ZENGAKUREN: Japan's Revolutionary Students

What is Zengakuren? What are its aims and how important is it in Japan? How did it start and where is it now? These and many other questions will be found in this timely analysis of the Japanese student movement.

Tracing the origins of modern activism in Japan, this book goes on to present a precise and understandable account of the history of Zengakuren. In a series of epic struggles, the students of Zengakuren have fought their way through from the Red scare era of the early fifties, the anti-Soviet battle of 1960, to the university struggles of the late sixties.

During this period the student movement of Zengakuren developed a number of distinctive and coherent subcultures of post-war Japan. With 1970 a crucial year in the history of Japanese student activities, this book will serve as a guide to the fascinating and intricate world of Zengakuren.

edited by Stuart Dowsey

THE ISHI PRESS
ZENGAKUREN:
Japan’s Revolutionary Students

edited by
Stuart J. Dowsey

THE ISHI PRESS
Berkeley, California
CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................. iv
Abbreviations and Organizations ............................... vi
Introduction .......................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Historical Background
   by Ikeda Kazuo .................................................. 9
Chapter 2: Origins of Zengakuren
   by Matsunami Michihiro ....................................... 42
Chapter 3: The Anti-Ampo Struggle
   by Harada Hisato ................................................ 75
Chapter 4: The University Problem
   by Kokubun Yutaka ............................................. 100
Chapter 5: The University Struggles
   by Sawara Yukiko ............................................... 136
Chapter 6: Kakumaru—Portrait of an Ultra-Radical Group
   by Nakanishi Masahiro ........................................ 193
Chapter 7: The Future . . ? ........................................ 226
Who's Who in Zengakuren and the Youth Movement in 1969
   —A Profile by Matsunami Michihiro ....................... 242
Bibliography ....................................................... 268

— iii —
PREFACE

There are literally hundreds of books that have been written in English about the unique society and culture of Japan. Almost all of them deal with the traditional culture, while books on modern Japan are few and far between. However, with Japan’s emergence on the international scene as an economic giant, it is no longer possible or indeed desirable that the post-war Japanese culture should continue to be thus neglected. This book intends to fill the gap that hitherto existed regarding the Japanese student movement. Until now, there has been no book which covers the entire history of Zengakuren and describes the various sects. While not a scholarly work, great pains have been taken to ensure the factual accuracy of the contents of this book in the hope that the reader can arrive at a good understanding of the Japanese student movement.

Each chapter has been written by a student of Waseda University. The co-authors are also all members of the Waseda English Speaking Society and belong to the district group known as the Shinjuku Home Meeting. The main work done in researching the material of this book was carried out in the latter half of 1969 during which time the students were in their 2nd year of studies (except Miss Sawara who was in her 1st year). They represent a wide variety of backgrounds and are studying in different fields. Mr. Ikeda Kazuo and Mr. Nakanishi Masahiro are both 20 years old and study Commerce; Mr. Matsunami Michihiro is also 20 and is in the Science and Technology Department; Mr. Harada Hisato is 20 and in the Law Department; Mr. Kokubun Yutaka is 22 years old and studies Economics.
while Miss Sawara Yukiko is 20 and belongs to the School of Education.

The main task of translating the material from Japanese into English was conducted in part by the students themselves with the remainder being done by myself, the editor. Therefore any lapses in clarity or in the stylistic presentation of the text is entirely my own responsibility. I have endeavored as much as possible to stick to the original meanings intended by the co-authors, and should my interpretations prove erroneous, then the blame must be laid at my door. As editor, I have also written the Introduction and Chapter 7, though in the latter case I have made use of much material gathered by the authors, which was not included in the earlier chapters.

In presenting this account of Zengakuren, it is has been necessary to put forward the left-wing theories and opinions involved, and in order to reach an understanding of the student movement, I have been sympathetic toward their ideals. However, in writing and editing this book, I have endeavored to give an objective viewpoint and trust that this has been achieved.

Finally I would like to acknowledge the assistance rendered by Mr. Frederick Lorenzino in checking the readability of the manuscript and of course to my wife Kiyoko, whose help and sympathy made this book a reality.

Tokyo, May, 1970

Stuart J. Dowsey
List of Abbreviations and Organizations

Japanese names appear in the text in the Japanese order, surnames first. The macron over long vowels has been omitted throughout by the editor’s preference.

Abbreviations

AIPC Armed Insurrection Preparatory Committee (Puro Gundan Faction)
ANZUS Australia-New Zealand-U.S. Security Treaty
DSP Democratic Socialist Party (Minshu Shakai To)
JCP Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosan To)
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Jiyu Minshu To)
ML Marx-Leninist Faction
SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SFL Student Liberation Front (Gakusei Kaiho Sensen)

Organizations

Akahata—Red Flag (JCP newspaper)
Ampo—Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Beheiren—Citizens Alliance for ‘Peace in Vietnam!’
Bund—see Kyosando
Chukaku—Central Core Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League.
Dai Yon Inta—Fourth International Japan Branch
Furonto—Socialist Student Front
Gakusei Inta—Student International
Gakusei Rengo—Student Federation
Hantei Gakuhyo—Anti-imperialist Student Council
Hansen Gakudo—Anti-war Student League
Hansen Seinen Iinkai—Anti-war Youth Committees
Heimin Gakkyo—Tokyo Student Joint Struggle Committee Against Ampo and for the Protection of Peace and Democracy
Heimin Gakuren—National Student Liaison Committee Against Ampo and for the Protection of Democracy
Jichikai—Student Self-governing Associations
Kakumaru—Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League
Kakukyodo—Japan Revolutionary Communist League
Komeito—Clean Government Party
Kyogakudo—Communist Student League
Kyosando—Communist League (Bund)
Marugakudo—Marxist Student League
Minseido—Democratic Youth League
Minsei To—Democratic Government Party (from Constitution Party)
Purogakudo—Proletarian Student League
Sampa Rengo—Three Faction Alliance
Sampa Zengakuren—Three Faction Zengakuren
Sanbetsu—Congress of Industrial Unions
Seiyukai—Government Association
Sekigun—Red Army Faction of the Socialist Student League
Shagakudo—Socialist Student League
Shinjinkai—Enlightened Man Association
Shaseido—Socialist Youth League
Shaseido Kaiho-ha—Liberation Faction of the Socialist Student League
Shingakudo—New Student League
Sodomei—General Federation of Labor
Sohyo—General Council of Trade Unions
Soka Gakkai—Modern Organization of the Nichiren Buddhist Church
Togakuren—Tokyo Branch of Zengakuren
Tojiren—Tokyo Liaison Council of Student Self-governing Associations
Tokyo Chihyo—Tokyo Chapter of Sohyo
Zengakuren—National Federation of Student Self-governing Associations
Zenjiren—National Liaison Council of Student Self-governing Associations
Zenkoku Zenkyoto—National Zenkyoto Federation
Zenkyoto—All-campus Joint Struggle Councils
Zenro—National Liaison Council of Trade Unions
INTRODUCTION

The streets of the Ginza, Japan's sparkling showcase for the world, are a shambles. Acrid fumes of tear gas hang in the air, shops are shuttered and the busy traffic is halted. The time is April 28, 1969, and in Japan it is Okinawa Day. Tokyo is an armed camp; police are guarding all the government buildings, downtown railway stations are closed, department store windows are boarded up and office workers have been sent home half a day early. Unable to get near the Diet House, the seat of Japan's government, the revolutionary students of Zengakuren have turned on the Ginza to vent their spleen and created a no-man's-land in the middle of the soaring buildings.

Under the ever-whirling flickering neon signs, the battle lines are drawn; the armies are poised and ready. The riot police in dark blue uniforms hold the intersections; they crouch in a line behind duralumin shields, dull lights glinting from their ominous blue steel helmets, plastic visors clamped down, batons and tear gas guns at the ready. Inside the police lines, from Ginza to Tokyo station nearly a mile away the students hold sway; in the road a fire burns sending oily smoke into the night air, billboards and iron sheets barricade the street, broken paving stones and spent tear gas cartridges lie in the gutter and through the mess an eddying mob of students swirling chanting running shouting. Underneath the ground the subway trains are still running but they do not stop at Ginza Station. On the elevated expressway above is the audience, thousands of bystanders craning to get a better view. From up here it is safer, no flying rocks, no chance to be hit by a police baton, or hosed down by water cannon. Here no cars are passing, the way is blocked by television vans,
which monitor the shots from the street below. The unearthly scene of the whirling dervish students, faces half-hidden under their brightly colored hand-painted helmets, mouths masked by flannel towels tucked into the straps, their wild eyes shining through tousled hair. The ponderous police van, a great gray elephant on wheels, inching forward, surrounded by its cohorts; the crack of the tear gas guns, the flash of flame as a mo1otov cocktail shatters on the road. The television picture jumps as the cameraman follows the crowd, trying to catch the action for the watchers at home safe in the comfort of their living rooms. The scene changes; fresh new student forces appear, brave troops bearing a forest of wooden staves to sweep down on the police lines; a student doubles up, his face twisted with pain, trying to avoid a kicking boot, his helmet rolling shattered by his side and finally the inevitable pathetic line of the captured being led into a waiting truck.

These scenes are but the latest in a continuing series which are carried to every household in Japan and then all over the world. The action is dramatic; it makes good television but the issues are obscure and are unimportant to the average viewer. Something is happening but we don't know what, the signs and slogans are unreadable and it all remains incomprehensible. However out of this one name emerges, the name which symbolizes the student revolution in Japan to the world—Zengakuren.

What is Zengakuren? What are its aims and how important is it in Japan? Who are its members? How did it start and where is it going? These are some of the unanswered questions that are posed by the existence of Zengakuren. Questions that were asked before in 1960, when Zengakuren burst on the world scene during the political struggles directed against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and which will be asked again in 1970 when the Security Treaty comes up for renewal. In 1960, the students were
chiefly responsible for the resignation of the Japanese Prime Minister and the cancellation of a visit to Japan by the American President. More recently they have succeeded in shutting down nearly every university in Japan in revolt against the antiquated methods in use, producing a paralysis in the education system and a cathartic shock to the Japanese establishment. Any organization that is able to wield such power should be understood and not neglected when trying to grasp the situation of modern Japan.

One common mistake is to regard Zengakuren as a cohesive group with its aims dictated by international communism when in fact nothing could be further from the truth. Zengakuren is a vast range of leftwing student factions, each with its own philosophy and character, but they all have one thing in common and that is to see a revolution in Japan. However, bitterness amongst rival groups is great and frequently degenerates into violence often exceeding in degree that directed at the police. Though Zengakuren was once directed by the Japan Communist Party (JCP), most of the sects are now in opposition to it. Similarly Zengakuren has little in common with the Japan Socialist Party, which represents to the students the Old Japanese Left, while they themselves are the New Left.

The history of the student struggle in Japan in both the political and educational arenas goes back many years to the period just following the war; while the history of student participation in the left-wing movement goes back even further, to the beginnings of Marxism in Japan. In the last few years, the world has seen the emergence of highly vocal student movements in nearly every corner of the globe and in Japan it is the Zengakuren who have managed to articulate the universal feelings of youth best of all. It is an ironic comment on Japanese society that in the era which has provided its people with the greatest affluence in their history, when Japan's gross national product is the third largest in the
world, the privileged youth of the nation’s universities choose to turn their backs on the established way with its guaranteed prosperity and respectability and take their chances in violent battles with the police. We can find much the same thing throughout the world, but whereas students in the developing nations have some clear idea of what they are struggling against, it is those in the advanced nations like Japan whose fight, less easily explicable, takes on the appearance of a blind attack at all the established values of the society that brought them up. One opinion put forward by a leading news magazine is that the advanced nations are in a period of chaotic change—a gear-wrenching moment in history in which no one can possibly know for certain what lies ahead.

Science and technology have created a new situation; it will take some time for the social structure to accommodate the new way of life. The youth of today are the first true citizens of the new world of electronic communications; they have been exposed to the full impact of a world community united under television from childhood and are the only ones of us who have completely adjusted to the life style it represents. The world has become an electronic anthill with the human race close to being linked up into a universal consciousness and it is the present generation of youth who instinctively sense its implications and feel that some new means of arranging and ordering human affairs is not only necessary but inevitable. The natural idealism of the young can now find support in similar sentiments and actions by others not in only one country but all over the world. Universal education has widened the range of those who feel they know more than their parents and are demanding their right to be heard and to participate, but the reins of power remain firmly held by the parental generation who have no intention of giving them up. Given these conditions, it was inevitable that given time, today’s
youth would organize itself politically and that a confrontation with authority would result.

If the origins of the student movement in the advanced countries are similar for the reasons that we have given, the focus of each struggle invariably centers around problems that are special to each country and culture. The American student movement has found a great catalyst in the continuing Vietnam War, while in France student protest against an outmoded university system neatly coincided with popular sentiment against the traditionalist regime of Charles de Gaulle and in Northern Ireland students are leaders in the Catholic civil rights struggles. In Japan too, the conditions that bred the Zengakuren movement are peculiar to that country; the disillusionment of losing the war, the idealism freed by the defeat of the militarists and ready to be turned to more humanitarian goals, the humiliation of occupation and the presence of foreign troops to this day, Japan's abhorrence of war and of nuclear weapons; all these factors and many others have helped shape the lives of Japan's revolutionary youth.

To understand the Japanese student movement we will examine the origins of the present educational system; we will look into the present-day political make-up and trace the history of Zengakuren from its beginnings in the dark days after the war.

The student movement is inextricably bound up in two separate fields of student struggle—polities and education. The first crystallizes around the nationwide movement against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; and though the students are ready to join with other anti-Security Treaty forces, they tend to take a more extremist view as compared with the other groups. They favor direct actions such as invading American bases, hindering construction of American facilities and attempting to block actions of Japanese government politicians. Theoretically, Japan is a multi-
party country, but the government is firmly under the control of the powerful Liberal Democrats making it virtually a one-party state with the left-wing cast as a permanent opposition. The students resort to extremist activities because they lack the basis for real political power and in doing so they can at least feel they are fighting for their ideals. As is well known, the violence generated by student struggles always attracts more attention than more peaceful methods, but at the same time the reasons are usually ignored. The failure of the established left-wing to make any headway at the polls has contributed to a general mistrust among students for their policies if not their ideals. Since its first inception, the Japanese left-wing has argued over whether to plan an one-step or a two-step revolution and this is mirrored in the basic split that exists between the different factions in Zengakuren. About the only thing that all Zengakuren students will agree on is that Japan needs a revolution; but beyond this no two groups are of the same mind.

The Japanese educational system is a patchwork quilt of policies taken from French, German and American sources and is in dire need of an overhaul if it is to be relevant to modern Japan. The present universities are extremely overcrowded creating pressures their originators could never have foreseen and which serve to dramatically show up the inadequacies. The students' basic desire to be allowed to participate in the running of the university is a logical extension of the doctrine of democratization that was imposed on Japan by the American occupation forces after the war. Real control however still rests in the hands of the Ministry of Education and this brings the students into conflict with the government yet again, when they resort to tactics such as the university strike and the blockading of university buildings to achieve their demands.

The use of the name Zengakuren has become meaningless as
it is used freely by a wide variety of student groups.Originally a non-political movement, Zengakuren developed under the control of the Japan Communist Party to the point where it split into rival factions. The history of the Japanese student movement, therefore, has to show how these rival groups relate to each other, giving their membership, size, ideological attitudes, alignments and relative importance. At the same time, the student radical has become the most distinctive indigenous cultural figure to mark the post war era. The street fighting has produced an image of the helmeted stick-wielding student; theorizing has spawned new words for the Japanese vocabulary; comics, songs, magazines and television are concerned with what they do, the advertising industry capitalizing on this image.

To get a better idea of the life of the Japanese student revolutionary it was decided to present a comprehensive portrait of one of the major factions. We chose the Revolutionary Marxists—Kakumaru—and in describing this group will try to examine the culture of the student movement in depth. The Kakumaru itself is perhaps the most independent of all the factions, being more concerned with dialectic than the others but in spite of this it too advocates violence in pursuit of its ideal and as such is quite representative.

Finally some thought has been given to the future. Of course the summer of 1970 is sure to see renewed activity against the Japan-U.S. security treaty which is due for renewal but after that the student movement is sure to be around for a long time yet. We can try and predict what the future would be like if a student revolt ever materialized. Ideas on how to make the movement succeed and the opposing viewpoint of how to stop it are also aired.

In this short book, an attempt has been made to sort out the main facts about what is an exceedingly complicated situation
and to present for the reader an account of the most continuously active student movement in the world. If in doing so, this helps to clear up misunderstandings and confusion as to what Zengakuren is and helps give a better insight into what is happening in Japan today, then this book will have fulfilled its purpose.
Chapter 1: Historical Background

by IKEDA KAZUO

Organized political activity by Japanese students is not a new thing. Most student movements in other advanced countries seem to have been strongly influenced by the phenomenon of the Red Guards in the Chinese Cultural Revolution of 1966 and made their appearances in 1967 and 1968. However, the Japanese student movement started much earlier and in fact has had a continuous development since 1947. It is completely indigenous and though subject to some foreign influences, it is probably true that Japan has on the other hand been a great influence in its own right. To see why this is so we must start by examining the historical background to the modern situation.

At the heart of every attempt to explain Japan, inevitably there must be an acknowledgement of the uniqueness of the Japanese culture. Japan is an island country with a highly centralized and cohesive society and this has been true throughout its history. It is also important to grasp that Japan used to be an isolated country, which although under the influence of China was able to maintain a sense of uniqueness and independence. In the overcrowded living space of the Japanese islands, there has arisen a society in which membership of a group is the natural order and in which individuality is seen as a source of disharmony and has little or no place. The Japanese is from birth a member of several groups; starting with his family, next his work or study group, then other organizations and finally, he is a member of the Japanese nation. At different periods in history different groups have taken priority. For instance, during the feudal era the political structure was based on family loyalties and it was during this period that the fanatical ideals of duty and obedi-
ence to the group were developed. This was extended to encompass the whole nation during the modern era and the militarists of the pre-war era were able to base their ascendancy on careful manipulation of these characteristics. During the present day, the emphasis has been switched to the economic field and, under skilful management, Japan has become an industrial giant with the third largest gross national product in the world.

In such a group-oriented society, there exists tremendous rivalry between groups and factionalism within each group. Success or failure is highly dependent on the quality of leadership. It is quite feasible for a small group of men to take control of a larger body just by supplanting the old leaders. The Meiji Government was in the hands of just 100 men; the militarist clique which led Japan into the Pacific War was also a small select group, but both of these controlled the fate of every Japanese. It is in this sense that we should regard the Japanese student’s vision of a Socialist revolution as something more than a pipe-dream and realize how important it is to have some knowledge and understanding of the various factions of the student revolutionaries now vying for power.

The feudal period survived right up to the nineteenth century when Japan was rudely awakened by the military might of the Western nations. This led to a complete change in leadership; the last shogunate of the Tokugawa family gave way to the restoration of the Emperor in 1867. This period is referred to as Meiji, after the Emperor. The new leaders had originally opposed the shogunate’s policies of admitting foreigners, but later realized that the more sensible course would be to learn from the West and thereby make Japan as powerful as any Western country. This was done by sending Japanese to foreign countries to study different aspects of each. The most important subjects were military (army and navy) and government
(communications, transportation, education, agriculture, etc), but some importance was placed on industrial development also. Students were chosen to study the best examples of their fields at that time; for example the German Army provided the format for the fledgling Japanese Imperial Army, while Britain provided the plan for the Navy. Sometimes, however, it became necessary to change countries in mid-stream as some other had shown its system to be better and on other occasions two or more national systems were studied and then integrated. This has led to the situation where modern institutions are the product of a hodgepodge of different systems from many countries and are extremely difficult to operate, being hardly appropriate to the conditions of the new Japan.

We are mainly concerned in this book with two of these systems: education and parliamentary government. In the case of education, Western influences were felt right from the start of the Meiji Restoration, but in the case of parliamentary government, though, this was established as early on as 1890; it was not until the 1920s that the western influences of Socialism and Communism were felt. In the former case, educational policies were the result of studies instigated by the national leadership, but in the lattercase, Socialist and Communist politics were never approved of by the leaders and had to be spread on a much lower level than other foreign influences. All the same, both of these have come to be integral parts of modern Japanese society and are two of the main factors shaping the lives of the young Japanese students, especially those who make up the ranks of the revolutionaries.

The Early Period

All of modern Japanese history has its origins somewhere in the feudal period. Politics at that time centered around a ruling
family, either imperial or aristocratic. The existence of a large number of aristocratic families, with their own ranks of retainers and warriors, led to great rivalry and frequently to war to decide who should in fact rule. However, these internecine conflicts did not usually involve the main population. Finally, the Tokugawa family was able to suppress all opposition and by instituting strict feudal controls imposed the rule of their shogunate for 265 years right up to the onset of the modern period. During this period, the main characteristics of modern Japanese society were formulated and the Japanese people were bound together as an ethnic unit closer than ever before.

Education, at this time, was considered necessary for the training of the aristocracy and the priesthood. Most of the teaching was done by priests and so the emphasis was on Buddhist philosophy. Under the tight control of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan was almost completely isolated from the outside world and the inflexible rule by regional lords (daimyo) produced a change in ethics. Confucianism, which placed emphasis on complete loyalty, obedience to one’s master and the acceptance of traditional authority, came to dominate the schooling system. It was because these Confucian ideals had become so woven into Japanese society that the feudal era was able to last so long. Feudalism in Japan was almost identical to that of medieval Europe but with one important difference; in Europe the relation between lord and vassal was in the form of a sort of contract with a two-way system of mutual responsibilities, but in Japan all the responsibility was on the part of the subordinate to his superior, a one-way system which still exists in modified form.

However, though the Shogun held the real power, the emperor was still nominally head of Japan and when a movement built up to overthrow the shogunate it was to restore imperial rule. The leaders of the imperial restoration movement had confidently ex-
pected to manipulate the Emperor Meiji as a figurehead of their
government, but he was a man of great character and in due
course asserted himself so that Japan, at the onset of the modern
era, was under the central rule of a supreme Emperor. The resto-
ration government destroyed the power and status of the warrior
classes and managed to orientate the people of Japan to allegiance
to the Emperor. The new government was, in fact, an oligarchy
made up of a fewer than one hundred young men who were
acting in the name of the Emperor.

In overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate, one of the issues had
been a desire to prevent an influx of foreign ideas but with the
end of years of isolation, the new leaders were faced with the
task of creating an independent nation that could stand alone in
the world and so they turned to the West to find the answers to
their problems. It was realized at once that the old system of
temple schools was completely inadequate and that a new edu-
cational system was needed. Young men from all over Japan were
sent abroad to study. First of all, the government set up a Ministry
of Education in 1871 and in the following year a new educational
system was set up. Education, as originally provided, was to be on
a universal compulsory 4-year basis; the country was divided up
into 8 collegiate districts, after the French model, each of these
was made up of 32 high school districts, with each being divided
into 210 elementary school districts. Thus it was, that modern
education came to Japan, not as the result of universal suffrage,
but as part of a modernization policy of the national government.
From the start, the Japanese government has had a voice in
educational affairs, a situation which has had many ramifica-
tions.

As a model for its new school system Japan looked to the
United States. This was natural as Japan’s aim was universal
education and at that time the United States had achieved the
greatest success in this respect. Many educators were brought to Japan to advise and train teachers for the new system and so it was that Japan, although an authoritarian country, originally had progressive educational methods and techniques, such as the Pestalozzi method, which was in vogue at the time, and which emphasized learning through sense experience in contrast to rote memorization.

However, this era of progressive education was short-lived. Towards the end of the 1870s, the influence of the Confucianists rose again and they demanded a return to the Confucian base of education. They were instrumental in promulgating a series of educational ordinances which introduced a compulsory course on morals, stressing the traditional ethical ideals of loyalty and filial piety, together with military drill into the curriculum. The goal of education was now defined; education was for the benefit of the state, not for the benefit of the student. Stated another way, education was to teach the student what to think, not how to think.

A textbook authorization system was established and teachers could only use textbooks approved of by the Minister of Education. In 1904, it was learned that publishers had been bribing members of the prefectural textbook examining committees and so after this the Ministry itself took over publication of all school texts, compiling a systematic series for all subjects taught in the educational system. In this way, the government was able to exercise direct control over what was being taught.

In 1889, the Imperial Constitution was decreed and this confirmed the Emperor as the absolute ruler of Japan. In the following year, the Imperial Edict on Education appeared providing a philosophical basis for the national educational system. It cast the Emperor as a god and demanded absolute loyalty from his subjects. Patriotism, respect for the Constitution, observation of the law and willingness to die for Japan were all included in the
educational emphasis. As a result of these promulgations, education in Japan took on a decidedly ultranationalistic tone and became increasingly more militaristic. Hence, the basis was laid for ‘thought control’ and fascism which were later to emerge.

As we have said before, the Meiji government rested in the hands of a small but powerful oligarchy, however, in order to retain their power, it was necessary to widen their popular support and this was done by introducing several Western institutions of government. There was the creation of a parliament called the National Diet, a Constitution, government ministries for each administrative field and a prefectural system of local government which kept control firmly in the hands of Tokyo. But, whereas the parliamentary system in other countries was the result of popular demand and pressure, once again the Japanese Constitution and the Diet were the gift of the ruling oligarchy to the people. There was no need to make any concessions to the people and these things were made available because members of the ruling group had reached the conclusion that a constitution and some form of parliamentary government were essential components of a strong Western state.

The task of drafting a constitution was put in the hands of a man named Ito who travelled Europe studying the political institutions of the leading powers. He modelled the Imperial Constitution after the German model but included a very important innovation, that being a bi-cameral Diet. There was to be a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The latter was to be elected by males over 25 who paid an annual tax of fifteen yen or more. This meant an initial electorate of 460,000, slightly more than 1% of the population. The original political parties were created in 1881; the Liberal Party (Jiyuto), Reform Party (Kaishinto) and Imperial Party (Teiseito). However, these parties merely reflected the interests of factions within the group of ruling
oligarchs. In 1890, the first elections were held and though the workings of government had moved from the closed committee room to the floor of the Diet, it was still not possible to say that Japan had become a democracy in the Western sense, and in fact, it still maintained all the traditions of a paternalistic authoritarian state.

The same period up to 1890 also saw the establishment of the first universities and the beginnings of higher education. In most countries, it is the private university which traditionally enjoys the greatest prestige, but in Japan a different state of affairs exists. Japan has three categories of university—national, public and private. The national universities were established and financed directly by the government and for this reason were more prestigious. However, the first university to be established was actually a private one, Keio University, which was started in 1858, some ten years before the Meiji Restoration. Following this, up to 1890, of the 9 universities founded, 8 were private and although they did not enjoy the approval of the government, they were able to build up good reputations, supplying services that the national universities were unable to provide, by making higher education more accessible and by stressing individual development.

The first national university was formed in 1877, when Tokyo University was created by joining two schools (Kaisei Gakko and Tokyo Medical College) together to become the most important scat of learning in the land. It consisted of four departments; Law, Science, Literature and Medicine. Initially, there was a student enrollment of 1,750 and a faculty of 91, including 35 foreigners. When the Imperial University Edict (Teikoku Dai-gaku Rei) was set forth in 1886, Tokyo University changed its name to Tokyo Imperial University. At first Tokyo had been modelled after the amalgamated college in the United States but after the Imperial University Edict, it was completely re-
organized after the pattern of the German universities, where the professors both taught and conducted research. According to the Imperial Edict, the purpose of the university was to provide instruction in the arts and sciences required by the state as well as to conduct original research in these fields. Hence the universities, and in particular Tokyo Imperial University, became the learning organizations of the state, training the leaders and officials of government.

In 1897, another imperial university was established at Kyoto. Two more quickly followed in Kyushu and Hokkaido in 1903. Tohoku Imperial University was set up in 1909 and then in 1931, one each in Osaka and Nagoya. Apart from Keio, the first private universities were Senshu (founded in 1880), Waseda (1882), Meiji (1881), Nihon (1889) and Hosei (1889). In addition to these, there were the private universities established by Christian missionary groups. These schools were founded so as to proselytize religious beliefs, but as they were staffed by many foreign teachers, they were able to provide excellent instruction in English, economics and political science. Among these universities were Rikkyo (Episcopalian, 1871), Aoyama Gakuin (1883) and Jochi or Sophia University (Roman Catholic, 1913).

During the period following the war with Russia in 1904 through to the First World War, Japanese industry developed and expanded. The industrial field consequently required a large number of people who had received a higher education. The government was quick to respond and passed a new University Edict in 1918 which recognized private as well as public universities. Through this law, single department schools were expanded into multiple department institutions and referred to as Government Universities. It was at this time that the imperial universities were first required to have graduate departments. The purpose of the university was further defined by this law as
the teaching of theory and practices required by the state, the investigation of basic knowledge and the cultivation of the spirit of nationalism. Before the passing of this law, there were only a few imperial universities and thus only a small percentage were able to obtain a first class higher education. However, with the University Edict of 1918, the character of the university changed and the number of people receiving a higher education greatly increased (see Chart). Already by this time, the Japanese university students had become an elite group, occupying a special position in society, which led to them taking an active role in the community at a very early age.

Chart
Government-recognized universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>69,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>81,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the Meiji government established universities in Japan it aimed at the cultivation of nationalism and naturally did not readily admit to university independence and autonomy. The government chose to control the university and restrict it to its own needs. However, as Japanese intellectuals came into contact with foreign ideologies and studied at foreign universities, they began to reflect on what the true nature of the university should be and became aware of the concepts of university autonomy and academic freedom. In spite of the Government's negative
attitude, two incidents occurred which were to lay the foundations for the continuing struggle for university autonomy.

In 1904, Japan was about to declare war with Russia when a professor of Law at Tokyo Imperial University, Tomizu Hiroto, criticized the government's policy towards Russia which he claimed had been unimaginative up to then. He was urging that a more aggressive stand be taken and to this end he started a political movement. The government was quite unprepared to accept this type of criticism and so, acting through the office of the Minister of Education, Kuboto Yuzuru, took the step of having Professor Tomizu fired from the university. Although such action had always been possible on the part of the Ministry, this act caused great concern amongst the professors at Tokyo, and the president, Yamagawa Kenjiro, resigned taking responsibility for the affair. The professors in the Law Department protested strongly saying that the government should have consulted with the university first before taking such action. Because of their demands, the Minister of Education resigned and Tomizu and Yamagawa were allowed to resume their posts. This incident set a precedent and though not recognized legally, action such as the dismissal of faculty members was never again taken by the government (until the war) without prior consultation with the faculty. So for the first time, public attention was drawn to the question of university autonomy.

The other key incident took place in 1914. The president of Kyoto Imperial University, Sawayanagi Seitaro, was well known for his ideas on eliminating the stagnating character of the university. He was well informed about foreign conditions and was keen on innovations. For instance, although women were rarely allowed to enter institutions of higher learning in Japan at that time, Sawayanagi was responsible for letting women enter Toboku Imperial University. However, he aroused opposition on
account of his dictatorial methods. The incident in question occurred when he tried to dismiss 7 professors who he claimed were lazy. The other professors protested his high-handedness, asserting that the president of a university ought to consult with his faculty before taking any such action, and the protest forced Sawayanagi's resignation. It is interesting to note that the next president at Kyoto, Araki Torasaburo, was elected by the voting of the faculty for the first time and that with this assertion of power on the part of the faculty, this method of selecting a president eventually spread to Tokyo Imperial University as well as other universities.

These two incidents established precedents for the preservation of university autonomy, established the rights of the university in its dealings with the government and for the faculty with regard to the university executive. It is important to note that these guidelines had no basis in law and that the government in particular would frequently try to ignore them, so that the question of university autonomy appears again and again and has never been satisfactorily resolved. When the student movement got started in the modern period, it too looked to these precedents to find examples upon which to base its claims for representation in the university administration.

The Pre-war Period

With the onset of the 1920's, the political picture in Japan was radically altered by the influx of foreign ideologies, especially Socialism and Communism. However, the main political power remained in essentially the same hands as it always had and would throughout Japan's history. Originally this power had been represented by the groups behind the Liberal Party and the Reform Party, but in time these parties changed their names and gradually drew closer. First, the Reform Party became the Pro-
gressive Party, and then in 1898 they joined the Liberal Party to form the Constitution Party (Kenseito). Factionalism quickly caused the new party to split into two rival Constitution Parties which in turn became the Government Association (Seiyukai) in 1900 and the People’s Party (Kokuminto) in 1910. The People’s Party itself subdivided into two groups which evolved into the Reform Club (Kakushin Kurabu, 1923) and the Constitution Association (Kenseikai, 1916). In 1927, the Constitution Association joined with a splinter group from the Government Association to form the Democratic Constitution Party and this once more broke up in 1932 into two parts, one of which called itself the National Federation (Kokumindomei) while the other kept the old name of the Democratic Constitution Party. All this jockeying for power amongst the governmental factions gave rise to the three main parties which existed before the war and which survived until they were broken up by the militarists in 1940. The way in which these groups continued splitting up and reforming is very Japanese and finds an interesting parallel in the modern student movement. At first, it was the purpose of the ruling oligarchy to use parliamentary government as a means of consolidating their power; later the new industrial and economic combines carried on this practice. The governments that were formed did not last long and the prewar period saw the rotation of the premiership around members of a select group.

Outside of this clique, in which the real political power was resolved, there were not many other political organizations but with the successful completion of the Russian Revolution it was not long before Socialist and Communist theories began to make an impression on the intellectuals of Japan. The 1920’s saw the emergence of the first student organizations which went beyond being simple university clubs and were centered around
the study of social science. This subject was not included in the curricula at that time and as time passed the interpretations of society made by these organizations took on a distinctly Marxist tone. There had also been several popular social movements in Japan such as the Rice Riots of 1918 and these had a profound effect on the students of the time. The first student group that was formed to study social theory and related problems was the Shinjinkai (Enlightened Man Society) at Tokyo Imperial University. This was also the start of the whole development of Socialism and Communism in Japan and left-wing history can be traced from this point. Thus it was that student organizations have always been an integral part of the Japanese Socialist movement and it is quite natural for today’s students to express their idealism in terms of socialist revolution.

Actually, the first Socialist teachings had made their appearance in Japan in 1898, through a small Christian oriented group which was formed to study Socialism, which was called the Shakaishugi Kenkyukai (The Association for the Study of Socialism). Following this was an abortive attempt to found a Social Democratic Party and it wasn’t until 1907 that a viable party was formed which called itself the Nihon Shakaito (Japan Socialist Party). Extremists within this tiny party were committed to violent revolution after the anarchist pattern and finally in 1910, they hatched the plot to assassinate the Emperor Meiji for which twelve radicals were executed and the Socialist movement ground to a halt.

Next came the Shinjinkai at Tokyo Imperial University which was founded in 1918 under the leadership of one of the professors, Yoshino Sakuzo. Its activities were mainly concerned with the instruction and study of social ideologies, interpretation of foreign books and lecture meetings. This group was the most important single student organization of the time and con-
continued to play an active part in the democratic movement until 1926, organizing itself as a labor movement as well. At this time, another very important student group was formed at Waseda University called the Gyominkai (Men of Dawn Society) which was to become the nucleus of the first Communist Party.

The first efforts to organize the students on a nationwide scale came with the formation of the Gakusei Rengo (Student Federation) which encompassed forty student groups, including the Shinjinkai and the Gyominkai, from all Japanese universities. The first Gakusei Rengo was set up at Tokyo Imperial University in 1922 and by the next year it had spread throughout Japan and even included several high school groups. The aim of this federation was to promote mutual understanding between students of different schools. In 1923 however, the government, alarmed by its rapid growth, tried to suppress it by arresting many of the active leaders. In spite of this, the Gakusei Rengo was able to hold a nationwide meeting in 1924 and by then could claim membership of forty-nine student groups with a total of 1,500 students. There were two main factions in the Gakusei Rengo; one favoring an active policy of making a radical movement the main purpose of the federation and the other, taking a more scholarly attitude, advocated deeper study of social problems. A meeting attended by all the representatives was held to resolve this conflict and the result was a compromise decision to devote themselves to the spreading of Marxism and to participate in the student movement in the role of students, not professional revolutionaries.

At the same time, the labor movement was beginning to get started with the first trade union organizations such as Sodomei (Japanese Federation of Labor) which were also following Socialist lines. For a while, there had been anarchists in control, but with the international failure of anarcho-syndicalism, 1922
saw the effective end of their influence in Japan. The first Communist Party was an underground organization founded in 1921 while the ostensive public front was an extension of the Waseda Gyominkai which had the name Gyomin Kyosanto (Men of Dawn Communist Party). Naturally these parties met with government disapproval and were vigorously suppressed, most of the leaders being arrested. Finally in 1922, through a group of Japanese delegates and Comintern officials in Moscow on July 15th, a meeting was held to found the Japan Communist Party as a branch of the international communist movement. This lasted until the summer of the following year when the police obtained a list of the members and it was wiped out. This was the pattern in those days when any mention of left wing sympathies was enough to get professors drummed out of their positions. The Socialist intellectuals had no chance to form a permanent body. However, it was already apparent that among the few Japanese who belonged to these groups a debate was emerging. The crux of the matter was this: what was the true nature of Japanese society and what was the correct way to regard social revolution in Japan? The early Communists were very much under the influence of Moscow and so they were concerned with making a proletarian revolution despite the fact that at that time the real mass of the population were peasants. The pivot was in the development of the bourgeoisie and whether the Meiji Reformation had produced a bourgeois revolution in Japan; if so, then Japan was already ripe for a one-step revolution, but if this was not so then a two-step revolution would be necessary.

It was acknowledged by nearly every one concerned that Japan was not ready for a Communist party, so instead it was decided to form a legal proletarian party. The Japan Communist Party therefore was disbanded, but when the Comintern heard of this they were indignant with such an independent action being taken
and ordered it to be reformed. Thus it was that several groups came into being within the Communist movement, each with its own interpretation of how to act. Accordingly, when the time came to form a proletarian party in 1925, four separate parties made their appearances. The so-called right-wing elements formed the Shakai Minshuto (Social Mass Party), which included Sodo-mei union representation; the Nihon Nominto (Japan Farmers Party) was based on rural support and by necessity had to be rather conservative; the Nihon Ronoto (Japan Labor-Farmer Party) was in the center and included labor leaders and intellectuals; and finally there was the Rodo Nominto (Labor-Farmer Party) which was under Communist control.

The government was embarking on a policy of ultra-nationalism and considered any form of social movement as a threat, so it was systematically harassing and trying to suppress the fledgeling student movement and proletarian parties. In 1925, the Law for the Maintenance of the Public Peace was passed which gave the government the power they needed to be able to crush any movement that was considered to be against their policies.

This had serious repercussions in the academic world. Professors were forced to give up their research into Marxist and Socialist ideologies or suffer the consequences. In one instance, an Assistant Professor of Tokyo Imperial University spent 3 months in jail because the Public Prosecutor argued that his essays made public anarchistic thinking like Kropotkin's and was clearly detrimental to Japanese nationalism. In 1923, the government tried to implement a policy of establishing military study groups in the universities. The first attempt was at Waseda University and aroused a storm of protest among the students and led to clashes between the Sumo Wrestling Club, whose sympathies were with the right wing militarists, and the protesters. The military study groups didn't succeed, but such was the climate.
of the times.

In 1925, the Law for the Maintenance of the Public Peace was proposed by the Government and it passed the Diet in March. Not only did it prohibit movements and associations which aimed at changing the national character but sympathizers could be punished under this law to penal servitude for up to 10 years (later in 1928, this was changed to a maximum penalty of death). This law was first invoked against members of the Gakusei Rengo at Kyoto Imperial University sending 30 students to prison. The result of this law was the complete prohibition of free speech and thought until it was finally repealed in 1945 when 500 political prisoners were freed by the occupation troops.

In 1928, the Minister of Education, Mizuno Rentaro, summoned all the presidents of the major Japanese universities and ordered them to break up all of the social science study groups such as the Shinjinkai and other members of the Gakusei Rengo. He also insisted that Marxist professors should be eliminated and as a result, many professors including those who were only guilty of lecturing on Marxian economics were forced to resign. At this time, it was clear that the real power lay with the government in directing the policy of the universities and that the presidents had become very weak. At the same time, the student social science study groups were being suppressed and by 1929 all of the important leaders had been arrested, so these groups could not help but break up.

By the 1920's a fundamental change had come over Japanese politics. The original oligarchy of the Meiji era had died out and had been replaced by an ever-increasing number of interests who had succeeded to the mantle of power. Prominent among these interests were the newly emerging industrial and economic combines which were able to buy control of whichever party was represented in the Cabinet and the government. Thus it was that
the right-wing parties, the Government Association and the Constitution Association, were the tools of backroom power groups. In this atmosphere, the newly educated class of young intellectuals emerged. We have already noted how these young men had turned to the study of social science and Marxism in their independent strivings toward an interpretation of society. Now there came an even more important phase in which these young men came to form the vanguard of the Japanese Communist movement. In doing so they tended to be at odds with the Comintern and like their leader Fukumoto Kazuo were even ready to criticize Marx!

In 1926, Fukumoto and his associates reformed the Japan Communist Party but within a year due to intense Comintern pressure, Fukumoto was forced to give up his position on the Central Committee and the Party endorsed the Moscow position. At the same time, there was the Rono faction which was organized by Yamazawa around the monthly magazine Rono (Labor-Farmer). This group tried desperately to get Comintern approval but were repeatedly rebuffed for their policies which included the thesis that Japan was ripe for a one-step revolution because the bourgeoisie had already triumphed over the feudalism of the past. By 1930, the Rono group was itself as an independent Communist faction without any ties and was instrumental in transmitting to postwar Japan a staunch Marxist stance to the more moderate political groups. The origins of the present Japan Socialist Party can be traced from this group and in time, Rono National Communism became Socialism.

The electorate was enlarged from 3 million to 13 million in the 1928 election and all the proletarian parties campaigned vigorously and gained 5% of the total vote. The Communist Labor-Farmer Party made the most substantial gains, but these were short lived as might be expected and the police rounded up some
1,200 people only one month after the election and the government ordered the dissolution of the Labor-Farmer Party and the Proletarian Youth League as being Communist front organizations. This put the Comintern Communists in a bad position as they opposed the creation of a legal party that would drain support from the Communist Party while the Rono faction went ahead and formed a new legal left party, the Musan Taishuto (Proletarian Mass Party), and began to recruit members of the defunct Labor-Farmer Party. The old Labor-Farmer Party was revived by some of its former members only to be banned two days later by the authorities. Communist influence continued in the labor movement with the formation of Zenkyo (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Zenkoku Kyogikai-National Council of Japanese Labor Unions) but this only had a membership of 5,500 so it could not be said to be very important at the time. Through the 1929-1930 period, surveillance of Japanese Communists was on the increase; so precarious was their position that members had taken to carrying guns and on occasion pitched battles were fought with police. But the nationalist tide was sweeping over Japan and by 1935 all the major leaders were in jail, where they remained until the end of the war. Other socialist and liberal politicians were harassed and occasionally imprisoned for short times.

Meanwhile, in the upper levels of government, there was an almost complete break down of parliamentary practice. The same infusion of newly educated youth that we saw at the intellectual Socialist level was mirrored among the more conservative of the youth. These young people tended to come from rural areas and were thus very reactionary, distrustful of capitalism and disinclined to hold respect for the older leaders. Many of these had joined the army and thus it was that this new breed of right-wing nationalists were sympathetic to totalitarianism, and given Japan’s weakness in the field of natural resources they advocated
a policy of imperialist expansion. That these militarists were able to get control of the reins of government was due to the Meiji emphasis on the supreme nature of the Emperor. By careful manipulation of the nation’s loyalties, the militarists were able both to justify their own actions and to lead the people forward in whatever direction they chose. Extremists of this group helped indirectly by liquidating democratic leaders, and also at the same time, making the militarists look more moderate, allowed them to step forward and take over. In 1932, the army finally took over, demanded an end to party Cabinets and put its own men in charge of a Cabinet composed of professional bureaucrats. The left-wing parties were all banned and the right-wing parties were left with a powerless Diet in which they could do little more than conduct meaningless debates. The elections of 1936 produced very strong support for liberal candidates which shocked the military considerably and as a result right-wing extremists were sent out to murder as many of the leading statesmen as possible. These extremists were punished, but with all the opposition removed nothing stood between the militarists and complete power.

This period saw the creation of the Bureau of Thought Supervision within the Ministry of Education. This office was just what its name implies, a straightjacket for education. It worked in two ways: one through control of schools by secret police and propaganda methods, and the other through examining books and surveying ‘thought problems’ in schools. This bureau also published books such as Basic Principles of the National Polity and The Way of the Subject which were then distributed to all teachers, from primary schools to universities.

In 1936, a Council on Innovation in Learning and Education was set up to advise the Ministry of Education on policy in the thought control program. Its members were both teachers and
laymen and their recommendations for guaranteeing the support of the people for nationalistic policies were as follows:

1) Institutions should be interpreted in accordance with national aims in contrast with the individualism and materialism of the West;

2) All things not conforming to national policy should be excluded from Japanese thinking;

3) University professors should be chosen not only for their scholarship but also for their loyalty to Japanese tradition;

4) Japanese spirit and ancestor worship were two subjects to be stressed in elementary schools;

5) Political reliability should be emphasized in the training of teachers, principals and inspectors;

6) Textbooks should enhance the national spirit and should include examination and refutation of foreign social philosophies;

7) Courses, such as morals and civics, should be taught in such a way as to strengthen filial piety, loyalty and obedience to law;

8) History, in particular, should interpret Japan's social and political system favorably;

9) Other subjects such as the arts and physical training should also be utilized.

The institution of this thought control program encountered strong resistance from the universities and many incidents occurred. In one case, the Minister of Education (Hatoyama Ichiro, who was to become Prime Minister in 1955) forced the resignation of Takigawa Yukitatsu, a law professor at Kyoto, because he lectured on Tolstoy's concepts of punishment, and such teaching was deemed communistic. In spite of protest action by students and faculty who believed that they would be consulted in the hiring or firing of professors, the government stood firm and from this time on suppression of academic freedom was assured.
In 1935, the country was completely militarized, with the budget for military affairs having risen from 39.9% in 1933 to 46.1%. Under these circumstances the Minobe incident occurred. Minobe Tatsukichi was a retired doctor from Tokyo Imperial University who lectured occasionally, and his crime was to put forward the idea that although the Emperor was the supreme head of the state, his right to govern was limited by the Imperial Constitution of 1889. His ideas were denounced by the military authorities and the right-wing who accused him of disloyalty and of ridiculing the Emperor. His books were banned and in the following year he was attacked by a right-wing terrorist who shot and injured him. (n.b. Minobe’s son is the present governor of Tokyo).

In 1937, another incident occurred in which right-wing professors at Tokyo Imperial University tried to get Professor Yanaihara Tadao dismissed from the Economics Department for publishing an anti-war essay entitled ‘The Ideal of the State’. At a faculty meeting, however, there was sufficient support for Yanaihara that no decision could be taken, and in addition the President of Tokyo, Nagaio Mataro, was determined to defend him. At this point, the Minister of Education stepped in and forced Nagaio to change his position and dismiss Yanaihara. Yanaihara, however, resigned before this action could be taken, but this incident set a new precedent in which the faculty meeting was over-ruled by the government, thus destroying the university autonomy.

Immediately after this, a group of right-wing professors in the Economics Department suggested that the students should go to the Meiji Shrine to worship on the day set aside for the Meiji holiday. Several of the more liberal professors opposed this, only to be marked as unpatriotic and in 1938 these and others were arrested and accused of opposing fascism. As a result of
these arrests, the professors were forced to resign.

