Pakistan: The Mummification
of the Class Struggle?

"The highest heroic
effort of which old society is till capable of is national war; and
this is now proved to be a mere humbug, intended to deter the struggle
of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as
that class struggle bursts out into civil war." Karl Marx,
The Civil War in France

The 'illegalization' of
the economy

Any meaningful analysis of
Pakistan has to treat "Pakistan and the Taleban-controlled Afghan
territory as one economic zone" (B. Raman). Otherwise, one would
not understand how an economy in deep crisis, deprived of financial
loans and with a burgeoning labour dispute does not simply fold in on
itself.

There was a concerted effort
by the previous Nawaz Sharif government to transfer all heroin-related
infrastructure to Taleban controlled territory, a process expedited
by the present government of Perviz Musharraf. Significantly, "while
the opium cultivation in Afghanistan is largely in the hands of Afghan
farmers, all heroin refineries in Taleban territory are owned by Pakistani
narcotics barons, enjoying the protection of the Pakistani military
and intelligence establishment" (ibid.). The billions earned each
year in the narcotics trade plus a tax collection improvement of around
20 percent has prevented the collapse of the economy.

The return of the mummy

After a long lull, the class
struggle went into overdrive in the 90s and resulted in stagflation.
Pakistani proletarian migration to the middle east (and its benefits)
was curtailed due to the Gulf War and world recession. Disputes, riots
and strikes were responded to by ever-harsher IMF inspired austerity
measures. Child labour disputes played a prominent role in these escalations.
Some six million children are forced to work in Pakistan and there are
20 million bonded workers (Pakistan Trade Union Defence Campaign Bulletin).
In the carpet industry alone there are 1 million child labourers (this
amounts to 90% of the workforce). Employers are quoted as saying that
they choose factory locations according to the "availability of
children". The 300,000 children in the Brick-Kiln industry are
virtual bonded labourers. Even to keep this miserable occupation they
have to bribe the police routinely. 50,000 children, some as young as
5 years old, work in football manufacturing industry, manually sewing
thick leather. A prominent militant who successfully organized a strike
against privatisation, and the abolition of contract and child labour
was assassinated in 1995 as reprisal. Two years later 20,000 carpet-workers
in Lahore went on strike demanding wage rises, retirement pay, and an
end to child labour.

In 1997 Pakistan witnessed
the spread of disputes to the banking sector when hundreds of militants
were made redundant unceremoniously as a way of breaking up their organization
and curbs were imposed on strikes. The frequent exhortations by the
IMF to impose a 15 per cent general tax on imported and processed food,
gas and petroleum is both unpopular and unworkable as "the revenue
collection system still suffers from widespread corruption and inefficiency"
(Financial Times, 2/Sept/1999). In order to abide by this tight agenda
the Pakistani bourgeoisie launched an attack on electricity and water
workers through downsizing and 'privatisation'. For instance, the federal
government "inducted 30,000 to 35,000 junior commissioned officers
and around 250 officers of the Pakistan army into the Water and Power
development Authority" (Green Left Weekly, 27/Jan/1999). 'Privatisations'
were resisted by workers at Habib Bank through a successful three-week
strike and rail workers who launched a national campaign involving mass
protest meetings and hunger strike camps. Women have played a prominent
role in campaigns against imported baby food as a substitute for mother's
milk and the tobacco companies who target 'third world' countries. The
state hits back by imposing Islamic morality. "At any one time
hundreds of women are imprisoned under the Zina Ordinance, a law that
punishes extra-marital sexual intercourse...The Zina Ordinance also
applies to rape. Under this law...specific types of evidence must be
produced which exclude the testimony of women. By bringing a charge
of rape, a woman is taken to admit that unlawful sexual intercourse
has taken place. A rape victim can therefore be punished after a trial
in which she was given no chance to testify" (Amnesty International).
In fact around 15% of women who bring a case against rape are themselves
charged and imprisoned! Here the state, Islamic jurisprudence and rapists
form a terroristic united front against women (especially proletarian
women) in order to weaken the whole movement.

Ethnic Cleansing as Immobilization

For decades the division of
proletarians into Hindus or Muslims, Indians or Pakistanis and more
recently the fragmentation of Pakistan itself into Eastern (Bangla Desh)
and western sectors aided the bourgeoisie in its strategy of divide
and rule. For example, the underprivileged position of Bengali bureaucrats
and army officers was "a driving force behind - Bengali nationalism
in Pakistan that led eventually to the liberation (sic) of Bangladesh"
(Hamza Alavi). We are beginning to see the gradual break up of such
demarcations as the subcontinent's proletariat tentatively creates horizontal
links regardless of nationality, ethnicity and religious affiliation.
A major factor has been the realization that since Pakistan and India
now both possess nuclear weapons a border dispute at Kashmir can now
result in total mutual annihilation. Pakistan is one of few societies
where there exists three different modes of surplus value extraction:
the pre-formal method of extraction which is a return of all those methods
deemed too antiquated for modern capitalist development (e.g., child
and bonded labour and in exceptional cases slavery); the formal method
of extraction (which dominates most of Pakistan); and the real method
of extraction (which has been inaugurated through the nuclear industry
and other advanced sectors of the economy). This latter tendency not
only determines the rate of exploitation in the rest of society but
also aggressively sucks up surplus value from the lower rungs.

