and probably to 3,000,000, within the last 10 years. This is a truly revolutionary process. Very rarely has anything of the kind happened with such speed in the whole history of capitalism. The group which has been hit hardest by the disappearance of unskilled jobs is, of course, the black population of the United States.

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The rapid decline in the number of unskilled jobs in American industry is the nexus which binds the growing negro revolt, especially the revolt of negro youth, to the general socio-economic framework of American capitalism. Of course it is clear, as most observers have indicated, that the acceleration of the negro revolt, and in particular the radicalization of negro youth in the fifties and early sixties, has been closely linked to the development of the colonial revolution. The appearance of independent states in Black Africa, the Cuban Revolution with its radical suppression of racial discrimination, and the development of the Vietnam War, have been powerful subjective and moral factors in accelerating the Afro-American explosion in the USA. But we must not overlook the objective stimuli which have grown out of the inner development of American capitalism itself. The long post-war boom and the explosive progress in agricultural productivity were the first factors in the massive urbanization and proletarization of the Afro-Americans: the Northern ghettoes grew by leaps and bounds. Today, the average rate of unemployment among the black population is double what it is among the white population, and the average rate of unemployment among *youth* is double what it is among adults, so that the average among the black youth is nearly four times the general average in the country. Up to 15 or 20 per cent of young black workers are unemployed: this is a percentage analogous to that of the Great Depression. It is sufficient to look at these figures to understand the social and material origin of the black revolt.

It is important to stress the very intimate inter-relationship between this high rate of unemployment among black youth and the generally scandalous state of education for black people in the ghettoes. This school system produces a large majority of drop-outs precisely at the moment when unskilled jobs are fast disappearing. It is perfectly clear under these conditions why black nationalists feel so strongly about the problem of community control over black schools—a problem which in New York and elsewhere has become a real crystallizing point for the black liberation struggle.

2. The Social Roots of the Student Revolt

The third industrial revolution can be seen at one and the same time as a process of *expulsion* of human labour from traditional industry, and of tremendous *influx* of industrial labour into all other fields of economic and social activity. Whereas more and more people are replaced by machines in industry, activities like agriculture, office administration, public administration and even education become industrialized—that is, more and more mechanized, streamlined and organized in industrial forms.

This leads to very important social consequences. These may be summed up by saying that, in the framework of the third industrial revolution, manual labour is expelled from production while intellectual labour is reintroduced into the productive process on a gigantic scale. It thereby becomes to an every-increasing degree alienated labour —standardized, mechanized, and subjected to rigid rules and regimentation, in exactly the same way that manual labour was in the first and second industrial revolutions. This fact is very closely linked with one of the most spectacular recent developments in American society: the massive student revolt, or, more correctly, the growing radicalization of students. To give an indication of the scope of this transformation in American society, it is enough to consider that the United States, which at the beginning of this century was still essentially a country exporting agricultural products, today contains fewer farmers than students. There are today in the United States 6,000,000 students, and the number of farmers together with their employees and family-help has sunk below 5,500,000. We are confronted with a colossal transformation which upsets traditional relations between social groups, expelling human labour radically from certain fields of activity, but reintroducing it on a larger scale and at a higher level of qualification and skill in other fields.

If one looks at the destiny of the new students, one can see another very important transformation, related to the changes which automation and technological progress have brought about in the American economy. Twenty or thirty years ago, it was still true that the students were in general either future capitalists, self-employed or agents of capitalism. The majority of them became either doctors, lawyers, archi-

tects, and so on or functionaries with managerial positions in capitalist industry or the State. But today this pattern is radically changed. It is obvious that there are not 6,000,000 jobs for capitalists in contemporary American society: neither for capitalists or self-employed professionals, nor for agents of capitalism. Thus a great number of present-day students are not future capitalists at all, but future salary-earners, in teaching, public administration and at various technical levels in industry and the economy. Their status will be nearer that of the industrial worker than that of management. For meanwhile, as a result of automation, the difference of status between the technician and the skilled worker is rapidly diminishing. US society is moving towards a situation in which most of the skilled workers for whom there remain jobs in industry will have to have a higher or semi-higher education. Such a situation already exists in certain industries even in countries other than the United States—Japanese shipbuilding is a notorious example.

The university explosion in the United States has created the same intense consciousness of alienation among students as that which is familiar in Western Europe today. This is all the more revealing, in that the material reasons for student revolt are much less evident in the United States than in Europe. Overcrowding of lecture halls, paucity of student lodgings, lack of cheap food in restaurants and other phenomena of a similar kind play a comparatively small role in American universities, whose material infrastructure is generally far superior to anything that we know in Europe. Nevertheless, the consciousness of alienation resulting from the capitalist form of the university, from the bourgeois structure and function of higher education and the authoritarian administration of it, has become more and more widespread. It is a symptomatic reflection of the changed social position of the students today in society.

American students are thus much more likely to understand general social alienation, in other words to become at least potentially anti-capitalist, than they were 10 or 15 years ago. Here the similarity with developments in Western Europe is striking. As a rule, political mobilization on the US campus started with aid to the black population within the United States, or solidarity with liberation movements in the Third World. The first political reaction of American students was an anti-imperialist one. But the logic of anti-imperialism has led the student movement to understand, at least in part, the necessity of anti-capitalist struggle, and to develop a socialist consciousness which is today widespread in radical student circles.

3. Automation, Technicians and the Hierarchical Structure of the Factory

The progress of automation has also had another financial and economic result, which we cannot yet see clearly in Europe, but which has emerged as a marked tendency in the United States during the sixties.

Marxist theory explains that one of the main special effects of automation and the present technological revolution is a shortening of the life-cycle of fixed capital. Machinery is now generally replaced every four or five years, while it used to be replaced every ten years in classical capitalism. Looking at the phenomenon from the perspective of the operations of big corporations, this means that there is occurring a shift of the centre of their gravity away from problems of *production* towards problems of *reproduction.*

The real bosses of the big corporations no longer mainly discuss the problems of how to organize production: that is left to lower-echelon levels of the hierarchy. The specific objective in which they are interested is how to organize and to ensure reproduction. In other words, what they discuss is future plans: plans for replacing the existing machinery, plans for financing that replacement, new fields and locations for investment, and so on. This has given the concentration of capital in the United States a new and unforeseen twist. The process of amalgamation during the last few years has not predominantly consisted in the creation of monopolies in certain branches of industry, fusing together automobile, copper or steel trusts, or aviation factories. It has instead been a movement towards uniting apparently quite *unconnected* companies, operating in completely heteroclite fields of production. There are some classical examples of this process, widely discussed in the American financial press, such as the Xerox-CIT merger, the spectacular diversification of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, or the Ling-Temco-Vought empire, which recently bought up the Jones and Loughlin Steel Corporation.

What this movement really reflects is the growing pre-occupation with 'pure' problems of accumulation of capital. That is to say, the imperative today is to assemble enough capital and then to diversify the investment of that capital in such a way as to minimize risks of structural or conjunctural decline in this or that branch—risks which are very great in periods of fast technological change. In other words, the operation of the capitalist system in the United States today shows in a very clear way what Marxists have always said (and what only economists in the Soviet Union and some of their associates in East European countries and elsewhere are forgetting today), namely that real cost reduction and income maximization is impossible if profitability is reckoned only at plant level. In fact, it is a truth which every big American corporation understands, that it is impossible to have maximum profitability and economic rationality at plant level, and that it is even impossible to achieve it at the level of a *single branch of industry.* That is why the prevailing capitalist tendency in the USA is to try to combine activities in a number of branches of production. The type of financial empire which is springing up as a result of this form of operation is a fascinating object of study for Marxists.

