RADICAL AMERICA

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Several years after the disintegration of the American New Left, there remains no significant political interpretation of the appearance, disappearance, and final meaning of the political movement which so thoroughly shaped our understanding of the world and of ourselves. This vacuum may be attributed in part to a sense of despair, for nearly all of us have experienced a sense of loss that is still not overcome; in part to the reality that only the arrival of the next stage of revolutionary development will allow a fuller illumination of our past. Still, as we gain more distance from the New Left we all begin to make provisional analyses, and we are joined by the practice of those individuals and groups, responding to tendencies in the larger society, who have already begun to regather themselves in preparation for the hard work ahead. (1)

The development of a New Left may be termed, in Gramsci’s phrase, a “revolt against Capital”, against Nineteenth Century Marxism extended long past its historic limits. For Marx, the essential development of a class society and class struggle lay around the formation of an industrial proletariat, its enslavement to capital in increasingly sophisticated forms, its socialization through the experience of production, and its self-development to the point of expropriating the expropriators. Although he clearly recognized the origins of “primitive accumulation” in the special degradation inflicted on those outside the factory proper, Marx narrowed the focus of his writings about the subject of the revolutionary process to the industrial worker. This
was indeed historically understandable: The swift movement of the proletariat from the stage of its appearance as an anti-bourgeois force in Paris of 1848 to the appearance of the Commune in 1871 promised a revolutionary conclusion in the next phase.

In elaborating a world-wide transformation, however, Capital created a social system whose contours neither its defenders nor its sharpest critics could fully grasp. The invasion and transformation of the societies later to be known as the "Third World" we can term today the externalization of Capital. The transformation of the family with its manifold implications, in turn, we call Capital's internalization. These terms are not mere facts of oppression, but symbols for social relationships which have provided the twin bases for modern industrial society and which, since World War II, have imparted an entirely new character to world-wide class struggle.

With the retrospect of the 1970s, we can understand far better than the most prescient revolutionary of a century ago the full impact of the social movements in the "underdeveloped" sectors of the world. Capital came into the world, in Marx's words, "dripping with blood", and has maintained its rule through an accelerating debauchery of the world's human and natural resources. Marxists have dimly, and for the most part one-sidedly, recognized an aspect of this process in the corruption of some sections of the Western working class. (2) But they have remained blind to the larger dynamic that this externalization had set into motion, a pulsation of rebellion which hinted not merely at the overthrow of Imperialism, but at the rejection of Imperialism as a cultural entity from within and without the Imperial nations. Some indication of the importance of this rejection and its implications for the revolutionary process are expressed within the United States, where the historical inclusion of a "Third World" people has brought a new dynamic to an increasingly stagnant and bankrupt culture: a reshaping of the arts, the sensibilities, and the entire self-understanding of a new generation. In an epochal view of all society's future, we can see still further the integration of a world community which will unquestionably
demonstrate how much the West has to learn about itself and about human existence generally. (3)

Marx did not fail to recognize that the specific task of the proletarian revolution was to remove the mantle of slavery from the woman in her role of wife and mother. Indeed, he went so far in the 1844 Manuscripts as to measure the progress of humanity by the relations between the sexes. Yet neither Marx nor the Marxists of the Nineteenth Century could grasp the dialectical development then going on within the family, which would at once deprive women of the clear status of their pre-industrial role in production and thereby free their most advanced representatives for penetrating insights into the whole society’s internal development. The advanced social nature of American society in particular evoked a political critique: the Communist manifesto of 1848 declaring the future of the proletariat was mirrored by the Seneca Falls, New York convention of the same year declaring the specific needs of woman for the ongoing evolution of society to its potential. In our own century, the convergence of woman’s increasing social strength (marked by the interrupted but developing role in the labor force) and the step-by-step disintegration of the family has produced a glaring contradiction between actual power and accepted standards. With the decay of the older values, an accumulating weight falls upon all women, and potentials for understanding and activity denied since the dawn of industrialization are irrevocably released. (4)

The elaboration of Capitalism vastly beyond Marx’s expectations depended finally on the extension of its exploitation over all the world’s inhabitants at increasing levels, and the entrenchment of its power through the smallest of social units within the metropolis. Neither externalization nor internalization was based on mere brute force, but both were also profoundly cultural, pulverizing the old customs, throwing the victims off guard with new mores of “progress” backed by the full weight of structural social development. At a point at which the Western proletariat seem successfully pacified, the forces most thoroughly affected become increasing sources of instability—as even the Marxists grudgingly recognize. (5) At the culminating period of class society, the reversal of initiatives from the
oppressor to the oppressed spreads the attack on Capital outside the factory limits. (6) And while the breakdown of Imperialist society at every level makes evident its growing inability to meet the most obvious human needs and desires, the increasingly thoroughgoing response foreshadows the birth of the new society within the womb of the old.

The New Left naively but nonetheless genuinely expressed this new society in its self-understanding and its expectations of revolutionary possibility. Each historic phase of the modern US Left provides a glimpse of the emerging order, even as the radical movement succumbs to the pressures of Capitalism. The movements of the pre-World War I years offered an evangelical vision of Socialism as a real social possibility, and a conception of workers' control on a plant-by-plant basis. The movements of the 1930s added a social conception of the workings of modern society immeasurably richer, filling in earlier abstractions with a concrete depiction of the mass worker in organized motion. The intervening period has contributed a black challenge to the entire Civilization which has not yet abated. And the New Left brought a sense of its own personal transformation. The Women's Movement, above all, clarified that the revolutionary process depended on the success of a pre-revolutionary "cultural" evolution. In this way, the New Left signified that the revolutionary process was continuous, and the insurrectionary act only the defense and extension of the New Society against its enemies. Previously, the IWW and anarchist groups had expressed similar beliefs. But the New Left rendered these visions full by adding a cultural dimension, and no longer Utopian by making them the implicit principles through which mass politics was conducted.

Through such understanding, the New Left discovered for itself seemingly elementary principles of social participation which were, however, a sweeping innovation for the historic Left. In rejecting the mere economic abundance offered much of American society by advanced Capitalism, it clearly insisted that the need for revolution did not rest on the promise of a "higher standard of living" espoused from Washington to Moscow. Revolution was something more than and different from adequate representation in a
Socialism of prosperity; it was no less than full participation in governing by every member of the community as the essential element in the society’s reconstruction. Marx had stressed that the liberation of the working class was a task for the working class itself; Lenin, in the midst of rebuilding Russian society, insisted that all elements of the population had to take a continuous role in self-government. Yet even in the most advanced of societies, the American Left remained blinded by its own theories until a New Left proclaimed total participation as its goal.

Finally, the circumstances of the New Left forced it against the State in a manner unprecedented for the non-anarchist American Left. Socialists, Communists, and nearly the entirety of the working-class movement had historically denounced only the control of the State by Capital. The militants of the 1960s were forced by their own experience to go further: As they recognized, the agency for murderous aggression abroad and suppression at home was the bureaucracy itself. Almost a century after the Paris Commune, Marx’s lesson that the state had to be smashed was extended decisively with the widespread conception that its replacement would no longer be the “State” but something different. In 1848 the Parisian proletariat called for the “Social Republic” because it could not formulate a conception of Socialism. By the 1960s, a distinctive Left representing masses of youth called first for Participatory Democracy, and later for Cultural Revolution, because its conception had bypassed the “Socialism” corrupted by reformism and Stalinism and yet could not find a means of expressing Communism, the next great leap for human society.

The essence of the New Left lay in its practical grasp of those particular tendencies of the 1960s which marked the major arenas for social action. Everything in its experience prepared it to understand and act on the cracks in the hegemony of world Imperialism and of patriarchal values within the family at home. But the New Left could not comprehend the class mediations for the specific revolutionary process precisely because of its fidelity to the great social issues of the times. No social movement ever better expressed the principle of Negative Unity, the pro-
gressive transformation of a force through continual shedding of outward forms, than the New Left. Continually, the New Left reshaped itself around attacks on racism, imperialism, and sexism, and thereby found itself. Unlike its European counterparts, however, it had no moorings in the historical development of class forces that it could understand, and to that extent its self-negations were more abrupt, more violent, and finally more self-destructive. The American New Left more than any others was free to soar from above and beyond the constricted arenas of its predecessors, but unable to plot a final course. Its limit was its class origins, and beyond those it could not pass: It contained the only true perception of society among the Left, but also a fully untenable stance for the classwide struggle to follow.

There was a double irony in the New Left collapse of 1969-70: first, in that below the surface of political efforts there was in fact a reshaping of the working class; and second, in that despite its own contrary consciousness, the New Left was itself contributing to that process. Like the assimilation and the changes of production of the 1920s which eroded the bases of earlier working-class radicalism, the shifts inside and outside the factory in the prosperous period following World War II rendered the Old Left understanding archaic for the 1950s-1960s. The traces of classwide self-consciousness apparent in the earlier days of the CIO dissipated into a family- and group-based loyalty. When the New Left took shape, these tendencies toward class fragmentation were at a kind of high tide, turning one sector of the work force against another and rendering any unified response to deteriorating conditions impossible.

By the early 1970s there were distinct signs that this phase of divisiveness had passed. Two interlinked trends toward a positive reshaping of the class could be detected: a structural reunification which, for instance, brought the highest percentage of women workers in American history into the labor force, blacks into key sectors of heavy industry, and white-collar workers into a consciousness of their proletarianization that encouraged their unity with blue-collar sectors; and an ideological reunification, based in
part on the very cultural homogenization that the post-World War II period had brought to a climax. Workers and especially the young enjoyed a vaster universality than had any working class in American conditions. The issues which the New Left had built itself around, and had popularized, made a decisive contribution to the ideological reshaping: the legitimization of protest against the Vietnam War, cultural opposition to the existing norms, and a sense of self-determination which helped inspire unwillingness to accept the conditions of wage slavery. Other contributions of the New Left (most specifically, the effect of the Women’s Movement on the actions and attitudes of female workers) are only now beginning to be felt.

The supreme virtue of the New Left was its distorted but nonetheless genuine recognition of a broader social struggle than previous Lefts had been able to understand. Around this breadth the New Left continually reorganized itself, in the process opening the path for fuller revolutionary theory and practice. Beyond this achievement, the New Left did not and could not succeed. But its understanding and activities as well as its failures have altered the course of revolutionary politics permanently.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The most sensible contribution to the retrospective discussion thus far has been Todd Gitlin: "Towards a New Left", Partisan Review, XXXIX (Summer 1972).

(2) We have scarcely begun that necessary exploration proposed by Aime Cesaire: "First, we must show how colonization works to decivilize the colonizer, to brutalize him in the true sense of the word, to degrade him, to awaken in him buried instincts, to covetousness, violence, race hatred, and moral relativism; and we must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam and in France they accept the fact, each time a little girl is raped and in France they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead weight, a universal regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a center of infection begins to spread; and that at the end of all these treaties that have been violated, all these lies that have been propagated, all these punitive ex-
peditions that have been tolerated, all these prisoners who have been tied up and 'interrogated', all these patriots who have been tortured, at the end of all the racial pride that has been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been instilled into the veins of Eu-

erope and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds towards savagery” — a savagery which Cesairez interprets as Amer-


(3) This point is admirably expressed in the poetry of Cesairez, which expresses both the dilemma of the West (“Hear the white world/horribly fatigued by its immense effort/its rebellious articulations crack under hard/stars/

its inflexibilities of blue steel pierce the mystic/flesh/hear its treacherous victories trumpeting its/defeats/hear with
grandiose alibis the pitiful stumbling/Mercy for our omnisci-
cient and naive conquerors.”) and its overcoming:

And we are standing now, my country and I,

hair in the wind, my little hand

now in its enormous fist, the force is not in us, but

above us, in a voice which pierces the night and

the audience like the sting of an apocalyptic hor-

net.

And the voice declares that for centuries Europe

has stuffed us with lies and bloats us with pesti-

lence,

for it is not true that the work of man is finished

that we have nothing to do in the world

that we are parasites in the world

that we have only to accept the way of the world

but the work of man has only begun

and it remains for man to conquer all prohibi-
tions immobilized in the corners of her fervor

and no race has a monopoly of beauty, intelli-
gence, strength

(4) So clearly has this permeated popular consciousness that a notable woman journalist can speak of "a breakthrough in human sexuality ... (which) is going to occur because women will start taking charge of their own sex lives." Barbara Seaman: "The Liberated Orgasm", in MS, August 1972. Even granted the loose usage of the term "revolution" by such magazines as MS, there is a serious expectation that we are on the threshold of a change in relations which will transform the most intimate aspects of human life, and thereby (whether MS considers this point or not) the entirety of human life.

(5) Limiting ourselves to the US, we can say without hesitation that the recognition of specific sources of revolutionary energy autonomous of the male proletariat has never been taken up by choice. Women forced their presence and power on the Socialist Party, as the Third International forced some understanding of the "Black Question" on the American Communists. Only with the apparent quiescence of the working-class movement as a whole after the mid-'40s could these matters be taken up fully; and only with a restored sense of a class movement could their full relation with class struggle be understood.

(6) Thus, while for G. Baldi (RA, May-June 1972) "Capital's plan is outgrowing the factory" to the point of the "subordination of all social relations to production relations", the opposite would appear equally true: that factory labor is increasingly affected directly and politically by the social relations of the whole society.

(7) In the absence of a successful revolution, movements from the working class, the New Left, and so forth inevitably recapitulate in one form or another the values of Capitalist society within their own organizations, signifying their practical demise. This occurrence should no more blind us to the specific dynamics and unique contributions of various movements than should the outright machismo of some black movements or the anti-class attitudes of some sectors of Feminism in the late 1960s.
Beyond Reminiscence:  
The New Left in History

By James O’Brien

Is there, 10 years after the Port Huron Statement, a New Left in the United States? Understandably, the term is seldom heard these days, since the adjective “New” has meaning only for those people whose political awareness dates from the 1950s or earlier. Even aside from the question of labels, it is fairly clear that the social movement we used to call the New Left is no longer an entity. Only the most optimistic will choose to believe that it is a slumbering giant, ready to spring into action once again when conditions are ripe and the appropriate slogans are invoked. The weakness and the ritualistic nature of campus response to the stepped-up bombing of Indochina in the spring of 1972 is enough to refute such a euphoric belief.

But at the present time the number of people who take an overly optimistic view of the New Left is clearly much smaller than the number whose attitude is one of extreme pessimism and collective self-denigration. In this latter view, the New Left is a social movement that has now been decisively defeated, with only a few survivors who repeat “Power to the People” and carry on their work, unaware (like the Japanese “stragglers” on remote Pacific islands after World War II) that their side has lost. Revolution in the US, according to this view, is either an utter impossibility or something that can be achieved only by backing up and trying a completely different route from the one taken by the New Left.

What has to be understood, in the midst of the despair that has so commonly set in, is that the New Left was a stage in the development of a revolutionary movement in the US. It was created by a particular generation of college-
based young people who, for reasons that will be explored here, adopted a distinctive Left-wing perspective on the society. As a coherent movement, the New Left may be said to have existed only from 1965 to 1969. It was not (and could not have been) a timeless entity keeping its cohesiveness and momentum regardless of changing circumstances. Its disintegration after 1969 was, for the most part, a natural result of its own internal weaknesses. If we see the New Left in this light, we can avoid the mistake of judging it by standards that are impossibly high. The New Left, after all, helped to advance immeasurably the conception of why life under capitalism is oppressive and the conception of what revolution might mean in an advanced industrial society. As a result of the experiences and “failures” of the New Left, the American socialist heritage is far richer today than it would otherwise have been. To understand the New Left involves two primary tasks: The first is to probe its social origins and its built-in limitations as a force for change, while the second—no less important—is to appreciate the way in which the New Left, despite its limitations, managed to uncover significant truths about modern capitalist society and the possibility of transforming it. (1)

The Interwar World and the Roots of a New Left

The New Left as a movement was basically the creation of young people who graduated from high school and entered college somewhere between, roughly, 1957 and 1966. These were young people whose first picture of politics and society (2) was formed during some part of the interval between the Korean War of 1950-53 and the decisive escalation of the Indochina War in the mid-1960s. Thus the starting point for an analysis of the New Left is an understanding of the main features of American society during that interwar period. These years, spanning the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and early Johnson Administrations, were characterized above all by the full and virtually unimpeded flowering of corporate capitalism in the US. It was the maturation of the epoch which began a half-century earlier with the birth of the modern industrial corporation and the initiation of the Federal Government’s active role in co-ordinating the economy.
Now, in the 1950s and '60s, perpetual military spending was the cornerstone of a prospering economy. The military buildup also underscored and protected the US's economic domination over most of the globe. The political basis for the military spending and for the country's interventionist foreign policy—militant anti-communism—served also to exert a deadening influence on Left-wing political dissent. It was a neatly wrapped package, and within it the capitalistic system was free from anything resembling an immediate crisis or challenge at home or abroad.

A necessary condition for the stability of the capitalist system during the interwar years was the muting of class conflict within American society. There were several factors which helped to bring about this condition. The simplest, though not necessarily the most important, was the prosperity brought about by permanent military spending. Despite the recession of 1957-58 and persistent unemployment at around the 6% level in the early 1960s, real wages generally showed a meaningful rise over the period as a whole. The bourgeois solution of minimizing discontent by "increasing the size of the pie" was working to that extent. The hegemony of anti-communism, which became a pervasive theme of American politics in the late 1940s and retained its strength thereafter, was also extremely important. Notions of class conflict (apart from politicians' traditional appeals to "the common people" against "the vested interests") were denied legitimacy and linked with a sinister international conspiracy. Both the prosperity and the anti-communism, in turn, facilitated the absorption of the CIO industrial unions into the old AFL-type formula of business unionism. This formula was one in which the unions gained power to bargain for workers on questions such as wages and hours and, for their part, gave the employers a more predictable labor force, since work stoppages could take place only under rigidly defined conditions. The union leadership, moreover, joined wholeheartedly in the defense of "Americanism" against communism, both by carrying out vigorous foreign-policy operations in conjunction with government agencies and by purging Left-wing dissenters in their own ranks. Just as the logic of business unionism
asserted a common interest between employers and workers in maintaining production, so the unions' enlistment in the anti-communist crusade was based on an assumption of a "national interest" which ought to override class interest.

Other factors also helped to create a situation in which class cleavages were relatively less prominent in this period than they had been in the '30s and earlier. For example, the actual composition of the working class was shifting in ways (especially the growing number of blacks in heavy industry and of women in white-collar jobs) whose implications were far from being understood. The working class was different from what it had been in the '30s, and it would take a long time for the difference to be absorbed into a revivified working-class consciousness.

The point here, however, is not to come up with a complete catalog of reasons for the lack of a visible and insurgent working-class movement during the interwar years, but to point out that the lack of such a movement was an important characteristic of that particular period of American history. What it meant for the students who were to be drawn into activist politics toward the end of the period was that "labor" did not exert an appeal similar to the one it had held for intellectuals and students in the 1930s. In place of the LaFollette Committee which had exposed the strike-breaking techniques of anti-union employers in the early CIO days, there was now a McClellan Committee exposing corrupt union officials. It was the most natural thing in the world for middle-class liberal and even radical students to dismiss "Big Labor" as the exact equivalent of "Big Business", and to ignore the working class entirely as a social force.

