Tunisia: Emergency state restructuring after an incomplete attempt at democratic insurrection - Mouvement Communiste and Kolektivně proti kapitálu

INTRODUCTION

For over a month, the Tunisian state faced a spontaneous social conflagration following the suicide of a young peddler in Sidi Bouzid, in the centre-west part of the country. First there were sit-ins, then demonstrations and riots spread from this little-developed region throughout the country and then to the capital, Tunis, and to the more economically dynamic coastal area. When proletarians are willing to defy the forces of repression with bare hands and not retreat from the bullets of the police, they bring to oppositional ferment a determination that can shake state power, despite the more than 100 deaths reported. This is exactly what happened in Sidi Bouzid during the final days of December 2010 and in the first half of January 2011. Thus, in three stages, the movement which began in the south spread to all regions of Tunisia, to finally conclude in Tunis beginning on 11 January.

The intervention of the proletariat in the Tunisian political scene forced a reshuffling of the cards of executive power. The former dictator Ben Ali had to leave Tunisia on 14 January, thus becoming the first leader of an Arab country to leave power under pressure from the street, and the opposition parties and other major players in the Tunisian government are now trying to take their places in a new government.

But as far as workers’ strikes are concerned, none had affected the country prior to the fall of Ben Ali. After that event, first in the public sector and then in the private sector, strikes broke out, and the wind of insubordination continues to blow, even if the UGTT (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, the official state-linked union) is still containing working-class potential.

The text thus comprises:

• A detailedchronology,
• An economicoverview,
• A historicaloverview,
• An analysis ofthe complex relations between the UGTT and the RCD,
• A study of thestrength of the Islamists,
• An assessmentof the movement in the larger society,
• An analysis ofworkers’ struggles,
• A tentativeconclusion,
• Appendices.

CHRONOLOGY

The fall of Ben Ali

17 December

Mohamed Bouazizi, a young street vendor of Sidi Bouzid (West Central Tunisia), 265 km from Tunis, protests against the seizure of his goods by the police and sets himself afire. The troubles begin the following day, December 18.

When he dies on January 4, a crowd of 5,000 people attends his burial.

19-20 December

Clashes between police and a young protesters’ “right to work” march in Sidi Bouzid and in the town near Meknessi. Dozens are arrested, according to the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR).

24 December

The disorders extend to Bouzayane Menzel (60 km from Sidi Bouzid) where police fire on protesters, killing two and injuring others. It is important to note that the repression and provocations of the police (especially the services under the thumb of Ben Ali) have been particularly deadly in this part of the country. This geographical area, like the south and part of the north, is one of the less developed regions.

28 December

In the wake of new protests against unemployment and the high cost of living in several cities, including Tunis, Ben Ali denounces a “political instrumentalization” of the disorders. To try to defuse the uprising, he dismisses the governor of Sidi Bouzid on the 30th.

3 January

Demonstration in Thala (Central West). The violence is marked by looting and the burning of government buildings. Numerous arrests. Violence also in Saida, near Sidi Bouzid.

6 January

Thousands of lawyers go on strike and demonstrate.

8-10 January

Bloody riots in Kasserine, capital of Thala, where the army is deployed around government buildings, and in Regueb near Sidi Bouzid. 21 are dead in riots, according to the authorities, more than 50 according to the UGTT. Further clashes in Kairouan, the local capital of the central region; demonstrations beginning at the University of Rakkada escalate into clashes with police in the city centre and others are reported in communities in this region, also in the grip of unemployment.

The fifth suicide since December 17 occurs; an unemployed university graduate, Alla Hidouri, 23, commits suicide near Sidi Bouzid; he was shot in the leg in clashes that left two dead and several injured on Dec. 24 in Menzel Bouazaine1. Further concessions by Ben Ali in a televised speech in which he denounces terrorist acts, while promising to create 300,000 more jobs by 2012.

11 January

The violence continues in Kasserine. Clashes erupt in the evening for the first time in a suburb of Tunis. Demonstrations by artists and regime opponents are repressed in the capital. Closing of schools and universities.

12 January

The Prime Minister announces the dismissal of the Interior Minister and the release of those arrested, except those involved in acts of vandalism, and the formation of a commission of inquiry into corruption.

The army is deployed in Ettadhamen (western suburbs) and in Tunis, where police used tear gas. Two civilians are killed by police in Douz (south) at a demonstration. Five demonstrators are shot and wounded in clashes in Sfax (Southeast) Arrest of the leader of the Communist Party of Tunisian Workers (the PCOT, which is banned). This is the first political leader arrested since the riots began. A night curfew is declared in Tunis and its suburbs.

EU condemns the disproportionate use of force and the UN calls on the Tunisian government to hold “credible, independent” investigations of the violence.

13 January

Tunis is tightly patrolled by Special Forces after the first night of curfew as clashes take place in the suburbs of the capital, and particularly in the city of Ettadhamen, where repression results in at least one death.

No official figures have been published on the violence that took place in this city and in Intilaka, home to some 30,000 inhabitants and located about 15 km from the centre of Tunis. The army withdraws from the capital, where it had deployed 24 hours earlier, while the country is plunged into an unprecedented challenge to the regime.

On the same day, armoured units and police intervention replace the army on Habib Bourguiba Avenue, a central artery, and in Barcelona Square. Buses filled with riot police are parked in the side streets leading to the main avenue, and enhanced security forces can be seen on the road to the presidential palace in Carthage. Armoured cars of the special intervention police and army trucks are also deployed in the plush northern suburbs of Tunis. The withdrawal of the army comes after violent clashes between security forces and youth on Wednesday night and into Thursday in two neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Tunis, despite a night curfew imposed for an indefinite period, the first such measure since the coming to power of Ben Ali (also known as ZABA, his full initials) in 1987. This day was apparently particularly deadly, the number of protesters shot dead possibly exceeding 30 across the country, almost half of them in Tunis. According to several witness accounts, the shooters positioned themselves on terraces and deliberately cut down their victims. The government of President Ben Ali, however, tries to calm the situation with the dismissal of the Interior Minister and with the release of all persons arrested, to “except those involved in acts of vandalism.”

