14. The Conflict Grows

Fierce discussions continued inside the Stepney Branch over the attitude to adopt against the fascists and the advisability of work ‘on the streets’ among the unorganised. There is no evidence that Joe’s statement made in late October was ever discussed publicly at either Branch or District level. The statement was most certainly never answered in writing, but it is during this period that Joe ceased to become Secretary of the Stepney Party, no doubt because of these internal quarrels. He claimed that by the very end of 1936 fascists were again becoming active in the Limehouse region and continued to press that something more be done about them, this despite the passing of the Public Order Act on December 18th. This Act banned the wearing of uniform in public and the operation of quasi-military organisations. The Act also gave the Police power to re-route any demonstration and to stop marching in certain places. The Police could also apply to the Council of a Borough or District for an order prohibiting demonstrations for a period of up to three months. The Police chiefs could even apply directly to the Secretary of State at the Home Office to issue such a temporary ban, if a Council were not compliant. This was done and in the East End all demonstrations were theoretically banned at the beginning of 1937.

The new Act contained several important clauses. People being ‘disorderly or disruptive’ at meetings could have their names taken and if they failed to give their names and addresses were liable for spot fines of £2. They could further be subject to arrest without a warrant on the spot. The maximum penalty for contravening any of these clauses was three months in prison or a £50 fine. For being part of a ‘quasi-military organisation’ you could get up to two years (1). It was clear that this act was as much against the Communist Party and all other militant anti-fascists as it was against Mosley’s Blackshirts.

It threatened to restrict all public meetings and demonstrations of any kind: It was used against anti-fascists and strikers. Many including Joe noted that Blackshirts no longer in uniform could still enjoy police protection. The Public Order ‘Act is still on the Statute Book today. Joe had noted on reading A.J.P. Taylor’s History of Britain Between the Wars that Taylor had rendered the introduction of this act responsible for defeating the Fascists (2). Joe also commented that this was to minimise October 4th and all other mass resistance to fascism from Olympia 1934 onwards which considerably slowed down fascist activity. In addition as Joe pointed out fascist terror did not stop after the passing of the Public Order Act.

The continuing fascist activity increased Joe’s insistance on the need for mass resistance to fascism. In February 1937, during the run up to the LCC elections, the matter was raised when it was discovered that a fascist candidate was standing for election in Limehouse. The Stepney Party Branch plans for the election campaign were criticised by Joe and those around him because they contained no specific provision for activity for concrete aid to Spain and because they allowed fascists freedom of assembly and speech without the local party being able to offset dangerous fascist propaganda.

The local party, Joe claimed, was allowing further penetration of fascists into East London. The Stepney Branch bulletin Number 5 dated February 15th 1937 contained the following statements’

‘While it is correct to say that the previous attitude of the Party to do everything possible to prevent the conducting of fascist meetings was a proper one in view of the political situation existing at the time, it does not follow that the same attitude will be proper at the present time...’

The bulletin continued:

“Today, however, and particularly during the LCC elections the circumstances have changed . . . The comrades from Limehouse are already reporting that many supporters of the fascists are willing to discuss many questions with, and ask questions from our speakers. Can we discuss these questions and answer these problems that they ask, if we just go in and smash up their meetings? . . . Our Party has a reply and a solution to all the problems confronting the working class no matter how small or big they appear to be. Experience shows that once workers have heard our case we get results.

It is, therefore, vitally necessary and particularly in areas where fascists are putting up candidates that our Party change its method of work in the fight against fascism .. .’

Further on the bulletin read:

‘The policy of the Party must be heard by every Fascist supporter during the elections. To smash up their meetings in places where, because of our inactivity, they have made some progress, won’t help. It would tend to support for the fascists among the less politically developed workers on the grounds that they are entitled to free speech during the elections, at least.’

The stern warning in the conclusion said that:

‘A violation of this decision will be considered by the branch committee and the DPC as a very serious breach of Party discipline.’

Alongside his internal battles with the Stepney Branch Joe noted what was happening on the left in general. He noted that the Trotskyist Socialist League had been expelled from the Labour Party at the end of January (3). The Stalin Purges were well under way too. Radek was condemned to death in the Soviet Union (4). Joe agreed to stifle his differences with the Branch Committee for the election campaign and to operate the Branch and DPC policy towards the fascists and their meetings against his better judgement.

The election results on March 4th included the following:

Limehouse—

2 Labour candidates 8,272 and 8,042 respectively (elected)

2 Conservatives (Municipal Reformers) 2,542 and 2,431

2 British Union of Fascists 2,086 and 2,086

Whitechapel and Mile End had no fascist candidates and a large Labour majority (the Communists had not sponsored separate candidates but canvassed support for the Labour Party) (5).

In the April issue of the Party Bulletin ‘Discussion’ Pat Divine admitted that 500 had been the limit set for the fascist vote in Limehouse by Communist Party workers. This convinced Joe that he was right in having previously said that the Party had not worked in Limehouse and was almost entirely divorced from the workers there. If this had not been the case, he argued, the Party workers could not have {ailed to see how strong Mosley’s influence had grown.

Joe noted that the Party group which he was leading was the best group working in Stepney during the elections. Out of six groups functioning in Stepney the Branch Committee received a total income of £10 and £6.10s of this came from his group. Joe was later to show this as proof to the Party leaders that he understood the need for carrying out decisions of the Party leaders and did so, despite differences of opinion he had with them at the time. Throughout this period of growing differences Joe was always to maintain that he was respecting the Party line and obeying Party discipline. Only much later did he realise this was not so. In fact the election campaign showed according to Joe further proof of the inactivity of leading members ‘hidden away in the Trade Unions’ who criticised his espousal of ‘street work’. The next Branch meeting after the elections reported that out of a membership of over 300 only 80 took part in work on the streets canvassing for Labour candidates, distributing leaflets and election material, whitewashing and organising open air meetings etc.

During the election campaign fascist meetings were held as close to the: Jewish areas such as Harding Street, Lucas Street and Jamaica Street without any organised opposition whatsoever. Joe claimed that in failing to rally the workers on the streets against these meetings, the Party allowed further penetration to take place. Agood meeting was however organised at Harding Street a couple of nights after Mosley’s meeting in which Ted Bramley was summonsed for using a loudspeaker. No campaign was organised around this issue. J.R. Campbell was twice arrested in the fascist Duckett Street area of Limehouse.

Both of his meetings were smashed up as a result of opposition by the Fascists and intervention by the Police. On one occasion the Party platform in Salmon’s Lane was tipped up by the Fascists (6). This showed, argued Joe, that the fascists could not be reasoned with as the Branch that the Fascists could not be reasoned with as the Branch Committee claimed.

* * * * *

While these electoral battles were being waged the armed struggle against fascism was continuing in Spain. Nat Cohen was due to be ‘repatriated’ from the front since his leg injury was proving more serious than at first thought. It was to leave him with a permanent limp, which didn’t prevent him from continuing his vigorous activity including his regular long bicycle rides. He had somehow managed to smuggle out of Spain the woman with whom he had fallen in love at the front, a Spanish nurse called Ramona. The problem was how to get Ramona into England with Nat. They had arrived crossing the Pyrenees into France and Nat was in a hospital in Paris. Unfortunately some of the details of this story are missing as all of the major protagonists are no longer alive, but from personal recollections and documents it is neverthless possible to tell the remarkable story of Nat and Ramona’s entry into Britain. It was done with the help of his close friend and ‘pupil’ Joe and his girl Pearl. Nat had managed to contact the Party and a plan had been worked out.