At this time, Araki Sadao, a general in the army, became the Minister of Education and his ideas were naturally very militaristic. He tried to get the system of electing the president and faculty of the universities changed to one of appointment. However, in this case, all the national universities united to protest such a change and his recommendation became ineffective. On another occasion, a history professor, Tsuda Sokichi, had succeeded in proving that two ancient books had been written for the purpose of justifying Imperial rule and were not based on historical facts, and for this he was persecuted and forbidden to publish his books, he resigned his position and finally was sentenced to three months in prison.

As these examples show, the government's intervention in university affairs was becoming more and more blatant and in the end, by using the war as an excuse, it was able to completely subjugate the universities. Students were forced to work in the war industries and by 1944 were in the battlefield. It is a measure of the effectiveness of the thought control programs that when the desperate measures involving kamikaze suicide pilots were developed, these planes were piloted by university undergraduates, ready to give their lives for the Emperor and Japan. In this way, the university had lost its meaning and served merely as a tool of the state. During this period many intellectuals were arrested, some spending the whole of the war in prison.

Parliamentary democracy had fared no better for in 1940, using the war as justification, all political parties were disbanded and the nation entered a period of martial rule which only ended with Japan's surrender and the end of the war.

The Modern Period

On September 2, 1945, Japan formally surrendered to the
Allied armies under the leadership of General MacArthur. For the next six years MacArthur was the Supreme Leader of the Japanese people and he supervised the task of reforming Japanese society. The operative word for this process was democratization. Of course this word has many connotations and was intended primarily in the American sense, but even from this point of view the democratization of Japan was far more radical than anything attempted in America. Japan had gone wrong in the past and drastic treatment was needed. Basic to this policy was a complete revision of all sections of government. Japan was presented with a new Constitution on March 6, 1946 in which the position of the Emperor was defined as symbol of the state with no actual power of government. This was because the militarists had been able to build their rise to power on use of the Emperor's position and the institution he represented. Second to this, the Constitution guaranteed the parliamentary system. Previous to this time, the Diet had no guarantees as to its power and the actual government was conducted through the Cabinet. The House of Peers was abolished and in its place was the House of Councillors, an elected body of men who were to be in an advisory capacity to the House of Representatives in whom the power of government now rested. The problem of control over the Army and Navy was solved by abolishing them and now the bureaucrats of the Ministries were directly answerable to the Diet.

Thus it was that Japan gained a foreign military regime that was in practice really revolutionary and the policies laid in that period still apply today. Hence, a new era of peace and liberalism began in Japan after so many years of militarism and repression. The reaction against the evils of war was so profound that from being one of the most aggressive countries in the world, Japan now became firmly committed to the ideals of peace and democracy and opposed to the use of nuclear weapons.

— 33 —
To select the new leaders, the Occupation authorities turned to those people who had established themselves before the war as being anti-militaristic or at least unaffected by militaristic thinking. The old regime was purged from all positions of authority and in this process nearly 200,000 people were involved. Actually, this did not make so much difference in the long run for many of the purged leaders were allowed to take their places again in society before the end of the Occupation, but it did mean that people with left-wing political philosophies were able to practise their beliefs freely. With the prewar Communist leaders released from prison, 1946 saw the organization of a legal Japan Communist Party (Nihon Kyosanto). The Socialist Party (Shakaito) was reorganized from elements of the Social Mass Party and the Rono faction communists of the prewar era. However, with the coming of legality, the left wing found itself cast in permanent opposition to the right wing government party.

Originally in 1945, the right-wing consisted of three parties: the Jiyuto (Liberal Party) which was directly descended from the Seiyukai, the Kyodoto (Cooperative Party) and the Shimpoto (Progressive Party), both of which drew their membership from the ranks of the old Seiyukai and the Minseito. These three parties existed for some time as separate entities but their policies were very close and in time they were to join together and became one broad right-wing party.

However, there was a tendency at this early stage for the electorate to identify the party in power with the Occupation authorities and on this basis, the Socialist Party enjoyed a brief spell of government. In the first election after the war, the Liberals had a plurality, but later in 1947, the Socialists and the Democrats (the Progressive Party had been renamed as the Nihon Minshuto—Japan Democratic Party that year) won 143 and 131 seats respectively against the Liberals' total of 124 seats.
A coalition government was formed between the Socialists and the Democrats with the Socialist leader, Katayama, as Prime Minister. At this time, internal divisions within the Socialist Party were aggravated by the necessarily close associations the ruling party had to have with the Occupation forces and this led first to a revolt of the Socialist left-wing and then to the complete withdrawal of the Socialists from the coalition. With this ended the first and only Socialist government in Japanese history.

With the collapse of the coalition, the electorate swung away from the center and the Democrats lost seats to the Liberals and the Socialists lost to the Communists. A large number of former Democrats had also joined the Liberals, and in 1950 the Liberals even changed their name to the Minshujiyuto (Democratic Liberal Party). With this increased support, the Liberals resumed power and have managed to hold onto it since that time. The Socialists, on the other hand, suffered a split in 1948 and became three separate parties; the Rodosha Nominto (Worker-Farmer Party), the Shakai Kakushinto (Social Reform Party) and the Socialist Party.

The Communist Party had emerged from the war as a party which was made up of men who had spent more than fifteen years in prison or in exile. They regarded the Occupation authorities as being favorable for their dreams of completing the first stage of revolution, that of establishing a democratic-bourgeois society. This thesis as put forward by Nozaka was criticized by Moscow through its new organ Cominform, and thus the Communists were obliged to put on a much more uncompromising attitude towards the Occupation. One of the annoying things was that the Occupation was sufficiently radical in its reforms, such as land reform, modification of the Emperor system and the break-up of the monopolistic cartels, as to rob
the Communists of an effective program with which to appeal to the masses. Particularly felt was the inability of the Communists to get any wide-spread support from rural areas. At this stage, the Communists also suffered a setback in their attempt to win mass support of the labor movement. Immediately after the war, the labor movement was re-established, and whereas it had never before claimed allegiance of more than 7% of the working population, the numbers quickly rose to 50% of all industrial workers. Two federations were formed: one was Sodomei (General Federation of Labor) which was under Socialist domination and had strong prewar foundations; the other was Sanbetsu (Congress of Industrial Unions) which was under Communist control. At the start, it was Sanbetsu which enjoyed the greatest success, quickly enlarging its membership within the labor movement, but the turning point came when in 1947, the Communists tried to organize a general strike which was put down by the last-minute intervention of the Occupation authorities. As the federation directly responsible for this fiasco, Sanbetsu lost most of its union affiliates, with membership dropping from 1,500,000 in the beginning to only 400,000 by 1949. The Communist Party and in particular its newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag), became ever more critical of the Occupation and after the success of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, were tempted to try for all out armed revolution. The only result of this was for the Communists to become increasingly isolated from the public.

In conformance with the new political changes after the war, educational policies were also changed. Militarism and ultranationalism were eliminated from the educational system in every form. So far reaching were these reforms that for a period teachers had to teach their students from the old textbooks, giving instructions as to which sentences to delete and which to retain. This about-face on the part of the teachers, later led to a great
deal of scepticism on the part of the students. However, the basic steps were taken to repeal such laws as the Publication Law, the Newspaper Law and the Law for the Maintenance of the Public Peace, all of which impinged on individual and academic freedom. Militarists and ultranationalists were forced to stop teaching while teachers who had been purged before 1945 were invited back to their former posts. The principles of university autonomy, freedom of study, thought and expression were all reinstated in the educational system.

In March, 1946, the United States Education Mission arrived in Japan to advise on educational reconstruction. In conjunction with this, a Japanese Education Reform Committee, (Kyoiku Sashin Inkai), was formed so as to discuss with and assist the U.S. Mission in solving the problems of Japanese education. The Mission ended its visit by making the following list of recommendations:

1) Introduction of freedom and democratization of education;
2) Decentralization of the Ministry of Education’s control;
3) Substitution of Social Studies for the courses on Morals;
4) A 6-3-3 ladder (6 years elementary school, 3 years junior high school and 3 years high school), the first 9 years of which would be compulsory and free for all children;
5) Greater emphasis on physical and vocational education at all levels;
6) Independence of private schools;
7) Change in the methods of student guidance;
8) Development of adult education.
9) Increase in the number of universities;
10) Broadening the scope of teacher training by means of 4-year normal schools which would provide both a professional and a liberal education.

On the basis of these recommendations the Education Reform
Committee drafted the Fundamental Law of Education which passed the Diet in March, 1947. We shall quote a part of this law.

The Fundamental Law of Education

Preface

Having established a new Japanese constitution, we have shown our resolve to contribute to the peace of the world and the welfare of humanity by building a democratic and cultural state. The realization of this ideal shall depend fundamentally on the strength of education.

We shall esteem individual dignity and endeavor to bring up people who love truth and peace by providing them with an education which aims at the creation of a universal and individual culture.

We hereby enact this law, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of Japan, with a view to clarifying the aim of education and establishing the foundation for a new Japan.

Article 1: The Aim of Education

Education shall aim at the full development of personality striving for the cultivation of a people sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labor, have a deep sense of responsibility and be imbued with an independent spirit as builders of a peaceful state and society.

Article 3: Equal Opportunity in Education

The people shall all be given equal opportunities in receiving an education according to their ability and they shall not be subject to educational discrimination on account of race, creed, sex, social status, economic position or family origin. The state and local public corporations shall take measures to give financial assistance to those who have difficulty, in spite of their ability, in receiving education for economic reasons.
Article 8: Political Education

The political knowledge necessary for intelligent citizenship shall be valued in education. However, schools shall refrain from political education or other political activity for or against any specific political party.

Article 10: School Administration

Education shall not be subject to improper control but shall be directly responsible to all the people. School Administration shall, on the basis of this realization, aim at the adjustment and establishment of various conditions required in order to fulfill the purposes of education.

This was the first time that the principles governing Japanese education had been made into law. In the past, education had to function in accordance with a series of Imperial Edicts which had laid down the principles for the benefit of the Emperor and Japan. Now for the first time, education was to be for the benefit of the individual student.

Accompanying this law was the School Education Law which provided the details for carrying out the aims of the new education. It specified a 6–3–3–4 education, making the first 9 years, elementary school and junior high school compulsory for all children, including the handicapped.

However, many of the reforms which were instituted did not fit very well into the Japanese system of education and were met with a certain amount of resistance. The American educators who advised on these reforms, based their recommendations on their own experience in the State and local educational systems in the U.S. and these were not always appropriate to Japan. In contrast to the U.S., Japan is a small country with a closely knit society, hence a centralized education system is more suited to Japan than to the U.S. The decentralization of the Ministry of Educa-
tion was one of the first reforms to be subjected to a reversal after the end of the occupation, when in 1956, the centralized powers of the Ministry were restored. Many such ill-suited reforms exist even today and are the source of some friction in the educational system.

Many new universities were established in 1949 under this law, and they were formed out of institutions, such as high schools, specialized schools and teacher training schools, that had existed under the previous system. They were modelled after the State universities in the U.S. and were open to women. Most of the new universities were private and in the first twenty years after the war, the number of private universities doubled while national universities stayed at almost the same level, the number of students enrolled increased by nearly four times and the number of female students went up more than eight times.

Under the new Constitution, university autonomy and academic freedom were to a great extent guaranteed and many of the educational practices which were under the control of the government were completely reformed. However, it was necessary to also reconsider the entire structure of the university as well as its relation to the Ministry of Education. In 1947, at the 50th general meeting of the Education Reform Committee, the following reforms were suggested in the formulation of a University Law:

1) As university autonomy should be respected, management should be left to the university.
2) A central educational committee should be established so as to democratize education and improve its quality.
3) The Ministry of Education should be abolished and in its place a Ministry of Culture established.

The Occupation Authorities also suggested that a Board of Trustees or Regents similar to the State universities in the U.S.
be set up and should be composed of men of experience and knowledge who were not otherwise members of the university. This last suggestion met with opposition from many professors including the heads of the seven old Imperial Universities who objected to the intrusion of non-university people into the university, for this was felt to entail many dangers.

The proposal to abolish the Ministry of Education was fiercely resisted by the bureaucrats of the Ministry and because of their pressure, it was never realized.

Another strong opponent of the proposed University Law was the newly formed organization, Zengakuren. This federation was formed in September, 1948, and consisted of students from national, public and private universities. The government at the time was suspected of planning to suppress the student movement and given this situation, some 200,000 students went on strike against the attempt to change the university system. Finally in 1951, a plan for a University Law was proposed to the 10th Diet. It called for respect of university autonomy and the establishment of a National University Council. This council would consist of 20 members appointed by the Ministry of Education and it would consider the important problems of the universities. In addition to this, a Shogikai (Consultative Committee) would be set up, consisting of professors, men of knowledge and men of experience. However, once again this legislation ran into fierce opposition on the part of both the professors and Zengakuren, and so it had to shelved.

This brings us into the beginning of the Zengakuren period and we will now take up our study of the modern Japanese student movement.
Chapter 2: Origins of Zengakuren

by MATSUNAMI MICHIIHIRO

In the year 1945, on August 15th, the Pacific War ended with Japan’s surrender. Slowly the students returned from the war to start their studies anew. However, there was a different atmosphere on the campus and university life in Japan had been changed irrevocably from what had gone before.

The Thought Control Bureau in the Ministry of Education was gone and now the students were free to air their opinions, which they did with relish. Those who had been drafted into the forces were filled with bitterness against the leaders and institutions that had produced the war. In their minds, there remained the voices of their friends who had died in the senseless slaughter. In the diary of a student-soldier, ‘Kike Wadatsumi no Koe’ (Listen to the Voices of the Sea-god!), we read: “If we live, can there yet be a day when we recall this time as the long long night, when we could hardly see the stars?” The very beginnings of the student movement started in their searchings for the responsibility of the war, in the exorcism of militarism on the campus and in a reappraisal of the old way of doing things.

Almost a third of Tokyo had been destroyed by fire-bombings at the end of the war; refugees from the countryside had come crowding back into the cities, there was little food, clothing was scarce, transportation woefully inadequate and yet, the students went back to their universities. Faced with extreme hardship and insufficient facilities, the students organised themselves in Livelihood Associations, which provided cheap meals, clothes and books at a time when prices were rising daily. These organizations were to be the nuclei of the future student councils. Taking a leaf out of Labor’s book, the students started their own move-
ment to protest the old system which was still existing on the campus.

The real start of the student movement was the democratization struggle at Mito High School (now Ibaragi University) in 1945. At Mito, the president was appointed by the Ministry of Education and his policies at the time had resulted in the progressive professors being restricted in their activities and the student management of their dormitories being taken away. So the students, who were proud of their High School's tradition of liberalism, started a movement which they called a campus liberation struggle. They went on strike and shut themselves up in one of the dormitories with the aim of forcing the dismissal of the conservative president and the return of the progressive professors. The students' conditions were accepted after only a three day strike and meeting with such success, the movement soon spread to nearly every campus in the country. It was not limited just to national universities and government schools, but also affected private universities as well. For instance, the university authorities at Nippon University Medical Faculty were confused by the demands of the students and closed the campus. But in spite of this, the students still went to the university and, more important, a plan was eventually hammered out in which students had some say in the use of the education fund and were able to criticize the management by the university authorities. This plan, with the students taking part in the management of a private university, was really epoch-making at the time from the point of view of the way in which universities were being run. Also affected were the missionary schools which had been deprived of the freedom of thought with respect to religion before the war and where Shintoism had been enforced. The professors and authorities at some 81 schools were forced to resign through student protests, which illustrates quite graphically the inroads the ultra-
nationalists had made into the private school system before the war.

At first, however, these protests were isolated incidents which followed the general mood for ‘democratization’ that was existing in Japan at the time and were in keeping with the policy being pursued by the Occupation administration. Later, these actions were united and February, 1946 saw the formation of the Japan Young Communist Alliance which was aligned with the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Social Science Study groups were set up again and they held a May Day celebration in which the following resolutions were adopted: democratization of the campus, stabilization of the student’s livelihood, joint control by students and teachers—including a student self-government system and participation in the hiring of teachers, opposition to any increase in school fees and most important of all there emerged the idea to form a student democratic front with the aim of opposing the reactionary Yoshida government and establishing a people’s government. Thus the students were seen to be a force by which the government could be overthrown.

In January, 1947, due to its inability to accommodate the students’ demands for participation in the running of the university, Tokyo University took the step of allowing the students to form their own Student Self-Governing Association (jichikai). This idea was quickly adopted by other universities which were looking for a compromise solution as a way to end student protests. The Self-Governing Associations differed from school to school and in the larger universities, each department or faculty had one. They functioned as coordinators of student activities and administered facilities such as student halls, dormitories and canteens. Every student registered at a university was automatically enrolled in his department’s jichikai and his dues were usually deducted by the university when he paid his tuition fees and were handed
over to the self-governing association committee (jichi iinkai). The committee was elected by the students and it in turn elected a standing committee (jonin iin) with a chairman (iincho). This system is still in effect today.

Due to the fact that the self-governing associations varied so much between the universities, it was very difficult to set up one student democratic front and the efforts of the progressive students were mainly devoted to this end during the 1946-47 period. In fact, the concept of student self-government had been adopted by a student meeting at Waseda University in May, 1946, and a meeting on this subject was held by representatives from all Japanese universities in June. In November, this produced the National Student Self-Governing Union, which had as its aim, the ascertainment of student's opinions by establishing student councils throughout the country, democratization of the campus and the improvement of student life.

All these preparations for student councils and their eventual amalgamation were being made by the activists, who were mostly sympathetic to the JCP. Thus it had already become established that any student movement or national organization of student self-governing bodies would have a political function and all that remained at that time was to start such a federation. The JCP at that time was flushed with success because of results of its labor movement struggles, having conducted the Toshiba strike in October and planning a general strike of government workers for February 1, 1947. The students were caught up in this enthusiasm, and on the day before the planned general strike a meeting was held by 30,000 students in the Kanto (Tokyo) area to discuss the democratization of the campus. They decided to have a student self-governing council on every campus and afterwards to gather again for an inaugural meeting of a students' self-governing union.
Cold water, however, was dashed on the hopes of the Japanese communists when General MacArthur ordered the banning of the general strike set for February 1, 1947. This ended the brief honeymoon that the JCP leaders had enjoyed with the Occupation administration and laid those leaders open to the criticism of misanalyzing the policies of the occupation army. It was clear that democratization by the government had run its course and there was, from this point on, a back-swing in which the communists and labor leaders came under increasing pressure from the authorities. The tendency after this was for the labor leaders to become disillusioned with the JCP and at the same time the student movement which had arisen, supported by the labor movement, was seriously weakened. The guiding principles of the JCP remained rather like before the war, and this meant that they thought of students as sons of the bourgeoisie and that it was impossible for the students to operate properly except by forcing them into the labor movement. Even though the JCP was going through a soul-searching period, they failed to realize that the students could be regarded as one wing of the labor movement.

Faced with this, the students were at a loss. Not only were they being suppressed by the occupation army and the government but also they felt they could not depend on a JCP which had not analyzed correctly the postwar situation in Japan.

In 1948, there was a turn of events which favored the students. Inflation at that time was rampant, and in order to keep up with the spiralling cost of living, the national universities decided to raise the tuition fees. The scale of these increases however was incredible; the basic school fees were to be raised from ¥600 to ¥1,800. The private universities also announced a raise, doubling their previous rates. The students were outraged and immediately set about protesting the hike in fees, and through these means
they were able to recover from the slump they had been in since February, 1947.

The protest movement was one which was common to all the self-governing associations in every university. But in spite of this protest movement, the government announced their intention to go through with the fee increase, which only helped the students’ position. According to student opinion, the increase in school fees not only had a detrimental affect on student life, but also aimed at making the university the preserve of sons from rich families.

Finally, the Minister of Education carried out the increase and the student protest which had centered around a ‘non-payment’ movement came to an abrupt halt. So the students decided to use the experience gained in this struggle, which had included university strikes, to further their movement and thereupon launched an all-round attack on the government’s ‘reactionary’ educational policies. This shift in emphasis became successful, and formed one of the decisive factors leading to the establishment of Zengakuren.

In June, the first step towards establishing a national student body was achieved with the setting up of a Federation of National University Students’ Self-governing Associations. This was attended by 300 representatives from 113 state-run schools and universities. At about the same time, there was a great discussion on education which was attended by some 5,000 students. Taking advantage of both of these gatherings, the strikes and demonstrations against the rise in school fees were expanded to all parts of the country. It was estimated that a total of half a million students would join the strike, but there were cases of students refusing to join in areas outside of Tokyo. In spite of this, some 102 schools were out on strike by the end of June. A petition signed by representatives of 82 schools of the Federation of
National University Students' Self-governing Associations was presented to the Diet at that time.

The lesson that the students had learned through this struggle was that whether they belonged to national or private universities, it was only by solidarity that they could hope to attain victory. Therefore, on July 3, 1948, a preparatory meeting was held to form a united system for the student movement in Japan. On July 6th, the decision was taken by representatives of 138 universities to form an All-Japan Federation of Student Self-governing Associations. Accordingly, on September 18th, 1948, the federation was formed at a meeting which lasted 3 days. The full name of the new federation was the Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sorengo, which became abbreviated to the name it is popularly known by—Zengakuren. The founding was attended by 250 representatives from 145 universities and they adopted the following resolutions:

1) Opposition to the fascist-colonialistic reorganization of education.
2) Protection of the freedom of study and student life.
3) Opposition to the low wages paid for student part-time work and paid by SCAP (the occupation forces).
4) Opposition to fascism and the protection of democracy.
5) Unity with the battle line of youth.
6) Complete freedom for the student political movement.

Thus, Zengakuren was formed and the Japanese student movement was a reality at last. Zengakuren made its headquarters at the Tokyo University campus and the leaders of the first executive committee were Takei Akio (Tokyo University) the committee chairman, Takahashi Sasuke (Waseda University) as vice-chairman and Takahashi Hidenori (Tokyo University) as secretary-general. The total membership from 145 universities was 300,000 students. From the start, Zengakuren aimed at
contacts with international student organizations and at becoming one of the battle fronts of the world student struggle.

Now fully recovered from the stagnation which hit them when the February 1st General Strike was banned, the students who made up Zengakureen started a vigorous struggle against the government’s educational policy and repressive tactics. On October 4, 1948, an undersecretary from the Ministry of Education announced the Minister’s intention of introducing legislation to emasculate the student self-government movement. According to this announcement, universities were not to be used for political struggle, and while the government was not against student groups being formed, it was opposed to these groups affiliating with political parties, which of course violates the neutrality of the campus. It was considered improper to permit the pressuring of student dissenters by political student groups on campus and the student movement should not copy the labor movement because of the special responsibilities of the students. It was not clear just what these special responsibilities were but the inference was clear; the June university strike was illegal. By making full use of this announcement, the university authorities were able to suppress the student movement to some extent. This was effected by trying to get JCP to relinquish its ties with Zengakureen and by expelling student activists from the university.

The most representative examples of this type of repression resulting from the Minister’s announcement was to be found in the cases involving both teachers and students in Nagano and Akita Cities. At Nagano, the university authorities investigated the parents and families of Communist and Communist Youth League students (Seikyoin) and teachers. The teachers were forced to break up their union. Also proposed were the break-up of the Education Reform Committee and the secession of the
students from Zengakuren. Next, the parents were made to sign pledges to the effect that their sons would not take further part in political movements. The president even went so far as to tell the students to stop reading Marx and 29 students were punished. At Akita, the jichikai members reacted against punishments being meted out by forcing the school authorities to attend a mass-bargaining session to settle the matter. However, the authorities struck back by bringing legal proceedings against 6 of the students. This was thought to be quite unreasonable because one of the students who was arraigned had not even been present at the mass-bargaining.

Zengakuren fought this type of repression which was occurring in one form or another all over Japan and committed their whole strength to the struggle. In this struggle their slogans were: 'Revoke the Punishments', 'Expel the Presidents', and 'Withdraw the Minister's Notification'. As a result of this, many JCP students were elected to the student self-governing committees, especially in Akita, and by October there were reported to be over 400 cells in various universities, and these included 52 communist cells, 54 aligned to the Communist Youth, 23 Social Science groups and 16 other groups. The students eventually won their fight against repression of the student movement by using the hungerstrike tactic.

The Minister of Education had intended to use the proposals in the October 4th announcement to form the basis of a University Bill and to weaken the student movement. The presence of political groups on the campus made it difficult for the government to keep the university under Diet control and they wanted to put curbs on the student self-governing associations. However, as so much opposition had been encountered, the presidents of the national universities were asked to hold a meeting and propose an alternative solution. This they did and they adopted a
proposal put forward by the president of Tokyo University and which was very similar in content to the government's version although it had been slightly modified. When Zengakuren learned of this substitute being foisted on them they countered strongly by announcing their own proposal for university reform. According to this, a central organization for university administration should be set up. Members would be selected by public election for a term of office of 3 years. There would be 30 members in all. All university expenditure should be met by the government and in principle the university shouldn't have to collect any fees from the students. This counter-proposal contained the idea that such a committee would be independent of government supervision. Not only was this an original proposal, but also, Zengakuren went far beyond a simple protest by basing their opposition on their own ideas. In this way, Zengakuren expanded their movement against the University Bill throughout the country and in December, 1948, 18 more universities from Kyushu joined in their struggle.

Meanwhile, the Communist position had improved considerably both inside and outside Japan. In January, 1949, the JCP sent 35 members to the Diet for the first time. Just before this, the Chinese Communists had successfully completed their takeover of the mainland by capturing Tientsin on the 15th of January. On the other hand, the U.S. began to regard Japan as an important ally whose security was vital to American Far East interests and moved to strengthen it. One of the effects of this was that the government, acting in concert with U.S. Occupation Forces directives, began to suppress the labor movement and to keep an eye on it. This was particularly crucial with regard to known Communists who were often threatened with dismissal from their companies.

Feeding the favorable situation for the Communists was the
fact that many soldiers were still returning from the War and most of these from the Soviet Union. This caused a few interesting results. 6,000 repatriates joined the JCP and also, in one case, when some expelled students at Shizuoka refused to leave the campus, it turned out that they were being lead by non-commissioned officers of the old Japanese Army.

The Zengakuren had by now proved themselves to be a formidable political force, quite capable of organizing protest movements throughout the country with telling effect. However, one American official offered the advice that a firm stand should be taken against student strikers, saying ‘It is ridiculous to pretend that students have the experience and judgement that must accompany legislative, executive and judicial power. Student-self government does...not exist because the students are not officially charged with the responsibility of the colleges or universities’.*

The government was planning to place the University Bill before the 5th session of the Diet, and on April 1, 1949, Zengakuren declared its opposition and instructed its members to carry their protest back to school with them. This University Bill was originally proposed in 1947 and is discussed on Page 40 and 41 of Chapter 1. The one suggestion that aroused most indignation in the students was that management of the universities would be taken care of by an American-style Board of Regents. They feared that this would mean undue interference by local ‘bosses’ of low intellect. They preferred continued supervision by the Ministry of Education, no matter what shortcomings it had. So on May 3, 1949, Zengakuren held its 5th Central Committee Meeting at which a resolution was passed to fight against the bill by means of a general strike, saying that they would raise their flag so that the people could rally round it and protect their

* Japan Times, Feb. 5th, 1949.
own education. The movement developed for three weeks, from May 3rd to 24th, and not only did 200,000 students join in, but also people from many walks of life causing the struggle to expand. The government was forced to give up its plan to place the bill before the Diet (though it was to try again in 1951) and in this case the government had proved impotent to resist the organised power of the students.

In the aftermath of this victory, Zengakuren held its 2nd General Meeting or Congress at Tokyo Commercial University for 3 days starting on May 28, 1949. At this meeting, they seriously discussed the struggle against the University Bill, analyzed the internal and external political situation and also brought up the question of future actions. At the same time, they elected a new executive committee, confirming Takei Akio (Tokyo University) as chairman for a second term, with Tawara Hiroo (Waseda University), Hosokawa Kiyoshi (Osaka Commercial University) and Takahashi Hidenori (Tokyo University) as the three vice-chairmen. This meeting was attended by representatives of 349 universities, including private ones, and was very successful.

The government's setback was a little unsettling but nevertheless the government wasn't completely without recourse to action and it responded by having many of the students who had participated in the anti-University Bill struggle punished. For instance, 30 students were expelled from Tokyo University at that time. In reaction to this, Zengakuren was going to protest the punishments with an all-Japan strike but as this was not wholeheartedly supported by the JCP, it didn't develop to encompass the whole country and thus collapsed. The JCP took the position that the student movement would be ruined by such radical tactics as a general strike and that the students should carry on their struggles in a democratic way both inside and outside the campus concerning themselves with answering the
general demands of students.

It was at this point that the first instances of any difference of opinion between the JCP and student leaders appeared and on December 2, 1949, when the 3rd Zengakuren Congress was held, these differences became more pronounced.

The events which were taking place in the world at that time, had a very special meaning in the context of the left-wing movement in Japan and set the pattern for the years to come. However, in organizing an effective movement against U.S. involvement in the Korean War or in opposition to the Peace Treaty and the accompanying Joint U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951, the JCP was unable to muster its full strength owing to the fact that it had been attacked both by Moscow and the U.S. Occupation forces. The attack from Moscow was the most important and unexpected, and consisted of a condemnation of the JCP leaders' (particularly Nozaka) compromising and gradualistic attitudes and their lack of concern for connections with the international Communist movement. The main arguments were included in an article published by the Cominform's magazine and it is worth quoting part of it at this point; “The basic point to be remembered when viewing American imperialism in the Japanese context is that it supports the reconstruction of Japanese imperialism. The reactionary forces of Japan are now in collusion with the U.S. imperialists and are preparing to advance onto the world stage. In such circumstances, it is imperative that we analyze the situation correctly with the aim of explaining thoroughly to everyone, especially the workers, that the foreign imperialists want Japan to be like a colony and that the American and Japanese reactionaries are going to betray the people's democracy. We Communists, must fight resolutely for the independence of Japan, establish a peace-loving and democratic government, join in just treaties as soon as possible, expel the American forces
from Japan immediately and promote peace between different races. However, some of the active members of the JCP have failed to understand that this should be the central issue in their policies, and moreover they have maintained the attitude that the occupation forces are devoted to democracy. They have also been guilty of a doctrine which says that it is possible for the working class to move into socialism and to take the reins of power in a peaceful way. To say this is almost anti-Marxist!"

The JCP accepted this criticism completely, and after a period of intensive self-criticism, they began to turn their attention towards revolution which had not been so important up to then. Almost immediately, the emphasis began to shift towards armed insurrection and this led into the 'molotov cocktail era'. Looking at the overall situation in retrospect, it is easy to see what Stalin had in mind. The Korean War was about to break out for control of the Korean peninsula, which had been partitioned into two halves by American and Russian forces since the Japanese surrender. The period of the Occupation in Japan was almost certain to come to an end in the very near future and it would suit both Russia and the new Chinese Communist government in Peking to have a friendly Japan. However, the Americans were not about to give up so easily, and especially, they didn't want to see the industrial might of Japan fall into Communist hands. So they began maneuvering to get a peace treaty and security treaty signed with Japan.

So it came about, that in the early part of 1950, the JCP was busy reorganizing itself for the coming 'revolutionary thrust', and at the same time, the Americans were urging the Japanese government to clamp down on leftist activities. The Zengakuren, which had been used as part of the former peaceful democratic policies of the JCP and was a good example of the success of these policies in action, naturally enough were dismayed at this
turn of events. However, rather than toe the party line, the Zen-
gakuren leaders made known their opposition to the JCP leaders
which was now on both political and strategic counts.

On the 20th of May, 1950, Zengakuren held it's 4th Congress,
reaffirming the line taken previously which was to maintain the
struggle for peace against imperialism. They also began to form
a policy of opposition to the JCP central executive committee
as outlined in the slogan 'Smash the selfish and narrow-minded
struggle line completely!'

The JCP reacted by condemning the students as 'Trotskyists'
and tried to get those groups who were foremost in their criticism
of the JCP party leadership, such as the one at Waseda University,
disbanded. The dispute began to heat up, but then it was agreed
to put aside the differences in order to combat the newly instituted
'red-purge' which aimed at the dismissal of all leftist teachers
and students.

The 'red purge' was actually started by the Occupation Forces
in May, 1950, and had an influence on all industries, with more
than 20,000 workers being dismissed from their positions. Under
the influence of Amano Shoyu, who was then the Minister of
Education, this purge soon affected the campus. At the same
time, SCAP had dispatched Dr. W.C. Eells, an educational
advisor, to visit many universities and colleges to present the
Occupation view that communist professors should be dis-
missed from the universities. He started his series of lectures with
an address at the opening ceremony of Niigata University on
July 19, 1950 and advised that all communist professors and
student strike leaders should be expelled. Dr. Eells then proceeded
to "run around" all the universities in Japan to propound his
anti-Communist and reactionary ideas with great vigor. However,
most professors were opposed to his ideas, insisting that whereas
the professors of a university should not be devoted to one politi-
cal party, there is nothing to stop them from entering any legal party as private individuals. Zengakuren based its opposition to Dr. Eells' lectures on the stand that his recommendations were contrary to the Potsdam agreement.

Finally on May 1, 1950, when Dr. Eells was supposed to give his 28th lecture at Tohoku University, he met his first opposition from the students. SCAP had requested Tohoku to allow Dr. Eells to lecture, but just before he was to start, a student asked him a question: "Is your lecture a public or a private one?" Eells answered that his opinions were the same as SCAP's and then when he tried to start his lecture they wouldn't let him onto the stage. The title of his lecture was 'Freedom of Study'. The students then held an assembly to protest and demand an apology from the authorities, but the Occupation Forces made the university expel the student leaders. At that time, Dr. Eells asked the President of Tohoku, Takahashi Satomi, if he would carry out the purge of communist professors and he answered evasively with "It's a very difficult problem so I can't answer off-hand but I think the university administration should be carried out in a more democratic way." His attitude typified that of the university administrations, who were very concerned over the threat to university autonomy and over the limits of student political activities.

On the first of September, the Minister of Education, Amano Shoyu, announced his intention to institute the red purge in the universities, by force if necessary, but the students, lead by Zengakuren, resisted with a nation-wide boycott of examinations and strike tactics. In 1950, graduating seniors even sacrificed their own interests by staying on at college in order to continue the struggle, and they succeeded, so much so that they were able to stop the progressive teachers from being kicked out. However, the damage resulting from the student struggle was also con-
siderable. Several hundred students were punished by suspension from classes and about a hundred were arrested. The worst thing of all was that the universities were no longer permitting student self-government and police were on duty on the campus all the time.

In June, the Korean War broke out and this was accompanied in Japan by the purging of the 24 members of the JCP Central Committee and the banning of the JCP official newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag). With the outbreak of war, it became even more imperative for the US. to conclude some sort of security treaty with Japan and so this was included as a prerequisite for the ending of the Occupation, which was due about that time anyway. So on September 8, 1951, Japan joined with 49 other countries at a peace conference held in the San Francisco Opera House. Russia and other socialist countries abstained from joining the peace conference, although in an unexpected turn of events, Russia attended as an observer and tried to break up the conference. The main objection the Russians had was that the Peace Treaty was an American-led imperialist plot against the people of Asia. As if to confirm this opinion, a joint Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was initialled 5 hours later on the same day. The way it was presented, it seemed as if the Security Treaty was the minor event, but in fact time has shown how important it really was. The full name of the security treaty in Japanese is Nichibei Anzen Hosho Joyaku and the contracted form of this, ‘Ampo’, has come to be a rallying cry for politicians of all stripes. Ampo symbolizes more than any thing else the predicament Japan finds itself in in relations with the U.S. and is still a great bone of contention amongst the Japanese people at the present time. The Socialists led the opposition against the new Security Treaty while the Communists and Zengakuren were in such disarray that they were unable to form an effective opposition at that time.
Zengakuren didn’t hold a Congress during 1951. The reason behind this was the change of leadership within the JCP which occurred at the 4th All-Japan Joint General Meeting of the JCP on February 23, 1951. Until then, the leadership had been in the hands of the ‘Internationalist’ Faction, which was also known as the JCP Unity Faction (Nikkyo Toitsu-ha). However, it had splintered over the Cominform criticism and an orthodox group took over the leadership of the JCP. The orthodox faction announced a change in tactics and declared their commitment to armed struggle as a means for liberation with the Cominform supporting this policy. From this point the JCP became extremely leftist. Many of the leaders of Zengakuren followed this shift in doctrine and strategy, but a group of more than 20 active students including Takei Akio, the chairman, refused to accept the new line and formed their own small group within Zengakuren.

The Zengakuren was made up of 9 regional district committees for normal administrative purposes and it was through two of these, the Hokkaido Gakuren (the Federation of Hokkaido Student Self-governing Associations) and Togakuren (the Federation of Tokyo Student Self-governing Associations) that the internal conflict first developed. The Takei faction executives resigned from Togakuren and then students of the Hokkaido Gakuren and Togakuren began to lose their confidence in the Zengakuren Executive Committee, which included Takei. On January 27, 1952, at their 5th All-Japan General Meeting, the JCP introduced its new general principles, and so the student struggle line was completely changed as a result. Zengakuren proceeded to kick out the old leaders who had led the anti-imperialist peace struggle and made a new executive which followed the JCP militant line. They were now entering into what has been termed a period of extreme leftist adventurism.

The group of students who disagreed with this development
decided to form themselves into a new organization which was called the Hansen Gakudo (the Anti-war Student League). They said that it was a complete mistake to slavishly copy the Chinese Communist principle of setting up bases for revolution first in the country and then in the towns, and that nowhere in Japan is armed insurrection necessary. The object of this criticism was the JCP policy of sending students into the country as mountain and village maneuver squads in order to have them change the thinking of the farmers and thus get them to fight against the landowners at the same time as it was expected for the laborers in the city to rise up and together make the Japanese Revolution. The Hansen Gakudo said that this was ridiculous, as we can realize by reading the following quotation from the book entitled ‘Gendai ni Okeru Seinen no Shiso to Kodo’ (The Ideas and Actions of Youth in Modern Times) by Nakaoka Tetsuo, which was written after these events took place.

“I can never forget the summer of 1952, following the struggle against the Anti-Subversive Activities Law, when I saw the students secretly slipping away to join the maneuvers. Their task was to plant the seeds of revolutionary thought among the farmers who lived in the mountain villages, applying Maoism to the plight of the poor farmers who were viciously exploited by the landowners in the half-feudal rural society of Japan. By their own efforts, they were to develop into a hard core of revolutionaries, who would form the backbone of the Japanese revolutionary movement. But they were mistaken in their naive belief that one could work miracles in the mass movement and become heroes in the revolutionary struggle without encountering the realities of hardship and difficulty. Rather the student leaders claimed that it would have been most unrevolutionary to organize such mundane details as where to stay, which hotel to sleep in and to have money ready in case of emergencies, and that any true revo-
olutionary should be able to produce the buddings of revolution immediately, armed only with his wits and a copy of Akahata. So many of the students, taking these instructions at face value, marched into the hills carrying their copies of Akahata...

"Only three days later, they began to straggle back, like the remnants of a defeated army, one by one. From morning to night they had been followed by the police and had been forced to find shelter in graveyards and abandoned mines. With such as their bases, who would accept them, the poor strangers; they were like the beggars one is wary about helping without first taking every precaution. They came back completely exhausted! Now, when thinking back on it, it was inevitable that it happened like that, just like a farce. But we went through with it, giving our all, but there are still many of us who are still unable to forget the humiliation of those days, the inability to suffer the hardships and the bitter taste of defeat as befits a revolutionary intelligentsia. This more than anything else served to act as a symbol of our failure and pointed to the breakdown of our ideals."

The militant line which the JCP had fostered in the young had led to defeat, confusion and collapse, and had also forced ordinary citizens to sacrifice themselves in struggles such as the Bloody May Day demonstrations in 1952, when a student and a worker were killed. This incident, which came some three days after Japan's independence, was protesting the proposed Anti-Subversive Activities Law, which threatened the left-wing. Some 20,000 workers and students tried to storm the Imperial Palace and in the process clashed with the riot police. The police were armed with pistols and the rioters responded by throwing stones with the result that as well as the deaths, 1,470 people were injured (including police) and 1,213 were arrested. This was followed by many other violent incidents; on May 30th, Molotov cocktails were thrown at Itabashi, and stones, Molotov cocktails and acid
were thrown in a riot at Shinjuku. Again two students were shot, one of whom died.

Thus the JCP not only caused the students and workers to make their sacrifices in vain, but it also gave the authorities an excuse to interfere directly in student affairs and this led to some oppression. In fact, the chief of police had already asked the government to outlaw Zengakuren, but this request was refused by the Attorney General in view of its character as a student group. However, the Minister of Education was actively seeking a way to halt student political activities and the prosecutor’s office was keeping an eye on the extremists. The general atmosphere between the students and the police was one of outright hostility, with the students using the pretext of university autonomy to detain police found on the campus. The most famous of these was the ‘Poporo’ incident, in which three policemen were beaten up by Tokyo University students at a performance of a memorial play for Kobayashi Takiji (a pre-war leftist student who had been tortured to death by the police). Other incidents also occurred and the police were forced to promise not to enter the campus unless requested by the university authorities. However, many of the university student self-governing associations were banned and this again lead to campus rioting.

In such an atmosphere of repression and uncertainty, the Zengakuren held its 5th National Congress in 1952, the first in two years. The turnout was very poor, with only 54 universities sending representatives and 20 more observers. This was due to the prevailing climate of oppression and it constituted an unspoken criticism of the JCP policies. However, at this meeting the students still supported the militant line and it was decided to bar more than 20 members, including Takei Akio, who opposed that line. In spite of this censure, the banned leaders had shown
themselves to have been the most capable organizers in the short history of Zengakuren.

In 1952, on September 4th, the Anti-Subversive Activities Law was passed. Just after this, there was a general election, in which the JCP lost all of its 35 Diet seats, along with 2 million votes, which was a token of the peoples' condemnation of the party, but in spite of this they still continued to advocate the militant line. With the coming of 1953, the student movement was losing its strength as the leaders made the mistake of committing all the students towards the futile policy. Sending the students on maneuvers among the farmers was like pouring water onto sand. After its 5th National Congress, the Zengakuren began to inch away from the propensity for violence, but it still managed to retain much the same character even though its policies were changing. This was understandable because the main power within the student body was in the hands of the JCP-lead 'Mainstream' faction.

From 1954 to 1955, the international situation changed quite markedly. With peace coming about as the result of negotiations in Korea and Khruschev's policy of co-existence, the socialist countries embarked on a peace offensive. The student movement, in light of these developments, was forced to be subdued and at their 7th National Congress, in face of peace slogans appearing everywhere, Zengakuren called for 'Life and Peace' in their own slogans. It was strange to see them change from a militant stance to the pacifist one so suddenly without even a period of self-criticism. On the previous 27th of July, the JCP had already made its own self-criticism at the 6th National Conference, which had shocked the student movement and upset their activities. They had been completely unprepared for this eventuality and up to that time, believing the revolution to be just around the corner, had gambled their lives on the success of armed revolt. Thus it was
that this turn-about produced a difficult situation for them to face. The JCP’s self-criticism was viewed as barefaced opportunism, with some of the students developing a neurosis about the untrustworthy nature of the JCP. Many lost their enthusiasm, and now those who had originally quit the movement in protest against the militant line, came back and added their voices of criticism. This difficulty to adjust to the shift in policies which the JCP 6th National Conference had entailed, caused the student self-governing movement to slow down.

The international communist movement took an unexpected turn when, in February, 1956, Khruschev publicly denounced Stalin at the 20th Meeting of the Soviet Communist Party. After this, a period of Russian-American co-existence was initiated and in October, relations between Japan and Russia were resumed. However, in the meantime, the Japanese left-wing still considered that imperialism in Japan was a factor to be reckoned with. On the student front, the confusion that had prevailed since 1952 began to decrease; the students got over their profound shock at the events of the JCP 6th National Conference and they got the movement back onto course by the beginning of 1956.

The Zengakuren held its 9th National Congress from June 9, 1956 with the program headed by a resolution to forbid the testing of nuclear weapons, to oppose the small constituency system and to break the three education laws, which were to be realized by concentrating the student’s whole energies into a national strike. The main subjects discussed during the 4 days of the meeting were the abolition of nuclear weapons, the exorcism of foreign bases and opposition to rearming and militarism. These formed the basis of their program for peace. Also, they showed concern for the resumption of trade between Japan and China and the Soviet Union. The distinctive feature of this meeting was its intention to get the student movement back to the stage it
had reached in its heyday in 1950 and to carry on from there. In other words, this meant to return to the traditional position and start again. In this year, the main activities concerned the Sunagawa base struggle; the students established their headquarters on the spot and fought tenaciously together with local farmers and other groups who were cooperating in opposing the base.

The progress of the student movement since the early 1950's is generally thought of in terms of the series of struggle campaigns that have been waged. In this way, it is possible to follow the escalation of tactics by both the students and the police, and at the same time it serves to show which groups within the movement are most active. The Sunagawa base struggle was the first in a long series, in which the students took their struggle to the actual site of the conflict and allied themselves with the local population who were conducting the original opposition.

At the 9th National Congress in June, the Zengakuren had decided not only to oppose foreign bases but also to oppose the expansion of existing bases. Previous to this, in 1955, it had been announced that the American base of Tachikawa, near Tokyo, would have its runway extended into the area of the neighboring village of Sunagawa. Accordingly, Zengakuren sent a team of investigators to the site where the planned extension was to take place and they made contact with the local farmers and trade unionists who were organizing an opposition movement. The first step toward the eventual construction of the new runway was a survey of the area involved, and the students and farmers concentrated on blocking this survey. However, there were some local inhabitants who were willing to agree to the survey according to certain conditions and this enabled the government to negotiate with them and part of the survey was thus completed. On the 12th of September, 1955, the district court handed down a
decision that allowed the government to requisition that portion of land which was to constitute the second stage of construction. Therefore, on September 13th, the Zengakureen issued a struggle statement, protested the decision, established a struggle center on the spot and sent organizers to all parts of the country in order to drum up support.

The on-the-spot headquarters was a joint affair manned by militants from the supporting trade unions, local inhabitants from the local opposition league (Hantai Domei) and Zengakureen students. Zengakureen's efforts at getting support began to bear fruit on October 1st when some 500 students arrived. By the 3rd of October, 1,000 students and laborers were staying there. At a meeting held on October 5th, 3,000 students were present and from that date, Zengakureen was able to rely on the presence of 1,500 people during the day and several hundred at night. The numbers were helped considerably by the fact that Sunagawa is only 80 minutes from downtown Tokyo by train. In their efforts at raising money, Zengakureen collected ¥300,000 from all over the country, while in the Sunagawa area, some ¥100,000 poured into their coffers every day.

The survey team attempted to start work on October 4th but met with fierce opposition and so little work was done. The government tried a change in tactics and put the date for the preliminary surveying up to October 11th. On October 9th, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office declared that the tactics being used by the opposition groups were illegal and this helped to raise tension so much that the Metropolitan Police Board announced that it was sending in special Police Reserves. Zengakureen were fully prepared to resist the Police Reserves, should they be used, and so on October 11th, the date for resumption of the survey, 3,000 students were on hand. However, the surveys didn't start until the following day and then the
surveyors were defended by 1,300 police. When the workers and students attempted to interrupt the proceedings, the police reacted using force and 260 people received light injuries and the surveys were halted again only to be resumed the next day. This time the surveyors came wearing helmets, protected by 2,000 police and part of the area was finished. On that day, 970 people were injured and this forced the government to postpone the survey again because of the adverse public opinion that had been roused. The Zengakuren celebrated this as a victory, which in a sense it was because national sentiment had been successfully roused over the issue of foreign bases. However, the problem was by no means settled and in the following year when the time-limit for the compulsory requisitions came due, the struggle flared up again.