On the campus of the Universityof Tunis, teachers gather to protest the murder of a professor of computer science, Hatem Bettahar, a French-Tunisian, who was killed the day before by police fire in Douz, in the south of the country.

Following the peaceful march in response to the death of a receptionist in the resort town of Hammamet (60 km south of Tunis) people put up barricades while others loot a seaside resort. Destruction of a police station and a local office of the RDC.

According to the IFHR, at least 58 people had been killed up to that point in the unrest, since mid-December, and the organization denounces “a continuing massacre”.

14 January

A rally begins in the morning on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, attracting all social classes. Without slogans or banners or guiding organization, the march begins in front of the Municipal Theatre to the Ministry of Interior. The protesters chant: “Rally, rally, until the fall of the government!” The gathering turns into a riot, with violent clashes between demonstrators and riot police. Army tanks are deployed to the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as to the national television and radio stations. Around 2 p.m., Prime Minister Ghannouchi announces: “The head of state has decided, in the context of the initiatives he announced on Thursday night, to dissolve the government and to call on the Prime Minister to propose the formation of a new government, and to organize early parliamentary elections within the next six months.”

A state of emergency is declared. The army controls the airport, and Tunisian airspace is closed.

Mohammed Ghannouchi says on TV at5 p.m. that he will be acting as interim president in place of Ben Ali, who has left the country. That night, Ben Ali fled, becoming the first leader of an Arab country to leave power under pressure from the street. Later that night, Ben Ali arrives in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Establishment of the new government

15 January

Security forces are set up in the heart of the city. That Saturday, Tunisian Prime Minister-designate Mohammed Ghannouchi declares, “The authorities are making every effort to restore order in the country, in whose opinion the continuation of the looting is unacceptable”. Police and supporters of the former Tunisian President Ben Ali are implicated in attacks and abuses against the population in Tunis, according to the witness report of a French diplomat. The head of the Tunisian parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, is sworn in as interim president of Tunisia and states that “no one will be excluded” from the political process.

Looting of houses, some owned by the Trabelsi, the in-laws of the fallen president, take place in La Marsa, a wealthy suburb twenty miles north of Tunis.

16 January

The curfew is reduced by one hour in Tunis. But clashes erupt in the afternoon in the centre of the city. The army storms the presidential palace in Carthage, where elements of the presiden­tial guard of Ben Ali are holed up. Police in the grounds of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (the Business School), near the presidential palace, call on the army to rescue them. Two snipers are killed by the army, in the city centre in the early phase of clashes between armed militia and regular forces. Somewhat earlier, Ben Ali’s former security chief, General Ali Seriate, is arrested and accused of being responsible for atrocities against the population. A nephew of Ben Ali is detained by the army in central Tunisia on Saturday night.

To deal with the threats and looting of the night before, vigilance committees are set up and spread quickly in various neighbourhoods, organizing patrols to protect the inhabitants. Several witnesses attribute the looting and atrocities in recent days to members of the security apparatus linked to Ben Ali, who seek to sow panic and to set the stage for his return. “We must not overlook the power to inflict harm of the presidential security force headed by Ali Seriate; it had thousands of followers of Ben Ali.”

The Prime Minister gathers together representatives of the political parties and from civil society to appoint people to guide the transition process until the elections.

17 January

“It has been decided by consensus to sideline the pro-government parties. The new government will include representatives from the Ettajdid movement, from the PDP, from the Democratic Front for Labour and Freedom, as well as independent personalities.” These formations were part of the legal opposition. The three parties had demanded a general amnesty for all political prisoners.

18 January

Mohammed Ghannouchi announces the formation of a government of national unity, the release of all prisoners of conscience, total freedom of information and the lifting of the ban on all non-governmental organizations including the LTDH.

19 January

On Wednesday, the interim president delivers his first speech since taking office on the evening of a new day of protests. “I commit the transitional government to overseeing a complete break with the past,” he said. The day before, he had decided to leave the RCD (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, the renamed ruling party since independence) with Prime Minister Ghannouchi. Fouad Mebazaa tried to calm things down, committing himself to grant all the legitimate aspirations of the uprising. He promised an imminent general amnesty, total freedom of information, the independence of the judiciary and the separation between the state and the party. The new authorities multiply their goodwill gestures to the street. The new Minister of Development, Najib Chebbi, from the ranks of the opposition, announces that all political detainees, including members of the banned Islamist movement Ennahda, have been released.

Thousands of Tunisians once again take to the streets of Tunis, Sidi Bouzid, Regueb and Kasserine to demand the removal of the figures of the old regime’s national unity government. In all, four members of the new team resigned the day before, dissatisfied with its compos­ition. “The population made sacrifices”, said Mustapha Ben Jaafar, leader of the Demo­cratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (and one of the resigning ministers). “Tunisians are not ready to return home by giving a blank check to a team that is not completely cleansed of legacy of Ben Ali”. The curfew in force since Friday is relaxed.

20 January

In Tunis, a thousand people protest outside the headquarters of the RCD, to demand the resignation of the government. The army fires warning shots to deter demonstrators from climbing the wall. The protesters manage to reach the interior ministry and continue their march to the headquarters of the RCD, passing through the police cordon on Avenue Habib Bourguiba without violence. The “street” and part of the opposition question the presence of eight members of the former Ben Ali entourage in the transitional government formed Monday, 16 January.

28 January

The demonstrators, who had been camping for days outside the offices of the Prime Minister on the place de la Kasbah, are removed by police. The anti-riot units use tear gas against demonstrators gathered under the windows of the office of Prime Minister. At least five people are injured during the clashes. An unusual morning silence has prevailed since the beginning of the week at the Kasbah, where hundreds of protesters are again camped under the windows of the seat of the government to discuss in small groups the next step for their movement.

