The Rojava resistance: rebirth of the anticapitalist struggle - Salvador Zana

You should add it to the library Kurrem.

@kurrme what really surprised me was the ridiculous adulation of ocalan who according to this article is "one of the most outstanding revolutionaries of all time"

Soapy

@kurrme what really surprised me was the ridiculous adulation of ocalan who according to this article is "one of the most outstanding revolutionaries of all time"

Absurd as it may look this discourse is actually an expression of PKKs internal ideological operation. There is a logic and purpose in this. "Discussion" in the PKK is organized around a clear structure based on these basic steps:

1- It starts by admitting or acknowledging the existence of a problem or several problems.

2- Since the leader can not be mistaken the problem(s) must be found among the rank&file, in the ignorance of the people, laziness of the party members etc.

3- Hence the problems are individualized/

4- Then finally they are confessed and recognized in the form of guilt, deserving at least moral self-punishment.

You can see this in the way the essay ends with a "self-criticism" of "international forces" for lagging behind in showing enough enthusiasm, in supporting the "revolution" with full zeal.

Crushing the personality and self-confidence of militants is a technique that stalinist organizations advanced, and PKK is excelled at that. With a bookchinist/activist flavor this is being put into circulation again.

Kurremkarmerruk,
You and chauvinists like you are in no position to order me anything. I am not afraid of your kind.

I don't know, this article feels pretty Maoist to me.

I wouldn't say Maoist. Enthusiastic, yes. Hero-worshippy, undoubtedly so.

Salvador Zana:

I will not elaborate this point, as one of the great things about Ocalan is that he has developed a more thourough analysis of these issues than I or any other human could hope to perform in our times (although I hope on this prognosis I will be proved mistaken).

the Ocalan movement

rat

Salvador Zana:

I will not elaborate this point, as one of the great things about Ocalan is that he has developed a more thourough analysis of these issues than I or any other human could hope to perform in our times (although I hope on this prognosis I will be proved mistaken).

the Ocalan movement

Yes, comments like that really do set off a few alarm bells here and there.

[youtube]g6yTRq_rJg4[/youtube]

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rh9zii64eVMtfF5cwEKpx1QAKk9ZP4lDkGl4OSzXiSI/edit

kurremkarmerruk, I deleted your other post of this in the library because this had already been changed from a forum to a library entry.

It is good to hear a voice against conscription from inside the YPG. Its good to see ANF News publish such a criticism.

The article does indeed praise Ocalan as an almost unfallible leader, and by calling the movement ""Ocalanist "i ts writer does a disservice to the struggle. I have come to distrust any political or social movement that calls itself after one individual (yes, that includes Marxism) Yes, there is hero worship here I find distatesteful and dangerous.

At the same time, ihe article does contain critical elements which are to be applauded. The fact that a disctinct lack of support fo conscription is expressed, within a pro-PKK article, is remarkable. And stressing that a Rojava in isolation cannot survive as a revolutionary society, is good as well. But the question then becomes: if you want to extend the movement from below, does that sit well with seeking alliances from above? What if people in a pro-American state - Turkey, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Jordan - get Rojava-like ideas? Do you then support these people? And do you think that the US will then keep on supporting you with bombs? Are you willing to give up US support in order to extend the revolutionary possibilie ties from below? Or will things go the other way around, and will everey whiff of solidarity beyond borders be sacrificed for power politics?

The comparison between 1936 Catalonia and 2015 Rojava, by the way, should be critically ripped to pieces. The FAI was not the armed wing of the CNT,as the comparison implies, but more a network of ideologically inspired affinity groups and activists. The 'armed wing' of the movement was not the FAI but the CNT militias. And the driving force in Barcelona was not the issue of Catalan autonomy that got revolutionary dimensions, as is the case in Rojava with the Kurdish struggle. It was plain class struggle that happened to be strong in the industrial city of Barcelona which happend to in the Catalan part of the Spanish state. There was not much specifically 'Catalan' about it, and the revolution was very strong in the countryside of Aragon as well.

