Although the war increased the pressures to produce, the urgent effort to rationalize the productive forces should not be attributed solely to the necessities of this conflict. Anarchosyndicalists of various shades of opinion advocated the development of the means of production through rationalization before the civil war and Revolution erupted. Indeed, one cause of the civil war and Revolution was the inability or unwillingness of Spanish capitalists to create and sustain modern industries. It was the resulting low standard of living for many workers that inspired working-class organizations-with varying degrees of success-to concentrate, standardize, and modernize the backward industrial structure.
In textiles, the most important industry in Barcelona, both the CNT and the UGT of Badalona, the city's industrial suburb, agreed on collectivizing and merging the firms into "a single industrial organization."1 The unions argued that concentration would improve productivity and encourage mass production. It would not only eliminate the many small and inefficient firms but would also end work done at home, trabajo a domicilio, which was often considered responsible for low wages. After 19 July 1936 such work was said to have disappeared; some collectives paid a weekly sum to workers who brought their sewing machines into the factory. Concentration would also lay the basis for a thriving national economy, and the CNT planned to reduce imports by planting cotton, pita, hemp, and other plants to free the textile industry from foreign sources of raw materials. The collectives would strive for Spanish economic independence.
The unions had similar plans for the construction industry. As in even advanced capitalist nations, this industry was dispersed into small units and employed approximately thirty-five thousand workers in Barcelona, the great majority of them in the CNT. The unions concentrated and coordinated many small firms and gradually consolidated an amalgamation, which employed approximately eleven thousand workers in workshops of twenty-five to four hundred members.2 By the beginning of September 1937, the CNT Building Union claimed-perhaps with some exaggeration-that it had eliminated "parasitic" intermediaries and had concentrated three thousand shops into one hundred twenty "great producing centers" that supposedly mass-produced.3 It retained a number of former employers as technical advisers at the standard wage for workers.
The tanning and leather industry of Barcelona, however, revealed a considerable distance between desires for concentration and the harsh reality of a wartime economy. Both unions noted that despite the profits of World War I, the industry remained backward.4 According to the CNT, after 19 July the seventy-one tanning factories of Barcelona were collectivized, and their number was quickly reduced to twenty-five, in which, "with the same personnel and the consequent savings of machinery and tools, the same amount of production was realized as in the seventy-one tanneries under bourgeois administration."5 Distribution was centralized, and an energetic attempt to export was organized "with the goal of independence from the rapacity of the capitalist system."
Yet the concentration of this and other industries was more difficult than the CNT admitted. The subservient status of Catalan industry, which the anarchosyndicalists had so decried, haunted the revolutionaries during the war. The need for foreign materials, markets, and transportation facilities hindered the grouping and integration of companies belonging to foreigners. Since the peseta's value continued to fall and Republican carriers might be sunk by the enemy, British currency and English ships were necessary to transport indispensable chemicals and fuels. The protests of the British consulate delayed plans to concentrate the leather and shoe industry, whose larger firms had attracted British investors.6 Likewise, the directors of Catalan railroads, telephones, and (as we shall see) utilities were obligated to negotiate with their former owners and managers.
In the chemical industry the process of concentration was slowed by the difficulty of coordinating the needs of individual firms, the unions, and the state. The Generalitat's Chemical Council, composed of four technicians, four UGT representatives, and four CNT delegates, was not empowered to take coercive measures against workers. When UGT workers' "indiscipline" harmed production in a glue factory, the council was forced to call on that union to restore order.7 In June 1937, the concentration of the soap industry, which employed eleven hundred workers in forty firms in Barcelona, was still being "studied." A month later the council was able to fix soap prices, but concentration of the industry seemed no more definite. The opposition of the Italian firm, Pirelli, which was by far the largest producer of cables and insulating materials, was also a major obstacle.8 Perhaps in order to maintain their autonomy, collectives were reluctant to provide the Generalitat's Chemical Council with information and statistics. In June 1938 inspectors were ordered to investigate enterprises that had not responded to census questionnaires.9
The division of power and the lack of a strong state not only hindered the process of concentration but also blocked the rational distribution of raw materials. Republicans and revolutionaries needed the equivalent of the Raw Materials Section that had functioned in Germany in the early years of World War I. In a situation where supplies were costly or impossible to acquire, some CNT firms and unions would hoard their stock of fuel or other necessities; others might sell them without authorization or at inflated prices.10 The Barcelona UGT undoubtedly used precious foreign currencies for partisan purposes when it sent militants to Paris to purchase arms.11 The power industry devoted valuable time and money to electrifying the town of Llivia, a small Spanish enclave inside France, in order to improve the image of Catalonia in the eyes of foreigners. Despite the opposition, which argued that resources should be used to unify the industry and bring electricity to more important Catalan towns, the committee decided "to demonstrate to the foreigner that the workers do things better than . . . the previous economic organization."12
Regional divisions complicated the problem; both CNT and UGT leaders complained that the national government at Valencia ignored Catalan needs. The Valencian administration supposedly refused to supply required chemicals to Catalan textile firms that had not paid their taxes.13 Catalan railroad workers asserted that Valencia had not rationally organized the distribution of wagons, and that outside Catalonia many cars sat vacant and inactive, even though the railroads had been declared a key industry.14
In many industries, wartime conditions made concentration and reorganization necessary. Military conscription opened positions and required a redistribution of manpower; in addition, the loss of markets and raw materials made many workers redundant. Bombardments destroyed capital goods and forced a new division of machinery and personnel. For example, despite opposition from those who were transferred, the CNT Automobile Union was determined to move workers where they were needed.15 Other enterprises made a special effort to ensure that "indispensable" status was granted only to workers who were absolutely necessary for production. Managers gained the authority to transfer personnel specifically for disciplinary purposes.16
The best documented example of industrial changes may be in Catalonia's industries of gas and electricity where militants attempted to unify and coordinate the 610 electrical companies. It is interesting to note that the figure of 610 was uncertain; the problematic state of statistics was itself a sign of the industrial backwardness that hindered the unification of the industry. A leading CNT militant of the Water, Gas, and Electricity Union commented in November 1936:
Unification creates many difficulties. The figures are not exact. We do not know if there are 605 or 615 small ex-firms (ex-empresas) that exist in Catalonia, and I have put the average at 610.
Of these 610 ex-firms there are only 203 that are producers of energy. . . . This means that some 407 ex-firms resell electricity. This is intolerable and is the fruit of the situation before 19 July.17
Although all militants agreed on the principle of unifying an industry so dispersed and scattered, the actual process of concentration was slow and full of obstacles. The new managers of the CNT and the UGT immediately confronted the problem of how to deal with technicians in restructuring this branch. Not surprisingly, given the conditions of the most advanced industries in Catalonia, the problem of the experts was complicated by the fact that many of them were foreigners. The nationalism of union leaders approached xenophobia; some committee members admitted that they had a "phobia against foreigners."18 Others asserted, "Everything that is within Spanish territory must be exploited by Spaniards." The Control Committee dismissed some of the most unpopular or incompetent technicians, whether Spanish or not.19 Yet the managing committee feared difficulties if the foreigners abandoned their former companies en bloc. After many-but not all-did depart, the ruling committee found it hard to find replacements and had to confront the resistance of the local committees, which sometimes refused to accept the technicians recommended by the head office.20 In addition, the power industry found it difficult to retain its own experts whose skills were also demanded by the military.
Managers not only depended to an extent on foreign technicians but also on foreign capital and, more generally, international goodwill. Because of the cutoff of its usual supply of Asturian coal and the poor quality of Catalan coal, the region needed foreign coal to produce gas. Fearing Nationalist attacks and suffering the blockade of loyal shipping, Catalans had to use foreign ships to transport energy supplies. The latter could be purchased only with gold or foreign currencies. Therefore, some gesture was required to demonstrate to non-Spanish investors that the new managers were not, as the right-wing press charged, "gangsters." Even as the British consulate protested the refusal of the electric companies to pay their foreign "coupon clippers," Spanish authorities rescheduled the debt to Swiss investors.21 Although in September 1937 the Generalitat declared a moratorium on interest payments, it delayed the formal legalization of the electrical industry in order not to alienate the English. British, Soviet, and, surprisingly enough, German coal found its way to Barcelona. Evidently, German commercial and mercantile policy conflicted with its diplomatic support of Franco's forces, and deutsche marks seem to have been easier to acquire than other currencies. The difficulties of obtaining foreign coal and other goods stimulated the inventiveness of Catalan scientists and technicians who experimented-often successfully-with new materials and energy sources.22 The five major gas and electricity companies disagreed over the extent of the sacrifices and the contributions that each firm would have to make to unify the industry. The prewar financial situation complicated matters since companies with a healthy balance sheet did not wish to pay off the debts of unprofitable enterprises.23 The numerous smaller enterprises feared that the large firms would take advantage of their comparative weakness and force them to work without proper compensation. Many former executives or foremen with needed technical and administrative skills were frightened that unification would mean a loss of their pay, power, and prestige. Workers feared that concentration by transfer to another branch might destroy their job security. They were reluctant, for example, to be moved to the gas section; not without reason, they considered it a dying enterprise.24 The Catalan companies had used coal to produce gas, but supplies-and thus gas production- became extremely precarious during the conflict. To encourage wage earners to adjust to a new workplace and to accept new transportation costs, managers proposed to award a bonus to transferred workers. By contrast, the Central Committee of gas and electricity had to discourage other employees who demanded new posts for reasons of personal advantage.25 In addition, the Decree on Collectivization of October 1936 granted firms with over one hundred workers the right to collectivize as they desired, and some of these firms preferred not to join the concentration in order to retain control of their resources and administration. Control Committee members complained that the decree suited neither the needs of their industry nor the necessities of the war, which required centralized command to shut off power and lights during an aerial attack.26 In response, the Generalitat attempted to amend legislation to fit the needs of the power industry. The infinity of committees that sprang up at the beginning of the Revolution blocked centralization of the industry. The Control Committee threatened to replace them if they did not follow its orders.27 "Only concentrations . . . can permit undertakings of such importance as the electrification of the railroads and electrochemical industries. To break up our industry would shackle progress and would mean the destruction of an extremely important part of the national economy."28
Yet resistance to unification remained significant throughout the Revolution. On 11 January 1937 the Cooperativa popular de Villanueva y Geltr£ accused the Barcelonan Central Committee of acting more rapaciously than capitalist enterprises. Representatives of the cooperative, backed by local CNT and UGT delegations, asserted that the newly unified power industry, SEUC (Serveis elÅ ctrics unificats de Catalunya), was merely a cover for four earlier enterprises that were trying to absorb the weaker firms. A CNT delegate from Barcelona replied that the SEUC had been created in the interests of the war effort and of the Catalan economy. The representatives of the cooperative and the local CNT protested that the SEUC had divided profits as had the bourgeoisie and, unlike railroads, had acted irresponsibly by granting its employees a year-end bonus. Another local CNT delegate threatened that the 2,300 members of the Villanueva cooperative would not pay their bills unless their rights were recognized. Local residents believed that their interests deserved a consideration equal to that given to foreigners. A member of the town council noted that his citizens were disappointed with the cost and the services of the new concentration. Barcelona's Central Committee members replied that their enterprise was protecting the general interest but agreed to study the proposals of the cooperative.
The local committees ignored recommendations of SEUC's Control Committee concerning promotions and ranking of personnel. They also refused to relay information about their excess personnel, which was vital in a situation of war and revolution.29 In September 1937 both the Barcelonan committee and the UGT criticized the persistent egoism of individual firms that prevented complete consolidation of the industry.30 Even in 1938, when the Generalitat controlled the industry, it declared that unification progressed slowly "owing to the reluctance of the former companies to transmit data that have been requested several times."31 Nor was this problem limited to the power industry. The control committees of other enterprises, such as the MZA (Madrid- Zaragoza-Alicante railroad), found it difficult to centralize command in the face of disobedient subcommittees. As in gas and electricity, workers of some companies resisted concentration because they feared that they might lose pay, benefits, or job security in the new organization.32 In the dramatic times of war and Revolution in Barcelona, the metallurgical and metalworking industries were arguably the most essential productive forces. The backwardness of this sector and its lack of competitive automobile and aviation branches has already been described. Of the metallurgical and metalworking factories surveyed, thirty-six employed between one and ten workers, fifty-two had from eleven to fifty workers, and twelve had between fifty-one and one hundred workers. Four factories employed from one hundred to five hundred workers, and only two employed over five hundred workers. Out of one hundred six factories, eighty-six had a CNT majority and twenty had a UGT majority, although the UGT tended to be slightly stronger in larger factories. The physical size of these firms was often minuscule; some measured 150 square meters, some only 50, or even 17 square meters. The scale of these enterprises limited production.33 For example, when the Fundici¢n Dalia was asked if it could increase the number of its workers in order to augment production, it responded that it had already doubled production for the war effort. With thirty-seven workers, it was working at peak capacity and could not absorb any more personnel. Another firm, Talleres Guerin, whose eighty workers made electrical equipment, reported that its production was limited by its lack of machinery.
In April 1937 the CNT and the UGT agreed "on the need to socialize the metallurgical industry on the basis of industrial concentration."34 The Confederaci¢n's Metallurgical Union in Barcelona declared that, despite the opposition of the petty bourgeoisie, it had unified the industry's small workshops and had thereby increased output. Seven major concentrations were planned, including iron and steel production, aviation, and automobiles. The last amalgamation would integrate all activities of automotive production, from casting and the production of parts to delivery on the market.
The Marathon Collective, formerly the General Motors plant in Barcelona, provides a good example of coordination if not concentration of an industry in mechanical construction. After the fighting of 19 July, part of the management left, and instructions came from the United States to shut down the factory. Instead, militants of the UGT and the CNT (the latter dominated in the collective) took control of the firm; technicians began to coordinate, finance, and advise many of the small metalworking firms that began to manufacture previously imported auto parts. The Marathon Collective embarked on an ambitious program to assemble parts made in Catalonia and to mass- produce a truly national truck. In July 1937 the collective celebrated the first anniversary of the 19 July victory by displaying the first mass-produced truck and motor that had been built in Catalonia.35 Ninety different factory councils and control committees that had cooperated in the construction of the Spanish truck participated in the festivities. A Marathon director praised the labor of twelve thousand workers in the Catalan automobile industry, and he stated that the production of a mass- produced vehicle was part of "our war of independence." He concluded that the bourgeoisie had neither the knowledge nor the will to mass-produce automobiles.
The CNT was quite proud of its role in the concentration of the auto industry: "The achievement of our Revolution is its power to control all enterprises. . . . Another very important point is . . . to be able to reduce the cost of cars that before 19 July we had to buy from foreign nations."36 Faced with the interruption of foreign parts and equipment, CNT militants had rationally reorganized production by coordinating and concentrating small workshops. Anarchosyndicalist productivism merged with Spanish economic nationalism to produce the beginnings of an independent automotive industry. Standardization of parts and equipment often accompanied concentration. CNT metallurgical militants wrote in their review that standardization had three advantages: interchangeable parts, speed of repairs, and economy. They concluded, "The degree of standardization is the gauge that determines industrial progress. Proof of this is that nations which have the best industry are those that have the greatest quantity of standardized parts."37
The Industria Metalgr fica, a collective of 220 workers, 91 of whom were men, offered an excellent example of rationalization that was accompanied by standardization in what was, for Barcelona, a relatively large factory.38 Of the collective's workers, 206 belonged to the CNT and 14 to the UGT. The 8 technicians of the firm were in the CNT, whereas the 14 administrative personnel were in the UGT. With machinery that was over two decades old, it had produced metal boxes, metal cases, and lithographic equipment. After revolution broke out, the factory converted its output to war production. On 5 November 1936 the collective's ruling council acknowledged that it intended "to reduce labor as much as possible" by eliminating certain processes. The council argued that it was "absolutely necessary to revamp the manufacturing process, and we consider that standard' manufacturing is the most advisable." Standardization would reduce the time needed for manufacture and open vistas of "almost unlimited" production of items such as beer cans. In September 1938 the UGT Metallurgical Union of Catalonia called for standardization of production and the use of the "most modern practices."39
The militants of the construction industry also embraced standardization. CNT activists in its Building Union argued against "archaic norms" and "rudimentary methods" in favor of new techniques such as reinforced concrete, "whose good results are unquestionable."40 The CNT approved "modern construction" with its solidity, cleanliness, airiness, and roominess. This desire for light, space, and hygiene was quite understandable in Barcelona, where working-class housing often lacked these qualities. The anarchosyndicalist militants admired methods of building in the Soviet Union, "where construction acquires the characteristics of a marvelous beauty."41 Their urbanism was highly influenced by Le Corbusier's ideas, and CNT journals included pictures of "cities of the future"- large modern metropolises of huge high rises linked by expressways.42
The Confederaci¢n modernized the machinery in the factories that it controlled. Modernization required a considerable effort during the war and Revolution since much of the needed machinery had to be imported. In addition, the CNT's adversaries in the central government and the Generalitat sometimes controlled the necessary foreign currencies. Many CNT unions nevertheless pursued modernization of equipment. The electrical industry illustrates the obstacles that attempts to modernize equipment sometimes encountered.43 As in the case of raw materials, Spanish substitutes for foreign products were hard to find. In January 1937 the industry's Central Committee discussed a request to change the billing system for its customers from monthly to bimonthly and to bill gas and electricity charges simultaneously as part of its program for the unification and concentration of its industries. However, the billing machines were in poor condition and continually required replacement parts from Paris; new personnel had to be trained to use the machines properly. Managers concluded, under the circumstances, that billing reforms would have to be delayed. Wartime conditions obstructed industrial development. A shortage of vulcanized wire limited the use of hydroelectric power. The industry could not quickly repair the damage caused by bombardments of power stations because much of the needed material had to be acquired abroad and purchased with foreign currencies. American-made material became so valuable that it was once proposed as collateral for an Aragon firm's loan.44 Even when machines could be purchased or were available, a shortage of qualified personnel-perhaps conscripted or departed-may have prevented their operation.45 Industries' unwillingness or inability to pay bills on time disturbed plans for their rationalization. Several weeks after the Revolution erupted, the Control Committee of gas and electricity considered employing the Antifascist Militias to collect debts from "elements who are taking advantage of the present circumstances to avoid paying their bills."46 Two months later, the committee complained to a representative of the CNT Construction Union that neither ordinary consumers nor a great number of institutions-which included the Generalitat, municipality, prisons, railroads, streetcar companies, journalists' union, police headquarters, and even the barracks of the Antifascist Militias-had met their payments.47 Furthermore, the departure of the upper and middle classes meant a 37 percent decline in revenue. Many of the remaining consumers were dishonest, "always trying to find a way to swipe free kilowatts. . . . Unfortunately, working-class comrades are among the defaulters (morosos). If we catch an upper-class defaulter, we give him what he deserves, but we cannot do anything to the workers since many plead that they don't have a job."
Committee members sharply attacked the railroads not only for their debt to the electric industry but also for their reduction in fares for passengers. Although the reduced price bolstered the railroad's image among the public, electricity managers accused the railroads of charging considerably more for bulk transportation to compensate for the loss of passenger revenue. According to the power company, the transport of coal had become more expensive than its purchase; these added expenses and defaults delayed the industry's plan to construct a modern headquarters in the plaza Catalu¤a. One member concluded sardonically, "The Revolution means not paying." Another worker (the representative of the Construction Union who had not succeeded in getting funds from the Control Committee for workers about to be laid off) added, "It's true there are many abuses. Many comrades have policing and defense tasks. They get free meals and clothes, bonuses and compensation. Then they go out on a spree, leaving their families to pay the gas and lighting." Militants wondered why, despite the purchase of all available electric stoves, no increase in use of electricity had been recorded, implying that customers were tinkering with their meters. At the end of the year the Control Committee studied a proposal for a special section to fight fraud.48 Members suggested that gas and electric meters no longer be read separately; joint readings would save labor and would also threaten potential defaulters with the interruption of both sources of power. The committee wanted to take strong measures to force consumers who had moved to pay bills that had accumulated at their former addresses; one militant asked the Housing Commission to refuse to rent to anyone who did not possess a receipt from a recently paid electric bill.49
In the spring of 1937, the shortage of coins in Barcelona made it difficult for clients to use pre-pay, coin-operated meters. Consumers were apparently hoarding silver coins. To solve the problem, a member suggested that the industry mint its own company tokens for use in its meters; another participant objected that the tokens would be immediately counterfeited.50 When the merchants of one town, La Rapita de los Alfaques, petitioned for a lower electricity rate, the committee agreed to study the problem, but one activist was certain that during the investigation "those merchants won't pay."51 In May the famous collectives of Aragon owed the Catalan electrical industry over 300,000 pesetas.
The Control Committee of the centralized power companies, which criticized other institutions for slow payment, was itself reluctant to pay the Generalitat's newly imposed taxes.52 Other collectives and controlled enterprises were also disinclined to meet their obligations. The MZA refused to contribute to the Ministry of Public Works since railroad traffic-and thus income-had declined dramatically.53 The War Industries Commission was a notorious debtor, and its delays caused economic problems for creditors such as the Plastic Industries Company.54 Movie theaters seemed also to have been in debt.55 During 1937 many enterprises began demanding payment in cash. For example, the CAMPSA, the state energy company, would not deliver fuel to the railroad unless it received hard currency.56
Regardless of problems of cash flow, many committees significantly improved working conditions. CNT factory councils recognized the effects of hygiene on production and wanted to imitate modern American firms that had industrial physicians. The textile factory, Espa¤a industrial, established a day- care center for working mothers and a new dining room.57 In Badalona textile firms, CNT activists improved retirement and medical benefits. The UGT established a clinic and expanded health-care and retirement benefits.58 Breaking with prerevolutionary practices in certain industries of employing children from twelve to fifteen years old, the CNT Graphic Arts Union prohibited the employment of those under fourteen. CNT loaders debated the difficult questions of the physical capacity and output of aged laborers. The power industry dealt with the delicate problem of how to divide fairly the burden of the retirement fund.59
Yet in many cases the disruption of the economy and the diminution of resources blocked the improvement of working conditions.60 For example, managers refused a request from a workshop for new windows. In another case, the high price of paint prevented the repainting of the offices of a train station. When the personnel of the Gerona-Llansa line became demoralized by poor working conditions, they were told to sacrifice for the war. The electrical industry was reluctant to give permanent payroll status to temporary personnel, such as construction workers or miners, even though it demanded "maximum output" from the latter in the admittedly hazardous mines. Laudatory accounts of the Catalan war industries have ignored the dangerous conditions in the newly built armaments industry.61 Fumes from dynamite and tolite, used in explosives' production, made the personnel sick. "To avoid possible poisoning" they asked for milk and coffee and suggested that two nurses be employed so that each shift had access to medical care in case of an accident. The personnel also demanded a bomb shelter where they could be safe from enemy bombardments and friendly (but often inaccurate) antiaircraft fire. Their CNT-backed delegate declared that after the national government had taken over the factory, the families of accident victims had not received compensation. He cited four workers who had perished because of an explosion on 4 September 1936, six who had died in another explosion on 22 September 1936, and one in an explosion in March 1938; two others had been seriously injured in accidents in October 1936 and November 1937. Only one of the victims had been insured.