The history of nuclear development
in India and Pakistan shows how every major capitalist power is implicated
in the subcontinent's arm race. With regard to India, President Eisenhower
offered atomic technology in 1953 for "civilian use". Three
years later the US supplied India with heavy water, which is used to
control nuclear fusion. In 1959 US trains Indian scientists in reprocessing
and a decade later France agrees to help India develop breeder reactors.
The USSR becomes India's main supplier of heavy water in 1976 and a
year later India develops supercomputers capable of testing nuclear-weapon
explosions. In 1998 India conducts five underground nuclear tests, declaring
itself a "nuclear state" (New York Times, 28/May/1998).

Pakistan launched its program
somewhat later reflecting its less 'developed' economy. In 1972, following
its third war with India, Pakistan starts its program with the aid of
Canadian 'Imperialism'. Five years later, Britain sells 30 high-frequency
inverters for controlling centrifugal speeds. In 1981 the Reagan administration
begins "generous military and financial aid because of Pakistani
help to Afghan rebels battling Soviets" (ibid.). Two years later,
China supplies Pakistan with bomb design. Pakistan becomes a nuclear
power in the same year as India, 1998. Looking at it historically, it
seems that the US, British and Canadian ruling classes have tried to
extend their influence in both India and Pakistan whereas Russia and
France have concentrated on India and China has opted for Pakistan.
We expect these rivalries to intensify.

Bangladesh: the other side
of the coin

If Afghanistan should be perceived
as an integral economic part of Pakistan then Bangladesh and Pakistan
should be viewed as an integral political entity. For whatever happens
in one society has an immediate political ramifications for the other.
So let us look more closely at Bangladesh.

Natural disasters (e.g. floods)
are usually blamed for the economic plight of Bangladesh. But the 90s
saw a massive escalation of the class struggle in the country. In 1990
violent riots broke out in the capital, Dacca (International Communist
Group, Communism, no. 12). Two years later several thousand striking
proletarians were brutally repressed in Dacca, and a year later striking
textile workers were the target. The same year witnessed the shutting
down of four universities described by the state as "centres of
conspiracy and terrorism" (ibid.). In 1994 despite the unions'
best efforts to sabotage the struggle of dockers at the port of Chittagong,
all traffic was halted. Harvests were burnt as protest against wage
cuts in the same year. In 1995 textile workers blocked many roads and
railways in protest against their work conditions. The Pakistani and
indeed Indian proletariat observed these events with interest but, as
far as we can gather, without active participation.

Bonaparte come back: all
is forgiven!

General Perviz Musharraf was
promoted as the Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee at the beginning
of October 1999 by the civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
Merely a week later he had organized a coup against his boss. Well,
there's gratitude for you!

The reasons for the take-over
were numerous but chief amongst them were the following: proletarian
strikes by cotton growers across the country who blocked roads and organized
mass demonstrations (cotton amounts to 70% of total 'legal' export);
the government's attempt to introduce an unpopular tax was successfully
defeated by small traders; Sharif's highway construction mentality had
overseen the bulldozering of many historical buildings creating resentment
amongst the urban population; the IMF's plans for 'privatisation' had
met fierce resistance especially in the railway, telecommunication and
electricity industries; Sharif's attempt to disentangle Pakistan from
Afghanistan by blaming the latter for terrorist activities inside Pakistani
borders did not go down very well with the 'intelligence community';
and finally, having realized that the General was as ambitious as he
was ruthless, the government tried in vain to get rid of him only a
week after promoting him. This was the last straw. The coup was inevitable.
Today, the General seems more secure than his predecessor. The demonstrations
in Pakistan have been confined to ethnic minorities, so far. The USA
needs him, at least temporarily. The IMF has been more generous with
loans and debt repayments, up to a point. And the Pakistani proletariat,
as opposed to Afghani proletarians inside Pakistan, has been relatively
quiet, at least up to now. And the General has been careful not to alienate
rich landowners who were last taxed heavily under Bhutto's government
(despite Bhutto herself coming from the same background!). Having said
all that, this war is less predictable than Kosovo and the Gulf War.
If things do not go according to script, who knows, anything could happen!

(Afghan Series, Number 4)
8.11.01

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