This was the time of the non-intervention pact. One of its strongest defenders was the French government. Nat and Ramona told later of how they had been fired on by Spanish Nationalist troops from across the border along with other escapees, without the French border guards intervening to save them. In fact they claimed some of the firing must have come from the French guards too! They had managed to arrive safely in Paris however, but Ramona had no papers to get her into Britain. In those days it was possible to go on day trips to the Continent without a Passport. So it was decided to try and smuggle Ramona out this way with the help of another English couple, namely Pearl and Joe. They were only too eager for an outing together and for a spot of adventure in Paris which, of course, neither of them had ever visited. So they crossed the channel on their own passports which they had had since their visit to Belgium in the Summer of 1935. They arrived at Dunkerque on March 26th 1937 and went straight to Paris. When they got to the hospital where Nat was supposed to be, they found that despite his wound he had discharged himself! The English couple didn’t know a word of French and had to hunt round Paris looking for Nat and his Spanish nurse. It seems they eventually found him at a cafe which had been given to them as a Party contact address.

Before leaving for the dangerous part of the journey which involved getting Ramona through Passport control Joe and Pearl found time briefly to look around Paris, as rather unexpectedly they had become foreign tourists. They spoke often in later years of their short stay in Paris. What always remained in Joe’s mind was the picture of Les Halles where they ate Onion Soup in the small hours of the moming before boarding the boat train at the Gare du Nord. It was to be well over thirty years before Joe was to return to Paris and Pearl never did. The four ‘tourists’ separated for their trip to England.

Pearl gave her passport to Ramona hoping that no one would look or ask questions. It was better that she be the day tripper and she could answer any likely questions, whereas a Spanish speaking English day tripper would have seemed strange to say the least. The exact details of how everyone got through passport controls are lost, but the plan worked and all four arrived safely in London. Shortly after this Nat and Ramona were married.

* * * * *

This short trip was an interlude in the growing battle between party leaders and Joe. He continued to raise questions about the lack of activity against fascists during the LCC elections. On March 30th he was invited to a closed branch meeting to be held on April 2nd. Sarah Wesker who sent the letter wrote: “Pat Divine who feels so keenly on your line on the question of Fascism has raised it with the District Secretariat again and they have agreed that J. Mahon again attend the Branch meeting and thrash the matter out’ (7).

The heated discussion of these differences flowed over to three branch meetings. On April 15tii the discussion was concluded. Joe pointed out that on April 14th after holding a meeting at Glasshouse Street, St. Georges, for the first time, 50 fascists marched through Whitechapel shouting slogans and singing the Horst Wessel song. They were only dispersed when they passed the Ex-Servicemen’s premises in Whitechapel Road. The Ex-Servicemen’s association members, who had been holding a meeting, closed it immediately and came out onto the streets (8). On April 21st the fascists held another meeting at Glasshouse Street and again intended to march through Whitechapel.

Thousands of anti-fascists gathered on the streets prepared to prevent a repetition of events which had occured the previous week. Owing to this opposition the fascists were compelled to go through Shadwell instead of Whitechapel, although in Joe’s opinion the fact that they were able to march anywhere was also a partial victory for the fascists (9).

At the April 8th Branch meeting (the second special meeting to discuss Joe’s views) Pat Divine described Joe’s opinions of the Stepney Branch Committee as ‘cunning and unprincipled’. J. Mahon said the line Joe was putting forward was Anarchist. At the last meeting of the three on April 15th. Pat Divine accused Joe of fighting the Party line and operating the wrong Party line. Joe demanded that the DPC state clearly in writing what the Party line was and said that he would then put in writing what he said of the line also. Joe was then invited to attend yet another special Branch meeting on April 22nd. For this he made a written statement demanding a written reply from the DPC who had said on April 15th that the matter was closed. In Joe’s statement he invoked recent fascist meetings and marches. He said that the matter was not closed since the proposed London District Congress for that year to take place soon was to discuss the problem under the heading of ‘Uproot Fascism in East London’. The Stepney Branch committee deciced however at this special Branch meeting that Joe should not be allowed to speak of this matter at the Congress.

On the Sunday foliowing April 21st, after a demonstration in aid of Spain, twelve co-op vans which had taken part were attacked by fascists while passing through Limehouse, despite the fact that Police had prevented the Aid to Spain demonstration from passing down certain streets. The fascists succeeded in smashing some of the co-op van windows but did not succeed in breaking up the demonstration. This demonstration followed on the famous bombardment of Guernica by Franco’s forces on April 24th (10). On April 27th Joe received a letter from the Stepney Branch committee telling him that because of his recent written statement and his behaviour at this latest special Branch meeting on April 22nd they had decided to ‘Suspend’ him from the local Party and refer the whole matter to the district. The letter added:

‘Pending the decision of the DPC your suspension actually means that you can hold no position in the Branch or in any ward, no matter how big or small, during the period of suspension. Also, you cannot appear on the Party platform speaking in the name of the Party. You are at Liberty now to send in whatever statement you desire to the DPC on this question.

The Branch Committee have nothing further to say re. this matter and nothing more to add. Our position was clearly and simply put in our bulletin during the LCC elections.’

On April 30th Joe received another letter, this time from the DPC itself saying they had received a copy of the Branch Committee’s letter of suspension plus Joe’s Statement of April 22nd. They added, ‘In your statement, however, you do not state what is your line in the fight against fascism.’ This was true but then Joe hadn’t stopped saying what his ‘line’ was since October 4th and he was sure the DPC was aware of what it was. They had sent representatives to meetings where this had only recently been discussed. Furthermore Joe had written a detailed statement to them at the end of October 1936 and this had never been replied to or discussed by the DPC. The DPC letter continued: “The Party at all times allows for differences between Party members and will not do anything to discourage this, but on the other hand, once a decision is taken by the Party Branch Committee, it is the duty of every loyal member of the Party to co-operate to the full in the carrying out of its decisions.’

The letter concludes:

‘We have, therefore, decided to endorse the recommendations of the Branch Committee to suspend you from Party membership, such decision to operate until you show by your actions that you are loyally prepared to abide by the decisions of the Branch Committee’.

Joe had actually been suspended two days before the London District Congress, but he did not receive the letter confirming this decision until after April 30th the day on which it was sent, which was after the London District Conference, so he did not know he would not be able to speak at all. Joe claimed that he was not elected delegate to the congress by his branch, because of opposition from members of the Branch Committee and Pat Divine. When Joe objected at the political commission of the Congress, his differences as to ‘The application of the Party line in the fight against fascism in East London’ was raised and the Commission decided that Joe should be allowed to state his opinions. If they were incorrect here they thought was an opportunity to give Joe a sound political thrashing.

In order not to carry this through over the heads of the East London delegation, Pat Divine was called to the Commission and informed of its opinion. He in tum informed the Commission that Joe Jacobs had been suspended.

Joe was not at the congress at the time Pat Divine was called. He was at work and as I have said before did not know that the DPC had endorsed his suspension as yet. When he returned to the Congress he found the Congress of the Commission had now also ruled that he could not speak at the conference. Sam Masters was allowed to speak at the congress as a representative of those advocating mass organisation against fascists in East London. Joe said later that Sam ‘could not represent my opinion’. He was well meaning and agreed with Joe in principle, but apart from the fact that he was no political speaker, but above all a man of action and physical energy and therefore was not able to put forward very persuasive arguments, he had spent the crucial period of the lead up to October 4th and the few weeks which followed in Spain fighting and not in East London.