Mohammed Ghannouchi wants to meet the protesters laying siege to the government. Consultations are held in the morning between union representatives and demonstrators. The general secretary of the UGTT Abdessalam Jrad speaks with Ghannouchi, who accepts the principle of a meeting with the protesters. The UGTT tries to convince the demonstrators to return to their provinces, following the formation the night before of a transitional government cleansed of the principal caciques of the Ben Ali regime, which the trade union had tacitly endorsed. Five of the seven former ministers of the last government of Ben Ali are replaced by technocrats and independent persons not known to the public.

But the retention of Prime Minister Ghannouchi is challenged by the most radical fringe among the demonstrators. “The majority wants to continue to a full cleansing,” said one of the approximately 300 demonstrators, mostly from the provinces, who camped at the Kasbah. After singing the national anthem and raising the Tunisian flag as they have done every morning, the protesters discuss what to think and what to do. The UGTT will participate in mid-day in a meeting with the opposition; the Bar Association and other components of civil society are trying to adopt a common position on the new government, according to Fethi Belhaj, spokesman for the nationalist and progressive current.

Mouldi Jandoubli, executive member of the UGTT, says: “A government is in place. I believe that’s the right attitude. The economy must start up again, and people have to go back to work.”

Provisional Epilogue

15 February

A group of 28 parties and organizations of different political views (Ennahdha, the Front of January 14, etc.1 , and the UGTT) call on 15 February for the establishment of the Council for the Protection of the Revolution. This body seeks to pay homage to those who lost their lives, and to maintain the aspirations of the Tunisian people.

27 February

Ghannouchi announces his resignation as Prime Minister; he calls on Tunisians to protect the revolution against all those attempting to cause its failure, and to confront the violence and looting committed by its enemies. That evening Mr Beji Caid Essebsi is appointed as Prime Minister. An old warhorse, 84 years old, he had already been in the colonial administration, as well as a minister under Bourguiba and Ben Ali.

1 March

The NCPC calls on the interim president of the republic to dissolve the provisional government and to initiate consultations “to ensure a national consensus around the choice of a prime minister and to form a provisional government to manage on-going affairs, having members known for their competence and not involved with the former regime.” He says “it has been proposed, in response to the draft decree presented by the interim President of the Republic, to oversee the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution, setting its objectives, composition and the conduct of its work ... [] ... in order to elect a constituent assembly that will be responsible for drafting the new constitution of the Republic and for managing the transitional stage.”

9 March

A county court in Tunis on Wednesday announces the dissolution of the RCD, causing an explosion of joy in the room. Already suspended on 6 February from any activity, the RCD, founded on 27 February, 1988 by Ben Ali, claimed more than two million members out of more than 10 million people.

12 March

The Tunisian Press Agency (TAP) announces a curfew imposed on the evening of Saturday, 12 March in the town of Metlaoui (south) after incidents on Friday and Saturday that left two dead and over 20 injured during clashes between locals over the issue of jobs. Clashes erupted following the posting of false job offers at the Gafsa Phosphate Company (Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa) (CPG), proposing quotas on a clan basis. The unrest continues on Friday and Saturday, forcing the authorities to declare a curfew. Units of the Guard and the National Army intervene, make arrests, and seize 16 hunting rifles.

In 2008, the Gafsa mining region was shaken by a lengthy strike, severely repressed by the regime of Ben Ali. The workers had revolted against massive layoffs at the CPG. The company had gone in a few months from 15,000 jobs to 5000, due to restructuring and modernization.

In the same period in Ksar Hellal (20 km south of Monastir), fights between locals and immigrants from the interior had resulted in the destruction of the makeshift homes of immigrants, who had come to work in the textile mills, as well as their return home.

14 March

The Tunisian government refuses to legalize five parties, including three Islamist ones: Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party), As-Salam (Peace) and the Sunni party (the other two are Free and Democratic People’s Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Tunisia), determining that they were not founded on democratic principles. Three other parties are legalized: the Party of Justice and Freedom, the Party of the Future for Development and Democracy, and the Movement of Democratic Patriots.

17 March

Hillary Clinton meets with the president. She assured him of US support for Tunisia and for a successful transition. Meanwhile tens of Ettahrir Islamist party activists express their aim of expelling American interests from Tunisian territory, speaking of “an occupation and of an American massacre of the Tunisian population.”

21 March

Many Tunisian NGOs (ATFD, LTDH, etc.) call for an increased presence of civil society in the interior regions. In keeping with this, two new sections of the ATFD will be established in Kairouan and Gafsa. The same goes for the LTDH, which plans to open branches in all parts of the country, in order to collect citizens’ complaints.

24 March

People sitting in for two weeks in the Kasbah Square are arrested for assault and for insulting aides of the Prime Minister.

28 March

The Tunis Appellate Court turns down the appeal of the RCD; the party is dissolved for good.

29 March

The curfew in the city of Metlaoui is set from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. instead of 7 p.m. to 5 a.m.

31 March

Less than a hundred people demonstrate on Thursday in the centre of Tunis to protest the window dressing of the political transition and to demand real change.

April 1

The government must approve several bills supporting businesses, agriculture and fisheries, for jobs (the creation of 20,000 positions in the public sector, the creation of internships and increased aid for the unemployed) and for regional development (restructuring of the budget allocations to regional and local authorities). The government also calls on Tunisians to return to work and redouble their efforts.

The Avenue Habib Bourguiba is the scene of lively demonstrations. The demonstrators, called out by the Ettahrir Party, had just left the mosques after prayers. Their demands are for religious freedom, mainly for the wearing of the headscarf (hijab).

The Financial Markets Authority (AMF), established to monitor the stock exchange, decides to terminate the business listing of 123 Tunisian companies presumed to be involved in numerous cases of illegality by the Trabelsi-Ben Ali clan in recent years.

The number of Tunisians from Kasserine fleeing Libya is estimated at over 2,000 people; the authorities decide today to expedite social services to them such as free access to health care, low-cost loans and automatic enrolment of their children in the nearest schools.

4 April

Silvio Berlusconi announces that a technical committee of the Ministries of the Interior of Tunisia and Italy will begin an investigation of illegal immigration, after his meeting with the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government Beji Caid Essebsi.

