Kautsky on “The New Tactics”

I. The New Tactic

Comrade Kautsky responded to my article “Mass Action and Revolution” in Die Neue Zeit with an article entitled “The New Tactics”, which misrepresents our real views in almost every point. As there was not enough time to reply to it in Die Neue Zeit even before the party congress, we would like to briefly correct the most important misinterpretations here.

The headline alone characterizes Kautsky's version of the issue. He believes that we want to impose a new tactic on the party in place of the one hitherto followed. He had already written this last year:

But does the peculiarity of the situation imply the need for a special, a new tactic? Some of our friends claim so. They want to revise our tactics. We will only be able to talk about this once they have come up with certain precautions. That hasn't happened yet.

I responded to this in my article (p. 592):

To this we must simply reply that we do not need to make any proposals. The tactic that we consider correct is already the party's tactic; without the need for proposals, it has become established in practice in the rally demonstrations. Theoretically, the party has already recognized it in the Jena resolution, which speaks of the mass strike as a means of conquering new political rights [...] When we sometimes talk about new tactics, it is not in the sense of proposing new principles or measures [...] but to bring flare theoretical insight into what is actually happening. The tactics of the proletariat are already changing, or better still, expanding, by absorbing new, more powerful means of struggle; our task as a party is to create a clear consciousness of this fact among the masses, of its causes as well as its broadest consequences. We must spread information about the fact that the situation arising from the increase in mass struggles is not an accidental one of which nothing can be said, but the permanent and normal situation of the latest period of capitalism. We must point out that the actions so far are only the beginning of a period of revolutionary class struggle, in which the proletariat, instead of waiting passively until catastrophes from outside shake the world, itself expands its power and its freedom in constant attack and advance, in heavy self-sacrificial labor. This is the “new tactic”, which could be known with full rights as the natural continuation of the old tactic in its positive aspect.

One might think that this is enough to clarify the situation. The fact is before us that since 1905 the German party has theoretically, and since 1908 practically, supplemented and broadened its old tactics by new methods of struggle, and at the same time we see mass actions rising more and more violently in all countries. What do these new phenomena mean? One can be of the opinion, like Kautsky, that they are a passing or secondary phenomenon and that the center of gravity of our struggle remains in the older methods; one can also be of the opinion, like us, that the center of gravity of our struggle is being shifted more and more to the new methods, without the old ones becoming superfluous. In both cases one stands on the ground of party tactics. Of course there are differences between Kautsky and us on practice and tactics; and only a theoretical discussion can reveal which of the two views on the significance of mass action is more correct. However, this discussion is put on a completely wrong track when one of the contending tendencies tries to prove its right by saying: my opponent stands outside the ground of party tactics, he wants a new tactic! But what does Kautsky have to say in reply to these facts?

So he (K.) explains:

Fine new tactics have become necessary, we must discuss them, come to an agreement on them, and lo and behold, these tactics have been determined almost unanimously by a party meeting for six years and have been followed by the party for just as long, without any objections from any side. Almost all the revisionists voted for it, Bernstein, David, Pens, Südekum. Have they all already “theoretically” recognized Pannekoek's tactics, and in such an unambiguous way that he can spare himself any further explanation of these tactics?

Kautsky could just as well ask whether all the workers who took part in the street demonstrations of 1910 recognized “my” tactics. Conversely, I recognized their tactics, not their theoretical opinions, but the actuality of their actions, and drew my conclusions from them. Just as they testified by their actions, the party delegates in Jena in 1905, out of experience and the situation of the moment, had to recognize the necessity of a new method of struggle by the act of their vote. Some of them may have changed their minds afterwards, Kautsky may have tried to prove two years ago that such a mass strike was unthinkable in Germany, but we have only to deal with the fact that the whole Party recognized then and afterwards the necessity of new methods of struggle. Their significance and scope will have to be determined by theoretical discussion.

Kautsky, however, has sought to propagate a tactic which has hitherto been alien to the party, a tactic which must of course contradict all social-democratic views; filled with this false idea, he seeks to read into our statements the view that organizations are superfluous, that parliamentarism is no longer necessary, and that we must continue, week after week, to organize nothing but mass actions. No wonder he constantly complains about the lack of clarity and comprehensiveness of his explanations, because what he is looking for is of course not there. No doubt it is a very simple and convenient method to dispose of the struggle in this way. But it certainly does not contribute to the purpose of clarifying the views if he merely beats to death a self-imposed argument.