But the more Big Capital is exclusively pre-occupied with problems of capital accumulation and reproduction, the more it leaves plant

management and organization of production to lower-echelon experts, and the more the smooth running of the economy must clash with the survival of private property and of the hierarchical structure of the factory. The absentee factory-owners and money-juggling financiers divorced from the productive process are not straw men. They retain ultimate power—the power to open or to close the plant, to shut it in one town and relaunch it 2,000 miles away, to suppress by one stroke of their pens 20,000 jobs and 50 skills acquired at the price of long human efforts. This power must seem more and more arbitrary and absolute in the eyes of the true technicians who precisely do *not* wield the decisive power, that of the owners of capital. The higher the level of education and scientific knowledge of the average worker-technician, the more obsolete must become the attempts of both capitalists and managers to maintain the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the plant, which even contradicts the logic of the latest techniques—the need for flexible co-operation within the factory in the place of a rigid chain of command.

4. The Erosion of Real Wage Increases through Inflation

Since the beginning of the sixties and the advent of the Kennedy Administration, structural unemployment has gone down and the rate of growth of the American economy has gone up. This shift has been generally associated with an increased rate of inflation in the American economy. The concrete origins and source of this inflation are to be located not only in the huge military establishment—although, of course, this is the main cause—but also in the vastly increased indebtedness of the whole American society. Private debt has accelerated very quickly; in the last 15 years it has gone up from something like 65 per cent to something like 120 per cent of the internal national income of the country, and this percentage is rising all the time. It passed the $1,000,0000,000 (thousand billion) mark a few years ago, in 1966, and is continually rising at a quicker rate than the national income itself. The specific price behaviour of the monopolistic and oligopolistic corporations, of course, interlocks with this inflationary process.

This is not the place to explore the technical problems of inflation. But it should be emphasized that the result of these inflationary tendencies, combined with the Vietnam war, has been that, for the first time for over three decades the growth of the real disposable income of the American working class has stopped. The highest point of that disposable real income was reached towards the end of 1965 and the beginning of 1966. Since then it has been going down. The downturn has been very slow—probably less than 1 per cent per annum. Nevertheless it is a significant break in a tendency which has continued practically without interruption for the last 35 years. This downturn in the real income of the workers has been the result of two processes: on the one hand inflation, and on the other a steep increase

in taxation since the beginning of the Vietnamese war. There is a very clear and concrete relation between this halt in the rise of the American working class's real income, and the growing impatience which exists today in American working class circles with the US Establishment as such, whose distorted reflection was partly to be seen in the Wallace movement.

It is, of course, impossible to speak at this stage of any political opposition on the part of the American working class to the capitalist system as such. But if American workers accepted more or less easily and normally the integration of their trade union leadership into the Democratic Party during the long period which started with the Roosevelt Administration, this acceptance was a product of the fact that their real income and material conditions, especially their social security, improved during that period. Today that period seems to be coming to an end. The current stagnation of proletarian real income means that the integration of the trade union bureaucracy into the bourgeois Democratic Party is now no longer accepted quite so easily as it was even four years ago. This was evident during the Presidential Election campaign of 1968. The UAW leadership organized their usual special convention to give formal endorsement to the Democratic candidates, Humphrey and Muskie. This time they got a real shock. Of the thousand delegates who normally come to these conventions, nearly one half did not show up at all. They no longer supported the Democratic Party with enthusiasm. They had lost any sense of identification with the Johnson Administration. All the talk about welfare legislation, social security, medicare and the other advantages which the workers had gained during the last four years was largely neutralized in their eyes by the results of inflation and of increased taxation on their incomes. The fact was that their real wages had stopped growing and were even starting to decline a little.

It is well known that dollar inflation in the United States has created major tensions in the world monetary system. Inside the USA, there is now a debate among different circles of the ruling class, the political personnel of the bourgeoisie, and the official economic experts, as to whether to give priority to restoring the US balance of payments, or to maintaining the present rate of growth. These two goals seem to be incompatible. Each attempt to stifle inflation completely, to re-establish a very stable currency, can only be ensured by deflationary policies which create unemployment—and probably unemployment on a considerable scale. Each attempt to create full employment and to quicken the rate of growth inevitably increases inflation and with it the general loss of power of the currency. This is the dilemma which confronts the new Republican administration today as it confronted Johnson yesterday. It is impossible to predict what course Nixon will choose, but it is quite possible that his economic policy will be closer to that of the Eisenhower Administration than to that of the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.

A group of leading American businessmen, who form a council of business advisors with semi-official standing, published a study two weeks before the November 1968 election which created a sensation in financial circles. They stated bluntly that in order to combat inflation, at least 6 per cent unemployment was needed. These American businessmen are far more outspoken than their British counterparts, who are already happy when there is talk about 3 per cent unemployment. Unemployment of 6 per cent in the United States means about 5,000,000 permanently without work. It is a high figure compared to the present level, to the level under 'normal' conditions, outside of recessions. If Nixon should move in that direction, in which the international bankers would like to push him, the American bourgeoisie will encounter increased difficulty in keeping the trade-union movement quiescent and ensuring that the American workers continue to accept the integration of their union bureaucracy into the system, passively submitting to both bosses and union bureaucrats.

5. The Social Consequences of Public Squalor

There is a further consequence of inflation which will have a growing impact on the American economy and especially on social relations in the United States. Inflation greatly intensifies the contradiction between 'private affluence' and 'public squalor'. This contradiction has been highlighted by liberal economists like Galbraith, and is today very striking for a European visiting the United States. The extent to which the public services in that rich country have broken down is, in fact, astonishing. The huge budget has still not proved capable of maintaining a minimum standard of normally functioning public services. In late 1968, the *New York Times Magazine*, criticizing the American postal services, revealed that the average letter travels between Washington and New York more slowly today that it did a hundred years ago on horseback in the West. In a city like New York street sweeping has almost entirely disappeared. Thoroughfares are generally filthy: in the poorer districts, streets are hardly ever cleaned. In the richer districts, the burgers achieve clean streets only because they pay private workers out of their own pockets to sweep the streets and keep them in more or less normal conditions. Perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon, at any rate for the European, is that of certain big cities in the South-West, like Houston or Phoenix, which have half a million inhabitants or more and yet do not have any public transport system *whatsoever*: not a broken-down system—just no system at all. There are private cars and nothing else—no buses, no trams, no subways, nothing.

The contradiction between private affluence and public squalor has generally been studied from the point of view of the consumer, and of the penalties or inconveniences that it imposes on the average citizen. But there is another dimension to this contradiction which

will become more and more important in the years to come. This is its impact on what one could call the 'producers', that is to say of the people who are employed by public administration.