The pathetic state of the organized Left during the interwar period was in large part a reflection of the same forces which hindered the development of insurgent working-class movements. The Communist Party in particular was badly hurt by repressive federal, state, and local laws and by political inquisitions within the labor unions. The continued prosperity was seemingly in refutation of the traditional Left-wing view that capitalism would not work on its own terms. Both the communist and the social-democratic Left
had a strategic perspective that was largely out of date, being based on economic deprivation and crisis and on the building of unions. Neither group had a real critique of the permanent war economy or of the stabilizing role of unions. While the tiny Socialist Party moved steadily closer to becoming an indistinguishable loyalist group within the Democratic Party and abandoned its old utopian visions, the Communist Party clung to the goal of revolution but without any real basis for seeing revolution as a possibility.

If there was no strong working-class insurgency, and if the organized Left had spent its momentum as a radical force in society, then where did the New Left come from? Looking at the US in the interwar period, we can see two main features that were to provide the basis for the peculiar type of radical movement which was the New Left. One of these features lay in the world context in which the US found itself. This period, with China now fully independent and with decolonization proceeding in Africa, was a turning point in the centuries-old hegemony of white European civilization over the rest of the world. The contradiction was especially important for the US, not only because it was now the world’s leading power, with an expanding system of imperial commitments all around the world, but also because it had a large non-white minority dispersed within its own borders. Within and without, American capitalist society was in direct contact with non-white peoples who were an overwhelming majority of the world’s population and who were ever less ready to accept white domination.

By itself, of course, the growing contradiction between white capitalist domination and the self-activity of non-white peoples would not have led to a new radicalization within the white population of the US. Thus it is necessary to discuss a second important weakness of American society in the interwar period. This weakness was an outgrowth of the fact that the economy had entered a phase of maturity. Instead of an unlimited horizon of opportunities for independent entrepreneurs and for free professionals, there was a horizon of stable bureaucracies making up ev-
ery major sector of American society. In these circumstances, corporate capitalism found it difficult to generate a self-renewing sense of excitement or purpose among young people. The collegiate "Silent Generation" of the 1950s was the object of much head-shaking among business and educational spokesmen because of its complacency and passivity. As a writer in Commonweal noted wryly, American industry needed two contradictory images: a Horatio Alger image to attract creative talent, and an image of luxury and security to sell its goods. (3) It was the latter image, the "consumer ethic", that tended to predominate in this period. But for a new generation growing up in relative affluence, with their families already having "made it", the challenge of achieving a comfortable middle-class lifestyle was no challenge at all; it offered only the prospect of chaining oneself to a dull job in order to attain a living standard they were already accustomed to. This did not mean that every college student was thus a malcontent and ripe for rebellion, but it did mean that the System's ability to attract the zealous loyalty of many of its brightest young people was being seriously eroded. When this is added to the fact that young people growing up in the late '50s and early '60s were much less affected by the fear of communism than were their elders, then we have the basis for the New Left: a segment of the country's youthful population ready to find in political rebellion the excitement and purpose which the society failed to offer them. (4)

The Birth of a New Left, 1960-65

Until 1960 the absence of a viable Left in American society was as evident on college campuses as anywhere else. There had been much political ferment on campus in the 1930s, revived for a time in the late '40s by both radical and liberal groups, but since the high tide of anti-communism during the Korean War an unbroken political silence had prevailed. By 1960 virtually the only students at any university who could remember political demonstrations on their campus were graduate students of long standing. The glacial calm was broken decisively in the late winter and spring of 1960 by the Southern sit-in movement. This spon-
taneous wave of non-violent militancy, usually taking the form of sit-ins at Jim Crow lunch counters, started with four freshmen at North Carolina A&T College and quickly spread among black college students all across the South. It also touched off the first widespread political activity among white students in recent memory. At scores of Northern campuses, students picketed Woolworth or other chain stores, collected money for the Southern black students, and held rallies to express their support. Perhaps as many as eight to ten thousand white students, an unheard-of number against the background of the 1950s, took part in the Woolworth picketing, which was the strongest form that support for the sit-ins took.

During the next three years, as the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC) emerged out of the sit-ins and embarked on a program of organizing in scattered pockets of the Deep South, white student support for civil rights continued. Students raised funds, brought speakers to campus, and occasionally took part in direct-action projects organized by Congress of Racial Equality chapters or by ad-hoc groups. Other important political issues which helped to nurture the nascent student movement were the House Un-American Activities Committee (whose film “Operation Abolition” melodramatically depicted the Committee’s opponents as Communist dupes) and atmospheric nuclear testing. During the 1961-62 school year, when Russia and the US resumed testing, a campus peace movement developed that was (again, by standards of the 1950s) of an impressive size. Perhaps a hundred campuses had peace groups of some sort, and the Student Peace Union became the largest by far of the student protest organizations. A march on Washington which the SPU sponsored along with other groups in February 1962, focused mainly on nuclear testing, drew an unexpectedly large turnout of five to eight thousand.

We can learn something about this early student movement, and about the New Left which it later evolved into, by looking at the type of campus environment where it grew. It grew earliest and fastest at a few of the most academically prestigious state universities (Berkeley, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Minnesota) and a few of the best private universities and co-ed colleges (Cornell, Swarthmore, Chicago, Oberlin, Antioch, Harvard-Radcliffe, Carleton, Columbia, Reed), almost exclusively among liberal-arts students who were not members of fraternities or sororities. It had a secondary impact, among the same section of the student body, at some of the elite men's and women's colleges, a few urban universities, and a number of second-ranking state universities and liberal-arts colleges. It struck no roots whatsoever at teachers' colleges, technical schools, or more than a very few church-related colleges. The many state institutions that had started out as normal schools many decades earlier and had not yet completed their evolution into secondary state universities were also untouched. The student movement grew in a mildly non-conformist campus subculture that was characterized above all by folk music. It attracted basically two types of students. There was a sizeable minority of "red diaper babies" who grew up in Old Left families in the 1950s, who had never been imbued with the standard American cold-war mythology, and whose backgrounds had made them keenly sensitive to such issues as civil rights, peace, and freedom of speech. There was a larger number of students from non-radical backgrounds, typically the children of liberal-minded professionals, who had swallowed a liberal dosage of "American ideals" in the course of growing up and who were ready to be shocked when ideals were found not to correspond with reality. (5)

The tone of the student movement reflected both the class backgrounds of its participants and the lack of a visible Left tradition in the US. The tone was marked on one hand by a distinct caution about political judgments, and on the other by a sense of the need to make a personal moral witness against things which seemed so far out of line with our ideals as to be unambiguously evil. In this category were segregation (at least in the South), pollution of the atmosphere by nuclear weapons, and the cruel buffoonery of the House Un-American Activities Committee. No political issues with an explicit class content — such as strikes, unemployment, economic policies, or automation — engaged
the slightest attention from the student movement. Nor did student peace activity embrace even a rudimentary critique of imperialism. The moralism of the movement was repeatedly expressed in an agnosticism about how our efforts might have a long-term effect. As one student, picketing and fasting in front of the White House against the resumption of nuclear testing, said: "Even if we don't change anyone's mind, we're going on record ourselves. We'd like to convert people—or think we do. I wanted to do something for peace. I feel much more honest after I've gotten out and done something." (6)

Except for the Young People's Socialist League, which provided organizational know-how for the Student Peace Union, no nationally organized multi-issue groups played a major role in the movement. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), whose 1962 Port Huron Statement was the first coherent attempt to forge a new political synthesis out of the separate strands of the new movement, was still a loose grouping of talented individuals rather than a bona-fide organization. Its national secretary reported at the end of 1962: "We have no real organizational base. This is clear. We have a few groups or collections who share our perspective. We have people appearing from time to time on this or that campus who want to 'organize'—then nothing happens. The fact that we have added a number this fall, on paper at least, is not significant." (7) The student movement as a whole, rather than representing anything like a coherent political force, was essentially a series of ad-hoc responses to the discovery of successive political-moral evils.

It was the explosion of the civil-rights struggle in the spring and summer of 1963, following the epochal mass demonstrations in Birmingham, that injected a new degree of breadth and commitment into the white student protest. Hundreds of students went to jail in demonstrations in both North and South, and in the summer of 1964 well over 500 took on roles as full-time civil-rights organizers in the Deep South. Most of them went to Mississippi, the most
dangerous Southern state. For tens of thousands of other students, fund raising and other activities in support of SNCC lent at least a vicarious involvement in the struggle. And SDS, responding to the activist impulse, became a significant national group for the first time by undertaking 10 community-organizing projects in Northern and border states, aimed at stimulating an "interracial movement of the poor".

The upsurge of the Freedom movement between 1963 and 1965 not only meant a quantitative jump in the degree of white student activism, but also had a profound effect in nudging the activists to the Left. SNCC was the principal group which exerted this radicalizing influence, doing it in two complimentary ways. One was SNCC's insistent demand that the Federal Government (which under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had a largely undeserved image of aiding civil rights) use its full constitutional powers to prevent Southern officials from harassing and brutalizing the movement. SNCC's willingness to confront the Democratic Administration was most dramatically expressed in Atlantic City in August 1964. There, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party sought to be seated in place of their state's regular all-white delegation to the Democratic national convention. The outcome, an Administration compromise which
refused to recognize any of the Freedom Democrats as representatives of their state, outraged SNCC and its supporters. Taken together with the Justice Department’s sparing use of its powers to protect Southern blacks trying to assert their rights, the Atlantic City episode made mainstream American liberalism vulnerable to the moralistic political judgments common within the student movement.

The other form which the SNCC-influenced radicalization took was a populistic one. SNCC, alone among the major civil-rights groups, took pride in organizing among the poorest elements of the Southern black population. SNCC field workers (many of whom came from lower-class backgrounds themselves) insisted that these people had both the right and the ability to participate in the decision-making processes of society. SNCC attacked mainstream liberalism, at Atlantic City and elsewhere, for its top-down style of allowing a few leaders to juggle the interests of ordinary people. For white students, coming into the South and experiencing a profound culture shock to start with, this element of SNCC’s approach made a strong impact. As a Mississippi Summer volunteer wrote: “These people, housewives, unskilled workers, many, but not all, uneducated, are fantastic. People who have never spoken publicly before get up and make the greatest speeches....” (8) The urban organizing projects of SDS, especially after the initial summer’s experience, took on a similar populist orientation. Increasingly the SDS activists tried to organize the poor around the issue of their powerlessness, rather than around a substantive national program.

During the 1964-65 school year, the student movement deepened and moved further to the Left. The Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in the fall of 1964, touched off by restrictions on the activity of campus civil-rights groups, turned into a revolt against dehumanizing aspects of the university itself. Berkeley was followed in the winter and spring by small-scale actions against university policies at Michigan State, Ohio State, Yale, Brooklyn College, Cornell, Columbia, Oberlin, and a number of other schools. Equally important, in February 1965 the Johnson Administration embarked on a dramatic expansion of the Vietnam
War by beginning a systematic bombing of North Vietnam. With vigils, leafleting, teach-ins, and an SDS-sponsored march on Washington which drew upwards of 20,000 young people, a strong campus protest quickly developed against the War. For the first time, it pitted the student movement against the US Government on a clear-cut issue of foreign policy. The Government, which had merely seemed guilty of laxity and cynicism in its failure to intervene in Southern civil-rights struggles, was now seen as guilty of wanton violence on a massive scale. In other respects, the Vietnam issue was a natural carry-over from the civil-rights movement. In both cases, the white society of which the students were a part was showing itself capable of gross inhumanity. The same intense moralism was present in the war protest. As a Wisconsin student, defending the heckling of State Department speakers on that campus, said: "I can't be calm, cool, and detached any longer. I can't speak softly when I want to shout 'Stop! This is sick and inhuman.' And I'll shout if it will make me heard. I think rather that being able to sit back and watch murder is what is sick." (9) Or as participants in a hunger strike at Penn State said: "We believe that the Government's actions in Vietnam are morally wrong, and as Americans we all feel guilty for these actions." (10)

By the middle of 1965 it could be said that there was a New Left, symbolized though by no means encompassed by SDS. The New Left was marked by opposition to the War, disillusionment with the society's resistance to progress in civil rights, and a readiness to challenge the decision-making processes of the universities and of the whole society. In only five years the movement had come a long way from its low-keyed origins in the Woolworth picket lines. But as a distinctive New Left, the movement nevertheless bore unmistakably the marks of its class origins and of the historical epoch in which it had emerged. Its composition, in contrast to that of the youth auxiliaries which the Old
Left had traditionally had (the Young Communist League, the Labor Youth League, and now the DuBois Clubs, a weak rival to SDS), was notably confined to students and college dropouts. There was scarcely any mixture of young people from working-class or non-college backgrounds. Among college students, in turn, the movement continued to draw almost exclusively from liberal-arts students rather than from those enrolled in the more narrowly vocational fields.

The New Left at its birth had only the vaguest of class analyses—little more, really, than a somewhat romantic identification with the poor and oppressed. It pinpointed no group in society (other than "most of us" or "most of the people") with the power and the need to bring about basic change. But to make this point is not to denigrate our own past. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the New Left sprang up at a time when the American working class was at a temporary standstill. Leaving aside the legislative alliances contracted by the AFL-CIO leadership, the working class was making no claims on the sympathy and support of other segments of the society. The most audible and urgent claims being made on the students' attention in the early 1960s were coming from the black Freedom movement. And for the most part, as expressed by Martin Luther King and even by SNCC, these claims had an almost exclusively moralistic and classless ring. Only an extraordinarily strong Left-wing tradition, which obviously did not exist, could have shaped the white students' response in a different way than it was actually shaped. Rather than lamenting the "deformed" character of the New Left at its birth, we should appreciate the way in which the student activists, lacking any ready-made theoretical framework, were nevertheless ready to be pushed even further to the Left by the course of events. Radicalization came about by an ad-hoc process of choosing sides: SNCC and its powerless constituency against Southern racists and against the Federal bureaucracy; the Vietnamese against the American military; and (as in the Free Speech Movement) themselves against their university administrators. The common thread in these assorted engagements was found to be the vague concept that many called participatory democracy—the right of all people to a voice in "the decisions that affect their lives". As a start-
ing point, and as the expression of college students whose own lives were generally free of any material deprivation, it was a not ignoble principle.

The New Left's Short Four-Year History, 1965–1969

For a period of four years after its emergence in 1965, the New Left enjoyed a steady growth of numbers. Although still essentially confined to college students (or dropouts) in the liberal-arts field, the movement spread to many hundreds of campuses which had been untouched by the political stirrings of the early 1960s. By the spring of 1969 there were perhaps 60,000 to 100,000 young people who took part in local chapters of SDS, the pre-eminent New Left organization, and a much greater number who sympathized. During these years the New Left also continued its own radicalization, as its indictment of American society became steadily more wholehearted and sweeping. This was the period of the New Left's maturation. As such, it was also the period in which the New Left's internal weaknesses became accentuated to the point where, at the peak of its apparent size and strength, it fell apart. This process of growth and dissolution deserves careful analysis.

The three social developments which did the most to speed up the growth and radicalization of the New Left in the late 1960s were the Indochina War, Black Power, and youth culture. The War, escalating year after year, provided a continuing backdrop to political dissent. It was the one issue which brought by far the greatest number of people into political activism. The rise of black militancy, symbolized on one hand by the Watts rebellion of 1965 and others that followed, and on the other hand by the adoption of revolutionary black nationalism by SNCC and then the Black Panther Party, provided sympathetic whites with a continuing example of militancy and of revolutionary rhetoric. Finally, the spread of youth culture, whose importance became unmistakably obvious by 1967, also made a mark on the political landscape. Youth culture was defined chiefly by the cult of the Beatles, Rolling Stones, and other rock groups; by drugs; and by the flouting of conventional stand-
ards of dress and appearance. In the overall context of the late 1960s, youth culture took on distinctly political overtones: By helping to create a widespread self-consciousness of young people as a group apart, it made possible the facile acceptance of radical political ideas as an expression of personal alienation. Beyond this, even where its devotees scorned politics, youth culture did represent an effort by millions of young people to reject the life patterns that corporate capitalism seemed to offer them. It thus had profound implications for the development of political radicalism in the US.

These, then, were the major developments that set the terms under which the New Left grew and evolved in the period after 1965. Far from altering its basic character, they allowed the New Left to grow more or less along the lines it had laid out for itself earlier. Even as it expanded and moved further to the Left, the movement retained a very strong thread of political continuity with its past. Perhaps this can be seen most clearly in relation to the rise of black nationalism. The enunciation of Black Power by SNCC in 1966, putting a close to the period in which whites had participated directly in the militant wing of the civil-

Mississippi
Viet Nam

FREEDOM is the same ALL OVER

- sds -
rights movement, carried an initial shock for SNCC's white supporters. Integration was now being repudiated by black militants, both as a tactic within the movement and as a goal for society. But, in its impact on white students, the changing tactics and goals of the black struggle were really less important than the fact that the struggle continued—that black people were still in rebellion against the racism of American society. Because of this fact, the issue of racism was constantly thrust on the attention of the New Left. Radical, rather than class, divisions remained the most visible cleavage in the society, just as they had been in the early 1960s. Moreover, just as the civil-rights movement in 1960-65 had provided a continuing inspiration to young white activists—a continuing reminder that the status quo could be challenged—the growth of a black revolutionary movement in the late '60s had the same exhilarating effect on the New Left.

At this point it may be desirable to pause and offer an operational definition that will differentiate the New Left from other radical groups that existed on campuses in the late 1960s. Even SDS, the New Left's main rallying point, had a minority faction that took leadership from the Progressive Labor Party, a super-Leninist offshoot of the Communist Party dating from 1961. Outside of SDS there existed a variety of Old Left youth groups; the most important of these, the Young Socialist Alliance, played a key role in organizing anti-war protests, and at the very end of the decade it gained rapidly in membership. Some of the New Left's political traits were shared with one or another of the Old Left groups, but taken as a whole they added up to a distinctive New Left position. The New Left was particularly willing to accept black organizations and leaders as vanguards of change. It was also eager, especially in the last few years of the decade, to give wholehearted support to the Vietnamese resistance movement and its leaders. In both areas the New Left often tended to romanticize non-white peoples as well as to single out individual leaders (Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh, Huey Newton) for adulation. At the same time, however, the New Left was much quicker than the Old Left groups to identify middle-
class young people as a somewhat oppressed group. In its opposition to the War, the characteristic New Left campaign was one that attacked the war on the students’ home grounds—through draft resistance and through protests against symbolic targets (Dow Chemical recruiting, ROTC, military research, and so forth) that linked the universities to the military. And the New Left’s attitude toward youth culture was especially distinctive. Both PL and YSA opposed the use of drugs, and their members were relatively clean-cut. PL in particular viewed youth culture as a sign of bourgeois degeneracy. For the New Left, on the other hand, the emergence of youth culture and of the hippies was seen as part of the solution, and not part of the problem. Through a variety of means, especially the underground press, New Left political activists sought a common ground with hippies and dropouts, believing that all of them were basically united in rejecting middle-class American life.