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II. The Organization

In almost all our writings we have emphasized again and again that organization, next to socialist insight, is the most important means of power of the proletariat, the only means that puts the workers in a position to fight successfully against capital and capitalism. Kautsky, however, has discovered that this high estimation of the organization has a catch with me:

According to Pannekoek, one is wrong to regard the real, concrete organizations of the proletariat as those which, apart from the dissemination of knowledge, our most important task is to maintain, develop and perfect. By no means! Pannekoek shows little interest in the real organizations. He familiarizes himself with the idea that they will perish in the coming struggles. (p. 688)

It would seem, then, that anyone who wishes to be considered a true Social-Democrat and friend of organization should not entertain such a sinful idea that an organization could perish under the blows of the enemy. But even worse is the inner absurdity of what I am advocating; for it follows from my statement that, wonderfully enough, it is precisely the destruction of organizations that “raises the inner strength of the organization”. At the end of the revolutionary process, when all the organizations of the proletariat have been completely dissolved, “the whole working people stands as a highly organized mass”, etc.

What did I actually say? In a general sketch of the development of the mutual relations of power between the two classes in the process of the revolution, I first point out how the firm organization, cohesion and solidarity of the proletarian masses in the mass actions will shake the most important means of power of the enemy, the most important state organization with its authority, and finally destroy it. Of course, I have to ask myself whether the state power could, on the other hand, break the power of the proletarian organization that threatens it, by robbing it of its leaders and confiscating its assets. I wrote:

In many cases it is said that in these dangerous struggles the organization of the proletariat, the most important means of struggle, could be destroyed..... For the state still possesses the power to simply dissolve the workers' organizations that rise up against it, to suppress their activities, to confiscate their assets, to imprison; the state will not be deterred from doing so by legal or moral conditions. But such acts of violence will not help it: it can only smash the outer form, but not the inner being. The organization of the proletariat, which we describe as the most important means of resistance, is not to be confused with the form of today's organizations and associations, in which it expresses itself under the conditions of a still existing bourgeois economy. The essence of this organization is something different, it is the complete transformation of the character of the proletariat... If the ruling class, by the unscrupulous use of its neo-governmental and police power, is made to destroy the organizations, the workers will never again become the old individualistic people who are moved only by their own whim, their own interest. In them the same spirit, the same discipline, the same cohesion, the same solidarity, the same habit of organized living will remain alive in them as before, and this spirit will create new forms of activity. Such an act of violence may hit them, but the essential power of the proletariat will not be affected by it, any more than socialism could be affected by the socialists, which prevented the regular form of organizing and agitation. (p. 548-49)

The last sentence could have made it clear to Kausky how badly he was on the wrong track with his interpretation. If a comrade had declared before or at the beginning under the Socialist Law that the party could not be destroyed, since the essence of socialism lived as something spiritual in the minds of the workers and would remain so in spite of all acts of violence, Kautsky could have condemned him with the same right for expressing little interest in the "real party" and for thanking him that it would perish; and he would certainly have declared: one is very wrong-headed if one believes that that comrade's love for the party applies to the party organization created in Gotha in 1875. And if that comrade could have foreseen and written how much socialist insight and unity would wane under the pressure of the Socialist Law, Kautsky would have refuted him in a similar way: for him, the destruction of the party organization seems to be the way to make the party strong and powerful!

What for me is proof that the body of organization grows again and again, despite all the blows of the opponents, because the organizational spirit lives in the workers and cannot be killed, is transformed by Kautsky into the exact opposite, into the opinion that the body is not necessary and that the spirit is sufficient. We have also pointed out in the columns quoted above that the spirit of organization, which cannot be eradicated in the workers by any means of violence, will always create new forms of activity. There is probably no other conceivable way of activating the spirit of organization than by uniting and forming organizations of such a form as is appropriate to the particular circumstances.