There WAS an aspiration for Catalan autonomy. But that was expressed through bourgois Republicanism (Companys cum suis), not through the CNT. The comparison with the Kurdish fight for national self-determination simply does not apply.

To summarize: Rojava is a national struggle that got more radical dimensions, maybe with anticapitalist possibilities. In Spain the struggle started out openly anticapitalist from the very beginning, but got derailed.

There is much more to be said about this article, unbalanced but interesting as it is. But I will leave it at this, for now.

iirc I tongue-in-cheekily referred to the cheerful mob at the Newroz carnival in Diyarbakir as doing the Apo-Calypso on my social media feed.

rooieravotr

The FAI was not the armed wing of the CNT,as the comparison implies, but more a network of ideologically inspired affinity groups and activists. The 'armed wing' of the movement was not the FAI but the CNT militias.

Not entirely correct. From the early 1920s onwards the defence of teh CNT against the employers hired pistoleros, was carried out by FAI groups like the famous "Nosotros"/"Los Solidarios" which made paramilitaries like Durruti, Ascaso and Garcia Oliver famous. In some ways it was the lionised status they gained as a result of their armed activity that meant they were able to lead so many cenetistas, anarchists and non-anarchists, into the compromise with the Generalitat and then the Republican government.

By the same author Middle Eastern power plays and the People's Spring

Latest from Salvador Zana:

Middle Eastern Power Plays and the People's Spring Rojava

It points out Saudi Arabia and the GCC are more interesting in fighting Shia than fighting Daesh. It puts Rojava in the context of Arab Spring. It claims the failures of various Arab Spring movements were caused by their lack or organization. It reiterates the multi-ethnic character of Rojava revolution. It claims some rebel groups around Aleppo have joined the YPG. It claims a "vibrant exchange of ideas in the Aleppo region between Arab and Kurdish communities". It reiterates opposition to Assad.

I imagine we'll being hearing more from Salvador Zana.

ocelot

rooieravotr

The FAI was not the armed wing of the CNT,as the comparison implies, but more a network of ideologically inspired affinity groups and activists. The 'armed wing' of the movement was not the FAI but the CNT militias.

Not entirely correct. From the early 1920s onwards the defence of teh CNT against the employers hired pistoleros, was carried out by FAI groups like the famous "Nosotros"/"Los Solidarios" which made paramilitaries like Durruti, Ascaso and Garcia Oliver famous. In some ways it was the lionised status they gained as a result of their armed activity that meant they were able to lead so many cenetistas, anarchists and non-anarchists, into the compromise with the Generalitat and then the Republican government.

Not that this thread should turn into a Spanish anarchy nerd off but this is also misleading, ocelot. For one thing, the second sentence is quite obviously incorrect since the FAI did not exist in the early 20s, so in the most famous years of pistolerismo the action groups cannot have been composed of FAI members. The FAI's (broadly unfair and misleading) link to anarchist violence came about during the radicalisation of the CNT in the early part of the 2nd Republic. The Nosotros group did not affiliate to the FAI until 1933.

Some details on the Sheikh Maksoud neighborhood in northwest Aleppo under the control of the YPG, 02/2015:

Most of the inhabitants of the neighborhood are displaced and poor. There is complete power outage, and streets are filled with holes and puddles. The activity of the relief committees is limited compared to the large number of people in need. Fatima said, “A month ago, we received one cleaning basket. Fuel prices are very high, and we have to cut wood for heat. But, thank God, we are in a much better state than some families that can’t find anyone to support them.”

The local council in the neighborhood handles the civil administration of the area, and its chairman, Imad Daoud, brags that his council is made up of representatives of all sects and races — Muslims, Christians, Arabs and Kurds.

Leafing through the residential records, he told Al-Monitor, “Around 90,000 people from diverse religions and races live in Sheikh Maksoud. More than half of the residents are displaced people seeking security. Our doors are open to everyone.”