With this rough definition in mind, we can go on to examine the way in which the War and the rise of youth culture accelerated the New Left’s radicalization in the late 1960s and accentuated its distinctive character. The War, because directly or indirectly it was the focus of most campus protest, deserves first consideration. For several years, recurrent protests against the War were answered only by the steady intensification of the US military effort. This produced within the movement a growing readiness to believe that the War must be an outgrowth of deeply imbedded features of the American system, not just a mistake that could be easily remedied. Thus, a critique of imperialism became easily accepted by the New Left. What is significant here is not the critique itself, which had no originality, but the manner of its acceptance. It came, not as a corollary to a critique of capitalism, but as a direct outgrowth of experience with the War. For the New Left, it became clear at the time of the SDS split, the basic contradiction in the world was between imperialism and its nonwhite victims, rather than between workers and capitalists. The New Left was an anti-imperialist movement before, and more fundamentally than, it was an anti-capitalist movement.
At the same time, as we have noted, the New Left was prone to attacking the War and imperialism in a way that related the struggle to the New Left's own social surroundings. In part this grew out of a desperate search for short-cuts to end the War. When draft resistance became a serious endeavor in the winter of 1966-67, many saw it initially as a way of stopping the military machine by cutting off its flow of manpower. While draft resistance came nowhere near that unrealistic goal, it nevertheless brought the New Left itself to an understanding (through confrontation) of the way in which individual lives are distorted and sacrificed according to the personnel needs of the System. Similarly, on-campus protests against military-related recruiters and university complicity were often seen as having a potential for causing serious disruption to the military. The tangible effects of these campaigns were modest, but they did lead to a sharpened sense within the New Left of the relation between universities and imperialism. For participants in the New Left, the frustration generated by the prolonged war in Asia was a constant prod to examining their own place in society.

The New Left's relation to youth culture fitted in with, and in fact stimulated, its tendency to relate the Indochina War to its own surroundings. It is true that at any given time there was scarcely any overlap between hippies and New Leftists. Almost by definition hippies were political as well as social dropouts from society and took no interest in radical politics as such. The emergence of the Yuppies in 1968, as an imaginative effort by Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and others to put across a political message in non-political guise, also was a separate phenomenon from the New Left. But youth culture had a pervasive effect that was not confined strictly to full-fledged dropouts. A sense of young people's distinctiveness, combined with a discontent with accepted life-patterns, went far beyond the ranks of the hippies. Youth culture provided a bridge by which an unmeasured number of middle-class young people were attracted, at least briefly, to the New Left. By the same token the New Left itself was profoundly affected by the cultural revolt. It sharpened our own feelings of revulsion at soci-
ety, and in that way it provided an emotional reinforcement
to our sweeping political judgments on matters such as ra-
cial oppression and foreign policy. In the militant campus
demonstrations of the late ’60s there was an urgency which
sprang, not only from the political issues which were ex-
plicitly raised, but also from students’ own frustrations
with life in the university. In addition, the cultural revolt
encouraged us to seek the social roots of what otherwise
might have been perceived as purely personal frustrations.
The most spectacular instance of this was the emergence
of a women’s liberation movement, which got much of its
impetus in the late ’60s from women who were part of the
New Left.

It was in its connection of personal to social issues that
the New Left’s claim to originality lay. The New Left took
students, as such, very seriously. It felt no embarrass-
ment in raising demands for changes in the universities them-
selves, rather than simply using the campus as a recruit-
ment center for outside struggles. It drew the proper con-
clusions from the ever-growing proportion of young people
going to college, which was that higher education had be-
come crucial to the operation of American capitalism. The
New Left, moreover, reached for a total critique of what it
meant to live in American society. It did this in relation to
such issues as the draft and manpower channeling, the use
of universities to produce skilled and pliable workers for
corporations, women’s oppression, and the view of con-
sumption as “domestic imperialism” which some people in
SDS raised. The New Left saw that capitalism meant not
simply dollars-and-cents exploitation, but powerlessness,
indignity, and drabness. Lives were at stake, and not mere-
ly checkbooks. All this was tentative, and it never crystal-
lized into a coherent overview; but it nevertheless was a
real advance in Left-wing thought in the US. It amounted to
an assertion that revolution might be possible even without
an economic breakdown of the capitalist system; that even
when it functioned most smoothly the system placed intol-
erable obstacles in the way of human fulfillment, and for
that reason had to be replaced.
No analysis of the process by which the New Left matured in the period after 1965 would be complete without a discussion of the weaknesses that were inherent in its development. There were serious weaknesses, and in the not-so-long run they were fatal. In discussing them, however, we need to keep in mind the fact that these were basic features of the New Left, not a series of "mistakes" or of "incorrect decisions" made by wrong-headed "leaders". The New Left's flaws were present from the start, and they were indissolubly connected with its strengths.

The most obvious and perhaps most basic limitation of the New Left was its confinement to a campus milieu. This is not to say that there was not a great deal of ferment among working-class youth in the army, in factories, on street corners, and in high schools in the late 1960s, but it is to say that there was scarcely any direct organizational connection between these rebellions and the college-based New Left. On the whole, Old Left youth groups such as the YSA were much quicker and more systematic than SDS about organizing GI's. While SDS groups in a number of cities worked creatively with high-school students, there was a tendency for them to reach primarily young people from educated middle-class backgrounds similar to their own, rather than working-class youth. As for factory workers, it was Progressive Labor which lobbied within SDS for sending students into factories; for the most part, the SDS leadership resisted the idea. Essentially the New Left remained on campus and in campus-centered youth communities, not in the workplace. While, as we have suggested, this concentration in a single milieu was helpful to the New Left's numerical growth, it also provided a natural limit to what the New Left could be expected to achieve. It could never have become a socialist movement. As its rhetoric suggested, it was anti-Imperialist, anti-racist, and even anti-capitalist; but the infrequency with which the word "socialist" was heard was indicative of the lack of a positive vision. Given its class setting and the nature of its radicalization, it would have been all but impossible for the New Left to develop a notion of working people taking control of the means of production and of the society. It had no real sense of how work is carried on at present, not to
speak of how it might be carried on under a new social system. The vague concept of participatory democracy did not survive long after 1965 as a generally accepted slogan within the New Left, and in any case it was never fleshed out by a vision of how it might make life different for the majority of Americans.

A second weakness of the New Left had to do not so much with its class composition as with the particular historical epoch in which it had emerged. The New Left was the creation of people who had gone through high school in the years before 1965, or in some cases a year or two beyond that. At its core the movement retained this generational stamp. Even as tens of thousands of younger students joined SDS, for example, the proportion which really became absorbed into the movement and developed a permanent identification with it was very small. The New Left, as we have said, formed and developed through a series of discoveries about the iniquity of American society—discoveries which had as their initial starting point the relative tranquility of the interwar era. But in the late 1960s young people were coming of age in a world that was far from tranquil—with a festering war in Indochina, with black militants condemning white society as bankrupt, and with a spreading youth culture that seemed to offer a direct challenge to accepted patterns of living. There were obvious social crises in the US, and revolutionary rhetoric was already very much a part of the social environment. These young people came to the movement already believing that society was sick and needed a revolution. The question for them was: What do we do on the basis of this understanding? If collective action seemed to show promise, it would be adopted; otherwise, some kind of individual adjustment to a bad society would have to be made. And the New Left, which was at its strongest in its critique of the existing society, was unequipped to furnish them with any sort of "revolutionary script" by which today's meetings and demonstrations might reasonably be expected to lead to tomorrow's revolution. The transition from revolutionary fervor to cynicism has always been an easy one to make, and it is understandable that so many young people have made it during the last few years.
A third inherent weakness of the New Left was the position of women within it. In a number of ways, the growth and development of the movement after 1965 led to a heightened oppression of women. The mere fact of the movement’s rapid growth, for example, meant that rallies and marches became much larger; there was a resultant premium on assertive public speaking, a trait on which men in the movement had a virtual monopoly. Beyond that, certain political trends within the movement from 1967 on had the effect of glamorizing political activities associated primarily with men. This was true, paradoxically, both in the sector of the movement that tended toward pacifism (for only men could become draft refusers) and in the sector that moved in the direction of greater militancy and violence (for men were the historic implementers of violence). The New Left’s partial fusion with youth culture also had its damaging aspects: There was a strong thread of male assertiveness running through rock music and youth culture generally, with “liberated women” being merely those who had lost their sexual inhibitions. In all these ways the problem of male supremacy was exacerbated in the New Left in the late 1960s. At the same time, it was all but inevitable — given the movement’s developing critique of non-economic oppression in American society — that a strong reaction would develop against male dominance within the New Left. Within SDS the issue was first raised publicly as early as December 1965, when a special workshop for women was held at a national SDS conference at the University of Illinois. At the 1967 SDS convention a women’s caucus pushed a resolution on women’s oppression in society and refused to let male delegates participate in amending the resolution. Over the next two years a growing number of women who considered themselves part of the New Left helped to form women’s groups both inside and outside the New Left. It would be an exaggeration to say that this activity, which sharpened the women’s sense of their oppression within the movement, was a major factor in the climactic SDS split in the summer of 1969. It was, however, an extremely important factor in the movement’s inability to reconstitute itself on a national level after the split. By that
time the accumulated experience of frustration within SDS left very little taste among most women for trying to create a new SDS. Once the New Left's momentum as a coherent movement had been destroyed, the growth in women's consciousness formed an impassable barrier to its reconstitution.

The Split in SDS

Because SDS was the pre-eminent New Left organization, its splintering in the summer of 1969 marked the symbolic demise of the New Left. The events which led up to the split are worth tracing here, because they show a great deal about the New Left's inherent instability. The story begins in the winter of 1965-66 when youthful members of the Progressive Labor Party, having dissolved the tiny May 2nd Movement in which they had formerly worked, took out membership cards in SDS. PL was very small, and for the first year and a half its presence in SDS was scarcely noted. By the summer of 1967, however, although still weak numerically, it was presenting SDS with a coherent political position that could not be ignored. This position was a version of Marxism-Leninism that was shorn of nearly all subtleties in its constant call for the student movement to place the blue-collar working class at the center of its concerns. In programmatic terms, this meant primarily strike support activities and summer "work-ins". PL also supported campus struggles against symbols of imperialism and tried to interpret these struggles in class terms. The overarching slogan used by PL members in SDS to tie their programs together was the building of a "Worker-Student Alliance".

The first alternative strategy which mainstream SDS people counterposed to PL was called the "New Working Class" theory. It was advanced in 1967 by New York SDS leaders who argued that white-collar and technical workers were beginning to eclipse blue-collar workers in the economy. According to this strategy, the best course for the New Left was to follow its own logic and try to radicalize the present and future holders of "new working class" jobs.
The weaknesses in this approach were not so much in the theory itself as in the way it was propounded in SDS. The first weakness was that its advocates misread the employment statistics and, as PL was quick to point out, exaggerated the relative decline of blue-collar jobs. The second was that, in stressing the importance of scientific and technical workers to the economy, it ignored the fact that most student activists were in the liberal-arts fields, especially the humanities and social sciences. Most New Leftists, in fact, even though they were likely to go into fields such as teaching and social work, had no strong attachment to any set of occupational plans. They had little eagerness, therefore, to conceptualize what their future jobs might be like under workers’ control. There was a strong element of revolt in the New Left against the students’ career prospects under capitalism, but the thrust of this revolt was primarily negative rather than positive. The New Working Class theory had the virtue of spotlighting the relationship of universities to the shaping of the labor force of the future, but it was not refined to the extent of providing a viable program which could rally the non-PL majority in SDS. Virtually its last appearance was in a resolution offered by Steve Halliwell, Tom Bell, and Bernadine Dohrn at the 1968 SDS convention and rejected after bitter debate.

Had the crises in American society in the late 1960s been less severe, and had events moved less swiftly, there might have been time for the New Left majority in SDS to resolve its political uncertainties in a deliberate and collective manner. But the New Left was caught in a social whirlwind that was only in small part of its own making. The events of 1968 — including the paralysis of Columbia University by building seizures, the Chicago Democratic convention, the May-June events in France, and the rise of the Black Panthers as a revolutionary black organization working on a nationwide scale — created enormous pressures within the New Left. American society now seemed far less stable than it had seemed earlier, and for this reason the stakes in SDS’s factional struggles now appeared to be much higher. Tentative efforts to build a program around the New Left’s unique insights were now gradually abandoned, as
the SDS leadership began to look to outside authority figures for guidelines to action.

The most important turning point was the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August 1968. SDS had turned a cold shoulder toward plans for demonstrations in Chicago, and had discouraged its own members from coming unless they wanted to help make converts among disillusioned McCarthy supporters. But very quickly, as street fighting developed in the Lincoln Park area, SDS members present in Chicago became caught up in the forming of affinity groups which disrupted traffic and harassed the police. The lesson that seemed to emerge from the Chicago experience — from the exhilaration of being in the streets and from the intense embarrassment that the demonstrators caused the Democratic Party — was the value of militancy.

In the fall, SDS attempted a nationally co-ordinated series of election-night marches which some hoped would duplicate the Chicago experience. These marches were generally small and disappointing. More generally, however, militancy as such began to take its place as the centerpiece of the SDS leadership’s alternative to the Worker-Student Alliance strategy of PL. In a way, it was natural that this should be so. By 1968-69, the New Left fully accepted the notion that American society was exploitative, imperialist, oppressive to women and young people, and racist in its treatment of blacks and other minority groups. There were few new discoveries to be made about the iniquity of this society. The only thing left was for the movement to escalate its protest against the iniquity it already saw.

The ideological basis for the actual split with PL was one that was furnished by PL itself in the winter and spring of 1969. Progressive Labor criticized the Black Panther Party and launched a strong campaign labeling all forms of black nationalism reactionary. This initiative was a direct thrust at the SDS leadership’s support for the Panthers, and more generally at the New Left’s willingness to follow the lead of black militant groups. Most important, PL’s hardened position created a serious impasse within SDS at the
chapter level. During the 1968-69 school year, particularly in the spring, there were protest demonstrations on scores of campuses led by black students demanding Black Studies programs and similar concessions. The natural inclination of the SDS mainstream was to give full support to these protests whenever they erupted. But PL opposed Black Studies and other demands that smacked of nationalism. Thus there was a cleavage over the most important strategic question facing SDS at that time. Characteristically, the issue was clouded by the SDS leadership’s somewhat frenzied efforts to cling to the Black Panther Party (as well as its attempt to drag PL’s criticisms of Cuba and North Vietnam into the debate), but the issue was real nonetheless. There was no room for compromise. The split came at the SDS convention in Chicago in June 1969 when, with PL’s caucus appearing to have a numerical majority, the New Left forces first seceded and then declared that PL supporters were expelled from SDS.

Had the New Left not contained such strong internal contradictions, the split with PL might have resulted in a new political vitality, with the New Left grouping free to organize on its own rather than struggling with PL for control of a single organization. But there were actually two splits in SDS in the summer of 1969, not just one. The second one was more lethal in that it clearly showed the bankruptcy of the New Left as a coherent political movement. It removed the possibility that the New Left SDS (which retained control of the old national office in Chicago) could keep a large student following grouped behind its banner. This split was between the Weatherman faction, which held most of the national leadership positions, and a loose grouping known as the Revolutionary Youth Movement II faction. Both had emerged in distinct form at the June convention, and they had joined forces to get rid of PL. In the aftermath, however, they drifted apart amidst mutual acrimony, and by the early fall it was clear that the Weatherman-controlled SDS had become an ideologically pure cadre organization.

The Weatherpeople embodied what may be called the logical conclusion of the New Left’s process of radicalization by outrage. In their view, virtually every aspect of American white society was hopelessly rotten. The only
role for white revolutionaries was, in effect, to act as shock troops for blacks and for the Third World; since the objective basis for a working-class movement was apparently lacking, white revolutionaries had to be conjured up by a heroic act of will. Thus came the mid-October “Days of Rage” in Chicago, the paramilitary maneuvers whose planning drove the RYM II faction out of SDS but which the Weatherpeople hoped would ignite the imaginations of alienated young people all across the country. But at the same time that Weatherman represented the culmination of some aspects of the New Left, it also marked the final scary abandonment of the New Left’s attempts to think through the meaning of a more humane society in the US. The model that the Weatherpeople imposed on themselves was a military one, based on discipline rather than participation and based on masculine versions of strength and toughness.

The RYM II faction consisted of the Bay Area Revolutionary Union and a scattering of small groups and prominent individuals elsewhere in the country. Its ideology was a curious blend. It agreed with Weatherman that the principal contradiction is between imperialism and the self-determination of Third World peoples. It strongly supported the Panthers and the Young Lords. At the same time, it laid very heavy stress on reaching the American working class, especially blue-collar workers of all races. In its attempt to combine the New Left’s strong anti-imperialism with a working-class perspective, RYM II may be seen as a progressive attempt to build on the New Left’s experience. But, like the Weatherpeople, RYM II was regressive in its conceptions of what a socialist society might look like. It was within the RYM II group that praise for Stalin was most often heard. In any case the grouping was loose-knit, and as a national formation it lasted only a few months after splitting away from Weatherman.

On the surface, the splintering of SDS came with bewildering suddenness. At the end of the spring the organization had immense prestige and tens of thousands of local members; at the end of the summer it had three sets of national “spokesmen” trying to inflate a punctured balloon. Yet the organizational collapse was not simply the result of bad decisions by leaders, no matter how wrong-headed those
people may seem to have been in their actions in 1969. SDS was an embodiment of the New Left, a social movement that was basically limited to a single sector of society (the college campus) and to a single generation of young people. It could not be made to carry the burden of revolution for the whole society. When pressures developed in 1968 and 1969 for the New Left to assume that burden, these pressures resulted in an accelerated growth for a time, but they also speeded the movement's ultimate collapse.

Explosions and Then Silence

For a year after the New Left's precipitous organizational decline, the momentum of student protest which had built up over the 1960s continued unchecked. The year started with massive outpourings for anti-war marches and rallies in scores of cities in mid-October, and then in Washington and San Francisco on November 15. In the winter and spring there were repeated violent clashes at individual campus centers, sparked by local issues or by the conviction of five defendants in the Chicago Conspiracy trial. These outbreaks occurred at such diverse places as Santa Barbara, Buffalo, Madison, Ann Arbor, Berkeley, Cambridge, and Columbus. Support for the Black Panther Party's battle against repression climaxed in a rally of about 15,000 on May Day in New Haven, a site of the murder trial of Bobby Seale and several other Panthers. Finally, the US invasion of Cambodia was met with a nationwide student strike of unprecedented proportions. Throughout the year there was a proliferation of locally-based activity (some of it radical, some not) in a half-dozen separate spheres: the war, women's liberation, Panther support, legal defense work, ecology, and gay liberation. With SDS absent, the Trotskyist Young Socialist Alliance was by far the most important Left-wing group on the campuses, but it was still relatively small. Student protest activity, especially during the Cambodia strike, was led by ad-hoc coalitions of New and Old leftists, concerned liberals, pacifists, feminists, and traditional student-government stalwarts. It was the high-water mark of the student movement, and everybody was in on the act.
Beneath the surface, however, the free-wheeling protests of 1969-70 obscured a basic weakness. There was no longer a self-sustaining New Left capable of formulating collective responses to events as they occurred and drawing strategic conclusions for the long run. This meant that, once there was any let-up in the scale of activity, the decline would feed on itself and produce widespread cynicism. It has to be remembered that the 1969-70 school year was characterized by a whole set of special circumstances which, taken together, lent a very strong but not necessarily permanent impetus to campus revolt. The months between September and May were marked by the President’s ostentatious disregard of popular protest against the war; by the launching of Vice-President Agnew’s furious assault on dissenters and the media; by violent raids on Black Panther offices in several cities and the murder of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in Chicago; and by the Chicago Eight trial, which dragged on from October to February and produced fresh judicial outrages almost daily. There was almost a sense that some kind of high-level conspiracy was afoot that year, aimed at young people and minorities. The Cambodia invasion, accompanied by Nixon’s bitter remarks about campus protestors and the shooting of four Kent State students, was the last straw. Fortuitously, the invasion also came at the one time of year, the late spring, when college students could most easily rouse themselves for political protest. Thus, the momentum of protest in 1969-70 was heavily dependent on a set of conditions and events that were unique to that particular year.

