The 23 September Communist League's ideology and Council Communism 1976-1981

The Revolution and the Mexican Left.

The regime that emerged from the Mexican Revolution was the subject of political debate since the 1940s, when it was considered that the corrupt promotion of “national” industry betrayed the foundations of the popular movement of 1910, or that the bourgeois character of that revolution demanded a socialist stage. However, most of the considerations were centered on the State. Whether it was Stalinist authoritarianism, which predominated and still predominates in the Mexican left, or the “revolutionary nationalism” of the Party of the Mexican Revolution which, in its ideological range had on its “right” the sector that promoted, in quite corrupt ways, Mexican businessmen, or on its “left” the sovereigntist wing concerned with protecting strategic sectors, such as oil and electricity, and trying to keep at bay, by means of diplomatic juggling, its nemesis to the north: the United States.

To this was added the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) which emerged with ties, even before the existence of the PRI, since it was subsumed to the caudillo, his State and the nationalist project of the Mexican Revolution. This can be seen in El Machete, organ of the PCM, on August 13, 1927: “Obregón is the representative of those elements that aspire to national reconstruction based on the industrialization of the country and the creation of a strong national bourgeoisie independent of foreign influence.”1 .

Revolutionary nationalism, in the two versions mentioned, defined Mexican politics and configured a good part of the “left”. For example, during the six-year term of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) it had its greatest growth in membership and from 1940 onwards, with Manuel Ávila Camacho, it experienced illegality and persecution. To this was added the PCM's conditioning to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which had in its embassy in Mexico an opportunity for espionage towards the United States, and was not interested in moving the diplomatic waters. The political and ideological annulment of the PCM, together with its Soviet dependence, made it redundant in an environment where revolutionary nationalism was nationalizing strategic sectors and building an incipient and extremely modest Welfare State.

On the other hand, the regime corporatized peasants, workers and kept the Army out of politics. Through the National Peasant Confederation (CNC) it distributed benefits to the peasantry affiliated, and functional, to the PRI. Meanwhile, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) controlled the important unions in the country, instituting an indispensable element of the Mexican political picaresque: union charrism. Making union leaders into corrupt puppets who, while enriching themselves with union resources, were more than obedient to the government. This generated distrust and, among the most radical, aversion to official institutions.

By the sixties the “left” was linked to revolutionary nationalism, through its institutions, or to atomized and minority organizations such as the PCM or other organizations such as the Liga Espartaco. Therefore:

One of the causes of this peripheral influence was the legitimacy of the regime, since pretending to make the revolution in a country where it had actually occurred was not something easy to propose to the subaltern classes (another important difference with the Latin American lefts) who, in addition, achieved a certain degree of welfare and social mobility during the 'Mexican miracle'.2

However, the erosion of the regime, both economically and in terms of legitimacy due to its evident corruption, led peripheral elements of disappointment and impotence to take up arms. It is not by chance that, disenchanted by corruption and radicalized by State violence, characters such as Lucio Cabañas, Génaro Vazquez and the members who attacked the barracks in Madera, Chihuahua, on September 23, 1965, participated, first, in an institutional manner and then decided to go underground. A part of the left was clear: another revolution was needed, a socialist one, and the State that was born of the Mexican Revolution could only be dealt with by arms since the elections were not reliable and its institutions were co-opted. The most radical within the PCM refused to follow the policy imposed by its authorities and decided to undertake a project of their own. They would go beyond revolutionary nationalism.

After 1965, the armed organizations became a serious problem for the regime, something that had not happened since the Mexican Revolution, and despite attempts during the six-year term of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) to co-opt or exterminate them, the situation reached unsustainable limits, both for the regime and for the organizations themselves.

To this was added the generational crisis, expressed politically in 1968, which led the government to use state forces at its discretion, in addition to torture and the military occupation of the state of Guerrero, provoking the discredit that the PRI and the Mexican Army continue to this day. The massacre of October 2, 1968 and then the state aggression, called Halconazo, on June 10, 1971 radicalized an ideologized sector of the youth that nurtured already existing organizations or founded new ones.

This article concentrates on one of these organizations: the 23 September Communist League and its theoretical texts, to explain its aversion to unions and its proposal, elaborated between 1976 and 1981, of armed combat through workers' councils. And this theory has coincidences with that of Anton Pannekoek, although he is not quoted.

Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón and David Jiménez Sarmiento: From the “Partidaria” to Madera 1973-1976

The 23 September Communist League was the unification of the remnants of the armed groups formed in response to the state aggressions of 1968 and 1971. In this conglomerate we find Los Feroces who confronted the political control of the Student Federation of Guadalajara (FEG)3 . First with fists and then with bullets. In Sinaloa, radicalization overtook the authorities of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa (UAS) and allowed the Enfermos4 to take control of it. On the other hand, one of the most industrialized areas of the country with a powerful business sector, Monterrey, was the cradle of the Processes5 : the ideologues of the League. In Mexico City, the brigades formed after 1968, such as Los Lacandones6 , among others, were fundamental. However, before being “the League” this attempt at unification was known as La Orga, or “Organización Partidaria” and made unsuccessful attempts at unification with Lucio Cabañas with whom they coordinated joint attacks on the Army7 and sent elements8 to Guerrero. However, the merger did not solidify. This organizational embryo perpetrated assaults in Monterrey, five on January 15, 1972, and in Chihuahua where Diego Lucero lost his life. Then, on February 6, Raul Ramos Zavala, leader of the Processes, died in a confrontation with the police, whose place would be taken by Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón.

The League was born in March 1973 with the First National Meeting in Guadalajara, in the territory of the FER, having as its fundamental document the texts known as old Maderas, which were later published as Cuestiones Fundamentales del Movimiento Revolucionario en México or El Cuestiones. Its name pays homage to the attempted assault on the barracks in Madera, Chihuahua on September 23, 1965.

The organization structured a National Coordinating Committee made up of representatives of the different groups with Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón as General Coordinator and depending on it a Management Bureau “...considered the highest executive body”9 made up of, among others, Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón and Leopoldo Ángulo Luken. It also formed a Military Committee under the responsibility of Leopoldo Angulo Luken, David Jimenez Sarmiento “Chano” and Francisco Alfonso Perez Rayon “La Papa”. Angulo Luken was also in charge of “...controlling and supervising the work of the Political-Military Coordinating Committees..."10 located in the Federal District, Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Baja California, Durango, State of Mexico, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Veracruz, Guerrero. From these first meetings the League tried to: “...support the revolutionary movement of the masses”,11 also “de-pistolize” police forces by attacking them to take away their weapons and to finance itself by robbing banks and kidnapping “bourgeoisie”.

In April 1973 they robbed a branch of the Banco General de México in Monterrey. In Guadalajara they “expropriated” the money from cash vans and a Surgical Material Supplier to obtain instruments. They also robbed stationery stores and schools where they were able to obtain propaganda material. They considered these actions as “expropriations”. For this purpose they operated with armed brigades, made up of around 5 militants, with a defined distribution of tasks, the most important of which were those linked to the distribution of their informative organ Madera, which was elaborated in April 1974.

Between July 1973 and January 1974 we have the Gray Period, with the failed kidnapping attempts that took the lives of businessmen such as Carlos Aranguren, Eugenio Garza Sada and the attempted insurrection, known as “Asalto al Cielo”, in Culiacán12 , in January 1974, which was put down by the army. The failures generated struggles among the members who considered the possibility of infiltration. In the meantime, they tried to act in other entities, for example, in Oaxaca and the mountains of Sonora13 .

In order to regroup forces, in July 1973, they held the 2nd National Meeting in Guadalajara. They considered reinforcing activities in the countryside and in the Bajío, in addition to the centralization of command. Internal contradictions appeared but Salas Obregón's faction managed to impose itself over the others which, together with the concern about the suspicion of infiltrators and the disasters, led to a reinforcement of his leadership by centralizing the command in him, which occurred in the Third National Meeting on April 2, 197414 , Salas Obregón, or Oseas, was the main promoter of the Mádera Newspaper as a collective organizer and tool for political education. He considered it as the main tool of the organization, even above weapons. This idea remained until the end of the armed group. Salas Obregón was captured in April 1974, after supervising the installation of one of the newspaper's printing presses15 . He is still missing.

