The following article was contributed to autonomedia by John Holloway. It is the Chapter 8 of the forthcoming book, Zapatistas! Reinventing the Revolution in Mexico, edited by John Holloway and Eloina Pelaez.
Dignity's revolt - John Holloway
It will be published in London by Pluto Press in June/July 1998. We thank John Holloway for his kind permission. A brief version of this article was published in Common Sense # 22, December 1997.
Dignity's Revolt
John Holloway
I
Dignity arose on the first day of January 1994.
The 'Enough!' ('!Ya Basta!') proclaimed by the Zapatistas on the first day of 1994 was the cry of dignity. When they occupied San Cristobal de las Casas and six other towns of Chiapas on that day, the wind they blew into the world, 'this wind from below, the wind of rebellion, the wind of dignity', carried 'a hope, the hope of the conversion of dignity and rebellion into freedom and dignity'.(1) When the wind dies down, 'when the storm abates, when the rain and the fire leave the earth in peace once again, the world will no longer be the world, but something better'.(2)
A letter from the ruling body of the Zapatistas, the Comite Clandestino Revolucionario Indigena (CCRI),(3) addressed just a month later to another indigenous organisation, the Consejo 500 Anos de Resistencia Indigena,(4) emphasises the central importance of dignity:
'Then that suffering that united us made us speak, and we recognised that in our words there was truth, we knew that not only pain and suffering lived in our tongue, we recognised that there is hope still in our hearts. We spoke with ourselves, we looked inside ourselves and we looked at our history: we saw our most ancient fathers suffering and struggling, we saw our grandfathers struggling, we saw our fathers with fury in their hands, we saw that not everything had been taken away from us, that we had the most valuable, that which made us live, that which made our step rise above plants and animals, that which made the stone be beneath our feet, and we saw, brothers, that all that we had was DIGNITY, and we saw that great was the shame of having forgotten it, and we saw that DIGNITY was good for men to be men again, and dignity returned to live in our hearts, and we were new again, and the dead, our dead, saw that we were new again and they called us again, to dignity, to struggle'.(5)
Dignity, the refusal to accept humiliation and dehumanisation, the refusal to conform: dignity is the core of the Zapatista revolution of revolution. The idea of dignity has not been invented by the Zapatistas, but they have given it a prominence that it has never before possessed in revolutionary thought. When the Zapatistas rose, they planted the flag of dignity not just in the centre of the uprising in Chiapas, but in the centre of oppositional thought. Dignity is not peculiar to the indigenous peoples of the southeast of Mexico: the struggle to convert 'dignity and rebellion into freedom and dignity' (an odd but important formulation) is the struggle of (and for) human existence in an oppressive society, as relevant to life in Edinburgh, Athens, Tokyo, Los Angeles or Johannesburg as it is to the struggles of the peoples of the Lacandon Jungle.
The aim of this essay is to explore what it means to put dignity at the centre of oppositional thought. In the course of the argument it should become clear why 'zapatismo' is not a movement restricted to Mexico but is central to the struggle of thousands of millions of people all over the world to live a human life against-and-in an increasingly inhuman society.
The essay aims not so much to give a historical account of the Zapatista movement as to provide a distillation of the most important themes, without at the same time concealing the ambiguities and contradictions of the movement. In order to distill a fragrant essence from roses, it is not necessary to conceal the existence of the thorns, but thorns do not enter into what one wants to extract. The purpose of trying to distill the theoretical themes of zapatismo is similar to the purpose behind any distillation process: to separate those themes from the immediate historical development of the Zapatista movement, to extend the fragrance beyond the immediacy of the particular experience.
II
Dignity was wrought in the jungle.
The uprising of the first of January 1994 was more than ten years in the preparation. The EZLN(6) celebrates the 17th November 1983 as the date of its foundation. On that date a small group of revolutionaries established themselves in the mountains of the Lacandon Jungle - 'a small group of men and women, three indigenous and three mestizos'.(7)
According to the police version, the revolutionaries were members of the Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional(8) (FLN), a guerrilla organisation founded in 1969 in the city of Monterrey, one of a number of such organisations which flourished in Mexico in the late sixties and early seventies. Many of the members of the FLN had been killed or arrested, but the organisation had survived. Its statutes of 1980 describe the organisation as 'a political-military organisation whose aim is the taking of political power by the workers of the countryside and of the cities of the Mexican Republic, in order to instal a popular republic with a socialist system'. The organisation was guided, according to its statutes, by 'the science of history and society: Marxism-Leninism, which has demonstrated its validity in all the triumphant revolutions of this century'.(9)
The supposed origins of the EZLN(10) are used by the authorities to suggest an image of manipulation of the indigenous people by a group of hard-core professional revolutionaries from the city. However, leaving aside the racist assumptions of such an argument, the supposed origins of the revolutionaries merely serve to underline the most important question: if, as is claimed, the small group of revolutionaries who set up the EZLN came from an orthodox Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group, how did they become transformed into what eventually emerged from the jungle in the early hours of 1994? What was the path that led from the first encampment of 17th November 1983 to the proclamation of dignity in the town hall of San Cristobal? For it is precisely the fact that they are not an orthodox guerrilla group that has confounded the state time and time again in its dealings with them. It is precisely the fact that they are not an orthodox group of revolutionaries that makes them theoretically and practically the most exciting development in oppositional politics in the world for many a long year.
What, then, was it that the original founders of the EZLN learned in the jungle? A letter written by Marcos(11) speaks of the change in these terms: 'We did not propose it. The only thing that we proposed to do was to change the world; everything else has been improvisation. Our square conception of the world and of revolution was badly dented in the confrontation with the indigenous realities of Chiapas. Out of those blows, something new (which does not necessarily mean 'good') emerged, that which today is known as "neo-Zapatismo".'
The confrontation with the indigenous realities took place as the Zapatistas became immersed in the communities of the Lacandon Jungle. At first the group of revolutionaries kept themselves to themselves, training in the mountains, slowly expanding in numbers. Then gradually they made contact with the local communities, initially through family contacts, then, from about 1985 onwards,(12) on a more open and organised basis. Gradually, more and more of the communities sought out the Zapatistas to help them defend themselves from the police or the farmers' armed 'white guards',(13) more and more became Zapatista communities, some of their members going to join the EZLN on a full-time basis, some forming part of the part-time militia, the rest of the community giving material support to the insurgents. Gradually, the EZLN was transformed from being a guerrilla group to being a community in arms.(14)
The community in question is in some respects a special community. The communities of the Lacandon Jungle are of recent formation, most of them dating from the 1950s and 1960s, when the government encouraged colonisation of the jungle by landless peasants, most of whom moved from other areas of Chiapas, in many cases simply transplanting whole villages. There is a long tradition of struggle, both from before the formation of the communities in the jungle and then, very intensely, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as the people fought to get enough land to ensure their own survival, as they tried to secure the legal basis of their landholdings, as they fought to maintain their existence against the expansion of the cattle ranches, as they resisted the threat to their survival posed by two government measures in particular, the Decree of the Lacandon Community,(15) a government decree which threatened to expropriate a large part of the Lacandon Jungle and the 1992 reform of Article 27 of the Constitution, which, by opening the countryside up to private investment, threatened to undermine the system of collective landholding. The communities of the Lacandon Jungle are special in many respects, but arguably the rethinking of revolutionary theory and practice could have resulted from immersion in any community:(16) what was important was probably not the specific characteristics of the Lacandon Jungle, so much as the transformation from being a group of dedicated young men and women into being an armed community of women, men, children, young, old, ill - all with their everyday struggles not just for survival but for humanity.
The Zapatistas learnt the pain of the community: the poverty, the hunger, the constant threat of harrassment by the authorities or the 'white guards', the unnecessary deaths from curable diseases. When asked in an interview which death had affected him most, Marcos told how a girl of three or four years old, Paticha (her way of saying Patricia), had died in his arms in a village. She had started a fever at six o'clock in the evening, and by ten o'clock she was dead: there was no medicine in the village that could help to lower her fever. 'And that happened many times, it was so everydady, so everyday that those births are not even taken into account. For example, Paticha never had a birth certificate, which means that for the country she never existed, for the statistical office (INEGI), therefore her death never existed either. And like her, there were thousands, thousands and thousands, and as we grew in the communities, as we had more villages, more comrades died. Just because death was natural, now it started to be ours.'(17) From such experiences arose the conviction that revolution was something that the Zapatistas owed to their children: 'we, their fathers, their mothers, their brothers and sisters, did not want to bear any more the guilt of doing nothing for our children.'(18)
They learnt the struggles of the people, both the struggles of the present and the struggles of the past, the continuing struggle of past and present. The culture of the people is a culture of struggle. Marcos tells of the story-telling by the campfire at night in the mountains - 'stories of apparitions, of the dead, of earlier struggles, of things that have happened, all mixed together. It seems that they are talking of the revolution (of the Mexican revolution, the past one, not the one that is happening now) and at moments no, it seems that is mixed up with the colonial period and sometimes it seems that it is the pre-hispanic period.'(19) The culture of struggle permeates the Zapatista communiques, often in the form of stories and myths: Marcos's stories of Old Antonio (el viejo Antonio) are a favourite way of passing on a culture impregnated with the wisdom of struggle.
And they learnt to listen. 'That is the great lesson that the indigenous communities teach to the original EZLN. The original EZLN, the one that is formed in 1983, is a political organisation in the sense that it speaks and what it says has to be done. The indigenous communities teach it to listen, and that is what we learn. The principal lesson that we learn from the indigenous people is that we have to learn to hear, to listen.'(20) Learning to listen meant incorporating new perspectives and new concepts into their theory. Learning to listen meant learning to talk as well, not just explaining things in a different way but thinking them in a different way.
Above all, learning to listen meant turning everything upside down. The revolutionary tradition of talking is not just a bad habit. It has a long-established theoretical basis in the concepts of Marxism-Leninism. The tradition of talking derives, on the one hand, from the idea that theory ('class consciousness') must be brought to the masses by the party and, on the other, from the idea that capitalism must be analysed from above, from the movement of capital rather than from the movement of anti-capitalist struggle. When the emphasis shifts to listening, both of these theoretical suppositions are undermined. The whole relation between theory and practice is thrown into question: theory can no longer be seen as being brought from outside, but is obviously the product of everyday practice. And dignity takes the place of imperialism as the starting point of theoretical reflection.
Dignity was presumably not part of the conceptual baggage of the revolutionaries who went into the jungle. It is not a word that appears very much in the literature of the Marxist tradition.(21) It could only emerge as a revolutionary concept in the course of a revolution by a people steeped in the dignity of struggle.(22) But once it appears (conciously or unconsciously) as a central concept, then it implies a rethinking of the whole revolutionary project, both theoretically and in terms of organisation. The whole conception of revolution becomes turned outwards: revolution becomes a question rather than an answer. 'Preguntando caminamos: asking we walk' becomes a central principle of the revolutionary movement, the radically democratic concept at the centre of the Zapatista call for 'freedom, democracy and justice'. The revolution advances by asking, not by telling; or perhaps even, revolution is asking instead of telling, the dissolution of power relations.
Here too the Zapatistas learned from (and developed) the tradition of the indigenous communities. The idea and practice of their central organisational principle, 'mandar obedeciendo' ('to command obeying'), derives from the practice of the communities, in which all important decisions are discussed by the whole community to the point where a consensus is reached, and in which all holders of positions of authority are assumed to be immediately recallable if they do not satisfy the community, if they do not command obeying the community. Thus the decision to go to war was not taken by some central committee and then handed down, but was discussed by all the communities in village assemblies.(23) The whole organisation is structured along the same principle: the ruling body, the CCRI is composed of recallable delegates chosen by the different ethnic groups (tzotzil, tzeltal, tojolobal and chol), and each ethnic group and each region has its own committees chosen in assemblies on the same principle.
The changes wrought in those ten years of confrontation between the received ideas of revolution and the reality of the indigenous peoples of Chiapas were very deep. Marcos is quoted in one book as saying 'I think that our only virtue as theorists was to have the humility to recognise that our theoretical scheme did not work, that it was very limited, that we had to adapt ourselves to the reality that was being imposed on us'.(24) However, the result was not that reality imposed itself on theory, as some (25) argue, but that the confrontation with reality gave rise to a whole new and immensely rich theorisation of revolutionary practice.
III
The revolt of dignity is an undefined revolt.
A revolution that listens, a revolution that takes as its starting point the dignity of those in revolt, is inevitably an undefined revolution, a revolution in which the distinction between rebellion and revolution loses meaning. The revolution is a moving outwards rather than a moving towards.
There is no transitional programme, no definite goal. There is, of course, an aim: the achievement of a society based on dignity, or, in the words of the Zapatista slogan, 'democracy, freedom, justice'. But just what this means and what concrete steps need to be taken to achieve it is never spelt out. This has at times been criticised by those educated in the classical revolutionary traditions as a sign of the political immaturity of the Zapatistas or of their reformism, but it is the logical complement of putting dignity at the centre of the revolutionary project. If the revolution is built on the dignity of those in struggle, if a central principle is the idea of 'preguntando caminamos - asking we walk', then it follows that it must be self-creative, a revolution created in the process of struggle. If the revolution is not only to achieve democracy as an end, but is democratic in its struggle, then it is impossible to pre-define its path, or indeed to think of a defined point of arrival. Whereas the concept of revolution that has predominated in this century has been overwhelmingly instrumentalist,(26) a conception of a means designed to achieve an end, this conception breaks down as soon as the starting point becomes the dignity of those in struggle. The revolt of dignity forces us to think of revolution in a new way, as a rebellion that cannot be defined or confined, a rebellion that overflows, a revolution that is by its very nature ambiguous and contradictory.