5 April

Following protests from environmentalists and accusations of being in the hands of the Trabelsi family, the Afripaper factory in Chebika (Kairouan) decides to close its doors.

The Franco-Tunisian Oil Company ceases operations (following British Gas) in the wake of repeated sit-ins by locals demanding jobs and more development in the Bir Lytayim region near Sfax. This is in spite of an agreement between locals and the company for the hiring of five graduates and grants of 5,000 dinars to twenty others for various projects, in addition to 250,000 dinars for the installation of drinking water for 200 families.

8 April

The Prime Minister announces the creation of 60,000 jobs: 20,000 in the civil service; 20,000 in other state institutions (military and security); 20,000 in the private sector.

11 April

The Supreme body for the realization of the goals of the Revolution, political reform and a democratic transition (sic) approves Article 15 of the law decreed for the election of the National Constituent Assembly, which prohibits members of the dissolved RCD from running for the National Constituent Assembly. Equality of the sexes is also adopted2 .

14 April

The UNHCR reports that more than 500 Libyans, mostly Berbers, have fled the conflict in western Libya and found refuge in the region of Dehiba the south in the south; beginning April 7, the Minister of Trade and Tourism Houas Mehdi says the prices of consumer staples (cereals and flour, vegetable oil, skimmed milk, tomato paste and sugar) will not increase in the coming period, noting the importance the government attaches to the provisional General Compensation Fund (GCF). Compensation would reach 1,256 million dinars.

14 May

The Tunisian Labour Party, the political expression of the UGTT, announces on Saturday, 14 May, 2011, its entry into the public arena. Its goal is to gather and build reinforcements for a progressive republican bloc. The “Labourites” cast a wide net among voters from the centre-right to the far left.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Presentation

Beginning as a semi-colonial economy at independence in 1956, based on mining (phosphates of the Gafsa company) and the processing of agricultural raw materials (olive oil), with little tourism (52,700 visitors in 1962), and a single new industry (North African Chemical Industries based in Gabes), Tunisia has developed since 1975, becoming one of the first countries to receive relocating European, first of all French, firms. Relevant sectors were mainly textiles and electronics (wiring).

These sectors, after 30 years, were stalled by competition from Asia and other countries with lower labour costs. Tunisia thus began to host companies in more skilled sectors, while trying, in its traditional sectors, to move up the scale by benefiting from its geographical proximity to Europe (as in the case of the outsourcing of automobile production) or by the creation of an Airbus parts assembly plant.

The economy is heavily dependent on trade with Europe. The slowdown of the recovery in the Euro area is the main risk to which the country is exposed, while Europe enters a period of fiscal crisis, flowing from the critical level of indebtedness of some of its member countries and a slowdown in fiscal stimulus.

Some statistics on Tunisia (2009)

Population: 10,440,000           Urban population: 65.9%         Rural population: 34.1%

Population 0-14 years: 24%     from 15 to 30 years: 26%        from 31 to 64 years: 42.5%

Life expectancy: 74.5 years      Birth rate per 1000: 17.7         Mortality rate per 1000: 5.7

School Enrolment: (6-14 years): 94.2% girls, boys 94.7%

Educational attainment of 10-year-olds and up:

None: 19.5%   Finished Primary School: 33.6%          Finished Secondary School: 36.1%

University: 10.8%

Share of households with:         Electricity: 99.5%                    Running water: 85.3%

TV: 96.7%                              Fixed Telephone: 26.1%          Mobile Phone: 89.2%

Personal computer: 14.4%       Car: 22.7%

GDP: $ 43.9 billion                  GDP per capita: $4,160

“The Tunisian economy was characterized by the dominance of the public sector, especially in industry, agriculture and services. However, since the mid-1980s, a major restructuring programme has been established for the national economy,” recalled Miloudi El Ghobentini at the Rabat congress in early 2010. He continued: “The country has privatized all state-owned enterprises operating in industrial production and services, which made possible the emergence of a market economy more integrated into the global economy.” The restructuring undertaken by the Ben Ali regime to reduce the domain of the state seriously contributed to the reduction in new public sector jobs for young graduates. Many of them turned to the informal economy. Miloudi El Ghobentini, then the director of the Tunisian National Agency for Employment, speaking at the above-mentioned Rabat conference, summarized: “In Tunisia, the state no longer creates many jobs (only 8 to 10% of jobs created). The state has privatized almost all firms producing goods and services and has fully withdrawn from the market.” Indeed, more than half the state budget for job creation is dedicated to the formation of micro-enterprises through the Tunisian Bank of Solidarity. According to a study conducted in 2006 by the World Bank and the by Ministry of Employment and Professional Insertion of Youth, the number of jobs created is very low. The distribution of beneficiaries by age shows that about 48% of them are 30-39 years old and 26% between 18 and 30.

Tunisian capitalism is flourishing despite the consequences of the so-called sub-prime crisis cycle of 2008. By far the richest country in the region except for Israel, Tunisia manifests the general conditions of capitalist production, quite close to those in the bottom third of the countries in the OECD, an organization that Tunis has wanted to join for a long time. But in dealing with any presentation of official data, their credibility must be examined. Asked about this in December 2005 by Florence Beaugé3 , Ben Mahmoud Romdhane, a bourgeois economist and a professor of economics at the University of Tunis who is opposed to the regime and a supporter of democratization, said:

“Contrary to what some say, the figures I have are reliable. It is true that we can give them a tendentious interpretation, hide them or defer their publication. But, to my knowledge, there are no falsified numbers. If Tunisia did that, it would lose credibility with the international community, particularly the World Bank and the IMF. And then there is an interrelation between the numbers. Falsification would be noticed. Tunisians often complain that it’s the World Bank and IMF which run the country. For my part, I say that in a regime without real statistics, fortunately those two institutions are there! At least in terms of macroeconomic management, there is a certain rigor. The IMF, through its agreements with the Tunisian government, encourages it to publish information by fixed dates. Reports from the World Bank and IMF on Tunisia are one of the sources of essential information. Without them, where the banking and financial system are concerned, for example, we would know nothing.”