David Jiménez Sarmiento: the Pen and the Iron 1974-1976

The Red Brigade of Mexico City, led by David Jiménez Sarmiento “Chano”, succeeded Salas Obregón and its leadership maintained the political line but emphasized the military one. The state forces were hunting the organization and it also decided to attack. The period between 1974 and 1976 is notable for the increase in ambushes and attacks on security forces, and is considered “militaristic” although activities linked to Madera were a priority. On the other hand, unlike the previous period, the military and political leadership was in one person, as with Salas Obregón, because while Jiménez Sarmiento had the first ideological leadership, reflected in Madera, Luis Miguel Corral García “El piojo blanco” and Migue Ángel Barraza García “El piojo negro” continued the theoretical work of Los Procesos. Having as their highest authority the Editorial Committee of Madera, of which they were members.

Las actividades de la Liga continuaron, siempre de manera limitada, incluso en las entidades con mayor actividad (DF, Sinaloa, Jalisco y Chihuahua) mientras las brigadas en estados como Oaxaca, Sonora, Nuevo León y Guerrero lucharon por subsistir, pero fueron neutralizadas por las autoridades y eventualmente exterminadas. En otras entidades la penetración del grupo armado, según el archivo de la DFS, fue anulada como en Hidalgo16 y Guanajuato17

The most complicated operations were the distribution of Madera because we found people who tried to prevent it and were executed18 . But where and by whom was the propaganda produced? In mid-1975 the DFS obtained information.

In a report dated May 3, 197519 , the authorities obtained information to locate a printing equipment, in the metropolitan area of Mexico City, with a value of 100,000 pesos20 and information on Madera's dissemination activities in factories. It was also learned of the League's intention to “... turn the group's ideology somewhat towards propaganda directed at workers' groups..."21 . Later in Guadalajara another printing plant was located, they found: “...the machinery of the printing plant... composed of a photographic camera with plate and rails of approximately 5 meters with a weight of one ton, a heavy guillotine, two one ton printers, an amplifier and several rolls of paper for printing”22 . With this equipment they produced, between December 1974 and the date of the capture of the facilities, around 15,000 Madera23 .

In Sonora the brigades operated in the so-called Golden Triangle of the highlands, and had serious ideological and operational differences with the League's leadership, which is probably why they were abandoned to their fate and quashed in November 1974 by the military. Meanwhile, propaganda activities such as graffiti and leafleting were reported in Obregón City and Empalme between June and October 1975.24 The “rural” brigades disappeared in Sonora. Subsequent activity was urban.

En Oaxaca las actividades de la Liga preocuparon all Gobernador de Oaxaca, pues a finales del 74, solicitó la intervención del Ejército.25 Cuando la Liga no podía proveer recursos las brigadas oaxaqueñas recurrieron también a "expropiciones" o a secuestros, sin embargo, las fuerzas estatales fueron más efectivas pues las actividades en Oaxaca, posteriores a 1975, son escasas. Otras brigadas en Veracruz y Baja California también fueron sofocadas. Sin embargo, en sus principales reductos como la Ciudad de México y su área metropolitana, Culiacán, Guadalajara y Cd. Juárez sus actividades no menguaban e incluso, como en el caso de la Brigada Roja, en ocasiones emboscaron a las fuerzas del orden.26

The authorities resorted to the distribution of flyers with photos of the League's militants “using helicopters and airplanes”27 offering $100,000 pesos for each militant.28 However, they also resorted to State Terrorism by creating a death squad: the White Brigade, as opposed to the League's Red Brigade, made up of 240 elements from the police, the Army and the DFS. Its main function was to “investigate and locate by all means the members of the so-called September 23rd Communist League”29 granting resources for their expenses “as many as necessary”.30 Their symbol was the tiger and they had the slogan: “the guerrillas must be killed like dogs”.31

By mid-1976 the League lost many elements. Although it also hurt the authorities, its attrition was greater and unsustainable. On August 11 of that year David Jiménez Sarmiento “Chano” died in the attempted kidnapping of the sister of the then President-elect. Thus, the most “militaristic” stage of the League ended and later we will find a more “discreet” strategy concentrated on propaganda.