In their efforts to improve working conditions and to develop the productive forces, both the CNT and the UGT built schools and centers to train technicians. These schools survived and even prospered despite political and ideological tensions within and between the unions. In metallurgy, both unions made a special effort to train technicians from their own ranks. The UGT established schools for "professional preparation," "without which there is no prosperity."62 The CNT Metallurgical Union established a school called Labor, which was free from the "false education" of the Church. In the Marathon Collective (CNT-UGT), professors taught "love of work" and studied the "magnificent" automobiles of General Motors.63 The largely CNT-dominated Foundry Collective and the UGT Metallurgical Union of Badalona instituted scholarships for children. Hundreds of children from working-class families received financial aid from the government or the unions for various types of schooling. In construction, the CNT encouraged young workers, who often ignored the promulgated "union values," to study in the libraries which the union had built and to attend the classes which it offered.
Even before the Revolution, the CNT had led efforts to raise the cultural level of the working class. Continuing this tradition, the CNT and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the UGT established libraries in many collectives to encourage reading and educate the many illiterate workers. Illiteracy remained significant among wage earners. The CNT Maritime Union stated that out of twenty sailors, fifteen could not sign their names. Members of the control committees of the remaining privately-owned enterprises were required to be able to read and write.64 The twenty-thousand-strong women's organization, Mujeres libres, which had close links to the anarchosyndicalist movement, began a large campaign during the Revolution to instruct women, who had higher rates of illiteracy than men.65 The UGT also wanted to hold classes for illiterates. Even though anarchosyndicalist and Marxist militants were often genuinely committed to improving workers' cultural life, the unions' attitude toward education resembled, in part, the literacy campaigns and educational practices of various Marxist regimes with their utilitarian emphasis on learning in order to increase production. Historians favorable to anarchosyndicalism have often regarded the CNT's educational efforts as part of its unique global culture, which transcended trade unionism and conventional politics to influence aspects of everyday life.66 The CNT and the UGT along with Catalan political parties organized the CENU (Consejo de la escuela nueva unificada), designed to replace parochial schools. The CENU desired both the rationalization of work and the social promotion of workers; its goal was to enable capable workers to attend the university. With other organizations, the CENU undertook the schooling of over 72,000 children who had been without any formal education before the Revolution. In one district, elementary-school enrollment jumped from 950 students to 9,501 during the conflict. In the entire city, 125,000 new students were registered.
The desire to create a rational educational system and to train students and technicians was thus not unique to the CNT and formed an essential part of both unions' revolutionary project of developing the means of production. For the CNT and organizations close to it, the elimination of illiteracy and the development of the productive forces were intimately linked. Well-rounded and educated workers were to be integrated into a society of production and order. One libertarian militant described their goal:
The producers in a libertarian communist society will not be divided into manual laborers and intellectuals. Access to arts and sciences will be open, because the time devoted to them will belong to the individual and not to the community. The individual will be emancipated from the community, if he desires, when the workday and his mission as producer are finished.67 The more work is esteemed, the more idleness will be repulsive. In other words, the more the child loves good . . . the less evil will affect him.68
In fact, the content of the CNT's technical education was hardly different from that of the more advanced capitalist nations or even that of the Soviet Union. An article published during the Revolution claimed that the United States showed the way in vocational education and that the Soviet Union perfected it.69 The Confederaci¢n criticized the Spanish bourgeoisie precisely for its inability to provide the training more accessible to workers in other nations.
The desire to create a rational educational system and to train students and technicians was thus not unique to the CNT and formed an essential part of both unions' revolutionary project of developing the means of production. For the CNT and organizations close to it, the elimination of illiteracy and the development of the productive forces were intimately linked. Well-rounded and educated workers were to be integrated into a society of production and order. One libertarian militant described their goal:
The producers in a libertarian communist society will not be divided into manual laborers and intellectuals. Access to arts and sciences will be open, because the time devoted to them will belong to the individual and not to the community. The individual will be emancipated from the community, if he desires, when the workday and his mission as producer are finished.67 The more work is esteemed, the more idleness will be repulsive. In other words, the more the child loves good . . . the less evil will affect him.68
In fact, the content of the CNT's technical education was hardly different from that of the more advanced capitalist nations or even that of the Soviet Union. An article published during the Revolution claimed that the United States showed the way in vocational education and that the Soviet Union perfected it.69 The Confederaci¢n criticized the Spanish bourgeoisie precisely for its inability to provide the training more accessible to workers in other nations.
The urgent need to train technicians in order to secure the Revolution strengthened the Confederaci¢n's technocratic tendencies, which were potent, if not dominant, even before the war. The conflict-with its conscription, disruption of supplies, and creation of defense industries- undoubtedly dramatized the importance of technicians who had to find substitutes for missing materials, build new industries almost from scratch, and replace their colleagues who had fled abroad or had gone into the army. One must keep in mind, though, that the war merely reinforced the technocratic tendencies of anarchosyndicalism: libertarian communists envisaged a postwar society where technicians would continue to direct the development of the means of production. The CNT's glorification of science and technology attracted some technicians and managers to its ranks while the union frightened away others by its leveling tendency, by the dominance of blue-collar workers in its membership, and by its relative indifference to Catalan nationalism. In turn, the Confederaci¢n distrusted the experts and kept detailed records of their personal, professional, and political histories.70 Many technicians, managers, and particularly white-collar workers joined the UGT, closely aligned with the PSUC, which supported many demands of the Catalan nationalists and often accepted large wage differentials without question.
Yet throughout the Revolution the CNT sought, and partially won, the support of the technicians. The journal of the CNT National Federation of Water, Gas, and Electricity, Luz y fuerza, believed that it had learned from the past:
The experience of the Russian Revolution taught us, the Spanish workers, how to treat the technicians because without them a total revolution cannot be made. Once everything rotten and archaic that exists in Spain is destroyed, the efforts of all will be needed for reconstruction. If we did not have this clear vision, we would find . . . at the end of the war that nothing would have been accomplished, and, what is worse, that we would have to submit to foreign technicians.71
The CNT Maritime Union asked, "Can an engineer be mistaken for an unskilled worker? The engineer symbolizes creative thought, and the unskilled worker [symbolizes] thought's object. . . . The social revolution . . . has its engineers . . . and its unskilled."72 The union admitted that "we need technicians." Revolution or not, the captain was still responsible for the organization of work and would remain the "primary and legitimate authority." By January 1938 the CNT approved a proposal to grant technicians "coercive powers."73 Its militants also criticized police actions that harassed needed technicians whose revolutionary credentials were not impeccable.74
Within the amalgamated construction industry and other collectives, the technicians were often in command. In the amalgamation, the CNT and the UGT agreed that "technicians of different sections must fix a scale of minimum output within twenty days and this must be ratified necessarily by the assembly of each section, attempting as much as possible to utilize the minimum output established before 19 July 1936."75 The Chemical Council agreed after long debate that former bosses with indispensable knowledge should be permitted to work as technicians.76 Experts in the newly developed defense industries were clearly essential because they had to improvise and create products that had never been produced in Catalonia. Presses, lathes, pistols, rifles, machine guns, grenades, and various chemicals for explosives were all manufactured, often for the first time in Spanish factories, under CNT auspices.77
The unions, though, could not always convince their members to obey and respect the technicians. Early in the Revolution the CNT-UGT managers of the power industry felt that they had to impose "authority and discipline" on local committees that wanted to dismiss technicians and managers with doubtful revolutionary credentials.78 In October 1936, a certain Menassanch stated that the central Control Committee had encountered difficulties in some power stations after foreign technicians had departed and three out of four local committees had rejected the central Control Committee's recommendations on replacements for the foreign technicians "in spite of our instructions and warnings":
We could not convince them. . . . We must not forget that both unions have a certain number of adherents who have recently joined [them]. This growing number weighs in the balance, and it is possible that they are more Catholic than the pope and maybe even more extremist than union veterans. We can easily be dragged down by these new elements. . . . In a word, it is necessary to require that the local committees strictly comply with our agreements with the juntas of the unions.79
On 27 November 1936 a large meeting of the central Control Committee, local committees, and both unions reached a compromise in which the central and local committees agreed to share power over the appointment of technicians.
Other sectors also refused to acquiesce in the leadership's technocratic desires. The CNT Maritime Union often demanded that sailors obey their officers and criticized the "crew's hatred of the technicians."80 The union warned sailors not to disturb ships' officers in the exercise of their technical functions. Salary differences certainly aggravated these tensions, and the rank and file's indiscipline provoked a kind of creeping democratic centralism of the Leninist variety:
Anarchosyndicalism and organized anarchism are governed by majority rule. . . . Members are required to accept the decisions of the majority even if they oppose them.81
The liaison between the union and the crew should not be understood only from the base to the top but also from the top down.82
Since the majority of the sailors "did not have the ability to occupy the positions which the organization [union] can entrust them today," the union needed "organization men" (hombres de organizaci¢n) to accomplish its tasks.83
Thus during the Spanish Revolution traditional anarchist and anarchosyndicalist desires for a nonhierarchical leveling of salaries conflicted with the urgent need to develop the means of production with the aid of scientists and technicians. The CNT's plans for modernization and its campaign to win and retain the support of the technicians opposed the leveling tendencies of its largely blue-collar base. In January 1937 in the CNT National Committee of the Textile Industry, a Barcelona delegate attacked the higher salaries that technicians were receiving and claimed that many of them had joined the Confederaci¢n only because of opportunism.84 In a response that certain members of the audience booed, Juan Peir¢, the CNT Minister of Industry in the central government, criticized the Barcelona delegate for desiring to level salaries. According to Peir¢, this attempt went against the syndicalist and libertarian principle, "to each according to his work": "The technician has many more needs [than the ordinary worker]. It is necessary that he be duly compensated." Peir¢'s viewpoint dominated the CNT's practice during the Spanish Revolution in Barcelona. An examination of salary differences in the Barcelona textile industry confirms the preferential treatment that the CNT and, of course, the UGT accorded to the skilled. Available statistics confirm that although there was some leveling of salaries, the militants in charge of the factories retained considerable wage differentials, ranging from 2:1 to 7:1. The Central Committee of the large textile factory, Espa¤a industrial, was controlled by the CNT. The factory employed 1,800 workers; its skilled workers and technicians received between 92 and 200 pesetas per week in December 1936.85 With 302 workers, the Industria Olesana reported in December 1936 reductions of 10 percent in the salaries of its directors; 21 other technicians received salary increases.86 While salaries for directors may have decreased, with or without UGT participation, the Confederaci¢n maintained higher wages for technicians and skilled workers in the dyeing and finishing branch of the Barcelonan textile industry. Even in cases of salary leveling, pay differentials increased as workers took on more responsibility or as their technical skill increased. Salary differences in other branches were similar to those found in textiles. Claims that the CNT-inspired contraction of salaries led to a great decrease in production must be qualified.87
The Revolution destroyed neither the lower wages of women nor the traditional gendered divisions of labor. When the Federaci¢n local of the UGT needed secretaries or cleaners, it invariably searched for women.88 In the Comedor popular Durruti all the waiters, cooks, and dishwashers were males. Workers in the first two jobs earned 92 pesetas and the third 69, whereas the seven cleaning women earned 57.5.89 In the large factory of Espa¤a industrial, where over half the personnel were female, women earned 45 to 55 pesetas per week; men received 52 to 68.90 In a large metallurgical collective, women in the same professional category as men earned lower pay.91 For telephone workers the proposed minimum weekly wage for men was 90, for women 70.92 As lower wage earners, women gained from the general leveling of salaries, but many collectives continued the prerevolutionary practice of paying them less.
When UGT telephone workers assembled to discuss military training, female and male participants agreed that women would receive instruction as nurses, not soldiers.93 In certain cases women were the first to be fired. When box makers encountered economic problems, CNT militants approved the motion not to pay female workers "who had other means of support."94 Committees also attempted to prevent pregnant women from using maternity insurance to receive more than their usual salaries. Yet when compared to prewar employers, revolutionaries reduced wage inequalities and offered more job opportunities. In November 1937, with the assistance of the government, Catalan organizations set up an Instituto para la adaptaci¢n profesional de la mujer, in which women trained not only as secretaries and cooks but also as engineers, electricians, and chemists. The CNT-supported Mujeres libres-whose active role in the literacy campaign among women we noted earlier-wanted to create a technical training school for women to enable them to replace mobilized males.95 Militants of this organization offered to "scour factories and workshops exhorting workers to produce the maximum" and encouraging them to volunteer for the front and for fortification work.
Anarchosyndicalist activists and Mujeres libres members-who admired the supposed Soviet success in eliminating prostitution-argued for the reform of prostitutes, of course through the therapy of work.96 Federica Montseny, the CNT Minister of Health and Public Assistance, asserted that the Revolution offered prostitutes the chance "to change their lives and become part of the society of workers." This choice was indeed ironic since there is some evidence that before the conflict certain women had opted to become prostitutes precisely to avoid factory jobs and poor working conditions.97 Although abortion was legalized and birth-control information made available, some militants recommended that workers refrain from sexual relations and childbirth during the Revolution.
The UGT took a special interest in adapting women's roles to meet the demands of the war and wished to cooperate with the CNT in training female apprentices. According to the secretary general of the Barcelona UGT federation, "Catalan women had always demonstrated a love of work and great ability in the workplace."98 He demanded that certain collectives end their practice of paying women less than men for equal work. He also urged the unions to promote women to leadership in their organizations. In some workshops women began agitating for equal salaries.99 In others, mothers received a twelve-week paid maternity leave and thirty minutes daily for nursing.100 In August 1938 a UGT official (a woman) asked member unions about the possibilities of hiring more women.101 The responses of union leaders revealed both the state of Catalan industries and male attitudes toward female workers. The secretary general of the Woodworkers' Union replied that the lack of raw materials and electric power prevented the integration of women into his branch. He asserted that women did not possess the skills to substitute for woodworkers in this still unstandardized sector. In addition, the UGT leader believed that "with honorable exceptions" women were qualified only for "simple" tasks, such as varnishing, not for heavy or dangerous work. In other sectors, the necessities of war introduced changes in the traditional division of labor. In rural post offices, women occupied the places of mobilized or deceased male relatives, and in the cities they began to labor as mail carriers. Despite their memory of female strikebreakers in the early 1930s, UGT Postal Union officials recommended that women also serve in offices. The secretary general of the UGT Paper Union believed that with proper training women would be able to perform most jobs in paper production but not in carton manufacture, which demanded more brute strength. The UGT Health Workers' Union claimed that the CNT job monopoly prevented it from hiring more women, who were "biologically" better suited for health-care positions.
Male and female wage earners learned to labor in new ways. The wartime priority on concentrating and standardizing productive forces reinforced the technocratic tendencies of anarchosyndicalist and Marxist theory and led to the most modern techniques to rationalize the means of production. For the CNT, the development of the factory system was a prerequisite for libertarian communism, and both unions adopted many of the methods that characterized capitalist production. In October 1938 S¡ntesis, the review of the CNT-UGT Collective Cros, the major Spanish chemical firm, frankly stated that "many of the methods employed by the capitalist system to obtain a greater output cannot yet be replaced and should be used by proletarian society."
Both the CNT and the UGT promoted Taylorism, a system of scientific organization of work proposed by the American engineer, Frederick W. Taylor. Although it may seem odd, Taylorism, which was developed by a Philadelphia engineer of bourgeois origins in the most advanced capitalist nation, shared one basic feature with anarchosyndicalism and communism: the elimination of the class struggle. Taylor did not seek union, communist, or socialist control and development of the means of production; he believed that the bourgeoisie, when scientifically instructed, would be able to terminate the class struggle through prosperity, that is, through unlimited production and its counterpart, unlimited consumption. Taylor viewed workers not only as producers but also as consumers (or savers) and sought to increase their ability to be both. The American engineer therefore advocated the most efficient ways to increase production.
His system involved breaking down a task into its component parts, thus deepening the division of labor and terminating artisan-like production. Standardization was an essential element of "scientific management," and he demanded "the standardization of all tools and implements used in the trades, and also of the acts or movements of workmen for each class of work."102 Management would accomplish this standardization and direct the rank-and-file workers. The underlying principle of Taylorism was management's appropriation of the direction of the work process itself and the reduction of workers to mere executors of management's wishes. Thus, Taylorism enlarged the division between those who planned or thought and those who executed orders. Taylor himself had a real disdain for workers' intelligence, and he feared their laziness. He felt, not without reason, that workers would resist scientific management through work slowdowns and even sabotage. Therefore, he made certain that scientific organization of work could coerce laborers, if need be. Human nature is such, however, that many of the workmen, if left to themselves, would pay but little attention to their written instructions. It is necessary, therefore, to provide teachers (called functional foremen) to see that the workmen both understand and carry out these written instructions.
[In the construction industry he demanded] the careful selection and subsequent training of the bricklayers into first-class men, and the elimination of all men who refuse to or are unable to adopt the best methods.
It is only through enforced standardization of methods, enforced adoption of the best implements and working conditions, and enforced cooperation that this faster work can be assured. Scientific management shared with anarchosyndicalism an emphasis on efficient production through control of the work process by technicians. Santill n had endorsed Fordism, which other CNT militants also praised as a "model" of "wise lessons."103 On 19 November 1938 a letter from a CNT technician called Taylor "the greatest organizer known."104 The technician thanked the workers and the director of the Labora factory for their cooperation. He regretted that he had to leave the arms- producing firm, but he was confident that if Labora continued on its present path, it would become one of the most important metallurgical firms in Spain. Another letter of 23 November 1938 to the administrative junta of the CNT Metallurgical Union confirmed that "during my stay at Labora I explained to the management of the factory the road to follow for the best output."105 An article entitled "Professional Selection" in the CNT metallurgical journal praised the research done at Bethlehem Steel, Taylor's factory, where the optimum-sized shovel for coal stokers was developed and employed;106 this shovel permitted the most efficient use of the workers' strength. The article also lauded a disciple of the Philadelphia engineer, H. Gantt, who had eliminated workers' unnecessary movements and therefore increased productivity. In addition, it argued for a careful selection of apprentices since the metallurgical industry had some jobs that required only brute strength and others that needed intelligence. The review of the CNT-UGT Collective Marathon also praised Taylorism, and it concluded that the American engineer had achieved "scientific organization of work" that chose the best workers for each job in the factory.107 In July 1937 the Catalan Institute of Economic Sciences called for "speed bosses" and a system of incentives in collectives.108 It is essential to underline that Taylorism and the other techniques employed by the unions were not merely a consequence of a wartime situation that demanded rapid production but were also the unions' response to the prewar social and economic incapacities of the Spanish and Catalan capitalist elites. In this regard, the Left continued to pursue an industrial modernization that the bourgeoisie had barely begun. The union militants envisaged a future of rationalized and developed productive forces within an independent national economy. The base of the anarchosyndicalist project was the rationalized, standardized, and even Taylorized factory, which, in its details, greatly resembled the plants of the advanced industrial nations. The Collective Marathon (formerly General Motors of Barcelona) constructed an automobile factory whose long aisles were suitable for assembly lines and whose space approximated the Renault factories in the industrial suburbs of Paris. Plans for a functionalist city of the future paralleled the addition of the techniques of advanced capitalism in the workplace. Anarchosyndicalist militants wanted to construct cities of apartment houses and mass automobile circulation. In fact, the Marathon Collective declared that the economic potential of a nation could be measured by the number of motor vehicles per inhabitant, and it hoped that the automobile would soon become an accepted part of everyday life in Spain.109 Nevertheless, the unions' and parties' visions of a rationalized and modernized future did not end the secular struggle against workspace and worktime, the subject of the next chapter.
1. Report of the textile unions, 17 May 1937, 1352, AS; Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria fabril y textil de Badalona y su radio, February, 1937; Acta de la tercera sesi¢n del pleno nacional de regionales de la industria fabril, textil, vestir, 626, AS; A. P"šrez, "La concentraci¢n industrial," CNT Mar¡tima, 15 September 1938; sastrer¡a, 7 October 1937, 1219, AS.
2. Antoni Castells i Dur n, "La colectivizaci¢n-socializaci¢n de la industria y los servicios en Barcelona ciudad y provincia" (Manuscript, Barcelona, Centre d'Estudis hist"¢rics internacionals, 1986), pp. 319-36. See figures in Josep Maria Bricall, Pol¡tica econ"¢mica de la Generalitat (1936-1939) (Barcelona, 1978-1979), 1:224; Francesc Roca, "El decret de municipalitzaci¢ de la propietat urbana de l'2 de juny del 1937 i la nova economia urbana," Recerques: Pol¡tica i economia a la Catalunya del segle XX, no. 2 (1972): 225.
3. Solidaridad Obrera, 4 and 5 September 1937; Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, the Left, and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War (Chapel Hill, 1979), p. 63.
4. UGT-CNT comisi¢n organizadora de la conferencia nacional de la industria de piel y de calzado, 163, AS.
5. Bolet¡n de informaci¢n, 10 April 1937; cf. Bolloten, Revolution, pp. 63-64, which claims that seventy-one factories were reduced to twenty.
6. Acta, 6 July 1937, Generalitat 252, AS. Yet the Chemical Council ignored the French consul's objection to establishing industrial federations; see Acta, 31 December 1937, Generalitat 252, AS. 7. Acta, 24 August 1937, Generalitat 252, AS.