The matter was supposed to have been discussed and settled at this congress. Obviously the DPC and the Branch Committee thought so for they continued to operate the suspension and made no further communication with Joe during May and June. No one wanted to clarify the situation and Joe was left in limbo. He continued to work for the Party despite being banned from all public speaking and from all official positions in the Party. From May 2nd onwards Joe claimed there was a steady growth of Mosleyite activities in East London. He wrote in July ‘It is hardly creditable that Blackshirts can hold very successful meetings at less than 50 yards from the open Whitechapel Road, in Collinwood Street, but this is a fact and no opposition has been organised by the Party as yet’.

* * * * *

While this conflict was continuing in May in the rest of the world things were happening too. George VI had his coronation, a lavish affair amid the growing war clouds and the reduced by still ever present unemployment and poor conditions. And as Joe also noted there was the Barcelona uprising in Spain and its defeat in early May. Mid-May Chamberlain succeeded Baldwin as Prime Minister. Events in Spain took a new tum. The Largo Caballeor, the Republican league, fell and the Negrin government with much closer links with the Soviet Union, took over. One month after this the leaders of the POUM were arrested. As Soviet influence became stronger in the Republican forces in Spain the purges continued inside Russia itself. In June Toukhatchevski the famous Red Army general was executed. Joe noted all these events, but did not connect them with his own battle which he was having at a local level with British Communist Party leaders.

On June 19th the Nationalists took Bilbao. From July 6th to 28th the Republican offensive to the West of Madrid, known as the Battle of the Brunette, waged fiercely. Its results for the Republicans were inconclusive. The ‘successes were eagerly followed by the Communist Party in Britain’(11). Sam Masters had returned to the front and it was in this offensive that he was killed. For Joe as for many of Sam’s friends this was a profound shock and a very sad loss. He was one of the many brave men who gave their lives for Spain. Joe noted that William Rust, the Communist Party journalist, in his book Britons in Spain published in 1939 referred to the many Britons who were killed at the Brunette. However only leading Communists and “Heroes of Jarama’ like Bill Meredith, Alex McCade and George Brown, or those with high ranking positions in the brigade like Charles Goodfellow, batallion adjuntant, or Sam Wild his replacement, are mentioned by name during the main body of Rusts’s account (12). Bob Elliot, ‘A Communist Councillor from Durham and one of the most popular of the political Commissars’ (13) is mentioned as another of those who fell. The less well known rank and file troops who were killed are only mentioned in a roll call at the end of the book. Sam Masters is in this alphabetical list along with all the others (14). Rust reported himself early on in his book, as has already been mentioned that Sam was one of the two (really three) very first Britons in Spain. We know that he was in Spain at the time of the declaration of hostilities. Joe thought he deserved a special mention too. He had stayed in the ranks and had never held any important position in the Party. Furthermore he had spoken on behalf of his comrade who was under suspension from the Party. Just the same Joe and others felt his untimely death ought to have been given more prominence by the Party.

* * * * *

There was much to occupy the Party at home too. On July 4th an event occurred which the Communist Party regarded as one of its greatest successes and the Mosley Fascists too! Mosley marched from St Pancras to Trafalgar Square with police protection and without any official attempt being made to stop him. A demonstration was organised at St Pancras by the Communists and a mass rally at the end of the march in Trafalgar Square. 150,000 attended the Party’s Trafalgar Square gathering according to the Daily Worker (15). They also claimed that no other groups tried to stop the fascists during their march. This appears to be untrue. There were references to ‘They shall not pass slogans’ chalked on the streets in the reports of the event. Later the Party claimed in a letter to Joe that these slogans were the result of ‘ILP influence and provocation’. Joe denied that the ILP were the sole instigators of moves to stop the fascists. Unfortunately Joe hadn’t yet written a detailed account of what happened on July 4th, before he died, but we do know that he did not share the official Party view that the events of that day in any way represented a victory for the Communist Party and anti-fascist forces in general.

Joe was still in limbo throughout June and July. His friends were pressing for some sort of response from the Party. Nat Cohen, a certain Malitsky and Lew Mitchell attended a Stepney Branch Committee meeting early in July to raise the question of where Joe stood in the Party. The Committee decided it would have to make some sort of an answer. Their answer was a request for yet another statement from Joe to be written within two weeks and sent to the District Committee ‘as was decided some months ago’ (?). Joe was informed of this decision in a letter dated 14th July 1937. The letter added:

‘Following this or pending the political line you now hold, the suspension, as decided by the Branch Committee previously, will come into full operation. That is, you will be suspended from all activity within the Party for a given period to be decided by the Branch Committee.’

Joe wrote the requested statement—15% closely typed pages of it. In the introduction he pointed out that on the same day as he had received the letter from the Branch committee, i.e. July 14th:

‘... Police protecting a fascist meeting showed how necessary it was for us to consider ways of opposing fascists, when as always in East London they are protected by the Police. July 14th was the day which produced the “Evening of Fascist Terror” for the people of Stepney Green (16). I would like to remind those comrades who say we should ask questions at fascist meetings to consider what happened in Stepney Green which was given wide publicity in the National Press. I agree,’

he added,

‘that questions should be asked with a view to exposing the false platform of fascism, but we must consider fascist methods and the National Govermment protection given to Blackshirts. We must rally the widest possible opposition to fascisi meetings. We must protect our questioners by placing groups around them to meet the possibility of Blackshirt or Police violence.

We must insist upon the fascist speaker answering our questions in the proper fashion and not just the way he would like to answer the questions, We must resist Police brutality and interference on the side of fascism at such meetings.’ (introduction p1)

The statement continued further on:

‘... duly 14th is the logical follow up to July 4th which was a victory for the National government and a partial victory for Mosley and not as has been stated a victory for the forces against fascism. The Blackshirts have held big victory celebrations in East London following July 4th. This was not possible following October 4th 1936, nor is it possible for Mosley to declare any victory in Southampton.

Almost every night Jewish people are assaulted by Blackshirts and little or nothing is done in these matters. . . . I do not propose the immediate formation of self-defence corps, but I would like to see some steps taken for self-defence. . . . A word on the ban on Political marches in East London. No serious attempts have been made to break this ban.’ (introduction p2)

Getting down to his main subject Joe quoted from Dimitrov’s speech to the 7th World Congress:

‘ . . before the establishment of a fascist dictatorship, bourgeois governments usually pass through a number of preliminary stages and institute a number of reactionary measures, which directly facilitate the accession to power of fascism. Whoever does not fight the reactionary measures of the bourgeoisie and the growth of fascism at these preparatory stages is not in a position to prevent the victory of fascism, but on the contrary, facilitates that victory.’ (quoted on p2 of introduction).

At the end of the introduction to this July statement Joe wrote: ‘I agree wholeheartedly with the party line, but declare that it is not being practised as well as it might be in East London.’ According to him, the ‘sharp differences’ between him and the local Party were about ‘tactics to be employed in order to gain our objectives’. Again he stressed:

‘ ...I fully realise that the Communist Party is not a United Front of all ideologies and that it has one line which must be carried out by the Party, that any tendency to operate a line other than the Party line must be fought against and any individual guilty of such a crime, must if he persists in fighting for and carrying out such a line, be expelled.’

Joe did not at this stage reject the terms of reference or underlying ideology of a single Party ‘line’. He merely thought he was the one who was operating the correct line as proclaimed in all pre-1936 International Congresses, ie constant and militant mass struggle against fascism. It did not occur to him that International Communists and the Soviet leaders in particular could have felt or acted otherwise. He thought it was just the DPC who had the ‘wrong tactics’ and that the National Party would think otherwise.