Miguel Ángel Barraza García: For the Workers' Councils 1976-1981

Barraza García “El Piojo Negro” succeeded Jiménez Sarmiento as leader. The DFS, before Chano's fall in combat, already considered Barraza García as “...one of the main leaders of the LC23S, having under his responsibility the elaboration of the Madera Newspaper.”32

Under his leadership, the League continued to weaken, although its operational capabilities remained relatively effective. For example, they continued to be functional in the states, according to DFS documentation, where they had a relevant presence since their origin: Federal District, Jalisco and Sinaloa. Nuevo León was languishing. Oaxaca, Veracruz and Guerrero were in losses and, as in some other states, their activity was marginal. However, their activities grew slowly, although not so slowly, in Chihuahua. Ciudad Juarez was a stronghold which even managed to transfer resources and militants to other entities. The League was limited although, by 1976, it was far from being exterminated and was fierce.

In this period the League tried to get closer to the industrial workers and not to confront the authorities but only to defend itself. The League “attacked” the businessmen. In December 1976 they kidnapped Isaac Duek Amkie33 and on March 29, 1977 they did the same with Antonino Fernández Rodríguez, President of Cervecería Modelo. The DFS also detected the presence of armed militants of the League in a workers' meeting at the brewery where they were negotiating the signing of the Collective Labor Contract. They had a presence, although marginal, in the industry.

In the country's capital, high schools and university centers were important, especially those of the UNAM, and among work centers the DFS identified the Vallejo industrial zone where the League had activities through the brigade “Ignacio A. Salas”.34 The last kidnapping in Mexico City was that of Monica Perez Olagaray in 1979.

In Jalisco the focus of activity was Guadalajara with some activities in Zapopan. There are reports in those places until June 1978. And the activities, between 1976 and 1978, were propaganda, assaults and attacks on the police. In Sinaloa the cities of Culiacán and Mazatlán were between 1976 and 1979 the scenes of distribution of Periódico Madera. In the state of Chihuahua they grow in an unusual way, they are more numerous even compared to bastions such as Guadalajara or Culiacan, which we see in the files up to April 1979 where I found propaganda, attacks on the police and raids on safe houses.

On January 22, 1981 Barraza fell in combat against the police and weeks later Jose Grijalva Galaviz “El Zombie” was captured. The first was the visible head and the second the coordinator of contacts and bridges for the elaboration and distribution of Madera, which reached its last issue that year and with it the end of the organization.