The number of these employees is increasing very rapidly. Public administration is already the largest single source of employment in the United States, employing over 11,000,000 wage earners. The various strata into which these 11,000,000 can be divided are all chronically underpaid. They have an average income which is lower than the income of the equivalent positions in private industry. This is not exceptional; similar phenomena have existed or exist in many European countries. But the results—results which have often been seen in Europe during the last 10 or 15 years—are now for the first time appearing on a large scale in the United States.

Public employees, who in the past were outside the trade-union movement and indeed any form of organized social activity, are today becoming radicalized at least at the union level. They are organizing, they are agitating, and they are demanding incomes at least similar to those which they could get in private industry. In a country like the United States, with the imperial position it occupies on a world scale, the vulnerability of the social system to any increase in trade-union radicalism by public employees is very great. A small example will do as illustration. In New York recently both police and firemen were, not officially but effectively, on strike—at the same time. They merely worked to rule, and thereby disorganized the whole urban life of the city. Everything broke down. In fact, for six days total traffic chaos reigned in New York. Drivers could park their cars anywhere without them being towed away. (Under normal conditions, between two and three thousand cars are towed away by the police each day in New York.) For those six days, with motorists free to park where they liked, the town became completely blocked after an hour of morning traffic—just because the police wanted a 10 per cent rise in wages.

The economic rationale of this problem needs to be understood. It is very important not to see it simply as an example of mistaken policy on the part of public administrators or capitalist politicians, but rather as the expression of basic tendencies of the capitalist system. One of the main trends of the last 25 or 30 years of European capitalism has been the growing socialization of all indirect costs of production. This constitutes a very direct contribution to the realization of private profit and to the accumulation of capital. Capitalists increasingly want the State to pay not only for electrical cables and roads, but also for research, development, education, and social insurance. But once this tendency towards the socialization of indirect costs of production get under way, it is obvious that the corporations will not accept large increases in taxation to finance it. If they were to pay the taxes needed to cover all these costs, there would in fact be no 'socialization'. They would continue to pay for them privately, but instead of doing so

directly they would pay indirectly through their taxes (and pay for the administration of these payments too). Instead of lessening the burden, such a solution would in fact increase it. So there is an inevitable institutionalized resistance of the corporations and of the capitalist class to increasing taxes up to the point where they would make possible a functional public service capable of satisfying the needs of the entire population. For this reason, it is probable that the gap between the wages of public employees and those of private workers in the United States will remain, and that the trend towards radicalization of public employees—both increased unionization and even possibly political radicalization—will continue.

Moreover, it is not without importance that a great number of university students enter public administration—both graduates and so-called drop-outs. Even today, if we look at the last four or five years, many young people who were student leaders or militants three or four years ago are now to be found teaching in the schools or working in municipal social services. They may lose part of their radical consciousness when they take jobs; that is the hope not only of their parents but also of the capitalist class. But the evidence shows that at least part of their political consciousness is preserved, and that there occurs a certain infiltration of radicalism from the student sector into the teaching body—especially in higher education—and into the various strata of public administration in which ex-students become employed.

6. The Impact of Foreign Competition

The way in which certain objective contradictions within the United States economy have been slowly tending to transform the subjective consciousness of different groups of the country's population—negroes, especially negro youth; students; technicians; public employees—has now been indicated. Inflation has begun to disaffect growing sections of the working class. But the final, and most important, moment of a Marxist analysis of US imperial society today has not yet been reached—that is the threat to American capitalism now posed by international competition.

Traditionally, American workers have always enjoyed much higher real wages than European workers. The historical causes for this phenomenon are well known. They are linked with the shortage of labour in the United States, which was originally a largely empty country. Traditionally, American capitalist industry was able to absorb these higher wages because it was practically isolated from international competition. Very few European manufactured goods reached the United States, and United States industry exported only a small part of its output. Over the last 40 years, of course, the situation has slowly changed. American industry has become ever more integrated into the world market. It participates increasingly in international competition,

both because it exports more and because the American domestic market is rapidly itself becoming the principal sector of the world market, since the exports of all other capitalist countries to the United States have been growing rapidly. Here a major paradox seems to arise. How can American workers earn real wages which are between two and three times higher than real wages in Western Europe, and between four and five times higher than real wages in Japan, while American industry is involved in international competition?

The answer is, of course, evident. These higher wages have been possible because United States industry has operated on a much higher level of productivity than European or Japanese industry. It has enjoyed a productivity gap, or as Engels said of British industry in the 19th century, a *productivity monopoly* on the world market. This productivity monopoly is a function of two factors: higher technology, and economy of scale—that is a much larger dimension of the average factory or firm. Today, both of these two causes of the productivity gap are threatened. The technological advance over Japan or Western Europe which has characterized American imperialism is now disappearing very rapidly. The very trend of massive capital export to the other imperialist countries which distinguishes American imperialism, and the very nature of the so-called 'multi-national' corporation (which in nine cases out of ten is in reality an American corporation), diffuses American technology on a world scale, thus equalizing technological levels at least among the imperialist countries. At the same time, it tends, of course, to increase the gap between the imperialist and the semi-colonial countries. Today, one can say that only in a few special fields such as computers and aircraft does American industry still enjoy a real technological advantage over its European and Japanese competitors. But these two sectors, although they may be very important for the future, are not decisive for the total export and import market either in Europe or in the United States, nor will they be decisive for the next 10 or 20 years. So this advantage is a little less important than certain European analysts have claimed.

If one looks at other sectors, in which the technological advantage is disappearing or has disappeared—such as steel, automobiles, electrical appliances, textiles, furniture, or certain types of machinery—it is evident that a massive invasion of the American market by foreign products is taking place. In steel, something between 15 and 20 per cent of American consumption is today imported from Japan and Western Europe. The Japanese are beginning to dominate the West Coast steel market, and the Europeans to take a large slice of the East Coast market. It is only in the Mid-West, which is still the major industrial region of the United States, that imported steel is not widely used. But with the opening of the St. Lawrence seaway, even there the

issue may be doubtful in the future. Meanwhile, automobiles are imported into the United States today at a rate which represents 10–15 per cent of total annual consumption. This proportion too could very quickly go up to 20–25 per cent. There is a similar development in furniture, textiles, transistor radios and portable television sets; shipbuilding and electrical appliances might be next.

So far, the gradual disappearance of the productivity differential has created increased competition for American capitalism in its own home market. Its foreign markets are seriously threatened or disappearing in certain fields like automobiles and steel. This, of course, is only the first phase. If the concentration of European and Japanese industry starts to create units which operate on the same scale as American units, with the same dimensions as American coporations, then American industry will ultimately find itself in an impossible position. It will then have to pay three times higher wages, with the same productivity as the Europeans or the Japanese. That would be an absolutely untenable situation, and it would be the beginning of a huge structural crisis for American industry.

Two examples should suffice to show that this is not a completely fantastic perspective. The last merger in the Japanese steel industry created a Japanese corporation producing 22,000,000 tons of steel a year. In the United States, this would make it the second biggest steel firm. On the other hand, in Europe the recent announcement that Fiat and Citroen are to merge by 1970 has created an automobile corporation producing 2,000,000 cars a year; this would make it the third largest American automobile firm, and it would move up into second place, overtaking Ford, if the momentum of its rate of growth, compared with the current rate of growth in the American industry, were maintained for another three or four years.