A developed and diversified industrial country

Tunisia is a predominantly urban country. Life expectancy exceeds 74 years. Close to two-thirds of Tunisia’s population lives in cities, against an average of 43% for so-called developing countries (Source: Coface, 2007). Tunisian social production is firmly oriented to industry. In 2009, the distribution of GDP was as follows:

• manufacturing, 17.6%
• non-manufacturing industries (mining, energy, electricity and construction), 17.4%
• agriculture, 11%
• tourism, 6%
• communications, 6.6%
• transport, 6.4%
• distribution, finance and state services, 35%.

In 2006, the distribution of GDP had been as follows:

• manufacturing, 18.9%
• non-manufacturing industries (mining, energy, electricity and construction), 14.4%
• agriculture, 12.3%,
• tourism, 6%,
• communications, 5.5%,
• transport, 6.4%,
• distribution, 11%,
• finance, 11.1%,
• services provided by the state, 14.4%.

If we rely on these data and cross-reference them, we arrive at a productive sector of new purely capitalist value accounting for at least half of GDP.

In terms of capital intensity, Tunisia has been advancing at a forced pace with a rate of productive investment (purchases of new capital goods minus write-offs of old capital goods; economists call this “gross fixed capital formation”) constituting nearly 27% of GDP in 2010, according to the IMF. The increase in the technical composition of manufacturing can be read between the lines in the distribution of manpower. In 2009, 31.9% of the employed population worked in industry, mining, energy and construction, as opposed to 48.9% in trade and services (including productive services) and 17.9% in agriculture and fishing. Moreover, despite ten years of strong growth, including during the two major global crises of valorisation in 2000-2001 and 2008-2009, the official rate of unemployment remained stuck at 14-16%, manifesting a growing labour productivity.

The Tunisian work force is, generally, rather disciplined and well trained, as foreign employers are happy to report. The Global Competitiveness Report for 2010-2011 places Tunisia in 7th place in its rankings measuring the availability of scientists and engineers4 , with France ranked 12th, Belgium 13th, Germany 27th, Italy, 54th, or Egypt and Morocco, 25th and 46^th, respectively.

The same report moved Tunisia up to 20th place for the quality of its education, better than France (29th), Germany (18th), Morocco (105th) or Egypt (131st). The Agency for the Promotion of Foreign Investment (FIPA) claims: “At a comparable level of qualifications and skills, Tunisia offers competitive salary costs in proportions ranging from 1 to 5 when compared with European countries.” Finally, on this point, the Davos Report indicates Tunisia is ranked 32nd in global competitiveness, ahead of Italy (48th), Turkey (61st), Egypt (81st) and Morocco (75th). In comparison, France, Germany, Belgium and Spain are 15th, 5th, 19th and 42^nd, respectively.

The infrastructure is adequate. Nine airports with a capacity of 19 million passengers per year and more than 1,400 weekly flights connect the country to Europe (more than a third with France). More than 8,000 ships each year load and unload goods in Tunisian ports for a tonnage of 31 million in 2009. The port and airport infrastructures were considered the 41st best in the world for the former and 30th for the latter. The Tunisian railway network covers the country from north to south and extends over a length of 2256 km. The road network consists of 20,000 km. A third of the population uses the Internet, with 381,982 subscribers in 2009 as against 128,352 in 2007. Total telephone density per 100 inhabitants is 105.2.

Foreign capitalists are well aware of opportunities for valorisation in Tunisia, especially since Ben Ali’s regime offered them a “total exemption from income tax for ten years for export earnings and for agricultural projects, and for five or ten years for projects located in areas of regional development, according to priority of the region.” The regime also offered them “investment bonuses equal to 8%, 15%, or 25% of project costs, capped at between 320,000 and 1 million Tunisian dinars (one dinar was approx. €0.5 in March 2011), according to the priority area, in regional development areas and 7% for agricultural projects”, not counting support for all or part of employer contributions for employment created, according to the region. “For 5 years at 100% to 20% for the zones in the higher group of regional development; and up to 10 years, at 100% for the first 5 years then 80% to 20% for regional priority development zones.” The Tunisian government also offers to cover the costs of projects for regional development at between 25.50% and 75% of the total cost of “infrastructure, depending on the priority of the region” (Source: FIPA-Tunisia). “A renovated and modern tax law, in constant evolution”, as the Economic Mission of the French Embassy in Tunis enthused.

The result: in 2008, 27% of productive investments in Tunisia were carried out by foreign capitalists, as against 9% in Morocco. Progress was spectacular: in 2005 they amounted to 1,088 million dinars. Four years later, they rose to 2,357 million dinars. At the end of 2009, 3,069 foreign or mixed enterprises were operating in Tunisia, employing 314,299 people as against 455 enterprises and 59,932 people in 1987. In 2009, 34% of these investments were in manufacturing, 54% in energy, 7.5% in services, 3.8% in tourism and real estate and 0.7% in agriculture. Within manufacturing, the share of foreign productive investment in the mechanical sector, in electrical construction and in electronics jumped from 5% in 2000 to 27% in 2009. In the textiles and clothing, their share has remained relatively stable over the same period, at about 13% of the total.

For all sectors, the presence of the major foreign capitalists for 2009 is summarized in the following table:

Year 2009

The enthusiasm of foreign capital is also due, in the summary of the economic mission of the French Embassy in Tunis, to “... constitutional forms similar to those found in France”, “an Incentives Code for investment, a strong framework of incentives for export”, and “... a wide range of solutions available to exporters and their Tunisian partners” for means of payment. But the main weapons of the government for capturing foreign investment are the cost and conditions for employing labour and low energy costs. The minimum wage for 40 hours of work per week is 235 dinars and 272 dinars for 48 hours (July 2010).

Tunisian capitalism’s strong resilience in cyclical crises

The Tunisian economy passed through the global valorisation crises of 2000/2001 and 2008/2009 without too much damage. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable information on the cumulative results of the various companies, which is the most important indicator, in our view, for identifying cycles of accumulation and crisis in capital. That is why we must refer to far less precise macroeconomic data on growth, including changes in GDP. If we look to the figures released by the IMF, real GDP growth merely slowed.