• 1Aguilar Camín, H. (2012). Saldos de la Revolución. Historia y política de México 1910-1968. Mexico: Planeta, p. 61.
• 2Illades, C. (2011). La inteligencia rebelde. La izquierda en el debate público en México 1968-1989. México: Oceano, p. 195.
• 3Coming from the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER) and from popular neighborhoods, they tried to exercise political presence at the University of Guadalajara, however, they confronted the political springboard and student arm of the PRI in the region: the Federación de Estudiantes de Guadalajara (feg). When they did not find a channel for their political concerns and were attacked with impunity, they became radicalized and found the League's proposal attractive. See Aguayo, S. (2001). La Charola. Una historia de los servicios de inteligencia en México. Mexico: Grijalbo.
• 4They were a leftist student group with their center of activities at the Autonomous University of Sinaloa (UAS), who due to their radicalism were adversaries to the “peces” of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), and were so deeply rooted that they managed to take formal control of the university. In their heyday they joined the League, turning Sinaloa into one of the most important strongholds of the organization. See: Sánchez Parra, S. A. (2012). Estudiantes en armas. Una historia política y cultural del movimiento estudiantil de los enfermos (1972-1978), UAS and Academia de Historia de Sinaloa, A.C.
• 5Initially influenced by Jesuits of Liberation Theology at the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM), Raúl Ramos Zavala and José Ángel García Martínez, who participated in meetings as “Catholic Communists”, as they called themselves, with pure Catholics, including Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón. The activities of these students became evident to the ITESM board of trustees in 1972 when the Convention of Catholic Universities took place at the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City, where, led by Ignacio Arturo Salas Obregón, they provoked conflicts and were expelled. The name of their group comes from the text elaborated by Ramos Zavala El proceso revolucionario. See: Torres Martínez, H. (2014) Monterrey rebel 1970-1973. Un estudio sobre la Guerrilla Urbana, la sedición urbana y sus representaciones colectivas. Thesis for Master's Degree in History, Colegio de San Luis.
• 6Emerging at the end of 1969 and coming, some of them, from Marxist study circles, they formed beloved brigades that took the names Patria o Muerte, Lacandones and Arturo Gámíz. The appellation of the latter transcended in the press and became the appellation of the rest. They perpetrated assaults to finance themselves and even tried to join the demonstrations of June 10, 1971, but were forbidden to attend with weapons. Eventually, the police managed to capture them and disintegrated their brigades. By 1973, some of the few who remained at liberty joined the League. See: Tamariz Estrada, M. (2007). Operación 23 de Septiembre. Auge y exterminio de la guerrilla urbana en la Ciudad de México (Reportaje histórico). Bachelor's thesis in Communication and Journalism. Mexico: Facultad de Estudios Superiores, Aragón-Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
• 7For example, they participated in the attack on an army convoy on August 23, 1972.
• 8General Archive of the Nation (AGN), Federal Security Directorate (DFS), Peasant Execution Brigade, File 3, f. 73 and 74. In the declaration of Marisol Orozco Vega, made on July 4, 1974, it is mentioned that by the end of June 1972 “... they also went up to the mountains SAÚL LÓPEZ DE LA TORRE, MARINA ÁVILA SOSA, FABIAN TEPORACA, INES, ROQUE, HÉCTOR ESCAMILLA LIRA and ISIDORA LOPEZ CORREA, who gave political-military instruction to the members of the Party...”.
• 9Rangel Hemández, L. (2011). The 23 September Communist League 1973-1981. History of the organization and its militants. PhD thesis in History. Morelia: Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, p. 120.
• 10Ibid.
• 11López Limón, A. (2010). Historia de las organizaciones politico-militares de izquierda en México (1960-1980). PhD thesis in Political and Social Sciences. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales-Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, p. 32.
• 12AGN, DFS, “23 September Communist League,” file 1, sheet 259-260.
• 13Ibid., 1. 3, f. 113 and Madera Newspaper, no. 3, pp. 13023.
• 14Editorial Committee, (1974), “Participación de Oseas en la lucha revolucionaria en México en Periódico Madera N° 5, (35-37). Mexico City, p. 35.
• 15Proceso (2002). “El caso del fundador de la Liga Communist League 23 September, ante la Fiscalía Especial” Available at: http://www.proceso.com.mx/240057/el-caso-del-fun-dador-de-la-liga-23-de-septiembre-ante-la-fiscalia-especial-2 (accessed May 10, 2020).
• 16In Tula, Hidalgo on June 8, 1974 a couple of people “said” to belong to the League were reported to have been “agitating” at the PEMEX refinery. AGN, DFS, 23 September Communist League, I. 3, 1. 20.
• 17Propaganda and safe houses were located in Irapuato and Leon, respectively. Ibid., 1. 2, ff., 294 and 362. Also in 1. 3, f. 80.
• 18Ibid., 1. 3, ff. 328 and 1.4, 1. 126.
• 19Ibid., 1, 5, f. 27-29.
• 20Ibid., 1, 5, 1. 34
• 21Ibid., f. 326.
• 22Ibid., 1. 350.
• 23Ibid., p. 337.
• 24Ibid., I. 6 ff. 31,107, 270 and 272.
• 25Ibid., p. 210.
• 26Ibid., 1. 6, f. 169.
• 27Ibid., l. 8, f. 84.
• 28Ibid.
• 29García, G. (2008). “El gobierno creó en 1976 brigada especial para “aplastar” a guerrilleros en el valle de México” in La Jornada. Available at http://www.jornada.com.mx/2008/07/07/index.php?section=politica&article=014n1pol [Last accessed May 10, 2020].
• 30Ibidem
• 31 Rodríguez Castañeda, R. (2013). El policía. Perseguía, torturaba, mataba. Grijalbo,
  p. 89.
• 32López Limón, A. (2013). La Liga. Una cronología. Guadalajara: La casa del mago, p. 295
• 33AGN, DFS, 23 September Communist League, l 1.9. f. 1. In exchange for his life they demanded the reinstatement of 137 workers and payments for their pension as well as 25 million pesos according to: Editorial Board, “Nota a la Carta a los obreros de la Cervecería Modelo,” Madera, no. 30, April 1977, p. 7.
• 34AGN, DFS, Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre, 1. 11, f. 339.