Future of the Kurds

In general, I tend to agree with meerov21. However, let 's be careful with sources. I checked that middle east observer ting. In "about us" it says: "Middle East Observer is managed by a group of Middle East journalists and analysts, from the head office in Istanbul in Turkey.

The aim is to produce neutral and objective news from the Middle East, and at the same time give a basic background to the events."

And I ask: how can you expect "objective news"f rom a news outlet based in Istanbul, Turkey, under its current regime? If there would be anything in it that seriously annoyed Erdiogan, the thing would be attacked or closed down. And it suits Turkey/ Erdogan very much to paint the PYD as just a branch of the Assad state machine and/ or a Russian state-sponsored outfit

Mind you, I am not saying that the article is untrue. I have seen other articles, from other souces, pointing in the same direction. I am saying that this article, in itself, should not be relied upon. It has a whiff of state propaganda about it.

And which Kurds - in Turkey, in Iraq, in Syria, in Iran? See also this aspect of the conflict:
http://www.naturalgasasia.com/turkey-kurds-in-duel-over-energy-17741

Russian help is probably only in northern Aleppo where it is advantageous to Russia and the SAA if the SDF seals the border with Turkey. We might see air strikes coordinate as far east as Manbij and Jarabulus. East of the Euphrates, SDF benefits from U.S. air strikes. Still, its hard to say.

Also, Russia has stressed that it wants peace talks and realizes there are going to be some changes in Syria. Russia's resources for this conflict are limited and there a possibility that Assad and the PYD could work a deal. Russia has also stressed that it wants the YPG at the table, and for them to be across from Assad (not part of the regime's bargaining position).

So far, Turkey has only been willing to cross into Syria with proxies. They've had plenty of opportunity to do that. They haven't done it. It would be very unpopular domestically. Its hard to say how ambitious Erdogan has gotten or how willing he is to use violence to advance his agenda, but so far... he hasn't been willing to use the Turkish army to directly occupy any part of Syria.

There are rebels that support and joined the YPG through the SDF. There are rebel factions that have always opposed the YPG violently. The alliances haven't particularly changed, the the SDF and the Syrian Democratic Assembly have grown and a lot more Arabs are coming over either as tribal units or as part of the HXP or YPG.

There are some that have only opposed them politically through the KNC (KDPS/ENKS) but still worked with the PYD in Rojava and now form a minority political opposition.

There is actually a danger to what are the more social revolutionary aspects of TEV-DEM from the inclusion of more parties to the right of the PYD as well as armed groups. But including those groups they can work with is part of their balancing act of trying to be the multi-ethnic group they ideologically claim to be--and its also a great practical help. But they have to maintain cohesion, otherwise it would be just a big of a mess as the FSA.

They have other problems along those lines, like not being able to even expropriate the abandoned property of emigrants. On the other hand, the acquire vast amounts of formerly Baathist state owned property that gives them a lot more capital to work with than they've ever had. The Tishrin Dam, for example. Though their biggest success, though one a lot of folks probably don't realize the significance of, has been the take over of the public education system.

They do seem to make a real effort to spread their ideology, and spread it beyond Kurds.

The future is unwritten. Before it happened and while it was happening... most everything the PYD, TEV-DEM and the YPG have done even knowledgeable people thought was impossible. Even lots of folks involved with the movement thought that if things were going to kick off, it would be in Turkey.

*

meerov21

http://civiroglu.net/the-constitution-of-the-rojava-cantons/
He continued, “Wealthy investors are welcome to contribute, by putting capital into various citizens' efforts to live off the land”, adding, ”since private enterprise is still part of the economy.”

Better descriptions of the political and economic organization currently in Rojava can be found in Pasewan.

Introduction to the Political and Social Structures of Democratic Autonomy in Rojava, Zanyar Omrani, Pasewan, 12/27/2015.

The Experience of Co-operative Societies in Rojava, TEV-DEM Economic Committee, Pasewan, 2/10/2016

It's not communism, despite their expropriation of some capital from the Syrian state. I'd like to see some documentation on what TEV-DEM is providing freely available and what communes are not co-operatives. The co-operatives described operate with market allocation, profit motive, some private investment (restricted beneath worker investment), difference in the amount of shares, etc... though on paper workers have some democratic control over the cooperatives and reap the largest share of profits. Its difficult to know even which cooperatives are paying the most without knowing the salaries (which aren't listed).

Let me describe what I mean. The pay out of profit on shares is either annually or after completing a big job. Looking at just two small cooperatives, the Fuel stations co-operative (100 members - share SYP 15,000/USD $69/150 KG of bread) and the Real estate construction co-operative (124 members - share SYP 730,000/USD $3,358/7,300 KG of bread). I'd speculate the fuel stations are paying out annually, while the construction co-operative is paying out per job. The buy in on the fuel station co-op is small, I'd speculate that their regular salaries make up most of their compensation with the annual profit being small. The construction workers have a high buy in for share, I'd speculate that their regular salary is small but they are getting large profit shares with regularly completing multiple projects a year.

A loaf of bread (1KG) in Hasakah is 100 SP/$0.52 USD.. Its as little as 50-60SP in Idlib or Damascus and as high as 3500SP Deir e-Zor (which is primarily supplied by air because it is besieged by Daesh). Crudely, 1 KG of bread is about 2,400 calories--and people's diets are typically 2K-3K calories daily.