The Zapatista uprising is in the first place a revolt of the indigenous peoples of the Lacandon Jungle, of the tzeltals, tzotzils, chols and tojolobals who live in that part of the state of Chiapas. For them, the conditions of living were (and are) such that the only choice, as they see it, is between dying an undignified death, the slow unsung death of misery suffered, and dying with dignity, the death of those fighting for their dignity and the dignity of those around them. The government has consistently tried to define and confine the uprising in those terms, as a matter limited to the state of Chiapas, but the Zapatistas have always refused to accept this. This was, indeed, the main point over which the first dialogue, the dialogue of San Cristobal, broke down.(27)
The Zapatista uprising is the assertion of indigenous dignity. The opening words of the Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, read from the balcony of the town hall of San Cristobal on the morning of the first of January 1994, were 'We are the product of 500 years of struggles'.(28) The uprising came just over a year after the demonstrations throughout America that marked the 500th anniversary of Columbus's 'discovery'. On that occasion, 12 October 1992, the Zapatistas had already marched through San Cristobal, when about ten thousand indigenous people, most of them Zapatistas(29) but under another guise, had taken the streets of the city. After the first of January 1994, the Zapatistas at once became the focus of the increasingly active indigenous movement in Mexico. When the EZLN began its dialogue with the government in April 1995, the dialogue of San Andres Larrainzar, the first theme for discussion was indigenous rights and culture. The Zapatistas used the dialogue to give cohesion to the indigenous struggle, asking representatives of all the main indigenous organisations of the country to join them as consultants or guests in the workshops which were part of the dialogue and concluding that phase of the dialogue with an Indigenous Forum, held in San Cristobal in January1996. The Indigenous Forum led in turn to the setting up of the Congreso Nacional Indigena (30) which gives a national focus to previously dispersed indigenous struggles. The first phase of the dialogue of San Andres also led to the signing of an agreement with the government designed to lead to changes in the constitution which would radically improve the legal position of indigenous peoples within the country, granting them important areas of autonomy.(31)
The Zapatista movement, however, has never claimed to be just an indigenous movement.(32) Overwhelmingly indigenous in composition, the EZLN has always made clear that it is fighting for a broader cause. Its struggle is for all those 'without voice, without face, without tomorrow', a category that stretches far beyond the indigenous peoples. The demands they make (work, land, housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace...) are not demands limited to the indigenous: they are demands for all. The Zapatista movement is a movement for national liberation, a movement not just for the liberation of the indigenous but of all.
The fact that the EZLN is an Army of National Liberation seems to give a clear definition to the movement. There have been many other movements (and wars) of national liberation in different parts of the world (Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Nicaragua etc). Here we have what appears to be a clearly defined and well-established framework: national liberation movements typically aim to liberate a national territory from foreign influence (the control of a colonial or neo-colonial power), to establish a government of national liberation designed to introduce radical social changes and establish national economic autonomy. If the Zapatista movement were a national liberation movement in that sense, then, if the history of such movements is anything to go by, there would be little to get excited about: it might be worthy of support and solidarity, but there would be nothing radically new about it. This indeed has been the position of some critics on the left.(33)
Looked at more closely, however, the apparent definition of 'Army of National Liberation' begins to dissolve. In the context of the uprising, the term 'national liberation' has more a sense of moving outwards than of moving inwards: 'national' in the sense of 'not just Chiapanecan' or 'not just indigenous', rather than 'national' in the sense of 'not foreign'.(34) 'Nation' is also used in the Zapatista communiques in the less clearly defined sense of 'homeland' ('patria'): the place where we happen to live, a space to be defended not just against imperialists but also (and more directly) against the state. 'Nation' is counterposed to the state, so that national liberation can even be understood as the liberation of Mexico from the Mexican state, or the defence of Mexico (or indeed whatever territory) against the state. 'Nation' in this sense refers to the idea of struggling wherever one happens to live, fighting against oppression, fighting for dignity. That the Zapatista movement is a movement of national liberation does not, then, confine or restrict the movement to Mexico: it can be understood rather as meaning a movement of liberation, wherever you happen to be (and whatever you happen to do). The fight for dignity cannot be restricted to national frontiers: 'dignity', in the wonderful expression used by Marcos in the invitation to the Intercontinental Gathering held in the Lacandon Jungle in July 1996, 'is that homeland without nationality, that rainbow that is also a bridge, that murmur of the heart no matter what blood lives in it, that rebel irreverence that mocks frontiers, customs officials and wars'.(35) It is consistent with this interpretation(36) of 'national liberation' that one of the principal slogans of the Zapatistas recently has been the theme chosen for the Intercontinental Gathering, 'for humanity and against neoliberalism'.
The open-ended nature of the Zapatista movement is summed up in the idea that it is a revolution, not a Revolution ("with small letters, to avoid polemics with the many vanguards and safeguards of THE REVOLUTION").(37) It is a revolution, because the claim to dignity in a society built upon the negation of dignity can only be met through a radical transformation of society. But it is not a Revolution in the sense of having some grand plan, in the sense of a movement designed to bring about the Great Event which will change the world. Its claim to be revolutionary lies not in the preparation for the future Event but in the present inversion of perspective, in the consistent insistence on seeing the world in terms of that which is incompatible with the world as it is: human dignity. Revolution refers to present existence, not to future instrumentality.
IV
The revolt of dignity is a revolt against definition.
The undefined, open-ended character of the Zapatista movement sometimes rouses the frustrations of those schooled in a harder-edged revolutionary tradition. Behind the lack of definition there is, however, a much sharper point. The lack of definition does not result from theoretical slackness: on the contrary, revolution is essentially anti-definitional.
The traditional Leninist concept of revolution is crucially definitional. At its centre is the idea that the struggles of the working class are inevitably limited in character, that they cannot rise above reformist demands, unless there is the intervention of a revolutionary party. The working class is a 'they' who cannot go beyond certain limits without outside intervention. The self-emancipation of the proletariat is impossible.(38)
The emphasis on dignity puts the unlimited at the centre of picture, not just the undefined but the anti-definitional. Dignity, understood as a category of struggle, is a tension which points beyond itself. The assertion of dignity implies the present negation of dignity. Dignity, then, is the struggle against the denial of dignity, the struggle for the realisation of dignity. Dignity is and is not: it is the struggle against its own negation. If dignity were simply the assertion of something that already is, then it would be an absolutely flabby concept, an empty complacency. To simply assert human dignity as a principle (as in 'all humans have dignity', or 'all humans have a right to dignity') would be either so general as to be meaningless or, worse, so general as to obscure the fact that existing society is based on the negation of dignity.(39) Similarly, if dignity were simply the assertion of something that is not, then it would be an empty daydream or a religious wish. The concept of dignity only gains force if it is understood in its double dimension, as the struggle against its own denial. One is dignified, or true, only by struggling against present indignity, or untruth. Dignity implies a constant moving against the barriers of that which exists, a constant subversion and transcendence of definitions. Dignity, understood as a category of struggle, is a fundamentally anti-identitarian concept: not 'my dignity as a Mexican...', but 'our dignity is our struggle against the negation of that dignity'.
Dignity is not a characteristic peculiar to the indigenous of the south-east of Mexico, nor to those overtly involved in revolutionary struggle. It is simply a characteristic of life in an oppressive society. It is the cry of 'Enough!' (!Ya Basta!) that is inseparable from the experience of oppression. Oppression cannot be total; whatever its form, it is always a pressure which is confronted by a counter-pressure, dehumanisation confronted by humanity. Domination implies resistance, dignity.(40) Dignity is the other side, too often forgotten, too often stifled, of what Marx called alienation: it is the struggle of dis-alienation, of defetishisation.(41) It is the struggle for recognition, but for the recognition of a self currently negated.
Dignity is the lived experience that the world is not so, that that is not the way things are. It is the lived rejection of positivism, of those forms of thought which start from the assumption that 'that's the way things are'. It is the cry of existence of that which has been silenced by 'the world that is', the refusal to be shut out by Is-ness, the scream against being forgotten in the fragmentation of the world into the disciplines of social science, those disciplines which break reality and, in breaking, exclude, suppressing the suppressed. Dignity is the cry of 'here we are!', the 'here we are!' of the indigenous peoples forgotten by neoliberal modernisation, the 'here we are!' of the growing numbers of poor who somehow do not show in the statistics of economic growth and the financial reports, the 'here we are!' of the gay whose sexuality was for so long not recognised, the 'here we are!' of the elderly shut away to die in the retirement homes of the richer countries, the 'here we are!' of the women closed into the houses whose wives they are, the 'here we are!' of the millions of illegal migrants(42) who are not where, officially, they should be, the 'here we are!' of all those pleasures of human life excluded by the growing subjection of humanity to the market. Dignity is the cry of those who are not heard, the voice of those without voice. Dignity is the truth of truth denied.(43)
'Us they forgot more and more, and history was no longer big enough for us to die just like that, forgotten and humiliated. Because dying does not hurt, what hurts is being forgotten. Then we discovered that we no longer existed, that those who govern had forgotten us in the euphoria of statistics and growth rates. A country which forgets itself is a sad country, a country which forgets its past cannot have a future. And then we seized our arms and went into the cities where we were animals. And we went and said to the powerful "here we are!" and to all the country we shouted "here we are!" and to all the world we shouted "here we are!" And see how odd things are because, for them to see us, we covered our faces; for them to name us, we gave up our name; we gambled the present to have a future; and to live ... we died'.(44)
This 'here we are!' is not the 'here we are!' of mere identity. It is a 'here we are!' which derives its meaning from the denial of that presence. It is not a static 'here we are!' but a movement, an assault on the barriers of exclusion. It is the breaking of barriers, the moving against separations, classifications, definitions, the assertion of unities that have been defined out of existence.
Dignity is an assault on the separation of morality and politics, and of the private and the public. Dignity cuts across those boundaries, asserts the unity of what has been sundered. The assertion of dignity is neither a moral nor a political claim: it is rather an attack on the separation of politics and morality that allows formally democratic regimes all over the world to co-exist with growing levels of poverty and social marginalisation. It is the 'here we are!' not just of the marginalised, but of the horror felt by all of us in the face of mass impoverishment and starvation. It is the 'here we are!' not just of the growing numbers shut away in prisons, hospitals and homes, but also of the shame and disgust of all of us who, by living, participate in the bricking up of people in those prisons, hospitals and homes. Dignity is an assault on the conventional definition of politics, but equally on the acceptance of that definition in the instrumental conception of revolutionary politics which has for so long subordinated the personal to the political, with such disastrous results. Probably nothing has done more to undermine the 'Left' in this century than this separation of the political and the personal, of the public and the private, and the dehumanisation that it entails.
Dignity encapsulates in one word the rejection of the separation of the personal and the political.(45) To a remarkable extent, this group of rebels in the jungle of the south-east of Mexico have crystallised and advanced the themes of oppositional thought and action that have been discussed throughout the world in recent years: the issues of gender, age, childhood, death and the dead. All flow from the understanding of politics as a politics of dignity, a politics which recognises the particular oppression of, and respects the struggles of, women, children, the old. Respect for the struggles of the old is a constant theme of Marcos's stories, particularly through the figure of Old Antonio, but was also forcefully underlined by the emergence of Comandante Trinidad as one of the leading figures in the dialogue of San Andres. The way in which women have imposed recognition of their struggles on the Zapatista men is well known, and can be seen, for example, in the Revolutionary Law for Women, issued on the first day of the uprising, or in the fact that it was a woman, Ana Maria, who led the most important military action undertaken by the Zapatistas, the occupation of the occupation of the town hall in San Cristobal on the 1st January 1994.(46) The question of childhood and the freedom to play is a constant theme in Marcos's letters. The stories, jokes, and poetry of the communiques and the dances that punctuate all that the Zapatistas do are not embellishments of a revolutionary process but central to it.
The struggle of dignity is the 'here we are!' of jokes, poetry, dancing, old age, childhood, games, death, love - of all those things excluded by serious bourgeois politics and serious revolutionary politics alike. As such, the struggle of dignity is opposed to the state. The Zapatista movement is an anti-state movement, not just in the obvious sense that the EZLN took up arms against the Mexican state, but in the much more profound sense that their forms of organisation, action and discourse are non-state, or, more precisely, anti-state forms.
The state defines and classifies and, by so doing, excludes. This is not by chance. The state, any state, embedded as it is in the global web of capitalist social relations, functions in such a way as to reproduce the capitalist status quo.(47) In its relation to us, and in our relation to it, there is a filtering out of anything that is not compatible with the reproduction of capitalist social relations. This may be a violent filtering, as in the repression of revolutionary or subversive activity, but it is also and above all a less perceptible filtering, a sidelining or suppression of passions, loves, hates, anger, laughter, dancing. Discontent is redefined as demands and demands are classified and defined, excluding all that is not reconcilable with the reproduction of capitalist social relations. The discontented are classified in the same way, the undigestable excluded with a greater or lesser degree of violence. The cry of dignity, the 'here we are!' of the unpalatable and undigestable, can only be a revolt against classification, against definition as such.
The state is pure Is-ness, pure Identity. Power says 'I am who am, the eternal repetition'.(48) The state is the great Classifier. Power says to the rebels: 'Be ye not awkward, refuse not to be classified. All that cannot be classified counts not, exists not, is not.'(49) The struggle of the state against the Zapatistas since the declaration of the cease-fire has been a struggle to define, to classify, to limit; the struggle of the Zapatistas against the state has been the struggle to break out, to break the barriers, to overflow, to refuse definition or to accept-and-transcend definition.
The dialogue between the government and the EZLN, first in San Cristobal in March 1994, and then in San Andres Larrainzar since April 1995, has been a constant double movement. The government has constantly sought to define and limit the Zapatista movement, to 'make it small', as one of the government representatives put it. It has constantly sought to define zapatismo as a movement limited to Chiapas, with no right to discuss matters of wider importance. It did sign agreements on the question of indigenous rights and autonomy, but apparently without having at the time any intention of implementing them.(50) In the section of the dialogue devoted to democracy and justice, however, the government representatives made no serious contribution and have apparently no intention of signing agreements in this area. The Zapatistas, on the other hand, have constantly used the dialogue to break out, to overcome their geographical isolation in the Lacandon Jungle. They have done this partly through their daily press conferences during the sessions of the dialogue, but also by negotiating the procedural right to invite advisers and guests and then inviting hundreds of them to participate in the sessions on indigenous rights and culture and on democracy and justice: advisers from a very wide range of indigenous and community organisations, complemented by a wide range of academics. Each of the two topics also provided the basis for organising a Forum in San Cristobal, first on Indigenous Rights and Culture in January 1996 and then on the Reform of the State in July of the same year, both attended by a very large number of activists from all over the country.
On the one hand, the government's drive to limit, define, make small; on the other, the (generally very successful) Zapatista push to break the cordon. On the one hand, a politics of definition, on the other a politics of overflowing. This does not mean that the Zapatistas have not sought to define: on the contrary, the definition of constitutional reforms to define indigenous autonomy is seen by them as an important achievement. But it has been a definition that overflows, thematically and politically. The definition of indigenous rights is seen not as an end-point, but as a start, as a basis for moving on to other areas of change, but also as a basis for taking the movement forward, a basis for breaking out.