The necessity for workers to develop their organizations as well as possible and expedient under all circumstances, including today, is self-evident. There is no difference of opinion between us about the necessity of strong centralized trade unions, with paid officials and strong coffers. For Kautsky, however, proletarian organization consists essentially in the external form of these associations; for him there is no profound difference in essence between a workers' organization and an employers' association. For us they are completely different; for for the worker the organization is not simply an association of which he is a member, but a complete transformation of his nature; instead of the individualistic, self-centred thinking of the bourgeois classes, solidarity with his comrades, discipline towards the association, the willingness to make sacrifices for the whole, the constant subordination of his person urb his personal interest to the community, completely determine his spirit. Therein lies the great inner strength of the organization; that the workers have become completely new people. It is not the outer bond of statute with rights and duties that holds the workers together, but only the form in which the inner force is expressed that binds them together. For Kautsky, as soon as the outer bond of association and statute disappears, the members fall apart as loose atoms; for us, the inner force that binds each worker together with his comrades, the organizational spirit, immediately creates a new form.

It is therefore no wonder that Kautsky regards the disappearance of the external form as the end of the organization and its power. But he has one consolation: the ruling class will keep its hands off it, and will be careful to not act against the workers' organizations. This is not entirely groundless inasmuch as the ruling class will certainly, and rightly, think long and hard before deciding to take action. For the reason that it will have to say to itself that it is after all a waste of time, which will also bring other major disadvantages for itself. To the extent that Kautsty's optimism is justified, the reason lies in the same force I have emphasized, the organizational spirit, which cannot be killed. But can we really rest assured that the ruling classes will never try or be able to harm the workers' organizations? Kautsky believes that only caution is necessary. Certainly caution is a good thing; but if this is to be the logic: if we do not attack the bourgeoisie, it will do us no harm — it must be noted that it is not possible for the proletariat to " dampen" its struggle in such a way that it is no longer dangerous to the ruling class; and the real danger alone determines its action against the workers. If the workers had to allow themselves to be dominated in their struggle by fear: if the rulers were to take harsh action against our organizations, they would be lost — then their power would be paralyzed. On the other hand, the consciousness that their organizational power lies in themselves and that therefore the essence of the organization cannot be touched by hostile force will promote their struggle to the highest level of energy.

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III. The Conquest of Power

In my article I examined the power factors of a ruling class on which its rule is based, and found them firstly in its economically important leading role, secondly in its intellectual superiority and dominion over the masses, thirdly in the firm organization at its disposal in the form of state power; this state power is powerful through the unified will that rules the whole, through authority, and through its material means of power, such as the police and the army. Then I add (p. 543):

A rising class can conquer and retain state power because of its economic importance and power; thus the bourgeoisie as the head of capitalist production and possessor of money. But the more its economic function becomes superfluous and it sinks to the level of a parasitic class, the more this factor of its power disappears. Then its prestige and intellectual superiority are also lost, and finally the only basis of its rule that remains is its disposal of state power with all its means of power. If the proletariat wants to conquer power, it must defeat the state power, the fortress in which the propertied class has entrenched itself. The struggle of the proletariat is not simply a struggle against the bourgeoisie for state power as an object, but a struggle against state power. The problem of the social revolution is, in brief summary: to increase the power of the proletariat to such an extent that it is superior to the power of the state, and the content of this revolution is the destruction and dissolution of the means of power of the state by the means of power of the proletariat.

If this already looks alarming to Comrade Kautsky, it will be even worse later on. In the account of the process of the revolution, where I explain how mass action has a destructive and disintegrating effect on the power and internal stability of the state organization, I say (p. 548):

Again and again, therefore, the struggle starts anew, organizational power confronts organizational power, again and again the state power must expose itself to the disintegrating, disintegrating effect of mass action. The struggle only ends when the final result is the complete destruction of the state organization.

Kautsky is quite appalled at how a social democrat can go around with such evil intentions of wanting to destroy the state. For, he exclaims, “hitherto the opposition between Social-Democrats and anarchists has consisted in the fact that the former wanted to conquer state power, the latter to destroy it” (p. 724) What then is it about the state that so provokes my enmity that I want to destroy it? The centralization, for instance? Or the civil servants? And then Kautsky gives me a long sermon that centralization is necessary, that civil servants are necessary, that a ministry of justice, a ministry of finance, even a ministry of war is necessary — then he himself becomes perplexed and adds that he is only talking about shaping the present state. Yes, but we are talking about the conquest of power; what is the organization of the present state to us? But at the end he is once again jealous and reproaches me (p. 732):

“By what means does Pannekoek intend to regulate these conditions — social-politics, expropriation of the mines, etc. — if not by a proletarian state power? And where is this to come from if all state power is destroyed by the action of the masses?”