The details of this probably seem unimportant to "full communists or nothing" but I suffer from a trade union consciousness and want co-operatives to be atleast as good as what workers in a unionized shop could achieve through adversarial activity against the bosses. Otherwise, co-operatives for all their workers self-management would be undercutting the efforts of unionized workers in a market.

Anyway, its not communism. Some kind of market socialism with an emphasis on worker-controlled cooperatives. Is it better or worse than other co-operatives? I can't tell. But we have different questions we can ask now.

Not only crazy that the leftist scene (“Marxists” and “anarchists” mixed) supporting ad nauseam the so-called “Revolution in Rojava” are rather embarrassed to see their darlings PKK/PYD and their armed militias YPG/YPJ directly collaborating with the USA and now Russia, and not talking about the military offensives in the region of Aleppo conducted in close cooperation with the Syrian army (you know, that army led by Bashar al-Assad aka “the butcher of Damascus”!). Yes, it hurts to hear that, so some prefer to close their ears and eyes…

But some other take directly and courageously a stand. It's the case of famous Syrian “anarchist” Mazen Kamalmaz who wrote this:

No to Turkish imperialist intervention
Long live US and Russian intervention, the friends of the nations and liberty

http://anarkismo.net/article/29105#comment16215

No comment for the moment from Anarkismo network who prefer to censor critical stands about Rojava.

May all capitalist States die: may the Turkish State die with its ferocious repression against populations revolted in the southeast of the country and elsewhere, may the Syrian State die and its massacres, may the States of USA, EU, Russia and Iran die, and may also all “progressive” and leftist States die: Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia as well as the “proto”-States like Rojava and Daesh…

*

The future of the Kurds is to be betrayed and slaughtered just like the time before and the time before that. Of course some elements of the Kurdish bourgeoisie will come out of this imperialist swamp with enhanced positions, power and financial gain. But the vast majority, drugged by a national identity which facilitates its coherence as an imperialist force (with its own agenda - these are not just pawns, but active imperialist elements) will pay the price. Not least its cannon-fodder which is being sacrificed for an ultimately reactionary Kurdish dream.

Interesting stuff on the PYD: http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/2/22/democratic-confederalism-or-counter-revolution

The book he wrote together with somebody involved in the Tahrir-ICN blog also seems really important: http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745336220

bakuninja

Interesting stuff on the PYD: http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/2/22/democratic-confederalism-or-counter-revolution

The book he wrote together with somebody involved in the Tahrir-ICN blog also seems really important: http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745336220

He also wrote:

"Apparently Turkey is using heavy artillery against the PYD in Azaz and Afrin. I do not oppose it. The PYD has been invading Arab-majority areas under heavy Russian bombing. It would be disastrous for civilians in Aleppo and Idlib as well as for the Turkish state if the PYD occupied the entire border."

Robin Yassin-Kassab

"Apparently Turkey is using heavy artillery against the PYD in Azaz and Afrin. I do not oppose it. The PYD has been invading Arab-majority areas under heavy Russian bombing. It would be disastrous for civilians in Aleppo and Idlib as well as for the Turkish state if the PYD occupied the entire border."

I don't think that the Turkish state has anything positive to offer.

Devrim

Devrim

I don't think that the Turkish state has anything positive to offer.

Devrim

For once, we are in agreement.

Flint

Devrim

I don't think that the Turkish state has anything positive to offer.

Devrim

For once, we are in agreement.

The Turkish state is obviously a blood soaked terrorist state. It's actions I've recent months in Kurdish cities in the southeast of this country are little short of genocidal. I think you ar wrong. I think that there are no working class or socialist sides in this war. I would still sit down, and gave a friendly drink and conversation on this subject with people who hold your sort of views. I wouldn't with people who think that Turkish intervention is positive in any way.

Devrim

Flint

bakuninja

Interesting stuff on the PYD: http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2016/2/22/democratic-confederalism-or-counter-revolution

The book he wrote together with somebody involved in the Tahrir-ICN blog also seems really important: http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745336220

He also wrote:

"Apparently Turkey is using heavy artillery against the PYD in Azaz and Afrin. I do not oppose it. The PYD has been invading Arab-majority areas under heavy Russian bombing. It would be disastrous for civilians in Aleppo and Idlib as well as for the Turkish state if the PYD occupied the entire border."

Robin Yassin-Kassab

That's stupid, but doesn't make his article less interesting?

bakuninja

That's stupid, but doesn't make his article less interesting?

If someone is going to support army of Turkey shelling Afrin then you might want to take what they have to say about the PYD with a grain of salt. Perhaps look more carefully at their sources and not accept any statement they say as factual without some evidence. Pretty much the only fact linked in the article was the YPG soldiers shooting at that demonstration in Amunde in 2013; something that was well documented in the HRW report "Under Kurdish Rule".