The difference in approach between the two sides of the dialogue has at times resulted in incidents which reflect not only the arrogance of the government negotiators but also the lack of understanding derived from their perspective as representatives of the state. This has even been expressed in the conception of time. Given the bad conditions of communication in the Lacandon Jungle, and the need to discuss everything thoroughly, the Zapatista principle of 'mandar obedeciendo' ('to command obeying') means that decisions take time. When the government representatives insisted on rapid replies, the Zapatistas replied that they did not understand the indigenous clock. As recounted by Comandante David afterwards, the Zapatistas explained that 'we, as Indians, have rhythms, forms of understanding, of deciding, of reaching agreements. And when we told them that, they replied by making fun of us; well then, they said, we don't understand why you say that because we see that you have Japanese watches, so how do you say that you use the indigenous clock, that's from Japan.'(51) And Comandante Tacho commented: 'They haven't learned. They understand us backwards. We use time, not the clock.'(52)
Even more fundamentally, the state representatives have been unable to understand the concept of dignity. In one of the press conferences held during the dialogue of San Andres, Comandante Tacho recounts that the government negotiators 'told us that they are studying what dignity means, that they are consulting and making studies on dignity. That what they understood was that dignity is service to others. And they asked us to tell them what we understand by dignity. We told them to continue with their research. It makes us laugh and we laughed in front of them. They asked us why and we told them that they have big research centres and big studies in schools of a high standard and that it would be a shame if they do not accept that. We told them that if we sign the peace, then we will tell them at the end what dignity means for us.'(53)
The Zapatista sense of satire and their refusal to be defined is turned not only against the state, but also against the more traditional 'definitional' left. In a letter dated 20 February 1995, when the Zapatistas were retreating from the army after the military intervention of 9 February, Marcos imagines an interrogation by the state prosecutor, consisting of the prosecutor's accusations and his own responses:
'The whites accuse you of being black: Guilty. The blacks accuse you of being white: Guilty... The machos accuse you of being feminist: Guilty. The feminists accuse you of being macho: Guilty. The communists accuse you of being an anarchist: Guilty. The anarchists accuse you of being orthodox: Guilty... The reformists accuse you of being an extremist: Guilty. The 'historical vanguard' accuse you of appealing to civil society and not to the proletariat: Guilty. Civil society accuse you of disturbing its tranquility: Guilty. The stock market accuses you of spoiling their lunch: Guilty... The serious people accuse you of being a joker: Guilty. The jokers accuse you of being serious: Guilty. The adults accuse you of being a child: Guilty. The children accuse you of being an adult: Guilty. The orthodox leftists accuse you for not condemning homosexuals and lesbians: Guilty. The theorists accuse you for being practical: Guilty. The practitioners accuse you for being theoretical: Guilty. Everybody accuses you for everything bad that happens to them: Guilty.'(54)
Dignity's revolt mocks classification. As it must. It must, because dignity makes sense only if understood as being-and-not-being, and therefore defying definition or classification. Dignity is that which pushes from itself towards itself, and cannot be reduced to a simple 'is'. The state, any state, on the other hand, is. The state, as its name suggests, imposes a state, an Is-ness, upon that which pushes beyond existing social relations. Dignity is a moving outwards, an overflowing, a fountain; the state is a moving inwards, a containment, a cistern.(55) The failure to understand dignity, then, is not peculiar to the Mexican state: it is simply that statehood and dignity are incompatible. There is no fit between them.
Dignity's revolt, therefore, cannot aim at winning state power. >From the beginning, the Zapatistas made it clear that they did not want to win power, and they have repeated it ever since. Many on the more traditional 'definitional' Left were scandalised when the repudiation of winning power gained more concrete expression in the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle at the beginning of 1996, when the Zapatistas launched the formation of the Zapatista Front of National Liberation (FZLN) and made the rejection of all ambition to hold state office a condition of membership.(56) The repudiation of state power is, however, simply an extension of the idea of dignity. The state, any state, is so bound into the web of global capitalist social relations that it has no option, whatever the composition of the government, but to promote the reproduction of those relations, and that means defining and degrading. To assume state power would inevitably be to abandon dignity. The revolt of dignity can only aim at abolishing the state or, more immediately, at developing alternative forms of social organisation and strengthening anti-state power. 'It is not necessary to conquer the world. It is enough to make it anew'.(57)
The central principles on which the Zapatistas have insisted in developing alternative forms of social organisation are those of 'mandar obedeciendo' ('to command obeying') and 'preguntando caminamos' ('asking we walk'). They have emphasised time and time again the importance for them of taking all important decisions through a collective process of discussion, and that the way forward cannot be a question of their imposing their line, but only through opening up spaces for discussion and democratic decision, in which they would express their view, but their view should count only as one among many. In relation to the state (and assuming that the state still exists), they have said many times that they do not want to hold state office, and that it does not matter which party holds state office as long as those in authority 'command obeying'. The problem of revolutionary politics, then, is not to win power but to develop forms of political articulation that would force those in office to obey the people (so that, fully developed, the separation between state and society would be overcome and the state effectively abolished). Just what this would mean has not been spelt out by the EZLN,(58) apart from the obvious principle of instant recallability: that the president or any other office-holder should be instantly recallable if they fail to obey the people's wishes, as is the case with all the members of the EZLN's ruling body, the CCRI.(59)
Although the details are not clear, and cannot be, since they could only be developed in struggle, the central point is that the focus of revolutionary struggle is shifted from the what to the how of politics. All the initiatives of the Zapatistas (the Convencion Nacional Democratica, the 'consultation' on the future of the EZLN, the invitation of advisers to the dialogue with the government, the organisation of the forum on indigenous rights and culture and on the reform of the state, the intercontinental meeting for humanity and against neoliberalism, amongst others) have been directed at promoting a different way of thinking about political activity. Similarly, all the contacts with the state and even the proposals for the 'reform' of the state have in fact been anti-state initiatives in the sense of trying to develop new political forms, forms of action which articulate dignity, forms which do not fit with the state. The principal problem for a revolutionary movement is not to elaborate a programme, to say what the revolutionary government will do (although the EZLN has its 16 demands as the basis for such a programme); the principal problem is rather how to articulate dignities, how to develop a form of struggle and a form of social organisation based upon the recognition of dignity. Only the articulation of dignities can provide the answer to what should be done: a self-determining society must determine itself.
V
Dignities unite.
The Zapatistas rose up on the first of January 1994 in order to change Mexico and to make the world anew. Their base was in the Lacandon Jungle, far away from any important urban centre. They were not part of an effective international or even national organisation.(60) Since the declaration of the cease-fire on the 12th January 1994, they have remained physically cordoned within the Lacandon Jungle.
Cut off in the jungle, how could the EZLN transform Mexico, or indeed change the world? Alone there was little that they could do, either to change the world, or even to defend themselves. 'Do not leave us alone' ('no nos dejen solos') was an oft-repeated call during the first months of the cease-fire. The effectiveness of the EZLN depended (and depends) inevitably on their ability to break the cordon and overcome their isolation. The revolt of dignity derives its strength from the uniting of dignities.
But how could this uniting of dignities come about when the EZLN itself was cornered in the jungle and there was no institutional structure to support them? Marcos suggests a powerful image in a radio interview in the early months of the uprising: 'Marcos, whoever Marcos is, who is in the mountains, had his twins, or comrades, or his accomplices (not in the organic sense, but accomplices in terms of how to see the world, the necessity of changing it or seeing it in a different way) in the media, for example, in the newspapers, in the radio, in the television, in the journals, but also in the trade unions, in the schools, among the teachers, among the students, in groups of workers, in peasant organisations and all that. There were many accomplices or, to use a radio term, there were many people tuned in to the same frequency, but nobody turned the radio on... Suddenly they [the comrades of the EZLN] turn it on and we discover that there are others on the same radio frequency - I'm talking of radio communication, not listening to the radio - and we begin to talk and to communicate and to realise that there are things in common, that it seems there are more things in common than differences.'(61)
The idea suggested by Marcos for thinking about the unity of struggles is one of frequencies, of being tuned in, of wavelengths, vibrations, echoes. Dignity resonates. As it vibrates, it sets off vibrations in other dignities, an unstructured, possibly discordant resonance.
There is no doubt of the extraordinary resonance of the Zapatista uprising throughout the world, as evidenced by the participation of over three thousand people from forty-three different countries in the Intercontinental Meeting organised by the EZLN in July 1996. 'What is happening in the mountains of the Mexican southeast that finds an echo and a mirror in the streets of Europe, the suburbs of Asia, the countryside of America, the towns of Africa and the houses of Oceania?'(62) And equally, of course, what is happening in the streets of Europe, the suburbs of Asia, the countryside of America, the towns of Africa and the houses of Oceania, that resonates so strongly with the Zapatista uprising?
The notion of resonance, or echo, or radio frequency may seem a very vague one. It is not so. The EZLN have engaged in a constant struggle over the past few years to break through the cordon, to overcome their isolation, to forge the unity of dignities on which their future depends. They have fought in many different ways. They have fought, with enormous success, by letters and communiques, by jokes and stories, by the use of symbolism(63) and by the theatre of their events. They have fought by the construction of their 'Aguascalientes', the meeting place constructed for the National Democratic Convention (Convencion Nacional Democratica) in July 1994, and by the construction of a series of new Aguascalientes in the jungle after the first one had been destroyed by the army in its intervention of February 1995. They have fought too by the creative organisation of a whole series of events which have been important catalysts for the opposition in Mexico and (increasingly) beyond Mexico. The first important event was the National Democratic Convention, organised immediately the EZLN had rejected the proposals made by the government in the Dialogue of San Cristobal and held just weeks before the presidential elections of August 1994: an event which brought more than 6,000 activists into the heart of the jungle only months after the fighting had finished. The following year, the EZLN built on the popular reaction to the military interventon of February 1995 to organise a consultation throughout the country on what the future of the EZLN should be, an event in which over a million people took part. The new dialogue with the government, begun in April 1995, also became the basis for inviting hundreds of activists and specialists to take part as advisers in the dialogue, and for organising the forums on Indigenous rights and culture (January 1996) and on the Reform of the State (July 1996). The same year also saw the organisation of the Intercontinental Meeting for Humanity and against Neoliberalism, held within the Zapatista territory at the end of July. In each case, these were events which seemed impossible at the time of their announcement, and events which stirred up enormous enthusiasm in their realisation.
The communiques and events have also been accompanied by more orthodox attempts to establish lasting organisational structures. The National Democratic Convention (CND) established a standing organisation of the same name, with the aim of coordinating the (non-military) Zapatista struggle for democracy, freedom and justice throughout the country. After internal conflicts had rendered the CND ineffective, the Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in January 1995 proposed the creation of a Movement for National Liberation, an organisation which was stillborn. The Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, a year later, launched the Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (the Zapatista National Liberation Front - FZLN) to organise the civilian struggle thoughout the country. This, although it has provided an important point of organisational support for the Zapatistas, has stirred up none of the enthusiasm aroused by the EZLN itself.
The relative failure of the institutional attempts to extend the Zapatista struggle lends weight to the argument that the real force of the Zapatista uniting of dignities has to be understood in terms of the much less structured notion of resonance. The notion of resonance is indeed the counterpart of the idea of 'preguntando caminamos' ('asking we walk'). We advance by asking, not by telling: by suggesting, arguing, proposing, inviting, looking for links with other struggles which are the same struggle, looking for responses, listening for echoes. If those echoes are not there, we can only propose again, argue again, probe again, ask again: we cannot create echoes where they do not exist.
All this does not mean that organisation is not important, that it is all just a matter of vibrations and spontaneous combustion. On the contrary, the whole Zapatista uprising shows the importance of profound and careful organisation. It does suggest, however, a different, less structured and more experimental way of thinking about organisation. The concept of organisation must be experimental in a double sense: experimental, simply because there is no pre-given model of revolutionary organisation, but also experimental in the sense that the notion of dignity and its corollary, 'asking we walk', mean that revolutionary organisation must be seen as a constant experiment, a constant asking. The notion of dignity does not imply an appeal to spontaneity, the idea that revolt will simply explode without prior organisation; but it does imply thinking in terms of a multitude of different forms of organisation and, above all, thinking of organisation as a constant experiment, a constant probing, a constant asking, a constant searching: not just to see if together we can find some way out of here, but because the asking is in itself the antithesis of Power.(64)
Yet there is obviously a tension here implied in the very notion of the 'uniting of dignities'. The Zapatistas speak, not just of 'dignity', but of 'dignities'. Clearly, then, it is not a question of imposing one dignity or of finding what 'true dignity' really means. It is a question rather of recognising the validity of different forms of struggle and different opinions as to what the realisation of dignity means. This does not mean a complete relativism in which all opinions, even fascist ones, are granted equal validity. Conflicts between different dignities are inevitable: it is clear, for example, that the Zapatista women's understanding of the dignity of their struggle has brought them into conflict with the men's understanding of their dignity.(65) What the concept of dignity points to is not the correctness of any particular solution to such conflicts, but rather a way of resolving such conflicts in which the particular dignities are recognised and articulated. Even here, the Zapatistas argue that there is not just one correct way of articulating dignities: while they themselves organise their discussions on the basis of village assemblies, they recognise that this may not be the best form of articulating dignities in all cases. What form the articulation of dignities might take in a big city, for example, is very much an open question, although there are obviously precedents(66) and, in some cases, deep-rooted traditions of forms of direct democracy. The struggle to unite dignities in a world that is based on the denial and fragmentation of dignities is not an easy one.
VI
Dignity is the revolutionary subject.
Dignity is a class concept, not a humanistic one.
The EZLN do not use the concept of 'class' or 'class struggle' in their discourse, in spite of the fact that Marxist theory has clearly played an important part in their formation. They have preferred, instead, to develop a new language, to speak of the struggle of truth and dignity. 'We saw that the old words had become so worn out that they had become harmful for those that used them.'(67) In looking for support, or in forming links with other struggles, they have appealed, not to the working class or the proletariat, but to 'civil society'. By 'civil society', they seem to mean 'society in struggle', in the broadest sense: all those groups and intitiatives engaged in latent or overt struggles to assert some sort of control over their future, without aspiring to hold governmental office.(68) In Mexico, the initial reference point is often taken as the forms of autonomous social organisation that arose in Mexico City in response to the earthquake of 1985 and the state's incapacity to deal with the emergency.
It is not difficult to see why the Zapatistas should have chosen to turn their back on the old words. That does not mean, however, that all the problems connected with these words are thereby erased. The Zapatistas have been criticised by some adherents of the traditional orthodox Marxist left for not using the concept of class. It is argued that, because they do not use the traditional triad of class struggle, revolution and socialism, preferring instead to speak of dignity, truth, freedom, democracy and justice, their struggle is a liberal one, an armed reformism which has little possibility of leading to radical change. An extreme form of this sort of application of a class analysis is the argument that the Zapatista uprising is just a peasant movement and, while it should be supported, the proletariat can have little confidence in it.
The orthodox Marxist tradition works with a definitional concept of class. The working class may be defined in various ways: most commonly as those who sell their labour power in order to survive; or as those who produce surplus value and are directly exploited. The important point here is that the working class is defined.