This time double the numbers turned out and were waiting for the survey team when they were ready to start work at 4 o'clock on the morning of June 8th. At first the protests were peaceful enough with slogans being shouted over loudspeakers, but then at 10 o'clock, the protesters moved into action, pulling up the marking posts and a group of about 300 broke through the boundary fence of Tachikawa base itself and carried on a confrontation with the police. The result of this day's work had immediate repercussions. For one, the police came in for criticism for their inept handling of the situation and plans were drawn up for the strengthening of the Police Reserves. A little later on, in a sweeping raid, the police arrested 9 students and 14 laborers who were leaders of the protest movement but then there were university strikes to protest what was termed ‘unfair detainment’. Then in 1959, Tokyo District Court Judge Date acquitted all the leaders on the grounds that not only was the law they were arrested under unconstitutional, but also, the stationing of U.S. forces was unconstitutional as was the Security Treaty itself. This
of course shocked the government who were about to enter into negotiations with the United States over the Security Treaty but it heartened the left-wing, giving them more grounds on which to oppose the Security Treaty. The Sunagawa base struggle was in fact to become a testing ground for the coming 'Ampo' struggle in 1960. From the Zengakuren point of view, it was extremely successful for it showed that they were capable of getting support from the general public.

In 1957, the Zengakuren conducted a series of campaigns against reactionary-imperialist doctrines which were epitomized in the U.S. by Eisenhower's New Year address and by the Christmas Island atomic tests conducted by the British government. Basking in an atmosphere of public sympathy, the Zengakuren held its 10th National Congress on June 3, 1957 for four days. It reconfirmed its commitment to the pursuit and maintenance of peace and also took steps to correct its own rightist tendencies. It was an extremely important meeting which established the right of the students to decide their own line and policies by themselves independent of the JCP. New executives were elected; Kayama Kenichi (Tokyo University) as chairman, Kojima Hiroshi (Meiji University) and Sakura Kensuke (Ritsumeikan University) as vice-chairmen, and Onodera Masaomi (Tokyo University) as secretary.

However, the reform and reunification movement of Zengakuren took a turn for the worse when a dispute developed over the best way to handle the Sunagawa struggle. One faction wished to struggle on their own initiative while the other, which was dominated by Socialist students, was strongly influenced by public opinion. The developing split came at a time when the JCP was undergoing a period of debate about its general policies and this made the students' problems that much more complicated. The added factors of the de-Stalinization program and the
Russian intervention in Hungary in 1956 only added to the confusion. It was at this time that a new left-wing organization was born. This was the Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosanshugisha Domei (the Japan Revolutionary Communist League), which was started in December, 1957. The Kakukyodo, as they were called, were influenced by the writings of Trotsky and those of its leader, a half-blind writer-philosopher, Kuroda Kanichi, and this group had a strong affect on many of the students.

In 1958, the opposition within Zengakuren became clearly defined. A campaign was being conducted against the teacher efficiency rating system, when it was decided to hold the 11th Zengakuren National Congress. This meeting heralded the disintegration of Zengakuren into rival groups and it is from this point that we can trace the development of the various sects which characterize the modern student movement. The Congress itself was very quiet, consisting only of a report on activities, since the previous 10th National Congress, which were judged to be correct. There was nothing in this meeting which pointed directly to the swing towards Trotskyism, but divisions between the opposing groups developed over the matter of qualifications of the representatives. So the struggle grew, unbeknownst to the general public.

When the Zengakuren meeting had finished, student members of the JCP held their own meeting at JCP headquarters in Yoyogi. The previously vague conflicts became sharply defined at this meeting, so much so that it degenerated into a fist fight between the Trotskyists and the party groups. In what became known as the ‘June 1st Incident’, 105 students out of the 130 attending the meeting passed a resolution of no-confidence in the JCP Central Committee on the grounds that insufficient attempts had been made at de-Stalinization and that the JCP was interfering in their affairs. Quite naturally, the JCP condemned this incident as being
both violent and a violation of the Party's rule, and accordingly ordered mass-punishment of the students involved. On July 18th, the JCP acted by ordering the deletion of 3 names from their membership lists; one of these was the Zengakuren chairman, Kayama Kenichi. The charge was that they had led the split and were beginning to represent an independent group. Following this, some 2,000 students, who had either been expelled or had left the JCP, formed this new group which began its independent existence in December, 1958 under the name of the Kyosanshu-gisha Domei (Communist League). This was also known by its abbreviated form Kyosando and by its German nickname ‘Bund’. This new group took over the leadership of the Zengakuren Central Committee, and together with the other assorted anti-JCP factions became known as the Mainstream. On the other hand, those who had remained loyal to the JCP were called the Anti-Mainstream.

As we have seen, the student movement was beginning split up into different sects and we have described three of these; Kaku-kyodo—the Revolutionary Communists, Kyosando (Bund)—the Communist League and the Yoyogi-lead JCP Faction. However, there was one more that was formed at that time and of whom we shall hear a great deal—Shagakudo. Their full name was the Shakaishugi Gakusei Domei (Socialist Student League) and they held their inaugural meeting on the day before the 11th Zengakuren Congress. This organization had developed from the Hansen Gakusei Domei, which, as we have already seen, led the opposition against the JCP-inspired leftist-adventurism in 1951–52 and had been formed under the auspices of the International Faction of Zengakuren back in 1950. Their general outlook was toward Marxist Socialism and the struggle for peace. The Shagakudo were not in any way connected to the Japan Socialist Party; those students connected with the Socialist
Party belonged to the Socialist Youth League (Shakaishugi Seinen Domei or Shaseido) but it was not officially organized until after the Security Treaty crisis of 1960. Shaseido students were noticeably more leftist than the Socialist Party, but they still accepted its leadership and hoped to radicalize the Socialist Party from within.

Following the 11th National Congress, Zengakuren finalized as its main plan of action an extremely violent campaign against the Teacher Efficiency-rating Law. This struggle had become focussed in Wakayama prefecture, so Zengakuren sent members there with the hope of turning this into a second Sunagawa struggle.

There were still however many vague points which the 11th Congress hadn't cleared up, so it was decided to hold the 12th National Congress on the 4th and 5th of September, 1958, only 4 months after the previous convention. The problem, as stated by the Mainstream leadership, was not the struggle to maintain peace but to overthrow imperialism which is the basic cause of war, and for this reason, the student movement must promote the establishment of a strong proletariat. The reason why the main labor unions didn't stand up for this cause wholeheartedly was because the Sohyo (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) executives were under the influence of the right-wing. For example, the only union which was actually concerned with the teachers' struggle against the Teacher Efficiency-rating Law, was the Teacher's Union itself. What was really needed was for all the unions to join together and form a united front, and in this way the revolution becomes possible. These sentiments accurately represent the Zengakuren stand at that time.

This attitude, which was confirmed at the 12th National Congress, completely separated Zengakuren from the JCP. In October, when the anti-Teacher Efficiency-rating Law struggle
began to spread to areas outside the Wakayama—Kansai district, the Kishi government chose this time to put the Police Bill before the Diet. This bill entailed a revision of the Police Duties Performance Law to enlarge the police powers with regard to interrogation, search and arrest. The left-wing viewed it with great suspicion and fearing it might lead back to a police state, strongly opposed it. Zengakuren acted immediately to oppose the bill and together with citizens and laborers, they conducted various protests such as a National Railways slow down, a sit-down strike by 5,000 students in front of the Chapel Center and on what was termed a historic occasion, 10,000 demonstrators surrounded the Diet House. The Kishi government had tried to pass the Police Bill by unexpectedly extending the Diet session, but this aroused such a furor in the press and left-wing groups that eventually the Police Bill was shelved. This success helped to bolster left-wing spirits, particularly those of the Socialists, and it was considered a good omen for the upcoming Ampo struggle against the Security Treaty revision. In addition, it provided useful experience in organizing techniques; a people's council had been established in order to present a united front of all opposition elements and this pattern was to be used again on a much larger scale in 1959-60. Within Zengakuren however, a dispute arose between the Mainstream leaders over the handling of the Police Bill struggle. By skillfully directing their criticism, Kakukyodo was able to take over the leadership from the Bund. This shift in power was confirmed at the 13th Zengakuren National Congress which was held from December 13th for 3 days.

At this time, student thinking was proceeding along the following lines: the student movement should aim at helping the working class to take its rightful place in the revolutionary vanguard and should do so as a true ally of the workers' movement. At the same time, it is important to remember that the student
movement cannot be forced into a mold by any outside group and this is because the students occupy a special position in society, sandwiched between the leaders and the workers. For this reason also, it is natural to expect that there will be differences between the students themselves.

This may seem to be very idealistic, but is serves to illustrate the special sense of mission that the student radicals in Japan hold. The Japanese student is a product of a fiercely competitive system which forms a youth elite; that small percentage who indulge in political activities are by and large idealistic and tend to throw themselves into each struggle with a self-righteous, almost sacrificial fervor. We will deal at length with the actual conditions surrounding the student movement, together with an examination of the rituals, tactics and strategies employed when we come to look at the Kakumaru, one of the prominent modern sects, later in this book; but it is sufficient to remember here that the Japanese student’s special position in society is probably responsible more than anything else for maintaining the continuously high level of activity in the Japanese student movement. With the events leading up to the Ampo struggle against the Security Treaty revision in 1960, this burgeoning independence on the part of the students and their special fanaticism were going to prove to be two important factors which would have profound repercussions and it enabled the Zengakuren to exert a political influence out of all proportion to their numbers. The results of the Ampo struggle put Zengakuren into the headlines around the world, helped to overthrow the Kishi government, splintered the left-wing and in the aftermath caused the break-up of Zengakuren itself into rival bodies.

However, in December, 1958, the main issue in Zengakuren still revolved around the leadership of the Mainstream. It was at this time that the Bund had been forced to relinquish control to
the Kakukyodo Faction. In the election of new officers, Kakukyodo were able to take over the executive, placing their members in the three top posts; Shiokawa Yoshinobu (Tokyo University) became chairman, vice-chairmen were Kojima Hiroshi (Meiji University) and Kato Noboru (Waseda University) and the secretary’s post was taken by Tsuchiya Gentaro (Meiji University).

With the onset of 1959, the year before the Security Treaty revision was due, Zengakuren began to formulate their plans for the Ampo struggle and at the same time they also directed their efforts against government plans for rationalization of the economy and the resultant unemployment. The Bund objected to the handling of this campaign saying that only Ampo should be dealt with and not the rationalization problem. Gathering a group of supporters about them, the Bund used this issue in an attempt to regain the leadership of Zengakuren. Actually, Zengakuren hadn’t been able to develop under the Kakukyodo administration and was barely crawling along, so finally in June, at the 14th Zengakuren National Congress, the Bund wrested the leadership from Kakukyodo. The new chairman was Karouji Kentaro (Hokkaido University) and Zengakuren took on an Ampo bias, with the birth of what was called the ‘Ampo Bund’.

Meanwhile, the JCP-lead students were working at restoring their lost strength and their leadership of Zengakuren, and had at that time succeeded in getting about 40% of the representatives. So during this period, Zengakuren consisted of three main opposing factions: the Bund, Kakukyodo (consisting two parts; the Tokyo based National Committee (Zenkoku Iinkai) and the Osaka and Kyoto centered Kansai Faction) and the JCP group. It was with this make-up that Zengakuren entered the Ampo struggle of 1960.
Chapter 3: The Anti-Ampo Struggle

by HARADA HISATO

This chapter will deal with Zengakuren's role in the struggle against revision of the U.S.—Japan Security Treaty. However, as the most important political event in post-war Japan, the protest in 1960 has to be seen as part of a series of developments regarding the Security Treaty itself. To be sure there were many violent incidents, including three attempts to storm the Diet House (seat of the Japanese parliament), one of which resulted in the death of a girl student, one attempt to block the Prime Minister from leaving for America and the mobbing of the U.S. Presidential Press Secretary, but none of these make any sense unless we examine the basic causes behind them.

First we must look at the original Security Treaty and the circumstances that saw its creation; then we must understand the reasons for its revision; lastly we must present the views of those involved in the anti-Ampo struggle. Once this is done, the events of those turbulent days in 1960 begin to take on some meaning.

On September 8, 1951, Japan concluded a peace treaty with 49 countries of the 'free-bloc' at San Francisco. On the afternoon of the same day, a security treaty was concluded between the U.S. and Japan. However, the contents of the treaty were not made known to the general public in Japan. Perhaps this was because it contained some potentially unpopular aspects, but more probably because it was a prerequisite for the ending of the occupation and few people really wanted to know the details. There was a cry of protest by the leftwing, headed by the Socialists, but two important groups, the JCP and Zengakuren, were in confusion over the Cominform censure of the JCP leaders, and so an effective opposition movement was not possible. The treaty was
accordingly passed by both Houses of the Diet and became law at the same time as the Peace Treaty in April, 1952.

In the latter half of the 1940’s, the U.S. eagerly wanted to conclude a peace treaty accompanied by a security treaty, as the war had been over for almost 5 years. Another reason behind America’s haste to conclude these treaties was the change in the international situation. Just after the Second World War, confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. resulted in the Cold War. It started over the disposal of Germany and with the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia in February, 1949 and the Berlin Blockade in October, 1949, it grew more intense. In Asia also, the situation was changing. In October, 1949, the government of Chiang Kai-Shek in the Republic of China was banished to the island of Formosa and a communist government was set up in Peking. In 1950, a treaty of friendship was concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the new Chinese government. Under such circumstances, the U.S. was forced to change its policies towards the Far East. The great problem was the disposal of Japan; the U.S. had invested great efforts in making Japan a showcase of democracy in Asia and now it was thought necessary to end the occupation and create an independent Japan participating in the Free World as a bulwark in the defense line against the spread of Communism.

Added to these factors was the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, which forced the U.S. to review its policies even faster. This war spread quickly and finally a United Nations army was ordered in. To ensure the support of the U.N. Army, which was mostly made up of American servicemen anyway, there was now a greater need for an independent Japan. Besides, in October 1950, the Peoples Liberation Army of China had intervened on the North Korean side. With such a background, the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty were formulated in order to make Japan
an anti-communist base country which was to be part of the U.S. containment policy towards communist countries.

At that time in Japan, there were two opinions; one was that Japan should wait until it could sign a peace treaty with all the nations in the world and the other was that Japan should take the Peace Treaty along with the Security Treaty with the Free World countries, becoming a member of the free world in the defense line against communism.

The Yoshida government took the latter point of view and went ahead with the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although the treaty was concluded as a collective security treaty between two independent countries there were many defects, which lead many people to regard it as a one-sided treaty. While acknowledging that in time, Japan must take care of its own defense, the Security Treaty was to be a temporary one, which provided for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and for the security of Japan, including the case of a civil war in Japan. Japan was forbidden to grant bases to any other foreign power without U.S. approval and the stationing of U.S. troops was left to a later administrative agreement.

There were many objections to the contents of the treaty, the main ones being the following:

While Japan was obliged to provide military bases, there was no article in the treaty which clearly defined the duty of the U.S.A. in the defense of Japan. Also, though the treaty was temporary, there was no written provision which stated when it would expire.

Japan had no power to curb the activities of the U.S. garrisons who would act in the name of Far East security and peace.

The article which included the clause providing U.S. forces to help put down a civil war was particularly distasteful. There
existed no precedent for such a proviso in any treaty hitherto concluded between two independent states and was thought of as an infringement of Japanese sovereignty. The prohibition of Japan’s right to grant bases without U.S. approval also interfered with Japan’s sovereignty.

Lastly, in the subsequent administrative agreement, which was drawn up after Diet approval had been sought and was not subject to either Diet or Senate scrutiny, was the addition of a clause stating that Japan had a common duty with regard to Japan’s governing area. However, it was not made clear whether Okinawa and the Ogasawara islands, under U.S. administration, were included in this area or not.

With these defects, the Security Treaty came into force and the Japan-U.S. Security System began. At first, Japan followed an extreme anti-communist policy complete with the network of U.S. bases around Japan. In 1953, the Korean Armistice was signed, but with both sides facing each other across the 38th parallel, the tension on the Korean peninsula didn’t die down at once.

The change didn’t come until 1955, when Mr. Hatoyama was chosen to be Prime Minister and he aimed at an independent diplomacy, to be able to effect a normalization of relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in 1956. In the same year, Japan joined the United Nations. However at home, Japanese of all walks of life began to question the Security Treaty and the existence of U.S. military bases on Japanese soil. The students in particular had been leading a series of struggles against the bases in the hope of rousing public opinion and in 1955 had succeeded with the Sunagawa Base struggle which had focussed the public’s attention on the issue. In fact, pressure was mounting for the government to examine the question of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty again.

— 78 —
In December 1956, Hatoyama was succeeded by Ishibashi Tanzan as Prime Minister. In spite of an impressive start the new Premier was forced to resign due to illness only 2 months after assuming office. His place was taken by Kishi Nobusuke who was to lead Japan into the troubled period of 1960 and who was to lose his job in the process.

The main objections to the Security Treaty had now crystallized around those given above, with the addition of worries over safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. forces in Japan and a concern that the U.S. abide by the United Nations charter when acting under the treaty. The Japanese phobia about nuclear weapons was well founded in its experiences at Hiroshima and Nagasaki when it became the first nation (so far the only nation) to be atom-bombed, and it had been heightened when a Japanese fishing vessel ‘The Lucky Dragon’ was caught in the fall-out from an American H-bomb as it strayed too near the Bikini testing grounds. During the 1950’s the Japanese economy had grown at an amazing rate; the new-found pride in Japan that accompanied this rise in affluence meant that many people began to question those portions of the Security Treaty which interfered with Japanese sovereignty.

None of this had escaped the notice of the government and as early as 1955, Hatoyama’s Foreign Minister Shigemitsu had suggested revision of the treaty while on a visit to the U.S. On that occasion, the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had rejected the idea, though he had intimated that if Japan were to build up its own defense potential, the Ground Self-Defense Forces, then he might be willing to consider the idea. On Kishi’s first visit to the U.S. as Prime Minister in 1957, he was still not able to persuade Dulles to revise the treaty, but he did obtain the withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat troops in the following year. Supported by U.S. aid, Japan slowly rearmed its Self-
Defense Forces, until finally in October, 1958, Kishi was able to announce that negotiations for the revision of the Security Treaty were under way.

The whole question of revision of the Security Treaty was destined to be one which affected Japan very profoundly. Not only were the Socialists and Communists dead set against it, but now, so were many other people especially after the U.S.S.R. had successfully orbited the first satellite around the earth. Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, it had been agreed that treaty revision should be Kishi’s last act as Prime Minister. Kishi himself did not agree and in 1959 went ahead and wagered his political life on the successful outcome of revision. He was in for a troubled time.

The opposition began to marshal their forces and in March, 1959, the People’s Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty (Ampo Joyaku Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi) was born. The People’s Council was made up of 13 original sponsors and was organized from 134 different groups. The most important members were the Japan Socialist Party, Sohyo and Zengakuren, while the JCP remained an observer, though it was later to join the Strategy Committee. Apprehensive of Zengakuren’s wild tendencies, the organizers put the students in the Joint Struggle Council of Youths and Students where it was hoped they could be kept under control. But soon, they had the youth and student council under their control and could send a representative to the directors’ meetings.

The Socialist Party was passing through a difficult period itself, and this had some effect on the size of the demonstrations and the manner in which they were conducted. In 1951, the party had actually split into two halves, the Left and Right Wing Socialist Parties, over the handling of the original peace treaty problem. The two halves had joined together again in 1955 and it can only
be said that this was at best a compromise solution. All it took was the formation of the People’s Council and the party sundered again, this time for good. The right-wing elements left to form their own party, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), taking the Zenro (Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaiai—Japan Trade Union Congress) unionists with them. This weakened the Socialists just when the activities of the People’s Council were being decided, and thus the effective leadership in these matters was by the JCP (who controlled 3 of the 13 members of the Board of Directors) and the left-wing elements of Sohyo. Thus the People’s Council became capable of far more violent protest than was originally intended.

Another important event was the court decision regarding those arrested in the Sunagawa Base struggle which we examined in the previous chapter. Judge Date ruled in March, 1959 that the Security Treaty was invalid and unconstitutional in acquitting the seven leaders of the base struggle and this came just at the time when revision of the treaty was due.

The first draft of the revised treaty was published in October, 1959. The old treaty had been thought of as one-sided, but the new Ampo was considered to be in shape as befitting a treaty between two independent nations. It was provided that the U.S. had an acknowledged duty to defend Japan. Article 5 stated that if one country was attacked the other would regard it as an attack on herself and had a duty to cooperate in the other’s defense. However, in this same article there was a clause which defined the defensive area of the treaty as that under the government of Japan. On the other hand, no area under U.S. administration was regarded as the defensive area. This peculiar arrangement was brought about because of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution which declared that Japan should not send its troops to fight on foreign soil, and this made it impossible for Japan to conclude
an ordinary security treaty. In spite of this, the U.S. deemed it necessary to conclude the treaty with Japan in order to keep its bases and maintain the presence of its troops which could act in the defense of friendly countries in Asia.

Although the old treaty had been a temporary step with no clear time-limit, the new one was to be for a ten-year period after which it could be abolished with one year’s notice being given. In contrast with the previous treaty, which had no provision for Japan’s right to check the actions of the U.S. Forces when acting under the pretext of the maintenance of Far East peace and security, prior-negotiations were included as necessary before the U.S. could use its troops stationed in Japan.

The clause forbidding Japan to grant bases to other countries without U.S. approval was cancelled. In addition, the other article which had infringed upon Japanese sovereignty, which said that the U.S. could send its forces to put down a civil war in Japan was also cancelled. However, there is a doubtful point in this matter as the new treaty prescribed that the U.S. can send troops to exclude all threats to Japan’s peace and security and it is conceivable that civil war might come within this category.

In this way, the old Security Treaty was reformed, but there were still several problems which remained. These included the civil war problem (detailed above), and the fact that the “prior-consultations” clause was not actually included in the text of the treaty, being part of the Joint Communiqué issued by Kishi and Eisenhower, which meant that it had no legally binding force. Whether Japan possessed a veto in the prior-consultations was not clear. The area of the ‘Far East’, the defense of which was the reason for the U.S. maintaining bases in Japan, was also left undefined.

Still, there were lobbies of support for the new treaty, which included the Liberal Democratic Party and many industrialists.
Generally speaking, the U.S. expected Japan to shoulder an increasing role in its own defense after 1960 and in line with this the Self-Defense Forces were being strengthened. However, the budget allotments for defense amounted to a very small percentage of the total gross national product, with the U.S. providing most of the expenditures, and so Japan could spend a huge percentage in the economic and social fields. This naturally benefitted the Japanese industrialists and a high growth rate was maintained throughout the post-war era.

Meanwhile, the People's Council had decided on a series of ten 'united-actions' against the treaty revision, but none of these had much impact until November 27th, when one of these actions resulted in the storming of the Diet House. Zengakuren had held its 14th National Congress in June, 1959 and the leadership was established as a coalition between the Bund (Kyosando or Communist League) and the Kakukyodo (Revolutionary Communist League) with the Bund in control. The chairman was Karouji Kentaro, from Hokkaido University, and under his dynamic leadership the 'Ampo Bund' was born. In a minority were the JCP-aligned students who then claimed about 40% of the representatives in Zengakuren. The first action of the new executive committee was to organize a nationwide turn-out of 100,000 people in some 163 places as part of the 3rd United Action, but this was really insufficient to have any effect.

In September, the Students' Central Committee decided on a policy of general strike at all schools and universities, which were bases in the student movement, to be held on October 30th. The Tokyo branch of Zengakuren—Togakuren—approved of this plan and started to organize their activities. Accordingly on October 30th, students of 121 jichikai (student self-governing associations) at 90 universities either went on strike or boycotted lectures with 300,000 students joining in. In Tokyo, 15,000
students demonstrated in the rain, and on that day 4 students in Hakodate and 8 in Hiroshima were arrested. The scale of the protests was beginning to increase.

However, the students of Zengakuren were looking for a way to stage a spectacular incident to rouse the nation and were dissatisfied with the 'unimaginative' leadership of the People’s Council. This became formulated in a plan to storm the Diet House, symbol of Japanese democracy. The Diet House is a large graystone building of uninspired architecture which is situated on a low hill facing the Imperial Palace and the downtown Tokyo area of Marunouchi and Ginza. It is situated in a spacious compound and surrounded by a low wall with a main gate in front and two service entrances behind. Other entrances at the back admit visitors and Diet House members. A normal demonstration route would proceed right around the Diet along the roads surrounding it, passing on the way the low yellow brick building that is the Prime Minister’s official residence, and would pause at the main gate to hand in petitions. Storming the Diet House would entail forcing a way into the compound past a guard of Police Reserves and would be the strongest gesture of defiance possible against established order.

The People’s Council was planning its 8th United Action to take place on November 27th in support of a 24 hour strike being called by the Mine Workers Union (Tanro) in protest against mass dismissals in the mines. It was planned for this double event to culminate in a mass march to the Diet with the handing of petitions to the Speakers of both houses at the main gate. Zengakuren’s force of 10,000 students was to be split up into three parts to avoid trouble but the students managed to foil this attempt by the People’s Council’s leaders to weaken them. Two nights before the event, Zengakuren leaders met secretly with representatives of Tokyo Chihiyo (the Tokyo Chapter of Sohyo)
and arrangements were made to concentrate most of the Zen-
gakuren force at the Chapel Center, just down the hill from the
main gate.

November 27th came and 500,000 people joined the protests
throughout the nation; 80,000 turned out in Tokyo for the
march to the Diet, which was guarded by 5,000 police. Speeches
were delivered and slogans shouted, and although there had been
an abortive attempt to force an entrance to the Prime Minister's
residence nothing unusual happened until the time came for the
presenting of the petitions at the main gate at 3:30 in the after-
noon. Just as the petitioners were moving forward accompanied
by 3 Socialist Diet members, 1,000 students charged through the
police barricades and entered the Diet compound. Pandemonium
broke loose as they were followed immediately by 5,000 more
students and workers and eventually 12,000 people were milling
around inside the Diet compound singing songs and snake-
dancing. The disturbance lasted until after 6 o'clock, when the
last 3,000 students of the Zengakuren left and dispersed, before
order was at last restored to the area.

Starting with this incident, the Ampo struggle changed qualitat-
ively. The government counter-attacked by a bill to control
demonstrations in the Diet area, the Socialists issued a statement
regretting the entry into the Diet, the JCP roundly condemned
the student's part in the affair, the leaders of the People's Council
on December 10th decided not to have any more united actions
and public opinion was decidedly against the demonstrators.
However, in the midst of all this criticism, Zengakuren became
more intransigent and refused to stop using violent tactics
where it served their aims. The main difference at this point be-
tween the students and the JCP was the old one of one-step
revolution or a two-stage variety which had plagued the left-
wing since its earliest days. The Mainstream Zengakuren were
for the former and committed to the Rono theory of the pre-war era. The JCP however interpreted the Japanese situation in terms of a two-stage revolution: first it is necessary to get rid of the U.S. imperialistic domination and effect the bourgeois revolution before a final socialist revolution becomes possible. We can see this attitude in the epithets the JCP used for Zengakuren, calling them Trotskyists, adventurists and tools of American imperialism. However, there were still many members of the Socialist Party who sympathized with the Mainstream students. Thus the Japanese left-wing was riven by a basic split which has more or less continued to the present day. Within the Zengakuren, the differences between the Bund-led Mainstream, who supported the overthrow of “Japanese monopolistic capitalism”, and the JCP-led Anti-Mainstream, who favored the struggle against American control, began to widen.

On December 1st, the police issued a warrant for Shimizu Takeo, the Zengakuren secretary, and Hayama Takeo, a committee member of Togakuren (Zengakuren’s Tokyo branch) for their parts in leading the charge into the Diet on November 27th. Feeling very confident, the two students took sanctuary inside the campus of Tokyo University, which now had immunity from police action following a circular to that effect which had been issued by the Vice-minister of Education in May, 1952. They finally left to attend the 9th United Action Central Meeting which was to be held at Hibiya Park in the center of Tokyo. They were arrested while making their way there in the forefront of the demonstrators. This was the last United Action and it was not very successful.

On January 6, 1960, Foreign Minister Fujiyama concluded negotiations with U.S. Ambassador MacArthur over the revision of the Security Treaty and it was arranged for Kishi to fly to America on January 16th to sign the new treaty. At one time,
it had been decided by the Secretariat of the People's Council to hold a big demonstration against Kishi's trip but on January 14th, only 2 days before the date, the Socialists, backed up by the JCP and the Sohyo leadership, decided to call it off and in the future to hold their own demonstration on a smaller scale either on a local level or by sending representatives with petitions.

The Zengakuren Mainstream was dissatisfied with this dissident decision and decided they themselves would try to prevent Kishi from leaving for Washington. Perhaps, it was hoped, he might even have to leave from the U.S. base of Tachikawa which would be a tremendous propaganda coup for them. Plotting their activities at nightly sessions at secret locations, the Bund leaders made their preparations. They were completely isolated, for even the Tokyo Chihiyo had deserted them but they went ahead alone. They decided to get into Haneda Airport on the day before and stay there overnight until Kishi's arrival the following morning.

On the 15th, under the leadership of Karouji Kentaro, the Zengakuren chairmen, the Bund students began their activities. The first groups arrived at 4 o'clock in the afternoon at the airport by bus and by 7 o'clock they occupied the airport lobby. At 7:30 the airport security guards began to wake up to what was going on and started to take measures to prevent further students from getting in. A group of 450 late-comers were stopped at Bentenbashi Bridge at the entrance to the airport grounds at 11:30 p.m. and the first clash occurred between the students and police. 200 of these students managed to break through, bringing the number holed-up in the airport lobby to 700. At 1 o'clock, the students shifted their position, moving from the lobby into an adjoining restaurant, where they entrenched themselves behind hastily erected barricades. It wasn't until 3:00 a.m. that 2,000 riot police were mobilized and made a direct assault on the students' position. The barricades were broken down and 76
students including Karouji were arrested. Outside the airport there were still about 2,000 workers and students who continued to demonstrate on the No. 1 Keihin (Tokyo-Yokohama) National Highway and many were injured there in a melee with the riot police.

Kishi arrived at the airport with his Foreign Minister Fujiyama early in the morning by the backdoor, so-to-speak, from the Tamagawa River side, defended at his departure by 6,000 police and 700 right-wing 'strong-arm' men. On January 19th, in Washington, Kishi added his signature to the new treaty and returned to Japan on the 24th. The airport incident caused the Bund to come under fire from other left-wing groups because it was said that it had given the government a good excuse to suppress the student movement. However, their sacrifice was not completely wasted since their purpose was to make the nation think about the Security Treaty and there was no denying that they had done that. The public criticism over the Haneda incident only served to worsen the split within Zengakuren which had now become defined between the Mainstream of Bund and the Kakukyodo Zenkoku Jinkai (that was the National Committee of the Revolutionary Communist League which was based in Tokyo) and the Anti-Mainstream of the JCP students and the Kakukyodo Kansai group (centered around Osaka and Kyoto in Western Honshu).

All the tendencies towards factionalism in Zengakuren emerged. The Socialist students in Zengakuren were already organising themselves as the Shaseido (the Socialist Student League), although this group was not officially founded until 1961, while the Kakukyodo decided to establish a separate student group to carry on their Zengakuren activities; this was called Marugakudo (Marukusushugi Gakusei Domei or the Marxist Student League). In March, the Zengakuren held its 15th National Congress. This
was an extraordinary meeting called at the express wish of the Bund students who were determined to run it under their enforced guidance. In response, Marugakudo (the old Kakukyodo) and the JCP Anti-Mainstream boycotted this meeting. At the 15th Congress, the Bund Mainstream leaders affirmed their radical activities and moreover planned a schedule of struggles, so the JCP Anti-Mainstream decided to set up a rival organization and leave Zengakuren almost entirely.

The new body was called Tojiren. This name was short for the Tokyo-to Gakusei Jichikai Renraku Kaigi (the Tokyo Liaison Council of Student Self-governing Associations) and was established for the first time at a meeting of the Anti-Mainstream on April 20, 1961. Thus the division of Zengakuren into two distinctive rival groups with separate organizations came in the middle of the ‘Ampo struggle’ and just before a time of great significance.

The protests continued against the new Security Treaty while it was being debated in the Diet. On April 26, 1960, students at about 20 universities went on strike and boycotted classes; the Mainstream mobilized about 6,000 students to demonstrate at the Chapel Center in front of the Diet and the Anti-Mainstream held a meeting of 9,000 students at Shimizudani Park. In another part of the country at Kyoto, 1,500 students held a meeting in front of the clock tower of Kyoto University and 3,500 more met at the Maruyama Concert Hall. On this day the People’s Council were making a petition with 80,000 workers and citizens and they were joined by the students of the Anti-Mainstream when they all marched to a meeting at the Open-air Amphitheater in Hibiya Park. The Mainstream ridiculed this peaceful petitioning, calling it a ‘funeral demonstration’ and they went ahead with a planned attempt to break into the Diet. About 3,000 of the students attacked the main gate which was barricaded with police
vehicles. Clambering over the first line of trucks they were set upon by riot police armed with truncheons waiting on the other side and were quickly overpowered. In this clash, 17 leaders of the Mainstream, including most of the members of the Central Executive Committee, Karouji Kentaro, Zengakuren chairman and Shinohara, Shagakudo's secretary, were arrested, leaving the Mainstream essentially leader-less. Also, because Zengakuren was being faced with the threat of expulsion from the People's Council, the overall result of the April 26th demonstrations was a general quietening down of the Mainstream students.

Ignoring the continuing protests by workers and students, the Kishi government took it upon themselves, at a meeting of the Special House of Representatives Security Treaty Council on May 19th, to have the new treaty put to vote in the Diet. This would entail the use of only Liberal Democratic Party members and constituted a forcible vote in which they 'railroaded' the opposition. The way in which the Kishi government showed their disdain for the normal practices of democratic assembly infuriated the general public. They showed their displeasure on the following day, when a huge crowd of workers, students and ordinary citizens who wanted the overthrow of the Kishi regime and dissolution of the Diet surrounded the perimeter of the Diet House grounds carrying placards and staged violent snake-dances. A group of the demonstrators, mostly members of the Zengakuren Mainstream, numbering about 300, broke into the inner garden of the Prime Minister's official residence next to the Diet.

Following the 21st of May, the students kept increasing numbers of demonstrators encircling the Diet grounds. In the meantime, public opinion was finally becoming aroused over the despotism of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's tactics and many intellectuals representing citizens' groups appealed to the
public to help break up this government in order to maintain democracy. Events were now clearly heading for a climax.

In April, it had been announced that President Eisenhower would visit Japan on July 19th and in preparation for this, U.S. Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty flew to Japan on June 10th. The climate of public opinion at the time of his arrival was rather unfavorable. There had just been a general strike on June 4th, which had been the largest in the history of the Japanese trade union movement, and anti-American feelings were running rather high among the JCP members and the Anti-Mainstream and Tojiren students. Thus several thousand Anti-Mainstream students backed up by workers of Sohyo’s local Kanagawa District Council gathered at Bentenbashi, the approach to Haneda Airport. As soon as Hagerty arrived, he was whisked into a car and was driven away—right into the middle of the crowd of demonstrators, where he was mobbed. They surrounded his car, rocked it backwards and forwards, dented its fenders and sat on the hood; they sang songs, shouted slogans and read their demands at him through the car windows. Hagerty stoically endured these indignities for over an hour before the police could force their way through the crowd to the car. Eventually he was rescued by a U.S. Marine helicopter.

This incident put the Japanese Security Treaty struggle on the front pages of newspapers all over the world and it began to look as if Eisenhower’s visit would have to be called off. Certainly, the police stated they would be unable to guarantee the President’s safety and for a while the Kishi government toyed with the idea of using militant right-wingers to help protect Eisenhower. However, instead it was decided to crack down on student and union leaders by intense police surveillance. On June 11th, there had been more demonstrations at what was called a ‘Second May Day’, with Tojiren mobilizing over 10,000 students. On June 13th, police
were sent to raid the offices of the Anti-Mainstream students at Tokyo Education University and Hosei University.

In the meantime, the Mainstream had been rather subdued, taking no part in the 'Hagerty Incident', because most of their leaders were still in jail. However, the leadership problem was solved when Kitakoji Satoshi came up to Tokyo from Kyoto, where he was studying, to take control. In their own eyes, the Mainstream had been losing its influence since the Anti-Mainstream had pulled off the 'Hagerty Incident', so they resolved to do something spectacular on the occasion of Sohyo's 2nd general strike and the People's Council demonstration planned for June 15th. 15,000 demonstrators turned out to protest the impending ratification of the new treaty and the police's use of violence during the 'Hagerty Incident', and the column marched past the Diet House and staged a sit-down in front of the Metropolitan Police Department buildings at the foot of the hill. In the meantime, the Mainstream were also demonstrating on the other side of the Diet House. Cutting their way in through the wire fencing they forced an entry to the Diet by the South Service Entrance which was guarded by police. At 6:00 p.m., the students clashed with the police in a wild skirmish which lasted the best part of an hour. The first 700 students were backed up by another 800 and they succeeded damaging and setting fire to 19 police vehicles. The police at that time were armed very simply with ex-army helmets, wire nets and water cannon, but did not carry tear-gas guns. Even the police armored trucks only had boards at the back for protection. Still, the police were not entirely as unprepared as they had been on the previous November 27th, and were ready to fight the students tooth and nail. Thus it was that in a police counter-attack around 7:00 p.m., a girl student named Kamba Michiko was crushed to death. The news of her death spread like wild-fire and by 8:30 p.m. there were 4,000
students inside the Diet compound. The fighting continued unabated until after 1 o’clock the following morning, when finally the police were issued with tear gas and the last students were routed. The toll at the end of this day was hundreds injured, 348 people arrested and 1 dead.

The effect of this incident, which turned out to be the final one in the 1960 anti-Ampo struggle, was the resignation of Kishi’s cabinet and the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit to Japan. Kishi had suffered most of all by the disturbances; his personal prestige had been gambled on the successful outcome of the Security Treaty revision, and now all he could do was stay in office to see the new treaty ratified on June 18th and then resign. On the day of the 18th, the Diet was surrounded by 330,000 demonstrators wearing black ribbons and other symbols of mourning, from morning until night. A detachment of Mainstream students was still sitting there long after the main demonstration had broken up but in spite of its size, this demonstration remained peaceful. On the same day, a memorial service was held at Tokyo University where the martyr, Kamba Michiko, had been a student.

Following this, there were several more events; a general strike on June 22nd, on June 24th a national funeral for Kamba Michiko (Mainstream students were excluded from the organizing committee by the JCP, which was quite a paradox in that she had been a Mainstream stalwart), on July 2nd a meeting of the newly formed New Ampo Non-recognition National Convention and on July 4th a meeting to protest “unreasonable oppression” and to propose “non-recognition” of the new treaty. However, in spite of all this, the tide of events was on the ebb and the students’ and workers’ fighting spirit dropped rapidly. Soon all that was left was the small core of activists who had begun the movement. The general mood was one of denouement.

After Kishi resigned, the Ikeda government was formed and
took office on July 19th. The Bill-to-Control-Demonstrations-in-the-Diet Area was shelved because it was realized that it would have been useless to prevent the kind of occurrences that happened anyway. The JCP emerged from this struggle quite satisfied with itself and the Socialists increased in stature. In fact, the only people who suffered were Kishi, and at the other end of the political spectrum, the dominating Zengakuren Mainstream faction, Bund.

True, the Mainstream Zengakuren had been responsible more than any other group for the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit and Kishi’s resignation, but when the steam went out of the 1960 Ampo struggle, the Mainstream fell to internal quarrelling. Zengakuren decided to hold its 16th National Congress as a Special Meeting on July 4th to sum up what had been achieved by the anti-Ampo movement and it was at this session that the latent rivalries came out into the open again and the Mainstream was split. The Anti-Mainstream forces, on the other hand, held a rival meeting at the same time in which Tojiren was extended into a national body named Zenjiren (Zenkoku Gakusei Jichikai Renraku Kai—The National Liaison Council of Student Self-governing Associations), which was primarily under JCP leadership. The Bund (Kyosando—The Communist League) who had held power in the Mainstream for so long broke up into four different groups. These were the Puroretaria Tsushin-ha (The Proletarian Communication Faction) the Kakumei Tsutatsu-ha (The Revolutionary Communication Faction), the Senki-ha (The Battle Flag Faction) and the Kyosanshugi no Hata-ha (The Communist Flag Faction). This proliferation of small groups, each with their own nuance in dialectic, was fated not to last long, although the Senki-ha has survived until the present time and is the parent body of the modern Shagakudo Toitsu Faction. Anyway, the Kyosando (Communist League) was split and the
Bund ceased to exist.

After the dissolution of the Bund, the group which took control of the Mainstream of Zengakuren, now only a skeleton of its former self, was Marugakudo (Marxist Student League) the lower organ of Kakukyodo Zenkoku Iinkai (Revolutionary Communist League National Committee). Marugakudo absorbed many of the active members of the defunct Bund and re-emerged under the slogan ‘Anti-war and Anti-Stalinism’ (Hansen, Hansuta) which indicated its anti-JCP stance. Moreover, some of the leaders of the JCP-led Zenjiren crossed over to their side. The seven defectors including Kasuga Shojiro had been instrumental in organizing the demonstration that turned into the ‘Hagerty Incident’ and they now quit the JCP in opposition to its policies just before the JCP 8th National Convention, in the summer of 1961. The JCP, in retaliation, struck off their names from the membership lists, charging that they had been guilty of enlarging on the ‘Italian theory’ that Communism should adjust itself to each country separately. In doing this, they had run away from the central theme of the anti-imperialist struggle and their theories were not connected with Marx-Leninism at all, which made them revisionists.

Marugakudo now held the 17th Zengakuren National Congress from July 8, 1961. This was to be a Marugakudo dominated affair and so when some Shaseido members set up an opposition they were swiftly ejected. There was also some infighting with Shagakudo, who had to settle for only 4 seats in the executive and a new Marugakudo Central Executive Committee was elected with Kitakoji Satoshi, who led the final assault on the Diet on June 15, 1960, as chairman. The other leaders were Nemoto Hitoshi (Hokkaido University of Arts and Science), Onoda Joji (Saitama University) as Vice-chairman, and Saito Kiyoshi (Waseda University) as secretary. Zenjiren had wanted
to attend this meeting but were refused entry unless they first broke up their own organization. They acquiesced to this in time and thus all the streams of Zengakuren who had taken part in the ‘Ampo struggle’ had broken up. Seeing Zenjiren desert them, the JCP resolved to strengthen their own student group Minseido (Minshu Seinen Domei—the Democratic Youth League) and go it alone, independent of the old Zengakuren.

The 18th Zengakuren National Congress was held in December, 1961, and the executive now became wholly an instrument of Marugakudo as the remaining Shagakudo committee members were kicked out and Nemoto Hitoshi became the new chairman with Onoda Joji his secretary. In the meantime, Shaseido, Shagakudo and the Structural Reform Faction (Kozo Kaikaku-ha or Kokaiha) students were not idle, and in December they formed an alliance called the Sampa Rengo (Three Faction Alliance) and proceeded to try and take control of university student self-governing associations much as Marugakudo did earlier.

Zengakuren now turned its attention to the problem of nuclear weapons experiments and testing. Up to now this had been directed against the United States and to a lesser degree Britain. Members of the Zengakuren Marugakudo executive lead by Nemoto had been invited to a meeting of the International Youth Peace Conference sponsored by the Eastern European Communist countries, being held in Bulgaria. They were staying in Moscow enroute to the meeting when, over a short-wave portable radio, they heard the news that Russia had detonated an H-bomb. They reacted swiftly; getting out a portable printing press they made up handbills and unfurling their flag marched out into Red Square. They had barely gone 10 meters and handed out a few leaflets when they were surrounded by plainclothes police and hustled behind a wall of the Kremlin for questioning. However, the detention was not for long and they carried on to
the Youth Conference, where they again brought up the taboo question of the Soviet 'democratic' H-bomb. It was the last time Zengakuren was asked to attend.

Back in Japan, the Marugakudo Zengakuren also directed their energies to fighting the rival factions. The Structural Reform Faction now set up its own organization called 'Front', which was the short form of Shakaishugi Gakusei Sensen (Socialist Student Front—hence the nickname ‘Front’ which pronounced by a Japanese is Furonto).

At this time, there were five main groups within the student movement, all which could claim to be Zengakuren; these were Marugakudo, Shagakudo, Shaseido, the Front and the JCP Minseido. All of these have survived in roughly the same form up to the present day, and it will be the direct descendants of these groups who lead the ‘Ampo struggle’ in 1970.

The revised form of the Security Treaty which was ratified in 1960 was set for a 10-year period. This period elapses in the summer of 1970. The issues remain much the same as before, but with an important addition; the return of Okinawa to Japanese soil which has many profound implications. Not the least of these is the problem of the nuclear weapons and warheads which the U.S. has been storing on Okinawa up to now. Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, who secured the return of Okinawa in November, 1969, was quick to assure the people that Okinawa would come under the same guarantees in the Security Treaty as Japan now does, but the Japanese left-wing remains suspicious, lest Okinawa be the loophole through which Japan itself is armed with nuclear weapons. The power of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces has been increased very considerably over the last ten years and there has been much speculation as to whether Japan will eventually send troops abroad. This would require a revision of the present Constitution. The continuing Vietnam War has com-
plicated matters because, whereas Sato has stated that the prior-
consultations clause will be abided to, it seems sure that in the 
event the U.S. forces ask permission to continue using Okinawa 
as a staging area for troops and bombing runs over Vietnam and 
Laos, his answer will be ‘yes’. Japan is now beginning to take an 
interest in the security of its traditional sphere of influence in 
Korea, and has been increasing economic ties. Hence, it is natural 
that Japanese industrialists will support a continuing Ampo 
in order to maintain the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean 
peninsula. Such a presence also provides a defense buffer for 
Japan itself, quite apart from the old viewpoint that the Security 
Treaty aids the Japanese economy. Japan’s gross national 
product has risen to be third in the world, after the U.S. and 
Russia, and with it comes a resurgence of nationalism and the 
question arises: should the Japanese people have a fullfledged 
army again?

The Japanese left-wing has been preparing for the renewed 
Ampo struggle in 1970 since 1968. The students have seen the 
university struggle during the 1968–69 period as merely a dress 
rehearsal for the summer of 1970. The Communists are headed 
for a greater say in the Diet House while the Socialists are losing 
ground. It remains to be seen if a People’s Council can be organized 
out of all opposition elements again, but it may be that the 
opposition is far too splintered for that. There is a new party in 
the Diet House this time—Komeito. A middle-of-the road party, 
Komeito (it literally means Clean Government Party) was formed 
as the political arm of the reformed Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai. 
It bases its power on families who are affiliated to Soka Gakkai 
and has a tremendously powerful grassroots organization which 
is only equalled by the JCP. However, its moderate stance gives 
it an edge over the JCP’s politics with the average Japanese voter 
and probably it will be the Socialists who suffer most from its 

— 98 —
challenge. Komeito is also against the Security Treaty and has just formed its own student group (Shingakudo—New Student League) with the aim of joining the 1970 struggles. The ruling party is still the Liberal Democratic Party, but this time the Prime Minister is Mr. Sato and his popularity is very high, in sharp contrast with Kishi’s in 1960, so he should be able to conduct the events of 1970 without any major crisis arising. He has already started on the right foot by securing the return of Okinawa, one of the big rallying points in the whole left-wing, and thus effectively clouded the issue of revision of the Security Treaty.