8. Actas, 4 June and 5 October 1937, Generalitat 252, AS; on Pirelli, see Jordi Maluquer de Motes, "De la crisis colonial a la guerra europea: Veinte a¤os de econom¡a espa¤ola," in La econom¡a espa¤ola en el siglo XX, ed. Jordi Nadal et al. (Barcelona, 1987), p. 89.
9. Acta, 2 June 1938, Generalitat 252, AS.
10. Junta, 15 and 23 February 1937, 1204; Actas, 27 August and 15 October 1937, Generalitat 252, AS. On the "blind egoism" of firms that refused to aid less successful enterprises, see Walther L. Bernecker, Colectividades y revoluci¢n social: El anarquismo en la guerra espa¤ola, 1936-1939, trans. Gustau Mu¤oz (Barcelona, 1982), pp. 378, 439.
11. Federaci¢ local de Barcelona, comit"š, 9 and 12 January 1937, 1311, AS.
12. 12 November 1936, 182, AS.
13. Actas, 24 August and 31 December 1937, Generalitat 252, AS.
14. Acta, MZA, 8 April 1937, 531, AS.
15. Reuni¢n, 17 April 1938, 1049, AS.
16. Minutes of the CNT secci¢n metales no-ferrosos, 1 September 1937, 847, AS; minutes of the CNT secci¢n caldereros en hierro y sopletistas, 6 December 1936, 1385, AS. See also Comit"š, 9 April 1937, 181, AS; Reuni¢n, 5 November 1936, 1122, AS; PSUC, radio 8, 12 December 1936, 1122, AS.
17. Acta de reuni¢n del pleno del comit"š central de control obrero del ramo gas y electricidad, 27 November 1936, 182, AS.
18. 14 and 26 April 1937, 181, AS.
19. 1, 2, 12 September and 5 December 1936, 182, AS; Castells ("Colectivizaci¢n," pp. 575-76) claims that the multinational SOFINA coerced technicians into leaving by threatening to blacklist them.
20. 5 and 9 October 1936, 182, AS.
21. 12 October 1936, 182, AS.
22. 15 December 1936, 182, AS; January 1937, 181, AS.
23. 30 October 1936, 182, AS.
24. 9 January 1937, 182, AS.
25. 5 December 1936, 182, AS; 29 September 1936, 182, AS.
26. 12 November and 1 December 1936, 182, AS.
27. 29 September and 29 December 1936, 182, AS.
28. Luz y fuerza, October 1937.
29. 14 April, 1 and 29 June 1937, 181, AS.
30. 27 September 1937, 181, AS; Federaci¢n catalana de gas y electricidad, UGT, July-September 1937, 482, AS.
31. Consell general, 31 March 1938, Generalitat 252, AS.
32. Acta, 5 April 1937, 531, AS; Hispano-Radio (n.d.), 1175, AS.
33. CNT questionnaires, 387, AS; see also Pere Gabriel, "¨La poblaci¢ obrera catalana, una poblaci¢ industrial?" Estudios de historia social 32-33 (January-June 1985): 206.
34. Proyecto de socializaci¢n de la industria siderometal£rgica CNT-UGT, June 1937, 505, AS; Sindicato de la industria siderometal£rgica de Barcelona, ¨Colectivizaci¢n? ¨Nacionalizaci¢n? No socializaci¢n (Barcelona, 1937), p. 11.
35. Horizontes, June-July 1937.
36. Sidero-Metalurgia, November 1937.
37. Ibid., September 1937.
38. This paragraph is based on Hoja de control y estad¡stica, CNT sindicato £nico de la metalurgia de Barcelona, 871, AS; Al Consejo local t"šcnico administrativo de la industria siderometal£rgica (carpeta unknown), AS. See also Les collectivitzacions a Catalunya, Secci¢ d'estudis econ"¢mics, pol¡tics i socials, Institucions Francesc Layret (Barcelona, 1938).
39. Las Noticias, 3 September 1938.
40. Hoy, January 1938.
41. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria de la edificaci¢n, madera y decoraci¢n, 10 October 1937 and 15 August 1938.
42. Hoy, December 1937.
43. The following paragraph adheres to the minutes of the meeting of the Pleno del comit"š central de control obrero, 181, AS.
44. 4 January, 11 March, and 19 April 1937, 181, AS.
45. 20 November 1936, 182, AS.
46. 19 September 1936, 182, AS. Early in the Revolution, peasants invaded not only property of large landowners but also that of worker-controlled enterprises; when peasants presented the Central Committee with a bill for "cultivation," it refused to pay (31 August 1936, 182, AS). 47. The following information comes from 26 November 1936, 182, AS.
48. 25 December 1936, 182, AS.
49. 20 March and 28 May 1937, 181, AS.
50. 9 April 1937, 182, AS.
51. 12 May 1937, 181, AS.
52. 26 April 1937, 182, AS.
53. Acta, 18 March 1937, 531, AS.
54. Acta, 14 September 1937, Generalitat 252, AS.
55. Junta, 5 February 1937, 1204, AS.
56. Acta de reuni¢n, comit"š central, 12 March 1937, 531, AS.
57. Agustin Souchy and Paul Folgare, Colectivizaciones: La obra constructiva de la revoluci¢n espa¤ola (Barcelona, 1977), p. 102.
58. Castells, "Colectivizaci¢n," p. 467; Libro de actas de comit"š UGT, sociedad de alba¤iles, acta de reuni¢n de la junta, 2 January 1937, 1051, AS.
59. Acta de asamblea, cargadores, 31 January 1937, 1404, AS.
60. 19 April 1937, 181, AS; Acta, MZA, 9 April 1937, 531, AS; Acta, comit"š central, 26 March 1937, 531, AS; 26 January 1937, 181, AS.
61. Vicente Guarner, Catalu¤a en la guerra de Espa¤a, 1936-1939 (Madrid, 1975), pp. 219-28. The following information is from Sugerencias, F brica LL, 1446, AS, and circular no. 53, 1084, AS.
62. En Badalona el sindicat metal.lurgic UGT, 1453, AS.
63. Sidero-Metalurgia, November 1937; Horizontes, May 1937.
64. CNT Mar¡tima, 7 August, 11 and 25 September 1937; Alberto P"šrez Bar¢, 30 meses de colectivismo en Catalu¤a (1936-1939) (Barcelona, 1974), p. 85.
65. Martha A. Ackelsberg, "Separate and Equal? Mujeres Libres and Anarchist Strategy for Women's Emancipation," Feminist Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 1985).
66. See Murray Bookchin, The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936 (New York, 1978), pp. 4-5, 56-57; Frank Mintz, La autogesti¢n en la Espa¤a revolucionaria (Madrid, 1977), p. 69. Ricardo Sanz (El sindicalismo y la pol¡tica: Los solidarios y nosotros [Toulouse, 1966], p. 83) notes that some militants abstained from smoking and drinking while others did not. On CENU, see Ram¢n Saf¢n, La educaci¢n en la Espa¤a revolucionara (1936-1939), trans. Mar¡a Luisa Delgado and F"šlix Ortega (Madrid, 1978), pp. 91-95; Discurso of Juan Puig Elias (n.d.), Generalitat 266, AS.
67. Floreal Oca¤a quoted in Saf¢n, Educaci¢n, p. 150.
68. Floreal Oca¤a, "La escuela moderna: Conferencia pronunciada el 30 de julio 1937," Tiempos nuevos (Oct.-Nov. 1938).
69. Economia: Butllet¡ mensual del departament d'economia de la Generalitat de Catalunya, September 1937. 70. See files in 798, AS.
71. Luz y fuerza, October 1937.
72. CNT Mar¡tima, 26 February, 23 April, 25 June 1937, 15 August and 20 November 1938.
73. Solidaridad Obrera, 19 January 1938.
74. 12 January 1937, 182, AS.
75. Joint CNT-UGT declaration in UGT Edificaci¢n, 15 August 1937; italics added.
76. Acta, 28 September and 5 October 1937, Generalitat 252, AS.
77. De Companys a Indalecio Prieto: Documentaci¢n sobre las industrias de guerra en Catalu¤a (Buenos Aires, 1939), pp. 21-31.
78. 26 and 29 September 1936, 182, AS.
79. Reuni¢n del pleno, 5 October 1936 (tarde), 181, AS.
80. CNT Mar¡tima, 26 February, 8 and 23 April 1937 and 11 September 1938.
81. Bolet¡n del Comit"š nacional de la CNT para exclusivo uso de los sindicatos, 1 November 1937. 82. CNT Mar¡tima, 2 April 1938.
83. Ibid., 19 February 1938. The UGT did not have enough dependable militants to fill positions of responsibility in the power industry (14 December 1936, 182, AS).
84. Comit"š nacional de relaciones de la industria fabril y textil CNT-AIT, Valencia, 626, AS.
85. Comit"š central de Espa¤a industrial, 10 December 1936, 626, AS; see H. E. Kaminski (Los de Barcelona, trans. Carmen Sanz Barber [Barcelona, 1976], p. 181), who reports that directors who remained as technicians received 1,000 pesetas per month.
86. Industria Olesana, S.A., companys de la ponencia del sindicato £nico del arte fabril i textil, 626, AS.
87. Cf. Ram¢n Tamames, La rep£blica, la era de Franco (Madrid, 1980), p. 307, for a Euro-Communist analysis. The payment of salaries often depended on a firm's economic situation; an engineer in a firm without resources might earn less than an unskilled laborer in an enterprise with contracts or influence (Consell de la federaci¢ local, 25 June 1937, 501, AS; Actas del pleno regional de industrias qu¡micas, July 1937, 531, AS).
88. Comit"š, 22 May and 1 September 1937, 501, AS.
89. March 1937, Generalitat 282, AS.
90. Kaminski, Barcelona, p. 181.
91. Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Els treballadors i la guerra civil (Barcelona, 1986), p. 87.
92. Acta de asamblea (n.d.), 469, AS.
93. Acta de asamblea, 21 February 1937, 469, AS.
94. Reuni¢n, 22 December 1936, 1204, AS.
95. Mujeres libres, 17 February 1938, 529, AS; A todos los sindicatos, 25 April 1938, 1084, AS.
96. Dr. F"šlix Mart¡ Ib ¤ez, Obra: Diez meses de labor en sanidad y asistencia social (Barcelona, 1937), p. 77; Ruta, 1 January 1937.
97. Quoted in Kaminski, Barcelona, p. 67; Dorsey Boatwright and Enric Ucelay Da Cal, "La dona del barrio chino," L'Aven"¡, no. 76 (November 1984): 29. On legalization of abortion, see Mary Nash, "L'avortament legal a Catalunya," L'Aven"¡, no. 58 (March 1983): 188-94.
98. Consejo de la federaci¢n local UGT, 2 and 5 October 1937, 501, AS; Informe al ple, 7 August 1937, 1322, AS.
99. Asamblea, R. Pujol Guell, 11 November 1937, 1085, AS.
100. Reglamento interior, Eudaldo Perramon, 1 September 1938, 1219; Secciones modistas UGT- CNT, 2 July 1937, 1336, AS.
101. UGT, letter from Elissa Uris and militants' replies, August-September, 1049, AS. 102. These citations are from F. W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York, 1967); original italics.
103. CNT Mar¡tima, 15 September 1938.
104. Letter from Francisco Cuinovart, 887, AS.
105. Letter (signature unclear) to Junta administrativa del sindicato de la industria siderometal£rgica, 887, AS.
106. Sidero-Metalurgia, September 1937.
107. Horizontes, May 1937.
108. Institut de ciÅ ncies econ"¢miques de Catalunya, October 1937.
109. Horizontes, February 1937.
6. Workers' Resistance
As we have seen, the prerevolutionary Barcelona working class was extremely combative. Before the outbreak of the civil war, the workers frequently went on strike-sometimes with violence, sabotage, and work slowdowns-over demands that included a shorter working day, higher wages, end to piecework, and defense of traditional holidays. Despite an economic crisis, the workers were generally successful in defending their living standards; they demonstrated a remarkable ability to win many of their claims.
When the unions took control of the factories, the traditional working-class demands did not cease, and many wage earners continued to ask for more pay and persisted in their attempts to avoid constraints of factory space and time. The CNT and UGT militants who ran the collectives opposed many of the workers' desires that they had once supported; in the difficult times of war and Revolution, they called for more work and sacrifice. Rank-and-file workers frequently ignored these calls and acted as though the union militants were the new ruling elite. Direct and indirect resistances to work became major points of conflict between the base and the militants, just as they had been when the bourgeoisie controlled the productive forces. In Barcelona and in Paris, industrial managers of various political convictions were compelled to confront this aspect of working-class culture. The rank and file's continuing exactions and actions revealed the productivist assumptions of anarchosyndicalist and Marxist theories of autogestion. Without changing the nature of the factory itself or by merely rationalizing it, anarchosyndicalists and Marxists called on workers to participate and control their workplace. Union activists were asking workers to endorse enthusiastically their role as workers. In effect, given the content of the militants' project for the development and rationalization of the means of production, workers were being pressured to participate willingly in their own bondage as wage earners. It is hardly surprising that many of them were reluctant to take part in the developmental democracy of the Spanish Revolution, and it is little wonder that union militants often lamented the unattended factory assemblies and unpaid union dues.
Union activists did attempt to satisfy one persistent rank-and-file desire. At the beginning of the Revolution, the CNT union of the textile and garment industry carried out a demand that it had been making for years: the abolition of production incentives, especially piecework-"the principal cause of the miserable conditions" of the workers, according to the union.1 The UGT too had condemned piecework and had asked the government to do away with it. Yet the abolition of piecework soon came under attack by the Confederaci¢n itself:
In the industrial branches that were in our [CNT] union and where before 19 July a great amount of piecework prevailed, now that there is a fixed weekly salary, productive output has declined.
With all this, there is nothing to give our economy a firm base, and we hope that all workers . . . will use with the maximum care tools and raw materials, and will give their maximum productive output.2
The Casa Girona offered one of the most significant and spectacular examples of the problems of workers' control in the Spanish Revolution. Casa Girona, also known as Material para ferrocarriles, employed eighteen hundred workers and was one of the most important metallurgical factories of Barcelona. It had made railroad equipment before the Revolution, and after July 1936 it produced war materiel.3 A report by the CNT-controlled factory council of Casa Girona to the CNT Metallurgical Union of Barcelona declared that costs before 19 July 1936 had been 31,500 pesetas and had increased to 105,000 pesetas. Charges for the retired personnel rose from 688 pesetas before 19 July to 7,915; for accidents from 950 pesetas to 5,719; for the sick from 0 to 3,348. Weekly payroll costs jumped from 90,000 to 210,000 pesetas. With all these cost increases a "rather intense production" was expected and needed. However, the factory council stated, production had actually diminished despite greatly improved benefits and an increase in the number of workers from the prerevolutionary total of thirteen hundred to eighteen hundred.
Girona's factory council did not believe that lengthening the working day would solve the problem since it had already added eight hours per week to the schedule; the additional time had not only failed to increase production but had not even succeeded in stopping its decline. Thus, despite a 38 percent increase in personnel, a 233 percent increase in benefits, a 133 percent rise in weekly paychecks, production declined 31 percent. The council suggested certain "practical" measures to correct the situation: "To establish a war bonus that will be adjusted to completed production [italics in original]." According to the management of Girona, no other solution was possible, since pay increases and the establishment of minimum production levels had failed. The council asked the Metallurgical Union for authorization to establish the bonus and to initiate "rigorous control" through its production committee and engineers. The council denied that its proposals meant a return to the "old times of exploitation" since "the prices of all work will be agreed upon by those who manage and those who execute." Workers whose work was superior must be rewarded. If not, the council argued, initiative would be discouraged.
A commission that the administrative board of the CNT Metallurgical Union delegated to investigate the "abnormalities" at Casa Girona confirmed the Girona factory council's difficulties. The investigators reported that a worker who received 18 pesetas produced 30 pieces, whereas an apprentice who received only 5 pesetas produced 80 pieces in the same time. According to the commission, the workers themselves had agreed with the factory council to establish a system of piecework. The commission concluded that the new system of production incentives clashed "fundamentally . . . with our most intimate convictions" because the CNT had always fought against piecework. Yet the workers were carried away by their "egoistic instincts" and (the commission claimed) egged on by Communist and UGT agitators. The commission declared despondently that Casa Girona would not be the last case where production necessities would contradict "our ideas of equality and liberty." It attacked the "un[class-]conscious and irresponsible" workers who refused to produce without a monetary incentive and judged that the Girona council was justified in establishing piecework since "[class-]conscious workers" were a minority in the factory.
Although it received scant mention in the press, the case of Casa Girona created a dramatic debate within the CNT. In a meeting of officials of the Metallurgical Union on 27 May 1937, its president, Rubio, declared that in a war and Revolution workers must work until exhaustion.4 A prominent militant, G¢mez, disagreed: he supported the forty-hour week in Casa Girona and rejected additional hours. In another meeting on 1 June, President Rubio stated that producers could not enjoy the Revolution during the Revolution; he attacked advocates of the forty-hour week in Girona and argued in favor of a longer workday in the war industry. According to Rubio, supporters of the forty-hour week in Girona "have been scabs and think only of their stomachs and nothing more." G¢mez, champion of the forty-hour week, resigned in protest. He declared that he had seen the discontent among Girona workers, and that they could not produce because of apathy and physical and moral fatigue. Yet the workers were still sacrificing, according to G¢mez. He protested that certain privileged persons were receiving several thousand pesetas per month. The bars of Barcelona were still full, the Ramblas (a main thoroughfare) was crowded, and "millions of slackers and idlers" were loitering in the city. He demanded CNT action to stop such abuses. If the CNT put the malingerers to work and granted the forty-hour week in Girona, these admittedly "un[class-]conscious" workers would zealously defend the Revolution to preserve their gains. The debate between G¢mez and the union's president ended in a compromise that both criticized the attitude of workers in Casa Girona and condemned the alleged conspiracy of political parties against the CNT's revolution. It asked G¢mez to change his attitude and rejoin the union and requested Rubio to continue as president. The resolution concluded that "socialization," that is, control by a CNT union of concentrated firms and collectives, would be the "salvation of our social and economic achievement."
Similar problems in other industries-whether controlled by CNT or UGT-nonetheless showed that neither Communist nor UGT agitators were primarily responsible for low output and productivity. One CNT militant in the Loaders' Section lamented that "production was 50 percent of what it should be" and complained that the section did not possess sufficient coercive powers to improve output.5 For several months the slow workpace continued to cause damage to perishable fruits, and militants criticized the rank and file for lacking "union and revolutionary spirit." At a private meeting of UGT railroad officials, one militant insisted that a forty-eight-hour week with Saturdays off was in effect at the branch in San Andr"šs, a Barcelonan suburb, but "the number of machines repaired is smaller than before the Revolution."6 An office workers' petition, eventually withdrawn, to restore the six-hour day that existed before the Revolution, demoralized Communists.7 Thus, the declaration of the CNT Metallurgical Union at Casa Girona, which blamed Communists for its production problems, reduced complex industrial and social difficulties to a rather simplistic political level. Except for changes in the industrial decision-making process that the theory of autogestion introduced, neither the CNT nor the UGT provided an alternative model to develop the productive forces. When the unions were faced with industrial problems such as poor productivity and workers' indifference, they were forced to tie pay to output, just as the capitalists had done.
Problems over piecework persisted throughout the Revolution. The tailoring collective F. Vehils Vidal, with over four hundred fifty workers who made and sold shirts and knitwear, imposed, as early as February 1937, an elaborate system of incentives to stimulate its personnel.8 In October 1937 the Casa Alemany, which received heavy orders for pants and other articles, subcontracted at piecework rates.9 In May 1938 Barcelona railroad workers were notified of the nearly total reestablishment of piecework:
The orders of the managers must be obeyed.
The workers will receive a reasonable rate per piece. They must not forget the basic rule of collaboration and must not try to deceive the management.
A list of work accomplished . . . must be presented monthly, and it must be accompanied by a report that compares the results obtained with those of previous months and justifies work outputs and variations.10
In the construction industry, the technical-administrative council of the CNT Building Union proposed in August 1937 a revision of anarchosyndicalist salary leveling.11 The council posed the following dilemma: either we restore work discipline and abolish the unified salary or we encounter disaster. The council recognized bourgeois influences among the workers and called for the reestablishment of incentives for technicians and professionals. In addition, it recommended that only "profitable (rentable) works" be undertaken: "The masses must be reeducated morally" and their work remunerated according to effort and quality. In July 1937 a joint declaration by the CNT-UGT Construction Amalgamation of Barcelona agreed that pay should be tied to production: "In case of the nonfulfillment of the minimum [output] by a comrade, he will be penalized and then expelled if he repeats his error."12 The CNT-UGT report recommended the posting of graphs on output as well as propaganda to raise morale and increase productivity. It determined that low output often resulted from construction workers' fears of layoffs after the termination of a project.
Both publicly and privately the UGT advocated that salaries be linked to output and that sanctions be imposed on offenders. The UGT Masons' Union reported on 20 November 1937 that a pay dispute in the Construction Amalgamation had led to a work stoppage and even sabotage. It also noted that other workers did not want to work because they were not receiving 100 pesetas per week. The Masons' Union called the attitude of these workers "disastrous and out of place in these moments."13 On 15 December it stated that lower-paid workers wanted to equalize their salaries and that it was discussing with the CNT how to establish minimum outputs. On 1 February 1938 the UGT told its members not to make demands in wartime and urged workers to work more.14
The conflicts in the construction industry revealed that the rank and file continued to press wage demands as they had done before the Revolution. Wartime inflation certainly aggravated workers' wage demands, as wholesale prices increased more than two and one-half times during the war.15 Certain collectives and industries did benefit from the inflationary economy. Brick, cement, and transportation firms were overbilling, complained the Construction Amalgamation, and it demanded guarantees that all work proceed normally and that prices correspond to normal outputs.16 Most workers, though, were penalized by the price hikes. At the end of 1936 and at the beginning of 1937, women demonstrated against the shortage of bread. Other demonstrators continued the Barcelonan tradition of popular seizure of food supplies. On 6 May 1937, "a large group of women descended on the port of Barcelona where they looted a number of vans filled with oranges."17 Furthermore, basic foodstuffs were rationed, and householders were forced to spend time in long lines. By 1938 milk, coffee, sugar, and tobacco were in short supply. No deaths from hunger were reported in 1936 and only 9 in 1937, but in 1938 the figure rose to 286.18 Enterprises and unions established cooperatives or continued company stores to save workers time and money. Yet an explanation of salary conflicts based solely on physical or economic needs is inadequate; any analysis must include an examination of the problematic social relations between the workers and the directors of the collectivized and controlled firms. These new industrial managers, who were usually technicians or union militants, were continually beseeching the rank and file not to demand wage hikes during the difficult times of war and revolution, but their pleas for more work and sacrifice were frequently ignored in various industrial sectors.