In this definitional approach, the working class, however defined, is defined on the basis of its subordination to capital: it is because it is subordinated to capital (as wage workers, or as producers of surplus value) that it is defined as working class. Capitalism, in this approach, is understood as a world of pre-defined social relations, a world in which the forms of social relations are constituted,(69) firmly fixed or fetishised. The fixity of the forms of social relations is taken as the starting point for the discussion of class. Thus, working class struggle is understood as starting from the (pre-constituted) subordination of labour to capital. Any sort of struggle that does not fall within this definition is then seen as non-class struggle (which consequently raises problems as to how it should be defined).
The definitional approach to class raises two sorts of problems. Firstly, it inevitably raises the question of who is and who is not part of the working class. Are intellectuals like Marx and Lenin part of the working class? Are those of us who work in the universities part of the working class? Are the rebels of Chiapas part of the working class? Are feminists part of the working class? Are those active in the gay movement part of the working class? In each case, there is a concept of a pre-defined working class to which these people do or do not belong.(70)
The second (and more serious) consequence of defining class is the definition of struggles that follows. From the classification of the people concerned there are derived certain conclusions about the struggles in which they are involved. Those who define the Zapatista rebels as being not part of the working class and draw from that certain conclusions about the nature and limitations of the uprising. From the definition of the class position of the participants there follows a definition of their struggles: the definition of class defines the antagonism that the definer perceives or accepts as valid. This leads to a blinkering of the perception of social antagonism. In some cases, for example, the definition of the working class as the urban proletariat directly exploited in factories, combined with evidence of the decreasing proportion of the population who fall within this definition, has led people to the conclusion that class struggle is no longer relevant for understanding social change. In other cases, the definition of the working class and therefore of working class struggle in a certain way has led to an incapacity to relate to the development of new forms of struggle (the student movement, feminism, ecologism and so on). The definitional understanding of class has done much in recent years to create the situation in which 'the old words had become so worn out that they had become harmful for those that used them'.
The notion of dignity detonates the definition of class, but does not thereby cease to be a class concept. It does so simply because the starting point is no longer a relation of subordination but a relation of struggle, a relation of insubordination/ subordination. The starting point of dignity is the negation of humiliation, the struggle against subordination. From this perspective there does not exist a settled, fixed world of subordination upon which definitions can be constructed. Just the contrary: the notion of dignity points to the fact that we are not just subordinated or exploited, that our existence within capitalist society cannot be understood simply in terms of subordination. Dignity points to the fact that subordination cannot be conceived without its opposite, the struggle against subordination, insubordination. A world of subordination is a world in which subordination is constantly at issue. The forms of social relations in capitalist society cannot be understood simply as fetishised, constituted forms, but only as forms which are always in question, which are imposed only thorugh the unceasing struggle of capital to reproduce itself. Once the starting point is dignity, once the starting point is the struggle to convert 'dignity and rebellion into freedom and dignity', then all that was fixed becomes shaky, all that appeared to be defined becomes blurred.
From the perspective of dignity, then, class cannot be understood as a defined group of people. This is quite consistent with Marx's approach. His understanding of capitalism was based not on the antagonism between two groups of people but on the antagonism in the way in which human social practice is organised. Existence in capitalist society is a conflictual existence, an antagonistic existence. Although this antagonism appears as a vast multiplicity of conflicts, it can be argued (and was argued by Marx) that the key to understanding this antagonism and its development is the fact that present society is built upon an antagonism in the way that the distinctive character of humanity, namely creative activity (work in its broadest sense) is organised. In capitalist society, work is turned against itself, alienated from itself; we lose control over our creative activity. This negation of human creativity takes place through the subjection of human activity to the market. This subjection to the market, in turn, takes place fully when the capacity to work creatively (labour power) becomes a commodity to be sold on the market to those with the capital to buy it. The antagonism between human creativity and its negation thus becomes focused in the antagonism between those who have to sell their creativity and those who appropriate that creativity and exploit it (and, in so doing, transform that creativity into labour). In shorthand, the antagonism between creativity and its negation can be referred to as the conflict between labour and capital, but this conflict (as Marx makes clear) is not a conflict between two external forces, but between work (human creativity) and work alienated.
The social antagonism is thus not in the first place a conflict between two groups of people: it is a conflict between creative social practice and its negation, or, in other words, between humanity and its negation, between the transcending of limits (creation) and the imposition of limits (definition). The conflict, in this interpretation, does not take place after subordination has been established, after the fetishised forms of social relations have been constituted: rather it is a conflict about the subordination of social practice, about the fetishisation of social relations.(71) The conflict is the conflict between subordination and insubordination, and it is this which allows us to speak of insubordination (or dignity) as a central feature of capitalism. Class struggle does not take place within the constituted forms of capitalist social relations: rather the constitution of those forms is itself class struggle. This leads to a much richer concept of class struggle in which the whole of social practice is at issue. All social practice is an unceasing antagonism between the subjection of practice to the fetishised, perverted, defining forms of capitalism and the attempt to live against-and-beyond those forms. There can thus be no question of the existence of non-class forms of struggle.
Class struggle, in this view, is a conflict that permeates the whole of human existence. We all exist within that conflict, just as the conflict exists within all of us. It is a polar antagonism which we cannot escape. We do not 'belong' to one class or another: rather, the class antagonism exists in us, tearing us apart. The antagonism (the class divide) traverses all of us.(72) Nevertheless, it clearly does so in very different ways. Some, the very small minority, participate directly in and/ or benefit directly from the appropriation and exploitation of the work of others. Others, the vast majority of us, are, directly or indirectly, the objects of that appropriation and exploitation. The polar nature of the antagonism is thus reflected in a polarisation of the two classes,(73) but the antagonism is prior to, not subsequent to, the classes: classes are constituted through the antagonism.
Since classes are constituted through the antagonism between work and its alienation, and since this antagonism is constantly changing, it follows that classes cannot be defined. The concept of class is essentially non-definitional. More than that, since definition imposes limits, closes openness, negates creativity, it is possible to say that the capitalist class, even if it cannot be defined, is the defining class, the class that defines, that identifies, that classifies. Labour (the working class, the class that exists in antagonism to capital) is not only incapable of definition but essentially anti-definitional. It is constituted by its repressed creativity: that is to say, by its resistance to the (ultimately impossible) attempt to define it. Not only is it mistaken to try to identify the working class ('are the Zapatistas working class?'), but class struggle itself is the struggle between definition and anti-definition. Capital says 'I am, you are'; labour says 'we are not, but we are becoming; you are, but you will not be': or 'We are/ are not, we struggle to create ourselves'.
Class struggle, then, is the unceasing daily antagonism (whether it be perceived or not) between alienation and dis-alienation, between definition and anti-definition, between fetishisation and de-fetishisation. The trouble with all these terms is that our side of the struggle is presented negatively: as dis-alienation, anti-definition, de-fetishisation. The Zapatistas are right when they say that we need a new language, not just because the 'old words' are 'worn out' but because the Marxist tradition has been so focused on domination that it has not developed adequate words to talk about resistance.(74) Dignity is the term that turns this around, that expresses positively that which is supressed, that for which we are fighting. Dignity is that which knows no Is-ness, no objective structures. Dignity is that which rises against humiliation, dehumanisation, marginalisation, dignity is that which says 'we are here, we are human and we struggle for the humanity that is denied to us'. Dignity is the struggle against capital.
Dignity, then, is the revolutionary subject. Where it is repressed most fiercely, where the antagonism is most intense, and where there is a tradition of communal organisation, it will fight most strongly, as in the factory, as in the jungle. But class struggle, the struggle of dignity, the struggle for humanity against its destruction, is not the privilege of any defined group: we exist in it, just as it exists in us, inescapably. Dignity, then, does not exist in a pure form, any more than the working class exists in a pure form. It is that in us which resists, which rebels, which does not conform. Constantly undermined, constantly smothered and suffocated by the myriad forms of alienation and fetishisation, constantly overlaid and distorted, constantly repressed, fragmented and corrupted by money and the state, constantly in danger of being extinguished, snuffed out, it is the indestructable (or maybe just the not yet destroyed) NO that makes us human. That is why the resonance of the Zapatistas goes so deep: 'as more and more rebel communiques were issued, we realised that in reality the revolt came from the depths of ourselves.'(75) The power of the Zapatistas is the power of the !Ya Basta!, the negation of oppression, which exists in the depths of all of us, the only hope for humanity.
VII
Dignity's revolution is uncertain, ambiguous and contradictory.
Uncertainty permeates the whole Zapatista undertaking. There is none of the sense of the inevitablity of history which has so often been a feature of revolutionary movements of the past. There is no certainty about the arrival at the promised land, nor any certainty about what this promised land might look like. It is a revolution that walks asking, not answering.
Revolution in the Zapatista sense is a moving outwards rather than a moving towards. But how can such a movement be revolutionary? How can such a movement bring about a radical social transformation? The very idea of social revolution is already greatly discredited at the end of the twentieth century: how does the Zapatista uprising help us to find a way forward?
There is a problem at the heart of any concept of revolution. How could it be possible for those who are currently alienated (or humiliated) to create a world of non-alienation (or dignity)? If we are all permeated by the conditions of social oppression in which we live, and if our perceptions are constrained by those conditions, shall we not always reproduce those conditions in everything we do? If our existence is traversed by relations of power, how can we possibly create a society that is not characterised by power relations?
The simplest way out of this problem is to solve it by bringing in a saviour, a deus ex machina. If there is some sort of figure who has broken free of alienation and come to a true understanding, then that figure can perhaps lead the masses out of the present alienated society. This is essentially the idea of the vanguard party proposed by Lenin:(76) a group of people who by virtue of their theoretical and practical experience can see beyond the confines of existing society and who, for that reason, can lead the masses in a revolutionary break. There are, however, two basic problems. How is it possible for anyone, no matter what their training, to so lift themselves above existing society that they do not reproduce in their own action the concepts and faults of that society? Even more fundamental: how is it possible to create a self-creative society other than through the self-emancipation of society itself? The experience of revolution in the twentieth century suggests that these are very grave problems indeed.
However, if the notion of a vanguard is discarded, and with it the notion of a revolutionary programme, which depends on the existence of such a vanguard, then what are we left with? The Leninist solution may have been wrong, but it was an attempt to solve a perceived problem: the problem of how you bring about a radical transformation of society in a society in which, apparently, the mass of people are so imbued with contemporary values that self-emancipation seems impossible. For many, the failure of the Leninist solution proves the impossibility of social revolution, the inevitability of conforming.
The Zapatista answer is focused on the notion of dignity. The notion of dignity points to the contradictory nature of existence. We are humiliated but have the dignity to struggle against the humiliation to realise our dignity. We are imbued with capitalist values, but also live a daily antagonism towards those values. We are alienated but still have sufficient humanity to struggle against alienation for a non-alienated world. Alienation is, but it is not, because dis-alienation is not but also is. Oppression exists, but it exists as struggle. It is the present existence of dignity (as struggle) that makes it possible to conceive of revolution without a vanguard party. The society based on dignity already exists in the form of the struggle against the negation of dignity.(77) Dignity implies self-emancipation.
The consistent pursuit of dignity in a society based on the denial of dignity is in itself revolutionary. But it implies a different concept of revolution from the 'storming the winter palace' concept that we have grown up with. There is no building of the revolutionary party, no strategy for world revolution, no transitional programme. Revolution is simply the constant, uncompromising struggle for that which cannot be achieved under capitalism: dignity, control over our own lives.
Revolution can only be thought of in this scheme as the cumulative uniting of dignities, the snowballing of struggles, the refusal of more and more people to subordinate their humanity to the degradations of capitalism. This implies a more open concept of revolution: the snowballing of struggles cannot be programmed or predicted. Revolution is not just a future event, but the complete inversion of the relation between dignity and degradation in the present, the cumulative assertion of power over our own lives, the progressive construction of autonomy. As long as capitalism exists (and as long as money exists), the degradation of dignity, the exploitation of work, the dehumanisation and immiseration of existence will continue: the assertion of dignity clearly comes into immediate conflict with the reproduction of capitalism. This conflict could only be resolved by the complete destruction of capitalism. What form this might take, how the cumulative uniting of dignities could lead to the abolition of capitalism, is not clear. It cannot be clear if it is to be a self-creative process. What is clear is that the experience of the last hundred years suggests that social transformation cannot be brought about by the conquest (be it 'democratic' or 'undemocratic') of state power.
This notion is not reformist, if by reformism is meant the idea that social transformation can be achieved through the accretion of state-sponsored reforms. Anti-reformism is not a question of the clarity of future goals but of the strength with which those forms (especially the state) which reproduce capitalist social relations are rejected in the present. It is a question not of a future programme but of present organisation.
An uncertain revolution is, however, an ambiguous and contradictory revolution. Openness and uncertainty are built in to the Zapatista concept of revolution. And that openness means also contradictions and ambiguities. At times it looks as if the EZLN might accept a settlement that falls far short of their dreams, at times the presentation of their aims is more limited, apparently more containable. Certainly, both the direction and the appeal of the uprising would be strengthened if it were made explicit that exploitation is central to the systematic negation of dignity and that dignity's struggle is a struggle against exploitation in all its forms. The very nature of the Zapatista concept of revolution means that the movement is particularly open to the charge of ambiguity. Yet historical experience suggests that ambiguities and contradictions are deep-rooted in any revolutionary process, no matter how clearly defined the line of the leadership. Rather than deny the contradictions, it seems better to focus on the forms of articulation and political experiment that might resolve those contradictions. It is better to recognise, as Tacho does, that in undertaking revolution, the Zapatistas are 'going to classes in a school that does not exist'.(78)
But what do the EZLN want? What is their dream of the future? Clearly, there are many dreams of the future: 'For one it can be that there should be land for everybody to work, which for the peasant is the central problem, no? In reality they are very clear that all the other problems turn on the question of land: housing, health, schools, services. Everything that makes them leave the land is bad and everything that lets them stay on it is good. To stay with dignity'.(79) That is a dream of the future, a simple dream perhaps, but its realisation would require enormous changes in the organisation of society.
Or again, in another interview, Marcos explains the Zapatista dream in these terms: 'in our dream the children are children and their work is to be children. Here no, in reality, in the reality of Chiapas the work of the children is to be adults, from the time they are born and that is not right, we say that that is not right.... My dream is not of agricultural redistribution, the great mobilisations, the fall of the government and elections and a party of the left wins, whatever. In my dream, I dream of the children and I see them being children. If we achieve that, that the children in any part of Mexico are children and nothing else, we've won. Whatever it costs, that is worth it. It doesn't matter what social regime is in power, or what political party is in government, or what the exchange rate between the peso and the dollar is, or how the stock market is doing, or whatever. If a child of five years can be a child, as children of five years should be, with that we are on the other side.... We, the Zapatista children, think that our work as children is to play and learn. And the children here do not play, they work.'(80) Again a simple dream, possibly to some a reformist dream, but one that is totally incompatible with the current direction of the world, in which the exploitation of children (child labour, child prostitution, child pornography, for example) is growing at an alarming rate. This dream of children being children is a good example of the power of the notion of dignity: the consistent pursuit of the dream would require a complete transformation of society.