These examples make it clear that it is possible for European and Japanese firms, if the existing process of capital concentration continues, to attain not only a comparable technology but also comparable scale to that of the top American firms. When they reach that level, American workers' wages are certain to be attacked, because it is not possible in the capitalist world to produce with the same productivity as rivals abroad and yet pay workers at home two or three times higher wages.

7. The Wage Differentials Enjoyed by American Workers

The American ruling class is becoming increasingly aware that the huge wage differential which it still grants its workers is a handicap in international competition. Although this handicap has not yet become

a serious fetter, American capitalists have already begun to react to it in various ways over the past few years.

The export of capital is precisely designed to counteract this wage differential. The American automobile trusts have been investing almost exclusively in foreign countries, where they enjoy lower wages and can therefore far more easily maintain their share of the world market, with cars produced cheaply in Britain or Germany, rather than for higher wages inside the United States. Another attempt to keep down the growth of real wages was the type of incomes policy advocated by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations—until 1966, when it broke down as a result of the Vietnam war. A third form of counteraction has been an intensification of the exploitation of labour—in particular a speed-up in big industry which has produced a structural transformation of the American working class in certain fields. This speed-up has led to a work rhythm that is so fast that the average adult worker is virtually incapable of keeping it up for long. This has radically lowered the age structure in certain industries, such as automobiles or steel. Today, since it is increasingly difficult to stay in plants (under conditions of speed-up) for 10 years without becoming a nervous or physical wreck, up to 40 per cent of the automobile workers of the United States are young workers. Moreover, the influx of black workers in large-scale industry has been tremendous as a result of the

same phenomenon, since they are physically more resistant. Today, there are percentages of 35, 40 or 45 per cent black workers in some of the key automobile factories. In Ford's famous River Rouge plant, there are over 40 per cent black workers; in the Dodge automobile plant in Detroit, there are over 50 per cent. These are still exceptional cases—although there are also some steel plants with over 50 per cent black workers. But the average employment of black workers in United States industry as a whole is far higher than the demographic average of 10 per cent: it is something like 30 per cent.

None of these policies has so far had much effect. However, if the historic moment arrives when the productivity gap between American and West European and Japanese industry is closed, American capitalism will have absolutely no choice but to launch a far more ruthless attack on the real wage levels of American workers than has occurred hitherto in Western Europe, in the various countries where a small wage differential existed (Italy, France, West Germany, England and Belgium, at different moments during the sixties). Since the wage differential between Europe and America is not a matter of 5, 10, or 15 per cent, as it is between different Western European countries, but is of the order of 200–300 per cent, it is easy to imagine what an enormous handicap this will become when productivity becomes comparable, and how massive the reactions of American capitalism will then be.

It is necessary to stress these facts in order to adopt a Marxist, in other words a materialist and not an idealist approach to the question of the attitudes of the American working class towards American society. It is true that there is a very close inter-relation between the anti-communism of the Establishment, the arms expediture which makes possible a high level of employment, the international role of American imperialism, the surplus profits which the latter gets from its international investments of capital, and the military apparatus which defends these investments. But one thing must be understood. The American workers go along with this whole system, not in the first place because they are intoxicated by the ideas of anti-communism. They go along with it because it has been capable of delivering the goods to them over the last 30 years. The system has been capable of giving them higher wages and a higher degree of social security. It is this fact which has determined their acceptance of anti-communism, and not the acceptance of anti-communism which has determined social stability. Once the system becomes less and less able to deliver the goods, a completely new situation will occur in the United States.

Trade-union consciousness is not only negative. Or, to formulate this more dialectically, trade-union consciousness is in and by itself socially neutral. It is neither reactionary nor revolutionary. It becomes reactionary when the system is capable of satisfying trade-union de-

mands. It creates a major revolutionary potential once the system is no longer capable of satisfying basic trade-union demands. Such a transformation of American society under the impact of the international competition of capital is today knocking at the door of US capitalism.

The liberation struggles of the peoples of the Third World, with their threat to American imperialist investment, will also play an important role in ending the long socio-economic equilibrium of American capitalism. But they do not involve such dramatic and immediate economic consequences as the international competition of capital could have, if the productivity gap were filled.

As long as socialism or revolution are only ideals preached by militants because of their own convictions and consciousness, their social impact is inevitably limited. But when the ideas of revolutionary socialism are able to unite faith, confidence and consciousness with the immediate material interest of a social class in revolt—the working class, then their potential becomes literally explosive. In that sense, the political radicalization of the working class, and therewith socialism, will become a practical proposition in the United States within the next 10 or 15 years, under the combined impact of all these forces which have been examined here. After the black workers, the young workers, the students, the technicians and the public employees, the mass of the American workers will put the struggle for socialism on the immediate historical agenda in the United States. The road to revolution will then be open.

Epilogue to the New German Edition of Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon

HERBERT MARCUSE

Marx's analysis of how the revolution of 1848 developed into the authoritarian rule of Louis Bonaparte, anticipates the dynamic of late bourgeois society: the liquidation of this society's liberal phase on the basis of its own structure. The parliamentary republic metamorphoses into a political-military apparatus, at whose head a 'charismatic' leader of the bourgeoisie takes over the decisions which this class can no longer make and execute through its own power. The Socialist movement also succumbs in this period: the proletariat departs (for how long?) from the stage. All this is the stuff of the twentieth century -- but the twentieth from the perspective of the nineteenth, in which the horror of the fascist and postfascist periods is still unknown. This horror requires a correction of the introductory sentences of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire': the 'world-historical facts and persons' which occur 'as it were twice', no longer occur the second time as 'farce'. Or rather, the farce is more fearful than the tragedy it follows.

The parliamentary republic decays in a situation in which the bourgeoisie retains only the choice: 'despotism or anarchy. Naturally it voted for despotism.' Marx reports the anecdote from the Council of Constance, according to which Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly called out to the advocates of moral reform, 'Only the devil himself can still save the Catholic Church, and you demand angels.' Today, the demand for angels is no longer the order of the day. But how does the situation arise in which only authoritarian rule, the army, the sellout and betrayal of liberal promises and institutions can any longer save bourgeois society? Let us attempt briefly to summarize the general theme which Marx makes visible everywhere through the particular historical events.(1)

> The bourgeoisie had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons which it had forged against feudalism turned their points against itself, that all the means of education which it had produced rebelled against its own civilization, that all the gods which it had created had fallen away from it. It understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of progress attacked and menaced its <u>class rule</u> at its social foundation and its political summit simultaneously, and had therefore become '<u>socialistic</u>'.