If you follow Yassin-Kassab in regards to the war, he has become either more indifferent or sympathetic to the Salafi jihadists that are intermixed with FSA in Northern Aleppo in contrast to SAA/NDF. His position on "Kurdish Militias" used to be more neutral, but he has become increasingly hostile to the PYD. He seems to have ignored how the PYD has successfully expanded politically to include Arabs and Syriacs through the Syrian Democratic Assembly/Syrian Democratic Forces, and some of that outeach very much involves supporting Arab units and mixed units taking over territory that is ethnically majority Arab. When they were taking it from Daesh, Yassin-Kassab didn't care so much. Now that after years of enduring attacks in Afrin in Sheikh Maqsood by the likes of Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham and their allies of varying degrees of Salafi Jihadism and Sharia... SDF/Jaysh al-Thuwar/YPG finally succeeded in taking the Menagh airbase and some towns to the east.

Yassin-Kassab seems particularly dependent upon the positions of the Syrian National Council and he, like the SNC, holds up the KNC as the Kurdish alternative to the PYD/TEV-DEM. The KNC is dominated by the KDPS/Barzani. The SNC is largely joked about as some suits in hotel rooms in Turkey.

There are better critiques of the PYD than this piece Yassin-Kassab put out. Many of them have been discussed here on Libcom.

If you want to use Yassin-Kassab, then expect people to point out his support for Turkey shelling Afrin.

What parts of his piece did you find interesting?

https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2016/02/28/the-kurdish-pyds-alliance-with-russia-against-free-aleppo-evidence-and-analysis-of-a-disaster/ Some relevant info, I am afraaid.

rooieravotr

https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2016/02/28/the-kurdish-pyds-alliance-with-russia-against-free-aleppo-evidence-and-analysis-of-a-disaster/ Some relevant info, I am afraaid.

FWIW that Karadjis clown has a long history of supporting dubious nationalist movements, for instance he wrote a bunch of articles for the the shitty Australian Leninoid paper Green Left Weekly supporting the KLA back in the late 90s.

Thanks .Yes, I am aware of his politics, Bastardx., although I did not know about his KLA fanhood... He 's some sort of Trotskyist., and he is way too positive about the "Syrian revolution", seeing revolutionary dynamics where others see mostly ( and realistically) jihadist dominance. Yet, he seems rather well-informed, and what he writes about the PYD here seems convincing. At the very least, there is a case to answer.

Turkey, Syria, the USA, the EU, Gulf monarchies, Russia, Iran, and even “proto”-States like Rojava and Daesh… all these States, all States are great buddies with varying degrees of good fortune according to geostrategic circumstances and the defense of their particular national and nationalistic interests; they get along with each other at rank and file’s expense, i.e. us all, the exploited, the proletarians, the real revolutionary.

There’s no need to wonder or to take offense at the fact that the PKK/PYD, the YPG/YPJ today overtly announce their collaboration with the USA, Russia or Syria. Yesterday they already collaborated with the Hezbollah, the Syrian regime of Assad father: Ocalan and all the PKK leadership had their headquarters in Damascus before alliances are reversed around 1998!!! The same way the PKK signed peace agreements with Turkey in 2013 (at the time of the revolt of the Gezi park, as it would have been more necessary to annoy the Turkish repressive forces, thank you PKK “comrades” for your class solidarity!), agreements that held until 2015, not because they would finally have been denounced by the PKK (supposed to be anti-statist) but because these didn’t correspond anymore to the Turkish imperialist necessities…

All this reminds the episode of the Molotov/Ribbentrop agreements in August 1939: the most fascist State of the world and the more overtly anticommunist (the Nazi Germany) signed a peace agreement with the most antifascist country of the world and that had lifted its facade with red color of “communism” (the Stalinist USSR). And guess a little bit who finally broke these “unnatural” agreements? The antifascists? Not at all! It’s the fascists who attacked in June 1941 and who this way finally unburdened the “conscience” of all these poor “communists” tangled up in their ideological contradictions…

AD NAUSEAM!!!

rooieravotr

Thanks .Yes, I am aware of his politics, Bastardx., although I did not know about his KLA fanhood... He 's some sort of Trotskyist., and he is way too positive about the "Syrian revolution", seeing revolutionary dynamics where others see mostly ( and realistically) jihadist dominance. Yet, he seems rather well-informed, and what he writes about the PYD here seems convincing. At the very least, there is a case to answer.

It's bastarx, I assume he's still part of this weird Australian group that used to be called the Democratic Socialist Party. I'm so disinterested in the pathetic maneuvers of the Australian left that I don't know what they're called now. I think they merged with the schismatic Australian Cliffites Socialist Alternative.

Anyway the DSP was until ~1986 the Socialist Workers Party and the franchise of the US SWP (nothing to do with the Cliffite UK SWP) when they split with the parent organisation and Trotskyism to pursue a merger with the Australian CP which didn't come off. So they are now maybe some Stalinist/Trotskyist mixture. They have a long history of courting extremely dubious allies, most notoriously the "left-wing" of the fascist Croatian Ustasa in Australia. See: http://slackbastard.anarchobase.com/?p=69

Apologies for the wrong name, bastarx :) And thanks for the information. I heard bits and pieces of this story, I didn't know Karadjis was part of that group. Did you check the article I linked to itself? What do you think of it? Does it look useful to you, even though his political connections are so dubious?