This has been a short summary of some of the points which exist at the beginning of 1970 with regard to the impending renewal of the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan. The only thing omitted was a discussion of the state of the student movement in this period, but this is extremely complicated and we will have to spend the next chapter following the development of the student movement through the years of the university struggle. Trying to trace each student group through the period from 1962 to the end of 1969 is like unravelling a ball of tangled wool, in which the thread splits, breaks and sometimes gets knotted, so we will mainly deal with the most important groups and events as they happened. All that remains to be done with the Ampo struggle of 1970 is wait and see.
Chapter 4: The University Problem

by KOKUBUN YUTAKA

The student movement in Japan had finally settled down from the turmoil of the 1960 Ampo Struggle by the onset of 1962, but as we have already seen, Zengakuren had become badly fragmented. There were now five main groups: Marugakudo (Marxist Student League), Shagakudo (Socialist Student League), Shaseido (Socialist Youth League), the Front (Socialist Student Front) and the pro-JCP Minseido (Democratic Youth League). The first four all opposed the JCP and together formed what became known as the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren (Yoyogi being the district in Tokyo where the JCP has its headquarters). The continuing development of Zengakuren is now almost entirely concerned with the exploits of the Anti-Yoyogi students as they escalate the level of violence used in political demonstrations and the university struggle. In the latter case, the politically-motivated students of Zengakuren were joined by a new type of activist—the non-political student radical—who brought a different point of view into the student movement. The non-political (or non-sect) radicals are extremely critical of the present university system and are determined to bring about its downfall. While the anti-JCP Zengakuren do not necessarily agree on this point, they have joined in the university struggle in order to use the campus dispute as the basis for altering the structure of Japanese society and bringing about a revolution. The main focus of our attention must now shift, therefore, to the problems surrounding the Japanese university system.

The Japanese university suffers from several defects. These surround the questions of university autonomy, university administration, student participation in the university, deteriora-
tion of education and poor communication between the professors and students, the influence of industry on the university and the financial arrangements in both national and private universities. The students are naturally concerned with those problems which directly affect them, but the associated problems are all brought into use to add fuel to the fire and frequently the activists are able to get support from nearly all the students in the university, when the cause is important enough. During the course of the university struggle, the students were able to paralyze most of the universities in Japan, but at each campus, the problems were not always the same. The most serious disputes arose in the national universities where it was possible to provoke a direct governmental reaction, but private universities also had their share of the trouble.

By far, the largest number of university disputes started over the question of student participation in the university and in the allocation of control over student facilities, such as student halls, dormitories and so on. However, the question which has the most profound implications is that of university autonomy, for it is in this field that government influence on the university itself is defined and provides an example to the private universities as well. To understand what is involved, we must now refer to the situation which resulted after the war.

Originally, the idea of university autonomy was not defined and had been established on the basis of several precedents set before the war. These precedents, however, were not enough to protect the university from the depredations of the militarists in the period leading up to and during the war. One of the first things which was done after the war was to guarantee the autonomy of the university constitutionally. The democratization movement initiated by the Occupation authorities proceeded smoothly and the basic freedoms were restored to the campus.
Students were disillusioned with the old system that had led to war and welcomed these new trends enthusiastically, setting up their own organizations in preparation for their expected participation in the university administration, in keeping with democratic principles. Their hopes were quickly dashed when the Occupation Government abruptly reversed its attitude in 1948 and began to suppress the left-wing movement. It now became apparent to the students that their student self-governing associations were intended to be a compromise, by which the universities could avoid the whole question of student participation. Also, in spite of constitutional guarantees, the university autonomy was still liable to abuse by the Occupation and the Japanese Government. A good example of such abuse is provided by the ‘Red Purge’ and Dr. Eells’ lectures in behalf of the Occupation, which caused the students to react on a nationwide scale. Later, in the early 1950’s period when the JCP was embarking on its ill-fated violent program of revolutionary maneuvers, police invaded various campuses on many occasions to search Zengakuren offices and investigate the students. On those occasions, the police were forced to admit that their actions were illegal (because they were at variance with constitutional guarantees) and were made to promise never to enter the campus except on request of the university authorities. These events illustrate the basic sensitivity on the part of the students and university authorities towards the problem of university autonomy and academic freedom.

With the end of the occupation and the granting of Japanese independence, the Japanese Government took over full responsibilities for internal affairs. Amongst the first few acts were renunciations of a number of changes that either had been made or recommended by the Occupation Forces. Significant was the shelving of plans for the abolition of the Ministry of Education
and the introduction of university boards of trustees to manage university affairs. This plan had met opposition on all sides: from the students, faculty and government, and was scrapped completely. With the confirmation of its traditional position of control over the university, the Ministry of Education now attempted to restore the degree of control it had had before the war. To do so would mean going against the Constitution but there were instances where the government had shown a tendency in this direction, such as in the establishment of the Ground Self-Defense Forces which violated the principle, if not the letter, of the Constitution's declaration that Japan would never maintain 'land, sea and air forces'. In view of this, the Japanese students and the left-wing, who had the most to lose by a return to old pre-war conditions, became very suspicious of the government's attempts to formulate any new University Laws.

The first hint of the Ministry's intentions came in 1958, when an Assistant Professor at Ehime University was censured over his support for the local Teacher's Union in its struggle against the proposed teacher's efficiency rating system. The Assistant Professor, Mr. Tagawa Seizo, had come under the scrutiny of the Professors Council in the Education Department where he worked in 1957, but they had shelved his case, and it was only when the local Board of Education, acting on the Ministry's behalf, intervened, that the President of the university and the Dean of the Education Department gave way and he was dismissed.

In 1960, following the Revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Prime Minister Ikeda began to talk about ways of controlling the universities. He intended to do this by reforming the educational system, and to this end he set up a Central Education Council to prepare the way. In 1961, in accordance with the government's plan, the National University Association made
public it's recommendations for reformation of the university system. These included proposals that only regular lecturers should have the right to vote in the election of university presidents, the president's power should be strengthened, the power of the faculty meeting be reduced, the president would possess the power of veto in the appointment of deans and that faculty meetings consist only of professors.

The Central Education Council deliberated until 1962 when it finalized its own plan for university reformation. According to this plan, the faculty meeting, which is the repository of university autonomy, would be restricted in power. Further, the president, who is the supreme responsible person in the university, would be strengthened in power. The university council and faculty meeting should only be advisory organs and professors only should be members of the faculty meeting. Moreover, the Minister of Education would possess the power of veto in the selection of university presidents and deans of departments. Finally, the university should have an advisory body which consists not only of educators but also of prominent public figures which would operate rather like a board of trustees.

The students and teachers saw this plan as a clear indication of the Ministry of Education's attempt to deny university autonomy and to place the university under direct control of the government. In addition to the above proposals, the government also was pressing for closer ties between the university and the economic field, suggesting a co-operative system between the university and industry. Opposition to these measures quickly developed, and students and teachers joined to form an anti-University Control Bill movement.

Realizing that the original draft was unpalatable to a large number of people connected with the university system, the government retreated and then had the National University
Association reissue its earlier plan. This was less candid than the Central Education Council's version, but in essence it was felt to be the same. In 1963, the Central Education Council again made public its plan and elaborated on the relationship between university autonomy and student self-government. It declared that the student's activities in self-administration should be restricted to achievement of education in the university and that student self-government does not come within the bounds of university autonomy.

The anti-University Control Bill struggle quickly spread to all parts of the country gaining support amongst student groups and from the Japan Teachers Union. In November, 1962, the Marugakudo, who controlled the Zengakuren body, having held the 19th Zengakuren National Congress in July, excluding all other groups, now joined with the Sampa Rengo (the Three Faction Alliance of Shagakudo, Shaseido and the Front) to promote joint actions against the University Control Bill. The left-wing parties also came out against the proposed bill. In spite of this widespread protest the government persisted in trying to push the bill through.

Finally, in response to the opposition movement, the National University Council held a meeting and voted that the Minister of Education should not be permitted the power of veto in presidential elections. This brought the full weight of public opinion to bear on the government's stand and Ikeda was forced to abandon all his efforts to get the bill before the Diet.

This struggle between the Ikeda government and the university illustrates quite graphically all of the important factors that are central to the problem of university autonomy. However, in the preceding paragraphs we have encountered many references to the various bodies which are part of the university (such as the faculty meeting), so this is a good point at which to describe the
structure of the Japanese national university. We will examine each of the organizations of the university attempting to show how they interact and the type of problems that occur within the national university system.

A national university in Japan is made up of several departments and research institutes, each of which contain several units known as professorships. A professorship consists of one professor, an assistant professor and several assistants. In addition, each graduate student is attached to a professorship where he receives guidance in his work. A professorship can be regarded from two points of view; one that it is a place where the same specialization can be studied, and the other being that it is a unit for the allocation of money.

The university is structured so that its autonomy is guaranteed. The ruling bodies are the council, the deans' meeting and the faculty meeting. The president of the university actually has no real power but acts as chairman in the council and at the deans' meeting. He is also the chosen representative for the university in its affairs with the government and the outside community. All members of the council, the deans' meeting and the faculty meeting as well as the president are members of the university personnel. This can be contrasted with the United States, where the ruling body is a board of regents or trustees, whose members are usually chosen from the business community. Let us look at each of these three ruling bodies in turn.

The council: In 1953, the Ministry of Education required every national university to establish a council which was to comprise representatives from each of the departments and research institutes. Legally, these councils have strong powers and are supposed to be the central decision-making bodies of the university. Included in their functions are the following: establishment of school regulations, setting of standards for the
faculty, deciding on the size of enrollment, making provisions for student welfare, making final decisions on the hiring and firing of university personnel and the punishing of students, and settling all other important matters concerning the management of the university.

However, although the powers of the council are legally recognized, it is the faculty meeting which actually makes these decisions. For example, even though the final decision on hiring personnel and punishing students should go to the council, there has never been an occasion in which it has ever vetoed a faculty meeting’s decision on such matters.

The faculty meeting is a departmental meeting attended by all the professors and assistant professors of that department. However, as the professor has absolute authority in his professorship, the assistant professors have little or no power and the faculty meeting is in fact a forum for the professors. Topics discussed and decided on at the faculty meeting are the hiring and firing of the department’s personnel, promotion of students, graduation of students, preliminary proposals on the punishment of students, the curriculum and plans for the future.

Departments tend to be rather insular organizations and furthermore, no one department is usually aware of the procedures or rules which apply to faculty meetings in other departments. Each faculty meeting regards its decisions as final and this often results in difficulties on those occasions when a problem involves the whole campus and different departments arrive at different decisions. We will see how this is frequently the cause of university disputes and was especially responsible for the creation of the Tokyo University Struggle in 1968.

The deans’ meeting is made up of all heads of departments plus the president. However, this excludes the heads of research institutes who are not deans but are professors. The most
important function of this meeting is as a consulting organization for the president. It also serves as kind of summit conference between the departments, and though its recommendations are not legally binding, they carry a lot of force.

It is hard to say whether the council or the faculty meetings have more power and it depends on the university in question. However, due to the growth in size of the Japanese university since the war (many universities in Tokyo have 30 or 40,000 students), it has become impossible for the faculty meeting to satisfactorily handle all the problems of the campus. In addition, the autonomy of each department is so well protected from outside pressures that the faculty meeting system lacks flexibility when dealing with problems that extend beyond its jurisdiction.

A good example of the inflexibility of the faculty meeting is to be found at Tokyo Education University. This university is supposed to move to a new and better campus, but the professors in the Literature Department are opposed to the plan. In 1962, the Council at Tokyo Education University decided that whenever a large problem involving the whole university had to be settled, unanimous agreement on the part of all five departments was necessary. However, each department regards its decision as final, making agreement or even compromise impossible. Besides this, communication between departments is almost non-existent. This problem has yet to be resolved.

Ideally, it is felt that the faculty meeting should be a democratic institution with each professor having one vote. In fact, this is not usually the case because the professors are often members of cliques and important professors are able to put pressure on lesser professors. These cliques are usually formed by teachers who attended the same university together, and who, because of their well-established positions, are able to relegate advantages to themselves and disadvantages to their opponents.
Students, especially, have great antipathy for this system for professors have an almost life-and-death control over their future.

Since power in the universities is dispersed in the council and the faculty meeting, the management of these institutions gives rise to many problems. The situation in the private universities is further complicated by having a board of directors.

None of the ruling bodies in a national university has any provisions for student participation in the running of the university. However, this question is one which is uppermost in the minds of the students and is the logical outcome of the democratization policy that was instituted after the war. According to their interpretation, Japan is now supposed to be a democratic country, in which case all members of an institution should have equal rights as well as obligations in its management. Using such reasoning it was only natural that the students should bring up the question of their participation in the university.

Student participation can be envisaged on four levels: 1) participation in the election of the president and deans; 2) participation in a conference of students and university authorities; 3) direct participation in the council or faculty meetings and 4) self-government of student centers and dormitories by the students themselves. In most cases, the best the students can hope for is the last category in which they manage their own facilities, and the whole Japanese student movement has arisen around the student self-governing associations. The name Zengakuren itself means the National Federation of Student Self-governing Associations. Whether fuller student participation in the university would bring about a more responsible attitude on the part of the students or, on the other hand, would result in greater intransigence by the students cannot be answered at this stage. However, there are some examples of student participation which
are worthy of note, but these represent just a small percentage of cases. Furthermore, almost all of these cases are found in private universities because of the special position the Ministry of Education has in the national universities.

We will now examine two examples of student participation in the election of the president. The first is at Hitotsubashi University, where students who have been at the university for more than 6 months have the power of veto against proposed presidential candidates. This system was established in 1946 and three groups, instructors, non-faculty personnel and students, participate in the election according to their responsibilities. First of all, the non-faculty personnel help to select a committee made up of faculty members; this committee then decides on at the most three candidates. Now the students vote. If any candidate is vetoed, it must by at least two-thirds of the the students. The remaining candidates now face an election by professors, assistant professors, assistants and all high ranking administrative officials in the university.

A different system is in effect at Doshisha University. In this case, the election has two steps. The first step is taken when a preliminary election is held by students who have been at the university for at least one year to decide which of the full-time professors should be the student’s nominee for president. The second step is an election in which the full-time professors and research workers vote on the candidates available. Though the students have participated in a preliminary election, their choice of candidate will have some influence on the second and final election only if they give the candidate of their choice an overwhelming majority.

Another method of student participation is in the form of a conference between the students and the university authorities. A good example is to be found at Ritsumeikan University. The
faculty meeting, the university conference and the board of directors are the traditional organizations at a private university. The students, however, have very little voice in this set-up, and so to remedy this situation, a Whole University Conference was established where the student representatives and the faculty could get together and talk. In spite of this, the students still have little influence if a plan is recommended by the Whole University Conference, it has little chance of receiving recognition. It has been suggested that the Whole University Conference should be replaced or at least put on an equal footing with the traditional university conference.

Probably the most important aspect of university administration is the selection of the faculty, and this is normally done at the faculty meeting. However, at the Medical Department of Nagoya University, the students are allowed to participate directly in the choice of new teachers. This precedent breaking procedure is all the more important because Nagoya is a national university and comes under the supervision of the Minister of Education. It is done as follows. A committee is made up of faculty workers' labor union representatives, assistants, graduates and trainees; included are student representatives. The purpose of this committee is to choose three names from a list of prospective applicants to fill a vacancy in the faculty, and then present them to the faculty meeting for final choice. Though the committee is to choose at the most three names, in fact, the by-laws of the committee say that only one candidate should be presented to the Faculty Meeting. The person who is finally selected should receive a two-thirds majority in the faculty meeting and so the election by the faculty meeting is in essence a vote of confidence for the committee's choice.

The system at Nagoya has, of course, engendered the disapproval of the Ministry of Education, in whose opinion this
method of selecting a member of the faculty is illegal. Commenting on the Ministry's behalf, Mr. Miyagi, head of the Science Bureau at the Ministry of Education, stated: "Direct participation by the students on personnel decisions is not permitted by actual law. According to the Special Law regarding Public Educational Officers (Kyoiku Komuin Tokurei), professors must be selected at a faculty meeting and finally the Minister of Education has the right to approve or dismiss this choice. For Nagoya University to give the students such rights is both excessive and illegal." (Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 20, 1968)

The one area in which student participation could be generously permitted, would seem to be self-government of their own student centers, but this has usually come about only after many bitter disputes. Even after granting the right of the students to manage their own student centers, the problems are not over. There are many important questions over finance and personnel but in addition, there is the more serious problem of leadership of the student center. All the various student factions compete bitterly and violently for the leadership, and sometimes the conflict becomes so bad that the university freezes the funds intended for the student council and the ordinary students turn their backs because they don't want to become involved. In such a case, the student center, which should be a place for voluntary club activities and for the promotion of friendship among the students, is turned into a base of operations for the activists. We will see in the next few pages many instances in which campus disputes have arisen out of this problem. However, before continuing this account of the university problem, we must first trace the development of the various factions which make up Zengakuren.

As was mentioned earlier, Marugakudo joined forces in 1962 with the Sampa Rengo of Shagakudo, Shaseido and the structural reform groups of the Front in order to create effective opposition
to the Ikeda government's proposed University Control Bill. This new alliance didn't last long. Moreover, within Marugakudo, a spirited controversy developed over the wisdom of making such a joint action with the Sampa Rengo. The debate grew into a basic split in which one faction, led by the Zengakuren chairman, Nemoto Hitoshi, favored independent actions, while the other faction, which gathered around the secretatry Onoda Joji, advocated joint-actions. In the autumn of 1962, Marugakudo's parent body, Kakukyodo, held its 3rd National Committee Meeting and the split within Marugakudo widened. The Nemoto faction now began to be called the Revolutionary Marxist Faction—Kakumaru (Kakumeiteki Marukusushugi-ha), and the Onoda Faction (also called the Yamamoto or 'Y' Faction) took over the National Central Committee of Marugakudo and became the Chukaku faction (literally: the Central Core Faction). These two new factions under Kakukyodo's wing made their official debut in February, 1963.

In the meantime, the Sampa Rengo had been undergoing some changes. First of all, the structural reform groups of the Front were thrown out in April, and then the Sampa Rengo was reformed in September, with the newly formed Chukaku joining Shagakudo and Shaseido to make up a new three faction alliance. However, the Shagakudo and Shaseido were also going through a period of internal conflicts. Shagakndo had become divided into two factions; one was the Marxist Front Faction (Marukusushugi Sensen-ha) and the other was the Marxist-Leninist Faction which became better known as the ML Faction. Shaseido was suffering from a deepening split between the Liberation Faction (Kaiho-ha) and the Association Faction (Kyokai-ha) which only ended when the Association group was expelled from the Sampa Rengo.

The 20th General Congress of Zengakuren was held in July,
1963 and hectic fighting broke out between the rival Kakukyodo factions of Kakumaru and Chukaku. Six Chukaku executives had already been expelled in April for advocating joint actions, and now the rest of the Onoda faction students were shut out of Zengakuren and the Kakumaru Zengakuren was born. The new Kakumaru executive was chosen with Nemoto Hitoshi (Hokkaido Gakuin University) as chairman, Matsuo Katsuhiko (Waseda University) and Watanabe Kazuya (Tokyo Engineering University) as vice-chairman and Ikegami Yoji (Chuo University) was the new secretary.

While the anti-Yoyogi students were fighting amongst themselves for control of Zengakuren, the JCP students were busy making new groups to replace Zenjiren which had collapsed. These groups took shape under incredibly long names such as the Tokyo Student Joint Struggle Committee against Ampo and for the Protection of Peace and Democracy (Ampo Hantai, Heiwa to Minshushugi o Mamoru Tokyo Gakusei Kyoto Kaigi) which was known as Heimin Gakkyo and was started in May, 1962. This was followed by the National Student Liaison Committee against Ampo and for the Protection of Peace and Democracy (Ampo Hantai, Heiwa to Minshushugi o Mamoru Zenkoku Gakusei Renraku Kaigi) otherwise called Heimin Gakuren which was established on August 3rd. In 1963, this changed into the National Federation of Student Self-governing Associations against Ampo and for the Protection of Peace and Democracy, (Ampo Hantai, Heiwa to Minshushugi o Mamoru Zenkoku Gakusei Jichikai Rengo). As the basis of this new body had returned to being organized around the student self-governing associations, it was obviously intended to be a new Zengakuren, and accordingly, it became known as the Zengakuren Unity Faction.

The antagonism between the Kakumaru and Chukaku became
worse day by day and culminated in an armed clash at Waseda University on July 2, 1964. Chukaku was joined in their attack on a Kakumaru meeting by members of Shagakudo, Shaseido and the Front, and for the first time the students were armed with sticks and wore helmets. From this time on, plastic worker's helmets became part of the anti-Yoyogi students' uniform. Helmet colors vary according to the group wearing them and are adorned with slogans in addition to the name of the faction. For example, Chukaku wears white, Shagakudo red, Shaseido blue and the Front green. Apart from the original purpose of protecting the head of the wearer, these helmets also have the function of identification and help promote a feeling of solidarity amongst members of a group.

The plans for reforming Zengakuren by the JCP students were proceeding rapidly and finally in December, 1964, a meeting was held in which the Zengakuren Unity faction was reformed as Zengakuren. At this meeting four points were decided on as the basis for the new organization. These were:

1) to ensure independence, peace, democracy, student self-government in the university and freedom of study;
2) to establish a united front and solidarity among all students,
3) to strengthen and widen their organization;
4) to develop contacts with the world's student youth movement.

In opposition to this, attempts were made to re-unite the various factions of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren. In October, 1964, students representing 30 student self-governing associations from 19 universities, including members of both the Sampa Rengo and Kakumaru, held a meeting to form the Student Committee for Preventing Nuclear Powered Submarines calling at Japanese Ports (Gensen Kiko Shoshi Gakusei Kaigi). This in time became the Student Liaison Committee, and on November 7, 1964, this group sponsored demonstrations by 7 factions at
the American naval base of Yokosuka, where the nuclear powered submarines were calling. However, this rapprochement between Kakumaru and the other anti-Yoyogi factions was short-lived, because in December, when a meeting of the Tokyo Federation Student Self-governing Associations Reformation Committee was held, Kakumaru was not present, insisting that only they represented the true leadership of Zengakuren.

In 1965, the student movement made rapid progress. The main reasons were the commencement of U.S. bombing raids against North Vietnam in February and the signing of the Japan-Korea Security Treaty in June. These events were interpreted by the Japanese left-wing as signs of Japanese and American imperialism joining forces as a challenge to democracy. This period saw the founding of two important anti-war youth groups: the Anti-war Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai), which was formed on the initiative of the Socialist Party and Sohyo to mobilize youth against the Vietnam War and against the Japan-Korea Security Treaty, and the Peace in Vietnam movement of Beheiren, which was originally created by a group of literary intellectuals, but later broadened to embrace a wide spectrum of people. Neither of these had any direct connections with the student movement or Zengakuren, but they both found great support from the students in the ranks of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren, particularly in the big cities. In addition, when the Hansen Seinen Iinkai was formed, observers from both Beheiren and the Anti-Yoyogi factions attended, so that a loose association was formed between all of these groups.

It was in 1966 that the university problem finally came to the fore and the student movement exploded at three different places in Tokyo simultaneously, with campus strikes at Waseda, Meiji and Chuo Universities, over the question of fees and student halls. The campus dispute at Waseda University is generally
regarded to be the beginning of the university struggle period, and so we will examine it in some detail.

The central problem at Waseda was about who should administer the New Student Hall. Other issues, such as the increasing influence that the industrial world was coming to have on the university and the rise in tuition fees, were also brought into play. The Waseda struggle followed a fairly typical pattern which has been repeated in many ways at universities all over Japan in the ensuing period.

In 1965, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Waseda's founding, the university completed a Second Student Hall at the cost of 260 million yen. The new building, which had 11 floors and two basements, was necessary for there were about 600 clubs and student organizations within the university and the old Student Hall had only 35 rooms which was enough to house only 70 clubs. A conflict now arose between the students and the university authorities as to who should manage the new building. Also, the students voiced their objections to the involvement of the Japanese industrial world in the university which they said had resulted in a disproportionate emphasis being placed on engineering, with research work being directed towards industrial demands and that this had caused a reduction in the number of evening courses.

In November, the Waseda All Campus Joint Struggle Committee (Waseda Zenkyoto), which had been formed in 1962 to handle the problem of the Student Hall and consisted mainly of Kakumaru and Sampa Rengo students, under the chairmanship of Oguchi Akihiko (also chairman of the First Politics and Economics Faculty Student Self-governing Association and a member of the Shaseido Liberation Faction), presented a list of three demands to the university just before the new hall was to be finished. These were: 1) the Student Hall should be ad-
ministered by the students themselves, 2) the Livelihood Co-operative Association (a body which was responsible for student welfare) should be permitted use of the Student Hall, and 3) each student circle should be given one room. They also demanded that these questions be submitted to mass-bargaining. However, the university authorities refused these demands on the grounds that the students would use the Student Hall as a base for the student movement. The Zenkyoto students then began their campaign to get control of the Student Hall and on December 8th, they demonstrated and went on a hunger strike. On December 11th, they took their action a step further by staging a sit-down strike, with 200 students sitting in front of the main university offices, confining the directors and employees inside. When 150 of these students then broke into the office building, the university authorities called in the Tokyo riot police to evict them.

Up to this point, the struggle had been limited to a small number of activists, but on December 20th the University Council decided at an extraordinary meeting to increase the tuition fees starting with the following term. With this announcement, the struggle spread to include most of the students in the university.

The following term the All Campus Joint Struggle Council reorganized itself to handle the tuition question and on January 6th renamed itself the All Campus Joint Student Hall and Tuition Fee Struggle Council. They began to campaign on the platform of preventing the fee increase from being applied to the new students in that year. In response to this, the pro-JCP Minsei students of the First Law Department started the strike on January 18th. They were joined two days later by the Sampa Rengo students in the Department of Commerce and Science and the Kakumaru students of the First Literature Faculty. Finally, on January 21st, the students of the Department of Science and Engineering entered the strike and the whole campus was barricaded. In
addition to this, the students decided to boycott the final examinations which were to be held at the end of the spring term. Waseda's President, Dr. Ohama, then held a meeting with the students on February 4th, in which he explained the university's determination to increase the tuition and enforce the end-of-term examinations. Of course, this meeting broke down.

However, negotiations were continued between the trustees and the All Campus Joint Struggle Council, but on February 10th, these broke down as well. Immediately following this, 500 students staged a protest demonstration and took over the main office building by barricading themselves behind a fortress of chairs and desks. The occupation of the main offices lasted three days. On the third day, 250 students belonging to the physical training club, who traditionally belong to the right-wing, attacked the Zenkyoto position with baseball bats and a water hose. This fight grew so bad that eventually the riot police were called in and they ejected all the students from the offices. Zenkyoto re-occupied the office building on the 20th and this time they refused to mediate with the university authorities over the problem of entrance examinations which were due to be held at that time. So the next day at the request of the university administration, 3,000 riot police were called in and they broke down all the barricades on the campus. The students immediately occupied the campus again as soon as the police left. The following day the riot police were mobilized yet again, and on this occasion 203 students were arrested. After this, the police were stationed on the campus until March 19th when the entrance examinations were held. Subsequently, all departments went on strike again behind their barricades and boycotted the end-of-term examinations.

During this period, the rank and file students were beginning to waver in their resolve and through a group representing these
students, they managed to gain power within the struggle control committee. The united student front began to break up from this time. First, the Commerce Department and the Science and Engineering Department voted to take the end-of-term examinations and they removed the barricades in front of their buildings on April 13th and 14th. On April 17th, the barricades at the Education Department were broken down by members of the physical training society, assisted by the university security guards. On April 19th, students of the 1st Politics and Economics Departments, who were to take their final examinations, were forced to take them elsewhere. However, in spite of these cracks in the All Campus Joint Struggle Council's front, the real collapse of the protest movement didn't come until President Ohama and the directors decided to tender their resignations on April 24th. The university later announced it's punishments for 40 students involved in the dispute and 10 of them were expelled. This brought the struggle to a close.

Acting-President Abe was installed on May 10th and the struggle quickly subsided as the result of his quiet and persuasive negotiating style. The department strikes were called off one-by-one: May 21st at the 1st Commerce Department; June 4th at the 1st Politics and Economics Department; June 14th the 1st Politics, the Education and the 2nd Politics and Economics Departments; and finally on June 20th, the 2nd Politics Department and the Kakumaru fortress in the Cultural Department voted to call off their strikes.

This whole struggle had now come a full circle. Taken overall it cannot be said to have been a success unless we can cite the resignation of President Ohama. Although the struggle died down in June, 1966, several problems remained; the two most important of which were the protest over the punishment of students and the court case that followed. The Waseda campus
dispute was now effectively over and the campus returned to a relatively peaceful state, remaining that way throughout nearly all of the next three years while disputes wracked other Japanese universities.

This dispute at Waseda has all the characteristic features of a Japanese university struggle. The students on one hand have several tactics they can employ to achieve their demands and these are: 1) making petitions; 2) conducting hunger strikes and sit-down strikes; 3) mass bargaining with the university authorities; 4) occupation of university buildings; 5) boycott of classes and examinations; 6) detention of university personnel; and 7) interference in entrance examinations and university ceremonies. The university authorities on the other hand are not helpless and they can do one or more of the following: 1) ignore the students' demands forcing them to give up their protest movement; 2) submit to their demands or attend negotiations or mass bargaining sessions with the aim of stopping the dispute or at least arranging a compromise; 3) organize self-defense squads from other student groups who oppose the activists; 4) punish ring-leaders and so incapacitate the student protest movement; and 5) when all else fails, call in the riot police to wrest the campus from the student strikers' control.

Mass-bargaining sessions are usually attended by a very large number of the students (in one case at Nihon University 10,000) where they forcibly present their demands to the university president and his fellow executives. The president has to answer most of the students' questioning, which is done by representatives, who frequently grab the microphone he is using to harangue the crowd. To submit to mass-bargaining is quite an ordeal and a frightful thing to many elderly Japanese professors who are ill-equipped to face constant insults and indignities and there have been occasions when teachers have had to be hospitaliz-
ed after a particularly strenous session. The student representatives are mostly Zengakuren leaders and they enjoy this type of meeting because it gives them the power to sway much larger numbers of students than otherwise possible. Also, it is remarkably effective in getting conciliatory statements out of the university authorities, which if they retract at a later date can be used as proof of the hypocrisy of the university administration.

To blockade a building or sometimes the whole campus is by far the most common tactic employed by students in a university strike. First, barricades are erected at all entrances; these are constructed out of desks and chairs (sometimes bookcases) from inside the building. The barricades are strengthened by lashing the desks together with wire and a small opening is left, just sufficient to allow one person to enter at a time. The front of the barricaded entrance is then covered by huge placards on which are written the students' demands and other notices. If the whole campus is on strike, then the front or main gate is barricaded in much the same way and a huge sign bearing the letters 'Suto Kekko Chu', which means 'On Strike', is posted before it. In all cases, the barricades are then guarded by a small squad of students, wearing helmets and carrying long wooden poles, who check all comers at the entrance and bar those they don't approve of. To try and force through a barricade is to invite a severe battering and possible injury. As well as placards, the students frequently display their group flags, either by flying them on the roof of a building or by hanging them in front. When it is possible that the barricades may be forced by an outside group, such as the police, the defenders will also take steps to arm themselves within their fortress. The most common armament is in the form of broken paving stones and pieces of concrete, although recently molotov cocktails have become standard equipment. Any building under siege often suffers quite a bit of damage both from the defenders.
and the attackers; in the case of research laboratories, offices and libraries, valuable documents and equipment are frequently destroyed and work ruined.

Faced with a campus dispute, the university authorities are loath to take any step to antagonize the students, but at the same time they want to stop the dispute without giving in to the student demands, so the result is a stalemate and the campus is paralyzed. The university authorities also come in for a great deal of outside criticism; in the case of national universities the Ministry of Education joins in the conflict too, and this is often no help at all. Most university disputes, therefore, are long drawn-out affairs which usually die down only when the student movement runs out of steam. Most important of all, they almost never succeed in solving the problems which are the root-cause of the trouble, which means that the same problems will recur again and again until it is faced and dealt with. The rash of campus disputes that hit Japan in 1966, '67 and '68 were, in fact, quite predictable and where nothing was done, they will crop up again in the not-so-distant future.

When the university struggle developed across Japan, the student groups were quick to capitalize on it and on holding their annual meetings, this issue was included along with the others. The pro-JCP Zengakuren, Minsei, held their 17th General Meeting in July, 1966, in which attention was focussed on the campus struggle and the small electoral district struggle. Minsei decided on a policy of extending the struggles using the whole campus during 1967 with the onset of the new terms. The Kakumaru Zengakuren also held their 23rd General Meeting in July. They defined their policy as ‘Anti-imperialism, anti-war’ and resolved to fight in the university struggle, in the small electoral district struggle and to destroy the Sampa Rengo. However, by 1966 Kakumaru’s strength had dropped appreciably. Later the
same year, in December, the Sampa Rengo held a reformation meeting in which they established the Sampa Zengakuren. They criticized both Kakumaru and the Minsei and they interpreted the student movement as an instrument of class struggle. At the same time the Sampa students, who advocated armed revolution, became synonymous in the public eye with violent struggles.

With the onset of 1967, the first talk was heard of preparations for the future struggle against the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1970, and this took its place along side the university struggle. Three groups now clearly defined Zengakuren—Minsei, Kakumaru and Sampa, and each developed their own individual movements.

The Minsei Zengakuren held their 18th General Meeting in July from the 13th to the 16th. They announced officially that their supporters numbered 240,000 students in 85 universities and 194 jichikai (student self-governing associations) and also that more than 160 jichikai were aligned with them, bringing a grand total of 70% of the student population in the whole country under their collective umbrella. They emphasized this as evidence for their claim that their struggle was being conducted across a national democratic united front. They chose a new executive: Taguma Kazutaka (Tokyo Economic University) as chairman, Iwamura Tomofumi (Tohoku University), Ikegami Yuhei (Tokyo Educational University) and Miyoshi Toshitaka (Osaka Gakuin University) as vice-chairmen and Ieno Sadao (Kyoto University) as secretary.

The Kakumaru Zengakuren held their 24th National Congress on the same days as the Minsei and they declared themselves against the Vietnam War, they denounced the Chinese nuclear tests and reiterated their basic slogan as 'Anti-imperialism, anti-Stalinism'.

The Sampa Zengakuren held their second meeting after re-
formation from July 12-14th and they approved a program to resolutely fight against the Security Treaty in 1970.

The university struggle had now become well established as a result of the unlimited university strikes at Waseda, the fee increase struggle at Meiji University, the student hall struggle at Chuo University and the struggle at Hosei University in which the president was confined by the students. Against this background of academic strife, the radicals of the anti-Yoyogi factions were turning their eyes once more to the political scene.

In the autumn of 1967, Prime Minister Sato Eisaku decided to go on a tour of S.E. Asia, starting with South Vietnam. His plan called for him to make this trip on October 8th, and then in November, he would pay a visit to America. The left-wing saw this as confirmation of the Japanese government becoming an active partner of American imperialism in Asia. Therefore, students of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren and workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai (Anti-war Youth Committees) tried to stop Sato from leaving the country on both occasions and these were called the Haneda Incidents of 1967. This was the first time that the Hansen Seinen Iinkai had joined with the anti-Yoyogi students in a protest action, and from this point on, the members of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai came increasingly under the influence of the extremist students, much to the dismay of the Socialist Party.

In preparation for their effort on the following day, 700 students from Shagakudo and Shaseido Liberation Factions gathered at Chuo University on the night of October 7th, 600 Chukaku students stayed at Hosei University, while 400 Kakumaru stayed at Waseda. Early on the morning of the 8th, the students gathered at stations all over Tokyo armed with wooden staves and wearing helmets and started for Haneda Airport. In the meantime, 300 students of the structural reform groups (i.e. Front), who had stayed at Bunka Hall, started to make their way to Haginaka
Park Ground, which is near Haneda.

At 8 o'clock that morning, 1,500 Shagakudo and Shaseido students, travelling on a commuter trains, got out at Oomori Station, which is between Tokyo and Haneda, and forced their way onto Platform 1, past which Sato's special train was supposed to travel on its way to Haneda. The platform was guarded by 200 riot police who had been expecting the students, but they were unable to stop them. Reinforcements were sent for and 400 more police quickly arrived and they broke up the students' attack after a free-for-all in the station. So the Prime Minister's train, which came later, was able to pass without further incident.

The Hansen Seinen Iinkai were, in the meantime, proceeding with their plans and at 9:00 a.m. held a meeting at Haginoka Park where they were joined by students from the Front and the Chukaku Faction. At the same time, 400 Kakumaru students left the train they had been travelling on at Haneda Airport station and approaching Haneda by way of Inaribashi Bridge, attacked the police defenses with sticks and stones. There are three ways of entering Haneda Airport by road and each one is across a bridge joining the mainland to the reclaimed land that the airport has been built upon. The riot police who were guarding these approach bridges blocked the students way with armored police vehicles. At 9:20 a.m., about 1,000 Chukaku left Haginaka Park, and coming towards Haneda from the South, attacked a company of 200 riot police at Bentenbashi Bridge, putting them temporarily to rout.

At 9:30, about 1,500 members of Shagakudo and Shaseido, who had failed at Oomori Station, now arrived on the North side of Haneda at Anamoribashi Bridge. Now all three bridges which adjoin the airport were the scenes of repeated clashes between
the students and the riot police. It seems evident that the students had agreed on this plan of action at some earlier stage.

At Anamoribashi Bridge the riot police made barricades using 6 armored vehicles and when the students tried to break through using wooden logs as battering rams the police repulsed them with a water cannon. Next, the students tried to set fire to the barricading vehicles. The police, thereupon, made a detour and got behind the students, and now the fighting at both Anamoribashi and Inaribashi became very confused.

Meanwhile, as this fighting was going on all around Haneda Airport, Prime Minister Sato flew off to South East Asia at 10:35 in the morning.

At Bentenbashi Bridge, the Chukaku students stole one of the police vehicles and charged the police lines with it. Many students joined in this attack, but the police counterattacked fiercely and forced the students to retreat, leaving many of their number trapped between the vehicle and the bridge wall, and forcing others to jump into the water under the bridge to escape. During this episode, a 19 year old student named Yamazaki Hiroaki from Kyoto University was killed. He died at approximately 11 o’clock that morning. The police version of his death is that he was run down by the police vehicle while it was commandeered by the students, but the students claim that he was beaten to death by the police. The true facts surrounding this unfortunate incident have not yet been ascertained.

As soon as the news of the student’s death spread, students and workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai and the Shaseido Liberation Faction joined the Chukaku at Bentenbashi Bridge and after pausing for one minute’s silent prayer, they tried to rush into the airport again. This time however, the police fired tear gas into the crowd and they retreated all the way back to Haginaka Park Ground. The result of this day’s futile fighting was 1 dead,
more than 600 wounded and 58 arrested. On the other side, it was estimated that 1,000 police were injured as well. The police strategy had been a failure because, although they had stopped the students getting into Haneda airport, they were only barely able to do so and had completely underestimated the violence of the student attacks. Also their helmet visors and small hand shields were almost useless against the student weapons and this is what produced such a high level of police casualties.

In sharp contrast to this day of violence at Haneda Airport, the students of the Yoyogi Zengakuren went to attend the Akahata (Red Flag) festival by the side of Lake Tama in North West Tokyo. The image of 80,000 Minsei students picknicking by the lakeside while they were fighting and dying at Haneda only helped to strengthen the resolve of the anti-Yoyogi students to overthrow the JCP.

One month later, on November 12th, the Sampa Zengakuren repeated their life-or-death struggle against Sato’s visit to America. Their new style of street fighting had now become established. They were armed with long woodeu poles and stones and wore helmets and face towels. The day before, the 3,000 Sampa students of the Shagakudo, Shaseido and Chukaku gathered at Chuo University to coordinate their efforts. On the same day, they made their way to the Komaba campus of Tokyo University to spend the night there at the Liberal Arts Department. The police were already alerted and had surrounded the campus but backed by Tokyo University’s preeminence as a national university, plus the fact that it was holding its annual fair, the students were able to hole up there until noon the following day.

At 1:30 p.m. on the afternoon of November 12th, 2,000 members of Shagakudo and Shaseido arrived at Kamata Station on their way to Haneda. They began to make their way to
Haneda and encountered part of the 7,000 police who were waiting for them at Ootorii Station and a street battle ensued. A little later, at about 2 o’clock, 1,000 Chukaku students also left Kamata Station and joined in the encounter at Ootorii Station. This time the police were better prepared, carrying large body-size duralumin shields and using tear gas so freely that the students were on the losing side of this fight from the start. At 3:15 p.m., the mass of students who were all Sampa Zengakuren closed ranks and made a concerted effort to break through the police ranks. However, the police defenses held firm and after one final joint attack by 300 students, the student activities were reduced to small-scale skirmishes by scattered groups.

On the same day, in the area surrounding Haneda, about 7,000 people were estimated to be demonstrating against Sato’s American trip. These were excluding the Sampa Zengakuren students, but included Kakumaru students, Beheiren, the Anti-violence Direct Action Committee (Hiboryoku Chokusetsu Kodo Iinkai), the Hansen Seinen Iinkai and members of the Socialist Party.

Sato left on schedule for America by a Japan Airlines plane that afternoon and having stopped fighting, the Sampa students gathered in front of Kamata Station and held a meeting there before breaking up and going home. During this second Haneda incident of 1967, 564 people were injured in the confused fighting and 335 were arrested. On this occasion, the police tactics had succeeded very well and the new duralumin shield became standard equipment from then on. The mass media, which had covered both incidents at Haneda with television films and wide newspaper coverage, unanimously condemned the Sampa Zengakuren violence, using terms to describe them similar to those used about gangsters.

Answering this criticism and commenting on their policy, the
Sampa Zengakuren chairman Akiyama Katsuyuki said "In essence there are two types of struggle, the first of which becomes routine unless one is willing to risk one's life in the fight against the established order, and the second where the participants do indeed gamble their lives and which, though it may end in defeat, is justified by having been a bigger struggle than the other. One point of criticism was that we used stones and wooden staves, but these were necessary in order to defend ourselves, and also these are the weapons with which we can defeat the riot police. However, it was not the quality or quantity of the weapons which decided our victory or defeat, but it was really the problem of basic class support." (Asahi Journal; March 17, 1968)

The two Haneda struggles marked a significant escalation in the scale of weapons and violence being used by the students of the anti-Yoyogi factions, especially the Sampa Zengakuren.

With the onset of 1968, the anti-JCP students began a series of actions which ranged all over the country. In January, there was the Sasebo Struggle against the nuclear aircraft carrier 'Enterprise', in February, the struggle directed against the building of a new air terminal at Narita commenced and in March, the students began their protest against the U.S. Camp Hospital at Oji.

The U.S. Navy had applied for and received permission to send the nuclear aircraft carrier 'Enterprise' and its escort to Japan on January 19, 1968 while en route to Vietnam. The Sampa Zengakuren decided to try and stop the visit on the grounds that this would constitute a first step towards the creation of nuclear bases in Japan.

The main body of students arrived at Fukuoka by train from Tokyo three days early only to be met by a large number of riot police who searched them at the station. In spite of protests from the university authorities, they then moved into Kyushu
University's Liberal Arts Department, which became their headquarters during the next few days. The students, who were mostly Sampa Zengakuren and Kakumaru, numbered about 950. The next morning, on the 17th, the students made the first of many attempts to break into the naval base at Sasebo. The approach to the base was a bridge barricaded with barbed wire and armored cars, and defended by Japanese riot police with water cannons and tear gas, so they were easily repulsed. All the students were able to do was throw stones. In one incident on this day, the police chased the students inside a hospital where they had taken refuge and fired tear gas inside the building. This caused a great outcry from the general public, who condemned the police action as being 'excessive defense'.

On this day, the students who were fighting got nowhere and had to return to Fukuoka that night feeling very dejected. The next day, after a meeting held by the Socialist and Communist Parties, 600 Sampa students led a demonstration which eventually clashed with the police again.

On the morning of the 19th, the “Enterprise” entered the harbor to be greeted by another clash between the Sampa and Kakumaru students and the riot police. During this fight, the students wore helmets with the following classifications: Shaseido Liberation Faction—blue, Shagakudo Unity Faction—red, Shagakudo ML Faction—red with a vertical white stripe, Chukaku—white, and Kakumaru—white. The fighting was very confused with some Chukaku students staging a snake-dance demonstration in the middle of it and many bystanders watching.

The next day there were no demonstrations. Instead the students collected money on street corners; and such was the general level of public support among the citizens of Sasebo that they collected more than 1 million yen ($3,000).

On the 21st, after another joint meeting of the Socialists and
Communists, the Chukaku decided to have another try to break into the naval base, and in fact 4 of them got in by wading the Sasebo River and climbing a wire fence. They were immediately arrested. This was the last big event because on January 23rd, the 'Enterprise' left port and that evening the last of the Chukaku students left by train for Tokyo and peace returned to Sasebo.

The Narita New Airport struggle started in February. The government had announced its intention to build a new international airport to handle the supersonic transports of the future because Haneda had become too small. After conducting an investigation, a site was decided on at Sanrizuka in Chiba prefecture, north east of Tokyo, to be known as Narita New Airport. The local inhabitants had started their own protest movement in 1967, but it wasn't until October of that year that the first surveyors moved in under protection of the riot police. Then the Chukaku and the Hansen Seinen linkai joined in the opposition to the airport on the grounds that it would be used under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty to support American aggression in Vietnam.

The first demonstrations took place on February 26th and March 10th in front of Narita City Hall which was guarded by the riot police. The students and workers broke through the police barricades on the second occasion, but were forced to flee when police reinforcements arrived. Many students were arrested on both days. The third demonstration took place on March 31st, when 2,400 people including 800 students from Chukaku, Shagakudo, Shaseido and the 4th International Factions, marched about 8 kilometers from the site of the airport to Narita City Hall where they again fought the riot police. From that day, the size of the struggle died down, but it had already succeeded in delaying the construction considerably; the preliminary surveys were completed without further incident but the op-
position among local people and the labor movement carried on, and it is still not known when the airport will be finished.

The Oji Camp Hospital struggle started in April, 1968 when, for the first time, patients were brought to the U.S. Army hospital at Oji in Tokyo's Kita Ward direct from Vietnam. A movement against the hospital had been started the year before by local inhabitants and they were now joined by students from the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren and workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai. The first of the new series of demonstrations was held on February 20th, but on March 20th, a protest was staged by a group of Chukaku students wearing helmets and they added their characteristic violent touch to the clashes with the riot police. When the new Socialist Governor of Tokyo, Minobe, learned that the Hansen Seinen Iinkai and local citizens had joined the struggle as well as the students, he petitioned the U.S. Army and the Japanese government to remove the hospital completely. The protests continued through March, gaining in intensity, when on April 1st, a bystander was killed by a flying stone, whereupon the crowd burnt a police patrol car. The demonstrations ended on April 8th, when the Tokyo Magistrates Court issued an order forbidding any more protests by the local struggle council. During the period from February to April, 613 people were arrested at Oji. This number included a rather large number of bystanders, for the Hansen Seinen Iinkai had begun to actively encourage ordinary passers-by to join the demonstrations and were enjoying a measure of success.

Meanwhile, as the number of political struggles increased and the university disputes proliferated, the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren was suffering from its old problem of factionalism. The Sampa Zengakuren split in July, 1968, over the question of leadership, into the Chukaku Zengakuren, and the anti-imperialist Zengakuren made up of the Shagakudo Unity Faction and the Shaseido
Liberation Faction. In spite of this, they didn't give up their style of extreme radical actions, but also, they couldn't get rid of the factionalism rife within each sect.

The anti-imperialist Zengakuren itself broke up a short while later, just before they were going to hold a reformation meeting for the new organization. The cause was the same as always, a conflict between two of the member groups, Shagakudo Unity Faction and Shaseido Liberation Faction. In this case, the Shagakudo splinter group that was called the ML (Marxist-Leninist) Faction joined the Shaseido side in the confrontation. Shortly after this, both the Shaseido Liberation Faction and the ML Faction changed their organizational structure, with the former becoming the upper echelon of the Hantei Gakuhyo (Anti-imperialist Student Council) and the latter became the higher body of the SFL (Gakusei Kaiho Sensen—Student Liberation Front).

