The Path of Struggle

Whoever follows the increasingly insolent violations of reaction in Germany, and in particular the attempts to paralyze the workers' organizations, to hand them over to the employers with their hands tied and to rob them of the right of coalition, will ask himself the question: why is the reactionary agitation so strong just now? The Junkers know only too well that if they drive the masses to despair and indignation, the outcome of the conflict could be highly undesirable for them; they know as well as we do that they cannot keep the working class down; why are they not content with the quiet enjoyment and advantages of their still uncircumcised rule? It has been pointed out before that they cannot do otherwise, because here there is an immediate need of the politics of the moment. The Junkers' fear of the crumbling of agricultural tariffs drives them to pursue a policy of rallying at full speed, and the best slogan for rallying is the struggle against the workers' coalitions. The Russian agrarian policy threatens the grain duties and import coupons; if the bourgeois strata of the urban population were now to become aware of their interest in low food prices, and if they were to form a front with the proletariat, it would be the end of the Junkers' customs usury. That is why the agrarians are working feverishly to chain all representatives of the bourgeois parties to themselves politically; the history of 1877, when the rally against the red coup made the protective tariff possible in the first place, is to be repeated. Therefore, an object of struggle is put forward that puts the entire bourgeoisie in sharp opposition to the workers; the fighting ability of the workers' organizations arouses hatred and fear among petty masters and capitalists alike, and their common desire is to paralyze this fighting ability. This is the background to the busy “rallying policy” that is now in full bloom: the agrarians' wallets are in danger; the right of coalition is the pretended suitable object, but customs usury is the unspoken target. Hence the agitation about the imperial high demonstration; but if the proletariat, as Heine and his friends recommend, were to back down on this question in order not to play into the hands of the collectivist politicians, it would mean nothing other than seeking the help of the bourgeoisie by kowtowing, which could only encourage the boldness of the attackers.

But it is not enough for the proletariat to stand upright and shout defiantly: dare! For they are already daring it; not in such a way that the masses are driven to a violent outbreak by an exceptional law, but by slowly reducing their rights bit by bit. Foot by foot the reaction is advancing.

This shows that the much-vaunted tactic of the wait-and-see defense is not as excellent as its defenders claim. A small determined crowd can often maintain its positions against a superior force by means of this tactic; but here we see how the proletariat is pushed back from position to position without being able to maintain them. And it becomes even worse when the masses begin to lose courage and confidence as a result of this rejection, whereby their own power, clear confidence and organizational strength suffer. Here the working class has to learn from its opponent that attack is the best defense. It cannot allow itself to be pushed into a corner and then strike a powerful blow. And the connections outlined above clearly show how and where the attack must take place. The proletariat can thwart the plans of the Junkers no better than by directing its attack at the weakest point of the enemy, from which the latter seeks to divert attention, and by initiating a vigorous struggle against the tariffs. When the proletariat brings all its power to bear and concentrates it on one object, this object automatically becomes the center of politics – as was the case a few years ago with the Prussian electoral law. By such an attack the rallying of the bourgeoisie can be disturbed in the most evil manner, and thus our oppressed position, the freedom of association, would have been given vent. If the Junkers have to defend their tariffs with all their might, if they are put on the defensive, they can no longer think of directing all their strength towards paralyzing the workers' organizations.

In his work on the political strike, Comrade Laufenberg, one of the best experts on the details of political development in Germany, whose remarks deserve all the more attention because they often deviate from the usual pattern, emphasizes with great emphasis this difference between the two main objects of politics in the coming years. The struggle for the right of association rallies the entire propertied class and isolates the workers; the struggle for tariffs brings to light deep conflicts of interest within the bourgeois masses, breaks up their ranks and places one section alongside the workers. Even if we do not wish to make this contrast so harshly - in every action of the proletariat lies a cause of rallying and also a cause of splintering the opponent, and precisely because the dismantling of the existing customs system shakes up all the relations of existing society, there lies in it a power to hold the whole propertied class together - it is nevertheless perfectly correct in practice. And from this it follows as a necessary tactic of the party that it must now lead the attack on the ruling protective customs system with all its might.

But even without these connections, the necessity of this attack is obvious. Twelve years have passed since the previous tariff battles. Years of the most enormous price increases and inflation, which placed a heavy burden on the petty bourgeois and working masses. What acrimony the agrarian usury policy caused at that time! But nothing could be done, because the tariff rates could not be changed until the trade agreements were renewed. Now, however, they must be renewed; now is the right time to intervene, now it is the duty of Social Democracy, as the spokesman of the masses, to transform the long accumulated resentment into political action. Never before has the opportunity been so favorable: whereas in the past agricultural tariffs were a defense against falling grain prices, they have now become more and more absurd under the rule of rising world market prices.

Of course, the fight should not simply be left to the parliamentarians; the parliamentary means of struggle were considerably weakened during the tariff debates in 1902. Behind our parliamentary group there would have to be a powerful popular movement, which would have to be set in motion by a properly comprehensive preparatory agitation of the party. The means to which this action of the masses would have to go can, of course, only be determined by the particular situation.

There has been a lot of talk about mass strikes recently. But it is not important to have a mass strike; it is not an end, but only a means. Comrade Luxemburg rightly emphasized repeatedly that a mass strike can only be considered in special situations as the highest intensification of an action that is already in flux. What matters is action; in every political question of the moment that affects the vital interests of the proletariat, the party must take action. The tactic must be not to allow the enemy's action to approach in a state of wait-and-see inactivity, but to advance fearlessly in every area which, due to the political situation, is at the center of the struggle. The question of maintaining usury tariffs will be high on the agenda of German politics in the coming year; therefore the fight against usury tariffs will have to be an important topic on the agenda of the Würzburg Party Congress.