Although the neighborhood is safe from shelling, in the past two months it has seen a wave of displaced due to concerns about a possible blockade that the regime forces might impose on Aleppo. The neighborhood is open to other neighborhoods that are under the opposition’s control, and it has frontlines along which the opposition forces and the YPG are positioned against the regime

“Around two months ago, the population in the neighborhood reached 120,000, but recently, many were displaced outside Aleppo to flee the blockade,” Daoud added.

The council handles the distribution of humanitarian aid to refugees, and dozens of poor people regularly return to the council’s office.

While Daoud addresses the affairs of some of them, he said, “Most of the neighborhood residents do not have an income to support their livelihood, as they lost their jobs. We receive from the organizations, on a monthly basis, 1,200 food rations and another 1,200 containers of cleaning detergents to be distributed to the displaced. But these cannot meet the huge needs.”

He added, “The residents need additional funding to pay fees for generators. Power has been cut for three years now, after the Shaqif power plant, which is a small industrial area in Aleppo, was shelled by the air force. We are facing difficulties in supplying an alternative power line.”

Aleppo's displaced find refuge in Kurdish regions

Ethnically diverse disaster communism of the newly lumpen proletariat.

In 2013:

At the top of the hill near the area’s main mosque, groups of rebels mingled, in newfound amity, with Kurdish fighters from the local People’s Defense Units, the armed wing of Syria’s main Kurdish group, the Democratic Union Party (P.Y.D.). Until Friday, this area had been controlled by Kurdish fighters but was frequently visited by militias and intelligence agents from the regime of Bashar al-Assad. On Friday, though, in an event that may have momentous consequences for the course of the civil war, the Kurds switched sides, and with their help the rebels overran Sheikh Maksoud, which commands strategic high ground north of the city’s center.

The Kurdish Factor

Unlike the more homogenous Kurdish areas of Iraq and Turkey, the Kurdish areas in Syria do not constitute a contiguous Kurdish region, making the development of Kurdish autonomy in Syria more difficult. The Kurds in Syria are spread between three unconnected Kurdish enclaves (Afrin, Ayn al-Arab and al-Jazeera), located in the governorates of Aleppo and Hasakah, which are surrounded by Arab and Turkmen-inhabited areas. There are also Christians living in these areas.

Interim Administration Project

The PYD has recognized this geographical reality; therefore, on November 11 they announced the division of the Kurdish areas into three cantons, with each canton having its own council to administer local affairs. PYD-leader Salih Muslim hopes that “the three of them will be united at a later stage when circumstances allow them to do so” (KurdishInfo.com, December 7).

The YPG militia was formed to control the Kurdish-dominated areas of Syria. The YPG confirmed in November that they want to connect these Kurdish areas by capturing the areas of Tel Ebyad, Azaz and Jarabulus, inhabited by Turkmen and Arabs and mostly controlled by Islamist groups close to al-Qaeda.

Most likely, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) took precautionary measures against this by arresting Kurdish civilians suspected of sympathy towards the PYD. Reportedly, hundreds of members of the ISIS arrived in the Kurdish neighborhoods of Manbej in the Jarabulus region on December 2, followed by the kidnapping of 51 Kurdish civilians in three days and the imposition of a blockade on Afrin and Kobani (Hawar News Agency, December 6; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, December 5; Welati, December 7).

A pro-ISIS Twitter account claimed that the ISIS raided YPG sleeper cells and arrested more than “50 apostates” (@zhoof21, December 6). Moreover, Islamist groups have been bringing Arabs from other areas to Tel Ebyad and putting them in Kurdish houses to increase their support (Firat News Agency, August 25).

The ISIS and other Islamist armed opposition groups had earlier forced the Kurdish FSA group Jabhat al-Akrad (close to the PYD and PKK) out of the mixed areas in the north of Syria – al-Bab, Azzaz, Raqqah, Tel Ebyad, the countryside of Aleppo and other areas – after the YPG expelled the ISIS and other Islamist groups from the mixed city of Ras al-Ayn on July 17. Jabhat al-Akrad was also expelled from the FSA’s Military Council in August (Transnational Middle-East Observer, August 15).

