Archive of issues of the online publication Viewpoint Magazine, an autonomist Marxist influenced online publication.
Viewpoint Magazine
Issue 1: Occupy Everything
Complete first issue of Viewpoint Magazine, an autonomist Marxist influenced online publication.
Everybody talks about the weather
Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi analyze the Occupy movement and the conditions that created it.
“Everybody talks about the weather. We don’t.” This 1968 poster was a response by the German Socialist Student Union to an ad campaign for weatherproof trains. The students were suggesting that like the figures pictured above, they had more important concerns than everyday things like the weather. The next year, journalist and future Red Army Faction terrorist Ulrike Meinhof would use the slogan to argue that radicals should talk about everyday life, since “the personal is political.”
For us, it just means that we should talk about the weather. It’s going to start snowing on the occupations, and the authorities want to use the weather as a weapon. They’re hoping that winter will kill the movement off, and it’s hard to deny that camping out in the middle of January would be a poor tactic.
But the weather represents a much bigger question: what will it take to make this movement last? There is great potential in what has been achieved, but there are also significant obstacles, which present themselves both inside and outside the movement. With an eye towards advancing this struggle, let’s start by trying to understand what’s happening: who is protesting, and what does it mean?
In a reflection on the riots in London this past summer, “The Prince and the Pauper,” we argued that the composition of the rioters reflected the blurred boundaries between a precarious and hyperexploited “lumpenproletariat” and the mainstream working class. What was important above all was that the spontaneous violence of the riots took place at the same time as a strike by Verizon workers across the pond, within the very industry that provided the rioters with means of communication. And though struggles were communicating with each other across the world, these two political compositions – one reflecting a disorganized population usually subjected to the worst state repression, the other reflecting the classical mode of trade-union politics – did not encounter one another.
The Occupy Wall Street crowd seems to be an in-between element, both technically and politically. Much of the energy behind it comes from the activist milieu that characterized the Seattle “anti-globalization” protests, but it also clearly draws from a wide base of working people who are now seeing the disintegration of classical forms of work alongside the social fabric that once supported them. So the Occupy movement is simultaneously the space where encounters can take place, as well as a form of struggle with the implicit objective of creating conditions in which these encounters can take hold. But who exactly is in this space?
The best information we have now is about Occupy Wall Street; though other occupations may have unique elements, this serves as a useful starting point. The composition of Occupy Wall Street is unsurprisingly heterogeneous. Age, wealth, and experience vary widely; some participants are veterans from former struggles, others are joining in for the first time; there’s a large concentration of youth, but more than 28% are over 40. You’ll find the homeless, doctoral students, and professionals of various stripes all camping out together. Despite these sharp differences, however, some common characteristics stand out. First, the vast majority is highly educated: a study by CUNY sociologist Hector R. Cordéro-Guzmán observed that over 90% reported “some college, a college degree, or a graduate degree.” Second, the great majority does not support either of the political parties. Third, and perhaps most important, the movement as a whole is overwhelmingly composed of the unemployed, underemployed, or precariously employed.
In many important ways, it’s no coincidence that this particular technical composition would choose the Occupy movement as its form of struggle. By firing workers, putting them on furlough, demanding that they work part-time, or simply forcing them to accept an early retirement, the capitalists gave them all free time. Instead of sitting at home, these workers are using this imposed free time against those capitalists who forced it upon them in the first place. The Occupy movement demonstrates how workers can creatively turn their situation against their bosses, how they can transform an imposed form of production into a weapon. It’s not so much a kind of prolonged march as it is a transformed strike, work stoppage, or collective slowdown. It’s a form of struggle that has emerged directly from the particular economic situation that capital has led us into. But not only is it a form of struggle, it’s a bridge between a multiplicity of forms, where already existing movements can cross-pollinate and new ones can be tested for the first time.
This bridging is international in character. Inspired by the Arab Spring, the struggles in Greece, and the Spanish indignados, Occupy Wall Street first emerged as yet another moment in this broader cycle of struggle. It’s significant, however, that after becoming a real movement by spreading itself across America, this form of struggle then found its way back into the hands of those who had inspired it in the first place. There is no greater illustration of the circulation of struggles today: from Puerta del Sol square in May, to the occupation of Zuccotti Park, and back to Madrid in October. But it’s not as though the same coin has passed through thousands of new hands just to return to its owner unchanged. The circulation of this struggle has added something; it returns with more experiences, a sharper perspective, a more radical edge.
But we’re not dealing with the same struggle. There’s a plurality of almost bewilderingly diverse forms of contestation. Before Occupy Wall Street, there were literally thousands of distinct struggles from Greece to the Middle East to China. What the Occupy movement has done is strategically subsume many of these preexisting struggles into a shared discursive space – providing them with a common language. In China, demonstrators have held up banners reading: “Resolutely support the American people’s mighty Wall Street Revolution!”
On October 15, protests erupted in 900 cities across the globe. Though many had already witnessed their fair share of disturbances over the past few years, it was the bold synchronicity of it all that was so unprecedented. This could have only been accomplished through a recoding of each particular struggle into a more general vernacular. Of course, all of these struggles were already implicitly – and in some cases explicitly – in touch with one another. But now, they speak the same language. Slogans reappear, symbols are shared, and practices are recycled on different continents. Struggles all over the world are beginning to recode themselves in this idiom.
The dilemma is that while unions have expressed their support, organizations like Occupy the Hood are attempting to prioritize the sectors of the working class that are racially marginalized, and international struggles are taking up occupations as their banners, no concrete and institutional connection has been made. It could very well be that the durability and radicalization of this movement will rely on its potential as a mediating element between the the various segments of the class, their particular interests, and their traditional forms of struggle. Achieving this means going beyond a spontaneous reflection of changes in our working lives. It has to start by understanding the system underlying them.
We Are the Wage Relation
We all know how the protest represents itself. “We are the 99%,” said Occupy Wall Street, and this single slogan has spread like a prairie fire.
Only a philistine would dismiss the movement based on objections to this slogan. A quick glance at the now-famous website wearethe99percent.tumblr.com shows what it has achieved. In a society that is supposed to be hopelessly atomized, made up of alienated zombies staring at individual TV screens, ordinary people are showing solidarity with each other. The problems people describe on this website might once have been thought of as personal issues, of no concern to anyone but your spouse and your landlord. Occupy Wall Street has given us the language to understand our personal problems as a collective political struggle against the 1% who got rich from our misfortune.
At the same time, the slogan advances no analysis about how things got this way. Social inequality is shameful, to be sure, and it’s been growing steadily. But does this happen because there are bad eggs at the top? Because the good guys in government aren’t strong enough? Or is it because there’s an underlying relationship in our society that produces this inequality and ensures that it constantly increases?
It would be no improvement to quibble about percentages. (“We are the 87.3%! Down with the 5.2% and their 7.5% running dogs!”) The figures which actually demonstrate the fundamental changes in our economy leading to today’s discontentment are shown in the following graph, covering the period from 1947 to 2010, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics:
The top line represents worker productivity, measured by output per hour. The line lagging behind is their hourly compensation, which means wages plus benefits, adjusted for inflation. The growing “wage gap” between the two lines essentially measures the change in the rate of exploitation, and it shows that exploitation has been steadily increasing. This doesn’t mean there wasn’t exploitation before the 1970s, it just means that social inequality wasn’t growing; now bigger and bigger portions of wealth are being transferred from labor to capital.
In 1865, Karl Marx engaged in a debate in the First International Working Men’s Association against a utopian socialist named John Weston. Weston argued that the wave of strikes across Europe demanding higher wages was dangerous, since if wages were increased, capitalists would simply raise commodity prices to compensate and make life more expensive for workers. Marx argued in his speeches, later published as Value, Price and Profit, that this position was based on a totally incorrect understanding of the wage. Capitalists pay a wage that ensures the worker will show up to work the next day, equivalent to the socially average collection of necessities (food, housing, entertainment) required to reproduce labor-power, or the ability to work. They don’t pay for each individual commodity the worker produces, because the central fact of capitalism is that workers produce more than the value of their daily necessities. The difference between their wages and the value of the commodities they produce is the “surplus value” that belongs to the capitalist. No other input of the production process generates more value than it costs; the exploitation of labor is the source of profit.
What Marx pointed out is that if there is an increase in the productivity of labor, but wages stay the same, struggles for higher wages have to be understood as “reactions of labour against the previous action of capital.” If capital can’t pay workers less, or work them longer hours, it has to increase the productivity of labor by disciplining workers and introducing technological innovations. This has two dramatic effects. First of all, it reduces the demand for labor, which means unemployment. Second, it means capitalists are investing more in expensive machinery than in their source of profit.
If productivity has dramatically increased, and industries across the board produce many more commodities, they need people to buy them – but that’s difficult to pull off when wages have been so low for so long. The result of rising social inequality is that capitalists are sitting on vast amounts of money, or channeling it into a luxury economy, and banks are running out of profitable investment opportunities. Workers, on the other hand, need money just to live. The solution to these problems is well known. The widespread reliance on consumer credit – a risky investment for the banks and potentially lifelong debt for the consumer – increases purchasing power beyond the wage.
Alongside the use of home equity loans and credit cards to shore up consumption is the massive student loan industry, which lends future workers the resources to develop their productive powers. In theory, these debts would be paid off by future income, assuming some kind of imminent recovery. The problem is that people graduating with enormous and unreasonable loans are not getting jobs, and as we’ve already noted, capitalism is tending towards unemployment. With the classical system of exploitation by the wage undermining itself, capital is forced to find ways to use debts to extract wealth. Ever paid an overdraft fee?
There’s also a dramatic political effect of debt: it prevents people from deserting the sinking ship of the wage system. In spite of the fact that nobody expects a job to become a lifelong career anymore, which used to be work’s way of justifying itself, they’re still forced to accept precarious work – rushing between multiple part-time jobs unrelated to their education, if they have jobs at all, and cutting every possible expense to pay off their loans.
This is just an extension of the brutal strategy of expropriation already imposed on the poorest sectors of the working class, the predatory lending that specifically targeted black and Latino women. Just as student debt established a supplementary form of exploitation, by compelling people to pay for the rest of their lives to acquire a competence they may be unable to cash in on the job, subprime mortgages practiced exploitation at the site of reproduction. Low-income workers who needed an address, a place to maintain their abilities to work and to institutionalize their social existence, found themselves struggling to pay an unmanageable debt until the bank simply took the house back to sell it again, pocketing the already-extracted payments.
It should be clear that these very visible actions by finance can’t be reduced to the greed of individual criminals. They are the violent and reckless attempts by capitalists to defend and radicalize the exploitation that took place in the wage system, in spite of the growing contradictions of that system. So we have to decouple our rhetoric from notions of corporate power and lawless bankers. It’s a relationship we’re fighting, not a bunch of guys in expensive suits.
What the 99% slogan moves us towards is a concept of class. It’s the ladder that we’re using to climb up to a class analysis. But to really develop that analysis, we’ll have to leave the ladder behind. “We are the wage relation” is not a very good slogan. It’s a shift in perspective that indicates the need for new slogans.
The 99% is a coalition built upon many different tendencies, interests, and projects. While it helps us unify our separate struggles, discover the social in the personal, and forge our different demands into a common discourse, it ultimately conceals more than it reveals. The danger is most apparent when we consider that some of the tendencies within the Occupy Movement hope to use the momentum of the struggle to enter into a profitable alliance with finance. The “professional-managerial sector,” or what has been commonly though erroneously labeled “the middle class,” is certainly part of this 99%. But it’s a peculiar part of this percentage: although it is exploited by capital like everyone else, it nevertheless occasionally profits from its own exploitation. As that layer which embodies the interests of both labor and capital, the “middle class” stands as a variable and potentially dangerous element within the movement as a whole.
The “middle class” is, in its own way, tormented by wage labor – we think of what Riccardo Bellofiore and Massimiliano Tomba describe as “the lack of social life, the endless cigarettes, the psychic disturbances and the hemorrhoids of our ultra-modern knowledge workers.” But this layer also has a tendency to look for a way out – not by abolishing exploitation in general, but by taking a cut of the exploitation of lower-income workers. The professional-managerial liberals want to make finance work for them; their gamble is to co-opt the more exploited sectors of the proletariat, to claim to speak for the whole working class, to use reform as a means of stabilizing the wage relation rather than putting it into question.
In many ways, it’s an old strategy that goes at least as far back as the French Revolution. The Third Estate united its heterogeneous components by reconstituting itself as the nation. Everyone else – the upper clergy and the nobility – was regarded as a mere parasite idly leeching off the labors of the overwhelming majority. The dominant figures of the Third Estate – the businessmen, lawyers, and aspiring politicians – at first hoped to use the strength of the movement to advance their own distinct interests rather than those of the masses. Even some aristocrats threw in their lot with the masses in the hopes that they too could domesticate it. This was all in 1789.
But now we’re in the twenty-first century – we don’t need another French Revolution. So we have to question the strange resurgence of the language of parasitism. It’s a convenient way to reduce the objectives of the movement to nothing other than casting off the parasites in order to preserve the body. And the rhetoric of the 99% helps dissemble the very real contradictions slowly tearing apart that purportedly coherent body. The danger is all the more severe when we remember that this body is not so much American as it is international.
Beyond the divisions within the American “99%” there are global divisions. Inequality of wealth extends to the inequality between nations and suggests that the situation of the working class varies with national boundaries. In many nations workers are caught between the increasing impoverishment of agriculture and an unstable slum life structured around contingent or informal work. Farmer suicides in India are echoed by iPhone factory worker suicides in China.
The American inflection of the slogans now circulating globally is significant. It signals the decisive reentry of the United States into this international cycle of struggle; the dominant pole of capitalist accumulation can no longer distance itself from the struggles rending the rest of the world. But there is a danger that the growing significance of the American struggle will begin to blind us to the distinct character of other struggles and the specific historical form of the wage relation in which they have found themselves. The Israelis began with a housing crisis, the Chileans attacked education, the Greeks aimed at austerity, and the Filipinos united against American imperialism. Movements in the countries of the “Third World” will have to take on a distinct set of interests and strategies precisely because their composition is already so different. So while the Occupy movement has allowed these dialects to translate, it will have to avoid the risk of obliterating its particularities. The contradiction is not between a homogeneous international majority against an equally homogeneous international minority, but between the different poles of a global wage relation that necessarily assumes different forms in different places.
Enemy of the State?
The media like to suggest that the Occupy movement is the Tea Party of the left. And maybe there are some similarities: both are socially hetereogenous, both have brought together individuals from across the country, and both have several decentralized grievances, some of which may even be the same. Where they differ most strongly, however, is their relationship to the state. While the Tea Party has strategically insinuated itself with the Republican Party in the hopes of reorienting the state itself, the Occupy movement has consistently refused to do the same with the Democratic Party. The Democrats are too politically impotent to effectively co-opt the movement, and even the unofficial demands of the occupation are well beyond anything the Democrats will ever be willing to get behind. Most significantly, the movement rejects the entire party system. The Cordéro-Guzmán survey discovered that the vast majority of those involved in Occupy Wall Street – some 70% of the respondents – identify as politically independent.
This signals a major shift in the political culture. While just a few years ago the Democrats were able to rebrand themselves as a party of opposition, change, and new hopes, they’re now widely regarded as opportunists with nothing to offer. This legitimation crisis forced open a wide vacuum on the left of the political spectrum that has been filled by the Occupy movement. But while the movement has clearly abandoned the Democratic Party, it has not yet definitively abandoned the state.
There are two tendencies that fetishize the state. The first is the typical liberal call for financial regulation – if it was the unregulated avarice of the corporations that got us into this mess, then we can resolve it by pressuring the state into regulating them more tightly. The second, paradoxically, is the opposite end of the spectrum, the “End the Fed” Ron Paul fanatics who believe that fiat currency is the root of all evil. The shared ideological assumption of both these tendencies is that the state and the market are somehow totally distinct actors with contrary interests.
So the comparison with the Tea Party should lead us to an unexpectedly important question: why is the only anti-government rhetoric to be found on the right? The paranoid notion that “big government” seeks to take away the private property of individuals is a mystified understanding of the reality that wealth really has been transferred away from middle-income Americans, and it accurately intuits that this process has been overseen by the state. We don’t have to spend a lot of time emphasizing the fact that the state not only represents the interests of the wealthy, it’s actually composed of them. Everybody knows this.
Add to this that all these processes of financialization have been administrated by the state. The bail-out was no aberration; it just confirmed who the state is here to support. Consider the telling example of student loans. Since 1965 the government has underwritten private lenders who facilitate an increasingly expensive college education, as part of the Federal Family Education Loan Program. What this means is that the ability of universities, including for-profit colleges, to radically increase tuition, and of private lenders to prey on more students, has been enabled by the government. The policy was ended in 2010, but not before making it absolutely clear in 2005 that the government was not interested in extending any support to the borrowers: student loans have become nondischargeable, leaving a generation of unemployed graduates without the option of declaring bankruptcy. The only winners are the financial corporations, which have been packaging student loans into lucrative financial products called student loan asset-backed securities. Even the most recent measures announced by the White House only make it easier for people to get into debt; they do nothing to counteract the 8.3% increase in tuition at public colleges.
In spite of the government’s visible defense of the capitalist class, the tendency on the left is to imagine that we can somehow just negotiate with the state. It’s not the first time this has been attempted. A militant labor movement confronted capital on the shop-floor during the 1920s and 1930s. Capital and the state were forced to find a way to subsume and control this threat; that strategy was called the New Deal. Under the pressure of World War II, the Communist Party entered into an alliance with the Democrats and threw in its lot with the New Deal, suppressing rank-and-file activity in the name of the “no-strike pledge.” The situation established had serious consequences after the war. The labor bureaucracy set the stage for its coming decline; they strengthened capital and paved the way not only for the Smith and Taft-Hartley Acts, the legal foundations for the purging of communists from the unions, but also for the devastating separation of the working class from the labor movement.
Recognizing that the state is an adversary, however, doesn’t mean moralistically ignoring it. It won’t wither away if we just refuse to engage with it out of principle. The lesson from our labor history is not only that alliance with political parties is treacherous, but also that meaningful reforms were won by the labor movement as a result of militant and antagonistic strategies, extending from the 1919 Seattle general strike to the 1934 San Francisco general strike. It would be the worst sectarianism to reject reforms; they alleviate suffering and advance the position of the working class. But the question is whether meaningful reforms can be achieved within the political limits of capitalism. If the political apparatus is controlled by the capitalist class, this means that those limits are not external limits that can be overcome by a stronger program. Instead, they are internal to the strategy of reform. The only way to force the capitalist class to concede reforms is to confront it with an antagonistic agent, a unified working class. Let’s not delude ourselves into thinking we can convince them with our better ideas.
Today the immediate tactical questions of the movement also pose the question of the state. In a telling international exchange between the various occupations across the world, a New Yorker questioned occupiers in Frankfurt about their decision to request a permit from the police. Noting that Liberty Plaza was occupied without a permit, she asked why the Germans had asked for one, wondering if such collaboration with class enemies could have been the result of a “cultural difference.” But why not be flexible, on the lookout for openings that can be strategically exploited? Some compromises may advance the class position, allowing a movement to confront the state on a different plane. If the state is willing to give us a permit, let them make that decision and live to regret it.
The question of police permits touches more generally on the police force itself. Are they, as some protesters have chanted, part of the 99%? From the start there has been a clear tension with the police. They have made arrests, have begun infiltrating the various occupations, and will certainly be called in, as they have been in Berlin and Oakland, to violently crush the movement.
But the challenge of the police is that they genuinely are workers, and their work is to repress proletarian antagonism. This paradox is not to be taken lightly. Neither blindly defending them as fellow workers nor blindly attacking them as hated pigs will help us now. Any failure to understand their specific function is either a reformist danger or an adventurist error.
The real problem was posed in 1968 by Pier Paolo Pasolini, after the Battle of Valle Giulia, in which police and student radicals clashed violently. Pasolini, the communist filmmaker, would later write a poem declaring solidarity with the police:
At Valle Giulia, yesterday, there was a fragment
of class struggle: you, my friends, (although
in the right) were the rich,
and the policemen (although in the wrong)
were the poor…
The important point in Pasolini’s poem is not his romanticization of the police’s purported proletarian identity, but instead the question of the composition of the revolutionaries. The problem this poses is that the repressive state apparatus has greater contact with many more layers of the proletariat than the political movement. In many spectacular street confrontations the police have seemed to be the only representatives of the “traditional” working class, including people of color, allowing the reactionary media to represent the protesters as entitled college students. And there can be no doubt that the police force recruits from the underclass; it offers one of the last careers available. Though in the abstract it is possible to bring the police over to our side – the protesters in Wisconsin successfully won the support of the police – this strategy can’t be assumed as some kind of utopian reflex. The Oakland Police Department gave us a crucial reminder of the instability of Pasolini’s perspective, when the vicious and obscene violence used for years against the black community was brought down upon Occupy Oakland. The real goal of the movement should be to move past the fetishization of the police, and to forge deeper connections with excluded segments of the proletariat, surrounding the police with their neighbors alongside college students.
Whatever the composition of the police, they remain an index of the state’s experience of protest. Remember the wise words of William S. Burroughs: “a functioning police state needs no police.” The Wall Street occupation was taken far more seriously when the pepper spray came out; even more when 700 were arrested on the Brooklyn Bridge. The acts of violence perpetrated by police have served as indication that the protest is a threat to the state’s functioning. Determining the next steps will require careful consideration, and leadership by people of color, who have the most experience dealing with police violence.
The Roof is on Fire
Some squeamish left-liberals complain that the Occupy movement lacks organization. This is obviously ridiculous. How can the simple occupation of a park spontaneously ignite similar occupations in well over 50 American cities, incite a global protest in nearly 900 cities across the globe, and successfully link together a series of heterogeneous struggles without any form of organization? The Occupy movement is perhaps one of the most organized movements in history.
An accompanying complaint is that the occupations have not put forth demands. But it’s not at all clear that demands are a sufficient condition for social transformation. To a certain extent, as we wrote about the London riots, the refusal to make demands is a protest against the idea that the existing order could make our lives better, a refusal to speak in capital’s language. At the same time, the absence of “official,” institutional demands coexists with an incredible multiplicity of demands made by individual protesters, as the list of grievances in the first official statement indicates.
The important question is whether this organization is durable, and whether the movement’s demands put the social structure into question. No spontaneous collectivity could come together without at least an abstract set of common demands, and it would be unable reproduce itself without some kind of organizational form. But can these forms radicalize the demands so that they are oriented towards the transformation of the social reality outside of them?
The meaning and political effect of demands will depend ultimately on the organizational structure that makes them. It’s possible, for example, that even a highly desirable demand, like free healthcare, could be posed by a faction of the protestors who will make it possible to dissolve the movement into the Democratic Party. But this dynamic could just as easily work in the other direction. Take, for example, this poster produced by the Italian revolutionary group Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power).
The text reads, “Reforms don’t protect wages from rising prices, from the robbery of deductions. Comrades, let’s take the offensive for our objectives. Transportation, rent, school, meals – free. No taxes.” The police figure wields the scale like a baton, showing how the deductions outweigh the wage. The base of the figure is labelled: “parties – bosses – unions.”
The analysis offered by these demands is clear. Like debt today, the prices of daily necessities is a deduction from the wage, a wage which already represents exploitation. But the American reader will find two things very strange about this poster. The first is the idea of communist parties and bosses in alliance with unions; while Italy in the 1960s and 1970s had large and powerful bureaucratic unions and a reformist communist party, we have no influential left parties and our unions have barely any social power. Where it says “parties – bosses – unions,” we should write “liberals.”
The other puzzle is the final demand: “no taxes.” Isn’t this the core platform of the right, of free-market extremists? It is, of course, but this demand is a platform of the right because it is embedded in class, in the organized structure of the ruling class. No taxes for whom? The capitalist class tries to escape from taxes, to continue to redistribute wealth towards the top, and to give the state an excuse to dismantle the social gains made by labor. But if the capitalist class was subjected to a tax that even began to approach the percentage it expropriates from workers, this would render taxes on workers obsolete.
Since the tax is experienced by workers as yet another deduction from the wage, while the public programs that benefit them are on the chopping block, it seems unnecessary to allow the right to monopolize the attack on taxes. If an anti-tax platform is put forward by workers as a class, it represents a program of eliminating one deduction from the wage while charging capitalists for the maintenance of the state. The demand to tax the rich is, of course, accepted by many left-liberals. While it’s definitely a good idea to charge the capitalists, taxing the rich as the maximum program sets us up for social development by the state. The occupation movement gives us the potential to independently develop the class.
Other demands may be more appropriate for our situation. But they will have to be put forward by an organizational structure that represents a unitary class power. And the construction of such a form of organization will have to emerge from strategies of action that produce class solidarity.
A concrete example of this kind of strategy took place in La Puente, California. Rose Gudiel, who was about to be evicted from her foreclosed home, discussed her situation at Occupy LA. Her seemingly personal story turned out to be a social one; others there had suffered a similar fate. Many of the occupiers followed her back to her home in support. A few days later over two hundred joined her as she protested in front of the mansion of OneWest’s CEO; the next day they staged a sit-in at the Pasadena branch of Fannie Mae. Faced with such widespread opposition the bank gave in and decided to modify her loan.
This was a strategy, however spontaneous, that united participants in the movement who were hit by foreclosures. It provided a conceptual language in which individuals began to recognize that their own problems are closely related to other seemingly distinct problems. Not everyone who supported Gudiel was facing eviction; they joined her in part because they recognized that their own difficulties – unemployment, debt, rising cost of living – were connected to hers. The woman who loses her home is not so different from the neighbor that lost his job. The power of this strategy emerged from a unique kind of solidarity. For the banks to fight Guidel, they had to fight the whole movement.
A foreclosed home is an interesting site for an occupation. Among the many differences between a house and Zuccotti Park is the fact that a house has a roof. And this brings us back to the weather. Everybody’s talking about it; everybody knows that winter will force the movement to rethink its tactics. This is the politics of weather: it’s not some neutral phenomenon, but a weapon like any other. We will have to use it to our advantage before capital enlists it to crush our movement.
This won’t be the first time weather has figured prominently in a struggle. A reform banquet was scheduled by the moderate opposition to take place in Paris on February 22, 1848. Fearing an escalation of the already existing conflict, hoping to break the solidarity of the opposition, and knowing full well that the district where the meeting was to be held was a real hotbed of revolutionary activity, the forces of order cancelled the banquet the night before, undoubtedly hoping that the week’s horrible weather would work to keep the demonstrators away.
But despite the heavy clouds, cold wind, and biting rain, the protesters took to the streets anyway, enraged by this provocation, and quickly set about building barricades, looting gun shops, and throwing stones at the National Guard. While order was restored in some of the more public places, the demonstrators strategically regrouped in their labyrinthine neighborhoods. Already a challenge for the army, the winding streets, tortuous alleyways, and bewildering terrain became even more dangerous to outsiders now that it was pouring rain. So the forces of order hoped to use the weather to dissuade protesters from coming out; the protesters ended up strategically using the weather to bolster their primary points of resistance and escalate the struggle. So began the revolution of 1848 in France.
We can also use the weather to our advantage. The forces of order are hoping that winter will kill off the movement by forcing us to retreat back to our homes. We should do just that. We should strategically regroup by reoccupying foreclosed homes, squatting abandoned apartments, occupying various other buildings, transforming each and every one of these into the cells of an escalating movement. From the occupation of a public park we can shift towards reoccupying those spaces from which we have been forcibly ejected by mounting debt, unemployment, austerity measures, and cuts to social services. We can take back the public libraries, schools, lost homes, community centers, and more. The point is to constantly think of creative ways to use the weapons of our enemies against them. Let’s start with the barometers.
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Who threw the can of green paint?: the first two weeks of Occupy Philadelphia
An article by Ben Webster on the contradictions and potential of the Occupy movement in Philadelphia during Fall 2011.
On the morning of October 14, one week into Occupy Philadelphia’s encampment beside City Hall, someone emptied the contents of a paint can on the building’s southwestern entrance. The unknown painter fled the scene, leaving behind a decidedly unsymbolic smear. Not of angry black or bloody red, but a smear of bland mint green. Police cordoned off the entrance, dismissing eager Occupy volunteers offering their assistance. A pressure cleaner quickly removed all traces of the deed.
This bizarre incident suggests much about Philadelphia’s iteration of the Occupy phenomenon. Like other occupations, its porous boundaries integrate the protest site with the flows of the city. Participants, passers-by, police, and provocateurs move freely throughout, with the possibility of enriching or destabilizing the action; was our painter a police provocateur or a well-intentioned but strategically challenged participant? Both were considered in the aftermath.
This incident also suggests the ambiguity and contradiction in the political imagination of Occupy Philadelphia (OP). What constitutes meaningful action – a spectacular act of vandalism, the peaceful occupation of public property, or direct action on the horizon more confrontational and radical? There has been no shortage of activity – daily marches strike out to the usual targets – but as of yet no dramatic confrontations like those of Occupy Wall Street have occurred. This is the real significance of the green paint incident. That such a blatant act of vandalism against the seat of municipal power was shrugged off so quickly by occupiers and police alike indicates both the power and impotence of OP. On the one hand, there was no police advance under the pretext of this or any other number of small provocations – surely an index of our power. On the other hand, the incident is an index of the limited threat to capital’s power that OP poses, which is, as of yet, not enough to move the heavy hand of the state, a hand whose ruthless power has been amply shown in recent Philadelphia history, from the 1985 bombing of the MOVE house to the repression of protests against the 2000 Republican National Convention.
To use two familiar political concepts, Occupy Philadelphia is at once animated by both the spirit of the commons and of the strike. I do not wish to argue for the primacy of either approach or assert their incompatibility, but rather to frame the young history of OP as a state of tension between these two poles. As a participant in the occupation, I hope to describe from both experience and analysis the distinct character of the Occupy X movement in post-industrial, working-class Philadelphia, and its significance for the contemporary class struggle.
Fighting City Hall
Occupy Philadelphia feels like a march, a strike, a commune, and a carnival. This variety of forms derives from the peculiarity of the tactic. One can participate in OP just by moving ordinary human activities – like sleeping, eating, socializing – to the occupation site. But “extraordinary” human activities – demonstrations, assemblies, teach-ins, movie screenings – have taken place there as well, creating a charged but uneven topography. The personal and the political do not yet coincide here, but they rub shoulders. A reading group on Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James’s The Power of Women and the Subversion of Community next to campers drying their soggy socks on a clothes line; a college dude testing out pickup lines in earshot of the people of color caucus.
Philly’s unique Occupy identity has developed in large part due to a détente with the city and its police. Over 1,000 people attended a raucous planning meeting two days before the occupation’s inauguration, a sizable show of force well covered by the local press. Of the two options available to the Philadelphia police – massive and very public repression or tacit cooperation – they opted for the latter. At 9 AM on October 6, hundreds assembled on the west side of City Hall and began constructing an encampment with relatively little interference. Although police are stationed visibly around the occupation and conduct walk-throughs both uniformed and plain-clothed, so far they’ve acted with restraint.
Activity in violation of city codes, including the construction of pallet structures for the homeless, has been permitted, emboldening some occupiers but creating an acrimonious internal debate. The hands-off approach thus far by the police confirms the liberal naiveté of some who, using the movement’s vocabulary, identify the police and city brass as part of “the 99%,” and therefore our allies. Indeed, Mayor Michael Nutter and Chief of Police Charles Ramsey made very public, very genial appearances at OP in its first days. Others, from political acumen or personal experience, view the city’s overtures with skepticism or overt antagonism. This debate came to a head with the early question posed to the general assembly of acquiring a permit, and has persisted to current discussions on how to respond to the city’s evolving position. The GA voted for a permit after much discussion. Although unprecedented in modern Philadelphia history for the liberties and exemptions it grants to the occupation, the permit does bind OP in a legalistic stasis – official, even granted a welcome by the powers that be, but neutered of antagonism. To the outlaw, relations of power are crystal clear.
This Philly compromise distinguishes OP from its Occupy Wall Street (OWS) template. Freed from both the glare of the international media and the menace of overt police activity, OP turns inward. Freedom from repression in a far larger physical space than OWS offers opportunities to strengthen our position but also deepens the contradictions latent within the Occupy movement. And although the police aren’t yet using pepper-spray and batons as they have against our New York comrades, this doesn’t indicate a lack of police tactics to crush OP. Two strategies must be anticipated from our enemies in City Hall. One, the strategy of patience, in which the police bide their time and wait for either winter weather or the “tragedy of the commons” to disperse OP. Two, the exploitation of incidents of non-passivity at OP-associated direct actions to crack down on the encampment. Both approaches can be anticipated, and, with proper foresight, made to backfire as the attempts at repression in New York have.
Strike and Commons
Philadelphia City Hall is monumental, the symbolic and geographical center of a battered but tenacious city. It is the second-tallest masonry building in the world, and in its heyday was a wonder of architectural achievement. The city’s two subway lines intersect underneath it, sending continuous rumblings up to its cold stone plazas. Along its west side is Dilworth Plaza, a two block long concrete plaza cast in the austere style of 60s urban renewal. It is the habitual dwelling of a large homeless population, and is scheduled to be handed over shortly to a private development group for the building of a cafe, skating rink, and conceptual fountains. In autumn, the plaza is perpetually in the shadow of City Hall and the surrounding office buildings, and whipped by intense winds.
OP has adapted many organizational features of the Occupy movement. The general assembly, which meets daily at 7 PM, is the primary forum for communication and decision-making. Working groups assure the daily reproduction of the occupation (food, medic, education, safety, facilitation, etc.) and its strategic thrust (direct action, media, messaging, etc.). Over 300 tents have been erected across Dilworth Plaza, populated by various “tribes” of the political and non-political (“do you go to the general assembly?”), young and old, white and black, counter-cultural and normies. Things are typically quiet before noon, and afterwards through the evening swell with part-time participants who sleep at home, curiosity-seekers, representatives of various political organizations, cops, passers-by, and the media. OP benefits greatly from its location literally on top of the city’s busiest transit hub. High school students and commuters contribute to its open vitality; there is strength in numbers, even if they are anonymous and temporary. Despite its proximity to Philadelphia’s central business district, OP does not have the belly-of-the-beast feel of OWS; this is not a global city, and a proletarian mien contaminates even those quarters fashioned in the mold of neoliberal finance capital.
OP, like its peers, strives for horizontal organization – ideally all participants have an equal right to determine the course of the occupation. The space created at OP for experimentation in egalitarian decision-making should be applauded; the proliferation of such spaces is essential for the project of proletarian autonomy. However, since thus far participation in decision-making and execution is encouraged but not compulsory, I would suggest that in practice, power at OP is functioning along the lines of a kind of primitive syndicalism. Proposals submitted for approval at the general assembly must first pass through a daily co-committee meeting (“co-co”), composed of representatives of the various working groups. In effect, access to power at OP is streamlined by participation in a working group: in the micro-society of OP, the workers in the working groups that constitute its infrastructure constitute its sovereign power. Is this a positive model to acknowledge and propagate, or a model that will tend to produce a division among occupiers between more active participants and those who participate by simply showing up and remaining in the encampment? It should be noted that groups such as caucuses of anarchists and people of color, by dint of their organizational capacity or moral power, readily move to the center of OP’s sovereign power at parity with the working groups. The ambiguity of the situation lies in the question of access to power: should this be determined by capacity for organization or objective position within existing social hierarchies? How can the reproduction of these hierarchies be actively combated within the occupations?
Confusion, overlap, and frustration are tolerated out of necessity at OP by the proliferating working groups. Good faith and movement momentum – for the time – paper over the considerable challenges of constituting a micro-society from a milieu of strangers with varying experiences and backgrounds, excepting the occasional raised voices and scuffles.
How long can the momentum last? OP has passed through three overlapping stages: spectacle, organization, and critique/action. In the early days in which spectacle dominated, everyone seemed to be filming everyone else with cellphone cameras, and the media swarmed over it all. When people gathered on the morning of October 6, they seemed uncertain what to do, which protest rituals to follow – who do I show my sign to? Is this a rally, a sit-in, or what? Who’ll be the first to set up their tent, and where? The proliferation of image production coincided with a nervous amorphous mass, only vaguely aware of its commonality and power.
In the second stage, organization, the encampment’s infrastructure was established. With the formation of working groups and procedures for communication and decision-making, the potential of the mass was harnessed. Dilworth Plaza was spatially delineated and mapped. Sub-groups such as the people of color caucus and the wheelchair-dependent self-organized to identify and correct patterns of exclusion. Brief struggles for control of media and outreach efforts finally expelled a narcissistic individual who treated OP’s Facebook page as a personal fiefdom. Internal organization is an ongoing process involving considerable experimentation, but the day to day reproduction of OP is secured for now, clearing the way for a deepening focus on critique and action.
In this current stage of critique and action, the conceptual parameters of commons and strike assume their power. Two questions, of demands and of acceptable direct action, predominate. It is widely accepted that OP can only maintain its momentum with a constant schedule of marches, teach-ins, and speakers. In this laboratory of praxis, in which the tactic of maintaining the occupation and the proliferation of collective critique are mutually reinforcing, the only thing lacking is a catalyst of true resistance. Marches have set out from OP to harass banks, visit predatory student loan sharks, tour shitty hospitals, and, arguably most successfully, chase Eric Cantor from a speaking engagement at the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia PD dutifully block off intersections and escort the marchers to their target and back to the occupation. OP now ironically possesses the power to march unobstructed anywhere in the city it chooses, but seems to be running out of symbolically potent destinations. All dressed up with nowhere to go, obscure political differences take on a new importance. What if the police are our enemies precisely by acting like our most obliging friends? If the “1%” can so easily neutralize our efforts, why will they bother listening to our demands?
OP recasts Dilworth Plaza as a commons, shifting it from a nominally public space to an actively common one, collectively owned by those who rule to the extent that they actively participate. It is a space striving towards decommodification, where human relationships have more value than the exchange of money. Yet it also bears a resemblance to a strike, a collective suspension of normal activity leading to a confrontational moment of decision. As the weather turns, the quotidian quality of OP tends towards the grim resolve of a picket line in the dead of winter. The two forms are not mutually exclusive; every commons must be defended, and every strike relies on a shared territory of experience, spatial or otherwise. The tendencies towards commons or strike do not neatly coincide with reformist or revolutionary perspectives. Yet the intersection of the forms makes for an unhappy tension, unable to develop with confidence in either direction. To expand and deepen the commons would be to hit too deeply and radically at the relations of private property and social reproduction for some participants. To adopt the antagonistic solidarity of the strike would be to abandon all pretenses of cooperation with the state and its agents, unacceptable for some. The project of OP, and the Occupy movement more broadly, is to synthesize the commons and the strike in a form appropriate to current relations of power and production.
Recomposition
Proletarian combativeness in Philadelphia, the site of many proud clashes in the history of American class struggle, still exists, evidenced by a variety of expressions ranging from the victorious PASNAP strike at Temple Hospital in 2010 to the auto-reduction action organized by teens at a local Sears store this past summer. OP is potentially a site of encounter and recomposition for a metropolitan working class changed by decades of deindustrialization, a swelling population of recent immigrants, and the combative youth subcultures of the flash mob and debt-ridden college grad variety. Although the process remains vague and preliminary, the occupation movement in Philly is a promising indicator of the working class’s political recomposition.
Two of the largest populations in the OP encampment are the long-term homeless and the college student milieu. That they sleep willingly side by side for weeks at a time speaks to the novelty of the Occupy movement. The close, extended contact of occupiers tends to cut through prejudice and ideological mystification, even though the egalitarian ideal of the movement remains distant. Individuals and groups who may never have otherwise encountered each other in the huge city now find themselves sharing both an economic critique and a tent. Should a major work stoppage occur in the city soon – both the Verizon negotiations and a number of public sector contract negotiations remain unsettled – encounter on a far larger scale is possible. The city’s major unions have issued statements of support for the occupation, but a material mingling has the potential to change the constitution of both movements for the better and expand momentum beyond the focal encampment. OP, however, may in the long run be a better producer of subjectivities then of concrete demands, and this would not be a fault.
An important subjectivity crystallizing in the Occupy movement is similar to the driving force behind the global originators of the occupation concept in Spain, Egypt, and Tunisia: young, educated, and downwardly mobile workers. Many recent graduates or dropouts of local universities like Temple and the University of Pennsylvania provide a motive force behind OP’s working groups, experiencing a mode of collective struggle quite different from managed, predictable campus “activism.” As comrades in California noted during the university occupations there in fall 2009, the practice of occupying tends to dissolve outdated distinctions like that between “workers” and “students.” A tantalizing possibility begging more research is the connection between OP’s site above a transit hub, and the highly mobile nature of this sector, moving around the city at odd hours between multiple part-time jobs, casual work, and classes. Earlier cycles of struggles in Philly, from the post-New Left Movement for a New Society in the 1970s to the clashes at the 2000 RNC, bequeathed long-lasting infrastructures of radical institutions and experience. Will OP be the coming-out party for a new cycle or just a flash in the pan?
Think Locally?
OP clearly owes its inspiration to Occupy Wall Street, encamped just two hours up the New Jersey Turnpike. The proximity of the two cities allowed many Philly organizers to visit OWS before launching OP, taking note of its organizational model and learning from its miscues. As one of the largest occupations in the country as of yet spared overt police repression, OP is both a significant model for the national movement and something of an aberration. Among occupiers, the relationship of OP to the movement remains uncertain, bespeaking a larger ambiguity towards the global, national, and local contexts of the crisis. Material efforts have been made to share resources with OWS, and solidarity actions with comrades attacked by police in Oakland and Atlanta are under discussion.
The political imaginary of OP remains largely stuck at the national level. Rhetoric of the 99%, Wall Street, and corporate taxes implicitly locates the current social and economic crises within national borders. Yet these crises have international causes and implications, and resistance in the form of occupations has likewise been a global phenomenon. As the calls for unified Occupy X demands increases, a real danger exists both in ignoring the global character of capital and our struggles, and in failing to connect Occupy’s critiques with local conditions and local grievances.
A faction within OP seized an early opportunity to advance long-standing local grievances and make demands of the city. After receiving a letter from the city government which made several demands of OP (dismantle fire hazards, control open urination, etc.), they refused a paternalistic relationship and in turn advanced several demands at the GA that OP should make in response. One of these included a repeal of Philadelphia’s racist youth curfew law. Conveniently up for a vote of extension steps away in City Hall, the law was initially passed to kill off the flash mobs that once rocked the city. Fighting a law that intentionally seeks to fracture, discipline, and manage specific layers of the working class would go a long way to reconnecting with those sectors that are still underrepresented at OP.
This general effort was accompanied by distribution of an excellent summary of recent local struggles, entitled “The Mayor and Police Are not Our Friends!” Spearheaded largely by anarchists (who have been the convenient targets of an ongoing red-baiting campaign), this effort has brilliantly changed the inflection of OP, focusing attention on local communities already in struggle. A predictable backlash followed, with many claiming that linking the occupation with struggles around the curfew and police brutality diluted our message and weakened public support.
This backlash escalated when 15 occupiers were arrested in front of Philadelphia PD headquarters on the national October 22 day of protest against police brutality. Although the efficacy of their non-violent civil disobedience tactics is debatable (all blocked a street overnight, refusing repeated police orders to disperse), the reality of police brutality in Philly is not. The first arrests of OP were denounced by many who sought to distance the activities at City Hall from those which, pushed outward by the occupation’s momentum, occurred elsewhere in the city. Should this failure of solidarity and centrifugal political imagination continue, OP will likely die a wintry death shivering in the shadows of Center City.
The October 22 arrests and the emergence of a new ultimatum from the city throw the future of OP into question. After granting an open-ended permit to the occupation, with no stated end date, the city announced November 15 as the first day of the renovation of Dilworth Plaza. This renovation includes the total reconstruction of the plaza by a private company bearing a 30-year lease, which will install an ice-skating rink and chic cafe, obviously inspired by Manhattan tourist geographies. Of course, the renovation will entail fencing off the plaza, expelling not only the occupation, but also the homeless who use it as a long-term home. So the date has been set for confrontation. Whether the city backs down, OP relocates, or is forcibly expelled, is uncertain. How OP decides to act against this threat will be a major indicator of the movement’s resolve and potential.
A far larger challenge, however, is the winter weather. The last two Philadelphia winters have been among the harshest on record. Simply put, OP cannot withstand a northeastern winter at its current size, and should not try to. Discouraged dispersion when the temperature dips is the worst possible outcome, and providing a spectacle of personal suffering to the media through it all is a terrible tactic. Occupations have captured the imagination of the world, but fetishizing the tactic is a strategic blunder. The only limit to continuing and growing this nascent movement is our imagination. Our conversations and GAs must move, and quickly, to the discussion of new tactics – occupying abandoned buildings (of no short supply in Philly), subversive organizing in our schools and workplaces, strengthening of the local struggles our anarchist comrades have drawn attention to – action, education, and theorizing without a central encampment if need be. GAs can continue indoors, marches and direct action can expand throughout the city, and of course hardcore occupiers can continue outside if they wish. This strategic retreat is actually an advance across the entirety of the social terrain – but one that will require defying the logic of media representation and the spectacle of contemporary politics.
In one form or the other, we can be optimistic that Occupy Philadelphia will inspire a winter of discontent in the City of Brotherly Love. Come spring, we can reoccupy not only Dilworth Plaza, but Rittenhouse Square, Love Park, Franklin Parkway, and – why not – Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell, too.
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From Egypt to Wall Street
Wendell Hassan Marsh on the links between the Wisconsin protests, the Egyptian Revolution and the Occupy movement.
Former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had already stepped down, following a popular movement that established a micro-republic, the Gumhuriyyah el-Tahrir (Republic of Liberty), which contradicted the pervading logic of the international economic system. And now protesters in Wisconsin were occupying the state house to prevent the passing of legislation that would effectively suspend bargaining rights for public workers. Sitting in a Washington newsroom, we needed a headline. I very quickly suggested something along these lines: “Middle East unrest spreads to the Midwest.” I got a side eye. After all, how could a free and open society, the democratic society, be taking its cues from, of all places, Egypt, an antique land with backward ways, Islamic fundamentalists, and Arab dictators? The editors went with a more modest title.
However, for many in the Arab world, the connection was not lost for a minute. They saw in the occupation of the Wisconsin State Capitol the same spirit that was present in Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation: the refusal to accept the financial order’s demand to obliterate decades of progressive struggle and negotiation.
Maybe my own time in Cairo made me see the easy connection that my editors missed. I lived there for a almost a year and a half on the largess of the American government. The conditions of my presence were a reminder of the structural inequalities of the global system. Any old American can arrive to the airport without a visa, little training in any useful domain and quickly find gainful employment and a life of comfort. An Egyptian, however, even with years of education, has to struggle to make a living.
As many set out today to occupy everything, let us take a moment to remember the real origins of this global movement and allow it to guide our ongoing politics.
Deep in the land of Hannibal the Carthaginian, who once challenged the power of another global empire, Bouazizi was born to a construction worker, living his entire life in Sidi Bouzid, an agrarian town. The 26-year-old scraped together an existence for himself and a large family by selling fruit. Relatively speaking, he did well to have even that hustle, as the New York Times reported that unemployment reaches as high as 30% in his area. There was a nearby factory, but that only pays around $50 a month. Even the college educated were heading to the coast, where they too struggled with underemployment.
A veteran fruit vendor, Bouazizi was used to the authorities that policed the fruit stands. Sometimes he paid a fine, other times a bribe. But on the morning of December 17, Bouazizi refused to do either. He also refused an attempted confiscation of his fruit, commodities that are often bought on credit by the para-legal vendors. The representative of the state eventually won the first battle. Beaten and humiliated, Bouazizi quickly tried redressing his grievances at the governor’s office, requesting that, at the least, his scale be returned. Ignored at the governor’s, he was reported to ask, “how do you expect me to make a living?” He set himself ablaze and ignited a global movement.
Protests started hours after the incident. Bouazizi’s family and friends threw coins at the governor’s gate. “Here is your bribe,” they yelled. As the unrest grew, police started to beat protesters, firing tear gas and eventually bullets. But the spirit wouldn’t be stifled. Organized labor joined in the struggle, identifying the central problem as economic. After all, it was global capital that had denied Bouazizi and his supporters their dignity; it extracted surplus value from human objects down to the last drop of blood.
Former colonial power France offered to lend a hand with its security savoir-faire. Or maybe they would have just hired a private firm to handle the contract. Later acknowledging the misstep, Sarkozy tried to justify his government’s support of the authoritarian regime with revealing, if trite, arguments. “Behind the emancipation of women, the drive for education and training, the economic dynamism, the emergence of a middle class, there was a despair, a suffering, a sense of suffocation. We have to recognise that we underestimated it,” Sarkozy said in a press conference.
Sarkozy underestimated the effect that the “economic dynamism” of the ruling elite had on the majority of the country. He underestimated the diminished economic prospects that resulted from Tunisia’s decreased agricultural and manufacturing exports to Europe. He underestimated the Tunisian people’s reaction in the face of potential annihilation by economic violence.
The movement quickly spread to nearby Egypt, where conditions have been even worse, the socio-economic divide between the top 1% and the rest even more dramatic. Several self-immolations occurred throughout the country, prompting the Cheikh of al Azhar, the most respected institution in the Sunni Islamic world, to issue a fatwa against the practice. Youth with degrees but without jobs started to occupy Tahrir Square, to call for the dignity that global neoliberal policies had denied them. They took the recent tactics of Egypt’s young but growing labor movement and added others.
When Mubarak, whose 30-year reign had been marked by the opening of the country to Western business interests, started to crack down on the protesters as the empire’s strong man, the people said he had to go. The public began to protest against dictatorship, but only insofar as they were protesting the global economic empire.
Somehow a popular narrative has emerged in our media that the Arab spring protested against dictatorship, against murderous regimes. These popular struggles have been reduced to rebellions against the villainies of a Qaddafi, an Assad, a Saleh.
But the Arab Spring started as a protest against global finance and its henchmen. Almost across the board, protesters claiming public space were demanding mostly economic reforms. It was only after Arab dictators, whose decennial rules offered up their countries to the jaws of the global market, started to repress this popular struggle with violence, that dictatorship became the target of regime change.
Occupy Wall Street and the subsequent Occupy movement were initiated in the same spirit of economic justice. Zuccotti Park, ironically taken and renamed Liberty Plaza by its occupiers, is a micro-republic where the logic of empire doesn’t work. People take pride in discomfort, in being arrested and working for free. Altruism has become normative and hierarchy repugnant. To be sure, there is inner dissent and struggle within the body politic of the micro-republic. Nevertheless, the audacity to live a utopian practice has become liberating in itself.
Yet this movement can’t content itself with granting young people the right to take on more debt to live the lives the world can’t sustain, or reforming the way candidates fund their campaigns. The despotism that western powers decry in the name of human rights is a symptom of a wider system of economic exploitation, which at home manifests itself in the attack on the American working and middle class. They are connected.
The repressive measures states use against their own populations has also been imported from the Middle East. A recent post by Max Blumenthal connects the dots behind recent alarming examples of social control and police militarization:
The police repression on display in Oakland reminded me of tactics I witnessed the Israeli army employ against Palestinian popular struggle demonstrations in occupied West Bank villages like Nabi Saleh, Ni’lin and Bilin. So I was not surprised when I learned that the same company that supplies the Israeli army with teargas rounds and other weapons of mass suppression is selling its dangerous wares to the Oakland police. The company is Defense Technology, a Casper, Wyoming based arms firm that claims to “specialize in less lethal technology” and other “crowd management products.” Defense Tech sells everything from rubber coated teargas rounds that bounce in order to maximize gas dispersal to 40 millimeter “direct impact” sponge rounds to “specialty impact” 12 gauge rubber bullets.
One veteran of the war in Iraq knows the effects of the police-sponsored violence firsthand. After being hit by a tear gas canister launched by the Oakland Police Department, Scott Olsen suffered a fractured skull and a swollen brain. As though that were not enough, video footage shows a police officer throwing a flash bang grenade next to the bloodied man to disperse the crowd of people coming to his aid. But such police brutality is nothing new in Oakland, home of a radical black politics that has struggled against structural economic and physical violence against the working class, the poor, and minorities.
We should remember that the politics forged by the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s and 1970s made deep ties with the anti-imperial projects of North Africa, the hotbed of today’s vanguard movement. Algeria made the Panther headquarters in Oakland their embassy, providing a sort of diplomatic shield against police surveillance. When Eldridge Cleaver went into exile, Algeria hosted him and the international section of the party. A chapter was also created in Cairo, then, a nerve center for the world wide freedom struggle.
Much is riding on the direction of the Occupy movement in America. While visiting the Wall Street occupiers, two of Tahrir’s leading activists emphasized the importance of the Occupy movement for the renewal of the Arab Spring. To Americans who asked how they could help the ongoing Egyptian struggle, Asmaa Mahfouz replied, “get your revolution done. That’s the biggest help you can give us.” What Mahfouz was counting on was the possibility that struggles in the United States could pressure the government to cut off the $1.3 billion yearly payments that sustain Egypt’s military.
Long-time activist Ahmad Maher reminded the crowd of the immense task the Arab Spring confronted, and which activists around the world still confront. An American asked him the most fundamental question: “how do you overthrow a system?” Speaking as a grassroots political organizer who has been on the Egyptian street for years, Maher replied, “It’s easier to overthrow a dictator than an entire system.”
There is a reason that the Occupy movement does not have a singular message, tied to one political body; its success or failure will lie in the degree to which it changes everything.
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Insurrection, Oakland style: a history
An article by Matthew Edwards on the roots of Occupy Oakland, which includes the movement and riots that happened in response to the police murder of Oscar Grant in January of 2009.
This is an unfinished work – a snapshot of history as it occurred, experienced by me, reported on social media, or retold by trusted comrades. It will lack the finality of hindsight. Contained within is my account of the Oakland Insurrection, as it has unfolded over the past days and weeks. Both the insurrection and this essay are works of hope. I hope that we push forward on the streets of Oakland, the Bay Area, and everywhere else, to the limit of what is possible – beyond occupation and the proposed general strike to “total freedom” for us all.1
#OccupyOakland
Inspired by the uprisings across the world and fueled by the increasingly precarious economic conditions across the United States, a callout was made for an occupation of Wall Street. On September 17, 1000 people occupied the financial hub of the United States and arguably global capitalism. Within days, dozens of towns and cities had their own version of the #Occupy movement – with varying degrees of encampment, protest, and organizing space; within weeks, hundreds of cities were occupied; within a month, over a thousand worldwide.
Oakland’s Frank Ogawa Plaza, renamed Oscar Grant Plaza by many Bay Area residents, was occupied on October 10. Logistical planning started a week before the occupation date, with #OccupyOakland fielding a fully functional canteen, childcare, medic, sound, and general assembly area on day one, with person of color (POC), gender, and queer safe spaces soon to follow. #OccupyOakland had the same populist rhetoric regarding the problematic “homogeneous” nature of “#Occupy…”, but pushed the “99%” critique in a decidedly anti-capitalist direction. Coupled with this was a distinctly anti-police and anti-state tone that also translated into anti-oppression organizational forms.
On October 21 the city of Oakland presented the general assembly, the official organizing body of #OccupyOakland, with a letter of eviction, citing “public safety.” The words of OaklandCommune, posted October 19 on the Bay of Rage website, beautifully foreshadow what transpired on October 25 and 26when the police made good on their threats:
Social rebels from around Oakland have descended upon Oscar Grant Plaza and have created a genuine, autonomous space free of police and unwelcoming to politicians. Whereas other occupations have invited the police and politicians, or have negotiated with them, Occupy Oakland has carved a line in the cement. That line of demarcation says: if you pass this, if you try and break up or over shadow this autonomous space, you are well aware, as observed over the last couple of years, what we are capable of.
History
The Bay Area’s history of social resistance is well documented, and it’s important to remember the context behind the militancy seen around #OccupyOakland. The general events these social rebels are referring to are the uprisings and demonstrations that have occurred over the past three years in the Bay Area, responding to police violence and “austerity.”2
To understand the events of the past week, one must understand the atmosphere in which these actions took place. The most relevant of these demonstrations revolve around three sets of riots that followed the murder of Oscar Grant III on January 1, 2009.3
One week after Oscar’s murder by police, January 7, 2009, a rally at the Fruitvale BART station transitioned into a march that eventually evolved into a riot, with running street fights against police. The action resulted in 100 arrests and hundreds of thousands in policing costs and property destruction. Johannes Mehserle, the officer who killed Grant, was arrested one week later – a day before thousands marched through Oakland, serving notice to the police that their actions had consequences.
A series of low and mid-intensity direct actions and marches occurred over the next 18 months until the verdict day, July 8, 2010, when Mehserle was ostensibly acquitted for murder and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for shooting an unarmed and prone Oscar Grant in the back. Police preparations, dubbed “Operation Verdict,” were one of the largest local buildups of state and federal police forces in recent history.4 The buildup actually seemed to intensify popular opinion against the police. Operation Verdict not only failed to stop another riot, where hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of property was destroyed, but also failed to arrest as many demonstrators as the riots of a year before. Sentencing day, November 5. 2010, saw an evolution of police tactics that stopped the march before it morphed into something greater. The march was kettled and everyone was arrested in mass, all later to be released without charges.
Oscar Grant’s Legacy
I would like to recognize that Oscar Grant was a real person; with a daughter, family, and friends. I would like to recognize this because the human element can get lost when we make martyrs out of casualties. The actions around his death were living laboratories for many Bay Area residents, specifically youth and political radicals – anarchists, anti-authoritarians, and anti-capitalists. For some, this was the first time they had tasted tear gas or felt the sting of a rubber bullet. The January 7 riot was a hurried affair, with people quickly learning how to stay together, erect makeshift barricades, or set fires to necessitate getaways.
July 8 saw the forces of the state prepared and still unable to stop scores of “crews” smashing shop windows.5 Communication and coordination appeared to improve between the various demonstration participants. Masks were worn and code names used. It was apparent that even just a few “battle hours” dramatically increased a collectivity’s “street” effectiveness, i.e. the ability to create social unrest and get away with it. Through these events, it was revealed that street demonstrations, with riots in particular, did have an effect on, if not public policy, then at least civic discourse.
There were failures as well. Media and state forces conspired to create the concept of the “outside agitator” – the anarchist from afar whose only purpose was to smash. The actions of property destruction seemed to overshadow the context in which they were used. The tactic itself was the perfect expression of the powerlessness that people felt in demanding, from an unjust state, some sort of “justice.” It was an action of tantrum, saying, “in this protest zone, in this space of social rupture, I only have the ability to destroy.” A statement like that, while unifying for the participants within that instant of “social rupture,” has little to no organizing potential. And so the movement went from active conflict to history. Its steam and momentum were lost. However, with its passing came a time of tactical and strategic reflection, the results of which were practiced on the streets of Oakland under the banner of #Occupy only a week ago.
Anarchists
The efforts and effects of the anarchist tradition in the Bay Area cannot be ignored, neither in the case of Oscar Grant nor #OccupyOakland. There are hundreds of anarchists active in “street level” actions; hundreds more working in various corporate, non-profit, alternative, and other industries that bring money, logistical support, and experience when needed; and hundreds still who are engaged in their own projects, communities, and building families.
The presence of such a high concentration of anarchists at radical or potentially explosive demonstrations has influenced how people protest. To be sure, not every person at a demo is an anarchist, far from it, but many have adopted anarchist practice. Masking up, wearing black, and working in teams has created a safer and more disciplined force. The attendance of anarchist street medics, propagandists, and experienced street fighters adds a level of infrastructural and logistical support that makes actions on the streets feel supported and emboldened. Traditionally organizing on egalitarian and non-hierarchical planes, as well as a familiarity with consensus process, have facilitated the creation of a strong general assembly. The creation of solidarity groups for those arrested at actions, and access to the legal network that years of Bay Area activism created has been key in movement progress. In both social movements the anarchist presence has been an important, though by far not the only, element to any success.
This is not to say that an anarchist presence in the Bay Area has not had its troubles in recent years. The attempt by the state to brand anarchists as “outsiders” failed in the buildup of Operation Verdict, but did highlight racial and class issues that people are still confronting. Furthermore there was a successful attempt to brand anarchists has violent, although this was just one more step in a process dating back hundreds of years to redefine “anarchism” in the negative. Still, the only contact that many people have had with anarchists is the images presented by the media of “black-clad hooligans destroying things.” The insurrectionary anarchist current that is alive within the Bay has showed itself as a trend of attack, security culture, and tightknit networks. In the past it was inward focusing and only surfaced in times of action, although the presence of many insurrectionists at the general assemblies and their use of violence in a form different from that of property destruction does give credence to the idea that this trend is maturing.
Insurrection and Strike
Throughout the week, preparations were made within the #OccupyOakland space for arrival of police enforcing the eviction notices. The plan was to construct and defend barricades to keep the Oakland Police Department (OPD) out for as long as possible. Over the past two weeks, the police made only a handful of incursions into the autonomous space. The response by those camped was always forceful yet disciplined, with the distilled message being: “get out!” As a result there was little worry about the question of “when” “they” would come. “They will come when they do,” one camper told me with a shrug the night before the eviction. On Tuesday October 25, at 4:30 AM, hundreds of riot police from over a dozen different agencies descended upon the camp. After calling a dispersal order, police waited for five minutes before throwing concussion grenades, launching tear gas, firing pepper and rubber bullets, and hitting people with batons. The night concluded with around 80 arrests and some serious injuries.
A call out was made for 4 PM the same day to meet at the Oakland Library for a march to Oscar Grant (OG) Plaza. A diverse crowd of over 1500 people arrived. They marched around Oakland, swelling in numbers as people came into the streets. The police attacked with gas, less-than-lethal rounds, and batons. Demonstrators responded with bottles and paint balloons. Police snatch squads grabbed and beat protestors in full view of the crowd, with a handful having to be taken to the emergency room.6 The march continued to OG Plaza where lines of riot police stood behind metal barricades blocking all possible entrances. A standoff ensued.
At roughly 8:30 PM a crowd of 500 assembled at 14 and Broadway. After repeated warnings the police attacked. The gas attack was the worst of the day. Injured protesters littered the intersection, including Scott Olson, two-tour Marine veteran, who took a teargas canister to the head. Others were blinded and choking on the gas. Numerous burn victims from the gas canisters ran for cover; at least one of them needed plastic surgery on her foot. The crowd recomposed within minutes, playing cat and mouse with the police, rallying and taking the streets outside the barricades, fleeing from police attacks only to form again.
The chatter of excitement and anger was easy to understand. Groups of people were swapping stories from the days events. The gas was loosing its fear effect; these crowds were not dispersing. Teenagers were laughing at each other’s snot and tear-soaked faces. Older people were talking about the 1960s; “gas nowadays seems more potent,” they said. Anarchist and other radical medics were helping gas victims. By about 10 PM it was obvious that even though the group had failed to retake the plaza, they had in fact won two important victories. #OccupyOakland was effectively in control of all of downtown Oakland save OG Plaza. Or, to put it differently, the police had lost the initiative: they had lost their mobility and the ability to dictate terms outside the range of their weapons. By controlling the plaza they abdicated control of the rest of downtown Oakland to the occupiers. Declaring victory on the ground, the hundreds of occupiers began to disperse to ready themselves for the next day.
The second victory was not seen until the next day, when media outlets had no choice but to broadcast images of the night’s insurrection. Grabbing the media’s attention as well was the grievous injury to Scott Olson. Surviving two tours in Iraq to come home and be shot by OPD sealed the police’s fate in the realm of public opinion. Not only had #OccupyOakland succeeded in controlling the streets, they had also won over hearts and minds. As of this writing it looks as though Scott will recover and not become a martyr for any cause, just another victim of police brutality.
A general assembly was called for 6 PM on October 26. The police were nowhere in sight, but some reported that they were massing at a nearby parking garage. They were never to mobilize in any show of force. Bike patrols were passing back information, and a general feeling of safety permeated the camp. The metal fence that had been set up by the city was taken down, and once again the plaza was in the hands of #OccupyOakland. A proposal was submitted for a general strike in Oakland on November 2. The proposal passed by 96.9%; 1484 votes for to 77 against, with 47 abstentions, more than enough in Oakland’s modified consensus of 90% for the proposal to pass.
After the vote, 2000 people attempted to march for the downtown Oakland BART station to travel to San Francisco, where it was reported that the SF occupation was to be attacked by SFPD. The station was closed by BART officials, so the 2000-strong group marched through Oakland, stopping once at the OPD headquarters to yell at the police, once at the Oakland jail chanting in support of those incarcerated, and once under a freeway overpass, to discuss whether the group should cross the Oakland/Bay bridge to support #OccupySF. The march decided to retake OG Plaza instead.
A truly startling realization emerged among many of the anarchists present at the general assembly. As thousands of people discussed the general strike proposal, others were circulating and intermingling, talking about the victory of the night before. A major theme of the discussion was the fact that so much had been gained without resorting to property destruction. A tacit understanding developed amongst many of the radicals that no one was going to physically stop any of the “wrecking crews” from smashing windows, but people understood that much of the previous night’s victory could be attributed to the images of police violence against protestors and the counter-violence of protestors against the police. If there is an insurrectionary imperative to attack the state, that idea seemed to gain support, at least among those in the general public who watched the live stream. The march on October 25 showed how the protestors had done due diligence in their attempt to remain “peaceful”; they responded to police violence with defensive force, instead of the less understood (and less direct) tactic of attacking property. A violence of low-intensity self-defense actually gained #OccupyOakland international support.
Lessons Learned
In the OG Plaza riots, the impotent violence that resulted in Mehserle’s arrest also doomed the movement to remain marginal. People have many unresolved issues with property destruction. It is my presumption that those in command of the police forces on the night of the October 25 expected to see protester-initiated property destruction. Broken windows have the power to retroactively rationalize the use of police violence. The destruction of the camp and the attack on the march would suddenly seem understandable once the nightly news flashed images of broken glass. Unfortunately for police command, the radical and urban #OccupyOaklanders did not fall into their trap. There was no need; confronting OPD and Alameda Sheriff’s Department was enough.
There was a very real feeling that if the OPD had changed its tactics on the night of October 25, and – instead of holding positions and gassing protestors – went in for arrests, the police might have started a fight that they were not prepared to win. There were roughly equal number of police and #OccupyOaklanders, around 500 each, but the police were spread out, covering the perimeter of OG Plaza, while the demonstrators were able to focus all their numbers in one location. Even more impressive is that on the night of October 26, with the police lacking the authority to act in response to #OccupyOakland’s retaking of OG Plaza, the occupiers were able to push the police out of their autonomous zone and defend it. This cohesion and the strength of will it produced is a direct result of the reflections, lessons, and tactical considerations that grew from the OG riots. Those initiating confrontations with police did so with discipline, and, dare I say it, style.
There has been a lot of talk about a lack of demands as a weakness of the #Occupy movements. I hear their demands loud and clear. The critique of capitalism, opposition to state power, clear revulsion towards the police, redefinition of social and power relations, independent organization, cooperation, and the attempt to reconfigure our existing world into one that is healthy for all; these are demands that are being made by those occupying. The idea from the beginning was to create. In acts of creation power is returned. We have held our ground, defended a space that is our own. Now we are organizing not just for ourselves but also for others. A general strike will occur. The next question is clear: what other cities will follow?
See you in the streets.
Matthew Edwards is a graduate student at UC-Santa Cruz, and an organizer in the Bay Area. A native Californian, he has been involved in radical politics since refusing deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002. Comments can be sent to anewhope AT riseup.net
- 1This phrase appeared on a massive banner by a contingent of Greek anarchists at the 2009 G-20 in Germany. While not explicitly Insurrectionist, the Greek anarchist tendency of spectacular street battles has become synonymous with the Insurrectionary Anarchist milieu that has dominated North American discourse in recent years.
- 2For an amazing collection of news stories dating back over 10 years, see indybay.org.
- 3The first murder of 2009 was committed by a police officer against an unarmed person of color.
- 4It is also important to note that the National Guard was mobilized.
- 5One could also use the term “affinity group,” but an affinity group is an expressly political form of self organization that may not necessarily apply to all those who ran together that night.
- 6It is important to point out that the police were not the only perpetrators of violence that evening. One arrestee was punched, elbowed and pushed to the ground by an Oakland fire department member who also made derogatory sexual and racial comments towards him. Later in sheriff custody at the county jail he was beaten by at least four correctional officers.
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The Italianization of Puerto Rico: a reflection on social struggles against university policies in the world's oldest colony
A former University of Puerto Rico professor briefly describes the imposition of austerity on the UPR, the struggle in response and the similarities to the Italian experience.
Dismantling a public education system in a country with strong background of political struggles requires a mitigated form of neoliberal strategy. Shutting down a whole language department, which is happening at SUNY Albany, is something you can do in certain areas of the United States. But it is a whole different story in a hot and participatory place like Italy. In a situation where active unions and a strong popular movement still have a say in public policies, one cannot launch a blitzkreig. What is needed is a longer and murky war of position. Thus various center-right governments, with the complicity of the center-left, embarked since the 1990s in a long-term project that aimed at progressively cutting off key resources from public education (while financing the private Catholic sector) so that the whole edifice would eventually crumble under the weight of its own (apparent) contradictions. At that point, they simply need to suggest that the public system is inefficient and ultimately unproductive and voilà! Who could deny the crude reality of the fact?
If the Italian peninsula displays the last stage of this drama, a similar – yet perhaps more rapid – operation has been carried out in Puerto Rico in the last three years. Between 2009 and 2010, I observed this operation as a new professor at the University of Puerto Rico. The new right-wing governor, Luis Fortuño, initiated the process I had already seen completed in Italy by frontally attacking the lower classes, the true source of his opposition. This happened through the infamous Ley 7 that fired about twenty thousand public employees in a matter of a few months. In 2010, the time was ripe to begin grinding down the public university system, one of the largest public sectors on the island and the last stronghold of a once fertile tradition of pro-independence and socialist thought. With the drastic reduction of state support for the university budget, the true revenue for higher education in Puerto Rico, the newly appointed bureaucrats (all political nominees) enforced draconian measures that crippled the institution. Tenure-track promotions were frozen, funds for research eliminated, contributions from the employer to pension funds were slashed away. After the technocrats sampled the weak response of their opponents – the professors – they hit the toughest contingents: the university maintenance workers, and students.
Employees of the university responded with a series of limited mobilizations. In the spring of 2010, students instead opted for an indefinite strike.1 The most controversial point, a matter that unified students in their fight, was a proposal to levy an additional yearly tax of eight hundred dollars for enrollment (the so-called cuota). The measure was presented by the president as the essential step to save the university from bankruptcy, but while the budget kept on shrinking in the following academic year, the university also refused to open its books and show how and where it was using the remaining funds graciously made available by the state. The reactions to these unfair and discriminatory actions were immediate. The strength of the response was especially noticed in a traditionally conservative campus like Mayagüez – the technological pole of the University of Puerto Rico. Ignoring the most politicized wing of the student body, who boycotted the referendum in fear of manipulations by the administration, the majority of students cast their ballot in favor of the strike three consecutive times.2 A felicitous case of popular outflanking of one’s own political avant-garde, the one-month-long occupation of the Mayagüez campus left a permanent memory in those who participated in it. Pickets were organized so that ongoing activities were taking place at all time during the hot days of the protest. Participants caught a glimpse the true meaning of a general strike, the moment when social norms and masked forms of oppression break down, making room for new modes of conviviality, where a gratuitous kind of social unity proliferates.
And yet, in the best Italian tradition, during that summer the university administration staged a treacherous coup de théâtre: it accepted the conditions of the Student National Negotiation Committee, declaring the rejection of its increase in tuition, only to enforce it a few weeks later when students had returned to the classroom.3 It was a perfect maneuver, which used trickery to spread a sense of impotence among the movement. Only in the main campus of San Juan did students deploy a vigorous and continuous opposition. But as the university – notwithstanding the opposition of the president, José Ramón de la Torre, who on this account later resigned – militarized the campus the movement lost that widespread mobilization that affected the whole island only few months before.4
Meanwhile, the ones who could have replaced the students, keeping alive the hope for an opposition against the destruction of higher education in Puerto Rico – the professors – remained silent. During the occupation, a minority of professors with ties to the union (APPU) actively supported the student movement. But as students were defeated, they had gained no consensus among the rest of the faculty. And yet the latter had every reason to protest, for beyond the serious impact these policies had on instruction, the faculty could also notice how former colleagues were rapidly disappearing while classrooms began to overflow. Those who had a market fled the island, but others, mostly holding temporary positions, vanished as the 2010-2011 academic year began. In the following months, the next most vulnerable component of the teachers’ workforce, international professors, was targeted as the usual procedures for working permits became almost impossible to complete. Here the most astonishing confirmation of the power of ideology took place. Although the large majority of the teachers, independently from their political affiliation, were affected in one way or the other, they kept silent and went about their business as usual.
The background of the teaching body at the University of Puerto Rico is significant. We could divide up faculty in three large sets. The first one is composed of Puerto Rican nationals, as well as Latin Americans and Europeans, who obtained a PhD. in the United States. Here is where the students enjoyed the strongest support. A consistent number of these intellectuals infused the body of theoretical knowledge accumulated in the best North American institutions with the praxis of the decades of struggle at home. Obviously, not all of them were so devoted to the cause. A consistent part of this group was also either cynically refusing any form of alliance with the students on account of some higher and more intellectual superiority, or was implicitly supporting the government. Among these individuals the new cadres of the university bureaucracy were selected; they zealously followed the prescriptions of the administration, opting out of what was left alive in the university.
The second ensemble groups US professors who were catapulted into an unfamiliar reality that remained foreign to them – although they usually operated in it quite effectively, at least from an educational point of view. Though the majority felt like they were living in another country, they usually denied that this territory is in fact a colony with specific tensions and responses in and to social fights. Moreover, accustomed as they were to the costs of education at home, these professors saw no problem in the imposition of the cuota. Overlooking at the disparity in incomes between Puerto Rico and the US, they at best adopted a classic defensive corporatist position tacitly supporting increases in tuition in the interest of the institution. This form of ideological preclusion prevented them from reading the complexity of the issues at stake, which also affected them as part of that community. They channeled their discontent into the usual reproach of Puerto Rico as just another Latin country, where corruption, bureaucracy and protest culture jam the whole social system and make it inefficient and chaotic. Only a few of them, those who knew their history and possibly lived through similar colonial dynamics in the US, avoided this ideological blockage and joined forces with the student movement.
The last group is formed by personnel trained in the former motherland: Spain. Although the Puerto Rican political elite holds the precious fruits of the Spanish academia in high regard, it recently had to realize that Spanish universities no longer produce the highly conformist generations of graduates they used to hurl out under Franco. Support came also from this new and energetic guard of professors, but it was not strong and pervasive enough to win a majority among the faculty.
To be sure, the rigid university hierarchy is very resistant to change, and has so far neutralized any reactions to the current situation. Divided by national differences and stubborn ideological occlusions, the majority of the teaching faculty is unlikely to take any collective step to protect their institution. As the administration rapidly saws away at the branch they are sitting on, along with any future safety net – the employees’ retirement plan recently came under government’s attention as well – they passively wait for a new election. Little do they know that freedom is something you gain, and that you have to defend day by day. It will not be an illuminated sovereign who will reestablishes peace and prosperity. It will be up to the students, instead, to rise again, and, if not defeat the government neo-liberal agenda, at least establish firm conditions for the new government (whatever it will be) to preserve the common good of their university.
Andrea Righi is the author of Biopolitics and Social Change in Italy: From Gramsci to Pasolini to Negri (Palgrave, 2011). He is assistant professor of Italian at Colorado College. Between 2009 and 2011 he taught at the University of Puerto Rico, Mayagüez.
Originally posted at Viewpoint Magazine
- 1The strike was supported by the Professor’s Association (APPU), the so-called Hermandad (university maintenance workers) and other unions such as Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration and the independent union of the authority of public buildings (UIAEP).
- 2Following the no-confrontation policy that is enforced in the university system after the bloody confrontations of the 1970s and 1980s, the University of Puerto Rico grants that if one of the major three branches (the faculty, the student body or the employees) calls for a strike, campuses shut down and classes resume only at the end of the strike.
- 3See Leysa Caro González, “Reafirman que la cuota va en enero próximo,” Primera Hora, December 14, 2010. http://www.primerahora.com/reafirmanquelacuotavaeneneroproximo-452820.html
- 4See Cynthia López Cabán, “De la Torre exorciza sus demonios,” El Nuevo Día, May 25, 2011. http://www.elnuevodia.com/delatorreexorcizasusdemonios-974789.html
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The underground history of occupation
Julie McIntyre argues that the Occupy movement, in order to sustain and increase its momentum, should put issues such as housing and the cost of utilities at the forefront and look towards the long history of ephemeral occupations by dancing collectivities for inspiration.
In the early twentieth century, hundreds of thousands of African-Americans migrated from the Deep South to Harlem. Racist white residents fled to the outer boroughs and the suburbs, and landlords began to double and triple Harlem rents, capitalizing on the limited geographic options presented to new black New Yorkers. Families crammed into single rooms, but when the first of the month neared, they still had to search for supplementary sources of income to make their rent payments. Inspired by the tradition of Southern Saturday night fish fries and “breakdowns,” Harlemites began to roll up their rugs, push the furniture aside, and print tickets to promote their “Parlor Socials,” or “Too Terrible Parties.” Hosts invited dueling pianists such as Fats Waller to turn on the heat with “cutting contests,” which sparked unrestrained dancing and revelry, the likes of which working-class blacks could never access in exclusive neighborhood joints that denied admission to black people, such as Harlem’s famed Cotton Club. The party hosts charged admission, typically a quarter, and made extra rent money from the sale of bathtub gin, corn whiskey, and soul food. The rent party scene served as an incubator for several notable jazz pianists, and it began to play a vital economic and social role in the life of Harlem’s working-class community.
Though some recent media accounts depict rent parties as a novel practice of the alternative white twenty-somethings who gentrify black communities, they began as a dynamic and autonomous response to exploitation, and warrant careful study as a traditional practice of occupation. Although the concept was not widely addressed in mainstream U.S. media prior to the seizing of Zuccotti Park and various other public and private spaces in American cities, the act of occupying has a rich and complex history. Critical participants have emphasized that the United States is occupied land, and have called for the movement to use the word with acknowledgement of its destructive history for indigenous populations. Those with a global perspective have pointed to the occupation of Tahrir Square, and similar popular movements throughout the world over the past many years. For those anchored in labor history, the term brings to mind the tradition of worker occupations of factories – as a strike technique used to prevent lockouts, and in some cases, to “recover” the factories under worker control. Finally, those who have inhabited abandoned buildings, by choice or necessity, clearly draw links between their life’s work and the habitation of major cities’ parks and plazas over the past several months.
But in spite of this attention to occupation, some vibrant and essential forms of the practice have been overlooked. It is these forms to which we should be looking as the winter months near and the movement begins to realize the need to diversify its tactics.
Throughout the summer of 2011, Philadelphia’s mayor, Michael Nutter, Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, and the local media whipped up a frenzy, threading together a diverse array of gatherings of black teenagers in predominantly white, affluent areas of the city over the past three years under the umbrella of “flash mobs,” “teen mob attacks,” and even “riots.” A closer look at the eleven incidents identified as flash mob attacks and used as a justification for the enactment of a racist curfew law, which the Philadelphia City Council recently extended across the city for the next two years, reveals that these events have little in common other than the presence of black youth transgressing the boundaries of their neighborhoods to occupy the city’s white economic center.
Several of the incidents can be completely discounted, according to the widely accepted definition of a flash mob, “a public gathering of complete strangers, organized via the Internet or mobile phone, who perform a pointless act and then disperse.” Six friends punching a man in the head on the way home from summer school hardly seems to constitute a mob of strangers engaging in a premeditated, pointless act, and anyone who has spent a day in a dysfunctional Philadelphia public school or one of its equally deranged charter counterparts could easily sympathize with the students’ sense of outrage and misdirected aggression.
Even if we set aside incidents in which a small group of people attack an individual, the collection of events identified as flash mobs is complex and ranges from exercises in auto-reduction to what many Philly teens would just describe as “breakin’ it down.” The news and gossip site Gawker investigated the conspiratorial social media exchanges that led up to a March 20, 2011 flash mob on South Street in Philadelphia and discovered links to Team Nike, a neighborhood dance crew that promotes their weekend parties through public dance performances. But while Gawker snidely concludes that Philly flash mobs and party crews such as Team Nike “might be nothing more sinister and revolutionary than a few street performances that got out of hand,” the Occupy movement can learn a lot from young people’s libidinal disruptions of the street.
While Philadelphia’s white elite spent their summer cowering indoors, bracing themselves for “roving gangs” of black teenagers who might “terrorize” their neighborhoods, the rest of the city embraced the heat and the streets, hosting outdoor parties on every block. Like the flash mob, the block party has much to teach today’s occupiers about taking back colonized spaces, and infusing them with a sense of joyful resistance. Black and Latino teenagers living in the Bronx in the early 1970s began organizing parties, inspired by Jamaican yard dances and sound system culture. They were looking for alternatives to the gang culture that had resulted in the deaths of their friends and brothers, and they were pushing back against the crushing force of “urban renewal,” a state-sponsored movement to destroy communities of people of color in major American cities. Young people organized block parties to make money for school clothes, to push their sound systems to the limits, and to demonstrate their vernacular dance expertise. They stacked up speakers in the parks and siphoned power from street lights, and they danced until daybreak.
The youthful founders of hip-hop, who literally rose from the ashes of their burnt, abandoned communities, followed in the footsteps of the Civil Rights activists who came a half generation before them by dancing in the street; but at the same time, they created a new form of occupation and defined new relationships with each other and their city by breaking away from the limited political paths presented. They created what hip-hop historian Jeff Chang describes as a celebratory “space of possibility,” and the tradition lives on in many communities of color each summer.
Party crews, groups of teens who have been loosely linked with flash mobs and described as “junior varsity street gangs,” have appropriated rent parties and block parties and applied them to the temporary occupation of vacant homes and commercial buildings. Coverage of party crew activities has been centered in Arizona and the Los Angeles metropolitan area, where swathes of vacant or foreclosed tract homes stand empty, inviting teenagers to claim the spaces as their own. The activities of young party crews echo the West Coast rave scene of the 1990s. Although many electronic music events are widely promoted and generously funded today, this widespread acceptance bloomed from a culture in which warehouses, malls, and large fields were secretly taken over, essential party infrastructure was put in place, and participants followed a trail of breadcrumbs and map clues to various locations before reaching the actual event. Once there, ravers had the chance to reinvent the spaces of everyday life, to encounter new bodies and sounds, and create strange new forms of community. In the morning, the occupation would end, the space would return to its mundane state of disuse, and the participants would begin planning their next intervention.
Dancing, in its many forms and contexts, from rent parties and block parties to raves and riots, often involves the active and intentional occupation of spaces that are highly regulated and controlled, and not intended for popping, locking, or any similar kind of social relation. Young people from marginalized communities have long politicized this everyday practice simply by insisting on doing it wherever they want, whenever they want. As the frigid weather sets in, the Occupy movement must look beyond its own borders and consult the annals of history to develop a broader repertoire of effective techniques, and the ephemeral occupation of city spaces by dancing collectivities might be just what this movement needs to increase its momentum.
As the movement consults this history, it must also recognize that there are communities who continue to occupy urban American spaces out of necessity and resilience, and that their tactical knowledge should put them in positions of leadership. I work with 18 to 21-year-old youth who have dropped out or been pushed out of traditional public schools. One of my students, a 20-year-old intermittently homeless black mother who is working towards obtaining her high school diploma and securing a job as a home health care aide, issued a demand to me after presenting her research on homelessness. “Y’all need to do something about this,” she explained. “There are so many houses in North Philly with nobody in ‘em, and then there are so many homeless people with no houses. Y’all need to fix that.” But it’s clear that we’ll only be able to fix it by organizing together.
“Turn on the heat.” The phrase refers to the heat generated by bodies dancing in spaces that we have temporarily reclaimed, but it also refers to the concrete concern of paying for heating as winter approaches. While the occupiers at City Hall in Philadelphia and around the Northeast confront cold weather this winter, many families struggle to stay warm every year because they can’t pay the heating bill. The participants of the contemporary Occupy movement need people of color, poor people, and young people to lead us into new forms of struggle. In order to sustain and expand the movement, their issues must be at the forefront; we have to understand that the cost of utilities is a major political issue. But let’s not think of people from marginalized communities as helpless victims. Instead, let’s learn from their history of resistance in everyday life.
Julie McIntyre is an educator who has worked with children and youth in schools, libraries, art organizations, and residential detention centers. She lives and works in Philadelphia, PA.
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Occupy the workplace: organized labor and the occupations movement
The Occupy Wall Street phenomenon has achieved a stature and longevity unrivaled by recent demonstrations in the United States, and has understandably struck a chord with a wide range of people dismayed by the barbaric level of inequality that is the defining feature of contemporary American society. As the small encampment in lower Manhattan has swelled and spread to cities across the country, the rallying cry of the “99%” has at least momentarily introduced the mainstream discourse to a conception of class, which is usually missing from the political theater showcased on corporate news outlets. The risks posed by an over-reliance on mass media coverage notwithstanding, the organizers’ ability to attract the public eye has been impressive and is an encouraging reminder that most people are yearning for a political vision that resonates with the material anxieties they feel. As the most brutal economic crisis in over a generation grinds on for the third consecutive year, perhaps most surprising is that it has taken so long for such an upsurge to occur.
However, while an inner-core of participants may remain for months, with time the size of the direct occupations will likely wane and media attention will slowly gravitate to more profitable ventures. The travesty that unfolded in Wisconsin over the past ten months should serve as a painful reminder of that inevitability. And though the moment’s political salience may briefly persist, it will be fleeting unless anchored in something more durable than a demonstration, throwing into sharp relief the need for a level of organization that can sustain and expand upon the Occupy energy. The slogan of the “99%” may have tremendous rhetorical currency, but history shows that there is no shortcut to the long-term, painstaking task of generating a real movement: meeting people where they are, building trust and struggling with them over the issues they’re worried about, connecting those anxieties to a coherent political program, and consolidating those efforts into a force to be reckoned with. While many of the Occupy working groups may be beginning this project, most of the millions who constitute the “99%” have been unable or unwilling to participate and need to be reached by some other means. OWS can be an opportunity to start this process, but it is not a spark that will spread on its own.
Here the civil rights movement, which is often invoked in relation to OWS, is instructive. Unmentioned in most grade school lore on the subject, the struggle for racial justice grew out of a deeply rooted organizational apparatus that had been constructed through decades of diligent labor and community organizing. Rosa Parks was a seasoned activist who had been trained at the legendary leftist organizing academy, the Highlander Folk School, and Martin Luther King Jr. owes his beginnings to veteran trade unionists who recruited him. No miracles initiated this historic fight; it was planned and executed by individuals and their organizations who through years of struggle in pursuit of concrete demands had cultivated powerful bases of support in specific communities.
Only through following this long-term organizing approach can OWS begin to harness the anger and energy it has made visible and translate it in into a dynamic, class-conscious movement. And only the labor movement has the experience and organizational capacity to take on the challenge. Weakened though they may be, and with all the limitations of their sedentary bureaucracies, unions are still the most democratic membership organizations in the United States, with established activists and infrastructures in cities across the country that possess the practical skills and resources necessary to carry on the fight, particularly when it becomes less visibly exciting. Though union density has precipitously declined in recent decades, still today millions of people have experienced real improvements in their lives through workplace struggles led by existing labor unions, a much larger and more representative cross-section of the population than is likely to turn out at any “Occupy” event.
It’s important to remember that historically, organized labor has been the most effective vehicle for challenging economic inequality; it is an empirical reality that when unions are weak wealth concentrates in the hands of the few, and when they’re strong it is at least a bit more evenly distributed. A recent study demonstrated that between 1973 and 2007 private sector unionization decreased by over 75% and inequality increased by 40%. In this spirit, OWS might best be considered as an opportunity to push the mainstream labor movement toward a more aggressive organizing strategy and, hopefully, an alternative political vision. Rank-and-file militants in a variety of unions have engaged in this grueling project for decades, with some successes and many setbacks, and perhaps the most encouraging feature of OWS is the space it might create for more work of this sort. However, an opportunity is only as valuable as the concrete steps taken to capitalize on it, and unless the strategic thinking needed to orient and initiate that process begins in earnest, this wave of activism will likely join the recent anti-globalization and immigrants’ rights demonstrations in the annals of modern left history while neoliberalism continues its plunder unscathed.
A number of unions have taken up the OWS mantle and some inspiring labor-community partnerships have grown out of it. The New York City Transport Workers Union (TWU) Local 100 was an early supporter, and even went to court to prevent police from ordering union drivers to bus arrested demonstrators to jail. The National Nurses United (NNU), one of the most progressive and militant unions, has been present at occupations around the country administering flu shots and providing basic medical assistance. And the courageous art handlers of Teamsters Local 814 who have been locked-out of Sotheby’s auction house – a quintessential symbol of the “1%” – have cultivated a remarkable level of solidarity with the New York occupation, turning out bus loads to their rallies and gaining international attention in the process. These three examples represent elements of the most dynamic and forward-looking wing of an otherwise rather glacial labor establishment that always seems to be on the defensive. The best chance OWS has to become the kind of force necessary to win a more just society lies in following their lead.
Samir Sonti is a graduate student at UC Santa Barbara. He has worked for SEIU.
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Deviations, part 1: the Castoriadis-Pannekoek exchange
Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi's introduction to a series of letters between Anton Pannekoek and Cornelius Castoriadis.
In early 1953 Cajo Brendel, a Dutch council communist affiliated with a group known as Spartacus, visited the members of Socialisme ou Barbarie (Socialism or Barbarism) in Paris. As members of a militant organization harshly marginalized by the most blistering winters of the cold war, Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, and their comrades understandably hoped to make contact with other communist tendencies critical of the official currents. Delighted to discover that Anton Pannekoek, that veteran communist whose dissenting tracts had drawn the ire of none other than Lenin himself, was quite close to Spartacus, the group decided to supply Brendel with a copy of every issue of the journal, eleven in all, to pass along to the revered theorist. Pannekoek, who read them with excitement, wrote later to Brendel the French group showed much promise despite its questionable position on the party question. On November 8, 1953, he wrote a letter to Castoriadis, which was later published, along with a response, in number 14 (April-June 1954) of the journal.
Spanning an entire generation, a linguistic divide, and a geographical shift, the epistolary encounter between Pannekoek and Castoriadis in many ways marks the internal transformation of the ultra-left. But the ultra-left, far from a historical relic, is making headlines again. The appearance of a mysterious little book called The Coming Insurrection on bookshelves across the country in 2009 piqued an already growing interest. Not only did Michael Moore name the “leftist call-to-arms manifesto” as his most recent read in an interview with the Hollywood Reporter, the tract even climbed to the top of Amazon bestseller list after Glenn Beck told Fox News viewers it was “the most evil book I’ve read in a long, long time.” But this pamphlet was only, if we may lapse into pop sociology, the tipping point for a resurgence of forgotten tendencies, obscure journals, and previously unheard of milieus, which are suddenly being discussed everywhere from academic conferences to national broadcasting channels. It’s likely that the “Invisible Committee” that wrote The Coming Insurrection grew out of Tiqqun, a French group that officially disbanded in 2001 after releasing two issues of its eponymous journal. Tiqqun itself has been rediscovered after the infamous Tarnac affair in 2008, when former members of the group were arrested for sabotaging train lines.
The appearance of new works and translations by groups like Tiqqun, including Troploin, Théorie Communiste, Aufheben, and Echanges et Mouvement, reflect the close engagement of the ultra-left with the tendencies and sensibilities of contemporary activist movements. An article in The Chronicle of Higher Education traced the “intellectual roots” of Occupy Wall Street to the anarchist David Graeber, who invoked the language of the ultra-left in his description of the political importance of the general assembly: “One of the things that revolutionaries have learned over the course of the 20th century is that the idea of the ends justifying the means is deeply problematic… You can’t create a just society through violence, or freedom through a tight revolutionary cadre. You can’t establish a big state and hope it will go away. The means and ends have to be the same.“1
But this paradigm, though it is thoroughly grounded in the present, nevertheless has deep roots in the past. All of the journals circulating today would deny such a strong link to their own ancestors; they admit the influence of the ultra-left, but none describe themselves as ultra-leftists. Most believe they have made a clean break with this history, and usually only employ the term as an epithet for those still thought to be trapped in antiquated politics. They are on poor terms with each other, and almost certainly would not consider themselves to be part of the same constellation of theories.
Although they have their disagreements, this dissension only conceals a shared unity that unsurprisingly originates from the common heritage they all seem intent on repressing. Many of the defining principles of the historical ultra-left persist, and their peculiar combination of blindness and insight bears the marks of their progenitors. Their shared emphasis on proletarian self-activity, their willingness to deliberately conflate means and ends, their tendency to elide the moment of strategy, their demand for the abolition of a transition period, and their tendency towards fatalism, are all age-old historical debates. And just as before, the ultra-left tendencies of contemporary movements have provoked a backlash from those who call for a return to the fundamentals of political organization, usually represented by the figure of “the party.”
What is now commonly called the ultra-left emerged as an oppositional tendency within the international communist movement in the early nineteen-twenties. Though critical of the right, personified by Eduard Bernstein, the center, represented by Karl Kautsky, and even the left, dominated by Lenin, its members never organized themselves into a coherent current: its theorists were spread across several countries, disagreed sharply with one another, and were only grouped together when Lenin criticized them all in his infamous pamphlet, Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Some, like Amadeo Bordiga, fetishized the vanguard party; others, like Otto Rühle, saw workers’ councils as the only organ of the revolutionary process; still others like Paul Mattick turned to crisis theory. But whatever their differences, their shared refusal to participate in parliamentary elections, work with trade unions, or make any compromises with any kind of reformism, unexpectedly brought them all together. It was this underlying stubbornness that allowed Lenin to transform them into a single tendency.
It should be remembered, however, that the ultra-left, despite what it would later become, was actually not a minority tendency in its heyday. Its spokesmen were all major figures in the history of European communism: Bordiga was the first general secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), Sylvia Pankhurst was one of the most respected communists in England, and Pannekoek was cautiously praised in Lenin’s State and Revolution as a bulwark against reformism. Even more importantly, the ultra-leftists had such a significant following in the early twenties that they could rightfully claim to be the dominant communist tendency of the time. When the PCI was finally formed in January 1921, it was Bordiga who commanded the majority. And when the German Communist Party (KPD) split in 1920, the vast majority followed the ultra-leftists in forming the Communist Workers’ Party of Germany (KAPD). The Communist Party, initially led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, had itself broken from reformist groups like the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the end of December 1918. But the KPD, despite its revolutionary stance, was pulled in several directions. Disagreements over the unions, parliament, and compromise in general, ultimately led to another break. It’s been suggested, however, that the new party, the KAPD, “embraced almost the entire membership of the former KPD.”2 The marginalization of the ultra-left – Bordiga, for example, officially lost control of his party to Gramsci in 1926 – only set in after the defeat of the revolutions to which they were almost organically connected.
With their revolutions crushed, and now harassed by capital on the one side and Comintern on the other, the tendency itself began to eat itself apart from within as ultra-leftists fought each other over the most trivial matters, and by the thirties this once vibrant milieu was reduced to a jumble of sequestered groups. The onset of the Cold War proved to be an especially decisive time for the ultra-left: marginalized more than ever, journals lost much of their already limited readership, organizations disintegrated, and isolated groups ossified into myopic sects. It was in this inhospitable context that two of the most prominent theorists of the tendency made contact.
Castoriadis Meets Pannekoek
The intersection of two lives represents the collision of two worlds. First and foremost, there is the generational divide: Anton Pannekoek was born in 1873, after the defeat of the Paris Commune, and Cornelius Castoriadis in 1922, just as the German Revolution, in which Pannekoek had played a part, was painfully coming to accept its own defeat. Then there is the implicit geographic shift: Pannekoek, born in the Netherlands, played a constitutive role in the development of central European communism, while Castoriadis, Greek by birth, made perhaps the most significant contribution to the emerging French scene that was made famous in May 1968. Their exchange shows the center of gravity of the communist movement moving from Germany back to France, while French theory made increasing reference to German history.
And last, the peculiar convergence of two distinct forms of ultra-leftism: one that defined itself against Lenin and another that actually made a constitutive detour through him. Though always aware of his great achievements, most of the historical ultra-left, from Sylvia Pankhurst to Herman Gorter, eventually grew quite critical of the Bolshevik leader’s theoretical doctrines. Pannekoek stands as perhaps the greatest example of a tendency that criticized all that Lenin represented, from his philosophical positions to his political practice. Shortly after the Russian Revolution, Pannekoek devoted much of his writing to refuting the universal applicability of Bolshevik tactics. His famous book Workers’ Councils sought to definitively discredit the theory of the vanguard party by demonstrating the historical significance of the councils as the only real form of proletarian emancipation. Against both reformists and Leninists, he claimed that “the new orientation of socialism is self-direction of production, self-direction of the class-struggle, by means of workers’ councils.”3
Castoriadis, in contrast to Pannekoek, had fought in the Greek resistance as a Communist, later joining the Trotskyists in France. Beyond the many positive references to Lenin in his writings of the time, it’s quite clear from his theoretical works and his practical positions that Lenin had left an indelible stamp on him. His ultra-leftism is an unusual case: he entered it through Trotskyism, but broke with that tradition when he argued that “the content of socialism” went beyond the abolition of private property to “workers’ management of society,” down to the organization of work on the shop floor – a historical task whose terms were established by the expansion and integration of managerial labor in postwar capitalism.4 He spent a good decade furiously producing a body of work so important that it would effectively define the far left in France, leading Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the European Green parliamentarian who was the most visible student revolutionary of May 1968, to frankly admit in Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative that he had plagiarized Castoriadis’s work. But then Castoriadis turned his pen against Marxism himself; having already grounded self-management in the critique of alienation in the young Marx, he concluded that the late Marx of Capital had capitulated completely to bourgeois scientism, and brazenly declared that the only way to remain revolutionary was to break from Marxism.
The letters of these figures not only give us a glimpse into the history of the ultra-left, they also speak to our own time. True, our conjuncture is radically different: we no longer face the realities of the Cold War, the role of the Soviet Union, the influence of the Communist Parties, or the uncertainties of decolonization. But there are nevertheless ways in which the present resembles the conjuncture in which these letters were written. We are beginning to glimpse the end of a long period of proletarian defeat, just as Castoriadis and Pannekoek were. They had the courage and insight to discuss the possibilities of revolution, reaffirm the value of autonomous activity, and emphasize the role of the proletariat at a time when intellectuals of the left and right were loudly declaring the integration of the working class, the definitive stabilization of capital, and the impossibility of revolutionary rupture.
But Pannekoek and Castoriadis were vindicated a few years after their exchange. Hungary and Poland erupted in revolution. Councils dotted the social terrain, autonomous activity was the order of the day, and suddenly capital did not seem so secure. If their mode of thought was in alignment with the potential and the limits of these nascent struggles, it seems that today’s ultra-left has a similar alignment with the eruptions of Greece, Spain, France, and England.
Reading through these letters makes it clear that whatever their agreements – and there were many – Pannekoek and Castoriadis differed on the very two questions that had defined the historical ultra-left from the beginning: the nature of the Russian Revolution and the party form. Though both clearly parted ways with the official communist movement, their differences were nevertheless irreconcilable.
Although the exchange circulated around what may appear to be a pedantic rehashing of these two seemingly irrelevant topics, both were using them to think through the key concepts of political practice. Beneath Pannekoek’s questioning of the Russian Revolution or Castoriadis’s consideration of the possible degeneration of the party lies a shared attempt to ascertain the content of the communism of their time. With sufficient historical distance from everything that transpired between the storming of the Winter Palace and the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have begun to ask how the content of communism can be reimagined beyond sectarian cliches. For our moment, these letters are remarkably contemporary. To grasp their relevance, we will have to trace the genealogy of these two major questions.
The Russian Revolution
Every communist current that sought to pose an alternative to the practices, policies, and programs of the Soviet Union first had to explain what kind of society it really was – an attempt to understand the meaning of communism as well as capitalism. The dominant explanations in the West for the nature of the USSR were variants of the Trotskyist analysis. However, Lenin had acknowledged, before Stalin’s ascent, that the revolutionary government was not only a proletarian dictatorship, but either a “workers’ and peasants’ state” or a “workers’ state with bureaucratic distortions.”5 During the years of “War Communism,” from 1918 to 1921, when requisition of peasant land and nationalization of industry proceeded alongside the introduction of Taylorism and one-man management in factories, it was actually Trotsky who had called for extension of militarization to the total control of trade unions by the state, as an apparatus of industrial management. Lenin insisted that more independent participation would train workers to ultimately take on the task of management themselves, arguing against Trotsky that the “sum and substance of his policy is bureaucratic harassment of the trade unions.“6
Beginning in 1921 with the “New Economic Policy” (NEP), Lenin argued for the replacement of the state’s “surplus-grain appropriation” with a moderate “tax in kind,” which would permit peasant producers to sell the remainder of their surplus in order to obtain manufactured goods at a more equitable rate. In spite of the reintroduction of market relations this represented, it was a transition to “regular socialist exchange of products,” and indeed an anti-bureaucratic measure, intended to avoid further development of the state bureaucracy that had grown in compensation for “the atomised and scattered state of the small producer with his poverty, illiteracy, lack of culture, the absence of roads and exchange between agriculture and industry.” If NEP represented a movement towards the free market and capitalist relations, this was a necessary step, since it permitted the peasantry to develop social power instead of subjugating it to the interests of the urban and industrial proletariat.7
Lenin had already argued as early as 1918, in a polemic against Russian left communists, that “state capitalism would be a step forward,” even “a sure guarantee that within a year socialism will have gained a permanently firm hold.” Since the transition period contained elements of different economic categories, the direction of large enterprises by the state would be a “proletarian weapon,” since “it is not state capitalism that is at war with socialism, but the petty bourgeoisie plus private capitalism fighting together against both state capitalism and socialism.”8 Now, three years later, he reiterated that the fact that the proletariat, represented by the party, held power in the state, was the primary defense against the “restoration of capitalism.”9 Recalling his earlier intervention on behalf of independent trade unions, Lenin emphasized that in a socialist transition there would still be classes, and therefore “the class struggle is inevitable” – the proletariat would have to use unions to combat bureaucracy and “survivals of the old capitalist system” in the government.10 The combination of an anti-bureaucratic attitude and the continued belief in shared workers’ and peasants’ power coexisted with the somewhat contradictory project of industrializing agriculture, to develop the productive forces to the level of the capitalist mode of production, and NEP manifested these contradictions.
After Lenin’s death, the continuation of NEP was advocated by both Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Bukharin, who were part of a hegemonic bloc within the Communist Party. Bukharin, in spite of his earlier leftist enthusiasm for immediate nationalization and industrialization, came to believe in the gradual enrichment of the peasants, which would lead to their identification with the communist project. This found support in Stalin’s insistence on continuing Lenin’s line on the “workers’ and peasants’ government,” defending “the worker-peasant alliance as a cardinal means of achieving the socialist class objectives of the proletarian dictatorship in our peasant country.“11
However, the enthusiasm for NEP was by no means universal; the Left Opposition, which included Trotsky and Bukharin’s former leftist coauthor Yvgeni Preobrazhensky, had warned that agricultural market relations would permit the development of a nascent capitalist class in the countryside. Their fears were confirmed in the rise of the kulaks, the landholding peasants who hired waged laborers and hoarded grain to counteract the drop in agricultural prices. In the 1927 platform of the left, Trotsky described a growing “class differentiation among the peasants,” the slave-like exploitation of farmhands, and a gap between industrial and agricultural prices that threatened to sever the “alliance between town and country.”12
The next year Stalin went to Siberia, to address party members who he accused not only of cooperating with the kulaks, but also living in their homes. He contrasted “socialist construction in the countryside, in agriculture” with the danger of capitalist restoration.13 Later that year, after returning to Moscow, he would rage in party plenums against the “Right deviation” which made restoration possible, since in spite of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the roots of capitalism, of capital and capitalists, were still embedded “in commodity production, in small production in the towns and, especially, the countryside.”14 The threat of regenerating capitalism resulted from the contradiction between two foundations of production in the USSR: “the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants.” To succeed, socialist construction would have to place “agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry.”15 With the end of NEP and the elaboration of the first Five Year Plan, Stalin put into place an economic program based on the collectivization of peasant land, aiming at the rapid industrialization of the countryside.
Writing in The Revolution Betrayed, Trotsky stepped into the middle of these “zig-zags” in policy by painting a picture of the USSR as a “degenerated workers’ state.” The workers had taken state power, but it had been usurped by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The difficulty of this view is that the history of the bureaucracy in the USSR could by no means be limited to Stalin – Trotsky had himself contributed to bureaucratization. Furthermore, Lenin had already described a close relationship between bureaucratization and economic development. “Socialism has demonstrated its right to victory,” Trotsky famously wrote in a celebration of Russia’s productive forces, “in the language of steel, cement and electricity”; and he made a point of noting that the blame for Stalin’s terror “lies not upon collectivization, but upon the blind, violent, gambling methods with which it was carried through.”16 But next to Lenin’s acknowledgement that the reorganization of peasant agriculture by industrial state capitalism forced a complex bureaucratic structure, the compatibility of these two positions seems unclear.
An unorthodox Trotskyist shoe salesman named Bruno Rizzi began to circulate an analysis, culminating in 1939’s The Bureaucratization of the World, which claimed that if the bureaucracy had indeed usurped state power, it was impossible to retain the idea of a “workers’ state,” degenerated or otherwise. The original, somewhat ultra-left concept he advanced was “bureaucratic collectivism,” which led Trotsky to conclude that Rizzi had “obviously lost his balance.”17 According to this theory, the managerial bureaucracy was a ruling class that extracted a surplus for its own enrichment, and orchestrated through a totalitarian state a highly developed monopoly capitalism indistinguishable from fascism and the New Deal.
Castoriadis may have had Rizzi’s account in mind when he underscored the primary importance of the bureaucracy as ruling class, but he rejected the earlier emphasis on collectivism. After all, far from a term of Marxist theory, “collectivism” is a quasi-ethical term of sociological description – it says nothing about the political economy of the USSR. For Castoriadis, capitalism as a system was defined by exploitation – the extraction of a surplus from labor by a non-producing class who dominated the production process – and not by market relations, which were essentially epiphenomena. The fact that the ruling class of the USSR operated collectively, rather than competitively, was irrelevant – the society could only be described as bureaucratic capitalism.
When Pannekoek first wrote to Castoriadis, he reminded his younger comrade that the theory of a non-socialist mode of production in the Soviet Union was by no means a development internal to Trotskyism. In fact, the left communists had made the case, arguably even before the Russian Revolution, that the policies of Lenin and Trotsky were not consistent with the struggle for a workers’ state and its accompanying socialist mode of production. This was a theory of “state capitalism,” distinctly different from the later Trotskyist version made famous by Tony Cliff. It held that the displacement of the “soviets” or “workers’ councils” that defined the explosions of 1905 and 1917 by the rule of the party represented the defeat of socialism. In this regard they anticipated the critique of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
However, there was a primary difference. Convinced of the capitalist nature of the Soviet Union, Pannekoek went on to denounce root and branch the very revolution that brought it into being. He called the Russian Revolution “the last bourgeois revolution, though carried out by the working class,” in the tradition of the English Revolution of 1647 and the French Revolution in 1789. By “bourgeois revolution,” he meant specifically “a revolution that destroys feudalism and opens the way to industrialization.” He pointed out that even the historic bourgeois revolutions had been enabled by the revolt of “the artisans, the peasants and the workers,” but since “working class was not yet mature enough to govern itself,” a “minority of functionaries and politicians” emerged as the dominant class. This was inevitable in Russia, “the laboring class being a small minority among the peasant population.”
The paradoxical element of this ultra-left theory, ultimately shared by Rühle and Gorter, was that it swung back around to the paradigm of reformism. Karl Kautsky vehemently denounced the Bolsheviks, before Stalin’s dominance and in opposition to Trotsky, for their notion that a socialist revolution was possible in a Russia that had not yet passed through the capitalist stage of history. As early as 1919, Kautsky wrote that the objective conditions in Russia “were not ripe for the abolition of capitalism,” and that the “immaturity of the existing relations” led the Bolshevik revolution to produce “the most oppressive of all forms of despotism that Russia has ever had.”18
Castoriadis’s response was twofold. He first called attention to the logical problem behind Pannekoek’s purism: the ultimate fate of the Russian Revolution does not alter the fact that within it, the proletariat struggled for its own interests, even instituting workers’ self-management in the factories, rather than subsuming its struggle into the program of the bourgeoisie. The fact that these independent demands were articulated by workers in Russia “made the Russian Revolution forever a proletarian revolution.” His second point was that the concept of the bourgeois revolution ignored a fundamental development in the mode of production of the 20th century: it was the bureaucracy, rather than the bourgeoisie, which ruled in Russia, and it was this same new class that was emerging as a dominating force throughout the world, including the capitalist world.
Throughout the whole ultra-left, these concepts of “bourgeois revolution” and the “bourgeois-democratic tasks” were never put into question. In spite of Pannekoek’s knowledge that Russia was predominantly peasant, that pre-capitalist conditions altered the subjective development of the working class, and that his own theory was developed within the specific conditions of political strikes in urban Europe, he never met the challenge posed by the Bolsheviks of theorizing communist revolution in a peasant society. And though Trotsky did accept the Bolshevik challenge in 1917, the approach to industrial development and “permanent revolution” that would predominate among Trotskyists took as its starting premise the subordination of peasant demands to the industrial proletariat.
But it was precisely the peasant problem that was central to the theories of economic development within the USSR. Just before Pannekoek and Castoriadis’s exchange, in 1951, Stalin wrote a final reflection called Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. There he preempted the entire discussion of state or bureaucratic capitalism in Russia by frankly acknowledging, even after the collectivization and industrialization advocated in his earlier speeches, that the law of value “does exist and does operate,” alongside commodity production, in the Russian economy. While the goods produced by state-owned industry were distributed publicly by the state, agricultural production, even in the form of the kolkhoz, the collective farm, “will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation – exchange through purchase and sale.”19
It is overall an unsettling collision of terms, which recalls Lenin’s argument against the left communists. The attributes ascribed by the left to state capitalism were simply the contradictions of the socialist transition, the persistence of elements of different modes of production within the same economy – including the survivals of capitalist relations. These contradictions within the USSR became clear when, after denouncing Stalin in the 20th Party Congress and calling for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, Nikita Khrushchev organized the sale of the state-owned “Machine and Tractor Stations” to the collective farms – which, Stalin had warned in Economic Problems, meant that the agricultural enterprises would privately own their means of production, a step backwards away from communism.
Only one ultra-leftist seriously engaged with this mode of analysis. Bordiga argued consistently that the central dynamic of the Soviet economy was the “agrarian revolution” – the condition of possibility for capitalism. Bordiga had supported the Bolshevik revolution as proletarian, which he reiterated in a 1926 letter to Korsch, who had taken the state capitalist line; but the same year he personally butted heads with Stalin when he called for the Soviet Union to be governed by the international communist parties that made up the Comintern. While Bordiga supported Trotsky and the Left Opposition in the 1920s, by 1945 he began to argue for an analysis of the Soviet Union that brought him far closer to Bukharin and the right.
The year before Castoriadis and Pannekoek’s exchange, Bordiga wrote a response to Stalin’s Economic Problems called Dialogue with Stalin. His assessment of the Soviet economy was broadly similar, but with an added historical dimension. Not only did the law of value operate in the USSR, so did all the laws of capitalism, since it was impossible to develop the productive forces “without proletarianizing people.” This meant a repetition of the “ferocious” process of primitive accumulation that Marx described in Capital:
It is the kolkhozians who find themselves deprived of their cow, the nomadic shepherds of Asia torn away from the contemplation of the beautiful stars of the Great Bear, or the feudal serfs of Mongolia, uprooted from their soil of a thousand years. It is certain that the orders demand more goods for production, more workers, a longer labor time with a greater intensity of effort, which is to say, an accumulation and expanded reproduction of capital to the rhythm of hell.20
The agrarian revolution, carried out in the process of primitive accumulation, was the violent refashioning of peasants into landless proletarians, the same process that occurred in 17th century England. Unsurprisingly, this returns to Preobrazhensky’s description of the coexistence of planning and the law of value in “socialist primitive accumulation.” While Preobrazhensky had called for a gentle process of accumulation based in progressive taxes, he had ultimately supported Stalin’s leftward turn.
The next step for Bordiga was to describe the economic characteristics of capitalism in Russia. For him, the accumulation of profit was epiphenomenal. What counted instead was the existence of enterprises that engaged in accounting on the basis of a general equivalent, the law of value, and maintained the existence of property. Even though production in Russia was centrally planned by the state, it was carried out by individual enterprises, which meant that property was not social and collective, but restricted to private bodies. The ruling class in Russia were not bureaucrats, but entrepreneurs – consistent with a theory of communism that opposed “human community,” grounded in the human essence described by the young Marx, to commerce, rather than proletariat to capital. For this reason the existence of soviets or councils was essentially irrelevant to Bordiga; if the workers managed enterprises, they were simply managing the capital relation.
So Stalin and Bordiga differed mainly in definitions. Stalin viewed socialism as a contradictory process of construction, while Bordiga argued for a total conception of communism incompatible with survivals from the old regime. But the trick is that Bordiga’s historical analysis, while it led him to condemn the capitalist nature of the USSR, also constrained him to see it as progressive, as he wrote in his Dialogue:
The homage which, in spite of a band of suckers, we render to “Great Stalin” responds precisely to this process of initial capitalist accumulation. If this really reaches the provinces of immense China, mysterious Tibet, and that fabulous Central Asia that the European stock came from, that will be a revolutionary fact, a fact that will move forward the wheel of history, but which, far from being socialist, will be on the contrary a capitalist fact. The elevation of the level of the productive forces in this immense part of the globe is necessary: but Stalin is right when he says that the credit will not go to him, but to the economic laws which have imposed this policy upon him. His whole enterprise consists in a falsification of labels which makes the capitalist commodity pass under the name of socialism and which is, itself, a classic expedient of the agents of primitive accumulation.
In other words, the whole of the ultra-left returned to Kautsky and his stages, which is why Bordiga described Russia as undergoing the transition to capitalism. Indeed, with only entrepreneurs managing production, it had not yet produced a properly capitalist class.
Though Pannekoek and Castoriadis did not directly address these issues, their exchange offers theoretical advances that put the problem of stages in new contexts. On the one hand, the skilled industrial working class who could organize councils on Pannekoek’s model were a such a minority in Russia that is very difficult to understand how this model of organization could lead the nation on a mass scale – and it gives no way of determining how the members of these councils will be fed.
On the other hand, Pannekoek’s theory of a “bourgeois revolution,” though it did not address Bordiga’s agrarian question, did step away from Kautskyan commitment to the fixed progression of stages. While Rühle and Korsch ultimately concluded along with Kautsky that Russia was too backwards, Pannekoek emphasized the subjective development of the class, rather than the objective development of the productive forces. He argued that if state capitalism led to revolution, this “would not be the result of economic crises but of the class struggle” – a political rather than economic change.21 The Russian workers, he wrote in the third letter, were “not yet capable of taking production into their own hands”; and when the party bureaucracy assumed this role in place of the proletariat, it became, ipso facto, the bourgeoisie.
But Pannekoek’s analysis had no way of determining whether the class was ready, particularly if it was spread into distinct forms of production. Castoriadis’s work had focused with greater attention on this problem. He had described the situation of the peasantry as “feudal exploitation” by the bureaucracy, and disputed the classic Bolshevik claim that the “small producer” would serve as the basis of capitalist restoration, instead arguing that only the bureaucracy could play such a role.22 Though he still assumed peasant production should be submitted to urban proletarian leadership, he went on to call for a form of peasant autonomy in “rural communes” analogous to the workers’ council.23 But because in Russia there was no automatic progression towards revolution, and no automatic way to unify the class, Castoriadis continued to insist on the form of the party – our next theme.
The Party
The historical ultra-left was always somewhat divided about the party form. Some, led by Bordiga, defended the notion of a disciplined party even more fervently than Lenin himself. Combining the intransigence of the German left communists with Lenin’s central focus on the party led Bordiga to produce a peculiar breed of vanguardist sectarianism. He soon went from reducing the class to the party to reducing communism itself to little more than the realization of an allegedly coherent, pure, and forever invariant program that was said to stretch back unchanged to the founders themselves. Others, like Karl Korsch, remained ambiguous. Although a member of the KPD, Communist Minister of Justice in the regional Thuringian government, and even a Riechstag deputy until 1928, he eventually broke entirely with the official communist movement and drew very close to Pannekoek, Rühle, and Mattick’s criticisms of the party, ultimately becoming something of an anarchist.
It was the German and Dutch left communists, however, who were the most uncompromising critics of the party form. They effectively offered three distinct, though interrelated, criticisms. The first, which was often shared by the anarchists, was a kind of moral denunciation of the authoritarian, undemocratic, and hierarchical character of parties in general. The second argued that the party, especially in its vanguardist configuration, was largely inapplicable to Western Europe, since its material conditions differed so vastly from those that engendered it in Russia. The third claimed that the proletariat had to prefigure the very world it was trying to create by inventing its own forms of struggle, rather than mirroring those that were firmly entrenched in the old world. Pannekoek summarized this sentiment in his second letter to Castoriadis, describing the need to oppose the established communist parties: “we cannot beat them by following their methods. That is only possible by practicing our own methods.” In terms of actual practice, this translated to a refusal of all bourgeois forms, from the trade unions to parliaments. Otto Rühle captured this sentiment in an essay audaciously titled “The Revolution is Not a Party Affair.”
Even when they did preserve the party as a form of struggle, the leftists severely restricted its role. Indeed, Lenin would at one point exclaim that they had essentially reduced the party of the class to a circle of intellectuals. According to Pannekoek, the party could only play the ancillary role of clarifying, through discussion, debate, and exchange, what the proletariat was already doing. As “organs of self-clarification,” such parties – and Pannekoek always imagined that there would be many – would have to content themselves with doing little more than offering suggestions to the workers, circulating information, and calmly debating their differing points of view.24 They would serve as the investigative subcommittees of a council, from which their destiny would ultimately be indistinguishable.
For both Castoriadis and Pannekoek, there was a primary logical consequence of the Marxist premise that the emancipation of the proletariat could only be the task of the proletariat itself: the council would be the principal organ of proletarian emancipation. By regarding the council as both that which would destroy the old and create the new, both were echoing a characteristic trait of the ultra-left: the deliberate conflation of means and ends.
But in contrast to the seasoned councilist, Castoriadis refused to accept that council would be the only organ of emancipation. He believed that the party could constitute a separate form of struggle, subordinated to, but ultimately distinct from the council: “the party is an organ whose form and substance are unique.”25 Its tasks could not be predetermined, as Pannekoek implied, but would have to vary depending on the particularities of the struggle at hand. If the revolution did indeed lead to the emergence of a network of decentralized councils in which unobstructed discussion could unfold, as Pannekoek suggested in his first letter, then Castoriadis agreed that the party would limit its role. But, Castoriadis quickly added, since the councils would likely become the very sites of class struggle rather than peaceful oases standing outside of it, the party, as something other than the council, could not limit itself to “appearing like the owl of Minerva at nightfall” but would have to set the stage for this struggle:
To be revolutionary signifies both to think that only the masses in struggle can resolve the problem of socialism and not to fold one’s arms for all that; it means to think that the essential content of the revolution will be given by the masses’ creative, original, and unforeseeable activity, and to act oneself, beginning with a rational analysis of the present with a perspective that anticipates the future.26
Experienced as he was with the dirty politics of workplace struggles in an environment dominated by Stalinists on the one hand and reformists on the other, Castoriadis poured some cold water on his friend’s naive faith in rational discussion. He insisted that the party would have to actively prevent counter-revolutionaries from co-opting the struggle, and therefore began to force a disjuncture between means and ends. Unlike the council, the party would not be an end in itself, but could only be a means. The destruction of the old world would have to be something related to but ultimately other than the constitution of a new one. Indeed, sometimes revolutionaries would have to resort to certain unsightly means in order to bring about certain desired ends. This could even mean a militant, even undemocratic, intervention on behalf the councils.
Pannekoek’s subsequent response was enviably simple: sometimes the class is just not ready to make a revolution. No amount of party intervention, no matter how militant, organized, or disciplined can force that class to mature – and in fact, such intervention would actually undermine the struggles of the class, by forcing it into a situation which it did not itself willingly create. The result, whatever the intentions of the revolutionaries, would have to be a new form of oppression.
A famous struggle just after these letters serves as an example. From December 1960 to January 1961 Belgium was rocked by an unexpectedly militant strike wave that ultimately involved some one million workers. Castoriadis called it the most important event, after the uprisngs of 1956, of the entire postwar period; Maurice Brinton, the guiding spirit of Solidarity, took part in them; and Guy Debord arrived the following year as part of a team sent by Socialisme ou Barbarie to research the aftermath of the strikes. The peculiar thing about these strikes, however, was that despite their strength they completely failed to exhibit any autonomous political initiative. Castoriadis put it as follows:
We thus find ourselves faced with a striking contradiction between the combativity of the working class, its solidarity, its awareness of its opposition as a class to the capitalist class and to the capitalist State, its distrust of bureaucracy, on the one hand; and, on the other, the at-present insurmountable difficulty it encounters as it tries to free itself from this bureaucracy’s grasp, to take on in a positive way the direction of its own affairs, to create its own institutions, to formulate explicitly its own objectives.27
Castoriadis’s solution was a revolutionary organization. But imagine, Pannekoek seemed to say, if this organization, which claimed to represent the proletariat, had hastily intervened by seizing the state, appropriating certain points of production, and dispatching red guards out into the streets to fight the Belgian police. Even if their intervention had somehow produced a revolution, the consequences would have been disastrous. Neither the proletariat, nor those other class formations which it would have to lead down the road of revolution, were prepared for such a situation. Rather than emancipating themselves, they would only enter a different kind of class society.
Castoriadis never wrote a direct reply. But he had already elaborated the basic premises of his position. Just as we can never really know if our actions will turn us into bureaucrats, we can also never know whether the proletariat is mature or not; there is simply no way to scientifically measure whether a class is ripe for power. In some cases, as with the Belgian strikes, there is some clarity. But in others, such as the Russian revolution of 1905, it is simply impossible to tell. When the first workers went on strike, no one expected the whole country to explode in insurrection. Even the revolutionaries who had studied the contours of the class struggle for decades were caught off guard, and had to determine what to do in this new situation. As it turns out, revolutionaries chose to intervene and the class was defeated – but we can only imagine the outcome if, after a sober assessment of the situation, the professional revolutionaries had decided not to intervene because the class was not ripe for power. What would have been the result if the party had chosen to fold its arms, take a step backward, and sit on the sidelines? Who is to say that it was not the very intervention of these revolutionaries, their very attempt to escalate a struggle possibly doomed to defeat, that later prepared the material conditions for victory less than a decade later?
The messiness of history demonstrates the difficulty of translating Pannekoek’s thoughts on class immaturity into concrete practice. But as we have already seen, this ambiguous position also contains an original answer to an old question: what are the necessary objective conditions for a successful revolution? For Pannekoek, immature objective conditions are not the result of underdeveloped industrial production. In fact, objective conditions are really nothing other than the general level of the class struggle itself. Because capital is an antagonistic relationship between two classes, its maturity or immaturity can only be understood with reference to the conflict between these classes. So when Pannekoek speaks of unripe objective conditions, he is actually referring to the underdeveloped subjective conditions of the class struggle itself. Claiming that Russia was unripe for revolution did not mean it was economically backward, only that the proletariat was not developed enough to take power on its own.
But here, as Castoriadis intimates, Pannekoek ultimately reveals his failure to understand the specific class dynamics of Russia on the eve of the revolution. For him, it is enough to claim that the class was not ready to take power simply because, at the end of the day, the party had to step in. His logic is consistent only if one assumes that communism will adopt the same form at all times: the gradual spread of councils over the totality of the social fabric. If this fails to happen, then the revolution was bourgeois; if it does, which, one might add, it never has, then it was communist. It is this static conception of communism, this refusal to accept that communism may appear differently in different historical conditions, that it may have to be produced by a diversity of means, that led him to misread the particularities of the Russian struggle.
Now the two questions, the nature of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the role of the party on the other, intersect dramatically. If Pannekoek had paid serious attention to the history of class relations in Russia, he would have seen that the characteristics of the proletariat at that historical moment – its technical makeup, its political forms, its relationship to the other classes – made it impossible for the class to take power without party intervention. Because Russia was so riven by class divisions, a revolution with any chance of success would have to find some way to forge an alliance between proletarian vanguards and peasant masses in a way that could transcend these separations. Pannekeok would have seen that the class was, at that conjuncture, actually quite ready. It just had to assume a different political form, one distinct from the soviets, in order to make the revolution.
This gap goes a long way in explaining Pannekoek’s somewhat confusing belief that the party can never actually be a part of the class itself. In his letters, he seems to argue that any enlarged conception of the party would necessarily transform it into a special forces team, which would be called in to bash heads when the class runs into trouble. He refused to entertain the possibility that the party, as was the case in Russia, may itself be a necessary element of the class. Unlike Castoriadis, who tried to capture the significance of the French Communist Party by studying its possible social bases, its particular history, and its broader relationship to the class struggle itself, Pannekoek contented himself with simply arguing that it was on the side of capital. For Castoriadis, this was not good enough; the task was to meticulously analyze the peculiar, and rather unprecedented, composition of a reformist party working in the service of a foreign country, to “explain patiently the complete workings and material roots of Stalinism’s betrayal” in order to definitively outflank it.28
Pannekoek deliberately ignored these kinds of questions – questions, he would say, that have been posed in “an entirely practical way” – because his vision of revolution, despite its numerous merits, was still largely informed by a kind of fatalism. Proletarians will naturally figure everything out based on their immediate experiences, as though they possess some kind of innate knowledge organically driving them to a specified goal, like an acorn growing into an oak tree. They will spontaneously become political subjects, like the logical result of an equation, and make their revolution on their own. If they run into any setbacks, it’s only because they still don’t have enough experience; if they suffer a defeat, it’s only because they weren’t ready. For the Pannekoek of these letters, there is no gap between immediate needs and the emancipation of the class through revolution. The two seamlessly blend into one another in such a way as to entirely cover up the moment of strategy.
But in order to explore these themes further we have to take a step backward. Though many of the problems above – the conflation of means and ends, the elision of strategy, the suppression of class heterogeneity, and the reversion to fatalism – persist within today’s ultra-left, the best way to understand and eventually supersede them is to go back to their genesis. This means returning to another famous encounter, that between the ultra-left and Lenin himself. It was Lenin, after all, who united a set of radically distinct groups under the umbrella of the “ultra-left.” Our forthcoming investigation, therefore, will move backwards to Lenin and his adversaries.
Until then, we present the letters. The first entry in this exchange, from Pannekoek to Castoriadis, has been available on the internet, and we reproduce that version here. Pannekoek indicates that he wrote the letter in English, but it was ultimately translated into French for publication in Socialisme ou Barbarie. It is not clear whether this version is a translation or the original English text. Castoriadis’s response, written under the pen name Pierre Chaulieu, and a final response by Pannekoek, have only been available in French. The versions available here are our translations from the originals reprinted at mondialisme.org.
- 1Dan Berrett, “Intellectual Roots of Wall St. Protest Lie in Academe,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 16, 2011.
- 2Denis Authier and Jean Barrot (Gilles Dauvé), La gauche communiste en Allemagne. 1918-1921 (Paris: Payot, 1976), p. 159; English version at marxists.org.
- 3Anton Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2003), p. 206.
- 4Cornelius Castoriadis, “On the Content of Socialism, I” in Political and Social Writings, Volume 1, 1946-1955: From the Critique of Bureaucracy to the Positive Content of Socialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 298.
- 5VI Lenin, “The Party Crisis” in Collected Works, vol. 32 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), p. 48.
- 6Lenin, “The Trade Unions and Trotsky’s Mistakes” in
, p. 42. - 7Lenin, “The Tax in Kind” in Collected Works, vol. 32, pp. 342, 351.
- 8Lenin, “Left-Wing Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality” in Collected Works, vol. 27, pp. 335, 349, 336.
- 9Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments” in Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 66.
- 10Lenin, “The Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy” in Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 186-7.
- 11JV Stalin, “Concerning the Question of a Workers’ and Peasants’ Government” in Works, vol. 9 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 189.
- 12Leon Trotsky, Platform of the Joint Opposition, chs. 1 and 3, reprinted at marxists.org.
- 13Stalin, “Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture” in Works, vol. 11, p. 8.
- 14Stalin, “The Right Danger in the CPSU(B)” in Works, vol. 11, p. 313.
- 15Stalin, “Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the CPSU(B)” in Works, vol. 11, p. 263.
- 16Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed (Minneola: Dover Publications, 2004), pp. 7, 31.
- 17Trotsky, “The USSR in War” in In Defense of Marxism (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1995), p. 55.
- 18Karl Kautsky, Terrorism and Communism, ch. 8, reprinted at marxists.org.
- 19Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), pp. 10, 15.
- 20Amadeo Bordiga, Dialogue avec Staline, “Deuxième journée,” reprinted at sinistra.net. All quotations are our translations from French.
- 21Pannekoek, “State Capitalism and Dictatorship,” reprinted at marxists.org.
- 22Castoriadis, “The Peasantry Under Bureaucratic Capitalism” in
1, pp. 162. - 23Castoriadis, “On the Content of Socialism, II” in Political and Social Writings, Volume 2, 1955-1960: From the Workers’ Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 134, 149.
- 24Pannekoek, “Party and Working Class,” 1936, reprinted at marxists.org.
- 25Castoriadis, “Proletarian Leadership” in PASW 1, p. 203.
- 26Castoriadis, “On the Content of Socialism, I” in PASW 1, p. 298.
- 27Castoriadis, “The Signification of the Belgian Strikes” in Political and Social Writings, Volume 3, 1961-1979: Recommencing the Revolution: From Socialism to the Autonomous Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 4.
- 28Castoriadis, “Stalinism in France” in PASW 1, p. 65.
Comments
An interesting and useful pulling together of various earlier and more recent 'ultra-left' tendencies and I'm curious to see how the author moves on to his (I suspect) defence of Lenin. For us today it seems we can find a better theoretical understanding of modern global capitalism only by weaving together some of the better elements of these past contributions. I think maybe the conclusions in this text regarding the need to recognise that communism might come through a diversity of means and political forms, whilst being a seemingly sensible observation given the changing nature of global capitalism, is drawn here from the same narrow focus of revolution as essentially limited within a national framework which even in the time of the Russian revolution was misplaced.
Reply to Pannekoek - Castoriadis
A reply to Pannekoek's letter to Socialisme ou Barbarie, translated by Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi for Viewpoint Magzine.
Your letter has provided a great satisfaction to all the comrades of the group; satisfaction of seeing our work appreciated by a comrade honored as you are and who has devoted an entire life to the proletariat and to socialism; satisfaction of seeing confirmed our idea of a profound agreement between you and us on the fundamental points; satisfaction finally of being able to discuss with you and of enriching our review with this discussion.
Before discussing the two points to which your letter is devoted (nature of the Russian Revolution, conception and role of the party), I would like to underline the points on which we agree: autonomy of the working class as both means and end of its historical action, total power of the proletariat at the economic and political level as the sole concrete content of socialism. I would furthermore like on this point to to clear up a misunderstanding. It is not correct that we restrict “the activity of these organisms to the organization of labor in factories after the taking of social power.” We think that the activity of these soviet – or workers’ council – organisms after the taking of power extends itself to the total organization of social life, which is to say that as long as there is need for an organism of power, its role will be fulfilled by the workers’ councils. Neither is it correct that we would only think of such a role for the councils in the period following the “taking of power.” At the same time, historical experience and reflection show that the councils could not be the organisms truly expressing the class if they were created to thus decree the future of a victorious revolution, that they will be nothing unless they are created spontaneously by a profound movement of the class, therefore before the “taking of power”; and if it is thus, it is evident that they will play a primordial role during the entire revolutionary period, whose beginning is precisely marked (as I said in my text on the party in number 10) by the constitution of the autonomous organisms of the masses.
Where in contrast there is, in fact, a real difference of opinion between us, is on the question of knowing if, during this revolutionary period, these councils will be the sole organism which plays an effective role in conducting the revolution, and, to a lesser extent, what the role and task is of the revolutionary militants in the meantime. That is, the “question of the party.”
You say “in the conquest of power we have no interest in a ‘revolutionary party’ that will take the leadership of the proletarian revolution.” And even further, after having quite rightly recalled that there are, beside us, a half-dozen other parties or groups that claim to represent the working class, you add: “in order for them (the masses in their councils) to decide in the best way possible they must be enlightened by well-considered advice coming from the greatest number of people possible.” I fear that this view of things has no correspondence with both the most glaring and the most hidden traits of the current and prospective situation of the working class. Since these other parties and groups of which you speak do not simply represent different opinions on the best way to make revolution, and the sessions of the councils will not be calm gatherings of reflection where, according the opinions of these diverse counselors (the representatives of the groups and parties), the working class will decide to follow one path rather than another. From the very moment that these organisms of the working class have been constituted, the class struggle will have been transposed to the very heart of these organisms; it will be transposed there by the representatives of the majority of these “groups or parties” which claim to represent the working class but who, in the majority of cases, represent the interests and the ideology of the classes hostile to the proletariat, like the reformists and the Stalinists. Even if they don’t exist there in their current form, they will exist in another, let us be sure. In all likelihood, they will start with a predominant position. And the whole experience of the last twenty years – of the Spanish war, the occupation, and up to and including the experience of any current union meeting – we learn that the militants who have our opinion must conquer by struggle even the right to speak within these organisms.
The intensification of the class struggle during the revolutionary period will inevitably take the form of the intensification of the struggle of diverse factions within the mass organisms. In these conditions, to say that a vanguard revolutionary organization will limit itself to “enlightening with well-considered advice” is, I believe, what in English is called an “understatement.” After all, if the councils of the revolutionary period prove to be this assembly of wise men where nobody comes to disturb the calm necessary for a well-considered reflection, we will be the first to congratulate ourselves; we feel sure, in fact, that our advice would prevail if things happened this way. But it is only in this case that the “party or group” could limit itself to the tasks that you assign it. And this case is by far the most improbable. The working class which will form the councils will not be a different class from the one that exists today; it will have made an enormous step forwards, but, to use a famous expression, it will still be stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges. It will be at the surface dominated by profoundly hostile influences, to which it can initially oppose only its still-confused revolutionary will and a minority vanguard. This will be by all means compatible with our fundamental idea of the autonomy of the working class extending and deepening its influence on the councils, winning the majority to its program. It may even have to act before; what can it do if, representing 45% of the councils, it learns that some neo-Stalinist party prepares to take power for the future? Will it not have to try to seize power immediately?
I do not think that you will disagree with all that; I believe that what you aim for above all in your criticisms is the idea of the revolutionary leadership of the party. I have however tried to explain that the party cannot be the leadership of the class, neither before, nor after the revolution; not before, because the class does not follow it and it would only know how to lead at most a minority (and again, “lead” it in a totally relative sense: influence it with its ideas and its exemplary action); not after, since proletarian power cannot be the power of the party, but the power of the class in its autonomous mass organisms. The only moment when the party can approach the role of effective leadership, of the corps which can try to impose its revolutionary will with violence, may be a certain phase of the revolutionary period immediately preceding its conclusion; important practical decisions may need to be taken outside the councils if the representatives of actually counter-revolutionary organizations participate, the party may, under the pressure of circumstances, commit itself to a decisive action even if it is not, in votes, followed by the majority of the class. The fact that in acting thus, the party will not act as a bureaucratic body aiming to impose its will on the class, but as the historical expression of the class itself, depends on a series of factors, which we can discuss in the abstract today, but which will only be appreciated at this moment: what proportion of the class is in agreement with the program of the party, what is the ideological state of the rest of the class, where is the struggle against the counterrevolutionary tendencies within the councils, what are the ulterior perspectives, etc. To draw up, as of now, a series of rules of conduct for the various possible cases would doubtless be puerile; one can be sure that the only cases that will present themselves will be the unforeseen cases.
There are comrades who say: to trace this perspective is to leave the path open to a possible degeneration of the party in the bureaucratic sense. The response is: not tracing it means accepting the defeat of the revolution or the bureaucratic degeneration of the councils from the very start, and this not as a possibility, but as a certitude. Ultimately, to refuse to act in fear that one will transform into a bureaucrat, seems to me as absurd as refusing to think in fear of being wrong. Just as the only “guarantee” against error consists in the exercise of thought itself, the only “guarantee” against bureaucratization consists in permanent action in an anti-bureaucratic direction, in struggling against the bureaucracy and in practically showing that a non-bureaucratic organization of the vanguard is possible, and that it can organize non-bureaucratic relations with the class. Since the bureaucracy is not born of false ideas, but of necessities proper to worker action at a certain stage, and in action it is about showing that the proletariat can do without the bureaucracy. Ultimately, to remain above all preoccupied with the fear of bureaucratization is to forget that in current conditions an organization would only know how to acquire a noteworthy influence with the masses on the condition of expressing and realizing their anti-bureaucratic aspirations; it is to forget that a vanguard group will only be able to reach a real existence by perpetually modeling itself on these aspirations of the masses; it is to forget that there is no longer room for the appearance of a new bureaucratic organization. The permanent failure of Trotskyist attempts to purely and simply recreate a “Bolshevik” organization finds its deepest cause there.
To close these reflections, I do not think either that one could say that in the current period (and hence the revolution) the task of a vanguard group would be a “theoretical” task. I believe that this task is also and above all the task of struggle and organization. For the class struggle is permanent, through its highs and lows, and the ideological maturation of the working class makes itself through this struggle. But the proletariat and its struggles are currently dominated by bureaucratic organizations (unions and parties), which has the result of rendering struggle impossible, of deviating them from the class goal or conducting them to defeat. A vanguard organization cannot indifferently attend this show, neither can it content itself with appearing as the owl of Minerva at dusk, letting the sound of its beak fall with tracts explaining to the workers the reasons for their defeat. It must be capable of intervening in these struggles, combating the influence of bureaucratic organizations, proposing forms of action and organization to the workers; it must even at times be capable of imposing them. Fifteen resolute vanguard workers can, in certain cases, put a factory of 5,000 into strike, if they are willing to knock out some Stalinist bureaucrats, which is neither theoretical, nor even democratic, these bureaucrats having always been elected in comfortable majorities by the workers themselves.
I would like, before ending this response, to say a couple things about our second divergence, which at first glance has only a theoretical character: that of the nature of the Russian Revolution. We think that characterizing the Russian Revolution as a bourgeois revolution does violence to the facts, to ideas, and to language. That in the Russian Revolution there were several elements of a bourgeois revolution – in particular, the “realization of the bourgeois-democratic tasks” – has always been recognized, and, long before the revolution itself, Lenin and Trotsky had made it the base of their strategy and tactics. But these tasks, in the given stage of historical development and the configuration of social forces in Russia, could not be dealt with by the working class who, in the same blow, could not pose itself essentially socialist tasks.
You say: the participation of workers does not suffice. Of course; as soon as a battle becomes a mass battle the workers are there, since they are the masses. But the criterion is not that: it is to know if the workers find themselves the pure and simple infantry of the bourgeoisie or if they fight for their own goals. In a revolution in which the workers battle for “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” – whatever meaning they subjectively give to these watchwords – they are the infantry of the bourgeoisie. When they fight for “All power to the soviets,” they fight for socialism. What makes the Russian Revolution a proletarian revolution is that the proletariat intervened in it as a dominant force with its own flag, its face, its demands, its means of struggle, its own forms of organization; it is not only that it constituted mass organisms aiming to appropriate all power but that this itself went past the expropriation of the capitalists and began to realize workers’ management of the factories. All this made the Russian Revolution forever a proletarian revolution, whatever its subsequent fate – just as neither the weakness, nor the confusions, nor the final defeat of the Paris Commune prevents it from having been a proletarian revolution.
This divergence may appear at first glance to be theoretical: I think however that it has a practical important insofar as it translates par excellence a methodological difference into a contemporary problem: the problem of the bureaucracy. The fact that the degeneration of the Russian Revolution has not given way to the restoration of the bourgeoisie but to the the formation of a new exploitative layer, the bureaucracy; that the regime that carries this layer, despite its profound identity with capitalism (as the domination of dead labor over living labor), differs in many aspects that cannot be neglected without refusing to understand anything; that this same layer, since 1945, is in the process of extending its domination over the world; that it is represented in the countries of Western Europe by parties deeply rooted in the working class – all this makes us think that contenting ourselves with saying that the Russian Revolution was a bourgeois revolution is equivalent to voluntarily closing our eyes to the most important aspects of the global situation today.
I hope that this discussion can be pursued and deepened, and I believe it is not necessary to repeat to you that we welcome with joy in Socialisme ou Barbarie all that you would like to send us.
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Reply to Castoriadis - Pannekoek
Pannekoek's final response to Castoriadis's letter in Socialisme ou Barbarie, translated by Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi for Viewpoint Magazine.
I noticed with great pleasure that you have published in your review Socialisme ou Barbarie a translation of my letter annotated with critical remarks in such a way that involves your readers in a discussion on fundamental questions. Since you express the desire to continue the discussion, I am sending you several remarks on your response. Naturally, there are still differences of opinion that could appear in the discussion with a greater clarity. Such differences are normally the result of a different assessment of what one considers as the most important points, which in turn is related to our practical experiences or the milieu in which we find ourselves. For me, this was the study of the political strikes in Belgium (1893), in Russia (1905 and 1917), and in Germany (1918 to 1919), a study by which I attempted to reach a clear understanding of the fundamental character of these actions. Your group lives and works among the turmoil of the working class of a great industrial city; consequently, your attention is completely concentrated on a practical problem: how could the methods of effective struggle develop beyond the inefficient struggle of parties and partial strikes of today?
Naturally, I do not claim that the revolutionary actions of the working class will all unfold in an atmosphere of peaceful discussion. What I claim is that the result of the struggle, often violent, is not determined by accidental circumstances, but by what is alive in the thoughts of the workers, as the basis of a solid consciousness acquired by experience, study, or their discussions. If the personnel of a factory must decide whether or not to go on strike, the decision is not taken by smashing fists on the table, but normally by discussions.
You pose the problem in an entirely practical way: what would the party do if it had 45% of the members of the councils behind it and if it expected another party (neo-Stalinists that strive to conquer the regime) to attempt a seizure of power by force? Your response is: we would have to preempt it by doing that which we fear it will do. What will be the definitive result of such an action? Look at what happened in Russia. There existed a party, with good revolutionary principles, influenced by Marxism; and assured, moreover, of the support of the councils already formed by the workers; however, it was obliged to seize power, and the result was totalitarian Stalinism (if I say “it was obliged” that means that the circumstances were not ripe enough for a real proletarian revolution. In the western world in which capitalism is more developed, the conditions certainly are more ripe; the measure of it is given by the development of the class struggle). Thus, one must pose the question: could the struggle of the party that you propose save the proletarian revolution? It seems to me that it would be instead one step towards a new oppression.
Certainly, there will always be difficulties. If the French, or global, situation required a mass struggle of the workers, the communist parties would try immediately to transform the action into a pro-Russian demonstration within the boundaries of the party. We must lead an energetic struggle against these parties. But we cannot beat them by following their methods. That is only possible by practicing our own methods. The true form of action of a class in struggle is the force of arguments, based on the fundamental principle of the autonomy of decisions! The workers can only prevent the communist party’s repression by the development and reinforcement of their own class power; that means their unanimous will to take the means of production under their control and manage them.
The principal condition for the conquest of freedom for the working class is that the conception of self-government and self-management of the apparatuses of production is rooted in the consciousness of the masses. That agrees, to a certain degree, with what Jaurès wrote on the Constituent Assembly, in his Socialist History of the French Revolution:
“This assembly, brand new, discussing political subjects, knew, barely convened, to thwart all the maneuvers of the Court. Why? Because it held several grand abstract ideas, seriously and lengthily ripened and which gave them a clear view of the situation.”
Of course, the two cases are not identical. Instead of the grand political ideas of the French Revolution, it is a question of the grand socialist ideas of the workers, which is to say: the management of production by organized cooperation. Instead of 500 deputies armed with their abstract ideas acquired through study, the workers will be millions guided by the experience of an entire life of exploitation in a productive job. This is why I see these things in the following way:
The most noble and useful task of a revolutionary party is, by its propaganda in thousands of small journals, brochures, etc., to enrich the knowledge of the masses in the process of a consciousness always more clear and more vast.
Now, several words on the character of the Russian revolution. Translating the English word “middle class revolution” into “révolution bourgeoise” does not exactly express its meaning. When in England the so-called middle classes seized power, they were composed of a large party of small capitalists, or businessmen, owners of the industrial apparatuses of production. The struggle of the masses was necessary to drive the aristocracy from power; but in spite of this fact, this mass was itself not yet capable of seizing the instruments of production; the workers could only achieve the spiritual, moral, and organizational capacity to do that by means of class struggle in a sufficiently developed capitalism. In Russia, there did not exist a bourgeoisie of certain importance; the consequence was that the vanguard of the revolution gave birth to a new “middle class” as ruling class of productive work, managing the apparatus of production, and not as an ensemble of individual owners each possessing a certain part of the apparatus of production, but as collective owners of the apparatus of production in its totality.
In general, we could say: if the laboring masses (because they are the product of pre-capitalist conditions) are not yet capable of taking production into their own hands, inevitably that will lead to new leading class becoming master of production. It is this concordance that makes me say that the Russian revolution (in its essential and permanent character) was a bourgeois revolution. Certainly the mass power of the proletariat was necessary to destroy the former system (and it was in this a lesson for the workers of the entire world). But a social revolution can obtain nothing more than what corresponds to the character of the revolutionary classes, and if the greatest radicalism possible was necessary to conquer all resistances, later on, it would have to fall behind.
This appears to be general rule of all revolutions up to the present day: up to 1793, the French Revolution became more and more radical, until the peasants definitively became the free masters of the soil, and until the foreign armies were pushed back; at that moment, the Jacobins were massacred and capitalism made its entrance as the new master. When one sees things this way, the course of the Russian revolution would be the same as those preceding revolutions that all conquered power, in England, in France, in Germany. The Russian revolution was not at all a premature proletarian revolution. The proletarian revolution belongs to the future.
I hope that this explanation, even though it does not contain any new arguments, will help to clarify several divergences in our points of view.
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Issue 2: Theory and Practice
The neighborhood is the new factory
An article by Liz Mason-Deese on the unemployed movement in Argentina since 2001.
In 2001, Argentina suffered an economic crisis, similar to the one that much of the world is experiencing today. After more than a decade of IMF-mandated structural adjustment, which only deepened poverty and unemployment, the government was forced to default on over $100 billion of public debt and declared a state of emergency in an attempt to calm public unrest. Despite a military-imposed curfew, thousands of people rushed to the streets and forced the president and other politicians out of office with the chant “que se vayan todos/ni se quede uno solo” (they all must go/not one can stay). These protests were the culmination of years of organizing in response to increasing unemployment and simultaneous reductions in welfare programs as part of neoliberal policies. Workers were taking over factories, the unemployed blocking highways, migrants occupying unused land. When joined by the spontaneous protests of the middle class in December, the mobilizations were able to overthrow the government as the president fled Buenos Aires in a helicopter. The movements were not only the largest mass mobilization in Argentina since the 1970s, but also qualitatively different from earlier movements: not interested in taking state power, nor in working more jobs and longer hours, they struggled to create new forms of life, including new forms of socio-spatial organization and the production and distribution of wealth. In the ten years following the crisis, the strongest of the movements, the Movements of Unemployed Workers (Movimientos de Trabajadores Desocupados, MTDs), has continued on this path, even as the country has recovered economically and has so far been able to resist the effects of the global crisis.
Here I’ll examine the history and practices of the MTDs, drawing on research I’ve conducted since 2003 with the MTDs La Matanza and Solano, and current research in Buenos Aires on the organization of the unemployed. The movements of the unemployed, which first emerged in Argentina in the mid-1990s, challenge traditional representations of the unemployed as lacking political agency and revolutionary potential. While many Marxists and labor organizers have maintained the latter position, Argentina’s recent history paints a different picture: the militant organization of the unemployed across the country was instrumental in overthrowing the neoliberal government in 2001 and steering the course the country would take following the economic crisis. Movements of the unemployed in Argentina are redefining work through their organizational practice, discourses around labor, and active creation of different forms of production and reproduction. This will necessarily be a very partial description of a complex, fragmented, and diverse movement, which has existed for over fifteen years.
Organizing the Unemployed
By the mid-1990s, unemployment in Argentina had reached nearly 20% (with even higher levels of underemployment), due to rapid deindustrialization and privatization, alongside a working class weakened from the earlier military dictatorship. New laws had stripped workers of remaining rights and led to the increasing “flexibilization” of labor, allowing employers to hire workers under short-term contracts and provide less benefits, making it easier to fire workers and unnecessary to compensate them upon doing so. Different forms of informal and precarious labor were already the norm for women and youth, and became increasingly so for adult men as well. President Carlos Menem had effectively cut social spending so that only certain sectors received unemployment benefits, and the jobless could not reliably depend on any support from the state. The main, officially recognized labor movement, headed by the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), was politically in ruins as it continued to support Menem because of its Peronist party affiliation, while these changes in the organization of work made the traditional forms of labor organizing increasingly difficult. Without stable employment, the poor increasingly relied on different forms of informal labor, illegal activity, and the political parties’ systems of patronage, as well as strengthened networks of mutual aid and support within communities.
It was in this context that the unemployed began to organize themselves, first in the interior of Argentina and soon after in the country’s major urban centers. Their first public actions were roadblocks, using barricades and burning tires to block major highways, sometimes for weeks at a time. The roadblocks were organized without any support from the major trade unions or leftist political parties, but rather through the already existing networks of support of the poor and unemployed. In the interior of the country, laid-off workers of the recently privatized oil company were the first to protest in 1996, demanding unemployment benefits and/or their jobs back. In the urban areas, however, the protests were of a more heterogeneous composition, including many who had never participated in the formal labor market. In the urban periphery of Buenos Aires, the first actions were centered around the question of food, with large public collective meals and protests demanding food assistance from the state. Other early protests focused on the rising costs of electricity and gas, the poor living conditions in working-class neighborhoods, and the lack of state support for the unemployed.
While different organizations of the unemployed emerged during this time in Argentina, the MTDs were generally the most independent and innovative. The MTDs are organized by neighborhood, instead of around a specific workplace or sector, taking the name of the neighborhood or region where they are based. Although the different MTDs sometimes come together in specific campaigns or actions, and have formed coalitions or blocks, there has never been a national organization uniting all the different groups of unemployed across the country. The MTDs are engaged in a constantly shifting constellation of alliances and networks with each other, different sectors of the labor movement, and other social movements. Thus each group is unique, not only in its geographic location, but in terms of its internal organization, political activity and ideological affiliations as well. Yet there are several elements the MTDs have in common, including the tactic of the roadblocks, a form of organization that emphasizes autonomy and a critique of hierarchy, and an emphasis on territorial organization and forming their own productive enterprises.
The MTDs first came into the public eye for their confrontational roadblocks, or piquetes. The roadblock’s immediate purpose is to stop the normal circulation of goods and services, and to make people’s demands visible. It has been widely remarked that the piquetes are the unemployed’s version of the strike or work stoppage, the only available tactic once denied access to this privileged form of workers’ revolt. However, the decision to block roads does not necessarily start from the assumption of lack: the piqueteros took their protests not to the factory doors, but rather to the streets of the city, understanding the city as the crucial site of capitalist production. For this reason, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri exemplify this tactic as a “wildcat strike against the metropolis.”1 In Buenos Aires, the roadblocks were particularly effective because they often took place at the major bridges or other entry points to the city from the suburbs, and as the crisis worsened and the government’s power weakened, at major intersections within the city itself. The roadblocks were essential in giving the piqueteros a sense of agency many felt they lacked without access to employment or the work site as a place to organize and proved to be an extremely powerful and effective tactic. The piquetes were successful in forcing the state to provide unemployment benefits and food baskets to the poor, and for the organizations winning control over the distribution of the subsidies. This control was important, as it allowed the movements to remain independent of the political parties, which would generally distribute benefits in turn for votes and political support, and because it allowed the movements to choose how to reinvest the funds in community organization.
The roadblocks were also important in that they served as a space of encounter, bringing together the different unemployed and forming new social relations and communal values. More than just protests, the piquetes were encampments in the middle of the street, where people took care of each other, and shared food and other responsibilities for maintaining the space.
Horizontality & Autonomy
While different organizations of the unemployed, and later other movements across the country, use the tactic of the roadblock, the MTDs can be further differentiated by their internal organization and commitment to autonomy. The MTDs’ internal organization emphasizes direct democracy, generally using a moderated consensus process in assemblies which are open to everyone in the movement. While the MTDs differ in their exact practices of internal democracy, with some committed to complete horizontalism while others have different leadership structures, they agree upon a critique of unions and parties for their top-down, hierarchical, and bureaucratic structures and practices, and are dedicated to enacting different forms of internal organization. This differentiates them from other organizations of the unemployed that are organized more bureaucratically, or that have come to rely on charismatic leaders.
The MTDs were formed from self-convened and organized groups of neighbors and remained autonomous from trade unions, leftist and national-popular political parties, and the parties’ patronage networks. They have resisted being incorporated into these institutions although at times they make strategic alliances with the more independent unions or leftist political parties. Since the election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003, many social movements in the country, including organizations of the unemployed with a more national-popular/Peronist political leaning, declared their support for the government, and, in some cases, became officially integrated into its ranks. Several of the MTDs, including those that make up the Frente Popular Dario Santillan, and the MTDs La Matanza and Solano, have remained independent from the government, choosing instead to focus on territorial organizing and creating new productive practices, which continue to this day.
The commitment to horizontality and autonomy are accompanied by a critique of representation. It is recognized that the movement is internally very heterogeneous and there is no ideal figure of the unemployed worker. Additionally, these movements emerged at the time of a complete breakdown of representational democracy, as seen in the neoliberal government of the 1990s and its eventual overthrow. It was clear that the politicians in power did not represent the people, not even of their own parties. Nor did the union, which continued to support Menem, represent the workers. The loss of faith in representational politics led to the cries that “they all must go,” and the adoption of popular neighborhood assemblies across the city of Buenos Aires. This skepticism toward representational politics is countered by a commitment to territorial organizing, to creating new ways of life and social-spatial organization in the neighborhoods where the poor live.
Territorial Organization
The territorial organization is another element that distinguishes the organizations of the unemployed, especially those in urban settings, from other social movements in Argentina and elsewhere. “The neighborhood is the new factory” was one of the principal slogans of the MTDs and other organizations of the unemployed. This slogan carries a double significance: production is no longer centered in the factory but dispersed throughout the territory and, in parallel, labor organizing must be dispersed throughout the neighborhood as well. Many of the MTDs, especially in southern reaches of Greater Buenos Aires, emerged from settlements in the urban periphery that had been illegally occupied in the 1980s. In these settlements, the neighborhood was already the key site of political organization, as the settlements were largely collectively controlled by their inhabitants and sites of constant struggles to maintain their land and for access to services. The neighborhood was also the obvious site for political organization for the large numbers of women and youth that had never been included in the formal labor movement and had always been excluded from other political organizations. Thus, they were the ones to take the lead as these movements emerged, a stark contrast to the many forms of political activity dominated by men.
The struggle against capital must also be the struggle to produce a different type of space and different social relations within the space.2 That is precisely what the MTDs seek to do in their territories, by establishing a physical presence in the neighborhood and seeking to collectively manage as many of the elements of daily life as possible. Territorial organization as practiced by the MTDs includes creating schools, soup kitchens, health clinics, daycares, community gardens, social centers and productive enterprises within a given territory. It means organizing around the basic needs of community residents, food, clean water, housing, education and the desire to form community in neighborhoods that are socially and ethnically fragmented. Territorial organization implies opening up all the spaces of daily activity to critique and as possible sites of organization. These movements recognize and more fully value the different types of labor that go into producing a territory. Ultimately, territorial organization seeks to build on the self-activity of the working class as expressed through the practices of everyday life and social organization in the neighborhoods.
Labor
The MTDs differ from what is traditionally conceived of as the labor movement because of their decentering of waged labor and explicit organizing of unemployed people. The MTDs have explicitly taken on the challenge of organizing the unemployed, as well as partially-employed, informal, and domestic workers. Through the positive identity of the piquetero and continuing to identify as workers, the MTDs have moved beyond a definition of the unemployed that is based on lack, on what they don’t have (employment), to one that values the political organization of the class. Thus, this discourse no longer privileges wage labor as the norm, recognizing that this is no longer a possibility for much of the country’s working class. Yet, the MTDs continue identifying as “workers,” as the working class, even without employment or even the possibility of employment. Rather, the movement recognizes that there are many types of work, and that they are organized in many different ways.
The MTDs decenter the experience of waged labor and instead put the spaces of everyday life in the center of their struggle. In this way, they are able to challenge distinctions between waged and unwaged labor, or formal and informal employment, to create a space for the majority of urban residents who survive on some combination of precarious work along with state subsidies, illegal activities, and support from family and friends. Residents of the urban periphery often work part-time in domestic labor or construction, are self-employed through micro-enterprises run out of their homes, and are involved in the constant labor of care in their own homes and communities. This labor lacks the rights and security that have helped other workers to organize, as well as geographic stability. This makes workplace organizing extremely difficult, if not impossible, meaning that there is generally little place for these workers within labor unions. The piquetero movement, however, is one of the few movements that has managed to successfully bring together these different type of workers without reproducing the hierarchies and divisions of the labor market.
Within the piquetero movement there are differing analyses of work and diagnostics of the economic situation, which are manifest in the organizations’ demands and practices. One sector of the movement calls for “genuine work” and demands their old jobs back: real, legitimate, authentic jobs. These were opposed to the demands for subsidies and unemployment benefits, which they considered to reproduce patterns of laziness and dependency. While certainly politicians’ use of these these subsidies to pacifty and co-opt movements must be criticized, it is easy to see how the simple critique of subsidies-as-dependency risks reproducing the logic of neoliberal capital and its ideology of individual responsibility. The demand for “genuine work” makes another mistake by labeling certain forms of labor as legitimate and authentic as opposed to others, devaluing women’s work in the household and community, as well as many other types of labor. It fails to take into account structural changes that make its premise worthless: there is no more genuine work.
Another sector of the piquetero movement, mostly adhering to a nationalist-populist ideology, has centered their actions around demanding unemployment subsidies from the state. Thanks to their success in winning these benefits and the right to distribute them, these organizations grew rapidly in the late 1990s, yet were unable to provide a real alternative to the corrupt and hierarchical forms of politics already taking place in working class neighborhoods. A politics based on making demands of the state means that most of these organizations now support the Kirchner administration and many have officially integrated into the government apparatus, thus losing most of their oppositional potential.
The independent MTDs, on the other hand, have taken a different approach from those either demanding “genuine work” or only demanding subsidies. While these MTDs decenter waged labor, work remains at the center of their practice and analysis. The MTDs do not just demand jobs, however. Instead, they ask: “what kind of work do we want?” and answer: “work with dignity.” Work with dignity is not so much a demand as a statement of intent, for it is precisely what the movements are putting into practice, creating new forms of work that spill over into new ways of living and organizing the urban territory.
Alternatives
Starting in the late 1990s, at the same time as some workers began taking over their factories, a number of MTDs started their own productive enterprises as a way to provide an income for some of their members and to regain a sense of control over their lives, which they had lost with unemployment. These efforts multiplied after 2001, as the crisis hit its peak and the lack of a stable government made it clear that solutions would not come from the state. During this time, the MTDs also participated in organizing barter markets and alternative currency networks, creating new economic systems based on mutual aid and support. Recognizing that full employment was no longer an option, or perhaps even a desire, for everyone, these groups decided to create their own ways of reproducing life in their territories, outside of the capitalist market.
There are different ways of interpreting “work with dignity,” and different ways of putting it into practice. We can, however, identify some common threads: (1) self-management/workers’ control/no boss, (2) workplace democracy and horizontality, (3) communal values over market values. These alternatives sometimes take the form of worker-owned cooperatives, but go beyond obviously productive enterprises as well. As part of their territorial organization, the MTDs seek to collectively manage other spaces and activities of life, from healthcare to education to the food they eat. There is a dimension of autonomy to these projects as well: although most are funded at least partially through state subsidies, the MTDs aim to be self-sufficient in order to no longer rely on the state. This is mostly a practical concern, since it is expected that the state will one day take away the subsidies or enforce certain requirements the movements are not prepared to meet. The subsidies are considered useful, however, inasmuch as they provide a material base from which to further strengthen the movement and people’s self-organization.
The alternatives that the MTDs construct are not limited to workplace alternatives, to working without bosses and democratically controlling the workplace. They aim to create different ways of working, questioning what counts as work and how that work is valued, how that work is carried out and organized, and the relationship between that work and other parts of life. This means going beyond the productive enterprises to focus on activities that create new social relations within the neighborhoods, relationships that are not based on competition or profit but on solidarity and mutual aid.
The productive enterprises the MTDs set up are usually small-scale workshops making food or textiles, or providing services. Bakeries and pizzerias are some of the most common. These enterprises are democratically controlled by the workers themselves and ultimately by the movement as whole, making the needs of the community more important than just turning a profit. They attempt to provide an alternative to the hierarchical discipline of most capitalist workplaces, as well as divisions between manual and intellectual labor, by including all workers in decision-making and rotating roles. Profit is generally invested into the organization as a whole or distributed to members most in need.
In many ways, the cooperatives run by the MTDs are similar to the “recuperated factories” that emerged in Argentina around the same time. In hundreds of sites around the country, workers took over and restarted production in factories, rather than submit to owners’ decisions to close the factories and leave workers unemployed. These range from small printing presses to large metal factories. There is a wide range of diversity in how the recuperated factories operate: in some, workers radically transform the relations of production, instituting non-hierarchical relations between workers and equally sharing responsibilities and tasks, decision-making power, and surplus, while others largely reproduce the relations and practices of the factory under its former boss. Yet in many ways the recuperated factories remain limited, because, after all, they are still creating work, which, instead of relying on a boss to instill the factory discipline, relies on collective self-exploitation. Overall, the recuperated factories do little to challenge the overall system of capital, especially as many continue to fill the same contracts with capitalist corporations as when they were run by a boss. The recuperated factories that are doing the most for political change are those that have been able to create networks with other worker-controlled enterprises, recreating the whole supply chain, and those that build ties with other movements and the wider community.
One of the central focuses of all these movements has been education, which can perhaps best be seen in the bachilleratos populares. The bachilleratos populares are high school degree programs for adults run by social movements, but with state funding and accreditation. The schools emerged out of the movements, both the recuperated factories and the MTDs, first without any outside funding or state recognition, as a way to provide education to their members and the public. They arose out of a double acknowledgment: the lack of quality educational opportunities for much of the city’s poor, and the power of education for political empowerment. After years of fighting, the degrees earned in these schools were formally recognized by the state (in 2007 in the province of Buenos Aires and 2008 in the city). The state provides additional resources as well, and in some localities provides small salaries for the teachers. However, the movements control the curriculum, and are responsible for organizing the school and teaching the classes. Teachers are generally movement activists and/or politically committed university students; some work as teachers in other schools. The MTDs put a great deal of emphasis on knowledge production in general, in some cases even operating their own publishing houses, through which they edit and publish their own research.3
Additionally, some of the MTDs operate health clinics, providing an alternative to the overcrowded and underfunded public health system and taking more holistic approaches to health, as opposed to only treating sickness. Alongside the clinics, the MTDs tend to offer classes about nutrition and wellness, seeking to integrate these elements of their activities into the daily lives of their members. The organizations offer a wide range of cultural and educational programming, from painting classes to readings groups on Marx, provide legal aid for migrants seeking to legalize their status, and facilitate women’s empowerment groups.
Participation in these activities, whether a worker-run bakery or a movement-controlled high school, creates new subjectivities and social relations, produces new territories and new forms of life. The participants go from seeing themselves as helpless victims of global capitalism, solely defined by their lack of employment, to identifying as active agents of social and political change, with the power to confront the state and capital and produce different ways of living. The MTDs challenge dominant narratives about the centrality and desirability of waged labor and instead seek to create alternative forms of production and social organization.
Today the MTDs are not as publicly visible as they were ten years ago, with much less open confrontation with the state and piquetes no longer a daily occurrence. The movement, which was never unified, is perhaps even more fragmented today: some piquetero organizations have been integrated into the Kirchner apparatus, receiving subsidies and other resources from the state, and others are increasingly critical of these new forms of co-optation. The lack of unified action poses an important problem as the government tries to divide “good protesters” from “bad protesters,” determining access to subsidies, and the cooperatives discover it is hard to sustain themselves without building larger networks of trade and support. Certain groups, most notably the Popular Front Darío Santillán, are attempting to counter this fragmentation through the construction of new alliances bringing together the unemployed, low-wage and precarious workers, and students, along with indigenous and campesino groups from other parts of the country. Despite these challenges, however, the MTDs remain committed to the day-to-day work of territorial organizing. There are now around 100 popular high school programs offering degrees around the country, dozens of cooperatives, social centers, and other activities, working to directly improve people’s lives while strengthening the self-organization of neighborhood residents and building their autonomy from the state and capital.
Liz Mason-Deese is a member of the Counter-Cartographies Collective and the Edu-Factory Collective, and is a graduate student in the geography program at UNC Chapel Hill. She currently lives in Buenos Aires, where she is conducting her dissertation research.
Originally posted: September 22, 2012 at Viewpoint Magazine
- 1Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).
- 2See Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991) for a theoretical analysis on the relationship between space and capital. For more on how social movements across Latin America struggle to produce new types of spaces, see Raúl Zibechi, Territorios En Resistencia: Cartografía Política De Las Periferias Urbanas Latinoamericanas, (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Lavaca editora, 2008). This book has recently been released in English as Territories in Resistance, trans. Ramor Ryan (Oakland: AK Press, 2012).
- 3The MTD La Matanza has self-published two books: De la culpa a la autogestión: un recorrido del Movimiento de Trabajadores de La Matanza (2005) and Cuando con otros somos nosotros: la experiencia asociativa del Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados de La Matanza (2007).The Popular Front Darío Santillán operates a publishing house which has published over 50 books since 2007. The MTD Solano has collaborated with Colectivo Situaciones on various projects, including the book Hipótesis 891: Más allá de los piquetes.
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Against humanities: the self-consciousness of the corporate university
A standard feature of the hand-wringing associated with the crisis of the university is a fixation on the humanities. After all, for those of us in the so-called creative and critical fields, illustrating, visualizing and – dare we say it – branding the crisis is a new and unique opportunity to show off. This is what we went to school for, isn’t it? Take a recent event at Cornell University, which dramatized the question with the following thought experiment: after some sort of maritime disaster (details are scarce), a group of undergraduates commandeers a life raft. As luck would have it, they have a bit of space left – but, tragic twist of fate, the only people left to save are professors. Instead of giving up the seats to their elders, our clever young narcissists make the professors present a case as to why they deserve the remaining spot on the life raft. One physics professor and four from the humanities are graciously granted 10 minutes, during which students are educated on the ability of literature to help us understand each other, Homer’s extensive insights on rafts in the Illiad, and the power of theater professors abroad to impart the “knowledge that Ugandans could solve many of their own problems” with a firm belief in themselves – more effective, apparently, than “fresh water or a new AIDS vaccine.” Physics offered electricity, fire, and, perhaps most important of all, distilled alcohol. While the classics and physics tied, everyone was rooting for the humanities as a whole by the end.
These creative defenses come with an underlying subtext: it has been the programs in the humanities, and to a lesser extent the social sciences, that bear the brunt of budget cuts, because some departments lack the immediate ability to parlay their knowledge into contracts with surrounding businesses. University administrations, only moderately adept at the art of triage, cut those programs that are unable to find outside sources to bolster their existence. This has become a human tragedy – after all, the way we know ourselves is through the common culture that the humanities in the university are supposed to facilitate. For the defenders of the humanities, the 1926 words of Harvard graduate and classical scholar Paul Shorey echo through now-profane halls. From his speech “Can an American be an Optimist?”:
Who shall resist the fierce, unremitting pressure of the public, the press, the lecture platform, the literary critics, the school boards and schools of education to reduce everything to the level of the taste and understanding of the average pupil, the general reader, the ordinary audience, and to suppress every word, allusion, or quotation, every difficulty, every refinement and qualification, every touch of scholarship in footnote or appendix that may baffle or offend the illiterate literacy of those who have learned to read easy head-line and best-seller English and do not wish to learn more? And yet if we cannot establish and maintain some dike and se-wall of resistance to these tendencies, the rising tide of mediocrity will submerge us even while we are counting our universities by the score and our students by myriads.
When the scalpels are about to be deployed, the natural response of intellectuals is to assume defensive postures and recite the usual litanies of praise for our own profession: the humanities teach democracy; they teach a shared sense of self; they teach how to playfully and intelligently interact with the world, and sometimes even produce the world; they are the sole patch of life beyond the scope of market relations. Those who teach in and take classes in the humanities make the principal claim that without the noble vocation of the professor we’d all be stupider, less capable of making informed decisions, and left to the cold calculations of science.
For those outside of the defensive posture, many of these arguments might seem ludicrous, arrogant, and insulting. Barely muted is the claim that only those who have attended college – the right classes at college – and have subsequently absorbed the requisite cultural learning have the capacity to make society thrive. This was precisely the argument used by the emerging intellectual elite at the end of the 19th century – the liberal sons of the New England ruling class who helped create the humanities from the rubble of the classical studies. The argument underlying their thinking was that civilization was essentially a fragile machine, which must be operated by a small, though hopefully growing, group of men – a “democratic aristocracy” whose position was granted by virtue of their education and judgment, who could inculcate right ideas in both the business titans (who they mistrusted) and the working class (who they feared). In a 1926 speech delivered to the Phi Beta Kappa club at William and Mary, former Princeton professor Henry Van Dyke summed it up well:
[democracy’s] high purpose should be to develop an aristocracy of its own begetting, after its own heart, and dedicated to its service. Unless it can do this, democracy spells confusion of mind, fickleness and feebleness of action, and final decay hastened by the increase of material wealth. The fatter it grows the more it degenerates.
The advent of capitalist higher education by the latter half of the 19th century meant that universities would no longer serve just the small cohort of legal and religious minds who were to influence the tenor of towns and cities through their exemplary action and material success. The transformation was a direct result of the capitalist class usurping hegemony from the colonial patricians, and subsequently ignoring those institutions of higher education; this forced the cash-strapped universities and colleges (whose numbers far outstripped demand) to desperately search for a way to seduce the fledgling capitalists, the stubborn farmers, and the recalcitrant working class.
John William Draper, president of NYU in 1835, complained that “mere literary acumen is becoming utterly powerless against profound scientific attainment.” He asked, “To what are the great advances of civilization for the last fifty years due – to literature or science? Which of the two is it that is shaping the thought of the world?” According to the historian Christopher Lucas, the superintendent of California schools in 1858 declared the graduates of the old colleges to be useless individuals. And Henry Tappan, NYU professor and later University of Michigan President, usually credited as the father of the modern US university, declared that “the commercial spirit of our country, and the many avenues of wealth which are opened before enterprise, create a distaste for study deeply inimical to education… The manufacturer, the merchant, and the gold-digger, will not pause in their career to gain intellectual accomplishments. While gaining knowledge, they are losing the opportunities to gain money.” Engineering, physical science, and other practical knowledges were the principal means of this courtship (and sports, of course, though these had appeal beyond the bourgeoisie and helped knit universities into the urban fabric of the industrial era). There was not a tremendous enthusiasm for either classical studies or the humanities outside of a small cohort of average students, who enjoyed the theatricality of lectures, or the scions of the wealthy.
Classical studies gave up the ghost as advocates of the humanities – a composite of classical studies and the contemplative elements of the newly splintered sphere of political economy, from which emerged the disciplines of economics, anthropology, history, social science, and psychology – seized control of university departments in philosophy, literature, and the arts. The capitalist university would not just produce the legal, juridical, and technical minds required for industrial capitalism, it would also produce its soul. As Laurence Veysey recounts in The Emergence of the American University, the Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce helped provide the core of the new humanities: to encounter the thought behind the scientific method, not just the method. The humanists would be the self-described conscience of the university, the sometimes conservative, sometimes radical gadfly that would preserve capitalism’s humanity in the face of the vulgar utilitarians who prized pecuniary gain and specialization above all. By the early 20th century, the humanities had become assured of their place in the university, allowing Paul Shorey to breathe a sigh of relief: “Neither do I fear direct hostility, suppression, or neglect for the so-called humanities. We have outgrown that stage of controversy.”
When those of us who are educators in the humanities reflect on what exactly it is that “we” do, it is easy to dissociate our individual work from that of the totality of the institution – and from the ways that students use or ignore our work. Sure, says our thoughtful professor, the humanities have been partly responsible for the status quo over the last century. But my colleagues and I subvert, deconstruct, transform these spatial, intellectual, disciplinary boundaries and help students actualize themselves, confront inequality, and learn methods for speaking truth to power in defiance of a culture that seeks to reduce all matter to market calculations.
This attitude will no doubt continue to persist because very few of us want to believe that we are participating in alienating institutions – whether we are bankers, educators, or urban gentrifiers. And of course, the work that some in the humanities do is interesting, reveals much that is not yet known, and provides tools by which to better understand the social structure. But the truth is that the humanities actively hide and mystify the struggles that underly the “common culture.”
Having long prized virtuoso performances, and the ability of the pen and podium to beat back the sword, the humanities foster a specialized tool, abstract intelligence, that can be most powerfully wielded by elites. Writing in The Nation, Christopher Hayes gives a fine description of the social role of this intelligence:
Of all the status obsessions that preoccupy our elites, none is quite so prominent as the obsession with smartness. Intelligence is the core value of the meritocracy, one that stretches back to the early years of standardized testing, when the modern-day SAT descended from early IQ tests. To call a member of the elite “brilliant” is to pay that person the highest compliment.
Hayes describes intelligence like some sort of jewel encrusted dagger: “Smartness dazzles and mesmerizes. More important, it intimidates.” This type of valuation is rife throughout academic departments, especially the humanities. The contempt with which many faculty and TAs regard their own students illustrates just how deeply this attitude runs.
What Hayes misses is that this meritocratic elitism isn’t just a general risk of organization that could be corrected by a “radicalized upper middle class”– it’s part of a wider social process. A cohort of properly democratic elites, long the central fantasy of the humanities, would still fail to step outside the underlying dynamic, which is that capitalism requires expansion and movement. There is no reproduction of market society without the conquest of new markets, and the opening of new spaces to market mechanisms. We would do well to keep this in mind when we discuss the “crisis of the university.” There can be no doubt that the university is in crisis. But the metrics in vogue to describe the crisis seem wrong.
A peculiar insight raised by Brian Whitener and Dan Nemser is that the university as such is not actually in crisis, when measured by the only really important index of our society: investor return. It would be a mistake to imagine that privatization, corporatization, or meritocracy are driving the crisis of the university, when in fact the internal dynamics of capitalism itself lay at its center. Higher education today is simply unable to remain in any kind of stasis, and the stasis urged by the defenders of the university in general, and the humanities in particular, is a weak liberal utopia.
But the utopia isn’t just a weak form of opposition – it’s been part of the ideological foundation of the university from the beginning. Echoing the earlier gadflies, English professor James Mullholland argues in the Chronicle of Higher Education: “We succeed within a corporatized university because we offer ways to reflect on it, reinvent it, and evaluate it. We are the self-consciousness of the corporate university.” When this self-consciousness is universal and “human,” questions of social struggle can be evaded. And once this evasion is complete, the fine-tuning of capitalism can commence.
For the ascendant liberals of the early 20th century, a broad framework embedded in the humanities and social sciences was a mechanism by which to absorb local conflict into the realm of the interventionist state. With the passing of laissez-faire capitalism heralded by the arrival of the railroads, big business and the emergence of an organized working class in the US, the intellectual and business leaders saw only two paths: a strong centralized state anchored through centralization of power at the national level, or socialism. Stephen Skowronek’s Building a New American State shows how this centralization of bureaucratic functions within the civil administration, the military, and business regulation was accomplished, with the help of the National Civic Federation (NCF), as a response to the accumulation of capital by large businesses in the 1870s and the concomitant labor strikes that subsequently shook the US. “The construction of a central bureaucratic apparatus,” Skowronek writes, “was championed as the best way to maintain order during this period of upheaval in economic social, and international affairs.”
Edward Silva and Sheila Slaughter have traced a parallel history in Serving Power, which tells of the crucial role academics from the newly created social sciences had to play in this transformation. As “disinterested experts,” they had the distance and authority to expound local problems in ways that those involved did not; they could see the whole picture. Through the NCF, “the most influential business-sponsored political-economic forum group operating during the Progressive Period,” academics, bankers, manufacturers, and conservative labor leaders – AFL president Samuel Gompers was a founding member – partnered together with the goal of “increasing the overall efficiency of capitalistic enterprise and solving the many problems of rapid industrialization” – meaning, labor militancy and revolution.
Calling on willing leaders in the newly formed divisions of the social sciences, academics wrote model legislation, conducted studies on working conditions and public opinion, and offered theories of social change that placed true agency only with the bureaucratic centralized state. Even the organizations of these new divisions – the American Economics Association, American Political Science Association, American Historical Association, American Social Science Association, and Modern Language Association – formed, Silva and Slaughter note, as academics sought to atomize and specialize the discipline of political economy, seen to have fostered Marxism.
Through the social sciences the university offered a strategy for social change that countered Marxist political economy, to entrench both private property and an interventionist state. Through the humanities the university offered a universal theory that saw humanity as something to be imposed upon those too stupid or too obstinate to sublimate their own desires and needs to those of Western civilization. For this reason, writes Richard Altenbaugh in Education for Struggle, the militant working class distrusted formal education at every level. Altenbaugh cites a 1921 remark by Alexander Fichland, director of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union’s “Workers University,” to this effect:
Workers feel that they cannot obtain in non-workers’ educational institutions correct information on subjects affecting their own interests. They feel that they are frequently deceived and are furnished with interpretations of life which are intended to keep them docile and submissive. They feel that the truth will be told to them only by those of their own choosing, whose outlook on life is their outlook on life, whose sympathies are their sympathies, whose interests are their interests.
By abstracting from class struggle in all of its guises, the university weaponized the knowledge of the emerging disciplines and turned them on the working class. All knowledge and all education are historically situated, developed out of particular histories and cultures, and are dependent on vast social structures in order to survive. The thought produced in universities has, for reasons deeply embedded in their history, been used to attack and undermine class struggle in the name of a progressive utopia that appears more impossible now than ever.
And this is precisely why the peans to to knowledge and higher education – especially to the humanities – grow more wearisome every year. Even in The New Yorker, the hallowed claims of educated self-consciousness, the crown jewel of the humanities, have been questioned. A recent article on the research of Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman concludes that we are nearly incapable of rational thought regarding our own actions, but revel in criticizing the actions of others along supposedly rational lines. “Education,” it acknowledges, “isn’t a savior.” In fact, “introspection can actually compound the error, blinding us to those primal processes responsible for many of our everyday failings. We spin eloquent stories, but these stories miss the point. The more we attempt to know ourselves, the less we actually understand.” Research shows that the smarter – and better educated – are more prone to these “mistakes.” A case in point is the author of these words, Jonah Lehrer, who was unable to resist the “primal process” of making up quotes and no longer has a job with The New Yorker.
Something other than defense of the university, and something other than the humanities, are necessary today. And this “something other” must take be constructed both within and outside of the university. Within, because as Gigi Roggero has pointed out, the university is a dynamic site of struggle and capitalist production. Outside, because knowledge is a particular kind of power, culturally and historically dependent. The humanities and university academics are an outstanding example of this: they were created as an ideological offensive against both the militant working-class struggles that threatened Europe and Americas and the residual patrician elites that threatened to hold back capitalist expansion. Instead of defending this kind of knowledge, we would do better to heed the words of Gilles Deleuze: “There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.” Our task is to develop new weapons, and that will require leaving the university and abandoning the humanities.
Mark Paschal has written for Reclamations Journal, and is a member of University Research Group Experiment (URGE). He is also a graduate student at UC Santa Cruz.
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When professors strip for the camera
If TED took a turn to leftist (or any) critique, Žižek, the professor of “toilets and ideology,” would be the keynote speaker. The irony of the animated lecture, “First as Tragedy, Then as Farce,” is that a diatribe on “global capitalism with a human face” would get over 900,000 views on YouTube. “It’s not just what you’re buying, but what you’re buying into” seems to apply not only to Starbucks’ “coffee ethics” and TOMS Shoes’ 1-for-1 African philanthropy, but also to the availability of 10-minute Lacanian Marxist “soft apocalyptism” at a Google subsidiary with personalized ads.
With YouTube’s help, the academy where Žižek’s persona was born is an increasingly visible terrain of so-called “cultural capitalism.” The last decade has witnessed a revolution in open courseware, a source of short-circuit consumption in which anyone with a computer can drink elite university Kool-Aid without earning credit. The movement has been so explosive – the Hewlett Foundation, which provides the mother lode of funding for university initiatives, supported a whole book on it, Taylor Walsh’s 2011 Unlocking the Gates – that one wonders how long the political economy of education that it anchors, contra Žižek’s hipster-friendly fantasies of consumerist dystopia, will last.
To date, the most successful, or at least most prominent, initiative is MIT’s OpenCourseWare. In 2001, MIT unveiled a plan to offer most of its courses online for free – reading lists, lecture notes, exams, and all. In its first five weeks of existence, the OCW site got 361,000 unique visitors from 177 countries and all 7 continents. In response to OCW, UNESCO held a “Forum on the Impact of Open Courseware for Higher Education in Developing Countries.” MIT was the new Bill Gates. As university president Charles Vest wrote in the Chronicle of Higher Education in 2004:
a faculty member at a new engineering university in Ghana, a precocious high-school biology student in suburban Chicago, a political scientist in Poland, a literature professor in upstate New York, or an executive in a management seminar down the hall at MIT will be able to use the materials our professors rely on in teaching our full-time students.
Open Yale Courses, which drafted off MIT’s success, is now a competitor in the techno hype-space, only with different operating parameters. The OYC site hosts 42 courses, most of which are introductory lectures in the humanities and social sciences. Yale gives OYC professors a small honorarium in exchange for letting videographers sit in the back of the room and record every lecture.
Occasionally, there will be an awkward moment when the professor asks students not to walk in front of the class lest they get on camera, or apologizes for having to fix their mic. It’s the self-assurance of Yale’s hand-picked all-stars which makes OYC differentiable from TED talks, in which some speakers, perhaps getting to condense their wisdom into 20-minute nuggets of optimism for the first time, repeat phrases or give clumsy postscripts. Otherwise, Yale qualifies, in the words of Evgeny Morozov, as a TED-esque “international meme launderer.” Open Yale Courses are the ivory tower of university TEDification. At the same time that Yale continues its 20-year stomp on grad student unionism and ’juncts its academic workforce, it parades popular tenured professors – “I keep my eyes open for people in the news,” director and OYC participant Diane Kleiner has said – with few offerings in critical or politically charged disciplines that produce less marketable research.
Yale isn’t the only university that picks the best and brightest for the world screen. Fathom, a failed for-profit initiative at Columbia that pre-dated OCW at MIT, marketed over 600 courses but focused on star faculty. Carnegie Mellon’s Open Learning Initiative, which offers 15 courses in its core competencies of science, math, and foreign language, demands significant time for course development and thus draws mostly from tenured faculty. The whole open courseware enterprise was born of relationships among big-name university leaders. Yale president Richard Levin had been on the board of the Hewlett Foundation since 1998. AllLearn, another failed for-profit venture from the dot-com era, was a collaboration between Levin and his friends at Oxford, Princeton, and Stanford. After AllLearn, Yale’s liaison went on to be president of TIAA-CREF.
The elite origins of open courseware, put together with the academic hyperreality of its all-star offerings, are nothing compared to the backroom power play that is 2011’s “Great Big Ideas,” a course offered to students at Yale, Harvard, and Bard College and anyone else willing to shell out $199 to watch twelve hour-long lectures online. The course, “an introduction to the world’s most important ideas and disciplines,” is the pilot offering of the for-profit Floating University, a joint venture between Yale-bred businessman Adam Glick and online forum Big Think. Though it isn’t free like OYC, the conceits of open courseware lie within FU’s glossy syllabus: Steven Pinker and Paul Bloom (Norton authors); Larry Summers; William Ackman’s “If You’re So Smart, Why Aren’t You Rich?” which explains “the logistics of the modern portfolio theory of investment, handing students the tools to become the savvy investors of tomorrow”; and a TED-friendly smorgasbord of hard science, economics, and discourse on human nature—to be sure, the world’s most important ideas and disciplines.1
In Shakespeare, Einstein, and the Bottom Line, Stephen Kirp writes that open courseware gives elite universities the symbolic capital “to keep their exclusivity intact.” For schools like Yale that can only drop within existing hierarchies of exchange value – U.S. News & World Report rankings, for one – the open courseware revolution represents a new lattice of use value that fortifies the gates against disruptive innovation from other high-tech knowledge ventures as well as competitors from below. (“I don’t want to wake up one morning and find out that Harvard and Microsoft have put $5 million on the table,” piped Columbia trustee and NBA commissioner David Stern at the advent of Fathom.) Under this new regime, universities accrue a sort of secondary rent on what they already own.
Like the University of Phoenix, elite universities have heeded Bank of America analyst Howard Block’s admonition to embrace their role as content providers – or, as David Brooks noted optimistically in a May column, to bank on the transformation of “knowledge into a commodity that is cheap and globally available.” Famous Berkeley chancellor Clark Kerr’s preferred use of the university is upon us: “Knowledge is durable. It is also transferable. It only pays to produce knowledge if through production it can be put into use better and faster.” Or, if we take Carnegie Mellon’s fine-tuned, web-specific courses as the model – as President Obama has, in hailing a future for community college expansion that doesn’t require more classrooms – BF Skinner’s “teaching machine,” which rewarded students for correct answers following pre-programmed instruction, is the new motor of the digital superhighway.
Open courseware is a way for universities to get by as businesses and as universities, with all the attendant contradictions. On the one hand, as Walsh recounts in Unlocking the Gates, Yale’s director of marketing and trademark licensing claims that OYC “was driven from a marketing perspective, because every time someone views something we made, they’re consuming Yale, and the quality of their experience reflects how they think of us and the brand.” Indeed, the OYC site is laced with Yale’s name, logo, and colors, and every YouTube video has a Yale imprint. On the other hand, as Kleiner has it, “This isn’t a numbers game, since we’re not making money off this; this is a gift we’re giving to the world, so we want to see if we can bring that to as many people as possible.” In a 2000 lecture at Oxford, Mellon Foundation president William Bowen waxed that universities shouldn’t sell open courseware for fear of sacrificing their pro-bono purpose. The proprietors of webcast.berkeley consider online lectures signals to state legislators that the purveyors of tech transfer and privately supported research also teach – for the public good.
At Yale and elsewhere, the old boys club has become a genderless, frictionless, surfable ocean of philanthropy; and yet these same universities remain corporately managed austerity-mongers. Standard critiques of cybernetic utopianism apply. In Data Trash: The Theory of the Virtual Class, Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein define the “will to virtuality” as the “dream of being the god of cyberspace – public ideology as the fantasy drive of pre-pubescent males.” In the globalized academy, a new pantheon rises.
TED and Twitter have two things in common: they package knowledge into personal brands; and they disseminate it faster and more widely than the average academic journal. Anyone can watch a TED talk; hardware-willing, anyone can tweet. Twitter’s mass appeal has as its elite counterpart the slushy marketing pitch of the TED talker.
Today’s paradigmatic intellectual commodities, like intellectual property rights granted to authors but absorbed into the capital circuitry of the publishing world of 18th century Western Europe, come with new forms of exploitation. The labor-power embedded in these commodities is lost not only in the buyer’s fetish but in mega-networks that redefine cognitive labor and reroute it to profitable ends. In the Twitter-sphere, The New Inquiry’s Rob Horning put it in a 2011 essay, “we can be aware of ourselves only insofar as we see ourselves as profiting or not… We sell out simply by choosing to have subjectivity on social media’s terms.” This alienation, one of the “quintessential aspects of the contemporary experience of precarity,” represents “the total breakdown of the possibility of collective identity… the transformational potential of the enhanced social cooperation on which the economy depends is neutralized, frittered away in ostentatious narcissism.”
In “The Ideology of Free Culture and the Grammar of Sabotage,” Matteo Pasquinelli describes this set-up as a regime of exploitation, while also pointing to a certain kind of resistance to it. Responding to high-utopian “digitalism” and selectively permeable networks like the Creative Commons, he writes, “There is nothing digital in any digital dream. Merged with a global economy, each bit of ‘free’ information carries its microslave like a forgotten twin.” Akin to creative production subsumed by urban growth machines or media monopolies, “open culture” becomes a kind of multitude-for-rent. For Pasquinelli, subversion lies with the likes of Dmytri Kleiner’s copyfarleft, in which the commons are open to commercial use by single workers or worker cooperatives that till them, but not agents that exist outside. Over and against the flat world of open culturists, Pasquinelli posits a commons that runs on both cooperation and uncooperation, in which the multitude struggles within itself.
Sabotage of the copyfarleft sort is an important plank of resistance, but a kind of vanguardist one; culture jammers and conspiratorial digital cabals draw on highly politicized subjectivities lodged in a world that relies on the academy no matter how much it may disavow its origins. By comparison, strong assertions about the impossibility of collective identity abandon all attempts to unravel the contradictions and changing class composition of the so-called knowledge economy. While it’s predictable for the professional intellectual to decry the crassness of the newest brave new world, tweets and free lectures represent a redistribution of knowledge whose latent promise must be taken as seriously as its runaway promises. To be sure, it’s easy to criticize techno-babblers like Wired – which in 2003 wrote of MIT’s OCW, “no institution of higher learning had ever proposed anything as revolutionary” – or, for that matter, MIT’s marketing team. The operative question here is whether the tweeters or open courseware consumers who aren’tprofessional intellectuals can speak. Just as Wired’s take on Occupy Wall Street, a December article entitled “#Riot: Self-Organized, Hyper-Networked Revolts,” treats protesters as mindless iron filings, Andy Merrifield’s “Crowd Politics” in the September/October 2011 New Left Review foregrounds the “intensity of the encounter” while ignoring the variable subjectivities and lived experiences that protesters carry with them to protest. Who is Horning’s “we”?
For those who never went to a top school or, financial aid notwithstanding, couldn’t take on the debt, open education represents a utopia captured by university growth machines. Bastard simulacrum of academia that it can be, it calls neither for knee-jerk defense of the traditional academy nor blithe celebration from those whose departments or job prospects are safe from the chopping block, but measured consideration of new possibilities for reappropriating the crisis of the university.
As America’s university system grew and modernized in the postwar era, students and faculty collaborated on significant reforms to Yale’s grading system, graduation credits, and opportunities for independent study. In the postmodern academy, ideas for appropriating systemic transformation for radical ends run wild. At the Open Education Conference in 2009, Christopher Mackie offered a “Model Proposal for Utterly Transforming Higher Education Pedagogy and Intellectual Property Generation,” involving course credit for students who generate online content – elevating students’ consumption of open courseware, particularly operative at MIT, to a co-creative art. As a resolution to the skyrocketing cost of university degrees, n+1’s editors make the less modest, if more speculative, pitch for “the credentialed to join the uncredentialed in shredding the diplomas that paper over the undemocratic infrastructure of American life.”
