Actually I have a few questions about Hegel philosophy is he basically the grandfather of Marxism and, also did he philosophize for bourgeois capitalism and Marx felt like it was his duty to slay his ghost? I've been doing drugs today.
Actually I have a few questions about Hegel philosophy is he basically the grandfather of Marxism and
Hegel was influential in Marxism, but generally speaking such terminology tends to come about when looking for someone to blame for Marxism. Hegel's works were often like a museum, a collection of antiquities, which so far as Engels was concerned was mostly of note for the initial notes on method - although people liked to pretend that Hegel was also primarily concerned with these, despite taking them in other directions - in which sense Engels' position was one of insecurity or awkwardness in a way: while Hegel was apparently 'confident' enough in such things to continue on to all sorts of exotica, like Steve Irwin with less concern that his physical endangerment be entertaining to people, although not enough to not ennumerate them in detail and context, Engels would like to look at these abstractions rather than just throwing them around. Most of these works were not of direct relevance to Marxism.
also did he philosophize bourgeois capitalism and Marx felt like it was his duty to slay his ghost?
Not exactly. Marx did often take him as a basis, such as in formulating Das Kapital. Das Kapital was slightly parasitic in this sense: apart from the small disclaimer that the Hegelian categories used were flawed, they were used with their transitions and so on as if this was not flawed at all. In this sense its 'metaphysical' and critical bent relative to other economists can be traced to Hegel - while most other political economists could be careful to constantly refer back to various situations and examples, like a text-book, Marx begins from discussing the economy as such and only returns to such examples a lot later. This is part of why he is able to progress beyond them.
It would be unlikely for Hegel to 'philosophise' such a thing, given that he wrote long works promising no practical gain to readers and hence distanced from the existing economy. He faced political economy, for instance, which was occasionally the justification of the existing order - but mostly at ends with its own immediate task, as Marx said -, as something external to him and potentially hostile. In general, though, Hegel's method did necessitate taking everything 'positively' or as rosy, and most spheres as such as well, and as such in life he was generally associated with such positive relations to just about everything, dissatisfaction with which was part of what led to Kierkegaard's critique of 'mediocrity' and passivity in relation to the existent order, of whatever sort. Of course, this attraction to everything was mediated in the works, if not elsewhere, by for instance a focus on the past and so on, which was limited but nonetheless there. In addition, because the overall picture had to derive from smaller parts - or social contract theory was taken for granted - he was reduced to reducing these smaller parts to abstractions so that they could be carried up through accounts of civil society, rather than being forced to notice what they are.
Marx's reference to value and use-value is instructive. Marx generally begins by pointing out an abstraction existent somewhere, near the beginning of some sort of system, and then notices a less abstract aspect. In this sense he diverges from Hegel immediately, but only partially, and is generally reduced to observations. In that way, Marx's own 'views,' especially the potentially controversial ones, are often left hidden and disparate, while all he presents is the other system while his own viewpoint is kept fairly obscure.
Marx's view on Hegel could be variable, but was nowhere close to treating Hegel as a 'ghost' to be slayed - as if to slay people they'd need ghosts. In terms of influence, they also drew on Feuerbach, although as Friedrich Engels also noted he didn't look that highly upon Feuerbach. Whether Hegel's philosophy was staunchly either way might be uncertain by their account, however, but certainly they didn't see his method as simply related to that transient historical system.
I've been doing drugs today.
I'm trying to resist the temptation by writing words. It seems to be working.
Thanks for the knowledgeable reply. So basically when the bourgeoisie knocked on Hegel's door and asked him to work for them, he said, "I'm afraid not. I'm busy gazing into the sky and I'll be on my way if you please... but if you happen to need any of this tonic I concocted, to make things seem dandy and fine... take it, take it!"
And Marx was once a Hegelian, but only because he had to learn his philosophy as an apprentice in the only workshop in Germany? So the Hegelenianism rubbed off on him but didn't rub into him?
So basically when the bourgeoisie knocked on Hegel's door and asked him to work for them, he said, "I'm afraid not. I'm busy gazing into the sky and I'll be on my way if you please... but if you happen to need any of this tonic I concocted, to make things seem dandy and fine... take it, take it!"
Hegel wasn't necessarily a communist infiltrator. The first part of this would contradict the second - if he opposes the system enough to be 'on their way' (and where else are they supposed to be looking? Communism, presumably, often characterised in such terms.), then their works would of course completely undermine whatever they were claiming dishonestly to 'promote' by them.