For instance, CNT and UGT members of the Control Committee of gas and electricity encountered a serious problem early in the Revolution, and considerably before the May Days of 1937. On 3 December 1936 rank-and-file workers of this industry began collecting signatures demanding a joint CNT-UGT assembly to solicit the year-end bonus.19 The reaction of the Control Committee was angry. One member qualified the petition as "counterrevolutionary and fascist" and asked that those who had signed it be locked up. UGT and CNT committee members alike feared that the proposed assembly would not only claim the annual bonus but might raise the potentially embarrassing question of salary differences among workers, technicians, and administrators. One Control Committee member declared that the "unions exist to direct and channel the aspirations of the masses"; others concluded that an assembly must be avoided at all costs. Some feared that in an assembly the three hundred who signed the petition demanding more money could easily be joined by another two thousand or even four thousand workers. A certain Garc¡a stated, "Either we have no authority over the masses or we impose it on them." The meeting finally agreed to pay the bonus to avoid the assembly. Members were requested not to discuss the meeting with outsiders since the committee wished to learn who had initiated and agitated for the petition in order to take possible punitive measures against them.
An equally dramatic debate occurred in the Cros Collective, whose review, S¡ntesis, frequently told workers to postpone their demands for salary increases and vacations. Not all workers followed S¡ntesis's advice. On 30 June 1937 the collective and its associated unions-representatives of the collective's offices and factories in Alicante, L"šrida, Valencia, and Barcelona as well as delegates of fourteen different UGT and CNT unions-met in Barcelona to discuss a petition from sailors and ships' technicians in the CNT and UGT maritime unions. The workers demanded back pay for overtime and work on Sundays and holidays performed for the Cros Company from November 1935 to 19 July 1936.20 In other words, the sailors wanted back pay for work done before Cros had been collectivized. Both the CNT and the UGT National Federations of Chemical Industries opposed the sailors' claim, but they hoped for a compromise since many other sailors had received back pay. Other delegates resisted a compromise because of the needs of the war and those of the collective itself. During the meeting, tension flared when a sailors' representative, frustrated by the long discussion, stated that if the assembly was not in a hurry to achieve a solution, the sailors were: a ship was scheduled to sail shortly. Delegates interpreted the statement as a threat, and the president of the assembly warned that the meeting could not be coerced. Other delegates criticized the sailors for threatening to strike and for their "indiscipline." A representative from Alicante noted that workers in his factory had been hungry but had still sacrificed for the good of the collective. The Badalona delegate protested the sailors' demands and argued that they should not treat the collective like "bourgeois" since all agreements had been adopted by majority vote. He insisted that no accord could be reached until the sailors' representatives ceased threatening to strike. The UGT maritime delegate replied that he was not aware of any strike threat. His CNT counterpart declared that all the sailors wanted for risking their lives at sea was fair and equal treatment. Another participant replied that the collective had always given the highest consideration to its sailors but that on occasion the sailors had refused to sail if their demands were not met and that the factory council had been forced to accede. Finally, the assembly accepted a proposal that delayed a solution to the problem of back pay until economic conditions permitted. In other collectives, workers' long memories posed problems for the new managers who had to decide about the rehiring and back pay for those fired during the bienio negro or even as early as 1919.
Another full session of the representatives of unions and factories of the Cros Collective debated the question of a 15 percent salary increase for workers at its Barcelonan factory. The local CNT and UGT chemical unions of Barcelonan had previously supported the wage claims of their workers and had even threatened to shut down the plant if salary hikes were not granted. The director of the Barcelonan factory and officials from other factories and unions urged the Barcelonan unions to oppose the increases that, even if justified, endangered the "new economy." The president of the assembly declared that the Barcelonan workers, like the sailors, were trying to win augmentations with coercive methods. He asserted that it was not the time to make demands; workers should not create new problems for their councils, which they themselves had elected. The president believed that he could permit only transitional cost-of-living increases, but that this concession did not mean the right to make further demands. When the central office of the collective presented a proposal arguing against the augmentations, the Barcelonan factory's delegates then threatened to leave the assembly. The delegation from Madrid responded that it was shameful to lose time in "such materialist" debates when there were great tasks to accomplish. Subsequently, the pay hike for the Barcelonan plant was voted down by all except the factory concerned, and the president reminded Barcelona's delegation of its wartime obligations. The debates over raises for the Barcelonan workers and back pay for the sailors demonstrated that the threat of strikes and actual strikes were present during the Spanish Revolution.
The constant demands of the workers, which began very early in the Revolution, frustrated the union leaders. In November 1936 the work of cleaners employed by the railroad reflected their dissatisfaction with their salaries; according to one member of the UGT council, "the cleaners had always met the wagons and discharged the toilets. Now in many cases they do not."21 They and other indisciplined workers had accepted tips, a practice that had been banned in this and other enterprises. Some railroad employees, such as cooks, resisted working on hospital trains. Members of the council asserted that most of the personnel lacked "goodwill," which committee members thought they had earlier demonstrated by working in the medical cars. The cleaners continued to complain frequently about their salaries and were eventually rewarded back pay.
Although the CNT-UGT unions of the amalgamated power industry agreed that demands for more pay and fewer hours "should not be discussed now," they had to confront workers from some poorer companies who felt that their salaries and work schedule should equal those of their colleagues from more privileged firms.22 To protest what they considered an unfair system of salary classification, employees of the power industry seem to have engaged in an organized slowdown strike in which they performed morning work in the afternoon.23 In a meeting of the CNT Metallurgical Union on 3 July 1937, a militant exhorted "our comrades" to become "idealist" and cease being "materialist." Several months earlier, the Metallurgical Union had concluded that higher living costs necessitated a sal-ary increase, but it had hoped that the raises might end the "malaise" and keep order in the factories.24 Workers sometimes demanded pay for volunteer work or refused to sacrifice for the war effort. The UGT Sindicato de vestir had requested four men and women to collect clothes for the troops. The volunteers did not "understand" that they would not be remunerated for their services and demanded their wages.25 The MZA Central Committee suspended seven volunteers, sent to unload coal at the French border, who abandoned their posts because of an argument over meals.26 Although some did sacrifice for the front by making clothes for soldiers or by donating money to the injured, others were reluctant to be taxed for the war. The CNT Graphic Arts Union dispatched a functionary to the well- known publishing house of Seix y Barral to ensure that the personnel paid the 5 percent contribution to the militias. The CNT sindicato promised to investigate other noncontributors.27 In January 1937 when workers of a jewelry collective were informed that they were required to give 5 percent of their salary to the militia, they "refused to work overtime."28 The union responded by rejecting any pay increase.
Wage conflicts were far from the only manifestation of workers' discontent: the unions were also forced to confront major problems of absenteeism and lateness, phenomena that have existed in varying degrees throughout the history of labor. In the nineteenth century, Catalan workers, like their French counterparts, sustained the tradition of "dilluns sant" (Holy Monday), an unofficial and unauthorized holiday that many workers took to prolong their Sunday break. In the twentieth century, the largely dechristianized and anticlerical Catalan working class continued to respect traditional interweekly religious holidays. During the Revolution the anarchosyndicalist and Communist press often criticized the workers' adamant defense of these traditions; Solidaridad Obrera and S¡ntesis proclaimed that the traditional religious holidays must not be an excuse to miss work. Some unions prohibited the celebration of interweekly fiestas. An initiative from local committees of the power industry forbade Christmas vacations in 1936 but retained New Year's Day as a fiesta.29 The observance of religious holidays during the working week (observers never noted Barcelonan workers in significant attendance at Sunday mass) along with absenteeism and lateness indicated workers' con- tinuing dislike of the factory, however rationalized or democratic. These acts of avoiding wage labor perhaps revealed a deeper detachment from the ideals of the Spanish Revolution than did struggles over salary issues.
Long and heated debates occurred concerning how-and if-vacations should be organized and paid.30 Many wage earners seem to have been determined not to miss summer vacations in 1936 and 1937 regardless of the political and military situation.31 Several weeks after the pronunciamiento, the Control Committee of gas and electrical industries decreed that 15 August would not be a holiday. In 1937 as the summer approached, some unions prohibited vacations entirely.32 In many collectives Saturday labor was highly unpopular. In November 1937 the UGT condemned the indiscipline of a number of railroad workers who refused to work Saturday afternoon.33 A CNT union penalized three loaders who had continually rejected Saturday work with the loss of ten days' pay and, significantly, of fifteen holidays.34 One militant added that the penalty for pilfering should be working six Saturdays. Women laboring in CNT offices ignored its slogan, During war there are no holidays, and militants felt compelled to take disciplinary action against a female typist who refused to work on Sunday; they feared that if the offender was not disciplined, "many [women] comrades would miss Sunday work."35 The famous days of May 1937 offered some wage earners an unexpected vacation before the CNT and the UGT campaigned vigorously for an immediate return to work.
Sickness multiplied the number of workdays missed. In construction many comrades were often "ill." The CNT Technical Commission of Masons noted "the irresponsibility of certain workers. We refer to those who fake illnesses and do not work, thus causing heavy economic damages to our collectives."36 The commission was astonished at the "astuteness and the wickedness of the unscrupulous workers" who invented all kinds of strategies to get sick pay. It singled out one case where a worker certified as an epileptic was surprised by a visit of members of the Technical Commission while he was gardening. This and other types of deceit "seriously threatened" the commission's social policies; it demanded a "crusade" by union delegates "to radically stamp out the abuses." Another technical commission, that of the CNT woodworkers, established a Committee on the Sick that required a worker to visit one of its physicians in order to obtain sick pay. It also alerted "union delegates and workers in general" to watch out for abuses. The CNT mutual did catch one woodworker who, continuing the tradition of self-inflicted wounds, had provoked an infection in his index finger. In November 1937 militants of the UGT Masons' Union claimed that, in addition to the excess of personnel, lack of credits, and transportation difficulties, an important reason for the "failure" of the Construction Amalgamation was the "excessive sum of pesetas paid to the ill."37 The Executive Committee of the UGT federation in Barcelona confirmed these findings:
[there were] many abuses regarding sicknesses since factory councils did not institute a severe control. Control is difficult because the presumed sick person often had a close relationship with the members of his committee. However, if the workers were insured by a firm, which would carefully watch the situation, this fraud might be avoided. It was agreed to consult with the comrades of the insurance union about this.38
Among loaders and stevedores, abuses by accident victims resulted in a heavier payment to the workers' mutual. One loader, who had been hospitalized for almost a year, was able to save a significant sum from his pension.39 The assembly urged the Control Committee to take measures to ensure that physically capable workers labored. The committee's effectiveness was doubtful, since several months later a militant denounced workers who had been absent for several days but appeared on Saturday to pick up their paychecks. In December 1936 a prominent militant of the Tinsmiths' Union complained of the "abnormalities committed in almost all workshops with respect to illnesses and [work] schedules." In January 1937 another tinsmith noted "licentiousness" in several workshops: "There are many workers who miss a day or a half-day because it suits them and not because of illness."40 In February 1937 the CNT Metallurgical Union declared frankly that some workers were taking advantage of work accidents.41
In this context the physician, ignored by historians, became a major figure of the Spanish Revolution. In the early months, some committees replaced individual company physicians but by no means eliminated their supervisory role. The revolutionary managers of the electric and gas industries urged that the Physicians' Union immediately remove a doctor whom the personnel distrusted; his replacement would have to "make house calls to verify the illnesses of those treated by other physicians."42 Many unions and collectives reserved the right to mandate their own medical personnel to examine sick workers. One collective required that victims of work accidents immediately inform the physician of its insurance company.43 Physicians had the power not only to excuse absenteeism but also to demand less difficult tasks for their patients. Their medical experts served to judge if control committees and other bodies were guilty of favoritism in granting sick leave. Yet physicians were not all paragons of revolutionary virtue. A number sympathized with the military rebellion, and others took advantage of their position. The UGT clinic reported a series of abuses: the sick were badly treated, nurses were "coerced," milk destined for patients was consumed by others, and the official car was used for personal purposes.44 Among railroad workers, although the number of injured had declined, their compensation had grown. The union delegate blamed "this irregularity on the lack of a spirit of sacrifice among the personnel, but much more on the indifference of the physicians, who do not do their duty. In many cases, the injured receive the entire weekend off."45 To end the abuses of some, the militants decided to increase the surveillance of the sick. The Communist cell agreed to warn physicians that unless they became stricter, they would be dismissed. It decided furthermore that only a physician who was unknown to the workers was qualified to judge "the dubiously ill."
Tobacco and alcohol, subjects of reprobation in socialist realist posters, contributed to the loss of worktime. Early in the Revolution, employees and security guards of the Barcelona newspaper La Vanguardia would meet to drink and gamble during working hours. A militant from the CNT Metallurgical Construction Union complained that workers abandoned their jobs to get cigarettes. After many warnings, the Central Committee punished a porter who was often drunk on the job by transferring him to another, perhaps harder, post for two months.46
The confused situation of war and revolution could provide a good cover for absenteeism. Control committees became skeptical when workers claimed that the "events" of July 1936 prevented them from returning to their jobs. An executive of Solidaridad Obrera warned that without the authorization of the CNT regional committee, those who were absent from work would not be paid. The managing committee of the power industry planned to examine "an infinity of cases of duplicity."47 Militiamen, who had been employed by the power companies, ignored a notice published in the newspapers asking them to return to their jobs. Furthermore, militants complained that many militiamen remained in the rear. Railroad managers dismissed a number of workers for what the union committee judged unauthorized absences; in turn the workers became distrustful of their committee, which, they suspected, wanted to encourage their enlistment in the armed forces as a way of reducing payroll costs.48
In addition to absenteeism, sabotage and theft-implying a great distance from the libertarian or communist principles of cooperation in production-continued during the Spanish Revolution. Sabotage was often defined in the broadest terms:
Leaving before the finishing time. . . . Complaining violently. . . . Taking holidays without reason. Finishing a job and not asking for more work. Waiting on customers impolitely. Eating during working hours. Talking. Distracting other workers. . . . Telephoning or receiving telephone messages that are not urgent. Workers who commit these infractions will lose one day's pay.49
A prominent CNT journalist from Madrid assessed the situation.
You can find comrades who do not know how to measure the value of things and carelessly permit them to be wasted. . . . Others, who are aware of and able to help the cause of antifascism, criminally tolerate the employers' sabotage for a guaranteed wage. They do not care if the machines are working or not as long as they get paid every Saturday. If they can eat, they don't give a damn if others lack the necessities.
Some act equally badly when they take over an industry and live off its capital. Others reduce the workweek so that no comrade remains unemployed. They labor maybe one whole day per week and then raise prices seven- or tenfold to maintain their wages.50
Given the shortages of gasoline and auto parts, a Central Committee charged that local committee members who used cars for unneeded trips were guilty of "sabotage" and might be dismissed.51 The CNT Junta de hierro expelled four workers who had "sabotaged" the rationalized foundry collective.52 The four, who had acquired "indispensable" status, had slept on the night shift; since he had allowed the skilled workmen to nap on the job, their foreman was also fired for permitting "serious damage to the Economy and the War [effort]." The CNT Metallurgical Union of Badalona-where, as we have seen, militancy was especially intense in the early 1930s-had a particular problem with saboteurs, and it requested its Barcelonan counterpart not to give work to Badalonan metallurgists without its express approval.
On 17 March 1938 the CNT delegate of the Collective M.E.Y.D.O. reported to the machinery section of the CNT Metallurgical Union that sabotage was endangering the life of the collective.53 Over an extended period a great number of parts and tools, valued at 50,000 to 60,000 pesetas, had disappeared. The collective had attempted to convince its workers that these thefts were equivalent to stealing from themselves. Persuasion failed, since the thefts continued and even increased. As a result, the collective laid off its workers until the stolen equipment reappeared. After two days without work (and apparently without pay), several workers on their own initiative went to the home of a certain Juan Sendera and found much of the stolen equipment. The accused Sendera was dismissed from the collective.
Stealing was reported in other workshops and collectives, although its extent or growth is hard to estimate. Petty larceny was rampant among loaders, who stole eggs and grains.54 Placing the stolen products in their bags, the laborers would make several trips a day to their homes, having apparently intimidated their colleagues and controllers to the point that the latter would not denounce any pilferer. One militant complained that "during work hours many comrades sit down, smoke, and don't behave as they should. When this is called to their attention, they are insolent with the comrades of the committee." The assembly voted to fine thieves 100 pesetas for the first offense and to expel recidivists. In the first weeks of the Revolution, the union of market laborers tried to reduce simultaneously both pilfering and unemployment by employing its jobless members as guards.55 Some union militants and officials of the collectives were even accused of embezzlement and misuse of funds.56 The lack of qualified cadres and devoted union militants may have led, in certain cases, to the promotion of opportunists. A former member of the conservative Radical party, who had been quickly promoted to important positions within the CNT local of Castell¢n, fled to Barcelona; the Castell¢n union accused him not only of running off with funds destined for refugees but also of taking a female comrade with him.57 A CNT metallurgist was suspected of siphoning off union dues into his own pocket.58 Anarchosyndicalist sources reported corruption concerning the collection of funds belonging to the Textile Union.59
The most spectacular case of theft occurred in the power industry.60 The gas and electric committee had a secret-and illegal-bank account in Paris that was supposedly destined for the purchase of coal. In 1936 the managing committee, acting perhaps with the complicity or knowledge of the Generalitat, had authorized a delegation to deposit funds in a Parisian bank. In September 1937 the managing committee ordered a new delegation to return to Paris to change the francs into pesetas. Several colleagues accompanied the two members of the original delegation-one in the CNT, the other in the UGT-who had placed the bank account in their own names. When the spouses of the two men joined them in the French capital, suspicions awoke in other members of the delegation. Tempted by such a large sum, over one million francs, the duo had become embezzlers. They disappeared with the women and the money.
The tabloid reader would be stimulated by this evident corruption in high places. For our purposes, though, the story -which so discredits the revolutionaries that one wonders whether it was fabricated by imaginative franquistas-demonstrated the lack of qualified and committed CNT and UGT personnel for positions of power and responsibility in certain industries. The scandal provoked the direct intervention of the Generalitat in October 1937 and the subsequent end of the industry's autonomy. Truly dedicated CNT and UGT militants knew that such cases of corruption among their leaders could only demoralize the rank and file and make them even more resistant to any appeal to work hard and fight hard for the cause. Under such circumstances, cynicism was a highly contagious disease. There were, of course, many examples of the other sort: dedicated activists who showed countless times that they were willing to sacrifice at the front and at home. For example, the treasurer of the CNT Woodworkers, assassinated by "vile thieves," was praised for having given his life to defend the collective's interests.61
In an odd twist, one agricultural collective in Barcelona felt compelled to defend one of its guards, who had killed a child. The collective explained that well-armed neighborhood gangs of twenty to thirty members employed children-some of whom were refugees-to steal produce that the gangs then sold on the black market; the collective's determination not to permit local "good-for-nothings" to live off its labor had resulted in the unfortunate "accident."62 The CNT charged that pilfering by "ignorant troublemakers" was the most serious problem of the Barcelonan Agricultural Collective, which possessed 1,000 hectares (for 24,700 acres) throughout the city.63 Militants often regarded stealing, waste, and other forms of sabotage and disobedience as fascist, again reducing a fundamentally social and industrial problem to a political level where they could more easily solve it through repression.
It was hardly surprising that petty larceny and welfare cheating became major issues in Barcelona, where thousands of unemployed refugees from other parts of Spain congregated. In July 1938 the city held approximately twenty-two thousand refugees.64 Communist activists complained that some employed refugees deceived welfare personnel and ate in collectives' soup kitchens.65 The PSUC militants demanded that the authorities purge the cheaters. Toward the end of 1938 tensions between natives and the uprooted grew; incidents-especially stealing from the fields-multiplied as food became scarcer for nearly everyone, and Catalans increasingly resented the presence of the newcomers.66 Welfare officials tried to be generous, and the refugee population in Catalan industrial cities sometimes received rations more regularly than the natives; however, certain towns siphoned rations designated for the new arrivals to the indigenous population.67 The uprooted suffered from typhoid epidemics, which in Barcelona resulted in 144 deaths in 1936, 261 in 1937, and 632 in 1938.68 In less desperate circumstances than the refugees, wage earners also deceived officials. Historians of the Spanish Revolution have ignored the fact that workers sometimes took advantage of the rivalry between the CNT and the UGT to advance their own interests, searching one union and then the other for support in their demands for less work, higher pay, vacations, and job security. A Communist UGT leader found that the naming of factory councils according to the proportion of workers enrolled in each union produced "confusion" and "instability" because of the workers' switches.69 In a private meeting of the UGT Railroad Union on 23 January 1937, the CNT was accused of attempting to attract UGT members by reneging on an agreement by both unions to require work on Saturdays.70 A UGT official asserted that "laziness at this moment is absurd and antirevolutionary," but other UGT activists insisted that unless the CNT consented to work on Saturday, their members would also refuse to labor. UGT militants also charged their rival with "manoeuvring" to attract disgruntled UGT clerks; the CNT supposedly advocated fewer working hours and more vacations for telephone employees.71
In the power industry, which was overwhelmingly CNT in the early days of the Revolution, the UGT tried to win adherents by advocating a shorter workweek of thirty-six hours instead of the CNT's proposed forty-four hours.72 The dispute revived in 1937. In July the UGT proposed either a thirty-six or forty-hour intensive schedule, which meant a minimal lunch break; the CNT wanted the normal workweek of forty-four hours.73 Given the division, the workers began choosing the workweek that suited their individual preferences. A libertarian militant charged that "if the CNT had proposed the establishment of an intensive working week of thirty-six hours, don't you think that we would have won the majority? The workers, in general, do not think beyond their stomachs." He implied that the UGT was campaigning to attract CNT members on the platform of a thirty-six-hour week and believed that "it was not now possible to manage the industry because of this problem." He feared the demoralization of comrades at the front when they learned about the scheduling conflict: the soldiers "will request that the English return to see if they can straighten out things." Many workers apparently adopted the shorter workweek. CNT activists accused the UGT Gas and Electrical Union of favoring a "do-nothing" working week in order to promote a situation that would force the government to take control of the industry.74
On 4 October 1937 a CNT delegate admitted, "We can't make the workers do what they reject," but "if we give them what they want, we are heading for slaughter." A member of the managing committee declared, "This indiscipline of the workers, without a doubt, comrades, stems from the disagreement between the two unions."75 An adherent of the UGT, upset at the indiscipline, added that the committee's orders were not being followed and recommended the expulsion of disobedient workers. He asked his CNT colleague if the Confederaci¢n could enforce the work schedule. I'm afraid not. They [the disobedient workers] will maintain the same attitude as always, and they will not want to compromise. . . . It is useless to try anything when they ignore the agreements and instructions that come from the Building Committees, the Section
Commissions, and so forth. They do not pay attention to anything, whether the orders originate from one union or the other.76
A representative from the Barcelonan UGT also feared the increasing "collective indiscipline." The meeting ended without a solution.