What did Engels say in 1891 in his preface to The Civil War in France?

“From this then follows a superstitious veneration of the state and of everything connected with the state, which arises all the more easily because one has been accustomed from childhood to imagine that the affairs and interests common to the whole of society cannot be managed otherwise than as they have hitherto been managed, namely, by the state and its well-appointed authorities.... In reality, however, the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another” (p. 13).

Let us imagine, my dear friend Kautsky, that, through some circumstance, the whole power of the state would have disappeared with a stroke of magic. The subjects have completely run out of Prussian reasoning, the policemen have become useful citizens without any authority, there is no longer any government in the offices and government buildings, no one listens to the district councillors any more, the ministries are deserted and the Reich Chancellor studies his philosophy undisturbed at Hohenfinow. But even though the power that stood in the way of the proletariat's rule over society has now been removed, it is still completely unable to build its world of socialist freedom. Paralyzed, nothing can come of socialism, because there is no longer any state power to carry it out! Don't you feel and doesn't everyone feel the absurdity of this whole idea? It is clear that it is easy for a proletariat, which has been able to build up such exemplary organizations despite all inhibiting resistance to the worst violence, to create a ready-made apparatus for the management and administration of public affairs within twice twenty-four hours.

But will this be necessary?

Let us leave the evil semi-anarchist plans for the time being, and as good social democrats, like Kautsky, let us only set ourselves the goal of conquering state power and putting it at our service. How do we do that? We win the majority of the people and thus the majority in parliament. But to do this we need universal and equal suffrage, so we have to win that first. Because the ruling class will not give it to us out of idealism, democracy or justice. How do we win such new rights? Through mass action; the Jena resolution already held out the prospect of mass strikes. But will the ruling class then say: You workers have done such a great mass strike that we will grant you equal voting rights out of respect for this achievement? No, the ruling class must be forced to give in to the power of action, which paralyses and undermines its state organization, otherwise its confidence in all hardships, to such an extent that it seems the most sensible thing to do in order to prevent worse things from happening. But that is why it will first use all its means of power to break the action of the proletariat and prevent this outcome. If it succeeds in this, the action has failed. Therefore, no victory will be possible for the proletariat unless these means of power are paralyzed and rendered powerless to a great extent by proletarian action. As long as the ruling class feels itself in possession of the means of power, it will not feel defenseless and lead them into battle against the action of the workers. Complete victory is therefore only possible by destroying all the state's means of power. This also includes the state organization; because it is a weapon in the hands of the enemy despite all its functions of a general nature, the proletariat must break its power in the struggle.

The destruction of the state's means of power is therefore not a presupposed goal, but an inevitable result of the struggle. Thus all talk that I want to destroy the power of the state, and therefore want something different from other social democrats, collapses. It is not a question of what I want, but of what will be. While the organization of state power is disintegrating and its power is waning, at the same time the new organization of society, the self-created democratic organization of struggle of the proletariat, is already rising as an ever greater social power and assuming the functions necessary for the general regulation of production.

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IV. Parliamentarism and Mass Action

For some years now we have been accused of disrespecting parliamentarianism whenever we criticize parliamentary activity or point out the limits of parliamentary struggle. This was also the case with Kautsky. We had talked about the growing impotence of parliaments to confront the dangers arising from imperialism, the danger of war and the lethargy, and about the impossibility of social democracy ever gaining a majority in them under the current electoral systems. Kautsky confirms this impotence in lengthy explanations, and then adds (p. 728):

But does this mean that the proletarians should turn away from the parliaments with either disdain or contempt in order to seek their goal in mass actions?

No one in the party thinks of this. If he had read my article a little more carefully, he would have found the following remarks at the beginning of the chapter on the conquest of political power (p. 545):

If parliamentarism and democracy were to prevail, if parliament ruled over the entire power of the state and a majority of the people ruled over parliament, then the political parliamentary struggle, that is, the gradual winning of a majority of the people by means of parliamentary elections, enlightenment and electoral struggle, would form the straight path to the conquest of state power. But these conditions are lacking. [...] They must first be established through constitutional struggles, above all through the conquest of the democratic right to vote. Where large masses have already been won, but the rights are lacking, as here in Germany, the focus of the struggle for power lies not in the struggle by means of the existing rights, but in the struggle for political rights.