There is a case to answer Karadjis, but there are several factual inaccuracies with that piece and many interpretations of his which can be challenged. Its a long piece so it'll take time to do so.

Richard 1917

The same way the PKK signed peace agreements with Turkey in 2013 (at the time of the revolt of the Gezi park, as it would have been more necessary to annoy the Turkish repressive forces, thank you PKK “comrades” for your class solidarity!), agreements that held until 2015, not because they would finally have been denounced by the PKK (supposed to be anti-statist) but because these didn’t correspond anymore to the Turkish imperialist necessities

Do you think the PKK should seek a ceasefire with Turkey?

"In the Jazirah region, the YPG’s main Arab ally in the SDF is the al-Sanadid militia, based among the Shammar tribe (which indirectly involves the YPG in inter-tribal rivalries in the region). While the Shammar have mostly been anti-regime, there are some indications that al-Sanadid itself has had regime connections in the past. Whatever the case, it was never an FSA-connected group."

The Quwat al-Sanadid militia based among the Shammar tribe has its origins in the FSA brigade Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ)/Ahrar al-Jazeera. LAJ rose up against the Assad regime in early 2013 and held the Yaroubiya/Til Koçer border crossing from March 2013. In that struggle, they were supported by Nusra front, Ahrar ash-Sham and Ghuraba al-Sham. In mid-October 2013, LAJ was then expelled from Yaroubiya by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

A local delegation from Yaroubiya of Shammar approached the YPG about liberating the town from ISIS. The YPG joined with LAJ to take it back in November 2013. The distinction between Jabahat al-Nusra and ISIS doesn't appear to have been large in Yaroubiya in late 2013. Since November 2013, YPG and LAJ have shared the town.

LAJ became the Jaysh al-Karama, led by Hmedi Dahham al-Hadi. In June 2014, ISIS(ISIL) threatened the Jaysh al-Karama and al-Hadi becaise of their cooperation with the YPG. In July 10, 2014, Humaydi Dahmam al-Assi al-Jarba/Hamidi Daham al-Hadi was appointed the co-governor of the Hasakah Province/Jazera canton by the Rojava autonomous administration ("after a vote"). Humaydi al-Jarba had a noted anti-government (anti-Assad) stance and was the political leader of LAJ.

LAJ/Jaysh al-Karama army would eventually become Quwwat al-Sanadid. Hamid Daham al-Hadi's son Bandar al-Humaydi is the military leader of al-Sanadid. It's relationship with the YPG has only become stronger over time. Its origin, however is still with the FSA in a rebellion against the Assad regime.

http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55607

http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-fall-of-yaroubiya-to-ypg-in-context.html

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41754&cHash=bbedc896f6cefadf8d7284fe2c7fe764#.VtVwLZwrKUk

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-kurds-appoint-arab-governor-hasakah-bid-international-support-1313083527

It can be argued whether or not LAJ was part of the FSA. That is one of the problems with the FSA. Whether a group is part of it or not seems to be as much a matter of self-identification and waving the green flag than joining some sort of coherent body that has some sort of central command or even the ability to determine its membership.

Again, a minor issue about an article about Northern Aleppo, I’d like to address this point about the Kobani-Raqqa region.

"In the Kobani-Raqqa region, the YPG was allied to a number of FSA groups in the defence of Kobani in late 2014, but the major local FSA group involved – the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade – has seriously fallen out with the YPG "

The article Karadjis links to for this point is referencing the “tribal army/clan army” that was nominally under the command of the Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa (LTR) that changed its name and upgraded its status to Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa after the incorporation of a number of locals from the Tel Abyad area and points south to Ain Issa after LTR and the YPG under the banner of the Burkan al-Furat (Euphrates Volcano operations room) took the town in an offensive from both Cizre canton from the east and Kobane canton from the west. That incorporation of those new recruits did not go smoothly.

There has been tension between LTR and the YPG--when a local council government for Tel Abyad was formed that declared it would affiliate with the Kobane canton, LTR claimed that Tel Abyad should remain part of some future Raqqa governorate. Ultimately, the decision for Tel Abyad to join with Kobane seems to still be in place.

Another issue that probably encouraged hostility to the YPG was the displacement of 500 Arabs from the village of Abdi Koy / 'Abdi Kuy. This village is less than 10 miles west of Tel Abyad and in the general area that the Tribes/Clan army was forming.

https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/2503/2015/en/

That area west of Tel Abyad was very slow to be taken by the YPG. For months, the YPG’s expansion east from Kobane was halted at Bedir Khan. When the YPG came from the east from the Cizre canton… it moved much more quickly. Advancement from the west came after Suluk was already in YPG’s hands.

Upon its formation the Tribes/Clan army demanded Tel Abyad be turned over to their control and the expulsion of the YPG. It was a very tense situation as the YPG had just extended a salient across the Tishrin dam and wanted to expand from the al-Hawl offensive in to ash-Shaddadi. It got so bad there were claims of violence between the Clan Army and the YPG in Sukkariyah.

It seems that the most logical conclusion to Tribes/Clan army’s disappearance almost as quickly as it created was LTR consolidating its control over its most recent recruits. LTR seemed to have decided to value its relationship with the YPG over the aspiration of some its new recruits. Some of the leadership of the Army of the Clans was “dismissed” and the new recruits better integrated into LTR.

