

The Other Israel

Edited by Arie Bober [*]

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*. In the spring and summer of 1970, Arie Bober (died 2003), then member of Matzpen, made a speaking tour of the US, sponsored by the Committee on New Alternatives in the Middle East (CONAME). Among the sponsors of CONAME were Arthur Miller, Noam Chomsky and Pete Seeger; its main activists included Berta Green Langston, Robert Langston and Emmanuel Dror Farjoun (a member of Matzpen doing post-graduate work at the MIT). In connection with this tour, the Langstons arranged with the publisher Doubleday & Co for the publication of a book, entitled *The Other Israel: The Radical Case Against Zionism*, to be edited by Bober. The book - consisting entirely of Matzpen material - came out in 1972. Bober signed the contract with Doubleday and his name appears as the nominal editor. The actual editing work was done by Emmanuel Dror Farjoun with the help of Robert Langstone.

Introduction

This book is the result of five years' collective effort by a small group of Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel to penetrate the dense net of illusion and myth that today dominates the thinking and feeling of most Israelis and, at the same time, largely determines the prevailing image of Israel in the Western world. According to the Zionist fairy tale, the state of Israel is an outpost of democracy, social justice and enlightenment, and a homeland and haven for the persecuted Jews of the world. This outpost, so the story goes, though earnestly seeking peace with its neighbors finds itself in a state of perpetual siege because of the greed of Arab rulers, the inherent "unreasonableness" of the Oriental mind and the innate Gentile proclivity toward hatred of the Jews.

The reality, this book demonstrates, is utterly different. The Zionist state was born in the violent expropriation and expulsion from their country of the Palestinian Arabs, and that process continues today. In open alliance with Western, especially United States, imperialism, and in scarcely hidden collusion with the most reactionary forces in the Arab world, the Zionist state actively sets itself against every step, no matter how faltering, taken by the Arab masses to alleviate the centuries' old misery imposed on them by colonialism and imperialism. Within the territories occupied since 1967, the Zionist state employs a system of direct military repression to expel Palestinian Arabs from their lands and secure Jewish colonization of them, and to crush every expression of Palestinian resistance. Within its own borders, the Zionist state engages in systematic national oppression of its minority of Arab citizens. The dark-skinned majority of the privileged Jewish community itself increasingly feels the sting of racist discrimination, as economic inequality increases and social conditions deteriorate. Far from offering a haven to the persecuted Jews of the world, the Zionist state is leading new immigrants and old settlers alike toward a new holocaust by mobilizing them in a colonial enterprise and a counterrevolutionary army against the struggle of the Arab masses for national liberation and social emancipation – a struggle that is not only just but will eventually be victorious. This state of affairs is, moreover, in no sense accidental. It was the inevitable outcome of the success of the Zionist project to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. And to change this reality requires not merely a change of government or a modification of one or another specific policy, but a revolutionary transformation of the very foundations of Israeli society.

The collective labor that has gone into making the analysis presented in this book has not been an academic exercise. On the contrary, it is just a part of the continuing effort to develop within Israel a joint struggle by Jews and Arabs against this reactionary Zionist regime. Since 1962, the Israeli Socialist Organization (usually referred to by the name of its Hebrew-language monthly, Matzpen [Compass]) has been in the forefront of this struggle. [1] The goal of ISO, which includes both Arabs and Jews, is a socialist revolution throughout the Arab East. [2] It is explicitly anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist.

The Zionist establishment has been united in its attack upon the ISO, beginning immediately after the Six Day War of June 1967 when the ISO called for immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories. Since the war, however, opposition to Zionist policies has grown within the country and more people are being drawn to the radical position. Aware of this development, Matzpen's opponents have conducted a campaign of misrepresentation, misquotation and character assassination in the media,

the Knesset (Israel's Parliament) and even in the streets. The label "Matzpenik" has been applied to anyone who voices even mild criticism of Israeli policy, and is usually linked with the words "defeatist," "self-hater" and "traitor." Even Nahum Goldmann, the venerable president of the World Jewish Congress, was denounced as a "Matzpenik" when he voiced his criticism of the rigidity of Israeli Government policy (about which more later). M. Bar-On, head of the youth department of the Jewish Agency and former chief educational officer of the Israeli Army, declared in the March 31, 1970, issue of Yediot Aharonot:

"Matzpen is nothing more than a gang of traitors ... Matzpen is the same as Fatah ... They are the real initiators and planners of the poisonous Fatah propaganda against Israel ... [that is] distributed in Britain and Europe ... Matzpen doesn't want peace ... they are traitors and self-haters and their only wish is to destroy Israel and its people and to erase their name from under the sun."

Vigilante groups have been formed – especially in the universities – which are sworn to "cleanse the nation" of "defeatists." ISO members are harassed in their jobs, and have often lost them. People passing out leaflets or hawking Matzpen in the universities and on the streets were regularly attacked, and the material has sometimes been burned in ceremonial auto-da-fe. The organization has been forced to defend its meetings against physical attack by organized goons. Typical of these incidents were an attack on Matzpen demonstrators at Tel Aviv University, who were protesting the blowing up of Arab houses, and the unsuccessful assault by the recently founded fascist student organization, the Wolfs Cubs, on an ISO meeting in Jerusalem which was addressed by Daniel Cohn-Bendit. [3]

The witch-hunting campaign has not been limited to attacks by the media or by vigilante groups. It has been accompanied by increasing police harassment of ISO members, especially Arabs. Khalil Toamme served nine months in prison in 1968-69 after a "trial" by a military court. After his release he was confined indefinitely to his village by military decree. Not one of the Arab members of ISO remaining in the country is completely at liberty – all are either under house arrest or area restriction by administrative decree. [4]

Another aspect of the repression is the severe censorship imposed on Matzpen. Not only has the proposed Arabic-language edition, El Nurr (The Light), been prohibited, but whole articles are sometimes censored out of the Hebrew edition under the pretext that "publication of this material may harm the security of the State and the security and welfare of the public." In one instance, twelve out of sixteen articles submitted to the censor were suppressed in what would have been the December 1969 issue.

But even after the leaflets or the magazine is "cleared" by the censor, the police regularly prevent their distribution. Members of Matzpen are arrested while distributing the leaflets or selling the paper; they are detained for "interrogation" for a few hours or days, and the material is confiscated and never returned. Sometimes they are formally charged with offenses ranging from slandering public officials and inciting to rebellion to littering the streets and disturbing the public peace. But a trial has yet to be held.

As the campaign against dissent gained momentum, official and semi-official spokesmen began to demand that the ISO be outlawed. On June 4, 1970, the parliamentary caucus of the ruling Labor Party discussed a motion to that effect presented by Knesset member Matilda Gez. Prime Minister Golda Meir opposed the step, not from any consideration of democratic principle, but because, as she put it, "Matzpen would be more dangerous underground than it is now." [5]

Under the headline Action Against Israelis Who Slander the State Abroad Will Be Considered, the July 15, 1970, Ma'ariv reported: "The Foreign and Justice Ministers were invited to a meeting of the coalition leadership to make a final decision on the action to be taken. There was general agreement that this phenomenon must be stopped." The report continued, "Mr. Y. Klinghoffer [member of the Knesset] said that he will press for a law permitting revocation of the citizenship of Israelis who slander the state abroad."

An especially lamentable aspect of the witch-hunt campaign against dissenters has been the haste with which many "doves," "liberals" and "radicals" have rushed to disassociate themselves from the ISO in order not to further antagonize the Zionist establishment. Indeed, Moshe Sneh, until his death in 1972, leader of the Zionist faction of the Israeli Communist Party, and Uri Avnery, leader of the New Force Party and publisher of Ha'olam Hazeh, led the attack on the ISO. This tactic, as many liberals in the United States learned to their sorrow during the 1950s, does not work. The leaders of the Peace and Security Movement, Siah (the Israeli New Left) and the Peace List learned in 1969 that it is not a successful election tactic.

Oddly enough, this entire campaign has been accompanied by an unending flow of statements to the effect that the ISO is merely a tiny "new left" splinter group, something wholly insignificant, and that outside of a handful of self-haters and beatniks, everyone in Israel totally rejects its views. The question that inevitably arises is why such a vigorous effort is directed against such an allegedly insignificant group. Why the whole campaign?

The answer, of course, is simple: The ISO, while still very small, is not insignificant. It is the only anti-Zionist political group [6] in a situation in which the fundamental political division is between Zionist and non- or anti-Zionist (the division between "right" and "left" Zionist is in reality superficial.) [7] It is not insignificant because the failure of Zionist policies to meet the vital needs of the Israeli people has led to an increasing receptiveness to many of the ISO's ideas, especially among the youth – both students and young workers.

That the political division among Israelis is in reality primarily between Zionists and non-Zionists is testified to by the fact that since 1948 the whole political spectrum has been constantly shifting to the right. This shift to the right has manifested itself particularly clearly in attitudes and policies toward the Palestinians. The differences among the various Zionist parties have become merely tactical, and the line between "hawks" and "doves" or "extremists" and "moderates" cuts across the division between right and left. This is due to the fact that everything the Zionists achieved in Palestine was the result not of agreement with the Palestinians but of faits accomplis at their expense. These faits accomplis were then secured by brute force, before 1947 primarily with the support of British power, and after the establishment of the state by the Israeli Army supported by US aid.

The logical consequence of this dependence on one or another imperialist power is the consistently pro-imperialist foreign policy which has actually resulted, despite the fact that the government has been in the hands of "socialist" parties.

In the early 1950s, Israel tried to secure a military pact with the United States. It supported the United States in the Korean war; until US policy changed, it opposed the admission of China to the United Nations; in 1956, it attacked Egypt in collaboration with Britain and France; it supported the fascist Secret Army Organization in Algeria and voted repeatedly in the United Nations against Algerian independence; it opposed the independence movements of Morocco,

Tunisia and Indonesia; it works with the CIA in "moderate" African countries – two well-known examples being the training of the Ethiopian Army and police and the training of paratroopers for the Congo's General Mobutu. Israel endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine and supported the landing of US and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958. It has supported King Hussein of Jordan against attempts to overthrow him – most recently in September 1970 – by the simple expedient of hinting broadly that any change in the Jordanian status quo would bring about Israeli military intervention.

The Israeli Government has found various ways to indicate its actual support for the US venture in Vietnam. Dayan visited Vietnam as early as 1967 as a guest of the United States Information Agency. South Vietnamese officials have visited Israel to "study" the methods used to control the Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories. Prime Minister Golda Meir went out of her way to congratulate President Nixon on his November 3, 1969, statement of Vietnam policy and expressed the view that his speech "contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over."

Israel's so-called defensive war of 1967 coincided with US imperialist interest in the Middle East. This was admirably summed up immediately after the conflict: "To Washington, the combination of Israeli muscle and US sweet talk had produced eminently satisfactory results. ... As an indirect beneficiary of the Israeli blitz, the US should at least be in a position to neutralize the Middle East, so that its oil can be profitably marketed and its waterways used for the benefit of world commerce." [8]

There has been no real difference among the parties participating in the "national unity" government regarding foreign policy, defense policy, relations to the United States and relations to world Jewry. Arguments or disagreements between the partners, so far as they have existed at all, have related to minor tactical points – how best to pursue the basic Zionist aims, how, at any given moment, to get away with as much as possible in the unending attempt to impose acceptance of the Zionist state on the Arab, and especially Palestinian, people.

Nor has there been any real difference among the Zionist parties on domestic questions. The "socialist" and liberal secular parties went along with the religious parties in passing laws that have strengthened the religious character of the Israeli state, particularly laws defining "nationality" and eligibility for Israeli citizenship in terms of an archaic racial-religious criterion. The same parties, supposedly representing the workers and those "socialist islands," the kibbutzim, acceded to the economic policies that profit local and foreign capitalists while freezing wages, reducing workers' standards of living and curtailing the right to strike. All the major parties, in short, share a fundamental commitment to Zionist goals, and the differences between them are purely tactical in nature.

But the fact that the Israeli Socialist Organization is the only political group that is anti-Zionist in a situation in which the only fundamental political difference is that between Zionism and anti- or non-Zionism does not by itself explain why it has come under such intense attack and has obviously brought consternation to the halls of government. What transforms a small, anti-Zionist organization into such a danger as to merit such an onslaught? The answer to this question lies in the failure of the Zionist state to meet the needs of the Israeli people.

The Jewish state was supposed to become the instrument of the in-gathering of the world's Jews through which they could be united in a proud and independent nation that could take its place among the nations of the world. In reality, there are now more Jews in New York City than in all of Israel, and in many respects the Israeli-Jewish

nation resembles the ghetto that the founding fathers wished so desperately to escape more than it does a sovereign nation. It is regarded by a hostile Arab world as a foreign implantation, and its leaders must periodically inform its people that their security, even their survival, depends on whether or not the United States is prepared to deliver fifty or so Phantom jets.

The Jewish state was also supposed to enable the Jewish people to develop an enlightened and democratic culture. In reality, however, high-school students who today are beginning to question some aspects of Zionist policy and culture find it necessary to form underground groups. Radical youth and other dissenters are viciously attacked by the Zionist establishment's spokesmen in the media with such epithets as "traitor and Fatah agent" and "beatnik."

A peace song that became a popular bit was banned from the Armed Forces radio stations. The Queen of the Bath, an anti-war play, was censored, repeatedly attacked in the press, and physically disrupted by right-wing goons. It was finally forced to close, although it was playing to full houses, because the municipality of Tel Aviv threatened to cancel its subsidy to the Kame'ry Theater. The film M.A.S.H. was banned [9], and the draft-card-burning scene in Hair was cut by order of the censor. Ministers of government have seen fit to try to incite a lynch-mob attitude toward opposition groups and ideas, especially those involving political dissenters who are not only non-Zionists, but proclaimed anti-Zionists. Minister without Portfolio [10] Israel Galili has called for "widespread reasoned and downright public condemnation of all poisonous comment which goes beyond the bounds of criticism permissible in a democratic state." According to a Jerusalem Post report, "In Mr. Galili's opinion, the condemnation should not be left to the Government alone, but a spontaneous campaign must be waged against it though without, God forbid, being carried away by witch-hunting." [11] Galili's appeal to "reason" and his pious disclaimer of any "witch-hunting" cannot hide the fact that he is really calling for mob assault on dissenters.

Police brutality against demonstrators, especially the recently organized Israeli Black Panthers, and the use of the Emergency Regulations and even military courts against workers on strike, have proven once again that a people that oppresses another people cannot itself be free. Instead, in short, of the free and open society Israel was meant to be, the ghost of Joseph McCarthy stalks the land and the specter of dictatorship is becoming visible on the horizon.

Above all, the Jewish state was supposed to secure the physical existence of the Jews, end pogroms forever and fend off a second holocaust. In reality, however, Jews are subject to more physical danger in Israel than anywhere else. And until there is revolutionary change within Israeli society and with regard to its relations to the Arab world, the Israeli-Jews will find themselves in an increasingly perilous position.

This state of affairs did not come about by accident. On the contrary, it is the inevitable outcome of the Zionist project: to establish an exclusively Jewish society in a territory already in possession of a people who had lived and worked there since time immemorial. The Zionist goal required that a "normal" Jewish nation be established. This implied the creation of a Jewish working class, a Jewish peasantry, a Jewish bourgeoisie, perhaps even a Jewish feudal class.

This side of the Zionist aim meant that Zionism had to become a colonizing movement of a specific land. Its character is best seen by comparing it with the "classical" colonialism as practiced, for example, in South Africa.

There, colonialism had a two-fold impact on the indigenous population and on the social, political and economic structure. It first displaced the original inhabitants and

disintegrated the traditional society and culture. Subsequently, however, it reintegrated the uprooted inhabitants as workers to be exploited into the new colonial society. In South Africa, the Africans were first thrown off the land, and they were then sent to work as wage laborers in the European-owned mines, factories and farms. The commitment to a "normalized" Jewish society, however, precluded this kind of colonization in the Zionist undertaking. Rather, the "natives," the Palestinian Arabs, were displaced, but they were not reintegrated as workers, as all social functions had to be reserved for Jews. In this way, the settlers came into conflict to a lesser or greater degree with all the classes of indigenous Palestinian society. The Palestinian feudalists sold their land to the Jews, thus liquidating themselves as a class, and the peasants were thrown off the land when the Jews bought it. The Zionist "Jewish labor only" policy prevented the integration of non-Jewish workers, and the efficient organization of the Zionist colonizers, their ready access to foreign capital and their high level of skills and education made it impossible for would-be Palestinian capitalists to compete with them. Thus they successfully blocked the development of a Palestinian comprador capitalism that might have offered some employment to the expropriated Palestinian peasants. The result was the development of a practically hermetically sealed Jewish society in the middle of a disintegrating Palestinian society. While the nature of "classical" colonialism is primarily to exploit, Zionist colonialism displaces and expels.

The Zionist colonization proceeded under three basic slogans. The first of these is Kibush Hakarka (Conquest of the Land). This means that the holy soil of Palestine is to be made the patrimony of the Jewish people. Jews must work the land, and Jews alone are entitled to do so. During the mandate period, this slogan justified the Zionist land purchases and the forcible removal of the Palestinian peasants; since the formation of the state, it continues to justify the violent expropriation of Palestinians without any pretense of contractual agreement.

The second slogan is Kibush Ha'avoda (Conquest of Labor). In practice, this means that, as far as possible, Jewish enterprises must hire only Jewish workers. It meant that the Histadrut, which virtually excluded Arabs from membership until the mid-1950s, had as its main function before the establishment of the state in 1948 the enforcement of an Arab labor boycott.

The third of these slogans is Tozteret Ha'aretz (Produce of the Land). In practice, this slogan meant the maintenance of a strict boycott of Arab-produced goods. Jews were to buy only from Jewish-run farms and stores.

Today, either from tactical considerations or from stirrings of guilty consciences, Zionist spokesmen try to cover up this past – and present – to demonstrate that these slogans in fact

represented day-to-day practice of the Zionist colonization, it suffices to quote David Hacohen, a leader of the Mapai Labor Party, which ruled and still rules in Israel. Hacohen was a member of the Knesset for many years and chairman of its most important committee, Defense and Foreign Affairs. In a speech to the secretariat of the Mapai in November 1969, Hacohen stated:

I remember being one of the first of our comrades to go to London after the First World War ... There I became a socialist ... When I joined the socialist students – English, Irish, Jewish, Chinese, Indian, African – we found that we were all under English domination or rule. And even here, in these intimate surroundings, I had to fight my friends on the issue of Jewish socialism, to defend the fact that I would not accept Arabs in my trade union, the Histadrut; to defend preaching to housewives that they not buy at Arab stores; to defend the fact that we stood guard at orchards to

prevent Arab workers from getting jobs there. ... To pour kerosene on Arab tomatoes; to attack Jewish housewives in the markets and smash the Arab eggs they had bought; to praise to the skies the Kereen Kayemet [Jewish Fund] that sent Hanlon to Beirut to buy land from absentee effendi [landlords] and to throw the fellahin [peasants] off the land – to buy dozens of dunams [12] from an Arab is permitted, but to sell, God forbid, one Jewish dunam to an Arab is prohibited; to take Rothschild, the incarnation of capitalism, as a socialist and to name him the "benefactor" – to do all that was not easy. And despite the fact that we did it – maybe we had no choice – I wasn't happy about it, [13]

Hacohen's revelation of his feelings is surely sufficient evidence that these slogans constituted day-to-day practice and that Zionism was in fact a colonization of displacement. In addition to the systematic economic and social displacement of the Palestinians, it involved the physical displacement of the population. For example, as Berel Katzenelson, the leader of Mapai before Ben-Gurion, wrote twenty-seven years ago,

"Situations are possible in which the transfer of population will become advisable ... We do not assume the right to force anybody out This is a basic Zionist assumption ... But was not Kibbutz Merhavia built on a transfer? Without many such transfers, the Hashomer Hatzair [14] would not today be sitting in Kibbutz Merhavia, nor in Kibbutz Mishmar Ha'emeck, nor in any other places ..." [15]

And R. Weitz, a Zionist leader, for many years the head of the Jewish Agency's colonization department – the body in charge of the actual organization of the Zionist settlements in Palestine – commented in September 1967 that twenty-seven years earlier he had made the following notation in his diary:

"Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country ... We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is a Palestine, at least Western Palestine (west of the Jordan River) without Arabs ... And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them: Not one village, not one tribe, should be left ... Only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb the millions of our own brethren. There is no other way out"

Then, this time speaking in the aftermath of the Six Day War, he added,

"From that point of view, the 'transfer' solution was discussed at the time, and it was supported by B. Katzenelson, J. Vulkani and M. Ussishkin, and some preliminary preparations were made to translate this theory into practice. Years later, when the UN passed the resolution to partition Palestine into two states, the War of Independence broke out to our great fortune. In this war, a twofold miracle occurred: territorial victory and the flight of the Arabs. In the Six Day War, there was one miracle: a tremendous territorial victory. But the general population of the liberated territories remained 'stuck' in their places, and this may destroy the very foundation of our state." [16]

The state of Israel was the product of the colonization movement. And as Weitz, despite his invocation of "miracles," indicates, today that state is the instrument of continuing colonization. This fact is testified to not only by Israel's continued occupation of the Arab lands conquered in 1967 and the expulsion from them of several hundred thousand Arabs, by the refusal to date, despite US pressure, to withdraw from these territories, and by the confiscation of land in East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Hebron and other West Bank areas to build Jewish settlements and kibbutzim; but it is also evidenced by the very words of the Israeli leaders. Weitz has already been cited; Moshe Dayan, who is still directly in power in Israel, said to a

group of American Jewish students on the Golan Heights just a year after the June war,

"During the last 100 years, our people have been in the process of building up the nation, of expansion, of getting additional Jews and settlements in order to expand the borders. Let no Jew say that the process has ended. Let no Jew say we are near the end of the road." [17]

Another aspect of Zionism relevant to this discussion arises from the effort to implement colonization under the historical conditions prevailing at the end of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth. The "native" population of Palestine had to be displaced, but Palestine, like most of the world, was already under the domination of some world power. The colonization project could thus be carried out only with the co-operation – often strained but nonetheless real – of the dominant power in the area. Max Nordau, Herd's deputy, formulated the principle of Zionist foreign policy succinctly: "Our aspirations point to Palestine as a compass points to the north. Therefore we must orient ourselves towards those powers under whose influence it happens to be." Accordingly, the Zionists sought – unsuccessfully – a charter from the Ottoman Empire, ruler of Palestine before the First World War. When it became clear that the "sick man on the Bosphorus" was dying and that England would emerge as the dominant power in the Middle East, the Zionists oriented themselves toward London and got as their reward the Balfour Declaration. During the Second World War it became evident that the United States was destined to supplant Great Britain's role in the Middle East, and the Zionist compass changed direction again, this time toward Washington.

It is easy to see why Zionism had to ally itself with the dominant world power in that region in order to implement its conquest of Palestine. But what did the country in power gain from this alliance? From the beginning, Zionism had certain benefits to offer its guardians. While Theodor Herzl was trying to gain Ottoman support, he wrote in his pamphlet, *The Jewish State*,

"If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us Palestine, we could in return undertake the complete management of the finances of Turkey. We would form there a part of a wall of defense of Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism. We would, as a neutral state, remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence."

To the British Empire, the Zionists offered the services of a loyal "European" community which would take the place of many military units. The British clearly perceived the importance of this offer. Sir Ronald Storrs, the first civil governor of Jerusalem under the British Mandate, wrote in his memoirs,

"Enough [Jews] could return, if not to form a Jewish state ... at least to prove that the enterprise was one which blessed him that gave as well as him that took, by forming for England 'a little loyal Jewish Ulster' in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism." [18]

And Lord Melchett who, as an English capitalist and Zionist, represented both sides of the bargain, wrote in a letter,

"The advantages to the British Empire are obvious ... The Suez Canal and air stations, the oil-pipe outlet in Haifa and its harbor, have become vital to our naval strategy in the Mediterranean. The security of the imperial complex of interests can be better assured by a large European population than by the few battalions that can be spared." [19]

Today, the basis for the alliance between US interests and the Zionist state and movement is easy to discern. The Zionists are seeking to compel acceptance by the Arab world as a foreign colonizing force. This has been expressed many times in

many different ways by Zionist spokesmen. Perhaps the most open and honest was Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's statement immediately after the June war, "If Hussein can't accept our peace conditions, let the Jordanians look for a new king. And if the Jordanians can't stand our peace conditions, let them look for another country." [20]

But every step, no matter how halting, toward the achievement of Arab unity and the basic social transformation of the Arab world jeopardizes this aim. The United States, on the other hand, aims at securing as much as possible its hold on the economies and resources of the region, especially the immense oil reserves. And every step here toward Arab unity and basic Arab social transformation jeopardizes this hold. Here lies the common interest that binds Zionism with the United States and imperialism in general.

Gershom Shoken, editor and publisher of Ha'aretz, Israel's New York Times, made the matter quite explicit in the early 1950s. He wrote:

The West is none too happy about its relations with the [Arab] states in the Middle East. The feudal regimes there have to make such concessions to the nationalist movements, which sometimes have a pronounced socialist-leftist coloring, that they become more and more reluctant to supply Britain and the United States with their natural resources and military bases ... Therefore, strengthening Israel helps the Western powers to maintain equilibrium and stability in the Middle East. Israel is to become the watchdog. There is no fear that Israel will undertake any aggressive policy toward the Arab states when this would explicitly contradict the wishes of the US and Britain. But if for any reason the Western powers should sometimes prefer to close their eyes, Israel could be relied on to punish one or several neighboring states whose discourtesy toward the West went beyond the bounds of the permissible. [21]

As a result of this alliance between the Zionists and the United States, the Israeli Jews today stand in a double antagonistic relation to the Arab world. The Zionist state is the direct colonial oppressor of the Palestinians. At the same time, as the junior ally of imperialism in the region, it acts against the aspirations of all the Arab masses for Arab unification, the end of foreign, big-power domination and exploitation, and basic social transformation. The masses of all the Arab countries must therefore combat Zionism as a part of their struggle against the reactionary and debilitating forces and structures in their own countries. They have no other choice if they are not to acquiesce in continuing servitude under their present yoke.

The Palestinians in particular directly confront the Zionist state as their immediate colonial oppressor. They must fight it if they are to resist expulsion from their homeland, and every believer in democracy must unconditionally support their right to conduct this struggle by any possible means. It would be utter hypocrisy for anyone, especially an Israeli Jew – a member of the oppressor nation – to say to the Palestinians: "This you may do; this you may not do," in the conduct of that struggle. [22] At the same time, this double contradiction explains the extreme peril in which Israeli Jews find themselves today.

Attempts by the great powers to impose a "peaceful" solution cannot succeed in the long run. Their success could only depend on the ability to freeze the status quo: that is, to maintain the Zionist state, perpetuate their domination in the Arab world, and keep the status of the Palestinians one of refugees or, at most, offer them a Bantustan-like "state" in part of, or all of, Jordan. But this status quo contains overwhelming contradictions that cannot long be frozen. The Zionist state on the one hand cannot be purged of its colonizing tendency and imperialism cannot be purged of its tendency to exploit the region ever more intensely. On the other side, the Palestinians have

demonstrated that nothing short of the end of national oppression can in the long run end their struggle, nor can the Arab masses tolerate continued domination and exploitation.

If the Jewish masses are not split from their Zionist rulers, if they do not free themselves from Zionist ideology, if they should fight to the end for the Zionist state instead of joining the Arab masses in a common struggle for liberation, then the Jewish people of Israel will eventually fall victim- to the Arab anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle directed against the Zionist state.

This analysis also clarifies how the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved. The Israeli Jews must themselves eliminate the double contradiction of their position vis-a-vis the Arab world. This is expressed in the demand of the ISO for the de-Zionization of Israel, involving, first of all, the abrogation of all laws and practices that confer special privileges on the Jews at the expense of the Palestinians. This means repeal of the Law of Return and a readiness to accept all Palestinians who wish to return to Israel and compensation for their losses if they do not. Secondly, de-Zionization means breaking the ties that bind the Israeli-Jewish nation to imperialism. It means the end of the military, economic and political dependence of Israel on the United States – or any other imperialist power – and the end of Israeli financial dependence on the Jewish community there.

These measures would involve a total break with the Zionist past. They would manifest, for the first time, the willingness of the Israeli Jews to live with instead of against and at the expense of the Palestinians and other Arabs. At the same time, given the class structure of Israel, to accomplish this de-Zionization will require nothing less than a socialist revolution.

Further, a solution will require integrating the Israeli-Jewish nation into a unified, socialist Middle East on the basis of the right to national self-determination.

Exercising this right to self-determination is, of course, subject to restriction: It cannot be contrary to another people's national rights. That is why Zionism, like any colonial movement, cannot under any circumstances be a legitimate expression of the Israeli-Jewish nation's right to self-determination. That is why the de-Zionization of Israel is the necessary precondition to the Israeli-Jewish nation's exercising its right to self-determination.

To recognize the right to self-determination is not to encourage separation and national particularism. If you support liberal divorce laws, it does not follow that you must urge married couples to get divorced. The purpose is to minimize the potential frictions between national communities and thereby to create the basis for voluntary integration and unification. Moreover, the ISO's concept of self-determination in the context of a unified, socialist Middle East [23] is not only correct in principle, but it is also the only conceivable basis for attracting and mobilizing the Israeli Jews and other non-Arab minorities in the Middle East in a joint struggle with the Arab masses. This is what is decisive for revolutionary socialists.

This program is not Utopian. [24] It is a real, practical perspective; it is a program that can, in time, win the allegiance of the Jewish masses of Israel. The reason for this is simply that, as I indicated at the beginning, Zionism has, in its own terms, failed utterly. There is today the beginning of a real opposition, especially among the youth, to Zionist ideology and policies.

It is possible for one incident, in the proper context of events, to move an entire segment of a nation. In the case of Israel, this occurred after the greatest military victory in the country's history: the Six Day War. With the support of the United States, the Zionist leaders found their state and its method of confronting its neighbors

with faits accomplis further from being accepted than at any previous time. It became increasingly difficult for them to assure the Israelis that things would soon change for the better – the refrain "Just one more war, and then ..." was wearing thin. A new refrain, "Ein Brera" (There is no choice), began to replace the outdated one, but this, too, progressively lost its credibility.

Suddenly, in the spring of 1970, an incident occurred that did more to destroy completely its credibility than any other single event. Nahum Goldmann, the seventy-eight-year-old president of the World Jewish Conference, reported to the Israeli Government that he had received an invitation from President Nasser to visit Cairo and conduct informal, exploratory talks on the possibility of normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab states. According to Goldmann, the Egyptians had placed no conditions except that the Jerusalem Government be informed and that the fact of the talks be made public. On April 5, 1970, a government communique from Jerusalem – the first the Israeli public had heard of the invitation – announced that under no circumstances would it sanction such a mission by Goldmann to Cairo.

The effect was electric. A student assembly at Tel Aviv University declared its support for the projected Goldmann visit. Otherwise pro-government newspapers harshly denounced the coalition for its refusal. In one Jerusalem high school, fifty-six students, including the son of a member of the Knesset, wrote a letter to Golda Meir expressing their doubt as to whether they would be justified in serving in the army after the regime's refusal to explore the possibilities of peace. Most significant of all were demonstrations involving hundreds of students, who were brutally attacked by the police. Although the demonstrations were organized by Rakah, Siah and Matzpen, participation in them was far broader than the total membership of these organizations.

This reaction enraged and frightened the Zionist establishment, for now it was brought face to face with a phenomenon it had often tried to ignore before – the fact that a substantial part of the country's youth was being radicalized prior to their military service and was becoming increasingly "unpatriotic." Before the Goldmann affair smaller numbers of young people had, of course, been involved in various kinds of dissenting activities. They belonged to Peace and Security, Siah and especially Matzpen – which had been recruiting heavily ever since the June war. They had participated in the small demonstrations against the occupation, collective punishment, blowing up of houses, settlement of Jews on confiscated Arab land, etc. Gradually, members of Siah had been drawn into these demonstrations, usually against the will of their leaders. High school students had begun to publish "underground" magazines and form groups with such revealing names as Youth for Change and Circle for Free Thought. The establishment had naturally tried to belittle all these small groups, reserving the major portion of its witch-hunting for Matzpen. But after the Goldmann affair stance became impossible to

For example, Davar, the Labor Party daily, wrote that government ministers were becoming more and more concerned with the "internal front," the credibility gap, radicalization of the youth, and the growing extreme-left extra-parliamentary opposition. [25] The letter written by the Jerusalem high school students even caused the normally staid Ha'aretz to lose some of its cool, although it too was critical of the government in the Goldmann affair. Their aims are good," opined the April 20 editorial, "but their intellectual capabilities are limited. They mix up some slogans and some ideas they apparently got from the Matzpen people ... They don't know our history in Palestine, and they don't remember the Holocaust."

The consternation of the Zionist establishment was not stilled when the high school students, who had been invited to discuss their concerns with Deputy Premier Y. Allon, reported after the interview that they were not satisfied with Allon's answers to their questions. In a speech before the secretariat of the Histadrut (the federation of labor unions), Golda Meir said, "Our main strength is a united people ... [disunity] will be our most dangerous enemy." She added that she had been "very upset" by the high school students' letter. She also found it "incredible" that Jews could demonstrate against a Jewish presence in Hebron. At the same meeting, David Hacohen expressed his concern at "the virus that has entered some people. If Britain at war could lock up Moseley, why do we let the Matzpen people walk around free? [26]

Pinhas Sade, the son of Yitzack Sade, the legendary commander of the Pahnach (the elite unit of the prostate Zionist Army), declared in an article that "the moral basis of being an Israeli was lost" by the government's handling of Nasser's feeler to Goldmann. [27] And Assi Dayan, Moshe Dayan's son, came out in favor of total withdrawal, East Jerusalem included, in exchange for peace. [28]

Such critical sentiments from the sons of Zionism's greatest heroes were distressing enough. But they were mild compared to what many previously apolitical youth were now saying. A manifesto that appeared in the underground paper Na'ashosh read:

"You, the tired and dead young man, awake! Liberate yourself from the traditions of your father and grandfather. Protest against the stupid leadership that brought us here. Stop agreeing to every word uttered by Dayan and Golda. Go out into the streets, mount the barricades and fight for peace. Don't say the security situation doesn't allow this; fight to change the security situation ... The war was not forced upon us, you forced it upon yourself by following your leaders. Do as young people do all over the world. They fight for peace in foreign places, in Vietnam, and you don't even fight for peace in your own country." [29]

Another underground publication read by youth, Gaashosh, published a poem seeking the words for the Zionist disaster:

The flood carries away the house and its foundations
The "old ones" sit on the chest that floats on the water
And they send out the children to swim in the rushing waters
To save die remnants of their past
They don't feel that the flood is going to topple them
They sit comfortably on a couch on die floating chest
And send the children to swim
And sometimes to drown.

Who can resuscitate those drowned in cannon shells? [30]

The underground publications go far beyond mere expressions of the hopelessness of the present situation or manifesto-like calls for sometimes rather indeterminate action. They reflect an effort on the part of many young Israelis to recover their real history, to confront die falsified "official" Zionist history with the reality. For example, they reprint old clippings from Israeli papers reporting the methods used to drive out the Palestinians during the 1948 war and later, thus refuting the official myth that the Palestinians left of their own free will And on this basis they expose the hypocrisy of the Zionists who moralize about Palestinian "terrorism" when terror directed against the Palestinians is the historical basis for their state.

The official sages of the Israeli media tried their best to explain away all of this by appealing to "psychological" factors – such as the "rebelliousness" of youth and the "rigidity of the establishment." Yet it is forced to recognize that the constant state of war, the brunt of which is borne by the young people, has a lot to do with it Amos

Elon reported that all the teachers he had interviewed said that "the younger generation is troubled, and they ask pertinent questions. They are not satisfied with the answers they receive." He quoted a principal of a Tel Aviv high school: "The majority of the students are convinced that Israel is in a blind alley and they are looking desperately for a way out. When they think they may have found one – like the Goldmann affair – they rebel." [31]

One of the most striking testimonies to the depth of the radicalization of the youth – and the apprehension with which the ruling establishment regards it and the consequent growth of Matzpen – is an interview with Deputy Premier Allon that appeared in the Ha'aretz, May 22, 1970. Allon lamented:

"I knew of the doubts they had, but I hadn't realized that they questioned our historical rights in Palestine and that they have doubts about their willingness to fight ... The ideological activity of Matzpen is harmful. Luckily, they don't have a substantial number of youth, but in the face of the difficult period we are in, Matzpen's ideas are taking hold."

Perhaps the clearest statement of what is involved in all this is an item in the May 6, 1970, Ha'aretz:

"There is no doubt that a movement like Matzpen attracts the youth. It presents an ideological challenge, supplies rebellious activities, and is associated with revolutionary movements abroad that are fashionable today. Matzpen operates in an educational void. The Zionist youth movements lost their attractiveness a long time ago. They do not present a clear challenge to the youth, and they are confused."

It was a natural consequence of such a radicalization that in July 1971 four young Israelis stated publicly that for reasons of conscience they were not going to serve in the army. They sent an open letter to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declaring:

"We refuse to participate in the oppression of another people, as was done in the past to our forefathers. We are not willing to serve in an occupying and oppressing army ... Occupation is foreign domination, foreign rule means a resistance movement, resistance movement means oppression ... We were not born free to become oppressors."

The Zionist establishment responded to this in the only way it knew: quick military trials and sentences in military stockades, accompanied by a campaign in the media which ridiculed the resisters, questioned their mental stability and naturally insisted that they were influenced by Matzpen. Not one newspaper found it necessary to publish their open letter.

But the radicalization has not been limited to the students. At the beginning of 1971, with the increase in immigration to Israel from the West, the Israeli Black Panthers began an organized struggle opposing the social, economic and racial discrimination against Oriental Jews. Their first leaflet was short and to the point: "Enough" was the slogan;

"Enough of unemployment. Enough of watching apartments being built for new immigrants while we have to sleep ten persons in one room. Enough of government promises that are never kept. Enough of police brutality. Enough of exploitation. Enough of discrimination."

So went the leaflet, ending with the call

"How much longer will this continue while we keep quiet? Alone we can do nothing; united we will succeed."

The reaction of the government and the entire Zionist establishment was predictable. Members of the Black Panthers were arrested while passing out their leaflets; they did

not get a permit to demonstrate [32], and the decision to break up their planned demonstration in Jerusalem by force was made at the highest level

"High government officials approved police action in preventing the Black Panther demonstration ... The decision was taken in a meeting in which the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and the Police Minister participated ... Mrs. Meir decided that the demonstration should not be allowed to take place and authorized the police to make preventive arrests." [33]

The official explanation given for this extreme step was that the Panthers had criminal records and were manipulated and incited by Matzpen. Two days before the planned demonstration, the arrests began. The entire Black Panther leadership was detained, along with a few members of Matzpen. A police spokesman declared in a press conference that a prerequisite for granting a permit to a Panther demonstration would be a total break in their ties with Matzpen. He added, "... ties with Matzpen are not against the law, but the law forbids ties having the character of incitement." [34] Teddy Kollek, the Mayor of Jerusalem, "accused Matzpen members of inciting criminals from the slums to open a struggle to improve the social conditions of the poor ..." [35]

This, then, was the official version: The Panthers were criminals and had ties with Matzpen. And the media all joined in the accusation. But the demonstration took place in spite of the efforts to suppress it. Hundreds of people came to the defense of the arrested Panthers and Matzpen members and demonstrated against social discrimination in front of the Municipal Building in Jerusalem. Kollek shouted from his window: "I don't care why you're here, but get off the grass and flowers!"

This was just the beginning, for the cry of the Panthers was heard all over Israel; in the slums of the big cities and in the small development towns a wave of solidarity with the Panthers swelled rapidly. Committees were formed to demonstrate their support for them; some of the committees bore such names as Defense for the Rights of Young Couples and Justice and Equality.