Both sides held meetings under the same name of the 'Anti-imperialist Zengakuren 19th Annual General Meetings' on July 21st and 22nd.

In Japan, the left-wing has designated October 21st as International Anti-war Day and in 1968 the Zengakuren groups made so much trouble that the police resurrected the crime of riotous assembly for the first time in 16 years. The main trouble was a rally held by the Hansen Seinen Inkanai at Shinjuku which turned into a full scale riot where crowds of workers, students and other people wrecked the important suburban train station of Shinjuku and burnt out a nearby police box with molotov cocktails. Even the pro-JCP Minsei Zengakuren, who had been disparagingly referred to by anti-JCP students as the 'non-fighting' Minsei, mobilized 12,000 students and staged a wild snake-dance demonstration which culminated in a sit-down in front of the Ministry of Education.
In 1968, it seemed that every group put their energy into street fighting, but it was the campus struggles that will be given first place in the history of the student movement in that year. All over Japan, the resentments against the university system boiled over and more than 100 campuses were engulfed by strikes, boycotts and stoppages. The situation became so bad at Sophia University that the campus was shut down completely for 6 months; at Kyushu University, an American jet crashed into the half-completed computer center and sparked a struggle which not only split the campus, but also demanded the removal of the U.S. base at Itazuke. It became almost fashionable for the students to put up barricades and those universities which were not affected were few and far between. The university system in Japan was almost completely paralyzed for the two years of 1968 and 1969, and Japanese society was struck a blow which shook it to the foundations. Of all the campus disputes that occurred, none had as much impact and so many implications as the Tokyo University struggle, which together with the dispute that wracked the mammoth Nihon University, provided the lead for university struggles throughout Japan.
The Tokyo University Struggle

The Tokyo University problem started on a small scale, as these things usually do, when in December, 1967, the Medical Department of Tokyo University decided to abolish the old system of internship which had received unfavorable criticism from the students, because interns were forced to work in the university hospital without pay. A new system entailing the registration of all doctors had been recommended by the Medical Department and was to be placed on the agenda of the Diet. However, the students opposed this new system as being, in content, not much different from the old system. Accordingly, student representatives asked for permission to discuss the new bill with Dr. Toyokawa, Dean of the Medical Faculty and Dr. Ueda, Director of Tokyo University Hospital, who were sponsoring the bill. They pressed for discussions from the end of 1967 to the beginning of 1968, but the university refused to grant them a hearing.

After holding a meeting, the students decided on January 27, 1968 to form the Medical Department Struggle Council and to go on strike from the 29th, setting no limit on the duration, and also to boycott the graduation examinations. On February 19th, a group of students representing the Struggle Council gathered in front of the hospital and asked for a meeting with Hospital Director Ueda. Instead, they were met by Dr. Harumi, the Senior Assistant of the Medical Staff, and the meeting degenerated into a scuffle. A rumor soon spread that the students had attacked Dr. Harumi using violence. The students themselves were quite indignant about this allegation and they asked Dr. Harumi to
issue an apology refuting the rumor, which he did. However the Faculty Meeting of the Medical Department on March 11th decided that the students involved should not be allowed to go unpunished and so they issued penalties for 17 students, 4 of whom were to be expelled.

One of the students included in the list, Tsubura Kunihiko, was punished on the basis of circumstantial evidence. It was clear to any impartial observer that he was innocent, for he was actually in Kyushu, about 1,000 miles away, on the day of the incident. In spite of this, the Faculty Meeting refused to reverse its decision as a matter of dignity and to save face. Because of the tradition of respecting the autonomy of the departments, both the President and the Council of Tokyo University could not help but support the unjust decision of the Faculty Meeting.

Thus the Tokyo University Struggle started and developed from this single incident. The movement spread to influence the whole campus, and in March and April the main slogans were 'Reconsider the Unreasonable Punishments', 'Break the Graduation and Entrance Ceremonies'. On March 26th, the Medical Department Struggle All-campus Tokyo University Support and Liaison Preparatory Committee (Igakubu Toso Shien Zentodai Renraku Kaigi Junbikai) was formed. As the next development, the graduation ceremonies were stopped by members of the Struggle Council on March 28th and the university was forced to hold separate ceremonies for each department. Attempts to interfere with the entrance ceremonies were thwarted by holding them on April 12th under the protection of the Tokyo Riot Police.

The Doctors' Registration Bill, which was the cause of the trouble, passed the Diet on July 6th. In retaliation the students of the Medical Department Struggle Council decided to occupy Yasuda Hall. Tokyo University is the most prestigious school in Japan; it is also the most important national university and
receives 10% of the total money laid aside by the government in budgetary allocations to state universities. The university has two campuses; one at Komaba in North West Tokyo, which houses the first and second year undergraduate courses, and the main campus at Hongo in central Tokyo which contains the main offices, the third and fourth year facilities, the graduate institute, and the university hospital. Centrally located in the Hongo campus is Yasuda Hall, a brown brick semi-circular auditorium surmounted by a 40 meter tall clock tower, which is the symbol of Tokyo University's prestige. Yasuda Hall was even featured on a special 10 yen stamp issued in 1952 to commemorate the 75th anniversary of Tokyo University. So when the Struggle Council needed a way to dramatise their protest, they struck at the very heart of the university when they took over Yasuda Hall.

On May 15th, about 100 students wearing helmets and face towels barricaded the front entrance to the Hall. Most of the students, including the Minsei, disagreed with the tactic of blockading Yasuda Hall but when the university authorities called in the riot police to break the barricades on May 17th, ordinary students, who previously had nothing to do with the Medical Department Struggle, now came to criticize the official position. A large protest meeting was held on June 20th by 6,000 students in front of Yasuda Hall and it was decided to take the whole campus out on an indefinite strike. An All-Campus Struggle League was formed by graduate students and they organized the student resistance. First on June 26th, the students of the Literature Department and research students from the Journalistic Laboratory went out on strike and were joined by the Graduate School Economics students on June 27th. Realizing that the situation had taken a serious turn for the worse, the university authorities decided to hold an emergency meeting of the whole campus at Yasuda Hall on the 28th. The President of Tokyo
University, Dr. Okochi, even left his hospital bed against doctor's orders in order to be at the meeting. However, his presence only served to increase the students' feelings of dissatisfaction and annoyance. Having failed to persuade the students to stop their strike, there was nothing he could do but go back to the hospital.

Yasuda Hall was reoccupied on July 2nd, and three days later the occupiers opened the doors of the Hall to ordinary students and held a meeting inside at which it was decided to form the Tokyo University All-Campus Joint Struggle Council (Todai Tososan Zengaku Kyoto Kaigi). This new organization was composed mainly of graduate students and became known as the Todai Zenkyoto. They elected Yamamoto Yoshitaka, a 26-year old postgraduate science student, to be their chairman. Yamamoto was a leading example of the new type of student radical; he was not affiliated to any of the existing student factions and thus commanded a very wide audience among the ordinary students who were willing to listen to his quiet-spoken arguments against the inequities of the university system.

One by one the Law, Engineering, Educational Science and Liberal Arts Departments entered the strike. The summer holidays came in July with the strike in full swing and Yasuda Hall still in rebel hands. On July 16th, the Zenkyoto decided on a list of seven demands to be presented to the university, and in answer to this, the university issued a peace plan on August 10th, and Toyokawa, the Dean of the Medical Department, and Ueda, Director of the University Hospital, announced their intention to resign.

It seemed as if the struggle had ended. On August 22nd, 118 medical students issued a 'Strike End Declaration' and the new Dean of the Medical Department, Kobayashi, went ahead and announced the date of the graduation examinations on August 24th. Then things hit a snag because on the 28th, Kobayashi...
refused to attend a discussion with the students and in retaliation the Zenkyoto promptly blockaded the main offices of the Medical School and confined Kobayashi to his room in order to force him to enter into discussions with them. Once again the problem escalated.

During September, all departments went on strike and the buildings were barricaded. On October 1st, when the 1st and 3rd Medical Department Halls were included in the blockade, all work in the offices and research sections came to a halt. By October 12th, the last building in the Law Faculty was closed and the whole of Tokyo University campus was on unlimited strike. The university authorities were faced with an untenable situation and so on November 1st, President Okochi resigned in acknowledgment of his failure and responsibility for the worsening dispute. On the same day, the Zenkyoto went ahead and added the Engineering Department's Exhibition Hall to their list of barricaded buildings.

Perhaps it would have been different if Dr. Okochi hadn't been a sick man, or if he had been younger and better able to control the campus, but thus it was that the most important university in Japan was suddenly without leadership in the midst of a 10 month old campus dispute that was threatening to destroy the very existence of the university. For once, the authorities acted with alacrity and wisely elected a younger man, Kato Ichiro, Dean of the Law Department to be the Acting President until the dispute was over. Kato brought a fresh approach to the problem and proposed to hold all-campus meetings and negotiations with the students. This was a welcome change from Okochi, who had earned the scorn of the students for being afraid even to venture onto the campus. However, on the other hand, the Zenkyoto tactics were becoming more and more extreme; the anti-Yoyogi factions were coming to be a dominating factor.
with their policy. The slogans they were acting under were ‘Complete the Blockade!’ and ‘Destroy Todai!’ and of course they refused to attend the all-campus meetings. Ordinary students and the pro-JCP Minsei, who had formed the Democratic Action Committee, wanted to solve the struggle by holding meetings with the new executive and were thus pitted against the Zenkyoto. The campus degenerated into anarchy as the students split down the middle.

The university struggle had now changed out of all recognition from the original relatively simple problem in the Medical Department. The whole meaning of the university and university education was being questioned by the students. The change of the university executive had produced Acting President Kato, who was ready to discuss the students’ problems, but by now it needed agreement by all the students before the dispute could be ended. Thus, we have the strange position in which the Zenkyoto students were fighting to stop the other students from negotiating the very issues which they had fought originally to correct. While the leadership of the Zenkyoto still remained in the hands of the non-sect radicals, more and more of their support was derived from the ranks of the anti-Yoyogi factions whose influence was very noticeable. To clarify this situation we will now examine the relative attitudes by different groups of students in light of the Tokyo University struggle.

Firstly, there is the basic question of student participation in the university administration. The most eager proponents of this are the Yoyogi or Minsei students who propose the establishment of some kind of conference system in which teachers, students and other university personnel may partake. It is supposed that their own aim is to take the lead in these conferences, thereby bringing about a change in the university from within. The non-sect radicals also support participation in principle, though
from a radical point of view. They see the Faculty Meeting as an undemocratic, even feudalistic, institution. They are also sympathetic towards the student movements in other countries such as America and in Europe. In contrast with the other two types of student, the Anti-Yoyogi factions are not interested in participation at all. They feel that it is useless to change the university without first changing the capitalistic society which fosters it. However, they consistently use the university struggle as a means to make a political struggle aiming at social change or revolution.

In the beginning, students of all types supported the Todai Zenkyoto, but with time many dropped out, including certain anti-Yoyogi factions. The factions who figured prominently in the last few months of the struggle were Chukaku, Hantei Gakuhyo, SFL, the Front, Shagakudo and Kakumaru. Each faction in the Anti-Yoyogi has its own concept of the university in society, and these are interesting to compare with the attitude of the Minsei.

Chukaku and Shagakudo have almost the same point of view. The Chukaku state it as follows: In the past the university was free of capitalism, but now the university is under the control of the capitalists because of its being put in the power of the state. The university is a mirror which reflects the contradictions in capitalist society: therefore the campus dispute is one way in which the whole structure of capitalism can be brought down. Given this basic attitude, there is no importance attached to using the university struggle in order to improve the structure of the university itself.

The Hantei Gakuhyo, on the other hand, place emphasis on the evils brought about by the close association of the university with the industrial world. Today's education is the process whereby students are trained to the requirements of industry and
become specialized slaves. The content of the education and the relationships with the professors all have become distorted. This type of education must be rejected and its evils exposed. With respect to the university disputes, those who have committed violations in the name of an enlightened university are not really guilty because they represent a moral force.

Kakumaru start by stating that the bourgeoisie have tried to reorganize the university in an imperialistic way. Because of this, it is nonsense to think that if the students participate in the administration of the university, they will then be able to influence the government's attitudes towards the university and finally change society. However, as a realistic revolutionary slogan, they recognize the desirability of the power of veto in the university administration.

Common to all these opinions is the contention that as long as the university continues to be an instrument of capitalism, it is useless to try to adjust or reconstruct it while ignoring the pressures from outside, and that there can be no compromise. The Minsei, however, who were represented at the Tokyo University struggle by the Democratic Action Committee, analyze the status quo in a slightly different way. They contend that the Ministry of Education is guilty of oppressing the university, of trying to take away the autonomy of the faculty meeting and place the university directly under its control. Therefore, the students must protect the merits of the faculty meeting in order to maintain university autonomy. At the same time, the students must keep up their demands to the university authorities, working together with 'democratic' professors. Therefore, the Minsei are open to compromise while the Anti-Yoyogi are not. This ingratiating attitude, or 'good boy' style, is rather irritating to the vast majority of Japanese students and gives rise to charges that the Minsei are only concerned with survival in this capitalistic
society. The Zenkyoto students naturally regard this as evidence of the duplicity and hypocrisy of the Minsei.

The Tokyo University struggle had now moved into the stage of inter-factional warfare accompanied by an escalation in the degree of force being used. The first volleys in the heightened conflict were fired when Zenkyoto students in the Literature Department under the leadership of the Kakumaru Faction detained 9 professors on November 4th in order to conduct forced mass-bargaining sessions with them. Most of them were freed in the next few days but the Dean of the Literature Department, Hayashi, was kept locked in his office for 9 days. He was eventually let out suffering from a severe headache brought on the hours of incessant grilling, but not until the Minsei had called on the ordinary students for help in freeing him. The day Hayashi was freed, a struggle between the Minsei and the Zenkyoto produced a violent clash. Over 2,000 students fought each other for control of the library building which had been taken over by Zenkyoto, and in the melee, in which sticks and stones were used freely, 70 students were injured.

These clashes became more frequent and occurred regularly on both the Hongo and Komaba campuses. The instructors were powerless to stop the violence, so instead they formed a squad of impartial middlemen who made sure that injured students got first-aid and when possible, they attempted to negotiate between the students. These instructors wore special white armbands and patrolled the campus during the height of the conflict.

Acting President Kato went ahead with his plans for holding meetings with the students and on November 16th he entered Yasuda Hall to get the Zenkyoto to agree to a mass-bargaining session with him. The next day he had made arrangements for talks with the two opposing student groups at different times.
However, in agreeing to meet Kato at a preliminary session, the Zenkyoto declared that they would barricade the whole campus if the meeting failed. The 7 points which Zenkyoto had issued on July 16th were brought up to date and presented to Kato. They were: 1) nullification of the medical students’ punishments; 2) self-criticism by the university over its policies, especially regarding the use of riot police on campus; 3) recognition of Seiinren (Young Doctors Federation) as the official spokesman for the medical department students; 4) nullification of the punishments meted out to students involved in the Literature Department dispute; 5) a promise to never bring the police onto the campus again; 6) adoption of a policy to never punish students over campus disputes, making this retroactive to January 25, 1968; 7) written acknowledgement to all of these demands.

In contrast to Kato’s policy of seeking a negotiated solution to the campus strife, Nadao, the Minister of Education, was advocating that a sterner attitude be taken against the students, imposing strict punishments. Still Kato tried his best, and on November 18th he attended the first meeting with the Zenkyoto in Yasuda Hall. 3,000 students were crammed into the 2,000 capacity building, while another 3,000 listened outside as the mass-bargaining session was relayed by the Yasuda Hall public-address system. These talks quickly broke down as Kato refused to commit himself and finally the students stopped the meeting and decided it was impossible to bargain with him. In spite of this, Kato still had hope that this method was the right one. On the following day, he initiated talks with the ordinary students and the Minsei, and these were peaceful and orderly, in sharp contrast to the previous meeting. 1,200 students attended the meeting with another 600 listening outside and heard, among other things, Kato refuse to apologise for talking with the Zen-
kyoto. The Minsei claimed that the Zenkyoto were not the official representatives of the student body while Kato countered that the Zenkyoto could not be ignored as they still represented a sizeable portion of the students. He also stated that the details of student representation at all-campus meetings should be decided by the students themselves.

During the two days that these preliminary meetings were held, there were many signs of an impending clash between the two rival groups, although none took place. The Zenkyoto students were now seen drilling with their sticks, practising charges and attacks in a military fashion. The non-political students were so dismayed by the violent methods of the two feuding groups that they tried to form a new student group, the United Council of All-campus Student Bodies, as an alternative to the Zenkyoto and the Minsei.

The Tokyo University struggle was now attracting daily attention in the newspapers and had become the focal point for the university struggles all over the country. So, when both groups decided to hold mass rallies on the Hongo campus on November 22nd, they were able to mobilize support from all over Japan. Some Shaseido students were even said to have come from as far as Kyushu. The university dispute at Nihon University was also at its peak and so a large contingent of their Zenkyoto was expected. Kato issued a bulletin stressing the need for a peaceful settlement and the police made preparations to intervene. When November 22nd arrived, there were 6,000 Zenkyoto students from many different universities gathered in front of Yasuda Hall, and 6,000 Minsei students at the other end of the campus. A battle seemed inevitable but was averted by a third group of some 2,000 unarmed ordinary students and professors, who turned themselves into a buffer between the two groups. The Zenkyoto were armed with sticks and long metal
pipes and wore helmets. They held their meeting in support of the Joint Victory of the Todai and Nichidai Struggle without any problems arising.

The Tokyo University struggle had gone on so long that it began to attract criticism and ridicule in the popular press and in the long run this meant a sharp drop in Tokyo University’s prestige among the average citizens. However, the movement to meet with Kato and thrash out a negotiated solution to the continuing dispute began to gain momentum among the ordinary students. The Minsei students were maneuvering adroitly to isolate the Zenkyoto from the main student body and align themselves with the majority. This they succeeded in doing. The turning point came when students in the Agriculture Department dismissed the 5 members of their student committee who were aligned to the Zenkyoto and elected 2 non-political students and 1 Minsei to take their places to become the department’s representatives in the forthcoming talks.

Kato now proposed to meet with the students again and attended an open-air discussion with some 10,000 students in front of the library. However, it degenerated into a barrage of insults, while the Minsei mounted a loud speaker on one side of the area to harangue the assembly. Kato’s next step was to propose a new 10-point plan on December 2nd, which had as its main points a declaration that the university would admit errors in the August 10th compromise plan which had been issued by Okoehi; it would not withdraw punishments given already to the Literature Department students although it would agree to waiving punishments for the students involved in the present conflict; and that a university reform committee would be set up. Kato knew that the current term of office for the student self-governing associations’ executives would end at the end of December, so he was still hopeful of holding the entrance examinations in the
spring of 1969. The Zenkyoto saw things differently and erected a huge sign in front of Yasuda Hall which said ‘Crush Kato’s December 2nd Plan! Start the 3rd Offensive, Barricade the Campus and Let Us Run the University by Ourselves!’.

The government remained unconvinced as to the wisdom of holding the spring entrance exams and began to formulate plans for the future administrating of the university. Tokyo University has always had a special place in the eyes of the government, with a large number of ministers and officials being drawn from its graduates, and so it was natural that the Ministry of Education would hold very strong views on the Tokyo University problem. Prime Minister Sato had just been reelected as the Liberal Democratic Party’s choice of Premier and he reshuffled his cabinet. The new Minister of Education was Mr. Sakata and he made public three alternative solutions for the situation: 1) Halt the university time-table and make the present students attend for an additional year; 2) Keep to the present schedule, letting students graduate when ready to; and 3) Cut down the numbers of new students to be enrolled in the spring.

At the beginning of December, an unexpected twist was added to the situation as the Kakumaru and Hantei Gakuhyo, both members of the Zenkyoto, turned on each other in a quarrel which threatened to weaken Zenkyoto considerably. The squabble started December 6th when Kakumaru at Waseda University accused Hantei Gakuhyo members of stealing their papers and then taking refuge in a Tokyo University dormitory. The problem quickly developed into pitched battles between the two groups and in one case two Kakumaru were taken prisoner and beaten so badly that they had to be hospitalized. This fight moved from the Hongo campus to Komaba where both factions were vying for control of the student self-governing association in the Literature Department, and a strange drama unfolded. Each group
took over one of the administration buildings and with about 200 members proceeded to build defenses and institute training programs. The Hantei Gakuhyo were ensconsed in a square concrete office building, which was in a corner of the campus overlooking a small slope facing one of the gates and an entrance to the local railway station. At first, a 24 hour guard was stationed at the gate to look out for the riot police, who were prepared to intervene if the situation worsened, and the enemy, Kakumaru. With red flags fluttering from the roof, they mounted loudspeakers and spotlights with which to harangue the enemy and keep watch at night. Later, the defenses were strengthened by boarding up all the ground floor windows, which were broken anyway, and the slope in front was converted into an obstacle course with barbed wire barriers strewn between wooden poles, sharpened bamboo stakes were sticking out of the ground, which was covered as well with broken glass. Food was brought in by girl students who had to thread their way through the defenses to reach the foot of the building and then it was hauled up to the defenders by ropes. The window ledges and roof lintel were all lined with large lumps of concrete, ready in case of attack. It was a medieval scene; the castle defended by blue helmeted samurai.

The Kakumaru took up their position in a building about 200 meters away, closer to the main gate, which they controlled. Later they moved to another place only 100 meters from the Hantei Gakuhyo fortress, also directing a constant stream of amplified invectives, harassments and assorted projectiles at their opponents. One serious fight developed on December 11th, between 200 Kakumaru and 150 Hantei Gakuhyo in which 21 students were injured, one of them seriously. This clash ended when 150 faculty and students came between the opposing armies and persuaded them to stop. Then a mob of about 400 Minsei,
taking advantage of this disarray in the ranks of the Zenkyoto, waded in and tried to remove the Kakumaru's barricades, which led to a second fight, but the barricades stayed put. On December 14th, the students and faculty of the Literature Department held a meeting to plan a new jichikai. The Kakumaru reacted by sending in 100 of their men armed with long wooden poles to break it up, while the Hantei Gakuhyo watched from the safety of their citadel. The conflict carried on until December 17th when the police arrested 17 students after a clash between Kakumaru and Hantei Gakuhyo at the main gate following an attempt by the Hantei Gakuhyo students to force the Kakumaru to leave the building in which they were holed up.

This extreme violence between two groups, ostensibly allied to each other, really had very little connection with the university dispute, but was made possible by the anarchic situation prevailing on the campus. The grounds at both Hongo and Komaba were reminiscent of the days when the sword ruled Japan. Each was a battlefield, dotted about with fortresses while armed bands of marauders from both sides roamed around looking for a fight. The Tokyo University struggle evoked strong images of Japan's violent past, and the establishment of the student struggle as a distinctive sub-culture of its own was assured.

This diversion lasted about three weeks with neither side giving way; but eventually it subsided and it was business as usual with the clashes between the Zenkyoto and the Minsei escalating again. One development had resulted from the Kakumaru-Hantei Gakuhyo clash and that was Kakumaru's withdrawal from Zenkyoto. This was in keeping with Kakumaru's fierce independent streak, which was probably as much responsible for the fight as any of the issues at stake, and accordingly the Kakumaru flag was removed from its place on Yasuda Hall and they retired to the 2nd Law and Science Department building at Hongo to
lick their wounds.

Meanwhile, the students in 7 of the 10 departments (Education, Engineering, Economics, Agriculture, Science, Pharmacy and Law) had held meetings and agreed to send their representatives to attend an all-campus discussion with President Kato. These students then produced a list of proposals which included: cancellation of the anti-strike legislation; formation of a campus court at which to try students involved in the Literature Department struggle; nullification of Okochi's compromise plan of August 10; and granting definite status to the students within the university. Kato, in the meantime, was preparing to meet the students and things looked better when the Law Department ended its strike on December 26th, even though on the previous day there had been a particularly bad incident when 400 Zenkyoto armed with sticks, stones and milk bottles, wearing helmets and masks and carrying wooden shields had attacked the Minsei headquarters in the Education Department, resulting in 70 casualties. Now the Minister of Education began to act, and taking the position that Tokyo University should close for at least a year, proposed a meeting with Kato. Kato and Sakata held their meeting on December 29th and it was agreed to cancel the entrance examinations although Kato wanted to hold them if the situation cleared up by January 15th at the latest. This caused a profound shock to many people, but the Zenkyoto shrugged it off saying it was "nothing to do with us, we are only concerned with intensifying the fight."

The struggle quieted down during the New Year holiday period; the Zenkyoto went ahead with their preparations for a final showdown as January 15th approached and the university authorities worked together with the non-aligned students and the Minsei to try and get the struggle under control. It was decided that the Minsei students would use their forces to break down the
Zenkyoto barricades. On January 9th, Zenkyoto unleashed a preemptive strike using about 2,500 of their members, including a ‘foreign’ contingent from Nihon University and Chuo University, against the Education and Economics Departments where the Minsei action units were entrenched. In the bloody fighting that ensued, 118 people were injured, some seriously, and the riot police were called in for the first time since June 17th. The police behaved with restraint and didn’t touch the barricades, they only stopped the fighting and arrested 52 students.

On January 10th, the long-awaited meeting with Kato by student representatives of the 7 departments was held outside the Tokyo University campus at Chichibunomiya Rugby Grounds. 7,000 students attended under the watchful eyes of 3,000 riot police, who stopped a band of 250 Zenkyoto from getting further than the nearest subway station. The government termed the meeting a success and Kato, greatly encouraged, once again began to think of holding the entrance examinations. The students presented their 10 demands and discussed them with Kato. Kato regretted having called the police onto the campus on the previous day, but hoped to have the situation solved by January 15th.

That night, 1,000 Zenkyoto students stormed a dormitory on the Komaba campus which the Minsei were defending, but failed to get in. They had left Yasuda Hall virtually undefended with only a small garrison of 30 men, so the Minsei at Hongo mustered 800 students and tried to break in. They used stones and molotov cocktails, but in spite of the vast numbers, the barricades were so good that the attack completely failed.

On January 11th, the student delegates from the Education Department voted to end the strike. This was considered very significant because it was the largest of the faculties, having 7,000 students. Of course the Zenkyoto tried to stop the vote
from taking place. A meeting was supposed to be held in a mess hall, so 700 Zenkyoto attacked it and fought the 1,500 Minsei who were on guard. However, the student representatives fooled the Zenkyoto by holding their assembly on the roof of one of the dormitories and overwhelmingly voted to call an end to the strike.

The fighting now fluctuated between Komaba and Hongo, with small groups of students snake-dancing their way there and back, crashing through the ticket barriers at both ends of the train line. Komaba was now a divided camp with makeshift barricades thrown up across the central avenue. At one end were the Minsei who controlled the three dormitories and who sat patiently in columns wearing yellow helmets and holding long wooden sticks behind the buildings, in case any trouble should break out. On the other side were the Zenkyoto, who feverishly barricaded first this building and then the next, hauling desks across the road, fixing bookcases and chairs along the roof edges, breaking up concrete paving stones to provide ammunition. Loudspeakers brayed out fiery rhetoric from both sides. Broken enemy helmets were displayed, stuck on the end of poles pushed out of windows, trophies of the fight. Students, instructors and newsmen wandered around between the two sectors as helicopters from the newspapers whirled overhead blowing up dust into people's faces. Television crews monitored the scene and cameramen prowled ubiquitously, clicking cameras everywhere as they went.

It was clear that the showdown was imminent. The whole country was waiting for the day when the barricades would be pulled down. On January 14th, the Police Department asked the university authorities for permission to search the campus grounds and immediately the Minsei disarmed themselves while the Zenkyoto responded by arming themselves further. The
Zenkyoto was now left in control of only Yasuda Hall, 2 buildings in the Medical Department and the Medical and Literature Departments. Realizing the showdown was near, the Zenkyoto set about strengthening their barricades and defenses for the siege to come. Already the police had intercepted a van leaving Chuo University laden with over a hundred Molotov cocktails, firecrackers and 5 bottles of acid destined for the Zenkyoto in Yasuda Hall. While the Zenkyoto were fighting at Komaba, the Minsei were liberating their buildings in Hongo and these were taken back again as soon as the Zenkyoto returned; but Yasuda Hall remained impregnable.

The Zenkyoto had now almost given up using the issues that had sparked the Tokyo University struggle and were aiming at a wider audience. Their new slogans were designed for the media to carry to a national audience; ‘Yasuda Hall is the Base for the Ampo Struggle of 1970!’, ‘Victory to All Campus Struggles in Japan’. Now Zenkyoto and Anti-Yoyogi diehards began to converge on Yasuda Hall from all parts of Japan. They stayed in different buildings, each according to his sect. Shagakudo Unity Faction, Hantei Gakuhyo and the Front were housed in Yasuda Hall, Chukaku was in the Engineering Laboratory, the ML Faction of the SFL stayed in the Engineering Department Exhibition Hall.

The ML students put up a portrait of Mao Tse-tung on the main gate, together with a flag emblazoned ‘Long Live Mao Tse-tung’, which drew enthusiastic revues from the New China News Agency in Peking, who hailed the student uprising as evidence of the popular discontent against the present Japanese society. Another sign said simply ‘Down with Tokyo Imperial University!’.

Zenkyoto approached the January 15th deadline as a tense calm prevailed, and declared their intention to hold a mass rally
in front of Yasuda Hall on that day. They continued to stockpile their weapons. Students from the Zenkyoto of 11 Tokyo universities, including Tokyo, Chuo, Waseda, Nihon and Meiji Gakuin, were joined by workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai. Bonfires lit up the campus as the crowd of 3,400 students and workers held their rally. Trouble was expected from an equally large gathering of Minsei students, but the only outbreak of violence was an attack on a Zenkyoto position in Komaba.

The Council and Deans Meeting both assembled to debate the fact that the Zenkyoto students were bringing dangerous weapons onto the campus. It was decided that police would have to be called in to break the Zenkyoto grip on Yasuda Hall. Kato was still at odds with the Minister of Education, Sakata, over whether to hold the spring entrance examinations or not. The Zenkyoto Chairman, Yamamoto Yosbitaka, held a press conference on January 17th to explain their stand. He said that they were resolved to crush the university authorities' plan to hold entrance examinations. This surprisingly put the Zenkyoto in agreement with the Ministry of Education. They planned also to stage a general strike throughout Japan on January 21st to support their struggle. "We cannot let the university authorities forcibly hold the entrance examinations without first solving the university problems of the past year. The university authorities are to blame for whatever consequences and confusion that result from their decisions." When asked about the weapons being stocked up and whether they had nitroglycerine in Yasuda Hall, he replied that the Zenkyoto would use anything available in order to fight.

The various factions now stationed at Yasuda Hall also had their opinions about the impending fight with the police. The militant Chukaku were committed to "smashing" the exams and "crushing" the university. They denounced the Kakumaru
as being ‘revisionists’ and charged that while the Hantei Gakuhyo and Shagakudo factions favored the liquidation of the university they were flinching from “shattering” the examinations.

The ML Faction of SFL, who were in the Exhibition Hall, declared that they had strung electrified wires all around their base and would fight 10,000 riot police if necessary.

The Hantei Gakuhyo and the Front were both doubtful whether or not to risk their lives in the defense of Yasuda Hall. The independent-minded Kakumaru, whose banner had been removed from Yasuda Hall earlier, wished to disassociate themselves from the movement to turn the campus struggle into a political struggle linked with Ampo. This was a mistake in their eyes because it was premature to try and make the campus a foothold for revolution at this stage.

Chairman Yamamoto, who didn’t belong to any of these sects, said in answering these positions; “It’s natural that each group has different opinions, but all those who have taken part in the past year’s struggle feel they should be prepared to gamble their lives in the fight with the shameless authorities, who are trying to end this dispute by joining forces with the Minsei and the rightists.”

On the morning of Saturday, January 18, 1969, the Japanese people woke up to learn that the riot police had moved into the Hongo campus of Tokyo University in force, under orders to root out the extremist Zenkyoto still holding onto portions of the campus. There were 8,500 police armed with tear gas guns and duralumin shields; they brought armored vehicles with water cannons and wire net protection. They had worked out their strategy beforehand and took added precautions to avoid injuries from missiles thrown from above. In addition, for the first time they brought in a police helicopter to spray tear gas from above.
At 8:30 a.m., they started their attack with a frontal assault on Yasuda Hall, firing their tear gas guns at the defending students. The students had completed their barricades and had sealed themselves off in different parts of the building, and were mainly members of Shagakudo (red helmets), ML and SFL (red with a white stripe down the middle) and Chukaku (white helmets). They were armed with just about everything they could lay their hands on—iron pipes, wooden poles, stones, hatchets, rivetguns, gasoline, poison, explosives and even a primitive homemade flame-thrower. They answered the initial police attack with stones and after about 2 hours, during which time no progress was made, the police called off the attack on Yasuda Hall and turned their attention to the other barricaded buildings. These were the Engineering Department Exhibition Hall and the Law Department Research Rooms and after some severe fighting both of these strongholds fell to the police by 1 o'clock in the afternoon. However, Yasuda Hall still held.

The front entrance was very solidly blocked so entry there was almost impossible. On either side of the front door is a sharp drop of about 15 meters down to a lower level on which stands the main auditorium, and the semicircular rear portion has a 20 meter high vertical wall up to the roof where the students were. The narrow windows are set in grooves running up the wall, and these were all securely boarded up from the inside. Any attempt to break in was met by a hail of rocks and molotov cocktails from the roof. The police moved up onto the roofs of nearby buildings and started to fire tear gas shells across on to the students’ positions. One of the defenders was hit in the eye and a truce was called while he was lowered down on a stretcher from the roof to be taken to hospital. The siege went on all day.

Late in the afternoon, the police succeeded in breaking through the tiny doors which are at the base of the rear wall, for these
hadn’t been boarded up securely. Thus they forced an entry in through the basement and to the first floor, pushing the students up to the second floor and the roof. However, it was already 6 o’clock in the evening and light was failing so the police called off their attack until the next day.

The Zenkyoto had by now endured a 10 hour siege and the struggle at Tokyo University had become headline news throughout Japan. The Japanese were dismayed and yet fascinated by the spectacle which was relayed to their houses by the national television networks’ news programs. This drama also made the front pages of the Sunday papers in Europe and America. The students had succeeded in one respect; they had forced the world to watch their fight against authority.

On the national political scene, the Secretary-General of the Liberal Democrats, Tanaka, was quoted as saying that the police action was inevitable. The Komeito, while not in agreement with the government over its university policy, stated that the introduction of the riot police was correct in this case. Both the Socialists and the JCP however were against the police entry, even though they criticized the students involved.

The next day was Sunday and the siege continued. In an unprecedented fashion, six of the seven Tokyo television stations scrapped their planned programs and gave live-coverage throughout the day. To watch continuously from morning to night it was only necessary to switch channels every so often. All day long the attack went on, high pressure jets of water continually swept the face of the hall, helicopters circled above like vultures looking for carrion. The students on the roof waved their flags and sang songs. Slowly the police fought their way up through the inside of the auditorium.

The stairways were blocked by interlocking steel desks and lockers. The barricade building experts from Chuo and Nihon
University had been called in to reinforce the barriers a few weeks before and they were now solidly fixed with wires, with some set in the floor with concrete. Braving a shower of molotov cocktails and acid thrown from above, the police cut their way up the stairways with electric saws, hammers and firehooks. They finally broke through into the second floor at noon and occupied the third floor 2 hours later. The main bulk of the students were there and 200 of them gave up without any further fight, to be led away with their hands on their heads to the waiting police wagons.

The ML students on the roof had now given up the fight because they had long since run out of ammunition, but they defiantly snake-danced around the roof and sang the ‘Internationale’ for the benefit of the television audience. The roof was in police hands by 3:30 p.m. and the last stronghold was the small group of Shagakudo left in the clock tower. The police had to use an acetylene torch cutter to get through the iron door to the tower, but by 5:45 that evening the last spot of resistance was eliminated. Zenkyoto’s rule was finished.

During the two days of fighting, students from other universities had staged bitter street fighting in the Kanda-Surugadai area about 1 mile away in an effort to divert the police from Yasuda Hall. Barricades were built across the roads, emulating the French riots in Paris’ Latin Quarter; cars were overturned and set on fire, and the whole area was declared a liberated zone. However, the police were able to keep the two battles separated, turning back thousands of students as they tried to bring relief to the Hongo campus. The only result was that more students were arrested. A total of 786 students were held on January 18th and 19th; 375 were taken in the fall of Yasuda ‘castle’, and 130 in the Kanda area. The Police Department assigned a total of 130 prosecutors to investigate the whole affair and the pre-trial
hearings are still going on even now.

In the aftermath, the costs of the year-long struggle were reckoned. The 45-year old Yasuda Hall, centerpiece of Tokyo University, symbol of its prestige, was in ruins. The windows were shattered, half the seats in the auditorium were torn out, together with the lockers to make barricades. The floor was ankle-deep in water. Even a grand piano had been turned into a barrier. The President’s office on the 4th floor was a mountain of soaked blankets and mattresses. The marble slabs and tiles had been torn up to make ammunition. Even the concrete balustrades on the stairs were broken off. Also found inside the hall was a 10 day supply of dried noodles. Apparently, the students had intended to try and equal the Viet Cong’s holdout of 10 days in the old citadel in Huế during the 1968 Tet offensive. On the following morning of January 20th, when Prime Minister Sato and his Minister of Education, Sakata, toured the shattered campus with Acting President Kato, the tear gas fumes were still so heavy in the air that Sato was seen wiping tears out of his eyes.

On the walls inside the Hall were written slogans and poems;

‘There is silence in the midst of battle,
Peace in the midst of war and
Order in the midst of struggle.’

‘Oppose the Russian’s armed invasion!’
‘Oppose Dubcek’s democracy!’
‘Oppose the fierce resistance of imperialism!’
‘Oppose the Chinese and French nuclear testing!’
‘Kill the Minsei!’

Why are those who wish most to be human regarded as those who are the most inhuman? Let us put up a good fight until the revolution.

‘From Tokyo University to her with love’
I wasn’t one who sat on the fence,
I fought to the end.
And as long as you are in this world I will always think of you tenderly, even though I may give my life for the revolution.

Signed: West Osaka Hansen

Nor were the other buildings left unscathed. In the Law Department, the professors’ offices were ransacked and disparaging remarks daubed on the doors. Acting President Kato is the Dean of this department and on his door was written this message; ‘Dear Mr. Kato, You have a way of handling things most energetically so we would like to smash your office energetically too’. And they did. Kato’s room was a shambles; books and papers were strewn around the floor, valuable microfilms containing French parliamentary records and research data about Nazi Germany were pulled from their cases and trampled on. The estimated damage was put at several hundred million yen.

Thus the tumultuous Zenkyoto occupation of Yasuda Hall was over, but the end of the Tokyo University problem was not yet quite reached. The entrance examinations, which Kato had hoped to hold after all, were cancelled at a meeting of the government cabinet on January 20th. Kato protested this decision, but his objections were spurned by the government, and Prime Minister Sato even went so far as to criticize the Tokyo University professors part in the affair. The last 60 Zenkyoto students, who had been entrenched in a hall on the Komaba campus, left voluntarily, under a guard furnished by their fellow students from Meiji University, when the cancellation was announced, declaring ‘We have won!’ as they went. There was still some sporadic fighting, as the Kakumaru who were the only extreme radical group left at liberty, tried to barricade the 2nd Law and Science building, but by the end of January, they too had called it quits.

On March 14th, the Kato executive committee resigned and 9 days later, Kato was elected as the new university president, and
the situation on campus returned to normal. The Zenkyoto moved their head office off the Tokyo campus, but declared themselves ready to take over again if the opportunity arose. As peace returned, the riot police gave up patrolling the Hongo campus and the lines of gray police vans which had become a familiar sight lining the back streets around the university disappeared from sight.

The Tokyo University struggle now moved from the campus to the courts. Of the 786 students arrested, 540 were later indicted on charges of breaking into a building, illegal assembly with dangerous weapons, refusal to obey orders to evacuate a public building and obstruction of the police in performance of their duties. These are rather mild charges considering the scale of the fighting at Yasuda Hall, but as a matter of principle, 469 of the 540 defendants elected for a unified trial. They argued that their crime was a revolutionary act against the establishment, they admitted throwing rocks and molotov cocktails, but they had done so as group and it would be ridiculous to try them separately and try to fix individual blame for each act. They wanted the court to consider the background and causes of the campus dispute at Tokyo University, but the authorities refused. This attempt to turn the proceedings into a political trial of an ideologically motivated segment of society failed, but produced some strange situations for Japanese justice. When the judges refused the students' requests for mass trials, the defendants and the defense lawyers boycotted the proceedings. This meant that many of the students were tried in absentia with only the judges, prosecutors, court clerks and prosecution witnesses present. The defendants were held in jail for many months without a trial being held, and at the end of 1969, 120 were still confined, having refused bail on the grounds that they would then be forced to attend separate trials. One woman student has steadfastly refused to
disclose even her name and is known on the court records as 'Kikuyabashi No. 101', which is the number of her cell in Kikuyabashi Police Station. The trial drags on. Several of the leaders were sentenced to periods approximating 1 year's hard labor in November, though others have been given suspended sentences as they were duly 'repentant'. The most important case is that regarding the part Zenkyoto Chairman Yamamoto Yoshitaka played in masterminding the resistance at Yasuda Hall. Yamamoto wasn't among those arrested in Yasuda Hall and a warrant for his arrest was issued on January 20th, the day after the siege ended. A quixotic leader, he was elusive too. He went underground from that time, emerging every so often to address meetings of the Zenkyoto and the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren. He would appear in the middle of a band of student bodyguards wearing a white helmet and face towel, address the cheering crowds and then melt into the background to the confusion of the police. At last, 71⁄2 months after the fall of Yasuda Hall he was caught. He was waiting in line with other students outside Hibiya Park before going in to attend the inaugural meeting of the National Zenkyoto Federation when a policeman pulled him aside for questioning. At that same meeting, he was elected Chairman of the newly formed federation by the assembled students. He is still in prison awaiting trial.

It is now over a year since the Tokyo University struggle died down. The campus has been trying to get back to where it was before the dispute began, but certain wounds are still visible. The spring entrance examinations were held again in 1970 after a year's lapse. The number of candidates was the lowest in years and the passing grades were among the lowest in history. The superior students from elite schools were clearly choosing other colleges. On the other hand, Japanese industry is beginning to realize that the students from other colleges are just as good as
those from Tokyo. More obvious scars are things like the red paint that disfigures the clock tower on the Komaba campus and the boards that are still fixed across the entrances to Yasuda Hall. It will be years, perhaps, before Tokyo University gets over its traumatic shock completely.

In the same period, when Tokyo University was wracked by violence, universities all over Japan were involved in similar disputes. Out of the 377 universities in the land, 107 were involved in disputes during 1968, and by the end of that year, only 47 had been solved. This compares with 94 disputes in 1967 and only 64 in 1966. The causes were many, but they could be put into various categories. For instance, there were disputes over the management of students halls and against the university president, such as that at Waseda University. Some originated out of disciplinary actions taken by the university against students; we saw the most serious example of this in the Tokyo University struggle. There is one more, and that is the so-called 'campus democratization' struggles. The best example of that was to be found in the Nihon University struggle, which lasted from May 1968 until February 1969.

The Nihon University Struggle

The struggle at Nihon University is considered unique among the student conflicts for it was the rank and file students who organized themselves into an All-campus Joint Struggle Council, and that for once there is no mention of radical sects at all. The trouble started in February, 1968, when the Tokyo Tax Office announced that there was some 2 billion yen ($5.5 million) missing from the Nihon University accounts. There had already been those of the students, especially in the Economics Department, who had shown their dissatisfaction with the administration of President Furuta and had criticized his university ‘dicta-
torship' and old-fashioned methods, which included a severe attitude towards critics, pressure on the student self-governing association and prohibition of the political student movement. These complaints were brought into sharp focus by the '20 oku yen' incident (one oku=100 million) and the struggle developed rapidly from this point.

Nihon University has a student body of 90,000, which makes it the largest in Japan, and has the reputation of being a training school for lower level 'salary men' (Japanese term for office workers, business and corporation men). The struggle had as one of its goals an attempt to break this image and to expose the worst aspects of Japanese post-war mass education. On May 22nd, the Economics Department and the Junior College Students Associations held a meeting protesting the chaotic accounting practices in the Student Section of the main offices, and they posted a declaration listing their criticisms. Of course, the university had the notice removed but on the next day, the 23rd, the same Student Associations held another meeting, this time in an underground hall. When the authorities got wind of it, they pulled down the shutters to the hall, thereby shutting the students inside. The students were infuriated and so they staged a 200 meter long protest demonstration. The number of students involved at this time was about 2,000. A few days later, on May 27th, they formed the Nihon University All-campus Joint Struggle Council (Nihon Daigaku Zengaku Kyoto Kaigi), which became known as the Nichidai Zenkyoto for short, and Akita Akehiro was elected chairman.

Following standard practice, the Zenkyoto group then demanded to hold mass-bargaining sessions with the university to present their complaints, but this demand was rejected and the university became even more high-handed. The authorities began to actively encourage students with right-wing affinities, who belonged to
the athletics and physical fitness associations, to harass the Zenkyoto students, which they did with relish. In answer to this, about 10,000 students staged a massive sit-down strike (suwari-joki) surrounding the main university building at Kanda Misaki-cho on June 4th and demanded to have a mass-bargaining session set for June 11th. At the same time, the Zenkyoto students organized an Action Corps to defend themselves against anticipated attacks from the physical training students.

On June 11th, again about 10,000 gathered to attend the mass-bargaining session which was called an ‘All-campus Joint Mobilization Meeting’. Suddenly they were set upon by physical-fitness students armed with samurai swords, wooden kendo swords, and iron pipes and a bloody incident was perpetrated. The authorities at Nihon University, because it was a private school, had no reservations about calling in the riot police. So at 5:00 p.m. the police were called in. At first, the Zenkyoto students welcomed them, clapping their hands because they thought the riot police would evict the violent physical-fitness students, but instead the opposite happened and it was they themselves who were kicked out. This had the effect of convincing the students that President Furuta could be equated with the established power, i.e. the government, in the worst sense and their anger became very bitter. Now the barricades went up; first in the 3rd Law Department Building, then the Economics Department, the Liberal Arts and Science Departments and the Commerce Department; a strike was called in the Art Department, the Liberal Arts and Science Departments on the Mishima campus, the School of Veterinary Medicine, the Narashino Campus Engineering Science Department and the Engineering Science Department; all were affected by July 8th.

On July 20th, Furuta and 13 of the trustees entered into preparatory negotiations with the students about holding another
mass-bargaining session in place of the ill-fated attempt on June 11th, and they promised in writing to have one on August 4th. Following these talks, the students held their own meeting and staged a demonstration. Again the police were called, and this time 68 students were arrested. Furuta then went back on his word and announced the indefinite postponement of the mass-bargaining session. Through July and August the university had been on holiday and when it looked as if the autumn semester would start with the strike still in progress, the university authorities asked the Tokyo Magistrates Court for an injunction to stop the students from occupying the Law and Economics Department buildings and to prohibit them from entering them. This was agreed on, and so the riot police were mobilized again on September 4th to remove the barricades from these two buildings. This time 132 students were arrested. The Zenkyoto responded by moving into different buildings in the same departments and erected their barricades again. The students throughout the whole campus were now united by this last introduction of the police and on September 19th, the Medical Department, which was the last one, joined the strike, so that all 11 departments were now affected.

