

Tenno vs. the People (PART 2)

—A Historical Review

by Inoue Kiyoshi

III. MODERN TENNOISM

1. The Formation of Modern Tennoism and its Structure

1) Loyalist ideas and the Anti-Shogunate Movement.

During the two centuries of the Tokugawa Shogunate's rule, Tennos were virtually prisoners in their own palace. Even in matters related to the inheritance of the throne, the tennos had to acquire the *Shogunate's* approval. They were cut off from all political affairs.

Toward the middle of the 19th century, however, the Tenno suddenly began to voice his political opinions. That was the time when Western imperialist powers made their threatening appearance quite visible in Asia. The wave of invasion, having swallowed China, was approaching Japan. At first, the voice of the Tenno was timid. In 1846, he dared to ask the *Shogunate* to be on its guard against any attempted invasion by Western powers. He was nervous at seeing so many foreign warships frequenting the Japanese shore. The *Shogunate*, being equally intimidated by the foreign pressure, did not discourage the Tenno in this move. Seven years later, in 1853, an American squadron entered Edo Bay and forced the *Shogunate* to receive its President's message demanding the opening of the country. The *Shogunate's* despotism could not hide its weakness any longer. Its foundations were collapsing. The Tenno ceased being timid. In 1868, the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown and replaced by the rule of the Tenno. This change in rulers also marked Japan's move from a feudal to a capitalist society. We do not have enough space here to go into the background of this development and shall limit ourselves to dealing with the ideological background facilitating the Tenno becoming the sovereign of the new nation.

Generally accepted theory says that, facing the

foreign pressure, the Japanese people naturally united under the Tenno to solve the national crisis. Is that really so?

It is true that the anti-Shogunate movement had as its slogan, "*Son-O-Jo-i*" (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians). But, as we shall see below, the leaders of the movement neither revered the Tenno personally nor were they hostile to the Western powers.

The loyalist philosophy, which spread in the latter half of the Edo period, did not call for the return of ancient Tennoism where the Tenno was the supreme sovereign. Rather than going against the *Shogunate*, this philosophy tried to add to the *Shogunate's* authority by stating that the *Shoguns* were appointed by the Tenno, a reverence being.

Theorists of the Mito-clan, the founders of the loyalist philosophy, said, "An ordinary warrior should revere his clan-lord who, in his turn, should be loyal to the *Shogun*. The *Shogun* reveres the Tenno.

This is the manner of true loyalism. A warrior should never try to go over his lord's head in being loyal to *Shogun* or Tenno. Similarly, a lord should never try to be loyal to the Tenno over the head of the *Shogun*."

Besides the Mito theorists, there were those who studied the classics and believed in the ancient Tennoist myth, the "*Kokugaku*". They believed that the Tenno was a 'god incarnate'. They too, however, justified the rule by *Shogun* appointed by the 'god incarnate.' Loyalism did not lead to the anti-*Shogunate* ideas.

The anti-*Shogunate* ideas were born from the "*Jo-i*" (Expel the Barbarians) sentiment. When the American squadron tried to force open the country, an overwhelming majority of the ruling class people were against hearing such demands. They were staunch chauvinists. The "anti-barbarian" sentiment was especially strong among the common

people, including the Tenno. They regarded Westerners as inhuman, unclean beings. The *Shogunate*, which actually had to deal with the Westerners, knew well that the country had no power to expel them. There was no choice for the *Shogunate* other than to retreat step by step and keep making compromises to the Westerners, thus outraging the "Jo-i" public. Komei Tenno, himself vehemently "anti-barbarian", was made the figurehead of the "Jo-i" faction. The latter claimed that it was unthinkable that the *Shogun*, an appointee chosen by the Tenno, dared to ignore the will of the Tenno. Loyalism, used thus far to justify the *Shogunate's* rule, now turned into a theory to criticize it. "Joi-ism" thus became "Son-o, Jo-i-ism". At first, the "Jo-i" faction did not intend to overthrow the *Shogunate's* rule. They hoped that the *Shogun* would obey the Tenno's orders to expel the Westerners. Realizing that this hope would not be realized, they tried to bring the *Shogunate* down by force in 1863. Komei Tenno, however, was against this move which might disturb the feudalistic order of society too much. He plotted with the *Shogunate* and expelled all the "Son-o, Jo-i" activists — some rank-and-file clan people and court nobles — from Kyoto. The loyalists thus became the enemies of the Tenno.

Around this time, from 1863 to 1864, the "Son-o-Jo-i" people of Satsuma (now Kagoshima Pref. in Kyushu) and Choshu (Yamaguchi Pref. the western tip of Honshu) clans opened fire against the Western squadron. Defeated by the British fleet, they switched their "Jo-i" position and made an agreement to obtain British help in their efforts to overthrow the *Shogunate*. The "Son-o, Jo-i" movement now no longer revered the Tenno, the worst obstacle, and was no longer against the Westerners, who were now its allies. The aim of the movement was to overthrow the *Shogunate* so that the country could be united. Komei Tenno died in December 1866, possibly poisoned to death by the "loyalists". The "loyalists" regained their influence over the palace. A year later they staged a coup overthrowing the *Shogunate*, and the restoration of Imperial Rule was proclaimed. The new Tenno issued an order to subdue the Tokugawa *Shogunate*. A large scale war was waged lasting ten months until the forces of Tokugawa and his supporters were destroyed.

Let us have a look at those who bore the burden of the anti-*Shogunate* movement. The main force of the movement was provided by progressive elements from among the rank-and-file clans people. They were assisted by rich farmers, village manufacturing owners, money lenders advancing capital to such owners and merchants. They all had complaints in the feudalist society but were not in a position to overturn the whole social

order. The rank-and-file clans people occupied the lowest position in the ruling class. Their interests sharply clashed with those of their higher-ups, but they too were members of the ruling circle. Rich farmers, enterprise owners, money lenders and the merchants all had a difficult time under the grasping feudal lords. Feudalistic restrictions upon commercial and industrial activities and on transportation also made them suffer. They were, on the other hand, dependent upon the feudal lords who let them exploit the farmers and other working people. One could expect an idea of a people's revolution overthrowing an oppressor to take root among these people.

There were indigenous revolutionary ideologists such as Ando Shoeki (d. 1758) in feudalistic Japan. Ando Shoeki saw no justice in the feudalist system allowing the lords to own manors. He was against every kind of discrimination based on social status or class distinctions. He was radically against exploitation and domination of any kind and sought to establish a "Natural World" where each person would support his or her life by tilling the land and weaving. Feudal lords, *Shoguns* and *Tennos* were, according to him, all exploiters; and Shintoism, Confucianism and Buddhism were all ideologies to justify exploitation and domination. He had some followers, but his ideas failed to find popular support.

Unlike the Americans or French of the 18th century, who based their revolutionary wars on the idea of the right to revolt, the Japanese clans people and rich farmers revolted without such an ideological base. They had to depend on the Tenno, being superior in social rank to the feudal lords and *Shogun*, and, therefore, targets of the revolt.

2) The Tenno's Rule and the Unification of the Nation by Means of his Divine Power.

The newborn Tenno's regime did not have its own particular territory or armed forces. It was supported by the joint forces of the anti-*Shogunate* clans, including the Satsuma, Chosu and Tosa clans. The new government members consisted of some court people, feudal lords and the leaders of the anti-*Shogunate* clans, who held the actual power. These clans people, however, were no more held on the leash of the clan lords. They were now the Tenno's officials.

The new regime subdued the *Shogunate* in April 1868. By September of the same year, it had destroyed the last resistance by the Northern clans. It occupied most of the land owned by the *Shogunate*. A large part of the territories owned by the resisting clans was also confiscated by the new regime. In this way the Tenno's regime came

to own a territory much wider than that owned by the *Shogunate*. The new government also differed basically from the *Shogunate* administration.

The new government was reorganized frequently. Former lords and court nobles, except for two leading persons in the anti-Shogunate movement, were all dismissed from the government. Capable persons, including those who had served the *Shogunate*, were collected to fortify the government. Government control over the clans was made stronger. In June 1869, the position of clan lord was nominally changed. The lords were now local governors directly under the Tenno's government. The position of governor was hereditary. In July 1871, the clans themselves were terminated. The new local political unit, the prefecture, was instituted. The prefectural governor was appointed by the Tenno. The Tenno was thus made the supreme despot of the country, the sole source of law and order. All powers were centralized in the Tenno's government. For the first time in Japanese history, the people began to have direct contact with the supreme Tenno. Modern Tennoism was thus established.

It should be emphasized that, since ancient times until the Edo period most of the Japanese did not know that the Tenno existed. So, one of the first things the new regime did was to "teach" the people that the Tenno, the sovereign of Japan, existed.

For example, the general sent by the regime to subdue the Kyushu area told its people, "From ancient days our country, Japan, always had Masters called "*Tenshi-sama*" (Emperors) who are the descendants of Amaterasu O-mikami." In February 1869, a government officer told the people of northern Japan (Ou), "*Tenshi-sama*, a descendant of Amaterasu-Omikami, is the one who graciously assigned all different ranks to the various gods and goddesses." Even in Kyoto, where the Imperial Palace had been situated for ten centuries, the government officers told people, "the land and water of Japan all belong to the Tenno. It is by His favor that we Japanese can live."

All these stories, were easily accepted by the people of those days. As mentioned before, local Shinto shrines were connected to Tennoist Shintoism. When people were told that the local gods they worshipped were given their positions by the Tenno, they were persuaded that the Tenno was superior to the local gods. Pilgrimages to Ise Shrine, so popular in Edo period, also prepared people to accept the Tenno. Such pilgrimages had nothing to do with the Tenno. They were occasions for joyful trips to pray for the longevity and prosperity of the family. Still, it made it easier for people to swallow the story that the Tenno was a descendant of the Amaterasu O-mikami, the sun

goddess of Ise.

Tennoist Shintoism presented the Tenno just as a worldly despot but as a deified ruler under whom the whole nation should be ruled. Shintoism was made the state religion and was used, not just in the early period, but throughout modern Tennoist history, to keep the people loyal followers of the sovereign. The Meiji Constitution (the Great Imperial Japanese Constitution) recognized, though in a limited manner, freedom of religion. This Constitution was written in such a way, however, so that the Shintoism would be kept as state-religion.

To exemplify the nature of the religious policy of the Tenno's regime let us briefly touch upon the establishment of the Yasukuni Shrine.

In 1869, the government built a shrine to the spirits of those who died for the Tenno's regime in the war with the *Shogunate* and its supporters. In 1879, it was decided to "promote" these spirits of the war dead to the status of gods, and, to worship these gods, the place was re-named the Yasukuni Shrine. The word "Yasukuni" was used to bring peace to the nation by subduing the Tenno's enemies both within and without the country. All the spirits of those who died in wars of invasion fought by Japan, including those in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95, are enshrined at Yasukuni. The Tenno worships these spirits. Even a poor farmer or a worker, if killed in a war for the Tenno, would have his spirit made a god and be worshipped by the Tenno. This was thought to be the highest of honors. Thus, the Yasukuni Shrine served as a religious prop for Tennoist militarism.

Other institutions we shall mention which unify the nation under the Tenno, besides Shintoism, are the "*Issei-Ichigen*" system and "*Kigen-setsu*." In the "*Issei-Ichigen*" system, the name of an era (*ichigen*) was matched with the reign of a Tenno (*issei*). The "*Kigen-setsu*" was for the day celebrating the founding of the nation.

The name of an era had previously had no relation to the reign of a Tenno until the new regime decided to match the two. Thus, in September 1868, the era was named "Meiji" to be used only when the throne was handed over to the Tenno. In this way, the new regime instituted a subtle but effective method of binding people's minds to Tennoism: whenever one uses the name of an era, one is reminded of the reigning Tenno.

The "*Kigen-setsu*" was set for February 11 because, according to the ancient Tennoist legend, the first Tenno Jimmu (an imaginary figure) ascended to the throne on February 11, 660 BC. Although this myth had no basis in reality, it was false to doubt it. People were forced to believe

line of Tennos, descendants of the Sun Goddess, was unbroken even from Jimmu Tenno, and that Japan was unique among all the nations in its long relation to its divine rulers.

The regime succeeded in presenting the Tenno, an awesome god, as also a compassionate protector of the people. For this purpose, the Tenno travelled around the nation visiting people. He showed pity on the aged and orphans. He rewarded faithful children and wives loyal to husbands and their parents. He personally visited the farmers and fishers at their workplaces. He summoned the local governors to inquire how the people were living and to encourage local industries. Merely by doing such things, he drew tears to the people's eyes.