Jabhat al-Akrad was most likely created by the PYD to gain access to mixed Arab-Kurdish areas and to make logistics between the three Kurdish enclaves easier. “Kurds in Syria live in various Arab cities, towns and villages. We wanted Kurds to have a common organization in these regions with other ethnicities. Therefore, we established Jabhat al Akrad,” said Haji Ahmad Kurdi, head of Jabhat al-Akrad (Rudaw, August 11).

A New Strategy Toward the Arab Population

However, since the YPG took over Ras al-Ayn and Jabhat al-Akrad was expelled from most mixed areas, the PYD and YPG have changed their strategy. On October 24, the YPG captured the Iraqi Yaroubiya border crossing with the support of local Arab tribes (al-Monitor, November 25). Some Arab villages supported the YPG in expelling FSA and Islamist fighters in villages surrounding Ras al-Ayn as a result of looting by armed opposition groups (al-Monitor, October 8).

However, Arab fighters could still switch their support to Islamist armed groups if the Kurdish groups grow too powerful and threaten to dominate Arab-inhabited areas in the north. Four leading members of the Arab Ba’ath party joined jihadist groups in Arab villages in al?Qahtaniyah (Tirbesipi) fighting the YPG even though the Ba’ath-regime opposes Jihadi groups (Hawar News Agency, October 13). The city experienced tensions between Arab settlers and Kurds after 2011 and is part of the Arab belt.

The PYD therefore maintains a careful policy towards the mixed areas and tries to incorporate Arabs and Christians in their interim administration. This is also part of the imprisoned PKK leader’s ideology of democratic confederalism, which opposes a centralist nation-state and aims to preserve internal autonomy.

Öcalan’s system of confederalism aims for “political self-administration where all groups of society and all cultural identities can express themselves in local meetings, general conventions and councils,” Öcalan wrote in his ideology of democratic confederalism, released on March 20, 2005. [1]

Sinem Muhammad, co-head of the PYD People’s Council for West Kurdistan, said that the PYD rejects borders and called for the recognition of ethnic differences between Arabs and Kurds. She said that in mixed areas, Arabs have the right to have their own council and participate in the administration with their own councils. [2]

The ideology of the PYD and PKK seems to have had some success in the Arab village of Alook, close to Ras al-Ayn, where local Arabs thanked the YPG (al-Monitor, October 13). A local council of Arabs was formed in the village with the help of the PYD, and the YPG stayed out of the village to demonstrate that they do not want to change the local demography.
The YPG also got some support from members of the Shammar tribe when they took over the Yaroubiya border crossing on October 24. The Shammar tribe’s FSA brigade, the Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ), was expelled from Yaroubiya in mid-October following allegations of corruption by the al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). [3] The YPG used the local resentment against al-Qaeda to dominate the town.

There are signs that the YPG is now trying to incorporate Arabs in their armed formations. On November 1, the YPG created an Arab brigade in Ras al-Ayn called Ahrar al-Watan (Free Men of the Homeland), led by Hawas al-Akub (Hawar News Agency, November 1). Also in Yaroubiya, local Arabs joined YPG security formations and local Arabs and Kurds will reportedly jointly administer the border-crossing(al-Monitor, November 25).

PYD leader Salih Muslim outlined a clearer Arab policy in a recent interview, saying that the PYD’s militias would fight against jihadi groups, but would not force out local Arabs, whether settlers or native Arabs:

"There are three sorts of Arabs among us: there are those with whom we have always lived and who we have fought alongside. We defend the brotherhood between these peoples. There are those who do not belong, Arabs who came from outside, other countries or the region, the jihadists who have burned our homes, and decapitated Kurds. Finally, there are the Arabs who were moved to Kurdistan by force by (former Syrian President) Hafez al-Assad ... to Arabize the region. They are victims ... and we advocate a peaceful solution for these populations. Those who can return to their hometowns should do so and the others can live in peace with the Kurds

(AFP December 2).