And Marx was once a Hegelian, but only because he had to learn his philosophy as an apprentice in the only workshop in Germany? So the Hegelenianism rubbed off on him but didn't rub into him?
Marx was originally opposed to Hegel, but eventually converted. So you wouldn't say so. In addition, obviously he did esteem Hegel and used him as a basis for many works, so you wouldn't say it didn't 'rub into him,' although you could say that he didn't dissolve into it. His description of communism - though minimal - did generally mirror Hegel's depiction of the Absolute Idea, as it is generally rendered in English. In addition, he had a similar focus on world-history, and generally derived his subject-matter from Hegel.
Doesn't Zizek talk a lot about Hegel?
Zizek is rarely interested in such philosophers seriously, their general aesthetic militates against this. They merely assimilate them to other things. The potentials of this approach were already exhausted in 19th Century Germany.
"For the last two centuries, Western philosophy has developed in the shadow of Hegel, an influence each new thinker struggles to escape. As a consequence, Hegel’s absolute idealism has become the bogeyman of philosophy, obscuring the fact that he is the defining philosopher of the historical transition to modernity, a period with which our own times share startling similarities.
Today, as global capitalism comes apart at the seams, we are entering a new period of transition. In Less Than Nothing, the product of a career-long focus on the part of its author, Slavoj Žižek argues it is imperative we not simply return to Hegel but that we repeat and exceed his triumphs, overcoming his limitations by being even more Hegelian than the master himself. Such an approach not only enables Žižek to diagnose our present condition, but also to engage in a critical dialogue with key strands of contemporary thought—Heidegger, Badiou, speculative realism, quantum physics, and cognitive sciences. Modernity will begin and end with Hegel."
Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism
It might seem a bit misleading, as noted Hegel's influence has waned significantly. In addition, it might seem to give a bit too much credence to various authors despite their likely 'ideological' function, and it might be said that Zizek takes the various 'modern' influences too positively, while his attitude to Hegel is strangely far more ambiguous, and in general appealed to people by counterposing the older philosophers to new, shiny things, as assimilating such things was an important role in modernity if the ideological functions of capital were to be able to get away with pretending to have a monopoly on such fields. Obviously, Hegel tended towards an overall and historical world-view, which had to be assimilated to prevent it from interfering with attempts to confine people to merely local and atomised existence. It is, however, a bit-part role in a less-than-first-rate play.
In a sense, though, Hegelianism today is unlikely to be found in Zizek, who is highly eclectic, and was generally quite obscure as a viewpoint. Of course, in a sense 'official Hegelianism' was unlikely to take root, because the academies trended towards relativism and such positivistic, stagnant beliefs, and Hegel was of course about absolute values and things which became dangerous at around the time of Marx. In that sense, a lot of what is maintained of Hegelianism is within less 'official' circles, such as within Marxism, where a general position of social antagonism gave it a niche where it could survive. In this sense, it is fairly indebted to Marxism for such things. As such, most forms of active 'Hegelianism' are merely attempts to extract it from Marxism and similar political views, and in this sense become quite marginal in focus and otherwise, and are generally characterised by a lack of much commitment to the author. Hegel generally has little relevance to 'post-modern' authors and so on, who are generally part of an overall retreat from stricter writers like Marx and Kierkegaard, towards a more accessible by then 'laissez-faire' attitude towards people's behaviour and social systems. He might be treated of as Marx is in literary academia, a few catch-phrases and buzzwords that can be paraded around in basically reactionary institutions and texts without causing a serious fuss.
Of course, people had to be reassured that such serious thinkers would not get in the way of their frivolity and systemic belonging, and hence could be reduced to things easily waved away or claimed, and in this sense actually claiming to go beyond Hegel, though it was common in Germany, was generally presented as a fairly specific thing, rather than something that could be done more or less arbitrarily. In that sense, while Zizek might be claiming to have an interest in Hegel, they are other than that generally seeming to cater to the prejudices of modernity that would prefer Hegel accessible, quick and not particularly far above or from more 'modern' thinkers, and in that sense Hegelianism would generally be sought where such traits would not be preferred to the author. Hegelian tendencies can be found in some older books based around the theme of a 'chain of nature,' such as Oliver Goldsmith's serious writings (the eventual anathematisation of which was perhaps anticipated humorously in his 'elegy on the death of a mad dog'), but are less common in modern publications.