3) The Structure of Modern Tennoism.

While mobilizing the people around Tennoist Shintoism, the new regime actively adopted Western science and technology to build up its industry and military.

A few years after the clans were abolished, a centralized national bureaucracy was established. A newly organized police network began to assert its oppressive presence into every corner of the nation. The army and navy were modernized and every one was forced to serve in the military. The Tenno was its sole, supreme commander. Elementary education was forced upon the people, who had to pay to send their children to schools to be educated into becoming good loyalists. Institutions of higher education for producing bureaucrats, scientists and technicians were also being established.

Around the time when the clans were abolished, the former clan lords and court nobles were given the new hereditary title of "Kizoku" (aristocracy). Even after the abolishment of the clans, these new aristocrats were guaranteed a certain amount of wealth and privilege. The former clans people were made "Shizoku" (ex-samurai). Until around 1876, they wore swords just as they did formerly. They were even given a stipend by the government. In 1876, however, the allowances to *Kazoku* and *Shizoku* were terminated (in exchange for a certain amount of compensation). Farmers, merchants and artisans were made "Heimin" (commoners). The untouchable class was nominally abolished. The freedom to choose one's job and place of residence and the right to sell or purchase private properties were guaranteed. However, under the patriarchal system of those days (which was later legalized), family members needed the patriarch's approval to practice the above-mentioned citizen's rights. Allowing rights and freedoms beyond the modifications of social positions were necessary for the

new regime to solidify its national rule and promote capitalistic development. The freedom of expression, press, assembly and organization, and the freedom of religion were all forbidden. It was out of the question for people to hope for political participation.

The new regime was active in promoting capitalism. It also modernized the feudalistic land system from 1872 to 1880. As a result of such moves, former serfs became independent landowners. By 1890, when the Constitution was put into effect, 70 percent of the populace were farmers who produced 70 percent of the GNP. The defeudalization of family did not free tenant farmers whose numbers increased. Sixty-to-seventy per cent of the crops harvested by tenant farmers were taken as rent. The government was on the side of the exploiting landlords.

The newly-created independent farmers had to pay heavy land taxes. For the overwhelming majority of farmers, who owned only a half to one hectare of land, this burden was in no way any lighter than what they had shouldered as serfs. From 1882 to 1885, the harsh deflationary measures taken by the government resulted in a drastic drop in prices of agricultural products including rice. This was a harsh blow to the farmers with small land holdings. Many of them could not pay their land taxes and were forced to leave their lands, becoming either tenant farmers or mine workers or public servants. Their land was swallowed up by the landlords. By 1890, about half of the farmers were either tenant farmers without any land or working as tenants while holding a small amount of land. Thus, the class of landlords living on the toil of tenant farmers became a dominant feature of Japanese agriculture.

Japan's primary capital accumulation was mostly completed by 1890; Japan was entering the stage of the industrial revolution. The following three items characterize the capitalism of the time:

a) Heavy dependency on militarism. Most of the machine industry was run by the State producing guns, ammunition, military uniforms and warships. Besides these military industries, the cotton spinning industry was beginning to introduce machine work. Silk spinning was still done manually even though raw silk was the most important merchandise exported by Japan.

b) A few elite capitalists heavily favored by the government monopolized most of the economic activity of the private sector including mining works, maritime traffic, private railways, the banking business and foreign trade. Among such elite capitalists, Mitsui — an extremely powerful merchant and usurer since the Edo period — and Mitsubishi — maritime traffic businessman new-




Illustration: Kaibara Hiroshi (*Emperor System in Japan*, pub., Gendaishokan)

comer (Iwasaki) — are well-known. The maritime traffic and railway businesses, both aided by the State, were tied to the military. Even after the industrial revolution, these privileged capitalists retained an overwhelming power over the country's economy.

c) Wages and working conditions were at an extremely low standard. Typical examples of this are in the mining works and textile works. In the mines, prisoners were used as slaves. The miners who were not prisoners were also put under slave-like conditions. In the textile factories, young female laborers worked in shifts day and night. They were the daughters of poor farmers virtually sold off to pay heavy land taxes and rent. Their dormitory rooms were small and dirty. The foremen even violated the privacy of their personal correspondence.

The classes of landlords and capitalists, especially the elite multi-millionaires, who expanded their wealth in this way, became the foundation of modern Tennoism.

The first decade of the Tennoist regime was filled with armed rebellions staged by the fast disintegrating *Shizokus*, on one hand, and by the farmers hard-pressed by the exploitation, on the other. The regime destroyed all of these. In 1874, however, a new kind of movement calling for freedom and democracy was born. It demanded the establishment of a constitution and the opening of a parliament representing the people.

At first it was a movement of intellectuals who had learned about Western democracy. From about 1878, however, it began to grow rapidly among independent farmers, minor capitalists and industrialists. For the first time in Japanese history, a popular revolutionary movement adopted the idea of claiming that sovereignty lies with the people and that the people have the right to overthrow a dictatorial regime. Although the movement did not succeed in making Japan a republic,

republicanism took sort within the movement.

The government succeeded, by 1887, in splitting and weakening this movement. Certain concessions were made by the government to split the movement: a Constitution and Parliament. The Great Imperial Japanese Constitution, and the Imperial Parliament were, however, far from being democratic. The Constitution and the Imperial House Law "bestowed" by the Tenno in February 1889, were written by high officials of the Tenno regime and their contents were kept secret until publicized.

The Constitution was made to give the deified Tennoist despotism the appearance of a constitutional monarchy. (We have touched on this subject in Ch. I.) The freedoms and rights "guaranteed" by the Constitution were admissible only when they did not interfere with the social order. A citizen must be loyal to the Tenno. Disagreement with the theory stating that the Tenno was descendant of Amaterasu O-mikami was regarded as disturbing that social order. Tennoist Shintoism was made the "Way of the Nation," something beyond a religion.

The Imperial Parliament consisted of the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The members of the House of Lords were chosen from the *Kazoku*. They owned large areas of land. They were rentiers holding government bonds and stocks. The members of the House of Commons were, at first, mostly representatives of large landlords. As capitalism grew rapidly and as election law was reformed repeatedly, the ratio of those representing the capitalists in the House of Commons grew. Prior to 1900, the landlords were dominant; from 1900 to the time of World War I the two powers competed with each other until the end of the War the capitalist camp won decisive superiority. The union of the capitalists and landlords, where the former had the leadership position, grew more influential in the Tennoist

ciety. The basic structure of the Tennoist state, however, remained unchanged until Japan was defeated in World War II.

2. Continuous Wars of Invasion and Tennoism

1) Militaristic Nature.

In December 1868, barely three months after the new rulers had subdued the remaining resistance in Northeastern Japan, the heads of the government were planning to invade Korea. It was impossible for the new regime to start a foreign war then, but the Tenno's regime never gave up the idea of invading Korea.

In 1873, some leading members of the government claimed that the time was ripe for subduing Korea. They obtained the Tenno's permission to go ahead with their plan. Other members of the government, however, strongly opposed the plan. They believed that Japan was not quite ready for such an action and that the government should concentrate on domestic problems. When it was decided that Japan should wait before opening a war, the defeated members of the government all gave up their positions. The following year (1874), however, the government ruled by the "domestic section" suddenly invaded Formosa, then a Chinese territory. Repelled from Formosa by international protest, the government again set out on an invasion the next year, 1875, when a Japanese warship illegally entered the territorial waters of Korea, threatened the capital and invited the Koreans to open fire. The government denounced Korea for this act of self-defence and immediately mobilized the entire army and navy. All of the naval forces were gathered at the Shimonoseki Strait. A mission was sent to Korea on a warship to force a treaty of "amity" on the country which was signed in February 1876. In this way, Japan forced Korea to open up the country. It secured a colony in the newly opened harbor areas free from Korean jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the treaty of commerce annexed to the treaty of amity, certain articles were included so that Japan could use its own currency in the colony and run foreign trade without paying tariffs. The first step for the invasion of Korea was thus achieved.

In the meantime, the new regime was promoting a policy to completely destroy and colonize the Ryukyu Kingdom. This Kingdom, since its foundation at the beginning of the 15th century, paid tribute to China even though it was virtually an independent nation. It was conquered by the Satsuma clan at the beginning of the 17th century. Since then the Kingdom had been a Satsuma colony and, at the same time, a tributary to China.

When the Tenno's regime abolished the clans, it began to make up plans to colonize the Kingdom. No effort was made to ask opinions of the King or the people of Ryukyu. The Chinese were not consulted either. After obtaining only British, American and other Western nations' consent, Japan went ahead and destroyed the Kingdom. Just by showing off its military power, Japan seized this small kingdom, which had no military forces, annexing and colonizing what is now called Okinawa prefecture in 1879.

Thus, Japan invaded Formosa, a Shin (Chinese) territory, and unilaterally annexed the Ryukyus, a tributary of Shin and exploited Korea, formally subject of Shin. The government knew well that all these acts would aggravate Chinese feeling towards Japan. The regime made it obvious, while negotiating a treaty of amity with Shin in 1871, that it wanted Shin to treat Japan in the same manner as Shin treated Western imperialist nations. This hope was fulfilled by the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95.

How did Tennoism become so aggressive? First, external crises were actively sought by the new regime so that it could defuse the discontent and anger boiling up among the ex-samurai and farmers. Secondly, the regime under heavy pressure from powerful Western nations sought to make the "glory of the Tenno" visible by invading weak neighbors. Submission to powerful nations was compensated for by the invasion of weak neighbors. Thirdly, the regime was motivated, as became obvious from the time the treaty of amity was signed between Korea and Japan, by greed in order to steal wealth from its neighbors. This point is made clear if one looks at the afore-mentioned treaty of commerce forced upon Korea. Protected by the treaty, powerful commercial capitalists such as Mitsui were able to operate free from the Korean jurisdiction and "bought", large amounts of Korean rice, soybeans and gold using unconvertible paper money. Through such colonial exploitation, Japanese capitalists accumulated Japan's primary capital. This last factor pressing Japan for further invasions grew stronger as capitalism developed. The first and second factors, especially the second, did not, however, disappear.

As Japan strengthened its exploitation and oppression of the Koreans, resistance by the Korean people also grew stronger. The schism between the pro-Japanese and the pro-Shin factions of the Korean elite also grew more serious. Antagonism between Shin and Japan grew stronger.

The Japanese government crushed the last revolt of the discontented *Shizoku* in the Seinan War in 1877. After that, the first priority in national affairs was to prepare for a war with Shin.

In 1878, the General Staff and the General Director of the Military (later renamed the General Director of Education, an office to direct military education) were established. Both were directly under the Tenno and independent of the administration. The General Staff immediately overshadowed the administration. In 1880, the General Staff proposed directly to the Tenno, over head of the administration, a plan for militaristic expansion to be ready for a war with Shin. The Tenno agreed.

In January 1882, the Tenno gave a special edict to the soldiers (*Gunjin Chokugo*) saying that the sole commander of the Japanese armed forces had always been the Tenno ever since the time of Jimmu Tenno. A soldier must immediately and unconditionally obey an order issued by the Tenno. An order issued by a higher officer must be regarded as an Imperial one. These teachings were made the bible of the military.

The next decade was spent expanding military power, reforming military organization, perfecting military education and solidifying militarism among the populace. Everything was geared for an approaching war with Shin.

In July 1894, Shin sent forces to subdue a revolutionary war staged by Korean farmers. Japan took this opportunity to send its own forces to Korea, thus encountering the Chinese. On August 1st, the Tenno declared war on Shin. A week before, however, the Japanese navy had made a surprise attack on a Shin fleet. The army also, three days prior to the declaration of war, had already opened fire against Shin forces. This practice of making surprise attacks before issuing the official declaration of war was also carried out by the Japanese at the time of the Russo-Japanese war.

The Sino-Japanese war resulted in a Japanese victory. As a result, Japan expelled all Shin forces from Korea, extracted reparations amounting to 1.5 times more than the actual war expense (350 million yen), snatched away Formosa and Pescadores and, furthermore, forced an unequal treaty upon Shin worse than the treaties between Shin and the Western powers. It was originally decided that Shin would cede the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, but, after being met with the joint opposition of Russia, Germany and France (the "Three Nations' Interference"), the plan was dropped.