In Casa Girona the UGT workers were "fervent partisans" of the forty-hour week, and, according to CNT sources, they threatened to abandon the UGT if its leaders remained opposed to the shorter working week.77 One CNT delegate feared that workers in the distribution sector might join the other union if the Confederaci¢n did not raise their salaries. The CNT Tinsmiths' Union worried that if it did not pay for vacations, Communists would profit from its consequent unpopularity.78 An unknown number of workers became members of both unions, a shrewd but risky tactic. When one such laborer was discovered during an identity check by a control patrol, union militants planned to take "energetic action" against him. The CNT Automobile Union tried to expel General Motors workers who held membership in both unions.79
The tensions between the two unions persisted throughout the Revolution, despite their daily cooperation and the similarity of the problems they confronted. The historiography has largely stressed the political and ideological differences between the two organizations. Some historians have focused on the program of the UGT and the Catalan Communist party for nationalization or government control of industry, in contrast to the CNT's policy of collectivization or union control. Others have pointed to the ambivalence of the CNT and anarchosyndicalists toward political action and governmental responsibility, as opposed to the willingness of the UGT and the Catalan Communist party to participate in elections and to control the state. However significant these ideological and political tensions were, the day-to-day conflicts over economic and industrial control were at least equally important.
The two unions competed constantly for new members, each adherent yielding new dues and increased power. In addition, competition for available jobs was fierce; only those holding an appropriate union card could get them. In certain branches where the CNT dominated, it could place its members in positions. A UGT building union reported in its meeting of 8 December 1936 that workers were joining the Confederaci¢n because it could offer them better chances for jobs.80 A serious struggle in the collective Fabricaci¢n general de colores, which had a slight CNT majority, erupted over which union would be able to place its members in a limited number of new jobs.81 The UGT members of this chemical firm declared that the CNT had acted illegally and arbitrarily by monopolizing new employment. In September 1937 UGT delegates and council members even threatened to call a strike if their rights were violated again.
Throughout the Revolution the unions traded charges of unjustified use of force and unfair tactics. The UGT protested that CNT collectives would ask the Generalitat for assistance when in debt but, when profitable, would hoard the surplus.82 Likewise, the Confederaci¢n accused "socialists" of dividing profits among themselves.83 Both unions asserted that their rival used "indispensable" status to protect favorites, not irreplaceable workers; others said that many workers became "demoralized" because of the large numbers of "dodgers" (emboscados) protected by the unions' organizations.84 The tensions and struggles between the unions, however important, were overshadowed by the similarity of the problems that they encountered in managing entire industries. Despite their ideological disputes and membership raids, they were responsible for production and therefore for industrial discipline; they cooperated to keep workers compliant. In many industrial branches the CNT and UGT agreed not to rehire workers who had been fired for indiscipline or low productivity.85 In Barcelona both unions' federations tried to act in unison to eliminate the New Year's bonus and prevent the celebration of Christmas.86 The sindicatos would sometimes combine forces to oppose government initiatives that they perceived to be harmful to the interests of their constituents.87 In some industries and particularly in textiles, joint CNT-UGT committees overcame their feuding and agreed on hiring practices that divided the number of jobs between the two organizations.88 As has been shown, the unions were in basic agreement concerning the issues of industrial reorganization: concentration, standardization, rationalization, and development of the productive forces of the nation. In October 1937, a Communist UGT leader declared that as the struggle continued, the "ideological and tactical differences between the two branches of the militant proletariat" were narrowing.89 At the UGT congress the following month, some militants demanded "first, unity of action [of the CNT and UGT] to increase and improve production; second, work discipline to eliminate loafing, saboteurs, and the unthinking."90 UGT leaders desired an alliance with the CNT not only to domesticate the "uncontrollables" but to avoid the formation of a third union, which, UGT militants feared, could easily attract large numbers of wage earners. The secretary general of the UGT federation of Barcelona supported the workers' right to choose-but only between the CNT and the UGT.91 In March 1938, as the eastern front collapsed, the CNT and the UGT signed a program for unity designed to bolster the defense of the Second Republic, whose armed forces experienced increasing desertions.
The CNT and the UGT will cooperate in the rapid constitution of a potent war industry. The unions will have to establish, as an urgent and indispensable task, a strict spirit of vigilance against any kind of sabotage and passivity in work and the improvement of the latter in order to increase and ameliorate production.
The CNT and the UGT believe that a salary that is tied to the cost of living and that takes into account professional categories and productivity must be established. In this sense the industries will defend the principle of "the more and better the production, the greater the pay."
The two organizations yearn for the recovery of the national wealth, coordinating the economy and ordering it legally so that the independence of the country is assured to its fullest extent.92
The Communists termed the program "a great victory for the Popular Front and for democracy."93 Many in both unions considered this pact a synthesis of Marxism and anarchosyndicalism, a fraternal embrace of Marx and Bakunin. If so, this joining of hands aimed to make the workers labor harder and to produce more for the unions and the nation.
Faced with sabotage, theft, absenteeism, lateness, false illness, and other forms of working-class resistance to work and workspace, the unions and the collectives cooperated to establish strict rules and regulations that equaled or surpassed the controls imposed by capitalist enterprises. On 18 June 1938 the CNT and UGT representatives of the Collectiv Gonzalo Coprons y Prat, which made military uniforms, reported a serious decline in production that lacked "a satisfactory explanation."94 The representatives of the two unions demanded respect for production quotas and the work schedule, strict control of absences, and "the strengthening of the moral authority of the technicians." The tailoring collective F. Vehils Vidal, which had established an elaborate system of incentives for its four hundred fifty workers, approved a rather strict set of rules in a general assembly on 5 March 1938.95 One individual was appointed to control tardiness, and too many latenesses would result in a worker's expulsion. Comrades who were ill would be visited by a representative of the council of the collective; if they were not at home, they would be fined. As in many collectives, to leave during work hours was forbidden, and all work done in the collective had to be for the collective, meaning that personal projects were banned. Comrades leaving the shops with packages were required to show them to guards who were charged with inspection. If a worker observed incidents of stealing, fraud, or any dishonesty, he had to report them or be held responsible. Technicians were required to issue a weekly report on the failures and accomplishments of their sections. Comrades were not permitted to disturb "order inside or outside the firm," and all workers who did not attend assemblies were fined. Many other collectives of the clothing industry issued similar sets of rules. In February 1938 the CNT- UGT council of Pantaleoni Germans prohibited unauthorized movements by threatening a suspension of work and salary ranging from three to eight days.96 The CNT-UGT Control Committee of the Rabat firm (employing mostly women) allowed only conversations concerning work during working hours. Other collectives, such as Artgust, which had unsuccessfully asked workers to increase production, also enforced rules forbidding conversations and even receiving phone calls.97 In August 1938 in the presence of representatives from the CNT, UGT, and the Generalitat, the workers' assembly of the Casa A. Lanau prohibited lateness, false illness, and singing during work.98 The CNT and UGT unions of Badalona initiated a supervision of the sick and agreed that all workers must justify their absences, which were, they claimed, "incomprehensible" and "abusive," considering that the working week had been reduced to 24 hours.99 In sev-eral collectives workers received a maximum three-day leave for a death in their immediate family. Enterprises also demanded that their personnel return to the workplace immediately after an air raid or alarm; the CNT Metallurgical Union urged militants to take measures to ensure that production could recommence "without any excuse."100 The severity of these rules and regulations would seem to have been a consequence of the decline of production and discipline in many textile and clothing firms. On 15 June 1937 the accountant of the CNT-UGT Casa Mallafr"š issued a report on its tailoring shops. He concluded that the administration of the collective had been honest and moral; however, production continued to be "the most delicate part of the problem" and "in production lies the secret of industrial and commercial failure or success."101 If output of the workshops continued at its current extremely low levels, the accountant warned, the firm-whether collectivized, controlled, or socialized-would fail. Current production did not even cover weekly expenses; output must increase if the firm were to survive. Another CNT- UGT garment collective, Artgust, reported in February 1938, "In spite of our constant demands to the factory personnel, we have not yet succeeded in improving output."102 The small clothes-making firm J. Lanau, with thirty workers, had similar problems. According to its accountant's report of November 1937, the mostly female personnel had been insured for accidents and illness; they had maternity benefits.103 The workers reportedly had good relations with the owner and a control committee composed of two representatives from the CNT and one from the UGT. Production was off 20 percent, however; to correct the problem the accountant recommended establishing "clear production quotas" in both the workshops and sales. In other enterprises where workers had cordial relations with management, accountants similarly recommended measures for increasing productivity.104 The director of a clothing firm told the assembled workers, "All this revolution against the economy must stop. You must maintain maximum productivity because the firm . . . is seriously ill and needs intensive care. It will only recover with the required injections of work. If this does not occur, the surgeon will be called to amputate the necessary members."105 He warned that if some were fired, "it is your fault for producing little and badly." The CNT representative added that those who did not do their job "were rats of the collective"; the assembly approved the dismissal of three workers. In other collectives individual wage earners were fired or suspended for a variety of reasons: malingering, absenteeism, unauthorized holidays, and "immorality."106 The latter charge was not infrequent during the Spanish Revolution and revealed that union activists considered any inadequacy or failure at work and vagrancy in general as "immoral," if not downright sinful.
In February 1938 the National Council of Railroads established penalties, which included fines and suspensions, for absenteeism, indiscipline, poor productivity, drunkenness, and lateness. The council aimed to eliminate "all types of intensive working days that are shorter than eight hours (the legal working day) and weekly breaks that, without being endorsed by any competent organization, have arisen spontaneously and that cannot and should not continue a day longer."107 The MZA required that workers who claimed to be injured on the job report immediately to its health service during working hours.108 Carelessness that caused accidents led to new rules and new techniques of supervision. In March 1937 a collision resulted in serious "moral" and "material damages," the latter estimated at "many thousands of pesetas, which the collective had to pay because of certain comrades' desertion and negligence."109 The Comit"š decided to impose sanctions and discussed the eventual "creation of a study concerning a psycho[logical]-technical examination of all railroad workers." In January 1938 at its economic session, the CNT determined the "duties and rights of the producer." It established the position of a "task distributor" who would "be officially responsible . . . for the quantity, quality, and conduct of the workers." This task distributor could dismiss a worker for "laziness or immorality"; other officials were to check if minor work accidents of "suspicious origin" were legitimate or "make-believe." In addition, "All workers and employees will have a file where the details of their professional and social personalities will be registered."110
Even as early as March 1937, when the CNT was participating in the government, all citizens between eighteen and forty-five (only soldiers, functionaries, and invalids were exempted) had to possess a "work certificate."111 The authorities could ask for this card "at any time" and would assign those who did not carry it to fortification work. If violators were found in "caf"šs, theaters, and other places of amusement," they could be jailed for thirty days. Right-wingers and others had to employ all kinds of subterfuges to obtain the documentation necessary to avoid fortification work.112 The Confederaci¢n thus realized the old anarchosyndicalist desire for the "identity card of the producer" that would inventory his moral, that is, productive, capacity.
Although most restrictions were designed to make workers work, one rule confirmed the existence of workers who held two jobs or who demanded overtime. These wage earners accepted labor because of individual or family needs, not those of the Revolution or the cause. Continuing the tradition of the prerevolutionary workers' movement, which desired to integrate the unemployed into the work force, collectives often prohibited dual employment and overtime. In certain collectives, workers were not allowed to have two sources of income. Communist militants planned to fire both those who received a double salary and rumormongers who made such false accusations.113 CNT union officials scheduled an inspection at the home of one "wheeler-dealer" who was thought to have a small business as well as his regular salary from a controlled enterprise. The UGT railroad union forced militiamen to declare in writing their sources of income.114
Although some management committees sharply discouraged overtime, they were not inflexible. When one firm claimed that it could not find the necessary qualified personnel during a busy period, it received permission for employees to work extra hours.115 Given the demand for skilled personnel in both military and civilian sectors, overtime was a prerequisite for victory, and it was authorized for war-related work. Unions sometimes insisted, however, that extra hours be paid at the ordinary rate. In December 1936 a militant in the jewelers' section of the CNT Metallurgical Union demanded the expulsion of a colleague who had refused to work extra hours in a CNT collective because overtime pay was low.116
During the Spanish Revolution in Barcelona, workers continued to engage in direct and indirect refusals to work. Their acts conflicted with the militants' urgent need to develop the backward productive forces they had inherited from a weak bourgeoisie. Militants therefore adopted repressive techniques to make workers work and to reduce resistances. They implemented piecework, dismissals, elimination of holidays, medical inspections, and strict rules. Like the capitalists and state managers in Paris, anarchosyndicalists and Marxists in Barcelona struggled against secular resistances. The following chapter will evaluate the activists' achievements and limitations.
1. A tots els sindicats obrers de la ind£stria tÅ xtil de Catalunya, 163, AS.
2. Bolet¡n de informaci¢n, 9 April 1937.
3. Informe que presenta el consejo econ¢mico de la industria siderometal£rgica; Informe que presenta el consejo de empresa de la material para ferrocarriles, 1186, AS.
4. The following paragraph adheres to the minutes of the CNT metallurgists, 1179, AS.
5. Secci¢n de estaciones colectivizadas, 29 November 1936 and 13 January 1937, 1404, AS.
6. Sindicato nacional ferroviario, 23 January 1937, 1482, AS.
7. PSUC, radi 8, 22 July 1937, 1122, AS.
8. F. Vehils Vidal, 23 February 1937, 1099, AS.
9. 26 October 1937, 1219, AS.
10. Red nacional de ferrocarriles, servicio de material y tracci¢n, sector este, May 1938, 1043, AS (original emphasis).
11. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria de la edificaci¢n, madera y decoraci¢n, 10 August 1937. 12. Joint CNT-UGT declaration in UGT Edificaci¢n, 15 August 1937.
13. Libro de actas de comit"š UGT, sociedad de alba¤iles, 20 November 1937, 1051, AS.
14. UGT Edificaci¢n, 1 February 1938.
15. Josep Maria Bricall, Pol¡tica econ"¢mica de la Generalitat (1936-1939), (Barcelona, 1978-1979), 1:101-18.
16. Hoy, January 1938.
17. Solidaridad Obrera, 7 May 1937; Juzgado general de contrabando, 1336, AS. On women's demonstrations, see Enric Ucelay Da Cal, La Catalunya populista: Imatge, cultura i pol¡tica en l'etapa republicana, 1936-1939 (Barcelona, 1982), 309-23; Temma Kaplan, "Female Consciousness and Collective Action: The Case of Barcelona, 1910-1918," Signs 7, no. 3 (Spring 1982): 548-65.
18. Estad¡stica: Res£menes demogr ficos de la ciudad de Barcelona, 1936-1939, p. 22.
19. This paragraph follows the minutes of the Comit"š central de control obrero, 181-82, AS; see Walther L. Bernecker, Colectividades y revoluci¢n social: El anarquismo en la guerra civil espa¤ola, 1936-1939, trans. Gustau Mu¤oz (Barcelona, 1982), p. 363.
20. The next two paragraphs are based on the minutes of the Cros assembly, 1421, AS.
21. Consejo obrero de coches camas, 10 November 1936 and 13 March 1937, 467, AS.
22. 29 September 1936, 182, AS.
23. 25 August 1937, 181, AS.
24. Actas de metal£rgicos, 3 July and 9 April 1937, 1179, AS.
25. Comit"š ejecutivo de la federaci¢n local UGT, 27 November 1937, 501, AS; the federation agreed to pay half the salaries.
26. Acta, 18 March 1937, 531, AS.
27. Reuni¢n de junta, 13 November and 8 December, 1936, 1204, AS.
28. Actas del sindicato £nico de la metalurgia, secci¢n joyer¡a, plater¡a, relojer¡a, 16 January 1937, 1352, AS.
29. 12 December 1936, 182, AS.
30. Acta, 29 November 1936, 1404, AS.
31. Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Els treballadors i la guerra civil (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 64, 170.
32. Informe, 14 August 1936, 182, AS; Junta de distribuci¢n, CNT, 15 June 1937, 1446, AS.
33. Letter from the Consejo obrero de MZA, sindicato nacional ferroviario UGT, 24 November 1937, 467, AS.
34. Asamblea, 13 January 1937 and Acta, 24 July 1937, 1404, AS. The assembly agreed that if the three paid the fine, they could keep their vacations.
35. Comit"š regional, secci¢n defensa, 17 July 1938, 1049, AS.
36. The following information is from Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria de la edificaci¢n, madera y decoraci¢n, 10 November 1937.
37. Sanitaria, 12 February 1938, 1203, AS; Libro de actas de comit"š UGT, sociedad de alba¤iles, reuni¢n de junta, 7 November 1937, 1051, AS.
38. Comit"š ejecutivo de la federaci¢n local UGT, 29 September 1937, 501. In November 1936 the prosecuting attorney of the Tribunal popular, Adolfo Bueso, labeled "as fascist the majority of the members of the Insurance Union" (Federaci¢ local UGT, 27 November 1936, 1311, AS). 39. Actas, 13 June, 6 June, and 22 August 1937, 1404, AS. Sick pay varied according to collective and union.
40. Sindicato de la industria siderometal£rgica, secci¢n lampistas, asamblea general, 25 December 1936 and 15 January 1937, 1453, AS.
41. Actas de metal£rgicos, 15 February 1937, 1179, AS.
42. Comit"š central, 22 August 1936, 182, AS; see also Acta de reuni¢n del comit"š de control, 19 March 1937, 467, AS.
43. Reglamento interior, Eudaldo Perramon, 1 September 1938, 1219, AS.
44. Consejo de la federaci¢n local, 4 November 1937, 501, AS.
45. The following information is derived from PSUC, radi 8, (July?) 1937, 1122, AS. 46. Reuni¢n de junta, 2 October 1936, 1204, AS; Actas de junta y los militantes de las industrias construcciones met licas CNT, 7 December 1937, 921, AS; Acta, MZA, 9 April 1937, 531, AS.
47. Reuni¢n de junta, 23 October 1936, 1204, AS; 9 October, 12 November, and 12 December 1936, 182, AS.
48. Acta de reuni¢n, 19 March 1937, 467, AS; Acta de reuni¢n, 16 March 1937, 531, AS.
49. Proyecto de estatuto interior, sastrer¡a Casarromona (n.d.), 1219, AS.
50. J. Garc¡a Pradas, Antifascismo proletario: Tesis, ambiente, t ctica (Madrid, 1938?), pp. 129-30.
51. 14 January 1937, 181, AS.
52. A la junta, 25 June 1938, 1084, AS; see also two letters, 20 January 1938, 1084, AS.
53. This paragraph follows the letter from the Collective M.E.Y.D.O., 854, AS.
54. The following information is from Acta de asamblea, 24 July 1937, 1404, AS.
55. Societat de mo"¡os, 20 September 1936, 1170, AS.
56. Actas de construcciones met licas CNT, 7 December 1937, 921; Junta de tel"šfonos UGT, 9 January 1937, 1170, AS; Solidaridad Obrera, 30 December 1937.
57. Federaci¢n local, 4 April 1938, 1084, AS.
58. Compa¤eros, 11 February 1938, 1084, AS; militants rejected a proposal to expel the accused but refused to allow him to hold union office.
59. Solidaridad Obrera, 3 February 1937.
60. The following information is based on a series of documents in 181, AS.
61. A todos, 30 September 1938, 1084, AS.
62. Secci¢n de coordinaci¢n, informe de la Barriada Prat Vermel, CNT, 11 July 1938, 830, AS.
63. Solidaridad Obrera, 24 June 1938.
64. Comissi¢ consultiva, 13 July 1938, Generalitat 277, AS.
65. PSUC, c"šlula 9a, 7 January 1938, 1122, AS.
66. Comissariat d'assistÅ ncia als refugiats, informe, Reus, 30 October 1938, Generalitat 277, AS.
67. Comissi¢, 27 July 1938, Generalitat 277, AS.
68. Estad¡stica, 1936-1939.
69. Joan Fronjos..., La missi¢ dels treballadors i la dels sindicats en la nova organitzaci¢ industrial (Barcelona, 1937), p. 15; see also Asamblea, 29 October 1937, 1219, AS.
70. Sindicato nacional ferroviario, acta, 23 January 1937, 1432, AS.
71. Consejo de la federaci¢n local, 4 November 1937, 501, AS; Comit"š ejecutivo de la federaci¢n local UGT, 26 July 1937, 501, AS.
72. 5 October 1936, 182, AS.
