From the Archives, this is a Police Document and briefly describes the role of so-called Red Army during the Kapp Putsch, in various places like Rhineland-Westphalia, Gotha, Pomerania and Central Germany. the It also has the names of several armed formations and their leaders in the Ruhr Region which took part in the Ruhr Uprising. It should be kept in mind that while the document talks about the "KPD" at several places, the leadership of the Party held onto the policy of "loyal opposition" and it was actually the local sections working against the Central Committee and with the KPD's Central Office, Secretariat Department [the Berlin Council Communist Opposition]. Later these local sections would join the KAPD, like in Düsseldorf, Stettin, Pomerania, Gotha, Vogtland etc. etc. and would constitute Military Units of the KAPD there. Also, it is to be mentioned that most of the commanders of the Ruhr Red Army were Council Communists [see Heinrich August Winkler and Erhard Lucas]. The original document can be found in "Kommunistische Kampforganisationen: Kommunistische Kampforganisationen" with the signature "StAB, 4.65, 1220" in the Bremen State Archives.
From various quarters, the claim is still maintained today that:
1. Even the radical left-wing parties during the March unrest rose merely to fend off the Kapp Putsch and pursued no other goals, and that
]2. There can be no talk of a prior military organization of the insurgents, but rather that it was merely an unguided movement of armed bands.
In stark contrast to this, numerous reports and documents prove:
Regarding 1: That in the circles of the USPD and the KPD, long before the Kapp Putsch, a overthrow of the constitutional government was anticipated and preparations were made for a coordinated action, and
Regarding 2: That organizations of the Red Army existed long before March 1920.
An organizational guide was submitted. On October 4, 1919, a draft titled "Structure and Guidelines of the Red Army During Illegality," confiscated in Upper Silesia in September 1919, was received here. A copy is attached. The statutes transmitted on October 5, 1919, from Braunschweig reveal the preparations already made there in October 1919.
No specific date for a government overthrow was set; rather, they wanted to wait for a favorable opportunity to strike together. The Klassenkampf wrote on January 31, 1920: 'For Germany, we must consider two possibilities of revolutionary development: one being the possibility of a putsch from the right, etc. Such a putsch would likely trigger a counteraction from the left and put an end to the rule of the bourgeoisie in Germany, etc.'
This favorable opportunity for revolution was seen in the Kapp Putsch. Evidence is provided by discovered stamp impressions bearing the inscription:
"Action Committee Hagen, March Revolution 1920."
In January 1920, as evidence of the systematically prepared and confidently anticipated action by the communists, the attached proclamation was found among arrested Spartacists near Leipzig.
It was known that preparations for an overthrow had been made earlier in the Ruhr region. On August 8, 1919, the Association for the Protection of Common Economic Interests in Rhineland and Westphalia informed the Minister of the Interior that the formation of a Red Guard was being pursued for the purpose of overthrowing the government and implementing the communist program. On January 10, 1920, another submission drew attention to the overthrow plans. These preparations for a violent coup can also be seen in the attached letter (copy) from the Düsseldorf Enforcement Commission dated January 30, 1919. The letter was found in a KPD office. Months before the Kapp Putsch, reports had reached the government president in Düsseldorf and the VI Military District Command in Münster, indicating that a large-scale uprising was planned by communist-syndicalist circles for the spring, or at the latest the early summer months. The Kapp Putsch gave the movement’s leaders the signal to act earlier. The government president in Düsseldorf writes about this in a report sent on April 14, 1920, by the State Commissioner for Public Order to the Reichswehr Ministry, as follows:
"How well the current uprising had been prepared long in advance is demonstrated by the extraordinarily rapid establishment of the 'Red Army,' even in the western parts of the administrative district that had remained calm until the end. From the very first moment, its military organization functioned excellently. The equipment—not only with weapons and ammunition but with everything necessary for regular warfare, from appropriately assembled truck convoys to the individual fighter’s knapsack—was excellent and can only be explained by systematic preparation. The military leadership positions must have been assigned long ago, and the entire mobilization must have been prepared down to the smallest detail.
As a preliminary example, it should now only be mentioned that as soon as the preparations for the departure of the Reichswehr from Düsseldorf became known and were communicated by party officials, who arrived in an automobile, to the working-class district of Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, within a few minutes hundreds of workers armed with military rifles emerged from the houses and assembled into companies and battalions to place themselves at the disposal of the leaders seizing executive power."