The prevailing mood among growing numbers of Oriental Jews was exemplified in an interview with a young mother of four children living in the small town of Yerocham in the Negev. After explaining that her family lived in a one-room apartment, she said,

"I went to Amidar [36], and asked for a two-room apartment that would be large enough for the children we already have, and for those that will come in the future. They told me there were no empty flats, but I saw there were many empty apartments in my neighborhood. When I asked about them, they told me it was for new immigrants ... They give [them] a two-room apartment even when they don't have children, and we with four have only one room. This is so because we are from Morocco. Last week ... some friends of my husband came over and they talked a lot; they said that we should do the same things in Yerocham that the Panthers did in Jerusalem. They said that we would get justice only by force, and not by begging. I think they are right. You wait and see, we'll have some action in Yerocham, too." [37]

The Black Panther movement grew and continued its struggle, in spite of the onslaught in the media, police harassment and repression, and notwithstanding Golda Meir's pronouncement that "they were not cute." In demonstration after demonstration their numbers grew. Police brutality intensified, as did the campaign to buy them off, penetrate the organization with provocateurs, bring about splits in the organization, and slander them in the media. The whole process culminated in what became known as "The night of the Panthers."

On May 18, the Panthers held a public meeting followed by a demonstration. A few hundred people attended the meeting, but afterward, when the demonstration began marching through Jaffa Street, Jerusalem's central street, their numbers swelled to thousands of people marching peacefully and shouting the Panther slogans for equality and "Teddy Kollek, we'll not get off the grass"; "Golda, teach us Yiddish" [38] and their old slogan "When will Aboutbul be equal to Faigin?" [39]

When the march reached Zion Square in the center of Jerusalem, the police suddenly appeared; a police officer approached the first ranks of the marchers and ordered them to "disperse in two minutes or well clear the streets." The march did not disperse, and immediately hundreds of helmeted policemen attacked the marchers. Mounted police and water cannons [40] were used, but the people fought back and were even joined by the onlookers. It quickly developed into a full-scale riot that went on through the night. People defended themselves against the police, shop windows were broken, stones and bottles were used against attacking policemen, and some Molotov cocktails were thrown. [41] Dozens of persons were wounded by the police; over 150 persons were arrested and beaten up in the police stations where they were detained. The police gave "special treatment" to the leaders of the Black Panthers and anyone suspected of being a leftist, including a sixteen-year-old girl. [42]

The Zionist establishment was united in condemning the Black Panthers and their "violence." Golda Meir repeated that the Panthers "were not cute ..." and went on to "ask": "How could a Jewish hand throw a Molotov cocktail at a Jewish policeman?" [43]

"The Prime Minister rejected the viewpoint that deprivation and poverty were responsible for pushing these young people [the Panthers] to violence," reported another newspaper.

"What is needed," Golda said, "is to love the fatherland in such a way that we will become one nation and one family ... The greatest and most horrible catastrophe possible is to divide the nation. Even Zahal [the Israeli Army] will not be strong enough to stand up against our many enemies if we allow the poison of divisiveness to penetrate ... if we allow demagogues to incite riots and plant the seed of division among us – this endangers our life and our existence." [44]

Reacting to the widespread hostility and criticism of the special privileges the new immigrants from the West received, the Prime Minister declared: "... Demagogues are trying to appear as defenders of the poor and the deprived, and they criticize the new immigrants, [but] if the state will not do everything in its power for any Jew to come here ... it will not be a Jewish state in my eyes." The newspaper report came to the "ultimate" argument:

"The Prime Minister hinted openly that behind the Black Panthers stand political elements that are hostile to the state; she said that during the riot in Jerusalem a young Ashkenazi [45] was arrested; he was also arrested previously while demonstrating in front of her house against Jewish settlements in Hebron. "What,' she demanded, has he to do with the Panthers and their problems?" [46]

This sentiment was shared by another government spokesman; the Minister of the Interior announced that the government would investigate "the dirty political hands that are mixed up in this ... [and that] the cease-fire is not a green light for social and cultural wars." [47] In other words, the answer of the Zionist establishment was violence and more repression – its traditional method for dealing with the awakening of the oppressed masses – and to charge them with being "unpatriotic," endangering the "Jewish existence" and being manipulated by "elements who are hostile to the state" (i.e., Matzpen).

It is true that in the face of this campaign carried out by the government, the media and "responsible critics" and aided by the inevitable appearance of "Uncle Toms" of Oriental origin, this radicalization lost ground; the Black Panthers, especially, suffered a series of inner splits that practically immobilized them. But the problem of the Oriental Jews remains and intensifies. It is impossible to solve it – to make them equal in the context of the capitalist-Zionist structure of Israel today. It is impossible to ignore the fact that two of the main slogans of Zionist ideology contradict each other. Kibbutz Galuyot and Mizug Galuyot [48] are two aims that are incompatible and mutually exclusive.

And when a Black Panther, or anyone else, demands equality and questions the special privileges granted the new Western immigrants, he is attacking the very foundations of the Zionist state, which are based on discrimination – first and foremost against the Palestinian Arabs, but now more and more against the Oriental Jews as well. This is why Golda Meir states that this – i.e., a state without discrimination of any kind – will not be a Jewish state in her eyes. And this is why Matzpen's intervention in this struggle is "hostile to the state."

Matzpen reacts to the Black Panthers' battle cry "When will Aboutbul be equal to Faigin?" by stating that "Aboutbul will be equal to Faigin when Mohammed is equal to Aboutbul!" And more and more Oriental Jews are beginning to understand as a result of their experience and Matzpen's intervention that their struggle is not isolated from the general class struggle, that it is futile to fight for equality, demand integration and expect the Zionist establishment to "grant" it, that ultimately there must be a total transformation of the socio-economic structure by socialist revolution in order to succeed in gaining their demands for "justice and equality." One can understand the significance of the ISO's intervention, its role, and why the Zionist establishment must be hostile to it, try to repress, and slander it and call it a tiny, insignificant group.

The unfolding and intensification of the contradictions within Israeli society have not been limited to the youth and the Oriental Jews. On the most significant front – that of the workers' struggle – the spring and summer of 1971 brought about a new explosion. Strikes and walkouts are not new phenomena in Israel, but the Israeli proletariat lacks the tools that are necessary for such struggles, for successfully defending itself against exploitation by local and foreign capital. It lacks a tradition of workers' struggles, not only a revolutionary one, but even a real tradition of trade-union action. The majority of the workers are immigrants with a petit-bourgeois background. They have no union, for the Histadrut is not in reality a union but one of the main pillars of the Zionist power structure and the second largest employer in Israel after the government. [49]

Another factor that plays a role in stifling the class struggle in Israel is the colonial character of the state. This brings material privileges to the Israeli-Jewish workers in comparison to the Arabs, and the large inflow of capital that has enabled the Israeli rulers to throw some crumbs to the workers from time to time.

Nonetheless, income differentials have increased [50], and the feeble attempts to integrate the Oriental Jews as equal partners with Western Jews failed. Exploitation of the workers – the majority of them Oriental Jews and Arabs – has increased, while at the same time the state has granted more and more subsidies of one sort or another and pursued other economic policies to assure foreign and local capitalists even greater profits, making Israel more appealing to foreign investors and attracting Jewish immigrants from the West, especially the United States.

The June war and its aftermath accentuated this pattern. Demands on the economy increased enormously, taxes were raised, inflation spiraled, and the wages of the workers were practically frozen – especially those in the lower strata. No one in the government dared consider interfering with the soaring profits and the "good business" everyone was doing [51], everyone, that is, except the workers. With this background in mind, it is easy to see why strikes increased in number and intensity; and why the overwhelming majority of them were "unauthorized" strikes, i.e., without the approval of the Histadrut. In 1970, there was a 60 per cent increase in the number of strikes over 1968. Partial walkouts and slowdowns rose from eight in 1968 to thirty in 1969 and to sixty-four in 1970. Most of the strikes occurred in the service sector, which is controlled by the government and the Histadrut. This culminated in the spring of 1971 when the strike wave spread over the entire economy.

The government and the Histadrut defined all the strikes as "wildcat, irresponsible and illegal," proving once again their basically repressive and anti-labor character. A series of anti-labor laws were approved by the Knesset, and the Histadrut went along after making some "responsible" criticism. Special courts were established so that workers who struck "illegally" – i.e., without the Histadrut's sanction—could be prosecuted and imprisoned like common criminals. The Emergency Regulations were used to break up the strikes of workers and compel them to return to work by "restriction decrees." [52] The police drove out workers who seized factories. [53] Military courts imposed prison sentences on customs workers in the occupied territories when they went on strike in solidarity with their striking comrades in Ashdod.

The ISO has been able to intervene in this volatile situation with some success. A typical Matzpen leaflet for distribution in front of the work places has the format of a "Wanted" poster with pictures of Meir, Dayan and Sapir and a text accusing them "of violence against the Panthers and workers ... of robbing poor families and reducing the workers' standard of living ... of character assassination ... of striking workers and slandering them in the media ... of lying to the people and making a multitude of unkept, election-time promises." The ISO has also published a pamphlet entitled Theory of the Strike that not only exposes the Histadrut as the anti-labor outfit it is, but also contains concrete discussions of how to organize an action committee, how to build a strike fund, how to conduct all aspects of a successful strike. A central emphasis of all Matzpen literature aimed at workers in their work places is the necessity for their self-organization in action committees as a step toward building a genuine, independent trade-union organization that can defend their elementary economic interests as a class.

The road to a mass revolutionary movement in Israel will be a long and arduous one. The development of such a mass movement will depend decisively on the intensification of the Arab revolutionary movement for national liberation and social emancipation. [54] But the ISO's ideas are already taking hold and gaining in influence because the dynamics of the class struggle in Israel are revealing the real alternatives with increasing clarity. The choice is either the present Zionist capitalist structure, with its inherent discrimination, contradictions and oppression, or the revolutionary alternative, the socialist future, of a society freed from discrimination and oppression, a society organized by and for the workers. And the dynamics of this struggle are such that even before arriving at full revolutionary consciousness, all those questioning important aspects of the existing order – the young student questioning oppression of the Palestinians and the endless war; the young Panther or older Oriental Jew questioning privileges granted to new Western immigrants; the

worker struggling to defend his right to build a real union to protect him from exploitation – are undermining the foundations of the Israeli Zionist state. Their struggle is leading them toward a revolutionary consciousness and the understanding that it is essential to build an anti-Zionist, revolutionary party to lead a successful anti-imperialist struggle and socialist revolution.

Moshe Dayan said in a speech given on the anniversary of the 1956 Suez war:

"I'm worried when people begin to compare butter to cannons because you cannot make cannons out of butter. It is impossible to raise simultaneously the flag of war and the flag of social reform. Today we are in a bad situation; a flag is raised now in the country – by itself not a bad flag – the flag of social reform, the flag of new apartments for young couples, the flag of solving the problems of the Panthers ... It is impossible to raise both flags at die same time. Israel cannot support two flags – the flag of war and the flag of all those reforms and improvements for the workers and young and not so young Panthers. Those two flags cannot exist together in the State of Israel ... Those flags are contradictory ..." [55]

Of course, Dayan is right The two flags are indeed incompatible, for the flag of imperialist war is the flag of Zionism, and the flag of social change is the flag of socialist revolution. The general goes under his flag; we must go under ours.

Arie Bober, Jerusalem, February 1972

Footnotes

1. Since this book went to print, the ISO has split into two roughly equal groups, one centered in Tel Aviv and the other in Jerusalem. Both groups claim the name ISO and the honorship of the monthly Matzpen. Of the people mentioned here, A. Bober, A. Sa'id, E. Aminov and M. Varshevsky belong to the Jerusalem group; the rest are either independent or close to the Tel Aviv group [subsequently those who initially remained independent joined the "Tel-Aviv" group; none of the founding members of Matzpen joined the "Jerusalem" group]. The dispute which led to the split did not concern matters discussed in the present volume.
2. The terms "Middle East" and "Arab East" are used interchangeably in this book to refer to that region stretching from the northern and eastern borders of Syria and Iraq across the Arabian Peninsula to the western borders of Egypt. The Arabic-speaking people of this region are socially and culturally clearly demarcated from their Turkish and Iranian neighbors. The demarcation in the west and south is far less clear, and in this book – with its focus on Palestine – there is no discussion of the extremely complex relations between the Arab East so defined and the Arabic-speaking regions southward into the Sudan and westward across North Africa to the Atlantic.
3. These two incidents were reported in Yediot Aharonot on Apr. 3, 1970, and June 1, 1970, respectively.
4. One index of the profoundly racist nature of the Israeli state is the fact that merely being a Jew offers considerable protection from legal harassment. Members of the New Communist Party (Rakah), which is overwhelmingly Arab in composition, have also been subject to intense police and judicial persecution.
5. Ma'ariv, June 5, 1970.
6. This statement requires some qualification in the case of the Communist Party, which is discussed in Chapter 6, The Left in Israel.
7. This is a vital point, which is elaborated on in Chapter 6.
8. Newsweek, June 19, 1967.
9. After the cease-fire, it was allowed to be shown in a heavily censored version.
10. A member of the government without a specific office.
11. Jerusalem Post, May 3, 1971 (*italics added*).
12. One dunam = 0.23 acres.
13. Ha'aretz, Nov. 15, 1969.
14. The youth movement of Mapam, the extreme left wing of Zionism; see The Left in Israel, Chapter 6.
15. Katzenelson, Writings, Vol.V, pp. naff.
16. Davar, Sept. 29, 1967.
17. Ma'ariv, July 7, 1968.
18. Orientations, London: Nicholson, 1937, p. 404.
19. (London) Daily Telegraph, June 14, 1937.
20. Yediot Aharonot, July 17, 1967.
21. Ha'aretz, Sept 30, 1951.
22. See the ISO statement of March 22, 1968, at the end of this book.
23. See The Case for Hebrew Self-Determination, Chapter 12.
24. See Conclusion for a more detailed discussion of this program.
25. Davar, May 1, 1970.
26. Jerusalem Post, May 8, 1970.
27. Ha'aretz, Apr. 19, 1970.
28. Ha'olam Hazeh, May 20, 1970.

29. Quoted in Ha'aretz, June 12, 1970.
30. Quoted in Ha'aretz, May 6, 1970.
31. Reported in Ha'aretz, June 10-12, 1970.
32. One must have a police permit to demonstrate, under Israeli law.
33. Ha'aretz, Mar. 3, 1971.
34. Ibid.
35. Ha'aretz, Mar. 1, 1971.
36. The government Housing Corporation.
37. It is worth noting that the municipality of Yerocham asked the government for 500 new apartments. They were promised 240, but in Mar. 1971 the Housing Ministry informed them that only 95 would be built, and of these 50 were to be allotted to new immigrants (Ha'aretz, Mar. 26, 1971).
38. This slogan was raised after it was reported that Golda, when meeting with new immigrants from Russia, got carried away and declared that a Jew who does not know Yiddish is not a real Jew.
39. Abouthbul is a common name among Moroccan Jews; Faigin, the Russian immigrant, is one of Israel's new "heroes."
40. These are special police vehicles equipped with water hoses to disperse people.
41. Rumors, which were not refuted, circulated that this was the work of police provocateurs.
42. According to the report by the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Mar. 20, 1971.
43. Ha'aretz, May 20, 1971.
44. Yediot Aharonot, May 20, 1971.
45. A Jew of Western origin.
46. Yediot Aharonot, May 20, 1971.
47. Ha'aretz, May 20, 1971.
48. Kibbutz Galuyot: the In-gathering (to Israel) of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora; Mizug Galuyot: the integration of the different Jewish communities and overcoming the economic and social "gap" between them.
49. See the discussion on the Histadrut in *The Left in Israel*, Chapter 6, and *The Histadrut: Union and Boss*, Chapter 7.
50. The gap between the highest wage earners and the lowest increased by 500 per cent since 1950, i.e., the average salary of the top 10 per cent of the salaried workers was 3.2 times of the lowest 10 per cent of the salaried workers in 1950; in 1971, it was 15 times. (Ha'aretz, Mar. 15, 1971). One must remember that this only applies to wage earners; it does not include profits and other incomes from capital.
51. A common statement at the time was, "For every soldier killed at the Suez Canal front, three new millionaires are born in Tel Aviv."
52. It was the Mapam representative in the government, Mr. Shem-Tov, who signed the "restriction decree" against the medical and non-medical staff of government hospitals.
53. For example, during the strike of the customs officials and clerks, the police opened by force the gates to Ashdod Harbor and attacked the strikers when they defended them. And during the attack on the Rogozine plant in Ashdod the workers seized the plant to prevent the management from selling the products still in the warehouses.
54. See Conclusion for a discussion of some aspects of the fundamental connection between the revolution in Israel and the Arab revolution.
55. See Yediot Aharonot, Nov. 7, 1971, for the full text of the speech (*italics added*).

Chapter 1 The Palestine Problem [1*]

Of all the problems bequeathed to the world by European imperialism, Palestine is one of the most intractable. It is a peculiarly emotional issue, not only for those immediately involved, but for the whole world. In the West the burden of guilt left by Hitler's crimes against the Jews has created a psychological barrier which the injustices suffered by the Palestinian Arabs cannot penetrate. In many Arab countries hatred of the Jews is whipped up to divert the internal struggle against reactionary regimes. Western economic interests in the Middle East and the tendency of both East and West to exploit the situation for ideological or strategic advantage further complicate the problem.

At the center of the emotional miasma surrounding Palestine lie two hard facts – the displaced Arab population which still lives in refugee camps around Israel's borders, and a new nation of Israel, with a complete class structure of its own.

A realistic solution can be based only on a thorough historical, economic, political and social analysis. This has, however, yet to be made. Here, a brief outline of such an analysis will be drawn. It will necessarily be sketchy and will omit detailed argumentation and much factual evidence, since the substantiating evidence by itself could easily fill several volumes.

The initial success of Zionism can be traced directly to the economic, political and ideological conditions existing in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century.

Economic: In the less industrialized countries, like Poland and Russia, new social stresses arising from the rapid development of capitalism and the decay of the Austrian and Russian empires led to the uprooting of the Jews from their traditional occupations. The Jews became the scapegoat in the declining feudal systems to divert the peasants' hostilities into channels of racial persecution. These processes resulted in a huge wave of Jewish emigration from eastern and central Europe – some five million emigrated to America and other "new countries"; a few thousand went to Palestine. At the same time, in western Europe, where the Jews were mostly merchants and members of the middle classes, the pressures of economic competition made it increasingly difficult for them to integrate into local bourgeois society and forced them to create their own social institutions.

Political: The capitalist development of nineteenth-century Europe brought to the fore two political phenomena: nationalism and colonization of the underdeveloped continents. Zionism arose and took shape under the influence of these two phenomena. It was the nationalist response to the problem created by persecution of the Jews. It proposed to create a national Jewish state by colonizing underdeveloped territory. In both these ways it was a product of its time and should be viewed in that context.

Ideological: These two objective trends were reflected in the consciousness of many East European Jews in a distinctive nationalist ideology. This new ideology was able to incorporate and secularize an element of the traditional religious belief of the Jews – the messianic expectation of the in-gathering of the exiles in Palestine.

The first step in the modern Jewish colonization of Palestine was taken in 1870 when Baron Edmund de Rothschild of France acquired some land near Jaffa and established an agricultural school, Mikveh Israel (Gatherer of Israel). This was followed by the building of some twenty villages, inhabited by about five thousand Jews, mostly from Russia. Up to 1900, the Baron invested about two million pounds in Palestine. The

Rothschilds were (and still are) among the world's leading financiers, with the French and British branches of the family holding influential positions in the economics of these two countries. Baron Edmund combined his sympathies for the East European Jews with his support for the colonial interests of French imperialism. He did not entertain the idea of an independent Jewish state in Palestine (he was no Zionist), but used his financial power in the Ottoman treasury to prepare a new sphere of influence for the French. His Palestine activities had been under way for thirty years when Zionism was born.

Political Zionism was founded in 1897 at a congress held in Basel, Switzerland. It differed significantly from the Rothschild colonization in that it declared its intention of solving the Jewish problem by creating a national Jewish state. However, the Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl, founder and first leader of the Zionist movement, did not consider Palestine the only possible location for such a state. On the contrary, he originally advocated that the Jews colonize Uganda, but the majority rejected his proposal and insisted on following the traditional religious Jewish sentiment toward Palestine.

From the very beginning, the guiding principle of Zionist diplomacy was to affiliate itself with that world power within whose sphere of influence Palestine happened to be. Herzl courted mainly the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser. After World War I Zionism was oriented toward British imperialism. After World War II the orientation was switched to the United States, with occasional flirtations with France.

The fact that Palestine was already populated by Arabs hardly figured in the early discussions of political Zionism. The philosopher Martin Buber relates in his memoirs:

"When Max Nordau, Herzl's second in command, first received details on the existence of an Arab population in Palestine, he came shocked to Herzl, exclaiming: 'I never realized this – we are committing an injustice.'"

These moral shocks (which continuously troubled the humanistic elements among the Zionists) proved to have little effect against nationalism.

When at the beginning of this century Zionist immigrants began to pour into Palestine, the fact that the country was already populated could no longer be ignored. Like every colonizing society, the Zionist settlers had to shape a definite policy toward the indigenous population. Here we come to the specific feature of Zionism which distinguishes it from all other modern colonization movements. The European settlers in other colonies sought to exploit the riches of the country (including the labor potential of the "natives") and invariably turned the former population into an exploited class in the new colonial society. But Zionism wanted not simply the resources of Palestine (which were not very great in any case) but the country itself for the creation of a new national state which, through immigration, would provide its own classes – including a working class. The Arabs were, therefore, not to be exploited, but totally replaced.

The Rothschild colonization clashed with the Palestine Arabs over one fundamental issue – land ownership. The Baron bought land from the feudal Effendis, sometimes by bribing the Ottoman administration, and drove the fellahin off the land. The expropriated fellahin were men employed as laborers in the Baron's settlements, following the usual colonial pattern. With Zionist colonization, however, the slogan "Jewish labor" was raised. Aspiring to create a Jewish working class as part of the new nation, it advocated a transition of people from middle-class occupations to manual labor, and it insisted that Jewish employers use Jewish labor only. The Zionists came into conflict not only with the expropriated Arab peasants, but also with

the interests of the Baron's settlers who preferred to use the cheaper Arab labor. This issue was the major source of conflict within the settlers' community during the first three decades of the century. The primary advocates of the Jewish labor policy were the left-wing elements within Zionism. The bourgeois elements were always tempted to employ the cheaper Arab labor. Had the bourgeois attitude prevailed, Palestine might have developed along much the same lines as Algeria, South Africa or Rhodesia. It was, however, the left wing that prevailed. The funds of the Zionist movement were often used to cover the differences between the cost of Arab labor and the more expensive Jewish labor.

The nascent Zionist society clashed with all the various classes of feudal Arab society. It brought from Europe capital, modern technological know-how and skills. Jewish capital (often backed by Zionist funds) gradually displaced the feudal elements simply by buying up their lands, and Zionist regulations forbade resale of land to Arabs. [1] Possessing such financial and technological advantages, the Zionist capitalist economy blocked the emergence of an Arab capitalist class. Having driven the Arabs off their land, Zionism also prevented them from becoming a proletariat in the Jewish sector of the economy. Their own capitalist development hindered, the Arab peasants (as well as the intelligentsia) found it hard to find any employment at all – except in the British Mandate administration and public services.

The entire economic and social structure of Arab Palestine (which had begun in conditions roughly similar to those in Syria) became totally deformed by Zionist colonization. This socioeconomic deformation was reflected in the political sphere. Since the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry were denied a normal path of development, they did not produce political parties or highly qualified leaders. Political leadership of the Palestine Arabs inevitably remained in the hands of the landowning class who, although they liquidated themselves as a class by selling their land to the Zionists, nevertheless became enormously wealthy by these transactions. They retained political leadership of the Arabs by covert co-operation with the Zionists and the British. Lest they be branded traitors, however, they assumed in public the most extreme anti-Zionist stands, even declaring the sale of land to Zionists to be treason.

Typical of this class were the El-Husseinis, one of the richest landowning families. Secretly they sold land to the Zionists; Amin el-Husseini was the religious leader of the Palestine Muslims and chairman of the Arab Higher Committee (the official political representatives of the Arabs in Palestine). His cousin, Jasmal el-Husseini, was deputy chairman of that committee and leader of one of the major Arab political parties. Similarly, the leader of another party (Al Istiklal) was Auni Abdul Hadi, another large landowner. In 1928, Abdul Hadi made a secret agreement with the Zionists and saw to it that the customary denunciation of the Balfour Declaration would not be raised in the seventh Arab conference.

Similarly, and with more far-reaching effects, understanding existed between Zionists and the Hashemite kings, who were the main allies of British imperialism in the Middle East. In 1922, in London, King Faisal (the son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca) signed a joint political agreement with Chaim Weizmann, chairman of the Zionist movement. Article 3 of this agreement endorsed the Balfour Declaration. Article 4 states: "All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration into Palestine on a large scale." This agreement was the ancestor of the secret agreement between Ben-Gurion and Abdullah (King of Jordan) in 1948, when they divided Palestine between them and virtually arranged the outcome of the war.

Typical of the British Foreign Office attitude was the nomination of Amin el-Husseini as Mufti of Jerusalem (April 1921), and later as President of the Supreme Muslim Council (1922) by Sir Herbert Samuel, die first British High Commissioner in Palestine, a pro-Zionist Jew. The Mufti was to be chosen by a small number of electors who were themselves elected by the small minority of people who had had the right to vote for the Ottoman Parliament. Three other candidates got eighteen, seventeen and twelve votes respectively; Haj Amin received only nine votes. The High Commissioner had the "right" to nominate one of die first three. One of these three candidates was made to resign, putting Haj Amin in third place. He was then chosen. The new Mufti combined religious fanaticism and right-wing nationalism. The majority of Palestine Arabs never took part in this or any other election and never exercised any democratic rights.

The decisive period in die development of the Palestine problem started with the rise of fascism in Europe. This brought into play three significant factors:

(1) Jewish immigration from Europe rose sharply, as can be seen from the following table showing Jewish population in Palestine [2]:

Year	No. of Jews in Palestine
1922	83,790
1931	174,606
1944	553,600
1945	579,227
1946	608,225

The jump between 1922 and 1931 followed the rise of fascism in Poland. The still more significant jump between 1931 and 1944 followed the rise of Hitler.

(2) This new wave of Jewish immigration differed qualitatively from previous and subsequent waves in its class structure. Whereas other waves consisted mainly of petit bourgeois without much capital, this wave brought many small capitalists. The following table gives the numbers of Jewish immigrants officially described as capitalists (i.e., those who proved to possess one thousand pounds or more, in current values) [3]:

Year	No. of capitalist Jewish immigrants
1932	727
1933	3,250
1934	5,124
1935	6,309
1936	2,970
1937	1,275
1938	1,753
1939	2,606
1940	802
1941	314

The peak of the capitalist immigration occurred in 1934-35 (after Hitler rose to power), just before the great Arab general strike in Palestine. This proved an important coincidence.

(3) The religious and nationalist leaders of the Palestine Arabs, following THE time-honored maxim "My enemy's enemies are my allies," saw in fascist Germany a potentially powerful ally against British imperialism.

Meanwhile, the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the Arab countries reached unprecedented scale. In Syria, a general strike was declared in 1936 against the French and it proved to be on the whole quite effective in bringing Syria nearer political independence. This made a great impression in Palestine and there, too, a long general strike was declared. Conditions in Palestine, however, were very different because of the presence of the Zionist economic infrastructure (which, of course, did not take part in the strike). Moreover, the Zionists exploited the fact that Arab workers in government administration and services (railroads, ports, etc.) were on strike, and that Arab commerce was paralyzed, to secure a grip on these large and important sectors of the economy. As mentioned above, the strike coincided with a great influx of Jewish capital from Europe. Thus, while the Arab sector suffered a blow from which it never recovered, the Zionists secured a new and decisive hold on the whole economy.

British imperialism, which ruled Palestine from 1918 to 1948, employed nationalist and religious provocation, which proved to be effective. It employed Jewish policemen against the Arab population, and vice versa. For the leaders it employed "diplomacy," including white papers, round-table conferences, and making contradictory promises to both sides while acting as "mediators."

The first important statement of British policy on Palestine was set out in a private letter from Arthur James Balfour, Foreign Minister in Lloyd George's Cabinet, to Lord Rothschild. This became known as the Balfour Declaration.

Foreign Office 2nd November, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of our sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country." I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely, Arthur James Balfour

We will not analyze here in detail the wording of this document (which, with extraordinary impudence refers to the Palestine Arabs, who outnumbered the Palestine Jews by about eight to one [4], as "existing non-Jewish communities"). We are more concerned with the motives behind it.

The British Government was engaged at that time in the war against Germany, whose ally in the Middle East was Turkey. The Balfour Declaration was meant to rally Jews all over the world (including those in Germany, America, Austria and Palestine) to Britain's side in the conflict. Moreover, the British were well aware of the aspirations of Arab nationalism, so the Declaration was also intended to supply Zionist hopes with a political foundation to use as a counterweight. Similar promises of national independence were given to the Arabs through T.E. Lawrence and Ronald Storrs. [5] The chief architect of the British policy was Herbert Samuel, who later became High Commissioner for Palestine in the early years of the British Mandate. Himself a Zionist, he cogently argued the case for establishing a Jewish homeland as a bastion of British policy in the Middle East in a memorandum to the Cabinet in March 1915.

Even before these promises were handed out, however, the whole area was divided between British and French imperialism in the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), which dissected the Ottoman Empire two years before its downfall. In 1922, the British Government implemented the Balfour letter by an official white paper, and in order to pacify the Arabs, who were justifiably enraged over the Sykes-Picot and Balfour betrayal, granted "independence" to Trans-Jordan in 1923 and appointed Abdullah as ruler.

In the late 1930s, with the sharpening conflict between England and Germany, contacts between Arab nationalists and the European fascists worried the British. The oil fields, pipelines and the Suez Canal appeared to be in danger. Zionist demands for more independence and increased immigration quotas for European Jews fleeing from persecution were other issues that had to be dealt with. But the Foreign Office, confident that the Nazis would never consider the Zionists political allies, produced another white paper in 1939 aimed at currying favor with the Arabs. It stated:

"His Majesty's Government now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state ... It should be a state in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured ..."

This, briefly, was the situation on the eve of World War II.

From World War II to the Present

During the Second World War, new economic and political factors revolutionized the Palestine situation. Before the war, Palestine's economy (especially the industrial and

manufacturing sector) was dominated by the British metropolitan economy. The development of local light industry particularly was hampered by imports of consumer goods from Britain. Partly as a result of this, even in the Jewish community (numbering on the eve of the war about 500,000 out of a total of 1,750,000), noticeable anti-British sentiments were beginning to form.

The war brought about an unprecedented boom in the economy. Palestine became a major base for the British garrison in the Middle East, which had to be housed, clothed, equipped and fed. Supply lines from Britain were disrupted so the British had to rely to a large extent on the local economy, and they encouraged its rapid development. In the Arab sector unemployment disappeared as thousands of workers were needed to build camps, roads and airfields. But whereas Arab industry was not ready to benefit fully from the enormous increase in demand, the Jewish sector was already organized along modern lines and had considerable reserves of manpower.

It therefore drew the maximum benefits and entered into a period of great expansion known as "The Prosperity." Whole industries grew from modest beginnings to formidable size within a period of four to five years. By 1942, there were six thousand Jewish industrial enterprises, employing some fifty-six thousand workers and producing at the rate of twenty million pounds per year. The level of production in 1942 was more than double that of 1939 in the food, textile, metal, machinery and chemical industries – treble in the electrical appliances industry. The Palestine diamond industry (exclusively in Jewish hands) grew at an even more spectacular rate as the European centers were cut off from their raw materials in South Africa: from 1,000 carats (valued at twenty-five thousand pounds) in 1940 to 58,000 carats (valued at two million, six hundred thousand pounds) in 1943 and to 138,000 carats (six million pounds) in 1945.

When the war ended, industrial growth slowed abruptly and imports from Britain again menaced local industry – but the wartime growth had made the Jewish sector of the economy a force to be reckoned with. It did not want to return to the prewar dominance by Britain and by now a much larger section of the Jewish population had a stake in maintaining industrial expansion. This new situation provided the economic impetus for the postwar demands for political independence. Unlike the Arabs, the Jewish community had made no such demands before World War II because it was clear that an independent Palestine would be a state with an Arab majority. The new Jewish dominance of the economy was one of the main factors that brought about a change of policy.

The Nazi crimes against the Jews also gave Zionists an entirely new international status. After the extermination of six million European Jews, what had been a minority trend among the world's eighteen million Jews – with the majority either indifferent or hostile – became a major political force even among Jews who had no intention personally of emigrating to Palestine.

The war left large numbers of Jewish refugees in Europe, many of whom, encouraged by the Zionists and denied refuge in the United States, Britain and other capitalist democracies, saw no choice but to emigrate to Palestine. The Palestine Arabs, having no wish to become a minority in their own country, pressed the British Government to stop Jewish emigration. The Zionists thereupon began to organize clandestine emigration on a large scale. The British tried to prevent this not only because of Arab pressure, but also because they were worried by the increasing desire for independence among the Palestine Jews. World opinion, especially in Europe and the United States, was still reeling with the shock of discovering the enormity of the Nazi war crimes and sympathized with the refugees. The resulting political atmosphere was

hostile both to the British Government and to Arab nationalism. Today the persistence of this atmosphere is one of Zionism's major assets.

After the war, with the decline of British influence, a strong Zionist lobby was set up in Washington, and pro-American elements in world Zionism began to gain supremacy over the pro-British faction. The combined effect of these economic and political factors precipitated the clash between the Zionists and the British Government. The war had transformed the Jewish community in Palestine into a nation with its own economy, army, political organizations, language and ideology. Its economic interests had become incompatible with colonial rule. And Zionist reorientation toward the United States, combined with growing American interests in the Middle East, hastened the inevitable collision with Britain.

In this new situation, the Zionists demanded political independence. The right wing demanded immediate independence for the whole of Palestine under Jewish minority rule; the centrists favored partition between Arabs and Jews; the left-wing Zionists (among them parts of the present-day Mapam Party) wanted to postpone independence until, through increased emigration, the Jews became a majority.

In essence there were three parties directly involved in the Palestine problem: the British imperialists, the Jewish minority (about six hundred thousand) and the Arab majority (about one million). Each of these had its own demands which conflicted with the other two. But – owing mainly to the deformation of Arab society by the process of Jewish colonization – the Palestine Arabs did not in fact constitute a major political force during 1945-47. The struggle was waged mainly between the Zionists and the British.

During these years a series of conflicts, accompanied by armed violence, occurred between the Jewish community and the British administration. The Palestine Arabs, although they still outnumbered the Jews by about two to one, remained relatively passive – a complete reversal of the situation during the twenties and thirties when the Arab struggle for independence had a mass base.

In 1947, Britain, facing the disintegration of the empire, referred the Palestine problem to the United Nations, expecting disagreement in the UN to lead to a renewal of the mandate, which would give a new lease on life to the precarious British authority in the area. On November 27, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the partition of Palestine into two independent but economically linked states. This solution, a victory for Zionism, was strongly opposed by the Arabs (who, of course, demanded an undivided, independent Arab Palestine) and by British imperialist interests which struggled to retain their influence.

Both the United States and the USSR supported the resolution for partition; the United States because it considered it a convenient way of gaining a foothold in the Middle East; the USSR because it considered it the most practical way to gain a foothold in the Middle East. The Russians probably underestimated the strength of the links between Zionism and American imperialism. As for the Foreign Office, it was worried not only because the creation of a Zionist state meant losing Britain's influence to the United States, but also because establishing an independent Arab state in Palestine could have repercussions throughout the Arab world.

After the UN partition resolution, the British decided to employ the regular armies of Trans-Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Iraq in open warfare against the Zionist state, which (according to the UN resolution) was to come into existence on May 15, 1948. The political and military plans for this invasion were drawn up by General I.C. Clayton (one of the major British colonial agents in the Middle East) in a meeting of the Arab chiefs of staff held at Bludan, Syria, early that year.

The 1948 war became a military conflict between the Zionists and the Arab armies. These armies were not, however, playing an independent role, but serving British interests through the puppet regimes of Farouk, Abdullah and Nuri Sa'id. The conduct of the war exposed the utter corruption of these regimes and hastened their downfall. The fate of Palestine was decided not only on the battlefield, but also in secret talks between Zionist leaders and Abdullah which started immediately after the adoption of the partition resolution and went on until 1950. In these talks the two "friendly enemies," although ostensibly at war with each other, agreed to divide between themselves the territory which the UN resolution had allotted to the Palestine Arabs, as well as Jerusalem which, according to the resolution, was to become a separate unit under United Nations administration. The armistice agreement coincided, more or less, with the results of the political negotiations between the Zionist leaders and Abdullah.

A new division of Palestine was thus set up: 20,000 square kilometers were allotted to Israel, instead of the 14,000 square kilometers allotted to it in the UN resolution, and the remaining territory (except the Gaza Strip) was annexed by Abdullah – who changed the name of his kingdom from Trans-Jordan to simply Jordan. This new division established the new spheres of influence among the Western powers: The area occupied by the Zionist state was lost to British imperialism and came under United States influence, while the area annexed by Abdullah represented the remnants of British influence. The new division received formal confirmation in the Tripartite (United States, Britain and France) Declaration of May 1950.

The most immediate victims of the whole Zionist colonization process that culminated in the establishment of the state of Israel were the Palestine Arabs, who were almost wholly uninvolved in the 1948 fighting. Most of them became homeless refugees; the fate of those who remained in the area held by Israel was hardly better. They have lived ever since under arbitrary rule and are subject to constant and severe repression. The land remaining in Arab hands is still gradually but systematically expropriated, often by administrative subterfuge, to make way for Zionist development. The Arabs are second-class citizens in their own country.

In the early 1950s, the anti-imperialist struggle intensified throughout the Arab world. In the Arab East this intensification was, in part, a direct result of the Palestine war. Britain, already too weak to defend its old positions, had to accept the fact that the United States was fast becoming the dominant power in this part, as well as in other areas, of the world. Throughout the 1950s, Britain and the United States combined their interests in an attempt to create a military alliance of Middle Eastern countries as a link in the chain of anti-Soviet alliances stretching from Scandinavia to Korea, and to strengthen Western domination in the Middle East.

This policy encountered great difficulties because the Arab masses were aware of its imperialist character and opposed it violently. On the government level, the consistent refusal of Egypt and Syria to participate in such pacts undermined the entire policy. The Israeli Government, on the other hand, was always willing to participate actively in any such scheme, not only because of the traditional links between Zionism and imperialism, but also (and more specifically) because Israel's adherence to the status quo forced it to identify its own national interests – indeed, its very existence – with the imperialist presence.

The Israeli position was fully understood and utilized by the West. Whenever the governments of Egypt, Syria or Jordan attacked the Anglo-American schemes, they were threatened with armed raids by Israeli forces. Jordan in particular was raided during the period when the El Nabulsi government was pursuing anti-Western

policies. Usually, after such a raid, the Arab governments involved would ask the West for arms. The reply was invariably: "Join the Baghdad Pact [against the Soviet Union] and you will get arms."

This policy finally collapsed when, after the big Israeli raid on Gaza on April 28, 1955, Nasser refused to submit to Western pressure and turned to Czechoslovakia for arms, thus breaking the Western arms monopoly in the area and considerably weakening Western influence. From that time on, the Soviet Union emerged as a protagonist in the Middle Eastern scene. This development, followed by the nationalization of the Suez Canal, drove Britain and France to undertake desperate measures. Employing a prearranged Israeli invasion as a pretext, they launched a direct military attack on Egypt in order to regain possession of the Canal and to overthrow Nasser's neutralist and anti-imperialist United Arab Republic. The fate of this undisguised aggression is well known.