Breaking down this infrastructure demands recognition that knowledge commodities are objects consumed by a heterogeneous multitude rather than a monolithic mass trapped within an imposed “consumerism.” As Yale’s Michael Denning contends in Culture in the Age of Three Worlds, “cultural forms do not have a necessary political meaning, and may be appropriated and reappropriated by a variety of social movements seeking to lead a society.” For Denning, cultural practices are not “quick sales” but sites of class contestation and variable material investment. Within this paradigm, the masses of people to whom simulated academic knowledge is distributed are an integral part of any program that purports to redirect the political economy of higher education.
As the academy broadcasts itself to the world, it opens itself to disruption from this audience – Ghanaian students seeking an MIT degree in exchange for all the coursework, high schoolers who love the free lectures but can’t access highly ranked university education because of race or class, let alone adjuncts who see the lies of tenure exposed on camera. The onus is on the rest of us to meet them at the gates.
* I’ve benefited from the personal guidance and generosity of several instructors from this course. My statements here are directed toward the course and not the professors themselves.
James Cersonsky (@cersonsky) is a Philadelphia-based writer and activist. His writing can be found at Dissent, In These Times, AlterNet, and elsewhere. Read about his work on community-centered pedagogy here.
- 1I’ve benefited from the personal guidance and generosity of several instructors from this course. My statements here are directed toward the course and not the professors themselves.
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History and politics: an interview
Asad Haider: You write within a Marxist framework, but often focus on classical political philosophy, prior to or outside of the Marxist tradition. What’s the relevance of this kind of study?
Gopal Balakrishnan: I would say that just as we clearly see that Marx’s economic thinking arises out of a critique of classical political economy, and that in turn was made possible by a prior critique of idealist philosophy, we also have to see the problems of revolutionary politics that Marx is addressing as a critical engagement with the past history of political thought. There are specific category problems, as well as intertwined historical subject matter in an engagement with that side of Marx, and Marx’s own engagement with this lineage of thinkers – Hegel as a legal and political thinker, clearly, but Hegel’s thought as a culmination of a tradition of legal and political thinking going back to Aristotle. That’s something which has been underscored by others in the Marxist tradition, you could think of Althusser and Colletti, who also had works which were explicitly about the political writers before Marx, who in some way introduce or delineate the problems of politics and history that Marx will subsequently take up in his accounts of the class struggles and civil wars of the times that he was living in.
I want to ask about two political thinkers, and what we can learn from them. The first is Carl Schmitt, the subject of your first book, The Enemy.
Well, you know, it’s not always obvious to people why it’s necessary to read figures like Schmitt, a figure who was compromised by his intimate associations with fascism and National Socialism. So this is an initial obstacle to a critical engagement – it was even for me. Schmitt, from the other side of the political spectrum, was approaching the problems of the forms of politics that arose in a period of the historical and structural crisis of the state-form, manifesting itself in the indeterminacy around the basic categories and conceptual distinctions that organized legal and political thinking from an earlier period. His benchmark is the period of classical liberalism, so the concepts and category distinctions that organized legal and political thinking for classical liberalism and before are entering into crisis in this new era, in which the opposition of state and society, the fundamental separation of the economic from the political – which is of course one of the ways Marx understands what’s specific to modern bourgeois or capitalist society – is under threat. Schmitt is addressing the same problem as Marx, except he’s doing it in a period when the further development of the capitalist system, mediated by the interstate system into a pattern of combined an uneven development, and further mediated by revolutionary and counterrevolutionary ruptures, is bringing about a reconnection of these previously separated spheres or domains of the political and the economic. The actual subsequent development of capitalism is reconnecting them in various ways, although maintaining fundamentally the separation insofar as we’re still speaking of capitalism. So I think in that sense Schmitt is dealing with a problem – indirectly, sometimes, but sometimes directly – a deep problem that arose in Marx’s own thinking.
Now Marx, even though he posited this separation of the political from the economic, did not on that basis attempt to elaborate on concrete forms of modern statehood and their potential historical transformations within later phases of capitalist development. While he identified the social relations behind the long-term dynamic of capital accumulation, he developed a more rudimentary account of the basic structure of the state that arises from this separation. His accounts of class struggles and civil wars of the 19th century present some general outlines of the modern bourgeois state, but not much as far as theorizing its concrete tendencies of development. Unlike capital, the state is a very simple category in Marx’s writings. There isn’t really a systematic historical critique of the political order that arises from this constitutive separation of the political from the economic, or of contemporary relation between state and the development of capitalism, although he has much to say about how this played out in the period of the formation of capitalist society. In the early works, when he’s engaging with Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he addresses the specific delineated forms of the European state arising out of this process of separation, but its of course still in a rudimentary philosophical form.
Getting back to Schmitt: there are of course serious limits to his thinking, to the extent that he only approached these problems through the mediation of his conception of the state in the tradition of constitutional law and its premises, so his understanding of the transformations of capitalism in this period are approached through this mediation. But what he has to say about the crisis of the legal forms of statehood, private property, and war is interesting in its own right, and often goes well beyond what Marxists at the time wrote on these matters. The Weimar Republic was, after all, the epicenter of a larger historical situation of an intense interwar structural crisis of capitalism and the inter-state system within which it had evolved. The Weimar state-form, and the constitutional controversies surrounding it, was a staging ground for the larger theoretical questions around the character of the period, in terms of the fundamental transformations in the relationship of the state to capitalism, of the political to the economic, that should be of interest to any Marxist. Of course, many of his students were Marxists, and he was often able to appropriate ideas from others across the political spectrum. This is apparent from the very beginning of the Weimar Republic, when he wrote on the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat within a wider intellectual history of emergency powers and states of exception, all the way to its end when he addressed the problem of the compatibility of the crisis management of post-laissez-faire capitalism with existing forms of democracy.
The second thinker is Machiavelli. Both Gramsci and Althusser wrote about Machiavelli, and you returned to some of this material in Antagonistics.
I would say that one of the ways to think about the significance of Machiavelli is the context in which thinking about the present through a reading of Machiavelli emerged, from the 19th century to the interwar period, and perhaps closer to the present context as well. If you think about it that way, you can see that there are a number of episodes in the story of the reception with Machiavelli. In the early 19th century you have Fichte and Hegel responding to the crisis of the German state, and trying to think about the conditions of possibility of the reconstitution of a national state, by looking at Machiavelli’s writings on the problem of Italian national unity. They saw Machiavelli as addressing the problem of the conditions of the genesis of a state, particularly in the context of what appeared as catastrophic defeat in the form of foreign occupation. So that’s their historical link to Machiavelli’s situation.
Keeping that in mind, the renewed interest in Machiavelli during the interwar period, and this is manifested by writings on him across the political spectrum – you mentioned Gramsci, there’s also Leo Strauss, Wyndham Lewis, Raymond Aron, and many others. Gramsci, whether he was dealing with the problem of revolutionary political strategy in the West, the rise of Fascism or even the onset of American hegemony, raised Machiavellian questions about the nexus between the foundation of new states and the conditions of their perpetuation. This is the problem that Machiavelli is dealing with in the Discourses, the need for an interlude or founding episode of terror to establish a new state, and the mode by which that origin can be superseded through the establishment of political forms that are capable of perpetuating themselves on the basis of the multitude, the not yet fully independent popular foundation of the new order. So, these episodes of reading Machiavelli are all about the origins and foundations of new orders, as experienced in the aftermath of defeat.
So we’re seeing the resonance of these themes across historical periods. Crises in state-forms, and crises which are truly global, with catastrophic defeats, situations in which the shape of a new order can’t be clearly seen. We’re now experiencing what seems to be an interminable economic crisis; how do these classical themes play into understanding the current period?
The ability of some of these older legacies of thought to address the present was called into question by the restabilization of the capitalist system in the postwar period. For that reason those who have remained interested in those older legacies of revolutionary political thought, thinking about a politics that could bring them back, have found it difficult to find its points of application to the world of capital that arose in the postwar Western sector. There were a variety of attempts to keep alive, in some way, the possibilities of revolutionary political change, but often this took the form of trying to look for other agencies outside the working class, and other sites of struggle. For a very a long period of time we’ve experienced the development of capitalism which is in some respects no longer capable of continuing and reproducing the successes of the postwar period.
An adequate understanding of the so-called period of neoliberalism involves understanding these different levels, some of which seemed to indicate that the capitalist system was reaching new heights, as the entire world was incorporated into it, while other levels of its evolution exhibited characteristics which suggested that the fundamental economic problems of the 1970s, in terms of a slowdown in the growth of income, were never really superseded. What I suggest in my piece “Speculations on the Stationary State” is that these conjunctural problems carried over from the 1970s are converging with the structural limits of capitalism itself, which make it less realistic to assume that this renewal process is going to happen.
It was often thought, until recently, that the last thirty years, after the postwar “Golden Age,” were the greatest period of capitalism ever. Developing a comprehensive objective account of what happened in this period has been difficult, since there are so many different levels at which what happened unfolded. There’s been a long term period of structural transformations and adjustments with so many new characteristics introduced into the capitalist system, it would seem at least initially paradoxical that this has not in some way broken forth into a new period of accumulation. So in order to address that problem, its now important to reconsider some theorizations of longer-term limits of capitalism. I didn’t really go into the various Marxist versions of that, which I would do more of now, but I think that the core of it arises out of the Brenner account and some unresolved problems and questions in that account regarding the long term, drawing the political and historical problems out.
Let’s talk about Robert Brenner’s analysis of what he calls the long downturn, which started in the 1970s. His account is controversial for a number of reasons, including among Marxists. He doesn’t make use of the Marxian terminology of value, and doesn’t explicitly refer to Marx’s texts on economic crisis.
It’s neither framed in terms of Marx’s own characteristic terminology, nor is it framed as a general theory of capitalist crisis. Though some general principles might come out of it, Brenner doesn’t advance this as an explanation of the interwar economic crisis, the so-called Great Depression, nor of the crisis of the last decades of the 19th century. So although there’s a general characterization of the social property relations of the capitalist mode of production, and there’s an account of some of the long-term dynamics and trends, every particular phase of accumulation is a historical topic unto itself, calling into question the idea of Marx’s economic thought as a crisis theory. That’s good, in my view.
As a secondary issue, on Brenner’s relation to Marx, despite the terminological distance, I think actually the account that Brenner provides gives a concrete meaning to various concepts that are the foundation of Marx’s own account of the value form. I think that there’s still something more to be said on this subject, since Brenner himself doesn’t use the terminology and more or less frames his own account of capitalism and of its accumulation process in terms of a cost-price theory, explicitly avoiding the problematic that Marx opened up with his understanding of the social relations which give rise to production in a value form, that there’s a significant dimension of what Marx was trying to get at in his theory of capitalism that is not brought into sharp relief in Brenner’s account.
You’re actually in the midst of researching and writing a book on Marx, focusing on Marx’s economic writings. One of the major problems for the entire history of what was called Western Marxism was that Marx never actually wrote what his method was in works like Capital.
From beginning to end, Marx’s own theory arises out of a critical analysis of the category problems that arose within classical political economy, that it was unable to solve. Marx’s own account of “the capitalist mode of production” takes the form of a solution to these problems, from the mystery of why the value of commodities must appear in a monetary form to why the social relations of production appear in the form of separate factors of production contributing to the value of the commodity, with each appearing as a separate source of revenue to their owner. One of the premises of my work on Marx’s economic thought is that we have generally lost sight of the fundamental economic problems that Marx was addressing, that came out of classical political economy. These were in part still living problems at the time that Marx was working through them, but even during the course of Marx’s own writings on these topics, from the late 1850s to the early 1870s, this tradition of classical political economy, and the living historical content of the problems it was addressing, began to fall out of view, became in some way occluded, so I would argue there’s a kind of opacity to the fundamental underlying problems of Marx’s economic thought. The meanings of many of the terms he’s using, and more seriously the systematic character of his economic thought, are not apparent. Of course, there have always been dogmatic understandings of the systematic character of Marx’s writings, but putting those aside, interpretations of his theory of capitalism have always been mediated by the initial attempts to make sense of it, which took shape in the aftermath of the decline of the intellectual traditions out of which Marx himself formulated his critique of political economy. These initial attempts established the points of entry, topics and problems that have dominated much of the commentary since.
That being said, Marx’s own understanding of capitalism has many characteristics of the particular socio-historical world of 19th century English capitalism embedded within it. Although it’s a general theory, and arises as a critique of the fundamental economic categories of classical political economy, and the solution of the fundamental category problems and with them obviously the real underlying characteristics of a capitalist economy, with the working through of the problems and impasses of classical political economy, Marx arrived at a general theory, but this general theory is in some way conjoined to the specific socio-historical context of the capitalism of his time. Not just of course the factory-industrial order that emerged in England, which is the locus classicus for the general theory, but also the various regions of the larger world-system, from declining Asiatic empires to the still-intact world of European feudalism in the East, in Russia, in the period of its demise, the emergence of white settler states, the end of the large plantation slavery-based economies. These conditions are specific to the classical period of capitalism that Marx is theorizing, and not all of them are in some uniform way subsumed under one single form of capitalism. Many of the characteristics of his age of capitalism belong to another world: capitalist landlordism based on agricultural rent, gold standard money, and conditions of working class life that were uprooted with the advent of modern medicine and the welfare state – although, of course, this latter development has only taken place in more advanced economies. So there’s a number of ways in which Marx’s world is discontinuous with our own, though the general theory allows us to make the bridge, to understand what in the subsequent periods of capitalism, although they break and depart with the characteristics of Marx’s own time, are nonetheless intelligible in terms of the account that Marx does provide.
What you’re pointing to is the fundamental relation between the logical exposition in Capital and the historical chapters, which are sometimes seen as existing in an entirely different register.
There is a tendency to isolate the value theory, or the “theory” part of Marx’s economic writings from the historical parts, to put it crudely. That has to do with prevailing conceptions of what theory is. I’d like to demonstrate what kind of theory Marx is building by presenting it in a systematically unified, reconstructed form. Clearly, Marx does not mean by mean by theory, generalizations applied to something called “history.” But there is another sense of the term “theory” associated with Marx which is also not exactly the one Marx himself had: so-called “Critical Theory.” Marx’s conception of theory was not merely negative in this sense, but aspired to be scientific and systematically integrated with historical content, that is, with the articulation and solution of real historical problems.
Many of the attempts now to get to a new reading of Capital set up as their adversary something called “traditional” Marxism or “worldview” Marxism, which is connected to the political projects of the workers’ movement. Now, if we do a reading of the theoretical texts that were produced by the workers’ movement, we find a remarkable heterogeneity, of perspectives, problematics, questions. How can we begin to reread this tradition as well?
I think there are a couple of questions there, some of which presuppose a particular answer. I would say that, contrary to my own inclinations, insofar as I’m sympathetic to some of the traditions of so-called “worldview Marxism,” there really isn’t much in Marx’s economic writings to warrant the idea that it had some immediate or direct relationship to an understanding of the conditions of possibility of the pursuit of class struggles, or immediately oriented towards the problems of the revolutionary praxis of the working class. That was an attempt made at a later point, based in the fact that Marx’s writings are not just economic, but also on the politics and history of his time, some of them part of a series of writings on the great upheavals, the revolutions and counterrevolutions from 1848 to 1871. So obviously it was not simply culled out of nothing, that so-called “worldview Marxists” would try to establish the connection. But aside from some discussions of the workers’ movement in the form of the struggle to limit the workday, and to establish normal conditions of labor within the factory system, and the significance of the success of that in inducing structural changes within capitalism, as opposed to breaking with it and overthrowing it, there isn’t really that much in the economic writings which either explicitly puts the class struggle at the center of the unfolding evolution of these social relations. There’s much more on the violence of the class struggles that characterized the period of the “primitive accumulation” of capital than on any subsequent episodes of it. It’s not even clear whether the theory which he presents, and this is a tribute to his scientific integrity, really identifies the conditions of possibility for a workers’ movement, in the sense of a dynamic by which the working class might develop out of the process of the accumulation of capital into a force of emancipation and reconstruction. It’s not entirely clear that this is his understanding of what happens to the working class under capitalism.
Nevertheless he described Capital as a weapon in the hands of the working class.
Scientific theory is a weapon, it’s ultimately beneficial to the workers and the downtrodden of society because they have the most interest in understanding the world without illusions. It’s in that respect that I think it’s a weapon for the working class, and it’s not really clear that it can be directly, in the form that Marx wrote it, turned into an instrument of the class struggle. But that’s not what Marx is trying to do, either. He’s trying to set up a framework for concrete investigations of the evolution of this form of society and the political and other forms of struggle that result from its underlying contradictions. Theory – in some ways I think this is what Althusser was good at pointing out – is not there for us, in the sense of something which is immediately even meaningful for us, and the questions that we’re asking. It’s not meant to do that. It’s meant to maybe take us away from the questions we’re asking. So we can’t really think of theory in an instrumental way, because of that relationship, true theories don’t serve our purposes so easily. But they better serve our purposes for all that, because they are ultimately about true things and a knowledge of them. In that sense I think you could say that the scientific-critical understanding of theory, as opposed to a political worldview understanding, is really what the classical conception ultimately subscribed to. Let me qualify that: I think that Gramsci is maybe, in the aftermath of defeat, more attuned to the way a scientific-critical understanding of history and politics leads to a certain, let’s say, disabused relationship to the immediate prospects of the conditions of struggle for working and subaltern classes. It’s really a difficult thing to scientifically and critically explore these problems. We prefer to have our questions result in answers which are enabling to us in some way. There are totally good reasons we ask theory to do this for us. But it best served even that purpose when it did this indirectly.
Now, there are moments in Marx, even in Capital, which describe a kind of inexorable process of historical development which will result in communism.
Where would you say that is?
The “Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation,” in continuity with earlier works.
I would disagree with that, I would say that there’s often a kind of peculiar dialectical form to the way Marx establishes the conditions of the negation of existing conditions. So although he very strikingly suggests the dialectical form of the development of capitalism as a process of the expropriation of labor, which will in turn capsize over into an expropriation of the expropriators, that formal-dialectical structure shouldn’t deceive us. I think this is where we might take a cue from some of the criticism of dialectical thought that came out of currents in the, let’s say, Althusserian tradition. The way the logic of development is understood as a way of following the logic of negation, can lead to assumptions about the course of history which ultimately turn out to be dialectical illusions. I’m not advocating stepping back away from the dialectical development of laws and tendencies. Much of what is great in Marx’s thinking takes this form, and any version of Marx which strips that out of it, really strips out the guts of it. Briefly in the penultimate chapter of volume 1 he speaks of this “expropriation of the expropriators,” it seems as if this is culmination of the analysis, at least in that volume of the text. We might be tempted to see volume 1 as culminating in this understanding of the expropriation of the expropriators. Capital is often read today as the story of the formation of the working class and, let’s call it, before the letter, “the multitude.” The basic idea is that as we approach the final chapter of the expropriation of the multitude, the conditions are emerging for a great reversal. This is the enabling ideological formula of the radical left today. There is a rational core to this. Liberals, social-democrats and remnant legacies of an older far-left often snicker at such illusions, but since they were completely blindsided by the contemporary crisis of capitalism, and failed to predict it, and now offer only hindsight and stick to whatever it is they were saying before, they’re hardly credible either.
It seems to me the reason Marx places such an emphasis on violence, as you mentioned before, in the chapters on primitive accumulation is to break from the idea – which is there in classical political economy, but can also be repeated in a modified form in a Marxism which relies on a transhistorical narrative of the forces of production, the development of the forces of production – the idea that the “social-property relations” of the capitalist mode of production are the realization of something nascent in the previous mode of production, whereas he is describing a process which isn’t a simple realization, but which involves discontinuity, and which engages every level of the social formation. He emphasizes the role of the state, the interaction of various elements which don’t contain capitalism within them.
I’m not sure if you’re describing Marx here, I think that his thoughts on the subject of the emergence or transition to something like a “social” mode of production, are scattered, as everyone knows, and really take the form of either this dialectical-overturning, or, more modestly, of a consideration of the way aspects of social reproduction which assume a particular form because of capitalist social-property relations would be suspended, given a social mode of production. In this latter vein his basic point is that what are assumed to be material necessities of production are really only such because of these particular social forms.
You’ve described the story of primitive accumulation as the formation of the working class as a kind of ideological narrative, with utility for the social moment. What would be a scientific analysis of the formation of the proletariat? Not Marx’s?
Well, he explicitly says in that chapter, that he is not going to look at the economic causes of the formation of the proletariat, that he is just going to look at the role that violence played in this process. That’s an explicit admission that this is not really a theorization, or historically grounded account of the whole process of the original accumulation of capital, but a counter-myth to the bourgeois story of enterprising Lockean forefathers scraping together, out of their labors, sums which they are then able to use to employ those who were unable, or didn’t want to do that. That story is basically an ideological account of why people today are divided into classes, and so Marx is countering it with another one unfolding within a dialectical form, with this kind of reversal.
So he’s lapsing out of science? Because you’ve described the systematicity of this entire work.
I have said that there is a logico-historical systematicity. I haven’t described it though.
Okay. But your characterization of the chapters on primitive accumulation seems to suggest that they are not part of this.
I think that there’s a conceptual development running throughout Marx’s works, including the texts on primitive accumulation.
Theorizations of history and politics are always in some way connected to a concrete historical situation, an existential-historical situation. Every example we have of even the articulation of sweeping accounts of basic political forms, whether that’s done in a way that historicizes them or not, arose in that conjuncture and encounter with a particular setting. That’s going back to Aristotle’s Politics, and that’s certainly true of early modern political thought. It’s also true of Marx. So this duality of theory and, let’s call it ideology, is inside of theory. The questions we’re asking of politics and history are questions for us, not like when we’re asking questions about other kinds of objects, with the understanding and comprehension of non-human reality, the separation of what is and what is for us can in some way be made completely, and that’s obviously not true when we’re talking about politics and history. So there is in some way this internal mutual implication of the ideological and the theoretical. Theory takes the form of the dissolution and critique of our ideologically formed questions. It doesn’t ever sever itself completely from our ideologically formed questions. Ideology in the Althusserian sense is rising out of social experience, right? The spontaneous ways things appear, and even theories can become encrusted with ideology, and become a kind of obscurantist naivete. I don’t know if that’s the right word, but it’s not the case that we have theory on the one hand and spontaneous and direct social experience in its naive form on the other. That social experience is mediated by a whole garbled set of terminologies and half-formed questions and problems, which then it’s the business of critical theoretical understanding to break apart and to generate tracks and paths for analysis and investigation. Theories and problems within any tradition can become ideologized. This is true of Marxism, this is true of every tradition. There’s a moment in which theory emerges in some living relation to scientific-critical problems and does so perhaps in some conjunction with the political moment, and then there are moments when that is left behind, and we only have ossified terminologies and poorly-understood questions and problems.
For Althusser, I would argue, the really core characteristic of ideology is that it posits the transparency of social relations. And this is guaranteed by an understanding of history as a process with a subject and a goal, which is the realization of this transparency. The primary example of this is the teleology of the Second International, and for him this is repeated in the humanist, historicist theoretical revolt against the categories of the Second International. The way this maps out onto Marx’s works is, for example, that dialectical account that you described in that chapter in Capital, that would be the ideological moment, while primitive accumulation is an attempt to break with that.
Certainly within Marx’s work is the possibility of developing an adequate account of the actual primitive, or original accumulation of capital. There’s plenty of material in Marx which is about this process of the formation of wealth in a new social form during the manufacturing period. That’s the real material on primitive accumulation. Whether it’s wholly correct is another matter.
So while I am suggesting, along with Althusser, that the chapter on the expropriation of the expropriators and the chapters on primitive accumulation are in a tension, because one describes a historical dialectic with a goal, the other describes a process of rupture which is figured in violence, you’re suggesting that they’re part of the same ideological mold.
Like I said before, I’m not saying that Marx himself was unable to break with this. I’m saying that he explicitly says that in this chapter he is only looking at the political side, the role that violence played in this process. That’s a pretty direct statement to the effect that this is not a comprehensive account of the whole process. The process of social and historical change, the emergence of a new mode of production, can’t be explained adequately by a “force theory of history.” Although Marx once referred to force as the midwife of such changes, Engels had to launch an attack on exaggerated reactionary versions of this view. By the late 19th century there’s an increasing widespread rejection of the older peaceful account of the origins of civilization, and Bismarckian blood and iron is replacing Lockean labor as the dominant ideology of the origins of society. Marxism as a result developed not just a critique of the story of the peaceful rise of civilization that you get from the classics, it also develops as a critique of the bourgeois reactionary accounts of blood and iron as the motor of history, and in this respect Marx was a Marxist.
It never really suffices to say “it’s more complicated than that,” but social and historical change is, to put it generally, a multi-dimensional process. In some way Althusser tried to convey this with his understanding of the discontinuities between levels of a social totality, that they were not capable of cohering into a single subject, because they all had their own relatively autonomous tendencies and histories. So in this sense there were histories, but there is no subject from which one could speak of a history. This was the point of contention with Sartre and Lukács. The formation of history was not an automatic and given process, it was a complex one in which the mediated and relatively autonomous social and historical existence could be given a unifying account which would become the basis for a process of their sociopolitical transformation. The idea of a subject of history, and I think Althusser came to this understanding later, is somehow implicit within our politics of historical transformation. One of the reasons why I think he’s wrestling with the problem of theory and ideology later on, is that he realizes that these are not separable things, in precisely the manner in which this was thought to be possible in the earlier writings.
Sometimes the critique of “traditional” or “worldview” Marxism extends as far as the claim that capitalist development required a workers’ movement in order to complete itself. So the end of the workers’ movement was essentially inscribed in its origins. To me it seems we’re back at what Althusser cheekily described as “poor man’s Hegelianism,” reproducing the Second International’s teleology in what claims to be a critique of the very deepest categories of Second International Marxism. The same structure of historical development is now applied to the history of the workers’ movement itself.
If by this you mean the idea that we can understand historical processes through general interrelationships between categories of analysis, this is truly to be avoided. This is something that Marx himself had things to say about. So the idea that one can, instead of actually doing historical investigation in the mold that Marx does himself, which he is in some sense creating the foundation of, if one thinks that we can instead of that do a kind of understanding of the world-historical dynamics that arise out of the internal relationships between categories, then that is not something which follows Marx. It might be that some things of intellectual interest arise out of this way of framing things, I don’t want to say that there’s nothing to that, but it should never be conceived of as a substitute for real historical understanding.
The social relations that Marx develops out of an analysis of categories and the category problems of political economy are always being developed through real historical content. This real historical content takes the form of problems that cannot be resolved by apprehending their conceptual form. They don’t exist independently, the idea that there’s a kind of purely logical mode of the interconnection of these categories to one another is simply to have a mystified and fetishistic conception of what theoretical categories are.
I want to return to these two themes of political thought that you identified earlier. One was crisis, which we’ve discussed. The other was defeat. The major defeat which frames our period is precisely the defeat of the workers’ movement, across the end of the 1970s through the 1980s. As the ambivalence towards “traditional” Marxism demonstrates, this defeat poses considerable problems for people interested in mass movements and political transformation today.
On the one hand we seem to be in a period in which more and more people are coming around to the view that the economic problems of the day speak to a deep structural crisis of capitalism. Even a few years ago when I wrote the piece on the stationary state this wasn’t widely held to be the case, but it’s now increasingly accepted. On the other hand, as you point out, we’re confronted with the absence of any large-scale agencies of social and political change that might open up the question of a new social economic order beyond capitalism. The way the crisis has unfolded so far is primarily to raise questions about how to sustain and prop up the status quo, and even forms of opposition to austerity have not really been able to break out of a set of purely defensive demands, to roll back some of the damage of the financial crisis and think about restabilizing the economy by restoring a previously existing level of economic equality and job security, which is thought to be perhaps attainable. Some people are drawing the conclusion that the problems are so deep that those kind of solutions aren’t going to work anymore, but the fundamental structural transformations that would have to happen for these problems of unemployment, declining wages, and mass poverty around the world, to be overcome are so daunting, that the fallback position is understandably one or another of these forms of left-wing populism. I don’t have any problem with that being the form that struggles assumes, it’s inevitable for that to be the case. But the reason the reason why this cannot ultimately succeed even as a strategy of defense is because there’s no new track that capitalism seems to be able to go to. Various types of left-wing reformism have been dependent on the ability of capitalism to deliver employment and rising living standards. So even though capitalism is in this deep and systemic crisis, the crisis is simultaneously manifesting itself in undermining the conditions of social and political opposition. That hasn’t just been a matter of defeat of revolutionary challenges to the system, but has also in this period taken the form of a rollback of the reformist accomplishments of the working class within the advanced capitalist countries, and elsewhere the various mixed legacies of the attempt to promote economic development in some vision of progress in more economically “backwards” zones of the world-system. That’s the context in which we operate.
Gopal Balakrishnan is an editor at New Left Review, and the author of The Enemy and Antagonistics. He is a professor in the History of Consciousness department at UC Santa Cruz.
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To the party members
The sound and image of a drum circle may be one of the most easily-mocked moments associated with the Occupy movements. But the role of music in the movement, and its relation to protests and political action in general, bears closer investigation, beyond the drum circle.
Music at Occupy events has been as diverse as the people and locations involved, from Bay Area rap stalwart Mistah FAB’s freestyle at Occupy Oakland to Tom Morello’s Guitarmy, indigenous dancers and singers in Minneapolis, political marching bands like the Rude Mechanical Orchestra or the Hungry March Bands in New York, the Milwaukee Molotov Marchers, Pittsburgh’s Riff Raff, and the legendary Infernal Noise Brigade of Seattle. Videos and albums have been launched, and many have called for a new era of protest music to arise.
These musical actions themselves are often characterized as “protest music.” In fact, marching bands serve vital tactical purposes at street protests (and beyond): surrounding police vans, identifying and following undercover police, de-escalating tension, and helping facilitate the flow and communication of the crowd. But the concept of “protest music” can obscure some of music’s most powerful aspects as a social force. For many involved in Occupy, the specific relationship between the music being played and the people who hear it has not been thought through very carefully – and this weakness can reinforce political weaknesses. Indeed, when even Salon.com can call 100 tracks of Occupy-themed music “shapeless and safe,” we might ask ourselves what this protest music is missing.
Harsha Walia has pointed out that many of the most powerful aspects of Occupy spaces were not about “protesting,” but about enacting existing connections: what happened in the kitchens, the medic tents, the libraries, the teach-ins and workshops. These were places where people brought their existing skills to bear in self-organized configurations, providing for themselves and each other along a metric that was neither charity nor business, but a common interest. The most promising political actions were those that connected to existing community struggles around police violence, home foreclosure, and homelessness, where activists, residents, and even the homeless themselves, engaged directly with the lived realities of people facing systemic violence.
Music constructs similar possibilities for social relations. The kind of social relations evoked by “protesting” are not very fertile – a protest can get voices “out there,” somewhere – but doesn’t necessarily affect how people deal with each other. While music, on the other hand, can have a “message” to communicate, it can be so much more – it can be a social activity rather than just a product, what the musicologist Christopher Small has called musicking: a way for people to perform connections with each other and with existing communities, through shared cultural expression.
There is a complex relationship between music and culture that makes music politically significant – and mobilizing – in ways that go beyond words, and the particular moment of “protest.” Music can be a lived negotiation and performance of community and communication. A better understanding of how music does this, as well as more serious attention to its different culturally and historically specific traditions, would help forge a more radical relationship between the heterogeneous communities and interests that participate in resistance movements.
In my own experience as a DJ, dancer, party organizer, and researcher, I’ve engaged in-depth with the everyday practices of Jamaican musicking. In Jamaica, even though the culture of the urban poor is officially vilified and excluded, that culture still sets mainstream trends, and is understood to be authentically Jamaican. This cultural authority has persisted despite its exclusion from mass media technologies like radio and television, from their earliest inception. Both underwritten by the government until relatively recently, these media outlets have consistently supported foreign and British-identified cultural expression over popular culture.
This same hostility has limited poor people’s ability to participate in both formal employment and prestigious artistic performance. Such bodily restraints operate at the levels of both race and class: skin color tracks poverty even more dramatically in Jamaica than in the US, so the physical and verbal traits associated with poverty are also generally associated with dark-skinned Jamaicans. In the face of colonial rejection and hostility at traditional sites of “mass culture,” poor Jamaicans began, in the 1930s and 1940s, to carve out their own sites of creative expression, especially through nightlife – music and dancing at night, usually around home-built sound system. These dances, especially the free outdoor events usually known as “street dances” – became places where poor Jamaicans produced a degree of cultural autonomy from the colonial tastes of the ruling class.
These parties weren’t utopias of freedom and equality, but the performances of gender, sexuality, dominance, and pleasure that were enacted there represented a collective resistance to domination. After Jamaican independence, official media channels remained dominated by colonial tastes, and poor neighborhood nightlife became centers of an alternative voice for the majority.
This alternative voice speaks in terms that traditional politics usually don’t hear. For example, sexualized dance moves have been continually popular in Jamaica from the 1930s to the present, and critics of nightlife are often unable to hide their discomfort with these erotic social interactions. But sweaty moments can have political significance. Jamaican scholars such as Carolyn Cooper have emphasized the context of these moves: invented by descendants of enslaved Africans, such dances were a way to express traditions and relations denied to them by dominant society. Cooper suggests that that dancehall culture is “an erogenous zone in which the celebration of female sexuality and fertility is ritualized.” Taking this point more broadly, for marginalized communities – especially those with a history of enslavement – sexual autonomy is a serious issue. Securing this autonomy frequently requires transgression of religious, sexual, and even economic relations valued by dominant society.
These issues are still alive. Jamaican elites, and the government itself, have been so hostile to local popular music that to this day there is no large music venue in the capital city – so the ability of popular spaces to redraw and resist dominant cultural hierarchies remains relevant. As Sonjah Stanley-Niaah puts it, these can be spaces where people “revaloriz[e] aspects of the body that are censored in the wider social sphere.” Consider, for example, the 2010 victory in a Jamaican “Dancehall Queen” competition by Kristal Anderson, a vivacious and talented performer who was both dark-skinned and weighed over 200 pounds. Anderson’s glorious skills and talents, honed in the dances that occur in what Obika Gray calls “exilic spaces,” drew enthusiastic popular support. The judges, whose ties to the local music scene require that they respect the audience’s taste, had to represent that audience’s subversive values. It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of street dances, and the culture centered on them, in challenging dominant standards.
Valid criticisms can be made of these practices. Sexualized performances can participate in the commodification of bodies along gendered and racial lines, and many subcultures are not free of the homophobia and sexism that also dominates mainstream society. However, ignoring the specific context in which such inequalities take place risks misinterpreting their origins, and perpetuating hierarchies of race and class. The Jamaican dancefloor, while echoing with the sound of many an explicitly anti-gay lyric, is simultaneously a place where performers challenge standard definitions of gender and sexuality – consistent with a cultural shift, even in mainstream Jamaican politics, towards a less homophobic stance than many popular elected officials in the US. Understanding how dancefloor politics reflects and possibly pushes towards these changes requires a critique informed by the subject-positions and experiences within the communities being discussed. Unfortunately, white-dominated “activist communities” have not demonstrated a humble commitment to understanding marginalized cultures. This is a great loss for many reasons. For one thing, it’s clear that so many communities care about music, and use it as a basis for solidarity and pleasure – which ought to make any good organizer sit up and pay attention.
My own observation of (and participation in) white-dominated activist scenes suggests that the ability to collaborate often falls apart not over political platforms, but over personal and social engagements around race, culture, ethnicity, and gender – often in seemingly non-political settings, like nightclubs and parties. In relation to music, these problems result from the “protest” mindset. Many participants in the Occupy movement have approached music as a didactic event, instrumentalized around “getting a message to people,” to inspire them or otherwise make them behave in a certain way. Alternately, music is expected to be a general communal “emotional release” where the specifics of particular cultural and musical practices and histories are expected to be subsumed or erased – and that erasure is apparently assumed to be liberating.
Neither understanding of music is politically fertile, or likely to take the musical experience very far outside of white middle-class activists, because it fundamentally mistakes or ignores the social function of music within marginalized communities. This reflects a broader problem facing the self-identified “American left,” which has long made it irrelevant, or even harmful, to communities of color, queer communities, and indeed the working class – an inability to deal with culture as an aspect of political identity and practice.
Much like Jamaican street dances, the history of vogue balls, hip-hop (which includes DJing, dancing, rapping, and graffiti), and house or block parties where immigrants play the music of their home countries or diasporic communities, all demonstrate that music affirms specific histories and identities in the face of marginalization. Queer communities, especially queer communities of color, have been especially rooted in these spaces, since a queer person of color may not be safe diverging from expected identity performances anywhere else they go. While certain norms of gender are enforced at home, at school, and at work, the dance floor is a space to work out pleasure, sex, and style, in the face of often murderous hostility from dominant culture. Pleasure, sex, and style can be disruptive of dominant social orders – not always, but depending on the specific bodies and communities who perform them, and the modes of their performance. It is possible, to be sure, for people to take pleasure in racism or sexism, or for hedonism to collapse, especially along lines of class, into consumerism and addiction. But when people’s actual bodies face hostility – from arrest to state-sanctioned vigilante violence, or direct police violence – for deviating from dominant norms of sexuality, gender, and race, then their practices are more significant than simple “sex-positivity” or the fetishization of transgression.
After all, we shouldn’t forget that despite the white faces of mainstream “gay rights,” it has always been queer and transgender people of color at the forefront of the struggles against the policing of sexuality. Such struggles often began with attempts to defend seemingly disreputable spaces of refuges and resistance. Such spaces are specially important for people – disproportionately queer people of color – who have been expelled from or are unable to find homes. If a home isn’t safe, or you don’t have one to live in, spaces where you can just be yourself, without scrutiny and threat from oppressive forces, are even more necessary. Many of these spaces exist on the margins of respectable and legal society. From warehouse parties to the Christopher Street Pier, such struggles are rooted in the history of queer liberation: it should be no surprise that Stonewall is so significant to the movement’s history – a bar frequented by trans people of color like Silvia Rivera, who led the resistance. Nightlife can be a refuge, but also a source of resistant identity and mobilization.
When we talk about culture, we’re also talking about history, and often music defines people’s identities from the beginning. Songs with lyrics that might make white middle-class activists squirm can take on different meanings in the context of the dance floor. Such an engagement with music is not defined by the recordings or lyrics themselves – music is a socialexperience, and its political significance can’t be understood until you know who is physically in the room, and how they are interacting with each other in the moment of musical engagement. A roomful of white frat boys singing along to DJ Assault’s “suck my motherfucking dick” has a very different significance, and a very different effect, from the same chorus sung by black drag queens.
What I’ve learned as a DJ is that the significance of a musical experience is enacted by the actual bodies of the people in the room, and thus making meaningful musical experiences requires knowing specifically who you’re trying to reach and what their (musical) histories are. Reusing those musical references can affirm and represent the listener in a way that builds collective emotional connections. In the context of mass political mobilizations, these tools are especially important, to generate the inclusivity that is the condition for any meaningful dialogue or connection.
The failure to build these connections has been one of the major weaknesses of the Occupy movement, which set its camps up against institutions – like the police – that many communities were already in struggle against. It’s not surprising that Occupy had repeatedly replicated the racist, sexist, nativist, and ethnocentric attitudes of mainstream society; it just requires a conscious effort to resist. Part of the solution is to more carefully define the problems facing Occupiers, to connect them to existing struggles over, for example, police violence or indigenous rights. And another part of the solution is that these same struggles take place over the role of music.
The great protest songs were powerful not only because the lyrics were true, and forced people to respond, but because the music called out to connections that already existed, named realities and identities that were already lodged in people’s memories, in their own experiences and traditions. That force is lost if music is subordinated to a passive vision of “message” and “protest,” or a homogeneously common struggle. Attending to music’s cultural resonance, and the social dynamics around its practice, can make it a powerful force for sharing pleasure, trust, release, and purpose across marginalized communities, and forging a radical, broadly participatory movement.
Larisa K. Mann is a legal ethnographer, educator, journalist, public speaker, and DJ, who teaches Media Studies at New York University’s Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development, and Sociology of Law at Brooklyn College. She has written for WireTap, the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts, and other publications, and has contributed chapters to Bits without Borders: Law, Communications & Transnational Culture Flow in the Digital Age (forthcoming, Elgar, 2012), and Dreaming in Public: Building the Occupy Movement (New Internationalist Publications, 2012). As DJ Ripley, she has played in 19 countries across 3 continents over the past 16 years.
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Be the street: on radical ethnography and cultural studies
The man who only observes himself however never gains
Knowledge of men. He is too anxious
To hide himself from himself. And nobody is
Cleverer than he himself is.
So your schooling must begin among
Living people. Let your first school
Be your place of work, your dwelling, your part of the town.
Be the street, the underground, the shops. You should observe
All the people there, strangers as if they were acquaintances, but
Acquaintances as if they were strangers to you.
—Bertolt Brecht, Speech to the Danish Working-Class Actors on the Art of Observation (1934-6)
“Anthropology is the daughter to this era of violence,” Claude Levi-Strauss once said. Poetic as that statement is, I prefer the more precise and less gendered words of esteemed anthropologist and Johnson-Forest Tendency member Kathleen Gough: “Anthropology is a child of Western imperialism.” Much like Catholic missionaries in the Spanish Empire, anthropologists examined indigenous groups in order to improve colonial administration, a tradition that continues into the present day with the US military’s Human Terrain Project in Iraq and Afghanistan. Often, this colonial imperative has fed a racist disrespect of the subjects under study. It was not uncommon, for example, for researchers to draw upon colonial police forces to collect subjects for humiliating anthropometric measurements.
According to Gough, at their best, anthropologists had been the “white liberals between conquerors and colonized.” Ethnography, the method in which researchers embed themselves within social groups to best understand their practices and the meanings behind them, had only mediated this relationship, while Gough, a revolutionary socialist, wanted to upend it. Writing in 1968, she urged her discipline to study imperialism and the revolutionary movements against it as a way to expiate anthropology of its sins. Gough later attempted this herself, travelling throughout Asia in the 1970s. Although she lacked a solid university connection due to her political sympathies, she managed to conduct fieldwork abroad, analyzing class recomposition in rural Southeast India during the Green Revolution, and detailing the improvement in the living standards of Vietnamese peasants after the expulsion of the United States.
Years later, anthropologist Ana Lopes sees fit to ask, “Why hasn’t anthropology made more difference?” The problem is not that anthropologists are reticent to contribute to ending imperialism. Indeed, there are probably more radical and critical anthropologists now than during Gough’s time, and certainly the discipline takes anti-racism and anti-imperialism incredibly seriously. Gough herself articulated some difficulties:
(1) the very process of specialization within anthropology and between anthropology and the related disciplines, especially political science, sociology, and economics; (2) the tradition of individual field work in small-scale societies, which at first produced a rich harvest of ethnography but later placed constraints on our methods and theories; (3) unwillingness to offend the governments that funded us, by choosing controversial subjects; and (4) the bureaucratic, counterrevolutionary setting in which anthropologists have increasingly worked in their universities, which may have contributed to a sense of impotence and to the development of machine-like models.
None of these plague anthropology today. Anthropologists are often incredibly deep knowlege about multiple disciplines (I have an anthropologist friend I consult on any questions of structural semiotics, Marxism, 19th century literature, or gambling); they have examined culture within large industrial and post-industrial societies; they have been involved in all sorts of radical issues, from unionizing sex workers to analyzing the securitized state; and while the university may remain a bureaucratic, counterrevolutionary setting, anthropologists have largely abandoned machine-like models. So what gives?
One issue is how anthropology chose to atone for its complicity in racism and imperialism. Instead of making a direct political intervention into imperialist practice, ethnography attacked imperialist hermeneutics. A deep critique of the Enlightenment subject, the source of anthropology’s claims to science and objectivity as well as metaphysical ground for Western notions of superiority, became a major target of the discipline. Thus rose critical ethnography, deconstructive in spirit. According to Soyini Madison, critical ethnography “takes us beneath surface appearances, disrupts the status quo, and unsettles both neutrality and taken-for-granted assumptions by bringing to light underlying and obscure operations of power and control.”
This functions at the level of the method itself: critical ethnographers should be self-reflexive. Rather than assuming an omniscient authoritative viewpoint, they should highlight their own positionality in the field by emphasizing it in the written account, thereby deconstructing the Self and its relation to the Other whenever possible. In an attack on Enlightenment pretensions to universality, accounts became partial and fragmentary, a way to head off potentially demeaning totalized portrayals at the pass.
However, ironically enough, by performatively questioning one’s own research, the figure of the ethnographer risks becoming the central figure in the study, rather than the social group. Even as it produces an often-engrossing literature, critical ethnography can undermine its own political thrust by drastically limiting what it permits itself to say. While Marxist sociologist Michael Burawoy, who shoveled pig iron for years in the name of social science, claims that with excessive reflexivity ethnographers “begin to believe they are the world they study or that the world revolves around them,” I’d counter that this isn’t so much professional narcissism as a product of the very real anxiety surrounding the ethics of representation. How best to fairly, but accurately, portray one’s subjects? How can one really know the Other? I’ve struggled with this in my own work, and I know colleagues who have been all but consumed by it. Writing about oneself seems, at the very least, safer. But this abandons scientific rigor in its reluctance to make any generalizable claims.
My own experience in ethnography came from a study of popular culture. I had grown tired of scholarly textual analysis: it seemed like more of a game for the commentators, where we critics bandied about speculative assessments of books and films and TV shows, trying to one-up each other in novelty and jargon. These interpretations said more about our positions as theory-stuffed graduate students eager to impress than they did about the putative “audiences” for the texts. Our consciousness of the objects in question had been determined by our material lives as critics-in-training. I felt pulled further away from cultural phenomena, when I wanted to get closer in order to better understand its significance. So I revolted against the rule of thoughts, starting to learn the methods that got closer to the matter at hand: ethnography,
In cultural studies, ethnography (or as a fully-trained anthropologist would probably write, “ethnography”) is most closely associated with audience reception and fandom studies. Textual analysis tells you only what a critic thinks of the work; in order to discover how “average” consumers experience it, you have to ask them. This way you avoid the totalizing, top-down generalizations of someone like Adorno, where a reified consciousness is determined by the repetitive, simplified forms of the culture industry.
This was Janet Radway’s goal when she studied female readers of misogynist romance novels. She found out that readers cared more about having private time away from domestic duties than the borderline-rape occurring in the books. However, she was forced to conclude that romance novels worked as compensatory mechanisms, securing women in capitalist patriarchal domination – in other words, she took the long way around and ended up in the same Adornoian conclusion: we’re fucked and it’s our mass culture that makes it so.
My chosen topic helped me get on a different path, one that I believe has more relevance to radical politics than haranguing the choices of hapless consumers. I wanted to study independent popular music instead of romance novels. This meant I was well positioned to examine music from the standpoint of production, rather than just surveying audience members, a technique that always felt too speculative and a bit too closely aligned with market research.
Not that market research was totally off base. Popular music exists in the form of commodities. Its form, as Adorno rightly points out, is dictated by the needs of the culture industry. If the music industry was a factory, then musicians were the workers, banging out products. A peculiar factory, to be sure, where operations spread to the homes of the workers, the machines were pirated software, and the products were derived from unique creative labors, becoming objects of intense devotion among consumers.
You can run into resistance when you define art in this way – it seems to cheapen it, as if you can’t call a song a “commodity” without implicitly sticking a “mere” in there, just as referring to artists as workers seems to demean their abilities. But this resistance comes almost entirely from music fans, who commit their own Adornoian blunder by placing music on that archaic crumbling pedestal of Art. The producers and DJs I spoke to in Detroit didn’t see it that way. They saw themselves as creative workers; at best, as entrepreneurs. One DJ talked about remixing songs in the morning over coffee. “You know how some people check their email or read the newspaper? Well, I’m making a remix of the new Ciara song during that time.” He took pride in his work ethic, but never romanticized his occupation.
There wasn’t much to wax romantic about in the Detroit music scene at that time. The culture industries were undergoing a restructuring for the immaterial age. Vinyl was no longer moving. Local radio and local music venues had gone corporate, squeezing out local music. DJs who wanted local gigs had to play Top 40 playlists in the suburban megaclubs instead of the native styles of electronic music that had given Detroit mythic status around the world. Many had given up on record labels entirely. Everyone looked to the internet as the saving grace for record sales, promotion, networking – for everything, practically. Some of the more successful artists were attempting to license their tracks for video games. Almost everyone had other jobs, often off the books. For critically acclaimed Detroit producer Omar-S, music is his side job, in case his position on the factory line is eliminated.
I wasn’t embedded within this community, as an anthropologist would be. Instead, I made the 90 minute drive to Detroit when I could, and spent the time interviewing artists in their homes or over the phone. I attended some events, participated and observed. And still, I could have written volumes on my subject-position and how it differed from many of the musicians: I was white, college-educated, not from Detroit (the last one being the most salient difference). But my goal was to go beyond self-reflexive interrogations, in spite of their importance as a starting point. I aspired to write something that would in some way, however minor, participate in the implicit political projects of musical workers.
I can’t say I succeeded in this goal. But while I may have done little for the political fortunes of Detroit musicians, I had started to think about how to revolutionize my theoretical tools. The point was not to efface or undermine my role in my research, but to identify the structural antagonism the artists were dealing with and describe it from a partisan perspective. Beyond the self-reflexive analysis of the ethnographer’s subject-position was the possibility of picking sides.
Deciding to pick sides is the difference between militant research, of the kind Kathleen Gough practiced, and purely scholastic exercises. Burawoy argues that this is a fundamental element of Karl Marx’s “ethnographic imagination”: Marx rooted his theories – not just of how capitalism functioned, but how best to destroy it – in the concrete experiences of workers, as relayed to him by Engels and others. Kathleen Gough is an exemplary figure in this respect, remaining a firm materialist in her studies. As Gough’s friend and colleague Eleanor Smollett puts it in a special journal dedicated to Gough’s legacy,
she did not arrive in Vietnam with a checklist of what a society must accomplish to be ‘really socialist’ as so many Marxists in academia were wont to do. She looked at the direction of the movement, of the concrete gains from where the Vietnamese had begun… Observing socialist development from the point of view of the Vietnamese themselves, rather than as judged against a hypothetical system, she found the people’s stated enthusiasm credible.
After studying material conditions and foreign policy in the socialist bloc, Gough decided that the Soviet Union, while certainly no workers’ paradise, was a net good for the workers of the world – heresy for anyone trying to publish in the West, let alone a Trotskyist.
Analysis is important, but the really explosive stuff of ethnography happens in the encounter. Accordingly, ethnographers and others have increasingly turned towards the methods of participatory action research (PAR). In these studies, a blend of ethnography and pedagogy, the anthropologist takes a partisan interest in the aspirations of the group, and aids the group in actively participating actively in the research. Members of the group under study become co-researchers, asking questions and articulating problems. The goal is to tease out native knowledges that best aid people in navigating difficult circumstances while mobilizing them to create political change.
But participatory action research has returned to the same old problems of imperialist anthropology. In the hands of radical anthropologist Ana Lopes, PAR led to the formation of a sex workers’ union in Great Britain. But in the hands of development scholar Robert Chambers, PAR is a tool to better implement World Bank initiatives and govern populations by allowing them to “participate” in their subjection.
The point, then, is to realize that ethnography has no political content of its own. Politics derives not from the commitment or beliefs of the researcher, but from engagement with wider social antagonisms. Ethnography enables Marxism to trace the contours of these antagonisms at the level of everyday life: a militant ethnography means Marxism at work, and functions not by imposing models of class consciousness and radical action from above, but by revealing the terrain of the struggle – to intellectuals and to workers – as it is continually produced. Ethnography can contribute in just this way, as a method where researchers listen, observe, and reveal the now hidden, now open fight for the future.
Gavin Mueller is a graduate student in Washington, DC.
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In defense of vernacular ways
The crises continue to accumulate: the economic crisis, the ecological crisis, the social crisis, crises upon crises. But as we try to create “solutions,” we distressingly find ourselves up against a limit, discovering that the only alternatives we can imagine are merely modifications of the same. Proposed solutions to the economic crisis toss us back and forth between two immobile poles: free market or regulated market. When we face the ecological crisis, we decide between sustainable technology or unsustainable technology. Whatever our personal preference, a little to this side or a little to that side, we all unwittingly play according to the same rules, think with the same concepts, speak the same language. We have forgotten how to think the new – or the old.
Ivan Illich, priest, philosopher, and social critic, is not a figure that most would expect to read about in a Marxist magazine. But he identified this problem long ago, and argued that the only “way out” was a complete change in thinking. His suggestion, both as concept and historical fact, was the “vernacular.” We will not escape from capitalism through the rationality of the scientist of history; nor will we get any help from the standpoint of the proletariat. The firm ground of Illich’s critique was precapitalist and preindustrial life in common.
Even those who reject this position must meet its challenge. Those for whom politics is embedded in the proliferation of postmodern “lifestyles,” inflected with pseudo-Marxist jargon, will have to recognize that the only model we have of forms of life based on direct access to the means of subsistence is precisely the “vernacular” that Illich proposes. Alternatively, those who locate emancipation in a Marx-inflected narrative of technological progress must to face Illich’s deep criticisms of developmentalism, scientism, and progressivism. The following is a challenge not only to capitalism and the experts who defend it, but also to its critics.
Mind Trap 1: the economic crisis
Ignoring his own contributions to the festivities, George W. Bush recently scolded those on Wall Street for getting drunk on the profits from selling unpayable debts.1 The resulting collapse of financial markets heralded the end of the party. The drunks seem to have sobered up without themselves suffering the consequent hangover. Instead, in the U.S. and elsewhere, a growing number of people are left stranded without homes, jobs, food, or medicines in the wake of that twenty-year long binge. In the opinion of some, the prospects of full employment or secure retirements for US citizens are a distant and unlikely dream. As recently as April 19th 2011, The McDonald Corporation conducted a national hiring day. Almost one million people applied for those jobs, known neither for their lavish pay nor for their agreeable working conditions. McDonald’s hired a mere six percent of these applicants, as many workers in one day as the number of net new jobs in the US for all of 2009.2
Unsurprisingly, diagnoses of what went wrong have proliferated fast and furiously. Of the many explanations offered, three stand out.3 First, in a spirit of self-examination, economists have concluded that their scientific models of how people behave and asset prices are determined were wrong and contributed to their inability to anticipate the crisis. That is, economists confessed to their ignorance of how economies work. Since their earnest attempts to improve these models are unlikely to question the credulity that forms the shaky foundations of financial markets, it is likely that the future of financial and macroeconomics will resemble the epicycles and eccentricities of Ptolemaic astronomy in the time of its decline.4
Second, journalists, policy makers, and economists who began to sing a different tune after the crisis erupted, find fault with the ideology of neo-liberalism. There is widespread recognition now that deregulated and unregulated markets allowed commercial and investment banks to invent and trade in financial instruments that carried systemic risks and contributed to the failure of credit and capital markets. This doctrine that unfettered markets produce the greatest economic benefit for the greatest number, while embarrassed, is not in full retreat, at least in the U.S.5 That neo-liberal ideology is not vanquished by its evident failures is related to the third cause identified in these diagnostic exercises.
If ignorance excused economists and policy makers from anticipating the crisis and widely worn ideological blinkers exacerbated it, then it is badly designed incentives that are generally fingered as the most prominent and proximate cause of the crisis. Accordingly, much ink has been spilled on redesigning incentives to more effectively rein in the “animal spirits” that derail economies from their presumed path of orderly growth. As such, incentives are a flaw that recommends itself as remedy.
This conceit is perhaps best exposed in the report authored by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of the US government.6 For instance, in indicting the process and methods for generating and marketing mortgage-backed securities, the commission emphasizes that incentives unwittingly encouraged failures at every link of the chain. Low-interest rates allowed borrowers to refinance their debts and use their homes as ATM cards; lucrative fees drove mortgage brokers to herd up subprime borrowers; the demand for mortgages from Wall Street induced bankers to lower lending standards; rating agencies stamped lead as gold because paid to do so by investment bankers; the latter distributed these toxic assets worldwide relying on mathematical models of risk; and the C-suite of the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors presided over the house of card because handsomely rewarded for short term profits. Unsurprisingly, changing these incentives through more stringent regulations and better-specified rewards and punishments to guide the behaviors of different market participants occupy most of its recommendations for the path forward7
This peculiar combination of ignorance, ideology, and incentives used to explain the economic crisis, also illuminates the space of contemporary politico-economic thought. Most of the heated debates on how to ensure orderly growth, center on the quantum of regulation necessary to control economic motives without stifling them. Accordingly, thinking about economic matters vacillates on a fixed line anchored by two poles-free markets on the one end and markets fettered by legally enforced regulations at the other. Only a brief exposé can be afforded here of the lineaments of this thought-space circumscribed almost two centuries ago.8
Around 1700, Bernard Mandeville acerbically exposed the mechanism driving economic growth. Poetically, he pointed out that it was the vices—vanity, greed, and envy—that spurred the expansion of trade and commerce. In baring the viciousness that nourished the desire to accumulate riches, he also left to posterity the problem of providing a moral justification for market activity.9 Adam Smith provided a seemingly lasting rhetorical solution to this moral paradox. First, he collapsed the vices into “self-interest” and so removed the sting of viciousness from the vices by renaming them. Second, he grounded “self-interest” in a natural desire to “better our condition” that began in the womb and ended in the tomb and so moralized it.10 Third, he invoked an invisible hand to transmute the self-interest of individuals into socially desirable benefits. Not only was the passage from the individual to the social thereby obscured by providential means but the private pursuit of riches was also justified by its supposed public benefits.
Thus, Smith hid the paradox unveiled by Mandeville behind a rhetorically pleasing façade. The uncomfortable insight that private vice leads to public benefit was defanged by the notion that public benefits accrue from the unflinching pursuit of self-interest. Whereas the former revealed the vicious mechanism fueling commercially oriented societies, the latter made it palatable. Faith in the efficacy of the inscrutable invisible hand thereby underwrote the purported “natural harmony of interests,” according to which the butcher and the baker in each pursuing his own ends unwittingly furthers the wealth of the nation at large.
Smith’s rhetorical convolutions were necessary because he excised use-value from political economy and founded the latter entirely on exchange-value. In contrast to his predecessors for whom the economic could not be separated from ethics and politics, Smith carves out a space for the economic by defining its domain by the determinants of market prices.11 He accepted Locke’s arguments: that labor is the foundation of property rights; that applying labor transforms the commons into private property; that money ignites acquisitiveness; and that accumulation beyond use is just.12 Smith deliberately ignores the commons and emboldens the market because it is the sphere in which acquisitiveness flourishes. He curtails his inquiry to exchange-value in full awareness of the contrasting “value-in-use.” Even if not in these precise terms, the distinction between “exchange-value” and “use-value” was known to both Aristotle and Smith. Yet, Smith is perhaps the first who recognizes that traditional distinction and nevertheless rules out use-value as a legitimate subject of an inquiry on wealth.13 For Aristotle, it was precisely the distinction between use and exchange that grounded the distinction between appropriate acquisition and inappropriate accumulation. More generally, it is when considerations of justice and the good constitute the starting point of thinking about man that profit-seeking becomes visible as a force that rends the political community into a commercial society. By encouraging self-interestedness, Smith allows the vainglorious pursuit of wealth to overshadow virtue as the natural end for man.14 By focusing economic science on exchange values, Smith privileges the world of goods over that of the good. The price Smith pays for ignoring use-value is the need to invoke providential the mystery by which self-interest becomes socially beneficial. Since Smith, neo-classical economics has either disavowed the distinction between use and exchange value or confessed to being incapable of understanding use-value.15 By insisting that the valuable must necessarily be useful, Marx, unlike Aristotle, could not rely on the latter to criticize the former.16
Nevertheless, it was soon discovered that individual self-interest did not “naturally” produce social benefits. Vast disparities in wealth, endemic poverty, miserable living conditions, and persistent unemployment constituted some of the many socially maligned consequences of unfettered market activity. To account for these visible failures in the natural harmony of interests, a second formula, due to Jeremy Bentham, was therefore paired to it. An “artificial harmony of interests” forged through laws and regulations were deemed necessary to lessen the disjunction between private interests and public benefits. That is, state interventions in the form of incentives – whether coded in money or by law- were thought necessary to prod wayward market participants to better serve the public interest.17
Accordingly, it is this dialectic between the natural and artificial harmony of interests that encodes the poles of the Market and the State and constitutes the thought-space for contemporary discussions on economic affairs.18 Too little regulation and markets become socially destructive; too much regulation and the wealth-creating engines fueled by self-interest begin to sputter. And yet, the continuum constituted by these two poles is unified by a common presupposition: that use-value is of no use to commerce and that the egoism implied by self-interest is both necessary and natural to commercial expansion.
Though the economic crisis has, once again, exposed the Mandevillian foundations of commercial society, thinking about it continues to function in the space marked out by Smith, Bentham and the founders of that philosophical radicalism, which erected the morality of a society oriented by exchange value on the foundation of egoism. When confined to this thought-space, one is condemned to relying, in alternating steps, on the interrelated logics of free and regulated markets. The question remains whether there is an alternative to the thought-space constituted by the State and the Market. Perhaps the answer to this question lies in taking a distance to what these logics presume: that exchange-value is of preeminent worth and that possessive individuals are to be harnessed to that cause.
Mind Trap 2: the environmental crisis
Boarded up homes and idle hands are to the ongoing crisis in economic affairs, what disappearing fish and poisoned airs are to the oncoming environmental crisis. A generation after Rachel Carson and Barry Commoner, scientists are now of almost one mind: humankind’s activities on the earth have so changed it, that the species is now threatened by disaster on a planetary scale.19 What poets and prophets once warned in verse, scientists now tell us through statistics and models. Lurking beneath those dry numbers is a growing catalog of horrors – rising seas, raging rivers, melting glaciers, dead zones in the oceans, unbearable hot spots on land – that foretell an unlivable future.
Were the picture they paint not so dire, it would be laughably ironic that scientists and technocrats now disavow the fruits of the very techno-scientific machine they once served to midwife. But it is certainly tragic that in thinking about what can be done to avert the impending crisis, scientists and engineers no less than politicians and corporate bosses insist on more of the same. Attention is now directed at inventing methods to not only mitigate the physical effects of runaway industrialization, but also to re-engineer the human psyche to better adapt to such effects. Thus, from recycling plastic and increasing fuel mileage in cars to devising towers to sequester carbon undersea and engineering carbon eating plants, the proposed solutions range from the mundane to the bizarre. More generally, the debate on what to do about the conflict between economic growth and ecological integrity is anchored by two poles: at the one end, “eco-friendly” or “sustainable” technologies, and at the other, presumably “unsustainable” or environmentally destructive ones.
Thus man’s survival appears as a choice between the Prius, solar panels, biodegradable paper bags, local foods, and high density urban lofts on the one hand, and the Hummer, oil tanks, plastic bags, industrialized foods, and suburbia on the other. Eco-friendly technologies may change the fuel that powers our energy slaves but does nothing to change our dependence on them. That the fruits of techno-science have turned poisonous is seen as a problem calling for more and improved technical solutions implying that the domain of technology forms the horizon of ecological thought.20 That more and different technology is the dominant response to its failure suggests that the made (techne) has replaced the given (physis). Ecological thought is confined to the space framed by technology partly because of the unstated assumption that knowledge is certain only when it is made.
It was Vico who announced the specifically modern claim that knowledge is made, that verum et factum convertuntur (the true and the made are convertible; have identical denotation). It is true that the schoolmen, in thinking through the question of the Christian God’s omnipotence and omniscience, argued his knowledge was identical to his creations. They argued this by insisting that through his creative act (making something from nothing) he expressed elements already contained within Himself. God knows everything because he made it all from his own being. However, the schoolmen humbly held that the identity of making and knowing applied only to God. Man, being created, could not know himself or other natural kinds in the manner akin to God. Since scientia or indubitable knowledge was the most perfect kind of knowledge, and nature or physis was already given to man, it implied that man could not scientifically know the sublunary world. It took a Galileo and a Descartes to turn this understanding on its head.21
These early moderns were “secular theologians” who tried to marry heaven and earth. They argued that geometrical objects or forms – such as triangles and squares – were unearthly. At best, such mathematical objects were “ideas” formed by the creative act of the imagination. The imagination as a site of creative activity entailed that it be unhinged from what is given. Exemplified by mathematical objects, whose perfection owes little, if anything, to the imperfect beings of the world, the secular theologians thus argued that the truth of ideas is guaranteed by the very fact that they are made.22
The perfect and timeless shapes of geometry were once thought to be applicable only to the unmoving heavens. The sublunary sphere of generation, change, and decay was not susceptible to immobile mathematical forms. But according to the secular theologians, what was good for the heavens was good enough for the earth. By insisting that the book of nature was written in “measure, weight and number,” these early moderns raised the earth to the stars.
For them, beneath the blooming, buzzing, phenomenal world lurked the laws of nature inscribed in mathematically formulated regularities. Thus the made lay beneath the given, it required arduous experimentation – the vexing of nature – to unveil these insensible but imagined laws. Accordingly, mathematical forms and laboratory experiments constituted the preeminent methods for constructing knowledge of the world. Unhinged from the given because committed to the cause of the made, techno-science shook off its Aristotelian roots, where experience was the memorable formed from long immersion in the regularities of the world, genesis and movement were impossible to know with certainty but only for the most part, and beings in the world were possessed of substantive natures.23
Prideful immodesty was not the only reason that early modern philosophers brought the heavens to the earth. They also did so for charitable reasons. Moved by concern for the poor this-worldly condition of man, they sought to improve man’s estate by escaping what is given – food technologies to erase hunger, cars and planes to overcome the limits of time and space, medicines to eliminate disease, and now genetic manipulations to perhaps even cheat death. Thus, pride and charity infuse that potent and world-making brew we call techno-science.24
Modern techno-science grew, a bit topsy-turvy, but always cleaving close to these founding impulses. The pride that compels to know-by-construction continues to be wedded to the charity fueling the production of artifacts that better our condition by transmogrifying it. Whether TV’s or theorems, the modern techno-scientific endeavor is one by which, Entis rationis, creations or constructions of the mind, are projected and given form as entis realis, things realized. Caught in this closed loop between mind and its projections, everywhere he looks, man now sees only what he has made. Instead of recovering the garden of his original innocence, modern man is now faced with the growing desert of his own making. Yet, trapped by the premise of the identity between knowing and making, contemporary thought remains unable to think of anything other than remaking what has been badly made.25
Perhaps it is this commitment to the proposition that we can know only what we make, to knowledge by construction, that forces us to be trapped within the techno-scientific frame. The environmental crisis has exposed the Achilles heel of unrestrained techno-scientific progress. Yet, faith in Progress and in Knowledge as the currency of Freedom remains unshaken. Shuttling between the poles of “sustainable” and “unsustainable” technologies, the former is proffered as the new and improved cure for the diseases caused by the latter. And once more, disinterested curiosity and solicitous concern for the welfare of others justify and reaffirm faith in salvation through technology. To escape this debilitating confine perhaps requires being disabused of the prejudicial identity between knowing and making, which animates techno-science.
Planely speaking, but not entirely
The space constituted by the dialectic between a natural and artificial “harmony of interests” enfolds the relation between free and regulated markets. The politics of a commercial republic is oriented to the satisfaction of human needs through commodities. To continually increase the satisfaction of needs, market societies must expand the sphere of commodity dependence, that is, the relentless pursuit economic growth. The production and consumption of commodities presupposes the worker and the consumer, and regardless of who owns the means of production or how profits are distributed, economic growth requires workers/consumers. Even if workers are no more likely to find well-paying jobs than are debt saturated consumers likely to buy more stuff, the social imaginary formed of workers and consumers persists. Accordingly, any effort to see beneath or beyond this confining thought-space must take its distance to this industrial mind-set formed by the thoroughgoing dependence on commodities.
Similarly, the debate on the necessity of “eco-friendly” technologies that carry a lower “ecological footprint” presupposes man as operator instead of as user.26 The user is transformed into an operator when the power of a tool overwhelms that of its user. Thus, whether it is a Prius or a Hummer, both aim to improve man’s condition by frustrating his natural ability and capacity to walk. Both demand skilled operators to steer, and neither permits the degrees of freedom necessary for autonomous use. Whether promoted by the technocrat or ecocrat, men are disabled by and become dependent on their artifacts when the latter are designed for operators instead of enabling users.
The ordinary and everyday meaning of usefulness embeds it within both human purposes and human actions. A thing is useful insofar as it unleashes and extends the capacities of the user; as long as it can be shaped, adapted, and modified to fit the purposes of its users. Therefore, the capacity of a thing to be useful is limited by the innate powers or natural thresholds of the user. For example, a bicycle calls for users because it only extends the innate capacity for self-mobility. In contrast, the automobile requires immobile if adept machine operators. In this sense, the former is a convivial technology where the latter is manipulative. A hand-pump or a well can be used to raise water for drinking or bathing. In contrast, a flush-toilet or a dam must be operated to pipe or store a liquid resource. Thus, to bring to light was has been cast into the shadows requires exposing the disabling features of some technologies.
Accordingly, whatever lies beyond the thought-space marked by the dialectic of the State-Market on the one hand and that of the sustainable-unsustainable technology on the other, it must be heterogeneous to both the worker/consumer and the operator. In this search, two caveats are to be kept in mind. First, even if the question is addressed to the present, the answer must be sought for in the past. One is obliged to rummage in the dustbin of history to recover what was once muscled into it. Otherwise, imagined futures would give wing to utopian dreams just like those that have now turned nightmarish. Second, there is no going back to the past and there is no choice between the (post)industrial and the traditional immured in habit and transmitted by memory. The dependence on commodities and manipulative technologies has been and continues to be established on the destruction of alternative modes of being and thinking. There is little of the latter around, even as millions of peasants and aboriginal peoples are daily uprooted and displaced in China, India, and Latin America. But it would be sentimental and dangerous to think that one can or should bring back the past. Instead, the task for thought is to find conceptual criteria to help think through the present.27
The Vernacular Domain
Ivan Illich proposed to revivify the word “vernacular” to name a domain that excludes both the consumer and the operator. The appropriate word to speak of the domain beyond dependence on commodities and disabling technologies is fundamental to avoiding one or both of two confusions. First, the presuppositions of economics and techno-science are likely to be anachronistically projected into forms-of-life that lie outside or beyond the thought space constituted by them. This is obvious when economists retro-project fables of the diamond and water “paradox,” “utility-maximization” and “scarcity” into pre-modern texts. So does the historian of technology who indifferently sees the monkey, Neanderthal man, and the university student as tool users. In a related vein, forms-of-life orthogonal to techno-scientifically fueled economies are likely to be misunderstood. Thus, those who today refuse modern conveniences are labeled Luddites or just cussed, while those who get by outside the techno-scientific and commodity bubbles are classified as backward or poor.
A second, more potent, confusion flourishes in the absence of a word adequate to the domain outside technologically intensive market societies. Disabling technologies no less than wage work can produce or generate unpaid toil. That the spinning jenny and the computer have put people out of work is well-known. But it is less familiar that waged work necessitates a shadowy unpaid complement. Indeed, wage work is a perhaps diminishing tip of the total toil exacted in market-intensive societies. Housework, schoolwork, commuting, monitoring the intake of medicines or the outflows from a bank account are only a few examples of the time and toil devoted to the necessary shadow work compelled by commodity-intensive social arrangements. To confuse the shadow work necessitated by the separation of production and consumption with the unpaid labor in settings where production is not separated from consumption is to misunderstand shadow work as either autonomous action or the threatened and shrinking spaces outside the market.28
Indicative of this confusion is the use of such terms as “subsistence economy,” “informal economies,” or “peasant economy” to refer to what has been cast into the shadows. By adding an adjective to the “economy,” historians and anthropologists unwittingly reinforce the grip of what they intend to weaken. By merely modifying the “economy” they are nevertheless beholden to its presuppositions. A similar weakness attends the term “subsistence.” While its etymology is noble and invokes that which is self-sufficient and stands in place, its modern connotations are irredeemably narrow and uncouth. In primarily invoking the modes by which people provided for their material needs – food and shelter – “subsistence” reinforces the economic by negation. With its connotations of “basic necessities” or “bare survival,” subsistence desiccates the varied and multifarious forms-of-life once and still conducted beyond the space circumscribed by the machine and the market. One cannot speak of “subsistence architecture” as one can of vernacular architectures. “Peasant” or “informal” does not modify dance and song, prayer and language, food and play. And yet, these are integral to a life well-lived, and at least historically, were neither commodified nor the products of techno-science. It is to avoid such blinding confusions that Illich argued for rehabilitating the word “vernacular.“29
Though from the Latin vernaculum, which named all that was homebred, homemade, and homespun, it was through Varro’s restricted sense of vernacular speech that the word “vernacular” enters English. The history of how vernacular speech was transmuted into a “taught mother tongue,” is an exemplar of not only what lies beyond the contemporary thought-space but also for what may be worthy of recuperation in modern forms.30
Elio Antonio de Nebrija was a contemporary of Christopher Columbus. In 1492, he petitioned Queen Isabella to sponsor a tool to quell the unruly everyday speech of her subjects. In the Spain of Isabella, her subjects spoke in a multitude of tongues. To discipline the anarchic speech of people in the interest of her power Nebrija noted, “Language has always been the consort of empire, and forever shall remain its mate.” To unify the sword and the book through language, Nebrija offered both a rulebook for Spanish grammar and a dictionary. In a kind of alchemical exercise, Nebrija reduced lived speech to a constructed grammar. Accordingly, this conversion of the speech of people into a national language stands as a prototype of the forays in that long war to create a world fit for workers/ consumers and operators.
Nebrija fabricated a Spanish grammar as a tool to rule enlivened speech. Because standardized and produced by an expert, his grammar had to be taught to be effective. Moreover, following grammatical rules for speech conveys the belief that people cannot speak without learning the rules of grammar. By this dispensation, the tongue is trained to repeat the grammatical forms it is taught; the tongue is made to operate on language. Hence, the natural ability to speak that can be exercised by each and all is transformed into an alienable product requiring producers and consumers. The conversion of everyday speech into a teachable mother tongue thus renders what is abundant into the regime of scarcity – to the realm of exchange-value. Instruction in language not only disables the natural powers of the speaker but also makes her dependent on certified service providers. Thus, Nebrija’s proposal at once discloses and foreshadows the world populated by workers and operators, by the market and the machine.
The war against the vernacular has been prosecuted for some 500 years.31 Once the commodity and market occupied the interstices of everyday life. Today, it is everywhere. For most of human history, tools were shaped by the purposes and limited by the natural abilities of its users. Today, their machines enslave the majority of people, particularly in advanced industrial societies. Though this transformation has and is occurring in different places at different times and rates, it nevertheless duplicates the diagram of how standardized Spanish grammar disembedded the speech of people. For instance, the rapacious “primitive accumulation” that enclosed the commons in the 17th century, uprooted English peasants from the land to make them fully dependent on wages. A similar dispossession now occurs in China and India, where hundreds of millions move from farms to factories and slums. Aboriginal tribes of the Amazon are being dispossessed and killed now with the same impunity as those in Australia and the Americas once were. For entertainment, children now operate PlayStations where they once kicked around a ball on the street. Mega-churches in the US indoctrinate the flock with power point slides and music, much as teachers, trainers, and coaches do in classrooms around the country. Food scientists, nutritionists, and plant pathologists provide just some of the inputs that consumers depend on for their daily calorie intake. Whether in single-family homes or boxes piled on top of each other, people live in houses seemingly cut from an architect’s template. Women in India now demand valentine cards with as much enthusiasm as Turkish men purchase hair, calf, and chest implants. The historical record is rife with examples that stand as witnesses to the continuing destruction of the vernacular –whether of food, shelter, song, love, or pleasures.
It is by attending to the historical specificity of our present predicament in the mirror of the past that Illich thus reveals a third axis that lies orthogonal to the plane circumscribed by the axes of commodity intensity and disabling technologies. On this z-axis are located forms of social organization anchored by two heterogeneous forms. At the point of origin of this three-dimensional space, are social arrangements that plug people into markets and machines and thereby prevent them from exercising their freely given powers. At the other end of this z-axis is found a profusion of social forms, each different from the other, but all marked by suspicion towards the claims for techno-science and the commodity.
For these modes of social organization, the difference between “sustainable” and “unsustainable” technologies is a chimera. Instead, what matters is the real distinction between convivial and disabling technologies. Similarly, the purported difference between regulated and free markets, between public and private property does little to shape these social forms. Instead, they are animated by the distinction between the household and the commons. Thus, the Amish of Pennsylvania curtail their use of such power tools as tractors. The Bhutanese limit the number of tourists to whom they play host. Some cities in Germany and Denmark have banned the car to make way for the bicycle and walking. Whether on a rooftop in Chicago or by the rail track in Mumbai, diverse groups rely on their vegetable patches for some their daily sustenance. While community supported agriculture build bonds of personal dependence, ceramic dry toilets and related forms of vernacular architectures allow people to dwell. In a fine essay by Peter Linebaugh on the Luddites and the Romantics, one is persuaded by the implicit claim that communism for the 21st century may need to mimic in a new key, the courageous Luddite defense of the vernacular.32 Even Marx, in his last years, was less of a Marxist than many of those who spoke in his name. He was far more open to the peasant communes of Russia and Western Europe than usually assumed.33
These modes and manners of living in the present are informed by the past. Those engaged in the attempt to unplug from the market and the machine know that the reign of property – whether private or public-was erected on the ruins of the commons and that the ubiquity of disabling technologies-whether sustainable or not-was achieved by denigrating convivial tools. Yet, crucially, knowing what is past has gone, they are not dogmatic in their fight. They practice a form of bricolage, opportunistically taking back whatever they can get. A shared lawnmower here, an overgrown and weed infested garden there, a political struggle to retain artisanal fishing in Kerala, a move to the barricades in the Chiapas, the willingness to peddle cocaine derived home remedies in Peru and building illegal tenements on public lands in Sao Paulo, each effort is aimed at reducing the radical monopoly of commodities and disabling technologies. Such ways – of fishing, farming, cooking, eating, dwelling, playing, praying or study – are as diverse and varied today as the people who engage in them. However, what they have in common is being oriented by the same genus, the vernacular.
Epistemic Prudence
The effort to fight against the continuing war on the vernacular also extends to the activity of thinking.34 What is confused for knowledge today is largely R&D funded and deployed by government and industry. Scientists, whether in the employ of universities, governments, or corporations, produce objective knowledge for use by others. The pertinent question for those affected by these circuits of knowledge production and sale is to ask if there are vernacular styles of thinking. Is there a kind of thought justified by neither pride nor charity? What is the nature of rigorous thought that is nevertheless conducted among friends and aimed at shaping one’s own modes of life in more beautiful ways? Are some styles of thinking better suited to comprehending the vernacular?
It is likely that the intellectual effort appropriate to bringing vernacular ways out of the shadows might itself be self-limiting. I suggest the now discarded notion of common sense as a criterion to both comprehend the vernacular domain and to recognize the styles of thought appropriate to it. Though the history of common sense is too tangled a story to be told here, it is sufficient to note its primary meaning, at least in English. The first meaning of common sense is the Aristotelian “sensus communis”: “The common bond or center of the five senses; the endowment of natural intelligence possessed by rational beings.”35 This understanding of the common sense stretches from at least Plato to Descartes and, in this primordial sense, refers to the faculty necessary for the exercise of reasonable judgments. Contrary to popular prejudice today, common sense does not refer to the content of what is known but rather how knowledge is achieved. Common sense is not reducible to a body of propositions or of knowledge-claims: instead, it is the ground from which judgments are reached, particularly, the judgment of what is appropriate, fitting, or adequate.36
Briefly, common sense is that faculty which synthesizes sense impressions into perceptions of the world. In turn, the active intelligence abstracts concepts from these sensible perceptions. An echo of this activity of the intellect still resonates in the word “concept,” etymologically related to grasping or touching. That concepts are tethered to percepts, which are rooted in the sensual, underwrites that Aristotelian commonplace, “nothing in the intellect that is not first in the senses.” Concepts are abstractions. But precisely because they are abstractions from the real, they maintain an accord between the world and the mind. Stated simply, both perception and the concepts that flow from them are dependent on what is given to the senses; conceptions of the world depend on grasping the world as it is.
Yet, techno-science is based on precisely turning this understanding on its head. Indeed, the announcement of Vico may be taken as the slogan behind which a common sense understanding of the world was slowly suffocated. From the very beginning of modern science, knowing is understood to be the same as making: the Cartesian plane is as constructed as an airplane; the Poisson distribution is as fabricated as a pipette in the laboratory. Modern scientific ideas are not concepts tethered to the senses; instead they are constructs. Constructs, as the word suggests, are made and not given. As Einstein famously said, “Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and not…uniquely determined by the external world.” Though wrong to use the word “concepts,” his acknowledgement that scientific theories are created underscores how scientific constructs fractures the common sense tie between perception and reality.
The sharp distinction between concepts and constructs recalls that the modern world is constructed and that people and things are often resized to fit in. Concepts are forms of thought engendered by the common sense, which itself expresses the union between the world and the senses. Concepts reflect a way of knowing things from the outside in – from the world to the mind. In contrast, constructs are forms of reflexive thought expressing a way of knowing from the inside out – from the mind to the world.In modern times, what is made up does not ideally conform to what is given. Instead, what is given is slowly buried under the made-up world.
Scientific constructs are therefore not rooted by a sense for the world. Indeed, given the contrast between concepts and constructs, it follows that scientific ideas are non-sense. They are not abstracted from experience but can often be used to reshape it. They can be experimentally verified or falsified. But experiments are not the stuff of ordinary experience. No experiment is necessary to verify if people breathe, but one is required to prove the properties of a vacuum. Experiments are necessary precisely to test what is not ordinarily evident, which is why they are conducted in controlled settings and also used to propagandize the unusual as ordinarily comprehensible. Experimental results are neither necessarily continuous with nor comprehensible to everyday experience; they do not clarify experience but usually obfuscate it.
Unlike R&D, vernacular styles of thought are neither institutionally funded nor directed at the purported happiness and ease of others. Moreover, vernacular thinking also cleaves closely to the common sense understood as the seat of reasonable judgments. Thus, it avoids the monstrous heights to which thought can rise on the wings of the unfettered imagination. Accordingly, the ability to grasp the vernacular demands not only the courage needed to buck academic pressures but also to avoid those flights of theoretical madness powered through the multiplication of constructs.37
To draw out some features of the form of thought adequate to the vernacular domain, consider Illich’s essay titled Energy and Equity, where he distinguishes between transport, transit, and traffic. Whereas transit bespeaks the motion afforded to man the self-moving animal, transport refers to his being moved by heteronomous means, whether car, train, or plane. There, a bullock cart transports villagers headed to the market. Here cars transport commuters to the workplace. By common sense perception, transport – whether by cart or car – perverts transit, which is embodied in the freely given capacity to walk. To those who cannot perceive the sensual and carnal difference between walking and being moved as a Fedex package, the distinction between transport and transit is unpersuasive. It is equally unpersuasive to those mired in that constructed universe where all motion is identified with the displacement of any body in space. The ritualized exposure to passenger-miles – whether in cars or classrooms – is the likely reason for the inability to perceive the felt distinction between transport and transit. Thus, the elaboration of concepts to properly grasp the vernacular domain cannot but begin by placing the constructions of the economy and techno-science within epistemic brackets.
Yet, if it is to be reasonable, such an exercise in epistemic hygiene cannot be immoderate.38 The contrast between transport and transit is clear and distinct, rooted as it is in phenomenologically distinct perceptions. Yet, traffic is a theoretical construct, proposed to comprehend any combination of transport and transit. This necessity for constructs is nevertheless undermined by their being tethered to and by concepts. Accordingly, the conceptual grasp of the world hobbles the free construction of it. The distinction between concepts and constructs does not imply refusing the latter at all costs but rather entails seeing the hierarchical relation between them. That is, vernacular styles of thinking do not exclude theoretical constructs but only seek to keep them in their place.
A second and related feature of vernacular thought-styles confirms its moderate and indeed, modest nature. In accord with vernacular ways, vernacular thought does not demand the exclusion or excision of that which is antithetical and foreign to its domain – the market or the machine. For instance, vernacular thought does not demand the erasure of transport so that transit can flourish. Instead, because rooted in the perceived accord or just proportion between the transit and transport, vernacular thought insists only that the capacity for auto-mobility impose a binding constraint on transport. The suggestion that the speed limit for cars be roughly the same as that reached by a bicycle is rooted in the argument that traffic be calibrated by the lexicographic preference for transit over transport.
Thus, vernacular ways of thinking in consonance with doing and being do not deny constructs – whether imagined or realized. It merely refuses the characteristically modern identification of knowing and making, of reducing thinking to calculating, of displacing the relation between subjects and their predicates by quantitative comparisons. In seeing beyond the prejudice that compares beings in terms of “measure, number, and weight,” vernacular thought reanimates a second form of quantitative measurement that, with it, was also cast into the shadows. Recall, as Einstein admitted, scientific constructs are free creations of the mind, exemplified by mathematical constructs – equations, calculations, and the like. But such mathematical measurement is only the inferior of two kinds of quantitative measurement.
In The Statesman, Plato argues for the distinction between arithmetical and “geometric” measures.39 While both are forms of quantitative measurements, arithmetical or numerical measure is independent of the purposes of the calculator and either correct or incorrect. In contrast, “geometric” measurements of too much or too little are inextricably bound to intentionality and therefore never simply correct or incorrect but always measured with respect to what is just right or fitting. To clarify the distinction, consider the following two points. Given a conventional measure – gallons or liters – a quantity of water can be precisely and universally measured as 4. However, whether 4 is too much or too little depends on whether one intends to fill a 3 or 5 gallon pail; or to put out a blazing fire or to water a horse. The frame of intentionality or purpose thus defines the quantitative measurement of greater or lesser, of more or less. Accordingly, the numerical measure of plus or minus 1 gains its meaning from and is therefore subordinate to the non-numerically measure of too much or too little. Moreover, it is also relative to purpose that 3 or 5 is considered fitting, appropriate or just right.
But there is a second point to be emphasized about the relation between so-called arithmetical and “geometrical” measurements. Arithmetical measures are utterly sterile when it comes to answering the question of purpose, of what is to be done. That is, the question of whether a given end is appropriate or fitting cannot be debated in mathematical symbols. In fact, the opposite is true. It is always possible to ask if applying arithmetical measures to a particular situation is appropriate. Thus, whether one should fill a 5-gallon pail, or construct a mathematical model of human behavior or fabricate a measure called ecological footprint are unanswerable in numerical terms.40
That arithmetical measurements cannot adjudicate its own appropriateness shows they are inferior in rank or hierarchically subordinate to “geometric” measurement. The question concerning purpose is preeminently a question of ethics, of justice among persons. Moreover, since personal relationship cannot but be grounded in the embodied sense of and for another, it follows that ethical judgments must be rooted in common sense. Thus, geometric measures of what is just and right, of what is appropriate and fitting, are judgments formed of the common sense. Accordingly it follows that concepts should regulate and serve as norms for constructs and, analogously, that vernacular ways should regulate techno-scientific constructions.
Past or Future?
Illich’s plea to resuscitate the vernacular must be taken seriously – especially now, when the ongoing economic and ecological crises reveal the restricted thought-space within which contemporary debates continue to be conducted. Just as the demand for more regulated markets expose exchange-value as the presupposition of economic thought, so also the call for sustainable or eco-friendly technologies expose the grip of techno-science on the modern imaginary. The vernacular, we could say, lies orthogonal to these axes of markets and machines, offering us a unique standpoint from which to interrogate the present. While the object of an almost 500 year long war, it nevertheless persists within the interstices and byways of modern life, ready for reactivation.
Sajay Samuel is a Clinical Associate Professor of Accounting at Penn State University. He has spoken on science, economic thought, and the vernacular for Canadian radio. His academic publications aim to undermine the current fascination with accounting and related numbers as a modality of management.
- 1BBC, “‘Wall Street got drunk’ says Bush.”
- 2Andy Kroll, “How the McEconomy Bombed the American Worker,” TomDispatch. While advanced industrialized economies cannot find enough jobs for its unemployed populations, so called emerging economies are actively creating employment. By inverse symmetry, to satisfy the demand of economic growth through industrialization, notably in China and India, peasants are converted into factory workers in the hundreds of millions.
- 3Of the raft of books on the causes and consequences of the current economic situation, there are those who argue, rightly in many particulars, that this was only the most severe of the crisis prone dynamics of capitalism. In this vein, see for example most recently, Paul Mattick, Business As Usual (London: Reaktion Books, 2011); David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009). I ignore these accounts since they are and were largely ignored in policy circles and mainstream economic thinking.
- 4Notably, George Akerlof and Robert Shiller, Animal Spirits (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). But see also Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market (New York: Harper Business Books, 2009); and Paul Krugman, “How did economists get it so wrong?” New York Times, September 9, 2009.
- 5Joseph Stiglitz in Freefall (New York: Norton Books, 2010) is perhaps the most trenchant of the well-known economists to finger free market ideology as an important cause of the crisis. Also see, N. Roubini & S. Mihm, Crisis Economics (New York, Penguin Press, 2010); and S. Johnson & J. Kwak, 13 Bankers (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010). Worthy of special mention in this regard, is Richard Posner’s, A Failure of Capitalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), which stands as a model for retrospective hand-wringing by a booster of neo-liberalism.
- 6The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Most if not all of the writings on the financial crisis cite incentives as both cause and remedy. The U.S. Congressional report published after two years of study and investigation is exemplary since failed or inadequate incentives—whether in the form of regulation or compensation- comprise the sum of causal factors driving the crisis. But also consult among any of the above-mentioned books, Laurence Koltikoff’s, Jimmy Stewart is Dead (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2010) for a sensible proposal to limit financially induced boom-bust cycles through limited purpose banking. The latter is designed to dampen the ill-effects of debt financing.
- 7The paradox of designing incentives to determine future behavior seems not to have been fully comprehended. Indeed, in a forthcoming work, I intend to argue that incentive mechanisms assure only one consequence: they will certainly fail.
- 8For a fuller account, see Sajay Samuel & Jean Roberts, “Water can and ought to run freely: reflections on the notion of “scarcity” in economics” in The Limits to Scarcity, ed. Lyla Mehta(London: Earthscan, 2010), 109-126.
- 9Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924).
- 10“It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty…Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? What is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and preheminence? Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them… If we examined his oeconomy with rigour, we should find that he spends a great part of them upon conveniencies, which may be regarded as superfluities, and that, upon extraordinary occasions, he can give something even to vanity and distinction…From whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, and what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages, which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. But vanity is always founded upon the belief of our being the object of attention and approbation.” Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A Millar, 1759/1858), pt. 1, sec. 1, ch. 3, emphasis added. Consult Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1977) whose close textual analysis of classical authors shows that it is the idea of a natural harmony between individual self-interest and the general interest, that allows, in principle, acquisitiveness to be free of ethico-political restraints. Though he includes William Petty and John Locke among “economists,” William Letwin’s judgment is instructive: “…there can be no doubt that economic theory owes its present development to the fact that some men…were willing to consider the economy as nothing more than an intricate mechanism, refraining for the while from asking whether the mechanism worked for good or evil”; Origins of Scientific Economics (London, 1963), 147-48. See CB Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962) for supporting arguments that root economic liberalism in 17th century political thought.
- 11“…money has become in all civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one another. What are the rules which men naturally observe in exchanging them either for money or one another, I shall now proceed to examine”; Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, book 1, ch. 4.
- 12The importance of Locke to Smith is evident in his paean to property. “The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable” (Wealth of Nations, book 1, ch. 10, part 2). For reasons of space, I cannot do full justice to Locke’s arguments. However, the following statements sufficiently support the four points I emphasize. “Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men”; “And as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions, so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them”; “…the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it”; John Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, ch. 5.
- 13“…These rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of goods. The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use’; the other, ‘value in exchange.’” (Wealth of Nations, book 1, ch. 4).
- 14Smith argues that “virtue consists not in any one affection but in the proper degree of all the affections.” For him, Agreeableness or utility is not a measure of virtue. Instead, it is ‘sympathy’ or the “correspondent affection of the spectator” that “is the natural and original measure of the proper degree (of virtue).” ***TMS, Part 8, Sec. 2, Ch.3. But such sympathy is not a virtue. At best it is a mirror of social prejudices.
- 15The blindness to subsistence in contemporary economics is evident in the judgment of George Stigler in his review of late 19th century efforts to grasp use-value: “…and there were some mystical references to the infinite utility of subsistence.” See his “Development of Utility Theory II,” Journal of Political Economy, 58 (1950), 373. Stigler is only capable of equating the useful, which is price-less, with the mystical.
- 16“A thing can be a use-value without being a value. A thing can be useful and a product of human labor, without being a commodity. …Nothing can be a value without being an object of utility..” Marx, K.(1976) Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books), 131.
- 17The fundamental, though largely overlooked, essay on the elaboration of the twinned yet polemically related “natural” and “artificial” harmony of interests remains, Elie Halevy The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).
- 18It would take a longer essay to show the function of law in commercial society. Summarily, Commercial society transforms Law into an instrument of social engineering; and thus of regulation. It began to be used to engineer society towards more or less market-intensive relations. Classical liberalism predicated on the “natural harmony of interests” requires economizing on law. In contrast, to mitigate the destructiveness of rampant market society requires shackling commercialism without destroying it, forging an “artificial harmony of interests” through punitive regulations. Hence both the minimal state of liberalism (whether classical or neo-liberalism) and the expanded state of welfare liberalism implies the instrumentalization of Law. See Michel Foucault, “On Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect, eds. Colin Gordon, G. Burchell and P. Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). The newest crinkle to this old tale is that markets are no longer thought natural. Instead, markets can be designed, often by market participants themselves. Thus moderating markets through incentives becomes a matter of auto-engineering of and by markets around the late 20th century.
- 19 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1962) and Barry Commoner Science and Survival (New York: Viking Books, 1967) are perhaps the two most prominent scientists to have jump-started the environmental movement with the blessings of science. By now, despite a few if noisy detractors, widespread anthropogenic environmental destruction is, as it is said, “scientific fact.” Over 2000 scientists worldwide contribute to the reports and recommendations produced by The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the environmental effects of industrialization at perhaps the most general environmental register. See Climate Change 2007 for its most recent report.
- 20 A pair of recent books authored by French philosophers suggests the philosophical ambit within with the environmental crisis is comprehended. On the one hand, Michel Serres’s The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) insists on the necessity of a contract with the Earth now that Humanity presses against it as does any mammoth natural force. Such a natural contract, presupposes a new metaphysics, according to which humanity cannot be reduced to individuals and Earth is not underfoot but whirling in empty space; both so comprehended by Science and Law. In some contrast, Luc Ferry’s The New Ecological Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) fears the new metaphysics. Cleaving to modern ways, he believes “it will ultimately be by means of advancements in science and technology that we manage one day to resolve the questions raised by environmental ethics” (127). Nevertheless, neither doubt the path forward to be illuminated by a suitably reformulated techno-science.
- 21Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science Magazine, 155:3767, argued for anthropocentric singularity of Christianity and its attendant bequest of nature to man for fueling techno-science that has caused the ecological crisis. In this section I focus on the metaphysics of modern science. For a recent statement on how historians of science who raise their heads from the dusty archives deal with the metaphysics of modern science, see Lindberg, The Beginning of Western Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), ch.14. He agrees with E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (New York: Doubleday, 1932), whose judgment of the presuppositions and implications of Newtonian mechanics has not been fundamentally challenged. Hannah Arendt, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” in Between Past and Future (New York: Random Books, 1993) offers a succinct sketch of the groundlessness presumed by techno-science.
- 22For a fuller account of the theological and philosophical debates that prepared this view from nowhere, see Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). It is he who names as secular theologians, “Galileo and Descartes, Liebniz and Newton, Hobbes and Vico” among others. I rely heavily on him (particularly part 5) and on Peter Dear, Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) to grasp the central lines in the mathematization of physis. Also consult Peter Dear’s textbook, Revolutionizing the Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) cast as a pithy summary of the seismic changes between 1500 and 1800 in what was worth knowing and how it was known.
- 23See A. Mark Smith’s “Knowing things inside out: the scientific revolution from a Medieval Perspective,” The American Historical Review, 95:3 (1990) for an excellent summary on the reversal of the hierarchy between sense and reason in modern scientific thought. Also, consult Eamon Duffy, Science and the Secrets of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) for a persuasive account of scientific experiments as vexing nature in order to extract her secrets.
- 24To appreciate the brew of pride and charity that constitutes modern techno-science we need only to attend to Descartes. “…It is possible to reach knowledge that will be of much utility in this life… instead of the speculative philosophy now taught in the schools we can find a practical one, by which, knowing the nature and behavior of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other bodies which surround us, as well as we now understand the different skills of our artisans, we can employ these entities for all the purposes for which they are suited, and so make ourselves masters and possessors of nature. This would not only be desirable in bringing about the invention of an infinity of devices to enable us to enjoy the fruits of agriculture and all the wealth of the earth without labor, but even more so in conserving health, the principal good and the basis of all other goods in life.” Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts Press, 1960), part six.
- 25The term construction refers to things – whether physical or symbolic – made. The mathematical roots of construction and constructivism are thoroughly explored with special note of Descartes in David Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometr (London: Routledge 1989). Funkenstein, Theology, especially chapter 5, describes well the philosophical shift from the contemplative ideal of knowing to the ideal of knowing-by-doing or made knowledge. A cursory glance at any scientific book should convince that “theoretical constructs” are a staple of the modern scientific enterprise. Those (so-called postmodern philosophers, historians and sociologists of science) who think they challenge techno-science by emphasizing that scientific knowledge is constructed only repeat in prose what Bacon, Gassendi, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton said in verse. Those who think they defend scientific knowledge by invoking, as the last trump card, its technical productions merely reconfirm the founding conceit of modern techno-science: that knowing and making are interchangeable.
- 26In this section I rely on the most extensive statement of Illich on critical technology, Tools for Conviviality (London: Marion Boyars, 1973). Note especially the Chapter 4, “Recovery” (84-99) calling for the demythologization of science, the rediscovery of language and the recovery of legal procedure. He supersedes this statement only in some respects with his later thinking: on systems; on the historicity of the instrument as a category; and the emphasis on the symbolic power of technology.
- 27Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), shows precisely the consequences of attempts to recover the past, whose signal dimension has been the relative embeddedness of the individual within the social whole. To insist on recovering that past today is thus to court a species of inhumanity the Western world has once already encountered in the mid 20th century.
- 28The chilling conclusion of this confusion is the dishonest sentimentalism fostered in industrial societies, to wit “that the values which industrial society destroys are precisely those which it cherishes” Ivan Illich, “Shadow Work” in Shadow Work (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), 99. Thus, the radical dependence on work promotes the cherished value of Freedom.
- 29“Vernacular comes from an Indo-Germanic root that implies ‘rootedness’ and ‘abode.’ Vernaculum as a Latin word was used for whatever was homebred, homespun, homegrown, homemade, as opposed to what was obtained in formal exchange. The child of one’s slave and of one’s wife, the donkey born of one’s own beast, were vernacular beings, as was the staple that came from the garden or the commons. If Karl Polanyi had adverted to this fact, he might have used the term in the meaning accepted by the ancient Romans: sustenance derived from reciprocity patterns imbedded in every aspect of life, as distinguished from sustenance that comes from exchange or from vertical distribution… We need a simple adjective to name those acts of competence, lust, or concern that we want to defend from measurement or manipulation by Chicago Boys and Socialist Commissars. The term must be broad enough to fit the preparation of food and the shaping of language, childbirth and recreation, without implying either a privatized activity akin to the housework of modern women, a hobby or an irrational and primitive procedure. Such an adjective is not at hand. But ‘vernacular’ might serve. By speaking about vernacular language and the possibility of its recuperation, I am trying to bring into awareness and discussion the existence of a vernacular mode of being, doing, and making that in a desirable future society might again expand in all aspects of life.” Ivan Illich, “The War against Subsistence” in Shadow Work, 57-58. The argument of this essay belies its title.
- 30For the following section, I gloss “Vernacular Values” and The War on Subsistence,” both in Illich, Shadow Work.
- 31A more comprehensive analysis of the themes in this section would include a selective survey on the historical and anthropological literature on vernacular ways and its destruction. As a first orientation to the extensive literature on the war on the vernacular, consult Ivan Illich, Gender, (Berkeley: Heyday Press, 1982). The works of Karl Polanyi, preeminently, The Great Transformation, (NY: Reinhart, 1944); but also the essays collected in Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies, ed. George Dalton, (NY: Anchor Books, 1968) and those in Trade and Markets in Early Empires,eds. K. Polanyi, C. Arensberg, and H. Pearson (NY: The Free Press, 1957) clarify the historicity of commodity-intensive societies, made visible when nature and human action become widely priced as land and labor respectively. Marshall Sahlins in Stone Age Economics, (NY: Adline, 1972) and M.I. Finley in The Ancient Economy, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985) confirm that pre- modern societies, whether Aboriginal Australia or Western Antiquity, got on quite well without it. Jacques Le Goff, in Medieval Civilization, 400-1500 emphasizes the aim of the medieval “economy” as that of subsistence, of providing for necessities (London: Blackwell, 1988). The continuing modern war on subsistence and the resistance to it is well documented. Consult for example, E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the Crowd,” reprinted in The Essential E.P. Thompson, ed. Dorothy Thompson (NY: The New Press, 2000), and the essays collected in Customs in Common (New York: New York Press, 1993); Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the 20th Century (NY: Harper & Row 1969), Teodor Shanin, The Awkward Class (London: Cambridge, 1977) and Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, Our Word is our Weapon (NY: Seven Stories Press, 2001). James Scott, in Seeing Like a State (Princeton: Yale University, 1999) argues that visionary plans to modernize society invariably fail and usually leave their beneficiaries worse off for the attention. Study the key terms collected in The Development Dictionary, ed. Wolfgang Sachs (NY: Zed Books, 1992) as commands that rally the troops to the war against subsistence.
- 32Peter Linebaugh, Ned Ludd, Queen Mab: Machine Breaking, Romanticism, and Several Commons 1811-12 (Oakland: PM Press/Retort, 2012).
- 33Consult the well-documented essay by Teodor Shanin, “Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen” in Late Marx and the Russian Road, ed. T. Shanin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), for a persuasive case that “…to Marx, a timely revolutionary victory could turn the Russian commune into a major ‘vehicle of social regeneration.’”
- 34This section is derived from Ivan Illich, “Research by People” in Shadow Work (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), and his unpublished manuscript titled The Wisdom of Leopold Kohr which makes reference to the common sense.
- 35This sentence from the OED weakly summarizes the following: “The senses perceive each other’s special objects incidentally; not because percipient sense is this or that special sense, but because all form a unity: this incidental perception takes place whenever sense is directed at one and the same moment to two disparate qualities in one and the same object, e.g., to the bitterness and the yellowness of bile…” De Anima, III, 425a 30-425b 1. And: “Further, there cannot be a special sense-organ for the common sensibles either, i.e, the objects which we perceive incidentally through this or that special sense, e.g, movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number & unity…. In the case of the common sensibles, there is already in us a common sensibility (or common sense) which enables us to perceive them non-incidentally; there is therefore no special sense required for their perception,” De Anima, III 425a 15-26.
- 36I do not fully explore here the transformation from a faculty into the “innate capacity” of any person to reason and judge correctly after Descartes. The judgment of Funkenstein in Theology, especially page 359, is instructive. He suggests that the “militant, missionary ideal” of education over the 17th and 18th centuries is related to “the shift in the connotation of the term ‘common sense.’” The connotations of the terms “le bon sens,” “gemeiner Menschenverstand,” and “common sense” after the 17th century imply the capacity to be educated; for all men to become philosophers. Indeed, the propagation of a method for thinking presupposes the commonsense as that which is in need of education. More recently, Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) traces the twinned logics generated by the degradation of common sense from a faculty. On the one hand, it serves as a touchstone for the wisdom of people against elites; on the other, the mulishness of the masses needed re-education. For a conspectus of writers on the common sense consult, AN Foxe, The Common Sense from Heraclitus to Pierce (Turnbridge Press, 1962). It is however frustrating for the lack of a bibliography and a historically insensitive reading of the authors surveyed. In contrast, JL Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcemaeon to Aristotle (Clarendon Press, 1926); WR Bundy, The Theory of the Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought (University of Illinois Press, 1927); David Summers, The Judgment of Sense (Cambridge University Press, 1987) are excellent treatments of the history of the common sense as faculty from Aristotle to the late Renaissance when read serially. See also E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (London, 1975); and HA Wolfson, “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophical Texts,” Harvard Theological Review, 25 (1935).
- 37 Stanley Rosen, The Elusiveness of the Ordinary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) argues spiritedly for the commonsense foundations of thought. Such foundations support but cannot rise to heights reached by extraordinary thought, which by necessity, exceed its grasp. In the so-called “science wars” of recent decades, the issue was framed as that between the social constructivists and the realists. In the light of the foregoing distinction between concepts and constructs, it is clear that both parties to the debate agree that scientific knowledge is made, that is to say, constructed.
- 38 In much of his writings, Illich insists on elaborating conceptual distinctions built on the perception of autonomous human actions. Between Deschooling Society and The History of Homo Educandus he contrasts learning to education and schooling; in Medical Nemesis, between autonomous coping and healthcare; between Research by People and R&D. In some cases, he invents or gives new shades of meaning to terms to recover perceptions buried by constructs – for example, disvalue, shadow work, gender and vernacular. Let the triple, housing, dwelling, and habitation stand as a parallel example to transport, transit, and traffic used in the text above. A general case for the commonsensical Illich still awaits a careful exegesis of his texts.
- 39 I take some liberties with interpreting The Statesman, 283d-284e in Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Hackett Publishing, 1997).The relevant distinction as described by the visitor reads as follows: “It is clear that we would divide the art of measurement, cutting it in two in just the way we said, posting as one part of it all sorts of expertise that measure the number, lengths, depths, breaths, and speeds of things in relation to what is opposed to them, and as the other, all those that measure in relation to what is in due measure, what is fitting, the right moment, what is as it ought to be-everything that removes itself from the extremes to the middle” (384e).
- 40 It is a weak recognition of this hierarchy that is reiterated in the widely accepted disjunction or discontinuity between “science” and “values.”
Comments
Illich had a major influence on me, trying to understand the differences in world outlooks between pre-industrialized/capitalist European organization of society. That led both to the esoteric later marx that Franklin Rosemont discusses in "Marx and the Iroquois" but also William Morris' work which influenced the impossibilist/libertarian tendancies in marxism.
The terrain of reproduction: Alisa Del Re’s “The sexualization of social relations”
In an era when the exploits of Silvio Berlusconi’s “private” life seem to have categorically obliterated any progress towards sexual equality achieved during the Italian feminist movement of the 70s, it is essential to remember what was once accomplished. Although second-wave feminism was already a well-established network of debates in the U.S. by 1970, Italian women influenced by workerist writings of the feminist ilk, most notably Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James’s The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (1972), set out to initiate battles over issues such as abortion and divorce.1 Feminist currents both from within and independent of workerist movements then spread with a fierce momentum that would endure through the decade.
From the inadequate patriarchal rubric of the New Left, from the ashes of male-dominated workerist organizations such as Potere Operaio, and later Lotta Continua, women throughout Italy organized autonomously, on the basis of the inherent connection of reproduction and gender roles to class struggle.2 It was the problem of marginalization of women within these movements, along with the larger question of unpaid domestic labor, that directed many feminist inquiries. Silvia Federici has said, reflecting on her difficulty reconciling her experience as a woman with the rhetoric of these organizations, “I was unwilling to accept my identity as a woman after having for years pinned all my hopes on my ability to pass for a man.“3 An organized collectivity of women independent of the uniform assimilation to a male-driven class perspective became necessary, since women’s work was to this point largely confined to the domain of reproduction, but remained an equally essential yet categorically unique form of production in the greater sense.
Mariarosa Dalla Costa has described how, in the 1970s, Italian feminism largely took one of two positions: a kind of generalized, overall “self-awareness” or a workerist-driven feminism. The latter took shape as Lotta Femminista, which organized into a more substantial international movement. The focus of their attack, housework, was described in Federici’s Wages Against Housework as “the most subtle and mystified violence that capitalism has ever perpetrated against any section of the working class.”4 In 1972, Dalla Costa, Selma James, and others formed the International Wages for Housework Campaign around the notion that women held a significant power as producers of the labor force itself – and that through the refusal of this production, they engaged in a form of social subversion that could lead to “a radical transformation of society.”5
However, Federici has since acknowledged this kind of utopian thinking as damaging to the feminist movement:
One of the major shortcomings of the women’s movement has been its tendency to overemphasize the role of consciousness in the context of social change, as if enslavement were a mental condition and liberation could be achieved by an act of will. Presumably, if we wanted, we could stop being exploited by men and employers… revolutionize our day to day life. Undoubtedly some women already have the power to take these steps… But for millions these recommendations could only turn into an imputation of guilt, short of building the material conditions that would make them possible.6
In an interview accompanying the volume Futuro Anteriore, Alisa Del Re describes how she began her own path towards the analysis of women and work, initially as a political science student and research assistant to Antonio Negri in the late 1960s.7 Encounters with the methods of workers’ inquiry, and later the writings of Tronti and Marx, became points of reference that would inform Del Re’s involvement with Potere Operaio until its dissolution in 1973. Without officially crossing over to Autonomia Operaia like many of her comrades, Del Re remained in somewhat close proximity to the group, while beginning to address issues from a feminist perspective that was unique for this period, particularly regarding social services and the relationship between work and personal time.
Del Re reveals a subjectivity that informed her position on welfare programs – a position that, stemming in large part from her own need for subsidized childcare while navigating the workforce, would unintentionally oppose the views of Dalla Costa and others driving the Wages for Housework movement. While Wages for Housework sought compensation for domestic labor, Del Re argued for subsidized childcare and other such social programs so that a woman could have a life outside of working, both in and outside of the home – not because she disagreed with Wages for Housework, but because their demands did not apply to her own situation as a woman choosing to subsist within the workforce rather than in the home. She describes how her very position as a working woman assigned her to the margins of the workerist movement, while the women of Wages for Housework were demanding rights from within their imposed “terrain” – that of reproduction:
…the issue of wages was perhaps more “revolutionary” but from the political practice that Rosa [Dalla Costa] endorsed it was difficult to understand who was demanding these wages and when… maybe my issue was much more reformist even though it is true that we annoyed a few people when we occupied local government meetings, demanding the construction of nursery schools and proposing concrete forms of ‘liberation from housework.8
It is worth noting, however, that while the positions of Wages for Housework and Del Re were seemingly in opposition, they are perhaps better described as parallel streams of struggle, progress in both arenas constituting a necessary condition for women’s autonomy. In the first place, Wages for Housework recognized housework as work, and thus, the strategy of “getting a job” as a means of liberating women from dependence on men’s wages, as Federici would later reflect, alienated women who worked because their families need the added financial support “and not because they consider it a liberating experience, particularly since ‘having a job’ never frees you from housework.“9 Furthermore, Del Re’s view on the reclamation of personal time supported by state-funded child care provisions offers the only possibility of relief from what would otherwise be a near-24/7 work week, waged or not, for working-class women. Years after Wages for Housework, Federici recognizes the mutual dependence of these two conditions:
…as long as housework goes unpaid, there will be no incentives to provide the social services necessary to reduce our work, as proved by the fact that, despite a strong women’s movement, subsidized day care has been steadily reduced through the 70s. I should add that wages for housework never meant simply a paycheck. It also meant more social services and free social services.10
In a later piece entitled “Women and Welfare: Where is Jocasta?”, Del Re describes the labor of reproduction as “a specific relation between women and the State” that is separate from the labor market and that has been inadequately supported and studied.11 The welfare system, despite “its limitations on the quality of life,” she proposes, “liberat[es] the labor of reproduction from its dependence on another person’s salary,” in other words, the labor of production.12 Thus, Del Re proposes that since women control the means of reproduction, we “must find a way to present [our] bill” – by making “visible the labor of reproduction in its totality” and by underlining “its centrality with respect to production and the market.” As she has continued to assert, this begins with a reorganization of one’s time.13
Interestingly, situated upon this same imposed terrain were both the subjects and objects of a year-long research study regarding work and family, culminating in the publication of Le sexe du travail: structures familiales et système productif (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1984). In an article for the journal Primo Maggio, Del Re examines this work with a favorable view on their investigations, as women researchers, into the sexual and social divisions of labor. Translated here, Del Re’s piece represents in itself an evolving vision of these divisions that does not, as she writes, “signal a marginality.”
In “Women and Welfare,” Del Re elegantly states the importance of the woman’s role as both subject and object:
It is crucial, therefore, that women’s lives – their existence, their nature, as well as their activities - become an integral part of philosophical and intellectual discourse, so that the acknowledgment of female subjectivity, constructed as it is in multiple symbolic and material loci, can reveal the partiality of a vision of the world that even today is considered universal.14
Like other projects of the workerist movement, Primo Maggio as a publication reveals conceptual layers ranging from historiographical record to scholarly periodical to political organization. As Primo Maggio’s Sergio Bologna writes in his review of Steve Wright’s Storming Heaven, the journal focused on maintaining a subject position “within a network of initiatives of self organisation at the level of political culture and formation ‘at the service of the movement.’”15 In an interview with Patrick Cuninghame, Bologna describes Primo Maggio’s search for new methodologies, in contrast to the efforts at party organization by Negri and Autonomia Organizzata:
Primo Maggio was not even a political elite. Rather, we had refused our role as a political elite to put ourselves instead in the role of that techno-scientific intelligentsia which excavated within the disciplines. So, we wanted to excavate within the historical disciplines to make history in another way. You read Primo Maggio and it is not a political journal, in the sense that it is a journal … for the transformation of historical methodology. In the sense of transformation also of historiographical language which has an enormous importance in political language.16
The idea of a “woman-science,” women (and sexual divisions of labor) as a topic of research by women researchers, is the product of this strategy, reconstructing a subject through its methodologies.
Anna Culbertson is a special collections librarian at San Diego State University, where she has taught courses on using primary sources to research feminism and gender roles.
- 1See Jacqueline Andall, “Abortion, politics and gender in Italy,” Parliamentary Affairs 47:2 (1994).
- 2Lotta Continua, in fact, aided in its own demise through its betrayal of female LC militants by sabotaging an abortion march in Rome in 1975. See especially Red Notes’ Italy 1977-8: Living with an Earthquake, chapter 19, and the Big Flame Women’s Group pamphlet Fighting for Feminism: the ‘Women Question’ in an Italian Revolutionary Group.
- 3Silvia Federici, “Putting Feminism Back on its Feet,” Social Text 9/10 (1984), 338.
- 4Silvia Federici, Wages Against Housework (Bristol: Power of Women Collective and Falling Wall Press, 1975), 2.
- 5Mariarosa Dalla Costa, “The Door to the Garden: Feminism and Operaismo,” reprinted on libcom.org.
- 6Federici, “Femnism,” 339.
- 7 “Interview with Alisa Del Re - 26th July 2000,” trans. Arianna Bove, Futuro anteriore. Dai ‘Quaderni rossi’ ai movimenti globali: ricchezze e limiti dell’operaismo italiano (Rome: DeriveApprodi, 2002).
- 8“Interview with Alisa Del Re.”
- 9Federici, “Feminism,” 340.
- 10Federici, “Feminism,” 341
- 11 Alisa Del Re, “Women and Welfare: Where is Jocasta?” trans. Maurizia Boscagli in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics, eds. Michael Hardt and Paolo Virno, (Minneapolis: U Minn. Press, 1996), 101-2.
- 12Del Re, “Women,” 108
- 13Del Re, “Women,” 110
- 14Del Re, “Women,” 101
- 15Sergio Bologna,“A Review of StormingHeaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism,” Strategies: Journal of Theory, Culture and Politics, 16:2 (2003).
- 16Patrick Cuninghame, “For an Analysis of Autonomia: An Interview with Sergio Bologna.” Mexico City, June 1995.
Comments
The sexualization of social relations
From Primo Maggio, no. 23/24 (summer 1985)1
“Should work, then, have a sex? Absurd question. Everyone knows it has existed only in the masculine [form], in sectors where activity is carried out by men. No work elsewhere, and no women in work. What remains, of course, is to settle the question of a few million ‘actives’…”2 And so is introduced The Sex of Work (Familial Structures and the System of Production), pub. by PUG, 1984, by the authors themselves: a large group of researchers who found themselves over the course of the previous year in the most diverse spaces of debate: from the conference Women and the Working Class (Vincennes, December 1978); to their days at the Société Française de Sociologie on The Familial Institution and Women’s Work (Nantes, June 1980); to the conference of the Centre Lyonnais d’Etudes Féministes on Women and the Question of Work (Lyon, December 1980); and finally to the research seminar of the Unité de Recherche et d’Etudes Sociologiques, Division sociale et sexuelle du travail, on Women’s Work, Paid Work, Domestic Work (1980-81-82), resulting directly in the formation of this group.
Drawing upon their own intellectual and existential resources, their own claims to both feminism and a succession of the most institutional of initiatives, the group finally formed at the Tenth World Congress of Sociology (Mexico City, August 1982), expressing the desire to promote research centered on the simultaneous analysis, for both men and women, of the situation of work and family. This book represents the bulk of the communications presented in Mexico City and constitutes a first tangible, visible step of the experience of the group, a moment in its life.
Women, researchers, feminists, in an institutionalized group with a research topic both precise and isolated from the traditional scientific context, with the palpable need to find new methodologies, new avenues, of reconstructing the subjects in their entire form, the same subjects that in traditional science become chopped, mutilated, seen in quantity and without quality. And this in “science,” to impose a new “scientific” point of view that concerns women and their work, the sexuality of social relations as an “existent.” As a method, bringing scientists together from different disciplines and different “schools” (although here we limit ourselves to the social sciences) is nothing new: interdisciplinary research in the humanities has been fruitful in various fields. But the novelty lies in the fact that it is the woman-subject that is studying the woman-object. And the effect this produces is that it seems the very object of the research floods the limits traditionally imposed, reaching into current methodology, finding itself within strict definitions of use. The very definition of the field research requires different means of approximation, as if one were to turn on different lights rather than just one to identify the road ahead, the contours of the object to be studied. And sometimes it is right at the intersection of two distinct fields, in the area of existing sociological frameworks, that the object of examination is found. As Martine Chaudron says about her research, “The object – the social trajectories and the familiar strategies of reproduction, the one and the other sexed – has been constructed on the intersection of two fields, that of social mobility and that of the family; it [the object] can’t exist sociologically outside of the problem attempting to articulate and hold together the sexual and social divisions of work with social relations of sex and class.”
And this permanent preoccupation with identifying the relations between the sexes as social relations is important, in order to exit the fixity of roles, totally determined and hierarchical: “That which is important in the notion of social relations – defined by the antagonism of social groups – is the dynamic that it introduces.”
The form that attempts this mode of stating, of seeking, of pointing towards a sexualization of social relations that does not signal a marginality, but is in recognition of an existing injustice, to be changed, requires an adjustment to a new vision of reality, and to do this demands a difficult but necessary innovation of tools. And then the interest to depart from traditional methodologies that have always made the study of women subordinate.
For example, as well stated in the general introduction: “The dominant discourse on work continues to function as an implicit model: the male worker, neither too young nor too old, light-skinned, clearly. In short, the ideal type! All the rest are not specified. And so that the family remains the essential starting point of analysis for the professional activity of women; as if their work situation results solely of the obligation (real or symbolic, material or ideological) imposed upon them to take on the bulk of family responsibilities.” “Maternity renders suspect the professional qualities of women”: and then, to remove this suspicion, they must “act like a man,” or not have children socially. And this, only for women. Because however the worker conforms to the norms of work is as a non-parent. But the non-parent as an absolute, the privileged worker, is the father with a family to provide for, but without the responsibilities of a family. This burden is placed on the mother, so that it becomes non-compliant to the norm and – perfectly squaring the circle – justifies her professional stagnation, her non-career with the same motives by which it promotes “the man of the house.”
In economics, sociology and the other humanities, the social inferiority of women is due to the mechanisms of marginalization suffered by this sector of the population, most unarmed for the labor market. So women would constitute, as the young or the old, as immigrants or the handicapped, a marginal group, non-competitive. In other words: because of their family responsibilities, women face obstacles, and therefore require assistance in order to be able to work, given the parameters of work hours, vacation time, and pensions.
Conversely, when it comes to studying the work of men, there is no reference to their marital status, nor to the size of their family (number of children, etc.), nor even to the professional activities of their wives. Only women are enlisted to a family, only men to their posts in the work world; women are inactive and men are without family. So, a joint approach to the familial structure and the productive system that is not the superimposition of one sector on the other is sought.
It is by the denunciation of the invisibility of domestic work in sociological and economic analyses that feminists have introduced a decisive break. The analysis of domestic work and relations between the sexes has signified new approaches in respect to social relations and women’s work. We no longer consider the study of relations between the sexes as confined to the family, but rather, merge all the inter-dependencies between housework and professional work.
And all of this within a constant: the critical analysis of science constitutes the insufficiency of the various disciplines, their blind spots.
So these researchers contest research (and methods) based on the distinction between productive work and reproductive work, where the participation of women in “productive” work is not analyzed as such, but as a particular of a general, masculine model. And the overtaking occurs in the simultaneous analysis of production systems and family structures. The rejection of the production/reproduction dichotomy, and, to its contrary, the study of their interrelations, necessarily implicates the acceptance of key concepts, which I briefly define here from the text:
- The concept of reproduction, used in the text in opposition to production. It’s not, then, treated in the classical sense of social reproduction. Reproduction includes, apart from the production of children and more broadly of individuals, a set of activities, excluding the activity of the production of commodities. From this perspective the analysis of the family is inseparable from the study of other institutions that contribute to reproduction.
- The concept of work: a term that, in the broader sense, takes into account as much professional activity as that which is developed in the domestic sphere. From this perspective it becomes necessary to renew the analysis of production.
- The concept of family, as something that is not a closed space concerning the private sphere. It is necessary, therefore, to study it in terms of social relations and not of the rules between the sexes, in terms of the divisions of work rather than the divisions of labor.
It is from these base concepts, these general agreements, that the itineraries of each researcher become the heads of rams with which this group attempts to break down the social sciences building, little by little, at different levels. Already the critical reading of the statistics of social mobility (generally sexed in terms of the masculine model) is further enriched by qualitative methods (surveys, interviews, biographies, genealogies) of identifying the social trajectories of men and women.
The simultaneous study of production and reproduction necessarily involves the construction of new terrains, cutting across traditional disciplines. And again, all of the more secure concepts should be reconsidered: from, for example, the sexual division of work as a given, it is obvious that the concept of the social division of work itself should be called into question. “To state, as we do, that work has a sex and that therefore the division of work is also sexed, has effectively subversive virtues”.
And it does not end with the book, because this group continues to work together at an annual seminar (1984-85) called Production/Reproduction Workshop (presented at PIRTTEM). They continue the hard work of researching, defining a subject, woman, at full length; of removing the veil of invisibility, of renewing the ties between the visible and the hidden, between the important and the disregarded.
A short digression: already many passes have been made in an attempt to untie the Gordian knot of the relationship between production and reproduction, for example by studying “in continuum” the two phenomena, thus defeating the acquiescent acceptance of inequality, attributed to the natural order of things.
Is it not possible to venture further? Why not attempt to establish a completely new method of investigation, that has reproduction as its epicenter, its quality, in which commodities and their production result in some subordinate way, objects of an external strategy; and inside this grid interpret the struggles, find again the real subjects, interests, the same recent history of the development of capital and of its institutions? Is it too much to propose a scale of values, even in research, less subordinated to the values of the capitalist mode of production (and I insist that it is already a lot to have even changed the composition of the field of investigation by interweaving the problem of reproduction)?
A woman-science that articulates itself on (being directly from) an imposed and not chosen terrain, that is the terrain of reproduction – might that therefore be a subordinate science?
Two considerations:
- Even though it has been imposed as a mode of domination, even though it subsists as a form of exploitation, even though it has been devalued, unpaid, “naturally” attributed to our sex, reproduction, in the broader sense of the word, is in reality the central axis of a world of values to reconsider, placing them in the subordinate, directing all work for the production of commodities. It may be a consideration of plain common sense, but then plainly we speak of work time and free time, we speak of peace and ecology, from the old poor, we speak of the new poor, of unemployment, of famine.
- In the second place, if it is true of the world in which we live that this is not the case, that work for the sake of working seems to be the only form of social and personal realization, and the measurement of existing passes through the measurement of existence or at least of earning a wage, and, subsequently, the amount of that wage (“Marx was right, but that doesn’t suit me – and then, until when?”), it is not clear why, exactly, in a time in which salaries have the tendency to shrink and work to disappear, for both women and men, we can’t see a glimpse of a chance to change our point of view.
But I don’t want to cast aside other budding ideas that need the soil of collective debate to grow. In every case, the very existence of this group of women-feminists-researchers, of a new rigorous and effective style, requires the assumption of a new point of view, marking a point of no return.
All women, researchers, teachers, who work on a topic concerning women, and thus on an issue that directly concerns them, have often seen, at some time or another, their results affected by derision, or else by invisibility. Already the fact of “trying to remain in touch with our similarities in the world” (see Sottosopra [Upside Down], More Women Than Men) “by weaving a web of preferential relationships between women, where the experience associated with being a woman becomes stronger in mutual recognition by inventing ways to translate it into social reality,” is a mode of existing and creating the strength to impose their own ideas. When, then, this also serves to invent new tools with which to understand and analyze the reality that surrounds us, and from this perhaps the strength and courage to change it, we get the impression that something is moving in the right direction, that concrete possibilities reopen.
—Translated by Anna Culbertson
Alisa Del Re is associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Padova.
- 1I would like to thank Andrea Righi for his invaluable advice; any errors in translation are my sole responsibility. All notes are the translator’s.
- 2The authors of The Sex of Work use “actives” in this case to refer to the four out of ten workers that are women, and as such, are “lost” or not accounted for outside of the domestic sphere. The economic term “active population” refers to all persons legally able to perform work, and corresponds to a country’s labor supply.
Comments
Towards a socialist art of government: Michel Foucault’s “The mesh of power”
How surprising the events of May 1968 must have seemed to Michel Foucault is suggested by a remark made to his life-long partner Daniel Defert in January of that year, following his nomination for a faculty position at the University of Paris Nanterre. “Strange how these students speak of their relations with profs in terms of class war.”1 Interpretations of this remark will reveal a lot about one’s received image of the late philosopher. Among figures of the New Left he had earned a reputation as an anti-Marxist for disparaging public comments about Jean-Paul Sartre, and the apparent heresies of Les mots et les choses (1966).2 A younger generation of left-leaning intellectuals, activists, and agitators, exposed only to later portraits of the radical philosopher – the author of Discipline and Punish (1974), megaphone in hand, rubbing shoulders with Sartre and other ultra-gauchistes at protests in the streets of Paris – will probably find the confession disconcerting. Is it possible that he was taken off guard by the political sparks that would set alight le mouvement du 22 mars? He did, after all, arrive in Paris post festum, participating in some of the final rallies at the Sorbonne in late June.
I prefer to read the remark as a knowing reflection on the peculiarity of privileged Nanterre students, representing themselves as some revolutionary proletarian subject, locked in a battle with their professors as though the latter owned the means of production. As if to draw out the consequences of this contradiction, by 1969 Foucault began using the language of class struggle in political discussions, and publicly declaring the “retour à Marx” as the spirit of his age.3 Foucault’s political makeover occurred among a group of Trotskyist students at the University of Tunis where he was teaching philosophy in 1968. The young Tunisians inspired him to brush up on the classics of historical materialism from Marx’s own work to Rosa Luxemburg, in addition to popular figures of the New Left, including Che Guevara and the Black Panthers.4 Reflecting back on this year of strikes, course suspensions, occupations, arrests, imprisonments and torture in Tunisia, Foucault admired the moral energy and existential charge of his students’ Marxist identification more than its rigor or precision. Reversing his earlier position on the historical obsolescence of Marx, he had been convinced “that myth was necessary. A political ideology or a political perception of the world, of human relations and situations was absolutely necessary to begin the struggle.”5
These remarks immediately recall Sorel, rather than Marx; however, is it going too far to suggest that Foucault sought to capture the political imaginary of his day by spinning a new myth, an alternate “political perception of the world” with his conceptual unfolding of the term “power?”6 After all, Foucault’s key insight in this regard – power is productive rather than repressive; individuality is itself the product of a historical organization of power – is not some world-weary warning about the ruse of history. It is not to say that “power always wins.” In fact, it is a research agenda: try to historically validate the hypothesis according to which everywhere power has crushed someone in its gears, or menaced people with guns and overseers, it has done so precisely because that individual or group presented some essential threat to the exercise of that power. The oppressed, Foucault argues, also make use of an immense “network of power.” They are not passive victims of a historical process; in fact, power is historically contingent. The resistance of the oppressed has shaped the present organization of power. Revolution, according to this view, is a rare bird indeed.7
Such political reflections may be cynical, but they are not altogether foreign from the Marxist political tradition of thought. For instance, some of the above formulations are remarkably similar to the lessons Benjamin gleans from the history of the oppressed, including his idea of the “weak messianic power” of revolutionary possibility.2 Throughout Foucault’s career, he was attentive to the voices of the oppressed. His written work and its bibliographic sources are scandalous precisely to the extent that he gives less space to master thinkers – Bentham, Marx, Freud, Decartes, Smith, Machiavelli, Rousseau – than to long-forgotten voices unearthed from voluminous time spent in libraries. These were also Marx and Benjamin’s preferred methods. Foucault fondly referred to it as the “warm freemasonry of useless erudition.” Although he immersed himself in the heights of Western thought, he was far more likely to write a book about a late-19th century hermaphrodite like Herculine Barbin, than some more explicit exposition or commentary on the thought which constituted his ground. Detecting his intellectual influences demands careful reading.
Given that Foucault’s particularstar rose at the start of the mass media age, during France’s trente glorieuses, it is possible that he crafted ambivalent concepts and catchphrases with precisely this vastly expanded power of media outlets in mind. It would be a mistake to assume that he did not foresee the difficulties of philosophizing with a word that invokes the stuff of superstition. In stark contrast to the Frankfurt School and Situationist International, Foucault refrained from criticizing mass media technologies and considered them as mostly neutral instruments, which broadened the field of discursive possibilities. This was probably due to the fact that he was able to navigate and manipulate this media apparatus so deftly as a public intellectual, foreshadowing the rise of the much-loathed, television-ready nouveau philosophe. However, this too is a principled stance. Foucault’s methodology resists divisions between “high” and “low” cultural forms: Bentham is just as likely to betray his era’s paradigm of punishment as the plan for a Quaker prison in Pennsylvania or the mundane daily routine from a prison in the French provinces. With Machiavelli in mind, Foucault calls this “the local cynicism of power.”9
Foucault’s thought about power must first be situated within his conjuncture and our own if we want to articulate his conceptual problems and grasp their stakes. These contextual moves will help us unlearn the way his thought was received and reconstructed. To uncover the rational kernel of his sweeping historical argument will require de-emphasizing his descriptive language, which was often quite beautiful but has a tendency to distract. He often rhetorically distanced himself from his own neologisms, treating them as indexical placeholders for a thought rather than as rigorous theorizations. As a cipher for unlocking this admittedly particular reading of Foucault, I offer a translation of “Les mailles de pouvoir” – “The Mesh of Power” – which for reasons that still remain obscure is absent from all English-language editions of Foucault’s “collected works.”
Originally delivered in two installments at the Federal University of Bahia in 1976, Foucault’s words were recorded on cassette tapes, transcribed and published as a text, first appearing in Portugese, and translated back into French for publication in Dits et écrits– now delivered to you in English, via the Internet. The “mesh” of a net of power, the size or gauge of its holes, is a particularly apt metaphor in the Internet age, resonating with these new kinds of capture and slippage.10 The transmission of this purloined letter to you is itself the result of the development of technologies that have made it easier to circulate what Foucault once termed discours veridique, parrhesia, or truthful speech. Indeed, Foucault’s work from the late 1970s reaches us like a ticking time bomb from some forgotten past, threatening to explode a whole set of assumptions about the unity and disunity of his thought, revealing new insights and limitations.
Situating Foucault’s Intellectual Crisis and “The Mesh of Power”
The “political turn” of 1969 and the late “ethical turn” towards the “care of the self” are widely cited episodes in the intellectual history of Foucault. This periodization provides a neat tripartite division of his work into early, middle and late. In the secondary literature, these turns are noted, but their causes remain obscure. Few have attempted a reasoned and well-argued reconstruction of their significance, and most studies of the subject compensate for such lacunae with gossip and speculation.
These difficulties have only been compounded by problems of reception. French historian François Cusset considers the “American adventure with French Theory” to be a paradox of comparative intellectual history; although “Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze & co.” were embraced on this side of the Atlantic and packaged together “for what was seen as their anti-Marxism… they were banned from their home country under the charges of a perverse collusion with the worst of leftist Marxism.”11
For various reasons, the American reception of Foucault emerged as the hegemonic one, and his concepts have crystallized into so many political ontologies – “normativity” in queer theory, “biopolitics” and war in the works of Giorgio Agamben, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri – but none of these ontologies responds to our political-economic horizon of low or no-growth capitalism and its implications for state power, social institutions, and resistance struggles. Indeed, the period characterized by bubblenomics, ostensible erosions of state sovereignty and the diffuse resistance offered by alter-globo and anti-war multitudes, which once gave these Foucauldian assessments of the conjuncture a certain bite in the late 1990s and early 2000s, has now capsized into a situation of economic meltdown, consolidations of old-fashioned class power, sovereign debt crises, uneven reassertions of Euro-American military might and emergent struggles over austerity measures in the US and Europe alongside popular rebellions against authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
The American heyday of French Theory now appears like a blip on the radar between the economic downturn, debt crisis, youth unemployment and Mideast uprisings of the 1970s, which was Foucault’s conjuncture, and the economic chain reaction set off by the American banks in 2008, political upheavals,youth unemployment and Arab Spring which constitutes our own. His political thought from this earlier period of economic crisis – especially his thought concerning neoliberalism as an emergent art of government for managing the crisis tendencies of capital – merit a careful reappraisal in light of the present conjuncture.
Most crucially for a reassessment of Foucault’s thought, all of his public lectures at the Collège de France have now been published.These lessons, which had previously circulated on bootleg cassettes within a limited milieu of connoisseurs, have now become a public record of Foucault’s intellectual trajectory from 1971 to his death in 1984. Although his will stipulated that there were to be “no posthumous publications” and Foucault admitted to being “allergic” to the recording devices cluttering his lectern, he understood their importance: “word always gets out,” he affirms in a lecture from 1976.12 Indeed, with these publications, his lessons are no longer subject to the demagoguery and occultation that so frequently accompanies arcana. The candid form of the lectures reveals a remarkable transitional period from 1976 to 1979 in which Foucault experienced a profound intellectual crisis and began a project of self-criticism, before turning to the more ethical concerns that would characterize his late period.
We may now be in the position to evaluate the intellectual significance of this moment, and venture a guess as to why the ever-prolific Foucault stopped publishing from 1976 to 1983.13 Does the thought that emerges from this period of intellectual crisis and self-criticism bring into focus the insights and limitations of Foucault’s earlier attempts to theorize power?Does his emphasis upon problems of statecraft, historical consciousness, and political economy during this period represent a departure from or a culmination of his earlier studies of the internal physiognomy of institutions such as the military, prisons, medicine and psychiatry?
No matter how many college freshmen have their minds blown by a virginal voyage through Foucault’s work, his problematic and its familiar constellation of sexy neologisms, “biopolitics,” “panopticism,” and “governmentality,” not to mention the dark atmospherics of a finely-meshed “network of power” in which “there is no outside,” have been in circulation for nearly thirty-five years.These terms have accreted a meaning that cannot be found in the original copy. This language and its many political valances – liberal, anarchist, radical – has gone in and out of fashion. The vintage of most “Theory people” can be ascertained from their preferred (or loathed) Foucauldian jargon. Perhaps with some distance from this period, we are now in a position to evaluate his remarkable and oscillating attempts to think politics without recourse to bourgeois conceptualizations of the state, law or rights.His old enemies – psychiatry, universities, prisons, humanism, rights discourse, and the remorseless compulsion to give an account of one’s sexuality – have continued to proliferate and expand alongside the growing popularity of his analyses of them.This paradoxical situation arouses the suspicion that these institutions of power are not threatened by the attempt to reawaken the historical memory of their entry into the world, dripping with blood and dirt.In the absence of the social movements that once contested these institutions, Foucault’s historical presentation up through the mid 1970s risks becoming a confessed critique, an advanced kind of agitation and propaganda for a struggle that experienced defeat and pyrrhic victories.
This conclusion may be premature, but Foucault admitted as much around the time that he delivered “Mesh of Power” to radical students in Brazil. While editing the final proofs of History of Sexuality, volume 1, Foucault publicly professed to his auditors, as students are called at the Collège de France, that he was suffering something of an intellectual crisis. In his first lecture of 1976, Foucault begins the course by questioning both the relevance and coherence of his intellectual project. He worries that his research agenda “had no continuity” and was “always falling into the same rut, the same themes, the same concepts,” ultimately fearing that “it’s all leading us nowhere.” Characterizing his genealogical method as an “insurrection of knowledges” against “scientific discourse embodied in the University” – and here the attack on his old mentor, Louis Althusser, is barely concealed – Foucault confronts the historicity of his own thought and the shifting cultural status of both the University and Marxism in France. He states that his work “was quite in keeping with a certain period; with the very limited period we have been living through for the last ten or fifteen years.” A certain number of “changes in the conjuncture” suggest to him that “perhaps the battle no longer looks quite the same.”14
Such sober assessments give one pause. Discipline and Punish had just been published the previous year to great acclaim following an intense period of activism around prisons in France. The activities of the Prison Information Group (Groupe d’information sur les prisons, GIP) brought about successful reforms of France’s sentencing practices and penal system by fomenting an unprecedented wave of prison strikes, forcing the apparatus to become more open and transparent. In autumn of 1971, twenty prisons across France simultaneously exploded into open revolt against their cages and masters.
The success of the GIP was due in large part to the fact that many of its agitators had themselves been imprisoned for political activities – thus the criminalization of revolutionary activity by the French state wound up politicizing crime.15 In a curiously Maoist adaptation of the tradition of worker’s inquiries, the GIP smuggled surveys to prisoners to discover weak points in the system and find out what demands they would make for their reform or abolition. Prisoners forced analogous reforms in the US, due to the resistance and litigation of members of the Nation of Islam who established an unprecedented jurisprudence pertaining to prisoner’s rights in the 1970s.16 During this era, French prisons permitted no visitors, unlike American prisons, and remained something of an information black hole. Foucault first visited a prison while in the US; he toured the Attica Correctional Facility following its uprising and repression.
Due to his growing popularity, Foucault’s public lectures had become so uncomfortable and over-crowded as to permit little exchange or contact with students.Politically, the heady days of post-68 French ultra-gauchisme and “new social movements” had begun to wane. The milieu with whom Foucault had organized and demonstrated in the early seventies began to dissolve. Some of these Maoist comrades became the nouveaux philosophes, celebrity academics preoccupied with totalitarianism or theological concerns, citing Foucault himself as their inspiration. The Stalinized Marxism of the French Communist Party (Partie communiste française, PCF) had also begun to decompose. The PCF had entered an alliance with François Mitterand’s new Socialist Party, (Partie socialiste, PS), signing a common programme in 1973. The PCF abandoned all references to the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and was forced to reevaluate the legacy of Lenin during the 1976 firestorm surrounding the French publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago, which detailed the abuses of the Soviet Union’s forced labor system.The alliance between the PCF and PS would propel Mitterrand into the presidency in 1981.All of this amounted to a tectonic shift in the intellectual and political terrain of the post-68 Left in France.
The conjuncture coming to a close in the mid-1970s had opened with the Algerian War of Independence in 1954, which did more to negate than construct a field of politics and intellectual activity in France – Sartre, de Beauvoir and Les temps modernes were exceptions in this regard. Reports of the brutality and torture of the gendarmes were a major blow to the tradition of la République and its supposedly universal values.17 Following the 1957 Battle of Algiers, 1958 coup d’etat and military junta in Algeria, the collapse of the Fourth Republic, and Charles de Gaulle’s return to the head of a much strengthened executive power, the non-Communist left was arguing that the Communist and Socialist parties had failed to use their moral and political high ground following the resistance to Nazi occupation to establish a clear direction and program. According to this view, they no longer represented the historical interests or consciousness of the French working class. Citing the astonishingly low union membership in France and the wildcat strikes of ‘53 and ‘55, André Giacometti writes that “[t]he bulk of the workers is unorganized, and the real life of the working-class takes place outside of their scope.”18 Spontaneity was, in keeping with long-standing political legacy of French radicalism, still the nation’s only revolutionary hope. Sartre and other members of the non-Communist left saw the party’s support of the Soviet Union’s intervention in Hungary and the party’s tacit endorsement of the Algerian War as evidence of either a conservative turn in the traditional French working class or a reformist and integrationist turn of its official political organs, or both. Many intellectuals of the non-Communist left no longer considered “the Party” to be a revolutionary subject. In this regard, Althusser was the exception.
The rapid expansion of the university system during the postwar economic and demographic boom, along with opposition to the Vietnam War, had established a new political actor that would become essential to the struggle in 1968: youth in general, and students in particular. An increasingly educated population created an historically unprecedented market for cultural journalism, which lent non-party intellectuals greater power and influence.The non-party Marxist tradition in France, as represented by the work of Socialisme ou Barbarie and the Situationist International, had reached the conclusion that revolutionary agitation would have to outflank established unions and parties if it was to galvanize the population.
Decolonization struggles and political breakthroughs in the Third World, above all China and Cuba, led to significant revisions of the theory of revolution.Regis Debray published Revolution in the Revolution in 1967, proposing foquismo– a viral theory of how an armed revolutionary vanguard could distribute hotbeds of discontent throughout a population, fomenting a general fever of insurrection – based on the Che Guevara’s experience of guerrilla warfare during the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Beneath the banner of a “revolution in everyday life” and a renewed emphasis upon the concept of alienation, Marxism became a theoretical home for new social movements. The events of May 1968 dovetailed these already existing political currents.
After May-June 1968, the revolution was no longer considered a matter of contesting the ownership of the means of production alone. State-managed capitalism was not a solution to the social problems identified by the new revolutionaries. The division of labor, and especially the authority structure of managers, union bosses, inspectors, and functionaries in place to keep workers in line had to be contested.
In the pages of Les temps modernes, Andre Gorz interpreted May ‘68 as demonstrating the revolutionary horizon in Western Europe, and blamed its failure on the PCF and CGT. Les temps modernes undertook an explicit critique of Leninism from 1969 to 1971 and attacked institutions from a radical democratic perspective, exhorting its readers to “destroy the University” as part of the struggle against the division of labor. Not only the abode of production, but also those superstructural apparatuses that reproduce racial and class divisions, create divisions of labor, support traditional roles for women, and prop up citizen/non-citizen distinctions had to be assaulted.19
The extra-parliamentary politics of the extreme Left of this period were announced by the 1969 text Vers la guerre civile (Towards Civil War), by individuals who would later found the Gauche prolétarienne. May ‘68 had, according to this view, “placed revolution and class struggle at the center of every strategy. Without playing the role of prophet: Revolution is France’s horizon from ‘70 to ’72”; the conditions of possibility for such a struggle were identified as the “the proletarianization of the mass movement.”20 Vers la guerre civile emphasizes the exemplary use of illegal direct action, the revolutionary potential of the lumpenproletariat, and the strategic importance of the division of labor for the maintenance of discipline and hierarchy. Armed struggle is invoked as the radical legacy of the French working class’s resistance to Nazi occupation.21
The text provided a programme for the Gauche prolétarienne (Proletarian Left, 1968-1973) which was considered “a greater threat to state security than any other left-wing group” by the head of the renseignements généraux (General Intelligence).22 With groupuscules scattered throughout France, theirs was a politics that combined voluntarism, radical democracy and spontaneity. The new figures of this revolution were the immigrant worker, ouvrier spécialisé, and prison inmate. Imprisonment, state repression, and union bureaucracies were the forces that had, in the terminology of this grouping, “proletarianized” the mass movement. The French state banned the sale of Gauche prolétarienne’s broadsheets in public spaces, which led to an engagement with intellectuals of the non-communist left. Daniel Defert joined and invited Foucault to participate in this group’s activities. Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Foucault and other public intellectuals were asked to continue distribution of the broadsheets on the assumption that the Republic would not arrest its lumières. Indeed, distribution continued unmolested. Foucault’s collaboration with Gauche prolétarienne eventually resulted in the founding of the Prison Information Group.
As history would have it, the warm afterglow of May ’68 in France turned out to be “a stillborn revolution – what should have been the turning point of its modern history that, as in 1848, failed to turn.”23 Reflecting on this period with his characteristic wit, Foucault’s 1976 course hinges on an inversion of Clauswitz’s famous aphorism that war is politics continued through other means, by tracing the genealogy of the view that “politics is a continuation of war by other means.”Although the theme immediately recalls the prevailing political language of a period of extreme left militancy, Foucault has deeper philosophical and historical problems in mind. In the discourses of the 17th and 18th century aristocracy and revolutionary bourgeoisie, he attempts to track the entry of race and class war into historical reflection, articulating the central paradox of the “theory of right” within which modern political struggles from the French Revolution to contemporary human rights discourse become intelligible. Rights talk always appeals to an imaginary history of ancient privileges which, Foucault suggests, erect a whole series of distinctively modern political oppositions between the individual and society.
Historical thought is thus politically useful to struggles over governmental priorities and reciprocal obligations only to the extent that it emphasizes one of two discursive paradigms. On the one hand, the conceptualization of politics as war privileges the moment of struggle, the moment of domination: “what is being put forward as a principle for the interpretation of society and its visible order is the confusion of violence, passions, hatreds, rages, resentments, and bitterness.”24 On the other hand, one may privilege the moment of universality and peace, the founding of cities and laws, according to which all history would be nothing other than praise of Rome. Foucault considers these to be the reactionary and liberal discourses of history – here “reactionary” in the strict sense of reaction to an ascendant bourgeois liberalism – reaching their highest philosophical articulations in Hegel and Kant respectively, a struggle for recognition or perpetual peace.25 This dilemma and its bloody 20th century history of national conflict and state racism is, according to Foucault, the reef upon which the concept of power as domination, repression, and war comes to grief.
Thus, Foucault returns to pre-Marxist theorists of class struggle – the Diggers, Henri de Boullainvilliers and Abbé Siyès – to show that the rhetoric of class war has certain genealogical affinities with pre-scientific and aristocratic theories of race. The later crystallization of scientific theories of race also have, as their immediate antecedent, certain 19th century pseudo-scientific racializations of lower classes.26 Instead of a “war-repression schema” Foucault calls for a theory of political power as essentially “productive,” that is as a set of techniques for regulating human populations and making bodily comportment more efficient. The lectures from 1976 culminate in an analysis of the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and the forced labor system of the USSR as productive deployments of the power to manage populations. It is an attempt to demonstrate the continuity of these politics with those of the Enlightenment project: what establishes their common ground and provides a grid of intelligibility for this history is not, as in the Frankfurt School, the “rational irrationality” of capitalism; it is rather the phenomenon of population, as the living substratum of capital accumulation and modern political power.
After a year-long sabbatical in 1977, during which time Bernard-HenriLévy and Andre Glucksmann take to the airwaves and television screens promoting their books La barbarie à visage humain (Barbarism with a Human Face, 1977) and Les maîtres penseurs (The Master Thinkers, 1977) with totalitarianism-mongering, Foucault’s lectures change course. This is also the year of Foucault’s reportage on the Iranian Revolution. He becomes increasingly circumspect regarding his earlier descriptive language. He explicitly abandons his claim that ours is a “disciplinary society” in 1978, arguing that power now operates through more subtle liberal techniques promoting freedom of various kinds.27 He abandons the words “biopolitics” and “biopower” after the 1979 course, and concludes that they were nothing other than an attempt to grasp “‘liberalism’… as a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization which obeys – and this is what is specific about it – the internal rule of maximum economy.”28 Perhaps after cultural revolution and de-industrialization, the factory discipline no longer provided the blueprint for power in advanced capitalist societies.
Future French editions of Discipline and Punish will quietly remove the phrase “carceral archipelago,” no doubt because Foucault wished to distance himself from the gulagism of Glucksmann and Lévy. His lectures turn to an account of the historical emergence of the concept of raison d’état and political economic thought as practical and reflective schemas for the “art of government” in the 17th and 18th centuries. He returns to the classics of political economy in order to make a remarkable analysis of Quesnay’s Tableau économique, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and the birth of neoliberalism. At times he seems to address himself directly to the nouveaux philosophes, confronting a caricature of his own thought on “security”: he criticizes right- and left-wing “state phobia” as eliding, “thanks to some play on words,” the difference between social security and concentration camps; “the requisite specificity of analysis is diluted.”29 The lectures then veer into an analysis of the various regimes of truth-telling among the early Christian desert fathers and conclude with an analysis of the practice of Parrhesia among the ancient Greeks, before Foucault’s project and life are suddenly cut short by AIDS in 1984. The above intellectual history suggests that, following his intellectual crisis and the closure of certain political horizons in France, Foucault refused to provide a unified political philosophy and turned to more explicitly “Marxist” themes when Marxism was being equated with barbarism and had became unfashionable for public intellectuals.
Foucault’s Concept of Power and its Relation to Marx
In the wake of the May ’68 uprising, the French ultra-left attempted to circumvent the Communist Party as the vehicle for the transformation of society, and sought to displace the state-capital nexus of classical political theory by proposing a radically expansive revolutionary subject. Foucault’s thought from the early 1970s attempts to capture these disparate and contradictory political currents with a concept of pouvoir, or “power,” which he claims to have developed out of the work of Bentham and Marx. This “power” posits the biological and social phenomenon of population and the physical movements of the human body not only as the economic substrate of production, but also the political ground of contention and neutralization. These kinds of knowledge, or general intellect – interventions in the collective social and biological metabolism, a Newtonian analytics of bodily comportment, movement and habitus – make possible wholly unprecedented kinds of political intervention, new forms of social engineering and control, that create a productive machine out of human multiplicity, a multiplicity previously wasted by political power.30 Foucault is trying to think about how a modern political field, different from absolutism, forms, takes shape, and allows for capital accumulation to take place, while undercutting worker militancy by providing the proletariat with “security” (Polizewissenschaft) – i.e., modest reforms that increase life expectancy, encourage family life, and so on. This thought implies that Marx abandoned the classical political economists’ formulations of the problem of population, only to rediscover the phenomenon of population as class struggle and labor-power.Although this political-economic conceptualization of “power” responds to Foucault’s particular conjuncture of renewed interest in Marx, and the demand made by new social movements for a more expansive model of the revolutionary subject, it is not reducible to such.
By conceiving of a properly capitalist political modernity in terms of the productive management of human populations and bodies, Foucault strategically returns to Marx in order to short circuit the tendency of bourgeois thought – and of many Marxists, for that matter! – to reify the “state apparatus” by conceiving of power in vulgar terms of property ownership, seizure of property and alienation.This is, according to Foucault, a profoundly anthropomorphic conceptualization of the political field. Political power ultimately appears as a conspiracy of interests which receive representation in the state apparatus; whereas power actually resides in the coordination, circulation, and productive employment of a multiplicity of forces without any “master plan” or inventor.The government of these forces is not provided by some central committee of the ruling class; it is provided by a non-subjective intentionality or abstract compulsion – the principle of “maximum economy,” the compulsion to work for someone else to reproduce your life – which provides the political field with a formal unity and principal of intelligibility.
Foucault also returns to Marx in order to neutralize the tendency of many fellow travelers on the Left to conceive of power in terms of suppression, which Foucault considered the political paradigm of an early modern transition to capitalism. He held that both tendencies of thought – power as ownership, power as suppression – ultimately affirmed the liberal model of society according to which “society is represented as a contractual association of isolated juridical subjects.” To claim such positions for Marx is to abandon his critique of classical political economy and merely “re-subscribes us to the bourgeois theory of power.” In the polemical judgement pronounced in “Mesh of Power,” these alternate conceptions of power “Rousseauify Marx,” as if the social form of capitalism were some contract-based free-association of individuals air-dropped from the heavens, forever abolishing man’s more perfect natural state.According to Foucault: “The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline.’”31
The above passage immediately recalls Marx’s language from the introduction to Grundrisse.32 Foucault is attempting to trace the genealogy of a social form in which commodity relations predominate by grasping the historical specificity of the isolated individuals of exchange. This transformation is not the inevitable outcome of the technological development of the forces of production. Instead, the moment of transition has to be understood as a contingent outcome of a new form of politics, which Foucault calls, again following Marx, “discipline.” The relevant passages in Discipline and Punish explicitly cite Marx’s discussion of “cooperation” in Capital, volume 1, and his exchanges with Engels about the origins of factory discipline in military discipline. Foucault asks how a tributary sovereign power to levy a tax – on produce, blood, trade, etc. – transitions to a productive economic power generative of surplus. The thread of this thought about the origins of capitalism proper – rather than the origins of mere market exchange – and its careful play on Marxist language can be followed through all of Foucault’s published works, though his citations and insinuations are rarely as obvious as they appear in “Mesh of Power” or Discipline and Punish.
Presented very schematically, consider:
1. His analyses of the confinement of paupers and the mad in the same workhouses inMadness and Civilization (1961).
2.His concern for the passage from an analysis of wealth to political economy in The Order of Things.
3. His analysis of the importance of discipline in the development of the forces of production in Discipline and Punish.33
4. His assertion that human life is the real material substrate of an expanding and productive deployment of political power in The History of Sexuality(1976).
5. His very explicit analyses of Physiocratic thought and the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Security, Territory, Population (1978).
6. Finally, his presentation of the problem of the political subject of neoliberalism, versus that of classical political economy in The Birth of Biopolitics (1979).
These are not merely incidental passages or asides. They are in fact quite crucial to understanding Foucault’s central historical claims; each of them returns us to Marx.
Perhaps generous minds will grant that Foucault was a careful reader of Marx, a scholar who appreciated the latter’s enormously significant historical account of the capitalist mode of production. But what would it mean to argue that Foucault’s thought expresses some essential underlying political and intellectual affinity for Marx’s project – one possibly even deserving of the moniker “Marxist”? There are many dangers to this kind of interpretation. It must be attentive to Foucault’s strong political cynicism. It requires a full reconstruction of Marx’s thought as well as Foucault’s, and there is no space for that discussion here. But this reading strategy faces other objections as well, considering his well known critique of the author-function. Wouldn’t calling his thought “Marxist,” even granting a bit of ironical distance from such a claim, be to engage in what Jacques Lacan termed “University Discourse,” the use of proper nouns, a chain of signifiers in place of actual thought or truth?34
Such an operation may be justifiable in Foucault’s own terms. Foucault makes the case in “What is an Author?” that certain founders of discourse, such as Marx and Freud, open up entirely new fields of inquiry, exploding the limits of what is sayable. Foucault considers their thought to be infinitely productive. New applications and transformations of such thought have the quality of “reactivations,” for the philosopher avails himself of a new zeitgeist only in order to clear the cobwebs away from old problems.35 Such claims are close to Sartre’s argument in the introduction to Critique of Dialectical Reason that Marx is the untranscendable horizon of our thought.
The wager of the following is that it is precisely in the spirit of a reactivation of Marx – rather than a faithful recitation of a dead letter, or some more thorough critical reconstruction – that Foucault pursued his historical analyses of power. Foucault’s resulting body of work is a testament to just how fruitful or fruitless such an approach may be. Ultimately, we must admit the possibility that his glib dismissals of Marx were facetious. To admit this possibility is to suggest that, by misunderstanding or rejecting Foucault, self-professed Marxists are taking the bait. They risk demonstrating that they haven’t understood something essential in their master’s discourse.
Although Foucault was under no illusion that he had supplanted Marx, he may have considered himself an inheritor of Marx’s project. I quote his words on the subject from a 1978 interview with a Japanese Marxist at length and without comment:
So long as we consider Marxism to be a unity [ensemble] of the forms of appearance of power connected, in one way or another, to the words of Marx [la parole de Marx], then to systematically examine each and every one of these forms of appearance is the least that a man living in the second half of the 20th century could do. Even today we are passively, scornfully, fearfully and interestedly submitting to this power, whereas it’s necessary to completely liberate ourselves from it. This must be systematically examined with the genuine sentiment that we are completely free in relation to Marx. Of course, to be free with regards to Marxism does not imply returning again to the source to show what Marx actually said, grasping his words [sa parole] in their purest state, and treating them like the one and only law. It certainly doesn’t mean demonstrating, for example, with the Althusserian method, how the gospel [la véritable parole] of the prophet Marx has been misinterpreted. These formal questions are unimportant. However, reconfirming the functional unity of the forms of appearance of power, which are connected to Marx’s own statements [la parole de Marx lui-même], strikes me as a worthy endeavor.36
Political Questions
Three crucial questions are raised by “Mesh of Power.” The first concerns Foucault’s curious claim that he derives his theory of power, at least in part, from the second volume of Capital. The second concerns “the problem of population” as the concept which gives Foucault’s disparate historical studies a thematic unity, despite his protests to the contrary;the problem of population returns us to the question of the transition from feudalism to capitalism and that of any uncertain contemporary transition out of capitalism.The third concerns his response to the question raised at the very end of the lecture by a female auditor, which will return us to the themes of Foucault’s historical conjuncture and the problem of his reception.
1. The question of Capital. Marx’s theory of the expanded reproduction of capital is important because he is attempting to describe the unity of disparate social processes. Although market society has anarchic qualities, there is a unity to the social form of production. Marx avoided the deadlocks of classical political economy with the concept of labor-power. Labour, as such, does not circulate on the market. The potential for labor –la force de travail, Arbeitskraft – is what circulates. Labor as force, as potential, as power is exchangeable according to abstract equivalence regardless of its particular uses because the market establishes a concrete minimum standard for its value: the labor necessary to reproduce labor as human life. Hence, “living labour.”
Although it is important to maintain a distinction between the two, Foucault unfolds “power,” as a category of thought, in a way analogous to Marx’s unfolding of the category of “capital” in his theory of expanded reproduction.“Capital” is invested in means of production, infrastructure, and the built environment just as “capital” is invested in living labour. Without either circuit, or department, “capital” cannot realize the value crystalized in commodities. This double movement is what differentiates capitalism from mere rent extraction; it is what historically and categorically distinguishes “relative” from “absolute” surplus value extraction. It is the source of capital’s periodic, and perhaps terminal, crisis tendencies.
For Foucault, “power” is a unity of both power and resistance. “Power” sustains and guarantees the life of human populations just as “power” is invested in the organization of a factory, the plan for a prison, or the organization of city streets according to a grid.The productive organization of human bodies and populations is a technology, he argues, just as important to the mode of production as the machines whose smooth operation it allows. He gave this term “power” a political significance outside the abode of production, as an alternative to representational theories of political power, but locates the origins of this “power” in the abode of production and in certain early modern military innovations. Accordingly, the divisions set up by the “power” Foucault describes are not reducible to those of class. In the lectures from ‘78 he argues that political technology of security distinguishes between “essential” and “non-essential” levels of the population in order to determine acceptable levels of risk. That is, Physiocratic reforms pertaining to grain shortages were not attempts to eliminate starvation. They were attempts to use market mechanisms to distribute scarcity within isolated pockets of the population, attempts to protect against mass hunger and scarcity which threatened political instability. The political transformations he isolates – pertaining to sanitation, housing, epidemic disease, insurance, mass immigration, welfare, and so on – emerge quite late in the 19th century, as a result of political reforms and exigencies that had only just begun in Marx’s time.
2. The question of population. Genealogy’s ability to juxtapose radically different conjunctures enables a thought about the transition from feudalism to capitalism which sheds light on the present moment in a way that other histories cannot. Theorizing the problem of population caused Foucault to revise his earlier claims about power; the concept of “security” represents a return to political economy and a more careful periodization of “discipline” as internal to a transition to a capitalist mode of production, after which discipline is in the service of more liberal arts of government. Foucault locates the epistemic and political break of modernity in the thought of the Physiocrats and their historical role within the French absolutist state. In an attempt to think the radically incommensurable, Foucault poses the following problem: within a largely backwards and populous region of Europe, in which a set of class relations particular to the French absolutist state forestalled the full transition to capitalism until the 19th century, a properly modern political economic theory of agricultural productivity emerges in the 18th century due to a succession of demographic crises which directly threatened monarchical power and created a remarkably polarized political field. However, this new art of economic government ‘remained imprisoned…within the forms of the administrative monarchy.’37 The population, according to Foucault, provides a unifying – if not entirely unified – field of practice for the transition from an analysis of wealth to political economy, from natural history to biology, from general grammar to philology.38
I would like to suggest that Foucault calls this new organization of power “security” because he is historically situated at the moment in which the rising post-war demand for housing credit in the United States required the structured financing of mortgage pools in the 1970s: the securitization of debt. Such developments enabled Foucault to venture the hypothesis that the utopian programme of neo-liberalism is not “a super market society, but an enterprise society. “Thus, he conceived of this new phase of capitalist development, inaugurating our own late capitalist era, in terms of a transformation in the management of political danger and market risk.39 In Foucault’s final analysis, neo-liberalism is not a reactivation of the practice of laissez faire, for the state must “intervene on society so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulative role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its objective will become possible… a general regulation of society by the market.”40
However, what does Foucault allow us to see about the birth of neoliberalism that prevailing accounts of the crisis of the 1970s in terms of financialization, deindustrialization, and the consolidation of class power fail to bring into view?In unequivocal terms, Foucault asserts: “Neo-liberalism is not Adam Smith; neo-liberalism is not market society; neo-liberalism is not the Gulag on the insidious scale of capitalism.”41 For the Marxist tradition, it was the discussion of “commodity fetishism” in Book I of Capital, volume 1,and the infamous “tendency of the rate of profit to fall” from volume 3, which prevented them from grasping the significance of this new form of governmental power. In an analysis of the Frankfurt School, which could be mobilized to criticize contemporary theorists of the grim arcana of “biopower” today, Foucault argues that it was Max Weber’s influence that displaced Marx’s problematic of the contradictory logic of capital in 20th century Germany. The problem of “the irrational rationality of capitalist society” would – in the wake of Nazism, political exile and the destruction unleashed by the second world war – motivate the Marxists of the Frankfurt School and the ordoliberals of the Freiburg School to criticize the irrational excesses of capitalism, rather than analyzing its forward march through internal contradictions and crises. Foucault concludes that, for both schools, Nazism represented “the epistemological and political ‘Road to Damascus’… the field of adversity that they would have to define and cross in order to reach their objective.” As for the political outcome: “history had it that in 1968 the last disciples of the Frankfurt School clashed with the police of a government inspired by the Freiburg School, thus finding themselves on opposite sides of the barricades.”42 Neo-liberalism and its proponents seem to have emerged – from the barricades and occupations in Berkeley, Paris or Frankfurt – the victor of this historic clash of forces.
In Foucault’s view, actually existing socialism represented a hypertrophied rationalization of existing arts of government.It had proposed strong economic and historical paradigms but failed to provide a “reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes and objectives of governmental action.”In the absence of a governmental art of its own, Foucault argues, socialism was forced by its historical struggles to connect up with liberalism, on the one hand – as a “corrective and a palliative to internal dangers” – or to a large administrative apparatus and police state, as in the Soviet Union, on the other.43
3. The question of hysterical discourse. Foucault refused hysterical discourse.He said it was simplistic, used by reactionaries, demagogues, and racists, and obscured the important historical questions. In confronting a caricature of his own thought, Foucault had to appeal to Marx. This moment in “Mesh of Power” epitomizes Foucault’s intellectual trajectory after the crisis of 1976. Returning to Marx was far more crucial during a reactionary period than during one of revolutionary upheaval.
Like Engels at the close of the 19th century, Foucault spent his final years contemplating early Christian movements and their practices of free love.44 Foucault’s response to talk of bathhouse closures in New York, San Francisco, and Montréal was a principled stance rather than the hysterics that characterized the mainstream gay movement’s responses. In an interview with Gai pied (Gay Foot) from 1982, Foucault did not require a theory of “heteronormativity” to oppose gay bathhouse closures. It was simply a matter of opposing this extension of police power on principle:
it is necessary to be intransigent, we cannot make a compromise between tolerance and intolerance, we cannot but be on the side of tolerance. It isn’t a matter of searching for an equilibrium between the persecutor and persecuted. We cannot give ourselves the objective of winning millimeter by millimeter. On this issue of the relation between police and sexual pleasure, it’s necessary to go the distance and take principled positions.45
A Socialist Art of Government
Foucault appropriately considered the “utopian dream” of neoliberalism to be an “enterprise society,” a society which treats human life and its risks as income streams. It encourages ownership and guarantees a minimum social safety net in order to prevent the formation of a class in open rebellion against their technocratic masters. Where these soft touches do not work, police power is deployed. Foucault identifies the ideological basis of this political economic system as a “culture of danger,” a dark glamor in which the risks of this system provide occasion for a moralizing discourse. This is the stuff of the 24-hour news cycle and Andy Warhol’s “superstars.” We are now observing this utopian dream come to grief on its own conditions of possibility: the defeat of class struggles of the 1970s and deindustrialization of the West have created a population problem internal to advanced capitalist states analogous to that of the surplus humanity in developing countries.46 This is the political horizon of the Occupy movement, and its professed solidarity with events in Tunis and Egypt is not merely hubris. The Left is once again caught in a tactical stranglehold, forced to defend the most modest of social safety nets – public universities, welfare, pensions etc. – against neoliberal shock therapy.
By returning to Marx’s problematic of the population as a central contradiction of capital, Foucault provides insights into our political moment. What happens to power when human life becomes superfluous to the mode of production? The lessons Foucault derives from the experience of the 1970s suggest that such questions will be decided by a struggle, but we need more than just struggle to challenge neoliberalism. We need a new art of government. The conclusion to the above mentioned lecture from 1979 is a challenge to the historical materialist tradition: “the importance of the text in socialism is commensurate with the lacuna constituted by the absence of a socialist art of government.”Foucault then asks, “What governmentality is possible as a strictly, intrinsically, and autonomously socialist governmentality?” Doubting that a socialist art of government can be found in the history of socialism or its texts, Foucault concludes: “It must be invented.”47
- 1Michel Foucault, “Chronology,” Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975, eds. Daniel Defert, François Ewald (Paris: Jacques Lagrange, 2001), 42. Translations from French are mine unless otherwise noted.
- 2Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” (1940).
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Ugh. Had this whole thing formatted except 2 footnotes, and my netbook crashed. That's never happened to me in the 5 years of putting stuff in the library.
Issue 3: Workers’ Inquiry
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Workers’ inquiry: a genealogy
Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi's exhaustive look at 'workers' inquiries' and how they were practiced and theorized by the Johnson-Forest Tendency, Socialisme Ou Barbarie and operaismo groups.
Exact and Positive Knowledge: Marx’s Questionnaire
In 1880, La Revue socialiste asked an aging Karl Marx to draft a questionnaire to be circulated among the French working class. Called “A Workers’ Inquiry,” it was a list of exactly 101 detailed questions, inquiring about everything from meal times to wages to lodging.1 On a closer look, there seems to be a progression in the line of questioning. The first quarter or so ask seemingly disinterested questions about the trade, the composition of the workforce employed at the firm, and the general conditions of the shop, while the final quarter generally shifts to more explicitly political questions about oppression, “resistance associations,” and strikes.
The questionnaire began with a few prefatory reflections on the project as a whole. These fifteen or so lines basically amounted to a single principle: learning from the working class itself. Only the working class could provide meaningful information on its own existence, just as only the working class itself could build the new world. But behind this simple call lay a number of complex motivations, objectives, and intentions, making workers’ inquiry – this seemingly modest desire to learn from the workers – a highly ambiguous, multifaceted, and indeterminate project from the very start.
At its most rudimentary level, workers’ inquiry was to be the empirical study of workers, a commonly neglected object of investigation at the time. “Not a single government, whether monarchy or bourgeois republic, has yet ventured to undertake a serious inquiry into the position of the French working class,” Marx lamented. “But what a number of investigations have been undertaken into crises – agricultural, financial, industrial, commercial, political!”
Since these other forms of investigation – like those endless government inquiries into this or that crisis – simply could not produce any real knowledge of the working class, some new form of investigation had to be developed. Its objective, as those hundred questions reveal, would be to amass as much factual material about workers as possible. The goal, Marx wrote, should be to acquire “an exact and positive knowledge of the conditions in which the working class – the class to whom the future belongs – works and moves.”
Of course, even in Marx’s time, health inspectors and others had already begun to undertake this kind of investigation into the world of the working class. But not only were these official investigations unsystematic and partial, they treated workers as mere objects of study, in the manner of the soil and seeds of those well-investigated agricultural crises. What set worker’s inquiry apart from these other empirical studies was the belief that the working class itself knew more about capitalist exploitation than anyone else. It is the “workers in town and country,” Marx thought, who “alone can describe with full knowledge the misfortunes from which they suffer.”
With this brief intervention, Marx established a fundamental epistemological challenge. What was the relationship between the workers’ knowledge of their exploitation, and the scientific analysis of the “laws of motion” of capitalist society? In Capital, he devoted many pages to documenting the labor process, yet this seemed to be part of a logical exposition which began with the critical exposition of value, an abstract category of bourgeois political economy. He nevertheless maintained in his 1873 afterword that “In so far as such a critique represents a class, it can only represent the class whose historical task is the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production and the final abolition of all classes – the proletariat.”2 Louis Althusser, in his famous Preface to the French translation, suggested that this meant that Capital could only be understood from a specifically proletarian viewpoint, since that is “the only viewpoint which makes visible the reality of the exploitation of wage labour power, which constitutes the whole of capitalism.”3 Yet Marx’s own view remains unclear. Was workers’ inquiry a means of accessing the proletarian viewpoint? Was it simply the workers’ participation in generating a universal knowledge?
What is abundantly clear is that Marx had a high estimation of the autonomous activity of the working class. Not only would workers provide knowledge about the nature of capitalism, they would be the only ones who could overthrow it: only the workers in town and country, “and not saviors sent by providence, can energetically apply the healing remedies for the social ills which they are prey.” This practice of workers’ inquiry, then, implied a certain connection between proletarian knowledge and proletarian politics. Socialists would begin by learning from the working class about its own material conditions. Only then would they be able to articulate strategies, compose theories, and draft programs. Inquiry would therefore be the necessary first step in articulating a historically appropriate socialist project.
The practice of disseminating the inquiry also represented a step towards organizing this project, by establishing direct links with workers. “It is not essential to reply to every question,” Marx wrote. “The name of the working man or woman who is replying will not be published without special permission but the name and address should be given so that if necessary we can send communication.” For some, this attempt to forge real contacts with the workers was in fact a genuine intention of the project.
Of course, Marx mentions nothing about building organizations in this short article. However, he would later indicate that research and organization had a close relationship. In 1881, just a year after penning this questionnaire, Marx received a letter from a young socialist who wanted to know what he thought about the recent calls to refound the International Workingmen’s Association. Marx revealed that he was opposed to this project. The “critical juncture” for such an association had not arrived, and attempting to form one would be “not merely useless but harmful,” since it would not be “related to the immediate given conditions in this or that particular nation.”4
So any organization had to be tied to concrete historical conditions. We can conclude from Marx’s enthusiastic response to La Revue socialiste that he granted a strategic role to research; in this specific conjuncture, inquiry was a more appropriate measure than launching an organization, and was perhaps even its precondition.
Marx died a few years after this first stab at inquiry, never receiving a single response. But the project would have a remarkable afterlife in the following century. As we pull away from Marx’s original blueprint to survey the much longer history of workers’ inquiry, it is hard not to notice the remarkable instability of this practice. Though nearly every example touches the coordinates first developed by Marx, inquiry has been polysemic and contradictory. This introduction will survey its development as a way of investigating its underlying questions.
Raising Consciousness: The Johnson-Forest Tendency
While figures like Pierre Naville and Simone Weil had earlier published firsthand accounts of factory life, Marx’s project was only truly reincarnated in 1947, when the Johnson-Forest Tendency released a short pamphlet called The American Worker. Named after the pseudonyms of its two principal theorists, CLR James (J.R. Johnson), the Trinidadian author of The Black Jacobins, and Raya Dunayevskaya (Freddie Forest), Leon Trotsky’s onetime assistant, the Johnson-Forest Tendency first emerged in 1941 as an oppositional current within the Trotskyist Workers’ Party. In 1947, the year they sponsored their first inquiry, this marginal though respected current left the WP over what was then known as the “Negro Question.” While the Workers’ Party argued for a single, broad, multiracial movement organized under the slogan “Black and White, Unite and Fight,” the Johnson-Forest Tendency countered that the black community had its own specific needs, which could not be peremptorily subsumed under such a homogenizing movement, and along with other oppressed minorities should struggle for its own autonomy.5
In 1951, after breaking from Trotskyism altogether, the Johnson-Forest Tendency formed Correspondence, with a newspaper of the same name.6 Correspondence, whose first issue was released that November, was to be a new kind of paper. Principally written, edited, and distributed by workers themselves, it was intended to serve as a forum in which workers could share their own experiences. Reflecting the Tendency’s continued emphasis on the primacy of autonomous needs, each issue was deliberately divided into four sections – for factory workers, blacks, youth, and women – so that each sector of the broader working class would have its own independent space to discuss what concerned them most. The hope was that in writing about their lives, workers would come to see that their problems were not personal, but social. A 1955 editorial titled “Gripes and Grievances” stated the purpose of the paper: “When millions of workers are expressing the same gripe about their job, the foreman, the union, and the company, it is no longer a gripe, it becomes a social problem. That gripe or grievance no longer affects just this or that individual, it affects all of society.”7 The objective of the paper, then, was to make people realize the universality of their seemingly particular experiences, by providing a space where they could be disseminated. Drawing an analogy to polio, which, they claimed, was once considered a personal problem before being accepted as a social concern, the editors argued that the whole point of Correspondence was to change public attitudes on decisive questions. The goal of the workers’ paper, to put it another way, was to raise consciousness.
This newspaper was in many ways a logical continuation of the Tendency’s earlier efforts at inquiry. The first and perhaps most famous of these was The American Worker. Grace Lee Boggs, a co-author of the pamphlet, recalls that it first began as a diary. When Phil Singer, an auto worker employed in a New Jersey GM plant, began to discuss the frustrations of the rank and file at the factory, CLR James suggested that he write his thoughts down in a diary.8 Sections of it were later assembled into a coherent piece, and paired with a theoretical essay by Grace Lee Boggs. The first part of the pamphlet, now attributed to Paul Romano, Singer’s pseudonym, became a kind of self-reflexive ethnographic investigation into the conditions of proletarian life in postwar America. The second part, attributed to Ria Stone, Boggs’s party name, consciously drew on the concrete experiences documented in the first part in order to theorize the content of socialism in a world changed by automation, the assembly line, and semi-skilled labor.
When Socialisme ou Barbarie later translated the pamphlet into French, they called it the “first of its genre.”9 A worker was describing, in his own voice and explicitly for other workers, his conditions of exploitation in a way that theorized the possibility of its strategic overthrow.10 Singer’s account represented both research into the changes in the labor process, as well as a political practice aimed at raising the consciousness of his co-workers. He steadily moved from static descriptions of exploitation in the factory to a dynamic consideration of the new forms of struggle that had emerged out of those forms of exploitation. Surveying the contradictions in the workplace, the various points of contestation, and signs of proletarian disgust with management, bureaucracy, and even unions, Singer pointed to the wildcat strike, with workers’ self-management as its content, as the new form of struggle in the postwar period.
While Phil Singer provided the first example of this new kind of workers’ inquiry, Grace Lee Boggs laid out the Johnson-Forest Tendency’s theoretical problematic. She drew heavily on a passage from Capital that described how the “partially developed individual,” who was restricted to “one specialized social function,” had to be replaced in large-scale industry by the “totally developed individual” who could adapt to varying forms of labor.11 Reading this in light of Marx’s earlier works, principally the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, which Boggs herself was the first to translate into English, she took this to mean that modern industry in postwar America had now realized the complete alienation of human nature.
According to Boggs, capitalism was to be understood as the progressive alienation of humanity’s natural powers into the things it produces. Eventually, however, this process will reach a point where all of humanity, all of its social essence, has been fully alienated into the means of production. But this thoroughgoing dehumanization of the indiviual, she argues, is at the same time the potential humanization of the world in its entirety. It is at that point that the objective conditions will finally be ripe to reclaim those powers, recover human essence, and definitively reconstitute the individual as a universal being. In her words, “Abstract labor reaches its most inhuman depths in machine production. But at the same time, it is only machine production which lays the basis for the fullest human development of concrete labor.”12
“The essential content of productive activity today is the cooperative form of the labor process,” Boggs concluded. In “the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only usable in common” and “the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor,” capitalist production had reached the point where it was now implicitly already socialist. However, the realization of this implicit socialism was blocked:
The bourgeoisie maintains a fetter on this essentially social activity by isolating individuals from one another through competition, by separating the intellectual powers of production from the manual labor, by suppressing the creative organizational talents of the broad masses, by dividing the world up into spheres of influence.
This conflict between the invading socialist society and the bourgeois fetters preventing its emergence is part of the daily experience of every worker.”13
Interestingly, this concept had emerged in a pamphlet that James, Dunayevskaya, and Boggs wrote the same year, with the title The Invading Socialist Society – a polemic against Trotskyists who did not share their view that the USSR represented a new form of capitalism. The pamphlet elaborates on some of the theoretical presuppositions of The American Worker, in which Boggs had defended “the distinction between abstract labor for value and concrete labor for human needs.” For Boggs, Marx’s definition of “value production” was “production which expanded itself through degradation and dehumanization of the worker to a fragment of a man,” which in its use of machinery “degrades to abstract labor the living worker which it employs.” Concrete labor was instead directed towards needs, “the labor in which man realizes his basic human need for exercising his natural and acquired powers.”14
In The Invading Socialist Society, the authors argued that value production was clearly at work in Russian “state capitalism,” just as it was in the United States, and they elaborated on the “dual character” of labor Boggs had described in the other pamphlet:
Labor’s fundamental, its eternally necessary function in all societies, past, present and future, was to create use-values. Into this organic function of all labor, capitalist production imposed the contradiction of producing value, and more particularly surplus-value. Within this contradiction is contained the necessity for the division of society into direct producers (workers) and rulers of society, into manual and intellectual laborers.
The managerial revolution, in this conception, was simply an expression of value production and the class division between manual and intellectual labor. If this class division and this kind of alienating labor process could be observed in Russia, there was only one conclusion: the state bureaucracy extracted surplus value from Russian workers, and was in fact a capitalist class.
The proletariat, they went on to argue, had been disabused of all the illusions of bureaucratic vanguards, which had simply instituted a new form of capitalism, and reformism, which limited itself to contesting the distribution of surplus-value. Now the proletariat had “drawn the ultimate conclusion”: “The revolt is against value production itself.” The invading socialist society, for James, Dunayevskaya, and Boggs, could be observed in this realization.15
The political motivation of this theory may have been understandable, but it led the group to use Marx’s categories in a way that dissolved their historical specificity. Two decades earlier I.I. Rubin, at the close of a period of relatively free debate in the Soviet Union, had explained in a lecture at the Institute for Economics in Moscow that a “concept of labour which lacks all the features which are characteristic of its social organisation in commodity production, cannot lead to the conclusion which we seek from the Marxian standpoint.” In his elaboration of Marx’s concepts Rubin asked directly whether the value-form could be observed in a planned economy, in which some social organ had to equate labor which produced different things and was undertaken by different individuals. While this social equation was often described as “abstraction” in some general sense, Rubin distinguished it from Marx’s concept of abstract labor. In all historical epochs, Rubin conceded, human beings have engaged in a physiological expenditure of effort to reproduce their conditions of existence. But Marx’s value theory set out to explain certain historically specific characteristics of capitalist commodity-producing societies. In such societies the labor of individuals, as concrete labor which produces use-values, is not “directly regulated by the society” – in contrast to a society in which social equation is done on the basis of the planned allocation of those use-values.16
In commodity-producing societies, labor is only socially equated when the products of individual laborers are “assimilated with the products of all the other commodity producers, and the labour of a specific individual is thus assimilated with the labour of all the other members of the society and all the others kinds of labour.” And crucially, this social equation only happens “through the equation of the products of labour”; labor “only takes the form of abstract labour, and the products of labour the form of values, to the extent that the production process assumes the social form of commodity production, i.e. production based on exchange.” When commodity owners in capitalist societies engage in production, they do so seeking to “transform their product into money and thus also transform their private and concrete labour into social and abstract labour,” since they depend on the market for their conditions of existence. It is through the mediation of the market that these private labor expenditures take on a social form.17
From the vantage point of Rubin’s intervention, the Johnson-Forest Tendency had ended up aligning itself with those Soviet economists who believed that value was a transhistorical category, reducible to the social equation of labor that would exist in any society and necessarily take the same form in socialist planning as it did in a capitalist market. Their attempt to show that the USSR, despite its planning of production and consumption, competed on the world market and therefore had the characteristics of a huge capitalist enterprise, simply dodged the question of the exchange of the products of labor as an expression of the market dependence of individuals.
Of course, Rubin did not address the question of whether the planning organ of a socialist society was a party bureaucracy, a workers’ council, or anything else. While this distinction would certainly be of political significance, it has no bearing on the questions of abstract labor and value. In its understandable drive to criticize the oppressive character of work in the USSR, the Johnson-Forest Tendency had lost grip on its own critical concepts, and above all, by reducing the value-form to alienation in the labor-process, completely muddled the distinction between abstract and concrete labor. In this regard inquiry had a tense relationship to Marxist theory; shifting towards the documentation of workers’ experience, the subjective experience of the shop floor, the Johnson-Forest Tendency accepted and inverted the orthodox economic worldview of their adversaries, leaving it more or less intact.
And by accepting the transhistorical conception of the categories of labor and value, socialism itself took on transhistorical characteristics. It was a telos already contained in the origin, in human nature which alienated itself in machinery. The task of socialists was to uncover it by casting aside the capitalist fetters. According to this view, socialism would not have to be constructed; it would have to be realized. We can identify a kind of double meaning to this term: on the one hand, socialism as an inherent tendency would have to be made “real,” or actual, and on the other hand, socialism could be actualized only when those workers currently engaged in these embryonic socialist relations gradually came to recognize, or “realize,” that socialism already constituted the very essence of postwar capitalism.
This conception of socialism was a commentary on Singer’s experiences insofar as workers’ inquiry was the means of this realization. It was through inquiry that workers would come to “realize” that socialism was already there, hidden in their everyday lives, waiting to burst forth. In circulating these inquiries, other workers with similar experiences would come to the same realization, sparking a dialogue over their universal experiences. In this way the workers would become conscious of themselves as a revolutionary class. The principal task of the organization, first as the Johnson-Forest Tendency, and then as Correspondence, would be to facilitate this coming-to-consciousness by creating a space where connections or “correspondences” between different workers could be made.
Inquiry, then, was the cornerstone of this project. Grace Lee Boggs had theorized it, and Phil Singer had provided the first concrete example. The American Worker would therefore emerge as a kind of paradigm. In 1952 Si Owens published Indignant Heart: A Black Worker’s Journal, under the pseudonym of Matthew Ward. It was much longer, in fact practically a book, and was explicitly autobiographical. It told the story of how a young black worker moved from the cotton fields of Tennessee to the automobile plants of Detroit and became a militant, a radical force within the United Automobile Workers of America. In 1953 “Arthur Bauman,” the pseudonym of an anonymous student, recounted his story to Paul Wallis in what would become Artie Cuts Out, a narrative, again in the style of Singer’s The American Worker, about high school students in New York. Also that year, Correspondence’s bestselling pamphlet, A Woman’s Place by Marie Brant (Selma James) and Ellen Santori (Filomena D’Addario), made its first appearance. What Singer did for factory workers, Owens for black workers, and Bauman for the youth, James and D’Addario sought to do for housewives. A Woman’s Place discussed the role of housework, the value of reproductive labor, and the organizations autonomously invented by women in the course of their struggle.
Following Singer’s model and Boggs’s theoretical frame, all of them drew on the everyday experiences of the author in order to rigorously investigate the social conditions of a particular class figure; they then used that inquiry to theorize how that fragmented social group might come together as a collective political subject. The objective in all of these – as it would later be for the Correspondence newspaper – was to show how seemingly personal experiences were actually social. The underlying assumption of these inquiries was that what one particular worker felt somewhere is very similar to what another might feel elsewhere, and that these shared experiences, these common ways of living, can provide the groundwork for collective action.18
Of course, it should be noted that neither The American Worker nor any of these other texts ever called itself a workers’ inquiry. Indeed, they could just be called worker narratives, or perhaps even testimonies.19 But they should all still be seen as representing an iteration, or at least a variation, of the project Marx laid out in 1880. The Tendency was quite familiar with Marx’s 1880 article.20 Boggs had read it, and made an explicit reference to it in a footnote in her section of The American Worker.21 And despite significant differences, these inquiries, especially The American Worker, reproduced many of the intentions, motivations, and objectives of Marx’s original project. In fact, reading Marx’s questions alongside The American Worker, it seems as though Singer had provided Marx with the first, comprehensive response to his questionnaire – it was just several decades late.
But Singer’s response took a form that Marx did not anticipate. Marx imagined that workers would offer line-by-line answers to his questionnaire. “In replies,” he made sure to specify, “the number of the corresponding question should be given.” Singer, however, did not produce a neat list of bulleted responses; he crafted these raw answers into a literary narrative. This was perhaps the most distinctive feature of all the inquiries sponsored by the Johnson-Forest Tendency – and perhaps one of the main reasons why they were never formally called “workers’ inquiries.” Workers’ inquiry, in this variation, was specifically a subjective narrative account, not a response to a questionnaire.
This innovation in the genre of inquiry, however, amplified tensions already embedded in the original project. On the one hand, the narrative form worked to advance inquiry as a form of proletarian self-activity. Although Marx made it clear that knowledge of the working class could only be produced by workers themselves, his original project seemed to foreclose the space for any kind of creative expression, demanding mechanical answers to prefabricated questions. Singer’s narrative model allowed workers to raise their own unique voice, express themselves in their own language, with their own idioms, ideas, and feelings, and even pose their own questions.
On the other hand, although privileging the narrative form might have amplified the power of workers’ inquiry as a means of self-activity, it had the potential to undermine another of aspect of that project, what Marx called the acquisition of “an exact and positive knowledge of the conditions” of the working class. The openness of the narrative form exaggerates a tendency to slip from measured generalization to untenable overgeneralization. By trying to fuse his subjectivity with that of the rank and file as a whole, Singer ends up attempting to legitimize himself as a reliable mouthpiece for all the workers in his factory: “Their feelings, anxieties, exhilaration, boredom, exhaustion, anger, have all been mine to one extent or another.”22 But as the text proceeds, Singer quietly goes from “their feelings are mine” to “my feelings are theirs,” leading the reader to believe that Singer’s personal experiences, desires, and opinions are actually those of the GM rank and file itself – if not those of the entire American working class. His experiences, or those of some workers at his particular plant, are presented as the experiences of all workers everywhere.
Allegedly common daily experiences are then generalized to universal political attitudes: “The workers feel that strikes merely for wages do not get them anywhere.”23 This is a problem shared by all the narrative accounts, since they all replicate Singer’s model. In A Woman’s Place, for example, Selma James wrote, “The co-authors of this booklet have seen this in their own lives and in the lives of the women they know. They have written this down as a beginning of the expression of what the average woman feels, thinks, and lives.” One first wonders whether there is such a thing as an “average woman,” free from the complicating dimensions of region, class, race, sexuality, and so forth; but even if this uneasiness is set aside, one is still left to ask whether James’s own unique experiences are enough to access “the average.” In fact, James introduces another innovation that extends the reach of her generalizations. Her inquiry begins in the third person, but after only a few pages abruptly shifts to the second person. The pattern quickly repeats itself: “Everything a housewife does, she does alone. All the work in the house is for you to do by yourself.”24
This kind of homogenization supports, and is in fact supported by, a decontextualization of experience. Nearly all of these inquiries, with the slight exception of Indignant Heart, go to great lengths to detach their narrative from a specific locality. There is nothing in The American Worker revealing where Singer actually works; the same goes for A Woman’s Place.25 If one of the primary objectives of workers’ inquiry is to rigorously study the conditions of exploitation at specific points of production, to produce a positive and exact knowledge of the working class, it must specify the boundaries of its investigation. Though factories in postwar America might have had some commonalities, they were wildly different, each with its distinct conditions of production, power relations, and demographics.
A closely related problem is the deliberate modification of information, in a way that often alters the meaning of the accounts. One immediate example results from the use of pseudonyms. Nearly everyone in the Johnson-Forest Tendency had one, and most had several; in fact, there were so many fake names in circulation, Boggs recalled that there were times when they themselves didn’t even know who was who.26 This was partly a holdover from Trotskyist practices, but more seriously a security measure against McCarthyism; at one point Correspondence had as many as 75 infiltrators, and CLR James would later be deported because of his activities with the group.27
But despite the justifications for the practice of assuming pseudonyms, they provided a cover for ambiguous authorship. A Woman’s Place was signed by two women, both under pseudonyms, but was actually written only by Selma James. As James later recalled, she wrote the book by jotting down ideas on scraps of paper, then dropping them into a slit made in the top of a shoe box. She later sat down and pieced together the ideas into a draft. After she shared the draft with the group and her neighbors, and made some revisions, CLR James told her to include Filomena D’Addario’s signature so that the latter could speak about it to the public with some legitimacy.28 It turns out that a piece which claims to have been written by two women, and in fact tries to convince its readers that it was constructed from the experiences of two different women, was actually written by one.
But the most serious trouble is in Indignant Heart. Of all the accounts, this is the only one to give precise details about places, and so, at first glance, seems to break with the model developed by Singer. In actual fact, however, though the book is largely accurate regarding Owens’ later life in the North, it deliberately distorts his place of birth, setting his childhood in southeast Tennessee rather than in Lowndes County, Alabama. In the 1978 reprint, which included a second part picking up where the original 1952 text left off, Owens justified this by reminding his readers of the “vicious McCarthyite witch hunt,” adding that “few who did not go through that experience of national repression of ideas can fully understand the truly totalitarian nature of McCarthyism and the terror it produced.”29 Less convincing, however, is his claim that these changes “do not take anything away from the truth of the experiences described,” and that what he wrote about his early years “could be true of almost all Blacks” living in the Southern United States.30
In other words, the rewriting of the facts is rationalized by the assumption of a homogeneous and universal experience. But Alabama is not Tennessee, and such a drastic move compromises the scientific character of the piece; it becomes more like historical fiction, and less a concrete inquiry into specific conditions of exploitation. An inquiry into the world of the working class threatens to degenerate into a kind of travel diary; close, meticulous, militant investigation tends to be replaced with entertaining stories about the mystery, exoticism, and strangeness of an unknown world.
Perhaps even more troubling, Si Owens did not actually write Indignant Heart. Constance Webb, another member of the group, and James’s onetime lover, did. Correspondence championed a practice which Dunayevskaya later called “the full fountain pen” method – though it is perhaps better known as amanuensis. Intellectuals would be paired with workers who might be uncomfortable writing their experiences; they would listen as the workers recounted their story, write them down on their behalf, and then have these workers revise the written documents as they saw fit. It was Webb, then, who recorded the story, made revisions, edited the drafts, and pieced it all together into a coherent whole.31 It was in many ways just as much her book.
But the leadership, in this case largely Dunayevskaya, and not the authors, decided how the book should appear. Dunayevskaya insisted that it be called Indignant Heart, after a quotation by Wendell Phillips, over the protest of both Owens and Webb; and, even more seriously, she decided to publish it all under the single name of Matthew Ward.32 In an odd way, Correspondence had deliberately effaced its conditions of production, making it appear as though a single author had written the book by himself, which was far from true. Yet one of original aims of Correspondence’s inquiries had been to honestly reconcile the tensions between intellectuals and workers. Why hesitate in admitting that Indignant Heart had been, at its very core, a work of collaboration? Why go to such lengths to make the text look like an example of raw proletarian experience, rather than a mediated production?
Finally, all these inquiries imbricate the descriptive with the prescriptive. They draw limited conclusions based on the analysis of observable phenomena while simultaneously making declarative statements about what reality should actually look like. The trend was first set by Singer, who concluded the first part of The American Worker by announcing that the workers’ frustration with the incentive system amounted to “no less than saying that the existing production relations must be overthrown.”33 In the same way, James ends her own inquiry, “Women are finding more and more that there is no way out but a complete change. But one thing is already clear. Things can’t go on the way they are. Every woman knows that.”34 Surely not all women actually thought this in 1953. And surely James knew this, just as Singer was well aware that most workers did not want to overthrow existing production relations. These statements can only really be understood as performative – not descriptions of existing situation, but declarative moves seeking to transform what the text has already described. For a tradition which grounded itself in the raising of consciousness, these statements about the consciousness of workers, disseminated to those workers themselves, sought to become self-fulfilling prophecies.
Though all four of these inquires certainly engage in scientific analysis, taking note of new forms of production, exploitation, and resistance, these observations only seem to serve as the literary background for an unfolding narrative, rather than serving as incisive observations into a particular point of production. All the tensions explored above work to seriously diminish the specific research value of these texts. But it is important to recognize that they only become problems if one continues to prioritize the research function of workers’ inquiry. If, however, the objective is to build class consciousness, then the distortions of the narrative form are not problems at all. They might actually be quite necessary. With these narratives, the tension in Marx’s workers’ inquiry – between a research tool on the one hand, and a form of agitation on the other – is largely resolved by subordinating the former to the latter, transforming inquiry into a means to the end of consciousness-building.
Building the Circuit: Socialisme ou Barbarie
These American experiments in workers’ inquiry resonated quite broadly, becoming an explicit reference point for one French group in particular. Socialisme ou Barbarie followed a remarkably similar trajectory to that of its American equivalents – the two groups were in contact, sharing their discoveries, translating each other’s work, and even co-authoring a book at one point. It began as the “Chaulieu-Montal Tendency,” an internal current within the French section of the Trotskyist Fourth International, named after the pseudonyms of its principal animators, Cornelius Castoriadis (Pierre Chaulieu) and Claude Lefort (Claude Montal). Like the Johnson-Forest Tendency in the United States, the Chaulieu-Montal Tendency soon found itself opposed to the official Trotskyist movement, prompting a split in late 1948. About twenty militants left to form a new organization, Socialisme ou Barbarie, with a new journal of the same name. The first issue was released in March of the following year.35
Like Correspondence, Socialisme ou Barbarie placed a great deal of emphasis on the notion of proletarian experience. For both these groups, socialist theory and strategy, even the very content of socialist project itself, could only be derived from the everyday experiences of the working class. Daniel Blanchard, a former member of Socialisme ou Barbarie, has reflected on the organization’s conception of a socialist society: it would be “not the result of either utopian dreaming, or of an alleged science of history, but of the creations of the workers movement. The proletariat is, by its practice, the perpetual inventor of revolutionary theory and the task of the intellectuals is limited to synthesizing and systematizing it.“36
In this regard Socialisme ou Barbarie contested the French Communist Party (PCF) which held that socialism had to be brought to the working class from the outside. For both Correspondence and Socialisme ou Barbarie, on the other hand socialism actually came from within everyday proletarian experiences. But these groups agreed that workers are largely socialized by capitalism, and therefore still marked by capitalist ideology, at least to some degree. Since almost no one was free of capitalist thinking, socialist consciousness would not spontaneously burst forth, even though it was always lurking below. Capitalist ideology still had to be combated; and some other mechanism was required to allow this latent consciousness to appear.
That mechanism was workers’ inquiry. So while the Johnson-Forest Tendency was the first to recode workers’ inquiry in the form of the worker narrative, Socialisme ou Barbarie explained why: the worker narrative could express the proletarian experience in such a way as to make its embedded socialist content appear.
Socialisme ou Barbarie adopted this specific form of workers’ inquiry – inquiry as narrative account – from Correspondence almost readymade. The group set about translating The American Worker, which appeared serially in the first eight issues of its homonymously titled journal. These militants hailed the pamphlet as a new, revolutionary kind of writing; Philippe Guillaume introduced it with the declaration that “the name Romano will stay in the history of proletarian literature, and that it will even signify a turning point in this history.”37
Workers’ inquiry, in this early French context, therefore took on roughly the same form that it did with the Americans, with The American Worker again setting the paradigm. It not only formed the empirical ground for Claude Lefort’s “Proletarian Experience,” Socialisme ou Barbarie’s most serious theorization of inquiry, but would also spawn a number French inquiries modeled on Singer’s account. The first came in 1952, when Georges Vivier, a young worker at Chausson, began a series on proletarian life titled “La vie en usine” (Life in the Factory). The most famous of these narratives, however, were the diaries of Daniel Mothé, the nom de guerre of Jacques Gautrat, a machinist at Renault-Billancourt.38 His writings, which first appeared in the pages of Socialisme ou Barbarie, attracted so much attention that an edited version was soon published by Les Éditions de Minuit in 1959 under the title Journal d’un ouvrier 1956-1958 (Journal of a Worker). It was received well enough to prompt the publication of a second diary, called Militant chez Renault (Militant at Renault), by Les Éditions du Seuil in 1965.
There would be a second moment in this transnational circulation. By the time Correspondence split from the official Trotskyist movement to become its own distinct entity, the group decided to further revolutionize the form of workers’ inquiry: worker narratives became a workers’ paper. The workers’ paper was to be a more dynamic form of inquiry, where different sectors of the working class could not only share their experiences with similar kinds of workers, but could in fact exchange those experiences with each other through letters to the editors.
Socialisme ou Barbarie certainly had some reservations about the theoretical assumptions underpinning the Correspondence project, but the group was sufficiently inspired by the model of the workers’ paper to sponsor one of its own in France. Just as The American Worker had created a new genre of writing, so too, they believed, did Correspondence stand for an entirely new kind of publication. “It represents a profoundly original effort to create a journal for the most part written by workers to speak with workers from the workers’ viewpoint,” they wrote in 1954. “It must simply be acknowledged that Correspondence represents a new type of journal and that it opens a new period in revolutionary worker journalism.”39 So just as Socialisme ou Barbarie was inspired by The American Worker to sponsor its own worker narratives, so too was it prompted to support the formation of a workers paper along the same lines as Correspondence.
But although both groups used the workers’ narrative and the workers’ paper as a means of accessing the proletarian experience, there was still at least one significant difference. For Correspondence, socialism already existed embryonically in proletarian experiences, which simply had to be expressed and shared with other workers. It was enough to provide a forum in which to circulate these experiences; the “invading socialist society” would emerge on its own.
Socialisme ou Barbarie remained skeptical. Cornelius Castoriadis would comment many years later, if “you talk about the invading socialist society,” then you “keep the apocalyptic, messianic streak; the idea that there is a definite end to the road, and unless everything blows up we are going there and we are bound to end there, which is not true.”40 For Socialisme ou Barbarie, the development of socialism was not an irresistible force, but the very question to be answered. While there were certain elements, rudimentary, inchoate, fragmented, that could be found in proletarian experiences, they could not be activated simply through writing, or even the sharing of that writing with other workers. Some in Socialisme ou Barbarie even believed that these elements could not be properly articulated into a coherent socialist project until they had been reworked through theory.
So the buried elements recovered by inquiry had to be politicized before socialism could see the light of day. These differences immediately put into question the potential function of militant intellectuals. For Correspondence, the role of intellectuals was ambiguous. Their goal was to provide the space for worker experiences to be shared, even if this resulted in a potential ventriloquism, as in the case of Constance Webb and Si Owens. As a 1955 editorial called “Must Serve Workers” put it, “The primary task of any individual who comes to a working class movement from another class is to put behind him his past and completely identify and adapt himself to the working class… The function of the intellectual is to aid the movement, to place his intellectual accomplishment at the disposal of the workers.”41
Indeed, the very structure of the organization was determined by this belief. Grace Lee Boggs later recalled in her autobiography that the group tried to ground itself on Lenin’s notion that the best way to combat the bureaucracy of the “first layer” of intellectuals was to develop the “third layer” of the workers.42 Correspondence divided itself into three layers: “real workers” in the first, “intellectuals” who were now employed in jobs traditionally done by “workers” in the second, and the “real intellectuals” in the third. As an evidently disgruntled former member recalled:
The real proletarians were put in the first layer, people of mixed status, like housewives, in the second, and the intellectuals were put in the third. Our meetings consisted of the now highly prestigeful first layer spouting off, usually in a random, inarticulate way, about what they thought about everything under the sun. The rest of us, especially we intellectuals in the third layer, were told to listen.43
In contrast to this, Socialisme ou Barbarie claimed that worker experiences had to be interpreted and developed, and this opened up space for a different role for intellectuals. The larger space that Socialisme ou Barbarie accorded to theoretical production forced it to more directly, and perhaps more contentiously, interrogate the relationship between workers and intellectuals, especially as it related to the practice of workers’ inquiry.
But to understand the problems raised by the workers’ paper, we have to go back to 1952 and an unsigned article by Claude Lefort titled “Proletarian Experience.”44 Hidden within their daily experiences, Lefort claimed, lay basic, perhaps even universal, proletarian attitudes: “Prior to any explicit reflection, to any interpretation of their lot or their role, workers have spontaneous comportments with respect to industrial work, exploitation, the organization of production and social life both inside and outside the factory.”45 To access these attitudes, which for Lefort formed the very ground of the socialist project, militants had to collect accounts of proletarian experiences. Indeed, learning about the experiences of the working class, and inquiring into its daily life, had to be a fundamental aspect of any revolutionary organizations. “Socialisme ou Barbarie would like to solicit testimonies from workers,” he announced, “and publish them at the same time as it accords an important place to all forms of analysis concerning proletarian experience.”46
Since those attitudes, however, remain latent, and because they are necessarily partial, testimonies must not only be collected, but actually interpreted. And therein lay the real problem: who had the right to interpret these accounts? Lefort concluded his programmatic essay with exactly this question, which he answered with another:
Who will reveal from beneath the explicit content of a document the intentions and attitudes that inspired it, and juxtapose the testimonies? The comrades of Socialisme ou Barbarie? But would this not run counter to their intentions, given that they propose a kind of research that would enable workers to reflect upon their experience?47
For the moment, these questions were not so pressing, since Socialisme ou Barbarie remained on the margins, and inquiry on the scale imagined by Lefort a mere proposal. But they became a practical concern in May 1954, when a workers’ paper actually emerged in France. It all began at Renault-Billancourt, an automobile plant in the suburbs of Paris. A monster of a factory, employing some 30,000 workers, it was also a legendary site of proletarian militancy, and widely considered a Communist stronghold. But by the 1950s, the Party slowly began to lose its grip, increasingly coming under fire from more radical elements, like the Trotskyists. It was in this context that, in April 1954, a breakthrough arrived when a few workers from one of the factory shops circulated a leaflet on wage levels. It was warmly received by other workers, and, encouraged by this enthusiastic reception, a few workers decided to launch an independent, clandestine, monthly paper called Tribune Ouvrière.48
“What we want,” announced the first issue of the workers paper, positioning itself against both the Renault management and the PCF leadership, “is to end the tutelage that the so-called workers’ organizations have exercised over us for many years. We want all problems concerning the working class to be debated by the workers themselves… What we suggest is to make of this paper a tribune in which we ask you to participate. We would like this paper to reflect the lives and opinions of workers. It’s up to you to make this happen.”49
Socialisme ou Barbarie quickly supported the paper, offering it financial backing, helping to distribute it, and even publishing extracts of the paper in its own review. But the exact relationship between the two publications – the one a clandestine paper written, edited, and managed by factory workers, the other a theoretical journal almost entirely produced by intellectuals – was ambiguous, and, at times highly divisive. Some saw the workers’ paper as an independent venue for the raw voice of the working class, whatever it might have to say, and therefore only loosely allied with the theoretical project carried out by Socialisme ou Barbarie; others wanted to formally integrate it with Socialisme ou Barbarie, hoping the workers’ paper could introduce the rigorous ideas of the group to a broader proletarian audience.
In 1955, Tribune Ouvrière began running into difficulties. The collective had not really grown, workers by and large seemed indifferent to the paper, and the editorial board remained tiny, with no more than perhaps 15 workers. Part of this general lack of interest stemmed from logistical challenges. The editorial team had minimal funding, and couldn’t afford to charge high prices, since none of the workers would buy an expensive paper. It was also very difficult to distribute. As a clandestine paper, it could only be circulated from hand to hand. And its meetings could not be organized out in the open, making it very difficult to establish long-term relations with interested readers.
But there were also other, perhaps more fundamental problems at play. Daniel Mothé used the opportunity to write a programmatic piece on the meaning of the workers’ paper, spending a significant portion of the article discussing the relationship between workers and intellectuals. It should be noted at the outset that Mothé was not really a “neutral” observer. The only one to have a foot in both organizations, Mothé was one of the principal animators behind the paper as well as member of Socialisme ou Barbarie since 1952 – he therefore had a vested interest in “solving” the vexed relationship between the two publications.50 It’s highly significant, moreover, that Mothé published his long piece about Tribune Ouvrière in Socialisme ou Barbarie.
In contrast to Correspondence, which he directly mentioned in his piece, Mothé argued that a workers’ paper, though entirely written by workers themselves, still had to participate in some kind of dialogue with militant intellectuals – in fact, this had to be its primary function. For Mothé there is a clear division of labor, determined by the capitalist mode of production itself, which cannot be willfully ignored. Revolutionary politics has to take account of this division, rather than wish it away. Mothé builds on this observation to construct a dichotomy between two ideal types: the worker on the one hand, and the militant intellectual on the other. They are primarily distinguished, he says, by their training, suggesting that “if the formation of the revolutionary militant is a formation that is almost exclusively intellectual,” especially during a period in which “revolutionary minorities” have been uprooted from the working class, the “political formation of workers is, on the contrary, almost exclusively practical.” This practical formation was both acquired in the experience of struggle and became the basis of new methods of struggle. The key problem is to find a way to link these two distinct poles, to create a form that can fuse the “immediate experience of the workers and the theoretical experience of revolutionary militants.”51
Mothé argued that each pole had to play a unique function that was nevertheless dependent on the other. The revolutionary militant articulates revolutionary theory, imparts that theory to the working class, and combats false ideas.52 The “essential elements” of that theory, however, are themselves drawn from the lived experiences of the working class. They form a reciprocal relationship: “In this sense, if the working class needs the revolutionary organization to theorize its experience, the organization needs the working class in order to draw on this experience. This process of osmosis has a decisive importance.”53
The keystone of this relation, Mothé argued, is precisely the workers’ newspaper. The real function of the workers’ paper is to mediate between these two poles. It is the means through which workers can express their everyday experiences, which can then be theorized by revolutionary militants. Militants can then read these accounts, sift through them for latent political tendencies, and work their rudimentary insights into revolutionary theory. At the same time, one assumes, the paper can serve as the vehicle through which these newly developed theories will then be transmitted back to the working class.
Mothé’s model, however, posed as many questions as it answered. To begin with, there was the imprecise notion of experience, and the questionable assumption that, at base, all proletarian experiences articulated a set of universal attitudes. The Johnson-Forest Tendency and Claude Lefort both shared this supposition. Indeed, in “Proletarian Experience,” Lefort went so far as to write:
Two workers in very different situations have in common that both have endured one or another form of work and exploitation that is essentially the same and absorbs three-quarters of their personal existence. Their wages might be very different, their living situations and family lives may not be comparable, but it remains the case that they are profoundly identical both in their roles as producers or machine operators, and in their alienation.
Even if one limits the working class to factory workers, which Lefort seemed to do, such a claim reduces the heterogeneity of the working class to a shared human essence: workers are everywhere the same because they have all alienated their universal creative powers into the things they produce. But such a conception prevents us from grasping the many forms that labor-power assumes, the plurality of ways it is put to work, and the diverse processes through which it is exploited.
All this leads one to wonder who these “workers” Mothé keeps talking about really are. If revolutionary militants must draw on proletarian experiences, do these include those of housewives and farmworkers? Must revolutionary militants draw on all these experiences, or is the experience of only one sector sufficient, and if so, which will speak for all the rest? Mothé’s unstable terminology exposes his preference. The piece begins by drawing a distinction between “revolutionary militants” and “workers,” but Mothé soon speaks of “revolutionary militants” and “vanguard workers.” The slip signals his prioritization of one kind of worker over the others. Indeed, for Mothé, as with most Socialisme ou Barbarie, when they spoke of the working class, they really meant the industrial working class, particularly at the automobile factories; but even more specifically, their ideal figure, their constructed vanguard, was semi-skilled laborers. It is important to observe that while Socialisme ou Barbarie sought to bypass the whole notion of the vanguard party by going directly to the working class, even its most “anarchistic” elements, like Lefort, remained encased in the general problematic of vanguardism: the vanguard element was no longer outside the class, but within it.
Mothé added a further qualification to this reduction. The worker must not only be the most politically conscious of his class, but must also be capable of expressing his experiences in such a way that they could be theorized. This required not only a high degree of general literacy, as well as a fair share of confidence, but also some fluency in a more challenging political lexicon. “In this sense,” Mothé clarified, “those workers most suitable for writing will be those who are at the same time the most conscious, the most educated but also those who will be the most rid of bourgeois or Stalinist ideological influence.”54 So Mothé wanted a worker who could not only reflect on his situation and transcribe it into a narrative that mimicked the natural oral culture of the average worker, but who would also be free of all non-revolutionary ideology. It’s no surprise then, that Mothé, and much of Socialisme ou Barbarie, only found one worker who fit the bill: Daniel Mothé himself.55
The synecdochic substitution of a single politically conscious male factory worker for the working class as a whole marks a significant step back from the positions developed by the Johnson-Forest Tendency, and later Correspondence, which had identified at least four distinct segments of the working class: industrial workers, blacks, women, and youth.
Perhaps the shakiest part of Mothé’s model, however, had to do not so much with the first step in this process – from workers to intellectuals – but the second, from intellectuals to workers. Mothé spent a great deal of time discussing the first process, but very little on the second. This was largely because this second process proved to be contentious among both the revolutionary militants of Socialisme ou Barbarie as well as the factory workers who formed the editorial core of Tribune Ouvrière.56
Some were strongly supportive of “returning” socialist ideas to the working class. Castoriadis was the first to argue, as early as June 1956, that the group had to create a separate “workers’ paper” aimed explicitly at the working class, not just in Paris, but all of France. It was imperative, he thought, to introduce more workers to Socialisme ou Barbarie’s theoretical work, and to sharpen the theory itself, since the need to engage with a broader audience, and therefore write more accessibly, would push the militants to work in a more “concrete” way, avoiding abstractions and paying greater attention to developments in the class struggle.
This proposal was rejected. Some, like Mothé, accepted Castoriadis’ theoretical position wholeheartedly, and agreed with the necessity of such paper, but felt it was impractical due to the lack of resources, and the fact that the paper probably would not find a ready audience, given that it did not already enjoy strong links with the wider working class in France. Moreover, Mothé had seen firsthand, through his work with Tribune Ouvrière, just how difficult it was to operate a “workers’ journal” in even one factory, let alone all of France, as Castoriadis hoped.
Others, like Henri Simon and Claude Lefort, opposed the paper on theoretical grounds, highlighting once again a major division over the vexed “organization question.” Simon asked to what extent the paper would actually be a workers’ paper if it were forcibly repurposed to transmit revolutionary theory to workers.57 How would this be any different from the other “worker” newspapers, such as those sponsored by the PCF, which they so harshly criticized?
In a similar vein Lefort, who had always opposed the imposition of any kind of “direction” onto the autonomous movements of the working class, decried Castoriadis’s proposed paper as “an operation from above.” As he put it, “Chaulieu has decided to have this paper at any cost, even though there is no working-class public in which to diffuse it, and even fewer workers to actively take part in it.”58 To be sure, Lefort was never opposed to the notion of a workers’ paper, not even to organization or theory as such. But his conviction that everything had to flow organically from the working class itself translated into a deep suspicion of programs: whatever the intentions behind the drafting of such a document, and even if it were elaborated in reference to the class, a program would always end up ossifying into an exterior form, ultimately straitjacketing working-class spontaneity. Such a stance, which implied an extremely circumscribed role for militants, was antithetical to Castoriadis’ position, already revealing an irreconcilable difference between the two principal theorists behind the journal. And it was precisely workers’ inquiry, in the form of the paper, that revealed it most strikingly. Though both rallied around workers’ inquiry, each had a very different objective in mind. For Lefort, the object of inquiry was universal proletarian attitudes; for Castoriadis, it was the rudimentary content of the socialist program.
Although the proposal was defeated, the matter exploded into full view again in 1958. De Gaulle’s coup created an entirely new situation. The established Left seemed paralyzed, a wave of new recruits flooded into Socialisme ou Barbarie, and many, led by Castoriadis, believed the time had finally come to transform the group into a revolutionary organization, complete with a line, and a popular paper like the one he had proposed back in 1956.59 A split took shape along the old fault lines, and in September, the minority, led by Lefort and Simon, left to form Information et Liaisons Ouvrières (Worker Information and Connections, ILO).60
One of the very first actions of this reinvented Socialisme ou Barbarie was to create a new paper, Pouvoir Ouvrier, in December of that year. The form of the paper reflected Mothé and Castoriadis’s goals, initially divided into two sections: a political one, which published simplified versions of the theories developed in its parent organization, and another, titled “La parole aux travailleurs” (loosely, The Workers’ Turn to Speak), which published worker testimonies in the tradition of Paul Romano.
Arguing for the strategic necessity of the paper, Castoriadis elaborated his conception of the relationship of the intellectual and the worker in “Proletariat and Organization, Part 1,” written in the summer of 1958 as the split with Lefort’s faction was taking place. While Mothé’s model of the paper had been something like a transmission belt, moving forward then backwards between workers and intellectuals, as if at the flip of a switch, in this text Castoriadis provides a more dynamic image, more like a circuit. Militants do not simply disseminate their theories among workers in order to convert them to socialism, they submit their theories for verification. Revolutionary theory will “have no value, no consistency with what it elsewhere proclaims to be its essential principles,” Castoriadis argued, “unless it is constantly being replenished, in practice, by the experience of the workers as it takes shape in their day-to-day lives;” it was this process which would allow the workers to “educate the educator.”61 This meant that Socialisme ou Barbarie, which had hitherto been an exceedingly “intellectual” review, had to rethink its practice. “The task the organization is up against in this sphere,” he continued, “is to merge intellectuals with workers as workers as it is elaborating its views. This means that the questions asked, and the methods for discussing and working out these problems, must be changed so that it will be possible for the worker to take part.” Revolutionary theory had to be more accessible, the organization had to become more disciplined, and its composition had to change:
Only an organization formed as a revolutionary workers’ organization, in which workers numerically predominate and dominate it on fundamental questions, and which creates broad avenues of exchange with the proletariat, thus allowing it to draw upon the widest possible experience of contemporary society – only an organization of this kind can produce a theory that will be anything other than the isolated work of specialists.
Like Mothé, he argued that militants had to “extract the socialist content in what is constantly being created by the proletariat (whether it is a matter of a strike or of a revolution), formulate it coherently, propagate it, and show its universal import.”62 Theory must flow from the “historic as well as day-to-day experience and action of the proletariat,” and even “economic theory has to be reconstructed around what is contained in embryo in the tendency of workers toward equality in pay; the entire theory of production around the informal organization of workers in the factory; all of political theory around the principles embodied in the soviets and the councils.” But then it would be up to militants to extract “what is universally valid in the experience of the proletariat,” work this up into a general “socialist outlook,” then propagate this outlook among the workers whose experiences served as its very condition of possibility (214).
Castoriadis had attempted precisely this in the third part of his “On the Content of Socialism,” also in 1958. After criticizing the bureaucratic Bolshevik experience and then imagining a councilist management of society in parts one and two, he turned in the last part to the analysis of the labor process at the level of the enterprise. The content of socialism is the “privileged center, the focal point” without which there is only “mere empirical sociology.” The content of socialism could only be demonstrated in the “proletariat’s struggle against alienation” (156).
The main contradiction of capitalism, Castoriadis argued, lay in the definition of the exchange of labor-power, understood as the tension between the “human time” of the laborer and the rationalization imposed by management. There can only be a temporary balance of forces between the two, the worker resigning to a compromise establishing a certain pace of work, which must be dissolved and reinvented when the manufacturing process is transformed by new machinery. Taylorism’s function was to reduce the heterogeneity of human time to the “‘one best way’ to accomplish each operation,” standardizing the procedures of work and determining an average output against which wages could be determined – management’s attempt to the eliminate the possibility of wage conflicts (159-60).
But Taylorism’s “one best way” could not possibly account for the reality of the work process, undertaken by individuals with multiplicities of “best ways” – with their own gestures and movements, their their own forms of adaptation to their tools, their own rhythms of execution. The collectivity of individuals on the shop floor would have to undertake its own form of “spontaneous association” against the rationalization of management, even to fulfill management’s goals (163).
Here the concept of the “elementary group,” the “living nuclei of productive activity,” drawn from The American Worker and the journals of Mothé as much as from industrial sociology, became decisive (170).63 Each enterprise, Castoriadis wrote, had a ” double structure,” its “formal organization” represented in charts and diagrams, and the informal organization, “whose activities are carried out and supported by individuals and groups at all levels of the hierarchical pyramid according to the requirements of their work, the imperatives of productive efficiency, and the necessities of their struggle against exploitation” (170). The distinction between the two was not merely a question of “theory versus practice,” of an illusory boss’s ideology against the messy reality of the shop floor, as some liberal sociologists would have it. It represented the real struggle by which management attempted to encompass the entire production process.
Against the “separate management [direction]” of the bureaucracy, the elementary group constituted “the management [gestion] of their own activity” (169-70, 171). The opposition between the two, Castoriadis argued, was the real character of class struggle, the formal organization coinciding with the “managerial stratum” and the informal organization representing “a different mode of operation of the enterprise, centered around the real situation of the executants.” This struggle between “directors and executants” characterized the capitalist workplace, beginning at the level of the elementary group and extending across the whole enterprise. Since the “position of each elementary group is essentially identical to that of the others,” the cooperation between the groups leads them “to merge in a class, the class of executants, defined by a community of situation, function, interests, attitude, mentality” (171).
If industrial sociology from management’s perspective was unable to recognize this class division in the workplace, and therefore got lost in theoretical abstraction, the same went for Marxists whose concept of class did not begin with “the basic articulations within the enterprise and among the human groups within the enterprise.” Their ideology blocked them from “seeing the proletariat’s vital process of class formation, of self-creation as the outcome of a permanent struggle that begins within production” (172).
This ideology had direct political consequences. For Castoriadis, even wage demands were nascent expressions of the struggle by which the informal organization of the executants tended towards an attack on the capitalist management of production. If Marxist parties and unions attempted to restrict the content of these struggles to the bureaucratic management of income redistribution, this could only reinforce the directors/executants division. “To the abstract concept of the proletariat corresponds the abstract concept of socialism as nationalization and planning,” Castoriadis wrote, “whose sole concrete content ultimately is revealed to be the totalitarian dictatorship of the representatives of this abstraction – of the bureaucratic party.” For the workers’ struggle to truly realize itself, it would have to go further towards the workers’ self-management of production (172).
Without this thoroughgoing transformation of society, capitalism would continue on its current course, with the “tremendous waste” generated by its irrational production process. Each enterprise unsteadily tried to balance between the decomposition of executants into atomized individuals, and their reintegration into new unified wholes corresponding to a newly rationalized production process (172-3). But the managerial plan is inevitably unable to establish a hierarchy of tasks that reflects the real requirements of production – while management is unaware of the reality of the process on the shop floor, the executant is separated from the plan and uninterested in the results, prone to taking shortcuts (175). Only “the practice, the invention, the creativity of the mass of executants,” the collectivity of the elementary group, can fill the gaps in management’s production directives (176).
But despite Castoriadis’s affirmation of the creativity of the executants in the production of commodities, their role in the production of theory was precipitously declining. As Simon, Lefort, and others had feared, the workers’ narratives increasingly became a mere ornament in Pouvoir Ouvrier. Confirming this worrisome trend, in November of 1959 the group voted to shift the emphasis of the journal even more towards the “political” section. By the spring of 1961 the separate section titled “La parole aux travailleurs” had vanished completely.64 The paper therefore ended up only fulfilling the second function outlined by Mothé – transmitting revolutionary theory to the working class. But without the first function – expressing proletarian experiences – Pouvoir Ouvrier simply became another vanguardist publication, indistinguishable from the various papers Mothé had originally criticized.
To be fair, it seems that the disappearance of “La parole aux travailleurs” was in large part the result of a lack of worker narratives. Indeed, this problem cut across the splits in Socialisme ou Barbarie. Whatever the differences between Lefort’s, Mothé’s, and Pouvoir Ouvrier’s conceptions of inquiry and the relation between workers and intellectuals, all were dependent on a steady stream of worker accounts. But to their chagrin, they found that workers’ simply did not want to write.65
It’s significant here that all of these models imagined workers’ inquiry in the same way: not the questionnaire, as Marx suggested, but the written testimony initiated by Romano. Lefort had gone as far as to explicitly criticize the “statistically-based” strategy of workers posing “thousands of questions” to each other, since these would result in mere numerical correlations and would be unable to bring out the “systems of living and thinking” of “concrete individuals.” Even worse, a “question imposed from the outside might be an irritant for the subject being questioned, shaping an artificial response or, in any case, imprinting upon it a character that it would not otherwise have had.”66 But it is hard not to wonder if the dearth of worker responses has to do with this specific form of inquiry. Though worker narratives might allow workers to express themselves more organically, they are nonetheless much more difficult to compose than responding to a questionnaire.
Just as Pouvoir Ouvrier saw itself moving away from its original goals, Information et Liaisons Ouvrières also ran into some difficulties. Unlike the majority of Socialisme ou Barbarie, which asserted the necessity of a formal party, complete with a kind of central committee, the ILO minority had advocated a more decentralized structure, based on autonomous worker cells, where everything could be openly discussed. The core of the group would be these cells, based in various firms, and the role of ILO would not be to disseminate ideas from above, as Pouvoir Ouvrier would soon do, but to circulate experiences, information, and ideas between these various cells. It was to be something of a network, providing links between different workers, very much along the lines of Correspondence. Whereas Pouvoir Ouvrier wanted to propagate the socialist project among workers, ILO, Lefort later recalled, aimed to “distribute a bulletin as unprogrammatic as possible attempting primarily to give workers a voice and to aid in coordinating experiences in industry – that is, those experiences resulting from attempts at autonomous struggle.”67
It should be noted that the minority which split off to form ILO was less united by a common perspective than by its general opposition to the majority that pushed for a party. It’s therefore unsurprising that this new group of about twenty would soon run into its own internal differences. A fissure began to appear between the principal animators of the group: Lefort, who wished to combine the authenticity of the workers’ voice with some kind of theory, felt that Simon not only wanted to abandon all signs of direction, orientation, and party line, but even interpretation and theory as such. He would later reflect:
The essential thing was that these people speak of their experience in everyday life. In a sense [Simon] was absolutely correct. We all thought that there was an evil spell of Theory detached from, and designed to mask, experience and everydayness. But it was still a matter of experience as actual experience and everydayness, not banality. Experience is not raw; it always implies an element of interpretation and opens itself to discussion. Speech in everyday life tacitly or explicitly refuses another speech and solicits a response. For Simon, the speech of the exploited, whoever he might be, whatever he might say, was in essence good. He knew like all of us that the dominant bourgeois or democratic discourse weighs heavily on the speech of the exploited. This knowledge did not weaken his conviction. The speech of the exploited was sufficient unto itself. Essentially, he said that a person speaks about what he sees and feels; we have only to listen to him, or better yet record his remarks in our bulletin, which is our raison d’être.68
Lefort, who left the group in 1960 (prompting them to rename themselves Informations et Correspondance Ouvrières, ICO), argued that no matter what, some kind of interpretation will always slip into inquiry, even if only in the selection of texts, the order in which they would be published, and so forth. To deny this was to deceive oneself.
In other words, the original project of workers’ inquiry broke down on both sides. Pouvoir Ouvrier became another vanguardist journal, indistinguishable from a Trotskyist paper, trying to educate the working class through simplified renditions of esoteric theories developed without reference to the concrete experiences of the working class. On the other, ICO tricked itself into ignoring the role of intellectuals, only to find itself immobilized, chasing after some pure proletarian experience untarnished by theoretical interpretation.
As for Castoriadis, he broke with his own group in 1962. His reflections on these debates had produced an even more drastic effect: Castoriadis had come to the conclusion that Marxism as a theory had been definitively disproved. “Modern Capitalism and Revolution,” first written between 1959 and 1961, had been published before he left with the disclaimer that its “ideas are not necessarily shared by the entire Socialisme ou Barbarie group” (226). Drawing on his day job as professional economist for the OECD, Castoriadis drew up a devastating balance sheet for Marxist theory. In the context of the postwar boom, Marxists were continuing to claim that capitalism, through structural unemployment and the increase in the rate of exploitation, was impoverishing and pauperizing the worker. But in reality, the system had yielded full employment and wages were growing more rapidly than ever, leading to a massive expansion of consumption which both provided a steady source of effective demand and represented a major rise in the standard of living of the working class. Marxist militants had exposed themselves as worse than useless; unions had become “cogs in the system” which “negotiate the workers’ docility in return for higher wages,” while politics “takes place exclusively among specialists,” the supposed workers’ parties dominated by bureaucrats (227).
As Lefort himself had suggested, the proletarian experience that Socialisme ou Barbarie’s inquires had attempted to reach would have to be counterposed to the rigid determination of economic laws. “For traditional Marxism,” Castoriadis wrote, “the ‘objective’ contradictions of capitalism were essentially economic ones, and the system’s radical inability to satisfy the working class’s economic demands made these the motive force of class struggle.” But underlying this premise was an “objectivist and mechanistic” fallacy which reinforcing the notion that specialists and bureaucrats who could understand history’s “objective laws” would be responsible for the analysis of capitalist society and the “elimination of private property and the market.” Stuck within this fallacy, traditional Marxists could not even explain their own fixations; they failed to grasp that wages had increased because they were actually determined by class struggle, and the demands put forth by wage struggles could be met as long as they did not exceed productivity increases (227).
Like the Johnson-Forest Tendency, Castoriadis argued that the contradiction of capitalism had to be located in “production and work,” and specifically in terms of the “alienation experienced by every worker.” But unlike his stalwart Marxist predecessors, Castoriadis recognized that this theory was incompatible with the language of value, and rejected “economic” definitions of class. The opposition between directors and executants thoroughly replaced the one between owners of the means of production to non-owners. This had major implications for the view of capitalist development itself: the “ideal tendency” of “bureaucratic capitalism” would be “the constitution of a totally hierarchized society in continuous expansion where people’s increasing alienation in their work would be compensated by a ‘rising standard of living’ and where all initiative would be given over to organizers” (229). This project, however, was prone to the contradiction of bureaucratic rationality, “capitalism’s need to reduce workers to the role of mere executants and the inability of this system to function if it succeeded in achieving this required objective.” The contradiction, then, was that “capitalism needs to realize simultaneously the participation and exclusion of the workers in the production process” (228). This inherent tendency of capitalism could “never completely prevail,” since “capitalism cannot exist without the proletariat,” and the proletariat’s continuous struggle to change the labor process and the standard of living played a fundamental role in capitalist development: “The extraction of ‘use value from labor power’ is not a technical operation; it is a process of bitter struggle in which half the time, so to speak, the capitalists turn out to be losers” (248).
The experience of this struggle, and the inadequacy of reformism within it, had shorn the executants of any delusional faith in “objective” contradictions as the guarantee of bureaucratic organizations. Now the proletariat could finally recognize that the true revolutionary horizon was “workers’ management and the overcoming of the capitalist values of production and consumption” (230).
In other words, the demands of this movement would not be at the level of wages, which represented the alienated substitute for a motivation driven by creative work. The source of motivation required for social cohesion no longer lay in “signifying” activities, but solely in the pursuit of income. Even the classical careerist goal of promotion in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy ultimately led to higher income (276). But since personal income cannot lead to accumulation – it cannot make a worker a capitalist – “income therefore only has meaning through the consumption it allows.” Since consumption could not rest solely on existing needs, which were “at the point of saturation, due to constant rises in income,” capitalists had to generate new needs through the introduction of new commodities, and the alienated culture of advertising which embedded them in everyday life (277).
Yet the increase in output which was required for a constantly rising level of consumption could only be ensured through the automation of production, capitalism’s attempt at “the radical abolition of its labor relation problems by abolishing the worker” (283). And this is the context in which the “wage relation becomes an intrinsically contradictory relation,” since a rapidly developing technology, as opposed to the static technology of previous societies, prevented management from settling on any permanent means for the “stabilization of class relations in the workplace,” and prevented “technical knowledge from becoming crystallized forever in a specific category of the laboring population” (260). The whole history of class struggle within capitalist production could be understood in these terms. The introduction of machinery in the early 19th century was met with the primordial acts of industrial sabotage. Despite the defeat of its Luddite beginnings, the workers’ struggle continued within the factory, leading to the introduction of piecework, wages based on output. Now that “norms” of production were the primary line of struggle, capitalism fought back with the Taylorist scientific management of norms. The workers’ resistance to management yielded the ideological responses of industrial psychology and sociology, with their goals of “integrating” workers into alienated workplaces. But it was impossible, even by these measures, to suppress the fundamental antagonism of workers towards the production process – in fact, in the most advanced capitalist countries, with the highest wages and the most “modern” method of production and management, the “daily conflict at the point of production reaches incredible proportions” (264).
According to Castoriadis, the traditional Marxist conception was unable to comprehend this historical process. For Marxism, “capitalists themselves do not act – they are ‘acted upon’ by economic motives that determine them just as gravitation governs the movement of bodies” (262). But history proved that the ruling class adapted its strategies according to its subjective experience of class struggle, learning that wages can buy the workers’ docility, that state intervention can stabilize the economy, and that full employment can prevent the revolutionary upheaval which would result from a repetition of 1929 (269-70).
So the new revolutionary critique of society had to shed the distraction of the objectivist theory and directly denounce the irrational and inhuman results of bureaucratic management and alienated work. And capitalist development had rendered the overcoming of alienation definitively possible, since at the technical level “the entire planning bureaucracy already can be replaced by electronic calculators,” and on the social level the irrationality of the bureaucratic organization of society had been completely unveiled (299).
Just as Castoriadis drew up a balance sheet of “traditional Marxism,” we can now evaluate this particular moment of rupture. The new theory of class was expedient for an analysis of the planned economy of the Soviet Union as “bureaucratic capitalism,” formulated in dialogue with the Johnson-Forest Tendency. Castoriadis radicalized their claim that capitalism emerged from relations on the shop floor, rather than ownership of the means of production.69 The rational kernel of this theory was clear: the process which began with the Bolshevik enthusiasm for Taylorism, the adoption by the Russian bureaucracy of forms of organization of the labor process pioneered by capitalist management and sociology, shattered the Second International philosophy of history. The advancement of the productive forces, whether they were privately or publicly owned, had become an element of the rationality which governed ever more complex forms of social stratification.
However, Castoriadis’s new theory was subject to the same blindspots as his predecessors, unable to explain class relations in their unity with exchange relations. The question of technological development itself poses fundamental questions about his analysis. While Castoriadis correctly criticized the identification of the development of the productive forces with the political project of socialism, he did not explain how this process was situated within the social relations of capitalism. Technological development was an expression of the rationality of management; while Castoriadis brilliantly outlined the contradictions of this rationality at the level of the enterprise, the underlying system-wide questions of Marx’s analysis, to which each volume of Capital had been devoted, were now left unanswered. If technological development is a wasteful process, why does a profit-seeking enterprise undertake it? How is it able to make large expenditures in fixed capital, in expensive machinery, and continue to reproduce its ongoing conditions of production? In Castoriadis’s analysis, technological development is practically the result of a lack of motivation, which can only be overcome through the expansion in consumption that is enabled by technological development and its augmentation of output. We now lack the theoretical resources to understand why production has become the end of human existence, or what “maximum production” would mean – as though the capitalist’s goal were to own more things rather than to make more profits.
Just as fundamental was the question of this system’s basic preconditions. While Castoriadis explained capitalism as the fullest expression of alienation and reification, it was by no means clear how these phenomena were specific to capitalism, and what they had to do with the economic dynamics he was so quick to dismiss. Underlying management’s attempt to direct labor-power towards the maximum possible output was the fact that capitalist management was compelled to exploit labor-power to the most profitable extent – and that workers were equally compelled to sell their labor-power in exchange for a wage. What accounted for this compulsion?
If these questions were somehow incompatible with the analysis of the capitalist enterprise, this would not only invalidate Marxism – it would make the capitalist nature of the enterprise inexplicable. But by starting from inquiries into the transformation of the labor process, and shifting to a historical account of the logic of capitalist development, Socialisme ou Barbarie had served as an indispensable foundation.
Science and Strategy: Operaismo
The influence of Castoriadis, Lefort, Mothé and others from Socialisme ou Barbarie was quite apparent in the Italy of the early 1960s. Toni Negri, for instance, recalls how Socialisme ou Barbarie, “the journal that Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort published in Paris,” became “my daily bread in that period.”70
Direct links, in fact, had already been established. In 1954 Danilo Montaldi, who had earlier been expelled from the Italian Communist Party (PCI), translated “The American Worker,” not from the original English, but from the French translations that appeared in Socialisme ou Barbarie. He traveled to Paris that year, meeting the militants of Socialisme ou Barbarie and initiating an exchange with none other than Daniel Mothé, whose diary he would later translate into Italian. Montaldi would maintain these connections, returning to Paris in 1957, and again in 1960, to strengthen ties with Castoriadis, Lefort, and Edgar Morin, among others.71
Montaldi not only played an indispensable role in the transmission of the ideas of Socialisme ou Barbarie into the Italian context, he put them into practice, conducting his own brand of workers’ inquiry. These practically unprecedented investigations, which relied on a plurality of methods, from narrative to sociological inquiry to oral history, resulted in a series of highly influential publications: “Milan, Korea,” an inquiry into southern immigrants living in Milan, Autobiografie della leggera, and finally Militanti politici di base.
Montaldi proposed an entirely different way of seeing things. The objective of inquiry was to uncover the everyday struggles of the working class, independently of all the official institutions that claimed to represent it. Yet as Sergio Bologna recalls, Montaldi’s careful histories rejected mythical tributes to spontaneity, opting instead for rich descriptions of “microsystems of struggle,” the political cultures of resistance that made seemingly spontaneous movements possible.72 This new focus on buried networks and obscured histories would have tremendous ramifications.
In addition to his own investigations, Montaldi organized a group in Cremona called Gruppo di Unità Proletaria. Lasting from 1957-1962, it brought together a number of young militants, all united by their desire to discover the working class as it really was, beyond the frigid world of party cards. One of these young militants was Romano Alquati.
Alquati, trained as a sociologist, would be a pivotal figure in the formation of the journal Quaderni Rossi, the initial encounter of heterodox militants from the Italian Socialist Party and the Italian Communist Party which would found operaismo, or “workerism.” Quaderni Rossi began with a debate over sociology, whose use by the bosses had yielded new forms of labor management and discipline, but had also generated invaluable information about the labor process. While a critical Marxist appropriation of sociology was on the agenda, its relation to Montaldi’s workers’ inquiry was not entirely clear. Some in Quaderni Rossi – the “sociologist” faction surrounding Vittorio Rieser – believed that this new science, though associated with bourgeois academics, could be used as a basis for the renewal of the institutions of the workers’ movement. Others, including Alquati, felt sociology could only be, at best, an initial step towards a specifically militant collaboration between researchers and workers, a new form of knowledge which would be characterized as “coresearch.”73
Alquati’s inquiries would prove to be fundamental in the development of workerism’s economic analysis. Steve Wright has brilliantly traced the break which can be observed between Alquati’s “Report on the ‘New Forces,’” a study of FIAT published in the first issue of Quaderni Rossi in 1961, and the 1962 study of Olivetti. In the first text, along with the two others published that year on FIAT, Alquati operates, interestingly enough, within the problematic established in Socialisme ou Barbarie.74 The “new forces” at FIAT were the younger generation, brought in to work the recently installed machinery that had deskilled more experienced professional workers. Management imposed hierarchies within the workforce – a division of labor separating technicians and skilled workers from the majority, along with divisive pay scales. But this process of rationalization was subject to the contradictory irrationality Castoriadis had described; and it gave rise to forms of “invisible organization” resulting from the fact that management was constrained to give executants responsibility while at the same time trying to repress their control. Alquati also drew political conclusions reminiscent of his French precursors: the workers were unconvinced by the reformism of the official workers’ movement, and instead expressed interest in workers’ management, in an end to the alienating process of work.
Alongside Alquati’s text in the inaugural issue of Quaderni Rossi, Ranziero Panzieri, the founder of the review, published a highly influential article called “The Capitalist Use of Machinery: Marx Against the Objectivists.” Written after Alquati’s “Report,” it reflected on the themes raised by Alquati, referring throughout to the workers “studied in the present issue of Quaderni Rossi,” while pushing towards a new framework. Panzieri, who had not only written the introduction to the Italian edition of Mothé’s diary, but was also the Italian translator of the second volume of Capital, was not prepared to drop Marx’s language in favor of that of directors and executants:
the worker, as owner and seller of his labour-power, enters into relation with capital only as an individual; cooperation, the mutual relationship between workers, only begins with the labour process, but by then they have ceased to belong to themselves. On entering the labour process they are incorporated into capital.75
For Panzieri, the means by which this incorporation took place was machinery, in the passage from manufacture to the developed level of large-scale industry. Citing Marx’s remark that in the capitalist factory, “the automaton itself is the subject, and the workers are merely conscious organs,” Panzieri’s target was the labor bureaucracy’s enthusiasm for technological development.76 According to this orthodox position, technological development represented a transhistorical force, determining the progressive movement through modes of production. To drive down the Italian road to socialism, the Italian worker would have to submit to the automatons in the automobile factories.77
It is significant that while Panzieri made many of the same historical observations as Castoriadis, he defended them as discoveries internal to Marx’s theory. The same went for the rising standard of living. According to Panzieri, “Marx foresaw an increase not just of the nominal but also of the real wage”: “the more the growth of capital is rapid, the more the material situation of the working-class improves. And the more the wage is linked to the growth of capital, the more direct becomes labour’s dependence upon capital.“78 For this reason, though now in agreement with Castoriadis, Panzieri considered wage struggles a function of the unions’ bureaucratic incorporation of labor into capital; only by directly attacking capital’s control and replacing it with workers’ control could technological rationality be subjected to “the socialist use of machines.” Indeed, for Panzieri, Quaderni Rossi’s inquiries showed that the workers were already coming to this view. However, he still warned against drawing any directly political conclusions: “The ‘new’ working-class demands which characterize trade-union struggles (studied in the present issue of Quaderni Rossi) do not directly furnish a revolutionary political content, nor do they imply an automatic development in that direction.”
When Alquati’s own investigations turned from FIAT to Olivetti – from a factory that made cars to one that made calculators and typewriters – he was able to draw on and build upon Panzieri’s analysis of technology. In the title “Organic Composition of Capital and Labor-Power at Olivetti,” Alquati definitively brought the discourse of workers’ inquiry back into the language of Marxist economic analysis, and implicitly suggested a new concept: class composition.
While the seeds of class composition can be already observed in the “Report on the ‘New Forces,’” insofar as Alquati attempted to describe the material existence of the working class, its behaviors and forms of interactions and organization, the earlier inquiry had treated machinery purely as a means by which directors reduced workers to executants. Deskilling was simply a way to break the will of the executants, and new machinery an instrument in this process. Now, in the inquiry at Olivetti, the increasing organic composition of capital was seen from the working-class viewpoint as the recomposition of labor-power, the transformation of the very forms of worker cooperation. Technology, in this sense, represented the field in which the social relations of class were embedded, but as part of a dynamic process in which the conflict between the extraction of surplus value and workers’ insubordination shaped the process of production. Directors were not mere parasites; while it was true that executants informally organized their concrete labor, the function of management was to plan and coordinate this labor within the valorization process. Workers’ struggles would have to articulate forms of political organization that responded to this technological recomposition, and in this context self-management would no longer be adequate – except as the workers’ self-management of the struggle against the capital relation.
If these inquiries resulted in the beginnings of a new scientific problematic, and an enthusiastic embrace of new forces, then inquiry turned out to be more politically divisive than the participants had realized. After the riots of Piazza Statuto in 1962, when workers attacked the offices of the Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL) in Turin, Quaderni Rossi would be torn apart by internal disagreements.79 While Tronti, Alquati, Negri, and others believed that this represented a new phase of the class struggle, an opportunity to break with the increasingly untenable strategy of collaboration with the unions, Panzieri saw it as a political impasse. Unconvinced that autonomous workers’ struggles could advance a lasting organizational form – even if the form of the unions had been exhausted – Panzieri thought that a renewed emphasis on inquiry and sociological research would be required before any movement could emerge.
This political difference was, significantly, also a theoretical one. At an editorial meeting at the end of 1963, Panzieri remarked that an essay of Tronti’s was
for me a fascinating resume of a whole series of errors that the workers’ Left can commit in this moment. It is fascinating because it is very Hegelian, in the original sense, as a new way of re-living a philosophy of history. It is precisely a philosophy of history of the working class. One speaks, for example, of the party, but in that context the concept of the party cannot be deduced or forced in; one can only deduce the self-organisation of the class at the level of neo-capitalism.80
In January of the following year, this essay would launch the new journal Classe Operaia, formed by Tronti’s faction. His controversial essay would famously announce, in the lines which have now become the inescapable catchphrase of workerism: “We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the class struggle of the working class.”81
In the fall of that year, the last of his life, Panzieri spoke at a Turin seminar called “Socialist Uses of Workers’ Inquiry,” alongside the “sociologist” faction that had remained with Quaderni Rossi. Here he argued for “the use of sociological tools for the political aims of the working class,” and in doing so presented a kind of counterpoint to “Lenin in England.” In his intervention, published the following year in Quaderni Rossi, Panzieri defended the anti-historicist character of inquiry, claiming that Marx’s Capital itself had the features of a sociological analysis:
In Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and other early writings the point of comparison is alienated being (“the worker suffers in his very existence, the capitalist in the profit on his dead mammon”) and the critique of political economy is linked to a historical and philosophical conception of humanity and history. However, Marx’s Capital abandons this metaphysical and philosophical outlook and the later critique is levelled exclusively at a specific situation that is capitalism, without claiming to be a universal anti-critique of the one-sidedness of bourgeois political economy.
Workers’ inquiry as a scientific practice had to be elaborated on this basis – by advancing its own one-sidedness in response. For Panzieri, Marxist sociology “refuses to identify the working class with the movement of capital and claims that it is impossible to automatically trace a study of the working class back to the movement of capital.”82
But what was the meaning of this one-sidedness? Panzieri had indicated his distaste for Tronti’s grandiose inversion, and this was indeed a pertinent criticism, presaging the increasing distance of workerist theory from the concrete practice of inquiry over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. However, Panzieri was unable to propose a new political approach; while he had tied the practice of inquiry to a Marxist economic analysis, he was unable to bring this theory to bear on the real political activity that was beginning to emerge, and which would characterize over a decade of class struggle to follow. Recently Tronti has reflected on this split:
Panzieri accused me of “Hegelianism,” of “philosophy of history.” This reading, and the accusation that underlies it, will often return; after all, Hegelianism was a real factor, it was effectively there, always had been; while this idea of a “philosophy of history” absolutely did not… Ours was not a theory that imposed itself from outside on real data, but the opposite: that is, the attempt to recover those real data, giving them meaning within a theoretical horizon.83
Indeed, workerism would, for its entire history, be tortured by the tension between “philosophy of history” and “real data”; this lives on in today’s “post-workerism.” But these are the risks taken by those whose eyes are on the “theoretical horizon.” It is important to note that Alquati, who did not share Panzieri’s views on the incompatibility of research and insurrection, split from Quaderni Rossi and joined Classe Operaia. His conception of inquiry was a militant and political one.
For this reason Tronti’s theoretical synthesis, in his 1965 essay “Marx, Labor-Power, Working Class,” has to be reexplored. This essay makes up the bulk of Workers and Capital (1966), with only a couple concluding sections translated into English. Unlike the rest of the book, which consists of articles written for Quaderni Rossi and Classe Operaia, this hitherto unpublished essay is a long and continuous argument, developed on the basis of Tronti’s Marxology and historical analysis. While this leads us to a certain digression, we believe it is the indispensable basis for rediscovering the theory of class composition that Alquati’s practice of inquiry suggested, while also developing this theory in a way that takes Panzieri’s warning seriously.
Though Tronti’s classical workerist inversion is widely known and cited, less is known about the process of theoretical elaboration that led to it. Throughout Workers and Capital the primacy of workers’ struggle is described as a strategic reversal which attempts to identify and advance the political character of Marx’s theoretical development, with the experience of 1848 and the political writings preceding the scientific economic analysis.84 In a sense, this represented a new object of inquiry. No longer was the goal, as it was for the Johnson-Forest Tendency or Socialisme ou Barbarie, to discover universal proletarian attitudes, or even the content of socialism, but to access a specifically political logic which emerged from the working-class viewpoint – a consequence of the difficult relation between strategy and science represented by Marx’s theoretical practice.
Despite what seems to be an affirmation of some purported working-class identity, Tronti did not seek to defend, in the manner of the Johnson-Forest Tendency and Socialisme ou Barbarie, the dignity of labor. On the contrary, the guiding principle of the “refusal of work” meant returning to Marx’s own critique of the ideology of the workers’ movement: “When Marx refused the idea of labor as the source of wealth and took up a concept of labor as the measure of value, socialist ideology was beaten for good, and working-class science was born. It’s no accident that this is still the choice” (222).85
Marx had tirelessly repeated that “labor is presupposed by capital and at the same time presupposes it in its turn” – in other words, the owner of capital presupposes labor-power, while labor-power presupposes the conditions of labor. On its own, Tronti wrote, “labor creates nothing, neither value nor capital, and consequently it cannot demand from anyone the restitution of the full fruit of what ‘it has created’” (222). But since socialist ideology had extended to new theories of labor and class, it would be necessary to “clear the field of every technological illusion” which tried to “reduce the productive process to the labor process, to a relation of the laborer to the instrument as such of his labor, as though it were an eternal relation of man with an evil gift of nature.” Just as treacherous was “the trap of the processes of reification,” which started with the “ideological lament” of machinery’s mortification of the worker and quickly moved to propose “the mystical cure for the class consciousness of this worker, as if it were the search for the lost soul of modern man” (203).
Instead, recognizing that the “working class is the point of historical departure for the birth and growth of capitalism,” Marx’s path was to “start from capital to arrive at logically understanding the working class” (230). Consequently, it was necessary to affirm that the capitalist viewpoint could attain the status of science. In fact, capitalist science would be superior to socialist ideologies, which were still trapped in the view that “only the working class, in particular in the persona of its representative officials, is the repository of real science (of real history etc.), and that this is the science of everything, the general social science also valid for capital.” It would be better to recognize that “in the reorganization of the productive process of a large factory, there is at least as much scientific knowledge as in the Smithian discovery of productive labor that is exchanged for capital” (172). To want to know more about capitalist society from the working-class viewpoint “than the capitalists themselves” was a “pious illusion,” and “every form of workers’ management of capital proves to be necessarily imperfect with relation to a directly capitalist management.” The workers’ path was not a perfected management, but destruction of capitalism by revolution. “So from the viewpoint of the capitalists,” Tronti argued, “it is completely correct to study the working class; only they are capable of studying it correctly. But the ideological smog of industrial sociology will not succeed in cancelling the death sentence that it represents for them” (230).
In this regard research from the working-class viewpoint would be distinct from capitalist sociology, since its findings would be oriented towards the organization of this destruction. This indicates the question of “political composition”; as Tronti wrote, “the theoretical research we have conducted on the concepts of labor, labor-power, working class, becomes nothing more than an exercise on the path to the practical discovery of a conquest of organization” (259). This specific line of research, which emerges from workers’ inquiry and, in the history of workerism, sometimes strays quite far from it, requires a separate investigation. For the time being, we will dwell on the concepts of labor, labor-power, and working class, insofar as they complement and systematize the findings of workers’ inquiry and the category of class composition.
Before even asking what it means to say that the working class drives capitalist development, we have to ask what it means to say class, and indeed this is the absolutely central question of Tronti’s theoretical elaboration. For Tronti the theory of class cannot be restricted to the point of production, and does not even necessarily begin there. Its exposition begins with Marx’s point in volume 2 of Capital: “The class relation between capitalist and wage-labourer is thus already present, already presupposed, the moment that the two confront each other in the act M-L (L-M from the side of the worker).”86 Indeed, Tronti will affirm that “for Marx it is beyond doubt that the class-relation already exists in-itself [an sich] in the act of circulation. It is precisely this which reveals, which brings out, the capitalist relation during the production-process” (149).87
His analysis pursues the lines of Marx which follow:
Money can be spent in this form only because labour-power is found in a state of separation from its means of production (including the means of subsistence as means of production of labour-power itself); and because this separation is abolished only through the sale of labour-power to the owner of the means of production, a sale which signifies that the buyer is now in control of the continuous flow of labour-power, a flow which by no means has to stop when the amount of labor necessary to reproduce the price of labour-power has been performed. The capital relation arises only in the production process because it exists implicitly in the act of circulation, in the basically different economic conditions in which buyer and seller confront one another, in their class relation.88
What can it mean that a theoretical tradition so known for its focus on the point of production starts with a theory not only of value, but of class, that is centered on exchange? Helmut Reichelt has commented on the choice faced for economic form-analysis between, on the one hand, labor as a “quasi-ontological category” which presents “substantialised abstract human labour as the substance of value”; and on the other hand, an account of the specifically capitalist social processes which constitute the “validity [Geltung]” of human activity as abstract labor, and the natural form of products as values – in other words, the determination of what is counted as labor in exchange.89 For Reichelt this is the basis of Marx’s advanced theory of value, and we can also observe Tronti following this thread: “Concrete labor realizes itself in the infinite variety of its use values; abstract labor realizes itself in the equality of commodities as general equivalents” (124).
In an adventurous reconquering of Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, against their humanist appropriation, Tronti argued that Marx’s early writings on alienation represented an initial and incomplete theory of abstract labor, arising from the separation characteristic of private property.90 But this account would only be truly developed in Capital. While for Castoriadis Capital amounted to little more than economic objectivism, it raised the fundamental question of the commensurability assumed in exchange – which, as Reichelt points out, is central to the “double character” of “the wealth of bourgeois society”: “a mass of a multitude of use-values that as homogenous abstract quantities can at the same time be aggregated into a social product.“91 The value relation is meant to explain the form of “equal validity” which allows different products to be rendered equivalent in exchange.92
A theory of class relations specific to capitalist society, then, cannot neglect to explain how the ability to work can possibly be part of a system of exchange: how labor-power can be exchanged for a wage, inserted into a system of circulation in which commodities are rendered equivalent according to their values. But this question can only be answered within the context of a historical analysis which opens onto the definition of class. Abstract labor is constituted in exchange, but the typical exchange of capitalism is money/labor-power; so how does this constitutive class relation arise, in which owners of money and owners of labor-power confront each other on the market, and what is its relation to the process of capitalist development?
For both Lefort and Castoriadis, relying on the Communist Manifesto, capitalism’s precondition was the bourgeois revolution. For Lefort, the bourgeoisie had to be understood as constituting “a homogeneous group with a fixed structure” which had “common interests and horizons”; the proletariat, on the other hand, reduced to its atomized economic functions, would have to unify itself through its struggle against the bourgeoisie.93 Capitalism represented the reshaping of society according to the bourgeoisie’s collective interest.
For Tronti, starting from the forms of generalized exchangeability characteristic of capitalism, such an account of the bourgeoisie was simply impossible. For a system in which the typical, defining exchange was money/labor-power, the starting premise had to be the constitution of a class with nothing to sell but labor-power, the free laborer constrained economically but not legally to sell labor-power in exchange for a wage. This, for Tronti, was the constitution of the proletariat: “the properly historical passage from labor to labor-power, that is from labor as slavery and service to labor-power as the sole commodity able to submit wealth to value, able to valorize wealth and thereby produce capital” (139). But the proletariat had to enter into exchange not with a class, but with individual capitalists, whose only “collective” interest was their shared drive to compete with each other:
The historical point of departure sees in capitalist society the workers on one side and the capitalist on the other. Here again is one of the facts which imposes itself with the violence of its simplicity. Historically we can speak of an individual capitalist: this is the socially determined figure which presides over the constitution of capitalist relations of production. As such, at least in the classical development of the system, this historical figure does not disappear, it is not suppressed or extinguished, but only organizes itself collectively, socializing itself so to speak in capital, precisely as the class relation. On the other hand we cannot speak of the isolated worker at any historical moment. In its material, socially determined figure, the worker is from his birth collectively organized. From the beginning the workers, as exchange values of the capitalist, come forth in the plural: the worker in the singular does not exist (232-3).
In this regard the individual capitalist persists, and continues to engage in the market exchange which characterizes capitalism. But the capitalist class is “always something else more or less than a social class. Something less, since direct economic interest has not ceased and perhaps will not cease to present itself as divided on the capitalist side. Something more, because the political power of capital now extends its apparatus of control, domination, and repression beyond the traditional forms taken by the State, to invest the whole structure of the new society” (233).
Once labor-power is exchanged for the wage, Tronti argues, introducing a terminological distinction into Marx’s categories, the proletariat is recomposed as working class: as labor-power which is cooperative, collective within the labor-process. This ongoing process of socialization of labor is the first source of relative surplus value; it will later require technological development for its further growth. Here Tronti develops the point implicitly suggested by Panzieri; but while the latter started with the individual worker whose labor-power was integrated into the factory plan, Tronti identifies a process of class recomposition.94 Between the proletariat and the working class Tronti sees “the same historical succession and the same logical difference as that which we have already found between the seller of labor-power and the producer of surplus value” (161).
The struggle for a normal working day, for Marx so fundamental in the logical exposition of relative surplus value, manifests the class struggle in terms which also framed the proletariat: the struggle to reduce a heterogeneous mass to the commodity labor-power, and the refusal to be reduced to it. This refusal is what drives capital to act in its collective interest; in this struggle capital constitutes itself politically as a class, which became an absolute imperative in the moment of 1848. Marx’s writings on 1848 show “the encounter and the superimposition of the abstract concept of labor with the concrete reality of the worker.” At this point, Marx could supplement his earlier, intuitive reflections on abstract labor with discovery of the peculiar characteristics of the labor-power commodity: “the labor-power commodity as working class” (161).
It was not enough, however, to conclude that waged workers first constituted themselves as a class when they became sellers of labor-power and were thus incorporated into capital. It was imperative not to “fix the concept of the working class in one unique and definitive form, without development, without history.” Just as the “internal history of capital” had to include “the specific analysis of the varied determinations assumed by capital in the course of its development,” against the easy transhistorical assumptions of a “historical materialist” teleology, an “internal history of the working class” would have to be “reconstruct the moments of its formation, the changes in its composition, the development of its organization according to the varied determinations successively assumed by labor-power as productive force of capital, and according to the experiences of different struggles, recurring and always renewed, with which the mass of workers equip themselves as the sole adversary of capitalist society” (149).
And indeed this account of the dynamic historical transformation and reconstitution of labor-power was required by the social relation of surplus value, and the unity of circulation with the process of production: “The history of diverse modes in which productive labor is extracted from the worker, that is, the history of different forms of production of surplus-value, is the story of capitalist society from the working-class viewpoint” (170). This is precisely because of the twofold character of labor, Marx’s most treasured discovery, in which both aspects were decisive. While one could not derive the abstract character of labor from the level of use-value and concrete labor – that is, this was not a matter of abstraction as a psychological effect of factory time-management – the valorization of value could not take place without the use-value of labor-power:
labor, the utilization of labor-power, is workers’ labor, a concrete deployment, a concretization of abstract labor – abstract labor which finds itself already in its turn reduced to the rank of commodity, and which realizes its value in the wage. Therefore the step where abstract labor overturns itself and takes the concrete form of the worker, is the process of consumption of labor-power, the moment where it becomes in action what it was only in potential, the step of the realization of the use-value of labor-power, if we may. What was already present in the operation sale/purchase as a class relation pure and simple, elementary and general, has definitively acquired from this point on its specific, complex, and total character (166).
This complex and total character is implied by the cooperative and collective form of the working class. Unless individual labor-powers are brought into association, they cannot “make valid [far valere], on a social scale, the special character of the labor-power commodity in general, that is to say cannot make abstract labor concrete, cannot realize the use-value of labor-power, whose actual consumption is the secret of the process of valorization of value, as a process of production of surplus-value and therefore of capital” (205).
Within this process we can glimpse the theoretical location of the concept of class composition: “The sale of labor-power thus provides the first elementary stage, the simplest, of a composition into a class of waged workers: it is for this reason that a social mass constrained to sell its labor-power remains the general form of the working class” (149). But this remains an elementary stage, since as Marx concluded in his chapter on the working day, “our worker emerges from the process of production looking different from when he entered it”; entering as seller of labor power (“one owner against another owner”), the worker leaves knowing that the production process is a relation of force, and that for protection “the workers have to put their heads together and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier by which they can be prevented from selling themselves and their families into slavery and death by voluntary contract with capital.”95 For Tronti this difference is “a political leap”: “It is the leap that the passage through production provokes in what we can call the composition of the working class or even the composition of the class of workers” (202).
We are now in a position to understand why the working-class struggle, for Tronti, comes first in the history of capitalist development. Capitalist development has to be understood as a process of exchange in which the valorization of value is driven by the sale and purchase of labor-power. It is only in the socialization of labor-power within the labor process that proletarians take the associated form of working class, in the realization of the use-value of their labor-power by the individual capitalist. And only the resistance of their reduction to the labor-power commodity can compel individual capitalists, who compete on the market, to form a cohesive class:
The particularity of labor-power as a commodity faced with other commodities coincides therefore with the specifically working-class character that the production process of capital takes on; and, inside of this, with the concentration of a working-class initiative in the class relation, that leads to a leap in the development of the working class and to the subsequent birth of a class of capitalists (166).
Within the context of this broad economic and historical theory, we are in a position to close the lengthy digression and return to workers’ inquiry. Workerism’s scientific discovery was to push the practice of inquiry away from the humanist problematic of experience towards a value theory which was able to reinterpret Marx’s critique of political economy and put it to use. It implied a political practice which affirmed shop floor passivity and wage struggles as expressions of a nascent power of refusal of work.
We can now understand that workers’ inquiry was an investigation into the composition of the working class, as the historical body which, separated from the means of subsistence and reduced to the sale of its labor-power, had to be formed into a socialized productive force within a process of constant expansion – the expanded reproduction of the class itself, and its recomposition in ever more technologically advanced labor processes.
To close this genealogy we described a significant moment of rupture, the discovery of a concept which opens new paths of scientific and political experimentation. But it was a theory which emerged from a specific historical moment. “We all have to be born some day, somewhere,” Althusser remarked, “and begin thinking and writing in a given world.”96 Tronti began with the hegemony of the factory to show how the class antagonism could be thought together with capitalism’s laws of motion, in a way that his predecessors had failed to do.97 Yet despite their theoretical underdevelopment, the Johnson-Forest Tendency had understood that proletarian life exists beyond the factory, that it encompasses a childhood in the cotton fields, afternoons in the kitchen. And just as feminists in Italy would challenge the hegemony of the factory as a masculine blindspot, Italian workerism would also have to respond to changes in capitalist development which they had not predicted: global economic crisis, the restructuring of production, and the decline of factory hegemony. Attempts to develop this theoretical problematic still have to respond to this historical challenge, and navigate around Panzieri’s warning – the risk of lapsing into a philosophy of history supported by the ontologization of labor.
Although the introduction of class composition identified capitalism with industrial labor, and the social world created by the postwar boom, at the same time it provided a method which could today be used to trace the constitution and transformation of labor-power in the context of uneven development and global crisis.98 Tronti confesses that his and his comrades’ fixation on the industrial working class now presents itself as an unresolved problem: “I have come to the conviction that the working class was the last great historical form of social aristocracy. It was a minority in the midst of the people; its struggles changed capitalism but did not change the world, and the reason for this is precisely what still needs to be understood.”99 We suggest that inquiry will be the first step in understanding.
Asad Haider is an editor of Viewpoint and a graduate student at UC Santa Cruz.
Salar Mohandesi is an editor of Viewpoint and a graduate student at the University of Pennsylvania.
- 1Karl Marx, “Enquête ouvrière” and “Workers’ Questionnaire” in Marx-Engels Collected Works vol. 24. (New York: International Publishers, 1880). The English version at marxists.org has only 100 questions; this is because Marx asks two separate questions about the decrease in wages during periods of stagnation, and their increase in periods of prosperity (questions 73 and 74), and in this English version the former is omitted.
- 2Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 1976), 98.
- 3Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 65.
- 4“Marx to Domela Nieuwenhuis In The Hague,” available online at marxists.org.
- 5Kent Worcester, CLR James: A Political Biography (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 55-81; Paul Buhle, CLR James: The Artist as Revolutionary (New York: Verso, 1988), 66-99.
- 6For a brief, but excellent introduction to the history of the newspaper, see “Introduction to Part 1” in Pages from a Black Radical’s Notebook: A James Boggs Reader, ed. Stephen M. Ward (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 37-41.
- 7“Gripes and Grievances,” Correspondence, vol. 2, no. 2 (January 22, 1955), 4.
- 8Grace Lee Boggs, “CLR. James: Organizing in the USA, 1938-1953,” in CLR James: His Intellectual Legacies, ed. Selwyn Cudjoe and William Cain (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 164. Paul Buhle, on the other hand, explictly claims that Grace Lee actually wrote the text, in, Buhle, CLR James, 90.
- 9Ph. Guillaume, “L’Ouvrier american par Paul Romano,” Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 1 (Mars/Avril 1949), 78.
- 10It is significant that Singer was not addressing this to philanthropists, bourgeois specialists, or even sympathetic intellectuals. This was for workers. “I am not writing in order to gain the approval or sympathy of these intellectuals for the workers’ actions. I want instead to illustrate to the workers themselves that sometimes when their conditions seem everlasting and hopeless, they are in actuality revealing by their every-day reactions and expressions that they are the road to a far-reaching change.” Paul Romano and Ria Stone, The American Worker (New York, 1947), 1.
- 11Marx, Capital vol. 1, 618; Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 52.
- 12Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 47-48.
- 13Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 57.
- 14Romano and Stone, The American Worker.
- 15CLR James, Raya Dunayevskaya, and Grace Lee Boggs, “World War II and Social Revolution” in The Invading Socialist Society, available online at marxists.org.
- 16I.I. Rubin, “Abstract Labour and Value in Marx’s System,” Capital & Class 2 (1978). See Rubin’s admirably concise definition: “Abstract labour is the designation for that part of the total social labour which was equalised in the process of social division of labour through the equation of the products of labour on the market.”
- 17Rubin, “Abstract Labour and Value.”
- 18“The rough draft of this pamphlet was given to workers across the country. Their reaction was as one. They were surprised and gratified to see in print the experiences and thoughts which they have rarely put into words. Workers arrive home from the factory too exhausted to read more than the daily comics. Yet most of the workers who read the pamphlet stayed up well into the night to finish the reading once they had started.” Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 1.
- 19In his introduction to the French translation of “The American Worker,” Philippe Guillaume called it “proletarian documentary literature.” For more on this, see Stephen Hastings-King, “On Claude Lefort’s ‘Proletarian Experience,’” in this issue.
- 20“A Worker’s Inquiry” was first published in the United States by The New International in December 1938.
- 21She wrote: “See, ‘A Workers’ Inquiry’ by Karl Marx in which one hundred and one questions are asked of the workers’ themselves, dealing with everything from lavatories, soap, wine, strikes and unions to ‘the general physical, intellectual, and moral conditions of life of the working men and women in your trade.’” Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 59.
- 22Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 1.
- 23Romano and Stone, The American Worker, 12.
- 24Selma James, “A Woman’s Place” in The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (London: Falling Wall Press, 1972), 58, 64.
- 25It is only Martin Glaberman’s 1972 preface to the pamphlet which finally reveals that Phil Singer worked at General Motors factory in New Jersey.
- 26Quoted in Rachel Peterson, “Correspondence: Journalism, Anticommunism, and Marxism in 1950s Detroit,” in Anticommunism and the African American Freedom Movement: “Another side of the Story,” ed. Robbie Lieberman and Clarence Lang (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 146. As if to dramatically confirm this, Boggs’s own pseudonym, Ria Stone, is often misidentified as Raya Dunayevskaya.
- 27Peterson, “Correspondence,” 146.
- 28Selma James, Sex, Race, and Class – The Perspective of Winning: A Selection of Writings, 1952-2011 (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), 13-14; Frank Rosengarten, Urbane Revolutionary: CLR. James and the Struggle for a New Society (Mississippi: University of Mississippi Press, 2008), 89.
- 29Charles Denby [Si Owens], Indignant Heart: A Black Workers’ Journal (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), xi. This edition was attributed to Charles Denby, Owens’s more common pseudonym, and the one he used for most of his article in Correspondence. It is also significant that Owens still wrote under a pseudonym in 1978, even though McCarthyism had clearly passed.
- 30Denby, Indignant Heart, xi.
- 31Peterson, “Correspondence,” 123.
- 32Constance Webb, Not Without Love: Memoirs (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2003), 266.
- 33Romano and Stone, The American Worker.
- 34James, “A Woman’s Place,” 79.
- 35For an excellent introduction to the group in English, see Marcel van der Linden, “Socialisme ou Barbarie: A French Revolutionary Group (1949-1965),” Left History vol. 5, no. 1, 1997. Republished at http://www.left-dis.nl/uk/lindsob.htm.” For a general history, see Philippe Gottraux, “Socialisme ou Barbarie”: Un engagement politique et intellectuel dans la France de l’après-guerre (Paris: Editions Payot Lausanne, 1997).
- 36“From Workers’ Autonomy to Social Autonomy: An interview with Daniel Blanchard by Amador Fernández-Savater,” available online at libcom.org
- 37Philippe Guillaume, “L’Ouvrier Americain par Paul Romano,” Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 1 (Mars/Avril 1949), 78; translated in this issue of Viewpoint.
- 38For more on this fascinating figure, see Stephen Hastings-King’s forthcoming book on Socialisme ou Barbarie.
- 39“Un journal ouvrier aux Etats-unis,” Socialisme ou Barbarie, no. 13 (jan-mars 1954): 82.
- 40Cornelius Castoriadis, “CLR James and the Fate of Marxism,” in CLR James: His Intellectual Legacies, ed. Selwyn Cudjoe and William Cain (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995), 287.
- 41“Workers and Intellectuals,” Correspondence, vol. 2, no. 3 (February 5, 1955): 4.
- 42Grace Lee Boggs, Living For Change: An Autobiography (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 67.
- 43An anonymous ex-member of Correspondence quoted in Ivar Oxaal, Black Intellectuals Come to Power (Cambridge: Schenkman Books, 1968), 78.
- 44For a detailed discussion of Lefort’s take on this problem, see Stephen Hastings-King, in this issue.
- 45Claude Lefort, “Proletarian Experience,” translated in this issue.
- 46Lefort, “Proletarian Experience.”
- 47Lefort, “Proletarian Experience.”
- 48For a fascinating account of this paper by a militant closely involved in its development, see Henri Simon’s contribution to this issue.
- 49“Que voulons-nous?” in Tribune Ouvrière no. 1 (mai 1954), reprinted in Socialisme ou Barbarie nos. 15/16: 74.
- 50Mothé was one of the few workers in the group, which led many to put him on a kind of pedestal. As Lefort has recalled “Mothé’s proposals, often very rich but sometimes also confused, carried weight for many because he was supposed to ‘represent’ Renault. Mothé was conscious of the role he was led to play and while he took advantage of it, he was also exasperated by it. The climate would have been very different if we had had more workers among us.” “An interview with Claude Lefort,” Telos 30 (Winter 1976-77): 178. This lack of workers in the group might have been a reason for the shortage of worker narratives that constantly plagued Socialisme ou Barbarie. This also marks a significant difference between Correspondence and Socialisme ou Barbarie. The first was overwhelmingly working-class. In 1954 it boasted a membership of 75 workers and only 5 self-described intellectuals; see The Correspondence Booklet (Detroit: Correspondence, 1954), 1. In contrast, Socialisme ou Barbarie’s membership largely consisted of intellectuals or students
- 51Daniel Mothé, “Le problème d’un journal ouvrier,” Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 17 (juillet-septembre 1955), 30; translated in this issue of Viewpoint.
- 52Mothé often uses the term “revolutionary ideology” instead of revolutionary theory.
- 53Note how Mothé substitutes “revolutionary organization” for “revolutionary militants.” This seems to suggest that, according to this model, the organization can be composed only by militants. This might be a reflection of the situation Socialisme ou Barbarie found itself in: a group that happened to be composed almost entirely of intellectuals is turned into theoretical type.
- 54Mothé, “Le problème d’un journal ouvrier,” 47.
- 55These stringent qualifications exacerbated the major problem facing this project: the unwillingness of most workers to write. More on this below.
- 56The editorial core of Tribune Ouvrière was already wracked by internal ideological disputes. Although he supported a closer relationship between the two journals, Mothé did not want to turn Tribune Ouvrière into a political journal, in other words, he opposed the idea that the journal should communicate overtly political ideas to the workers, and held that it should primarily be a space where workers could discuss their experiences. Gottraux, “Socialisme ou Barbarie”, 67
- 57For more on Henri Simon’s stance on inquiry, the workers’ paper, and this broader experience, see his contribution to this issue.
- 58Gottraux, “Socialisme ou Barbarie”, 86.
- 59For more on this conjuncture, see “Interview with Castoriadis,” Telos 23 (Spring 1975), 135.
- 60For more on this split, Marcel van der Linden, “Socialisme ou Barbarie: A French Revolutionary Group (1949-1965).” For a brief analysis from the perspective of a militant who was involved, see Henri Simon, “1958-1998: Communism in France: Socialisme ou Barbarie, ICO and Echanges,” available online at libcom.org
- 61Daniel Blanchard saw a perfect illustration of this in the relationship between Mothé and Castoriadis: “Whereas the Leninist organizations kept the manual and intellectual workers strictly separated in specific roles (the latter educating the former in any case), in SouB we devoted special efforts—which were often unsuccessful—to abolish this separation. For example, the relationship between Daniel Mothé and Castoriadis was an interesting example of the collaboration of a very intelligent worker, as Mothé was, and a theoretician like Castoriadis. The ideas that Castoriadis elaborated helped Mothé to understand his own reality in the factory. And Mothé was then able to analyze his experience in a very concrete way that in turn nourished the theoretical labors of Castoriadis; Blanchard, “Autonomy.” Henri Simon has also commented on this pairing, but from a more critical perspective: “In Socialisme ou Barbarie, there was a kind of harmony [osmose], symbiosis Mothé/Castoriadis. There was almost always placed side by side in Socialisme ou Barbarie a theoretical article by Castoriadis and a concrete article by Mothé. Mothé saw the factory through the theoretical lenses of Castoriadis”; “Entretien d’Henri Simon avec l’Anti-mythes (1974),” available online at raumgegenzement.blogsport.de.
- 62Cornelius Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings, Volume 2, 1955-1960: From the Workers’ Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 213. Further references to this collection are given in the text.
- 63For a fascinating autobiographical account of the phenomenon, see Stan Weir, “The Informal Work Group” in Rank and File: Personal Histories by Working-Class Organizers, ed. Alice and Staughton Lynd, expanded edition (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011).
- 64Gottraux, “Socialisme ou Barbarie”, 120-121.
- 65Indeed, it appears that Pouvoir Ouvrier never really learned the lessons of Tribune Ouvrière; Castoriadis found himself writing another article, this time in Pouvoir Ouvrier, in which he tried, yet again, to theorize why workers simply were not writing. See Cornelius Castoriadis, “What Really Matters” in PSW 2, 223-5.
- 66Claude Lefort, “Proletarian Experience.”
- 67“Interview with Lefort,” 179.
- 68“Interview with Lefort,” 183.
- 69See “The Relations of Production in Russia” in Political and Social Writings, Volume 1, 1946-1955: From the Critique of Bureaucracy to the Positive Content of Socialism, trans. and ed. David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), and our commentary in “Deviations, Part 1: The Castoriadis-Pannekoek Exchange.”
- 70Cesare Casarino and Antonio Negri, In Praise of the Common (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2008), 54.
- 71Danilo Montaldi, Bisogna sognare. Scritti 1952-1975 (Milano: Colibrì, 1994).
- 72Sergio Bologna and Patrick Cuninghame, “For an Analysis of Autonomia – An Interview with Sergio Bologna,” available online at libcom.org
- 73Montaldi himself had believed that sociology, as Steve Wright recounts, “could help in the development of revolutionary theory”; see Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 2002), 21-25. On the division within Quaderni Rossi, see Marta Malo de Molina, “Common Notions, part 1: workers-inquiry, co-research, consciousness-raising,” trans. Maribel Casas-Cortés and Sebastian Cobarrubias of the Notas Rojas Collective Chapel Hill, eicp (2006). Finally, for more on coresearch or conricerca, and the influence of both Montaldi and another of Alquati’s precursors, Alessandro Pizzorno, see Guido Borio, Francesca Pozzi, and Gigi Roggero, “Conricerca as Political Action” in Utopian Pedagogy: Radical Experiments Against Neoliberal Globalization, ed. Mark Coté, Richard J.F. Day, and Greig de Peuter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
- 74See Wright, Storming Heaven, 46-58; the texts themselves are collected in Romano Alquati, Sulla Fiat (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1975): “Relazione sulle ‘forze nuove.’ Convegno del PSI sulla FIAT, gennaio 1961”; “Documenti sulla lotta di classe alla FIAT”; “Tradizione e rinnovamento alla FIAT-Ferriere.” A partial translation of the 1962 text, “Organic Composition of Capital and Labor-Power at Olivetti,” is presented in this issue. For a very perceptive analysis of Alquati’s Olivetti text, and the trajectory of inquiry in general, see Wildcat, “The Renascence of Operaismo,” available online at libcom.org
- 75Raniero Panzieri, “The Capitalist Use of Machinery,” trans. Quintin Hoare, available online at libcom.org.
- 76Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 544.
- 77Since the further development of the orthodox position was that collaboration between the unions, the state, and the employers, represented the displacement of competition towards planning, and therefore a step towards socialism, Panzieri also made the argument that planning represented the necessary social extension of capital’s despotism in the factory. “The basic factor in this process is the continual growth of constant capital with respect to variable capital”; as machines grew more numerous than workers, capital had to exercise an “absolute control,” imposing its rationality of production upons workers, and through the growth of monopolies extending its plan “from the factory to the market, to the external social sphere” (“Capitalist Use of Machinery.”) This thesis would be the subject of Panzieri’s last major essay, “Surplus Value and Planning,” in issue 4 of Quaderni Rossi (translated by Julian Bees and available online at zerowork.org). In this sense, while Panzieri’s argument represented a sophisticated theoretical advance and had a worthwhile political function, it also contained a certain reification of the features of postwar capitalism, and lost some of its clarity on the nature of capitalist exchange relations. Interestingly, this essay was followed in Quaderni Rossi with Marx’s so-called “Fragment on Machines” from the Grundrisse.
- 78Panzieri, “Capitalist Use of Machinery.”
- 79See Wildcat, “Renascence of Operaismo,” for some interesting comments on Piazza Statuto in the context of workers’ inquiry.
- 80Quoted in Robert Lumley, “Review Article: Working Class Autonomy and the Crisis,” Capital and Class 12 (Winter 1980): 129; also discussed in Wright, Storming Heaven, 58-62. Lumley considers Tronti’s intervention to be “a theoretical and political regression”; as we will try to demonstrate below, we disagree with this assessment
- 81Mario Tronti, “Lenin in England,” available online at libcom.org.
- 82Raniero Panzieri, “Socialist Uses of Workers’ Inquiry,” trans. Arianna Bove, eicp (2006).
- 83Tronti, Noi operaisti, quoted in Adelino Zanini, “On the Philosophical Foundations of Italian Workerism,” Historical Materialism 18 (2010): 60.
- 84Mario Tronti, Operai e capitale (Turin: Einaudi, 1966), 128, 179, 209-10, 220, 256. Translations from this text are ours, with the invaluable help of Evan Calder Williams, unless otherwise noted. We also profitably consulted the French translation by Yann Moulier-Boutang and Giuseppe Bezza, available online at multitudes.samizdat.net. Further references to the original Italian are given in the text
- 85Here of course Tronti recalls Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme.
- 86Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1978), 115; Tronti quotes this passage in Operai e capitale, 144-5.
- 87This is also quoted in Zanini, “Philosophical Foundations,” 50. Zanini’s is one of the few texts in English which addresses Tronti’s economic analysis.
- 88Marx, Capital, Volume 2, 115; second sentence quoted by Tronti, Operai e capitale, 148-9.
- 89Helmut Reichelt, “Marx’s Critique of Economic Categories,” trans. Werner Strauss and ed. Jim Kincaid, Historical Materialism 15 (2007): 11. It is worth noting that workerism was not always able to successfully navigate between the two; while Reichelt’s “quasi-ontological category” refers to the conception which understands abstract labor as expenditure of physiological energy, measurable in calories, workerism would at times be captivated by labor as the “living, form-giving fire,” which is at times suggested in Tronti’s assessment of the Grundrisse as “a more advanced book” than Capital. (Tronti, Operai e capitale, 210; translated in Murphy 339). The Grundrisse played an ambiguous role in the history of workerism, providing new theoretical energies while also obscuring the ruptures in Marx’s economic thought. Future research will have to draw these distinctions clearly, especially to move beyond the Grundrisse’s problematic of “capital in general”; see Michael Heinrich, “Capital in General and the Structure of Marx’s Capital,” Capital and Class 13:63 (1989).
- 90This argument is presented throughout the introduction to the essay, pages 123-43, with attention to a range of Marx’s other early manuscripts.
- 91Helmut Reichelt, “Social Reality as Appearance: Some Notes on Marx’s Conception of Reality,” trans. Werner Bonefeld, Human Dignity, eds. Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 40. Reichelt ends this article (65) with comments on the category of class which, in contrast to Tronti’s, do not manage to incorporate Marx’s close attention to the historical constitution of the proletariat, and its recomposition in the labor process.
- 92Reichelt, “Marx’s Critique,” 22.
- 93Lefort, “Proletarian Experience”; see also the somewhat different argument, which refers to waged labor and technological development alongside the bourgeois revolution, in Castoriadis, “Modern Capitalism and Revolution,” 259-60.
- 94Compare to Raniero Panzieri, “Surplus Value and Planning”: “The relationship between the workers, their cooperation, appears only after the sale of their labour-power, which involves the simple relationship of individual workers to capital.” It is worth noting that while Panzieri’s 1964 account was based on the displacement of competition by planning, Tronti’s description of “the plan of capital” a year earlier in Quaderni Rossi had represented it as the highest level of development of the socialization of capital still mediated by competition, in the individual capitalist’s pursuit of profits higher than the average: “Individual enterprises, or entire ‘privileged’ productive activities, along with the propulsive function of the whole system, constantly tend to break from within the total social capital in order to subsequently re-compose it at a higher level. The struggle among capitalists continues, but now it functions directly within the development of capital.” Planning represented the extension of capital’s despotism to the state, not a new phase displacing competitive capitalism: “The anarchy of capitalist production is not cancelled: it is simply socially organized.” See “Social Capital,” available online at libcom.org, and the original collected in Operai e capitale, 60-85.
- 95Marx, Capital, Volume 1, 415-6.
- 96Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1969), 74.
- 97Introduced in “Factory and Society” in the second issue of Quaderni Rossi (1962), collected in Tronti, Operai e capitale, 39-59; see also Sergio Bologna, “The Factory-Society Relationship as an Historical Category,” available online at libcom.org (translation of “Rapporto società-fabbrica come categoria storica,” Primo Maggio 2, 1974).
- 98For an account of the workerist attempt to develop the theory of money and class composition in the context of the economic instability of the early 1970s, see Steve Wright, “Revolution from Above? Money and Class-Composition in Italian Operaismo” in Karl Heinz-Roth and Marcel van der Linden, ed., Beyond Marx (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming).
- 99Mario Tronti, “Towards a Critique of Political Democracy,” trans. Alberto Toscano, Cosmos and History, 5:1 (2009): 74.
Comments
Probably common knowledge amongst some in our milieu but the specific connections between 'Socialisme ou Barbarie' and various influential figures of Italian autonomist marxism underlined some theoretical connections that I had observed in relation to the 'Worker's Inquiry' theme elsewhere. So thanks for this.
Finally, after almost 3 months, finished the footnotes and reformatting on this 20,000 word monster.
Juan Conatz, I really appreciate your efforts to put texts related to worker's inquiry. And you even still continue to do so, that is superb.
The American worker and the Forze Nuove: Turin and Detroit at the twilight of Fordism
Nicola Pizzolato on the commonalities between Detroit and Turin, Italy in the 1960s.
In a 1982 paper presented at MIT, Italian urbanist Paolo Ceccarelli characterized Detroit and Turin as “città fragili” – fragile cities. His assessment contrasted starkly with the way the two “motor cities” had been represented for most of the twentieth century, but it resonated with his contemporary audience. While they were once seen, at the pinnacle of their industrial development, as the benchmark for the modern city, Ceccarelli argued that Detroit and Turin, were actually examples of how such cities should not be built. In both places, Fordism had sparked rapid and tumultous demographic change, first through mass immigration, then through emigration. This upheaval had not been matched by adequate urban planning and governance. The initial inordinate growth had generated societies divided along fault lines of race, ethnicity, and class. Industrial expansion had brought a number of social ills, but decentralization, a harbinger of deindustrialization, made things worse, leaving in its wake a desolated urban landscape of abandoned plant complexes and dilapidated neighborhoods (in Detroit), or pauperized and marginal peripheries and slums (in Turin).1
In depicting the history of Detroit and Turin as a cautionary tale of modernization gone awry, Ceccarelli neglected to note that Fordism had brought not only an urban cataclysm, but also the opportunity for a far-reaching working-class recomposition within the industrial plants, the rise and fall of social movements, and the creation of a corpus of social theory and militant practice related to both. All these topics would benefit from the kind of comparative perspective that Ceccarelli applied to urban planning. After all, it had been Meridionali, southern Italians, in Turin, and African-Americans in Detroit (two groups heavily represented in the automobile factories of these cities in the 1960s), who had exposed how ‘fragile’ the motor cities were.
A number of transnational threads connected the two cities during the twentieth century, in particular in the 1950s and 1960s, two decades crucial for the destiny of these cities and for the paradigm of production and social organization on which they thrived, Fordism. During the 1950s and early 1960s, political militants outside the traditional left developed a critique of the practice and ideology of trade unions and Soviet-inspired communist parties, and generated a new, empirical way of documenting and researching the working-class that populated Turin and Detroit. Initially independent from each other, these militants would eventually situate their work within transnational connections. In the American Motor City, dissident Marxists C.L.R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya exposed Soviet communism as “state capitalism” – a system which, like its market-driven counterpart, rested on the exploitation of workers – and at the same time issued a scathing attack on American labor unions. By the early 1950s they had gathered in Detroit a small but vocal group of activists and intellectuals, under the name of Correspondence; this described both a publication and its supporting activist group, focused on political intervention in the factories. Correspondence’s vision of class struggle with the automobile factories of Detroit was grounded in the idea of workers’ self-organization outside the existing labor movement. The 1947 pamphlet The American Worker by Paul Romano (a pseudonym for Phil Singer, a General Motors autoworker) and Ria Stone (an alias for Grace Lee, one of the leading members of Correspondence) was one of the group’s most influential early publications. Even though the pamphlet was penned by these two authors, it was born out of the collective discussion of the group. Written just after American trade unions had curtailed a period of intense strike activity, The American Worker denounced the adverse effect of union bureaucracy on the everyday life of workers, and on the prospect of working-class struggle. It decried the union’s failure to address the issues that mattered most to workers, such as the speed-up. Romano also touched upon two principles that would become fundamental to the new transnational approach: the existence of a latent and spontaneous workers’ resistance to the regimented life of the factory, irrespective of any actual union organization; and their instinctive ability to organize their work in a more humane, but equally effective way: “Many workers become angry because of the fact that suggestions which they put in are ignored. These suggestions would add to efficiency and also increase production as well as save money. There is a general tendency in all strata of the working class to work in as efficient a manner as possible.” However, the pamphlet argued, the exploitation workers were subjected to forced them to oppose the managers’ efforts, resorting in their pent-up frustration to justified acts of sabotage and vandalism.2 The American Worker’s novelty consisted in presenting, in a worker’s own words, a realistic representation of factory work and its repercussions on the psyche and political outlook of the worker. The industrial worker’s autobiographical account became a minor genre during the 1950s and 1960s, as Correspondence and other groups tried to inquire into the condition of workers on the basis of their actual experience in the factory – rather than on the basis of a dogmatic truth bequeathed by Marxist theory. The American Worker was serialized by the homonymous publication of the French group Socialisme ou Barbarie and found an echo in another influential biography, Journal d’un ouvrier by Daniel Mothé, a worker at Renault’s automobile plants. Cooperation between members of Correspondence and Socialisme ou Barbarie in Paris spanned throughout the 1950s, resulting in the book Facing Reality (1958), co-authored by C.L.R. James, Grace Lee Boggs, and Pierre Chaulieu (the cover name for Cornelius Castoriadis, one of the leading members of Socialisme ou Barbarie).3 This book built on the common perspective shared by the groups in Detroit and Paris and characterized trade unions as the “bodyguards of capital,’.” Their repressive action manifested itself into two elements: the steward system and the grievance procedure. Both had originally been devised to protect the union and the worker from the whims of management, but now they acted as a straitjacket, restricting workers’ capacity to organize production on the shop floor. The steward secured workers’ compliance with the union contract, rather than representing workers in management. The grievance procedure defused conflict with management through an “‘elaborate”’ process that removed conflict from workers’ hands and transferred it to the labor bureaucracy. Later, observers on the liberal Left would uphold the idea that the grievance procedure was an ineffective way to solve workers’ complaints, but the main critique made by James and the other went further: grievance procedures gave management the power to schedule and control the production flow and the organization of work. This criticism was not totally wholly fair, since the union’s encroachment on the shop floor did after all check to some degree the arbitrary power of management, but it also touched a nerve: the UAW had in fact succumbed to the auto manufacturers’ wish to control and organize the point of production as they saw fit, even though individual workers were now less vulnerable to retaliatory lay offs and wage cuts. Facing Reality argued that this system suppressed workers’ desire for self-organization, which, while not a conscious program, but simply something “inherent in all their actions and in the discussions they hold among themselves.”’4
In early 1950s Italy, this analysis appealed to those leftwing activists who questioned whether the dogmatic Marxist narrative propounded by the Italian Communist Party really applied to the actual conditions of the Italian working class. By the middle of the decade, the ideas of the Johnson-Forest Tendency began to filter through to dissident Marxist circles through the translation of Romano’s and Mothé’s work by Danilo Montaldi. Montaldi was an essayist and sociologist who had left the PCI after the war, remaining critical of the Old Left throughout his life. In his preface to the translation of The American Worker, Montaldi celebrated the text as a sign that, contrary to prevailing assumptions, the American working-class remained class conscious and had not fallen for the ideological blandishments of capitalism. Montaldi described Correspondence as the American “revolutionary vanguard”, a group that understood that “the worker is first of all someone who lives at the point of production of the capitalist factory before being the member of a party, a revolutionary militant, or the subject of coming socialist power. It is the productive process that shapes his rejection of exploitation and his capacity to build a superior type of society, […] and his class solidarity.” The development of this fundamental idea, wrote Montaldi, was Correspondence’s crucial contribution to the contemporary revolutionary movement.5
One of Montaldi’s collaborators, Romano Alquati, was greatly inspired by both The American Worker and Mothè’s Journal. They both travelled to Paris to meet the members of Socialisme ou Barbarie, and Alquati organized roundtable presentations of the Journal in Turin.6 Alquati was in the process of developing his own brand of workers’ inquiry, close in many ways to that of Correspondence, in which the experience of workers constituted the basis for theory, rather than vice versa.
In 1961, Alquati pioneered this new kind of workers’ research at FIAT.7 Two themes ran through Alquati’s report, later published in Quaderni Rossi: first, the pre-eminence of a new working class at FIAT, disillusioned with the company, but also indifferent to left-wing unions and parties. Alquati controversially argued that even a large company such as FIAT failed to “integrate” workers into capitalism and to neutralise their rebelliousness: whatever faith these youth had before entering the factory in the desirability of industrial work, this was quickly shed after only a few months’ work at the point of production. Relatively high wages (for some) and the consumerism they enabled did not lessen the effects of alienation. Any resurgence of class struggle within the firm would be based upon these forze nuove, as Alquati called them, which included southern Italian migrants. Even though the “new forces” lacked class consciousness in a traditional sense, they spontaneously understood the need for “self-determination,” that is, self-organization within the factory.8
Second, Alquati emphasized the inability of the traditional left to identify and make use of these new trends. The report accused the union and PCI leadership of focusing on loftier political goals, such as legal reform, which did not directly affect factory conditions. The politics of the traditional Left did not measure up to the politics of the new working class. Or, conversely, the new workers did not perceive their action to be “political” because they associated politics with partisan politics in Rome. The solution lay in a new “organizational praxis” through which the new workers would be led to analyze their situation.9 The wave of workers’ struggles in the Turinese factories in 1962, leading to the so called “riot of Piazza Statuto” and the events from 1969 onwards, vindicated Alquati’s insight that the working class organized itself in ways that transcended the trade union leadership.10
By the early 1960s, in both Turin and Detroit, political militants and radical social theorists analyzed a drastically recomposed working-class, whose significance escaped the dominant organizations of the labor movement. This recomposition accounts for the striking similarities, as well as important differences, in the way industrial relations broke down in the automobile factories, and social protest flared up in Detroit and Turin after 1968. In both cases, a massive wave of migration had fundamentally changed the demographics of the two cities. Tensions over competition for housing and resources between newcomers and natives were compounded by ethnic (and in Detroit, racial) prejudices. Racial discrimination took a heavier toll on African-Americans, since they were victims of a racially segmented labor and housing market, police brutality, and none-too-subtle forms of social segregation. In Turin, Italian southern migrants likewise encountered housing discrimination and were concentrated in run-down sections of the city center, or in building projects in degraded suburbs poorly connected to the rest of the metropolitan area. Even though their problems were not exacerbated by “race,” southern migrants were at the mercy of a dual labor market, typical of Fordism, that allotted high-paid steady jobs to natives, and precarious low-wage occupations to newcomers. Because Turin and Detroit were industrial cities, the experience and the standing of southern migrants and blacks within the factories played a considerable role in their overall positions in the community, in terms of income, political influence, and symbolic status. The parallel trajectories of the two cities were determined by the structural configuration and urban concentration of the Fordist industry par excellence: the automobile industry.
League of Revolutionary Black Workers.
Working-class unrest in Turin and Detroit shared an important feature: the activism of social groups occupying a marginal position in the political economy of the city. In both cases, the distinct cultural background of the “new workers” shaped the tactics, political language, and goals of the movement. They subverted the traditional class narrative of insubordination against capital by elevating cultural, regional, or racial “difference” to political importance. Americans had long associated European immigration with radicalism, but this argument was not usually applied to internal migration, the kind that brought tens of thousands of southern blacks to Detroit in the 1940s, 1950s, and also, to a lesser extent, in the 1960s.11 Similarly, in Italy, after the war few would have imagined that southerners were destined to become a major force of political change. On the contrary, industrialists and unionists, conservatives and Communists, all expected southern migrants to sap working-class consciousness.
My book Challenging Global Capitalism puts forward the argument that in the case of both Detroit and Turin, the experience of marginalization was a key stimulus to action, even when protesters interpreted their resistance in terms of interest categories such as race, class, or ethnicity.12 This characteristic had been captured by the dissent activists that operated in both cities during the 1950s and 1960s, but caught the traditional labor movement by surprise.
The analysis of this period of intense social mobilization, which takes into account parallel developments in different local settings – an analysis, that is, which pursues similarities and connections beyond national borders – highlights three significant themes that enhance our understanding of this phenomenon. The first is the direct consequence of the marginalization processes described above. In Detroit and Turin, “marginal” workers; that is African-Americans and Meridionali, who, for a number of reasons, had benefited least from the existing system of industrial relations, and whose path to social integration had been steep and strewn with obstacles, were prominent in the workers’ unrest. In a sense, this is hardly unexpected for the historian, yet it did take many representatives of the Left by surprise. These workers were bringing into the struggle motives, tactics, and political identities that clashed with the traditional approach of organized labor – their emergence as a class subject changed the working class forever.
The second theme that resonates on both sides of the Atlantic was the challenge that workers’ militancy posed to existing industrial relations, in particular to the link between wages and productivity – a central pillar of Fordism. This had been the result of hard bargaining and collective action, in the American case, and the outcome of FIAT’s attempt to defuse mass unionization by means of heavy-handed paternalism, in the Italian case. Workers disrupted this nexus by turning the shop floor into the key site of industrial conflict. In the automobile plants of the late 1960s, workers not only took time off work by striking, but blocked production in a variety of ways without renouncing their wages. Because Fordist industry relied on a highly integrated process, these actions disrupted not only the department directly implicated, but also all the other departments and plants connected to it. The demands that accompanied these tactics were equally disruptive of the old order, as they rarely focused solely on wage increases, but also tended to involve changes in the organization of work, or the balance of authority at the point of production, and safety issues raised by the production process. In both Detroit and Turin, when the workforce mobilized, decision-making shifted away from union and corporate boardrooms onto the shop floor.
Finally, the third theme implicit in both cases studied here, and no doubt in many others, is the link between workers’ struggles and a wider process of social mobilization which had “antisystemic” objectives (a term used by Arrighi, Wallerstein, and Hopkins in the context of 1968).13 Workers hardly needed to be convinced by students of the desirability of resisting the exhausting demands of the assembly line, but the coalition with New Left activists magnified the effect of the revolt on the shop floor. This period saw the establishment of various forms of collaboration between students and industrial workers. Sometimes it was spontaneous or unstructured, but more often it occurred within the radical groups that agitated against capitalism, discrimination, and oppression, both inside and outside the factory. Mention might here be made of groups such as the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, Lotta Continua, and Potere Operaio. Workers and students (at any rate those on the Left), shared a youth culture that extolled anti-authoritarianism, forms of participatory democracy – such as general assemblies where anyone could take the stage and speak – and disruptive tactics such as unannounced sit-ins or occupations. These actions often riled labor activists from the Old Left.
Radicals on both sides of the Atlantic found solace in the idea that a transformation of the relations of production elsewhere could abet change in their own region. They engaged in dialogue – sometimes in writing, at other times in person – in order to share tactics of rebellion, to elicit support for their particular groups, or to refine their analysis of the workings of capitalism. They saw in the autonomously organized working class the engine of radical social transformation. Simultaneous upheaval in Detroit and Turin, and elsewhere, seemed to suggest that at the turn of the 1970s the world was on the point of being fundamentally transformed by social movements. Fordism was at the twilight of its existence, crumbling under the pressure of self-organized protest and withdrawal from work. It was a fundamental insight of the social theory developed in this period that the protest developed in the factories by this new working class ushered in an utterly new era of capitalism in the West which could no longer be called Fordist.
Nicola Pizzolato is the author of Challenging Global Capitalism: Labor Migration, Radical Struggle, and Urban Change in Detroit and Turin.
- 1Paolo Ceccarelli, “Due città fragili: Detroit e Torino. Ovvero, come non si dovrebbe costruire la città moderna” in Il Mulino, 1 (1983).
- 2Ibid, 15.
- 3Marcel van der Linden, “Socialism ou Barbarie: A French Revolutionary Group (1949-1965),” Left History, 5:1 (1997).
- 4CLR James, Grace Lee, and Pierre Chaulieu, Facing Reality (1958; Detroit: Bewick Editions, 1974), 21, 27.
- 5Preface to L’operaio americano in Danilo Montaldi, Bisogna sognare. Scritti 1952-1975 (Milano: Colibrì, 1994), 501.
- 6Romano Alquati, interview in Guido Borio, Francesca Pozzi, Gigi Roggero, Futuro Anteriore. Dai ‘Quaderni Rossi’ ai movimento globali: ricchezze e limiti dell’operaiosmo italiano (Roma: DeriveApprodi, 2002), attached CD-ROM.
- 7“Relazione sulle ‘forze nuove. Convegno del PSI sulla FIAT, gennaio 1961” and “Documenti sulla lotta di classe alla FIAT” in Romano Alquati, Sulla Fiat e altri scritti, (Milano, 1975), 314-341.
- 8Alquati, “Relazione sulle “Forze nuove,” 35.
- 9“Documenti sulla lotta di classe alla FIAT,” 63.
- 10See Dario Lanzardo, La rivolta di Piazza Statuto (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1980); Sante Notarnicola, L’evasione impossibile (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1978), 79-82.
- 11For the immigrants-radicals association see John Higham, Strangers in the Land (New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1955); see also C. Guerin-Gonzales and C. Strikwerda eds., The Politics of Immigrant Workers. Labor Activism and Migration in the World Economy Since 1830 (New York, London: Holmes & Meier, 1993).
- 12Nicola Pizzolato, Challenging Global Capitalism: Labor Migration, Radical Struggle and Urban Change in Detroit and Turin (New York: Palgrave, 2013).
- 13Giovanni Arrighi, Terence Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein, Antisystemic Movements, (London: Verso, 1989).
Attachments
Comments
Introduction to L’ouvrier américain (1949)
From Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 1 (1949), the introduction to The American Worker.
The American Worker by Paul Romano
Translated from the American
We present here an unprecedented document of great value about the lives of American workers. This appraisal stems not only from the fact that it definitively puts paid to both the absurd claim that American workers don’t have class consciousness, and the myth of the comfort and luxury of the American proletariat. This would already be amply sufficient reason to make a point of publishing the document by the worker and militant revolutionary Romano. It is indispensable that a credible voice is raised to destroy the barefaced propaganda of Hollywood firms which show us workers in bathrooms, or those of Reader’s Digest which depict at every opportunity the benefits of class collaboration.
The merits of this small pamphlet are much more profound. Every worker, regardless of “his nationality” of exploitation, will find in it the image of his own existence as a proletarian. There are, in fact, deep and consistent characteristics of proletarian experience that know neither frontiers nor regimes. Furthermore every worker, and this is precisely because it’s the reflection of the exploitation “without formalities” [sans phrase] that is given to us, will be filled with a boundless confidence in the historic destiny [destinées historiques] of his class, because he will see there, like the author, that even at the moment when the worker is in the deepest despair, when his situation appears to him to be insoluble, his own “everyday reactions and expressions” reveal that he is on “the road to a far-reaching change…”
The translator of this small pamphlet himself has worked several years in the factory. We was struck by the accuracy and the important implications of every line. It is impossible for a worker to remain indifferent to this reading. It is even more impossible to translate such a text in an indifferent, or even routine, manner. At several junctures, it was necessary to take a considerable distance from the letter of the English text to provide a really faithful translation. Some American popular expressions have an exact correspondence in French, but embedded in different imagery. Even in his descriptive style, Romano uses a proletarian optic. It was necessary to find a corresponding style in French, even if it meant straying from the text. Admittedly, this translation is not elegant, but it is the most faithful we could have given.
Even more in translating than reading one is struck by the concrete universality of the proletarian condition, and we hope to have respected this expression.
In our eyes, it is not by accident that such a sample of proletarian documentary literature comes to us from America, and it is also not by accident that it is, in some of its deepest aspects, the first of the genre. One can be certain that the name Romano will stay in the history of proletarian literature, and that it will even signify a turning point in that history. The most industrialized country in the world, with the most concentrated proletariat, should give rise to new and original talent. That is a sign of the vigor and the depth of American workers’ movement.
—Translated by Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi
Philippe Guillaume was a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
Comments
Introduction to L’operaio americano (1954)
From Battaglia Comunista, a. XV, n. 2 (febbraio-marzo 1954), the introduction to the Italian translation of The American Worker.
The document with which we start off this issue was written by Paul Romano, an American worker. There exists an America that no one talks about, which is to be found beyond the myth of the refrigerator, the automobile, and the television, and beyond the myth of affluence for all. It is the America of the factory: an unknown America whose history is made of strikes, exploitation, and proletarian misery. The protagonists of this story are the workers, and Paul Romano is a worker who writes about the life of the workers.
It is no coincidence that such a deeply interesting document comes from the most highly industrialized country in the world, to counter the lie that the American proletariat has no class consciousness.
We know the difficulties through which the revolutionary vanguard must move in the United States. The group that Paul Romano belongs to was formed within the American Trotskyist organization, but split off following a profound disagreement. At the heart of this disagreement lay the refusal to adhere to the watchword of “unconditional defense of the USSR,” which constituted the classical platform of Trotskyism, represented in the United States by the Socialist Workers’ Party; the evaluation of the USSR as state capitalist; the same analysis of the capitalist situation as that of the Workers’ Party, another wing of American Trotskyism, which did not present anything fundamentally new, while this group stressed the concentration and statization of the economy; and, finally, differences over their political tasks, since the seizure of power by the proletariat remained fundamental to the group that published “The American Worker” in 1947. Formed in 1950 as an independent organization, since October 1953 the group has published a bimonthly newspaper, Correspondence, of which ten issues are already out. “The American Worker,” as much as the newspaper Correspondence, expresses with great force and profundity this idea, practically forgotten by the Marxist movement after the publication of the first volume of Capital, that the worker is first of all someone who lives at the point of production of the capitalist factory before being the member of a party, a revolutionary militant, or the subject of coming socialist power; and that it is the productive process that shapes his rejection of exploitation and his capacity to build a superior type of society, his class solidarity with other workers, and his hatred for exploitation and the exploiters, the traditional bosses of yesterday and the impersonal bureaucrats of today and tomorrow. The development of this fundamental idea is the principal contribution of this group to the revolutionary movement of today. But the documentary value of Paul Romano’s book resides also in this: that it reveals the conditions of the workers to be universal. For this reason, we invite the comrades, the workers, the readers to write to Battaglia, to compare their own situations to that of the “American worker,” which is to say, with the worker of all countries – the worker with whom they feel something similar and yet see something different.
—Translated by Salar Mohandesi
Danilo Montaldi was an Italian historian and militant.
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Workers’ Inquiry in Socialisme ou Barbarie
Henri Simon's account of Socialisme ou Barbarie and its 'worker's papers'.
Before taking up the subject, it is necessary to point out that Socialisme ou Barbarie, primarily at the impetus of Castoriadis (alias Chaulieu), went through different periods, largely corresponding to political analyses of the prospects of struggle which conditioned the development of the group.
If one can schematically distinguish a Marxist period from a non-Marxist period, with the new positions of Castoriadis and the split of Pouvoir Ouvrier (Marxist tendency) in 1963, the preceding period, beginning in 1949, went through different approaches in the analysis of the economic, social, and political situation not only in France, but also in the entire world. In these different orientations, which are easy to detect in the 40 issues of the review, the question of workers’ inquiry was only posed in periods during which the group affirmed the primacy of the class struggle. It might be worth recalling that the Chaulieu-Montal tendency’s break with the Parti Communiste Internationaliste and the Fourth International happened over the question of the nature of the USSR; and at the same time, and for several years, the group essentially fixed its attention on the coming of the Third World War. But it could show an interest in the working class in the form of testimonies, as is demonstrated by the publication, from the first issue of the review, of a translation of Paul Romano’s text – The American Worker – and some reports on strikes in both France and abroad. But, then, it was never a question of workers’ inquiry and one cannot say that the class struggle and an attempt to understand the world of the worker were at that time primary concerns of the group.
Personally, I participated in Socialisme ou Barbarie from 1952 to 1958. I left Socialisme ou Barbarie with Claude Lefort (Montal) after an attempt by the majority of the group to create a political party during the events bound up with the war in Algeria and the Gaullist semi-coup. This rupture happened over purely organization considerations that did not directly put into question the interest in the action of the working class. On the contrary, the majority saw in Gaullism a kind of fascism (which was an incorrect analysis), and drew the conclusion that we were going to participate in a workers’ revolt, hence the necessity of a structured organization. This orientation was, however, in opposition to the concept of workers’ inquiry because the group saw itself, at that time, as a guide, a coordinator, a recruiter aiming to impose a line rather than drawing this line from an analysis of workers’ behavior. I would not know what to say about what really happened after 1958 – because I was no longer a part of it – except to comment on the texts published by the review, or to trust what my contacts in the group could tell me.
If the first issues of the review did not have an essential interest in having a deep understanding of the working class, of the proletariat in general and in particular, the 11th issue of the review, from November-December 1952, did address the question of workers’ inquiry in a leading article (not signed, which leads one to suppose that there was a consensus on this point, or a compromise) entitled “Proletarian Experience.” But, if this article spoke about inquiry, it was not to privilege this method of understanding what the proletariat really is, but, on the contrary, to rule in favor of these “narrative accounts.” It is interesting to copy this passage, which is the conclusion of a long text on theoretical developments:
Socialisme ou Barbarie would like to solicit testimonies from workers and publish them at the same time as it accords an important place to all forms of analysis concerning proletarian experience. In this issue the reader will find the beginning of such a testimony, one that leaves aside several of the points we have outlined.1 Other such texts could broach these points in ways that go beyond those envisioned in this issue. In fact, it is impossible to impose an exact framework. If we have seemed to do so in the course of our explanations, and if we have produced nothing but a questionnaire, then this work would not be valuable: a question imposed from the outside might be an irritant for the subject being questioned, shaping an artificial response or, in any case, imprinting upon it a character that it would not otherwise have had. Our research directions would be brought to bear even on narratives that we provoke: we must be attentive to all forms of expression that might advance concrete analysis. As for the rest, the problem is not the form taken by a document, but its interpretation. Who will work out the relationships understood as significant between such and such responses? Who will reveal from beneath the explicit content of a document the intentions and attitudes that inspired it, and juxtapose the testimonies? The comrades of Socialisme ou Barbarie? But would this not run counter to their intentions, given that they propose a kind of research that would enable workers to reflect upon their experience? This problem cannot be resolved artificially, particularly not at this first step in the work. In any case, the interpretation, from wherever it comes, will remain contemporary with the text being interpreted. It can only impress if it is judged to be accurate by the reader, someone who is able to find another meaning in the materials we submit to him. We hope it will be possible to connect the authors with texts in a collective critique of the documents. For the moment, our goal is to gather these materials: in this, we count on the active support of those sympathetic with this journal.
All of this talk ends in this decision to put aside workers’ inquiry in favor of the first-hand narrative of a single person, when one knows what Socialisme ou Barbarie really was at that time: a core of some dozen militants with a few contacts in the provinces and review that circulated barely more than 200 copies. It was out of the question, for purely practical reasons to start any kind of “workers’ inquiry,” even less because only three or four of these participants were proletarians. Did this critical rejection not express the concrete impossibility of realizing this work, given the size of the group? Or rather, was it not the consequence of a political approach to the question – that the group had nothing to learn from the working class but, on the contrary, had several things to teach it? (This connects to the positions on the role of the organization that exploded in 1958 in the political turmoil of the war in Algeria.) In fact, the review would only include, following The American Worker by Paul Romano mentioned above, narratives from the proletarian members of the group. There is clear evidence that these narratives were influenced by the political vision of the group; this was particularly true, for example, with the Mothé’s narratives on the Renault Billancourt factory, which were strongly influenced by the Castoriadis’ positions.
The publication of this text on “Proletarian Experience” coincided with the development of struggle in France, notably the large strikes in 1953 and 1955, up until 1958, when the political problems tied to the war in Algeria gained the upper hand over the life of the group, the discussions in the group, and the articles in the review, privileged the workers’ struggles and the narratives in question, but at no moment did the question of “workers’ inquiry” posed in 1952 reappear. On the contrary, innumerable debates unfolded in the weekly meetings on the question of a workers paper. Such a paper existed, clandestinely, Tribune Ouvrière, operated by group of workers at the Renault factory in Billancourt (a suburb of Paris), a few of whom were close to Socialisme ou Barbarie (one was a member).
To recount the history of Tribune Ouvrière, workers bulletin of the Renault factory at Billancourt necessitates retracing the situation in the factory and the relations of labor in the fifteen years that followed the Second World War. To broadly summarize, this factory of about 30,000 workers, the “workers’ fortress,” as we used it call it at the time, was then dominated by the CGT, tied closely to the Communist Party, and which until 1947, imposed the management’s production imperatives. It was in line with the national political union for the economic reconstruction of capitalism in France.
The class struggle continued nonetheless, and Trotskyist militants succeeded in polarizing opposition against this politics of class collaboration in certain workshops in the factory, and in unleashing in April-May 1947 a wildcat strike and the creation of a strike committee outside the union. The violent repression of the strike ended with a compromise (signed by the CGT without the presence of the strike committee), but had political consequences: the ejection of the Communist ministers from the government (other factors also contributed to this ejection: on the one hand, the beginning of the cold war and alignment on the politics of the USSR, and on the other hand, the first war in Vietnam). The end of the strike saw the exclusion of the CGT from those sections that had launched the strike, which had to create a new union, the Renault Democratic Union (SDR), led by a Trotskyist militant, Bois. The existence of this union was very ephemeral because it clashed with both the CGT and the management (the legal arrangement practically prohibited it from participating in any discussion in the factory).
A few years later, in 1954, some participated in the creation of a new opposition in the factory, which regrouped, under the impetus of a militant close to Socialisme ou Barbarie, Raymond (who still refused to participate in the group), and other militants in the factory, an anarchist, Pierrot, the Trotskyist Bois, and a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie, Mothé. It was in this way that the workers bulletin, Tribune Ouvrière, was launched. It was totally clandestine and disseminated secretly in the factory - the CGT’s presence was still so strong that it could oppose any attempt to organize outside its union control. The true facilitator of this nucleus was Gaspard, who did not content himself with ensuring the appearance and distribution of the bulletin, but was a true organizer of a real nucleus of nearly 50 workers in a collective approach that expanded beyond the union into a kind of collective life outside the factory (vacations, cultural trips, etc.). I can testify to this since, organizer of an opposition core at my company. I occasionally took part in these “activities.”
There were attempts to turn Tribune Ouvrière into the worker bulletin of Socialisme ou Barbarie; these discussions aimed to define the method of such a bulletin, which was intended to propagate the ideas of the group, rather than to promote a deeper understanding of the proletariat. After 1958, and the group’s split, such a paper appeared under the title Pouvoir Ouvrier. No longer a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie after this date, I can only refer to publications in order to maintain that the question of Workers’ Inquiry was never addressed in the group, and even more so that even the worker narratives disappeared [from the review] completely, the group being in large part composed of intellectuals and students, and no proletarians.
The debates that, in 1958, led to Socialisme ou Barbarie’s split, were polarized around two texts on the role of the organization, one coming from Castoriadis, the other from Lefort. In this latter text one finds a brief reference to workers inquiry in the conclusion on “militant activity” in these terms: “On the other hand, one can begin several serious analyses concerning the functioning of our own society (on the relations of production, the French bureaucracy, or the union bureaucracy). One would in this way establish a collaboration with factory militants in a way that poses in concrete terms (through inquiries into their life and work experiences) the problem of workers’ management.”2 But even there this remained a purely theoretical position without the possibility of practical realization given the reduced size of the group and, in fact, everything would unfold differently.
In a certain way, one can say that this approach to understanding the proletarian milieu was adopted by those who emerged, after the various turmoils that lasted up until 1962, as the minority that was more or less excluded from Socialisme ou Barbarie in 1958. It would take too long to explain how, from the autumn of 1958, we constituted an “inter-firm group” composed solely of proletarians, and which began to publish a monthly bulletin essentially reproducing what the participants could say about whatever happened in their factory. This bulletin ended up calling itself Informations Correspondance Ouvrières (ICO)3 and continued under this form until 1968 where, once again, an influx of students fundamentally modified the original character of the group and the content of the bulletin. In a certain way this resembles workers’ inquiry, but it was in no way a response to precise questionnaire, but a narrative, eventually clarified by questions to other proletarians participating in the meeting. I must add that until 1967-1968, when economic and social development sparked a revival of interest in this experience, the membership of ICO never surpassed more than 30, the bulletin’s circulation having finally attained 1000 copies, and that the influence of the group remained negligible all the same.
Tribune Ouvrière disappeared around 1962-63 because Raymond left – and he took with him a certain number of Renault workers – to create a collective vacation center. In the years before 1958 discussions went on in Socialisme ou Barbarie about a “workers’ paper” that would express the group’s position on workers’ struggles to the workers. For some time some in Socialisme ou Barbarie had thought that Tribune Ouvrière would be this workers’ paper expressing the group. But the opposition of Raymond and the other members (except Mothé, who pushed for such an integration), nullified all these efforts. It was then that the majority, taking advantage of the 1958 split, launched the workers’ paper of the group: Pouvoir Ouvrier. It was neither the continuation of Tribune Ouvrière, which continued for some time in its original form, nor some formula that corresponded to it, but the paper of a political group carrying, in more accessible language, the good word to the workers: it did not base itself on any concrete workers experience. This was so true that at the time of Socialisme ou Barbarie’s new split in 1963, “Pouvoir Ouvrier” became the name and the political organ of the new group. After 1958 Mothé founded the paper according to the formula he defended in the review, but he quickly abandoned it to pursue a union career in the CFDT.
With Mothé having become a syndicalist, Raymond leaving for a commercial career, and Bois, who was the animating spirit behind Voix Ouvrières, launching factory bulletins that were closely controlled by the Trotskyist apparatus, Tribune Ouvrière could disappear because the majority of those who had directed it were working elsewhere. Only one of them was left, Pierrot, still a worker at Renault Billancourt, who joined ICO and became one of its animateurs. But one cannot say there was any filiation with Tribune Ouvrière, which disappeared practically the moment when ICO emerged on completely different bases than any of the groups of bulletins cited. Practically, all the participants in ICO were workers who, opposed to unions, shared their experience as workers, and their experience of the difficult struggle between the boss’s exploitation and the union bureaucracy; this made for an original conception, very different from both Tribune Ouvrière, limited to a single factory, and Pouvoir Ouvrier, the expression of a political group. ICO continued in this form practically until 1968, then everything was overturned in May 68 with an influx of non-workers, and with this influx a mutation towards a political group, which, for its part, led to shattering of the group around ideological orientations. Neither one nor the other of these so-called “workers’” bulletins can serve as models for today because they corresponded to certain structures of capital, to ensuing relations of production, and a certain union presence. A half century later, many things have changed in this area and few today discuss the “workers’ paper.”
ICO disappeared after 1968 in large part because of profound divergences over the role of the proletariat, some foreseeing a rise in struggles, which would justify a revolutionary perspective (which led to the reemergence of the old debates on the role of organizations and an irreducible cleavage between the Marxist and anarchist currents); others thinking the role of the proletariat was no longer central to the prospects of a communist transformation of society. These are the currents that still confront each other 40 years later, but the least that can be said is that neither one concerned itself with really knowing how proletarians live and struggle, and their vision of a non-capitalist world. For these currents – even though a whole arsenal of sociologists and ethnologists around the world try to tap into this in order to further the domination of the worker however they can, with the sole interest of ensuring the permanence of the system that exploits labor-power – the theme of workers’ inquiry is no longer relevant: for some it is totally useless, because the workers are no longer a determining factor; for others, as in the past, it is a secondary thing, because they still think they have to teach something to workers, and not the other way around.
—Translated by Asad Haider and Salar Mohandesi
Henri Simon was a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
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Proletarian experience
A 1953 essay by Claude Lefort of Socialisme Ou Barbarie that represents part of the turn to the sociologically oriented approach to the working class fundamental for the group’s revolutionary project, in particular from 1953 through 1957.
There is no phrase from Marx more often repeated: “The history of all societies to date has been the history of class struggle.”1 These words have lost none of their explosive potential. People are continuously providing practical commentaries, charlatans have obscured their meaning, replacing them with more reassuring truths. Yet must we still say that history is defined entirely around class struggle, that history today is defined entirely by the struggles of the proletariat against the class that exploits it, and that historical creativity and the creativity of the proletariat are today one and the same? On these points, there is no ambiguity in Marx. He wrote: “Of all the instruments of production the greatest productive power is the proletariat itself.”2 But rather than subordinate everything to this productive power and interpret the development of society as a whole in terms shaped by that of the revolutionary class, pseudo-Marxists of all kinds have tried to base the conception of history on less moveable grounds. They have converted the theory of class struggle into a purely economic science and claim to have derived its laws in the image of those of classical physics, deducing a superstructure and thereby conflating class comportment3 with ideological phenomena. Taking an expression from Capital, they say that the proletariat and bourgeoisie are “personifications of economic categories,” the former of wage labor and the latter of capital. The struggle between them is the mere reflection of an objective conflict, the nature of which is tied to a given period as a function of the development of productive forces and existing relations of production. Because this conflict results from the development of productive forces, history is essentially reduced to it, and is in the process unwittingly transformed into a particular episode in the evolution of nature. Simultaneously, the role of class and of human beings is vacated. To be sure, this theory does not dispense entirely with interest in the development of the proletariat, but restricts it to objective characteristics – to extension, density, and concentration. In the best scenario, these characteristics are then brought into relation with large-scale proletarian actions. This theoretical viewpoint monitors the natural evolution of a proletariat that it casts as an unconscious and undifferentiated mass. The permanent struggle against exploitation, revolutionary actions and ideological phenomena that accompany them, are not the real history of the class. They are mere expressions of an economic function.
Not only did Marx distance himself from this theory, there is an explicit critique of it in the philosophical work of his youth. According to Marx, attempts to grasp social development in itself, independently of concrete human beings and the relations they establish amongst themselves – be they of cooperation or of conflict – are expressions of the alienation inherent in capitalist society. Because they are made strangers to their work, because their social situation is imposed on them independently of their will, people are inclined to grasp human activity in general on the model of physics and to grasp society as a being in-itself.
Marx’s critique did not destroy this tendency any more than he eliminated alienation by revealing it. On the contrary, this tendency developed out of other aspects of Marx in the form of a so-called economic materialism that, with time, came to play a specific role in the mystification of the workers’ movement. Its duplication of the social division within the proletariat between the worker elite associated with the intelligentsia and the masses fed into a command ideology the bureaucratic character of which is fully revealed in Stalinism. By converting the proletariat into a mass governed by laws and its agency into an economic function, this tendency justifies the reduction of workers to the status of executants within their own organizations, which have become instruments of worker exploitation.
The proletariat is the real response to this economic pseudo-materialism. Its response is elaborated through its practical existence. Anyone who looks at its history can see that the proletariat has not merely reacted to definite, external economic factors (degree of exploitation, standard of living, mode of concentration), but that it has really acted. The proletariat has intervened in a revolutionary manner based not on some schema provided by the objective situation, but on its total, cumulative experience. While it would be absurd to interpret the history of the workers’ movement without continuous reference to the economic structure of society as a whole at the time, to reduce workers to that structure is to condemn oneself to ignore three-quarters of its concrete class comportment. Who would try to deduce a century’s worth of transformations in worker mentalités4 , methods of struggle and forms of organization on the basis of purely economic processes?
Following Marx, it is essential to affirm that the working class is not merely an economic category, but the “greatest of productive forces.” We must show how this is the case both against critics and mystifiers and for the development of revolutionary theory. But we must also recognize that this topic was only broached in Marx and that its expression through his conception of the proletariat remained conceptually unclear. He was often content with abstract claims about the role of changes of consciousness in class formation without explaining what they meant. At the same time, in the interest of showing the necessity of fundamental revolution, he often depicted the working class in terms so dark that they lead one to wonder how workers could possibly acquire consciousness of their situation and their role in the management of Humanity. Marx argues that capitalism has transformed the worker into a machine and robbed it of “every human physical and moral characteristic” and that capitalism has removed from work all semblance of “individual interaction.” The result has been a “loss of humanity.” However, according to Marx, because it is subhuman, because it is totally alienated and an accumulation of all social distress, the proletariat’s revolt against its fate can emancipate all of humanity. (It requires “a class…for which humanity is entirely lost and which can only reconquer itself by conquering all of humanity” or “the proletariat of the present day alone, totally excluded from all personal activity, is able to realize its total personal activity and no longer recognize limits on the appropriation of the totality of collective forces.”5 ). At the same time, it is clear that proletarian revolution is not a liberatory explosion followed by the instant transformation of all society (Marx directed much sarcasm at this anarchist naïveté). Rather, proletarian revolution is when the exploited class assumes the management of all of society. But how could the proletariat successfully take on the innumerable social, political, economic, and cultural tasks that a successful revolution would bring if the night before it had been radically excluded from social life? One response could be: the class undergoes a metamorphosis through revolution. But even as there is an acceleration of historical processes in a revolutionary period, one that upsets existing relations amongst men and establishes communication that links each to society as a whole, phenomena which are required for the extraordinary maturation of the class that revolution brings, nonetheless it would be absurd, sociologically speaking, to see the class as born of revolution. Its maturation is only possible due to prior experience that it interprets and puts into a positive practice.
Marx’s characterizations of the total alienation of the proletariat are linked to the idea that the overthrow of the bourgeoisie is the necessary and sufficient condition for the victory of socialism. In these cases, he is preoccupied with the destruction of the old order and opposes to it communist society, like a positive is opposed to a negative. These points show that Marx was necessarily dependent on a particular historical situation. The unfolding of subsequent decades requires us to think otherwise about the passage from the old order into a post-revolutionary society. The problem of revolution has become that of the proletariat’s capacity to manage all of society. This requires us to think about the development of this capacity within capitalist society.
There is no lack of indications in Marx of the material that would be required to outline another conception of the proletariat. For example, Marx writes that communism is the actual movement of overthrowing the existing society that is presupposed by it. From a certain viewpoint, this indicates continuities that would link social forces in the existing capitalist stage to the future of humanity. More explicitly, Marx highlights the originality of the proletariat, which already represents the “dissolution of all classes,”6 he says, because, it is not linked to any particular interest, because it absorbs aspects of previous social classes and recombines them in a unique manner, and because it has no necessary link with the soil or, by extension, with any nation. What is more, while Marx insists – correctly – on the negative, alienated character of proletarian work, he also shows that this same situation puts the proletariat in a universal situation because of technological development which has enabled an interchangeability of tasks and a rationalization of production virtually without limits. This enables us to see the creative function of the proletariat within Industry, which he calls the “open book of human forces.”7 In this, the proletariat appears, not as subhuman, but as the producer of social life in its entirety. The proletariat fabricates the objects thanks to which human life continues in all domains because there is no one who does not owe his conditions of existence to industrial production. If the proletariat is the universal producer, it must somehow also be a depository of social and cultural progress.
In other places, Marx describes the development of the bourgeoisie and proletariat in much the same terms, as if the classes belong together not only because of their places in production, but also because of their mode of evolution and the relations they establish between people. For example, he writes: “The diverse individuals only constitute a class when they support a struggle against another class. The rest of the time, they confront each other in competition. At the same time, the class becomes autonomous relative to individuals, so that they find their predestined conditions of existence.”8 However, when he concretely describes the evolution of the proletariat and bourgeoisie he differentiates them radically. Essentially, the bourgeoisie compose a class because those who constitute it have a common economic function. Common interests and horizons describe their common conditions of existence for them. Independently of the politics each adopts, the bourgeoisie constitutes a homogeneous group with a fixed structure. Their commonalities of interest explain the ease with which the class can develop a specialized fraction to undertake its politics. Bourgeois politics are expressions and interpretations of these shared dispositions. This characteristic of the bourgeoisie is equally evident in the process of its historical development: “Because they were in opposition to existing conditions and the division of labor that resulted from them, the conditions of existence for isolated bourgeois became the conditions common to all of them.”9 In other words, the identity of their economic situation within feudalism unified them and gave them a class aspect, imposing on them from the beginning a simple association by resemblance. This is what Marx means by the expression the runaway serfs were already half-bourgeois. There was no continuity that linked serf and bourgeois. Rather, the latter simply legalized the former’s already-extant mode of life. As a group, the bourgeoisie insinuated itself into feudal society, and its focus was broadening its own mode of production. When this mode of production encountered the limits of the existing conditions, there was no contradiction; existing conditions merely impeded its development. Marx does not say, but enables one to say: From the beginning the bourgeoisie is what it will become, an exploiting class. Of course, it was initially underprivileged, but it already contained within itself all the characteristics that its history would simply develop.
The development of the proletariat is completely different. Reduced solely to its economic function, it represents a determinate social category. But this category does not yet posses a class direction. Its direction [sens de classe] is constituted by its original comportment: the struggle against all forms of class in the society which it confronts as adversarial strata. This does not mean that the role of class in production should be neglected; on the contrary, we will see that the role workers play in society, and those they will be called upon to play in becoming its masters, are directly rooted in their roles as producers. But the essential point is that their role does not give them the ability to act, but only an increasingly strong capacity to manage. The bourgeoisie is continually confronted with the results of its work: that is what gives it objectivity. The proletariat is raised up through its work without ever being concerned with its results. Both the objects it produces and the sequence of operations required to produce them are taken from it. While there is a progress in technical skill, this progress will only acquire a value in the future. In the present, it is inscribed in the negative image of an exploitative society. (The technical capabilities of the contemporary American proletariat have no common measure with that of the French proletariat of 1848, but both the former and the latter are equally without economic power.) It is true that workers, like the bourgeoisie, have similar interests imposed on them by their common working conditions – for example, they have an interest in full employment and higher wages. But these interests are of a different order than their most fundamental interest, which is to not be workers. It appears that workers seek higher wages in the same way as bourgeois seek profits, just as it appears both offer commodities on the market – the latter capital, the former labor-power. In fact, the bourgeoisie constitutes itself through this comportment as author of its class: it builds the system of production that is the source of its own social structure. For its part, while the proletariat seems only to react to conditions that are imposed on it, it is being matured by its exploiters. Even if the workers are points of departure for radical opposition to the system of exploitation itself, they nonetheless play an integral part in the dialectic of capital. In confrontation with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat only affirms itself as an autonomous class when it contests bourgeois power, which is to say its mode of production, or, more concretely, exploitation itself. Its revolutionary attitude constitutes its class attitude. Proletarian class direction is not developed through an accumulation of economic attributes, but rather through their radical denial in order to institute a new social order. From this follows that the proletariat, unlike the bourgeoisie, cannot cast off their chains as individuals because the fulfillment of their destiny cannot be located in what they already virtually are, but only through the abolition of the proletarian condition itself.10 Marx notes that the bourgeoisie are only of their class as “members” or as “average” individuals (that is, as passively determined by their economic situation) while the workers, forming a “revolutionary community,”11 are properly individuals to the extent they dominate their situation and immediate relations to production.
If it is true that no class can ever be reduced solely to an economic function and that a description of concrete social relations within the bourgeoisie are a necessary component of a comprehension of that class, then it is even more true that the proletariat requires a specific approach that would enable access to its subjective development. Despite some reservations concerning what is entailed by this term, it summarizes better than any other the dominant trait of the proletariat. The proletariat is subjective to the extent that its comportments are not the simple result of the conditions of its existence: its conditions of existence require of it a continuous struggle for transformation, thus a continuous distance from its immediate fate. The progress of this struggle, sense of distance and the development of the ideological content that enables them comprise an experience across which the class constitutes itself.
To paraphrase Marx again, one must avoid above all fixing the relation of the proletariat to the individual as an abstraction. One must search for how its social structure emerges from the situations of determinate individuals because it is true, according to Marx, that in society it is the proletariat which represents a fortiori an eminently social force within the present historical stage as the group which produces collective life.
The indications that we find in Marx of an orientation toward the concrete analysis of the social relations constitutive of the working class have not been developed by the Marxist movement. The fundamental questions for us have not been directly broached – how do men, placed in the conditions of industrial work, come to appropriate that work? how do they build links between specific relations amongst themselves, and how do they perceive and fashion relations with the rest of society? and, in a singular manner, how do they compose the shared experience which makes of them a historical force? For the most part they have been left aside in favor of a more abstract conception, the object of which is, for example, capitalist Society (considered in its generality). The forces which comprise it are placed on the same level. So it was for Lenin, for whom the proletariat was an entity whose historical meaning had been established once and for all and which was, with some exceptions, treated as an adversary by virtue of its external characteristics. An excessive interest was accorded to the study of “forces of production,” which were conflated with class struggle itself, as if the essential problem were to measure the pressure that one mass exerted on an opposing mass. For us, this does not at all mean that we reject the objective analysis of the structure and institutions of the social totality, nor do we imagine, for example, that the only true knowledge that can be given has to be elaborated by the proletarians themselves as a function of their rootedness in the class. This “workerist” theory of knowledge which, it must be said in passing, reduces the work of Marx to nothing, must be rejected for two reasons: first, because all knowledge claims objectivity (even as it may be conscious of being socially and psychologically conditioned); second, because the aspiration to practical and ideological universality belongs to the very nature of the proletariat, which would identify itself with society as a whole. But the fact remains that objective analysis, even carried out with the greatest rigor, as it was done in Marx’s Capital, remains incomplete because it is constrained to be only interested in the results of social life or in the fixed forms into which it is integrated (for example technical development or the concentration of capital) and to ignore the human experience that corresponds to more or less external material processes (for example, the relations of men to their work in the steam age or the age of electricity, in the age of competitive capitalism and in that of state monopoly capitalism). In a sense there is no way to separate material forms and human experience because the former is determined by the conditions in which they are made, and these conditions, which are the result of social evolution, are the work of human beings. But from a practical viewpoint, objective analysis is subordinated to concrete analysis because it is not conditions that are revolutionary, but human beings, and the ultimate question is how to know about the ways that human beings appropriate and transform their situation.
The urgency of and interest in concrete analysis comes from another direction as well. Holding close to Marx, we have underlined the role of producers in the social lives of workers. It must be said, however, that the same could be said in a general way of any class that has played any role in the history of work. But the role of the proletariat in production is unlike that of any other class from the past. Its role is specific to modern industrial society and can only be indirectly compared with other social forms which have preceded it. The idea fashionable today amongst many sociologists, for example, that the most archaic forms of primitive societies are closer to feudal Europe of the Middle Ages than the latter is to the capitalism to which it gave way, does not pay adequate attention to the role of classes and their relations. There is a double relation in any society, one amongst men and another between men and the objects they transform, but with industrial society the second relation took on a new significance. Now there is a sphere of industrial production governed by laws that are to a certain extent autonomous. Of course they are situated in a total social sphere because the relations between classes are constituted through the relations of production, but not strictly so because the technical developments and processes of rationalization which have been characteristic of capitalism since its origins have had impacts that go beyond class struggle. To take a banal example, the industrial usage of steam or electricity entail a series of consequences – on the division of labor, on the distribution of firms – that are relatively independent of the general form of social relations. Of course, rationalization and technical development are not realities in themselves: there is so little to them that they can be interpreted as defenses erected by capitalists whose profits are continuously threatened by proletarian resistance of exploitation. Nonetheless, even if the motivations of Capital are sufficient to explain these origins, they still cannot account for the content of technological development. The deeper explanation for the apparent autonomy in the logic of technological development is that it is not the work of capitalist management alone: it is also an expression of proletarian work. The action of the proletariat, in fact, does not only take the form of a resistance (forcing employers to constantly improve their methods of operation), but also of continuous assimilation of progress, and even more, active collaboration in it. It is because workers are able to adapt to the rhythm and form of continuous evolution that this evolution has been able to occur. More basically, because workers carry within themselves responses to the myriad problems posed within production in its detail they make possible the appearance of the systematic response that one calls technological innovation. Explicit rationalization is the gathering, interpretation, and integration from a class perspective of the multiple, dispersed, fragmented, and anonymous innovations of men engaged in the concrete processes of production.
From our viewpoint, this last remark is fundamental because it places the emphasis on experience that unfolds at the point of production and on the perceptions of workers. This does not entail a separation of this particular social relation from those of the global society that shape it, but rather recognition of its specificity. In other words, if we say that industrial structure determines social structure, which is the means by which it acquires permanence, so that any society – regardless of the class characteristics – models itself on certain of its characteristics, then we must understand the situation into which it places those who are integrated out of necessity – that is, the situation of the proletariat.
So what is a concrete analysis of the proletariat? We will try to define it by enumerating some possibilities and determining their respective interests.
The first approach would be to describe the economic situation in which the class finds itself and the influences that situation has on its structure. At the limit, it would require a total social and economic analysis. In a more restricted sense, we would want to talk about working conditions and those of the lives of workers, the modifications that have accompanied its concentration and differentiation, changes in methods of exploitation (intensity of work, length of the work day, wages and labor markets and so forth). This is the most objective approach in that it is focused on the apparent (but nonetheless essential) class characteristics. Any social group can be studied in this way, and anyone can devote a study to it independently of any revolutionary commitments whatsoever.12 There is nothing specifically proletarian about such work, even as one can say that it is or would be inspired by political forms opposed to the interests of the exploiting class.
A second approach, the inverse of the first, would typically be labeled more subjective. It would focus on all expressions of proletarian consciousness, or on what one ordinarily refers to as ideology. For example, primitive Marxism, anarchism, reformism, Bolshevism, and Stalinism represent stages in the development of proletarian consciousness. It is important to understand the meaning of their succession, to understand why large numbers of workers have rallied around them at different historical stages and why these forms continue to signify in the present context. In other words, it is important to understand what the proletariat is trying to say by way of these intermediaries. While we make no claim for its originality – many examples can be found in Marxist literature (in Lenin’s critiques of anarchism or reformism, for example) – this type of analysis could be taken quite far: the contemporary decline enables an appreciation of the transformations of doctrines despite the superficial appearances of continuities (that of Stalinism from 1928-1952 or that of reformism over the past century). However, whatever its interest, this approach remains abstract and incomplete. It remains external, using information that can be gathered through publications (the programs and larger statements of the movement in which one might be interested) that do not necessarily impose a proletarian viewpoint. And it allows what is arguably most fundamental about worker experience to escape. It is only concerned with explicit experience, in what is expressed and put into the form of programs or articles without being preoccupied with whether or how these ideas reflect the thoughts and intentions of the workers in whose name they speak. While there is always a gap that separates what is experienced from what is elaborated, it acquires a particular amplification in the case of the proletariat. This amplification follows from the fact that the working class is not only dominated, but is also alienated, totally excluded from economic power and by virtue of that excluded from being able to represent any status at all. This does not mean that ideologies have no relation to the class experience of working people, but the transformation into a system of thought presupposes a break with and anticipation of that experience which allows non-proletarian factors to exercise their influence and make the relation indirect. Here we encounter once again the basic difference between the proletariat and bourgeoisie noted earlier. For the latter, the theory of liberalism of a given period is a simple idealization and/or rationalization of its interests: the programs of its political parties express the status of certain strata of their organizations. For the proletariat, Bolshevism, although to some extent a rationalization of the worker’s condition, was also an interpretation of it elaborated by a fraction of the worker avant-garde13 associated with an intelligentsia that was relatively separated from the class. In other words, there are two reasons for the deformation of worker expression: that it is the work of a minority external to the real life of the working class or which is constrained to adopt a relation of exteriority to it; and that it is utopian, not in a pejorative sense, but in the sense that it is a project that would establish a situation all the premises of which are not given in the present. Of course, the various ideologies of the workers’ movement represent certain kinds of relations to workers, which the workers recognize as their own, but only represent them in a derivative form.
A third approach would be more specifically historical. It would consist in research into a continuity linking the great manifestations of the workers’ movement since it came into being, to demonstrate that revolutions and, more generally, diverse forms of worker resistance and organization (associations, unions, political parties, committees formed during strikes or in the context of particular conflicts) are part of a progressive experience and to show how this experience is linked to the evolution of economic and political forms within capitalist society.
Finally there is a fourth approach, one that we see as the most concrete. Rather than examining the situation of the proletariat from the outside, this approach seeks to reconstruct the proletariat’s relations to its work and to society from the inside and show how its capacities for invention and power of organization manifest in everyday life.
Prior to any explicit reflection, to any interpretation of their lot or their role, workers have spontaneous comportments with respect to industrial work, exploitation, the organization of production, and social life both inside and outside the factory. By any account, this is the comportment that most completely manifests in their personalities. At this level, the distinction between subjective and objective loses its meaning: this comportment includes ideologies which it constitutes with a certain degree of rationalization, just as it presupposes economic conditions. This comportment performs their ongoing integration and elaboration.
As we have said, such an approach has yet to be really explored. No doubt there are valuable lessons in the analysis of the 19th century English working class from Capital; however, to the extent that Marx’s preoccupation was to describe the working conditions and lives of workers, he operated within the first approach outlined earlier. Since Marx, there are only “literary” documents attempting to describe the worker personality. Over the past few years and primarily from the United States, a “worker” sociology has appeared that claims to do concrete analyses of social relations within production and to isolate their practical intentions. This sociology is the work of management. “Enlightened” capitalists discovered that material rationalization had its limits, that human-objects had specific reactions one had to account for if one wanted to get the most out of them – that is, to get them to submit to the most efficient forms of exploitation. This admirable discovery pressed into service a Taylorized form of humanism and made lots of money both for pseudo-psychoanalysts, who were called upon to liberate workers from their resentment as a harmful obstacle to productivity, and for pseudo-sociologists, who carried out studies of worker attitudes toward their work and their comrades in order to help implement the newest notions of social adaptation. The misfortune of this sociology is that it cannot get to the proletarian personality by definition and is condemned to remain outside by virtue of its class perspective, seeing nothing but the personality of the producing worker, a simple executant irreducibly linked to the capitalist system of exploitation. The concepts used in these analyses, like social adaptation, have for workers a meaning opposite to that of the researchers (for the latter, there can only be adaptation to existing conditions: for workers, adaptation implies a lack of adaptation for exploitation). The results generated are worthless. This failure shows the presuppositions that would shape a real concrete analysis of proletarian experience. It is fundamental that the work be recognized by workers as a moment of their own experience, an opportunity to formalize, condense and confront types of knowledge usually implicit, more “felt” than thought, and fragmentary. The distance that separates a sociology shaped by revolutionary aspirations from the industrial sociology we have referred to is that which separates the work of time-motion men from the collective determination of production norms in the context of worker management. To the workers, an industrial sociologist looks like a time-motion man trying to measure his “psychological durations” and the cooperative dimensions of his social adaptation. In contrast, what we are proposing presupposes that the workers are engaged in a progressive experience that would tend to explode the framework of exploitation itself. The work would only be meaningful for those who participate in that experience themselves. Chief amongst those people are the workers.
In this respect, the radical originality of the proletariat emerges once again. This class can only be known by itself, on the condition that whomever inquires about it acknowledges the value of proletarian experience, orients himself through their situation and makes his own their social and historical class horizons, and on the condition that he breaks with the immediately given, that is, with the framework of exploitation. This sort of work could go quite otherwise with any other social group. American researchers have studied with considerable success the Midwest petite bourgeoisie as if they were studying the Papou on the island of Alor. Whatever complexities were encountered (we are still discussing the relation of an observer to what is being studied) along with the necessity for the analyst to go beyond the simple analysis of institutions in order to constitute something of the meanings they have for concrete human beings, it is nonetheless possible to acquire a certain understanding of the group being studied without sharing their norms and accepting their values. This is because the petit bourgeois, like the Papous, have an objective social existence which, for better or worse, tends to perpetuate itself in the same form, one which is solidly linked to conditions in the present. As we have emphasized throughout, the proletariat is only defined in appearance by its condition as the collectivity of executants within capitalist production. Its actual social life is hidden: it is at once symmetrical with existing conditions and in stark contradiction to the system that determines those conditions (the system of capitalist exploitation itself). This opens onto a role that is different from that which contemporary society imposes on it at every point.
The concrete approach that we see as required by the very nature of the proletariat entails that we collect and interpret testimonies written by workers. By testimonies we mean especially narratives that recount individual lives, or, better, experiences in contemporary industry, made by the interested parties that can provide insights into their social lives. Let us indicate some of the questions that we think are the most interesting that can be posed by reading these testimonies, questions which have been shaped in significant measure by documents that already exist14 :
We would like to know about a) the relations of a worker to his work – his function within the factory, level of technical knowledge, and understanding of the production process. For example, does he know where the piece comes from that he works on? His professional experience – has he worked in other factories, in other branches of industrial production, etc.? His interest in production – what types of initiative can he bring to his work, is he curious about technical and technological developments? Does he have a spontaneous sense of the transformations that could be brought to the structure of production and rhythms of work, to the context and conditions that shape life in the factory? Does he have in general a critical attitude toward managerial efforts at rationalization? How does he welcome attempts at modernization?
b) Relations with other workers and elements from different social strata within the enterprise (differences in attitudes toward other workers, toward foremen, managers, engineers and executives), and understanding of the division of labor. What do hierarchies of function and wage represent? Would he prefer to do some of his work at a machine and some in an office? How does he accommodate his role as simple executant? Does he understand the social structure in the factory as necessary or at least as something that “goes without saying”? Are there tendencies toward co-operation, competition or isolation? Preference for working as an individual or in a team? How are relations amongst individuals divided up? Personal relations, the formation of small groups and the basis on which they are established? How important are these small groups for individuals? If these are different from social relations that take shape in offices, how are these perceived and evaluated? What importance does he attribute to the social physiognomy of the factory? Does he know about other factories and how does he compare them? Does he have exact knowledge of the wage levels attached to other functions throughout the enterprise? Does he compare pay stubs with other workers? Etc.
c) Life outside the factory and knowledge about what is happening in the wider social world. Impact of life inside the factory on life outside of it – how his work materially and psychologically influences his personal and family life, for example? Which milieu does he frequent outside the factory? To what extent are these patterns imposed on him by his work, or by the neighborhood in which he lives? What are the characteristics of his family life, relations with his children and how he educates them, his extra-professional activities? How does he occupy his leisure time? Does he have predilections for particular types of distraction? To what extent does he use mass media: books, newspapers, radio, cinema? What are his attitudes about them? What are his tastes… not merely what newspaper does he read, but what does he read first? What interests him (accounts of political or social events, technological developments, bourgeois scandals)? Etc.
d) Links to properly proletarian history and traditions: knowledge of the history of the workers’ movement and familiarity with it; participation in particular social or political struggles and the memories they have left with him; knowledge of workers in other countries; attitudes toward the future independently of any particular political estimation, etc.
Whatever the interest of these questions, it is nonetheless important to ask about the weight attributed to individual testimonies. We know that we will be able to gather a relatively limited number of texts: on what basis can one generalize from them? A testimony is by definition particular: that of a 20- or 50-year-old worker who works in a small plant or large facility, a developed militant, someone with extensive trade-union and political experience, one with rigid opinions without benefit of any particular training or experience in particular… without resorting to artifice, how can one discount these differences of situation and derive from such differently motivated narratives lessons of universal import? On this point, critique is largely justified, and it seems clear that the results it would be possible to obtain would necessarily be limited. At the same time, it would be equally artificial to deny all value to these texts. First, no matter how significant the differences amongst them, all these texts are situated within a single frame: the situation of the proletariat. This allows us to see much more than the specificity of a particular life in the reading of these texts. Two workers in very different situations have in common that both have endured one or another form of work and exploitation that is essentially the same and absorbs three-quarters of their personal existence. Their wages might be very different, their living situations and family lives may not be comparable, but it remains the case that they are profoundly identical both in their roles as producers or machine operators, and in their alienation. Every worker knows this: it is what enables that sense of familiarity and complicity (even when the individuals do not know each other) which is evident at a glance for a bourgeois who finds himself in a working-class neighborhood. It is not absurd to look amongst these particular characteristics for those with a more general signification, given that they all have resemblances which are sufficient to distinguish them from those of any other social group. To this it must be added that this approach to testimonies would be susceptible to critique if we were interested in gathering and correlating opinions because these would necessarily be of a great diversity – but as we have said, we are interested in worker attitudes. These attitudes are sometimes expressed in the form of opinions, and are often disfigured by them, but they are in every case deeper and more simple. This would present a considerable obstacle were we to try to use a limited number of texts to infer the proletarian view of the USSR or of wage hierarchies in general. But it is a much simpler matter to isolate worker attitudes toward bureaucracy spontaneously developed from inside the production process. Finally, we should note that no other mode of knowledge would allow us to respond to the problems we have posed. Even if we had available the materials required for a vast statistically-based investigation (the data for which would be gathered by numerous comrades who would pose thousands of questions to other workers in various factories, given that we have already excluded any investigation carried out by researchers from outside the working class), the results would be useless, because results based on responses gathered from anonymous respondents that could only be correlated numerically would be without interest. Only responses attributed to concrete individuals can be brought into relation with each other; their convergences and divergences enable the isolation of meaning and invoke systems of living and thinking that can be interpreted. For all these reasons, individual narratives are invaluable.
This does not mean that we would use this approach to define what the proletariat is in its reality after having rejected all representations that have been made of its situation as perceived through the distorting prism of bourgeois society or the political parties that purport to speak in its name. A worker testimony, no matter how evocative, symbolic or spontaneous it may be, remains conditioned by the situation of its author. We are not referring here to the deformations that can arise in the particular interpretations given by an author, but rather to those which testimony necessarily imposes on the author. To tell a story is not to act within it. Telling a story even entails a break with action in ways that transform its meaning. For example, writing an account of a strike is not the same as participating in that strike simply because as a participant, one does not yet know the outcome of one’s actions, and the distance entailed by reflection allows for judgments about that which, in real time, is not fixed as to meaning. In fact, there is in this case something much more than a separation of opinion: there is a change of attitude, that is, a transformation in the mode of reacting to situations in which one finds oneself. In addition, a narrative puts the individual in an unnaturally isolated position. Workers typically act out of solidarity with the other people who are caught up in the same situation; without even talking about open social struggles, there is the ongoing everyday struggle within the production process to resist exploitation, a struggle hidden but continuous and shared amongst comrades. The attitudes most characteristic of a worker toward his work or toward other social strata are not found in him, as would be the case with the bourgeois or the bureaucrat who see their own actions determined by their individual interests. Rather, the worker shares in collective responses. The critique of a worker narrative must make visible within individual responses that aspect which leans on collective comportments; however, in the final analysis, these registers do not entirely overlap in a narrative, with the result that we can only derive an incomplete knowledge from them. To finish – and this critique connects back to the first at a deeper level – the historical context in which these narratives are published must be clarified. There is no eternal proletariat that speaks, but a certain type of worker who occupies a definite historical position, situated in a time characterized by a significant retreat of worker forces all over the world as the struggle between two types of exploitative society little by little reduces to silence all other social manifestations, as a function of its tendency to develop into both an overt conflict and a bureaucratic unification of the world. The attitude of the proletariat (even the attitude that we are searching for which transcends to some extent this particular historical conjuncture) is not the same in a period in which the class works with an anticipation of emancipation in the short term, on the one hand, and one in which it is condemned to momentary contemplation of blocked horizons and to maintain a historical silence, on the other.
It is enough to say that the approach that we characterize as concrete remains abstract in many respects given that the three aspects of the proletariat (practical, collective, historical) only emerge indirectly and are thereby deformed. In fact, the concrete proletariat is not an object of knowledge: it works, it struggles and it transforms itself. One cannot catch up with it at the level of theory, but only at the level of practice by participating in its history. But this last remark is abstract because it does not take into account the role of knowledge in history itself, as a mode of integration along with work and struggle. It is a fact as manifest as others that workers pose questions about their condition and the possibilities for transforming it. One can only multiply theoretical perspectives, which are necessarily abstract, even at moments of their convergence, and postulate that progress in the clarification of worker experience will advance that experience. So it is not by way of a standard formula that we say that the four approaches we criticized in succession are in fact complementary. This is not to say that their results can be usefully added together, but rather that their convergence across different paths communicates, in a more or less comprehensive manner, the same reality that we have called proletarian experience, for lack of a better term. For example, we think that the critique of the evolution of the workers’ movement, of its forms of organization and struggle, the critique of ideologies, and the description of worker attitudes necessarily all confirm one another. Because the positions that expressed themselves in systematic and rational ways in the history of the workers’ movement and the organizations and movements that have followed one another all coexist, in a sense, as the interpretations and possible accomplishments of the proletariat today. Beneath (so to speak) the reformist, anarchist, or Stalinist movements, there is a projection amongst the workers, proceeding directly from the relation to production, a projection concerning their fate which makes these elaborations possible and contains them at the same time. There is a similar relation to forms of struggle that seem to be associated with phases of worker history (1848, 1870 or 1917) but which express types of relations between workers that continue to exist and even to manifest themselves (in the form of a wildcat strike without any organization, for example). This is not to say that the proletariat contains by its nature all the moments of its history and all possible ideological expressions of its condition. Following on what we have been saying, the material and theoretical evolution of the proletariat has led it to be as it is and the ways in which the past has come to be condensed in its comportment today have opened whole new fields of possibilities and reflections. In analyzing worker attitudes, what is essential is not to lose sight of the fact that the knowledge obtained through it is limited and that, more profoundly and comprehensively than is the case with other forms of knowledge, while this does not undermine its validity, it must be connected back with the workers or risk becoming unintelligible.
Now that we have enumerated a series of questions that concrete analysis should enable us to answer or to pose better, we will turn to how concrete analysis might reorganize and contribute to a deepening of revolutionary theory, after first formulating some reservations. The following seem to us the main problems: (1) Under what form does the worker appropriate social life? (2) How does the worker integrate himself into his class? That is, what are the relations that unify people who share this condition and to what extent do these relations constitute a delimited and stable community in society? (3) What are his perceptions of other social strata, his communication with society globally, his sensitivity to institutions and to events that do not directly concern him or his everyday life? (4) In what ways does he submit materially and ideologically to the pressures brought by the dominant class and what are his tendencies to escape from his own class? (5) Finally, what is his awareness of the history of the workers’ movement? To what extent does he feel integrated with the past of the class and what are his capacities to act with a sense of class tradition?
How could these problems be broached and what would be the interest in doing so? Take for example the appropriation of social life. The initial approach would be to detail the skills and technical capabilities of the worker: there is no doubt about the need for information that directly concerns his professional aptitudes. But research should also be done into how technical curiosity appears outside of the workplace, in leisure activities ( in all the forms of bricolage, or in the interest accorded to scientific and technical publications, for example) and should clarify the understandings of technology and the industrial organization of work that the worker has, as well as his awareness of everything that touches the administration of things more generally. Without losing interest in an evaluation of the cultural level of the worker (in the narrow sense that the bourgeoisie typically gives the term – extent of literary, scientific and artistic knowledge), one would describe the field of information to which he is open: newspapers, radio, cinema. At the same time, we would want to know whether the proletarian has a specific way of envisioning events and outcomes and which interest him (whether he hears about them in the course of everyday life or reads about them in a newspaper, whether these are of a political order or, as the expression goes, entertainments). The essential would be to determine whether there is a class mentalité and how it differs from a bourgeois mentalité.
We merely provide some indications on this point: developing them here would run us ahead of the testimonies themselves, and these texts allow not only for an interpretation but also the reconsideration of the extent and order of the questions involved in our approach to research. The revolutionary interest of such research is evident. In short, this would be a way to know whether the proletariat has or has not submitted to the cultural domination of the bourgeoisie and whether its alienation has robbed it of an original perspective on society. The answer to this question could either enable one to conclude that any revolution is doomed to failure because the overthrow of the State would only bring back a cultural hodgepodge of the previous society, or it could allow one to perceive the direction in which a new culture may develop in the scattered and often unconscious elements that already exist.
Again, we must emphasize, against the all too predictable accusations of bad faith, that this inquiry into the social life of the proletariat will not study the class from the outside and will not reveal its nature to those who do not know it. It is a response to a series of questions posed explicitly by the worker avant-garde and implicitly by the working class more generally in a situation where a series of revolutionary defeats and the domination of a worker bureaucracy have undermined the confidence of the proletariat in its capacities for creativity and in its own emancipation. Still dominated by the bourgeoisie on this point, workers do not believe that they have any knowledge of their own. They see themselves as the pariahs of bourgeois culture.
In fact, their creativity is such that there is no need for it to show itself according to bourgeois norms; their culture does not exist as an order separated from their social lives, it does not take the form of the production of ideas. Proletarian culture exists as a certain power in the organization of things and an adaptation to progress, as a certain understanding of human relations, a disposition toward social community. As individuals, workers have only a confused sense of this: because it is impossible for them to give their culture objective content in a society based on exploitation, they have come to doubt it and to believe in the reality of bourgeois culture alone.
Let’s take a second example: how to describe the integration of the proletarian into the class? In this case, the question is knowing how, within the factory, the worker perceives those who share his work, as well as the representatives of all other social strata; of knowing the nature and meaning of the relations he has with his coworkers; whether he has different attitudes toward workers of different professional grades (Professional, O.S., or semi-skilled, and manoeuvre, or unskilled); whether these relations of camaraderie extend beyond the factory; whether he tends to seek out work that require cooperation. If he has always worked in a factory, in what situation he began to do so; whether he has considered the possibility of doing something different or whether the chance has ever presented itself to change trades? It would be good to know whether he frequents milieus that are not working-class and what he thinks of them, in particular whether he has interactions with the peasant milieu and how he evaluates it. It would be necessary to juxtapose this information with responses concerning quite different topics. For example, one might use the familiarity of the individual with the traditions of the workers’ movement, the acuity of memories associated with episodes of social struggle, the interest that he takes in this struggle independently of the judgment he might make of it (a condemnation of a struggle inspired by revolutionary pessimism and an enthusiastic narrative of the events of 1936 of 1944 can often be found together). Or one might locate a tendency to the history and, more particularly, the future of the proletariat, noting his reactions to foreign proletarians, particularly to a relatively well-off proletariat like that in the United States. In other words, look for everything in the worker’s personal life that might show the effects and sense of belonging to the working class and also attempts at escape from from the condition of being a worker (attitudes about children, the education they receive and projects oriented toward the future are particularly significant in this respect.)
From a revolutionary viewpoint, this kind of information would have the interest of showing the manner in which a worker is joined with the class and whether his belonging to his group is or is not different from that of a petit-bourgeois or a bourgeois to his group. Does the worker link his fate to all levels of his social existence and, consciously or not, to that of his class? Can one confirm concretely classic, but too-often abstract, phrases class consciousness or class attitude, and the idea from Marx that, unlike the bourgeois, the proletarian is not only a member of his class, but an individual within a community and conscious of only being able to go beyond that by acting collectively?
Socialisme ou Barbarie would like to solicit testimonies from workers and publish them at the same time as it accords an important place to all forms of analysis concerning proletarian experience. In this issue the reader will find the beginning of such a testimony, one that leaves aside several of the points we have outlined.15 Other such texts could broach these points in ways that go beyond those envisioned in this issue. In fact, it is impossible to impose an exact framework. If we have seemed to do so in the course of our explanations, and if we have produced nothing but a questionnaire, then this work would not be valuable: a question imposed from the outside might be an irritant for the subject being questioned, shaping an artificial response or, in any case, imprinting upon it a character that it would not otherwise have had. Our research directions would be brought to bear even on narratives that we provoke: we must be attentive to all forms of expression that might advance concrete analysis. As for the rest, the problem is not the form taken by a document, but its interpretation. Who will work out the relationships understood as significant between such and such responses? Who will reveal from beneath the explicit content of a document the intentions and attitudes that inspired it, and juxtapose the testimonies? The comrades of Socialisme ou Barbarie? But would this not run counter to their intentions, given that they propose a kind of research that would enable workers to reflect upon their experience? This problem cannot be resolved artificially, particularly not at this first step in the work. In any case, the interpretation, from wherever it comes, will remain contemporary with the text being interpreted. It can only impress if it is judged to be accurate by the reader, someone who is able to find another meaning in the materials we submit to him. We hope it will be possible to connect the authors with texts in a collective critique of the documents. For the moment, our goal is to gather these materials: in this, we count on the active support of those sympathetic with this journal.
—Translated by Stephen Hastings-King
- 1Translator’s Note: This article originally appeared in Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 11, dated July, 1952. It was reprinted in the collection Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Droz, 1971). A scan of the original can be consulted at the Projet de scannerisation de la revue Socialisme ou Barbarie. In composing this text, Lefort used L’oeuvre completes de Karl Marx published in Paris by Alfred Costes between 1948 and 1953. For reasons of consistency in terminology and tone, I have translated quotations directly from the French and left the original pagination. Socialisme ou Barbarie operated in Paris from 1948-1966. This essay is part of the turn to the sociologically oriented approach to the working class fundamental for the group’s revolutionary project, in particular from 1953 through 1957. My thanks to Kelly Grotke.
- 2Marx, La misère de la philosophie, Costes ed, 135.
- 3Translator’s Note: I retain the phenomenological term “comportment” throughout this piece. The term refers to the structure of behaviors or attitudes toward an environment or situation. It is symmetrical with the emphasis on overall historical direction that one encounters in this essay as well.
- 4Translator’s Note: I left this in French. It is associated with the Annales School of French history. There is no good English equivalent: I have seen “cognitive toolbox” used. The term “worldview” used in translations of Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics is logically closer, even as the social-history oriented methodologies pioneered by the Annales School made of mentalité a quite different category that refers to a more material orientation toward a historically-specific world.
- 5Idéologie allemande, 242.
- 6Cf. The Communist Manifesto.
- 7Economie politique et Philosophie, 34.
- 8Idéologie allemande, 223.
- 9Ibid., 229
- 10Ibid„ p. 229.
- 11Ibid., p. 230.
- 12I am thinking of the work by Georges Duveau, La vie ouvrière sous le Second Empire (Paris: Gallimard, 1946).
- 13Translator Note: The worker avant-garde is the center of Socialisme ou Barbarie’s construction of revolutionary theory. I kept the term “avant-garde” in favor of “vanguard” – an alternate possibility for rendering the term in English – in order to avoid confusion with Lenin’s Vanguard Party.
- 14Paul Romano, “The American Worker,” translated in Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 1, and Eric Albert, “Témoignage” in Les Temps Modernes, juillet 1952.
- 15G. Vivier, “La vie en usine” in Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 11.
Comments
On Claude Lefort’s “Proletarian Experience”
An article by Stephen Hastings-King about Socialisme ou Barbarie's worker accounts.
The schema that ordered Socialisme ou Barbarie’s conception of revolution relied upon the close examination of working-class experience.1 This put the group in little-explored territory. Even though traditional Marxism placed the proletariat at the conceptual and political center of its concerns, its treatment of the working class as the embodied expression of abstract economic forces foreclosed close analysis of concrete relations of production. It also evacuated questions of how the proletariat could act as a revolutionary agent by conceiving of revolution as a quasi-automatic result of contradictions that played out at the level of “objective forces.”2 French “human sciences” had not yet begun producing researchers who took the French working class as a legitimate object of study. Through the 1950s, anthropology was dominated on the one hand by research on the “exotic,” and on the other by the conflict between structural anthropology and philosophy over which discipline “owned” epistemology.3 Sociology, for the most part, operated in a zone of inquiry that hovered between politics and the university. While students of Georges Friedman, like Alain Touraine, produced studies of the French working class in modes quite distinct from American-style industrial sociology, it was only with the failure of the workers to oppose the Gaullist Fifth Republic in 1958 that the academic discipline—represented notably by Touraine, Serge Mallet and Michel Crozier—concerned itself with the “fate” of the French working class.4 Only industrial relations and industrial sociology took the problem of shop-floor experience seriously. However, the field was dominated by American researchers who, in the main, viewed industrial conflict as the social expression of psychological deviance. This epistemological position was the direct recoding of the political worldview particular to the Capitalists who employed them.5
Even Marx’s early writings offered little in the way of a historically specific approach to working-class experience. Lefort argues that this follows from the double image of the proletariat in Marx. The proletariat is a creation of capitalism, positioned at the leading edge of technological and organizational development. It operates simultaneously inside the dominant bourgeois rationality by virtue of its socialization and outside by virtue of the experience of the reality of exploitation that the dominant rationality legitimates and conceals at once. This unique situation is what enables the proletariat to develop a rationality that goes beyond that of the bourgeoisie, and to become the historical agent that brings about socialism. This position is juxtaposed with another in which ruthless exploitation and wholesale alienation have reduced workers to a less-than-human status. Lefort argues that this second image is symmetrical with a notion of revolution as explosion, and of a socialism that requires no internal articulations at the level of theory because it would simply replace capitalism “as a negative to a positive.”6 This is the image of the proletariat that came to be dominant in Marx.7
Working against this predominance, Lefort takes up a version of the first but positions it in the specific context of post-1945 capitalism. His approach is conditioned by the assumption that alienation is a tendency rather than an accomplishment. This assumption is rooted in Socialisme ou Barbarie’s view of the basic contradiction of bureaucratic capitalism, according to which capitalist managerial ideology and practice tends to exclude workers from creative interaction with their work while, at the same time, that creative interaction is continually required in order to solve the myriad problems that arise in the course of production. If workers were completely alienated, not only would revolutionary action be impossible, but capitalist production itself would grind to a halt.8 Implicit in the use of the concept of bureaucratic capitalism is the more basic claim that modalities of exploitation, conflict, and creativity are variable and historically specific. The situation in bureaucratic capitalist enterprises is different from that of enterprises in earlier periods and experience at the point of production is particular not only to this type of organization, but also to the specific situation of the workers’ movement.9 Even if there were a fully articulated approach to this register of working-class experience in the early Marx, it could serve only as a template. The problems of analysis would still have to be posed again.
“Proletarian Experience” emphasizes the radical creativity of the working class and the historically contingent character of that creativity. Following in part from his position on revolutionary organization, Lefort argues that only workers can know and write about their experience: revolutionary theory must be confined to analyzing and interpreting what they write.10 Using Paul Romano’s “The American Worker” and Eric Albert’s “Témoinage: La vie en usine” as points of departure, Lefort outlines a program for the investigation of “the proletarian standpoint” that would isolate and describe the significations that structure proletarian comportment. These analyses would be supplemented with critical accounts of autonomous worker actions which would function as statements of political horizon, and as broadly synthetic analyses of contemporary capitalism. Lefort also imagines the collection of these narratives as the basis for a wide-ranging working-class sociology “from the inside” that would include all aspects of worker interaction with the dominant culture and be centered on the question of whether there was a specific “mentalité ouvrier” and what it might look like. Worker narratives would be part of an ongoing dialogue between the group and the worker avant-garde that was to be the center of Socialisme ou Barbarie’s activity as Lefort envisioned it. But it never became the model for the group or as the journal because, despite the solicitation for writings which frequently appeared in Socialisme ou Barbarie (as well as in related projects like Tribune Ouvrière), workers simply did not write.
Lefort’s emphasis on second-order descriptions and interpretation follows from his position elaborated in recurrent debates within Socialisme ou Barbarie on “the organization question.” A point of consensus within the group was the vision of revolution as the culmination of a process whereby the working class, acting autonomously, would consciously assume the direction of production and, by extension, of society. Positioning themselves broadly within in the tradition of the general strike, members of SB emphasized the content of socialism rather than the modalities of transition. With this, the group put aside the more militarized conceptions of revolution that emerged within the Marxian tradition in response to the violent suppression of the Paris Commune, which served as the logical basis for Leninism. The move was in significant measure a result of the group’s shared preoccupation with the historical fate of Leninism. There was little disagreement over the basic analysis. The Vanguard Party was a military organization that, in its division between Party and Masses, recapitulated the division of intellectual labor characteristic of bureaucratic capitalism in general which separated dirigeant from exécutant, thinking from doing, those who conceptualize from those who carry out orders. It was this, and not questions of ownership, that shaped the outcomes of the revolutionary movement. The consequences were apparent in the trajectory taken by the USSR.11
While there was agreement about the critique of Leninism, Socialisme ou Barbarie was not of one mind about how best to avoid repetition of the problem of the Vanguard Party in their own activities. Cornelius Castoriadis argued that the group should be an organization that generates revolutionary theory aimed at empowering the worker avant-garde and not be worried about appearing to recapitulate the Leninist split between theorists (those who think) and masses (those who follow instructions). Theory developed in a dialogue with the worker avant-garde: it represented a complementary, but not separate, form of activity. Social relations within the organization could be seen as a kind of laboratory for revolutionary sociability unfolding in its own, particular register. For Lefort, the problem of bureaucratization was paramount. Not only was a revolutionary organization in itself a problem, but theoretical production had to avoid falling into the trap of telling the workers what they were “really doing.” For Castoriadis, this would make political work impossible because one or another version of this relation was built into the nature of theory itself. “Proletarian Experience“can be read as Lefort’s attempt to address this practical impasse. The project outlined was revolutionary action.12 We will see in the second part of this article that this desire to not tell the workers what they are really doing had consequences for the selection of texts that would constitute “proletarian documentary literature.”
As we have seen, following Marx, Lefort (and the group more generally) saw the proletariat as a creation of capitalism positioned at the leading edge of technological and organizational development. The proletariat is simultaneously inside the dominant rationality by virtue of socialization and outside it by virtue of the experience at the point of production of the realities of exploitation and irrationality that the dominant rationality legitimates and conceals. Conflicts at the point of production would, in theory, make of workers the source of an alternate rationality that might inform socialism—but because they are also participants in the dominant rationality, the elements of this rationality would be fragmentary and workers erratic in their abilities to recognize them. The same problem repeats in an exacerbated form in the theorist, whose capacity to generate theory presupposes certain training and skills that come tied to precisely the rationality that theory works to overthrow. Individual narratives written by workers that detail experience at the point of production provide militants access to these conflicts and the industrial realities that condition them. A phenomenology of these narratives would use a comparative approach, based on the idea of the eidetic reduction, to produce second-order descriptions of structuring characteristics of worker experience in general. These second-order descriptions would point to the latent content of that experience, disengaging universal substructures with revolutionary political potentials from the contingency of the particular and feeding them back to the worker avant-garde through the medium of the journal.
This relation to worker-writers, and, by extension, to the worker avant-garde constituted revolutionary action in part because, following on the ways in which he was sensitive to the problems of objectifying the working class, Lefort tended not to differentiate within it. This effectively eliminated any space for militant action: there were no tasks to be performed by militants within the working class.13 One had to be either with the workers, which was good, or to be outside, which was bad. One could either be a worker or a militant, but not both. The generally phenomenological approach to worker narratives was symmetrical with this view: revolutionary militants could gather worker narratives and create interpretations of those narratives as their part of an ongoing dialogue with the worker avant-garde. But that role, and the dialogue along with it, would be progressively effaced by the unfolding of the proletariat’s capacities to direct, manifested in revolutionary action.
Throughout “Proletarian Experience,” Lefort argues that the analysis of the proletarian standpoint has to be thoroughly historical. It cannot generate transcendental claims or reify worker experience. The results of analysis must account for everyday experience at the point of production in terms of its specific historical determinants. He outlines what is at stake by referring to Marx’s theory of social change using the well-known schema of the transition from feudal to bourgeois domination outlined in The Communist Manifesto, and the more elaborated version in The German Ideology, as points of departure. Perhaps one reason the revolution will not be televised is that revolution cannot be understood through the analysis of discrete events. Rather, revolution of the sort that replaces one historical form with another is a result of the progressive unfolding of potentials that are being worked out in the previous social-historical formation14 :
Marx does not say, but allows to be said, that, from its origin, the bourgeoisie is what it will be, an exploiting class, underprivileged at first to be sure, but possessing from the outset all the traits that its history only developed. The development of the proletariat is entirely different; reduced to its economic function alone, it represents a category that does not yet possess its class-meaning/direction [sens], the meaning/direction that constitutes its original comportment, which is, in its definitive form, struggle in all class-specific forms within society against adversarial strata. This is not to say that the role of the class in production should be neglected—on the contrary, we will see that the role workers play in society, and that they are called on to play in making themselves its masters, is directly based on their role as producers—but the essential thing is that this role does not give them any actual power, but only an increasingly strong capacity to direct [production and society].15
Lefort’s opening line reproduces a problem in Marxism that Socialisme ou Barbarie elsewhere criticized at length: the treatment of the bourgeoisie as if it were incapable of creativity or transformation.16 Such a view constructs the bourgeoisie in the image of its rationality and then shifts to the claim that the bourgeoisie was always, in its essence, what it would become once it was dominant. History changed nothing except its position.17 But Lefort’s point does not center on this schematic analysis of the bourgeoisie and its rise to power; rather, it provides both a backdrop against which he begins to set up the problem of understanding the nature of the working class, and a shorthand way of staging the present as conditioned by bourgeois domination.
Lefort’s lines make explicit the assumptions about class formation that run through much of Socialisme ou Barbarie’s collective evaluations of autonomous worker actions. As a class in itself, the proletariat occupies a common position in the production process, which sells its labor-power for a wage, engages in certain types of conflict at the point of production, and so on. The shift into reflexivity, into a class for-itself, is predicated on recognition of what links the people who occupy a common position in the production process and the conflicts that arise there, as well as the interests and political projects that arise from that recognition. In a strict sense, both registers are historical so both forms can be understood as endowed with certain meanings and/or a sense of direction (sens).18 But, following on the logic above, that of the class in-itself is circumscribed by its immediate situation. The possibilities for a shift into a class for-itself and would be fragmentary and scattered. For Lefort, the transition of the working class into a class for itself hinges on its assimilation of an overarching telos—its “increasing capacity to direct production.” Both the telos and process of assimilation are conditioned by the types of conflict characteristic of bureaucratic capitalism. So there is a level of directedness that may unfold through everyday experience and conflict and another, linked but not identical, that follows from the same experiences reprocessed through different significations.19 The relation between these registers echoes Vico’s conception of social development, with history understood as a spiral, a circular motion spread out temporally, and in principle progressively, that allows for both repetition and change. Struggle acquires its meaning relative to an overall (revolutionary) project (here, a synonym for direction), and the overall project is, in turn, continually inflected by particular struggles. The role for revolutionary militants in feeding back descriptions and interpretations of the commonalities that link worker experience, based on the close reading of worker writings, is to facilitate the shift into this kind of collective self-awareness. And in line with his critique of deductivism20 , Lefort argues that this propels analysis toward close scrutiny of what social-historical conditions shape and inform worker experience, and away from the heady aether of the dialectic.
For revolutionary militants to access this experience, they would need to position themselves “inside” it, but are prevented from doing so by their social positions. From this follows the centrality of narratives written by working people about their experiences at the point of production. As noted before, what militants can bring to the dialogue that links them to the worker avant-garde (for which worker-writers stand in) is the comparative analyses of the narratives that would provide a coherent description of workers’ “spontaneous comportments” in the context of industrial work, the precondition for apprehension of the “proletarian standpoint” specific to a particular period. What this phenomenology consists in should by now be clear. It would use comparative readings, informed by revolutionary theory, to isolate and interpret types of conflicts, practices, or other patterns that emerge as universal (and politically coherent) from within accounts of proletarian experience. The usage of methods drawn from transcendental phenomenology would be loose, but the assumptions are similar. The reductions as Husserl developed them were a method for isolating universal aspects of meaning attached to a concept from within the shifting terrain of usage. The reductions move through a series of steps of comparing exemplars in order to produce intersubjectively verifiable sets of necessary predicates clustered around a “determinable x.”21 But there is a fundamental difference between objects and social groups or processes as objects of knowledge. Phenomenology transposed empirical objects to transcendental objects in a quest for certainty. For Lefort, the goal of comparative reading is the delineation, transformation, and (revolutionary) politicization of what Castoriadis would later term the social-imaginary significations that shape worker experience.
These premises come together in the analysis of what Lefort called a “reconsideration of the subjective element of class formation.” This issue was crucial in the early Marx but remained underdeveloped, because the reduction of history to the play of objective forces rendered it epiphenomenal.22 For Socialisme ou Barbarie, it was a basic analytic and political matter. Revolution does not simply happen. Revolution is made by people who consciously and collectively assume control over their lives, their surroundings, and the society in which they live. They can only do so on the basis of their experience. Here, experience refers to the explicit content of experience processed through a re-imagining of what is, at the level of the worker narratives at least, their latent political content. A subjectively oriented restatement of the transformation from a class in itself to a class for itself, the re-imagining of this latent dimension provides workers with the forestructure(s) of revolutionary consciousness, the condition(s) of possibility for revolutionary agency. The “subjective” therefore had a central place in revolutionary theory.23 The term “subjective” is used in a specific sense:
If it is true that no class can ever be reduced to its economic function alone [… ] it is even more so that the proletariat requires an approach that enables one to attend to its subjective development. With some reservations as to the implications of the term, it nonetheless summarizes better than any other the dominant trait of the proletariat. It is subjective in the sense that its comportment is not the simple consequence of the conditions [that objectively shape its] existence, or, more profoundly, the conditions that require of it a constant struggle for transformation. [One cannot define the working class by] constantly distinguishing its short-term fate. [Rather, the] struggle to elucidate the ideological [preconditions] that enable this distinguishing constitutes an experience through which the class constitutes itself.24
The subjective designates that which is eliminated by the reduction of the working class to a simple economic category entirely shaped by the position it occupies within industry, the ways in which the workers accommodates their situation and struggle to transform it. For Lefort, the subjective is the domain within which the bases for a working-class “for itself” are practically elaborated. Again, this class for-itself is the forestructure of a revolutionary “for itself” that would institute socialism. The analysis of this subjective domain posed a methodological problem of isolating the particular dimensions of everyday experience on the shop floor to be analyzed. It also posed a problem of data.
The everyday experience that concerned Socialisme ou Barbarie took place within informal collectives that formed by shop and by shift in modern industry. The collectives are the scenes out of which a given “spontaneous comportment in the face of industrial work” or horizon structure emerges. The analysis of these collective comporments extends the rethinking of intentionality begun by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, particularly in the section “The Body as Expression and Speech.”25 Merleau-Ponty transposed the Husserlian framework directly onto the problem of subjective orientation in the social-historical.26 For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s transcendental subject becomes a historically situated, embodied subject that moves through and constitutes a meaningful world. Intentionality, directedness toward/constitution of the world, is mapped onto the body as the source of spatial orientation, and the site upon which cultural meanings are written. This places intentionality between the personal and the social. By the seminars of the mid-1950s, in the context of a more general shift away from subject-centered thinking, Merleau-Ponty made intentionality explicitly social by reworking it through the notion of institution.27 A subject is instituted in that it articulates itself and its world by way of specific pre-existing forms of rule-governed activity; a subject is instituting in that such an engagement is never simply a passive acceptance but is at once an operationalizing of the rules and a creative bringing-into-being of the environment circumscribed by them.28 The characteristics of what came to count as proletarian documentary literature mirror this in the preference for a sense of an embodied narrator who uses a suitably working-class language in the present tense, capturing sightlines and a sense of movement through the spaces that are staged.
Lefort regarded the working class “for itself” as a practical creation elaborated on a continual basis through the play of general patterns of assimilation and conflict characteristic of experience at the point of production under bureaucratic capitalism. The notion that the “sens” of working-class experience was its “ever increasing capacity to direct” served as a premise and a sort of filter that enabled Lefort to order experience as an analytic problem. Lefort argues that the particular working-class “for itself” manifests itself as a viewpoint linked directly to particular practices. The notion of practice can be broken into two components: a narrow or immanent level and another, implicit level that unifies practices and gives them a direction. At the more immanent level, it refers to the actual working at a machine, the repertoire of motions and decisions required to perform a given task. This immanent level is situated in a larger ensemble of social relations and practices that socially and informally regulate, inform, and organize both relations among workers and the performance of work. These practices shape the deployment of skill as a collective attribute, the pace of work and so forth. This same register of practice shapes relations between workers and the representatives of factory management: foremen, time-motion men (chronos), and industrial organization generally.29 Central to the acquisition of these practices was the process of socialization that shaped the relationships of workers to each other, to production and to politics. Workers who operate in environments shaped by these patterns of socialization and circumscribed by these practices occupy an instituted and instituting “proletarian standpoint.”
The other, latent register of worker experience is given its coherence in part by the degree of familiarity on the part of workers (or, more precisely, of worker-writers) with the history of the workers’ movement, which stands in for familiarity with the Marxist discourse that oriented this history as a political project.30 This broader history stands in contrast to the instituted manifestations of a version of that history in the (bureaucratic) trade unions and main political organizations that use versions of that same discourse—the PCF and CGT in particular in the French context. Familiarity with this broader tradition provides space for alternate “activations” of a heavily sedimented language that, by its sedimentation, provides a sense of legitimation. An example of this is the role played in the 1953 East Berlin June Days by the study circles devoted to reading Marx and Lenin directly rather than as mediated through official catechisms. In the analyses published in Socialisme ou Barbarie, these collective readings formed a horizon of instituted signifiers that enabled the articulation of political positions in revolutionary language outside the purview of the main bureaucratic organizations. Insofar as Socialisme ou Barbarie was concerned the reappropriation of this language was a condition of possibility for autonomous worker action, and an indication of the extent to which at this time the group understood it as a natural horizon against which these actions could take shape. Autonomous worker actions, then, instituted alternate interpretations of the language that structured the history of the workers’ movement. In this, they were Socialisme ou Barbarie’s proletarian doubles.
Socialisme ou Barbarie never explicitly said who these workers were: we will return to this point in the second part of this article. However, it is clear that when Socialisme ou Barbarie referred to the working class, they had in mind primarily semi-skilled workers like machinists and lathe operators.31 In a context dominated by assembly-line production, these workers were under sustained attack. Semi-skilled workers worked in collectives, and not in the individuated image of Fordism. They retained some autonomy in the conception and execution of their work, though the extent of this autonomy varied considerably from factory to factory, and within the same factory as a function of the shop’s place in the factory hierarchy. This autonomy enabled these shops to develop types of sociability that were for the most part tied to the transmission of skill. However, as French heavy industry, led by Renault, increasingly adopted American industrial organization during the 1950s, the struggles of these workers to retain their autonomy and skill became more acute. The explosions engendered by this struggle were among the most intense and violent of the decade.32
These conflicts over the autonomy of semi-skilled workers within mass production were a continuation of what Benjamin Coriat called Fordism’s war on skill, which he argues was the defining feature of its mode of industrial organization. The genius of Henry Ford, from a capitalist viewpoint, was his reconceptualization of skill as a block on accumulation. Ford’s methods did not develop in isolation, but rather appear as a condensed expression of experiments in organization that arose with monopoly capitalism. Previously, skill had been monopolized by workers. This monopoly lay at the heart of a contractual relation between them and employers: employers were beholden to workers as the actual source of wealth, and workers were beholden to employers as providers of the means to exercise their skills.33 The automobile industry, a product of monopoly capitalism, played a crucial role in developing the mechanisms by means of which the assault on skill was carried out. Henry Ford led the way in this domain with his aim of producing a low-cost automobile. Standardization of product enabled standardization of production process, which in turn made possible the assembly line. The assembly line initiated a massive transfer of initiative away from workers into management and wiped out previously sacrosanct limits to the rationalization of production.34 Most indicative of this pattern was the fact that Fordist industrial organization encouraged the spatial separation of research and development from production, putting them into different buildings, and often in different towns, as a function of the more general trend of vertical integration.35
Technological developments closely tracked these organizational innovations in delimiting the situation of semi-skilled workers under Fordism. Machine tools were increasingly designed as variations on the lathe. Having learned to turn, a worker could with relative ease shift to another machine and pick up the necessary movements.36 In hindsight, it is clear that the standardization of tool design was a first step in the both the standardization and routinization of tasks.37 In French heavy industry of the mid-1950s, implementation of industrial Fordism rapidly changed overall production design; in the introduction of management; and in the imposition of a new division of labor that separated intellectual and manual work.Changes in tool design facilitated the atomization of the factory itself into isolated units concerned with maximum rationalization of what were initially component parts of the larger production process. The standardization of tasks and increased specialization of technology reopened the politics of wage rates and production speed. It also sparked, with more political variability, a move to integrate and depoliticize trade unions through the mechanism of collective bargaining. In these larger contexts, the fate of the machinists played a small, but symbolically important part.
Socialisme ou Barbarie collectively believed the relative professional autonomy of semi-skilled workers enabled them to develop the type of informal shop-floor culture presupposed by any revolutionary project that did not assume the intervention of a Vanguard Party. Therefore, when the group inquired into worker experience, they referred to semi-skilled workers in the context of Fordist mass production, the most advanced form of industrial organization of the period. In this, they conformed to a general tendency of the French Left. Les métallos were, for the most part, French, and were highly politicized and volatile.38 French heavy industry recruited and increasingly relied upon an immigrant workforce on the assembly-line. This policy set up political, cultural and professional fractures within the factory that Socialisme ou Barbarie member Daniel Mothé (Jacques Gautrat) wrote about candidly in 1956.39 For Socialisme ou Barbarie, it was in general more significant that assembly-line work was unskilled. The lack of skill and collective life in the context of production as well as the nature of line work itself were more important than the plurality of ethnicities, nationalities and languages in preventing these workers from acting collectively. Like most French Left organizations, Socialisme ou Barbarie did not focus on the unskilled OS workers on the line.40
On Worker Narratives and Proletarian Experience
Text means Tissue; but whereas hitherto we have always taken this tissue as a product, a ready-made veil, behind which lies, more or less hidden, meaning (truth), we are now emphasizing, in the tissue, the generative idea that the text is made, is worked out in a perpetual interweaving; lost in this tissue--this texture--the subject unmakes himself, like a spider dissolving in the constructive secretions of its web. Were we fond of neologisms, we might define the theory of the text as a hypology (hyphos is the tissue and the spider’s web).41
The worker narratives that Socialisme ou Barbarie envisioned collecting would combine first person observation of shop-floor experience with an anthropological perspective on the processes that shaped that experience and a sociological view of industrial organization. The worker/writer of such narratives had to be both involved with, and detached from, the experience described. The narratives were to be autobiographical and descriptive of worker experience generally. The descriptions provided by any one narrative would have obvious limitations with respect to completeness and universality.42 Many narratives gathered together might overcome these limitations. A phenomenology of these texts would provide the general structure of worker comportments at the point of production as reproduced in these narratives and shaped by their genre. What Socialisme ou Barbarie wanted was a window onto factory experience that would enable them to see how workers processed structural conditions as horizons. Further, Socialisme ou Barbarie wanted access to the interaction of appropriation and resistance constitutive of the proletarian standpoint. The analysis would acquire its significance from the larger revolutionary project.
In “Proletarian Experience”, Lefort argues that a feature of the “radical originality of the proletariat” is that it can only be known by itself. Consequently, others may understand the working class only on its terms and in its language. From this premise follows the necessity of interpreting worker writing. However, these texts were not without problems:
This does not mean that we will claim to define what the proletariat is in its reality from this angle, after having rejected all other representations that have been made of its condition, which view it either through the deforming prism of bourgeois society or that of the Parties that claim to represent it. A worker testimony, no matter how evocative, symbolic and spontaneous it might be, remains conditioned by the situation of its source. We are not alluding to the deformation that can come from an individual interpretation, but to that which narration necessarily imposes on its author. Telling is necessarily not acting, and even supposes a break with action that transforms its meaning. Making a narrative about a strike is entirely different from participating in a strike, if only because one then knows the outcome, and the simple distance of reflection enables one to evaluate what had not, in the moment, yet become fixed in its meaning. In fact, this is much more than a simple change of opinion: it is a change of attitude, that is to say a transformation in the manner of reacting to situations in which one finds oneself. To this must be added that narrative places the individual in an isolated position which is not natural to him either […] Critique of a testimony must precisely enable one to see in the individual’s attitudes that which implies the comportment of the group. However, in the last analysis, the former does not coincide exactly with the latter, and we have access only to incomplete knowledge.43
For Lefort, the basic issue is not defining what the proletariat is or substituting a new, better representation for existing ones, because the class cannot be an object of this type of knowledge. He argues that “knowing” the working class is more “being-with.” It is an imaginative transformation, carried out through reading and critique. Knowing the working class transforms the reader into a specular “participant observer.”44
A vicarious “acquisition” of the proletarian standpoint and its constituent practices is hindered by the necessary incompleteness of any given narrative. Such incompleteness is a result of perspectivalism and of the suspension of the “natural attitude” implicit in the act of writing. To paraphrase from the quoted passage above: “Writing about an action is not to act within it and presupposes a break with acting that transforms its meaning.” For a worker to adopt an anthropological relation to his own experience as worker places him inside and outside that experience at the same time. The writer retrospectively orders experience by writing it: experience is no longer an open-ended relation to a context on the part of an embedded subject who interprets and makes judgments about it based on incomplete information.45 The consequence of this retrospective character is to render contingent aspects of human experience as necessary elements by giving experience a dramatic or narrative form. Doing so eliminates the space for creativity.46 Not only is writing necessarily retrospective, but it re-orders and spatializes the environment in particular ways and re-temporalizes experience according to criteria internal to the process of narration and the type of narrative being produced. While Lefort acknowledges these mediations, the real question for him does not concern the gap that might be thereby instituted between text and experience. Rather, the main problem facing the critic/reader is in recognizing and bridging the divide that separates the “unnaturally isolated” writing worker from the necessarily social character of that which is described. The role of phenomenological analysis is to search for traces of the collective comportments within individual, fragmentary accounts.
For Lefort, the worker-writer is the phenomenologist’s accomplice who sorts out, compares and reduces. He (almost always he) transforms experience into data from which a second order critique can derive fragments of “authentic” experience. At the same time the worker-writer remains a worker, writing like a worker, describing factory conditions in a recognizably “prolo” manner. The worker-writer is the critic’s double: the critic watches the worker watching; the critic appropriates what the worker describes.47 The writing worker is a vehicle for the militant/critic’s identification with the workers, an identification given content through the discovery of their practices, the adoption of their standpoint and the theorization of their self-production. Haunted by the fear of reverting to a form of Leninism, Lefort confines the revolutionary militant to the role of phenomenological observer. However, this same identification is encouraged and exacerbated by the formal characteristics of the narratives that Lefort treats as primary evidence. To show how this part of the circuit operates, we take up the two texts that Lefort considered exemplary: Paul Romano’s 1947 “The American Worker” and Eric Albert’s 1952 “Témoignage: la vie en usine.”
Socialisme ou Barbarie member Philippe Guillaume introduced his translation of Paul Romano’s “The American Worker” with: “We present here an unprecedented document of great value about the lives of American workers.” The pamphlet’s value, Guillaume argues, lay first of all in its demolition of the “Hollywood and Readers’ Digest” illusion that the American worker, rich and without class consciousness, is a living example of the benefits of class collaboration. More than this, Guillaume argues that Romano has produced the first example of a new “proletarian documentary literature.” This documentary literature holds a mirror up to workers that reflects (politically) significant elements within their experience back to them in their own language. The pamphlet addresses the reader by soliciting recognition. Guillaume repeats this gesture, and it is repeated a number of times thereafter, before Romano’s narrative actually begins. Guillaume writes:
Every worker, regardless of “his nationality” of exploitation, will find in it the image of his own existence as proletarian. There are, in fact, deep and consistent characteristics of proletarian alienation that know neither frontiers nor regimes… The translator of this small pamphlet himself has worked several years in the factory. He was struck by the accuracy and the important implications of every line. It is impossible for a worker to remain indifferent to this reading. In our eyes, it is not by accident that such a sample of proletarian documentary literature comes to us from America, and it is also not by accident that it is, in some of its deepest aspects, the first of the genre.48
Near the end of this quote, Guillaume repeats the Marxist axiom that the most advanced industrial setting will produce the most advanced forms of worker resistance. These advanced forms of opposition, and their potentials for new modes of class consciousness, are reflected in the creation of a new form of written expression.49 This new form of expression is itself reflective of the transition within the industrial working class away from more traditional types of political (revolutionary) action which amounts to postulating that a new revolutionary avant-garde is developing out of worker experience of technology, conventional political parties, trade unions, and so on, at the point of production. All this is implicit in Guillaume’s statement but it is made explicit in Ria Stone’s “The Reconstruction of Society,” the extended theoretical essay that accompanied Romano’s narrative in its original American edition.50
From the outset, Romano is presented as a part of a new “revolutionary tide” rising within the American working class. The elision of the particular into the general is made all the more attractive by his use of a pseudonym or “war name.” These names were normal amongst the anti-Stalinist Left in both the U.S. and France. Within Socialisme ou Barbarie, adoption of an alias was simply a matter of tactical necessity. It should be kept in mind that revolutionary political activity amongst intellectuals occurred in a semi-clandestine zone. Groups were subject to surveillance by the political arm of the Parisian Police, the “Renseignements Généraux.” Socialisme ou Barbarie included a number of foreigners who were actively engaged in a type of political activity that could get them deported, like Castoriadis and Alberto Maso (Véga).51 These groups were also subject to surveillance and repression from the PCF. Anti-Stalinist politics in a PCF-dominated environment, like Renault’s Billancourt factory, could pose real physical and career dangers to those who engaged in it.52 These pressures affected different people in different ways, and Lefort is interesting in this regard. A philosophy professor during the day, he initially published in Socialisme ou Barbarie under the name C. Montal. He began to use his real name more frequently after leaving Les Temps Modernes in 1952, and exclusively after 1956.
The names take on another, quite independent function in the reading of these narratives. Scant information was provided about Paul Romano, the pamphlet’s author. Even in 1972, in a preface to a new edition of the pamphlet, Martin Glaberman would only say that Romano was active in the Johnson-Forest Tendency, and worked at a General Motors factory in New Jersey that employed about 800 production workers.53 The Introduction to the first edition, signed J.H., describes Romano as:
himself a factory worker, [who] has contributed greatly to such understanding [of “what the workers are thinking and doing while actually at work on the bench or on the line”] by his description, based on years of study and observation of the lives of workers in modem mass production. The profundity of Romano’s contribution lies not in making any new discovery but rather in seeing the obvious-the constant and daily raging of the workers against the degrading and oppressive conditions of their life in the factory; and at the same time, their creative and elemental drive to reconstruct society on a new and higher level.54
Romano’s own opening paragraphs repeat this operation in a somewhat more complex manner:
I am a young worker in my late 20s. The past several years have found me in the productive apparatus of the most highly industrialized country in the world. Most of my working years have been spent in mass production industries among hundreds and thousands of other workers. Their feelings, anxieties, exhilaration, boredom, exhaustion, anger, have all been mine to one extent or another. By “their feelings” I mean those which are the direct reactions to modern high-speed production. The present finds me still in a factory – one of the giant corporations in the country.
This pamphlet is addressed to the rank and file worker and its intention is to express those innermost thoughts which the worker rarely talks about even to his fellow-workers. In keeping a diary, so to speak, of the day-to-day factory life I hoped to uncover the reasons for the worker’s deep dissatisfaction which has reached its peak in recent years and has expressed itself in the latest strikes and spontaneous walkouts.
The rough draft of this pamphlet was given to workers across the country. Their reactions were as one. They were surprised and gratified to see in print the experiences and thoughts which they have rarely put into words. Workers arrive home from the factory too exhausted to read more than the daily comics. Yet most of the workers who read the pamphlet stayed up well into the night to finish the reading once they had started.55
The first three sentences contain all the particular information we are given. From this point on, the individual is blurred into the collective, and vice-versa. For example, Romano claims to describe “the innermost thoughts which the worker rarely talks about even to his fellow workers.” The accuracy of such description is, in Husserlian language, intersubjectively verified, established quasi-scientifically, by means of a straw-poll of “workers around the country” who stayed up late to read it because they (who? where?) recognized themselves in the writing. “Paul Romano” itself is a nearly arbitrary name, a proper name that does not signify, that does not limit, that does not help establish some reference point around which to stabilize the shifting border between experience and writing about experience. The author, Paul Romano, is an empty function that generates propositions in the form “the worker feels x…”; “the workers see y…every day.” We are presented with a claim to a sort of “lateral verification.” The workers stayed up late to read these propositions.
Romano delimits his intended audience in another way through the paragraphs on intellectuals.56 The pamphlet is a conversation between workers: intellectuals “so removed from the daily experience of the laboring masses” could not be sympathetic to its content. Romano argues that: “They felt cheated” because there was “too much dirt and noise.” This characterization places the phenomenologist-cum-revolutionary militant, who in all probability has a romantic attachment to the idea of dirt and noise, in an ambiguous position. He seems to approximate an eavesdropper listening in on a telephone conversation between two others during which they begin to make disparaging remarks that could be about the silent third party. There is a certain voyeurism that attends looking at the “elemental drive” of the working class in process through the act of reading. At the same time, the reader is encouraged to side with the workers, to embark on a voyage accompanied by a trusted native informant.
The war name functions to turn the author into a contentless variable, an observing machine that generates a trail of propositions about factory life. I have argued above that there is a structural doubling of the militant/critic in the writing worker, and powerful political reasons for the former to project himself into the position made available within the narratives by the latter. The arbitrariness of the proper name in this context removes any brake that might otherwise have been set up on this identification by information on the empirical life of the author.57 This identification, staged at the level of relation between militant/critic as phenomenologist and the worker-writer, is furthered by the narrative’s use of “prolo” language. Philippe Guillaume touched on this issue again in his brief translator’s preface, and on some of the problems he encountered while translating Romano’s English:
It is impossible for a worker to remain indifferent to this reading. It is even more impossible to translate such a text in an indifferent, or even routine, manner. At several junctures, it was necessary to take a considerable distance from the letter of the English text to provide a really faithful translation. Some American popular expressions have an exact correspondent in French, but embedded in different imagery. Even in his descriptive style, Romano uses a proletarian optic.58
The translation problem in moving from popular American to a parallel French while not dissolving Romano’s “proletarian optic” was resolved in such a way as to make the version published in Socialisme ou Barbarie an interesting primer in “prolo” French for an American reader. It also functions as a second order legitimation of Romano’s status as worker, something which go without saying were the pamphlet were actually being transmitted worker to worker. For whom need a “proletarian optic” be defined?
The various prefaces and introductions to Romano’s pamphlet are important because they make explicit what usually left unsaid in these narratives and is worked out at the level of style and through the manipulation of certain conventions. Once past these introductions, we encounter Romano’s narrative proper. Here we shift to a more structural analysis, reading Romano along with Eric Albert’s “Témoignage: la vie en usine,” published in the July 1952 issue of Les Temps Modernes, to isolate several common features that operate as genre markers informing/shaping “proletarian documentary literature” as collected or generated by Socialisme ou Barbarie.59
In several ways, Albert’s narrative is quite different from that of Romano. It was written for a different audience—the educated, progressive bourgeois readership of Les Temps Modernes. A journalistic expose of conditions inside the newer types of factories, combined with elements of a travel narrative it documents Albert’s experience as an O.S. (an unskilled worker). Albert worked in two different factories owned by the same cable manufacturing company near Paris. The first, in which Albert learns his job, is older, roughly on the order of Billancourt; the second is a more recent building and an example of Fordist organization on the order of Flins.
The point of Albert’s narrative emerges through the contrast between his experiences in the two factories, which are staged as emblematic of the past and future of factory design. The former allowed a margin for worker autonomy, and thereby the creation of the types of informal shop and shift-specific collectivities that are the focus of Romano’s writing. The latter offers no such margin. Its layout is entirely subordinated to what Albert calls the “geometrical requirements of the machinery.”60 Albert uses his experience to reveal the inhumanity, and the political danger for the Left, of Fordist factory design from the vantage point of an unskilled worker. Romano’s narrative, on the other hand, consists mostly of detailed descriptions of informal shop-floor communities from the viewpoint of a semi-skilled worker (who would be in the range of a P1-P3 according to the French professional hierarchy). Romano uses these descriptions to winnow out the political implications of their collective life.
There are thus significant divergences between the two narratives that Lefort takes as exemplary in “Proletarian Experience.” There was an enormous gulf that separated the experience of an O.S. from that of a P1-P3 worker. The accounts were written for different assumed audiences. There is also a political difference between the two. It is difficult to pinpoint Albert’s political viewpoint. He appears at times to be an old-style anarcho-syndicalist whose politics come from the pre-World War II period, and who is still attached to the traditions of the “worker aristocracy.” At other times, he appears to have simply read a lot of material like Michel Collinet’s 1950 Esprit du syndicalisme.61 Romano’s affiliation with “Correspondence” would position him closer to Socialisme ou Barbarie.62
That said, the narratives nonetheless share a number of formal characteristics, though each deploys these features in a different order. This variation can serve as an index of the writer’s political affiliation or aspirations. For example, consider the location of the initiation scene. Romano’s narrative begins:
The factory worker lives and breathes dirt and oil. As machines are speeded up, the noise becomes greater, the strain greater, the labor greater, even though the process is simplified. Most steel cutting and grinding machines of today require a lubricant to facilitate machining the material. It is commonplace to put on a clean set of clothes in the morning and by noon to be soaked, literally, with oil. Most workers in my department have oil pimples, rashes and sores on their arms and legs. The shoes become soaked and the result is a steady case of athlete’s foot. Blackheads fill the pores. it is an extremely aggravating set of effects. We speak often of sitting and soaking in a hot tub of water to loosen the dirt and ease the infectious blackheads.
In most factories the worker freezes in the winter, sweats in the summer and often does not have hot water to wash the day’s grime from his body…63
This paragraph introduces two fundamental characteristics of Romano’s narrative, and of these narratives in general. The universal and the particular are intertwined in a complex manner. The universal appears through the propositional form “the worker lives…”; “most workers in my department have oil pimples…”; “we speak often…” The particular appears through Romano’s evocation of pain. This usage of pain is a bit surprising, given its extreme particularity, its incommunicability, its tendency to “unmake the world” available to the subject by forcing the body (roughly following Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body as social and spatial orientation for a subject) back onto itself. Another’s pain is most distant from oneself.64
The collective first-person pronouns function in Romano’s text to shift identification onto a very immediate level. The reader/militant/critic is encouraged to project himself into the empty space outlined by the author as generator of propositions, but left empty because of the arbitrariness of the proper name. The tone of the descriptions is on the order of: you and I know the extreme noise, the stress induced by machine speed-ups; the rashes and pimples caused by inadequate facilities and poor ventilation. The reader is squarely on the shop floor. Albert’s narrative opens with a structurally similar “reduction of the subject.” Because the piece is not designed as explicitly to draw the reader into the experience being described, though it is not without its vivid moments, the reader’s initiation into the Textual Factory can be more abstract. Albert’s experience is presented as universal in a rather different way: I ran out of money. I had to get a job. I got hired at this place. Here is what happened: “When one no longer knows what, to do to make a living, all that remains is finding a job as an O.S.. That is why I found myself one day on a street outside the large door of a cable-making plant, along with about twenty other men…”65
The intertwining of the universal and particular is repeated at the level of framing information. Romano’s text features extremely detailed accounts of worker responses to concrete problems (using steel pipe to smash closed windows that should be open to provide ventilation) and resistance (the informally organized slow-downs accompanying the arrival of the time-study men, chronos in French, because everyone knows that working up to or over speed is self- defeating and results only in increased production quotas and cadences). In the section “Why Such Inefficiency?” Romano provides descriptions of the shop-floor view of overall industrial organization. These accounts are situated within a “shop floor” that is itself decontextualized. The reader is provided with no information about where these acts occur, either within the geography of the factory (workers simply do this) or in the world (not a word).66
However, the shop floor is situated rather carefully with respect to the Abstract Factory that is produced within or by the text. The Abstract Factory is elaborated along one of two general lines. In the writings of Albert and Vivier, a sociologizing gaze surveys the entirety of the Factory from top to bottom and generates a typology of worker strata and various personality types.67 In the other pattern, the Abstract Factory is described from the standpoint of a particular shop. For Romano and Mothé, the Abstract Factory functions to legitimate and give content to the “proletarian standpoint,” which is a narrative position. The Factory environment locates the reader on the shop floor. The presentation of other workers from this narrative viewpoint is also presentation of types, but one that serves to fill out the reader’s experience of the textual shop-floor. In his texts published in Socialisme ou Barbarie several years later, Mothé was able to take this much further than Romano, as will be seen in the next parts of this dissertation, because the prominence of Billancourt for Parisian Left politics enabled him to avoid having to stage the entirety of the Abstract Factory and because his writings appeared as a series of articles that frequently involved the same shop and characters. Mothe’s readers become almost comfortable with them: they constitute something of a repertoire company.
The point where the worker enters the effective life of the shop floor is also the moment the reader enters the “interior.” The initiation scene in “The American Worker” is retrospective, and is staged as an account of relations between a neophyte and the political culture of the shop:
The Workers’ Organization
I arrived in the plant several weeks after the “Big Strike” had ended. Things were tense for several weeks. Newcomers were eyed with suspicion by both workers and company so soon after the strike. My first day in the plant found me waiting in one of the departments for the foreman. A worker sauntered over to me. In a very brief discussion, he tried to determine my attitude toward unions. I shook him off and he walked away. His speech made it clear that he was anti-union. Union men made themselves conspicuous by their avoidance of newcomers.68
Romano only stays on this threshold for a paragraph: having passed an initial test, he is soon integrated into the political structure of the shop. This is a crucial passage in the pamphlet, as it marks more than Romano’s passage into the interior of shop-floor life. The section of which this is the opening quickly turns to a detailed discussion of the gap that separates the union hierarchy from the shop-floor, it is also a demonstration of, and argument for, the existence of a class perspective tied to this shop life and independent of union organization and ideology. Only after establishing this perspective does Romano undertake his survey of the Abstract Factory: the function of this survey is the legitimation of the viewpoint from which it is carried out. The political implications of the position of the initiation scene can be seen by counterpoising Romano to Albert. Albert’s narrative conforms much more explicitly to the conventions of a travel narrative: the encounter, the threshold moment, the unanticipated test and passage into the interior all happen at the beginning. This passage into the interior is explicitly linked with the acquisition of skill, where this link remains a pervasive assumption only made explicit in Romano’s final pages.69
At this point, by way of a conclusion, a recapitulation. Lefort’s essay is fundamental to understanding Socialisme ou Barbarie’s efforts to gain access to and think about worker experience as the basis for a type of political work that did not subordinate this experience to the Higher Historical wisdom of the Party. Lefort’s approach to worker narratives, and his phenomenology of worker experience that frames it, would have combined the careful gathering and collating of texts with a sophisticated theory of reading. His theoretical framework was also shot through with problems of uncontrolled identification/projection. Efforts to control for this projection were impeded by the narrowness of the sample the group was able to collect. This small data set meant that, while the phenomenological apparatus was in place, the reductions themselves really could not be undertaken. The possibility remains that a more detailed phenomenological description of the “proletarian standpoint,” based on reductions performed with a larger data set, could have significantly reduced, or eliminated, the space for projection. Because Socialisme ou Barbarie’s project belongs to the past, we cannot know.
Lefort’s approach to the question of interpreting worker narratives as windows onto shop floor experience took as central the problem of knowledge about social-historical phenomena, understood as spatially and temporally imbricated processes that entail or produce meaning-structures or what Castoriadis would later call social-imaginary significations. Lefort’s use of phenomenology to analyze these texts cut two ways. By focusing on them in terms shaped by the situation of their production, it allowed for the development of some interesting and fruitful conceptualizations, particularly in thinking about practice, which was the domain Socialisme ou Barbarie wanted to analyze as the everyday “ground” of its revolutionary project. The situating of practice and how it unfolds within both the immanent and (potentially) revolutionary contexts at once clarifies the orientation of revolutionary theory with respect to the present. At the same time, Lefort’s focus on the conditions of their production and indications of worker creativity, patterns of self-organization and orientations toward the future entailed a curious neglect of these texts as texts, and of the experience of being a reader of them. At the same time as it enabled an isolation of potentials for revolutionary creativity, the phenomenology of worker narratives formalized a projective relation between analyst/critic/militant and worker. This projective relationship repeated within the texts, in the gaps that separated their extreme precision about concrete shop-floor experience and its presentation in a decontextualized, abstract manner, that is in precisely the way these narratives gave Socialisme ou Barbarie, as a community of readers (like ourselves), access to the shop floor, the proletarian standpoint, and the “games” in the context of which that standpoint was instituted.
Lefort’s phenomenology of worker narratives approach bracketed from the outset the possibility that this type of self-reflexive writing was as much a literary construction (a set of genre rules and expectations) as an account of actual experience. By treating these narratives as phenomenological data for a series of reductions that never get underway, Lefort’s approach sets Socialisme ou Barbarie up for a wholesale confusion of the signified of the narratives’ discourse with the referent, taking for “objective” history that which is highly mediated and processed through certain linguistic and generic conventions. The signified would be the internal world of the narrative, the Abstract Factory, the decontextualized shop floor, the Workers as types or as individual atoms, the upsurging revolutionary wave sweeping across the American working class, the formation of a class consciousness closely linked to the production of significations on the shop floor outside of and in direct opposition to the existing workers’ movement. The referent would be the actual factory experience of Paul Romano or Eric Albert. The relation between the two would be difficult enough to establish even were Romano and Albert present in Socialisme ou Barbarie, as will be seen by way of Gautrat/Mothé. Here, the relation is undecidable. That Socialisme ou Barbarie took these narratives as direct accounts of experience, whose constructed character is simply a function of the temporal gap that separated the worker within a specific situation from that same worker writing about that situation testifies to the power of what Roland Barthes called the “realism effect” of these narratives.70
Stephen Hastings-King lives by a salt marsh in Essex, Massachusetts where he makes constraints, works with prepared piano and writes entertainments of various kinds. His short fictions have appeared in Sleepingfish, Black Warrior Review and elsewhere. He has a Ph.D in Modern European History from Cornell University. His book, Looking for the Proletariat: Socialisme ou Barbarie and the Question of Worker Writing, will be published in the Spring of 2014 from Brill as part of the Historical Materialism series.
Originally posted: September 27, 2014 at Viewpoint
- 1This is a version of a chapter that will appear in my Looking for the Working Class: Socialisme ou Barbarie, Correspondence and the Problem of Worker Writing through the Historical Materialism Series at Brill in early 2014. Many thanks are owed to Kelly Grotke and David Ames Curtis for their help with preparing this piece.
- 2Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” Socialisme ou Barbarie 11 (1952), 1-19. Reprinted as Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Gallimard, 1979). Reference here is to Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 74.
- 3See François Dosse, L’Histoire du structuralisme t. 1: le champs du signe (Paris: Le Découverte, 1991).
- 4See Alain Touraine, L’Evolution du travail ouvrier aux usines Renault (Paris: CNRS, 1955). Arguments no. 12/13 is an important compilation of texts on 1958 and the French working class. I will return to the interaction of revolutionary politics and the nascent “sociologie du travail” in my Looking for the Working Class: Socialisme ou Barbarie, Correspondence and the Problem of Worker Writing.
- 5This is not to say that the work of people like Elton Mayo was without utility: see the extensive, critical use made of Mayo in Cornelius Castoriadis, “On the Content of Socialism III: Worker’s Struggles against the Organization of Capitalist Enterprise” in Political and Social Writings v.2, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1988). Donald Roy’s work, which represented a marginal, more explicitly Left/critical variant of industrial sociology, is fundamental to Castoriadis’ 1958 text. See pp. 184-188, Political and Social Writings v.2, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1988).
- 6Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 74.
- 7This miserabalist conception of the working class, which emphasizes its exploitation to the near exclusion of other aspect of working-class life, is evident in Engels On the Condition of the Working Class in England, 1844 and in the (quite remarkable) analysis of the English working class of 1860 in volume one of Capital. By contrast, see, for example, E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vantage, 1966).
- 8Cornelius Castoriadis, “Socialisme ou Barbarie,” in Political and Social Writings v.1, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1988).
- 9This refers primarily to the configuration of trade unions and political parties dominant at a given time and the possibilities that may or may not exist for autonomous action. On this, see further on in this section.
- 10Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, passim.
- 11See Chapter 2 in my forthcoming Looking for the Proletariat.
- 12See the debate on revolutionary organization published in Socialisme ou Barbarie 10 (July-August, 1952): Chaulieu, Pierre, “La direction prolétarienne,” 10-18 and Montal, Claude, “Le prolétariat et le problème de la direction révolutionnaire,” 18-27. The reference here is to Montal’s (Lefort), 27: There is no need for a revolutionary organization at all.
- 13This point emerges from a reading of the exchange between Lefort and Jean Paul Sartre that resulted in Lefort’s departure from Les Temps Modemes in 1954. Particularly important is Castoriadis’ “contribution” to the debate which, in the context of a general defense, criticizes Lefort on precisely this point. See the first two parts of Sartre’s “Communists and Peace” originally published in TM no. 81, July 1952 and 84-85, November 1952; reprinted in Jean-Paul Sartre, Situations VI (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). Lefort’s “Le marxisme et Sartre” originally in TM no. 89, April 1953 along with Sartre’s response, “Réponse a Claude Lefort”. Lefort’s article is reprinted in Claude Lefort, Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie. Sartre’s two essays are translated as Jean-Paul Sartre, The Communists and Peace (New York: George Braziller, 1968). Castoriadis, “Sartre, le stalinisme et les ouvriers,” Socialisme ou Barbarie, 12: 63–88 is a response to Sartre’s attack on Lefort. It was reprinted in Castoriadis, L’experience du mouvement ouvrier 1: Comment lutter (Paris: 10/18, 1974) and is translated in Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings v.1, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1988), pp. 207-241. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Sartre and Ultrabolshevism,” in Adventures of the Dialectic (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973).
- 14This point could be much more fully developed, particularly since it addresses one of the more common charges leveled at Marx(ists) concerning the problem of periodicity and, by extension, of accounting for changes leading up to capitalism. Lefort’s arguments can be found in Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Gallimard, 1979), 4-5. See also Lefort 1978, originally published in Les Temps Modernes no. 78.
- 15Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” Socialisme ou Barbarie 11: 4- 5.
- 16For the most fully worked out statement of this critique of Marx, see “L’expérience de l’histoire du mouvement ouvrier” in Castoriadis, L’experience du mouvement ouvrier 1: Comment lutter (Paris: 10/18, 1974), translated as “On the Experience of the History of the Workers’ Movement” in Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Question of the History of the Workers’ Movement,” in Political and Social Writings v.2, edited and translated by David Ames Curtis (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 1993).
- 17See Cornelius Castoriadis, L’experience du mouvement ouvrier 1: Comment lutter (Paris: 10/18, 1974).
- 18A term taken, along with the problems in translating it, from Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
- 19The language of social-imaginary significations is taken from the later philosophical work of Cornelius Castoriadis. While it appears throughout this article, it operates primarily as a heuristic rather than as an explicit analytic category. Here refers to the revolutionary project and its reconfiguration of elements of everyday experience in terms shape by an understanding of socialism as direct democratic.
- 20The position that bourgeois thought in general is characterized by an effort to derive reality from the concepts used to think about/order that reality, a position common to Marx, Nietzsche, and others.
- 21See paragraph 87 of Edmund Husserl, Ideas (New York: Collier, 1962), for the distinction between the object in itself and the noematic, and on the function of inverted commas in restricting meaning to the noematic.
- 22The opening pages of Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, expend considerable energy to define and defend this domain from within the Marxist tradition.
- 23S ou B used phrases like this in a quite different sense than is current largely in interest group-based politics fashionable on American campuses. its usage has nothing to do with the “post-modern” notion that subject positions are constituted discursively to such an extent that one can simply pick one out that best corresponds to the structure of affect—a variant of shopping in a “free market” where “rational actors” calculate their interests and buy (into) a politics off the rack. Such shopping need never call into question the system of distribution that supplies particular options to the exclusion of others, any more than one would be led to think about transnational capitalism by roaming the Gap. For S ou B, the goal was rather autonomy: the revolutionary project aspired to institute direct democracy, the political form within which autonomy might be operationally possible.
- 24The last sentence is quite difficult to translate. It appears to try replacing a more Trotskyist mode of analyzing worker struggles in terms of short-term prospects with a more abstract form of interrogation into the political or ideological preconditions that enabled Trotskyism—and others—to assess the “meaning” of worker struggle. This reflexive, properly philosophical and open-ended mode of interrogation is posited here as the experience through which the class might develop, Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” Socialisme ou Barbarie 11: 6.
- 25Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1965), Chapter 6.
- 26From Merleau-Ponty’s viewpoint, Heidegger’s effort to push the inquiry about the nature of the copula into a single general question of Being could be viewed as itself an effort to institute a transcendental philosophy of finitude. On how difficult it is to separate what philosophy says from what it does institutionally, see François Dosse, L’Histoire du structuralisme t. 1: le champs du signe (Paris: Le Découverte, 1991) and Vincent Descombes, Le même et l’autre (Paris: Minuit, 1979). Both detail the consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking as opening the field for structuralist anthropology to take over the position formerly occupied by philosophy.
- 27The notion of institution as used by Merleau-Ponty derives from a reading of Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology translated by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern, 1970). See Merleau-Ponty, “Institution in Personal and Public History,” in Themes from the Lectures at the Collège de France (Evanston: Northwestern, 1970). The seminars on the notion of institution have since been published as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours sur L’origine de la géométrie de Husserl (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998). See also Dick Howard, The Marxian Legacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 167.
- 28The notion of rules in relation to particular language games is an important theme explored in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, which could be profitably cross-voiced with Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in this regard.
- 29This distinction between practices narrowly construed and that which unifies them, gives them a direction (a sens), the domain out of which they emerge and relative to which they acquire meaning has been elaborated in various ways. Merleau-Ponty does so in “Cezanne’s Doubt” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-sense, translated by Hubert Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus, (Evanston: Northwestern, 1964), or on Matisse in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) through his notion of “l’oeuvre.” Lefort later took up the same issue in his work on Machiavelli (l’oeuvre of Machiavelli is the creation of the political). Developing in a separate direction, Castoriadis, following Freud, refers to this dimension of social practice as signification, that which brings into relation. The production and deployment of such significations is what the social-historical does.
- 30Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 91-92.
- 31On the French salary scale, occupying the rankings of P1-P3.
- 32The shipyard strikes in St. Nazaire and Nantes during the summer of 1955, for example, were triggered by Penhoët (and the state’s) efforts to increase cadences by redesigning production in such a way as to tie together the wages and functions of workers involved with various stages of welding despite some operations being simpler and faster than others. See Louis Oury, Les Prolos (Paris: DeNoël, 1973) and the accounts of the strikes published in Socialisme ou Barbarie no. 18 (Jan-Mar 1956).
- 33Benjamin Coriat, L’atelier et le chronomètre (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1979), 16ff.
- 34On the role of the automobile industry as leading edge of technological, organizational and demand changes in the 20th century, see Jean-Pierre Bardou, The Automobile Revolution (University of North Carolina Press, 1982). For a litany of preconditions that allowed the American automobile industry to shape this revolution in industrial organization, see Chapter 6.
- 35On this process at Renault, see Michel Freyssenet, La siderurgie francaise, 1945-1979: L’histoire d’une faillite: les solutions qui s’affrontent (Savelli, 1979).
- 36See Paul Romano, The American Worker (Detroit: Bewick, 1972), 40. See also Alain Touraine, L’Evolution du travail ouvrier aux usines Renault for a more detailed version of the same argument in the context of Renault’s Billancourt factory.
- 37This was often more true on paper than in actual factories. By the time covered in Touraine’s book on work at Billancourt, it had become an awkward combination of advanced design and heavily modified older machinery that required an unusually large section of machinists simply to maintain—rather like the Boston MTA does today. A more thoroughgoing Fordisation of production could not be adapted to such conditions: it was therefore cheaper and easier simply to build a new factory at Flins based on newer conceptions and employing more up-to- date equipment. When Flins opened in 1952, the writing was in a sense already on the wall for Billancourt. Demonstration that transitions take time: Billancourt, the closing of which was announced in 1980, closed in 1992, the same week EuroDisney opened.
- 38For the French Left, the métallo was the quintessential revolutionary militant.
- 39Daniel Mothé, “Les ouvriers français et les nord africains,” Socialisme ou Barbarie 21 (1958): 146ff.
- 40These would only later be targeted by Maoist “établis” after 1968. Les etablis were Maoist students who got jobs on factory assembly lines in order to be with the workers in the period following May 1968. See Robert Linhardt, L’établi (Paris: Minuit, 1978). Nicolas Dubost, Flins sans fin (Paris: Maspero, 1979) provides an interesting and oddly moving account of the conditions among immigrant workers on the line at Flins and of the disastrous mistakes the Maoists made while trying to organize them.
- 41Roland Barthes, Pleasure of the Text, edited and translated by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975).
- 42Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 87-88.
- 43Claude Lefort, “L’experience prolétarienne,” in Eléments d’une critique de la bureaucratie, 90.
- 44The classic statement on participant observer sociology is William Foote Whyte, Street Corner Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). More recent examples include David Simons and Edward Burns: The Corner: A Year in the Life of an Inner City Neighborhood (New York: Random House (Broadway), 1998). Loïc Wacquant, Body & Soul: Notebooks of an Apprentice Boxer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) is a lovely demonstration of what can be done with this form.
- 45This is the peril of the instituting. On this theme, see Cornelius Castoriadis, “Marxism and Revolutionary Theory,” reprinted in The Imaginary Institution of Society translated by Kathleen Blamey, Cambridge: MIT, 1998), passim.
- 46Consider the difference between a musical improvisation and a recording of an improvisation. See also Merleau-Ponty “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence” in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) on the gap which separates Matisse painting from a film of Matisse painting and the wholesale transformations of meanings that accompany the passage from open-ended creative work to the representation of open-ended creative work.
- 47I think the motif of doubling was inspired by Jacques Rancière, La nuit des prolétaires: Archives du rêve ouvrier (Paris: Fayard, 1981).
- 48Philippe Guillaume, “L’ouvrier américain,” Socialisme ou Barbarie 1 (1949): 78.
- 49Ibid.
- 50Originally published along with Paul Romano, The American Worker (Detroit: Bewick, 1972). It was translated by Guillaume and published in Socialise ou Barbarie nos. 7 and 8 (1950-1951). See the pamphlet’s final flourishes.
- 51Interviews with most members of S ou B, Véga in particular. This theme of the war name recurs in Chapter 5 of my forthcoming Looking for the Proletariat more extensively.
- 52Interview with Pierre Blachier.
- 53Martin Glaberman, Introduction to Paul Romano, The American Worker, v.
- 54J.H. Preface to The American Worker, viii.
- 55The American Worker, 1. We return to this shortly.
- 56Ibid.
- 57Roland Barthes, “L’effet du réel,” Communications 11 (1968): 11.
- 58Philippe Guillaume, “L’ouvrier américain.”
- 59Eric Albert “La vie dans une usine,” Les Temps Modernes 81 (1952): 95–130.
- 60Ibid., 98-101. This section in Albert is an exact mirroring of a similar section in Georges Navels 1945 autobiography Travaux, which recounts his experiences in factories on either side of World War I. On Navel, see the section on proletarian literature in Chapter 5 of my forthcoming Looking for the Proletariat.
- 61I know nothing about Eric Albert. The possibility of being an anarcho-syndicalist comes from page l25ff: Albert discusses what he considers to be the significant political tradition lost to younger workers in anarchist writers like Proudhon, Bakunin, Jules Vallès, Collinet and Friedmann. He also outlines an anarchist take on the Popular Front on page 117.
- 62See Chapter 5 of my forthcoming Looking for the Proletariat for an extended discussion of Correspondence.
- 63Paul Romano, The American Worker, 3.
- 64This discussion leans heavily on Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: Making and Unmaking the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985).
- 65Eric Albert, “La vie dans une usine,” 98-100.
- 66Paul Romano, The American Worker,14-15.
- 67Albert’s typological chapters are entitled “Les anciens,” “Les jeunes” etc. Vivier follows much the same model. That Viver’s narrative is relatively ignored in subsequent development is indicative, I think, of S ou B’s collective relation to this type of writing. See Eric Albert, “La vie dans une usine,” 118-126.
- 68Paul Romano, The American Worker, 21.
- 69Ibid., 34-41.
- 70See Roland Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” translated by Stephen Bann, Comparative Criticism 3: 7–20.
Comments
The Problem of the Workers’ Paper (1955)
An article by Daniel Mothé that opened a discussion on the problem of the workers’ journal, which was carried on in issues of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
This text opens a discussion on the problem of the workers’ paper, which will be carried on in the following issues of Socialisme ou Barbarie. It draws on the experience of Tribune Ouvrière, published for over a year by a group of workers from Regie Renault, from which we have published extracts in the preceding issue of this review, and from which one will find new extracts in the current one.
The development of culture and the role of political parties are at the origin of the enormous expansion of the press that characterizes our century. The division of labor, on the other hand, had turned journalism into a distinct industrial branch with its own laws. This is particularly the case in “liberal” capitalism, where the press must generally be a profitable industry.
Although totalitarian regimes suppress this apparent autonomy, and closely bind the paper to the regime, it is no less true that the paper of a communist party in a popular democracy must obey the same fundamental rules of a liberal paper in a Western democracy: to inform, influence the ideology of its readers – and above all: to be read. It’s for this reason that even in totalitarian countries, the paper must make concessions to readers; since these cannot be made on the political or ideological level, the role of the journalist is precisely to find the means of interesting the reader through the back door. We will not put journalism on trial here, or analyze the contradictions in which it develops.
Against the official press arises the press of revolutionary organizations: the latter, and in particular during periods of revolutionary crisis in society, are blessed by the fact their political content corresponds to the interests of their working-class readers. But, although their political content may be completely different, revolutionary papers always have this in common with bourgeois papers, their separation from the working class; the paper is in both cases a separate body, with its official staff, its hierarchy of editors, of which some have propaganda as their task, all kinds of papers; conclude, under the pretext that both of them produce other information, etc.
On the one side, therefore, we have the bourgeois or Stalinist paper, on the other the revolutionary paper, each of which spreads its own ideology. Our goal here is not to mix these two kinds of papers; to assume that both make propaganda and politics, that they have the same ideology, would be a stupidity that one would only find in syndicalist and anarchist currents.
But if we have spoken of these papers and discovered a characteristic common to them, it’s in fact to set them against another kind of paper, which we call the workers’ paper.
This is not about a new idea, produced through intellectual creation; such papers have already existed in the history of the workers’ movement (workers’ papers of the 19th century). And, as we will try to show in the following pages, this idea belongs to the fundamental conception of socialism, the capacity of the working class to destroy capitalism and manage a socialist society itself.
This workers’ paper will be a paper that will not have a separate apparatus; in other words, its editors, its distributors, its readers will be a reasonably large ensemble of workers. Not only will the paper’s apparatus not be separated from from its readers, but its content, too, will be determined by this collective of working-class editors, distributors, and readers. The paper will not have as its objective the diffusion of an established political conception to the working class, but will share the concrete experiences of individual workers and groups of workers, in order to respond to the problems that concern them.
What are these problems?
There are first of all problems of exploitation, which impose themselves every day, at the heart of production – and we don’t just mean by that the problems of everyday demands [revendication], but all aspects of the workers’ alienation within the framework [cadre] of capitalist production. There are then all the problems that the social framework of capitalism imposes on workers. But the class is not only held in its exploited role by the economic laws of capitalism, but also by the ideology of this society. The concerns of the workers are deviated from their real goals by the dominant ideologies: either bourgeois or Stalinist currents deform the problems that concern workers (for example the problem of wages tied to productivity by the bosses, or German rearmament by the Stalinists), or they insert into the class concerns that are fundamentally alien (electoral law). Finally, the very existence of these ideologies and their diffusion in the heart of the working class poses a problem in itself. What are these ideological currents, in what way do they influence the workers, in what ways do the workers react? Responding to these questions is the goal the paper has to set for itself. It is therefore just as absurd to say from the start that the workers’ paper will only talk about the international political situation, as to say that the journal will only talk about the relationship between workers and the management. Thus, the paper must be “empirical” to a certain degree; it must follow the everyday concerns of the workers. Only the bureaucratic or bourgeois organizations could fear this; revolutionaries have nothing to lose in this dialogue, they have everything to gain because only the working class can provide the means and the forms of struggle against capitalist society.
If we are led to talk to talk about this problem today, it’s because there exist two experiments with a paper of this type, one in the United States with the paper Correspondence, the other in France, with Tribune Ouvrière. We will examine the problem in light of the experience of Tribune Ouvrière, both at the theoretical and practical level, and we will try to draw lessons from this experiment, however slim they may be.
We will therefore remain loyal to this fundamental concern: the relation between the revolutionary organization and the working class, between theory and the practical experience of workers. These two elements will have to meet up, and their junction will not only be an absorption of revolutionary ideology by the working class, but also an assimilation of working-class experience by revolutionary militants. In this article, we will try to put into dialogue [mettre face à face] our fundamental theoretical conception and the dynamic of the workers’ efforts who participate in this paper. We will always be led by these two elements, and in the end we will try to bring them together, the most abstract and the most concrete, to formulate precise conclusions on the development of the workers’ paper.
The Two Processes of Politicization
Politics, in capitalist society, has become a specialized profession, a kind of science requiring study; becoming initiated is arduous and discourages many workers who often end up classifying everything they don’t understand as “politics.” There is therefore a division within the working class between those who do politics and those who don’t.
For socialist, Stalinist, or Trotskyist militants, the objective is to “politicize the worker,” which is to say, to initiate him, in a vulgarized and simplified form, into the mysteries of this science. This initiation aims to convince him that the party in question defends the worker and that, for his part, the worker must defend the party.
For Stalinists, this politicization consists in introducing the workers to the political mechanisms of the bourgeoisie, both on the domestic terrain (the meaning of the bourgeois parties), as well as the foreign (the meaning of international relations). For Trotskyists, introducing workers to politics is much more complex and difficult: it requires an interpretation of the history of the workers’ movement (the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and of the Third International), and an equally abridged explanation of Marxist theories on the economy, politics, etc.
Both the attempts to initiate workers to bourgeois politics as well as the attempt to introduce them to abstract questions rests on a particular conception of the role of mass organizations and movements. For Stalinism and Trotskyism, the mass organizations and movements are only the reservoirs from which the party draws its worker militants, and onto which the party tries to imprint its unique orientation, by means of infiltration and other maneuvers. They tend to substitute the politics of mass organizations with the politics of the party, the initiative of the workers with the initiative of the party; it’s all about substituting the problems that are born in production or in the public lives of workers, with the general political problems that concern the party. This is how they end up explaining to workers that low wages are result of the accords made in Paris, or that they are the product of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution – something that is, in varying degrees, an absurdity and a mystification.
In the two conceptions, we find the same idea: general political problems that concern the party, no interest, the only interest resides in the politics of the French government or in the politics of the Russian bureaucracy.
Aside from its mystifying content, this conception rests on fundamental theoretical error: it misrecognizes the existence of two processes of politicization, one which is particular to militants, another which is particular to the working class.
If the training [formation] of revolutionary militant is a formation that is almost exclusively intellectual, especially in those periods, like the ones we have lived through, where the absence of workers’ movements has uprooted the revolutionary minorities from the class, the political formation of workers is, on the contrary, almost exclusively practical. It’s in the course of its different struggles that the working class assimilates, in a more or less lasting way, a certain political experience, and creates its own methods of struggle.1
If it’s obvious that these two poles, the immediate experience of the workers and the theoretical experience of revolutionary militants, must come together, the controversial question is to determine their meeting point. The Stalinist conception only considers one aspect of the relationship between the organization and the class, the one in which the party gives its revolutionary ideology to the working class. The other aspect, passed over in silence, is that the ideology which the vanguard organization gives to the working class is itself drawn from this class. Thus, there is not only one current, going from the organization to the class and from the class to the organization. In this sense, if the working class needs the revolutionary organization to theorize its experience, the organization needs the working class in order to draw on this experience. This process of osmosis has a decisive importance.
When we say that the organization draws from the working class, we don’t mean that it only draws from it the method to make itself understood, the way of teaching its theories to the proletariat, but also the essential elements for the very development of this theory. To schematize, the revolutionary organization has nothing to do with the Church, which instills a dogma by using every mode of expression, slang for the workers, music for the artists. It’s not a question of finding a language accessible to the class, but of extracting the ideas that it generates within itself.
One is thus led to acknowledge the deep link between the basic and spontaneous reactions of the masses and the establishment of a socialist society; but then, the role of the revolutionary organization is nothing more than to support these reactions through tactics and solely to attach itself to the masses, or else, to transpose these onto the terrain of bourgeois politics. These are the fundamental aspirations that must guide us.
There are not, of course, two separate problems, one of which would be the struggle against the capitalist system culminating in the seizure of power, and the other being the realization of socialism and the management of society by workers; and the role of the revolutionary organization is not to “conquer” mass organisms, but to help them to become the structure of society.
Indeed, socialism is only possible if the workers are able to manage this society. The ability to manage must be developed to a maximum at the very heart of capitalist society. However, this management cannot be done within capitalist production, but only in the struggle against capitalist management; put differently, there’s no way that workers can manage anything so long as capitalism persists, with the only exception of their own political bodies designed to struggle against capital. And the methods of this apprenticeship in management must be directed from the start towards the goal they set out to realize. How can the working class’s ability to manage be developed? It’s this question that the workers’ paper must answer, not only in its content, but also in its very conception, and in its way of operating; which is to say it must itself be managed by workers.
The Nature of the Workers’ Paper
The workers’ paper must therefore be at the same time the expression of workers’ experiences (and in this sense, we will see, it can only be written by workers themselves) and the means of aiding in the theorization of this experience (and, in this way, contributing to the process of politicizing the working class). But the paper must not separate itself from this experience, for otherwise it will necessarily escape the control of the working class.
In this definition, the workers’ paper is neither a political paper, nor a trade-union paper, nor documentary literature.
a) This is not a political paper; that means it is not the expression of a political organization, that it does not circulate the ideology of this organization within the masses. It does not assume a prerequisite agreement between different political tendencies under a program. The principle that it bases itself on, and that suffices to distinguish it from every other undertaking, is that “the working class is itself able to resolve the problems of its emancipation.”
This does not at all mean that the paper will not discuss politics. It can deal with political questions. But the political ideas that will come out of this paper will only be the findings of actual experiences; they will never be posed as thoughts or postulates implying the prior acceptance of whatever ideology.
b) But neither will it be a trade-union paper concerning itself with economic questions.
We have already had the opportunity to show how this separation between economic and political questions does not correspond today to anything in reality, that every syndicalism, however pure it may be, is political. The paper will not be trade-union paper in the sense that the questions treated will go beyond the framework of unionism.
c) This will not be documentary literature. The workers’ paper cannot be a magazine that contents itself with recounting the life of factory workers in an anecdotal fashion. The worker knows what happens in the factory; the description of his place of work and of his relations with management only interest those who are outside the factory. And this is not the case of the paper. The description of an event in the factory or somewhere else is only of interest if one can extract from this event some reflections that concern working-class experience in general.
The paper will be neither a political paper, nor a trade-union paper, nor a documentary on the life of workers, but it will be all of that at once. We are not saying that the workers’ paper must be a paper of which one part must be reserved for politics, another for economics, and another for description.
The paper will have a more universal meaning to the extent that it will condense the political, the economic, and the social. It’s in this way that it will attain a deeper meaning of politics.
In traditional papers one part is reserved for political questions that are the political questions of the bourgeoisie of different countries: the evolution of the relations between the dominant classes of different countries, the relations between different political parties, etc.
Another part is reserved for economic questions and consists in laying out the demands of this or that professional category or of this or that union.
Furthermore a constant effort is made to reconnect these sectors among themselves. For example, the campaign led by the CGT against German rearmament is tied directly to all kinds of minimum demands of workers. This practically amounts to: in order to increase your wages, struggle against German rearmament.
There are therefore two poles, one political, the other economic, and for the party papers, it’s a question of drawing a path from one pole to the other. It is in this sense that today the union is a political form and that the political party is an economic union. It’s a question of going from the unified agreement of the workers around a demand, understood by everyone, towards a general politics which cannot be easily understood by anyone.” For example, the fact that the unions defend a program of demands such that “40 hours paid 48, 3 weeks of paid vacations” might make it so that the workers will accept the politics of the unions, not for themselves but for the demand. The communist municipalities take care of old workers, victims, public works, etc. in order to legitimate their general politics. The fact that at this level the communists are unbeatable is the result of their position of opposition to the government.
A minority that is even more detached from the apparatuses of the bourgeois state than the Stalinists are, which therefore has nothing to lose, could at this level rival and surpass the communist organizations.
This is what Trotskyist and anarchist organizations, which outbid the demands posed by unions as well as their forms of struggle, often do.
Thus appears an entire hierarchical ladder of political and demand-centered struggles. The Syndicat Chrétien or FP ask for a 10 franc raise, in proposing one day of strike. The CGT will demand 20 francs and two days of strikes; the Trotskyists and anarchists demand a 1,000 franc raise and an unlimited strike.
The path that leads from a simple economic demand to a political demand or action is tortuous. Some will tie the demands to the question of German rearmament; for others, the demands will be tied to the destruction of the capitalist system and the seizure of political power by the working class.
For both, there exist two issues. The first is the immediate demands of the workers, that of the spontaneous action of the workers, of the class struggle at its most basic state; the other is the seizure of political power. The connection between these two concerns can be boiled down like this: “if you help us take political power, you will no longer have to struggle for your immediate demands: we will give them to you.”
This propaganda tends to propose a sort of deal to the working class to show it that in every situation it has the most to gain by voting for this party, and to put this party in power or to make a Revolution that demands a 10-franc hourly raise every six months.
In fact, this policy consists either in showing that the working class takes the wrong road when it demands or defends itself in this way, or that it does not demand enough and that in asking for more it will be able to succeed little by little in provoking crises and precipitating the contradictions of the regime and will, in this way, oppose itself more and more to the system itself.
But for all these organizations the workers’ struggle is considered an accessory, something secondary, a means to realizing a final end.
The workers’ paper belongs to a different conception. This conception is that the most elementary class struggle contains within itself the fundamental elements for the destruction of the capitalist system and for the establishment of socialism. And these are the elements that the paper must find and develop. For it, there is a deep connection between the revolutionary conceptions of socialism and the everyday class struggle.
We don’t at all want to say that every class struggle poses in its entirety the fundamental question of the destruction of the capitalist system and the establishment of socialism. Every class struggle carries the trace of bourgeois or Stalinist ideological influences. And it’s first of all these influences that the paper must expel from the class struggle. But this cannot be done by enlarging the scope of the struggle like the Trotskyists or the anarchists do, but in discovering the real objectives of this struggle. Thus, for example, for the strike of 28 April 1954, the Trotskyists and the anarchists launched the idea of an unlimited strike – without concerning themselves with the demand itself. In contrast, we identified the false meaning of the demand, which had been hierarchized. This had a deeper political significance than outdoing a movement that only rested on a tactical objective and which had a false base from the start.
However, the paper could neither address all the fundamental issues nor provide an automatic conclusion to every issue. The experience of the working class is often a particular experience; the role of the paper will be to start with these particular experiences in order to pull general conclusions from them - this is not to say that these general conclusions are always possible.
The paper will also have to combat bourgeois or Stalinist conceptions. In order to do this, it will sometimes have to discuss in general and abstract terms, but will try to reconnect, as much as possible, these issues to the living experience of the workers.
Everything we have just said about the content of the paper corresponds to a certain ideological orientation. This is undeniable and it would be hypocritical to want to present the workers’ paper as a paper that does not follow any course of action, guided simply by “what the workers want and think.”
A paper without a directing line would automatically be contradictory paper which, sooner or later, will fall under the influence of the most wiley political elements. The paper has a line. It’s the discussion and interaction of the workers, but it is only the revolutionary militants who have understood the great meaning of this discussion, and of the participation of workers in political, economic, and social issues, who can prevent the strangulation of this discussion by crafty politicians.
The role of revolutionary militant in the paper is not limited to that. The revolutionary militant is not a spectator who watches the clashing of workers in a discussion, or who gathers, like a collector, the reflections of the working class. He is a defender of this discussion, but also a participant. The revolutionary militant will aim to deepen and develop the discussion, which will become a dialogue between workers and the revolutionary organization. The revolutionary militant will try to make his ideology triumph but, in contrast to bourgeois and Stalinist politicians, he will only use the experience of the workers, on the terrain of concrete questions. In this sense, his dialogue with the workers will be a genuine dialogue, and not a monologue.
In this way the paper will avoid the danger of being nothing but a confrontation between political parties, and can escape the rut of these parties. The role of the revolutionary militant is to help the working class get out of this rut at that will be the directing line of the paper.
In this sense, the separation between political articles and “articles that interest workers” must disappear. In bourgeois or Stalinist papers, it is customary to make the political article easier to swallow by diluting it with faits divers, with things that happen in everyday society.
In this way the two things are separated: the concrete aspects of life and the abstract aspects, the things “of the people” and the things “of the politicians” or the “initiated.” The things that happen every day and which the workers can appreciate are considered gossip, the gossip with which the mainstream media guarantees its success.
The criticism of the mainstream paper is not that it deals with this everyday life but that it deforms it and that it handles it randomly, in accordance with their morality and ideology. But inasmuch as these are the ideological concerns of the exploiting layers who give an interpretation to real facts, it follows that the facts themselves undergo a distortion.
Reality is also, as a result, unreal, above all during the periods in which the proletariat tends to free itself from the dominant ideologies.
In this way one represents abstract men with imaginary feelings. The ideal proletariat – such as it would have to be for a communist bureaucrat or for a bourgeois. Thus the communist Superman has more in common with Great Man of History than with the worker-reader that it is supposed to represent.
The worker paper will not contain these two separate elements – theory on the one hand and reality on the other – not to pander to or to have a larger following, but because the problems of everyday life are the essential problems that the working class and its vanguard have to resolve, and because wanting to limit these concerns of the workers to “political” aspects of the struggle is the inheritance of a false conception that only sees in the proletariat a force likely to back the political party.
The final goal, the solution of all these problems is incontestably the suppression of capitalist society and its replacement by a socialist society.
The final goal is an abstract solution in the sense that it corresponds to a purely intellectual notion. The final goal is the schema, the framework that the revolutionary militant has absorbed. But this notion remains abstract up until the moment when the experience of the working class leads it to concretize this schema, to blanket this framework with an entire network of practical actions. But before this period, the gap separating the real actions of the workers and the final goal cannot be resolved through a leap from the actual situation to an abstract solution. Thus, we have criticized this way of artificially treating every problem, which ends every article with the necessity of making the socialist revolution. In order to remain on a concrete plane, the paper cannot therefore jump over this gap artificially. If, however, we want to offer a conclusion, a perspective that could be absorbed, which appears concrete, we risk falling into certain traps. Simply observing the positive role of the bureaucracy of the factory or of the State, for example, might lead to the conclusion that suppressing the parasites in the very framework of society would be enough to resolve these problems.
That is where the essential role of the revolutionary militant emerges; if he cannot provide a concrete conclusion to a problem, he can show that every solution calling for the reform of this society is impossible. In this sense, the paper becomes the setting of a real dialogue that can continue through several issues.
Even if the solution to every problem finds itself joined in the destruction of the capitalist system, there are actions, possibilities for defense, or of struggle against capitalist society; these struggles succeed in developing the consciousness of the workers, advancing their experience. The militants will have to enrich all of these struggles with their own experience as theorists, without, for all that, saying that they can necessarily provide a solution to every problem.
The Workers’ Paper in the Present Period
If we pose the problem of the workers’ paper today, it’s not solely because this workers’ paper follows from our fundamental theoretical conceptions, but also, and above all, because this paper seems realizable in a very concrete way. It corresponds to the most appropriate form of activity in our present period, the form of activity that may be the link [trait d’union] between revolutionary militants and the worker vanguard. It is necessary here to precisely define this period.
In the period that followed the Liberation, the proletariat adopted the politics of the Stalinist parties. The problems that the workers posed for themselves were resolved by the parties. Insofar as the solutions proposed by the parties were only false solutions, the adhesion of the workers to these political forces could not last for long. This is proving to be true more and more clearly today. In this way, we can say that a workers’ paper in this period was impossible in the sense that the proletariat still put its hopes in the political forces that it followed. If today, the relation between the workers and “their” parties has changed, it has not changed in the sense that the Trotskyist organizations had hoped. The workers have not changed their politics. They have not changed their ideas on Russia in order to progressively constitute themselves as a fraction, or a party, further left than the Stalinists, in order finally to bring themselves closer to the Trotskyist positions, and then the Trotskyists of the Left. This is roughly what the leftist organizations had expected would happen over the years, and the majority of the struggles between these groupings were based on the tactics to adopt in order to form a mass party further to the Left than the Stalinists. If many workers have held onto their hopes about Russia, they have detached themselves little by little from Stalinist politics. They have refused to follow their watchwords, to unionize, to read their press, etc.
In this development of the working class one can say that the influence of the socialist parties or the FO unions had no heft since all the propaganda and every ideology of these organizations limited themselves to an anti-Stalinism that subsequently became their very raison d’être.
If the workers have broken away from Stalinism after breaking away from the Socialist Party, it’s not to go to the Trotskyists, it’s to not do “politics”; the workers are less and less interested in “politics.”
There, we saw a unanimous reaction from all the Leftist parties, from the socialists to the Trotskyists, who were outraged by such an attitude from the proletariat. Everyone saw in it a reactionary development that could have led to fascism.
For all of these parties, the proletariat is a force that has to be dominated, canalized in its own direction. That the workers were mystified by Stalinism is only a lesser evil. For others, it is a question of finding the tactic or the method for securing the workers through compromises, alliances, etc.
But the workers do not want to let themselves be canalized by any existing organization – precisely what makes all these politicians shudder with bitterness.
In contrast to all these parties, we thought that the proletariat’s detachment from “politics” had a positive meaning.
Not only has the proletariat broken away from the pastimes to which the bourgeois or the Stalinist parties tried for year to fasten it and which is their own politics. But this very deep disaffection does not end in blind conformity to other political parties, but in a general distrust.
In this sense, one can say that the indifference of the proletariat to politics is a realization that has a political value infinitely more profound than the discovery of the degeneration of Russia.
These two characteristic traits of the working class today (disengagement from the parties and passivity) are, it is true, applauded by the bourgeoisie which sees on the one hand a weakening of a rival power – Russian Stalinism – and on the other hand an ideological disorganization of the working class. In the past, the workers who broke with the parties, bypassed these parties through their direct action. This was the case with communist minorities within social democracy. If the bourgeoisie delights in the passivity of the working class, we can see the difficulties that this very passivity brings about for the development of its own politics. Because the disaffection of the workers from the Stalinist party is at the same time a very profound detachment of the working class from the dominant classes. Thus, for example, the mobilization of the workers by the Stalinists for a nationalist demonstration against German rearmament does nothing, in reality, except reinforce nationalist ideology, even if it finds itself led against the bourgeoisie in a certain period. On the other hand, the refusal of the workers to mobilize themselves under the watchword “against the CED” signifies a certain rupture with the nationalist ideology, which is to say, bourgeois ideology. This rupture has consequences on another plane. When the bourgeoisie will try to recruit the working class to its national ideology, for this European army or for the maintaining its domination in the colonies, it will find itself faced with the very refusal of the workers who favored it in the preceding case. Seeing the proletariat’s action as positive element in itself, even if this action is completely or in part led towards bourgeois objectives amounts to considering the proletariat’s action, and the proletariat itself, as an instrument merely capable of acting, without itself determining its direction. From such a conception flows, for example, all the Trotskyist propaganda, which consists of leading every workers’ action by supporting these actions and in trying to make them go beyond their framework, “in pushing the movement.”
We think that the passivity of the proletariat is positive insofar as it is a form of disengagement from bourgeois ideology. This is not to say that we welcome such passivity; the proletariat finds itself in a period where it finds its own route by shrugging off bourgeois and Stalinist ideology little by little. The workers’ paper is possible only insofar as this autonomy emerges.
The outline of the present situation in which workers experience develops must however be clarified.
If the working class today has accumulated a certain “political” experience, it is necessary to immediately trace the limits of this experience.
The role of the Stalinist party in France was not as deeply advanced as in the countries of “popular democracy,” the role of the reformist union bureaucracy is not more developed than in countries like England or America. France remained midway between the erstwhile forms of capitalist domination and the new bureaucratic forms. In this sense, workers experience finds itself in a very ambiguous situation and it’s from this situation that comes the difficulty of creating a workers’ paper that can differentiate itself from other political tendencies on every plane. The workers’ paper will not only have to struggle against the new tendencies of exploitation, the bureaucratic tendencies, it will also have to fight the previous forms and there it will find itself next to the Stalinist or reformist forces from which it will be difficult to delimit itself.
The workers’ paper will have to fight two forces:
-The power of the traditional bosses;
-The bureaucratic forces (reformist or Stalinist);
The great majority of French capitalists are composed of small, private owners who manage their firms themselves. In many factories, the unions are practically nonexistent. The trade union militant risks getting fired, there is no union bureaucracy. The struggle against the employers has held onto these older forms and there the workers will even have to aid the unions in making the bosses respect the law. Next to this, there are large factories, private or nationalized, where the union bureaucracy played a certain role in the production apparatus and where the “modernized” forms of domination have surpassed the traditional, violent forms.
In parallel with the diversity of the forms of domination in French capitalism, one finds the diversity of forms of resistance. The fact the union bureaucracy has not been able to play its role in France, the fact that Stalinism finds itself in the position of an opposition party, has given to these forces a character which is different from their true role. Thus, the Stalinist or union forces, instead of demanding to manage society, content themselves with taking over, more often than not, a politics drawn from the traditional reformist arsenal: parliamentarism, municipal disputes, etc.
In this complex situation, the workers’ struggle against the small capitalist [petit patron] or the workers’ struggle against the baiting of the factory management, could be supported by the Stalinist or reformist unions. The workers’ struggle against the union bureaucracy could be supported by the factory management. The struggle against the reformists could be supported by the Stalinists.
Only in particular and really characteristic cases will the workers’ struggle against their exploitation simultaneously be a struggle against the employers and the union bureaucracies; it is over the most fundamental issues that this struggle will therefore become a reality on the three planes.
From this, it appears with evidence that the experience of the French working class with Stalinism and union bureaucracy is a latent and incomplete experience, and it’s from this that the principal obstacles to the realization of a workers’ paper will arise.
The Obstacles
We will now try to describe the problems we have encountered in our practical experience with the workers’ paper:
La Tribune Ouvrière.
I. The difficulty in demarcating ourselves from other forces
a) Struggle against the bosses
At an elementary stage, it we found that our struggle against capitalist forms of domination was identical with that waged by Stalinism.
We can cite a few examples:
-Management fires a worker.
-A worker is injured by the lack of proper safety measures.
-Management sets up a fundraiser for the director general’s funeral services.
Faced with these events, what is done?
The workers discuss; some are enraged; others are passive; others finally accept and, even justify, the conduct of the management.
The reaction of the most conscious workers is to protest these kinds of things. They want to talk, to make others understand, and that is justified. But it is impossible to talk about these things in a way that is different from the Stalinists, unless they tie these three events to some political question. The only way to demarcate ourselves would be to deepen these facts by returning them to the course of history. Taking the third case for example: “you are outraged by the fundraiser for the director, yet in a given year you glorify him.” But already the differentiation seems artificial and in bad faith. One can respond that formerly the communist party made mistakes, etc.
b) The struggle against Stalinism
The capitalist in France is anti-Stalinist these days. We have already spoken about the anti-Stalinist tendencies represented by the FO unions, Christian or Gaullist. The necessity of distinguishing ourselves is incontestable, but sometimes difficult. Examples:
-The CGT demands a moment of silence to commemorate the death of Stalin.
-The CGT demands to hold an action to defend a campaign against rearmament or the release of Duclos.
-The CGT calls a warning strike [grève d’avertissement] doomed to failure from the start. The workers find themselves split into two blocs, this split does not often represent a delimitation based on positions in the class struggle.
Some workers go on strike because, for them, the strike is a way of opposing their exploitation: “Everything that is against the boss is for the worker.” Others, on the other hand, don’t go on strike, even if they still share Stalinist ideas about Russia, because the strike requires effort, sacrifice, a risk they are not willing take, because they are afraid of the supervisors, because they want to ingratiate themselves with the management. When a split happens in this way, one is right to affirm that such a split, despite its false political character, corresponds in reality to a split on the level of the class, a split between the brawlers and the cowards.
But in most cases the division is far more complicated. Take for example the strike of April 28, 1954. Many workers really saw the mystification of the movement and the impossibility of its success. Others refused to go on strike to show that they no longer wanted to follow a union that had betrayed them. The refusal to strike was the refusal to follow the union leadership. Still others did not want to go on strike in order to get back at the unions that had led them, in certain periods, almost by force, into movements which they disapproved of. What position to adopt under these circumstances? Any position could be ambiguous. To go on strike is to leave yourself open to reproach for being a tool of the union; not going on strike is open yourself up to reproach that you defend the boss. How to avoid this ambivalence? We solved the question in the following way. We denounced the strike to all those who asked for our opinion, adding, however, that we didn’t want to be scabs, and that we would follow the majority, while affirming that those who refused to participate in this strike were not necessarily cowards. We adopted a very ambiguous position by participating in the movement.
c) The struggle against the reformist unions
-The reformist unions agree to participate in the funeral services of the factory director.
-The reformist unions put together a fundraiser with the management to help out victims.
In our criticism we find ourselves side by side with the Stalinists.
Faced with such problems, the workers’ paper find itself before an alternative:
-either to deal with these events and to risk perhaps adding to the confusion.
-or to keep quiet about these events because they do not sufficiently permit us to distinguish the paper.
To not stand up to a provocation by the management under the pretext that it would be impossible for us to do so without being able to distinguish ourselves from anti-worker forces would be the very negation of a paper that must handle the problems that concern the workers, and which must, on the other hand, cover the problems that appear at the level of workers’ experience.
Wanting to artificially downplay certain problems under the pretext that they are tending to disappear – the struggle against the private employer, for example – would be the proof of an absurd sectarianism.
We must respond to the real problems that the working class confronts every day. If history were cut up into distinct slices, if the world evolved according to the single rhythm, if the development of society were everywhere uniform, such problems would not pose themselves: but the fact that some problems are fated to disappear does not at all mean that they have disappeared, and that is why we must still respond to them.
In certain periods one risks, therefore, in creating a workers’ paper that will be original solely because its articles will be finely tuned, and because it will simultaneously criticize the three tendencies: capitalist, reformist, and Stalinist.
Pretending that a workers’ paper can only exist when it will be able distinguish itself on every question, that one will only be able to pose the problem of the workers’ paper in period that will have permitted the working class to have acquired a far more advanced experience is an absurdity; because, this period will be the period of the totalitarian domination of the bureaucracy. Then the problem of the workers’ paper will have been bypassed, it will be unrealizable and the working class will have to find other forms expression.
II. Difficulties due to the passivity of the working class
The working class’s rupture with the traditional political forces is not accompanied by an autonomous activity; it appears that the experience of the workers in political parties or unions has worn out their desire to revolt, their need for activity. And that is precisely one of the obstacles to the appearance of an activity as simple as the editing, diffusion, and financing of a workers’ paper.
In a situation of acute crisis between the management and the workers, or between the union bureaucracy and the workers, the problem of the workers’ paper is easy to solve; when something has aroused the anger or indignation of the workers, when the division of the workers expresses itself through discussions and showing matches, when they form two camps – those who approve, those who criticize – the revolutionary militant only has to gather these polemics, to arrange the arguments, and the article is written. It will interest, it will correspond to an effort by the vanguard workers to resolve the problem.
But it’s not always like this. The antagonism between the workers and the machine, between the workers and system of management, does not always arouse a violent opposition: this antagonism is like a wound that heals itself during certain periods. The role of the paper is not to artificially open these wounds – it moreover does not have the power to do that; the antagonism can only be born from the events themselves. The paper can, at most, only give an explanation, try to express, and orient this class antagonism.
In these periods the workers will not experience the need to express themselves and the workers’ paper will fall again unto a nucleus of the most conscious, most politicized workers, but who will have the tendency to express their own political or theoretical problems. The workers’ paper will therefore have a tendency to fall back into the same rut as the other papers. It will lose its interest, the problems treated will not correspond to the concerns of the workers. The workers will place their trust in their comrades, designating them to speak, to write, to think, in their place. One therefore sees the danger in such an attitude, which could lead the workers who have the trust of others to express, in turn, their personal ideas, without relating to the problems of workers.
The other danger is of creating a leadership of the paper that is more and more separated from the other workers; that the passivity of some leads to a certain habit by the leaders to decide in their place.
III. Difficulties due to the opposition of workers
We started by affirming that the paper will have to reflect the level of experience of the workers. But two difficulties result:
-First is to determine this level;
-The second is to respond to the problems that the workers pose at this level.
We have said that the problems which interest the workers are essential problems that must be resolved. This is true, but it is necessary, however, to add a few restrictions to this idea – two orders of restriction. The influence of bourgeois of Stalinist ideology on the working class: the discussion around the election of Mendès-France for example. When the majority of workers, at the moment, still end up influenced by a wave of chauvinism, it is obvious that if we address these problems, we will be in opposition to the majority of workers.
At another order of ideas, one finds the problems that divide the workers in two; for example, one worker wants to write an article that criticizes the division of labor and hierarchy, but this critique is solely made against his own comrades; he shifts the blame for his condition onto his comrades. Such a problem is dealt with in a way that agrees with the management, and it is impossible to accept it.
Thus, in certain situations, one finds oneself before the following dilemma: either accept reactionary currents in the pages of the paper, or oppose oneself to the majority of workers. It goes without saying that on this plane we have always chosen the second solution.
We sometimes also find ourselves before the impossibility of responding to certain problems. Faced with this impossibility, the editors will have the tendency to replace solutions with demagogic articles that succumb to the criticism we made above about union or political papers. We will propose a demand that will receive the approval of the workers, but will remain a pious vow; or else we will hurl insults towards supervisors, management, or the government.
IV. Difficulties due to the enlargement of the paper
The level of workers’ experience is not the same everywhere; it differs with profession, industrial sector, corporate tradition, geographic milieu. It also differs for reasons according to the very nature of the problems.
It suffices for all that to refer to the polemics on the union question in order to to observe the diversity of problems. Thus, an article concerning the O.S. on the assembly line at Renault will not necessarily interest, or respond to, the problems of the worker of Toulouse factory. The development of such a paper can therefore only happen in the opposite way of other papers; this development will be conditioned by the growth in the number of its participants and editors. A dilemma poses itself here, which can be distilled as follows: the paper must interest the workers so that they will participate in it and express their own experience, but these workers will only be interested in the paper if they find in it the problems that themselves deal with the experience that they have lived.
V. Difficulties of form
Politics, like journalism, tends to breaks itself away from social reality, to become a particular science. In this way, political and journalistic language tends to separate itself from real language.
One must not think that the workers, when they want to express themselves, draft an article that is free from these literary prejudices. It enters into spoken habits in one way and written ones in another. Therefore the articles written by the workers are quite often stamped by this journalistic form, full of clichés, readymade and inexact formulas. The workers most fit to write are precisely those who have been most subjected to this journalist influence and who, initiated into these mysteries, think they must only express themselves in an equally tortuous way or with the help of expressions that are quite often incomprehensible to the majority of workers. The paper’s task is therefore also to free the workers from literary prejudices, to encourage them to express themselves in a fashion as simple as their natural form of spoken expression. The allusions, images, references, comparisons can only be borrowed from of daily proletarian life. In this sense the most capable of writing will be both the most conscious workers, the most cultivated, but also those who will be the most disencumbered by bourgeois or Stalinist ideological influence.
Conclusion
We have developed several fundamental ideas on the workers’ paper, on what it must be. We have examined the principle obstacles that a paper of this type encounters. In accordance with all of this one question poses itself:
Is a workers’ paper possible today?
Producing a workers’ paper today entails a series of disadvantages.
In those periods when the paper will not respond to the needs of the workers it risks becoming a paper without interest. A paper that will have no echoes among the working class could discourage the few worker militants who devote themselves to it, losing them for good. But can we give up on the paper after having made it, after having earned the support of the workers, letting go of it solely because during six months or more the workers seemed disinterested in it?
Can one think that the combativity of the workers grows in a continual way, that there aren’t periods of calm and discouragement, even when the working class progresses in its experience?
In any event, in the periods of working class combativity, can one think of making a paper from scratch, with such a formula, the day after tomorrow. Can one believe that, because the workers will have understood the role of Stalinism and unions, they will spontaneously be led to write for a paper that we put at their service? Will they not be suspicious of us as well? Would it not be better that the paper exist during the periods that follow and precede these moments?
Must we not prepare the most experienced and most conscious workers to become the cadres of this paper?
An intermittent paper is unthinkable and unrealizable.
What balance sheet can we draw up of this experience that has lasted less than one year?
Despite the errors we have made with the paper, it appears that we have accomplished our objective on the four most important points.
1. The workers – more than fifteen – have participated in and written for this paper – the majority among them having never written before.
2. The subjects of the paper are the problems of the factory and the problems picked up by the workers, and no longer the problems of the bourgeoisie treated by the usual papers.
3. The paper in large part no longer comprises only insiders, but even the least cultivated and least politicized workers.
4. The paper has sparked lively discussions in the workshops.
We believe that this balance sheet is positive and that it allows us to conclude that this paper must be continued, enriched, developed. But this does not only depend on us; it depends on the workers who are interested in it.
Image thanks to Pierre J.
Daniel Mothé was a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie.
Originally posted: September 26, 2014 at Viewpoint
- 1It is quite obvious that these two processes have been reduced here to a schema; in reality there exists neither one nor the other as pure state. In the formation of revolutionary militants there is always a dimension of practical experience, and in the formation of vanguard workers there exists a dimension of intellectual formation.
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Issue 4: The State
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Commune, Party, State
As it forces the matter of the political form of the people, the Paris Commune serves as a key reference point in Marxist discussions of the state. What form does the people’s self-government take? Insofar as the people precede the state, analysis of the Commune event necessarily opens up to the people’s subjectification and to the political process of which the people are the subject. And insofar as the people politicized are people divided, a part of a constitutively open and incomplete set, the place from which the people are understood is necessarily partisan. The question of the party precedes the question of the state. Until we pose the party as a possibility, discussions of the state—of whether or not we should target or seize the state—are nothing more than fantasies that cloak failure as a choice: it’s not that we couldn’t take power; we just didn’t want to.
Crowd and People
A feature of every discussion of the Paris Commune is the crowd, the people, the working class, the shocking presence of those who have been excluded from politics now in its place and the confounding of politics that results. In the Commune event, crowd and Commune overlap in an expression of the desire of the people. Interpretations of the Commune read this desire, making claims about who the people are and what it is that they want.
It’s not quite right to say that what the people wanted was the Commune: prior to March 18, 1871 clubs and associations throughout Paris had repeatedly called for elections to a new Commune. People had rioted. But the protests and dissent hadn’t yet broken the connection with the National Government. That didn’t happen until the National Government attempted to disarm the Paris National Guard and the crowd emerged to stop it. In the wake of this rupture, advocates for a new municipal government, a Commune, present the Commune as answer and object, answer to the question of the political form for Paris (and perhaps all of France) and object of the desire of the people. The people are an effect of the positing of the object of their desire. They don’t precede it. What precedes it is the crowd.
After March 18th, there would be argument over who the Commune is—the working class in power?—and what it wants, but no one will dispute the fact that the situation had turned on the actuality of an insistence and a desire. The crowd forced an opening, an interruption that changed the political setting. It ruptured suppositions of order, inciting thereby attempts to expand, enclose, and target the unleashed intensities in one direction rather than another.
That the March 18th crowd event was followed by the Commune does not mean that the crowd created the Commune or that the Commune was an expression of the constituent power of the people expressed by the crowd. The Commune form preceded the event. It was an already existent political possibility, attempted yet thwarted in revolts in October and January.1 Throughout the fall and winter of 1870-1871, militants organized as vigilance committees in the districts of Paris collected and distributed information, debated proposals, and planned demonstrations. Yet when in their attempts to establish the Commune they pushed for revolt, the people weren’t with them. In the elections following the October 31st march on the Hotel de Ville, over 322,000 Parisians voted in support of the National Government. 54,000 voted against.2 In January, only a few hundred people responded to the “red poster” calling for insurrection that was distributed by the delegation of the Twenty Districts, which “saw itself as the Commune to be constituted.”3 Later that month, even as thousands were dying from the Prussian siege, only a few insurgents showed up for a new insurrection planned for January 22. The insurrection was brutally suppressed, and the National Government cracked down on clubs, public meetings, and newspapers. The national elections held in February, however, made it clear that while the majority of the French countryside supported monarchy, the cities favored a republic. Resulting anxiety over the restoration of a monarchy, the convening of the National Assembly in Bordeaux, the Assembly’s failure to pay the National Guard in Paris, and the exodus of the bourgeoisie, not to mention the ongoing destitution of the people because of the siege, produced conditions more auspicious for an uprising. The previous efforts on behalf of the Commune established in advance the idea of what an uprising would produce even as they couldn’t in themselves produce it. Commune could name a division, “the direct antithesis to the empire,” in Marx’s words.4 Yet until the crowd created the opening for it, it was just this “vague aspiration” denoting a fundamental opposition. As antithesis and aspiration, the Commune form preceded its arrival.
The struggle for the Commune was also a struggle over its meaning. It has been offered as a figure for republicanism, patriotic nationalism, federalism, centralism, communism, socialism, anarchism, even secessionism. Marx views the multiplicity of its interpretations, “and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favor,” as indicative of the thorough expansiveness of the Commune form.5 This same excess can also be read as a lack, as the gap of the political. For example, although Charles Beslay’s opening speech depicted the Commune as a municipal government concentrating on local matters, its decrees quickly encompassed national affairs. As Prosper Olivier Lissagaray observes in his definitive account, it was, “Commune in the morning, Constituent Assembly in the evening.”6 Contention over the political form of the Commune is inseparable from, indicative of, the Commune event.7
Consider reception of the Commune in the United States. It was configured through the politics of Reconstruction.8 Some in the North saw Paris as wrongfully seceding from France, just as the Southern states wrongly left the Union. Commune and Confederacy both rejected legitimate centralized government. Others in the North, increasingly mistrustful of popular sovereignty, used the Commune as an emblem of the failure of Reconstruction. An editor of the Nation railed against the “Socialism in South Carolina” that came from “allowing incompetent black men to govern and vote.”9 As he saw it, neither Paris nor the South had the political capacity to govern itself. Some Southerners embraced the parallel between Paris and the Confederacy, particularly the revolt against a repressive governmental authority. Weirdly, a former vice-president of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens, who became a member of Congress from Georgia after the war, identified himself as a communist in 1880. For Stephens, to be a communist means to favor home rule, the sovereignty of the local government.10. He explicitly rejects the abolition of private property, capturing communist desire in a racist ressentiment that substitutes for and attempts to displace class struggle.
Marx suggests that the Paris Commune provided a glimpse of a solution to the problem of the political form of the people. While all previous forms of government had been repressive, the Commune was a “thoroughly expansive political form.”11. Marx’s rhetoric is stirring, polemically suited to struggle over the meaning of the Commune. “Commune” named an aspiration and antagonism; it designated the alternative to the empire. Within the ongoing struggle over the positive realization of that alternative, Marx prioritizes one among the multiple interests that could see itself in the Commune form, presenting the Commune “essentially” as the political form “under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor.” Analytically, Marx’s account is less satisfying insofar as it is equates proletarian self-government with a federal system composed of local communes, district assemblies (composed of delegates elected from the communes), and a National Delegation of deputies sent from these assemblies to Paris. That this arrangement presented itself does not make it uniquely suited for the emancipation of labor (distributed and federal political arrangements have served bourgeois and imperial power quite well). It was the break, the disruption, and the positing of a new arrangement for governance that matters. Moreover, Marx himself acknowledges that in Commune’s governing schema rural producers were brought under the lead of the towns; it didn’t eliminate repression. To the extent that Commune names a governing body, apparatus, or schema, one containing an arrangement of offices, the rules for their maintenance and distribution, as well as of a set of dictates connecting this arrangement to the people it would govern, Commune institutionalizes some possibilities and excludes others. Marx treats the coherence it inscribed as a partisan subjectification, an event in the political expression of the working class.
In the different accounts of the Paris Commune, the referent of “Commune” is unstable. It shifts from all of Paris, to the people of Paris who voted representatives to the Commune, to the working class, to those elected to the Commune, to those who served in it, even to particular sets of voices in the Council. While a politics can and should be traced in these shifts, for this movement is nothing but the expression and enclosure of a political subject, we might also note that the fact of shifting indexes an irreducible feature of the people as non-all, non-totalizable, and never fully present to itself. It is only present as few, some, or many. The substitutionism about which Trotsky warned is not a danger particular to communist or working class parties. It’s an unavoidable condition of any popular politics with emancipatory egalitarian ends. Neither people nor class (nor movement or mass) exists as a unity; every attempt to invoke, create, or speak in behalf of such a unity comes up against an ineliminable, constitutive, division.
Instead of solving a political problem, the Commune poses one: the sovereignty of the people. Is it possible and what forms can it take? The non-all character of the people has been a consistent sticking point in democratic theory. If the people are not a unity, how can they rule themselves? How can they speak or legislate? And how do we know? The theoretical discussions take place under various headings—foundings, constituent power, and the possibility of bringing something new into being. Taking the place of the mythic social contract, the power of the people to make their own history comes up against its grounding in what cannot be other than a crime against the prior order. Marxist theory makes the prior order itself the crime. The revolutionary class gives its ideas “the form of universality” and represents these ideas “as the only rational, universally valid ones.” Marx explains, “The class making revolution emerges at the outset simply because it is opposed to a class not as a class but as a representative of the whole of society.”12 This is the sense in which class struggle is a political struggle. Rather than determined within the economic conditions in which class confronts class as two distinct forces with particular interests, the class making revolution represents its interests as general over and against the particular will of the oppressing class. More precisely, class partisans and allies struggle to present the real of the crowd’s destructive interruption as expressions of the desire of the people.
Marx premises the revolutionary break within existing conditions of production; nevertheless, Marxist theory doesn’t escape the problem of the people. Whether as the limits of working class struggle in trade union consciousness, the failure of the masses to revolt, or the betrayal of elitist, authoritarian vanguard parties, Marxist theory and communist movement run up against the disorganized, disagreeable, divided people. The people resist and evade the very forms on which their political subjectivity depends. When it appears, which isn’t often, the movement for the majority isn’t necessarily in the immediate interest of the majority. Since they can never be fully present, no revolution or revolutionary movement can actually be that of the people. It will always entail the imposition of the ideas of some upon the many.
The Commune gives form to the break with the National Government effected by the crowd even as the people’s elusive desire propels a new subjective process, that is to say, a process of inserting the people into history as an active subject and re-reading history in terms of the actions of this subject.13 Interpretations of the Commune thus grapple with how to understand the power of the people. Marx suggests as much in the letter to Kugelmann that Lenin cites in The State and Revolution: heroic party comrades in Paris are attempting “real people’s revolution.”14The multiple, opposing treatments of the Commune are not just indications of an expansive political form. That is to say, they are not simply reflections of specific features of institutional design. Rather, they underscore the irreducibility of the gap between the people and their political forms, the gap constitutive of the people’s subjectivity. Badiou writes, “The subject glides between the successive partial representations of that whose radical lack institutes it as articulated desire.”15 Badiou is glossing Lacan. What I find suggestive is the possibility of seeing in the partial representations of the Commune traces of the people as a political subject. The point here is not to celebrate multiplicity or indeterminacy. It is to see in the overlap of the Commune form and the crowd event the specificity of an emancipatory egalitarian politics. Because it is a form for the expression of the people’s desire the Commune is necessarily lacking.
Subjectivization and Subjective Process
In Theory of the Subject, a book that grew out of a seminar given from 1975 to 1979, Alain Badiou says that the Marxist tradition has given us two assessments of the Paris Commune. The first, from Marx, objectively considers the Commune in terms of the political goals of the working class with regard to the state. The proletariat has to smash the old state machinery and build new organs of political power. It has to take a place and exert force. How exactly force is concentrated, Marx neglects to explain. The second assessment of the Commune, from Lenin, takes up this concentration. Lenin brings out the subjective aspect of force. Reading What is to Be Done? for its “silent assessment” of the Commune, Badiou tells us that Lenin draws four consequences from the Commune’s defeat: “it is necessary to practice Marxist politics, and not some local romantic revolt”; “it is necessary to have some overall view of things … and not be fragmented into the federalism of struggles”; “it is necessary to forge an alliance with the rural masses”; and, “it is necessary to break the counter-revolution through an uninterrupted, militarily offensive, centralized process.”16 Lenin conceives the party by inferring a certain kind of subjective force from the Commune. In other words, he reads the Commune as an effect or consequence of a political subject and builds his idea of the party from this reading. The party is an “operator of concentration” of the four consequences, “the system of practical possibility for the assessment of the Commune.” The party provides the vehicle enabling assessment of the Commune even as it is an effect of this very assessment. Or, the place from which the Commune is assessed itself results from the Commune.
Badiou uses Lacan’s notion of the real to express the function of the Commune for Marxists. More than an historical event or political institution, the Commune serves as a concept that enables us “to think the relation of the political subject to the real.” Badiou writes, “The Marxist status of the revolutions is their having-taken-place, which is the real on the basis of which a political subject pronounces itself in the present.” The crowd rupture can be the exciting cause of a political subject, but its pronouncement or appearance as such a cause is a separate, analytically distinct, move. The crowd rupture has to be politicized, tied to a subject. The crowd provides a material opportunity for the expression of a political subject, a moment that has happened and the happening of which can be attributed to the workings of this political subject.
That’s not all. The political subject is more than the combination of event and interpretation. Badiou demonstrates that the Marxist approach remains incomplete. How event and interpretation are combined matters if an event is to be the cause of a subject. The real of the Commune event consisted in its rupture with the state, both the official state and the Marxist conception of the state. Confronted with the event, Marx was surprised. He had to change his thinking. Badiou writes, “It is by putting into effect a point of the impossible in this theory that it reveals its status as real, so that Marx, who logically disapproves of the triggering of the insurrection can only encounter in it the vanishing Parisian masses. Whence the obligation, to which he remains faithful, of being wholly on the side of that of which he disapproves in theory, so as to find the new and retroactive concept of his practical approval.”17 The people as a collective subject appeared through the disruption of the crowd insofar as there was something about the insurrection that was unimaginable prior to its enactment. The impossible happened, compelling Marx to take a stand: whose side was he on? Here was the unpredictability of an exciting cause, the people forcing a change of theory and practice. Riotous crowd, available political form, force of the impossible: the political subject impresses itself at the effervescent site of their convergence. Marx responds to this appearance of the people with fidelity. As he says in his letter to Kugelmann, no matter the Commune’s multiple tactical and policy errors, “the present rising in Paris – even if it be crushed by the wolves, swine and vile curs of the old society – is the most glorious deed of our Party since the June insurrection in Paris.”18.
Marx nevertheless criticizes the Commune in this same letter. After praising the elasticity, historical initiative, and sacrifice of the Parisians, he chides them, first, for missing the right moment when they failed to march on Versailles. He faults them, second, for eliminating the Central Committee of the National Guard and holding elections to institute the Commune.
The order Marx lists his criticisms is odd, seemingly backwards in that the first is a consequence of the second; the second happened first. Badiou, drawing from Lacan’s discussion of anticipation and certainty in “Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty,” explains why it is not. Marx is using Versailles’s reaction (or what he imagines Versailles’s reaction would have been) to register the Commune event. Versailles’s reaction validates the hasty or anticipatory move that created the Commune. A subject had acted and Versailles had no choice but to respond. Badiou writes:
Marx judges the Commune to be precipitated—subjectivizing in its political haste—and blames it for not marching onto Versailles. But this is in order to indicate retroactively the nature of the certainty (of victory) of which this haste itself could be the bearer, insofar as it could be deciphered in the other: in the initial disorder and surprise of the inhabitants of Versailles, and in the possibility of changing the lack into reason by a second haste, that of the military offensive against Versailles. The latter would then be finally caught up in the subjective process, that is to say, in a consequent political direction, which is the only validation of the vanishing algebra of the Parisian masses into a consistent subject.
In subjectivization, certainty is anticipated.
In the subjective process, consistency is retroactive.
To put into consistency the haste of the cause: therein lies the whole enigma of the subject.19
Understanding an event as the effect of a political subject the political subject requires conjoining two operations: subjectivization and the subjective process. We will win. We will be shown to have been right. The certainty of the political subject is too soon, an anticipation of results it cannot guarantee but pursues nonetheless. Precipitous certainty, we might say, is another term for political will. Rather than an amorphous combination of multiple possibilities, which is just a description of a manifold, the subject is a direction that cuts through this manifold. The other provides evidence of this direction. The response of the other, its disorder and surprise, indicates the presence of a subject. The other’s response reads the disorder as an effect of a subject, attributing to this subject a consistency of action, purpose, and will. That the other can do nothing but respond, that it cannot proceed as it had, that it pushed, affected, is the work of the subject.
Each operation, subjectivization and subjective process, involves political struggle. Militants, organizers, agitators, and vanguards try to set things in motion. They produce actions. They try to bring people out, get them to feel their collective power, and incite them to use it. They are alert to possibilities, to protests that may become ruptures. And, consequent to the gap of a disruption, militants, organizers, agitators, and vanguards work to render the disruption as an effect of a subject. They fight on the terrain of the other, endeavoring to insure that the gap remains and to give this gap meaning and direction, to make it consistent. Enemies fight back. They may deny that a disruption occurred: nothing significant happened; the demonstration or event was within the field demarcated by capital and state, part of business as usual, an expected and permitted protest, child-friendly and within the demarcated free-speech zone. They may deny that the disruption was the effect of a subject: it was hooligans; it was a motley and contingent array of disparate voices (here empirical sociological data that identifies and fragments crowd elements comes in handy). They may attribute the disruption to the wrong subject, another state, class, or agency. For the militants, organizers, agitators, and vanguards, establishing the collectivity as the subject of a politics, inscribing it in a process and rendering it consistent, politicizes the rupture.
Subjectification and the subjective process are connected by an anticipation and a lag. To disrupt and surprise, subjectification has to come too soon. It can’t be predicted, expected, or natural, for that would mean that it remained within the order of things. Rather than the advent of a new subject, “it” wouldn’t have appeared at all. Correlative to anticipation is a lag, a gap between a move that may or may not disrupt and the disruption as it registers in the other. The lag means that effects seem to precede their causes; only after an effect registers is its cause brought into consistency with it.
Badiou associates four “categories of the subject-effect” with subjectification and the subjective process. Anxiety and courage respond to the gap of anticipation. The former wants to fill in the void in the old order, to restore things to their proper place, to put the law back where it belongs. The latter wants to extend the hole, to force it forward in the direction of justice. Courage leaves behind (and no longer feels) the former sense of proper place. It looks ahead to the building of something new. Correlative to anxiety and courage, then, are super-ego and justice, which are themselves effects of the subjective process, reactions to the rupture of anticipation.
That perspective which gives body to the political subject is the party. Marx describes the Commune as a glorious achievement of “our party.” This is not a descriptive empirical claim regarding membership in a political organization. It is the point from which he responds to the subjectification effected by the Commune event, positioning it within a process oriented to justice.
Politicizing the people
Thirty years subsequent to his analysis of Commune, subject, and party, Badiou revises his analysis. In an essay included in The Communist Hypothesis (a slightly revised version of material presented in The Logics of Worlds), Badiou presents the Marxist discussion of the Commune in terms of the state. Rather than reading the party as the subject support of a politics, he figures it as the realization of the ambiguity of the Marxist account of the Commune.20 On the one hand, the Commune is a clear advance in proletarian struggle insofar as it smashes the machinery of the state. On the other, it ultimately fails because it smashed the machinery of the state—it’s unorganized, incapable of decision, unable to defend itself. To resolve these problems, the party takes a statist form. It is a vehicle of destruction and reconstitution, but reconstitution within the constraints given by the state.
Badiou’s rejection of party and state is familiar. Bruno Bosteels and Slavoj Zizek compellingly demonstrate the political inadequacy of this rejection. Arguing for the actualization and organization of communism in real movement, Bosteels criticizes the leftist idealism of the later Badiou’s emphasis on the pure Idea.21 Zizek likewise rejects the alternative of seizing or abandoning the state as a false one: the real challenge is transforming the state itself.22 I agree with Bosteels and Zizek. I want to add, moreover, that for us to focus on the state now is to short-circuit the discussion that matters. The left in the US, UK, and EU—not to mention communists—barely registers as a political force of any kind whatsoever. To worry about our seizing the state, then, is a joke, fantasy, and distraction from the task at hand. Rather than a concentration of political will, communist possibility remains diffuse, dispersed in the multitudinous politics of issues, identities, and moments of action that have yet to consolidate in the collective power of the divided people. What matters for us here and now is the galvanization of such a communist will.
In his effort to reduce the Marxist discussion of the Commune to the problem of the party-state, Badiou neglects the more fundamental question posed by the Commune, namely, that of the relation of the party to the people, the collective political subject. The Commune is less the form of a state than it is the form of a break with a previous state, both the state as in the National Government and the state of political incapacity associated with the workers, as Badiou himself emphasizes in the later work. As such a break, it opens up and disorders. The people are disassembled, suggestible, strong, and mobile as crowds. It is a mistake, then, to reduce the Commune to a state form and the Marxist tradition to commentary on and reaction to this state form. Badiou seems to have fallen prey to the fatalism his younger self criticizes—parties will be parties; “we will always be fucked over.”23 Particularly now, in the wake of the collapse of the socialist party-states and the generalized disarray of the left of the global north, the consolidated state power of a communist party state, should not be our concern. More pressing is the necessity of building collective power – the very problem facing the Commune that the party attempts to solve.
Marx himself analyzes the Commune in terms of the subjectification of the people. In the letter to Kugelmann, Marx treats the Parisians, the people of Paris, as “our heroic Party comrades.” Their advances are teaching new lessons in political struggle, namely, that smashing the bureaucratic-military machine is essential “for every people’s revolution on the Continent.”24 In The Civil War in France, as he presents the Commune as the “direct anti-thesis to the empire,” Marx describes it as the positive form of a republic in which class rule itself is superseded. He draws out the politics of constituting the people under the leadership of the working class, noting the replacing of the standing army by the armed people, the establishing of universal suffrage, the opening of education open to all, and, of course, the replacing of the parasitic excrescence of the old state organization with the self-government of the producers. Marx writes, “The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people.”
The people “storming heaven” don’t preexist the revolutionary event of the Commune. The Commune produces them as its cause. The middle class, which had helped put down the workers’ insurrection of June 1848, finds itself enrolling “under the colors of the Commune and defending it against the willful misconstructions of Thiers.” Marx explains this support as resulting from the Commune’s abolition of interest on debts and extension of time for repayment. The peasantry had Louis Bonaparte, but this support started to break down under the Second Empire. Were it not for the blockade around Paris, Marx argues, the French peasantry would have had to recognize that the Commune was its only hope, its only source of release from blood tax, gendarme, and priest. Again, the temporality is important: the peasantry “would have had,” had the Commune process been able to continue, a process that Marx presents as the subjectification of the people as party.
In his discussion of the Commune, Lenin takes up a similar problematic of people and party. State and Revolution observes that the idea of “a people’s revolution seems strange coming from Marx.”25 Lenin, however, thinks this idea is crucial—and crucial to understanding the role of the party—insofar as it points to the active and independent activity of the majority, “the very lowest social groups, crushed by oppression and exploitation,” imprinting the revolution with their own demands. Because in 1871 the proletariat was not a majority anywhere in Europe, a “people’s revolution” had also to embrace the peasants. Lenin writes, “These two classes then constituted the ‘people’. These two classes are united by the fact that the “bureaucratic-military state machine” oppresses, crushes, exploits them.” For Lenin, where the Commune fails and where its failure impresses itself on (en-forms) the party is in the constitution of the people, that is, in actually producing the alliance between peasants and proletariat necessary for revolution. Lenin commends Marx for seeing that, insofar as the “smashing of the state machine was required by the interests of both the peasants and the workers,” it united them and placed before them a common task. Smashing the state, or eliminating a “special force” of oppression, requires that the majority (workers and peasants) suppress the minority (the bourgeoisie), which means that the majority have to be organized to carry this out. This is the role of the party: concentrating and directing the energies of the people. The party shapes and intensifies the people’s practical struggles.
Given Lenin’s interests in establishing the revolutionary action of the Russian working class within the historical trajectory of proletarian struggle, that he highlights the idea of a people’s revolution isn’t surprising. The parallel with the Commune helps him here, providing a form by which to understand the Russian 1905 revolution. In an earlier text, “Lessons of the Moscow Uprising,” published in 1906, he looks more closely at the revolutionary events in Moscow in December 1905.26 And while he does not look specifically at the Commune, he does highlight the action of the crowd, seeing in the crowd the march of practice ahead of theory, or, the anticipation effect of the subject.
For Lenin, the December movement in Moscow demonstrates that the general strike, as a predominant mode of struggle, is outmoded: “the movement is breaking out of these narrow bounds with elemental and irresistible force and giving rise to the highest form of struggle—an uprising.” He argues that even as the unions and revolutionary parties “intuitively felt” that the strike they called for December 7 should grow into an uprising, they weren’t prepared for this; they spoke of it as something remote. At the same time, a general strike was already contained within the parameters of the expected. The government was ready for the strike, organizing its counter-measures accordingly. These counter-revolutionary measures on the part of the government pushed the masses of people to insurrection. As the government escalated its repression, “the unorganized street crowds, quite spontaneously and hesitatingly, set up the first barricade.” Lenin traces the move from strike, to isolated barricades, to the “mass erection of barricades and street fighting against the troops.” At each point, the revolutionary movement compels the reaction to further violence, further attack, further extension and exhaustion of its troops. The workers demand more resolute action: “what is to be done next?” The Social Democratic leaders are left behind, perhaps because they are still arguing over what is to be done even as the revolutionary masses have already destroyed the previous setting of action and are rapidly creating a new one.
Lenin’s excoriating critique of Plekhanov puts “into consistency the haste of the cause,” that is, it retroactively assigns consistency to the revolutionary workers in anticipation of the certainty of their ultimate victory. Lenin writes:
Thus, nothing could be more short-sighted than Plekhanov’s view, seized upon by all the opportunists, that the strike was untimely and should not have been started, and that “they should not have taken to arms.” On the contrary, we should have taken to arms more resolutely, energetically and aggressively; we should have explained to the masses that it was impossible to confine things to a peaceful strike and that a fearless and relentless armed fight was necessary. And now we must at last openly and publicly admit that political strikes are inadequate; we must carry on the widest agitation among the masses in favour of an armed uprising and make no attempt to obscure this question by talk about “preliminary stages,” or to befog it in any way.
Plekhanov failed to respond to the masses as subject; he failed to note how their haste brought into being another phase of political conflict. What if the party had not lagged behind the workers? As he makes the party the subject support of the revolutionary people, Lenin makes it responsive to the lessons they teach.
In a passage evocative of descriptions of the March 18, 1871 crowd event that made way for the Commune, Lenin praises the crowd:
In the December days, the Moscow proletariat taught us magnificent lessons in ideologically “winning over” the troops, as, for example, on December 8 in Strastnaya Square, when the crowd surrounded the Cossacks, mingled and fraternised with them, and persuaded them to turn back. Or on December 10, in Presnya District, when two working girls, carrying a red flag in a crowd of 10,000 people, rushed out to meet the Cossacks crying: “Kill us! We will not surrender the flag alive!” And the Cossacks were disconcerted and galloped away, amidst the shouts from the crowd: “Hurrah for the Cossacks!”
The party is the bearer of the lessons of the uprising. It is both the perspective from which the uprising is assessed and itself as an organization capable of learning and responding an effect of the uprising. The party learns from the subject it supports – and that it is the support of this subject is clear insofar as the subject necessarily exceeds it. Whether posed as crowd or Commune, the political form of the party cannot be reduced to a problem of the state. It must also be thought in terms of the collective subject of politics, to the subjectification of the people and their process as the subject of a politics.
In his classic account of the Commune, the French journalist and revolutionary socialist Lissagaray likewise links crowd and party such that movements in the street are legible as the actions of a subject. He describes the weeks and months prior to the Paris Commune—the defeats in the war with Prussia, negotiations toward surrender, substitution of plebiscite (an up or down vote of confidence in the provisional government) for elections, and increase of political clubs in working class areas of the city. As he does so, Lissagaray attends to poor, the working men, and the faithful children of 1789, young men from the bourgeoisie who “have gone over to the people.” In 1863, he tells us, these people scandalously affirm themselves as a class. In 1867, their demonstrations in the streets are the “appearance of a revolutionary socialist party” (which will be asserted more directly in a resolution adopted by a meeting of the vigilance committees in February 1871).27 In 1870, they alone in a paralyzed summer exhibit political courage. Yet this class, this party (Lissagaray doesn’t think it necessary to make distinctions here, implying, perhaps, the open, changing, and interconnected dimensions of each), remains unable to direct the energies of the crowd. They may be a “party of action,” but they are in a “chaotic state,” criss-crossed by different currents (and, again, “party” here suggests a collective that is part of a changing situation).28 So even as the crowd riots against the armistice, the people nonetheless endorse the government in the plebiscite that follows: 558,000 yes and 62,000 no.29 Lissagaray explains that this happened because those who were “clear-sighted, prompt, and energetic” were wanting in “cadres, in method, in organizers.”30 Jacobins like Blanqui “lived in an exclusive circle of friends.” Still other potential leaders “carefully kept aloof from working men.” Even the Central Committee of the twenty arrondissements, while “daring, eloquent” treated “everything by manifestos” and so remained “only a center of emotions, not of direction.”31
Lissagaray establishes the setting of the Commune in the challenge of responding to the opening the active crowd produces, in the consequences of the gap effected by the crowd for organizing the people. At stake is not the specificity of a form of government, municipal or national. Nor is it a matter of the legitimacy of elections, representatives, or decisions. Instead it concerns the movement from class, to people, to party, the movement at stake in politicization. The stakes of this movement, moreover, are not those of substitution, vanguardism, or domination—they are arrangements of intensity, courage, and will. The relation of the people to the party is a question of organization in the context of those who might steer the people against themselves, making them a means of a revolution not their own. Lissagaray suggests that a class enters politics as a scandal, a scandalous insistence on equality. When this insistence makes itself felt on the streets, a revolutionary socialist party appears, a party characterized by action, even by a concentration of emotions. But action and emotion, subjective capacity, aren’t enough. The capacity, to persist as the capacity of a subject, has to be organized, incorporated, into a form. Thus, the problem of the party is organizing the people in one direction rather than another, but always retroactively.
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Crisis and Strategy: On Daniel Bensaïd’s “The Notion of the Revolutionary Crisis in Lenin”
The English translation of Daniel Bensaïd’s autobiography, Une lente impatience, is a welcome event in the Anglophone Marxist world.1 Not only does it contain a rich history of some of the most decisive moments for the French Left from the ’60s to the present, it also deepens our understanding of the heterodox sources that coexisted within Bensaïd’s unique form of Marxism. Two key chapters contribute to this theoretical approfondissement: “A Thousand (and One) Marxisms” and “Thinking the Crisis.” The former is a winding, wide-ranging intellectual mini-history of the various currents of Marxism that have been an influence on his own work, from the critical, historicist Marxisms of Lukács and Gramsci in the face of Second International orthodoxy, to the the analytical Marxist and post-workerist schools.2 Bensaïd stresses that each generation must face its own “crisis” of Marxism, thus sweeping away any “myth of a homogeneous doctrine”; it is a critical theory inseparable from social struggles and practices, and “inseparable from the history of its receptions.” From this perspective there is always a capacity for Marxism to begin anew, something that needed to be urgently reiterated and emphasized in the post-’89 conjuncture. This way of approaching the history of Marxism as an “open dogmatism” is familiar to anyone who has read Marx for Our Times, his most substantial and extensive theoretical statement.3
The latter chapter, however, reveals a side of Bensaïd that is less well-known to readers outside of France. This is a retrospective look at his memoire de maîtrise (master’s thesis) written under the supervision of Henri Lefebvre, entitled “The Notion of the Revolutionary Crisis in Lenin.” Parts of the thesis were recycled for a famous article in Partisans from 1968, co-written with Samy Naïr.4 With the recent launch of Le site de Daniel Bensaïd, the majority of Bensaïd’s writings are now available, including the complete version of this fascinating thesis. With an impressive range of sources and an auspicious analytic and intellectual prowess on display (coupled with a deep knowledge of Lenin’s Collected Works), Bensaïd seeks in this text to theoretically clarify the concept of crisis in Lenin and the broader Marxist tradition. While the marks of the then-current Parisian scholarly field are evident in the more Althusserian aspects of the text, it is also true that the themes he encounters here would, as Sebastian Budgen notes, “continue to goad him for the next 40 years.”5 These included the recurrent dialectical oppositions between subjectivity and objectivity, structure and event, and crisis and strategy; Bensaïd constantly, and from many different angles, tried to set these philosophical dualisms in motion through a politically charged optic. It becomes readily apparent, from even a cursory perusal of his later texts (not only on Lenin, but also his writings in La discordance des temps and Marx for Our Times) that these are concerns that stayed with him, as direct sections of the thesis will appear in his rightly praised article from the Lenin Reloaded collection.6 This an opportune moment, then – un moment propice, in Bensaïd’s evocative vocabulary – to reconsider the impact of this thesis on his career, with his critical recollections serving as our guide. This is not meant to serve as an exhaustive overview, as his corpus demands a more patient and thorough reading, but is instead intended as a brief inquiry into the reading of Lenin that this particular work opens up for us, and the ways in which the problems evident in this very early text have a continuing actuality for contemporary Marxism.7
The first question we may pose is a common problematic that can be found in previous pages of Viewpoint: what kind of Lenin does Bensaïd give us?8 How does Lenin’s understanding of the relation between theory and practice, organizational form and class struggle, state power and ultimately, the revolutionary crisis, bear on present struggles? As we will see, Henri Lefebvre’s “unfortunately neglected” book on Lenin was a major influence on Bensaïd’s own reading, primarily in its comprehensive and careful reconstruction of the connection between Lenin’s contributions to historical materialism and his advancement of a distinctly Marxist political theory, comprising both a theory of the state and revolutionary political action. Bensaïd’s text here and his later work will bear the traces of Lefebvre’s interpretation, but we will also encounter an even more intriguing and innovative fusion of these two facets of Leninism which, in an untimely fashion, endeavors to think politics both as an art of scanning historical possibilities and as a surveying of situated conflicts for moments of strategic intervention.
The second issue concerns the qualification of a revolutionary crisis being restricted to the status of a notion, not a concept. This separation is connected to the distinct difference drawn between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary crisis. With the latter problem, there is a clear reference to the French historical epistemological tradition in Bensaïd’s analysis of how Lenin tried, and ultimately failed, to truly “establish [fonder] a concept,” understood as a definition that can hold up to the modalities of history, theory, and politics.9 There could not be, in other words, a truly scientific concept of the “revolutionary crisis” in the Althusserian sense, since its predicative characteristics necessarily had to pass through the test of practice: therefore, it could not escape the trappings of ideology and remained at the level of the notion. This line of questioning, then, involves a strict delineation between the subjective and objective aspects of a crisis (between what can be described and what has to to be accomplished through practice) through a methodological lens that is tainted by an “ultra-Bolshevism” inspired by Lukàcs circa History and Class Consciousness, with the subjective factor – or revolutionary party – as the nodal point of differentiation and decisive element. Ultimately, I will look to Bensaïd’s later writings to answer this question of the demarcation between a revolutionary situation and crisis, or notion and concept: there, he notes that possible resolution of this problem can come from seeing “crisis” as a “strategic concept,” a concept that has political implications relative to its historical and theoretical efficacy.
Lenin and Political Strategy
If we we want to gain an understanding of the basic ideas underlying Bensaïd’s dense text, it is useful to start with the “unjustly forgotten” book his thesis supervisor devoted to Lenin’s thought, La pensée de Lenine, from 1957.10 There Lefebvre embarks on an ambitious attempt to synthesize all the periods of Lenin’s thought, an approach that finds definite echoes in Bensaïd’s own panoramic view that connects “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are” to the “April Theses,” within a coherent theoretical and practical narrative. There are three features of Lefebvre’s account in particular that I want to highlight for their importance to Bensaïd: first, the consideration of Lenin’s rigorous investigation into the expansion of capitalism in the Russian countryside and the drawing out of its strategic and political implications; second, the role of the party as the principal “subjective factor” in the class struggle; third, and most significantly, the attention given to the notion of revolutionary crisis as the moment where the political, economic, and social contradictions engendered by capitalism fuse and condense to produce a conjuncture where true change is possible, when it becomes possible “to sketch the outline of another mode of production.”11 We can take these features in turn.
Lefebvre links Lenin’s body of thought as a whole to his initial investigation into the conditions of the development of the Russian proletariat: “What has Lenin contributed? A theoretical analysis of the totality [ensemble] of Russian society and its historical development – a new analysis that led him to a new analysis of the global situation itself.”12 Lenin’s Marxist stance in theory and politics – what Gramsci would call his methodological criterion – allowed him to grasp historical and societal development in all its contradictory reality. Lefebvre continues: “it was necessary to find a revolutionary formula specifically adapted … to Russian conditions, adapted to the backward countries that are predominantly agricultural.” But this agricultural basis does not diminish the role of the proletariat: “the revolution forming in Russia – and in Asia and other continents – will have Marxism as a guide, the proletariat as the leading force.”13 From his detailed study of the ongoing introduction of capitalist social relations into Russian agriculture, Lenin ensures that this thesis – “the capitalist mode of production becoming increasingly dominant in Russia” – is the focal point for his political strategy, stressing the leading hegemonic role of the proletariat in the coming revolution.14 While there is clearly (as will be shown below) a complex interplay between rupture and continuity in Lenin’s thought—chiefly based around the outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Second International, as well as his close reading of Hegel’s Logic15—Bensaïd will maintain even in his later work that this “foundational work of his youth… will put in place the problematic that subsequently allows him to make theoretical corrections and strategic adjustments.”16 This provides an initial yet cohesive framework that can be bent and shaped in light of the shifting terrain of conflict, as will become evident in the particular shifts that took place in Lenin’s political vocabulary and focus from 1905 to 1917.
There is a persistent emphasis, then, on the fact that political theory and practice follows from and is bound up with inquiry into actual historical developments: Lenin’s early work could be seen as a “theoretical summing up,” to use Lenin’s terms in State and Revolution, that can be referred back to for direction in future struggles.17 For Bensaïd, these early theoretical and scientific works provide a “confrontational clarity” and coherence to all of Lenin’s political interventions, from his polemical texts against the Populists, his debates within the RSDLP, and (most importantly) his conjunctural analyses of 1917. Lenin transposed, in other words, Marxist theory to a certain set of unique conditions, conditions which in turn delimited or made clear certain tactical and strategic choices. Lefebvre sees this as Lenin’s fundamental deepening or elaboration upon Marx and Engels’s own revolutionary thought; the most effective consequences of this transposition are reflected in the novelty of Lenin’s political theory, and the conceptual apparatus that is thereby established. The crucial fifth chapter of Lefebvre’s book – “Lenin’s Political Thought” – has two passages from Lenin that will serve a critical function both in Bensaïd’s mémoire de maîtrise and his later work: first, from 1917, that “the key question of every revolution is undoubtedly the question of state power;” and second, from 1920: “politics is more like algebra than like elementary arithmetic, and still more like higher rather than elementary mathematics.”18 The question of state power will always be in play when politics is involved, this is a matter of course; yet the second quotation is connected to the first, and helps to explain its deeper meaning. Politics has its own logic that is irreducible to the social order, i.e. the social relations of capitalism; Marxist politics cannot be imagined as a form of sociologism.19
For Lenin, the confusion between the political subject and the social subject – party and class – can only lead to a “disorganizing” confusion that can considerably hamper the impact of short- or long-term political strategies. There is an undoubtedly a connection between the two orders; but, as Lefebvre notes, “the perpetual relations between these two elements is also perpetually changing.” Politics reveals certain “becomings, possibilities.”20 Bensaïd will describe it in terms of “a permanent game of displacements and condensations,” whereby “social reality is manifested in political language.”21 This refraction causes the central antagonism of capitalist social reality, between capital and labor, to appear in more complex, convoluted form, thus requiring an expanded conception of political practice to navigate through these historically specific articulations. This point was also made quite forcefully by Trotsky in “Class, Party, and the Leadership,” where he polemicizes against determinist explanations of revolutionary politics. He notes that “History is a process of the class struggle,” but it also remains the case that “classes do not bring their full weight to bear automatically and simultaneously,” as “in the process of struggle the classes create various organs which play an important and independent role and are subject to deformations.”22 Politics, and a form of politics based on revolutionary Marxist principles in particular, is to be conceived as a “strategic art,” traversing the interacting and shifting variables of a volatile situation. In turn, it also requires a theoretical understanding of the revolutionary political subject and the objective conditions in which it finds itself that goes beyond any and all simplifying or reductive (sociological) gestures:
The force of Lenin’s thought lies in the fact that he knew to establish, through the theory of the party, the specificity of politics as seen from the viewpoint of the working-class. His theory of organization (the party) is at the center of a conceptual network which structures this new understanding of the political field: class consciousness, relation of forces, alliances, moment (revolutionary crisis). It is with Lenin that time, duration, irrupts into politics, giving it a strategic formulation. The proletarian struggle is no longer a pilgrimage [pèlerinage] to the horizon of history, or an abstract dialectic of means and ends; rather, it is a rhythmic battle where, for the first time, there is a tactic (initiative, decision) that is not a empirical fragment the battle, but the permanent actualization of a plan, the translation of a project and a will. It is thus with Lenin that Marxism makes a real step forward in terms of political theory.23
Two concepts are crucial to this reading: on the one hand, the formation of the revolutionary party and its implementation of tactics and strategy based on the historical development and activity of the proletariat and its class allies; on the other, the objective conditions, or situational elements, of a revolutionary crisis. Once again, these concepts are of great significance for Lefebvre’s earlier study. The revolutionary party, as described in What is to be Done?, “realizes concretely, practically, the fusion of thought and action, socialism and the workers’ movement, knowledge and the mass movement.”24 The revolutionary crisis is the necessary condition for this practical realization. The crisis is the moment where the subjective and objective conditions fuse together and reciprocally condition each other, where a potentially revolutionary situation is altered and transformed by the subject which traverses it. In Lefebvre’s words, it is a “total crisis, shaking the existing society from the base to the superstructures, from the social relations of production to ideologies and juridical institutions … it is as much a crisis of daily life as it is of politics.” In brief: “no revolution without a revolutionary crisis.”25
As parenthetically noted above, the traumatic shock of the almost unanimous support given by the European Social-Democratic parties for war credits in 1914 allowed Lenin to modify as well as systematize his conceptual and practical understandings of revolutionary situations and revolutionary crises in “The Collapse of the Second International.” The revolutionary crisis became essential to his overall strategic approach, highlighting the break between Lenin’s outlook and the majority opportunist orientation of the Second International. Above all, the consideration of the “factors” that are at work within a revolutionary situation implies a reworking of the role of the party, from a pedagogical role to “a conscious project, a force capable of initiative – of decision.”26 Instead of an educative party that mainly has a clarifying task, the party becomes a “strategic operator” that is ready not only to reflect upon but also make tactical choices depending on the current relation of forces within the political struggle. And without a notion of crisis, the “taking of power by the proletariat… becomes strictly unthinkable… all avoidance of the revolutionary crisis leads sooner or later to the replacement of the perspective of revolution by a gradual and electoral process of partial conquests, substituting the movement for the goal.”27 The crisis, understood as the theoretical and practical lens through which to view political struggle, breaks up the continuity of revolutionary strategies based on economistic themes of development and growth, and keeps the question of working-class emancipation as the end goal. Revolutionary strategy now articulated a plurality of times and spaces through the analysis of concrete, conflictual situations and precise evaluations of the national and international class struggles that did not accord to any form of historical rationality, thus “combining history and event, act and process, the taking of power and the ‘revolution in permanence.’” Bensaïd will come back to this question of the crisis as a “discontinuity within continuity” in his thesis.
This emphasis on the theoretical centrality of revolutionary crisis is perhaps the most noteworthy upshot of Bensaïd’s continual engagements with Lenin’s thought, as he takes Lefebvre’s short mention of the notion’s importance to a much more rigorous level. This is clear in his balance-sheet of the events of May, Mai 1968: Une répétition générale [May 1968: A Dress Rehearsal], co-written with Alain Krivine right before the completion of the master’s thesis.28 This work contains the essentials of Bensaïd’s outline of the elements of a revolutionary crisis, as the authors analyze Mai ‘68 as an “objectively” revolutionary situation that fatally lacked a political subject to work towards its resolution–thus remaining at a “pre-revolutionary” level. The inexistence of “the subjective conditions of revolution in May,” the lack of a “sufficiently organized and politically educated political force” that could take up the project of overthrowing bourgeois power and radical social transformation, meant that there could not even be discussion of a “situation that was ¾ths revolutionary.”29 Revolution, on this view, is not a matter of percentages. Bensaïd’s reading of Lenin will stress the “interdependence” of the elements of revolutionary crises: but it is precisely this interdependence or reciprocity of conditions (i.e., subjective and objective) that make the formation of a concept of revolutionary crisis so difficult.
Lenin in the Crisis
In his thesis, Bensaïd takes the schema from “The Collapse of the Second International” as his starting point. First, he delineates the criteria that Lenin describes as essential for a revolutionary situation to take place: when there is a crisis in the policies of the ruling class; when class exploitation has grown more and more; when class struggle has become more antagonistic. But there is always a deciding factor, the subjective factor of the party and the actions of the masses in their ability to take power. As he argues, “the nodal point of the crisis is no longer located in one particular objective element, but is transferred within the organization-subject which combines and incorporates them.”30 From this basic point, common to both Lenin and Trotsky, he then complicates his analysis. There is an acknowledgement very early on in the text that there is no satisfactory construction of the “concept” of revolutionary crisis in Lenin’s work; and yet, it still serves as a singular term, one in which all of the key terms of Lenin’s political theory – many of which probably reach a higher degree of scientificity and thus conceptuality – seem to merge and interact. He sets up these basic groupings, or parallel syllogisms, modeled after the Hegelian syllogisms of existence, whereby the “singular serves as the mediation between the particular and the universal”:31
Social Formation Revolutionary Crisis Mode of Production
Subservient Spontaneity Organization – Party Class
Ideology Theory Truth
The first vertical column (social formation, spontaneity, ideology) corresponds to the particular, the middle column (revolutionary crisis, party, theory) corresponds to the singular, and the last column (truth, class, mode of production) represents the universal, or the basic concepts of historical materialism. It is the dialectical interaction of the first and third columns with the middle (singular) terms that specifically provides the historical conjuncture of a revolutionary event, with the last column reduced to, or condensed into, their most acute and antagonistic forms. So, while the revolutionary crisis can only be the crisis of a determinant social formation with all its contradictory and overlapping realities, it still lays bare the antagonistic relation between the working-class and the bourgeoisie, marking the “determinate unity of the extremes.”32 The party is what allows, in the best Lukácsian fashion, for the passage from the proletariat as the theoretical subject of the revolution to its role as the political revolutionary subject. More ambiguously, the crisis is what allows for the intersection of truth and ideology to be measured through revolutionary theory, that is, Marxism. It is through the crisis that theory can take on a practical role. As he writes later, the crisis is the moment where theory can be transformed into strategy, touching upon practice. It is, in an interesting turn of phrase, the “truth-operator of an event,” mediating and suturing the hole between continuity and discontinuity, diachrony and synchrony. A revolutionary crisis, then, constitutes a “test of truth” for these different groupings: for the social formation, by heightening the contradictions between the antagonistic classes of the capitalist mode of production; for the party-organization in that it must “take on the state” through its leadership of the proletariat, while also fighting opportunistic and reformist deviations with its own ranks; and finally for theory in that it allows for, in a historically determinant and differential manner, a “reconnection” of truth (historical materialism) and ideology (class struggle or political practice).
However, Bensaïd performs some audacious theoretical leaps to keep this intricate structure intact, not all of them effective: drawing on Freud and Lacan, linguistics (Greimas and Guillaume), as well as Lukács, Poulantzas, Bachelard, and Sartre, he tries to hold the dialectical articulation of the three groupings together. It is clear that they do not always work, and he would later disavow this theoretical structure as inevitably leading to a form of “ultra-Bolshevism” and blind voluntarism. No matter how differential or non-linear he tries to make the gap between the theoretical subject of revolution (the proletariat) as compared to its historically concrete political subject in the party, there is always an inevitable conflation of party and class within this framework. This tendency to absorb the class into the party was driven in a certain sense by the very concept of revolutionary crisis, through which one could “reconcile, in a kind of historical epiphany, the practical subject and its theoretical phantom.”33 Bensaïd was deeply critical of this “Hegelian metaphysics,” but also saw it as a product of a particular practical-theoretical milieu:
the very choice of such a theme was clearly a critique of the structuralist ideology that was tendentially dominant (at the university at least), whose ultimate consequence could be to render the very idea of revolution unthinkable. In other words: against the ventriloquist structures, everything for the subject!34
In later works, most evidently Marx for Our Times, Bensaïd would try and rethink this linked problematic of party and class, subject and object, and ultimately, the in-itself/for-itself division in more materialist and anti-historicist terms. Put otherwise, it will be his reconception of time, and its relation to politics, that will allow Bensaïd to overcome the Lukácsian problematic. The concept of the discordance of different times within the present opens up a radical critique of historical progress and the “homogeneous, empty time” that is seen as inhabiting much of the previous Marxist political tradition.35 The consequences of such a critique of historical reason for political action are evident in Marx for Our Times:
Object and subject, being and essence are bound up with one another in the development of classes. In the dynamic of class relations, the subjectivity of consciousness cannot arbitrarily emancipate itself from the structure, any more than the objectivity of being can be passively detached from consciousness. This problematic is opposed to any mechanical conception of a necessary transition from the in-itself to the for-itself, from the unconscious to the conscious, from the pre-conscious social to the conscious political, with time acting as a neutral go-between. Class consciousness and unconsciousness are intertwined in a perverse embrace, and both are consistently mistaken.36
This leads Bensaïd to posit a conception of politics based upon the uncertainties and uneven development of struggle, and most importantly, the unpredictable bifurcations of historical possibility. This is a domain that can only be charted through a form of strategic reason, “based on the interaction between theory and practical experimentation”; this idea of strategy, and the revolutionary crisis as fundamentally a strategic concept—the qualifier is absolutely essential, as it signals a political importance—is the key breakthrough Bensaïd retains from this early text.37
This returns us to to one of our guiding questions – why the insistence in this text that the revolutionary crisis was not a concept, but a notion? It is because it necessarily breaks down at the threshold of practice.38 This is a point that is reminiscent of Lenin’s explanation in the Postface of State and Revolution for the incompleteness of the text: “I was ‘interrupted’ by a political crisis – the eve of the October Revolution of 1917.”39 Revolutionary crises find their resolution and completion through a subjective intervention: it is a concept with a necessarily practical referent, a concept that is necessarily encountered on the concrete terrain of history and politics. For the Althusserianism dominant during the immediate period, Marxism was based on an epistemology of the concept, and reliant on the autonomous production of theoretical practice. There could be no subject of a science. As is well known, high-Althusserianism encountered real and unresolvable difficulties after May ‘68; it is clear that Bensaïd had already observed these and taken them into account (he maintained a critical, if appreciative, distance from Althusser throughout his career).40 The fact that a revolutionary crisis can only rise to the level of a notion – and not the “purity of the concept” – is surely attributable to the impure imprint left by one of its conditions, the revolutionary organization or subject.41 This means that instead of a concept fashioned from the concrete-in-thought, the development and efficacy of the notion of revolutionary crisis indicated a shift from theory to strategy: “the crisis then appears as the moment of rupture at which theory be transformed into the art of conflict.”42
Strategic Questions
In some of his later articles, and in the context of his own work as a militant within the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire, Bensaïd deepens this shift from theory to politics—the latter informed by strategy, with an emphasis on the importance of strategic hypotheses. These mediate the exigencies of struggle and a critical understanding of previous revolutionary experiences:
We have insisted on the role of the “subjective factor” as against both the spontaneist view of the revolutionary process and the structuralist immobilism of the 1960s. Our insistence is not on a “model” but on what we have called “strategic hypotheses.” Models are something to be copied; they are instructions for use. A hypothesis is a guide to action that starts from past experience but is open and can be modified in the light of new experience or unexpected circumstances. Our concern therefore is not to speculate but to see what we can take from past experience, the only material at our disposal. But we always have to recognise that it is necessarily poorer than the present and the future if revolutionaries are to avoid the risk of doing what the generals are said to do – always fight the last war.43
From this passage we can see how the question of strategy is implicated both in the Leninist notion of revolutionary crisis and its theoretical-practical implications (the crisis transforms the place or role of theory and the party), as well as Bensaïd’s own understanding of historical time that stresses the “primacy of politics over history.”44 In a way, this is an example of Bensaïd’s heterodox historical materialism, what could be described as “the concrete analysis of historical possibility” that combines historical reflection with strategic foresight and tactical creativity.45 Revolutionary politics must have a conception of how ruptural events are historically determined. Today, when it seems that we can’t get away from the word “crisis,” this combination or merger of perspectives is more relevant than ever. Bensaïd’s Lenin invites us to ask ourselves: what is a crisis, how do we think its emergence, and what do we do about it? For what are we to do when the real crisis happens?
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Disrupting distribution: subversion, the social factory, and the "state" of supply chains
Article about the global logistics industry, and the possibilities for disrupting supply chains.
The State of Supply Chains
We have entered a time of logistics space. Contemporary capitalism is organized as a dispersed but coordinated system, where commodities are manufactured across vast distances, multiple national borders, and complex social and technological infrastructures. Geopolitical economies that were previously governed largely at the national scale – even though as part of a global system of trading nation states – have been reordered into transnational circulatory systems. The global circulation of stuff is organized around the standard shipping container and the intermodal infrastructures that support its mobility across rail, road, and especially sea. Ninety percent of the world’s commodities move through maritime space, much of it in the form of containers. Like giant Lego blocks, these boxes move in vast and growing quantities, eliminating much of the human labor of distribution. Thomas Reifer goes as far as to suggest that if Marx were with us today, he would begin his analysis with the container in place of the commodity.1
Yet it is not simply the shipping container, but the modern supply chain that is carving contours of contemporary capitalism. Anna Tsing posits the rise of what she calls, “supply chain capitalism,” helpful for its emphasis on difference within structure2. She is unequivocal about the large scale of supply chains, but without sidelining the diversity of forms and experiences across space. For Tsing, “diversity forms a part of the structure of capitalism rather than an inessential appendage.”3 Difference is not only a central element of supply chains; it is through the exploitation of difference as well as its production that supply chains are consolidated. Supply chain capitalism is in effect the socio-spatial ordering of difference and unevenness at a global scale, governed through geoeconomic as much as geopolitical logics. This ordering is the domain of an understudied field that presents itself as technical and apolitical, despite its vital role in global geopolitical economy. Even the World Bank now asserts, “a competitive network of global logistics is the backbone of international trade.”4
If contemporary capitalism assumes the form of the supply chain, it is ordered by the logics of the “revolution in logistics.” This revolution transformed geographies of trade, not simply by coordinating the movement of production to new and distant places. Rather, production itself was systematized, disaggregated into component parts and distributed into complex spatial arrangements. The supply chain now supersedes the factory, which is “stretched” across a highly uneven economic and political geography. In a sense, the vast logistical network is today’s factory, and it is often repeated in the world of business management that competition today takes place on the basis of supply chains not individual firms.
Explicit “securitization” of supply chains is recent, but the entanglement of military and civilian forms is far from new. While Tsing’s is a useful way of conceptualizing contemporary capitalism – a much more material way of saying “globalization” – it tends to civilianize the field and underplay the central role of martial violence. The civilianized story of supply chain capitalism is called into question historically by scholars like Erica Schoenberger, who has argued that the rise of capitalism relied on the logistics of early modern warfare.5 Logistics had a long life as a military art before being imported into the business world in the twentieth century. As I explore in The Deadly Life of Logistics, the revolution in logistics that gave rise to a corporate management science in the post-WWII period was centrally about the mobility of calculation across military and corporate worlds – a public-private partnership that has only intensified recently.
Over the last decade, supply chains have been securitized such that disruption is managed as a security threat and policed by public and private military and civilian forces. Only a few years ago, the imperatives of national security were understood as an obstacle to trade. Security experts bemoaned what was understood as an inherent contradiction between the transnational flows of trade and the national imperatives of border security. In 2002, The Economist could exclaim that there is “a tension between the needs of international security and those of global trade.”6 Only a decade later, with the launch of the US Global Supply Chain Security Strategy, US President Obama could assert the profound compatibility of trade and security. This was a result of a rapid and extensive recasting of logics of national security in terms of how security is conceptualized, designed, and operationalized on the ground. In 2013, the World Economic Forum’s survey on “supply chain resilience” reported, “security measures and supply chain systems are increasingly co-designed to facilitate rather than disrupt trade.”7 They specifically identify the impact of the US Global Supply Chain Security Strategy in catalyzing this gestalt shift, amidst a plethora of policies and regulations implemented at multiple scales over the last decade that could now be said to constitute a global architecture of security.
Countless critical security scholars have highlighted the rise of a shifting cartography of security that is no longer anchored in national territoriality. Marc Duffield maps a geography of imperialism defined by “nodal bunkers, linked by secure corridors and formed into defended archipelagos of privileged circulation.” Duffield emphasizes the ways in which “secure corridors” delineate “global camps” offering a networked map of the world that is also a map of logistics space, without calling it such.8 Martin Coward insists that critical infrastructure – long the target of warring states – has become profoundly constitutive of the contemporary global city.9 Warfare today, following the geography of circulatory systems, is defined by its urban and transnational cartography. But it is logistics that perhaps most clearly maps the geography of imperialism today. It is no accident that the supply chain of contemporary capitalism resonates so clearly with the supply line of the colonial frontier. It is not only striking but diagnostic that old enemies of empire – “Indians” and “pirates” – are among the groups that pose the biggest threats to the “security of supply chains” today.
Disruption as Threat and Tactic
If the supply chain stretches the factory across the corridors, nodes, and seams of logistics space, it is a system that is extremely vulnerable to disruption. Far from a mark of its strength, the securitization of logistics marks its vulnerability. It is precisely because of the potency of disruption that we have seen the assembly of this new architecture of security. The World Economic Forum highlights how the very material form of supply chains – the distributed nature of distribution networks – means that disruption can easily become systemic. They explain, “systemic risks are created or magnified by the way supply chain systems are configured… In today’s globalized and interconnected world, any major disruption… has the potential to cascade through supply chains and permeate other systems.” Using a database created by the US National Counterterrorism Center, PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) tracks more then 68,000 incidents worldwide from its founding in January 2004 through April 2010.10 They report on the steady increase in supply chain attacks, which reached 3,299 in 2010, despite post-2001 securitization. The Panalpina study has been tracking global logistics outsourcing for the past 17 years.11 In their 2013 3PL Logistics Study they assert, “Economic losses from supply chain disruptions increased 465% from 2009 to 2011, reaching a staggering $350 billion.” The salience of disruption in key nodes and chokepoints of circulatory systems in an era of just-in-time logistics is heightened, and yet disruption has long been a powerful tactic of social movements of different stripes.
There is precedent for the contemporary power of disruption across vastly uneven imperial networks. Strikes, blockades, and occupations clearly all have long histories. In their prescient engagement with the “many-headed hydra” of the early Atlantic, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker investigate the geographies of exploitation, dispossession, and circulation that not only made imperial rule possible but which also brought disparate groups into relation – sometimes intimately and sometimes instrumentally.12 They describe the unlikely ways in which these imperial cartographies also provided a skeleton for the emergence of a surprising flesh of connections across vast spatial networks. Precisely because the organized violence of empire threw spatially dispersed social orders into heterogeneous relations of rule – through exploitation, slavery, incarceration, and colonization, for instance – it also brought oppressed peoples into relation differently. Without guarantee or even intentionality, these relations could at times produce creative solidarities. “Sailors, pilots, felons, lovers, translators, musicians, mobile workers of all kinds made new and unexpected connections,” they write, “which variously appeared to be accidental, contingent, transient, even miraculous.” Connections forged through the violent infrastructures of relations of rule may become the connective tissues of alternative futurities, when occupied differently.
These lessons are instructive and help focus our attention on the widespread resistance that characterizes our era of supply chain capitalism. Reading Linebaugh and Rediker raises the question of the constitution of today’s hydra. Social and labor movements are acting in ways that exploit the specific vulnerabilities of logistics systems – occupying strategic sites in the infrastructures of circulation, as well as organizing creative coalitions across diverse social and spatial locations. One of the most potent forms of disruption to supply chains comes from logistics workers. As Jo Anne Wypijewski asserted at a longshore workers convention in 2010, “The people who move the world can also stop it.”13 And indeed they do. Supply chain security managers repeatedly highlight labor and industrial disputes as the top sources of disruption. These are often assessed interchangeably with disruptions caused by acts of terrorism. For instance, PwC outlines how labor actions in supply chain chokepoints provide a useful proxy for the effects of terror. They use a 2002 lockout in West Coast US ports with its estimated costs of $1 billion per day as a proxy for the impacts of terror attacks in key logistics hubs. As I have detailed elsewhere, logistics workers are also subject to exceptional security measures aimed to pre-empt disruption in ports and transport corridors.14
Over the last decade, there has been a surge of labor actions targeting transportation networks around the world. From Busan15 to Shezhen,16 Chittagong,17 Sokhna,18 Johannesburg,19 Piraeus, Tangiers,20 the Panama Canal,21 and across the West Coast of North and South America,22 workers are taking action at inland and maritime ports, and within massive logistics companies like DHL, DP World, Fed-Ex, Amazon, and Walmart. It is the supply chain itself – its spaces, infrastructures, and flows – that unites these actions. State and corporate efforts to make supply chains more “efficient” through privatization of infrastructure and employment, the gutting of conditions of work, and the increasing securitization of management are also common provocations. It is precisely to fight these sorts of developments that organizations like the International Transport Federation (ITF) and Union Network International (UNI) have been supporting transnational organizing and bargaining efforts like their “Global Delivery” campaign. The campaign works for rights and standards for all workers, “regardless of country or employment status,” by connecting activists within multinational logistics companies.23
While the logistics system is distributed, it is also highly uneven; some nodes and networks are more critical in terms of global circulation then others, meaning some nodes are also more vulnerable than others. As one conservative media outlet analyzing the power of West Coast dockworkers in the United Stated suggests, “The modern, just-in-time global economy is often analyzed as a threat to workers because fluid international markets mean that jobs can be outsourced anywhere. Overlooked is the fact that when companies depend upon international logistics, they are at the mercy of workers who run the cargo network.” Stephen Cohen, co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, outlines the role of logistics as the critical infrastructure for contemporary capitalism. “This is not just another industry like aluminum or tires, or even automobiles,” he suggests, “It’s more like utilities. This affects the whole economy very broadly and very quickly.”24 Describing the complex organization of supply chain capitalism, Cohen explains, “At some point you start running out of parts, and the factory stops, and the factory that relies on that factory for components stops, and you have a chain reaction that’s really rather a nightmare.” It is not just cargo workers in general that are identified in the article, but the ILWU specifically, “which represents 25,000 dockworkers at 29 Pacific coast ports, [and] is simultaneously the most politically radical, materially comfortable and economically significant group of US workers.” Indeed, the ILWU is exceptional within the US labor movement more broadly, with a strong tradition of internationalism, anti-colonial, anti-racist, and anti-apartheid organizing, initiatives on gender equity, and for the rights of undocumented workers. They have not only taken powerful stands against the national security state and the speeding up of global trade, which have seen them branded a threat to US national security and subject to the use of the Taft-Hartley Act; they have also taken a lead in organizing across supply chains.
Labor actions are of undoubted significance to the flows of global trade, but so are the protests of many other groups whose lands and livelihoods stand in the path of logistics space. In fact, one of the best maps of the resistance of diverse groups that disrupt logistics space are supply chain security reports and policies themselves, which in addition to “industrial disruption,” alternately cite “pirates,” “terrorists,” “indigenous blockades” and the generic “political disruption” as key risks. Supply chain security documents offer valuable inventories of old and new enemies of empire. In the first ever textbooks on the topic of supply chain security, two entire chapters are devoted to the “threat of piracy” focusing on the Gulf of Aden and the so-called “crisis of the Somali Pirate.” As one author explains, “waters off the Indian Ocean coast of Somalia have proved to be a dangerous area that threatens the shipping industry with the offense of piracy.”25 This is despite the fact that so-called Somali pirates have organized in response to the patent disregard for anything approaching international law by individual nations, the EU and the UN in toxic waste dumping and direct military aggression in Somalia. In fact, I suggest that it is in the violent experiments being conducted in the Gulf of Aden under the banner of the crisis of Somali piracy that important new spatial logics of imperialism are being coded in international law.26
According to the Panalpina report, topping the list of “global risks with the potential to cause system-wide disruptions” are “natural disasters and extreme weather” and “conflict and political unrest.” The report cites the Icelandic Volcano eruption, the “Arab Spring” and “the on-going social turmoil in Europe and South Africa, which led respectively to oil price increases and labour strikes” as the most disruptive events of 2011. The “Arab Spring” is not typically thought about in the context of supply chains, but it is especially difficult to overlook the ever-present politics of the Suez Canal – one of the most important spaces in the global architecture of trade flow. Canal and dockworkers were critical in the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak; on February 8, 2011, more then six thousand Suez Canal workers at five service companies initiated a wildcat strike in the cities of Suez, Port Said, and Ismailia. Dock workers followed suit, stopping work at the key port of Ain Al Sokhna, disrupting Egypt’s vital sea links.
Jumping far across space but not time, we could also look to Occupy Oakland in California, where the movement demonstrated some of its most aggressive and sustained analysis and action, and here the port was central. Oakland’s Occupy movement builds on long traditions of radical organizing around a variety of issues, most notably antiracist and labor organizing. Referring to the Oakland port as “Wall Street on Water” in 2011, organizers drew connections between the dramatic decline of the city and the booming prosperity of the port. With the city facing economic crisis, the port was bankrolling revenues of $27 billion per year while operating rent-free on public lands. The city’s financial crisis (acute enough to provoke the closure of public schools) was in part a result of Goldman Sachs’s predatory lending in financing Oakland’s debts. Occupiers drew many lines of connection between finance capital and commodity circulation, one of the most direct connections being Goldman Sachs’s majority ownership of global shipping company SSA Marine, one of the main port operators in Oakland. It was, furthermore, right around this time that the Oakland Army Base (OAB) – once the world’s largest military port complex – was preparing to transform into “a world-class trade and logistics center.”27 The project is led by ProLogis – the world’s largest owner, manager, and developer of distribution facilities. Plans for “Oakland Global” – the military base-cum-logistics facility’s new identity – were solidified when ProLogis and partners were promised hundreds of millions in grants from city, state, and federal government.
The “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy” movements ignited in 2011, with “Idle No More” following closely in 2012. This grassroots movement galvanized a renewed energy of organizing and claims-making in indigenous communities, first in Canada, and then across the settler colonial world. And indeed, this activism has often assumed the form of blockades of rail and highway corridors, making indigenous resistance a key concern for corporate and state security managers north of the 49th parallel. Groves and Lukacs,28 Pasternak,29 and Dafnos’s30 work on the securitization of indigenous resistance exposes the surveillance of indigenous movements by the Canadian state, working in concert with extractive and logistics industries. Of particular concern to this public-private security partnership are the “coordinated efforts of First Nations across the country” and the “economic cost of even a few hours of such coordinated efforts.” Pasternak also highlights a third concern that haunts state and corporate joint efforts at securitization, “that solidarity and coordination between non-natives and Indigenous peoples will encourage the movement to build.”31
Disrupting Futurity
Dismissive accounts of any of these efforts abound that diagnose them as momentary, isolated, or failed. Yet, the supply chain security world refrains from such confident assertions and instead works to secure their failed futurity. No doubt, these movements have encountered limits and obstacles of all kinds, but we might consider them differently to appreciate their enormous potential. In place of a simple assessment of their individual impact in a moment, we might consider their cultivation of networks of resistance that take shape through the geographies of supply chains they seek to contest. Both the networked space and networked relations of supply chain capitalism can be occupied and activated differently. As Linebaugh and Rediker highlight historically, and as Pasternak shows in the present, one of the greatest fears of state and corporate security experts is the aligning of forces across movements. Indeed, a fascinating world of collaboration is underway which can constitute these socio-spatial alternatives. Elaborating on these forms requires engagement with the questions of both disruption and futurity, an engagement that I can only briefly hint at here.
In the world of organized labor, inspiring coalitions are emerging specifically to tackle the challenges of supply chain capitalism, coalitions which themselves are organized along supply chains. A key organizing challenge, and also a mark of their creativity and strength, is the dramatically uneven relations of power along the lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, and status that make workers of the world as different as they are alike. One impressive example of these efforts is the work of the American labor movement forging coalition with Iraqi Dock and Oil workers. This 2008 action marked the first time ever that an American union has struck against a US war. The union rank and file defied the rulings of an arbitrator, who twice ordered them to go to work. The employers’ Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) declared the May 1 port shutdown an “illegal strike.” The action was felt all the way to Iraq, where workers from the General Union of Port Workers in two ports stopped work in solidarity with the ILWU for an hour. A May Day message from the General Union of Port Workers in Iraq to the “brothers and sisters of the ILWU” acknowledged the organizing and solidarity.
Logistics labor has also been active in organizing efforts with other social movements. Some of the best known and most interesting initiatives have seen ILWU collaborate with various Occupy sites around ports. It would be easy to oversimplify complex conversations, but at stake are the distinct interests, experiences, and desires emanating from very different movements – neither of which are anything like internally homogenous. On the one hand, organized labor has decades of experience in movement building, but also relative material comfort, and a stake in the very logistics system to be disrupted. On the other hand, the often younger and less resourced activists are typically also less experienced working in the very kinds of complex coalitions they aimed to build. In telling me about the “failed effort” at a coordinated action in 2011, one ILWU member from Vancouver who acted informally as an intermediary between these movements because of their extensive activist work in the ILWU, the broader labor movement, and feminist, queer, and anti-racist organizing, outlined for me how these different class positionalities and organizing styles, combined with a limited political education around racism, colonialism, and sexism among the largely younger “occupiers,” helped to dissolve that coalition. However, when questioned further about the outcomes of those efforts, they also discussed the lasting effects of these events in terms of coalition building. In fact, they described lasting initiatives around anti-oppression training and education across generations of activists. This lively and intensive organizing work is an achievement in itself while also heralding alternative possibilities for more meaningful action and collaboration in the future. And indeed, we are seeing important organizing work in many of these same ports in response to the summer 2014 assault on Gaza in the “Block the Boat” movement that has been especially active in the port of Oakland, disrupting the Israeli shipping line Zim and preventing it from unloading in August 2014.32 Describing the initiative as “raising the bar” on the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement by engaging in direct economic disruption, the “Block the Boat” movement understands its work as profoundly coalitional:
We have learned from the freedom fighters that ended apartheid in South Africa. We are committed to the values of worker solidarity and the legacy of ILWU who have always waged struggles for justice from the memories of Bloody Thursday to their solidarity with the anti apartheid movement in South Africa in 1984. We are inspired by the resistance to state violence by our brothers and sisters from Ferguson to Oakland. And from the ports of Long Beach, Tampa, New York, New Orleans, Vancouver, Seattle, Tacoma and Oakland, we are holding the US government accountable for its role in making Israel possible.33
Occupy has been in a host of creative conversations that rarely make it to mainstream media. Indeed, across its diverse local iterations, the movement encountered extensive critique about racism, sexism, and especially colonialism in its conceptual and practical efforts, signaled immediately by the frame of “occupying” occupied lands. The New York movement engaged in dialogue with groups like “Take Back the Land” – a group of organizers of color involved in reclaiming foreclosed homes in US cities, who work in solidarity with US indigenous groups.34 And on the anniversary of the occupation of Zuccotti Park, it was the Sylvia Rivera Project that led a teach-in on the site; transgender activists made powerful statements that connected contemporary economic, racial and gender oppression to the histories of settler colonialism and the slave trade in that same area of lower Manhattan. And indeed, the work of Occupy NY increasingly became tied to the longer-term labors of environmental justice initiatives in post-Sandy relief efforts. “Occupy Sandy” turned its attention to the work of community organizing in low income racialized neighborhoods like Red Hook, Brooklyn and the Far Rockaways, Queens. In highlighting alternative trajectories and the people who have labored towards their potential I do not intend to minimize the problems of the politics of “occupation” or the specific struggles between different movements. Rather, recalling these efforts and labors of transformation marks the work of indigenous and antiracist activists who devoted their time, skill, and spirit to these conversations.35
Perhaps more than any other, it is Idle No More that has demonstrated an incredible flair for creative translocal coalition. Idle No More has inspired and connected to anti-pipeline activists in Houston, Palestinian activists in the occupied territories, LGBTQI organizing, and migrant solidarity activists in many places, and has provoked increasing settler solidarity in many forms. Indeed, the Idle No More movement website makes these coalitional politics a cornerstone of the movement by highlighting efforts to engage the “contemporary context of colonialism, and provide an analysis of the interconnections of race, gender, sexuality, class and other identity constructions in ongoing oppression,” and explicitly invites “everyone to join in this movement.”36
I call these coalitions “queer,” intending a playful reference to the seemingly strange nature of the alliances borne out of supply chain capitalism, but also to gesture at the actual LGBTQ organizing and theorizing that has been so lively within many of these movements, and which has engaged the politics of alliance so centrally. Cathy Cohen has made powerful claims about the necessity of coalition in queer politics, arguing that the promise of queerness is a politics in which, “one’s relation to power, and not some homogenized identity, is privileged in determining one’s political comrades.” For Cohen, nonnormative and marginalized political position is the basis for “progressive transformative coalition work.”37 In a conversation about queer-Palestinian solidarity work, Judith Butler suggests: “I think acting in coalitions means finding a way to struggle with other groups where some disagreements and antagonisms remain in play. I am not sure all disagreements need to be solved before we agree to enter a coalition.”38 Butler frames this approach to coalition not as a liberal choice, but as a political necessity. “Some of us are ‘coalitional subjects’ without any choice, and other times we work with people with whom we disagree because certain notions of political equality and justice bring us together.” Conversations within and between movements are often aimed specifically at developing more sophisticated analysis of how differently located peoples experience and engage violence and envision possibilities for alternative futures, and this is key to the work of transforming systems of oppression. It is telling that for Butler, “it is only after people have worked with one another that those antagonisms become less defining or important.” There is further an intimacy between questions of queerness and those of futurity, taken up most artfully by the late Jose Muñoz. Queerness, he asserts, “is essentially about the rejection of the here and now and an insistence on potentiality of concrete possibility for another world.” Queerness brings the future into the present as a deliberate object of scrutiny and action for transformative politics, and a conceptual focus on futurity works in coalition with the kind of movement building work highlighted above. Muñoz writes, “we must strive, in the face of the here and now’s totalizing rendering of reality, to think and feel a then and there.”39 Queer coalition insists that alternative futurity is ripe for cultivation in our violent present.
It is perhaps in transformative alliance that works from and through difference, and which insists that subjects and groups might change, that meaningful “disruption” occurs. The common sense notion of disruption equates it with the act or effect of disabling something, in this case material circulation. In this conception, to disrupt is to stop the normal workings of things for some period of time or in some space. No doubt this is an important way of conceiving disruption, and acts of this kind can produce the kinds of effects detailed above. Yet there are other ways of conceptualizing disruption that have more productive connotations. Disruption can also signal a creative destruction that brings new possibilities into the world, as old or normative ways are brought to a halt. This is, in fact, a dictionary definition of the term. Indeed, as Toscano insists, “it is also possible, and indeed necessary, to think of logistics not just as the site of interruption, but as the stake of enduring and articulated struggles.”40 A vision of today’s many headed hydra as coalition on these terms responds directly to Tsing’s arguments about supply chain capitalism as a structure assembled through difference.
If logistics is essentially about networks that provision and sustain both human life and the non-human animals, machines, and infrastructures that constitute our ecologies, then it is in fact not a practice, industry, or assemblage that could ever be ceded to the corporate and military worlds that today work and fight under its banner. Provisioning and sustaining are also the labors of social reproduction that gendered and racialized peoples and social movements have always done. Alongside its military and corporate forms – in fact, provoked directly by these – we can see explicit take-up of logistics by disruptive movements in an alternative register. Now a critical element of social movements from social forums to the Occupy movement, logistics is also a field that activists are actively exploring investing in further for the future.41 Logistics is not only the calculative technologies and material infrastructures that order the global social factory. Today, logistics also renders a complex network of coalitions through which disrupted futures of distribution are assembled.
Comments
Europe Forged in Crisis: The Emergence and Development of the EU
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” – Jean Monnet
These are turbulent but confusing times in Europe. The Great Recession has taken a serious toll. In Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (the PIIGS), intervention by the EU in domestic policy seems unprecedented. Portugal, Ireland, and Greece were forced by financial markets into bailout agreements with the “Troika.”1 In Italy, under the watchful eyes of Europe, the unelected technocratic government of Mario Monti replaced the elected government of Silvio Berlusconi – and not a single member of this new technocratic government was elected. Spain negotiated with the Troika, but was saved by changes in the financial markets.
The EU’s intervention has not been restricted to the so-called European periphery. In the Netherlands, the government fell in 2012 under pressure from the European Commission to implement major spending cuts. The subsequent government did as it was told. In France, in the summer of 2014, the Prime Minister presented the resignation of the entire government to the president, in protest over the implementation of the austerity programme demanded by the EU.
The political reaction has been fierce, with demonstrations, riots, and occupations a frequent occurrence across Europe. There has also been an electoral backlash. In the UK, France, and Denmark, the far right topped the polls in the 2014 European Parliament elections, while in Italy, the Five Star Movement led by the clownish Beppe Grillo came second. Across Europe few governments now last more than one term. Jean Claude Junker, then Luxembourg’s Prime Minister and now the incoming President of the European Commission, lamented: “We all know what to do, but we don’t know how to get re-elected once we have done it.” But the story can be told equally well in reverse: we all oppose what you’re doing, but even when we elect someone different it keeps being done.
This phenomenon whereby policies are decided by Europe, implemented nationally, and contested helplessly is not as new as it may seem. We need only think of the Juppe plan in France in 1994, which led to France’s largest strike wave since 1968. This was just an early example of a government implementing hated policies in order to meet an EU target. What is new is that with the current crisis, this is not happening in one or two countries but across the EU simultaneously.
Although the EU is not new, and its role in determining the economic and political development of Europe is both substantial and well established, critical analysis of the EU is sorely lacking. Most of what is written on the EU is uncritically liberal and focuses on diplomatic and legislative detail.2 What little critical literature exists often simply interprets the EU in terms of the function it plays for neoliberal globalization. At one extreme, it is portrayed as a transnational capitalist conspiracy, while at the other extreme the critique is limited to identifying the wrong policies: too much liberalization, privatization, etc.3 When analyses of the EU go from what it does to the larger questions of what it is and why it exists, analysis often becomes completely un-rooted. We see nonsense claims about the idea of a united Europe across time, sometimes extending to hagiographic accounts about the founding fathers of Europe.4 At times it is truly absurd: Europe is a bastion of social democratic anti-imperialist capitalism in distinction to the USA.5 Other times more intriguing claims are made, such as the argument that the EU is a neo-medieval state like the Holy Roman Empire!6
Curiously the question of whether the EU is a state or not and, if so, what kind of state is it, rarely connects the development of the EU polity with what has been at its core: economic integration. The state is treated as though its existence and form can and should be understood separately to the question of the economic reproduction of society.
Instead, I will try to address the emergence and development of the EU as a new political form by focusing on the underlying process of economic integration: why was economic integration needed and why did its establishment involve the creation of the EU? Pursuing this question will allow us better understand what the EU is in relation to the state, how it developed, and what it does.
European integration should not be understood as a steady and continuous progress towards “ever closer union.” Rather, we need to understand the development of the EU as an iterated process of dealing with crises of capitalist reproduction that arise from working class power and the threat of working class autonomy. This iterated process can be seen then as having two waves, the first one emerging in the late ’40s and ’50s, the second emerging in the late ’80s and early ’90s, and continuing to develop ever since.7
I: Economic Regulation and State Form
In order to root my analysis of the relation between the form of political institutions (the EU and the national state) and the economy, I want to begin this article with a brief theoretical consideration of this issue. I would like to step back from Europe and discuss the nature of the state and its relation to economic regulation over a much longer time frame. I draw substantially here on both, what Benno Teschke has called the “theory of social property relations”8 and on the state derivation debate in the 1960s and 70s.9
The question always facing materialist social analysis is: “how does a society reproduce itself?” The answer to this question differs across history, but in every society central to the question of how a society reproduces itself is the question of the extraction of surplus labor.10
In pre-capitalist forms of society the extraction of social surplus occurs primarily under threat of direct violence.11 For example, a peasant worked a corvée for their lord because that lord could directly threaten violence on the peasant. Importantly, here both economic power (the power to buy, sell and exploit) and political power (the control of violence) are united in the one person, the lord, whereas under contemporary liberal capitalist society these powers are separated. With the separation of economic and political power, the exploiting subject that extracts surplus labor no longer directly or personally holds the threat of violence. Under capitalism, this exploiting subject, i.e. the capitalist, is the subject of a logic of accumulation through exploitation independent of the use of violence, but which requires a form of violence equally independent from the process of exploitation. This mutual requirement of independence is symbiotic. Neither the economic nor the political can exist or be understood independently of the other, despite their necessary mutual independence.
This independent process of exploitation occurs through a seemingly non-violent form of legal contracting. This free contracting involves the capitalist paying the worker the value of their labor-power, which is less than the value of the goods they produce. However, despite the apparent political neutrality of this contract, workers engage in it is because they lack independent access to the means of production. Therefore, they are incapable of satisfying their own needs and desires except by selling their labor-power to an employer. This of course raises the question: “why do workers not have access to the means of production?” The well-rehearsed answer is that the means of production are the private property of the capitalist, and this private property is publicly enforced through the public power of state violence. This returns us to the bifurcation of social power into private, economic power to contract and public, political power to enforce contracts. The economic power to buy, sell and, most importantly, to exploit, and the political power to enforce, are separated under capitalism. Through the separation of the political power of enforcement, economic power takes on a natural semblance devoid of force. The violence that is involved in ensuring the operation of capitalist processes of exploitation is separated into the sphere of the state.
The fundamental characteristic of this separate political sphere of the state is its control of violence. But what this violence is there for is to ensure the operation of capitalism. It is to ensure that seemingly neutral property rights exist. These property rights are ensured through the creation of laws and regulations regarding the operation of these property rights and through the use of violence to maintain the operation of these laws and regulations. However, as this political sphere is where laws and regulations are decided, they are also where these property relations can be contested and feasibly changed.12 The state is therefore simultaneously the institution through which the legal framework of capitalist reproduction is put in place, the violent organization that enforces that framework, and the institution through which antagonism to capitalist reproduction can be mediated. The state mediates class antagonism by being the institution that implements the legal framework through which class relations are maintained. To reiterate, we can point to three aspects of the state, firstly, a legal framework for exploitation to occur, secondly, a medium for the mediation of class antagonism, and finally, a means through which these property relations are violently imposed and maintained.
This framework will help us understand the changing nature of the state in the twentieth century, with the increasing incorporation and mediation of class conflict within the state. And it will help frame the fundamental argument of this article: that the development of the EU needs to be understood as a bifurcation of the state, where the regulation of capitalist reproduction takes place at a European level, while the mediation of class antagonism and the enforcement of these regulations remains at a national level.
II: The creation of the EEC (1914-1957)
The Crisis of the Interwar Period
By 1945 Europe had experienced over 30 years of chaos. Beginning in 1914, the continent had seen over 10 years of war, and 70 million deaths. The 21 interwar years were marked by permanent volatility, with extreme economic and political crises. It was from this chaos, and more specifically the crisis of the postwar years, that European integration was born.
World War I marked the end of the long period of peace, liberalism, free trade, and unprecedented economic growth that defined 19th century Europe. There were therefore repeated attempts after the war to return to the 19th century order. But they all failed, and the economy slumped. Growth of GDP per capita in Western Europe between 1913-1950 was 0.8% per annum, lower than any period between 1820 and 2000.
Table 1: Growth of real GDP per capita, 1820-2000 (Average annual compound growth rate)
1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000
Austria 0,7 1,5 0,2 4,9 2,2
Belgium 1,4 1,0 0,7 3,5 2,0
Denmark 0,9 1,6 1,6 3,1 1,9
Finland 0,8 1,4 1,9 4,3 2,2
France 0,8 1,5 1,1 4,0 1,7
Germany 1,1 1,6 0,3 5,0 1,6
Italy 0,6 1,3 0,8 5,0 2,1
Netherlands 1,1 0,9 1,1 3,4 1,9
Norway 0,5 1,3 2,1 3,2 2,9
Sweden 0,7 1,5 2,1 3,1 1,5
Switzerland NA 1,5 2,1 3,1 0,7
UK 1,2 1,0 0,8 2,5 1,9
Regional Average 1,0 1,3 0,8 4,0 1,8
Source: Barry Eichengreen, The European economy since 1945, 17.
In addition to economic failure, the period was one of extreme political volatility. Immediately after the war there was the revolutionary wave, which in many ways continues to define the ideational identity of the radical left. This wave coincided with the expansion of suffrage, the rise of mass parties and mass unions, increased democratization of the state, and the politicization of the economy. In Russia this revolutionary movement took state power, while in Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Greece, and Portugal the fascist counterrevolution took state power. In other countries the high levels of class conflict lead to the creation of some form of democratic corporatism: the Basic Agreement in Norway (1935), the Peace Agreement in Switzerland (1937), and the Basic Agreement in Sweden (1938).
As World War II approached it was widely expected that the crisis of the interwar years would continue unless there was some final resolution. For the Axis powers this solution was the victory of the Third Reich. But others had different hopes. On the Left, many believed that World War II would end with a revolutionary wave greater than that at the end of World War I. Leon Trotsky founded the Fourth International with the explicit aim of acting act as the “head of the revolutionary tide” which would inevitably follow the war.13 For leaders of the allied nations, it was equally clear that postwar reconstruction could not follow the same path as after World War I.
In August 1941, Winston Churchill sailed to Newfoundland to meet with President Roosevelt to agree on the “Atlantic Charter,” an eight-point plan for postwar reconstruction. At the center of this plan was a clear commitment to lower trade barriers and to the rather social democratic goal of bringing “about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security… and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”14 While the sincerity of this commitment can easily be questioned, it is clear that a lesson had been learnt from the interwar crisis and the postwar period would be different.
Postwar Settlement
After World War II, Trotsky’s anticipated revolution never happened. As can be seen from Table 2, the years from 1946 to 50 experienced far less labor unrest than those immediately following WWI. This does not mean there were no revolutionary pressures. Across Europe communist parties were growing rapidly, and in some countries were winning elections. But instead of leading to socialism, Europe saw the creation of what has been called the postwar settlement.
Table 2. Strike Activity (Annual days lost per 100 workers)
France Germany Italy UK
1919-24 120 191 149 233
1946-50 87 4 145 10
1953-61 41 7 64 28
1962-66 32 3 134 23
1967-71 350 8 161 60
1972-76 34 3 200 97
1977-81 23 8 151 112
1982-87 13 9 93 88
Source: 1919-1924 & 1946-1950: Andrea Boltho “Reconstruction after Two World Wars: Why the Differences?” Journal of European Economic History 30 no. 2 (2001), 429–456. 1953-1987: Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, John Harrison, Capitalism since 1945, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). Note that the figures do not measure exactly the same thing. Boltho’s figure measure “man-days lost” per 100 non-agricultural wage earners. Armstrong et al measure workers in industry and transport.
This postwar settlement resulted in the rise of the welfare state, full employment, and the incorporation of workers’ organizations into the management of capitalist development. It also saw an unprecedented economic boom and a massive increase in international trade.
The growth boom is remembered well across the Western world. In almost every country the thirty year period after 1945 has a unique name emphasising its novelty: Les Trente Glorieuses (France), Wirtschaftswunder (Germany), Rekordåren (Sweden), the “Economic Miracle” (Italy, Japan and Greece) or simply the “Golden Age” (United States and UK). As Table 1 shows, growth in Western Europe in this period was around 4% per annum, the highest growth ever recorded for Western Europe and startlingly higher than the 0.8% growth in the interwar period.
The boom in international trade, while not as well remembered, is even more dramatic. As can be seen in Table 3, while during the interwar years exports declined, the postwar years saw a massive increase in international trade.
Table 3. Growth in Volume of Merchandise Exports (Annual average compound growth rates)
1870–1913 1913–1950 1950–1973 1973–1998
Western Europe 3,24 –0.14 8,38 4,79
Source: Angus Maddison, The world economy, (Paris, France: OECD, 2006), 127.
The postwar growth boom was driven both by this increase in international trade and by a significant increase in investment.
Central to this growth in investment were the institutions created as part of the postwar settlement. These “institutions solved commitment and coordination problems in whose presence neither wage moderation nor the expansion of international trade could have taken place.”15 Under these institutions workers moderated their wage claims, making profits available to capitalists to reinvest. Capitalists restrained dividend payouts in order to reinvest. Investing in modernization and expansion of productive capacity stimulated growth and increased the future income of both workers and capital owners.
The benefit for employers was that the threat of an insurgent working class was avoided; for the organized working class, it was a seat at the table, which facilitated the other aspects of the postwar settlement – it enabled the creation of the welfare state and the oversight of rising living standards and full employment.
However, the postwar settlement went further than the conflict between labor and capital. The instability of the interwar years was not only created by working class militancy. In Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria and elsewhere the far right had come to power on the basis of a popular movement dependent on the support of disgruntled nationalist farmers.16 During the great depression, agriculture was hit badly, resulting in growing demands for autarky and the protection of agricultural producers from the world market. The solution to these issues in the postwar period was the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Before getting to CAP, we need to look at the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC).
The Birth of Europe?
The standard political narrative regarding the EU is to pose the alternative as being either for Europe or for national sovereignty. The appeal of national sovereignty here is obvious both to the Left and Right. For the Right national sovereignty means the collective nation walking its own path, and for the Left it means people democratically determining their own social development. The postwar period was an era whereby national peoples were able to determine their own domestic policies in a highly democratic and free manner that was unprecedented. Today both the Left and Right recall this period wistfully.
A seeming paradox here is that this emergence of popular sovereignty went hand in hand with the development of a level of supranational governance that had never been seen before. Internationally, this was represented by the creation of the IMF, GATT, and World Bank. But this development was even more extreme in Europe, where a vast array of new institutions emerged: the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which exists today as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Payments Union (EPU), and of course the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Between them, these organizations marked a new phase in the political organization of the European economy.
In order to disentangle the paradox of a simultaneous increase in national democratic sovereignty with the increase in European supranational governance, it is necessary to depart with some of the mythology surrounding the birth of the European Union.
A frequent story often told is that the early development of the EU was driven by a noble few or a sinister cabal, depending on the political perspective. But regardless of the perspective, the names are generally the same. At the front is the French civil servant Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the Luxembourg-born French Prime Minister (1947-1948). The supporting cast is provided by Altiero Spinelli, the Italian author of the Ventotene Manifesto; Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium (1947-49); Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of Germany (1949-1963); and Walter Hallstein, a German civil servant who became the first president of the Commission of the European Economic Community (1958-1967).17
The legend is that a few people determined to establish peace across the continent, and convinced of the need for a European Federation, set about establishing a European state bit by bit. The first step in reaching this high and noble ideal was an agreement on coal and steel, and the rest naturally followed.
Indeed the Treaty of Paris and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) is a rather odd moment of international diplomacy. It emerged as a proposal from the rather grandiose “Schuman Declaration,” made by the then French Foreign Minister on May 9, 1950, which gave “world peace” as its aim, and “a united Europe” as its interim objective, but settled for “the pooling of coal and steel production… as a first step.”18
In addition to these overflowing statements, the treaty overflowed with institutions. To administer a common market in coal and steel, it created in embryo the institutions of the modern EU: a High Authority (the precursor of the European Commission), a Common Assembly (the precursor of the European Parliament), a Council of Ministers (the precursor of the Council of Ministers), and a Court of Justice (the precursor of the Court of Justice of the EU).
In order to understand why the European federalists came to found the ECSC, the important issue is less their federalist ambitions, but rather the actual issue of European coal and steel production.
The coal and steel heartlands of continental Europe encompassed the borderlands of Germany, Luxembourg, France, and southeast Belgium. It had been at the centre of all recent western European military conflicts, as well as being both economically important and potentially highly economically integrated. It was a region both where the breakdown of international trade mattered greatly and where the industrial working class was at its strongest.
The question, therefore, was how to manage the transition to a liberal market economy while avoiding social conflicts that might arise from that transition. The content of the Treaty of Paris is therefore focused heavily on the social difficulties in managing the transition to an integrated coal and steel market. It is striking from any brief perusal of Title III of the Treaty, the section which deals with the coal and steel industries, how much of it is focussed on matters such as “the possibilities of reemployment… of workers set at liberty by the evolution of the market or by technical transformations” or “the appraisal of the possibilities of improving the living and working conditions of the labor force… and of the risks which menace such living conditions.”19
Alan Milward supports this understanding when, in his detailed discussion of the social dynamics behind Belgian participation in the ECSC, he writes “The Treaty of Paris can be understood not just as the diplomatic substitute for a peace treaty, but also as the moment when Belgium formally entered the mixed economy… It ratified the shift to public responsibility in management, to the incorporation of the labor force into that responsibility, and to the commitment of the state to welfare and employment.”20
However, the importance of the ECSC should not be overstated – although it often is. The ECSC was important in primarily two ways, firstly, it was an early step in the direction of the creation of the common market; secondly, it created the institutions of the EEC. However, the ambition of an integrated European economy was not realized with the ECSC. In fact, the ECSC was really only a very small step in that direction.21
The first major step in the creation of the EU was not the Treaty of Paris or the ECSC; it was the creation of the EEC with the Treaty of Rome. Today the Treaty that started as the Treaty of Rome constitutes roughly three quarters of the “constitution” of the EU.22
International Trade and Social Protection: The Creation of the EEC
As we have already emphasized, central to the postwar boom was the growth in postwar trade (see Table 3). In Europe this was enabled by the creation of the Common Market with the Treaty of Rome.23 The Common Market entailed a customs union — no internal tariffs or trade barriers. It was to be administered through the European Economic Community (EEC), which inherited the ECSC institutions.
From the Treaty of Rome onwards the EEC was to present a single economic tariff and customs bloc to the rest of the world, while internally trade would be free.
But why was the creation of the EEC necessary? In the late 19th century, tariff barriers were radically reduced across the Western world and a Commission, an Assembly, a Council of Ministers, and a Court of Justice weren’t necessary. Through the wonders of the “most favoured nation” clause, economic integration appeared to develop naturally.
However, after World War I, things were different. With the rise of democracy and the organized working class in the first half of the twentieth century, the separation between liberal politics and the liberal economy were threatened. The economy was politicized. In the interwar period there was no successful resolution of this problem.
After World War II, the problem was resolved through the incorporation of the organized working class into capitalist governance. This entailed both an expansion of the state into new spheres of socioeconomic life as well as its increased democratic administration.
Therefore the integration of European trade after the war required not only the reduction of barriers, but also the means through which the reduction of these barriers could take place without threatening the living standards of European citizens.24
We can see this clearly in the negotiations leading up to the creation of the EEC. Central to these negotiations were concerns regarding issues such as wage rates, differences in holidays, and the fact that working hours in the French automobile industry were 40 hours per week, while they were 48 in Germany. Even the question of equal pay for women was on the agenda.
Here, we can finally return to the issue raised earlier regarding farmers. The Treaty of Rome included a commitment to the creation of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Whilst the signatories of the Treaty did surely not anticipate the current size of the CAP in 1957, it serves as another example of creating a means through which citizens could be protected by the state from the disruption and threat of free and open markets. This kind of defensive mechanism defines what is novel about the approach to the reduction of trade barriers brought about by the Treaty of Rome.25
The creation of the EEC brought about the reduction of trade barriers, the expansion of trade within Europe and thereby contributed to growth and capitalist development. The creation of this supranational organization created a new means through which the rules of economic life could be set. It thereby increased the power of national states to set these rules and facilitated the increased democratic administration of economic life.
It can now be seen how opposing national sovereignty to European governance makes little sense. Rather than threatening the power of the state, the EEC was created as a means through which the power of the state could be preserved and enhanced.
III: From Consensus to Crisis (1957-1984)
The establishment of the EEC ushered in the first wave of European Integration, after which little changed for nearly 30 years. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1980s that the process of European Integration was renewed.
But this is not at all to say that nothing was happening. Indeed, one can retrospectively discern three very important developments. First, expansion; second, the flurry of failed proposals; and finally, the early moves towards monetary union.
Perhaps the most major change in the EEC between 1957 and 1986 was its expansion. First the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined (1973). They were followed later by the recently democratized Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986).26
The second development was the flurry of failed reforms. Amongst these, there were proposals for a common currency (see the Werner report27), proposals for a massive expansion in Europe’s fiscal capabilities (see the MacDougall report28), and proposals for developing a European social democracy (see the Social Action Programme arising from the Paris summit29). However despite these debates, processes, reports and agreements, very little of these proposals actually materialized, and they are therefore of limited interest and importance.
The one major development that did take place was the response of EEC states to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. First, there was the “snake in the tunnel,” then simply “the snake”. This was followed by the European Monetary System, which lasted the early 1990s. I will cover these in some more depth below. But first, it is worth considering why these developments happened at all.
The Postwar Settlement becomes Unsettled
As described above the postwar settlement was a fundamentally unstable arrangement, under which the working class agreed to moderate wage demands and the capitalist class agreed to invest the surplus profits generated by this wage restraint. The result was an unusually high level of investment in the postwar period (See Chart 2). This arrangement was managed through the expansion and integration of working class organizations into capitalist governance. The instability arose from the fact that at any point there were gains to be made from abandoning this agreement. There was an additional problem; the integration of the working class into capitalist governance was brought about partially as a means of avoiding revolutionary conflict. In other words, in order to avoid the threat of working-class organizations seizing power and expropriating the capitalist class, these organizations were integrated into the management of capitalist development. However, this integration brought about a dramatic increase in the size and power of workers organizations, both as integrated bodies and, potentially, as independent actors. For those who believed in the potential of revolutionary action, the opportunities for the revolutionary activity of the working class were not dwindling, but rather growing.
Increasingly, the problem for the revolutionary elements in the workers’ movement was not organization; it was the bureaucratic leadership of the workers’ movement, which had become integrated into capitalist management. This problem was expressed differently by different sectors of the newly emerging New Left, perhaps most clearly in Trotskyism: “The historical crisis of mankind is reduced to the crisis of the revolutionary leadership.”30 But similar sentiments can be seen in Maoism, anarchism, and the general rise of anti-authoritarian movements, in which notions of self-management and self-managed autonomous struggles became paramount.
Extricating the exact causal relationship is difficult, but by the late 1960s, strikes were increasing, profit rates were decreasing, and the investment rate began its decline.
In France, days lost to strikes more than doubled. In 1962-1966, annual days lost were 32 per 100 workers; between 1967-1971 it was 350 days lost to strikes per annum. This figure was of course largely driven by the revolutionary crisis of May 1968. In the UK, the figure also more than doubled. It climbed from 23 in 1962-1966, to 60 in 1967-71. However, in the UK the number of strikes continued to rise throughout the 1970s, and only began to fall after the election of Thatcher. In Italy, the workers’ movement was in the 1970s perhaps the most militant of anywhere in Europe, and the days lost to strikes nearly quadrupled, from 64 annual days per 100 workers in 1953-61 up to 200 days in 1972-1976 (see Table 2).
oisin chart 1
Source: Phillip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn, John Harrison, Capitalism since 1945, 352.
Profit rates went in the opposite direction, as can be seen in Chart 1. Here we see the weighted average net manufacturing and business profit rates for France, Germany, Italy, and the UK. As can be seen the net manufacturing profit rate decreased from 24.3% in 1955 to a low of 8.8% in 1975.31
By the late 1960s, the investment rate had also started to decline. As can be seen in Chart 2, in Germany it fell from 37% of GDP in 1965 to less than 27% in 1975. In the UK and France, the postwar rise in the investment rate came to an end.32
oisin chart 2
Source: Penn World Tables 8.0
Not only was there a crisis in the private sector, but the postwar state continued to expand in order to meet rising demands for the universal provision of social services. As can be seen from Table 4, the size of the government sector in Western European economies had been increasing throughout the twentieth century, and by the mid-1970s there was little sign this trend would be coming to an end.
Table 4. Total Government Expenditure as Per Cent of GDP at Current Prices, 1913–1999
1913 1938 1950 1973 1999
France 8,9 23,2 27,6 38,8 52,4
Germany 17,7 42,4 30,4 42 47,6
Netherlands 8.2a 21,7 26,8 45,5 43,8
United Kingdom 13,3 28,8 34,2 41,5 39,7
Arithmetic Average 12 29 29,8 42 45,9
Source: Angus Maddison, The world economy, 135.
a. 1910
However, despite the significant rise in social spending during this period, social conflict did not abate, and the legitimacy of the existing political order was being increasingly undermined.
A telling example was in Britain, where, in 1973, industrial action by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) had reduced the supply of electricity to the point where the Conservative government was forced to declare a three-day-week. But public support was largely behind the miners. The Prime Minister sought a mandate to take on miners and called a snap election under the slogan “Who governs Britain?” – the government or the labor movement. The Conservatives got their answer when they were kicked out of office, and the Labor Party was voted in.
The reaction to the crisis of the late ’60s and ’70s was largely to concede to the demands of the movement. Wages went up, profit shares went down, government expenditure increased, and the doors were open to the social movement to come inside and share power. In brief, the postwar solution was extended. Rather than aiming to suppress the movement, it was thought that a demobilizing democratic resolution was possible.
This enables us to understand the flurry of well-meaning and often ambitious proposals that developed at a European level in this period, such as the aforementioned MacDougall report, which proposed to massively increase Europe’s spending power and move some fiscal decision-making to a European level. It also helps us understand the Social Action Programme, which emerged from the 1972 Paris summit, and began that ephemeral dream of the European liberal Left: “Social Europe.” The political space from which these proposals arose was a crisis whereby the trajectory of postwar development was breaking down and generating a desire for new solutions. But none of these projects ever had any real legs. The reason for this is equally obvious – they could not solve the problems that existed within the nation states of Europe.
The only proposal that did get some real traction was the one that was at first merely intended to solve a problem arising from America.
The Breakdown of Bretton Woods
It is widely believed that a major contributing factor to the economic chaos of the interwar period was the gold standard. This operated through the declared commitment to maintain convertibility of currency into a specified amount of gold. Thereby all currencies were fixed in value against a homogenous internationally tradable commodity. In order to maintain gold convertibility, countries needed to pursue a set of economic policies to avoid balance of payments problems and maintain their gold reserves. This could involve cutting wages and government spending, regardless of the effect this might have on the country’s wider economic health, the living standards of its citizens, or its political stability. Accordingly, this led to many problems in the interwar period.
Therefore, in 1944 an agreement was reached that the postwar monetary system would be much more flexible. It was agreed that the US dollar would be convertible into gold, and every other currency would be convertible into dollars. This allowed for adjustments to a country’s exchange rate. For example, if workers in a country brought about wage increases and thereby made that country’s exports uncompetitive, it would be possible to adjust the exchange rate so that the value of the national currency would be worth less in dollar terms, reversing some of the negative effect that this wage increase might have.
By 1971, almost all of America’s main competitors had devalued against the dollar on a number of occasions, and as wage demands, the cost of social services, and the cost of the war in Vietnam rose, America found itself in a situation where it had a growing balance of payments problem and an overvalued currency. The solution was obvious, and the US ended dollar-gold convertibility. The stated intention was to devalue the dollar but maintain the system more or less unchanged. And indeed, a few short months later, the “Smithsonian Agreement” was signed, which largely returned the system to how it operated before. One significant change, however, was that currencies were now allowed to fluctuate against the dollar more than previously. Under the new Smithsonian Agreement, countries could fluctuate ±2.25% against the dollar. However, this meant that in the EEC, currencies would now be able to fluctuate much more against one another.33
The response to this drew on the Werner Report (1970), which laid out a plan for creating a single European currency. The EEC countries agreed to allow their currencies fluctuate by only ±2.25% against one another. This framework, whereby European currencies fluctuated within a smaller band than the band for fluctuation faced by other countries, was called “the snake in the tunnel.” However, very shortly after the signing of the Smithsonian Agreement, its “tunnel” fell apart and the international monetary system moved to free floating exchange rates. In Europe, however, the snake persisted without the tunnel. But even this was only of limited success, and through the 1970s countries entered and exited the snake depending on their domestic economic situation. In 1979, therefore, the European Monetary System was created, which operated on more or less the same principle, only in a more structured manner.
Despite this important change, looking at the long period between the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992), we can see relatively few developments. It is therefore useful to consider European Integration as occurring in two waves. The first was established by the Treaty of Rome, was centered on the common market, and lasted until the mid-80s. The second was established by the Maastricht Treaty and lasts to this day. This second wave was centered on the single market and the common currency, whose early moments I have just described. However, before we consider the development of this second wave from 1992 onwards, it is worth considering the situation in Europe in the 1980s that it developed in response to.
The Delayed Resolution of the Crisis
By the late 1970s the crisis that had emerged in the mid-60s was still not resolved. Profit rates were continuing their decline and had not recovered (See Chart 2). Investment rates had fallen substantially (See Chart 1). Growth rates were substantially lower than what they had been during the 1945-1975 period. In addition, the re-emergence of unemployment became a major social problem. This was in fact a very significant change, since full employment had been the norm across Western Europe for the entire 1945-1973 period (see Table 5).
Table 5: Level of Unemployment (% of labour force)
1950–73 1974–83 1984–93 1994–98 2000 2004 2008 2012 2014
Belgium 3 8,2 8,8 9,7 7,5 8,7 7,2 7,2 8,5
Finland 1,7 4,7 6,9 14,2 10,0 9,0 6,4 7,5 8,4
France 2 5,7 10 12,1 10,4 9,0 7,3 9,4 10,2
Germany 2,5 4,1 6,2 9 8,2 9,9 8,1 5,6 5,2
Italy 5,5 7,2 9,3 11,9 10,6 8,2 6,4 9,5 12,6
Netherlands 2,2 7,3 7,3 5,9 3,3 4,8 3,2 5,0 7,1
Norway 1,9 2,1 4,1 4,6 3,4 4,2 2,4 3,2 3,5
Sweden 1,8 2,3 3,4 9,2 6,2 7,0 6,0 7,9 8,2
United Kingdom 2,8 7 9,7 8 5,7 4,7 5,1 8,2 6,8
Ireland n.a. 8,8 15,6 11,2 4,8 4,9 5,0 15,0 12,1
Spain 2,9 9,1 19,4 21,8 12,7 11,3 9,0 23,2 25,5
Average 2,4 6,0 9,2 10,7 7,5 7,4 6,0 9,2 9,8
Source: 1950-1998: Angus Maddison, The world economy, 134. 2000-2014: January data from Eurostat.
And society was still politically highly unstable. In Italy, the very high level of industrial activity continued, albeit with greater desperation. This hopelessness saw the beginning of the “Years of Lead,” which perhaps reached its peak with the kidnapping and execution of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by the Brigate Rosse in 1978. Such violence was not limited to Italy. Germany witnessed left-wing guerrilla activity during this period as well, with such groups as the Rote Armee Fraktion, Rote Zellen, Rote Zora and the June 2 Movement. The UK experienced left-wing armed activity in the north of Ireland and, in Britain, there was a persistent increase in strike activity.
Indeed, the British winter of 1978-1979 was rocked by a strike wave that is remembered as the “Winter of Discontent.” This strike wave was both felt and visible across the UK. The fact that the winter was one of the coldest on record did not improve things. City centers filled with uncollected trash. Infamously, in Liverpool, the city was forced to hire an empty factory to store corpses as the gravediggers struck. The UK had to go to the IMF for a £2.3bn loan. By the time an election was called in 1979, the Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher won.
Thatcher famously used her mandate to take on the British labor movement piece by piece, until what was once one of the strongest and most militant labor movements in Europe was destroyed. Today in Britain unions scarcely exist outside the public sector, and strikes are a minor issue economically and politically.
Although the social movement of the 1960s and 1970s were filled with hope, by the late 1970s the movement had reached an impasse. It could continue to force the state to increase its social spending, but it was unclear how to fund it. Equally, it could continue to increase wage demands, but it was clear that this was reducing profit opportunities and damaging the economy. The next step seemed unclear, and many believed the moment for a break with capitalism had passed.34 As these hopes faded, the emerging voices from the Right for a return to pre-war liberalism began to gain favor.
Of course, the Left did not simply abandon its project, and the debates of this period remain of real interest.35 And although across Europe the labor movement was suffering defeats: the mass arrests in Italy 1979-1981,36 the defeat at FIAT Mirafiori (1980),37 the UK Miners’ Strike (1984), Wapping (1986), etc. There were other attempts to find another route for the Left. Perhaps the most successful was François Mitterrand’s electoral victory in France in May 1981. This brought together much of the Left, many of the militants of 1968, along with many of the political refugees fleeing persecution in Italy. Mitterrand was elected on a radical platform named the “110 Propositions for France.” This involved a major push further towards more social control of the economy. There were several nationalizations and the minimum wage, statutory holidays, pensions, health insurance for the unemployed, social housing, family allowances, taxes on wealth, were all increased, while simultaneously the workweek was reduced. However, as this happened, capital began to leave the country. With inflation continuing to rise, France faced a persistent and serious balance of payments problem. The franc was devalued in October 1981, again in June 1982, and yet again in March 1983! Ultimately, Mitterrand was forced to abandon his left-wing economic policy and launched the “Franc Fort” (Strong Franc) policy. This involved a major shift to austerity, and in many ways the end of postwar social democracy. From this point on across Europe, the parties of the Left reoriented themselves towards a pro-market, neoliberal approach to the economy.
Neoliberalism?
Despite the appearance of neoliberalism as an intellectual movement, it is important to treat it as neither a purely intellectual phenomenon nor as a return to normal. Neoliberalism emerged as a response to the prolonged political instability and economic downturn of the 1965-1985 period. While the prolonged political instability is often underplayed and reduced to the momentary madness of May 1968, the economic downturn is often overplayed. By almost any measure, European economies were doing better in the 1970s than at any point since. The growth rate was higher, the investment rate was higher, the unemployment rate was lower and inequality was lower. Compared to the economic situation in the 70s, the only clear improvement for workers today is that inflation has stabilized at a low level. However, low inflation primarily benefits creditors and capital owners. Other changes also benefit capitalists. Strikes have gone down dramatically. Tax rates have stabilized and the growth of the public sector has been more or less halted (although contrary what much of the left might say, it has not reversed) (see Table 4). And, by most measures, the profit rate has risen again.
Presumably in 1975 it was possible for Europe to continue to develop away from capitalism and place the economy under increasing democratic control. Whether this might have been achieved through socialist revolution, autonomous action, or legislation, is unknown to us because, of course, it never happened.
In the Western European countries where revolutions did happen,38 despite their revolutionary commitments, these societies quickly entered the Western liberal order. The high points of workers’ autonomy in Italy and the UK were crushed, and the more nebulous forms of autonomy among squatters and environmentalists in Northern Europe were gradually hacked away at, so that little remains but some interesting concert venues and the embarrassment of the Green parties. Where legislative reform was attempted, most significantly in France under Mitterrand, the renewed freedom of capital to flow across borders brought about rapid balance of payments problems, forcing the reforms to be abandoned.
In short, by the early ’80s the Left was at an impasse while the Right had a clear agenda: liberalize!
Seen from the Right, the problem of the European economy and the reason for the downturn was an over-empowered labor movement and excessive government intervention in the economy. What was necessary therefore was to facilitate the process of private firms competing for profits via the market. By stimulating trade and profit-making, this would lead to increased investment, growth and employment. Central to this process was increasing cross-border European trade.
IV: The Second Wave of European Integration (1984-Today)
The second wave of European integration began with the Single European Act (1986) and was properly established with the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The Maastricht Treaty is perhaps the most significant of all treaties relating to European integration. It created the European Union and along with the Treaty of Rome (1957), the Maastricht Treaty is the basis of one of the two “Treaties” that form the core of the European constitution.39
The core of the establishment of this second wave of European Integration was the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) under Maastricht, which in turn involves two key elements: the creation of the Single Market and the creation of the Euro.
It is worth distinguishing the Single Market from the Common Market. The first was established under the Single European Act (1986), the latter under the Treaty of Rome (1957).
The core of the common market (i.e. the EEC) was, as discussed earlier, the creation of a tariff free area within Europe for the international trade of nationally produced goods. These goods were, even when produced by multinationals, produced within nation states in a manner laid out by national legislation. The logic behind this process was to democratically manage the transition to free trade. This involved the incorporation at the national level of working-class and farmers’ organizations into capitalist management. The aim was to maintain living standards and avoid the chaos of the interwar years, while still getting the benefits of higher levels of trade and market expansion and integration. In other words, the logic was one that saw the postwar maintenance of a market society through the exercise of social control over the market.
The Single European Act is often presented as simply being a part of the further extension of an undetermined process of “ever closer union.” It is often suggested that it was simply a matter of “completing” the common market.40 However, the logic of the creation of the single market was qualitatively different from the creation of the EEC. Whereas the creation of the EEC was embedding the market within wider social controls, the move towards the single market was aimed at making greater aspects of society subject to market control.
The first wave of European integration aimed at empowering both the market and the nation state, by reducing political and social turbulence through the creation of democratic controls over the market economy. The second wave of European Integration, on the other hand, involved reducing political and social turbulence by removing the market from democratic contestation.
The Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty which followed, committed Europe not simply to creating a common market free of tariffs for international trade within Europe, it aimed at creating single markets ruled and regulated by a common set of rules and regulations determined at a European level.
The pre-history of the SEA is rather telling about its development. The wordy declarations by heads of states on the need for European unity continued throughout the ’70s and early ’80s. But over time the focus of these announcements, reports, draft treaties and white papers shifted from the ephemeral federalist goal of “political union” to what has always been the core of the European project: economic integration.41
Interestingly, this period of the mid-80s, in particular around the SEA, is perhaps the only point in the history of European integration when the UK plays an agenda-setting role in Europe. Desmond Dinan writes “Mitterrand and Kohl42 had succumbed to Thatcher’s minimalist programme.”43
The core of the SEA was a commitment to implement the 279 proposals in the 1985 Commission White Paper on the Internal Market and create a single market by December 31, 1992. This involved harmonizing economic regulation of a huge number of industries across Europe – thereby the regulation of the internal European market would be fundamentally European, replacing the system of national regulation.
France’s enthusiasm for this process is of interest. As noted above, Mitterrand’s agenda for pushing social democracy forward collapsed in ’83/’84 with the Franc Fort policy. In response to this shift Jean-Pierre Chevènement, the Minister of Industry, resigned and was replaced by Laurent Fabius.44 In his first speech as minister, Fabius announced that “the state does not intend to become a substitute for the role of enterprises and entrepreneurs,” and launched a series of reforms under the motto “Modernize or decline.” It is against this background of the turn to market liberalization, and the notion that France must “adapt itself to the conditions of the new world economy,” that the French government’s attitude to the SEA and Maastricht should be understood. The aim was for France to bind herself to Germany’s strong Deutschemark and to adjust her internal markets by liberalising and internationalising.45
Maastricht
While the Single European Act marked the launch of the second wave of European integration, the Maastricht treaty marked its establishment. At the core of the Maastricht treaty were two core elements: institutional change and economic integration.
The institutional changes brought in by Maastricht were substantial. For one, Maastricht established the European Union. Secondly, it established a new structure of the European Union, which was to last until the passing of the Lisbon Treaty.
The new structure brought together an array of forms of European cooperation that had previously been separate under the common framework of the EU. Part of the logic here was to increase European integration in areas beyond economic integration by tying them institutionally to economic integration. Under Maastricht, the EU was structured around “the three pillars of the EU.” These were the European Community (EC), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Intuitively, this maps onto the economy (EC), law (JHA), and foreign affairs (CFSP). The European Community was basically the EEC renamed and was by far the most important pillar of the EU. The other two pillars that were created under Maastricht took over from relatively minor institutions, but it was hoped they would grow in importance. Justice and Home Affairs took over from TREVI, which was little more than a means to facilitate cross-border cooperation in responding to terrorism, in particular the growing number of left-wing armed actions and by Palestinian groups within Europe.46 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) took over from “European Political Cooperation” – the name given to the then existing institution which aimed to give form to the perennially unrealized dream that one day Europe would have an independent and united foreign policy.47 The competencies of neither the JHA nor the CFSP pillar grew much over time, as decision-making under these pillars was based on consensus. Therefore, many of the responsibilities under the JHA and CFSP pillars were transferred to the EC pillar, to allow for easier decision-making. With the Lisbon Treaty the pillar system was abolished, and the EU was given a single legal personality. Nevertheless, the institutional changes under Maastricht were significant, marking the creation of a single structure in relation to which essentially all future moves to greater European integration would be oriented.
The second major change with the creation of the European Union under Maastricht was the commitment to the creating the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The euro is the central plank of the EMU. Every member of the EU is a signatory to the Maastricht treaty and as such every country, barring two,48 is committed to joining the common currency. However, joining the euro is a three-stage process. First, the country must reach a set of “convergence criteria.” Second, it must join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II).49 The third and final stage is adopting the euro.50
Perhaps as significant as the euro itself was the creation of the system through which countries adopt the currency. There are four convergence criteria. First, there is a tight limit on inflation.51) Second, there is an extremely tight limit on governments fiscally: debt to GDP must not exceed 60% and government deficits must not exceed 3%. Third, exchange rates must be stable with the euro. Finally, the interest rate of 10-year government bonds must be below a certain level.52
With the creation of the “Stability and Growth Pact” in 1996 the two elements of the fiscal convergence criterion – the 60% debt rule and the 3% deficit rule – were made permanent. All countries must, after accession to the euro, remain with their debt at or below 60% and with their deficit at or below 3%. If they do not meet these criteria, they must be on a path towards realizing them.
Thereby all EU countries, with the partial exception of the UK, have committed themselves to having the same regulations for the industries in their economies and having the same macroeconomic situation. Industrial regulation and monetary policy are now decided at a European level, not a national level, while national fiscal policy in the form of expansionary or contractionary policy is simply precluded by European law.
After Maastricht
Since Maastricht the second wave of European integration has not abated. There have been three major changes to the Treaties since Maastricht. First there was the Amsterdam Treaty, which was mainly about two things: the CFSP pillar, and the fact that many center-left governments had been elected and wanted to reform the Maastricht treaty by increasing the power of the European Parliament, and by including some “social” issues in the Treaty.53 Then there was the Nice Treaty, which was primarily about amending the voting arrangements in the EU to allow for the accession of Eastern European countries. Finally, there was the Lisbon Treaty. This was basically the EU Constitution under a different name. It involved a large number of changes including, as mentioned above, the abolition of the pillar system. The main thing the Lisbon Treaty did was push Maastricht further, in terms of turning the European institutions into a single integrated whole. But beyond that the Treaty did not change the direction or speed of European integration dramatically.
In terms of European economic integration things also proceed apace. Building on the success of the regulatory homogenization brought about by the Single European Act, more and more aspects of economic life within the EU are being homogenized. In some areas this is generally welcomed; for example, the creation of a single European telecoms market has resulted in technological improvements and lower roaming charges, although it has also overseen the privatization of telecoms companies. Today it is harder to think of aspects of economic life that are regulated by the national state rather than the EU,54 and the extent of European regulation of markets within Europe is only increasing. For example, today, there is a major drive to move the regulation of all aspects of the finance industry, e-commerce, and patents to a European level. In addition to the ever-increasing competencies of the EU with regards to the regulation of markets, the competence of the EU over national economic policy has also increased.
As mentioned above, the 60% debt rule and the 3% deficit rule were expanded under the Stability and Growth Pact to cover all countries all the time, not just in the period leading up to adopting the euro. However, in 1998 German debt went above the 60% mark, where it has remained since (with the exception of 2001 when it dropped to 59%). Likewise, France went over the 60% limit in 2002 and has remained above it ever since. Therefore, in 2005 the rules were changed to allow for breaches but requiring that countries have a Medium Term Objective (MTO) whereby they would return to the 60% debt, the 3% deficit and a 1% “underlying deficit.” Since the crisis this has been extended further, and now every country must have binding national legislation regarding the 60% debt and the 3% deficit rules.
In addition, the EU has significantly increased it oversight of national economic policy. This began with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), which countries had to send to the EU Commission explaining how their economic policy was in line with European objectives. Then in 1998, the European Commission began to issue Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) explaining how countries should improve their policies. In 2000 the ten-year Lisbon Strategy was launched, which aimed to bring European economic and social policy more in line and tried to use the BEPG/CSR framework to achieve that. However, the Lisbon Strategy was not a major success, and was replaced in 2010 by the Europe 2020 strategy.
More significantly, in 2011 a new process known as the European Semester was launched.55 It is a rather complicated process of economic surveillance through which the EU monitors national economic development. It combines and integrates
A reinforced Stability and Growth Pact, with significant sanctions if countries breach the set objectives
A Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure which sets out 10 objectives which a country must achieve
The overview of national budgetary plans by the European Commission
A reinforced process around Country Specific Recommendations
A set of sanctions for countries that are failing to achieve their targets
An annual framework through which this entire process is organised
A framework through which countries that are failing to address their problems are dealt with
In addition to these recent reforms, during the ongoing economic crisis Ireland, Portugal and Greece have been placed in EU/ECB/IMF recovery programmes, which determine economic policy for a few years.56
Having now followed the process of European integration up to the current day, it is now possible to make some general remarks. I have already made a distinction between the first wave and second wave of European integration. The first was an attempt to gain control over the market, in order to both avoid socialist change and facilitate the integration of labor and agricultural interests into capitalist governance. The second wave was qualitatively different. Over the last thirty years, with the second wave of European integration, greater and greater responsibility for economic regulation is being shifted to the European level. This happened in response to the political impasse faced by the Left, and the new political economic situation that had developed by the 1980s. Control over economic regulation was taken out of the hand of democratic national states and transferred to the European Union.
V: The European Union as State Form
This brings us back to the Middle Ages – to what might have seemed the slightly esoteric start to this article. As described above, the emergence of capitalism was characterized by a division of social power into economic power and political power. Economic power is the power to buy and sell, in particular to buy labor-power and sell the commodities produced. Political power, on the other hand, is power over violence. The control over violence implied in political power involves not only the exercise of violence, but also the determination of when and how to exercise that violence. This determination process involves setting down rules, and the contestation of those rules. Less abstractly, it is through the state that laws are made, contested and enacted. These laws create the framework through which social reproduction occurs under capitalism. The state thereby uses its control of violence to determine the framework through which economic life occurs, and acts as a means and forum for the contestation and change of this framework.
We can therefore see how with the postwar settlement, the framework through which economic life occurred was changed by the expansion of state action into aspects of economic life that were previously considered outside the scope of politics.
We can also understand what has happened with European integration. The first wave of European integration was an aspect of the general expansion of state action into previously non-political spheres. The development of the welfare state and the incorporation of the organized working class into capitalist governance at a national level went hand in hand with European integration. The EEC and the organizations that preceded it developed to facilitate the democratic governance and organization of international economic activity. This was the international dimension of the primarily national process of the postwar settlement.
The second wave of European integration is rather different. This too can be understood as the international dimension of a primarily national process. But this national process was a process whereby democratic intervention in the economy was being reduced. However, this did not mean simply deregulation or privatization. In Europe it involved the transfer of power over economic regulation out of the hand of the national state and onto a supranational level. Increasingly, the laws that govern economic activity in the EU are determined at a European level.
While the power of the feudal lord was bifurcated into the economic power of the modern employer and the political power of the modern state, the development of the EU over the last 30 years involves a further bifurcation. The political power of the state involves the creation, contestation, and implementation of the legal framework for economic life and the rise of the EU involves the bifurcation of this political power. The EU now creates the regulations that govern almost all aspects of economic life in Europe. However, both the contestation and implementation of these regulations remains at a national level. This is not sustainable.
Today, the political contestation of economic life, which has been the core of liberal democracies based on universal suffrage, is increasingly impossible. In each national state, governments change, but the policies do not. Policies are not set by national government, but by the EU. But it is not possible to democratically change the government of the EU, or to democratically change the policies it pursues.
This has not only drawn outrage from the European electorate, but also from national governments. In 2012, when Olli Rehn, the European commissioner for economic and monetary affairs directed the Belgian government to cut between €1.2 billion and €2 billion from its budget, a government Minister responded: “Who knows who Olli Rehn is? Who has seen Olli Rehn’s face? Who knows where he comes from and what he’s done? Nobody. Yet he tells us how we should conduct our economic policy.”57
The superficial solution to this “democratic deficit” would be to return to national democracies. This is not an unpopular idea. We see this demand being raised by both the far right and the far left. In France, the quasi-fascist Front National was the largest party in the 2014 European Parliament election winning one in every four votes cast. In the UK the right-populist UK Independence Party also topped the poll. In Italy, the “Five Star Movement” went from nothing to winning 20% of the vote. In social democratic Denmark, the extreme right Danish People’s Party also topped the poll.
However, the superficial, and obviously popular, appeal for a return to national democracy does not correspond with the social possibilities that exist today. I have tried to describe at some length the crisis in response to which the EU and the second wave of European Integration developed. And I have tried to show that the alternative route pursued by the Mitterrand government in France in the early 1980s did not and could not work. In the presence of free capital movement, the kind of policies that Mitterrand pursued will always end with balance of payments crises.
This is not to pose some grim inevitability to the European development, but rather to point to the fact that the scope of change that has occurred over the last 150 years is massive, and that to change the direction of its further development involves more than political ambition or a change in political focus. The postwar settlement happened where there was an imminent threat of socialist revolution and where, due to wartime capital controls, it was very hard for capital flight to occur. We are living in a very different world.
Europe is at an impasse. Economic regulation now takes place at a European level, but the social contestation of economic issues is contained at an impotent national level. It seems most likely that European integration will continue to follow the path mapped out in this article for the foreseeable future. Despite this, one fact remains: all structures of governance rely on the passive consent of the governed. It is hard to see much hope for socialist change in Europe. But it is equally hard to see European’s passive consent lasting indefinitely.
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From Subaltern to State: Toward a Left Critique of the Pink Tide
In February, scenes of protest began filtering out from cities all over Venezuela. Students threw molotov cocktails. Red banners waved in the streets. Barricades, made of old tires, burned high. After two years of intensified global protest from Cairo to Athens to Oakland, these images were somewhat familiar. President Nicolás Maduro had been in office for less than a year following the death of Hugo Chávez, and now the people seemed ready to give their judgment on his tenure. The Venezuelan government’s response appeared to mimic the actions of so many other states under threat; the National Guard faced off with demonstrators in the streets, and police arrested the movement’s most visible promoter for inciting violence.
For some outside observers, this series of events made for easy political positioning in support of the protestors. And it is difficult to blame anyone whose first impulse is sympathy with the streets. Yet most of the protesters, despite the evocative face masks and stone-hurling, are demanding little more than a return of the privileges they held in the pre-Chávez era.1 If the situation in Venezuela is, in fact, different from elsewhere, it is because political content matters: those on the revolutionary Left must reconcile their reflexive sympathies for protest with the fact that, at the moment, Venezuela represents just about the closest thing in the world to really existing socialism.
Of course, the purported political goals of the Venezuelan state do not automatically guarantee it a free pass. But it is difficult to ignore that the current government is the product of a massive and popular two-decade political transformation. Indeed, as people throughout Latin America react to the unsparing neoliberal policies that swept the region in the 1980s and 90s, Venezuela has become the hinge of a much broader leftward turn. This shift has impelled massive political transformations in Venezuela and Bolivia, stirred more moderate resonances in the Southern Cone, and in the cases of Paraguay and Honduras, aroused reactionary coups. As one of the few left political projects of its scale in the post-Soviet era, this Latin American marea rosada, or pink tide, is a material testing ground for the transition from capitalism to something else – leaving open for now the question of whether this something else is communism – and it demands substantive discussion on the Left.
To really grasp what is happening in Venezuela and elsewhere, however, it is important to rethink the concepts through which we approach new political scenarios. In the 20th century, the theme of guerilla warfare dominated the theoretical currents in and about Latin America; Che Guevara’s own work on the subject and Regis Debray’s foco theory of revolution are notable examples. But as cultural studies and international affairs scholar Sophia McClennen has suggested, “the currently existing forms of political activism [in Latin America] have taken on new modes of organization that no longer track to the idealized ideas of indigenous resistance movements and guerilla groups, and they no longer take place wholly within the nation state.”2 In other words, the old theoretical tools and political impulses are inadequate for the new terrain of the Latin American Left—particularly when one considers its entry into the state.
The challenge in assessing Latin America’s 21st century socialism, then, is twofold: first, it is necessary to formulate a conceptual framework that can explain the pink tide’s various processes of state-centered political change. And second, such a framework must serve as a political compass for those of us on the Left who favor the broader goals of the popular marea rosada states, and thus give us criteria by which to make serious political assessments as these projects unfold.
Sixteen years after Hugo Chávez’s election to the Venezuelan presidency, people have already begun to theorize these developments and supercede the guerilla-centered framework of Guevara and Debray. The main currents in this newer vein revolve around the theory of hegemony and the related concept of subalternity. But these ideas, focusing as they do on exclusion from state power, must now too be rethought, or at least relativized. The state itself must now fall at the center of the Left’s political analysis. As John Beverley puts it, “In a situation where, as is the case of several governments of the marea rosada, social movements from the popular-subaltern sectors of society have ‘become the state’… or are bidding to do so, a new way of thinking the relationship between the state and society has become necessary.”3 This new way of thinking the about the state is necessary in order to assess the achievements, weaknesses, and post-capitalist possibilities presented by the pink tide. One potential foundational source of a renewed state theory is a figure who was once central to any Marxist discussion of the political, but who is now rarely mentioned: Nicos Poulantzas. But before turning to Poulantzas, it is useful to examine the contributions and limitations of the theory of hegemony as it has been used to understand Latin American politics.
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The theory of hegemony, of course, has a long, multi-threaded history. Though the term itself was important to some early Russian socialist political debates prior to 1917, its more famous conceptualization emerged within Italian communist Antonio Gramsci’s attempt to understand the position of Western European workers’ parties in the 1920s and 30s. The increasing popularity of Gramsci’s work over the course of the 20th century meant that hegemony theory soon found resonance outside of “Western Marxism”—the importance of the concepts of hegemony and subalternity for the South Asian subaltern studies school, for instance, is well known. Scholars of Latin American politics and culture within the North American academy, including many who originally hail from Latin America, have also made extensive use of this theoretical complex, and in 1993 the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group (which officially lasted until 2000) was founded on the model of Ranajit Guha and his South Asian colleagues.4
Literary scholar Gareth Williams was one of the latter-day members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group. In his 2002 book The Other Side of the Popular, Williams attempts to push onward with the group’s mission “to recuperate the figure of the subaltern” in order to challenge “elitist forms of conceptualization that have silenced Latin American subalternity within Latin America’s histories of nation formation.”5 He seeks to refine the notion of subalternity so as to unite the “philosophical-deconstructive” meaning of the term, which he associates with Gayatri Spivak, with a more sociological understanding ascribed to Guha.6 In its more “philosophical” role, subalternity “promises to interrupt” dominant political narratives—it is an ontological fragment whose very presence signals the limit of state politics. In its more concrete sociological meaning, on the other hand, it denotes the persistence of a sort of working-class or peasant political sensibility that stands outside, and in antagonism to, elite politics. With these two meanings taken together, Williams explains that “subalternity continues the possibility of, and yet promises to destabilize, hegemony’s often neo-colonial expansion of its universalizing logics… [it] is a limit to constituted power that is potentially constitutive of alternative forms of thinking, reading, and acting.”7 In other words, the oppressed and excluded quarters of society constitute a subaltern difference, which in turn stands in for the political possibility of a different future to come. Thus, politically, Williams’ synthesis means that one should take one’s cues from those outside what Gramsci called the historic bloc in power; philosophically, these outsiders are the bulwark of potential deconstructive difference holding back the totalizing threat of state and capital.
Williams’ argument is a representative example of Latin American Subaltern Studies: he offers some important insights, but he also comes up against characteristic limitations. His definition of subalternity clarifies some of the group’s more ambiguous work by arguing that subalternity cannot be reduced to simple identity politics. And he provides a compelling analysis of the dangers of such an approach by explaining how Latin American states in the mid-20th century used variants of subaltern identity politics in order to solidify the position of national capitalists and forge mass bases for elite political parties.8 Nevertheless, the incorporation of the “philosophical-deconstructive” reading of hegemony and subalternity means that Williams mistakes theoretical concepts for ontological categories—that is, he takes a set of ideas that correspond to a specific political issues and radically over-generalizes them.9 By using hegemon and subaltern as synonyms for “oppressed” and “oppressor,” Williams and other subalternists lose the ability to explain the particular relation that the former set of concepts is meant to illustrate. This mistake obscures the more specific sociological meaning in the work of Gramsci and Guha (relating to class alliances and ideological leadership), and the terms hegemony and subalternity become transhistorical stand-ins for an eternally recurring dynamic of unequal power relations.10
The consequence of philosophizing and generalizing hegemony theory is that as soon as the subaltern strata become hegemonic—which was, of course, the strategic goal underlying Gramsci’s own theory—subalternists run into a political dead end. Their conflation of subalternity and oppression does not permit the possibility that the newly hegemonic classes and groups are still oppressed and exploited. Such a political scenario destabilizes the entire relationship of subalternity and hegemony and should lead to a search for appropriate concepts.
To return to this year’s protests in Venezuela—it would be possible, on a certain view of the scenes there, to project onto protesters the status of a subaltern group, an oppressed minority who is excluded from the hegemonic bloc in power represented by the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (a catch-all collection of pro-Chávez parties and movements). Such an assumption (protesters=oppressed=subaltern) might have been a safe bet for the Left in the last quarter century, but this political reduction is untenable in the case of Bolivarian Venezuela. One has to look instead beyond immediate power relations to the underlying social framework. It would be important to note in this case: the history of gentrification in the Venezuelan universities where many protesters came from; the relationship of these anti-Chavista students to the traditional power elite; the nature of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela itself as a state comprising a great number of social organizations that, in another moment, were clearly subaltern.11 In short, to define the relations of power, Left observers need to theorize the political situation in question rather than rely on the categorical oppositions of a social ontology of oppressed and oppressor.
In light of the new success of popular mass movements, some thinkers have begun the necessary reconceptualization. John Beverley sums up the question that I am trying to advance here:
What happens when, as has been the case with some of the governments of the marea rosada in Latin America, subaltern or, to use the expression more in favor today, subaltern-popular social movements originating well outside the parameters of the state and formal politics (including the traditional parties of the Left), have “become the state,” to borrow Ernesto Laclau’s characterization, or have lent themselves to political projects seeking to occupy the state?12
In other words, what happens when the state and subaltern cease to be in opposition? In answering this, Beverley, a founding member of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, abandons his previously strict anti-state orientation. He rightly notes that we cannot approach Latin American politics today within a merely philosophical or deconstructive framework— the pressing weight of political possibility, that is, “the resurgence of an actual political Left in Latin America,” compels us to take a stand beyond solidarity with those who happen to be out of power, and to pay attention instead to the political and social composition of the new left states.13 In doing so, one finds that far from reproducing an infinite alternation of hegemony and subalternity, the marea rosada represents a rarity: the agency of the subaltern passing through the framework of the state. Beverley is an thus an unabashed supporter of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution and, despite many acute differences, all other left-leaning political undertakings in the region. Whatever their present weaknesses, he argues,the current state-centered Latin American Left can “keep alive the idea of socialism as the postcapitalist order of things,” and at the same time present the actual “‘transformative’ possibility” that “society itself can be remade in a more redistributive, egalitarian, culturally diverse way.”14
Beverley notes that it is not enough for the Left to simply take over the state; it must transform the state machinery as well. Yet his readiness to indiscriminately endorse any left-leaning state project, as well as his quick condemnation of left endeavors that aim away from state power (namely, the anti-electoral stance of Mexico’s Zapatista National Liberation Army), mean that he does not ask important questions that might help to drive such transformations. The imprudence of this nearly dogmatic support is clear when one considers the history of the Left-in-power, so full of mistakes, betrayals, and tragedies. The troublesome legacies of the German SPD and the USSR parallel the difficulties of Salvador Allende’s aborted term as president of Chile and the missteps of the ongoing Cuban Revolution. Each of these cases is unique, but then, as now, the institutionalized Left had more to gain from questions and challenges than from acritical admiration. It is essential to keep these questions alive: how can the Left consolidate power without falling into authoritarianism? What are the possible pitfalls that might derail a revolutionary project? And beyond abstract ideals, what do we hope that Left-leaning states actually do—and don’t do—in order to open up a set of post-capitalist possibilities?
Jon Beasley-Murray, like Beverley, argues for a renewed attention to the state, but his skepticism about state-centered projects gives his 2010 book Posthegemony a critical edge that Beverley lacks. He advances his argument through a critique of Argentine political philosopher Ernesto Laclau—one the most complex theorists of hegemony, and a waypoint of the theory’s proliferation within both British cultural studies and South Asian subalternist scholarship. A brief reconstruction of Beasley-Murray’s argument will thus illustrate another threshold of the present theoretical conjuncture.
Laclau, for his part, attempts to theorize the articulation of social antagonism through chains of equivalence between social sectors. His version of hegemony theory is meant to explain how a figure like Argentina’s Juan Perón, for instance, came to signify different things for his polarized base of both left and right political groups—an unexpected joining of students and militarists, trade unionists and capitalists.15 Laclau conceives of Perón himself as an empty signifier that took on different valences for each of these different factions. He discursively managed to bring them all together against the common enemy at the core of Peronist discourse, an always-shifting “anti-people” consisting sometimes of communists, at other times imperialists, and yet at other times, the old oligarchy. Conversely, Laclau uses this same logic to explain how excluded subaltern movements begin to make demands on a state, establishing an equivalence between them that can ultimately lead to the creation of a mass counter-hegemonic project.16 Though Laclau’s work is considerably more elaborate than this brief account might suggest, the point is that the concept of hegemony and the logics of equivalence and difference sit at the center of his theoretical world.
But for Beasley-Murray, this emphasis leads Laclau into the same error that I’ve identified in Williams: by ascribing an ontological status to particular concepts, Laclau reduces all of politics to a relation between hegemony and subalternity. Other manifestations of the political are categorically discounted; nothing can be explained except through the play of signifiers and discursive representations. As Beasley-Murray argues, “The basic flaw in hegemony theory is not [as some have suggested] its underestimation of the economy; it is that it substitutes culture for state, ideological representations for institutions, discourse for habit.”17 In other words, questions of representation displace all other mechanisms of power. All of politics becomes a game of who or what can best represent their hegemonic bloc, and the state itself—not to mention the constituents of hegemonic power—receives no theoretical elaboration.
Beasley-Murray, however, does not focus on to the state so as to better support it. Rather, his goal is to understand the way that the state restrains revolutionary potential by harnessing the constituent power of the multitude and stabilizing it in the constituted power of the state and its subject, the people. He thus aligns himself with movements that eschew such capture—again, Mexico’s contemporary Zapatistas come to mind—through the pursuit of autonomy and sporadic insurrection, occupying the boundaries of constituent and constituted power rather than attempting to simply replace one state with another. The real political test of a movement, for Beasley-Murray, is whether transformations manifest themselves in creative forms of collectivity and novel social practices outside the arena of the state.18
As Becquer Seguín points out, if Beverley is not critical enough of the pink tide states, Beasley-Murray’s theoretical positions lead him into an unsatisfying political ambivalence regarding state power itself. At best, his emphasis on insurgency and insurrection leads to the conclusion that the positive power of the state is largely irrelevant. And at worst, this route leads back into the same cul-de-sac as subalternism: an oversimplification of politics in which whatever is against the state is always deserving of political backing.19
While Beverley and Beasley-Murray therefore represent two opposite poles of a theoretical advance beyond hegemony theory and subalternism, neither gives us any political criteria by which assess the various actions and decisions of pink-tide governments. Seguín rightly notes that their accounts “all too quickly support or reject pink tide governments without being able to differentiate among them.”20 He asks instead what it would mean to present a true “left-wing critique” of the pink tide: “Can we critique these governments from within the realm of their theoretical enterprise precisely in order to make them more egalitarian, democratic, multicultural, multiethnic, and the like?”21 In other words, how can we contribute to and learn from the political projects underway while holding onto a Marxist theoretical framework and sharing the stated emancipatory goals of those governments? And how can we gauge the achievements, flaws, and trajectories of these governments without rejecting them or unequivocally backing their every move?
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An oft neglected theoretical perspective presents itself as a stepping stone out of the mire: Nicos Poulantzas’ theory of the capitalist state.22 The most intriguing elements of this theory for a left-wing critique of the pink tide are found in State, Power, Socialism, published a year prior to the author’s death in 1979. Part of the difficulty with this text is that, as Stuart Hall noted in a commemorative 1980 article, many of its more exciting insights require further explication.23 Poulantzas opened a path that he himself did not live long enough to walk. Even his most basic insights, however, can shed some light on our central question of how best to evaluate 21st century socialism today. First, with Poulantzas’ concept of state power, it is possible to rethink what it means for a president like Chávez or a movement like Bolivia’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) to “take power.” And with the complementary idea of the institutional materiality of the state , we can reexamine key transitional questions—like the status of the nation, or the social division of labor—in order to grasp how different political changes may deepen the process of socialist construction. Together, these two concepts, state power and institutional materiality, form the nucleus of a general political orientation toward the pink tide.
For Poulantzas, Marx and Engels’ comment in the Manifesto of the Communist Party that the state is the committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie is a starting point, but it is incomplete. It aims at the first concept, state power, without recognizing that the state is “a special apparatus, exhibiting a peculiar material framework that cannot be reduced to given relations of political domination.”24 In other words, the flaw in Marx and Engels’ most commonly cited (but by no means only) formulation on the state is that it fails to specify the shape and role of the state machinery within the broader landscape of bourgeois class rule. Rather than speaking to its institutional materiality, it suggests that it is enough to qualify a state as a bourgeois state in order to understand it.
But even state power is more complex than it appears in the “ruling committee” formulation: important divisions traverse its configuration, meaning that the state cannot be reduced to the expression of a unified class. Class conflict, says Poulantzas, is “inscribed into the institutional structure of the state.”25 This means that, against the notion of class dictatorship emphasized by Lenin, the state is not the product of a victory by one class over another, but is rather itself “a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions.”26 That is to say, the antagonism with which classes encounter each other in the economic realm reproduces itself politically on the terrain—though not only on this this terrain—of the state. Thus, even while a state may be bourgeois in the sense that it ultimately reproduces capitalist relations of production, Poulantzas’ argument suggests that no single class or class fraction can dictate the terms of this reproduction.27 The presence of social and political resistance by exploited classes is registered in the political architecture of bourgeois class domination.
Most basically, one can conceptualize by this the concrete presence of the working classes and other oppressed groups within state institutions. The capitalist state comprises massive numbers of workers whose obedience allow it to operate effectively, or not. In the case of Venezuela, for instance, left organizations have found some success organizing the many working class (and often racialized) members of the military. This class division within the armed forces led to a number of soldier-led rebellions and defections during the armed movements of the Left in the 1960s, and also spawned the clandestine Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement from which Chávez himself emerged.28 The internal divisions in the military also proved important during the 2002 coup attempt against Chávez, when number of junior officers decided to turn against the coup-plotters and join the masses of more or less organized workers and Caracas slum-dwellers who crowded the streets to demand his return.29 In short, state power in this context is conditioned by the status of class conflict: the ruling classes cannot simply possess or occupy it as if in separation from the the classes they exploit, since these classes are vital to the operation of the state itself.
Cutting across these class divisions, another set of fissures separates the many institutional components that frame the broader structure of state power. Side-by-side apparatuses with potentially clashing goals—the military, the bureaucracy of this or that department, even individual judges or legislators—engage in a complex, situationally dependent, and ultimately contingent interplay of decisions and priorities.30 These differing priorities may in turn be the manifestation of variable configurations of class contradiction within a given branch or department. Ultimately, says Poulantzas, developing Althusser’s account of the relative autonomy of the state, “the establishment of the State’s policy must be seen as the result of class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the State.”31 That is, through the interaction of the various departments and branches affected in different ways by class relationships, the state takes on a number of potentially conflictive projects, and cannot therefore be thought as an instrument to be unilaterally directed by a particular class.
Here, Poulantzas’ non-unitary concept of state power provides some insight into the role and limits of charismatic leaders like Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales, and it can correct some misconceptions arising from an overemphasis on hegemony. If the theory of hegemony can explain how these figures became emblematic of their respective movements through the play of empty signifiers and subaltern demands, the concept of the relatively autonomous and internally divided state shows that the ideological prominence that led to their election does not translate into unfettered political power. The positions of such leaders are always both bolstered by and beholden to the contours of class struggle and the multifarious structures of the capitalist states they inherit. As Beasley-Murray correctly argues, hegemony theory tends toward a fetishization of both state and individual leader that finds its apogee in the ideology of populism. The result is either a hope- or fear-driven assumption (depending on your political position) of instrumentalism: the populist President appears to have complete control of the State. Poulantzas’ conceptualization of relative autonomy precludes such conclusions; “A change in state power,” he writes, “is never enough to transform the materiality of the state apparatus,” rather, “such a transformation depends on a specific kind of operation and action.”32 But what is this “specific kind of operation and action”? And what sort of transformations are we to expect or hope for in any case? To ask this is to bring into view the question of institutional materiality.
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While the concept of state power designates how different positions of power are structurally related, institutional materiality designates the specific means and circuits through which these relationships crystallize in capitalism.33 To ask about the specifics of the institutional materiality of the state in a given scenario is to ask: what is the sedimented shape of political bodies and institutions in a given social formation, and by what mechanisms are they linked to the reproduction of capitalist relations of production and the classes that inhere in it? From this perspective, Poulantzas offers further inquiries—what is it about capitalism that has made so prominent the institutions of representative democracy, such as parliaments and legislatures? How might the separation between the governing and the governed be related to the larger division of manual and intellectual labor within capitalism? Why is the individual, and not some other unit, the object of power in such political circumstances? And why, more often than not, has nationality become the de facto binding agent of capitalist states?
Of course, not all of these can be directly addressed here, and the answers may vary in different concrete scenarios. But taken alongside the concept of state power, the concept of institutional materiality can set these questions into motion, so to speak, as questions of transformation—and perhaps even point toward the transition to a new mode of production. In other words, in understanding how the specific shape of the state relates to the distribution of power both within and outside of it, the measures by which that shape can change become clearer.
The transformation of the institutional materiality of the state, however, should be differentiated from minor policy shifts in response to popular demands. This distinction is what separates social democratic welfare states from potentially revolutionary ones. It is the difference between a supposedly socialist state that tries to create objective economic conditions for a perpetually deferred future socialist society, and one that sets itself to, as Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera says, “support as much as possible the deployment of society’s autonomous organizational capacities,” and to invite the masses into the political circuitry of the state.34
Poulantzas approaches this issue in terms of the social division of labor. He argues that the existence of a specific institution charged with social organization ( the state) is an instance of the division between intellectual labor and manual labor at the heart of the broader social division of labor within capitalism.35 This insight opens various options for left political projects. It would be characteristic of social democracy, for instance, to act strictly within the confines of the existing social division of labor, governing with an eye toward the masses, and toward a redistribution of wealth, toward regulating capital, and even taking on a more direct organizational role in some industries by nationalizing them. In contrast, a revolutionary perspective on this point would have to refigure this divide: if the science of government is an intellectual project of capital, then one thing that the institutionalized Left must do, instead of simply governing differently, is open up governing apparatuses to those who were previously excluded from this intellectual work with the hope that the types of knowledge they bring to social organization will displace that of a class trained in reproducing relations of exploitation.
To what extent are pink tide governments and the movements that propel them expanding the possibilities for regular mass engagement with the day-to-day work of governing, usually ceded to technocrats and representatives? How might workers, campesinos, neighborhood organizations, and others execute their own projects with resources that would otherwise travel through the upper echelons of the state? In short, to what extent is the state being restructured so as to encourage and make possible popular participation?
In the case of Bolivarian Venezuela, Article 62 of the 1999 Constitution articulates this goal: “The participation of the people in the formation, execution, and control of public administration is the necessary means to achieve its protagonism and guarantee its complete development, both individual and collective.”36 The state, according to Article 62, is to create conditions favorable to this possibility. A great number of programs have come into existence to this end, including Communal Councils that, as stated in the 2006 law implementing them, “allow the organized people to directly manage public policy and projects oriented toward responding to the needs and aspirations of communities in the construction of a society of equity and social justice.37
Also in the spirit of Article 62 is the a policy of worker-state co-management that actually blurs the lines between the political and the economic by redistributing the intellectual work of social organization across the boundaries of the productive sphere. Inveval, a worker-occupied valve producer in the coastal state of Miranda, is one of the more successful projects of co-management, operating not only under worker control, but in tandem with local community-based participatory structures in order to avoid the capitalist pitfalls that undo the best efforts of many workers’ cooperatives. The balance of worker power, community power and the state at Inveval creates a nexus of transformation in which the top-down social division of labor has no place.38 The realms of production, consumption, and distribution are bound together in a novel reconfiguration of the social division of labor.
Thus, against social democracy, the thing to pay attention to in the marea rosada is not so much a state’s intervention in the economy, as if from the outside, but rather the state’s efforts to transform its own role in the social division division of labor and refigure class relationships that otherwise exclude direct producers from decision-making. The above are just brief examples—deserving of more scrutiny—whose significance becomes intelligible within this Poulantzian theoretical framework. Without then succumbing to an abstract faith in participation, and without confusing these examples for the death throes of capitalism, this perspective illuminates the emphasis on participatory democracy that pervades the discourse of the institutionalized Latin American Left. The standard of this greater participation, from a critical left perspective, must be to leave open the political door to greater transformations down the line. Against economism or revisionism, the pink tide states can only create post-capitalist possibilities by building, as Marta Harnecker says, “spaces of popular protagonism that continue to prepare the popular sectors to exercise power from the simplest level to the most complex.”39
The importance of reflexive political transformation also becomes clear through the example of the nation. Nationalism is, of course, a recurring historical question for the Left, and one with important consequences for any revolutionary approach to politics. With respect to Latin America, John Beverley argues (contra Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri) that the nation is still an indispensable political locus: “To construct the politics of the multitude today, under conditions of globalization and in the face of the neoliberal critique and privatization of state functions requires a relegitimization and reterritorialization of the nation-state.”40 In other words, with the apparent fragmentation and weakening of the nation-state vis-á-vis international capital, the Left needs to push back, emphasizing its importance and making it a site of struggle.
Beverley makes a fair point here, but wades into dangerous territory in the process: In the mid-20th century, the consolidation of mestizo national-popular identities throughout Latin America, alongside import-substitution economic models, offered an important way for various national capitals to strengthen themselves and to build corporatist arrangements through unions and political parties. The result of this political project in ostensible defense of the nation was largely a co-optation of fledgling worker’s movements and a refusal to acknowledge the persistence of racism and indigenous oppression.41 And as the wave of right wing dictatorships that followed in the wake of these projects shows, the contradictions within these national coalitions were always resolved in favor of capital.42
Acknowledging this history under the heading of “populist” nationalism however, Beverley hopes for something else:
What might be envisioned in the place of both classical nineteenth-century style nationalism and more recent populist forms of nationalism is a new kind of politics that interpellates “the people” not as a unitary, homogeneously modern subject, but rather in the fashion of [Otto] Bauer’s “communities of will,” as internally fissured, heterogeneous, multiple.43
This general call for pluralism allows Beverley to differentiate his hopes from those of last century’s nation building projects, yet he does not remark on the role of the state in actualizing his ideals, nor on the relationship of different internal fissures—namely class struggle—to nationalism.
Poulantzas can fill in these gaps on the heterogeneity of the nation. Like the state itself, “the modern nation is… the outcome of a relationship of forces between ‘modern’ social classes—one in which the nation is the stake for the various classes.”44 In other words, the fractures and divisions that traverse the state also cut through the nation. This is because, according to Poulantzas, the nation itself is a state project, built and defined through the construction of borders and the shaping of national histories.45 To construct the nation as an “internally fissured, heterogeneous, multiple,” then, is to play upon borders and histories as they relate to existing social divisions. Just as with the division of labor, the point is not to use the existing apparatuses to alleviate the ills of capitalism—for instance by smoothing over class or racial heterogeneity with a new discursive construction. Instead, a refiguration of the nation-state must bring those antagonisms into its very structure in order to open new political possibilities.
If, as Poulantzas says,“the state establishes the modern nation by eliminating other national pasts and turning them into variations on its own history,” then to what extent have the marea rosada states staked a claim for legitimacy by digging up these other pasts? What does it mean for a state to build upon an alternative and potentially divisive conception of subaltern history that explicitly challenges, and does not merely subsume, the historical narration of the dominant national framework? In other words, how do these states set the stage for transformation by bringing different claims to national legitimacy into conflict—in particular, by drawing on hidden discourses that locate the nation not in the past of the colonizers, or even of mestizo unity, but rather, of the oppressed, excluded, and exploited?
In Venezuela, the state’s acknowledgement of social conflict is itself a rebuke to a certain national history which has emphasized the “Venezuelan exception” in the second half of the 20th century. This supposedly exceptional history of Venezuelan unity and stability at a time when other South and Central American countries were divided by political strife was only achieved, in fact, through the strategy of puntofijismo, wherein Venezuela’s three major political parties agreed, following the 1959 introduction of formal democracy, to share power at the expense of both the radical Left and the remnants of the old rightist regime, and to enforce this pact through violent repression and exclusion of anyone who would question it.46 Chávez’s election marked the end of puntofijismo; with the support of the masses, political antagonism, which had erupted more than a few times even under that system, burst out into the open and achieved a presence in the state. The accusations that he was a divisive figure are correct in this respect: Chávez and the movements that brought him to power sought precisely to highlight the already divided status of the Venezuelan nation that had been obscured through 40 years of elite party rule. Thus, by acknowledging the existence of at least two Venezuelan nations, divided by class, the Bolivarian state took a giant forward leap in the founding of a new history and a new Venezuelan nation.
The theory of hegemony can, in part, explain this logic of equivalence wherein the social is split along increasingly clear lines, and one of Laclau’s great contributions is to reveal how these discursive demarcations (e.g., two Venezuelas) emerge. But Poulantzas introduces the question of how the state participates in and solidifies these reconceptualizations of the divided nation—i.e, to what extent these discursive constructions at the level of hegemony translate into changes in the state’s own nation-building role.
The case of Bolivia provides concrete examples of such changes. There, the rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo and the eventual propulsion of Evo Morales to the country’s presidency corresponded to a series of racial and class-based re-identifications of indigenous and national identity.47 MAS began as the “political instrument” of a grassroots coca growers syndicate, but with its 2006 entry into various key positions of state power, the battle it had been waging for social hegemony on the question of the nation—what is the Bolivian nation? what of the other indigenous nations that exist within the Bolivian borders?—entered the terrain of the state under the banner of plurinationalism. The 2009 constitution ended the Republic of Bolivia, a title and form of government predicated on national unity, and created the Plurinational State of Bolivia in its place; representatives from indigenous communities took seats alongside other deputies in the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly. That is to say, Bolivia gave up the very concept of the nation-state, and members of MAS, with massive participatory support, began to restructure both state power and institutional apparatuses on the basis of the Bolivian multitude’s internal divisions of class, race, and nationality.
The point here is not whether one is “for or against” the nation-state as a site of political mobilization—this matter is already settled in the case of the pink tide. One must ask instead how left-leaning governments can use the positive power of the state to transform the shape and content of the nation, even as they rely on it, and consider whether they are creating political space through which constituent power can push social transformation toward a decisive break with the capitalism. What should be clear, more broadly, is that beyond the questions of who is in charge and who they claim to represent stands the pressing matter of how those in power can reconfigure the various parts of the state, its institutional materiality, and change the terms of popular political engagement with an eye toward continuing struggle and future ruptures.
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Changes in theoretical practice must match the changes in the political practice of those we support. Though the course of political developments must guide any ongoing analysis of the pink tide, and though hegemony theory has its uses, Poulantzas’ state theory offers a necessary orientation for the current conjuncture.
Once we recognize that state power is a variegated and contradictory phenomenon, and that the task of state power is not simply to “take over” the state machinery, as one takes over the driver’s seat of a vehicle, then the need to deeply reconfigure the already-divided structure of the state becomes obvious. But how can one know when the reconfigurations are moving in the right direction? The guiding question is this: to what extent are purportedly left-leaning states sharpening the divisions that inhere in the state’s institutional materiality? In other words, to what extent are they carrying class struggle into the structure of the state apparatus, not to tame or reconcile it, but to advance, on the political level, the possibility of a rupture with capitalism? Where the mandate of capitalist states is always to accommodate or repress antagonism, the mandate of 21st century socialism must be heighten it and bring it to its political, and not solely economic, conclusions.
The political processes underway across Latin America are something less than communism, but they are something more than reformism. As they move on, however, they have the potential to become either. Their momentum is difficult to gauge; at times it is hard to tell the difference between a genuine opening of a state’s political structure and a cynical attempt to garner popular favor. The proof can only be in concrete transformations. Further elaboration of Poulantzas’ theoretical intervention can, hopefully, serve as a guide for understanding these changes. If we are to be fellow travellers of any political project today, and if critical voices can lend any sort of support to these political projects, then we need to track new developments, to push onward to further political rupture, and to encourage the deepening of the class struggle both outside of state apparatuses and within them.
International solidarity, of course, will not make or break a revolution. But cross-border engagements have been the glue of the worker’s movement since the days of the First International, and the stakes now are as high as ever: for if the pink tide turns red, it may sweep the whole world into uncharted seas.
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Hans-Jürgen Krahl: From Critical to Revolutionary Theory
Hans-Jürgen Krahl died in a car crash in 1970, at the age of twenty-seven. By that time he had weathered the rise and decline of the Socialist German Student Union (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, or SDS), among whose ranks he was, arguably, both the most sophisticated theorist and, after Rudi Dutschke, the most incendiary orator. The SDS had been founded shortly after World War II as the youth wing of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) of Germany. As the latter moved towards the center, however, the SDS radicalized, eventually leading to expulsion from its parent organization in 1961. It would soon become the most important student group in Germany, even as its official policy shifted further towards revolutionary Marxism.1 Krahl’s historical significance lies in the role he played as a leader of the SDS in the few years immediately before and after 1967-68, when the West German student movement reached its highest pitch. Yet his theoretical contributions are by no means inconsiderable – nor, in any case, can they be divorced from the practical political activities with which Krahl was occupied at the same time.
In this sense it may be argued that Krahl brought to a head the distinctive relation between theory and practice that had long been gestating within his milieu. Crucial to the development of the SDS was the attendance of various members, including Krahl, at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main. It was here that West German students with little or no personal memory of the Nazi period encountered the early works of Georg Lukács, Karl Korsch, and others, as well as the still-evolving thought of the Institute’s own faculty. As such the Frankfurt School was a living connection to a Weimar-era left that had been utterly destroyed under Hitler. By the same measure it also demonstrated the existence of a Marxist tradition distinct from that of the neighboring German Democratic Republic. New recruits belonging to the Frankfurt School’s so-called second generation, such as Jürgen Habermas and Oskar Negt, further enhanced the Institute’s prestige among would-be anti-authoritarians.
Yet for young radicals the Frankfurt School’s legacy was far from unambiguous. Its protagonists had made various compromises merely to survive the preceding decades of Nazism and Cold War reconsolidation. Notably, both Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, the Institute’s leaders, had over the years retreated to positions that came to seem quietist if not openly conservative, at least to students beginning to take cues from the era’s decolonization movements, anti-rearmament campaigns, and protests against the Vietnam War. By the end of the 1960s this led to direct confrontations between Adorno and his own students, most dramatically in January 1969 when Adorno called in the police to break up an occupation of the Institute that had been initiated by Krahl himself. Of the Institute’s prewar cohort only Herbert Marcuse – based at the time in San Diego, rather than West Germany – maintained a consistently revolutionary stance. If, then, the paradigmatic relationship between postwar Germans and their parents was inevitably fractured by the question of complicity with Nazism, by the mid- to late-1960s it appeared that a secondary divide was starting to open between the first and second, or more properly the third, generations of critical theorists.
It was in this context that Krahl made his decisive interventions, both theoretically and practically. He began writing a dissertation under Adorno’s supervision in 1965, at the same time as he was becoming involved in the day-to-day operations of the SDS (he had in fact previously belonged to the political Right). Yet by the time of his former teacher’s death in 1969 he was capable of delivering a biting critique of the “political contradiction of Adorno’s critical theory” – in the guise of an obituary, no less.2 Krahl published little during his lifetime. Other than reading notes for personal use, most of his surviving texts are seminar papers or speeches, or were prepared as discussion material for teach-ins.3 Krahl was nonetheless a distinctive voice in the German New Left’s fractious intellectual culture, the flavor of which one can now gather from the pages of journals such as Das Argument and neue kritik, where immediate strategic and tactical concerns of the day tend to lie in close proximity to theoretical discourse at the highest level of abstraction.
Krahl epitomized this mobility. In his writing, points that at first seem straightforward often lead to intricate theoretical justification, while dryly philological matters take on the texture of everyday struggle. Nowhere is this two-step more striking than in the notorious speech he delivered jointly with Dutschke at an SDS conference in September 1967, in which analysis of recent economic trends quickly leads to a call for the “propaganda of gunfire in the Third World” to be complemented by “the propaganda of the deed in the metropole.”4 The effect can be vertiginous – “like Hegel on acid,” Anders Ramsay has said.5 Whatever the defects of his prose, though, Krahl’s basic impulse is always clear. The Frankfurt School as he knew it had passed down a trove of theoretical tools, but these had become transfixed in a conservative attitude that denied the dialectical mediation of theory and practice. It was Krahl who most insisted on taking up the legacy of critical theory from the perspective of revolutionary theory (against the likes of Habermas, it bears mentioning), that is to say – to quote the essay translated in this issue of Viewpoint – from the perspective of a “doctrine the propositions of which describe society in terms of its revolutionary transformability.” His work is thus an immanent critique and eclipse of the very intellectual tradition in which he was profoundly immersed. This perhaps accounts for the somewhat estranging effect of many of Krahl’s essays. In his collected writings published posthumously as Konstitution und Klassenkampf (Constitution and Class Struggle), it may seem that he is only juggling quotations, or drawing links from one Marxist authority to another, yet his conclusions are always, inevitably, nothing if not radical with respect to any given political conjuncture. Precision and philosophical rigor sometimes give way to polemical effect; on the other hand, concrete analysis often bogs down in obscure jargon. Yet, if this is regrettable, it is also the surest index of the intensity with which Krahl set himself to the work of building a theoretically ambitious post-Frankfurt School Marxism adequate to the upheavals of the few years in which he was writing.
So it is with the text at hand, “The Philosophy of History and the Authoritarian State.” (The German title, slightly different, is “Zur Geschichtsphilosophie des autoritären Staates.”) Krahl’s aim here is to review Marxist theories of the state – specifically, of the authoritarian state during periods of economic crisis – in order to better describe the possibility of revolution in his own moment of the late 1960s. This effort takes the form, notably, of a recovery of Max Horkheimer’s essay on the topic from 1940 – one of the author’s most insistently radical statements, which was read feverishly by anti-authoritarians in the 1960s (much to the older and more conservative Horkheimer’s displeasure). We hope Krahl’s piece will speak for itself, in spite of its difficulties, and hence we will merely gesture at the problems it seeks to address. The following strike us as among the more significant: the changed relation of base and superstructure in late capitalism; the necessity that historical materialism apply its method to itself; the obsolescence of the traditional Marxist critique of voluntarism; the degeneration of Marxist theory following the revolutionary wave of the early twentieth century; and the status of both fascism and the welfare state as intermediaries between capitalism and socialism. The piece covers tremendous ground, then. Not everything is equally well developed. Hence the reader is encouraged to approach this essay in part as a snapshot of Krahl’s thinking caught in midair.
So what exactly is the authoritarian state according to Krahl? We might take a cue here from the author himself and approach the authoritarian state as he did, both theoretically as well as practically, with the aim of grasping how its manifestation shapes the form and horizon of political struggle. While Krahl’s essay makes reference to myriad theorists, two tributaries are essential: Horkheimer’s own thoughts on the authoritarian state, and the theory of monopoly capitalism. For Horkheimer, writing in 1940 in a volume dedicated to the memory of Walter Benjamin, the authoritarian state could appear in fascism as well as in its supposed alternatives, the capitalist welfare state and, especially, state socialism. What defined it was not its form of appearance, but the drive to subsume the contradictions and crisis tendencies of capitalism to deliberate political control. The authoritarian state’s existence not only intensified and expanded modes of extra-economic coercion, but, by suspending capital’s tendency toward crisis, it also abolished the very conditions on which certain Marxist traditions had thought the possibility for revolt depended. Yet rather than lead to resignation, Horkheimer’s analysis moved him to embrace – however briefly – a revolutionary praxis for which the argument of properly mature conditions hardly applied. In his remarkable essay, we see Horkheimer promote the need for the masses to spontaneously capture the forces of production, bypassing and abandoning the state entirely. “For the revolutionary,” Horkheimer declared boldly, “conditions have always been ripe.”6
Krahl’s description of the authoritarian state is in most ways the application of Horkheimer’s theory to a specific historical situation, defined by what Krahl would describe – informed in the first instance by Lenin’s analysis of imperialism – as the shift from competitive to monopoly capitalism. In contrast to the clear influence of Horkheimer on Krahl’s concept of the authoritarian state – he even bookends the essay with quotations from Horkheimer – the main source for his understanding of monopoly capitalism is not specifically stated; it seems instead an amalgamation of classic works by the likes of Engels, Lenin, and Hilferding molded by the many postwar proponents of the monopoly capitalism thesis. While frequently named in the essay, the term “monopoly capital” is, notably, undefined by Krahl. This is no doubt a reflection of the particular West German radical milieu in and to which Krahl was writing, one that took it for granted that capitalism had entered a new historical stage defined by monopolistic business interests. There were (and continue to be) varied takes on what monopoly capitalism is, but to give a sense of Krahl’s intellectual context we might do well to gloss the influential work of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, whose 1966 book Monopoly Capital left a profound mark on the German New Left’s Marxism.7 According to Baran and Sweezy, the world following the Second World War was dominated by large corporations protected against competition from smaller upstarts by government intervention. In such a landscape, states worked together with enterprises to create sites for absorbing economic surpluses generated during the so-called golden age of capitalism, although these outlets were most often military endeavors and the financial sector. Krahl’s understanding of monopoly capitalism certainly encompassed more than Baran and Sweezy’s book; and given his study of value theory, Krahl likely even took issue with their controversial notion of “economic surplus.” Yet the point to be made here is this: the authoritarian state of interest to Krahl is the state formation proper to monopoly capital. As he explains, the authoritarian state consists of the entire “repressive instrumentarium” necessary “to delay definitive economic collapse and to sabotage the real possibility” that unified struggle by the proletariat could bring an end to capitalism. Ultimately Krahl’s theory of the authoritarian state amounts to less a revision of Horkheimer – or, for that matter, Marxian understandings of the state – than a refusal of past theories of the crisis and collapse of capitalism, as well as what he names in a related essay the “fatal social democratic ideology of the Second International that predicted capitalism would bring socialism into being by natural necessity.”8 Such traditions had lost their luster in the years since the First World War, though certain of their precepts continued to hold sway among the intellectual mentors of the German New Left, many of whom looked askance at the younger generation’s political will and worked intensely to convince them to change course. It is into this discourse that Krahl looked to intervene.
Left unstated in the translated portion of this text are the circumstances of its composition, which clarify Krahl’s practical intents for it. The essay was meant to be included in documentation of the “political university” that Frankfurt SDS members had attempted to establish in May of 1968, in the midst of student strikes against passage of the notorious Notstandsgesetze, or emergency laws. These were a major priority of the ruling Grand Coalition between the SPD and the conservative Christian Democrats. They provided for abrogation of basic civil rights in the event of ill-defined states of emergency, and were seen by the German Left as revivals of Nazi-era policies. Despite enormous nationwide street protests and strikes, the laws were passed on May 30 of that year. Failure to sway the course of the legislative process was then an impetus for further radicalization in the New Left milieu and was taken to prove, as Krahl notes in the essay’s preface, here untranslated, that the “dialectic of reform and revolution” had been “historically exhausted.”9 It was the evident paradox of a Social Democratic government pushing through repressive legislation that was presumably the immediate prompt for Krahl’s analysis. But the intervention he sought to make with it targeted an ingrained belief that successful revolutionary action depended on the maturation of proper objective conditions. As the 1960s wore on and the SDS grew increasingly militant, its members were bombarded from all sides by innumerable critiques, the fiercest of which emanated from the halls of the Institute for Social Research itself. It was neither Horkheimer nor Adorno, but a young Jürgen Habermas who distinguished himself as the SDS’s most virulent critic. In a heated debate with Rudi Dutschke in June 1967, Habermas infamously accused the SDS not just of “subjective insolence” in their apparent disregard for the absence of proper conditions for revolutionary struggle, but of “left fascism” as well. It is as a justification for continued and escalated struggle in the face of charges of voluntarism that we might read Krahl’s essay.10 If nothing else, it is a passionate defense of the thesis that the conditions for struggle will always be ripe so long as the “exploitative essence” of the capital relation persists.11
This is the crux of what Krahl’s essay contributes to the theory and praxis of his time. It is a critique of the critiques of voluntarism that faced West Germany’s anti-authoritarian Left. But here we run up against the trickiest aspect of Krahl’s argument. At the time he was writing, critics of the monopoly capitalism thesis, like Paul Mattick, charged its proponents with suggesting that the government intervention made necessary by monopoly capitalism could also make the possibility of abolishing economic crisis and collapse a reality. In his 1966 review of Monopoly Capital, Mattick insisted that even if one were to accept the fleeting actuality of monopoly capitalism, the state that supports it could only be “capable of postponing, but not of abolishing, crisis conditions.”12 Whether Mattick is correct in his accusation that Baran and Sweezy argued state intervention could eliminate the possibility of crisis is certainly beyond the scope of Krahl’s essay. Yet it does force us to ask a question that may nag contemporary readers of “The Philosophy of History and the Authoritarian State”: does Krahl’s description of the authoritarian state take as a premise the possible end of capitalist crisis? Unfortunately, on this topic, the present essay is ambiguous. But keep in mind, the West German recession of 1966, which marked the end of the so-called postwar “Economic Miracle” and reintroduced the country to the vicissitudes of capital accumulation, was still fresh in the memory of the New Left. It was clear to most, Krahl included, that the possibility for economic crisis surely had not passed. And yet Krahl joined the ranks of those who viewed the formation of the Grand Coalition between the SPD and CDU as partly a political response to the return of such economic turbulence. Thus, instead of accepting the authoritarian state as what Krahl describes here as “capital’s political exit from the economic crisis,” we might better grasp it as the “repressive instrumentarium” that allows capital to mediate economic crisis politically.
Over half a decade into the current global crisis – itself the postponed fulfillment of the crisis of the 1970s – evidence of its mediation by the state is everywhere and takes varying forms, from so-called austerity measures to the militarization of police. There is no way to “fix” capital, and there is certainly no fixing it via state intervention. Every measure the state takes to solve the current crisis and prevent its recurrence will only favor capital. As Krahl might have insisted, the only hope we can place in the state is the chance to destroy it. But alas, destroying the state – even the authoritarian state – will never, on its own, bring about the destruction of capital. By the same measure, though, neither will economic crisis automatically lead to the overthrow of capital’s state.
“The Philosophy of History and the Authoritarian State” ought then to be considered in tandem with Johannes Agnoli’s contemporaneous work on the same topic, some of which is also translated in this issue of Viewpoint: they are joint attempts to advance a theory of the state that does not succumb to one variety or another of Marxist reductionism (the state as either fully autonomous from, or fully subservient to, the interests of capital). As such, the essay can also legitimately be considered part of the prehistory of the 1970s “state derivation debate,” in which context these matters were to be theorized at much greater length. It was precisely to, or against, interventions by Krahl, Agnoli, and their contemporaries around 1968 – in addition to the orthodox theories of the state emanating from both eastern and western Communist Parties – that thinkers such as Claus Offe and Elmar Altvater were to respond a few years later. It is also these slightly later developments that help to fill out what is a missing link in Krahl’s writings on the state. His greatest theoretical legacy, in fact, does not lie in this field at all: it was rather the themes broached in Krahl’s attempts to reconstruct the logic of the commodity and its value-form that were to be taken up in the body of discourses known as the Neue Marx-Lektüre (New Reading of Marx, or NML), value-form theory, and the so-called “capital-logic” school.13 This is in part a matter of convergent evolution rather than direct filiation. Like Krahl, Hans-Georg Backhaus and Helmut Reichelt (key names in the early history of the NML) had studied with Adorno in Frankfurt; in all three cases, the events of the 1960s stimulated a return to the basics of the Marxist critique of political economy, at the expense of the cultural preoccupations that had dominated much of Adorno’s later work. Their point of departure was therefore similar.
Backhaus and Reichelt, though, have had the luxury of another forty-odd years to further develop the implications of their early insights. Krahl was not so lucky. His untimely death in February of 1970 deprived the SDS of one of its brightest stars. By then, though, the organization was already on its last legs. The era of the K-Groups followed soon thereafter – miniature Marxist-Leninist parties, generally also Maoist in orientation. The “anti-authoritarian” student revolt was then mostly liquidated in favor of supposedly necessary revolutionary discipline. Or else it flipped over into armed struggle, or diffused into the anarchistic Sponti (“Spontaneist”) scene, or into the apolitical counterculture. There was also, of course, what remains today the most lasting political legacy of the German New Left: the “long march through the institutions,” the path of which led directly to founding the Green Party, who, like the SPD before them, would prove their willingness to govern alongside the Christian Democrats. The personnel responsible for these developments had in many cases passed through the SDS orbit. Subsequent contributions to German critical theory also often read like a who’s who of its former activists. But the unity that the group had once provided was irrevocably lost. The SDS itself dissolved barely a month after Krahl’s decease. Though collected and published the next year, his writings of necessity quickly passed into the realm of the merely historical.
He had not been, at any rate, a universally adored figure. The most trenchant critique arrived via tomato: in September of 1968, the feminist Sigrid Rüger landed one on Krahl’s neck at an SDS conference in Frankfurt. Rüger was acting against male dominance within the organization. Ulrike Meinhof soon wrote a column approving the “attack”; it has since been recognized as a foundational moment in German feminism.14 Though it would exceed the scope of this introduction to consider the episode at greater length, perhaps we can at least recommend an aphorism from Marx that Krahl himself was fond enough of quoting – to wit: “The weapon of critique cannot indeed replace the critique of weapons.”
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Inside Logistics: Organization, Work, Distinctions
This interview was originally published by Commonware on September 10, 2013.
Commonware: Let us begin with the situation in the logistics industry in Italy. You have highlighted a few times how Italian businesses invest little in innovation, information systems, automatic storage systems and networks, and rely instead on the hyper-exploitation of low-skill labor, or those paid as though they were low-skill even if they have medium or higher levels of education (think of many migrants) – to give a snapshot of the paradigmatic traits of Italian business. How do things stand now in the logistics sector in Italy? What is changing in terms of innovation in this sector?
Sergio Bologna: I do not think that anything has changed, notwithstanding some expansion, in some parts of the country, of warehouses and logistics platforms.1 The expansion is often illusory because it is often a matter of moving from pre-existing locations. In the last three years, logistics companies that had their warehouses outside an interport, or were previously in an interport but left because it was cheaper elsewhere, have transferred to the Bologna and Padua interports, for example.2
Today the prices of warehouses of excellent quality, for sale or rent, are sometimes equal to or even lower than the prices in the less modern warehouses of a few years ago. The crisis is really about the unwillingness of managers or buyers to accept certain prices, and in particular the unwillingness to enter into long-term contracts, so that the owners of the property live with the anxiety of seeing the warehouse empty after a year, forced to go in search of a new tenant. Therefore, the opening of new platforms or new warehouses often coincides with the closing of others, abandoned because they are obsolete. The warehouses of class A, class B, or C correspond to different markets. In addition, you need to keep in mind the different roles of the key figures of this market, in particular the so-called “developers,” who represent a crucial link between landed property or real estate and the actual user, the one who manages the inventory on behalf of the company or on behalf of third parties. In this situation, although the market is not as stable as in certain industrial sectors, it is difficult to imagine that the lessee or purchaser of a warehouse would make the costly investments in advanced technologies – except for some market segments, such as pharmaceuticals and automobile manufacturing, where it is inevitable. So continues the intensive exploitation of the workforce.
Logistics is an industry with a highly complex organization of production and labor. Bearing in mind the extreme differentiation of what we call the logistics system, what are the main forms of labor that keep it running? In which nodes and particular links in the chain is valorization concentrated?
Before we talk about work, you must have a basic idea of which sectors we call logistics. First of all, we should distinguish industrial logistics from distribution logistics. Germany is the world leader, because it has developed industrial logistics to the utmost, with industrial quality standards, thus requiring adequate investment and sophisticated technology. It provides support in the choice of production planning, marketing, and location of production facilities; it provides support in the selection of suppliers, and sometimes get to have its say in the design of the product.
The other thing is distribution logistics, in turn divided into high-end distribution and low-level distribution, which consists essentially in bringing goods to stores according to a logic and parameters set by the owner of the goods or the manufacturer. There may be multi-client distribution companies that have a financial power much higher than that of their clients, and thus are able to organize distribution, with other value-added services attached, in conjunction with the client, and sometimes according to their own criteria. But there are also distribution companies that simply collect the cartons or pallets and deliver them to the point of sale. Logistics can never be understood from outside the warehouse, only by coming inside and looking at the techniques employed, the equipment and the organization of work does one understand if we find ourselves faced with something that belongs to the new economy, in the real sense of the term, or that resembles the sweatshops of Bangladesh.3 There is therefore no organization of standardized labor with specific figures, because every commodity sector has its specificity in industrial logistics, and because in distribution logistics, not all goods are subject to the same treatment (think only of perishable products, the cold chain4 or dangerous and toxic products). Speaking in the generic sense of “logistics” does not lead us anywhere. We have to start with the fundamental distinction between distribution logistics and industrial logistics, we have to identify the different industrial sectors that require a specific logistics, being careful to distinguish the internally organized phases of the cycle and those that are outsourced, assigned through outsourcing to a specialist. Then you have to deal with distribution logistics with its characteristics for specific products, always remembering that the three basic components of a logistics cycle are: the management of orders, warehousing, transportation, with the last two covering at least 50% of the total cost. It should be a labor of in-depth investigation. Out of 40 or 50 logistics companies established in an interport as big as Bologna you can also find 40 or 50 different models.
The last few years, especially the last one, have witnessed in Italy what can be defined as a cycle of struggles of logistics workers, in particular migrants. They fight against the cooperative system,5 which – as you’ve pointed out – constitute a system of blackmail and hyper-exploitation, and are born and die quickly and in a fraudulent way. These cooperatives are often permeated by or use parts of organized crime and the Mafia. What weight do you think these struggles have?
I do not know if you can speak of a cycle of struggles yet. However, they were very important because for the first time they unveiled this sector which is little-known and much discussed (almost always inappropriately). What they have achieved, I don’t know. In some places they haven’t moved anything – with this absurd idolatry of the market elements of incivility have rooted themselves so deeply, even in some unionized quarters, that one part, small I hope, of the diverse world of the counterparty sees the solution only in violent repression. One part, which is the majority, thinks it can get away with declarations of intent, memoranda of understanding and conferences; another side – aware even before the strikes of having taken things too far – sees that it has to change its tune. Unfortunately, the general background conditions are not favorable. The Letta government is a real disaster from this point of view, worse than the Monti-Fornero government, not only because he lives under the blackmail of Berlusconi and is apparently even happy to endure this blackmail, but because in this way he can make reactionary policy, which is now in the Democratic Party’s blood. But why does he continue to think that only flexibility at entry raises employment, repeating the mistake made by all governments from the Treu Law onwards.6 He therefore legitimates the exploitation of the labor force and does not open his mouth on the issue of legality. As for the logistics interests in the governing party, about which he talks plenty, it is clear from the unfortunate choice of the Municipality and the Province of Bologna to sell their controlling interest in the Bologna interport company, a public company that was useful and which will be sold for a pittance to an on-call real estate adventurer. The profits were not reinvested; they preferred to fall back on being indebted to the bank (to make some banker friend happy?). Thus, the interport finds itself with an exposure that eats all the profits, with interest. A clearer display of the ignorance of a local ruling class is hard to find. Therefore, the struggles in this key area will raise the bar, will have to involve the world of transport, will have to create a wide front, otherwise they will end up being crushed.
– Translated by Salar Mohandesi. The translator would like to thank Asad Haider, Evan Calder Williams, and Anna Curcio for checking the draft.
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Lessons for Building a Democratic Workers’ State
The Crisis of Social Democracy
The failure of socialism in the early 20th century is a product of the internal contradictions of bourgeois democracy, which permitted independent working-class organizations on condition that they did not pose a challenge to the capitalist state.1 In this way, the most significant historic fracture on the Left, one which remains with us today, followed the eager embrace of liberal democracy by Second International reformist socialists. The rise of social democracy in Germany dashed any prospect of a transition to working class power in Europe by instead appealing to the base sentiment of nationalism. But even more importantly, the rise of social democracy under capitalism was a declaration of war against the revolutionary Left that advocated a socialist break with capitalism. Social democracy is still more a declaration of war by the leading workers’ organizations of the imperialist countries, as well as their followers, on the oppressed nations of the Third World. From the late nineteenth century and increasingly until today, it is only the unrequited transfer of wealth from the latter to the former that has provided the rising incomes necessary to sustain a mass working class base for social democracy.2
Lenin as intellectual and revolutionary always recognized the state as a coercive apparatus in Tsarist Russia and the capitalist west. Following Marx, Lenin also recognized that socialist revolution would bring about a workers’ state that would maintain power through coercion. Decisively, the socialist state, under attack from national and international capitalists, would operate at the directive of the working class and peasants. Lenin sees the state as permanently repressive. The formation of the workers’ state following the Bolshevik Revolution did not transform the fact that state power remains rooted in class power. By raising an idealistic unobtainable bar for a workers’ state as an idyllic paradise of democracy and equality far above the present bourgeois liberal democracy is sheer fantasy rooted in pretense and chicanery. Georg Lukács underscores the revolutionary nature of the historically grounded state:
Workers’ Soviets as a state apparatus: that is the state as a weapon in the class struggle of a proletariat. Because the proletariat fights against bourgeois class rule and strives to create a classless society, the undialetical and therefore unhistorical and unrevolutionary analysis of opportunism concludes that the proletariat must fight against all class rule; in other words, its own form of domination should under no circumstances be an organ of class rule, of class oppression. Taken abstractly this basic viewpoint is Utopian, for proletarian rule cold never become a reality in this way; taken concretely, however, and applied to the present, it exposes itself as an ideological capitulation to the bourgeoisie.3
Of course, in 1918 the distinction was that the state would operate in the interests of the working class. This did not denote that the state would cease to be a coercive and violent force, even if it would be far less destructive than the bourgeois-liberal state that has operated and continues to operate in the form of a violent dictatorship. The liberal-democratic state is a violent class dictatorship. The targets of this violence and the forms it takes change over time. The maintenance of social peace and inter-class national solidarity in the developed countries has typically come about by displacing violent class antagonisms onto oppressed nations and peoples. Thus, for example, whilst placating the militant (and largely Jim Crow) white working class at home, the Roosevelt presidency of the 1930s stepped up repression of the Puerto Rican independence struggle. As such, the violent class dictatorship of bourgeois society can be seen most clearly in the colonial world. There, as Marx said, is displayed the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization [that] lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked.” In the same article, he wrote that capitalist progress resembled a “hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.”4
Lenin certainly recognized that the state was an instrument of class power and would be wielded in the interests of the class that seized power. As Lenin states: “The main thing that socialists fail to understand and that constitutes their short-sightedness in matters of theory, their subservience to bourgeois prejudices and their political betrayal of the proletariat is that in capitalist society, whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to that society, there can be no alternative but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dreams of some third way are reactionary, petty-bourgeois lamentations.”5 Imperialist capitalism, of course, by displacing class contradictions onto a world scale, allows these dreams to become a reality for a minority of the world’s workers (and, initially, only a minority of the metropolitan workers, too). Further revolutionary workers’ states have not cynically asserted that they were an abstract force for freedom, equality, and a means of guaranteeing social rights, as was the case in every liberal-democratic regime.
Given the failure of European socialist revolutions in the early 20th century, Lenin was most eager to develop the forces of production for the Soviet workers state. To do so also required the domination of the working class. The notion of the state as a transmission belt is a recognition that the seizure of power by workers and peasants would not transform the state straightaway into a socialist paradise.
The act of seizing state power does not alter the landscape and apparatus of the repressive state, which, under workers’ control, represents and defends the class interests of the proletariat; the organized trade unions which formed under liberal democracy must alter their stance to defend the project of socialist transformation in opposition to capital and support of the proletarian state, which at times inevitably will lead to conflict within the labor organization. Lenin makes this patently obvious in in “Role and Functions of the Trade Unions,” upon launching the New Economic Policy in 1922.
The only correct, sound and expedient method of removing friction and of settling disputes between individual contingents of the working class and the organs of the workers’ state is for the trade unions to act as mediators, and through their competent bodies either to enter into negotiations with the competent business organisations on the basis of precise demands and proposals formulated by both sides, or appeal to higher state bodies.6
Marxist currents over the past century have selectively emphasized the Marxist-Leninist vision that they share and discard those doctrinal arguments that may be uncomfortable and do not conveniently fit in to their perspective, rooted in a puerile utopianism. However, a humanitarian and moral Leninist perspective can be drawn from the above passage. To wit: Lenin understands the profound internal divisions within the working class, and the actuality that a parasitic fraction benefits materially from its position in established trade unions under competitive capitalism. Trade unions forged under capitalism are often not engaged in class struggle for systemic change but preoccupied with economism that benefits individual privileged workers over the masses—first against unorganized elements of the class, and then through imperialism and monopoly capitalism.
State Power Today
To understand the relevance of the state power in the contemporary era we are duty-bound to begin by detecting the profound transformations within capitalism over the past 100 years, under which the working classes in the imperial world have gained material advantages through the marginalization and collective exploitation of workers more generally in the Global South. As Ellen Meiksins Wood maintains, state power was and remains crucial to maintaining class power and privilege throughout the history of capitalism,7 a position that is shared by French political economists Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, who document a class and imperial project under historical capitalism.8 Today more than ever the state exerts power through direct exploitation of workers in the semi-colonial world.
The transformation of the Chinese workers’ state to market socialism is crucial to investigate in this context, as it represents a variation of Lenin’s understanding of developing the forces of production carried to the extreme. The PRC and the Communist Party of China maintain firm control of the organs of all organizational and state power. Workers are subordinated to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, a remote trade union organization that claims to represent the interest of organized labor. But we do have a difference: the industrial working class in China is emerging as the majority and is hardly a freeloading class profiteering off the exploitation of lower-wage workers in a dependent state. Concomitantly, Chinese industrial workers maintain state power in the abstract sense and would benefit from organizing a broader class alliance within a mutable and ideologically warped state that is cohering in support of the upper class and foreign capital. Workers are engaged in direct struggle against private, mostly foreign capital devoid of organizational power for their class.
It is fundamental to establish what we mean by the representation of state power. I would argue that the nature and location of state power has not appreciably changed over the last 100 years if understood through the prism of a hierarchical system of states dominated by an imperial core. The former colonial powers continue to dominate the world through international relations established upon superior force and economic dependency. However, state power does vary over time and place, principally according to the dynamic between the political exigencies of class struggle and the economic priorities of its protagonists. Thus, for example, what Bagchi refers to as the developmental state is one in which government policy is designed to promote national economic development.9 The developmental state can, of course, be one in which the national bourgeoisie rules primarily in its own interests, whether by means of parliamentary democracy or right-wing dictatorship (as, for example, in post-war Japan and Rhee’s southern Korea, respectively); one in which the working masses, the peasantry and proletariat, rule (as in the USSR under Lenin and Stalin and China under Mao); or an admixture of the two types (as in the USSR after Stalin and China today). Such states are relatively distinct both from imperialist sates and colonial dependencies. In the early 20th century the United States and a handful of declining European powers dominated the world through the exertion of economic and military force. Today the domination of the US ruling capitalist class is more far-reaching than a century ago, through its increased capacity to demarcate the boundaries of independent state activity and to subordinate the interests of smaller states to its class and geopolitical interests. As imperialism has integrated the world economy even further, any state that threatens to depart from the dominant international neoliberal paradigm is scorned, punished, and excluded from the international system.
The state remains an oppressive instrument today and is controlled by the capitalist class.
Revolutionaries must challenge capital’s control over the state through exposing its sham democratic pretenses that maintain and expand the power of the upper class and under which political competition offers no hope and only misery for the working class. The violent suppression and eradication of political opponents of white supremacy and capitalism in the United States are a testament to the fraudulent nature of alleged “representative” liberal democracy there. We must pursue a revolutionary strategy not just to challenge a rapacious state, but also to forestall the growth of national chauvinism which is emerging due to popular recognition of the failure of electoral systems and the alarming growth of paramilitary police and incarceration systems. The façade of democracy is now exposed to the popular masses at a time when fascist parties are emerging as the only organized political alternative. More likely is a rise of the fascist right, which can manipulate worker interests in Europe and elsewhere far better than liberals and social democrats. Fascism’s appeal to the metropolitan working class in the current crisis stems from its unmitigated promise to maintain and extend existing patterns of labor stratification based on established national and gender hierarchies. Social democratic trade unions and their leaders in settler-colonial states have a history of embracing outright white nationalism and chauvinism when the victims of colonial-capitalist exploitation appear as any form of labor competition amongst them. I would not say that workers whose living standards have always come at the expense of the superexploited and oppressed are being “manipulated” when they are encouraged to join in a renewed drive to plunder them further. Proletarian feminist revolutionary nationalism, by contrast, aims at the expulsion of imperialism from oppressed nation territories by means of creating a worker-led united front of all sections of the oppressed with all patriotic classes. Support for the anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed nations is a solid foundation for socialist ideology in the current age just as much as it was a century ago. Unfortunately, it faces the same and even greater obstacles now as then. Poulantzas was correct about the necessity of democracy under socialism, but he also did not have a solution to the greater danger of capital and its ability to create the appearance of real power struggles among competitive parties, hypnotize people through the media and disillusion most people who seek to create an equitable democracy.10
A revolutionary stance must first and foremost appear as a political movement that repudiates the existing bourgeois political system and categorically distinguishes the far more exploited workers in the South from those struggling in the North. Occupy gained traction in 2011 amid working class frustration with capitalist domination over state, politics, and society, not just in the West but throughout the world. But the diffuse movements lacked a dialectical historical analysis of class interest in global capitalism and were an expression of disapproval rather than a revolutionary challenge to capitalist hegemony.
Imperialism and the Global South
One hundred and ten years ago, the Industrial Workers of the World formed in strict opposition to the capitalist state. They did not believe in compromising the principles of socialism and believed strongly in a disciplined opposition to capital. The provisional interests of the working class were upheld through tactics. The IWW was a genuinely proletarian party for a time, but the economism of the IWW was responsible for its fatal inability to connect US labor struggles to those of the oppressed internal colonies.
A working class and anti-imperialist party form dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism and in opposition to US and western hegemonic power is indispensable. Occupy was right to direct indignation at finance capital, but failed to express its opposition to the capitalist and imperial state as such. A socialist strategy must have at its core taking state power: but to succeed we must challenge the power of imperial states to dictate extractive and unequal policies around the world. We must seek a power bloc that is not the conventional set of left parties, but a bloc of working-class/anti-imperialist forces in the Global South, recognizing class inequality within a divided world system. We also must recognize the sustained importance of imperialism. In the 1970s to 1980s, smug Western Marxists and Eurocommunists all but jettisoned the concept as an applicable means for understanding the reality of class struggles on a global basis. Opposition to capitalism without a grasp of the class divisions that correspond with national boundaries is essential.
Ever since the French Socialists came to power in 1981 it is obvious to us all that the Second International socialism idea of the Left taking power is delusional, even if it provided a momentary period of hope when capital in the modern state was ascendant and the post-war Soviet Union was failing to meet its ideals rooted in building a workers’ state. Socialist praise for the development of civil liberties and human rights in the West is highly insensitive to cultural difference and relevant only to the privileged and a thin layer of the oppressed. We have no examples of successes on the Left in the West that could be sustained for more than a short period of time without a counterattack from capital. The growth of financialization has made it even more difficult to rein in the power of capital in most states. The idea of a power bloc, as in Greece and other regions, is a stimulating undertaking for the Left, but it is also largely bereft of any concrete evidence that it will achieve any gain.
Taking state power is only relevant if seized by socialists in the Third World countries on a regional geographic level. Yes, something like a Soviet Union. In the early 21st century most states can be turned into “failed states” if opposed by capital. Thus. we need to re-imagine taking state power on a much wider level. The axiom of the Cold War era that imperial wars were to be fought over the spoils in the Third World is more prescient today than ever, as class struggles expand in the Global South and the West is extending its exploitation from extractive industries to the production of commodities. The United States is reviving its Cold War stance not in opposition to Russia or other regional states, but out of fear that a working class bloc could form at a time when the West is ever more dependent on both natural resources and commodities produced by workers in the Global South.
This model is analogous to extant socialist states that have asserted the importance of developing the means of production before advancing the class interests. The state becomes essentially the representative of the workers. The question is whether in fact the “communist” State does represent the interests of workers and peasants. This is certainly not the case in China and Vietnam, and other states that are advancing with the patina of “communism.” The Chinese state could crush the “democracy” protests of the educated middle class at Tiananmen Square, and perhaps Hong Kong, but given the nature of state power, this new movement could gain control over the state: a fate much more threatening to The City of London and Wall Street than to Beijing. Thus we could consider the potential of workers’ states to evolve into representatives of the working class, as direct struggles grow at an ever more rapid pace.
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Lineaments of the Logistical State
Lineament. noun. GEOLOGY. A linear feature on the earth’s surface, such as a fault.
“State space subordinates both chaos and difference to its implacable logistics.” – Henri Lefebvre, “Space and the State” (1978)
Logistical revolts
Sometimes, we have to look in unlikely places for news that can nourish a radical political imagination.1 World Cargo News, for instance:
According to The Strike Club, the market leader for delay insurance for the maritime trades, the early months of 2013 have been marked by extremely damaging strike action in several countries, which has punished shipowners and charterers even though they are innocent parties. Some of the worst trouble spots in recent weeks have been in South America, particularly Chile, where a three-week strike crippled the country’s key ports, blocking exports of copper, fruit and wood products. Chile’s business leaders estimate the country lost more than US$200M a day due to the conflict. There has also been a miners’ strike in Colombia and it was only this month that US stevedores signed a six-year master contract with employers that removed the strike threat at east and Gulf coast ports. In South East Asia, a port workers’ strike has now dragged on for more than three weeks in Hong Kong, while Greece is currently in the spotlight as the seafarers’ union is threatening strike action in protest at new maritime legislation that, it is claimed, will swell their current high unemployment number. It was against this background that the Strike Club’s directors met in Singapore at the end of last week, where the managers reported higher levels of shore-related claims from a wide range of incidents. These included general strikes, port strikes, strikes by land transport operators, customs and pilots, as well as port closures, blockades by fishermen, physical obstructions and mechanical equipment breakdowns.2
It has long been noted that the apparatuses of control and accumulation that structure the social and material reality of circulation – transport, the energy industry and, after World War Two, “business logistics” as a veritable science of real subsumption – though born to break the bargaining power of transport workers and accumulate profits by annihilating space and depressing wages, have also, especially through their energetic dimensions, created dynamic arenas for class struggle. Tim Mitchell has advanced this argument with great acumen – writing that in the age of coal, workers’ power “derived not just from the organizations they formed, the ideas they began to share on the political alliances that they built, but from the extraordinary quantities of carbon energy that could be used to assemble political agency, by employing the ability to slow, disrupt, or cut off its supply.”3 Interruption here represented a form of power correlated to the energetic vulnerabilities of capital accumulation and political power. The strike and the blockade, control and interruption, were entwined in the history of what, repurposing Mitchell, we could call carbon syndicalism or carbon communism. More recently, struggles at the choke points of a planetary logistical system have led Sergio Bologna to speak of “the multitude of globalization,” designating all of those who work across the supply chain, in the manual and intellectual labour that makes highly complex integrated transnational systems of warehousing, transport, and control possible. It is members of this multitude, clerical workers and truckers in Los Angeles and Long Beach,4 crane operators in Hong Kong,5 distribution centre workers for Wal-Mart,6 logistical workers in Northern Italy7, or even air-traffic controllers in Spain8 that have led some to see not a secular vanishing but a shift in the loci of class struggle. This has prodded some to look again at the critical role of antagonism along the conduits of circulation – an abiding feature of the workers’ movement throughout its history – taking into consideration the intensifying significance of logistics to the reproduction of capital, but also its contradictory, uneven relationship to the reproduction of the capital-labor relation.
Can we define or declare a relocation of political and class conflict, in the overdeveloped de-industrializing countries of the “Global North,” from the point of production to the chokepoints of circulation? Is it possible to raise the status of logistical counter-power, in the guise of the blockade, for instance, from that of a tactic to that of a strategy, one that would redefine anti-capitalist and revolutionary action in a context where the appropriation of the means of production is either a distant or an unappealing prospect? In order to begin to approach such challenging issues of theory and practice, I believe it is necessary to consider the centrality of a theory and practice of interruption, targeted at logistical apparatuses, which has become increasingly attractive to anti-systemic militancy – and in a second moment to explore the forms of capitalist and political power that have accompanied the “logistics revolution.”
In this light, I would like to revisit – meaning both to expand and revise – some arguments about the current political significance of logistics that I rehearsed 3 years ago in a brief article for Mute magazine, entitled “Logistics and Opposition.”9 That article tried to identify, picking up on one of the leitmotifs of The Invisible Committee’s The Coming Insurrection, how an ambient radical preoccupation with events, ruptures, dissensus, was being both concretized and in some ways surpassed by a “spontaneous philosophy of interruption,” or even of sabotage, which saw disruptive actions at the nodes and terminals of circulation (here used loosely to include distribution, transportation, and consumption, but with an emphasis on the logistical) as overtaking workers’ actions at the point of production, the paradigm for nineteenth and twentieth century socialist politics. The Invisible Committee’s stance – which I think faithfully renders a structure of feeling of contemporary radicalism – is nicely encapsulated in the following declaration:
The technical infrastructure of the metropolis is vulnerable: its flows are not merely for the transportation of people and commodities; information and energy circulate by way of wire networks, fibres and channels, which it is possible to attack. To sabotage the social machine with some consequence today means re-conquering and reinventing the means of interrupting its networks. How could a TGV line or an electrical network be rendered useless?10
As suggested by some statements and reflections that accompanied the 2 November 2011 shutdown of the Port of Oakland,11 this could be framed – in that periodizing register so prevalent in contemporary debates – as an epochal transformation in anti-capitalist action, figuratively captured as a move from the strike to the blockade, as well as from workers’ demands centered on their own workplaces to a less regimented convergence of an “extrinsic proletariat” around the interruption of capital flows. If capital not in motion, is (as Marxists and managers concur) no longer capital, then its political immobilization, however fleeting, lends an impact otherwise absent from defensive anti-austerity politics. Motion and mobility, or rather “mobilization,” were the targets of The Invisible Committee’s jeremiads against the depoliticizing despotism of the metropolis, and their wager – common to other strands in contemporary insurrectionary thought – was that the interruption of this spectacular regime of commodity flows may serve as the catalyst for the forging of antagonistic collectivities and forms-of-life: a recasting of the political form of the commune, which traced its arc from the beginning of the age of Empire to the present through the transfiguration of the social spaces and political temporalities of cities such as Paris, Barcelona, Shanghai, Kwangju, mutating in step with economic conjunctures and ideas of politics.
In my Mute article, leaning on Furio Jesi’s remarkable book on the Berlin insurrection of 1919, Spartakus: The Symbology of Revolt,12 I suggested that the spatio-temporal imaginary at work here is not one of revolution but of revolt, yet that the revolt imagined in The Coming Insurrection and kindred texts is a different kind of revolt, one aimed not so much at the urbanization of capital, à la David Harvey, but at the all-encompassing integration of production, circulation and distribution in logistical systems through which the supremacy of constant capital prophesied by Marx writes itself on the surface of the earth in forms both titanic and capillary. This is the baleful spatio-energetic complex that Mumford identified when he argued that “processing” had become “the chief form of metropolitan control.”13
Beyond the notion, shared by both the pro- and anti-union left, that attention to logistics lays bare some of capital’s nerve-centers, be they levers for political pressure or sites of negation, I also wanted to speculate about, and partially endorse, a trend in some recent radical thought, to consider the “logistical revolution” as an important site for thinking the “reconfiguration” or “refunctioning” of capitalist social relations of production – efforts towards imagining and practicing non-capitalist uses of quintessential instruments of contemporary capital accumulation. Could the speed, standardization and automation of the container port, or the capacities of Walmart distribution chains, be regarded as possible material bases for alternative, antagonistic organizations of production, circulation and distribution?
My Mute article has been the object of trenchant if comradely critique in a contribution to the journal Endnotes by Jasper Bernes. That piece, “Logistics, Counterlogistics, and the Communist Prospect”14 raises some urgent critical and strategic questions, and I want to take the opportunity to respond to some of its arguments here, since I think they clarify the stakes (as well as the different conceptions) of a politics of circulation. I then want to consider how our conceptions of capital accumulation, the capital-relation, and material flows might determine a certain understanding of tactics of resistance and strategies of antagonism by considering two geographically-inflected ways of approaching these problems – drawn from Marx and Henri Lefebvre – that can help us better to specify what kind of “circulation” is at stake. What emerges from this brief foray into historical materialist geographies of circulation are two corrections to a direct political identification of crisis capitalism with its logistical infrastructure: first, the need to offset a tendency to class logistics and transport on the side of circulation, neglecting Marx’s prescient assertion that locational change could be a commodity on its own right, and that the capitalist transport industry was itself a form of, as it were, directly productive circulation, blurring the boundaries between making and moving15 ; second, now following Lefebvre, a recognition that even or especially in a neoliberal moment, the state has played an absolutely crucial role in the deployment and securitization of logistics, meaning that conflicts at the choke points of circulation are not immediate challenges to value-in-motion, but mediated assaults on capitalist power, in the guise of what Lefebvre depicted in the 1970s as the emergent logistical state.
The reconfiguration thesis: a reply
Bernes’s article takes me to task as a representative of what he calls the “reconfiguration thesis,” a strategic hypothesis which argues that anti-capitalist politics should move beyond a mere negation of capitalist relations, orienting itself instead towards a reckoning with what can be redeployed or refunctioned in the vast, and vastly complex, systems of “dead labor” that capital accumulation has thrown up – systems of which logistics is both an emblem and a vital component. Bernes’s text is an important theoretical balance sheet of the struggles that culminated, for the time being, in the Oakland port blockade, and provides a rich, polemical synthesis of many of their key stakes. For that reason, I hope that engaging with his criticisms can serve to clarify the problems of circulation and logistics that confront present efforts to revive communist theory and practice.
Bernes suggests that I – along with other advocates of the aforementioned thesis, namely Mike Davis16 and Fredric Jameson17 – hold to the argument that “all existing means of production must have some use beyond capital, and that all technological innovation must have, almost categorically, a progressive dimension which is recuperable through a process of ‘determinate negation.’” Though I was purposely bending the stick against a romantic vision of communitarian sabotage,18 I stressed that any “reconfiguration” concerns an evaluation, both practical test and theoretical anticipation, of, as I had said, “what aspects of contemporary capitalism could be refunctioned in the passage to a communist society.” This implies that some (many, even most – the ratio is not decidable a priori) of these aspects could not be refunctioned at all (though they would still need to be somehow dealt with or disposed of). Notwithstanding our strategic differend, or our different intuitions about the leeway for repurposing, I think we broadly agree that the there is no a priori way to simply declare certain features of capitalist production and circulation as allowing for communist uses. The test is a practical and political one. Where we part ways, perhaps, is in the confidence with which Bernes dismisses the potentialities of the assemblages of capitalist accumulation – logistics in primis – which he presents as (to employ Jameson’s terminology) essentially mono-valent, dialectically irrecuperable.
Approaching logistics in a transitional horizon necessarily involves reflecting on how much of the gigantism of the contemporary logistical complex is unthinkable outside of capital’s irrational rationalities – as Sergio Bologna has pointed out in some very interesting “insider” interventions (his “day job” for many years has been as a logistics consultant) on Italian ports: the vast majority of containers travelling east from Europe are full of “shit and air” (waste products and emptiness) and the craze for supercontainers as well as for the building of countless deep ports is comprehensible only in the context of the financialization of maritime assets and the correlated competition between different local authorities for subsidies and capital.19 So speaking of “potentially reconfigurable” devices is, I hope, compatible, with the practical evaluation of what, where and how can any reconfiguration could occur (we could think here of the experience of the Lucas Plan in the UK as a rough precursor for this kind of social practice20 ). As both Bernes’s “communist prospect” and Bologna’s advice to the Italian logistics industry suggest, this would most likely involve smaller ships and fewer ports…
Bernes also suggests that, together with its contribution to the tendential evanescence of an organized working class at the hinges of circulation, the specifically capitalist use-value of logistics – principally its depression of labour costs through a smooth despotism over the international division of labor – means that it cannot be approached by analogy with the factory, traditionally envisaged by the left as the site of workers’ reappropriation and control.
That logistics has been driven by labour arbitrage and class struggle (the latter more in its inaugural moments, I think) is certainly true, but I remain sceptical about some of the conclusions Bernes draws from it, as well as about the assumption that logistics has made possible a linear race to the bottom. Though conditions there are hardly rosy, if we view the logistical revolution say from Shenzen and not Long Beach, the bargaining power as well as wages of some sectors of the Chinese workers have risen.21 Moreover, the complexities of the international division of labour and possibilities of class struggle involved therein are not comprehensible, in my view, through the axis of absolute/relative surplus value alone – as suggested in Bernes’s claim that, inasmuch as the “technological ensemble which logistics superintends is therefore fundamentally different than other ensembles such as the Fordist factory,” focusing on labour arbitrage rather than increased labour productivity, logistics “is absolute surplus value masquerading as relative surplus value.” The passage from craft to industrial (assembly line) production in the earlier twentieth century was also viewed as a devastation of the workplace and associational bargaining power of workers, but it turned out not to be such a univocal process. Here I think Bernes falls into what for me remains a serious shortcoming of so-called communization theory, the positing of a linear periodization of figures of struggle and exploitation (not dissimilar from the periodizing problems of operaismo, with a similar tendency to generalise from “Northern” conditions), and a disregard for the political and economic unevenness of capitalism, which at times ends up generating a baleful materialist teleology. In short, the notion that Chinese industrial strikes are somehow historically residual is as untenable today as the Stalinist notion that agrarian struggles were regressive was in the 1940s.
In the final analysis, I think the economic and political arguments enlisted by Bernes to establish that logistical systems are lacking the “refunctionable” potentialities that were once projected onto the factory are not definitive. In effect, we could see logistics as a crucial component of the materialization of that old Italian workerist thesis, the “social factory.” Leaning on the embryonic theorization of value-production in the transport industry in volume 2 of Capital (on which more below), on the material reality that commodities today are “manufactured across logistics space,”22 as well as on the explicit capitalist strategy behind the rise of logistics in the postwar period – grounded as it is on the idea of a “shift from cost minimization after production to value added across circulatory systems”23 – it seems difficult not to conclude that logistics is only analytically and not actually separable from the production-process nowadays, such that we could really hive-off valorization in the factory (which is a spatially-segregated production unit only in economic abstraction) from valorization at the container terminal. Moreover, as a complex material and social relation of circulation and exploitation, it does not seem to me that logistics is “more” constitutively hostile to workers’ needs than the factory. That said, I think Bernes’s essay is to be commended for delineating some of the formidable problems for political strategy and especially for envisaging transitions out of capitalism that the “logistics revolution” entails.
Bernes, who nicely presents logistics not only as “capital’s art of war” but as its own solution to what Jameson had called the problem of cognitive mapping rejects the idea that some kind of counter-logistics, or more bluntly the collective planning of circulation, could throw up such a map.24 For him:
Because of the uneven distribution of productive means and capitals – not to mention the tendency for geographical specialisation, the concentration of certain lines in certain areas (textiles in Bangladesh, for instance) – the system is not scalable in any way but up. It does not permit partitioning by continent, hemisphere, zone or nation. It must be managed as a totality or not at all. Therefore, nearly all proponents of the reconfiguration thesis assume high-volume and hyper-global distribution in their socialist or communist system, even if the usefulness of such distributions beyond production for profit remain unclear.
The fundamental opacity of logistical systems to workers has been much remarked upon, and it can indeed be seen as one of its broadly political functions. As Allan Sekula noted, those boxes, uncannily proportioned like dollar bills, are also coffins of labor-power.25 Yet, for all of the skepticism towards refunctioning this state of affairs should inspire, we can’t simply infer from these blockages to proletarian knowledge that an emancipatory refunctioning (and therefore profound transformation) of these systems is impossible. One should be wary in any case of treating this primarily as an issue about the mappability of the system for the individual, when it is really a question of devising forms of collective control, which might include – especially at larger scales of social mediation – considerable quotas of opacity. In this regard, short of the unviable idea that a post-capitalist society must be local, and that its politics needs involve the transparency of the small community or commune, I think the world market remains, in however arduous a way, a presupposition (not a framework!) for any transition out of capitalism. Most things of worth and interest are beyond the cognizability of single individuals (scientific developments, cultural traditions, how technology works, what have you) but this only poses a problem as such if we think dis-alienation is a matter of personalization, of making us “at home in the world” (a cast of mind that some recent radical theory shares with the palliative spectacles of ethical consumption it would undoubtedly castigate). I struggle to see why this would either be emancipatory or attractive. I also don’t think that, as Bernes suggests, logistics is a view from nowhere of Capital-as-subject: it is a deeply incoherent, contradictory, conflicted, and competitive domain; a strategic field of fierce competition sitting uneasily with state and security coordination, as well as inevitable processes of standardization. Process mappings, while striving towards homogeneity of spaces and codes, remain strategic weapons in the hands of capitalist agents, not overviews by “capital.” Ideas of full visibility as integral flexibility are part of the ideology (and fantasy) of logistics, which in many ways is just a later iteration of other ideologies of capitalist efficacy: Taylorism, Toyotism, etc. The value-dynamics and spaces of logistics are deeply contradictory, in ways I will explore further below with reference to Lefebvre; they are more likely to be gummed up – for the time being – by internal impasses than by resolute political intervention.
Bernes is rightly wary of those “reconfigurationists” who see the problems of building a post-capitalist society resolved by a digital magic bullet – communist algorithms of distribution and other such hopeful schemes. But faced with such technological fixes, it is worth recalling that26 paucity of solutions has never been an argument for the non-existence of problems. Bernes also takes me to task for asserting, in keeping with some of David Harvey’s observations in Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, that social processes and spaces have built-in hierarchies and opacities, and that a sober if intransigent anti-capitalist politics would require, by analogy with Marcuse’s distinction between surplus and necessary repression, to think, practically, through something like “necessary alienation.” What I meant by this was the (perhaps banal) point that the reproduction of social life in general, even outside of the mediation of value, will involve certain asymmetries of authority, partial delegations of control, opacity, and so forth. Post-capitalism, or communism, is not the absence of social form or social synthesis but another form or synthesis, another mode of regulation – as Raymond Williams noted, a more complex one.
Here I think Bernes takes back with one hand what he’s abandoned with the other. On one side, he writes about those who through blockades and communes, “occupations,” may try to undo the rule of capital: “To meet their own needs and the needs of others, these proletarians would have to engage in the production of food and other necessaries, the capacity for which does not exist in most countries.” I agree, and would add, that, as such, there is nothing particularly attractive about the devastation of capitalist everyday life, in all its alienations, in favour of some kind of re-ruralization, where the social form is based on comradeship, friendship, or some kind of band of brothers bond (communism too needs to think through “unsociable sociability”). But then he says that: “The absence of opportunities for ‘reconfiguration’ will mean that in their attempts to break from capitalism proletarians will need to find other ways of meeting their needs.” To which I think a sober material analysis will simply answer: they won’t (even if, which I think would be a big problem, we maintain “needs” as defined in a rather biological way). This entails that in many cases (perhaps most – but again this is not an a priori matter) “delinking” is simply not an option.
The rhetoric of communist abundance has most likely seen its day, but not for that should it be replaced by some kind of communism of penury or emergency – and in this sense I think the “delinking” point is somewhat “terroristic” in form (in the noble sense of a Sartrean terror-fraternity, not of the PATRIOT Act): a communism of survival in a besieged enclave forced by the fact that existing in a global capitalist system involves irrevocable compromises. This other formulation, on the other hand, I find much more plausible, and, strategic differences aside, would endorse: “one might also develop a functional understanding of the infrastructure of capital, such that one then knew which technologies and productive means would be orphaned by a partial or total delinking from planetary flows, which ones might alternately be conserved or converted, and what the major practical and technical questions facing a revolutionary situation might look like.” The “inventory” would certainly be a part of anything I would consider as refunctioning. As would of course the problem of what to do with the unrefunctionable dead labors (both in terms of the social relations they bear, and the material problems they pose, the waste they perpetuate). Planned communist obsolescence perhaps? This too would be the object of some pretty trenchant struggles, for which we have some interesting preludes in the big disputes in the 1920s over whether the urban form as it existed was compatible with communism (here I’m more with Mike Davis than with Amadeo Bordiga’s urban abolitionism in his bracing screed “Space Versus Cement,”27 much as I’m exceedingly fond of the latter).
Bernes, reflecting on the experience of Oakland – which he’s largely right in seeing as a high point of the Occupy moment, transcending a certain fetishism for democratic participation, while rediscovering forms of struggle adequate to our present – puts much emphasis on the blockade, but I have questions as to whether its status as tactic and strategy has been duly clarified here. In particular, I remain unclear about what the criteria of political “efficacy” are in this instance. Presumably, they are not a matter of workplace bargaining power – of the kind recently seen in Long Beach or the Hong Kong container port, or in that sadly missed opportunity that was the Spanish air traffic controllers strike. Is “power” here measured principally by providing an emblem (logistics as a kind of symbolic insurrectional adversary, rather than a lever for traditional workers’ politics), as a point of political condensation? Is it marked by the losses incurred by capital (usually nugatory in the broader scheme, even in strong struggles)? What kind of political spaces and durable organization (in the widest sense of the term) can we see coalescing around the blockade as a form of contemporary struggle?
Social forms of dead labor
As I’ve noted, Bernes’s argument against the presupposition that devices and systems crucial to capital accumulation could be refunctioned in a non-capitalist guise is a healthy reminder of the fact that we’re never dealing with mere materiality or technology, but with certain often invisible social forms that animate given configurations of matter. Yet if we concur that technological contents or forces can’t simply slough off their forms and find themselves happily relocated within other relations of production and reproduction, we should likewise, while remaining cognizant of the material and energetic preconditions for certain forms, not fetishize them. This, it seems to me, is one of the pitfalls of the “interruptive strain” in the politics of circulation – which sees the blockage as a kind of material revelation (this is a problem which haunts The Coming Insurrection much more than Bernes’s essay). In this respect, there is a left version here of the notion of frontstaging the urban backstage which has recently been ably criticized by Stephen Graham28 – where state phobias and practices of disruption (like military strategy of “shutting cities down”) are simply mirrored in activist discourses, where disruption is not sufficiently linked to control.
One of the theoretical limits of the philosophy of interruption, whether spontaneous or reflexive, that marks much contemporary radicalism lies then in its insufficient consideration of the polysemy of “circulation.”29 The hypostasis of the blockade tactic can suggest that all varieties of circulation may be targeted at the “choke points” of logistics. But even if we remain only within the bounds of the Marxian canon, circulation can take an at times bewildering and slippery variety of guises. It can denote flows of material and resources (such as would exist in any mode of production); the sphere of exchange (that domain ruled over by freedom, equality and Bentham, and from which most of our misprisions about liberalism are deemed to derive); it can denote circulating as opposed to fixed capital (meaning the capital consumed in process of production, be it raw materials or the exertion of living labour-power); but it can also mean “capital of circulation,” which takes different guises in its travels through the market – leading to Marx’s crucial reflections on “circulation time,” which the annihilation of space through time is constantly driving to diminish. We can even think of circulation in keeping with the circuits in which Marx maps the formal metamorphosis of value, which are also the sites, at the level of theory, of capital’s contradictions.
In 1928, Isaak Illich Rubin pioneered the discussion of Marx as a thinker of “social form.” Rubin stressed how Marx’s critique of classical political economy hinges on distinguishing between “material categories” concerned with “technical methods and instruments of labour,” on the one hand, and “social forms” concerned with specifically capitalist relations, on the other. The blind spot of political economy is precisely its inability, evidenced by the theory of commodity fetishism, to think about why these particular value-forms are generated in bourgeois society, wrongly supposing that it is in transhistorical “material categories” – a physiological understanding of labor rather than labor-power, exchange separate from capital, and so on – that one can look for the clues to the structure and development of a mode of production.
Contrariwise, it is “the social function which is realized through a thing [that] gives this thing a particular social character, a determined social form, a ‘determination of form’ (Formbestimmtheit), as Marx frequently wrote.”30 Marx’s remonstrations against those political economists who, in Rubin’s terms, cannot see the “social forms” lying “beneath” the “technical functions in the process of material production” are legion. Historical materialism is predicated on the rejection of the spontaneous materialism of the political economists. This is the impetus behind such seemingly anti-materialist declarations as this famous passage from Volume 1 of Capital: “The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition.”31 The critique of “materialism” is also a key methodological postulate in Volume 2, for instance in Marx’s sardonic attempts on those who think that fixed capital, for instance, should be “fixed” in a common-sensically material sense of the term. This is how political economists go astray:
Firstly, certain properties that characterize the means of labour materially are made into direct properties of fixed capital, e.g. physical immobility, such as that of a house. But it is always easy to show that other means of labour, which are also as such fixed capital, ships for example, have the opposite property, i.e. physical mobility. Alternatively, the formal economic characteristic that arises from the circulation of value is confused with a concrete [dinglich] property; as if things, which are never capital at all in themselves, could already in themselves and by nature be capital in a definite form, fixed or circulating.32
What’s more, those ships (say the new mega-containers lumbering their way onto the market and demanding huge outlays of public finances on the construction of the corresponding ports) may themselves be best understood as financial assets and not just physical capitals or commodities. What happens then if we consider the question of circulation less literally? And what would it mean to struggle not simply against material flows but against the social forms that channel them? Can we think of different types of struggle in terms of how they map onto the various meanings of circulation mentioned above?
On the one level, the notion that capital not in motion is no longer capital, or, as Marx rather stunningly puts it, that “continuity is a productive force of labour,” has important political resonances – though these are far more palpable in in the creeping devastation of deindustrialization than in the successful blockade. On the other, the nature of capital is such that the arms race to lessen circulation times by deploying (and securitizing) vast circulatory apparatuses necessarily involves the hypertrophy of constant capital, dwarfing variable capital (proletarians) and revealing potentially paralyzing quanta of fixity as the price for accelerated circulation. I have recently tried to argue, in another piece for Mute, how in the real-estate politics and energetic difficulties plaguing the seemingly ethereal rise of high-frequency trading we could witness such a revenge of matter and space upon financial ideality – a revenge we can only understand in terms of certain social forms that are specifically capitalist.33 In an economic field whose drive to instantaneousness seems to obliterate spatial difference, this corroborates, in the financial arena, a well-known observation from Marx’s Grundrisse:
The more production comes to rest on exchange value, hence on exchange, the more important do the physical conditions of exchange – the means of communication and transport – become for the costs of circulation. Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it.34
For the costs of financial circulation “physical conditions” are paramount – as manifested in the fierce competition over “co-located” server space, proximity to trading venues and access to data, and in related phenomena like the rush to acquire and develop real-estate for data centres. As mentioned above, Marx had already argued in volume 2 of Capital that transport is itself a domain of production, in which the commodity, as he puts it, “is the change of place itself” – revisiting this thesis in the light of financializtion and the logistics revolution makes a politically overdetermined schematism separating production and circulation, the factory and the port, all the more difficult to sustain.
But I have as yet only glancingly dealt with a or perhaps the key player in the politics of circulation: the state. One of the strategic dangers of a politics of interruption is to think of the blockade as a kind of unmediated confrontation with or negation of the social form of value, of capital as a social relation, in which the state is either ignored or reduced to the mesmerizing metonym of the cop. I’d like instead, simply by way of opening up another geographical and materialist avenue of inquiry, to sketch out how the very thinker who pioneered the analysis of the production of space also gave us some tools to think through the imbrication of logistics and the state – something easily verified, for instance, by the strategic panics and confusions regarding how to secure the flows of capital witnessed after 9/11. This is what Deborah Cowen has presented, in her illuminating work on logistics, as the problem of September 12 – the collapse of cargo flow in the wake of that of the World Trade Center, showing the profound tear in the tactics and strategy of the capitalist state, spanning as they do still contradictory spaces.
Contradictions in the logistical state35
On the face of it, Henri Lefebvre’s thesis about the emergence of a “state mode of production” (SMP) – as elaborated on the eve of the neoliberal surge in the four volumes of his De l’État (1976-78) – would appear to be a threadbare Marxist anachronism, a belated successor to twentieth-century efforts to think the convergence between liberal-capitalist and state-socialist or fascist political systems – Horkheimer’s authoritarian state, Burnham’s managerial revolution, Rizzi’s bureacuratization of the world, or Debord’s integrated spectacle. Yet I would like to suggest that attending to the French philosopher’s arguments about the spatial contradictions of the modern state can allow us to refine our understanding of the forms of power borne by logistics, the tensions they carry, and how they cannot simply be reduced to a direct expression of Capital.
For Lefebvre, the state is initially identified with a specific production of space, that of the national territory. This state does not have the “chaotic” characteristics of “private space.” Moreover, unlike the nightwatchman state, it is a persistent agent of social reproduction; it “does not intervene in an episodic and circumscribed fashion but ceaselessly, through different organisms and institutions devoted to the management as well as the production of space.”36 This space is both homogeneous – everywhere subject to the same logic – and broken, shattered – by the logics of property, rent, social conflict, and the ensuing fragmentation. The logistical space of the SMP, like capitalist space broadly construed, is homogeneous-broken [homogène-brisé]. Isn’t this a paradox? No, says Lefebvre: “This space is homogeneous because everything in it is equivalent, exchangeable, interchangeable, because it is a space bought and sold and exchange only exists between equivalences and interchangeabilities. This space is broken because it is treated by lots and sections; sold by lots and sections, it is therefore fragmentary.”37
Logistical space, as conceived in Lefebvre’s work of the 1970s, is prolonged by energetic space – beyond its specific economic and political investments in railways, roads and aerial space,38 the state’s relation to the production of energy is intimately linked to the production of a political space, state-space. This space is both a precondition of, and in contradiction with, the fragmented space of capitalist urbanization, and its attendant chaos. In the end, state action does not resolve spatial contradictions, it aggravates them, in the guise of synthesis and regulation. Its need to keep the flows smooth does not undo spatial chaos, or at best replaces it with social void. For Lefebvre, the logistical non-places of late capitalist modernity are thus byproducts of the spatial strategies of the capitalist state:
Wherever the state abolishes chaos, it establishes itself within spaces made fascinating by their social emptiness: a highway interchange or an airport runway, for example, both of which are places of transit and only of transit … Armed with the instrument of logistical space, the State inserts itself between pulverized spaces and spaces that have been reconstructed differentially.39
Space is thus the secret of the state in general and the SMP in particular. Lefebvre presented the space of the SMP as an anti-political space, organized to neutralize “users” (usagers), their movements, and the creation of differential spaces (these are all key themes in Lefebvre’s writings of the 1970s, crystallized especially in the 1971 Le manifeste différentialiste). Two of the key vectors of this antipolitical space, which is the product and precondition of the state mode of production, are its logistical orientation, which reveals it as a space of catastrophe or potential breakdown, and its “visuality,” which transforms space into a spectacle or series of images, in which the body disappears. Nonetheless, Lefebvre still wishes to maintain a dialectical foothold, allowing one to imagine the appropriation of state space for the sake of differential social practices. As he writes, the space of the SMP is “opposed to possible (differential) space and nevertheless leading towards it.”
At different points in his argument, Lefebvre qualifies this new space as phallic, optical, visual, homogeneous and broken, global and fragmentary, “logical-logistical.”40 This is also the space in which capitalism organises its survie, its living-on, its afterlife – through the reproduction of the relations of production. As Lefebvre would write in The Survival of Capitalism: “It is in this dialecticized (conflictual) space that the reproduction of the relations of production takes place. It is this space that reproduction produces, by introducing into it multiple contradictions.”41 The formula “logical-logistical” crops up at different points in Lefebvre’s notoriously sprawling and often slippery texts. In The Production of Space, for instance, he writes that logic and logistics both conceal latent violence.42 De l’État insistently links the two terms together. Without exploring Lefebvre’s complex engagement with logic and language,43 we can note here that logistics designates in these texts not the military or capitalist practice of managing resources and circulation, but a particular, abstract representation of space – one which, however, is dialectically bound-up with spatial and political practices – namely the state’s oversight of stocks and flows – which are, so to speak, concretely logistical.
One possible name for this link between logistical representations and logistical practices is what in The Survival of Capitalism Lefebvre calls aménagement (a term used in urbanism to denote planning or layout). “To the extent that it is represented by naming it aménagement,” he writes, “the production of space is considered logically or logistically.”44 This aménagement is responsible for the reproduction of means of production and of production relations, for organizing the “environment” of firms, for setting out a “puzzle” of cities and regions, for spatially organizing life itself. Elsewhere, Lefebvre refers to this same set of issues under the heading of a “spatiotemporal programming” which requires the knowledge of flows, circulation and terrain.45 Logistics, broadly construed, is a critical field for the reproduction of the relations of production, in which the state intervenes as producer of capitalist space. This logistical imperative – to lay out the space of stocks and flows for the optimal reproduction of capitalist relations – involves the state precisely to the extent that reproduction is not a matter of logic, but of strategy.46
In this regard the “logical-logistical” – as we’ve already noted in our discussion of Bernes – is also a fantasy, albeit a partially realized one, about the possibility to master spatial reproduction for the sake of state and capital.47 Such is the lure of abstraction: if the science of space “is a science of formal space, of a spatial form,” Lefebvre writes, “it implies a rigid logistics, and this science would consist of nothing but the constraints placed on the contents (the people!).” Behind this theoretical and mental abstraction, however, lies the sedimentation of really abstract social practices: “If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its contents and thus seems to be ‘purely’ formal, the essence of rational abstraction, it is precisely because this space has already been occupied and planned, already the focus of past strategies, of which we cannot always find the traces.”48 “Systems of equivalence take on a sensible existence and are inscribed in space.”49 The persistence of contradictions, which themselves are the product of a logical-logistical imperative, means that the science of space “does not have a logistics of space as its culmination”50 – where logistics entails an all-encompassing intelligibility and control of a homogeneously coded space, from whence the negativity of practices and struggles has been stripped out.
State space is understood as a space of flows and stocks, logistically organized and controlled for political ends; it reorganises social relations of production in function of their spatial support. The state tends to oppose a chaos of fragmentary relations – which it has itself created – with a rationality in which space is the privileged instrument, and in which economics is reconceived spatially (in terms of stocks and flows, but also rents and real estate). As Lefebvre writes: “The state tends to control flows and stocks, assuring their coordination. In the course of this process, which has a threefold aspect – growth, namely increase in the productive forces; urbanization, that is formation of giant units of production and consumption; spatialization – a qualitative leap takes place: the emergence of the SMP (state mode of production).”51 Or, in another illuminating formulation:
In the chaos of relations among individuals, groups, class factions, and classes, the State tends to impose a rationality, its own, that has space as its privileged instrument. The economy is thus recast in spatial terms – flows (of energy, raw materials, labor power, finished goods, trade patterns, etc.) and stocks (of gold and capital, investments, machines, technologies, stable clusters of various jobs, etc.). The State tends to control flows and stocks by ensuring their coordination. … Only the State can control the flows and harmonize them with the fixed demands of the economy (stocks), because the State integrates them into the dominant state it produces.52
Especially as Lefebvre turns to the present, he is sensitive to the state’s contradictory trespassing of confines of the national territory in the process of its mondialisation – a “globalization” which is not, as commonly understood, beyond the state, but rather of the state, in ways that can allow us also to rethink the tendency to take logistics as an instance of the state’s loss of predominance.53 Consider the following:
Through organization and information, there is produced a kind of unification of world space, with strong points (the centres) and weaker and dominated bases (the peripheries). In these latter zones are perpetuated differences that, for better and for worse, resist but do not paralyse the process as a whole. The latter is translated through efficient apparatuses [dispositifs] of control and surveillance, linked to informational machines: satellites, radars, beacons, and grids. In this respect, space has a much stronger connection with the State than territory once had with the nation.54
This spatialization of the state is not just projective, but endogenous. In other words, as the state becomes increasingly occupied by the logistical problems of stocks and flows, we cannot think of it as concentric, centripetal or centrifugal. Though it is inseparable from effects of centring and centrality, it is capable of considerable dissemination and multiplicity, as well as internal contradiction, if not proper difference. In the first volume of De l’État, interestingly in the context of an exploration of the place of “intelligence” in the state mode of production (one resonating in the moment of Assange and Snowden), Lefebvre will posit that the state is not a system with a central nucleus but a hierarchically-ordered network of institutions and organizations intervening at different levels of society, and thus of space.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion of Lefebvre is but a sketch of a reconstruction, whose aim was merely to complicate the political meanings accorded to logistics in contemporary radical thought and practice. To rethink logistics not just as a spatio-political fix for a potentially stagnating capitalism, but as a contradictory strategy of state power – a task that would obviously require a radical updating and revision of Lefebvre’s unruly intuitions – could help us to move beyond both the naïve perspective of its integral refunctioning as well as the untenable prospect that it will be the privileged site of a revolutionary interruption of value-in-motion. Technology, as a social relation of production, distribution, and circulation, is by no means innocent of capitalist value-imperatives and of the strategic expediencies of exploitation. But neither is the reproduction of the social forms of value endangered by the notion that the interruption of capital’s motion is directly political. Lefebvre’s scattered insights on the logistical and strategic space of the state can help situate the contemporary surge of struggles at the point of circulation within a broader historical and geographic horizon, spurring us to investigate what the state itself has become in the age of the “logistics revolution,” and thus what strategies may be adequate to struggles in and against it.
Comments
Materials for a revolutionary theory of the state
“I believe that the status of the state in current thinking on the Left is very problematic,” Stuart Hall wrote in 1984, in the midst of Margaret Thatcher’s war on the “enemy within.” He reflected on the legacy of the postwar period, which saw the extension of public services within the context of a vast expansion of the state’s intervention in social life. The ensuing crisis and restructuring of global capitalism was characterized by the strategic use of policing and repression, not to mention global military power – warfare alongside welfare. Hall’s description of the ideological dilemma faced by the Left could, with minor updates in terminology, have been written in today’s United States:
On the one hand, we not only defend the welfare side of the state, we believe it should be massively expanded. And yet, on the other hand, we feel there is something deeply anti-socialist about how this welfare state functions. We know, indeed, that it is experienced by masses of ordinary people, in the very moment that they are benefiting from it, as an intrusive managerial, bureaucratic force in their lives. However, if we go too far down that particular road, whom do we discover keeping us company along the road but – of course – the Thatcherites, the new Right, the free market “hot gospellers,” who seem (whisper it not too loud) to be saying rather similar things about the state. Only they are busy making capital against us on this very point, treating widespread popular dissatisfactions with the modes in which the beneficiary parts of the state function as fuel for an anti-Left, “roll back the state” crusade. And where, to be honest, do we stand on the issue? Are we for “rolling back the state” – including the welfare state? Are we for or against the management of the whole of society by the state? Not for the first time, Thatcherism here catches the Left on the hop – hopping from one uncertain position to the next, unsure of our ground. 1
We now confront an even more drastic expansion of state power. Even the mainstream media documents with trepidation the new technologies of surveillance and the increasing fusion of military and police control, alongside the continuing domestic growth of prisons and the fortification of imperial domination.
The hypertrophy of the state’s repressive dimensions has been matched, however, by an amputation of its welfare functions. The neoliberal restructuring that began in the 1970s is therefore experienced by many on the Left as a loss of the state’s angelic effects, of everything that once emanated from the regulation of finance and the embeddedness of markets. The state, we note forlornly in the age of austerity, is just as much teachers and the post office as it is cops and prisons. “On the hop,” as Hall described, we wonder whether it would not be better to take our distance from the Tea Party, and even the austerians of the Democratic Party and European social democracy, by defending big government from big business. We are unable to find our way out of this bind: fighting some aspects of the state – police violence, a racist judicial system, a surveillance apparatus beyond J. Edgar Hoover’s wildest dreams – while putting everything on the line to preserve others – a failing public education system, besieged social welfare programs, crumbling infrastructure. Meanwhile, one of the most precious tenets of our legacy – not the reform, not the infiltration, but the abolition of the state – risks being abandoned to the slogans of an agitated fringe of the Republican Party.
Regrettably, these formulations have also become an obstacle to clarity about contemporary capitalism. Covered up completely is the role of the state in the crisis management that followed the postwar boom, and the character of neoliberalism as a wholly state-driven project – in which the institutional coordination of markets and the penetration of finance into everyday life, both part of the heritage of the New Deal, were profoundly extended and articulated with an open assault on labor. 2
The brutal reality of the neoliberal state, on ample display in economic history, can be documented just as much in the doctrines of its theorists – a kind of unity of neoliberal theory and practice elegantly illustrated by Friedrich Hayek’s admiring visits to Augusto Pinochet’s Chile. As both Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas would recognize, in an instance of the underappreciated convergence which began to develop just as their famous debate was peaking in vitriol, Salvador Allende’s defeat had already raised the strategic question of the state – the questions of parliamentary action, the political allegiances of the state personnel, the socialist use of the state apparatus, the relation of state reform to popular movements, and the danger posed by the violence of the Right. 3 The problem of the state was at the very center of both the defeat of the Left and the ascendancy of neoliberalism.
Fortunately, the past few years have seen major shifts in the field of political possibilities. After a long period of decline, a new cycle of struggle seems to have emerged, marked by an upsurge in radical movements facing off against the state. Global mobilizations against repressive immigration laws, police violence, and austerity directly put the question of the state on the table. After all, the struggles for clean water, against racist police, and over the future of public schools are all state issues. But alongside these movements there is also a striking resurgence of socialist electoral parties and programs – from Syriza in Greece, to Podemos in Spain, to Kshama Sawant in Seattle – and much excitement about municipal socialism, popular referendums, and even the prospects of a future third party.
But the relation between these two different political approaches is uncertain. One side of the Left hopes to participate in the state – to push for ameliorative reforms, to restore the forms of public spending that characterized the now-mutilated welfare state, to pressure elected officials and push them to the left, or to themselves be elected into parliament or local government. At the opposite extreme are those who categorically reject the electoral terrain, identifying the primary line of struggle as the confrontation with the police. While the militants denounce those who seek to work within the state as collaborators, decrying any such participation as an irredeemable capitulation to its logic, the pragmatists insist that confrontational politics can only harm the movement, and demonize their ostensible comrades in terms sometimes worse than what you’ll hear from the Right. In the past, socialist movements struggled to articulate these approaches to the state into a coherent front; today, the distance between them has never been greater.
What our situation requires is a serious strategic rethinking of the state. The renewed vigor of electoral struggles on the one hand and militant mobilizations on the other form a vivid landscape of action, a dizzying “diversity of tactics.” But too often the language intellectuals use to theorize these struggles remains locked in obsolete organizational traditions, still fighting the vendettas of previous generations – against anarchism, against Leninism, against Eurocommunism. It is time to give up chasing after ghosts. A renewed theory of the state, the kind of theory that can help us overcome the political ambiguities of the present, will emerge from a space of encounter, from the convergence of perspectives conditioned by distinct sets of struggles from different times and places. This issue of Viewpoint is intended as a contribution to rebuilding such a theory. We have no “line” to propose; instead, we wager that it is precisely through such unexpected combinations and confrontations that a set of historically apposite strategies may begin to emerge.
- 1Stuart Hall, “The State – Socialism’s Old Caretaker,” Marxism Today(November 1984); also collected in The Hard Road to Renewal (London: Verso, 1988). See his self-critical reflections on the remainder of this article and the Marxism Today legacy in his interview with Helen Davis, in her Understanding Stuart Hall (London: Sage, 2004), 157-8; and Robin Blackburn’s astute commentary on Hall’s political conjuncture, “Stuart Hall: 1932-2014,” New Left Review 86 (March-April 2014).
- 2For noteworthy examples of the extensive literature on the neoliberal state, see Werner Bonefeld, “Free economy and the strong state: Some notes on the state,” Capital & Class 34 (2010); and Martijn Konings, “Neoliberalism and the American State,” Critical Sociology 36:5 (2010).
- 3See Ralph Miliband, “The Coup in Chile,” Socialist Register 10 (1973), also collected in Class Power and State Power (London: Verso, 1983); and Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), 263. In a manuscript currently under preparation, we trace this convergence and try to explain its significance, but the point has already been argued by attentive readers of Miliband and Poulantzas. See Leo Panitch, “The State and the Future of Socialism,” Capital & Class 4:2 (1980); “Ralph Miliband, Socialist Intellectual,” Socialist Register 31 (1995); and “The Impoverishment of State Theory” in Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). With specific reference to their debate, see Bob Jessop, “Dialogue of the Deaf: Some Reflections on the Poulantzas-Miliband Debate” inClass, Power and the State in Capitalist Society: Essays on Ralph Miliband, ed. Paul Wetherly, Clyde W. Barrow, and Peter Burnham (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
Comments
Notes on the Political Over the Longue Durée
“Politics” distinguishes itself from the “political,” which has as a characteristic that of contemplating, alongside the state, other holders [titolari], other subjects of political reality. Here then is a history of these subjects that is anything but over.
— Mario Tronti1
Written towards the end of what we might call the “second period” of Tronti’s reflections, that of the so-called “autonomy of the Political,” sandwiched between the more famous phase of Operaismo and the – almost completely unknown to the Anglophone world – “third period” political theological phase, that of the twilight [tramonto] of the political, the short text translated here will come to many Anglophone readers of Tronti as a surprise. The heretical Marxist, the author of Workers and Capital who analyzed the development and dynamics of the “mass worker” and argued that the working class was the dynamic element of capitalism – within and against – but always shifting capital on (every innovation a failed revolution), and that the political form of capital was determined by the intensity and form of the struggle, now shifts the theoretical framework onto another, much more historical level: the longue durée of the capitalist state from the 16th century.
In the first phase of his work, Tronti confronted the theoretical and political problems that stemmed from the dynamics of industrial capital spreading at breakneck speed throughout the Italian peninsula in the 1950s and ‘60s, neo-capitalism (as it was known at the time), alongside the massive extension and concentration of the working class in terms of condition and unification of desire – and of the need to organize this spontaneity. In the second phase, the international crisis of capital in the late-‘60s and ‘70s revived, for Tronti and others, questions of past capitalist responses to economic and political crisis, bringing the state into relief. As Tronti argues in a number of texts throughout the 1970s, with the crisis of capital of 1929, with the “Great Transformation” discussed so insightfully by Karl Polanyi, capitalism would never be the same again. The role of the state, of politics – of bourgeois politics – would be that of stabilization. So, whereas capitalism is crisis, as so many have argued since Marx’s day, the state is order.2 It is this conjuncture – capitalism and state, crisis and order – that becomes the focus of Tronti’s thought from this period, driven by the concrete shifts on the ground that confronted the working class and its organizations. In the rest of this brief introduction, I shall try to outline the reasons for this shift.
***
The “very gist, the living soul, of Marxism – a concrete analysis of a concrete situation”3; so why, precisely at this time – that of the crisis of the international capital of the 1970s – does Tronti decide that this “concrete situation” can best be analyzed through a study of the development of the “political” and of the bourgeois state (which are by no means synonymous, as we shall see) since the 16th century? Why is this the period in which Tronti decided to compose his first and only monograph, on Hegel of all people (Hegel Politico, 1975), an edited volume on the English Civil War (Stato e Rivoluzione in Inghilterra, 1977),4 and a subsequent four-volume edited anthology, of excerpts and critical essays on the leading bourgeois theorists from 1500-1800 (Il Politico, 1979-1982 – from which the translation below is drawn)? It should be noted, first of all, that this is by no means all that he worked on during this period – he continued to write on current affairs, such as the relationship that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) should maintain with extra-parliamentary movements and parties, the role of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) in the state-system, as well as more general articles on the nature of the political,5 and studies of more recent phases of capitalist restructuring such as the New Deal and Weimar.6 Alongside the important studies of the contemporary situation, he also sat on the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party during the period of the “Historic Compromise.” Hence, although his work was not restricted to the study of the early history of the bourgeois state, it is clear that during this period, from the mid-1970s till the early ‘80s, much of Tronti’s theoretical work was focused upon the bourgeois state since the 16th century, and that this decision he saw as essential to renewing the theoretical and practical tools of the workers’ movement and its party. Why? What was the question to which this course of study was to provide an answer, the problem to which this would be a solution? And what of these problems, these questions, is alive today after – or within – the Great Recession?
One path towards an answer would lead us through the fraught territory of the “autonomy of the political,” the infamous term first discussed in a lecture in 1972 (published only five years later), and that sparked Tronti’s investigations into the longue durée of the state. Whereas the “autonomy” traced here was developed through an analysis of the structure and function of the state following the Great Crash (but also the transformation of the Soviet State under Lenin was a persistent reference point), we will see that this proved to be just the first step towards a longer analysis of the political in which the bourgeois state – as theorized by Hegel and returning to the fore in the 1930s – was simply the highest or latest incarnation of the political.7
Let us begin, then, by briefly outlining the – frequently misunderstood – problem that Tronti encountered in this period. Doing so will help us understand why the history of the bourgeois state, from its origins in the 16th century, becomes so important for Tronti at this specific historical moment; it will also serve to correct some of the misunderstandings that have bedevilled many subsequent interpretations, standing in the way of an adequate theoretical and practical interpretation of the question of the autonomy of the political.
***
The first thing to note is that the series of reflections that would converge on the idea of the autonomy of the political, did not come fully formed and, arguably, never did find a definitive formulation.8 The autonomy of the political can be best described as a field of forces, of unresolved tensions that circumscribe a problematic theoretical and practical space that stems from a concrete conjunctural intuition: that once capitalism ceases to be a progressive force, i.e. when it ceases to be able to integrate the working class through a reformist moment of wage increases and heightened consumption (as during the so-called Fordist-compromise), the command of the state by bourgeois parties permits the strategic use of crisis – most notably under Thatcher and Reagan – to restructure the working class, fragmenting and isolating it geographically, sectorially or within the space of production, thereby permitting the process of the reproduction of capital to be re-established on a new and more advanced terrain of integration.9 This intuition of the active role of the state in the reproduction of capitalwould be developed further, in a series of analyses of the relation between economic crisis and the political to an investigation into the history of the bourgeois state since the Great Depression.
The autonomy of the political identifies a phenomenon of the Great Transformation. It accounts for how the bourgeoisie, confronted with economic crisis, used the state to restructure society from above, in tandem with capital. This is a necessity driven by crisis and by the combined and uneven development of capital and of its state, of the mechanisms of the state, sometimes in advance (as during the New Deal), more often retarded with respect to capitalist development (as in the Italy of the 1960s-‘70s); of the different articulations of fractions of capital with one another; and of capital and its state in relation to the level of development of its great antagonist, the working class. The question of the autonomy of the political is the question of the mechanisms at the disposal of capital10 to mediate between, to manage and to coordinate its fragments, its advances and delays, and its antagonist – a function that is initially called upon when the mechanism of development breaks down. The question to which the autonomy of the political is an answer, is not only – as so many left critics have described it, and despite evident ambiguities and rhetorical excesses11 – that of the proper relation of the Party to the class or to the state, or – for that matter – of the class to the state (although it is also this). The problem is not merely that of the correct form of political participation; the problem is also how to count politically within the bourgeois state.12 More specifically, the reality of the 1970s posed a problem with two component parts: given the autonomy of the political – “a fact of capital … I repeat, so that people stop pretending not to understand”13 – how can the workers’ movement make use of this autonomy in order to intervene at the level of the state?
In order to clarify what we mean by this problem with two elements, we can perhaps think of it in analogy with the New Economic Policy. With the Soviet Union coming out of revolution and civil war, the question for Lenin was one of rebuilding the economy and even rebuilding the class subject of the revolution, the working class, decimated by violent conflict and industrial collapse. The NEP was, as Lenin himself conceded, a step back, a “strategical retreat”;14 it was the conscious use of capitalist tools – private ownership of the means of production – for socialist purposes. Capitalism was to be let back in, was to be allowed to grow and, in growing, strengthen, but in so doing it would also rebuild the proletariat that had been “declassed” by the previous period of economic defeat and political and military conflict, and rebuild the productive forces – but this time, it would do so to defend the revolution. The question was: “who will take the lead?” Rereading the Lenin of these years alongside Tronti, the similarities in tone and form are extraordinary:
The whole question is who will take the lead. We must face this issue squarely – who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organizing first – in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on those gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and to create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the state. (Lenin15)
[We must] elaborate a medium term strategy, that is, to get to the point of being able to lead the process of adjustment of the state machine to the productive machine of capital… it is a case of going so far as to consciously take hold of the process of modernization of the state machinery, to even manage not the reforms in general, as one says in the usual jargon, but in particular that specific reform that is the capitalist reform of the state. (Tronti16)
We can speak, only half in jest, of a New Political Policy, the use of the autonomy of the political, that eminently bourgeois invention brought in most recently to save capital from its crisis (in the ‘20s and ‘30s), in order to advance the workers’ movement. This is the problem and the challenge that Tronti tries to develop in this period.
I do not want to make too much of this analogy,17 but I think it is useful when trying to make sense of the problem and the task Tronti set himself at this time. It was not, therefore, to provide a new, even if heretical Marxist theory of the state – the lack of which was a widespread topic of discussion at this time – that Tronti developed the notion of the autonomy of the political. Instead, this notion served both to make sense of the specific practice of the capitalist state after the Great Transformation and was a call to a pragmatic engagement with those tools in order to bend them to different ends. The autonomy of the political is the subjective stance of the bourgeois state, used to further its interests; Tronti demanded that it should be appropriated by the working class and bent to its interests. So it is not a question of a new Marxist Theory of the State, which had been lacking (although that too); but, crucially, a Marxist Practice of the State is what was called for. Only a thorough understanding of the machinery of state and of the political could enable one to effectively operate it – but a call for an “art of politics, that is, of particular techniques for the conquest and conservation of power,”18 was by no means a ‘“politicist-abstract” departure from the more “political-conjunctural” focus of the militant interventions of the 1960s’ – as the parallel with the NEP makes plain.19 In the final text in the book L’Autonomia del Politico, Tronti writes:
I am struck (given that we are speaking of the subjectivity of the State, [i.e.] of capitalist interests) that to some it has appeared that the properly subjective moment, in particular, that of the working class had disappeared from my discussion. We must certainly correct this impression: in the background of this argument, there is a carefully hidden interlocutor who pulls all the strings of the matter… It is true: every movement in the relationship between capital and power has a class relationship between capital and its antagonist at its origin …20
He goes on to argue with respect to the change in the state-form in the 1930s, much in the same way as does Antonio Negri21 – one of the most fierce adversaries of the notion of the autonomy of the political – that one cannot understand the particular solution given to the Great Crash without the rupture of 1917. That solution – as Tronti argues – is that which leads to the autonomy of the political, of the state as agent called to compensate for the failures of capital, to try to stabilize, re-start, re-model development, and redirecting investment between more or less advanced industrial sectors – in short, to mediate, recompose, decide and to organise the institutionalization of the class compromise that alone could save capitalism from itself and from its great antagonist. For analogous reasons, we can say that Lenin – as well as Roosevelt (in the New Deal) and Keynes – could be said to have understood the historical necessity for the autonomy of the political for the re-establishment of order on a new footing. It is here that we encounter the specificity of the political: the political in its autonomy is a theory of the reproduction of order after crisis and a theory of the means to intervene in the process of the reproduction of order. Both of these operations come under the heading of the “political,” without being reducible to it.22For this reason, Tronti privileges bourgeois theorists (including social democratic ones) who developed a theory and practice of the state to guide the autonomy of the political for the reproduction of capital, in the same way that Lenin turned to “bourgeois specialists” to run the machinery of state and large-scale industry; and it is for this same reason that Marx, who was faced with a liberal state, ceases to be a theoretical and practical reference point for thinking the new political mechanisms for the reproduction of capital.23 The autonomy of the political in the bourgeois state is precisely “in order to be able to intervene” in the reproduction of capitalism after its crisis, to re-establish conditions of development and exploitation. Tronti argued that the mechanisms of its autonomy should instead be grasped by the organization of the working class, “in order to be able to intervene” in the reproduction of capital, after its crisis, to establish conditions for a “new idea of the state,” because “one cannot introduce new masses into an old state.”24 There is no easy way to do this, no easy delegation – whether to party or to class for that matter; each concrete situation calls for a concrete analysis and the flexibility to act on the basis of the results of that analysis. The analysis always starts from the relations of class forces that determines the relative strength of the contenders and, hence, circumscribes the level of autonomy of action. An additional level of autonomy may be given by the relation to the state, to the political form of reproduction. The question is not whether or not the political operates independently of, autonomously from material conditions – it does not; the character and quality of that autonomy is governed, circumscribed by very concrete material conditions. For example, we have already indicated how, though a “great transformation,” the state became a renewed principle of order emerging from a very concrete crisis of reproduction. It did so by reproducing the class relation through, firstly, a class compromise between the two great contending classes the relative strength of which would circumscribe the relative levels of autonomy (in the New Deal / Fordist compromise) and, later, through a careful deployment of crisis, one that re-established the conditions of growth through the intensification of relative and absolute surplus value (shift to floating exchange rates / end of dollar convertibility, oil shocks, Volker shock, war on organized labour, etc.). The question for Tronti was: what are the conditions for achieving a level of autonomy, in practice, that can be exercised in order to intervene within the reproduction of class relations in a form more favorable to the working class. His answer was that it was necessary to understand and to appropriate the bourgeois mechanisms of autonomy experimented in the course of the twentieth century.25
***
To return, then, to our starting point. Why did Tronti feel the need to spend much of the 1970s, at the same time as that he was arguing for the appropriation – in theory and practice – of the bourgeois autonomy of the Political, i.e. of the mechanisms for the reproduction of capitalism, by the workers’ movement, carrying out an analysis of the political over the longue durée?
The hypothesis is that precisely with the 1930s the return of the political, call it what you will, of the autonomy, of the primacy, of the anticipation of the political, the opening – that is – of a new classical phase of politics is accompanied by a history of the State on the grand scale [in grande], where the origins of modern bourgeois power – unity and concentration, sovereignty and violence, the machine and the prince – are once again decisive. Naturally there are great changes: new paths, ideological apparatuses, grand solutions to mass organization, and the planned control of economic contradictions. But in this phase I would like to underline and hold to the common ground of correspondences and echoes [richiami] between the two periods, that of the origins and that of the great crisis, between the long process of the transition to capitalism and the epoch of the “great transformation.” From here stems the almost obligatory choice of classical political thought, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the terrain of study of living problems and the encounter with the model of political revolution, as the intersection of conditions for the passage to capitalism. At the same time, the setting to work, in practice, of the relationship between the economic crisis and the political exit from the crisis. I do not want to claim that everything holds together. But at a time when the “organic” has become a bad word, to lay claim to the organic nature of a course of study might be useful. Not in order to go against the current but to demonstrate that, in addition to studying, one can also understand.26
What I particularly want to highlight in this rich passage is the clear statement that the political is not the state – it is not only the state, but even precedes it and may – and sometimes does – become concentrated in it.27 This process of the original coming together of the political in the state is what Tronti calls, in an almost identical formulation to that used by Louis Althusser at this time, an “originary accumulation of the political.”28 This is the period of the formation of national states that accompanied but is irreducible to the transition to capitalism. So, while it is clear from the origins of modern politics that politics and the state were thrown together violently in an originary accumulation of the political, in the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries we encounter the bourgeois fear of the breaking apart of this unity, when the state loses the monopoly on the political – either to the working class and its organizations (even the reformist ones such as trade unions), to large corporations, to international bodies, or even to markets.29 Carl Schmitt’s sensitivity to the gradual erosion of sovereign authority and the ever-increasing threat of potestas indirecta makes him a privileged interlocutor for Tronti, for while the discussion of the political is one concerning the “complex path of the sometimes contradictory relationship between the political and the state,” Tronti is looking to this relationship of the political to the state so as to take stock, “in Marxist and Leninist terms, of the possibility, the probability of an original way to power.”30
***
So, have we answered our question? Why did Tronti dedicate so much time in the 1970s to the study of the bourgeois state over the longue durée and concern himself with the transformations of the political over the same period? It is because he contended that it was only a detailed study of the bourgeois state since its origins in the 16th century, which marks the start of an epoch within which we continue to operate, and of the – frequently contradictory – relations between the political and the state over this period, that could provide the workers’ movement with sufficiently sophisticated analytical and practical tools to begin to grasp the mechanisms for the appropriation and the transformation of the state. The 1930s signalled a reprise of the political after a century in which it had, for much of the time, been subordinated to the economic; this came together with a return of the “grande storia” of the state – the conjuncture again of “political maneuvering of the class struggles” through the “political control” over the social, and the “new political management of a new economic cycle;”31 to study this reprise of the origins of bourgeois power, with all the novelties that intervened in the meantime, could provide the working class with analytical and practical tools for the transformation of the state, so that it could truly “count politically.”
I do not believe that we are at the end of the history of the state. The political, the new political subjectivity strikes at it, transforms it, it does not smash it, it does not break it. As we run we will once again feel the bite of the state. We may as well grasp the reins and attempt to tame it.32
What then of today? Today, after the end of the long twentieth century of the European workers’ movement, when once again the state is assailed by numerous, even more powerful potestas indirectae; when the subjectivity of the state seems ever more closely aligned with that of international capital, what can Tronti’s work on the autonomy of the political still teach us? It continues to confirm that this autonomy is indeed “a fact of capital” and that without a workers’ movement capable of appropriating those instruments of the state for itself, the political is forced to migrate to another terrain, one where it may be better served; recognizing, at the same time, that by so doing, it will have left an instrument of inestimable power for the sole use of those whose interests are the reproduction of capital and exploitation. What Tronti allows us to think is the different and changing articulations of the political, of how it can intersect with and be pulled from the state; how it can serve to re-establish order – its function of stabilization within capitalist crisis – as well as the potential for it to be appropriated to reconfigure the reproductive mechanisms for the purposes of other subjectivities and interests, antagonistic to those of capital; but always, within capital, it is the quality of its autonomy that will determine its function and effectiveness in intervening in the process of reproduction. When that autonomy diminishes, or is too clearly subordinated to specific interests, its effectiveness is eroded – think of the Great Recession, of the way that the state has been subordinated not to international capital in general, but to finance capital, eroding both consumption as well as productive investment, rerouting cheap monetary flows into share buy-backs stoking the stock market and real estate bubbles while exacerbating geopolitical and economic instabilities, while evacuating the state of the means to serve further rounds of reproduction and stabilization, leaving capital open to its always threatening crisis and without its principle of order.
The position Tronti leaves us in is perhaps an unsettling one; but he leaves us with a great lucidity about our condition and the analytical tools to begin to think possible new articulations of the political and – perhaps – eventually to avail ourselves of them.
I would like to thank Giorgio Cesarale and Alberto Toscano for their careful reading and perceptive comments to the introduction and translation. Unfortunately, I have not been able to resolve all the issues that they have raised.
Comments
Paths of Racism, Flows of Labor: Nation-State Formation, Capitalism and the Metamorphosis of Racism in Italy
The recent European elections in May 2014 were a startling display of the rise of radical racism in Europe. But the triumph of Ukip in the United Kingdom, the Front National and Marine Le Pen in France, and the Golden Dawn in Greece, whose members have been involved in several racist attacks and murders of immigrants and leftists, are merely the more institutional evidence of a deeper trend. In Italy, where I write this text, the European elections led to the victory of the leftist, but strongly neoliberal, Democratic Party (PD), the former PCI. Nevertheless, racism increasingly circulates within the country, perpetrated by the leaders and members of both left- and right-wing parties as well as private citizens.1
During the spring of 2013, Cécile Kyenge, an immigrant from the Democratic Republic of Congo, became Minister of Integration in the center-left government of Enrico Letta. The first black minister in Italy, Kyenge was targeted by racist attacks from members of the right-wing party Lega Nord, and described by Roberto Calderoli as “an orangutan.” Of course, racist attacks are not limited to verbal harassment. In December 2011, in Florence, a member of an extreme-right racist organization killed two Senegalese vendors, and injured a third, in a local market.2 In metropolitan contexts, such as Milan or Rome, racist assaults against black people are daily occurrences. In 2009, a nineteen-year-old second-generation migrant from Burkina Faso in Milan was killed by two kiosk owners for stealing a packet of biscuits – they ran after him and beat him with an iron bar, yelling, “fuck you, nigger.” We could go on to make a very lengthy list of such incidents, especially if we were to include the daily racism migrant workers face on the job.
As the examples from Italy show, the targets of such racist attacks are mostly immigrants. They are accused of “stealing jobs,” especially – but not only – since the outbreak of the economic crisis. On the institutional level, these “popular” or “daily” racist behaviors have been translated into a very strict control over labor mobility. In 2002, after two decades of mass immigration,3 the latest in a long series of racist laws – known as the Bossi-Fini law, after the two members of parliament who signed it (one from Lega Nord, and the other from Alleanza Nazionale, the successor of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano) – entered into force, fully differentiating between migrants and natives. According to the law, immigrants can reside on national territory only if they hold a formal contract of employment, and they may be jailed on administrative charges, such as not holding a residential permit.4 The common assumption in Italian politics is that these outbreaks of racism are the combined effect of mass migrations and financial crisis: since the crisis has narrowed the labor market, competition between native and immigrant workers has intensified.
But what this interpretation misses is that Italian racism, and European racism in general, is not a transitory or contingent effect of social phenomena such as economic crisis, mass migrations, or right-wing politics; rather, it is linked to the very core of European modernity, at the nexus of the rise of capitalism, the formation of the nation-state, and the colonial project.
In what follows I will discuss Italian and European racial thinking, the roots of which can be traced to the origins of the narrative of modern Europe. Since the mid-19th century, Europe has been characterized by a “double path” of racism, directed against Southerners on the one hand, and the African colonized population on the other. To understand the present, not just the question of racism, but of Europe’s “Southern” problem, and of underdevelopment itself, it will be necessary to consider the metamorphosis of Italian racism through the 20th century, and the shape taken by European racism within the crisis.5 It will be just as important to identify new possible antiracist practices, which can both identify and struggle against the material basis of racism.
The Material Basis of Racism
To reject the assumption that racism is the effect of other social phenomena, an incidental issue in the analysis of society and politics, means identifying it as an enduring factor in the history of modern capitalist societies. I reflect here on racism as a historical fracture in the narrative of European modernity, which has shaped social relations at the local, continental, and transnational level, especially in the organization of the labor market. In this sense, in contrast with the mainstream debate about racism in Europe, I stress the material basis of racism, including race and racialization. I mean by racialization a means for disciplining intersubjective social relationships, or better, for the construction of institutional and non-institutional practices and discourses oriented towards the hierarchical representation of differences, both real and imagined. In this sense, my aim is to start with the histories of economic and cultural processes of essentialization and discrimination against certain social groups, which results in manifestations of material and symbolic violence.
As Frantz Fanon has powerfully pointed out, racism is “the shameless exploitation of one group of men by another” which entails processes of “inferiorization” and the “gigantic work of economic, and even biological, enslavement”;6 that is to say, it is not a constant of the human mind, but a tendency arising within the history of of the system which has imposed white supremacy on the social fabric and in the labor market. Thus, once again in contradistinction to a mainstream European reading of racism as ideological-cultural-ontological-psychological need, as an “ancestral sin” that describes a “deferential racism” or a “racism without race,”7 I focus on the material and structuring nature of racism, placing it at the very center of the constitution of colonial modernity and at the core of the construction and narration of modern nation-states.
In the history of capitalism, from its outset and at all latitudes, class domination has largely been intertwined with and supported by race discourses, assuming different historical inflections, always according to new or contingent political and economical circumstances – or, in Marxian terms, according to the character of the capitalist transition and forms of accumulation. From this perspective – and again against the idea of racism as psychological or ancestral sin – it is possible to analyze the metamorphosis of racism in Italy, considering the different social groups it targets, in order to bring to the fore the system of hierarchies built around and supported by “race management”8 in Europe and Italy. In this sense, as critical race theory has demonstrated, race is not an objective or fixed category, but rather something that “society invents, manipulates, or retires when convenient.”9 It is a powerful dispositif of social control and the organization and disciplining of living labor, describing an actual “wage of whiteness” – to refer to the classic definition of W.E.B Du Bois – that is constitutive of modern capitalist formations.10
Despite the resistance in the Italian and European debate to discussing “race,”11 to talk distinctly about race means both calling up a whole system of historically constructed inequalities and highlighting the material and structural nature of racism – that is to say, its strong connection to the relations of production and their transformation. However, focusing on the necessary connection between the capitalist use of race and the relations of production does not require a deterministic or economistic point of view. Rather, this focus allows us to rethink the concept of relations of production, starting from the racialization process in order to stress the unavoidable “articulation”12 or “translation”13 of race in capitalist social formations. Following Marx, this means analyzing capital as a social relation, and so insisting on the structures of domination and exploitation which lie within racism, as well as on the experiences that exceed and challenge it. Finally, it should be noted that by emphasizing the necessary connection between racialization and the relations of production, I do not mean to deny that racism and racialization predate capitalism; I only mean to trace the history of capitalism as it has been marked and saturated by race.
The Double Path in Italian Racism
Italian racism, and indeed European racism in general, has followed a “double path”: first, the invention of the “geographically close” Other in the South of the country (strictly intertwined with the racialization of Southern or Mediterranean Europe, a sort of joint-space between Europe and Africa); second, the construction of the colonial Other in Africa. These two process, which led to Italian nation-building and the formation of modern Europe itself, have been bound up with one other, each describing a specific facet of Italian racism.
After its birth as a nation-state in 1861, Italy immediately had to negotiate the narration of its identity at the European level. In fact, in order to enter the ranks of the modern European state, Italy had to shake off the image of a backward, poor, oppressed, and irrational country, deeply ingrained in the cultural taxonomy of modern Europe. Travel literature at the turn of the 19th century largely describes Italy as a country of incredible natural beauty, but one that is economically backward, lagging behind the social and political development of other European countries. The South of the country especially is described as “picturesque” and yet “primitive,” with little sense of morality, dedicated instead to civil inertia.14 It is “a paradise inhabited by devils,” according to the famous definition of Naples attributed to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. This image was clearly antithetical to the reputation of Europe for dynamism and technological advancement, represented above all by Great Britain in its transition to capitalism and the first Industrial Revolution.15
In this scenario, the narration of the newborn nation-state found its basis in the idea of the existence of “Two Italies,” coined by the Italian positivist anthropologist Alfredo Niceforo of the Lombrosian School. In the 1890s, Niceforo – providing “scientific” support for the racialization of southern Italians – described the existence of two races in Italy:16 the “Aryan and Caucasian” in the North and a “Negroid” in the South. According to Niceforo, the Italian populations of Germanic descent in the North were “easier to discipline and educate” and “much inclined to the common interest,” while the Latin populations originating in the South were “rebels, undisciplined, and too often averse to education.” Furthermore, just as the “Germans” were “civilians” capable of self-government, the “Latins” were considered less civilized, and, especially, politically immature.17 As a result, the existence of “Two Italies,” each one inhabited by a different racial group, signifies the existence of two different moral and sociopolitical inclinations, where the “Negroid” ancestry of southern Italians becomes the evidence of their inferiority and criminal behaviors, as well as the justification for brutal repression of social uprisings in the South.
Thus, the racialization of southern Italians and the invention of an “accursed race” [razza maledetta] – according to the forceful expression of the Meridionalist Napoleone Colajanni in a 1898 pamphlet strongly critical of the racial theory of the Lombrosian criminal anthropology school – constituted the basis from which the narration of modern Italy was built. On the one hand, the existence of “Two Italies” gave Italian political elites the opportunity to mark a positivist difference between the North and the South of the country, offering a tidy explanation for the internal social and economic gap to other European countries. The South was given the main responsibility for the severe economic crisis affecting Italy in the last decade of the 19th century, covering over the incompetence and irresponsibility of national policy in addressing this issue. On the other hand, “Two Italies” also allowed the construction of a vast supply of cheap (because it was racialized) labor that enabled the economic development of the country. The development of Italian capitalism was the first concrete translation in the local context of the “modern racial capitalism”18 that was developing in the United States and Australia.
Following the coordinates mapped by white supremacy, Southerners, who had been considered lazy and unintelligent because of the presence of “Negro” blood in theirs veins,19 were subjected to harsh forms of exploitation and wage discrimination, becoming cheap labor-power in service of the development of Italian capitalism. This was not much different from what was happening in the United States, where race management, drawing important lessons from the work of Alfredo Niceforo, was producing a real taxonomy of race. According to David Roediger’s analysis of American race management in the early 20th century, German workers (who “embodied strength, doggedness, and thrift”) occupied the highest levels of wage and labor hierarchies, while all other workers gradually found placement in the lower ranks: Italians, especially those from the South (“Italians allegedly excelled with pick and shovel but were unable to assist engineers,” as Roediger records), then Slavs (funneled “into filthy and unhealthy jobs because they were ‘immune’ to dirt”), then Armenians (who “ranked ‘good’ in none of the twenty-two job categories listed and rose to fair only once: wheelbarrow”). At the very bottom were Chinese workers, who were considered biologically ill-equipped with low intelligence.20
The other path of Italian racism, namely the construction of the colonial Other in Africa, took place almost simultaneously with the invention of the “accursed race.” Italy had just been unified for twenty years when, between 1882 and 1885, it gave way to its first colonial experience, once again aiming – among other reasons – to become a member of modern Europe in all respects. In conquering Africa, all the rhetoric used for the racialization of Southern Italians was put to work. Much of positivist anthropology, starting from the assumed inclination to indolence and laziness because of “Negroid” descent, was drawn upon in order to racialize the colonized population in Africa. This was the basis for a correspondence between Southern Italians and Africans. At that time, this correspondence was so strong, as historians of colonial Italy point out, that “when the government began to talk about Africa, the left opposition [which was against the colonial expansion] warned that ‘Italy had Africa at home.’”21
The idea of “Africa at home” played a specific role in the construction of national identity, clearly revealing the Italian aspirations for redemption, which is the possibility of holding a different position in the European context. To become “empire builders” meant that Italy could represent itself as more European, politically stronger and more modern. At the same time, it provided an opportunity to mark a distance between Italians – as white colonizers – and racialized non-Europeans, seizing on the possibility to start a process of “whitening” in order to enter modernity in all respects. What is crucial, however, is that the colonial project expressed the material aspirations for managing the transition to capitalism.
On the one hand, it aimed to manage poverty in the South, and the rising migration away from the South. In a first stage of colonial expansion, many southern Italians moved to Africa, where they became a bit less “black” (or a bit more white) than they were at home. On the other hand, colonial expansion served to organize a colonial labor market in Africa, especially beginning with the process of industrialization in the last decade of the 19th century. From this point on, the Italian colonial expansion in Africa took on a more markedly capitalist nature. And as investments became more massive, colonialist rhetoric took a more aggressive and violent drift, extolling “the superiority of race” over native populations. The production of labor segmentation and hierarchies intensified while journalism put the construction of racial taxonomies to work, such as the following description of the existence of four races in Tripolitania (now western Libya), each one with its own productive location: “Arabs… seem to be created to withstand long labors”; “Blacks… are the best servants”; “Jews [have] a strong disposition to business and commercial banking”; “the Turks… are soldiers, officers and officials.”22
The Metamorphosis of Racism
During the 20th century, Italian racism took on new characteristics, showing the ability to remodel and complexify itself according to the transformation of the mode of production and the new geopolitical context. In the aftermath of the earthquake that was the crisis of 1929, racism, on the entire European level, took on the task of managing new economic and social international arrangements, especially in the relationship between the mother country and the colonies. Such new articulations mainly meant a growing protectionism and a more strict use of colonial resources (raw materials and labor-power), as well as, simultaneously, the reorganization of the international division of labor which had broken down following the collapse of the American stock market. In both cases, the alleged superiority of whiteness was the ground from which the two processes were redesigned. Italy, for its part, took a more precise and aggressive approach, producing a real breakthrough in the race management of the colonial context.
Between 1930 and 1933, 15 concentration camps were set up in the desert region of Sirtica in the middle of the Italian colony in Libya. More than 100,000 Libyan civilians were deported to Sirtica in order to break up the partnership between the civilian population and the insurgents engaged in anti-colonial resistance. More specifically, and what is more relevant for our purposes, this mass deportation can be described as an incredible laboratory of race management. The semi-nomadic farmers, forced to become sedentary, were transformed into a large pool of free labor that provided for both the construction of roads (mainly men) and the preparation of fields (mainly women), both of which largely contributed to the economic output of the colonies.23
However, a stronger process of racialization in the colonies took shape in the aftermath of the proclamation of the empire during the fascist regime in May 1936. The new imperial identity aimed at erasing all traces of the past backwardness and civil inertia in which the country had long been placed, which required marking the differences between Italians and Africans. In support of this project, starting in 1937, two different legal circuits were activated: the metropolitan right and the colonial, both intending to segment and hierarchize labor-power along the color line. In the colonies, the segregation of the African black population was organized around all spheres of life: African black neighborhoods were separated from the Italian white neighborhoods.24 At work, any native employee could be employed in tasks equal to or greater than Italians,25 but native workers earned only one-fifth of the daily wage of an Italian (7 lire vs. 33 lire);26 in the schools for natives (strictly separate from those for Italian whites), the only forms of teaching were oriented around the training of unskilled workers.27
In the homeland, the new imperial identity was structured as a “defense of race,” taking the form of Aryanism, which in 1938 promoted the so-called “racial laws” and the persecution of Jews. On the one hand, these laws – fully in accordance with the functioning of race management and at the very core of the “invention of the white race”28 – were responding to the need to break the bonds of solidarity among workers, facing the real possibility of an explosion of dissent amidst growing uncertainties in the geopolitical context on the eve of the outbreak of the World War II. On the other hand the systematic exclusion of “citizens from the Jewish race” by many working environments, which was a prelude to further persecution such as searches and concentration camps, managed the reorganization of the internal labor market after the 1929 crisis. Starting in the late 1930s, violent propaganda marginalized shops run by Jews; Jews were expelled from the Fascist party, causing a large rise in unemployment.29 As a result of the process of “Aryanization” of the Italian culture, all Jewish scholars and teachers were expelled from schools and universities. Nevertheless, as evidence of the material (rather then psychological) basis of racism, and of race as an actual changeable dispositif for labor hierarchization and social control, in November 1938 an exception was made to the provision preventing Jews from having Italian citizens of the “Aryan race” as servants, allowing for “special reasons of expediency.”30 More than 2,500 “Aryan” workers, mainly women working as servants, were able to return to work.
In the aftermath of World War II and as result of the horrors produced by Nazi and Fascist eugenics, the word “race” become a taboo, disappearing from both the scientific vocabulary and everyday discourse in Europe. Nevertheless, it remained an actual dispositif of segmentation and hierarchization of social relations. Although racism was radically reinterpreted through what has been called the “epistemological turn,” put into motion through UNESCO’s statements on the racial issue in 1950 and 1951, which erased the material and structuring nature of racism, no longer regarding it as system of inequalities (an objective phenomenon), but rather as original “vice” or “injury” (subjective phenomenon),31 race would continue to organize the labor market at the national and continental levels.
The racialization of Italian workers who immigrated to Germany, France, Switzerland, or Belgium ran along very similar lines as the life and work experience of other Italians at the beginning of the century in United States, where they came to be “classified” as “Color: White/Complexion: Dark,”32 and downgraded in labor and wage hierarchies. Similarly, during the aftermath of World War II in Europe, Italian racialized workers were pushed to the low ranks of labor hierarchies, finding very insecure jobs, which resulted in tragic events such as the explosion at the coal mine in Marcinelle, Belgium, in 1956, when over a hundred Italian workers died.
Within the Italian borders the process of reinterpreting racism was translated as the removal of one of the most revolting pages in the history of the country from collective discourses and imaginaries. The new national identity put forth by the partisans of resistance against fascism left no room for such a detestable story, and quickly tried to rid itself of the uncomfortable legacy of racism at home and in the colonies, together with mass murders and atrocities. Nevertheless, race survived, and the Italian post-war reconstruction, and especially the economic boom that followed, could once again benefit from the processes of racialization and race management.
In Italy, the post-war transition highlighted the shift from a still predominantly agricultural economy to a more distinctly industrial one, and showed the revival of myths and representations from the post-unification period, which re-proposed the distinction between a “backward” South assimilated to Africa and a “modern” and “civilized” North holding its place within the European matrix. Through government decisions, all productive activities of the emerging industrial capitalism were placed in the Northwest of the country; in the South, the few industrial complexes were dismantled, while the drastic reduction of arable land produced a surge in unemployment. In the following two decades, the South “offered” more than two million people to the North, who were employed in various capacities of industrial production.
In Northern cities, migrant workers from the South found an uncomfortable social climate marked by misinterpretation and mistrust, with blatant discrimination that made it difficult to even to find a home or access adequate education. Meanwhile, the representation of a southern Otherness, largely circulated through the media, had been mainly articulated around the concepts of poverty, backwardness, and violence.33 Marginalized and subjected to processes of subordination, workers from the South were driven to unskilled jobs, often with irregular administrative positions, and forced to accept shorter labor contracts and very low wages.34 Many of them worked by either piecework or subcontracting in the building industry. Others, especially women, were “illegally” employed in sort of renewed “craft” jobs within the satellite industries.35 And, until 1961, when the law that controlled the internal mobility of labor was repealed, only workers holding the status of “resident” could find work in the industrial plants.
In sum, the racialization of workers from the South had the task of managing the particular phase of capitalist transition, introducing the mechanization of production into Italy. These transformations were increasingly rendering obsolete the figure of the “craft workers,” predominantly from the North, in favor of the introduction of the system of new, generic, and low-skilled labor-power that was the young workers from the South (which we will eventually call “mass worker”).36 Therefore, the construction of race hierarchies aimed both at devaluing the new labor-power that was entering the labor market, and undermining the forms of solidarity among workers that could challenge the recovery of Italian industry. The racialization of southern workers in the aftermath of World War II allowed the creation of a large pool of cheap and docile labor-power that enabled the so-called “Italian miracle.” However, here it should be also noted that at the end of the 1960s, young and low-skilled racialized workers from the South were the main actors of an extraordinary season of labor struggles in Italy, which started a profound process of social transformation, calling into question both labor hierarchies and hierarchies constructed around the Otherness of the South. These struggles demonstrate how the processes of racialization – and therefore racism understood as material and structuring phenomenon – constitute a battleground in which racial hierarchies can be reversed.
Nevertheless, the ability of workers’ struggles in the 1960s and 1970s to challenge racial hierarchies did not mean, of course, the end of racism in Italy. Within the processes of globalization, as the country dealt for the first time with international immigration, racism developed new roots, contributing to the construction of what, following Etienne Balibar, one could define as a “migrant race.”37 In a manner different from other European countries such as England and France, which had experienced a steady stream of migrants from former colonies since the time of decolonization, Italy met its colonial Other at home for the first time only in the late 1980s. Then, the aggressive racism already seen in the African colonies was quickly set ablaze, affecting newcomers especially from North Africa and Eastern Europe (mainly from the former Soviet States after 1989).38
Starting from the end of the 1990s, legislative measures to control and govern global labor mobility were largely responsible for the management of globalization and the increasing mass phenomenon of immigration. Similar to other European countries, the management of labor mobility in Italy has privileged processes of differentiation and selection of migrant workers, “including” rather than “excluding” them, although in a subordinate position. Status with respect to citizenship, the non-recognition of education and degrees, and the often stereotypical interpretation of signs of recognition, such as clothing or language, work as dispositifs of “differential inclusion,”39 continuing to ensure a large supply of low-cost labor. All Italian immigration laws have been shaped and continue to be shaped in this direction, such as the aforementioned Bossi-Fini law that is now fundamental in regulating labor mobility.
Racism and the Crisis
In recent years, the double path of Italian (and European) racism, and their simultaneous operation, has taken on a renewed existence within the economic crisis. On the one hand, the crisis exacerbated the aforementioned racism against international immigrants, which finds its roots in the invention of the colonial Other. On the other hand, it marked an updating of the racism against Southerners that refers to the historical fracture between North and South of Europe. From this latter perspective, one could read the violent rhetoric against “laziness” and “corruption” of southern European countries that is taking form today. Such rhetoric largely contributes to images of marginalization and inferiorization, and discourses about the so-called PIGS, the nasty acronym used to dub Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain the “swine” of Europe, identified as the cause of the Eurozone crisis.40 In this respect, the international press and the gray literature that flanks the European “Troika” insist on identifying the origin of the crisis in some forms of politics and in the functioning of the economy in the countries of the Mediterranean. In this way, a productive North, which is rigorous and sober, is contrasted to the lazy South, which is wasteful and corrupt, exactly as at the beginning of European modernity. In an explicit way, Hans-Jurgen Schlamp wrote in Der Spiegel International: “The true problem of the south isn’t the economic and financial crisis – it’s corruption, waste and nepotism,”41 thereby establishing a linear relationship between the Eurozone crisis and some of the worst features of the functioning of politics and economics in southern Europe. Alongside this production of imaginaries and discourses confirming the myth of white supremacy at the origin of the modern, capitalist, and colonial Europe emerges the idea that the South is always a kind of reverse of capitalist production, showing, today as in the past, a distinction between a North inclined to capitalist ethic and development, and a South undisciplined by this ethic and therefore underdeveloped.
As Luciano Ferrari Bravo usefully pointed out in his analysis of Southern Italy in the 1950s and 1960s, when internal migration was redrawing the social and productive structures, the whole gamble of capitalism has historically run between the concept of development and underdevelopment. Accordingly, in the capitalist narrative, so-called “underdevelopment” does not represent the not yet of development; it is rather a specific function of capitalism itself, “a material and political function of capitalism which, while it is determining itself, gives meaning to the process of capitalist socialization,”42 allowing the reproduction of capitalism itself. From this perspective, the social, economic, and political underdevelopment that is today attributed to Mediterranean Europe, is what makes possible the very existence of the neoliberal European capitalism in crisis. In other words, such underdevelopment represents the space of the capitalist accumulation (just as in Ferrari Bravo’s analysis southern Italy supports the very existence of the growing Italian capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s). The distinction between virtuous economies in northern Europe and weak economies in southern Europe has a specific function in contemporary capitalist valorization: transferring the material and symbolic costs of the crisis to the South, by way of the austerity programs that the European “Troika” have, mostly unilaterally, imposed on the Mediterranean countries.
Within the crisis of Eurozone,43 while a growing share of migrant labor-power has been moved into the most deregulated sectors of production (especially the building industry and agricultural work) and mechanisms of “differential inclusion” – such as the measures for regularizing the residency status of workers, especially women, employed in care and domestic labor, in 2009 – aim to produce new internal fractures, the racialization of southern Europe (and in a microcosmic way, southern Italy) provides the means for interpreting the economic crisis, supporting the reorganization of European (and Italian) governance, and the implementation of austerity policies. In this sense, the renewed rhetoric of “laziness and corruption” used to characterize people living in the South is deployed on the one hand to support and justify the imposition of austerity programs in countries such as Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain, the so-called PIGS, and on the other hand to establish new labor hierarchies for managing the reorganization of the labor market on the national and European level.
From this perspective, and as part of the historical trend of race management that goes hand in hand with the development of capitalism, the South, both in Italy and at the continental European level, emerges once again as a supply of cheap labor. Low-skilled wage labor, such as call centers, are relocating to southern Italy, counting on a two-thirds reduction of wages. At the same time, the South is still feeding important flows of young workers, often highly educated, both towards the North of the country and outside the national border, the predictable outcome of the systematic neglect of universities and research, disinvestment in culture and innovation, and the draconian cuts imposed by the austerity measures.44 In 2012, residents in the Italian South working in the center-North counted almost 140,000 (+4.3%). They were mostly young people under 40, with a medium-high level of education, employed mainly in precarious conditions.45 Fifty thousand have left the country, reversing for the first time in recent years the balance between emigration and immigration in Italy. Again, a large part of them are “qualified youth” who move away, often sponsored by private universities.46 In 2012, Germany, as a real magnet of labor mobility in Europe, accepted 42,000 Italians, with an increase of 40% over the previous year, especially workers in creative and cognitive industries.47
Nevertheless, northern Europe, far from being a happy island, offers newcomers a highly deregulated labor market (characterized by short-term work and very high flexibility) that is crossed by processes of racialization that translate the historical narrative of the intra-European fracture into the present. In this sense, young precarious cognitive workers who leave Italy or other countries in the South and move North live the deskilling and devaluing of their work, not only in terms of a penalty in the possibility of negotiating wages and labor guarantees (as was the case in the early 20th century or in the 1950s and 1960s, although in a different paradigm of production), but especially by dealing directly with precarity, the rising of social insecurity, and the blackmail of the discontinuity of income in an highly deregulated labor-market. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that these young skilled and specialized workers, subject to disqualification and downgrading in wages, protections, and guarantees, are today, together with international migrants, the central target of race management within intra-European labor mobility.
What is at Stake?
With the historical foundation of race management in mind, it follows that struggling against racism cannot be disengaged from the struggle against the capitalist conditions of domination and exploitation. Therein especially lies the importance of understanding racism in its inherently material and structural nature, in order to approach it as a device of social control, segmentation, and hierarchization, instead of an ideological-cultural-ontological-psychological need, or a social pathology. It is only by accepting racism as intimately linked with the system of production and capitalist exploitation that one can imagine and practice an actual way to challenge the social segmentation and hierarchies built around race. If we assume, instead, as the majority of the Italian and European debate does, that racism is a purely psychological practice, the only way to fight it would be through an educational project that has, however, revealed few possibilities for success, given that fact that the least fifty years (starting from the aftermath of World War II and the already mentioned “epistemological turn” of UNESCO) of good intentions and discourses of social justice that actually allowed racism, in its continuous and different forms, to continue to spread.
However, understanding racism within a materialist theory gives us the possibility of challenging it by starting exactly from a questioning of the dispositifs of exploitation and control that are built on the ground of race, that is to say, to challenge the race management that has historically accompanied the capitalist transition and accumulation. It is, in other words, to bring together struggles against racism in the workplace with labor struggles at the level of antiracism.
Today, in Italy, the struggles in the retail logistics industry, in which the workforce is largely composed of migrants, are a nascent way of touching on this.48 In moving the main focus of anti-racist struggle from citizenship to racialized labor, these logistics struggles are producing effective transformations of the labor and life conditions for workers (mainly racialized migrants) in the industry. Therefore, to challenge race hierarchies in the management of retail logistics in Italy has meant a considerable improvement in working conditions, as well as an end to racial blackmail and abuse. At the same time, these struggles, developed within large social networks and involving other figures such as students and precarious workers, political collectives and social centers, are producing forms of cooperation that are delineating new kinds of relationships between native and foreign workers. What is taking shape in the blockades at the retail logistics warehouses is a common plan of struggle, which, by bringing students and temporary workers together with warehouse workers to block the flow of goods, connects these different sectors of struggle. Thus, what is at stake in Italy and Europe within the crisis is this common ground of struggle. The welding together of different figures of labor and the social is literally terrorizing government and capital – it aims to reshape social relationships and challenge the processes of impoverishment and déclassement imposed by the neoliberal capital in crisis.
Comments
Primitive Accumulation and the State-Form: National Debt as an Apparatus of Capture
The moment has come to expose capital to the absence of reason, for which capital provides the fullest development: and this moment comes from capital itself, but it is no longer a moment of a “crisis” that can be solved in the course of the process. It is a different kind of moment to which we must give thought.
– J-L. Nancy1
Commencement and Crisis2
In a brief moment of his theoretical work, the great Japanese Marxist critic Tosaka Jun deployed a decisive and crucial phrase, a phrase that I believe concentrates within it the historical conjuncture we have been experiencing on a world-scale in the recent years of crisis: he calls this ultimate crystallization of politics “the facts of the streets” or “the facts on the streets” (gaitō no jijitsu).3 I would like to excessively develop or overwrite – in other words translate – this phrase into a concept in the strong sense, to raise this seemingly marginal choice of words to the level of a principle, and to utilize this principle itself as a lever through which to force into existence a certain theoretical sequence. What Tosaka essentially reminds us of is the literal factuality (or more specifically, in Alain Badiou’s terms, the “veridicity”) of the streets, the “fact” that the streets themselves express the dense sociality that capital’s tendency towards the socialization of labor must necessarily-inevitably produce. In other words, what we have seen in the political energies that have been widely unleashed around the globe in the last year, is that the streets themselves recurrently-continuously testify or bear witness to their own “facts.” These “facts” are precisely the verso or underside of capital’s mapping on a world-scale. Or, to put it in another way, a way that I would like to develop here, “the facts of the streets” is the center of the volatile “absence of reason” or (im)possibility that is always “passing through” in between two polarities of theory that I will call capital’s logical topology and its historical cartography.
The logical topology of capital’s inside is always paradoxically searching for a way to trace out and mirror itself in the historical cartography, always attempting to make itself a world. Since the beginning of the capitalist mode of production, the primary lever through which to force the capture of labor has always been the form of the state amalgamated together with the form of the nation, sutured together in the process of primitive accumulation. Using this building-block, capital tries incessantly-recurrently to translate its logical structure into the territoriality of the earth, to inscribe itself into the actual surface of the world. For this task, an entire sequence of “mechanisms” or “apparatuses” are necessary. But today, the “facts of the streets” are showing us more and more that, as capital’s logical topology oscillates itself into new, hazardous and volatile concentrations of its unstable core, these mechanisms, that for so long had guaranteed or legitimated capital’s forcing of the historical process, are themselves descending-ascending into delirium. The delirious and demented logic of capital today confronts the dignity and refusal that lines the streets. Engels, in his stark and forceful style, reminds us of what is essentially at stake:
The relation of the manufacturer to the worker has nothing human in it; it is purely economic. The manufacturer is ‘Capital,’ the worker is “Labour.” And if the worker will not be forced into this abstraction, if he insists that he is not “Labour,” but a man, who possesses, among other things, the attribute of labour-power, if he takes it into his head that he need not allow himself to be bought and sold in the market as the commodity “Labour,” the bourgeois reason comes to a standstill.4
When the streets erupt against this commodification, and the bourgeois reason is halted, capital must modify its equilibrium, it must determine how this “absence of reason” can be “passed through,” because capital cannot solve the crisis, but merely traverse it without resolving it. But how does this seemingly improbable or excessive (il)logic operate? Here we must literally “go back to the beginning.”
The Erasure of Violence by Means of Violence
Today, the crisis is not simply reducible to the financial crisis, nor can it be said to be a purely political crisis of legitimation of the state apparatus. Rather, the crisis today is one centered on the violent-volatile amalgam between capital’s limits and the limits of the state-form, particularly, the limits of the mechanisms that have allowed this amalgam to primarily organize social relations since the advent of capitalism itself. In order to think the ways in which our moment, and the moment of the advent of industrial capital converge, we have to think the question of the beginning, the origin. This is also a question of crisis as such, of the theory of crisis. Today, there is a constant tendency to see this crisis as an exception, as a permanent state of exception, as a making-permanent of something contingent, and so forth. But this in turn obscures the systematic and cyclical nature of crisis, which occurs only insofar as the systematic order in which it is placed is itself in question. Crisis, it must be said, cannot be simply and easily summed up in its typical underconsumptionist reading and its political consequences. If underconsumption is the motor-force of crisis, it would appear merely as a contingent question of national policy. But the specific nature of capitalist crisis can never be explained on such a basis, precisely because the underconsumptionist explanation treats every crisis as a surprise. But nothing about this crisis is surprising – or rather, if there is a surprising element in our current situation, it is the rebirth of the politicality of the “facts of the streets” that capital has suicidally let loose. Crisis is always a repetition, but a cyclical motion in which difference emerges within this repetition. That is, every time the circle has to be traced back to its starting point or commencement, the tracing itself always exhibits microscopic divergences. These divergences themselves, because they are exposed to the figurative or creative dimension of repetition, always contain within them the possibility for another arrangement: “From time to time the conflict of antagonistic agencies finds vent in crises. The crises are always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium.”5 But the “disturbed equilibrium” is not itself a state of harmony and peace. Rather, the disturbed equilibrium is an undertaking of “violent eruptions” that have been covered over in new forms, and made to violently erase their own violence. But where does this violence emerge from?
As is well-known, the problem of the “so-called primitive accumulation,” centered in the 24th chapter of the first volume of Capital, originates from Marx’s recognition of the fact that his own analysis of the logical structure of capital requires an endlessly regressing series of presuppositions: the movement of accumulation presupposes the existence of surplus value, surplus value presupposes that capitalist production is already established, the existence of capitalist production presupposes a stock of capital sufficient for the cycle to begin, and so on. Thus he argues, the whole movement requires that we assume what Adam Smith called the “previous accumulation,” a period of accumulation which precedes capitalism’s established functioning, and from which it itself begins to move. But primitive accumulation does not mean a smooth transition that establishes the “good society,” nor the moment when mankind falls from an idyllic state. Rather, it is an irruption of violence, an instant in which what was previously untethered, undefined, and unbound is violently concatenated into a sequence that furnishes the basic material conditions for capitalist production. Thus, in this moment, it is “notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly, force, play the great part.”6 It is not simply that the peasantry is “freed” to become the wage-labor required for the formation and rotation of the circuit of capitalist accumulation, it is also at the same time the inverse: this process also indicates the closure of heterogeneity in order to produce equivalences which can then “encounter” each other: the owner of capital and the owner of labor power.
In this sense, the process of primitive accumulation (which is not a period, but a cyclically reproduced logical moment) describes the installation of “real abstraction” into history, and the fact that this moment is repeating everyday shows us the paradoxical nature of the historical temporality that characterizes capitalist society. More than anything however, we are immediately made aware of the violence of the production of the conditions of possibility for capitalist relations of production, for the “encounter” between buyers and sellers of labor power. Here we are reminded that “there is a primitive accumulation that, far from deriving from the agricultural mode of production, precedes it: as a general rule, there is primitive accumulation whenever an apparatus of capture is mounted, with that very particular kind of violence that creates or contributes to the creation of that which it is directed against, and thus presupposes itself.”7 As Marx incisively pointed out, in capitalist society, which is never at rest, but rather a circuit in constant motion, we must recognize that the “original sin is at work everywhere” (die Erbsünde wirkt überall).8
There is a long debate on the translation of die sogennante ursprungliche Akkumulation as the so-called primitive accumulation. But I would like to give this debate an added dimension: what we must consider today is how the originary accumulation is incorporated into capitalist development as primitive accumulation, as a repetition of the origin that is also concerned with the division or “separation” (Trennung) of historical time between the “primitive” or “backwards” and the “on time” or “normal” course of development. The trick of primitive accumulation is to work on these two dimensions at once, as part of the same social motion, to divide the earth on the basis of “forms” in the same way as the abstraction of the exchange process is divided between “two sides.” In other words, this moment of the beginning, which is cyclically-recursively repeated within the sphere of crisis (and in every capture of the worker’s body to secure the grounds for the labor-power commodity), is repeated in relation to a volatile historical exterior, repeated in terms of the form-determination of the “nation-form” (Balibar) and the “historical and moral factors” for the determination of the value and price of labor power, the “naïve anthropology” (Althusser) that lurks in the interior of capital’s logic. Capital’s schema of the world divided up into “national capitals” is itself profoundly linked to the historical formation of so-called “homo economicus,” in the form of the two figures of exchange, buyers and sellers. In other words, the figure of “Man” – as Deleuze and Guattari importantly point out, this figure of humanism is not simply “white man” (l’homme blanc) but rather “White Man” (L’Homme blanc) – is not an “exteriority” or “cultural supplement” to the economic field: it is rather the presupposition always-already at the very core of the circulation process.
The image of the world that capital presents to itself, by presupposing a certain accomplished history, also presupposes the production of the individuals that would furnish the “needs” upon which “rational” exchange would emerge. But the very production of these individuals itself presupposes the unitary and eternal area, or gradient which could legitimate those individuals as individuals by means of the form of belonging, typically to the nation-state. Thus, the whole circuit constitutes a “vicious circle,” one which never adequately returns to its starting point, because the whole sequence of presupposition forms an abyssal and regressive chain, in which something must always be given: “the homogeneous given space of economic phenomena is thus doubly given by the anthropology which grips it in the vice of origins and ends.”9 The field of “interest,” which is supposed to represent therefore the pure or immediate expression of “need,” separated from any extra-economic coercion, direct violence, and so forth, reveals itself as the ultimate expression of this “vice of origins and ends,” insofar as it must always erase or cover over the production of this figure of “Man” itself. When Marx discusses the figures of the “guardians,” the “bearers” or “owners” of the labor power commodity, he refers to them specifically as “this race of peculiar commodity-owners” (diese Race eigentümlicher Warenbesitzer),10 effectively reminding us that “the schema of the West and the Rest” is co-extensive and co-emergent with the dynamics of capital itself.
In other words, the “naïve anthropology” that is supposedly excluded from the circulation process or the “total material exchange” between “rational” individuals, is in fact located at its very core. Exactly as Deleuze and Guattari point out in their identification of the nation-state as the ultimate model of the capitalist axiomatic, the form of “the nation” is already contained at the very origin of the supposedly “rational” and “universal” process of exchange, a process that acts as if it represents the smooth and perfect circle of pure rationality, but that is permanently suspended between its impossible origin, which it is compelled to cyclically repeat, and its end, which is equally impossible, because it would relativize the circuit of exchange, and expose it to its outside, which it must constantly erase. Thus the social body or socius itself must remain in its state of insanity or “derangement” forever pulled in two directions of the production of subjects. It cannot exit this “deranged form,” but must try perpetually to prove its “universality” simply by oscillating between these two boundaries, two impossibilities: its underlying schema of the world, which “seems absent from the immediate reality of the pheonoma themselves” because it is permanently located in “the interval between origins and ends,” a short-circuit that incessantly reveals to us that “its universality is merely repetition.”11 The paradox of logic and history in the apparatus of capture thus is contained in the following problem: “the mechanism of capture contributes from the outset to the constitution of the aggregate upon which the capture is effectuated” (le mécanisme de capture fait déjà partie de la constitution de l’ensemble sur lequel la capture s’effectue).12 This paradox, however, is “no mystery at all” (pas du tout de mystère), precisely because it is a mechanism or schema that exists out in the open, on the surface of society. The historical accident, the moment of capture for which there was no apparent necessity or pulsion, produces a form of torsion back upon itself. Once capture has been effected, it loops back onto its own contingent origins to once again derive itself, to anticipate and “conjure” itself up as if it were the necessary outcome of its own schema. In other words, the forms of capture, enclosure, and ordering are not simply distinguished by their appearance as always-already prior; more fundamentally, they are distinguished by this paradoxical and demented structure in which the contingent historical event cycles back to itself, once again “discovering” its own hazardous origins, but does so precisely to “recode” its emergence so as to appear as if what ought to be an accident was always in fact a necessary outcome. Thus, the historical accident of primitive accumulation is constantly “becoming what it is” neither through its contingent foundations nor its inner drive to pretend it is necessary; this schema operates precisely by cyclically repeating its origin in capture in order to harness its hazardous flux retrospectively, to conjure itself up as if its origin were a mere testament to its necessary emergence.
In this system of the violence of inclusion, the violence of the schema itself “hides in plain view,” it operates immediately before our eyes, yet “it is very difficult to pinpoint this violence because it always presents itself as preaccomplished.”13 The seeming double-bind contained in the violence of the apparatus of capture might appear to disable any conception of political intervention, to be a closed circle, but we could also say precisely the opposite. In the process of primitive accumulation, “the concept of ‘determined social formation’ has become the concept of ‘class composition’: it restores, in other words, the dynamism of the subject’s action, of the will that structures or destroys the relations of necessity.”14 In other words, paradoxically it is the fact that our forclosure into the social field has taken place that opens the possibilities of politics. We have always-already been included into this systematic expression of capture, but this inescapability of the repetition of the beginning does not mean something disabling.
Capital, as the fundamental concretization of social relations, and therefore as the apex of the social relation’s violent verso, cannot rid itself of this fundamental “condition of violence” (Gewaltverhältnis),15 located in its logical alpha and omega, the labor power commodity, whose “indirect” production is located paradoxically outside commodity relations. An excess of violence is haunting capital’s interior by means of this constantly liminalizing/volatilizing forcible “production” of labor power. Precisely by this excessive violence, capital endangers itself and opens itself up to a whole continent of raw violence, and it is exactly this point that shows us something important in terms of the question of how capital utilizes the “anthropological difference” to effect the “indirect” production of labor power. The primal violence, sustained as a continuum or “status quo,” appears as a smooth state, a cyclical reproduction cycle without edges. But this appearance or semblance of smooth continuity is in fact a product of the working of violence upon itself: the violence of the historical cartography must erase and recode itself by means of violence as the smooth functioning of the logical topology. In other words, when we encounter the basic social scenario of capitalist society, the exchange of a product for money, we are already in a situation in which the raw violence of subjectivation, whereby some absent potentiality within the worker’s body is exchanged as if it is a substance called labor power which can be commodified, is covered over by the form of money, which appears as a smooth container of significations that can serve as a measure of this potentiality. But in order for labor power to be measured and exchanged as money, there must be a repeated doubling of violence. What must remain on the outside of capital as a social relation is paradoxically what must also be simultaneously forced into its inside, perpetually torn between the forms of subjectivation that produce labor power as an inside, and the historical field of reproduction in which the worker’s body is produced on the violent outside of capital.
The National Debt as a Conduit
Every time capital requires the commodification of labor power, it must in effect repeat at the level of the logical topology the process of the transition, the “so-called primitive accumulation.” But the historical process simultaneously forces capital to undertake the transition at a microscopic level, in the form of the shrinking commodity-unit, and therefore in an even more paradoxical form than the historical “beginning.” That is, capital must capitalistically undertake a microscopic version of the transition to capitalism. At the “beginning” capital could rely on direct force, on a structural violence that would enable or set in motion a field of effects that would generate a general order of capture. But how can the transition be undertaken over and over again, in particular after the historical transition is assumed to have already occurred? Marx gave us an essential clue when he reminded us that the so-called primitive accumulation in effect reappears or takes up a second logical position in capital’s interior, in the form of the national debt.
The original sin at the beginning of the capital-relation might as well be understood as an “original debt,” an historical appearance of something given, a gift. The process of primitive accumulation and its historical acts of enclosure cannot simply be understood as an excessive violence that is then superceded by a more “rational” or “decent” and “restrained” order. Rather, what the process of primitive accumulation reminds us of, is the necessity for capital of the given, the form of “supposition” (Setzung) and “presupposition” (Voraussetzung). But how does this originary debt-gift operate? In what sense is this a problem of actuality for us? In this sense, what exactly is the national debt itself?
The national debt is a mechanism. A very special type of mechanism, and one that capital relies on intimately. Uno Kozo gave us a critical clue to this type of mechanism as follows:
Through the law of population, capitalism comes into possession of mechanisms or apparatuses which allow the (im)possibility of the commodification of labor power to pass through (‘muri’ o tôsu kikô). This is precisely the point on which capitalism historically forms itself into a determinate form of society, and further, is what makes it independent in pure-economic terms. Like land, this is a so-called given for capitalism, one that is given from its exterior, but unlike land it can be reproduced, and by means of this reproduction becomes capable of responding to the demands of capital put forward through the specific phenomenon of capitalism called crisis.16
Uno locates this mechanism in the form of the “law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of production” (der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise eigentümliches Populationsgesetz),17 a law that is central to the questions of crisis and debt, because it concerns above all the management of personhood, the management of the physical-moral aspects of the material existence of the body, so as to maintain the “rational individual,” the form which would furnish adequate labor power for capitalist production. But this structure of such an apparatus is not limited to the form of population; rather the “law of population” is one moment of the overall taxonomy of these mechanisms for the traversal of the nihil of reason that capitalism necessitates from the outset. If at the beginning, there is a debt or gift, capital cannot ever truly “begin.” That is, it is impossible to “start from the first instance” if the first instance is always-already delayed or deferred by means of something that must be there already. In other words, if capital can only expand on the basis of its originary debt/gift, then capital is permanently or eternally crippled and restrained by the nature of this given element, it can never extract itself from what is given in order to fully realize its image of a circle with neither end nor beginning. In order therefore, to overcome or at least avoid this problem, capital must formulate all sorts of these “apparatuses for the traversal of (im)possibility.” That is, capital must discover ways in which something that should restrain or even expose its limitations can be traversed or passed through. But precisely in constantly requiring mechanisms or apparatuses outside its interior logic, capital demonstrates its relatively volatile functioning, in which precisely its excessive aspects (the reliance on the state, the enforcement of the nation-form, the violence of the exterior allowed into the interior and once more erased as violence by means of violence), its paradoxical and even “demented” aspects, appear as the central principles of its operation. When we confront this “demented” or “deranged” aspect of capital, we are also immediately alerted to the fact that this aspect of capital is also where an immense political breach exists, and it is on this point that we must clarify the current scenario of debt.
Marx recalls this problem for us at an early historical moment, reminding us that the system of national debt was generated in the “forcing-house” (Treibhaus) of the colonial system: thus “National debts, i.e., the alienation of the state (Veräusserung des Staats) – whether despotic, constitutional or republican – marked with its stamp the capitalistic era.”18 In this sense, already we are acquainted with the national debt as the “mark” or “stamp” (Stempel) of the entry into capitalist society on a world-scale, as the initial moment in which the originary accumulation of capital is at one and the same time the formation of the mechanisms that will install a cartography onto the surface of the world.
The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possessions (Gesamtbesitz) of modern peoples is their national debt. Hence, as a necessary consequence, the modern doctrine that a nation becomes the richer the more deeply it is in debt. Public credit becomes the credo of capital. And with the rise of national debt-making, want of faith in the national debt takes the place of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which may not be forgiven. The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers (energischsten Hebel) of primitive accumulation. As with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows barren money with the power of breeding and thus turns it into capital, without the necessity of its exposing itself to the troubles and risks inseparable from its employment in industry or even in usury.19
The logical topology of capital’s origin and maintenance, and the historical cartography of the modern world order, based on the unit of the state, are volatilely amalgamated together in the form of the national debt. But Marx also alerts us to something critically important: here the national debt is not so much a separate motion of violence, but rather one of the most “powerful” or “energetic” “levers” for the continuation or maintenance of primitive accumulation. But why would capital need yet another exteriority? Primitive accumulation itself, its raw violence, its “extra-economic coercion,” is already to an extent exterior to capital. Yet what capital always requires are ways and means of taking the raw violence on which it secretly rests and reinserting this violence into a new modality, in which its violence can appear in another form. This is exactly why the national debt, as a mechanism, allows capital to avoid “exposing itself to troubles and risks.” Marx goes one step further, by connecting the national debt as primitive accumulation to the nation-form itself:
With the national debt arose an international credit system, which often conceals one of the sources (Quellen) of primitive accumulation in this or that people (Volk). […] A great deal of capital, which appears today in the United States without any certificate of birth, was yesterday, in England, the capitalised blood of children.20
In other words, capital’s enclosure of the earth appears both within and by means of national borders – by extension, Marx essentially reminds us here that the nation-form itself allows for the concealing within an organized and bordered system of entities, of capital’s originary-primitive violence, and yet erases this violence precisely by allowing it to vanish into the nation as an apparatus for the traversal of this gap, “vanishing in its own result, leaving no trace behind.” But this theoretical and historical problem is by no means simply an interesting episode from the past.
Let us recall here a peculiar historical moment characteristic of our current conjuncture. In the German “gutter press” (Bild and the like) in 2010-2011, an entire series of discussions of the Greek national debt (and by extension the ongoing Eurozone crisis) took place. The essence of the national debt was finally blamed on the Greek “national character” (supposedly “lazy,” excessively enjoying holidays, corrupt, incapable of “rational competition,” and so forth).21 This moment of the German-Greek opposition on the question of the national debt exposes to us the recent history of this mechanism. The era of imperialism in the strict sense consisted in the formation of “debt traps” for the peripheral and underdeveloped countries: the central imperialist nations export the domestic surplus to the colonies, the periphery, and so forth, by creating and enforcing demand, maintained by the national debt. Thus the poorer nations end up not only importing from the imperialist nations but also effectively in an endless spiral of debt, a mechanism that then forces the periphery to accept the political and economic directives of the imperialist nations for the plunder and expropriation of raw materials, cheap labor power, border controls, subordination to political regimes, and so forth. Today, this same logic persists. If the old modality of imperialism consists in the macroscopic formation of monopoly capital and super-profits in the peripheral violence, the new modality of imperialism financializes this violence into the miniature and dense concentration of capital’s interior. It is no accident that today we see a “return of the origin,” “a moment when wage constriction is violently manifested, exactly like the 16th century enclosures where access to land as a common good was repressed with the privatization of the land and the putting of wages to the proletariat.”22 This is why we should overlap capital’s historical threshold with the moment we are living through today:
The logic of ‘governing through debt’ has its origin in the fundamental relation between capital and labor. Financial capitalism has globalized imperialism, its modus operandi that operates through the form of ‘debt traps’, both national and private indebtedness, in order to realize and sell the surplus value extracted from living labor. In the imperial schema, debt is the monetary face of surplus value, the universal exploitation of labor power, and constitutes a trap precisely because it prevents living labor from freeing itself from exploitation, from autonomizing the relations of dependency and slavery that are proper to debt.23
The national debt allows the “reckless terrorism” of primitive accumulation to be maintained as if it were absent by redirecting it to the market. The national debt is a mechanism that “conducts” or forces the situation onto a new site of the curve of capitalist development, but it is not a mechanism that “resolves,” it is a mechanism that “defers” or “displaces” the sharpening of political struggles. The national debt therefore is precisely the “dangerous supplement” of capitalism as a historical force: the national debt exposes the fact that capital itself can never resolve the situation that emerges when the relations of production come into conflict with the development of the productive forces. Capital is always trying to create mechanisms that allow it to transcend its own limitations, while simultaneously permitting it to avoid making the political leap past its own boundaries. Yet, this inevitable limit of capital’s self-deployment is paradoxically the source of capital’s own dynamism. Without this tense multiplication of its wounds, capital would never develop – that is, capital requires a certain risk or recklessness, but the more it defers this leap, the more spaces of political intervention are opened up in capital’s austere movement. This movement keeps the elements of primitive accumulation circulating on the surface, a mechanism by which to traverse the impossibility of the commencement as such, precisely by beginning the commencement over and over again. In turn, this element of the national debt returns our focus to the role played by the nation-state in allowing this “first return to origins” – the element of the national is exactly deployed in and within the movement of capture in order to guarantee labor power’s “elasticity” (Elastizität).24 Without the nation, the malleable elememts of labor power cannot be recirculated as if they were directly graspable, by means of the reproduction of the worker’s body on the outside. The nation – the original fictitious “substance” – conjures up its own little images of its pseudo-substantiality precisely in order to then “re-derive” itself from their existence. In this way the elasticity of labor power is simply the microscopic or “micrological” extension of the elasticity of the nation, the form by which capital attempts incessantly to territorializes itself. Labor power’s impossibility is a microscopic image of the gap or chiasmus between the logical and the historical: the historical origin and the logical commencement, and this is the point on which “the insanity of the capitalist mode of conception (die Verrücktheit der kapitalistischen Vorstellungsweise) reaches its climax.”25
Facing the crisis today, the form of the national debt alerts us to a crucial fact: “The crisis is neither an economic nor a political crisis: it is a crisis of the capital relation, a crisis made inevitable by the inherent contradictions of that relation. The crisis inevitably involves a restructuring of the capital relation, a restructuring which necessarily takes on economic and political forms. What is involved on both levels is an assault by capital to maintain the conditions of its own existence.”26 In this sense, the problem of the national debt as a mechanism for the continuation of primitive accumulation within the capital-relation, cannot be solved on the level of the nation-form – we might say polemically that the national debt is in fact the origin of the nation itself. It itself is a technology of drawing a border around the form of the nation, something that cannot be rigorously bordered. The nation itself is a form of credit: it must be traced as if it could be located. But it must be traced by capital itself. Because the nation cannot be bordered in any strict sense, it forces a coherence economically where there cannot be one historically. But because this technology continuously exposes it to the historical exterior, it is therefore always being undermined by its own inability to escape the historical process. At the origin there is already a debt, because something has been presupposed as given, something that utilizes this presupposition as a lever for its own functioning. The illogical logic of capital’s origin or beginning is recoded as the illogical history of the state. This “intercourse” between capital and the state is concentrated or compressed into the insanity of the supposedly rational exchange process, this “Verkehr” at the beginning which appears precisely as “Austausch” in the logical interior. This is exactly what Lenin meant when he famously emphasized that “politics is the concentrated expression of economy.”27
The Facts on the Streets
Today, it behooves us to state the matter clearly and without pretense: capital can only “overcome” its own crises by passing through them without resolving them. And it can only undertake this traversal or passing by placing the burden of violence, suffering, and immiseration onto the backs of the world – the world working class – the facies totius universi, or “face of the entire universe.” Capital itself formulates these apparatuses – the state, the national debt – to overcome or traverse what it cannot solve. Our task lies in the relentless and unending exposure of its raw violence, covered over and hidden by the form of finance. Labor power is an internal outside to capital manifested in its pure outside, the worker’s body. But the body is under the control of the state. Thus, when contemporary global police power is employed against the concrete bodies of the young, the unemployed, the old, the sick, the dropouts, those who are torn between an inability to function in the expected style as the “self-conscious instruments of production” for capital, or to be smoothly integrated into the state’s order, we are witnessing the raw and violent historical exterior’s incapacity to “reset” or “restart” the cyclical return of the origin. In thinking through the contemporary “facts of the streets,” let us pay close attention to a famous passage from Marx:
The specific economic form (Form), in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled (Herrschafts- und Knechtschaftsverhältnis), as it grows directly out of production itself and in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form (Gestalt). It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers – a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity – which reveals the innermost secret (innere Geheimnis), the hidden basis of the entire social structure (verborgene Grundlage der ganzen gesellschaftlichen Konstruktion), and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same from the standpoint of its main conditions – due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances (empirisch gegebenen Umstände).28
These “empirically given circumstances” furnish us with capital’s “factual” limits, limits that are being tested today by a new generation of political upheavals. The tenuous and searching existence of the upsurge in the “facts of the streets” today, under the aspect of the mutations of the state, returns us to the commencement. Not only the commencement of capital, in which the violence of capture must masquerade as the smooth operation of the interior, but also the (re)commencement of politics. This would not seek to produce a “stable” and therefore easily-assumed subject of our moment. Rather, it would assume that, as the “guardians” of labor power, the “bearers” of this fragile and ambiguous commodity, we are incapable of fully “being,” but only a sort of “para-being.” The aleatory or contingent dimension which always enters into the element of “composition” in class struggle is profoundly manifest today. But this aleatory undercurrent is not something that undermines or that holds us back from politics:
“Let us para-be,” that is our war cry.
And better yet: “We are nothing, let us para-be the Whole.”29
The International today, that is “springing out of the ground of modern society”30 is not the old fantasy of the stable subject of the discourse of “civilizational difference,” but rather a fragile hazard that capital itself can no longer effectively police through its external “mechanisms.” This “composition” (in the sense that Negri and others have given to “class composition”) indicates the whole logic by which the mechanisms of capital and the state attempt to effect a specific logic of the social dimension of separation (Trennung), but this “separation” is something profoundly different than the theory of alienation. It shows that where capital has “forced” an amalgam, there is a “slippage” or “décalage.” Where the amalgam seems most perfectly sutured is also where this décalage can be raised as a social antagonism and transformed into a political contradiction. The suicidal nature of the capitalist mode of production is expressed in its need to internalize, to financialize, its violent exterior, to include within its “count” the “uncountable” and savage process of primitive accumulation, recoded as the apparatus of the national debt. The paradox is however that we, the debtors, are transformed into a permanent reserve of debt, yet hold a social power over capital, by occupying the position of the “guardians” (Hütern), the “bearers” (Träger) of labor power, the location of capital’s “original sin,” its primal debt.31 This is the social antagonism that today we find in the streets: when this antagonism is raised to the level of a political contradiction, the groundwork is prepared for a new opening against capital’s supposed indifference to the world.
In the face of this crisis – this repetition of the original debt in the form of the national debt – we have to be able to say bluntly and openly: capital and the state cannot resolve this crisis. They can only formulate mechanisms to traverse its “absence of reason.” These mechanisms of bourgeois insanity can only operate by transferring the violent spasms of crisis onto the back of the working class, the unemployed, the poor and oppressed strata of the world. Increasingly, these “mechanisms” themselves are also failing to support capital’s leap to a new basis of accumulation. The state can only undertake such a leap through the increasing control of the bodies, the “guardians” and “bearers” of labor power, that clash with its logic, that lie just outside its strict sphere on influence. Historically, the state has utilized “apparatuses for the traversal of the nihil of reason” such as the “nation-form” (Balibar) to suture and cover over this incapacity. But today, the nation-form cannot hold back or restrain the fact that “the conditions for the capitalization of surplus value clash increasingly with the conditions for the renewal of the aggregate capital”32 on a world-scale. There is no option today except to emphasize that our only hope lies in precisely these “facts of the streets” that cannot be fully erased from capital’s image of the world. But rather than simply conclude with famous assertion from Marx that communism is the “real movement that abolishes the present state of affairs,” a familiar reference that has been recently revived in a number of discussions,33 we might instead appeal to another moment in The German Ideology that, facing the crisis this time, returns to us today with a vital force:
In history up to the present it is certainly an empirical fact (eine empirische Tatsache) that separate individuals have, with the broadening of their activity (Tätigkeit) into world-historical activity, become more and more enslaved under a power alien to them, a power which has become more and more enormous and, in the last instance, turns out to be the world market (in letzter Instanz als Weltmarkt ausweist). But it is just as empirically established that, by the overthrow of the existing state of society by the communist revolution and the abolition of private property which is identical with it, this power will be dissolved. […] Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers (nationalen und lokalen Schranken), be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy (Genußfähigkeit) this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man).34
This “empirische Tatsache” of the world of capital, linked above to the “empirically given circumstances” within which capital attempts to make its most “fatal leap” between the logical topology and the historical cartography, lays the groundwork of “facticity” or “factuality” in the historical world, the “given” that is implied in this “empirische.” In turn, this “Tatsache” re-emerges paradoxically as the original revolutionary weapon of the people in the form of the “facts of the streets.” These “facts of the streets” that Tosaka alerted us to are at work today in the streets of the historical world, where the demand for a reinvention of socialism – of modes of life beyond the stranglehold of austerity, debt servitude, and an image of social relations found in the “world market” – responds to the original residue or remainder, the “empirical fact” of the originary debt at capital’s origin, which we carry within ourselves, and which can open a new era of affirmative politics and critical thought.
Comments
Remarks on Gender
I. Patriarchy and/or Capitalism: Reopening the Debate
It is standard to find references to “patriarchy” and “patriarchal relations” in feminist texts, tracts, or documents.1 Patriarchy is often used to show how gender oppression and inequality are not sporadic or exceptional occurrences. On the contrary, these are issues that traverse all of society, and are fundamentally reproduced through mechanisms that cannot be explained at the individual level.
In short, we often use the term patriarchy to underscore that gender oppression is a phenomenon not reducible to interpersonal relations, but rather has a more societal character and consistency. However, things become a bit more complicated if we want to be more precise about what exactly is meant by “patriarchy” and “patriarchal system.” And this move becomes even more complex when we begin to ask about the precise relationship between patriarchy and capitalism.
The Question
For a brief period, from the 1970s to the mid-1980s, the question of the structural relationship between patriarchy and capitalism was the subject of a heated debate among theorists and partisans of a materialist current of thought as well as Marxist-feminists. The fundamental questions which were posed revolved around two axes: 1) is patriarchy an autonomous system in relation to capitalism? 2) is it correct to use the term “patriarchy” to designate gender oppression and inequality?
Although it produced very interesting work, this debate gradually became more and more unfashionable. This occurred in tandem with the retreat of critiques of capitalism, while other currents of feminist thought asserted themselves. These new modes of thought often did not go beyond the liberal horizon of the times – they sometimes essentialized relations between men and women and de-historicized gender, or they avoided questions of capitalism and class – but at the same time, they developed useful concepts for the deconstruction of gender (such as queer theory in the 1990s).
Of course, to go out of fashion does not necessarily mean to disappear. In the past decade, many feminist theorists have continued to work on these questions, at the risk of seeming out of touch with the times, vestiges of a tedious past. They were certainly right to persevere: during a time of economic and social crisis, we are currently bringing partial but much-needed attention back to the structural relation between gender oppression and capitalism.
Over these last few years, empirical analyses or descriptions of phenomena or specific questions have certainly not been lacking, such as the feminization of work; the impact of neoliberal politics on women’s living and workplace conditions; the intersection of gender, racial, and class oppression; or the relation between the different constructions of sexual identity and capitalist regimes of accumulation. However, it is one thing to “describe” a phenomenon or a group of social phenomena, where the link between capitalism and gender oppression is more or less evident. It is another to give a “theoretical” explanation of the reason for this structural relation that can be identified within these phenomena and their mode of functioning. It is therefore crucial to ask if there is an “organizing principle” which explains this link.
In order to be both clear and concise on this point, I will try to summarize the most interesting theses on these matters that have been suggested until now. In the following remarks, I will analyze and question these different theses separately. To uphold a degree of intellectual honesty and to avoid any misunderstandings, I stress that my reconstruction of different points of view is not impartial. My own view is found in the third thesis below.
Three Theses
First Thesis: “Dual or Triple Systems Theory.” We can put the original version of this thesis in the following terms: Gender and sexual relations constitute an autonomous system which combines with capitalism and reshapes class relations, while being at the same time modified by capitalism in a process of reciprocal interaction. The most up-to-date version of this theory includes racial relations, also considered as a system of autonomous social relations interconnected with gender and class relations.
Within materialist feminist circles, these reflections are usually associated with the notion that gender and racial relations are systems of oppression as much as relations of exploitation. In general, these theses have an understanding of class relations as defined solely in economic terms. It is only via the interaction with patriarchy and the system of racial domination that they acquire an extra-economic character as well. A variation of this thesis is to see gender relations as a system of ideological and cultural relations derived from older modes of production and social formations, independent of capitalism. These older relations then interact with capitalist social relations, giving the latter their gendered dimension.
Second Thesis: “Indifferent Capitalism.” Gender oppression and inequality are the remnants of previous social formations and modes of production, when patriarchy directly organized production and determined a strict sexual division of labor. Capitalism is itself indifferent to gender relations and can overcome them to such a degree that patriarchy as a system has been dissolved in the advanced capitalist countries, while family relations have been restructured in quite radical ways. In sum, capitalism has an essentially opportunistic relation with gender inequality: it utilizes what it finds to be beneficial in existing gender relations, and destroys what becomes an obstacle. This view is articulated in various versions. Some claim that within capitalism women have benefited from a degree of emancipation unknown in other kinds of society, and this would demonstrate that capitalism as such is not a structural obstacle to women’s liberation. Others maintain that we should carefully distinguish between the logical and historical levels: logically, capitalism does not specifically need gender inequality, and could get rid of it; historically, things are not so simple.
Third Thesis: The “Unitary Thesis.” According to this theory, in capitalist countries, a patriarchal system that is autonomous from capitalism no longer exists. Patriarchal relations continue to exist, but without being part of a separate system. To deny that patriarchy is an autonomous system under capitalism is not to deny that gender oppression really exists, permeating both social and interpersonal relations. In other words, this thesis does not reduce every aspect of oppression to simply a mechanistic or direct consequence of capitalism, nor does it seek to offer an explanation solely in economic terms.
In short, the unitary theory is not reductionist or economistic, and it does not underestimate the centrality of gender oppression. Proponents of the “unitary theory” disagree with the idea that today patriarchy would be a system of rules and mechanisms that autonomously reproduce themselves. At the same time, they insist on the need to consider capitalism not as a set of purely economic laws, but rather as a complex and articulated social order, an order that at its core consists of relations of exploitation, domination, and alienation.
From this point of view, the task today is to understand how the dynamic of capital accumulation continues to produce, reproduce, transform, and renew hierarchical and oppressive relations, without expressing these mechanisms in strictly economic or automatic terms.
II. One, Two, or Three Systems?
In 1970, Christine Delphy wrote an article called “The Main Enemy,” in which she theorized the existence of a patriarchal mode of production, its relation to, as well as its non-correspondence with, the capitalist mode of production, and the definition of housewives as a class, in the strictly economic sense of the term.
Nine years later, Heidi Hartmann published her own article, “The Unhappy Marriages of Marxism and Feminism,” in which she argued for the thesis that patriarchy and capitalism are two autonomous systems, but also historically interconnected. For Hartmann, capitalist laws of accumulation are indifferent to the sex of labor-power, and if there arises a need for capitalism to create hierarchical relations in the division of labor, racism and patriarchy determine the distribution of the hierarchical positions and the specific way these are utilized.
This thesis eventually took on the name of “Dual Systems Theory.” In her 1990 book Theorizing Patriarchy, Sylvia Walby reformulated the dual systems theory by adding a third, the racial system, and also sought to understand patriarchy as a variable system of social relations composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in wage labor and salaried labor, patriarchal relations in the State, male violence, patriarchal relations in the sphere of sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions. These six structures reciprocally condition each other while remaining autonomous: they can also be either private or public. More recently, Danièle Kergoat has theorized the “consubstantiality” of patriarchal, race, and class relations; these are three systems of relations based on exploitation and domination which intersect and are of the same substance (exploitation and domination), while being distinct, like the three persons of the Holy Trinity.
This brief survey of authors and essays is only one example of the different ways in which the intersection of the patriarchal system and capitalist system has been theorized, and the ways in which one system is distinguished from the other. There are others, too, but for limits of space I am forced to limit my analysis to these examples, which are among the most clear while remaining the most systematic and complex. As I have already shown, the difficulty with this debate concerns the definition of patriarchy. There is not a uniform definition, but more of a set of propositions, some of which are compatible with each other, while others are contradictory. Since I cannot analyze all of these definitions, I propose, for now, to focus on the concept of the patriarchal system, understood as a system of relations, both material and cultural, of domination and exploitation of women by men. This is a system with its own logic that is at same time malleable to historical changes, in an ongoing relation with capitalism.
Before analyzing the problems presented by this theoretical approach, we should define exploitation and make some distinctions. From the point of view of class relations, exploitation is defined as a process or mechanism of the expropriation of a surplus produced by a producing class for the benefit of another class. This can happen either through automatic mechanisms such as the wage, or the violent expropriation of the others’ labor – this was the case with the corvée, by which the feudal lords constrained the serfs through imposed authority and violent coercion. Capitalist exploitation, in the Marxist sense, is a specific form of exploitation that consists in the extraction of the surplus-value produced by the worker for the benefit of the capitalist. Generally, in order to talk about capitalist exploitation, there must exist generalized commodity production, abstract labor, socially necessary labor time, value, and the wage-form.
I am clearly leaving out other hypotheses, such as those based on the real subsumption of society in its totality, as defended by the workerist and post-workerist traditions. Confronting this view and its consequences for understanding gender relations would take up another article. In loosely defined terms: the extraction of surplus-value for Marx is the secret of capital, in the sense that it constitutes the origin of socially produced wealth and its modes of distribution.
Exploitation as the extraction of surplus-value is not the only form of exploitation within capitalist society: to be simplistic, we can say that an employee in an unproductive sector (in value terms) is also exploited through the extraction of surplus-labor. And the wage-rate, living conditions, and workplace conditions of a shopkeeper can of course be worse than that of a factory worker. In addition, beyond the slightly economistic tendencies of past misunderstandings and debates, it is important to note that from a political point of view, the distinction between productive and unproductive workers (in terms of value or surplus-value production) is practically irrelevant. Strictly speaking, the mechanisms and forms of organization and division of the labor process are much more important.
Let us return now to the dual systems theory and to the problem of patriarchy.
First Problem
If we define patriarchy as a system of exploitation, it logically follows that there is an exploiting group and an exploited group or, better, an expropriating class and an expropriated class. Who makes up these classes? The answers can be: all women and all men, or only some women and some men (in the example cited by Delphy, housewives and the adult male members of their families). If we talk about patriarchy as a system of exploitation in the “public” sphere, the notion can arise in which the State is the exploiter or expropriator. The “workerist feminists” applied the notion of capitalist exploitation to domestic labor, but according to their view, the true expropriator of domestic labor is capital, which would imply that patriarchy is not in fact an autonomous system of exploitation.
In the case of Delphy’s work, the thesis that housewives are a class and their immediate male family members (in particular their husbands) are the exploiting class is not fully articulated, but also taken to its most far-reaching consequences. In logical terms, the consequence of her position would be that the spouse of a migrant worker belongs to the same social class as the wife of a capitalist: they both produce use-values (in one case care work pure and simple, in the other, the work of “representation” of a certain social status, organizing meetings and receptions, for example) and are both in an exploitative relation of a servile nature, that is to say, working in exchange for the financial security provided by their husbands.
In “The Main Enemy,” Delphy insists that being a member of the patriarchal class is a more important fact than being part of the capitalist class. It would follow that the solidarity between the wife of a capitalist and the wife of the migrant worker must take precedence over the class solidarity between the wife of the migrant worker and the other members of her husband’s class (or, and this is more optimism than anything else, it must take precedence over the class solidarity of the wife of the capitalist and her country club friends). In the end, Delphy’s actual political practice stands in contradiction with the logical consequences of her theory, which makes its analytical limits even more apparent.
Furthermore, if we define men and women (in one version or another) as two classes — one the exploiters, the other the exploited — we inevitably come to the conclusion that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between classes whose interests are in reciprocal contradiction. But, if Delphy is wrong, should we then deny that men profit and take advantage of women’s unpaid work? No, because this would be a symmetrical error, unfortunately made by many Marxists who have taken this reasoning to the opposite extreme. It is clearly better and more convenient to have someone cook you a hot meal in the evening than to have to deal with the dishes yourself after a long day of work. It is quite “natural,” then, that men tend to try and hold on to this privilege. In short, it is undeniable that there are relations of domination and social hierarchy based on gender and that men, including those of lower classes, benefit from them.
However, this should not be taken to mean that there is a class antagonism. We could rather make the following hypothesis: in a capitalist society, the complete or partial “privatization” of care work, that is, its concentration within the family (whatever the type of family, and including single-parent households), the lack of large-scale socialization of this care work, through the state or other forms, all this determines the workload that must be maintained within the private sphere, outside of both the market and institutions. The relations of gender oppression and domination determine the mode and scale in which this workload is to be distributed, giving way to an unequal division: women work more while men work less. But there is no appropriation of a “surplus.”
Is there evidence to the contrary? A simple thought experiment will do. A man would lose nothing, in terms of workload, if the distribution of care work were completely socialized instead of being performed by his wife. In structural terms, there would be no antagonistic or irreconcilable interests. Of course, this does not mean that he is conscious of this problem, as it may well be that he is so integrated into sexist culture that he has developed some severe form of narcissism based on his presumed male superiority, which leads him to naturally oppose any attempts to socialize care work, or the emancipation of his wife. The capitalist, on the other hand, has something to lose in the socialization of the means of production; it is not just about his convictions about the way the world works and his place in it, but also the massive profits he happily expropriates from the workers.
Second Problem
The second problem concerns the fact that those who insist that patriarchal relations today make up an independent system within advanced capitalist societies must face the thorny problem of determining its driving force: why does this system continually reproduce itself? Why does it persist? If it is an independent system, the reason must be internal and not external. Capitalism, for example, is a mode of production and a system of social relations, with an identifiable logic: according to Marx, it is a process of the valorization of value. Certainly, to have identified this process as the driving force or motor of capitalism does not say everything that needs to be said about capitalism: this would be analogous to thinking that the explanation of the anatomy of the heart and its functions would suffice to explain the whole anatomy of the human body. Capitalism is an ensemble of complex processes and relations. However, understanding what its heart is and how it works is a fundamental analytic necessity.
Where patriarchal relations play a direct role in the organization of the relations of production (who produces and how, who appropriates, how the reproduction of these conditions of production is organized), identifying the driving force of the patriarchal system is simpler. This is the case with agrarian societies, for example, where the patriarchal family directly forms the unity of the production with the means of subsistence. Yet this is more complicated in capitalist society, where patriarchal relations do not directly organize production, but play a role in the division of labor, and the family is relegated to the private sphere of reproduction.
Faced with this question, either one agrees with Delphy and other materialist feminists in seeing contemporary patriarchy as a specific mode of production, but would then have to face all the challenges I noted above, especially the intractable problem of who, in this conception, would make up the exploiting and exploited classes; or one simply has to abandon the view that patriarchy is a distinct mode of production, at least in the conventional sense of that term.
A hypothesis that has already been suggested in the past is that patriarchy is an independent ideological system, whose motor resides in the process of the production of signifiers and interpretations of the world. But here, we run into other problems: if ideology is the way in which we interpret our conditions of existence and our relations to them, a link must exist between ideology and these social conditions of existence; a link that is definitely not mechanistic, or automatic, or anything like that. But it would still be a matter of a certain form of connection, otherwise we would risk having a fetishistic and ahistorical conception of culture and ideology. Now the idea that the patriarchal system is an ideological system that constantly reproduces itself, despite the incredible changes introduced by capitalism in social life and relations of production these last two centuries, is even less convincing. Another hypothesis could be that the motor is psychological, but this also risks falling into a fetishistic and ahistorical conception of the human psyche.
Last Problem
Let us admit for a moment that patriarchy, racial relations, and capitalism are three independent systems, but also intersect and reciprocally reinforce each other. In this case, the question is of knowing the organizing principle and logic of this “holy alliance.” In Kergoat’s texts, for example, the definition of this relation in consubstantial terms remains a descriptive image, which does not succeed in explaining much. The causes for the intersection between these systems of exploitation and domination remain mysterious, just like with the Holy Trinity!
Despite these problems, the dual or triple systems theories, in their different forms, remain implicit influences in many recent feminist theories. In my opinion, this is because these seem to be the most immediate and intuitive kinds of explanation. In other words, these are explanations that reflect how reality as such is manifested. It is evident that social relations include relations of domination and hierarchy based on gender and race that permeate both the social whole and daily life. The more immediate explanation is that these relations all correspond to specific systems, because this is the way they manifest themselves. However, the most intuitive explanations are not always the most correct.
III. Is It All Capitalism’s Fault?
In the last section, I wrote that the conception of patriarchy as an independent system within capitalist society is the most widespread not only among feminist theorists but also activists. This is because it is an interpretation that reflects reality in the way this appears to us. To speak of modes of appearance does not mean to describe an illusory phenomenon that is to be put in opposition to reality with a capital R. “Appearance” here refers to the specific way in which the relations of alienation and domination produced and reproduced by capital are experienced by people because of their very same logic. As Daniel Bensaïd has remarked, the critique of political economy is first and foremost a critique of economic fetishism and ideology, which forces us to think in the shadow of capital.2 This is not a matter of “false consciousness,” but of a mode of experience determined by capital itself: the fragmentation of our perception of reality. This is a complex discourse, but in order to have an idea of what is to be understood by “a mode of experience determined by capital,” we have to refer, for example, to the section in the first volume of Marx’s Capital on commodity fetishism.
Since our perception is fragmentary and those who have developed an awareness of gender inequality usually experience and perceive it as determined by a logic that is different and separate from that of capital, any denial of the view that patriarchy is an independent system within capitalism inevitably encounters rejections and doubts.
The Transformation of the Family
The most common objection has to do with the historic dimension: how can one affirm that patriarchy is not an independent system when the oppression of women existed before capitalist society? Now, to say that within capitalist society women’s oppression and power relations are a necessary consequence of capitalism, and that these phenomena do not have their own independent and proper logic, is not to support the absurd argument that holds that gender oppression originates with capitalism. What is being defended here is a different argument, tied to the particular characteristics of capitalism. Societies in which capitalism has supplanted the preceding mode of production are characterized by a profound and radical transformation of the family.
The transformation of the family is above all the result of the expropriation of the land, or primitive accumulation, which separated large portions of the population from their means of production and subsistence (the land), provoking on the one hand the disintegration of the patriarchal peasant family, and on the other a historically unprecedented process of urbanization. The result was that the family no longer represented the unity of production with a specific productive role, generally organized through the specific patriarchal relations that prevailed in the previous agrarian society.
This process began at different moments and took different forms in all the countries in which capitalist relations took hold. With the separation between the family and the site of production, the relation between production and reproduction (in the sense of biological, generational, and social reproduction) was also radically transformed.
And here is the point: although the relations of gender domination were maintained, they have, on the other hand, ceased being an independent system following an autonomous logic because of this transformation of the family from a unit of production to private place outside commodity production and the market. Moreover, these relations of domination have undergone a significant transformation.
For example, one of these transformations is tied to a direct link between sexual orientation, reified into an identity, and gender (we can consult on this matter the work of Foucault in The History of Sexuality, works by Judith Butler, or, more recently, the writings of Kevin Floyd and Rosemary Hennessy). While it is certainly true that gender oppression existed well before the advent of capitalism, this does not mean that the forms it takes remained the same afterwards.
Moreover, one could question the idea that gender oppression is a transhistorical fact, an idea defended forcefully by a number of “second wave” feminists but which must be revised in light of recent anthropological research. In fact, not only has the oppression of women not always existed, but it did not exist in various classless societies, where gender oppression was introduced only with colonialism. In order to have a better idea of the link between the class relation and the power relations between genders, we can take the example of slavery in the United States.
Race and Class
In her book Women, Race, and Class, Angela Davis highlights the way in which the destruction of the family and all the relations of kinship between African-American slaves, as well as the specific form of slave labor, gave rise to a substantial overturning of gendered power relations between slaves. This does not mean that the female slaves did not undergo a specific form of oppression as women, quite the opposite: they severely suffered, but at the hands of the white slaveowners, not their fellow slaves. In other words, the persistence and articulation of gender relations are linked in complex ways to social conditions, class relations, and relations of production and reproduction. An abstract and transhistorical vision of women’s oppression does not allow for an understanding of these articulations and differences, and therefore cannot explain them.
Persistence of the Domestic Mode of Production
As I wrote above, in the countries where the capitalist mode of production supplanted the preceding mode of production, radically transforming the family and its role, the relations of power between genders ceased to form an independent system. This does not hold for countries with structures of production that are not entirely transformed and that remain on the periphery of the global capitalist economy. Claude Meillassoux documented on this point the persistence of a “domestic mode of production” in many African countries, in which the process of proletarianization (that is, the separation of the peasantry from the land) remained quite limited.3
However, even in places where the domestic mode of production remains in place, it is subjected to intense pressure by the country’s integration into the world capitalist system. The effects of colonialism, imperialism, the pillaging of natural resources on the part of the advanced capitalist countries, the objective pressures of the global market economy, etc., have a significant impact on the social and familial relations which organize the production and distribution of goods, often exacerbating the exploitation of women and gender violence.
A Contradictory Totality
Let’s return now to the advanced capitalist countries. A classic objection to the thesis that patriarchy does not constitute an independent system is that Marxist feminism is fundamentally reductionist. In other words, it tries to reduce the plural complexity of society to mere economic laws without correctly grasping the irreducibility of power relations. This objection would make sense under two conditions: the first would be that capitalism is understood only as a strictly economic process of the extraction of surplus-value, and thus as an ensemble of economic rules that determines this process; the second would be to understand power relations as the mechanistic and automatic result of the process of surplus-value extraction. The truth is that this type of reductionism does not correspond in the least to the richness and complexity of Marx’s thought, and even less to the extraordinary sophistication of a large part of the Marxist theoretical tradition.
As I already said above, to try to explain what capitalist society is only in terms of surplus-value extraction is like trying to explain the anatomy of the human body by explaining only how the heart works.
Capitalism is a versatile, contradictory totality, continually in movement, with relations of exploitation and alienation that are constantly in a process of transformation. Even though Marx attributed an apparently automatic character to the valorization of value in the first volume of Capital – a process in which value is the real subject, while capitalists and individuals are reduced to the role of emissaries or bearers of a structure – “Monsieur le Capital” does not really exist, except as a logical category. It is not until the third volume of Capital that this becomes clear. Capitalism is not a Moloch, a hidden god, a puppeteer or a machine: it is a living totality of social relations, in which class relations trace lines of demarcation and impose constraints that affect all other forms of relations. Among these, we also find power relations connected to gender, sexual orientation, race, nationality, and religion, and all are put into the service of the accumulation of capital and its reproduction, but often in varying, unpredictable, and contradictory ways.
Is Capitalism “Indifferent” to the Oppression of Women?
A widely held opinion among Marxist theorists is to consider gender oppression as unnecessary to capitalism. This is not to say that capitalism doesn’t exploit or profit from the forms of gender inequality produced by previous social configurations; it is, however, a contingent and opportunistic relationship. In actuality, capitalism does not really depend on gender oppression, and women have attained an unprecedented level of freedom and emancipation under capitalism in comparison to other historical epochs. In short, there is not an antagonistic relationship between capitalism and the project of women’s liberation.
This point of view has been favorably received among Marxist theorists from many different schools of thought, so it is worthwhile to analyze it. We can use an article written by Ellen Meiksins Wood as a starting point. In her article “Capitalism and Human Emancipation: Race, Gender, and Democracy,” Wood begins by explaining the fundamental differences between capitalism and the modes of production that preceded it. Capitalism has no intrinsic ties to particular identities, inequalities, or extra-economic, political, or juridical differences. Quite the opposite: the extraction of surplus-value takes place in the relations between formally free and equal individuals, without any differences in juridical or political status. Capitalism is thus not structurally disposed to creating gender inequalities, and it even has a natural tendency to put such differences into question and dilute racial and gender identities.
An Internal or an Opportunistic Relationship?
Capitalist development also created the social conditions conducive to the critique of these inequalities, and to the facilitation of social pressure against them. This has no precedent in previous historical epochs; one only needs to think back to Greco-Roman literature in which abolitionist positions are practically absent, despite the universal presence of slavery for productive ends.
At the same time, capitalism tends to use pre-existing differences inherited from previous societies in an opportunistic manner. For example, gender and racial difference are utilized in order to create hierarchies between the more and less advantaged sectors of the exploited class. These hierarchies are passed off as consequences of natural differences, masking their real nature, namely that they are products of the logic of capitalist competition.
This should not be understood as a conscious plan that capitalism follows, but as the convergence of a series of practices and policies which follow from the fact that gender and racial equalities are advantageous from the point of view of the capitalists. Capitalism does indeed instrumentalize gender oppression for its own ends, but it would be able to survive just fine without it. On the other hand, capitalism would not be able to exist without class exploitation.
It is crucial to note that the framework of Wood’s article is a series of basic political questions about the type of extra-economic gains and benefits that can – and cannot – be obtained in a capitalist society. Her starting point is the shift in attention of social struggles from the economic terrain to non-economic questions (racial and gender emancipation, peace, environmental health, citizenship). And there’s the rub. I mention Wood’s framework because on the one hand, her article is based on a sharp separation between the logical structure of capital and its historical dimensions; but, on the other hand, it ends up conflating these very same levels, thus reproducing a classic confusion that is unfortunately common in the work of many Marxist theorists who would subscribe to the theses of Wood’s article.
To put this point more clearly: as soon as we accept this distinction between the logical structure of capital and its historical dimensions, we can then accept the idea that the extraction of surplus-value takes place within the framework of relations between formally free and equal individuals without presupposing differences in juridical and political status. But we can do this only at a very high level of abstraction–that is to say, at the level of the logical structure. From the point of view of concrete history, things change radically. Let’s take this issue point by point.
1. Let’s start from a fact: a capitalist social formation devoid of gender oppression (in its various forms) has never existed. That capitalism was limited to the use of pre-existing inequalities in this process remains debatable: imperialism and colonialism contributed to the introduction of gender hierarchies in societies where they did not exist before, or existed in a much more nuanced way. The process of capitalist accumulation was accompanied by the equally important expropriation of women from different forms of property to which they had access, and professions that they had been able to hold throughout the High Middle Ages; the alternation of processes of the feminization and defeminization of labor contributed to the continual reconfiguration of family relations, creating new forms of oppression based on gender. The advent of the reification of gender identity starting from the end of the 19th century contributed to the reinforcement of a heteronormative matrix that had oppressive consequences for women, but not only them.
Other examples could be cited. To say that women obtained formal freedoms and political rights, until then unimaginable, only under capitalism, because this system had created the social conditions allowing for this process of emancipation, is an argument of questionable validity. One could, in fact, say the exact same thing for the working class as a whole: it is only within capitalism that the conditions were created allowing for the political emancipation of the subaltern strata and that this class became a subject capable of attaining important democratic victories. So what? Would this demonstrate that capitalism could easily do without the exploitation of the working class? I don’t think so. It is better to drop the reference to what women have or have not obtained: if women have obtained something, it is both because they have struggled for it, and because with capitalism, the social conditions have been favorable to the birth of mass social movements and modern politics. But this is true for the working class as well.
2. It is important to distinguish what is functional to capitalism and what is a necessary consequence of it. The two concepts are different. It is perhaps difficult to show at a high level of abstraction that gender oppression is essential to the inner workings of capitalism. It is true that capitalist competition continually creates differences and inequalities, but these inequalities, from an abstract point of view, are not necessarily gender-related. If we were to think of capitalism as “pure,” that is, analyze it on the basis of its essential mechanisms, then maybe Wood would be right. However, this does not prove that capitalism would not necessarily produce, as a result of its concrete functioning, the constant reproduction of gender oppression, often under diverse forms.
3. Lastly, we must return to the distinction between the logical level and the historical level. What is possible from logical viewpoint and what happens at the level of historical processes are two profoundly different things. Capitalism always exists in concrete social formations that each have their own specific history. As I have already said, these social formations are characterized by the constant and pervasive presence of gender oppression. Let us suppose, as a thought experiment, that these hierarchies in the division of labor were based upon other forms of inequality (large and small, old and young, fat and skinny, those who speak an Indo-European language versus those who speak other languages, etc.). Let’s suppose as well that pregnancy and birth are completely mechanized and that the whole sphere of emotional relationships can be commodified and managed by private services… briefly, let’s suppose all of this. Is this a plausible vision from a historical point of view? Can gender oppression be so easily replaced by other types of hierarchical relations, which would appear as natural and be as deeply rooted in the psyche? These scenarios seem legitimately doubtful.
Towards Concrete Historical Analysis
To conclude: in order to respond to the question of whether it is possible for women’s emancipation and liberation to be attained under the capitalist mode of production, we must look for the answer at the level of concrete historical analysis, not at the level of a highly abstract analysis of capital.
It is indeed here where we find not only Wood’s misstep, but also the error of many Marxist theorists who remain fiercely attached to the idea of a hierarchy between (principal) exploitation and (secondary) oppression. If we want to pose the political aspect of this question and also be in a position to respond to it, we must have a historical conception of what capitalism is today and what it has been historically. This is one of the points of departure for a Marxist feminism where the notion of social reproduction occupies a central role.
IV. Rethinking Capital, Rethinking Gender
In the previous section, I tried to clarify the limits of the “fragmented thought” which presents the different types of oppression and domination as each being connected to an autonomous system, without understanding their intrinsic unity. Moreover, I criticized the reading of the relation between capital and gender oppression that relies on what I called an “indifferent capitalism.” It is time now to approach “unitary theory,” as well as the concept of “social reproduction.”
Reconceptualizing Capital
The dualist positions often begin from the idea that the Marxist critique of political economy only analyzes the economic laws of capitalism, through solely economic categories. This approach would be inadequate to understand such complex phenomena as the multiplicity of power relations, or the discursive practices that constitute us as subjects. This is why alternative epistemological approaches are deemed to be more capable of seeing causes that lie outside the domain of economics, and more adequate for understanding the specificity and irreducible nature of these social relations.
This position is shared across a broad spectrum of feminist theorists. Some of them have suggested that we need a “marriage” or eclectic combination between different types of critical analyses, some devoted to the “pure” economic laws of capitalist accumulation, and others addressing other forms of social relations. On the other hand, other theorists have embraced what is called the “linguistic turn” in feminist theory, which separates the critique of gender oppression from the critique of capitalism. In both cases, there is the common assumption that “pure economic laws” exist, independent from specific relations of domination and alienation. It is precisely this assumption that must be critically questioned. For reasons of space, I will limit myself to highlighting two aspects of the Marxian critique of political economy.
1. A relation of exploitation always implies a relation of domination and alienation.
These three aspects are never truly separated in the Marxian critique of political economy. The worker is before everything else a living and thinking body and is submitted to specific forms of discipline that remold her. As Marx writes, the productive process “produces” the worker to the same extent that it reproduces the work-capitalist relation. Since each process of production is always concrete – that is to say, characterized by aspects that are historically and geographically determined – it is possible to conceive of each productive process as being linked to a disciplinary process, which partially constructs the type of subject the worker becomes.
We can say the same thing for the consumption of commodities: as Kevin Floyd has shown in his analysis of the formation of sexual identity, commodity consumption entails a disciplinary aspect and participates in the reification of sexual identity. Consumption thus takes part in the process of subject-formation.
2. For Marx, production and reproduction form an indivisible unity.
In other words, while they are distinct and separate and have specific characteristics, production and reproduction are necessarily combined as concrete moments of an articulated totality. Reproduction is understood here as the process of the reproduction of a society as a whole, or in Althusserian terms, the reproduction of the conditions of production: education, the culture industry, the Church, the police, the army, the healthcare system, science, gender discourses, consumption habits… all these aspects play a crucial role in the reproduction of specific relations of production. Althusser noted in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” that without the reproduction of the conditions of production, a social formation would not be able to hold together for even one year.
It is essential, however, not to understand the relation between production and reproduction in a mechanistic or deterministic manner. In fact, if Marx understands capitalist society as a totality, he nonetheless does not understand it as an “expressive” totality: put otherwise, there is no automatic or direct “reflection” between the different moments of this totality (art, culture, economic structure, etc.), or between one particular moment and the totality as a whole.
At the same time, an analysis of capitalism that does not understand this unity between production and reproduction will fall back into a vulgar materialism or economism, and Marx does not make this mistake. Beyond his political writings, Capital itself is proof of this, for example in the sections on the struggle over the working day or on primitive accumulation. In these passages, one can clearly see that coercion, the active intervention of the State, and class struggle are in fact constitutive components of a relation of exploitation that is not determined by purely economic or mechanical laws.
These observations allow us to highlight how this idea that Marx conceives capitalism solely in economic terms is untenable. This is not to say that there have not been reductionist or vulgar materialist tendencies within the Marxist tradition. This means, however, that these tendencies relied on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Marxian critique of political economy and a fetishization of economic laws, the latter conceived as static things or as abstract structures rather than as forms of activity or human relations.
An alternative, opposed assumption to the separation between the purely economic laws of capitalism and other systems of domination amounts to conceiving the unity between production and reproduction as a direct identity. This point of view characterizes a section of Marxist-feminist thought, in particular the workerist tradition, which insisted on seeing reproductive labor as directly productive of surplus-value, and thus governed by the same laws.
Again, for reasons of space, I will limit myself to the observation that such a point of view returns to a form of reductionism, which obscures the difference between various social relations and does not help us understand the specific characteristics of diverse relations of domination that are not only constantly reproduced but also transformed within each capitalist social formation. Moreover, it does not help us to analyze the specific way in which certain relations of power are located outside of the labor market, while still being indirectly influenced by this market: for example, through different forms of commodity consumption, or through the objective constraints that wage labor (or its equivalent, unemployment) imposes on personal life and interpersonal relationships.
To conclude, I propose to rethink the Marxian critique of capitalism as a critique of an articulated and contradictory totality of relations of exploitation, domination, and alienation.
Social Reproduction and “Unitary Theory”
In light of this methodological clarification, we now have to understand what is meant by “social reproduction” within what is generally called “unitary theory.” The term social reproduction, in the Marxist tradition, usually indicates the process of reproduction of a society in its totality, as already mentioned. In the feminist Marxist tradition, however, social reproduction means something more precise: the maintenance and reproduction of life, at the daily or generational level. In this context, social reproduction designates the way in which the physical, emotional, and mental labor necessary for the production of the population is socially organized: for example, food preparation, youth education, care for the elderly and the sick, as well as questions of housing and all the way to questions of sexuality…
The concept of social reproduction has the advantage of enlarging our vision of what was previously called domestic labor, and which a large part of Marxist-feminism has focused on. In fact, social reproduction includes within its concept a series of social practices and types of labor that go well beyond only domestic labor. It also makes it possible to extend analysis outside the walls of the home, since the labor of social reproduction is not always found in the same forms: what part of the latter comes from the market, the welfare state, and family relations, remains a contingent question that depends on specific historical dynamics and feminist struggles.
The concept of social reproduction, then, allows us to locate more precisely the mobile and porous quality of the walls of the home: in other words, the relation between, on the one hand, domestic life within the home, and the phenomena of commodification, the sexualization of the division of labor, and the policies of the welfare-state on the other. Social reproduction also enables us to more effectively analyze phenomena like the relation between the commodification of care-work and its “racialization” by repressive migration policies, such as those that aim to lower the costs of immigrant labor and force them to accept slave-like working conditions.
Finally, and this is the crucial point, the way social reproduction functions within a given social formation has an intrinsic relation to the way the production and reproduction of societies are organized in their totality, and therefore to class relations. Once again, these relations cannot be conceived as purely accidental and contingent intersections: viewing them through the lens of social reproduction allows us to identify the organizing logic of these intersections without for this reason excluding the role played by struggle, and the existence of contingent phenomena and practices in general.
We must keep in mind that the sphere of social reproduction is also determinant in the formation of subjectivity, and thus relations of power. If we take into account the relations that exist in each capitalist society between social reproduction, the production of the society as a whole, and the relations of production, we can say that these relations of domination and power are not separate structures or levels: they do not intersect in a purely external manner and do not maintain a solely contingent relation with the relations of production.
The multiple relations of power and domination therefore appear as concrete expressions of the articulated and contradictory unity that is capitalist society. This process should not be understood in an automatic or mechanistic manner. As noted before, we must not forget the dimension of human praxis: capitalism is not a machine or automaton but a social relation, and as such, is subject to contingencies, accidents, and conflicts. However, contingencies and conflicts do not rule out the existence of a logic – namely, capitalist accumulation – that imposes objective constraints not only on our praxis or lived experience but also on our ability to produce and articulate relations with others, our place in the world, and our relations with our conditions of existence.
This is exactly what “unitary theory” tries to grasp: to be able to read relations of power based on gender or sexual orientation as concrete moments of that articulated, complex, and contradictory totality that is contemporary capitalism. From this point of view, these concrete moments certainly possess their own specific characteristics, and thus must be analyzed with adequate and specific theoretical tools (from psychoanalysis to literary theory…), but they also maintain an internal relation with this larger totality and with the process of societal reproduction that proceeds according to the logic of capitalist accumulation.
The essential thesis of “unitary theory” is that for Marxist feminism, gender oppression and racial oppression do not correspond to two autonomous systems which have their own particular causes: they have become an integral part of capitalist society through a long historical process that has dissolved preceding forms of social life.
From this point of view, it would be mistaken to see both as mere residues of past social formations that continue to exist within capitalist society for reasons pertaining to their anchoring in the human psyche or in the antagonism between sexed “classes,” etc. This is not to underestimate the psychological dimension of gender and sexual oppression or the contradictions between oppressors and oppressed. It is, however, a matter of identifying the social conditions and framework provided by class relations that impact, reproduce, and influence our perceptions of ourselves and of our relations to others, our behaviors, and our practices.
This framework is the logic of capitalist accumulation, which imposes fundamental limits and constraints on our lived experiences and how we interpret them. The fact that such a large number of feminist theoretical currents over the last few decades have been able to avoid analyzing this process, and the crucial role played by capital in gender oppression in its various forms, attests to the power of capital to co-opt our ideas and influence our modes of thinking.
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Rethinking Political Power and Revolutionary Strategy Today
We asked several contributors to write on the theme of the state and revolutionary strategy, for a roundtable discussion revolving around the following prompt:
“In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the socialist movement spilled a great deal of ink debating the question of state power. Lenin’s work was perhaps the most influential, but it also provoked a wide range of critical responses, which were arguably equally significant. But whether or not Lenin’s conception of the correct revolutionary stance towards the state was adequate to his own particular historical conjuncture, it is clear that today the reality of state power itself has changed. What is living and what is dead in this theoretical and political legacy? What would a properly revolutionary stance towards state power look like today, and what would be the concrete consequences of this stance for a political strategy? Does the ‘seizure of state power’ still have any meaning? Does the party still have a place in these broader questions?”
This essay is one contribution to the roundtable. Please be sure to read the others: Geoff Eley, Joshua Clover and Jasper Bernes, Jodi Dean, Nina Power, Immanuel Ness.
The question of political power has returned to the forefront of political and theoretical discussion. This is not a coincidence. The acute economic crisis, its serious social consequences, the open political crisis in certain social formations, and the very sight of the overthrow of governments and regimes under the force of political mobilization – despite, in the case of the Arab Spring, the tragic end of such processes – mean that such questions are again urgent.
This development comes after a long period of retreat, during which it was more than obvious that the forces of capital had the initiative and were hegemonic, even in the form of the neoliberal “passive revolution.”1 During that period, from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 2000s, social movements and the radical Left refrained from confronting the question of political power. It was as if the political limit of radical or emancipatory politics was a politics “at a distance from the State” to borrow Alain Badiou’s expression, namely a politics of movements from below, of putting pressure upon the state, of resisting capitalist reconstruction, of opening cracks, of giving face and voice to the excluded, but not of aspiring to achieve hegemony, seize political power and initiate processes of social transformation. In a certain way, this was exemplified in the whole conception of “changing the world without taking power.”2 However, the very materiality of political power is still with us; it presents an unavoidable terrain of social antagonism, and at the same time an unavoidable question.
The very evolution of the contemporary forms of protest and contestation — and the fact that in most cases, with the exception perhaps of Greece, despite the dynamics from below, political developments from above have remained within the contours of a preexisting political configuration and in most cases have had a more reactionary transformation — means that the question of political power and state power remains a nodal point. I mention Greece as a potential exception, because of the electoral rise of the Left as a political translation of the dynamics of the movement. In this sense, the question that unavoidably emerges is the following: is it possible to have a process of social transformation that could move beyond the limitations imposed by capitalist social relations and forms, without dealing with the question of what social classes retain political – and state – power?
However, this brings forward another important question: what is the relation between social and political power, between social and political relations, forms and antagonisms, and how are what we tend to define as class rule or class power established, secured, and reproduced?
It is interesting here to note that there have been important developments in our understanding of social and political power.
In contrast to a traditional view of the economy as a neutral productive process whose exploitative class character is determined mainly by legal relations of ownership guaranteed by political relations of force, we now have a more complex apprehension of the importance of social relations of production, as complex and overdetermined social, political, and ideological power relations within production, and, at the same time, as social and political matrices for capitalist social forms. In this sense, we now have a much more complex conception of the grounding of political power upon social relations and forms. This has been the main point of most radical currents within Marxism from the 1960s onwards that insisted upon the primacy of the relations of production and the centrality of class antagonism, from the work of Althusser3 to the seminal researches of Bettelheim on the class nature of the USSR,4 through Italian operaismo5 and other Marxist currents.
In contrast to a negative conception of political power as coercion and repression, Foucault’s work has helped us realize the “productive” aspects of the disciplinary or biopolitical functions of the modern capitalist state, and offers important insights into the social and historical processes that subsume population under the norms of capitalist production and create “productive” subjects.6
At the same time, ever since the revolutionary movements in the wake of the October Revolution were confronted with the very complexity of power and hegemony in advanced capitalist social formations, we know that we can treat neither politics (and political apparatuses and institutions) nor ideology (and ideological apparatuses) as mere epiphenomena of the economy or as simple instruments in the hand of the ruling class. In contrast, Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and of the integral state offers an ability to apprehend the expansive forms of the capitalist state and the complex interplay of the dispositifs of the hegemonic apparatuses.7
In contrast to any instrumentalist conception of the state, we know from the work of Poulantzas that it is much more productive theoretically and politically to think of the state as a material condensation of social relations of force, as a terrain of struggles traversed by social antagonism.8
At the same time, we live in a period of expansion of state repressive apparatuses, new technologies of surveillance, and new technologies of killing and repressing. In this sense, contemporary state violence is both a determining and overdetermining factor in social and political antagonism, exemplified in the various forms of excessive preemptive and asymmetrical violence by the dominant forces. We are living in a period that is marked by the realization of both how many aspects of the working of the state do not have to do with violence, and by the confrontation of the extreme violence of contemporary capitalist states.
In this sense, it is interesting to go back to the classical definition of smashing the state. We should remember that it was not an easy conception to formulate. On the one hand, it referred to the actual need to capture political and state power and use state coercion in order to expropriate the capitalists of their ownership of means of production, to impose measures of social equality and public provision of services and to initiate a process of social transformation.
Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production.9
At the same time, this use of state coercion was just the beginning of a broader process of social transformation that would lead to a society of full equality, without any form of exploitation and coercion, a stateless and classless society. This is the main point of the Communist Manifesto, but also of most of Marx’s interventions.
When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.10
As such, this represents a decisive break with a locus communis of the political philosophy of modernity, namely the position that the guarantor of the just and free society is the state. In contrast, in Marx’s intervention we have the insistence that the state is the problem. At the same it attempts to strike a delicate balance between two conflicting positions: on the one hand, the utopian insistence on an exodus from the state, exemplified in the projects of building socialist communities “outside” existing institutions, and the anarchist insistence on an “instantaneous” abolition of property, exploitation, and any form of state organization; on the other hand, the “reformist,” statist view of the state as an instrument of social rationalization and enhancer of justice, exemplified in nineteenth-century Germany in the personality of Lassalle. This balance was not easy to achieve, and Balibar has commented on Marx and Engels’s inability to write an Anti-Bakunin or Anti-Lassalle.
In my opinion, one does not wonder enough about the fact that such indefatigable polemicists such as Marx and his faithful assistant Engels turned out to be incapable of writing an “Anti-Lassalle” or an “Anti-Bakunin” which would have been practically much more important than an Anti-Dühring or even than the reissue of an Anti-Proudhon … What is Marx’s response when Bakunin systematically associates the totality of Marx’s “scientific socialism” with Lassalle’s “state socialism”? He has no other recourse than to reaffirm the meaning of the Manifesto‘s democratic program, which, as a matter of fact, had allowed Lassalle to proclaim himself in its favor. Conversely, Marx also proclaimed himself, as against Bakunin, in favor of “real anarchism,” which he supposedly discovered and defended “long before him.” The high point of this “response” consists in the affirmation that Marxism and Bakunin’s anarchism are the opposite of each other, which ends up admitting an enormous concession that they are constituted from the same terms.11
Moreover, again as Balibar has stressed, after the experience of the Paris Commune Marx felt compelled to “rectify” the Communist Manifesto12 by insisting that the state apparatus could not be used as it is after the revolution. This implies that the process of transformation, of revolutionizing, of “withering away” of the state starts at the beginning and there can no simple “use” of actually existing apparatuses, since the dominant social relations are inscribed in the very materiality of the state apparatus under capitalism. Balibar summarizes this point in the following manner:
The fact that is revealed here we can express in the following way: the exploiting classes and the exploited class that, for the first time in history and because of its place within production, is in position to take power for itself, cannot exercise their power (and even their absolute power: their “dictatorship”) with the same means and thus in the same form. They cannot not in the sense of a moral impossibility, but of a material impossibility: the machine of the state does not function “on behalf” of the working class; either it does not function at all, or it functions but on behalf of someone else, that can be no other than the class adversary. It is impossible for the proletariat to conquer, then keep and use political power by using an instrument analogous at that which served the dominant classes, or it will lose it necessarily, under one form or the other, “violent” of “peaceful.”13
The question of the materiality of the state and its efficacy came into prominence after the first wave of revolutionary struggles in two crucial ways. On the one hand, it was the question of the complexity of the state in “western formations,” exemplified in the “defeat of the revolution in the West” and the work of Gramsci. The other aspect of course was the evolution of Soviet Union, where, in the name of socialist construction, not only did the state continue to expand but in the end an impressive coercive apparatus was deployed along with a paternalistic version of a “social welfare state.” Moreover, the trademark of communist reformism, but also of post-WWII social democracy, was to view the state as a neutral and even positive apparatus that not only represented the possibility for redistributive politics, but could also be considered an antechamber of socialism (along with the “progressive” development of the productive forces).14
In a curious twist of history, it was the neoliberal counterrevolution with its anti-state rhetoric, evident even today in the almost paranoid character of the Tea Party’s tirades against Obamacare, that led to another wave of “idealization” of the state on the part of many militants. I am not denying, of course, that the defense of welfare, public services, and the redistributive intervention of the state is positive, nor do I deny the urgency of these tasks. What I am trying to highlight is how all these have led to certain retreat of the critique of the state as an integral part of left-wing or communist politics.
In this sense, we need a new critique of the state and a full apprehension of the extent of its workings. To this end, as we have already stressed, both Antonio Gramsci’s conception of the “integral state” and his elaboration of the mechanisms of hegemony, and Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics can be of use. They can help us realize the strategic, relational, and in no sense neutral character of the state. But what about the “positive” aspects of the state that are now under attack by neoliberal fundamentalists? Here a more Poulantzian approach is necessary: if the state represents the material condensation of a balance of class forces, then the positive aspects of the capitalist state cease to be expressions of political and social rationality and instead appear as what they are: the uneven and ever-threatened expressions of the presence of working-class and popular struggles and demands within the state.
However, at the same time we must stress that this does not mean that we can have a process of self-transformation of the state “from within,” based upon the mere efficacy of popular struggles. There is always going to be an aspect “in dominance,” and this is the role of the state in the reproduction of the dominant social relations of exploitation and class domination, and in enhancing capitalist strategies of accumulation. Moreover, even maintaining these positive aspects (such as the public provision of basic goods and services), is far from certain if we take into consideration the widespread use of management techniques coming from the private sector and industry, and the constant pressure of privatization.
Therefore, what is needed is not just to struggle so that hospitals and schools remain a responsibility of the state, but also to struggle to transform them. How can we make them accountable to actual human needs, and not the targets set by the government? What forms of democracy within the workplace must be introduced, forms of democracy that should not limit themselves only to the employees in a particular branch but also the “users” of these services, in an attempt towards self-management and actual collective decision processes? These are important and urgent questions of a directly political nature, which cannot be answered only in theoretical terms but also through actual experimentation within particular historical and political contexts.
At the same time, the problem of the repressive apparatuses of the state remains important. They are the last line of defense against any potential process of social transformation, and we must expect them to act this way. Reducing their size, smashing all parallel structures, and doing away both with the chain of command and their immense material means, imposing forms of democratic social control at all levels, can be steps in this direction.
All these are not just theoretical questions. One of the most interesting aspects of contemporary developments and the combination between economic and political crisis is that the question of a governmental power is again a possibility as a limit case, in “weak links of the chain” such as Greece, where there has been an impressive electoral shift towards the Left.15 Whether this can indeed be part of a revolutionary sequence depends, to a great extent, upon how to deal with the question of the state. The reason is that unless there is a process of actual transformation and, in the last instance, of revolutionizing the state, in the end the political and economic strategies already inscribed in the state will prevail. This has to do not only with the mentalities of civil servants, but also with the material processes within state apparatuses, their degree of transparency but also mystification, and the knowledge processes involved.
But what does it mean today to smash the state? Does this mean the abolition “by decree” of state bureaucracy, specialized coercive apparatuses, the judiciary? And what will they be replaced by? Revolutionary militias, people’s courts and ad hoc collective decisions? In a strange dialectic, the answer is yes and no. On the one hand, one could imagine that for a whole period some form of public authority will remain in place, but it will be “of a completely different type.” This will also include institutions guaranteeing full political rights and a protection against arbitrary decisions. At the same time, forms of a “people in arms” should be put in place in order to implement de facto democratic social control of coercive apparatuses, and the same goes for the combination between progressive legal reform, greater emphasis on participation in the execution of justice, and a new conception of legality based not only upon abstract and universal rules, but also upon the concrete analysis of each case in its peculiarities (a practice common to all forms of popular justice associated with major popular movements).
Here another point must be made. It is an open question whether in advanced capitalist societies with their extended economic, political, and ideological state apparatuses (or “hegemonic apparatuses” of the “integral state”), a “classical” insurrectionary opening of a revolutionary sequence, in the form of an “organic crisis” of the state is possible, or whether a “democratic road” is possible, in the form of hegemonic crisis leading to sharp changes in electoral representation and the achievement of governmental power, as the experience of Bolivia or Venezuela and the electoral dynamics in Greece seem to suggest.
However, this would be an underestimation of the potential of bourgeois counterattack, of segments of the state apparatus that defend the previous social “status quo” and of course of imperialist forces that might want to undermine, sabotage, or even openly oppose any process of social transformation. In this sense, even though the beginning of the process can be democratic, its evolution will not necessarily be “peaceful” and this must be an aspect that no one interested in communist politics should underestimate. In this sense, the question of popular violence, as a democratic, political, non-idealized, non-instrumental, form of violence, remains an integral aspect of revolutionary politics. It is exactly the challenge of what Georges Labica described as the “impossibility of non-violence.”16
This requires a deepening of and experimentation with extended democratic practices. This is in sharp contrast to the suspicion of open democratic practices that plagued the historical communist movement. Democracy means contradictions, differences, struggles, conflicts, not just “voicing of opinions.” This is not only unavoidable, but also positive; it is the only way to deploy an actual “dialectic in action,” to experiment with a different configuration, to make good use of struggles and demands even during “socialist construction.” It is also the only way to actually wage class struggle against all the forms of reemergence of capitalist social forms, practices, norms, and relations, which in most cases take the form of “the most obvious solution.” One might even say that only in the context of socialism, of communist politics, democracy can find its real nature. In a certain sense, capitalism is innately undemocratic, since the democratic impulse, not as the sanitized “deliberation” proscribed by liberalism, but as collective will or social transformation, is an expression of subaltern demands and aspirations. In a way, the syntagm “liberal democracy” is a contradiction in terms representing both the history of struggles for democratic rights from the part of the subaltern classes and the attempt of the bourgeoisie to establish its hegemony through parliamentary procedures.
Moreover, we have to think of this process in terms of experimentation. This goes both for political and social forms. In this sense, the emergent forms of popular self-organization, of networking, of equal voicing, of open and democratic decision-making and in general all the forms of contemporary “democracy of struggle” should not be seen in an instrumental way as just ways to organize the struggle more efficiently. Occupations of open spaces, with their egalitarian and democratic organization, from Syntagma to Zuccoti Park and Gezi Park, mass assemblies, mass coordinations of broader movement, are also emerging forms of popular power from below, of experimentation with new forms of democracy; they can be considered emerging contemporary forms of dual power. In a similar way, contemporary forms of solidarity, of self-management, of alternative non-commercial networks of distribution, of open access to services, are not only ways to deal with urgent social problems. They are also experimental test sites for new social configurations, for new non-capitalist social relations, based upon the “traces of communism” in contemporary social resistances and collective demands and aspirations. Revolutionary politics is also a learning experience, a process of learning through the experience of struggles. In this sense, “smashing the state” is a process of collective experimentation with new political and social configurations, based upon the experiences of struggles and self-organization which emerge long before the nominal seize of power.
In the long run, this experimentation needs to deal with social relations and forms that can act as terrains of reproduction of capitalist relations of production. One side has to do with the attempt to overcome the compulsion of the market. The market is not just a mechanism of exchange. It is also a form or socialization of private labors and an expression of the reproduction of capitalist forms. Moreover, it is also a powerful ideological mechanism which constantly compels us to treat capitalist social forms as “natural.” The experimentation with non-market forms of coordinating economic practices is therefore an important aspect of any attempt towards socialist transformation. Another side has to do with the social division of labor. An important aspect of the Marxist tradition has been that the transition to communism also entails the abolition of the division of manual and intellectual labor. Moreover, the very experience of class struggles in the USSR and other social formations of “actually existing socialism,” has shown that the reproduction of the capitalist division of labor and workplace hierarchy lead, in the end, to the reproduction of state-capitalist forms of exploitation even under the abolition of private property. This was also the main thrust of the critique of the Chinese Cultural Revolution.17 Therefore, the attempt to socialize knowledge and technical expertise, to offer full access to scientific study and training in all sectors, and to implement forms of democratic decision at all levels of in the workplace still remains some of the most important exigencies of any process of social transformation.
Moreover, only such an attempt towards extensive democratic participation in all levels of social life, including the supposedly closed terrain of the economy, is a necessary step towards overcoming the bourgeois separation of the economic and the political. The division between economic agent and citizen, so fundamental in bourgeois politics, must be superseded in any process of social transformation through a necessary re-politicization of the economy. This is exactly the meaning of a new form of politics, a new political practice, based upon extended democracy in the workplace, new extended forms of participative democracy, forms of representation from the workplace (an important element of the initial soviet voting system), and limits against the creation of a professional political class.
These aspects are important exactly in the attempt to actually smash the state, decrease the need to resort to state coercion, establish democratic decision and self-organization (the very meaning of “free association”) at all levels, and actually create a much more equal and free society. This will be the result of struggles, but also of experiments
In light of the above, we can see that the notion of “dual power”18 acquires a broader significance. It is no longer a question of just a period of organic crisis and catastrophic equilibrium, during which there is an antagonistic coexistence of two competing state forms. Dual power refers to the emergence of new social and political forms. as part of the elevation of struggle and the fight for power and hegemony on the part of an alliance of the subaltern classes. It is not a political “stand-off”; it is a process of intense struggle, but also of learning and experimentation. Moreover, dual power is in fact the best way to describe the actual social and political balance of forces after the seizure of power, especially if we are talking about a potentially “democratic” process. In such a case, we will face the new forms of popular power, self-management, worker’s control, the attempts to institutionalize new social and political arrangements and the continuous resistance of important parts of the state apparatus – along with the attempt from the part of the forces of capital to resist the attacks against capitalist property and capitalist relations of productions.
To put it in Gramscian terms, when we attempt to discuss the question of revolutionary strategy in contemporary terms, we are in fact always facing a combination of war of position and war of maneuver. In fact, a war of position, namely an attempt to construct hegemony, is necessary both before and after the seizure of power. This should not be read as a reference to some “cultural” hegemony or “preparation,” as it was the reformist reading in the 1970s. Rather it refers to this continuous process of struggles, collective experimentation, creation of new forms of popular power and workers’ control. “Smashing the state,” therefore, is not opposed to an attempt to build hegemony; rather, the two are part of the same dialectic of social transformation.
This dialectic of hegemony and the need for a process of cultural revolution can also be seen as the only way to create the ideological and cultural conditions for the necessary politicization of everyday life and socialization of the political process that “smashing the state” and even more “withering away of the state” entails. This requires making people think and act beyond the compulsion of the market, but also beyond relying on an impersonal and benevolent state apparatus. A revolutionary process also entails a new collective ethos of participation and collective responsibility in order to avoid the danger of an alienated relation to social and political processes that can easily lead to the reproduction of capitalist social forms and norms.
All this means that the question of the political program is important, especially in countries such as Greece where the Left is facing the challenge of political power. What is needed is a set of demands that not only bridge the gap between immediate demands and socialist transformation, but actually articulate a narrative of transition, point to the necessary ruptures that can begin a revolutionary process. Such a program cannot be limited to demands for “redistribution”; it must also point to an alternative economic and productive paradigm, include demands for the rupture from processes of internationalization of capital such as the euro, for mass nationalizations of banks and strategic enterprises, for self-management and alternative distribution networks, and suggest a new orientation away from “export-oriented growth” (including seeing service sectors such as tourism in countries such as Greece as “heavy industry”), and consumerism, towards a new hierarchy of economic priorities based upon actual social needs and environmental sustainability.
Therefore, “smashing the state” entails a confrontation with all the major questions of revolutionary strategy and the actual attempt to initiate a process of social transformation; it should be seen as a highly original and open process of social transformation.
A final point refers to the question of political organization. What kind of political organizations do we need in order to be able to attempt such a revolutionary process? The traditional model that viewed, in a schematic and mechanical way, the confrontations with the question of power in terms of a military logic, placing all the emphasis on discipline, is of course inherently inadequate, and moreover runs the risk of imitating the model of the bourgeois state. It is necessary to think that in the struggle for a different society, based upon principles and practices antagonistic to the bourgeois/capitalist logic, we need organizations that reflect the emerging new social forms. In contrast to the traditional view – according to which the exigencies of the struggle and the need for disciplined commitment to the revolutionary process justify limits to intraparty democracy, suppression of free discussion, and rigid hierarchy – we want political organizations that are at the same time laboratories for the collective elaboration of new projects and new mass forms of critical political intellectuality, and experimental sites for new social and political relations. In this sense, they have to be more democratic, more egalitarian, more open than the society around them. Gramsci was one of the first to stress this conception of political organization as laboratory:
One should stress the importance and significance, which, in the modern world, political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of the world, because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were their historical “laboratory” … The relation between theory and practice becomes even closer the more the conception is vitally and radically innovatory and opposed to old ways of thinking. For this reason one can say that the parties are the elaborators of new integral and all-encompassing intellectualities and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice understood as real historical process takes place.19
However, this should not be considered an abstract exigency, but as an urgent task which also entails the whole process of reconstructing and reinventing political organizations.20 Contemporary radical political organizations do not reflect only the dynamics of the conjuncture and current struggles; they are also the result of a whole period of crisis and retreat of the communist and revolutionary socialist movement. This is also evident today in the limitations of the main organizational forms suggested: the “horizontal coordination” of movements, which is indispensable in order to create alliances and open spaces of struggle, but at the same time does not aid in the necessary elaboration of political programs, and usually does not permit any discussion of questions of political power and hegemony; the left-wing “electoral front” that usually is based on a minimum program of immediate anti-neoliberal reforms that can easily take the form of a reformist agenda for progressive social democratic governance; the classical model of the revolutionary group or sect (along with the respective international currents) that tend to reproduce fragmentation, sectarianism, and parochial authoritarian version of an “imaginary Lenin.” In contrast, “repeating Lenin” today means thinking in terms of maximum originality, of trying not just to reproduce some model but to create laboratories of new political projects. This can be accomplished neither by simple electoral coalitions nor by an antagonism between groups for “hegemony” within the radical Left. We need democratic political fronts, based upon anti-capitalist programs that can also act as processes that can bring together different currents, experiences in the movement, political sensitivities that can actually act as laboratories of new and antagonistic political projects.
All this should not be seen as the result of our preoccupation with the singular dynamics of the Greek experience, the depth of the crisis and the potential for radical left politics there. A more strategic approach, an attempt to ground our politics in the “traces of communism” of today’s resistances, however minor or small-scale they might seem, a new emphasis on articulating alternative narratives and not just “demands,” an attempt to create fronts and networks that bring together different experiences and currents – all are equally indispensable both in social formations where the Left is facing the challenge of power, and in social formations where the process of reinventing a revolutionary sequence must start again after a period of disintegration.
Rethinking revolutionary strategy is no longer a political and theoretical luxury. The current economic crisis is in fact one of the most important transition periods in the history of capitalism. We are witnessing a new historical cycle of movements, of almost insurrectionary character, and – at the same time and in a dialectical relation of mutual determination – of deep political and in certain cases hegemonic crisis (expressed also in the rise of the far Right). It is important to start thinking in terms of strategy again, if we do not want to miss the opportunities offered. After all, we must never forget that history has more imagination than we do.
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Seven theses on workers' control - Raniero Panzieri and Lucio Libertini
1958 article on workers' control, from an autonomist Marxist perspective.
This text was published in February 1958 in issue 2 of Mondo Operaio [Workers’ World], signed Raniero Panzieri and Lucio Libertini. Panzieri, after having been excluded from the leadership of the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) in 1956, became co-editor with Nenni (de facto editor) of the review, transforming it into an extraordinary laboratory of research. This essay forms part of the research carried out by Panzieri from a libertarian perspective and from the left of the double crisis of the workers’ movement; on the one hand the invasion of Hungary in 1956, and on the other the defeat of FIOM [metalworkers’ union] in the big Turin factories, starting with Fiat. This text, which represents a point of synthesis of a series of Panzieri’s elaborations on the theme of workers’ control, opened a passionate debate on the left, as much in the columns of Mondo Operaio as in those of Avanti and Unità. (Paolo Ferrero, Raniero Panzieri: un uomo di frontiera, Milan: Editions Punto Rosso, 2006.)
The demand for workers’ control of the factories is at the center of the “democratic and peaceful road” to socialism. The following theses mean to provide an initial, provisional direction for a wide debate that gathers not only the contributions of politicians and specialists but also and above all the experience of the workers’ movement, which are the only conclusive verification of the elaboration of socialist thought.
1. On the question of the transition from capitalism to socialism
In the workers’ movement there has been for a long time, and in successive periods, a discussion of the question of the modes and temporalities of the transition to socialism. One tendency, which occurred in various forms, believed it was possible to schematize the temporality of this process, as if socialist construction had to be preceded, always and in every case, by the “phase” of construction of bourgeois democracy. In this way the proletariat, where the bourgeoisie has not yet completed its revolution, would come to be assigned the task of conducting its struggle with a delimited end in view: that indeed of constructing or favoring the construction of modes of production and of political forms of a completed bourgeois society. This conception can be defined schematically because it claims to apply in the abstract and without reference to a historical reality, a prefabricated model. If in fact it is true that the reality of political Institutions corresponds, in every epoch, to the economic reality, it is however an error to believe that the economic reality (productive forces and relations of production) develops according to a line that is always gradual, regular, perfectly predictable because divided in precise successive phases, one distinct from the other. It is sufficient, to understand the nature of this error, to reflect on some historical examples. When, at the beginning of the last century, technical progress (invention of the mechanical loom and the steam engine) brought about a qualitative leap in production (industrial revolution) which remained in force, the old forms of production [remained] alongside the new; and in the more economically evolved countries the political struggle had therefore a rather complex character. On one side there was the resistance to the feudal survivals, on the other side the affirmation of the industrial bourgeoisie; and finally, at the same time, the appearance of a new class, the industrial proletariat. In Russia, at the end of the first revolutionary wave (February 1917), after the collapse of the Tsarist autocracy and the monstrous capitalist-feudal system, one part of the Marxist workers’ movement, falling into the same error, maintained that the Russian proletariat had to join forces with the bourgeoisie to realize the necessary “second stage” (bourgeois democracy) of the revolution. As is known, this thesis was defeated by Lenin and the majority of the Russian workers’ movement; in the total collapse of the old system the only real protagonist remained the proletariat, and its problem was not therefore that of creating the typical institutions of the bourgeoisie, but of constructing the institutions of its democracy, of socialist democracy. In China between 1924 and 1928, there was the prevalence in the communist party of those who erroneously wanted to commit the class movement to unconditionally supporting the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek, helping it to realize, after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty and the feudal system, the second stage (bourgeois democracy): they did not account for the inexistence of a Chinese bourgeoisie capable of establishing itself as a “national” class, or for the fact that the immense masses of peasants of this country could struggle only for the cause of their own emancipation, and not in pursuit of abstract and incomprehensible schemes.
These considerations do not lead by any means to exalting an intellectualist revolutionary voluntarism (to affirming, that is, that the revolution can be the fruit of an act of will of a vanguard group), but only to clarifying as, first of all, every political force, rather than chasing prefabricated models, must become aware of its own reality, the always complex and specific field within which it moves. It is social democracy in all its forms which, to cover up its opportunism and justify it ideologically, systematically mixes up the cards on the table and reduces every position consistent with the revolutionary left to that of an intellectualist voluntarism. The historical essence of the social-democratic experience consists moreover in this: in the assigning, with the pretext of the struggle against maximalism, to the proletariat the task of supporting the bourgeoisie or even of replacing it in the construction of bourgeois democracy: and by that very fact it denies the tasks and the revolutionary autonomy of the proletariat, and finishes by assigning to it the position of a subaltern force.
In today’s Italian society the fundamental factor is constituted by the fact that the bourgeoisie has never been, is not, can never be a “national” class; a class thus capable (as happened in England and France) of guaranteeing, albeit in a certain period of time, the development of national society, in its whole. The Italian bourgeoisie arose on a corporate and parasitical basis, namely:
through the formation of individual industrial sectors that did not constitute a national market, but survived on the exploitation of a market of a quasi-colonial kind (the South)
by means of the permanent recourse to the protection and active support of the State
with the alliance with the remains of feudalism (agrarian bloc of the South)
Fascism was the inflamed expression of this contradictory equilibrium, and of the domination, in this form, of the bourgeoisie: it, also through the massive intervention of the totalitarian State in favor of bankrupt private industry (IRI) [Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale, fascist bailout in 1933], promoted to the maximum the transformation of determinate industrial sectors into powerful monopolistic structures (Fiat, Montecatini, Edison, etc.). After the collapse of fascism the monopolies found, in the intensification of the relations with American big industry and in the subordination to it, the continuation of their old anti-national policy (Italian big industry is always, in one way or another, cartelized with big international monopolies; one of the cases in which these links have appeared with great evidence was when Fiat, Edison, and Montecatini supported in Italy the campaign for the international oil cartel; and in general the Atlanticism of the parties of the center-right is the expression of links of subordination that we have indicated. The Marshall Plan, expression of American imperialism, was accepted by Italian monopolies before the political parties). Thus is established a situation in which next to the monopolistic areas there coexist large areas of deep depression and backwardness, (many zones in the mountains and hills, the Po delta and, more generally, the South and the islands); the distance between social stratum and social stratum [ceto sociale], between region and region, increases enormously; the traditional imbalances of industrial production grow; the monopolistic bottlenecks tighten (the limitations and distortions, that is, that the power and politics of monopolies oppose the full and balanced development of the productive forces); there is mass unemployment that becomes a permanent element of our economy; the traditional terms of the greatest problem of our socioeconomic structure (the Southern question) are reproduced in an aggravated fashion.
However, it would be a great error to reaffirm the existence of these facts to conceal, as has been done in recent years, the new elements. There is no doubt that, starting above all with 1951-52, in some sectors Italian capitalism was able to take advantage of the favorable international conjuncture and the considerable economic progress: there was thus a phase of expansion (rapid growth of production, growth of income, rapid accumulation of capital and intense boost in fixed capital) that nevertheless, unfolding under the control of the monopolies, remained restricted to their area, and even provoked the aggravation of the fundamental imbalances of the Italian economy.
The contradictory situation, dominated by large areas of depression and the crisis we have described, is not going to improve but worsen, whether because of a possible reversal of the international conjuncture, or a probable growth of technological unemployment, or the negative effects of the Common Market, or finally because the characteristics of the internal Italian market (its narrow-mindedness, its poverty) don’t provide an adequate area to merge with productive capacity and technological maturity, which is further maturing in the monopolistic area.
An analysis of this type does not aim and does not serve naturally to valorize the prospect of a “catastrophic” crisis of capitalism; and moreover a polemic on the terrain of prophecies, and in these terms, would serve only to paralyze and sterilize the action of the class movement. What follows from this analysis is the existence of certain real conditions and the identification of the tendency of development implicit in them; and the conclusion that within the boundaries of these conditions and of this tendency the workers’ movement must act.
In light of these considerations the following theses appear therefore quite abstract and unreal (specifically today in Italy): a) the class movement must substantially limit itself to giving support to the capitalist class (or determinate bourgeois groups) in the construction of a regime of completed bourgeois democracy; b) the class movement must essentially substitute itself for the capitalist class and assume in its own right the task of constructing a regime of completed bourgeois democracy.
Instead the contradictions that sharply tear apart Italian society, the weight that the monopolies have acquired and continually tend more to assume, the contradictions between technological development and the capitalist relations of production, the weakness of the bourgeoisie as a national class, lead the workers’ movement to take on tasks of a different nature; to struggle at the same time for reforms with a bourgeois content and for reforms with a socialist content. On the political level this signifies that the leading force of democratic development in Italy is the working class and under its direction can be realized the only efficient system of alliance, with the intellectuals, with the peasants, with the groups of small and medium bourgeois producers. It is this system of alliances and this kind of leadership that correspond to the real perspective.
2. The democratic road to socialism is the road of workers’ democracy.
It is a false deduction, which emerges from a wrong analysis of the Italian situation, and from a simplistic interpretation of the turning point registered in the theses proclaimed at the 20th conference of the CPSU, to affirm that the Italian road to socialism, democratic and peaceful, coincides with a “parliamentary” road to socialism. The affirmation of the democratic character of socialism is in fact correct, in the sense that it refutes all the old conceptions according to which the transition to socialism is an act of revolutionary voluntarism, and the work of an isolated minority, without the political and economic conditions having matured; it just as much rejects the conception that ties the the transition to socialism to the automatic verification of the “crash” of capitalism. But the democratic road cannot be reduced to an always and necessarily peaceful road, as in the moment when [dal momento che], including in a determinate Country when the conditions for socialism are mature and its forces have attained the majority of the votes, the resistance of the capitalist class and its recourse to violence nevertheless lead to an armed assault, and to the necessity of proletarian violence.
Nevertheless, in Italy today there is a democratic and peaceful perspective for socialism. But those who identify the exclusive (or even just the only significant or characteristic) instrument of the peaceful transition to socialism in Parliament, empty the very notion of the democratic and peaceful road of any real substance. In this way they revive instead the old bourgeois mystifications that present the bourgeois representative State not as it is, as a class State, but as a State above classes; where the Parliament is only the place for the ratification and registration of the relations of force between classes, which develop and are determined outside of it, and the economy remains the sphere in which real relations are produced and is the real source of power.
It is right on the other hand to affirm that the use of the parliamentary institutions is also one of most important tasks laid out for the class movement, and that these very institutions can be transformed (by the pressure exercised from below by the workers’ movement through its new institutions) from the representative seat of merely political, formal leadership, to the expression of substantial political and economic rights at the same time.
3. The proletariat educates itself by constructing its own institutions.
When, in general, the road to socialism is defined as democratic, with the hope of fully guaranteeing the prospects of peaceful transition, the following concept is accordingly and in substance affirmed: that there is continuity in the methods of political struggle before, during, and after the revolutionary leap, and that therefore the institutions of proletarian power must form themselves not only after the revolutionary leap, but in the very course of the whole struggle of the workers’ movement for power. These institutions must arise from the economic sphere, where there is the real source of power, and represent therefore man not only as as citizen but also as producer: and the rights that are determined in these institutions must be political and economic rights at the same time. The real force of the class movement measures itself form the share of power and the capacity to exercise a leading function within the structure of production. The distance that separates the institutions of bourgeois democracy from the institutions of workers’ democracy is qualitatively the same as that which separates bourgeois society divided into classes from socialist society without classes. It is also to ward off the conception, of naive Enlightenment origins, that wants to generically “train” the proletariat for power, disregarding the concrete construction of its institutions. Thus we hear of the “subjective preparation” of the proletariat, of the “education” of the proletariat (and whose turn is it to play the role of educator?); but everybody knows that only those who jump in water learn how to swim (and for this reason, among others, it is best to start by throwing the Enlightened “educator” in the water).
Certainly these things aren’t new. They are the historical experience of the workers’ movement and of Marxism, from the Soviet of 1917 to the Turin movement of factory councils, to the Polish and Yugoslav workers’ councils, to the necessary discussion of the theses of the 20th Congress, that are going to take flesh before our eyes. It is all the more superfluous to have to recall that it is exactly on this issue, in the last years, that the Socialist Party has provided the most original contributions to the entire Italian workers’ movement.
4. On the current conditions of workers’ control.
Today the demand for workers’ control (workers and technicians) is not laid out only in relation with the reasons that have just been explained, but is connected to a series of new conditions which render this demand deeply contemporary and place it at the center of the struggle of the class movement:
The first of these conditions is constituted by the development of the modern factory. On this terrain arises the practice and the ideology of the contemporary monopoly (human relations, scientific organization of labor, etc.), which aims at subordinating in an integral way spirit and body – the laborer to his boss, reducing him to a small cog in the gears of a large machine whose complexity remains unknown to him. The only way of breaking this process of total subjection of the person of the laborer is, aside from the laborer himself, that of first of all becoming conscious of the situation as it is in productive business terms; and to oppose to “business democracy” in the boss’s brand name, and to the mystification of “human relations,” the demand of a conscious role for the laborer in the business complex: the demand of workers’ democracy;
if the organs of political power in the bourgeois State have always remained the “executive committee” of the capitalist class, today we are nevertheless observing an even bigger interpenetration than in the past between the State and the monopolies: whether because the monopoly, according to its internal logic, is led to assume an always greater direct control, or because the economic operations of the monopoly (and in this regard laissez-faire illusions are by now collapsing) demand in increasing ways the aid and friendly intervention of the State. Precisely because, then, the authorities of the economy extend their direct political functions (and behind the facade of the Rule of law increase the real and direct functions of the class State), the workers’ movement is learning the lessons of its adversary, must always shift further its center of struggle onto the terrain of real and designated power. And, for the same reason, the struggle of the class movement for control cannot exhaust itself within the limits of a single firm, but must be connected and extended in all sectors, on all productive fronts. To conceive of the workers’ control as something that could be restricted to a single firm does not only mean “limiting” the demand of control, but emptying it of its real meaning, and causing it to break down on the corporate level;
there is finally a last new condition that is at the roots of the demand for the workers’ control. The development of modern capitalism, on the one hand, and on the other, the development of the socialist forces in the world and the difficult problematic of power, which imposes itself forcefully in the countries in which the class movement has already made its revolution, indicate the importance today of defending and guaranteeing the revolutionary autonomy of the proletariat, whether against the new forms of reformism, or against the bureaucratization of power, that is to say, against reformist bureaucratization and against the conceptions of “leaders” (party-leader, State-leader).
The defense, in this situation, of the revolutionary autonomy of the proletariat, manifests itself in the creation from below, before and after the conquest of power, of institutions of socialist democracy, and in the return of the party to its function as instrument of the political formation of the class movement (instrument, that is, not of a paternalistic leader, from above, but of encouraging and supporting the organizations in which the unity of the class is articulated). The importance now of the autonomy of the Socialist Party in Italy is precisely in this: certainly not in how much it advances or forecasts the scission of the class movement, not in opposing one “leader” to another “leader,” but in the guarantee of the autonomy of the entire workers’ movement from any external, bureaucratic, and paternalistic direction.
Affirming this definitely does not mean that the question of power, the essential condition for the construction of socialism, has been forgotten: but the socialist nature of power is exactly determined by the base of workers’ democracy on which it rests, and that cannot be improvised in the aftermath of the revolutionary “leap” in the relations of production. This is the only serious method, not reformist, of opposing the prospect of bureaucratic socialism (Stalinism).
5. The meaning of class unity is the question of the connection between partial struggles and general ends.
The demand for workers’ control, the problems it raises, the theoretical preparation connected to it implies necessarily the unity of the masses, and the refusal of every rigid party conception that reduces the very thesis of control to a wretched parody. There is no workers’ control without unity of action of all laborers in the same firm, in the same sector, in the entire productive front: a unity that is not mythological or purely an adornment to the propaganda of a party, but a reality that is implemented from below, with laborers becoming conscious of their function in the productive process, and the simultaneous creation of unitary institutions of a new power. It is therefore to reject, in this context, the reduction of the struggles of laborers to a pure instrument of reinforcement of a party or of its more or less clandestine strategy. The question, long debated, of how to connect and harmonize demands and partial, immediate struggles, with general ends, is resolved precisely in affirming the continuity of struggles and of their nature. In effect this connection and this harmonization are impossible, and are an ideological mess, as long as there is still the idea that there is a realm of socialism, a for the time unknowable mystery, that will appear one day as a miraculous dawn to achieve the dreams of man. The ideal of socialism is indeed an ideal that contrasts profoundly and without the possibility of accommodation with capitalist society, but it is an ideal that needs to be made alive day by day, won moment by moment in struggles; that arises and develops insofar as every struggle serves to mature and advance institutions that emerge from below, the nature of which is exactly already the affirmation of socialism.
6. The class movement and economic development.
A conception that is based on workers’ control and on the unity within the struggles of the masses carries with it the rejection of every attitude or orientation which hinges on a catastrophic perspective (automatic collapse of capitalism), and the full and unconditional adherence to a politics of economic development. But this politics of economic development is not an adjustment, a correction of the capitalist course, nor does it consist of an abstract planning that would be proposed to the bourgeois state; it is realized in the struggle of the masses, and manifests itself by gradually breaking the capitalist structure, and from this taking to head a new impulse. When in this sense it is affirmed that the struggles of the proletariat serve to gain day by day new shares of power we should not understand this to mean that the proletariat gains day by day portions of bourgeois power (or of collaboration with bourgeois power) but that day by day it opposes to bourgeois power the demand, the affirmation, and the form of a new power that comes directly, and without proxies, from below.
The working class, slowly, through the struggle for control, becomes the active subject of a new economic politics, takes on for itself the responsibility for a balanced economic development, such that it interrupts the power of monopolies and their consequences: imbalances between region and region, between stratum and stratum, between sector and sector. For this reason, similarly, overturning the contemporary function of public enterprise, transforming it from an element of support and protection for monopolies, into a direct instrument of the industrialization of the South and depressed areas. In practice this makes the politics of economic development into an element of harsh contrast with the monopolies; a contrast that presents itself first and foremost as a conflict between the public sector (allied with the small and medium enterprises) and the sector of big private enterprise. It should also be emphasized that the class movement, carrying forward an equilibrium and adequate process of industrialization does not “substitute” itself for capitalism, nor does it “complete the work,” but joins economic development to the parallel transformation of the relations of production; because, today in Italy, these old, capitalist relations of production are precisely the irreconcilable obstacle for a politics of economic development. Whoever confuses industrialization (growth of accumulation) with the expansion of capitalism (economy of profit), does not only commit a theoretical error but has also not even managed to take note of Italian reality in its most evident terms.
A politics of economic development entrusts to the control of the laborers completely the guarantee of technical development; not only eliminates the practical separation between it and the laborers, but makes the laborers their own most direct bearers and advocates, realizing finally the convergence, at the level of struggle, between workers and technicians.
7. The forms of workers’ control.
The demand for control on the part of laborers is by its nature unitary, and it arises and develops at the level of struggle. In the concrete situation of the class struggle in our Country control does not arise as a generic, programmatic demand, and much less as a demand for legislative formulations on the part of Parliament: preparations and formulas of this kind can only distort the problem of control, even reducing it to a veiled or open formula for collaborationism, or bringing it back in to a framework of a dangerous parliamentary paternalism. By this we certainly don’t mean that it’s a matter of excluding a legislative formulation on workers’ control, but that this cannot be bestowed paternalistically from above, nor can it be achieved just by generic struggles of a parliamentary kind; in this field Parliament can only register, reflect the result of a struggle that takes place in the economic sphere (that is to say essentially of the working class). The question of control advances insofar as the laborers, in the productive structure, unitarily become conscious of their necessity in the productive system, and of the productive reality, and struggle on their own. It is clear moreover, by the things already said, that there is no difference for this theme between state enterprises and private enterprises: the demand for control arises in both sectors on the same level of struggle. On the other hand the demand for control is not the romantic exhumation of a past that never repeats itself in the same form, nor can it be confused with the revindicative functions of determinate union organs (and therefore cannot be confused with an expansion of the power of internal commissions): and this last thing is also true of the workers, in many places, giving this form to demands for control because the internal commissions have remained a symbol of real workers’ unity in places of labor.
Therefore every utopian anticipation must be banned, while it must be emphasized that the forms of control must not be determined by a committee of “specialists,” but rise up only from the concrete experience of laborers. In this sense three points must already be mentioned that come from certain workers’ sectors. The first of them concerns the Conferences of production [Conferenze di produzione] as a concrete form from which it can launch a movement for control. The second refers on the other hand to the demand that the question of control be placed at the center of the general struggle for the recapture of contractual power and the freedom of workers in the factories, and thus for instance, that it be manifested in elected Commissions that would control employment and prevent discrimination. The third, while it emphasizes the needs of linking between various firms, poses the problem of participation in representative territorial democracy to the elaboration of productive programs.
These are very useful points, resulting already from basic experience, to which certainly others will be added: each one of these will be further and more deeply discussed, bearing in mind that the scope of application and of study is primarily the factory, and the best test is the unitary struggle.
Comments
State Violence, State Control: Marxist State Theory and the Critique of Political Economy
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, a number of movements arose which in different ways, opposed the status quo.1 At the time, many of us in our exuberance thought these events signaled the end – or at least the beginning of the end – of capitalism. Yet from London to Oakland to Madrid to Athens to Cairo, each of these movements were met and outmaneuvered by an institution which was generally neglected in analyses of the final crisis, and the calls to communize everything by abolishing the value-form: the state.
This was doubly surprising, for the crisis was also said to be a crisis of neoliberalism, a new regime of financialized accumulation that had emerged in the 1970s and had transformed capitalist society through what Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner have described as “post-1970s patterns of institutional and spatial reorganization” consisting in “the tendential extension of market-based competition and commodification processes into previously relatively insulated realms of social life.”2
While many explanations of how and why this process of neoliberalization occurred abound, Philip Mirowski perceptively notes that “many authors of a Marxist bent want to portray neoliberalism as the simple deployment of class power over the unsuspecting masses, but encounter difficulty in specifying the chains of causality stretching from the elusive executive committee of the capitalist class down to the shopper at Wal-Mart.”3 As Mirowski indicates, much of this explanatory gap in prominent “traditional” and “critical” Marxian accounts of neoliberalism thus centers on the lack of sophisticated analyses of the capitalist state.
Chris Harman, for instance, provides a “Classical Marxist” interpretation of the state in Zombie Capitalism.4 For Harman there is little need to consider the structure of the capitalist state, how it relates to the capitalist economy, its peculiar capacities, its means or its ends, or to provide a detailed investigation of how the state participated in regimes of accumulation; for him, the state is a formless instrument of capital, which the ruling class uses to stall the Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Fall. In this view, the state’s “autonomy” does not consist in its separation from the capitalist economy or its separated interrelation with it, but in “a limited degree of freedom as to how it enforces the needs of national capital accumulation, not in any choice as to whether to enforce these or not.”5 Consequently, a political class is not separated from the capitalist class, nor is it beholden to a particular political rationality implicated in the overall social logic of capital; rather, “state appointees behave as much like capitalists – as living embodiments of capital accumulation at the expense of workers – as do private entrepreneurs, or shareholders.”6 Harman thus argues that the crisis of the 1970s represented “the limits of state capitalism’s ability to maintain accumulation” in the face of this tendency, leading to a new phase of accumulation in which individual states act in the interest of global capital.7 Consequently, Harman’s explanation of neoliberalism treats the capitalist ruling class as the prime mover and the state as its mere instrument, while his definition of neoliberalism is precisely the one that Mirowski criticizes: “Neoliberalism is an ideology primarily used to justify attacks on workers.”8
Despite their opposition to these traditional interpretations of Marx, some of the most prominent proponents of “value-form theory” who address neoliberalism echo Harman’s analysis, albeit in a different register.9 Moishe Postone’s “Theorizing the Contemporary World” parallels Harman by characterizing the historical trajectory of neoliberalism as “the weakening of national, state-centered economic sovereignty and the emergence and consolidation of a neo-liberal global order.”10 Postone’s intervention – which consists of critical remarks on how analyses of neoliberalism by Robert Brenner, David Harvey, and Giovanni Arrighi fail to grasp Marx’s theory of value – makes the case that properly understanding Marx’s theory of value can provide a full picture of the dynamic of capitalist, and thus neoliberal, society. Although Postone remarks in passing that the state should be analyzed as a historically-specific form, he does not say why this is particularly important, how this would change his analysis, or how it relates to his interpretation of Marx’s theory of value. Like Harman but on a different theoretical basis, he ultimately reduces the state to an incidental instantiation of capital.
Taken together, Harman and Postone’s analyses are representative of the type of Marxist theory that has underlaid approaches to the crisis. Unfortunately, they can also be said to represent the general theoretical paucity of state theory in much of the Marxian tradition, where the state is often treated as a formless instrument or a supraindividual form that merely reflects a given characterization of the dynamic of valorization. The explanatory capacities of these approaches are called into question not only by the quashing of these post-crisis movements by the state, but also by the underlying character of the neoliberal project itself, which Mirowski and Peck both show to be a state-driven enterprise that became more extensive in the wake of periodic global economic crises since the 1970s.11
Nonetheless, Mirowski and Peck have their own limitations. They treat neoliberalism as a political project or as a political rationality, but they do not consider how such a political rationality relates to the social logic and corresponding behavioral rationality of capital. This means they do not consider how this perspective could provide a conception of the capitalist state that might help us further understand neoliberalism, the neoliberal state and the neoliberalization of global society in relation to global capitalism.
These omissions not only raise the question of whether the state can be brought back into Marxist accounts of neoliberalism, but if a Marxist theory of the state can be devised that the treats the state as integral to the dynamic of accumulation – in a way that explains the development and pervasiveness of neoliberalism, sets the stage for an understanding of the recent waves of state-backed repression, and in so doing contributes to a more sober analyses of the overcoming of capitalist society. This once again raises the vexed question of the Marxist theory of the capitalist state – is a theory available which can explain the relation between the capitalist state and the capitalist economy, the means and ends of the capitalist state, which overcomes the one-sided approaches of Harman and Postone?
Such a conception would view the state as a historically specific entity, separate from yet interrelated with the capitalist economy, endowed with form-determined capacities that are integral to the process of valorization and social reproduction. Moreover, while these capacities would have certain instrumental uses, their utilization would not be deduced from the direct subordination of the state apparatus or its functionaries to capital or the capitalist class, but from a perspective which shows how the state’s role in this overarching social dynamic instantiates a political rationality that compels such a utilization, in order to reproduce the state and capitalist society. This theory would also seek to explain the nature and the purpose of the capitalist state and its capacities, providing a framework for the analysis of state policies as the instrumentalization of these form-determined abilities. In order to determine the possibility of advancing such a theory, we will start by reviewing important moments in the history of Marxian state theory.
Marx’s theories of the state
As Bob Jessop and others have noted, Marx himself did not present “a definitive analysis” of the capitalist state.12 Instead, a variety of conceptions of the state can be drawn from his work. In early texts such as “On The Jewish Question” (1843) and “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” (1844), written prior to his first engagement with political economy, Marx conceives of the state as the alienated representation of a human community premised on the separation between the state and civil society. Following Marx’s initial criticisms of political economy, The German Ideology (1845) conceives of the state as a class entity that represents particular class interests as universal. However, Marx’s most influential comments on the state in this period are the famous lines from The Communist Manifesto (1848) – “The executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” – which describe the state as an instrument in the playing out of the history of class struggle.13 Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1851) provides a more complex analysis of the relationship between the state and class struggle, in his account of the intra-state conflicts between class fractions in Bonaparte’s coup of 1851.
While Jessop and others treat these moments in the development of Marx’s thought as distinct, or even antithetical, Michael Heinrich notes they are also indicative of the period before Marx fully developed his critique of political economy.14 Despite their differences, these “pre-critical” conceptions of the state do not investigate its historically specific form, and thus lack an account of how such a form participates in the peculiar dynamic of capitalist valorization.
Marx had planned to provide such an account as part of his critique of political economy. Unfortunately, it was never completed. Nevertheless, he made scattered references to such a form-analytic conception of the state in Volume 3 of Capital (1863-1883), calling it “the specific political form” that corresponds to the “specific economic form” of capitalist social production. He also noted that such a “specific economic form” grows directly out of the particular manner in which “unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers,” which “determines the relationship of the rulers and the ruled.” The “specific political form” of the state, in other words, is constituted by the historically specific relations of production, possessing a “political relation of sovereignty” that is separate but also embedded in this determinate economic form. Finally, he noted that these forms appeared in “infinite variations and gradations” in different empirical circumstances:
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers – a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity – which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis – the same from the standpoint of its main conditions – due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc. from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.15
Taken in tandem with the parts of his critique of political economy that Marx did complete, this would imply that the “specific political form” of the capitalist state corresponds to and reacts upon the specific economic form of capitalist social production.
But what is this economic form? For Marx, “capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character.”16 Succinctly put, this definite social production relation is manifested in the social character of a thing because the capitalist mode of production is characterized by an atomized social division of labor in which production occurs for the purpose of exchange. This, in turn, means that some type of general equivalent is necessary to facilitate exchange. Money is this equivalent. But because money is the only equivalent that facilitates exchange, it acquires what Marx refers to as a “social power,” this “thing’s” social character. This also means, as Marx shows in the course of his further presentation in Capital, that since the capitalist mode of production consists in a class antagonism in which a class of workers are compelled, in order to reproduce themselves, to sell their labor-power to a class of capitalists who are then compelled to pump out unpaid surplus-labor in order to sell commodities and valorize capital, that the capitalist process of valorization occurs through the medium of money for the sake of acquiring more money. Money thus becomes the sole aim of production, “the self-sufficient purpose of the sale,” and thus the ends of the process of valorization, which is simultaneously one of reproduction.17 Surplus value, as “the specific economic form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped out of direct producers” in order to valorize capital, is the means of this process. This “definite social production relation” – the “specific economic form” of capitalism – is thus manifest in money’s social character, which in the process of valorization serves as the subject of a social dynamic that reproduces these relations by determining the actions of capitalists and proletarians.18 It finds its presuppositions in conditions of separation, and is marked by an antagonism of exploitation and domination.
In conjunction with such a conception of this “specific economic form,” Marx’s fragmentary account of the state thus implies that a form-analytic theory of the capitalist state would consist in an explication of a historically specific “political form that corresponds to these peculiarities of the capitalist social form.” It further implies that the relation of sovereignty, which characterizes this “specific” political form, corresponds to the ends of this economic form: the process of valorization, which “determines the actions of the rulers and the ruled.” Such a notion shows that at this stage in his work, Marx does not conceive of the state as a formless entity in a decontexualized history of class struggle, while the reference to its “hidden basis” shows that Marx does not see it as an impersonal form extraneous to it. Rather, it indicates that he conceived of the state as a form-determined instrument in which the specific form of the state and its political relation of sovereignty correspond to and serve the ends of the capitalist process of valorization. This would seem to indicate that the state as a form is separate from, yet also corresponds to, the capitalist economy, and that “the political form” it possesses by virtue of this separation consists in a “relation of sovereignty” in which its form-determined abilities are utilized as instruments by its functionaries, who are compelled to reinforce and react upon the peculiar antagonisms of exploitation, domination, and separation that are the premise and the result of capitalist process of valorization.19
Elements of such a theory can be seen in the instances in Capital where the state is shown to enforce laws on the basis of formal freedom and equality, codifying private property and the sale of labor-power and thus functioning as integral to the process of valorization. It can also be seen to utilize these form-determined capacities in an instrumental manner, in the sections on the length of the working day and primitive accumulation, where the impersonal entity of the state acts as the “concentrated and organised force of society” by implementing the separation of the worker from the means of production and modifying the length of the working day – thus aligning political rationality with the social logic of capital in order to assure valorization and reproduction.20 While the incomplete status of Capital means that Marx never aligned the state with the world market, these comments imply that Marx’s critique of political economy conceives of the state as an entity which is separate yet integral to the capitalist social form; a form-determined instrument for the purpose of perpetuating and extending capitalist social production.21 Yet it is also the case that fragments such as these are few and far between in the extant manuscripts that make up the unfinished project of the critique of political economy.
Classical Marxism
Engels’s transformation of these manuscripts into volumes 2 (1885) and 3 (1894) of Capital provided an invaluable service under impossible conditions. However, the hegemonic logico-historical interpretation he played an essential part in formulating, in conjunction with the reception of the pre-critical Marx and Engel’s own remarks on the state, formed the basis for the most prominent theories of the state in classical Marxism and Western Marxism.22
This is particularly the case for the Classical Marxist theories of the state, which would continue to be of influence in the evolution of “Classical Marxism” in the 20th century: the Social-Democratic and Imperialist theories of the state.23 As Ingo Elbe notes, Engels’s “content-based” conception of the state as “the mere instrument” of the ruling class “paved the way” for these theories.24 The Classical Marxist theory of the state followed a logico-historical reading of Capital and Engels’s notion that the state acted as “real total social capitalist”25 to argue that that the state had been used as an instrument by the ruling class to take “on many of the functions of capital, in the attempt to avert an economic crisis and to stabilise the class struggle,” thus ushering in the new historical stage of monopoly capitalism.26 Although this theory, which is echoed in Harman’s work, can be said to offer an account of the state’s role in accumulation, it lacks a form-analytic dimension. Instead of explaining how the state comes to exist as a separate entity serving the ends of the particular social dynamic of capitalist valorization, a dynamic that compels the actions of the rulers and the ruled, this formless theory conceived of the state as a neutral instrument which was used by the capitalist class to direct the capitalist economy – and which could also be used by proletarians to direct the communist economy.
The Frankfurt School
Despite their mutual animosity, the Althusserian and Hegelian-Marxist strands of Western Marxism both embedded this classical account in more complex social theories. This was notably the case with the theories of the state promulgated by those associated with the Institute for Social Research, which, in spite of their variation, can be seen to have married such an instrumentalist account of the state to an analysis of social institutions, drawing on the Weberian elements of Lukács’s theory of reification.
Friedrich Pollock and Max Horkheimer’s theory of the state-capitalist “Authoritarian State” proposed a particular logico-historical social theory, with a formless conception of the state as a rationalizing instrument. In their analysis of state capitalism, which they posited as the latest stage of capitalism’s historical development, the authoritarian state was said to have taken on the role of total social capital, with the “new ruling class” using the state to “totally administer” society. In Pollock’s succinct summarization, this “new state openly appears as an institution in which all earthly power is embodied and which serves the new ruling class as a tool for its power politics.”27 The new ruling class uses the state to “control everything it wants to” including “the general economic plan” of production and circulation, “foreign policy, rights and duties,” and the “life and death of the individual.”28
While Postone rightly criticizes the “Traditional Marxist” conception of the capitalist economy upon which Pollock and Horkheimer rely, for conceiving of value as a trans-historical mode of market allocation that has been superseded by the state’s management of distribution, his paradigmatic treatment of these figures discounts the more complex theories of the state and the capitalist economy that were formulated by associates of the Frankfurt School.29 Franz Neumann’s account of the Nazism argued, contra Pollock and his analysis of a state-controlled economy, that an ensemble of monopolies had aligned to use the German state as “the power instrument of a new ruling group” in order to institute a “totalitarian form of state capitalism.”30 Marcuse’s notion that the “National Socialist state” was “the government of hypostatized economic, social, and political forces” lies somewhere in between Pollock and Neumann.31 Finally, Adorno’s “Reflections on Class Theory” posits that as a result of the outcome of the dynamism of reified social relations, the state could be used as a rationalizing instrument under the monopoly rule of the capitalist class.32
Aspects of Neumann’s and Adorno’s analysis are brought together in Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s The Economy and Class Structure of German Fascism. In many ways this often neglected work offers the most complex theoretical and historically-embedded account of the state in this generation of Frankfurt School critical theory.33 Echoing Adorno, Sohn-Rethel conceives of the state on a theoretical level as a rationalizing instrument that enforces capitalist valorization. This is reflected in a historical analysis that supplements Neumann’s account of the German fascism by arguing that a constellation of monopoly forces aligned with the Nazi Party in order to institute a new accumulation regime. In such an accumulation regime, the German fascist state acted as the managerial apparatus of monopoly capital by implementing coercive labour policies that rationalized the valorization of absolute surplus value.34
By providing an account of how a sector of German capital was compelled to enter into an agreement with the Nazi Party in order to utilize the institution of German state to implement and enforce policies that spurred valorization, Sohn-Rethel provides a sophisticated theoretical account of the state as an instrument of rationalization that is utilized in class struggle for the purpose of valorization. He also argues that the class fraction that wields this instrument is compelled by the overarching imperatives of valorization. Yet, despite a deeper socio-theoretical account of the state, Sohn-Rethel’s and other Frankfurtian theories of the state lacked the explanatory dimensions of a form-analytic account. Indeed, this is perhaps why its most influential proponents relied on Weberian notions of rationalized administration to explain the anonymous and impersonal instrumental function of the state, rather than aligning these properties with an account of the capitalist social form of production.
Althusser
Louis Althusser, like the theorists of the Frankfurt School, also added a sophisticated socio-theoretical dimension to the formless instrumentalist conception of the state. Yet in pointed contrast to the Frankfurt School, the Althusserian theory of the state developed out of Althusser’s reinterpretation of the topology of base and superstructure, which in its classical version held that Marx’s social theory asserted the primacy of economic base, and the subordination of the political-legal and ideological superstructure. Althusser’s notion of the state as an instrument emerged from a multi-level reframing of the relation between base and superstructure, characterized by complex relations of overdetermination, rather than form-analytic social theory.
This was notably the case in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” which sought to make the Classical Marxist theory of the state less descriptive and “more precise” by elaborating on the complementary relation of the repressive and ideological functions of state apparatuses in the reproduction of the relations of production.35 Although the majority of this essay focused on how ideological apparatuses contributed to reproduction, Althusser would later fill out and amend his theory of the state in the remarkable “Marx in His Limits.” Like Sohn-Rethel’s contribution, this work offers a sophisticated theoretical formulation of the repressive function of the instrument of the state. It also offers a formulation of the peculiar structure of the state that revises the earlier theoretical architecture of the levels of the base and superstructure, for the more reciprocal notions of separation and interrelation. Finally, it even revises Althusser’s earlier criticisms of fetishism.
These points are brought together in a conception of the state as a repressive instrument by virtue of its structural separation from class struggle:
what makes the state the state… is the fact that the state is made in order to be, as far as possible, separate from class struggle… in order to serve as an instrument in the hands of those who hold power. The fact that the state “is made for this purpose” is inscribed in its structure, in the state hierarchy, and in the obedience (as well as the mandatory reserve) required of all civil servants, whatever their post.36
Consequently, the state is “separate” and “above classes” only in order to ensure that the dominant class can ensure the reproduction of the conditions of domination, with the “ensemble of elements” that make up the state working “together to the same end.” For Althusser, the goal of reproduction “does not consist solely in the reproduction of the conditions of ‘social relations’ and, ultimately, the ‘productive relations’; it also includes the reproduction of the material conditions of the relations of production and exploitation.”37 The emphasis, for Althusser, lay in the way that the state obscured the reality of the class antagonism by virtue of its structural separation from the economy: “the circle of the reproduction of the state in its functions as an instrument for the reproduction of the conditions of production, hence of exploitation, hence of the conditions of existence of the domination of the exploiting class’, constitutes ‘in and of itself’, the supreme objective mystification.”38
Such a theory of the state clearly draws on the late Marx, to conceive of the state as a specific entity that is structurally separate from but still connected to the dynamic of class struggle qua social reproduction. Yet for all of its advances on his earlier account, as with Sohn-Rethel, the structural-instrumental role the state plays in this process of reproduction is not linked to an account of the specific economic form that Marx discloses in his critique of political economy. This diminishes Althusser’s account of how this process of social reproduction comes about through the specific dynamic of the valorization process, thus preventing him from explaining the form-determination of the state’s structural-instrumentality. It is the state theories that came in wake of the “New Reading of Marx” that would emphasize these form-determined elements.
New Readings
What is known as the “New German Reading of Marx” emerged in the 1960s in West Germany. As pioneered by Hans-Georg Backhaus and Helmut Reichelt, this new reading consisted in a reinterpretation of Marx’s theory of value which brought the form-analytic element of Marx’s critique of political economy to the forefront. Backhaus and Reichelt’s interpretation of this dimension rested on “reconstructing” what they termed the “esoteric” theory of value, which they argued had been obscured in the published volumes of Capital. In contrast to traditional interpretations of Marx’s theory of value, Backhaus and Reichelt argued that this esoteric theory, which centered on their understanding of the dialectic of the value-form, consisted in a supraindividual type of social rationality that compelled individuals on both sides of the class relation.
This conceptual and methodological focus was an influence on the West German “State Derivation Debate,” which took place over the course of the 1970s. The approach that characterizes this debate also echoed, and at a certain point explicitly drew on, the state theory of Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis. As early as 1923, Pashukanis had criticized Marxist theories that simply focused on the content of the state. In contrast, Pashukanis’s theory focused on why the dominance of the capitalist class takes “on the form of official state domination,” by deriving the form of capitalist law and the capitalist state from commodity production.39 Drawing on a form-analytic interpretation of Marx’s theory of value, he argued that the social relations of capitalist society constitute capitalist laws and a capitalist state which codify and enforce the social form of capitalist social relations as relations between things. For Pashukanis, capitalist law and the capitalist state were thus “forms” logically derived from the commodity-form.
As John Holloway and Sol Picciotto point out, the Derivation Debate emerged in the context of the first significant recession in postwar West Germany; the election of a social-liberal coalition, which posed the issue of reformism; and the eclipse of the student movement.40 These developments called into question Classical Marxist state theories, which held that the state management of the economy would prevent economic crises, and also raised questions about the structure and limits of the capitalist state.
Many aspects of this political context had already been addressed by Johannes Agnoli. Although Agnoli was adamant that the state could not be “derived,” since it was already there, his influential essay in Die Transformation der Demokratie (1967) held that the state’s role in maintaining freedom and equality through law contributed to the reproduction of capitalist society, not only by enforcing property rights, but also by transforming class relations into social relations between abstract and atomized individuals. His idea of “statification,” moreover, also provided a historical account of how the student movement and attempts at reformism were subsumed by these overriding political structures. Agnoli’s work as a whole thus provided an analysis of the capitalist state that focused on how the political capacities of the state ensure the economic processes of valorization and reproduction, and how the structure of the state compels functionaries, no matter what their ostensible “political” orientation, to instrumentalize these capacities.41
These methodological influences and contextual developments can be seen in the work of Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neüsuss, who launched the debate, and can thus be seen to lay out the contours of its approach to Marxist state theory. In opposition to instrumentalist theories, especially those of the Frankfurt School, they stated that “the definition and criticism of state institutions as the instruments of manipulation of the ruling class, does not enable us to discover the limits of that manipulation.”42 Rather, they held that Marxist state theory should provide “a critique of the development of the various functions of the modern state.”43 As a result, mirroring Pashukanis, Müller and Neüsuss argued that these functions “can only be revealed by an analysis which shows in detail the needs for and the limits to state intervention, arising from the contradictions of the capitalist process of production as a labour-process and a valorization-process.”44 The contributions to this debate which followed thus centered on explaining the necessary function of the capitalist state, and its limits, by deriving the form of the state from the dynamic of valorization.
Following John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, we can identify three main approaches to this problematic. The first took issue with theories such as those of Pollock and Horkheimer and argued that the state’s institutional separation from the capitalist economy was key to understanding its role in the valorization process. This approach held that form of the state was necessary for the continued existence of capitalist society, since it stood above the competition of individual capitals in order to assure the system’s reproduction.”45 The second centered on providing a more sophisticated logical derivation of the state form from the order of presentation in Capital, while also establishing its necessity on this basis. This approach systematically derived the necessity and possibility of the state from the forms of appearance of capitalist social relations, in which all members of society, as owners of various sources of revenue, seem to have common interests, thus rendering an autonomous state necessary in order for these common interests to be realized outside of the sphere of competition. The third moved from these forms of appearance to capitalist social relations themselves. In contrast to the first two approaches, which can be seen to establish the necessity of the state as an ex post facto functional supplement to a fully articulated account of the valorization process, Joachim Hirsch’s contribution argued that a “theory of the bourgeois state” is “a matter of defining the bourgeois state as the expression of a specific historical form of class rule and not simply as the bearer of particular social functions.”46 This led Hirsch to derive the “possibility” and “general necessity” of the state from the capital relation, arguing that the particular form of the state abstracted “relations of force from the immediate process of production, thus constituting discrete ‘political’ and ‘economic’ spheres,” which were integral to reproducing this relation.47 In so doing, Hirsch’s “elements of a theory of the bourgeois state” also addressed the shortcomings of the other types of contributions – namely the separation of the state-form from the capital-relation – while also pointing to the importance of analyzing the state and social reproduction in the context of the world market.48
Despite these different points of emphasis, as a whole, the State Derivation Debate thus put forward a theoretical conception of the state that broke with instrumentalist interpretations. The participants convincingly argued against a conception of the state as a formless instrument that directed the economy, to conceive of the state’s impersonal form and separation from the capitalist economy as necessary for the reproduction of capitalist society. This foregrounding of form-determination in state theory was taken up by a number of the German state theories that followed.
The World Market Debate
Drawing on and advancing elements of Hirsch’s work, the German “World Market Debate” revolved around placing a form-analytic conception of the state in the concrete context of the world market. Christel Neusüss’s, Klaus Busch’s, and Claudia von Braunmühl’s contributions to this debate thus drew on Marx’s comments in the Grundrisse that the “tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself,” and developed accounts of how the law of value operated through the world market. In so doing, they relied on the value-theoretic conception of valorization as a process that “imposes a particular logic upon people,” while also echoing insights from the State Derivation Debate that capitalism’s crisis-prone tendencies can only be regulated if “the capitalist state is able to form and survive as a separate and relatively autonomous” entity.49 Yet in contrast to these approaches, the contributions to the World-Market Debate started from the methodological premises of a plurality of states in “multipolar” world capitalism.
Neusüss’s and Busch’s theories attempted to apply their interpretation of Marx’s theory of value to the world market by conceiving of it as a “combination of different nationally delineated spheres.” In contrast to the Derivation Debate, they held that that “an analysis of the world-market motion of capital could not be derived seamlessly from the inner nature of capital,” but had to occur in “modified forms.” Of the two, Neusüss provided a particular focus on the state, as an entity “that rests on a capitalist base, but is also ‘beside and outside it.’” She argued that the state was responsible for creating the “general material preconditions for production” and an “internal sphere of circulation” for national total social capital by enabling primitive accumulation, capitalist legal relations, thus guaranteeing the movement of capital and labor and facilitating the imposition of the law of value.50
Von Braunmühl attacked Neusüss’s and Busch’s ideas of “modified forms,” contending that value always appears in such a manner. She also held that the state could not be regarded as external to value theory:
The form of the bourgeois nation state, of the world market organized as nation states, acquires, as a bounded, legally sovereign centre of a capitalist complex of exchange and production, the function of securing, both internally and externally, the politico-economic power of the bourgeoisies competing in the “international system.” The form, however great its economic significance… is ultimately not comprehensible without recourse to the political moment of domination which is implicit in the economic relation of force between wage labour and capital, and without reference to the competing claims to rule advanced by rival bearers of authority.51
Von Braunmühl thus argued that the world market was “the appropriate level from which to observe the motion of capital and the effect of the law of value in general,” and that it was not the capitalist state as such that should be conceptualized but “the specific political organisation of the world market in many states.”52 Consequently, in opposition to the Derviation Debate, von Braunmühl made the case that “the form of the state as a political organisation of ‘separate and distinct relations of reproduction’” cannot be “derived from the merely internal dimensions of a commodity-producing class society alone – the role of the state in question in its specific relationship with the world market and with other states must always be included in the analysis from the outset.”53
These premises led von Braunmühl to argue on a theoretical level that the state should be conceived from the perspective of the internal dynamic of national capital and the external one of the world market. The fact of “political and economic rule by internationally competing ruling classes” was achieved through the political functions of a sovereign state, which could secure the necessary conditions within the nation state framework.54
While Nachtway and Brink point to a number of shortcomings in the World-Market Debate, and its premature dissolution, it did point out the importance of conceiving of form-analytic interpretations of the state from the perspective of the world market and a plurality of states, building on dimensions of Marx’s incomplete work and pointing to the shortfalls of deriving the form of capitalist state as such.
Weaving the strands
The Althusserian and critical-Marxian theories that followed took aspects of these German contributions on board, while also trying to integrate them with an account of social struggles. This was particularly the case in the Conference of Socialist Economists (CSE) debate, in which Open Marxists, such as John Holloway and Simon Clarke, stressed the dimensions of class struggle that were articulated in the internal relation between the state and the economy. It was also the case for other participants, such as Bob Jessop, who followed Poulantzas and integrated elements of the form-analysis into a theory of the state’s relative autonomy, within a broader multi-level social theory. The work of Werner Bonefeld and John Milios can be seen to weave these strands, reuniting Frankfurt School critical theory and Althusserian theory respectively with more complex theories of the state that draw on value-form theory, Pashukanis, Agnoli, the State Derivation Debate and the World Market Debate.
However, these contributions bring us back to the question of neoliberalism. As we have seen, Peck and Mirowski show that neoliberalism was inextricably linked with the state, which is an an explanatory dimension that is absent from prevalent Marxist accounts. Yet at the same time, Mirowski and Peck both refrain from considering what explanatory dimensions a more rigorous Marxian theory of the neoliberal state and neoliberalism would offer: linking neoliberal rationality to the social logic of capital by aligning the strong neoliberal state with the process of valorization. As I show in closing, Bonefeld’s and Milios’s recent writings can be brought together to lay the groundwork for such an explanation, providing a basis for an understanding of the strong capitalist state’s role in the development and continued reproduction of neoliberal capitalism, and of the way that neoliberal rationality corresponds to the political rationality of capitalism.
Neoliberalism and the strong state
Werner Bonefeld’s account of the social constitution of the form of the capitalist state holds that the capitalist economy and the capitalist state are a “contradictory unity” that is created by the “substantive abstraction of class antagonism,” with the capitalist state utilizing its form-determined political capacities to reproduce this class antagonism. The specific antagonism of capitalist class struggle is the “historical result” of primitive accumulation. As a result, the world market is derived from “the contradictory existence of abstract labour as the social form of wealth founded on exploitation,” which in turn determines the form of the state: “the development of the state needs to be seen as one in which the contradictory unity of surplus value production is processed in a political form, as a moment of the same process of class struggle: social reproduction as, and in and against, domination.” Bonefeld argues that this antagonism is also at the heart of “the harmonies of formal equality and formal freedom,” which are in fact systematic with political domination. The form of the state “concentrates the social reality of exploitation in and through the guarantee of formal freedom and formal equality of property rights.” Drawing on Agnoli, Bonefeld also focuses on how these legal and political forms are instrumentalized to assure reproduction. As he sees it, “the political guarantee of the right of property determines the state as a strong state” which “imposes the rationality and equality of the right of property over society in the attempt to contain the social antagonism of capital and labour by the force of law.”55 This theory of the state can thus be seen to align a number of insights from the form-analytic conception of the state with an account of class struggle, in order to understand the strong state as a separate yet interrelated entity, by virtue of the form-determined role it plays in reproducing the capitalist class antagonism.
Bonefeld’s recent work, written following the 2008 crisis, can thus be seen to provide a theoretical rebuttal of analyses of neoliberalism that ignored or diminished the role of the state, by theoretically elaborating how the neoliberal state is exemplary of the form-determined instrumental capacities of the capitalist state. This is a theory of political economy as a political practice, which shows how its “cohesion, organization, integration and reproduction are matters of state.”56 Following Agnoli, Bonefeld succinctly formulates the ends of such a political practice: “crudely put, the purpose of capital is to accumulate extracted surplus value, and the state is the political form of that purpose.” He provides an account of how this purpose is achieved by the instrumentalization of the form-determined capacities of the state for purpose of valorization. As he argues, the state “facilitates the order of economic freedom by means of the force of law-making violence”; sustains the capitalist relations of production and exchange by depoliticizing “socio-economic relations”; guarantees “contractual relations of social interaction”; seeks the further progress of the system of free labor by facilitating the “cheapness of provision”; and extends these relations by “securing free and equal market relations.”57 The “strong state” thus utilizes its form-determined capacities in an instrumental manner, to organize, integrate, sustain, and extend the social relation at the heart of the peculiar dynamic of valorization for the purpose of accumulating surplus value.
Bonefeld also enumerates how the “market-facilitating” coercive force of the strong neoliberal state achieves these ends in the three areas of political-legal form-determined instrumentality outlined above. He argues that capitalist relations have been sustained and extended “over the past 30 years” by “the accumulation of potentially fictitious wealth” – through “the coercive control of labour, from debt bondage to new enclosures,” and from “the deregulation of conditions to the privatization of risk.”58 Thus, in contrast to prevalent characterizations of the neoliberal state as a weak state that is separate from the market, unwilling and unable to guard it, Bonefeld argues: “The conventional view that neoliberalism has to do with the weakening of the state has little, if anything, to do with the neoliberal conception of the free economy.”59 Rather, since “the free market requires the strong, market-facilitating state, but it is also dependent on the state as the coercive force of that freedom,” the “neoliberal demand for the strong state is a demand for the limited state, one that limits itself to the task of making the economy of free labour effective.”60 This means that “the capitalist state is fundamentally a liberal state” and that the neoliberal state is typical of these fundamental qualities, because “the neoliberal state functions as a market facilitating state.”61
The social violence of capital
Like Bonfeld, John Milios also provides a theory of the capitalist state that draws important elements from form-analytic state theory.62 He also aligns these insights with the constitutive social dynamic of class struggle, but he does so from an Althusserian perspective. Although Milios rightly notes that Althusser’s “approach to value theory” was, at best, “ambiguous,” he also identifies several points of compatibility between Althusser’s work and form-analysis:
the predicative and categorical manner in which Althusser declares Marx’s rupture with Political Economy, as well as the basic parameters of his analysis, i.e. his approach to materialist dialectics, the epistemological break, the eccentric conception of social totality, the primacy of class struggle, the relative autonomy and interpenetration of the various practices, point to the theoretical potential implicit in the comprehension of Marx’s monetary theory of value, a key-issue of which is the insistence on the significance of the concept of value-form.63
This approach also draws on Milios’s interpretation of Pashukanis, who provided an account of the “process of simultaneous formation of the interacting elements” of the capitalist mode of production, “comprising among other things the formation of the (bourgeois civil) law and the ideology/philosophy which accompanies it.”64 Following the Althusserian conception of the “primacy of class struggle,” Milios contends that the capitalist mode of production (CMP) is constituted by two contradictions. The “principal contradiction” is the “contradiction” of the relations of production, which “divides society into two fundamental (and unequal) classes: the capitalist and working classes.”65 Yet in the CMP, these “agents of production embody other secondary power relations (contradictions)” because “certain relations of production presuppose the existence of specific legal-political and ideological relations: the so-called superstructure.”66 Therefore, while these “secondary contradictions are not the pure expressions of the principal contradiction,” they are “actually constitute its condition of existence, just as the principal contradiction constitutes their condition of existence.”67 Thus, rather than a one-way determinism, for Milios, the relationship between these contradictions is reciprocal; for, while in the “last instance” the relations of production ultimately “determine the general form of the superstructure,” these secondary determinations also possesses “relative autonomy” and act on the base.68 Consequently, “the (capitalist) mode of production is not exclusively an economic relation. It applies at all levels of society (social instances). It also includes the core of (capitalist) political and ideological relations of power, that is the particular structure of the capitalist state.”69
As a consequence, while Milios derives the state from class struggle, he also draws on accounts for the constitution of the form of the state, as a structural entity that is a separate yet interrelated aspect of the CMP. The “particular structure of the capitalist state” thus consists in “economic and political” powers, all of which possess “impersonal structures that function to ensure the overall preservation and reproduction” of the CMP.70 Since this structure corresponds to class domination, Milios argues, like Bonefeld, that these legal and political capacities are also used as instruments to ensure the preservation and reproduction of the class antagonism: “the state, as the centre for the exercise of capitalist class power, is the mechanism for concentrating the generalized social violence of capital.”71
Following the Althusser of “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Milios argues that this form-determined instrumentalization occurs at two levels. The “economic level” is where “the state makes a decisive contribution to creating the overall material conditions for reproduction of capitalist relations.” It formulates politico-legal policies “for managing the workforce, interventions for an increase in the profitability of aggregate social capital, the national currency and state management of money, the institutional and legal framework safeguarding the “freedom” of the market, mechanisms for disciplining labour power and institutions of social pacification.”72 At the “political and ideological-cultural level,” the state has the important function of legitimating “the exercise of bourgeois political power” – it provides a national framework for the ideology of capitalist power, constituting capital as “socio-national capital.” As a whole, “capitalist exploitation is rendered possible, and appears as a ‘natural order,’ by virtue of the functioning of the state.”73
Mirroring Bonefeld, Milios’s account of the state thus aligns important form-analytic concerns with an account of the constitutive properties of class struggle. In this theorization, the state is not merely instrumental, nor is it simply an autonomous form.74 Rather, for Milios, the capitalist state is, “in reality: the political condensation of class relations of domination, the factor that underwrites the cohesion of capitalist society.”75
Milios provides an account of the neoliberalization of capitalist society that also reflects the “market facilitating” properties of the neoliberal state that Bonefeld identifies. He defines neoliberalism as a “historically specific form of organization of capitalist power on a social-wide scale, wherein governmentality through financial markets acquires a crucial role.”76 This leads Milios to argue that this historically specific organization consisted in the “recomposition” of the CMP, a “reforming all components involved, in a way that secures the reproduction of the dominant (neoliberal) capitalist paradigm.”77 As the mechanism for concentrating the generalized social violence of capital, the capitalist state facilitated this process of neoliberalization.
This is relayed in Milios’s account of the four basic elements of recomposition that constituted the neoliberal model, which the state was instrumental in instituting. The first consisted in repressive methods and monetarist policies that deregulated the job market, boosting unemployment, squeezing wages, and lessening the power of wage-earners. The second, which is linked to the first, entailed outsourcing in order to devalue “non-competitive” capital and further discipline labor. These were complemented by the third, the privatization and recomposition of state activities, which created a “basis for an increase in the debt of households,” generating the potential for debt in other privatized areas. Finally, consent to this model was secured by the possibility of “access to cheap loans” and a variety other financialized entities.78
Consequently, contra Harman and Postone, for Milios, neoliberalization did not erode the state, because it did not diminish its form-determined purpose. Rather, he holds that the capitalist state’s neoliberal recomposition strengthened the state’s ability to facilitate these ends. In neoliberalism, the capitalist state’s organization and reproduction of “the economic and political dominance of capital” is recomposed and extended to the historically specific governmentality of financialization, which has engendered “new kinds of rationality for the promotion of exploitation strategies based on the circuit of capital that presume compliance with the laws of the capitalist system.”79 Neoliberalization has thus led to “embedding” a “particular form of capitalist state power, of class governance, undoubtedly more authoritarian, crude, and violent” in neoliberal valorization and social reproduction.80 We are not far from Bonefeld’s theory of the market-facilitating purpose of the strong neoliberal state.
Vital politics as capitalist rationality
This brings us to the second productive affinity of Bonefeld’s and Milios’s recent work: both align phenomena that Foucauldian analyses of neoliberalism separate from capitalism with their form-analytic interpretations of the strong neoliberal state. They are thus able to conceive of neoliberal rationality as a political rationality of capital. Bonefeld’s work on ordoliberalism81 holds that ordoliberal theory not only exemplifies policies such as the Cameron government’s handling of the 2008 crisis, but that it also captures the “economic rationality of capitalist social relations” manifesting the “theology of capitalism.”82
The key is the emphasis on extending political rule into purportedly private arenas, in order to perpetuate the reproduction of the capital relation. For Bonefeld, “ordoliberal social policy is thus not only a policy towards and of society. It is fundamentally a policy in and through society, governing its mentality from within.”83 Consequently, the strong ordoliberal state “restrains competition and secures the social and ideological preconditions of economic liberty” by developing “the technique of liberal governance as a means of ‘market police.’”84
In Bonefeld’s view, such a technique consists in the moralizing social policy of “vital politics” (Vitalpolitik), which acts a “market-facilitating and -embedding policy, which has to be pursued relentlessly to sustain and maintain the moral sentiments of economic liberty in the face of the destructive sociological and moral effects of free economy.”85 Vital politics thus acts as a “market police” by instrumentalizing social policy in order to “eliminate the proletariat by means of a ‘market-conforming’ social policy,” which facilitates “freedom and responsibility” in a way that transforms “recalcitrant workers into willing entrepreneurs of their own labour power.”86 Ultimately, this “social element of the market economy… connects market freedom with individual responsibility, sets out to reconcile workers with the law of private property, promotes enterprise, and delivers society from proletarianised social structures.”87 In this way, the social policy of vital politics exemplifies the extended political practice of the strong neoliberal state, complementing its coercive use of legal and political policy. Neoliberal rationality is thus the political rationality of capital.
Milios’s account of financialization aims at a parallel explanation. For Milios, financialization does not represent privatization or the rolling back of the state, but an incorporation of “a range of institutions, procedures, reflections, and strategies that make possible the accomplishment (not without contradictions) of fundamental targets in the context of existing social relations.”88 Moreover, in contrast to narratives that interpret financialization as a desperate attempt to forestall the erosion of capital in response to the falling rate of profit, Milios argues that it represents a “strong and deeply established capitalism.”89 This is because Milios controversially contends that financialization is a sui generis form of fictitious capital which produces value, on the basis of his monetary interpretation of Marx’s theory of value.90 He also argues that financialization represents the main instance of the recomposition of the state’s form-determined role. The state embeds itself in this technology of power, which facilitates the market by reproducing the power relations of capitalist society.
For Milios, financial markets thus “have the dual function of assessing and effectively organizing individual economic actors and at the same time promoting a particular form of financing.”91 In so doing, they “monitor and control the terms and reproduction trajectories of the contemporary capitalist relation.”92 His analysis of financialization thus repurposes Foucault’s notions of neoliberal governmentality and biopolitics, in a way that mirrors Bonefeld’s analysis of vital politics – providing an explanation of how financialization serves political ends by consisting in a type of rationality that governs individual behaviour, compelling individuals to act in an entrepreneurial manner that assures the reproduction of the capital relation.93
Milios links these Foucauldian concepts to financialization primarily through an account of the normalization of risk. In his view, not only has risk become a commodified component of neoliberal valorization, as a result of the composition of neoliberal capitalism, but by virtue of these very same factors, it is utilized as a governmental technology of power to assure the reproduction of capital on the world market:
Attaching a risk profile to an agent (a capitalist firm, a state, or a wage earner etc.) means accessing and measuring their ability to conform in a docile manner to roles within a complex world that is underwritten by power relations. Risk calculation involves systemic evaluation on the part of every market participant of the efficiency with which particular targets (norms), as defined by social power relations, have been achieved. Every market participant lives risk as their reality and becomes caught up in a perpetual effort to improve their profile as a competent risk-taker, in this sense conforming to what is required by the “laws” of capitalism.94
This is particularly the case for workers who have been left most vulnerable by the composition of neoliberalism, with their “households… more reliant on risk management for their social reproduction.” Here, in what Milios describes as the “most important moment of financial innovation as a social process,” risk management “shapes and disciplines social behavior under the norms of capital,” making labor “hostage to its own fortune, that is to say, hostage to the demands of capital.”95 Financialization is thus representative of the recomposition of the state, rather than its retreat. As an instance of neoliberal rationality it serves the political purpose of reproducing neoliberal capitalism.
Conclusion
Since the capitalist state is a strong state, and the neoliberal state is a capitalist state, the neoliberal state is a strong state that has used its form-determined political capacities in an instrumental manner for the purpose of instituting the neoliberal regime of surplus value extraction, in order to guarantee the perpetuation of the capital relation. Rather than the erosion of the state, it is these state capacities that drove the neoliberalization of society, and have perpetuated it in its strengthened and recomposed form – in which even financialization is a form of governmentality. The neoliberal state exemplifies Marx’s account of the political purpose of the capitalist state, and the ordoliberal social policy of vital politics is paradigmatic of capitalist political rationality.
Taken together, these accounts align neoliberal rationality with the social rationality of capital. By conceiving of the neoliberal state as a strong capitalist state, they provide a basis for understanding how such a strong state, and its “biopolitical” social policies, serve the political purpose of assuring capitalist reproduction. These perspectives could be further strengthened by drawing on theoretical insights discussed above. For instance, the World Market Debate could prove helpful in understanding how the development of neoliberalism was driven by a plurality of states in the context of deindustrialization and restructuring on the world market.96 The empirical accounts of reactions to previous crises in neoliberalism, by Clarke and other members of the CSE, could also contribute to understanding how the strong neoliberal state responds to crises.97 Finally, Agnoli’s theory of statification, in tandem with Bonefeld’s theory of vital-political social management, could illuminate the steps taken by states that contained the counter-hegemonic movements that emerged after 2008. Further developing this account of the form-determined instrument of the capitalist state will be essential in generating theories that can grasp its overcoming.
Comments
The Biology of Citizenship: Immigration, DNA Testing, and the State
The past twenty years have witnessed a “return of the citizen,”1 resulting in manifold proposals to redefine and expand the notion of citizenship and its links to the nation-states, giving rise to terms like post-national, denationalized, and transnational citizenship.2 In the last decade, a new concept has emerged that has received particular attention in the citizenship discourse: “biological”3 or “genetic citizenship.”4 This “keyword in the making”5 was first introduced by the anthropologist Adriana Petryna, in her study of Ukrainian citizens affected by the nuclear disaster of 1986.6 The book is based on extensive fieldwork, presenting observations and interviews with government officials, scientists, clinicians, activists from nongovernmental organizations, and people who lived and worked in the contaminated zone around Chernobyl. Petryna shows how, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, people who had worked at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant made demands upon the new Ukrainian state through their biological status as sufferers of radiation sickness. In this context, the author introduces the concept of biological citizenship. She uses the term to describe “a massive demand for, but selective access to, a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific, and legal criteria that both acknowledge biological injury and compensate for it.”7
Until now, the growing literature on this topic has almost exclusively referred to the importance of patients’ associations, disease advocacy organizations, and self-help groups that give rise to new forms of subjectivation and collective action, thus challenging existing borderlines between laypeople and scientific experts, between active researchers and passive beneficiaries of technological progress. Frequently, authors using the notion of biological or genetic citizenship argue that these groups are questioning access to knowledge and claims to expertise, forging new alliances with biomedical researchers, and lobbying to influence political decision-making and to receive funding for medical research. So far, the focus of the debate has been on the extension of rights, the emergence of new possibilities of civic participation and social engagement, and on the choice-enhancing options of biomedical technologies, especially the new genetics.8
While this understanding of biological citizenship certainly highlights important social and political implications of biotechnological innovations in a globalized world, it tends to downplay and ignore practices of surveillance and exclusion, and the refusal of citizenship rights based on biological knowledge.9 An interesting example in this respect is the use of DNA testing for family reunification. By discussing Germany as an exemplary case, we show that the use of parental testing endorses a biological concept of the family and may lead to the exclusion or suspension of citizenship rights.10
Family Reunification and DNA Analysis
In general, family reunification refers to the right of family members living abroad to join relatives who hold long-term residence permits for, or are citizens of, a given country. The right to family reunification has been an integral part of many countries’ immigration policies, and is derived from the protection of the family as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Family-related immigration is currently one of the major drivers of legal immigration to Western countries. However, many countries are enforcing more restrictive family reunification policies, imposing stricter requirements on those applying to enter the country. Even if applicants possess the documents required to prove their identities, the information is often rejected by immigration authorities, as they question their authenticity.
In this context, many countries resort to parental testing. Applicants are required to provide official documentation to prove their identities, such as birth and marriage certificates and passports. Providing such information is often difficult, especially in countries that do not use official documents to establish identity, or where those documents have been lost or destroyed due to politically unstable situations. But even if applicants possess the required documents, immigration authorities sometimes reject the information as they question their authenticity.
In the 1990s, some host countries began to use DNA analysis to resolve cases in which they considered the information presented on family relationships to be incomplete or unsatisfactory. Today, at least 20 countries around the world, including 16 European countries, have incorporated parental testing into decision-making on family reunification in immigration cases: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, and the USA11
In Germany, the most important piece of family reunification legislation is the Residence Act, which came into force in 2005 and incorporates most of the regulations of Council Directive 2003/86/EC. The Residence Act explicitly states that the right to family reunification is meant to protect the family in accordance with the Basic Constitutional Law. Generally speaking, every spouse, either a German or a foreigner who is in possession of a temporary or unrestricted residence permit, can be the sponsor of an application for family reunification. The sponsor and his or her partner need to be married. In principle, same-sex partners may apply for family reunification as well, and they have the same rights as married couples. However, the same-sex partnership or marriage has to be officially recognized as such in the country of origin. For many applicants it is almost impossible to fulfill this prerequisite, as same-sex partnerships are not officially recognized in many home countries. Even worse, the fact that a person is gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender and was persecuted because of their sexual identity may well have been the main reason for leaving the country of origin. It might also be a valid foundation for a successful application for asylum in the EU, only for the person concerned to find out that they cannot be reunited with their partner.
In addition to the prerequisite of an existing marriage or recognized same-sex partnership, the sponsor is also expected to provide evidence of an adequate income and enough living space for the prospective united family. Furthermore, the non-German partner needs to prove basic German language skills. Accepted asylum seekers and refugees are exempted from these requirements. Children holding a temporary or unrestricted residence permit may also serve as sponsors and apply to be reunited with their parents, though the provisions in the Residence Act generally assume that the person serving as a sponsor is an adult.
However, German immigration offices will not necessarily accept these pieces of evidence for an existing family relation, and even in cases where legal documents are provided, it is a common administrative practice to ask the applicants for a DNA kinship report.12 There has been press coverage of a case where more than ten pieces of evidence were provided to the immigration authorities, but not accepted.13 Moreover, the German Federal Foreign Office has published a list of over 40 countries whose documents are not acknowledged by German embassies at all, because they assume that their system of identity registration lacks systematic and sound procedures.14 Applicants from these countries will find it extremely difficult to prove a family relationship by means of official documents or alternative pieces of evidence. To obtain permission to reunite with family members, they generally have to resort to DNA testing. Even German citizens may be asked to provide DNA evidence for their biological relation if they apply for family reunification with a foreign spouse and children from one of these blacklisted countries.
The use of DNA testing is considered to be an appropriate measure to prevent fraudulent uses of family reunification.15 The Federal Foreign Office states on its website that the decision on blacklisted countries is made on the basis of an individual evaluation of the likelihood of falsified documents in the country involved. However, it is quite striking that this list almost exclusively consists of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Southeast Asia. Documents from countries in these regions encounter systematic mistrust, and as a consequence it is especially applicants with black skin or families from Central and Southeast Asia that are requested to undergo parental testing. At the same time, citizens from Western countries (e.g. the USA) or nationals from other developing countries (e.g. in Latin America) are not usually required to provide DNA evidence. On a related note, they are also exempted from the requirement of basic German language skills.
Given these conditions, one might ask if the formal and procedural argument put forward by the immigration authorities serves to target and discriminate against selective groups of applicants who will generally – regardless of their particular case – encounter more problems than other applicants in proving their identity and family relatedness. Refugee advisors and representatives of NGOs we interviewed report that applicants from some countries such as Somalia, Eritrea, or Burma are almost always asked to provide DNA evidence for their family relations.16
The possibility of DNA kinship testing is explicitly provided for in the general administrative regulations for the Residence Act (no. 27.0.5 AVwV AufenthG). The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees and the Federal Ministry of the Interior present DNA testing as an entirely appropriate measure to verify family relatedness. They stress that DNA tests are not a constraint but an opportunity for the sponsors and applicants to prove the validity of their application17. Furthermore, they emphasize the voluntary character of the DNA tests and argue that it is up to the applicants whether they choose this option. Finally, the authorities point out that DNA evidence is only used as a last resort to establish family links, if all other possible options to verify family relatedness have been exhausted. For example, the Federal Foreign Office, which is responsible for issuing the visas for family reunification, stated in response to our inquiry that the “DNA test for family reunification is not a standard but only an exceptional case and … is only offered to the applicants if evidence relevant to the issue cannot otherwise be provided.”18
However, the results of our research indicate that DNA testing for family reunification is not an ultima ratio but a standard tool for the verification of a family relationship in immigration cases.19 The immigration authority of a major city in Germany declared in a written statement sent in response to our inquiry: “While there is no obligation for applicants even from countries with an insufficient official documentation system to prove family relation by DNA evidence, parental testing is an appropriate and frequently used tool of verification.” A senior UNHCR officer mentioned in an interview that “we observe an inflationary use of DNA analyses for family reunification for refugees from Africa and Southeast Asia.”20 Furthermore, a refugee advisor from a church information centre in a town in Germany stated that she alone had supervised more than 20 cases of Somali refugees who were asked to prove their family relations by a DNA test in the course of the family reunification procedure in 2010.
This apparent contradiction between the official statements and the findings of our research can be explained by the German legal framework for immigration. Decisions on immigration and visas have to be based on a case-by-case assessment. Therefore, authorities have no legal grounds for a comprehensive and systematic use of parental tests in family reunification cases, and even if it is a common administrative practice, they cannot officially confirm it.
If the immigration authorities do not recognize the applicant’s documents, they may “offer” him or her the option of taking a DNA test to prove a biological link to family members. As the burden of proof is always on the applicant and the test is a voluntary option, it is up to the applicants to find a suitable laboratory and organize the entire testing procedure. Once all relevant samples are in the lab it will take two to three weeks for the results to be provided to the applicant21, and this is also one of the biggest advantages of DNA testing for family reunification. Applicants often have to wait for as long as a year before their documents are checked and verified by the authorities, and it takes a very long time before they are reunited with their family members. With a DNA test, the decision is sometimes made within less than four months from the application to the final decision. This is also why immigration lawyers often advise their clients to take the test. “We, the lawyers, are quite pragmatic in this respect. It has to go fast, [and] the DNA test is helpful in this respect.”22
While the use of DNA evidence for family reunification might offer some advantages in claiming citizenship rights, it often leads to a restriction of legal claims and citizenship rights by endorsing a biological concept of the family and by refusing the right to informational self-determination to applicants for family reunification.
Biologizing the Family
The establishment of DNA testing in administrative decision-making on family reunification reduces the already narrow definition of the family in German immigration law to biological ancestry. This tendency contrasts with the social understanding and the legal framing of the family for German citizens. The routinization of divorce and remarriage and the growing legal recognition of same-sex unions have generated heterogeneous patterns of family structure and a diversity of new kin connections that are not necessarily based on biological ties. In recent years, several laws have come into force or been amended with the aim of emphasizing the social aspects of parenthood and paternity. In this perspective, parenthood is not defined in terms of biological relatedness but rather as a social relation. The Federal Court of Justice argued in a 2008 judgment that this kind of socio-familial relation exists if the legal father has been shown to be responsible for looking after the child. If this is the case, the biological father cannot question the already existing social fatherhood. This line of argumentation as used by the Federal Court of Justice has been upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in 2013.
Furthermore, married and unmarried couples have increasingly been treated equally in legal practice in the last 10 to 15 years, and with the introduction of the Life Partnership Act in 2001 same-sex unions are now legally recognized in Germany as well. In this context it has also been made easier for unmarried couples and same-sex partners to adopt stepchildren. These legislative steps also stress the family as a social relation. In a press release in 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court pointed out that “biological parenthood is not prioritized over legal and social notions of the family in the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court”23
A completely different trend can be observed in German immigration law. With the use of parental testing in decision-making on family reunification, the family is increasingly conceived of as a biological entity. Consequently, migrants will find it difficult to enter Germany if they do not adhere to the nuclear family model. For example, foster children and adopted children have serious problems reuniting with their families. According to German immigration law, no distinction shall be made between biological children and adopted children if the applicants can prove the adoption by official documentation. As German authorities consider official registration systems in the blacklisted countries to be insufficient, this claim is difficult to sustain in administrative practice.
The practice of family unification in Germany exhibits a differential treatment of native citizens and immigrants. The latter have to comply with a traditional heterosexual and biological family model in order to be officially recognized as a family in immigration cases. The problems that arise from these conflicting definitions of the family for native citizens and immigrants can be illustrated by a parental test that was carried out in a German laboratory in 2010. The application for family reunification by a man, a woman, and a girl from Somalia was turned down by the German authorities earlier that year because they questioned the authenticity of the documents provided. Thus, the applicants had to resort to a DNA test to prove their family relatedness. The test result showed that neither the putative father nor the putative mother was biologically linked to the child. In other words, the test result demonstrated that these three persons were not a family in terms of biological relatedness. However, the staff of the DNA lab were so convinced that the applicants were indeed a family, even though the result was negative, that they wrote letters to the immigration authorities arguing that the result could only be explained by an exchange of children after their birth in the hospital and that they would nevertheless advocate family reunification. It is quite remarkable that the institution that produced a test result that eliminated the possibility of a family relation, according to their own definition, still felt obliged to argue that the three persons were a “true” family. The case was reported to us by the geneticists involved in the procedure24, and their argument was clearly based on a social definition of the family.25
These different standards for family recognition exist not only in Germany but in many host countries26 As family policies in these countries generally tend to favor social notions of the family, the legal gap between native citizens and immigrants may grow wider, since for the latter group the focus is on biological relatedness, while same-sex partnerships and patchwork families are not equally recognized – a trend that is further strengthened and reinforced by the use of parental testing for family reunification.
Genetic Surveillance
The first DNA tests for family reunification in Germany were carried out in 199227. Until 2010, however, they were conducted in a legal grey area. While proofs of kinship by DNA analysis were a more or less common institutional practice in this period, they were conducted without any legal regulation. DNA testing for immigration purposes was first mentioned in the Genetic Diagnostics Law (Gendiagnostikgesetz), which came into force on February 1, 2010 and contains a section dealing solely with kinship DNA testing (Sec. 3, Paragraph 17, GenDG). The general focus of this law is on the right to informational self-determination, with the aim of protecting individuals from the abuse of their genetic information.28
However, for the use of genetic data in the context of family reunification, important legal guarantees are inoperative. First, and it almost goes without saying, the right to informational self-determination in the context of family reunification is just a formal or theoretical right. In practice, it may well be the only chance for a person actually to reunite with his/her family if the documents s/he has provided are not deemed appropriate to prove family relations. The burden of proof is on the applicant, which may force him or her to resort to a DNA test. Therefore, it might be doubted how voluntary the use of DNA analysis in this context can be if the application for family reunification will be rejected otherwise. Here, we note a remarkable parallel to forensic DNA profiling. “Persons who refuse to give a ‘voluntary’ sample (which is their legal right) attract police attention and become more suspicious as a result”29 as it is assumed that someone who rejects the “voluntary” DNA test has something to hide30
Secondly, immigrants have no right to decide what happens to the DNA profiles once the test has been carried out. They cannot demand that their genetic information be destroyed, and their data might be used for criminal prosecution purposes if there is reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed by the immigrant in question31. Their profile may be stored in a DNA database in accordance with the Prüm Convention, and this information may be exchanged among European member states for crime prevention purposes. In other words, applicants for family reunification are more likely to come under suspicion of criminal activity. While the Genetic Diagnostics Law in its entirety strengthens the right to informational self-determination for German citizens, it denies immigrants this right. In general, the legal framework for DNA testing in family reunification cases establishes an environment of mistrust towards immigrants and provides new means for surveilling them32
Conclusion
The use of DNA testing for family reunification creates a general “double standard” for native citizens and immigrants. It imposes a very restricted, biological definition of the family onto immigrants, undermining the varying social definitions of family forms; and immigrants are not given the same rights to the access, handling, and protection of genetic information.
On the basis of this empirical research, the very concept of biological citizenship has to be rendered more complex, in two respects. First, the existing literature too often stresses the transnational dynamics of patient organizations and support groups. We do not deny the medical significance and the societal impact of support group and patient associations for (genetic) diseases that are characterized by forms of organization and modes of communication often transgressing national borders33 However, the use of DNA tests in immigration displays the enduring relevance of biological criteria to determine who should be granted citizenship rights in a particular nation-state. It follows that there is not only a transnational dynamic to be observed, but also a continuation and re-articulation of the relation between biology and citizenship.
Secondly, the literature on biological citizenship sometimes insists that there is a decisive rupture between the eugenic projects and racialized politics of the past and the new genetics. Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas argue that biological citizenship stands for a new governmental regime which radically breaks with the eugenic and racialized past, and that there has been a shift from political rationalities directed toward the management of risk at the level of populations to the individual management of genetic risks34. In the light of our empirical study this claim has to be reconsidered. The use of DNA analysis in the context of family reunification represents a form of migration control targeted at particular populations – in Germany especially those who derive from “blacklisted countries,” mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Southeast Asia. In this respect, the thesis that the use of genetic information for population control belongs to the biopolitics of the past has to be complemented or even corrected. Immigration management and border control are central domains where the “eclipsed” side of current biological citizenship materializes.35
The use of DNA tests for decision-making in the context of immigration reveals the selective format of the debate on biological citizenship. So far, this discussion has often stressed the biological body as the basis of claims about social inclusion, recognition and democratic deliberation. However, as our study demonstrates, this view of biological citizenship itself excludes important dimensions of contemporary migration regimes. The use of DNA testing in immigration policies does not signify the advent of a “molecular biopolitics”36 that finally displaces the concern with bodily features such as skin color, hair texture or eye shape. Rather, it serves to reaffirm and re-articulate “traditional” forms of classification and exclusion.37
Comments
The Committee Room and the Streets
We asked several contributors to write on the theme of the state and revolutionary strategy, for a roundtable discussion revolving around the following prompt:
“In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the socialist movement spilled a great deal of ink debating the question of state power. Lenin’s work was perhaps the most influential, but it also provoked a wide range of critical responses, which were arguably equally significant. But whether or not Lenin’s conception of the correct revolutionary stance towards the state was adequate to his own particular historical conjuncture, it is clear that today the reality of state power itself has changed. What is living and what is dead in this theoretical and political legacy? What would a properly revolutionary stance towards state power look like today, and what would be the concrete consequences of this stance for a political strategy? Does the ‘seizure of state power’ still have any meaning? Does the party still have a place in these broader questions?”
Although this interview was conducted independently of the roundtable, its themes correspond so closely that we have decided to include it here. Please be sure to read all the other contributions: Panagiotis Sotiris, Joshua Clover and Jasper Bernes, Jodi Dean, Nina Power, Immanuel Ness.
Salar Mohandesi: The Left is slowly beginning to reassess its relationship to the State. One of the forms this has taken is a renewed interest in electoral politics – in the US, for example, with the election of Kshama Sawant, and in Europe, to take another example, with Syriza. But the return of such “pragmatic socialists” to this older tradition of Leftist electoral political strategy, it seems to me, is either implicitly or explicitly tied to a certain model of postwar social democracy. Is such a model, given how determined it was by a very specific historical conjuncture, workable today, or do you think that the moment which made such a social democratic electoralist politics possible is simply non-repeatable?
Geoff Eley: Well, it probably is non-repeatable. Because it consisted of so many contingencies of that particular period, the 1950s and 1960s – whether in terms of the Cold War alignments, whether in terms of the consequences of Marshall Aid, in terms of the international monetary system that’s created after the War, whether it’s in terms of those longer run processes of working class formation that I talk about in Forging Democracy, or in terms of Europe’s and North America’s position in the world – it is certainly non-repeatable in each of those aspects. So the idea that one could reconstitute a viable left politics by straightforwardly reappropriating the elements that were so effective in this earlier period is a non-starter. At the same time it does not mean that you cannot take some or even all of those elements – suitably rethought – and combine them in new and creative ways that can have real efficacy for the purposes of the present. You have to begin the argument now rather than in relation to then. You can’t recuperate “then” as a way of restarting “now.”
Nor does an electoralist strategy – or a politics that focuses on elections – have to translate necessarily to some close or exact equivalent of the old social democratic or communist model of public mobilization. There are all sorts of ways of using the electoral process as a vehicle, as an instrument, as a platform, as an arena in which you argue the importance of your particular kind of politics – as opposed to the electoral machinery that the Social Democratic and Communist Parties simply became. During the course of the later 20th century, the whole raison d’être of the party became reduced downwards into fighting an election, winning an election, keeping itself in office, or getting back there. But the classic slogan of the SPD left before the First World War had been Durch das Fenster reden (“Speak through the Window!”), i.e. use the parliamentary chamber as an opportunity to challenge the given rules and boundaries of the politically possible by addressing the people outside, and thereby overcome the gap between the committee room and the street. So the problem isn’t so much the bankruptcy of an electoralist politics as such, but rather the degree to which fighting elections can turn into the sole focus.
The challenge now is to think of viable political purposes and objectives in other ways. So how can you acquire a voice of significance, so that you are actually inside the conversations that determine how policy gets made, or how can you use local concentrations of strength in order to ensure the delivery of services and public goods in effective and just ways. Which then become, actually, the bases for political argument themselves. When people can see that something is actually doable, and may even work, then that’s how movements actually acquire momentum.
Historically speaking, there are lots of examples of a movement or a party, oftentimes on a very local basis, using the opportunities for political voice in order to build solidarities, create continuities over time, that were not simply subsumed under the electoral strategy of a labor party or an SPD at a deradicalized, national level.
So you are saying that elections can still be used as an instrument in struggle.
Yes. It seems to me to be self-defeatingly ultra-left to ignore elections completely. Politics has to begin from the already existing points of access – not least because that’s where the majority of people understand politics to be located. So, democratically speaking, it seems self-defeating just to ignore elections or relegate them to purely instrumental or tactical importance. I mean, obviously there will be occasions, and situations, where you may not want to prioritize your politics around an electoral campaign, but, in principle, it seems to be foolish not to acknowledge that this is where political practice has to occur.
It seems, though, that the example you are drawing on is really of a parliamentary system where it is possible to make coalitions. What about the United States, where the strategic options are rather limited in that you may win at the municipal level, but when you move higher up, it becomes less feasible. So what do you think about the American electoral system?
Well, that does feel like an intractable problem at the moment. I mean, the whole polity is broken, in my view. And not least in how its national instances really don’t work. Nothing seems to work anymore. Nor is there any sign of real possibility of significant electoral reform, it seems to me. This is a state that is completely mired in its own inefficiencies, incompetencies, dysfunctionalities. Now that does not mean you have to abandon congressional elections. But how else do you imagine an effective left politics with some popular, democratic appeal and traction?
I think it has to be city by city and state by state. It has to be built from the ground. There are currently some interesting instances of this, like the minimum wage campaign, which is both a real issue with enormous potential and appeal, and, just in terms of building popular openness and sympathy for a different set of policies, it seems to be doable on a city-by-city basis. And there is a sort of rolling effect to that kind of politics. Something that can accumulate and aggregate. So long as you keep realistic expectations, and an understanding that it has to be a politics of the long haul.
This actually leads into another question. Beyond elections, and you’ve written about this extensively, these parties were really rooted in the everyday lives of masses of people. So there was a kind of reciprocal relationship between the electoral struggle and politicizing everyday life, in the sense that the Italian Communist Party, for example, could at one point have been described as a kind of society within society. Today, for a number of reasons, it seems that way of doing politics is gone. So why do you think that has vanished? Can that happen again?
My way of answering that question is to build up an argument about its conditions of viability in the past. And there is this old article from the 1980s, which I think was by Peter Stearns, called “The Effort at Continuity in Working-Class Culture,” something like that. The idea is crucial. So in order to ensure that fragmentary, decentralized, and quite explosive instances of popular political mobilization are not just that, but create efficacies over time, you need to have answers to that very question: how do you create continuities in working-class culture over time? On the one hand, those Social Democratic and Communist Parties were remarkably successful in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century in accomplishing those important starting conditions for what you describe. How do you build identification with your particular kind of politics that lasts over time?
My way of answering that question has been to look at the process of the emergence of those conditions. It has everything to do with building of communities around those concentration points, growth of the parties around them, and especially including the incremental and steadily accumulating conquest of local government. Because it’s once you start building influence and eventually taking control over local governments that you can gain access to those resources that can begin making a difference in people’s lives, especially in the provision of services and public employment. Jobs. Municipal socialism was created out of an infrastructure of resources and access of that kind in a period when other goods were disbursed from the central state through local government. Now that’s what characterized the political strength of the Socialist and Communist Parties in the early twentieth century, which then carried over into the 1950s, 1960s, and even to some extent the 1970s, and that is what is gone. That’s what has been dismantled at every level. Most importantly via deindustrializtion, reorganization of labor markets, and so on and so forth. And also suburbanization and the dismantlement of local government in the 1970s and 1980s, so that local government does not exist in the old way any more as a source of services, employment, and other resources.
So, backtracking a bit to the point where I mentioned the minimum wage campaign, and city-by-city successes: until the 1980s, cities, especially in Europe, had hugely more resources than they do now in terms of their ability to have a real effect on employment, services, and housing. Well, if I’m not mistaken about the American case, one of the most important and destructive outcomes of the Reagan administration, was essentially to dismantle that system of federal subsidy and funding to cities. There’s been a systematic privatization in relation to federal and state governments as well. This was dramatically the case in Britain under Thatcher in the 1980s. The Thatcher and Major governments basically abolished local government democracy in Britain – at a time when the Left’s principle strength in Britain was in those metropolitan councils, in the Greater London Council (GLC), and other forms of local and regional government. So that in the course of the 1970s there was a steady erosion of the resources local government had available to it. Until Thatcher, whose momentum actually grew from the rightwing grassroots backlash of the 1970s, the principal form of local taxation in Britain was based in the so-called local government rates, the equivalent of property taxes. Building during the 1970s, there was a constant drumbeat of right-wing campaigning against rates as the form of local property tax that essentially funded most sorts of local government services. Systematic efforts on the part of the right to force local governments in the early 1970s to cap the rates was the UK equivalent of the successful campaign for Proposition 13 (1978) in California in the 1970s, which then continued into the Thatcher era in a radicalized form, resulting in the effective dismantlement of funding for local government, the dependence of local government spending on approval from central government, and finally the abolition of any strong basis for local government democracy.
To my mind, that removed one of the essential elements in that historical formation previously enabling the earlier form of left politics to accomplish so much. So it’s easier to answer that question that it is to answer the big one, the one about the present, which is: how do you build something that can acquire and demonstrate that same kind of political efficacy. I think it’s really hard. And you can only imagine doing it from the ground up, but without the kind of resources that this kind of politics was able to take advantage of earlier in the twentieth century. If movements can be built over the longer term, piece by piece and city by city, then maybe that can assemble the foundations for returning to a kind of strong public sector. Who knows? But for a viable Left politics, that’s what you need, it seems to me. You need to be able to reward the political activism based in communities with real gains in terms of resources, services, and some practical and tangible sense that it makes a difference.
You’ve said a lot about local politics, what about politics at the national level? Also, when you had local governments with resources that could be used by socialist movements, you also had a certain configuration of the nation-state, and the state operating within a certain conception of the nation, so that socialist movements could actually put pressure on national governments to win certain things. How has that changed, in the sense that the state configuration that allowed these kinds of socialist and communist movements to function seem to be different?
Circumstances now are profoundly different. Well, that’s partly a result of those processes of privatization that we’ve talked about already. I mean, they have essentially gutted the ability of national government to provide the social services and public goods that characterized the Keynesian welfare state in that heyday of the 1950s and 1960s, which I do think was a very exceptional time. So how has national government changed? An answer has to begin from neoliberalism, and the triumph of that set of politics. There’s also another factor: the redistribution of sovereignties away from a strong national state model and towards a globalized, transnationalized, far more complex system of sovereignty in the world, which complicates, compromises, and seriously reduces and impedes the abilities of national governments to undertake an ambitious program of progressive reform, whether it’s in the form of the IMF-World Bank complex of global institutions, whether it’s the EU, whether it’s the various international trade agreements in North American terms, or in a variety of other ways too, including the brute power of multinational globalized corporations, the leeway available to national governments is obviously seriously compromised relative to earlier moments in the twentieth century.
And certainly national governments believe they don’t have the latitude anymore – and when I say national governments, I mean the civil services, other bureaucracies, and whichever parties that have come into office. All of them are constantly speaking and having to speak in this language of limited capability. Whether it’s in relation to revenue or whether it’s in terms of what government can legitimately be expected to do in relation to society. For 25 years the language of government has been all about the reduction of government. More and more functions of government are displaced away from the state and are subcontracted to types of profit-making organization, whether it’s the health services, prisons, schools or any other institutional sector, and so the single most important priority for any Left, whether in terms of its principled basis for politics or its access to potential popular support, is to start making arguments again, with real conviction and real traction, arguments that can be really effective, about public goods, social goods. During the 1990s and 2000s, the ability to make those arguments in the public sphere was disastrously destroyed. There was no space for that language in politics anymore.
But even if we succeed in changing the language to speak more of public goods, to talk of a commons, and also of social rights, like a guaranteed social wage, what if the state materially cannot grant that any longer? Perhaps social democracy in after the Second World War could only do this because of a very unique conjuncture – reconstruction, imperialism, and so on. So even if we change the discourse, is this model still materially possible?
It seems to me that it becomes possible if resources are imagined differently than now. I mean it is completely impossible for the state, in its present form, to provide those kinds of social services and public goods, and that kind of interventionist, forward policy, in relation to social justice, if you assume the same resource base. Once you start returning to different ideas, like a rational system of redistributive taxation or the creation of resources through a graduated taxation system, then those possibilities necessarily begin to change and return.
Sometimes this is actually not very difficult. One interesting example is Norway. Well, in Norway they decided to put the revenues from oil into public trust, as opposed to, say, spending them all, which is more or less what happened in Britain under Thatcher. That’s established a protected social fund in fact, from which the Norwegian government is, I think, constitutionally prevented from spending the capital. It is from that fund the Norwegian government finances many of its policies. That’s kind of an easy thing. So long as you’ve got an ideal of the good of the whole society at the center of the thinking around which politics is organized, other associated arguments and claims can then be more easily made. Well, there’s nothing remotely like that in this country.
There has always historically been an uneasy relationship between electoral strategies and militant, on-the-street, extraparliamentary struggles. In some ways these two tendencies enabled each other (the Russian and German revolutions after many years of parliamentary activity by the parties on the one hand, and perhaps the election of Sawant after Occupy on the other). How have socialists historically tried to link up these two tendencies, and what might be the nature of this relationship in the future?
This brings us back to the original starting point of this conversation: how do you try to connect the activism and forms of necessary direct-action militancy on the ground with the conventional places where “legitimate” political action and debate are normally deemed to be taking place (in parliaments; city and local government chambers; election campaigns; the recognized public sphere of newspapers and TV)? How do you make those connections, especially when the “extraparliamentary” and the “parliamentary” commonly treat each other as beyond the pale? On the one hand, the advocates of on-the-street militancy easily develop a kind of purist intransigence, in a confrontationalism that can’t see either the practical purpose or the defensible ethics of coalitioning with mainstream party elements, because that kind of collaboration always leads to sellout or compromise, with effects that demoralize and demobilize the energies that first got people and their demands moving in the first place. On the other hand, those progressives who’ve been working away inside the existing left-wing parties, often with tremendous idealism and patience and with lots of genuine sacrifices, can’t see the point of trying to talk to the activists and bring them along, whether because of their own prejudices or from fear of alienating their “legitimate” allies in the center and right. This kind of gap has become all the harder to bridge as the former socialist parties have moved further and further to the right under the contemporary neoliberal hegemony, while any remaining democracy in the national polities has become more and more hollowed out. The old left-wing parties, from the British Labour Party through the SPD to the Italian Democratic Party or any other evolved forms of the Socialist and Communist left, are now rarely anything more than mildly left-of-center in their orientation. So why should activists on the street ever see the latter as potential sources of alliance in the first place? With all of the differences between the respective contexts, this same kind of argument can also be applied in principle to the US and the Democratic Party too.
It’s very tempting to shoehorn this problem into the old adversarial framework of “revolution” versus “reform.” Leaving aside the more extreme case of an insurrectionary politics (whose conditions of possible success profoundly changed between 1917 and 1968, in my view), a confrontational type of Left politics (extraparliamentary, direct-action) now has to face very unfavorable circumstances, in which the forces of the state and political order more generally are lined up against such radicalism and its chances of succeeding, and – just as key – large sections of society are just not willing even to imagine such radical challenges to the system. In fact, the usual dynamics work precisely against the possibility of building majoritarian support for such challenges, and rather tend to isolate the radical groupings instead. In fact, outside the much rarer exceptional situations (the very biggest crises), the Left builds support for itself by persuasion, campaigning, and all the continuities of organization we associate with successful social movements, and this process requires respect for the rights and entitlements provided by the democratic system, however imperfect the latter may be. The ability of the Left to broaden its support outwards from the core constituencies, with the hope of building sufficient confidence across social groupings that might allow it to start speaking credibly and legitimately for society as a whole (and simultaneously to forestall the emergence of reactionary coalitions, e.g. in the form of a military coup), necessitates a practical and principled respect for democratic process and procedures. Moreover, when existing democratic goods are in danger (whether the more specific democratic gains made in earlier periods or the constitution, civil liberties, and the rule of law per se), the priority of building the broadest possible popular support for democratic goals becomes all the more vital. (I should say, parenthetically, that this is a very deliberately “Gramscian” way of coming at the question.)
The priority of preserving democratic freedoms at the level of the polity (in terms of the constitution, parliamentary process, civil liberties, the rule of law, regional and local government, and whatever social policies and public goods can be protected and even enhanced) has in some ways become harder and harder to see, let alone accomplish, because the state and the powers of government have become ever-further removed from accountability. A key part of his has also been the strengthening of the state’s police powers, whether in the forms and extent of the security apparatus and its coercive technologies, the accepted practices of policing, the criminalizing of protest and dissent, the relentless expansion of the carceral state, or the degree of tolerance in the public sphere for violence exercised by police and security apparatuses. All of these now accepted ways of “policing the crisis” make it both all the more important to defend the classic civil freedoms and all the more difficult to achieve. But however hard it’s become, the case for holding on to the democratic rights gained under the law seems to me to outweigh the arguments for maintaining a “purist” commitment to more radical policies that focus only on transforming the system (where the “system” means capitalism plus liberal democracy).
At the same time, this question needs always to be judged carefully in relation to the “present conjuncture” (a good Marxist term!). For example, where crises are quite finely balanced, whether because of the economy or more contingent political crises (or both), it may well be necessary for the Left to undertake more militant confrontational actions in order to ensure that the situation doesn’t start slipping beyond its influence or control. It’s not hard to think of historical cases of this kind where democratic goods are perilously under threat – e.g. Weimar Germany in the summer and autumn of 1932, or France in early 1937, or Italy after the assassination attempt on Togliatti in 1948, or Chile in 1972-73 – and the usual pattern is for the Left to fail to step decisively up to the mark, although of course the circumstances are also always incredibly complex and ambiguous and full of risks and dangers. It may be useful to think of the recent (and still continuing) crises of democracy in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other countries of Central and South America in this way. So in other words, there are certainly circumstances where democratic criteria require a different type of strategy – i.e. one based on militant and even insurrectionary actions rather than the broadest-based coalition-building through elections. But now, realistically speaking, the Left is usually nowhere near as strongly placed any more to imagine mounting that kind of militantly mobilized massed defense of democratic goods. The practical ground of politics has become more defensive, more strategic, and more dependent on the building of coalitions. Until mass mobilizations have been building over a much longer period, with a huge shift of broader popular sympathies inside then public sphere, any effort at pressing direct-action beyond certain carefully strategized limits is likely to meet with a ferocious and unstoppable police response.
In Forging Democracy I tried to show how the most successful democratic movements have always combined electoral and parliamentary with social movement and extraparliamentary strategies – that is to say, all the ways in which “the committee room” and “the streets” need to be moved into acting together. I’ve argued that in the European present, these two aspects of democratic politics have been broken apart as the result of long-term processes of social, cultural, and political change going back to the 1950s and 1960s, whose consequences the recent centrist deradicalizing of social democratic parties has so successfully ratified. There’s now very little connection at all between the parliamentary parties and the grassroots or the more elemental democracy of “the streets.” So the goal has to be one of patiently trying to build up the kind of political trust that can allow each of these necessary spheres of action to be brought into believable and productive relations again. In the US the severity of the difficulties seems all the greater, as the national Democratic Party has never come close to functioning in the same way as the old European Socialist and Communist Parties. But we can find some rough equivalents of the kind of dynamics I’ve been describing – e.g. the peak of the Civil Rights movement and the Black Power/Black Panther politics that followed, along with the forms of social movement politics developing out of the late 1960s into the 1970s, whose history is still waiting to be properly rehabilitated. The two Jesse Jackson campaigns in 1984 and 1988 provide a very good ground for thinking about how these processes of articulation between the street and the committee room can occur. And again: we can see this happening most clearly when we look city by city.
What I’m suggesting involves an underlying argument about how political change usually occurs, based on my historian’s understanding of the later 19th and 20th centuries and a Gramscian approach to political practice influenced over many years by feminist theory and thinkers like Stuart Hall and Ernesto Laclau. It’s an approach that can be applied to all sorts of particular movements and situations, as well as to the larger-scale conundrum of how to develop an overall political strategy for imagining macro-political change. One very concrete example from the contemporary U.S., as I mentioned earlier, would be the current drive for an improved minimum wage, which has been proceeding most effectively on a city-by-city basis, with important articulations between grassroots activism and allies inside parties, assemblies, and administrations, and with cumulative effects across different places that potentially begin to redraw the terms of the overall political climate. In other words, social movement politics of this kind can be shaped in such a way as to outgrow the localism of its immediate context and take on a much wider efficacy and resonance. And at that point it becomes incredibly important that there be a Left that’s active on a larger-than-local level too – spatially across a region or in chains of coordination across other cities elsewhere, in the multiple contexts of publicness (electronic media, internet, and blogosphere as well as press, radio, and TV), in national parliaments and assemblies via parties and the constellations of NGOs, pressure groups, and campaigning organizations, in the transnationally active versions of all these forms of coaltioning, and so forth. It’s precisely in this way, it seems to me, that the environmental movements have built up their collective political agency during the past several decades, both mobilizing action and everyday awareness at the local level and campaigning for change in the national and global institutional scenes of policy-making, in ways that increasingly aggregate to a critically effective set of political capacities. Given the degree to which climate change will be shaping not just the possibilities for policy at the level of states, but all of the practical details of the quality of life all the way down to the ground in societies, it becomes incredibly important that we make ourselves as conscious and experienced as possible in these ways of understanding political practice.
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The Deep State: Germany, Immigration, and the National Socialist Underground
Nearly three years ago, in November 2011, news of a double suicide after a failed bank robbery developed into one of the biggest scandals in postwar German history.1 Even now, it remains unresolved. For thirteen years the two dead men, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, had lived underground, together with a woman, Beate Zschäpe. The three were part of the National-Sozialistischer Untergrund (NSU), a fascist terror organization which is supposed to have murdered nine migrant small entrepreneurs in various German towns and a female police officer, and to have been responsible for three bomb attacks and around fifteen bank hold-ups. Although the NSU did not issue a public declaration, the connection between the nine murders committed between 2000 and 2006 as obvious: the same weapon was used each time, a Ceska gun.
At the time they were called “doner murders” (as in doner kebab) and the police called their special investigation team “Bosphorus.”2 Nearly all the police departments working on the murders focused mainly on the victims and their alleged involvement in “organized crime,” the drug trade, etc. Not only was it eventually revealed that the murderers were organized Nazis, but that the killers had been supported by some branches of the state apparatus and the search for the murderers had been systematically obstructed. As one famous public television news presenter said: “One fact is established: the perpetrators could have been stopped and the murders could have been prevented.” She also voiced “the outrageous suspicion that perhaps they were not supposed to be stopped.” The final report of the parliamentary investigation committee of the Thuringia state parliament, published in August 2014, stated a “suspicion of targeted sabotage or conscious obstruction” of the police search. The Verfassungsschutz (VS, the German domestic secret service) had “at least in an indirect fashion protected the culprits from being arrested.”
Since the supposed double suicide on the November 4, 2011, the intelligence services, the interior ministries of the federal and central state, and the BKA collaborated to cover tracks, just as they had collaborated before to keep the existence of the NSU from becoming publicly known. One day before the connection between the NSU and the last bank robbery was publicly announced, a consultation in the chancellery took place. Since then, the investigation has been systematically obstructed by the destruction of files, lies, and the refusal to surrender evidence. In the current criminal case against the alleged sole survivor of the NSU (Beate Zschäpe) and five supporters at the higher regional court in Munich, the public prosecutor wants it to be believed that the series of terror acts were the work of three people (“the Trio”) and a small circle of sympathizers. “The investigations have found no indication of the participation of local third parties in the attacks or any of organizational integration with other groups.” But it is clear that the NSU was much larger and had a network all over Germany. And it is highly unlikely that the two dead men were the only perpetrators.
Research on the NSU has shown that the VS had the organized fascists under surveillance the whole time, without passing its information on to the police. It had many Confidential Informants (CIs)3 in leading positions in the fascist structures – or rather, the CIs even built up large parts of these structures. It is very unlikely that the secret services acted without consultation with the government – but it is certain that we will never find any written order. Sometimes public prosecutors and leading police officials were included in the cover-up. For example, the current President – at the time Vice-President – of the Landeskriminalamt (LKA) or Criminal Police Offices of Thuringia ordered his police in 2003 to “go out there, but don’t find anything!” after receiving a tip about Böhnhardt’s whereabouts.
Obviously the German state apparatus has erected a (new?) parallel structure that operates in accordance with government policies and out of the reach of parliamentary or legal control. The National-Sozialistischer Untergrund was a flagship project of this “deep state,” supporting the new policy towards migrants that started in 1998 at the instigation of Otto Schily, then Interior Minister. Since the NSU became known to the public, this apparatus has even been financially and operationally strengthened.
The NSU complex gives us a glimpse of the way the German state functions, and can therefore sharpen our criticism of the capitalist state. This is of international relevance for two reasons. First, many countries, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Morocco, and Russia, have recently seen mobilization, pogroms, and violence against migrants. In a weaker form this has also happened in Germany, and as usual one can see a pattern: the government stirs up hatred, fascists take action (there have been at least five arson attacks in the first half of 2014). Second, many states are preparing militarily for mass strikes and social unrest. In accordance with an operational scheme that has shaped interior policies in many Western countries since the Second World War, state institutions make use of paramilitary fascist structures. A recent example is the relation between the Greek security apparatus and the fascist Golden Dawn.4
The Background: The State Lays the Ground for Racism
In October 1982 the new German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told Margaret Thatcher in a confidential conversation that he wanted to reduce the number of Turks in Germany by half within four years. They were “impossible to assimilate in their present number.” A few months before this conversation his predecessor Schmidt blared: “I won’t let any more Turks cross the border.” In October 1983, the government passed a repatriation grant. In the following years, the Christian Democrats (CDU) began a debate about the alleged rampant abuse of the asylum law. Although hate was stirred against “gypsies,” “negroes,” and others, in its core this racism was always aimed against “the Turks,” the largest group of immigrants. Kohl made this clear in his conversation with Thatcher: “Germany does not have a problem with the Portuguese, the Italians, not even the Southeast Asians, because all these communities are well integrated. But the Turks, they come from a very different culture.”5
Already in the second half of the 1980s, this government policy was accompanied by Nazi attacks on foreigners. After German reunification this process culminated in the racist pogroms of Rostock-Lichtenhagen in August 1992.6 Less than four months later, the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) and the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) agreed to abolish the right of asylum almost completely.
The state racism was bloody, but it was not quantitatively successful in deporting large numbers or discouraging immigration. At the beginning of Kohl’s Chancellery there were 4.6 million foreigners in Germany; when it ended in 1998 there were 7.3 million. Consequently, interior policy focused on “police penetration” of “parallel societies” after the Rostock pogroms and especially under the Schröder government. Interior minister Kanther and his successor Schily imposed the definition of immigration as “criminally organized” throughout Europe. This policy, too, was primarily directed not against “newcomers” but against the “Turks” who already live here. Small businesses owned by migrants are generally suspected of involvement in organized crime. Even before 9/11, the financial transactions and phone calls of whole communities were screened and analyzed on suspicion of organized crime and trafficking. In particular, the investigations targeted small businesses frequented by large numbers of people: coffee shops, internet cafes, kiosks, and so forth. From these places migrants can transfer money to another country without the involvement of banks, using the Hawala system.7 “Police penetration” reached its climax with the search for the Ceska killers: the “BOA Bosphorus” organized the largest dragnet among migrant communities in the history of Germany: massive surveillance of phone calls, mobile phones, money transfers, hotel bookings, rental car use, etc.
The Nazis
Although the global economic crisis of the early 1990s reached Germany a bit later than elsewhere because of the “reunification boom,” it was relatively more severe. Unemployment doubled, “floodgates opened wide” in the factories. The unions supported the crisis policy of employers with new collective agreements to ensure “job security” and company agreements implementing “working time accounts” over a full year. The workers were left alone in their defensive struggles, even though some were quite militant and creative. The (radical) Left was preoccupied with the struggle against fascism and racism. They no longer analysed racism as a governmental policy, but as a “popular passion.” Anyone who tries to fight against ethnic racism in all its shades but omits the dimension of social racism remains toothless at best: in the worst case s/he becomes an agent of state racism.8 Jacques Rancière described it this way: “The racism we have today is a cold racism, an intellectual construction. It is primarily a creation of the state… [It is] a logic of the state and not a popular passion. And this state logic is primarily supported not by, who knows what, backward social groups, but by a substantial part of the intellectual elite.” Rancière concludes that the “‘Leftist’ critique” has adopted the “same conceit” as the right wing (“racism is a popular passion” which the state has to fight with increasingly tougher laws). They “build the legitimacy of a new form of racism: state racism and ‘Leftist’ intellectual racism.”9 After that shift, there was a strong tendency for antifascist activities to focus on the socially deprived and their primitive racism, and the state became increasingly attractive as an ally. From the mid-90s onward, it funded most of these anti-racist initiatives. All these changes were completed by the self-disarming of most of the radical Left, which started adopting the aim of “strengthening civil society” at the same time as it removed all references to class struggle.
The most important NSU members were born in the mid-1970s in East Germany and were politically socialized in the “asylum debate” in the early 90s. It was a phase of massive de-industrialization and high unemployment in the East of Germany. The young Nazis learned that they could use violence against migrants and leftist youth without being prosecuted by the state. They realized that they could change society through militant action.
In West Germany a new youth culture grew in the ’80s as well: right-wing skinheads. The skinhead scene in the East and in the West was held together by alcohol, excessive violence, concerts, and the distribution of illegal videos and CDs. This music business allowed them to set up their own financing. Still, a large part of their money was organized through petty crime. From the beginning, many Nazis were involved in prostitution, and arms and drug trafficking. Later they became heavily involved with biker gangs and security firms, which are booming due to the the privatization of state functions.
In the mid-90s various militant groups and other groups from the rightwing music scene united under the banner of the Blood & Honour network (B&H).10 Soon after the German Nazi scene organized internationally, making contacts worldwide and building an infrastructure that stretched from CD production to arms dealing and shooting ranges. At that time the police could no longer countenance Nazi violence, and the Nazis had to hide their actions. In that context, the B&H/Combat 18 concept of clandestine struggle and small, independent terrorist groups (“leaderless resistance”) helped them reorganize.
In the former East German state of Thuringia, the Nazi scene was built up by “Freie Kameradschaften,”11 the Thüringer Heimatschutz (THS),12 Blood & Honour, and the Ku Klux Klan. This is the environment that gave birth to the National-Sozialistischer Untergrund. The “Kameradschaft Jena” consisted of Ralf Wohlleben, Holger Gerlach, André Kapke, Böhnhardt, Mundlos, and Zschäpe. From 1995 onwards they were filed as “rightwing extremists” in the VS Information System. Organized in the THS, they practised the use of explosives and firearms, and committed their first attacks. The other members of the “Kameradschaft Jena” remained active in the scene after the Trio went underground in 1998. And they supported their comrades: Holger Gerlach gave them his driver’s licence, passport, and birth certificate, and he rented motorhomes for them. Kapke and Wohlleben organized weapons and passports. Those two organized the largest right-wing rock festival in Germany and maintained international contacts. In 1998 Wohlleben became a member of the NPD, the largest neo-Nazi party at the time. Over time he became its deputy chairman in Thuringia. With the help of this network, Böhnhart, Mundlos and Zschäpe could move underground and commit their attacks, probably with local support.
The Informants System
The German State is directly involved in organized fascist structures. But the direct and extensive involvement in the Thüringer Heimatschutz and the National-Sozialistischer Untergrund stands out. In and around these groups the VS positioned more than two dozen Confidential Informants, or CIs. These CIs were not used to catch violent Nazis like the Trio, instead they organized the militant Nazi scene in Germany, developing it ideologically and militarily. The VS recruited mostly very young fascists and made them into leaders of the scene. In an internal document of 1997, the Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office, or the BKA) called these CIs “incendiaries” in the Nazi scene.13 It saw “the danger that the CIs egged each other on to bigger actions” and found it questionable “whether some actions would have happened without the innovative activities of the CIs.” There are many statements by former CIs descriving how they discussed their political actions with their handlers. In some of those cases the handlers prevented their CIs from leaving the scene or told them to appear more aggressive. For the German intelligence agencies, maintaining CIs is more important than law enforcement. They protected them from the police in multiple cases so that they could operate undisturbed. In the mid-90s there was a brief debate about this problem, because it became known that CIs of the German intelligence agencies fought and killed as mercenaries in the Yugoslavian civil war.
In 1996 the Federal Interior Ministry began Operation Rennsteig: the Bundesamt für Verfassungschutz (BfV, federal domestic secret service), Militärischer Abschirmdienst (MAD, German military intelligence agency), and local VS agencies of Thuringia and Bavaria coordinated their intelligence activities relating to the THS and the NSU, at least until 2003. They discussed the recruitment of informants but also how they could achieve discursive hegemony within “civil society.” Operation Rennsteig marks a turning point in German interior policy, which really took hold when Otto Schily, a former ’60s student radical and defense lawyer of the Red Army Faction, became interior minister in 1998. There was an unseen extension of the security apparatus and an adjustment of the focus of the intelligence agencies. To adapt themselves to the new international constellation (Yugoslavian wars, the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993), they centralized the German intelligence structure and unified the handling of the Nazi scene. In this process they also expanded intelligence activities within the Nazi scene. All this happened at the same time as the shift in “foreigners policy” from the attempt at “reduction” under Kohl to the “fight against parallel societies in our midst” under Schily.
Everyone involved in Operation Rennsteig knew that it was an explosive and not entirely legal operation. Most of the files concerning recruitment and handling were incomplete, some CIs were not even registered. Between November 12, 2011 and the summer of 2012, 310 case files were destroyed in the BfV alone. They tried to destroy everything connected with Operation Rennsteig, CI “Tarif,” and other important CIs around the NSU. Again, the commands were coming from the top of the hierarchy. A few days after the first destruction of files, the Federal Interior Ministry gave the order to continue the destruction. Not only did they destroy physical files, they also manipulated computer files and deleted the phone data of CIs in contact with the NSU.
Who Was in Control?
When more and more high-level CIs in the NSU’s immediate environment were exposed, they began to tell the fairy tale of “CIs out of control.” This was just the secret service’s next smokescreen, after such cover stories as “we didn’t know anything” and “we were badly coordinated” collapsed when Operation Rennsteig became publicly known. It is a lie, but many on the Left believe it because it fits into their picture that “the Nazis can do what they want with the state.” It is therefore worth taking a closer look at this point.
Who are CIs? The services usually try to recruit people with problems: prison, debts, and personal crises. These people then receive an allowance that can amount to a normal monthly income for important CIs. CIs get support for their political actions and warnings before a house search. On the other hand, there is a lot of control: surveillance of all telephones, tracking of movements, sometimes direct shadowing. In order to crosscheck the reports, the VS runs more CIs than it would otherwise need. Time and again there are meetings of Nazi cadres with four or five CIs sitting around the table. There were several CIs within the NSU structure who did not know about each other. The great majority of them did what the VS wanted them to do — passing on information, betraying everything and everyone, while also directly supporting armed struggle by providing passports, logistics, propaganda and weapons.
Some examples of CIs in the NSU structure:
Tino Brandt, the chief of the THS, was the best paid CI of the Thuringia VS from 1994 to 2001; he helped the Trio go underground, and afterward provided passports and money.
Thomas Starke (LKA CI in Berlin from 2000 to 2011) organized weapons and the Trio’s first hideout, and he delivered explosives before they went underground. He gave clues as to where they could be found in 2002, but these were “not investigated.”
Thomas Richter was CI “Corelli” for the BfV from 1994 to 2012; after this became public he was kept hidden by the agency and was found dead in April 2014. He had “immediate contact” with Mundlos as early as 1995, and was the link between the NSU and the KKK and co-founder of the anti-antifa.
Andreas Rachhausen – “GP Alex” – brought back the getaway car the three had used for going underground in January 1998, when Rachhausen was already a CI.
Ralf Marschner was CI “Primus” for the BfV from 1992 until about 2001. He rented motorhomes through his building company at exactly the time when two of the murders occurred.
Carsten Szczepanski tried to build up a German branch of the KKK in the early 1990s, while monitored by the VS. Between 1993 and 2000, he was imprisoned for a brutal attempted murder. In prison he co-edited the Nazi magazine “Weißer Wolf” (White Wolf), which propagated the concept of leaderless resistance and sent greetings “to the NSU” even then. He became a CI in prison. For his work he received many prison privileges (besides lots of money). He supplied much information, for example that Jan Werner had organized the Trio’s weapons. Immediately after his release he tried to set up a terror cell like Combat 18. When his cover blew in 2000, the VS got him a new identity and sent him abroad.
Michael von Dolsperg, (formerly See), a member of Combat 18, close to the THS. From 1995 to 2001 he was a BfV CI with the code name “Tarif.” He was rewarded with at least 66,000 D-Mark. After 1994 he was editor of the magazine “Sonnebanner,” which proposed “going underground” and “forming independent cells.” We know that some of its articles were discussed by Mundlos, Böhnhardt, Zschäpe and their close contacts. Dolsperg produced a total of 19 issues. In an interview he claimed that “the BfV got all issues in advance.”14 This is not the only case where the VS partly financed and “fine-tuned” the contents of a Nazi magazine. In Thuringia, the VS was consulted for anti-antifascist leaflets and did the proofreading.15 In 1998 Kapke asked Dolsperg if he could provide housing for the Trio in hiding. Dolpsberg refused after his handler advised him to do so.
Parallel to the story about “CIs out of control,” the intelligence agencies created another one: “too much chaos in the intelligence apparatus.” To support this legend they put on display all the internal conflicts between the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies, cases of “conflicting authorities” and the competition between different agencies. One highpoint was the scandal around Roewer, the former President of the local VS agency in Thuringia.16 All this show of confusion was used to make the NSU a pretext for the enhancement of the security apparatus.
1998: The So-called Disappearance of the Underground
In January 1998, the LKA found pipe bombs and explosives in a garage rented by Zschäpe in Jena. The VS had known about these explosives all along. Nonetheless, Böhnhardt was able to leave undisturbed in his car during the raid. It took days until the police issued a warrant for the Trio because all those responsible were on sick leave, on vacation, or otherwise unavailable. Obviously they wanted the Trio to go underground. Already in November 2011, the famous German feuilletonist Nils Minkmar described the nature of the “underground” as follows: “They didn’t have to hide very deep, it was more like snorkeling in a bathtub: They used to have a social life in Zwickau, kept in contact with a wide circle of supporters and attended demonstrations, concerts and other events. Many did know where the three were hiding. And if the right wing scene in Germany has a problem, it is certainly not that it is extremely sealed off, but that it is heavily interspersed with CIs.” In fact, today we know that the three operated in an environment that was structured and monitored by the VS; most of their main supporters were CIs. After searching the garage, the police even found two address lists belonging to Mundlos containing 50 names, including at least five CIs.17 The lists displayed the national network of the NSU, with contacts in Chemnitz, Jena, Halle, Rostock, Nuremberg, Straubing, Regensburg, Ludwigsburg. Officially, the police never analyzed the lists or used them for investigation purposes!
2000: The Extremism Doctrine and the Beginning of the Murders
Two and a half years later, on September 9, 2000, the Ceska murders began with the death of Enver Simsek. In early summer the BfV had informed the interior ministry that “a few groups” were trying to get the “structure and the equipment” to “attack certain targets.” These groups were especially active in the states of Berlin and Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Lower Saxony. The BfV also kept an eye on the Trio — after they went underground they were closely watched by the unit for right-wing terrorism (!). Nevertheless the BfV claimed that these small Nazi groups had “no political concept for armed struggle,” although they actively propagated such concepts by supporting newspapers such as the “Sonnenbanner.” Federal Interior Minister Schily used this information to make a press statement in which he warned of the “danger of Antifa actions radicalizing individual right-wing extremists. These militant right-wing extremists or small groups could decide to retaliate.”
The strategy was to build up fascist structures and to blame the radical left for their existence in the public discourse, employing the extremism doctrine.18 The film Youth Extremism in the Heart of Germany, made by the Thuringian VS in May 2000, is a clear example. At the beginning it states that fascist and antifascist “scenes need each other, they cannot live without each other” and that “violence as a means to an end is accepted in the left-wing scene.” It describes the fascists with the usual clichés: unemployed, uneducated, disorganized, committing crimes when drunk. Roewer, the president of the VS, explains the high number of right offenses “solely with the fact that scrawling swastikas, roaring Sieg Heil … are offenses in Germany … because of that the statistics appear very high with over 1,000 crimes per year, but nearly all are propaganda offences.” The THS is mentioned positively, Kapke and Tino Brandt are allowed to speak: “the Anti-Antifa Ostthüringen was formed in response to violence from the left, to bring those perpetrators to light,” and “We are representatives of the National Democratic Party of Germany in Jena … We are fundamentally opposed to violence.”
2003-2005: The Manhunt is Discontinued; Bomb Attack in Cologne
In 2003 four immigrants from Turkey had already been killed. Evidence piled up that the murders could have a right-wing extremist background. In March 2003 the Italian secret service gave the VS evidence of a network of European Nazis that prepared murders of immigrants. The FBI had analysed the murders and regarded “hatred of Turks” as a motive for the murders. In Baden-Württemberg CI “Erbse” revealed that there was a Nazi group called NSU and one member was called “Mundlos:” the handler was advised to destroy this information. It was decided to let the Trio disappear.
In June 2004, a nail bomb exploded in the Keupstraße in Cologne. The attack resembled other right-wing attacks, for example the London nail bombings by the Nazi David Copeland five years earlier. But the Federal Interior Minister Schily announced two days later: “The findings of our law enforcement agencies do not indicate a terrorist background, but a criminal one.” He definitely knew better!
The shops and restaurants in the Keupstraße are almost exclusively run by immigrants. Many of these shops are very successful; some businesspeople even joined in an initiative to become active in local politics with their own demands. The attack ended these attempts. The uncertainty as to who was behind the attack and the crackdown by the police on the victims directly after created great distrust in the Keupstraße, which is still felt to this day.
The Keupstraße bombing and its aftermath exemplify the structural interaction of state institutions with the fascist terror: first the attack terrorizes the immigrants, then they are harassed by the police and the media. This harassment makes the intentions of the NSU a reality: “foreign profiteers” and “foreign mafias” were marked and cut off from the German “Volkskörper” (“German people’s body”).
2006-2007: Murders of Migrants Stop, Police Officer Kiesewetter is Murdered
In April 2006 two people were killed within three days: kiosk owner Mehmet Kubasik in Dortmund and Halit Yozgat in his internet café in Kassel. The body count of the Ceska murders went up to nine. The victims’ relatives organized joint demonstrations in Kassel and Dortmund, shouting the slogan “No tenth victim!” After the demonstrations the series of murders stopped.
The murder in Kassel showed clearly that the VS wanted to sabotage all investigations – and that this was a decision from the top of the hierarchy: at the time of the murder the Hessian VS officer Andreas Temme was present in Yozgat’s internet café. Temme was known as a gun fanatic and collected fascist literature. He was the only person present at the murder scene and did not come forward to the police. At that time he was the handler of a fascist CI with whom he had a long phone call an hour before the murder. The police saw Temme as a suspect for the entire Ceska series. Nevertheless, the Hessian VS refused to give the police any information; otherwise someone “would just have to put a dead body near a CIs or a handler” to “paralyze the whole VS.” The dispute between the police and the VS was taken up to the Hessian interior minister Bouffier, who stopped the investigations after consultation with the BfV.
Just over a year later, on April 25, 2007, the police officer Michèle Kiesewetter was shot in her police car. Her colleague Martin Arnold, sitting next to her, survived a headshot. After four and a half years the investigations still had not gotten anywhere. After the NSU became publicly known, politicians and the public prosecutor insisted obstinately that Kiesewetter had been murdered by chance and that Böhnhardt and Mundlos had been the sole perpetrators. But that story does not add up!19 In the case of Kiesewetter, the poor performance of the investigation teams cannot be explained by “racism.” The murder victim was part of the police. Why the need for a cover-up?
After the murder in Heilbronn, it became quiet around the NSU. Four and a half years later, suddenly there were two bank robberies that were attributed to the NSU. After the second of these failed, Böhnhard and Mundlos allegedly committed suicide and the NSU became a matter of public knowledge.
Germany’s “Security Structure” and the Nazis
One has to make use of the far right, no matter how reactionary they are… Afterwards it is always possible to get rid of them elegantly… One must not be squeamish with auxiliary forces.
– Franz Joseph Strauß20
Since at least the disclosures starting in Italy in the second half of 1990, it has been known that NATO keeps armed fascist troops as a reserve intervention force. Only states with such a “stay-behind” structure could become NATO members after the Second World War. In case of a Soviet occupation this reserve was supposed to fight as a guerrilla force behind the front (hence the name stay-behind). But it also had to prevent Communist Party election victories and other forms of radical social change. In West Germany the stay-behind troops were called Technischer Dienst (technical services) and were built up by Nazi war criminals such as Klaus Barbie under US leadership. This became publicly known for the first time in 1952.21
According to a German government report of December 1990, in which the existence of stay-behind structures was admitted, “preparations for the defence of the state” were made in cooperation with the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, German foreign intelligence agency) from 1956 onwards. Heinz Lembke was part of these structures. He delivered weapons to the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann22 in the ’70s. Lembke’s huge arsenal was discovered incidentally by forestry workers in 1981. The night after Lembke agreed to disclose who had pulled the strings, he was found hanged in his cell.
The stay-behind structures obviously changed their character in the 70s and 80s (in Italy they were called Gladio and took part in something they must have understood as a civil war from 1969 to 1989.) In the 1990s they changed their direction again: now Islamism was the main enemy – it was perhaps at this point that new personnel were recruited. The thread connecting them: fascist groups as reserve intervention forces.
Christian Menhorn’s testimony at the penultimate session of the BUA23 is typical of the secret services’ self-confidence. Menhorn was responsible for the THS at the time. He appeared as the best-informed VS analyst. He gave the BUA members the impression that he knew a lot more about the Nazi scene than they did and reprimanded them repeatedly. The questions put to him centered on why the VS prevented any mention of the Trio in a joint internal paper by the VS and BKA. Menhorn said that the VS, in opposition to the BKA, knew that the Trio was “irrelevant.” That was after the first murders had already happened. When he was asked for the reasons for this fatal denial, his immediate reply was very brief but still revealed what the VS did at that time: “We adjusted our information.”24
Menhorn, Richard Kaldrack (alias; Marschner’s handler), Thomas Richter, Mirko Hesse, Martin Thein (Dolsperg’s handler) and Gordian Meyer-Plath, Scepanski’s handler and head of the Saxony VS, are all part of a new generation, born in 1966 or later, who came straight from school or university and started working for the VS. They all stand for the extremism doctrine; some of them have used it for an academic career. Thein for example has published books on Ultras and “fan culture” with leftwing publishers. It is very unlikely that those agents/handlers, who were very young at the time, could have taken important decisions (not stopping the Trio, giving them arms, keeping information from the police … ) without consultation with the hierarchy. They were instructed by old hands like Norbert Wießner, Peter Nocken and Lothar Lingen (alias), who won their wings fighting the Red Army Faction. Lingen set up a department in the BfV exclusively for “right terror” at the beginning of the 90s. He could be called the highest-ranking agent/handler: it was he who coordinated the destruction of files after the existence of the NSU became public knowledge.
Behind them there was a strategic level of a very few high officials whose careers swung between the interior ministry, the chancellery and the top levels of the services (e.g. Hanning and Fritsche).
Intelligence, Nazis, and the War
Since the mid-90s Germany has almost always been at war. The biggest missions were those in Yugoslavia since 1995 and in Afghanistan since 2002. The role of intelligence became far more important, playing a greater role in securing German territory, holding down the domestic opposition to the war, and monitoring the Bundeswehr (German army) soldiers. To these ends it uses intelligence operations against opponents of the war, it infiltrates Islamist groups, and it cooperates with neo-fascist soldiers and mercenaries.
Many German and Austrian Nazis fought in the Yugoslavian civil wars, especially on the Croatian side. This involvement was organized by contacts in the “Freien Kameradschaften” and was known to the German government all along. At the same time, the German government ignored the embargo and sent military instructors to Croatia. August Hanning (see below) told the BUA that they were fighting against the Islamists since the mid-90s – and could not be bothered with the Nazis. They were focused on the “presence of al-Qaeda terrorist groups” and not on the extreme right-wing terrorists in Bosnia. What this statement obscures, of course, is that they had previously had strongly supported the Islamist militias, when these were not yet called “al-Qaeda.”
These wars were quite lucrative for some Nazis. Normally they got no pay but they were allowed to loot. They took part in “ethnic cleansing.” The regular Croatian army and the professional mercenaries25 conquered a town and marked the houses of “Serbs.” Then the Nazis were allowed to plunder and murder. After their return to Germany some Nazis could build up companies (and get leading positions in the NPD and other organizations).
The Bundeswehr has been called an “expeditionary force” since 2006. It became an all-volunteer military in July 2011 and can also be used inside Germany. So far, Germany has had little direct experience of the “privatization of warfare,” but the Bundeswehr is actively trying to eliminate this “shortcoming,” seeking to create its own private shadow armies with the support of the Federal Employment Agency. (This agency finances the training and “certification of safety personnel for international assignments”).
Operational Cores and Control from Above
You can see that the structure that led the NSU is still intact by looking at the systematic action to destroy important files. The heads of the agencies were immediately operationally active. On a strategic level they set the course for the further upgrade of the law enforcement agencies with targeted public relations work. In total five presidents of VS agencies were forced to resign. These resignations were intended “to provide breathing space for the Minister of the Interior,” as one of these directors put it. But above all the resignations were supposed to allow the the operational work to continue undisturbed. The “deep state” – this dense web of intelligence agencies, military, and police that supports government actions and implements its regulations with extra-legal means, “freelance” employees and “auxiliary forces” – must not become visible.
August Hanning is certainly one of the strategic coordinators of this structure. From 1986 to 1990 he was Security Officer in the embassy in East Berlin, among other things responsible for prisoner ransom. In 1990 he moved to the German chancellery and in 1998 he became president of the BND. Under his leadership the BND assisted in abductions and torture by the CIA. Among other things, Hanning argued against the return of Guantanamo prisoner Murat Kurnaz, although he knew of his innocence.26 He became secretary of state in the interior ministry late in 2005. During his examination before the BUA he said in relation to the NSU complex that “the security structure of Germany has proved itself.”
Another important figure is Klaus-Dieter Fritsche (CSU). Since the beginning of this year he has been federal government commissioner for the federal intelligence services, a newly created post. He is at the height of his career now. In 2009 he succeeded Hanning as Interior Ministry Secretary of State: in this capacity he was known as “Germany’s most powerful official” and “the secret interior minister.” Previously he was intelligence coordinator at the federal chancellery and before that, from 1996 to 2005, he was vice-president of the BfV with responsibility for the management of CIs like Corelli, Tarif and Primus. At the BUA he expressed the self-image of the “deep state” clearly: “secrets that could affect the government’s ability to act if revealed, must not be revealed… the interests of the state are more important than a parliamentary investigation.”
This “deep state” has a long tradition in Germany: it survived both 1933 and 1945. In 1933 the Nazis could smash the (Communist) opposition quickly, because the political police had previously created files about them which they immediately made available to the Nazi government. After 1945 the secret services, police agencies, and the administrative apparatus continued with essentially the same personnel. The BND, the VS and the stay-behind structures were made up of old Nazis. But today this complex runs across party lines. In the case of the NSU, both CDU and SPD Interior Ministers of the states played a role. BKA chief Ziercke is member of the SPD, while the public prosecutor is from the FDP [Free Democratic Party, a liberal party]. In Thuringia, interior ministers openly fought antifascist activities in cooperation with the VS whether they were from the SPD or the CDU, and so on.
The VS was an important tool in the domestic policy of all previous governments. In the mid-50s it helped to ban the Communist Party; in the 60s it worked with intelligence operations and agent-provocateurs against the youth movement. At the beginning of the 70s it helped the Brandt government to implement “professional bans”: 3.5 million applicants for civil service were audited, 11,000 applicants were banned from work as civil servants. There were unofficial disciplinary procedures and dismissals, too.
These structures survived the collapse of the Eastern Bloc: the security services were even able to use them to expand their sphere of influence. This was reinforced by 9/11: During the war on terror intelligence agencies worldwide had a massive boost, similar to that of the Cold War. The United States enhanced its security apparatus with the Patriot Acts to ensure “homeland security.” In Germany, the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre was founded in 2004 to coordinate BKA, BND, VS and the LKAs. The BKA Act of 2009 provides the BKA with means “to respond to threats of international terrorism,” which were previously only available to the police authorities of the states (computer and network surveillance, dragnets, use of undercover investigators, audio and video surveillance of housing and telecommunications). In addition, the BKA can now investigate without concrete suspicion on its own initiative, without the approval of an prosecutor.
The development of the scandals surrounding the NSU and the surveillance of the NSA and its western partners (which include the German agencies) has made clear that the power of the ‘deep state’ in Germany is stronger than was expected. It was never touched and has survived all scandals. Across party lines, parliamentary investigation is conducted with special consideration for raison d‘état. This ensures that the deep state is not affected and that police and intelligence agencies continue to be empowered, provided with additional rights and encouraged to cooperate more closely. Because of this, the Bundestag investigation committee arrived at the non-factual conclusions that there is “no evidence to show that any authority was involved in the crimes (of the NSU) in any manner, or supported or approved them” and that there was no evidence “that before November 4, 2011 any authority had knowledge” of the NSU or its deeds or “helped it to escape the grasp of the investigating authorities.”27
This raison d‘état also includes the PdL (Partei die Linke – Left Party), which participated “constructively” in the BUA and supported its final report. The PdL is the left-wing opposition party in Germany. It was formed in 2007 through a merger of the successor of the SED (state party of former East Germany) and the Left opposition in the SPD. It is increasingly supported by sections of the radical left. So far, the VS had spied on the PdL. As part of the final declaration of the BUA the PdL has been assured that it will be no longer monitored by the secret services.
The Nazi scene is hardly affected: the unmasking of the NSU has not weakened it, instead many are encouraged to pursue their goals at gunpoint. They are arming themselves. In 2012, there were 350 cases of gun use registered. That was a peak, but in 2013, the use of firearms by Nazis increased further. Refugee shelters are attacked much more frequently again.
There is no reason to believe that we could take action against the brown plague via the state. At the trial in Munich, the public prosecutor is doing a political job, trying to deal with the case according to the ruling doctrine.
A weakness of large parts of the “left” opposition and the radical Left becomes apparent: after the pogroms of the early ’90s many abandoned the working class as a revolutionary force. They could therefore only turn to “civil society” and thus ultimately the state as an ally against the Nazis. This ally supported fascist structures and helped to establish them, while at the same time it gave the left-wing opposition the opportunity to turn itself into a force supportive of the state. This fact paralyses many Antifa and other leftwing groups. Instead of naming the state’s role in the NSU complex, they focus on the investigation committees and the trial, they lose themselves in the details which are produced there. There were no significant movements on the streets when the NSU became public. All this allows the state apparatus to minimize the NSU – but many people still feel the horror.
NSU timeline:
1993/1994 Foundation of the “Kameradschaft Jena”
1996 Foundation of the Thüringer Heimatschutz (THS)
1996-1998 Small actions with dummy bombs and deactivated bombs
1/26/1998 Raid on the garage of Zschäpe; the Trio (Zschäpe, Mundlos, Böhnhardt) goes underground
1998-2011 Numerous bank robberies
07/27/2000 Bomb attack on eastern European, mostly Jewish migrants in Düsseldorf
09/09/2000 Murder of Enver Şimşek in Nürnberg
01/19/2001 Bomb attack in the Probsteigasse in Cologne
6/13/2001 Murder of Abdurrahim Özüdoğru in Nürnberg
6/27/2001 Murder of Süleyman Taşköprü in Hamburg
8/29/2001 Murder of Habil Kılıç in Munich
2/25/2004 Murder of Mehmet Turgut in Rostock
06/09/2004 Bomb attack on the Keupstraße in Cologne
06/09/2005 Murder of İsmail Yaşar in Nürnberg
6/15/2005 Murder of Theodoros Boulgarides in Munich
04/04/2006 Murder of Mehmet Kubaşık in Dortmund
04/06/2006 Murder of Halit Yozgat in Kassel
4/25/2007 Murder of the police officer Michèle Kiesewetter
11/04/2011 The NSU becomes publicly known
List of Abbreviations
VS = German domestic secret service
BfV = Federal office of the domestic secret service
MAD = German military intelligence agency
BND = German foreign intelligence agency
BUA = Parliamentary investigation committee
NSU = National Socialist Underground
B&H = Blood & Honour
Trio = Böhnhardt, Mundlos, Zschäpe
BAW = German public prosecutor
BOA = Special investigation team
LKA = The “Criminal Police Offices” of Germany’s 16 federal states (Länder). Each incorporates a ‘state security’ division.
BKA = Federal equivalent of the LKA, with reponsibility for “national security,” “counter-terrorism,” etc.
THS = Thüringer Heimatschutz (Thuringia Homeland Protection): coordinating network of the neo-Nazi Freie Kameradschaften groups in Thuringia, eastern Germany. See also footnotes 9 and 10.
Comments
The Ends of the State
As a prefatory aside, it seems worth averring that, while we often encounter the suggestion that purportedly practical questions like that of state power are shortchanged at the expense of sexy but vague musings on revolution and full communism and so forth, in truth contemporary social movements are altogether far too focused on the state. It would be curious indeed to suggest that the various social movements and uprisings of the last few years, spilling from the squares and plazas of Egypt, Greece, the United States, Turkey and beyond, somehow did not sufficiently orient themselves to the state and its functions, whether legislative, repressive, or bureaucratic. Indeed, these movements were often entirely focused on state power – on the tyranny of leaders, on the repression of the police, on the bad decisions of parliaments and legislature. If they were thoughtless about anything, it was capital; the organization of our lives by work and money remained far more elusive as a target for these movements than the presidential palace or the department of interior. This was true from the level of the most common daily conversations to that of the most militant direct actions: again and again the state provided the focal point for these struggles and the limit of their imaginings. It is therefore in no way self-apparent that thinking more about the state, even if one promises to do it differently, is the sensible remedy for the problem of social movements that hurl themselves repeatedly against the colonnades of the National Assembly. If we are to confront practical problems in the struggle to remake the world, we should like to see the situation right side up. For us, the problem is not how to seize state power but how not to be seized by it – how we might elude being hailed by the question of power rather than that of social reproduction, and in turn, elude being forced to fight on terrain that is unfavorable.
The Unity of the Political-Economic
No doubt one must have some serious account of the state so as to avoid being captured by it. Let us in fact grant that questions of the state are of such significance for communism that they ask us to return to first principles. As it happens, it is precisely the nature of first principles that distinguishes a Marxist approach from others: they are necessarily not based in formalizations, theories, or examples drawn from the past. They are not to be found in politics. Neither, however, are they to be found in economics, in the sense of a bourgeois description of the market’s operations. Marxism being neither a policy nor a program but a mode of analysis, the return to first principles insists on unfolding the possibilities that inhere within a given historical situation. Within such an analysis, the political and the economic cannot be separated into independent strata, for it is precisely their enforced unity – the domination of political economy – which provides the character of history under capitalism and is thus the object of critique. The state ought not be rendered as a mere epiphenomenon of economic interest; neither can it be treated as a political instrumentality.
The state is a precondition for a capitalist economy, producing the legal conditions for the dissemination of property rights (and rendering the violence of property impersonal, by making the direct violence of the state something external to property rights), engaging in infrastructural projects necessary for accumulation, establishing the monetary and diplomatic conditions for exchange both nationally and internationally – most significantly, perhaps, in the production of money economies via taxation and military waging. By the same token, a capitalist economy is a precondition for a modern state (which can only fund its massive bureaucratic and military operations by way of the kinds of revenue generated by capitalist accumulation processes). Here we draw largely on the “state-derivation” debate and its reception by the writers associated with Open Marxism, the considerable nuance and complexity of which we can’t describe in any detail here.1 In nuce, rather than treating the state as an instrument of class rule, or a semi-autonomous “region,” the writers involved with the debate examine how the functions and structures of the capitalist state are presupposed by the underlying capitalist mode of production, which itself presupposes the existence of a state. The recognition of this mutual presupposition – that is, the “form-determination” of the capitalist state by capital – is what led Karl Marx to conclude, in the wake of the Paris Commune, that “the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.”
This critical unity of the political and the economic does not exist in the mind, in theory, before it exists materially; neither can it be divided by any act of mind without affirming the political and the economic as the bourgeois reifications they so often appear to be, as the names of academic departments, for instance, or sections of the bookstore. When we say that communism is the real movement which abolishes the present state of things, the very condition of possibility for such a scandalous claim is that “the real movement” (die wirkliche Bewegung) draws together the visible forms of political activity with the deepest dynamics of capital, the ceaseless expression of the law of value, the ongoing restructurings of the wage-commodity nexus, the recompositions of class belonging and of technical and social divisions of labor, and so forth.
Paradoxically, it is this mode of analysis which offers a practical outlook onto strategies and tactics – precisely because questions of the state have salience only in so far as they are posed in relation to present conditions. This is the conjuncture in which people “make their own history” but only “under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.” Wary of veiled idealisms, we cannot start from a political theory of the state absent this careful engagement with circumstances existing already for us. If we are to examine the extraordinary developments of France in 1871, of Russia in the early 20th century (or for that matter of China in 1949, Mexico in 1914, or any other false dawn in the long night of capital), it is not to learn from these moments what an ideal state might be. It is rather to understand from the present prospect what was possible within the given conditions, what was not, and how that might inform the question, what is possible in our own given conditions? For that is the only place from which to begin: with a careful assessment of the present situation.
Method in the Present
The debate as to whether long-standing Marxist ideas about the state, for instance, or its conceptual supplement, the party, are presently a plausible model of communist struggle will be by now a familiar conversation to some. To revisit a recent argument in which we have shared regarding the party, that might apply as well to state, “The collective experience of work and life that gave rise to the vanguard party during the era of industrialization has passed away with industrialization itself. We recognize as materialists that the capital-labor relation that made such a party effective – not only as idea but as reality – is no longer operative. A changed capital-labor relation will give rise to new forms of organization. We should not criticize present-day struggles in the name of idealized reconstructions from the past. Rather, we should describe the communist potential that presents itself immanently in the limits confronted by today’s struggles.”2 Ideas about the state must also be adequate to their time.
None of this is to foreclose a discussion of the state or the party but to make sure we do not fall into kitsch formalisms and instead begin from solid ground. We must end there as well. By this we mean to specify the content of particular struggles, their orientation or disposition. As we know, a riot or a strike may be anti-capitalist or anti-immigrant, just as a neighborhood assembly may be convened for the purposes of instituting communist measures or protecting the property of petit-bourgeois shopkeepers. We can only evaluate forms such as the state or the party in the light of particular contents, and those contents are always given by history. However, because capitalism obtains a certain dynamic historical consistency, based around axiomatic elements – value and wage, abstract labor, and the impersonal domination of the state – communism as the content of proletarian struggles obtains a similar consistency, defined as the negation of all these elements and their replacement by a classless society. In other words, this content should not be thought of as invariant (to use the term given to it by some ultra-leftists) except to the extent that capitalism and the condition of the proletariat is itself invariant, vested in the formal and apparent separation of state and economy which occludes their compelled underlying unity.
The content of communism cannot be associated with a particular form, be it of party, council, state. It is found in the smashing of said unity-in-separation: the breaking of the index between one’s labor and one’s access to the social store, and the concomitant abolition of state and economy both. In this we discover the emancipation of proletarians from capitalist domination, the generation of a classless and therefore communist society, the destruction of all the poisoned inheritances of capitalism: wage, money, value, compelled labor, and yes, the state.
What remains contingent and historically determined is how this happens. Each age gives rise to its own communist horizon, one that unfolds from within the material conditions at hand. The horizon only seems not to move; it is historical contingency all too often mistaken for invariance by Marxists and other communists.
The Two Seizures
None of this means we can neglect the question of forms or their effectivity. If we want to know whether the “seizure of state power” thematic has relevance today, we still must understand the history of the state as particular social form, as well as the kinds of things socialists and communists have tried to do with it. To speak in the broadest terms possible, we might say that, among those who imagine the state as means to a socialist or communist end, who think of the state as an object to be seized, there are two currents of thought. One is progressivist, gradualist, reformist. The other is strictly insurrectionary. The former imagines the capture of the capitalist state through the formation of proletarian electoral majorities (and the struggles for democracy and suffrage that this presupposes) and from there a transition to socialism, perhaps involving armed confrontation but mostly unfolding within the framework of the bourgeois state. In this project, there is no immediate or complete expropriation of capitalist producers, but rather the introduction of gradual set of reforms – abolition of inheritance, nationalization of banking, progressive taxation – that aims to slowly squeeze out capital, perhaps by the expansion of a state-owned sector. We can associate this particularly programmatic conception with the practice of the 2nd International, if not its theory. The other current descends from the 3rd International, based upon a reading of the insurrectionary lines in Marx’s and Engels’s theory, particularly The Civil War in France. It is exemplified and perhaps systematized first and foremost by V.I. Lenin’s State and Revolution. Here, the state is a tool of the insurrectionary class, to be purged of its most loathsome aspects – the army, first and foremost – and used both for the administering of society along communist lines and for defensive combat against the organized enemies of the revolution.
In practice, these two currents often run together. Each can be tracked upstream to the same wellspring via a selective reading of The Communist Manifesto. Marx and Engels themselves did not seem to see any contradiction between urging, on the one hand, the need to smash the repressive machinery of the state in a revolutionary overcoming, and encouraging, on the other, the participation of workers’ parties in parliamentary processes toward winning vital reforms. The currents separate quickly, however, and most followers have emphasized one or the other; it’s not hard to read the ebb and flow between the two currents as a moving index of revolutionary promise.
The confluence of the currents is not only at their source. It returns downstream, as it were, in the courses that the two streams are driven to take in their flowing – until the two streams cross, not simply a confluence but a chiasmus. The state seized within a reformist mode, if it is not to fall back into capitalism, is compelled to move toward revolutionary expropriation; the insurrectionary seizure of the state will be drawn toward reformist arrangements.
Reformist Seizure
Let us consider this crossed destiny in some detail, beginning with the somewhat more easily dispatched reformist conception. Consider what it means to say that the modern state presupposes the existence of a capitalist economy. At the most basic level, this is a simple acknowledgment that a modern capitalist state requires continuous revenue at volumes that only an expanding economy can generate: to pay its workers, to build infrastructures, to provision armies and police, to act as a lender of first and last resort, to maintain a felicitous monetary environment for domestic and international exchange. The presupposition is mutual, since these necessary activities cannot be undertaken by individual capitalists without eroding their competitive prerogatives. The state is therefore both a requirement for, and dependent upon, conditions of profitability.3
Moreover, if programs of redistribution and provision of a social wage – health care, education, wage controls – are undertaken while maintaining capitalist production, as one would expect from even the most feeble of social democracies, such a state will need further revenues. If it is to generate enough taxable income to pay for all its programs, it will be compelled to steer the economy toward maximal rates of surplus value generation so as to satisfy the conditions of profitability that capitalists demand if they are to keep reinvesting their income. Notably, any attempt to redistribute output away from capital and toward workers – via the mechanisms of the state – will threaten the circuit of valorization and realization, except in very exceptional conditions of high rates of profit. Such a state will be functionally subordinated to world capital, to the world-market, and the prevailing conditions of profitability and competition. None of the obvious expedients here are likely to help all that much – partial nationalization of “vital” industries, for instance, capital controls, progressive taxation.
Here we encounter the historical aspect of such a process. The mutually-presupposing functions at play in capitalism – abstract labor, money, capital, wage-labor, the state – are continually reproduced in a dynamic, historically variable manner. They have a directionality that corresponds with the tendential aspects of the accumulation process: real subsumption of labor, the rising organic composition of capital, the falling rate of profit, the expulsion of living labor from the production process. In this section, as ever, we are not describing “the state,” for such is meaningless. We are describing an exceptional developmental route. The path we have just outlined is a best-case scenario, as it were, available only to states controlling rapidly industrializing and modernizing economies capable of generating the rates of growth that allow states to meet all their socialist obligations without imperiling reproduction. In fact, industrializing economies are able to benefit in some circumstances from the kinds of putative socialist measures that reformist programs would want to enact: either social wages or direct wage controls, both of which can increase profitability. But few states are in such a position today, and those that are will quickly find themselves in the same post-industrial doldrums through which the United States, Europe and East Asia presently drift. This speaks rather clearly to prospects for Syriza-style left parties and so-called Latin American Socialism both. Such projects – and here we come to the rock and hard place of a serious analysis – will either be re-incorporated and tamed by the capitalist world system, or will need to pass over into an explicitly revolutionary, expropriating phase.
Revolutionary Seizure
We are left, then, with the “orthodox” position on seizure of state power. The state is taken up as a weapon wielded by an expropriating proletarian revolution, a weapon necessary, according to the influential treatment by Lenin, in order to smash the armed force of the counterrevolution and fulfill the administrative duties of a nascent non-capitalist economy.
Lenin’s book is an explication of the conclusions that Marx drew from the experience of the Commune, pivoting on the passage cited earlier: “ the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.” Lenin educes a fairly crude conception of the state. It is a two-headed monster: bureaucratic and military. The latter he deems unsuitable to the aims of proletarian revolution; any successful overthrow of state power would need to shatter the police and army and replace them with the “armed people” or the “armed workers.” Many of the most significant revolutionary events have occurred against the exhaustion and even defeat of the state’s military powers via interstate conflicts. This confirms the importance of dismantling the repressive powers of the state; if there was ever any doubt, the recent experience of the Egyptian revolution reminds us of the army’s intransigently counterrevolutionary character.
In Lenin’s account, once the repressive fraction of the state is smashed and the legislature abolished, the administrative remainder can be made into an effective tool for those who want to produce communist or socialist relations. The necessary staff positions can be transferred quickly to proletarians and, through routinization, made simple enough that no special skills are required for their performance. But this cleansed state is not simply an “administration of things”; it is not simply the post offices whose powers of efficiency he extols. It is also, for Lenin, a “government of persons,” a means by which proletarians govern themselves forcefully, as can only be the case once we consider that, as Lenin tells us, “human nature… cannot do without subordination, control, and ‘managers.’” What matters, for Lenin, is who rules: “if there is to subordination, it must be to the armed vanguard of all exploited and laboring – to the proletariat.”4
Government of persons is costly, however, and can’t be self-managed, distributed throughout the entirety of the social body. It requires centralization and centralization requires that no small amount of social surplus be directed toward state functions. Since these large, bureaucratic states will require massive volumes of revenue in order to operate, inasmuch as money relations are maintained they will find themselves require to develop the productive forces of the economy, to force the accumulation process forward, with all the baleful consequences this spells for presumed beneficiaries of such a revolution. Even where some of the main elements associated with capitalism are suspended, as was the case with the USSR, revolutions will find that state functions inherited from capitalist states are not good for much else than superintending a course of economic (and nationally-delimited) development, and that what one gets with these kinds of experiments in “socialist transition” is a mimesis of capitalist accumulation, using various bureaucratic and administrative indices in place of the mediations at work in capitalism. This is the best-case scenario, of course, presuming that there is an economy to develop, an assurance that seems less and less the case in the world at hand. In short, states are good for one thing: administering capitalist economies. Those revolutions which would keep in place money, wages, markets and other aspects of capitalism, in order to deal first with the question of political power, to win the war, to develop the productive forces, or any of the various reasons usually given, will find the state a useful tool, no doubt. But this is a tool that will use these revolutions with far more ruthlessness than they will use it. These revolutionary processes will therefore, sooner or later, slip back onto a historical trajectory not all that different from the reformist and gradualist path.
21st-Century Prospects
We can agree, as seems universally acknowledged, that any authentically expropriating revolution will need to arm itself and defend itself against attack. However, the “armed people” is something other than a state. Indeed, it is definitionally the opposite of the state, as it distributes and concentrates power in the hands of the insurgents themselves rather than some delegation. The more state-like such armed groups become – that is, the more they function through structures of discipline, command, hierarchy – the more they will bear in themselves the germ of counterrevolution. When the defensive power of the “armed people” is vested in a particular, dedicated fraction, directed by military leaders, it is easily co-opted, neutralized, or turned against the people themselves. Whatever benefits traditional command and control military structures might confer to those who want to win this or that battle is overshadowed by the fact that such structures, by definition, lose the war. Here, also, the historical dimension is paramount. We are not dealing with 19th-century militaries. The hyper-technological powers of killing and counter-insurgency at the disposal of contemporary states puts paid to any idea of winning a frontal confrontation, of a purely “military” victory. Even the old theory of guerrilla warfare, which has had scant success beyond peripheral, rural zones, now appears ludicrous in the face of the new algorithmic security and military apparatus that inventories every sparrow falling and every grain of sand.
Only a process of demoralization and destabilization of the armed forces, with mass defections and an undermining of the very social and economic foundations of the military, could have any hope of success. This can take place only under conditions in which the revolution is not merely a question of power, of the seizure of power, but is something that allows people to directly and immediately meet their own needs – for food, housing, and useful things; for care of all sorts; for education; for hope in the future and meaningful participation in the things that concern them. For this reason, endeavoring to lead the majority of people forcibly toward a future they don’t know is good for them – one definition of “dictatorship of the proletariat” – will always fail. If there is a role for a dedicated, interventionist proletarian fraction within the revolution, it is in creating the initial conditions under which communist relations and further communist measures might be undertaken. This might involve an inaugurating communist measure – for example, expropriating and distributing necessary and useful things on the basis of free access, or collectively and voluntarily organizing and generating other useful things. But this is something quite different than telling people what to do or commanding and organizing the activity of the larger mass of dispossessed people; such a class fraction is a catalyzing factor, producing communist relations in which it plays no part aside from its initial contribution.5 As we and many of our contemporaries have argued, the immediate establishment of these new social conditions, to the greatest extent possible, is in the present not only the likely course a revolutionary unfolding might pursue, directly or indirectly, but, given the objective material conditions, its only hope for eventual success.6
The question then becomes, if our task involves the immediate transformation of social relations, the abolition of money, wages, and compulsory labor, how useful would the offices, resources, and technologies of the administrative rather than repressive portion of the state be? Not very. As elaborated above, the state bureaucracy provides functions which are necessary or at the very least helpful for the reproduction of capitalism in many and various ways. States are concerned with maintaining the legal conditions of property and exchange, maintaining a proper monetary environment, providing the infrastructure necessary for the development of capital (and not the development of human beings). They help insure that labor-power arrives at the site of production in the right packaging, requiring certain conditions of hygiene and education.
Moreover, while these functional components of the state might have once enjoyed a certain autonomy from capitalist logic and market imperatives, they have been increasingly disciplined over the last century to capital’s needs, cleansed of all aspects that elude the calculative logic of the bottom line. It’s fairly fantastical to imagine that the Departments of Housing and Urban Development, of Education, or of Health and Human Welfare – along with their municipal and state-level counterparts – can be reconfigured to meet the kinds of needs for housing, learning, and medical care that people are likely to have in a revolutionary situation, without relying on the mediations of money, wages, et cetera.
From the outset, these departments are constituted by their separation from all sorts of functions pertaining to education, housing, and health undertaken directly by capitalist firms; by design, they are constitutively incapable of administering the totality of functions people would need, even in the event that such functions and capacities already exist and do not simply need to be generated from the ground up, which is the more likely scenario. The resources of the Post Office that Lenin treated as prime example of the virtuous aspect of the state may, in fact, be useful to a revolution, but no more useful than the technologies for moving objects and distributing messages that exist in the private sector. In any case, revolutions will doubtless need to invent entirely new methods of coordination and administration more suited to the tasks at hand. These functions will be most effective when directly controlled by those involved in them, whether as providers or receivers or both; in this sense, there will be no division between the state, as a sphere of separate powers that stands apart from and controls society, and no division between “economy” and “state.” There will not even be an economy, since that also presumes such separation.
Readers will recognize in this final turn the reappearance of our opening theme, having gone through its dialectical unfolding. Under prevailing conditions, which yoke the political to the economic at the root while presenting each superficially as autonomous objects, one simply errs in imagining there is such a thing as “the state” which can be supposed independent of capital’s presuppositions. The task before us is to break the domination of political-economy as such – this is the minimum definition of emancipation from capital, which engenders that unity even as it enforces its spectral separation. And this cannot be done other than by smashing the underlying unity in reality. The breaking of this bond is recto to the verso of breaking the index between labor and access to social goods, since it is precisely this indexing which makes labor the measure of value and wage the instrument of control, and thus allows the law of value and its compulsions to stand over social existence.
We can say again therefore that this breaking of the index is the goal provided to us by capital, which universalizes the index in the first place; it is in this historical sense that it becomes the project of the struggle for a classless and free society. And with this cleavage, “the state” and “economy” will be neither perfected in their independent existence nor bound together more effectively, but will cease to be; provided the autonomy in reality that they appear to have in bourgeois ideality, they will lack the mutual presuppositions that have to this point preserved them. There will simply be people meeting their own needs and developing the facilities and resources to do this.
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The Margins and the Center: For a New History of the Cultural Revolution
At the end of the Qing dynasty and in the early twentieth century, a significant number of Chinese revolutionary activists and theorists believed that anarchism was China’s most promising revolutionary path, and that was in part because it corresponded most closely to the actuality of social existence. The vast majority of the population, after all, lived their lives with next to no relationship with the state, whose functionaries almost never reached the village level, and whose levies and regulations were for the most part administered by members of the local elite, with ties to their communities that were many and varied. Peoples’ lives were marked by various forms of community and solidarity—self-help, religious, ceremonial, clan-based, labor-cycle, and market-network related—and these forms of solidarity had made many communities capable of resistance and mobilization in the face of external threats, including imperial authoritarian overreach. Those early theorists of revolution felt that these local social capabilities could be strengthened and politicized in an egalitarian direction, and that the emergent energies of the polity to come would lie precisely in these local forms, rather than national state authority.1
The anarchist revolution never came, of course, and most anarchist activists, and the social forces they represented, were absorbed, as one-time semi-anarchist Mao Zedong was, into either the Nationalist (KMT) or Communist (CCP) parties. Both parties, in the course of their struggle for state power, were forced to respond to or ally with local formations in a number of ways, and this made for a number of local variants in revolutionary practice.2 For both, however, the ultimate project was strong state power, a version of which the CCP attained in 1949. Most western observers of the PRC, in the Maoist and reform periods, assume a strong central state. Figures like Mao or Deng Xiaoping give a picture of sovereign authority that has led many to ascribe to them a dirigisme that has for the most part been less thorough than widely assumed.
Unlike in the Qing dynasty, officialdom in the PRC penetrated to nearly all levels of society, but, particularly in the reform period, the interests and practices of local officials have often been at some variance from those at the center. I remember being initially surprised, when taking a bus in 1991 through coastal Fujian province—an area that had emerged as a center of new export-oriented manufacturing in the post-1978 reform period—by the number of red billboards exhorting local enterprises to pay their taxes as required. The billboards wouldn’t have been there had taxes been paid. The center’s inability to manage revenue collection created fiscal difficulties for the state and necessitated policy changes in the middle of the reform period.
The localities have consistently shown a high level of resilience and semi-autonomy. During the double-digit growth years, this bifurcation of authority was generally useful to the center.3 The local officials’ front-line status made them take the brunt of protests from workers, residents with environmental NIMBY issues, or from those—pensioners, retirees, those with ambiguous residential status—with unmet financial claims on the state, and the violent repression those protests often met, as the testimony of participants nearly always revealed, contrasted with a faith and confidence in the authorities in Beijing, a strong testimony to the center’s legitimation efforts. The ability of local officials to profit—legally and illegally—from commercial, enterprise, and property development, or from management of Foreign Direct Investment, played a central role in transforming them into stake-holders in, rather than conservative obstructers of, the central state’s reform process. This pattern of often extreme local divergence has served the state in other ways. New forms of capital accumulation could be tested locally before being applied on a wider scale. Shanghai, by all economic measures the most advanced city/region in China from the mid-19th century until the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s, was left out of the first wave of market and FDI reforms, which were concentrated in the Pearl River Delta region and in Fujian province, across the straits from Taiwan; if the reforms proved to be a failure, failure was not deemed to be an option for Shanghai, whose capitalist takeoff waited until the 1990s, after the “successful” implementation of reform in the south. In the last decade, the central government has been able to take advantage of regional disparities in order to accomplish internal spatial fixes of the kind employed by capital globally: the massive infrastructural and financial investments in Sichuan province and elsewhere in the west have helped to balance and counteract growing workers’ power and concomitant wage increases in the coastal regions. For the most part, the state has well weathered the chaotic dynamic between local and central power, and has thrived. The citizenry, absorbed into a shifting and precarious capitalist labor market as well as into a multi-tiered consumer society, adept at channeling social aspirations through mass-mediation and the attendant consolidation of mechanisms of identification with a largely mythic promise of individual self-fulfillment and upward mobility, is left with fewer and fewer social resources.
This particular center/local dynamic may be coming to an end. I write this in September 2014 in Shanghai, and a several hundred person strong delegation of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the body charged with the massive anti-corruption campaign instigated by President Xi Jinping, has recently arrived and installed themselves in a local hotel. It is widely assumed that its targets are in high places, and the local papers report and speculate about the meaning of events such as one last week, when a neighborhood residents group who had in years past unsuccessfully struggled against a local real estate development presented the commission with a sheaf of purportedly incriminating documents, which the commission then agreed to review. Around the country, local officials are falling by the day, in what is proving to be a relentless and wide-sweeping campaign. If Xi Jinping is successful in creating a rationalized, functionalist bureaucracy, one which for the most part no longer views land and contracts as local resources to be mined, but serves more purely an instrument of the will of the state, he will have reached a level of central state authority well beyond that of any of his predecessors. This is not guaranteed, of course, and an achievement even of that scale might be open to later reversal, but it could significantly alter the terrain of political possibility. Many voices on the Left in China continue to place their hopes in the central government, which they view as capable of a decisionism that would, with the right ideological orientation, be able to contain the market within a new social compact.4 I suspect that they will prove to be mistaken. It is easy to overestimate the political capacity to contain market forces.
Few leftist intellectuals write of political initiative or creativity coming from the people themselves—they see intellectuals as fulfilling that role. Labor activism remains largely within the local dynamic described above; there remain significant institutional and political barriers to broader, trans-local mobilization. Although the Yue Yuen (shoe manufacturing) strikes in the spring of 2014 had a wider reach than previous labor actions, it is too soon to evaluate what this portends for the future. Still, given that a militant politics has to date largely been confined to “the margins,” and given the present fairly bleak political terrain, an examination of historical manifestations of political creativity at the mass level might have greater than historiographical importance.
Wu Yiching’s re-interpretation of the Cultural Revolution—The Cultural Revolution at the Margins: Chinese Socialism in Crisis (Harvard University Press, 2014)—is such a study, and it is a story whose dynamic bears an important relation to the historical vicissitudes of the local/center dynamic. Considering its historical and continuing political importance, including in much recent radical philosophy, the Cultural Revolution (CR) remains one of the most under-studied phenomena of the 20th century. This is a particularly acute problem in China, where the negation of the Cultural Revolution and the prevention of its recurrence form a central pillar of state ideology, and where the relative absence of sustained analysis and discussion of the period has foreclosed a deeper understanding of the changing nature of what has constituted politics in China over the last half century. This, and the prohibition of discourse on that other and more ambiguous outburst of the political—the late 1980s protests that culminated in the so-called Tiananmen Square movement in 1989—has been central to the state’s ongoing depoliticization process.
Although the state prohibition on open and widespread discourse on the Cultural Revolution remains in place, there has, over the last ten or twelve years, been a steady and slow accumulation of scholarship in Chinese,5 as well as in western languages. There is of course much archival and empirical work that remains to be done. But mostly absent in recent work are new historical syntheses that make clear, original, and cogent claims for the broadly political character of the Cultural Revolution, and for its legacy into the reform period. In addition to performing important and analytically rich historical and political syntheses, Revolution at the Margins contains much new scholarship as well, based on newly available material, including interviews, and work in archives that have rarely been consulted. Wu’s notion of “margins” is not geographically based—his case studies include events in Beijing and Shanghai—but refers to popular-based political movements and analyses that arose outside of official state organs, made possible by the irruption of political groups and tendencies over which there initially existed little official control.
The view that the mass politics of the Cultural Revolution was merely a case of mass manipulation, or a distorted effect of central CCP power politics, has fortunately lost much of its authority in recent years, even though machinations in the central leadership remain central to the most recent comprehensive English-language history, Macfarquahar and Schoenhals’s Mao’s Last Revolution.6 But no analytical framework of similarly broad interpretive scope has arisen to replace this. The argument for the primacy and originality of the margins is thus an important one. Those studies that do investigate politics “from below”—and there have been many good ones recently7 —tend to focus on group identity, interest, or structural antagonism, and generally downplay non-functionalist dimensions of the political.
Wu’s thesis is that the irruption of new political energies in the early period of the Cultural Revolution was initially facilitated but not controlled by the center, that it represented new responses to long-standing grievances and discontent as well as emergent forms of political imagination, and that the state’s response to that irruption decisively shaped the character of the party-state itself, beginning as early as 1968 and continuing up to the present day. Wu does not ascribe to the “margins” more political and ideological coherence than they actually possessed; politics at the margins was tentative, messy, heterogeneous, and out of control. The state’s active policy of containment not only led to the premature end of political and ideological experimentation, but made containment itself, and the resultant energies of political neutralization, a core component of state function. Wu writes of the object of containment:
The freeing of political interpretation from the neat categories of official thought created a carnivalesque space in which officially sanctioned ideas and heretical meanings coexisted and impinged upon one another; and orthodox notions—while being ritualistically invoked—were nevertheless surreptitiously appropriated and creatively modified into new interpretations. (13)
The mass political activism characteristic of the Cultural Revolution, however, was not necessarily the direct expression of preexisting social discontent and grievances. Rather, this activism was often the result of novel forms of political language and action in a turbulent process that few participants fully comprehended. In espousing explosive slogans such as “Bombard the headquarters” and “Rebellion is justified”, Mao—China’s party chief turned rebel leader—set in motion new dynamics that radically disrupted the existing arrangements of politics. With the abrupt separation of Mao’s charismatic authority from the party apparatus, superior political understanding was no longer the monopoly of the party. Indeed, the basic rationale of the mass politics characteristic of the Cultural Revolution was that Mao’s Thought could be grasped directly by the general populace, unmediated by the party. Although everyone was speaking in the name of Mao, Mao’s fragmentary ideas were variously interpreted in fluid circumstances and were appropriated for diverse purposes—to rationalize interpersonal conflicts and factional rivalries, to articulate popular grievances, or to justify attacks on political authorities… Giving new meanings to a myriad of antagonisms that had hitherto remained latent, the events of the Cultural Revolution had a logic and dynamic of their own, and in ways that neither the Supreme Leader nor any determinate political programs could fully control or even foresee. (51)
Important corrective approaches to the Cultural Revolution,8 Wu’s included, treat its politics according to a specific historical periodization that centers on the changing nature of political actors and small-group composition, the nature of antagonisms, and the character of containment/institutionalization. Wu’s periodization is not, of course, neat and tidy, and the movement was certainly subject to numerous local variations. In the following summary of the historical sequence, for readers unfamiliar with the movement’s contents, I will make occasional note of Wu’s interpretive periodization schema, but will address his specific arguments in the following section.
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The Cultural Revolution began in the late winter of 1966, with a power struggle waged by Mao and his allies against others in positions of central authority deemed to be following a “revisionist” line antagonistic to Mao himself. Mao and his anti-revisionist allies consolidated their power from February on, culminating in the May 16 establishment of the “Cultural Revolution Group,” whose most prominent members included his wife, the radical Jiang Qing, as well as Kang Sheng, polemicist Yao Wenyuan, and theorist Zhang Chunqiao. On May 25, Beijing University philosophy lecturer Nie Yuanzi posted the first “big character poster” attacking the university leadership and its suppression of revolutionary fervor, a poster that Mao publicly approved. Almost immediately, Red Guard groups arose at nearly every university and middle school in Beijing, and this was soon to be emulated around the country. In the early summer of 1966, then-President Liu Shaoqi, later to become the major target of the anti-revisionist campaign, sent “work teams” to the schools and universities to direct and supervise student activism. This attempt to suppress these nascent energies met with substantial student opposition. The Cultural Revolution Group also recognized the work teams as counterrevolutionary, and these teams were withdrawn in July. At that point, the “pluralization” phase, as Alessandro Russo has called it, developed rapidly, as numerous and varied Red Guard groups sprang up, often in conflict with each other. Although the composition of the Red Guards was diverse, Wu observes that in this early period, the children of revolutionaries and cadres, those who were “Born Red,” played a dominant role. These young people primarily targeted those with “bad class backgrounds,” which they believed made them real or potential agents of counter-revolution. Beijing’s demographics—it had a negligible working class population and a disproportionately high number of government functionaries—shaped this dynamic. This, according to Wu, contributed to the strategic and ideological predominance of the “bloodline” theory of revolutionary identity in the early period. The summer and early fall of 1966 were marked by numerous incidents of violent attack on those with bad class backgrounds, as well as destruction of historical monuments from imperial times. In Wu’s analysis, the high degree of violence in this period was not unrelated to the ideological domination of the bloodline position, and he musters research to suggest, here and elsewhere in the book, that the worst violence in the Cultural Revolution was not characteristic of the Cultural Revolution as a whole, but was the product of distinct political conjunctures.
The Cultural Revolution Group was tepid in its support of the “bloodline” analysis, however, and over the fall, the targets increasingly included all those in positions of authority, irrespective of class background. This, according to Wu, both allowed for broader participation in the movement and occasioned significantly more political creativity than had been possible under the more rigid identity politics of the previous months. The most significant events of late 1966 and early 1967 occurred in Shanghai, where, in contrast to Beijing, large numbers of workers became active in the movement. The Shanghai events are among the most studied in the Cultural Revolution, but interpretations vary. Over the course of the autumn, workers organized around a disparate range of grievances—pay, employment status, residence and relocation, working conditions, and factory governance, and in November, a loose coalition of groups took shape, naming itself the Workers’ General Headquarters (WGHQ). Foremost among their demands was recognition and legitimacy, for the directives from the Cultural Revolution Group were, in the fall of 1966, somewhat ambiguous on the question of workers’ participation. Other groups sprang up as well, including the Scarlet Guards, who were defenders of the Shanghai municipal authorities, against whom the WGHQ were arrayed. Events came to a climax in late December and early January of 1967, as WGHQ and allied groups’ militancy reached a boiling point—institutions were taken over, and the situation in general was akin to that of a general strike. Zhang Chunqiao of the Cultural Revolution Group came to Shanghai in January and officially recognized the WGHQ as a revolutionary group. February 5, 1967 witnessed the formation of the famous Shanghai Commune, which was heralded as a new model for a politics developing out of the seizure of power from below. Earlier than this, however, units of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) had been sent into Shanghai to assist in the revolutionary seizure of power, and the PLA constituted, in Wu’s analysis, an energy of order and, at times, containment.
As events progressed in Shanghai, Mao had second thoughts about the Commune, and ordered it disbanded on February 24 in favor of a new administrative form that had emerged in the northeast. In Shanghai, as elsewhere in China, the Cultural Revolution was to be overseen by Revolutionary Committees, comprising members of the PLA, representatives of rebel groups, and party cadres. Throughout the late fall and winter, and throughout the brief life of the Commune, groups with varied compositions and agenda proliferated, with demands that their grievances be addressed and that they participate in power sharing. The situation before, during, and after the Commune was very fluid. Although the Revolutionary Committee mode of governance was intended to be followed nationwide, its implementation was slow and uneven, and Shanghai remained the scene of inter-factional struggle until the summer of 1967. The events in Shanghai precipitated many other attempts to seize power throughout the country during the winter and spring of that year.
In the spring of 1967 in Wuhan, a strategically and industrially important city in central China, the PLA intervened militarily against the city’s large, radical Red Guard faction, despite being ordered to desist by the Cultural Revolution Group. When two representatives of the Cultural Revolution Group arrived in the city, one was assaulted. This prompted a brief campaign against “capitalist roaders in the army,” and the damage to the PLA’s legitimacy encouraged widespread defiance against their authority. This confluence of events convinced many in the central leadership that the country was threatened with total chaos. In September of 1967, Mao began a campaign to end factional conflict, and rapidly put the Cultural Revolution under the control of the Revolutionary Committees. This met considerable resistance in many quarters, but by the end of 1967 it was clear that this was the center’s chosen course.
Over the first half of 1968, the movement and factions were largely contained, and the focus shifted to the institutionalization of the Cultural Revolution’s successful power struggles to date. By September of 1968, Revolutionary Committees were in place in every province. Between late 1968 and 1972, the Revolutionary Committees went after thousands of people accused of factional fighting and counterrevolutionary activities, and as several scholars have noted, these purges marked the most violent period of the Cultural Revolution.9 By 1972, the PLA had emerged as the strongest administrative force in the country. In the factories and the schools, the politics and values of the Cultural Revolution remained in force, as evident in the “worker-peasant-soldier” universities, the universities-in-the-factories, continued discussion of organizational forms, etc. Although the Red Guards had ceased to exist, this final period witnessed periodic national campaigns (criticize Lin Biao, etc.) as well as struggles within particular factories. The period was also marked by power struggles within the central leadership, the most salient event of which was an aborted coup by PLA supporters of Lin Biao in 1971. Following its defeat, the PLA’s authority again came into question. The Cultural Revolution continued until 1976, when the “Gang of Four” was arrested.
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Critique of bureaucratic class privilege was central to Cultural Revolution politics, and Revolution at the Margins makes distinctive analytical contributions to our understanding of the nature of class, class analysis, and class conflict in the PRC. It begins by recognizing the incommensurate and discrepant temporalities of post-1949 class politics. The codification of class categories was first made on the basis of family origin, i.e., with reference to a social system whose field of antagonism had for the most part ceased to exist by the 1960s, but which were insisted upon, in part, to guarantee a form of affirmative action for those with “good” class backgrounds, and thus avoid the unintended reproduction of class privilege.10 Yet these bureaucratized and reified class categories, which had become a defining element of individual identities, had taken on a life of their own, divorced, for the most part, from actual social relations. At the same time, a privileged bureaucratic stratum was in formation, with well-defined benefits for each administrative level. Mao’s alarm at the emergence of this new class structure—he was determined to avoid China’s revolution following the Soviet revisionist path—added a new dimension of antagonism to the social field. Existing class discourse proved an awkward vehicle for this newly superimposed language of critique of bureaucratic class privilege. A consequence, Wu writes, was that
Instead of giving rise to a conception of class adequate to Chinese socialism, the reification of class and compression of class analyses centering on old and new—or prerevolutionary and postrevolutionary—social relationships ended up creating a hopelessly incoherent ideological space in which sharply different politics of class interpenetrated and fused, with new types of social conflict continually represented as manifestations of the titanic battles of the past between the revolutionary forces and the agents of the ancient regime. (49)
Although much existing scholarship on post-1949 class recognizes the incoherence of PRC class discourse, it remains far less analytically precise on this incommensurability and its consequences. Wu suggests the political and theoretical work at the margins proposed various ways out of that incoherence. The party-state’s containment and repression of those initiatives culminated, ultimately, in the suppression of class discourse altogether as the reform period progressed. Today, for example, the word “class” (jieji) is frowned upon, in favor of the less fraught term “stratum” (jieceng). Another characteristic of class in China today, although Wu neglects to mention this, is that members of families with “bad” class backgrounds have been disproportionately represented in the ranks of university students, in executive positions, and in arts and letters. This phenomenon is not uncommon in postsocialist societies, wherein pre-revolutionary elites, such as the Polish szlachta, have managed to recapture substantial social and economic privilege after decades of social restructuring. This re-emergence might make one look more sympathetically at the redistributive identity-based class politics of the earlier period.
One significant force on the margins was Yu Luoke, whose writings represented a major challenge to official class discourse. Yu Luoke is best known for his polemical essay against the bloodline theory, “On Class Origins,” published in January 1967. It was critical not only of the rigidity of codified class identity, but also of the capacity of such a system to produce a new elite class. Wu makes the strong claim that Yu Luoke’s position was in no way a functionalist expression of a particularist interest, derived from his own (privileged background) class position as defined by the system, and thus a harbinger of a later liberal universalizing human rights discourse, as some have claimed, but rather a significant attempt to reframe the revolution-era discourse of class in its entirety, turning it to questions of “moral autonomy” and “human dignity.” Although, as I mentioned earlier, members of the Cultural Revolution Group also expressed reservations of the bloodline theory, the broadly anti-authoritarian and popular democratic implications of Yu’s analysis were considered too great a challenge to the CCP. Yu, variously branded as a Trotskyist or an anarchist, was arrested in January 1968 and executed in 1970. Wu suggests that the state’s reactive foreclosure of this discussion of class was a formative component of its growing neutralization function, a function kept alive today in state bromides on the “harmonious society.”
Wu offers a new and original interpretation of the Shanghai events. The spread of the Cultural Revolution beyond students and into the working population was not part of the revolution’s original plan. The PRC was of course a developmentalist state, and Mao was consistent in his insistence on the importance of maintaining production levels. Although approving of workers’ radicalism in the strictly political sphere—the challenge to the power of municipal authorities, for example—concerns were raised, for the first time in PRC history, about “economism.” For on the surface, “economistic” concerns were indeed a primary activator of the Shanghai mobilizations. There were good reasons for this. Massive numbers of workers had been laid off in the early sixties, many sent to the countryside where they met a severe reduction in living standards. A system had grown in place whereby peasants from nearby agricultural areas were brought into factories seasonally, according to production schedule needs, and at vastly lower wages than those of urban workers; in many factories they represented 30% or more of the workforce. The housing crisis was acute, with urban residents reduced to an average of around three square meters per person. Although state rhetoric designated the working class as the masters of the country, in Shanghai, their position seemed to be deteriorating.
In late 1966 and early 1967, though, when state authority was at its nadir and when radical worker power was at its apogee, demands for back pay and benefits were often rapidly met, depleting enterprise and municipal coffers. The charge of “economism” was the language the state authorities used to curb this alarming tendency, and this charge was echoed by their epigones in the movements. And yet, as in the discourse of class, “economism” failed to capture what Wu sees as an underlying dynamic of an inchoate politics, an understanding of which requires a consideration of the relation between the economic and the political in socialist societies.
Although working-class struggles over wages and the length of the workday under capitalism may be viewed as economistic (or “economic-corporate” to borrow a term from Antonio Gramsci) and thus structurally intrinsic to a capitalist system, the same may not be true of similar struggles in state-socialist societies in which economic and political spheres lack differentiation and in which extraction of surplus-labor is achieved through extra-economic means… But in certain forms of noncapitalist society (including state-socialist society), the amalgamation of economic and political powers makes possible extraction of surplus labor through the coercive apparatus of the state. In such contexts, contests over economic issues challenge the state power underlying surplus extraction, and apparently economic struggles often become inseparable from political conflicts. (107)
The CCP, Wu holds, functioned very early on in the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution as a force of containment, a force visible even in the proclamation of the Shanghai Commune itself. Wu’s analysis of the complex sequence of events in January and February is extremely detailed. Zhang Chunqiao, in this analysis, does not emerge as a spokesperson/theorist of a new worker’s politics, and the Commune is not the expression of workers’ victories. Rather, the state from the start worked to forestall the development of a mass politics that had yet to coalesce and which could have, given space, time, and opportunity, created a new political discourse, expanding its initially prominent “economistic” concerns more fully into the social and political field. The proclamation of the Commune had a dual character. It galvanized political imagination elsewhere in the country, as Wu demonstrates in his chapter on the Shengwulian group in Hunan province (see below), but it was at the same time an attempt to reassert order, albeit within the parameters set by the political achievements of the rebel groups.
The document “Whither China,” written by Yang Xikuang for the Shengwulian group, which formed in Hunan province in September 1967 in reaction to the deradicalization of the Cultural Revolution then in progress, reflected the lessons that its author had learned from the Shanghai Commune—that the way to build communist society was through the wholesale elimination of the bureaucratic stratum, and the multiplication of communes. It is an extraordinary document, and I recommend it to readers of this review (available as of September 2014 at http://www.signalfire.org/?p=6810 or http://anti-imperialism.com/2012/10/17/whither-china-1968/ ). Rejecting the view that Shengwulian’s composition reflected a form of interest politics—its members were commonly drawn from those deemed to have been left out of the Cultural Revolution’s main thrust, such as decommissioned soldiers, urban “rusticates” who had left the villages to which they had been sent and returned to the countryside, and others—Wu holds that it was rather this marginal status that gave energy to a broader and more general critique of bureaucratic authority. Based on interviews and on archival work in Hunan (for which Wu was jailed and subject to interrogation), Wu gives a remarkably clear history of the organizational precedents for the Shengwulian group in Hunan—this itself is a remarkable feat of historiography—and the specific historical conjunctures to which it was a response. The chapter also makes clear that Yang Xiguang, member of Shengwulian and author of the famous “Whither China” essay, was not the only active intellectual in the movement. Wu makes clear that the standard view of Shengwulian as a movement of the disaffected and persecuted is not an inaccurate one, but argues convincingly that the group’s politics are not reducible to that.
The combination of locally based demands and the development of novel political ideas that informed and gave new meaning to specific incidents and grievances had a potentially explosive impact on the mass politics of the Cultural Revolution. But such ruptural moment did not materialize. Condemned as “anarchist” and anti-party, these critical currents were swiftly crushed by national and local authorities. The political and theoretical activities of the activists were suppressed ruthlessly. They were denounced for calling for the discarding of party leadership and deliberately propagating a false image of a self-perpetrating bureaucratic class. With the reassertion of organizational regimentation and interpretive control, critical voices emergent in the movement were silenced, and political orthodoxy was reimposed. (185)
The Shengwulian group was active as the most radical phase of the CR was winding down, as the party was consolidating the policies of containment and neutralization that crystallized in reaction to developments such as those described above. The Shengwulian presented a particularly radical challenge to the newly consolidated state orthodoxy, and Wu’s analysis makes clear why it met with such a heavy state response.
The Shengwulian was one of many popular anti-bureaucracy movements around the country that arose from the end of 1967 and into 1968, when all of them met the heavy hand of the state and suffered the same fate as Shengwulian’s. Indeed, as Wu shows from a survey of mostly Chinese-language scholarship, the most violent phase of the CR was a consequence of violence perpetrated by the state against these late-period militants. The period between 1970 and 1976 is a significant gap in Wu’s historical coverage, even given that the book is not intended to be a “history” of the CR. This is the most under-researched period of the CR, and we will need to await further scholarship before this period can be evaluated more fully.11 Extra-party mass movements had ceased to exist, but as I mentioned above, struggles continued within schools and factories as the CR was institutionalized. Although the period was indeed characterized by purges of “class enemies,” it is likely that in this period, as in earlier periods, there were a range of antagonisms that were carried out within this discursive frame. It is possible that further research on this period might reveal “micro-margins,” within particular institutions, and thus complicate Wu’s analysis of neutralization and containment.
Wu continues his analysis of the anti-bureaucratic tendencies by skipping to the immediate post-Mao period in the late 70s, treating material more familiar to readers of English-language scholarship—Li Yizhe, Chen Erjin, and Democracy Wall, commonly taken as the first stirrings of western-style human rights and liberal democracy discourse. Wu places this irruption of late Seventies politics within the context of the grassroots anti-bureaucratic movements that arose in late 1967 and early 1968, and makes a clear and convincing case for the many continuities he finds between movements of the two periods. The economic and political shifts of the immediate post-Mao years had, of course, created the latter opening, and political contingency made it initially expedient for the Deng Xiaoping reformist faction to use and tolerate the movement. Containment and neutralization of these energies would take a new form, however, with the 1978 Deng-ist reforms, which Wu analyzes according to Gramsci’s notion of “passive revolution,” whereby the earlier antagonisms were displaced into and neutralized by the new context of market reforms. The state logic of containment that arose in 1968 perdured, albeit in a new form.
Here, although it is not discussed in The Cultural Revolution at the Margins, I believe it would be useful to return to the reform-period center/local dynamics discussed at the beginning of this essay, which, as I suggested, represent a different version of politics and economics at the margins. Wu’s late-Seventies “margins” are worker-intellectual anti-authoritarian activists, who continued, in a different form and in new language, the radical anti-bureaucratic politics of the Cultural Revolution. Equally significant in the early reform period were spontaneous village-level reorganizations of rural industrial production. There remain significant ideological and political disputes about the nature of this development. Many on the Chinese Left hold that in its initial phases, these represented popular, locally based mutations of a cooperative mode of production, at more remove from state control, but in which the development of ownership and private property rights was not on the political-economic agenda. I tend to concur with this judgment.12 This is also, however, one argument made by the “continuity” school in China, which sees in the early Deng-era reforms significant continuities with Mao-era socialist developmentalism, but without bureaucratic and authoritarian shackles of the earlier period, in other words, a politically progressive development. There are significant political implications in these claims for continuity. In this school’s analysis of the present period, to summarize somewhat crudely, China remains a socialist country, and in the absence of universal private-property rights, and minus the consolidation of a distinct capitalist class with its own social power, the state retains the capacity—although it has largely chosen not to exercise this capacity—to shape development along socialist and egalitarian lines, given the rapid development of productive forces and China’s participation in the global economy on its own terms.13 This is certainly an overestimation of the Chinese state’s ability or will to create a socio-economic system that represents a serious alternative to globally dominant modes of capitalist accumulation. It does represent a conviction that the CCP is a power wherein the political and the economic spheres continue to have a different relationship than elsewhere in the capitalist world, and that socialist or social-democratic political and ideological hegemony within the party remains a possibility.
I would suggest, rather, that the course of the reform period, especially beginning in the 1990s, with its massive acceleration of private enterprise development and capitalist market relations, even within the state-owned enterprises, represented a reshaping of the center/local or center/margin dynamic, locating it no longer in the realm of politics, but in the realm of differentiated capitalist spatiality. To date, this has served the state reasonably well. But the negative consequences—corruption, over-capacity, local debt, environmental degradation—not only render the economy more prone to crises but, more importantly, threaten state legitimacy. Current efforts to reassert central control and rationalize the bureaucracy are intended to address these threats. It is doubtful that this effort, even if successful, could immunize China against capitalist crisis. But it could very possibly, in the near future, in any case, weaken the capacity for innovation or political creativity at “the margins.”
The Chinese Left was generally enthusiastic about developments in Chongqing at the end of the first decade of this century. Bo Xilai, Chongqing party chairman, announced a series of social-democratic reforms and an expansion of the government-owned sector of the economy, and revived, though the singing of “red songs” and other public forums, some of the populist language of the Mao era. As I have written elsewhere, developments in Chongqing departed in very few ways from the market-reform state’s developmentalist path, and it was questionable whether the modest social-democratic reform programs were economically sustainable, or whether they were, as Bo Xilai’s champions claimed, exportable to the country at large and not merely a slightly progressive version of the spatial fix.14 Bo fell from power in 2012—and the extent to which this was a political or a criminal affair is still debated. Many leftist supporters reacted with alarm when then Premier Wen Jiabao raised the specter of the Cultural Revolution in his denunciation of Bo. Although there was nothing especially radical in Bo’s politics, the Cultural Revolution language signaled central concern over the political implications of excessive local deviation. His fall was likely to end, for the time being at least, of any possibility of significant innovation at the local level.
Existing scholarship on the Cultural Revolution in China generally adheres to the official state view of “ten years of disaster” or restricts itself to detailed, often regionally specific empirical study. It is difficult to do more than that, and the political argument that Wu is advancing here would not be possible in China. In English-language scholarship, another set of constraints obtains. One is what Jacques Rancière once referred to as the “police view of history”: the historian functions as the cop at the scene of an incident, urging witnesses to move along by saying “nothing happened”: the CR as disastrous aberration without anything significant at the level of content. More serious studies commonly focus on planes of antagonism either at the level of the CCP higher bureaucracy, or between factions among the people, factions whose own organizational logics are interpreted in various ways, most commonly according to material or corporate group interest, and to the relationship or non-relationship between politics at the center and in the extra-party organizations.
Wu’s achievement in this book is to consider the primary antagonism as that between the party state bureaucracy and the “marginal” political forces that arose either in the early period of the CR or in reaction to the containment/consolidation of late 1967 and into 1968. His analysis overlaps with, but is ultimately quite different from, that of Perry and Li, for whom worker politics in the CR was primarily an expression of worker interest. For Wu, as outlined above, has a more nuanced sense of “interest.” It also has some overlap with, but is ultimately quite different from the very interesting work of Alessandro Russo, who has a much more sanguine view of the anti-bureaucratic politics of Mao and others in the Cultural Revolution Group. Wu’s book makes a coherent and important argument about the political content of popular movements in the CR, even though these politics remained inchoate, and the deep impact that these movements had on the nature of the party state. The legitimacy of the contemporary Chinese state rests on the twin pillars of developmentalism and “maintaining stability” (weiwen). The latter is of course a notoriously fluid term, and serves a number of purposes—suppression of popular protest movements, militarization of ethnic-minority regions, controls on the internet—but it is widely understood to refer in no small part to the “chaos” (luan) of the not-so-distant past. In keeping with the logic of negation that this position embodies, the state thus remains within the parameters set by the Cultural Revolution, which makes Wu’s study so vital today.
Comments
The New Deal and the New Order of Capitalist Institutions (1972)
Selections from a longer text in Sergio Bologna and Antonio Negri, eds., Operai e stato: Lotte operaie e riforma dello Stato capitalistico tra rivoluzione d’ottobre e New Deal (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1972).
To speak of the New Deal as a huge qualitative leap in the development of capitalist institutions – a leap that, precisely because it functions at a crucial point in the plot1 of capitalist society at a global level, has itself a special historical importance – seems to be a statement by now generally taken to be wholly correct. The matter was already settled in the mind of its greatest protagonist [Franklin Delano Roosevelt] and in the ideology created around him that enthusiastically founded the “myth” of the New Deal’s “revolution”; and, if every myth must have a real justification, this one lay in the effective dismantling of the system in the rapid course of a decade. No less significant, at this level, is the bitter opposition from various positions that the New Deal came to provoke; these were attitudes that then, and not accidentally, flowed back against it in a wide underlying consensus. Even the opposition was to become New Dealistic2 in a “me-too” fashion. In any case, one can recognize in the facts the irreversibility of the new order imposed or acquired by the New Deal. But how was this tremendous leap of the entire capitalist order reflected internally? On what points did it hinge and along which lines did its upheaval unfold, even while it is still taken in general shape as a given fact, or, at the least, as a more than legitimate working hypothesis?
It’s clear that passing to analysis, which alone might give us a definitive answer, our research would be strengthened and supported by an accomplished articulation of the hypotheses. But it’s precisely on this point that the usefulness of what we might call traditional elaboration is attenuated: instead of responses in terms of a global political-institutional system, we get either ideological generalizations or sectarian responses, more solid yet limited. The most incisive recent effort to offer a synthetic interpretation of the period, even if still within the limits of an analysis conducted in terms of ideological constellation, is that of Hofstadter. Therefore, it’s from there that we can proceed.
It seems difficult to contest Hofstadter’s theses in their negative part, so to speak: for Hofstadter, the New Deal was essentially a “fresh start,” and, above all, a radical rupture with the entire populist and progressive tradition which, on first glance, it might appear close to. We shouldn’t marvel at the way that it manages to yoke together the whole multicolored world of that tradition – from bimetallism to the KKK, from “muckrakers” to the campaign for competition, from the struggle for social welfare to that for prohibition, and, above all, in their most conscious, historically and politically significant forms, from the “neonationalism” of Theodore Roosevelt to the “new liberty” of Woodrow Wilson. That’s to say, it connects the social and political climate of which it is an expression, however mediated. That is a climate dominated, according to Hofstadter, by the already massive presence of social-economic forces, which can be read through small urban entrepreneurship and the figure of the farmer, who became more active on the political scene the more dramatically they struggled with continuous social upheavals brought about by the expansion of capitalist production relations. From this perspective, it’s no great leap to see how the true lineage of populism could gather, in the ’30s, the unequivocal figure of Huey Long, the “lord” of Louisiana, or a variety of Father Coughlins, Reverend Smiths, and Doctor Townsends; and, as Hofstadter notes, that progressivism, so strong in the moralizing campaigns and protests in defense of competition and balancing the books, truly came out of the Republican “opposition” to the New Deal.
Naturally, all of this is of little direct interest to us. But it remains important insofar as it lets us understand, or at least intuit, just how much the old stratification of society was revolutionized in the span of years from the First World War to the “second” Roosevelt. To discern it in its particulars would require extended research, but the lines are clear all the same: it is the polarization of an entire society toward a “pure” capitalist form. Concentration of capital on one side, and concentration, enlargement, and flattening of labor-power on the other.3
This sweeping process took off in ’29 with an intensity proportional to the liberty with which it was performed. No one could see the point from which it might have started: not the workers who, having struck down in ’20 the prospect of a direct assault on the state, now found themselves without even the minimal practical instruments of organization available for immediate use. Not capital, which was totally disorientated, incapable of fully explaining the reasons for the crash, searching, through Hoover, for “international” causes that convinced no one, and precisely because of this, fearful of restarting accumulation along paths already taken. The years from the crash to Roosevelt were years of stalling: a paradoxical situation, where everything was in movement and everything remained still. In other words: the situation couldn’t last indefinitely. But public consciousness itself couldn’t imagine [a way out], either a directly capitalist initiative of exiting the impasse differently from what was happening that very same moment in Germany [i.e. the Nazis], or a workers’ initiative different from that of 15 years prior and the situation of general societal breakdown that brought the Bolsheviks to power.
From this emerged the New Deal. We have to acknowledge this, because there is an element of historical truth contained in all these ideological theorizations about the New Deal’s third way, or, if one prefers, about American “exceptionalism,” – provided, that is, that we remember that this exception had the same logic as every exception in the capitalist mode of production: it will be suppressed, or it will be imposed as a general rule, with all the force of a natural law.
The New Deal’s initiative meant a political initiative that moves and develops entirely from institutions, from the state, from collective capital. When we see big finance, the Morgans and Mellons, Wall Street, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Manufactures all put themselves entirely at the disposition of Roosevelt, who leads the charge, we are not witnessing a picture whatsoever similar to old representations of investment. Behind the resigned attitude of a Morgan in ’33, there is the awareness that the single capitalist, big as he may well be, does not succeed – does not because he cannot – in seeing with his own eyes anything beyond the possibilities and needs of his own profit, his own market. He can’t see the average rise of profit or the market as a whole, which, at this level of development, signifies society as a whole. In order to see this and to govern society, collective eyes and arms are needed: and in this historical moment, these are Roosevelt’s eyes and the New Deal’s “arsenal.” In this moment, the crucial leap is made, or, at least, its immediate premises are laid. Later, the old brawl between business and government will start up again, but the fundamentals have already been decided: there will be either verbal battles, from the rearguard in particular, or, as we will see, they will have new causes. Either way, all will be carried out on the ground created by the New Deal and will often even extend it.
Roosevelt, for his part, is perfectly aware of what is happening, and he comes to embody it rapidly, in spite of his purported pragmatism: “The truth of the matter, of course, is that the exponents of the theory of private initiative as the cure for deep-seated national ills want in most cases to improve the lot of mankind. But, well intentioned as they may be, they fail for four evident reasons – first, they see the problem from the point of view of their own business; second, they see the problem from the point of view of their own locality or region; third, they cannot act unanimously because they have no machinery for agreeing among themselves; and, finally, they have no power to bind the inevitable minority of chiselers within their own ranks.”4
Obviously, we’re not talking about the discovery of state intervention: those who stop at this vacuous generality would risk misunderstanding, entirely of their own fault, and would have reason to object – like an Italian expert of labor law – that, when seen really on the institutional and political level, the New Deal was a direct heir of the neo-nationalism of the first Roosevelt or even of the politics of W. Wilson, in the way that its effective management practically contradicted Jeffersonian ideology.
At the same time, we’re not seeking to simply counterpose a “positive government” to a “negative government;” we’re dealing instead with a different total function and therefore with a qualification of the New Deal’s “positive government” different even in comparison to the “positivity” of previous interventionism. This difference also isn’t to be found in the charge of “empire,” with greater or lesser intensity of constriction, in regards to single capitalists, because from this point of view, there were far more sanctioning mechanisms in the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, with its Federal Trade Commission, than in the NRA (National Recovery Adminstration) and its “codes,” of which tbe only unique (or quasi-unique) formal guarantee was bound up with the abolition of the Blue Eagle [in 1935], collective capital’s certificate of merit given to its own functionaries. Nor does the difference lie in the immediate contents of the intervention, if it is true that between the concrete administration of anti-trust legislation in the years of the New Deal and the declared aims of the NRA, or the “efficientist” imposition enacted in the course of the “second New Deal,” there was perfect continuity.
So just what are we dealing with? One lone, unadorned fact alone offers the key to an answer: in the space of one year, the more than 600 laws sanctioned by Roosevelt – containing price fixes, production quantities, wage conditions, etc. – pertained to 95% of American employers! Here it is no longer a question of interventionism but of the direct responsibility of the state, in the first person, for the entire production of value. Here, even in symbolic form, a whole series of traditional presuppositions of the State and its relation to society (and the economy) discover, in the framework of an uninterrupted continuity of power, their own practical reversal.
In reality, if one really wants to find precedents and practical origins of the first New Deal models, they should be sought in the brief, exceptional experience of the War Industries Board: and it is hardly accidental that here, in General Hugh Johnson of the NRA or George Peck of the AAA, one can even identify them with specific persons. But it is really this reference to the model of war industry management, which is achieved by now and which imposes itself out from here, that can spontaneously generate the objection that, because that was an episode, imposed by circumstances and limited in time, the required leap made by the institutions of the New Deal, and of which NIRA was without doubt a qualifying element, can also be traced back to a parenthesis, imposed by the no less dramatic situation of the war and totally dominated by the need to exit the crises however possible, the need to secure the recovery by whatever means necessary.
It’s an idea that, in turn, might find ample confirmation in the fact that, between ’35 and ’36, a large part of institutional construction put in place in the preceding years had to fall and that, therefore, of this construction, it was specifically the NIRA that would not be brought back to life; yet this shouldn’t be accidental or surprising, because it was then believed, and still is by many, to be a largely “failed” measure.
There emerges here, in other words, an interpretative tendency to separate, if not to oppose, recovery and reform within the overall New Deal experience; a tendency that was nourished also by the distinction, to which we’ll return, between a “first” and “second” New Deal.
Even if one had, in general, excellent reasons for doubting every attempt to abstractly distinguish between “recovery” and “reform,” between conjuncture and development, how should one reconcile these apparently contrasting elements in this case? How to square the importance of NIRA – here assuming for simplicity that exemplary and summary moment of the political-institutional leap – with the admission (and in line with current view) not just of the exhaustion of its function but truly of its failure, less than two years from its founding?
It does not seem difficult to isolate the path through which to exit this problem of how to interpret the New Deal “revolution,” as soon as one has got free of that abstract, and merely institutional, approach. In fact: what signifies all that formidable articulation of the state over society, that flows down from the state as from the political heavens,
that coordinates around a single center of gravity the entire process of social reproduction and its conditions? This is, it’s said, the discovery of society, of capitalist society; the discovery of a real dynamic that was grown through many convulsions and that today shows itself before our eyes not just in all its complexity but also in all its terrible simplicity; it is an active discovery, that is an immediate need, of the necessity of organization and control. But now it’s clear that, for the restructuring to be effective and functional, for it to constitute that new “economic constitutional order” of which Roosevelt spoke (in a much-noted speech to the Commonwealth Club of California), the entire structure of society will be learned, in its real consistency and real contradictions, beyond any “popular” ideological residue. Now, the paradox, if you wish, of the American situation in ’31 is this: while capital, that which is wrongly accused of incurable individualism, offers to society a compact political will and rich organizational forms for proceeding with “industrial reorganization,” the working class cannot “offer,” so to speak, anything of this sort: it covers an economically broad surface but one totally, or nearly, without handholds. One can’t take into serious consideration the unions of the Gompersian trades [i.e. the AFL], which gathered less than 3 million workers, an extremely low percentage of the total labor-power of the factory, true leftovers of a situation in which unionized workers were not just the heart but also – still – the relatively restricted elite of the proletariat. Instead, after the rapid massification of workers in preceding years (the disappearance of the proletariat within direct relations of factory production), and under the whip of the crisis, it became an urgent political and economic necessity to recuperate for society a comprehensive and organized figure of the working class.
If there was, with the New Deal, a leap made by institutions, its characteristic internal element was this need for a public remedy through the “economic” organization of the working class. If NIRA was the “heart” of the 100 days [i.e. the first 100 days of Roosevelt’s administration], then paragraph 7(a) – that imposed by law the necessary conditions for unionization5 and that the organizations of industrialists themselves had demanded in a moment of maximum awareness (knowing full well that, without a legislative obligation, each of them at the meeting would be “forced” to squeeze salaries to save their own capital, thereby accelerating the tailspin of the Depression) – is, in outlook, the heart of the entire New Deal.
So, what failed in ’35, when the NIRA was annulled, or better, what had not succeeded to the degree demanded by the circumstances, was really that paragraph 7(a). But it did not shift the fundamental axis of the New Deal one iota: it didn’t shift it for the workers who also, in ’35, speak of the NRA as the “National Round Around,”6 but who together, for their own interests, drive more than the half the struggles of that year on the theme of union organization or, if you prefer, for the “respecting” of 7(a). It did not shift for the New Deal that, in the same year, substituted 7(a) with the Wagner Act, guaranteeing it on a larger scale. Of the latter, one could say from a historical perspective, that it was to be the “most significant measure of the first and second New Deal, that which engraved itself most lastingly on the structure of American society.”7
It is of absolutely secondary importance, in this regard, that the Wagner Act was not a direct Roosevelt initiative or that Roosevelt had taken it up and supported it only after it was approved by the lower House. Those who are embarrassed by this difficulty problem could speak of a “real cunning of reason.”8 It’s important to grasp its absolutely characteristic significance in this specific historical phase. One is simply dealing with the fact of unionization itself: from this point of view, the birth of the CIO, the jump from 3 million unionized workers in ’33 to 7 million in ’37, to 41 in ’45, would seem above all – as in the cover, the recuperation of a delay with respect to the conditions of capitalist production in other countries. But the fact of the matter is that, at that level of the system’s development (and with the crisis having at least served to impose awareness of this), unionization was, or least became, a directly capitalist exigency and need.
We’re not crafting a “fantastic” or ideological story of the New Deal: capital’s needs are always, in the last analysis, hard economic needs. In this case, the immediate need was to resolve the enormous economic problem of the crisis, even if the solution came to condition, as a projection forward, an entire historical phase of capitalist society. Workers’ union organization – that is, the class of workers as seen through the eyes of capital – is necessary because it – not by itself, if you wish; it is just one directly Keynesian face of the New Deal – could stimulate and guarantee the recovery of development, moving from the single grounding point it could find that would let it realize this in a stable fashion. To put the second category of the Marxian schema9 in relation with the first, and to ensure this relation, it is in fact necessary that the process begin again and that it will be guided by the rise of demands, by purchasing power: workers’ unionization in all branches of production signifies exactly that guarantee of the rate of increase of salary in single branches of industry (whose downward rigidity has already been discovered) and of the rise of the global mass of wages.
[…]
[The protests of capital] in fact project today nothing other than results achieved by the New Deal. It isn’t a question of “verifying” that hypothesis; only, if anything, of fleshing out its construction. It would have to result in, on one side, the adherence of terms of the actual situation to those constructed within the New Deal; and, on the other, as new problems that emerge and demand new solutions born from the internal logic of that balance. We might say that it is all the more possible today to grasp the construction of the New Deal as the opening of the “historical phase” in the development of capitalist society insofar as it reveals itself, and its specific internal characteristics, to be over. Because the United States will now have to refer, in all likelihood, back to the ’50s when capital, determinedly following its “technological way” toward anti-worker repression, made the leap to the “era of automation” and, conversely, spread wide the gap between the autonomous logic of the struggle of workers from that of their “organizations.”10 As always, it is in the moment of crisis that the essential features of the old order are revealed. This transition is perfectly realized in dialectical form. That extraordinary Fordist intuition, having become through the New Deal the Grundnorm of capitalist society, assigns to the wage its role as the strategic share of revenue within the dynamics of the system, and to the working class the concrete function of capital’s “moving motor.” Yet the grand effort of “appropriating” the working class, like the daily appropriation of their labor-power by capital, could have no other result than to render the contradictions of the system even more intimate. Here is rooted the crisis of that same order achieved through the New Deal, a crisis that can only collide with what [the New Deal] sought to claim as its most mature institutional achievement: the “function” of the union.
For this reason, it might seem interesting to give a quick glance at more recent developments; for this, the indications of a good enough manual will suffice. Therefore, today, “certain principles seem to be fixed. Among these are the right of labor to organize for collective bargaining, the duty of each party to negotiate in good faith, the right of employers to express their opinions in a noncoercive way to their employees, the liability of labor organizations to suit, the recognition of the distinctiveness of the supervisor’s position, determination of questions of representation by election, and prohibition of political contributions from corporate or union funds.” 11
The uncertainties still surrounding certain points – like indirect boycott, mass picketing – don’t shift the general framework. But more interesting to consider are new problems: these are the problems born, we’d say, “from the existence of third party interests: the totality of the public.” The so recent use of so old an idea isn’t accidental. It’s the most evident index of a real difficulty, born on properly economic terrain, of the dynamics of these elements to which were entrusted the task of the recovery.
We see in this nothing less than its basic institutional shape, which is of interest to us now. The problem comes to be posed in terms of a “monopoly of labor.” It’s not the problem, mind you, of the closed or union shop, that directs an entire category of workers under a single union. The Taft-Hartley Act, in this regard, may have been a reactionary moment, to the degree it sought to intervene on this point. But the unity of the union in the company or in the category isn’t here in question; the unity of representation is even seen as a positive fact. The co-involved problems are indeed problems of the excessive breadth of the bargaining and of the union. More precisely – for the moment excluding the impracticably drastic solution of resubmitting the unions to anti-trust law – the major open questions were the following two:
1) What must the public political stance in the case that bargaining fails? This is the problem that lies behind the final demand of the outline of labor conflicts prepared by the Railways Act. One could arrange the outline as one liked, one might extend it in all possible ways, but at a certain point, this [failure of bargaining] had to come. It’s precisely this that they sought to avoid: not because workers pressure for wage increases always requires open and official war in order to be heard (also because the struggle was always used consciously by the union, in the initial bargaining phases, as a steam valve to reduce the pressure that built up past a point “rationally” possible to obtain), but more simply because a demand always contains something worrying. And moreover, the problem, in its abstract terms, is irresolvable, or at the least, its conflictuality cannot be eliminated. So in concrete terms, the best solution still seemed to be that of putting trust in the self-regulation of the mechanism, only taking care to handle it in a more “rational” manner or to once again extend the length of its passages. But the dissatisfaction was obvious, as the existing balance’s slump betrayed awareness of its unsustainability.
2) On the other hand, the so-called public interests don’t lie only in the “industrial,” i.e. in the existence of correct relations between involved parties and of procedural rules that could determine the dynamics; nor were they only concerned to avoid blockages of production (which was a later specification of those interests behind this peace). Today, one could say, they concern also the contents of these agreements. The problem can also be expressed in these terms: “whether the public can leave the determination of some issues to private parties whose jurisdiction is industry-wide, or whose decisions are pattern-setting. These decisions may have such large consequences toward inflation, impairment of the American competitive position abroad, increase of unemployment, or other results as to raise a question whether they should be made in a forum where only private parties, under constraint to represent their limited clienteles, participate in the decision.”12
This is an increasingly pressing problem. How to confront it? On one hand, by reinforcing the tripartite bargaining model: if a general interest is in play, it must be represented: and it can be done so indifferently, either by the government or by “neutral” technicians.
On the other, there’s the formulation of guideposts “for the non-inflationary movement of prices and wages.” This is the most consistent strategic move, especially because, for the time being, it reconciles the desire for public intervention with that of avoiding solutions that are merely impositions or that are irregular or ad hoc presidential interventions. The guideposts (whose principle is the equalization of taxes on wage increases in single branches of industry with the tax on the general rise in productivity) are contained for the first time in the 1962 report of the Council of Economic Advisors; it’s the Council of Kennedy.
In this case, the “new frontier” is that of the entirety of international capital: the “politics of wages” and the repression of legitimate struggles by the “plan” already have nothing uniquely American about them. The New Deal, tested in the highest point of capitalist development in a crucial moment, is by now behind them, and behind us all.
[…]
A few conclusive remarks seem possible on the basis of what has just been observed. What reveals itself is a series of contradictory movements in the relation between bourgeois political terrain and the social process of capitalist production. The horizon of the New Deal would seem to be dominated by a unique tension. In effect, what presented itself, in still limited dimensions, for the first time with the “legislation on factories” – “that first conscious and methodical reaction of society against the spontaneously developed form of the process of production”13 – could then become a completely developed reality when all of society is directly inserted into the production process of capital. In the same way that the legislation of factories is already a legislation of capital by capital, of the variable part of itself, on the level of the society-factory it gives objective grounding to legislation of the working class by collective capital. It would not seem unjustified to see in the New Deal a historically foundational point of passage in this development.
However, this process has its own dialectic. On one side, the machinery of the political state tends to increasingly identify itself with the figure of the collective capitalist and increasingly becomes the property of the capitalist mode of production and therefore a function of the capitalist. On the other, however, this “recuperation within society… of the political functions of the state” necessarily participates in the mystifying appearances of a society divided into classes and in the mystified relation between capitalist production and bourgeois society. In fact: as “when the factory becomes boss of all society… the factory seems to vanish,” as “the real rising process of proletarianization presents itself as the formal process of tertiarization,” so “the return of political and state functions inside the very structure of civil society presents itself as a contradiction between state and society: the increasingly strict functionality of politics and economy as the possible autonomy of the political terrain from economic relations.”14
We should also perhaps underscore now that this “appearance” is, or becomes, also a real process, a necessity. Here the New Deal enters it only relatively: it was totally engaged in the “discovery” of capitalist society. The discourse bears on recent developments: when, today, we see the autonomy of the political vigorously confirmed and constructed, while for some time now the state has become the subjective principle of the imputation of the process of social reproduction, in which we can discern a defensive principle, a spy of a capital’s weakness on its own terrain, that found in the New Deal a historic point of departure and the essential terms of its own explication.
This weakness is a reality that capital must learn on its own accord, through experience. The awareness of this is entirely absent in technocratic utopias of controlled industry, of which there were so many in the New Deal. When Berle and Means end The Modern Corporation (1932) by writing: “The future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship”15 – this is the confident and optimistic proposition of a new economic order. It’s fitting that the union, officially constituted, enter into this process, because the new order loses every ambiguous corporate residue, and presents itself instead as the organization of freely contracted subjects, a system of “counterposed powers,” and dynamic democracy.
Society-factory, capitalist social plan: from the first historical realization of this movement is born the optical illusion that foresees the “extinction” of the exponential accumulation of social violence. What we can’t see immediately, though, is how the social diffusion of domination and the apparent “truce” between “politics” and “economy” necessarily contains within in itself the concentration of factory despotism [to be spread] over all of society, the relation of separation that must increasingly reunite authority with consensus.
But the experience ends by putting into crisis this optimism about a perfect democracy on economic ground: workers keep pushing, even if in fits and starts, the terms of trade to their favor, doing so in a disordered fashion dangerous given the overall equilibrium. We aren’t reproposing an updated edition of theses of the automatic discovery of contradictions: what is there of the automatic in the workers struggles? Nor are we discussing a mythic system of “high salaries”: high or low, in the end, in terms of what? The problem is that of the function of the wage. Between the New Deal proposition of the wage as the spurring moment of development and the actual generalization of the politics of income as the specific content of the plan, there moves a true and proper historical period, a cycle of development. This is the hypothesis that we are proposing once again. To find its depth and proof, our research will have to properly begin.
– Translated by Evan Calder Williams
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The Notion of the Revolutionary Crisis in Lenin (1968)
I. The Revolutionary Crisis
1. Attempts at a Definition
In several places throughout his work, Lenin tries to define the notion of a “revolutionary crisis,” especially in Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder and The Collapse of the Second International. However, he outlines a notion more than he establishes [fonder] a concept, as the descriptive criteria that he enumerates remain subjective assessments.
These criteria are stated most clearly in The Collapse of the Second International. First, Lenin tries to discern the “symptoms of a revolutionary situation”:
(1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the “upper classes,” a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses…1
Lenin views “the totality of all these objective changes” as the elements of a revolutionary situation.2 This definition remains theoretically imprecise, especially since these criteria cannot be considered in isolation from one another but only in their interdependence. The “increase in the activity of the masses” and the “crisis of the ruling class” reciprocally condition each other. In Left-Wing Communism, these main criteria undergo a noticeable shift, as there Lenin also stresses the support [ralliement] of the middle classes for the proletarian cause. Again, this support cannot be understood as a phenomenon in itself, but only through its relation to other prerequisite phenomena. The support of the other classes is all the more resolute when the proletariat shows itself to be determined in its struggle.
The Leninist definition of the revolutionary situation thus involves an interplay of elements which interact in complex and variable ways, and cannot easily be analyzed in a rigorous and objective manner. Trotsky takes a similar approach in his History of the Russian Revolution, such as when he takes up Lenin’s definition and explicitly emphasizes this dimension of reciprocal conditioning:
That these premises condition each other is obvious. The more decisively and confidently the proletariat acts, the better will it succeed in bringing after it the intermediate layer, the more isolated will be the ruling class, and the more acute its demoralisation. And, on the other hand, a demoralisation of the rulers will pour water into the mill of the revolutionary class.3
But if the analysis of a revolutionary situation always appears to be revisable, then the intervention of a deciding factor would correct the dangers of imprecision by unifying the other disparate factors and grounding their interaction. Trotsky considers the “revolutionary party” as a deciding condition in the seizure of power insofar as it is a “tightly welded and tempered vanguard of the class.”4 Lenin also sees the party as what differentiates a revolutionary situation from a revolutionary crisis.
it is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution; revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary class to take revolutionary mass action strong enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, “falls,” if it is not toppled over.5
In this way, the revolutionary organization transcends the tentative status of the different conditions of a revolutionary crisis; it also links these conditions together and unifies them. Their juxtaposition is abolished through this point of intersection. The weakness of the ruling classes, the impatience of the lower classes, the support of the middle classes: all these factors strengthen the party. The nature of the crisis seems to reside in the fact that the unmeasurable diversity of the revolutionary situation is unified by the organization that works within these conditions. The nodal point of the crisis is no longer located in one particular objective element, but is transferred within the organization-subject that combines and incorporates them.
2. What is the Object of the Crisis?
In order to overcome the inaccuracies that mark any attempt at defining the notion of revolutionary crisis, it is necessary to go beyond literal interpretations. One must begin again on a theoretical basis that is not found in these initial definitions and which alone can bring us to a true concept. First, in order to talk about a crisis, we need to know that there is one. Two levels of this question have to be distinguished, and confusing them only leads to further obstacles. More specifically, there needs to be a theoretical understanding of the crisis that is distinct from its practical manifestations. If we consider the succession of modes of production – understood as theoretically elaborated models that subsume the diversity of social formations – then the rupture between modes of production can perhaps be understood as a crisis. But this brings us back to a problem which is unsolvable at the theoretical level; we can juxtapose different models, but the transition from one mode of production to another cannot be deduced through logic, and a theory cannot be constructed out of a logical sequence without making a detour through politics. The “pure” mode of production – the one Marx derived from the historical conditions of nineteenth-century England – does not exist in reality. It is an abstract-formal object, an archetype that does not correspond to any concrete social formation, and for good reason. Nicos Poulantzas, in his Political Power and Social Classes, considers a social formation as “the specific overlapping of several ‘pure’ modes of production.” He also adds: “the social formation itself constitutes a complex unity in which a certain mode of production dominates the others which compose it.”6
The revolutionary crisis, then, is not the crisis of a mode of production, because between modes of production there is a transformation, not a crisis. The crisis of a determinant social formation, which involves the real forces that bring to life and actualize the contradictions of a mode of production (in Lenin’s words: “all history is made up of the actions of individuals, who are undoubtedly active figures”7), is the only type of crisis that can be analyzed.
This is why Lenin defines the essential characteristics and dominant aspects of the current Russian social formation with such exactness. From the 1890s onwards, he devotes much time to careful research, compiling the most detailed statistics on the zemstvos. From these early works, he delineates the arguments that will anchor all the strategic and tactical maneuvers of his political practice. The Development of Capitalism in Russia is a product of this arduous work, as its conclusions will be the reliable reference points that Lenin refers to when faced with difficult questions.
In “What The ‘Friends of the People’ Are,” written in 1894, the conclusions of The Development were already being broached: “everywhere in Russia the exploitation of the working people is by its nature capitalistic.”8 He draws all the consequences from this position, in particular that it is impossible to “find in Russia any branch of handicraft industry, at all developed, which is not organized on capitalist lines.”9 From now on, these certainties will serve to ground any political strategy: Russian revolutionaries will fight against a capitalist social formation (even if feudal remnants survive in the countryside). Lenin underscores this argument in the first point of the program declared at the RSDLP congress in 1902: “Commodity production is ever more rapidly developing in Russia, the capitalist mode of production becoming increasingly dominant in it.”10
Lenin defined his opponents in this manner from his earliest political experiences. This confrontational clarity always informed his analytic methods and tactical choices. As the Russian revolutionaries fought against capitalism, their strategy of alliance contained an understanding of the unequal development of the economic sectors within Russian capitalism; but they never forgot that the crisis they were working towards was that of the capitalist system itself. It is these same analyses from the young Lenin that will support the interpretation of the Russian Revolution found in The Renegade Kautsky:
Things have turned out just as we said they would. The course taken by the revolution has confirmed the correctness of our reasoning. First, with the “whole” of the peasants against the monarchy, against the landowners, against medievalism (and to that extent the revolution remains bourgeois, bourgeois-democratic). Then, with the poor peasants, with the semi-proletarians, with all the exploited, against capitalism, including the rural rich, the kulaks, the profiteers, and to that extent the revolution becomes a socialist one. To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese Wall between the first and second, to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of its unity with the poor peasants, means to distort Marxism dreadfully, to vulgarise it, to substitute liberalism in its place.11
The path ahead is clear, given that the objective remains the overthrow of the form of capitalism already dominant within the Russian social formation; the Russian Social-Democrats sought a temporary alliance with the peasantry in order to destroy the vestiges of feudalism in agriculture. Lenin’s various agricultural programs made it imperative to determine the correct grounds for this revolutionary alliance. But the struggle against feudalism and autocracy was only a springboard for the anti-capitalist struggle, which remained the principal objective.
In Capital, Marx emphasized that the capitalist process of production, considered in its continuity as a process of reproduction, does not only produce commodities or surplus value; it produces and reproduces the capital relation itself: “on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage labourer.”12 The system that reproduces itself also engenders its own crises; its contradictions produce ruptural points, which can become economic crises. However, an economic crisis is not a revolutionary crisis. It can be part of the self-regulating mechanisms of the system itself, only fulfilling a “purging” function. After the crisis, with the stocks returning to previous levels and unprofitable businesses eliminated, the capitalist economy starts up again with a clean slate. Georg Lukács is insistent on this distinction between revolutionary and economic crises: “Only the consciousness of the proletariat can point to the way that leads out of the impasse of capitalism. As long as this consciousness is lacking, the crisis remains permanent, it goes back to its starting-point, repeats the cycle.”13
The crisis of a social formation, then, has an expanding, deepening function. It is the tipping point where one can glimpse the structure of a new system, but it can just as easily be part of the self-regulation of the capitalist system. If the crisis is to become a revolutionary situation, the emphasis must be on the becoming: that is to say, it becomes surpassable in the revolutionary sense, where a subject takes hold of the process of deconstructing and reconstructing a social formation. Lukács again expresses this idea clearly, in response to the fatalists who passively wait for the final revolutionary crisis of capitalism:
It must not be forgotten, however, that the difference between the period in which the decisive battles are fought and the foregoing period does not lie in the extent and the intensity of the battles themselves. These quantitative changes are merely symptomatic of the fundamental differences in quality which distinguish these struggles from earlier ones. At an earlier stage, in the words of the Communist Manifesto, even “the massive solidarity of the workers was not yet the consequence of their own unification but merely a consequence of the unification of the bourgeoisie.” Now, however, the process by which the proletariat becomes independent and “organises itself into a class” is repeated and intensified until the time when the final crisis of capitalism has been reached, the time when the decision comes more and more within the grasp of the proletariat.14
3. Who is the Subject of the Crisis?
The crisis that affects a determinant social formation does not become revolutionary until a subject works towards its resolution; this is accomplished through taking on [attaquer] the State. The State is the strategic target, the connecting point [vérin] which maintains the relation between capitalist relations of production and the forces of production.
After having located the principal object of the crisis [the State], it still must be defeated. The Marxist problematic, reaffirmed by many of its proponents, seems indisputable on this point. It clearly distinguishes between a theoretical subject of the revolution and a politico-historical subject. The theoretical subject is the proletariat insofar as it is a class, and the political subject is its vanguard organization insofar as it incarnates and represents, not the proletariat “in-itself” (as politically, economically and ideologically dominated) but “for-itself,” when it is conscious of the process of production in its totality and its own unique role in this process.
This point relates to one of the most forceful arguments of What is to be Done?, where Lenin distinguishes between different forms of “spontaneity.” He sees spontaneity as “consciousness in its embryonic form,” but he also differentiates between degrees of consciousness, such as a directionless and subservient [asservie] spontaneity and a spontaneity freed and deepened by the revolutionary vanguard. He maintains that consciousness can only come to the working class “from without,” from intellectuals who bring them their understanding and acute knowledge of society and the process of production. “The working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness.”15
In the revolutionary crisis, the two subjects are brought together: first, the theoretical subject, because it is both the bearer of a yet-to-come [encore à venir], and vital for the formulation of revolutionary strategy; second, the political subject, or the party that takes up and elaborates this strategy. Again, Lenin commits himself to the twofold task of accurately defining the theoretical subject of the coming revolution and giving it a political subject capable of accomplishing this task.
In his early writings, Lenin is constantly concerned with showing that the proletariat is the social class most invested with a revolutionary mission. At the same time as he analyzes the Russian social formation as capitalist, he declares the autonomy of the proletariat as the only class capable of resolving the contradictions of society as a whole. He unwaveringly affirms the independent role of the proletariat in its alliances and political initiatives. From 1894 onwards, he thinks that “none but a bourgeois could see only the solidarity of the interests of the whole ‘people’ against medieval, feudal institutions and forget the profound and irreconcilable antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat within this ‘people.’”16 In the same work, Lenin advances the “fundamental and principal thesis” that “Russia is a bourgeois society which has grown out of the feudal system, that its political form is a class state, and that the only way to end the exploitation of the working people is through the class struggle of the proletariat.”17 He clarifies further: “the period of Russia’s social development, when democracy and socialism were merged in one inseparable and indissoluble whole… has gone, never to return.”18
One year later, in the “The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats,” Lenin recalls that “only those fighters are strong who rely on the consciously recognized real interests of certain classes,” urging the Social-Democrats to remember and “emphasize the independent class identity of the proletariat, who tomorrow may find themselves in opposition to their allies of today.”19 He also returns to the point that “the merging of the democratic activities of the working class with the democratic aspirations of other classes and groups would weaken the democratic movement, would weaken the political struggle.”20 Because of his precise knowledge of historical conditions and the coming revolutionary crisis, Lenin avoids all confusions on this point in The Development of Capitalism in Russia, where he calls for the “support for the peasantry… insofar as the peasantry is capable of a revolutionary struggle against the survivals of serfdom in general and against the autocracy in particular.”21 In the same work, he continues:
Two basic forms of the class struggle are today intertwined in the Russian countryside: 1) the struggle of the peasantry against the privileged landed proprietors and against the remnants of serfdom; 2) the struggle of the emergent rural proletariat against the rural bourgeoisie. For Social-Democrats the second struggle, of course, is of greater importance; but they must also indispensably support the first struggle to the extent that it does not contradict the interests of social development.22
This solidly grounded and patiently refined understanding of the Russian social formation and class structure makes it possible for Lenin to grasp the real forces at work in the revolutionary crisis of 1917:
The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution – which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie – to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.23
Having elucidated the problem of the theoretical subject of the coming revolution – not the people, not the peasantry, but the proletariat – Lenin focuses all of his militant energy on making sure that the political subject will be equal to its task. He tirelessly attempts to bring the proletarian vanguard within the Social-Democratic party. It was not enough to theoretically give the proletariat the leading role in the revolution (ahead of the populist currents), as the question of emerging from the revolutionary crisis victoriously still remains. Even among those who recognize the proletariat’s leading role, there is not a real understanding of the practical means by which the latter can “become what it is” in reality: a class.
Against the Economists, Lenin demonstrates that the proletariat does not rise above the terrain of the economic struggle “spontaneously.” He posits that
The struggle of the workers becomes a class struggle only when all the foremost representatives of the entire working class of the whole country are conscious of themselves as a single working class and launch a struggle that is directed, not against individual employers, but against the entire class of capitalists and against the government that supports that class.24
Recalling the famous words of Marx, Lenin stresses that a struggle only becomes political to the extent that it becomes a struggle between classes. While he readily admits that the activity of local Social-Democratic cells forms the basis of all party activity, if this remains only the work of isolated cells, it would not be properly social-democratic, “since it will not be the organisation and leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat.”25
Lenin always defends the same – theoretically justified – concept of the party, whether it is against the Mensheviks after 1904, against the partisans of the organizational process, against the liquidationists after 1907. The party is the instrument through which the conscious elements of the proletariat reach the level of political consciousness and prepare for the confrontation with the centralized bourgeois State, the key support of the capitalist social formation. All the ideological battles that Lenin engages in regarding the party can be considered as struggles over the shaping of the political subject in preparation of the revolutionary crisis. The organization, conceived of as a historical subject, is thus not a pure form but a content: the vessel of a collective will, expressed through a theory that continually renews itself in relation to a political program of class struggle.
II. The Crisis as a Test of Truth
Of course, condensed formulas and slogans are subject to all sorts of theoretical misunderstandings and simplistic interpretations. In an article on Engels, Lenin tries to summarize Marx and Engels’s importance in one phrase: “The services rendered by Marx and Engels to the working class may be expressed in a few words thus: they taught the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself, and they substituted science for dreams.”26
A trivial summary could give rise to many unwarranted extrapolations: on the one hand, the belief that the proletariat can, on its own, become conscious of its role through a progressive process of self-emancipation; on the other, there is a slippage towards scientism, i.e. the idea that Marxist theory is a science that speaks the Truth.
The revolutionary crisis throws light on the “absolutes” and leads us toward them in a more adequate fashion. In the decisive moments of the crisis, we can glimpse the fugitive arrival of truth: “The experience of war, like the experience of any crisis in history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and breaks some people, but enlightens and tempers others.”27
1. For Organization
The party-organization is not a pure crystal, just as theory is not a pure Science; in an internalizing movement, the party translates within itself the contradictions of the system with which it is intertwined. Rosa Luxemburg, in Marxism or Leninism?, clearly identified the origins of this occurrence:
The international movement of the proletariat toward its complete emancipation is a process peculiar in the following respect. For the first time in the history of civilization, the people are expressing their will consciously and in opposition to all ruling classes. But this will can only be satisfied beyond the limits of the existing system. Now the mass can only acquire and strengthen this will in the course of day-to-day struggle against the existing social order – that is, within the limits of capitalist society. On the one hand, we have the mass; on the other, its historic goal, located outside of existing society. On one hand, we have the day-to-day struggle; on the other, the social revolution. Such are the terms of the dialectical contradiction through which the socialist movement makes its way.28
Two rival currents take shape within the revolutionary organization as a result of the redoubling of this contradiction: one which maintains its fidelity to the revolution, another which is susceptible to the dangers of opportunism. The organization cannot completely separate itself from society; not only does it have to prepare itself for the assault [on the state], but it also must simultaneously conduct a permanent struggle against opportunist deviations within its ranks.
Lenin and Luxemburg perceive the social causes of this opportunism differently, as each assigns greater influence to a certain factor more than the other, but their definitions also overlap at certain points.
One should first consider legal parliamentarianism and relatively long periods of stability as the causes of opportunism. Together, these phenomena produce professional representatives of the working class who can become agents of the state and are vulnerable to bourgeois interests. These political personnel in turn rely on the labor aristocracy and the petty-bourgeoisie who benefit from the spoils of colonial relations. Lenin summarizes this point in The Collapse of the Second International, where he affirms that “Opportunism has been nurtured by legalism,” or “bourgeois legality.”29
The second cause is more subtle, and is a mechanism Luxemburg makes most apparent; it consists in the fact that opportunism depends on the existence of an organization. The spread of bourgeois values and the preservation of granted privileges is not enough to explain opportunism: the defense of the organization is also a major part. These two sources inextricably reinforce each other. This occurrence did not escape Lenin: “the great and strong parties were frightened by the prospect of their organisations being dissolved, their funds sequestered and their leaders arrested by the government.”30 The constitution of a worker bureaucracy and organizational conservatism are two ways in which the party-organization manifests the contradictions of the capitalist system, affecting all members of the revolutionary ranks.
This problem is at the root of all failures, all betrayals by the working-class parties, and all reformist ideologies. May ’68 in France was an illustration of the way in which bourgeois ideology and PCF ideology are mutually connected, through the passive acceptance of an established order seen as unchangeable. The degeneration of the working-class parties can be viewed more or less in this way. Lenin always strives to determine the errors which render a party irredeemably lost: the social-chauvinist support for the war exhibited in 1914 marked for him the end of the Second International and the beginning of a factional struggle. There is no party that remains completely free from the danger of degeneration.
The organization is thus never a tempered sword; it must be defined in differential terms. Its determinate impact is established through the interval it explores, the in-between that it measures. More than being the direct expression of a class, it is marked by a gap: the gap which separates a class as theoretical subject from its political spontaneity, such as they appear within the capitalist social formation.
Lenin always held the view that social-democracy is the merger of the workers’ movement and socialism: “Isolated from Social-Democracy, the working-class movement becomes petty and inevitably becomes bourgeois.”31 We could add that when isolated from working class struggles, social-democracy also becomes disorientated and tends to degenerate; it strengthens itself on the “instincts” of the revolutionary class. The Party forms a bridge between the embryonic consciousness of the proletariat and the theoretical role with which the latter is invested. It is the necessary mediation between the concept of the working-class and its practical, alienated realization in capitalist society. This is why:
The Party’s task is not to concoct some fashionable means of helping the workers, but to join up with the workers’ movement, to bring light into it, to assist the workers in the struggle they themselves have already begun to wage… [to] develop the workers’ class-consciousness.32
The task of the Party is to hold together the two complementary poles that tear it apart: the theoretical understanding of the process of production and the role of the proletariat, and the connection with practical, everyday questions of working-class life. The Party forges itself through this permanent tension; it is between these two points that it formulates its strategy, by which the consciousness of a difference and a gap [interval] becomes the indication of a new order to come. At the same time as being the visible and “organised incarnation of their class consciousness” (Lukács), the working-class party is the witness to the gap that separates the historical role of the proletariat and its consciousness mystified by the ruling ideology.33
As the mediation between a subject (the proletariat) which is not yet conscious of its historical role and an object (capitalist social formation) that must be transformed by this subject, the party embodies and expresses the project of the working class. Here, a philosophy of the project is established, something that politics perhaps shares with science, since according to Bachelard, “above the subject and beyond the object, modern science is based on the project. In scientific thought the subject’s mediation upon the object always takes the form of a project.34 This philosophy of the project is also at the core of Sartre’s observations in the Critique of Dialectical Reason: “The project, as the subjective surpassing of objectivity toward objectivity, and stretched between the objective conditions of the environment and the objective structures of the field of possibles, represents in itself the moving unity of subjectivity and objectivity… Thus the subjective contains within itself the objective, which it denies and which it surpasses toward a new objectivity; and this new objectivity by virtue of objectification externalizes the internality of the project as an objectified subjectivity.”35
As a last example, Freud’s formula of Wo es War, soll ich werden contains the idea of a movement which carries a disfigured and alienated proletariat toward its truth. In this movement, the party represents neither the ego nor the id, but the mediating effort by which the proletariat breaks away from its immediacy to see its proper place in the totality of the social process through its relations with other classes, and discovers its historical truth as a class. The work of the Party resides in shedding this “trade union secretary ideal for that of the ‘tribune of the people.’”36
Insofar as, “synchronically,” its presence represents a gap – a discontinuity between the proletariat as it exists historically and its theoretical role (its “mission”) – the party-organization restores a diachronic continuity. The working class, as the hidden truth of the capitalist system, carries socialism beyond the merely possible. If, as for science, “what is possible and what is [l’Être] are homogeneous,” the revolutionary crisis is to be understood through a double perspective: that of continuity and discontinuity.37
But to define the party in this way, as the project that synthesizes and surpasses the subjective and the objective when the will of its militants becomes an objective factor of social development, is to define its content as well as its function: “When, in the pursuit of a single aim and animated by a single will, millions alter the forms of their communication and their behaviour, change the place and the mode of their activities, change their tools and weapons in accordance with the changing conditions and the requirements of the struggle – all this is genuine organisation.”38 To know the function of the vanguard organization is not to simply justify its necessity but to recognize what type of organization it must be and which internal rules must rigidly structure it.39 The ensemble of these rules tend to make an organization coherent and homogeneous; the famous formula of “democratic centralism” summarizes and condenses them. But to merely list them resolves nothing. Democratic centralism indeed constitutes a contradiction in terms, an expression of the organization’s contradictory position with the system it is supposed to destroy and overcome. Democratic centralism is the formula of a provisional reconciliation between opposites, shaping militant revolutionary spontaneity into a democratic form within the centralized network of the organization. Cohesion never comes without the revolutionary organization encountering difficulties. The crisis not only affects the system it undermines, but also the organization: for the latter it is the hour of its truth, the time for readjustments. The Bolshevik party could not escape history: the public articles of Zinoviev and Kamenev against the insurrection led Lenin to demand their expulsion in September 1917. The revolutionary crisis works to reveal much for the organization: it shows its defects and delimits the fraction of the party capable of concluding the crisis through the revolution. It serves as the pattern on which the provisional organization stands out and adjusts itself to its historical task.
2. For Theory
Just as the organization is not pure steel, so theory is not pure science. In periods of stagnation, scientistic tendencies dominate the revolutionary movement. Korsch first made this remark and Althusser illustrates it when he considers theory as speaking the truth distinctly, beyond the grasp of history.
Lenin is more cautious when he reiterates after the 1905 Revolution that “practice marched ahead of theory,”40 but he still stresses elsewhere that “Marxism is all-powerful because it is true.” Starting from the premise that in the sciences where man is taken as object, my truth does not speak, at most it is heard, Lacan concludes that one cannot tell the truth about the truth. There is no metalanguage which does not have its connotation.
The object of science is also its subject, but it is “internally excluded from its object.”41 In assuming the truth to be mute, Lacan rightly questions Lenin’s statement above: “how could theorizing this [the omnipotence of Marxist theory] increase its power?”42
Lacan thinks the relation between knowledge and truth topologically in the form of the Mobius strip, where the two terms interpenetrate one another to an indiscernible degree. Truth speaks [parle] through theory, but theory does not tell [dit] the truth. In a Lacanian vein, when Althusser escapes from his scientistic nostalgia, he reaches deeper insights: “the truth of history cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the text of history is not a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but the inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of a structure of structures.”43 But in the Lacanian entanglement of truth and knowledge, a dimension is lost, without which theory would only be redundant, leaving no reason to theorize truth in order to increase its power. This third dimension is ideology. If truth speaks through knowledge, it also speaks through ideology. On the Mobius strip, where, to recall the image, truth and ideology run together, theory marks the point that can sketch their shared place. Just as organization is the measure of the gap between the theoretical standing of the proletariat and its empirical reality, so theory is the conscious formulation and measure of a truth which overtakes the voice and an ideology which renders it silent.
Theory is thus within the order of “relative truth” that Lenin borrows from Engels, speaking of the
contradiction … between the character of human thought, necessarily conceived as absolute, and its reality in individual human beings with their extremely limited thought. This is a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite progression, or what is for us, at least from a practical standpoint, the endless succession, of generations of mankind. In this sense human thought is just as much sovereign as not sovereign, and its capacity for knowledge just as much unlimited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimited in its disposition (Anlage), its vocation, its possibilities and its historical ultimate goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited in its individual expression and in its realisation at each particular moment.44
In respect to theory, the revolutionary crisis functions as a cut [coup de ciseau], through which the noted difference between truth and ideology is accentuated and realized through the fracturing of the Möbius strip, breaking these terms apart. Knowledge pays the price, as its place is abolished by this division. What was the case for organization holds for theory as well: the crisis acts as a practical functor of truth, marking the ruptural point between a long-winded science and a truth liberated from its silence.
Like the conception of organization, theory is differential.
In a period of crisis, It is also what makes possible the overcoming of the conservative aspects of organizational work. Only a complete ignorance and a great theoretical acuity would leave the organization open to the contingencies of history. It is was because of this theoretical acuity that Lenin knew to see the revolutionary crisis for what it was, while the old Bolsheviks were blind to this fact.
From this parallelism between the grouping of class-party-spontaneity and the grouping truth-theory-ideology, there is the outline of a homology by which the party is indeed the place of theory but not necessarily that of truth. Trotsky did not understand this in his struggle against Stalin, as he hesitated to put the place of truth outside the party (according to Merleau-Ponty), because he had learned that what was true could only be attributed to the proletariat and its vanguard organization.
The revolutionary crisis is the moment of truth for the party-organization, when the latter tends to correspond with the class which remains its hidden truth; the same goes for the revolutionary crisis in relation to theory, a suspended moment that allows this hidden truth to suddenly irrupt into the realm of practice.
Theory is a possible measure of the gap between truth and ideology, but it is not alone in having the ability to reconnect them. Ultimately, a theory taken too seriously can become a danger, as it forces the flow of history into neat categories. This is why Lenin never discarded the corrective of the imagination, even if he approached every problem from a theoretical angle; he found in imagination another form of connection, certainly less rational than the theory which carefully manages it. But from ideology to the truth, the imaginative path intersects with science and reveals detours and shortcuts not viewable from a more rigorous track.
“We should dream!”
Strangely, this is one of the conclusions of What is to be Done?: “We should dream,” repeats Lenin.45 He sketches in a few lines the bizarre table of beards and monocles at the congress attacking him for posing this apparent incongruity; he mentions Marytnov and Krichevsky, who respond with incredulity: “I ask, has a Marxist any right at all to dream?” He answers them with a long citation from Pisarev on the rich dialectic between dream and reality, and he concludes: “Of this kind of dreaming there is unfortunately too little in our movement.”46
The revolutionary crisis brings historical truth to life, while the imagination delineates a complementary mode of access to theory. This is not the least of Lenin’s denials of all stubborn scientism.
3. For the Social Formation
We have shown that the revolutionary crisis is a crisis of the social formation, not the mode of production, and that the contradictory structure of the mode of production forms the hidden background of this crisis. This is what Althusser expresses through the concept of Darstellung, “the effectivity of an absent cause,” or again, through a metonymic causality, “the very form of the interiority of a structure, as structure, in its effects.”47
Lenin’s second criterion of the revolutionary situation shows what the crisis means in relation to the social formation. Through the rallying of the middle class strata behind the proletariat, the social formation diminishes the overlap between modes of production of which the intermediate stratum are a consequence. In the crisis, the social formation tends symptomatically towards the dominant mode of production which constitutes its hidden truth. Rosa Luxemburg argues in The Accumulation of Capital that the development of capitalism puts into motion the disintegration of the intermediate strata. The more the vestiges of feudalism are eliminated, the more the social formation tends toward the abstract capitalist mode of production defined by Marx, and the more violent this process becomes:
Broader and broader strata separate out from the – seemingly – solid edifice of bourgeois society; they then bring confusion into the ranks of the bourgeoisie, they unleash movements which do not themselves proceed in the direction of socialism but which through the violence of the impact they make do hasten the realisation of the preconditions of socialism: namely, the collapse of the bourgeoisie.48
The revolutionary crisis accelerates the process and heightens its contradictions, leaving only the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, wage labor against capital, what Marx had theoretically distinguished as the two necessary and irreducibly antagonistic poles of the capitalist mode of production.
This is because through the rupture of the crisis, the social formation – the site of an emergence of dual power – tends to be reduced to its dominant mode of production. After having rigorously studied the lessons of 1905, Lenin incessantly repeated in 1917 that the soviets were “a new type of State.”49 He vigorously reproached Martov for acknowledging the councils as organs of combat without seeing their larger mission, as a new type of State apparatus. Because it is the mode of production itself which is affected by the crisis, the relations between the vanguard and the masses are transformed. The proletariat rapidly attains a higher degree of class consciousness.
In the specific temporality of the crisis, Lenin repeatedly insists that the masses learn more in a few hours than they would in twenty years. Their subservient and mystified spontaneity gives way to their revolutionary spontaneity as a class, deepened by the work of the vanguard. The organs of this class, the “highest form of the united front,”50 the soviets, are the organs of power of the proletarian class. Lukács, commenting on Lenin against the ultra-leftists, recalls the difference between party and union, and that the councils are a permanent class organization. Their concrete possibility goes beyond the frame of bourgeois society and their mere presence already signifies the real struggle for State power, namely the civil war.
The revolutionary crisis is the privileged point of rupture where the proletariat intervenes within history, where the masses “take hold of their own destiny” and play a leading role. The party now has an educative task: to organize the proletariat against disorganizing forces (commercial petty bourgeoisie, marginal reconstitution of a commodity economy) which undermine it. But the leading role remains with the class which maintains itself through its own organs of power.
The crisis can be conceived, like organization and theory, as a particular relation by which the social formation is reduced to the mode of production. We can recall the parallelism of these relations through the following table:
Social Formation Revolutionary Crisis Mode of Production
Subservient Spontaneity Organization – Party Class
Ideology Theory Truth
The crisis thus acts as a catalyst by which its foundational differences, its gaps are abolished: an embryonic time [le temps d’un accouchement]. “It is the great significance of all crises,” said Lenin, “that they manifest what is hidden; they cast aside all that is conventional, superficial, or trivial; they sweep away the political litter, and expose the real mainsprings of the class struggle.”51
Only upon this dual basis, disclosed by the sudden irruption of the latent process, can we account for the Marxist images and metaphors making reference to the “occult works,” with Marx’s “old moles” remaining the most famous. It follows that the perception of society oscillates between two views. The first is descriptive: it registers and keeps track of social events, such as comparing competing class demands and the electoral results of parties. The second is of a strategic order: it is not merely confined to aligning classes side by side, it goes beyond their appearances to their deeply decisive conflicts. “The key to class statistics,” writes Glucksmann, “lies in the class struggle, not vice versa.”52
To take up an analogous distinction of Lenin’s: politics is not a matter of arithmetic but of algebra, a superior form of mathematics rather than an elementary one.53 The bureaucrats incessantly harp that three is better than two, but in their electoralist blindness, they do not see that
all the old forms of the socialist movement have acquired a new content, and, consequently, a new symbol, the “minus” sign, has appeared in front of all the figures; our wiseacres, however, have stubbornly continued (and still continue) to persuade themselves and others that “minus three” is more than “minus two.”54
This algebraic understanding of the class struggle, which alone opens the path to strategy, is characteristic of the political field. The revolutionary crisis distinguishes itself from the simple “purgative” economic crisis of the system through politics.
III – Revolutionary Crisis as Political Crisis
1. The Renunciation of Organization and the Forgetting of Politics
The subsequent discussions around the events of May ’68 often dwell on the problem of the revolutionary party. Most novel takes on this subject propose a party of a new type, or simply denounce the anachronism of a party left based on the Bolshevik model.
In fact, this is an old yet fundamental problem that has resurfaced under the guise of novelty and actuality. What do the innovators have to say today on the problems of organization? Gorz, in an editorial for Les Temps Modernes from May-June 1968, determines the sole function of the party apparatus to be to “coordinate the activities of local activists through a thread of communication and news; elaborating general perspectives.” Glucksmann, on the other hand, breaks down the many functions of the party (political, economic, theoretical); he asserts that a revolutionary movement “does not need to be organised as a second State apparatus; its task is not to direct but to co-ordinate these autonomous centres into a network.”55 He recognizes that “centres are necessary: not to ‘make’ a revolution, but to co-ordinate it.”56 Eventually, it results in the roles of the leaders fading in the course of the struggle, through the discovery of “work-teams which bring together ‘specialists’ capable of defining the most urgent technical tasks of the revolution.”57
Some Maoist groups base their rejection of a party “of the Leninist type” on the fact that the dominant ideological force at the global level is not that of the bourgeoisie but of the proletariat, that the period of the bourgeoisie’s encirclement of the proletariat has given way to, in the epoch of “Mao Tse-Tung Thought,” the proletariat’s encirclement of the bourgeoisie. Marxism would become the source of an ambient ideology, no longer needed to demarcate and protect the vanguard from bourgeois ideology. Now there is only the soft debate between currents that flow within proletarian ideology.
All these remarks and reflections point to a problematic that Rossana Rossanda interprets most clearly: “The center of gravity displaces political forces toward social forces.”58 The origin of this problem is found in Arthur Rosenberg’s theses that the theory of the party is dependent on the state of development of the proletariat.59 In the period where the proletariat was only weakly developed, a group of intellectuals founded conspiratorial organizations that were the restrictive bearers of the atrophied class consciousness of the proletariat. Thus, for Marx and Engels, the party was limited to their two physical persons. Lenin reformulates this model for Russia, where the proletariat is still weakly developed in 1907. But in a subsequent stage, the proletariat, particularly in the period of the Second International and in its development within industrial capitalism, assimilates Marxist theory. In a third and final period, the educated proletariat becomes a revolutionary class; the party no longer has a limited role of permissive leadership [direction], or simply interpreting the aspirations of the proletariat.
In sum, through the historical development of the proletariat, the class in itself would become a class for itself, the theoretical subject of the revolution and its political subject coincide. This thesis arises from the Hegelian problematic, of the in-itself and the for-itself, as filtered [transmettre] through Lukács. This reading of Marx is what Poulantzas qualifies as historico-genetic: an undifferentiated mass at the start, the social class organizes itself as a class in-itself in order to reach the level of a class for-itself. This problematic engenders a slippage by which the class is conceived as the subject of history, “as the factor of genetic production and of transformations of the structures of a social formation.”60 The provisional role of the party is over due to the self-development of the class-subject of history.
For, as Poulantzas reminds us: “if class is indeed a concept, it designates the effect of an ensemble of given structures, an ensemble which determines social relations as class relations.”61 In this problematic, the order of the political and therefore the party is irreducible to the social. Class remains the theoretical and not the political subject of history, and the mediation of the party through which the former rises to the political level remains indispensable.
All of Lenin’s efforts on the question of organization are dedicated to avoid this specific confusion between party and class. In What is to be Done?, he incessantly repeats that purely worker movement is incapable of elaborating its own ideology, all “belittling” of socialist ideology involves a reinforcement of bourgeois ideology, “that the spontaneous development of the working-class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology,” that “the spontaneous working-class movement is trade-unionism … and trade unionism means the ideological enslavement of the workers by the bourgeoisie.”62
In One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, Lenin’s debate with Martov over paragraph I of the party statutes has the clear and neat distinction between class and party as a larger goal. The looseness of the categorization or titles of party members “introduces a disorganizing idea, the confusing of class and party.”63 Several pages later, he resumes discussion on Martov’s formula whereby the “the party is the conscious spokesman of an unconscious process.” He continues:
for if “every strike” were not only a spontaneous expression of the powerful class instinct and of the class struggle which is leading inevitably to the social revolution, but a conscious expression of that process, then… our Party would forthwith and at once embrace the whole working class, and, consequently, would at once put an end to bourgeois society as a whole.64
It is only in the revolutionary crisis that the party begins to identify with the class, because it is then that the latter reaches the level of the political struggle. The party is the instrument by which the revolutionary class maintains its presence at this level as a permanent threat to the bourgeois State. But the revolutionary crisis, by opening the political field to the class in its masses, qualitatively transforms political life. This is why organizations are seen in the crisis as crucibles of truth, and also why practice takes precedence over theory:
History as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class-conscious vanguards of the most advanced classes. This can readily be understood, because even the finest of vanguards express the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of thousands, whereas at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolutions are made by the class-consciousness, will, passion and imagination of tens of millions, spurred on by a most acute struggle of classes.65
The principles of a Leninist politics are established in this dialectical relation between party and class, where neither term can be reduced to the other. Those who downplay the role of organization conceive of it in terms of specific conjunctures and definite tasks. Glucksmann, for instance, distinguishes between organizational norms for periods of legality and for periods of illegality. Lenin has a different conception, one which determines a set of invariant organizational principles correlative to the task of the party: the struggle for the overthrow of the bourgeois State, the cornerstone of the capitalist social formation. This fundamental objective also situates the party in the political sphere: as much as the relations of production, the State is what is ultimately at stake in the political struggle. It is upon this resolute basis that the party has a margin of leeway relative to its immediate tasks; but what really defines its function is its fundamental task. Lenin makes this distinction by distinguishing between “principles of organization” and the “systematic organization.” As he further remarks, the specific conditions of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century made the systematic organization conceived around Iskra the mark of a “gap” in relation to the principles of organization that it defined.
All of the revisions of Lenin’s principles in organizational matters follow, in one way or another, from a shift outside of the political field; it is only within this field that the protagonists of the revolutionary crisis can arm and prepare themselves and can locate what is at stake, the State. Beyond the simplistic schema of consciousness and unconsciousness as respective attributes of class and party, the Leninist problematic is more akin in complexity to the second Freudian topography introduced in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,where the conscious/unconscious opposition is substituted for that between the “coherent ego and the repressed”; in the latter, the unconscious is an attribute which affects both terms.66 Thus, in the Leninist problematic of organization, there is no continuous path from the in-itself to the for-itself, from unconsciousness to consciousness. The party is not a “militarized” class, it remains plagued by uncertainties, theoretical immaturity, and a degree of unconsciousness. But it expresses the fact that in a capitalist social formation, there cannot be a class for-itself as a reality, but only as a project through the mediation of the party. Lukács comments on this point in his short work on Lenin: “it would be a totally unhistorical illusion, to conclude that a correct proletarian class-consciousness – adequate to the proletariat’s leading role – can gradually develop on its own, without both frictions and setbacks, as though the proletariat could gradually evolve ideologically into the revolutionary vocation appropriate to its class.”67 This is also the reason why the revolutionary crisis for Rosa Luxemburg never occurs too early, and consequently is always too early. Never too early, because its economic premises and the existence of the proletariat are necessarily united; always too early because its political premise – the fully conscious proletariat – is never met. It then follows that the vanguard party can be prepared to overthrow the bourgeois State, but it is never prepared enough to follow through in the aftermath of the crisis, for the domination of the proletariat as a class (dictatorship of the proletariat, proletarian democracy): while Marxism prepares the party for the first moment, it only offers a glimpse of the second, where power remains an empirical problem. There is the idea that there exists no pure separation between the capitalist mode of production and socialism. The revolutionary crisis is thus both in its place and an arbitrary time: it cuts through the center of a social formation that has not completely exhausted the resources of capitalism when it turns towards socialism, the conditions of which are not all met. Here lies the origin of Trotsky and Mao’s pragmatism and a first answer to Kautsky’s fatalism, where we learn that one can only learn to ride once seated firmly in the saddle.
2. The Crisis and the Specificity of Politics
The organization that synthesizes the dialectical relations between subject and object through its project forms the mediation through which the revolutionary crisis is resolved at its real level, that is, politics: “The most purposeful, most comprehensive and specific expression of the political struggle of classes is the struggle of parties. The non-party principle means indifference to the struggle of parties.”68
But what exactly is this political struggle that Lenin always returns to? Before defining it positively, he is adamant about what it is not: “it would be inexact to say that the realization of political freedom is as necessary for the proletariat as an increase in wages…” Its necessity is of another order, one “much more complicated and difficult.”69 This is the algebraic terrain that appears elsewhere. Lenin always struggles against the reduction of the political to the economic sphere, any and all diminutions of the class struggle. He fights the members of Rabochaia mysl for whom “politics always obediently follows economics,” and he castigates Rabochee delo for proclaiming that the “economic struggle is inseparable from the political struggle.”70
But outside of these warnings, Lenin discusses politics more than he defines it. Poulantzas endeavors to define politics by its object (“the conjuncture”)71, its product (the transformation of the unity of the social formation), and above its strategic objective: the State is the nodal point which maintains the conflictual equilibrium of the various modes of production combined within a social formation. It is “cohesive factor of this complex overlapping of various modes of production,” between which it neutralizes any “true relations of forces.”72
The State, as the site that ties together the unity of the social formation, is also the place where the “ruptural situation of this unity can be deciphered”73: the duality of power which is the decisive factor of the revolutionary crisis, through which the proletariat builds itself up as a holder of power and endeavors to break the bourgeois State. This is what causes the simple economic crisis to transform into a revolutionary one: because it affects the State and through the State all the juridical and ideological bases of society, the crisis, “as a critique, in words and deeds, of the superstructures,” becomes a total crisis and shakes society from its economic foundations to its superstructures.74
This specificity of the political, which is the site of the emergence of the revolutionary crisis, makes it possible to define the role of the political subject as breaking with all rigid economic determinism. Lenin is attentive to the original roles certain political forces can play, without a common measure among their real social content. This role does not depend on the strata they represent, but more on the place they occupy in the specific structuration of the political field: all simplified mechanisms are rejected. In this way we can understand, in accordance with Leninist orthodoxy and devoid of sociological extrapolations, the role the students played in the crisis of May ‘68 in France. Lenin was always very sensitive to the consequences of the specificity of the political. For example, in an article entitled “Tasks of the Revolutionary Youth,” he noted: “The class division is, of course, the ultimate basis of the political grouping; in the final analysis, of course, it always determines that grouping. This ‘final analysis’ is arrived at only by political struggle.”75
If the political subject is indeed determined in the last instance by the economy, only fatalism can result. To the contrary, the initiative of the subject helps to trigger the crisis, whose outcome depends on the part that subject plays within it. The corresponding lesson is that the wealth of politics foils all plans, as its complexity causes the triggering or pretext of the crisis to not always – or almost never – occur as one would have expected it to have “logically.” This is why the party, armed with political understanding, must be vigilant to the horizon of the social whole [ensemble]:
We do not and cannot know which spark – of the innumerable sparks that are flying about in all countries as a result of the world economic and political crisis – will kindle the conflagration, in the sense of raising up the masses; we must, therefore, with our new and communist principles, set to work to stir up all and sundry, even the oldest, mustiest and seemingly hopeless spheres, for otherwise we shall not be able to cope with our tasks, shall not be comprehensively prepared, shall not be in possession of all the weapons …76
And again: “Communism is emerging in positively every sphere of public life … If special efforts are made to block one of the channels, the ‘contagion’ will find another one, sometimes very unexpectedly.”77
These detours, these sudden and unexpected upsurges – which can take the revolutionary organization unawares and make it a victim of its blindness, its dogmas, its prejudices – constitute the very particularity [le bien propre] of politics as the revolutionary crisis slowly makes its way to the surface, unexpectedly. May in France highlighted the specific structuration of the political field, giving politics a disalienated, freed image, appearing attractive to all those who had seen it as austere and unwieldy. Mutilated by the traditional parties, torn apart by union struggles over immediate demands and parliamentary struggles, confined by others to the single form of anti-imperialism, each had used up what had been suitable to them; politics was pillaged, nothing more than a sad chessboard. Nanterre was enough to put the puzzle back together and return to politics its totalizing function, through which the crisis can break and undermine the contradictory assemblage of contradictions. When politics is in shambles, the revolutionary crisis breaks down, its gaps sealed and its fronts controlled; it can play its full role only on the political terrain, where the contradictions of the crisis are brought together.
3. Proletarian Strategy and Bourgeois Strategy During the Crisis
The forms of the bourgeoisie’s political domination are secondary in relation to the forms of its economic domination. It is on this level that the economy is strategically situated. Lenin insists on the very relative importance of political domination for the bourgeoisie: “economic domination is everything to the bourgeoisie, and the form of political domination is of very little importance; the bourgeoisie can rule just as well under a republic.”78 Prolonging the economic struggle means fighting the bourgeoisie on its own terrain. This why Lenin repeats several times in What is to Be Done? that the “Trade-unionist politics of the working class is precisely bourgeois politics of the working class.”79
The political terrain, on the other hand, is the strategic space of the proletariat, understood as the class that can overthrow the capitalist system. The political structures concentrate and reproduce all the forms of exploitation of the proletariat, who is the dominated class in every sphere (economic, political, ideological). The bourgeoisie already held economic power at the time of its own political revolution.
This is the source of the originality of the proletarian revolution as proclaimed in the Communist Manifesto:
All the preceding classes that got the upper hand sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation.80
This is why, while the goal of the bourgeois revolution is to put political power in the service of economic power, the proletarian revolution is characterized by putting politics “in command.” Maurice Godelier goes in the same direction when he asserts from a mathematical point of view that free perfect competition and a perfect system of planning are equal. It is not only economic rationality that is leading the proletariat’s revolutionary struggle, but a rationality, needs, and objectives that are of a different order: the order of politics. This is not the contradiction internal to the economy that undermines the capitalist mode of production in a decisive manner, but an interstructural contradiction that produces distortions between the political and the economic.
Knowing that the outcome of the crisis depends on its actions, the revolutionary party gives itself the means to accomplish the task. While the onset of the crisis cannot be determined with any certainty – the organization plays a role without controlling all the given facts – its outcome must be decided. The antagonistic forces are on alert and observing each other. From now on, those who know how to choose their weapons and proper terrain will prevail. Assessing the situation to see if the ruptural moment has been reached, setting the date of the insurrection; these are the final actions and decisive experiences that force the organization to prove its own cohesion and its unity.
On September 29, 1917, Lenin calls out the warning: “The crisis has matured.”81 On October 24th, he sends a letter to members of the central committee: “to delay the uprising would be fatal … this very evening, this very night, arrest the government… History will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastinating.”82 The next day, the insurrection is victorious.
While the exact date of the revolution cannot be set, the insurrection must be made in the light of theory. Lenin stressed this point to the Bolsheviks after the 1905 Revolution. But theory stops at the threshold of insurrection, which is an art, the last – practical – test of truth [épreuve de vérité] encountered during the revolutionary crisis.
IV. The Inaugural Crisis of What Revolution?
1. What Revolutionary Crisis?
The crisis that Lenin prepared for was the crisis of a capitalist social formation; it was of the political order and could only be resolved by a political subject. But what revolution was this the crisis of?
Beyond the knowledge of the social formation that he confronted, Lenin focused from his very first writings on defining the level of structuration of the system he was battling. Already in “What the ‘Friends of the People’ Are” (from 1894) he understands, with Marx, “the entanglement of all people in the net of the world market, and with this the international character of the capitalistic regime.”83 Here one finds the real level of structuration of a system, a system of which the Russian social formation is only a part of.
This systemic level of structuration corresponds to the particular level of structuration of the theoretical subject. This does not mean a national proletariat, but a global proletariat. The strategy it assumes is also an international one: “A strictly proletarian programme and strictly proletarian tactics are the programme and the tactics of international revolutionary Social-Democracy.”84
Just as the national revolutionary strategy finds its manifestation in the organization, so the international revolutionary strategy finds its apparatus and manifestation in the international organization: “The International consists in the coming together (first ideologically, then in due time organizationally as well) of people who, in these grave days, are capable of defending socialist internationalism in deed.”85 And after his return to Russia in 1917, Lenin advanced the creation of “a new International” (in the April Theses) as one of the Bolsheviks’ principal tasks.86
The existence of such an international organization is not reducible to the sum of its individual sections, as it qualitatively transforms these sections and establishes them as the political subject of the world revolution. In the program he wrote for the RSDLP in 1902, Lenin argues in thesis XI that “the development of international exchange and of production for the world market has established such close ties among all nations of the civilised world, that the present-day working-class movement had to become, and has long become, an international movement. That is why Russian Social-Democracy regards itself as one of the detachments of the world army of the proletariat, as part of international Social-Democracy.”87 In this problematic of the international revolutionary organization, the intellectuals of the feudal countries could become communists if they adhere to the strategy and rules [la discipline] of the International. At the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organization of the Peoples of the East (1919), Lenin asserts to the representatives from countries where the proletariat hardly existed in even an embryonic state that “Thanks to the communist organisations in the East, of which you here are the representatives, you have contact with the advanced revolutionary proletariat.”88
Because of this conception of the international character of capitalism in the imperialist epoch and the international level of the structuration of the corresponding theoretical and political subjects, Lenin saw the revolution as a global process of which all revolutionary crises only represent a moment, affecting “the weakest link in the chain.” This is why the Russian Revolution was not to be enclosed within its national borders, but was to be only the bridgehead of the revolution.
In the epoch of the “actuality of the revolution,” all revolutionary crises are moments of the world revolution.
2. Beyond the Crisis
The historical articulation of the revolutionary crisis is always readable through the double aspects of continuity and discontinuity. One could say that it accentuates a discontinuity in the structure of modes of production but it remains the channel of a continuity, to the extent that the elements of the original social formation are re-articulated – after the revolution – in the following social formation. Logically, this must be admitted.
Just as there are many modes of production that overlap in the capitalist social formation, so are there many co-existing and entangled modes of production within the socialist social formation that is typical for the transitional phase.
Lenin is particularly aware of this situation and the resulting problems:
There can be no doubt that between capitalism and communism there lies a definite transition period which must combine the features and properties of both these forms of social economy. This transition period has to be a period of struggle between dying capitalism and nascent communism – or, in other words, between capitalism which has been defeated but not destroyed and communism which has been born but is still very feeble.89
In Left-Wing Communism, Lenin insists many times over on the daily, multiple attacks the bourgeoisie will carry out on the dictatorship of the proletariat, especially the part of the bourgeoisie that reforms itself in the sectors of small-production and whose resistance is “increased tenfold by their overthrow.”90 He also asserts that “it is a thousand times easier to vanquish the centralized big bourgeoisie than to ‘vanquish’ the millions upon millions of petty proprietors; however, through their ordinary, everyday, imperceptible, elusive and demoralizing activities, they produce the very results which the bourgeoisie need and which tend to restore the bourgeoisie.”91
The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is thus not completely over after the revolutionary crisis; the sole criterion which marks the success of a revolutionary crisis, and in fact a historical threshold, is the conquest of political power by the proletariat and maintaining the position of politics as “in command.”
Only a victorious and international revolution can definitively ensure the triumph of the proletariat.
It is important to note on this point that proletarian power can deliberately give back command to the economy and thus lose ground to the bourgeoisie. Stalinist policies demonstrate that in the construction of socialism in one country, the encouragement of economic competition as the primary objective in a world where imperialism remains the dominant structure is also to encourage the vital necessity of finding markets, as well as the restoration of profits and profitability, in order to maintain the competitive capacity of the national economy within the larger international economy. As long as the revolution has not triumphed internationally, this only reinstates the economic criteria of the bourgeoisie and tries to fight a battle on their own ground, instead of deepening the revolution against any peripheral resurgence of the market economy and bourgeois ideology.
Conclusion: The Revolutionary Crisis as Criterion for Periodization
1. Continuity and Discontinuity
The revolutionary crisis appears as the nodal point in the international class struggle. In this way, the crisis opens up a periodization that follows the traditional concept of history, a result that Marx’s own concepts cannot overcome. Balibar indicates that this concept of periodization is the concept of the discontinuous within the continuous, by which they illuminate and explicate themselves through the other, just as for Bachelard the particle and the wave (discontinuous and continuous) “are different moments of the mathematization of experience… the wave regulating the probability of the presence of particles.” The revolutionary situation engendered by the contradictions of the social formation regulates the probability of the revolutionary crisis; a crisis introduces discontinuity within continuity and can accentuate the developmental rhythms of social formations.
2. Diachrony and Synchrony
In his article on history and structure, Greimas stresses the difficulty of integrating temporal dimensions in relative consideration to the mode of existence of structures of signification; he attributes this difficulty to the non-pertinence of the Saussurian dichotomy of diachrony and synchrony, the chronic axis being logically prior to these two complementary aspects of temporality.92 But this common axis cutting through diachrony and synchrony is not enough to put them in relation. Only speech, as a repetitive action of the subject upon language (synchrony), can show the path of transformation. This suggests a possible solution but it is not elaborated further.
Thus for the articulation between continuity and discontinuity, and thus for the articulation between synchrony and diachrony, all solutions lead back to the poorly defined mediation of the subject. Gustave Guillaume extracts an “evental duration” from a universal duration through the intervention of an “operational time,” the present: this is the time of the subject.93 The present is then the point of overlap and fusion of the past and the future, “the image of the operation by which, incessantly, a portion of the future is resolved in a portion of the past.”94 The revolutionary crisis is also, in this way, the present where the dual determination of history exhausts itself.
3. History and Structure
As Greimas remarks, a single duration does not seem to be able to serve as a reliable bridge between history and structure. Moreover, modern epistemology has shown that time acts more through repetition than duration, and that the agent of transformation is “the action of rhythm upon the structure.”95
Lenin searched in this way for the practical solution to the problems of the revolutionary crisis. The merit of returning to his work is his recognition of the importance of the political order, in the manner of Marx, in order to form the political subject of this crisis. Also, to his credit, Lenin understood the crisis as the sharp thread upon which nothing can permanently stay, as the rare instance where practice becomes the truth of the theory it advances, where the working class finally plays the historical role temporarily bequeathed to the intermediate party. Finally, it returns the unique privilege to have made the primary fact of history the result of the conscious will of men. Marx had announced this new era where men, armed with theory and organization, were no longer satisfied with a subordinate role: they were only satisfied with the continuation and completion of a chosen project. Lenin opens it by victoriously deciding the crisis of 1917.
Yet, the image of the crisis as a razor blade that sharpens the truth, under the condensed material of steel, demonstrates the function of the crisis without allowing a glimpse of its nature. Balibar states this problem:
The “transition” from one mode of production to another can therefore never appear in our understanding as an irrational hiatus between two “periods” which are subject to the functioning of a structure, i.e., which have their specified concept. The transition cannot be a moment of destructuration, however brief. It is itself a movement subject to a structure which has to be discovered.96
Under this transition, Marx poses the invariant structure of the uninterrupted process of reproduction, which takes a particular form in each mode of production, as an obvious fact. In this way, the transition cannot be reduced to a “qualitative leap”; having distinguished, within the concept of reproduction, the continuous reproduction of commodities and the reproduction of social relations, and the conditions of the perpetuation of the system as a whole (which are specifically abolished in the crisis), Marx gives a partial solution without allowing for a real conclusion. The splitting of the concept of reproduction cannot be a substitute for the construction of a concept of transition.
The theory and laws of the revolutionary crisis are not adequately defined when put in the terms of an inaugural rupture of a new order, with the global proletariat as its subject. At the threshold of this problem the Leninist notion of the revolutionary crisis breaks down, at the very threshold of its own concept.
Mémoire de maîtrise (Philosophy), under the supervision of Henri Lefebvre, 1968
The original version of this text can be found at Le site de Daniel Bensaïd.
– Translated by Patrick King
Comments
The Philosophy of History and the Authoritarian State (1971)
“If socialism is improbable, it will require an all the more desperate determination to make it come true. What stands in its way is not the technical difficulty of its implementation but the apparatus of domination of the ruling class.”
– Heinrich Regius1
Historical materialism’s critical economic prognoses on the natural course of the capitalist world order have been confirmed. The conditions for the economic breakdown and crisis of capital have been fulfilled; the historical tendency of capitalist accumulation has long since reached the degree of concentration and centralization that Marx and Engels designated as its naturally produced historical terminus.2 The existence of the authoritarian state is just as much an expression of the “final crisis” as it is of the temporary, politically mediated success of the attempt to manage it in the interests of monopoly capital. Scholars have long feared, however, that the economic breakdown and crisis does not yet spell the political end of the capitalist social formation:
Even if the theory of the imminent collapse were correct as an economic theory, no unambiguous political consequences would flow from it. If it were correct that the process of capitalist production must necessarily lead to the collapse of this production, this still would not mean that a political collapse would have to follow on the economic collapse. It could very well be that the ruling class would draw the inference from the threatening collapse of the capitalist system that it must use political means to prevent this collapse from becoming politically effective.3
Franz Neumann’s hypothesis is notable for historical materialism as the only general model [Formtypus] of revolutionary theory to date, that is, of a doctrine the propositions of which describe society in terms of its revolutionary transformability. To equate the system’s final economic crisis with its elimination from the whole of society would contradict all of the theoretical determinations that structure the materialist concept of history in the doctrine of Marx and Engels. A tendency towards economic breakdown, generalized in terms of the philosophy of history and social theory, would imply that humans are inescapably under the heel of a social being that is beyond their conscious control; revolution then would be an absurdity of the historical process. The “final battle,” however, should definitively annul the shabby materialist doctrine of capitalist reality, according to which material being determines consciousness. That the history humanity makes is also made consciously, that “mankind is not beginning a new work, but is consciously carrying into effect its old work,” is a central emancipatory exigency of the Marxian concept of history.4 Thus the natural logic of capitalist development, according to which “capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation,” implies no optimistic belief in progress as a kind of fate.5 The natural laws of capitalist society are of a qualitatively different constitution from those of nature itself [ersten Natur]. They can be abolished; their abstract existence relies on the producers’ false consciousness of their own production. The objective validity of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall is not immutable in the same way as the physical law of gravity. Such views are left over from Marx’s epigones in the Second International, for whom the idea of unstoppable human progress according to natural laws exempted the proletariat, as well as themselves, from the task of revolutionary liberation even while rationalizing their own reformist betrayal.6
Against Wilhelm Dietzgen’s “religion of social democracy” – “Every day our cause becomes clearer and people get smarter” – Benjamin also applies his accurate critique of the social democratic concept of time, in which history, formalized as a transcendental time-continuum, in truth delivers an apology for a dehistoricized time-consciousness that, through exploitation, comes to appear as unchangeable labor-time.
Social Democratic theory, and even more its practice, have been formed by a conception of progress which did not adhere to reality but made dogmatic claims… The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogenous, empty time. A critique of the concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of progress itself.7
When raised to a historical principle, the practical stabilization of capitalism through the politics of social reform corresponded to the vulgarized reprise of the bourgeois philosophy of history in social democratic theory. Bernstein, as a sort of Kant of social democracy, delivered the nicely packaged teleology that inserted a hidden natural rationality into the history of the human species as capitalism’s evolutionary “growing into” socialism. He glorified the logical unreason of capitalist development as the rational course of world history itself. History is then expected to perform what only the revolutionary praxis of a united proletariat can accomplish. By contrast, Marx and Engels consistently stress:
History does nothing, it “possesses no immense wealth,” it “wages no battles.” It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights; “history” is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.8
Social reformism repeats the idealistic and Young Hegelian mystification of history as a “person apart, a metaphysical subject of which the real human individuals are merely the bearers.”9 It ossifies the ambivalent objectivity of the law of value, which indeed places itself over the heads of the individuals who are thus reduced to accidental agents of capital-in-process and which imposes itself, in the manner of a law of nature, as an unfaltering natural history. According to Marx and Lenin, it is only the final crisis that will be brought about with the necessity of natural law, by no means revolutionary liberation and much less a rational society – a critique that forms the systematic conceptual basis of Georg Lukács’ early work. “Lenin was very right to go against the front of opinion that mechanistically and fatalistically deemed the imperialist crisis of capitalism—which he himself thoroughly comprehended—as hopeless; there is, he said, no situation that could be abstractly, and in and for itself hopeless. The proletariat, the action of the proletariat blocks the way out of the this crisis for capitalism. Of course, the fact that the proletariat can be in such a position that the solution to the crisis depends on the proletariat is the consequence of economic necessity, of ‘natural laws.’ But the ‘natural laws’ only determine the crisis and rule out that this crisis (like earlier ones) will reach a capitalist sort of solution. The unhindered effects of this crisis allow for another solution: ‘the joint downfall of the struggling classes,’ the reversion to a condition of barbarism. The ‘natural laws’ of capitalist development can only lead society into the the final crisis, they are not able to point to the path that would lead out of the crisis.”10 The final crisis that historically announces the economic collapse of the capital relation does not necessarily compel the proletariat, but rather offers it the objective possibility to break through the economic power structures internalized by terroristic means for hundreds of years – the real semblance of capitalist conformity to the laws of nature – and to illuminate the darkened memory of exploitation through the historical anamnesis of a class consciousness that is aware of the mediations of politics and the economy at the level of society as a whole. This could then materialize the diffuse position of the wage-dependent masses as a class-in-itself into a revolutionary subjectivity and an objectively determined organization of the proletarian class struggle. Liberation can only occur through the consciousness and will of the exploited, or it does not occur at all.
The dictatorship of capital can, however, find an exit from the final crisis, as Marx and Engels, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg emphasized in historically different ways. An extreme dialectic of monopolistic and imperialist phases in the collapse of the capitalist social formation admits of two objectively possible resolutions, one at the scale of world history and the other in the dimension of the history of the species: the historical abolition of the system through the self-conscious associated producers, the “leap into the realm of freedom” (Engels), or else the blind reproduction of the unconscious “spiritual animal kingdom” of capitalist prehistory – “either transition to socialism or regression to barbarism.” More than fifty years ago, in reference to the First World War, Rosa Luxemburg articulated this world-historical alternative with which imperialism confronts humanity.
Today, we face the choice exactly as Friedrich Engels foresaw it a generation ago: either the triumph of imperialism and the collapse of all civilization as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration – a great cemetery. Or the victory of socialism, that means the conscious active struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism and its method of war. This is a dilemma of world history, an either/or; the scales are wavering before the decision of the class-conscious proletariat. The future of civilization and humanity depends on whether or not the proletariat resolves manfully to throw its revolutionary broadsword into the scales.11
The natural decision in favor of fascist barbarism and the destructive power of highly technologized forces of production in late capitalism, the danger of an atomic catastrophe, all confirm the world-historical and species-historical character of the alternative that the phase of capitalist collapse has put to the human species: the question of a better life is inextricably bound, on the level of global history, to that of mere survival; the final crisis forces the species to confront the question of its own continued existence.
The authoritarian state is capital’s political exit from the economic crisis. Its absolutized extra-economic coercive power, typically represented by the Bonapartist coercion of the nineteenth century and the fascist terror of the twentieth, furnishes the repressive instrumentarium necessary to delay definitive economic collapse and to sabotage the real possibility that the action of the “unified proletarians” could bring the capitalist system to an “unnatural end” (Horkheimer). Nevertheless, Thalheimer’s phenomenological description – correctly developed in connection with Marx’s materialist historiography of Louis Bonaparte’s regime – of a structural equivalence between the Bonapartist and the fascist forms of the authoritarian state’s appearance founded upon the mechanism of “the independence of the executive authority” (Marx) vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie,12 which blindly delegates its political power to the “the dictatorship of an adventurer and his gang” for the sake of maintaining its existence and economic dominance, should not lead us to overlook the essential differences between the two that result from changes within the economic production process itself owing to the progressive concentration of capital. The monopolist and imperialist final phase of capitalism transforms the relation between valorization and crisis. Monopoly capital is crisis capital in intentione recta; it requires the state’s uninterrupted intervention into the economic valorization process, which ultimately elevates the state to the material personification of national capital [den Staat zum materiellen Gesamtkapitalisten]. If we follow Max Horkheimer’s early analyses, fascism is a potentiality inherent to monopoly capital that the state can actualize at any time. “In any case, with trusts or without,” Engels writes,
the official representative of capitalist society – the state – will ultimately have to undertake the direction of production. This necessity for conversion into State property is felt first in the great institutions for intercourse and communication – the post office, the telegraphs, the railways… All its social functions are now performed by salaried employees… But, the transformation – either into joint-stock companies and trusts, or into State-ownership – does not do away with the capitalistic nature of the productive forces… And the modern State, again, is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine – the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital… The workers remain wage-workers – proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with. It is, rather, brought to a head.13
The theory of the authoritarian state is determined by this historical endpoint of the capital relation; if the concept of late capitalism is to have more than a formal meaning, then it will have it only in the philosophical context of the tendency towards state capitalism that Engels described and that Horkheimer once broached theoretically:
This theory of the end grows out of a situation which was still ambiguous, and is itself ambiguous: either it counts on collapse through an economic crisis, thereby ruling out stabilization of an authoritarian state, as Engels in fact predicted. Or else the theory expects the triumph of the authoritarian state, thus foreclosing collapse through a crisis, which was always defined by the market economy. But state capitalism does away with the market and hypostatizes the crisis for the duration of eternal Germany.14
Out of scientific necessity, the critique of political economy breaks off at the endpoint of capital historically fixed by Marx and Engels themselves, if it is not to degenerate into prophetic abstraction. Revolutionary theory still applies to the end phase of capitalism, which is partly but not wholly characterized by its form of appearance, the increasing primacy of the political. It is highly questionable whether revolutionary theory is still possible as the critique of political economy, or whether it must already be written, like Marcuse implicitly assumes, as a critique of political technology. In any case the dogmatists still treat revolutionary theory as if no further historical development were possible. Critique, however, is the theoretical life of the revolution. It would be a logical absurdity to claim that a doctrine that is so much a theory of history and of conscious change as is historical materialism should itself be removed from history and in no need of change. With the historical transformation of social facts, historical materialism’s propositions about these facts must also change. The historicity of the theory demands the critical application of historical materialism to itself, which Karl Korsch elevated to a program. Through its desire, grounded in practical reason, for a revolutionary transformation of the world, historical materialism ultimately presents itself with the immense theoretical claim to be the first self-aware doctrine in the history of human thought.
The level of revolutionary subjectivity in historical materialism was critically and philosophically uncovered by Korsch and Lukacs in the early 1920s through their explications of the genuinely negative relationship of Marxism and philosophy. This was a time of actual historical world revolution defined by the objective terrain of the first imperialist world war and the great October socialist revolution and the failed November German revolution, which structured the thought of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, the theoretical development of the constituent phase of the Comintern, as well as the representatives of the Dutch school in regard to controversial theories of organization.15 Yet the emancipatory subjective dimension of the revolutionary theory of the proletariat brought to light theoretically in this way was condemned to either suffocate or be of practical inconsequence for decades to come due to the Soviet Union’s transformation of once revolutionary politics into pragmatic Realpolitik. This went along with the growing terroristic demands of forced collectivization of the countryside and stunted technical industrialization under Stalinism,16 not to mention the ever-more intensifying context of the world economic crisis and fascism’s solution of violence.
To a similar degree, Marxist theoreticians were less and less able to analytically describe monopoly capitalism and its imperialist world system as guided by the emancipatory rational interest to connect revolutionary theory to such a praxis. The reconstruction period of West European capitalism following the Second World War seemed to permanently extinguish the actuality of revolutionary praxis and put off revolution forever and a day. Critical political economy continued to ossify into a positive economics unable to conceptualize society as a whole. As a result, its practical strategic significance remained in the dark. To unite historically new facts with the conclusions of a handed-down theory, the “system” of Marxism was either fragmentarily “amended” into dogmatic orthodoxy, or parts were broken off from it in a revisionist manner to bring it into accordance with the changed conditions. The possibility that the fundamental stratification of the social totality – of production and circulation, of economic “base” and the derivative institutional “superstructure” – could have historically transformed itself was left entirely out of consideration, due not least to the historical situation of theory, marked as it was by the absence of any practical experience of revolutionary actuality. The “system” in toto was assumed to be inalterable; orthodox dogmatism and system-adapted revisionism agree in liquidating the dialectical quintessence of critique, the historical difference between the essence and appearance of things. According to this view, historical mutability should pertain only to the empirical manifold of capitalism’s world of appearances, not the consistent identity of its exploitative essence. If such profound changes in the reified forms of appearance of capitalist production – of the flow of exchange and of the legal, political-moral, and cultural-scientific superstructure – take place as happened in the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism in the highly industrialized countries at the end of 19th and beginning of the 20th century, then it stands to reason to assume, in terms of historical materialism, that the derivative relationship of economy and industrialized ideology had changed together. This suggests a change of “the system of needs,” of the economic essence of capitalist social forms themselves and, with that, bourgeois society in general.
Without the assumption that the “essence” of the capitalist mode of production is part of its historical dynamic and in no way ontologically separate from it, and that it alone corresponds to the historically transitory character of the capitalist mode of production that Marx systematically revealed, neither Horkheimer’s conception of the authoritarian state nor Marcuse’s systematic hypothesis of the one-dimensionalization of social antagonisms would be thinkable.17 Both theoretical conceptions offer complementary systematic approaches that target the changed whole of the capitalist social formation. They set out to hold onto Marx and Engels’ theory of the historical endpoint of capitalist relations, albeit without adequately subjecting their new systematic approach to a critique of political economy in its Marxian version. Marcuse and Horkheimer relate to each other, with different emphases, by reference to two overlapping socioeconomic tendencies that are bound to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
1. Horkheimer, in agreement with Engels, refers essentially to the growing and manifestly emergent socialization of the productive forces at the foundation of the capitalist mode of production itself. According to Marx and Engels, with the joint stock company form this immanent though suppressed basic contradiction in the capital relation – the intrinsically social character of the forces of production that are coerced into the guise of capitalist private property – historically becomes an “empirically perceptible” appearance that can be practically experienced and gains explosive revolutionary force.18 Engels takes the Marxian theory of the joint-stock company further by exposing this immanent tendency toward monopoly and the authoritarian state:
Taking over of the great institutions for production and communication, first by joint-stock companies, later in by trusts, then by the State. The bourgeoisie demonstrated to be a superfluous class. All its social functions are now performed by salaried employees.19)
It was under the historically new effect of monopolization, in which the inner-capitalist socialization of the productive forces corresponded to an increasingly coercive statification [Verstaatlichung] of society, that Horkheimer near the end of the 1930s drafted – in however fragmentary a fashion – a theory of the authoritarian state. At the heart of this theory is the assumption of an admittedly inadequately defined liquidation of the sphere of circulation by the monopolist market controls of centralized authoritarian production. With the abolition of competition and the liberal free market economy, this process eliminates from bourgeois society its ideologically distorted emancipatory content and unleashes the exploitative relationship of violence between capital exchange and wage labor, which was previously concealed by the law of contract. By no means does the term “authoritarian state” stand for a problematic isolated to theories of legal philosophy and of the state, but rather for a historically new system constituting the social totality. “State capitalism is the authoritarian state of the present.”20
2. Where for Horkheimer the systemic accumulative dynamic toward authoritarian [autoritativen] state capitalism is based on the historically new monopolistic quality of socializing productive forces immanent to capital and the resulting changed constellation of production and circulation, Marcuse, more than thirty years later, deals with the changed constitution within the “metabolism between man and nature” itself: the increasing automation of industrial forces of production radically shifts the weight of the constitutive moment of the labor process from the position of the producers to machines [Maschinenwesen], from living to objectified labor.21 The technical and scientific advance by means of automation is more “than quantitative growth of mechanization,” rather “a change in the character of the basic productive forces.”22 Automation “is an explosive or non-explosive catalyst in the material base of qualitative change”23 that actualizes a “totalitarian” systemic transformation of bourgeois society even as it potentially opens the “historical transcendence toward a new civilization.”24 With this, Marcuse is able to invoke what Marx in the Grundrisse referred to as the highest and last developmental tendency of the capitalist mode of production, in which technology and science have reached a productively implemented stage of development on a scale that threatens to explode the system. The “growth of scientific power… the measure in which it is already posited as fixed capital, the scope and width in which it is realized and has conquered the totality of production” is one of those explosive moments of contradiction found at the natural end of capital’s violent history of crisis “in which advice is given it to be gone and to give room to a higher state of social production.”25 The technological and scientific reshaping of production is no longer able to tolerate its compulsory capitalist objectification. For Marx, automation—the scientific reshaping of industrial machinery— produces a totalitarian technologization of political economy.26 But with that, according Marcuse, the principle of “technological rationality,” which is part and parcel of industrial technique [Technik] and modern science from the beginning and inseparable from domination over nature and human beings seems to reach its fully developed reality, as he asserts in his critique of Max Weber’s concept of rationality. “[W]hen technics becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality—a ‘world’.”27
Following Marcuse’s logic, theory can no longer be carried out as a critique of political economy; rather, it is driven on by the force of its intrinsic historical tendency to become to a critique of political technology.
Both endpoints of the capital relation – the authoritarian [autoritär] statification of society as well as its totalitarian one-dimensionalization in a social lifeworld thoroughly rationalized by technology – underlie a peculiar dialectic of historical transition. Both the immanent tendency of socialization toward state capitalism that Horkheimer demonstrated as well as the possible technical and scientific substitution of living labor described by Marcuse refer immediately to the association of producers and the “association of free men.” Capital nevertheless seems to put off its own historical terminus and to stabilize in its transition when immediately faced with the possibility of its demise. State capitalism and a total system of fixed capital embodied in machines typically stand for this final dialectic of capital, which neutralizes in appearance its most historically glaring contradiction and most acute crisis. The authoritarian “Welfare State” presents the image “of a historical freak between organized capitalism and socialism, servitude and freedom, totalitarianism and happiness.”28 In a Hegelian sense, state capitalism is an instance of bad ideality [schlechte Idealität]. The ideal is a speculative result of a historically ripe and perishing reality within the medium of bourgeois post festum consciousness. “History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom.”29 The ideal comprises a two-fold abstraction of the course of history. It releases the old substance that has historically come into being from the medium of the conceptual process within which it realized itself, and abstracts the principle of the historically new from the conceptual unfolding that lies before it, and in which it forms an idea for the first time. It connects ahistorically two moments that repel each other historically, the old substance with the new though still unreal principle.30 State capitalism is just such an ideal end product of a matured crisis and the dying valorization of capital. State capitalism, in its form of appearance, releases the old substance of capital – value – from the shell of capitalist private property and apparently links it to the historically undeveloped principle of the socialization of the means of production, whose socialist, associative concretion it at first blocks; it thus captures the new principle of the associative mode of production in the old substance of value. The authoritarian state is capitalism’s distorted caricature of socialism.
Conversely, the technological and scientific reshaping of production, which pushes for the abolition of capital, is unable to realize its emancipatory potential so long as it remains captured within the limits of the valorization of fixed capital. But this creates the technical and scientific advance that elevates the abolition of work to a concrete utopia, instead of structural unemployment: “In the system of the free market economy, which pushed men to labor-saving discoveries and finally subsumed them in a global mathematical formula, its specific offspring, machines, have become means of destruction not merely in the literal sense: they have made not work but the workers superfluous.”31
This fatal dialectic, which fixes the capital relation in its transition, leads Marcuse and Horkheimer to conclude that the position of revolutionary subjectivity in relation to the objective state of development of the capitalist social formation has changed. The objective appeal to maturity, “the topic probandum and probatum,” of history (Horkheimer), has lost its validity. In its time, Marx’s polemic against Bakunin’s abstractly idealist voluntarism was practically correct and theoretically true, but now seems to have lost its power. When faced with the Willich-Schapper group, Marx dismissed the idealism of pure will in the revolutionary learning process that takes place in the formative epoch-making spontaneity of crisis-ridden and warring social relations, a process in which the working class matures into self-liberation:
The point of view of the minority is dogmatic instead of critical, idealistic instead of materialistic. They regard not the real conditions but a mere effort of will as the driving force of the revolution. Whereas we say to the workers: “You will have to go through 15, 20, 50 years of civil wars and national struggles not only to bring about a change in society but also to change yourselves, and prepare yourselves for the exercise of political power,” you say on the contrary: “Either we seize power at once, or else we might as well just take to our beds.”32
That the proletariat must be free for its liberation is a conditio sine qua non of insight into the revolution. But regulated fixed capital, at its natural historical endpoint, seems to flip the relationship between Marxism and anarchism on the grounds of historical materialism itself. If the natural laws of capitalist development have run their course, then the appeal to insufficient maturity can only hold off practically the theoretically necessary revolution.
It might be said of past historical enterprises that the time was not yet ripe for them. Present talk of inadequate conditions is a cover for the tolerance of oppression. For the revolutionary, conditions have always been ripe… A revolutionary is with the desperate people for whom everything is on the line, not with those who have time. The invocation of a scheme of social stages which demonstrates post festum the impotence of a past era was at the time an inversion of theory and politically bankrupt. Part of the meaning of theory is the time at which it is developed.33
The conception of the revolutionary theory of the proletariat as an “epistemology of revolutionary will” corresponds to Horkheimer’s idea that the actuality of revolution depends on the practical reason of the voluntary factor. Certainly unheeded in this conception is whether the reification of capital in its endphase does not constitute another contradictory quality, whether revolutionary subjectivity and objectivity do not differentiate themselves anew on another social level. If we presuppose the objective possibility, opened by the last crisis, of a formerly only hypothesized revolutionary liberation in the world historical sense, then Horkheimer’s dictum applies: “The revolution that ends domination is as far-reaching as the will of the liberated. Any resignation is already a regression into prehistory.”34
– Translated by Michael Shane Boyle and Daniel Spaulding
Comments
The Political (1979)
“Introduction” to the edited collection Il Politico, in four volumes, Feltrinelli, Milan 1979.
1. The political has a history. It is the modern history of relations of power. To reconstruct, reread, to accumulate materials, to lay out the problems by following the unhurried course of time, to set out from the classics is not an escape into the past, it is an experiment, a test, the attempt to verify a hypothesis. Let us leave formulae to the arithmetic of politics. Let us leave the autonomy of politics to the newspapers. The difficulties encountered by the Marxist theory and practice of the workers’ movement in taking upon itself the fact of power all stem from this absence of knowledge, from this lack of reflection on the historical horizon of bourgeois politics. The Marxist critique of politics has no follow-up; it has not accompanied, not anticipated – here we must choose! – the Marxist critique of political economy. The idea of this book has, in its own small way, a great model: that fourth book of Capital [Theories of Surplus Value], where Marx collects, exposes, comments upon, attacks – that is, critiques – the economists, great and small, classical and vulgar; he does history of theoretical economics, a history of battle, for his own ends, so as to know, to understand, to beat the hegemony of bourgeois thought in a field that is immediately incorporated in the class relations of capitalist society. The fourth book of Capital, as everyone knows, was composed prior to the other three.
The political has a bourgeois history. It cannot be leapt over. One cannot immediately arrive at an “other” political without having traversed and tested and understood what there is already. The past is weighty. Up to now capitalism has produced power; but power has also produced capitalism. This latter thing is difficult to accept. And yet here there is one of those stubborn facts that do not allow themselves to be shunted aside even by the most revolutionary form of thought that has ever existed, that of Marx. It is the fact of a history that from its beginnings, above all from its beginnings, comes forth as a political history. The proposal that we read this political history of capital, in intellectual discoveries and practical choices, is a necessity for Marxist research. Each attempt to leap over a moment of theoretical delay naturally provokes the risk of imprecision, numerous examples of incompleteness, and some naïve enthusiasms. This proposal would like to act as a guide to a gathering of materials that are then to be taken up, one by one, through specific analyses and labors. It is an idea for investigation aimed at young intellectual forces. We also find here a first reply to one of their questions. The arc of historical development is long. Whoever thinks of politics today, thinks they are doing so in a new way. This is very much organic to the old politics, because it leaves it in the tranquility of its everyday life, it fails to reckon with it, it does not fight it and hence does not destroy it. The need for strategic breadth cannot leap over the angst of everyday practice; it must confront it if it wishes to strike it.
The political has a modern bourgeois history. Many of the things that we do badly today had been done well a few centuries ago. It is extraordinary how little that is new can be found under the sun of politics. No, this is not the banal thesis that politics is always the same. It is not. Depending upon the way that it relates itself to the problem of power, politics changes form. As the subjects of politics change, its laws also change. It is around the crux of the political history of capital that a unity is to be reconstructed. The iterability of political phenomena must be scientifically verified within a historically determined socio-economic formation. For this reason, in undertaking a unified reconstruction of political history, we cannot go back beyond the modern era. Otherwise one would have to speak of an eternal and ideal notion of the political. This we can do without. The quarrel between the ancients and the moderns does not present itself again here. In politics we are not dwarves standing on the shoulders of giants. Capitalism, in the epoch of its great crisis, produces Great Politics, as it did at the time of its birth. And alongside the modern classics there are the contemporary classics of politics. There is an intertwining of the production of politics, theoretical and practical, and the production of culture, modern and contemporary, that must almost always be teased apart in original ways. The old interpretive categories of the great intellectuals are useless. One needs new forces, brains that have not been smoothed out by the hammer of tradition. One needs the taste for a new inquiry into new problems. This explains the method chosen for the composition of this anthology. Putting in direct contact a page of modern history or of political theory with a young scholar who is doing research or doing politics today already makes a spark fly that can illuminate possible discoveries. But only on one condition: that we possess a working theoretical hypothesis within a horizon of practical action. This project exists to bring Marxist research and the initiative of the workers’ movement to a transformative strategic confrontation with the political.
But what is the political? There is an image of it that is at once modern and classical. This image has undergone prodigious development and ruinous crises, it has shaped the history of the past centuries but also that of recent decades, and only today does it appear unable to gather within itself the new complexity of the social, incapable of governing the action of the forces that it itself contributed to putting into play. The powerlessness of power seems today to hint ambiguously at the end of politics. It is not so. But we should take on and follow through to the end the positive charge of this ambiguity. We must put up for discussion the classical modern canons of politics. A critique of politics is necessary. In a Marxist sense. Not mere critique of ideology, but critique of the practice embodied in the relations of power. Knowledge, which is insufficient, is nevertheless indispensable. Knowledge of the mechanisms, the techniques, the subjects and of the images of power. One cannot turn the State into a theoretical dogma, precisely today when it no longer works as the manager of interests and the controller of contradictions. The standpoint of the movements that contest the state-form must not be expelled from the horizon of reflection, because something of their theoretically aggressive charge must be brought to bear on the problem. The outlook of a possible government of the new figure of the social should not be moralistically thrown back into the hellfire of criminal actions, because direction and mediation, that is, authority, is not the past of politics, but its present in crisis. The oscillations between these extreme ways of looking at the political are in the things themselves, in the forces, in the relations and in the subjects. We can find their echo in the different treatment of the thinkers in this anthology. One cannot do a history of the political without doing politics.
What, then, is the modern bourgeois political? It is technique [tecnica] plus machine, political class [ceto] plus mechanism of domination, politics plus state. Each of these components has a history, but the history of the political includes them all. In the bourgeois consciousness of the modern political the totality is not brought in from outside; it is its nature, its tendency, its logic. Hegel is in nuce Machiavelli. Not in general, but on the basis of capitalism, the machine of the State is implicit in the technique [tecnica] of politics. For this reason, power cannot be the pure summation of techniques [tecniche] and politics the raw instrument of domination. Of course, the totality of the political is that of the classical bourgeois era. Then there is the crisis. In other words, there is our time: crisis of totalities, of organicist summings-up, of final products and results, the crisis of the Synthesis-State. One must stand in this new horizon of the broken, dispersed, non-organized political. In the knowledge, however, of the relationship that is established here with the preceding moments of unity, concentration, and force. It is not enough to look, one must change. This is also true of the political, and for its history. The crisis of the State-form poses practical problems of struggle. Is the schema, the passage, the contradiction “conquest of power – conservation of power” still valid? In order to know, we will have to retrace the entire development of the experience of the modern political at the level of the highest works of thought, on the battlefields of ideological alternatives, on the terrain of historic practical decisions. The consciousness of the past must not lead to the historicist knowledge of the present; it must push, practically, for its transformation. Hence the leaps will be privileged over the developments. What emerges is a history of Great Politics. This is a choice. Besides, the question comes from below. The last ten years have made an initial selection of the emerging forces of the young politics. The mass elite that has emerged from it is now being asked to stand up and be counted. Those who resist the return of moderation in small things, whether private or public, will find themselves having to make a grand reckoning anew. We must prepare instruments for reading the processes that are capable of grasping reality so as to return to the young intellectual forces the taste and appetite for great transformations.
2. There is, then, a practical origin to this theoretical interest in the history of the political. From the beginning, a close link is established between the terrain of the political and the birth and development of capitalism; an organic relationship, a reciprocal functionality. The present transition – that is, the strategic reversal that within capitalism puts crisis in the place of development without even a glimpse of a possible collapse of the system – and yesterday’s transition – that is, the great crisis and the exit from it through a new relationship between system of power and class struggle in America – all of this puts the role of the political back in play and makes that of the State visible. To grasp the sense of these transitions at its root it is necessary to retrieve the classical dimension of certain problems.
The birth of the political as a problem lies at the origins of capitalist society. The impact, the intertwining, the exchange, the conflict is between the state subject and the transition to capitalism. Without the State, from its origins, no capitalism. Without modern politics, immediately, from its beginnings, no bourgeois revolution. Let us reconsider the “Marxian” example of England. The English route to capitalism is simultaneously – not before and not after – but at once the English route to the modern bourgeois State. And the latter, before its birth as a liberal State, as a constitutional form, does not have a pre-history; it has a real history that leads to that result, which forces it to that transition. About this originary history, about this primitive political accumulation of the bourgeois State, Marxism is silent. And yet, as is Marxism’s wont, there are here elements not only for knowledge, but also for denunciation; moments not only for development, but also for struggle. And so it is. The political development, like the economic, drips blood and tears. The history of the State, like that of capitalism, is the history of force and violence, of conquest and domination, of ability and deceit. It is political, not ethical; it is history, not human progress. When individual rights made their appearance, power had already won, sovereignty was already absolute, and the modern State had already been born. How does one arrive first, along with capitalism, at this sovereign power of the State – this is the problem.
The hypothesis that runs through the pages of this first volume is that one passes from a theory of politics to a theory of the State, from Machiavelli to the threshold of Hobbes, from the Prince to the Leviathan. With respect to this strong line of interpretation of political thought and political practice in the 1500s and through to the middle of the 1600s, the differences of approach to the various protagonists of the epoch serve not only to articulate the framework of the interpretations, but also to register the objective blurring of the rigidity of the hypothesis. So we pass from the careful philological reconstruction of an author and his work to the brilliant discourse of someone who has fallen in love with a character, painting a portrait that cannot fail to be personal. At least at the start, I think this margin of oscillation cannot be eliminated. This is a tangled knot that belongs to cultural work on the modern classics. I do not believe that it will be possible quickly to arrive at a synthesis of a sophisticated interpretation of a text (as scientific as possible), and its cold, raw, practical use. This contradiction must be kept alive; its terms must be taken to their extremes, the opposite solutions must be set in opposition. This is a real conflict, as with all conflicts that cannot be eliminated, one must prepare oneself to use them.
As we said: from politics to the State, throughout that century of great political thought that the sixteenth-century was. Here the great islands of Bodin, Althusius, Suarez, Grotius are surrounded by an archipelago of lesser islands where realism and ideology, the recognition of things and the vain ambitions of universal palingeneses are interwoven, coexist and fight. No matter how and in any case, at the beginnings, in the process of formation of the bourgeois political horizon, the technique [tecnica] of politics comes forth as a technique [tecnica] of domination. Conquest and conservation of power: Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses put the problem directly in this form. Modern society is founded not only on the domination of nature, through the development of technique [tecnica] and industry. Modern capitalist society is founded on the domination of men by men. As Horkheimer writes of Machiavelli: “The aggregate of the paths that lead to this condition, and of the measures which serve to maintain this domination, goes under the name of politics.”1 Whether we are dealing with a principality, a government of patricians, or a popular state, it is always like this – as Machiavelli said, “it is while revolving in this cycle that all republics are governed and govern themselves.”2
Let’s repeat. There has been an optical illusion, that is, an excessively passive Marxist reading of a bourgeois politics as being based on the “rights of man,” as a universalist ideology of the citoyen that masked the particular class interest of the bourgeois. Whence a workers’ horizon of thought as essentially a critique of ideology and as a retrieval of its ultimate truth in the Marxist doctrine of human emancipation. These things remain painfully present. What still has to be calculated is the politico-practical damage, the blockage of the development of the class struggle that has been occasioned by the incomprehension of the political origins of capitalism. Once again, these are the reasons behind this choice of a work of research that, over the long term, aims to remove this blockage, even, and amongst other things, putting a web of problems back into play. In reality, in modern classical bourgeois political thought there was not only a knowing false consciousness, which is to say ideology, but also realistic objective description of nodes, passages and, yes, problems – of course, this is truer in the case of great conservative thought than in so-called revolutionary thinking. So, I repeat, from Machiavelli to Hobbes, politics becomes State, technique [tecnica] becomes machine, accumulation becomes power and the practice of politics wins, that is, conquers and conserves domination. In between there are the wars of religion, social revolts, a civil war turning into revolution, the “general crisis” of the 1600s and a first crisis of bourgeois culture in which the unity and rationality of the Renaissance intellect crumbles. In the course of this fiery ordeal, it is a fact – as historically indubitable as it is politically rich – that the unity and concentration of power, and hence the reality of sovereign power, comes before and founds the liberty, sovereignty, and the very property of the bourgeois individual. It is on this latter material base that the need for the ideology of modern politics emerges and does so quickly, already in the sixteenth century with natural law theory and Calvinism. What follows, Locke, the liberal tradition and later democratic thought, cannot be understood without these ideological sources; but they also cannot be understood without those great material, structural processes of the organization of power as a function of what will become the history of the accumulation of capital. What emerges here is a weighty problem that has yet to find its great historian. Upon these two aspects of ideology and power the religious unity of the world is shattered. The protestant ethic operates as an ideological support for a very specific epoch of the spirit of capitalism: it appears as a tactical relation, not by chance expressed in certain sociological categories, Weberian ideal types that interpret, describe, explain but do not change and do not propose to change the conditions of the investigation according to a practical outlook. The historical nexus represented by the relation of power and capital – the conquest and exercise of power, the accumulation and development of capital – is posed in the form of the strategic nexus of the relation between Catholicism and capitalism. And on the side, more distant historically but conceptually tighter, it appears as the ambiguous functional interchange of theology and politics. This is where we must plunge the knife of discovery so as to uncover the nerves, the ligaments, and the relations of the political in a determinate historical point; here is perhaps the privileged field for an anatomy of power; without doubt, this is the terrain upon which for a long time it will be necessary to work with the means of production of the critique of politics.
With Hobbes, in the bourgeois epoch, a veritable age of the State begins. From Machiavelli to Cromwell – this is the age of modern politics. A doing, an acting begins, which is by a single individual but is for all the others, or over all the others. It is the public action of the isolated individual; it is political activity. The laws of action, the rules to direct men and women, the forms to dominate them are born. The rationality of politics is born: looking in, there is the iterability of human behaviour and the contempt for the naturally subaltern vocation of humanity, the citizen as subject; looking out, there is the taste for ability and the sense of force, the cultivation of virtù and the command over fortuna, “those princes are weak who do not rely on war.”3 This is the bourgeois horizon of politics: the only one that has existed up to now. Hitherto the workers’ standpoint has attempted to change this horizon; now the moment has come to understand it. Only a cold understanding can put a real transformation back on its feet. From Machiavelli to Cromwell politics wins: because it becomes State, it becomes power. The workers’ movement is the end of politics, or is it politics incarnated in the masses? In the first case there is a break in the course of history: “play crazy, like Brutus,”4 Machiavelli used to say. In the second case, there is the reversal of direction: “we should consider where are the fewer inconveniences and take that for the best policy, because nothing entirely clean and entirely without suspicion is ever found.”5 Death of politics or class politics? This sharp alternative should be left open. The knot must either be undone or cut. Before we decide, we must understand. This is why we need to traverse modern politics, looking at it with fresh eyes, rethinking it with young minds. At the end of the historical course of events, we will decide with theory.
3. Theory, precisely. In the current confusion of languages or, to be more up-to-date, in the present plurality of languages, it is difficult to understand if this crisis of Marxism exists or not. Insofar as it is a project of thought-transformation, Marxism is tied to the historical nature of the workers’ movement. There could be a temporary tactical crisis regarding the instruments, within the framework however of a strategic development of restructuring of objectives. That is, the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach does not go into crisis while there is even a single case of class struggle present. When there is none, if there is none, then we will see. In the meantime, parts of contemporary Marxism fall. Sectors of Marxist culture no longer find space for productive growth. There is a crisis, in the strong sense, of historical Marxist research. It has lasted too long and is too widespread for it to be down to mere accidental or immediate causes. There must be an underlying process that makes its effects felt on the general sense of the research, on the entire field of the analyses that refer back to Marxism. There is a crisis of historical materialism, of that complex of organicist, universalist, and (not coincidentally) economistic ideas that goes by the name of the materialist conception of history. These first centuries of modern history, this passé present, has refuted this aspect of Marxism. Indeed, as Lüthy writes: “The greatest wrong that the prevalent school of doctrinaire historical materialism has committed against history has been that of considering the State solely as an instrument in the service of others, and of the political regime as the reflection of the relations of power between social classes; and hence to have precluded for itself the true study of institutions, law, regimes, in short, of the political organization of society and of the evermore constraining and overpowering autonomous action of constituted power on the evolution of society and of economies. Because political history, in the full sense of the term, is not an epiphenomenon, nor a historical category alongside others: the economic, the social, the cultural, it dominates them and unites all of them as integrating parts of the history of the ‘city.’” Here there is a clear-cut inversion of direction that goes to the opposite extreme, assigning to political history a new totalizing, integrating function. This is certainly not the guiding hypothesis of our investigation. We seek a place for the political within a Marxist analytical horizon; a specific place for the political and hence also a determination of its history that helps us understand the function that it has played and thus the role that we can ask it to play. The history of thinking about politics and about the State, the history of certain great directions of state politics must also be read alongside the rest of modern history, that of class struggle and the relations of production, that of industry and science, that of society and movements. We want to hold open this historical spectrum; in each case, we attempt to understand its logic; we do not abandon the objective of a synthesis, but we do not preempt the results of the investigation. Besides, the logic of scientific discovery within the workers’ movement is interwoven with the struggle over political direction. I am convinced that a theoretical synthesis only begins to become possible when one starts to win in practice.
The centrality of politics must therefore be critical and problematic, it must carry contradictions – which it has done and continues to do. Immediately behind us lies the era of the victory of politics: in the workers’ camp, with the age of revolutions and the attempts at alternative societies; in the capitalist camp, with the macro-government of the great crisis and the programmes for the rationalization of development. The substantial failure of these attempts and programmes, both the great revolutionary ones and the great conservative ones, and furthermore the growth in the complexity, stratification, and disarticulation of the contemporary social, lead today (or appear to lead) the great forces as well as single individuals, to a “retraite” from the political. We are living through a moment of crisis of politics. It is a crisis of the ideological apparatuses, the criteria of belonging, the articles of faith, and it is a crisis of the technical instruments, of administration and mutation, State, parties, unions. The capture of active consent and the practice of subjective transformation become increasingly difficult. The functioning of politics becomes more difficult, both in terms of management-and/or-overturning and of government-and/or-revolution.6 Politics is suffering from a crisis of identity; there is a fall in the credibility of a political solution to the great problems of modern society and individuals. We are experiencing a crisis of political rationality. Here too one must think and live this transition; remain within it, traverse it and allow it to traverse us. We must take up a line of investigation that is open and provisional. This was precisely the “other” dimension of the autonomy of the political. Taking cognizance of a logic specific to the political and in this sense bringing about a revolution in the Marxist mode of thinking. But not as a project; not as a recomposition or as rationalization. On the contrary, as a moment of destabilization at the level of the theoretical tradition and, hence, with an awareness of the crisis of political rationality. The unveiling of the autonomous forms of political domination and so the anticipatory expression of anti-institutional movements understood, however, as new levels of class struggle that seek for themselves – and perhaps here is where the real novelty lies – a use of the political and an institutional politics. In other words: maturing of the class movement through a crisis of rationality of the very autonomy of the political of the bourgeoisie.
To know politics, and its history, is a weapon; an offensive instrument in the struggle for change. And it is not a struggle between cultures; it is not a battle of ideas. It is not a case of convincing intellectuals. And we don’t wish to titillate the specialists. I repeat and insist. There is an area of new militancy that has grown in the course of these ten years amid various disappointments; it now asks for a new culture of politics, a modern knowledge of transformation. There is a young intellectual force in formation, which has already experienced on its own body the failure of the “progressive” cultural horizons and is now ready to grapple with the other, even if the other is the enemy. This is the public for this discourse. Here there are vigilant eyes and minds ready to understand, deployed in such a way as to capture the true sense of the investigation and to utilize it for growth or for changing themselves. There is only one path towards the recovery of politics – as activity and as thought – and that is via the realistic recognition of its originary bourgeois nature. Once recognized, and only then, will we be able and will we need to go beyond.
Cassirer writes: “There is a scene in Goethe’s Faust in which we see Faust in the kitchen of the witch, waiting for her drink by virtue of which he shall regain his youth. Standing before an enchanted glass he suddenly has a wonderful vision. In the glass appears the image of a woman of supernatural beauty. He is enraptured and spellbound; but Mephisto, standing at his side, scoffs at his enthusiasm. He knows better, he knows that what Faust has seen was not the form of a real woman; it was only a creature of his own mind.”7 There is not only the “myth of the State,” there is also the myth of politics. It is possible that the exercise of this new power, “the power of mythical thinking,” has not erupted anywhere with greater violence than in the field of politics. Carr has spoken of “Bolshevik utopia;” it would have been better to speak of utopia with respect to the Bolshevik 1917, or of State and Revolution as active inheritance that brings with it the “most blatantly utopian element of Marxist doctrine,” the extinction of the State and, consequently, the end of politics; a Marx closer to Smith than to Hegel. Alongside other significant facts, is it not also this Bolshevik utopia that arouses the complete state-centeredness of the Soviet experience? “Mystical visions” are like the sleep of reason; they produce monsters. Only the realism of analysis, the critique of motives, the calculation of forces, and the disenchantment of values are able to save us from the fate of uncontrollable results.
And so: from Machiavelli to Cromwell; this is politics and this is the State. Here we find the history of origins. The rest, what follows, will not come about through spontaneous germination, or through peaceful development, or from the accumulation of data; it will only come through contradiction, contrast, via leaps, forward and back. Focusing on the origin does not help us understand everything, but it does help us to know the origin. Knowing where the theoretical roots of politics and the State lead is knowing where we must plunge the spade to tear out those roots in practice. To do this we must turn our hands to a labor of excavation. We cannot just exploit the labor of others; revisit their scholarship. We must get our hands dirty. Better to run the risk of error than to have the academic certainty of not knowing. In politics, in political theory, one cannot be Canetti’s Peter Kien, professor of sinology, a head without a world: “he remembered [the roses’] sweet smell from Persian love poetry.”8 The route is the other one. Confide in God but keep your powder dry. Machiavelli … but with Ironsides.
– Translated by Matteo Mandarini
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The Political Economy of Capitalist Labor
The conviction that capitalist production requires laborers who are not only dispossessed of autonomous means of reproduction, but are also legally free to offer their capacity to labor on the market, has been central to Marxist analyses of capitalism. Any endeavor to confront this thesis with the actual history of capitalism not only runs counter to the dominant content of traditional Marxist analysis, but also to the fundamentally optimistic Marxist philosophy of history. Notwithstanding exploitation, pauperization, injustice, and all the other evils of this historical epoch, Marx, Engels, and Marxists have also conceived of capitalism as one step further in the development of humanity.
Much like the proponents of capitalism, Marx and Marxists have explained that while direct violence against producers was constantly threatened and often applied in pre-capitalist forms of production, violence is no longer required for capitalist forms of exploitation. It is, indeed, even contrary to the successful production of surplus value, and hence profit. Capitalism, then, is conceived of as a marker of human progress in comparison to pre-capitalist forms of production, not only because of its surpassing of direct violence, but also because it brings about the social, technological, and ideological conditions which make socialism possible.
Nonetheless, while Marx, Engels, and Marxists concur with proponents of capitalism in their conception of this political-economic system as a progressive stage in the history of mankind, they are neither in agreement with the latter’s conception of capitalism as the final stage of history, nor with their explanation of its historical origin. This difference is spelled out at the end of the first volume of Capital in Marx’s explication of “primitive accumulation,” conceived of as historical prerequisite to the accumulation that becomes dominant in capitalism.
After having made fun of Adam Smith’s anecdotal narrative of the origin of capitalism, Marx explains that primitive accumulation of capital was “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”1 The seven paragraphs of the chapter on “so-called primitive accumulation” contain extensive historical descriptions. However, they do not represent historical analysis as such. Instead, Marx highlights strategies and processes which resulted in the dispossession of laborers from autonomous means of reproduction, and in the accumulation of capital. While the latter was achieved through “colonialism, national debt, taxation, protectionism, trade wars, etc.,”2 the former was brought about through forceful appropriation and expropriation. All of these strategies were ripe with violence, and all of them made use of state power.
That these practices are considered to be conducive of the establishment of capitalist production, but not of its continuous reproduction, is made clear by the famous statement about violence being the midwife of any old society which is pregnant with a new one.3 We might smile about Marx’s choice of word, since instead of using the word “Hebamme” (midwife), he entrusts historical progress to a male, designating him as “Geburtshelfer” (obstetrician). We will leave that aside. I will also leave aside the extensive debate on revolution in the course of which this sentence has, again and again, been cited.4 But this statement is not only relevant for debates on revolution; it also concerns the analysis of capitalism. Having helped a woman in labor to give birth to new life, the mission of a midwife is fulfilled. Assuming that Marx chose his terms conscientiously, this also applies to the role of violence in history. And, indeed, it is in the same chapter that we are told that extra-economic violence, though exceptionally still made use of in capitalism, has been replaced by the “natural laws of production.”5 In other words: the open violence of former times has been replaced by the silent force of market conditions.
Of course, neither Marx nor Marxists have conceived of capitalism as being devoid of violence. Instead, they have remarked, the site of violence has changed. It is no longer in the open, executed through the state, or – in places where the monopoly of legitimate physical violence has not yet been appropriated by the state – by open private violence. Once material conditions have forced men, women, and even children to offer their capacity to labor on the market, direct violence is no longer necessary to establish exploitation, because this result is achieved by the impersonal functioning of competition on the labor market. And it is this impersonal power which ensures the acceptance of dominance that is inherent in every capitalist labor relation. This capitalist form of violence, no longer in the open and no longer sporadic, has become the central element of the everyday life of capitalism. Its analysis forms the center of the Marxist analysis of capitalist labor, and rightly so. Nevertheless, by focusing exclusively on the violence inherent in the everyday command over the application of one’s capacity to labor, and hence over the bodies and the intellectual capacities of wage-laborers themselves, one only grasps specific historical developments of capitalist labor, albeit important ones.
I am rather convinced that Marx himself conceived of primitive accumulation as a historical phase which more or less ended when and where capitalist forms of production became dominant. Why else would he have stated that at the time of his writing, primitive accumulation had been more or less accomplished in Western Europe?6 I am not opposed to re-interpretations which endeavor to make use of the analytical concept of primitive accumulation in order to grasp continual processes of expropriation as well as the extension of market structures into spheres of life heretofore outside the realm of competition.7 Instead, my critique focuses on the assumption that the constitution of labor relations through direct violence and constraint is only prevalent at the fringes of capitalism, and that this will be overcome when the rationality of capitalist economic relations becomes dominant.
Just like proponents of capitalism, Marx, Engels, and Marxists have maintained that the forceful constraint of laborers is a hindrance to any strategy which aims at furthering the productivity of labor. If there was, indeed, slavery to be found in the epoch of capitalism, then this had to be conceived of as an alternative to capitalist production, albeit an alternative that was historically outdated and hence doomed to disappear. Marcel van der Linden and Karl Heinz Roth have recently labeled this a Eurocentric conception of the history of capitalism.8 I would rather point to the fact that – with very few exceptions – it is not economic rationality that effects the end of forced labor. Instead, historical analysis of the concrete functioning of capitalism reveals that the end of the many different forms of direct violence in labor relations has usually been achieved by the application of state power, hence by political struggle. Capitalism has correctly been termed a “political-economic” system. In what follows I will try to explain why this should be taken much more seriously than has hitherto been the case.
