"My interest here has been in the mode of discourse more than its topic". Oh that discourse! This is probably where the difficulty lies. An interest in "mode of discourse" is bound to come up against any serious attempt to establish a method that can be used by the working class.
For example, trying to understand the roots of any phenomena is not easy to do outside of a historical framework. To return, for instance, to the strategy of the Provisionals in the 1970s - its roots can be traced back more than a century,
After the American Civil War the American Fenians tried to provoke Britain and the US into a war by making raids into Canada in 1866, 1870 and 1871. As it turned out, the US authorities did not rise to the bait. In June 1866, for example, it turned a blind eye to British military incursions on to US territory to capture and slaughter Fenian forces. The US saw no advantage in conflict [and was also happy, in due course, to collect $15.5 million for British 'non-neutrality' in the Civil War].
Engels (in a letter to Bernstein 26 June 1882) examined the sitiuation in retrospect and thought that "Had it come to a war, Ireland would in a few months have been part of the United States or at least a republic under its protection". He emphasised the very limited circumstances in which an Irish rising could be successful. "Without war or the threat of war from without, an Irish rebellion has not the slightest chance; and only two powers can become dangerous in this respect: France and, still far more, the United States." Irish nationalism would need support from a major power. Engels didn't see any reason for any immediate US action - although thought the situation would be different 20 years further on. Assuming the possibility that he might also be wrong he went on "However, if there should be danger of war with America, England would grant the Irish open-handedly everything they asked for - only not complete independence, which is not at all desirable owing to the geographical position"
Geography! That's the reason that Britain retains its attachment to the North of Ireland, and why Irish nationalists and Britain's imperialist rivals court each other. That Ireland is a potential springboard for an invasion of Britain is still relevant, even in the age of the inter-continental missile.
Hitler was well aware of the strategic importance of Ireland, in particular as a base for attacks on the ports and industry of NW England and Scotland. In December 1941 he mused that "The occupation of Ireland might lead to the end of the war". Earlier that year a diversionary German paratroop attack on Northern Ireland was planned (to coincide with German attacks on the southern English coast). Before the idea was shelved, a date was chosen - in April, the 25th anniversary of the Easter Rising.
In Churchill's autobiography there is a famous passage (1922ish) where he muses on the things that had changed since the Great War and those that will always be the same: ‘whole empires had disappeared in that great cataclysm… the boundaries of many countries have been re-drawn… But when the floodwaters have subsided and we look across the landscape, we see again in all their glory, the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone. Only the integrity of their quarrel remains undiminished…’ As someone who had participated [!]more than most in Irish affairs Churchill had an axe to grind. He tried to make out that the 'quarrel' began and ended on the island of Ireland. Showing how so-called backwaters fit into the global picture is a difficult but important task.
Some of us are - as something more than mathematical (or other) abstraction. There's surely a necessary relationship between evidence and proof. Otherwise never talk of facts or try to convince us of anything. My interest here has been in the mode of discourse more than its topic - that is as legitimate a subject as any. As for "substantial issues" - I have commented on evidence presented here, and possible alternative interpretations of it.
Feel free to ignore me, Alf - coming from you, I take it as a complement.