Having introduced his statement, Joe went on to argue his case about the way to combat fascism in East London. He wrote:

‘ . . . In East London, in Bethnal Green, Shoreditch and Limehouse, Mosley had succeeded in gaining positions there because we have not systematically led the workers on their immediate demands social and economic, because the labour movement is still split, because the Party in those areas has failed to carry on its propaganda activities in the way that it has in Stepney, because Moseley has been able to take advantage of the latent anti-semitic feeling which had existed in many parts.’ (main part of statement p2)

Joe claimed that when the Blackshirts first appeared in Bethnal Green, Poplar and Stepney Green the Party supported those who prevented fascist meetings and actively participated in preventing fascist rallies:

‘The fascists no longer appeared in Newby Place (Poplar) or Stepney Green’ wrote Joe, ‘because whenever there was a rumour to the effect that they would be at these places, thousands of workers who had been called to the streets by the Party were ready to prevent fascist meetings being held. This was done on one or two occasions in Bethnal Green and Shoreditch.’

Joe claimed that at a later date in these same areas fascists were able to hold meetings with Police protection without the Party mobilising workers to oppose them. In Bethnal Green he described a situation whereby ‘anti-fascists would be meeting outside the Salmon and Ball (Bethnal Green Road) and the fascists with larger crowds would be meeting at Victoria Park Square at the same time’. Joe also said that for a while there was no Party in Shoreditch at all. (Statement p2) In Stepney proper the fascists appeared only rarely before 1936, twice at Dellow Street and both times thousands prevented their meetings continuing.

Joe noted that many gentiles as well as Jews participated in preventing fascist meetings. In 1936 the fascists held meetings in Limehouse at Old Street and Salmons Lane and also at Duckett Street. The Young Communist League and the ex-servicemen’s association tried to hold meetings in the same places, but had to abandon them through lack of success or because the Police stopped them. There were a few unsuccessful local party open air meetings too. Joe spoke of the many complaints by the YCL to the Branch committee that they were on their own preventing fascist meetings and were not getting enough support from the Branch (p3 of Statement).

Joe then described in his statement the lead up to October 4th 1936. He described what has already been related in this book, ie how he had been told by DPC leaders to stick by arrangements to rally in Trafalgar Square for Spain after Mosley had announced his intention of marching through the East End.

He added that in meetings with Springhall and Mahon he was told that it was romantic on his part to want to stop Mosley’s march on October 4th. Joe described the four-day struggle of the Stepney members to reverse the decision not to try and stop Mosley. He adds that Springhall had told him personally that it would be impossible to rally at least 50,000 workers which Springhall considered the amount required, in such a short time. We know that the Party relented at the last minute and two hundred and fifty thousand responded to the call (see p3 of statement).

Joe claimed that starting a year or so before October 4th there had been a tendency to underestimate the feelings of the people and to abandon the struggle and to allow fascists to carry on with their marches. After October 4th Joe wrote that the Party failed to deal with the fascist terror that followed and failed to win over permanently those whose sympathies they had won on October 4th. He wrote:

‘We were still not able to rally workers in the struggle around their immediate social and economic demands or to adequately take up the struggle around the grievances of the workers, ie municipal employees and the numerous social questions, housing etc, the unemployed... .

Another important failing is that we did not carry on propaganda activity in these arpas where fascism later gained support.’ (Statement p3/4)

Joe went on to describe his clashes with members of the Stepney Branch Committee, the March LCC elections, the branch’s ‘soft’ line on fascism and his own reactions. He discussed the fascist advances in the LCC elections. He explained that there was a ‘passive resistance’ to taking up those social issues of workers which entailed a need for ‘working in the streets’. (Statement p7)

In 1936 the London Social Programme was launched at the London District Congress but Joe claimed it was not carried into effect in Stepney other than in the selling of the Programme in pamphlet form. He added

'... The basis for this failing is the tum to the Trade Unions, Labour Party and other organisations for the purpose of building Unity without stressing the need for continuing and intensifying our work on the streets’.

Joe repeated his previous plea for the formation of ‘non-party class bodies’ as a way of extending the United Front among the rank and file. He used the same quotes from Dimitrov’s speech to the 7th World Congress as he had used in his earlier statement at the end of October about the importance of the ‘unorganised’ masses (Statement p7). He quoted the Jewish People’s Council, the Ex- Servicemen’s Movement Against Fascism and the recently formed Tenants Defence Committee sponsored by the Party as examples of such ‘non-Party bodies’. He regretted the passing of the Peace Council, a similar body which the Party had let die and he asked why the Unity Campaign Committee was made up only of members of the Communist Party, the Socialist League and the ILP thus excluding those representatives without a definite party label. Joe spoke of the need for building up those bodies which were the most broadly based. The National Unemployed Workers Movement he said had failed to function due to lack of attention to the need for correct fraction work within the NUWM. Joe’s idea was that mass international non-Party organisations should be penetrated by the Communist Party as had been the policy in the years prior to 1935 in the National Minority Union movements and the International Red Aid, to quote two examples that Joe knew well from the inside. His education in the CP had been based on this and he was not aware that the Party was liquidating its international non-Party base as a mass révolutionary organisation and going all out for ‘deep entry’ into estab- lished Trade Unions and Social Democratic Parties with their support for United Front tactics. That the Party line should have changed so radically did not seem logical to him. The line suggested here seemed to him totally lacking in revolutionary perspective.

Joe complained in his statement that the Stepney Trades Council where ‘we have great influence’ did not reflect the prominence of its CP members, who had failed to press for the establishment of an organisation of the unemployed based on the Trades Union and Labour Movement. The only thing the CP members on the Trades Council had done was to secure the passing of a resolution for the Communist Party’s affiliation to the Labour Party (Statement p8).

Joe then went on to describe the fascist attack on Communist Party open meetings during the LCC election campaign. He spoke of the subsequent violent attacks on individuals and property in East London in April at the time when his own position was being attacked in successive closed local Branch meetings. He also described further fascist penetration into Stepney during May. Joe claimed that when he approached prominent people in the Stepney Branch about the proposed fascist meetings in new areas, he was told ‘There was no need for any fuss’ (p9). Joe proposed his own plan of action. He wanted to see the Party active in:

‘1. Defending the Workers from attacks of the employers who seek to worsen wages and conditions

2. The winning of better standards for the unemployed and resisting further attacks

3. Gaining the social demands of the workers—housing, school feeding for the children, open spaces, safety measures etc

4. The defence of all democratic rights and against all working class legislation—Sedition Act, Public Order Act, banning of marches, Trades Dispute Act, Police protection for Mosley etc

5. The rallying of all democratic organisations and the masses of East London’s unorganised workers for concrete aid to Spain to ensure a speedy victory for the Spanish people over fascism

6. Attention to the Youth and youth problems along the lines laid down by the YCL by correctly selecting Party members for work with the YCL

7. An unremitting struggle against National government war plans and its support of fascism abroad’

(statement p10)

Joe’s implied criticism was that the Party was not active enough in any of the areas listed in the above programme. Joe continued his statement by quoting from Harry Pollitt Chairman of the CPGB in a speech to the 14th Congress of the National Party held earlier that year in May 1937. Pollitt said:

‘There should be no under-estimation of Mosley’s Blackshirt movement ... the mass of people do not desire that this organisation shall be allowed to continue. They realise that Guernica is the only logic of Olympia. When the people of East London declared on October 4th that Mosley shall not pass, they were as good as their word and the Blackshirts would have been finished, if the whole Labour movement had then carried the fight forward. . .” (17)

Joe took this statement to mean largely a criticism of the Party itself and failed to notice that it was largely an attack on the Labour Party. Pollitt’s speech continued: ‘

,..We should all recognise the need of firm opposition to every attempt of Mosley to spread his propaganda, although these attempts will receive the full support of the government and the police, backed by, the Public Order Act (18)...Mosley seeks to take full advantage of the dissension caused by the policy of the Labour leaders, who play fully into his hands by their conscience-salving propaganda that Mosley does not matter. The events in East London constitute a very grave danger which can only be overcome by united Campaigns against Mosley and by much more systematic attention to work among the unemployed (19).