2) Imperialist World and Tennoism

From the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century, monopolistic financial capitalism became dominant in the Western world. The modern imperialist era was

beginning. The competition for colonies, spheres of influence and for interests related to railroad and mines was getting more severe. The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war and the acquisition of an exorbitant amount of reparations and territory started off a violent race to rip China apart. The "Three Nations' Interference" was one phase of Japan's modern imperialistic activity.

Japanese capitalism was then still at the beginning stages of the industrial revolution and far from being monopolistic. This did not, however, deter Japan from joining the race to rip Asia apart. Mutsuhito Tenno himself took an active leadership in this race. After deciding to yield to the "Three Nations' Interference," he consoled Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi saying, "We have no other choice than to give up Liaotung now. However, the war experience taught us Liaotung's geography and other conditions. We still have hopes to take Liaotung back someday using the Korean problem or something as an excuse."

The Tenno, high officials and generals were elated by the "game" won in the Sino-Japanese war and promoted, harder than ever, the militarization of the country. They wanted to annex Korea to Japanese territory, go north to regain Liaotung and expand Japan's sphere of influence in the north-eastern part of Shin. At the same time, they wanted to use Formosa as a foothold to proceed to the Fukien Province of Shin and further down into south-east Asia. They soon realized that these desires were far from realistic. Japan, by itself, was unable to proceed either to the north or south.

In Korea, Russian influence was getting stronger and pushing Japan back. To the south, British and French influence could not be easily shaken. In 1900, a large-scale armed uprising led by the Boxers shook the imperialist powers in China. Japan sent a large number of soldiers to join the forces of the eight nations, including Britain, Germany and Russia, mobilized to crush this rebellion. While everybody's concern was centered around Peking, Japan tried to seize Fukien and Amoy. In August, Japan sent its army to the port of Amoy. As Britain and France issued a strong protest, the embarrassed Japanese withdrew.

Japan gave up, for the time being, the idea of proceeding to the south. It entered into a military alliance with Britain in 1902. Competition with Russia for the domination of Korea and the north-eastern portion of China led to the Russo-Japanese war, started in February 1904.

It was impossible for Japan to wage this war without a great amount of aid, both political and financial, from Britain and the United States. Close to half of the Japanese war expenses — 800 million yen out of the total 1,700 million yen —

was provided by war bonds purchased by the British and Americans.

Japan was victorious in its early encounter. In March 1905, the Japanese army defeated the main Russian force near Shengang and forced it to retreat far to the north. The navy destroyed a large Russian squadron in the Korean Straits in May. However, by this time, the army came to suffer seriously from a lack of officers and non-commissioned officers. Weapons and ammunition supplies were close to non-existent. It became virtually impossible for the Japanese to keep on fighting.

The Japanese government and the military both became anxious to find a way to reach a cease-fire. Russia also wanted peace so that it could concentrate its forces to subdue the domestic revolutionary movement of workers and peasants. The U.K. and U.S. also desired peace, not wanting Japan to expand its influence any further. The Czarist regime, a mainstay of the reactionary order in Europe, was dear to them. Capitalists in Britain and the United States stopped buying Japanese war bonds. The two countries pressed Russia and Japan to start negotiating. Through the mediation of the U.S. President, a peace treaty was concluded between Russia and Japan in September 1905. Thus, from beginning to end, the war was within the framework of Anglo-American policy to contain Russian influence in Asia. The Japanese rulers, however, told a very different story to the people: the great Japanese victory, epoch-making in the world's history of wars, was possible because of the great virtue of the Tenno and the loyalty of the soldiers. This story was repeated until Japan was defeated in World War II in 1945. It was forbidden to tell the truth about the Russo-Japanese war in public.

The war cost the people great sacrifices. About one million men were taken into battle. (One person out of every 8.5 families went to the war.) The number of those killed in battle or by disease rose to approximately 110,000 and the number of wounded was approximately 330,000. The rate of war casualties rose to more than 40 percent. In every small village, there were many coming back either dead or wounded. The financial burden almost broke the people's backs. It was natural for people, after having paid so much for the war, to believe what was told by the government. They wanted to believe that the victory was truly glorious. They also liked to believe that their dead relatives were deified and enshrined at Yasukuni to be worshipped by the Tenno himself. In this way, Meiji Tenno became, in the peoples' mind, not just a god incarnate but also a good lord leading the people in both political and military affairs. It became, therefore, quite hard for people to open

their eyes to the evils of imperialism and militarism.

The victorious Japan made Russia hand over Southern Sakhalin, the rights to lease Lu-shun and Ta-lien and the railroad between Ch'ang-ch'un and Ta-lien (later called the Southern Manchurian Railroad) and associated rights and interests. The area containing Port Arthur and Ta-lien was renamed "Kanto-shu" and put under the rule of an army general heading a standing army corps — later reorganized as the "Kanto-gun". In the same period, Japan forced Shin to sign a treaty binding Shin and giving Japan certain rights as follows: a) Japan has rights to station army corps to guard the Southern Manchurian Railroad (SMRR); b) Shin will not construct a railroad running parallel to the SMRR or a branch line harmful to the interests of the SMRR; c) Shin will not give concessions to any foreign country other than Japan to build railroads within the Kirin district; d) Shin will make efforts to guarantee that residents in Manchuria, both of Shin and of foreign (Japanese) nationality, have equal rights to employment and safety of life.

Japan thus turned Southern Manchuria into a semi-colony. Item 4 above would be used frequently by Japan to interfere with Manchurian affairs.

When Japan opened war on Russia, it virtually annexed Korea. Two army divisions were stationed there. When the war ended, Japan made Korea a "protectorate." A national armed revolt against the Japanese rule was brutally crushed. Korea was formally swallowed up by Japan in 1910. With newly acquired colonies — Formosa, Kanto-shu, Southern Sakhalien and Korea — whose total area amounted to seven-tenths of the Japanese mainland, and a semi-colony (Southern Manchuria) with an area of about twice the mainland, Japan grew to be a formidable imperialist nation to be compared with the Western powers.

In an effort to solidify and expand Japanese rule in Asia, Japan entered into a secret pact with Russia right after the war ended to define their domains of influence in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia. This pact was renewed twice until Czarist Russia fell. Japan also wished to monopolize Southern Manchuria. It closed its doors to British or Americans who wished to invest in Southern Manchurian enterprises. Irritated by this act of "ingratitude," the British and especially the Americans hardened their attitude towards Japan. American (and British) and Japanese competition to rip apart Manchuria and China began. This competition, although easing at times, grew more serious as the years went by until the war broke out between Japan and America (and Britain) in 1941.

Japan was massacreing peoples in its colonies.

In Formosa, it was said then that a minor revolt occurred every three years and a major revolt every five years. In Korea also, the people never let up their powerful struggle for national liberation.

In the face of all this, Japan only kept its military expansionist policy growing stronger. The army grew more powerful than before in exerting its influence on policy-making. In 1907, the Tenno and chiefs of the military forces decided on "Guidelines for the Defence of Imperial Japan." The administration was kept out of this decision — making until, after the Guidelines had been written, the Prime Minister was summoned by the Tenno to express his opinion about the "draft." The parliament was completely ignored. Meiji Tenno always favored military chiefs as opposed to civilian heads. The law also made the military stand aloof from civilian control. Decision-making of the above kind was, therefore, nothing unusual in those days.

3) The Era of Taisho Tenno.

In July 1912, Meiji Tenno, believed to be a Tenno of unparalleled greatness, died. The Crown Prince Yoshihito inherited the throne and the new era was named Taisho. The new Tenno was born with a brain defect and was incapable of taking care of national affairs. (The Crown Prince Hirohito was appointed to the regency in 1921). Although the nature of the Tenno's problem was concealed, the people came to learn about it anyway. This helped to lower the Tenno's prestige to an extent.

Yoshihito reigned from 1912 to 1926. A democratic atmosphere, largely of a bourgeoisie nature, was visible. It was a change after the freedom-democratic movement was crushed in 1880's. As the bases of this new atmosphere, we may point out the growth of the modern middle class sup-

ported by capitalistic development, the growth of class struggles waged by workers and peasants, certain contradictions between the over-militarization and capitalistic interests and the social and economic changes Japan was going through during this period. The wave of pacifism and anti-militarism of the post-World War I era also gave impetus to the formation of a democratic current. It must have been helpful for this tide that people felt less pressure coming from the new Tenno with his faltering prestige.

The expansionism of Japanese imperialism, however, did not weaken. Newly arising monopolistic financial capitalism was the driving force behind this aggressive move. The following chronology is a brief sketch of the important foreign invasions made by Japan from 1912 to 1926.

1912: The General Staff took advantage of the disturbance caused by the Chinese "Xinhai Geming (revolution)" to promote a fake independence movement in Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia (and failed).

1913-14: Crushed a large-scale armed uprising in Formosa.

1914-18: As a participant in World War I, attacked the German fort at Tsingtao and seized Shantung Province. Occupied the islands north of the equator formerly under German rule. Sent a squadron to the Mediterranean.

1915: Forced the 21 demands upon China. Tried to colonize the whole of China.

1916: Second attempt by the General Staff to fake an independence movement in Manchuria and Mongolia. (Failed.)

1918-22: Sent an army of up to 75,000 soldiers to Russia to harass the Socialist Revolution in Russia and to grab northern

Carrying the sacred mirror, inauguration ceremony of Hirohito Tenno, October 3rd, 1926



Manchuria and northern Sakhalin from Russia, (Repelled.)

1919: Crushed a nation-wide uprising by the Korean people fighting for national liberation. (Two divisions stationed in Korea, 4,000 gendarmes and their assistants together with six battalions sent from Japan were used.)

1920-21: The armed forces in Korea were sent to charge Chientao, a stronghold of anti-Japanese Imperialism fighters situated in China.

1925: Kanto-gun interferes with the fight between Zhang Zuo Lin and Kuo Song Ling, siding with Zhang.

It may be too much to demand Yoshihito Tenno be personally responsible for all these acts of invasion as he was a disabled person. But, after all, he must share some of the responsibility as the head of the nation. Political ideologists of that time, supposedly democratic, were also responsible. They did speak up for domestic reformation and democracy but very few opposed the invasions in Korea, China and Siberia. One of the rare exceptions of people who stood up against the Japanese invasions were the publishers of a small magazine called the "Toyo Keizai Zasshi" (East Asian Economics Journal). Their voice was, unfortunately, not influential.

4) Twenty Years of War and Fascism.

In December 1926, Taisho Tenno died and the Crown Prince Hirohito inherited the throne. In the twenty years following, until August 1945, Japan continuously expanded its war of invasion in China, entered into the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy and finally engaged in a global war against the allied powers of China, the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and others. These twenty years ended in the complete defeat of the Triple Alliance.

These years of wars may be roughly separated into the following three stages: (a) 1927-33: The invasion of the north-eastern part of China, (b) 1934-40: The total invasion of China, its deadlock and strategic failures; (c) 1940-45: The formation of the Triple Alliance leading to complete defeat.

The demarcation of these three stages and the events in them differs from the usual theory which assumes that the first stage began with the "Liutiaoha Incident" (the so-called "Manchurian Incident") of September 18, 1931, while the second stage is supposed to begin with the "Lukowkiao Incident" ("Chinese Incident") of July 7, 1937 and the last stage with the beginning of the U.S.-Japanese war in 1941. Let me explain.

When Hirohito took the throne, the Nationalist Party of China and Chinese Communist Party had joined forces to form the National Revolutionary Army which led successful wars to overthrow the war lords and unite the nation. The Japanese administration in China under Wakatsuki was accused of being "soft" on the Chinese and replaced in April of 1927, by a hardline Tanaka government. The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was, at that time, advancing towards Peking, the place where the Manchurian war lord Zhang Zuo Lin — a person brought to his position of power by the Japanese — dwelled. The Tanaka administration sent its army to Shantung Province towards the end of May 1927, to prevent the NRA from taking over Peking. Subsequently the administration and army held an 11-day meeting to decide the basics of the Chinese policy. This clarified Japanese readiness to "take appropriate measures" whenever it saw the "special position and interests" held by Japan in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia threatened by the Chinese revolution. Thus, Japan declared that it would hold fast to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, part of China, and keep the area under the sole rule of Japan, if necessary by using force.

This decision was a blatant violation of the treaty signed in Washington in 1922 by nine nations, including Japan, stating that Chinese territorial integrity should be respected, its boundaries kept open and the signatory nations maintain equal opportunities of investing in China. Thus, confrontation with the United States, Britain and other nations became inevitable.