You might ask, indeed, whether Engels' declaiming of Feuerbach compared to Hegel near the end might have a strange relation to their - or mostly Marx's - initial critique of Hegel, which was done under Feuerbachian terms and hence might seem slightly unfounded in some ways after this. To be fair, Marx also drew on Hegel quite explicitly later on, for instance with the mathematical manuscripts. Marx's initial 'critique' of Hegel was, of course, very similar to the 'Left Hegelian' trend of claiming that Hegel's system had a point, but was influenced in certain ways by society at the time, except that this was phrased in slightly different terms nonetheless ultimately accusing Hegel of, despite their virtues, being influenced by a quite different kind of system. Engels did go along with this in part, but generally maintained more Hegelian influence, weirdly, and they both might have influenced each other in different ways at different times as that goes, nonetheless Engels did tend to have a slightly cynical view of Hegel, as if he were merely putting a text on repeat for a few hundred times and distracting from his focus. Nonetheless, forms of Marxism that don't mind Engels, comparatively, do tend to display some features comparable to 'Hegelianism.' Strict Hegelianism will be unlikely outside of fields quite strictly inoculated to modern science, as Hegel's attempts at avoiding the division of labour in such fields - which was even in his time a point at which he had to retreat significantly and merely pay deference to the scientists, etc., most of the time, a problematic tendency which his theory had to adjust to (Marx and Engels could be more active in criticising even active scientists and favouring such as Tremaux) - were generally speaking converted into an easy target for such and often was more allowing of this than they could have been (attempts to pretend Marx and Engels 'debunked' in the natural sciences and this being relevant to their theory generally came up against the spines that they were watching and judging this scientific activity themselves and in terms of their own views, while Hegel was quite prone to them.) In terms of the part within en-dashes, a lot of Hegel is merely a fossilised remains of various things said during the 19th Century, although he did tend to guard against certain social tendencies at the time.
In that sense, a continued Hegelianism would either be in fairly obscure or mystical fields - where such themes might be common - or be capable of abstracting his essential or theoretical content from the rest, while not being impressed by merely the 'shiny' claims to give accounts of various subjects and things, which would generally consign it to Marxism or similar views. The virtue of this, however, is that because Hegelianism must be abstracted from its manifestations, it therefore tends to be fairly abstract in nature, so far as it goes, and as a result is also quite obscure.
The Pigeon wrote: Actually I
The Pigeon
Hegel was influential in Marxism, but generally speaking such terminology tends to come about when looking for someone to blame for Marxism. Hegel's works were often like a museum, a collection of antiquities, which so far as Engels was concerned was mostly of note for the initial notes on method - although people liked to pretend that Hegel was also primarily concerned with these, despite taking them in other directions - in which sense Engels' position was one of insecurity or awkwardness in a way: while Hegel was apparently 'confident' enough in such things to continue on to all sorts of exotica, like Steve Irwin with less concern that his physical endangerment be entertaining to people, although not enough to not ennumerate them in detail and context, Engels would like to look at these abstractions rather than just throwing them around. Most of these works were not of direct relevance to Marxism.
Not exactly. Marx did often take him as a basis, such as in formulating Das Kapital. Das Kapital was slightly parasitic in this sense: apart from the small disclaimer that the Hegelian categories used were flawed, they were used with their transitions and so on as if this was not flawed at all. In this sense its 'metaphysical' and critical bent relative to other economists can be traced to Hegel - while most other political economists could be careful to constantly refer back to various situations and examples, like a text-book, Marx begins from discussing the economy as such and only returns to such examples a lot later. This is part of why he is able to progress beyond them.
It would be unlikely for Hegel to 'philosophise' such a thing, given that he wrote long works promising no practical gain to readers and hence distanced from the existing economy. He faced political economy, for instance, which was occasionally the justification of the existing order - but mostly at ends with its own immediate task, as Marx said -, as something external to him and potentially hostile. In general, though, Hegel's method did necessitate taking everything 'positively' or as rosy, and most spheres as such as well, and as such in life he was generally associated with such positive relations to just about everything, dissatisfaction with which was part of what led to Kierkegaard's critique of 'mediocrity' and passivity in relation to the existent order, of whatever sort. Of course, this attraction to everything was mediated in the works, if not elsewhere, by for instance a focus on the past and so on, which was limited but nonetheless there. In addition, because the overall picture had to derive from smaller parts - or social contract theory was taken for granted - he was reduced to reducing these smaller parts to abstractions so that they could be carried up through accounts of civil society, rather than being forced to notice what they are.