To the extent that the waning impulses of the New Left proper had an embodiment in 1969-70, it was in the underground press, which continued to flourish although hard times were soon to set in. There were several clear political themes in the underground papers. One was support for the liberation struggles of Third World peoples: the Vietnamese, Cubans, and others abroad; blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and native Americans at home. A second was support for women’s liberation and (more hesitantly, since the gay movement was just beginning to spread at that time) gay liberation. The women’s and gay issues were not nearly as easy to handle as the issue of Third World liber-
ation, because they hit so much closer to home. Fresh discoveries were constantly being made about the place that machismo had held in the New Left. Individuals now found themselves forced to examine their whole pattern of behavior toward other people, and the process was painful. A third theme was the attempt to build a sense of solidarity within the off-campus youth communities that were served by the underground papers. These were areas that Tom Hayden, one of the Chicago Eight, called the potential “liberated zones” of the developing American revolution. Co-ops, rock concerts, tenants’ unions, women’s centers, street dances, anti-heroism campaigns, the exposure of undercover police agents, political meetings, bail funds — these were all a part of the effort to build genuine communities in the youth areas. Typically, people on and around the staffs of the underground papers were the ones who saw these disparate activities as part of an overall political scheme, and who linked that scheme to the support of Third World struggles. These people were the carriers of the New Left tradition.

In explaining the decline of the New Left tradition after the Indian Summer of 1969-70, we have a somewhat different set of factors from those which explain the dampening of campus protest. The new quietude on the campuses starting in the fall of 1970 can be attributed mainly to the disillusionment setting in after the huge Cambodia protest failed to bring an end to the war; to the vast improvement in counterinsurgency know-how available to university administrators; and to the university financial crisis which led to a growing impatience with students who seemed to be adding to the costs by creating disruptions. For the remnants of the New Left, however, the heaviest blows came from sources off the campus. The forces that gave the greatest impetus to the New Left’s growth in the late 1960s were now apparently on the wane and were less capable of serving as sources of inspiration. This is particularly clear in the case of the black liberation movement and the Black Panthers. The high point of the Panthers’ prestige came with the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in September 1970. After that came
a series of blows in succession over the next half-year. A planned follow-up in Washington to the Philadelphia convention was mismanaged and fizzled. There was a reaction against the Party’s tendency to glorify individual leaders, climaxed by the disclosure that Huey Newton lived in a luxury apartment. In the spring there was a split in the Panther’s top leadership with sensational charges between the two factions. At the same time, the Panthers were winning a number of their court trials, and thus appeared less as the victims of persecution even though the Government had achieved its purpose by keeping Party leaders in jail as long as it had.

Internationally, the seeming quiet in the Indochina war during the interval between Cambodia and the 1972 Spring Offensive meant a temporary loss of the encouragement which the American movement had drawn from the fierce Vietnamese resistance to US intervention. (This period was not marked by an actual lull in the fighting, but the steady disengagement of American ground combat troops helped to give it that appearance.) The failure of Cuba’s campaign to harvest 10,000,000 tons of sugar—a campaign in which New Leftists had a strong emotional stake through the Venceremos Brigades of young American volunteers—was a blow of a similar sort. And the Chinese Government’s support for Pakistan and Ceylon in their bloody suppression of popular insurgencies did much to tarnish the image of China and Chairman Mao as symbols of world-wide revolution. The Nixon visit to China, though it was in part an admission of defeat in the US Government’s effort to isolate China, had to exert a further dampening effect on China’s revolutionary image among young people.

Finally, the period when youth culture had represented an oppositional movement within American society was now passing. By roughly 1970, long hair and drugs were becoming widely accepted fashions with no political implications. Even in the off-campus “liberated zones”, youth culture was no longer serving as a cement holding young people together as a community. While many institutions such as food co-ops and women’s centers survived, the overarching framework of a community was missing. High rents, heroin, and the easily proven ability of the police to do whatever
they wanted there made these "liberated zones" symbols of despair as much as of hope.

The women's movement had a momentum and logic of its own that did not depend on the existence of a broader New Left, but it also ran into serious difficulties after 1970. In the previous two or three years the women's movement had undergone an incredible growth in its consciousness about the nature of women's oppression in society and in the Left. Now, however, the problem was to find vehicles for expanding the movement through programs other than consciousness-raising. The problem was organizational rather than theoretical. Factionalism arose over the issue of lesbianism and over the participation of women who belonged to mixed Leninist organizations such as the YSA. The biggest frustration, however, was one that was strongly suggestive of the New Left's problems. The women's movement found it extremely hard to reach working-class women, whether as factory or office workers or as equally exploited housewives. While the liberal wing of the women's movement, centered in the National Organization for Women and the National Women's Political Caucus, has made appreciable gains in opening opportunities for women in the professions, the more radical movement which grew out of the New Left has found much slower going.

If any one event could be said to have signified the burial of the New Left as we knew it, that event was the astonishingly successful campaign of Senator George McGovern for the Democratic Presidential nomination. Far more than the McCarthy crusade of 1968, the McGovern campaign absorbed the impetus of recent movements for change in the US. In 1968 there had been a vibrant New Left, capable of exerting a Leftward pull on the impulse for social change. Now, however, the McGovern forces were able to displace the radical demands of the New Left and the student protest movement with a set of Left-liberal measures that could conceivably be implemented within the existing social system. They were able to make this replacement without diminishing—in fact, expanding—the number of people who could work enthusiastically in favor of the cause. The liberal wings of the anti-war movement and of
the women's movement played ball with McGovern and won victories that would have seemed inconceivable in the wake of the convention held in Mayor Daley's Chicago four years earlier. Young people also gained an unprecedented degree of representation inside the Democratic Party. The overall tone of the McGovern campaign, similarly, was a Left-liberal version of the outraged idealism which had been so strongly characteristic of the New Left. In summary, the McGovern forces were able to replace the now-defunct New Left with the Democratic Party as the synthesizing force in the single-issue movements for change.

A Final Note

We end more or less where we began. The New Left was the creation of a particular generation of young people in and around universities. It sustained itself and radicalized itself in response to the successive discovery of outrages about American society. Sometimes these had to do with matters that did not directly affect the New Left itself—above all, the brutalization of non-white peoples at home and abroad. Sometimes they had to do with aspects of the students' own lives, which were seen to be distorted by the "normal" functioning of capitalist society. Usually, these two impulses were interwoven. The existence of a militant black movement in the US and the protracted struggle of the Vietnamese against American intervention had the effect, not only of exposing the hypocrisy of American society, but also of raising the hope that successful struggle against it was possible. Thus a strong New Left thrived on the campuses for several years. But it did not survive for long, nor could it have. It was, after all, a partial movement in one sector of society with no roots in the working class. The particular manner of its radicalization, by a series of shocks, was unique to a single generation of middle-class young people who could be shocked. And its development necessarily brought it into a collision, for which it was unprepared, with the reality of women's oppression in the society as a whole and in the movement itself. After a disintegration that was almost as rapid as its initial rise, the New Left has had its day.
Amid the wreckage of so many hopes which were raised and then shattered in the space of a few years, is it possible to end this essay on a note of optimism? The answer is yes. The first development to be noted is the large number of veterans of the New Left who have been immersing themselves in working-class communities—as factory or office workers, as high-school or junior-college teachers, and as community activists—and who see their work as part of a gradually emerging socialist movement. With the classless radicalism of the New Left having been largely deflected into electoral politics or cynicism, it has been made increasingly clear that class-based politics are the direction in which former New Leftists who are still committed to a radical vision have to move. The growing number of socialist community newspapers, which are working-class oriented but which retain the New Left stress on issues such as women’s oppression, racism, and imperialism, is only a surface indication of the energy that is going into this area.

The economic squeeze which has been evident for the past several years, and in particular the wage controls imposed by the Nixon Administration in 1971, have also made class divisions a matter of public discussion for the first time in decades. The myth of a homogeneous “middle class” society has been blown away. This is not to say that we are currently witnessing a great wave of working-class militancy—indeed, such outbreaks have rarely taken place during times of rising unemployment—but only to say that the basis for class consciousness is being laid.

By far the most important basis for hope, however, is the way in which the composition of the working class has changed over the years. The proportion of women who have entered the job market has been steadily rising for the past two decades. This does not mean that these women are now in the working class while as housewives they were in some other class. What it means, rather, is that they now have a direct role in production which formerly was denied to them. Taken in conjunction with the spread of women’s consciousness, which is still in its very earliest stages, the increase in women workers portends a drastic change in the political composition of the working class. This same
kind of change is already apparent in the role which black workers, who were traditionally confined to a peasant status in Southern agriculture, have begun to play in the Northern industries into which they have moved over the past few decades. The historic postal wildcat of 1970, for example, was largely led by black workers. In a similar manner, the attitudes of young white male workers have clearly been affected by the ferment taking place among young people in the wider society. The spread of higher education at the community-college level has been reducing the gap in culture and experience between college and non-college youth. What this all amounts to is an assertion that the working class of the 1970s, both because of its statistical composition and because of the way the social movements of the 1960s have exerted their influence, is a markedly altered class. The insights of the New Left, despite the fact that the New Left as a social movement consisted mainly of young people from professional and managerial backgrounds, have a relevance to working-class politics today far greater than that which they would have had in the past.

For all its stumbling, the New Left raised two principles that constitute an invaluable legacy for the socialist revolutionary movement that may emerge in the US in the coming period. The first is that principle that revolution must be international—that it cannot simply be a redistribution of power among white Americans, but must take into account the place of Western white civilization in the total scheme of things, and thus be genuinely anti-racist. The second principle is that capitalism affects peoples’ lives not only by diverting workers’ money into the pockets of their bosses, but also by distorting their “personal” lives, and that no revolution could be complete that did not remedy that distortion. The New Left was not a socialist movement. But, if its heritage is not foolishly neglected, we can hope that the New Left’s experience will have an abiding and beneficial effect on the socialist movement that is now in prospect.
(1) Although this essay represents the precise views of only one person, it has gone through very extensive discussions among people associated with Radical America. Jim Kaplan, Allen Hunter, Roger Keeran, Brian Peterson, and Paul Buhle have had especially strong influences on sects of it.

(2) I should make explicit my reliance on a brilliant essay by Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations", in his Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), Pages 276-320, in which he argues that the possibility of serious reflection and questioning begins at about age 17, and that the picture one has formed of the world at that time serves as a first approximation for one's later views. Later experiences, he says, "tend to receive their meaning from this original set, whether they appear as that set's verification and fulfillment or as its negation and antithesis." (Page 297) What I have done in this essay is to take the period of ages 14 to 17 as the period when this original set of pictures of the society is developed.


(4) I would like to quote an excerpt from a letter from Roger Keeran to the author (May 13, 1972) which makes this point sharply. "American society had never—except in wartime—offered excitement or purpose or anything but dull jobs to working-class youth. Whereas it had held out that promise to "middle-class" youth until the '50s and '60s. Then, because of the development of corporate capitalism (described by Mills in White Collar, by White in Organization Man, and by Riesman in The Lonely Crowd), the opportunities for exciting occupations as independent entrepreneurs, farmers, professionals began to shrink. When that happens just maybe the youth who have been raised on expectations of challenge, excitement, and independence that their expectations will not be met." Fred Gordon, in a paper being published by the New England Free Press this fall, develops in a brilliant but overdrawn manner the notion that the New Left had its roots in the "petit bourgeoisie". The distinction needs to be kept in mind that a far greater number of New Leftists came from professional than from small-business or small-farming backgrounds.
(5) This may be an appropriate point at which to insert a note about the complex relationship of President Kennedy to the development of student activism and the New Left. His influence is easily overrated. The decisive breakthrough in student political activity took place with the sit-ins in the winter and spring of 1960, before Kennedy had even become the Democratic nominee for President. At that time Adlai Stevenson, not Kennedy, was the one potential candidate who aroused the active sympathy of many campus liberals. During his three-and-a-half years in office, Kennedy's impact appears to have been mixed. On one hand, his administration was regarded with increasing mistrust among students already involved in activist politics; SNCC's criticisms of the Justice Department's hands-off policies in the Deep South were especially important in this regard. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1963 adopted a document, America and the New Era, which made a comprehensive critique of Kennedy-style liberalism. On the other hand, President Kennedy's image among young people not yet involved in activist politics, especially many who were still in high school during his tenure, seems to have been different. Among many, he raised idealistic hopes about the possibilities for change in the US, hopes whose shattering later in the decade helped lead to disillusionment and radicalization.

One thing that can be said with some certainty is that the New Left was strongly affected by the fact that Democratic administrations were in power during the period of its emergence and maturation. This fact meant that the lines between liberals and radicals were much clearer than they would have been if there had existed an amorphous liberal-radical "opposition" to a conservative Republican President. The New Left's hostility toward "corporate liberalism" was a spur to its radicalization.


(7) "National Council (December) 1962: Report of the National Secretary", SDS papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.


PICTURES FROM MY LIFE
Marcia Salo Rizzi
"We have no art, we simply do everything as well as possible."
—Balinese saying

This book is a small attempt to de-mystify what critics call creating art, and I call making pictures. The difference is: only a few adults create art, which they hang in museums, while most children make pictures, which they show to their friends and parents.

Most children stop making pictures when they grow up, but I was determined to be the exception, so I enrolled in art school. But making pictures wasn’t enough anymore, I had to be an artist, and to really make a go of it, a genius. I tried very hard to be both those things, but I was at a disadvantage, first, I don’t like isolation and second, I’m a woman. There are very few spaces for artists, even if you’re a genius, and the men who publish art books, write reviews and run, teach and endow art schools allot these spaces.
For two years I was directly or indirectly discouraged with comments like “You should paint with more balls,” or with polite silences. The comments I could combat, the silences were deadly. Looking back, I’m surprised, not that I quit art school, but that I persevered as long as I did. But I still thought making pictures was important, I just didn’t have the necessary qualifications. So I married a painter who did, and who stood a good chance of getting one of those allotted spaces!

It’s been eight years since I quit art school, and four years since my marriage broke up, and my involvement with first the movement, then with the women’s movement, and now with It’s All Right to be Woman Theatre has brought me back to picture making! The movement taught me that the art establishment, like other establishments, does not wield ultimate power; it can be confronted, battled and de-valued. The women’s movement taught me, simply, self-respect. And from It’s All Right to be Woman Theatre, where we make our lives the subject of our plays, I learned that my life can be the subject of my pictures—which brings me full circle to the simple way I drew as a child.

Not that the simple way is easy—on the contrary, every time I put my brush to a piece of paper, dozens of doubts and judgments crowd around me and pull at my elbow. I work without plan, improvisationally, and the judgments lecture, “You’re forgetting composition!” I work simply, and the judgments mutter “No technique.” I work emotionally and personally, and they sneer “Formless, trivial, no perspective.” And finally, I work as a woman, and when I push the rest of them away, there’s one doubt in the corner who says quietly, but with authority, “You don’t really want to make pictures, you want to make babies.”

I feel that the struggle to produce these pictures has been well worth the price, and I am proud and happy to share them with you, but even with the combined forces of therapy, the women’s movement and the theatre group, it’s all I can do to keep that last doubt at bay.

Marcia Salo Rizzi February 6th, 1972

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Fifteen is excruciating; I've grown out of my tee-shirts but I haven't grown into a bra; I've stopped playing freeze tag but no one has asked me for a date. And the reflection in my mirror advises, "No one WILL ask you—you're too tall to be petite, but not tall enough to be dramatic, you're too skinny in some places and too fat in others, and you're too stiff-necked to be charming, but not unusual enough to be mysterious."

The situation was serious; I knew I needed more than contact lenses, braces or even a glamour make-over—I needed to be totally transformed. And from all the books I'd read and the movies I'd seen, transformation was achieved by falling passionately in love with a mysterious stranger; Then my passion would carry me like a strong tide beyond the shoals of my high school, my home and my age. And then my passion would melt down my gross, impure self, and I would emerge chemically purer, a higher alloy.

And although this mysterious stranger would be unlike me in every way, he would understand me better than anyone else. I could tell him all the stored-up angry things I couldn't tell my parents, but he would know I wasn't a crazy monkey who needed to be locked up. He would understand I was really a little girl in disguise, and he would tell me bedtime stories and tuck me in at night, just like my parents used to do before I had to grow up.
And best of all, we would have fun together. I wouldn’t be like my mother—a dutiful and self-effacing crocodile, and he wouldn’t be like my father—a grumpy and distant hippo. And we would play together like two furry animals, leaving the well-tended paths to explore the far corners of the forest.

As soon as I left home I fell passionately in love with a whole series of mysterious strangers, and although I didn’t melt into a new alloy, each passion swept me further from home. Then I met a man who understood me better than the rest; he read me bedtime stories and tucked me in at night and I married him.

I was very happy, and very determined not to let it trickle away. But in the process of protecting my happiness I turned into the very creature I had sworn never to become—a domestic animal punching time-clocks and content with table scraps. He was my future, but he turned into my death, and we lived that death for many years.
When he left me
there was no one to read me bedtime stories
and tuck me in at night. I was an orphan.
I felt amputated. I wanted to sleep
..... I wanted to die.
After a year of sleeping, I dediced I didn’t want to die, but I didn’t know how to go about living. I quit my job and dropped out, but I still longed for a cozy home. I joined the movement and worked honestly to transform society, but I still couldn’t look at my reflection in the mirror. I shared ideals with my comrades, but I felt too ashamed to tell anyone I masturbated. I alternated between total collectivity and total isolation, punctuating the two extremes with alienated fucking.
Both because of and in spite of all my floundering, I began to grow. It's hard to talk about growth: If I tell you about my friends, my analyst or my theatre group I get hopelessly specific. But if I try and generalize, it all sounds so vague and unreal. But I do see myself differently than I did at fifteen, and I would like to talk about that difference.
In one way I'm less alone: I no longer see myself as a solitary tree, scorched by fire and frost, and split by storms. Rather, I form, with other women, a forest. Our trunks are separate, distinct, each with our own growth rings and our own scars.
We each bear our own fruit in our own season. But our roots share the same soil, and our limbs reach towards each other forming a canopy, a network that is better able to endure.
But in another way, I'm more alone. Although I still long to be tucked in at night, I no longer seem to be looking for that mysterious stranger to inspire that mysterious passion. I neither want to be swept away nor melted down; I suppose I now see transformation as something I do, not something that gets done to me.
I AM A WOMAN GIVING BIRTH TO MYSELF.