This inversion is a manifestation of the conflict between the political form and the social content of the rule of the bourgeoisie. The political form of rule is the parliamentary republic, but in countries 'with a developed class structure' and modern conditions of production, the parliamentary republic is 'only the political form of revolution of bourgeois society and not its conservative form of life'.(2) The rights of liberty and equality which have been won against Feudalism and which have been defined and instituted in parliamentary debates, compromises and decisions, can no longer be contained within the framework of parliament and the limits imposed by it: they become generalized through extra-parliamentary class struggles and class conflicts. Parliamentary discussion itself, in its rational-liberal form (which has long become past history in the twentieth century) transformed every interest, every social institution 'into the general idea': the particular interest of the bourgeoisie came to power as the general interest of society. But once it has become official, the ideology presses toward its own realization. The debates in the parliament continue in the press, in the bars and 'salons', in 'public opinion'. The 'parliamentary regime leaves everything to the decision of the majorities: how shall the great majori-

ties outside parliament not want to decide? When you play the fiddle at the top of the state, what else is to be expected but that those down below dance?'(3) And 'those down below', they are the class enemy, or they are the non-privileged of the bourgeois class. Liberty and equality here mean something very different -- something which threatens constituted authority. The generalizing, the realization of liberty -- that is no longer the interest of the bourgeoisie, it is 'Socialism'. Where is the origin of this fateful dynamic, where can it be pinned down? The threatening ghost of the enemy appears to be everywhere, in one's own camp. The ruling class mobilizes, not only for the liquidation of the socialist movement but also of its own institutions, which have fallen into contradiction with the interest of property and of business: civil rights, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and universal suffrage are sacrifices to this interest, so that the bourgeoisie 'might then be able to pursue its private affairs with full confidence in the protection of a strong and unrestricted government. It declared unequivocally that it longed to get rid of its own political rule in order to get rid of the troubles and dangers of ruling.'(4) The Executive becomes an independent power.

But as such a power, it needs legitimacy. With its secularization of liberty and equality, bourgeois democracy endangers the abstract, transcendant 'inner' character of ideology and thereby, the consolation in the essential difference between ideology and reality -- inner freedom and equality strives toward externalization. In its rise the bourgeoisie mobilized the masses; since then it has repeatedly betrayed and suppressed them. The evolving capitalist society must increasingly reckon with the masses, fit them into some condition of economic and political normalcy, teach them how to calculate and even (to a limited degree) how to rule. The authoritarian state requires the democratic mass base; the leader must be elected -- by the People, and he is elected. Universal suffrage, which is negated de facto and then de jure by the bourgeoisie, becomes the weapon of the authoritarian executive against the recalcitrant groups of the bourgeoisie. In the Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx gives the model analysis of the plebiscitary dictatorship. At that time it was the masses of small peasants who helped Louis Napoleon to power. Their historical role in the present is projected in Marx's analysis. The Bonapartists dictatorship cannot abolish the misery of the peasantry; the latter finds its 'natural ally and leader in the urban proletariat, whose task is the overthrow of the bourgeois order.'(5) And vice versa: in the despairing peasants, 'the proletarian revolution will obtain that chorus without which its solo song becomes a swan song in all peasant countries.'(6)

The obligation of the Marxian dialectic to the comprehended reality forbids dogmatic obligation: perhaps nowhere is the contrast of Marxian theory with contemporary Marxian ideology greater than in the perception of the 'abdication' of the proletariat in one of the 'most splendid years of industrial and commercial prosperity'. The abolition of universal suffrage excluded the worker 'from all participation in political power'. To the extent they were (7)

> letting themselves be led by the democrats in the face of such an event and forgetting the revolutionary interests of their class for momentary ease and comfort, they renounced the honour of being a conquering power, surrendered to their fate, proved that the defeat of June 1848 had put

them out of the fight for years and that the historical process would for the present again have to go on over their heads.

As early as 1850 Marx had turned against the minority of the London Central Committee who put a dogmatic interpretation in 'the place of a critical view', and an idealistic one in place of a materialistic: 'While we say to the workers, you have 15, 20, 50 years of civil war and national struggles to go through, not only in order to alter relations but in order to change yourselves and make yourselves capable of political rule, you say the contrary: We must immediately come to power...'(8)

The consciousness of defeat, even of despair, belongs to the truth of the theory and of its hope. This fracturing of thought - in the face of a fractured reality, a sign of its authenticity - determines the style of the 'Eighteenth Brumaire': against the will of he who wrote it, it has become a great work of literature. Language grasps reality in such a way that the horror of the event is staved off by irony. Before it no phrases, no cliches can stand -- not even those of socialism. To the extent that men sell and betray the idea of humanity, smash down or jail those who fight for it, the idea as such can no longer be expressed; scorn and satire is the real appearance of its reality. Its form appears both in the 'socialist synagogue', which the regime constructs in the Luxemburg Palace, and in the slaughter of the June days. Before the mixture of stupidity, greed, baseness and brutality of which politics is composed, language forbids seriousness. What happens is comical: every party is supported on the shoulders of the next, until this one lets them fall and supports itself in turn on the next. So it goes from Left to Right, from the proletarian party to the party of order.

> The party of Order hunches its shoulders, lets the bourgeois-republicans tumble and throws itself on the shoulders of armed force. It fancies it is still sitting on its shoulders when, one fine morning, it perceives that the shoulders have transformed themselves into bayonets. Each party strikes from behind at that pressing further and leans from in front on that pressing back. No wonder that in this ridiculous posture it loses its balance and, having made the inevitable grimaces, collapses with curious capers.(9)

That is comical, but the comedy itself is already the tragedy, in which everything is gambled away and sacrificed.
The totality is still nineteenth century: the liberal and pre-liberal past. The figure of the third Napoleon, still laughable for Marx, has long since given way to other, more horrible politicians: the class struggles have metamorphosed, and the ruling class has learned how to rule. The democratic system of parties has either been abolished or reduced to the unity which is necessary if the established institutions of society are not to be endangered. And the proletariat has decayed into the generality of the working masses of the great industrial nations, who bear and preserve the apparatus of production and domination. This apparatus forces the society together into an administered totality which mobilizes men and countries, in all their dimensions, against the enemy. Only under total administration, which can at any time transform the power of technology into that of the military, the highest productivity into final destruction, can this society reproduce itself on an expanded scale. For its enemy is not only without, it is also within, as its own potentiality: the satisfaction of the struggle for existence, the abolition of alienated labor. Marx did not foresee how quickly and how

closely capitalism would approach this potentiality, and how the forces which were supposed to explode it would become instruments of its rule.

At this stage, the contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production has become so broad and so obvious, that it can no longer be rationally mastered or stamped out. No technological, no ideological veil can any longer conceal it. It can only appear now as naked contradiction, as reason turned into unreason. Only a false consciousness, one which has become indifferent to the distinction between true and false, can any longer endure it. It finds its authentic expression in Orwellian language (which Orwell projected too optimistically into 1984). Slavery is spoken of as freedom, armed intervention as self-determination, torture and firebombs as 'conventional techniques', object as subject. In this language are fused politics and publicity, business and love for mankind, information and propaganda, good and bad, morality and its elimination. In what counter-tongue can Reason be articulated? What is played is no longer satire, and irony, via the severity of horror, becomes cynicism. The Eighteenth Brumaire begins with the recollection of Hegel: Marx's analysis was still indebted to 'Reason in History'. From the latter and from its existential manifestations, criticism drew its power.