Marx's reference to value and use-value is instructive. Marx generally begins by pointing out an abstraction existent somewhere, near the beginning of some sort of system, and then notices a less abstract aspect. In this sense he diverges from Hegel immediately, but only partially, and is generally reduced to observations. In that way, Marx's own 'views,' especially the potentially controversial ones, are often left hidden and disparate, while all he presents is the other system while his own viewpoint is kept fairly obscure.
Marx's view on Hegel could be variable, but was nowhere close to treating Hegel as a 'ghost' to be slayed - as if to slay people they'd need ghosts. In terms of influence, they also drew on Feuerbach, although as Friedrich Engels also noted he didn't look that highly upon Feuerbach. Whether Hegel's philosophy was staunchly either way might be uncertain by their account, however, but certainly they didn't see his method as simply related to that transient historical system.
I'm trying to resist the temptation by writing words. It seems to be working.
Thanks for the knowledgeable
Thanks for the knowledgeable reply. So basically when the bourgeoisie knocked on Hegel's door and asked him to work for them, he said, "I'm afraid not. I'm busy gazing into the sky and I'll be on my way if you please... but if you happen to need any of this tonic I concocted, to make things seem dandy and fine... take it, take it!"
And Marx was once a Hegelian, but only because he had to learn his philosophy as an apprentice in the only workshop in Germany? So the Hegelenianism rubbed off on him but didn't rub into him?
Doesn't Zizek talk a lot about Hegel?
The Pigeon wrote: So
The Pigeon
Hegel wasn't necessarily a communist infiltrator. The first part of this would contradict the second - if he opposes the system enough to be 'on their way' (and where else are they supposed to be looking? Communism, presumably, often characterised in such terms.), then their works would of course completely undermine whatever they were claiming dishonestly to 'promote' by them.
Marx was originally opposed to Hegel, but eventually converted. So you wouldn't say so. In addition, obviously he did esteem Hegel and used him as a basis for many works, so you wouldn't say it didn't 'rub into him,' although you could say that he didn't dissolve into it. His description of communism - though minimal - did generally mirror Hegel's depiction of the Absolute Idea, as it is generally rendered in English. In addition, he had a similar focus on world-history, and generally derived his subject-matter from Hegel.
Zizek is rarely interested in such philosophers seriously, their general aesthetic militates against this. They merely assimilate them to other things. The potentials of this approach were already exhausted in 19th Century Germany.
"For the last two centuries,
"For the last two centuries, Western philosophy has developed in the shadow of Hegel, an influence each new thinker struggles to escape. As a consequence, Hegel’s absolute idealism has become the bogeyman of philosophy, obscuring the fact that he is the defining philosopher of the historical transition to modernity, a period with which our own times share startling similarities.
Today, as global capitalism comes apart at the seams, we are entering a new period of transition. In Less Than Nothing, the product of a career-long focus on the part of its author, Slavoj Žižek argues it is imperative we not simply return to Hegel but that we repeat and exceed his triumphs, overcoming his limitations by being even more Hegelian than the master himself. Such an approach not only enables Žižek to diagnose our present condition, but also to engage in a critical dialogue with key strands of contemporary thought—Heidegger, Badiou, speculative realism, quantum physics, and cognitive sciences. Modernity will begin and end with Hegel."
Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism
It has over a 1,000 page book!
It might seem a bit
It might seem a bit misleading, as noted Hegel's influence has waned significantly. In addition, it might seem to give a bit too much credence to various authors despite their likely 'ideological' function, and it might be said that Zizek takes the various 'modern' influences too positively, while his attitude to Hegel is strangely far more ambiguous, and in general appealed to people by counterposing the older philosophers to new, shiny things, as assimilating such things was an important role in modernity if the ideological functions of capital were to be able to get away with pretending to have a monopoly on such fields. Obviously, Hegel tended towards an overall and historical world-view, which had to be assimilated to prevent it from interfering with attempts to confine people to merely local and atomised existence. It is, however, a bit-part role in a less-than-first-rate play.