A society based on dignity would be an honest, mutually recognitive society, in which people 'do not have to use a mask ... in order to relate with other people'.(81) It would also be an absolutely self-creative society. In an interview for the Venice Film Festival, Marcos replied to the standard question, 'what is it that the EZLN wants?': 'We want life to be like a cinema poster from which we can choose a different film each day. Now we have risen in arms because, for more than 500 years, they have forced us to watch the same film every day'.(82)
There are no five-year plans here, no blueprint for the new society, no pre-defined utopia. There are no guarantees.
There are no guarantees, no certainties. Openness and uncertainty are built in to the Zapatista concept of revolution. And that openness means also contradictions and ambiguities. At times it looks as if the EZLN might accept a settlement that falls far short of their dreams, at times the presentation of their aims is more limited, apparently more containable. These contradictions and ambiguities are part and parcel of the Zapatista concept of revolution, of the idea of a revolution that walks asking. Inevitably, the contradictions and ambiguities are part of the development of the movement, and undoubtedly it is possible to sustain interpretations of zapatismo that are more restricted than the one offered here. The argument here is an attempt to distill rather than to analyse. Our question is not 'what will happen to the EZLN?' but 'what will happen to us?' Or rather not 'happen to' since the whole point is that we are not 'happened to': how will we (not 'they') change the world? How can we change a world in which capitalism starves thousands of people to death each day, in which the systematic killing of street children in certain cities is organised as the only way of upholding the concept of private property in the world, in which the unleashed horrors of neoliberalism are hurtling humanity towards self-destruction?
And what if they fail? By the time this is published, there is no guarantee that the EZLN will still exist. It may be that the Mexican government will have launched an open military assault (already tried on the 9 February 1995 and an always present threat): it is even possible that the army could be successful, more successful than the last time they tried it. It is also possible that the EZLN will become exhausted: that they will be drawn by tiredness, by their own ambiguities or by the simple lack of response from civil society into limiting their demands and settling for definitions. All of these are possible. The important point, though, is that the Zapatistas are not 'they': they are 'we' - we are 'we'. When the huge crowds who demonstrated in Mexico City and elsewhere after the army intervention of 9 February 1995 chanted 'we are all Marcos', they were not announcing an intention to join the EZLN. They were saying that the struggle of the Zapatistas is the life-struggle of all of us, that we are all part of their struggle and their struggle is part of us, wherever we are. As Major Ana-Maria put it in the opening speech of the Intercontinental Meeting: 'Behind us are the we that are you.(83) Behind our balaclavas is the face of all the excluded women. Of all the forgotten indigenous people. Of all the persecuted homosexuals. Of all the despised youth. Of all the beaten migrants. Of all those imprisoned for their word and thought. Of all the humiliated workers. Of all those who have died from being forgotten. Of all the simple and ordinary men and women who do not count, who are not seen, who are not named, who have no tomorrow.'(84)
We are all Zapatistas. The Zapatistas of Chiapas have lit a flame, but the struggle to convert 'dignity and rebellion into freedom and dignity' is ours.
Libcom note: A critique of this article by Wildcat Germany is linked below, followed by a reply from John Holloway.
Notes
1) EZLN, La Palabra de los Armados de Verdad y Fuego, (Mexico City: Editorial Fuenteovejuna, 1994/ 1995), Vol. 1, pp.31-32. The three volumes of this series are a collection of the interviews, letters and communiques of the EZLN during 1994, an invaluable source. All translations of Spanish quotations are by the author.
2) EZLN, La Palabra, Vol 1, p. 35.
3) Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee.
4) The Council 500 Years of Indigenous Resistance.
5) EZLN, La Palabra, Vol 1, p.122; emphasis in the original. The continuing importance of this passage was underlined when it was quoted by Comandante Ramona in her speech to a meeting in Mexico City on 16 February 1997 organised to protest against the government's failure to fulfill the Agreements of San Andres.
6) Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional: Zapatista Army of National Liberation.
7) Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 17th November 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. III, p. 224. Subcomandante Marcos is the spokesperson and military leader of the EZLN. He is, however, subordinate to the CCRI, a popularly elected body. "Mestizos" are people of mixed indigenous and European origin - the vast majority of the Mexican population.
8) Forces of National Liberation.
9) Quoted in C. Tello Diaz, La Rebelion de las Canadas (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1995) pp. 97, 99.
10) The EZLN's reply to the government's claim is contained in a communique of 9 February 1995: 'In relation to the connections of the EZLN with the organisation called "Forces of National Liberation", the EZLN has declared in interviews, letters and communiques that members of different armed organisations of the country came together in its origin, that the EZLN was born from that and, gradually, was appropriated by the indigenous communities to the point where they took the political and military leadership of the EZLN. To the name of the "Forces of National Liberation", the government should add as the antecedents of the EZLN those of all the guerrilla organisations of the 70s and 80s, Arturo Gamiz, Lucio Cabanas, Genaro Vazquez Rojas, Emiliano Zapato, Francisco Villa, Vicente Guerrero, Jose Maria Morelos y Pavon, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, Benito Juarez and many others whom they have already erased from the history books because a people with memory is a rebel people". La Jornada, 13 February 1995.
11) Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 'Carta a Adolfo Gilly', Viento del Sur, no.4 (summer 1995) pp. 21-25, at p. 25.
12) See the account given by Tello, La Rebelion, p. 105, of the meeting between some of the insurgent leaders and the community of the ejido of San Francisco on 23 September 1985.
13) See the account given by Marcos in an interview with Radio UNAM, 18 March 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p. 69. The 'white guards' are paid paramilitary groups who, often in collusion with the authorities, suppress protest and dissent with violence.
14) For a discussion of the transformations in the EZLN, see the chapter by Luis Lorenzano in this volume.
15) Decree of the Lacandon Community. See Tello, La Rebelion, pp. 59ff.
16) For a discussion of the significance of 'community', see the chapter by King and Villanueva in this volume.
17) Radio UNAM interview with Marcos, 18 March 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p.69-70.
18) Marcos, Letter to children of a boarding school in Guadalajara, 8 February 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. I, p. 179.
19) Radio UNAM interview with Marcos, 18 March 1994, EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p. 62.
20) Marcos interview with Cristian Calonico Lucio, 11 November 1995, ms. p. 47. The interview is unpublished in written form, but formed the basis of a video.
21) Ernst Bloch's Naturrecht und Menschliche Wuerde (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1961) is a notable exception. Although theoretically very relevant, it probably did not exercise any influence on the Zapatistas.
22) In a recent interview, Marcos confirms that it was as a result of the integration of the revolutionaries with the indigenous communities that they started using the concept of dignity. 'More than the redistribution of wealth or the expropriation of the means of production, revolution starts to be the possibility that human beings can have a space of dignity. Dignity begins to be a very strong word. It is not our contribution, it is not a contribution of the urban element, it is the communities who contribute it. Such that revolution should be the assurance that dignity be realised, be respected.' Yvon Le Bot, El Sueno Zapatista (The Zapatista Dream) (Mexico City: Plaza & Janes, 1997) p. 146.
23) See for example the interview of Marcos with correspondents of the Proceso, El Financiero and The New York Times, February 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol.I, p. 204, at p. 216.
24) G. Camu Urzua and D. Totoro Taulis, EZLN: el ejercito que salio de la selva (Mexico City: Editorial Planeta, 1994) p. 83.
25) Camu and Totoro, EZLN.
26) The supreme example of the instrumentalist theory of revolution is, of course, Lenin's What is to be Done?
27) See the CCRI communique of 10 June 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol.II, 201.
28) EZLN, La Palabra, Vol.I, p.5.
29) See the account given by Tello, La Rebelion, p. 151; see also Le Bot, El Sueno, p. 191.
30) National Indigenous Congress.
31) At the time of writing, the agreement still has not been implemented by the government.
32) On the refusal of the Zapatistas to define their movement as an indigenous movement, see Le Bot, El Sueno, p. 206, where Marcos says in interview: 'The principal preoccupation of the Committee [CCRI] and of the delegates was that the movement should not be reduced to the indigenous question. On the contrary, if it had been up to them, at least to that part of the committee [those who come from the areas with the strongest traditions] our discourse would have abandoned completely any reference to the indigenous.'
33) The Zapatista use of national symbols, such as the Mexican flag and the national anthem, disconcerted some, especially of the European participants in the recent Intercontinental Gathering in Chiapas. For a critique of the alleged 'nationalism' of the EZLN, see, for example, Sylvie Deneuve, Charles Reeve and Marc Geoffroy, Au-dela des passe-montagnes du Sud-Est mexicain (Paris: Ab irato, 1996); and Katerina, 'Mexico is not only Chiapas nor is the rebellion in Chiapas merely a Mexican affair', Common Sense, no. 22 (winter 1997).
34) In this sense, for example, see the Third Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (1st January, 1995): "The indigenous question will not be solved unless there is a RADICAL transformation of the national pact. The only way to incorporate, with justice and dignity, the indigenous peoples into the nation is by recognising the peculiar characteristics of their social, cultural and political organisation. The autonomies are not a separation but rather the integration of the most humiliated and forgotten minorities into contemporary Mexico. That is how the EZLN has understood it since its formation and tha is how the indigenous bases which form the leadership of our oranisation have directed. Today we repeat it: OUR STRUGGLE IS NATIONAL": La Jornada, 2 January 1995, p.5.
35) La Jornada, 30 January 1996, p. 12.
36) This is, of course, not the only interpretation possible. See, for example, S. Deneuve et al., Au-dela des passe-montagnes. Although it seems incorrect to interpret the Zapatista use of national liberation in the narrow, statist sense, there is no doubt that the term 'national liberation' opens up an enormous, and dangerous, area of ambiguity, simply because the notion of 'nation' and 'state' have been so interwoven that it is difficult to disentangle them completely. It is argued below that the undoubted contradictions and tensions in the discourse of the Zapatistas are not the result of eclecticism, but are the outcome of the consistent pursuit of the principle of dignity. They are not necessarily less serious for that. For a further discussion of Zapatista nationalism, see REDaktion (Hrsg), Chiapas und die Internationale der Hoffnung (Cologne: Neuer ISP-Verlag, 1997), pp. 178-184.
37) Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, "Mexico: La Luna entre los espejos de la noche y el cristal del dia", La Jornada, 9/10/11 June 1995, p. 17 (11 June).
38) This is most clearly elaborated in Lenin's What is to be Done? For example: 'We said that there could not yet be Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. This consciousness could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade union consciousness... The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophical, historical and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals': V.I.Lenin, 'What is to be Done' in Essential Works of Lenin (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 74.
39) The notion of dignity is little used by mainstream political theory. Where it is used, it is often connected with notions of self-ownership (for example, Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 334) or self-possession (for example, Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p. 279). The use of the term in mainstream political theory and philosophy differs crucially from the Zapatista concept in two respects: firstly, its primary point of reference is the individual; and, secondly, it refers to an abstract, indeterminate and idealised present in which it is assumed that people already have the 'right' to dignity. At best, this is a sort of flabby wishful thinking which has little to do with the Zapatista concept of dignity as struggle against the denial of dignity, and is far removed indeed from seeing 'our fathers with fury in their hands'.
40) See, for example, James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
41) This argument is developed in section V.
42) It is not surprising that the !Ya Basta! of the Zapatistas has been strongly echoed by the "sans papiers", the movement of illegal immigrants in France.
43) The Zapatistas use truth and dignity as basically interchangeable concepts. The Zapatistas speak of what they say as the 'word of those who are armed with truth and fire' ('la palabra de los armados de verdad y fuego'). The fire is there, but the truth comes first, not just as a moral attribute, but as a weapon: they are armed with truth, and this is a more important weapon than the firepower of their guns. Although they are organised as an army, they aim to win by truth, not by fire. Their truth is not just that they speak the truth about their situation or about the country, but that they are true to themselves, that they speak the truth of truth denied.
44) Communique of 17 March 1995: La Jornada, 22 March 1995.
45) The separation of personal and political, of private and public, is at the same time their mutual constitution. The point is not to conflate the personal and the political, the public and the private, but to abolish them (to abolish the separation which constitutes both). On this, see Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, Marx Engels Collected Works, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975). To that extent, the phrase 'the personal is political' is misleading.
46) See the chapter by Margara Millan in this volume.
47) It is as a form of the capital relation that the state defines and classifies. The defining action of the state is one moment of the definition inherent in the alienation of labour, the containment of human creativity. For a development of the general argument, see John Holloway, 'Global Capital and the National State' in W. Bonefeld, J. Holloway (eds), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 116-140.
48) Communique of May 1996, La Jornada 10 June 1996.
49) Communique of May 1996, La Jornada 10 June 1996.
50) At the time of writing (February 1997), the agreement still has not been implemented by the government.
51) La Jornada 17 May 1995.
52) La Jornada, 18 May 1995.
53) La Jornada, 10 June1995.
54) La Jornada, 5 March 1995.
55) 'The cistern contains; the fountain overflows': William Blake, 'The Proverbs of Heaven and Hell': in, for example, William Blake (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958) p. 97.
56) 'A political force whose members do not hold or aspire to hold popularly elected offices nor governmental posts at any level. A political force which does not aspire to take power. A force which is not a political party'. La Jornada, 2 January 1996.
57) First Declaration of La Realidad, January 1996: La Jornada, 30 January 1996.
58) They have often mentioned the idea of plebiscites or referendums as a necessary part of a new political system. It is clear, however, from the experience of other states that plebiscites and referendums are quite inadequate as a form of articulating popular decision-making, and are in no sense comparable to the communal discussions which are central to the Zapatistas' own practice.
59) 'And we demand that the authorities should be able to be removed just as soon as the communities decide it and come to an agreement. It could be through a referendum, or some other similar mechanism. And we want to transmit this experience to every level: when the President of the Republic is no use any more he should be automatically removed. As simple as that.' Press Conference given by Subcomandante Marcos, 26 February 1994: EZLN, La Palabra, Vol.1, p. 244.
60) If indeed they are part of the FLN, as the state maintains, it has remained remarkably ineffective.
61) Radio UNAM interview with Marcos, 18 March 1994, EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p. 97.
62) Closing speech by Marcos to the Intercontinental Meeting in La Realidad: Chiapas, no. 3, pp. 106-116, at p. 107.
63) See the chapter by Heau-Lambert and Rajchenberg in this volume.