There was some debate over whether LTR had joined the Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) when it was created in October 2015. The big meeting to establish the Syrian Democratic Assembly (MSD) to be the political wing of the Syrian Democratic forces was held December 8th, 2015.

As recently as February 12, 2016 it was stated that Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa joined the Syrian Democratic Council and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

http://syriadirect.org/news/jabhat-thuwar-a-raqqa-%E2%80%98an-essential-component-of-the-sdf%E2%80%99/

http://imgur.com/a/WQ5fZ

https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/14024.html

Today, there is effectively no FSA group holding territory that is east of the Euphrates that isn’t allied with the YPG through the Syrian Democratic Forces. Early last month, Jabhat al-Thuwar clarified that it was joining the Syrian Demcoratic Forces and Syrian Democratic Assembly. There may still be tensions, but Karadjis was using this event to argue that the YPG was not allied with any FSA group. For the al-Sanadid he took the position that they were never FSA; for Jabhat Thuwar al-Raqqa he implied that they were no longer allied with the YPG.

Karadjis also brings up the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and its “15 parties” in contrast with the PYD. The largest party of the KNC is the Barzani affiliated KDPS and also includes:

• Azadi Kurdish Party in Syria
• Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria
• Kurdish Democratic National Party in Syria
• Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Yekiti)
• Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria
• Kurdish Democratic Wifaq Party
• Kurdish Left Party in Syria
• Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria (KDPS)
• Kurdish Yekiti Party in Syria
• Yekiti Kurdistani

However, the KNC has largely been a talking shop with the PYD, TEV-DEM and the YPG controlling the civil and military administration of Rojava. A KDPS affiliated militia--the Rojava Peshmerga is on guard duty on the Mosul Dam in Iraq. While the Rojava administration has included other parties in their parliament and administration… the easiest example of their inclusion to point to is the newly formed 43 member Syrian Democratic Assembly (MSD) which includes:

• Syrian Kurds' Democratic Peace Party
• Kurdistan Liberal Unity Party
• Syrian Kurds' Progressive Democratic Party/Yekîtî
• Partiya Wîfaqa Demokratîk a Kurdî li Sûriyeyê
• Left Party of Syrian Kurds
• KDPS
• PYD

The Yekîti, BTW, were the party that was involved in the infamous YPG violence against a protest in Amunde in 2013. Yekîti are now part of the administration and participate in elections. They are supposedly the second largest party in the Afrin canton.

Not only does the KDPS has a seat in the assembly, its representative Cemal Şêx Baqî is on the nine member Joint Coordination Board. Its also worth noting that Akram Hesso the prime minister of the Cizre canton was a member of the ENKS. As far back as 2003, Salih Muslim was once a member of the KDPS. We can go into a lot of contortions to say “who represents the Kurds”; but from what we see militarily, electorally and in civil society--PYD, TEV-DEM and the YPG seem to enjoy majority (if not supermajority) support among Kurds in Syria.
http://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/executive-board-of-democratic-syria-assembly-elected

“the 60-mile stretch between Efrin and Kobani is not ‘Rojava’, as is often blithely claimed by Rojava-Firsters… Quite simply, therefore, the PYD/YPG has no god-given right to “link” separate Kurdish-majority regions by annexing Arab-majority and Turkmen-majority territory! Yes, there are other Kurdish—majority regions under ISIS control further south from the Turkish border, which the YPG has a right to seize (eg Manbij, south of Jarablus), but clearly the only “link” that can be established between Afrin and Kobani is one based on Arab-Kurdish-Turkmen solidarity”

The PYD has made no secret of their plans to link Afrin and Kobane; and to link Kobane with Cizre. People can disagree with that ambition, but the PYD has been clear in stating it. Not only have the proposed a contiguous territory but it has included Manbij, al-Bab, Azaz and even linking to Aleppo.

This map appeared on the PYD website in 2013: https://www.google.com/search?tbs=simg%3Am00&tbnid=ZbTzeRY2XhTf7M%3A&docid=dWZ49pGTZEf5RM&tbm=isch&ved=0ahUKEwiK5tLd3J_LAhWMez4KHWiiCF4QhxwICA&dpr=1&biw=1280&bih=923

A map in the new PYD office in Russia reaches all the way west to Jabal al-Akrad in Latakia; but stop short of coast access to the Mediterranean.

https://twitter.com/taylieli/status/697423259936124930

There are many ethnic demographic maps of Syria around. Izady’s is a popular one, but there are others.

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-3jnjIwbvWbM/UpbjNJTLCRI/AAAAAAAAE9M/aFlTi29gA3k/s1600/Kurdish+Areas+Map.png

https://worldshiaforum.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/syr.png

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Syria_Ethno-religious_composition..jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CcURLcSW4AIa4Lp.jpg:large

What the exact ethnic distribution was before the war or during may always be a mystery. Among the details being fought right now is what the demographics will be after the war.

Rojava as conceived of by the PYD has always been a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity. Much of that is a reality because of the demographics of the strongest canton--Cizre/Hasakah/Gozarto. From the formation of TEV-DEM the PYD worked with the Syriac SUP; over time it brought Shammar Arabs into its project as described above.