Conclusion

It seems that the most powerful Kurdish party, the PKK-affiliated PYD, has decided to expand their control over mixed areas in Northern Syria instead of cooperating with the FSA. Their aim is to create a transitional administration. In mixed areas under their control, the PYD also wants to create councils of the local population based on the ideology of imprisoned PKK leader Öcalan and has a ‘soft policy’ that gives local Arabs their own local power. The PYD aims to include local Arabs and Christians in their administration project and their militias, or to cooperate with independent Arab or Christian militias. In the end, the success of their project will depend on whether the civil war continues, or one of the opposing factions wins. If either faction wins, they would be unlikely to accept any form of Kurdish autonomy. The PYD hopes to get international support in the upcoming Geneva II conference scheduled for January in order to legitimize their project. The PYD emphasizes that their project is temporary, although in reality they want to create a form of Kurdish self-rule in Syria.

Kurdish Strategy Towards Ethnically-Mixed Areas in the Syrian Conflict, December 13, 2013

Aleppo had become safe places for the people, adding: “A secure life has been established. People who fled to Iraq and Turkey have begun to return. We are calling on people to come back.”

Rezan Rojhat said around 100,000 people lived in the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Aleppo. He said people who had taken refuge in the city from other places made up 60% of the population of these neighbourhoods. Rojhat said these neighbourhoods were protected by the YPG/YPJ.

YPG commander Rezan Rojhat said there was also an Arab battalion within the YPG and Christians in the public security force. He said people had started to come back from Iraq and Turkey, and that some of the people in Aleppo had fled attacks by ISIS gangs on villages in Kobanê. “We expect people to return now we have established security in the Kurdish neighbourhoods. Of course there are problems. For instance, unemployment. We have tried to resolve this with economic projects. Our part of Aleppo is an example of the progress we have made as regards our understanding of democratic autonomy

YPG Aleppo commander: Syrian regime failed to regain control over Kurdish neighborhoods, 02/10/2015

In light of Salvador Zana's statements about Aleppo, he seems to be politically priming the pump for some YPG Arab-Kurd resistance to Assad specifically in Aleppo:

"Around Aleppo some have joined the YPG, as it remains the only fighting force to uphold the ideals of the revolution. The threat of Daesh and the horrible years of war have brought many Syrians to rally behind Assad again.

"The fire of the revolution is still silently burning beneath the rubble, and when the unifying common enemy in the form of Daesh disappears and Assad tries to return to normality, these tensions will bring society to erupt again. Already now there is a vibrant exchange of ideas in the Aleppo region between Arab and Kurdish communities. It is now the duty of Rojava to make it known that the revolution has not died and that the new society already exists. The rips within Syrian society are far too deep to be mended by Assad. "

If they move against the regime in the rest of Aleppo, I would't be surprised if they declared another canton. O.K. I would be surprised. That would be a pretty amazing change in the situation. If the YPG has brought secular Arab rebels into a realignment with them on the TEV-DEM program, that would be significant.

Here is what Aleppo looks like right now:
another map

Sounds like the Assembly in Şêx Meqsȗd (Sheikh Maksoud) is pushing that Project for a Democratic Syria statement hard in Aleppo.

The chairman of joint Assembly in Şêx Meqsȗd neighborhood of Aleppo city confirmed that democratic solution project for Syria is a perfect solution for peace and co-existence between the spectra of the society and its components. Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM) for solution of the Syrian crisis presented a political democratic solution project in fourth anniversary of the Syrian revolution. It attracted attention of many political parties. The chairman of joint Assembly in Şêx Meqsȗd neighborhood of Aleppo city Îmad Dawȗd in this regard has spoken to ANHA. He said: “This project will stop the bloodshed in Syria and will provide peace”. Dawȗd also stated that this project includes all the components of society.

TEV-DEM project is for all Syrian components 3/29/2015

I had thought that TEV-DEM statement on a Project for a Democratic Syria was something being pushed out of Cizre or Afrin as a hope to hold onto autonomy if Assad came out on top. But, with it being pushed in Aleppo, it may be an attempt to realign rebels there under a YPG banner.