These conditions are not here by chance; the absence of a formative basis for popular rule in a country with a highly developed labor movement is the necessary form of capital rule. It expresses the fact that the real power lies in the hands of the propertied class. As long as this power remains unbroken, the bourgeoisie cannot itself provide us with the formal means to maneuver it out peacefully. It must be defeated, its power must be broken. The constitution defines the relationship of power between the classes; but this power must prove itself in battle. A change in the delimitation of the constitutional rights of the classes is only possible if the means of power of the contending classes confront each other and measure themselves against each other. What on the formal side is a struggle for the most important political rights is in reality, at its deepest level, a clash between the whole of the entire guard of the two classes, a struggle to weaken and ultimately destroy their strongest members, who seek to destroy each other.

Here, then, the goal of mass action is explicitly stated: the conquest of democratic voting rights. What sense would that make if these rights were not exercised through elections and parliamentary activity? We are strange despisers of parliamentarism, who want to create a broader basis for parliamentarism!

For us, it is not a question of either parliamentarism or mass action, which is better? For us they are both a necessary mode of activity of the proletariat, each with its own special function. Kautsky is imposing the opinion on us that because the parliaments are powerless, we should give up the fruitless fuss and merely organize mass actions. On the other hand, he sees a way out; the contradiction between the growing power of the proletariat and the powerlessness of its parliamentary representation need not persist:

The power of the proletariat in parliament and outside parliament are in the closest interaction with each other; they can at most advance temporarily, but not permanently in the opposite direction. The one side strengthens the other (page 729).

But why this must be so, what mysterious pre-stabilized harmony ensures that the power of the proletariat and its parliamentary influence must always come into agreement with each other — Kautsky is completely silent about this. Of course, because then all his mirror fencing against me would have continued. The force that brings them into agreement with each other is not a supernatural, pre-destined harmony, but a very earthly, material force, the force of mass action. The parliamentary factions need not remain powerless; but democratic suffrage, which alone can abolish the impotence of our parliamentary factions, must and can only be conquered by pressure from outside, by mass action.

This is the real connection between parliamentarism and mass action. It does not consist in merely coming together to strengthen each other, but in the fact that mass political action must always create the ground for a broader development of parliamentarism. That is why they are limited to those situations in which the workers become so acutely aware of the inadequacies of the electoral system that they are prepared to make the greatest sacrifices. For it is only through heavy, sacrificial mass struggles that we can win the rights that are the key to political rule.

This applies to the mass actions to conquer the right to vote. But the dangers and oppressions that imperialism brings us must also lead to mass action. Kautsky denies this: against general capitalist effects, against which parliaments are powerless, even mass actions can do nothing, since they can only extort decisions from parliaments. But precisely because they have an effect on parliament and government, he is wrong. Inflation due to global economic causes is not caused by parliamentary resolutions; nevertheless, governments, authorities or parliaments could do a great deal to alleviate the hardship. But they will only do so if the masses, driven to despair, force them to do so through strong action; a few rallies are not enough. Of course, this applies even more to Germany, where customs duties, border closures and entry tickets are making the hardship even worse. Here it would be a real expense for the party to channel the resentment of the masses into massive mass actions and thereby achieve the greatest possible beneficial effect for the people.

But even more than inflation, the threat of war must lead to mass action. –

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V. The Fight Against War

For some years now, the danger of war has been a constant source of anxiety for the masses; we must always be prepared for the fact that imperialist antagonisms threaten to ignite a world fire. For the international proletariat there is scarcely a more important political question in this respect than the question of how to prevent war. It is clear that all proposals to demand an international limitation of armaments are pointless here. Not only because in those countries which are striving for capitalism and want to acquire a share of the world, the whole bourgeois world stands behind imperialism and its armaments, as we also see in Germany. But also because cause and effect are confused; the danger of war does not arise from the armaments — as Kautsky tries to prove once again in the last Neue Zeit according to the old pattern — but the armaments arise from the firm will of each party to assert its demands with all its might or to defend its vested interests.