In May of next year, 1928, Japan sent waves of armies to prevent the NRA forces, already at Tsinan, from entering Peking. The main target of the Chinese anti-imperialist struggle, which used to be the Britain, was now shifted to Japan. The Britain, and United States, which had supported Japanese military intervention in 1927, now stood firmly opposed to the second and third inter-ventions. The Chinese national liberation struggle against imperialism and the imperialist U.K. and U.S. now all confronted Japanese imperialism. Twenty years of Japanese wars against Asian peoples rising up for liberation as well as against the allied forces of the U.S., U.K. and other Western powers started, I believe, when Japan sent the first envoy to Shantung and issued its decision on Chinese policy in 1927.

The war to seize Manchuria and Inner Mongolia came to an end in 1933. In 1934, Japan started to maneuver to establish a puppet regime in northern China. The Lukowkiao Incident was the outcome of this maneuver. This is why I have chosen 1934 as the beginning of the second stage.

I pick 1940, the year when the Triple Alliance

was concluded, as the beginning of the third stage because, when Japan entered the Triple Alliance, both the Tenno and the military chiefs knew that such an action would make war with the U.S. and U.K. inevitable.

The state of political freedom within Japan had never been satisfactory, but the 20 years of war completely obliterated it. People lost their freedom of expression, of the press, freedom to assemble, to organize, to research, their freedom of belief and religion. The position of the parliament grew weaker as the years went by until it became almost non-existent in 1940 when all the political parties were forced to disband. By contrast, the military and high officials of the Tenno's regime grew more despotic. The economic life of the people was put under total State control. The material and spiritual life of the people was put under strict surveillance. Police watched every move of the people. Tennoism became fascist. The domestic politics of Japan followed three steps of development roughly corresponding to the three stages mentioned previously. We shall refrain here from going into detail about this procedure, limit ourselves to consideration of the nature of Tennoist fascism in comparison with German and Italian fascism.

a) In Germany and Italy, capitalism came near to total collapse. Revolutionary movements led by the proletariat cornered the ruling classes. Fascism rose as a reactionary movement against this upsurge of proletarian movement and succeeded in taking power. In Japan, capitalism also faced problems. In 1927, for example, an unprecedented financial crisis shook Japan. From 1929 to 1931, the waves of the world financial crisis hit the shores of Japan. However, these problems did not bring Japanese capitalism to the brink of total collapse. The revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants was also showing unprecedented strength, but it did not come close to threatening the foundations of the Tennoist state. If there was anything which truly caused a crisis of Tennoism, it was external elements: the development of the Chinese people's resistance to Japanese rule, and the deepening antagonism between the United States, Britain and Japan.

b) In Germany and Italy, fascism assumed an anti-capitalist appearance competing with the proletarian revolution. The fascists organized the people to overthrow the establishment so that it could take power. In Japan, the fascists, at one time, made themselves look as if they were critical of the financial cliques. The fascist movement in Japan, however, was not based among the people. It was led by the military, the most powerful institution of the Tenno's regime, and the regime itself turned fascistic.

c) In Germany and Italy, fascism took power as a reactionary response to the domestic crisis and after taking power, the new regimes started wars of aggression. In Japan, by contrast, the wars of aggression preceded fascism, which was introduced to deal with the largely external crisis.

d) In Germany and Italy, the fascists had to create anew the symbols of national unity, the Fuhrer Hitler and the Generalissimo Mussolini. Japanese fascism, by contrast, only had to strengthen the already-existing Tenno warship.

Hirohito Tenno himself was not so active in promoting Tennoist fascism. He was outraged when fascist officers killed his ministers and generals. However, he never opposed the militarists when they ignored the parliament, started wars and promoted fascist politics. He did embody the Tennoist fascism and reigned at the top of the fascist military and government.


5) War, Japan's Defeat and Hirohito Tenno

Hirohito Tenno is certainly responsible for the twenty years of wars as the sole ruler of Japan and the supreme commander of the armed forces. We must, further, accuse him personally for his own active participation in the war effort.

After the war ended, Hirohito said on many occasions that he himself was opposed to the war with the United States. He was, according to Hirohito, only following an unwritten law binding the Tenno to sanction proposals formally agreed upon by a responsible institution, and had no choice other than to give approval to the decision made by the General Staff and the administration. These words are outright lies.

It is true that the Tennes of modern days sanctioned any proposal officially made by the administration or military. However, before such official proposals were made, unofficial inquiries were made to learn the Tenno's opinion about the issue. Original proposals were modified (on occasion, two or three times) until both sides agreed upon the final and official proposals. Some diaries, memos, talks and correspondence of those who were close to Hirohito during the war have been made public and tell how these unofficial changes of opinion were made. The Tenno, according to these records, actively led the administration and the military in promoting the war. We compiled these findings in a book *Tenno no Senjaku Sekinin* (The Tenno's Responsibility in the War) published by the Gendai Hyoron-sha, Tokyo, 1975. We shall give three of the many examples to prove our points.)

a) In December 1937, the Japanese army occupied Nanking, the capital of Nationalist China. Finding out that the Chinese resistance was



Hirohito inspects students' military training, 1939.

stronger than expected, the General Staff wanted to negotiate a ceasefire so that Japan would not be bogged down too much in a war on the continent. The administration, however, did not want a ceasefire. Cabinet members thought that without a capital, the Nationalist government would be nothing more than a local government which did not deserve the position of negotiating with the Japanese government, which was on the verge of a total victory. Hirohito supported the administration. Japan continued the war of aggression until it was defeated miserably.

b) From the end of 1937 to the summer of 1938, the Japanese Army conspired with German leaders to form the Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan to confront the U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and U.K. Hirohito agreed to form an alliance to confront the U.S.S.R. alone, but was opposed to also making the U.S. and U.K. enemies. Even when the Chief of Staff, a member of the Imperial family, asked to have an interview with Hirohito, he refused it saying that there was no need to talk about the issue of the Triple Alliance. Hirohito's strong opposition frustrated the formation of the Triple Alliance at this time. However, in May 1940, Hirohito gave immediate approval to the Konoe administration's attempt to enter into a pact of non-aggression with the U.S.S.R. and to form a new Triple Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan confronting, this time, only the U.S. and U.K. Although the official explanation given by the government and the military for entering into the Triple Alliance was to prevent a war with the U.S., both Hirohito and his high officials were fully aware that this action made war with the U.S. inevitable.

c) Concerning the opening of the war with the United States in December 1941, Hirohito, the Imperial Headquarters and Prime Minister Tojo

exchanged opinions repeatedly. Hirohito accumulated all the information he could get to study carefully if there was any chance of winning the war with the United States. He even re-evaluated the policies already decided upon. After all these calculations were made, he decided to go ahead with the war. The surprise attack by the Navy against the U.S. position in Pearl Harbor as well as an Army raid on the Malay Peninsula after passing through Thailand's territory in contravention of international law, were both included in the war plan prepared prior to the opening of the war by Hirohito and the Chiefs of the Armed Forces.

Hirohito takes pride in the fact that he himself made the decision for the Japanese surrender. Actually, more than a year before the surrender date, there was a plan, carefully prepared by those who saw no future in continuing fighting, to let the Tenno declare the end of the war as the only means of suppressing the fanatic elements in the Army who wanted to continue the war no matter what the cost. The Tenno himself, however, was not ready to take that up then. He did begin to consider a way to end the fighting when he saw Germany unconditionally surrender on May 8th, 1945, and when Okinawa was occupied by U.S. forces on June 21st of the same year. However, he never dreamt of surrendering then. On July 25, Interior Minister Kido Koichi told Hirohito that further continuation of the war would result in the total occupation of Japan by the United States and, furthermore, in such a case, the Tenno himself would be captured, the three Sacred Treasures might be lost and the unity of the nation under the Tenno might also be destroyed. It was then, it seems, that the Tenno began to think that he might have to choose surrender as a way to hold intact the unity of the nation under himself. The next day, July 26th, the United States, Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration demanding the immediate surrender of Japan. Japanese rulers were split into two factions: one willing to immediately accept the Declaration unconditionally, and another, including Hirohito, who did not want to accept it unless it was guaranteed that the Tenno would remain the sovereign of Japan after surrender. While Hirohito and other hard-liners delayed surrendering, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6th and 9th) and the Soviet Union joined forces to attack Japan. It was only then that the people who were willing to accept the Potsdam Declaration unconditionally could persuade Hirohito to decide on surrender.

On August 15, the Tenno announced on the radio that the Potsdam Declaration was accepted and said that he was happy to have been able to secure the unity of the nation under him, that the

people should believe in the eternity of the "holy Japan" and should make every effort to let the nation's glory shine. The only thing dear to

Hirohito was the security of the nation's throne under him, that is, the security of Tennoism. He cared only for himself.

IV. CONTEMPORARY TENNOISM AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

1. The U.S. Occupation and Hirohito

1) The U.S. Occupation Policy and the Japanese People.

The Japanese surrender was decided by the Tenno and some military persons, bureaucrats and politicians of the highest rank. The decision was kept secret from the people until the last moment. There had been no anti-war sentiment among the people. There was a general war-weariness towards the end of the war, but that was about all. The surrender shook the foundations of Tennoism but no popular revolutionary movement was born. People were still used as slaves, but no movements, except those organized by captive Koreans and Chinese, rose up in protest. The Asian captives used in hell-like labor camps at mines and other places were the first to rise up against their oppression. It was also the Koreans who led the struggle to liberate the political prisoners. Most of the Japanese were, at that time, in a state of despondency. Writing this down, I feel, as a Japanese, utterly ashamed.

As the people were weak, the rulers had everything their way. On the day of surrender, according to the Tenno's suggestion, a new government was formed headed by a general belonging to the Imperial Family. The first thing the new Prime Minister said was that every one of the hundred million Japanese should repent for Japan's defeat. In a nonchalant manner he blamed the people, not the Tenno, generals or politicians, for the defeat.

Amid the confusion which followed the defeat, the capitalists and high officials divided up the enormous amount of wealth stored for the war expenses among themselves. The capitalists also made the government pay for the unfinished war munitions which they had contracts with the government to make. These practices were among the factors causing serious inflation. In this way, the Tennoist elite and capitalists took advantage of even the defeat to exploit the people.

The occupation force of the Allied Nations was led by and mainly consisted of U.S. personnel. The General of the U.S. Army, Douglas MacArthur, was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SAP). Officers of the occupation force's General Head Quarters (GHQ) were all U.S. personnel. On September 22, 1945, the U.S. government issued its Basic Policy for the Early Period of the Jap-

anese Occupation. The following two items are cited as the final aims of the occupation:

(A) To guarantee that Japan would never again become a threat to U.S. or to world security and peace, and

(B) To eventually establish a responsible government which respected other nations' rights and supported the U.S.' purposes as shown in the Charter and principles embodied in the United Nations Charter.

Expressing this more straight forwardly, the above means:

(A) To make it totally impossible for Japan to rise up against the U.S. again,

(B) To make Japan subject to the U.S. and subordinate to its purposes.

"In order to achieve the purposes of occupation with the least possible military force and materials," the above Basic Policy states with typically American frankness, "SCAP may exert power through the Japanese ruling structure including the Tenno."

The first thing the U.S. government and SCAP did was to totally dissolve the Japanese military and, for this purpose, the Tenno and his government were put to use. Even an attempt by the government to organize a unit to guard the Palace was immediately banned by the GHQ. When the dissolution of the military was almost complete, the GHQ directed the government on October 1, 1945, to guarantee the freedom of speech, press, assembly, organization and religion (including freedom to debate Tennoism), to release all political prisoners, to terminate the political secret police, to dismiss all policemen and prosecutors working for the latter and to abolish the regulatory laws. The government resigned en masse protesting that such measures would destroy Kokutai (the unity of the nation under the Tenno).