Here is an article from 2013 on YPG recruitment of Arab FSA fighters in Aleppo: Arabs join Kurdish militia in Aleppo 2/9/2013

Abdurrahman Saleh, a spokesperson for ISIS, confirmed in our interview with him an alliance between Syrian anti-Assad rebels and Kurds, but suggested it to be a local alliance rather than a cohesive policy. “Some battalions of al-Tawheed brigade in Aleppo cooperate with the YPG against ISIS, but I do not know if this is a general decision, or a specific case. It may be a local agreement, rather than an overall strategy,

Kurdish-Arab Rebel Alliance May be Key to Obama’s Syrian Strategy, Mutlu Civiroglu and Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, February 12, 2015

I've met Mutlu Civiroglu and tend to regard his analysis and information as reliable. Though saying this is Obama's plan seems rather like a click-bait headline.

I knew about Euphrates Volcano and their success in Kobane and at the Qara Qawzak.bridge, and now the Lafarge cement plant. I didn't know the scope of cooperation the YPG had built up with Arabs and/or the FSA in Aleppo.

Whatever the PYD is... it is ambitious.

Jihad Ghazal coordinator of security relations in the Alshamia Front, which consists of severalt factions of freeSyrian armyin north eastren of Aleppo told Hawar news today Saturday 04/04/2015 and continued Ghazal The nation-state has failed over the past forty years in Syria, pointing out that the reality and the facts proved that self-management in the Kurdish areas experience a successful experience, adding that the draft of the Syrian democratic solution can serve as a solution for Syria, "a condition that the Syrian regime falls a whole "...

a group of Free Syrian Army factions in Aleppo north and north-west and east have formed a joint military council a few days ago under aLShamia front YPG has sent a cable of congratulations , includes Alshamia front and Alhazim movement that stood and rejected agendas of the Islamic state and all extreme battalions and north storm and other moderate combat battalions in the Free Syrian Army

Coordinator of security relations in the Alshamia front: Blessing the YPG and the nation-state has failed in Syria and self-management is successful experience, 4/4/2015

Based on the flag behind Ghazal, this is Levant Front. Curious that he is using such TEV-DEMish rhetoric for a front of so many Islamists. And, listed on the PYD site. This is the only place I've ever seen his name. The specific reference to Hazim is curious since they were largely wiped out by Al Nursa. Prior to that, they were one of the groups to get U.S. TOW missiles.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levant_Front

Commentary about this front has been "it's all the rebels in Aleppo except the jihadis"

It's really very weird for someone presumably influential in Levant Front to be mouthing Tev-Dem's program. A cynic would say its because Tev-Dem's program is so meaningless, even a coalition of "moderate" Islamists and "moderate" secular U.S./Qatari proxies could get behind it. An optimist might say that the shared defense of certain neighborhoods in Aleppo against the atrocities of the Ba'ath (which, body count wise, is as bad or worse than Daesh), against Daesh and the multi-ethnic outreach PYD has been doing brought Arabs rebels who were previously skeptical of the PYD/YPG/Tev-Dem into considering their program seriously. The YPG seems to have treated Arab refugees in Aleppo right. A middle position might be that these statements are atleast lip service that Levant Front will respect Rojava democratic autonomy for now and perhaps after the defeat of Assad. It may be that all of these are true, depending on who is saying it.

It certainly is a change in situation from when the FSA executed the military commander of the YPG in Aleppo.

Here is an article shared by the usually pro-KCK KurdishQuestion from Green Left Weekly that contrasts the YPG/YPJ from Levant Front, making the argument is worthy of "Green Left" support and that the Levant Front is not.

the Levant Front’s ideological underpinnings range from the “hard-line Salafism (of Islamic Front groups), across Muslim Brotherhood and other mainstream Sunni Islamist tendencies, to more or less apolitical factions linked to the Western and Gulf-backed exile structure that is loosely referred to as the Free Syrian Army

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said the Hazzm Movement had received some heavy weapons from the US and, describing the group as “a moderate/secularist faction, not an extremist/jihadist group,” recommended it as “a model for the type of group the United States and its allies can support with meaningful, lethal military assistance”.

