The famine of 1936, the mass defeatism and anti-war sentiment in the USSR

Submitted by meerov21 on September 10, 2016

From the book of O. Khlevniuk. "Stalin. The life of one leader."
.
In 1936 there was a poor harvest. Numerous reports from different regions, including addressed to Stalin, testified on hunger and starvation in autumn 1936 — spring 1937 sharply aggravated the situation in the cities, where hungry peasants, in spite of many obstacles, rushed in search of bread.

In March 1937 USSR Prosecutor A. Vyshinsky reported to Stalin about peasants kidnapping corpses of dead animals in the Kuibyshev region (2) , and in April about cannibalism and murder of children in the Chelyabinsk region. "We registered dozens of deaths on starvation, typhoid, numerous cases of exhaustion in children...," wrote Vyshinsky (3)...

NKVD regularly reported to Stalin about the spread of anti-government statements, refusals to work at the collective farms, about the Exodus to the cities, the slaughter of livestock in connection with starvation (4)...

...The reports of the NKVD wich Stalin received in 1936-1937 constantly present signals about the mood of defeatism in connection with the rumors about the imminent war. "People are talking about the war in in our village. The peasantry are all set against the Soviets. Let there be war and we will soon overthrow this government. Maybe we will be worse, but it just would not have the power of the Bolsheviks. They have looted us so let them remember that no mercy they will get" — this example is from the report of the heads of the NKVD in the North Caucasus region (1) and it is typical for other messages from security services.

+++

2) РГАСПИ. Ф. 82. Оп. 2. Д. 887. Л. 17. Записка Сталину и Молотову от 22 марта 1937
3) Там же. Л. 32, 41-42- Записки Сталину и Молотову от 14 и 21 апреля 1937 г-
4) Комплекс спецсообщений руководителей региональных управлений НКВД о голоде 1936-1937 гг-> направленных на имя Сталина, опубликован: Советская деревня глазами ВЧК-ОГПУ-
НКВД. Т. 4-1935—1939 / П°Д РеД- А. Береловича и др. М., 2012. С. 273-45°
1) Там же. С. 304. Спецсообщение от 4 сентября 1936 г., направленное группе советских руководителей, в том числе Сталину.

Steven.

7 years 7 months ago

In reply to by libcom.org

Submitted by Steven. on September 10, 2016

Interesting stuff

meerov21

7 years 7 months ago

In reply to by libcom.org

Submitted by meerov21 on September 10, 2016

We also know todey that Stalin's USSR was a universe of famines. Famine of 1932-1933 (5-7 million victims), the famine of 1936 (?), the 1946-1947 famine (1-2 million victims). And that's not counting the famine of 1921-1922 at the time of Lenin (5-7 million victims).

meerov21

7 years 7 months ago

In reply to by libcom.org

Submitted by meerov21 on September 10, 2016

There is nothing strange in the fact that, according to another contemporary Russian historian, Mark Solonin, the main reason for the disaster of 1941 in the author's opinion is the "inseparable inability and unwillingness to fight of the majority of the Red Army." https://libcom.org/forums/history/june-41th-final-diagnosis-mark-solonin-23062016

meerov21

7 years 7 months ago

In reply to by libcom.org

Submitted by meerov21 on September 12, 2016

For Anyone interested in the history of the second world war

Interesting discussion between historians, well known in Russia specialists, one (Isaev) is Stalinist, the second one (Solonin) is anti-Stalinist.

Both claim the thesis about USSR preparation to the first strike in the summer of 1941 is adopted by modern historical science and the main discussion about it is finished. Yes, the Germans are also preparing for the first blow.

Also both talk about the enormous superiority of the Soviet army over the Germans in numbers of tanks and planes in June 1941 (12 thousand Soviet tanks against German 4 thousand, 8 thousand combat aircraft against 2 thousand German).

So What are they arguing?

In general only about the causes of the disaster of 1941: Isaev believes that the main problem in better organization and more efficient management of the German army. Solonin, agreeing with the thesis of mismanagement of the Red army, said that on 1 of the killed soldier there were 5-6 prisoners and deserters (the total losses of the red army in 1941 are about 7 million). In the opinion of Solonin, the reason for the defeat was "fused into one whole inability and unwillingness of the Red army soldiers to fight".

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NpV6oETAgkM&feature=youtu.be

jesuithitsquad

7 years 7 months ago

In reply to by libcom.org

Submitted by jesuithitsquad on September 12, 2016

Really great info. Thanks for posting.