On October 10th, the new government followed the above GHQ orders and 500 political prisoners, including communists, were liberated. On October 11th, General MacArthur personally directed the Prime Minister to make the Constitution liberal, to liberate women, to encourage the organization of labor unions, make education liberal and added five more items of political reform. In this period, GHQ was to encourage people to rise up against the ruling circles. (When the people grew more

tionary than the GHQ needed, as in April and May of 1946, GHQ immediately crushed the people's movement and openly defended the ruling class.) On October 10, 1946, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), enabled to campaign openly for the first time, started to vigorously organize workers, farmers, women, youth and intellectuals. The JCP strongly urged people to stand up and overthrow Tennoism. Capitalists, landlords and people who were at a loss to know what to do all reacted to this. The political atmosphere of Japanese society suddenly became active. Around this time, the pre-war political movement representing the capitalists and landlords was reactivated and organized itself into political parties such as the "Jiyu-to" (Freedom Party) or "Kaishin-to" (Reform Party). The pre-war movement of the proletariat, except that of the JCP, re-gained its forces and organized the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). Every political organization except the JCP claimed, as its most important aim, the upholding of Tennoism. The number of people who were for overthrowing the Tennoist rule may have been around one percent of the whole population. Still it was great progress for a people who used to be too afraid to even talk openly about the Tenno to begin to debating publicly the right or wrong of overthrowing Tennoism.

In December 1945, the GHQ directed that Shintoism should be separated from the State. This directive prohibited, among other things, the propagation of any belief or theory claiming the

End of an era? MacArthur & Hirohito, 1945



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superiority of the Japanese Tenno over other sovereigns because of his special lineage, or origin, and the superiority of the Japanese archipelago over other nations because of its heavenly origin. It also prohibited public funding of the Ise Shrine and other Shinto shrines. The government should, the directive said, no longer direct the religious ceremonies held in these shrines. Official textbooks of Japanese history and ethics could no longer be used. Kyoiku Chokugo (the Imperial Rescript on Education – the basic principles of education “endowed” by Meiji Tenno to “teach” people about the supremacy and godly nature of Tennoism) was no longer “holy.” Some school masters stopped reciting the Kyoiku Chokugo with reverence in front of the students. (The government, however, attempted to uphold the Kyoiku Chokugo even though it called off the practice of reading it in front of students. It was not until June 1948 that the Kyoiku Chokugo was made invalid by the Diet in accordance with the new Constitution. The ruling class tried hard to keep the Kyoiku Chokugo.) Various forms of class struggle and social movements began to grow and spread like a storm.

2) The Reformation and Continuation of Tennoism

It was about this time that an international debate began concerning whether Tennoism should be terminated or not. Occupation policy had been decided solely by the U.S. government until nearly the end of 1945, when the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was formed in Washington D.C. as the institution which would decide on Japanese occupation policy. The FEC consisted of delegates from 11 nations including the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China. The Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), a consultative committee for SCAP, was also formed in Tokyo. The U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. and China sent delegates to the ACJ. On February 26, 1946, the FEC held its first meeting. Among the member nations of the FEC there were many, including the U.S.S.R., China, the Philippines and Australia, which believed that Tennoism should be terminated to prevent the return of militarism to Japan. The U.S. government had, as mentioned before, decided to keep and utilize Tennoism. However, even within the U.S. government there was strong opinion calling for the abolishment of Tennoism. The same opinion was stronger among the American public.

Prior to this, the Japanese government had began to amend the Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempo (Great Imperial Japanese Constitution) following an order issued in October 1945 by SCAP to make the Constitution liberal. Japanese rulers attempted

to limit the amendments to minor matters so that the sovereignty of the Tenno could remain unchanged. MacArthur knew how useful a tool Tennoism was to rule the Japanese. He was all for keeping it. Being aware of the strong opinion to abolish Tennoism coming both from within the U.S. and from international circles, he believed that a drastic measure was necessary to keep Tennoism. A partial amendment to the Constitution was not enough. A new Constitution, a people's Constitution must be created, he thought. Japanese rulers did not see what was going on. They were only anxious to keep the essence of the old Constitution. MacArthur could not stand their obstinacy based upon lack of awareness.

On February 13, 1946, MacArthur suddenly presented the Japanese government a draft of the Japanese Constitution written by GHQ. (In Chapter I, we touched on the contents of the new Constitution.) The Japanese rulers did everything possible to accept this draft. GHQ emphasized that the only way to evade the pressure of international opinion was to accept the draft. If the draft were not accepted, GHQ said, the FEC might force a constitution on Japan that did not allow any place at all for the Tenno. If the government would not obey, GHQ also said, it would show the draft directly to the Japanese public. (Then, GHQ suggested, a government would be replaced by a new one accepting the draft.)

In this way, the Tenno and the government finally accepted the draft considering it the only "lightning rod" they could get to avoid being struck by the lightning of Republicanism. The government published the translation of the GHQ draft as if it were its own draft of the amended Constitution. This "draft" went through minor changes and then was "proposed" to the parliament by the Tenno as his draft of the amended Dai Nippon Teikoku Kempo. The Tenno and the government tried hard to make the meaning of the sentence "Sovereignty rests with the people" vague by translating it to mean "the collective will of the people is supreme". Sensing that the FEC would not agree to such a vague statement, GHQ again ordered the government, in secret, to reformulate the sentence into a more straight translation. The government reluctantly obeyed this order and made the Joyu-to propose in the Diet the reformation of the sentence in question and saw to it that the proposal was adopted.

Both in the House of Representatives and the House of Lords there was strong apprehension voiced that the new Constitution might jeopardize the Kokutai. To these voices the government steadfastly responded that the Kokutai would remain unmoved. Everyone knew that the new Constitution, if applied to the letter, would contradict

the supremacy of the Tenno. And yet, the rulers were resolute in their willingness to keep the Kokutai. The draft of the Constitution passed in the Diet and was then sent to the Privy Council to be studied. After passing the latter, it was "endowed" by the Tenno to his subjects, the Japanese people. The Japanese Constitution was thus presented to the nation from above as an amendment to the great Imperial Japanese Constitution. The supreme ruler, the successor of the unbroken line of rulers, the Tenno now became the symbol of national unity given the position according to the will of the people, who were sovereign.

As we have shown in Ch. I, the Tenno ceased to be the supreme ruler but he still held supreme authority, making the entire ruling structure function. The Tenno under the new Constitution is not like the Tenno under the *Shogunate* rule. Japan is still a Tennoist nation.

The economic structure of Japan is ruled by the capitalist class who are the actual holders of power in this country. The class of landlords, who supported modern Tennoism together with the capitalists, was dissolved in the early part of the 1950's when an overwhelming tide of farmers' outcries forced agricultural reform. Presently, therefore, the highly developed monopoly capitalists constitute the ruling class in this country. The Tenno is, thus, the supreme institution holding together the nation which is ruled by the class of monopoly capitalists.


3) The Deal Between Hirohito and MacArthur.

The first thing Hirohito Tenno did after the war ended was to try to save himself from being tried as a war criminal by the Allied Powers. On September 27, 1945, Hirohito met MacArthur. According to a rigorous analysis based upon facts given in "The Free Will of the Japanese People and the Free Will of D. MacArthur" by Matsuura Reo (contained in the *Collected Treatises of Matsuura*



Hirohito resigns his divinity in his second public broadcast following Japan's defeat, 1946.

250,000 gather before the Tenno's palace demanding food, 1946.



"What has the Tenno been for the Japanese, II", 1979), Hirohito said apologetically to MacArthur that in spite of all the effort he made to stop the war against the U.S. he could not overrule the nation which wanted war. In this way he put the blame on the nation rather than on himself. MacArthur was friendly to Hirohito. He had already decided to use the Tenno, who was powerful enough to dissolve the fanatic Japanese military. MacArthur told Hirohito that it was due to the august virtue of the Tenno that the whole nation followed him when he decided to end the war. The Tenno's virtue, he said, surpassed that of every other sovereign in the world. Hirohito must have felt quite relieved.

On January 1, 1946, Hirohito issued an Imperial edict which expressed boldly but cleverly his will to continue being the ruler of Japan. He first quoted the "Five Oaths" of Meiji Tenno published in March 1868.

He then said that the "Five Oaths" were the pinnacle of fairness and justice which should be made the guidelines in building a new Japan. He next expressed anxiety regarding the rising atmosphere of extremism, dangerous thoughts and faltering public morality. Having blasted the class struggle and revolutionary movements, he went on to say that he and the nation were bound by mutual trust and respect, not by the myth stating that the Tenno was a god incarnate. He concluded the edict by saying, "The nation should prove its merits worthy of our supreme tradition (that is, to use the "old" Kyoiku-Chokugo terminology, the nation should prove the quintessence of Kokutai) by contributing to the promotion of the welfare of humanity. Let the mind of the nation be one with that of Ours."

These words said by a person who brought the nation to the verge of total destruction do not show any awareness of his own responsibility but only show his determination to keep the nation under his reign. (The above-mentioned paper by Matsuura also reaches the same conclusion.)

The "Five Oaths" were issued on March 15, 1868, right after the Tenno's regime took power

by destroying the *Shogunate* forces in Edo. Meiji Tenno headed the court nobles, clanlords and high officials and swore to the gods of *Tennoist Shintoism* that he would follow the oaths as basic policy in the new regime. The "Five Oaths" may appear to be democratic if, for example, one reads the first point: Broad-based councils should be promoted and all matters should be decided on by public opinion. One should note, however, that "public opinion" only meant the opinion generally shared by the nobles, clanlords and high officials. The people were absent when the Tenno swore those oaths to the gods. The nature of these "Five Oaths" are clearly shown by the history Meiji Tenno and his government: a series of wars of aggression. One must start by facing the fact that Hirohito Tenno, who worshipped Meiji Tenno, led Japan to ruin.

The part of Hirohito's edict negating the Tenno's deity had been added to the original manuscript in accordance with directions given by GHQ. At a press interview taking place in August 1977, Hirohito himself revealed that this negation of the Tenno's deity was not really important. The true purpose of issuing the edict was, according to him, to encourage the demoralized people of defeated Japan by telling them that the principle of democracy was already shown in the "Five Oaths" of Meiji Tenno. In that way, he thought, the people could regain self-confidence and follow the paths already prepared by the "Five Oaths". Thus, in Hirohito's mind, nothing had really changed.

MacArthur readily applauded this edict. In this way, he succeeded in keeping the image of the Tenno awesome and respectable. He also succeeded in making the Tenno work for him. Just about a month later, GHQ pressed the draft for the new Constitution of the Tenno's government. Hirohito might have been disappointed by this, feeling that he was betrayed by MacArthur. His disappointment, however, did not last long. He may have lost his sovereignty on paper, but, with the ruling class and the people at large still treating him as the supreme authority uniting the nation, things had not really changed much, at least in his

mind. It was obvious from the way even the Prime Minister called himself a subject of the Tenno that the ruling class were loyal to him. Hirohito wanted to make sure that the general population was still with him. This desire must have prompted Hirohito to tour the war-torn nation. A week after he received GHQ's draft for the new Constitution, he visited bombed out families in Kanagawa and encouraged them. By the end of 1946, he had toured every part of the country except Hokkaido, Shikoku and Kyushu and acted as a benevolent lord, considering the welfare of people. Everywhere people flocked around him worshipping and choking with tears of gratitude. In this action, too, he might have been following the example of Meiji Tenno. (See Ch. IV 1-2.) The government and GHQ thus succeeded in selling the Tenno to the people. The people's revolutionary awakening was greatly hampered.

Meanwhile, the Far Eastern International Military Tribunal was opened in May 1946 to judge Class A war criminals. International opinion was outraged when it was found that the Tenno was not indicted. Some of the judiciary nations were also critical of this exclusion. Even among the Japanese there were many who voiced their feeling, at the time of defeat, that the Tenno should at least resign. But MacArthur defended the Tenno to the hilt and he was not even summoned as a witness in the Tribunal.

On May 6, 1947, Hirohito met MacArthur for the third time. He asked the General who would defend Japan, left without any armed forces, after a peace treaty was established and the U.S. army withdrew from Japan. I do not know yet what the General's answer was. In the middle of September 1947, H. Terasaki, a liaison agent of the Tenno, visited GHQ with a message from the Tenno addressed to the U.S. State Department. In the message Hirohito stated his desire for the U.S. to continue the military occupation of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands for a long period of time. Leaving these islands under Japanese sovereignty, Hirohito wrote, they should be kept under U.S. control for 25 to 50 years or even longer—for that purpose, the islands may be leased to the U.S. This policy would be, he continued, favored by a majority of Japanese since they were afraid of not only Russia but also of the possibility of some "incidents" brought about by the rising tides from both left and right wingers, providing an excuse for Russia to interfere with Japan's domestic affairs. (I myself have not seen the original message. The above passages are based upon *Divided Territories - Okinawa, Kuriles and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Kondo Eiichi, Sekai, June, 1977.*)

Hirohito was selling out the territories of Japan! His proposal in the message was closely

connected to his question to MaArthur on May 6 1947. He was asking the U.S. to stay in the Ryukyu Islands after the conclusion of the peace treaty and, further, to defend disarmed Japan.