The radical left had the firm intention to realize their goals at the opportunity presented by the Kapp Putsch. The report of the mayor of the city of Hamborn shows how the radical left pursued the intention from the outset to overthrow the constitutional government by force of arms. On March 13, 1920, the same day Kapp seized governmental power in Berlin, the KPD in Düsseldorf issued a written call for the overthrow of the Ebert-Noske government. On March 13 and 14, 1920, the KPD also proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat through circulars.
Regarding the connection between radical left preparations and the uprising in larger parts of the Reich, the attached discovered sketches provide clarification. They show where the KPD intended to deploy combat troops and in which directions they planned to use them. Sketch 3 indicates an offensive from the industrial region of the west. According to the explanations, the activity was to begin either on general instruction or upon a signal from the east.
The fact that the "Northwest" district of the KPD, i.e., Hanover, Braunschweig, etc., was not included in the plan suggests that it was drawn up at a time when the Northwest district of the KPD had distanced itself from the KPD central leadership, i.e., in early or mid-January 1920.
The firm resolve for an overthrow and the preparations found their strongest expression in the speed with which the Red Army emerged.
During the Kapp Putsch, organized "Red Troops" appeared simultaneously in many parts of the Reich. The radical left parties called for the formation of this Red Army. The uprising was directed—this is shown by the situation report of the Communist Party of Germany, Central Office, Secretariat Department Greater Berlin, dated March 27, 1920. According to this, the KAP initially, and two days later the KPD, called for the establishment of armed cadres.
The organization of the Red Army also originated in many places from the "Red Soldiers’ League," which collaborated with the "Red Sailors’ League." However, since the initially public recruitment efforts could easily be tracked, this movement gradually receded. The leading bodies of the radical left parties then secretly created new combat organizations. Staffs (executive committees, combat leaderships, section commands, subsection commands) and troop units were established. The intelligence service was expanded. Medical and logistical facilities were set up.
The armament came partly from caches of the communist workforce, partly from overwhelmed citizens’ militias, police, or troop units. The Red Troops were equipped with stabbing weapons, pistols, rifles, hand grenades, machine guns, mortars, and artillery. Rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades were the most prevalent.
Insight into the structure and composition of the Red units is provided by the discovered name lists and individual identification cards, some of which are attached. They demonstrate the care taken in the preparations.
In Pomerania, membership cards of the Workers’ Militia were found, signed by the "Command of the Workers’ Militia." In Stettin itself, the Red Guards possessed red identification cards, with which the "Military Leadership of the Action Committee" certified their right to bear arms. In Mecklenburg, the Agricultural Workers’ Union was militarily organized. In Wismar, a plan drawn on a 1:100,000 map for the defense of Wismar and adjacent areas by 12 workers’ battalions was confiscated from a communist. Carefully crafted armbands made of thick red wool fabric with buckles were taken from armed workers near Wismar. Such armbands are available in their original form at the Reichswehr Ministry. They bear various embroidered battalion and company insignia (e.g., II.5, V.1). The train and company identification cards signed by the "Troop Command of the Republic of Gotha" on March 23, 1920, are simultaneously stamped with "Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council Gotha."
Written instructions taken from the Red Troops in Berlin in March 1920 are attached. A combat report is also included.
In general, the Red troop units appeared in the strength of companies or in formations of several companies. In Rostock, eight Red battalions were identified. In the Rhineland-Westphalian industrial region, significantly larger formations were deployed under higher command structures.
The units appearing in Central Germany were armed and organized workers from individual localities, near which they also remained. Only the communist Hölz undertook larger raids with his Red Guards. However, at greater distances, only 300 men followed him. In the Rhineland-Westphalian industrial region, however, the red companies formed in the cities advanced to the "front" either individually or grouped into detachments and were deployed there by the central leadership of the Red Army, initially based in Marl. Operations against Wesel were directed from the headquarters in Marl. A written order regulated the command structure for the eastern and western sectors. Discovered orders are signed and stamped by the "Military High Command of the Red Army." Each of the two sectors, East and West, consisted of subsections I and II, to which the companies were subordinated. The left flank was further divided into three smaller combat sections; at times, parts of the front were grouped into assault units. The Reichswehr troops sent by the Reich government to restore state authority in the area occupied by the Red Army brought back manifold written evidence of the Red Army’s structure and activities. Examples are attached. Annex 52 contains the regulations (articles of war) of the Red Army and the oath formula. According to original written evidence, the following formations existed, among others:
1. Company Rosa Luxemburg, Essen-Schönebeck, strength 91, leader Gustav Brandt from Erckenschwick.
2. Company Hugo Haase, Bochum, strength..., leader Plesemann.
3. Company Heim, Essen, strength..., leader Heim-Essen.
4. Company Krausch, strength...
5. Company Rothe, Recklinghausen-Süd, strength...
6. Company Suderwich, strength...
7. Company Duisburg, strength 108, leader Starzinski.
8. Company Duisburg, strength 65, leader Spitzkeith.
9. Company Duisburg, strength 82, leader Engels.
10. Company Duisburg-Meiderich, strength 347, leader Wons.
11. Company Duisburg, strength 153, leader Osten (Max).
12. Company Duisburg, strength 119, leader Wehling.
13. Company Essen, strength..., leader Thielmann.
14. Company Essen, strength..., leader Lorenz.
15. Company Essen, strength..., leader Schwarz.
16. Assault Company Duisburg, strength 242, leader Grambon.
17. Free Company Hamborn, strength..., leader...
18. Company Hamborn, strength..., leader Kaufmann (?).
19. Company Düsseldorf, strength..., leader Faber (Johann).
20. Company Düsseldorf, strength..., leader Hirsch (Friedr.).
21. Company Düsseldorf, strength 88, leader Liedtke.
22. Company Dortmund-Hengede, strength..., leader Hillenbrandt.
23. Machine Gun Detachment Düsseldorf, strength 199, leader Elze.
24. Company Dortmund, Section Cohen, strength..., leader...
25. Platoon Oberhausen, strength..., leader Hacker (Herm.).
26. Company Schladowski-Osterfeld, strength 68.
27. Company Mottkowsky-Osterfeld, strength 38.
28. Machine Gun Detachment Osterfeld, strength 23.
29. Company Wüffel-Hieschr, Essen, strength 75.
30. Company Roth (Wolfski), Essen, strength 83.
31. Company Limburg, Essen, strength 37.
32. 1st Company Rosa Luxemburg, Essen, strength 34, leader Eifert.
33. 2nd Company Rosa Luxemburg, Essen, strength 20, leader Abranowski.
34. Company Herder, Essen, strength 35, leader...
35. Company Kruppe, Essen, strength 34, leader Andreas.
36. Company Wolf, Essen, strength..., leader...
37. Company Rond, Horst-Emscher, strength 35, leader...
38. Company Mohrfeld, Horst-Emscher, strength..., leader...
39. Assault Company Franz Giehs, Wehofen, strength 60.
40. Assault Company Adolf Schäfer, Wehofen, strength 86.
41. Company Zalter-Hallert, Wehofen, strength 50.
42. Company Limburg, Mülheim, strength 60.
43. Company Pams, Mülheim, strength 50.
44. Company Beckmann, Mülheim, strength 83.
45. Company Rosa, Mülheim, strength 37, leader Pollock.
46. Company Detachment Mülheim, strength 22.
47. Detachment Dungs, Mülheim, strength 15.
48. Detachment Prinz, Mülheim, strength 60.
49. Shock Troop Kreideweiss, Oberhausen, strength 42.
50. Company Pitroschewski, Oberhausen, strength 42.
51. Company Triebele-Zahn, Oberhausen, strength 42.
52. Company Fr. Pohl, Düsseldorf, strength 45.
53. 1st Detachment, Düsseldorf, strength 19, leader Hirsch (Fr.).
54. 2nd Detachment, Düsseldorf, strength 71, leader Welter (Peter).
55. 3rd Detachment, Düsseldorf, strength 56, leader Weinand (Peter).
56. Company Alex, Hamborn, strength 47, leader...
57. Company Magura, Hamborn, strength 86, leader Nennrühl.
58. Company Hamborn, strength 157, leader Bardotsch (Ed.).
59. Free Company Hamborn, strength 60, leader Maltzik (Rob.).
60. Company Meyer, Icken (Dortmund District), strength 35.
61. Company Otto Querling, Gerresheim, strength 195.
62. 2 Companies of 70 men each, Lohberg, total strength 140.