The birth chant from Ellen's story, from It's All Right to be Woman Theatre.
Reading About the New Left

By Allen Hunter and James O'Brien

In the not-quite four years since Radical America last published a review of literature on the New Left and the student movement, there has been a flood of new writing on the subject. Our purpose here is not to catalog all of this material, but to spotlight particular works (old ones as well as new ones) which are helpful in understanding various aspects of the New Left’s development. These are books that can help to provide a collective political biography of the New Left generation: the experiences it went through in the 1960s, and what they have meant. There is no single book which by itself comes anywhere close to fulfilling that task. Even after omitting any mention of the many books we read which seemed useless for our purpose we still have a list of several dozen books, each of which tells part of the story.

For reasons of greater availability, this essay deals only with material that has been published in book (or sometimes pamphlet) form, and not with magazine or newspaper articles unless they have been included in anthologies. At the moment the most nearly up-to-date listing of relevant articles is the one compiled by Bettina Aptheker, Bibliography of Higher Education and the Student Rebellion in the United States (revised 1972), available for $1.25 from the American Institute for Marxist Studies, 20 East 30th Street, New York, New York 10016. A select list of academic studies of student dissent is included in Philip G. Altbach and Robert Laufer (editors): The New Pilgrims (1972, David McKay paperback). In any case, the gusto with which major publishers vied for material on the New Left two or three years ago guaranteed that a great many of the movement’s best descriptive and analytical writings are now available in books.

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We begin with a brief survey of literature which preceded the New Left, but in which one can see a foreshadowing of the dominant intellectual and political concerns of the New Left in the 1960s. There is a tendency to view the 1950s as simply the triumphal period of the American empire. Its passive populace was sanitized and deradicalized and lulled by the spread of televised cultural mediocrity. The period was characterized by intellectual timidity born in the collapse of the Left; intellectuals were unable to stand against McCarthyism and were drawn into the celebration of America's material success. Yet the placidity was not total, and some literary and cultural forms did contain the seeds of discontent and dissatisfaction, if not of outright opposition. The earliest manifestations of discontent took the form of personal rebellion. In this rebellion we see the seeds of the self-conscious politics of anti-authoritarianism that was very important in the New Left. J. D. Salinger’s enormously popular Catcher in the Rye (1951 Bantam paperback) was one of the first post-war works in which the hero’s sensitivity was integrally related to his willful noncompliance. Furthermore Holden Caulfield was an adolescent who rejected America as phony and in so doing set himself apart from the adult world.

By the mid-'50s the rise of rock and roll reflected the growing popularity of postures of personal defiance. The origins of rock and roll in both rhythm and blues and country and western music were important in providing an alternative to the programmed popular music of the time. The assertive stage presence and uninhibited sensual style of rock performers led adults to oppose it, and this response fed generational antagonism which has been important in the history of rock and roll's success. A good introduction to its early history is Charlie Gillett's The Sound of the City: The Rise of Rock and Roll (1970, Dell paperback). Gillett is good at showing how the powerful major record companies subverted the wilder, creative strains in rock and roll and learned to serve up a standardized style they felt they could sell. He gives less attention to the social setting and implications of the rise of rock. The movies of James Dean and Marlon Brando are another example of the importance of generational conflict. The heroes were young,
and older people were either well-meaning but unable to understand or outright unsympathetic enemies. James Dean, misunderstood teenager and young man of Rebel Without a Cause and East of Eden, captivated young people and became an idol largely because of his style—which was uniquely his, but also represented the longings and fears youth romanticized. In The Wild One, Marlon Brando as the hoodlum with the heart of gold contributed to the myth of the bike gangs as maltreated, unwanted members of society who of necessity created their own way of life and code of ethics. Because of the kernel of truth in these images and because of the romanticization of the oppressed, this myth persisted in one form or another until Altamont.

Though not directly related to the above changes in music and movies, the late 1950s also saw the birth of the beats. The beat movement extended far beyond the isolated bohemianism of earlier periods. Progressive jazz, folk music, poetry readings, drugs, a different dress, and an attempted adoption of hip black ways were all aspects of the beats. The beat movement strove to be complete in addressing all aspects of life. Its members not only rebelled but sought to create an alternative. The movement propagandized itself; although non-conformist and often arrogant, it did not desire to remain a small elite aloof from other young people. A result of this was that though the Village, North Beach, and Venice were its meccas, they were not its universe. The publishing houses of New Directions, City Lights, and the Evergreen Review printed the beats’ poetry and fiction and gave them wide circulation. The rush of words in Jack Kerouac’s On The Road (1957, New American Library paperback) spun Dean Moriarty and Sal Paradise back and forth across the country; and it helped to set many others in motion in pursuit of pockets of like-minded people. Much more than in Kerouac the critique of society is explicit in Allen Ginsberg’s Howl (1956, City Lights Press paperback), which presented horrified images of America, that “Nightmare of Moloch”. Less intense but more widely read than Ginsberg’s poetry was that of his publisher, Lawrence Ferlinghetti. In A Coney Island of the Mind (1958, New Directions paperback), he did not approach Ginsberg’s mad visions, but his poems did ring true because they were
variably ironic, nostalgic, or angry about the events of commonly-shared everyday life.

The theme of personal rebellion discussed above is but one aspect of the powerful American belief in individualism. With the spread of bureaucracy through so much of our lives, a new strain of individualism achieved its literary form. The need for daily individual opposition to totally administered lives was hilariously expressed in Joseph Heller’s *Catch-22* (1961, Dell paperback) and in Ken Kesey’s *One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest* (1962, Signet paperback). As in C. W. Mills’s brilliant but pessimistic *White Collar* (1951, Oxford University Press paperback) and the pop sociology of William H. Whyte Junior’s *The Organization Man* (1956, Doubleday Anchor paperback), these novels show society as no longer the milieu in which a person could realize his individual desires and potentials. Only through conscious and concerted opposition to society could a person hope to create a bit of psychic space and guard the safety of his body. A reflection of the partiality of the success of the New Left is the fact that these novels—and ones like them—have remained so popular. Their continued popularity is a gauge of the degree to which opposition to society is still seen as an individual struggle rather than one based in collective solidarity.

Paul Goodman provided one of the first coherent analyses of this personal rebellion. His most successful book was *Growing Up Absurd* (1960, Vintage paperback), in which the reasons for the rebellion of the young were shown to have their roots in the oppressive organization of society. Goodman’s critique of America’s vacuous and stifling institutions helped to validate the feelings of alienation experienced by many young people.

In his association with *Liberation* magazine (since 1956), Goodman was also part of the pacifist Left which existed after the collapse of the Marxist parties. This Left found a focus for rebellion in its members’ need to stand, alone if need be, against society’s evils. From this absolute moralism and the non-violent tactics of personal witness and mass civil disobedience, the New Left consciously and unconsciously adopted issues, tactics, and moral postures. In the late 1950s the Friends, the Fellowship of Reconcili-
ation (FOR), and the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), opposed nuclear testing as well as the fearful anti-communism that justified such atomic insanity. Radical pacifists, working in CORE and other groups, also played an active role in civil-rights activity in the early 1960s. This tradition of personal witness had a larger influence on the New Left than is generally recognized. These organizations, their activities, and their role in sponsoring major protests and demonstrations provided much of the context and texture of early New Left experiences. The act of putting one's body on the line and the significance of symbolic action derive from that influence. The best introduction to the writings of A. J. Muste, David Dellinger, and other people involved in this politics is found in Seeds of Liberation (1964), edited by Paul Goodman from issues of Liberation between 1956 and 1964.

In addition to the style of personal revolt and the politics of radical pacifism, there are several important intellectual precursors to the New Left. Particularly in the writings of William A. Williams, Paul Baran, C. Wright Mills, Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, and Wilhelm Reich, the beginnings of several critical perspectives were evident.

Several of Williams's ideas have been influential. In The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959, 1972 Delta paperback), the basic thesis was that since the 1890s those few in power have sought to resolve domestic economic and social crises through foreign economic expansion. This necessary outward thrust determined America's need for hegemony over as much of the world as possible. Williams's analysis was important in two ways. First, it helped topple the Cold War ideology in which America's international policies were seen as generous and benevolent. Second, the theory of expansion gave coherence to American actions in such a way that, when the Vietnam War became an overriding issue after 1965, it could be seen as an imperialist venture and not as an unfortunate aberration. In his more comprehensive and synthetic book, The Contours of American History (1961, Quadrangle paperback), Williams traced the development of American capitalism through three stages: those of mercantilism, laissez-faire, and corporatism. This periodization was important because it made
clear the idea that the periods of capitalism and capitalism itself are historical categories that can be transcended. But it was in the concept of corporate liberalism that Williams had his widest and most direct influence. Briefly, Williams saw the major reforms of the Twentieth Century as attempts to stabilize society in the interests of the large corporations. While not widely read himself, he was the teacher and collaborator of some of the New Leftists who edited *Studies on the Left* in the early 1960s. These young historians in their journal and in books and articles have elaborated and applied the concept of corporate liberalism to both domestic history and the history of foreign policy. They had an important influence on the thinking of early SDS members. A collection of articles from *Studies* is available as *For a New America* (1970, Vintage paperback). It was edited by David Eakins and James Weinstein, both of whom are now editors of Socialist Revolution.

Like Williams, Paul Baran developed his ideas at a time when domestic struggles were at their nadir. This lack of class politics is reflected in *The Political Economy of Growth* (1956, Monthly Review Press paperback), which is an attempt to understand the workings of a mature international capitalist economy. Its value and the reason for its wide acceptance by Third World intellectuals was in its explanation of underdevelopment as a necessary function of capitalist development. Not read by many in the US, it is nonetheless important because it was the starting point of much of *Monthly Review*'s later scholarship and publishing. In Baran we see the intellectual origins of the Third World orientation that led many New Leftists to the writings of Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Lin Piao. In the past decade *Monthly Review* devoted most of its attention to the international aspects of imperialism; and until the last couple of years its lack of discussion of domestic class dynamics went largely unnoticed. Continuing his earlier work, in *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (1966, Monthly Review Press paperback), Baran and Paul Sweezy attempted to develop an understanding of the domestic effects of some of the economic forces that Baran had located in *The Political Economy of Growth*. They
concerned themselves with the "generation and absorption of the surplus under conditions of monopoly capitalism". The book, however, only reflects a partial reality; it failed to understand the forces that are again leading to class militancy in the US.

The most widely read work of C. W. Mills, *The Power Elite* (1956, Oxford University Press paperback) contributed to another mode of New Left thinking. He popularized elite analysis and demonstrated that the reason that major events seemed to be out of our (popular) control is that, in effect, they were. Mills's non-Marxist interpretation did not stress the interaction of social classes; he did, however, show that the "commanding heights" of all major institutions were controlled by a small group of inter-related and interlocking elites. At a time when the young New Left was still outraged by the lack of substantive democracy at all levels of government and in all important institutions, Mills provided an understanding of why it was lacking, and helped organizers to focus analytical attention on questions of power and control. The early community organizing projects began to develop community power structure research methods that owed much to Mills. In the later years of the New Left researchers such as those in NACL A (the North American Committee on Latin America) used much of his methodology in their studies of the mechanisms of control in the American empire. And it was partly in the rejection of elite structures that participatory democracy became an important goal and method for a time in the New Left.

Another strain of thought was in the unity of the personal and the political. This was reflected in a variety of ways: the attempts at participatory democracy; the emphasis on life-styles and the desire to integrate drugs and a (male-oriented) freer sexuality. However the greatest lasting importance of this unity is expressed in the women's and gay liberation movements. More fully than past Left movements the New Left criticized the totality of American culture, and in this enterprise owed much to Reich, Brown, and Marcus. In *Character Analysis* (1933, Noonday paperback) and in *The Function of the Orgasm* (1942, Noonday paperback), Reich emphasized character structure and sexuality as modes for internalizing repression. But unlike Freud, Reich
was not ultimately pessimistic about the need for repression; and he did believe in the potentiality of a liberated sexuality. In Life Against Death (1959, Vintage paperback), Brown went even further in prescribing polymorphous perversity in which the genital orientation and the male/female dichotomy in sexuality would disappear. Unlike Reich, who was a Marxist (in his early period, at least), Brown was not concerned with social or historical change. His writing thus tantalized but had limited lasting appeal to the New Left.

Even though his writings are now properly criticized by the Left, Herbert Marcuse had a greater influence on the New Left than either Brown or Reich. The power of Eros and Civilization (1955, Vintage paperback) was that at the same time that it analyzed the historical social and psychological forces of repression necessary for Western civilization, it also held out the liberatory vision of unpressed and sensuous activity. One-Dimensional Man (1964, Beacon Press paperback) was more directly concerned with the forms of political, technological, and intellectual domination of advanced capitalism. With this emphasis Marcuse—as well as Reich—was arguing that the development of the superstructure had a dynamic of its own. This, again, is related to the New Left’s concern with the various modes of oppression before it also became concerned with direct economic exploitation. Because Marcuse took the multi- versity as his model of society (a mistake), his critique was attractive to many culturally-isolated and campus-based New Leftists.

The New Left thus was born with many of its basic ideas already in existence; however the New Left as a movement integrated (1) the anti-authoritarianism of the young with the fuller politics of the personal; and (2) a critique of imperialism abroad with a critique of racism and the lack of popular control at home. What we must now examine is the literature that discusses how these new understandings were translated into practical activity in the past decade.

The New Left Experience: Overviews
Of the anthologies on the New Left, two are worthy of special mention: Massimo Teodori (editor): *The New Left: A Documentary History* (1969, Bobbs-Merrill paperback) and Mitchell Goodman (editor): *The Movement* (1970, Knopf paperback). Teodori, a veteran of the Italian student movement, spent a relatively short time in the US but did a remarkably sensitive job of choosing and excerpting documents. His introductory essay, stressing the aptness of a decentralized movement like the New Left for a "post-industrial" capitalist society, is also worthwhile. Although there is little in the book to predict the disintegration of SDS and the New Left that was well underway by the time The New Left was actually published, Teodori's book is still the best single guide to the New Left's development from 1960 to 1968. (A more precise chronology, though without much interpretation, is given in James O'Brien: *A History of the New Left, 1960-1968*, available for 30¢ from the New England Free Press, 791 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02118.) Mitchell Goodman's *The Movement*, a huge, sprawling book, is notable chiefly for the way in which its layout permitted it to catch the freewheeling flavor of the underground press. Nearly all of its documents and pictures are from 1968 and 1969, although a few go further back. It is especially strong in its coverage of the women's movement and of alternative institutions. Rather than a history, it is basically a long series of snapshots of movement activities at the end of the 1960s, with theoretical debates and factional intrigues left off-camera.

Less helpful for our purposes, but still worthwhile, is *The New Left: A Collection of Essays*, edited by Priscilla Long (1969, Porter Sargent paperback). It is the best of several anthologies—others were edited by Carl Oglesby, William Slate, and Arthur Lothstein—aimed at showing non-movement audiences the plausibility of New Left ideas. Especially valuable in this book is an early overview of women's liberation, written by Sue Munker, Evelyn Goldfield, and Naomi Weissstein, which is unavailable elsewhere. Todd Gitlin (editor): *Campfires of Resistance: Poetry from the Movement* (1971, Bobbs-Merrill paperback) is a fine selection of admittedly uneven poetry. Fifty-eight different
authors, nearly all of whom saw themselves primarily as political activists rather than poets, are represented. Gitlin’s search for “expressions of situation, feeling, vision which I recognized, instantly, as a true statement of what the movement has seen and gone through” was the right one.

Unfortunately, there is very little in the way of autobiography or reminiscence which might depict the course of the New Left through the prism of an individual life. Paul Cowan’s The Making of an Un-American (1969, Delta paperback) is the most intensive account of one person’s move from liberalism to radicalism. Cowan relates primarily his experiences in Southern civil-rights work and in the Peace Corps; the common thread is his sense of the arrogance and cultural oppression which mark the relations between white Yankees and the rest of the world. Another clear, though implicit, theme in the book is the author’s awareness that as a bright Harvard graduate with good family connections he could probably have chosen a path of ascent into the ruling class. A number of Michael Rossman’s personal-political writings from 1960 — when he was a Berkeley sophomore — to 1970 have been collected as The Wedding Within the War (1971, Doubleday Anchor paperback). His earlier essays, particularly one on the vigil for Caryl Chessman outside San Quentin in 1960 and his “Barefoot in a Marshmallow World” about the Free Speech Movement of 1964, form the most valuable part of the book. There is a strong collective self-celebration in Rossman’s attitude toward the youth revolt, and by the end of the decade he tended to see politics as superfluous. Still, he is a gifted writer. Thomas Powers’s somewhat melodramatic Diana: The Making of a Terrorist (1971, Bantam paperback) is of interest despite some distortions of fact and emphasis. It chronicles the life of Diana Oughton, one of the three Weatherpeople killed in the town-house explosion in New York in the spring of 1970. She was a Bryn Mawr graduate and daughter of a wealthy Republican state legislator in Illinois, and her radicalization was primarily the result of an outraged idealism. This same impulse, minus the element of cultural revolt, is very clearly marked in the collective biography which Kenneth Keniston presents of Young Radicals (1968, Harcourt Brace paperback). Keniston’s book
is based on extensive interviews with several (unnamed) young male activists working in the national office of the Vietnam Summer project in 1967.

A final book worth mentioning here is *Youth and Social Change* (1971) by Richard Flacks, a leader of SDS for several years after the Port Huron convention of 1962, and more recently a leading academic writer on student activism. Although much of this book is written in a pedestrian style, it is still the most thoroughgoing attempt by a movement participant to come to grips with the revolt of the 1960s and where it came from. He puts great stress on changes in child-rearing practices, especially within the college-educated middle class, and also borrows Kenneth Keniston's emphasis (developed in *Youth and Dissent*, 1971) on the relatively recent emergence of "youth" as a separate stage of life between adolescence and full adulthood. A concluding chapter, "Beyond the Youth Revolt", discusses the fragile nature of youthful solidarity and the need for a broader movement to fulfill the promise of the youth revolt.

**Formation of the New Left 1960-65**

The best source on this early period, aside from Massimo Teodori's book, is Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau: *The New Radicals: A Report With Documents* (1966 Vintage paperback). It has a generally shrewd introduction of 85 pages and well chosen (though too often excerpted) documents on SNCC, early SDS, the Free Speech Movement, and the first year of Vietnam protest. Jack Newfield: *A Prophetic Minority* (1966, Signet paperback) is a warm and highly readable journalistic account covering the same period, though its primary focus is on the leadership of SNCC and SDS rather than what was actually happening on the campuses. An anthology edited by Mitchell Cohen and Dennis Hale, *The New Student Left* (1966, 1967 Beacon paperback), is generally inferior to the Jacobs-Landau book, but it has some early SDS documents, including a good selection on SDS's community-organizing projects, which are not available in other anthologies. (There is one book which is tangentially about SDS's community organizing. It is Todd
Gitlin and Nanci Hollander: *Uptown* (1970, Harper Torchbook paperback). It is not directly about SDS, but about poor Appalachian whites whom the Chicago JOIN project worked with starting in 1964; it is a beautiful example of the potential of oral history, and worth mentioning here for that reason.)