This period in 1947 coincided with the time when the possibility of the Far Eastern Tribunal asking, in one way or another, for the Tenno to take responsibility for the war seemed to be strong. It may be not wrong to assume that the Tenno sold a part of Japan's territory to the U.S. so that he could be more certain about MacArthur's support in his attempt to evade an inquiry by the Tribunal. We should also note that the new Constitution was already in effect when the Tenno engaged in this grave political action one which the Constitution prohibited him from taking. The Tenno simply ignored this prohibition. Thus, he proved once more that his mentality did not really change from the framework of the old Constitution. The Tenno could get away with doing this since the ruling class, still of the same old mentality, allowed it.

On November 2, 1948 the Far Eastern International Military Tribunal passed sentence on the Class A war criminals and the court was dismissed. The Tenno's war crimes had never been discussed in the Tribunal. However, after the dismissal of the Tribunal, Chief Justice Webb published his personal opinion stating clearly that he believed that the Tenno was responsible for the war. He further stated that it was due to political consideration on the side of the Allied Powers that the Tenno was not indicted. On the same day, November 2nd, Hirohito sent a letter of gratitude to MacArthur saying: "I am grateful to have received Your Excellency's kind words which were conveyed to me through Prime Minister Yoshida. It is my life's ambition to be able to work for the welfare and safety of the Japanese people and to contribute to the cause of world peace. I shall be more resolute than ever in trying my best, jointly with the nation, to quickly rebuild Japan surmounting all difficulties." This message indicates that MacArthur had sent a letter to the Tenno immediately before the final sentence was given by the Tribunal informing him, in some way that the Tribunal had been adjourned and that the Tenno need not worry about retiring. The above letter of the Tenno must have been written to express his gratitude for MacArthur's consideration and to clarify his resoluteness in continuing to maintain his position.

About three years later, in September 1951 the Peace Treaty between Japan and the U.S., U.S. and other nations was signed in San Francisco. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed simultaneously. It was decided, in the Peace Treaty that the Ryukyu Islands would be virtually un-

U.S. rule for an indefinite period of time and, in the Security Treaty, Japan agreed to give the U.S. the right to station its forces in Japan, again for an indefinite term, to destroy any revolutionary uprising. Everything Hirohito asked MacArthur for in May and September 1947 was realized.

2. Tennoism as the Mainstay of Militarism.

1) Re-militarization of Japan

Before the Peace Treaty was concluded, the U.S. made a radical change in its policy toward Japan during the Spring and Summer of 1948. Until that time, the U.S. had tried to keep Japan one of the small Asian countries obedient to it. A major change in the political situation in China, however, made the U.S. modify its policy. Japan was now to be established as an anti-Soviet, anti-communist stronghold in East Asia and the base for a reactionary movement against national liberation. Japanese capitalism was to be encouraged to grow rapidly so that it would provide the "Factory of the Far East".

In February 1947, the United States gave Chiang Kai Shek's regime in China an enormous amount of military aid so that the regime could mount a large-scale war to exterminate the communists. By the summer of 1948, however, it became obvious that Chiang's regime would be overthrown and, at the same time, that U.S. imperialism could no longer remain in China. Japan was then chosen by the U.S. to replace Chiang's China.

From the Summer of 1948, the U.S. government and GHQ began to lift, one after another, the limitations put on Japanese economic activities. Japanese monopoly capitalism was encouraged to grow. The labor movement and revolutionary movement were thoroughly oppressed. By the end of 1948, the U.S. had already begun to study ways to remilitarize Japan. The news of this move appeared frequently in the Japanese media. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began. Most of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan were immediately sent to Korea. On July 8, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to create a "Police Reserve Force" of 75,000 men and to increase the members of the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000 men and form a "Coast Guard Corps". The funds needed for those actions were found in the Japanese national budget buried deep beneath an item which held an abnormally large amount of money to be used for repaying national debt. (The draft of national budget for 1950, carefully prepared by the Japanese government, had been edited by GHQ.) Only 45 days after MacArthur had issued this order, 7,000 men

entered the barracks to form the First Corps of the Police Reserve Force. By the end of 1950, a force comparable in size to four U.S. infantry divisions was created. The remarkable speed in which this armed force was created must have been made possible through carefully planned preparation. Necessary equipment, weapons and facilities were all ready.

This army, although small, was to fill in the vacuum created by the transfer of U.S. forces to the Korean front so that the U.S. rule of Japan and the prestige of the Japanese ruling class would remain secure. The formation and drilling of the new army were all performed by both commissioned and non-commissioned U.S. officers. The equipment — carbines and light tanks — were all leased by the U.S. The U.S. forces virtually commanded the new army.

As the Peace Treaty was concluded, the Police Reserve Force was re-organized into the Security Force holding 110,000 men equipped with heavy guns and tanks. The Coast Guard Corps, nominally belonging then to the Maritime Safety Agency, was also made into a small but independent navy holding destroyers leased by the United States. The Security Force and the new Coast Guard Corps were then put under the control of the newly created Security Board. The United States further urged Japan to increase the number of soldiers in the Army to 300,000. On the other hand, it tried to stop Japan from constructing substantial Naval and Air Forces. The United States wanted Japanese soldiers only as cannon fodder. Prime Minister S. Yoshida tried, instead, to resist this policy of the United States claiming that Japan lacked the economic power to build a large army so rapidly. He chose to build slowly a modern, well-balanced Army, Navy and Air-Force, obtaining U.S. aid to do so.

As soon as the Korean War started, every industry in Japan, including shipping, and the heavy industry side of the chemical industry, was mobilized to supply war materials to the U.S. Forces. Japan's foreign trade deficit was wiped out by this and the enterprises further earned large incomes. The latest industrial technology was also introduced to Japan during this period. Japanese capitalism grew rapidly. The shipbuilding, automobile and steel industries, the industries in which Japan now leads the world, were all established in this period. In 1952, when the Peace Treaty became effective, the productivity of the mining and manufacturing industry, the electric power industry and gas enterprises surpassed pre-war levels. Around 1954, modern financial monopoly capitalism, more advanced than that in pre-war days, was re-established. Based on this economic power, the Security Board was re-organized into the Defence

Agency in 1954. A new armed force called the Self-Defence Force was established. The Army, Navy and Air Force, military supplies and education, in short, all the institutions necessary for genuine armed forces, were established.

It goes without saying that this re-militarization contradicts Article 9 of the Constitution which states that Japan will not maintain an Army, Navy, Air Force or any other form of armed forces. When the armed forces were still called the Police Reserve Force or Security Force, the government and the ruling party used to say that the force was a part of the police force and not of a military nature. When the Self-Defence Force (SDF) was established, the same people said that the SDF was a military force without military power and hence admissible according to the Constitution. When the Three-Year Plan for the Expansion of re-armament (1958 through 1960) was introduced, the government claimed that the Constitution admits the holding of military power for self-defence. Then-Prime Minister Kishi Shinsuke said, "To defend our nation we may even own nuclear weapons. It is only matter of policy that we don't have them." Since then everything was made permissible if it was for "self defence."

In 1960, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty — a treaty forcing Japan to accept the U.S. military presence for an indefinite term, and providing any given place in the territory of Japan to be used freely by the U.S. armed forces — was reformed into the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, a treaty of military and political alliance. Taking into account the overwhelming differences existing between Japan and the U.S. in the fields of the military, economics and politics, a treaty of alliance between the two countries, even though equal in appearance, could not but force Japan to be dependent, both militarily and politically, on the U.S. And yet, the Japanese government and the ruling class strongly desired the conclusion of this treaty. The year 1960 thus marked the return of Japanese monopoly capitalism as an imperialist force which had grown both politically and militarily. The alliance with the U.S., the world leader in imperialism and militarism and ceaselessly promoting armed actions against the U.S.S.R., communism and national liberation movements in Asia, also defined the course to be followed by the Japanese ruling class: the course of militarism.

The growth of the SDF, the armed forces of this militaristic imperialism, was accelerated year after year. The Fourth Five-Year Plan for Military Expansion from 1972 through 1976 cost twice the amount of money used during the previous 20 years for military build-up. The government no longer hid the fact that the major aim of this Plan

was to secure command of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. (The government had said that the SDF was the minimum military force required to defend Japan's territorial land, sea and air.)

During the previous years of 1969-1970, representatives of various organizations such as the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, the Japan Ordinance Association and the Japan Committee for Economic Development, strongly urged a rapid acceleration of military expansion. Some of them even said that Japan should take command of the Malacca Straits so that the sea route to carry Middle Eastern oil to Japan could be secured. The Fourth Five-Year Plan was prepared under the direct guidance of the Head of the Defence Agency, Y. Nakasone (who is now, the Prime Minister) who tried, through all possible means, to satisfy the above desire voiced by the representatives of monopoly capitalism.

In November 1978, the Guidelines for Military Cooperation Between Japan and the U.S. were published. The Guidelines suggested that research should be carried out concerning joint Japan-U.S. military operations and drilling under various imaginable situations. The conclusions of this research were to be kept top secret. In this way, the stronger the Japanese military grew, the deeper its association with United States world strategy became until it has become a major component of the U.S. armed forces in Asia. In November 1982, Nakasone became Prime Minister. In January of the following year, he visited south Korea to express his support of Chun Do Hwan's regime. He then flew to Washington D.C. to meet President Reagan. The two of them talked about the way to solidify the political and military alliance between Japan and the U.S. Nakasone said that the two countries share the same destiny. He further told the people of America that the Japanese archipelago would be an unsinkable aircraft carrier against a Russian air attack. He boastfully promised that, in case of an emergency, Japan would close the four straits so that the Russian Far Eastern Fleet would not be able to come out of the Japan Sea. He also reaffirmed his predecessor Suzuki's statement made in the United States saying that Japan would defend the sea lane stretching 1,000 nautical miles southeast from Tokyo and 1,000 nautical miles southwest from Osaka.

2) Unification of the Nation by Means Tennoism.

Prime Minister Yoshida, the first leader of Japanese re-armament, emphasized on many occasions that a firm spiritual base must be found so that re-armament would be successful. I



Illustration: Kaibara Hiroshi (*Emperor System in Japan*, pub., Gendaishokan)

example, in the General Meeting of the ruling party held in September 1952, Yoshida said that, "What is important for us now is to teach our youth about our glorious history, more glorious than any other history in the world., and about our beautiful land. By means of such education about history and geography, we must help the growth of patriotism which is the basis of armament."

When Yoshida mentioned Japanese history as being unsurpassed by any other history in the world, his view of history was no different from that expressed in the *Kyoiku Chokugo*, which stated that the unbroken line of Tenno led the nation in the flourishing of the quintessence of the Kokutai. S. Amano, the Education Minister of the Yoshida administration and a philosopher, published "Kokumin Jissen Yoryo" (Summary of Civil Ethics), to be distributed to primary and middle schools, stating that the Tenno was the ethical center of the nation. Yoshida further stated, in April 1951, that the Kigensetsu (Ceremony for the Founding of the Nation) should be re-instituted.

Soon after coming back from San Francisco where he signed the Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida visited the Yasukuni Shrine (on Oct. 18, 1951) to attend the Great Autumn Festival.

Subsequently, the Tenno and Kogo (Empress) visited the same shrine at the time of the Great Autumn Festival in October 1952, the first such festival after the Peace Treaty was put into effect. The families of the war dead filling the precincts of Yasukuni were so moved to see the two that they shed tears. Their visit appeared under big headlines and with large photos in the nation's papers. The Tenno and Kogo, as well as the Prime Minister, claimed that their visit to Yasukuni was merely a personal matter and that they were exercising the right of religious freedom. Their visit to Yasukuni was, in actuality, far from being a personal matter. It was the first step to re-building

the spiritual and religious foundation supporting rearmament.