But the Reason to which Marx was indebted was also, in its day, not 'there': it appeared only in its negativity and in the struggles of those who revolted against the existent, who protested and who were beaten. With them, Marx's thought has kept faith -- in the face of defeat and against the dominating Reason. And in the same way Marx preserved hope for the hopeless in the defeat of the Paris Commune of 1871. If today unreason has itself become Reason, it is so only as the Reason of domination. Thus it remains the Reason of exploitation and repression -- even when the ruled cooperate with it. And everywhere there are still those who protest, who rebel, who fight. Even in the society of abundance they are there: the young -- those who have not yet forgotten how to see and hear and think, who have not yet abdicated; and those who are still being sacrificed to abundance and who are painfully learning how to see, hear and think. For them is the Eighteenth Brumaire written, for them it is not obsolete.

footnotes

1. Marx-Engels Selected Works, vol. 1, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, p. 260.
2. Ibid, p. 232.
3. Ibid, p. 261.
4. Ibid, p. 290.
6. Ibid, p. 308.
7. Ibid, p. 308.
8. Enthullungen uber den Kommunistenprozess zu Koln, edited by Franz Mehring, Berlin, 1914, p. 52.
9. Marx-Engels, op. cit, p. 244.

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* RECENT EUROPEAN THEORY AND THE AMERICAN LEFT, Perry Anderson (New Left Review),John Cammett (John Jay College), Martin Nicolaus, Robert Rosen (Columbia)
* MARCUSE: HIS WORKS AND INFLUENCE, Ronald Aronson (Wayne State Univ.), Paul Breines (Univ.of Wis.),Martin Jay (Harvard), Andrew Levine (Columbia),Stanley Aronowitz
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* TOWARD A RE-DEFINITION OF AMERICAN LITERATURE, Sol Yurick (The Bag), Jonah Raskin and others
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* AMERICAN ETHNICITY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS, Morris Schappes (Jewish Currents), Alice Harris (Hofstra)
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An Essay on Liberation

William Leiss

Among the most widespread reactions to One-Dimensional Man has been a feeling of scorn for Marcuse's emphasis on the integrating power of late capitalism and a rejection of his alleged 'pessimism' about the chances of opposition. Very few, if any, attacks on One-Dimensional Man even tried to come to grips with its strongest element, namely the analysis of the ideational forms (in traditional terms, the so-called 'superstructure') of modern bourgeois society. The implicit premise of that analysis, which has been one of the guiding ideas of the work of the 'Frankfurt School' (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, et al), is that the dominant ideational or cultural forms pervade the whole of society - including the consciousness of the proletariat - and that in a real sense they are part of the productive process itself. Instead of addressing themselves to this argument, most critics were content to belabor the obvious omission of the book -- the lack of connection of its theme with a study of the political economy of modern society - without offering in return much more than ritualistic invocations of the established radical dogmas. (A notable exception is the essay by Paul Mattick in The Critical Spirit.)

But the criticism is based upon a misconceived notion of the function of social theory. Radical social theory is not designed as a hymn to console the faithful with dreams of inevitable victory during the period when the historical machine grinds laboriously toward its goal. It should not pretend either to encourage or to discourage specific modes of practice, but rather should reflect on them and examine critically their potentialities. Das Kapital did not call into being the industrial proletariat, nor could it (had it wished) have legislated the proletariat out of existence. Marx's theory presupposed the historical fact of the proletariat as already conscious of itself (to some extent) in the form of a social class. The value of his theory consisted in its attempt to show what elements of the practice of the proletariat transcended the immediate demands of the workers and provided the foundations for an overcoming of the system of exploitation itself.

For the professional socialists, however, theory serves a different purpose: primarily, it is the manifestation of loyalty to the common cause. In extreme form it becomes a perverted form of philosophical idealism, for it seems to suggest that adherence to correct formulas could prevent historical reality from deviating from its 'natural' course. The revolutionary struggle becomes identified with the maintenance of the 'correct line'. Thus for some of today's professional socialists Marcuse's heretical position is evidence not of his theoretical mistakes but rather of his CIA affiliations.

Emphasis on the critical function of theory helps to avoid such excesses. The liberation movement needs a continual reassessment of its current situation and prospects, based upon a willingness to take into account all of the novel practices through which the ruling groups exercise their hegemony. Radical theory argues that the contradictions of capitalism propel it toward ever higher planes of irrationality; and that socialism is a real possibility. But an intelligent radical theory also argues that, as capitalism develops, the specific conditions under which a socialist transformation of society might occur

change dramatically. In the liberal phase of capitalist society, characterized by a weak state and a wide dispersion of economic power, the mere unification of a militant working class on an international scale in Europe might have been a sufficient condition for revolution, and this goal represented a rational objective for socialist organization. The failure to attain it then, and the radically different face of capitalist society in its monopoly phase, demand fresh theoretical and practical efforts.

In the different phases of capitalist society the basic form of social reproduction (the commodity process) persists, along with the progressively more intensive exploitation of human labor accomplished through the maintenance of class relations and continuing technological progress. But the specific content of the social dynamic undergoes considerable transformation, and this can be seen both in the organization of the economy and in the makeup of class consciousness; the painstaking analysis of this content is the ongoing task of radical social theory. The Essay on Liberation is consistent with Marcuse's earlier work in concentrating on the problematic of a radical consciousness, and the Essay does not even mention, for example, Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital, which was published in 1966. Marcuse has never totally ignored the subject of contradictions in the productive process itself. The two poles - the one analyzed by Baran and Sweezy, the other by Marcuse - have never been joined, and this remains one of the necessities for radical theory.

An Essay on Liberation considers the nature and prospects of some of the oppositional forces that have emerged in the United States and Western Europe in the past few years. The emergence of new oppositional elements does not contradict the basic these of One-Dimensional Man, and in fact to some degree confirms them: A qualitatively different kind of challenge (led by students, blacks, and intellectuals) has begun to break through the stultifying embrace in which the system had contained the traditional working class opposition. What the Essay analyzes - all too briefly - under the heading of 'the new sensibility' is the challenge directed at the present possibilities for shaping the social and the natural environment in accordance with the discipline of the 'rational imagination'.

This activity of the opposition is not merely opposition, but also the affirmation of a qualitatively different mode of social arrangements. It affirms, as against the system's postponement of real leisure and gratification, as against the system's perpetuation of inhuman labor in the service of endlessly expanding false needs, the right to enjoy a rational set of material necessities on the basis of the minimum labor possible in the light of present technological capabilities. The tyranny of false needs and unnecessary labor must be overthrown in the individuals, as a precondition for liberation. The Essay amplifies the apparently paradoxical thesis that was stated in One-Dimensional Man, namely, that individuals must be free for their liberation, i.e. that a decisive break with the 'continuum of domination' must occur in the course of the struggle against the present forms of domination. Technological capabilities have already made possible the abolition of material scarcity, and thus the opposition to the manipulation of needs is critical: For the attempt to shape the innermost drives of the individual threatens to preserve the continuum of domination just as the possibility for the real gratification of basic needs has emerged.

Unfortunately, instead of developing this line of thought, the Essay confines itself to rather oversimplified pronouncements on the subject of technologi-

cal progress. It is possible to see science and technology as 'the great vehicles of liberation'; in the modern period, however, they have become also the great vehicles of domination. One should not underestimate the immensity of the effort which will be required in order to relieve modern technology of the burden of its attachment to the structure of domination. It is not at all clear at present, for instance, just what aspects of twentieth-century technological development - not the extensions of previous trends, but the significant innovations - possess an enduring value, and what aspects represent the needs of a hierarchical, bureaucratically-administered organization of production. Nor is it clear yet what will be the true cost, expressed in terms of the permanent damage to the natural environment, of the attained level of technological development.