This powerless demand does not in the least diminish the danger of war. The proletariat would be faced with the question of what to do in the event of a war threatening at close quarters. The party has the greatest interest in becoming as clear as possible about this question. But it is not a question of passing party resolutions; it is not these that rule the course of the world at such critical times, but the deepest passions that dominate the masses and then assert themselves with irresistible force. If the party repeatedly affirms its opposition to war, and if individual spokesmen occasionally declare their readiness to defend the fatherland, these may be small sympathies, but they mean nothing more. Kautsky and we agree that the question is: what will the masses do in the event of war? In what direction will their deepest passions then drive them? The answer can therefore only ever be a conclusion, an expectation, a prediction, not a fact of today.

But Kautsky and we seek the answer in precisely the opposite direction. Kautsky is of the opinion that there is a patriotic passion at the bottom of the proletarian's heart which drives him to rush enthusiastically to the frontiers if only his own government operates so skillfully that the other appears to be the aggressor. Kautsky himself declared at the Essen Party Congress that it can and will ensure this, when he polemicized against Bebel's distinction between offensive and defensive war. Then the social-democratic workers forget their socialism and everything they have learned in party propaganda about the capitalist causes of wars; then they fraternize with the bourgeoisie and become a crowd that angrily attacks anyone who wants to do something against the war.

Once it has come to the point that the population sees the cause of the war not in its own government, but in the viciousness of the enemy. [...] The whole population unanimously felt the urgent need to secure the border from the vicious enemy, to protect it from invasion. First of all, everyone becomes patriots, even those who are internationally minded, and if some would have the superhuman courage to oppose and prevent the militia from rushing to the border and providing them with the most abundant war material, the government would not lift a finger to render them harmless. The angry mob would kill them themselves.

This is the picture of the future that Kautsky sketched in his May article of 1911.

In contrast, I explained in my article that the effect of a modern war, in contrast to the period of predominantly peasant and petty-bourgeois production, is seen above all in an enormous economic crisis that paralyzes the entire highly developed social organization and destroys the sources of life in the widest circles of the masses.

The damage of such a war is not limited to the areas where the battles are fought, but extends to the whole country. Even if the enemy remains outside, the catastrophe in one's own backyard is no less great. For a modern capitalist country, it is not the invasion of the enemy but the war itself that is the great calamity, and it is primarily the proletarian masses, who suffer most from the crisis, that are whipped up into counter-action. The aim of this action, which rouses the masses to the highest passion, is not to keep the field away, as in the old peasant days, but to prevent the war. (p. 612.)

Because their deepest vital interests compel them to this struggle, the masses, when threatened by such a fearful catastrophe, will necessarily resort to defense and attempt to prevent the war. It is true that powerful traditions, above all the feeling that they can do nothing against the omnipotence of the military state, will have to be overcome, but the awareness of their own power will also grow out of the distress of their eyes. Therefore it seems to me absolutely inevitable that the proletariat will make an attempt to prevent the war.

A working class that has undergone forty years of intensive fundamental socialist enlightenment will no longer allow itself to be dragged onto the battlefields with a feeling of complete powerlessness. The German proletariat, which leads the world in organizational power, can neither stand idly by in the face of the machinations of international big business nor rely on the alleged peace tendencies of the bourgeois world. It will have no choice but to intervene as soon as the danger of war arises and to place its power against the means of government power.

The forms these actions will take depend essentially on the circumstances, the magnitude of the danger and the actions of the enemy, the ruling class. In its simplest form, it simply follows from the fact that capital can be deterred from war above all by consideration for the proletariat. If the proletariat is powerless, if it is pitiful, if it does not stir, the bourgeoisie does not consider this danger great and will more easily dare to go to war. The protests of the proletariat therefore have the character of a warning in their first form, so that the ruling class becomes aware of the danger and is reminded to be cautious. International demonstrations must be organized against the capitalist circles interested in the war in order to exert pressure on the governments and to contain them. But the more imminent the danger of war becomes, the more vigorously the demonstrations will have to be shaken up, the more energetic and fierce they will be, especially if the opposing side tries to suppress them by force. Because this a question of life or death of the proletariat, it will ultimately have to resort to the strongest means, such as mass strikes. Thus the struggle between the bourgeoisie's will to war and the proletariat's will to fight develops into a piece of violent class struggle, to which everything that has been said before about the conditions and effects of mass actions to conquer a democratic right to vote applies. (p. 615.)