Furuta was forced to attend a new mass-bargaining session set for September 30th, where he was confronted by about 15,000 students. To the accompaniment of the students' angry shouts, he agreed to sign a paper listing three self-criticisms which were: 1) He had used violent elements of the physical-fitness association in conjunction with gangster groups; 2) he had brought the riot police onto the campus; and 3) he had broken his promise to hold the second mass-bargaining session. He also promised to satisfy four demands which were put to him in writing, and these were to ensure 1) establishment of a student self-governing association, 2) solution of the problem of dis-
honest salary payments, 3) resignation of all the trustees, and 4) another mass-bargaining session would be held on October 3rd. However, the university later refused to hold the meeting on October 3rd and instead a summons was issued for the arrest of 8 students including Akita, chairman of the Nichidai Zenkyoto.

On October 9th, it was decided that the trustees would resign, thus satisfying one of the students demands. However, on the 14th, right-wing students attacked the Engineering Department's barricades on the Koriyama campus in Fukushima prefecture, setting fire to the barricades and shooting at the students inside with airguns. On October 31st, Furuta announced his intention to fight the students and declared all the promises he had made on September 30th null and void. So the struggle bogged down.

The Art Department, which has its campus at Ekota in Naka-no Ward in Tokyo, was attacked on November 11th by 400 people wearing gray overalls marked with the words ‘Kanto-gun’ or Kanto Army. They had been equipped by a company president named Iijima, who was a former officer of the defunct Imperial Japanese Army, and though they were all students they behaved more like an army of right-wing gangster-types. The Art Department Struggle Council students put up a heroic resistance and their attackers were forced to retreat. The students were now in such high spirits that they held their annual university fair inside the barricades. However, smiles didn’t stay on their faces for long. On the next day, November 12th, the riot police were mobilized again and moved against the Art Department, pulling down the barricades and arresting 46 members of the Art Department Struggle Committee. The Zenkyoto then held a meeting to protest the entrance of the riot police and they re-occupied the Art Department Building, remaking the barricades. The Nihon University Struggle was now one of the most important campus disputes in Japan; so on November
22nd, 2,000 of the Nichidai Zenkyoto joined Tokyo University students in a joint rally in front of Tokyo’s Yasuda Hall to promote the ‘Nihon and Tokyo University Struggles’ Victory’.

December arrived, but Furuta refused to resign and the struggle continued unabated behind the barricades. However, from the beginning of 1969, the barricades were removed one by one from each department until finally, on February 18th, the last ones in the Liberal Arts Department were broken down by a few thousand riot police. Three days later the spring entrance examinations were held under a heavy police guard. Many of the Zenkyoto leaders had been arrested, including Akita who had gone into hiding in a left-wing writer’s house, but was arrested when he came out to help clear away the snow from the driveway and was spotted. With the all-campus strike over, Akita arrested, and the recommencement of classes, it seemed as if the struggle was dying down. In fact however, the problems that the students were protesting over had not been solved, Furuta is still the President, the suppression of the student movement still continues, the financial irregularities have not yet been satisfactorily answered and none of the student demands have been realized. However, it isn’t possible to say that the struggle is finished but rather that it has gone underground for the moment and is preparing for the day when the students renew the fight.

As far as the general public was concerned, the dispute at Nihon University was overshadowed by the Tokyo University problems, although these two rank together as the most significant and influential of the university struggles that swept Japan. A new pattern had been set which characterized the thinking of the non-sect radicals, emphasizing the occupation of university buildings and closure of the whole campus with unlimited strikes. This type of self-denial became very popular and led to the creation of Zenkyoto in every university in the land.

—169—
The Kyoto University Struggle

The next university to become the focus of the university struggle was the second most prestigious national university in Kyoto. This was the scene of wild battles between the Kyoto Zenkyoto and the Minsei students who were part of a self-defense force organized by the university authorities. The problem originated out of the students' desire to control the new Student Dormitory. After several departments had gone on indefinite strike, the aim shifted to stopping the spring entrance examinations. Support came from the Zenkyoto of Tokyo and Nihon Universities and resulted in a spectacular street fight when Nichidai Zenkyoto students put up barricades on the roads in the center of Kyoto and declared a 'liberated area'. The riot police were called in on this and many other occasions and finally, they were used to protect the entrance exams being held at emergency sites around the city. After the exams were finished in March, the Kyoto University struggle fizzled out.

By now, it had become standard practice to mobilize the riot police whenever a campus was barricaded. In addition, the authorities took to investigating members of the sects, even going so far as to arrest some students before incidents could happen and on other occasions, submitting people attending public meetings to body searches for hidden weapons. In more than one instance, the police refused to help the beleaguered university authorities unless they first furnished details of the student leaders, the size and number of radical factions and so on. In this way, the control the riot police exercised was really overpowering and became concentrated on the activities of the anti-Yoyogi students and their efforts to destroy the university as well as their preparations for the Ampo struggle in 1970.
The University Control Bill of 1969

The government had been deeply shocked by the extent of the student disputes and so they presented a new University Law before the Diet on May 24th, and using the sheer numbers of Liberal Democratic members, pushed it through both houses. On August 10th, it became law. There have been many attempts by the various political parties in Japan to produce university reformation plans and it is necessary to take a look at some of these so as to give a sense of perspective to the content of the actual University Bill. Needless to say, the new bill was opposed by most student groups and the left-wing parties.

The first attempt by the Liberal Democratic Party to formulate a university reform policy was in November, 1968, when the Liberal Democrats' Educational System Investigation Committee, whose chief was Sakata, the present Minister of Education, published an interim report on the university problem. This seemed to represent the main points of their policy and contained the following items:

1) Universities should be divided into 4 groups; Arts, Liberal Arts, Research and Teacher's Training Schools.

2) The autonomy must be protected from violations by the radical students.

3) There must be an improvement in communications on campus, which will include a system whereby the students can register their wishes to the university administration (n.b. this does not mean participation by the students) and democratization of the student councils.

4) Student participation in the administration of the university and in presidential elections cannot be allowed.

The Liberal Democratic plan envisions each university pursuing its own specialty, so that with the reclassification into 4 groups, there will be increasing uniformity in the standards of higher
education. This idea is essentially the same as one considered by the Japan Federation of Employers’ Association and so it is in accord with the wishes of the business world.

One of the biggest problems encountered during a campus dispute is the deterioration of the administrative functions and leadership in the university. The main reasons for this are the old-fashioned system in effect and the dispersion of power within the executive. Therefore, the LDP plan intended to either take measures to strengthen the power of the president or to establish a new post of vice-president. However, the question remains whether the government will be able to control the university more effectively by taking such measures. There have been occasions in the past when the Ministry of Education has objected to and postponed the appointment of presidents who had been elected on the campus.

The reason why students are to be excluded from participation is that they are in the course of study and cannot be responsible for the conduct of social affairs as long as they are incapable of fulfilling their own social responsibilities. This idea, however, runs counter to the present trend, and also, as long as the autonomy of the university is contained in the autonomy of the faculty meeting, the problems and disputes on campus cannot be effectively handled.

The Socialist Party presented a very idealistic reform program based to a great extent upon ideological considerations and for that reason is so vague and abstract that it cannot really contribute to this discussion. The Democratic Socialist Party on the other hand had a more concrete plan and it contained the following main points:

1) The modern university should be made more popular and research should be left to the graduate institutes.

2) Students may be permitted to participate in a presidential
election, but their choice would have no authority unless backed up by a two-thirds majority of all the students.

3) The core of the university administration should be in the hands of a board of trustees, which is to be made up of equal numbers of representatives of the professors, other staff, graduate students and prominent members of society.

This plan is thought to be quite clever, it is both conservative and moderate, and is popular among the conservative intellectuals. However, it is also considered to be lacking in practicality with respect to the Japanese political set-up.

The final opinion that must be considered is that of the Japan Communist Party who have a well documented analysis of the situation. They maintain that the university should be free from interference by the government and that its autonomy should be protected by democratic unity among all the members of the university—the faculty, the students and the other staff. For this purpose, a whole university conference should be instituted.

In their analysis of the present university disputes, the JCP takes into account the questions of mass education, increasing tuition fees, intervention in the autonomy of the university, anti-democratic administration by the school authorities and the maneuvers of the Trotskyists. The last item refers to the students of the anti-Yoyogi factions, who claim they are going to make the university a base for revolution. The JCP says that on the contrary, their activities are anti-revolutionary as they provide an excuse for suppression by the establishment and also serve to produce splits in the student movement.

As the first step in improvement of the university, democratization of the administration is suggested. This can be done by establishing a whole university conference, which would guarantee that administration, on important questions concerning education and study, reflects the will of the majority on campus. The method
of electing presidents and deans should be drastically changed, giving the staff a chance to express their opinion. This would go hand in hand with democratization of the faculty meeting. It will also be necessary to alter the makeup of the board of directors or the council at private universities. The management of private universities should be made public, with the whole campus conference having the right to audit and eliminate inequities. The final consideration is that students and graduates will be guaranteed freedom of democratic activity both on and off campus without fear of interference by the police or the university authorities.

It is clear from this outline that the JCP aims to be able to control the university through the whole campus conference thus freeing it from the influence of the LDP and the government. In this respect, the JCP plan clashes with the LDP's intention to put the university under the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

The University Control Bill which was presented to the Diet on May 24, 1969 and became law on August 10th, bears the indelible mark of the LDP stand on education. The aim of this law is to enable the universities to take the urgent administrative measures needed to bring about a settlement of a campus dispute, as is stated in Article 1 of the Bill, and it is to be correspondingly applied to disputes in both public and private universities. It must be noted that the Law aims only at a settlement of the problems and not a solution. The main means by which a settlement is to be reached is by strengthening the power of the existing authority and thus it can safely be said that this Law is useful for the maintenance of order rather than for an independent solution. In Japan, however, any government stand which advocates law and order brings back unpleasant memories of the prewar era when the government suppressed the freedom of
speech and led the nation into war in the name of the maintenance of public peace and order.

The meaning of a dispute on campus is defined in Article 2 as a situation whereby normal or regular education and study is interrupted by the occupation, blockade or boycott of a class or any other extraordinary or irregular action on the part of the students. The final decision as to what constitutes a dispute is left up to the Minister of Education. The counter-measures at his disposal include such strong actions as the closure or even abolition of a university and with so much at stake it is felt that the term dispute should be more clearly and strictly defined. Another objection which has been raised is that the Minister of Education is a man of a certain political party and this may have some bearing on his evaluation of a situation. The Fundamental Law of Education guarantees the political neutrality of education and prohibits undue control of it and it is one of the anomalies of this Law, that it permits a greater degree of interference by the Minister of Education than before. This is not to say that the Minister will abuse his power, but the fact that the question remains open is a source of considerable concern to those affected.

The measure introduced in this Law that aroused the most soul searching was the creation of an Extra Council on University Disputes (referred to in this discussion as the Council). According to Article 13 of the Law, the function of the Council is to handle affairs that are described in this Law. The Council is to bring forward proposals about important matters and on improvements in university administration. The members are to be appointed by the Minister of Education with the agreement of the Cabinet and are to be 5 in number, including university presidents, faculty members or officers of private universities and other experts on university affairs.
The most important aspect of this new Council is its composition, but in fact, when the first Council was announced in October, 1969, only one of its members was an active president of a university. The political overtones in the Minister’s choices were only too obvious to an observant critic. It is also feared that this Council will be used a means to justify and conceal the Minister of Education’s newly increased power over the universities. The decisions of the Council have no legally binding power over the Minister of Education, and it is largely dependent on him whether the Council’s decisions and proposals will be adopted or not.

The main bulk of the Law is contained in Articles 3 through 11 and we will quote each at length before discussing them as a whole.

**Article 3:** The power and responsibility of the university president is as prescribed in the following points:

1) The president of a university involved in a dispute must play a leading part in deciding on and carrying out measures to settle the dispute.

2) The president concerned must try to listen to the desires and opinions of the students in so far as they are related to the students themselves and if they are fitting, he must consider them when planning a settlement.

**Article 4:**

1) The presidents of the national universities have a duty to report to the Minister of Education as soon as a dispute arises on campus.

2) The Minister of Education can, if necessary, ask the presidents concerned to make a report on the measures being taken for settlement and improvement of the situation.

**Article 5:**

1) The Minister of Education can refer a university dispute to
the Extra Council on University Disputes and based on the answer he receives from the Council, give a recommendation.

2) A recommendation as described in 1) should assist in an independent and proper settlement of a dispute.

3) The school authority concerned must respect the recommendation and try to act in accordance with the recommendation.

Article 6: Presidents of universities suffering from disputes can take the following measures with the agreement of the Council;

1) a) Appointment of the following on campus:
   i) A vice-president or other presidential assistants,
   ii) A council to handle the settlement of the campus dispute and the improvement of the university administration,
   iii) An organization to legislate on and execute matters concerning the university administration.

   b) The president can assume the powers and responsibilities of organizations which are legalized by the School Education Law and the Special Law for Educational Officers, or he can transfer the powers and responsibilities to the new organizations in item a).

2) Establish a conference regarding the dispute.

3) When taking measures in items i) or iii), the president must negotiate first with the Minister of Education. The members of these organizations must be appointed by the Minister.

4) The membership of 2) can include some students if the problems concern the students.

Article 7:

1) The president of a university involved in a dispute can halt the functioning of the university for at the most 9 months.

2) When a dispute continues for more than 9 months or when a dispute occurs within 6 months of the previous dispute being settled, the Minister of Education can stop the functions of the department or university in question with the agreement of the
Extra Council on University Disputes.

Article 8:

1) When a university or departments of a university are closed by the order of the Minister, the staff are automatically suspended from office.

2) During the period of suspension, they will be paid 70% of their normal salary.

8) The students concerned will automatically be suspended from school.

10) The scholarships for the students provided by the Japan Scholarship Society will be stopped.

Article 9: When a dispute continues for more than 3 months after the Minister of Education has closed the university or department, the appropriate measures for the revision of the National University Law should be taken with the agreement of the Extra Council on University Disputes. (n.b. this is taken to mean the closure of the university concerned)

Article 10:

1) When confrontation between the departments of a university is a serious obstacle in the way of solving a campus dispute, the president can ask the Minister of Education to mediate.

2) At that time the Council will use its good offices.

Article 11: When difficulties arise over entrance examinations or the completion of a course on time, the president concerned must consult with the Minister of Education.

There are two main objections to the content of this University Law and they are that whereas the Bill forces the university to place restrictions on itself, it also justifies the interference of the Ministry of Education. These two factors are seen to work mutually.

Firstly, the Bill emphasizes that the president is the supreme responsible person, and by strengthening the power of the
president and the deans, it will bring about a greater centralization of the university administration. On the other hand the powers of the faculty meeting and university councils are restricted. Also, the Bill ignores the opinions of the students as well as the teachers and other staff. In Article 6, there is an item which purports to answer and register the opinions and hopes of the students, but it lacks substance. The conference which is to handle the proposals made by the students and the staff is in fact only an advisory organ and does not have any legally binding power over the president. Whenever an organization has the authority to make decisions, all its members are appointed by the Minister of Education. Thus, although this bill appears to admit the participation of students and staff in the university administration, it is actually very deceptive.

The second objection manifests itself in those sections of the Bill which permit the intervention of the Minister of Education through obligatory reports, the recommendation system, the consultative system and the appointment of a vice-president and the members of other new committees. With respect to the reports, the Bill states that a president has a duty to submit reports and the Minister the right to receive them. In the cases of the elections of presidents at Tohoku and Kyushu Universities, the Minister demanded and received reports and delayed the announcement of the results. In this sense, the power of the Minister of Education was actually strengthened. The recommendation system also binds the person who receives the recommendation more strongly than the advice of any previous Minister of Education. That is, the person in receipt of a recommendation must respect it and has a duty to realize it. Again, according to this Bill, the university has to consult with the Minister of Education on the establishment of administrative organizations, entrance examinations and completion of courses. Originally,
these matters were wholly within the responsibility of the university so this can be taken as an instance of invasion of university autonomy by the government. There is one striking example of this in March, 1969 at the end of the Tokyo University dispute, when the Minister of Education, Sakata, stopped the entrance examinations in spite of the strong desire of the university, as articulated by Acting-President Kato, to hold the exams. The Minister insisted at that time that he has the right to make final decisions in the educational field.

These are the main points which critics point to as evidence that the government is trying to establish a university system to its liking throughout the country, but there are also some other dubious points. For example in Article 7, it states that a president can stop the functions of the university for a certain time but no provisions are made about the power of the president during this period. Article 9 gives the right of the Minister to revise the National University Law by which the university itself can be nullified and destroyed. In such an eventuality, the Minister will listen to the opinions of the president and will act upon the decision of the Council. However, neither the president nor the Council have any power in law so it is entirely possible that the fate of a university will be in the hands of the Minister alone.

The financial aspect treated in Article 8, which says that in the event of closure, the staff will receive 70% or less of their normal salary, will have an adverse affect on the researchers. Their salary is already so low that to accept a cut would mean having to stop their studies. The scholarship question in which students are unable to receive money from the Japan Scholarship Society is explained by the fact that this society, which is the largest in Japan, is funded by the government. Furthermore, the Constitutional guarantees which are presented in the Fundamental Law of Education and which concern the right to study
and receive a proper education are in fact denied when the Minister of Education closes a university.

Of course, these criticisms must be set against the realization that this Bill represented the first concrete measure to control the increasing problem of university disputes. However, we cannot escape from the fact that the Bill doesn’t touch on the root causes of the disputes and that as long as these remain, the disputes are liable to recur in spite of the new Law. All the Zengakuren factions immediately came out against it, rightly seeing it as a threat to their activities. Up to now, the Law hasn’t received a serious test and, in fact, it came into force just when the nationwide university struggle was subsiding. The reasons behind this development are many, but mainly a sense of exhaustion had come over the student movement in the summer of 1969. The Zenkyoto had now shifted its emphasis to preparations for the Ampo Struggle in 1970 and while the campus struggles subsided, street warfare was escalating.

The chief means whereby the anti-Yoyogi students were able to step up the tempo of their street actions, was by initiating a new series of alliances in contrast to the general trend. Using such broad-based organizations as Beheiren, the Hansen Seinen Iinkai and Zenkyoto as mediators, they began by forming the ‘Five Faction Alliance’ just before the Okinawa Day demonstrations of April 28, 1969. This was made up of Shagakudo, Chukaku, ML, the 4th International and Kyo-gakudo. The left-wing had been agitating for some time for the return of Okinawa to Japanese rule and were on very safe ground as this wish was echoed by the majority of Japanese. The government had started negotiations as long ago as 1965 with the U.S. over the return, but the Socialists and Communists had succeeded in making sufficient noise that should Sato have failed to ensure it, he would have suffered a major political defeat.
When Okinawa Day came, the official left-wing received permission to conduct peaceful demonstrations and meetings, but the “Five Faction Alliance” was refused a permit. However, this didn’t stop them from planning widespread disruption on that day.

In what amounted to a coordinated effort, the students gathered at their various staging spots all over Tokyo. The original slogans advocated ‘occupation of the Prime Minister’s Official Residence’ and the ‘seizing of the Capital’. There was even a rumor that the student’s would try to occupy the Kasumigaseki Building, a brand new skyscraper and the tallest building in Japan, as a flamboyant gesture. However, the police were mobilized in large numbers to protect the Kasumigaseki area, which also includes the Diet House, the Ministries and the Prime Minister’s Official Residence. As an added precaution, the sidewalks in that area had all the old paving stones removed and were swiftly paved with asphalt to deny the rioters a convenient source of weapons. Also, there were police on standby near the universities used by the radical students who were to nip the trouble in the bud before it got out of hand. Faced with the overwhelming superiority of police numbers the students were forced to abandon their first plan of action and to switch to a contingency plan.

The first half of Monday, April 28th, consisted of the students being bottled up in their respective university districts, or so it seemed, but suddenly, in the late afternoon, all factions broke off their running battle with the police and converged on the Ginza. The Five Faction Alliance had been joined by workers of the Hansen Seinen linkai and students from the structural reform groups, resulting in a formidable number of demonstrators. The first real actions came when the Hansen Seinen workers wearing helmets and several of the student factions burst onto the mainline railway tracks leading to Tokyo station. The trains
were stopped and stations closed. Pandemonium hit the commuters. The police appeared swiftly and chased the rioters along the tracks until they took refuge in the streets at the back of the Ginza. Here they were joined by the other factions and put up barricades on a 800 meter stretch of road running between the Ginza shopping area and Tokyo terminal station. This was dubbed the Ginza Liberated Area.

The police were outmaneuvered for once because they couldn’t muster sufficient numbers to cover the students from all sides without weakening their guard elsewhere. The students now held sway over their temporary domain, taunting the police and chanting slogans to the fascination of the thousands of onlookers who were rubbernecking from an expressway which runs overhead. The end came at 9:00 in the evening when a Beheiren propaganda car appeared and led half the demonstrators peacefully through the police lines at the Ginza end, while the other half left in the other direction burning several cars and a police box as an explosive finale to the day.

The meaning of April 28th as Okinawa Day is that it was in April 28, 1952 that Okinawa was cut off from the homeland and the San Francisco Peace Treaty agreements came into force. However, the students saw it as an opportunity to attack the government and to remind the people to be on their guard, lest Prime Minister Sato should engineer the return of Okinawa complete with nuclear bases. As it was, the result created a storm of disapproval amongst political parties of all stripes. The Government came in for criticism over its ‘weak-kneed’ policies for containing the students’ violence from many sources, including the LDP. The Socialists pointed to the fact that if the anti-Yoyogi students had been allowed to demonstrate in a unified rally, much of the trouble might have been averted. The Democratic Socialists feared that the radical
action might provide a good excuse for the rise of totalitarianism, and the Komeito took a strong stand against the students' violence, particularly as so many high school students had been involved for the first time.

Still, in spite of a large number of arrests, the anti-Yoyogi students were very encouraged by their joint effort and continued to organize on a larger scale. The next step was a six faction joint meeting against war and Ampo on June 15th. The six were Shagakudo, Chukaku, 4th International, ML, Progakudo and Kyogakudo.

The university struggles still persisted throughout this period, but gradually the main energies were being directed towards the onset of the anti-Ampo campaign for 1970. The first official event in the calendar was International Anti-war Day on October 21st. However, as if in a move to outflank the anti-Security Treaty movement, Sato announced that he would go to America later in the year, to complete negotiations over the return of Okinawa. The anti-Yoyogi factions were fired with a new determination to carry their struggle to the people and started to advocate 'guerilla' actions. The foremost in this trend were the battle-hard Chukaku, Shagakudo and ML factions. However, there emerged an even more extremist fringe from within the ranks of Shagakudo. The Shagakudo, from the Kansai area of Osaka and Kyoto, proposed to start a revolutionary war in the cities with bombs and firearms as a means to stop Sato, but they were opposed by the Tokyo-based members. A split developed with the Kansai group leaving the Shagakudo Unity Faction to form an new independent faction known as the Sekigun or Red Army. Their aims were 'Armed Revolution', 'Simultaneous Worldwide Revolution' and a 'World Party, World Sekigun, and a World Revolutionary Front'. Though miniscule in size, having at the most only 300 active members, this group soon hit the headlines.
The final line up of as many factions as feasible came in September, when 8 factions (Chukaku, Shagakudo Unity faction, ML, Hantei Gakuhyo, 4th International, Progakudo, Kyogakudo and the Front) joined in the inaugural meeting of the National Federation of the All-Campus Joint Struggle Councils (Zenkoku Zenkyoto Rengo), which became known simply as Zenkyoto.

The only factions in the anti-Yoyogi line up who didn’t join were Kakumaru and the new Sekigun. Rivalry was running very high between the Kakumaru and the Zenkyoto, and resulted in a confrontation at Waseda University on September 3rd, just 2 days before the scheduled Zenkyoto meeting. The Zenkyoto had taken over the 2nd Student Hall (which had previously been the cause of the Waseda Struggle) intending to use it as a base during the national Zenkyoto meeting, thus arousing the Kakumaru who regard Waseda as their own preserve. The Kakumaru then proceeded to turn the Okuma Auditorium into a fortress from which to conduct their fight against the Zenkyoto. Both of these buildings are outside the campus proper and face each other across the square in front of the main entrance. The 2nd Student Hall is an 11 story building of steel and concrete while the Okuma Auditorium is a squat yellow brick hall, shaped like a church. The confrontation escalated to the stage where Waseda’s President, Tokoyama Tsunesaburo, called in the riot police in order to avert the expected clashes between the rival groups.

Firm barricades prevented the riot police from getting into the student center, so they used aerial ladders to get in higher up. The Zenkyoto resisted fiercely for 4 hours hurling stones, chunks of concrete, Molotov cocktails and bottles at the police. Many neighboring shops had their windows smashed and roofs burnt as a consequence. The Kakumaru students continued to fight in Okuma Auditorium for two hours after the fall of the student center, and demonstrated on the roof. 90 students were arrested
and 15 injured, while the university had to offer a token sum as compensation to the local shopkeepers for the damage they had incurred. After this stormy prelude, the national Zenkyoto meeting on September 5th came as something of an anti-climax.

An estimated 20,000 students were represented at the inaugural meeting in Hibiya Park and included students from the eight factions and Zenkyoto from all over the country. At the rally, students pledged to crush the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1970, and as a first step, to prevent Prime Minister Sato from leaving to visit Washington in November. The officers for the new federation were announced with Yamamoto Yoshitaka, chairman of the Tokyo University Zenkyoto, as chairman and Akita Akehiro, chairman of the Nihon University Zenkyoto, as vice-chairman. This relatively calm meeting was only marred by the arrest of chairman Yamamoto, who was picked out by a keen-eyed riot policeman as he attempted to enter the park, some 228 days after the warrant for his arrest had been issued.

While the Anti-Yoyogi was organizing itself, a new student body made its appearance. It was called Shin Gakusei Domei (New Student League—Shingakudo) and was sponsored by the Buddhist Soka Gakkai church. The Soka Gakkai students first became organized in June in opposition to the 1969 University Bill but as this was passed into law by a show of LDP force in the Diet, the new movement had to be revised. It was decided to create a national student group; this took shape on September 17th and was officially started on October 19, 1969 at a huge rally in Yoyogi Park in Tokyo. This new body is politically in the middle and is ready to oppose both the Minsei Zengakuren and the anti-Yoyogi students. It is anti-Ampo, against war and has introduced a new, and as yet, untried factor into the events to come in 1970.

The Ampo Struggle of 1970 opened officially on October 21st,
International Anti-War Day. Meetings were held by the Socialist Party, Sohyo and the JCP at 600 locations around Japan and for the main part were peaceful. The only organization with affiliations to the radical students which received permission to hold a rally and demonstration was Beheiren, all the other groups in the Anti-Yoyogi fold demonstrated illegally. With factions like the 'fighting' Chukaku urging guerrilla warfare and the memory of the previous year's International Anti-War Day, in which the sacking of Shinjuku Station resulted in the police invoking the Anti-Riot Law, the stage had already been set for new violence. The Police Department mobilized 25,000 riot police for Tokyo alone, businesses in the city area closed for the day, and the main terminal stations had the stones, which form the track-beds, asphalted over as an expensive precautionary measure.

The focus was on Shinjuku and a large crowd appeared, only to be dispersed by the riot police. However, this did nothing to change the mood amongst the young people gathering there. Finally, at about 6.30 p.m., 3,000 people moved to the plaza near the east exit of Shinjuku Station and built barricades there. They fought with the riot police for nearly 4 hours, exchanging stones and Molotov cocktails for the tear gas the police were using.

Elsewhere, 4 police stations and 19 police boxes were attacked and Molotov cocktails were hurled into the headquarters of the 7th Riot Police Detachment. A state of siege also occurred on the roads between Waseda University and nearby Takadanobaba Station, the students, behind barricades holding off the police with Molotov cocktails. On account of this unrest, the National Railways, several private railways and subways were put out of operation, and some 350,000 commuters were left without transport. On this day, the police arrested 1,505 people (including 1,221 in Tokyo) throughout Japan, which was the largest number
ever arrested on one day. This was considered a key day which would augur the success or failure of the Ampo Struggle and served as prologue for the anti-Yoyogi students activities. The next event was to be an attempt to stop Sato from going to America, which was scheduled for November 17th.

Fearful that this day would turn into a repetition of the bloody Haneda incidents of 1967, the authorities began to take the severest security precautions ever. Haneda Airport itself was taken over by a force of 3,000 riot police, who started to check all incoming vehicles as much as a week before Sato’s departure date. Local self-defense organizations were created out of local inhabitants from the Kamata and Haneda areas after police urging. Armed with baseball bats and wooden swords, these vigilantes were to help the police control the students.

The protesting groups who saw reason to try and stop Sato were those of the Rono approach to revolution. These were the Socialist Party, Sohyo, Hansen Seinen linkai and the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren. The Socialist Party orginally planned for a massive on-the-spot protest rally near Haneda, followed by a march to the airport on the morning of November 17th, but in spite of this having been supported by 80% of the delegates to its national conference, it was called off only two days before. Instead, all activities were concentrated in a central rally on November 16th, which was attended by about 50,000 people. However, the cancellation of the on-the-spot meeting was a source of great disappointment to those student factions, such as Hantei Gakuhyo, who still looked to the Socialists to provide leadership. Sohyo limited its protest to a ‘united action’ on November 13th in which token strikes were called by 54 local industrial unions. Another group which joined in the demonstrations, although it is not strictly a theoretical body, is Beheiren, which held a mass rally in Hibiya Park on November 16th in
spite of a ban placed on the meeting by the police. The characteristic feature of this meeting was the large numbers of 'non-sect' radicals who were unable to join in the armed struggle being planned by the Anti-Yoyogi groups as the combat groups had been organized strictly according to factions. The Hansen Seinen Iinkai had also held its own rally at Hibiya Park on November 15th and about 10,000 workers and students had joined in. In all, in the period between November 13th and 17th, there were many meetings and demonstrations held all over Japan.

It was, however, left to the militant students of the anti-Yoyogi actions and the young workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai to try and attack Haneda Airport itself. Due to the immense police turnout this was impossible, but it was hoped that they would be able to engulf the local populace in the area of Kamata on the approach to Haneda, and create a state of siege. If this came about on sufficient a scale as to plunge the nation into a crisis, then Sato would be forced to abandon his trip. The armaments necessary for the coming struggle were smuggled into the Kamata area beforehand, but because of the efficiency of police investigations most of these were found and confiscated. The actions commenced on November 16th, in the afternoon, in an attempt to seize control of the Kamata area and hold it over night.

The police precautions proved so severe that many students were unable to get even as far as Kamata Station, while many of those who did were arrested on the station platforms before they could join the protests. The first moves were made at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, with several simultaneous 'guerrilla' attacks. There are several train lines which lead to Kamata and the students and workers covered all of these. Some time after 4 o'clock, 400 Chukaku students stopped the train they were riding on and alighting from it, ran along the tracks to Kamata Station. They then burst out of the station into the square in front, where
they joined other demonstrators who had already arrived. They were supplied with molotov cocktails which had been brought to the spot, and the area was transformed into a sea of flame. At about the same time, Kamata Station of the private Keihin Kyuko Railway was attacked with molotov cocktails and services were halted. Workers of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai wearing white helmets jumped onto the tracks at Tokyo Station stopping mainline and commuter services temporarily. 500 members of the ML Faction attacked a police station in the Shinagawa district of Tokyo with molotov cocktails, destroying part of the entrance. Later, they seized a bus and rammed it into a police water-cannon truck.

The main street fighting in the Kamata area was kept confined to the station square region by heavy police actions. However, the students persisted in their attacks until late at night. The main failure of their attempt was that they were unable to involve the local inhabitants in the protest as the division between the rioters and the bystanders was always apparent. The police for their part used tear gas liberally, and assisted by the vigilante groups they arrested a huge number of the students. In fact, the number arrested on November 16th in Tokyo was 1,689 (out of a national total of 1,857), which even exceeded the record set on the previous October 21st. The protests carried on into the next day, but during the night a fine rain had started to fall which considerably dampened the spirits of the demonstrators.

November 17th dawned on the Kanagawa riverside and a bedraggled group of Socialist Youth League and Hantei Gakuhyo members, together with other people who were disappointed by the Socialist Party's decision to call off their protest, had turned out to demonstrate as had been originally planned. They were all that was left of the massive protests that had been hoped for. At 10:04 a.m., Sato's party took off from Haneda airport,
deserted save for the riot police who stood guard in their long blue waterproof capes. Thus, the Prime Minister winged safely on his way, after being ferried to Haneda in a Ground Self-Defense Forces helicopter, but at what a great expense. 80 domestic and 60 international flights to Haneda had been cancelled or rescheduled, bringing the airport to a standstill on November 17th; 75,000 riot police had been mobilized; more than 2,000 people were arrested during the period and 82 people were injured.

On November 21st, Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon issued a joint statement in which provisions were made for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule in 1972. The Japanese left-wing were not particularly surprised by the content of it and proceeded to pull the communique apart sentence by sentence. Sato feigned astonishment, saying that the left-wing should be pleased, as this was what they had long waited for. The students, almost to a man, saw the threat of nuclear arms being introduced into Japan via Okinawa and another specter arose in the form of a resurgence of Japanese military power after the reversion takes place. However, none of these issues have yet been truly put to the test and will probably figure strongly in the 1970 Ampo struggle.

In 1969, the university struggle hadn’t yet died out and in fact it seemed to have broadened its scope if anything. There were 152 universities involved in disputes during the year, which is a 40% increase over 1968. Not only this, there were 62 instances of high schools being barricaded and classrooms occupied, with an unprecedented number (30,000) of high school students participating in street demonstrations of whom 602 were arrested. The figures, published in the 1969 White Paper on Security by the National Police Agency, show an increase in the forces of the Anti-Yoyogi memberships. The number of student self-governing associations they control has increased from 180 in 1968 to
209, with a corresponding increase in active members from 8,300 to 14,200 and a mobilization strength increase from 33,700 to 44,000. This makes the Anti-Yoyogi just about equal in strength to the Minsei Zengakuren who now control 335 student self-governing associations, have 14,200 active members and a mobilization strength of 47,600. These forces will be very significant in the coming Security Treaty struggles.

The general mood of the student movement since the tumultuous days of October and November 1969, has been one of quiet and caution. For one thing, the students don’t want to have too many of their numbers under arrest when the main struggles come and they have seen what happened to the Sekigun. The wild rhetoric that Sekigun used in the period before Sato’s trip to America promised bombs and guns, a ‘War in Tokyo’ and a ‘War in Osaka’, as a positive means of stopping Sato. They backed up their words with actions, but the police soon got wind of what was going on and swiftly raided those universities which were actually engaged in manufacturing pipe bombs for the Sekigun. A little later on November 5th, the police interrupted a special training camp which was being held by 53 Sekigun members in a mountain pass in Yamanashi prefecture, arresting all of them. A dragnet was then put out to catch all the leading members of the Red Army executive committee and this eventually netted the chairman Shionti Takaya. Thus, in spite of a tremendous publicity boost by the national press, with over 200 Sekigun members in jail, the numbers have never managed to rise over the original tally of 300 and most of these are now forced to lie low. The rest of the factions have watched this example and are now treading warily waiting for the developments of 1970 to unfold.
Chapter 6: Kakumaru—Analysis of an Ultra-Radical Group

by NAKANISHI MASAHIRO

This chapter is where we try to present a typical student group, examining it from all aspects. For this purpose, we have chosen the Kakumaru—the Revolutionary Marxists as our model. This group has several distinctive features, the most important of which is its independent nature, but also it has had an interesting history which mirrors the twists and turns of the Zengakuren movement during the last ten years. Although the Kakumaru is the most theoretical of the student factions, but it is always prepared to indulge in violence whenever necessary. For these reasons, it was chosen as the model through which we will present a picture of life in the Japanese student movement.

The structure of a student group is usually on three levels. The basic support is drawn from student members at the university level who join through their department’s group; next there is a coordinating committee on a national level which consists of representatives from each university group; finally there is the parent body which oversees the whole group and functions as its official political organization, gathering support from all sectors of society, including the universities.

The name Kakumaru is the popular contraction of the full-title of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League’s Revolutionary Marxist Faction (Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosanshugisha Domei Kakumeiteki Marukushushugi-ha), and was founded on July 8, 1963. The parent body is the Revolutionary Communist League (Kakumeiteki Kyosanshigisha Domei—Kakukyodo) which was founded in June, 1958 as an opposition group to JCP and which holds to an ideology strongly influenced
by Trotsky's writings. At the university level, Kakumaru groups exist to some degree in nearly every campus in Japan but their main strength is to be found at Waseda University (in the 1st and 2nd Literature, Commerce, Social Studies Departments and the Commerce Night School), at Gakushuin University, at Kokugakuin (The National Graduate School), at International Christian University, and at Japan Women's University, which are all in Tokyo. Outside of Tokyo, their strongholds are Gifu University, Kanazawa University, Aichi University, Kumamoto University and Kagoshima University. Kakumaru controls 30 student self-governing associations throughout Japan, but even though this adds up to a membership of 66,000 students, the hard core of active members is only about 1,800. Of course, if there is to be a demonstration, extra supporters can be found, but even including these additional members, Kakumaru's optimal strength is about 3,500. However in Tokyo, public meetings, which are given to aid fund raising, attract new members and to proselytize the group's theory, attendances from 500 to 1,000 can be relied upon. Kakumaru also has an organization at the high school level which has three main divisions according to the area it serves. In Tokyo, it is called the Marxist High School Students' League (Marukusushugi Kokosei Domei), in Aichi prefecture, it is the High School Students Council (Kokosei Kaigi) and in Osaka, it is the All-Osaka High School Students Anti-war Committee (Zen Osaka Kokosei Hansen Iinkai). In addition, Kakumaru is attempting to widen its base by recruiting workers. If this plan succeeds, then Kakumaru will no longer be purely a university student organization, but at the moment, no major changes have been noticed.

As might be expected, the main offices of Kakumaru and its parent body Kakukyodo are in Tokyo. Kakumaru is housed in the Zengakuren Central Secretariat at 7 Yokoderacho in Shinjuku
Ward, while the Kakukyodo is at the Freedom Press offices at 4-6 Higashi-nakano in Nakano Ward. The fact that the Kakumaru and its parent body have different offices is not really surprising as the Kakumaru is not the only student group that is directed by Kakukyodo. The other is Chukaku, and in fact, there are different departments within the Kakukyodo to handle the affairs of each group. The Freedom Press (Kaiho-Sha) is the main publishing organization of the Kakukyodo and it handles all of the Kakumaru publications as a matter of course. These include ‘Liberation’ (Kaiho), a newspaper which appears twice monthly, ‘Communist’ (Kyosanshugisha), an irregular magazine that gives Kakukyodo opinions and is sold by Chukaku as well, ‘Zengakuren Secretariat Bulletin’ (Zengakuren Shokikyokutsushin), ‘Spartacus’, a monthly magazine and ‘Fighting Zengakuren’ (Tatakau Zengakuren). These are supplemented by numerous wall posters and handouts. The wall posters announce coming meetings, detailing the slogans chosen for the occasion and the speakers; printed in red or blue ink with white lettering these are slim vertical sheets which are designed for posting on walls and poles. The handouts, on the other hand, are handwritten and stencilled on poor quality paper, usually in one color only, though red may be used for added effect, and are given out at meetings, during marches and speeches. The handouts contain a detailed account of the issues taken up at that time and in the case of speeches and meetings, are almost word for word renderings of what the main speaker is going to say.

The Kakumaru offices in the Zengakuren Secretariat are used as a base for the executive committee, which handles the running of the student group, deciding on policy and planning activities. The executive committee is elected at the National Congress, which takes place annually or more frequently if necessary. The actual election of the committee is the outcome of fierce man-
evening between the personalities prominent within the organization, and sometimes those with a large enough following can hand pick their own committee. The present committee consists of 28 members, with an average age of between 22 and 23. One third of the committee is usually drawn from Waseda University, which ensures a Waseda student as chairman most of the time. The members of the present executive, together with their universities and ages, are as follows:

Committee chairman Narioka Yoji (Waseda University, 24)
Vice-chairman and head of the overseas section Nemoto Jin (Hokkaido University of Arts and Science, 29)
Vice-chairman Sasaki Michitomo (Aichi University, 23)
Secretary and treasurer Kinoshita Hiroshi (Tokyo University, 26)
2nd secretary Yokokawa Katsuya (Hosei University, 25)

In addition to this, the affairs of Kakumaru are also taken care of by the Central Executive Committee of the Kakumaru Zengakuren but they are very much under the direction of the main Kakumaru leadership.

Decisions are made at the committee level, though sometimes, in the case of planning demonstrations and anti-police activities, these meetings are held in secret and the resolutions are passed on to the local level by representatives who instruct the rank and file members. After an action has been completed, it is dissected and subjected to a minute examination by the committee members who then formulate a new policy. The results are then presented to members and other interested parties at propaganda meetings, which are in fact small scale political rallies. The meeting is a very important part of every factions’ activities and plays a central role in the Zengakuren movement. It is the
meeting which dictates policy and attracts new members. Furthermore, it helps create a feeling of unity amongst the students and this is the place where the student leaders really reign supreme. The importance of the meeting is not ignored by the students themselves and in those wild outbreaks of inter-factional violence, the conflict often starts with an attempt by one faction to interfere with or break up a meeting being held by another.

A typical Kakumaru meeting for the public is arranged as follows. The hall is divided into 4 sections; for students, workers, high school students and citizens. The active members come in proudly wearing their helmets and sit in the front rows, or if it gets too crowded, they will sit cross-legged on the stage at the feet of the speakers. Flags from each university and local chapter are unhooked from their poles and are pinned to the walls, deep ruby red rectangles of cloth emblazoned with the Kakumaru ‘Z’ across the middle. The name of the meeting and the slogans chosen have been painted onto long paper or cloth banners which stretch across the top of the stage and down the sides. When everyone is seated, having paid a contribution in the form of an entrance fee, the proceedings can begin. A spokesman gets up to start the meeting with the calling of slogans. The audience stands and shouts the phrases in unison, and with the last two syllables of each slogan, everyone punches the air in the clenched fist salute. The styles of the speakers vary somewhat, with the younger speakers shouting harshly and the older speakers using a quieter style with more humor and balance. The meeting ends with a second round of slogans and the singing of the ‘Internationale’ as the whole mass of people link arms and sway rhythmically to and fro.

In the content of their speeches and literature, the Kakumaru display remarkable candor for a Zengakuren group, freely admitting failure in their actions. However, this doesn’t mean
that they admit to faults in their own theory but rather they spend considerable effort in criticizing the errors of other groups, with special emphasis on the activities of Chukaku. This is one of the great paradoxes of the Zengakuren movement that the Kakumaru and Chukaku share the same parent body, Kaku-kyodo, and though one would expect their thinking to be similar, it is in fact very different and represents years of emnity. Therefore, to understand Kakumaru’s theory, it is first necessary to go back and trace its history, showing the background to the present situation.

The origins of Kakumaru were in the period just after the 1960 Ampo Struggle had subsided. The Communist League or Bund (Kyosando) had been in control of the Mainstream leadership in Zengakuren during the Security Treaty struggle period, but it was suffering from internal problems. The Kakukyodo at that time was functioning within the Mainstream Zengakuren as the Marugakudo or Marxist Student League. Marugakudo took over the leadership of Zengakuren when the Bund split up, and in July 1961, banned the JCP affiliated students of Zenjiren from attending the 17th National Congress of Zengakuren. The Bund was finished but the student movement was still alive, and so after some infighting with Shagakudo, a new Marugakudo controlled leadership was elected with Kitakoji Satoshi as chairman. Gradually tightening their control, Marugakudo held another National Congress in December, 1961; the four Shagakudo members of the executive committee were expelled and the Zengakuren became an instrument of Marugakudo. At this congress, the new chairman was Nemoto Hitoshi and the secretary was Onoda Joji.

In June of the following year, Marugakudo got the Zengakuren to nominate Kuroda Kanichi, the Kakukyodo National Committee Chairman, as a prospective candidate for election to the
House of Councillors. However, in reaching this decision, Marugakudo itself began to feel the pressures of internal conflict. Two opposing factions within the Marxist Student League arose; one following the chairman, Nemoto, and the other behind the secretary, Onoda. By the autumn of 1962, when Kakukyodo held its 3rd National Committee Meeting, the split had widened with the Nemoto faction forming the Revolutionary Marxist Faction or Kakumaru (Kakumeiteki Marukusushugi-ha) and the Onoda faction joining the National Central Committee Faction, which became better known as the Chukaku (Central Core) Faction.

The year 1962 saw the Zengakuren demonstration against Soviet nuclear weapons led by Nemoto in Moscow’s Red Square. In November, a joint meeting was held on Icho Boulevard in the Tokyo University campus and was attended by 6,000 students, representing the biggest gathering by students at any time since the 1960 Ampo Struggles two years before. However, this meeting brought the differences between the two factions inside Kakukyodo into focus. The Nemoto group was already showing the independent spirit that Kakumaru is now noted for and criticized the Icho Boulevard meeting from the point of view that ‘it was impossible to censure other groups such as Shagakudo when engaged in joint actions like that.’ The Kakumaru position was that joint actions created ‘illicit unions’, but the Chukaku or Onoda faction denied this and in turn criticized the former as being guilty of factionalism. Accordingly in April, 1963, at the 34th Central Committee Meeting of Zengakuren, the six Chukaku executives were expelled for advocating joint actions. This caused the Onoda sympathizers to be completely shut out of the 20th National Congress of Zengakuren in July and marked the beginning of the Kakumaru Zengakuren.

After this, the antagonism between Kakumaru and Chukaku became deeper day by day. Finally, it resulted in a chaotic fight...
at Waseda University on July 2, 1964. Kakumaru had gathered at Waseda for a meeting at which they were to decide their actions and protests against the Constitutional Investigation Committee Report which was due on the next day. Members of Chukaku, Shagakudo, Shaseido and the structural reform groups, interrupted the meeting by bursting in wearing helmets and carrying sticks, and a fierce fight ensued.

However, in spite of this open hostility, the Kakumaru still joined with the other groups of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren when it came to opposing the JCP students, who had reformed as Zengakuren in 1964. In addition, Kakumaru demonstrated alongside the Sampa Rengo in the protest movement against nuclear submarines calling at Japanese ports which began to develop in November, 1964. But once again, when a meeting was held of the Tokyo branch of Zengakuren for the reformation of this body, the Kakumaru were absent because of their insistence that only they represented the true leadership of Zengakuren.

In 1965, the Vietnam War and the Japan-Korean Security Treaty emerged as major political issues and this was reflected in the slogans put out at the 22nd National Congress of the Kakumaru Zengakuren in July. These were 'Don’t Allow the Communist and Socialist Struggle against Ratification of the Security Treaty to Degenerate into a Petitioning Movement to the Diet!', 'Crush the Bureaucratism in JCP Joint Security Treaty Reform Struggle!'.

When it came to political action in concert with other Anti-Yoyogi students, Kakumaru showed itself very active, but as soon as matters of organization were considered, they were still opposed to the Sampa Rengo students. One field, however, in which they were able to join without any management difficulties was the formation in August, 1965 of the Hansen Seinen Iinkai (Anti-war Youth Committees) and Kakumaru members enlisted
in the Tokyo Hansen Seinen Linkai as individuals.

In 1966, the university struggle exploded in three different places, with strikes at Waseda, Meiji and Chuo Universities over the questions of school fees and student halls. At the same time, the confrontation between Kakumaru and the Sampa Rengo became more intense. In September, Kakumaru fought with Sampa students at a meeting in Shimizudani Park near Akasaka in Tokyo. In October, Kakumaru next launched an attack by 250 of its members on a Zengakuren Reformation Meeting being held by Sampa Rengo students, invading Meiji University in order to stop it, and riot police were mobilized to cope with the disorder. Thus Kakumaru and Chukaku (as the leading faction in the Sampa Rengo) carried on their long-standing feud, even though they fought together at the Sunagawa Struggle in May, 1967, at Haneda on October 8th and November 12th, at Sasebo in January, 1968 and at Oji Camp Hospital from February. However, behind this united front, the old enmities were still alive. One dramatic incident occurred on the night of June 15, 1968, at a meeting of Citizen’s Anti-Vietnam War groups at Hibiya Park. This meeting had been sponsored by the Sampa Zengakuren and Kakumaru, but they disagreed over the procedure for conducting the meeting. First, an armed squad of Chukaku students occupied the stage, but the people who were attending the meeting asked them to get down and they did. They then withdrew from the main gathering and held an impromptu meeting of their own, whereupon the Kakumaru attacked them from outside and a wild melee resulted.