Every administration after Yoshida's, as well as the ruling party — the Jiyu Minshu-to (Liberal Democratic Party) which was born in 1955 of the union between the Jiyu-to and the Minshu-to-promoted Yoshida's idea of "patriotism" and the unification of nation by means of the Tenno's authority as the basis for re-armament and their power. As soon as the Peace Treaty was made effective, the rulers began to say that "certain excesses" during the U.S. occupation must be corrected in an attempt to frustrate democratic policies and promote Tennoism. To counter this move, a strenuous struggle was organized, both inside and outside the Diet, by the Socialist Party, Communist Party, Labor unions, progressive intellectuals and women. The first peak of their struggle was seen at the time of the 19th Session of the Diet in 1954. At this time the administration proposed three reactionary laws: the Establishment of the SDF; the Establishment of a centralized police more powerful than in pre-war days; and the Prohibition of political activity by teachers. Re-building a genuine armed force, the construction of a police force to suppress the people's opposition to rearmament and controlling the educators so that the rulers could begin frustrating education for peace and democracy, these three together were all pressed upon the people. In spite of powerful resistance by the opposition parties and people, the majority parties — the Jiyu-to and Minshu-to — forced these proposals through.

Reactionary control of education was thus strengthened. The censorship of school textbooks by the Ministry of Education, which was called an official examination of textbooks, became more strict. The ruling parties vehemently attacked various parts of the textbooks claiming that they were biased. A theory which was recorded in textbooks, and generally accepted by scholars, stating that the Constitution prohibits re-armament, was considered "biased." Historical descriptions of the miserable life under ancient Tennoism was also considered "biased". Any criticism against past invasions by Japan was "biased". The Ministry of Education forced publishers to include in their textbooks passages stating that the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War promoted the country's international position. Also around this time "monuments to the loyal dead" — those who died for the Tenno in the last war — were built in every corner of the country. Ceremonies at Gokoku Jinja (Shrines for the Protection of the Nation), having the character of being branches of the Yasukuni Shrine situated in each prefecture, became more grand year after year. The ruling party and associations of Shinto Shrines began

Hirohito offers New Years greetings to crowds of thousands from the balcony of the palace minutes before an ex-Imperial Army soldier shoots at him with a pin-ball ball.



pressing for the re-institution of the *Kigensetsu*.

Hirohito Tenno no longer had to tour around the nation as he did in 1946 and 1947. Instead, he appeared at the annual gymnastic festivals held in rotation in various prefectures and he greeted the audience. He also showed his smiling face at the time of Arbor day (tree-planting day). In November 1958, it was announced that the Crown Prince Akihito was engaged to Shoda Michiko, daughter of a wealthy miller. The mass media made a big thing out of their engagement. Almost every day until April 1959 when two of them married the media carried big news about "the democratization of the Imperial Household" as shown by Akihito's engagement to the "daughter of a Heimin (an ordinary citizen not belonging to either the Imperial Family or the old Kazoku (aristocracy), the daughter of a miller." Good-looking Michiko became the idol of young girls. It was said that the Imperial Household became a possession of the people, but, in actuality, it was the people who were being possessed by the Imperial Household.

During the 1960's, when the re-militarization of Japan was going ahead full speed at the urging of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, the Tenno was no more presented as a "friendly and democratic" figure or as the "symbol of peace-loving Japan". He became, instead, a supremely awesome High Being. In November 1960, the Chuo Koron Company published a novel called "Furyu Mutan" (the Elegant Dream Tale) containing a description of a fictional scene in which the Tenno, Kogo, Crown Prince and his wife all had their heads chopped off. The Imperial Household Agency and right-wingers loudly protested the Chuo Koron Company publishing this novel. In February 1961, a right-wing youth broke into the house of the Chuo Koron Company's head and, being unable to find the company head there, killed his wife and injured his a housemaid. The Chuo Koron company

used to be one of the publishers, well-known for its liberal stand since pre-war times. However, after this incident, this publisher stopped printing anything which criticized either the Tenno or the Imperial Household. Other media and publishers also grew timid about printing any criticism of Tennoism.

In April 1963, the government decided to give a legal basis to the Gengo system, which had been put into practice against the Constitution and the Imperial House Law, and to make Kimigayo — song eulogizing the Imperial Household which school children were forced to sing at ceremonial occasions — the national anthem. (These aims were attained in 1979.)

In April 1964, the Tenno began, as he did in pre-war days, to decorate living persons with medals. The titles and designs of the orders were the same as those in pre-war days. Starting with the special Grand Order of the Chrysanthemum there are orders of rank from one to eight. The selection of the persons to be decorated and the orders to be given are made by the government. Maybe it is hard for foreigners to imagine how greatly such a decoration is appreciated by an ordinary Japanese. There are not a few university professors, who call themselves "progressive" and yet hold grand parties to celebrate their being decorated.

In 1966, the Ministry of Education published the "Desirable Personality" showing its aims for middle-school education. According to the booklet, "The nation expects a person to love the country, and, to love the country the person must respect and love the Tenno, the symbol of the nation." Thus, the government precludes loving the nation without loving the Tenno.

In 1966, the *Kigensetsu*, under the new name of "Kenkoku Kinen no Hi" (The Day to Commemorate the Founding of the Nation), was re-instituted. As noted before, this re-institution

the Kigensetsu was proposed many years ago by the then-Prime Minister Yoshida. In 1957, members of ruling party Jiyu Minshu-to proposed in the Diet that February 11th officially be made a national holiday as the Kigensetsu. Historians and the Teacher's Union led a strong opposition to this proposal and, for the next ten years, the proposal was left hanging in the air until, finally, the proposed date was made an official holiday to commemorate the founding of the nation in 1966. In the following year the celebration of the first Kenkoku Kinen no Hi was held by a civilian organization. Eventually, the government began to support the new Kigensetsu openly and the Minister of Education and/or the Prime Minister began to attend the ceremony.

Encouraged by the successful re-institution of the Kigensetsu, the Jiyu Minshu-to, Association of Shinto Shrines and Association of the Families of War Dead (organized by the Jiyu Minshu-to) strengthened their effort to make new "Yasukuni Laws" to nationalize the Yasukuni Shrine, to make the Yasukuni ceremony a national affair and to make the Prime Minister's visit to the ceremony official. Nationalization of the Yasukuni Shrine is a clear violation of the Constitution separating the State from religion and will be the first step in the State controlling all religions. Even conservative circles of Buddhists, Christians and other religious people, except for Shintoists, are strongly opposed to this move. All the people fighting against militarism joined their forces with this opposition. This opposition has been standing in the way of the Jiyu Minshu-to's scheme even though the party has made considerable gains towards its purpose.

In May 1974, the Jiyu Minshu-to passed, by itself, the above Yasukuni laws in the House of Representatives (All other parties, in protest of the ruling party's high-handed manner, were absent.) The proposed laws were sent to the House of Councilors, shelved there and dropped. On August 15, 1975 — the anniversary of Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers — Prime Minister Miki visited the Yasukuni Shrine "as a private citizen"; the first time a Prime Minister had visited Yasukuni since Yoshida's visit in 1951. The next Prime Minister Fukuda visited Yasukuni on August 15, 1978. This time Fukuda did not say if he visited there as a private citizen or as a government official. He signed his name in the guestbook listing his title: Naikaku Sori Daijin (Prime Minister). Prime Minister Suzuki visited the Shrine on August 15, 1980 "as a private citizen" together with 17 members of the cabinet. He visited the Shrine again in the same year to attend the Autumn Festival and, further, in April 1981, he attended the Spring Festival at Yasukuni. A group of 200 Jiyu Minshu-to Diet members also attended

this Spring Festival. On August 15, 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone officially visited Yasukuni together with all the Cabinet Members and many Jiyu Minshu-to Diet members. Nakasone dared to say that this action was not a violation of the Constitution. Nakasone's words seem to become laws. There remains only one step before nationalization of Yasukuni is made Constitutional. Despite viewing all these outrageous violations of the Constitution and the overriding of the religious feelings of the people, the Diet is unable to even sound a note of accusation. The mass movement outside the Diet is also weak. It goes without saying that this past year's high-handed moves by the government to push Yasukuni correspond to the new stage of Japanese militarization.

It was found, in the course of the fight against the nationalization of Yasukuni, that seven executed Class A war-criminals including Tojo Hideki were enshrined, in 1978, as gods at Yasukuni. Who deified those war-criminals?

Matsuura Rei inquired directly to the Yasukuni Shrine in June 1975 about who had the power to decide who would be enshrined there. The answer he got was, "The Tenno does." (Matsuura, "Rondan Jihyo" contained in the book *Zoku Nippon-jin ni totte Tenno towa nande attaka*) (What has the Tenno been to the Japanese?II). This means that the Tenno is still the supreme living god who decides who will be made a god. If the Tenno indeed decided to deify Tojo and other war-criminals, he really had no regrets about the War.

3) The Behavior of Hirohito Tenno.

Hirohito Tenno did not stand out much during the 1960's. The Crown Prince Akihito and his wife stood out instead. They toured the country frequently, visited Southeast Asian nations, the United States and Europe, and were quite successful in drawing the people toward the Tenno. Since 1971, however, Hirohito Tenno suddenly has begun to be active. In August of that year U.S. President Nixon discontinued the exchange of yen for dollars or gold. The yen market became subject to sharp fluctuations and the Japanese economy was seriously shaken. In September, the re-entry of China into the United Nations became certain. Japan failed miserably in its attempt to frustrate the re-entry of China. Japanese efforts to work as the most faithful agent of the United States were in vain. Japan made itself an international laughing-stock. (China re-entered the United Nations on October 25, 1971.) It was in this period — on September 27, 1971 — that the Tenno left for a diplomatic tour of seven European nations including the U.K., France and

West Germany. He was no longer merely the symbol of Japan. He began to move as the head of the nation.

In March 1972, the Tenno told a New York Times interviewer that the tie between the Tenno and the nation is most important and should be kept alive no matter how society changes. This shows that the Tenno considers himself as the mainstay of national unity and, in that respect, his position and function has not changed from the period under the Great Imperial Japanese Constitution.

In May 1973, the Head of the Defence Agency, K. Masuhara, met the Tenno and explained the situation of Japanese military. The Tenno told Masuhara, "Japanese armament is not much bigger than that of the neighboring countries. I wonder why people are bothered by it. National defence is an important matter. Do not take in the vices of the old armed forces but inherit its virtues. Try your best in your work." Very moved, Masuhara told what he had heard to journalists. The opposition parties in the Diet strongly denounced Masuhara accusing him of using the Tenno to expand armaments. Masuhara was forced to resign. He got what he deserved. We have to, however, point out the fact that no opposition party criticized the Tenno himself for encouraging the head of the armed forces and connecting the new and old armed forces.

Related to this incident, it was found out that the Tenno had been, for many years, seeing over 60 of the top brass from the Army, Navy and Air Force on New Year's day. On that occasion the Tenno says to the generals, "I hope you will be conscious of the importance of your calling and that you will endeavor more than ever for the sake of the State." The generals' representative answers, "We shall renew our determination to do our best to guard the peace and independence of our nation so that your divine spirit will be pleased." The Tenno behaves like the supreme commander and the generals treat him as such.

In November 1974, the Tenno and Kogo visited Ise Shrine. Unlike the many similar occasions repeated even after the Japanese surrender in the War, this time the Tenno carried with him the jewel, the "treasure sword" which is said to be an imitation of the "sacred sword" of the "Three Sacred Treasures." This action consists of the ceremony inherited from ancient Tennoism signifying that the Tenno is part of the unbroken line of sovereigns descended from Amaterasu O-Mikami. It was the first time in the post-war years this ceremony was performed. In the Constitution this kind of action is included in the "private affairs" of the Tenno, but, whatever the legal story may be, that fact is that the Tenno is acting as a

living god and the government and Diet are permitting it.

In September 1975, the Tenno and Kogo visited the U.S. and met the President. It is reported that the Tenno mentioned to the President that the War was something which he deeply regretted. When later asked by news reporters if his words meant that he felt responsibility for the War, the Tenno answered, "Since I am not well versed in the literary arts I do not understand the subtleties of rhetoric." He later talked with Japanese reporters on October 31 after returning to Japan. When asked how he felt about the U.S. dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he said, "It could not be helped since a war was going on." The Tenno has become a mouthpiece for U.S. imperialism.

In 1976, a national celebration was held to commemorate Hirohito's reigning for fifty years. It is true that a person called Hirohito has been in the position called Tenno continuously for fifty years. The era-name "Showa" also has been used continuously. However, the content of the Constitution of the Tenno underwent a major change when the Constitution was revised. The term "fifty year reign" disregards this change and makes people feel as if nothing has really changed and the Tenno is still the ruler of the Great Empire.

Beginning the revival: 50th Anniversary of Hirohito's inauguration, 1976.



Japan.