ABOLITIONISM

Staughton Lynd

Aileen S. Kraditor, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: GARRISON AND HIS CRITICS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS, 1834-1850. New York, Pantheon, 1969. $7.95.

Here is both an exciting new book on abolitionism and an exicting new way of looking at a past social movement. Means and Ends in American Abolitionism is not quite an organizer's manual. We do not learn what steps an itinerant organizer took in setting up new local abolitionist groups. The day-to-day relationship between abolitionists and other radical organizers in particular communities is not explored. What the book deals with is the thinking behind the organizer's work: exactly how one expected emancipation to come about and in what way this affected strategy and tactics, why one did or did not include issues other than slavery in one's agitation, whether or not one pushed one's program through conventional political channels (and if so, how).

To ask these questions requires scholar and reader to perceive abolitionism as an unfolding process the direction of which depended significantly on decisions which might have been made differently. This is how a radical organizer perceives his or her work in the present. By ordering the experience of the past in the same way that we order our contemporary experience, Miss Kraditor begins to make history relevant to the most anti-theoretical activist. As she says, when enough studies like her own have been done 'current movements for change will be able to benefit by the lessons of their predecessors' successes and failures.' To my mind the most important achievement of Means And Ends is this methodological breakthrough.

My impressions concerning Miss Kraditor's substantive conclusions are more complex. To begin with, she delimits her subject somewhat oddly. 'The petition campaign, the struggle against the annexation of Texas, and the agitation against recapture of fugitive slaves' were omitted, because other students had dealt with them extensively; yet these were the three

principal foci of antislavery political action in the late 1830s, the 1840s, and the 1850s, respectively. The study ends in 1850, although it was precisely in the 1850s that an alternative strategy to Garrison's (not just 'the question of violence') was fully developed, which, in the end, triumphed. Finally, although Miss Kraditor begins by stating the need for 'analyses of the philosophical differences behind... tactical differences' and 'studies of the efficacy in different historical situations of' these tactics, she then says that her book attempts only the first of these tasks. The net result of these self-imposed restrictions is a little like a history of the New Left which omitted the campaign for voter registration in the South (because treated elsewhere), ended in 1965 (before the 'question of violence' became paramount), and made no assessment of the efficacy of nonviolent direct action.

It follows that a strength of Miss Kraditor's book, the insistence that Garrisonian abolitionism had a complex and on-the-whole-consistent rationale for its strategic perspective, also becomes a source of weakness. To continue the previous analogy, the problem can be compared to writing an intellectual history of SDS on the basis of New Left Notes. Any participant knows that the successive new directions taken by SDS were fundamentally responses to new political experiences. Analysis of the attack on corporate liberalism, or the turn toward mobile tactics, would be artifical unless placed in the context of the national state's decision-making about Vietnam, the changing manpower requirements of the Vietnam war, the enunciation of Black Power, the publication of Revolution in the Revolution?, and so on. Abstracted from these events external to the debate, an account of the evolving debate within SDS would be prone to scholasticism, to exegesis which found causal connections between coincidences, to a general tendency to take rhetoric at face value. Despite its brilliance and massive documentation, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism appears to me weakest in precisely these ways. A procedure which would have been perfectly satisfactory in sketching a movement's underlying political philosophy (in expounding, for instance, the concept of 'participatory democracy') breaks down in explicating nuances of strategy and tactics.

Let me give four examples.

1. Miss Kraditor argues that a main reason for Garrison's opposition to political action was his belief that

> if antislavery sentiment became popular without being accompanied by real progress on the race question, the reflection of that sentiment in congressional action would create a frightful danger to the nation. Abolition of slavery could conceivably be forced eventually by a white North aroused to protect its own interests, but that very abolition would make the achievement of the abolitionists' other goal more difficult. It could be argued (she adds) that that is precisely what happened.

Very little evidence is offered for this interpretation. Many other arguments against politics and political action are detailed in chapters on the Garrisonian view of these matters, but the point just quoted is certainly not prominent among them. Further, how are we to reconcile this exegesis of pre-1850 Garrisonian abolitionism with Garrison's later acceptance of war (not just political action) as an instrument of emancipation, and especially with his

tendency to believe that the right to vote would guarantee the social equality of the Southern freedman during Reconstruction?

2. Miss Kraditor seems to regard Garrison's advocacy of Northern withdrawal from the Union, especially in the years 1842-1846, as an heuristic device.

> The call for disunion was precisely analogous to the call for immediate emancipation and the call for Christlike perfection; it was the statement of a moral imperative, a reveille to the conscience; and it was made by an agitator who knew that those who heard the call were in no condition immediately to translate it into practice.

Therefore, Miss Kraditor explicates Garrison, 'a frank agitation of the disunionist slogan was justified as the only way to prevent the otherwise inevitable breakup of the Union...'

My own impression is that the withdrawal of Northern states from the Union was a seriously-intended political proposal in the years immediately preceding Texas annexation, which for a time attracted surprisingly wide support, especially in Massachusetts.

3. Miss Kraditor finds consistency in Garrison's resistance to the Liberty Party of 1840 and 1844, and qualified support of the Free Soil Party of 1848. This is perhaps the subtlest and most densely-documented portion of the book, and a reader, to do Miss Kraditor justice, should examine her own account. If I understand her correctly, she contends that Garrison opposed the Liberty Party in part because it falsely asserted that the national government had power under the Constitution to abolish slavery in the states; whereas he supported the Free Soil Party in part because it, correctly recognizing that the Constitution protected slavery where it already existed, merely opposed slavery's extension. If indeed this was Garrison's point of view, it reminds me of nothing so much as the position current among members of the Progressive Labor Party: that SDS should remain a student movement, because what is needed is a worker-student alliance, and were SDS to reach out to workers, it would do it in the wrong way. Miss Kraditor underpins her analysis with the persuasive observation that Garrison sensed that

> ad hoc alliances for partial ends may under certain circumstances strengthen the hegemony of the enemy by legitimizing the institutions, and the ideological justifications of those institutions, by means of which the enemy exercises his hegemony.

But it seems to me that for all practical purposes this caution applied as much to the Free Soil (or, later, Republican) Party as to the Liberty Party. Like Howard Zinn before her, Miss Kraditor shows how Garrisonians sought to bring about political change indirectly, as a 'vanguard' agitating a 'constituency' which in turn would bring pressure through conventional political means. Garrison's tactical turnabout with respect to particular political parties, however, would appear to be most simply explained by (a) the failure of the disunionist stretegy, discussed above; and (b) the fact, noted by Miss Kraditor very much in passing, that the ideological affinities of the Liberty Party were Democratic, while those of the Free Soil Party, coinciding with those of Garrison and most abolitionists, were Whig.

4. Miss Kraditor rebuts the usual contention that Garrison's multi-issue radicalism forced the 1840 split in the abolitionist movement, insisting, first, that anti-Garrisonian abolitionists also espoused other issues which, however, were not radical, and second, that Garrison did not press his beliefs in nonresistance, women's rights, and church reform in abolitionist meetings, but only in The Liberator.