Al Akbar reported on May 22 that many of the brigades forming the Hazzm Movement were explicitly Islamist. They had ties to Qatar and Turkey, the latter being the conduit for US-supplied optically-tracked, wire-guided missiles... Al Akbar said the Hazzm Movement was competing for Western aid with “the Syrian Revolutionaries Front … the Saudi candidate for explicit Western support”.

By comparison, the values of the Rojava resistance consist of grassroots democracy, ecological socialism and feminism. Moreover, not only is the Rojava resistance committed to freedom of religious belief and a separation of religion from politics, it is committed to full equality and the inclusion of Rojava’s non-Kurdish minorities, which include Chechens, Armenians, Aramaeans and Arabs.

The history of Arab chauvinism both under the Assad regime and from the opposition groups has meant that the resistance has had to work carefully with the Arab population in Rojava. In an interview published on Ecology or Catastrophe on February 1, Peoples Defence Units (YPG) spokesperson Huseyin Kocer said, “Hundreds of Arabs take part in the YPG and YPJ (Women’s Defence Units) … many of the Arab villagers support Daesh (IS) but we don’t try to harm them. Many of the villagers feel they have to support Daesh out of fear…

“We try to create consciousness of freedom and liberation. We try to communicate the need for self-organisation. Not only to sustain daily life but also politically.

“In places that we have liberated, the people’s council … goes there and helps them organise … We help and support them in creating councils where they live. We discuss with them and propose to them our democratic project.”

With the odds stacked against them, the YPG and YPJ have taken back 20 towns from the IS in the past year — which is a greater achievement than the Levant Front, the Hazzm Movement and Al-Nusra put together. What sets Kobane apart from other fighting militias is that their fight is more ideological than it will ever be physical — a fight not just for the liberation of Kurdistan or Syria but a fight for human liberation.

Syria: Why Rojava is Different, 2/6/2015

That last bit about the YPG/YPJ being more successful than Levant Front, Hazzm and Al-Nursa combined is arguably true. Aleppo is the largest city and the YPG has held its neighborhoods and its probably the most peaceful part of the city, further the population of its neighborhood swelled because of its security and it has taken in an ethnically diverse population. Al-Hasakah and Qamishli were the 8th and 9th largest cities in Syria before the war and they are in the Cizre canton (the "capitol of Rojava"), they have grown as well through refugees. The YPG has some 45,000 soldiers.

Hazzm was thought to be destroyed by Al-Nursa is is supposedly down to 400 soldiers. All the groups making up the Levant Front are considerably smaller than the YPG with the exception of the Islamic Front... but supposedly ONLY the Aleppo section of the Islamic Front is part of Levant Front. However, its also described as virtually defunct.

It maybe the Levant Front only really exists because different rebel groups were getting too small to operate on their own and they have teamed up together for survival against the Ba'ath; and the YPG happens to be the next biggest game in town and seems to have held to its position on incorporating Arabs.

The Levant Front: Can Aleppo’s Rebels Unite?12/26/2014

At the start of this conflict, noone would have guessed that the YPG would have come to lead Aleppo.

Judicial Agreement in Aleppo between Levant Front and YPG , 2/5/2015

Maybe more importantly, it acknowledges YPG control over not just Sheikh Maqsud but also the Ashrafiyah and Rusafah neighborhoods of Aleppo.

Flint, Our different takes on the events on Syria/Rojava aside I appreciate the flow of information you are providing - especially the 'extracts' as I don't always have time to dig into all the fuller linked texts - and as I'm taking a short break I will try to catch up with all this later.