73. The following information is found in minutes of 16 July and 27 September 1937, 181, AS.
74. Solidaridad Obrera, 24 July 1937.
75. Consell general, reuni¢ extraordin...ria, 181, AS.
76. Reuni¢ extraordin...ria del consell, 4 October 1937, 181, AS.
77. Actas de metal£rgicos CNT, 27 May and 14 July 1937, 1179, AS.
78. Sindicato de la industria siderometal£rgica, secci¢n lampistas, 2 July 1937, 1453, AS.
79. Reuni¢n de junta, 29 December 1936, 1204, AS; Industria del autom¢vil, 14 October 1936, 1049, AS.
80. Minutes of the Secci¢ de paletes i manobres del sindicat de l'edificaci¢, 1052, AS.
81. Letter from UGT militants to UGT secretary general, 24 September 1937, PC.
82. Consejo de la federaci¢n local, 2 October 1937, 501, AS.
83. Actas, cuarta sesi¢n del pleno regional de las industrias qu¡micas de Catalu¤a, July 1937, 531, AS.
84. Acta de reuni¢n de militantes, 3 June 1938, 531, AS.
85. Sindicat d'obrers metal.l£rgics UGT, secci¢ de joieria, argenteria i anexes, assamblea, 3 July 1937, 505, AS.
86. Federaci¢ local UGT, 9 January 1937, 1311, AS.
87. Comit"š ejecutivo, 21 December 1937, 501, AS.
88. Federaci¢ catalana, 1 September 1938, 1049; Comit"š d'enlla"¡, secci¢ sastreria, 25 June 1937, 1219, AS.
89. Fronjos..., La missi¢, p. 28.
90. III Congr"šs de la UGT a Catalunya, informe de Josep del Barrio (Barcelona, 1937), p. 26.
91. Consejo de la federaci¢n local, 16 December 1937, 501, AS; Informe, 7 August 1938, 1322, AS.
92. Jos"š Peirats, La CNT en la revoluci¢n espa¤ola (Paris, 1971), 3:37-39.
93. Quoted in Bernecker, Colectividades, p. 136.
94. Gonzalo Coprons y Prat, empresa colectivizada, vestuarios militares, 1099, AS.
95. The following information is based on Projecte de reglamentaci¢ interior de l'empresa, 1099, AS.
96. Projecte d'estatut interior per el qual hauran de regir-se els treballadors, 1099, AS.
97. Assamblea ordinaria dels obrers de la casa Artgust, 6 September 1938, 1099, AS.
98. Acta aprobada por el personel de la casa Antonio Lanau, 15 August 1938, 1099, AS; for an analogous prohibition on singing, Reglamento, Costa colectivizada, 22 September 1938, 1219, AS.
99. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria fabril y textil de Badalona y su radio, February 1937; Reglamento interior, confecciones casa Parareda, empresa colectivizada, 1219, AS; Reglamento interior, Eudaldo Perramon, 1 September 1938, 1219, AS.
100. See Reglamentos, 1219, AS; Circular no. 37, 19 March 1938, 1084, AS.
101. Informe de la casa Mallafr"š hecho por el contable del CADCI, 15 June 1937, 1099, AS.
102. Letter from Artgust to Secci¢n sastrer¡a CNT, 9 February 1938, 1099, AS.
103. Informe revisi¢n J. Lanau (signed by accountant), 15 November 1937, 1099, AS.
104. Informe, August 1938, 1219, AS.
105. Acta, 12 July 1938, 1219, AS.
106. Casa Alemany, 23 June 1937, 1219, AS; Rabasso Palau, 25 October 1938, 1219, AS; 8 July 1938, 1219, AS; letter from Comit"š de la f brica no. 7 (n.d.), 1085, AS.
107. Consejo nacional de ferrocarriles, circular no. 3, primas de regularidad, 26 February 1938, 1043, AS.
108. Acta, MZA, 8 April 1937, 531, AS.
109. Acta de la reuni¢n, comit"š central, 16 and 18 March 1937, 531, AS.
110. Peirats, La CNT, 3:21.
111. D"šcret instituant un "certificat du travail," 4 March 1937, 259, AD. For the certificates themselves, Generalitat 252, no. 13, AS.
112. Luis L¢pez de Medrano, 986 d¡as en el infierno (Madrid, 1939), pp. 192-93.
113. PSUC, radi 8, 26 July 1937, 1122, AS.
114. CNT junta de distribuci¢n, 8 June 1937, 1446, AS; Sindicato nacional ferroviario, 23 January 1937, 1482, AS.
115. Reuni¢n de junta, 29 December 1936, 1204, AS.
116. Actas del sindicato £nico de la metalurgia, secci¢n joyer¡a, plater¡a, relojer¡a, 8 December 1936, 1352, AS.
7. The End of the Spanish Revolution in Barcelona
Under the extremely difficult circumstances of war and Revolution, union activists fought to create a competitive national market and to modernize and rationalize industry. Despite the shortages in food and raw materials, the effects of the bombardments on factories, and the loss of traditional markets, the militants and technicians bought and manufactured new machinery, created products, improved working conditions in many firms, opened new sources of raw materials, and eliminated some of the most glaring inequalities in the workplace.
Even their adversaries often praised their control of industry. The pro-Franco historian of the large textile firm, Espa¤a industrial, wrote that the "reds" had permitted technicians to act skillfully and efficiently and "thus they were able to manage the ship in the best way despite the absence of the captain."1 The conservative historian of the Maquinista Terrestre y Mar¡tima noted that at the end of the war and Revolution, the factories of his company were in much better condition than its directors "had ever hoped."2 The union militants who controlled the gas and electricity industries of Catalonia maintained their equipment so well that after the war production quickly returned to prewar levels once problems of coal supplies were resolved.3 French diplomats confirmed the rapid return of industry, and one observer noted that trams and electric railways offered normal service shortly after Franco's occupation of Barcelona.4 Despite their contribution to the productive forces, many union militants who participated in the management of collectives and controlled enterprises were purged or imprisoned, as their colleagues watched, afraid or indifferent.5
It is difficult to present an overall evaluation of the purely economic performance of workers' control in Barcelona for various reasons. First, the interruptions in supplies of food and raw materials lowered production in many collectives and controlled factories. Second, the traditional markets for Catalan industry-Andalusia and other regions-were under franquista control, and exchange was often impossible. Third, the difficulty of acquiring foreign currencies and the fall of the peseta hindered purchases of needed foreign-made machinery; domestic enemies of the collectives were often reluctant to provide capital and equipment. Fourth, beginning in the spring of 1937 and continuing much more intensively in the first months of 1938, enemy bombardments reduced industrial output. Fifth, the transformation of many Catalan industries to war-related activities distorted productivity. Therefore, industrial production dropped between 33 and 50 percent during the civil war.6 Yet an approach that seeks to judge only the economic performance of workers' control will, like the purely political appraisals of the Spanish Revolution, surely miss the significance of this Revolution, which some have called the most profound of the twentieth century. My concern has been to avoid an exclusively political or economic evaluation and instead to explore the social relations in the collectivized factories and workshops. In this regard, the technicians and union militants who took control of the productive forces confronted the same problems that have affected both the Western bourgeoisies and the Communist parties that have rapidly developed the means of production. The new factory managers often ran into the resistance of the workers themselves, who continued to demand more pay, fake illness, sabotage production, reject the control and discipline of the factory system, and ignore calls to participate in managing the workplace.
In response to workers' resistance, the union militants disregarded their democratic ideology of workers' control and opted for coercive techniques to increase production. Many collectives gave technicians the power to set production levels; piecework reappeared, and incentives tied pay to production. The new managers established strict control of the sick, severe surveil lance of the rank and file during worktime, and frequent inspections. Firings and dismissals for poor performance and "immorality," that is, low productivity, occurred. The CNT realized its plan for the "identity card of the producer" that would catalogue workers' behavior. Socialist realist posters glorified the means of production and the workers themselves so they would produce more. Labor camps for "parasitic" enemies and "saboteurs" were founded on the modern principle of reform through work. The reactions of the leaders of the working-class organizations to the rank and file's actions in the collectives and controlled firms were revealing. Federica Montseny, the CNT Minister of Health and Public Assistance in the republican government, posited a theory of human nature to explain the problems in workers' control. According to this prominent fa¡sta, who was the daughter of a well- known anarchist theoretician, human beings "are as they are. They always need an incentive and an interior and exterior stimulus to work and to produce the maximum production in quality and quantity."7 As for the CNT Metallurgical Union, "the collectives . . . have underlined the bad side of human nature. This has consequently led to a decrease of production when it is most necessary to produce."8 At the end of 1938, Felipe Alaiz-a fa¡sta who was elected editor of Solidaridad Obrera in 1931 and was later named director of Tierra y Libertad-defined the "essential problem of Spain" as "the problem of not working."9 "In general," he complained, "there is low productivity, and low productivity means . . . irremediable ruin in the future."
The CNT activist asserted that the "strikes were partially responsible for the decline of the work ethic." Though strikes were necessary on occasions, workers had abused the right to strike. Political, general, sit-down, slowdown, and other kinds of strikes may have been useful in the past, but now they only hurt the new "consumer-producer." Likewise, holidays on Sundays, weekends, May Day, and numerous other public holidays as well as vacations injured the cause. Sick leave, work accidents, featherbedding, and job security hurt the "proletarian economy" and food production: "To be on the payroll for a year really means working a half year. This shortfall has deservedly ruined many firms, but if it continues, it will ruin all the workers." Enlarging the focus, Alaiz reiterated: "If we do not work, we will lose everything, even if we win the war." One of the most important UGT leaders and a prominent Communist agreed that it was the conduct of the workers that most endangered the collectives.10 In a confidential conversation with CNT members of the Optical Collective Ruiz y Ponseti, this UGT economist said that though few would state so publicly, the workers were merely "masses," whose cooperation was unfortunately necessary for the success of the enterprises. The union leaders were joined by lower-ranking militants who embarked on extensive propaganda campaigns to convince and compel the rank and file to work harder. Solidaridad Obrera claimed that the women who were making uniforms in the new CNT tailoring shops were content; it contrasted the space, lighting, and machinery of the Confederaci¢n's workshops with the unhygienic conditions that prevailed before the Revolution.11 The CNT daily proudly stated, "We are organizing some workshops with the same system as in the United States." Yet in June 1937 the tailoring union's Central Committee criticized the "immense majority" of workers for misunderstanding the Revolution.12 The rank and file had not yet realized that they must sacrifice and, as a result, the tailoring industry had had to postpone plans for collectivization. Women, who were the majority in the textile industry, received special criticism since they used the factory not merely as a workplace but also as a social space. One CNT militant complained, "It is not rare that many women come to work, gossip too much, and do not produce enough. If the lack of raw materials is added to this, the collapse of production is considerable."13 S¡ntesis, the magazine of the CNT-UGT Collective Cros, attacked laziness and vice, and it warned workers who considered "work a punishment" that they had better change their attitude quickly. Petr¢leo, the organ of the UGT petroleum militants, criticized workers who, "as in the time of black capitalist domination," wanted to celebrate traditional holidays and to receive pay hikes. "The Revolution," it bluntly stated, "is not a party time (juerga)."14 Not surprisingly, sailors were singled out as an especially undisciplined group of workers. In March 1937 CNT Mar¡tima stated that, with some exceptions, the majority of sailors had not been working energetically. In July 1937 it rebuked them for low productivity, fake illness, and absenteeism. A "lamentable majority" of CNT sailors felt that they had fufilled their union duties when they paid their dues; CNT Mar¡tima estimated that only 20 percent were working as hard as they should. A report of July 1938 stated that sailors who had been receiving pay on shore for months had resisted orders to sail.15 Near the end of the civil war and Revolution, the CNT Maritime Union became extremely blunt: "The majority of workers are an inert mass who, carried by circumstances, came to the unions because life was impossible without a union card. . . . You must guess what the sailors are thinking because they are not able to express themselves in assemblies and meetings."16
Under the circumstances, even anarchosyndicalist militants admired the Soviet model, since the Bolsheviks had built new industries and had modernized the old, thereby securing the economic base of the Revolution. According to one fa¡sta, the Soviet Union continued to progress despite capitalist attempts to strangle its triumphant revolution.17 The CNT Building Union esteemed not only Soviet art and architecture but to a certain extent the Soviet economic model as well: "The gigantic thrust of industry and agriculture in Russia derives from the producers and not from the rulers."18 This statement revealed the Confederaci¢n's belief that workers must construct an economy without coercion from above. However, given the industries that the unions wanted to build and the division of labor that they had decided to impose, coercion proved to be as necessary in Barcelona as it had been in the Soviet Union. Therefore, with UGT cooperation, the CNT came to accept and even to promote Stakhanovism, a Soviet technique for increasing production. In February 1937 the CNT Textile Union of Badalona called on workers to imitate Stakhanovism, which had aroused "keen enthusiasm" among Soviet laborers.19 The CNT review even published a photograph of the Communist work hero. "Here is an example that the Spanish worker must strive to imitate for the benefit of the industrial economy." The CNT and UGT militants of the Collective Cros lauded Stakhanovism and determined to make work "a sporting game, a noble competition" in which the victor could achieve a great prize: "the title of distinguished worker of production."20 The collective called the Soviet Union an example of "successes obtained by rationalization and efficient work organization." For the Collective Marathon, formerly the General Motors branch in Barcelona, the Soviet Union was the "guide and example for the world."21 The UGT Metallurgical Union and other organizations friendly to the Communists supported the Soviets' ideal of work; the CNT Building Union proposed a five-year plan "of technical modernity and stringent morality" that would liberate Catalonia from "international capitalism" and orient the economy in the postwar period.22 In a pamphlet, The Front of Production, F. Melchor-one of Communist leader Santiago Carrillo's principal lieutenants-cited Stalin's and Molotov's praise of Stakhanovism, which, said Molotov, produced "a happy and cheerful working class" that went to the factory "joyously."23 Melchor advocated a popular front of production; he praised the example of a shock brigade in a Catalan munitions factory where four comrades-two from the Communist-dominated JSU (Juventudes socialistas unificadas), one from Estat catal..., and one from the CNT-"encouraged" their comrades to work "intensively." A Barcelona UGT leader claimed that shock workers offered a contagious example of higher output that other workers felt inspired to emulate.24 He cited the feats of various "production heroes," among them one truck driver who worked overtime to maintain his vehicle in good repair and had driven more than 95,000 kilometers without a breakdown. The UGT activist warned that workers must remain vigilant in the workplace since "saboteurs" and "Trotskyists" were trying to wear down workers' enthusiasm by mouthing slogans such as We should work only if the government feeds us.
In practice, though, the shock brigade seemed to have arisen not from a spontaneous demonstration of enthusiasm but rather as a response from above to workers' indiscipline. In a PSUC cell meeting, militants reported that the head of the Sabadell aviation factories had agreed to establish shock brigades because "even though the majority of the workers belong to the [Communist] party . . . new members lacked the spirit of sacrifice that, given the present circumstances, they should have."25 To give the Sabadell workers the proper example, it was "an absolute necessity" to form a brigade with several comrades who were "accustomed to this kind of work." The activists decided to appoint several dismissed UGT subway militants as shock workers in the factory. After meeting with their Sabadell colleagues, the shock workers returned disgusted by the aviation workers' lack of "political and union education and spirit of sacrifice." According to the militants, what really concerned the Sabadell workers was "to hold jobs that would let them avoid work. [They gave] the impression of a fascist, not Communist, cell meeting." On the other hand, CNT militants "provided an example worth imitating." PSUC shock workers recommended a purge of the Sabadell cell.
The unions made it perfectly clear that the workers had to build a new society based on work. The Revolution must create a "new dawn" where "work was essential."26 Whereas true art and science had been destroyed by capitalism, work was "the only value that remains unblemished."27 One CNT activist wrote that "work is the source of life"; the Confederaci¢n itself praised the "sublime song of work."28 The anarchosyndicalist militants came to accept uncritically a value that in other European countries had accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie, and they lauded the union as the basis of the new economy because its productive capacity was supposedly superior to that of private property: "The union is the form par excellence that permits the extraction of the maximum of efficiency and output from its members." The journal of the UGT petroleum workers, Petr¢leo, explained, "We want to make a new society in which work and the worker will be everything."29 The Confederaci¢n fervently desired to "lay the foundations of a society based on love of work"; activists composed poems dedicated to work as "the divine sun" that "gives light to nations."30 The future society would not revolve around religion, sex, art, or play: the workers would be central, and it was certain that they must labor.
Even though production was the top priority and coercion served to increase output, the unions and the state provided leisure activities to attract the rank and file. Before the Revolution, spectators and participants enjoyed a wide choice of hobbies and sports.31 Swimming, cycling, tennis, boxing, jai alai, bullfights, wrestling, and soccer had aroused great interest in the early and mid-1930s. The playing of basketball and baseball were signs of incipient Americanization, and nonpolitical clubs promoted hiking and other activities. The Amateur Soccer League coordinated the activities of approximately two hundred clubs.32 In fact, during the election campaign of 1936 the Left accused the Lliga of distributing, significantly enough, soccer balls and sport shirts to buy votes.33
The Revolution continued most prewar leisure activities and politicized Catalan sports. The National Federation of Catalan Students declared that sports offered a way of mobilizing youth to defend Spain. The Amateur Soccer League was proud to be the "sporting organization that has the most militants at the front." The Boxing Section of the CNT asserted that some of its thirty boxing clubs had 80 percent of their members in the military.34 In addition, the unions held festivals and established rest homes.
Certain groups of CNT militants tried to purify more traditional leisure and sporting activities. In the nineteenth century, anarchists had argued for the elimination of bullfights. During the Revolution, libertarian militants continued to distinguish between educational and noneducational leisure activities but often maintained the latter to avoid an increase of unemployment. Some CNT activists demanded greater taxation on noneducational entertainment-bullfights, frontones (pelota courts), dog tracks, boxing, and even soccer.35 Reduced numbers of dog tracks and frontones operated throughout the struggle.
Licentious popular culture was attacked but did not disappear. Anarchosyndicalist and Communist militants criticized the lazy for congregating in bars and caf"šs.36 Some CNT activists wanted to end immorality by shutting down such unproductive activities as bars and music or dance halls by 10:00 P.M.; several music-hall managers reduced the number of bars. Authorities executed a number of drug dealers and pimps and supposedly cleaned up "neighborhoods of vice."37 In general, the Left frowned on pornography. One CNT militant equated pornography with "evil influences that make children turn pale."38 According to a military publication, pornography produced masturbation that provoked tuberculosis; the militant CNT Graphics Union even destroyed "a pornographic novel."39 The campaign against prostitution, with posters and propaganda, did not eliminate the major problem of venereal disease in Barcelona. The sailors' port also attracted many soldiers, who usually had a good deal of disposable income. Indeed, venereal disease was the primary cause for discharging militiamen, who received repeated warnings against the malady.40 In July 1938 army physicians were ordered to inspect brothels located away from the front lines and to check their men every two weeks. If soldiers became infected more than once, they could be sent to a military prison. Three-time offenders were subject to the accusation of self-inflicted wounding and might receive the death penalty, a certain cure.
Besides traditional streetwalking, new vices prefiguring the consumerist future arose. The use of the automobile was one of the most frequent. Countless members of committees and councils drove vehicles without proper authorization. Even the most dedicated revolutionaries were fascinated by the car. Many collectives took measures to limit the use of automobiles since members were wasting precious gasoline. Militants spent great amounts of time and energy discussing the unauthorized trips, accidents, insurance, repairs, confiscations, and the enormous expenses of what would become the centerpiece of twentieth-century consumption. Anticipating Spaniards of today, the activists pleaded for safe driving and proper care of vehicles. The telephone, not yet banalized and vulgarized, became a symbol of power and authority. Committee members were awarded a phone when elected and forced to relinquish it when their term expired.41 As with automobiles, abuses developed: many activists demanded phone service on the slightest pretext, and former committee members avoided having their phone disconnected when they left office. The elevator completed the modernist trilogy and became, like the car and the telephone, a necessity for unions and their militants.
Anarchosyndicalists' plans for a rationalized, modern Barcelona within an economically independent nation failed to inspire many of the rank and file to wholehearted sacrifice. In fact, direct and indirect resistances were a negation of the values of the Spanish Revolution, which glorified the development of modern productive forces and production itself. The workers' refusal to participate enthusiastically in workers' control demonstrated that their class consciousness differed from that of their new industrial managers. For the union militants, class consciousness meant active participation in the building of socialism or libertarian communism; many workers expressed their class consciousness by avoiding the space, time, and demands of wage labor.
Despite their proclaimed Marxism, even historians of the extreme Left-Trotskyists, pure anarchists, and autonomes-have viewed the conflicts of the Spanish Revolution as essentially political. Some have criticized the CNT leadership for its participation in government, increasing bureaucratization, and compromises with other parties and unions, particularly with the Communists. Extreme leftists have often seen Los amigos de Durruti, a group that was active in the street fighting of May 1937, as offering an alternative to the CNT's compromises and bureaucratization. Los amigos proposed to strengthen the collectives at the expense of the private property still remaining in Catalonia, and it desired to revitalize the CNT so that the Confederaci¢n could exercise a revolutionary dictatorship against the Republican and Communist opposition. Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that even the extremists of Los amigos offered a response to the fundamental problems of the Spanish Revolution. As the CNT and the UGT did, this group called for more work, sacrifices, the end of salary increases, and even "forced labor" (trabajo obligatorio).42 Los amigos de Durruti failed, of course, to take power, but its type of anarchobolshevik program would not have resolved the differences between the militants and the base. Like its opponents, Los amigos offered basically political solutions to problems that had deep social and economic roots.
The rank and file's daily negation of the values of the Spanish Revolution, which were also the values of Communists, anarchosyndicalists, and even many progressive Republicans, did not mean that these workers agreed with the military and clerical Right. The rank and file's resistance to the modernization and rationalization of the productive forces desired by the militants should not be identified with political conservatism or reaction. Their opposition was diffuse, unarticulated, and both individual and collective. They proposed no alternative to party, union, or private control of the means of production; yet their refusal to participate enthusiastically in workers' control must not be dismissed as false consciousness or unconsciousness. Nor should it be attributed to the peasant or preindustrial character of the Barcelonan working class since over two-thirds of the workers were natives of Barcelona or veteran industrial laborers. As shall be seen in Paris, direct and indirect refusals are present in much more advanced industrial societies; these phenomena indicate that resistance to workspace and worktime is not confined to developing countries but occurs through many stages of industrialization.