In the first case, the crisis hit home in 2002. GDP growth fell to 1.7%, preceded by an increase of 4.9% in 2001 and followed by a rebound of 5.6% in 2003. In the second case, things went even better. In 2008, Tunisia’s real GDP rose 4.5%. In 2009, it slowed to 3.1%. In 2010, there was a slight uptick to 3.8%. For 2011 and 2012, three months before the outbreak of the country’s social and political crisis, the IMF was forecasting a GDP growth of 4.8% and 5% respectively. In its report, published in September 2010, the Fund wrote that “Tunisia has weathered the global crisis; it has come through it with solid fundamentals that are largely the result of prudent policies in the past.” The report also supported the action of the Tunisian government: “The prompt and appropriate response of the authorities helped cushion the impact of lower external demand in 2009.” The Washington-based Fund, in the same document, specified that “internal demand in 2009 was supported by strong consumption fuelled by an increase in per capita income.” Despite soaring global food and energy prices, the state and the central bank managed to stem the rise in consumer prices.

The index of consumer prices did in fact increase by 5% in 2008 and 4.8% in 2009, but they showed an increase of only 3.7% in 2006 and 3.1% in 2007. These are rates closer to those of the central countries of the capitalist mode of production than to those on its periphery. By comparison, in Egypt, the price index for consumption jumped 16.2% in 2008-2009 after advancing 11% and 11.7% respectively in 2006-2007 and 2007-2008. In April 2010, the IMF anticipated increases of 12% in 2009-2010 and 9.5% in 2010-2011. But, in the IMF’s view, the sky in Tunis was clouding over. The international fund noted that, due to its heavy dependence on its troubled “European partners”, Tunisia “will need to identify more dynamic sources of growth to significantly reduce unemployment, which remains important, particularly among young people.” As a result of the slowdown in European growth, Tunisia’s foreign trade fell significantly in 2009, erasing the gains of the previous year and increasing the trade deficit. Recent history says that the regime failed. It did not find new sources of growth and unemployment, especially among the youth, did not decline. We will discuss the condition of the workers below.

As a good student of the IMF, Tunisia was preparing, before the outbreak of the proletarian revolt, to revive its long-term programme of fiscal discipline, including a more selective use of subsidies for retail foodstuffs (wheat and oil) and the restructuring of the pension system, including a rising contribution rate and an increase in the retirement age. Meanwhile, Ben Ali and his entourage planned to lower the tax on corporate profits and at the same time to raise the value added tax. .As unconditional supporters of permanent fiscal austerity, Ben Ali’s “socialist” RCD had embraced this principle since its founding in February 1988. The party-state was set up within four months after the palace conspiracy, and inscribed this principle on its flag and held to it without fail for more than 20 years. It was a constitutional coup d’état that brought to power Ben Ali, the future head of RCD. He ousted the sick, old Caudillo Habib Bourguiba (84 years old at the time) on grounds of senility, and at the time was second in command within the executive, as Minister of the Interior, and in the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD)5 .

The 1990s: an exceptionally serious fiscal and financial crisis

Ben Ali justified his elimination of Bourguiba by the necessity of establishing a regime based on “a multiparty system and a plurality of mass organizations”, and to prevent a coup d’état by the Islamists. The main reason for his seizure of power was more prosaic. The state, by far the biggest individual capitalist in the country, on the model of people’s democracies in Eastern Europe, was at the time plunged into an extremely serious fiscal and financial crisis. It was imperative to put things right as quickly as possible, which was not possible until the flight of the autocrat, whose promises of liberalization had remained a dead letter. From the first year of the Ben Ali era, the state asked for help and advice from the World Bank to manage the crisis.

The task was not easy. It took time to overcome the decay of the economic and social formation left by Bourguiba. Eleven years later, in late 1998, public debt and debt guaranteed by the government still represented 80% of Tunisia’s GDP. In late 1997, as part of the financial crisis of the so-called emerging countries, foreign debt amounted to 62.5% of GDP, producing a public deficit of 4.2% of GDP. It was 4.9% a year earlier. In 1985, state enterprises (30% of the value added of the country, employing 33% of wage workers) were collapsing under the weight of debt and had multiple operating losses. Two years before the bloodless coup of Ben Ali, these losses and debts amounted to about 35% of GDP. To finance itself, the government increasingly had to resort to foreign capital. As a result, in 1991, interest payments accounted for 27% of GDP. Five years later, in 1996, the burden still corresponded to 21.4% of GDP and 43% of the state budget. In a failed attempt to keep a high rate of profit, the nationalized banks were themselves overwhelmed by bad loans after extending all kinds of credits to unprofitable businesses. Even in 2003, bad debts accounted for 41% of total loans from nationalized banks. The so-called development banks, whose main task was the financing of infrastructure, sank under the weight of dubious loans in 1998. These amounted to 67.5% of their total loan portfolios.

Private banks did not fare much better. In 1993, some 34% of their loans were of poor quality. These problem loans corresponded to 24% of GDP. The government and its donors, the IMF and the World Bank, decided to take the bull of the financial and fiscal crisis by the horns with the 9th Five Year Plan, for 1997-2001. Industrial restructuring had begun 10 years earlier under the supervision of the World Bank. Now it was time for banks and the state to go on a diet. By 1998, the privatization of financial institutions was proceeding apace. About 80% of the bad debts of public companies and of the state were eliminated. To speed up the movement, the state executive established structures for private debt collection. The ninth plan alone was not sufficient to get the banks back on their feet.

The crises of 1997-1998 and 2000-2001 once again multiplied the number of dubious loans. By 2003, they represented 24% of total commercial bank loans. The government had to carry out a new fiscal tightening. But the results were slow to emerge. In 2005, while non-performing loans of banks were reduced to 21%, the Tunisian foreign debt amounted to the equivalent of 68% of GDP mainly because of soaring oil prices. The executive did not ease up, applauded as it was by its strong international partners. By 2007, non-performing loans of the banks had decreased to 17% of total loans. The increase in hydrocarbon production offset the new surge in import prices of energy products.