In a sense, though, Hegelianism today is unlikely to be found in Zizek, who is highly eclectic, and was generally quite obscure as a viewpoint. Of course, in a sense 'official Hegelianism' was unlikely to take root, because the academies trended towards relativism and such positivistic, stagnant beliefs, and Hegel was of course about absolute values and things which became dangerous at around the time of Marx. In that sense, a lot of what is maintained of Hegelianism is within less 'official' circles, such as within Marxism, where a general position of social antagonism gave it a niche where it could survive. In this sense, it is fairly indebted to Marxism for such things. As such, most forms of active 'Hegelianism' are merely attempts to extract it from Marxism and similar political views, and in this sense become quite marginal in focus and otherwise, and are generally characterised by a lack of much commitment to the author. Hegel generally has little relevance to 'post-modern' authors and so on, who are generally part of an overall retreat from stricter writers like Marx and Kierkegaard, towards a more accessible by then 'laissez-faire' attitude towards people's behaviour and social systems. He might be treated of as Marx is in literary academia, a few catch-phrases and buzzwords that can be paraded around in basically reactionary institutions and texts without causing a serious fuss.
Of course, people had to be reassured that such serious thinkers would not get in the way of their frivolity and systemic belonging, and hence could be reduced to things easily waved away or claimed, and in this sense actually claiming to go beyond Hegel, though it was common in Germany, was generally presented as a fairly specific thing, rather than something that could be done more or less arbitrarily. In that sense, while Zizek might be claiming to have an interest in Hegel, they are other than that generally seeming to cater to the prejudices of modernity that would prefer Hegel accessible, quick and not particularly far above or from more 'modern' thinkers, and in that sense Hegelianism would generally be sought where such traits would not be preferred to the author. Hegelian tendencies can be found in some older books based around the theme of a 'chain of nature,' such as Oliver Goldsmith's serious writings (the eventual anathematisation of which was perhaps anticipated humorously in his 'elegy on the death of a mad dog'), but are less common in modern publications.
You might ask, indeed, whether Engels' declaiming of Feuerbach compared to Hegel near the end might have a strange relation to their - or mostly Marx's - initial critique of Hegel, which was done under Feuerbachian terms and hence might seem slightly unfounded in some ways after this. To be fair, Marx also drew on Hegel quite explicitly later on, for instance with the mathematical manuscripts. Marx's initial 'critique' of Hegel was, of course, very similar to the 'Left Hegelian' trend of claiming that Hegel's system had a point, but was influenced in certain ways by society at the time, except that this was phrased in slightly different terms nonetheless ultimately accusing Hegel of, despite their virtues, being influenced by a quite different kind of system. Engels did go along with this in part, but generally maintained more Hegelian influence, weirdly, and they both might have influenced each other in different ways at different times as that goes, nonetheless Engels did tend to have a slightly cynical view of Hegel, as if he were merely putting a text on repeat for a few hundred times and distracting from his focus. Nonetheless, forms of Marxism that don't mind Engels, comparatively, do tend to display some features comparable to 'Hegelianism.' Strict Hegelianism will be unlikely outside of fields quite strictly inoculated to modern science, as Hegel's attempts at avoiding the division of labour in such fields - which was even in his time a point at which he had to retreat significantly and merely pay deference to the scientists, etc., most of the time, a problematic tendency which his theory had to adjust to (Marx and Engels could be more active in criticising even active scientists and favouring such as Tremaux) - were generally speaking converted into an easy target for such and often was more allowing of this than they could have been (attempts to pretend Marx and Engels 'debunked' in the natural sciences and this being relevant to their theory generally came up against the spines that they were watching and judging this scientific activity themselves and in terms of their own views, while Hegel was quite prone to them.) In terms of the part within en-dashes, a lot of Hegel is merely a fossilised remains of various things said during the 19th Century, although he did tend to guard against certain social tendencies at the time.
In that sense, a continued Hegelianism would either be in fairly obscure or mystical fields - where such themes might be common - or be capable of abstracting his essential or theoretical content from the rest, while not being impressed by merely the 'shiny' claims to give accounts of various subjects and things, which would generally consign it to Marxism or similar views. The virtue of this, however, is that because Hegelianism must be abstracted from its manifestations, it therefore tends to be fairly abstract in nature, so far as it goes, and as a result is also quite obscure.
Thanks for the erudite
Thanks for the erudite response mon ami
Merci.
Merci.