An indispensable book for understanding the impact which the Southern civil-rights movement, and particularly SNCC, had on the development of the New Left is Howard Zinn's *SNCC: The New Abolitionists* (1964, 1965, Beacon paperback). Zinn sympathetically portrays SNCC and its work and makes it clear why its staff members became so bitter at the Federal Government's role in civil rights. The book's second edition includes an account of the crucial Democratic convention in Atlanta City in 1964. James Forman's just-published *The Making of Black Revolutionaries* (1972) includes a long section on its author's experiences in SNCC, in which he was executive secretary during its period of greatest activity. Two good books on the 1964 Mississippi Summer project, both of which convey a sense of the civil-rights struggle's radicalizing impact on young whites who joined it, are Sally Belfrage: *Freedom Summer* (1965, Viking paperback) and Elizabeth Sutherland (editor): *Letters from Mississippi* (1965, Signet paperback). The latter book consists of excerpts from letters written by summer volunteers and is a highly valuable source. Douglas Dowd and Mary Nichols (editors): *Step by Step* (1965, Norton paperback) describes the experience of Cornell students who worked in Fayette County, Tennessee, during the same summer. Not so lively as the Mississippi books, it is still a useful supplement to them.

While very little material has been collected on white Northern campuses in the first few years of the 1960s, the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964 is amply memorialized. Max Heirich's scholarly *The Beginning: Berkeley 1964* (1970) is based on first-hand observations and lengthy interviews and is the best book to read on the subject. Hal Draper's *Berkeley: The New Student Revolt* (1965, Evergreen paperback) is a more stirring narration by a long-time socialist who worked at the U of C library and whose critique of the University was influential within the
Finally, The Berkeley Student Revolt, edited by S.M. Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin (1965, Doubleday Anchor paperback), is a useful collection of leaflets, speeches, faculty punditry, and a hundred-page chronology.

Maturation, 1965–69

Probably the best single book to read on the 1965–69 period, though it is not formally about the New Left, is Michael Miles’s The Radical Probe: The Logic of Student Rebellion (1971). It is not a narrative but an analysis of present-day universities in the US and the dynamics of white and black student revolts. Rebellion in the University, by S.M. Lipset (1971, Little Brown paperback) contains, among a certain amount of drivel, two historical chapters on student unrest through the 1950s and a useful summary of social-science research on which types of students tended to become involved in activist politics in the 1960s. There are several worthwhile books on particular campus uprisings. By far the most analytical and useful is Bill Barlow and Peter Shapiro, An End to Silence: The San Francisco State Student Movement in the ‘60s (1971, Pegasus paperback), which contains a good discussion of educational tracking in the California higher educational system. Jerry Avorn and associates: Up Against the Ivy Wall: A History of the Columbia Crisis (1968, Atheneum paperback) is a competent narrative by student journalists. Parallel to it is a similar book on the Harvard revolt a year later, The Harvard Strike by Lawrence E. Eichel and associates (1970, Houghton-Mifflin paperback). James S. Kunen’s witty personal account of the Columbia strike, The Strawberry Statement (1969, Avon paperback) deserves mention despite its superficiality, because it is the best “view from the inside” of one of the campus confrontations.

Even though direct white participation in the civil-rights movement was essentially ended with the adoption of Black Power by SNCC and CORE in 1966, black influence was still extremely strong in the continued growth and radicalization of the New Left. In addition to the well known Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965, Grove paperback) and Eldridge Cleav-
er’s Soul on Ice (1968, Dell paperback), at least two other books are worth reading. James Forman: Sammy Younge, Junior (1968, Grove paperback) is a fine example of the use of oral history. It gives a sensitive picture, through the life of one participant, of SNCC and the black student movement at the middle of the decade. Robert L. Allen: Black Awakening in Capitalist America (1969, Doubleday Anchor paperback) is a brilliant analysis of different tendencies within the black movement in the late ’60s.

There is no general history of the protest against the Vietnam War, though there are useful books on various aspects of it. Louis Menashe and Ronald Radosh (editors): Teach-Ins: U.S.A. (1967, Praeger paperback) gives a good sense of the teach-ins which were important in the first year or so of opposition to the war around 1965. Barbara Garson’s morbidly satirical play MacBird (1966, Grove paperback) shows the bitterness which anti-war feeling took on as the war deepened. The idea that the Kennedy assassination was due to a high-level conspiracy, used in MacBird as a dramatic device, was actually quite widespread, and was an index of young people’s increasing mistrust of the Government. Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd: The Resistance (1970, Beacon paperback) is an excellent source on the origins and development of draft resistance, which became an important theme of the New Left in 1967. Alice Lynd (editor): We Won’t Go (1968, Beacon Press paperback) brings together an assortment of political and autobiographical statements by young draft resisters. On the other side of the induction line, Andrew Stapp’s exuberant and enjoyable Up Against the Brass (1970, Simon and Schuster paperback) and Fred Halsted’s GIs Speak Out (1969, Pathfinder paperback), which is on the Fort Jackson Eight, show the work that Old Left groups were finding it possible to do within the army in the late ’60s. More recently GI dissent has been a major focus for concern among all segments of the Left; Larry Waterhouse and Marian Vizard: Turning the Guns Around (1971, Delta paperback) is a fine selection of writings from GI underground papers and civilian support groups. Scarcely anyone on the Left has paid attention to the tens of thousands of draft evaders and deserters who went to Canada; Roger Neville Williams:
The New Exiles: American War Resisters in Canada (1971, Liveright paperback) is a lengthy and informative report on them. Norman Mailer's Armies of the Night (1968, New American Library paperback) takes the Pentagon demonstration of October 1967 as its setting, and for all its author's pretenses it stands as a creative example of contemporary history. The protests at the Democratic convention in Chicago the following year are covered by the Walker Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Rights in Conflict (1968, Bantam paperback), and by John Schultz's sensitive journalistic account, No One Was Killed (1969, Follett paperback), which accuses the Walker Report of twisting evidence in order to soften its criticism of the Chicago authorities.

The relationship between radical politics and youth culture is crucial to an understanding of the New Left. Several books shed light on different aspects of this question. Don McNeill's Moving Through Here (1970, Lancer paperback) consists of sadly humorous sketches written for the Village Voice by a young reporter who was murdered at age 22. It depicts the inability of the hippie population on the Lower East Side in 1967, the "Summer of Love", to evolve cooperative means of survival. Raymond Mungo, Famous Long Ago: My Life and Hard Times with Liberation News Service (1970, Pocket Book paperback) is a personal chronicle of the first year (1967-68) of Liberation News Service and its ultimate split between political and cultural rebels; Mungo, who now lives on a farm in Vermont, writes from the latter perspective and writes very well if not deeply. Abby Hoffman, Revolution for the Hell of It (1968, Dial paperback) is also set in 1967-68 and describes the origins of the Youth International Party and the background of the Yippies' observances at the Democratic convention in Chicago. Like Jerry Rubin's less engaging Do It: Scenarios of the Revolution (1970, Simon & Schuster paperback), Hoffman's book showed the machismo tendencies which became heightened as the movement became a focal point for the mass media toward the end of the decade.

On the internal development of SDS in the period between 1965 and the 1969 split, little is available. The second volume of Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Starr (editor): The
University Crisis Reader (1971, Vintage paperback) is the best single source of strategic writings on the New Left side of the SDS debates, with important documents by Carl Davidson, Todd Gitlin, Les Coleman, Mark Rudd, and others, including the original Weatherman statement. Revolution Today: USA, a collection of basic documents of the Progressive Labor Party (1970, Exposition Press paperback) gives a more than ample view of the positions which PL held in the debate. Although the New Working Class position was not defended for long by any major New Left grouping, it still has historical importance. A recent book by Greg Calvert and Carol Neiman, A Disrupted History: The New Left and the New Capitalism (1971, Vintage paperback), is the best statement of the viewpoint, though David Gilber's essay "Consumption: Domestic Imperialism" (reprinted in the Priscilla Long anthology and as a New England Free Press pamphlet) remains important.

Since 1969

All of the writings from and about the post-1969 period clearly show their roots in the earlier history of the New Left. At the same time they represent the culmination of several strands of the New Left, and the development of new sectoral movements. To begin with the moderate extreme, Ken Hurwitz's Marching Nowhere (1971, W.W. Norton paperback) is a personal account of the Left-liberal Moratorium that was intended to begin (but in fact also peaked) on October 15, 1969. Hurwitz gave a sense of how the Moratorium tried to play both sides of the street—appealing to establishment liberals and student radicals—by promoting a vacuous anti-war politics that was meant to offend no one.

There is not yet a good account of the protests against Nixon's Cambodia invasion of May 1970, but there is a journalistic narrative of the killings at Kent State and the events surrounding the shooting by the National Guard. It is Thirteen Seconds: Confrontation at Kent State, by two Cleveland Plain Dealer reporters, Michael D. Roberts and Joe Eszterhas (1970). Another spectacle of this period was
the Conspiracy Trial. The best chronicle of the trial itself is Jason Epstein’s *The Great Conspiracy Trial: An Essay on Law, Liberty, and the Constitution* (1970, Vintage paperback). The text is largely a Left-liberal account—with historical and constitutional digressions—of the trial proceedings, the courtroom antics of Judge Julius and associates, and the denial of basic rights to Bobby Seale and the others. *The Conspiracy* (1970, Dell paperback) is a collection of articles by each of the defendants with a preface by their lawyers. It gives a sense of the different politics and styles of the defendants as they seized the opportunity of the Trial and their many speaking engagements for putting forth their views. Tom Hayden’s thoughts on the Trial, the TDA demonstrations, and the politics of the “liberated zones”—with youth as a central category—are found in *The Trial* (1970, Holt, Rinehart paperback). Originally published as the July 1970 issue of Ramparts, The Trial was widely read in the Left, but it unwittingly represented the culmination of a political period, not the foreshadowing of a new strategy.

The repression against the Conspiracy 8 was but a small part of the Government’s “law and order” campaign. The Panthers were harshly attacked throughout this period, and much of the campus organizing in 1969–70 was around various Panther trials and killings. The Panthers were seen as the vanguard by much of the white Left and admired by most of it. The militant politics that attracted the New Left, an idolatory biography of Huey P. Newton, and the history of the Black Panther Party are all in Bobby Seale’s *Seize the Time* (1970, Vintage paperback).

Also about this time the prison support movement began, and like Eldridge Cleaver before him, George Jackson was an eloquent spokesman for the black revolutionaries being forged in America’s prisons. His strength, hunger for freedom, and growing radicalism were vividly recorded in *Soledad Brother: The Prison Letters of George Jackson* (1970, Bantam paperback).

*The Letters of Sam Melville* (1971, Morrow paperback), also from prison, are by a white radical who was jailed for self-conscious political acts of destruction. Melville was killed by the New York state police in their attack on Attica
in the fall of 1971. His letters do not approach the power of Jackson's, but two introductions by his close friends Jane Alpert (now underground) and John Cohen capture the ambiguities of Melville's acts. They have attained an objective view of Melville's potential for personally and politically nihilistic acts at the same time they saw his humanity and passion for social liberation.

Although he was not part of SDS, Melville's ideas and acts were akin to those of Weatherman. Harold Jacobs has edited Weatherman (1970, Ramparts paperback), a collection of articles about Weatherman and important Weatherman documents. The full Weatherman statement, Shin'ya Ono's gripping narrative of the Days of Rage, Weather songs and testimonials are included. Because it was more diffuse and less "newsworthy", there has been no book or anthologized article about RYM II. There is, however, a book about the PL-oriented faction of SDS—now the only SDS. Alan Adelson's SDS: A Profile (1972, Scribner paperback) is a favorable, highly superficial description of several SDS chapters in the year after the split.

With the gradual coming apart of the New Left, one of the directions in which movement energy flowed was into Third World support. Anti-imperialism and the adulation of Che and Ho go back several years, but the fullest organizational expression of this politics was the Venceremos Brigade. Writings by members of the first two Brigades have been collected in Venceremos Brigade: Young Americans Sharing the Life and Work of Revolutionary Cuba (1971, Simon and Schuster paperback) edited by Carol Brightman and Sandra Levinson. Excited by the Cuban Revolution, the brigadistas were better able to be thorough and honest in discussing the dynamics of the Brigade itself than in capturing
the nuances of the Cuban Revolution.

The politics of everyday life was another way in which people moved away from campus-based New Left politics. For those who fully immersed themselves in the counter-culture it was less a new politics than an escape from politics. But for others it was a serious attempt to link the political with the personal. In A Name for Ourselves (1971) Paul Potter unsuccessfully attempted to wed these two inter-related aspects of change. The first third of his book is a moving account of our need for love and of the blocks that keep us from making ourselves whole. But the rest of the book fumbles and fails as Potter tries to develop a politics that would allow us to become whole, and thus capable of love.

Two sectoral movements that have been more successful in integrating the personal and political (largely because they are movements) are the women’s and gay liberation movements. The literature of women’s liberation is already extensive, and the books listed below are an introduction more to the development of the movement than to the breadth of the ideas and issues that are part of women’s liberation. Before discussing books from women’s liberation itself there are a few works that had some influence and renown earlier, but were most widely read with the rise of women’s liberation in the late 1960s. Pre-eminent among these is Simone de Beauvoir’s classic The Second Sex (1949, Bantam paperback). Using Sartrean existential categories she saw the oppression of women in their condition of otherness and objectification. Also important are the novels of Doris Lessing and the poetry of Sylvia Plath. In The Feminine Mystique (1963, Bantam paperback) Betty Friedan located many of the modes of oppression that women experience in the US today. The book was important because it attacked the economic exploitation of women, it began to look critically at Freud’s analysis of women, and it exposed the media’s use of female sexuality.

The most detailed overview of the development of the women’s movement is the Rebirth of Feminism (1971) by Judith Hole and Ellen Levine. The authors trace the rise of the first of the new feminist organizations, NOW (National Organization for Women), and in a long second chapter they
chronicle the growth of the radical women’s movement out of the male-dominated New Left. In the anthologies mentioned below there are other discussions of the rise of the women’s movement that verify and amplify Hole and Levine’s discussion. As a counterpoint to these histories, Juliet Mitchell’s *Women’s Estate* (1971) is important because she stressed structural changes in advanced capitalist societies that help account for the rise of the new women’s movement. She also reworked and extended the material that originally appeared in her well-known article “The Longest Revolution” (1966, reprinted as a New England Free Press pamphlet and in E. H. Altbach’s *From Feminism to Liberation*); and she tried to suggest the limitations of radical feminism without socialism and of socialism without radical feminism.

Of the anthologies, one of the earliest was *The New Women: A Motive Anthology on Women’s Liberation* edited by Joanne Cooke, Charlotte Bunch-Weeks, and Robin Morgan (1970, Fawcett paperback). It is of interest in part because it appeared as the March-April 1969 issue of *Motive*, a church-affiliated magazine, and at that early date already conveyed a sense of the breadth of issues the women’s movement touched on. Probably the best of the anthologies is Robin Morgan (editor): *Sisterhood Is Powerful* (1970, Vintage paperback). Edited by radicals, Sisterhood is a strong book because it was made to be used, not just read. It has useful quotes, statistics, and a good bibliography, and the articles give a sense of the breadth of women’s liberation: in employment and education, in the family, in sexuality, in birth control, among high school women, among Third World women.

*Voices from Women’s Liberation* (1970, Signet paperback), edited by Leslie B. Tanner, also has a number of early manifestos as well as other good articles. An expansion of the Radical America Women’s Issue of February 1970, *From Feminism to Liberation*, collected by Edith Hoshino Altbach (1971, Schenkman paperback), also has a good selection of articles including a section on “Work and the Family”. Roberta Salper (editor): *Female Liberation: History and Current Politics* (1972, Knopf paperback) has a useful summary by Salper of “The Development of the
American Women’s Liberation Movement, 1967-1971”. It is of particular interest here because it includes a bibliographical history that relates the publication of important pieces to developments within the women’s movement. A reading of this article will provide a good guide to many of the pieces contained in the anthologies mentioned above.

The writings of the gay liberation movement, while growing, are not yet as extensive as those of the women’s movement. Or at least they are not as readily available in book form. The Gay Militants (1971), by Donn Teal, is a useful survey of the development of gay liberation through 1970—but with only one chapter specifically about women. Much of Teal’s writing is used to introduce and situate selections from gay movement writings. This makes the book a bit unwieldy, but does lend it an immediacy. The book is good as a history, not only of gay liberation, but of its relationship to the machismo of the straight male-dominated Left in which numbers of gay people felt it necessary to keep their homosexuality hidden.

Taken as a whole, the books which we have discussed in this essay add up to a more or less adequate description of the New Left and of the way in which it grew and disintegrated. Many of them were written in the late 1960s, when it appeared to many of us that the movement was irresistibly growing—and some of these writings are colored by that euphoric mood. Almost all of them share the fault of not being sufficiently analytical about the roots of the New Left: its class setting and the reason it emerged at this particular point in history. In this respect they may be said to share a weakness that was strongly characteristic of the New Left itself, since the New Left was never able to construct a program for action that was based on an understanding of its own position in society. Still, on reading the books one is struck by a sense of the scope of what the New Left did accomplish in its brief history.
Sports and the American Empire

by Mark Naison

Since the Second World War, sports have become a more visible and important part of American mass culture than ever before in our history. Through television coverage and heavy journalistic promotion, mass spectator sports have been made one of the major psychological reference points for American men, perhaps the single most important focus of emotion and energy in their leisure time. The corporations that finance this activity are capitalized at billions of dollars and are granted political privileges — gifts of land, stadiums constructed at public expense, immunity from anti-trust legislation — that are normally extended only to "public utilities". This special status is reinforced by the American educational system, which sponsors an intensive program of spectator sports from grade school up and explicitly seeks to "train" athletes for professional ranks in its higher levels.

The support that organized sports has been given by government, business, and education is not coincidental. The sports industry has been self-consciously used as a safety valve for social discontent and a vehicle for the political and cultural unification of the American population. Since the Second World War, sports has been one of the major areas for the assimilation of new racial groups (Blacks and Latins) into the mainstream of American life and the incorporation of backward and developing sections (the South and Southwest) into the orbit of modern capitalist relations. Black players began to enter major-league sports in large numbers at the exact time (1947–1950) that a series of executive orders "integrated" the US Armed Forces, and the expansion of professional (major-league)
football, basketball, and baseball to the South directly followed the passage of Federal Civil Rights legislation.

In addition, athletic events have increasingly reflected the dynamics of an emergent American imperialism. As the American political economy "internationalized" in the post-war period, many of its most distinctive cultural values and patterns, from consumerism to military preparedness, have become an integral part of organized sports. Professional sports events have become "spectacles" whose political and cultural impact lies as much in the marching bands, the cheerleaders, the commercial endorsements and the introduction of politicians and visiting servicemen as in the competition on the field. The spectator is dazzled by an image of American civilization that is so overwhelming that it seems incomprehensible and futile to try to change it or exist outside its framework.

Nevertheless, the use of organized sports as an instrument of political control and repression has not been entirely successful. The enormous American sports industry has not only failed to defuse social discontent off the field, but has found itself increasingly torn by rebellion within its own ranks. The black revolt, the anti-war movement, and women's liberation have all had an impact on contemporary sports, an impact which seems to get progressively greater the more sports are "capitalized" and exposed in the media. In the last ten years, with more TV coverage than ever, sports events have been interrupted by strikes, boycotts, and racial conflict to an unprecedented degree.