The failure of the Suez invasion meant that Israel was unable to force the Arab world to accept the status quo. The Palestine situation thus entered a period of stalemate.

Present Attitudes and Possible Solutions

In the years after the 1956 Suez crisis, the maintenance of the status quo became the principal object of Israeli foreign policy. Zionist propaganda, aimed at consolidating the existing situation, preached peace while the Arabs, anxious to change the situation, were placed in the difficult position of having to explain the injustice of the status quo. This gave the Zionists a tremendous advantage in Western public opinion: They appeared to be the peace seekers, the Arabs, the aggressors.

The development of military power has continued to be an important element of Israeli foreign policy. Knowing that eventually the balance of conventional forces would be against them, they began to develop nuclear weapons. The possession of these weapons, it was hoped, would make it impossible for the Arabs to upset the status quo. The introduction in recent years of large amounts of Soviet weaponry into the Arab Middle East has, however, placed the situation in an entirely new light. Should nuclear weapons be added to the Arab arsenal, or should the great powers force Israel to give up possession of its nuclear weapons, the Zionists hope to be able to extract an East-West guarantee, in return for the ensuing détente, to maintain the status quo.

In the long run, Zionist policies cannot succeed. Even if it does manage to remain in the newly acquired territories, Israel will remain a besieged fortress, economically unviable and dependent on outside aid to balance a constant deficit in the balance of payments. Its own natural resources are meager, and its markets extremely limited. It cannot compete with the advanced economies of the European countries, and Arab markets are closed to it. It is only the worldwide fund-raising activities of Zionist organizations such as the Jewish Agency, and the grants from the United States Government and the reparations paid by Germany that keep the standard of living in Israel at an artificially high level. If Israel's carefully cultivated image in the West – of a democratic, refugee-sheltering, peace-loving country – were seriously damaged, the economic consequences could be very serious. The inevitable decline of imperialist influence, coupled with the progressive unification of the Arab world, will make Israel's position even more precarious.

Arab attitudes can be broadly divided into two types: those of the feudal regimes and those of the bourgeois nationalist parties. Superficially similar, the attitudes of the two

groups are very differently motivated and take form in very different actions. Any apparent unity among Arab groups is ephemeral.

The feudal regimes, like Zionism, were always natural allies of Western imperialism. Both waged a struggle against rising bourgeois nationalism, and these regimes tended to consider Zionism the lesser of two evils. Today, as in the past, they share common political interests with the Zionists, as both depend for their existence on imperialist influence.

The feudal regimes cannot uphold publicly any policy that appears to link them to Zionist interests in an Arab world where the masses are becoming increasingly anti-imperialist and anxious for their independence. To cover up, therefore, they put out a steady stream of anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist propaganda.

Publicly, the feudal regimes have often advocated the annihilation of Israel; privately, they co-operate with it. In some cases (Jordan in particular), they depend on Israel for their own existence. Whenever the Palestinian Arabs in Jordan threaten the regime of King Hussein (grandson of Abdullah), the Israeli Army moves to the armistice lines, ready to intervene if Hussein is overthrown. The rebellious masses are immediately "pacified" on the grounds that only Hussein's army can defend them from the aggressive Israelis. Although Hussein's throne has rocked violently more than once, it has withstood all attacks thanks to the intervention of Israel – which would regard the overthrow of Hussein as an attack upon the status quo. A new regime in Jordan might refuse to recognize the Abdullah-Ben-Gurion pact of 1948 and the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

Thus, while on the surface the feudal regimes appear to be the most extreme enemies of Zionism, they are as concerned as Israel to consolidate and perpetuate the imperialist presence in the area. Zionism and Arab feudalism are, as always, "friendly enemies."

The bourgeois and petit-bourgeois parties throughout the Arab world tried at one time to approach the Palestine problem by means of the United Nations resolutions. Nasser was the first to undertake this approach – at the Bandung Conference of 1955 – and it was unanimously adopted. It meant essentially two things: that Israel should repatriate the Arab refugees according to a 1949 UN resolution, and that Israel should give up the territory annexed as a result of the secret pact with Abdullah. This would reduce the area of Israel but would not affect its Zionist character.

In fact, this program, which represented a considerable concession to Zionism, would not have provided a stable solution to the Palestine problem. Nasser, in fact, dropped the program after the Suez war. However, since Nasser's approach to the problem of Arab unity was basically a bourgeois one, relegating class contradictions within Arab society to second place, he was led to seek an understanding with the reactionary regime in Jordan. But this regime is no more opposed to the UN partition resolution than the Zionists are, because Jordan also annexed part of Palestine.

Editorial Note

1*. This chapter is a shortened and edited version of a document submitted for discussion among the ISO membership in 1968.

Footnotes

1. A detailed account of the whole process of land purchase and peasant expulsion is given by the pioneer Zionist Moshe Goldbert in his autobiography, *And the Fund Still Stands (Ve-ha-keren Odena Kayemet)*, Tel Aviv: 1965.
 2. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.
 3. *Ibid.*
 4. For Ben-Gurion's figure of the number of Arabs in Palestine, see *Ma'ariv*, Mar. 19, 1971.
 5. A detailed account of the promises of these British officials is given in George Antonious, *The Arab Awakening*, New York; Capricorn, 1965.
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Chapter 2 Israel and Imperialism [1*]

The relationship between Zionism and imperialism is unique and merits a special analysis. Many people of various viewpoints on the left agree that Israeli policies today are linked with those of US imperialism, and condemn these links. Few, however, realize the origin or the internal mechanism of these relations. Can Israel ever align itself with the anti-imperialist forces in the Middle East? Did not Israel, after all, fight against British imperialism in Palestine in 1948? The following essay constitutes an attempt to answer these and similar questions through an analysis of Israel's relations with the imperialist West.

Modern Jewish colonization of Palestine was begun not by the Zionists, but by a French organization sponsored and financed by Baron Edmund de Rothschild. For that matter the Rothschild movement, named Alliance Israelite Universelle (AIU), was hostile to Zionism until the late 1930s.

The Rothschild settlers had some conflicts in Palestine with the Arab peasants who refused to give up the land which their feudal landlords had sold to the AIU. Later these peasants became hired farm hands in the AIU settlements. The AIU never got into a political conflict with the Palestinian Arabs because it was not in itself a movement for political independence – the Rothschild colonization was simply part of the French colonial system. The Zionist movement was something entirely different. From the very beginning – even before the Zionist immigrants reached Palestine – its main aim was to establish a politically independent Jewish nation. (For tactical reasons this aim was couched in the terms "to achieve a Jewish homeland in Palestine.") Unlike the AIU, Zionism therefore required an independent foreign policy and some Zionists recognized immediately that their fundamental aim implied a foreign policy which would rest upon an alliance with imperialist interests.

In its history as well as its nature, Zionism differs significantly from all other nationalist movements. It is the case, as has been said, of "a government that acquired a state." From the time of the 1897 founding Congress, the Zionists had a government (the Zionist executive committee). They had a House of Representatives (the Zionist Congress) with a left and a right wing, moderates and extremists, progressives and conservatives, religious and secular parties. They collected annual taxes (the shekel, whose payment granted the right to vote in the elections of the Zionist Congress). Yet they had no state to govern and no citizens. The Congress was a federation of political parties which shared one common objective – to create a Jewish state in Palestine – yet quarreled on almost every other issue, including the means to achieve this common objective. All this activity was taking place in Europe while the Jewish population in Palestine numbered less than 10 per cent of the Arab population, and had nothing to do with the Zionist movement.

Zionism originated in Europe and was a European phenomenon arising out of conditions affecting European Jews. These conditions included: the severe persecution suffered by Jews in Tsarist Russia in the second half of the last century (in the pogroms the Russian Jews were in constant danger of losing not only their livelihood, but their lives) and the obstacles faced by Jews in Western Europe (where their economic conditions were much better) in becoming integrated into non-Jewish society (the Dreyfus Affair converted Herzl from an assimilationist to a Zionist). Ideologically, Zionism was shaped under the impact of nineteenth-century European

nationalism, which was the emerging ideology of a wide group of people living in the belt between the Baltic and the Adriatic. Emotionally, it was deeply influenced by the Jewish religion.

Herzl himself underestimated the strength of the Jewish sentiment toward Palestine. Coming from an assimilationist home, he was unaware of the emotional-political power of the Jewish religion. When he suggested to the Congress that the Jewish state be created in Uganda, he was surprised by the fierceness of the opposition from the majority which refused to accept any substitute, even temporarily, for Palestine. The Zionists considered their rights in Palestine to be incontestable, but they realized that they must either achieve recognition of these rights by some world power or else convince those who happened to be ruling Palestine that the creation of a Jewish state there would be to their benefit. [1] Although Palestine was at that time populated by some 700,000 Arabs, the Zionists never bothered to consult them. Realistically they could hardly have expected the Palestinian Arabs – who had their own nationalist aspirations – to accept the idea of a Jewish state, especially at a time when Jews constituted such a small percentage of the population. And like any other colonizing movement of that time, Zionism simply did not consider the indigenous population of the colonized country as a political factor to be reckoned with. According to Max Nordau, Herzl's deputy: "Our aspirations point to Palestine as a compass points to the north, therefore we must orient ourselves towards those Powers [Germany and Turkey] under whose influence Palestine happens to be." Considering the circumstances and the nature of a nationalist movement bent on a policy of colonization, whatever the reason, one can hardly see an alternative to this policy. Thus, during the first phase of its existence (from 1897 to 1914), political Zionism courted the Turkish Sultan and the German Kaiser, attempting to win their approval of Zionist plans. During World War I, the focus of the campaign was shifted when it became clear that Britain would be the next ruler of Palestine.

The primary goal of Zionist foreign policy was achieved on November 2, 1917, when the British Government made public the Balfour Declaration, recognizing the right of the Zionists to establish a Jewish "homeland" in Palestine and making a vague promise of support. It is evident, even at this early stage, that the pro-imperialist orientation of Zionist foreign policy was inherent in its aims, since Zionism could not possibly begin to carry out its plan if the ruler of Palestine did not approve. It was this internal logic that drove Zionism into the imperialist camp. It simply had no choice.

Once the legitimacy of the Zionist plan was recognized, the next step was to implement it. This necessitated two things: a mass immigration of Jews into Palestine and mass acquisition of land by Jews.

The Palestinian Arabs, awakened to political consciousness under the impact of World War I and taunted by hints of independence from the British during the war (in order to gain their co-operation against the Turks), immediately opposed the Zionist plan. The Arabs had no wish to become a minority in their own country; nor did they wish to be citizens of a Jewish state. Moreover, they were anxious to establish their own state and hence found their political interests in direct contradiction to those of the British. On the other hand, the Zionists realized that if the Arabs in Palestine achieved independence before the Jews constituted a majority, the main Zionist aim would have been defeated. Thus they strove to support British rule long enough to build up their numbers and to buy more of the land. Only when they had formed a majority over a considerable and continuous part of the territory would they be ready to start the struggle for their own independence. Many Zionists were unhappy about the coincidence of their interests with those of British imperialism, but whenever a

Zionist experienced a conflict between his anti-imperialist attitudes and his Zionism, it was always the latter which gained the upper hand in the end.

In the thirty years between 1918 and 1948, the Jewish population of Palestine increased from 50,000 to some 600,000 inhabitants. Most of this increase was the direct result of Zionist immigration. Funds collected regularly from Jews throughout the world helped to build an all-Jewish economy (which never was, nor aimed to be, economically profitable) based on the slogans "Redeem the land," "Jewish labor," "Buy Jewish," Despite some friction with the British (who on the eve of World War II began to court the Arabs' favor by curtailing immigration, etc.), the basic alliance of interests remained. Both parties opposed Palestinian efforts to dislodge the British, and during the 1936-39 rebellion (a major effort that at times tied down as much as 50 per cent of the entire British Army), the Zionists contributed to the Palestinian defeat. This defeat marked the departure of Palestinians from power politics in the area, leaving the field to be occupied by the British and the Zionists.

During World War II, friction started to build up between these two parties, finally breaking out into armed conflict between 1945 and 1947. The main reason for the outbreak of hostilities was the refusal of the British to allow mass immigration of Jewish refugees from Europe. There were, however, important economic factors as well. During the war, local industry (mostly in Jewish hands) had become the main source of supply for the British Army in the area. When the war was over, economic prosperity was over too, and British goods once more enjoyed preference. The Jewish community in Palestine (often against the advice of its leaders) began to clamor for independence. This clamor developed finally into an armed struggle based mostly on urban guerrilla warfare. The Zionists enjoyed tremendous popularity in world opinion and this factor, combined with the weakness and demoralization of the British and the complete collapse of Arab nationalism (which had based its hopes on the defeat of the British in the war), contributed to their victory.

When the United Nations partitioned Palestine in 1947, Ben-Gurion and Abdullah each annexed half the territory allotted to the Palestinian Arabs. This forfeited international recognition of Israeli borders for Ben-Gurion, and the recognition of the legitimacy of this claim by some authority of world opinion then became the major task of Israeli foreign policy. The United States, Britain and France provided this recognition in their Tripartite resolution of 1950 in which they sanctioned the 1949 armistice lines. (They compromised by not recognizing the finality of these lines, however, and declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel as the Zionists demanded.)

Once more Zionist foreign policy had demonstrated its dependence on imperialism. Moreover, the economic and political links between the Israeli leadership (who, from the establishment of an independent Jewish state, became the de facto, though not de jure, leaders of the Zionists) and both United States Jewry and Government were already too strong to permit a neutral, let alone anti-imperialist, foreign policy. When the war with Korea broke out in 1950, the Israeli Government aligned itself openly with the United States. This signaled a certain transformation in the pro-imperialist attitudes of the Israeli leadership: from the previous coalignment of interests on the local, Palestinian issue suddenly sprang a coalignment of interests on global issues. The price of relying on imperialist support at home is support of the imperialist system throughout the world.

By 1950, political Zionism had succeeded in accomplishing four tasks: Its claims in Palestine were recognized by the big powers, it had created a Jewish majority, it had achieved political independence in part of Palestine, and it had achieved imperialist recognition of its territorial integrity. There was, however, one flaw in this series of

successes – the Arabs refused to recognize them or to accept the situation as final. This is hardly surprising. With the defeat of their aspirations to independence, many Palestinians lost all they had and became refugees within their own former territory. The Israelis then began to treat them as non-existent. From the moment they concluded the secret agreement (endorsed by the British Foreign Office) with Abdullah in 1949, Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Levi Eshkol, Moshe Dayan and the rest of the Israeli leadership scrupulously refrained from any mention of the Palestinians. They were willing to conclude peace with the rulers of any Arab state, to enter negotiations with them "anywhere and anytime," but they insisted that the Palestinians were, politically, non-existent. It is an irony of history that through their victory in the 1967 war these same leaders were forced to recognize and deal once again with the same Palestinians they conjured away in their imaginations some nineteen years earlier.

In 1950, Ben-Gurion expected that within a year Jordan would conclude a peace treaty with Israel, thereby bringing the Israeli-Arab conflict to an end. Abdullah, however, was shot by a Palestinian and suddenly peace seemed further away than ever. It is not entirely clear what the Israeli leadership meant by "peace." Still, there is little doubt that the Israeli leadership was intent on extracting from the Arab states the overt, de jure recognition as well as the covert, de facto acceptance of the 1949 territorial and demographic status quo. Since the Arab states refused to grant this recognition and all direct Israeli approaches had failed, Ben-Gurion decided to use indirect means.

At this time (1953-55), the United States was surrounding the USSR with a network of bases and enticing its allies into a series of anti-Soviet pacts. Numerous attempts were made, especially by John Foster Dulles, to draw the Middle Eastern states into a joint anti-Soviet pact. Israel was always eager to join, not so much out of fear or hatred of the Soviet Union (which had been the staunchest political and military supporter of Israel in 1948), but because of the possibility that a paragraph concerning "mutual respect for territorial integrity" or the like could always be introduced into such a treaty, thereby causing any Arab signatory to recognize indirectly the accomplished fact. Most Arab leaders, with the exception of veteran pro-imperialist politicians like Nuri Sa'id of Iraq, refused to sign. They were suspicious that these treaties were directed not so much against the Soviet Union as against their own interests, and they believed – with some justification – that they constituted a veiled attempt by the United States to replace the British imperialist presence in the Middle East.

Anti-imperialist movements throughout the Arab world have been gaining in influence since the end of World War II and they exert considerable pressure, both directly and indirectly, on every ruler and politician in the area. Gradually these movements came to power and the Israeli leadership became more and more worried. When it became clear in 1954, for example, that the British intended to evacuate the Suez Canal, the Israeli Government made frantic efforts to make them stay. In a carefully calculated provocation, the Israelis sent a ship flying the Israeli flag into the Canal and used its detention to demonstrate that "Egypt cannot be relied upon to ensure free navigation to all nations." The truth is that during the period that the British ran the Canal, no Israeli ship passed through. Egypt was not ready to grant passage to Israeli ships before a settlement of the whole Palestine problem had been achieved. But the really significant fact is that while up to 1948 the Zionists had had no conflict with Egypt, they now found themselves up against the anti-imperialist

policies of a new Egyptian regime (which was not responsible for the 1948 invasion of Palestine) and with a stake in the continuation of British presence in the Canal.

Once again the alliance with imperialism in local affairs had prescribed distant consequences. The Arab world stubbornly refused to accept as final the situation that the Zionists had imposed on the Palestinians. When this failure became clear to Ben-Gurion (who between 1949 and 1959 was the sole authority on defense and foreign policy in Israel), the Zionists changed their tactics. The instrument of this change was the "retaliation" raid conducted by the Israeli Army into Arab territory. As the name implies, these raids were said to be retaliations for the small-scale armed infiltration and acts of sabotage carried out by various Arab organizations inside Israel. Politically, there was a somewhat different motive behind them (a motive of which few Israelis were aware): that of forcing the Arab regimes to join the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact, which was part of the American cold-war containment policy.

When, after a major Israeli raid on Gaza on February 28, 1955, Nasser approached H. Bayrod, the US ambassador, with a request for arms, he got the usual answer: "First join the Baghdad Pact." Instead of following this advice, he turned to the Soviet Union for help and as a result an Egyptian-Czech arms deal was signed. The West was now forced to compete with the Soviet Union for the favors of local rulers in order to maintain its interests in the area.

Nasser made much use of this competition. Ben-Gurion, on the other hand, was unable to exploit it for two reasons: He was already too dependent economically on the United States, and the USSR continued to insist upon the rights of the Palestinians. So the Israeli leadership, which during its struggle with the British in 1948 had found its staunchest supporter in Stalin, now found itself in direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

From 1955 onward, the Israeli leadership had its own vested interest in diminishing Soviet influence in the Middle East, which culminated in the Suez war of 1956. Israel was certainly not lured into this situation by France or Britain—there is reason to believe, in fact, that it was the other way around. Realizing that France, because of its involvement in Algeria, had an interest in defeating the anti-imperialist movements in the area — particularly in overthrowing Nasser, who symbolized these movements — the Israelis started to tempt the French into a joint military strike on Egypt. Once the bargain was struck, Britain was lured into it. [2] The Suez war, which the United States opposed, demonstrated one important aspect of the link between Israel and imperialism — namely, that Israel is not an obedient servant of US, British or French imperialism. Rather it is more than ready to initiate action on its own behalf. The failure of the Suez war, in spite of the Israeli military victory, to force the Arab states into a recognition of the status quo terminated this stage in the development of Zionist foreign policy.

After Suez it became clear to the Israeli leadership that, at least for the present, little could be done to make the Arabs accept a Zionist state in Palestine. The situation was aggravated by the clear split in the Arab world between anti- and pro-imperialist regimes, a split which deepened during the Suez war. Pro-imperialists like Nuri Sa'id and Hussein who, like the Israelis, were interested in preserving imperialist influence in the Middle East, were under constant pressure from the masses supported by the anti-imperialist governments. To counter this pressure they turned to racial, anti-Jewish propaganda, calling upon the anti-imperialists to "throw all the Jews into the sea." Instead of mouthing empty words about fighting imperialism, they said, let us join ranks in the fight against the Jews. The fact that the Arab governments were no longer united in their attitude toward imperialism, and that it was precisely the pro-

imperialists who resorted to the strongest anti-Israel propaganda, frustrated the Israeli leadership. Moreover, the fact that the British, French and Americans continued to court Nasser because of their economic interests in the area, while at the same time remaining cool toward Israel in order not to antagonize the Arabs, gradually brought into being a policy of self-reliance. Israel began to feel that it could not entirely trust the Western governments to safeguard its existence, and must rely almost exclusively on its own resources and the resources of Jews throughout the world. One consequence of this policy was the insistence on the part of Ben-Gurion and his disciples – notably Dayan and Peres – upon the development of an independent nuclear deterrent. The moderates like Eshkol and Meir wavered; they disliked the idea of antagonizing the United States, which for years had insisted on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Ben-Gurion, however, went ahead and built a secret atomic pile without the knowledge of the United States (which had donated a smaller one over which it had absolute control). When Washington finally learned about this, American pressure was used to unseat Ben-Gurion in favor of Eshkol.

One of Eshkol's first moves as premier was to delay the construction of an Israeli bomb. In return he received a very definite American military commitment to safeguard the territorial status quo. However, when Nasser imposed the naval blockage in Tiran in June 1967, President Johnson refused to intervene. He already had a war on his hands in Vietnam and was unwilling to antagonize the entire Arab world – not to speak of the Soviet Union – by siding openly with Israel. It was only after the CIA and the Israeli leadership assured him that there would be no need for "American boys to die for Israel" that he accepted the possibility of a military conflict. For the Israeli leadership, however, Washington's refusal to honor its commitment was a shock; Ben-Gurion's arguments for self-reliance were vindicated. Today there are a significant number of Israeli politicians who would not hesitate to employ the most drastic measures in order to avoid the prospect of military defeat.

Editorial Note

1*. This is an edited version of an article written by N. Israeli.

Footnotes

1. See Ben-Gurion's statement in Ma'ariv, Mar. 19, 1971.
 2. See M. Bar Zohar, Ben Gurion, the Prophet Armed.
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Chapter3 Military Escalation Within Israeli Society

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The dominant power in Israel can be described schematically as an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the labor bureaucracy. These groups confront each other in the most significant manner within the country's two great mass organizations, the Histadrut and the Army.

The labor bureaucracy has come under increasing attack within its own bastion, the Histadrut, from both the Israeli working class and the bourgeoisie. There is now open discussion of the "crisis of confidence" in the trade-union leadership. This crisis is reflected in the facts that some 40 per cent of the federation's members failed to vote at all in the 1969 union elections and that the slate supported by the Herat, the extreme right-wing party of the bourgeoisie, won 20 per cent of the vote in that same election. Moreover, since 1969 the overwhelming majority of strikes have been wildcats conducted in die face of the Histadrut leadership's bitter opposition.

A more important political and ideological confrontation between the two dominant classes has, however, taken place within the Army. There was a time, and it extended at least until the establishment of the state of Israel, when the labor bureaucracy and the Jewish armed forces shared the same outlook. The Histadrut determined the line of action of Hagana, the "official" Zionist armed force in Mandate Palestine. The Palmach, shock troops established during World War II, was practically a creation of the Histadrut.

The kibbutzim and moshavim (collective farms and agricultural co-operatives) constituted the material base for the armed forces, and commanders were mostly members of agricultural collectives. Under these circumstances, consistent opposition to the labor bureaucracy became the same as opposition to the whole pre-state Zionist establishment, and the military organizations of that opposition – Lehi (Stern Gang) and Irgun – were called "dissident."

The shift in the relationship of forces within the Army and the increasing ideological impact of the extremists can be traced to two primary sources. The first is the growing dependence on foreign financial aid, channeled mainly through the various organizations of the world Zionist movement, and the increasingly close collusion with Western, especially US, imperialism. The second is the logic of the confrontation with the Palestinian people, and it is this factor that we will deal with primarily.

The main result of the 1948 war, which followed Israel's declaration of independence, was the dismemberment of Palestine and the reduction of part of its people to refugee status. Israeli sources estimate the number of "departees" at 550,000; a UN commission of inquiry put the number at 725,000; the UN's relief agency UNRWA refers to some 925,000 Palestinians who received aid in 1950.

The Israeli Government had no specific policy toward these refugees. They were refused repatriation; beyond that, with the exception of an ephemeral proposal to allow the return of 100,000 refugees and some measures to reunite families that involved at most 10,000 people, they were simply ignored. The hope was that in time the refugees would forget their ties to Palestine and the problem would take care of itself. This, it seems, was also die view of John Foster Dulles, who thought he knew the Arabs.

In reality, events turned out differently. The Palestinian refugees, most of them peasants, lived in camps all around Israel. They saw their fields being worked by others, and they wanted to return to them.

At the time, the Israeli press spoke of the refugees as a "plague of infiltrators" and "marauders." The Paratroopers' Book describes the phenomenon this way:

"From 1949 on, a wave of infiltration began to flow over our frontiers. At first, the motives of this infiltration were emotional or economic. The Arab refugees who saw their land from the other side jumped the border at night and sneaked into their villages, their houses and the orchards they had planted. Some of them came to get valuables they had hidden on the eve of their departure. Later, they began to steal: horses, cows, goats, agricultural implements. They dragged pipes, pumps, spare parts with them to the other side ... A little later, murders were added to the thefts." [1]

It is certain, however, that the line between "emotional or economic motivations" and acts of violence would not have been crossed if not for simultaneous or prior brutal reactions from the Israeli side against those refugees who merely wanted to return to their homes. At the same time, it seems established that at first the Israeli retaliation was not the work of the regular armed forces. Most often, it was members of frontier villages who had stolen the Palestinians' land and property, and frontier guards 'who took on the responsibility for the Israelis' indiscriminate firing on refugees crossing the border. Volleys were exchanged which claimed victims on both sides, the majority of whom were Palestinian.

The Israeli Army was divided about what attitude to assume. There were some reprisals, but they ended in failure. A step had to be taken which would affect the psychology and methods of warfare, and thus was the Israeli Army destined to become an army of repression. The transition to this new role involved an upheaval that could not be completed without internal struggle.

"During this period, Zahal [Israeli Army] was impotent in the face of the infiltration. The necessity of reacting to the waves of infiltration with reprisal actions was recognized in the Army, but it didn't have appropriate tools and it was not animated by the land of spirit required for such initiatives. Zahal was in crisis ... The Army attempted to engage in some reprisal actions, but they were failures. The defeat that most infuriated General Moshe Dayan-chief of operations at the time – was the scandalous defeat of the Givathi Regiment at the Jordanian village of Palma. An entire battalion, a shock battalion with a glorious name, set out to attack the village. There were only a dozen Jordanian frontier guards, armed with rifles, in the village. The Jordanians opened fire, the battalion halted at the village walls and retreated." [2] The Army was even more divided because a good part of its activity consisted in repressing the Arab population that had remained in Israel and in expelling another part of it. [3]

The extremist tendency in the Army decided to present as faits accomplis actions of increased violence, not only to the Palestinians and the Arab countries but also, and especially, to the opposition inside Israel. The extremists proposed the establishment of a specialized reprisal unit. "Dayan decided to support the establishment of this unit ... But for several weeks the project remained stuck in the files of the general staff. It occasioned bitter arguments and intense opposition from the generals of Zahal who feared the establishment of a new corps which would neither act according to established codes nor be integrated into the regular military framework. Some maintained that Dayan was building a kind of secret 'private army' within Zahal." [4] Nevertheless, these extremists decided to go ahead, and the famous Unit 101 was

formed. Its commander was Ariel Sharon, who later became the commanding general of the Southern Sector of Israel.

In January 1954, Unit 101 and the Airborne were merged at the initiative of Dayan, who had become Chief of Staff. According to Sharon, who was appointed commander of the new Airborne, Dayan "was aware of the decisive influence the small unit would have on the Airborne and, later, on the whole Zahal ... One might say that the ideology of reprisal operations was, in all respects, crystallized among the Airborne units." [5]

The first major operation of Unit 101 and the paratroopers was directed against the village of Kibye on October 14, 1953. The pretext was the killing by a grenade of a mother and two children in the Jewish village of Yahoud.

"The operation at Kibye," comments The Paratroopers' Book, "was to be distinguished from other operations by its purposes and its effects. The dynamiting of dozens of houses in Kibye was an ambitious undertaking surpassing anything in the past. Once and for all, it washed away the stain of the defeats that Zahal had suffered in its reprisal operations." [6]

Sixty-nine Arabs died under the ruins of their homes.

Today, Zahal officially assumes responsibility for the dynamiting. A legend of heroism has been created to surround the paratroopers and Unit 101. But at the time of the incident, a part of the Army, leading civilian circles and the majority of the population were not ready to accept such operations. It was also important to reassure world public opinion. David Ben-Gurion found himself compelled to deny categorically that any unit of the Israeli Army had been involved in the Kibye operation. [7] People protested, sometimes vehemently. But the new line of violent action, imposed by the "activists" within the Army, who increasingly identified themselves with the right wing, was quickly imposed on the entire Army. Although instructions were issued to spare the lives of civilians, it was obvious that there would be many victims in this kind of punitive operation.

On the political plane, Kibye was followed by Ben-Gurion's temporary withdrawal. For a brief period, Moshe Sharett became Prime Minister and Pinhas Lavon his Minister of Defense. Dayan, however, remained Army Chief of Staff.

Military operations on the frontiers were intensified. But until Ben-Gurion's return – first, in January 1955, as Minister

of Defense and later in the year as Premier – the quietest border was the Egyptian. One week after Ben-Gurion's return, a Zahal attack on Egyptian military camps in Gaza caused thirty-eight deaths on the Egyptian side and eight on the Israeli. "This attack," according to an evaluation made at the time by a group of British experts, "which took place in February, 1955, marks one of the most important dates in the history of the Middle East. Until then, Egypt had been less active than any other Arab country against Israel. There were fewer incidents between Israel and Egypt than between Israel and Syria or Jordan." [8] Nasser affirmed several times that, as he put it in a Le Monde interview in 1970,

"In the years 1952, '53, and '54, it was I who defended the position that Egypt did not need very extensive armament because the differences with Israel could be resolved peacefully. But the murderous raid that Ben-Gurion launched against Gaza in February, 1955, dealt me a slashing refutation." [9]

And, in fact, with Ben-Gurion's return, war against Egypt was put on the agenda.

"It is today frankly admitted," according to The Paratroopers' Book, "that if it had been up to David Ben-Gurion, the Sinai war would have taken place a year earlier." [10]

On October 22, 1955, Ben-Gurion ordered Dayan to begin preparations for the war against Egypt.

"At the beginning of December, Ben-Gurion submitted to the cabinet his proposal for an offensive to conquer the Straits [of Tiran and Sharm el Sheik]. The majority of the government, led by Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, opposed him, and the project was shelved." [11]

At this point, one important element necessary for launching the war was lacking – agreement of the Western powers. Moreover, this was the period during which some attempts at mediation were under way – apparently with the secret concurrence of Nasser and Sharett. But on June 18, 1956, following a long and bitter dispute, Sharett resigned from the foreign ministry at Ben-Gurion's insistence and was replaced by Golda Meir. Thereupon, in the words of *The Paratroopers' Book*, "Israeli foreign policy was adjusted to the hard and energetic line of the Minister of Defense." [12] A month later, the event occurred that brought Western support for the war against Egypt:

"On July 27, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal before an enthusiastic crowd in Alexandria. Without knowing it, he thereby kicked off the Suez campaign." [13]

In a later passage, *The Paratroopers' Book* describes even more clearly how the internal logic of armed confrontation implied war. Discussing an Israeli raid on a police station at Kalkyilia, Jordan, just eighteen days before the opening of the Sinai campaign, in which the Israelis suffered heavy losses, the book comments,

"The nocturnal reprisal operations had reached their end. The Jordanians came to know their enemy ... The battles became bigger, both in terms of the men and materiel committed and in terms of the number of casualties on both sides. With respect to relations between Israel and the Arabs, these confrontations went beyond the framework of border incidents and minor harassing actions to the level of a hidden war. The road to open war was short." [14]

Kibye played a part in the profound transformation of the Army and of the country's entire political and psychological scene. It represented an escalation both internally and externally. Unit 101 was established as an anti-body to the Palmach, the elite troops of the Hagana before the creation of the state. I have no intention of glorifying the earlier period, but it is unquestionable that during 1940-48 there was a fundamental difference in ideology and battle methods between the Palmach, on the one hand, and the Lehi – and especially the Irgun – on the other. [15]

Among the Palmach, most of whose leaders came from kibbutzim, there were frequent discussions of the "purity of arms" and there was some hesitation about performing certain kinds of acts. An example is of an individual who refused to participate in one of Unit 101's bloody expeditions:

"As an ex-Palmach who believed in the purity of arms, he refused to participate in an expedition directed not against enemy soldiers but against the civilian population. Arik [A. Sharon, commander of Unit 101] did not force him to take part [101 was an all-volunteer unit from the beginning]. In a heated discussion, Shlomo Baum [Sharon's adjutant] hurled a remark at him: 'There are no pure or impure arms; there are only clean weapons that work when you need them and dirty weapons that jam the moment you fire.'" [16]

The Israeli Army is today largely under the influence and command of men of Unit 101 and the Airborne. In general, these men either no longer belong to kibbutzim, or have never belonged. A fitting symbol here is Meir Har-Zion, one of the most formidable soldiers of Unit 101, who, after retiring from the Army because of his

wounds, withdrew from his kibbutz and established a private cattle ranch on the peak of Mount Kaoukab, not far from his old kibbutz. Kaoukab and the ranch became the objects of a pilgrimage by soldiers of Unit 101, and Har-Zion himself has described it; "A whole ceremony developed around Kaoukab. They arrived after a long march that lasted a day and a night. At the end of the march, the unit's insignia were distributed to the soldiers. The goal of the march was the ranch. To ascend to it has become a tradition; it is a summit one must reach." [17]

In summary, the basic cause of the confrontations were the Palestinian refugees who had become, overnight, peasants without land. The Israeli reaction – sporadic at first, but bloody nonetheless – later assumed the form of large-scale military operations directed against the civilian population and military installations of neighboring countries. At first the Army was seriously handicapped, indeed it was impotent, when confronted with the double task of becoming an internal police force and of avenging Israel beyond the frontier. Special units were formed to carry out the latter task, and these units finally transformed the whole Army. The spirit and methods of the Palmach were abandoned in favor of the spirit and methods of the Irgun – although the Palmach hardly lacked toughness. At the same time, the ideology of the Irgun-Herut people was strengthened within the Army, especially among its career officers.

As far as the military operations leading up to the war were concerned, Egypt was more or less deliberately provoked since for geopolitical reasons, every Israeli war must involve its southern neighbor. The Arab countries learned how to reply to the Israeli attacks. The Palestinians were often used by Israel's neighbors, notably in the case of the Palestinian fedayeen during 1955-56, who, as far as can be determined, were organized and controlled by Egypt. But these fedayeen began their operations after the Israeli raid on the Egyptian military camp in Gaza in February 1955. Efforts at conciliation were sabotaged, and the moderate wing of Israeli Zionism, which expressed the more traditional political line of the labor bureaucracy, was driven from power. Foreign support, without which the Israelis hesitated to attack, was provided as a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and Egyptian solidarity with the Algerian people. Franco-British assent to the tripartite aggression followed.

The similarity in all essential points to the situation preceding the June 1967 war is clear. But nothing in history is ever identical; the relative importance of the forces involved changes. The first big difference is that the Palestinian "marauders" of 1951 and 1952 became the commandos of El Fatah's El Assifa, whose first armed operations began in 1965. From that time, the Palestinian people were present as a conscious, organized force with their own military expression. Secondly, the harsh political struggle inside the labor bureaucracy – so evident in the period preceding the Sinai campaign – was not repeated in 1967. Moreover, the Herat Party of the chauvinist and expansionist national bourgeoisie, which had been aligned with the extreme nationalist wing of the labor bureaucracy since the 1965 elections in Jerusalem, joined the June 1967 government of national unity.

As for the Army during this period, The reprisal actions of 1965-66 differed from those which preceded the Sinai campaign ... The operations were no longer acts of vengeance, savage and nervous, of a small state fighting for its independence. Rather, they were blows struck by a state strong and sure of itself, and which did not fear the army it confronted." [18] The soldier now wanted by the Army for training is a calm and determined man who can coldly execute the operations entrusted to him. This, at least, is the ideal held up to the youth: not hatred of the enemy, but contempt for him. The flyer, particularly the bombardier, took the place of the paratrooper or the infantryman. It is typical that the bedside reading of Zahal's officers in the '50s

included books like Alexander Beck's *The Men of Panfilov*, a Soviet work of World War II that recounts the training of an assault unit, while in the '60s, their reading turned to the exploits of bombardiers "for whom war became a hobby, something secondary that one calmly accepted." [19]

The sentiment that motivates the military caste today in its relations to the Arabs is less one of hatred than of contempt, the contempt of the Westerner with his superior technology for the underdeveloped Levantine. But it is also the contempt of the Westerner who has not grasped the lesson of the Vietnam war. Air Force General Ezer Weitzmann, a member of Herat and Minister of Transport in the national unity government, expressed this contempt forcefully:

I believe it is a mistake to treat the Arabs with contempt. I believe that the Arabs have many excellent traits. I grew up among them, I speak their language, and I believe that we will one day find a common language. But their military ability is a different matter. I am certain that, given their kind of education, their way of life, and the mentality of their leaders, it is high time they realized that warfare is not their strong point ... A modern war is not only a question of muscles and heart, it also puts heavy demands on the head. In this, we surpass the Arabs. I do not believe this superiority will disappear over the years. [20]

The new attitude of the military caste is ideologically linked to the dominant political conception of the Israeli bourgeoisie. The task of the labor bureaucracy was not to dominate but to expel the Palestinian people. This conception, translated into deeds under the slogans of "Conquest of Labor," "Conquest of the Land," and "Build a state by a state," was held by the majority of the Jewish population in Palestine before the creation of the state and even afterward. On the other hand, the Jewish bourgeoisie in Palestine and today in Israel anticipated the exploitation of the Arab masses. Not so long ago the liberal wing of the local Jewish bourgeoisie still dreamed of an alliance with the notables and bourgeois elements among the Palestinians; it was, in fact, frequently bi-nationalist. The extremist bourgeois ideology anticipated from the outset a strong Jewish state in which the Arab population would consist of second-class citizens constituting a proletariat or sub-proletariat while maintaining subsistence agriculture. Since the bi-national conception is decidedly remote, the only ideology that remains among the Israeli bourgeoisie is that of the extremist wing. And despite some minor differences, this approximates the South African model.

The fusion in 1963 of the Herat with the other Israeli bourgeois party, the General Zionists, under Herat leader Menahem Begin, former commander in chief of the Irgun, was the organizational expression of the bankruptcy of the liberal wing of the Israeli bourgeoisie. At the same time, because of its actual position and its own psychological and ideological development, the military is continuously approaching the standpoint of the nationalist right. This tendency of the new military caste is expressed both directly within the Herat and through the intermediary of the Labor Party faction led by Dayan and Shimon Peres.

The different class-determined conceptions held by the two partners in power today are clearly indicated by their methods for settling the territories occupied since the June war. Dayan and Begin have fought for the transfer of tens of thousands of Jews to Arab cities on the West Bank "in accordance with their general political vision of the future of the territories, which includes economic integration of the inhabitants and the introduction of Israeli legislation." [21]

It is not difficult to understand why this position is shared by the expansionist military caste, which combines confidence in its ability to subdue the occupied Palestinian people with contempt for that people's military abilities and the almost natural desire

of a military caste to hang on to conquered lands. At the same time, it is the traditional political line of the extreme Israeli right to dominate the Palestinian people while exploiting it economically.