If for the sake of argument we use Izady’s ethnic map to describe where Kurdish majorities are in northern aleppo, the gap between the Afrin area Kurds and the Kurdish majority west of Aleppo is about 16 miles. That’s without a detour to the mixed Kurdish area northeast of Aleppo or the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsood that is controlled by the YPG in nothern Aleppo city.

The PYD/YPG certainly claims no “god-given” rights. It has been argued that the YPG has needed to secure the area between Afrin and Kobane to cut off the access of ISIS and other Salafi Jihadists to support from Turkey. A contiguous territory also would allow the YPG to easily move military assets from Cizre all the way to Afrn. Also, a connection to Sheikh Maqsood would allow the “4th canton” to not be so isolated and vulnerable.

The YPG came close to uniting Afrin and Kobane cantons in October 2013. The SDF seems particularly interested in liberating the Kurdish villages under ISIS control in the Al-Shahba reservoir area; further a member of the Al-Shahba Regional Assembly is a representative in the Syrian Democratic Assembly. The Al-Shahba reservoir area is known to have been a Jabhat al-Krad area in the past.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/archive/8/88/20140128024523%21Syrian_civil_war.png

http://anfenglish.com/kurdistan/executive-board-of-democratic-syria-assembly-elected

The Arab majority area between Kobane and Serê Kaniyê / Ras al-Ayn that centered on Tel Abyad (90 miles) is far greater than the distance between Al-Shahba reservoir and Deir Jamal (12 miles).

Arab units of the FSA have no more god-given right to occupy Kurdish villages than Kurdish SDF units have a god-given right to occupy Arab villages. The FSA isn’t only Arab. The SDF isn’t only Kurdish. There is more to politics than ethnic and religious identity.
By creating the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces and including various Arab groups into those organization like Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, the Jarabulus brigade, al-Sendadid and fighters from the Baggara and the Shaitat--the SDF has raised an expetation that it will go into Arab majority areas like Raqqa, Jarabulus, southern Hasakah and the southern Euphrates. Just as its inclusion of Jaysh al Thuwar and Jabhat al-Krad motivates the SDF in Afrin to head towards JAT/Jabhat al-Krad areas once held like the Al-Shahba reservoir area; as well as defend the areas that JAT/Jabhat al-Krad east of Maryamayn taken from ISIS in 2014. It is the PYD’s attempts to make Rojava and their “Project for a Democratic Syria” more inclusive that encourages them to expand outside of Kurdish-majority areas.

History didn’t start in January 2016.

“Aleppo province council “has been forced to leave its main base in the town of Hreitein and carry out its work from inside a tent east of the city of Azaz” after being attacked by Russian warplanes and “the advance of Assad’s forces,” but this was not the first displacement of the council, as it was preceded by the displacement from its previous base in the town of Deir al-Jamaal, which the Kurdish People’s Protection Units seized months ago, as a result of Russian aircraft targeting the base”

This quotation makes it seem as if Deir al-Jamaal was somehow the long time home of an FSA/rebel affiliated province capital. No, Deir Jamal has traded hands a couple of times over the course of the civil war. First, its either majority Kurdish or a Kurdish-Arab mix town of four thousand people. It was taken from the Assad regime by rebels in July 2012. It was then taken by ISIS in January 2014. It was then taken by Jabhat al-Krad in summer of 2014. They held it until when it was taken by rebels including Ahrar ash-Sham/Mare Operations Room in late 2015. On February 7th, 2016, Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat Al-Shamiyah (Levantine Front) withdrew from Deir Jamal--then the SDF and Jaysh al-Thuwar moved in. If you use Karadjis’s irredentist argument Arab majority groups like Ahrar ash-Sham/Mare Operations Room should have never taken Deir Jamal from Jabhat al-Krad in the first place. Jabhat al-Krad didn’t displace rebels in January 2014--ISIS did. If the Aleppo Province Council was setup after that, it could of only been in late 2015; because SDF is once again controls security in the town in February 2016. archicivilians claims the destruction in the Provincial Council of Aleppo in Deir Jamal town, due to Russia’s airstrike on November 28, 2015--not from SDF/JAT/YPG attack. Turkey, BTW, has been shelling Deir Jamal since SDF moved in; presumably Yassin-Kassab has no objections--does Karadjis?

https://twitter.com/archicivilians/status/670664912935481344

A series of towns and villages east of Maryamayn were liberated by Jabhat al-Krad/YPG/Jaysh al-Thuwar from ISIS in the summer of 2013 including: Shawarighat al-Arz, Tatmarash / Mrash, Tanab, Kishtaar, Ibbīn and Alqamiyeh. It was the “rebels” that had attacked Jaysh al-Thuwar positions there in late 2015 having temporarily secured many of them as of December 1st, 2015. Then by January, JAT had started to take them back. When then SAA linked up with Nubl and Al-Zahraa; the SDF/JAT were able to definitely secure these villages and move onto the areas that rebels had staged attacks from like the Menagh air base and Tell Rifaat. Maryamayn has been the headquarters for Jaysh al-Thuwar.

The rebels involved with taking those villages east of Maryamayn were organized as the Mare Operations Room. As recently as November 23rd, 2014… the Mare Operations Room did not control these villages.