In addition, sports, particularly on a local level, continue to serve as vehicles for creativity, self-expression, and cultural growth for oppressed people. In working-class and poor neighborhoods throughout America, both black and white, participation in sports (as distinct from viewing) serves as a highly affirmative experience which can define communities, express personalities, and help people endure the pains of daily life. In Harlem, for example, basketball is more than just physical exercise and competition, it is a sphere of life in which young men affirmatively experience their blackness, feel the full-flowering of their abilities, and experience pride in their origin and community.
There is a kind of pathos in this (described in Peter Axheim’s excellent book *The City Game*)—that in communities where creative outlets are few, opportunities for mobility limited, and forms of living death legion, a sport should become the focal point of such emotion and energy. But it also represents a triumph of human ingenuity and creativity, an example of people’s ability to use an “irrelevant” or even repressive institution as a tool of self-development and solidarity. (1)

In the following pages, I will try to shed some light on the “double-edged” character of contemporary American sports—its emergence as a vehicle for the maintenance of corporate hegemony in America and the Empire, and its transformation into an instrument of political rebellion and the creation of new social relations. The essay will be divided into three sections—the first dealing with sports as a mirror of America’s relationship with the Third World and the American black community, the second dealing with the relationship of the sports industry to the changing position of women in American society, the third dealing with the effects of expanded media coverage and the corporate rationalization of sports on both athlete and spectator. In each section, we will observe a tension between the expanding use of athletic events to legitimize imperial goals and values, and the growing self-consciousness of groups directly or indirectly oppressed by the American sports industry.

Much of what follows will be highly speculative. It is not so much the product of original research as an effort to synthesize my own experiences as an athlete and a sports fan with my readings on the dynamics of American capitalism and the position of black people and women in American society. Its interpretive stance has been greatly influenced by the writings of CLR James, Selma James, and George Rawick, and by long and often painful discussions with Paul Buhle. These individuals have enabled me to develop a view of history which can accept my interest in sports as something other than a “political embarassment” and which can see revolution as a process which continually turns the most repressive aspects of society and culture into instruments of their own destruction. Much of the
"inspiration" behind what follows is theirs; the faults are all mine.

SPORTS, DECOLONIZATION, AND THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM: A CONTEXT FOR UNDERSTANDING THE POSITION OF THE BLACK ATHLETE IN AMERICAN SPORTS

The rise of the black athlete has been one of the more dramatic occurrences in post-war professional sports. Since 1947, black football, basketball, and baseball players, once limited to segregated teams, have moved quickly into the major leagues in their respective sports. By the late 1960s, they had become a dominant force, comprising over half the professional basketball players, over one-quarter of baseball and football players, and the majority of "all-stars" in all three sports. (2)

The meaning of this phenomenon has been the subject of much journalistic speculation and barroom debate. The "superiority" of the black athlete has been attributed to everything from extra muscles in the legs, to a unique bone structure, to a "constitutional ability to remain calm under pressure". (3) However such biological theories and images represent a fundamental misreading of the character of contemporary professional sports. Team sports are activities which are governed by the dynamics of modern industrial life and require highly specialized behavior. Professional athletes need far more than natural ability to succeed—they must practice their skills steadily, use strategic thinking, and co-operate with teammates and comrades (fellow workers) in a manner which is quite comparable to industrial work situations. The rise of the black athlete thus tells us a lot more about the rapid movement of black people into urban society and their creative assimilation of industrial values than it does about inherited racial differences. Blacks now compose almost 40% of the work force in the American automobile industry and over half the transit work force in Chicago, New York, and Detroit; yet no one talks about the "natural propensity" of black people for assembly-line work, or their "constitutional attraction" to fast-moving vehicles.
The significance of sports in the political modernization of agrarian (and colonial) people has been brilliantly analyzed by CLR James in his history of cricket in the West Indies, *Beyond A Boundary*. As James shows, cricket was one of the primary vehicles through which English culture was transmitted to the West Indies and, in turn, West Indian identity was forged in a distinctive way. West Indians learned English values and the norms of industrial and commercial life as much on the cricket field as in the school and the work place, and their success in developing great players and great teams marked their coming of age as a people. When West Indian teams demonstrated their ability to beat the best of the English teams using styles and techniques all their own, it symbolized their mastery of modern social organization, their ability to produce dominant personalities, and the viability of their traditional cultures. Cricket, a sport which had been imported to legitimize English culture and English rule, was thus transformed into a proving ground for West Indian self-government.

With some modifications, the same analysis can help us understand the role that soccer has played in defining “national identity” in South American countries. That game has been taken to unparalleled heights of skill by South American teams who have incorporated the rhythms of dance into their play. The South American soccer leagues bring together, in a creative context, seemingly conflicting elements in their national culture, fusing modern mass society and commercialism (embodied in the huge stadiums, the crowds, and the publicity surrounding the games) with traditional folkways and rivalries. The mixture is an explosive one — full of riots, violent assaults, and stampeding crowds — but it is an accurate mirror of the tensions of contemporary life that these societies experience. In countries like Brazil, soccer has become an affirmative embodiment of the national experience, where the personality forms, values, and tensions of modern civilization are played off against the distinctive local cultures that people must remain in touch with if they are to keep their sense of balance in times of rapid social change.
A more dramatic example of this process can be found in the growing popularity of "American" sports (baseball and basketball) in post-war Japan and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean (Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico). In Japan, baseball came into the country with the American military occupation and became that country's most popular spectator sport. A similar experience took place somewhat earlier in the Caribbean, where baseball was popularized by the increasing number of American corporate and military personnel who entered those countries after the Spanish American War. (4) The sport became a vehicle of adjustment to American imperialism, its popularity an index of America's success in transmitting adulation of its culture and values. Nevertheless, the process which began as imitation soon assumed other proportions. As athletes were produced capable of competing with or beating the Americans (as happened with Caribbean baseball players in the '50s and '60s) and as these "stars" embodied qualities distinctive to the country, the sport became an instrument of national pride and independence. It is no accident that one of Fidel Castro's favorite ways of demonstrating his closeness to the people was to travel around the country playing baseball with workers and peasants, or that Cuba's victory over American volleyball and basketball (!!!) teams in the Pan-American games was viewed as a symbolic triumph for the revolution.

The experience of black Americans in professional sports has followed a similar dynamic of assimilation and resistance. The integration of black athletes into the major leagues had been fought for for years by the black press and the organized Left (the Daily Worker and the Harlem People's Voice had been particularly active in the fight), but its implementation took the form of a calculated edict from the top designed to reinforce the legitimacy of American institutions. (5) Branch Rickey's "pioneering act", carefully cleared with Truman Administration leaders, New York City politicians, and local community leaders (6), was one of a variety of coincident decisions (the Executive Order desegregating the Armed Forces and the Truman Civil Rights act were others) designed to adjust American
society to the requirements of the post-war world and to help bring a strategically located black population (increasingly urban and industrial) into the mainstream of American society. With the US economy increasingly dependent on the penetration and control of the emerging nations, racial segregation had become a political embarrassment which could be exploited by the Soviet bloc or anti-colonial revolutionaries to mobilize resistance to US aims. The more far-sighted American leaders saw the need to create at least a facade of racial equality and harmony in key American institutions, and were willing to use sports to get that message across to both the American public and the large international audience.

From the perspective of the black community, integration in sports (as in other areas of life) represented both an opportunity to get a larger share of the rewards of industrial society and an end to irksome racial prohibitions. The black community had its own professional sports leagues ever since it urbanized (after World War I), but they were poorly financed, poorly organized, and unable to provide their players with anywhere near the income of their counterparts in "the majors". (7) When Jackie Robinson signed with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947, it thus symbolized to black Americans the opening of a whole new era, filled with opportunities and dangers. (8) They were excited by the chance their best athletes would be getting to "prove themselves" on the ball field and get into the big money, but were concerned about the insults, humiliations, and internal tensions they would have to endure as they confronted white society.

The "case" of Jackie Robinson put all these competing pressures and emotions on the line. When Robinson was chosen to integrate professional baseball — then far and away the most popular American spectator sport — he was faced with incredible mental pressures that almost thrust the question of his physical ability into the background. To succeed, Robinson had to maintain his concentration, his self-discipline, and his enthusiasm for the game in the face of threats, insults, ostracism, and condescension, and to live with the knowledge that the hopes of millions of black people were invested in his performance while millions of
whites were hoping he would fail. Robinson was selected for this task not because he was clearly the best black ball player (Sam Jethroe and Larry Doby had equivalent reputations, and Satchel Paige was a household word) (9), but because he was deemed best equipped to stand the pressure and function as a symbol of the black community. (10) College-educated, articulate by white standards, possessed of great personal dignity, Robinson survived his ordeal well enough to win "Rookie of the Year" honors and make the All-Star Game. To many black people, he became the definitive symbol of their arrival into the mainstream of American life.

But if Robinson's experience represented a vindication of black hopes for a new era in race relations, it also reflected the rather restricted boundaries within which the system intended "racial integration" to occur. To liberal whites, Robinson was the archetypical "acceptable" Negro, a person who fit all the standards of white society and would not rock the boat. In the press, the radio, and the bulletins of the USIA and the Voice of America, he was presented as an example of America's racial progress and of black people's loyalty to the American political system. When Paul Robeson made his famous speech saying that black people would not fight on the US side in a war with the Soviet Union, Robinson was called before the House Un-American Activities Committee to assert that black people identified completely with America and would repudiate Robeson. (11) Under such conditions, whites could easily see racial integration in sports as an opportunity for self-congratulation.

However, the ability of whites to control the context of racial integration in sports was to prove considerably more limited in succeeding years. In the late 1950s two black athletes, Bill Russell in basketball and Jim Brown in football, emerged as dominant figures in their sports in a manner which gave whites little grounds for self-congratulation. Both of these men were intelligent, independent, and fiercely proud; they refused the gratuitous displays of gratitude that sports journalists demanded and made no secret of their distaste for racial discrimination in any form. (12) Their superiority in their respective sports was so great,
their reputations so awesome, that they could define the terms on which they interacted with whites to a far greater degree than most Americans, black or white, were used to. Both men were living contradictions to prevailing racial stereotypes and images. Although both were great athletes, the distinctive elements in their superiority were concentration, self-discipline, and an unwavering drive to succeed (classic elements for success in American sports and American capitalist society). Aloof from their teammates, in tune with hidden and internalized sources of energy, they went to incredible lengths to psyche themselves up before games—Russell to the point of having to throw up from nervous tension before every contest. The unwavering dignity and professionalism of these two black men enforced respect even from people who opposed their political positions and their avoidance of journalistic rituals. They helped create a new image of black self-consciousness in America, fully within the framework of American capitalist values and male supremacy but transcendent of the historic racial dynamic which required whites to take the initiative in defining race relations.

An even further step in defining black self-consciousness was taken by Muhammad Ali (born Cassius Clay), a black prizefighter from Louisville, Kentucky. Clay began his career as an exuberant, highly talented youth, who alternately delighted and annoyed the American fighting public with his mocking predictions of his opponents' downfall, his poetry, and his complete absence of false modesty ("I'm the greatest.") Although he flaunted the unwritten norms of the sports world by his refusal to act humble, he hardly seemed a very threatening figure—indeed his bragging was regarded benignly by some whites as a reaffirmation of racial stereotypes ("What do you expect from a nigger?") and as comforting signs of undiscipline.

It was an incredible shock when Cassius Clay, that laughing, jiving kid, beat the most fearsome heavyweight of his time, Sonny Liston, and then announced that his victory was due to the influence of the Nation of Islam. Changing his name to Muhammad Ali, Clay swore off drinking, smoking, and sexual excess and proclaimed his belief in black independence and racial separation. After a year of fighting
under his new banner, Ali was drafted and refused to enter the armed forces. The reaction of the sports establishment in America, who had spent millions of dollars promoting Ali as a "fresh new face on the boxing scene", was swift and brutal. Ali lost his license to fight in most of the US, was charged with draft evasion, and was almost universally condemned in the press as "ungrateful and unpatriotic".

Through all this, Ali was the decisive psychological victor. He served notice on white America that it could not unopposedly use racial integration on a symbolic level to legitimize its domination of non-white peoples. In his public statements, Ali argued that black people had a tie of solidarity with non-white people around the world, including the Vietnamese, which transcended any loyalty to the US Government. In his speeches, his political actions, and his approach to sports, he embodied the spirit of decolonization — the commitment of oppressed peoples to transform the mechanisms of Western capitalist rule into instruments of popular liberation. He was viewed by young blacks as a symbol of black manhood — a man who combined the survival skills of the ghetto (rapping, psychological warfare, physical strength, the "hustle") with an uncommon self-discipline and willingness to sacrifice wealth for principle. He represented, much like Malcolm X, a new image of being, a portent of higher human possibilities.

Ali, like most heroes fortunate enough to avoid assassination, has been cut down to more human proportions in succeeding years. After the initial shock wore off, the American sports establishment, like the American ruling class in general (13), moved to co-opt black nationalism into the mainstream of American culture and to remove its "revolutionary" implications. As soon as Ali was cleared of his draft charge, athletic commissions throughout the country renewed his license and sports reporters literally fell over one another trying to interview him and mark his return as "one of the boys". Ali, weary of his ordeal and perhaps somewhat disillusioned by factional struggles in the Nation of Islam, returned to his earlier position as the "darling" of the American press, appearing on talk shows, giving play-by-plays of sports events, even helping to
“roast” Sammy Davis Jr. at the Friars’ Club (a humorous ritual honoring entertainers). He never lost his primary sense of commitment to black people, maintaining an intensive schedule of speaking engagements and boxing exhibitions in the black community. But the cutting edge of his rebellion was gone, limited by the inability of the movement to which he was tied to forge a stable political or economic base for black independence in America. He had helped pave the way for the “coming of black men” (14) as a force in American society, and had helped legitimize black nationalism as a political and cultural stance (when Lew Alcindor changed his name to Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, sports announcers accepted the change without discussion or protest), but could not stop the absorption of black people into the sports industry or their acceptance of many of its values.

The political pacification of Muhammad Ali dramatizes some of the most painful dilemmas facing the black movement in America. Although black people have experienced a form of oppression which is similar to that of their brethren in the Third World, they find it impossible to liberate themselves through a movement of national independence. The dispersion of the black population through the country and its employment in the center of the American industrial infrastructure (heavy industry, government employment, the armed forces) means that the black movement can escape the domination of Capital and its attendant social relationships only if Capital itself is destroyed. The black revolt in sports, like the black movement as a whole, inevitably becomes a “reform” movement when it does not connect its nationalist aims to a large struggle to transform American society.

There is perhaps no better example of the political limitations of the black revolt in sports (and much of the black movement generally) than the image of male supremacy it projects. While the new forms of “social personality” forged by black athletes represent a transcendence of historic patterns of racial control in America, they present no challenge to the domination of men over women on which the very fabric of American capitalism is woven. The Nation of Islam, the organization from which Ali drew
strength, inspiration, and political support for his rebellion, has explicitly defined the subordination of black women as a precondition for the liberation of black men. The image of "black manhood" embodied by Jim Brown in his football career, his acting, and his personal life seems to be an Afro-American amalgam of Errol Flynn and James Bond—an image in which women are alternately seen as status symbols, sexual partners, and targets for aggression.

The racial transformation of commercial sports in America, while often disquieting to both the sports establishment and the American public, has thus far been contained within the framework of capitalist and male-supremacist relations. While black people have been able to use athletics as an arena for self-development, self-expression, and the creative affirmation of black "nationality," they have been unable to transcend the attendant value system which makes domination, competition, and personal profit the highest social ideals.

It remains to be seen whether a similar neutralization can be accomplished with movements for women's liberation. The growing power of women in post-war American life has not been reflected in commercial sports. The massive participation of women in the labor market and the accompanying, though grudging, democratization of family life that this has produced (15) have no analogies in the sports world, where the hiring of a few female jockeys and the more vigorous promotion of women's tennis are the only noticeable "reforms". Indeed, the expansion of commercial athletics has been so dramatically impervious to women's influence as to raise questions whether sports, like the "new sexuality", is being used to culturally sustain male-supremacist behavior when its objective social basis is diminishing. In any case, the relationship between sports and women's struggle is an important subject to examine, and I will try to suggest a framework which may make some of the contradictions comprehensible.
SPORTS, WOMEN, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF DOMINATION

In exposing the relationship between the "sports industries" and emerging women's struggle, I would like to draw attention to three coincident trends in the post-war political economy.

First, the growing importance of women in the labor market and the effect of this on male-female relationships in the family, the workplace, the educational system, and the bedroom. As Selma James points out, the entry of women into the labor market during the Second World War "created in women a new awareness of themselves...expanded their conception of their capacities, and cracked...open the economic basis of the subordination of women." (16) When the pattern persisted after the war (by 1966, one third of married women were working), it created a crisis of "roles" in both working-class and middle-class families. With the economic basis for male "authoritarianism" in the family (the single paycheck) weakening male-female relationships entered a period of struggle, sometimes hostile and politicized (among the middle class), sometimes veiled behind a mutual concern for survival (among the working-class and poor). As James described it: "Men, particularly young men who have been trained to exercise domination, but have had little opportunity to do so, find themselves lost in their relations with these new women." (17) Their diminishing power over their wives and children evokes feelings of frustration that must be exorcised through social activity or rendered insignificant by more satisfying experiences in other spheres of life.

Second, and equally significant for our purposes, has been the increasing bureaucratization and "Taylorization" of factory and office work and the bargaining away of worker control of the quality and pace of production by the labor movement. Between 1940 and 1956, the once-militant CIO unions, with the lure of "high wages", assumed the role of disciplining workers to managerial imperatives of "efficiency" and became what amounted to a middle layer of the managerial bureaucracy. Workers who once had unions and/or shop committees responsive to their needs found
themselves faced with another hierarchy of relentless impersonality that did nothing to stop the speed-ups and changes in production methods that took away what little pride workers had in their job and product. In addition, the growing service sector of the economy brought with it an increasing “proletarianization” of white-collar work which was reflected in the rise of civil service unions, but not in a more satisfying work experience. For the majority of working Americans, craftsmanship, creativity, and feelings of community became experiences sought in their leisure hours rather than through their work.

A third significant phenomenon is the emergence of the US as a full-blown imperial power, with a political and military “line of defense” on every continent. The entire society was mobilized behind the banner of anti-communism to higher levels of effort—as workers, as soldiers, as managers, as consumers. Never in American history had there been so co-ordinated an effort to discipline the American people to a common cause, in this instance the cause of world domination. Education, music, sports, in fact all aspects of culture became infused with the dynamics of the need to protect the empire.

The psychology of domination thus became an increasingly important theme in American life, but, as we have seen, at a time when the historic domination of men over women was diminishing and the control by workers over the productive process was shrinking. The result was that the American male, told constantly that he was a hero and a “world runner”, was not confirmed in this sense of himself by his day-to-day experience. Whatever frustrations resulted from this contradiction had to be expressed outside the workplace, where a struggle for greater control of production might reduce “efficiency” or challenge some corporate priorities. One legitimate outlet became consumerism—which made the accumulation of property, appliances, and hobbies a focal point of energy and emotion, but through which more violent, aggressive feelings could not be fully released. The most socially destructive feelings, when they were not actually being lived (with wives, children, work companions, friends, racial and political opponents) found their outlet in two areas—commercial-
ized sex and commercialized sports, both of which reached new levels of development in the post-war period.