In 2009, GDP growth slowed but the state coffers and banks were in good shape. The IMF finally pronounced the financial sector solid, with only 13% of bad loans on bank balance sheets, at 58% of their face value for the corresponding provisions. Public debt represented less than 43% of GDP. Immediately, the international financial institutions set new objectives for the Ben Ali regime: bring down public debt to below 40% of GDP and reduce the public deficit to less than 2% of GDP. All this was to culminate in the full convertibility of the Tunisian dinar, scheduled for 2014. But these plans had not taken account of the class struggle… As for the Ben Ali regime’s corruption, there is not much to add to what is widely known. One might merely mention, in this regard, that the illegal export of capital (about €1.3 billion per year according to the NGOs), the confiscation of land, the manipulation of public markets, the widespread patronage favouring clans and the families in power or close to the autocrat, did not prevent Tunisia from undergoing a strong capitalist development, touted as exemplary for the region. In the intentions of former supporters of Ben Ali and the regime, corruption is the rotten tree that is supposed to hide the forest of valorisation of capital and development and of exploitation in the country.

“In 2011 and probably in 2012, there our financial needs will peak, both in the budget and in the balance of payments. The amount will depend on the rate of growth and on tourism. But we know that our funding requirements are between $3 and 4 billion” said Mustapha Kamel Nabli6 , governor of Tunisia’s central bank, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, 15 April, during his participation in an IMF panel. According to the Journal, the Tunisian government is seeking to attract foreign investment while launching a development programme for infrastructure and to help young graduates to find jobs.

Situation of the proletariat

If Tunisian capitalism is thriving, the working class long ago lost all hope of seeing its condition improve. This sentiment is reflected in a 2005 survey by the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS) of unmarried young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine: nearly 2 million of them, 76% of the total, said they wanted to emigrate if the opportunity arose. Comparable figures were only 1.1 million people (45%) in 2000 and 457,000 (22 %) in 1996. The decline in purchasing power is also visible in the indebtedness of the active population. A study conducted in 2007 by the INS showed that 18% of the active population was in debt. The total amount of credits had doubled in four years. Within this, the share of consumer credits had grown incessantly7 . Without claiming to cover all industries, we present here a non-exhaustive overview of monthly wages in a good number of professions. These salaries are given as net averages, excluding bonuses and benefits:

Source: https://www.businessnews.com.tn/article,519,19911,1

Since the minimum monthly wage is only about 250 dinars, women are over-represented in manufacturing employment. Such a wage level keeps most young graduates away; the employment prospects are not up to their expectations. Those under 30 represent nearly half the Tunisian population. Unemployment is essentially youth unemployment: 2 out of 3 unemployed people are under 30. In 2009, unemployment among 15-24 year olds remained high (31.3%) by comparison with to people 50-64 years of age (2.8%), as Elachhab Fathi, Professor at the University of Sfax, attested at the beginning of January 2010. Some 21% of graduates are unemployed. Only 5% of people without education are unemployed.

“The graduates of higher education represent nearly a quarter of the unemployed (19 to 20%) and educated women are most affected (among unemployed university graduates 28% were female as opposed to 13% male; 60% of students are female”, stated Mongi Ben Chaaban, Professor at the University of Tunis, in January 2010

Here is a long explanation by Professor Fathi Elachhab:

“Since the 1980s, productivity in Tunisia has been changing markedly, after which GDP growth in the 1990s greatly increased. However, the creation of employment has not followed a similar trend, and this is explained by the lowering of growth in jobs, as shown by the accelerated growth of the ratio of production to the number of jobs. During the 1980s and in the early 1990s, it was the service sectors that contributed most to the enrichment of job growth. Moreover, the share of services in employment in the non-agricultural sector increased during the 2000’s to 47%, continuing the upward trend which started in the 1980s. Figures on the elasticity of employment relative to growth show that the period 2005-2008 is rather unique: it records its lowest level since 1987. One can thus understand, now that growth in Tunisia is less job-rich than it was during the 1980s, that it is necessary to ‘create’ more growth in order to reach the same rhythm of job creation. This change is better explained by structural factors rather than cyclical factors. During the 1990s, the unemployment rate rose fairly significantly from 15.2% in 1990 to 17% in 1998. After that, the rate of unemployment declined steadily, reaching a value of 14.3% in 2008, a decrease of nearly three points. A demographic transition is the main explanation for this. Indeed, until 2004, unemployment fell on average by 0.4% each year, mainly due to the growth of the active population (2.3%) at lower rate than that of employment. This reflects a growth in the population of working age of 2.4% on average per year, offset in part by a decline in the participation rate of 0.1%. The observation of changes in the rate of exit from unemployment, measured as the ratio between the number of people exiting (through job placement) compared with the number of registered job seekers, shows that the possibility of finding work does not depend on the economic situation as recorded. Thus in many phases of conjunctural improvement, the rate of exit from unemployment does not react to an improvement in the economic situation.”

In other words, the accelerated capitalist development in Tunisia, the rapid increase In the productivity of social labour, and the shift in its productive structure toward industries that require relatively less labour than traditional manufacturing, has played a central role in the stagnation of the unemployment rate at relatively high levels. The restructuring of the state has also helped reduce, relatively, access to jobs. Paradoxically, the long-term existence of a social safety net that is more solid than those of neighbouring countries has made proletarians less flexible and less resigned to accept appalling working conditions.

As for the health care system, here are the words, in April 2009, of the Economic Mission of the French Embassy in Tunis. They are triumphalist but the figures are indisputable: “The social security system has reached a coverage rate of 92% in 2008. Health indicators reflect the success of health policy in Tunisia: life expectancy rose from 70.3 years in 1990 to 73.6 years in 2008, and infant mortality fell from 51.6 ‰ in 1987 to 19.5 ‰ in 2008. Mandatory immunization rates in young children reached 95% in 2008. In addition, various health programmes have made possible the containment of several infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, as well as treatment for AIDS patients. However, the challenge ahead remains the control of diseases related to individual behaviour such as diet, including diabetes, obesity, cancer and cardiovascular disease.”