“There have been repeated aggressions on the part of some battalions that have strayed from their path and pointed their weapons toward the revolutionaries in each of the following villages—Maryamain, Inab, Shawaghirah (sic), Tanab, Kishta’ar, Marash, Qanbariyyah—all in Aleppo’s northern countryside. The Mare’ Operations Room is giving these battalions 48 hours to clear out of the aforementioned villages, or else it will remove them by force. Their repeated aggressions and their obstructions of the revolutionaries’ movements must cease.”

Take note, the Russian airstrikes began in September 30th 2015, with air strikes in the Aleppo area by mid-October. That means that the Mare Operations Room began its most recent offensive against the JAT villages east of Maryamayn AFTER Russia had already begun its air strikes in Aleppo.

While the Mare Operations Room was ostensibly setup in August 2014 with 800 members of Islamic Front joining the FSA to defend Mare from falling to ISIS who were besieging it from the east, the Mare Operations Room seems to have devoted a lot of resources in November 2015 to taking Jabhat al-Krad/Jaysah al-Thuwar villages to their west to widen the supply corridor from Azaz to Aleppo. So with fighting after the 48 hour deadline expired, Mare Operations Room did take those villages; but then there was sporadic fighting with JAT/SDF all winter over control of these villages until the fighitng definitively ended with a JAT/SDF victory in February 2016. The Mare Operations Room attacks on JAT villages was just the latest in a long list of attacks on JAT and the YPG throughout northern Aleppo over the years.

https://twitter.com/IvanSidorenko1/status/668915789945290752

Who is in the Mare Operations Room is a good question? Falcons of Mount Zawiya Brigade (Fuqour al-Jabal Brigade), Sham Legion, Northern Division, Jaysh al-Tahrir and allegedly Jabhat al-Nusra Front and Ahrar ash-Sham. As recently as February 2016 it may have inlcuded Liwa almutassem, Levant front, Safwa islamiya, Quwa almarkaziya, Ossood alTawheed, Ahar ash-Sham and Abu Walid group, The SDF/JAT were supposedly in negotiations for the Mare Operation Room groups to withdraw from Mare leaving only the Abu Walid group to share the town with the SDF/JAT--all without a single shot being fired. That diplomatic attempt appears to have failed and the SDF/JAT did not enter Mare. During the fighting in February atleast one US manufactured TOW missile was used by a rebel group west of Mare to destroy an SDF/JAT vehicle. This is around the time that there were articles about how U.S. backed rebel groups were fighting each other in northern Aleppo.

https://twitter.com/jenanmoussa/status/699554083930148865

For years, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar ash Sham and their allies have attacked YPG/Jabhat al-Krad/Jaysh al Thuwar in the Afrin canton and Sheikh Maqsood neighborhood in Aleppo. Just google it and you come up with story after story about it as well as accusations of kidnappings, mistreatment of civilians, breaches of truces and ceasefires, bloodshed around checkpoints, etc… the Mare Operations Room attack on villages east of Maryamayn in November/December 2015 particularly along route 65 seem to have been the last straw for JAT and the Afrin YPG to finally launch an offensive towards Mare in January/February 2016.

Now after years of conflict, some FSA supporters who seem quite willing to tolerate alliance of the FSA with Salafi Jihadists are now screaming about how the PYD has betrayed the revolution. Karadjis doesn’t mention any of this and continues to downplay the role of Nusra, Ahrar ash-Sham and other Salafi Jihadhists role in Northern Aleppo. If it is not Nusra and Ahrar ash-Sham attacking JAT and the YPG in northern Aleppo--then who is?

SDF/JAT/YPG took Menagh Air Base after three days of fighting. SDF/JAT/YPG took Tel Rifaat in a day--which either means a withdraw of the rebels there or a complete collapse of their defenses (under the pressure of Russian bombing). SAA had also been advancing on Tel Rifaat, but the YPG got their first and blocked the road to prevent the SAA’s progress. Turkey then started shelling Tel Rifaat. The SDF/JAT/YPG advance in Northern Aleppo as far east as Ahras towards ISIS front lines is accomplished and with the cease fire, their position is solidifying. The road between Azaz and Aleppo city is blocked both by the SDF/JAT/YPG line from Deir Jamal to Ahras; and south of there from Nubl to Tell Jabin. Even if rebels conquered the villages along the Deir Jamal-Ahras line, negotiated their turn over, or got an agreement of free passage, they would still be blocked by the SAA having linked up with Nubl. However, as long as the SDF/JAT/YPG holds the Deir Jamal to Ahras line, the SAA can not advance on the remaining rebels in Mare and the Azaz pocket unless they are willing to fight the SDF/JAT/YPG. If the Mare Operations Room was capable of stopping the SAA’s progress in Northern Aleppo, they should have done so to prevent the link with Nubl--instead their defenses of Tel Rifaat collapsed in a day.

http://sputniknews.com/europe/20160216/1034857922/kurdish-office-prague.html

The first European office of Syria's Kurds will be opened in Prague. It will provide military and financial support for the Kurdish people. (...)
One of those supporting the Kurds in the Czech capital is Lumir Nemec, a former member of the special operations unit of the Czech Military Police. (...)
The Czech Republic has supported the Kurds in their fight against Daesh militants, including supplying weapons and ammunition.