Joe said these quotations showed that Pollitt agreed with him.

Joe ended his statement by denying the accusation that he was advocating that the Branch become a band of thugs aimed at smashing up fascist meetings. He meant to prevent fascist meetings by the

‘widest mobilisation of the organised Labour movement plus the unorgan- ised workers in Unity of action against Blackshirt penetration and propaganda . . . This does not mean we should man-handle every fascist or fascist supporter. On the contrary every attempt must be made by personal contact and other means to win over those who are temporarily deluded by fascism.’

(statement p12-—Joe’s emphasis)

Finally Joe quoted Harry Pollitt again, this time from his speech to the 7th World Congress of the Communist International in August 1935, where Pollitt declared:

‘We are too content to believe we can easily win the support of the workers by a general appeal for the United Front against the attacks of capital, fascism and War. Alongside this, the question of the United Front is often placed in an abstract way and Unity looked upon as a thing in itself. Whereas, if we take as our starting point the fact that the United Front is the Class Front of all workers, drawing all into common action to defend their wages and conditions, their unemployment benefits, their rights and liberties, their fight against rapacious landlords, to defend their Trade Unions and co-operatives, that is to protect their homes and families from the horrors of fascism and War. If we can get it understood in this light then we shall soon see an improvement in every phase of United Front activity.’

These were the last lines of Joe’s statement. In his own brief notes jotted down later on the subject Joe pointed out that hardly anyone had ever seen this statement and the correspondence which followed besides the corres- pondants themselves. No one was allowed to see such documents at the time as this would have been a breach of Party discipline. Joe scrupulously respected this, only a couple of friends who helped with the typing ever saw any of these documents. They are being made public for the first time now. They have previously only been shown to close members of Joe’s family and a very few close friends. He wanted to publish them one day so that the contents would be able to speak for themselves. They do so eloquently.

On July 28th 1937 Joe was sent a letter by the London District Committee. It read:

‘Dear Comrade,

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your statement which will be reported at tomorrow’s meeting of the District Secretariat.

Yours fraternally,

for DF Springhall’

There followed weeks of total silence from the London District Committee. Joe was not called upon to defend his statement. The summer holidays came and went. Joe still took part in regular Party activities, canvassing, selling literature, whitewashing etc, but since he was suspended, it was still considered dangerous for him to speak at public meetings or hold any leading positions in the local Party. His unwelcome exclusion did however leave time for other activity. Joe wrote later, ‘During this time I have organised my shop and have been elected shop steward’. This was in September 1937. Unfortunately there are no details of Joe’s activities as shop steward at this time. After the War Joe was again to become shop steward and in the early 1950s was very prominent in an important clothing factory occupation. His turn towards ‘factory work’ in late 1937 does not seem to have changed the Party leaders’ attitude. There was still silence.

When Joe had been removed as Party Secretary, Sam Masters had stepped into the breach. Nat was still suffering too much from the effects of his wound to take more than a post as ‘instructor’. Sam returned to Spain where he was killed in action. The Secretary’s post was vacant, Nat later became Chairman of the local Party. He was still at this time identified with Joe’s so called fraction. The local ward suffered because of this disruption. Joe claimed later that every time he was proposed for even the most minor position in the ward a number of comrades objected on the grounds that he was suspended. Many in the ward were more favourable to Joe and his friends than the Branch Committee, but Joe claimed that the Branch Committee paid the ward little attention.

During September Joe later described how he organised an ‘important shop meeting’ in his trade. The so-called Trade Union fraction in the Stepney Branch, members of the Tailors’ unions, the Dockers Union and the Number 2 branch of the T& GWU, and the Cabinet Makers Union, were all fully informed of this meeting and invited to it. He managed to get workers in his shop to agree to transfer from one Union to the more militant Ladies Tailors Union and carried on discussions with other workers closely connected with his own firm. Unfortunately no details of this activity exist.

The Borough elections took place in November 1937. Despite the fact that Joe was banned from speaking on platforms he remained active. He ‘canvassed the Mile End West Ward and Spitalfields, addressed envelopes, delivered letters, whitewashed walls, carried the platform to open air meetings, distributed leaflets, collected money on a punch board and sold tickets for socials’ (20). The rest of the ward participated actively too, which is why Joe was particularly upset when less than a month later, he was accused of lack of activity in the Borough elections and of encouraging disruption in his ward. He was said to be responsible for the ward’s supposed poor record in the Borough elections. The results were acclaimed a great victory by the Party. Labour regained overwhelming control of the Stepney Borough Council. In Spitalfields East of the five councillors elected, four were Labour, but one was a Communist, Phil Piratin, the first Communist Councillor to be elected in London (21).

Dissension continued in the local Stepney Party. Ward chairman, Nat Cohen, was also under attack. He had been proposed as candidate in the local Borough elections. The idea had been violently attacked by Springhall and the DPC and by the Branch Committee in which Piratin was becoming more and more prominent. Nat was criticised for poisoning the minds of comrades by reading and discussing Stalin’s speeches. On November 24th the Branch Committee called for Nat’s removal as Chairman, because of these discussions although it was at no time suggested that Nat was in disagreement with Stalin’s speeches. They seemed to urge vigorous attack on the fascists and as such Joe approved of them too, but the Branch Committee seemed uneasy about referring to them or were just looking for a pretext (22). On the day of the Borough Council elections, November 1st, Joe finally wrote to the central committee of the CPGB. For nearly three months he had heard nothing by way of a reply to his July statement. He enclosed a copy of the statement just in case it had never got beyond the London District Office. He stated that his position had not changed but that he thought himself capable of recognising mistakes he might have made if these were pointed out to him correctly. He complained that to ignore the statement for such a long time and to fail to acquaint comrades in the locality with its contents for discussion would lead to stagnation. It was not the first time, Joe added, that a statement he had been instructed to write had been ignored. He appealed to the Central Committee for its intervention.

On November 3rd the Central Committee wrote back from National headquarters that they had taken the matter up with Comrade Springhall, who had given them an undertaking that he would be personally responsible for getting the matter finally decided by the DPC ‘who will communicate with you direct on the matter’. On November 23rd, Joe wrote again to the Central Committee:

Dear Comrades,

re. your letter of 3rd November 1937, I wish to inform you that I have not yet heard from the London DPC nor from comrade Springhall. A further three weeks have passed and the position is very serious.

I have heard a rumour, which I have every reason to believe is true, that I have been recommended for expulsion.

Will you please give this your attention etc. . .’

A letter sent on November 22nd and arriving no doubt soon afterwards was sent to Joe from the London DPC. It stated that they had received a request from the Stepney Branch Committee, carried unanimously, that Joe be expelled. The reasons given were:

‘...Your adherence to your line regarding anti-fascist activity, contained in a statement submitted, I think, in July, in which you show that you have not changed your attitude since this matter was discussed and settled by the London District Congress.

In addition the report from the Stepney Branch Committee shows that you have not contributed to the actual work of the Party in the election campaign and that the group of which you are a member has fallen to pieces, which is attributable precisely to the political differences which have arisen therein.’