64) The question of what sort of organisation should develop out of the Intercontinental Meeting of the summer of 1996 was addressed by Marcos in his closing speech: 'What follows? A new number in the useless enumeration of numerous internationals? A new scheme that will give tranquility and relief to those anguished by the lack of recipes? A world programme for world revolution? A theorisation of utopia which will allow us to maintain a prudent distance from the reality that torments us? An organigram that will secure us all a post, a responsibility, a name and no work? What follows is the echo, the reflected image of the possible and the forgotten: the possibility and necessity of talking and listening... The echo of this rebel voice transforming itself and renewing itself in other voices. An echo that converts itself into many voices, into a network of voices that, in the face of the deafness of Power, chooses to speak to itself, knowing itself to be one and many, knowing itself to be equal in its aspiration to listen and make itself heard, recognising itself to be different in the tonalities and levels of the voices which form it... A network that covers the five continents and helps to resist the death promised to us by Power. There follows a great bag of voices, sounds that seek their place fitting with others... There follows the reproduction of resistances, the I do not conform, the I rebel. There follows the world with many worlds which the world needs. There follows humanity recognising itself to be plural, different, inclusive, tolerant of itself, with hope. There follows the human and rebel voice consulted in the five continents to make itself a network of voices and resistances.' (Closing speech by Marcos to the Intercontinental Meeting in La Realidad: Chiapas, no. 3, pp. 106-116, at p. 112.)
65) See the chapter by Margara Millan in this volume.
66) Obvious precedents are, for example, Marx's discussion of the Paris Commune in the Civil War in France, or Pannekoek's discussion of workers' councils in the early years of this century.
67) La Jornada, 27/8/95.
68) 'Civil society, those people without party who do not aspire to be in a political party in the senes that they do not aspire to be the government, what they want is that the government should keep its word, should do its work': Marcos interview with Cristian Calonico Lucio, 11 November 1995, ms. p39.
69) On the dialectic of constituting and constituted, see the article by Werner Bonefeld, 'Capital as Subject and the Existence of Labour', in W. Bonefeld. R. Gunn, J. Holloway and K. Psychopedis (eds), Open Marxism Vol. III (London: Pluto 1995), pp. 182-212; see also J. Holloway, 'The State and Everyday Struggle', in S. Clarke (ed), The State Debate (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991).
70) The understanding of the working class as a defined group has been extended ad infinitum to discussions about the class definition of those who do not fall inside this group - as new petty bourgeoisis, salariat, etc.
71) What Marx calls primitive accumulation is thus a permanent and central feature of capitalism, not a historical phase. On this, see Werner Bonefeld, 'Class Struggle and the Permanence of Primitive Accumulation', Common Sense no. 6 (1988).
72) For a development of this point, see Richard Gunn's article, 'Notes on Class', Common Sense, no. 2 (1987); and also Werner Bonefeld, 'Capital, Labour and Primitive Accumulation: Notes on Class and Constitution', unpublished ms. (1997).
73) Thus, for Marx, capitalists are the personification of capital, as he repeatedly points out in Capital. The proletariat too first makes its appearance in his work not as a definable group but as the pole of an antagonistic relation: 'a class ... which ... is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man': K. Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', in Marx Engels Collected Works, Volume 3 (London:Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 186.
74) The autonomist concept of self-valorisation is perhaps the closest that the Marxist tradition comes to a concept that expresses positively the struggle against-and-beyond capital, but the term is clumsy and obscure. On self-valorisation, see, for example Harry Cleaver, 'The Inversion of Class Perspective in Marxian Theory: From Valorisation to Self-Valorisation', in W. Bonefeld, R. Gunn and K. Psychopedis (eds), Open Marxism, Volume II (London: Pluto Press, 1992), pp. 106-145.
75) Antonio Garcia de Leon in his prologue to an edition of the Zapatista communiques: EZLN, Documentos y Comunicados: 1 de enero / 8 de agosto de 1994 (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1994), p. 14.
76) The deus ex machina idea stretches far beyond Leninism, of course. It can be seen also in those theories which privilege the revolutionary role of the intellectuals. On a quite different plane, the same notions are reflected in the state's understanding of the Zapatista movement and its (racist) assumption that the real protagonists of the movement are urban white or mestizo intellectuals, such as Marcos.
77) 'Alienation could not even be seen, and condemned of robbing people of their freedom and depriving the world of its soul, if there did not exist some measure of its opposite, of that possible coming-to-oneself, being-with-oneself, against which alienation can be measured': Ernst Bloch, Tuebinger Einleitung in die Philosophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1963), Vol. II, p.113. Dignity, in other words.
78) Le Bot, El Sueno, p. 191.
79) Radio UNAM interview with Marcos, 18 March 1994, EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p. 89.
80) Radio UNAM interview with Marcos, 18 March 1994, EZLN, La Palabra, Vol. II, p. 89.
81) Marcos interview with Cristian Calonico Lucio, 11 November 1995, ms. p. 61. This would of course mean a society without power relations.
82) La Jornada, 25 August 1996.
83) This is clumsy, but the best translation I could find for the more elegant 'Detras de nosotros estamos ustedes'.
84) 'Discurso inaugural de la mayor Ana Maria', Chiapas no. 3, pp. 101-105, at p. 103.
Attachments
Open Letter to John Holloway
1997 open letter from Wildcat (Germany) to John Holloway concering his article "Dignity's Revolt" and issues of class composition, the Zapatistas and more.
From Wildcat-Zirkular No. 39 - September 1997 - pp. (german edition) 31-44.
https://www.wildcat-www.de/en/zirkular/39/z39e_hol.htm
Open Letter to John Holloway
Dear John,
In the last two years we have translated various texts of yours and published them in the Wildcat-Zirkular.1 In the spring you sent us your paper on 'Dignity's Revolt' and asked if we wanted to translate it and publish it.2 We would now like to explain why we are not satisfied with this text, with the aim of starting an open discussion. Your inquiry about 'Dignity's Revolt' stimulated us to formulate in writing some critical reflections on your theoretical approach. The letter consists of three parts: first we shall explain the background of our group, in so far as this is important for understanding our objections (A). Then we want to focus on a central critical point of the paper 'Dignity's Revolt', without discussing the whole text, and without getting into a debate about the EZLN itself (B). Finally we want to explain through the concept of work what direction we think a further discussion might take (C).
A. How Wildcat arose and what our Problems are
From Jobbing to Militant Inquiry
In the beginning of the 1980s the cycle of factory worker struggles was over, but for many young people it was inconceivable to adjust to wage labour and to work away at a job until reaching pension age. Additionally, we ourselves refused to strive individually through a professional career for a better place in the capitalist hierarchy. Out of this grew the practice of jobbing: to do any old shitty job for a short time, in order then to have time for ourselves, for political struggle and for pleasure. In formal terms, we worked under conditions that would later be characterised by the sociologists as 'precarious' in the sense of being vulnerable to one-sided measures by capital. But it was even easier then to use the regulations of labour law and the welfare state for our own needs.
Out of the attempt to politicise these practices and to bring them into play intentionally as struggle against work and for a revolutionary perspective, there arose 'jobber groups'. They were a form of self-organisation aimed at mutual support, solidarity against the bosses and the spreading of experiences. A group in Karlsruhe picked up on Italian theoretical discussions in which this 'figure' of the jobber was seen as a rising proletarian subject: through the refusal of work and the gradual spread of these practices, this figure is seen as being at the centre of a process of class composition. Jobbers are seen as embodying the tendency to communism through their mobility on the labour market and their high level of qualification combined with their rejection of capitalist command. Because of their mobility, it is argued that they do not develop any sort of identification with capital and thus get involved to a high degree in such forms of struggle as sabotage and wildcat strikes.
That corresponded to the experiences that we had in factories, building sites and temporary work agencies. But we also observed that 'jobbers' remained a very heterogeneous and marginal group within the working class, and that many just practised an individualised rejection of work. While some jobber groups decided to institutionalise themselves and to become advice centres for welfare state benefits (and this was then referred to as the 'unemployed workers' movement'), the group in Karlsruhe - from which the 'Wildcat' journal later arose - proposed a comprehensive discussion on the working class as a whole. For our theoretical understanding of capitalism and class struggle, the Italian 'operaismo' was particularly important.3 Especially the early texts of this current (by Romano Alquati and others) helped us to decipher the mystifications of capital in the immediate process of production. The operaist critique offered not just the basis for a theoretically revolutionary understanding of the world, but also a practical set of instruments. Basing ourselves on the operaist ideas of inquiry, we proposed to the undogmatic and non-Leninist left a broad 'militant inquiry' within the working class. But the proposal remained a minority affair. The only people who were still interested in the working class were Leninist and Stalinist 'parties' with whom we did not want to have anything to do.
Through the 'militant inquiry' project we wanted to develop a revolutionary critique of capitalism out of the critique of the production process as contradictory unity of labour process and valorisation process. In discussions, surveys and common struggles together with our co-workers we tried to demystify the fetishised power of capital which confronts us hostilely in production as technology, division of labour and alienated cooperation. We wanted to see where and how the workers break through these mystifications themselves in their struggles and thus recognise their productive cooperation as power against capitalism and as possibility of communism.
Bound up with this approach was an understanding of 'class' and 'class struggle' which stood in complete contrast to the traditional understanding in Marxist theory and in the labour movement. We criticised the reduction of class struggle to an economic question of distribution and wages as the ideology of the labour movement, which we saw as an essential moment in the mediation and political weakening of class antagonism. In all this, it was important that since the 1970s a whole series of groups had turned to operaismo and had carried out their own inquiries (see, for example, the book by Karl Heinz Roth on the The 'Other' Labour Movement, published in 1974).
Our experience in the early and mid-1980s in factories, temporary employment agencies and building sites made it clear to us that everyday class antagonism had in no way disappeared, as many on the left maintained. We came across many forms of underground conflict and saw what enormous problems capital had in introducing new technologies of production or new models of work organisation - exactly as you observe at the end of your analysis of Keynesianism: 'The social forces that had imposed the recognition of the power of labour upon capital still existed, stronger than ever, and could not be abolished simply by the declarations of the politicians' (Bonefeld and Holloway (1995), 33).
From the middle of the 1980s there arose new class conflicts in Europe which escaped from the traditional grip of the trade unions. Workers rose as subjects of their own struggles and their radicality embodied a new offensive moment. These conflicts took place especially in 'new' sectors (public service, transport, hospitals, schools, banks, but also in some 'modernised' factories) and seemed to represent a new class composition. We thought that a revolutionary perspective could again become practical in these struggles. In contrast to the trade union struggles for peaceful accommodation with exploitation, a comprehensive hostility to capitalist society could be seen here. We were actively involved in the nurses' movement of 1989 and saw what sort of initiatives were possible without the obstructive influence of the trade unions.
For this reason we paid little attention to the theoretical debates of the 1980s. We observed the change-over of most of the intellectual left to the side of capital, but thought that in the context of the new class struggles the theoretical questions could be approached from within the struggles. In other words, we considered our theoretical basis quite adequate in order to develop a revolutionary project from the working class itself.
The Radical Change of '89 and its consequences
At the beginning of the '90s we proposed to a group of the revolutionary left in Europe the idea of undertaking a common research project on the situation of the working class. (This proposal was later taken up once again in your journal, Common Sense: see Ed Emery, 'No Politics without Inquiry: A Proposal for a Class Composition Inquiry Project 1996-97', Common Sense no. 18). Some comrades from other countries, however, thought that, in view of the world-historical change, it was more urgent to examine our theoretical concepts. At that time we ourselves still approached the collapse of really existing socialism very optimistically.
In 1988/89 there were the beginnings of an instensification of class conflict in West Germany. In the course of the change in the GDR it came to - now long forgotten - mass discussions in the factories there about a social perspective beyond capitalism and GDR-socialism, and with the economic ruin of the former GDR there developed there a broad movement of struggle against factory closures and the deterioration of social conditions. In spite of that, we were no longer able to read a communist perspective in these quantitatively increasing struggles. With the massacre of the Gulf War in 1991 and the economic crisis, which broke rather late in Germany (in 1993, after the unification boom) and which led to the acceptance of the intensification of labour and deteriorating social conditions on a broad scale, we were no longer convinced by our original optimism.
Previous revolutionary concepts and certainties were thoroughly shaken. Struggles in the factories had now only a defensive character, even stooping to begging for jobs. The left was concentrating on racism, fascism and nationalism, without either wanting to or being able to connect these with the class character of capitalism and the question of its revolutionary overcoming. That is why more and more influence in political discussion was gained by those theories which had already in the 1980s departed from the radical critique of class society (as you (pl.) have shown in detail and criticised in relation to Hirsch's theories). We did not wish to become supporters of these theories and to forget the class character of this society. A large part of the work in the journal Wildcat consisted in presenting and analysing the class struggles in the world, which had by no means disappeared after 1989. But struggles and wars were breaking out (Gulf War, Yugoslavia, Chechenya, Somalia, Rwanda...) which seemed to indicate the tendency towards barbarism rather than towards liberation from capitalist domination.
The significance of your (pl.) theoretical efforts for our discussion4
In this situation, we felt it was necessary to examine (and, if necessary, to develop anew) our theoretical basis. A reckoning with the 'new' left theory, which had departed from its radical hostility to capitalism, was more necessary than we had thought. They offered plausible explanations for the new developments, and we had nothing to offer in their place. The operaist thesis that 'the workers produce the crisis' became meaningless, since the open crisis of capitalism bore no direct relation to offensive struggles by workers. Then how could we understand this crisis without seeking refuge in the 'objective laws of development' of the Marxist textbooks or the then fashionable regulation theory? How can we explain that the working class is forced to accept a serious deterioration in their conditions without any radical struggles developing? And why, in spite of this apparent weakness of the working class, does capital not come out of its crisis?
We therefore began with an intensive theoretical discussion of these questions and looked at all sorts of theories about the present crisis (from the regulationists to Wallerstein's world system theory). It was a special piece of good luck that in this process we came across your texts, which, unlike most other theories, start out from the same question as ourselves. You criticise radically the theories of the new left as a capitulation in the face of the tasks of revolutionary theory. Against the apparent all-powerfulness of capital, you stick to the point that it is not a question of autonomous 'things' or 'structures', but of a social relation, in which antagonism is inscribed. Starting from the social constitution of the social relations you try to sketch a different explanation of current development.
Precisely because we agree with you on the way the question is posed, we consider that a more precise discussion of your theses would be important and productive. For us it is a question of coming to a revolutionary theory which has practical meaning. The theory must relate to the reality of the present-day working class. We can imagine such a project only as a collective one, as one of many people discussing and working together. For us it is not a question of getting immediate answers, but of starting up a process of asking and exploring. To anticipate: the main problem that we have with your texts is that in many points they do not follow through the revolutionary and de-mystifying approach radically enough. This may be because you often want to give general solutions too quickly, where today it would be more important to leave questions and problems open in order to lead into a collective theoretical process.