Historians of the Spanish Revolution have focused on the political and ideological divisions among Communists, Socialists, and anarchosyndicalists and have thereby neglected the central problem of the divorce between militants committed to a certain vision of the future and workers who were reluctant to sacrifice to fulfill this ideal. The militants used coercion to force the workers to work harder both to win the war and to build the new society. The war merely reinforced, but did not create, the need for coercive methods. The war was thus not the cause of the coercion and repression of the rank and file but, like the militants' vision of the future, the result of a long historical process with prewar roots.
Ironically, after the defeat of the Left, Franco's governments adopted many aspects of the militants' vision of the future. After two generations of stagnation, in the late 1950s the means of production began again to be rationalized and modernized. Spain strengthened its agriculture, improved its infrastructure, and developed its industrial base. New needs-such as the automobile and the telephone-were refashioned, and no longer could CNT militants lament that "Spanish backwardness derived, to a great degree, from racial laziness that leaves [the Spaniard] satisfied with a crust of bread."43 Cars began to be mass-produced, and the anarchosyndicalist project of cities of large apartment complexes and massive automobile circulation was partially realized. Considering the ability of postwar Spain to achieve much of the CNT and UGT militants' dream, it is no wonder that anarchosyndicalist and other large-scale, working-class, revolutionary movements have nearly disappeared in present-day Spain.
The decline of revolutionary movements can be traced to the rapid economic growth from the late 1950s to early 1970s. For our purposes, it is important to note that the spurt to increased prosperity did not result from an industrial revolution undertaken by the Spanish bourgeoisie but rather from Spain's proximity to the expanding labor and capital markets of post-World-War-II Europe. A mass tourist industry grew to accommodate northern Europeans attracted by the sunny beaches and the cheap peseta. Spanish workers traveled in the opposite direction and sent a hefty part of their salaries back to the Iberian Peninsula. The Franco regime kept wages low, limited strikes, and maintained a repressive order, which established a climate favorable to investments by multinational corporations. In addition to the old model of the pronunciamiento, Spain can now offer certain Hispanic and Third World countries a new model of democratic consumer society.
1. La Espa¤a industrial: Libro del centenario (Barcelona, 1947).
2. Alberto del Castillo, La Maquinista Terrestre y Mar¡tima: Personaje hist¢rico (1855-1955) (Barcelona, 1955), p. 508.
3. Josep Maria Bricall, Pol¡tica econ"¢mica de la Generalitat (1936-1939) (Barcelona, 1978-1979), 1:61.
4. [Author unknown] Franco in Barcelona (London, 1939).
5. Anna Monjo and Carme Vega, Els treballadors i la guerra civil (Barcelona, 1986), p. 189.
6. Bricall, Pol¡tica econ"¢mica de la Generalitat, 1:47-56.
7. Solidaridad Obrera, 26 December 1937.
8. Sindicato de la industria siderometal£rgica de Barcelona, ¨Colectivizaci¢n? ¨Nacionalizaci¢n? No socializaci¢n (Barcelona, 1937), p. 6.
9. The following is derived from Felipe Alaiz, "Hacia el estajanovismo," Tiempos nuevos (Oct.-Nov. 1938).
10. Informe confidencial, 1 January 1938, 855, AS.
11. Solidaridad Obrera, 28 and 29 August 1937.
12. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria fabril y textil de Badalona y su radio, June 1937.
13. Hoy, January 1938.
14. S¡ntesis, December 1937; Petr¢leo, January 1938.
15. CNT Mar¡tima, 29 March, 3 July, and 13 November 1937; Libro de actas de gerencia de la flota mercante espa¤ola, 30 July 1938, 183, AS.
16. CNT Mar¡tima, 11 June and 15 August 1938.
17. Ricardo Sanz, El sindicalismo y la pol¡tica: Los solidarios y nosotros (Toulouse, 1966), pp. 98-99.
18. Hoy, January 1938.
19. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria fabril y textil de Badalona y su radio, February 1937. As mentioned earlier, some members of the CNT opposed Stakhanovism, but they, like their colleagues who favored decentralization, were frequently ignored during the Revolution (J. Garc¡a Pradas, Antifascismo proletario: Tesis, ambiente, t ctica [Madrid, 1938?], p. 120, which argued against Communists' proposals for incentives and Stakhanovism).
20. S¡ntesis, January and December 1937. In the workplace the emphasis on medals and distinctions roughly corresponded with that in the Republican army (Ram¢n Salas Larraz bal, Los datos exactos de la guerra civil [Madrid, 1980], p. 151).
21. Horizontes, June-July 1937.
22. UGT Metallurgical Congress, September 1938, 901, AS; Hoy, January 1938.
23. Federico Melchor, El frente de la producci¢n: Una industria grande y fuerte para ganar la guerra (Valencia? 1937?), p. 21.
24. Informe al ple, 7 August 1938, 1322, AS.
25. PSUC, radi 8, 22 July 1937, 1122, AS.
26. Sidero-Metalurgia, September 1937.
27. Hoy, December 1937.
28. Bolet¡n del Sindicato de la industria de la edificaci¢n, madera y decoraci¢n, 10 September 1937; Sidero- Metalurgia, July 1937.
29. Petr¢leo, January 1938.
30. Bolet¡n de informaci¢n, 5 May 1937; Amanecer: Organo de la escuela de militantes de Catalu¤a, CNT-FAI, October 1937.
31. Gobernaci¢n A, caja 2412, AGA; see also El mundo deportivo (1936-1938).
32. Lliga amateur de futbol, 13 November 1936, Generalitat 89, AS.
33. Jos"š A. Gonz lez Casanova, Elecciones en Barcelona (1931-1936) (Madrid, 1969), p. 73. 34. Sindicato £nico de espect culos p£blicos, December 1936, Generalitat 89, AS.
35. Reuni¢n de junta, 23 October 1936, 1204, AS; Solidaridad Obrera, 1 June 1937.
36. 12 February 1937; PSUC, c"šlula 9a, 7 January 1938, 1122, AS; minutes of CNT metallurgists, 11 March 1937, 1179, AS.
37. F. Montseny quoted in H. E. Kaminski, Los de Barcelona, trans. Carmen Sanz Barber (Barcelona, 1976), p. 66.
38. Floreal Oca¤a, "La escuela moderna: Conferencia pronunciada el 30 de julio 1937," Tiempos nuevos (Oct.-Nov. 1938).
39. Michael Alpert, El ej"šrcito republicano en la guerra civil (Paris, 1977), p. 211; Junta, 23 February 1937, 1204, AS.
40. Alpert, El ej"šrcito, p. 210.
41. 11 December 1936, 182; 3 February 1937, 181, AS.
42. Los amigos de Durruti, 22 June 1937.
43. Alaiz, "Hacia el estajanovismo."
8. The Strength of the Parisian Bourgeoisie
Both Left and Right in France have often described the Popular Front as a r"švolution manqu"še, a missed opportunity for the working class to take control of the means of production as its Spanish counterpart had done. When French workers occupied factories and staged sit-down strikes during May and June 1936, commentators of various political persuasions believed that the workers were on the road to revolution. Yet despite an unprecedented one million workers occupying factories throughout France, the French capitalist elite, unlike the Spanish, retained its ownership of the means of production. Instead of making revolution during the governments of the Popular Front, the workers demanded-and received-paid vacations and the forty-hour week. In the midst of the greatest economic depression capitalism has never known, France gave birth to the weekend. In the face of high unemployment and the increasing threat of war, French workers fought for their forty- hour week with Saturday and Sunday off. Thus the Popular Front was not only an alliance of unions and leftist political parties to prevent fascism in France, it was also the birthplace of mass tourism and leisure. The demand for a social revolution in which the workers would take over and develop the means of production was superseded by numerous struggles against work. The second part of this book examines the revolts against work in Paris and its suburbs; it details the reactions to workers' aspirations by the Communist and Socialist parties and the massive federation, Conf"šd"šration g"šn"šrale du travail (CGT), which were, with the Radical party, the main components of the Popular Front. To recall the different French and Spanish economic, political, and religious evolutions helps us understand the decline of revolution and revolutionary ideologies in France. In contrast to Spain, France had steadily and consistently industrialized from the middle of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth; its development of the productive forces had, as in other Western nations, severely restricted the revolutionary possibilities of working-class organizations. The French had created a thriving national market and slowly forged national unity. In the first third of the twentieth century, regionalist movements did not pose a threat to the indivisibility of the nation. Again, in direct contrast to Spain, there were no attempts at a coup d'"štat in the 1920s, and the conspiracies of the 1930s failed miserably. The French, too, had separated Church from state and the military from the civilian government. After the Dreyfus affair anticlericalism was no longer the burning issue that it continued to be in Spain and seemed after World War I to have become an outdated ideology, its appeal lost. Although anticlericalism did not disappear in the interwar era, it progressively dwindled and declined.1
Furthermore, in France and particularly in Paris, careers were open to the talented, regardless of religion. The French bourgeoisie became increasingly decatholicized and widened its ranks to include considerable numbers of Protestants and Jews, some of whom played essential roles in the most modern industries-electricity, automobiles, and aviation-that in Spain were either backward or nonexistent. The assumed aristocratic values of venality, oisivet"š, and the prestige of titles gradually declined, as that of r"šussite (success) took their place: "The most modern and active part of the bourgeoisie defended the virtues of work and talent."2 If, in the nineteenth century, rentiers were an important minority of the French upper classes, the true idle rich (v"šritables oisifs)-those who never exercised a profession-were much less numerous. As the Socialist leader Jean JaurÅ s said, "The bourgeoisie is a class that works." Periodic economic crises forced this class to renew itself; in so doing, it enlarged its numbers and broadened its base. The Parisian bourgeoisie was particularly fluid and supported a philosophy of effort and action.3
From such diverse national contexts, different paths emerged. In 1936 anarchosyndicalist militants in Barcelona took control of the underdeveloped productive forces that a weak bourgeoisie had abandoned, whereas the militants of the extreme Left in Paris-anarchosyndicalists, Trotskyists, and dissident Communists-who demanded soviets, workers' councils, or some form of workers' control, were largely ignored. They held little interest for the masses of workers and, quite unlike in Barcelona, for militants of the largest working-class organizations-Communist, Socialist, and the overwhelming majority of the CGT. In contrast to the Spanish organizations, by 1936 the largest French unions had relinquished their earlier doctrines of revolutionary workers' control. In Paris the huge majority of workers and even most union militants in the industries under study here did not want to take over and develop the means of production. In fact, many workers often desired to avoid work and had little wish to labor for their employer, state, party, or union. As in Spain, the nature of the productive forces promoted struggles against work. The noise and vast space of the factories, the dirtiness of the workplace, the ugliness of industrial suburbs and anxious boredom of daily commutes, the ever- present danger of accidents, and the meaninglessness of many tasks encouraged workers to flee from the means of production. The spreading rationalization, the increased deskilling of labor, and the consequent necessity of army-like discipline in the factories aggravated resentments that expressed themselves through direct and indirect revolts against work. When closing time arrived in many factories, workers, even if exhausted, rushed madly for the exit. Thus, during the Popular Front in Paris militants and workers waged a daily guerrilla against work and its attendant discipline. This guerrilla became the most important form of class struggle during the Popular Front and damaged the Left's hopes of economic growth through increased production and consumption. The workers' struggles against labor discipline and for the weekend bring into question certain generalizations by historians that French workers had accepted the industrial system and had adapted to the factory. Paris is the obvious subject for analysis because of its enormous political and economic importance to France, even greater than Barcelona's to Spain. And the choice of the industrial branches is not totally arbitrary. Two of them-automobiles and aviation-formed the advanced sectors that led the working-class movement during the Popular Front; the occupation waves of the spring of 1936 began precisely in these sectors. Because of its more traditional character, the third branch, construction, contrasted sharply with the industrial modernity of the other sectors. The building industry reflected the small-scale, family concerns that, despite the success of the second industrial revolution in France, still dominated in many branches of the economy. In the World's Fair of 1937, it took part in a huge construction project employing tens of thousands of workers that was to be the showcase of the Popular Front. The workers of the industries examined here expressed many of the desires of Parisian wage earners in other sectors (which, when relevant, have also been adduced). To put workers' actions and desires into proper perspective requires a survey of French and particularly Parisian economic and social development.
After World War II, many historians emphasized French industrial backwardness compared to Germany, England, and the United States. More recently the focus of historiography has shifted, and historians have stressed France's development of powerful industries in automobiles, aviation, and chemicals. If the French patronat (employers) often remained patriarchical and authoritarian, it was not always Malthusian. The growth of capital equipment in France during the first third of the twentieth century was comparable to that in Germany and the United States and faster than that in Great Britain.4 Even before World War I, France was "unmistakably a country of advanced industrial capitalism."5 "In real terms, the French in 1913 enjoyed a standard of living higher than their German neighbors and had made substantial progress with regard to Great Britain." The growth rate per inhabitant in France between 1870 and 1964 increased more rapidly than Great Britain's and only a bit less than Germany's.6
The economist Alfred Sauvy, who has emphasized the "Malthusianism" of French employers, has nonetheless declared that between the wars France, "like other industrial nations," imported raw materials and exported manufactured products.7 From 1911 to 1936 French industry began to dominate a previously agricultural nation, and by 1931 the majority of the population was no longer rural.8 Although the number of farmers declined by one million from 1911 to 1936, agricultural production increased. Industrial progress surpassed agricultural advances, and from 1898 to 1913 industrial production grew 3.4 percent per year, a very respectable figure.9 The First World War produced even greater industrial growth, and the industries of the second industrial revolution- automobiles, aviation, and chemicals-expanded rapidly. With the assistance of an activist state, French industry successfully met the test of World War I and then adapted to the loss of the heavy industries of the north and northeast, regions occupied by the Germans. In a remarkably short time, the armaments ministries organized arms and airplane production, and after several years of war, a dynamic Ministry of Commerce regulated trade.10
In the 1920s these modern industrial sectors did not suffer a postwar crisis, and the growth rate for French industry was the highest in Europe.11 Industrial production more than doubled from 1921 to 1929, although population grew only 14 percent in the same period. Thus, industrial expansion occurred in those industries that used machinery extensively and attained levels between 1906 and 1929 that were matched again only in the 1950s and 1960s.12 In the 1920s Spain too experienced significant industrial growth, but its expansion was based on the employment of large quantities of inexpensive labor, not the introduction of new machinery.13 Between 1920 and 1930, Spanish industrial productivity increased, at most, by 20 percent, whereas French industrial productivity grew nearly 100 percent. Even during the depression of the 1930s, hourly productivity continued to rise 2.1 percent per year, a rate similar to the gains registered from 1896 to 1929.14 C. J. Gignoux, the leader of the French manufacturers' association, CGPF (Conf"šd"šration g"šn"šrale de la production fran"¡aise), during the Popular Front and a supporter of Vichy's R"švolution nationale during World War II, nonetheless declared that France had made significant industrial progress from 1919 to 1939.15 He noted that after World War I the Third Republic had provided the modern infrastructure of the French economy by building roads, airports, power stations, and ports; it constructed or improved schools, hospitals, and telephone and postal communications.
A tendency toward concentration or elimination of small, relatively inefficient firms characterized industrial developments in the first third of the twentieth century.16 From 1906 to 1931 the number of firms employing from one to five workers decreased approximately 35 percent, whereas the number of establishments with over five hundred workers almost doubled. Even though the majority of French enterprises remained small, the economic significance of very large factories with over one thousand workers increased substantially. The majority of workers labored in firms employing over one hundred workers. Modern metalworking firms began to employ more workers than the older textile industries, which had been the base of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution. In metalworking, those businesses that employed over five hundred workers formed only 1.2 percent of metalworking firms, but these companies employed 37.8 percent of the work force. The technologically most advanced industries-iron, steel, chemicals, and motor vehicles-were the most concentrated. By 1936 French industry had reached a certain balance between large and small firms, a kind of interdependent dual economy in which small and medium-sized businesses coexisted with large enterprises and in which rather backward regions contrasted with the very advanced. Again, unlike in Spain, the automotive industry played a fundamental role in France in the first half of the twentieth century. The French had been pioneers in automotive construction before the First World War, and they adopted mass-production techniques during the conflict. At the end of the war France remained second only to the United States in production of automobiles.17 Between 1906 and 1931, the number of workers in the automotive sector grew by a multiple of five. From 1923 to 1938 French motor-vehicle production increased 180 percent, compared to a 20 percent growth in the United States. Throughout the 1920s France remained the largest automaker in Europe, surpassed in exports only by the United States in 1931. Continuing concentration characterized this industry: in 1924 there were 155 firms; in 1932 there were 60, but by 1939 only 31 automakers remained. In 1934 the majority of the eighty-eight thousand workers directly involved in motor-vehicle manufacture labored in firms with over two thousand workers. The three largest companies-Renault, Peugeot, and Citro"°n-produced 56 percent of the vehicles in 1925 and 70 percent in 1932. In 1936 the automotive industry, including its spin-off activities such as repairs, sales, and services, was capable of employing up to eight hundred thousand workers, making it perhaps the key sector of the French industrial economy. During the Popular Front, France was second, again, to the United States in the number of vehicles in circulation and in the ratio of automobiles per inhabitant. In 1935 the over two million vehicles traveled on a relatively good road system. By the 1930s the railroads, the transportation achievement of the nineteenth century, were surpassed by automobiles, which had 650,000 kilometers of roads compared to 67,000 kilometers of track and employed directly or indirectly six hundred thousand workers compared to five hundred fifty thousand railway employees.18 At its birth the French aviation industry had a symbiotic relation with the automobile industry. Most of the early French aviation pioneers had begun their industrial and technical careers in automobile- related activities; many pilots had been bicycle or race-car drivers.19 The First World War had considerably promoted investment in this sector, and production jumped from 50 planes per month in 1914 to 629 per month in 1918. Post-war output fell sharply, but the French state, in contrast with the Spanish, actively promoted an independent national aviation industry. The government aided private aviation companies and built the necessary airport facilities.20 In 1926 France transported 1,067 tons of merchandise by air, compared to 1,050 tons for Germany and 679 tons for England. The chemical industry closely followed the growth of automobiles and aviation. Rubber and petroleum products were needed to build and fuel the vehicles, in addition to the more traditional uses of chemicals in agriculture and textiles. Prior to World War I the French chemical industry was prosperous but weak in comparison with the German since it did not produce chemicals such as coloring agents, bromine, and chlorine.21 During the conflict French industry learned how to replace chemicals that it had previously imported from Germany. After the war the state, with the cooperation of chemical industrialists and sometimes with the participation of labor organizations, created committees-such as the Commission de d"šfense nationale pour les industries chimiques and the Conseil national "šconomique-to assure French self-sufficiency in chemicals and other products. By 1929 the French balance of trade in chemicals was favorable, and in 1932 France had risen to second place in the production of phosphate fertilizers.22 Although the French chemical industry remained behind its American and German competitors, in the decade that followed the First World War, "France equipped herself with a chemical industry that could stand up to most in Europe."23 As in industrial sectors like chemicals, automobiles, and aviation, the French capitalist elite created a powerful electrical industry. On the eve of the First World War the city of Paris had already unified the production and distribution of electricity.24 In 1907 there were approximately forty plants in the Paris region, but by 1914 their number had been reduced to nineteen. Between 1906 and 1931 the numbers of workers in electrical construction multiplied by 7.5. In the 1920s, "French technology of electrical construction . . . freed itself from foreign techniques."25 In 1925 the Conseil sup"šrieur de d"šfense nationale concluded that the electrical construction industry was capable of satisfying potential French war needs. In 1930 France produced more electrical power than Japan or England, and in 1933 the nation was reportedly fourth in the world in the generation of electricity.26 Between the wars, concentration continued. In 1936, 80 percent of the electrical power of the Paris region was generated by six plants, and a significant part of the railroads and the public transportation of the Paris region had been electrified. The French industry contrasted sharply with the backward and scattered character of Barcelonan electrical firms.
The dynamism of French industrialists not only altered the factory and production, but in certain industries it also changed the quality of labor itself. The modern industries of the Paris region, particularly the automotive, were pioneers in the rationalization of work. Unlike in Spain, where union militants were sometimes responsible for the introduction of scientific techniques of rationalization, in France the capitalist elite often proved quite capable of industrial reorganization. It viewed Taylorism and other forms of scientific organization at work as following in the tradition of Saint-Simonian productivism and "štatisme.27 French technological and industrial elites often welcomed the latest methods of rationalization and believed that they could bring prosperity and power to the nation. The experts thought that the increasing consumption of goods produced by the new techniques would dampen class conflict and create the material and spiritual climate for class collaboration. As in America, capital and labor would be reconciled on the neutral ground of science and technology. In contrast to the Spanish situation, a collection of Taylor's articles appeared in French in 1907. His famous work, The Principles of Scientific Management, was immediately translated and made available to French readers in 1912, less than a year after its American publication. French advocates of scientific management wanted to make the American engineer's writings known to French industrialists to "avoid false interpretations of Taylor."28 Taylorism was adopted in the French automotive industry before World War I, when its introduction provoked strikes against production speed-ups and the lowering of piecework rates. A minority of workers, mainly skilled personnel, resisted the deskilling of their labor caused by the new methods of organization.
The First World War and its consequent requirements of production accelerated the application of Taylorism and other forms of scientific organization at work. During the conflict, M. Hourst, a Michelin director, defended Taylorism against attacks by arguing that it enabled wage earners to perfect their skills in several days or weeks, as opposed to the years that were previously required.29 In addition, it allowed unskilled and new workers, including women, to replace qualified personnel. The Michelin executive cited the shorter workweek and the higher wages that would result from the correct application of the procedures of the Philadelphia engineer. To obtain these advantages, the workers must, of course, give up idling (flÆ’nerie).
The trends toward the deskilling of labor and mass production continued after the war. Several firms that had produced armaments during the conflict reconverted to the mass production of automobiles.30 During the 1920s assembly lines multiplied throughout the motor-vehicle industry where "the skilled worker with his habits, his own rhythm of work, and his particular consciousness of a job well done" was replaced "by the unskilled laborer, the o.s. (ouvrier sp"šcialis"š)."31 At Renault between the wars "intelligence was incorporated into the machine." Workers found themselves before a mechanism that aimed "to replace their own labor; and their initiative was thus more and more limited by the engineer."32 In 1925 at Renault, approximately 46 percent of the workers were skilled (ouvriers professionnels), while 54 percent were relatively unskilled (manouvres and o.s.). By 1939 the percentages were 32 percent skilled and 68 percent relatively unskilled. On the eve of the Second World War in the large automobile factories around Paris, 60 percent of the workers could learn their jobs in three days.33
The development of the assembly line gave rise to a new kind of factory space. "Assembly-line work leads to the construction of buildings that have only outside walls. The interior is divided by a very small number of partitions, in contrast to the compartments of the era of specialized and skilled workshops. The new spatial organization permits a large view of the whole production."34 Presumably, the new space helped managers to oversee and control workers.