The political line of the labor bureaucracy, which is linked to the labor-Zionist conceptions that were formerly predominant, tends to preserve the exclusively Jewish character of the state. The Allon plan, Labor's characteristic response to the problem of the occupied territories, as well as a compromise among the various tendencies, anticipates only partial annexations. According to this plan, the Palestinians would be gathered on the West Bank and surrounded by Jewish agricultural communities. Thus, in the last analysis, the Palestinian areas would be controlled by Israel without actually being annexed.

None of the above plans can be carried through without engendering ever more violent acts of war or provoking intensified external pressure. The Palestinian Resistance is a reality in the occupied territories, on the frontiers and even beyond them. The Arab states surrounding Israel cannot accept a unilateral annexation of their territory. The big powers, whose interests are directly involved, have been led to intervene.

At each stage of increased external pressure, there is a reply from the Israeli side. Any political arrangement imposed from without would not only involve the liquidation or "voluntary" retreat of the Palestinian Resistance, but also Israel's retreat from the occupied territories. This, the Israeli right wing and the military circles will vigorously oppose. But if the present situation should continue, with the succession of faits accomplis by the Israelis, the intensification of the struggle could reach the level of a real revolt of the occupied Palestinians. In either case, the immediate result would be repressive measures from the right and the dangerous possibility of the evolution of Israeli society toward a regime of the South African or fascist type. This evolution was inherent in Zionism from the beginning, notwithstanding the consciousness and illusions of the Zionist pioneers who established themselves in Palestine. The erosion of left Zionist positions is clearly revealed by a man of the right, Menahem Begin. At a conference at Ein Hahoreh, a Mapam kibbutz, he was asked about recognition of the existence of a Palestinian people. He replied:

"My friend, take care. When you recognize the concept of 'Palestine,' you demolish your right to live in Ein Hahoreh. If this is Palestine and not the Land of Israel, then you are conquerors and not tillers of the land. You are invaders. If this is Palestine, then it belongs to a people who lived here before you came. Only if it is the Land of Israel do you have a right to live in Ein Hahoreh and in Deganiyah B. If it is not your country, your fatherland, the country of your ancestors and of your sons, then what are you doing here? You came to another people's homeland, as they claim, you expelled them and you have taken their land ..." [22]

When asked how Israel could impose its will on a million Arabs, Begin replied with the question

"And why does Mapam, which demands that Gaza stay in our possession, want to impose its will on Gaza's 350,000 inhabitants? Two hundred thousand Arabs have fled the Golan Heights – which Mapam would have us keep. How are you going to impose your will – that they stay in Syria – on them?"

According to Begin's calculation, Mapam would impose its will on 900,000 Arabs, while according to his "Greater Israel" scheme, the number would be raised to 1,300,000. "So," he said, "do you have the right to impose your will on 900,000 but then cry bloody murder over 400,000 more?"

It is the recognition of the basic nature of Zionist ideology and the total break with it which permits the affirmation of an internationalist position and which is thereby the basis for a common battle between Israeli and Palestinian revolutionaries. At a single stroke, the question of knowing by what right the Israelis find themselves where they are becomes superfluous. It is only when one envisages continuing the Zionist process that one feels obligated to justify one's past

For Israeli revolutionaries, the problem is precisely how to effect that break. The fact that the continuation of Zionist structures in Israel can only be effected in a pro-imperialist perspective and with a South African or fascist structure inside Israel opens the possibility of the development of a revolutionary consciousness among the masses of Israelis.

The dividing line between the alternatives has never before been as starkly drawn as it is today.

Editorial Note

1*. This chapter is based on an article written by Eli Lobel.

Footnotes

1. The Paratroopers' Book, Tel Aviv, 1969, p.60. This is a quasi-official history of the Israeli Airborne corps of the Army and is widely read by the general public in addition to the military.

2. The Paratroopers' Book, p.60.

3. See The Emergency Regulations, Chapter 8, for some of the expulsion operations carried out by the Army.

4. The Paratroopers' Book, p.63.

5. Ariel Sharon's Introduction to Meir Har-Zioa, Chapters from a Diary, Tel Aviv: 1969, p.16 (in Hebrew).

6. Ibid., p.77.

7. On Oct. 19, 1953, Ben-Gurion announced over Israeli radio:

"The government of Israel emphatically denies the fake and fantastic tale according to which 600 Zahal soldiers participated in an operation against the village of Kibye. We have examined the facts in detail, and we can state without hesitation that not a single unit, not even the smallest, was absent from its barracks on the night of the attack on Kibye."

8. Cited in E. Israel, Peace, Peace and There Is No Peace, Jerusalem: 1961 (in Hebrew).

9. Le Monde, Feb. 19, 1970.

10. Op. cit., p.114.

11. Ibid., pp.114-15.

12. Ibid., pp.122-23.

13. Ibid., pp.122-23.

14. Ibid., pp.129-30.

15. Lehi was an anti-British, anti-Arab terrorist organization. The Irgun, a similar organization, was responsible for most of the attacks on Arab civilians, the most notorious of which was the massacre at Deir Yassin in 1948.

16. The Paratroopers' Book, p.71.

17. Meir Har-Zion, Chapters from a Diary, p.240.
 18. The Paratroopers' Book, pp.157-38.
 19. Ibid., p.164.
 20. Ma'ariv, July 14, 1967.
 21. Ha'aretz, July 4, 1969.
 22. Aharonot, Oct. 17, 1969.
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Chapter 4 From Generation to Generation

The Origins of the 1967 War

They Rise Up to Destroy Us [1*]

Natan Yalin-More, writing in the September 1968 Aheret, insists that "the June war was a defensive war against a clear attempt at genocide on the part of Egypt."

On December 22, 1967, Ha'aretz published an interview with Yitzhak Rabin, Army Chief of Staff at the time of the June war:

Question: There are some people who believe the Six Day War was one which no one wanted. Do you agree with this version?

General Rabin: To the best of my knowledge, the war broke out not from the wish of any one side, not because one of the sides decided two months before the war to attack at that time in order to achieve this or that aim. The war was a result of a whole development, and there had been a number of deteriorating elements.

Question: On both sides?

Rabin: It was not we who initiated the development that brought on the war. When Nasser, under Russian influence, decided that his prestige required some action to prove to the Arab world that he, Nasser, had not lost his power to aid the Arab world, when he started to concentrate his forces in the Sinai, he must have assumed that war might break out. But there is a difference between concentrating forces in order to get into a war and making a move that, while it might end up in war, is not aimed at war but at something else. I think this is what was at the basis of Nasser's thinking.

Question: You seem to think that Nasser made an incorrect calculation, that he thought he could get away without war but was trapped.

Rabin: Yes, that's my evaluation. He confronted a situation in which he preferred the danger of war to backing down.

Question: And this, despite our deterrent force?

Rabin: Yes.

According to the October 18, 1967, Yediot Aharonot, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol said: "The deployment of Egyptian forces in the Sinai and the general military activity there indicate that an Egyptian defensive formation was being built there."

Yalin-More is familiar with these quotations. We included them in our Letter to All Those "Once-Good" Israelis [1], to which his article is a reply. Yet he avoids any direct and explicit comment on them. He does not explain how Eshkol's and Rabin's judgments that the Egyptian formations were defensive and that Nasser's aim was not war at that time can be reconciled with his evaluation that at that moment Israel was defending herself from attempted annihilation. Instead, he hides behind a curtain of racist Egyptian quotations – they make up over half his article – which are well known to us. Of Rabin's and Eshkol's evaluations, he can only say, "I honor truth more than I honor them."

The "truth" here is his interpretation of the events. But no matter how important his interpretation was to him, it was not he who made the decision to begin the war. Yalin-More's version can, at best, explain to us his position with regard to the war. But to understand the considerations of the leaders who actually decided to begin the war, we ought to listen to what they have to say. Yalin-More's talk about honoring

truth" is simply an evasion of the task of analyzing Rabin's and Eshkol's statements. The host of Egyptian racist quotations is simply an attempt to justify a different version of the statement "I supported the decision to begin the war – a decision made by someone else – because in the light of Egyptian statements I was convinced that we were facing annihilation."

But what, for example, was Moshe Dayan convinced of? Unlike Yalin-More, Dayan actually participated in the decision making. Here is his statement in a March 30, 1968, Ma'ariv interview: "What do you mean, [the war was] unavoidable? It was, of course, possible to avoid the war if the Straits [of Tiran] had stayed closed to Israeli shipping."

Yalin-More sees that this estimate of Dayan contradicts his evaluation that Egypt was preparing to attack Israel in June 1967 in order to destroy it. He understands that Dayan's words contradict his assertion that the June war was "a defensive war against a clear attempt at genocide on the part of Egypt." But he doesn't admit it explicitly. Instead, he shifts to a somewhat different position – that the war was a preventive war. Again, he does not say so explicitly, but this is what hides behind the following formulation:

The Egyptian Government saw a possibility that Israel might accommodate itself to the fait accompli. Perhaps this is what it wanted, since it knew that such acquiescence would finally bring about the same longed-for aim – the elimination of Israel by strangulation. Many months might pass before the end of Israel's independence, more than the six months that separated the Munich agreements from the Nazi army's entry into Prague. In essence, though, there was no reason to expect a different outcome.

If, in fact, it was a preventive war, if it was the closing of the Straits of Tiran (and not any danger of immediate annihilation) that justified the June war in Yalin-More's eyes, then why does he denounce the "preventive" war that Israel waged in 1956? Before the Suez war, too, the Straits were closed to Israeli shipping; then, too, racist declarations came from various Egyptian sources. If the 1967 war was launched only in anticipation of "liquidation by strangulation," why is he not ready to see the 1956 war in the same light? Is his negative attitude toward the 1956 war perhaps due to Israel's co-operation with certain imperialist powers at that time? If so, why does he not try to analyze the connection between the 1967 war and the general structure of relations between the Arab world, Israel and imperialism? It is strange that not once in Yalin-More's article is the United States even mentioned.

We do not claim that there was no difference between the Suez war and the Six Day War. We do not exonerate the Arab rulers of provocative actions in preaching genocide. Our point is quite different. It is one that Shalom Cohen (former co-editor with Uri Avnery of Ha'olam Hazeh) made on the eve of the war:

"Tanks, artillery pieces, helicopters and armor. For a whole week you could not watch Egyptian TV without seeing the flood of armaments which flowed towards the Sinai and the Israeli border. And in every broadcast, the unequivocal declaration: 'If Israel attacks Syria, the Egyptian Army will intervene!' The idea that all this propaganda tries to get across is that the Egyptian Army occupies a powerful position. The truth is that the Army has got itself in a trap. Everyone who has any strategic sense realizes this ... I assume that Nasser knows it too." [2]

We don't know what Yalin-More thinks of this evaluation, but we share it. And the Israeli general staff arrived at a similar one.

How do these quotations accord with our interpretation of the chain of events from May 15 to June 5, 1967? Beginning in 1966, Fatah actions began to disturb the Israeli Government. This was not primarily because these actions seriously affected the

feeling of security but rather because with Fatah a Palestinian actor appeared on the stage, one hostile to Jordan, independent of Egypt and, while based in Syria, independent of the Syrian regime. But any appearance of an independent Palestinian factor in the Middle East threatens to undermine the political status quo and bring Israeli policy back to 1947. Israel was ready to negotiate with the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, but it was not ready to accept the Palestinians as a factor in and for themselves with whom Israel should negotiate.

Thus, worried by the Fatah presence, the Israeli leaders threatened Syria. These threats forced Nasser to declare that he would stand by Syria should it be attacked. Under nationalist-chauvinist pressure from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who had a direct interest in getting Nasser embroiled, he adopted the tactic of "going to the brink of war." He began to make a show of posing military and political threats to Israel, but in fact, he was afraid of war.

The Israeli leadership understood the situation well. The "activists" wished to exploit this opportunity: namely, that Nasser had fallen into a trap by deploying his army in a static formation in the Sinai and by appearing as an aggressor in the eyes of world public opinion. War was bound to come in any case within a few years, these activists argued, and it would be wise to use the opportunity to smash Egypt

But most of the Israeli leaders objected to this for two reasons. First, there was no green light from Washington. The United States was certainly interested in crushing Nasser, but it was leery of anything that might compel direct American intervention. Secondly, there was no satisfactory political pretext. But when Nasser announced the blockade of the Straits, it became clear to the Israeli leadership that it had to fight.

The reason for this was neither economic nor military, but political. To understand it, we must recognize the fundamental method of Zionist policy from the beginning of the century until today. Everything the Yishuv [3] in Palestine acquired – land, "Conquest of Labor," political sovereignty—it obtained not through agreement with the Palestinian Arabs but by the creation of *faits accomplis*, at the expense of the Arabs. Then these *faits accomplis* would be made secure by force with the help of the British and by political alliance with the imperialist powers. And since 1948, the entire Israeli policy vis-a-vis the Arab world has been based on this method. It is sufficient to recall how the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran was achieved in 1956 to understand the method.

By blockading the Straits in 1967, for the first time since the beginning of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, Nasser broke the continuity of the chain of *faits accomplis*, thus creating a situation that Israel could not accept. Even if negotiations between Israel and Egypt might have led to a reaffirmation of freedom of navigation in the Straits – as part of an agreement with Egypt – this would have set a precedent of relations not based on force. It would have created a precedent in which an Israeli "fact" had been broken by an Egyptian "fact". This was a situation the Zionist leaders could not tolerate.

It is impossible to understand the 1967 war in abstraction from the entire struggle between Zionism and the Arabs during the past seventy years. Yalin-More tries to do just this; he tries to separate this war from the continuity of the Zionist-Arab conflict. From the moment Nasser proclaimed the blockade, the Israeli leadership had an urgent interest in breaking by force the Egyptian attempt to create a *fait accompli*.

Thus, after the blockade, only one obstacle remained – the hesitations in Washington. The Israeli Government plunged into the effort to convince the White House that the United States would not have to intervene directly and that the war would end in a few days with an Israeli victory. As long as President Johnson remained unconvinced

of the soundness of these two evaluations, he refused to give the green light, and the "defensive war against an attempt at genocide" had to be delayed. As soon as he became convinced, he cabled a diplomatic formulation of the go-ahead signal to Jerusalem (on June 4). The war Cabinet met and reached the final decision. [4]

We don't have any evidence at present that the Israeli leadership aimed, in advance, at launching the war in order to annex territory. The reality was probably more complex: The war was fought for political reasons, and only after the territories were conquered did the Zionist instinct and the chauvinist madness that are an inherent part of it come to dominate policy.

The abundant evidence that has come to light since the war leaves no room for doubt [5] No arguments about the necessity for "defense against a clear and present danger of liquidation" played important roles in the deliberations of the government and the general staff. There were Egyptian threats and boasts – but not the ability to realize them. In fact, the threats and boasts were forthcoming precisely to cover up this incapability. And the Israeli general staff knew this full well.

However, the idea of a "defensive war against an attempt at genocide" fits nicely into a certain Jewish philosophy of history, which can be summed up in the famous sentence "From generation to generation, they rise up to destroy us." [6] Into this formula, everything can be forced, including the wars of '47, '56 and '67. It is no accident that these wars entered into the consciousness of much of the Jewish public as "wars of existence."

This self-justifying and self-righteous philosophy of history customarily seeks to comprehend the Jewish fate in separation from – and even in opposition to – the fate of the Gentiles. Yalin-More's apologetic is by and large a repetition of this accepted formula. In this light we can understand his attempt to deal with the June '67 war in isolation from the past seventy years of Arab history and the policies of the big powers. As we mentioned earlier, he does not once refer to the United States in his piece. But US policy occupied a very important place in the considerations of the Israeli war Cabinet.

A group that insists on fabricating an ethnocentric interpretation of its own history, and then of becoming the object of that interpretation by letting its actions be guided by it; revolves in a vicious circle of its own making. Whoever accepts the assumption that discrimination against national minorities is inherent in human nature must also accept the Zionist solution to the Jewish problem. He should not be surprised that from his political analysis the assumption he started with stares back at him.

"From generation to generation, they rise up to destroy us" – in the past, in the present, in the future. This is the principle that has determined the selection of historical and political facts.

Editorial Note

1*. This is an edited version of an article written by Mosh? Machover and Haim Hanegbi.

Footnotes

1. Matzpen, No.43 (July 1968), an answer to Amos Kenan's Letter to All Good People of the World, defending the Israeli position.

2. Ha'olam Hazeh, May 29, 1967.
 3. The Jewish community in Palestine before 1948.
 4. Cf., for example, the chronology of events given by U. Dan in Ma'ariv, May 3, 1968.
 5. On March 19, 1972, Ha'aretz reported:
"Dr. M. Peled said that the thesis that in June '67 Israel faced a danger of annihilation and that the state of Israel was fighting for its physical survival is 'a tale which was born and elaborated only after the war.' Dr. Peled, who was in the Army general staff during the '67 war, is now a professor of history at the Shilo'ah Institute. He further noted that in May '67 there was no danger of annihilation to Israel: The Egyptians concentrated 80,000 soldiers, while we mobilized against them hundreds of thousands of men."
These observations of Peled were fully endorsed in Ha'aretz the following day by E. Weitzman, the former commander of the Israeli Air Force and a former Herat cabinet minister.
 6. This is a saying that has been repeated throughout Jewish folklore as an expression of their persecution.
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Chapter 5 The Class Character of Israel [1*]

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ISRAELI SOCIETY, like all other class societies, contains conflicting social interests—class interests which give rise to an internal class struggle. Yet Israeli society as a whole has been engaged, for the last 50 years, in a continuous external conflict: the conflict between Zionism and the Arab world, particularly the Palestinians. Which of these two conflicts is dominant and which is subordinate? What is the nature of this subordination and what is its dynamic? These are questions that everyone involved with Israeli society and politics must answer.

For revolutionaries inside Israel these questions are not academic. The answers given determine the strategy of the revolutionary struggle. Those who consider the internal class conflict to be the dominant one concentrate their efforts on the Israeli working class and attach secondary importance to the struggle against the colonizing, nationalistic, and discriminatory character of the Zionist state. This position sees the external conflict as a derivative of the internal one. Moreover, in this perspective, the internal dynamics of Israeli society will lead to a revolution in Israel, without this necessarily depending on a social revolution in the Arab world.

The experience of classical capitalist countries has often demonstrated that internal class conflicts and interests dominate external conflicts and interests. However, this theory fails to hold in certain specific cases. For example, in a colonized country under the direct rule of a foreign power, the dynamics of the colonized society cannot be deduced simply from the internal conflicts of that society, since the conflict with the colonizing power is dominant. Israel is neither a classic capitalist country nor is it a classic colony. Its economic, social, and political features are so unique that any attempt to analyze it through the application of theories or analogies evolved for different societies will be a caricature. An analysis must be based rather on the specific characteristics and specific history of Israeli society.

THE FIRST crucial characteristic of Israeli society is that the majority of the population are either immigrants or the children of immigrants. In 1968, the adult (i.e., over 15) Jewish population of Israel numbered 1,689,286, of whom only 24 percent were Israeli born and only 4 percent of Israeli-born parents. [1] Israeli society today is still an immigrant community and has many features typical of such a community. In such a society, classes themselves, not to mention class consciousness, are still in a formative stage. Immigration produces an experience and a mentality of having "turned over a new leaf in life." As a rule the immigrant has changed his occupation, social role, and class. In the case of Israel the majority of the immigrants come from the petty bourgeoisie, whether they are from urban areas in Central and Eastern Europe or from towns and cities in the Arab world. The new immigrant looks forward to changing his place in society. Moreover, he sees that all the advantageous positions in the new society are filled by earlier immigrants and this enhances his ambition to climb the social scale through long, hard work. The immigrant considers the actual social role he occupies as transitional. His father was rarely a worker, and he himself lives in the hope that he too will become independent one day, or at least that his son will be able to do so. The class consciousness and pride which exist in the British and French proletariats do not exist in Israel, and appear odd to many Israeli

workers. An English worker, if asked about his origins, will almost automatically reply in class terms ("I'm working class") and will define his attitudes to other people in terms of similar class concepts; an Israeli worker, however, will use ethnic categories and consider himself and others in terms of being "Polish," "Oriental," and so on. Most people in Israel still consider their social position in terms of their ethnic and geographic origins, and such a social consciousness is obviously a barrier hindering the working class from playing an independent role, let alone a revolutionary one aiming at a total transformation of society.

No working class can play a revolutionary role in society while the majority of its members desire to improve their situation individually, within the framework of the existing society, by leaving the ranks of their class. This truth is reinforced when the proletariat does not recognize itself as a stable social class with its own group interests and its own value system in conflict with those of the existing social order. The impulse toward a total transformation of society does not arise easily in a community of immigrants who have just changed their social and political status and who are still living in conditions of high social mobility. This does not mean that the Israeli working class cannot become a revolutionary force in the future; it merely implies that today political activity inside this class cannot proceed from the same assumptions and expectations as apply in a classic capitalist country.

If the uniqueness of the Israeli working class consisted only in the fact that it was composed mainly of immigrants, then it could still be assumed that through time and patient socialist propaganda it would start to play an independent, possibly revolutionary, role. In such a situation, patient educational work would not differ much from similar work elsewhere. However, Israeli society is not merely a society of immigrants; it is one of settlers. This society, including its working class, was shaped through a process of colonization. This process, which has been going on for 80 years, was not carried out in a vacuum but in a country populated by another people. The permanent conflict between the settlers' society and the indigenous, displaced Palestinian Arabs has never stopped and it has shaped the very structure of Israeli sociology, politics, and economics. The second generation of Israeli leaders is fully aware of this. In a famous speech at the burial of Roy Rutberg, a kibbutz member killed by Palestinian guerrillas in 1956, General Dayan declared:

We are a settler generation, and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree or build a house. Let us not flinch from the hatred enflaming hundreds of thousands of Arabs around us. Let us not turn our head away lest our hand tremble. It is our generation's destiny, our life's alternative, to be prepared and armed, strong and harsh, lest the sword drop from our fist and our life cease. [2]

This clear evaluation stands in sharp contrast to official Zionist mythology about "making the desert bloom," and Dayan brought this out by going on to say that the Palestinians had a very good case since "their fields are cultivated by us in front of their very eyes."

When Marx made the famous statement that "a people oppressing another cannot itself be free" he did not mean this merely as a moral judgment. He also meant that in a society whose rulers oppress another people the exploited class which does not actively oppose this oppression inevitably becomes an accomplice in it. Even when this class does not directly gain anything from this oppression it becomes susceptible to the illusion that it shares a common interest with its own rulers in perpetuating this oppression. Such a class tends to trail behind its rulers rather than to challenge their rule. This, furthermore, is even truer when the oppression takes place not in a faraway country, but "at home," and when the national oppression and expropriation form the

very conditions for the emergence and existence of the oppressing society. Revolutionary organizations have operated within the Jewish community in Palestine since the 1920s and have accumulated considerable experience from such practical activity; this experience provides clear proof of the dictum that "a people oppressing another cannot itself be free." In the context of Israeli society it means that as long as Zionism is politically and ideologically dominant within that society, and forms the accepted framework of politics, there is no chance whatsoever of the Israeli working class becoming a revolutionary class. The experience of 50 years does not contain a single example of Israeli workers being mobilized on material or trade-union issues to challenge the Israeli regime itself; it is impossible to mobilize even a minority of the proletariat in this way. On the contrary, Israeli workers nearly always put their national loyalties before their class loyalties. Although this may change in the future, this does not remove the need for us to analyze why it has been so for the last 50 years.

A third crucial factor is the ethnic character of the Israeli proletariat. The majority of the most exploited strata within the Israeli working class are immigrants from Asia and Africa. [3] At first sight it might appear as if the reduplication of class divisions by ethnic divisions might sharpen internal class conflicts within Israeli society. There has been a certain tendency in this direction, yet the ethnic factor has worked mainly in the opposite direction over the past 20 years.

Many of the immigrants from Asia and Africa improved their standard of living by becoming proletarians in a modern capitalistic society. Their discontent was not directed against their condition as proletarians but against their condition as "Orientals," i.e., against the fact that they were looked down upon, and sometimes even discriminated against, by those of European origin. The Zionist rulers have taken measures to try to fuse the two groups together. But, in spite of these, the differences remained clear and in fact were growing. [4] In the mid-sixties, two-thirds of those doing unskilled work were Orientals; 38 percent of Orientals lived three or more people to a room, whereas only 7 percent of those from Europe did so; and in the Knesset only 16 of the 120 members were Orientals before 1965 and only 21 after it.

So, then, why doesn't Israel succeed in "integrating" its Jewish society and improve the working skills of the Oriental Jews? The answer lies in the nature of the Israeli state: With the expansion of the economy, a great demand was created for skilled workers. The obvious way to meet this demand would be either to launch a massive campaign for educating the large number of unskilled and semi-skilled Oriental Jews, or else to recruit Jewish skilled workers from abroad. The dynamics of both capitalism and Zionism lead to the second solution, thus perpetuating the inferior position of Oriental Jews in Israeli society.

Besides the general tendency of capitalist societies to maintain the prevailing class divisions, it is cheaper in this case to import skilled workers than to create them at home. Moreover, aside from the intrinsic value of Jewish immigration to Israel from the Zionist point of view, a massive upward movement of Oriental Jews could create a problem for Zionism at the same time: Namely, the vacuum created in the unskilled and semi-skilled working class could only be filled by Arab labor, who would then dominate the vital sectors of the Israeli proletariat. This, of course, would not be tolerated by the Zionist leadership. [5] Thus, there is no doubt that as long as Israeli society remains capitalist and purely Jewish, the ethnic divisions are largely going to correspond to the class divisions.

However, such social divisions and differences are interpreted by the Orientals in ethnic terms; they do not say, "I am exploited and discriminated against because I am a worker," but "I am exploited and discriminated against because I am an Oriental." Furthermore, in the present context of colonial Israeli society, the Oriental workers are a group whose equivalent would be the "poor whites" of the USA or the Algerian *piéd noirs*. Such groups resent being identified with Arabs, Blacks, and natives of any kind, who are considered "inferior" by these settlers. Their response is to side with the most chauvinist, racist, and discriminatory elements in the establishment; most supporters of the semi-fascist Herut Party are Jewish immigrants from Asia and Africa, and this must be borne in mind by those whose revolutionary strategy for Israeli society is based upon a future alliance of Arab Palestinians and Oriental Jews, whether on the basis of their common exploited condition or on the basis of their cultural affinity, a result of the Oriental Jews having come from Arab countries. All this said, it is important to take note of periodic waves of bitterness which sweep the Oriental-Jewish community. The most important of these were the short-lived violent protest in Haifa immediately before the Suez war in 1956, and the movement which started before the June 1967 war. It revived in 1970 with the creation of the Israeli Black Panther group. It is encouraging that these Black Panthers have begun to understand some aspects of the connection between their plight and the Zionist-capitalist nature of Israel.

ISRAELI SOCIETY is not only a settlers' society shaped by a process of colonizing an already populated country, it is also a society which benefits from unique privileges. It enjoys an influx of material resources from the outside of unparalleled quantity and quality; indeed, it has been calculated that in 1968 Israel received 10 percent of all aid given to underdeveloped countries. [6] Israel is a unique case in the Middle East; it is financed by imperialism without being economically exploited by it. This has always been the case in the past: Imperialism used Israel for its political purposes and paid for this by economic support. Oscar Gass, an American economist who at one time acted as an economic adviser to the Israeli government, recently wrote:

What is unique in this development process ... is the factor of capital inflow ... During the 17 years 1949–65 Israel received \$6 billion more of imports of goods and services than she exported. For the 21 years 1948–68, the import surplus would be in excess of 7.5 billion dollars. This means an excess of some \$2,650 per person during the 21 years for every person who lived in Israel (within the pre-June 1967 borders) at the end of 1968. And of this supply from abroad ...only about 30 percent came to Israel under conditions which call for a return outflow of dividends, interest or capital. This is a circumstance without parallel elsewhere, and it severely limits the significance of Israel's economic development as an example to other countries. [7]

Seventy percent of this \$6 billion deficit was covered by "net unilateral capital transfers," which were not subject to conditions governing returns on capital or payment of dividends. They consisted of donations raised by the United Jewish Appeal, reparations from the German government, and grants by the United States government. Thirty percent came from "long-term capital transfers"—Israeli government bonds, loans by foreign governments, and capitalist investment. The latter benefits in Israel from tax exemptions and guaranteed profits by virtue of a Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments [8]; nevertheless, this quasi-capitalist source of investment came far behind the unilateral donations and long-term transfers loans. In the entire period from 1949 to 1965, capital transfers (both forms taken

together) came from the following sources: 60 percent from world Jewry, 28 percent from the German government, and 12 percent from the United States government. Of the unilateral capital transfers, 51.5 percent came from world Jewry, 41 percent from the German government, and 7.4 percent from the United States government. Of the long-term capital transfers, 68.7 percent came from world Jewry, 20.5 percent from the United States government, and 11 percent from other sources. During the 1949–65 period, the net saving of the Israeli economy averaged zero, being sometimes +1 percent and sometimes –1 percent. Yet the rate of investment over the same period was around 20 percent of the GNP. This could not have come from within because there was no internal saving within the Israeli economy; it came entirely from abroad in the form of unilateral and long-term capital investments. In other words, the growth of the Israeli economy was based entirely on the inflow of capital from outside. [9]

Since 1967, this dependence on foreign capital has increased. As a result of the changed Middle Eastern situation, military expenditure has risen. According to the Israeli minister of the treasury, in January 1970 military expenditure was estimated as 24 percent of GNP for 1970, which was twice the US ratio in 1966, three times the British ratio, and four times that of France. [10] This has placed an additional strain both on internal sources of investment money and on the balance of payments, and has had to be met by a commensurate rise in capital inflow. In 1967-68, three "millionaires' conferences" were called in Israel; foreign capitalists were invited to join in increasing the inflow of capital and foreign participation in industrial and agricultural projects. In September 1970, the Israeli minister of the treasury, Pinhas Sapir, returned from a three-week money-raising tour in the USA and summed up the situation at that time:

We set ourselves the aim of raising \$1,000 million from world Jewry in the coming year, by means of the United Jewish Appeal and the Israel Development Bonds campaign sponsored by the Jewish Agency. This sum is \$400 million higher than that raised in the record year of 1967 ... During the recent visit to Israel of the US financial research team we explained to them that even if we succeed in raising all that we expect from the United Jewish Appeal and the Israel Development Bonds campaign we shall still be millions of dollars short of our requirements. After summing up our requirements in arms we informed the United States that we shall need \$400-500 million per year. [11]

It thus appears that the dependence of Israel on the United States has changed significantly since the 1967 war. Fund raising among Jews all over the world (by cashing in on their sentiments and fears) no longer suffices to support the enormously increased military budget. The rough average of \$500 million from fund raising has now to be doubled, and on top of this the United States government has been asked to provide directly an additional \$500 million. It is obvious that the readiness of the United States government to forward these sums depends on what it gets in return. In the particular case of Israel this return is not economic profit. [12]

British capital has also been developing close ties with Israel. [13] Twenty percent of Israel's imports comes from Britain, and trade has nearly doubled since the June war. British Leyland participated with the Histadrut (who have a 34-percent holding) in bus production, and with private Israeli capital in car and jeep production.

The increased participation of foreign capital in Israel has led to certain changes within the economy itself, which have also been carried out under the increased pressures set off directly by the level of military expenditure. The economy has been made more "efficient" by American capitalist standards: Taxes have been reformed, investment conditions "liberalized," and army generals sent to US business schools

and then put in charge of industrial enterprises. In the period 1968-69, there was a compulsory wage freeze, and some public enterprises were even sold off to private capital—for instance, the 26 percent state share in the Haifa oil refinery.

This influx of resources from abroad does not include the property which the Zionist establishment in Israel took over from refugee Palestinians as "abandoned property." This includes land, both cultivated and uncultivated; only 10 percent of the land held by Zionist bodies in pre-1967 Israel had been bought before 1948. It also includes many houses, and completely deserted cities like Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramleh, where much property was confiscated after the 1948 war.

THE ENORMOUS influx of capital did not come into the hands of the small Israeli bourgeoisie, but into the hands of the state, of the Zionist establishment [14], and this establishment has been under the control of the bureaucracies of the Labor parties since the 1920s. This has determined the way in which all inflowing capital, as well as conquered property, has been put to use. Funds collected abroad are channeled through the Jewish Agency which, with the Histadrut and the government, forms part of the triangle governing institutions. All the Zionist parties, from Mapam to Herut, are represented in the Jewish Agency. It finances sections of the Israeli economy, in particular the non-profitable parts of agriculture like the kibbutzim, and it also distributes funds to the Zionist parties, enabling them to run their newspapers and economic enterprises. The funds are divided according to the votes cast for the parties at the previous election, and this system of subsidies enables the Zionist parties to survive long after the social forces that created them have disappeared.

Historically, the purpose of this system was the strengthening of the colonization process, in accordance with the ideas of the Zionist Labor parties, and the strengthening of the grip which the bureaucracy itself had over Israeli society. This has proved successful, since not only is the Israeli working class organizationally and economically under the complete control of the Labor bureaucracy, but so too is the Israeli bourgeoisie. Historically, the bureaucracy has shaped most of the institutions, values, and practices of Israeli society without any successful opposition from within, and subject only to the external constraints imposed by imperialism and the resistance of the Arabs. Most of this enormous inflow of resources went into immigration projects and the housing and employment necessary to cope with the inflow that raised the Jewish population from 0.6 million in 1948 to 2.4 million in 1968.

This process was accompanied by relatively little personal corruption, but by a lot of political and social corruption. The influx of resources had a decisive effect on the dynamics of Israeli society, for the Israeli working class shared, directly and indirectly, in this transfusion of capital. Israel is not a country where foreign aid flows entirely into private pockets; it is a country where this aid subsidizes the whole of society. The Jewish worker in Israel does not get his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living which does not correspond to the output of that society. The same obviously applies to the profits of the Israeli bourgeoisie whose economic activity and profit making is regulated by the bureaucracy through subsidies, import licenses, and tax exemptions. In this way, the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker, but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies.

WHAT POLITICAL circumstances enabled Israel to receive external aid in such quantities and under such unparalleled conditions? This question was answered as early as 1951 by the editor of the daily paper Ha'aretz:

Israel has been given a role not unlike that of a watchdog. One need not fear that it will exercise an aggressive policy towards the Arab states if this will contradict the interests of the USA and Britain. But should the West prefer for one reason or another to close its eyes one can rely on Israel to punish severely those of the neighboring states whose lack of manners towards the West has exceeded the proper limits. [15]

This evaluation of Israel's role in the Middle East has been verified many times, and it is clear that Israel's foreign and military policies cannot be deduced from the dynamics of the internal social conflicts alone. The entire Israeli economy is founded on the special political and military role which Zionism, and the settlers' society, fulfill in the Middle East as a whole. If Israel is viewed in isolation from the rest of the Middle East there is no explanation for the fact that 70 percent of the capital inflow is not intended for economic gain and is not subject to considerations of profitability. But the problem is immediately solved when Israel is considered as a component of the Middle East. The fact that a considerable part of this money comes from donations raised by Zionists among Jews all over the world does not alter its being a subsidy by imperialism. What matters is rather the fact that the United States Treasury is willing to consider these funds, raised in the United States for transferring to another country, as "charity donations" qualifying for income tax exemptions. These donations depend on the good will of the United States Treasury and it is only reasonable to assume that this good will would not continue were Israel to conduct a principled anti-imperialist policy.

This means that although class conflicts do exist in Israeli society, they are constrained by the fact that the society as a whole is subsidized from the outside. This privileged status is related to Israel's role in the region, and as long as this role continues there is little prospect of the internal social conflicts acquiring a revolutionary character. On the other hand, a revolutionary breakthrough in the Arab world would change this situation. By releasing the activity of the masses throughout the Arab world it could change the balance of power; this would make Israel's traditional politico-military role obsolete, and would thus reduce its usefulness for imperialism. At first Israel would probably be used in an attempt to crush such a revolutionary breakthrough in the Arab world; yet once this attempt had failed, Israel's politico-military role vis-?-vis the Arab world would be finished. Once this role and its associated privileges had been ended, the Zionist regime, depending as it does on these privileges, would be open to mass challenge from within Israel itself.

This does not mean that there is nothing for revolutionaries inside Israel to do, except sit and wait for the emergence of objective external conditions on which they have no influence. It only means that they must base their activity on a strategy that acknowledges the unique features of Israeli society, rather than one that reproduces the generalizations of the analysis of classic capitalism. The main task for revolutionaries who accept this assessment is to direct their work toward those strata of the Israeli population who are immediately affected by the political results of Zionism and who have to pay for it. These strata include Israeli youth, who are called on to wage "an eternal war imposed by destiny," and the Palestinian Arabs who live under Israeli rule. [16] These strata share an anti-Zionist tendency which makes them potential allies in the revolutionary struggle inside Israel and the revolutionary struggle throughout the Middle East. Anyone who follows closely the revolutionary

struggles within the Arab world becomes aware of the dialectical relationship between the struggle against Zionism within Israel and the struggle for social revolution within the Arab world. Such a strategy does not imply that activity within the Israeli working class should be neglected; it only implies that this activity too must be subordinated to the general strategy of the struggle against Zionism.

Editorial Note

1*. Written by Moshe Machover and Akiva Orr.

Footnotes

1. Statistical Yearbook of the Israeli Government, 1969.
 2. Moshe Dayan, in *Davar*, May 2, 1956.
 3. The vast majority of those who immigrated before 1948 were of European origin; between 1948 and 1951 the proportions were about equal; and since then the majority of immigrants have come from outside Europe. By 1966, only half of the Israeli population were of European origin.
 4. See Statistical Yearbook (Jerusalem), 1969.
 5. "There is a great danger in employing large numbers of [Arabs] in the Israeli economy, one which has nothing to do with security: They are a time bomb ... Some branches of the economy are already becoming dependent upon Arab labor from the occupied territories, and Jewish workers are abandoning whole sectors of the economy." (Haim Gevati, Minister of Agriculture, in *Yediot Aharonot*, May 20, 1970.)
 6. *Le Monde*, July 2, 1969.
 7. *Journal of Economic Literature*, December 1969, p.1177.
 8. This law was passed in 1959.
 9. These figures are taken from *The Economic Development of Israel*, by N. Halevi and R. Klinov-Malul, published by the Bank of Israel and Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. The category "other sources," included under "long-term capital transfers," has been omitted from the figures for both long-term and unilateral transfers taken together.
 10. Professor D. Patienkin in *Ma'ariv*, January 30, 1970.
 11. *Yediot Aharonot*, September 30, 1970. Out of a total of \$1,034 million US military aid to foreign countries, excluding Vietnam during 1970, Israel received \$500 million.
 12. Early in December 1970, Sapir presented the budget for the period 1970-71; 40 percent was devoted to military purposes. This included: the purchase of arms, partly covered by the \$500 million promised by Nixon; the development of the arms industry and of military research; and the everyday costs of national security operations.
 13. See *Why this nation does buy British*, *The Times* (London), March 28, 1969.
 14. The term "Zionist establishment" is that conventionally used in Israel to denote the ruling group present in the interlocking set of Zionist institutions.
 15. *Ha'aretz*, September 30, 1951.
 16. The opposition movement in Israel, particularly among high school students, was discussed in Akiva Orr's *Israel: Opposition grows*, *Black Dwarf*, June 12, 1970.
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Chapter 6 The Left in Israel [1*]

The left-wing parties existing in Israel today were all founded before the establishment of the state. Apart from splinter groups that enjoyed a brief existence before joining another party, no new left party has been formed since 1948. In order to understand these parties, it is necessary to analyze their history prior to 1948. This history, with the exception of the Communist Party, is the history of the Zionist left; i.e., the history of a nationalist left.