With the first of these points I am deeply sympathetic. In her Introduction, Epilogue, and in fact throughout, Miss Kraditor argues that the

> radical and reformist wings of the abolitionist movement did not simply occupy different locations on a single continuum. It would be misleading to portray them as two groups, one more and the other less extreme, but fundamentally heading in the same direction. On certain issues they did appear in that way. But in a deeper sense their differences were not quantitative but qualitative; to one faction abolition would preserve and strengthen the social order, and to the other it would be a step toward the subversion of that social order and its replacement by a new one.

Hence it was not multi-issue politics but multi-issue radicalism which made Garrison offensive to a Birney or a Tappan.

As to the second point, is it not a little formalistic? Both Garrison and The Liberator were indistinguishable from abolitionism in the public mind. In seeking to purge him and his views, Garrison's opponents reacted realistically, however much their realism may offend.

One other thing, which I have left to the last because I feel personally involved in it, and realize I may not see clearly. Seeking to defend the abolitionists' condemnation of slavery as sinful, Miss Kraditor writes: 'It may be argued that slavery was objectively a moral problem precisely because it was anomalous and anachronistic and involved basic questions of men's relations with one another.' To this observation is added the footnote: 'Acceptance of the objective validity of the moral aspect of slavery is gaining increasing currency among historians.' What do these words mean? Consider first 'anomalous' and 'anachronistic'. Does Miss Kraditor agree with Eugene Genovese that slavery is wrong only when historically anachronistic, whatever that means? Then, what is the difference between 'objectively moral' and the presumable antonym 'subjectively moral'? Miss Kraditor edges sidewise toward this question at another point, when she says that transcendentalists were not abolitionists because they believed in an 'immanent God', whereas abolitionists,

> like secular radicals and reformers of other times, could agree on a common task because they accepted a source of value and obligation that was objective -- external to themselves and valid for all men, even though not all men recognized it. For the abolitionists that source was the God who commanded men to love their neighbors as themselves...

Yet Miss Kraditor, I take it, does not believe in any sort of God, immanent or transcendent. Does she mean that something can be 'objective' which is not true? If not, does she mean that what the abolitionists believed to be true because it was the will of God is actually true, but for other reasons? If so, what other reasons?

Miss Kraditor apparently believes that a source of value and obligation can be valid for all men only if external to man. This leads her to prefer to intuition not only God, but even that well-known source of objective truth, the Bible. Thus she says of Quakers: 'The Quakers, in believing the Bible an inspired (but not the only) source of revelation, had a criterion, which the transcendentalists did not, for choosing between the abolitionist's and the slaveholder's intuitions.' In contrast, I hold that both the Quakers and Garrison believed that the 'intuition of the spirit' (to use a phrase of Garrison's which Miss Kraditor quotes) was a superior source of authority to scripture, and should prevail when the two were in conflict. They believed that the uniformity of man's nature would in the long run lead men to perceive the same moral truths to be self-evident; that because slavery was inconsistent with the universally intuited truth of equality, slaveholders could not, in the long run, make a convincing moral defense of their peculiar institution; and that the sense of human solidarity which Miss Kraditor awkwardly terms 'the empathy theme' arises, in the long run, not from agitation but from human nature itself.

It may be that the most applicable tactical lesson to be drawn from Garrisonian abolitionism concerns this apparently esoteric question of the source of moral truth. In my opinion the New Left (the pre-1965 New Left) shared with Garrisonian abolitionism the conviction that moral truth could not be derived from external authority - not from any text, not from alleged laws of historical development - but was nonetheless objective because inherent in man.

In Revolt

Paul Breines

A. Quattrocchi & T. Nairn, The Beginning of the End: France, May 1968. London, 1968.

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H. Lefebvre, The Explosion: Marxism and the French Upheaval. A. Ehrenfeld, tr. New York & London, 1969.

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H. M. Enzensberger, 'The Industrialization of the Mind,' Partisan Review (Winter 1969), 100-111.

Explicit theories of the new left-student-youth revolt have begun to emerge only lately. New left critiques of contemporary capitalism have been in the process of development for some time, even as they continue to lag behind the Movement's actions. Yet only with the recent internationalization of the student movement, with last year's upheaval in France, and with the past and

present spring offensive on U.S. campuses, has the new left begun to raise its actual situation to the level of conscious theory. (The reverse side of this development is the virtual identification of the terms 'student' and 'revolutionary' in the mass-media.) The books and essay cited here are tentative efforts - in English or in English translation - to deal with a nexus of questions: What is the new left? Why and how has it arisen in the present period? Is it, in theory, a global determinate negation of advanced industrial capitalism or is it a new catalyst whose task is to detonate a still revolutionary industrial proletariat?

H. Marcuse's Essay on Liberation will be examined elsewhere in these pages. T. Nairn's analysis is the real mind-bender of the present group. He argues that the student revolt is the students' self-definition as workers in the context of a late stage of capitalism in which intellectual production and the 'mental surplus' are replacing material production and surplus as the driving force of the economy. This structural shift generates 'new contradictions', the crucial one being the 'natural' incompatibility of mind and the mental surplus with their private appropriation by capitalism. The militants of Paris May, says Nairn, were walking paragraphs from Marx's 1844 Manuscripts and his Grundrisse. Any summary of his analysis is inevitably a banalization. Enzensberger's essay delineates some of the specific tensions between capitalism's need to 'industrialize the mind' and the mind's need to go beyond capitalist industrialization. Lefebvre's complex little book shares the preceding assumptions regarding the social and dialectical character of mind; he grounds the student revolt in the struggle against contemporary capitalism's effort to 'functionalize creativity'. He also attempts to elaborate the theoretical implications of 'contestation' and 'self-management' as they were momentarily actualized in May '68. With Nairn, Lefebvre locates capitalism's central contradictions within the 'superstructure'. The essays by Cockburn and Stedman-Jones in the Student Power anthology build on the above perspectives but, stressing the proletariat as the sole revolutionary class, insist on the catalytical role of the student revolt. The anthology as a whole advocates the centrality of the radical critique of capitalist ideology and culture as a prerequisite to a social movement. It includes P. Anderson's magisterial critique of British culture, Carl Davidson's 'Multiversity' pamphlet, a manifesto by Nanterre sociology students, a survey of the international student movement and several other solid pieces. The Ehrenreichs' book is useful for anyone who knows little of the European movement. Their contention that the revolt is largely a militant defense of the humane values of Western Civilization against the system that long ago discarded them in practice is neither inaccurate nor sufficient. Fortune's Youth in Turmoil is a crucial document. For anyone with doubts, it demonstrates the existence of 'sophisticated corporate capitalists' (who fear, among other things, a popular right-wing movement). It shows that corporate capitalism perceives the prospect of a real crisis resulting from the student revolt. It proposes the possibilities of cashing in on 'youth culture'. Most important, the book suggests the existence of a crisis in the ruling ideology. Its plea that 'we heed the cry of these young adults' in order to make the 'democratic capitalist order... attractive to the young' is more than just soft-sell counter-revolution. The editors implicitly admit that the reservoir of values and ideals once generated by the commodity-business system has dried up, and that the only remaining source lies outside it: in the new left revolt and culture themselves.

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
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