B. 'Dignity' and 'Humanism' - a flight into the unhistorical?
In the paper on 'Dignity's Revolt' you want to protect the EZLN and the uprising in Chiapas against criticism from the left. To do that, you develop a comprehensive concept of 'dignity', which keeps on cropping up in the texts of the Zapatistas.
The uprising in Chiapas was for us too one of the most important movements after 1989 and the Gulf War. It put world revolution back on the agenda. Here, and everywhere in the world, it embodied a new feeling of revolt, courage and revolutionary hope. It set something up against the feeling that capitalism had finally triumphed and that revolution had become impossible. We hoped that with the uprising in Chiapas a new revolutionary debate could start up. All the more so since the Zapatistas themselves seemed to stimulate such a debate by their invitation to the international gatherings 'against neoliberalism'.
However, we soon became aware of three things:
1. The movement of support for the Zapatistas remained limited to the classical form of solidarity work. In this context it was not possible to hold a comprehensive revolutionary discussion. The uprising in Chiapas was 'cool' and 'important', but it was a long way away and had nothing to do with conditions here.
2. Behind the slogan 'against neo-liberalism' there quickly gathered a broad spectrum of political currents, of which the majority was in no sense revolutionary. There is a strong bourgeois critique of neo-liberalism (for example under the slogan of turbo-capitalism, which was coined by the rightwing conservative military strategist Edward Luttwak in the United States), which is concerned not with overthrowing capitalist relations, but with saving them. 'Unbridled capitalism' must, in this view, be protected from destroying itself. The age of 'Keynesianism' is characterised as a 'golden age'. Precisely because of this argument, which is shared by many on the left, we found your criticism of Keynesianism important and helpful.
3. From the EZLN itself came no indications that they would criticise this development. Their position - both on questions of development in Mexico and in the world - was thus questioned not only by the orthodox-Marxist groups to which you refer in 'Dignity's Revolt'. It was criticised also by people who expressly consider themselves to be part of the anti-Leninist and undogmatic tendency. 5
For us it is not enough to read a new model of revolution out of the declarations of the Zapatistas and to use this to interpret away all problems. It is also not enough just to take the declarations of the Zapatistas and on that basis to say something about the character of the struggle and the uprising, rather we have to deal with the way in which the people there live, produce and struggle; how their struggle fits materially into the international class struggle. Precisely on this point there is hardly anything at all in the paper on 'Dignity's Revolt'. In its unhistorical generality, it might just as well be a defence of the liberation struggle of the Sandinistas or any other movement of liberation in any other time.
Our principal problem with your text on 'Dignity's Revolt' can be illustrated by the heading of the sixth section: 'Dignity is the revolutionary subject. Dignity is a class concept and not a humanistic one.' (This and all following quotations not specifically referring to other texts are taken from 'Dignity's Revolt'.) We would agree with the assumption contained in the statement: there is an insuperable division between revolutionary and humanistic concepts. While humanistic approaches refer to an ideal, philosophical concept of being a person and an abstract, unhistorical 'humanity', revolutionary theory starts from the historically real person. It does not see 'the person' as the revolutionary subject, but real people, who in all previous societies have been split into antagonistic classes. The subject of revolutionary change is thus the class of producers, who are exploited by the ruling class. The particular historical forms of domination and class struggle are the result of the 'specific ... form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of the direct producers' (as, quoting Marx, you emphasise in your essay 'Crisis, Fetishism, Class Composition').
The Zapatistas speak not of class but of 'civil society'. You justify that by saying that the 'old words' are so 'worn out' that they bring more harm than clarity. The class concept, you say, has been used in orthodox Marxism as a 'definitional concept', in which it is just a question of defining class membership. Usually class is defined in terms of 'those who sell their labour power in order to survive', or 'those who produce surplus value and are directly exploited'. The working class has thus become a question of definition and indeed of a defintion which starts from 'subjection to capital'. People's struggles are then judged, you say, according to the way that they are classified. This has led, for example to the argument that, in view of the shrinking of the urban factory proletariat, class struggle is not important for social change; or it has been impossible to relate to new forms of struggle like the student movement, feminism or ecologism. For this reason you want to oppose to this definitional, classificational concept of class another which starts not from class membership (classification) but from antagonism.
We see the problem of a definitional class concept in just the same way. It is a problem of subject and object. To define the class in terms of membership on the basis of certain objective characteristics leads to political concepts that turn the class into the object of politics. It is then not a question of the self-liberation or self-change of the class, instead the class becomes the object of a political party (as is the case in Leninism). In the 'revolutionary process' it is then not the class that is the subject but a party which leads or represents it. Against this notion of party communism we too have objected that the liberation of the working class can only be the deed of the working class itself.
You then explain the character of the anatgonism between the classes in terms of the theory of fetishism. 'Although this antagonism appears as a vast multiplicity of conflicts, it can be argued (and was argued by Marx) that the key to understanding this antagonism and its development is the fact that present society is built upon an antagonism in the way that the distinctive character of humanity, namely creative activity (work in its broadest sense) is organised. In capitalist society, work is turned against itself, alienated from itself; we lose control over our creative activity.' This contradiction between creativity and its own negation is, you say, the antagonism between labour and capital. So it is not a conflict between two external forces, 'but between work (human creativity) and work alienated'. In a moment we shall return to the concept of work that you use. Here we just want to observe that for us too it is important to see class conflict as a dialectical and not an external relation. People themselves produce the conditions in which they live, and yet are dominated by them. It is by no means easy to make this deranged relation clear.
The question immediatley arises of why we produce our own world in this deranged manner. To say that this negation 'takes place through the subjection of human activity to the market' does not explain it, but merely indicates the form. And this form must be explained from the specific content, the specific historic character of labour. You avoid this problem by making subjectivity, which creates over and against itself an alienated objectivity, into an ever thinner, more abstract and unhistorical residue: 'humanity (dignity repressed and in struggle) against neoliberalism (the current, savagely destructive phase of capitalism)'.6 The subject of struggle becomes an anthropolgical category: 'the indestructable (or maybe just the not yet destroyed) NO that makes us human'. In other texts you have characterised this residue, referring to Hegel, as the 'sheer unrest of life'. Here there is no longer anything that is specific to the antagonistic struggle in capitalist society. We could apply such statements to all historical periods and use them as a general characterisation of all struggles against oppression that have ever existed. You arrive in this way to precisely to that humanism which you wanted to reject in your heading: 'humanity against neoliberalism'. This is not just a theoretical but a political problem. This slogan can be accepted by any representative of the Socialist International, or it could be used as an advertising slogan by the socialist government in France.
The problem you (and we) started from was a different one: you wanted to criticise the left currents that put the activity and seizure of power by a political party in place of the self-emancipation of the working class. But in attempting to oppose the objectivist, definitional and classificatory concept of class, you throw the baby out with the bathwater. If we reduce the concept of class to a general human contradiction present in every person between alienation and non-alienation, between creativity and its subordination to the market, between humanity and the negation of humanity, then the class concept loses all meaning. It then only has the value of a moral characterisation which we can apply to all possible movements, without saying anything at all about them, their character and their importance for the worldwide revolutionary process. The antagonism is accordingly timeless in your work: it exists all the time, sometimes weaker, sometimes stronger - there is no end in sight. 'Revolution is simply the constant, uncompromising struggle for that which cannot be achieved under capitalism: dignity, control over our own lives.'
Revolutionary theory must work out how a concrete perspective of emancipation and liberation is contained in struggles in spite of their fragmentation, and bring this perspective into them. Showing that there is a general human content in all these single struggles does not create this bond, but runs away from the real political problems to a philosophical level. We have come to the conclusion in our discussions that we need a theoretical precision of the class concept, but to do that we must stick with the question, instead of avoiding it with philosophical answers.
In operaist theory 'class composition' was a category and an analytical instrument that was opposed both to the fetishised and objectivist class concept of party Marxism and to the sociological concept of class. After the defeat of class struggles in Italy, there was a discussion about how and whether this concept could be maintained as an abstract framework in separation from the concrete historical conditions in which it arose. The generalisation of 'class composition' from the mass worker to the 'social worker', which Negri undertook, never convinced us, neither then nor now.7 Just like the 'sheer unrest of life' the 'social worker' is a sort of universal key, which fits everything and thus becomes meaningless for practice. Precisely because the question of the understanding and meaning of the concept of class is important for us, we must pose it correctly.8
C. Work is central - but what does that mean?
The different conflicts within society are today generally juxtaposed without any relation being established between them. The result is an image of a multiplicity of conflicts, in which the 'totality' of capitalist society and hence a revolutionary goal no longer appear. In your essay, 'From Scream of Refusal to Scream of Power: the Centrality of Work', you therefore emphasise the role of 'totality' for a 'theory against society'. You criticise the mystifying separation off of the struggle over exploitation into an 'economic' sphere. This struggle, you say, stands in the centre of social reproduction and its change, because in it is contained the basic dialectic and instability of the social cohesion.
Capital depends on work, it is nothing other than the fetishised form of appearance of past work. 'No matter how absolute and terroristic the domination of capital is, there is no way it can free itself from its dependence on labour. The dependence of capital on labour exists within capital as contradiction' (Open Marxism III, p. 178). That means that the domination of capital is the domination of our own products over us. And thus it is a relation that is capable of being revolutionised, capable of being overcome, because it is constituted by us ourselves. It seems to us extremely important to insist on this basic dialectic of fetishisation and to make it the starting point of every investigation.
However, as we have said already, this raises the question of why we put ourselves in this historically specific relation to the products of our work. Marx criticises the classical political economists for never having posed the question, for accepting the fetishised forms of our products - commodities, money, capital - as normal and historically unchangeable. They never asked the question why this content (human work) takes that form (commodity). Marx traces the commodity character of our products back to the specific historical shape of work: abstract labour. With that he does not mean an abstraction in thought, but the really abstract character that work has for us in capitalism: we do not work to produce a particular product; the product that we produce is not for us, but for others; we are not bound by particular personal qualities with this or that activity; an employer can employ these hundred workers today, those hundred tomorrow and in both cases will have the same average quantity of work. This abstraction is tied to the capitalist mode of production and first develops historically with the establishment of a factory-type organisation of work, whether it now take place in the hospital, the office, in a lorry, in agriculture or in the factory. The commodity character of our products rests on this 'specifically capitalist mode of production'. Work in this mode of production is daily alienation, which confronts us in the commodity and in private property as a thing.
In this sense we agree with you that work is central. Because the form of value constituted by work is 'the thread that binds the world together, that makes apparently quite separate processes of production mutually interdependent, that creates a link between the coal miners of Britain and working conditions of car workers in Mexico, and vice versa' (as you put it in 'Crisis, Fetishism, Class Composition', Open Marxism II, p.155). We could also put it in this way: in value our social connection in production confronts us as a thing because we do not constitute it self-consciously and freely. We do not choose the people for whom and with whom we produce, rather this seems pre-ordained by the command of capital. In capital the social connection which is reified in value becomes autonomous and commands us.
That does not mean, however, that all riches and all social appearances are the product of work, as you seem to say ('Work is all-constitutive,' or 'since work is the only creative force in society (any society)...' in 'From Scream...', Open Marxism III, p. 172). There are any amount of activities that nobody would describe as 'work': free artistic activities, games or struggles within society. And there are plenty of riches that are not the product of work, starting with air and sunshine. To lead everything back to work easily comes close to the glorification of work by the workers' parties (Marx criticised this as long ago as the first draft programme of the German Social Democratic Party). If wealth depends only on work - work as it is commonly understood today - then the biblical curse of 'you shall eat bread by the sweat of your brow' is our inescapable destiny. Marx said in Capital that the 'realm of freedom' could begin only beyond work.9
We know that for you it is not a question of glorifying work, but of criticising the reified world. In all your texts you emphasise that it is a question of forms that are constituted by us ourselves, and not of eternally valid 'structures' or 'laws'. But to use 'work, creation and practice' as 'interchangeable concepts' ('From Scream...', Open Marxism III, p. 172) deprives the demystifying critique of the commodity, money and capital forms of its explosive force. The demystification cannot consist just in relating these forms simply to human activity, but to a historically specific and changing way of producing. But to do this, there must be an investigation of the change in form and the transformations in the process of production. If 'work' is defined simply as human activity, statements about the centrality of work become tautological, because by defintion all practice has already been declared to be work. The centrality of work, that is, of the process of production and exploitation, for a revolutionary perspective is thus asserted, but the demonstration is lacking. Besides, the perspective of real liberation is dismantled. Communism as the overcoming of socialisation through work is then no longer conceivable.
We think that a reason for the over-historical generality of the concept of work in your texts is that the 'immediate production process' rarely appears and, when it does, it is abridged. In the article on 'Crisis, Fetishism, Class Composition' you emphasise: 'The core of the matter is the form "in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers"'. The specifically capitalist character of this form is related to commodity exchange: 'What distinguishes capitalist exploitation from other forms of exploitation is that it is mediated through exchange' (Open Marxism II, p. 153). But then we are caught in a circle, for it is the exchange and commodity character that needs to be explained. We think that this can be done only through the analysis of the specifically capitalist production process. The essential characteristic of this mode of production consists in the fact that it is possible only as social production, as the working together of millions of people. But since this socialisation exists as cooperation, division of labour and machinery which are forced upon us and pre-given, it appears as an alien power. This material, real shape of the production process is the hard core of the capitalist command over our life.
The material shape of the production process, and therefore machinery and technology, are indissolubly linked with the social relation of domination, the command of capital. In your texts you stress that the antagonism exists not on the level of distribution and the wage question but in the immediate process of production, in the conflict over the 'pumping out of surplus value'. But what is missing is the analysis and determination of the specific forms of this pumping out. Only when we decipher the basis of capitalist command in the concrete structures of the production process can we understand why this deranged capital relation of alienation and reification continues to exist - and how the working class develops in it as an antagonistic subject.
That is why it is particularly important to discuss what you have to say about the production process in your texts. In the presentation of 'Fordist production' in your articles on 'The Red Rose of Nissan' (Capital & Class no. 32, summer 1987) and in 'The Abyss Opens ...', it struck us that the specific character of labour is established there only in terms of its monotony, boredom, de-skilling etc. These are all characterisations that are assumed in the general left criticism of Taylorism (e.g. Bravermann) and that always start out from the individualised, atomised worker. They make that which is the result and form of appearance of the capitalist mode of production - namely the fragmentation and atomisation of the working class - into their theoretical point of departure. In that sense they stand in direct contradiction to your demystification approach. In left sociological criticism, the contradictory unity of atomisation and socialisation in the capitalist production process is suppressed. It is not only that capital is always dependent on living labour, but this labour develops an increasingly social character. The sociality of work, that is, the productive cooperation of the workers, is a historical process. Capital flees from the 'insubordinate power of labour', but it can only flee in the direction of its further socialisation, which it must build up against the workers as a new 'social power', just as Ford's River Rouge complex was a 'social power'. A principal problem of the revolutionary politics consists in our view today in its inability to criticise, theoretically and practically, the worldwide production process in such a radical, demystifying fashion.