Again during the Tokyo University Struggle, Kakumaru took an active role in the Zenkyoto, occupying the library and leading the Literature Department struggle, but due to increasing friction with the other factions, including open warfare with the Hantei Gakuhyo at the Komaba campus, they didn’t take part in the
Yasuda Hall incident. With the onset of 1969, Kakumaru has consistently pursued a parallel course to the Zenkyoto groups, through the Okinawa Day fighting of April 28th and the anti-University Law protests which started in May. But in the beginning of September, more the 100 Kakumaru were arrested by the riot police at Waseda while occupying Okuma Auditorium in a confrontation with the Zenkyoto. This had quite a profound effect and partly because of this, they weren’t able to muster such a big effort for the Anti-war Day demonstrations on October 21st, and their fighting recently hasn’t been so well organized.

This dichotomy between the Kakumaru and Chukaku factions, who both grew out of the Kakukyodo Marugakudo mold, has continued and forms a fundamental part of Kakumaru’s thinking, which we will examine later on. The confrontation has also played a great part in the development of the Kakumaru character. This was summed up in a book published by the Mainichi newspaper’s Social Science Department which said: “If we can say that among the radical groups, the Chukaku are the peasants, single-mindedly charging through life, then the Kakumaru are sophisticated city-types with their stylish up-to-date ways and shrewd approach. They tend to act independently.” This criticism seems to be right in a sense, that is to say, the two groups are diametrically opposed (the ‘bull-fighting’ Chukaku versus the ‘cool’ Kakumaru) although they are both part of the Kakukyodo.

Takashima, chairman of the Waseda Literature Department Student Self-governing Association, in explaining their stand in 1968 said: “The difference in thought between the Sampa Zengakuren and the Kakumaru is that we think that the present conditions are not favorable for revolution. Such being the case, we first have to organize the workers who will be the main forces in the revolution. In this sense we are opposed to fighting for fighting’s sake. Of course, it is sometimes necessary to fight
in the streets using weapons such as sticks and stones, but it is a mistake to act in this way without it being part of a well thought out plan. Therefore, we are now organizing the students within the universities, emphasizing this more than the need for street actions. As a result we favor university strikes. The Sampa way of thinking is, in contrast, rather narrow."

The Kakumaru is unique amongst the Zengakuren factions for having its own political philosopher. He is Kuroda Kanichi, the Kakukyodo National Committee Chairman, and his writings form the basis for much of what Kakumaru believe. In an interview in a book on Zengakuren published in 1968, he was quoted as saying "the Sampa fighting is ineffectual, like fighting with a water-pistol. So, we will become the main force in the student movement. In 1970, we will lead the anti-Yoyogi students in the fight against Ampo."

The Kakumaru also criticize other groups for their attempts to work together. For example, on Okinawa Day in 1969, 5 factions came together and their slogans were 'Smash Ampo', 'Destroy Japanese Imperialism', 'Destroy the American Military Administration' and 'Remove All Bases', which were all summed up as part of the 'Victory of the Okinawa Struggle'. The Kakumaru position is that these slogans will lead to armed insurrection. The Chukaku, in particular, believe they can reproduce the same conditions as prevailed in Russia in 1905 just before the Russian Revolution, merely by increasing the scale of armaments. In reality, they will repeat the mistakes committed by the JCP in 1950.

Although there have been a few instances when the Kakumaru have allied themselves with other groups, these have been few and far between, as they tend to keep more to themselves. At Sasebo and in the Tokyo University Struggle, the Kakumaru were still critical of the Minsei and Sampa positions. Even when allied
with others, if it comes to the point that there is a scramble for power, they will fight their erstwhile allies. In 1968, the Kakumaru fought for several weeks with the Hantei Gakuhyo in the Tokyo University Liberal Arts Department at Komaba, even though they were allied at the time.

There are also differences in their recruiting methods. The Kakumaru place great emphasis on class discussions in school, while the Chukaku expect people to join in at the scene of activities or demonstrations. It is often said that of all the Zen-gakuren groups, the Kakumaru have the strongest arguments. This is in part due to the influence of Kuroda Kanichi. One of his favorite doctrines is called the theory of the formation of the main forces. He says, “The students must reform and change themselves into the main forces of revolution, in order to destroy imperialism and Stalinism. In this way, they can create a revolutionary student movement.”

In the Russian sense, these students are Trotskyists and they in turn are severely critical of the Soviet system saying it is a distortion of the peoples’ state and a proletarian dictatorship under Stalinism. The Kakumaru think that their duty is to expedite the struggle against imperialism, but at the same time they must also carry on a struggle against Stalinism which is holding back the proletarian revolution. Without the successful completion of the proletarian revolution, man cannot realize his own freedom and the liberation of mankind.

Specifically, they criticize Stalinism in the following respects: “In the past, the Stalinist bureaucrats have always suppressed the actions of the proletariat all over the world. Even today, the Stalinists refuse to set the people of the world free from the threat of all-out-war with their ‘balance of power’ policy. They are betraying the workers and are hiding the fact under programs for the reconstruction of society now being put forward by the Soviet
Presidium. This is nothing but a pale imitation of Marx-Leninism.” In this way the Kakumaru aim at world revolution, through anti-imperialism and anti-Stalinism. They think that without the destruction of Stalinism in the fight against imperialism, the working classes will never truly be free.

“Our (Kakumaru) struggle within the context of the proletarian world revolution is to destroy the power of the existing Japanese national authority and at the same time we must develop our struggle against Stalinism. The essential meaning of the latter struggle in Japan is to destroy the bureaucrats of the Japan Communist Party, who have been tainted by Stalinism, and to organize a new front line party that will bring together and crystallize the ranks of the revolutionary communists.

“The first thing which we must confirm is that Zengakuren is not the organization which leads directly to the attainment of revolution. Of course a popular movement developed by Zengakuren is armed with the theory of revolution and active students of Zengakuren should try to train themselves to be student-communists as well as to organize their movement. But a popular movement by Zengakuren does not directly result in revolution, and it also does not mean going forth with the particular intention of ‘breaking down Japanese imperialism’.

“We can say that such a way of thinking is based on the facile presumption that an escalation of the popular movement will lead to the realization of revolution. However, when we think of the problem of a proletarian revolution, the essential force is—needless to say—the working class, and without organizing this main force, we cannot think about the problem.

“The real problem is how to organize the workers as a class and how to realize that organization under the present difficult circumstances, with the workers under the control of the Socialist and Communist Parties.
“In order to resolve this problem, we must stay inside the worker’s struggle and resolve it from inside.

“However, there are many people with no views on the organization of the workers as a main force. They imagine the revolution without the organizing of the workers as a class. They think that the workers will automatically join them if they escalate the struggle and can thus accomplish their revolution. It is nonsense to think so and it is a fallacy to think that popular struggles result directly in revolution.

“Although we are developing our struggle militantly, we don’t believe that it will directly result in revolution. The set-up for the realization of revolution is first, the radical development of the workers’ movement and the organization of the proletariat as a class, and then through this, to develop the establishment of a progressive party.

“Throughout the course of these difficult struggles, we will greatly multiply the power of the organizations, and based on this, many of the conditions for revolution can be developed. Then through the progressive party, which will be based on the example of a soviet foundation, the revolutionary struggle will openly appear and it will become apparent that it will succeed. In this way, we will fight alongside the workers’ front, conducting on-the-spot fighting. This is our present task.”

This is the backbone of Kakumaru’s thinking and all other opinions are based on it. They hold very definite views on a wide range of subjects, of which the most important are the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the reversion of Okinawa and the university problem. We will examine each of these in turn.

a) The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

The Japanese government (i.e. the ruling classes) began to clarify its policy on the restoration of Okinawa, including the U.S. bases, and on the reformation of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty at the time of the Japan-U.S. talks which were held in the autumn of 1967. The substance of these talks can be summed up in two basic points:

1) Restoration of Okinawa, complete with nuclear bases, which will continue to function as a strategical anti-communist outpost for the U.S. in Asia.

2) The intention of reforming the Security Treaty is clearly seen as a clever trick which will result in the emasculation of the prior consultations clause. In other words, the ground will have been prepared for the re-militarization of Japan proper.

When the Security Treaty is applied to Okinawa, the area which relates to Japanese security, as prescribed in Article 5 of the present treaty will be extended to include all of Asia, as Okinawa already plays a vital role in ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), U.S.-Taiwan, U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Philippines Security Treaties. The Japanese Government is already preparing the public for such an extension of the area by setting the scenes with a campaign stressing the necessity of self-defense. From this, we can see that Okinawa will become a base for Japanese imperialism and those who concentrate on stressing the simple independence of Okinawa are talking rubbish and are oversimplifying what is really a large scale problem. The end-product will be that U.S. power is strengthened. The policy that the Japanese government now has with respect to the Okinawa problem means that they have already decided upon their policy regarding the Security Treaty in 1970. In 1970, there will be two problems presenting themselves concurrently and these are to be resolved in bilateral talks between the leaders of the two countries. It is the intention of the Japanese leaders to use the successful reversion of Okinawa as a means of directing public attention away from the more important and crucial decisions over the renewal of the Security Treaty. The resistance to such a
policy being conducted by the opposition parties has degenerated into a parliamentary version of anti-American racism, while we the Kakumaru, have started our struggle in the universities and factories with the following slogans: ‘Smash the Policy of Returning Okinawa complete with Nuclear Bases!’, ‘Remove the B-52s!', 'Abolish the Worker’s Coordination Bill!', 'Remove the Military Bases!' and ‘Smash Ampo ‘70 which Aims at Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Military Alliance!’

In the case of Zengakuren, we must analyze the theory of the student movement in order to develop the Ampo Struggle into an anti-government struggle, organizing the current struggle groups. In 1951, Japan was granted freedom according to international law in San Francisco, but at the same time, Japan was bound to a military alliance. This was agreed on between the American imperialists and the leaders of Japan, which had just been granted freedom on the condition of this Peace Treaty. So the abolition of Ampo means the end of the military alliance between two equal and independent countries. In the struggle against American imperialism, it’s the re-emergence of anti-American racism, which causes misunderstanding of the true nature of the problem.

b) Okinawa

We are just entering a period which will see a substantial revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Nowadays, the Okinawa problem which is bound up with the Security Treaty problem, has become an object of serious concern in Japan and in the world.

Okinawa has been ruled for more than 20 years by the American imperialists, since the signing of the San Francisco Treaty prescribed the renunciation of Okinawa by Japan. Now the machinery for the solution of the Okinawa problem is being prepared by the Japanese imperialists. That is, the reversion of Okinawa complete
with nuclear bases. The American imperialists are aiming at maintaining and strengthening their anti-communist strategy in Asia by ruling Okinawa. In this sense, Okinawa has been ruled as something like a branch office of the American imperialists. This is clearly shown by the fact that the High Commissioner has always been a soldier.

The American imperialists, as ring leaders of the capitalist bloc, which has been suffering from the Dollar and Pound crisis and failure in the Vietnam War, is determined to keep its military control of Okinawa as the key-stone of its anti-communist strategy in Asia, even though it has to request the Japanese imperialists to take over what it is doing in Asia militarily, politically and economically. The U.S. must change its strategy from a neutral retaliatory strategy to a flexible reactionary stance. Therefore, we must struggle with the Okinawa problem uniting it with the Ampo problem.

This is not because Okinawa is the real mainstay of the Security Treaty system, and not because the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which prescribed the separation of Okinawa from Japan proper, was concluded at the same time, but because the restoration of Okinawa with nuclear bases is a bourgeois solution and also, it was established by cooperation between the Japanese and American ruling classes as a necessary condition for the revision and strengthening of the Security Treaty alliance. The policy of the Japanese government, which foresees the restoration of Okinawa, admitting the use of nuclear bases, will necessarily bring about a nuclear-armed Japan, which means the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

We must expose such a bourgeois plot. In addition, we must show that the restoration of administrative control to Japan is a trick whereby the ruling classes benefit and not the Okinawan people. We should develop our struggle for setting the Okinawans
free through the abolition of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and in doing so, we must overcome the blind struggle between the existing left-wing and the anti-JCP factions.

c) The University Problem and the University Law

It is necessary to first analyze the tendency towards an overall reorganization of university education due to the changing emphasis in the industrial structure of postwar Japanese capitalism towards the heavy and chemical industries and also in the labor market, as brought about by changes in the class structure, then clarifying our strategy based on this analysis. For example we must set up the machinery to tackle the intrinsic problems, such as the problems of the students' autonomy, school expenses and accounting and the central question of the educational system and its content, with the view to improving the system. At the same time, we must develop our revolutionary struggle, overcoming the distortions brought about by the 'anarchistic anti-university' movement of the non-sect radicals and Zenkyo, and the 'campaign for the protection of democratic education' of the pro-JCP elements. Kakumaru and Zengakuren, in their confrontation with the Tokyo University authorities over the policy of self-regulation, helped develop the Tokyo University Struggle not only as a struggle against the reorganization of the labor markets as part of the reorganization of the industrial structure by such means as technical reform and rationalization, but also against the imperialistic reorganization of the university system and the concepts of education, and against the government's policies for the repression of our movement in 1970.

In addition, we are against the government control of the universities and against the strike-breaking tactics of the university authorities. At the same time, we will show that the JCP position is racist and revisionist and by doing so try to break down
the rapid growth of petit-bourgeoisism. Moreover, we will develop the fight using the struggle at Tokyo University’s Literature Department as a basis, and then expand the fight onto a larger scale. At first, we fought for the return of Tokyo University in agreement with the above propositions and also we have been fighting against the government’s policies at the same time on a nationwide scale.

We must destroy the reasoning that leads to joint actions by the factions, such as the Chukaku theory that ‘The campus equals an outpost from which to lead the destruction of Ampo and Japanese imperialism’ and the Shagakudo attitude that the ‘Base for the Ampo struggle equals the university commune’. We must show the true logic of the campus struggle and still develop the Security Treaty struggle for 1970. Furthermore, we also oppose the non-sect radicals and must bring about a reformation of Zenkyoto’s revolutionary ideas.

With regard to the University Control Bill, it goes without saying that since the university was created by the government and the ruling classes, it aims at the complete destruction of the campus struggle over education which found its focus in the famous indefinite strike at the Literature Department during the Tokyo University conflict. Not only this, but the government intends to change the university system back to the imperialist system. At the same time, the Law aims at stopping the current student struggle against Ampo and the Okinawa problem before it starts. Our struggle, at the present time, will fight to destroy the University Law by opposing the government and the Minister of Education and we will resolutely oppose all those, such as the university authorities and pro-JCP student groups, who favor the use of the riot police to break up the struggle without recourse to law and the courts, and in doing so, are unwittingly aiding the University Law, and who break down the barricades,
free through the abolition of Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and in doing so, we must overcome the blind struggle between the existing left-wing and the anti-JCP factions.
c) The University Problem and the University Law

It is necessary to first analyze the tendency towards an overall reorganization of university education due to the changing emphasis in the industrial structure of postwar Japanese capitalism towards the heavy and chemical industries and also in the labor market, as brought about by changes in the class structure, then clarifying our strategy based on this analysis. For example we must set up the machinery to tackle the intrinsic problems, such as the problems of the students' autonomy, school expenses and accounting and the central question of the educational system and its content, with the view to improving the system. At the same time, we must develop our revolutionary struggle, overcoming the distortions brought about by the 'anarchistic anti-university' movement of the non-sect radicals and Zenkyoto, and the 'campaign for the protection of democratic education' of the pro-JCP elements. Kakumaru and Zengakuren, in their confrontation with the Tokyo University authorities over the policy of self-regulation, helped develop the Tokyo University Struggle not only as a struggle against the reorganization of the labor markets as part of the reorganization of the industrial structure by such means as technical reform and rationalization, but also against the imperialistic reorganization of the university system and the concepts of education, and against the government's policies for the repression of our movement in 1970.

In addition, we are against the government control of the universities and against the strike-breaking tactics of the university authorities. At the same time, we will show that the JCP position is racist and revisionist and by doing so try to break down
the rapid growth of petit-bourgeoisism. Moreover, we will develop the fight using the struggle at Tokyo University’s Literature Department as a basis, and then expand the fight onto a larger scale. At first, we fought for the return of Tokyo University in agreement with the above propositions and also we have been fighting against the government’s policies at the same time on a nationwide scale.

We must destroy the reasoning that leads to joint actions by the factions, such as the Chukaku theory that ‘The campus equals an outpost from which to lead the destruction of Ampo and Japanese imperialism’ and the Shagakudo attitude that the ‘Base for the Ampo struggle equals the university commune’. We must show the true logic of the campus struggle and still develop the Security Treaty struggle for 1970. Furthermore, we also oppose the non-sect radicals and must bring about a reformation of Zenkyoto’s revolutionary ideas.

With regard to the University Control Bill, it goes without saying that since the university was created by the government and the ruling classes, it aims at the complete destruction of the campus struggle over education which found its focus in the famous indefinite strike at the Literature Department during the Tokyo University conflict. Not only this, but the government intends to change the university system back to the imperialist system. At the same time, the Law aims at stopping the current student struggle against Ampo and the Okinawa problem before it starts. Our struggle, at the present time, will fight to destroy the University Law by opposing the government and the Minister of Education and we will resolutely oppose all those, such as the university authorities and pro-JCP student groups, who favor the use of the riot police to break up the struggle without recourse to law and the courts, and in doing so, are unwittingly aiding the University Law, and who break down the barricades,
in conformity with the reactionary policies of the JCP, thus permitting classes to start again. This struggle for us also means the complete destruction of the petit-bourgeois education struggle, which is merely an attempt to escape the from the decisive battle and this means that we must establish a new base for the struggle in the proletarian masses. We must realize that we can't succeed in changing any of these things without fighting and we think that we must develop our fight in order to make our position more secure when dealing with the problems of control of the student self-governing movement and the reformation of the University Law, and we must pursue these aims actively.

**The Student Sub-culture**

In the preceding pages we have seen how the Kakumaru mind works but it is not this aspect which actually has the greatest impact on the popular attitudes towards the students. It is the trappings of the student activist that have captured the imagination. The life-style of the students has become a sub-culture within postwar Japanese society. This is manifested in the helmets worn by the students and in the zig-zag demonstrations; the barricades and Molotov cocktails. So pervasive is this image of the student activist that when the middle-of-the-road Soka Gakkai students formed their own organization, they too sported brand new white helmets with the name Shingakudo painted in red on the front.

The standard accoutrement of the anti-Yoyogi students are helmets, face masks and long wooden staves. The most important of these are the helmets. Originally brought into use in 1967, at the time of the Haneda Airport Struggles to stop Prime Minister Sato from leaving to visit S.E. Asia, the helmets were simply a protective device for the members of the militant Sampa Rengo. However, they quickly took on a new significance as each group adopted their use and took a suitable color for identification.
purposes. The main colors were for the Kakukyodo groups (Kakumaru and Chukaku) white, Shagakudo red and Shaseido blue. Later on, other factions such as Minsei and the Front chose to identify themselves with yellow and green respectively, while the factionless students who made up the Nihon University Zenkyoto wear silver or black helmets. Each helmet is painted with the name of the group, or in the case of Zenkyoto the name of the university or department, and often the group slogan is added too. In the case of Kakumaru, the front of the helmet has a large letter ‘Z’ signifying Zengakuren and Kakumaru is written on the side. The favorite Kakumaru slogan is sometimes added—‘Hantei Hansuta?’—which means ‘Anti-imperialism, Anti-Stalinism’. The helmet is white, the writing in black with harsh jagged strokes and around the bottom edge is a red line. Most helmets are bought at construction worker’s outfitters and are made of plastic, and though quite cheap, they don’t afford the wearer complete protection. However, the overall aesthetic is most satisfactory.

The face masks on the other hand are very useful. These are small towels which when soaked in water and wrapped around the face help to counteract the effects of tear gas fumes. At the same time, the towel, which is tucked into the straps of the helmet, helps to protect the wearer’s identity from the police.

The wooden poles that the students carry are about 2 meters in length. Any shorter or longer and they become ineffective. The police, in contrast, use short truncheons because they have to carry their large protective shields too. These poles have a special name, ‘gebabo’. Most of the radical students have very little experience in using wooden swords or playing kendo, but they can still produce quite a lot of damage with one. It is interesting to note that while the radicals use the gebabo made of rough building timber, it is usually the right-wing student activists who wield the traditional Japanese swords or kendo sticks, (one nota-
ble exception was the Sekigun hijacking of a JAL airliner to North Korea in April, 1970, when the students carried short swords as well as bombs). The importance of the gebabo is as much psychological as anything else and one student put it this way 'When you face the struggle unarmed, you feel weak, but with a gebabo in your hands, you become strong'.

With the emergence of the new image of the student fighters, the student movement truly became a subculture within modern Japanese society. Not only did the students have a distinctive style, but now they had developed an appearance to match. It is significant that the new image was one deeply rooted in Japanese tradition as well. The parallel between the gebabo and a samurai sword is obvious, but the helmet too has a proud place in Japanese culture. The helmet has always been a symbol of virility, and as such, is still given to a baby hoy on his first birthday. When the Sampa Rengo first embarked upon their violent course armed with gebabo and wearing helmets, the press reacted with condemnations of their activities, but in time the new phase became accepted by everyone. In fact, when the Zenkyoto struggle at Tokyo University precipitated the siege of Yasuda Hall, many commentators compared the students with the Byakkotai, a famous group of rebel samurai who wore white kimono and fought against the Meiji government in a castle in Northern Honshu. This historical battle was the last throes of a dying class, for in the end they all committed suicide by hara-kiri, and the incident became one of the dramatic events in Japanese history. To compare the Zenkyoto with them was, in its way, a measure of the degree to which Japan accepts the student revolutionaries as one of the facts of modern life.

The development of Zengakuren into a subculture has taken a period of nearly 20 years since its first inception. The original mood of the students in the late nineteen-fifties was one of anger
at the militarists who had led Japan to war. Their attitude for the future was one of optimism and they happily joined with other progressive forces, accepting the leadership of the JCP, in their search for democracy. By 1960, this had changed. Not only were the students now disillusioned with parliamentary democracy and the government, but now the beginnings of doubt about the established left-wing were setting in. When we come to the present period, it is obvious that most of the student groups are completely fed up with the JCP and the Socialist Party and have cut their ties with them almost completely, seeking instead to make their own movement. Only when the student movement became independent, did the new subculture begin to flower.

The peak of popular interest in the student revolutionaries was reached shortly after the climax of the Tokyo University Struggle. This struggle had brought the whole world of the radical students forward into the limelight and it was swiftly incorporated by the mass media. Soon there were advertisements using films of students demonstrations; student activists appeared as characters in comedy shows and family serials, there were cartoons by the dozen and stories in children’s comics. In one comic magazine, there is a regular feature was entitled ‘Zenpakaren’ which translates as the ‘National Federation of Fools’. These, of course, were in addition to wide coverage being given in the daily press, weekly magazines, television and radio, which dealt with the factual side. Perhaps the most interesting facet of this boom was the impact of the new words coined by the students on the Japanese language.

The most important words in this new lexicon were ‘geba’, ‘demo’, ‘suto’, ‘aji’, ‘barikedo’ and ‘shupurehikoru’. Nearly all of these words are the short renderings of some foreign loan word which has been incorporated into Japanese. Central to the whole anti-Yoyogi movement is the word ‘geba’. It derives from
the German word 'gewalt', which is pronounced 'gebaruto' in Japanese, and means power, authority or violence as is associated with an act of God. In the student meaning, it is divine violence in the revolutionary struggle. There are many other words which stem from it. There is a verb 'gebaru', to make revolutionary violence, and the 'gebabo', which we introduced already, which is a geba-stick. Internal fighting between factions within the campus is called 'inner-geba' or 'uchigeba' while street fighting with the police is 'outer-geba' or 'sotogeba'. This word caught the public fancy so much that a new television comedy program, which started in 1969, was called 'Geba Geba'. 'Demo' is the short form for demonstration, 'aji' for agitate and both of these can become verbs by adding '-ru' to them. 'Suto' comes from the English strike and there is also a compound word 'hansuto' which means a hunger strike. 'Barikedo' is quite simply barricade and cannot be shortened any more. There was a television joke going round which had a conversation between two foreigners visiting Japan. The first said "What is the Japanese for 'desk'?", the other replied "Barikedo". The last word in our list is 'shupurehikoru' which is the German word sprechchor, which means an announcer or speaking chorus. This word originated in the Russian practice of having political talks given by a group of people and has now come to be associated with the pep-talks that group leaders give to the students during demonstrations. The 'shupurehikoru' is usually made with the aid of a hand-held battery powered megaphone. If an impromptu meeting is held with a large number of people, then the microphones of many megaphones are placed in front of the one the speaker is using to get better amplification all round.

With this upsurge in popular interest in the student movement, a few of the student groups tried to cash in. Most notable was the Nihon University Zenkyoto who have very little money, and so
they produced their own book of photographs and two films of their struggle. Of course, the factions continued to pour out a steady stream of the regular literature, but there were also new efforts as well. Beheiren started a new fortnightly magazine called Ampo which, while being a propaganda vehicle, also aims to be entertaining which is quite different from usual. Noting this, the advance literature on the Security Treaty struggle in 1970 includes at least two books of comics, written and drawn by popular cartoonists. There are countless poems and new songs of protest being made available. However, such is the censorship of the Japanese pop music and entertainment world, none of these will reach a very wide audience. It is interesting to note also, that whereas there have been many books published in Japanese on the student movement, articles in newspapers and magazines, programs on television and radio, no one has yet tried to make a full-length feature film for the popular cinema. It seems there just aren't any more Kurosawa's.

The one thing that still attracts the most attention is the street demonstration. If this degenerates into a fight, then the focus of the television cameras is assured. Demonstrations can take many forms from the orderly marches of the left-wing parties to the violent street battles of the anti-Yoyogi students. Especially popular with the latter is the zig-zag demonstration. The students link arms and form a solid mass, which may be four or five people wide and as long as possible. Those in front make the formation by holding onto a flagpole or a gebabo. The squad leader runs in front blowing a whistle, and conducting the whole group like an orchestra leader with energetic gestures and blasts on the whistle. Two quick blasts spaced with pauses of equal length set up the rhythm for jogging. The students take up a chant which is based on one of their slogans. The most popular are 'Ampo Funsai' (Smash the security treaty!) and 'Toso Shorii'
(Victory to the Struggle!) amongst the anti-Yoyogi students. Also heard is the blood-thirsty cry of 'Minsei Korose' (Kill the Minsei!). These chants fit into the rhythm of the demonstrations and follow a pattern laid down in ancient festivals found all over Japan. The traditional chant is 'Wasshoi, Wasshoi' and is used in many instances, including running, training for judo groups, and other athletic pursuits. It is a familiar rhythm for most Japanese and has an almost mesmeric effect upon the marchers. Merged into one group and surrendering all sense of identity and responsibility, the students can now carry on for a long time. The zig-zag demonstration is also called snake-dancing because the line sways to-and-fro covering the whole street or area, hitting against obstacles and blocking the way. The snake dance usually is aimed at the attendant riot police and they react at once if a peaceful demonstration shows signs of becoming a wild one. If the number of police is sufficient, then the students can be sandwiched into submission. Other types of demonstrations include sit-down strikes (suwari-komi) and 'French style' demonstrations in which the marchers walk abreast down the middle of a street completely shutting the road to traffic. It is odd that although the students place great emphasis on violence, the worst damage to be expected is broken windows and burnt-out vehicles. The police naturally suffer the greatest injuries and unless there is a clash with the police, student activities do not hurt people outside the university campus. For example, in spite of the proliferation of molotov cocktails and bombs, the only case when houses or shops were burnt was in police raid on Waseda University when shops surrounding the 2nd Student Hall were hit. Of course, all demonstrations are accompanied by a widespread disruption of normal affairs.

The nearest equivalent to the demonstration in the campus struggles are confrontations with the university authorities in
mass-bargaining sessions (taishu danko). These are the occasions when the students put their demands and voice their discontents to the president and his administration in front thousands of their fellows. This is quite an ordeal for most professors, who must put up with insults from the audience, bullying from the student representatives who may snatch away the microphone before a professor finishes speaking and other indignities such as self-criticism that they are scarcely well prepared to undergo. One professor called it ‘a furnace in the fire of purity, which each professor must pass through in order to burn out his consciousness of prestige and become a humble human being’. When Dean Hayashi was confined in the Literature Department at Tokyo University by the Kakumaru-led Zenkyoto students, he endured 170 hours of grilling. The professors who suffer most, understandably, are those who have been in the communist or socialist mold all along, and cannot adjust to the new generation of student-activists. It has been estimated that at universities with campus disputes, between 4 and 7% of the professors have developed neuroses. At least 4 professors have committed suicide as a result of the turmoil on campus while others are suffering from insomnia, acute depression, anxiety and stomach pains. However, the mass-bargaining session is, for the students, one sure way to see the results before their eyes and get the administration to face them. This type of meeting holds great interest for them and can be sure to attract a large number of otherwise uncommitted students. Normal student meetings, on the other hand, require tremendous stamina on the part of the students who frequently go to sleep rather than listen to their leaders make the same speeches again and again. During the Nihon University struggle, the mass-bargaining sessions with the university administration were attended by about 10,000 students both inside and listening by loudspeaker outside the hall they were held in.
During the last few years, there have been numerous instances of ordinary students becoming radicalized by the situation on campus as well as off, but still the main membership of the student movement is composed of those who belong to the Zengakuren factions. The student leaders are generally from left-wing families or on occasion they may have quite rich parents. In the former case, the parents often support their children's activities but in the latter, involvement in the student movement may result in being disowned by the family. The rank-and-file members, however, usually come from rural areas of Japan, so they live in university dormitories or apartments and can be easily organized. They are frequently poorer than other students and are extremely radical in outlook. It is often found that the 1st and 2nd year students are more active as they are further from the point of seeking suitable employment, but the Tokyo University Zenkyoto was originally formed almost solely by graduate students. Other students who have fewer responsibilities, and thus are very active, are high school students and they make up a surprising proportion of the Sekigun membership. It often happens, that the fact of a student's participation in a Zengakuren faction is kept from the parents, and in fact some Sekigun mothers hadn't even heard of the existence of Sekigun. Most factions have well developed financial and legal resources so that when members are arrested, the faction is able to get most of them out of prison on bail rather quickly. However, in the case of the Zenkyoto activists who have no affiliation to established political organizations, if the parents have no money, then the arrested students may stay in jail for months. This is especially true with respect to the Nihon University Zenkyoto, who are supported by a parents and friends association. However, the efforts by this supporter's group are still not enough, as 15 of the leaders of the Nihon University
Zenkyoto, including the chairman Akita, are still in prison after more than a year and bail of more than 2 million yen (about $6,000) has yet to be met.

The financial arrangements of most factions remain a closely guarded secret, although it is possible to find out quite a bit about the sources. Basically, each group when it gets control of a student self-governing association, also becomes the repository for the fees paid by the student members. These are collected along with the tuition fees by the university and are then handed over to the self-governing committee. In some cases, these funds are frozen by the authorities when there is a dispute over control of student facilities such as at Chuo University, when rivalry erupted between the Shagakudo and Minsei students for control of the student center. The amount paid by each student varies, but averages out to about ¥2,000 or $5.55 each. When the number of student members is far larger than the actual number of active members (for the Kakumaru the ratio is about 25:1) then this amount becomes quite significant. Of course, a limited source of money is derived from the sales of publications, but this is usually very small, considering the circulation of most is almost entirely among members themselves. Another standard way of raising money is by taking collections, such as outside the larger stations in Tokyo. Each faction, it seems, has one of the stations as its particular territory. The most prominent among them are Chukaku and the ML Factions who are always busy outside Shibuya, Shinagawa and Ikebukuro stations on the Tokyo Loop Railway. Tokyo Station itself, however, is covered by extreme right-wing groups. This method of collecting money is called 'kampa', the name coming from the English word campaign, which in this case is a fund-raising campaign.

In addition to these sources, which are freely admitted, there are the unofficial contributions received from private individuals.
and organizations. The police are very active in trying to trace such sources and have reported that the anti-Yoyogi students have received money indirectly from the Socialist Party and the Japan-China Friendship Association. During the 1960 period, the Zengakuren Mainstream was supported to the tune of 5 million yen by a wealthy businessman, Tanaka Seigen. He was a member of the Shinjinkai at Tokyo University in the nineteen-twenties and had belonged to the prewar JCP, but after the war, he became very wealthy and took up an eccentric anti-JCP stance. It was his opposition to the JCP, that led him to turn his admiration for Karouji and the other Mainstream leaders into financial terms. During 1968, the police revealed their estimates that the Sampa Rengo needed to have a fund of ¥30 million to cover their activities at that time, while the actual contributions from the student self-governing associations they controlled came to a mere ¥3,600,000. However, we have already seen that it was possible for the Sampa students, on one occasion at Sasebo in January, 1968, to raise more than ¥1 million in one day’s ‘kampa’. One of the interesting factors which surround the breakaway extremist group of Sekigun, which was formed in 1969, is that it is surprisingly affluent for such a small group and quite rich by Zengakuren standards. The leader of Red Army, Shiomi, when he was arrested in late December, 1969, had more than ¥100,000 on his person. It has since been found out that one major source of Sekigun money was from university professors at colleges in the Tokyo area. The professors gave sums of up to ¥40,000 at several private universities which included Waseda, Chuo and Meiji. The question of money is quite important to the success or failure of student strikes and in running demonstrations. The traditional left-wing parties are not above paying the expenses of demonstrators who come to Tokyo from outlying districts, so it must
apply just as well to the student groups. Somebody must have paid for the materials and food needed in, for example, the siege of Tokyo University's Yasuda Hall. However, this is one of the unknown factors remaining in the running of the student movement. Only one source that hasn't yet been tapped is left, and that was noted by the Sekigun, who propose to rob banks if need be.

Many people unacquainted with the Japanese student movement, still regard it as a product of the 'student power' movement in other countries, such as the U.S., though this is patently untrue. In fact, the Zengakuren was formed in 1948, some twelve years before the formation of the American equivalent, Students for Democratic Society, which was started in June, 1960. However, there has been considerable cross-fertilization in ideas and tactics. For example, the Shagakudo, who like to fight in the Kanda area of Tokyo, have been strongly influenced by the French students' Latin Quarter style of street fighting and are always trying to emulate this with street barricades and liberated areas to get the ordinary citizens involved too. In France, on the other hand, there were instances when the students armed themselves with sticks (like 'gebabo') and tried snake-dance demonstrations, although these may not have been so successful. The helmet too has now been taken up by the militant Weatherman faction of the American SDS and made its appearance at the 'Days of Rage' riots in Chicago in 1969. However, the escalation of armaments in Japan and the U.S. have taken different courses, with the emphasis on bombs and guns remaining only as rhetoric in Japan, while in the U.S., these weapons are already in use. When Beatle John Lennon and his Japanese wife Yoko Ono sent their Christmas message of peace to the world in December, 1969, it was sent to Beheiren in Japan to incorporate in their New Year demonstrations.
After a student activist leaves university and finds work, usually a change sets in and he leaves his past behind, becoming a respectable employee and an upstanding member of society. This has always been a point of ridicule harped on by the detractors but the signs are that conditions are changing. In the past, any student leader who was sincere in his political beliefs had few openings, other than to join the parent body of his faction’s organization or become a writer or a critic, but now the commercial world has started actively seeking activists as its future employees. A spate of advertisements in the Japanese press, asking for ‘beast-like men’ and ‘aggressive students dissatisfied with the present set-up’, which were aimed at the current crop of student leaders, appeared in the summer of 1969. Most of the companies who want to recruit activists are trading companies, who are on the look-out for aggressive students to be their salesmen. This, of course, is doubly annoying to the peaceful and non-political students, because one of the reasons they were reluctant to join the campus struggles has been that they were afraid to prejudice their chances of a good job and now it was all in vain.

In this discussion of the activities of the students and their factions, the sub-culture and its offshoots, it only remains to make one more point, and that is how the students find time to follow their studies too. The answer is that in Japan, the actual amount of studying done by students at university is very small. The big hurdle that every student has to vault is the intensive system of university entrance examinations, which he has to take separately for every university he wishes to enter. Once this is over, he can relax and enjoy university life for the duration of his stay at college. Most students in fact spend perhaps as much time playing mahjong or tennis as they do studying and it is this atmosphere that breeds the student revolutionaries of
Zengakuren. Even though the number of radicals is only a small percentage of the total student enrollment, this is why they can control the student organizations so easily, and when a strike is called the ordinary uninvolved students welcome the opportunity for more holidays.

This has been a portrait of the Kakumaru as a typical student faction and the subculture that it is part of. Further developments are to be expected in the near future and we can be sure that the students of Zengakuren will play an important role in them. The immediate question of course is the imminent renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty scheduled for 1970, and from now on, all eyes will be focussed on this event.
Chapter 7: The Future...?

The 1970 season opened with the dramatic sky-jacking of a Japan Air Lines jet liner by 9 members of the Sekigun Faction. Since its inception in September, 1969, the Red Army group has been the object of numerous raids and sweeping arrests by the Japanese police, which has resulted in the imprisonment of about 200 of its members, including the Chairman Shiomi. A dragnet was still out for other members of the Sekigun executive committee, so they planned to escape from the country. The characteristic touch that the Sekigun has added to the Japanese student movement was their manufacture of steel pipe bombs for use at the time of Sato's departure for America on November 17, 1969. The Sekigun had also put forward a plan for worldwide revolution (including overthrow of such Socialist states as China and Russia) and had hoped to develop connections with revolutionaries in America, Cuba and North Korea. However, due to police pressure, they had little room to maneuver and decided to hi-jack an internal JAL flight to North Korea.

They made all the arrangements carefully, even going so far as to switch reservations and have their flight tickets bought by several people at different places as precautionary measures. The flight decided on was the JAL flight from Tokyo to Fukuoka in Kyushu on the morning of March 31st. The leader of the Sekigun band was Tamiya Takamaro, 27 years old, who had graduated from the Economics Department of Osaka Municipal College in March, 1967, and had become the de facto leader of the Sekigun political and revolutionary organization after the Chairman, Shiomi, was jailed. On the question of how to persuade the pilot to follow their demands they decided that if he was a
Foreign pilot, then it would be sufficient to threaten him with a pistol, but it was the Japanese pilots that they were wary of. The problem of the latter was that many had served in the Japanese Imperial Air Force during the war and would put up a struggle if threatened, so it was decided that they would threaten the lives of the passengers instead. As code names for the members of the group, they chose to call each other by the names of Tokyo railway stations, with Tamiya going as Shibuya.

On the morning of the 31st, all went according to plan and as the JAL jet ‘Yodo’ was in the air over Nagoya the hijackers made their move. Unsheathing short swords and displaying pipe bombs, they forced their way into the pilot’s cockpit and demanded to be flown to Pyongyang. Informed that they would have to land at Fukuoka to refuel first, the Sekigun agreed and proceeded to produce over 200 pieces of rope and vinyl cord with which to tie up the 122 passengers, excepting the women and children. By the time the plane had arrived at Fukuoka Airport, the event was world news and was being covered on live television broadcasts direct from the spot.

It was still not known for sure if the skyjackers were from the Red Army faction or not, but arrangements were speedily made to let the plane leave for North Korea the same day. Relenting enough to let 23 passengers, mostly women and children, disembark, the Sekigun didn’t sway in their resolve to fly on. The scene of the passengers filing down the gangway past a student guard brandishing his sword flashed round the world and the incident became known as the ‘Samurai sky-jack’ in the world’s press.

After the plane was refuelled, it took off from Fukuoka Airport at 2 p.m. and headed northwards escorted by fighter planes of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces. It reached the eastern part of the South Korean coast at about 2.30 p.m. and the
escort was changed to several F-5A fighters of the South Korean Air Force as they flew on at about 30 miles from the coast. As the plane neared the 38th parallel it changed course to fly along the boundary line between the North and South. The captain of the ‘Yodo’, Ishida Shinji, had only a high school map to guide him, but he turned the plane to the north and entered North Korean airspace. What happened at this point is still not quite certain, but suddenly the plane changed course again and flew to the west. At this point two jet fighters approached and signalled the plane to land announcing ‘This is Pyongyang’ on the frequency used by Pyongyang. The plane approached the airport which was signalling and landed, but it turned out to be Kimpo Airport at Seoul, South Korea.

The trick was quickly discovered by the Sekigun students and they were very angry, but by now there was little chance that they would be able to leave for Pyongyang that day, so with threats to blow the plane up along with its crew and remaining 99 passengers, they settled in for the night. In the meantime, the Japanese and South Korean governments were getting in the act. The Japanese Foreign Minister knew nothing of the trick until a television broadcast announced the plane was at Kimpo. The whole ruse seems to have been concocted by JAL, the U.S. 5th Air Force, the South Korean Air Force and Kimpo Airport Control Tower, without consultation with the Japanese Government. However, the problem now was in the hands of the South Koreans, whose trick to camouflage Kimpo Airport with trick signs and disguised airport guards had failed, and were now trying to get the hijackers to give up the passengers before they would refuel the plane and let it fly to the North. Still the Sekigun were adamant. The morning of April 1st dawned with calm weather and flying conditions were excellent, but the ‘Yodo’ sat on the tarmac at one end of Kimpo Airport without moving

— 228 —
more than a few yards.

The position became frozen with neither the South Koreans or the Sekigun budging an inch. This carried on until the evening of Wednesday, April 1st, when the Japanese Transport Minister Hashimoto Tomisaburo arrived in person to try to persuade the students to give up. All this occurred while the occupants of the plane went without food. Finally at 10 in the evening, sandwiches were brought for the passengers, but the Sekigun stoically refused to eat.

The drama continued and the hijacked plane sat at Kimpo Airport all through April 2nd, while the interminable negotiations went on. At last, the impasse was broken on the morning of April 3rd when Yamamura Shinjiro, the Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Transport, volunteered to replace the passengers as a hostage so that the plane could continue on to Pyongyang. The Sekigun students were still suspicious. Before agreeing to the new arrangement, they wanted a Socialist Party Member of the House of Representatives, Abe Sukeya, to be present in order to identify Yamamura. There was yet another delay as word was sent to Japan to fetch Mr. Abe. Finally, the scene was set for the exchange of hostages, and they filed out of the airplane after 79 hours of captivity into the waiting ambulances. Fortunately, all of them were well in spite of their ordeal and they were quickly flown back to Japan.

The JAL plane ‘Yodo’ left Kimpo Airport finally at 6.00 p.m. April 3rd, with its new complement of 3 crewmen, 9 hijackers and 1 hostage. The plane landed at Pyongyang at about 7:20 the same evening and the incident was all but over. Only the return of the plane, its crew and Mr. Yamamura remained and they were allowed to return to Japan on Sunday, April 5th.

It is perhaps appropriate that Japan’s first skyjack was carried out by extremists from the ranks of Zengakuren, in the important

— 229 —
year of 1970. The 84 hours the Sekigun spent in their captured plane was not only the longest hijack on record, but also it served as a dramatic opener for the year of the Security Treaty renewal. The actual fate of the Sekigun students in North Korea is still doubt for though they wanted to go to Pyongyang, it is thought that this was only an emergency escape route and the North Korean authorities certainly were not expecting them. Also, Sekigun theory is very Trotskyist and with Pyongyang on good terms with the JCP, they have been criticizing Japanese Trotskyism for the past 4 years. While the North Korean authorities are not about to hand the students back to Japan, they probably are not very welcome and steps may be taken to have them go on to some other country such as Cuba as soon as possible.

In the meantime, the skyjacking incident threw the other anti-Yoyogi factions into confusion. It occurred at just the time when all the groups were holding their meetings to decide policy for the coming Spring term and to plan their recruiting drives for the new students. The general tendency had been to avoid trouble with the police and thereby recoup their numbers which had been sorely affected by the arrests during the October-November period of 1969. However, the Sekigun hijack was so dramatic that it immediately started a debate among the members of the more warlike factions as the mood for more 'gewalt' spread. The Chukaku was affected most of all by this mood and stated their open admiration for the Sekigun act. The ML faction were a little more reserved in their reaction, but declared that they too would be ready to do the same thing if necessary. The dissenting voice was from the Kakumaru who dismissed the incident as simply a criminal act with no other meaning whatsoever. Whether this resurgence to the call for violence will affect the Okinawa Day demonstrations set for April 28th remains to be seen. Certainly, we can now expect some of the
factions to attempt something really spectacular during the Security Treaty struggles in the summer, if only to outdo the Red Army.

As to the general attitudes and planned strategy towards opposition to the renewal of the Security Treaty, most of the groups have already made their positions known. Foremost in advocating a peaceful and democratic way are, of course, the Minsei. They state that Ampo should be abolished through a mass movement, which will urge the government to send notice of the termination of the Security Treaty to the U.S. However, due to the fact that Ampo is a military pact which helps the U.S. policy of aggression in Asia, and is also a necessary means whereby the Japanese exploiting classes can invade South East Asia economically, it is obvious that the continuation of Ampo means the maintenance of Japanese and American imperialist power and influence in Asia. The Minsei, therefore, are striving for the abolition of the Security Treaty and their strategy is in line with the JCP’s policy of a 2-step revolution. In other words, they will promote their movement by lawful means.

According to public opinion polls conducted by the JCP, 60% of the Japanese population are against the Security Treaty. Therefore, the Minsei plan to politicize these people in support of their movement, and by pointing out the risks attached to the Security Treaty, will try to influence the remainder, eventually concentrating all these forces against Ampo.

First, they intend to collect the signatures of those in opposition to Ampo, and through this, they will press the government to abolish the Security Treaty. In order to expose the nature of Ampo and show the risks involved to the uncommitted people, they will keep up their democratic movement against American bases, such as was done at the U.S. Camp Hospital in Oji and in the fight against the nuclear aircraft carrier ‘Enterprise’ at
Sasebo, when it is clear that these installations are instrumental in aiding the U.S. policy of aggression towards Asia. Through these means, they hope to concentrate all opposition to the Security Treaty, but at the same time they intend to remove all obstacles standing in the way of a democratic united front against Ampo. The Minsei believe that only by creating a strong and united front can the people concentrate all their energy in overthrowing the Security Treaty.

However, the students who belong to anti-Yoyogi factions hold more extreme attitudes. For example, the Chukaku regard the 1970 Anti-Ampo struggle as a focal point in the class war in Japan which must become the breakthrough point at which to destroy Japanese imperialism and establish a proletarian dictatorship. Under the present circumstances, the Security Treaty is a pre-condition for the existence of both U.S. and Japanese imperialism. But U.S. imperialism is at present facing a fatal crisis in Asia with the failure of its Vietnam policy and the increasing nationalism of Asia countries, and this crisis threatens the existence of Japanese imperialism, which is closely involved too. Therefore, Japanese imperialism must co-operate as the U.S. conducts its withdrawal tactics, and as a concrete measure this will entail the strengthening of the Security Treaty in order that, in the future, Japanese imperialism can take over the American role in Asia. This will also satisfy the desires of the Japanese imperialists who wish to continue their economic invasion of Asia. Therefore, the fighters of Chukaku intend to “smash” such intentions. Winning this struggle against Ampo means the destruction of the fundamental condition that enables U.S. and Japanese imperialism to exist side-by-side.

The Chukaku look upon the street struggle as their best tactic and have consistently pursued this type of struggle from the time of the Sunagawa struggle until the present day, in spite of
the criticisms of "the Minsei opportunists." They repeatedly confirm their stand that the street struggle is the most universal way to achieve revolution along with the strike and blockade tactics of the working class. The street struggle has one very good point and it is that they can involve many workers in the struggle at the same time and can fight in joint actions against the central power of the government, with such workers' groups as the Hansen Seinen Iinkai.