All Zionist parties, from the rightist Herat (Freedom) to the leftist Mapam (United Workers Party), whatever their enmity in the political arena, are members of the Jewish Agency. This agency is the organizational backbone of Zionism. One of its primary activities is fund raising among Jewish communities all over the world. (Although we do not possess exact figures, it is not an exaggeration to say that it raises sums on the order of \$112 million annually.) This money finances all Zionist activities; a considerable part goes to subsidize the Israeli economy – mostly in the agricultural sector, the kibbutzim, etc. Another part finances the various Zionist parties.

In Tsarist Russia and Poland during the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, Russian Jews participated actively in all anti-Tsarist parties – Social Revolutionary, Menshevik, Bolshevik and others. Martov and Dan, Radek and Zinoviev, Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg are a few of the revolutionaries of Jewish origin who participated in the revolutions of 1905, February 1917 and October 1917. (These revolutionaries were, of course, anti-Zionist.)

The percentage of Jews among the revolutionaries was always greater than their percentage in the population. This was the result of several factors:

1. Jews tended to concentrate in urban areas,
2. a large Jewish proletariat existed in Poland (mostly in the textile industry),
3. there was a large Jewish intelligentsia in Russia, and
4. the Jews were oppressed by the Tsarist regime not only as proletarians, but also as a national minority.

The persecution of Jews gave rise to social and economic interests which eventually gave birth to a number of political parties. A whole spectrum of left-wing parties came into existence, all seeking to alleviate the plight of the Jews as proletarians as well as members of a (national) minority group. The main difference between these parties was between Zionists (a minority) and non-Zionists.

The largest of these parties was the Bund (Fraternity). This was basically a Social Democratic party of the Second International which, under the conditions of Tsarist Russia, was driven to the revolutionary side. The Bund never aimed at acquiring political power, only at improving the lot of the Jewish proletariat. Lenin waged a long ideological struggle against the Bund, insisting that the proletariat must be organized on a territorial basis (i.e., all proletarians living and working in the same region or country, irrespective of their nationalities), whereas the Bund claimed that existing circumstances of national persecution forced the Jewish proletariat to defend its rights as a national minority, especially since considerable numbers of the Polish proletariat participated in anti-Jewish riots. The Bund, however, never accepted the Zionist principle that only in an independent national Jewish state could the Jewish proletariat be free. The Bund was nationalist, but not Zionist.

When Hitler exterminated East European Jewry, the Bund was exterminated too. Remnants still exist in the United States, Latin America and Canada, however, as a result of mass immigration of Jewish proletarians in the first decades of this century. Ber Borochov, the leading ideologist of the Zionist left [1], contested the ideas of the Bund as well as those of Lenin. Following Borochov's "Theory of Steps," the Zionist left preached and practiced emigration. After a period of training and indoctrination recruits were sent to Palestine, mostly to the agricultural settlements. Ben-Gurion, Eshkol, Lavon and many other prominent Zionist socialists who later became leaders in Israel came from these left Zionist parties. Some of these groups continue to exist today – Habonim (the Builders, affiliated with Mapai) and Hashomer Hatzair (Young Guardians, affiliated with Mapam).

There was sharp conflict between the left Zionist parties and those that sought to transform their own societies. Holding to the Zionist ideology, they upheld the principle that no transformation of society can ever overcome anti-Semitism and considered the persecution of national minorities to be a permanent feature of mankind (a view the revolutionaries strongly opposed). Politically, they diverted many people from participating in revolutionary politics by advocating emigration to Palestine.

Today the primary division in Israeli politics is between the Zionists and non- or anti-Zionists. The division into right and left is of secondary importance, both subjectively and objectively.

The division inside the Zionist left is a family affair. Once, there was a considerable gap between the Social Democrats (Mapai) and those who considered themselves revolutionaries (Mapam), but in the last decade it narrowed so much, and the whole political spectrum of the left shifted so much to the right, that ideological and political feuds have all but given way to a squabble for economic benefits.

Mapai (Palestine Workers' Party) has, for the last three decades, been the central party in Israeli politics. Originally it was a Social Democratic party advocating gradual and peaceful transition to socialism. About two decades ago it dropped this aim in order not to antagonize the United States, on whose direct and indirect support Israel depends for its existence. Of the three major power structures in Israel (the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut and the official government), Mapai has always held the largest representation in the first two and hence also in the third. Its main asset is the fact that it is in power. Its voters are mostly people who might lose their jobs, salaries, health insurance or even homes by voting otherwise.

Mapam is the second largest party of the Zionist left. It was formed in the 1940s as a united bloc, of which the most important element was Hashomer Hatzair. It is torn between nationalist Zionist practices (e.g., expropriating fellahin, as in the case of the village Biri'm in 1952) and internationalist slogans. This is reflected in the slogan that appears in the heading of Mapam's daily paper, *Al Hamishmar* (The Guardian): "To Zionism, Socialism, and Friendship between Nations." The order is significant. Whenever Mapam was forced to choose between Zionism and socialism, or between Zionism and internationalism (and this happened quite often in Palestine), it has chosen Zionism – justifying the choice by reference to the "uniqueness of the Jewish case." One must keep in mind that the internationalism of a party like Mapam has to be tested not by its policies toward the United States, but first of all by its policies and practices toward the Palestinian Arabs.

On paper Mapam supports socialism, the USSR, Cuba and the people of Vietnam. Once in a while it organizes a demonstration; but the nearer the issues come to Palestine, the more nationalistic it becomes. Mapam supported the Suez campaign to

the fullest, its ministers stayed on in Ben-Gurion's Suez Cabinet and justified (as they still do!) the Israeli aggression. Later, when Ben-Gurion was forced to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, Mapam organized mass demonstrations against the withdrawal, insisting on annexation. Mapam refuses to recognize the Palestinian Arabs' right to self-determination or the right of the Palestinian refugees to repatriation. Recently it went so far as to oppose a UN proposal to hold a referendum among the refugees to find out whether they prefer restitution payment to repatriation. In Israeli politics Mapam does not play an independent role but instead follows the lead of Mapai, sometimes reluctantly but always submitting in the end. It does, however, play a significant role in presenting Zionism to socialists and left-wing intellectuals abroad. Mapam publishes a special periodical in English (New Outlook) for the West; Israeli ambassadors to Eastern European countries like Poland or Yugoslavia are often Mapam leaders, while for negotiations with right-wing elements the government sends a right winger; delegates to Afro-Asian conferences are often dark-skinned Jews.

Mapam is often thought of in connection with kibbutzim, although most other parties (including the extreme rightist Herat and the religious parties) run a few kibbutzim of their own. On the kibbutz, a communal agricultural settlement whose members join voluntarily and are free to leave at any time, the land belongs to the Zionist organization, as do the means of production, but it is donated to the kibbutz. All labor is carried out communally; decisions on policy, development, investment, election of officers, etc. are made by the general meeting of all members. These elements of "free socialism" have fascinated many intellectuals and socialists in the West, and are much advertised by Mapam all over the world. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals some basic flaws:

(1) The kibbutz is usually a one-party affair. People voting Communist were expelled from kibbutzim of Hashomer Hatzair and those voting Mapam from kibbutzim run by Mapai, etc. There is little political tolerance on the kibbutz.

(2) The kibbutz is part of a whole ideological setup, namely, "From the Commune to Communism." Let us fill the country with kibbutzim (communes), the refrain goes, and eventually the majority of the population will live communally and the economy will switch over, too – i.e., there will be a peaceful transition to communism. Reality has proved this to be a fallacy. All the kibbutzim are in debt to the government; private firms and the banks. Without constant subsidies from Zionist organizations they would be unable to exist. Fuels fertilizers, water, electricity, machinery have to be bought outside the kibbutz, and kibbutz products have to compete on the market with goods produced by others – sometimes by Arab fellahin. In short, the kibbutz has proved to be economically unfeasible and must be kept alive by private enterprise.

(3) Faced with this reality, many kibbutzim have turned to industrialization, at first processing their own agricultural products and then gradually moving into other fields such as plastics, crockery, furniture and a host of other light and medium industrial products. But the small population of the kibbutz (normally only a few hundred) cannot provide the labor force for both agriculture and industry. Since giving up agriculture would mean betrayal of the principles of Zionist socialism, the kibbutzim have been forced to employ hired labor from nearby towns. Thus the communal kibbutz society becomes a communal exploiter of labor. Usually the kibbutz members act as overseers in their factories while the hired men do the less professional jobs. When work is over, the hired men go back to town. For them the kibbutz is an employer like any other capitalist, except that capitalists don't preach socialism. At present about half of the workers in kibbutz enterprises are hired from the outside.

(This does not include hired labor in enterprises jointly owned by several kibbutzim with or without other owners.) [2]

When a strike occurs in a kibbutz factory, the owners do not hesitate to call in the police.

The slogan "From Commune to Communism" has proved doubly false. It did not bring about a transformation of Israeli society to socialism, let alone communism. Instead, the communes themselves were transformed from phalansteries into collective exploiters, profiting from hired labor. The history of the kibbutz (indeed the history of the whole Zionist left) is the history of a social democracy corrupted by nationalism and the harsh realities of capitalist economy.

A point often overlooked is the significance of the kibbutz for Zionist colonization. A spirit of pioneering, collective, organized labor, a social structure especially suited to absorb newcomers, to defend itself, to carry out (through great personal sacrifice) unprofitable economic tasks in order to establish the Zionist presence in hostile areas – these are the reasons why Zionist institutions financed the kibbutzim, whether they belong to Mapai, Mapam, Herat or the religious parties.

Though the kibbutzim have played a significant Zionist role, today only slightly more than 3 per cent of the Jewish population is involved in them. [3] The Zionist left contains another organization whose importance, power and wealth exceed by far that of all the kibbutzim together. This is the Histadrut, which owns a giant industry, banks, shipping, airline companies, the largest construction firm and the largest health insurance system in Israel (there is no national health insurance). In short, it controls a major piece of the Israeli economy. One out of every three Israelis pays membership fees to the Histadrut (those who do not lose their health insurance). Ninety per cent of the Jewish workers are members of trade unions that are run by Histadrut.

Although the Histadrut calls itself a federation of workers, thus calling up the familiar image of a federation of trade unions, it is unique in its aims and its structure. Its Zionist characteristics outweigh by far its trade-unionist ones, and go back to its early days some four decades ago.

When the first Zionist socialists came to Palestine, they discovered that most of the previous Jewish settlers (noticeably in the colonies established by Baron Edmund de Rothschild before the founding of the Zionist organization) employed Arab labor. How, they asked, was it possible to transform the Jews into peasants and workers when Jewish landowners and capitalists preferred to employ Arabs? As an answer they launched the kibbutzim movement and, somewhat later, the Histadrut. Moreover, they started a nationalist campaign against Jews employing Arab labor. "As Zionists you ought to create a Jewish working class in Palestine," they cried, "and not employ Arabs." All through the 1920s and '30s their slogan was "Jewish labor," and they terrorized both Jewish employers and Arab workers.

The main instrument of this campaign was the Histadrut. The organization was "for Jews only," as the name (General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel) in Hebrew clearly stated. Arab workers were not accepted as members. Jewish workers were called upon to make sacrifices, work harder, earn less for the sake of establishing and strengthening the Jewish state. When the capitalists complained that Jewish labor was more expensive than Arab labor, the Histadrut often paid the difference out of its own funds. With other Zionist organizations it launched a "Buy Jewish" campaign and implemented a boycott on Arab products. When some socialist Zionists feebly objected to this negative policy toward Arab workers, they were reminded that Arab workers were unorganized and it was the duty of a trade union to fight against employment of unorganized labor.

It is not often that the Histadrut behaves like a trade union. It does not defend the class interests of the Jewish workers, but rather calls upon them continually to make sacrifices for the sake of the state. The membership card of every Histadrut member reminds him of his duties, not the least important of which is to teach Hebrew to new immigrants – hardly a task for a common trade union, but typical for a nationalist organization. The Histadrut is probably the only trade union that has a "Department for Trade Unions," necessary because its activities as owner and employer outweigh its activities as a trade union. Actually the Histadrut owns the trade unions much as it owns the health insurance program. In many unions Histadrut officials appoint union officers. Where they are elected, they must first be approved by Histadrut officials before they can be recognized by the employers as official representatives.

As an extra precaution, all membership fees (amounting to about 7 per cent of the income of a member) are collected directly by the central organization; local unions receive their allotments from the central authorities. In this way the Histadrut maintains firm control over the entire Israeli working class. When an "unauthorized" strike occurs, the strikers find themselves without a strike fund, facing the possibility of losing their jobs (if the employer happens to be the Histadrut itself) and sometimes – as in the 1951 seamen's strike – up against every element in the country that the Histadrut can mobilize against them. The only analogue to such a state of affairs is, paradoxically, an "unofficial" strike in a Stalinist regime where in the same way the strike comes into conflict with the official ideology, challenges the foundations of the "Establishment" and often causes the regime to mobilize all its resources (including sometimes the Army) to swiftly crush the strikers. Usually the strikers are very surprised by such a reaction because they are rarely aware of the hidden implications of their action, and only meant to defend their economic interests, which the trade union had failed to do. Considering that the Histadrut is the largest employer in Israel and, simultaneously, the "federation of trade unions," it is easy to see that it has enormous power. It is a state within a state, the backbone of Israeli society and economy. Historically, it is the legitimate father of the state of Israel, as socialist Zionists claim. It preceded the state and by means of its policies created a Jewish working class.

Whoever controls the Histadrut, controls Israel, and Mapai has controlled the Histadrut for thirty years. It is not an accident that the most influential premier in Israel's history, Ben-Gurion, was one of the Histadrut's founders and at one time its secretary-general. Levi Eshkol and other leaders such as Lavon and Namier all have similar ties to it. The right wing of Zionism has never achieved significant power. It has never constructed an organization that could approach the Histadrut in power and has never even mounted a serious challenge. Only the state itself has enough potential power to constitute a threat, but a struggle between the state administration and the Histadrut would require either a schism in Mapai or an election victory for the right. Considering the enormous resources, both financial and political, of the Histadrut, the right has a very slim chance in any electoral contest. A military dictatorship by generals of the Mapai (which consolidated its control of the Army during Ben-Gurion's regime) is a more likely possibility.

The question of whether the Histadrut can be transformed from within into a revolutionary tool or at least a normal trade union, or whether it must be overthrown like any other institution of the existing Zionist state apparatus before any essential change can occur, has been a serious problem for revolutionary-minded Israelis.

Even the Israeli Communist Party has failed to rise to the challenge. The CP vehemently rejects any suggestion of a struggle against the Histadrut, recognizing it

as purely a trade union and refusing to acknowledge its essentially Zionist character. The Communists have even opposed the establishment of a national health insurance (which Ben-Gurion, as Premier, tried to organize in order to transfer some power from the Histadrut to the government) because they see this as transferring an asset from the working class (i.e., the Histadrut) to the bourgeoisie (i.e., the government). Of the three Zionist socialist parties – Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labor) and Mapam – none advocates revolution. Mapai ceased talking about socialism a decade ago, sometimes muttering to Social Democrats or trade unionists from abroad that Israel is "of course" a free socialist society. In order to demonstrate this, visitors as a matter of routine are taken to some kibbutz. They are normally convinced. John Foster Dulles, of course, was not taken to a kibbutz when he paid a visit to Ben-Gurion.

Mapai is viciously anti-Soviet, supported French imperialism in Algeria, supports the United States in Vietnam and initiated as well as actively participated in the Suez campaign. It is the mainstay of Zionism in Israel. The struggle between its two factions – Ben-Gurion and some of his followers split off in 1965 – is a family affair, neither ideological nor political.

Achdut Ha'avoda split off Mapai over personal and ideological trifles. It hardly differs from Mapai in its foreign or domestic policies, but since it runs a few kibbutzim and is financed as an independent Zionist party, it can go on vegetating.

Mapam is the traditional left extreme of Zionism. At one time it advocated a revolutionary ideology, and for the unique case of the Jewish community in Palestine, peaceful coexistence between classes until a Jewish state could be created. As it happened the state came into existence, the revolutionary ideology dissipated, the peaceful coexistence remained.

Mapam advocates friendship with the USSR and denounces US imperialism. In Zionist and Israeli issues of defense, labor, etc., it trails behind Mapai and occasionally utters leftish noises. When it happens to be outside a coalition government the reason is usually not that it opposed some Mapai policy so strongly that it refused to join the coalition, but simply that it preferred different partners. It refuses to join a "Popular Front," which the CP has repeatedly suggested, on the grounds that the CP is non-Zionist. (Recently, however, one faction of the CP crossed the ideological barrier into Zionism.) On the other hand, Mapam has never considered the anti-socialist policies of religious or right-wing Zionist parties an obstacle to coalition in the Jewish Agency or the government.

The main role assigned to Mapam is to mobilize the good will of socialists and left intellectuals in the West for Zionism.

Outside the Zionist camp entirely sits the Israeli Communist Party, Rakah. The history of the Israeli CP (as yet unknown to most of its present rank and file) is the history of its splits over the question of Jewish-Arab relations. It has been torn between Zionism and Arab nationalism ever since Stalin imprinted his nationalist policies on the Communist movement.

The CP was born out of a split that occurred during the 1922 conference of the Zionist Workers' Party. At issue was whether to join the newly formed Communist International or the Zionist Congress. Those who chose Zionism (Lavon) eventually became leaders of Mapai. Those who chose communism later founded the Palestine Communist Party (PGP). Some of these leaders such as W. Averbuch were deported by the British in the twenties and thirties to Russia, where most of them were exterminated by Stalin.

The difficulties of the CP can be summed up briefly. The founders of the party, the cadres, were Jewish immigrants from Russia and it was on the Russian experience that then-ideology and politics were based. The very fact that they had arrived in Palestine meant that at some time or another they had been Zionists. When they realized that they were part of a nationalist, colonialist society that constituted a minority in Palestine and had little sympathy for their internationalist, anti-imperialist policies, they directed their efforts toward recruiting Arab members and influencing Arab society. But there was not much more opportunity to spread internationalist, socialist, revolutionary ideology in the Arab community than there had been in the Zionist. Not only did they have little knowledge of Arab language, history, customs, etc., but under the impact of Zionism the Palestinians became more nationalistic and fell under the influence of reactionary religious leaders.

Faced with the reality of two hostile, nationalistic communities combating each other by mass movements (general strikes, rebellions, armed underground organizations, etc.) which the CP could not ignore, it was forced to shape a policy toward two conflicting nationalist movements. In 1936, it supported the Arab rebellion; in 1948, it approved the establishment of the state of Israel. On both occasions it suffered a split.

The last split occurred in 1965, again on the issue of policy toward Arab nationalism and Israel. The Mikunis-Sneh faction (Maki), whose membership is 100 per cent Jewish, has undertaken to criticize the policies of Arab nationalist leaders with regard to Israel. It objects to identifying Israel as an ally of imperialism, accepts the facts established by Zionism as final, accepts the territorial status quo and undertakes "constructive" criticism of Israeli policies. It considers any fundamental critique of Zionism irrelevant. It justifies the 1967 war as a "struggle for survival" and refused to vote against the annexation of East Jerusalem. This faction relieves Mapam of its duties as the extreme left of the Zionist camp. Maki is tired of being unpopular and is trying to become "respectable," hoping in time to be accepted as the mediator between the Zionist establishment and the USSR (which, however, prefers to deal with the Zionists directly). Although it has usurped the official daily paper of the party and its name, Maki, it hardly has any influence in Israel.

The other CP faction, the Vilner-Tuby group, known as Rakah, continues the old line and refuses to be modernized. It is reluctant to criticize Arab nationalist reactionary tendencies since it considers this to be the duty of Arab internationalists. It maintains the earlier "unconstructive" criticism of Israeli policy. It does, however, insist (like the Mikunis-Sneh) on "transforming the Histadrut from within." (The Vilner-Tuby group is the only party that voted against the 1967 war and later against annexation of East Jerusalem. But the courage displayed in these moves is a poor substitute for independent, revolutionary policies.)

Both factions vie for recognition from Moscow; both denounce Peking; both are headed by old Stalinists who pursue Stalinist policies without, alas, the guiding hand of Stalin. The Communist parties are clearly and irrevocably caught between two antagonistic nationalisms. One part leans toward Jewish nationalism, the other toward Arab. Both factions fail to recognize that Zionism is the major cause of the Israeli-Arab conflict but they cover this up by referring to the "right of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine to self-determination." The CP has always recognized the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and of the refugees to repatriation. Yet, following Moscow, it opposes changes in the territorial status quo, thus sanctioning annexations made by Ben-Gurion in 1948. Suppose that these rights were granted and the self-determined Jewish state chose Zionism (as happens to be the case). What then? The CP has no answer.

The Left Since The June War [4]

The June 1967 war and the situation prevailing in Israel since then have vindicated our main thesis on the Israeli left: namely, that the deepest division in Israeli politics is not between left and right, doves and hawks, but between Zionists and anti-Zionists. This was highlighted by the fact that on the eve of the war, on June 1, a "national unity" government was formed.

The "socialist" Mapam – which translated and published Lenin's works in Israel and founded the communally most devout kibbutzim – shared its ministerial portfolios with Herat, which in the 1930s openly called itself fascist and in 1948 was responsible for the massacre of two hundred Arabs in Deir-Yassin.

Not only did Mapam join the national unity government, it later supported the annexation of East Jerusalem. Its members settled in semi-military kibbutzim in the "liberated territories" and on newly confiscated land near Latrun, where villages were razed to make room for the new settlements. At the time demonstrations were held to protest the confiscation of land to allow Jewish settlement in Hebron, Mapam leader Yaakov Hazan declared, "Everyone who demonstrated against the settlement of Jews in Hebron is a traitor to the nation." The Mapam leadership also condemned the demonstrations around the Goldmann affair and called them "subversive." In short, Mapam's internationalist principles exist only for foreign consumption. In Israel, there has never been a single instance of Mapam voting against a decision taken by its senior partners on matters of Zionist policy or on military questions.

One of the most striking examples of Mapam's methods of reconciling its principles with its real politics occurred just prior to the October 1969 elections. The Alignment, a bloc of workers' parties led by the Labor Party and including Mapam, adopted a platform that included support of Zionist colonization in the occupied territories. Mapam objected to that point and insisted that its objection be mentioned in the platform. The Mapam leadership would have none of this. Finally, what Ha'aretz on September 12 called "an honorable way out" was found: The disputed point would remain in the platform and be binding on all parties, including Mapam, to the Alignment; Mapam, however, would be permitted to speak publicly against that particular point.

Mapam's record in defending the interests of the Israeli workers is on a par with its record regarding the Palestinians. This workers' party frequently makes noises about the rights of workers, but it has voted with the other parties in the Knesset and the Histadrut for anti-labor laws and policies. A recent example of this hypocrisy occurred on June 18, 1971. During the intensive strike wave that encompassed so many industries, but mostly in the government sector, Ben Moshe, Mapam's secretary general, declared that the government should not use anti-labor laws and the Emergency Regulations to "solve" the problem of striking workers. An editorial in Al Hamishmar warned that "It is a dangerous illusion to believe it possible to break justified social struggles of the workers by decrees and State laws." [5] On the same day, Shem-Tov, the Minister of Health and Mapam's representative in the government, signed "restriction orders" for the non-medical staff of government hospitals, thus breaking the staffs' walkout by using the Emergency Regulations and forcing the striking workers to return to work under threat of criminal charges and prison terms.

The reality that the political differences among the various socialist groups had practically disappeared was formally acknowledged when, in 1969, the Israeli Labor Party was formed through a union of Mapam, Achdut Ha'avoda and Ben-Gurion's Rafi. This new Labor Party then proceeded to form a bloc with Mapam, the extreme left of

Zionism. The permanent conflict with the Arab world forces Zionism to depend increasingly on imperialism, and this creates a permanent pressure shifting the Zionist left to the right. On its long road from its origins in the Russia of 1905 the Zionist left has one by one shed its slogans of revolution, socialism and anti-imperialism. Each shift to the right leaves behind it a splinter group loyal to the abandoned slogan.

The latest offspring of this kind is Siah (Israeli New Left). It was formed after the 1967 war by members of Mapam and Maki who were opposed to their parties' collaboration with the Dayan-Eshkol-Begin bloc, and their main emphasis is on the lack of a peace initiative in Israeli policy.

Siah has a general commitment to a none-too-well defined leftist ideology and it attempts to identify in style and tactics with the world-wide "new left". It has attracted a number of young people whose experience of profound discontent with Israeli society as a whole has led them to criticize sharply many aspects of government policy, but who at the same time have not yet been able to transform this uneasy consciousness and criticism of particular policies into an understanding that these policies are an inevitable consequence of Zionist theory and practice. Siah spokesmen are generally anxious to clearly differentiate themselves from new left attitudes in one crucial respect. Everywhere in the advanced capitalist world the new left has revived the old and honorable slogan "The enemy is at home"; but Siah is much more concerned with national security. Its leaders characterize the June 1967 war as a "justifiable defensive" war and attempt to base their opposition to annexation of the occupied territories precisely on the ground that the war would have ceased being defensive if Israel had annexed the conquered areas. This remarkable logic demonstrates clearly the basic Zionist commitment of Siah. Its leaders try to find arguments opposing a specific Zionist policy which do not question the fundamental moral presupposition of Zionism – that Jewish settlers had and still have a right to dispossess an Arab population in order to form an exclusively Jewish society and state.

The editor of one of their publications recently stated:

"Our struggle to change the image of Israeli society and to consolidate a peace policy must be based, whatever happens, on principled and consistent affirmation of the state of Israel and of the Zionist principles on which it is founded. Any departure from this will lead Siah astray from the aims it set itself when it was founded." [6]

If Siah has any future at all, it will probably be to play the historic role of Mapam – an "extreme left wing" of the Zionist movement.

Another critical group that formed after the June war was the Movement for Peace and Security. It was formed by a group of professors and young faculty members at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, among whom were the philosopher Y. Bar Hillel, the historians Y. Talmon and Y. Arieli, and A. Levantin of the Law School. They sought to counteract the influence of the Greater Israel Movement, whose dream was an Israel stretching from the Euphrates to the Nile, and to develop forces of moderation. They opposed total annexation of the occupied territories, but not one of them came out in favor of immediate withdrawal.

In the 1969 elections, they formed the nucleus of the Peace List, headed by two young professors, C. Yatziv and S. Vogel, and by N. Yalin-More, who before 1948 had been the commander of the Stern Gang, and later, a co-thinker of Uri Avnery in the Semitic Federation group. The Peace List failed to win even a single seat in the Knesset, and this defeat at the polls, combined with sharp chauvinist attacks, led to a quick decline. Some of their leaders succumbed to the temptation to prove themselves "good patriots" by joining the defamation campaign against the ISO. The Peace and Security

Movement regained some lost ground during the Goldmann affair, but its activity has since consisted of little more than placing a few ads in newspapers that oppose certain government policies such as the confiscation of Arab land in Hebron to build a Jewish settlement

Despite the Peace and Security Movement's somewhat critical stance, it is firmly within the Zionist camp. In fact, its leaders are the first to insist on this and they loudly declare their Zionist loyalty. None of them is for total and immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the organization supports the Rogers peace plan.

A group with more influence in Israeli politics is Uri Avnery's Ha'olam Hazeh-Koach Hadash (New Force Party). Avnery's list won two seats in the Knesset out of 120 in the 1969 elections. Ha'olam Hazeh, which Avnery edits and publishes, is one of the largest circulation magazines in Israel, and his views have influenced a sizable section of the leftist and liberal press in the West. Avnery's book *Israel Without Zionists – a Plea for Peace in the Middle East* has brought his views to a substantial English-speaking audience. In it, Avnery voiced some criticisms of Israeli policies and presented his alternative – the Semitic union.

Typical of Avnery's approach to politics are certain differences between the English and Hebrew editions of his book. An exact translation of the Hebrew title would be *The Seventh Day's War*. And while the English edition ends with a long quotation from Ecclesiastes "... A time for war and a time for peace ..." and Avnery's comment: "The time for peace is now," the Hebrew edition contains an epilogue absent from the English – appropriately entitled "Glory to the Israeli Army."

Despite the anti-Zionist noises that sometimes emanate from Avnery, he is a nationalist. "Nationalism will reign supreme in our generation in all the countries of the region," Avnery assures his readers, "and nothing will stop it ... I am a Hebrew nationalist and I want to deal with Arab nationalists." [7]

Avnery's position on certain concrete political questions – his position at the time, not as he recalls it years later – may give some insight as to how he might really "deal with Arab nationalists." While in his book, Avnery piously refers to the "1956 Sinai war to which we strongly objected," [8] in an editorial written nearly a year before the 1956 war he entoned: "The war is facing us and its eyes are red and hot ... It is our duty to annihilate the fighting forces of our strongest adversary – Egypt – before it is too late." [9]

And immediately after the Israeli regime had followed his advice, when the United States was putting pressure on the Zionist state to withdraw from its newly occupied territories, Avnery vigorously opposed evacuation of the Gaza Strip, arguing, "From a political standpoint the absorption of Gaza will strengthen the State enormously ... It will solve part of the refugee problem, which, serves as the main instrument for defaming Israel abroad." [10]

Avnery's reaction to the preparations for the June 1967 war was somewhat different. Shalom Cohen, Avnery's co-editor and the other member of the Knesset's New Force Party, argued that war against Egypt would not really be to Israel's advantage. [11] But once the national unity government launched the war, Avnery became one of its militant supporters. Today he characterizes it as a "defensive war," [12] and he voted in the Knesset for the annexation of East Jerusalem. In his book, Avnery evokes his Semitic federation scheme as justification for that vote:

"Jerusalem as a unified city would become the federal capital, as well as the capital of both states, thus finding a solution – the only practical one, I believe – to an issue

charged with emotions, both religious and nationalist, which make retreat for either side impossible." [13]

Today, Avnery attempts to evade the entire issue of Zionism. He explained, for example, in a speech before the Knesset:

"We live ... in the post-Zionist era. Zionism with its glorious achievements and its mistakes belongs to the past. It was the scaffolding for building the State, and now there is a new reality, there is a State. I speak in the name of a post-Zionist movement, post-Zionism, not anti-Zionism, because you cannot be anti something that belongs to the past" [14]

Nonetheless, even in the most basic matters, Avnery's post-Zionism is strikingly like the old Zionism. He complains, for example, that the Zionist establishment is not effective enough in encouraging young Jews to immigrate to Israel, and he insists that his approach is far more efficient. When he speaks to students in Paris, Rome and New York, he explains, he appeals to them: "Come to Israel and help us build a society that we like." [15]

Avnery's Semitic federation envisages the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

"In the present circumstances," Avnery writes, "it would mean that the government of Israel would offer the Palestinian Arabs assistance in setting up a national republic of their own, this offer being conditional upon a federal agreement between such a Palestine and Israel. The Palestinian Republic would comprise the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. Trans-Jordan could join it if its inhabitants were able and willing to decide."

Having thus graciously granted the Palestinians "their" territory, Avnery goes on to describe the character of the independence of this Palestinian state:

"The federal agreement," he writes, "should be preceded by an economic, political and military pact. It should safeguard the military security of Israel by forbidding foreign armies to enter the territory of Palestine, guaranteeing this in a practical way by a system of military coordination between the armies of Israel and the Arab republic of Palestine on the lines of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. It should unify the economy of the area, which had been one economic entity from the dawn of history to 1948, including the two hundred years of the Crusader States ..." [16]

This, for Avnery, constitutes self-determination for the Palestinian people. In reality, such a solution would be equivalent to the South African Bantustan "solution" to the problems of relations between whites and Africans. Avnery cannot deny that this danger is inherent in his Semitic federation. But, he argues, it is a danger that would be actualized only if an anti-Arab regime should exist in Israel. A regime headed by Uri Avnery, he seems to be assuring his reader, is a necessary and sufficient condition for averting this danger. In view of this Israeli nationalist's record, it is not surprising that very few Arabs find his assurances convincing.

From the beginning Avnery was an enthusiastic supporter of the Rogers "peace initiative," which does not recognize the Palestinians as a national group, but merely as refugees, and which implied the physical annihilation of the Palestinian guerrillas, particularly the leftists among them. He applauded King Hussein's attempts to liquidate the fedayeen, and greeted acceptance of the Rogers plan by the parties involved as a "great courageous and revolutionary step." [17]

Although from time to time Avnery has questioned the arbitrary manner in which Israeli military authorities deal with Arabs, he has never upheld the elementary democratic principle that a human being is to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty. The furthest he has ever gone is to propose that before a military commander

signs an order of administrative detention, there should be – not a trial – but a "clarification" procedure presided over by a judge. [18]

Part of Avnery's solution to the refugee problem involves allowing Palestinians to return – but only in numbers equal to that of Jews emigrating from the USSR so that "the general character of Israel will be preserved." [19]

In brief, all these so-called left-wing and radical parties stand together in their basic adherence to Zionism. None of them demands the de-Zionization of Israel. None demands immediate and complete withdrawal from the territories occupied since June 1967. For all of them the June war was a defensive one. It is very appropriate that at the moment when most liberal and left-wing opinion in the world expressed its profound suspicion of the US-inspired "peace" efforts in the Middle East, these groups all heartily welcomed the American initiative.

Editorial Note

1*. The first part of this chapter consists of a document submitted for discussion among the members of the ISO in January 1968. The second part, written in September 1971, discusses developments since the 1967 war. It should be noted that at the time the first part was written, the Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda parties, which united to form the Labor Party, were still distinct organizations.

Footnotes

1. For a critical discussion of Borochov's theory, see Borochovism, Chapter 9.
 2. Source: New Outlook, May 1971 (Tel Aviv).
 3. Or approximately 100,000 kibbutz members in 1971; Ibid.
 4. The remainder of this chapter was written in Sept 1971.
 5. Hamishmar (the Mapam daily newspaper), June 18, 1971.
 6. J. Amitai, editor, in Siah, No.5, Aug. 1970.
 7. Israel Without Zionists, New York: Macmillan, 1968, p.210.
 8. Ibid., p. 16.
 9. Ha'olam Hazeq, Dec. 12, 1955.
 10. Ha'olam Hazeq, Dec. 26, 1956.
 11. Ibid., May 24, 1967. Cohen split from Avnery on personal grounds in 1971.
 12. See, for example, Ha'olam Hazeq, Supplement, Dec. 3, 1969.
 13. Israel Without Zionists, p.188.
 14. Ha'olam Hazeq, July 15, 1970.
 15. This proclamation of Avnery's own effectiveness in stimulating Jewish immigration is contained in the same speech that defines the post-Zionist epoch and movement
 16. Israel Without Zionists, pp.187-88.
 17. Ha'olam Hazeq, Aug. 12, 1970. This may be the only time the US initiative has been called "revolutionary."
 18. Ibid., June 17, 1970.
 19. Ibid., June 3, 1970.
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Chapter 7 The Histadrut: Union and Boss [1*]

Israeli workers might seem to be in an enviable situation, since the Histadrut gives the impression of being a progressive and powerful workers' union. From a certain viewpoint the Histadrut and its facilities are indeed quite exceptional: It has 1.1 million members out of a total population of nearly 3 million; a quarter of Israeli wage earners work in concerns belonging to the Histadrut; and for many years the Histadrut accounted for around 22-25 per cent of the Israeli Net National Product.

The Histadrut was founded in 1920 during a general congress of Jewish workers and until 1966 was known as the General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel. The number of Jewish workers in Palestine in 1920 was around five thousand, while there were around fifty thousand Arab workers, according to the estimate of a Zionist historian. [1]

The founders of this "General Federation," who were all inspired by Zionist ideology and who mostly were members of Jewish petit-bourgeois parties, limited membership in the Histadrut exclusively to Jews, and to Jews living on the fruits of their labor – workers, artisans, tradesmen and self-employed workers. When the basic principles of the Histadrut were being laid down, the founders made it clear that "national interest" took priority over "economic interest" and "cultural interests." The internationalist approach to the class nature of society was never brought up at the Histadrut's founding congress. A year after its foundation, the Histadrut created its first enterprises. These were a large company, Solel Boneh, dealing with public works, and the Workers' Bank, the latter in association with the World Zionist Organization. (In recent years Solel Boneh has been engaged in construction jobs in several parts of the world; for example, it has built luxury hotels in certain African countries and has constructed roads and military installations in several Asian countries, including US air bases in Turkey.) The fact that from the start the Histadrut made Zionist interests its primary concern, at the expense of its trade-union role, has led to an extremely hierarchal organizational structure. Such bureaucratic machinery was set up that the entire organization of the trade union was subordinated to the management and to the political bosses – who were always from Zionist parties. There has never been the least trade-union independence in the Histadrut. [2]

The Histadrut was not merely concerned with its role of maintaining Jews in national isolation while they were living in an essentially Arab milieu. Since its creation it has been at the spearhead of Zionist colonization in Palestine. Its choice position among the country's Zionist colonizers and its extremely strong organization made it a pioneer in agricultural colonization and in securing jobs for Jewish workers, by evicting and excluding Arab peasants and workers. The Zionist slogans of the twenties and thirties – "the Conquest of Work" and "the Conquest of the Land" – found their principal realizers in the Histadrut.

In 1960, the general secretary of the Histadrut, Pinhas Lavon, summed up the historical role of the Federation:

"The General Federation of Workers was founded forty years ago by several thousand young people wanting to work in an underdeveloped country where labor was cheap, a country which, rejected its inhabitants and which was inhospitable to newcomers. Under these conditions, the foundation of the Histadrut was a central event in the process of the rebirth of the Hebrew people in its fatherland. Our Histadrut is a

general organization to its core. It is not a workers' trade union, although it copes perfectly well with the real needs of the worker." [3]

Being "general to its core," the Histadrut has effectively become the central force of the Jewish community in its many aspects. It organized the Zionist armed forces, sometimes in collusion with the British occupation, and sometimes secretly against British wishes; it created a system of social security, the only one in existence in Israel, which has become an important weapon in the domination of the Jewish masses and the organization of the workers under the authority of the Histadrut; it has opened recruitment offices everywhere, thus reinforcing its domination, while at the same time regulating the right to work; it possesses its own school network, its own promotion societies and its own production and service co-operatives; as an organization it completely dominates the kibbutzim and collective farms of the whole country. It is not for nothing that the Histadrut was considered the central pillar of the Zionist enterprise from its beginning, or as the Zionists say, "the state in embryo."

The Histadrut leadership decided the political line of the Jewish community, both in Jewish affairs and in its relations with the British occupiers and the Arab masses. The political leaders of the state of Israel – David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir – have all come from the ranks of the Histadrut

It was not until 1943, the end of the British Mandate period, that the Histadrut established a special department for Arab workers; its aim was to organize them within a paternalistic and puppet framework, so as to divert them from the political struggle – i.e., from the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggle. The experiment was summed up at the time by a Zionist historian specializing in Arab questions and a Histadrut member:

As national feeling develops among the [Arab] workers their opposition to those who want to organize them from the outside is becoming stronger. The most intelligent and dynamic among them never had an opportunity to show their talent and initiative. A pamphlet in Arabic [published by the Histadrut] explains that one should only be concerned with the economic interests of the Arab workers to the exclusion of all political activity. This condition is difficult for people who are aware and close to public life to accept. The conception of work and the conquest of work held by the majority of the Histadrut is equally an obstacle, since it is difficult to explain things convincingly to an Arab worker. The discrimination in salaries between Jewish and Arab workers exasperates the Arabs, particularly since working conditions and price levels tend to be equal. In these circumstances it was easy for Arab organizations to send us their members to ask "naive questions" at the time of the May Day demonstration – "Is proletarian solidarity compatible with a call for the conquest of labor, and for the creation of the Jewish state?" [4]

No Zionist has ever been able to answer that question.

After the 1948 war and the nationalization of Arab lands that followed, there was further disintegration of the remaining Arab peasant society. But since it was next to impossible to expel the entire Arab population, what to do with them became one of the major dilemmas of Israeli policy. The problem has become even more pressing since the 1967 war, which greatly increased the number of Arabs under Israel's jurisdiction. Thus, while hungrily biting into chunks of Arab land, Zionism cut deeply into its own fingers.