In addition to an altered organization of space and labor, a new measure of time was devised in the modern automobile factory. Piecework, or rather production incentives, an intrinsic part of scientific organization at work, became the established form of payment for most autoworkers between the wars. Workers were forced to be conscious of the clock from the time they punched in until the siren ended the working day. Simone Weil, the intellectual who worked in several of the large metalworking concerns around Paris, described factory life in the 1930s:
Piecework, the purely bureaucratic relation between the various parts of the firm, and the separated production processes are all inhuman. Your attention has no worthy goal and is forced to concentrate on a small-minded task, which is always the same with some variations: do fifty pieces in five minutes instead of six, or something similar.
There are two factors in this slavery: speed and orders. To succeed, you must repeat the same movement at a pace that, being quicker than thinking, stops not only reflection but even dreaming. When you are in front of your machine, you must destroy your soul, your thoughts, your feelings, everything.35
The unskilled and the semiskilled were subordinated to the operations and the pace of their machines. At best, workers could control their working speed, but certain methods of piecework reduced even this limited degree of autonomy. Working too rapidly might eventually result in a lower rate per piece; a slow pace meant a skimpier paycheck. Important decisions were made by managers and technicians, and hierarchy was an intrinsic part of a metallurgical worker's life. In the huge space of the noisy factory, a stringent discipline was needed to force the semiskilled laborers to perform their repetitive and boring jobs. Foremen and controllers, with virtually absolute authority over their subjects, were hired to ensure that workers produced how and what they were ordered. Sometimes a foreman played the sultan and sexually harassed female subordinates.36 Every aspect of wage-earning lives was tightly controlled: at Renault the management, not the unions, issued special identity cards to workers. With other important French firms, Renault participated in the Exhibition on Waste promoted by the Service of Scientific Organization at Work of the Union des industries m"štallurgiques et miniÅ res in November and December 1932.37 The war against gaspillage (waste) was considered by Left and Right alike to be an integral part of scientific management. The goal of the exhibition was to encourage a "spirit of thrift" and economy among French employers and workers in order to reduce waste whenever possible. Renault was determined to "expose the nefarious and sometimes deadly role of waste" through lectures and displays. The exhibition on wasting time displayed a clock that replaced the usual divisions of hours and minutes with calculations that each lost hour cost the factory 175,000 francs. The display on squandering office supplies confirmed that if all the sheets of paper consumed by factories every year were placed end to end, they would reach halfway around the globe. The staples used would have linked Paris to Montargis, some hundred kilometers away. Other stands presented tools and materials broken by carelessness or lack of maintenance and showed parts and materials found in the trash and in the washrooms. The Exhibition on Waste argued that it would be better to "kill squandering" than to rely on protective tariffs to ensure the future of French industry. Renault's efficiency experts wanted to cut costs by simplifying tasks and eliminating superfluous movements. Renault management understood that its drive to save money needed at least some cooperation from the rank and file:
A surveillance that is too apparent becomes aggressive and leads to a struggle between the workers and the controllers. Then there is a constant, silent, and underhanded war in which the personnel, more numerous and knowledgeable about the details of the work, always have an advantage. . . . Time used in this warfare is time paid by the employer and lost to production.
[The problem is] how to encourage the personnel to produce more and better without having to watch them constantly.38
The company's ideal was to encourage self-control: "The controllers in the workshop ought to be replaced as soon as possible by machines of control and verification, permitting the workers to control themselves."39
Yet Renault's efficiency experts were trapped in a logical and practical impasse. For if industrial societies usually exercised surveillance and control of the workers, then they would have no simple task to create conditions under which workers would labor without control and coercion, especially when jobs were becoming increasingly deskilled. Indeed, the demand for the simplification of tasks and for scientific organization of work, including Taylorism itself, arose precisely because workers often resisted work and required the control of supervisors, human or machine. In fact, managements faced the real dilemma of whether to permit the production of inferior and flawed goods or to spend considerable sums to control workers and cut down on defects. Verification of production was costly, and management strove to make certain that the services were as effective as possible. In the early 1930s inspections occurred periodically, but not regularly, to maintain the element of surprise. All controllers were obliged to sign a prepared checklist to verify that they had really inspected what had been assigned. A chief controller spot-checked the inspectors; sanctions were taken when inspectors were negligent.40 Those who checked payrolls and parts were to receive a certain percentage of the money they saved for the company in order to encourage them to find errors and reduce overall expenses. Inspection was not completely effective, however, and in April 1931 Louis Renault complained that "what kills our country is that nobody wants to be sufficiently disciplined to demand from those who execute that they do what they are told quickly and scrupulously. . . . Those who will not act so that parts without defects are made will first be penalized and then dismissed."41 Renault wanted to avoid the predicament of Citro"°n and certain American companies where the cost of quality control exceeded the damages that an increase in defective parts would have caused if inspections were reduced.42 It should be remembered that not only the workers but also the controllers themselves had to be monitored. During the Popular Front, the firm tried to reach a proper balance between the number of productive workers and the number of unproductive personnel who watched those who produced. To avoid continuous surveillance, Louis Renault wanted to "make the worker as responsible as possible for his work so that he is interested in it and loves it."43 As will be seen, this goal was not to be realized.
Management wanted to foster upward mobility. Workers who had demonstrated competence and commitment to the company must be allowed to advance. A Renault executive concluded that "experience has shown that it is indispensable that a good inspector be a good professional who had performed assembly-line jobs before he acquired his position. Besides, this is the method used in American factories."44 In fact, one major reason that Renault engineers and executives admired American industry was its ability to integrate and promote workers who desired to climb the professional ladder. In 1936 Renault officials who were visiting automotive plants throughout the United States commented on the 4 to 1 salary differential between skilled and unskilled workers: "It is this enormous difference between the salary of the laborer and the salary of the highly skilled worker that allows the quality of the labor force that America possesses. [American] workers make a constant effort to educate themselves in their profession and to advance into a higher class."45 The Renault engineers lamented that "this mentality is difficult to implant in France." As evidence, they noted that at the Soci"št"š des aciers fins de l'est (S.A.F.E.), a metallurgical firm controlled by Renault, "we frequently run into difficulties when the laborers protest against the supposedly excessive salaries of an excellent roller (premier lamineur) even though the difference between the pay of the rolling-mill hand and an excellent roller is hardly 1 to 2 compared with 1 to 3 or 1 to 4 in America." Management's desire to reward the upwardly mobile was forced to confront the egalitarianism of many French wage earners.
During the Popular Front, management continued to struggle against this egalitarianism and attempted to create its own company culture. One way of assuring that supervisory personnel would be disciplined was to follow their careers from the beginning. Apprentices who might eventually become foremen or superintendents were supposedly subjected to "total training-professional, technical, and moral."46 Foremen, whose "moral and professional capacities" were absolutely necessary to obtain greater output from workers, must be able "to reach higher ranks through their knowledge, experience and moral values."47 In other firms, technical knowledge and ability were not the only criteria for selecting supervisory personnel. Michelin, which controlled Citro"°n after 1935, chose to train not only technicians for its service des "šconomies but "above all, former law students." In other words, what was really important was that these efficiency experts be committed to the company values of cutting costs and reducing waste.48
The Renault executives admired the Americans not only for their ability to implement policies that promoted social mobility among workers but also for their organizational methods. "Cleanliness," "order," and "discipline" were the terms French visitors frequently employed to describe American factories.49 At Ford in Detroit, "an extreme discipline governs the entire factory. It is absolutely forbidden to smoke." Although Ford workers were paid hourly and not by piecework, each wore a highly visible number and had to produce a minimum output (recorded by counters on the machines) or be discharged.50 Walkways raised above the shop floor facilitated surveillance of the rank and file. Renault officials also praised the organization of the General Motors plant in Antwerp, where the foreman was freed from all tasks other than surveillance of workers. To help the foreman with his job of control, an inspector and his assistants marked each operation on a card that accompanied the automobile on the assembly line. If a customer complained about a defect, the controller could be immediately identified and dismissed.51 Workers who wore distinctive red and blue hats supplied the assembly lines with tools and parts and "helped the foreman maintain order." By bringing the needed parts and equipment directly to the assembly lines, these specific workers reduced the movements of their colleagues and increased the rhythm and steadiness of production. Renault attempted to copy General Motors and to free its supervisory personnel from tasks other than control; in 1938 new machinery and an innovative system of accounting permitted foremen and superintendents to devote their time to "technical surveillance of production."52 Thus Renault often succeeded in implementing the latest techniques to reduce the gap in productivity between French automakers and their American competitors.
Not all industries were as rationalized or as concentrated as that of automobiles. Rationalization in the aviation industry was less advanced, and manufacture of airplanes often required a precision and a perfection that was not compulsory in automotive fabrication. Prior to the First World War, to an even greater degree than in auto production, workers in aviation were largely skilled artisans who labored long hours but lived "at the same rhythm as their employer, eating and drinking when he did."53 The earliest aviation workshops were frequently located near the airfields of the Paris suburbs. When the first large factories were constructed as early as 1911-1912, with management's offices separated from the shop floors, assembly lines were still rare. Between the wars rationalization progressed: in the suburb of Argenteuil, the Lior"š et Olivier company replaced its wooden hangars with massive concrete and glass constructions. Visitors to an aviation plant at Mureaux were impressed by the "order and ease of execution that permitted better and quicker production." Despite increasing rationalization in all sectors, workers in aviation remained more skilled than their counterparts in other metalworking industries.
The construction industry was commonly a refuge for workers in various crafts. Compared to the "militarized territory of the factory," the independent employment of plumbers or roofers, for instance, was remarkable.54 Most construction was decentralized and family-run; whereas in 1931 in metallurgy firms with more than one hundred workers employed 98.3 percent of workers, in construction and public works such firms employed only 23.8 percent of workers. In 1931 construction occupied one million workers, approximately 10 percent of the labor force; about 40 percent of construction workers labored in establishments with fewer than fifty workers. Yet even within the rather traditional structure of the construction industry, the character of work was changing between the wars. Like aviation, chemicals, and automobiles, construction was among the fastest growing industries in France in the first third of the twentieth century.55 The use of machinery like bulldozers, cranes, cement mixers, pumps, and jackhammers eliminated considerable amounts of hard physical labor; spray-painting machines and the beginning of mass production in locks and hardware made other old m"štiers obsolete. Large public-works projects in the Paris region, the extension of the subways and the World's Fair of 1937, employed hundreds and even thousands of workers.
The modern industries examined here changed the face of Paris and particularly of its suburbs. The automobile industry started up in the western part of Paris proper, where its wealthy clientele resided.56 During the war, the industries of automobiles and aviation expanded rapidly and huge factories rose in the banlieue. The Renault establishments in Boulogne-Billancourt, employing over thirty thousand workers, were probably the largest in Europe. The Citro"°n firm was located only a few kilometers from Renault; thus the giants of the French motor-vehicle industry were located inside their largest market. The aviation industry was even more concentrated around Paris than the automotive industry. In 1936, one estimate claimed, 65 percent of the factories manufacturing aircraft bodies and 90 percent of the plants producing airplane engines were in the Paris metropolitan area.57 Both industries were willing to pay the greater costs and higher salaries that the Paris region entailed in order to be situated in perhaps the largest market on the Continent.
The increasing concentration and intensified division of labor found in the advanced industries of the Paris region were paralleled by a growing specialization of urban space. In eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Paris, aristocrats, bourgeois, and workers had often lived in the same neighborhood or even in the same building. Many industries were established in the heart of the city, and there was little need to leave one's quartier to commute from home to work.58 During the nineteenth century, neighborhoods began to take on the character of a specific class, and some workers left the center of the city for outlying arrondissements while bourgeois went to the western parts of Paris. The twentieth-century development of the suburbs reinforced the tendency of the working class to move from the urban center to its periphery. The ratio of workers living in Paris to the total Parisian population in 1931 was lower than in 1848.59 By 1936 the strength and dynamism of the Parisian bourgeoisie had considerably altered the everyday life of workers in the Paris region. The commute from home to work lengthened as both factories and personnel moved into the suburbs of the city. The graceless nature of the banlieue contrasted sharply with the more intimate atmosphere of the traditional working-class quartiers of Paris. In some industries, the specialization of urban space was complemented by a further deepening of the division of labor at the workplace, and many workers were reduced to mere executors of orders from superiors. During the Popular Front workers would respond to the changes not by making a revolution but by continuing struggles against work and by fighting for paid vacations and the weekend, which opened the prospect of escape from jobs and residences alike.
1. Ren"š R"šmond, Histoire de l'anticl"šricalisme en France de 1815 ... nos jours (Paris, 1976), pp. 225-30; Michel Winock, Histoire politique de la revue ®Esprit¯, 1930-1950 (Paris, 1975), p. 37.
2. Ad"šline Daumard, "CaractÅ res de la soci"št"š bourgeoise," in Histoire "šconomique et sociale de la France, ed. Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (Paris, 1976), 3:839.
3. Maurice L"švy-Leboyer, "Le Patronat fran"¡ais a-t-il "št"š malthusien?" Le Mouvement social, no. 88 (July-September 1974): 28; Ingo Kolboom, "Patron et patronat: Histoire sociale du concept de patronat en France au 19e et 20e siÅ cles," Mots, no. 9 (October 1984): 98.
4. J.-J. Carr"š, P. Dubois, and E. Malinvaud, French Economic Growth, trans. John P. Hatfield (Stanford, 1976), p. 150.
5. Tom Kemp, Economic Forces in French History (London, 1971), p. 223. See Patrick O'Brien and Caglar Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914: Two Paths to the Twentieth Century (London, 1978), p. 21: "Our central point is that something called relative backwardness cannot be inferred from characteristic features of French industrialization."
6. Rondo Cameron, "L'"šconomie fran"¡aise: Pass"š, pr"šsent, avenir," Annales Economies, Soci"št"šs, Civilisations, no. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1970): 1418-33.
7. Alfred Sauvy, ed., Histoire "šconomique de la France entre les deux guerres (Paris, 1972), 1:304.
8. Jacques N"šr"š, La TroisiÅ me R"špublique, 1914-1940 (Paris, 1967), p. 84; Andr"š Armengaud, "La population," in Histoire "šconomique de la France entre les deux guerres, ed. Alfred Sauvy (Paris, 1972), 3:31.
9. Sauvy, ed., Histoire "šconomique, 1:265.
10. Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France (New York, 1981), pp. 31-51; Gerd Hardach, "La mobilisation industrielle en 1914-1918: Production, planification et id"šologie," in 1914- 1918: L'autre front, ed. P. Fridenson (Paris, 1977), p. 88.
11. Fran"¡ois Caron and Jean Bouvier, "Guerre, crise, guerre," in Histoire "šconomique et sociale de la France, ed. Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (Paris, 1976), 4:648.
12. Fran"¡ois Caron, Histoire "šconomique de la France, XIXe-XXe siÅ cles (Paris, 1981), p. 158.
13. Albert Carreras, "La industria: Atraso y modernizaci¢n," in La econom¡a espa¤ola en el siglo XX, ed. Jordi Nadal, Albert Carreras, and Carles Sudri... (Barcelona, 1987), p. 293.
14. Jean-Charles Asselain, Histoire "šconomique de la France (Paris, 1984), 2:78.
15. C. J. Gignoux, L'"šconomie fran"¡aise entre les deux guerres, 1919-1939 (Paris, 1942), p. 104.
16. Charles P. Kindleberger, Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), p. 122; Sauvy, ed., Histoire "šconomique, 1:232; Fran"¡ois Caron and Jean Bouvier, "Structure des firmes-emprise de l'"štat," in Histoire "šconomique et sociale de la France, ed. Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse (Paris, 1976), 4:771; G"šrard Noiriel, Les ouvriers dans la soci"št"š fran"¡aise (Paris, 1986), p. 123; Pierre, George, "Etude statistique des dimensions des "štablissements industrielles," in Mat"šriaux pour une g"šographie volontaire de l'industrie fran"¡aise, Gabriel Dessus, Pierre George, and Jacques Weulersse (Paris, 1949), p. 123; Kemp, Economic Forces, p. 54; L"švy-Leboyer, "Le patronat," pp. 46-48; Asselain, Histoire "šconomique, 2:73; Ingo Kolboom, Frankreichs Unternehmer in der Periode der Volksfront, 1936-1938 (Rheinfelden, 1983).
17. M. Schwartz, "L'industrie automobile," Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128798; Patrick Fridenson, Histoire des usines Renault (Paris, 1972), pp. 10-11; Noiriel, Ouvriers, p. 123.
18. M. R. Musnier, "Le problÅ me des transports," Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128798.
19. Edmond Petit, La vie quotidienne dans l'aviation en France au d"šbut du XXe siÅ cle (1900-1935) (Paris, 1977), p. 58.
20. M. Dautry, "Rapport sur l'a"šronautique marchande fran"¡aise," Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128798.
21. A. Matagrin, L'industrie des produits chimiques et ses travailleurs (Paris, 1925), p. 67. 22. M. Fleurent, "Les industries chimiques," Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128796.
23. Claude Fohlen, "France 1920-1970," in Fontana Economic History of Europe, ed. Carlo Cipolla (Glasgow, 1976), 1:85.
24. Ernest Mercier Collection, Hoover Archives; Charles Mal"šgarie, L'"šlectricit"š ... Paris (Paris, 1947), p. 67; Noiriel, Ouvriers, p. 123.
25. Caron and Bouvier, "Guerre, crise, guerre," 4:650.
26. "La question des industries," Conseil sup"šrieur de d"šfense nationale, 19 September 1925, AN, F22316; Marcel Ulrich, rapport, Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128796; L'Europe nouvelle, 15 February 1936.
27. Judith A. Merkle, Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement (Berkeley, 1980), chap. 5.
28. Henry Le Chatelier, preface to F. W. Taylor, La direction des ateliers (Paris, 1913); F. W. Taylor, Etudes sur l'organisation du travail dans les usines (Angers, 1907); F. W. Taylor, Principes d'organisation scientifique des usines (Paris, 1912).
29. [Commander] Hourst, Le problÅ me de la main d'ouvre: La taylorisation et son application aux conditions industrielles de l'aprÅ s-guerre (Paris, 1916), pp. 46-47.
30. Maurice Daumas, "Les techniques industrielles," in Histoire "šconomique de la France entre les deux guerres, ed. Alfred Sauvy (Paris, 1972), 3:158-59.
31. Michel Collinet, L'ouvrier fran"¡ais: Essai sur la condition ouvriÅ re (1900-1950) (Paris, 1951), p. 69. 32. Alain Touraine, L'"švolution du travail ouvrier aux usines Renault (Paris, 1955), pp. 28, 84. 33. Georges Lefranc, Histoire du travail et des travailleurs (Paris, 1975), p. 335.
34. Touraine, Evolution du travail, p. 42.
35. Simone Weil, La condition ouvriÅ re (Paris, 1951), pp. 20, 28.
36. Annie Fourcaut, Femmes ... l'usine en France dans l'entre-deux-guerres (Paris, 1982), p. 99.
37. Campagne contre le gaspillage, March 1932, AN, 91AQ3; Jules Moch, Socialisme et rationalisation (Brussels, 1927), pp. 38- 49.
38. Du chapitre des "šconomies, AN, 91AQ3.
39. Note de service no. 816, 22 October 1931, AN, 91AQ22.
40. R"šsum"š de notes de M. Renault, Jan.-Feb. 1931, AN, 91AQ22.
41. Note 391, 14 April 1931, AN, 91AQ22.
42. Note de service, no. 2093, 29 April 1932, AN, 91AQ22.
43. Note concernant le service d'"šconomies, 1937-1938, AN, 91AQ3; Conf"šrence de M. Renault du 10 novembre 1937, AN, 91AQ3.
44. Note 975, 1 July 1931, AN, 91AQ22.
45. Rapport g"šn"šral du voyage de M. Reynaud en Am"šrique, 11 November-16 December 1936, AN, 91AQ69.
46. L'apprentissage aux usines Renault, 2 March 1937, AN, 91AQ3.
47. Recherche des moyens propres ... am"šliorer les prix de revient, 10 May 1937, AN, 91AQ3. 48. R"šsum"š d'un entretien avec un agent de service des "šconomies de l'usine Citro"°n, AN, 91AQ3. 49. Visite ... la maison Ford (1929), AN, 91AQ67.
50. La fabrication automobile en Am"šrique (n.d.), AN, 91AQ77; R"šsum"š-voyage aux Etats-Unis de M. Guillemon (1929), AN, 91AQ67.
51. Visite de la G.M., AN, 91AQ24.
52. Rapport sur la m"šcanisation comptable dans les d"špartements, 8 July 1938, AN, 91AQ3.
53. The following paragraph is derived from Petit, La vie quotidienne dans l'aviation.
54. Arnold Br"šmond, Une explication du monde ouvrier: EnquË†te d'un "študiant-ouvrier dans la banlieue parisienne (Saint-Etienne [Loire], 1927), p. 47; Sauvy, ed., Histoire "šconomique, 1:232; F"šlix Battestini, L'industrie fran"¡aise du gros mat"šriel m"šcanique et "šlectrique (Paris, 1937); M. Herv"š Detton, "Les industries des mat"šriaux de construction, du bÆ’timent et des travaux publics," 1 May 1931, Conseil national "šconomique, AN, F128797.
55. Sauvy, ed., Histoire "šconomique, 1:268; Adolphe Hod"še, Les travailleurs devant la rationalisation (Paris, 1934), p. 17.
56. Jean Basti"š, La croissance de la banlieue parisienne (Paris, 1964), p. 141; Schwartz, "L'industrie automobile,"AN, F128798.
57. Pierre Cot, Triumph of Treason (Chicago, 1944), p. 322.
58. Philippe AriÅ s, Histoire des populations fran"¡aises (Paris, 1971), p. 130.
59. Ibid., p. 145.