The government has resorted to increasing the strength of the riot police in order to suppress the university struggle and the anti-Ampo struggle, so in order to cope with this the Chukaku have elected to follow the old Biblical adage 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for the tooth!'. They declare that they must smash the riot police; not just a small part of it, but if possible, all of it. If they fail to smash the riot police then the masses will not follow their struggle. The reason is that without confidence in winning the struggle, the masses will not participate. Therefore, the Chukaku claim that if they are successful in destroying the riot police, then the people will gain confidence and will join the struggle.

As we have already seen in Chapter 6, the Kakumaru take the attitude that the government is trying to confuse the issue of the Security Treaty by placing emphasis on the reversion of Okinawa. They see the Okinawa question as being only part of the greater problem of a resurgence of militarism in Japan. The Kakumaru feel that the present opposition plans being made by the parliamentary left-wing parties are degenerating into anti-American racism which is a distortion of the worst kind. Therefore, the Kakumaru intend to use the Zengakuren student movement as means to develop the struggle against the Security Treaty into an anti-government struggle by organizing the present struggle groups. They visualize themselves leading the student struggle against Ampo in the summer of 1970.
The Shagakudo Unity Faction has quite a detailed analysis of the situation surrounding the Security Treaty problem. They state that as the U.S. has, since the dollar crisis of 1968, been suffering a loss of prosperity due to the immense amounts of money that had been spent propping up the economies of such countries as Japan and Germany after the war, in order to stop the spread of communism and to establish stable capitalist governments in those countries. The new state of affairs that came about when both these countries made rapid progress in the reconstruction of their economies, was that they aimed at sharing the world market with American imperialism, and for that purpose, Japan entered into the Security Treaty with the U.S. Under the Ampo system, Japanese imperialism demands the right to divide the Asian market with American imperialism. Therefore, the Shagakudo will ruin this mischief-making by Japanese imperialism by winning the struggle against the Security Treaty and smashing the basic condition whereby Japanese imperialism can exist.

If they are successful in producing the abolition of the Security Treaty, then this may be a stepping-stone on the road to smashing Japanese and American imperialism and to world revolution.

Shagakudo, therefore, place great stress upon armed struggle as the way to acquire the central power of government and are now putting emphasis on strategically planned mass strikes. The term that Shagakudo are fond of using in this context is 'Massen Strike', which envisages bringing about civil war by the following steps: 1) to maintain the struggle against centralized power by using the university campuses as their bases, and 2) getting the laborers, farmers and citizens to go on strike on such a scale that it will lead to civil war. Through the mass strike, they will secure strategic military bases and will be able to promote on-the-spot street struggles. By aiming at the establishment of a regular army,
the Shagakudo must conduct guerrilla activities and campaign so as to create a critical situation in the political sphere. In this way, it will be possible to start a successful and continuous revolutionary movement.

However, in order to accomplish this and finally win the revolution, it is impossible for just one group to succeed, so they must unite all elements and make a united front against common problems such as the Security Treaty. For this purpose, they have joined in the formation of the National Zenkyoto which is a united front encompassing 8 different groups.

The attitude of the Sekigun faction, which was created out of Shagakudo in the second half of 1969, is basically the same. They want to overthrow the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in order to destroy Japanese and American imperialism, and cause a world revolution which will emancipate the suppressed peoples of the world. Since their aim is worldwide revolution, they feel that the proletariat in both Japan and the U.S. should rise up against the Security Treaty system. By building up co-operation between the left-wing in both countries they propose to cause a street war in both Chicago and Tokyo at the same time.

Shagakudo, in both its manifestations, has always been one of the most radical in its street actions, even equalling Chukaku. But the upshot of all their activities in 1969 was to severely weaken their strength with large numbers getting arrested and they may be a little more subdued this year.

Finally, there is the Hantei Gakuhyo, who regard the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1970 as an opportunity for Japanese and American imperialism to strengthen their bases both politically and economically through the reorganization of the treaty and adjust to the changes in the world market. This reorganization is detrimental to the realization of a proletarian revolution because
by using it, the Japanese imperialists intend to change the Japanese social structure back to being imperialistic. By the anti-Ampo struggle, the students must abolish the Security Treaty and thereby hold their own against the imperialistic reorganization of the Japanese social structure. Moreover, by concentrating the workers’ power, they intend to ‘smash’ imperialism and bring about a proletarian revolution.

In their strategy, the Hantei Gakuhyo see the necessity of staging street struggles, but their main effort will be directed towards making the laborers’ struggle change into a revolutionary fight. They also propose a general strike in concert with these laborers as the way to fight against the Security Treaty.

The main forces of the anti-Ampo struggle will, however, still be led by the traditional parties of the left, and in general, they do not want to have anything to do with the students of the Anti-Yoyogi factions. What will happen then is that the students will go their own way, joining forces on occasion with the workers of the Hansen Seinen Linkai and Beheiren. The main forces of the students will be centered in the Zenkyoto body, while Kaku maru will be alone, unless they can forget their prejudices against joint actions long enough to permit themselves to join the others. The future will answer all these questions, but it is almost sure that the student front against the Security Treaty will be very stormy in both its internal and external activities during the crucial months of 1970.

The national political scene has already undergone some very profound changes, which were brought about by the snap elections called by Prime Minister Sato on his return from America at the end of 1969, having already received assurance on the return of Okinawa in 1972. The national elections, for the membership of the Lower House of Representatives, were held on December 27, 1969 right in the middle of the holiday season half way
between Christmas and the New Year festivities. By timing it so soon after his return from America, Sato was able to avoid prolonged parliamentary debate over the content of the Joint Communique issued by himself and President Nixon on the terms under which Okinawa would be returned. The voter turnout was very low, being less than 50% of the registered voters in the main cities of Tokyo and Osaka, with the national average coming to 68.51%, which is the second lowest ever. Given the higher percentage in the country areas, where the Liberal Democratic government party is traditionally strong, the results produced a predictable increase in the number of LDP seats, from 271 to 300 out of a total of 482. The big shock was in the number of seats held by the Socialists. This figure dropped by 50 members, from 140 to only 90. At the same time, both the JCP and the Komeito increased their numbers, with the former getting 14 seats as opposed to the previous tally of 5, while the latter almost doubled their number of representatives from 25 to 47.

The pattern of opposition which had been centered around the Socialist Party is clearly over. In addition to this, the Komeito which had been siding with the Socialists and Communists against the LDP, has now swung more to the LDP side of the fence. The effect on the Socialist Party has been quite traumatic, and they still haven't been able to recover their poise, in spite of much soul-searching and numerous meetings. One reason for their weakened position is undoubtedly to be found in the ranks of Sohyo, which has been losing ground in its organization of the labor unions to Domei, which represents the right-wing of the labor union movement. Also there is the vexing question of the Socialist Party's support for the Hansen Seinen Inkai and its connections with Socialist Youth League's Hantei Gakuhyo, which, tenuous as they may be, have had quite an effect on the
supporters. At the 33rd Annual Convention of the Socialist Party, held on the 20th-22nd of April, the protests of the Hansen Seinen workers, who were refused entry to the meeting, were so violent that the organizers went as far as calling out the riot police to mount guard—unheard of situation. Not only that, the representatives at the convention stayed in the hall overnight, in case the militant workers would keep them out in the following days.

With the opposition in a state of disarray and backed by their new allies, the incumbent LDP is in a very strong position to enforce any legislation it wants to. The students' protests are sure to come in for swift police action, and in this respect, arrangements have already been made for detachments of the Ground Self-Defense Forces to supplement the riot police, even in situations where the Prime Minister hasn't issued a mobilization order. On October 3, 1969, the members of the press were invited to attend a demonstration of riot-control maneuvers held by the Ground Self-Defense Forces. During the exercise, 210 soldiers in a mock riot-control action, put down a group of 300 rioters dressed in helmets (which looked surprisingly like ML helmets in the photographs), who threw stones and imitation Molotov cocktails. The number of riot police has also been increased to 3,137, which is the largest figure since war, and the tactics employed have been changed. Police Chief Hatano in stating the position of the riot police said, that whereas they had adopted a defensive posture in the past, they would now go on the offensive in order to cut down the number of injuries. Up to 1969, it had been the policy to match the response with the provocation, but now emphasis is to placed on anticipating the actions and armaments of the rioters and thus to plan for all eventualities before they happen. Already, the use of stones and sticks by students has been reduced by having sidewalks with paving stones asphalted.
over and timber merchants close their stores during key days, and it is impractical for the students to carry iron pipes and larger weapons. After the guerrilla tactics which were first put into use on September 30, 1969, the police formed a plain-clothes squad which was instrumental in stopping the worst from happening during the series of anti-war and anti-Ampo struggles which were staged on October 10th. The riot police are at the peak of their strength. Of course, no one knows for sure what tactics the ‘new-left’ will apply in their future street fighting, but Police Chief Hatano is confident that the riot police will be able to control them.

Such are the preparations and the situations as Japan enters into the significant period of the 1970 renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. After this, the future is more uncertain and much depends on the actual results of the events in summer, 1970. It is conceivable that the Socialist Party may split again with the right-wing Socialists joining up with the Social Democratic Party to form a new alliance. Also, within the realm of possibilities is a splintering of the ruling LDP which is after all only a group conservative factions joined together. The student movement is hardly likely to die out. It may, as in the past, enter into a period of decline after 1970 and there are sure to be many changes in the actual number and organization of the factions. It seems that the government is reluctant to ban even the most radical of the groups (such as Sekigun or Chukaku) because it would produce adverse publicity, but not only that, the continued existence of the anti-Yoyogi factions helps to keep the parliamentary left-wing in constant disarray. One possible way to render the factions truly ineffective and destroy part of their mystique, would be to simply prohibit the wearing of uniforms and the conducting of military-type training by any political groups. This tactic was utilized with great effect in England against the fascists just before
the Second World War. However, such steps will probably not be taken.

The resurgence of Japanese militarism will become more apparent in the coming years. That is to say, Japan will acquire once more its own defense capability, and when that is the case, the Security Treaty will possibly be amended to arrange for the vast bulk of American bases to be handed over to Japan. However, in spite of the fears of students and the left-wing, it is almost inconceivable that Japan would ever again embark on a program military agression such as led to the Pacific War. The sensitive points are of course the defense of South Korea and Taiwan. Japan has more at stake in the former and it has been suggested that a Communist Korea would mean a nuclear-armed Japan. In spite of this, there are at the present time enough safeguards in the Japanese Constitution to prevent too great an abuse of power by the government, and the peoples' political consciousness is much greater than it was in the prewar era, which in itself is another safeguard.

The revolution as envisaged by the radical students will probably never come. There will, undoubtedly, be changes that in the end will prove just as revolutionary, but under the present conditions of affluence, it is just about impossible for a bloody revolution to occur. What then is to be the future of Zengakuren and the revolutionary students? They will be the critics of society, as students in Japan always have been, the gadflies to sting the government and the establishment into action where and when necessary. There will always be a case against injustice, inequities will remain and the students will be one group whose task it is to force people's attention toward them. The one particular area that their influence will always be the greatest is education. The causes of the university struggles have not yet been eliminated and will produce student action again and again, as long as there is
a need. If the present student groups have a drawback it is that they are so oriented towards politics that they are blind to other fields of human folly. For example, there is the deteriorating situation of Japan’s ecology which cries out for a group with the organizing power of Zengakuren to protest the destruction of this nation’s natural resources. If Zengakuren and the student members can only broaden their vision a little, shake off their dogmatism and render their protests effective in diversified ways, then the title of ‘revolutionary’ students will become even more meaningful.
Who’s Who in Zengakuren and the Youth Movement in 1969: A Profile

by MATSUNAMI MICHIHIRO

In order to give a synoptic view of what is going on in the student and youth movement in Japan, this Profile introduces the various groups and the main categories they fall into. To simply give a long list of all the names of the groups is not only boring but very complicated, especially as the names are all Japanese. So, what we will do first is to give a brief outline of the main categories and then present each group in its respective category detailing such things as the character and strength, and where appropriate, the helmet worn by members of the group for identification purposes.

The first category is the most important and contains all the student groups that originate in the university student self-governing movement and can properly be called Zengakuren. There are two main divisions: the pro-JCP students of the Minsei; and the sects which make up the anti-JCP (or anti-Yoyogi) student movement. Recently, the anti-Yoyogi students have polarized into only two main movements, which came about with the formation of the Zenkyoto alliance by all members of the anti-JCP, except for the ever-independent Kakumaru who continue to operate their own Zengakuren, which is actually descended directly from the original Zengakuren organization. All the students in this first category are in the political left-wing and have been the subject of this book.

The second category contains all the right-wing and nationalist student groups. Because these are not so large, or important, we will content ourselves with examining the types of groups in
existence along with their motivations.

The third category is as yet an unknown factor. It is the brand-new student group organized by the Buddhist sect, Soka Gakkai, and their political arm Komeito, and is called Shingakudo.

Next comes the most obscure of the student groups, the anarchists, and little is known about their organizations. As might be expected, they are quite ethereal.

The fifth category contains two anti-war youth organizations which are open to any type of member, be he student, worker, or intellectual. The first is the Anti-war Youth Committee of lHansen Seinen linkai; the second is the Peace in Vietnam Alliance—Beheiren. These two are closely caught up in the student scene of 1969 and are, of course, on the left-wing.

1) Zengakuren Factions

A) Pro-JCP Minsei (Democratic Youth League) Zengakuren

Established: December 7, 1964

(n.b. Zengakuren was first established on September 18, 1948 under JCP control but later split; the present organization was formed out of Heigakuren (Heiwa Minshushugi Gakusei Jichikai Rengo—Peace and Democracy Federation of Student Self-governing Associations) which was started on July 16, 1963)

Parent body: Japan Communist Party and the Japan Democratic Youth League (Nihon Minshu Seinen Domei—Minsei)

Strength: Active members—12,000

98 universities, 353 jichikai—453,000 members

Mobilization strength—47,000
High school groups: Minsei Koko Han (Democratic Youth League High School Group)
870 schools, 10,000 students
Publications: 'For Our Country and Education' (Sokoku to Gakumon no tameni)
‘Zengakuren’
Helmet: Yellow with no markings.
Character: The Minsei are committed to parliamentary democracy, which Japan adopted after the war, and despite the lapse into violence in the ‘molotov cocktail’ era of 1950–51, the twin ideals of the JCP-led Zengakuren have always been peace and democracy. These ideals are not really the essence of revolution, but the Minsei are more concerned with reformation of the ruling system. The JCP favors the ‘orthodox’ theory of a two-step revolution for Japan; first remove the dependence on U.S. imperialism in order to affect a bourgeois revolution and then proceed to the second stage of a socialist revolution.

Therefore, the Minsei believe that the student movement can only proceed within the framework of parliamentary democracy. Accordingly, they avoid clashes with the police both on and off campus and are mainly occupied in making peaceful demonstrations, petitions and representations, pursuing this course in a subdued but tenacious manner. Within the campus, they try to solve problems with class discussions, seminars and dormitory meetings and insist that all elections be democratic to ensure that student organizations are based on mass support.

When organizing a protest movement, they are able to mobilize very large numbers for demonstrations. Their attitude towards the other sects of the student movement is that they are ‘anti-revolutionaries’ and ‘Trotskyists’; they criticize them as widely as possible, using media such as the radio and newspapers, and if necessary, they don’t hesitate to use violence against them.
justifying it as legitimate self-defense. Their struggles are characterized by both political and tactical maneuvering.

B) Anti-Yoyogi (i.e. anti-JCP) Zengakuren

The sects which make up the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren are always in a state of flux. They split up, form alliances and rejoin with such bewildering rapidity, that it is difficult to describe them accurately. However, the most effective in the student movement at the moment are as follows:

Kakumaru—Revolutionary Marxists
Chukaku—Marxist Student League Central Core
Shagakudo Toitsu—Socialist Student League Unity Group
Shagakudo Sekigun—Socialist Student League ‘Red Army’
Hantei Gakuhyo—Anti-imperialist Student Council
4th International
SFL or ML-ha—Student Liberation Front or Marx-Leninist Faction
Front—Socialist Student Front
Purogakudo—Proletarian Student League
Kyogakudo—Communist Student League

These ten sects can be divided into three main ideological groups.

First there are the Trotskyists—Kakumaru, Chukaku, Shagakudo Toitsu and Sekigun, Hantei Gakuhyo, and the 4th International.

Second, the Maoists—SFL or ML-ha.

Third, those who follow the Italian example of reforming the structure of Communism—Front, Purogakudo and Kyogakudo.

As can be seen, there are many differences between these groups, but on one point they are all agreed, and that is opposition to the JCP ideas of revolution and in the aim of destroying the
JCP. This is why they are all lumped together as the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren.

At the end of 1969, all these groups, with the exceptions of Kakumaru and Shagakudo Sekigun, formed a grand alliance (Zenkyoto) based on the All Campus Joint Struggle Councils which had been created in universities throughout Japan during the university struggle period. Kakumaru, although isolated, has its own Zengakuren organization; so we will deal with it first. Shagakudo Sekigun, however, will be treated along with Shagakudo Toitsu.

Kakumaru Zengakuren (Revolutionary Marxists)
Established: July 8, 1963
Parent body: Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosanshugisha Domei Kakumeiteki Marukusushugiha (Kakukyodo Kakumaruha—Revolutionary Communist League Revolutionary Marxist Faction)
Strength: Active members—1,980
29 jichikai—48,200 members
Mobilization strength—4,700
High School groups: 4 schools
Publications: 'Liberation' (Kaiho)
‘Communist’ (Kyosanshugisha)
‘Zengakuren Secretariat Bulletin’ (Zengakuren Shokikyoku Tsushin)
‘Spartacus’
‘Fighting Zengakuren’ (Tatakau Zengakuren)
Helmet: White with a red line around the bottom. Writing in black, with a large letter ‘Z’ in front and the characters ‘革新’ (Kakumaru) on the side.
Kakumaru shares the same parent body with Chukaku, and
in fact they were once the same organization, but in spite of this, they are radically different and remain diametrically opposed to each other in all they do. Kakumaru are great theoreticians and prefer to pursue their own independent line rather than join forces with other groups in alliances which they cannot control. They criticize the Chukaku penchant for street fighting and guerrilla tactics, saying that whereas Chukaku is hoping simplistically to arm themselves and bring events to a stage comparable with the Russian Revolution in 1905, in fact all that will happen is that the Chukaku, while dreaming of 1905, will commit the same mistakes as were made in 1950 in the JCP's abortive 'molotov cocktail era'. In the meantime, the Chukaku have allied themselves with the 7 other factions of Zenkyoto and are working actively toward joint-actions with these groups; and while Kakumaru want to join in these activities, they feel that they occupy a special position in the student movement and therefore refuse to join in. Also, Kakumaru scorn those instances, such as the Sasebo and Tokyo University struggles, in which the anti-Yoyogi factions collaborated with the pro-JCP Minsei, and continue to pursue their own independent course. At present, they are working to establish branches among the workers and are observers in the Hansen Seinen Iinkai (Anti-war Youth Committee), which has a predominantly worker membership.

Zenkyoto (Zenkoku Zenkyoto Rengo—National Federation of All Campus Joint Struggle Councils)
Established: September 5, 1969
Parent body: none
Member groups: Chukaku, Shagakudo Toitsu, Hantei Gakuhyo, 4th International, SFL, Front, Purogakudo, and Kyogakudo.
Strength: the combined strength of all the above groups is
estimated at 20,000 active members. There are Zenkyoto at 200 universities which includes some without political affiliations (non-sect radicals), such as at Nihon University, so possibly its full strength may be more.

Character: This organization is the largest in the ranks of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren and easily outnumbers Kakumaru. The control of this body lies in the hands of its secretaries, one from each sect. The method of making decisions does not depend on the will of the strongest sect nor on the will of a majority of sects, but through a process of discussions and meetings. In other words, it is neither autocratic nor democratic. All the Zenkyoto (All Campus Joint Struggle Councils) joined this body. Its activities are quite radical, but it contains two main streams of thought. The first is concerned with creating a politically based struggle, and this movement is spearheaded by Chukaku and the SFL-ML-ha; the other half is orientated towards campus strike actions and is made up of Shagakudo and Hantei Gakuhyo. The former are insistent upon street fighting of the type displayed at Haneda Airport on numerous occasions, while the latter want to occupy university buildings, set up barricades, the whole paraphernalia of a campus strike (the second group is sometimes known as the ‘Campus-Soviet Organizers’).

Chukaku (Marugakudo Chukaku-ha—Marxist Student League Central Core)

Established: February, 1963
Parent body: Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosanshugisha Domei Zenkoku Iinkai (Japan Revolutionary Communist League National Committee)

Strength: Active members—2,920
42 jichikai—92,400 members

——248——
Mobilization strength—7,900
Publications:  ‘Forward!’ (Zenshin)—weekly
‘Communist’ (Kyosanshugisha)—irregular
‘Chukaku’—monthly
‘Student Front’ (Gakusei Sensen)

Helmet: White in color with the characters ‘中核’ (Chukaku) written in black at the front.

Character: The full name of Chukaku is the Nihon Marukusushugi Gakusei Domei Chukaku-ha (Japan Marxist Student League Central Core Faction—sometimes referred to by its initials MSL). Among the students of the anti-JCP factions, the student struggle on campus is known as ‘positional fighting’, while that off campus is known as ‘mobile fighting’ or ‘street fighting’. The most radical group engaged in street fighting is the Chukaku. In July, 1968, when the Sampa (3 faction) Zengakuren, which had been an alliance of Chukaku, Shagakudo and Shaseido Kaiho-ha, split up, the Chukaku decided to form their own Zengakuren organization. The first chairman of this new body was Akiyama Katsuyuki who had been chairman of the old Sampa Zengakuren, but in December, 1968, the chair passed to Kanayama Katsumi (Yokohama National University) and he is still holding this position.

The Chukaku started their career of fighting in 1967 in the Haneda struggle of October 8th and November 11th and at Sasebo during the ‘Anti-Enterprise struggle’ of January, 1968. Their name has since become well known in connection with brute force street fighting tactics. The scale of force used has since escalated with the struggles at Narita and Oji and with the university problem so that now Chukaku is actively proposing guerrilla warfare in the streets of Tokyo.

There is, however, quite a lot of opposition to Chukaku within the student movement because of their inflexibility and, to some,
their too revolutionary tactics. The non-sect students, in particular, don’t respect them and this led to their isolation during the university struggles of 1968. At about the same time, they were also kicked out of their headquarters at Hosei University by the pro-JCP Minsei students, but because their parent body Kakukyodo is very strong and well organized, they were able to get back again, and Hosei University is again a Chukaku headquarters.

Shagakudo Toitsu (Socialist Student League Unity Group)
Full name: Nihon Shakaishugi Gakusei Domei Zenkoku Inkai (Japan Socialist Student League National Committee)
Established: July, 31, 1965
Parent body: Kyosanshugisha Domei Toitsu-ha (Communist league Unity Faction) also known as Kyosando Senki-ha (Communist League Battle Flag Faction)
Strength: Active members—2,410
52 jichikai—127,300 members
Mobilization strength—5,300
Publications: ‘Battle Flag’ (Senki)—weekly
‘Communism’ (Kyosanshugi)
‘The Ideological Front’ (Riron Sensen)
‘Anti-imperialist Front’ (Hantei Sensen)
‘Beacon’ (Noroshi)
‘Herald’ (Senku)
Helmet: Red in color with the characters ‘社会同’ (Shagakudo) written in black on the front.
Character: They have gained both fame and infamy for their radical street fighting which is similar to Chukaku’s. They have also been influenced by the French students, trying to emulate the type of fighting that went on in the Latin Quarter of Paris.
Their favorite spot for building street barricades is the Kanda
Surugadai area where there are many famous private university
buildings (Chuo University, Meiji University and Nihon Uni-
versity). They also tried to charge into the Defense Ministry
on October 21, 1968, during the International Anti-war Day
demonstrations. In the final showdown of the Tokyo University
struggle, the siege of Yasuda Hall of January 18th and 19th,
1969, they fought stubbornly to the end, ensconced in the clock-
tower.

Shagakudo Toitsu-ha belonged to the Sampa Zengakuren
until July, 1968, and when that split up, they formed the Hantei
(Anti-imperialism) Zengakuren with SFL (Gakusei Kaiho Sen-
sen—Student Liberation Front) and Hantei Gakuhyo (Anti-
imperialist Student Council).

Their main method of recruiting lies not in trying to attract
students through study meetings and lectures, but rather by en-
listing those students who prove to be active at demonstrations
and in street fighting. Those students are recruited by Shagakudo
and in this way they are rather like the Chukaku again. They
avoid public debate preferring to discuss political views only
amongst themselves and with potential recruits.

Shagakudo Sekigun (Socialist Student League Red Army)

Full name: Kyosanshugi Seinen Domei Sekigun-ha (Communist
Youth League Red Army faction)

Established: September 3, 1969

Strength: Active members—300

Publications: ‘Red Army’ (Sekigun)

Parent body: Kyosanshugisha Domei Sekigun-ha (Communist
League Red Army faction)

Helmet: Red in color with the characters ‘赤軍派’ (Sekigun-
ha) written in black on the front.

Character: In July, 1969, a split developed between members of the national committee of the Kyosanshugisha Domei (Kyosando) over how to oppose Sato’s proposed visit to the U.S., and the split came about like this: Shagakudo Toitsu had two main area groups, one in Tokyo and the other in the Kansai area around Osaka and Kyoto; the Kansai group proposed to start a revolution by means of bombs and firearms, but this was opposed by the Tokyo branch members. Because of this, the two halves separated, with the Kansai group setting themselves up independently as the Shagakudo Sekigun. They did so at a public meeting in September which was called rather grandly ‘The Great Red Army Political Meeting’. Their slogans were ‘Escalate the Present Struggle into Armed Revolution’, ‘Simultaneous Worldwide Revolution’, ‘Create a World Party, a World Red Army and a World Revolutionary Front’.

On September 22nd, true to their word, they attempted to start their program of revolution by attacking police boxes in Osaka with molotov cocktails. With their violent slogans such as ‘War in Tokyo!’ and ‘War in Osaka!’ they have even isolated themselves from other groups in the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren, becoming the most violent and radical of all. The Red Army is said to consist of three sections; the Central Army, the Local Armies and the Partisan Squads which carry out guerrilla actions. The Partisans are divided up into small groups numbering about five students each. On November 5th, the police, in an early morning raid on a mountain hut at Daibosatsu Pass in Yamana-nashi Prefecture, surprised and arrested 53 members of the Red Army while they were on a program of “special training”. Thus the Red Army is temporarily incapacitated. One interesting feature of the Sekigun membership is the high percentage of High School students.
Hantei Gakuhyo (Anti-imperialist Student Council)
Full name: Zenkoku Hantei Gakusei Hyogikai Rengo (National Federation of Anti-imperialist Student Councils)
Established: December, 1967
Parent body: Nihon Shakaishugi Seinen Domei Gakuseihan Kyogikai Kaiho-ha (Student Council of the Japan Socialist Youth League Liberation Faction)
Strength: Active members—1,420
28 jichikai—67,100 members
Mobilization strength—3,500
Publications: 'Revolution' (Kakumei)—twice-monthly
'Liberation' (Kaiho)
'Commune'
'Battle Line' (Senretsu)
Helmet: Blue in color with the characters '反帝学評' (Hantei Gakuhyo) written in white on the front.
Character: Hantei Gakuhyo was formerly known as Shascido Kaiho-ha (Socialist Youth League Liberation Faction) and the name was changed in 1967 in preparation for the oncoming 'Ampo Struggle' over the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1970, while Shaseido Kaiho-ha became the upper organization charge of the group's political movement.
Shaseido was originally a youth movement under the wing of the Socialist Party, but nowadays this group together with the Hansen Seinen Iinkai (Antiwar Youth Committees) is proving most troublesome for the Socialists. Shaseido Kaiho-ha call themselves an 'avant-garde' organization and its ties with the Socialists are almost completely severed. However, that is not to say that the Socialist Party has no effect on them, because there have been numerous instances when they have not taken up arms (such as the Narita and Oji struggles) on account of the demands

--- 253 ---
of the Socialists. On the whole, their street fighting tactics tend to be relaxed and flexible depending on the situation.

The Liberation Faction of the Student Council follows the anti-parliamentarianism of the German Communist Rosa Luxemburg and this can be seen in Hantei Gakuhyo actions. However, one attitude which they have never altered since the start of Shaseido is the one that the workers and students must cooperate in the creation of a Revolutionary Coalition Council. This is their slogan and they are earnestly pursuing this line within the ranks of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren.

4th International Japan Branch Member Groups
a) Gakusei Inta (Student International)
Established: March 29, 1969
Parent body: Dai Yon Intanashonaru Nihonshibu—Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosanshugisha Domei Tasu-ha (4th International Japan Branch—Japan Revolutionary Communist League Majority Faction)
Strength: Active members—370
6 jichikai—11,470 members
Mobilization strength—1,211
Publications: ‘4th International’
‘World Revolution’ (Sekai Kakumei)
‘The Proletariat’
‘Bolshevik’—twice monthly
‘International Anti-war News’ (Kokusai Hansen Nyusu)
‘Armament’ (Buso)
‘Permanent Revolution’ (Eizoku Kakumei)
Helmet: Red in color with a hammer and sickle in black on the front.
History: Up until 1963, most of the students who made up the 4th International group of Trotskyists belonged to the Shaseido Kaiho-ha (Socialist Youth League Liberation faction) and they propagated Trotskyism inside that group. However, in 1967, with the international emergence of 'student power' and the increasing activity in the Japanese student movement in campus struggles and street fighting, they split away from the Shaseido Kaiho-ha and formed their own group. This was called Shakaishugi Seinen Domei Zeukokui Gakuseihan Kyogikai Puroretaria Kokusaishugi-ha (Socialist Youth League National Student Council International Proletarian Faction). Later on, this was restarted in April, 1969, under the shorter name Kokusai Kyosan-shugi Gakusei Domei (International Communist Student League), which is what is known as Gakusei Inta.

b) AIPC (Busohoki Jumbi Linkai—Armed Insurrection Preparatory Committee) Puroretaria Gundan Zenkoku Gakusei Hyogikai (Proletarian Army National Student Council)
Established: October 5, 1969
Parent body: Dai Yon Inta Nihon Shibu, Nihon Kakumeiteki Kyosan shugisha Domei BL-ha (4th International Japan Branch, Japan Revolutionary Communist League BL Faction)
Strength: Active members—250
2 jiehikai—3,300 members
Mobilization strength—600
Publications: 'Proletarian Army' (Puroretaria Gundan)
'Report of the Rebel Army' (Hanrangun Joho)
Helmet: Black in color with the characters 'プロ軍団' (Puro Gundan) written in white on the front.
Character: They aim to make the campus struggle into a class struggle and they see the occupation of university buildings as a
step in developing a nationwide insurrection. At the same time, they try to destroy the JCP students’ armed self-defense squads because these are anti-revolutionary and help maintain bourgeois morality on the campus. So ferocious were their tactics, that ordinary people were struck by the sudden emergence of this “black helmeted group”. They often fight against pro-JCP Minsei at Hosei University, which is their main stronghold. Their first appearance in street fighting was at the ‘Enterprise Struggle’ in Sasebo in January, 1968. However, they weren’t officially launched until October 5, 1969, at the Great Inaugural Meeting of the Proletarian Army National Student Council held on Hosei University campus.

SFL—Gakusei Kaiho Sensen (Student Liberation Front) formerly Shagakudo ML-ha (Socialist Student League Marx-Leninist Faction)

Established: October, 1968
Parent body: Nihon Marukusu-Reninshugisha Domei—Kyosando ML-ha (Japan Marx-Leninist League—Communist League ML Faction)
Strength: Active members—800
8 jichikai—30,800 members
Mobilization strength—1,950
Publications: ‘Red Glory’ (Shakko)—twice-monthly
‘Marx-Leninism’ (Marukusu-Reninshugi)
‘Red Flag Youth’ (Koki Seinen)
Helmet: Red in color with a thick white band running over the top from the front to back. The initials ‘SFL’ or ‘ML’ are painted in white on the side.
Character: The Marx-Leninist League was originally formed out of part of the remnants of the Bund (Kyosando) after it
broke up in 1961. The SFL joined in the formation of the Hantei (Anti-imperialism) Zengakuren in 1968; there was a confrontation within this organization between Shagakudo Toitsu-ha and Shaseido Kaiho-ha with SFL taking sides with Shaseido Kaiho-ha. Later when their parent body helped in the founding of the Hantei Goha Rengo (Five Faction Anti-imperialist Alliance) on April 28, 1969, in order to participate in the Okinawa Day struggles, they joined straight away with Shagakudo, Chukaku, AIPC Puro Gundan and Kyoroto. The Nihon Marukushu-Renin-shugishia Domei—ML-ha (Japan Marx-Leninist League—ML Faction) has as its slogan “Workers of the World and All Oppressed Peoples Unite and Make the International Proletarian Revolution under the Flag of Marx-Lenin-Mao Tse-tung!”. In their theoretical line, they follow Maoism and the Chinese Communist way. The main feature of their slogans and opinions is an attempt to fit the people’s revolutionary war, as laid down by Mao, to the circumstances of Japan. They are trying to create a liberation front by combining the student liberation front, the worker’s front, the high school students’ front and the Maoist liberation front. They believe that the creation of such a united front will point the way to a people’s revolution in Japan.

Structural Reform Groups
a) Furonto—Shakaishugi Gakusei Sensen Zenkoku Kyogikai (Front—Socialist Student Front National Council)
Parent body: Toitsu Shakaishugi Domei (United Socialist League)
Strength: Active members—650
17 jichikai—18,700 members
Mobilisation—5,600

—257—
Publications: 'Spearhead' (Saizensen)
'Young Jacobins' (Wakaki Jakoban)—monthly
'Structural Reform' (Kozokaikaku)—monthly
'Front'
'Brave the Storm' (Arashi o Tsuite)—monthly
Associated publication: 'Modern Theory' (Gendai Riron)—monthly
Helmet: Green in color with characters ‘フロント’ (Front) in white on the front.
Character: After the Haneda struggle of October 8, 1967, the Front was gradually forced to change its character in the increasingly violent university struggle. Through contacts made between students representing their universities at the inter-university negotiating federation meetings was born the central body of the Front. This group became the National Student Political Federation and was at the center of the Anti-imperialist United Front (Hantei Toitsu Sensen). They were all able to forget their differences under this joint banner.

In October, 1968, first an All Tokyo Front was formed, and in March, 1969, they held the National Front Inaugural Convention Celebration at Momoyama University. Later in July, an All Kansai Front was formed. At the same time, in July, they joined with Purogakudo to form the Ampo Funsai Zenkoku Kyoto (The 'Smash Ampo' National Joint Struggle Council) and assumed leadership in this alliance. They decided to strengthen the National Front by making the All Tokyo Front and the All Kansai Front the pivotal groups within it, and thus help strengthen the support for the Anti-imperialist United Front organization.

b) Purogakudo (Puroretaria Gakusei Domei—Proletarian Student League)
Established: March, 1969

Parent body: Kyosanshugi Rodosha To (Kyoroto—Communist Workers Party)

Strength: Active members—1,100
          10 jichikai—15,600 members
          Mobilization strength—8,300

Publications: ‘Unity’ (Toitsu)

Helmet: Green in color with the characters ‘プロ学同’ (Purogakudo) in white on the front.

Character: In March, 1969, the left wing members of an organization called the Democratic Student League (Mingakudo) left to form the Purogakudo with some other small groups. When they came into being, they joined with part of Kyogakudo to take over publication of the Student Youth Movement Report, which had previously been put out by the Japan Communist Youth League (Nihon Kyosanshugi Seinen Domei), the lower organization of the Socialist Reform Movement—Shakaku (Sha-kaishugi Kakushin Undo).

Nowadays, the effect of the violence of student actions has become marked within Kyoroto and two opinions are prevalent. One is that it is necessary to rethink critically about a systematic sharing of peace, and aim at a reconstruction in order to oppose “monopolistic capitalism’s” reformation of democracy. Thy other point of view is to oppose all forms of joint actions be all classes in the proletarian revolution. This debate and the formation of many subgroups over this question results in the main character being a middle of the road compromise policy between all parties. However, the effect of this discussion is also to give Purogakudo an appearance of being very radical.

In May, there was an internal dispute inside Kyoroto which resulted in Naito Tomochika being deposed from the chairmanship, and now the leadership is in the hands of a faction lead by
Ida Momo. This means that they are close to becoming a Trotskyist group.

e) Kyogakudo (Kyosanshugi Gakusei Domei—Communist Student League)
Established: March, 1968
Parent Body: Sharodo (Shakaishugi Rodosha Domei—Socialist Workers League)
Strength: About 100 members (exact figure unknown)
Publication: 'The New Left' (Shinsayoku)
Character: This is the most radical of the Reform groups. Their theoretical leader is Nakamura Takeo, who figured prominently in the anti-Naito faction of the former Socialist Reform Movement. They joined with Kyoroto in the formation of the Hantei Goha Rengo (Anti-imperialist 5 Faction Alliance) for the Okinawa day struggles on April 28, 1969. Thus their radical leanings became a focus of attention within the Reform Groups.

2) Nationalist and Right-wing Student Groups

Now we will examine the make-up of the nationalist student movement in the period leading up to 1970. There are five main types:
1) Those who act on the direct instruction of the right-wing; these include the physical fitness groups, certain sports clubs, and what are referred to as right-wing gangsters.
2) Student propagandists who are supported by right-wing sponsors. They lecture to the general public at places like rail terminals.
3) Nationalists, whose thinking reflects religion more than
politics.

4) Students who work in opposition to the recent increase of campus struggles and do so alone without support because of their own convictions.

5) Finally, those who are called into action by the government when necessary.

Thus within the meaning of 'nationalist' groups we have many different types, each with their own thinking distinct from the others. For example, in such matters as constitutional reform and self-defense, their opinions are not always in agreement. So nowadays, the nationalist student movement is not merely confined to the karate groups or the cheerleader groups, but has spread to include ordinary students too. These students have made their impact in the student self-governing associations (jichikai) even to the extent of taking over control from the left-wing groups in a few isolated instances.

Overall, their movement has widened considerably and there are now both action groups and organized amalgamated groups. Their previous weakness in conflicts was a neglect of theoretical knowledge. This void is now being filled with study and concern for problems outside the campus.

There have always been sporadic outbursts of violence between the right and left-wing student groups, but this has been negligible in the past. However, in the event of the right-wing becoming united, this problem would become very serious indeed.

3) Shingakudo (Shingakusei Domei—New Student League)

Established: October 19, 1969
Strength: The parent body is the Soka Gakkai Gakuseibu (the

— 261 —
Soka Gakkai Buddhist Church Student Department) and although the new group controls no student self-governing associations, it has at present 270,000 members at 315 universities.

Helmet: White in color with the characters ‘新学同’ (Shingakudo) in red on the front.

Character: Just after the proposed University Law had been made public by the Ministry of Education in June, the Soka Gakkai Student Group set up a national liaison council to “Smash the University Bill” called Zenkyo (Daigaku Rippo Funsai Zenkoku Renraku Kyogikai). However shortly after, the government decided to pass this bill by a show of Liberal Democratic force in the Diet and the Zenkyo movement was immediately put in a bad position. Therefore, this organization was used as the basis for a national student group as a means to strengthen and widen their movement.

Their policy is anti-war, anti-dictatorship, and has definite attitudes on the Security Treaty, Okinawa and the university problems which put them in opposition to the government. On the other hand, though their ideology is different, their methods are closely akin to the JCP and thus, they are natural rivals. Their long-term program envisages utilizing ordinary people and students on a wide scale.

Shingakudo held its inaugural meeting at Yoyogi Park in Tokyo on October 19, 1969; it was attended by 75,000 representatives from 368 universities from all over the country. The Soka Gakkai student department is a religious organization, but the Shingakudo is concerned with political struggles, with participation in the peace movement their avowed policy. If it becomes necessary, they are prepared to fight against either the pro-JCP Minsei Zengakuren or against the Zenkyoto factions of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren.
4) Miscellaneous Anarchist Group

The anarchist student groups are rather overshadowed by the presence of Zengakuren, and though they have been in existence since the war, they remain virtually unknown except to those people who are actively connected with them. Recently, however, some attention has been afforded them because of their activities against munitions factories and the explosives manufacturing incidents of the Haihansha (Rebellion publishers) group as part of their participation in the anarchist Vietnam Anti-war Action Committee. Actually, the problem is that they are, as might be expected, basically rather free wheeling groups, and they don't possess the organization that the left-wing groups have, although they do have coordinating committees.

Their activities are rather radical, although their purpose usually depends upon the occasion, and once a purpose or goal has been achieved they tend to break up. One favorite practice is to hold meetings of criticism on a local level and announce their reports quietly.

5) Anti-war Youth Organizations

a) Hansen Seinen Iinkai (Anti-war Youth Committees)
Former name: Betonamu Hansen Nikkan Joyaku Hijun Soshi no tame no Seinen Iinkai (Youth Committees for Opposition to the Vietnam War and to Prevent Ratification of the Japan-Korean Security Treaty)
Established: August 30, 1965
Strength: Mobilization strength of 20,000 people, which include approximately 12,700 workers.

The Hansen Seinen Iinkai has 4 different levels of organization;
national, prefectural, town and village, and factory anti-war committees. Also, the national category has been divided into 11 blocks for general purposes, but in fact these are made up of the 43 prefectural anti-war groups, of which only 30 are really active. Memberships of the Hansen Seinen Linkai:

The youth groups of 14 labor unions (Kokuro, Zentei, Doro, Zendentsu, Zennorin, Zentrinya, Zensenbai, Toshiko, Zensuido, Nikkyoso, Jichiro, Shitetsu Soren, Gokaroren, and Zennitsu)

Added to this are the Socialist Party's Youth Bureau (Shakaito Seishonen Kyoku), Shaseido, Sohyo Seitaibu (Sohyo Youth Group) and Nihon no Koe (Voice of Japan Group), which makes 18 groups in all.

As observers, there are the members of the old Sampa Zen-gakuren, the Kakumaru Zengakuren, Beheiren, Kyoseiro (Young Communist Workers) and Toshado (United Socialist League).

Character: The Hansen Seinen Iinkai was formed in 1965 on the initiative of the Socialist Party, Shaseido and Sohyo. At that time, the government was preparing to sign the Joint Japan-Korea Security Treaty while the Vietnam War was beginning to escalate, so the Socialist Party and Sohyo wanted to make a new group which emphasized the participation by youth and workers on a broad front in opposition to the Vietnam War, and in an attempt to direct their energies to destroying the Japan-Korean Security Treaty.

Their basic policy is set forward in three sections;
1) To eliminate the old-style anti-war struggle and replace it with a newer and better method.
2) Policies are not decided on the basis of the leaders' wishes, but on what the whole body of members want.
3) To form a group that is separate from and above any one ideology.
However, after the first Haneda incident of 1967, many members of the district anti-war councils joined in the activities of the anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren students. Because of this, the Socialists and Sohyo were put in a bit of a fix in dealing with this. The increasing influence of the extremist radicals such as Kaku-maru, Chukaku and Hantei Gakuhyo on the factory level anti-war committees resulted in their having increasing doubts about the established left-wing. Of course, the Socialist Party and Sohyo would like to eliminate those members who belong to the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren, but this is impossible because the membership at factory and local level is made up of individuals and not groups, making it impossible to expel members on the basis of their membership of the more extreme student groups. In the end, it seems likely that the Socialists will withdraw their connections with the Hansen Seinen Iinkai in order to avoid further damage to its reputation.

b) Beheiren—‘Betonamu ni Heiwa o!’ Shimin Rengo (Citizens Alliance for ‘Peace in Vietnam!’)

Established: April 24, 1965
Membership: The Voiceless Voices Society (Koe naki Koe no Kai), The Seagod Society (Wadatsumi Kai), The Join Hands for Peace Society (Heiwa no Tame ni Te o Tsunagu Kai), Scientific Study of Thought Society (Shiso no Kagakukenkyu Kai), Christian Peace Society (Kiristosha Heiwa no Kai), all joined as member groups. There are circles in each prefecture and members can join anywhere they like according to their own judgement. In Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka, the big cities, many of the members who habitually make up the numbers are drawn from all sects of the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren. In Tokyo, Beheiren meetings or demonstrations usually attract between 2 and 5,000
people (though the 1969 Anti-war Day saw 10,000 people attend a Beheiren rally).

Publications: Beheiren News, Shukan Ampo (Weekly Ampo), Ampo (English)

Doctrine: Each group is free to hold its own opinions in so far as they all support activities directed against the Vietnam War.

Character: Beheiren held its first meeting in Shimizudani Park in April, 1965, in which it called for ‘Peace in Vietnam, Vietnam for the Vietnamese!’ This meeting had been called by 38 literary personalities including Oda Makoto, Kaiko Takeshi, Takei Akio, Komatsu Sakyo, Iida Momo, Yoshida Yoshihige and Sato Sampei. They adopted a statement which demanded that the American forces cease bombing North Vietnam and get out of South Vietnam. On the same day they started the Citizens and Intellectuals ‘Peace in Vietnam’ Alliance.

Included in Beheiren are some radical groups as well as some which only find meaning in demonstrations, yet Beheiren doesn’t even have a branch system of organization, thus it is very difficult to state categorically that it is like this or like that. However, it is similar in outlook to the Anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren.

Recently the leader of Beheiren, Oda Makoto, has taken up the theme of a ‘whirlpool of humanity theory’, in which the center of the whirlpool is made up of activists such as the anti-war groups and Sohyo while around them are the citizens on the edge of current. However, as the movement lasts longer and longer, so the size of the involved populace becomes larger due to the syphoning action of the whirlpool of humanity, until eventually, through some means such as a general strike, this movement will have the momentum to destroy the old order.

Beheiren is planning to reform itself into an active organization which will include non-sect radicals and the Kyorodo (Communist Workers League) executives who will then be able to join together

— 266 —
in one force under the same Beheiren leaders through the newly reformed structure.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

English Language Material
Japan Times, 1946–1970

Japanese Language Material
Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo)
Gendaishi no Kai, ed., Gendai Kakumei no Joken (The Conditions for a Modern Revolution), Tokyo, Akishobo
Jijimondai Kenkyujo, ed., Zengakuren: Sono Ishiki to Kodo (Zengakuren: Their Feelings and Actions), Tokyo, Jijimondai Kenkyujo, 1969
Kakukyodo Kakumeiteki Marukusushugi-ha, ed., Gyakuryu ni Koshite (Overcoming the Adverse Current), 7th ed., Kaihousha, Tokyo, 1969

- 268 -

Mainichi Shimbunsha, ed., *Ampo to Zengakuren: Zoku ‘Student Power’* (Ampo and Zengakuren: Sequel to ‘Student Power’), Tokyo, 1969

*Mainichi Shimbun (Tokyo)*


Ohno Akio, *Zengakuren: Sono Kodo to Riron* (Zengakuren: Their Actions and Theories), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1969


Shimizu Takichi, *70 Nen o Do Suru?* (What will we do in 1970?), Tokyo, Denenshobo, 1969

*Shukan Yomiuri, (Tokyo), 1968–1969*


*Suparutakusu*, 1969

Uchida Tadao and Eto Hankichi, *Atarashii Daigakuzo o Motomete* (The Search for a New University Image), Tokyo, Nihon Hyoronsha, 1969

Yamanaka Akira, *Sengo Gakusei Undoshi* (History of the Post-war Student Movement), 8th, ed., Tokyo, Aoki Shoten, 1969

*Zengakuren: 70 Nen to Gakusei Undo* (Zengakuren: 1970 and the Student Movement), Tokyo