In order to survive, the landless Palestinian peasants were compelled to join the lowest ranks of the Israeli urban working class. [5] And since there is no objective way to banish them from these lower echelons, the Histadrut was assigned the role of controlling their penetration into urban labor. The Histadrut did so by assuring

employers that the gap between Jewish and Arab wages would not be allowed to widen too much (thus keeping Arabs in direct competition with Jews for the same jobs). [6] For this reason – and by its own admission – the Histadrut changed its name from Federation of Hebrew Workers to Federation of Workers, thereby allowing Arabs to join. The 1969 Histadrut Yearbook commented with reference to the post-1967 situation:

"Many Arab construction workers were absorbed through the Labor Department [of Histadrut] or succeeded in penetrating various places of work for lower wages than the official West Jerusalem wage. Infiltration of the Arab laborer to various branches of the economy is facilitated by the reduction of wages and constitutes a problem which calls for a speedy solution before it becomes uncontrollable ..."

Further, the Yearbook noted,

"The feverish activity [strikes, etc.] in which the Arab teachers were engaged ... led to a quick organizing effort of the teachers' federation [part of the Histadrut] ..."

Evidently, the Histadrut brought the Arab laborers under its strangle hold in order to stem their infiltration into the Jewish economy and nip in the bud any organizing effort that might be taking place. This was a crucial role for the Histadrut to play in implementing Zionist policies toward the Arab population. In addition to this activity, however, the Histadrut has not ignored its role toward the working class as a whole.

With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the integration of the Histadrut into the ruling Zionist system became more evident. The economic sector of the Histadrut, with its business concerns and its immense wealth, forms part of the public sector, whose development had to accelerate with the arrival of new immigrants, at the same time that capital was flowing into the new state. According to the theory propagated for decades by Histadrut leaders, the Histadrut economic sector was supposed to be the foundation for the building of socialism. Another widespread notion was that the Histadrut economic sector belonged to the workers. Both of these popular notions collapsed with the coming of independence. The Minister of Agriculture Haim Gvati, who is one of the principal leaders of the Histadrut, had to admit during the 1964 conference,

"We have not succeeded in transforming this immense wealth into socialist economic cells. We have not succeeded in maintaining the working-class nature of our economic sector. Actually there are no characteristics to differentiate it from the rest of the public sector, and sometimes even from the private sector. The atmosphere, work relations and human relations of our economic sector are in no way different from any other industrial enterprises."

The attitude of Israeli workers toward the Histadrut complements and illustrates this observation. The 1966 Histadrut Yearbook underscores the point:

"A very considerable number of workers are hardly aware of the Histadrut's trade union activities, and they believe that nothing would change if there were no union."

The Yearbook reports the results of a poll taken by the organization which indicates that a growing number of workers feel that the shop sections (called workers' committees) of the union should be independent of the federation. Twenty per cent of the wage earners said that strikes broke out in their shops despite Histadrut opposition; 47 per cent thought that in some cases it was a good thing for workers to strike without Histadrut authorization. The Yearbook continues,

"The conclusions drawn from the poll concerning the opinion of the action committees [workers' committees formed in opposition to Histadrut officials to lead wildcat strikes and job actions] are still more serious. While 8 per cent of the workers reported that strikes had occurred in their plants in opposition to the shop section, 29

per cent felt that there were cases in which strikes not authorized by the shop section were justified. In short, the tendency to break with the established order is getting stronger." (Italics added.)

The same publication discloses that the majority of Histadrut members believe that the rank and file do not have any influence over the central authority. And among the minority who do believe that ordinary members can exercise some influence, there are still many who think this influence is insufficient.

Histadrut leaders, industrialists and members of the government are now openly expressing their concern over what they call the workers' "crisis of confidence" in the Histadrut. This crisis is deepening from year to year. It is, moreover, the reason for the change in the Histadrut top leadership in 1969, when Secretary General Aharon Becker was replaced by Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, who is known for his vigorous rhetorical style and his habit of "talking the workers' language." Both the previous secretary general and the new one are members of the ruling Labor Party.

The strike waves throughout 1971 demonstrated to the Labor Party that the workers of Israel will not be contained and their energies not absorbed into the machine which attempts to speak their language. Thus, in October 1971 the ruling Labor Party, ratified a Labor Relations Law establishing the Histadrut's monopoly as the legal representative of the workers. In addition, the law renders all "unauthorized" strikes illegal. As could be expected, Mapam fully co-operated with the Labor Party in agreeing with these measures.

There is at present no party in Israel unburdened by national responsibility and Zionist ideology which could become the political expression of a working-class struggle. There are only two exceptions: Rakah, the pro-Soviet Communist Party, and the ISO. Rakah is in an ossified position concerning the class struggle; it regards the Histadrut as the proper framework for conducting it. Its perspective is one of purifying, improving and changing the confederation from within. The ISO, which has only limited influence, calls for the building and expansion of action committees as the road leading to the creation of militant trade unions – outside the Histadrut framework.

The other parties are entrapped in Zionist loyalties and participation in the existing power structure both at the governmental and trade-union levels. Mapam plays a special role in this context. At the outset of many workers' struggles in the past, Mapam adopted a militant attitude in its attempt to gain support among the workers. Then after negotiations with the Histadrut leadership, Mapam would suddenly call on the workers to return to their jobs, dampening the struggle under the slogan "We must know how to end a strike." But since the June 1967 war, when national Zionist unity reached new heights, Mapam has gradually ceased to play this safety-valve role, and it has become more and more difficult to differentiate it from the Labor Party.

During the short history of workers' struggles in Israel, there have been three important series of strikes. The first occurred in 1951, relatively soon after the creation of the state, with the famous seamen's strike. Then, in 1962, a series of wildcat strikes occurred in the wake of the devaluation of the Israeli pound. The third wave took place in 1969 when the postal workers and dockers struck at the port of Ashdod.

The seamen's strike was the most violent in Israeli history. The battlefield was immense: from the port of Haifa to all the Israeli ships in foreign ports. The strike was led by young sailors with no trade-union traditions, and the conflict concerned methods of electing union delegates by the sailors. It is not surprising to anyone who understands the nature of the Histadrut that all its resources were immediately

mobilized against the strikers. In die strike wave of 1962, the action committees appeared on the scene for the first time in any significant way. The two sides once again were clearly delineated: the Histadrut on one side of the barricades, the workers on the other. During this period the first abortive attempts were also made to bring the action committees together on a national or at least regional level. The strikes of 1969 were a clear message to the government and the employers that despite wartime conditions and national unity, strikes were still possible. The postal workers' strike saw the government, in agreement with the Histadrut, use military induction orders to force the strikers to return to work. The strikers broke the law and were indicted, but the cases have never come to trial. The Ashdod dockers' strike was characterized by another feature. The Histadrut threatened to bring the local trade-union militants before an "internal tribunal," but the militants resisted and were supported by the dockers. The trial opened in the presence of television cameras, and it was followed with great interest throughout the country. The workers had been denounced as "Fatah agents" and "saboteurs," and the Histadrut leadership was threatening them with expulsion and consequent loss of social security protection to themselves and their families. Unmoved by the threats, the workers continued the struggle and passed from accused to accusers. The Histadrut leadership received some very bad publicity and hastened to end the spectacle without pronouncing a verdict.

Strike Activity in Israel

TABLE 1

Before concluding this brief survey of the situation of the Israeli working class in relation to the Histadrut, the international role of the organization should be mentioned. The fact that it is both an employer and a domestic labor union facilitates Israeli penetration in the Third World, where a single government party and trade union is frequently found. This penetration occurs both in Israel's own interest and in the service of a collusion of interests between Israel and imperialistic enterprises throughout the world. In 1959, Arthur Rivkin, then director of the Africa Research Project of the CIA-funded Center for International Studies at MIT, wrote,

"It is possible that the Israeli model will serve as a 'third economic force.' Israel is an alternative differing from the Western model, but certainly more adapted to the interests of the free world than is the communist model" [7]

Later, Rivkin defined Israel's role in the Western penetration of Africa even more clearly:

"Israel's role as a Third force could also be reinforced through imaginative use of the Third Country technique. A Free World state wishing to enlarge its assistance flow to Africa might channel some part of it through Israel because of Israel's special qualifications and demonstrated acceptability to many African nations." [8]

The head of the Histadrut's political department recently summarized the activities of the organization's Afro-Asian Institute:

The Institute, which was created by the Histadrut in 1960 ... is an important link in its international activity, especially in the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia. But its activity and its world renown contribute to reinforcing Histadrut's ties to other

countries and organizations. To date, the Institute has trained 1,848 delegates from trade unions and cooperatives, from institutes of higher learning, as well as high officials from 85 African, Asian and Latin American countries ... The Institute has been called upon to organize seminars in various African and Asian countries ... It was former students of the Institute, now occupying high positions in their respective countries and organizations, who took the initiative for such seminars. Up to now the Institute has organized such seminars in Nigeria (twice), Dahomey, Togo, The Ivory Coast, Liberia, Singapore, Korea (twice), Ceylon, India and Nepal. Three short seminars will be held next month for trade union militants in Cyprus, and the 1970 program includes Swaziland, Lessoto, Botswana, Zambia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea ... others will follow. [9]

George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, which finances the Afro-Asian Institute, put it this way:

"The Histadrut is a national center which has worked for the cause of democracy and liberty in the free world, particularly in Asia and Africa, through the intermediary of its Afro-Asian Institute." [10]

Editorial Note

1*. This is an edited version of an article written by Haim Hanegbi.

Footnotes

1. Joseph Washitz, *The Arabs in Palestine* (in Hebrew), Sifriat Poalim, p.151.
 2. Union dues are collected by special collection offices which the Histadrut has set up throughout Israel, and local branches receive their funds from me center, not from their local membership. This severely limits their independence. The Histadrut employs a permanent staff of 30,000 and its bureaucracy has a very tight hold on its members; indeed, the Histadrut building in Tel Aviv is known as "the Kremlin."
 3. Moed, published by the Department of Culture and Education of the Histadrut (in Hebrew), 1960, p.3.
 4. Washitz, op. cit., p. 173.
 5. See Yediot Aharonot, May 20, 1971.
 6. The Arab worker actually takes home only about half of what he earns, the remainder going to taxes and other expenses not paid by Jewish employees. See Ha'aretz, Nov. 20-27, 1971. for a detailed account of the situation of the Arab workers in Israel.
 7. *Israel and the Afro-Asian World*, Foreign Affairs, Vol.37 (April 1959), p.486.
 8. *Africa and the West*, New York: Praeger, 1961.
 9. *International Supplement for the 50th Anniversary of Histadrut (1920-1970)* (in Hebrew), Davar, 1970.
 10. Ibid.
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Chapter 8 The Emergency Regulations [1*]

The Emergency Regulations, commonly known as security laws, were inherited from British colonial law, where they were initially used by the British Government as a judicial short cut which was necessitated by the Arab rebellion of 1936. Israel incorporated them into its own law on the grounds that it had to deal with a state of perpetual warfare and security problems.

During the last twenty years, the Emergency Regulations and the police mechanism which enforces them have emerged as some of the most striking features of the Israeli political structure. There are, in fact, few states with democratic pretensions that have such laws, and all Zionist legal "justifications" of the Emergency Regulations today stand condemned by a resolution passed on February 7, 1946, by a convention of the Hebrew Lawyers' Union: "The powers given to the ruling authority in the emergency regulations deny the inhabitants of Palestine their basic human rights. These regulations undermine the foundation of law and justice, they constitute a serious danger to individual freedom, and they institute a regime of arbitrariness without any judicial supervision." Moreover, these laws contradict the terms of The Hague and Geneva conventions; thus their application in the occupied territory is illegal, since Israel is a party to these conventions. In reality, of course, as the prominent attorney H. Holzman has noted [1], Israel frequently violates these international agreements. Recently, Israel refused to approve the UN Charter of Human Rights on the ground that the UN is unfriendly to Israel.

We will try to show that the Emergency Regulations are a central feature of the Israeli political structure, for they have provided one of the crucial legal tools for the consolidation of the Zionist state since 1948. They have facilitated the expropriation of Arab land, the expulsion of Palestinians from Palestine, the regulation of Arab population movement and, of course, the repression of all moves toward political self-expression by the Arab community in Israel and the occupied territories. Together with the Law of Return they are fundamental, and it is extremely dubious that they could be completely repealed without thereby negating the basic character of the state: its Jewish exclusiveness.

The Emergency Regulations were originally enacted by the crumbling British Empire during the great Arab revolt of 1936-39, which began in Syria and Palestine and then spread throughout the Levant and into Egypt. Passed by the English Parliament and implemented by the British Palestine Mandate Government, they were the most important legal tools used in crushing the revolt.

Later, the same laws, somewhat revised, were directed by the British against the Jewish community to control Jewish immigration and restrict the Zionist acquisition of land. This, of course, explains the attack on them by the Jewish lawyers in 1946. At the 1946 lawyers' conference, D. Yosef stated: "With regard to the security regulations the question is: Will we all be subject to official terrorism?" At the same meeting, Yaakov Shimshon Shapira proclaimed: "The regime built in Palestine on the Defense Regulations has no parallel in any civilized nation. Even in Nazi Germany there were no such laws." [2] However, with typical narrow-minded nationalist hypocrisy; notwithstanding these attacks, the Emergency Regulations were incorporated into the legal system of the newly born "Home of the Jewish People," supposedly the realization of the prophets' dream of justice and equality. Thus the Zionist morality succeeded in reconciling "Nazi" methods with the prophets' dream.

Since the founding of the state, these laws have remained unchanged and, as Holzman pointed out in the interview referred to above, there is no prospect of change. Two basic features of these laws should be mentioned before presenting a more detailed description.

First, the laws authorize a local military governor or officer to order at will specific actions such as arrest, restriction of movement and destruction of homes and other personal property without any kind of trial – without even bringing any formal charges against the victims of these actions. These measures are defined as "non-punitive" precautions. If the individual does not observe the terms of the administrative decrees against him, he can then be tried and sentenced by a military court for the infraction.

Secondly, once the order is issued, there is no way to appeal it. Formally, it is true, Regulation No.119 specifies a procedure of appeal to the supreme military authority, at present Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan. Dayan, however, has admitted that he does not and will not entertain any such appeals. If he did, after all, he would have to spend all his time considering these cases and would have no time to issue the orders that give rise to them in the first place. Moreover, higher courts routinely refuse to hear appeals of court-martial convictions for infractions of the security laws. [3]

Under the Emergency Regulations, a military commander can, at his discretion and without any sort of judicial review, imprison an individual indefinitely, prohibit travel inside or outside Israel or expel an individual permanently from the country; restrict anyone to his home, locality, village or town; forbid anyone to make use of his own private property; impose police surveillance on any individual and order him to report to a police station several times a day; bar an individual from seeking work or accepting a job. Moreover, all these actions can be taken en masse, without specifying the names of the affected persons, and they can be taken against native-born citizens as well as anyone else. The commander can also confiscate or destroy whatever property he thinks fit. He can declare whole areas "closed" so that it is forbidden to enter or leave them, without even making the declaration public, and he can proclaim an unlimited curfew.

All these regulations are frequently used today, and they have been used since the establishment of the state. Except for their use in labor disputes to break strikes, they have been directed almost exclusively against Arabs. Once more, the hypocrisy and pretense are apparent: "The law says 'person'; in practice it means 'Arab'." This is the Orwellian tax that Israel pays to the concept of democracy.

For example, for many years, Jerusalem and Tiberias were "closed areas." Thousands of Jews (and tourists) went up and down and "broke the law" with impunity. But if the police saw an Arab face (they are as good at recognizing Arabs as some Nazi policemen were at recognizing Jews in Nazi Europe), they would immediately demand his identification card (to see in black and white that he was an Arab) and arrest him.

Let us now turn to the applications of these laws. What kind of order have they helped to create and maintain? In what ways? Clearly, the role they play reflects the goals and dynamics of the Zionist movement, and the Israeli state which applies them.

The primary goal of Zionism is and has always been the creation, expansion and preservation of an exclusively Jewish state in what is called "the Land of Israel" (referring to the areas in and around Palestine). A major obstacle to the Zionist aim was the simple fact that the Palestinian Arabs already lived in Palestine. After the 1948 war, the Emergency Regulations provided the legal basis for dealing with the Palestinian Arab society under Israel's control. In fact, they ensured what the founders

of Zionism always wanted, namely: "that the Jews will be granted as such those rights and privileges which will enable them to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English." [4]

During the short history of Israel, important developments and changes in the application of these laws occurred. The 1948 war saw the flight or expulsion of most of the Arab population native to territories that came under Zionist control. Immediately following the war the Regulations (together with the nationalization laws) were used to take over and confiscate most Arab land and to expel as many Palestinians across the border as possible.

The border areas especially had to be cleansed of Arabs.

"It is as simple as that: the Arabs were rounded up, taken in trucks to the nearest border, and expelled. For this reason the military commander does not have to bother with names. He simply expels everybody that he can catch, and this is legal. So the town of Ashkelon was still an Arab village in the summer of 1950 – after the war. One morning the Israeli Army of Defense came, put all the inhabitants on trucks, took them to the border of the Gaza Strip, and said, 'Uhrub! (Flee!)' ... and some thousands more refugees were added to the Gaza Strip, and the very nice city of Ashkelon could be built without Arabs." [5]

Similar cases occurred all over the place. In March 1950, the inhabitants of Batat were driven from their homes. In February 1951, the inhabitants of thirteen villages in Wadi Ara were driven across the border. In October 1953, several families of Rechnia were expelled. In October 1956, the northern tribe of El Bakava was expelled across the border into Syria. And so on. Most of these acts were reported in the Israeli press at the time they occurred.

The role of these laws in the great Zionist land grab has been openly admitted by leading Zionist spokesmen. Thus, according to Shimon Peres, "The use of Regulation 125, which served to a great extent as the basis for the military regime, is the direct continuation of the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration." [6] Ben-Gurion has made the point, if necessary, even clearer: "The military regime exists for the defense of the right of Jewish settlement everywhere." [7]

The procedure in these cases is simple. An area is selected for Jewish development or Judaization (Yehud). Under Regulation 125, the area is declared closed. This isolates the area totally from the outside world and, of course, utterly wrecks the economy of the Arab population there. Understandably enough, after a short while the people are willing to leave their homes, shops and farms "voluntarily." They are then "evacuated," and the civil authorities begin Jewish settlement and development of the area.

In some cases, like Carmiel, a fertile land was closed and the Arabs who lost their sources of livelihood were employed in the construction of a new city, near their old village. This city was then declared – using the Regulations – closed to Arabs.

In order to erect a wall around the Arab minority, to limit to the utmost its economic and cultural development in Palestine, to rob it of its sources of life – land, village, culture – in short, in order to Judaize Palestine, a whole Army bureaucracy was set up in 1949. This "military regime" resembled the present military occupation of the territories occupied during the June 1967 war.

In this way emerged a network of military governors, police stations, agents, spies, military courts and jails, and, of course, an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Within this framework all aspects of the day-to-day life of the Arab community were under the direct and arbitrary control of officers assigned by the Minister of Defense.

By the early sixties, the bureaucratic machine of this military regime had deteriorated into a corrupt tool of the Ben-Gurion-Dayan-Peres faction of the ruling Mapai Party. [8] The other factions of Mapai, as well as the other parties, were naturally anxious to neutralize this Ben-Gurion machine. After his fall in November 1963, the military regime was gradually dismantled and replaced by a civilian police apparatus to administer the laws. (The post-June 1967 occupied territories are still administered by the military.) This process was completed by 1966, but there have been no changes in the law – it is the same now as in 1948. What was heralded by Mapam and the Zionist ‘left’ as a “major improvement” was only the transfer of the enforcement authority from a special agency of the Army to that of the police force.

The only real change has been a significant relaxation of restrictions on the freedom of movement. Because of the severe shortage of unskilled labor power in Israel and the consequent need for cheap Arab labor, severe restrictions on the movements of Arabs became impracticable. As a result, most licenses for Arab workers are now issued for a period of one year or more. However, this relaxation was accompanied by an intensification of the use of the law to stifle political dissent. We will return to this point later.

Thus, the Emergency Regulations have played and continue to play a crucial legal role in carrying out the following major policy toward the Arab minority: First, the Judaization of Palestine. This phrase, used by the Israeli Government (e.g., in *Jehud Ha'Galil* [Judaization of the Galilee]), does not simply call for Jewish monopoly over Palestine as a whole, but Jewish hegemony in every part and province of the land. Secondly, implicit in this phrase is the creation of Arab ghettos. The Arabs should not be allowed to mingle with the Jewish society; rather, they should be kept at the periphery of the society in the economical, geographical, cultural and political sense.

Zionists, especially those on the left, the labor bureaucracy, understood that in order to maintain a purely Jewish society in the middle of an Arab world rich in culture, tradition and economic potential, no sector of Israeli life could be allowed to become contaminated by Arabs. The nationalization of Arab lands meant further disintegration of the remaining Arab society. Arab agriculture gives employment to no more than 4 per cent of the village dwellers. The only way open to the impoverished Palestinian peasants was to become members of the bottom ranks of the working class, primarily in Jewish cities. They became an important part of the unskilled labor force. Thus the Arab worker had to keep moving; he could not be allowed actually to settle in the Jewish city. [9]

The security laws permit the government to restrict the Arabs to their areas because a license is needed for changing one's residence, which Arabs are not granted as a rule. In fact, very few people in Israel are aware of the fact that not only are Israel's “socialist islands” – the kibbutzim and co-operative villages (moshavim) – hermetically sealed against the Arabs, but almost all Jewish cities and towns accept Arabs only as day laborers, not residents. In all of Israel there are only six towns (and one or two small villages) with mixed populations: Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Acre, Ramle and Lod. The policy of segregation is official only in a few cases (Carmiel, Arad, Eilat); mostly it is unofficial policy. Very rarely is the Israeli public allowed to hear of an Arab who is prohibited from buying a house in Tel Aviv, [10] or from establishing a quarry in Carmiel. [11]

Thus the life of the Arabs in Israel was brought under the complete control of the Jewish state. Under a normal capitalist-democratic regime this would generate considerable political dissent. Not so in Israel. In fact, the security laws are best

known for their power to stifle political dissent, to prevent any kind of organization or activity on the part of the Arab community, independent of the Zionist establishment. Beyond active attempts to buy off, bribe and corrupt the leaders of the Arab community (by offering more economic and educational state help for road and school construction, for example, in exchange for votes for a certain political party in the local election), resistance and political activity are punished very severely. The coercive means are arbitrary and vary from restriction of movement, denial of a work permit and house arrest to wholesale destruction of houses and neighborhoods. Every year curfews are imposed on Arab holy days, and the Arab community is not permitted to mourn the deaths of its leaders or commemorate Israel's massacres of its members. Even the massacre of Kaffir Kasim [12], which was officially recognized by the Israeli Supreme Court as a crime against humanity, is not allowed to be remembered in public mourning and ceremonies.

Thousands of Arabs – Israeli citizens and inhabitants of the occupied territories alike – are under administrative restriction and arrest without any charge against them or trial. Thousands of homes and entire villages were demolished (using Regulation 119 as the legal basis) for the sole "crime" of not actively collaborating with the Zionist establishment

In 1964, a number of Palestinian intellectuals attempted to found a new party (El Ard) which aimed at becoming an open, legal political expression of the Arab community. It was outlawed. Many of its active members were put under house arrest and forbidden by the Minister of Defense from engaging in any political activity whatsoever. There does not exist today a single independent, legal, exclusively Arab political organization in Israel. Even non-political Arab student organizations are under severe restrictions and their leaders are frequently arrested. [13]

Of course, there are the small Arab "parties" which are attached to the big, exclusively Jewish labor parties, but they themselves refer to these satellite organizations as "the Arab section." The Communist Party, while the majority of its members and supporters are Arab, does not regard itself and is not regarded by the Israeli-Arab community as the political expression of its national aspirations. A vote for the CP in Israel is, everyone agrees, most of the time simply a protest vote against the Zionist establishment and its parties.

Many leading Arab intellectuals have been forced to leave Israel "voluntarily." They are simply not permitted to publish or engage in any kind of group activity. Then they are informed: Rot in jail, remain under house arrest or other restrictions forever, or else leave the country. This was the "choice" offered for example, Abu Sa'id, a founding member of Matzpen, and Sabri Jeris, one of the country's leading civil liberties lawyers. Both of them "chose" to leave Palestine.

But not all do. Fawzi El-Asmar, a prominent Arab writer and poet, was under administrative arrest for two years (the authorities themselves could not agree on a charge). He was never brought to trial and the only condition offered to him for release was that he leave the land of his ancestors forever. But he vowed never to leave the country and he remains under restriction in Lydda.

Carmiel, Kibbutz-Bar'am, Upper ("New") Nazareth, Upper Hebron are all examples of exclusively Jewish settlements, which are particularly irritating to the Arabs because of the way they were established: Built on Arab land, many times with Arab labor, even renamed with a Judaized version of the original name, these places receive huge development funds and are hermetically sealed against Arabs by using the Emergency Regulations. Safed, "the Jerusalem of the Galilee," which has always been

a city of many cultures and religions, became exclusively Jewish in 1948; "no Arab need apply for residence."

The Zionists say, "But we are restoring our presence in Palestine, the Land of Israel, which was stolen from us two thousand years ago!" This farce of restoring ancient times is in reality freezing the colonial rule in Palestine, inherited by the Zionist movement from the Ottomans and the British Empire.

Editorial Note

1*. This chapter was written by Emmanuel Dror.

Footnotes

1. Interview with Holzman by M. Sadeh in *Brith-Shalom*, Apr. 1970. Cf. also Holzman's book *The Security Laws in the Occupied Territories*, Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Workers' Library), pp.77-79.

2. Yosef became Israel's first Minister of Justice; his judicial adviser was Shapira, today's Minister of Justice.

3. Holzman, op. cit., p. 20. Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court refused to hear such an appeal. (*Ha'aretz*, Sept. 4, 1970).

4. Chaim Weitzman, *Jewish Chronicle*, May 20, 1921.

5. Amitay Ben-Yona in a Letter to American Jewry, reprinted in *Arab Areas Occupied by Israel in June 1967*, Information Papers, No.1 (Sept 1970), Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., Chicago. Ben-Yona summarized from Sabri Jiryis' *The Arabs in Israel*.

6. *Davar*, Jan. 26, 1962.

7. *Divray ha Knesset* (Parliamentary Record), No.36, p.1217.

8. Corruption spread rapidly among the Jewish landlords of the newly confiscated Arab land; although the land was supposed to become Judaized, Arabs were hired to work what was once their own land. In a parliamentary debate Uri Avnery revealed: "I'm not going to mention the military governors – some of you here know their names – who finished their work as governors and turned themselves into effendis [landlords] in the area they once controlled ... These are cases of unprecedented gravity – persons who exploited their positions to obtain land in these areas where they employ people from the same military governorate and become a new landlord class." U. Avnery, the *Knesset Debate*, Oct. 31, 1966, pp.164-65.

9. See, for example, Dr. H. Rosenfeld, *The Moving Arab Worker*, Biweekly of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Feb. 18, 1970.

10. A speech by Ezer Weitzman, ex-commander of the Air Force, in *Ma'ariv*, Feb. 6, 1970.

11. *Yediot Aharonot*, Feb. 8, 1971.

12. This occurred during the Suez crisis when a curfew was imposed and the unsuspecting villagers returned from work in the fields only to be slaughtered.

13. "Many of the Arab students are under travel restrictions, and two of them are currently under administrative arrest Almost all the Arab students consider the restrictions to be the result of their objections to government policy. Very few of them can get jobs while studying." *Ha'aretz*, Nov. 27, 1970.

Chapter 9 Borochovism [1*]

In the past few years, the Zionist propaganda machine has made a strenuous effort to resuscitate the unique doctrine of "proletarian Zionism," first formulated by the Russian Jew Ber Borochov (1881-1917). A small army of functionaries is kept busy preparing new editions of this master's works in several European languages, supplying them with learned exegeses and in general delivering the rehashed gospel of Borochov to young Jews of Europe and the Americas.

At first sight, all this seems rather odd, because Borochovism disappeared as a living political force in the Zionist movement years ago. In Israel, the Borochovist Party, Po'aley Zion Smol (Workers of Zion, left) departed from the scene in 1948 when it combined with the larger, non-Borochovist groups, Hashomer Hatzair and Achdut Ha'avoda, to form the united, left Zionist party Mapam. For the Borochovists, this meant not only organizational demise but also total theoretical capitulation, since the program of the newly formed Mapam in no way represented a compromise between Borochovism and the other left Zionist tendencies; it was simply non-Borochovist.

Thus, the "revival" of Borochovism poses a triple question. Has any new historical reality emerged recently that Borochovist theory is uniquely able to illuminate and that thus lends it a renewed relevance? Secondly, who is the new audience for this Borochovist revival? Finally, why are Zionist emissaries so eager to sell this doctrine? To answer these questions, we will outline Borochov's theory and confront it with the historical reality. According to Ber Borochov, the Jews of the world constitute a single nation, and he defines a nation as "a social group that has developed on the basis of common conditions of production and ... which is, moreover, united by a consciousness of affinity based on a common historical past." [1] Further, he states that "the most general condition of production ... is the national territory," and hence the national territory is "the positive foundation" on which a nation is able to develop a national life of its own. [2] But the Jews lack this "positive foundation" because they are extraterritorial and constitute an anomalous nation. Their national existence, therefore, is determined by this purely negative factor, the absence of a national territory. Living in a foreign environment, they tend to adapt themselves to the surrounding society and assume its characteristics.

But, according to Borochov, a tendency contrary to assimilation is also produced by the absence of a national territory. Namely, because the Jews are an extraterritorial nation, they are always defeated in economic competition with their host nations. As a consequence of these defeats, the Jews are first pushed into economic sectors that have not yet been occupied by the host nation; generally speaking these are not the primary sectors of the economy (agriculture and production of capital goods) but the secondary sectors (the final stages of production and commerce). This incomplete isolation of the Jews from the host nation later gives way to total isolation, as the host nation enters into competition with them even in these secondary sectors and evicts the Jews from them. [3]

Up to this point, Borochov's analysis is not very different from that of other "socialist" Zionists and even of bourgeois Zionists like Herzl. While Borochov's general concept of "nation" is incomplete and, in particular, his claim that the Jews of the world constitute a nation is false, his theory rests on a plausible if somewhat distorted picture of the position of his contemporaries – that is, the Jews of the Russian Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But even the most fleeting confrontation of Borochov's analysis with the actual position of Jews today –

especially in Europe and the Americas, where Borochovist ideology is being disseminated most vigorously – shows that it has completely lost that plausibility.

While it is true that the Jews do tend to be concentrated in certain sectors of the economy (although not nearly to the same extent as they were in Russia at the turn of the century), they are not on the whole isolated or separated from the host nations by economic competition. Of course, capitalist competition does exist, but it does not usually assume the form of national competition between Jews and the host nations. The Jews in Tsarist Russia were confined by law to a ghetto, the Pale. A rigid quota system governed university admissions; Jews were barred by law from a number of professions and occupations. As they lost their traditional economic roles, the Jewish masses were to some degree being progressively isolated from the larger society, pushed out of it, and forced to emigrate. Today, no such process is discernible in, say, the United States, where the world's largest Jewish community lives. There, the forces of integration are much stronger than the forces of isolation.

Of course, it is possible that this process of integration will one day be reversed. The fate of European Jewry under Nazism clearly demonstrates that an advanced capitalist society which had long assimilated the Jews can under conditions of general crisis "expel" them in the most murderous way possible. But the causes of the reversal of the process of Jewish integration in Germany – and the causes of any possible reversal of this process wherever Jewish communities live today – are utterly different from those operating in pre-revolutionary Russia. There, the Jews traditionally fulfilled certain economic functions (in some crafts and commerce) required by Russian society but which the dominant Russian feudalism was incapable of fulfilling. As usually happens in such cases, relative strangers were able to find a "natural" place in that society; the Jewish community was maintained from one generation to the next in Russian society, but not as a part of it. Then, with the development of capitalism the traditional occupations of the Jews either became superfluous or were taken over by non-Jews. Moreover, in Russia – as Borochov himself states – the upper Jewish bourgeoisie adapted rather well to the new conditions. The real victims were the large majority of middlemen and small craftsmen.

But none of this has any connection with the realities of any large Jewish community in the world today. The majority of Jews live in advanced capitalist countries where only the slightest remnants of pre-capitalist relations are evident. Those Jewish communities still living in colonial and semi-colonial countries, where quasi-feudal social forms are still significant, possess a social structure that in no way resembles that of late nineteenth-century Russian Jewry. And whatever becomes of the Soviet Jewish community, it will certainly not be as a consequence of the development of capitalism in a disintegrating feudal society!

One of the crucial differences between Borochovism and other brands of "socialist" Zionism is Borochov's claim to deduce Zionism not from the dynamics and interests of the Jewish people in general, but from the interests of the Jewish proletariat. It was not sufficient for Borochov to show that the spontaneous dynamics and real interest of the largest Jewish class of his time, the lower middle class, led to Zionism.

If it were the case that the interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie and of the masses standing on the verge of proletarianization led them to territorialism, while the interests of the Jewish proletariat were not connected with territorialism, then there would be no grounds for saying that the future of the entire Jewish people is also the future of the Jewish proletariat. One should not take as the starting point the general, national future and deduce the future of the proletariat from it. On the contrary, one should start with the interests of the proletariat, and from this arrive at the future of

the nation as a whole ... From the starting point of the interests of the militant Jewish proletariat and from our view of it as the vanguard of the Jewish future, we deduce territorialism for the Jewish people as a whole. [4]

It must be stressed that when Borochov claimed that his Zionism expressed the objective movement and interests of the Jewish working class, he was not speaking about a potential or future class, but about one which actually existed. [5] The only Zionist group to hold this view with any degree of consistency was Po'aley Zion Smol. All the other factions reject this central Borochovist idea. They present Zionism as a Jewish national movement without any particular reference to class or justify Zionism as necessary for creating a Jewish proletariat – a justification which Borochov did not accept. This is one of the reasons why all these groups cannot be regarded as Borochovist, and the claims to the contrary which are made from time to time are based on theoretical confusion or intellectual dishonesty, or both.

Borochov begins his analysis of the specific conditions and interests of the Jewish working class by pointing out that "national competition" tends to isolate the Jewish worker and restrict his field of potential employment "Because of national competition among the masses that are becoming proletarianized and are seeking employment, Jewish labor is employed only by middle Jewish capital; the anti-Semitism of the non-Jewish employers and workers does not allow Jewish labor to penetrate into workshops owned by non-Jews." [6]

The effect of all this is not merely a quantitative restriction of employment "Since almost the whole of Jewish capital is invested in the production of consumer goods ... Jewish proletarianization is on a lower level than required. The exclusion of Jewish workers from heavy industry and machines is so widespread and conspicuous that the Christian workers have adopted the view that operating a machine is their own special prerogative and privilege, and they systematically forbid Jews to operate them even when the machine replaces handicraft in a branch of production where Jews are employed." [7] Thus Jewish employment was numerically restricted, confined to branches where Jewish capital was invested – i.e., non-basic branches of industry. Even within these branches it was confined to non-basic jobs. This isolation had an organizational consequence: "In the course of the development of capitalist economy, the Jewish proletariat has spontaneously organized itself in special national organizations that unite the Jewish workers separately from the workers of other nations. The special organization of the working class is a consequence of the fact that its national existence is economically special, that it is isolated." And Borochov concludes that "because the economic isolation of Jewish life is increasing, there is also an increasing need for a special political organization." [8]

On the other hand, because of the types of jobs to which Jewish labor was confined, the Jewish proletariat did not have a proper "strategic base" in its economic and political struggle against capital:

Since the Jewish proletariat is almost entirely employed in producing consumer goods, and is not active in any primary stage of the economic process, it does not hold any life lines to the economy in the country where it lives; hence its influence on the general trend of life is necessarily quite restricted. It cannot paralyze the whole economic machine at once, as can the railway workers and others whose conditions are more favorable ... Even in its most just demands it is powerless to defend itself when not supported by other, more fortunate workers. [9]

From this, Borochov deduces that a territorial solution to the Jewish problem is in the interests of the Jewish proletariat:

All these national anomalies will disappear only after the fundamental conditions of Jewish life have changed, after the Jewish people are no longer extraterritorial. When the Jews are employed in the primary branches of production and produce not only consumer goods but also means of production ... then will the class struggle of the Jewish proletariat be directed not against an impotent bourgeoisie in the Jewish economy, as it is today, but against a strong bourgeoisie which organizes production in a single country. Then the class struggle of the Jewish worker will achieve the necessary political, economic and social impact. [10]

At this point we should note Borochof's misconception inherent in the theories discussed above. The idea that the pre-revolutionary Russian Jewish proletariat needed an independent strategic base for its own class struggle was formulated by Borochof in a narrow, nationalistic context, and can lead to harmful conclusions. The proletarian struggle begins as a confrontation between worker and employer, "his own" capitalist, so to speak. At first it is conducted in relative isolation within a given industry and national or ethnic group. But the struggle assumes its true social and political significance only by overcoming these backward and narrow limitations. The task of a revolutionary working-class movement is therefore not to take the isolated struggles separately and look for another strategic base for each new struggle, but to coordinate and unite them all on the basis of the whole country, and later on the international arena.

The struggle of the Jewish workers began in the ghetto, the Russian Pale. There, it is safe to say, their strategic position was quite weak as long as the community remained isolated. Borochof assumed that isolation was necessary for the struggle to remain a confrontation between Jewish worker and employer. But in fact what the Jewish workers needed was not a separate strategic base but grounds for a common struggle involving all the workers in the community, a movement being established by the true internationalist revolutionaries.

Borochof wrote that Jewish socialists and revolutionaries could not play a significant role in the socialist revolution of the peoples among whom they lived in the Diaspora. But only six years after that, Russia was swept by her great revolution in which Jews played an important role precisely because they were not looking for a Jewish national socialism as an isolated Jewish strategic base. [11]

Borochof's "proletarian Zionism" came to harmful theoretical conclusions, but many of his factual assumptions were not imaginary; they were based on existing reality. The Jews' isolated condition, loss of traditional economic roles, their proletarianization and exclusion from non-Jewish enterprises were all part of the reality of the day. And in then-initial confrontations with the bourgeoisie in their community, they necessarily dealt only with the Jewish bourgeoisie. Thus "the Jewish proletariat" were not just empty words – they denoted a definite, distinct socioeconomic group with its own class interests.

This was the situation about sixty years ago; but what possible application can proletarian Zionism have in relation to the Jewish communities that now exist in Europe and the Americas? Today there is no Jewish proletariat in the Diaspora, which is not to say that there are no Jewish workers – there are. But no Jewish proletariat exists as a coherent social group, as it did in a segregated ghetto in pre-revolutionary Russia. A Jewish worker in Britain is a member of the working class in general, not of any "Jewish" class. To speak of the class interests and needs of the Jewish working class today, and therefore proletarian Zionism in general, is not merely incorrect, it is meaningless. This is perhaps the main reason why Borochovism has been losing its

influence within the Zionist movement: The social groups on which it bases itself and which it claims to represent have ceased to exist.

Borochov died at the end of 1917, just before Zionism began to colonize Palestine on a large scale. But during the actual process of colonization, many of his arguments and forecasts were demonstrated to be false, thereby weakening the position of his followers. There are a number of examples of this.

First, Borochov claimed [12] that the petit bourgeois Jewish masses who immigrated to the advanced capitalist countries would soon become impoverished and proletarianized. A new Jewish proletariat would emerge in those countries and would be subject to the same process of national competition and isolation as in Russia. The Jewish masses would therefore gravitate to proletarian Zionism and migrate to Palestine. This of course never happened. The Jewish immigrants in the advanced countries were not proletarianized and managed to improve their economic and social positions rather rapidly.