The Secretariat, therefore, recommended Joe’s expulsion to the forthcoming District Party Committee meeting, although they added that, of course, he had the right to send in a written statement on these points in time for that meeting if he so wished. The letter was signed Ted Bramley and not DF Spring- hall. The DPC meeting was to be held on Friday November 26th, which left Joe very little time to write anything. He wanted to attend the local ward meeting on November 24th. This was the meeting in which Joe’s friend and mentor Nat Cohen was attacked by the Branch Committee. Discussion of Joe’s expulsion was not allowed at this meeting by the decision of the Branch Committee, but when the local ward voted on whether to remove Nat as chairman 12 were against his removal and 10 for with some abstentions. Proposals to draft in a new Secretary were accepted unanimously because there was no one competent or available in the ward to fill the position. At this meeting Joe confirmed his information that many comrades knew of the proposal to expel Joe before he did himself and also that there was a substantial group in the Ward who were not happy about this (23).

On November 25th. Joe wrote to the DPC requesting more time to prepare a statement. He complained that no opportunity had been given him to defend himself against what he considered to be false charges made by the Branch Committee. He urged the DPC to respect their ‘duty’ to check the report of the Branch Committee concerning Joe and his group’s election work. Joe did manage to write something, however, and it was sent off on November 29th. Joe explained he was only available for discussion after Tpm, Whether this was because of working hours or other family commitments we do not know. Nothing has been recorded of Joe’s social life at this period.

Joe’s statement was ready on November 29th. In it he explained how he had not been allowed to defend himself against specific charges of the Branch Committee. He described the November 24th Branch meeting and how discussion of his proposed expulsion had been prevented. The fact that he was not informed of the recommendation to expel him until everyone else knew revealed to Joe a ‘callous attitude to individual comrades’. He had obviously felt very hurt. He challenged the statement made by the DPC that he had not changed his line on the anti-fascist struggle and that this was clearly illustrated in his July statement, whereas according to the Stepney Branch and the DPC ‘the matter had been discussed and settled by the District Congress’. According to Joe the matter could never have been settled at that Congress, because it had never been properly discussed. Joe had not been elected delegate and later had not been allowed to speak even though the Political Commission of the Congress had first ruled that he would be able to address the Congress. He said this had been so because he had quickly been suspended over the heads of the East London delegation two days before the Congress. He described how he had not been informed of this suspension until after the Congress had started and how Sam Masters had been ‘allowed’ to speak for him, although not competent to do so. Furthermore he told of how he was requested to write a statement on the matter, two months later, a request he claimed which would hardly have been made if everyone thought the matter had been finally settled in May. He described how he had sent his statement on July 28th and despite appeals, even to the National Party Central Committee. this statement had never been answered. Joe complained that the Branch Committee claimed he adhered to the incorrect line, but asked: ‘How can anyone know whether or not this is true, when the matter has not been discussed with me in any form?’ Joe repeated that all statements, except one, had never been discussed in any way. Joe replied also to the accusation that he had not worked for the party during the Borough elections. He explained how the ward had suffered through disruption, because of his own suspension and then through Sam Masters’ death in Spain and Nat Cohen’s incapacity due to injuries sustained in Spain. However, he vigorously denied that the Ward had ‘fallen to pieces’, as the Branch committee claimed. The ward had been very active in the election campaign. Joe added:

‘It is not for me to state why this proposal for my expulsion should be raised for the reasons given in your letter. I have my opinion which could fill a statement as long as this. I think I have shown to the best of my ability that there are no grounds for my expulsion. I am comparatively young in the Party. I joined when I was 19 years old. I am now 24 years. I think I am capable of recognising mistakes I may make if these are pointed out in correct Communist Party fashion.’

Joe added that the treatment he had received led him to believe that there was something wrong with the actions of many Party members which he could help to correct and that if anything was wrong with himself he would welcome any help from the Party to correct this ‘in order that I can yet be of service to the Party and the working class’. Joe could not conceive of being outside the Party. At this period it seemed to him almost like being outside the working class. He wanted to prove he was a loyal Party member. He did not challenge the need for this until many years later. And so he ended this latest statement by stressing that he had not discussed his opinions with anyone since the decision of the Stepney Branch Committee that it should not be discussed and that he had certainly not tried to put his views on the present struggle against fascism into direct practice. Joe commented years later in his rough notes that at the time he was pressed to make a statement or be expelled without resistance, he felt ‘like I had a revolver at my head’.

On November 30th Joe received a short reply from Ted Bramley of the London DPC saying that this last letter would be placed in front of the District Secretariat for their consideration. The letter stated that, in addition, Bramley could see Joe at 7pm on Wednesday evening, but only for a short time as Bramley had three further meetings that evening. Joe appears to have been unable or unwilling to go to such a short meeting. On December 11th 1937 Joe finally received a full reply to his long statement of July and to his most recent letter. It came from the London District Party Committee. It is a very revealing statement. It began by denying that the reasons for Joe’s suspension and the subsequent demand for expulsion had never been pointed out to him. It says that the four meetings with the Stepney Branch and privately with individuals in which comrades Devine and Mahon had been present had been sufficient to point out Joe’s mistakes. Nevertheless the object of this letter was to answer Joe once and for all in writing so that ‘Joe Jacobs may be called upon either to recognise his mistakes and openly say so, or to say frankly that he disagrees with the Party Statement’ (p1).

The DPC then excused itself for not replying earlier, ‘because of certain verbal discussions which took place under the direction of comrade Springhall’ (p1--according to Joe these never took place) ‘which were unfortunately prolonged’ and finally ended because of ‘the transterence of Comrade Spring- hall to other work and the taking over the responsibility in the district by Bramley’ (p1).

The statement then goes on to attack Joe’s claims about the local Party’s anti-fascist activity. First of all it denies Joe’s claim that he was not against the Party line, but against its wrong application in Stepney, by saying: ‘Of course if one is against the local application of the line when that application is in the concrete circumstances correct, then one is in fact against the line of the Party’ (pl). The statement claimed that whether this local application was correct had been settled by the London District Congress in the Spring of that year ard added:

‘The brief facts are that Joe Jacobs has never accepted this decision of the District Congress, but takes refuge in the argument that his own personal statement has not been answered. The District Congress Decision is in fact the answer to Joe Jacobs (p1).

Joe’s statement that he was not elected to the district congress, because of opposition by Pat Devine and that Sam Masters who spoke for his point of view could not adequately represent him, is rejected. Joe’s objection that he was suspended two days before the Congress is also brushed aside.

‘What does all this show? It shows that Joe Jacobs who had been engaged in discussion on this question in his own Branch since before the LCC elections in November 1936 and February and March and April 1937 does not accept the discussion and the decision on the issue arrived at by the District Congress in April, because he was not a delegate and because he had not agreed that it was settled’ (p2).

The DPC statement argues that if this is valid then every person not personally elected as a delegate can reserve for himself the right to adhere to a standpoint which that congress declares to be wrong.

As to whether the issue of fascism had been thoroughly discussed at the Congress the DPC pointed out that a Congress resolution had been passed calling for the continuation of a mass drive to drive fascism out of London. The resolution blamed the disunited and inactive character of the Labour movement in East London as a whole for fascist penetration and electoral successes. It stressed the need to point out to workers that their main enemy was the ‘Large Capitalists of the West End’. An industrial campaign developing a mass movement on Social issues had been advocated with the operation of all working class organisations in East London. The resolution had called for the intensification of work on these lines in all Labour and TU organisations so that Mosley would be unable to secure a foothold and would be driven out of East London.