63. Detachment Gladbeck, Meldrich, Solingen, and Oberbilk, total strength 96.
64. Company Dortmund, Lohberg, strength 22, leader Paradies (K.).
65. Company Blaseck, Lohberg, strength 30, leader...
66. Detachment Alex Pickatzeck, Lohberg, strength 47.
67. Detachment Gröger, Lohberg, strength 20.
68. Company Schwab, Oberhausen, strength 20.
69. Company Strehlau, Essen, strength 46.
70. Company Nüffel, Essen, strength 67.
71. Company (Freischützen), Horst-Emscher, strength 75, leader Rath.
72. 2 Companies Bottrop (deployed between Holsterhausen-Schermbeck on March 23 and 28, subordinated to Section II).
73. Company Rosa Luxemburg, strength 30, leader Kalla from Hüls.
74. Company Horst I, strength 50, leader Schülz or Barnickel.
75. 2 Companies Eisner, Marl, strength 29, leader Otto Krumbholz.
76. Company Haase, Schönebeck near Essen, strength 41 (mostly Poles), leader Gustav Kansikát, deputy Josef Solecki.
77. Company Trotsky, Hervest-Dorsten-Holsterhausen, strength 41, leader Tarwichen, Hans, deputy Otto Fidora.
78. Company (name unknown), strength 150, leader... (including Shock Troop "Steinern Kreuz").
79. Company Bebel, strength 157, leader Döhmen (Karl), (also Bicycle Detachment, strength 27).
80. Company H. Bossendorf, strength 23, leader Schmidt.
81. Company Liebknecht, Bertlich (Assault Troop), strength 29, leader Adolf Essenberg.
82. 1st Company Buer, strength 65, leader...
83. 1st Company Herten, strength 36, leader...
84. Company Hain-Essen, strength 51, leader...
85. 4th Company Gelsenkirchen, strength..., leader Sommer.
86. 1st Company Gelsenkirchen (Battalion), strength..., leader Wilhelm Krischack, deputy Branner, Paul.
87. Company Essen II, strength..., leader... (deployed near Marl).
88. Company Liebknecht, strength 40, leader...
89. Company Hitern, strength 26, leader...
90. Company Loreley.
91. 1st Company Bochum, strength 50, leader...
92. 2nd Company Bochum, strength 83, leader...
93. 3rd Company Bochum, strength..., leader... (with Machine Gun Platoon).
94. 4th Company Bochum, strength 42, leader...
95. 7th Company Bochum, strength 24, leader...
96. 8th Company Bochum, strength 65, leader...
97. 1st Company Hamborn, strength..., leader Kluwig.
98. 4th Company Hamborn, leader Sedelasczk (only 12 men remaining).
99. Company Rosa, strength 41, leader Kuhfdss.
100. 1st Company Dortmund, strength..., leader...
101. 5th Company Dortmund, strength..., leader...
102. 7th Company Dortmund, strength..., leader...
103. Company Lohberg, strength 64, leader Emil Holzig.
104. Company Lohberg, strength 40, leader Friedrich Gerecke (deployed April 2, 1920, eastern flank).
105. 11th Company Duisburg-Laar (allegedly including a special Russian detachment of about 40 men forming the core of the group, leader an active Russian officer).
106. Company Kimmel, strength 90, deployed near Hervest and Dorsten.
107. Company Kureck, strength 70, deployed near Hervest and Dorsten.
108. 4 Bicycle Stations of 3-4 cyclists each, leader Popper.
109. 1st Medical Column Marl, strength 29, leader Otto Hartmann.
110. Battery Ibsen.
Heavy artillery was used by the insurgents near Wesel and Friedrichsfeld. A 10-centimeter cannon and a 15-centimeter howitzer were captured there. In total, the following were deployed in the Ruhr region:
1 heavy field howitzer.
2 10-centimeter guns.
1 12-centimeter gun.
4 naval guns of various calibers.
The foregoing statements demonstrate the prepared organization in which the Red Army emerged in March. It proved itself a serious opponent there and trained its troops.
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