Second, Borochov insisted [13] that there was no need to propagandize among the Jewish workers to encourage them to go to Palestine. He repeated that Jewish capital would gravitate toward Palestine spontaneously and the Jewish workers would naturally follow it. Jewish capital did in fact find its way into Palestine (although not quite as spontaneously as Borochov supposed), but the Jewish workers did not follow it. Among those who went to Palestine were very few workers indeed; there was such a shortage of them that many people were forced to become workers there.

Third, one of Palestine's main virtues as Borochov saw it was that it was under Turkish rule. He strongly rejected the idea of Jewish colonization in any country ruled by an advanced capitalist power. In particular, he bitterly opposed colonization under a charter granted by such a power. [14] In practice, widespread Zionist colonization only started when Palestine came under British rule. And the only way in which this colonization could ever be realized was precisely the way it was: under British sponsorship, granted by charter. (The Balfour Declaration was issued a few days before Borochov died.)

Finally, in Borochov's view [15] the Palestinian Arabs (he refers to them as "natives of Palestine") lacked any culture of their own and did not have any outstanding national characteristics. "They easily and quickly adopt any imported cultural character higher than their own; they cannot unite in organized resistance against external influences, they are not capable of national competition." He therefore deduced that "the natives of Palestine will assimilate economically and culturally with whoever brings order into the country and undertakes the development of the forces of production of Palestine." [16] As for the Arab national movement, Borochov was confident that "it does not and cannot have any relation to Palestine." [17]

It is not difficult to see why this philosophy and mentality are now being resurrected by the Zionist propaganda machine, and what the reasons are for their sudden demand. This is partly so because a rough similarity exists between the present political and intellectual atmosphere in the West and that in East Europe during the birth of Borochovism. Socially and economically, the position of the Jews now and then could not be further apart; the analogy is confined mainly to the political and intellectual spheres. In both cases a major upsurge of revolutionary socialist consciousness occurred among the young. This state of turbulence, typically preceding revolutions, usually spreads first among students and the young intelligentsia, incurring a new political awareness in them and replacing the old apathy and cynicism. No alert and self-respecting young intellectual can remain indifferent to the groups that are formed, the heated debates that occur, the direct

action that is often taken; he is drawn in and must take a stand. In addition, Jews have traditionally played a prominent role in social and revolutionary movements.

Now, as in the past, young Jews find that they must make a choice between joining the revolutionary struggle where they live, or opting out of it in order to take part in the Zionist colonization of Palestine. In effect, these are two roads leading in opposite directions: socialism and Zionism. Or, theoretically, the choice lies between Marxism and a peculiar kind of nationalism. And since many of these budding revolutionaries are still tied to their petit-bourgeois class origins and remain victims of an alienated social psychology created by the circumstances of Jewish history, they can only go so far as to find a compromise in their version of socialist Zionism.

This compromise has had many variants, of which Borochovism was only one, and one which was doomed to become a dead branch of the Zionist movement. These other factions of socialist Zionism consisted essentially in an eclectic mixture of these two heterogeneous ingredients. At most, a synthesis between Zionism and socialism was spoken of, but this only emphasized the fact that their theory was a derivation of two completely different elements and premises.

As an ideology there was always something special about Borochovism: Rather than merge the two concepts superficially, Borochov attempted to deduce Zionism from Marxism. He claimed to start from a purely Marxist position and to arrive at Zionist conclusions without making any extraneous assumptions. This reasoning understandably makes Borochovist theory much more attractive to young people who want to be Zionist but already have a taste for Marxism. For Marxism by its very nature is a monist theory that does not mix well with alien ingredients. A "synthesis" consisting of Marxism and any kind of nationalism has always been unacceptable, particularly today, due to the general disfavor nationalism has fallen into – both in Marxist and non-Marxist circles.

More than ever before, socialists are unwilling to support nationalist causes unless they can be justified without making any theoretical concessions to nationalism, that is, they must be on purely socialist grounds such as wars of national liberation against imperialism.

All this serves to explain the new demand for Borochovist theory. It is the only existing brand of Zionist ideology that suits the tastes of young Jews in the West who have become radicalized and exposed to present-day socialist currents and the tradition of Marxist thought, but who at the same time are seeking a compromise between joining the revolutionary struggle and opting out of it.

There is also much to be said about the ample supply of Borochovist literature and propaganda. The present purveyors of this ideology are not Borochovists; they do not belong to a Borochovist-oriented party in Israel, nor to a Borochovist group in the Zionist movement. Such a party or group does not exist, and the professional peddlers of Borochovism have no intention of creating one. In fact, they do not believe a word of the gospel they are preaching.

During 1968, the author became well acquainted with some young people newly arrived from Latin America. They were experiencing a very painful disillusionment upon finding the realities in Israel so different from the image painted by Israeli emissaries sent to their countries of origin. One bewildering discovery was that they could find hardly a trace of the Borochovism which had been fed to them in Latin America. When one of the immigrants happened to meet that emissary who had originally indoctrinated him with Borochovism (and who had subsequently been transferred back to Israel) he was delighted at last to have found a true Borochovist with whom he could have an interesting discussion. When he eagerly raised the

subject, the emissary responded, "Oh, Borochoy, he was just a third-rate sociologist whom we merely use in Latin America to attract the Jewish youth away from Castroism!" To which my friend could only reply sadly, "And I was one of them ..."

The Zionist propagandists are prepared to use all sorts of means to attract the Jewish youth in the West away from Castroism, Trotskyism and various other "harmful" ideas and movements. And if one of the methods is to indoctrinate them with an ideology that the propagandists themselves do not believe in, the latter console themselves by assuring us that this is only a temporary measure, because "when they [the young Jews] come to us, we shall regain the initiative." [18]

Editorial Note

1*. This chapter is based on an article written by Mosh? Machover.

Footnotes

1. The Class Struggle and the National Question, in Arthur Herzberg's The Zionist Idea, New York: Temple Press Book, 1969. This anthology provides a good summary of Borochoy's ideas and includes some of his original works.

2. Our Platform (hereafter referred to as OP), p.193. All citations from Ber Borochoy are from the Hebrew editions of his works, published in 1955 by Hakibutz Hameuohad and Sifriath Poalim, in Israel.

3. OP, p.197.

4. OP, p.240 (italics added). Borochoy is referring to the proletarianization of the middle class and to the territorial solution of the Jewish question.

5. This is made absolutely clear not only in the remarks quoted above, but again in the beginning of the fifth chapter of OP, which contains a sharp and detailed polemic against rival left Zionist theories on this very point. This assertion occupies such a central position in Borochovist theory that without it the theory loses even its formal claim as proletarian Zionism, and becomes ordinary (i.e., classless or bourgeois) Zionism.

6. OP, p.204.

7. Ibid., p.203.

8. The Role of the Proletariat in the Realization of Territorialism, p.324. Originally published in Yiddish as a sequel to OP in 1907.

9. OP, pp.219-20.

10. Ibid., p.264.

11. In a carefully written letter, Chaim Weitzmann, the emerging leader of political Zionism, reported to Herzl on the situation in Russia in 1903: "The Zionist movement failed here since it did not succeed in attracting the best of the Jewish youth." He described the acute economic situation and the typical reaction of the Jews: to join the revolutionary socialist movement.

"In general, West European Jewry thinks that the majority of East European Jewish youth belongs to the Zionist camp. Unfortunately, the contrary is true. The lion's share of the youth is anti-Zionist, not from an assimilationist point of view as in West Europe, but rather as a result of their revolutionary mood.

"It is impossible to describe how many became the victims of police oppression because of membership in the Jewish Social Democracy – they are sent to jail and left

to rot in Siberia; 9,000 are under state surveillance ... and I am not speaking only of the youth of the proletariat ... Almost the entire Jewish student body stands firmly behind the revolutionary camp. This revolutionary movement has captured the spirit of the very young. During my stay in Minsk, 200 Jewish Social Democrats were arrested, all of whom were under seventeen years of age. This is a terrible vision ... and all this is accompanied by a distaste for Jewish nationalism which borders on self-hatred."

Weitzmann concluded that the Zionist movement must do everything possible to encourage and gain influence among the youth. See Ma'ariv, Mar. 3, 1971.

12. OP, Chapter 2.

13. The Role of the Proletariat ..., p. 323.

14. These arguments are discussed further in On the Question of Zion and a Territory, Chapter 9 (in Russian), 1905; see also OP, Chapter 9.

15. On the Question of Zion and a Territory, Chapter 9; OP, Chapter 8.

16. OP, p.282.

17. Ibid.

18. Ben-Aharon, A Change of Values in the Relation between Israel and the Diaspora, in Ot (Letter), No.2, Feb. 1967. Ben-Aharon is a prominent Israeli Labor Party ideologist and at present the Secretary General of the Histadrut.

Chapter 10 Zionism and Universal Ethics [1*]

Zionism by its theory and practice in regard to the Palestinians has produced a moral conflict which haunts the Israeli-Zionist establishment and its leaders. In a speech at the officers' school, Moshe Dayan quoted from the writings of Artur Rupin, "godfather" of the Zionist colonization of Palestine. It is interesting to note the passages Dayan felt called upon to cite. Dayan quoted from one of Rupin's letters of 1936 concerning the founding of Brith Shalom (Peace Fellowship): "We are aiming at relations [between the Zionist colonists and the Palestinians] which we will be able to defend against our own consciences and against the League of Nations as a just solution to the problem without renouncing the fundamentals of Zionism." [1]

So the godfather of Zionist settlement felt the need to defend himself against a stab of his conscience created by the conflict between the realization of Zionist aims and the demands of a universal humanist ethic. He found it necessary to defend himself against his feeling that he might be responsible for deeds which appeared to him contrary to that ethic, but which were, nevertheless, necessitated by his Zionist convictions.

Dayan quoted another passage from Rupin, written in 1928: "It became clear to me how hard it is to realize Zionism in a way compatible with the demands of universal ethics. I was quite depressed." The interesting point here is Rupin's guilty conscience and, even more, the fact that Dayan had to bring up the question and confront it anew in 1968. In spite of all the ideological and ethical tranquilizers which the Israeli-Zionist establishment and its intellectual camp followers cram into Israeli youth, in spite of all the historical justifications and all the sermons about Jewish identity, in spite of all the work of the machinery which molds national consciousness and national loyalty and which has, for many decades, been exerting immense pressure on Israeli minds at home, at school and in the media – in spite of all this, Zionism cannot rid itself of the demon that Rupin calls the "demands of universal ethics."

The very fact that Dayan was forced to confront this problem in 1968 in a forum such as the officers' school of the Israeli Army indicates that this same moral conflict exists to such an extent that it has become a real problem within the Army. Dayan is trying to bury the moral ghost. We doubt that Dayan or anyone will ever succeed in attempts to put national ethics above human ethics. What is of interest to us here, however, is the intensity of the moral conflict in a state which, according to the official and popular version, only a year and a half earlier was saved from the "danger of annihilation" by winning a "war for survival." Annexation of territories as a result of military conquest does not usually bring with it moral problems. Why then, do those who favor annexation need moral justification in the form of historical rights? Why can they not simply insist on ownership by right of conquest? Why, for example, in an interview with Shlomo Shmagor, was Ben-Gurion forced to ask, "Is it right for Jews to settle in Jaffa and wrong in Hebron?" [2] Whose permission does he ask? The Palestinians?

The fact that in Israel it is necessary to supply moral justification for military and political acts stems, to no small extent, from a particular feature of Jewish culture. One of the most important elements in this culture is that of social justice, where justice means humanist ethics. This culture, unlike Christianity, does not stress forgiveness; nor does it stress material incentives or honor. It denies the realism that

demands reconciliation, adjustment to objective reality, and it demands, "Thou shalt be killed rather than transgress [the basic moral laws]." Whoever seeks to justify his deeds in the name of this culture is forced to do so in the name of "universal human justice."

But this is impossible for Zionism, simply because its basic assumption – the starting point of all Zionist ideology, of the Zionist enterprise itself, and of day-to-day Israeli policy – is reconciliation with and acceptance of an immoral phenomenon. That phenomenon is discrimination against and oppression of national minorities. This is regarded as a permanent phenomenon of human society, unwanted but still understandable, since it is inseparable from human nature. Zionism does not see in anti-Semitism a problem of humanity as a whole, but an exclusively Jewish problem. It tries to solve the Jewish problem by coping with and even justifying anti-Semitism while actually reversing the situation: In the Jewish national state, the Jews are transformed from an oppressed minority into the oppressing majority. But the principle of discrimination is maintained; it is still the highest "morality" of Zionism.

Thus Zionism does not see any possibility of avoiding discrimination against the Palestinians. For example, it cannot help exclude them from the Law of Return or discourage a higher birth rate among them, to mention only two of the issues.

Zionism, in its relation both to anti-Semitism and to the Palestinians, comes into conflict with the Jewish code of universal ethics. Because Zionists sense this they must continually invent rationalizations to try to end the conflict.

This problem is, of course, not peculiar to Zionism. It exists whenever a national movement tries to place national values above human ones. It is given more weight, however, in a public educated on Jewish culture. Rupin tried to pacify his conscience in 1928 by using the argument that "the same right which entitles the Arabs to remain here, entitles us to come." Forty years later, Dayan presents the same argument to officers of the Israeli Army.

It is noteworthy that Rupin was forced to deal with his conscience by using the category of right – moral justification – and could not, for example, simply pit force against force, fact against fact. Dayan had to follow him forty years later in his attempt to bury the demon of "human rights." But, what is "right"?

For Robinson Crusoe, as long as he lived in isolation on the island to which fate carried him, there was no meaning to concepts such as "right" and "ownership." They acquired meaning only when Robinson met Friday. Human beings, living in society, use these terms to explain and justify their mutual relations in order to avoid resorting to physical violence. The concept of right can be the basis of a society only when all members conceive it as natural or self-evident. Moral rights are like mathematical axioms: They do not need justification. Robinson could insist forever that he had right of ownership on the island, but as long as Friday did not willingly agree, the concept of right could have no social role; it was superfluous. Historically, it would not yet have been invented. Robinson could, of course, force his will on Friday, but in such a situation he would have no use for such an ideological tool as the concept of right. A situation in which Robinson forced Friday to accept his will by constantly fighting and applying physical force, yet simultaneously insisting on justifying his actions by the concept of right, would become schizophrenic.

The demon of right enters Robinson's mind and complicates what for him is quite a simple situation in which he constantly applies brute force against Friday. In the absence of a psychiatrist on the island, Robinson has to make do with self-treatment. He invents explanations such as "The source of Friday's resistance is emotional, not rational"; "It may be too bad, but this is reality"; or "The development of the island

through social and economic faits accomplis will sooner or later lead Friday to accept the reality I have forced on him."

But Friday refuses to give up. He can see the facts that Robinson is creating, but he refuses to recognize them as right and just. Robinson, who was educated on "justice," arrives at the conclusion that there is some logic in Friday's claim, and says:

Well, I agree that you have rights on this island due to the fact that you have been living here for generations, and I see that the proposition "Might is right" is morally wrong. But I have historical rights to the island too, as I was taught when I was a boy and as I read in certain books. Why don't you reconcile yourself to my definition of the concept of "historical rights" on the island?

Then Friday might reply:

The fact that you've created for yourself the notion of "historical rights" and that this helps you get rid of your guilty feelings is none of my business. In reality, you force your will on me by using direct and indirect physical force, confronting me with faits accomplis. You take for yourself, and you refuse in principle to recognize my political and civil rights, which stem from my living on the island. You refuse, again in principle, to include me in the Law of Return and in the policy of encouraging a high birth rate, while at the same time you declare at the top of your voice that you give me equal rights. You have a strange definition and interpretation of the notion of "right" I cannot understand it, and I cannot accept something which I don't understand.

Robinson (to himself): "It may be regrettable, but this is the reality."

This is the classical argument of someone suffering from constant mental conflict. He tries to convince himself that the source of the conflict lies in something that is external and over which he has no control. Mental illness can become degenerative. Rupin was aware of this danger in 1928 when, after recording his "depression," he went on to ask, "Will Zionism degenerate into a senseless chauvinism? Is there no way to give the growing number of Jews a sphere of activity without robbing the Arabs?"

It is enough to look at a discussion among top leaders of the Israeli Labor Party to recognize the chauvinism, with a veneer of Zionist "rationality," toward which Zionism has pulled its executors. Shimon Peres, a member of the Knesset, argued, "To my mind the Labor Party is a Jewish-Zionist world party, not a binational Jewish-Arab party ... [Assume that] it should become a binational Jewish-Arab party while we continue to talk about encouraging a high birth rate in Israel. We get up and say, 'We only encourage a high Jewish birth rate and Jewish immigration, not immigration of Arab refugees.' We would be saying to the Arabs, 'You should vote for Jewish immigration, but you're still an equal member of the party ...' What kind of party would that be?" [3]

Such a party in Peres' eyes would be an organized hypocrisy, since he and his followers insist on justifying everything on moral grounds. But how does he propose to overcome the problem? Very simply: Refuse to accept Arab members in the Labor Party, and then encourage a higher Jewish birth rate and Jewish immigration without a guilty conscience.

Member of the Knesset Santa Yospital, for example, has a guilty conscience of the "I must not lie to myself" variety.

"The Arab question," she said, "seems to me a decisive matter. I cannot lie to myself. I cannot today regard Arabs as equal party members in all matters. I don't trust them to the extent that I'd be willing to discuss every matter with them. I hear from [Mapam leader Meir] Ya'ari that they are tactful enough to know when not to participate. I don't regard this as tact on their side but as hypocrisy on our side. In some situations

we're willing to meet with them, in some, not This is true not only in matters of security and foreign policy but also concerning immigration, birth-rate encouragement, etc. I cannot accept it." [4]

Of course, Santa Yospital doesn't see any hypocrisy in the fact that the Labor Party, cleansed of Arabs, will encourage a higher birth rate among Jews (and, possibly, discuss means of reducing the birth rate among Arab citizens of Israel). That this solution in fact eases her conscience is the moral degeneration characteristic of Zionist ideology.

To cite another instance, Ben-Gurion told Shlomo Shmagor in the interview cited above,

"It is the Jewish Agency, not the government, that should take care of encouraging a rise in the birth rate, for, since the government cannot discriminate, money would have to go to big Arab families too. There is equality in everything except immigration." [5]

This argument is a miracle of Zionist moral reasoning. If the policy of encouraging a higher birth rate were in the hands of the government, it would have to discriminate against Arab citizens. (Why? What exactly prevents the realization of equal civil rights?) Therefore, there must be a special institution which discriminates in favor of the Jews. By this formal step, the Zionists resolve the moral conflict. The problem no longer bothers their consciences; they no longer perceive in this special treatment a degeneration of the principle of equal rights. They no longer lie to themselves.

It is typical that in the same interview Ben-Gurion insists again and again that "historically, our nation survived conditions which no other people could have, and when I ask why, the answer is, a great spiritual virtue. If we lose it, I don't know whether we will continue to exist."

In no way do we share a philosophy of history with this man who, as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense at the time, bears responsibility for the massacre of Kibye in October 1953 by the Army's Unit 101, and who afterward declared on the Israeli radio, "We made a careful investigation and it was evident that not even the smallest army unit was missing during the night of Babye." [6] This statement could not be further from the truth. But the fact that Ben-Gurion can invoke the great spiritual virtue of Jewish culture without realizing that the meaning of this culture entails a universal human ethic as the sole guide to human behavior, and that in the same breath he can recommend the Jewish Agency as an instrument of discrimination in favor of the Jews so as to relieve the government of the necessity of doing so, and that he does all this without seeing any moral wrong-this is a classical example of the decay of morality of nationalist ideology.

Nationalist ideology and feeling constitute a specific form of human alienation. Human beings produce for themselves not only material things, but also languages, moralities, particular interpretations of history and social notions like nation and fatherland. None of these things comes from nature or heaven, they are continuously being created and re-created by human beings who live today. Once created, they confront their creators as objective forces and fetishes, as in some religious practices; they conquer the minds of their producers. Whether nationalism is a historically necessary form of alienation or not, once it is understood as alienation, the ground is cut from under national morality and the conflict between this morality and human ethics ceases to exist. But as long as nationalism is not perceived merely as a historical phenomenon, there is no way to resolve the contradiction between the two kinds of morality. An attempt can be made to quiet the guilty conscience by means of the

objectification Dayan uses: "This state of affairs may be undesirable, but it is the reality."

Our answer is: People have produced the social reality and it lies within their power to change it, especially if it is undesirable.

But the question that remains to be answered is: Is the "reality" Dayan mentions actually undesirable to the Zionists?

Editorial Note

1*. This is an edited version of an article written by Akiva Orr.

Footnotes

1. Ha'aretz, Sept. 22, 1968.
 2. Yediot Aharonot, Oct. 11, 1968.
 3. Yediot Aharonot, Oct. 11, 1968.
 4. Ibid. (italics added).
 5. Ibid.
 6. Kol Israel (Voice of Israel), Oct 19, 1963.
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Chapter 11 Zionism and Anti-Semitism [1*]

The relation between Zionism and anti-Semitism is surrounded by an emotional smoke screen that deters many people, including Jews, from voicing their apprehensions about Zionism. This reluctance is well known to Zionist public relations men, who make use of it in a kind of emotional blackmail.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the largely middle-class Jews of Western Europe had achieved a large measure of legal equality with Gentiles. They were, however, still far from having attained full social integration, and a recrudescence of anti-Semitism threatened the gains they had made. At the same time, the Jewish poor of East Europe were still denied even the most elementary civil rights, and the anti-Semitic reaction was intensifying in all spheres of life. Zionism emerged from the growing frustration of the struggles for full social integration and democratic rights. Zionist ideology gave an illusory explanation of the defeat of these struggles. It proclaimed that minority persecution is not the result of specific social, political, economic and cultural conditions. Rather, Zionism declared, minority persecution is inherent in human nature. There is thus no point in trying to combat it; instead, one must accept it and accommodate as well as one can to this inevitable, eternal evil.

Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, an assimilated West European Jew who was shocked into awareness of his "Jewishness" by the Dreyfus Affair, summed up his attitude toward anti-Semitism:

"In Paris, as I have said, I achieved a freer attitude towards anti-Semitism, which I now began to understand historically and to pardon. Above all, I recognized the emptiness and futility of trying to 'combat' anti-Semitism." [1]

This pessimistic starting point, which postulates an immutable, inherently evil human nature, is often toned down by official Zionist spokesmen. But it is voiced loud and dear by those who do not have to make allowances for diplomacy. J. Bar-Yossef is typical of the more extreme position:

The generation in which Zionism was born had great faith in human progress and fraternity. It accepted Rousseau's theory that human nature is basically good: let people live decently and human society will become an angels' society ... The minority must realize that human nature is basically evil, that the majority will always treat the minority according to its whims. Occasional waves of liberalism have only a temporary character ... No education, progress, liberalism, humanism can save the minority when the terrible hour comes. [2]

There is another current within Zionism that emphasizes not the purported impossibility of successful integration and assimilation, but rather regards them as disastrous. Often, these two currents mingle, but the most uncompromising advocates of the second one denounce the interpretation of Zionism as a response to pressures from outside and regard it as corrupting to Zionism as a natural expression of Jewish nationalism. Israel Sheib expresses this view:

The root of all trouble in [Jewish] history stems from the French Revolution and the damnable Emancipation. Zionism was forced upon us. Most of the people who are now here [in Israel] are here because they could not live elsewhere, could not assimilate. Why is there no mass immigration of many thousands of Jews to Palestine, now that we have redeemed it? Don't tell me it is the fault of the Jewish Agency or that there are no economic means. The Diaspora is deep within us and religious Jewry

did not pioneer the resurrection in Palestine. This was handed to Herzl, Jabotinsky, Ben-Gurion, and they were products of an emancipation that went bankrupt. Hence all our other complexes such as "we came here," "we are progressive," "we are humanitarian," etc. All this is so because the two great revolutions, the French and the Russian, carried the banner of integration, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, ideas which we were among the first to accept, and when we come here we feel uncomfortable. Since we failed over there and came here, we feel uncomfortable in regard to the Arabs, militarism, war. This discomfort is the spiritual crisis. Even religious Jewry today believes that the Messiah will come of his own, that it need do nothing, that there is a state, a Zionist organization, a ruling party, that they deal with practical politics. But we are dealing with matters of eternity, not of politics. Hence the trailing of all parties behind the historical events instead of blaming the way. [3]

Thus, to the false generalization that minority persecution is inherent in human nature is added the wish to perpetuate Jewish separateness, "Jewishness" as a supreme value. The first approach considers anti-Semitism an evil and integration an inevitable failure; the second considers anti-Semitism a blessing and integration an evil to be avoided. A hazy combination of both approaches motivates most articulate Zionists. And therewith arises a certain characteristic ambivalence of Zionism toward anti-Semitism. On the one hand, anti-Semitism is hated and feared because it injures and threatens the very existence of the Jews. But on the other hand, it perpetuates "Jewishness" by forcing the Jews to band together in self-defense.

The liberal Zionist Uri Horary expresses this ambivalence in a somewhat modulated tone:

It is of course not customary to talk about it in public, but many of us felt a tiny bit of joy when we read newspaper reports of the swastika epidemic in Europe in 1960; or about the pro-Nazi movement in Argentina. Today, too, we have very mixed feelings when we read about the growing anti-Jewishness of Negro leaders in America. Together with all the anger, shock and humiliation, these phenomena form a part of our world outlook because Zionism said, and is still saying, that this is the way things are. This is what has to be as long as Jews live among Gentiles. [4]

More direct are the words of Dr. Gevaryahu in a report on the situation of the European Jewish communities:

Swedish Jewry is also corroded by assimilation, and even the idea of immigration to Israel is still remote ... Anti-Semitism has a certain role to play in preserving Jews and Jewishness ... Anti-Semitism is similar to the Jewish way of making a living—to be too wealthy or too poor is unhealthy for the existence of Judaism. The same holds true for anti-Semitism: Too much or too little is not welcome, but in reasonable amounts it is. It reminds the Jews who they are and forces them to stick to their people and remain loyal to their ancient homeland. [5]

Once the postulate that minority persecution is inherent in human nature is accepted, the rest of the Zionist argument follows easily. If the hostile majority cannot be expected to overcome its evil ways, the only possibility left for the minority is an exclusive self-liberation. This was the idea behind Leo Pinsker's booklet of 1892, *Autoemancipation*, which asserts that the only way in which a persecuted group can gain control over its destiny is through the establishment of its own nation state in which it wields majority power.

But Zionism did not abolish minority persecution in Israel, nor can it. Instead it transformed Jews from a persecuted minority into an oppressing majority. Zionism merely succeeded in creating its own version of the world from which the Jews were rejected. Herzl, in fact, devoted many pages of his diaries to describing the Jewish

state as a liberalized version of the Habsburg empire, of Viennese society in the late 1890s.

In prescribing immigration to Palestine as the only possible solution to the problem of anti-Semitism, Zionism ironically found itself in the same camp with those anti-Semites who replied to the straggles of the Jewish community for civil rights and social integration with the slogan "Go to Palestine." Typically, the initiative in the struggle against Nazism during the 1930s came from non-Zionist Jews and their organizations. The fiercer the straggle became, the further apart the Zionist organizations stood from the rest of European Jewry. The underlying considerations are spelled out in a letter from Ben-Gurion to the Zionist executive, dated December 17, 1938:

The Jewish problem now is not what it used to be. The fate of Jews in Germany is not an end but a beginning. Other anti-Semitic states will learn from Hitler. Millions of Jews face annihilation^ the refugee problem has assumed world-wide proportions, and urgency. Britain is trying to separate the issue of the refugees from that of Palestine. It is assisted by anti-Zionist Jews. The dimensions of die refugee problem demand an immediate, territorial solution; if Palestine will not absorb them another territory will. Zionism is endangered. All other territorial solutions, certain to fail, will demand enormous sums of money. If Jews will have to choose between the refugees, saving Jews from concentration camps, and assisting a national museum in Palestine, mercy will have the upper hand and the whole energy of the people will be channelled into saving Jews from various countries. Zionism will be struck off the agenda not only in world public opinion, in Britain and the United States, but elsewhere in Jewish public opinion. If we allow a separation between the refugee problem and the Palestine problem, we are risking the existence of Zionism.

Saving Jewish lives from Hitler is considered by Ben-Gurion a potential threat to Zionism unless the Jews thus saved are brought to Palestine. When Zionism had to choose between the Jews and the Jewish state, it unhesitatingly preferred the latter.

It is often argued by advocates of Zionism that had a Jewish state existed in Palestine before World War n, it would have saved most of Europe's Jews. The fact that the Jews in Palestine escaped extermination is used to provide the factual support for this argument.

The truth, however, is that the Jews in Palestine were saved simply because the Nazis did not conquer the Middle East There is no reason to believe that they would have treated a Jewish state any differently from the way they treated all other Jewish communities. And as for the belief that the Jews in Palestine would have behaved differently from the European communities under Nazi occupation, the evidence is hardly decisive. It is known that on the eve of the battle in El-Alamein this issue was debated in the Zionist and other executive committees. While one group advocated concentrating all Palestinian Jews on Mount Carmel in a final, Masada-like battle, another anticipated some modus vivendi with the Nazis. It was even argued that the industrial potential of the Jewish community in Palestine be used as a bargaining card in negotiations.

To sum up: Zionism accepts anti-Semitism as the natural, normal attitude of the non-Jewish world. It does not consider it a distorted, perverted phenomenon. Burdened by this attitude, Zionism can respond to anti-Semitism, but cannot confront it, denounce it or fight against it. In Palestine, Zionism created an exclusivist, oppressing society in which the Jews were made a majority so as to exercise broad rights, while the minorities (especially the former Palestinian majority) suffer political, legal, social and economic discrimination.

The Zionist assumptions have fostered a matter-of-fact approach to anti-Semitism among many Zionists in which the anti-Semite appears to the Zionist not as an enemy against whom an implacable struggle must be waged, but as a potential bargaining partner with whom arrangements can be negotiated to achieve a common goal; e.g., the removal of Jews from non-Jewish society and their concentration in a society of their own. Thus could Theodor Herzl negotiate with Plehve, the notorious anti-Semitic Tsarist Minister of the Interior who, in 1903, granted him a letter stating that the Zionist movement could count on the Tsarist government's "moral and material assistance with respect to the measures taken by the Zionist movement which would lead to the diminution of the Jewish population in Russia." [6] A similar arrangement was negotiated between Arlossorof, secretary of the Histadrut, and die Nazis in 1934. Most infamous of all such negotiations were probably those carried out in Budapest between Rudolph Kastner, secretary of the Zionist committee in that city, and Adolph Eichmann in 1944. Having won Kastner's co-operation by allowing a thousand of the wealthiest Jews to escape to Switzerland, Eichmann used him to coax another 800,000 reluctant Hungarian Jews to board the trains to Auschwitz.

The mutual understanding between Zionism and anti-Semitism is shared by both sides on the political and personal levels. Typical is the following excerpt from the diaries of R. Meinertzhagen, Allenby's political officer from 1919-21:

"My inclination towards Jews in general is governed by an anti-Semitic instinct which is invariably modified by personal contact My views on Zionism are those of an ardent Zionist" [7]

The massacre of the Jews during World War II completely transformed the image of the leadership of the Jewish community in Palestine. Whereas up to the war this leadership was accepted as representative of a small though unique Jewish community, after 1945 (and especially after independence in 1948) it became accepted as the only legitimate representative of world Jewry. The state of Israel gradually came to overshadow completely all other Jewish representative bodies, including the Zionist movement itself. Once the image was established, moreover, that leadership started to wield enormous moral weight throughout the West

For example, when Washington decided to reintegrate Adenauer's Germany into the Western alliance, rebuild the Wehrmacht and integrate it into NATO, it had to "rehabilitate" the Adenauer regime and make it "respectable" in the eyes of world public opinion. The task naturally fell to Ben-Gurion. He duly signed a reparations agreement with Adenauer, publicly declaring that "Germany today is not the one of yesterday," and ignored the violent protest within Israel itself. Adenauer named the agreement Wiedergutmachung (Making Good Again), as if genocide could be atoned for by monetary payments. Later, when Adenauer was invited for the first time to the United States and feared Jewish demonstrations, Ben-Gurion obligingly flew over from Israel and "accidentally" met him in the Waldorf-Astoria, where a photographer "accidentally" snapped them both, holding each other's hands. When the picture appeared on the front pages of the world press, Adenauer was "Kosherized." (Incidentally, during their brief meeting Adenauer promised an enormous new loan to Israel) Some years later, when Eichmann was tried in Jerusalem, the prosecution was careful to avoid mentioning the name of Globke, die promulgator of the Nuremberg race laws, which laid the legal foundation for racial discrimination in Nazi Germany. The fact is that Globke was Adenauer's close aide and that frantic negotiations that went on behind the scenes about this point are little known even today.

Gradually the practice became established for any "respectable" politician accused of racism in his own country to arrange an official visit to Israel to improve his image.

Jacques Soustelle, the French extremist nationalist, Franz-Josef Strauss of West Germany and Britain's Enoch Powell have all been recent visitors. The public relations mechanism of these visits is based on the fact that Western public opinion has been conditioned to accept the Israeli Government as the "spokesman of Jewish conscience," "the voice of the six million Jews massacred by the Nazis." Therefore it expects the Israeli Government to expose and denounce any racist. It is not so much collusion as the old, mutual understanding between Zionism and anti-Semitism in a new, official garb.

Western civilization produced anti-Semitism as its legitimate offspring, Nazism as its illegitimate one. Much of European Jewry, unable to recognize anti-Semitism as a product of a civilization of which it was a part, elevated it to the rank of a "law of human nature" and produced Zionism to cope with that alienation. With both ideological alienations taking hold of human minds, genocide and the Jewish state became realities. Finally, the pyramid of alienations was capped when Western civilization accepted the Zionist state as its "conscience." Under these circumstances the reluctance of public opinion in the West to criticize, expose or denounce Zionism is understandable, but those who placidly go along with this state of affairs ought at least to be aware that they accept, tacitly, the basic assumptions of racism.

Editorial Note

1*. An edited version of an article by N. Israeli.

Footnotes

1. The Diaries of Theodor Herzl, London: Gollancz, 1958, p.6.
 2. J. Bar-Yossef in Yediot Aharonot, Jan. 12, 1968.
 3. Israel Sheib ("Eldad"), Views, Quarterly of Religious Academics, Winter 1968, p.296. (Translated from the Hebrew.)
 4. Yediot Aharonot, Feb. 9, 1969.
 5. Ibid., May 29, 1964.
 6. Herzl's diaries, op. cit., p.398.
 7. R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, London: Crescent Press, 1959, p.49.
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Chapter 12 The Case for Hebrew Self-Determination [1*]

One of the central issues raised by people concerned with the future of Palestine is that of the status of the Israeli Jews (i.e., the Hebrew-speaking national community). The ISO has argued that, despite the fact that it was created by Zionism, a Hebrew nation in the full sense of the term now exists in Palestine. And as such it has the right to self-determination, not certainly in the Zionist sense, but within the context of a socialist federation of the Middle East. On the other hand, many revolutionaries, including the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPF) favors "union of Jews and Arabs of Palestine as one people as the only possible basis for a socialist transformation." Obviously, nations and national communities cannot simply be wished out of, or into, existence. If this were possible, the only truly socialist "wish" would be for the whole human race to form a union "as one people." This is also the condition that one hopes to achieve in the long run under communism – the withering away of all national differences, and therefore of nations as such. But for the present, nations and national problems do exist and socialists must formulate a correct policy on the national question.

By "correct" is meant that which is most in accordance with the interests of the struggle for socialism. The policy adopted by many socialists (including the ISO) is to recognize the right of all nations to self-determination. The purpose of this is not to encourage separatism and national particularism. On the contrary, it is designed to minimize them and to create, wherever possible, a basis for voluntary convergence, unification and integration.

A question that remains to be answered is whether the Hebrew-speaking community does, in fact, constitute a nationality. But this is not just a matter of historical analysis; it is, to a great extent, an empirical question. Our answer-based both on historical analysis and on the direct and close familiarity with the relevant empirical facts – is that, according to any reasonable definition of "nation" or "national community," the Israeli Jews do constitute such a group. Those who oppose the recognition of the principle of self-determination of the Israeli Jews assert that merging of Arabs and Jews in Palestine into a single Palestinian national entity is the only basis for a socialist transformation. Let us analyze this assertion. No true socialist would deny that in order to achieve a socialist revolution in a country inhabited by two peoples, they should join together in a common struggle – this is elemental. But this by no means implies that they must merge into one people. Moreover, an analysis of the Middle East shows that a socialist revolution is extremely unlikely to occur within the framework of Palestine alone; it can be thought of only as a process embracing the whole Arab East.

This thesis, that revolution cannot be localized in Palestine but must encompass the entire Middle East, is accepted not only by the ISO but by all Arab revolutionary socialists. Why then should the Israeli Jews merge only with the Palestinian Arabs rather than with the entire Arab nation? If one claims that the creation of a single nation is the prerequisite for the revolution, and if one also accepts the concept of a total Middle-Eastern revolution, then one must advocate the view that the Israeli Jews should be regarded as part of a "Middle-Eastern" people.

Those who support the idea of one Palestinian people consisting of Palestinian Jews and Arabs do so because they believe that the territory of Palestine should be constituted as a new Palestinian state. On the other hand, it is generally agreed that such a new state can be created only by a socialist revolution victorious throughout a much wider region, and that one of the aims and results of such a revolution would be the creation of a united, socialist Arab East. It follows, therefore, that the new Palestinian state must be conceived only as a relatively separate constituent of a larger socialist union. And to follow this one step further, the *raison d'être* of such a new Palestinian state can only be to furnish a national home for the new Palestinian nation. This is definitely begging the question: We come back to the starting point. The view of the ISO is more coherent; it views the solution of the Palestine problem as one of the tasks of a socialist revolution throughout the entire region. The main obstacles which must be overcome in order to achieve this revolution are direct imperialist intervention, neo-colonialist domination, and imperialism's two partners, Zionism and Arab reaction.

The struggle of the Palestinian Arabs, carried out directly against Zionism and resulting from the fact that they are the direct and chief victims of Zionism, must be regarded in the light of the wider revolutionary struggle. A victorious revolution will have to solve (among other things) the national problems bequeathed to it by imperialism. The following three points must be considered if the real problems existing in the Middle East today are to be solved.

1. Arab national unification. The Arabs of the Middle East are a nation in the process of crystallization (roughly comparable to the Italians in the late nineteenth century on the eve of the political unification of Italy). The Balkanization of the Arab East imposed by British and French imperialism after 1918 does not make sense in terms of past history and – more important – would block any kind of serious social-economic reconstruction and development. Within the Arab nation – as within most big nations, especially in their formative period – there exist numerous subgroups with their own local or regional particularities. It follows, therefore, that a united socialist Arab East would be likely to have some sort of federal structure.

2. The Palestinian Arabs, who are a special part of the Arab nation, are victims of a specific and acute form of national oppression. The revolution will overthrow Zionism and arrange the repatriation of all the refugees who choose to be repatriated, as well as the full compensation and rehabilitation of all those who suffered in any way as a result of Zionism. Territorial arrangements can be made for the establishment of a Palestinian (plus Jordanian) Arab constituent, part of the united socialist state.

3. The non-Arab nationalities living within the Arab world (Israeli Jews, Kurds, South Sudanese) will be recognized and granted their national rights – in other words, self-determination. This is not only correct in principle, but it is also the only conceivable basis for attracting the masses of these nationalities to a joint struggle with the Arab masses.