In August 1977, the Tenno had a press-conference at a summer resort. He said that the true aim for publishing the Imperial Edict on January 1st the year after the surrender was not to deny his deity but to tell people to have pride in following the path shown by the Five Oaths of the Meiji Tenno (mentioned above). In this way, Hirohito Tenno is becoming bolder than ever in following the path of his idol, the "Great Meiji Tenno."

The government and the ruling party did their share to fortify national unity under the Tenno. In 1979, they finally succeeded in legalizing Gengo. Thus, as explained in Chap. I, the very time-flow of Japan was connected to the Tenno. At the same time, the Ministry of Education directed the Boards of Education in each locale that Kimigayo should be used as the national anthem at schools and Nisshoki (a flag depicting a red circle in the center with white back-ground) should be hoisted as the national flag. If an administrative department can decide upon a national flag and anthem without waiting for the approval of the Diet, then sovereignty no more rests with the people.

What is more important is the fact that the Boards of Education, controlled by the local Jiyu Minshu-to bosses, and the school heads who are under the strict leadership of the Boards of Education all meekly followed the above directions issued by the Ministry of Education. Presently (in 1985), the Governor of Hokkaido is a former Diet member belonging to the Socialist Party. He won his position over the Jiyu Minshu-to candidate. He is, by any standard, a progressive person. Even he agreed, in the Hokkaido Parliament held in July

1985, that Kimigayo was the national anthem and Nisshoki was the national flag. (Nisshoki was originally used to make Japanese ships in the early period of modern Tennoism to clarify the difference between Japanese and foreign ships. It was never legally made the national flag. It became a symbol of modern Japanese militarism. It reminds Asian people of how they suffered atrocities inflicted by the Japanese military in the Japanese invasions.)

The Japan Socialist Party, on the other hand, had included in its Foundational Policy of its 1984 General Meeting, a decision to oppose the Jiyu Minshu-to and right-wingers trying to force the use of Kimigayo and the Nisshoki. However, this plan disappeared from the party's Fundamental Policy decided on in the General Meeting held in January 1985. According to Mainichi News Paper (1985/4/28) reporting the JSP's attitude on this issue, "As yet no one has mentioned this point and, of course, no discussion has been made about this issue." The Japan Communist Party does not agree with the forced use of Kimigayo and the Nisshoki but even since 1973 it stated that it was a matter of "freedom of religion" for Japanese people to worship the Tenno.

During the 34 years since the signing of the Peace Treaty, Tennoism has made long strides in bringing the nation under its control. The Tenno himself is conscious about his function as the mainstay of national unity. He believes that he is the spiritual commander-in-chief of Japan and behaves as one. When necessary he also makes himself a mouthpiece for U.S. imperialism and sits at the top of Japanese imperialism and militarism.

CONCLUSION: THE TENNO AND THE PEOPLE

As we have seen, the position and role of the Tenno has varied throughout Japanese history. However, in spite of all the changes, the Tenno has always been treated as a supreme being in Japanese society. Based on this observation, some people claim that the Tenno is a unifying power of the nation standing outside the framework of class structure. When, for example, the revision of the Constitution was under discussion in the Diet, the Minister responsible for the revision said that throughout Japanese history the nation has adored the Tenno and, in this sense, the "Kokutai" would remain unchanged even under the new Constitution. Hirohito Tenno himself told foreign journalists, as mentioned in Ch. IV, that the tie between the Tenno and the nation has never changed regardless of the social changes.

Some noted scholars have added their voices to this chorus. For example, Tsuda Sokichi, un-

surpassed in his analysis of the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, says that the Tenno is a non-political spiritual authority and natural being and that this is why the line of Tennes has been able to continue unbroken. Amino Yoshihiko, who recently attained renown as a historian specializing in the Japanese Medieval Period, says that the Tsuda theory is very profound and that the Tenno is "something which may be described as the chief of the whole communal body embodying the natural and essential rights of that communal body" (Amino, *The Non-Agricultural People of Medieval Japan and the Tenno*, Introduction and Chap. I).

I believe, however, it is evident that Tennes have been part of the class structure. The Tenno was, himself, supreme ruler of the State under both Ancient and Modern Tennoism. In the Medieval period and in contemporary times, he lost his ruling power, but, even then he was a pol-

itical entity with the political function of justifying the existing state power.

On two occasions in Japanese history there were real possibilities for Tennoism to be obliterated. The first such occasion came when Ancient Tennoism was replaced by the power of the warrior class, the class of feudalistic landlords. The second was when Modern Tennoism, after continuous wars of invasion, was miserably defeated. The Tenno surrendered and Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces, the U.S. imperialist armed forces. In both of these instances the Tenno lost his ruling power but kept his authority. The reason for this was explained toward the end of Chap. II and in the beginning of Chap. IV. We also have seen in Chap. III No. 1 how and why the Tenno, robbed of all power by the *Shogunate* and isolated from politics, suddenly assumed political power toward the end of the *Shogunate* rule and became the head of Modern Tennoism.

Some may still ask, "All right, the ruling class in each age used the Tenno to justify their power. But what made the Tenno so useful? Maybe the Tenno have had something to charm the people. Maybe people have felt something, without really being able to clarify what it was, which made them worship the Tenno as the supreme authority." To this question I would answer as follows.

Before Modern Tennoism was introduced, there had been no direct contact between the people and the Tenno. For the people, the rulers directly above them, such as feudal lords or those rulers ranked above them, have been the supreme power and inviolable authority. Except for a very few elite with considerable education people did not even know that the Tenno existed. People could not, therefore, feel the Tenno's authority. The position of the Tenno in those days depended on how the feudalistic rulers regarded him.

Why, then, did people kneel down in front of the Tenno after the Meiji Restoration? To answer this we have to first look at history. Before Meiji, people were not under the spell of the Tenno, but, they were abjectly subject to their direct rulers. They had not grown up to be independent individuals with individual citizenship. They existed as a member of families ruled by family heads. Their families were part of village communities. These communities were, of course, not the classless communities of primitive ages but were controlled by the class of landlords. Furthermore, the people believed in the large varieties of Shintoist gods starting from the guardian gods of their villages. The Shintoist gods were either part of the fictional legend made up by Ancient Tennoism centering around the belief in Amaterasu Omikami or connected to legend. In the latter half of the Edo period, commerce and traffic were well developed

and many towns were created. The population of merchants and artisans dwelling in those towns reached about one-tenth of the whole population. The townspeople were, however, not liberated. They were ruled by feudalistic lords. The towns were not the centers of society but they depended on the rural areas. Individualism was, even in the towns, in a rudimentary stage of development. Powerful people were also believers in Shintoism.

These historical conditions made it easy for the rulers of the Modern Tennoist regime to make people accept the power and authority of the Tenno, a "living god" and descendant of Amaterasu Omikami. As we have expanded in detail in Chap. III, the Modern Tennoist regime was thorough-going in forcing people by law and education to be unconditionally subject and loyal to the Tenno and believe in him as a living god. As modern Japan grew to be the most wealthy and powerful country in Asia and a colonial empire, the Japanese people came to take pride in this growth. This pride was connected to the feeling of gratitude and awe toward the Tenno whose virtue, people were told, made it possible for Japan to become so powerful and great. The Japanese wars against China and Russia were quite significant in connection with this point. Japan, therefore, became more fanatical than any other nation in their belief and loyalty to their sovereign.

The Japanese surrender in August 1945, blew apart the illusion of the invincibility of the Tenno's Army. The whole of Tennoism was shaken. This was indeed a rare opportunity to get rid of Tennoism. The Japanese people, however, not only did not question the validity of Tennoism but also did not demand Hirohito Tenno to take responsibility for the war. Actually, Hirohito himself and his close attendants were quite afraid that the Tenno might have to at least resign his throne. The people had been spellbound thus far by Modern Tennoism. On October 10, 1945, the Japan Communist Party, allowed to act publicly for the first time, began to fight for the overthrow of Tennoism and to accuse Hirohito Tenno of war crimes. No one had tried this until then. The Japan Communist Party's efforts to awaken the people's political consciousness should indeed be appreciated. The JCP was, however, quite artless in attacking Tennoism and failed to attract a wide range of people to its cause.

Meanwhile, U.S. imperialists and the Japanese ruling class did not waste time in establishing the new Constitution and securing the Tenno's position, not as the ruler of the State but as the supreme authority validating the institutions of social rule. Japanese monopoly capitalism regained its power and attained high growth. Japan was remilitarized and its armament increased

year. The Japan-U.S. alliance in both political and military fields was strengthened. At the same time, as noted in detail, a series of policies fortified the Tenno's authority to be used as the mainstay for militaristic unification of the nation. The ruling class occupies the majority in the Diet and makes laws and institutions at will. The Constitution has been over-ridden. The ruling class has now tightened control of education further than it did in the days prior to the surrender.

Have they really been successful in instilling in people awe of the Tenno from the bottom of their hearts? I do not have objective data to make a judgement on this matter. However, we can get some idea by studying, for example, an opinion poll, taken by the Asahi Shinbun (a leading daily newspaper) in October 1985, concerning Kimigayo and the Nisshoki. The poll shows:

	<i>Love it</i>	<i>Hate it</i>	<i>Others/No answer</i>
Nisshoki	64 %	6 %	30 %
Kimigayo	62 %	14 %	24 %

To be more precise, Kimigayo is not popular among the post-war generation: among those between 20 to 25 years old, 25 per cent love the song while 44 per cent hate it; among those between age 25 to 35, the ratio of those who love it to those who hate it is 3 to 4; it is only when one passes age 35 that the song is loved by the majority of those who were polled. A similar tendency is found with regard to the Nisshoki. The poll also asked people if they supported the policy taken by the Ministry of Education forcing the use of the Nisshoki and Kimigayo in schools at entrance and commencement ceremonies: 62 per cent answered yes whereas 20 per cent answered no. More precisely, among males in the first half of their 20's, 34 per cent answered yes while 48 per cent answered no. Close to 70 per cent of rural people answered yes to the same question while considerable numbers of city dwellers answered no — among those within the Tokyo metropolitan area, 51 per cent answered yes while 29 per cent answered no. 86 per cent of those polled thought that the Nisshoki was appropriate for use as the national flag whereas 68 per cent thought that Kimigayo was suitable as the national anthem. Furthermore, only 56 per cent kept the Nisshoki in their homes — this ratio is much lower than the 75 per cent ratio of those, polled by the Asahi Shinbun in 1963, who kept the Nisshoki at home.

The above findings suggest that the youths of today either hate or are not interested in Kimigayo, an outright eulogy for the Tenno. If

you ask a youth if he or she reveres the Tenno, the most likely answer you might get may be, "I don't care about him"; those who revere him among today's youths must be in the minority.

The rural communities dominated by the land lords, the social foundation of the Tenno's authority in the old days, have collapsed in the face of the development of capitalism. The patriarchal system of families is also collapsing. As the village communities collapse, the Shintoist beliefs are getting weaker among the villagers. The monopoly capitalism of today, on the other hand, has created a new form of unifying the worker. Something which may be called "Company Communities" has been created and has become the social base for unifying the people under State power. These "Company Communities" also generate an atmosphere which forces people to revere the Tenno. The labor unions dominated by elite workers are embraced by the "Company Communities". A representative of a national federation of such labor unions attended, together with the Prime Minister and other representatives of capitalist organizations, the February 11th Ceremony for the Founding of the Nation held by Tennoist organizations in 1985. He led a cheer saying, "Tennoheika Banzai!" (Long live Tenno!).

Many organizations in Japan are boss-ridden. The bosses act like, in many cases, small Tennes. Present-day Tennoism is also supported by these "small Tennes."

As Japanese militarism grows stronger, the ruling class will certainly increase its efforts to fortify national unity by using the Tenno's authority. If we want to stop this trend, it is evidently not sufficient to just sit and wait for the Constitution to work for us. The Constitution prohibits re-armament, but Japan has militarized itself this much. Prime Minister Nakasone openly violates the Constitution and attends the Yasukuni ceremony officially.

One thing which makes us hopeful is that reverence for the Tenno is weaker among middle-aged people than among more elderly people, and even weaker among the youth. "Company Communities" are not as tight as village communities used to be in the old days. The "small-scale Tennoism" found everywhere may be overcome if people stand up and face it squarely. It is not an impossible task to connect all kinds of everyday struggles against "small-scale Tennoism" and the oppressive power structure to the struggles against militarism and Tennoism so that these various struggles can grow stronger. Such a task may not be easily accomplished but we are hopeful. We shall never make our nation an aggressor. We shall never let the blood of our youths flow for the sake of the Tenno.