The use of sports and sexuality as outlets for violent and guilt-provoking feelings is nothing new; they have served that function throughout the history of industrial society and probably much before. Violent games and rituals like rugby, hurling, boxing, wrestling, and cock-fighting have been part of the daily life of European and American working men for centuries, as have prostitution and pornography in their various forms.

What is new in post-war America is the scale on which they are organized, their expression in nationwide media (some of which, like television, are new inventions), and their penetration by corporate values and relations. In the last twenty years, for example, the imagery of sexual domination and exploitation has become a major theme in the culture, dominating the consumer market, the film industry, popular music, and the agencies defining values for courtship, marriage, and the family (such as popular magazines and medical books). Women, once seen as the repositories of morality and civilized culture, have been projected as sexual beings whose new freedom offers men unimagined possibilities for sexual consumption. The advertising industry and magazines like Playboy offer a new and more hedonistic image of male domination to replace the declining authoritarianism in the family. With the help of filmmakers, psychiatrists, and progressive clergymen, they suggest that every woman should now provide what men once sought in prostitutes — a seductive, but fundamentally passive sexuality that would affirm men's feelings of competence. Female sexuality is projected as a legitimate "catch-all" for male anxieties, a narcotic that eases the pain of daily existence. In both reality and projective fantasy men are encouraged to find in sex and the experience of control (over women, over themselves) what is lacking in their economic and social life.

The success of this "sexualization" of daily experience is questionable. Despite the incredible propaganda campaign, women have resisted sexual objectification, and most men find it difficult to get their wives and lovers to play
the roles defined in Playboy. Nevertheless, what is unattainable in relationships is made available in fantasy. The growing culture of pornography in America — topless dancers, X-rated movies, sex novels and magazines — represent efforts to provide a vicarious experience that meets male needs for sexual dominance. In daily life, women have thus won a kind of quiet victory. By their own self-activity, they have forced the most repressive aspects of the "new sexuality" out of the household, out of sexual encounters, and into compensatory fantasies, art, and masturbation.

The growth of commercial athletics in the post-war period mirrors many of the same developments and the same struggles. The increasing coverage of sports in the national media, like the increasing use of sexual images and incentives, aims at the re-inforcement of ideals of male dominance that are being undercut in daily life. The major commercial sports — baseball, football, basketball, ice hockey, and auto racing — allow women to participate only as cheerleaders, spectators, and advertising images, a situation which hardly mirrors the increasing participation of women in the job market and their growing influence in the family. Moreover, these games are not so much played as they are observed. Unlike tennis, golf, volleyball, table tennis, and softball, games which a whole family can participate in and enjoy democratically, these five all-male sports have expanded nationwide, catalyzed the construction of new stadiums, and acquired enormous television, radio, and newspaper coverage without increasing significantly in the degree to which they are played. The American male spends a far greater portion of his time with sports than he did 40 years ago, but the greatest proportion of that time is spent in front of a television set observing games that he will hardly ever play.

THE CORPORATE RATIONALIZATION OF SPORTS:
REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

The political and psychological implications of the massive promotion of spectator sports are worth investigating in some detail. The major commercial sports, as we have
suggested before, are all-male games which have a fairly high incidence of violence; they provide the spectators, when emotionally involved, with an opportunity to purge themselves of aggressive feelings. What is most distinctive about the way these sports are now presented is their penetration by corporate forms of organization and their suffusion with military and technological imagery. The man watching a football game on television not only sees huge men smashing each other in a way that he would like to do (possibly to his boss, his wife, or his kids) but the reduplication of military and corporate thinking. Elaborate offensive and defensive “maneuvers”, discussions of “field generalship”, and analyses of “what it takes to win” not only reinforce images of strong men running things, but legitimate the strategies by which America seeks to maintain its empire. From what was once a rather simple idolization of will power, competition, and physical strength, spectator sports in America have begun to glorify strategic thinking and technological rationality as contemporary masculine values. The violence, the brutality, and the vicarious identification are still central elements, but they have been appropriated for more sophisticated ends.

This “modernization” of the sports world has had a decisive effect on the life of the professional athlete. As professional (and college) sports have become bigger and bigger business (with television rights, advertising contracts, and huge arenas) athletes have been increasingly subjected to industrial norms and disciplines. From grade school, through high school, up to college and professional ranks, the “production” of star athletes has been systematized along superficially rational lines. Sports programs in most American schools are tracking systems designed not to maintain physical fitness among their students, but to select out potential stars for training. On each level, players are disciplined, skills are refined, and the best are selected to move on to the next level. Those who succeed in sports are often discouraged from serious academic concerns. Arrangements are made to provide tutors, term papers, and “gentlemen’s Cs” so that intellectual labors will not interfere with athletic proficiency. In the great
sports factories (Syracuse, Michigan, UCLA, and the like),
many of the athletes in major sports do not actually attain
their degrees.

By the time a player "makes it" to the pro ranks, the
pressure on him escalates astronomically. Pro athletes
are given training regimens which refine their special
skills, but can handicap them for life. As Dave Meggysey
points out in his excellent book Out of Their League, pro-
fessional football players are forced to strain their bodies
beyond physically tolerable limits in both training and
games and are given amphetamines to increase their ener-
gy level and steroids to help them put on weight. The most
famous football coach of modern times, Vince Lombardi,
was reknowned for insisting that his players perform with
sprains, viruses, and broken bones; One of his favorite
players, Jerry Kramer, was nicknamed "the Zipper" be-
cause he continue to play after many serious operations.
Even in sports like baseball and basketball, which have a
lower level of violence than football, players continue to
play with injuries that leave them nearly crippled (Mickey
Mantle, Tony Oliva, Gus Johnson, Willis Reed), and many
are only inured to existing with constant pain. The average
professional "athlete" is probably less physically healthy
than a normal person his age, and considers himself lucky
to finish his career without permanent physical and mental
damage.

However, the irony of this situation (not to say its bru-
tality) is lost on the American sports fan. Every weekend,
tens of millions of men sit before their television sets and
in stadiums and arenas, rising with their victories, falling
with their defeats, and emerging temporarily purged of
their anger, their frustration, their feelings of impotence.
Some of them, if they have the energy, go out to the play-
ground and with each jump shot, base hit, or cross body
block put flesh onto their fantasies. This strange, this sad,
this painfully self-deceiving network of rituals is part of
the basic fabric of American life—a safety valve for ag-
gression and a crucible for social values organic to modern
capitalism. It is a central stabilizing element in American
culture: organized and financed by the corporate elite, but
supported by millions of men because it provides an outlet for overwhelming inner needs.

However, there is growing resistance within the sports world to many of its most repressive cultural and political patterns. Both inside and outside professional sports, the credibility of the sports establishments' values, images, and business practices is being questioned and challenged. This counter-struggle cannot as yet be called a "movement"—for it has been diffuse and self-contradictory, and has thus far failed to project an alternative vision of athletic activity and organization. But it has forced political conflict and economic struggle into commercial athletics in a way which has undercut sports' ability to reinforce corporate values and serve as an "escape" from the anxieties of daily life.

Within professional sports itself, the most important sign of resistance has been the growing strength and militancy of the players' associations, culminating in this spring's baseball strike. This movement can be seen as a direct response to the proletarianization of athletes in major sports. Although salaries have been increasing rapidly in the post-war period, players have been experiencing the introduction of "speed-up" and scientific management into their lives. In all major sports, the athlete's work life has become more difficult and dangerous because of the lengthening of the season and the imposition of new performance norms. Baseball, basketball, and football players all have a longer "regular season" than they did 15 years ago, and a longer exhibition schedule. In addition, training procedures have been scientifically refined to produce the maximum response from their bodies. Professional athletes are now given IQ and personality tests (the Dallas Cowboys won't let anybody play quarterback with less than 120 IQ), trained with machines, given special diets, and shorn up with drugs. This introduction of corporate discipline into what are fondly called "games" has increased the number of injuries, but it has also brought collective organization into a historically individualistic milieu. Players' organizations, uniting "stars" and journeyman players, have assumed a larger and larger bargaining role in major sports, threatening and
most recently using the strike as a weapon to force the
owners' hand. Their most basic demand has been the de-
velopment of pension plans which provide security for the
injured and retired athlete—a demand which has great
force in a field where the average playing span is 4 to 6
years, and where the player is often left physically and
mentally unequipped for the job market.

The proletarianization of athletics has also generated
more individual forms of resistance. A number of star ath-
letes in major sports have begun to challenge the "reserve
clause"—the rule which enables a team to purchase ex-
clusive rights to a player and prevent him from playing for
another club unless he is sold or traded. This regulation,
with its analogues to slavery, was challenged in the courts
by Curt Flood, formerly a star outfielder with the St. Louis
Cardinals, and was recently (June 1972) upheld by the Su-
preme Court. But it has been challenged more effectively
in practice by professional basketball players who have
"jumped" from one basketball league to another in violation
of their contracts in order to gain high salaries or more
satisfactory living or playing conditions. Yet another "test"
of this regulation has been made by the brilliant young
pitcher Vida Blue, who sat out much of this season rather
than play at the salary which his team's owner was offering.

In these highly-publicized cases, black athletes have
taken the lead. Owners, fans, and journalists have attacked
them for lack of loyalty to their teams and contempt for the
traditions of the game, but such criticism has not stopped
Flood, Blue, Earl Monroe (who refused to play in Balti-
more), Charley Scott, Spencer Haywood, and others from
forcing owners to bid against one another for their serv-
ces. The growing commercialism of sports, as well as its
dangers, have removed such "romanticism" as the leagues
try to project from the minds of the players and have re-
duced motivations on all levels to the calculation of maxi-
mum financial advantage. Star players are increasingly
using their bargaining power to force teams to give them
a share of the club's profits and to help set them up in
business with loans and investments. The black athletes
have been most aggressive in this respect because they
have learned from experience that they are least likely to
be "taken care of" by their sports or by private industry when their playing careers are over. Their actions, even when "selfishly" motivated, have helped to strip the aura of sanctity from the sports world and have shown an often unwilling public its true character. It is an excellent example of how capitalism can help dig its own grave through the extension of its own most cherished values.

The increasing "economic chaos" in commercial sports has been paralleled by the beginnings of a political and cultural critique of the sports establishment's values and goals. In the last ten years, several leading sports figures have taken "unpopular" political stances, and a few have begun to question the function that sports are made to serve in American society. Beginning with Muhammad Ali, black athletes have been increasingly outspoken about racism in sports and society and have refused to accept the traditional dictum that "politics" be kept out of the playing field or the sports interview. Black athletes in pro and college ranks give clenched-fist salutes when introduced; use the black handshake in center jumps and other rituals; have pressed steadily for representation of blacks in coaching, announcing, cheerleading, and sports administration; and have generally challenged the illusion that loyalty to the team and sport comes before race, politics, or personal interest. An increasing number of white athletes have also taken political or cultural stances, announcing their opposition to the war, their commitment to new life styles, and their doubts about the brutality or the political uses of athletics.

These actions, however, have not qualitatively changed the character of commercial sports. The sports industry, like the American Empire as a whole, manages to stumble through its opposition with its violence, its brutality, its grim will to prevail yet unchecked. As long as the social relations of contemporary capitalism generate a need for violent outlets and a vicarious experience of mastery in American men, the corporations will be glad to finance the sports industry and mold it in their own image. The rebellion in the sports world must be accompanied by a struggle to transform the most significant institutional centers of American life if it is to humanize this aspect of our culture.
Only as creative, co-operative activity begins to govern human relations in production, child-rearing, and sexuality; only as the imperatives of maintaining the Empire diminish, can we begin to divest sports of the responsibility for legitimizing violent and domimative behavior and make democratic participation, rather than "rooting", the focal point of athletic involvement.

Slowly, often undramatically, the basis for a new approach to sports is developing. The growing power of women in American society, while it has evoked a counter-reaction in many areas, has paved the way for more democratic relations in the family, the educational system, the job market, and politics. This has often increased the level of social tension, but it has also begun to help erode the psychological "stake" in authoritarian behavior. In those sectors of society where a conscious women's movement has been strongest and the brutality of daily life least overwhelming (declassé or white middle-class youth) women have taken the lead in developing new approaches to sports, exercise, and physical health. In youth communities, college campuses, or parks in urban areas where young people congregate, men and women can be seen playing previously male sports (soccer, softball, touch football, basketball) in a newly non-competitive way, inventing new sports (frisbee) and practicing calisthenics and self-defense (judo, karate, and the like). In addition, people in these groups have begun to challenge patterns of diet, musculature, and physical well-being projected by the consumer culture, and have sought a more comfortable relation with both nature and self which looks toward a reduction in the basic sources of violence and aggression.

These new patterns are not capable, in themselves, of providing a model for "athletic revolution." Among the industrial working class and the poor, there is justifiable suspicion that the vision of athletics projected by the "counter-culture" neglects the opportunities for achievement, self-expression, and communal solidarity that competitive sports can provide. In working-class communities throughout America, sports leagues which place a premium on good fellowship and skill continue to thrive, and it is hard to envision them "withering away" into a hippie para-
dise where everyone plays at the same level in the interest of co-operation. Nor is this necessarily reactionary. As sports critic Jack Scott points out, the disciplined pursuit of athletic excellence is intrinsically no more harmful than the development of scientific, literary, or artistic skill. (19) Rather, the problem has been the context in which such skills have been cultivated and the uses to which they have been put.

If this point is understood, we can help set the stage for a broad attack on the more alienating aspects of American sports and particularly its legitimation of the dominance of men over women. The ability of men to run faster, jump higher, or hit a ball further offers no more "natural" claim to power in advanced industrial society than the ability of women to have children, and the one-sided glorification of maleness that pervades American athletics is ripe to be subverted. Women have begun to press for equal opportunity to develop their athletic talents, and have won a few significant victories. In schools throughout the country, women have won the right to play on tennis, golf, and even basketball teams when they have the ability; have organized women's teams in football, basketball, and volleyball; and have begun to raise questions about male domination of athletic departments. In addition, women professionals in tennis and golf have achieved some concessions in their demand for parity with men in the distribution of prize money and have attracted far greater recognition for their performance in the press. These changes are hardly revolutionary, but they do give some indication of the opportunities for concerted action.

The greatest single obstacle to such democratization lies in the structure of the sports industry and the media with which it is allied. At no time has the potential for broad and non-dominative athletic participation been so obvious, yet at no time has the sports industry made such a concerted effort to get people to watch rather than play. (There is an average of six hours of sports on TV every Saturday and Sunday during most of the year.) The athletic "spectacle" has become the definitive mode of social manipulation for American capitalism, absorbing the viewer's ener-
gies in a hypnotic panoply of crowds, contests, and commercials. It can be transcended, but only by activity which strikes at the need for this kind of entertainment. A radical transformation of sports must be linked to a larger effort to bring people’s control of production and communication and to develop satisfying proximate relations in the family, the community, and the workplace. The vicarious, abstract stimulation provided by the sports industry will lose much of its appeal when people are involved in struggle and creative activity.

FOOTNOTES

(1) The notion of an instrument of repression (or of socialization to an oppressive system) becoming a tool of liberation has been influenced by George Rawick’s discussion of the role of the black church during slavery in his new book *The Makings of the Black Community, From Sundown to Sunup* (Greenwood Press, 1972).

(2) Harry Edwards: “The Sources of the Black Athlete’s Superiority”, *The Black Scholar* (November 1971), Page 34.

(3) Ibid., Pages 35-38.

(4) Professional baseball leagues had been organized in Cuba as early as 1910, only 10 years after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. From that time on, interest in the game increased steadily, and white and black stars of American teams frequently traveled to play there when their seasons were over. Black players in particular cherished this opportunity, for the salaries they received were often higher than those the black teams were paying, and they were received in hotels and restaurants without the humiliation of Jim Crow. Even today the Caribbean leagues (now concentrated in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Puerto Rico) offer black players substantially greater opportunity to exercise leadership than the “majors”—for example, several black players are managers in the winter leagues, a situation that no major-league team has emulated as yet. See Robert W. Petersen: *Only the Ball Was White* (Englewood Cliffs, 1970) for a good description of the role of black Americans in Caribbean baseball.

(5) Both Petersen (Page 184) and Joseph Starobin: *Amer-
ican Communism in Crisis, 1943–1956 (Cambridge, 1972, Pages 30–31) mention the role of the Daily Worker in pres-
sing the major leagues to enroll black ballplayers. However
Starobin greatly overstates his case when he claims that
“This was the almost singlehanded work of the Daily Worker
sports editor.” Black newspapers such as the Pittsburgh
Courier and the Chicago Defender had been pressing this
issue for years, as had a radical Harlem daily called the
People’s Voice which was tied to both Adam Clayton Powell
and the CP.

(6) Petersen, Pages 183–205.

(7) As Petersen points out, the black leagues suffered a
rapid decline in attendance and interest as soon as signifi-
cant numbers of black players entered the majors. Only
during the Second World War had the leagues attained any-
where near the stability and organization of the majors, and
their salaries remained, with one or two exceptions, far
below the “big-league” level. There was surprisingly little
sentiment on behalf of the retention of the black teams, even
in nationalistic communities such as Harlem and the South
Side of Chicago. By 1958 there were no black professional
baseball teams left on any scale except a Globetrotter–like
group called the Indianapolis Clowns.

(8) At a dinner honoring Jackie Robinson, Bill Russell
made a speech saying that at the time Robinson came into
the majors he “was carrying black people on his shoulders”.

(9) Petersen quotes a black player named Buck Leonard
as saying: “We didn’t think he was going to get there. We
thought we had other ballplayers who were better players
than he. We thought maybe they were going to get there, but
we didn’t think he would.” (Petersen: Only the Ball Was
White, Page 193)

(10) Ibid., Page 189.

(11) From “Communist Influence Among Negroes—Fact
or Illusion”, National Urban League Pamphlet, 1949. Rob-
inson’s statement of July 19, 1949 before the House Un-
American Activities Committee was reprinted here in full.
The statement was prepared for “Hearings Regarding Com-
munist Infiltration of Minority Groups”. During this, Rob-
inson said: “I can’t speak for 15,000,000 people any more
than any other one person can, but I know myself that I’ve got too much invested for my wife and child and myself in the future of this country, and I and other Americans of many races and faiths have too much invested in this country’s welfare to throw it away because of a siren song sung in bass.... But that doesn’t mean we’re going to stop fighting race discrimination in this country until we’ve got it licked. It means that we’re going to fight all the harder because our stake in the future is so big. We can win our fight without the communists, and we don’t want their help.”

(12) Bill Russell with William McSweeney: _Go Up For Glory_ (New York, 1966), Russell asserted: “I had made up my mind that I would not become the bigot’s stereotype of the Negro. I would not be the laughing boy, seeking their favors.... There were some who expected me to curry favor with them. I had news for them, baby. I didn’t and I won’t. I wrote some controversial articles, but I believed them at the time. I was talking human rights before it was popular.” (Page 55)


(14) See Vincent Harding’s essay “Beyond Chaos: Black History and the Search for the New Land”, Amistad I (New York, 1970), for an excellent example of how an extremely sophisticated spokesman for black nationalism sees the black liberation movement of the ’60s as “the coming of black men”.


(17) _Ibid._, Page 15.


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