So this is a different picture of the future, completely opposite to Kautsky's. Who is right?
It is clear that no experience of the present can give a decision. If Kautsky points out to me that the masses will not act in this way, since there are not even many comrades in Social Democracy who share my point of view, as statements by Bebel, Guesde and himself from 1907 show, we can say the same to him about his picture of the future, which is at odds with the content and spirit of our whole agitation. But we know that there is a great deal of tradition in ordinary party views. Otherwise, this tradition dies away only gradually and slowly; but in times of tremendous tension and crisis, when the spirit of the people is highly stimulated and shaken up, when their deepest interests in life come into question, then the narrow class interest breaks through all traditional barriers.

Therein lies the power and significance of Marxism, that it allows us to base our action on an understanding of the people's interests, so that we need not simply fantasize or rely on their current ideologies. Kautsky also feels this; although his view is basically based on the belief in the power of the inherited bourgeois nationalist ideology, he nevertheless tries to justify it in a Marxist way, through material interests. He therefore pointed out the dangers of invasion. In contrast, we emphasized that the invasion of the enemy under the old, local peasant and petty-bourgeois economy was in fact the main evil of the war, and that this explains the instinctive urge in these classes to rush to the frontiers and repel the enemy — the echo of which can be heard in Kautsky's statement. But this does not apply to the modern proletariat. Whether the battles are fought here or abroad, which depends less on the workers' enthusiasm for war than on the military strength and readiness for war of the two states — the main evil remains almost the same for the proletariat. This main evil takes its course when the working class rushes to the front; it is eliminated when it succeeds in preventing the war.

Kautsky asks the question whether, for example, if the German workers prevent the war, are they are not playing into the hands of the other government, which could then, without meeting resistance, march its troops into Germany. First of all, it should be noted that the proletarian revolt is not a military revolt that is organizing the army — the struggle of the socialist proletariat against the war has nothing in common with the anarchist conscientious objection — but rather a political pressure on the government that is trying to force it to give in, which is thus indirectly directed against the foreign government. And indeed, in such a case the foreign government would have other things on its mind than “exploiting the internal difficulties” of the opponent; it would have its hands full with its own proletarians, on whom the example of the German workers would exert a tremendous influence. Such a class struggle would have such a tremendous revolutionary significance that the disputes between governments would immediately fade into the background. Herein also lies the fact that such a position was not possible as long as among the enemy states there was one without a proletarian class to oppose its government — the former Russia of 1904.

Therefore, if it is true that the deepest real class interest of the proletariat will determine its attitude and behavior in the coming war, it will not act according to Kautsky's but according to our expectations. It will not fall to nationalist but rise to revolutionary passion. Kautsky points to the practice of the English workers in the Boer War, the Russian in 1904, the Italian in 1911. But it is clear that these examples prove nothing for the German proletariat; everywhere the long training in class struggle, the deep socialist class consciousness, was lacking; where the consciousness of having one's own class interests is still lacking, there can be no question of action according to such interests.

Kautsky believes he can counter with the fact that only a minority of voters are in favor of Social Democracy. As if, in order to be able to wage a struggle, one must first be a majority. The fact that only a third of all voters support our party is not decisive; for the political actions that come into question here, a dispersed peasantry terrorized by Junker does not count, but the urban proletarian masses give the final blow. On the other hand, the masses of workers, who are currently being kept away from our movement by heavy pressure, will undoubtedly be attracted by an action that goes against their very own interests. However, we do not underestimate the power of tradition, of bourgeois nationalist ideology. We are certainly not of the opinion that the entire population will rise up unanimously at the first opportunity; only in the course of the action will it become more and more widespread. But with the organized unity of the proletarian masses crowded together in the large cities, with the consciousness of power that grows up in them as a result, with the socialist class consciousness deeply engraved in their minds, we consider it impossible that these masses will not make the most energetic attempts to avert disaster when the danger of war threatens, continuing up to the most vigorous actions — regardless of whether we wish or fear this.

Because Kautsky does not have this confidence in the proletarian masses, he is forced to place his hopes in the alleged tendencies towards rejection in the bourgeois world. We contrast this with the view that the proletariat has only itself to count on against the dangers with which imperialist development threatens it, and that it finds in itself the only power to counter these dangers effectively.