So far for the moment our remarks, as a start in the process of theoretical clarification, of which we hope that it will open the way to practice.
Your translators
Libcom note: John Holloway's reply is here.
- 1We have translated the following texts of John Holloway and published them in the Wildcat-Zirkular: 'Capital Moves' in no. 21 (originally in Capital & Class no. 57); 'The Abyss Opens: The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism' and 'Global Capital and the National State' in no. 28/29 (both originally in W. Bonefeld and J. Holloway (eds), Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money, Macmillan, London, 1995); 'Introduction' and 'Conclusion: Money and Class Struggle' (both with Werner Bonefeld) from the same book in no. 30/31; 'From Scream of Refusal to Scream of Power: The Centrality of Work' (from W. Bonefeld et al., eds, Open Marxism III, Pluto, London, 1995) and 'Crisis, Fetishsim, Class Composition' (from W. Bonefeld et al., eds, Open Marxism III, Pluto, London, 1992) in no. 34/35.
- 2The article is published in John Holloway and Eloina Pelaez (eds), Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico, Pluto, London, 1998.
- 3Important texts were re-published by us or translated for the first time in Thekla 5, 6, 7, 9; on the origin of 'operaismo' see the article 'Renaissance of Operaismo' in Wildcat no. 64/65.
- 4Translator's note: The 'you' in this section of the letter refers to texts by Werner Bonefeld, John Holloway, Richard Gunn and others connected with Common Sense and Open Marxism.
- 5In Wildcat-Zirkular no. 22 we translated, for example, texts by Sylvie Deneuve / Charles Reeve from France and by Katerina from Greece.
- 6Did you not want to show in 'The Abyss Opens', that Keynesianism was no less destructive, but could only 'blossom' after the murder of millions of people by world war and fascism?
- 7See 'Mass worker and social worker - some remarks' by Roberto Battaggia, Primo Maggio No. 14, 1980/81, translated in Wildcat-Zirkular no. 36/37.
- 8As a complement to 'Dignity's Revolt' you recommended to us the article by Luis Lorenzano, 'Zapatismo: Recomposition of Labour, Radical Democracy and revolutionary Project'. It is an extreme example of this 'new' operaismo, which uses 'class composition' as a sort of universal key, without even devoting a sentence to going into what the material conditions of production and the social relations in Chiapas look like. (The article is also published in Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico).
- 9"In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases, thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production ... Freedom in this field can only consist in socialised man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control... But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itslef, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis" (Marx, Capital, III, p. 820, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1959). Thus Marx contradicts conventional wisdom of the Left which implies, that "humanizing" of labour or a "liberation within labour" were at stake. As labour is in itself the active alienation it follows that the aim cannot be liberated labour but only liberation by getting rid of labour. As a result it is also a mistake to confront "alienated" labour with "non alienated" labour as is hinted at in "Dignity's Revolt".
Comments
Open reply to open letter - John Holloway
Holloway responds to Wildcat (Germany)'s 1997 open letter about his work.
Open Reply to an Open Letter
Dearest Wildcat,
Many thanks for your letter. I'm very sorry for not replying sooner, but ... and then follow all the excuses. I don't know how many letters I've started in this way.
And yet your letter is very special. You say that it was a 'besonderer Gluecksfall' that you came across our texts, but of course the converse is also true. You cannot imagine what a pleasure it is, when one spends most of one's time in that peculiar form of class struggle (or peculiar vice, perhaps) which is Marxist theory, to discover that somebody not only reads it but actually discusses it and finds it helpful. Of course I was at first disappointed that you didn't publish the Dignity's Revolt paper, but it's actually far more gratifying to know that you read the paper with care, discussed it and took the care to write a detailed criticism. Thank you very much.
I would like to take up the points you make in the way that you suggest: not as an Answer to your Criticisms, but as moving a step forward in the Prozess des Fragens und Untersuchens. I want to focus on three points that seem to be central in your argument: the importance of the EZLN, the question of class and humanism, and the question of work.
1. The EZLN:
You say in your letter that the aim of my paper was to defend the EZLN against criticisms from the left. I think, on the contrary, that I was more concerned with defending the EZLN from their supporters than from their critics. As you point out, the movement that has grown up around the zapatista uprising is very confused and includes a whole range of different political positions. I think it is very important to engage within this movement by advancing political-theoretical arguments about the nature of the movement. The way I chose to do this was by focussing on the category of 'dignity', which seems to me a potentially very powerful category.
Part of my argument is, of course, that I consider the zapatista movement to be an extremely important and original revolutionary movement. I do not think that they are beyond criticism and the movement is, as I say, confused and ambivalent in many ways. But then I find it hard to imagine any revolutionary process that would not be confused, ambivalent and open to criticism. To refuse to engage with the movement in the name of theoretical purity or correctness would, I think, be a great mistake. I also think that any engagement with the zapatistas must be based on an openness to learn from them, to listen, and not just to apply pre-cast ideas of what is correct. What they have done, and what they are doing, and the revolutionary way in which they are challenging revolutionary ideas, make them for me the most exciting revolutionary movement in a very long time. 'May 1968' too was a confused movement, full of mistakes and criticable practices: then too, the many groups who felt that they had the 'correct line' stood on the sidelines. The position of the left-wing critics of the zapatistas, such as Deneuve / Reeve, seems to me no different.
2. Class and humanism:
You focus your discussion here on the section of the paper which begins: 'Dignity is the revolutionary subject. Dignity is a class concept, not a humanisitic one', a section which was obviously intended to provoke discussion. You accuse me of falling into the humanism that I claim to criticise and quite rightly link this problem with the 'sheer unrest of life' which I quote in other texts.
I have already revised this section considerably, partly in response to your criticisms, but I do not think that this revision affects the discussion.
Your criticism is that, in the attempt to avoid a definitional or objectivist concept of class, I throw the baby out with the bath water, reducing the concept of class to the contradiction between alienation and non-alienation, a contradiction present in every person.
I think your characterisation is right. For me, the working class, the revolutionary subject, is humanity dehumanised, insubordination subordinated, freedom enchained, the sheer unrest of life entrapped, indefinition defined, creativity negated, etc. However, these contradictions do not just float in the air: they are the precondition of and consequence of, they exist in and through, the daily, hourly pumping of surplus value from the workers. If exploitation comes to an end, then there is no dehumanisation of humanity, etc. But similarly, if there is no dehumanisation of humanity (etc), then there is no exploitation. Exploitation is the core of dehumanisation, the core of class struggle. But I do not think that the exploitation of surplus value producing workers can be separated from the dehumanisation of humanity that it implies, and this dehumanisation is not just an external contradiction between us and capital, but a contradiction that runs through all of us. Thus when you say that 'Subjekt der revolutionaeren Veraenderung ist damit die Klasse der Produzenten, die von der herrschenden Klasse ausgebeutet wird' [The subject of revolutionary change is thus the class of producers, who are exploited by the ruling class], it seems to me that there is a danger here of 'reducing' class conflict, of separating off one aspect of the class conflict, of impoverishing revolution.
When I say that exploitation is the core of dehumanisation, I do not mean by that there is a hierarchy between the direct producers of surplus value and the rest of us, simply that the negation of creativity (etc) is a material, palpable, historical process. I think that there might possibly be a case for establishing such a hierarchy if it could be shown that the direct producers of surplus value play a particular part in the attack against capital. This has often been the assumption, and was one of the points that came up in the discussion when we met in Hamburg: the idea that there are key sections of workers who are able to inflict particular damage on capital (such as workers in large factories or transport workers). These workers are able to impose with particular directness the dependence of capital upon labour. But I'm not sure that such groups of workers are necessarily direct producers of surplus value (think of bank workers, for example), and the impact of the zapatistas on capital (through the devaluation and the world financial upheaval of 1994-95, for example) makes it clear that the capacity to disrupt capital accumulation does not (any longer?) depend necessarily on one's place in the process of production. Anyway, which does more 'damage to capital' - a prolonged strike by industrial workers or a rebellion in the jungles of Mexico which stirs up again the idea of revolution and the dream of a different type of society?
You argue in your letter that I fall into the humanism that I set out to criticise. You say: 'es gibt eine unueberwindbare Trennung zwischen humanistischen und revolutionaeren Konzepten. Waehrend sich humanistische Ansaetze auf ein ideales, philosophisches Menschsein und eine abstrakte, unhistorische Menschlichkeit beziehen, geht die revolutionare Theorie von den historisch wirklichen Menschen aus.' [there is an insuperable division between revolutionary and humanistic concepts. While humanistic approaches refer to an ideal, philosophical concept of being a person and an abstract, unhistorical 'humanity', revolutionary theory starts from the historically real person] (37). My problem here is with the 'historisch wirklichen Menschen' [historically real person]. If this is understood positivistically, as meaning people as they are now, then there is no revolution: there might be complaints, struggles, but that is all. It is only if it is understood negatively, to mean 'historically real people, as they exist in their negation, their alienation, their form of being denied' that the term 'historically real people' carries any revolutionary force. But what is it then that is being negated, alienated, denied? The possibiity of living as humans, free and self-determining. The term 'historically real people' makes sense only if we understand that real historical existence as an existence-in-negation, an existence-in-tension, the tension being towards humanity, self-determining practice. The problem with humanism is not that it has a concept of humanity, but that it thinks of humanity positively, as something already existing, rather than starting from the understanding that humanity exists only in the form of being denied, as a dream, as a struggle. The zapatista slogan 'humanity against neoliberalism' is ambiguous: humanity can be understood either positively (socialdemocratically) or negatively. The argument of my article is that it should be understood negatively.
You object to the idea of 'humanity against neoliberalism' because the slogan could be just as easily used by supporters of the Socialist International. Yes, but I'm not sure that that's a problem. Any categories that we use are terrains of struggle: the PRI-politicians here in Mexico talk of the importance of the revolutionary tradition, the hacks of the ex-Soviet Union talked of class struggle, Clinton of freedom. So what? But, more fundamentally, any situation of revolutionary upheaval is a situation of confusion, of confused thought, of confused enthusiasms, of (less confused) opportunism, of ambiguous categories. That is not a reason for standing aside.
All this feels too negative, too defensive. The point, of course, is not to defend myself against your criticisms, even less to counter-attack. Your letter has been very helpful to me in trying to think things out more clearly. There are some points I agree with, others that I am still thinking about. One of the points that worries me is your argument that if one understands the concept of class as the contradiction between alienation and non-alienation, then it loses all meaning: 'er kann beliebig auf alles moegliche angewendet werden' [can apply to all possible movements, without saying anything at all about them]. But isn't that the point of Marxist theory? To understand all social phenomena as forms of class struggle, and thereby to understand the richness of class struggle and the fragility of all social phenomena? By focussing on money as a form of class struggle, for example, as in the articles you have published by Werner [Bonefeld] and myself, we can learn a lot about the current development and fragility of capitalism, which would be closed if one adopted a narrower view of class struggle and saw money as something external to class struggle. That the arguments are not sufficiently developed I agree, but one of the best ways to develop them is by seeing them in the context of particular movements of struggle such as the zapatista uprising. I don't understand why a concept that fits everything 'damit fuer did Praxis bedeutungslos bleibt'.
3. Work is central:
I agree with many of your comments in this section of your letter: for example, that the question of the relation between creative practice and work should have been developed more in the article on 'The Centrality of Work'. I think, however, that the central issue is again the question of how we think of class. You insist again on seeing class struggle as centred in the immediate production process: 'Diese materielle, dingliche Gestalt des Produktionsprozesses ist der harte Kern des kapitalistischen Kommandos ueber unser Leben' [This material, real shape of the production process is the hard core of the capitalist command over our life.]. And then you say just at the end: 'Das Kapital flieht vor der "aufstaendischen Macht der Arbeit", aber es kann nur in die Richtung ihrer weiteren Vergesellschaftung fliehen, die es den ArbeiterInnen gegenueber wieder als neue "soziale Macht" aufbauen muss, so wie der River-Rouge-Komplex von Ford eine "soziale Macht" war.' [Capital flees from the 'insubordinate power of labour', but it can only flee in the direction of its further socialisation, which it must build up against the workers as a new 'social power', just as Ford's River Rouge complex was a 'social power'.] I think I agree with both of these statements, but I understand them in a different way from you. For me, for example, the zapatista uprising is precisely an example of the way in which the flight of capital leads to new forms of socialisation (the fiercer subjection of the lives of Mexican peasants into the circuit of capital). I don't think we should limit the idea of socialisation to the old idea of the growth of the (industrial) proletarian army (Schornstein nach Schornstein - as Brecht puts it somewhere, does he?), which I suspect underlies your argument. I think it would be dangerous to limit class struggle in this way, simply because I think class struggle is much richer and faster-moving than that suggests.
Capital depends on the exploitation of labour, but exploitation is impossible without subordination, the transformation of insubordinate humanity (the 'sheer unrest of life') into subordinate labour. Obviously, this is a struggle that takes place not only within the factory but in every aspect of human existence. Primitive accumulation, capital's violent struggle to subordinate, is not something in the past but is everyday existence. I see no reason why an emphasis on the centrality of exploitation should mean restricting class struggle to the immediate process of production.
But I want to finish on a more positive note. The long article which you decided not to publish (as well as the shorter version which you did publish) is a plea for Marxists (and beyond) to listen carefully to what the zapatistas are saying and doing. They are saying very original and, on the whole, very good things. It is not just (although that is important) that they have reawakened the idea of revolution: it is also that they are re-inventing what revolution means. Central to this is the idea of changing the world without taking power, which, I think, has enormous consequences for the way we think about revolution and about political practice. Certainly part of the response in Europe has been a deaf romanticism, but far worse than the deafness of the romantics has been the deafness of the dogmatics, of those on the independent left who simply do not want to listen to what might challenge their established ideas. There are many indications now that the next few months could see a tragic outcome in Mexico: if so, it would be a tragedy for the world as much as for Mexico. I do not think the world has so many chances left: when one arises it is important to fight for it - critically, of course, but to fight for it.
Again very, very many thanks for your letter. I hope we can continue to make our disagreements productive and that I shall hear from you soon. I know there are many points of your letter that I have not touched. You criticise me for always wanting to round things off, with over-smooth general answers, instead of leaving problems and questions open. On this point I think probably .... [here the manuscript breaks off]
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