Czech Republic is member of NATO...

Can we criticize the Kurds?
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/1/can-we-criticize-the-kurds.html

Thanks for researching and explaining all that Flint, I've not had time to deal with the complexity of the current situation but what you write makes a lot of sense out of it.

AndrewF

Thanks for researching and explaining all that Flint, I've not had time to deal with the complexity of the current situation but what you write makes a lot of sense out of it.

Andrew, you might find this interview with Aldar Xelil, a member of the executive committee of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), and Zuhat Kobani, a representative of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Europe as relevant:

What is the Kurdish Calculation in Rojava?, March 14, 2016

(Also originally in Turkish, 12/03/2016)

There was a big falling out between Jabhat al-Nusra and Division 13 around Idlib, Ma'rat al-Nu'man and north of Hama recently. JAN basically annihilated Division 13, as it has done with other FSA groups that have opposed them. Now the issue is going to be sorted out by Sharia court with JAN suggesting the judges.

Here is a story about it that strikes me as a bit to optimistic on FSA/Division 13 recovery: Jabhat al-Nusra Oversteps Mark with Idlib Crackdown, Charles Lister, March 14, 2016

meerov21

First, according to the latest reports from the Kurds, Americans have reduced or even stopped military support of Rojava.

What reports are you using? Liwa Ahfad Sallahudeen claimed this. They are perhaps not the best source to trust. I hear reports that the SDF still have U.S. support in Hasakah and that the U.S. will likely be helping with the push towards Manbij. We can all post rumors. It is better to post sources.

meerov21

Instead, they Fund groups of supporters of Barzani who are fighting against supporters of Rajava in the district of Afrin.

I assume you are referring to Liwa Ahfad Sallahudeen. They have fought with the YPG in the past, but right now they are fighting ISIS. They took the village of Doudyan / Dudyan about fifteen miles to the east of A'zaz. They are not currently fighting the YPG. They had a crew at demonstrations in Mare' recently where they threatened to fight the YPG if they entered Mare. SInce then, Mare came under attack by ISIS (not by YPG/SDF, which was trying to negotiate the surrender of Mare without violence).

They say they follow Barzani, but they aren't the Rojava Peshmerga or seemingly affiliated with KDPS.

Here is there Youtube Channel

They are a relatively small outfit that is holding one village and is isolated in the Azaz pocket. They are by no means comparable to the YPG/SDF.

Secondly, Russia under pressure from the U.S. withdraws troops from Syria. Yesterday's unexpected decision of the Kremlin about the withdrawal of troops is connected with new sanctions that were adopted yesterday in the United States and the European Union.

Wild speculation.

The Kurds relied on the support of the weak Russian imperialism. This can lead to their defeat.

TEV-DEM and the PYD claim otherwise. See the above article I linked for Andrew.

meerov21

What? Putin officially announced that Russia leaves Syria.
And the fact that sanctions cause painful damage to the Russian economy there is a widely known fact. I think you should not talk about things you don't know.

You are talking about things you don't know. You are speculating on why Russia withdrew its ground troops. That they have said they will is something they publicized.

meerov21

What?? They opened in the Russian Federation a representative office, and their cooperation with Russia is on a formal nature.

They also have an office in Czech Republic. Anyway, the article I posted quoting folks from TEV-DEM and PYD is clear enough. You can chose not to believe them.

meerov21

This is the official Kurdish website.

There are many Kurdish websites and many official websites for many organizations. This one does seem to be a pro-PKK Russian site. I would encourage you to read more sources than just this one and just in Russian.

The article in question discusses Liwa Ahfad Sallahudeen, as I previously mentioned. The claim that Liwa Ahfad Sallahudeen that the U.S. no longer supports the YPG should not be taken seriously. Its is merely rhetoric.

Folks can speculate wildly who is funding the Liwa Ahfad Sallahudeen. Could be Barzani (the KRG is technically broke), could be Erdogan, could be Saudi Arabia, etc... It wouldn't even be that strange for the U.S. to do so given its long history of supporting Islamists. But at the moment, we just don't know.

The article does mention their size as 600 (which may even be generous). Speculation on the size of the Syrian Democratic Forces including the YPG is anywhere between 30,000 and 80,000.

meerov21

In other words, while the PKK says that the United States ceased to help them you are sure that, on the contrary, the U.S. continues to help PKK\PYD\YPG?

The U.S. was never aiding the PKK. While you might want to regard the PKK and PYD as inter-changeable, the U.S. has taken great pains to say they only secondarily aid the YPG and that they are not assisting the PKK. However, the U.S. also doesn't attack the PKK directly in Iraq either. Though it is the principle arms supplier to Turkey.

The U.S. was aiding the SDF(QSD) and through it the YPG. It is still doing so. Primarily through air strikes. There is evidence to suggest ammunition and even a special operations unit operating an anti-tank weapon. PYD and YPG folks meet with the U.S. in the U.S. and U.S. officials meet with PYD/YPG/SDF folks in Rojava.

meerov21

Maybe the US did not stopped air support, and only reduced the supply of weapons who knows.

I think we need only wait for the next SDF offensive to see.