Very short article by KAPD talking about the personality cult of Lenin in Russia. Originally published in "KAZ, 1924, No. 13".
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Although Lenin has been dead for about a year, specifically since his last feat of strength—the retreat of the Communist Party of Russia (KPR) to the defensive line of the NEP—the mere fact that he still seemed alive was enough to silence all conflicts within the Russian party. It was uncanny to observe what power still emanated from this living corpse, how the feeble breath of his mouth remained more powerful than the weightiest arguments of his critics. The mere name "Lenin" held everyone spellbound and stifled any independent impulse from the outset. With the formula "Lenin has said" or "Lenin wants," all opposition was preemptively defeated.
To us in Western Europe, who are more sober and critical, especially toward individuals, this cult of a single man seems somewhat distasteful. We certainly do not deny the value of a great personality for the movement, but for us, the measure of their greatness will always be solely the benefit the cause derives from them. The pomp of the funeral ceremonies, the display of the corpse, and the worker’s blouse in which the writer and statesman was buried—all of this smells a bit like theater to us. Of course, this is not mere idolization of the person; it is also politically motivated, "something for the heart" of the working masses of Europe and Asia, so to speak. But it is precisely at such a point that we repeatedly feel how deep the gulf is between these communists and us. It is not merely a tactical difference when they, unlike us, believe they can advance the revolution with propaganda on an American scale. It is their conception of the essence of the revolution itself that runs like a pink thread through all their events—whether it’s the "conquest of the trade unions" or a funeral ceremony in the Great Theater, "revolutionary parliamentarism" or a political traveling variety show, which the propaganda department recently resorted to, or red hundreds chanting the slogans of great men. They see the revolution as a matter of organization, of shrewder propaganda, of louder mouths. They believe in the revolution (if at all...) as a fixed point to which the masses merely need to be led, by force or cunning. We believe in the revolution as an act of the masses themselves, a social process that cannot be forced or persuaded. That’s why our main focus is on showing the masses the obstacles that stand in their way to liberation and giving them the tools to overcome those obstacles. It is well known that in Europe, these obstacles lie primarily in the ideology of the masses themselves, meaning that the main cleanup work must take place in the minds of the proletarians. Among these blocks, which cast a shadow over the face of the struggling working class, is, among other things, the "great leader."
Once the initial smoke of the revolution had cleared, Lenin weighed like a nightmare not only on Russia but on the entire revolutionary proletariat of the world. As much as he contributed to the destruction of feudalism and large landownership, he also contributed to the destruction of the free revolutionary initiative of the proletariat. Thanks to the idolization he enjoyed, his famous "mistakes"—which were no less disastrous because he was always the first to admit them afterward—became international dogmas. One need not think of the abolition of the Councils, nor of Kronstadt, where Council Communists were "shot like partridges," nor of the "infantile disorder." One need only imagine that in Russia, 130 million people had to remain silent because one man spoke, that one man could praise, reprimand, or command the entire international proletariat like a herd of young recruits, and one grasps the infinite damage done to the minds of workers in all countries. Though "power positions may have been built upon power positions," the one thing that matters—proletarian self-consciousness and independent thinking—has been weakened for a long time. We are Marxist enough not to blame Lenin as a person. Rather, we condemn the system that gives individuals a position which, even unintentionally, must lead to abuse.
How artificial the structure built on Lenin’s name was is proven by recent events. His body was not yet cold when "party discipline," the backbone of the RSFSR, began to waver. Preobrazhensky and Sapronov, old and proven communists—the former the author of the "ABC of Communism"—were the first to step forward with open criticism of the conditions in the party. Pyatakov and Ossinsky, the Commissar for Agriculture, joined them. A veritable storm broke out against the Central Committee. They demanded the removal of the "three men" (Stalin, Kamenev, Zinoviev) and a radical restructuring of the party, particularly the abolition of the system of appointing officials and the reintroduction of elections. Alongside this, they unleashed a discussion about the NEP. They called for the complete restoration of capitalism, the industrialization of Russia; it seems strange that these people, who want this, must be called revolutionary in contrast to a Zinoviev, who clings to the old communist tradition. Alongside this opposition, a second, more reformist one has developed, centered around Bukharin, which also demands a reshuffling of the Central Committee. A third, fourth, and fifth opposition have emerged through partial overlap and partial rejection of the various demands—for instance, Radek, who considers the reorganization of the party correct but the complete capitalization of Russia wrong. Amid this discussion, a question has also been raised; it is small and unassuming, but the fact that it has been asked at all speaks volumes: "Was the Russian Revolution even a socialist one?" The nightmare is lifting from the minds, and hope is returning.
For now, Zinoviev has postponed the discussion until the next congress by having the editorial staff of Pravda arrested and taking over its leadership himself. Trotsky, who has semi-officially spoken out for the good old communism of military observance—so to speak, "happiness for the people with cannons"—is in Baku, allegedly for health reasons. His weakness, however, allows him to write articles and letters in greater volume and to confer extensively with his generals Budyonny and Kolenko. At 45 years old, he is a man possessed by burning ambition. He was never a Bolshevik in the political sense, belonged to the left wing of the old Social Democracy, and has always adamantly refused to be a "Leninist." After Lenin’s death, he is the most popular man in Russia, with the army completely devoted to him.
The threads with which Lenin pulled his puppets seem to be increasingly tangling into an inextricable knot. Perhaps it will be Trotsky’s sword that cuts through this knot.
Comments
Lenin Claus is probably my…
Lenin Claus is probably my favorite manifestation of the Lenin personality cult: