The article presented by the well-known left-wing writer and activist Rezgar Akrawi on the problem of trade unions and mass organizations in Iraq and the Global South touches upon one of the most complex and sensitive issues in the experience of the contemporary left, for what it contains of a serious attempt to rethink the relationship between party work and trade union and mass work in light of the profound political, social, and economic transformations that Iraq and the region have witnessed over recent decades.
The Problem of Independent Trade Unions in Iraq and the Prospects for Mass Action
Yunis Matti
The article presented by the well-known left-wing writer and activist Rezgar Akrawi on the problem of trade unions and mass organizations in Iraq and the Global South touches upon one of the most complex and sensitive issues in the experience of the contemporary left, for what it contains of a serious attempt to rethink the relationship between party work and trade union and mass work in light of the profound political, social, and economic transformations that Iraq and the region have witnessed over recent decades. The importance of this contribution lies in the fact that it does not merely describe the state of dispersal and weakness afflicting the trade union and mass movement, but seeks to open an intellectual and practical discussion about its structural causes and the prospects for overcoming them, drawing benefit from diverse global experiences and experiments. Credit must also be given to the author for addressing the subject with a calm critical spirit, far removed from accusations of treason or direct partisan polemics, attempting to raise genuine questions concerning trade union independence, the relationship with political parties, and the crisis of mass organization under the rentier state and the dominance of traditional political structures. From this standpoint, the following observations and ideas may be viewed as an attempt to contribute to the development of this discussion and to answer some of the practical questions raised specifically by the Iraqi reality.
In the Iraqi case in particular, the question of building independent trade unions and mass organizations cannot be addressed by replicating ready-made models or formulas imported from other experiences, because the Iraqi reality is governed by deep structural complexities manifested in the rentier nature of the state, the weakness of the private sector, the dominance of political parties over the public sphere, the infiltration of most existing trade unions, and the dependence of broad sectors of workers and employees on the state as the primary source of livelihood. For this reason, any talk of trade union independence cannot rest on idealistic conceptions or sudden organizational leaps, but must proceed from a realistic and gradual understanding of the nature of society, the state, and the actual conditions of mass work.
From this emerges a fundamental truth that has often been ignored in previous experiences, namely that an independent trade union is not built by a political decision or a top-down organizational declaration, but forms gradually from within people's direct daily interests. One of the core problems that confronted trade union work in Iraq is that many trade unions and mass organizations came into being through party decisions, or through political splits, or as organizational extensions of particular political forces, more than they arose in response to genuine demands rooted within workplaces and daily life.
Nor is talk of building independent trade unions alien to the history of the Iraqi labor movement itself. Since the 1930s, Iraq witnessed the beginnings of the formation of the modern trade union movement, and communist and left-wing workers played a prominent role in founding many trade unions, organizing labor strikes, and leading demand struggles in various sectors. These individuals acquired their influence and impact not because the trade unions were merely closed partisan facades, but because they were genuinely embedded in the daily lives of workers and authentic defenders of their interests and rights under conditions of extreme hardship. For this reason, the Iraqi trade union movement was able in certain phases to become an influential social and national force that transcended the narrow partisan framework.
Yet the subsequent political transformations, the escalation of repression, the domination of the totalitarian state, and then the partisan dispersal after 2003, all gradually contributed to weakening this mass trade union legacy and transforming a significant part of trade union work into an arena of partisan competition rather than a space for independent defense of the interests of workers. As a result, broad sectors of workers and employees continued to view many of these organizations as political facades rather than tools for defending their immediate interests.
Starting from Daily Economic Concerns
Building independent and effective trade unions requires proceeding first from everyday livelihood issues rather than from abstract grand slogans. The worker or employee in Iraq does not enter trade union organizing driven by political theories so much as they are driven by the concerns of wages, temporary contracts, job security, social insurance, delayed salary payments, working hours, the absence of occupational safety, the rights of working women, and retirement. Without grounding in these tangible interests, it is difficult to build a genuine social base for any independent trade union work. Mass power is not produced by slogans alone; its foundation is generated by the capacity of the organization to genuinely integrate into people's daily lives and defend their immediate needs.
For this reason, a genuine trade union cannot be built from closed offices, or from media presence alone, or from virtual activity on social media platforms, but from within workplaces themselves — from hospitals and factories and universities and ports and oil fields and schools and contracting companies. The living trade union begins from small grassroots committees that arise among the workers themselves, and develops gradually through accumulation, trust, and shared practice, not from a central leadership that declares its representation of everyone without an actual firmly established base.
The Iraqi experience also indicates that sectoral professional organization is more realistic and effective than attempts to build broad mass frameworks of a general ideological character. It is easier and more worthwhile to build a strong union for teachers, or for workers in the oil sector, or in healthcare, or transport, or electricity, because these sectors are connected to tangible and shared interests that can unite their workers despite differences in their intellectual and political affiliations.
Here precisely the importance of distinguishing between trade union independence and hostility toward political parties becomes apparent. Trade union independence does not mean excluding party members or claiming the possibility of absolute political neutrality, but rather that the trade union should not be organizationally, financially, or politically subordinate to the hegemony of a single party or current. The communist, the left-winger, the independent, and even those affiliated with Islamic or nationalist currents all have the right to be part of the trade union if they commit to its demand-based and democratic program and to the defense of its members' interests.
Internal Democracy as the True Measure of Independence
True independence, however, is not measured by declared slogans so much as it is embodied in the internal structure of the trade union itself. The democratic trade union is one that is founded on actual periodic elections, rotation of leadership, financial transparency, the right of criticism and accountability, the publication of decisions and minutes, and the prevention of leadership positions from becoming closed permanent dominions. Many trade unions formally declare their independence, but in practice are managed with a monopolistic mentality that differs little from the structures of party hegemony they claim to oppose.
The question of financial independence emerges here as one of the most dangerous and sensitive issues, because the entity that finances the trade union most often possesses the capacity to influence its decisions and directions. In Iraq, the primary risks take the form of government financing, or partisan financing, or externally conditioned political financing. For this reason, protecting trade union independence requires above all reliance on member subscriptions, however limited, because member contribution to financing their own organization creates a sense of collective ownership and reduces dependence on external sources.
Absolute transparency in publishing budgets, revenues, expenditures, grants, and projects is a basic condition for preventing corruption and the transformation of the trade union into a closed space controlled by a limited few. In the same context, it becomes necessary to prevent direct partisan financing, because this type of financing gradually transforms the trade union into a political arm even if it began under the banner of support and solidarity.
International financing, meanwhile, cannot be approached with a logic of absolute acceptance or absolute rejection, but with a logic of caution and independence, such that any support remains declared, transparent, politically unconditioned, and not controlling the priorities of trade union work. Financing should serve the trade union's program, not manufacture for it an alternative program imposed from outside.
The importance of building genuine solidarity funds to support dismissed workers, strikers, and those facing prosecution also emerges here, because the worker or employee cannot engage in any serious confrontation if they feel they will be left alone facing the authority or the employer.
The Relationship between Trade Unions and Political Parties
The relationship between trade unions and political parties remains one of the most complex issues, because parties by their nature seek influence, recruitment, and the use of trade unions as a political and social asset. But the solution does not lie in a complete separation between trade union and political work, because that is not realistically possible, but rather in organizing the relationship between them and preventing subordination.
The trade unionist should work within the trade union as a representative of the sector that elected them, not as a delegate of their party. It is also necessary to prevent any single current from monopolizing leadership or decision-making, and to ensure that decisions on strikes, negotiations, or protests proceed from the interests of the members themselves rather than from narrow partisan calculations. Trade unions can ally with, coordinate with, or apply political pressure, but without being transformed into organs subordinate to particular political forces.
The Cultural and Historical Dimension of the Challenge
Yet the real challenge in Iraq is not only legal or organizational; it is also a deep cultural and historical challenge. The prevailing political culture still regards every organization as an extension of a party, every independence as a weakness or hidden cover, and every difference as a split. For this reason, building independent trade unions requires a long time, a new democratic culture, and a gradual accumulation of trust through tangible and small successes on the ground.
Perhaps for this reason too, real change will not begin from building a large central federation that declares the representation of everyone all at once, but from small and independent sectoral successes capable of proving their practical usefulness — such as a strong teachers' union in a particular province, or a genuine coordinating body for contract workers, or a democratic professional federation possessing an actual presence within its sector. Such models, if they succeed in defending their members' interests and achieving tangible gains, will first produce trust, then open the path toward expansion and the building of a new trade union culture that is more independent and democratic.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, trade union independence is not achieved through a political declaration or an organizational designation, but through building a genuine social base, independent financing, internal democracy, a balanced relationship with parties that is not subject to them, and daily rootedness in people's tangible interests. This precisely constitutes one of the most prominent historical challenges facing the Iraqi left today: the transition from the logic of owning organizations to the logic of building a genuine social force capable of influence and change.
In any case, the importance of the article presented by the dear Rezgar Akrawi lies in the fact that it reopened a necessary discussion long postponed within left-wing and Iraqi trade union circles, and raised genuine questions concerning the crisis of mass work and the prospects for its renewal in light of the profound transformations Iraq and the region are living through. Perhaps the importance of this type of discussion lies precisely in the fact that it opens space for a calmer and more realistic left-wing and trade union dialogue around the deferred questions related to building social power and mass organization in Iraq — questions that will continue to be raised as long as the need exists to build a mass movement capable of defending people's interests and expressing their genuine aspirations.
Source: https://libcom.org/article/left-trade-unions-and-mass-organizations
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