This third point has been a source of anxiety to some: It raises the question of how the concept of self-determination ties in with the full restitution of Palestinian rights lost since 1948. For the geographical reintegration that would ensue would not necessarily be reconcilable with a separate Hebrew state, particularly if given territory and boundaries are involved. Some people argue that the concept of a separate state for Jews leads inexorably back to the contradiction inherent in Zionism and represents essentially a compromise with the Zionist idea.

This line of thinking, however, is based on false assumptions. First, the ISO does not advocate a separate Jewish state. An official statement published in the beginning of May 1967 reads:

Self-determination does not necessarily mean separation. On the contrary, we hold that a small country which is poor in national resources, such as Israel, cannot exist as a separate entity. It is faced with two alternatives only – to continue to depend on foreign powers or to integrate itself in a regional union.

It follows that the only solution consistent with the interests of both Arab and Israeli masses is the integration of Israel as a unit in an economic and political union of the Middle East, a union based on socialism.

The restitution of Palestinian rights lost since 1948 would not make self-determination for the Jews geographically impossible. Even in 1947, when Arabs outnumbered Jews by about two to one, the Jews remained numerically predominant in continuous portions of Palestine. At present, the ratio is about five Israeli Jews to three or four Palestinian Arabs. Consequently, even if all Arabs that were displaced in and after 1948 (together with their descendants) were to return to their precise original homes, Jewish self-determination still would not be geographically unfeasible. Actually, the repatriation and rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees must involve mainly industrial and urban projects, the construction of new towns and industries, etc. Before 1948, most Palestinians were peasants with rather small holdings, but in the context of an integrated socialist economy in the Middle East, the geographical area of Palestine will certainly not be devoted primarily to agriculture – other areas are much more suited to this. The region of Palestine will play an increasingly industrial and urban role, with relatively few people employed in agriculture. Thus the idea of resettling the refugees in their exact original location – and as peasants – is scarcely progressive.

Finally, the ISO's concept of self-determination, far from compromising with Zionism (which insists on an exclusively Jewish state that is supposed to "belong" to all the Jews in the world), actually assumes the overthrow of Zionism. The formula inherent in self-determination is part of a program for a victorious socialist revolution – it has no meaning in any other context. And the program must be declared immediately in order to mobilize the people struggling for it; but it will be effected only after the overthrow of imperialism and its allies – Zionism and Arab reaction – in the Middle East. Of course, if one thinks in terms of an independent Palestinian state, then Jewish self-determination within it may lead to a phenomenon now part of Zionism but is conceivable without it – namely, domination of Jews over Arabs. And given existing numerical and socio-economic facts, this would be quite likely even within an independent Palestinian state. Rather than proving the danger of self-determination, however, it shows that the concept of an independent or separate Palestine is dangerous. Conversely, the ISO concept of self-determination, in the context of a united socialist Middle East, does not contain any such danger.

Editorial Note

1*. This chapter is an edited version of an article written by M. Machover in response to one written by Bill Hillier, *Revival of the Palestinians*, which appeared in *Peace News* on June 6, 1969. In it, Hillier raised some pertinent questions, a central one being the right of the Israeli Jews to self-determination. He also demanded a prompt

reply from the Israeli revolutionary left. In point of fact, the ISO already stated its views on these issues in an article by A. Sa'id and Moshe Machover (see Document V in this book); nevertheless, Machover here reiterates and elucidates the ISO's position concerning self-determination.

Chapter 13 The Zionist Left and the Palestinian Resistance [1*]

The official Mapam publication, *Al Hamishmar*, has been forced into the position of having to engage in a rear-guard battle of ideas against the ISO. Mapam's traditional role has been to "sell" Zionism to left-wing circles around the world. Having lost the last vestiges of its ideological individuality and having finally capitulated to the chauvinist policy of its senior partners in power, Mapam now is quickly losing its ability to conduct a dialogue with those left-wing circles. Under these circumstances Mapam is irritated more than ever by Matzpen's existence and by the support which Matzpen has won among the revolutionary left throughout the world.

At first Mapam tried to ignore Matzpen; then it joined the national orchestra of anti-Matzpen calumnies and vilifications. Now it has been compelled to try to contend with Matzpen by using arguments which are almost to the point.

Both the title and contents of Peretz Merhav's article, *Fighters for Peace or Warmongers?* [1], reflect this new development. Merhav is head of Mapam's international department (the department which deals with Mapam's foreign contacts), and according to an editorial comment in *Al Hamishmar*, his article illustrates Mapam's propaganda abroad. As for the title (in which Merhav implies that the ISO's members are warmongers), we are not going to repay Mapam members with their own coin and claim that we think they are warmongers. They do have a tradition of trailing after their senior partners in the Zionist camp whenever the latter decide to make war, and thus might be said to bear a large part of the responsibility not only for the decision to start the 1967 war, but also for the decision made in 1956 to start the Suez war. (In both cases Mapam was part of the Cabinet.) They have no right, therefore, to call Matzpen members warmongers. He who has partaken of a feast in which the dove of peace was served roasted must not be allowed to sport her white feathers!

Mr. Merhav begins his article with a "factual survey" on Matzpen and its history. Many of his "facts", are inaccurate, and the rest are completely misrepresented – intentionally, it seems. The ideological-polemical part of the article also suffers from serious inaccuracies. Merhav does not quote from the original ISO article, which he condemns. He attempts to formulate our position in his own words, and the result is necessarily quite bungled.

An example: Merhav writes that Matzpen demands "withdrawal from all die territories populated by Arabs and now held by the Israel Defence Force, without exception." This is a translation of our principled position into die devious language typical of Mapam. We raise a demand for the short-term immediate and unconditioned withdrawal from all the occupied territories. In order to dodge the term "occupied territories," Merhav is compelled to wriggle with "populated by Arabs and now held by the IDF."

Another example: Our demand for the de-Zionization of Israel is interpreted by Merhav as calling for "severing it from the Jewish people and turning it into an exclusive 'local state,' without aspirations and ties overseas." Wherever did he get such a strange definition? Certainly not from Matzpen. According to our position, the question is not whether Israel should have no "aspirations and ties overseas," but what kind of aspirations, and ties with whom? Ties with Cohn-Bendit or with Rothschild?

Affinity with Karl Marx or Neiman-Marcus? In our revolutionary spirit, Matzpen's affinities are quite clear.

We are not against ties overseas. We are only against certain ties such as those of the Mapam coalition government with American imperialism, which are merely a continuation of the traditional and natural ties of Zionism with imperialism.

De-Zionization means the abolition of Jewish exclusiveness (which is inherent, e.g., in the Law of Return) whereby a Jew living in Brooklyn gets more civil and political rights in Israel than a Palestinian Arab who was born there (whether he is now a refugee or an Israeli citizen). In our view, the fact that the Brooklyn Jew feels an emotional tie to the Holy Land does not entitle him to have any political rights in the country, whereas the Palestinian Arab is entitled to full civil and political rights.

The aim of Zionism – to use Mapam's own formulation – is "to concentrate the majority of the Jewish people in a whole and undivided Palestine." This aim provides the guide according to which the Zionist establishment in Israel decides on each political, economic, social or cultural step. Even today the state of Israel is, from Zionism's viewpoint, not a finished product but only an intermediate stage and an instrument in achieving the full aim of Zionism.

The Zionist aim puts those who uphold its doctrine into an inevitable and inescapable conflict with the Arab world, in whose midst – and at whose expense – this aim is realized. The fundamental essence of the conflict has not changed from the beginning of Zionist colonization to the present. This is no ordinary national-territorial conflict of the kind that sometimes breaks out between nations existing in a historically stable proximity. It is a conflict between a movement of colonization – which according to its own declarations has not yet achieved its full aim – and the indigenous population of the area which is being colonized.

Merhav prefers not to enter into a discussion of the roots of Israeli-Arab conflict. He merely alleges that Zionism is not to blame for "the extension of the borders of Israel and the tragedy of the wandering and suffering of Arab refugees." The blame, in his opinion, is that of "the blind, violent and military resistance to Zionism from the time of the Mufti Haj Amin el Husseini to the June 1967 war and his disciples in Al-Fateh." This was exactly the claim of hypocritical colonizers everywhere: "It is not our fault, but that of the natives, who refuse to accept our colonization with love." This kind of hypocrisy is typical of Zionism's left wing, torn in an attempt to find a compromise between Zionist practice and socialist conscience. Dayan, in contrast, is not afraid to admit openly that the Arabs' resistance is a natural and necessary result of Zionist colonization.

As mentioned above, Merhav avoids serious discussion of the origins of the conflict. His main argument is that the de-Zionization formula is simply not realistic because it is "the idea least acceptable to the Israelis ... since de-Zionization and severance from the Jewish people is in the eyes of every Israeli giving up the very *raison d'être* of the state of Israel ..."

This, too, is a typical Mapam argument. They are not looking for a way to end the conflict, but for a formula which would be acceptable to the majority of the Israeli public. In our view this kind of realpolitik suffers not only from opportunism but from short-sightedness and a misunderstanding of basic reality. For every arrangement that does not include de-Zionization will be only imaginary and temporary: The basic problem will continue to exist.

Let us illustrate this by an extreme example – that of South Africa. [2] At present no military clash exists between South Africa and the neighboring African states; nevertheless, there is a historic conflict between a settlers' society and the African

population. There is only one solution: to abolish the racist nature of the Republic of South Africa, which is not only the historical source of the conflict but also the factor that re-creates it at present. It is well known that this solution is categorically rejected by the majority of the white population who regard it as abandoning the *raison d'être* of their state. Does the revolutionary movement in South Africa therefore have to seek other solutions?

When Merhav turns to discuss Matzpen's attitude to Al-Fateh, he again carefully refrains from directly quoting us. He reformulates our position in his own words – and, as usual, it does not come out well. It is characteristic of those who cannot present a principled position in an argument to put their opponents' ideas into their own words in a bungled form. They then find it quite easy to fight the scarecrow they have set up. Let us repeat Matzpen's position. We distinguish between the resistance to occupation of the Palestinian Arabs as a group and the specific policy of this or that organization within the resistance movement. We recognize the right and the duty of every conquered and oppressed people to resist occupation and to struggle for freedom. Our position concerning various organizations within the resistance movement is determined primarily according to their individual political programs. In this we differ from those who reject these organizations because of the very fact that they are struggling against occupation, or because of the means that they use in the struggle.

Our position – we repeat – is determined by a political program. Our political criticism of the dominant currents of the Palestinian resistance movement is based on two main points. First, they do not regard social and political revolution throughout the region as a condition and framework for the solution of the Palestinian problem, but rather they defer all struggles within the Arab world and subject them to the Palestinian cause. They believe in a national unity which is "above classes" – and therefore false. The solution they propose refers to an artificial political entity – Palestine within the borders of the British Mandate – instead of the region as a whole. Second, they do not accept the principle that the victorious revolution in the region, which will defeat the existing regimes, including the Zionist regime in Israel, will grant the right of self-determination to the non-Arab national entities living inside the Arab world, including the Israeli people.

In our view there is only one struggle – the revolutionary struggle for a new society in the Middle East, including Israel. Only within the framework of such a revolution will it be possible to solve the problems of the region, including the Israeli-Arab problem.

Merhav summarizes his own position as follows:

The problem is how to reach an understanding, agreement and peace between the two neighboring and rival national collectives (or between the decisive majority of each of them), that is, between the Arab countries and the Palestinians who inscribe on their flag the idea of Arab nationalism, revival and unity, and the state of Israel that inscribes on her flag the idea of nationalism, revival, unity of the Jewish people and the gathering of its exiles in the historic homeland. To the challenge of creating contacts and an atmosphere favorable to conducting a friendly, purposive and constructive dialogue between these two real national collectives as they are now – our efforts are dedicated.

This is a classic formulation of the nationalist trend in the socialist movement: It kneels down before "the national collective as it is now." Merhav is seeking understanding, agreement and peace between the Arab world and Arab nationalism as they are now, and Israel and Zionism as they are now.

In our opinion, this approach must be discarded as a matter of principle. But the experience of the last seventy years of the Middle East history also shows that what

Merhav says he is seeking cannot be achieved. Even if the Israeli-Arab conflict did not exist, we would oppose the regimes that now exist in Israel and the Arab countries. All the more reason for this, since we know that the conflict cannot be solved while they remain "as they are now."

In fact, those who claim that the solution should be found through agreement between "the two national collectives as they are now" make no contribution to solving the problem but only seal their own fate: perpetually to trail behind the powers that dominate their national collective.

Mr. Merhav states, quite correctly, that we regard the struggle for a new society as the central and dominant issue, to which all other matters are subject and from which they are derived. He, in contrast, puts forward a different principle: activity for peace – between Israel as it is now and the Arab world as it is now. This, he asserts, is of paramount importance, and all other matters must be subordinate to it.

This is typical Zionist thinking. Zionism does not speak of the solution of the Israeli-Arab problem, because as far as it is concerned no such problem exists; it does not even like to speak of solving the Israeli-Arab conflict. As far as Zionism is concerned, everything can be summed up in one word: peace. It is not difficult to understand why. Zionism is engaged in a process of creating facts that are favorable to it and of realizing its goals. In each stage of partial realization, it wants only one thing: that the Arabs acquiesce in the facts that it has created. From the point of view of Zionism no political or social problem exists, only the problem of Arab psychology. Therefore the Zionist demand is "peace" not "a solution to the problem."

Of course, this does not mean that Zionism is particularly peace-loving; it is not prepared to have peace at any price but only on its own terms. Even Merhav writes that "we are prepared, in the event of peace, to return most of the territories now held by" the Israeli Army. Most of the territories, not all of them. To return all the occupied territories would be too high a price to pay for peace, even from the socialist point of view of Merhav. If all the territories were to be returned, it would seem that Zionism did not really advance, as a result of the June 1967 war, to the full realization of its aim. This would not be a worthwhile price for peace. In Zionist terminology, "peace" does not necessarily mean the opposite of war. When the Zionists demand peace, what they really mean is that the Arabs should peacefully accept the accomplished facts that Zionism has created at their expense, that they should peacefully accept Zionism.

A public discussion is currently taking place in Israel on the relation between "peace" and "security." It is a debate between those – like Mapam – who think that the Arab world may ultimately accept Zionism and those who have inferred from the historical experience of Zionism that it will never be accepted by the Arabs and must therefore impose itself by military superiority alone. Merhav states, quite correctly, that Matzpen is taking no part whatever in this national discussion on peace or security. For it is a sterile discussion which we totally reject. A Zionist Israel can never achieve peace and can never achieve security. In this sense it will share the fate of all other settlers' regimes that are trying to exist in the midst of the Third World – regimes that are based on discrimination against the indigenous population, on its exploitation or expulsion, and that are tied by an umbilical cord to the global imperialist alignment. In this respect Israel does not differ from South Africa or Rhodesia.

The only path to take is that of the struggle to abolish the Zionist nature of Israel, to set up a new society through active collaboration with revolutionary forces throughout the region. Whoever refuses to recognize this thereby sentences himself to a future of permanent warfare, of permanent militarization in all fields of social life and in all

aspects of culture, morals and science. Whoever adheres to Zionism sentences himself to perpetual war against the Arab world and to perpetual dependence on the suppliers of Phantom jets. This is absolutely inescapable.

Up to this point we have been discussing principles. But we cannot end the discussion without stressing that Mapam members themselves do not take their own principles seriously; in fact, the whole history of Mapam is the history of surrendering one principle after another. Let us mention their kibbutzim – e.g., Bar'am – which are found on lands confiscated from Arab peasants, Israeli citizens who nevertheless were dispossessed to make room for these Zionist settlements. Let us recall Mapam's participation in the coalition government that decided to start the Suez war of 1956; let us recall that in 1957 Mapam helped to organize mass demonstrations against Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Let us remember that they are part of the Dayan-Begin government, that they voted for the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel (What has this got to do with peace or security?) and continue to support further annexations.

In short, Mapam's "principles" exist only for the sake of "the propaganda activity of our party abroad." In Israel there has never been a single instance of Mapam voting against a decision taken by its senior partners on matters of Zionist policy or on military questions.

The latest item on the list of surrenders exposes once more Mapam's role in the Zionist camp. The Israeli daily Ha'aretz of September 12, 1969, reports that the Alignment (a bloc of all Zionist workers' parties led by the Labor Party – formerly called Mapai – and including Mapam) adopted a platform for the general elections, which were to be held on the following month. One of the points in this platform was support for Zionist colonization in the occupied territories. Ha'aretz goes on to say that Mapam was against this point and at first insisted that its objection be mentioned in the platform itself; but Moshe Dayan announced that he would not allow such a thing. Finally, there was found what Ha'aretz rather amusingly calls "an honorable way out": The point in support of colonization would be included in the platform without any reservation and all partners in the Alignment – including Mapam – would be bound by it. However, Mapam, while being bound by the platform, was given permission (with the consent of Mr. Dayan) to speak in public against that particular point.

The division of labor is quite clear. Mapam will continue to participate in the ruling alignment which supports and actually carries out the colonization of the occupied territories; at the same time, this policy contradicts Mapam's declared principles, and Mapam will go on declaring those principles. So Mapam will in fact support the colonization policy but – with the consent of Dayan – will continue to make noises against that policy, in particular when speaking to the left abroad.

Editorial Note

1*. This is an edited version of an article by A. Orr and Mosh? Machover.

Footnotes

1. Al Hamishmar, Aug. 29, 1969.
 2. Even though the two cases are by no means similar in all respects.
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IV. Conclusion

The Israeli Socialist Organization is working and struggling within Israel today. Its goal is the formation in the Arab East and in the whole world of a social order without exploitation, privilege or oppression in which the anachronism of national boundaries will disappear and the alienated, coercive power of the state will be progressively reduced; a society in which consciously co-operating human beings will be ever more able through the products of their work to satisfy their material and cultural needs, as they themselves consciously and collectively define these needs. Its goal, in short, is socialism. The strategies that point the way along the road to this goal are determined both by the goal itself and by the special conditions of the point of departure – Israel today, its internal social, economic and political relations, its relations to its immediate geographic and social environment – the Arab East – and its relations to the rest of the world.

Israeli society and the Zionist state are the products of Zionist colonization of Palestine. This colonization process consisted of the organized immigration of Jews; the influx of capital under Zionist control; the formation of exclusively Jewish political, educational and cultural institutions; the construction of Jewish armed forces; the development of an exclusively Jewish economy through land purchases from absentee Palestine landlords, followed by the violent dispossession of the Palestinian peasantry; denying Arabs employment in industries working with capital under Zionist control; and a tightly enforced Jewish boycott of Arab-produced goods. In 1948, this process reached a climax in the establishment of the state of Israel – and in the physical expulsion of almost a million Palestinian Arabs from the territory occupied by the new state. The process is by no means at an end. While diplomats negotiate and politicians debate, Arabs in the territories occupied since the 1967 war are steadily being driven from their homes and land, while new Jewish settlements are being founded there. And, in fact, the tendency to colonize more and more territory is inseparable from Zionist ideology and the deepest economic and political dynamic of Israeli society. Every benefit, real or imagined, that the Israeli Jews today possess – a standard of living much higher than that of the other peoples in the region, a reasonably high degree of formal political democracy, a formally independent state, even some land of their own – is historically based on acts of violence against the Palestinian Arabs.

The Israeli Jews constitute a society of settler colonialists, and the Zionist state is the instrument that procures benefits for them based on the denial of these benefits to the Palestinians. This colonization could not be carried out by the Zionist movement alone. It has required the economic, military and diplomatic support of one or more imperialist powers. From the very beginning, a primary goal of Zionist leaders has been to cement the alliance with imperialism. There is nothing accidental or extrinsic about this alliance; contrary to what some left Zionists claim, it is not the result of mistaken policies or bad leadership within the Zionist movement or state. Without this support the settler community could not have been secured, and the state could neither have been established nor could it continue to exist in the face of the implacable hostility of the violently dispossessed Palestinians and the intensifying opposition of the other Arab peoples. And because of this, the alliance is by no means one of equals; on the contrary, the imperialist partner is overwhelmingly dominant, and the Zionist state is utterly dependent on imperialism.

Zionist colonization began around the turn of the century, just when the national awakening of the Arab East was beginning to assume a definite political form directed primarily against the doddering Ottoman Empire. It reached significant proportions in the years following World War I, when the European powers were completing their colonial conquest of the Arab East and when, at the same time, the Arab masses were engaging in great struggles for political independence. The Zionist state was formed at precisely that moment when powerful social forces were gathering in the Arab East, tending not only toward formal political independence but toward combating the economic exploitation by and dependence on imperialism. These forces are part of the same rebellion of the Third World that has already abolished imperialist exploitation in China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba.

These coincidences point to the benefit that imperialism derives from the alliance with Zionism. Through Zionist colonization a society was established in the Arab East that because of its own profound conflict with the Palestinians would be relatively immune to the revolutionary struggle for political and economic independence and hence a reliable base for an armed force directed against these struggles in the interest of imperialism. And this is precisely the service that Israel renders. In return for this service the imperialist powers – today the United States in particular – have not only armed the Zionist state but have aided its economic development. Israel is the only country in the Middle East that not only is not economically exploited by imperialism but is actually subsidized by it. The Zionist state, in short, is a client state of imperialism, and Israeli-Jewish society as a whole has the aspect of a counter-revolutionary, military outpost of imperialism.

The specific character of Zionist colonization had another decisive effect on the formation of Israeli-Jewish society. Having driven the indigenous population from the land and broken down the indigenous economy, Zionist settlers – unlike other colonizing movements – did not reincorporate the expropriated population into the economy as a laboring class. Rather, the Palestinians, even though an overwhelming majority of the area's population, were excluded from the economy and later driven from the country. The settlers themselves then took over most of the functions at all levels of the social division of labor. Throughout the history of the Zionist enterprise the forces tending to want to reshape the colonization process in accordance with the normal capitalist goal of maximizing short-term profits – a goal that would best be achieved by using cheap Arab labor – have been defeated. "Conquest of the Land," "Conquest of Labor" and "Produce of the Land" have remained the primary guides of Zionist practice. But despite the containment of "normal" capitalist tendencies within the Zionist movement and despite the vaguely socialist goals of many Zionist leaders, Israeli-Jewish society developed – had to develop – in an increasingly capitalist fashion. This is the inevitable consequence of the political and military dependence on imperialism, the economic dependence on foreign capital, the complete integration into the capitalist world market, and the subordination by socialist and labor Zionist leaders of the needs of the working people to national development – that is, to the struggle against the Arab people and the performance of services paid for by imperialism.

As a result of this, social classes with antagonistic interests, characteristic of every capitalist society, have emerged among the Israeli Jews. There is a working class that is compelled, in order to live, to produce a surplus over the disposition of which it has no control and that is always forced to produce a greater surplus. And there is a ruling class, appropriating this surplus and disposing of it, that consists of two components – the labor bureaucracy, historically rooted in die Hista-drut and the left Zionist parties

and today dominant in the government, which controls the bulk of the surplus produced by Israeli workers as well as the bulk of the funds that flow into the country from abroad, and the private capitalists, who directly appropriate the surplus produced by Israeli workers in the private sector of the economy. Although the balance within the social coalition has been shifting steadily in favor of private capitalists, the labor bureaucracy remains dominant in the economy and will remain dominant in the foreseeable future. The Israeli masses are afflicted with all the ills that befall the proletariat in any capitalist society – the erosion of real wages through inflation and wage controls, the periodic threat of unemployment, constant pressure to intensify their labor, lack of control over their own labor process and increasingly inadequate housing, educational facilities and social services. Moreover, in the case of Israeli Jews of Oriental origin, added to these ills are racial or ethnic discrimination, which greatly intensifies them all. Thus, the Israeli-Jewish workers and middle classes live and suffer all the contradictions of advanced capitalist societies, and like their counterparts elsewhere, they spontaneously struggle against these ills by strikes and demonstrations. And when the Zionist state through the police force and, more usually, through the Histadrut with its labor courts and its control over jobs and social insurance, strikes back against these strikers and demonstrators, it expresses what it really is – an instrument of coercion in the hands of the Israeli-Jewish ruling class which is directed against the Israeli-Jewish proletariat and, of course, that Arab minority which is incorporated as super-exploited workers into the Israeli economy. The result of all this is the maintenance and intensification of exploitation of the proletariat and the strengthening of the wealth and power of the social system that constantly reproduces both components of the Israeli-Jewish ruling class.

At the same time, under the specific conditions of unending struggle against the Arabs from whom the territory supporting this class-divided society was seized, there has developed a culture of Israeli Jews quite as distinct from the culture of East European Jewry that supplied its basic characteristics or from the culture of the Sephardic communities of the East, from which the majority of the population today has sprung – or for that matter, from any other Jewish culture in the world – as it is from the Arab culture that surrounds it. The most obvious external sign of the development of this culture is, of course, the development of the new Hebrew language, and the rapid assimilation of Hebrew is a precondition of any but the most marginal participation in Israeli Me. Contrary, of course, to the Zionist myth, this culture is no harmonious blending of various ethnic elements brought by settlers of widely divergent backgrounds. On the contrary, it reflects all the real conflicts – ultimately of a class nature – of Israeli-Jewish society. The emphasis placed by the Israeli Black Panthers and other radical Oriental Jews on the struggle against cultural oppression – the powerful tendencies to strip off everything Eastern and conform to predominantly Western culture norms – shows that the issue of Israeli-Jewish culture will itself be an important battleground of any revolutionary movement in Israel.

In short, Israeli-Jewish society is in reality a new, bourgeois nation, with a fully developed capitalist class structure and a distinctive national culture based on a capitalist economy. As a national, capitalist state, the Zionist state is an instrument in the hands of the Israeli-Jewish ruling class to maintain and intensify the exploitation of the Israeli-Jewish workers and of the Arab minority, and to serve the class interests of that ruling class in its relations with the rest of the world.

These three aspects of Israeli-Jewish society and the Zionist state – the settler-colonial character, the imperialist client state offering the services of a counter-revolutionary army to imperialism and the bourgeois nation with its internally repressive state

apparatus – are interrelated in an exceedingly complex fashion. One feature of this interaction in particular must be emphasized in order to understand the possibilities and dynamics of an Israeli revolution. As long as colonization can be carried out without intensifying resistance from the expropriated Arabs, and as long as imperialism can continue to rule in the Arab East primarily through the established Arab political structures, the internal contradictions of Israeli-Jewish society can be contained by the Israeli ruling class. In other words, the development of the objective conditions of a mass revolutionary movement in Israel depends on the development of a deepening revolutionary struggle by the Arab masses of the region.

What the Zionist state and the imperialist powers confront in the Arab East today is a process of permanent revolution. The crucial feature of this process is that the urgently experienced needs and aspirations of the masses – above all, the unification of the Arab people in an independent Arab nation, the elimination of traditional privilege, the establishment of the conditions of balanced, rapid economic growth that can open the way to a continuous and rapid rise in mass consumption – cannot be satisfied within the framework of capitalist property relations and the integration of the region into the imperialist world economic system. These goals can be realized only by the destruction of the economic and social power of all the classes, whether feudal or bourgeois and whether traditional or newly crystalizing, that are tied by class interest to imperialism. This will mean the end of direct or indirect domination and exploitation by imperialism, the establishment of an economy based on collective ownership of the most important means of production and the progressive expansion of economic planning. This, in turn, requires the revolutionary overthrow of all the existing state institutions in the region and the establishment of a new kind of state – the workers' state – that directly reflects the interests of the working class and rests on the armed masses of workers and peasants.

Nowhere in the Arab East has such a state yet appeared. But although the Arab masses in their spontaneous revolutionary activity have suffered serious defeats – most recently in the catastrophe suffered by the Palestinian Resistance at the hands of King Hussein – they have not suffered a decisive defeat, one that would leave them passive and demoralized for a long period of time. Nor, given the world-wide anti-colonial revolution and the growing radicalization of masses of people, including important sections of the working class in the imperialist countries themselves, is there any likely prospect that they will suffer such a defeat. However, this makes the eventual establishment of the revolutionary Arab workers' state – and therewith the defeat of the settler-colonial, imperialist-agent Zionist state – a practical certainty.

The obstacles in the way of this revolutionary process are immense. The imperialist powers, especially the United States, have every bit as great a political and military strategic interest in the Arab East as they have in Southeast Asia and because of petroleum they have a far more direct economic interest there. Imperialism will try with the utmost tenacity to contain, divert and eventually crush this revolutionary process. In order to lead the struggle of the Arab masses against this formidable array of forces – the threat of direct imperialist military intervention, the Zionist state and the established Arab ruling classes – to final victory, a revolutionary party of the working class must be built that can conduct a persistent ideological struggle against all feudal and bourgeois influences among the masses and that can select the tactics appropriate at each step along the way to weld the Arab workers, the poor peasants and the revolutionary individuals drawn from the middle classes into a coherent army of the revolution. But this problem will be solved, because imperialism can neither

crush and demoralize the Arab masses nor can any of the contradictions that drive them to revolt be resolved until it is.

For the Israeli Jews, four crucially important consequences flow from this state of affairs. First, they face a long-term intensification of all the contradictions characteristic of a capitalist society as a result of the long-term intensification of the Arab revolutionary struggle against the Zionist state. This means they face the prospect of increasing casualties and of more intense exploitation at the hands of the Israeli-Jewish ruling class in its efforts to support the counter-revolutionary struggle. Second, the fact that the Arab revolution has an objectively socialist tendency, that to succeed it must destroy all the existing oppressive and exploitative structures in the Arab East means that its objective tendency is to destroy the basis of any possible future national oppression. Third, regardless of what the Israeli Jews do or do not do, the Zionist state will be defeated. The only question confronting the Israeli-Jewish masses is whether they will ultimately recognize the Zionist state as their own oppressor and join the Arab masses in the struggle to overthrow it, thereby becoming active participants in shaping the new order. The alternative, of course, is that they will permit themselves to remain a counter-revolutionary force that must be crushed by the Arab revolution.

The fourth consequence that follows from this state of affairs is that any possible Israeli revolution can be conceived only as an aspect of the Arab revolution; the development of a mass revolutionary movement is wholly dependent on the progress of the Arab revolution. But the Arab revolution and the intensification of the internal conflicts within Israeli-Jewish society will not automatically generate a mass revolutionary movement. Whether or not such a movement develops will depend on whether or not ever larger sectors of the Israeli-Jewish masses come to perceive these relationships – between the Israeli-Jewish nation and the Palestinians and the other Arabs, and between the Israeli-Jewish nation and imperialism. Under the sway of Zionist ideology, every element of this reality appears the opposite of what it really is. What is in reality a new nation produced by a specific historical process appears as the victorious restoration to its natural (or divine) rights of an ancient nation deprived of them for thousands of years as a result of the natural anti-Semitism of the Gentiles. What are in reality privileges maintained at the expense of the Palestinians appear as the natural rights of Jews. What is in reality a repressive apparatus directed against the masses of the Israeli Jews to maintain and intensify the exploitation of the Israeli-Jewish workers appears as the defender of these natural rights. What is in reality a counter-revolutionary mercenary army of imperialism appears as an army of the mythical Jewish nation fighting for survival and dependent in order to survive on support from the Western nations. What is in reality a struggle by the Palestinians to end the privileges of the Israeli Jews maintained at their expense, and a struggle by all the Arab people both to contain Israeli expansion and to destroy the chief military instrument of their continued exploitation appears as one more Gentile effort to oppress and kill Jews.

As long as this system of ideas retains its unbroken hold over the Israeli-Jewish masses, no mass revolutionary movement can possibly develop. For to minds shaped by this ideology, every sacrifice appears necessary to the survival of the nation. Nor can this ideology ever be undermined purely as a consequence of social struggles around particular issues, no matter how militant these struggles may become. For long before such struggles reach the pitch at which the state and its institutions stand revealed as crude instruments of violence directed against the aspirations of the masses, these struggles are broken by the simple expedient of identifying those in the

forefront of them as "traitors to the nation." This has happened again and again in the history of the Zionist settlement and state. Never has the question of the fundamental character of the Zionist state or the role of Zionist ideology spontaneously arisen in the course of such social struggles, no matter how militant.

It might appear, therefore, that the possibility of developing a revolutionary movement among the Israeli-Jewish masses is hopeless. This, however, is not the case due to some crass contradictions between the prevailing ideology and the immediately perceptible reality, and within the reality itself. For one thing, there is a certain democratic, humanistic strain in Israeli-Jewish culture that is in conflict with the reality of the injustices done to the Palestinians in the name of Zionism. Alone this is not likely to provide the basis for a mass, anti-Zionist movement; if this were the only challenge to Zionist ideological hegemony the anti-Zionist, revolutionary message would be reduced to empty moralizing. In the context, however, of other, more fundamental challenges to Zionist ideology, this can become a powerful factor in mobilizing the Israeli-Jewish masses against the oppression of the Palestinians.

The most fundamental break in Zionist ideological hegemony will derive from the overwhelming fact that under the conditions of the long-term intensification of the Arab revolution, the Zionist project, judged by its own standards, is and will remain an utter failure and that different basic goals of this Zionist project will continue to contradict each other. Zionism promised national awakening and fraternal solidarity; it has produced a society of increasing economic inequality and of racist discrimination and cultural oppression. Zionism promised independence; it has produced a society in which the Prime Minister must periodically affirm to the people that the existence of the nation depends on the delivery of fifty or a hundred Phantom jets from the United States. Zionism promised the Jews the dignity of a nation taking its place among the nations of the world; it has not been able to compel formal recognition by even the weakest and most reactionary Arab state, and it has not gained the slightest hint of legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab masses. Zionism promised physical security to the Jews; Israel is the most dangerous place on earth today for a Jew, and it will remain so as long as Israeli-Jewish society retains its colonial character and its function as an instrument of imperialism.

Real life is demonstrating with ever greater clarity that the two basic goals of the Zionist movement – the "ingathering of the exiles" and the integration of the nation – are mutually contradictory and that this contradiction is resolved by sacrificing the welfare of the masses of the Israeli Jews to continued immigration. It is this contradiction that is at the base of militant demonstrations staged by Oriental Jews to demand the end of privileges granted to new immigrants at their expense. Moreover, every social ill suffered by the masses of Israeli Jews can easily be shown to be the immediate result of the basic Zionist political goal – the building of an exclusively Jewish society in the Arab East. This is true not only of threatening or present military casualties. It is also true of the pressure on living standards, speed-up, the tendency to erosion of democratic rights, the power of the narrow-minded religious establishment over everyday personal life, and the endemic racism of which the Oriental majority is the victim.

In short, while ideologically Zionism is the greatest power working to maintain the established order in Israel, in its real political and institutional embodiment it is the most vulnerable feature of the status quo. A would-be revolutionary strategy – Wee that of the Israeli Communist Party – which fails to place the anti-Zionist struggle at its very center is doomed to failure. For it not only refrains from attacking the real system of illusions that prevents Hebrew workers from recognizing what is being

done with and to them and hence makes impossible the intensification of struggles around particular issues. It also fails to pose the immediate, concrete political question implied by every struggle. To try to explain to the Israeli-Jewish masses the political meaning of their struggles by talking about the contradictions of capitalism and the exploitation of labor without talking about Zionism is to deal in pure abstractions. The concrete political form of the contradictions of capitalism in Israel is Zionism.

Thus, at the very center of the ISO's program stands the demand for the de-Zionization of Israel. This demand, its specification in other demands and its concretization in slogans, is able to meet the masses of people in their more or less spontaneous struggles around particular issues and to lead them toward a general political struggle against the Zionist state. The de-Zionization program thus takes on a transitional character. It starts from the issues of the struggle as the masses understand them and relates these issues to a goal that cannot be achieved without the overthrow of the Zionist state and the total transformation of Israeli society.

One point of the de-Zionization program is the call for the formation of an independent, militant, trade-union organization based on committees democratically elected in the work places. This corresponds to one of the major needs of the workers in their economic struggles. Because of the fundamentally anti-working-class character of the Histadrut, because it is in reality not a trade union in any sense whatever, every militant struggle takes place against the Histadrut leadership and is organized by rank-and-file shop committees. The struggle to maintain the independence of these committees and to move toward their coalescence into a real trade-union organization in the face of the violent opposition of the Histadrut bureaucracy will not only progressively expose to the masses of the workers the generally oppressive nature of this central Zionist institution. The actual achievement of such a union will in fact mean the destruction of this pillar of the Zionist state.

Another demand of the de-Zionization program calls for the separation of religion and state. This is an elementary demand long ago achieved in most capitalist democracies that immediately appeals to democratic sentiment and can win broad support because of the oppressive intervention of the reactionary religious establishment in the everyday life of every Israeli. But it is a measure that cannot be carried out by the Zionist state, for the entire claim to legitimacy of that state depends on a religious conception. The state claims to be the national territory of the "Jewish nation." But the Jewish nation – a nation purportedly comprising all the world's Jews, as opposed to the real Israeli-Jewish nation – is a myth, so the definition of a member of that "nation" can only be a mythical, religious one. And, in fact, the most rabbi-baiting, atheistic "socialist" Zionist cannot offer any non-arbitrary answer to the question "Who is a Jew?" except the religious one: A Jew is the child of a Jewish mother or someone who has been converted to the Jewish religion.

An immediate logical consequence of the demand for secularization is the demand for the abrogation of the Law of Return, which depends on the religious definition of "Jew." The immediate expression of this is the call for the end to all privileges enjoyed by Jews in Israel and for consistent democratization of relations between the Israeli Jews and the Palestinians and other Arabs. This in turn implies a measure that strikes at the very foundation of the exclusive Jewish state – the invitation to all Palestinians who desire repatriation to return to the land from which they were driven, and the offer of unconditional compensation for their losses to all those who do not want repatriation. The fulfillment of this demand will end one of the fundamental antagonisms between the Israeli Jews and the Arabs; the status of Israeli-Jewish society as a settler colony oppressing the Palestinian people.

Finally, de-Zionization requires the end of all relations of economic, military and political dependence on imperialism, including the financial and political ties between Israel and the Jewish community in the United States. The rupture of these ties will eliminate the other basic antagonism between the Israeli Jews and the Arab nation, the antagonism resulting from the counterrevolutionary services the Zionist state offers imperialism.

Together these demands correspond to the real, felt needs of the Israeli masses; the struggles on issues defined by them can progressively break the domination of Zionist ideology. Their full accomplishment – which can come only through socialist revolution and the establishment of a workers' state – will not only free the Palestinians of their oppression by the Zionist state and significantly aid the entire Arab nation in its struggle for independence from imperialism, but it will also free the Israeli Jews for the task of finding their secure place as one of the non-Arab nationalities within the Arab East.

The mobilization of the Israeli-Jewish masses around this program will certainly not happen quickly or automatically. It will require the most patient, persistent and conscious work. It requires the organization of the most politically advanced elements of Israeli society on a clear revolutionary socialist program – the building of a mass revolutionary vanguard party of the working class. The ISO is today in the very early stages of the development of such a party. In it are gathering the initial cadres of this party. They are being educated both theoretically and practically, and they are being tested in the experience of actual social struggles as they exist today. They are gaining the experience and the numbers that will make it possible for them to lead the great mass struggles of the future, struggles that will bring about the break with Zionism, the development of mass revolutionary socialist consciousness and the eventual achievement of state power through the victory of socialist revolution in Israel.

But just as the socialist revolution in Israel is only possible as an integral part of the process of permanent revolution in the whole Arab East, so, too, the revolutionary party in Israel can only be built as a part of the broader, multinational revolutionary party of the entire region. This party, through its centralized organization and its ability to develop the correct tactical orientation in each concrete situation of struggle, will lead the masses of the whole region to the successful socialist revolution. Its basic program will aim at the establishment of a workers' state in the Arab East, a state governed on the basis of the broadest possible democracy. For the success of the party in leading the Israeli-Jewish masses away from Zionism and toward united struggle with the Arab masses, the perspective of the broadest possible democracy in the national question will be especially important. Democracy in the national question implies the right of national self-determination for non-Arab nationalities in the region-including the Israeli Jews – so far as the exercise of this right is consistent with defense of the socialist revolution in the Arab East.

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