A circular from the headquarters of the Northern District of the KAPD to the subordinate local groups (as a result of a meeting on 19th June 1921 on military issues). This talks about the March Action that took place few months ago, draws lessons from it and recommends new guidelines that KAPD's surviving military units from follow in the future. Taken from the "Hektographierte Lageberichte des Kasseler Korrespondenzbüros Henkel über die deutsche linksradikale Bewegung, Büro Kölpin, No. 241" of the "State Archives of North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland Department"
The last action did not collapse least of all due to a lack of military-technical preparations. We must now draw the lessons. Only the explosions on the morning of March 23 were exemplary, well-prepared, and carried out on time. All other acts testified only to immense confusion. A regulated courier service did not exist; only in Geiseltal was contact continuously maintained. The plan was to extend the fighting into the districts of Leipzig, Chemnitz, and Halle, but this failed for various reasons, namely:
1. Because the leadership of the action was based in Halle, and the Russian officers had no understanding of German conditions.
2. Because the Red troops limited themselves to occupying towns and factories and did not form cohesive units.
3. Because the Combat Organizations of the three mentioned districts went into the countryside instead of staying in the cities.
From these and countless smaller mistakes, we must learn and consider the following points in the future:
The combat leadership must consist only of comrades from the district who are familiar with the area and possess military knowledge.
The available weapons and means of transport must be distributed by the combat leadership beforehand.
The bourgeois militias must be closely monitored in advance. The fighters of a district should gather in smaller suburbs in the event of an action.
Once the fighting breaks out, the insurgents must seek a unified line. Above all, the combat leadership must be located in the uprising area. Only a third of the workers may remain at the site of the uprising; the others must be quickly assembled into cohesive units. The fighting must begin in the countryside and then spread to the surrounding areas. Combat with government troops must not be avoided and should particularly aim for early successes.
The access roads to the uprising area must be blocked, as the movement develops only slowly and is far inferior to the militias in terms of operational speed. In the occupied areas, emergency work must absolutely be carried out.
The combat leadership must know precisely all measures to be taken. It must always be focused on the offensive and avoid entering into negotiations. Delaying the uprising, given the poor quality of the Red troops, always leads to their dissolution.
Unconditional obedience need not be given to a combat leadership that commands across the entire Reich. Each district troop must attempt to occupy the countryside as quickly as possible. The departure of the White troops must be prevented; they are to be attacked and disbanded. The core troops (former KO, etc.) are to be held in reserve until the clash with the Reichswehr. The expected losses will be 3:1 in favor of the Red troops.
Establishing highly specialized Combat Organizations in the deepest peace is pointless; they will mostly be observed by informants. The representatives of the KAPD comrades in the factories must select their people and note the objects or locations suitable for sabotage or occupation. Only the number of people and weapons, as well as the possibilities for shutting down operations, should be reported. The representatives must not contact each other before the action, are responsible for their information, and hold provisional command.
If certain places or factories in the uprising area are unwilling to cooperate, sabotage must come into play to bring the masses onto the streets. Explosives will often be lacking, and we recommend using oxygen tanks for explosions in such cases, as they are readily available everywhere and the matter requires no lengthy preparations. Of decisive importance is the destruction of the power plants’ control centers.
The youth should be enlisted for courier services. Too much revolutionary discipline cannot be demanded at the beginning, as no one wants to wander around as a penniless refugee after a bitter, lost battle. The lives of comrades captured by the Whites must be secured through the mass taking of hostages; the administrative staff of the towns are particularly suitable for this.
These principles were drawn up in haste; more detailed instructions will follow.
With revolutionary greetings,
The Liaison Commission of the Northern District of the KAPD
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