In substance, it is then argued in the DPC’s statement that while one must acknowledge the huge success of October 4th 1936, it must be admitted that the fascists had already gained a foothold in East London before this date. It had sometimes been possible to hold counter demonstrations and prevent meetings, but it was impossible and unrealistic to do so in all circumstances. Much more, said the statement, should, however, be done to develop United Front activity with labour and TU organisations. Joe’s call for ‘more militant action’ is interpreted by the DPC statement as a call for the organised brea- up of fascist meetings in all circumstances. According to Joe October 4th rep- resented a victory whereas the St Pancras and Trafalgar Square rallies of July 4th, 1937 were a defeat for anti-fascist forces as the fascists were able to or- ganise mass victory rallies right across London and in the East End in July whereas this had not been possible after October 4th. The DPC’s reply is that the fascists did rally in Victoria Park Square ‘within three or four days’ of October 4th and did march through Mile End to Limehouse ‘right across Stepney’ shortly after. It is not clear exactly what marches the DPC had in mind. There are no reports in the Daily Worker of fascist victory rallies at this period, although there is some reference, amplified in the local East London press, of fascist meetings ending up in vengeance expeditions when gangs went on the rampage to try and terrorise local Jews (24). It seems odd to compare these with the July 4th rally which succeeded in taking place and the victory claimed by the fascists then, although the terror outbreak on July 4th, 1937 does seem very similar to that which occurred after October 4th, 1936. Also we must note here that the route between Mile End and Limehouse does not pass through Whitechapel, the main Jewish area where the fascists had tried to march on October 4th, 1936. It is stretching it a bit to say that this is right across Stepney. The route is in fact the one where fascist support- ers already existed. Duckett Street, which connects Mile End to Limehouse, was the ‘fascist’ street.

The DPC however equates all these various statements and says that if fascists could hold meetings before and after October 4th, it proves that ‘it is not necessary and possible to make such actions as October 4th every day of the week whenever Moseley happened to march’ (p3). The statement argues that if Joe regards October 4th as a victory, but will not accept July 14th then he will ‘accept nothing less than mass action against Mosley as a Victory’ (p3). Of course the DPC is perfectly correct in stating these to be Joe’s views, they add ‘in other words if Mosley succeeds in holding a meeting in which he speaks in any part of London, even with Police protection then it is a victory for Mosley’ (p3). Joe claimed that when the fascists marched from St Pancras on July 4th, the slogan should have been, as on October 4th, “They shall not Pass’. The DPC replied that this could not be the case. The slogan was correct on October 4th because the Public Order Act banning uniforms and certain marches had not yet been passed. Also the terrain in East London through which Mosley planned his mass march was territory more advantageous to resistance than Central London. The DPC statement does not refer to the fact that up to a few days before October 4th it had also opposed the ‘They shall not pass’ action as unrealistic.

The DPC statement claims that in July 1937 publication of the slogan ‘They shall not Pass’ in the Daily Worker or in leaflets would have rendered the Party liable to prosecution under the Public Order Act ¢ under such circumstances that would have been provocation of the working class move- ment and a victory for fascism’ (p4). (Joe had underlined this sentence in his copy of the DPC’s letter. He obviously strongly objected to this defence of legality.) The statement also added that on October 4th public opinion was on the side of the anti-fascists as it was considered a provocation on Mosley’s part to march through Stepney. However, they claimed that many people thought that Mosley had a right to march through Central London in July 1937, so the Party could not have had so much support for the tactics they had employed in October 1936. (Joe also underlined this part of the argument, presumably because he thought the writers were saying that the fascists might have certain democratic rights or, at least that the CP should not alienate those who thought they had.) The DPC said it would have been ridiculous to launch a ‘They shall not pass’ campaign and then have to face humiliating defeat, because the fascists had succeeded in passing anyway. This, the statement claimed, is what the ILP had done on July 4th. (Joe again under- lined these sentences and added exclamation marks. The statement was saying there was no point in resisting, because defeat would only be worse if you failed.)

The DPC did refer however to events in Bermondsey in South East London where because, it is claimed, of more favourable circumstances, the fascists had been prevented from marching on October 3rd 1937 (25). Thus they were claiming that it was easier to resist fascist marches in working class areas and this was no doubt true. Joe, however, did not accept the argument that fascist marches could only be prevented in special circumstances. He wrote in his rough notes on the statement, ‘They shall Never Pass’.

The DPC statement then left the particular question of July 4th 1937. It began to deal with Joe’s claim that no serious attempt had been made to break the ban on political marches in the East End. Of course, says the DPC, Dimitrov was right when saying that before the advent to power of fascism, it is assisted by measures passed by the old bourgeois governments, but it was wrong to conclude from this that processsions must be organised to ‘smash the ban’. The principal step to be taken, the statement says, is to:

‘mobilise the whole Labour and Trade Union Movement for various political activities aimed at removing the ban and defeating fascism. This of course is precisely what the Stepney Branch and the Party have been trying to do, but the difficulty lies in convincing thousands of labour people that the ban is a bad thing and you cannot answer this simply by talking about smashing the ban’ (p5—-Joe had again underlined these sentences).

The statement then turned to Joe’s claim that recent violent attacks on Jews by fascists had served to further convince him of the need for more effective action. To the DPC this was further proof that Joe was against the Stepney Branch and the DPC who ‘were correctly applying the line of the District Congress on this question’. Technically the DPC is correct here. The actual problem of what to do about the fascist attacks on Jews was not deait with. The DPC further claimed that Joe was ‘fighting against the whole line of the Party IN PRACTICE’ (p6—the capital letters are in the original statement). Joe noted in his notes on the statement that this was untrue. His objections had remained theoretical. He wrote that in all his five years in the party he had never acted contrary to party decisions. His objections had only been verbal and reserved for internal Party discussion. Joe, said the statement, claimed he was operating ‘Bolshevik self criticism’ as preached at the 7th World congress of the International. The DPC replied ‘We must distinguish between self-criticism and opposition to the line of the Party in practice, which is not Bolshevik self-criticism, but leads to disruption’ (p6). This section does not refer to any concrete issues.

The statement then goes on to deal with October 4th 1936 itself and why it was that the DPC reacted too late to pressure for an all out fight to stop Mosley. They give no explanation other than that ‘there was not sufficient appreciation by the DPC of growing mass feeling in Stepney and East London generally’ (p6). In any case, the statement continues, they did change their minds and succeeded ‘in three days in swinging the whole movement in London against Mosley with the result that he received a crushing defeat’. Joe had claimed on the contrary that they were not responsible for rallying the mass of demonstrators. They could not have been in only three days. Joe claimed that the DPC’s attitude represented a tendency already existing in 1936 not to fight the fascists. The statement pleads that this was not the case. The proof was that the DPC did react when they had realised their mistake in the end. The statement added: ‘Comrade Jacobs should remember what Lenin said about men who never made mistakes and those people who can correct their mistakes before they become too serious’ (p6—this sentence had been underlined by Joe).

The DPC statement then dealt with fascist advances in the LCC elections. It was claimed that latent fascist progress prior to October 4th 1936 revealed itself in the March LCC elections. The statement does not deal with why the fascists had been less important before early 1937 or the question of preventing fascist advances after October 6th in specific detail, but claimed in fact that little or nothing had been done in the East End about the fascists before late 1936. In fact the statement said, and they underlined this themselves: ‘The plain facts are that October 4th 1936 and the work in the LCC elections were the first real beginnings in Stepney and Bethnal Green and elsewhere of effective organisation of the fight against fascism’ (p6). The lateness of such intervention would according tc the DPC help explain why penetration by fascists was revealed in 1937. Many episodes described in this book have been devoted to the struggle against fascism in the East End at least from 1933 onwards. See for example the attacks on the Olympia meeting held by Mosley in 1934, when a large contingent of anti-fascists came from Stepney. See also the many local incidents described. They would not seem to bear out the claim that those in the East End had been largely inactive against the fascists prior to October 4th.