In the past two days, Syrian field sources have confirmed the arrival of huge military reinforcements to Aleppo, ahead of the “zero hour” for a major operation, which may extend beyond the “siege” on the city. Most notably, the sources referred to a “main role by Kurdish fighters in the prospective [military] act,” which (at least apparently) contradicts the recent talk about a rapprochement between the Kurds and the “Sham Front,” which includes the major armed groups in Aleppo affiliated with the Turks. In the last two days, the “Sham Front” tried to achieve new gains in their battles against the Syrian army and its allies on the Bureij and al-Mallah fronts, two key fronts in the “Aleppo siege” battle. Despite the significant progress made by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) in the north-eastern Aleppo countryside, which might lead to their control of wide parts of the Syrian-Turkish border, disagreement between the YPG and the Sham Front will put the latter in a critical situation.

The success of the “freeze of hostilities” initiative — albeit on a small scale, since it will be initially implemented in the Salah al-Din neighborhood — will likely affect other areas, given that the YPG and “Sham Front” have power over most areas that are outside the control of the Syrian state in Aleppo.

Aleppo Siege Back in the Spotlight Ahead of Renewed Push to Freeze Hostilities, 2/17/2015

In the 8th edition of Islamic State’s magazine Dabiq, the group condemns Islamic rebel alliance the Levant Front, for working with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The Levant Front, active in Aleppo, agreed with the Autonomous Democratic Administration and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) – the armed branch of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian party with close links to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – to implement an united judicial system, and work to crackdown on crime in February 2015.

The Levant Front is an ally of the Al-Qaida-linked Jabhat al- Nusra. (Flint: Levant Front specifically did not invite al-Nursa to join it)There has been limited cooperation between Islamic groups and the PYD since fighting broke out between IS and other rebel groups in January 2014. The article blames Nusra for working with secular and nationalist rebel groups. (Flint: this is probably Daesh pissing on Nursa and not true.)

IS criticized the Kurdish rebels in the magazine. “How exactly the nationalist ‘Islamists’ plan to implement Sharī’ah alongside Marxist and democratic secularists is unfathomable,” the terrorist group said.

“One question to ask them is whether or not the crusader planes backing the PKK in Ayn al-Islām (Kobani) will aid in the implementation of Sharī’ah,” IS suggested.

IS Condemns Islamic Rebel Alliance with Kurds in Aleppo, 4/9/2015

Sharing this more because its Daesh confirmation of YPG and Levant Front cooperation and mention of that judicial agreement. Its Daesh's propaganda, so its not a very reliable source.

On the plans to secure water, it is of interest to note the local council's mention of the Midanki Dam, which is located in the Kurdish PYD autonomous canton of Afrin. Northern Storm and the PYD were once enemies, and tensions between the two sides meant that water, which before the civil war would come from the Midanki pumping station two days a week, was subsequently cut off.

Securing water from Afrin would therefore require greater outreach to the PYD, which may be one of the underlying reasons behind the agreement publicly announced in February between the PYD's military wing the YPG and the Levant Front, stipulating a united judicial system, establishing joint Shari'a and da'wah offices in Aleppo and Afrin, and working together to crack down on crime. Of course, Jabhat al-Nusra is opposed to any such arrangements with the PYD/YPG, which it considers to be apostate entities.

The Administration of the Local Council in Azaz, 3/21/2015

Al-Monitor: In a previous interview you called on the Turkmen to join forces against ISIS. Did they respond?

Muslim: We are acting together in areas where Kurds and Turkmens live within close proximity. Mostly around Afrin. A new agreement was reached between the YPG and the Turkmen forces there, uniting them under the umbrella of a newly formed group called Shams Shemal, or the Northern Sun.

Syrian Kurd leader urges Turkey to join fight against jihadists, 5/6/2014

Flint FYI Green Left Weekly is the paper of a weird ex-Trot group in Australia the Democratic Socialist Party aka Socialist Alliance. They love national liberation to an extent that would make even Connor blush including supporting the "left wing" of the Croatian fascist exiles here in Australia in 70s and 80s.

Levant Front dissolved. Apparently the Islamists quit the group.

We'll have to see if the YPG picks up the secularists involved.

Key Islamist group Shamiya Front resolves itself