The local production of medicines, produced by thirty laboratories, provides between 42 and 45% of the market supply.

Changes in the unemployment rate:

Unemployed university graduates:

2003: 59,000

2006:74,000

2007: 86,000

2008:115,000

Unemployment by age 1966-2008 in percent:

Structure of the active population by level of education (%):

Manufacturing industries in Tunisia

According to official statistics, in November 2009 there were 5,756 companies employing 10 or more workers. The textiles and clothing sector (TCI) is the biggest, with 36% of companies, followed by agribusiness and food, (18%) and then machinery and metallurgy (MMI), 10%. No less than 48% of these companies are exclusively oriented to exports. All told, 485,000 wage earners work in them, with 41% in textiles and clothing, (TCI), 14% in food, 13% in the electrical industry, electronics, and appliances (EEAI) and 7 % in machines and manufacture (MMI).

France is the largest foreign investor in partnership companies (43%) followed by Italy (29%), Germany (9%) and Belgium (7%). These partnership companies are heavily represented in textiles and clothing (60%), electronics (11%), machines and manufacture (9%) and building materials, ceramics and glass (8%).

Between 2004 and 2008, the value of manufacturing production jumped from 26.29 billion dinars to 43.76 billion, posting an average annual increase of 14%.

The value in textiles remained stable, reaching 5.36 billion in 2008 with an average annual increase of 1%. The first sector in value terms, the food industry, has increased 10% to 9.927 billion. The highest increases are those in the chemical industry (up 33%, to 8.858 billion), electronics and appliances (21% to 4.356 billion), leather and footwear (17%, to 5.681 billion) and machinery and manufacture (14% to 3.706 billion).

Investment in manufacturing, 1.84 billion dinars in 2004, remained slack during the next three years, before jumping to 3.26 billion in 2008, increasing in one year by more than 50%.

Aircraft construction up to now mostly in wiring moved up to the construction of frames with the establishment of Aerolia in December 2010, which by 2014 will have an industrial park and 750 sub-contractors in Tunis. This sector currently employs about 5,000 workers, primarily in French companies, five times more than a decade ago.

In 2008, manufacturing accounted for 79% of exports of goods from the country, a stable rate since 2005, when it was 82%. However, foreign trade in manufactured goods is clearly in deficit, with a coverage rate of 82% in 2008. It was only 71% for aerospace and only 26% for machines and manufacture. The main surplus sectors are the textiles leather and footwear, ceramics, and to a lesser extent, electronics and appliances

The economic consequences of the events

The following gives the figures for unemployment (between 500,000 and 600,000 more unemployed in 2010), for growth (around 1%, according to the latest IMF estimates) and the various foci of government policy in the coming months, namely regional development, social support and economic revitalization.

According to the French daily Les Echos, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Tunisia decreased by 28.8% in the first quarter of 2011, as indicated by the Tunisian Agency to Promote Foreign Investment. Foreign investment in the first quarter was 339 billion dinars (170 billion euros) compared to 476 billion dinars (239 billion euros) during the same period in 2010.

FDI in the sectors of manufacturing and energy is down 23% and 30.8% year-on-year respectively in the first quarter. Foreign investment normally generates about 25% of new jobs annually, and constitutes a major contribution to the development effort of the country. Minister of Finance Jalloul Ayed presented a grim economic picture of the country, indicating growth between 0 and 1% and job creation more than three times lower than that originally intended. The thousands of young people fleeing the country for Italy and France do not seem to believe in any imminent economic recovery or in any assistance from the Tunisian government. They dream only of leaving for Europe.

Moreover, with the closure of the Tunisian-Libyan border, thousands of Tunisians living from exchange and informal trade suddenly find themselves with no source of income – for example, according to official statistics, the border village Ben Guerdane alone has some 80,000 people hit hard by the shutdown of trade with Libya. Moreover, the flow of thousands of refugees, both Libyans and foreigners fleeing the war in Libya, has made life even more precarious in the south.

Synthesis

As a good student of the IMF, Tunisian capital has achieved a modernization allowing it to become an industrial platform for large foreign companies, mainly European, seeking skilled workers to exploit, but at reduced costs. These investments initially focused on textiles, clothing and leather, but have diversified into areas with a higher organic composition. In aeronautics, production took off, for example, in wiring, for example, before moving on to the construction of more complex plane frames, requiring a more skilled workforce. But this development remained localized on the coast, especially in the Tunis region.

Financial and fiscal crises were gradually dealt with, but at the cost of an increase in social inequality. Economic development had not solved two major problems, namely youth unemployment, both of university graduates and others, and the economic under­develop­ment of the interior. Unfinished land reform left the country at the mercy of the tensions on the markets for agricultural raw materials.

The beginning of the revolt, in Kasserine, combined all three ingredients.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Brief overview (1956-2008)

We can divide the history of Tunisia since independence into several periods:

• 1Composed of the League of the Labour Left, the Movement of Nasserite Unionists, the Movement of Nationalist Democrats (Al-Watad), the Baathist current, the Independent Left, the Communist Party of Tunisian Workers (PCOT), the Labour Party and the Democratic and Patriotic Labor Party (PGWPP).
• 2This is a first in the Arab world. This provision provides that any list must include alternate male and female candidates at the risk of invalidation in case of non-compliance.
• 3Florence Beaugé: La Tunisie de Ben Ali. Miracle ou mirage? Éditions du Cygne
• 4For each age group, the report indicates the number of engineers and scientists available, i.e. having completed their education.
• 5The word “destour” is a North African Arabic word (possibly of Ottoman origin) meaning “constitutional”. It was the name of a nationalist party founded in Tunisia in 1920.
  
• 6Source: http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2011/04/15/qa-tunisia-central-banker-mustapha-nabli-on-rebuilding-the-economy
  
• 7Source: La Régente de Carthage