The DPC statement then went on to claim that it was interesting to note that during all this period

‘A period in which for two years the fascists had been making contact and conducting propaganda in various parts of East London, including Limehouse and Stepney, Joe Jacobs was Branch Secretary, yet his statement tries to give the impression that it was after he was removed from the secretaryship, after October 4th, that the fascists began to gain their influence’.

This sentence is the one which is the most heavily underlined by Joe (p6). He wrote rough notes on the statement:

“This is a false statement. There is no evidence for this, nor for the statements that I was actively fighting the Party line or advocated the smashing up of fascists’ meetings or was opposed to Trade Union activity. I was not Secretary of the Stepney Branch for two years.’

In fact, as has been described in this book, Joe became Secretary of the Branch in mid-1935.

The DPC statement then went on to deal with the controversy concerning Trade Union activity and street work. It counters Joe’s claim that he was not against work in the Trade Unions simply by asserting ‘It is quite apparent that Comrade Jacobs was himself not quite clear on this subject and was in fact preventing proper mobilisation of the Branch membership, for its work in all important spheres, ie factories, Trade Unions, Streets etc’ (p7). No specific evidence is given to support this claim.

In dealing with the results of the LCC elections Joe had referred to the controversy raging inside Stepney Branch over mass activity on the streets and had criticised leading comrades who were hidden within the Trade Unions and who were not active on the streets at all. To the DPC this claim was proof that Joe did not understand the root causes for fascist support in East London, which were not the result of fascist influence won in the LCC election campaign or during the two or three months before that, but

‘was a result of nearly 4 years of effort and conditioned by the nature of East London, i.e. the extremely great poverty, the widespread discon- tent, the apathetic nature of the Labour movement, the anti-semitic prejudice and the general backward character politically of a large section of the population. It is not and cannot be explained away simply in terms of what the Party did or did not do’ (p8 - again underlined by Joe).

By attributing the Party’s insufficient action to comrades ‘hidden within the Trade Unions’ the DPC said that Joe was only serving to reveal ‘the incorrect- ness of Joe Jacobs’ attitude in the whole discussion which raged in the Branch and where he is in practice advocating street work in opposition to Trade Union work’ (p8).

The statement, continuing, again referred to Joe’s claims that in failing to rally workers on the streets against recent fascist meetings, it was allowing further fascist penetration to take place. This said the DPC is further proof that Joe’s chief conception in the fight against fascism was to organise oppos- ition to break up meetings. The DPC claimed, however, that since the LCC elections, the Party had made a more sustained effort especially in Limehouse and Bethnal Green to pursue a more active anti-fascist campaign of propaganda, mass meetings etc. This claim would appear to have had some truth in Bethnal Green as Joe had noticed himself. As the DPC pointed out, recent Borough elections showed the fascist percentage of the poll had been reduced from 24% to 18%in Bethnal Green where the propaganda effort had been strongest. In Limehouse the fascist vote remained stationary. Only in Mile End had the fascist vote increased (26). The DPC claimed that the fascist vote had increased only in those areas where the tendency to fight fascism ‘only by breaking up its meetings was strongest’. Joe’s account of events is completely in contradiction with this claim, for his says in areas such as Mile End and Whitechapel, the Stepney Branch Committee had prevented mass opposition to fascist meetings whever possible and he and his friends had never actually put into practice the militant policies they advocated.

The conclusion of the DPC statement reiterated the claim that Joe was operating the wrong Party line. It called upon Joe to end his opposition by frankly recognising his mistakes and to ‘accept without equivocation the line of the Party, as indicated in this document, or he must be expelled from the Party’. The statement was signed by Elinor Bums for the DPC.

As Joe did not show this statement to anyone while he still considered it possible to work with the Party, he did not show this document to any other comrades either at the time or in the period that followed. Needless to say the DPC did not openly reproduce or publish the statement either. The document in Joe’s possession is a carbon copy, which is undated and unsigned. The date and the name of the signatory are both pencilled in Joe’s own hand. Joe pointed out in his own notes that this correspondence was never made public and that members of his'local Party were never informed of its con- tents. Joe pointed out himself that the statement was not dated and unsigned. However he received a letter from the DPC dated 13th December and this time signed by Elinor Bums herself, saying that she hoped that Joe had received the DPC statement by that time which permits us to corroborate Joe’s anotation of the statement. This latest letter also invited Joe to meet the DPC at their office on Thursday December 16th at 8.30pm. On the same day a letter was sent from the Stepney Branch Committee signed Phil Piratin, which said that at a meeting on December 10th they had taken a decision that, pending an enquiry into the Branch Committee’s recommendation for expulsion by the District Secretariat, Joe should be suspended from all Party activity and could no longer attend any meetings. Thus he could not publicly inform anyone about his correspondence with the DPC nor explain his reactions. Joe wrote back to Elinor Burns taking care to note that the statement he had received had not been signed or dated. He accepted the invitation to a meeting with the DPC.

Joe noted in his own notes that this was the first meeting he had had with the DPC during the whole six months of controversy and conversation and it was to be the last. He described later in one of his letters what happened at that meeting. Present at the meeting, a special commission set up by the DPC to deal with Joe’s case, were Springhall, Elinor Bums, Phil Piratin of the Stepney Branch Committee and himself. Joe was asked to say what he thought of the DPC document. He offered to examine each point in detail, but was told there wasn’t enough time for this. He suggested writing a reply, but was told he was ‘not being called upon to become a full time author’. He was referred to the last paragraph of the DPC statement and told that unless he accepted the point of view expressed in the document, he would be expelled * from the Party. Joe was unable to accept the document. He said he thought it was bad and false and was prepared to show why in detail. Phil Piratin was then called upon to give his opinion. He accused Joe of fighting the Party line, of sabotage, of being involved in fractional work within the Party. Piratin named as members of Joe’s ‘fraction’ Nat Cohen and Harold Cohen and ‘some lesser lights’ forming a group which he characterised as ‘leftists’. Springhall then informed Joe that he was guilty of ‘hostile, narking criticism, amounting to sabotage’ and that he would be expelled from the Party (27).

After this meeting there followed a gap of six months in which there was no further official communication between Joe and the Communist Party.

Notes

1. Information from a pamphlet entitled ‘Meetings, Uniforms and Public order’ by Jordan Publications, Chancery Lane, 1936.
2. A.J.P. Taylor, Britain Between the Wars, p 374.
3. DW, 28.1.1937.
4. News of Radek trial, DW, 23.1.1937.
5. DW, 6.3.1937.
6. DW, 18.2.1937, describes some of these incidents but in vague terms. Some are not reported at all.
7. From Joe’s correspondence collection.
8. DW, 164.1937.
9. DW, 23.4.1937.
10. I have not been able to trace any DW references to these events.
11. The ‘Battle of the Brunette’ story was serialised in the DW from 13.10.1937 by W. Tapsell.
12. William Rust, op cit, pp 80-81.
13. Ibid, p 83.
14. Ibid, p 195.
15. DW, 5.7.1937.
16. DW, July 16th, 1937, ‘Night of East End Terror’.
17. It Can Be Done, report of the 14th Congress of the CPGB, pp 38-9.
18. Ibid, p 39.
19. Ibid, pp 39-40.
20. From Joe’s letter to the Party of 29th November, 1937.
21. DW, 3.11.1937.
22. op cit.
23. From 29th November statement.
24. See p 261.
25. DW, 4.10.1937.
26. For the whole of Stepney the Fascist vote was 19%, an overall increase. DW, 3.11.1937
27. From letter of June 1st, 1938.