Let us start out with the results of recent historical research on the history of wage labor in England. In contrast to developments on the continent, English laborers were legally free to sell their capacity to labor at a very early stage. However, until the mid-1870s – definitely long after the beginning of industrial capitalism in England – they were not legally free to end their contract at will. If they did so and their employer went to court, they had to expect a sentence in prison. Upon their arrival they were officially welcomed with a flogging, and during their stay many experienced forced labor in a treadmill. In his important work on the history of voluntary wage labor Robert J. Steinfeld is very firm in his rejection of any functional explanation of the persistent use of state violence to leave the duration of contracts to the will of employers.9 He concludes that “what we call ‘free labor’ is defined essentially by the moral and political judgment that penal sanctions… should not be permitted to enforce ‘voluntary’ labor agreements.”10 While coercion had long been a foregone conclusion in the political management of labor relations, its justification came into public doubt when suffrage was extended to more laborers in 1868. More and more members of parliament started to think that it might not be politically wise to uphold the legal inequality between employers and laborers, as far as labor contracts were concerned, by making use of penal law and penal institutions. Seven years after the extension of suffrage, the penal sanctions of so-called breaches of contract were repealed.
While corresponding developments were taking place in other states of the metropolitan core of capitalism, developments in France were somewhat different. This difference should be taken into account when debating the theoretical analysis of the political economy of capitalist labor. Before the Revolution, laborers in France, just like almost everywhere in Europe, had been under the control of the police. This subjection was symbolized in the fact that laborers had to present their livret (worker’s booklet) to the police when entering a new occupation, thereby proving that they had left their former occupation with the consent of their employer. Again just like almost everywhere in Europe, breach of contract was considered a penal offense in Ancien Régime France. The livret was hated, and it was abolished in the course of the Revolution. Although it was reinstituted at the beginning of the 19th century, it no longer functioned as a means to constrain employment-at-will as far as journaliers, meaning industrial wage-laborers, were concerned. (Instead, it was used for documenting advances of wages and the repayment of these credits.11 ) In spite of the fact that post-revolutionary development was a struggle about the removal or the preservation of revolutionary changes in society, and in spite of the numerous attempts to control and discipline workers, labor relations as such remained private in France, i.e. not under the direct supervision of the state. The political necessity to decree that the two parties of a contract were to be equal before the law was brought about by the political necessity of constituting state power after the revolutionary demise of nobility. It was a direct result of the Revolution, and had nothing to do with any economic rationality. Indeed, in France industrialized capitalist production was developed much later than in the United Kingdom. Some maintain that it started in the middle decades of the 19th century, others that it was negligible until the 1880s. In any case: there is no convincing functional economic explanation for the development of modern free wage labor at the end of the 18th century in France.12
In spite of the restriction of the examples to only two national developments, it should now be clear that the actual history of capitalism does not support the assumption that the full legal and political autonomy of laborers is a fundamental requirement for capitalist forms of exploitation. Once this is established, we can start to tackle the problem of slavery.
The notion of the incompatibility of slavery with capitalist production is not only dear to proponents of capitalism, but also, at least until very recently, to most of its critics. More often than not the adherence to this conviction has been taken to be a touchstone by which to decide if an analysis can be accepted as Marxist or not.13 Rather early on, however, Wilhelm Backhaus contended that Marx had to postulate this incompatibility because he conceived of the division between free wage-laborers and slaves as a hindrance to the development of a revolutionary class in the United States.14 Of course, not only Marx and Engels but also later critics have suggested other explanations for their assertion. They have been successfully refuted by historical research.
Marx would have been correct in postulating that the enslaved workforce was exploited to an early death and therefore had to be continually replaced, if he had restricted himself to the West Indian sugar colonies. But the enslaved workforce in the United States was not only biologically reproduced, but growing. The mobility of labor, which indeed is a requisite for a capitalist labor market, was managed through the practice of hiring out slaves, as well as through the marketing of slaves. Where technology was introduced, as for example in Caribbean sugar mills, slavery was no obstacle to its competent operation. Every one of these arguments, and all the others that have been advanced in the course of the extensive debate on slavery, has been and will further be objected to. But as soon as we replace conviction by historical analysis, it is simply not possible to refute Robin Blackburn’s conclusion that “slavery was not overthrown for economic reasons but where it became politically untenable.”15 And if some still insist on explaining the durability of slavery by pointing out that, in spite of its economic irrationality, it was sustained by the self-image of slave owners and their ladies, this explanation falters in the view of the many strategies aiming at the reproduction of a subservient labor force which differed from outright slavery only by name and legal definition. In the United States most former slaves were not only disappointed in their hopes to become landowners, somehow receiving “forty acres and a mule,” but in the decades after emancipation very many of them had to endure some form or another of “Ersatz” slavery.16 The Black Codes, enacted by one Southern state after another in 1865 in order to effectively prevent the mobility of all black people,17 and to legislate severe punishment for breach of labor contract, had to be repealed in the course of time. But white landowners continued to reject blacks as tenants, thereby forcing many of them to become laborers. More often than not they were denied any form of autonomous production.18 The fact that the enticement of laborers by another employer was made a legal offence in every one of the former slave states shows that former slave owners still saw their workforce as property. The most important substitute for the legal status of slavery, however, was peonage. In spite of the fact that Congress outlawed any form of forced labor in 1867, laws sanctioning debt bondage existed in all of the Southern states. Cheap and bonded labor could also be acquired by renting prisoners. The sheer number of convictions sentenced to forced labor in the South proves the economic relevance of this practice.19 Employers tried to prevent flight by using chains, dogs, whips, and weapons.20 Most of these forced laborers were black. However, by the beginning of the 20th century a growing number of whites also came to suffer under peonage and other forms of bonded labor.
Not only in the United States did abolition fail to do away with the reality of forced and bonded labor. So-called domestic slavery remained lawful in many parts of the world; the slave trade as well as slavery were secretly being continued; Black Codes, vagrancy laws, and especially peonage forced many a freed slave and many poor men, women, and children into jobs they were constrained to uphold, even if they would have preferred to exist in unemployed misery. In many colonies, forced apprenticeship, as well as laws against vagrancy, were used as substitutes for slavery.21
When a global labor market came to increasingly replace the former slave trade in the middle decades of the 19th century, its dominant institutional form was a trade in labor contracts.22 Even if recruiters made use of “coolie-catchers” who were known not to shrink from outright kidnapping,23 and even if the future laborers were not able to read or to write their name and had been deceived about the conditions of their servitude and the continent where they were going to be employed, the fiction of a labor contract to which both partners had freely agreed was upheld.
Coolies were made use of in the United States, on the Sugar Islands, in Peru, in Hawaii, in European Colonies in Southeast Asia, and in Australia. Most of them were recruited in China, India, and Malaya, but some of them also in Africa. Conditions varied in the different states and colonies, but some recurred in most coolie contracts. Officially, coolies were free to return to their home country at the end of their contract, but even if they would have been able to find a ship and pay their fare, many were tricked and forced into the renewal of their contract. In the early phases of the trade in coolies, these laborers often found themselves on plantations or in sugar mills whose owners and overseers were accustomed to slavery and saw no reason to change their manner of commanding labor. The hypothetical ability to leave their job at the end of a contract did not improve the working and living conditions of coolies while the contract lasted. From the 1860s onward, governments in the home countries tried to forbid or at least to control the trade, and some governments in receiving countries, especially in the West Indies, set up commissions to look into the realities of contract labor. The most important incentive to do so seems to have come from free wage-laborers in these countries, among them those former coolies who – for whatever reason – had not returned home after the end of their contract. They protested against the fact that the very low pay of coolies endangered their own demand for better wages. At the end of the 19th and in the first decades of the 20th century there were many places in world capitalism where unbiased observers were at a loss to detect differences between slavery and contract labor. Often coolies were forced to live at their place of work, and not only the managers of the tea-gardens in Assam but also those of tobacco plantations at the Eastern Coast of Sumatra tried to prevent the flight of their labor force by guarding them with fences, dogs, and armed watch personnel. Of the 85,000 coolies who had arrived in the modern hell of tobacco plantations in Sumatra in 1866, 35,000 had already died three years later. In 1873 planters in this colony were granted penal jurisdiction over their labor force.24
It was around that time that free wage labor had, indeed, become prevalent in the metropolitan core states of capitalism. This notwithstanding, employers could and still did make use of the state in order to prevent collective bargaining. More often than not armed forces were employed in order to prevent or break up a strike, and activists were regularly sentenced to stints in prison. It was only in the first decades of the 20th century that capitalism in the core metropolitan capitalist states started to become domesticated.25 While most authors take the development of social policy as having been vital for the transformations of capitalism, “domestication” focuses on the institutionalization of class conflict. This is most evident in the neutrality of state penal institutions in the face of strikes.
One might be tempted, and many Marxists have given in to this temptation, to describe these developments as the workings of tendencies inherent in capitalism, the most important aspect of this tendency being the fact that direct violence was no longer used as threat against the health and the life of workers, in order to make them subservient to exploitation. That this argument – as well as the philosophy of history from which it has been deduced – cannot be upheld in the face of the concrete historical functioning of capitalism has been brutally made obvious by the labor regime of National Socialism. Not only were strikes outlawed and trade unions dissolved, with their activists among the first to be imprisoned in concentration camps, but from the late 1930s onwards, millions of men, women and even children were forced to labor under severe conditions in the “Reich.” Their capacity to labor was used in private households, on farms and on ships, in institutions of the church and in factories.
And it was especially in factories that German employers disproved the conviction that forced labor cannot be used in modern industry. In spite of the fact that in some firms in the armament industry more than thirty and sometimes even more than sixty percent of the work force consisted of forced labor,26 the output of these firms grew threefold between 1942 and 1944.27 This growth was not halted when the German government decided to make available for private exploitation not only so-called “civilian” laborers from occupied countries, as well as prisoners of war, but also prisoners of concentration camps. All of these were delivered upon the request of private firms. Since forced labor had already been widely used since 1939, the application for prisoners of concentration camps seems to have been considered as falling into the range of normal management strategies. Some processes of production were adapted to these changes of the work force, for example by reducing the level of mechanization or by introducing production lines.28
The offer of concentration camp prisoners for private exploitation was motivated by the intention of the SS to further its political influence;29 it was not the result of political intentions to integrate economic rationality into the machinery of terrorism and destruction. Racism remained the guiding principle of strategy. It was, therefore, only in mid-1944 that the physical destruction of Jews was “postponed,” in order to reduce the scarcity of labor in the armament industry.30 While the percentage of forced labor, including prisoners of war, was very high in Germany during the Second World War, the percentage of concentration camp prisoners in the whole German workforce never amounted to more than 3%. Every one of their number was denied existence as an individual human being by being reduced to a number and a creature whose physical existence was permanently endangered.
When the International Court, which was set up in Nuremburg after the war, worked to investigate and punish the crimes against humanity committed by personnel of the Nazi regime, the use of prisoners for production was labeled “slavery.” Victims have also often used this term to sum up their experiences. Since then some historians have tried to compare German practices during World War II to other forms of slavery, most often slavery in the South of the United States.31 While these endeavors offer insights into the specificities of the systems under consideration, they are nonetheless futile, because the abolition movement changed, once and for all, the content of the word “slavery.” It no longer refers to a status which, in the course of the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries, was defined by the laws of a colony or a sovereign state. Instead, it has become a political category, used to denote conditions of life and work considered to be irreconcilable with globally accepted norms of morality. The historical experience of Nazi Germany has proved that utter brutality is not irreconcilable with the functioning of advanced industrialized production.
There are two theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this degeneration of advanced capitalism to an economic system in which the extensive use of direct violence was practiced on a regular basis. Firstly: the domestication of capitalism hinges on the state safeguarding private and collective rights of laborers, and secondly: no level of economic development safeguards against the brutal use of direct violence against laborers.
It was only after the end of Second World that political struggle and political regulation resulted in what Robert Castel has called the civilization of labor,32 and what I call the further domestication of capitalism. This, alas, was rather short-lived. Because not only has rigid competition on the world market led governments to sharpen the constraint to offer one’s capacity to labor on a very unfavorable market, but societies and governments all over the world also, once again, more or less tolerate forced labor. My definition of forced labor centers on the restriction of movement, i.e. the prevention of laborers from leaving the workplace and/or the job. Taking away the passports of foreign wage-earners implies that they are threatened with criminal procedure for lack of an identification card, and preventing them from leaving the workplace by barring doors and windows implies the threat of illness and even death. We all know numerous examples.
Political struggles against such practices of constraint have not become easier since the globalization of the labor market. They are, nevertheless, unavoidable. If it has always been analytically problematic to conceive of the violence inherent in primitive accumulation as being the characteristic of a certain historical phase of capitalism or of its fringes, globalization forces us to finally recognize that open violence and forceful constraint continue to present dangers in all phases and all places of capitalist labor regimes.
Indeed, I insist on the hypothesis that open constraint and repression are constant possibilities of capitalist labor regimes. Far from marking a certain epoch of capitalist development, violence is constantly hanging about in the wings of capitalist labor relations. It comes into the open when governments and societies refrain from decisive objection.
Comments
The Reproduction of Patriarchal Hegemony: Women in Italy Between Paid and Unpaid Work
As long as reproductive work is devalued, as long it is considered a private matter and women’s responsibility, women will always confront capital and the state with less power than men, and in conditions of extreme social and economic vulnerability. It is also important to recognize that there are serious limits to the extent to which reproductive work can be reduced or reorganized on a market basis… As for the commercialization of reproductive work through its redistribution on the shoulders of other women, as currently organized this “solution” only extends the housework crisis, now displaced to the families of the paid care providers, and creates new inequalities among women.
– Silvia Federici, “The reproduction of labor power in the global economy and the unfinished feminist revolution” (2008)1
In the system of gender relations, the role played by women in augmenting the productivity of the workforce has been and still remains absolutely functional to economic growth. In these terms, the role assigned to women is the outcome of the condition of subordination and dependence on the employment status of the partner or husband, and also the cause of the reproduction of this condition. This process was a structural feature of the Fordist regime, but it is also shaping the post-Fordist regime – because it is precisely through the denial of reproductive work that the patriarchal system allows capital accumulation, and state disengagement in public spending.
Our case study will be Italy, which like all other Mediterranean countries has very limited state intervention to reduce care burdens, and which maintains that the pathway to full economic citizenship necessarily follows a male model marked by the demands of the market based on the exchange value, full-time availability, and androcentric hierarchies that cannot be reconciled with the constraints of reproductive work. The lack of jobs allowing workers to combine life and professional prospects, requires Italian women to engage in a deep reorientation of their life. Along these lines, the greater investment in higher education by many young women, and the consequent desire by those women to direct their career path far from family traditions or prescriptions based on gender stereotypes, are leading to a radical transformation of family patterns both an outstanding reduction in births (one of the highest among European countries) and also the increase in the average age of women who marry and who have their first child, as shown by Eurostat data on fertility and marriage.2
The (hidden) role of women in the Italian economy
babboThe participation of Italian women in paid work is not a twentieth-century phenomenon, as testified by data from the census carried out in the post-Unification period. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Italian women worked in manufacturing industries, especially in the textile industry, which requires a large workforce with high availability, on the basis of peaks of production and seasonality. Women’s work then expanded during the war periods: up to 1920s women were employed in military clothing manufacturing, and more generally in all positions that, before the war, were filled by men. Perry Willson notes that with the advent of fascism, the relationship between the state and the private sphere radically changed.3 Fascist ideology characterized motherhood as a “useful service to the country,” embedded within militarism, to the point of establishing reproduction as a real political imperative.4 Female labor was strongly condemned, while the representation of women as prolific mothers was exalted, in line with the imagery of the Catholic Church.5 Victoria De Grazia highlights the role of ruralization and the policy of low wages in the dispersion of the workforce, and in maintaining a state of dependence of rural households on the state, and of women on the heads of households; both these conditions of dependence played a key role in the construction of the stereotype of the male breadwinner and the wife-mother-housewife. The fascist dictatorship invented the maternalistic tradition: in 1933 it announced the celebration of the “Day of the Mother and Child,” but it did not provide any equitable distribution of funds and resources among indigent families, while it introduced the “tax on celibacy” that required payments from all men aged 25 to 65.6
During the fascist regime, particularly in the educational sector, women were not allowed to gain access to senior positions and to some specific fields: in 1923 women were forbidden to operate as principals in state secondary schools, while in 1926 women could not teach Italian language, history, philosophy and Latin in high schools. Furthermore, women were prevented from obtaining top management roles at the Ministry of Postal Service, and limits on the recruitment of women were introduced in public administration. Willson emphasizes that the measures taken by the regime intended to maintain a gender balance in order to reintroduce male domination and gendered hierarchies in the workplace.7 These measures played a decisive role in the social control of women: they undermined the possibility of self-determination, restricting women to the role of wives and mothers, and increasing the economic dependence of women on the income of men. In this sense, what happened during the fascist regime was a crucial step in forming the mode of production that supported the “Italian road to Fordism” taken after World War II.
In the second postwar period, rural exodus and urbanization were driven by the “economic miracle,” and the inexorable decline of the patriarchal family redefined the family structure. However, these phenomena, at least until the 1970s, would not involve the greater participation of women in paid work or the redrawing of balance in the relationship between men and women. Unlike most European countries during the economic expansion of the second post-war period, in Italy female employment did not grow, but declined. In 1950 only 32% of Italian women were employed (a compared to 40.7% in United Kingdom, 44.3% in Germany, 35.1% in Sweden, and 49.5% in France), in part a consequence of the entry into force of the law of 1 October 1960, n. 1027,8 which recognized the principle of equal pay between men and women and generated an increase in labor costs. In order to defend the institution of the family against the “danger” of women’s emancipation, the Catholic Church opposed birth control practices and attributed responsibility for the declining birth rate to the “selfishness” of modern women.9 The growth of the real wages as a result of industrialization, and the increase of the share of income allocated to consumption, allowed many Italians to improve their standard of living. At the same time, the distribution of resources worsened, and population growth led to an increased demand for public services, such as healthcare, housing, education, and transport. The state’s response in public spending, however, was trivial compared to this demand. Laura Balbo points out that the worsening of the relationship between public resources and social needs caused the intensification of the exploitation of women, to the point that the role of full-time housewife became “a role structurally necessary to realize, in the new conditions, the balance between resources and need-satisfaction that is considered an essential standard.”10
In the late 1960s the Fordist mode of production, based on the large-scale manufacturing of standardized goods and the centrality of big firms, was in crisis. The Italian production system was reorganized, introducing elements of flexibility that could preserve and also increase the profits of big firms. In 1970, the introduction of an extensive system of formal protections for workers with the Workers’ Statute accelerated the collapse of the Fordist mode of production. The increased rigidity in the use of the work force became the main argument in support of policies of decentralization of production.11 Italian capitalism’s response to the economic crisis of the 1970s therefore consisted, on the one hand, in the dismantling of big firms through the extensive use of vertical disintegration of the production process, and on the other, in the spread of small and medium firms, where the limited number of workers and the close relationship between employers and employees precluded class struggles.12
In the 1970s the reorganization of the Italian manufacturing system passed through the expansion of the black market and illegal employment, homework (piecework done at home), second jobs, and a general proliferation of working activities with no contract. This labor market segmentation and the spread of new firms, in industrialized but also especially in rural areas, totally invisible for taxes and national insurance, grew to the point that the underground economy began to play a structural role within the Italian economy. It should be emphasized that in early 1970s Italy the segmentation of the labor market, as well as occupational segregation, were not related to migrant workers, as they were in other industrialized countries, because the migrant flows were still limited. Rather, these processes involved young people, adults over 40 with few job opportunities, and especially women.13 So the female workforce represented a crucial pool of labor, which could be used in the most flexible way, through the exploitation of the irregular workforce and homework, allowing the production system to cope with the instability resulting from extreme fluctuations of the economy without affecting reproductive labor.14 In these terms it is the female workforce that ultimately bore the burden of economic and industrial restructuring. Think, here, of the spread of the practice of “blank resignation letters” imposed on female candidates at the time of recruitment. In this practice, which still exists today, women are asked to sign their employment contract together with a blank resignation letter, which can be enforced at the employer’s will; these letters are usually brought out when an employee informs her employer that she is pregnant.15
Since the 1970s the strategic role progressively gained by small-firm manufacturing has been mostly due to high productivity, the intense pace of work, and the peculiar role of exports. The economic sectors that, in fact, derived greater benefit from smaller firm size were clothing, footwear, furniture, and small metallic manufacturing. These sectors are characterized by low technological investment and intensive exploitation of human labor, while the manufacturing process can be easily segmented and some of its stages outsourced to other firms, self-employed workers, and homeworkers. In small-firm areas manufacturing socialization has affected entire local communities, defining a labor market, on a territorial basis, consisting of men employed in agriculture and in the factories, women and workers with low educational levels employed in discontinuous working positions, in which the unions and the traditional means of aggregating interests are unlikely to take root. In these feminized contexts, the onset of conflict is less likely.16 The dynamic economy of new manufacturing areas which expanded during the 1970s and the 1980s, especially in rural areas, were mainly supported by families that informally managed workforce placement, through the activation of local networks; contributed to the reduction of labor costs, because of the closeness between households and workplaces; and also organized the reproduction of the workforce through the informalization of social services.17
Nevertheless, this explanation does not consider some important macroeconomic elements related to the global division of labor, and its effects on the Italian economy. It must be observed that in the 1970s the restructuring of the Italian manufacturing system was closely associated with external pressures arising from fluctuations in global demand and internal rigidities produced by the new relations between capital and labor. Therefore, the extensive use of the decentralization of production, while establishing a new form of development, was in continuity with the existing economic relations, deeply rooted in the social structure.18
The economic dynamism of the system of production emerging in the second half of the 1970s was based on the family structure and a peculiar socialization due to the legacy of rural culture. For a long time the main economic actor in Italy has been the family as a “place of composition, examination, income distribution, agent consumption, scope definition in labor supply, and actor of the informal economy.”19 In these manufacturing areas the culture of the “self-made man” was the result of a socialization process that occurred within the family. In fact, the economy of these areas associated formal production for the market with informal production, related to the ties arising between the employed workforce and the local community.20
In small-firm areas the marginalization of women’s role, totally subordinated to the expectations of social promotion of male family members, has been fully functional for economic development, as showed by the spread of the homework. During the 1960s and 1980s, the expansion of homework in many manufacturing areas became crucial for the national economy, testifying that women working at home have played a pivotal position, fully functional to the needs of economic growth.21 Domestic and care work and working activity for the market have coexisted in the same subject, even if dependent on the needs of the family, often resulting in physically detrimental labor conditions. It is sufficient here to recall, for example, the frequent cases of neuropathies found among women working at home due to the use of risky solvents usually employed in the shoe manufacturing industry.
During the economic miracle, the paid and unpaid work of Italian women led to a decisive reduction of the social costs of production. In the long run, however, this large amount of unpaid domestic and care work, and low-paid work for the market, has reinforced the gendered division of labor, affecting not only the participation of women in paid work but the position of women in the broader social sphere and within the structures of political and labor representation. The invisibility of the work done at home has played a key role in the reproduction of patriarchy, with the effect of reinforcing gender stereotypes and the dependence of women on the economic and social position of the husband or partner.
Reproductive work without public spending
In Italy, women’s participation in paid work continues to suffer, more than in other European countries, from the steep imbalance in the gender division of family and care work and the retrenchment of the welfare state, to the point that Italian women work more hours per day, in domestic and care work, than anywhere else in Europe. The unavoidability of family and care work and the current division of labor between men and women still force women, rather than both members of the working couple, to structure their career paths around the “work-life balance.”22 There are, however, significant social factors that can enhance or reduce the degree of balance: the availability of the partner to share the burden of family work (including purely domestic work) more equally; the number and ages of children; the education level of both members of the couple; job and professional status and the capacity to find care services and/or familial networks. Nevertheless, it should be also be recalled that the participation of women in paid work, along with the work-life balance, are closely related to the structure of labor demand. Viewing the employment dynamic on a long-term scale, on the basis of economic sector, it can be observed that in Italy, unlike many other European countries, public administration (the Italian state as employer) had no particular role in increasing the participation of women in paid work. National statistics data shows that female labor is more concentrated in sectors typically associated with service and care, highly marked by income discontinuity, low wages, and rigid working times.23 By contrast, the very limited presence of women in Italian public administration testifies that the gendered division of labor and the occupational segregation have been nourished and reproduced by the Italian state in order to support the male workforce, along with discrimination supporting the male breadwinner model.
Public Spending on Families (Cash Benefits and Benefits in Kind) as % of Gross Domestic Product
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2009
Austria
3.1
2.8
2.6
3.1
2.8
2.9
Belgium
3
2.6
2.3
2.3
2.6
2.8
Denmark
2.8
2.6
3.2
3.8
3.5
3.9
Finland
1.9
2.6
3.2
4
3
3.3
France
2.4
2.7
2.5
2.7
3
3.2
Germany
2
1.5
1.6
2.1
2.1
2.1
Greece
0.3
0.3
0.7
1
1
1.4
Ireland
1.1
1.4
2
2.1
2
4.1
Italy
1.1
0.9
0.8
0.6
1.1
1.6
Netherlands
2.5
2.1
1.7
1.3
1.5
1.7
Norway
1.8
1.9
2.7
3.5
3
3.2
Portugal
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.7
1
1.5
Spain
0.5
0.3
0.3
0.4
1
1.5
Sweden
3.9
4.1
4.4
3.8
3
3.7
United Kingdom
2.3
2.3
1.9
2.3
2.7
3.8
Source: OECD Statistics on Social Expenditure
From the early twentieth century to the present, average family size has reduced by half, while one-person households (with or without children) have strongly increased. In spite of the fact that reproductive work is unavoidable, regardless of household composition, there are many variables to consider: the presence, number, and age of children and/or dependent adults make a significant difference in its intensity, and explain the degree and continuity of women’s participation in paid work. The employment rate of mothers varies widely, in fact, based on household composition. Eurostat data shows that for all employed women in Europe between the ages of 25 and 49, the crucial difference in participation in paid work is between women who have no children and those who have one or more.
The analysis of the employment rate of women aged between 15 and 64 years in the last decade shows a high continuity among countries in some specific areas: the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal), Western and Central European countries (France and Germany), and the Scandinavian countries. These areas are very different in several respects: welfare regimes, economic structures, and systems of gender relations. Even if in all countries women carry out the main burden of family and care work the analysis of data on the distribution of this work within the couple draws attention to some peculiar differences in women’s commitment. According to 2008-9 OECD data, while in Italy women do family and care work for 315 minutes on average each day (men 104 minutes), in France women do unpaid work for 233 minutes (men 143), in Germany 269 minutes (men 164), and in Spain 258 minutes (men 154).24 The data shows that despite the increased number of dual-earner households, the burden resulting from increased reproductive work still affects women far more heavily than men. In Mediterranean countries the male partners’ commitment to family work is very limited, especially compared to male partners in the countries of Central and Northern Europe. The persistence of these differences testifies that patriarchal culture and its crucial contribution to the gendered division of labor are still deeply entrenched. This imbalance in the distribution of domestic and care work within the couple, and the scarcity both of public services, such as kindergartens or care services for dependent adults, and transfers to families, has a significant effect on the participation of women in paid work, and at the same time must be understood as cause and effect of the strategy of the capitalist state.
The analysis of participation in paid work also shows that the increased burden of family care often translates, for women, into precarious employment. From 2000 to 2013, in the Mediterranean area—composed of Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal—female part-time employment has grown by 7 percentage points compared to the average of 4.6 percentage points in the European Union (EU 15).25 However, in Italy more than half of women employed as part-timers did not choose this type of employment: 58.6% of women employed in part-time jobs said they had no alternative employment opportunities.26 The survey results show the presence of a high rigidity in the work organization, particularly in the service sector, which drives companies to prefer hiring part-time workers to ensure the continuous turnover of staff in peak workload over the adoption of measures for increasing flexibility of working time.27
However, as noted above, the transformation of the Italian labor market cannot be understood as a result of the attenuating of the asymmetry within the household. The weakening of parental support networks and the greater participation of women in paid work is associated, in fact, with the assignment of domestic and care work to migrant women. INPS data (2013) indicates the presence of 748,777 domestic workers and caregivers (formally hired and paid on the basis of the National Collective Bargaining Agreements) of foreign nationality, mostly coming from Eastern Europe. According to ILO estimates, Italy, along with Spain and France, has one of largest numbers of domestic workers and caregivers in Europe. This dynamic shows that increasing participation of Italian women in paid work has not affected the redistribution of workload within the household; neither has it compelled the intervention of the state through welfare provisions. The greater participation of Italian women in paid work has, rather, resulted the assignment of part of reproductive work to other women outside the family, who in turn are affected by lack of social recognition, segregation, and often abuse.
Nevertheless, the defamilization of care work through the use of private assistance both for children and for dependent adults can be chosen only in particular conditions; it depends on the income and working hours of the household, which are tied up with the the professional status of both partners. It also depends on the proximity of these services. Currently many working-class women, after dismissals due to the economic crisis and the restructuring processes in many workplaces, often give up looking for a job, even if they need to work, to devote themselves full-time to domestic and care work, in order to manage the reduction of the household budget produced by the job loss. Such measures for work-life balance clearly have a close tie with class conditions, especially in those countries where public spending in social and family policies is and will be more and more marginal as a consequence of austerity measures.
Conclusions
In Italy, women’s participation in paid work has been affected by several factors: the relatively late development of the tertiary sector; the assignment of the full load of care work by the state to families and familial networks; and a very peculiar, and mainly fragmented, economic structure. All of these factors are the result of the deep-rooted patriarchal culture, and in the long run they have strongly contributed to the reproduction of this culture. Gender inequalities pose questions about the role that the Italian state – through the enduring disengagement in family and social policies, both in terms of transfers and services – has had in the structuring of the system of gender relations and in disciplining the workforce as a whole.
Along these lines the partnership between patriarchy and capitalism can be thought as a relationship of mutual reinforcement: the former gains in the subjugation of women and in the reproduction of the masculine domination, as the latter expands control over the workforce. This peculiar partnership has been supported by the state, because of the need to exercise control and gain political consent while preventing the emergence of social conflict. It is also because of the saving that comes from the disengagement in expenditure for family and social policies. It must be observed that the model of the male breadwinner played a crucial role in postwar capitalist accumulation, both because it made possible an extraordinary reduction in the costs of social reproduction, and because it allowed for the exploitation of women’s invisible domestic and care work in the household. The results of the partnership between capitalism and the state are marked in many countries, but especially in Italy, where the process of state-building encountered geopolitical dilemmas it never overcame, and where, at least until the end of the 1960s, the Catholic Church has preserved a strong hegemony in moral and political issues. In Italy, patriarchal ideology has undoubtedly been reproduced by the interests of the state, perfectly compatible with those of the Catholic Church, both converging in the feminization of domestic and care work and in the rigid division between public and private sphere.
The contribution of patriarchal ideology to the reproduction of capitalist accumulation and state legimation has played a central role in the exercise of control and command over the population without a formal concentration of power. This hegemony has seen an extraordinary expansion in the neoliberal period: the standardized rigidity of working time in the Fordist period has been completely substituted by a diversified rigidity in neoliberal time. Today, even if the worsening of working and living conditions affects all workers, women, especially those who are unskilled and/or alone with children, suffer the most. Austerity measures and the structural conditions of the Italian economy portend that the cuts in social spending and the expanding casualization of working conditions will increase the risk of social exclusion of women, leading us back to the past, when the institutionalization of the unwaged labor of women and their wageless dependence on men were the dominant attributes of the family.28
Comments
The State Against the State
As the last vestiges of the welfare state all but disappear in the UK (among other things: healthcare; disability benefits; a tax on spare rooms, the so-called “bedroom tax”; legal aid; funding for arts and the humanities; affordable university education; housing benefits; and unemployment benefits, especially for young adults) we are faced with the paradoxical situation of those most opposed to “the state” (either as anarchists or as revolutionaries committed to its “withering away”) being forced to defend elements of it against those who are in the process of privatizing it into oblivion. Of course “the state” is not simply a vanishing safety net or a real but ignored set of obligations, but also prisons, police, courts, and multiple other forms of coercion, punishment, control, and violence. Can we defend the “good state” against this other one without falling into political contradiction or practical confusion? Can we separate out the state and capitalist production?
In “Within or Against the State?” Elizabeth Humphrys argues that “In moving towards a better understanding of the capitalist state it is better … to see the state and capitalist production as differentiated moments of the same set of social relations.” We do not need to oppose the image of trans-state economic elites to state-specific considerations in order to be critical of both the repressive aspects of the state and capitalism: we do not have to believe that we will first need to wage a war from within the state in order to overturn it. As Humphrys puts it, we need instead to start “from an acknowledgement that the capitalist state, the most concentrated form of social relations of capitalist domination, cannot be transformed to deliver the very different world we all agree is urgently required.”1
Since the beginning of the UK state’s “austerity measures,” it has been clear that the state, despite wishing to abdicate or sell off many of its political and legal responsibilities (such as providing legal aid for defendants), has in no way backed down when it comes to prosecuting those who seek to challenge these measures. If anything, we could say that the UK state has taken on a deliberately muscular approach to protests and riots since the Conservative-led government has come to power.
If you are the state, the context for protest and uprisings is all yours, it belongs to you. Police “witnesses” stand up for hours in court intoning the same phrases: “it was the worst violence I’ve ever seen,” “I was afraid for my life!,” “We were surrounded.” The crowd and the mob who cannot be prosecuted en masse but whose spectral terror can be invoked to taint the individual in the box, as if they carry the weight of numbers upon their shoulders, are everywhere, threatening to invade the courtroom at any moment to carry the jury off in a maelstrom of irrationality, a cloud of collective lunacy. But the mob does not (yet) control the space in which this menace is invoked, and the silence of the courtroom masks its true purpose and its real violence.
If those being prosecuted do not get to invoke context, nor control the narrative, they do not get to control time either. The state has all the time in the world. You do not. It is infinite and you are mortal. Your life is on hold as you await trial and possible imprisonment. Family members die before they get even the mere hint of a verdict regarding the death of a loved one. An emergency or a crisis is something that happens to you, but it is not the same emergency as the one that gets reported, or the one that sees government ministers huddle together trying to formulate a response. The daily emergency that is impoverished or brutalized existence is never described as such because the notion of emergency does not belong to those for whom it is the ongoing fabric of their lives. An “emergency” is one in which the state is supposedly under attack – even if the violence or threat involved is far less than that experienced by a far larger and much more real number all the time. An “emergency” is when the drones and the airstrikes come out overseas and the batons come out at home. An emergency belongs only to the state.
The state controls not only the images of emergency and the narrative that enfolds them, even as we watch and see a permanent mismatch between words and image (“but the police are attacking them!”); it also gets to order the relationship between time and those flashes within time that rise up, those states of “emergency.” They get to generate them too, especially if a smaller narrative can be used to make sense of a larger one: force a protest to “turn violent,” open the courts for 24-hours a day to process “rioters” and demonstrate that “justice is being done,” declare at all times that the state is under threat from “domestic extremists.” In these times of heightened security, as the endless transport announcements have it, it is imperative that the state knows who the enemy is, or at least how to construct it, even if you do not know who it is, or even if there is one. What “happens” happens to you, but never in the way they say it did: it passes through you and you are made into a puppet or a ghost, a warning to others. To exit the state’s definition of emergency would be to destroy the state itself, and to create a new kind of “emergency” that would highlight all at once the devastation wrought by the emergency that is all around us, the one we are supposed to believe is nothing other than business as usual.
The one argument it is impossible to make in court, but the one that pushes itself forward constantly is the one that says: “But we had a right to be angry! Did you see what they were doing to us? Did you expect us to just stand there and take it?” All you can say is “it wasn’t me,” “I didn’t do it,” or “I didn’t mean it like that.” I am not the individual to whom this charge relates, but I am reduced to my individuality on the stand: I cannot invoke the cause, however just, and I cannot rely on the crowd because you have plucked me from it. If you are a defendant, there is no context, only your actions and your future swaying in the balance. Any attempt to talk about why you were there, or what the police did to you will be deemed irrelevant: it’s the facts that matter, always damn facts, because something “happened” and you do not get to control the narrative, because you are not the state, and are always positioned as its enemy.
From out of the monotony, suddenly something “happens,” and the scramble for facts begins. A protest takes place, let’s say, and the police, as always, are there and they start to get rough: pushing, shoving, smacking shields against faces, batons out, people get hurt, cameras start flashing – perhaps a shot like the one of a masked kid kicking in the glass at the Conservative Party headquarters in 2010 will turn up, or someone will chuck a bottle. News reports will talk about “violence” in a way that both alarms and obfuscates – who caused it? Who got hurt? What were people protesting about anyway? The battle for control of the narrative – of “what happened” – begins. It is, like most wars, asymmetrical, with one side able to marshal vast resources (this year the London Metropolitan police will spend around £5.4 million on “media and communication”) and the other possessing nothing. It is a battle played out across the field of its own reproduction: the expensive cameras that film the protesters are mirrored by the camera-phones held up by the crowd, each trying to capture something slightly different: on the one hand, a story, possibly even the lead on tonight’s news, on the other, a record of what “really happened,” the other story that won’t ever make the news, but might just stop someone from going to prison.
The use of film in the Westminster student protests of late 2010, and the more recent Cops Off Campus demos that took place in late 2013 and 2014 in Bloomsbury, Central London provide a salutary lesson in this framing of events, on the question of who gets to call an event an emergency, of who gets to decide what the context is, or if there even is one. The rise of citizen journalism has made it possible to communicate, often in real time, what is “happening” and where: but it has also made the question of surveillance an urgent matter for protesters. In the dozens of trials following the student protests of 2010, footage from YouTube, alongside that from the many CCTV cameras and police observers on the ground, was used repeatedly in evidence against protesters. While people generally know well enough not to put up footage that might incriminate individuals, what emerged was how the police and Crown Prosecution Service have the resources to trawl through hours and hours of footage uploaded by well-meaning fellow protesters: footage of the accused simply wondering around was used to pinpoint clothes, location, making montages of supposed intention and latent violence. Every frame starts to look guilty, every well-intentioned clip a resource for the other side. The state not only has most of these cameras already but can force anyone else – businesses, media – to turn over what fragments of the spectacle they possess: the state is omnivorous for images, except for those of itself in its true, violent form.
It is no surprise that the visual field becomes the site of contestation when police violence is involved. When the families of those killed by the police in custody call for justice, they know from bitter experience that it is not bourgeois law that will provide it: these deaths are shrouded in mystery and cover-ups, investigations are lengthy and deliberately inconclusive: the chance of a prosecution against officers approaches zero. There is no transparency, no answers, only silence, bureaucracy and defeat. When families of those killed call for CCTV in the back of police cars, or for officers to wear cameras as part of their kit, or for footage in stations to be made available, they are competing on the only ground that remains available, the ground upon which the police themselves attempt to control the narrative: the visual field. The battle here is once again between the idea that something has “happened” or, in these cases, as the police would prefer, that “nothing has happened, there’s nothing to see here.” But families don’t forget – how could they? The omnipresence of CCTV, the way in which police and courts rely on it constantly to put people in prison means that the call for the image to be set free cannot be ignored without a fundamental truth being admitted: the visual field is obscured precisely to the extent that power wants it hidden. It doesn’t matter how easy it would be to fit cameras in police cars, or in stations, or on kit, it doesn’t matter how much everyone else “signs” a contract to be surveilled that doesn’t exist – even the images you make do not belong to you. You will never know if the footage you shot will be used to prosecute the very people you protested alongside. The police “super-spotters” who claim to be able to identify protesters by their eyes alone are the direct inverse of the imageless vacuum that greets those who try to discover moments of real, deadly state violence only to be greeted with the absence of anything – no images, no apology, no explanation, no justice, no peace.
What does this mean for our relation to the state? The state itself, while maintaining the institutions of oppression, sees no contradiction between punishing whoever it wants whenever it wants with all the resources at its command, and at the same time privatizing elements of these same institutions. In the UK, groups such as Serco and G4S run various elements of the prison system, while a private police force has been openly discussed for some years now: in this we are of course and as always, just a few years behind the US, doggedly pursuing our “special relationship.” To “seize” state power would first of all mean to understand how it operates, and how it disavows its own operations. To make it wither away would mean to destroy its very mechanisms for creating space and time. Do we, in the meantime, attempt to preserve what little is left of it that concerns care and support? Do we continue to set up our own networks, thus absolving the state of its former “responsibilities”? It is clear that the state does the work of capital, but also its own work to which we are frequently forced to respond (court support, prison support). Economic elites perpetuate their lives through the dispossession and robbing of everyone else, whether it be through exploitation, incarceration or both. The destruction of the repressive state is also the destruction of capitalism, and vice versa.
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The State of Capitalist Globalization
The State Stripped Bare
It seems almost a paradox, or perhaps just an anachronism, to suggest that it is possible to describe the global situation from the vantage point of the state. Flows and scapes, transnational corporations, migratory movements, financialization, supply chains, the “unholy trinity” of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO – these are the actors, processes, and entities to which analyses of the global most frequently refer. Overwhelmingly the focus has been on operations and dynamics that in some way exceed or displace state power and borders. So much is this the case that arguments about the decline of the state have become predictable and overfamiliar. Particularly in the early heyday of globalization talk in the 1990s, these perspectives were so common that they prompted an opposite and reactive argument – that the state continues to dominate the global political landscape, and claims about its decline are both inflated and misguided. This argument gained traction in the wake of growing security concerns in the first decade of this century, particularly among scholars and political actors who considered discussions of globalization to be more discursive and rhetorical than actual developments warranted. Thankfully, we now have more complex accounts of how globalization has changed the state from within, and of the roles played by states (some more than others) in fostering globalization1. Although we agree with these arguments, our point in this essay is different. Moving beyond discussions about the decline or maintenance of the state, we critically interrogate the very baseline model of the state that has thus far informed arguments about the changing position of the state in capitalist globalization.
Our argument evolves both in dialogue with and reaction to the wide debate concerning the transformations of the state in the most recent waves of capitalist transition, restructuring, and disruption. The very unity of the state has been at stake in this debate. The prominence of arguments about governance and the governmentalization of the state is one register of a widespread approach that highlights the disarticulation of the state and its functions, by calling into question the unity of the institutional system and political body of the state. In contrast to these approaches, there has emerged an equally prevalent series of arguments that tend to take the unity of the state for granted, but point to powerful and more or less enduring instances of exception that both underlie and undermine the classical narrative of state sovereignty. Although these lines of argument are often opposed and have given rise to reams of polemic and compromise, we tend to see them as complicit. While the first line of argument points to the stripping away of powers from the state and the rise of new political, legal, and territorial assemblages that blur the boundary between economic and political forms of rule, the second sheds light on the blind spots of this approach. In our book Border as Method 2 we have forged the concept of the sovereign machine of governmentality to grasp both the salience of processes of governmentalization and the mutations of sovereignty beyond the state. The conceptualization of the state within imperial visions of globalization that highlight decentered forms of sovereignty and mixed constitution has provided an important advance in discussions of the shifting relations between the state and capital.3 This framework continues to provide a guide rail for critical analysis of the present global predicament – but there is a need to assess the role of the state within an altered landscape marked by experiences of war, crisis, and persistent turbulence.
This unstable global situation cannot be fully apprehended within the classical framework of unilateral and multilateral international relations. The changing status of territory and its relation to juridical regimes of territoriality has complicated questions of jurisdiction and pushed constitutional arrangements well beyond the administrative and geographical limits of the state. From a perspective that highlights the global dynamics of capital, the effects have been by no means consistent. Persistent processes of financialization have shifted the scale and techniques of regulation in ways that extend beyond any single national economy. The US-based architecture of globalization has weakened its grip on the world’s circuits of capitalist accumulation and monetization, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis of 2007-8. Ambitious global plans such as those developed within the framework of the WTO have given way to more modest regional and oceanic visions for the projection of US economic power (one thinks for instance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). At the same time, new economic nationalisms have arisen to counterpoint these visions and suggest alternative patterns and paths of global ascendency. One thinks of the activities of China in Africa, Latin America, and even Antarctica. The presence of the state in these divergent patterns of global expansion is manifest, even if it relates to entities such as the market or the political party in specific ways. From India to Japan, Brazil to Russia, South Africa to Germany, states have made tangible investments that shape and enforce variable geometries of economic expansion and development. In doing so, they have entered into shifting arrays of power in which their relations to populations and strategies of governance have changed in multifarious ways. They have also been compelled to come to terms with a regime of capitalist accumulation that is increasingly characterized by the primacy of finance and by what we have described elsewhere as “extractive” operations of capital.4 The question is how much, in these reckonings with capital, states themselves have changed.
To come to terms with the new roles and forms of the state it is necessary to account for the global scale of processes and dynamics that disrupt established political as well as economic geographies. The crisis of US hegemony, carefully analyzed by Giovanni Arrighi5, provides an important interpretive background for these transformations. The persistence of war (with the shattering of colonial and postcolonial boundaries in the Middle East, the tearing apart of the Ukraine, or the struggles over vast stretches of land in Africa) is an important part of this scenario, in which the overwhelming military power of the US does not seem to provide any kind of stabilization. The emerging formations and deformations of the state in these war-ridden territories deserve a more detailed investigation. At the same time, the current global predicament cannot be described in terms of an impending linear hegemonic transition. The emerging landscape of power at the world scale increasingly abides a diffuse and multipolar, or even “nonpolar,” pattern. Although some of the most crucial contemporary operations of capital, (for instance in the fields of finance, logistics, and extraction) are characterized by a high level of homogeneity, the ways in which they “hit the ground” are profoundly heterogeneous. The juncture between the global operations of capital and their specific and grounded instantiations provides an important point of entry for the analysis of the contemporary mutations of the state. States are crucial actors at this juncture, but they are far from being able to claim a monopoly in its management and overseeing. They are rather compelled to negotiate their role with a multifarious array of agencies and reckon with heterogeneous legal orders, logistical protocols, financial algorithms, and monetary arrangements that exceed the control of any state. These negotiations and reckonings also contribute to the longstanding tendency toward a prevalence of the executive and administrative branches of power within the state and a marginalization of its representative bodies. This is clear even in important experiences such as those of Latin America’s new “progressive” governments in the last decade, where the celebrated “return of the state” has been made possible by an intensification of extractive activities and by the dynamics of the global market for commodities.
The contemporary state is far from being autonomous, and it is important to point to the limits of its action in order to counter the easy optimism surrounding for instance the above-mentioned discourse of the “return of the state” in Latin America. We are convinced that there is also a need to move beyond the focus on the “negative” stripping away of state functions and capacities that has characterized many critical discussions of the state in globalization. Whether the focus is put on the rolling back of welfare, the destabilization of the state monopoly on violence through the rise of private security actors, or the multiple and widespread techniques of privatization that have altered the state’s position in matters of ownership and economic activity, the overwhelming tendency has been to conceptualize the state in relation to that which has been subtracted from it. Mainstream critiques of neoliberalism, whether this is understood as an economic doctrine or a governmental technique, have only entrenched this tendency. What we propose is a more “positive” description (positive in analytical terms) of what states are doing nowadays without presuming to know already what the state is or might be. In other words, our approach differs from a normative understanding of the state – both in terms of a qualitative appraisal of its supposed capacity to deliver order through regulative or legal means and a juridical framing of its activities, relation with subjects, and indeed very founding. Focusing rather on what contemporary states are doing leads us beyond the boundaries of traditional state theory, which is shaped by these normative assumptions. As we show later in this article, such assumptions are usually predicated on a particular historical genealogy of the modern state with precise geographical correlates. Opening alternative historical archives, which are not necessarily limited to the rise of a standard state-form, provides a way to shift both conceptually and empirically grounded approaches to the state across different scales and frames of reference. This is a problem that does not only concern traditional juridical theories of the state, or the variegated elaborations of the immensely influential Weberian ideal type of the modern territorial state. Different historical genealogies and alternative archives also allow us to frame in new and productive ways debates about the crisis of the state that have unfolded since the 1970s.
Multiple Crises, Multiple Beginnings
To speak of a crisis of the state is elusive, since a long debate surrounding this claim extends at least from the late nineteenth century. International law, increased internal social pluralism, imperial entanglements, and processes of organizing capitalism all contributed to this questioning of the autonomy of the state and its capacity to exercise an absolute sovereign power. Nevertheless, for most of the twentieth century, the state remained intact and maintained a dominant position as a world political actor, through wars, economic crises and growth, struggles of decolonization, and the expanding administration of social life. It was only in the late 1960s/early 1970s that amid tumultuous social struggles and unprecedented economic changes this dominant position was tested and challenged. Particularly in the North Atlantic countries, a fiscal crisis of the state was matched by a crisis of legitimation. This double crisis registered the growing difficulty of the state in framing the reproduction and socialization of labor power, which had been a key aspect of its activities at least since the economic shocks of 1929. In his important chapter on the working day in Capital, Volume 1, Marx had already pointed to this function of the state. As the state confronted increasing barriers to its regulative function in the 1970s, the socialization of labor power became inextricably linked to processes of subjectivation and struggle that neither capital nor the state could contain.
Wolfgang Streeck6 has stressed the importance of the neo-Marxist debate on the crisis of the state in the 1970s, involving such thinkers as Jürgen Habermas, Claus Offe, and James O’Connor. Streeck highlights the absence from this discussion of a deep consideration of the role of the banking system and financial markets in the specific strategies adopted by capital as a political actor and form of social power. Such an absence did not characterize all critical strains of argument that emerged in this period. In the tradition of Italian operaismo, for instance, there was a rapid appreciation of the epoch-making consequences of the delinking of the US dollar from gold in 1971. The new wave and scale of financialization, which figure prominently among these consequences, dramatically changed the very conditions of the reproduction of labor power. They also strategically altered the state’s position with regard to the mediation of the contrasting interests of different “fractions” of capital and to the representation of “total capital” (or the general interest and overall reproductive logic of capital). This latter concept, elaborated by Marx in the second and third volumes of Capital, is not to be understood in reified terms. It rather points to a field of forces and dynamics characterized by instability and elusiveness. Friedrich Engels’ definition of the state in Anti-Dühring as the “ideal collective capitalist” nicely captures the important roles played by the state in the representation of a “total capital” whose horizon has nevertheless always been the world market.7 The operaista discussion of the state in the 1970s focused on the crisis of planning as a strategic juncture between the state’s activities in targeting the reproduction and socialization of labor power (which also means the articulation of capital’s command over these processes) and its labor in the field of the representation of “total capital.”8 While this debate was characterized by a political emphasis on struggles and the transformations of class composition underlying the crisis of the state, there was also an acute awareness of the reactive strategies of capital, at both the national and international levels. The analysis of the crisis of the “planner-state” (Stato-piano) pointed therefore to a set of violent dislocations of the reproduction of labor power and the representation of “total capital,” which in many ways anticipated the trends later discussed in debates on neoliberalism and globalization.
Although this narrative of the crisis of the planner-state remains seminal, there is a need to recognize that it is not the only disruption that marks the political and economic turmoil that inaugurates the global era. To fully apprehend the depth and range of the crisis faced by the state since the 1970s, it is necessary to widen the geographical scope of analysis and confront the deep processes of heterogenization that remake political spaces in their tense entanglement with spaces of capital. Planning was a general feature of the state-form that dominated in the period following World War II, although it assumed different shapes depending on political contexts and economic conditions. In quite schematic and abstract terms, it is possible to identify three varieties of state that became prominent in these decades: the democratic welfare state, the socialist state, and the developmental state. It is easy to see how these categorizations correspond to the “three worlds” model of political and economic geography that emerged with the clashes and turbulence of decolonization. In invoking these instantiations of the state, we are aware of the limits of typological analysis and seek only to provide guidelines for assessing the changes that emerge with the triple crisis that affects them all. Discussions of the impact of globalization on the democratic welfare state and the socialist state are rife. For our purposes, it is more interesting to give attention to the developmental state, by which we refer to a huge variety of political regimes and experiences that grew out of state-building processes after the end of colonialism in Asia and Africa or took new forms in Latin America where they confronted processes of industrialization, contested democratization, and persistent conditions of dependence. In these continental contexts it is possible to observe frictions and distortions that marked attempts to match the conditions and struggles of development to the modern state-form. Such fallout shaped the crisis of the developmental state. What attracts our attention is how this crisis foreshadows more general features and trends of the state that would come to the fore globally.
The developmental state registered a certain globalization of the state-form that emerged with the containment of anti-colonial struggles and the installation of technical measures and standards by which a state’s progress along a developmental path could be tracked. In this way, the developmental state was driven both by strong imperatives of centralized planning and state-building, and by more regional or international disciplines of economic restructuring and political clientelism. The question of the reproduction of labor power and the state’s position with respect to “total capital” looks quite different in this optic. To put it simply, the attempt to reproduce labor power according to the norm of “free” wage labor was severely limited by the presence of informal, coerced, and mobile labor forces, as well as by household conditions and gender regimes that could not easily be managed by technologies such as the Fordist family wage. In addition, the script of so-called primitive accumulation in developmental states did not easily follow the narrative of transition from agrarian to industrial work, creating myriad surplus populations that could not readily be corralled into standard regimes of reproduction. At the same time, the reality of “total capital” took on imperial and neo-colonial guises, generating comprador classes and weakening the state’s powers of intervention and negotiation. This positioning of the state poses challenges for any attempt to understand the developmental state with reference to the classical Weberian definition of the modern state, with its emphasis on institutional and bureaucratic organization and the state’s successful claim to the “monopoly of legitimate physical force” within “a given territory”9 Such difficulties in matching the developmental state to the Weberian template were not the effect of belated modernity, or deficits to be recuperated through economic growth, but arose from variegated historical and geographical circumstances that would only become more pronounced with the transitions that opened globalization.
There is no need here to remember in detail how the crisis of the developmental state was fuelled by and entangled with brutal dictatorships, the suppression of popular political and social power, structural adjustment programs, or hot and cold forms of warfare. Such physical, administrative, and economic violence should figure prominently in any attempt to reconstruct the crisis of the developmental state as well as the struggles and transitions that marked the emergence of new enmeshments of capital and power in the 1980s. Our main concern here is to survey the variegated postdevelopmental scenarios that began to emerge in the wake of the changes, since they are important analytically as well as historically for any understanding of the contemporary state writ large. These vistas of change encompassed the emergence of more flexible political technologies of rule, heterogeneous territorial arrangements, and increasingly decentered ways of mediating the relation of capital to the state. We will reserve a fuller discussion of these transformations for later interventions. For now, we want to suggest that such postdevelopmental tendencies are best understood not as irregularities with respect to a supposed norm or “ideal type” of the modern state, but rather as mutations that adapt to but also spur the tumultuous and asynchronous temporality, expansion, and intensification of contemporary capitalist accumulation. In this respect, these tendencies are by no means limited by the geographical axes of North and South, or center and periphery, which they have largely superseded and replaced with more complex spatial distributions of power and wealth. To recognize this, however, is not to suggest that these arrangements are without historical precedents, which can provide powerful points of reference for an alternative genealogy of the modern state.
History Matters
Theoretical understandings of the state have been shaped by a particular historical account of state formation, which usually departs from early modern Europe. The emphasis falls on how the concentrated power of the monarchy provides the basis for the political form of the modern state, with its uniform and limited notions of territory, subjecthood, and coherently linked administrative bodies. In the wake of the revolutions that spread across Europe and the Atlantic world, there emerged a constitutional state that established a continuity of legal order and firmly embedded the state-form in new arrangements of nation and citizenship. Needless to say, this is an extremely rough sketch of historical processes that have been the subject of many contestations and reinterpretations. Nonetheless, the basic premises of this vision have provided the scaffolding for the construction of many different traditions of state theory – those that build on Marx as much as those that draw on Weber. These premises have also supplied an implicit ontology that has made the question of what the state is superfluous in many debates, including attempts to take stock of the most recent changes to the state in globalization. We would like to question the extent to which this genealogy can adequately facilitate an understanding of the changing shape and roles of the state in the present global situation. If one looks at the historical efforts of European empires to establish effective control over vast stretches of land and populations across the surface of the globe, a different history of sovereignty and power emerges.10 Clearly these imperial ventures must be analyzed in ways attentive to their huge variety, as well as their historical and geographical differentiations. Nonetheless, the model of homogeneous territorial integrity, the construction of systematic legal order, and the vertical diagram of state power and subjecthood do not provide adequate analytical coordinates within which to grasp the extent of these differentiations. Far from being incidental to the history of the modern state, historical research on these complex colonial arrangements and entanglements shows how imperial expansion becomes a crucial moment in state building itself. The European world of states took shape and evolved within such an imperial environment, where the sheer exercise of violence was accompanied by legal and political disputes that would eventually shape the path of global history in ways just as important, if not more so, than the peace of Westphalia.
In this perspective the evolution of the modern state does not run directly through the coordinates of nation and citizenship, but instead passes through a panoply of commercial and legal arrangements that a new generation of historians has begun to investigate. The result is a much more fragmented view of the history of the modern state, which we consider to be much richer and more fecund for a critical understanding of the state in the present era. If one considers, for instance, the history of chartered companies, it is possible to see them as body politics in their own terms. These apparently commercial entities combined features of governments, corporations, jurisdictions, and colonial property to exercise “a precarious but potentially potent form of ‘structural autonomy’ and thus corporate sovereignty” enabled by the volatility of their constitutions.11 In his book The Company State, Philip Stern turns Edmund Burke’s famous disparagement of the East India Company as “state in the disguise of a merchant” into a positive description of its political existence. However, it is not only in the “factories” and outposts established by chartered companies that we can observe this more fragmented history of the modern state. The system of plantations, transport, and ownership that characterized the trans-Atlantic slave trade, as well as the movement of “coolies” and other kinds of indentured laborers, required the invention of innovative forms of territorial power and legal regulation. The establishment of protectorates, concessions, and treaty ports was part of the mainstream of European imperial expansion and created scattered legal and political spaces. From the late nineteenth century, these already complex spaces were further complicated by multifarious deformations of sovereignty, giving rise to a wide array of “quasi-sovereign” and “partially sovereign” colonial polities.12 Moreover, the system of international law, which is clearly important to the history of the modern state, is unthinkable in separation from imperial practices in the Americas, Asia, and Africa. As Partha Chatterjee explains, these practices “had a profound effect in shaping the so-called law of nations, and defining the place within it of the modern sovereign nation-state.”13 Importantly, the evolution of these systems took place in confrontation with heterogeneous forms of political organization – such as the tribute system that structured China’s relation with its dependencies, and the patchwork of rule and influence that characterized Mughal India.
When viewed in the light of these refractions of imperial political and legal formations, the postdevelopmental scenario we discussed earlier appears much less “anomalous” than it does when compared with the dominant state forms of the post-World War II era. It is easy to see the similarities between the differentiated geography of colonial rule and subjecthood and contemporary strategies of zoning, graduated sovereignty, multilevel governance, and differentiation of rights. This is the case even though the former was part and parcel of a contested process of territorializing the world, while the current transformations take place within the frame of a territorialized world that is forced to adapt to changing conditions of capital, and thus tests the limits of established notions of territoriality. The range and variety of actually existing states in the present is even more complicated than the bewildering array of political and legal forms present in the colonial era. As Akhil Gupta writes: “All claims about the state” today “should be countered with the question, Which state?”14 Gupta is referring here to India and the confounding proliferation of different levels of government, heterogeneous agencies and bureaus, and the various policies, programs, and people that constitute the state in that context. But his question also has relevance at the global level, where it is possible to observe a dazzling array of different kinds of states way beyond the realms usually identified with postdevelopmental dynamics.
One need only think of the wide variety of prefixes and adjectives that populate discussions about the transformations of the state-form today, giving rise to a range of denominations from gatekeeper state to party state, continental state to rogue state, failed state to quasi-state. Far from being applicable only to the specific realities they evoke, these categories provide analytical lenses through which it is possible to grasp some of the changes and trends that are reshaping the state-form at the global level. For instance, there is something to be gained analytically by approaching the UK as a gatekeeper state (mediating the US-centered financial world into Europe) or the member states of the European Union as quasi-states (considering the mixed constitution of sovereignty at the European scale). Moreover, the imbrication of sovereignty and commercial power instantiated by the historical chartered company has assumed new forms and heights in the contemporary world. In the fragmented political and institutional landscape of present globalization the border between state and capital is continuously tested, whether through imperatives of state entrepreneurialism, the direct political power exercised by many transnational corporations, or the role of international agencies in orchestrating political and economic development. Remembering the quip from Edmund Burke cited earlier, we might say today that there are many merchants acting in the disguise of a state.
Reckoning with the State
Above we have offered two distinct but interconnected genealogies through which to approach the state in times of globalization: first, we followed the trajectories that break down the developmental state, giving rise to legal and political arrangements that have become increasingly prevalent at the global scale; second, we have focused on the longue durée of fragmented state-forms that develop through the history of modern imperialism and colonialism. Both of these narratives allow us to see something specific about the contemporary state but taken together they highlight the complicated and fractured landscape of present state formations and deformations. Critically analyzing the state nowadays means taking into account this landscape in its widest scope and implications rather than focusing on single instances, or privileging a baseline model from which various empirical changes are measured or dismissed as extraneous to the state. Our main interest is not in the comparative analysis of different states, identified according to the established geographies of the world map, but rather in discerning and following resonances between trends and processes that traverse the state in heterogeneous contexts. In this regard, to come back to a point we mentioned at the beginning of this piece, it is important to look at how states these days tend to meld or be increasingly enmeshed with emerging assemblages or regimes that transcend them. Often these assemblages and regimes blur the boundaries between legal norms, technical standards, and political consensus in ways that facilitate and promote the operations of capital across diverse geographical scales. Recent research in geography and urban theory has given us a new vocabulary with which to describe and analyze these processes of mixing and rescaling – from Neil Brenner’s discussion of state spaces15 to Keller Easterling’s explorations of extrastatecraft.16 The issue of how the state fits into these emerging patterns and scenarios tests our very notions of the state and recasts familiar questions about matters such as political representation, hegemony, civil society, and the role the state can play in contrasting or even taming global capitalist dynamics. For us, grappling with these important questions means approaching the difficult task of examining the state’s deep entanglement with global economic and political forces without reverting to traditional contractual or normative conceptions that imagine they can put the state back in control.
In exploring the terms of this entanglement, it should be clear that our position is that states still matter. We have already affirmed that we subscribe to neither arguments that posit the state’s withering away, nor those that in guarded celebration argue that globalization has left its core unchanged. In pointing to a more fragmented history of the state, we do not mean to suggest that such fragmentation is sufficient to ground a theorization of the state. As much as arguments about the governmentalization of the state are useful in highlighting the diffuse operations of contemporary rule over territories and populations, the claim for unity continues to be a defining feature of the state and its contested legitimacy. Indeed, the tension between the disarticulation of the state’s unity and its continued reinstatement defines the field in which the state operates today. There are many different empirical manifestations of this tension, which is evident, for instance, in rhetoric that denies the influence of global forces on the state or on a different level in the gap between the collection and accuracy of statistics and their aggregation into databases that profess to undergird coherent narratives about a state’s growth or destiny. We do not believe this tension can be resolved. Although the nation has always promised the possibility of such a resolution, its ability to deliver this is highly uneven and often dependent on variables that display the fractures in the state that nationalism can be so effective in covering over or filling up. Equally repressive state mechanisms, which with various degrees of intensity and brutality can create the patina of state unity, also show the cracks in the state’s armature. This exposing of cracks can occur through historical excavation that sheds light on the excess and unrepaired wounds of past state regimes, or the sheer audaciousness of continued opposition in many parts of the world, whether organized or spontaneous. States continue to be repressive, for instance in the face of dissent, the testing of their borders by mobile populations, challenges to the workings and discipline of capitalist accumulation, or the unruliness of racialized minorities. Increasingly, however, the repressive work of states, which is classically considered part of their core business, is outsourced to private interests or pursued through the perverse logic of the public-private partnership.
Going back to what we wrote above about Marxist discussions of the state, there is a need to stress that globalization has fostered an increasing bifurcation between the reproduction of labor power and “total capital.” It has become difficult for the state, for any state, to provide an effective mediation between them. In its relation with capital the state is compelled to reckon with logics of capital accumulation that largely exceed national denominations and boundaries. In this situation, the state emerges as an economic actor that holds particular relations with specific fractions of capital, whether these relations involve the promotion of national economic interests through neo-mercantilist strategies, or efforts to attract foreign investment through fiscal mechanisms, labor law arrangements, or various kinds of territorial concessions. In making such moves the state does not necessarily act as the “ideal collective capitalist,” to recall the phrase we used from Engels above. Rather, it emerges as one capitalist actor among others, although it may be in a stronger or weaker position with respect to the interests and agencies with which it interacts. “Total capital” today is more a bundle of logics, rationalities, and dynamics in which diverse capitalist actors collaborate and compete, giving rise to powerful alliances that sometimes operate at the continental or even global scales. States are enmeshed in these mixed constitutional relations that make up the only possible approximation of the reality of “total capital” in the global age. Even where the state still plays a role in the reproduction of labor power (for instance through national health, education schemes, or systems of labor market regulation and industrial arbitration), it is understood as a “positive externality” to capitalist enterprise. More pertinently, reproductive functions have been reshuffled by financialization and the entrepreneurial rationality that has infiltrated state welfare schemes, imbuing everyday routines with the discipline and temporality of indebted life.
This displacement of reproductive activity from the state in tandem with the state’s repositioning within the mixed constitution of “total capital” calls for a more extended analysis, which necessarily must confront a wide array of instances in which the shifting relations of state and capital take diverse and sometimes novel forms. This means taking stock of the latest developments and mutations in the world of capital, placing equal emphasis on and exploring the complicity of heterogeneous modes of extraction and the seemingly metaphysical qualities of abstraction today. The analysis of finance, logistics, and extraction we have pursued elsewhere allows us to shed light on a set of principles and logics that increasingly drive economic development well beyond these “sectors.”17 In these practices and domains we see the intertwining of harshly material aspects of extraction and the almost ethereal protocols, techniques, and algorithms that guide capital’s operations. We are convinced that this intertwining points to present capitalist conditions and rationalities that are quite distinct from the classical form of industrial capitalism and that states nowadays are compelled to come to terms with this emerging and globally extensive capitalist formation. The ways in which states adjust to these conditions are clearly heterogeneous, and thus a grounded observation of how states actually confront these circumstances must be a crucial element of any analytical and political appraisal of current state transformations. Such grounded observation will inevitably encounter issues of framing, location, articulation of state structures, and the need to negotiate the gaps and clashes between critical analysis and seeing like a state. It will also need to be informed by and contribute to the further elaboration of a theoretical perspective that reckons with the accumulation of capital, practices of daily life, the politics of geographical scale, and the state’s imbrication with the ruptures and antagonisms that crisscross social cooperation.
We do not expect that such an approach to the state will conjure away a series of classical questions that have always haunted political debates – questions about the collective will, representation, participation, political pluralism, and the capacity of states to provide grounds for emancipation. Far from the vision of society without the state, these questions continue to be posed with regard to the state and thus are negotiated or displaced against the background it provides. Nonetheless, there is a need to take very seriously claims about the exhaustion of these categories before the emergence of powerful branches of state administration and governance that seem to operate independently of their supposed representative legitimation and guidance. Moreover, these branches of power are increasingly susceptible to forms and practices of corruption, resulting, on the one hand, from the direct influence of corporate actors, and on the other hand from the penetration of entrepreneurial logics into the state’s most routine workings. This is not to deny that the state’s capabilities can be effectively appropriated, waylaid, or negotiated to radical political ends. But the success of such maneuvers is entirely dependent on assemblages of power that exceed and enfold the state. In confronting such issues, it is therefore a political imperative not to overly trust the state or to act in state service. It is not a matter of opposing an abstract “state-phobia,” to remember a word used by Michel Foucault,18 to the state-philia that is widespread in not only mainstream discourses but also those strands of critical theory that claim a monopoly on the realistic reckoning with issues of power. Rather, a realistic observation of current trends and transformations across diverse spaces and scales demonstrates that the state is not powerful enough to confront the operations of global capital and thus to provide an effective framework for projects of radical transformation within and against contemporary capitalism. While the approach to the study of the state that we have sketched in this article highlights the relevant roles states continue to play in the present, it also stresses the structural limits that are imposed on their actions. There is a need for social movements and struggles to take stock of both sides of this predicament, inventing ways to confront the state capable of combining a tactical understanding of different political conjunctures with the capacity to materially open the horizon of a politics beyond the state.
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Theses on the Transformation of Democracy and the Extraparliamentary Opposition - Johannes Agnoli
Johannes Agnoli was a militant and theorist whose essay Die Transformation der Demokratie (1968), co-authored with Peter Brückner, played a fundamental role in the German New Left.
Below is a shortened version of the essay, released in 1967 (the full Die Transformation der Demokratie remains untranslated).
These theses serve as a supplement to my book Transformation of Democracy and a correction to some misquotations made at the remarkable delegates conference of the SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, or Socialist German Student Union]. I am generally of the opinion that rather than interpret texts, revolutionaries should change relations [Verhältnisse].
As measured by the state’s actual power relations and by the actual relations of domination in society, the familiar expression for the modern bourgeois state – “parliamentary democracy” – represents a paradox. Some time ago, William Borm asked the board of the Republican Club1 whether the club still stood on the basis of “classical parliamentary democracy.” To that, the club’s board could only give a vague and uncertain, although politically clever answer (“We do, of course, but the parliamentary parties don’t anymore”). For classical parliamentary democracy has long since disappeared. It is not just the case that its social function and its institutional structure correspond to a past period in history. The liberal state was the public and legal organizational form of rule in a society that indeed produced in a capitalist way (thus some of its institutions are extant), yet relied on the power of the steam engine. Our society, which produces and will produce with atomic power, has no use for such a state. Moreover, the classical parliamentary quality of the earlier bourgeois state – the supremacy of parliament, with its political as well as legislative decision-making authority – has been overcome by constitutional law itself. The Basic Law [Grundgesetz]2 posits the supremacy of the executive over the legislative, be it in the question of policy-setting authority or government control over parliament.
Our society, however, still can do very little with the conventional forms and conventional institutions of the parliamentary system of government. In 1922 Pareto3 had advised Mussolini, for the sake of stabilizing power, to let parliament continue to exist in a changed form; masses that lean towards democratic feelings can best be neutralized through an organ that gives them the illusion of participating in state power. It is not the complete abolition of parliament that makes the new state strong, rather the transfer of decision-making authorities from parliament to the closed inner circle of “elites.”
Therein also lay, following Pareto, the historical meaning and bourgeois class contract of the fascistic transformation of the state.
I
After the defeat of fascism, the restoration of the parliamentary governmental system in West European countries faced the same problem that historical fascism could not successfully solve: how to hold the dependent masses – that have nonetheless been set in motion – in a condition of dependence, to prevent their emancipation that would begin as the revolution of production relations.
The difficulty lay – and continues to lie – in the ambivalent character parliament can assume under certain circumstances. In an increasingly dynamic bourgeois society characterized as much by the antagonism of production as it is by the plurality of distribution interests, the representative body can offer itself as an instrument that expresses antagonism through the state and so elevates (social) class struggle to a political conflict of rule.
Viewed this way, the parliamentary governmental system can only guarantee bourgeois rule and protect capitalism so long as it succeeds in pushing back its ambivalence. It must function as a mechanism that makes antagonistic conflicts politically irrelevant as much as possible, and monitors and pacifies conflicts of interest. In this, the perspective developed by Friedrich Engels inverts itself; the “bourgeois republic” – which according to Engels was the best form for the open, and, under certain circumstances, even peaceful unfolding of class struggle and conflicts of rule – tries to remain bourgeois and transform itself into the best form for integrating the dependent classes into the capitalist system of production and the bourgeois system of rule. The “people” are degraded into mere bargaining chips in the rivalry of leading political groups. For other countries under “parliamentary” government, the way this transformation was accomplished in the Federal Republic [West Germany] is exemplary.
II
Among the most important aspects of this attempt to stabilize and secure capitalism politically include:
The dissolution of the class of dependents into a pluralist system of job categories. Already in its fascist form, this proved itself suited to countering the objective polarization of society from the subjective, organizational, and consciousness-manipulating side. Here, more effective means are at the disposal of organized capitalism than earlier competitive capitalism. And from the errors of fascist pluralism it has also finally learned to call itself democratic.
With this, the reproduction of society through the state turns into the articulation of a plurality of parties. This means that while several parties – although, from the point of view of the ruling tendencies, two are best – compete for a share of power, individual parties come to resemble each other to a large extent. They forego representing concrete groups or class-tied interests, and become part of a general equilibrium. They superficially roll all real groups and all ideal positions into a single indiscriminate exchange relationship – and exclude any group with revolutionary ideas or interests in transforming structures. Such parties separate themselves from their own social basis and become part of political state associations; they become officials charged with upholding the equilibrium of the state.
The parties, having become part of the state, develop a novel social quality that is connected to their own material interests: they are interested in maintaining relations that make it possible for them to hold power as part of the state and establishment. They thereby couple themselves – whether they are mass parties or not – to the interests of those social groups that are likewise committed to conserving given structures. In this respect, the old question whether the ruling political groups are stooges of the ruling classes or whether they represent an independent social class (the political class) is otiose. They are themselves a part of the political ruling class. More specifically, they are a function of the state. In this way, social antagonism is not reflected in the party system. All that takes place in the state ruling apparatus is the reproduction of one pole of society, which would otherwise be called into question antagonistically. That means the separation of parties from the social basis does not affect all classes and groups in the same way. Only groups that would potentially want to transform relations are shut out from representation at the level of the state: the dependent masses. They have no say in fundamental policy decisions, even though they may fare better with one or another party in marginal problems of political pragmatics.
These same parties, which have alienated the broad masses, self-identify ideologically as Volksparteien [people’s parties].4 The efforts of their own leadership lead Volksparteien to develop a novel mechanism of rule, in which reified and authoritarian concentrations of power enter into a cycle of competition with one another. Only this competitive relationship is oligarchically organized, and has as little to do with the political principle of free competition as the organized market sharing of modern oligarchic capitalism has to do with free competition in economics. The open-rivalry cycle of ruling groups that fight against and exclude one another will be supplanted by an assimilative cycle that ultimately leads to self-liquidation: with regard to the constant assimilation of (seemingly) competitive parties and their mutual participation in state violence – be it in the cooperation of majority and minority factions and the mechanism by which they swap power, or in the form of the grand coalition. In this way parties fight amongst themselves for the power to govern but nevertheless form a symbiotic unity, in whose sphere an abstract conflict of leadership can be fought out. They form the pluralist version of a unified party [Einheitspartei].5
III
The transformation in the party system is connected to the structural and functional changes that parliament itself has experienced in recent decades. Of these changes, there is one that should not be forgotten, lest one run the danger of mystifying parliament’s “loss of functionality” relative to earlier forms of parliamentarianism: as a factor of social power, parliament has historically always represented for bourgeois society the fiction of popular freedom through the implementation of popular representation. “Of all the specific elements… in the idea of freedom and thus of democracy, the most important is parliamentarianism… It would seem as if the idea of democratic freedom finds unbroken expression in parliamentarianism. This purpose serves the fiction of representation” (Kelsen).6
As a matter of fact, the principle of parliamentary representation (free mandate – free from the will of voters, but not from the directives and orders of the party leadership – unimpeachability during the legislative period, etc.) turns out to be an effective means of keeping the masses out of the state’s centers of power and – through state and legal mediation – society’s centers of decision. Certainly no individual representatives, provided they do not belong to the inner circle of leadership, accrue any power of their own from the principle of representation. To the parliamentary fiction also belongs the Leibhholz-ian7 ideologization that the representative is the master, and not the servant of the people. If, however (and here Pareto is in agreement), partly due to the political monopoly of parliamentary parties, the population orients itself on the one hand towards parliamentary politics and cooperation between government and parliament, and on the other hand towards the confrontation between government and opposition that sees the light of day in parliament, a real element of domination emerges from this fiction. The West German parliament [Bundestag] is neither master of the people nor a legislator representing the people.
Rather, parliament is active as a constitutionally indispensable instrument for publicizing decisions made through cooperation between the state apparatus and social pressure groups [Machtgruppen]. It thus acts as the transmission belt for the decisions of oligarchical groups. These groups (the leading groups of the sphere of production – oligopoly – but also of the cultural spheres - eg. churches) find themselves thoroughly and concretely represented in parliament, provided that parliament acts and functions as the representation of domination. Only as such is parliament rewarding and acceptable to bourgeois-capitalist society. When it provides for the incursion of an emancipatory countervailing power, that is, when the transformation does not succeed, the ruling class grasps for the more severe means of its own self-representation. See, for example, Greece.8
IV
This means that the perspective of a “system-immanent” evolution of parliamentarianism fails due to its own tendency towards involution, which is systematically determined by its function of domination. Developments in still-unintegrated societies show how over the long run this tendency towards involution is more effective than the potential to exploit parliament for its representative function. The fundamentally oppositional parties which play the parliamentary game, rather than taking part in extra-parliamentary struggle as the essential means for contesting domination, are threatened with losing their emancipatory quality and of transforming into bureaucratic apparatuses of integration. In other words, the political as well as (why not?) the moral downfall of social democracy (a historical betrayal of humanity’s liberation) is a warning sign for the socialist and communist parties in the capitalist countries.
Each parliamentary reform that is realized within states oriented towards involution serves not to expand the possibility for the masses to take part in decision-making processes, but rather to contain that possibility by intensifying parliament’s function of domination. Even where there exists a political articulation of a free public sphere, it cannot use parliament as a tool to implement itself practically.
This applies not only to the antagonistic public sphere but also at times even to the critical public sphere. Both must seek their political mediation in extra- and, in the wider course of the refunctioning of parliament, anti-capitalist organizations and organizational forms. It is up for debate whether the transformation of democracy can still be reversed. Today most groups of the extra-parliamentary opposition tend towards this position.
However, two things must be considered here:
1. A detailed analysis of the Basic Law must first of all clarify whether and to what extent the de-democratization of the Federal Republic was already intended in its constitution.
2. Neither the will to power and corruptibility of the politicians nor the depoliticization of the masses are the causes of the transformation. It is, rather, a necessity for a capitalism that seeks its own salvation by organizing itself through means of the state. The return to the purity of the Basic Law would be a return to the initial conditions of the transformation itself. It may be that the restoration or the defense of basic rights constitutes an essential prerequisite for the struggle against domination and exploitation. Basic rights, however, do not emancipate the masses so long as we have a bourgeois society and a capitalist mode of production whose state precisely does not provide for the emancipatory use of these rights.
Under the conditions of organized capitalism, as pacified and integrated by the state, it is rather the political recovery of antagonism – and this means the actualization of the class struggle and the disintegration of society – that is the first step towards the realization of democracy.
V
The political recovery of antagonism is the current task of the extra-parliamentary opposition. A few clarifications are necessary here:
1. Extra-parliamentary opposition is not fundamentally – in either practical or conceptual terms – anti-parliamentary. It is rather the normal form of participation for groups dissatisfied by the political life of parliamentary democracy, and indeed a support for and an extension of the politics of oppositional parliamentary parties. It therefore represents the social power of the parliamentary fronts – insofar as they can be said to exist, that is to say, insofar as the parliamentary fronts, for their part, effectively mirror social fronts.
2. Because social oppositional groups and parliamentary representation do not thoroughly coincide, conflicts can arise at any time between the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary opposition (just as much, incidentally, as they can between ruling groups and majorities and a given parliamentary majority, in practical terms with a given government). Such a conflict can extend across the entire parliament when it leads to confrontations between the public sphere and state organs. In such rare cases, the public sphere, as complete opposition to the constitutional organs (to which the parties also belong), exerts a pressure that indeed can function as “parliamentary coercion.” For example: in the Spiegel Affair it was not the Bundestag that forced Minister Strauß to resign, but rather the mobilized public sphere that forced the minister’s recusal and in the end his inglorious departure. A further example of “parliamentary coercion” was the Telephone Charge Affair, when the Bild-Zeitung effectively recalled the Bundestag from the parliamentary holiday.
3. In the course of certain political processes, however, a transition in the extra-parliamentary struggle can occur. That the opposition, which has in this way become anti-parliamentary, gets labeled anti-democratic is due partly to the unjustified identification of democracy with parliamentary formalism, and partly to the method by which parliamentary parties name themselves the sole foundations of the democratic state. Rather, insofar as parliaments function anti-democratically, despite democratic elections, the struggle for democracy must be pushed into anti-parliamentary praxis. This may sometimes be directed towards partial aspects of the parliamentary parties: a parliament must be criticized as a whole, attacked in case of passivity, when for example its president lies publicly without being held accountable in parliament. Here it is evident, incidentally, that the transition to an anti-parliamentary position is tightly connected to the failure of parliamentary opposition parties.
4. If the involution of the parliamentary system of government towards the authoritarian form of domination has already extended very far (as it has in the Federal Republic), so too does the extra-parliamentary opposition gain a new quality that results from the conflict with the new quality of parliament. This consists – negatively – in the lack of a constitutional provision for popular representation and in the lack of oversight and a public sphere. Positively, the new quality consists in the transformation of parliament into a representational organ of domination. The people, who are no longer represented, or at the very least the groups and classes that are no longer represented, must take matters into their own hands for the sake of democracy. It is their right to participate in political decision-making processes. If parliament becomes an instrument for curtailing this right, the extra-parliamentary opposition, as the byproduct of a parliamentarism that is still capable of being democratic, thus constitutes the counterweight to a parliamentarism that has become anti-democratic.
5. The possibilities of political praxis for the extra-parliamentary opposition differ from society to society. Consider the weight and significance of the political clubs in France, which by now have established themselves as recognized opponents of the official organs. Or the Republican Club in West Berlin, which representatives for the official bodies (and the semi-official power of the press) sometimes label as an organizer of “terror” and – most recently – as a center for spying. In many western countries it has become a working principle for the extra-parliamentary opposition to pursue central campaigns representing political aims and ideas that either find no hearing in parliaments, or which parliaments fight against. One central campaign in the future may have to do with gaining official recognition for the German Democratic Republic.9
Such central campaigns have a weakness, however: they propagate general ideas and can only speak to and mobilize general political interests. They will thus only be successful and constitute a concrete counter-power against anti-democratic involution tendencies if they bind themselves to the representation of the particular material interests of the dependent masses. Here too the way of ideas initially goes the way of needs. Here too the Idea disgraces itself if it shies away from alliance with material interests. Those who rule seem to understand this relation better than the “rebels” of West Berlin. While some groups of the extra-parliamentary opposition still orient themselves to Marcuse’s theses on marginalized groups and have written off the working class, the Federal Board of German Industry [Bundesvorstand der Deutschen Industrie, or BDI] demands, as a condition for investing, that the Senate of West Berlin impede solidarity between workers and students.
6. And lastly a note on the methods of the extra-parliamentary opposition. If it succeeds in setting the masses in motion and in this way partially and temporarily paralyzes or irritates the state apparatus, it will be accused of wanting to mobilize “the street.” It is generally accepted that “pressure from the street” directed at freely elected parliaments is a severe offense against the constitution and democracy. The question is simply when pressure is permissible and appears acceptable. Every segment of the population must seek to use its own means to be heard. If the extra-parliamentary opposition writes a letter to the mayor of West Berlin no attention will be paid to it. No attention is paid to students who demand parliamentary action and educational reforms through petitions. A letter from Mr. Fritz Berg10 or a report of the BDI, however, always receives attention and response. Politically, though, the pressure of a BDI report (fundamentally, a “go-in” by mail) on the West Berlin Parliament is disproportionately stronger and more incisive than a go-in of a few dozen students and assorted “agitators” [“Drahtziehern”]. Part of the ruling mechanism’s perfidy is that it presents pressure from the upper class as noble recommendation, and pressure from below as mob-like coercion.
“Pressure from the street” is the legitimate means of an extra-parliamentary opposition whose petitions that play by the rules of social order always end up in the wastebasket of parliament and the government.
– Translated by Michael Shane Boyle and Daniel Spaulding
Taken from Viewpoint Magazine
- 1Translators’ note: Founded in 1967 in West Berlin by Agnoli and other figures such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger and William Borm, the Republican Club was a key space for discussion and debate in the West German student movement and the broader extra-parliamentary Left. All further footnotes are by the translators.
- 2The Grundgesetz or Basic Law is the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany that came into effect on May 23, 1949. It established West Germany as a sovereign nation independent from both the Allied occupying powers and the socialist German Democratic Republic.
- 3Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Italian economist whose theories influenced fascist policies.
- 4In Germany the term Volkspartei describes a type of political party whose membership transcends social lines such as class or religion. The SPD’s transformation with the 1959 Godesborg Program from a worker’s party into a Volkspartei was still a fresh memory for the West German Left when Agnoli wrote this essay.
- 5The ruling party in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was known as the Sozialistische Einheitspartei, or Socialist Unity Party. It was created in the country’s Soviet-occupied zone in 1946 as a merger of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) with the German Communist Party (KPD).
- 6This quote from Hans Kelsen is not cited in Agnoli’s original essay. It comes from Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (Tübingen: Mohr, 1929), 25; 30. The translation from German is our own.
- 7Agnoli is speaking of Gerhard Leibholz (1901-1982), an influential German legal scholar and jurist who served on West Germany’s constitutional court from 1951 to 1971.
- 8This refers to the Greek military junta that began on 21 April 1967 and which would last until 24 July 1974.
- 9The German Democratic Republic had no official status in the Federal Republic of Germany at the time Agnoli was writing. Normalization of relations with East Germany would take place under the aegis of the so-called Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) of Chancellor Willy Brandt, in office 1969-1974.
- 10Fritz Berg was a prominent German industrialist and the first president of the BDI.
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Issue 5: Social Reproduction
Comments
Reproducing the struggle: a new feminist perspective on the concept of social reproduction
I believe that intimacy, together with other social and intellectual practices that are necessary for the reproduction of our collectivity, is being appropriated today by the capitalist machine and, in the same movement, transferred from the collective sphere to that of the nuclear unit and from the sphere of reproduction to that of the market economy.
Introduction: The Erosion of Intimacy
In 2012 I stumbled upon an article which was originally published in The Art of Manliness and which consists essentially of a series of pictures. The article is entitled Bosom Buddies: a Photo History of Male Affection and the pictures ended up being widely shared on social media.
friendsportrait2
What is so compelling about these pictures is not only the performance of masculinity portrayed, but the fact that intimacy in itself is so openly shared and displayed in a context that is not necessarily limited to the setting of family or romance. I had the realization that intimacy–and in particular physical intimacy, closeness and the possibility of touch–has declined in the last century among men and everybody else. Or to be more exact, it has been relegated to a handful of relationships, defined either by romance and family bonds, or, on the other end of the spectrum, by market value (sex work, massage, physical therapy, contact improvisation, etc.). I realized that we are witnessing, under capitalism, the erosion (or maybe I should say the enclosure) of intimacy.
As it turns out, intimacy is one of those hard to define areas of the common that make the reproduction of oneself and of each other possible. As Toni Negri and Michael Hardt write in Commonwealth: “This Common is not only the earth we share but also the languages we create, the social practices we establish, the modes of sociality that define our relationships.”1 Negri and Hardt continue, writing: “This form of the common does not lend itself to a logic of scarcity as does the first.”2
On the contrary, I believe that intimacy, together with other social and intellectual practices that are necessary for the reproduction of our collectivity, is being appropriated today by the capitalist machine and, in the same movement, transferred from the collective sphere to that of the nuclear unit and from the sphere of reproduction to that of the market economy.
The problem here is that the definition of social reproduction is still rather blurred. At the same time, in recent years, both the concept itself — the areas in which it takes place and what is considered common — have been redefined and expanded, with a continuous movement and a constant creation of the common on one side and, in response, a continuous expansion of the process that can be described as enclosure on the other.
The process of enclosure, “not only of communal lands but also of social relations,”3 can be redefined as a process that aims not only at the accumulation of capital and resources but, more importantly, at creating political paralysis and dependence, reducing workers’ ability to negotiate and cutting off the possibility of freely accessing forms of self-sustenance.
Self-sustenance, of course, does not refer exclusively to the material reproduction of oneself. More than just food and shelter go into the maintenance of our life. Emotional and intellectual nurturing are just as necessary and are usually provided in ways that are hard to measure, primarily by women and especially by mothers. This form of nurturing is continuously being transferred from the collective and public sphere to that of the private household or the medical institution.
Important in this respect is a particular definition of the concept of social reproduction that has to do with the necessity of reproducing one’s own identity. From the point of view of political organizing, this is an essential aspect, especially if we consider the difficulty of reproducing ourselves and our collectivity as a revolutionary one.
Apparently, the capitalist machine has understood the centrality of this activity, or set of activities, since, as Tiqqun argues,4 it responded by appropriating those areas of reproduction that have to do with the self, to promote what has been a largely successful and market oriented project of identity engineering. This is what Tiqqun calls “the anthropotechnical project of Empire”5 In essence, “At the beginning of the 1920s, capitalism realized that it could no longer maintain itself as the exploitation of human labor if it did not also colonize everything that is beyond the strict sphere of production.”6
At the core of this project is the necessity to reify the space where our social relationships take place, those we establish with others as well as those we entertain with ourselves. In order to accomplish the task of self-valorization and reification (i.e. of assigning a value to oneself and each other), capital must annihilate intimacy. As Tiqqun puts it, “The Young-Girl would thus be the being that no longer had any intimacy with herself except as value.”7
This has devastating consequences not only on the existential level — in the way we perceive ourselves and the world around us and in the moral choices that inform our everyday actions — but on the political level as well. It literally unmakes our attempts at creating a sustainable resistance and a revolutionary movement. In fact, exactly because political organizing cannot and does not subsist without a strong investment in personal relationships, the inability to relate intimately with each other produces political paralysis.
The Implosion of Movements of Resistance
In an article that I translated into Italian a couple of years ago entitled “Feminism and the Politics of the Commons,” Silvia Federici makes a claim that shifts the focus on social reproduction from a question of ideological and analytical correctness to one of strategic necessity, arguing that political movements that fail to create new forms of social reproduction are destined to be reabsorbed into the mechanism of the capitalist system.
In other words, Federici suggests that our attempts at revolution are doomed unless we find a way to transform the sphere of reproduction in revolutionary ways — ways that would include the reproduction of the social collectivity and not only of the single household. This requires a process of collectivization that would allow us, among other things, to overcome the division of labor based on gender and race.
In most industrialized and/or patriarchal societies, the prevailing model is that of a collectivity divided into modules or single reproductive units. Usually these take the form of households or families, constructed around normative regulatory principles: the men (or those individuals who assume a male role) are responsible for providing essential resources, by exchanging them for labor power in the places allocated for production (the production units: factories, offices, farms, the digital world, etc). The women (or those who assume female roles), beside increasingly providing material resources in exchange for their labor, are also expected to engage in activities that fall under the sphere of reproduction: activities of care, physical and emotional support, mediation and conflict resolution among members of the family, sex work, the socialization of children, the transmission of customs and traditions, etc.
Traditional feminist struggles in the west focused largely on fighting for the access of women into the sphere of production (the labor force) with very little leverage upon the way families are organized. The result of these struggles has been disappointing on several levels: if it’s true that some women, mostly white middle class women, were able to gain a certain amount of independence and personal liberties, this has been accomplished at a high cost. Women still largely perform those jobs that can be considered an extension of reproductive activities and that increasingly have been enclosed and transformed into value-generating activities: care work in general like teaching, sex work, nursing, human resources, therapy in all its forms, and the care of children and the elders.
Those relatively few women who succeed in establishing a stable career in traditionally male dominated fields (academia and the intellectual world in general, engineering and sciences, the medical field, administration and management, etc.) still earn considerably less than their male counterparts, under worse conditions. In addition they are still expected to perform a certain amount of care-work both on the workplace and for their family, resulting in an unsustainable amount of working hours. In this way, women often find themselves unable to devote time to research, personal development, or artistic and vocational endeavours, and are faced with hard choices. Either they decide to identify completely with their career as defined by capitalist standards — and delay or forgo the establishment of significant relationships — or they partially abandon it when they decide to have children. In addition, many women are today faced with a sort of “Sophie’s choice”: in a situation where their male partner often has a better chance at higher wages, full-time stable employment and career advancement, reproducing him and his capacity for labor presents a better chance for survival than focusing on their own aspirations and ambitions.
Another development related to the entrance of women into the labor force has been a process wherein large portions of reproductive work has been farmed out, in exchange for meager wages, to the most vulnerable sectors of society, in particular, women of color, single mothers, undocumented immigrants or even the proletariat of entire countries where workers are unprotected by unions or favorable legislation.
Most importantly, this entireprocess has proven unable to create any significant change in the basic constitution of the family and, at the same time, has not generated a coherent feminist critique of the capitalist system of production. It has evolved as a struggle for inclusion, with little or no questioning of the system in which women were to be included and with little or no awareness of the process of exclusion that is implied and makes possible any incorporation in an exclusive order.
The economic emancipation of women could be accomplished instead by concentrating changes at the point of reproduction, in particular, by transferring traditional female responsibilities, like the care of children and elders, from the single woman in the context of a family/household to the collectivity (neighborhood, village, town). This would make women less dependent from their male kins and less isolated and it would help create a network of solidarity and reciprocal protection among women.
In fact, in those societies where reproductive work is performed collectively, the division of labor based on gender often seems to be less pronounced. From Federici, we learn that this was the predominant model in the pre-capitalist servile communities of the middle ages:
… since work on the servile farm was organized on a subsistence base, the sexual division of labor in it was less pronounced and less discriminating than in a capitalist farm. In the feudal village no social separation existed between the production of goods and the reproduction of the work-force; all work contributed to the family’s sustenance. Women worked in the fields in addition to raising children, cooking, washing, spinning and keeping an herb garden; their domestic activities were not devalued and did not involve different social relations from those of men, as they would later, in a money economy, when housework would cease to be viewed as real work. […] in medieval society collective relations prevailed over familial ones, and most of the task that female serfs performed […] were done in cooperation with other women.8
Conversely, an exclusive strategic focus by revolutionaries on the realm of production creates a situation of impasse, by which movements of resistance end up being reabsorbed into the traditional system of values and its attendant social dynamics.
Federici offers two opposite examples of this mechanism. In the first one, we are taken back to the Great Depression and to the movement of the hobos. Hobos were mostly unemployed men or day laborers who lived a nomadic life, hopping trains and moving constantly. Nevertheless the hobos developed a form of collective living, the hobo jungle, with an internal system of administration, including a juridical process, an exclusive system of communication and a moral code.
But because the hobos were unable to develop beyond a mere masculine society, with the exceptional and sporadic participation of a few women who were kept at the margins, it was easy and, in a certain sense, unavoidable for them to be reabsorbed into the traditional functioning of the capitalist system. The traditional society, with its allure of the dream of a home and family was able to constitute a strong motivation for re-entering the labor force when the market needed it, exactly because the jungle was unable to offer any viable alternatives.
As Federici writes:
… but for a few Boxcar Berthas, this was predominantly a masculine world, a fraternity of men, and in the long term it could not be sustained. Once the economic crisis and the war came to an end, the hobos were domesticated by the two great engines of labor power fixation: the family and the house. Mindful of the threat of working class recomposition during the Depression, American capital excelled in its application of the principle that has characterized the organization of economic life: cooperation at the point of production, separation and atomization at the point of reproduction. The atomized, serialized family house that Levittown provided, compounded by its umbilical appendix, the car, not only sedentarized the worker but put an end to the type of autonomous workers’ commons that hobo jungles had represented.9
The second example Federici offers is that of the Sem Terra in Brazil. The Sem Terra are a movement of landless peasants, active to this day, who aim at occupying and eventually expropriating unproductive land in Brazil. The first recorded organized occupation goes back to 1980/1981 and included 6000 households on three estates in the State of Rio Grande del Sul.
The encampment, known as the Encruzilhada Natalino, took the shape of a village, and revolved around the self-sustenance of its families, where reproductive work was, for the most part, collectivized. The Sem Terra also embrace a nonhierarchical form of organization, without any clear-cut leadership and where every unit elects two representatives, a man and a woman, for the Nucleo de Base and the regional assembly.
Federici reports that when the peasants of the Encruzilhada were finally able to expropriate the land and build their own houses on it, the women demanded that the houses included common areas, and especially common kitchens, so that they could continue collectivizing the work and protecting each other from the violence of men.
New Theories of Social Reproduction
Federici’s argument, as well as other recent developments in the theory of social reproduction, suggest that we need to reconsider the classic Marxist definition.
There is a remarkable increase in the volume and the variety of discourse on social reproduction, which points to the fact that the emphasis on its importance has intensified notably. At the same time, however, it seems that the inherent meaning of this concept still escapes us. Furthermore, social reproduction continues to be treated largely as an ancillary problem in the larger plan for revolution and resistance.
In classic Marxist terms, production coincides with the sphere of proper economic activity while reproduction with all the work necessary to create and re-create the conditions that make production possible.10 In this way, reproduction is described as a relative term, which exists only in relation to production and in order to guarantee its functioning. Furthermore, it is a limited and insufficient definition which does not reflect the variety of activities that should be included.
In the traditional feminist perspective, social reproduction is defined as all that is necessary to create and maintain life, related or unrelated to the sphere of production:
…feminists use social reproduction to refer to activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis, and intergenerationally. Among other things, social reproduction includes how food, clothing, and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, the ways in which the care and socialization of children are provided, the care of the infirm and the elderly, and the social organization of sexuality. Social reproduction can thus be seen to include various kind of work – mental, manual, and emotional – aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care necessary to maintain the existing life and to reproduce the next generation.11
In a more recent reading, proposed by Endnotes, reproduction is all the work we do that doesn’t participate directly in the market economy and does not directly produce profit. Reproduction would then be the Indirectly Market Mediated Sphere (IMM) to use a definition proposed in the 3rd issue of Endnotes:
Because the existing concepts of production and reproduction are themselves limited, we need to find more precise terms to designate these two spheres. From now on we will use two very descriptive (and therefore rather clunky) terms to name them: (a) the directly market-mediated sphere (DMM); and (b) the indirectly market-mediated sphere (IMM).12
Nevertheless, what exactly constitutes this work is not yet entirely clear.
In Caliban and the Witch, Federici, when talking about the transition from slavery to serfdom which marks the beginning of the Middle Ages from an economic point of view writes:
The most important aspect of serfdom, from the viewpoint of the changes it introduced in the master-servant relation, is that it gave the serf direct access to the means of their reproduction. In exchange for the work which they were bound to do on the lord’s land (the demesne), the serf received a plot of land (mansus or hide) which they could use to support themselves.13
I use this distinction between demesne and mansus as a metaphor and say that the work on the village garden (the mansus) represents the sphere of reproduction, while the work on the lord’s garden (the demesne) is the sphere of production. It then becomes clear that the same set of activities can be considered production when included in a relationship of exchange/value and reproduction when not.
Again, in the third issue of Endnotes, we read:
These necessary non-labour activities do not produce value, not because of their concrete characteristics, but rather, because they take place in a sphere of the capitalist mode of production which is not directly mediated by the form of value. […] Indeed, the same concrete activity, like cleaning or cooking, can take place in either sphere: it can be value-producing labour in one specific social context and non-labour in another.14
The only distinguishing factor that can be identified is that production creates value while reproduction does not.
Accepting this definition makes it possible then to understand enclosure as the process of transforming or transferring not only material resources but also entire areas of reproduction into the production sphere, by assigning them a market value.
There is a reason, however, why the task of defining the field of social reproduction always eludes us: more than a container with fixed boundaries (a sphere), it should be considered a process, a continuously changing one, which expands and contracts both in response to its own internal dynamics, and under the pressure of the continuous attempts at enclosing it on the part of the capitalist machine. As Endnotes argues:
Terms like the “reproductive sphere” are insufficient …, because what we are trying to name cannot be defined as a specific set of activities according to their use-value or concrete character.15
What concerns us should rather be understanding the underlying mechanisms of social reproduction and, in this context, especially those related to the replication of the traditional values of hierarchy and domination.
Social reproduction is, to this day, a process rooted in a dynamic of power, largely functioning through a division of labor that falls along gender and race lines.
Federici writes:
According to this new social-sexual contract [the one that resulted from the enclosure of commons and the division of labor] proletarian women became for male workers the substitute for the land lost to the enclosures, their most basic means of reproduction , and a communal good anyone could appropriate and use at will. […] In the new organization of work every woman (other than those privatized by bourgeois men) became a communal good, for once women’s activities were defined as non-work, women’s labor began to appear as a natural resource, available to all, no less than the air we breathe or the water we drink.16
The Unseen Impact of Social Reproduction on Revolutionary Movements
In fact the repetition of patriarchal modes of relations is at the core of the sclerotization of many radical movements precisely when they presuppose a pyramidal organization that mimics and replicates many aspects of the sphere of production. This includes an ethic largely based on the process of self-identification with production-based labor and a set of personal values based on power and dominance, rather than on the social and emotional charge necessary to build and reproduce durable relationships. It also includes the accumulation and display of male power, as opposed to the construction of collective power.
Emblematic in this sense is the case of the Black Panther Party, which focused its strategy in large part on the area of social reproduction. The BPP school and breakfast programs, as well as their focus on self-defense from police harassment and brutality, constituted an approach, in many ways revolutionary, that made social reproduction both its target and its area of recruitment. This strategy, nevertheless, did not affect the internal functioning of the party itself. In fact, patriarchal characteristics inside the party were evident in the emphasis on male identity and the performance of masculinity, as well as, in the role assigned to women in the party.
The patriarchal practices contained in the internal dynamics of the BPP, as documented in the biographies of several of its female cadres and sympathizers, such as Angela Davis, Assata Shakur and Elaine Brown, were certainly one of the factors that contributed to its demise, transforming it from a force focused on the construction of collective power to one focused on the accumulation and execution of male power.
It is well known, for instance, that when Huey Newton returned from exile in Cuba, he swiftly rid the party of the women in key positions of leadership, among them Elaine Brown, who was at the head of the party during his absence, and Regina Davis and Ericka Huggins, who managed the party school in Oakland. His argument, according to the account contained in A Taste of Power by Elaine Brown, was that the men in the party were feeling restless and emasculated and had expressly requested that the women “would be put back in their places.”
A week later, Ericka Huggins called me […]. Regina Davis, her assistant, had been hospitalized as the result of a severe beating, her jaw broken. The Brothers had done it. […] I called Huey. […] he had indeed given his authorization for Regina’s discipline. I explained to Huey exactly who Regina Davis was, as I was sure he had no idea. Regina held together the proudest of our programs, our school. Without the recognition of Central Committee membership, she had worked more than fifteen hours of every day of every week for the past two years. I emphasized that Regina managed the teachers, cooks, maintenance people, and other personnel at the school. Regina planned the children’s daily activities, weekly field trips, health checkups. Regina oversaw menus, and food and materials purchases. Regina communicated with parents and other schools as to the status of current students, former students, and prospective students. “She is the fucking school,” I said.
[…] The women were feeling the change, I noted. The beating of Regina would be taken as a clear signal that the words “Panthers” and “comrade” had taken on gender connotations, denoting an inferiority in the female half of us. Something awful was not only driving a dangerous wedge between Sisters and Brothers, it was attacking the very foundation of the party.
[…] He did not respond for a long time. “You know, of course, that I know all that,” he said finally, softly, thoughtfully. “But what do you want me to do about it? The Brothers came to me. I had to give them something.”17
The necessity to reassert a forever uncertain notion of masculinity catapulted the party itself into a spiral in which the compulsion to antagonize and dominate its own members and the entire community in its territory resulted in the almost total estrangement of the leadership from its base.
While it’s certainly true that the relentless attacks by COINTELPRO were historically the main factor in the eventual disintegration of the party, we can also say that, at the same time, the BPP collapsed because its focus shifted from that of organizing and empowering its community to that of self-survival and the reification of its own internal power.
I recalled a conversation I had with several of the Brothers one night […]. We have the guns and the men, they had boasted. We could take what we want from the Establishment. […] They wanted so little from our revolution, they had lost sight of it. Too many of them seemed satisfied to appropriate for themselves the power the party was gaining, measured by the shining illusion of cars and clothes and guns. They were even willing to cash in their revolutionary principles for a self-serving “Mafia.”18
It is necessary here to emphasize that in no way am I trying to suggest that the BPP was unique in reiterating gender dynamics that reproduce the same oppressive pattern of dominion that we can find in the Capitalist/Patriarchal society at large. On the contrary, what makes the case of the BPP so relevant is exactly the fact that, even given its internal contradictions, so much of its strategy was focused not in the place of production (workers organizing, strikes and so on) but in the sphere of reproduction, (the neighborhood, the school, the street).
I consider gender and race oppression to be a prevalent characteristic that historically affected and still plagues most revolutionary movements and that creates a situation of impasse in our attempts at bringing change. I also believe these practices of male dominance to be founded, among other things, on a series of errors in the analysis and definition of the dichotomy production/reproduction. I’m furthermore convinced these errors make it impossible to bring forth a critique of capitalism and market economy that could radically put into question its system of production and waged labor.
Conclusions: Resisting Wage Slavery and Reappropriating the Commons
We are experiencing today a massive process of enclosure in which more and more of our lives is swallowed up by the market economy and the system seems to have engaged in a project of totalitarian, capillary control. More and more aspects of our reproduction are being delegated to third parties, while our time is being freed in order to be devoted to a life of total production and consumption. Many activities that were traditionally part of the sphere of reproduction have now been assigned a market value; they are thus being transferred to areas of production and are executed by the most vulnerable people in our society.This new phase of accumulation and enclosure, however, doesn’t aim at the complete annihilation of the sphere of reproduction which, as a reservoir of unpaid labor, is essential for the survival of the system itself.
At the same time, we are witnessing the revival of campaigns proposing family wages or a basic guaranteed income – which see among its supporters Toni Negri and Michael Hardt. Alisa McKay claimed in “Rethinking Work and Income Maintenance Policy” that a basic income would be “a tool for promoting gender-neutral social citizenship rights,” while in Italy last year the parliament considered a proposal to implement salaries for all the work of care done inside the house.19 Demanding compensation for those activities that are now not considered labor seems necessary and even urgent, considering the misery and dependence in which millions of people, especially women, are made to live. If these people were to receive wages for all that they now do as a form of reproduction of themselves and others, they could emancipate themselves economically and politically. Moreover, these campaigns are often used to highlight an essential contradiction in the system: since capitalism is built upon the exploitation and appropriation of free work, it would necessarily collapse if all this work were to be adequately compensated.
However, that’s exactly why the ruling class will never concede, or at least not universally. The most we could possibly hope for, which is partially what’s happening, is that a handful of mostly white women, mostly living at the centre of the Empire will be partially relieved from the slavery of unpaid labor, by the thousands of mostly black and brown women in those same countries or somewhere else on the planet.It’s unlikely that the contradictions that exist in the areas of reproduction – namely the fact that it constitutes both work necessary for our survival and one of the places in our life where exploitation and dominion transpire in the deepest and most totalitarian way – can be resolved by accommodating or even advocating for its complete absorption into the sphere of production; in other words by assigning a market value to all our activities.
This does not mean that we should replicate capitalist schemes in the way we define and assign value to our work, to then relegate part of it to a territory of devaluation or even utter invisibility. At the same time, the demand for a monetary compensation in exchange for all the activities that now fall outside of the realm of the market seems destined to fail or to be satisfied partially and by replicating the same kind of oppression along gender and race lines.
Trying to bring down the system by offering it slices of our life for total market control offers the illusion that, if all we did could be considered productive labor and be exchanged for wages, we would somehow be more free and happier. If only the ruling class would somehow, one day, be pressured enough to concede and pay us more, pay us for more! And yet our negotiating margins are getting everyday narrower, along with our possibility to access the resources we need for self-sustenance.
This strategy also creates a narrative that offers legitimacy to the status quo and ends up allowing it to replicate itself: a continue struggle for inclusion into an exclusive system of privileges, with the argument that the urgency of the present situation doesn’t leave time and energy for more radical projects of revolution, has historically always ended with compromises that left out exactly those people whose living conditions were the most urgent.
Moreover, on the symbolic plane, this request could derail resistance from organizing around issues and strategies that have a more radical/revolutionary potential: resisting waged labor and reappropriating the common.In this sense, beside concentrating on reappropriating the means of production, it’s important to start talking about the necessity to reappropriate the means of our reproduction: essential resources like land, water, energy as well as time, public spaces, knowledge, information, etc.
The contemporary critique of capitalism could learn from theories and movements that in the past have advocated an organized resistance to waged labor. Frederick Douglass, looking back at his life as first a slave and then a waged worker, affirmed that:
Experience demonstrates that there may be a slavery of wages only a little less galling and crushing in its effects than chattel slavery, and that this slavery of wages must go down with the other.20
Silvia Federici tells us that, since the dawn of Capitalism, poor people have resisted entering the workforce, so much so that anti-loitering and anti-vagrancy laws had to be introduced:
The image of a worker freely alienating his labor,or confronting his body as capital to be delivered to the highest bidder, refers to a working class already molded by the capitalist work-discipline. But only in the second half of the 19th century can we glimpse that type of worker…The situation was radically different in the period of primitive accumulation when the emerging bourgeoisie discovered that the “liberation of labor-power” – that is, the expropriation of the peasantry from the common lands – was not sufficient to force the dispossessed proletarians to accept wage-labor….the expropriated peasants and artisans did not peacefully agree to work for a wage. More often they became beggars, vagabonds or criminals. A long process would be required to produce a disciplined work-force. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the hatred for wage labor was so intense that many proletarians preferred the gallows rather than submit to the new conditions of work.21
The “disciplined work force” Federici is talking about is none but ourselves! Our labor culture seems to have fully embraced the values that support productivity, high performance and the display of good work ethics, to the point that our revolutionary imagination has been short circuited into an impossibility to name or consider alternatives to wages.
Yet, according to Helga Kristin, it was only at the end of the 19th century that unions abandoned the term “wage slavery,” and with it, the idea that one day wages could be completely abolished:
By 1890 … references to wage slavery in the rhetorical toolkit of North American labor leaders had all but disappeared, replaced by a much more pragmatic vision of labor politics, exemplified by the “living wage” campaign…22
Sam Gindin and Michael Hurley write in Jacobin that after WWII:
….a particular trade-off evolved that saw unions accept an emphasis on the price of labor power (wages and benefits) trumping workplace rights…The small but effective militant Communist minority that agitated for more radical directions was harassed and many were drummed not only out of their jobs but also their unions…In this way, post-war worker militancy was consequently channeled into the safer territory of individualized consumption.
…Quantitative demands overtook qualitative demands. Getting something more rather than something different became the watchword. A culture of consumerism came to dominate, characterized not so much by the understandable urge to meet daily needs and enjoy life, but to do so in competitive and individualistic ways that sidelined popular possibilities for collectively shaping the world and sharing equitably in humanity’s achievement.23
A strategy that focuses not only on more pay and better conditions in the short term but also on less work, resistance to the idea of “good work ethics” and even refusal to engage in production altogether, could mean a switch where, instead of aiming exclusively at making the conditions in which production happens better for workers, the entirety of production would be questioned. Ideally production should be reabsorbed and coincide with the reproduction of ourselves and of our collectivity.
Comments
Bringing the Vanguard Home: Revisiting the Black Panther Party’s Sites of Class Struggle
By the summer of 1968, less than two years after its inception, Oakland, California’s Black Panther Party was running out of space. Signs of the Black Power organization’s rapid growth were especially evident at its Grove Street office, which by this time, was “busting out at the seams,” with “piles of newsletters, leaflets, buttons, [and] flags” overflowing into members’ homes.1 Not surprisingly, state agents were equally privy to the Party’s increasing popularity among local residents; during the same year, increased rates of incarceration, police-led murders, and the political exile of Panther men resulted in a predominantly female membership.2 In the midst of heightened FBI and police repression of the organization, David Hilliard, the Party’s then Chief of Staff, recalls in his autobiography that by September, he no longer felt safe in his home or the Party office.3
Thus, the search was on for a new base of operations. With the help of friends and the pooling of organizational funds, Hilliard quickly located an ideal site on Shattuck Avenue, midway between Berkeley and Oakland. Aside from the buffer that the college town’s businesses would afford Hilliard’s family against “the marginally more civilized Berkeley police” at this particular location, Hilliard envisioned additional benefits to purchasing the property:
We could hold meetings, press conferences, and store the paper in the wide space on the ground floor. Upstairs in front we can put out the paper; in back are plenty of rooms, including the kitchen. From the basement we can build tunnels to the backyard of a friend of Eldridge’s who lives nearby, escape routes in case of attack.4
Further, aware of the house’s ample size, Hilliard proposed to his wife, Patricia, the idea of withdrawing their children from Oakland’s public schools and homeschooling them at the new residence. His plans quickly materialized. After outfitting the bedrooms with bunk beds and equipping every desk with a telephone, Hilliard and his comrades covered the windows with steel sheets and placed sandbags along the walls.5 Soon “the chatter of people working, the chaos of last-minute details, some nonsense about the kids upstairs, some members sacked out on the floor in sleeping bags,” filled the house with an atmosphere that Hilliard recalls, felt “familiar, natural, right.” He called the new domain, “home, headquarters, embassy.”6
But what do we make of the tripartite relationship that Hilliard describes? Beyond what it suggests about the central role that the organization’s Chief of Staff played in the Black Panther Party’s early years, the image he provides is telling on at least one additional level; it offers us a key window through which we can more fully examine the organization’s sites of class struggle. While Hilliard may have been the only Party member to actualize plans for building an underground escape route in his backyard (and he might have been successful, had the city’s underground subway system not backed up the water level, causing the tunnels to flood), the “home, headquarters, embassy” he depicts was not unique. In fact, accounts of Panther households outlined in memoirs and biographies of former members, organizational documents, and FBI files suggest that for numerous Black Panthers, the home existed as a liminal space, at the nexus of family, community, and work life. More specifically, for many Black Panthers, the household functioned as a primary site of contestation between the Party and the state over the terms of social reproduction.
While much has been written about how the Black Panther Party’s brand of black radicalism operated as a spectacular politics – in the streets, in front of government buildings, and in community centers – few scholars have fully explored the more intimate terrains over which the BPP attempted to multiply its revolutionary ranks. If the state actively hindered the ability of black working-class families to perform the daily tasks of reproductive labor by relegating them to ghettos ridden with police violence, by inculcating their children with a public school curriculum void of black history, or by officially pathologizing black female-headed households, Party members responded with collective calls for self-determination.7
Yet, Black Power militancy, and state responses to it, did not always occur in those spaces most visible to the public. Rather, the home and family unit were just as likely targets of government subversion as the more visible urban terrains that have become the central backdrop of Black Panther iconography. Equally important, the Panthers’ anti-colonial politics were often transmitted across generations not in Party offices or community centers, but behind closed doors, in the intimate spaces of living rooms, kitchens, and backyards.
Specifically, this essay investigates the ways in which the home and family unit functioned as political and politicizing spaces for Party members and their children. In the context of the organization’s politics of self-determination, this essay seeks to understand the significance of those moments when Black Panthers’ most personal domains transformed into refuges from state violence, venues for the political education of children, and quarters that accommodated Party members’ experimentations with various living arrangements. I ask: what symbolic or material significance, if any, did conceptions of parenthood, childrearing practices, or the home, have for those interested in the Party, and for those bent on its demise? Similarly, to what extent did these phenomena function as mechanisms of Black Panther socialism? Utilizing a range of primary and secondary sources including autobiographies of former Party members, newspaper articles, and general studies of the organization, I contend that these more domestically-insulated interactions were as central to the Party’s political practices as members’ more overt organizational labor.8
Background
Like the Party’s gender theories, the ideas the BPP espoused about parenthood and family were neither monolithic nor static throughout its twelve-year lifespan from 1966 to 1982. And while Oakland’s Black Power group never released an official statement articulating the role of family and children in the socialist revolution, questions about fatherhood, motherhood, and family structure figured prominently in organizational theories and practices from the group’s early stages.9
In fact, on many levels, the Party’s establishment by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale served as a response to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s controversial 1965 study, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. Drawing on a compilation of sociological, economic, and historical research, Moynihan ultimately attributed the high unemployment and school attrition rates among blacks in low-income cities to the structure of black families. Black mothers and matriarchal households were particularly troubling to Moynihan, as his report would cast both as debilitating to the social and economic progress of black men and male youth.10
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that tropes of the reclamation of black manhood, which could be achieved through a man’s ability to protect his family, fill the pages of the BPP’s early literature. In his early writings, Newton’s response to the matriarchal family form offers an ironic corroboration of many of Moynihan’s assertions about the state of black fatherhood. His 1967 essay, “Fear and Doubt,” for example, depicts the black husband and father as a dejected figure, consumed with feelings of guilt over his inability to provide for his wife and children. Unable to financially support or protect his family, he ultimately “withdraws into the world of invisibility.”11 Newton’s trope of invisibility is coupled with a rhetoric of protection and survival that underscores the paradoxical nature of the black father figure; both a product of governmental neglect and the target of police-sanctioned violence, he is at once invisible and hypervisible. Echoing Newton’s personal writings, the BPP’s agenda of combating police brutality inscribed a version of revolutionary black manhood that was directly tied to the protection of the home and family. One of the organization’s earliest documents, Executive Mandate Number One, for instance, called on members to defend the homes and persons of the black ghetto from oppressive state forces.12
But scholars of the BPP’s gender politics, including Tracye Matthews remind us that the Party maintained fluid, and at times contradictory notions of familial relationships as the organization’s political ideology transformed over time, in constant dialectic with external contemporary discourses.13 Even Newton, while reinscribing Moynihan’s patriarchal conceptions of family and marriage, at other moments posited the “bourgeois family” as “imprisoning, enslaving, and suffocating.”14 In line with capitalistic forms of property ownership and exploitation, the nuclear family symbolized a direct challenge to socialist modes of parenthood and siblinghood.
Moving Away From the “Bourgeois Family”
Certainly, Huey Newton’s critique of the nuclear family model did not fall on deaf ears. In fact, even before the publication of his “Fear and Doubt” essay, Black Panthers were already experimenting with communal living arrangements and sexual relationships. The image of Panther homes as at once serving as sleeping quarters, all-night diners, and organizational meeting centers abound in Panther memoirs.15 Looking at a handful of Panther families, in the following section I trace the ways in which home life manifested itself for both those individuals who worked for the Party, and those whose lineage bound them to Black Panther politics. By mapping the spatial layouts of Panther households, by tracing the nature of childhood development including the education and socialization of Panthers’ children, and by examining Party members’ conceptions of parenthood, this section asks: how did members of the Black Panther Party prepare their kin for a post-capitalist future?
Mary Williams offers a telling example of the communalism that was characteristic of many Panther households. Born in Oakland, California in 1967, Williams was exposed to the Bay Area’s culture of black radicalism from a young age. During the BPP’s early years, her mother, Mary Williams, sold issues of The Black Panther, the organization’s literary mouthpiece, to local residents, and helped facilitate the group’s community service programs. Her father, Louis Randolph, served on the Party’s community police patrols until his arrest and incarceration in Soledad Prison in 1970 on charges of the assault and intent to kill a police officer.16 Her father’s political prisoner status and her parents’ ultimate divorce meant that Williams and her siblings were exposed to different types of family settings growing up. From time to time, the Williams children stayed with their uncle, Landon Williams, who also worked for the Party. As a child, Mary recognized that her uncle’s decision to live independently with his wife and child, outside the confines of Panther housing, was somewhat unique. Whereas her uncle resided in “his own tidy little apartment,” other members of the rank-and-file settled in Party housing, “which meant bunklike [sp] quarters and often sleeping on pallets.”17 While Williams reminds us of the diversity of living styles among Party members, her account also echoes the theme of mobility – evidenced by the constant flow of comrades – that is central to David Hilliard’s account of his Shattuck Avenue home. As the cases of Mary Williams and the Hilliards indicate, then, the constant movement of people within the household serves as a telling symbol of the inseparability of personal and political spaces for Panther families.
Movement between residences was also a common experience among Panther youth. Dorion Hilliard, son of David and Patricia, recalls spending much of his childhood moving from state to state as a result of his parents’ deep involvement in the movement. Ironically, although his was a childhood of constant relocation, Dorion remained fully surrounded by Black Panther culture. Nearly twenty of his relatives belonged to the Party, adding a sense of normalcy to his engagement in learning political songs and writing to incarcerated Panthers – activities that might otherwise have been considered strange and “un-American” by his non-Panther peers.18 At the same time, however, his Black Panther lineage was also evidenced by what was deliberately absent from his family’s home: TV, nursery rhymes, and G.I. Joes.19 His parents’ decisions regarding what they would and would not expose their children to are revealing on at least two levels; on the one hand, their banning of television viewing suggests a level of regimentation and discipline within the Hilliard household. Secondly, David’s and Patricia’s prohibition of G.I. Joe toys may be understood as their unwillingness to accommodate symbols of the state in their home, a possible indication of the Party’s firm rejection of the U.S.’s involvement in the Vietnam War; a conflict the Party understood as an exercise in U.S. imperialism.
For other children of Black Power families, the wedding of Party and family life at times posed challenges for the existence of more intimate parent-child relationships. Ericka Abram, the daughter of former Party chairman Elaine Brown, recalls how her mother’s commitment to the working-class revolution at times led to a degree of physical and emotional distance between the two. Brown’s leading position often required her presence abroad, meeting with leaders of socialist and anti-colonial movements in places such as North Korea and China as part of the BPP’s efforts to build international coalitions.20 Still, even when the two shared the same living space, the frequent presence of Brown’s bodyguard often precluded Brown and her daughter from spending exclusive time with one another. For many years, theirs was more of a professional and politically-oriented relationship. After Brown’s departure from the Party in 1977, she and Ericka moved in together, thrust into a new situation in which they would both learn to exist as mother and daughter. Years later, in an interview with journalist, John Blake, Brown and Abram would remember it as an awkward experience because for so long, they had lived more like comrades.21
Ericka Abram was among many children of Black Power organizers whose early years were embedded in expressions of vanguard activism. To be sure, the theme of duty to one’s community appears regularly in biographical and autobiographical sources. At a young age, Ericka worked alongside Party organizers distributing food to local youth as part of the BPP’s Free Breakfast for School Children Program, one of the organization’s more than forty community service programs.22 Reflecting on her early grassroots work over thirty years later, Abram describes a duality to this phase of her life. Being politically aware as a child, she contends, was both purposeful and demanding. She notes, “Sometimes I didn’t want the responsibility of being awake. I just wanted to be like other kids. I wanted to watch cartoons.”23 Here, Abram’s understanding of her past echoes what Dorion Hilliard described earlier as an insulated childhood, one that was at once rewarding in its communalism, yet necessarily distinct from the daily operations of the more apolitical adolescence.
For other members of the second generation, their place in the socialist revolution was delineated even before birth. In July 1969, nearly one year into his life as a political exile, BPP Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, was joined in Algiers by his wife and BPP Communications Secretary, Kathleen Cleaver, who at the time was seven months pregnant with their first child.24The Cleavers named their son, Maceo, after the nineteenth-century Cuban revolutionary, Antonio Maceo, and on the day of his birth in Pissemsilt Algeria, The Black Panther announced that the Cleavers’ child would implement the Party’s ideals “until the pigs who enslave the world are wiped out from the face of the earth.”25 Witnessing his parents’ efforts in developing an international network of anti-colonial solidarity undoubtedly contributed to Maceo’s own budding consciousness of class disparity, and his role in the struggle against it. As an adult looking back on his early years, Maceo Cleaver asserts, “We knew we were freedom fighters. We realized that there were a lot of injustices and that it was our responsibility to speak up and say something about it.”26
The prioritization of the community over the individual that was central to Black Panther politics affected other realms of interpersonal relations as well. Beyond the ways in which communal thinking may have shaped children’s daily activities and self-awareness, the organization’s vanguard sensibilities also informed how individual members conceptualized parenthood. Again, the case of Elaine Brown and Ericka Abram serves as a useful example. Like many Black revolutionary Nationalists, Brown posited the overthrow of the ruling class as inherent to one’s parental duty. But the revolution never came. Abram contends that the disillusionment her mother felt upon leaving the BPP in 1977 stemmed both from an unrealized political project, as well as Brown’s feelings of parental failure. In an interview with John Blake, Abram says of her mother, “In her mind, she failed me because she didn’t change the world for me.”27 Brown adds, “We thought we were going to create something new or die trying. We didn’t think we would leave our kids right back where we started.”28
For some, collective parenting also involved collective forms of discipline. While Party members with children employed a range of disciplinary practices, memoirs and biographical sources suggest that it was not uncommon for Panther parents to experiment with non-punitive measures. Ericka Abram remembers instances in which she was asked to make amends with her peers after a dispute by writing essays on leading black figures such as Jackie Robinson.29 In this sense, some activists utilized discipline as a mechanism to expose the daughters and sons of members to the organization’s political education efforts. And, perhaps not surprisingly, parents themselves were not exempt from receiving such disciplinary actions. During her membership in the BPP’s Brooklyn branch, Safiya Bukhari often brought her daughter, Wonda with her to the Party’s office during long work days. When her comrades detected signs of parental neglect such as a diaper that was overdue for changing, Bukhari sometimes faced repercussions in the form of volunteer work assignments. On one occasion, her comrades tasked with cleaning a community members’ apartment. In another instance, after witnessing Safiya raise her voice in front of Wonda, Bukhari’s colleagues assigned her the job of writing an essay on Franz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.30
As the Party grew in membership by the end of the 1960s, conversations about the relationship between the Party, family, and parenthood assumed new forms. The BPP’s Chicago branch offers a telling example of the ways in which the personal was political for Black Power radicals. In 1972, the leader of the Chicago chapter, Audrea Jones, issued a position paper addressing both the recent growth in Party membership and the rising number of children born to Panther women. Reflecting her anxieties about the increased strain on Party resources which had been used to support members and their families, Jones advocated for a change in the organization’s policy concerning birth control and family planning. Specifically, she proposed a four-step program that would require all Panther couples intending to have children to communicate with “responsible members” of the Party’s Review Committee, which included the Finance Secretary, Personnel, and Ministry of Health. After assessing the “objective conditions” of a given couple under review, the Committee would present a recommendation to the Party’s Central Committee. Ultimately, the latter group would have the final say regarding whether or not a couple should proceed with plans to start a family.31
While Jones’ program never became official policy, only two years later Panther leaders did issue a mandate requiring all members to use birth control.32 Aside from what it reveals about the momentum gained in the Black Power Movement by the early 1970s, the proposed initiative is revealing on another level. At a time when the rhetoric of “genocide,” “sterilization,” and “annihilation of the black race” flooded the pages of The Black Panther, the organization implemented its own measures to curtail and regulate the sexual activity of its cadres. Ironically, the same people that the state actively sought to control through surveillance, incarceration, displacement and murder, became key sites through which the Panthers’ black revolutionary nationalism grew beyond its self-sustaining limits.
But while we may draw parallels between the organization’s introduction of a new politics of sexual and familial responsibility and concurrent state attempts to produce vulnerability among Black Panthers, there is a danger in equating these two phenomenon. While state agencies such as the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program operated with the intent to physically eradicate black militants, BPP efforts to curtail the birth rates of the second generation reflect one of several organizational strategies used to mitigate resource scarcity in order to sustain the Party and its programs. Rather than interpreting such family planning initiatives as reproductions of state efforts to extinguish Black Panther radicalism and its legacy, then, we might better understand these policies as examples of members’ attempts to preserve their capacity to serve their communities and build a more egalitarian world for future generations.
The Home and the State
As noted above, the Black Panther Party’s attempts to determine the conditions of the social reproduction of its cadres never occurred in isolation from similar state projects. Just as the home and family unit acted as important domains in which Panthers cultivated a unified black body politic bent on the overthrow of capitalism, so too did the state recognize these spaces as crucial to its own agenda of annihilating the organization. Government officials’ framing of the BPP as antithetical to a safe nation is perhaps best illustrated by J. Edgar Hoover’s multiple warnings to the American public that the Black Panther Party – and its Free Breakfast for School Children Program in particular – posed a primary threat to national security.33
But what did the state’s attempts to inscribe its own national borders mean for families of revolutionary socialism in the 1960s and 1970s? And in the context of social reproduction, in what ways did agencies like COINTELPRO and local police departments enter the Party’s intimate spaces while carrying out the state’s mission to eliminate black radicalism? Certainly, few sites of Panther activity were left untouched by the government’s repressive hand. Evidence of state penetration of the Party’s internal operations abounds in Panther memoirs, through symbols of wiretapped phones, parked police cars stationed outside of members’ homes, and household doors laden with police-fired bullet holes.34 A fuller understanding of Party-state relations, then, warrants an examination of those moments of government intrusion in the less publicly visible realms of BPP activity – particularly those spaces in which Party members fed, housed, educated, and socialized their kin.35
Certainly, children were not exempt from the monitored status that characterized so many BPP families. Targeted at home, at school, and in some cases, as members of exiled families, children became primary avenues through which government agents produced vulnerability and disruption within both the Party and its individual family units. David Hilliard offers one of the most insightful examples of the extent to which Hoover’s agency would go to obtain information about the Black Power organization. When the Hilliards’ six-year-old son, Darryl, was sent home from school for starting a fire in his classroom, administrative officials alerted Darryl’s parents that the school might press charges. When the family received a knock on their door one week later, they were greeted by a man in a business suit, his FBI badge in hand. Hilliard recounts that when the agent informed David that his son was at risk of facing serious charges, the man used the interrogation as an opportunity to survey the inside of their home. Angry and amused, Hilliard remembers thinking to himself, “In the face of the warfare I’m bracing for, this foolishness strikes me as really contemptible, pathetic.”36 After asking the agent if his threat of taking Darryl to trial was serious, Hilliard asked the man, “A six year-old boy? Is that how desperate you are? Worried about six-year-old revolutionaries?” Although Hilliard read the situation as a moment of embarrassment for the FBI agent, his question was not unfounded. Years later Hilliard would aver that the FBI and local police would “use every weapon in their arsenal to destroy the Party,” including children.37
At times, the state’s invasive measures intensified to such a degree that some activists no longer felt that Oakland’s public schools provided safe spaces for black youth. In fact, Hilliard and Seale were among the first Party members to withdraw their children from the Oakland Public School District after cases of their repeated harassment by teachers due to Seale’s and Hilliard’s political affiliations. Hilliard and Seale would also be the first Party members to enroll their children in the BPP’s newly established liberation schools.38 For the sake of brevity, I will not address the history of the organization’s alternative schools here. However, it is important to note that such political education initiatives, on many levels, exemplify the Party’s agency in determining the nature of the educational and social development of Oakland’s black youth. The Oakland Community School – the Party’s first and longest-running liberation school – for example, served as both a safe haven for scores of local children, and as a direct corrective to a white-washed public school curriculum which many Panthers felt alienated non-white children.39
Not surprisingly, the state’s intrusion into the personal realms of American black radicalism transcended national borders as well. Although most of his involvement with the BPP took place outside of the U.S., as the head of the Party’s International Chapter, Eldridge Cleaver was also fully aware of the precarious position of second-generation Panthers. As political exiles, the Cleavers underwent constant relocation, between and within nations, employing a range of tactics to protect the confidentiality of their family’s whereabouts. In a 2006 published collection of his writings, Eldridge recounts, “We had to be very secretive about where we kept our children, often keeping them in hiding places separate from where we were staying.”40 He adds, during the family’s nearly seven-year period in exile, he and Kathleen placed their son and daughter in hiding for one year.41 When these measures left Eldridge feeling vulnerable still, he went as far as lying to his children about his own identity. It was a failed attempt, however. After their father repeatedly stressed to Maceo and Joju that his was name Henry Jones, they refused to believe him.42
While the Cleavers’ case is by no means representative of the numerous Panther families that found political asylum abroad during the Party’s years of operation – the archives have left us with few sources detailing the experiences of such families – their trajectory offers a window into the complex and diverse nature of how mid-twentieth century black radicals negotiated family responsibilities and participation in the revolution. Analyzing the Cleavers’ experience in particular may further help to expand our understanding of how reproductive labor operated within Panther families. That Eldridge Cleaver’s efforts to protect his children from state repression assumed the form of a false identity suggests that for some, family development was a necessarily precarious and at times, alienating process.
Conclusion
While scholarship on the Black Panther Party has only recently begun to explore the organization’s spatial politics, few authors have situated the home and family unit as key sites of Party members’ class struggle. Just as public parks, government buildings, and the streets became central domains of Black Power activism, Black Panthers also utilized less obvious spaces to implement their brand of revolutionary socialism. Signs of the organization’s rejection of a capitalistic state, and Panthers’ attempts to wrestle control from the state in securing a future for their kin, can be seen in members’ parental practices, living arrangements, and in the socialization of the second generation. And as newspaper articles, memoirs, and state sources reveal, the state was not hesitant to infiltrate these spaces in its efforts to monitor Party operations. For it was precisely within these realms of social reproduction that the co-construction of the Panther vanguard and Hoover’s “American” nation materialized.
Comments
Collective spaces
My intention is to talk about social reproduction in the context of a specific social environment. Social reproduction versus the reproduction of individuals, public versus private, manipulated and regulated versus free and autonomous, frustration and solitude versus joyous cooperation.
I would like to use some informal notes to create a connection between the necessity to rethink and clarify the concept of social reproduction, and the need to create collective spaces in our cities.
It is necessary to think about these spaces as truly public and relational, putting together theories and practices of resistance experimented with during the crisis.
1. What do we mean by “social reproduction”? The reproduction of individuals is social in the sense of being controlled or manipulated, in a constant shift between public and private.
My intention is to talk about social reproduction in the context of a specific social environment. Social reproduction versus the reproduction of individuals, public versus private, manipulated and regulated versus free and autonomous, frustration and solitude versus joyous cooperation.
In Europe the reproduction of individuals is subject to a continuous fluctuation between “social” and “private.”1 The social is the space of direct manipulation, organized by laws, public expenditures, customs, and moral rules that crush the individual’s ability to desire. The private is coarsely idealized as the space of freedom, but in most cases it reveals itself as the dominion of neglect, misery, frustration, powerlessness, and loneliness.
The social forms of the reproduction of individuals do not coincide only with welfare (which, during Fordism functioned as a control mechanism for the reproduction of the labor force, while today it’s only a shadow of an expense on the public budget, reduced to insignificance). It is also the entirety of the ways in which a specific society views the relationship between sexes, as well as the development, growth, and formation of individuals.
Inside the narrative proposed by neoliberalism, individuals are portrayed as free of commitments and interdependencies, free to choose their own life, able to discover by themselves a reproductive balance, even if limited by the constraints of rigid norms.
Of course all of this produces a process of retreat into the private sphere, with the establishment of new hierarchies between genders, but also between citizens and migrants, beside the usual class divisions.
According to my point of view, a feminist point of view, the reproduction of individuals is entirely social, because it is always regulated and manipulated by the society and the state, even if it doesn’t always appear to be so. This control and manipulation is exerted upon the work that has historically been assigned to women, paid labor in the case of service work or free in the case of the “work of love.”2
In this moment of crisis that we are experiencing in Europe, the actual model of social reproduction is no longer sustainable and needs the push of strong and creative forms of experimentation, even when they might seem problematic.
If we start from re-defining reproduction as “entirely social” and performed by everybody, then it is possible to imagine new forms of collaboration, interconnections between the freedom of choice and the comfort of commonality, and projects of resistance on the issue of welfare and social activity, at least regarding the sphere of material reproduction.
2. Biological reproduction is social reproduction
The reproduction of individuals can be described in various ways: biological, material, emotional, cultural, relational. Obviously these various characteristics are produced by a society that is historically determined and in turn defined by them.
The primary trait, the one that has to do with the reproduction of the species, with the material actions of having children, with the physical reproduction of individuals – because it is merely rooted in biology, seems to be dissociated from the “social” and remain a private affair, a choice founded on love and freedom, more than ever today, when women in many countries have gained access to contraceptive and abortive choices.
Nonetheless, these choices are exactly what determines the social character of biological reproduction, which has been made “free” by laws that are sometimes limiting, sometimes badly enforced, and which often contain many restrictive clauses. The choices that are ascribed to the will of individuals are indeed conditioned more than what we think. Let’s take into consideration, for instance, the history of women’s struggles during the second half of the 1900s.
Even though incentives used to affect demographic changes in countries with a strong conservative regime, keen on protecting the “race” (such as Italy and Germany but also France during the 1930s), have very little if any impact at all, there are more subtle restrictions in situations where the freedom of choice of women might seem an accomplished fact: laws on abortion can be disregarded by doctors and healthcare professionals on the basis of conscientious objection, abortion clinics might close, cultural pressures from religious institutions in favor of a generic defense of life can create obstacles to informed choices, work and life conditions can be unfavorable to reproductive choices, and a general reduction in public expenditures and in social services can strongly affect the decision to have children. It is not a coincidence that the recognition of non-traditional families, from families recreated after a divorce to homosexual families, is more and more established and widespread. These families guarantee a model for bio-social reproduction that is modern but still inside the frame of the recognized and respected paradigm of the “family,” so that biological and non-biological reproduction can still be regulated by a set of socially determined norms.
Abortive and contraceptive practices, viewed as able to guarantee freedom to the female body, freedom regarding life choices as well as the times and modes of reproduction are, on the contrary, controlled and often subjected to strong legitimacy challenges.
The implementation of practices of control upon the sexuality of women, which has been widespread through history, has recently caused strong clashes at the international level and often led to judicial sentences condemning the “sexual freedom” of women in the case of rape and violence.3
This is how biological reproduction is conditioned and ends depending on social structures. It is very difficult then to separate it from what we usually call social reproduction and from the politics and power of the ruling classes.
3. The material aspect of reproduction, the historically unpaid work of women, which had been partially socialized by the Fordist welfare system, is again privatized and retreats into the realm of the single household during the crises.
Capitalism has always treated the work of care as labor. In fact, capitalists have always compensated it (bonnes, housemaids, wet nurses, butlers, servants, etc.), even while underpaying that labor and making it structural by inserting it in relationships of dependency, attachment, and belonging.4
Considered natural inside the framework of the gender based division of labor and the financial and domestic submission of women, not only by the middle classes but also by large stratas of the Fordist working class, care work has strongly influenced the strenuous struggles for emancipation led by the feminist movements of the 20th century.
Marxist feminism during the 1970s, in classifying domestic work as labor, has simply unveiled its mystical aspects – mystified by attachment, love, status and by the search for a socially codified and predefined role – including it among the basic components of primitive accumulation.5
Certain sectors of this work had been socialized by a form of welfare that was strictly connected to full employment, but with the crisis those expenses in the public budget that were destined to the assistance of vulnerable people have been drastically cut in Europe, and consequently we are moving towards more and more aggressive forms of privatization. The social organization based on the family structure, with inadequate and minimal public services, has been delegated to women, who have become unpaid service providers, so that all the work of care, of children, elderly and infirmed, has been charged on their shoulders.
Assuming then that the majority of reproductive work, unpaid or underpaid, has been and still is at the foundation of the process of capitalist accumulation, today, beside the rise in unpaid work – pushed back inside the household – a new organization of reproduction is being orchestrated, with minimum wages and total exploitation, through selective and divisive lines, between the citizen-mistress and the migrant worker. With the welfare system no longer functioning, it is the privatization that affects the poorest sectors of the population, because the needs of those who are not self-sufficient are absolute and can’t be put aside.
Women represent roughly 50 percent of the international migratory flux, according to the report compiled in 2013 by the United Nation Population Division.6 They are sought after for specific kinds of work: babysitter, housekeeper, caregiver, nurse or sex-worker; all kinds of work that have to do with the reproduction of individuals.
Even when professionally qualified, they are deemed fit only for care and domestic work, as those are considered typically feminine, so they are underpaid and isolated, confined to the house of their master or mistress.
To this picture it is necessary to add an additional factor, at least in the case of Europe, regarding the families of origin of the European migrant women, usually from Romania or Moldova: these are women who left behind at home a family in which the mother was absent and other workers, from Ukraine or Bielorussia, would sometime assist them in the work of care of children and elderly, thus creating an international migratory chain inside the market of reproduction. In addition, this aspect has to do with the material reproduction of individuals that, even if privatized, still presents strong social connotations related to the dominion and the exploitation of poverty.
4. Politics of economic reconciliation and cooperation do not address men and women equally and, in any case, do not offer real solutions because they are directed only to those who are fully employed. The crisis produces scarcity of goods and social relations but engenders also forms of cooperation that are independent from the state.
Feminist movements are still demanding that a portion of the reproduction of individuals (such as the care of children and elderly) be socialized. On the other hand, increasing the expenditure for social services or the organization of the work of care is not on the agenda in any of the states. In the European Union the general tendency is rather that of assigning the responsibilities of the work of care to the single household, through the use of a system of paid leave, even though this only applies to those who are fully employed.
The system of paid leave is traditionally viewed through a perspective that sees women as the main caregivers, while little attention is paid to the fathers or the grown children of dependent seniors. The most progressive approaches, like that of the legislation 2010/18/UE of the European Union, propose a gender neutral take on care work, where, when it comes to the care of children – but not to that of adults or elderly in need of assistance – both parents, if fully employed, can take paid time off (even though in practice it is mostly the mothers who take advantage of these opportunities, since their salary is usually lower than that of the fathers and it is thus compatible with the percentual reductions set up at state level. In the south of Europe there’s also a cultural stigma that works against the idea of fathers engaging in care work). Less popular, if more interesting, is the practice of mandatory paternity leave, parallel to the mandatory maternity leave for mothers, even though in many states it is only a few days’ time off. In any case, it is worth repeating that all these interventions are directed exclusively at those who are employed full time.
This is what the picture looks like today: waged labor, as dependent in its traditional forms on the protection guaranteed by public expenditures (and for which T.H. Marshall’s project of a social citizenship, constructed around the idea of full employment, should have allowed constant state funding) is disappearing.7 The progressive impoverishment of a large sector of the European population through unemployment (estimated at 28 million of unemployed in Europe, especially among the younger population), leaves a large number of vulnerable people without any social support. There is more suffering and the consequence is a considerable increase in the expenses of the single households – for instance to pay for health care or for professional caretakers (there are an estimated 700,000 private caretakers in Italy, and the average expenditure for their salary is 920 euro a month: almost 10 percent of the entire health care budget!) –- but especially increased hours of work for families (which means essentially for daughters, mothers, and grandmothers) who are taking care of the elderly and the disabled, the children, and all those who need it, including those same youths who are unemployed or have unstable jobs.8
The ideology of neoliberalism puts a lot of emphasis on the responsibility of the individual towards the choices and the risks of life. Today the good citizen is the self-made one (this goes together with the privatization of services and resources that used to be public). The achievements of the individual are put above any form of social aggregation. What so called neoliberalism really wants is to “liberate” capital from any responsibility towards the reproduction of the labor force; it wants to erase the last residues of those Keynesian policies that, to this day, still force the state to guarantee (even though less and less) certain levels of reproduction.
Women know from experience that nobody is ever self-sufficient in life, not in youth or in old age, not when infirm, not as male or female, worker or unemployed. In fact, the reproduction of individuals is at the foundation of social, economic, and political relationships and represents the only meaningful framework for coexistence.
The concrete base from which to start is then the ability to think of individuals as people with bodies, thinking of ourselves as interdependent, thus escaping the liberal abstraction of the self-sufficient individual (individual and not subject).
In these times of crisis, the scarcity of resources has as a consequence the creation of innovative forms of cooperative reproduction, mostly volunteer based, which nonetheless tend to constitute a free alternative to the deficiencies of welfare, socializing the costs of reproduction.
In addition, the material aspects of reproduction, weakened by the crisis, are being re-organized in collaborative forms – such as buying clubs, co-housing, car-sharing, flea markets, time banks, communal gardens, caregivers co-ops, and community clinics.
Two emblematic examples of this process in Europe are Spain and Greece, where it is possible to find forms of resistance to the crisis at the level of social reproduction, such as health care services offered by volunteer doctors, pharmacies that distribute drugs free of charge to those in need, or the PAH (Plataforma d’Afectats per la Hipoteca, or the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages, started in 2009 in Catalonia) which was able to spread its experiences and transformative momentum beyond the mere network of activists. Within the PAH, we face issues of housing, habitat, survival, and the vulnerability of the body.
The PAH was able to organize vulnerability and turn it into political action. In Greece and Spain they were able to mobilize the impoverished middle class, which the crisis of 2008 had put in a situation of precariousness. Bodies came out into the streets, and whole cities were turned into political spaces by their presence.
Forms of reproduction alternative to the market system or to the vanishing public services managed by the state, often can respond to immediate needs. The question is, are these interventions able to produce forms of social aggregation on a larger scale?
5. Can these forms of socialization substitute for the welfare system? Undoubtedly there are grey zones: often they are not transferable or cover small geographical and social areas; often they are utilized to make up for the deficiencies of the public sector. Nonetheless, many innovative projects are emerging.
It is interesting to see how the autonomy and the productive and cooperative abilities of the social fabric are often exalted as able to make up for the deficiencies of public services. In fact a strong ambivalence can be found both in forms of voluntary social work and in nonprofit organizations that operate within the area of the reproduction of individuals.
If on the one hand they represent extraordinary mechanisms of consciousness raising, on the other they are perfectly compatible with austerity policies, since they are means to socialize the costs of reproduction.
It’s not a coincidence that local governments are relying more and more, in the face of emergencies, on voluntary social work and nonprofit organizations. There is a concrete risk that the collectivization of the activities of reproduction could become just a way to manage poverty rather than a mechanism to reappropriate wealth.
There is evidence that protest movements, even the most radical of them, are not expressing themselves just with refusal, indignation, and attacks anymore. On the contrary, they are becoming more and more able to offer alternative solutions.9 They seem to be taking the form of an organization of the common, of forms of production and reproduction of life alternative to the market economy and to the state. Often they offer hybrid solutions, midway between the state and the market, with innovative contents.
The development of new means for the socialization of the costs of reproduction creates a space that can be imagined as existing between public and private, able to reintegrate bodies and their needs – those same bodies that are usually excluded from politics and formal democracy.
When it comes to the reproduction of individuals, the “common” is a reality mostly in fieri, of which we can foresee just a few aspects, and its projects unfold on a limited scale, often prompted by the necessity of survival. One of our most important goals is that of breaking the isolation in which the work of reproduction is today organized, isolation that affects mostly women and that becomes dramatic when they are taking care of those who are not self-sufficient, such as children, elderly, and the infirm.
Avoiding the emphasis on the feasibility of expanding these new forms of socialization, and even taking into consideration the difficulties of reinventing forms of relations inside the sphere of reproduction, it is possible to observe how these first experiments express a desire for community and a renewed possibility for the creation of social relationships and change.
Nancy Fraser claims that the political perspective that was originally meant for the democratization of the state and the empowering of its citizens is today used to legitimize the commodification and the disintegration of the social state. On the other hand, the outlook offered by a solidarity-based feminism could still be useful. The current crisis offers the possibility to expand that perspective, connecting the dream of the liberation of women with that of a society founded on solidarity:
First, we might break the spurious link between our critique of the family wage and flexible capitalism by militating for a form of life that de-centres waged work and valorises unwaged activities, including – but not only – care work.10
Secondly, it is important to separate labor from any notion of a well lived life, declaring the end of the model of Workfare, as it was already prefigured by some of the womens’ movements.
Actually, both liberal and socialist feminists subscribed to the typical capitalist devaluation of the work of reproduction, embracing, as the only path to emancipation, waged labor and the integration of women into the public sphere, exactly at the moment when it was the target of a serious attack by workers, both male and female, all over the world. Feminists abandoned any struggle inside the sphere of reproduction, thinking that, once fully integrated into the labor market, women would gain more social power.11
At the same time, what can be called “difference feminism” considered reproduction work as if it were ingrained in the nature of women, forgetting the conditions of exploitation in which it happens,turning it into an essentialist notion.
Defining reproduction as the fundamental source of capitalist accumulation, Marxist feminism made it possible to conceive of the possibility of an overturn towards a process of socialization that can revolutionize the actual conditions of neoliberal exploitation and emphasize the materiality of self-sustenance.
Sexual bodies, in order to survive and reproduce, need to be connected to one another. Individuals are not able to develop, live, or produce in solitude.
Compulsory relationships, typical of those unyielding structures of interconnection that were revolutionized by anti-authoritarian movements during the second half of the twentieth century, corresponded to the factory model, with its rigid and pyramidal organization. The diffuse design factory, the idea of work as incorporated into the fabric of our life, are concepts able to extract freedom from control, subsuming it into a superior instance. Relationships develop remotely, become ethereal, incorporeal; our communication, even when voice and facial expressions are included, doesn’t include the body, it’s bidimensional. It is then necessary to reestablish elements of materiality also in the reproduction of individuals.
6. It is possible to reinvent new parameters for the reproduction of individuals, intrinsic to its own transformation and with a radical innovation of its contents. On the other hand, if we fail to consider the needs of those who are not self-sufficient and the work necessary for the care of bodies and relationships, we will continue producing forms of socialization tragically characterized by inequality.
The reproduction of individuals is not just material reproduction. There is a necessary “work of love,” a work to be done for the care of relationships, which was annihilated by the process of individualization promoted by neoliberalism.
I wonder if it’s possible to grasp, in the general tendency that promotes the defense of the common and the collectivization of material reproduction, possibilities that go beyond its mere value for resistance, enriching it with potentials for the creation of new forms of relationships. This would make the practices of social reproduction more open to question and less mechanic. Most importantly, it would require a substantial modification of the theories surrounding the process of transformation, the relationship with politics, and the enunciation of practices.
The main focus should be directed at those who are not self-sufficient, that is, children, the elderly, infirm, the poor: these people depend on relationships that cannot be managed on an emergency basis or only rely on the goodwill of volunteers. If we take the needs of these subjects as a starting point, a real change in the social reproduction of individuals becomes more practical.
It is necessary to come up with ambitious projects, making theories available to those who need to put them into practice, in order to create real change. A change in the dynamic of relationships but also a change in the connections between knowledge and power.
There are theories and proposals able to formulate projects for new forms of social reproduction, respectful of the relationship between genders, of the physical presence of weak and vulnerable bodies, of the conjunction between theoretical knowledge and the needs of individuals: these are theories surrounding the notions of home, the city (the urban space), the common, the health care system.
It is necessary to make an effort, both on the theoretical and the practical level, to think and then actualize forms of collective welfare, taking into account the possibilities implied in the promotion of a social recomposition, the increase in solidarity based exchanges and, most importantly, beyond just wanting to re-appropriate our wealth, the need for solidarity towards vulnerable subjects. It is necessary to try and establish an alliance between juridical culture and social movements, between practices of self-care and the medical profession, between living in urban spaces and dreaming of a city meant for living bodies.
We could ask ourselves if it’s possible to create a connection between public and collective, material reproduction and relationships of attachment, interdependency and the free expression of subjectivity, acknowledgement of differences and the tension towards equality.
A first example of a possible restructuration of the dynamics of social reproduction is in the area of health care, where the primary filter is that of the work of care. But that needs to overcome the prejudices of a normative notion of well being, dependent from the protocols and the diktats of the pharmaceutical industry, creating interactions between patients and healthcare providers founded on a notion of health that is not medicalized, dependent on drugs, routinized, pathologized, treated as an emergency, but rather as a place of resistance and transformation of the conditions of our existence.12
Women have already opened a critical discourse around health and the use and configuration of public health care infrastructures. On the issue of abortion, European movements recently unified under the slogan “I decide,” which implies the right of self-determination and the access to a secular notion of reproductive health. Female doctors started focusing on sexualized bodies, launching a practice of medical care based on gender, with specific attention to differences. Even though the relationship between professionals, services, and social movements reveals the existence of institutional and practical limitations that are hard to recompose, this seems to be a possible open path for the transformation of social reproduction.
A second example could be that of the city, the metropolis. In a recent interview, Toni Negri describes the metropolis as equivalent to what the factory was for older generations, and the home as a residential machine for living and working inside a digitized city, in which existing and producing are inextricably interconnected.13 Life and survival are thus tied together, even though it is possible to identify some areas of disenfranchisement if compared to the total control of factory work. In this home-machine, exploitation coexists with a few possibilities for liberation/emancipation both for men and women, who could reclaim a base income as a form of compensation for the productive but especially for the domestic aspects of their work.
The spatial configuration of the city around work, production, and the placement of the bodies of the workers is now different from the model described in Revolutionary Road, in which monofunctional conglomerates defined the places of reproduction, while production happened in places isolated and separated along class and gender lines.14
If it’s true that this separation (a specific space for men at work and one for reproduction reserved for women) has disappeared today, according to Negri – in the process that sees the mechanization of the home for productive purposes and the emancipation of women from domestic work, made possible by the progress in new technologies (even though he fails to demonstrate this point. The only thing he proves is that domestic work,the basic work of reproduction,has changed) – what happened to the spaces of the common, the spaces for the reproduction of social relations?
The most prevalent architecture in a city should be the one that includes health care structures, libraries, pre-schools, schools, public art galleries, museums, and recreational facilities – all buildings and spaces where the exchanges are not monetary and where, at the moment, the majority of people working are women. The urban public sphere is the place par excellence, where non-market mediated exchanges can take place; a safe place for exploration, education, and rest. It is the place where it’s possible to experiment with democracy.
It is necessary to create spaces in which the most vulnerable subjects can coexist; spaces that are truly public, where it would be possible to spend time without having to buy anything; spaces for playing that are not sport fields, where there would be room for dreaming and exploring.
The city is a common, a place where social reproduction happens. The urbanized space reflects the lifestyle of its inhabitants and it is at the same time the container for the forms of communication recognized and accepted by the community. Public squares and recreational spaces instead of residential neighborhoods, social services that are effective and accessible, the creation of new forms of aggregation, the construction of a society where self-sustenance happens in a collective space.
In public spaces bodies can meet, with their limitations, their different needs; in public spaces it is possible to create interdependent forms of life, reinvent a cooperative sort of reproduction.
Creating an urban collective space can open the possibility for finding alternatives to the notion of neoliberal individualism, starting from the free expression of diverse subjectivities, and from an awareness of mutual interdependencies.
The sexual body represents a critique of the standard subject of the social contract, subject of rights and politics, inside the frame of liberalism (a subject supposed neutral, self-sufficient, free of commitments and relationships, signified only by its capacity to choose rationally, on the basis of a utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits), and opens up a path for the possibility to recognize sexualized singularities, limited bodies, and the need for relationships and collaboration. If this narrative has to become a form of socialization, since it is about the reproduction of individuals, it cannot be limited to the abstraction of theories, it must find spaces where it would be possible to practice and reinvent new forms of social reproduction. This is about a radical transformation of our lifestyle, it is about conquering spaces of freedom and practices of equality that include the expression of diverse forms of subjectivity and the acknowledgement of different and universal forms of interdependency.
– Translated by Fulvia Serra
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Decolonial Feminist Economics: A Necessary View for Strengthening Social and Popular Economy
The crisis of the relation between human well-being and the capitalist economy is clear. Societies in the so-called core countries of Europe and the United States are facing the persistent deterioration of their living conditions while the capital generated by large corporations and the financial system is ever more concentrated.
The unemployment, vulnerability, and poverty faced by a large part of society in countries that used to be situated as winners on the world stage, have shown the limits of an economic theory in the service of the market. The well-being of human beings and the integration of the whole of society has been neglected by the neoliberal focus on economics of recent decades, which places the satisfaction of needs at the level of the individual, consequently, economic theory has been oriented toward the proper functioning of markets.
In Latin America, the perspectives of popular economy and social economy have challenged the individualist paradigm, focusing on the satisfaction of collective needs. Their conceptual developments result from the region’s particular context and history, thereby breaking with the universalist pretensions of orthodox economics and revealing the historical character of economic processes as well as the heterogeneity of its practices.
Feminist economics develops a similar critique of the constitution of a profoundly “male-centric” economic rationality, which privileges behaviors associated with competition and individualism, values that under patriarchy have been assigned to men. In contrast behaviors of solidarity, care, and reciprocity are considered to be extra-economic and feminine within the same gender regime.1
The interaction between feminist economics and social and popular economy reveals the importance of non-market settings, as well as understanding the different contributions and needs of women and men in this scenario. These include, for example, spaces associated with care and activities of reproduction, the existence of a multiplicity of economic practices rooted in knowledges constructed from ethnicity, gender, and territory. Therefore, their contributions expand the scenarios and alternatives for public policies that revalue existing practices.
The first part of this article briefly presents definitions of popular and feminist economics, to show how the interaction between these fields can contribute to the formulation of public policies in the city. In the second part, I make recommendations for public policy that challenge market enclosure, based on the revalorization of non-commodified settings, the continuity between production and reproduction, and the affirmation of the common.
Popular Economy: A Theoretical Contribution from Latin America
From the hegemonic perspective in the region, the principle objective of economics has been modernization. Therefore, non-capitalist economic practices have been addressed through concepts associated with underdevelopment and informality, highlighting the necessity of “overcoming” economic forms rooted in people’s historical experience and their culture, in the hybridization of the campesino and the urban worlds. Faced with this diversity, development programs, these being the generalization of the capitalist ethic, were formulated.
Anchored in political processes and the recognition of existing practices, the concepts of popular economy and social economy were developed. Although diverse approaches exist, there are common points associated with the existence of a reproductive rationality (instead of an instrumental rationality) that orients diverse expressions of labor, whether in the production of use-values or exchange-values, in opposition to activities oriented toward profit as the goal in and of itself.
The concept of the popular economy does not have a uniform meaning. Razeto defines it as the economy of the poor, who, to deal with exclusion, generate associative social forms to resolve the most pressing problems from their own initiatives and to deal with exclusion from the state.2 On the other hand, Núñez links the popular economy to associative work and cooperatives, in the rural as well as the urban environment.3 He considers that all workers are producers and that their activities are not oriented toward capitalist accumulation, but rather the resolution of personal and social needs. For this author, to the extent that the capitalist system is incapable of including broad sectors, those sectors find association and self-management as alternatives to resolve their everyday problems, but also to develop cultural expressions that challenge the practices and values of capitalism.
From another perspective, Coraggio, defines the popular economy as a heterogeneous and fragmented sector that cannot be understood in its complexity through the traditional concepts of informality or poverty, nor through its equivalence to the concepts of the traditional social and solidarity economy.4 He emphasizes the labor capacities of its members independent of their employment status and highlights the reproductive purpose of their processes and the organizational forms transcending kinship ties. Coraggio takes a critical perspective toward the popular economy associated with subordination based on gender, generational distinctions, and income differences, among others. Therefore, he believes that through processes of self-management, association, and forms of self-governance, practices of the social and solidarity economy can be consolidated, oriented by social reproduction proposing alternatives to the market-centric society driven by capitalism.
Gaiger, coinciding with Coraggio, states that “communitarian popular solidarity” does not have the qualities that Núñez and Razeto attribute to it, in which economic performance is marked by survival and immediacy; he argues that many of the popular economy’s activities (self-employment, micro-enterprises, family agriculture, etc.) are marked by subordination and vulnerability, which leads to the need to generate the associative practices characterizing the social and solidarity economy5
Despite these difficulties, elements of the popular economy’s dynamic are capable of being empowered to construct a sector focused on freely associated and self-managed labor, with the production of surplus connected to people’s living conditions.
The recognition of domestic units as constitutive elements of the popular economy– and, in turn, a way of finding a common thread with the issues of the feminist economy – owes its view of economic action to the framework of relations of reciprocity and not individualism.6. Members of domestic units turn to different strategies of hybridizing resources, combining wage labor and domestic reproductive labor (activities of care and production for household consumption), or production for the market, among other strategies. Another characteristic of the popular economy is that its accumulation levels are not unlimited and its goal is the intergenerational reproduction of its members.
The relationships that are woven to resolve common (material and symbolic) needs and their complexity increases as formal expressions of labor become scarcer and an innumerable amount of practices of communities emerge to maintain their lifestyle.7
However, domestic units, different from the conceptualization of the family in neoclassical economics – which was profoundly critiqued by feminist theory – is not proposed as a conflict-free setting, but as a space where there are rules of distribution and reciprocity with the objective of reproducing all of its members. This is reflected in the way in which women are mainly responsible for carrying out activities of care and producing use-values without remuneration. The shared goal of reproduction of all of its members coexists then with inequalities based on gender, age, income, etc. within each domestic unit and the popular economy as a whole.
From Fragmentation to Association
Analyses of the popular economy are framed in the field of Social and Solidarity Economy [SSE] that critiques the response that consumption is the only way to meet human needs. This limitation is the result of the totalization of private property and the institutionalization of the self-regulating market, which does not integrate an important part of the population. Thus, the market excludes vast sectors of the population, that have the capacity to work but cannot find remunerated activities to occupy them, and, therefore, cannot access needed goods and services because those are commodified.
In the neoclassical definition, the market is the only institution capable of coordinating economic initiatives and satisfying the needs of individuals, thus the intervention of any other institution is considered “extra-economic.” From the perspective of the SSE then it is about strengthening and developing a multiplicity of institutions for the economy’s development, where the market is not the only one considered possible.
The popular economy’s fragmentation presents the challenge of establishing collective processes, which would exceed the current adaptation to the conditions of savage competition for small and medium producers and of monopoly for the large corporations. The market left to its own becoming inevitably configures scenarios that exacerbate all inequalities.
Regaining sovereignty over the economic field implies a change of axis; in other words, it means primarily dealing with the material and social conditions that make life possible and the social transformations required to access said conditions.
The incorporation of a reproductive rationality occurs through linking the spheres of the public/private and the productive/reproductive. On overcoming these separations, which were artificially instituted by the conception of the self-regulating market, it goes from a maximum value of selfishness – guiding action in the economic – to incorporating values and rationalities that include solidarity and association. The first recognizes that the option for the life of the other is constitutive of the option for one’s own life, and the second is an alternative for breaking with the destructive compulsion and anomie entailed in the individualist competition of the market economy.8
Interdependence with the other generates a common framework between the popular/social economy and feminist economics, as they coincide in their critiques of the utilitarian paradigm and in the reformulation of the rationality that orients action in the economic.
Why is it Necessary to Talk about a Feminist Economics?
Feminist economics, in contrast to what common sense would suggest, is not the study of the economy and women: it is the study of how the economy, in its theoretical development and policies is embedded by gender relations to the point that one of its principal institutions, the labor market, is organized by the sexual division of labor. This current questions how men and women participate differently in the institutionalization of the economy.
Considering feminist economics as a reflection by women and for women has been an effective mechanism for ignoring the critiques that this field makes about the theoretical nucleus of the hegemonic economics., Thus the relevance of their contributions to the construction of an other economy or the development of an other society is made invisible. This field emerged in response to the conceptual limitations of a discipline that makes the same assumptions of universality and neutrality as the scientific paradigm.
Economic theory has been presented as gender-neutral although its prototypical agent, homo economicus, has been endowed with values associated with masculinity: self-sufficient, competitive, selfish, and calculating, its actions are developed in the public sphere of the market, while the non-economic sphere of the family has supposed generosity, solidarity, and equality.
This dichotomous vision in neoclassical theory is rooted in Becker’s perspective, who explains the situation of women facing reproductive tasks as a problem of efficiency and the maximization of resources.9 Feminist economics has widely debated this perspective, demonstrating its male-centric and heterosexist bias.10
The assumption of the rational economic man has been one of the pillars of neoclassical economic theory, which proposes it as a norm of human behavior and as a mechanism for ensuring the proper functioning of the competitive market. The adoption of this behavior as the ideal does not recognize behaviors based on other relations, such as those of reciprocity, solidarity, altruism, love, and care, among many others – those that, furthermore, patriarchal culture in capitalism associates with the universe of the feminine.11 Thus, a fictional separation is established between the logics that govern behavior in the market, considered a public sphere, and the home, relegated to the private sphere.
This pretense of universality assigned to homo economicus and its instrumental rationality, as the assumption of human beings’ relationship with the economy, is another one of the discussed aspects because it denies the presence of other types of behaviors that make up the market, such as solidarity, reciprocity, and concern for others.12 Such conducts are present in many of the previously mentioned popular economies. Feminist economics, on demonstrating that the reproductive sphere is inherent in the process, has deepened the analysis of the consequences of limiting the economic to the sphere of the market.
The conceptual development associated with homo economicus and its instrumental rationality is a perfect expression of how economic theory has internalized the values of patriarchy, to consider human beings’ dependence on care and protection for their institutions as extra-economic.
Capitalist hegemony in the organization of production, distribution, circulation, and reproduction, within and outside of the family, is closely linked to gender assignment. Patriarchy has produced a hierarchization of the social values of the feminine and the masculine. Hence, access to resources for production and reproduction would be framed by the place that men and women are assigned within patriarchal culture. One expression of this is the different activities and remunerations that women and men can access in the labor market.
That is not to say that inequality between men and women is reduced to economic determinism, but that market tendencies are socially processed, worsening or improving the situation in response to other relationships that are not structurally economic.
Therefore, one of the key contributions of feminist economics is redefining the concept of labor, given that the vision of “the reproductive” and of “care,” in their different dimensions, allows for those activities that are not directed by the market, without which human life would be impossible, to be included within “the economic.” Thus, one of the field’s current objectives is to make visible the value produced by care activities through their quantification in terms of wealth generation.13 In its reports, CEPAL has been showing that without the care work carried out by women, poverty in the region would increase by approximately ten points, and it has estimated that non-paid domestic work would amount to 30% of the region’s GDP.14
This perspective of feminist economics deepens the analysis of the contradictory and complex existing relationships between capitalism and reproductive labor. It shows that women are responsible for human life, ensuring that the production of goods is possible. This work, carried out without remuneration, encourages the wage paid by capitalists and public spending by the state to evade the costs of reproducing labor power and, thus, a part of the activity carried out in the home would not be the final moment of enjoying consumption, but a condition of existence of the economic system.15
The relation between popular economy and feminist economics shows that the naturalization of the reproductive as a feminine responsibility, and the separation between production and reproduction, generate conditions of structural vulnerability for these initiatives. The recognition and strengthening of the conditions for care are then a central factor for its sustainability.
Viewing popular and social economy from the perspective of reproduction breaks with the imprisonment of the economy in the market characteristic of neoclassical theory and expands the possibilities of action for organized actors and for those public policies committed to life and not to capital.
Contributions of a Decolonial Feminist Economics for the Formulation of Public Policies
I have been outlining approaches to popular economy, social and solidarity economy, and feminist economics, showing how these fields share a critique of the totalization of the market. Feminism argues that recognizing the importance of domestic labor and care mostly carried out by women is fundamental for resolving the artificial separation that capitalism imposes between production and reproduction. Likewise, social economy emphasizes a reproductive rationality in opposition to the ideal of competition and calculation, while highlighting the importance of use-values for meeting social needs.
The historical experience of Latin America and of Bogota in particular necessitates a decolonial perspective that makes explicit the need to investigate the political and economic processes that groups in conditions of subalternity in the region have faced. I am specifically interested in uncovering the economic experiences of indigenous, Afro-descendent, peasant, and low-income women to think from their economies rooted in knowledges constructed by situations of class, race, and territorial origin.16 In these economies, men and women’s participation is also differential. The hegemonic theory has naturalized the masculine, white, and European or North American position, therefore that diversity has been addressed based on categories of backwardness, informality, promoting an ideal of modernization that actively made those experiences subaltern. In this way, it has denied their theoretical relevance and importance in the economy.
Radically Situated Thought
This article has been written in the context of a country in the midst a peace process with one of the oldest actors of the multiple wars that Colombia has experienced. The peace process is necessary to stop the bloodshed, the war business with the United States, and the extraordinary benefits held by the country’s armed forces. In addition to the necessary debate over an economy in the service of the security of investors and the families in power whose roots go back to colonialism.
Despite the peace process, the longest war has been that of the Colombian elites against the population through plundering its resources. One verification of this is the untimely urbanization/proletarianization of a country with a strong rural identity. This process is exemplified by analyzing the composition of twentieth-century cities.
In 1938, 31% of the Colombian population was urban. In 1973, this figure had reached 73%. For thirty years, this forced proletarianization was achieved by the displacement of the peasant population to cities through means of terror.17 The height of this process occurred with the 1948 assassination of the liberal party’s presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, who, with a majority of popular support, had been denouncing the violence against the population. A year before his assassination, 14,000 violent deaths had already been recorded, and following the event known as the Bogotazo, Aprile-Gniset calculates that 300,000 people were killed and three million campesinos were displaced between 1946 and 1965.18
The victims of this war have been concentrated in low-income sectors, campesino, indigenous and black populations. This longer term perspective is necessary for understanding the power of these economies and what it means to remain as a community in its own territory in the context of forced urbanization.
The dispossession of lands from those living in rural areas has continued to this day and it is estimated that five million people, about 10% of the country’s total population, have been displaced by the war. Forced displacement is key to understanding why land ownership in Colombia has a concentration of 0.87 (Gini indicator), one of the highest in the world’s most unequal continent.
The majority of the displaced population ends up in the large cities to safeguard their lives and Bogotá is the main recipient of this internal displacement. It is the country’s largest city with more than eight million inhabitants and its urban history is profoundly linked to the exodus of the campesino population.
Due to these historical factors, Bogotá has a particularly heterogeneous social and cultural composition. The city’s popular economy hosts a population with diverse trajectories of urbanization seeking improved living conditions. This population is attracted by a city with the economic and social infrastructure to offer comparatively better conditions, but that is also home to large impoverished sectors because of war and the social exclusion generated by decades of neoliberalism steadily implemented by national governments.
The magnitude of the social problems facing the city demonstrates the relevance of the many groups’ experiences in their capacity to guarantee collective reproduction, the decommodification of central aspects of their lives, and the defense of the territory where they live.19
Strengthening Non-Market Situations
In the economic field, all imagination regarding the question “What is to be done?” has been captured by the market relation. Most of the policies developed in support of the popular economy are focused on facilitating the process of integration into the market, without considering intervention on the conditions of a competition that is more acute for those who don’t have a dominant position in the system of privileges that capital produces, while the actors with the highest level of accumulation set the conditions of exchange for their products.
As we have seen, the popular economy’s organizational units (domestic units), as economic organizations aim to guarantee and improve the material conditions of reproduction and development of their members. Therefore, the mercantile path (selling with a monetary difference to buy useful goods and services to satisfy their needs) is not the only alternative to be taken into account. Needs can be met independently of the market.
Hinkelammert and Mora write:
The analysis of use-value looks at the economic process from the perspective of the conditions of possibility of life. It formulates, therefore, the question of how the product must be produced, distributed, and consumed so that human beings can live, that is, how the process of reproduction can be achieved in terms of a process of reproduction of human life. This does not imply reducing the human to the product (‘you are what you eat’), but it does mean that no human value can be realized if it does not enter into symbiosis with use values.20
Recuperating the production of use-values, whose consumption is not mediated by the market as an objective for strengthening the micro-social units, as well as the whole of the popular economy, contributes to recognizing that there are capacities of labor that in the present are not being valued in monetary terms. This implies that broad sectors of society cannot contribute with their work, nor can they depend on an income for meeting their needs. A dwelling protects although it is not produced as a commodity, clothing warms although it is not commercialized. Goods can be driven by social function that they supply and not by profit.
At the limit, the commodification of life makes it so that one cannot live without income or rent. The current development of capitalism considers a good part of the capacities of labor as excess and not useful for capital. Therefore, well-being cannot be a result of the becoming economic of the market liberated by neoliberalism, especially when the accumulation of profits is increasingly the fruit of speculative activity.
This tendency of the economy intensifies the conditions of injustice for sectors that historically faced greater inequalities, in the case of women, for example, the production of use-values takes on a central importance, given that in Colombia 31.1% of women lack an income compared to 12.6% of men. In Latin America, the figures are similar: 34.4% for women and 13.3% for men, according to the 2010 measurement by CEPAL’s observatory for gender inequality.
Defending economies producing use-values can be one of the keys for a more just society. In particular, because many of these economies tied to the land and its resources have suffered the constant pressure of capitalist modernization and the violence of primary and/or extractivist accumulation. This pressure has caused an over-representation of the black and indigenous population, of popular sectors, and in particular of women in the lowest income sector of the population.
While there are many policies that can be implemented to strengthen the production of use-value, I will mention some illustrative cases based on the principles of institutionalization of the economic proposed by Karl Polanyi and expanded by Coraggio in the field of the social and solidarity economy that broadens the income rates of capital and dispossesses groups of the necessary conditions for their material and symbolic reproduction.21
Autarky/sovereignty: In this section, I highlight policies that favor self-production of goods and services in the domestic units, for example:
Experiences of urban agriculture, community gardens, and seed exchanges.
Processes of appropriating knowledge in the field of natural medicine, prevention and care of allopathic medicine.
Housing improvement and self-construction.
Reciprocity and exchange: One of the decisive elements for strengthening use-values is linked to the form of circulation, in these cases networks based on reciprocity are a key factor in the movement of goods and services. The development of mutually agreed upon rules and of the distribution of goods and activities is fundamental in a society with a high social division of labor. The characteristics of the depersonalizing market in its capitalist form have downplayed the importance of the points of commerce as places of encounter and of relation beyond the monetary surplus. By tradition or resistance in the face of the crisis of the reproduction of life, the networks of direct barter or social currency (thus called because it does not meet the objective of accumulation) have resurfaced and are very useful for the exchange of diverse material goods and services and have encouraged participants to fulfill the dual role of producers and consumers.
Planning: An expression of the capacity to regain sovereignty over the economic is linked to the possibility of coordination at different institutional levels and in a communitarian way, and planning over time how one wants to live and the economic actions that support those plans. The possibility of decommodifying the basic scenarios of life, can lead to promoting the production of collective use values in those fields.
Practices of the Social Economy in Colombia
In Colombia, a multiplicity of experiences of the social economy exist despite the virulence of the armed conflict. It is impossible to draw a complete picture in such little space, however I will name a few experiences that are relevant for demonstrating the ability to organize an economy at the service of life.
In the Colombian Pacific, the black population’s struggles made possible a law that recognizes those communities’ ancestral rights. The extension of legally titled collective territories is approaching 5.5 million hectares. This recognition has allowed for limiting the projects of resource extraction and biodiversity that the World Bank has been promoting in the region. Arturo Escobar has rigorously shown how this population collectively regulates the use of space and the relation with nature combining the spiritual ordering, traditions, and necessities. The symbolic and cultural interpretation has implications for how these communities use and manage the territory, allowing them to co-exist with a nature that is endowed with power and agency.
In Escobar’s words:
The construction of the natural world established by black groups of the Pacific, as shown by ethnographers, may be seen as constituting a complex grammar of the environment or local model of nature. This grammar includes ritual practices such as the ombligada, structured uses of spaces, an ordering of the universe in terms of worlds and levels, and systems of classification and categorization of entities. The model constitutes a cultural code for the appropriation of the territory; this appropriation entails elaborate forms of knowledge and cultural representations […] Accordingly, the environment is a cultural and symbolic construction, and the way in which it is constructed had implications for how it is used and managed.22
Similarly, the indigenous regional organization of Cauca, called the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) was founded in 1971 in Toribio, with the goal of making such rights recognized. This organization started with a platform of struggle with the following objectives: To recuperate and expand the lands of the reservations, to strengthen the indigenous councils, to not pay the terraje, to make known the laws about the indigenous and demand their fair application, to defend indigenous history, language, and customs, to train indigenous professors to educate in accordance with the situation of the indigenous people and in their respective languages.23
This process has been strengthened over the years and today a variety of projects in all areas of life are being developed, ensuring a high level of autarky in terms of the resolution of material and symbolic necessities. Despite the ongoing violence and assassinations of its principal leader that the government, the army, the paramilitary, and the guerrillas have carried out on the Cauca’s indigenous populations, the strengthening of their organization has not only allowed for maintaining the territory but also for promoting alternatives to development and challenging the government’s neoliberal policies, in particular the signing of the free trade agreement with the United States.24
An emblematic expression of this process was the march that began in 2004 with the name “El Caminar de la Palabra” and that mobilized more than 60,000 indigenous people from throughout Colombia, who, in their long journey to Bogotá, were joined by a diverse range of social movements. They marched for six months without asking for anything from the government and demanding four fundamental points: 1) “No to the transnational economic model represented by the free trade’ agreement; 2) No to the terror and war that displaces and subdues people; 3) No to legislation of dispossession that hands over territories and destroys the Mother Earth; 4) Yes to to the enforcement of compliance with agreements with the people; and Yes to creating our own mechanisms of participation through an agenda of popular unity.”25 The organizational capacity brought into play and the process that later continued under the name of indigenous and popular minga demonstrated indigenous people’s ability to denounce the correlation between the neoliberal model and the war and displacement.26
In the present moment, a new occupation of lands is taking place. Beginning in December 2014, after the state’s failure to comply with granting land as reparation for the victims of the 1991 Nilo massacre, the indigenous took over lands in the north of Cauca that are destined for the monoculture of sugarcane for the production of sugar and biofuels. The bloody repression has left hundreds of people injured and various indigenous leaders assassinated, however the indigenous population maintains its presence with strong support from the country’s social movements.
The town of Nasa in Cauca not only has had the capacity to maintain its territory and its identity, but also has been actively proposing arrangements of construction with the black, campesino, and urban population, demonstrating the possibility of organizing a society with full respect of Mother Earth and all forms of life that inhabit it.
An Economy that Cares
Public policies’ emphasis on the conditions of reproduction is key for guaranteeing the sustainability of a popular economy that has as its main objective the conditions for the good life of its workers and domestic units.
The prevalence of market values over human and planetary life led the care of people to be situated in the policies of the field of “the social,” considered residual and as compensation for the market’s exclusionary and discriminatory effects, and which increasingly focuses on the most disadvantaged, individualizing the interventions. Thus, families, and particularly women, with their available resources, end up taking on the problems of reproduction as if they were problems of the private order and as managers of assistance programs.
The tension between the logic of profit and social well-being has been made explicit by structural adjustment programs, which show how the reduction in state spending (in programs that do not address social emergencies) has corresponded to the transfer of costs to households that are faced with the increase of mostly feminine free labor. This has reached its limits, with the insufficiency of atomized actions to reproduce the population and produce cohesion in society being evident.
Therefore, the socialization of reproduction needs entails that the state and the capitalist sector also assume the responsibilities that included citizens and skilled workers imply. Thus, it is about theoretically and practically incorporating a reproductive rationality that integrates production and reproduction, understanding as the economic process as a whole.27 This reproductive rationality replaces the utilitarian logic of homo economicus and is related to the proposals being formulated in Ecuador and Bolivia tied to Buen Vivir.
The perspective of la Buena Vida and its reproductive rationality allows for formulating a non-anthropocentric politics of care, given that land is considered a subject of reciprocity (if we protect her, she cares for us). At the same time, it opens a communitarian dimension of autonomy, collective self-organization that expands the alternatives for thinking about the politics of care.28
Toward the practical strengthening of the popular economy, it would be about promoting spaces for the increasing self-management of reproduction but with substantial resources and capacity for decision-making. Noting that in neoliberalism the responsibilities for care have been placed on communities (one example of this are the communitarian mothers), it is a question of not replicating the logic of compensation or co-participation that extracts the associative capacity and transformative power of the initiatives from women, organizational processes, and the most fragile sectors, thus depoliticizing reproduction to inscribe it in the rationality of the projects that expand the power of the market to the detriment of life.29
It is about promoting a public policy that recognizes the option for the life of the other as constitutive of the option for one’s own life, not only as a mandate of care for women, but as an alternative for institutionalizing an economy that cares for us. This supposes significant redistribution of resources and productive capacities, but also empowering the spaces of the constitution of critical popular collective actors and with another project of the economy.
The Space of the Common in the City
The creation of spaces for the common is one of the principal contributions to the construction of a city conducive to the popular economy. This means encouraging settings for reflection, deliberation, and exchange, as well as places for production and reproduction without the market’s mediation.
In the urban sphere, the common has been understood from the logic of the public. However, in many experiences “the common” does not coincide with the governmental, because there are ways of using space or knowledges that problematize the idea of property.
One example of this is the experience of recuperated factories in Argentina, where workers, given the breach of labor obligations and the threat of losing their jobs, appropriate the infrastructure to guarantee their job positions and produce without a boss. A large number of these spaces integrate neighborhood necessities into their own surroundings and, while they maintain their manufacturing activity, they also develop cultural, recreational, and educational activities.30
In this regard, the challenge lies in imagining legal forms that shelter and encourage collective practices of possession or use rights. These initiatives demonstrate the limits of regulatory frameworks oriented toward a polarity ranging from the public (understood as tied to the state) to the private, which is insufficient for the development of a social economy connected to the diversity of existing needs and possible responses that the associative can produce.
The definition of places of the common should not only be the outcome of technical planning, the activation of neighborhood histories, the routes between the rural and the urban, and the re-elaboration of identities related to the productive enable the recuperation of spaces and also the invention of new places.
Following the 2001 crisis in Argentina, as the result of the deepening of neoliberal policies, poverty rose to 40% of households in 2002, an unprecedented event in the country’s history. In this situation a diversity of experiences of the social and solidarity economy emerged and were strengthened, and many of them are still being maintained and growing. The phenomenon of the recuperated factories and enterprises continues today: the Productive Union of Worker-Managed Enterprises has recognized 350 companies employing 25,000 people.
These experiences continue as self-management of spaces of the common, in some cases with some level of (national) state recognition and in other cases with opposition (from the local government). There are many examples, such as food markets oriented toward the social economy, where food products made by cooperatives and small organic producers are sold.31 There are also practices of large-scale, cooperative and self-managed, housing construction among many other experiences in the production of goods and services as well as in the sphere of care (particularly in the areas of childcare, health, and education).32
These diverse experiences demonstrate the common has as its objective the resolution of needs through a plurality of collective economic forms. In all the cases, it has to do with securing the means for life outside of the market. The management of these spaces has been approached from a political perspective, not without tensions and contradictions, but that has given rise to forms of decidedly democratic organization and regulation where the principle of horizontality characterizes the set of initiatives.
In Colombia there are organizational processes that have enabled the conformation of networks of communitarian trade that mainly connect the production of the campesino economy with the needs of urban domestic units. The associations that compose these networks are small productive units that make decisions through assemblies. Among the most well known are REDESOL, RECAB, the Federación Agrosolidaria, the Red Colombiana de Comercialización and Desarrollo Comunitario REDCOM Nariño. REDESS operates at the national, composed of sectors of the solidarity economy from across Colombia (cooperatives, mutual societies, and some associations).
The Empresa Comunitaria de Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo is found in Saravena, Arauca. Given that the privatization of public services has been a national state policy in Colombia and that in most cities the payment of these services is one of the main costs for the reproduction of domestic units, the organizational process that allows the emergence of of this initiative is emblematic, especially if improvement in the service’s quality and a just price are valued.
The city of Bogotá faces extensive challenges, while many of the named networks are present in the city, the principal economic activities are dominated by large multinational companies. The continuity of leftist governments in the city has allowed for keeping various city services public, for example, strengthening primary and secondary education, policies of community soup kitchens, and resources for strengthening popular economies, above all in the dimension of technical assistance.
However, the free market’s legitimacy in economic discourse, the idea that international integration is more important than strengthening the internal market, and the sacralization of private property are factors that limit the city government’s initiatives aiming to regulate the market and even decommodify the essential conditions of reproduction, such as the recognition of the right to water and gratuitous vital consumption, the implementation of a new trash collection model in the city that involved the creation of a public operator, taking a profitable business away from the private sector. These policies were attacked to the point that the business lobby caused the temporary overthrow of a democratically elected mayor.
Therefore, one of the principal challenges facing the city consists of politicizing and democratizing the debate around “the economic,” recovering the social construction of the economy, relating the policies of strengthening domestic units in this field instead of presenting them from the social or the struggle against poverty. Intervening in the economy, broadly understood, beyond the market, is also a right of citizenship that should fuel public debate in the city.
Therefore, the view accustomed to seeing the economic from the market perspective might consider the diversity of experiences previously considered as utopian, however, even when capitalism is the dominant mode of production, it is not the only one that exists. In fact, in Colombia the strength of social movements and the ability to sustain and reformulate struggles in the face of continuous processes of primary and extractivist accumulation, the financialization of housing, gentrification, etc. show that the economic institutions associated with the diverse world of indigenous groups, Afro-descendants and blacks, campesinos and the popular, have been capable of finding forms of social organizing where the reproduction of the collective has put limits on the war and its logics strictly associated with profit.
These experiences, which are maintained and are reinvented, have much to teach us. The broadening of spaces of the common for the social economy increases its power to restrict the market’s expansion in respect to the scenarios for life and limits the fragmentation and survival that imposes the logic of profit on the popular economy. Finally, an economy that cares for us, is an economy that has freed itself from the narrow space of the market.
– Translated by Liz Mason-Deese
This article was originally published in L’économie sociale et solidaire: levier de changement, Vol. XXII, no. 2 (2015).
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Domestic Workers’ Rights, the Politics of Social Reproduction, and New Models of Labor Organizing
“Labor has to recognize us as a force. And how do you do that? Maybe it’s developing a union of our own.”
– Carolyn Reed
In the 1970s, a powerful movement for domestic workers’ rights emerged on the national political stage. Through their organizing, African American household workers argued for the inclusion of housework and social reproduction in the larger politics of wage labor and made a case for the centrality of this occupation to capitalism. These black working-class feminists claimed that household labor was essential for the maintenance of human life, and pushed for expanded monetary benefits and federal labor protections. The movement’s broader definition of labor, as well as its distinctive approaches to mobilizing a precarious labor force, offers new models of worker organizing that speak to some of the challenges facing the contemporary labor movement.
The organizing efforts undertaken by household workers have critical implications for our engagement with the history of the labor movement. Labor unions rarely reached out to domestic workers, in part because they believed that domestics were unorganizable, but also because the unions’ very definition of labor simply did not include household employment. The approach adopted by many industrial unions in the first half of the 20th century was premised on a manufacturing model. Workers were organized in large-scale collective spaces—usually a factory floor—and went on strike to wield leverage against their employer. Through such actions, some workers won better wages, pensions, and health and vacation benefits from employers.
While effective in large factory settings, this model is less applicable in the contemporary moment. Over the past few decades, there has been a rise in precarious labor in the United States, with a greater proportion of workers employed on a part-time, subcontracted, or temporary basis and with more workers who change employers or occupations frequently. Coupled with this is a decline in manufacturing jobs and an expansion of the service sector, which has mushroomed in part because families and households are increasingly outsourcing the labor of social reproduction to wage-laborers. Families buy prepared food, hire landscapers, or purchase the services of care workers instead of doing this work themselves. A growing number of workers are in the food industry, health care, and personal or home care—occupations that are more likely to be populated by women and people of color. Employment insecurity has been compounded by attacks on unions, fewer pension and retirement benefits, and a shredding of the social safety net.
American workers today are in a more unpredictable situation than 50 years ago. They are not guaranteed unemployment and workers’ compensation, paid vacations, and sick leave. Workers tend to be more dispersed and employed in isolated settings, where it is harder to organize. They are more likely to be classified as independent contractors or temporary workers. And they are more likely to work for multiple employers over the course of their working lives, rather than for a single employer.
While these economic changes may seem indicative of the neoliberal shift, certain categories of employment in the United States have always experienced this kind of insecurity. Household labor has historically been precarious, characterized by part-time, intermittent work with few benefits. Household workers operated essentially as independent contractors, changed employers frequently, and had little job or income security. They were excluded from labor protections in the 1930s and marginalized by organized labor. The domestic workers’ rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s rectified some of these exclusions, and offered a precedent and possible model for mobilizing an insecure labor force.
While there have been some advances, the occupation of household work is still precarious. Over time, household workers have won access to social security benefits and the federal minimum wage, but they are still excluded from the National Labor Relations Act and Civil Rights laws. And even when workers are legally covered, those laws are not always enforced. Domestic workers today are overwhelmingly immigrant women who are often unaware of their rights, may not be fluent in English, and may be undocumented, and thus are more likely to be legally exploited. Furthermore, paid private domestic work is still largely unregulated. In these ways, this sector of the American workforce has always experienced conditions akin to what other wage workers have come to encounter in recent decades under neoliberalism.
So as we ponder how to organize precarious workers, we may learn something from those in the domestic workers’ rights movement. Household labor has rarely been considered a site of resistance and organizing. The work of social reproduction that household workers engage in—cooking, cleaning and caring—is often not considered economically productive labor, because of its association with women’s unpaid housework. Because women have done this work for centuries without pay, it tends to be viewed as a “labor of love” not meriting competitive compensation. The location of the work in the home also makes it harder to recognize it normatively as work. Furthermore, because the paid workforce has been made up of low-wage immigrants and women of color, the social value attached to this labor is minimized; and it is a dispersed workforce, in which the number of employers may exceed the number of employees, making strikes an unlikely labor tactic. In the postwar period, despite these difficulties of organizing, a national movement for domestic workers’ rights emerged which won important protections for the occupation and transformed the social standing of African American household workers.
Origins of Domestic Worker Organizing
African American women have a long history of being confined to the occupation of paid household labor. They were the primary domestic labor force during slavery and in the post-emancipation South. After World War 1, with the Great Migration and the curtailment of European immigration, they became the predominant household labor force in nearly all regions of the country. By World War 2, the association of African American women with household labor was firmly solidified in the stereotypical “mammy” figure—a content and loyal household worker who always chose her employer’s family over her own.
Belying the stereotype, of course, African American household workers were not content and loyal, and resistance was common. It often took the form of individualized, day-to-day opposition to work expectations, such as refusing to do certain kinds of tasks or refusing to live-in. But household workers also organized collectively. As Tera Hunter has recounted, African American washer women in Atlanta in 1881 formed a washing society and went on strike to demand higher rates for their labor.1 In the 1930s, a number of domestic worker organizations were formed to counter the rise of what journalists Marvel Cooke and Ella Baker called “slave markets,” where African American women stood on street corners to be hired as day laborers. Cooke and Baker described the experiences of these domestic workers: “Under a rigid watch, she is permitted to scrub floors on her bended knees, to hang precariously from window sills, cleaning window after window, or to strain and sweat over steaming tubs of heavy blankets, spreads and furniture covers. Fortunate, indeed, is she who gets a full hourly rate promised. Often, her day’s slavery is rewarded with a single dollar bill or whatever her unscrupulous employer pleases to pay.”2 In the postwar period, given the context of black freedom organizing, African American women began to more systematically challenge the racialized nature of the occupation and the notions of servitude that characterized domestic service. In the 1960s, household workers established local organizations to demand higher wages, contractually-based employment, federal labor protections, and recognition of the value of their work.
Geraldine Roberts grew up in Arkansas and attended segregated schools. She left home at a young age, married, moved to Cleveland, and divorced. As a single mother, she had little opportunity to complete her education and ended up doing domestic work. As a domestic, she was not treated like a worker with rights, but as a servant whose body was the property of her employer. She described one job interview when an employer, after examining Robert’s teeth, told her: “Any girl… with a mouth this clean and pretty clean teeth was a pretty clean gal ’cause I don’t like dirty help in the house.”3 The story conjures up images of the slave auction block where slaves’ physical health, including their teeth, was closely examined by potential slave buyers. Roberts recounted the way employers routinely used physical separation to maintain a racial hierarchy: “There was a back room that was the bathroom, that would be the bathroom for myself and… other household employees… all black, and we were all told to use that bathroom, and to never use the family bathroom.”4 Roberts became involved in the civil rights and black power movements and drew parallels between Jim Crow segregation and the racialized nature of household labor. In 1965, she started the Domestic Workers of America to mobilize other household workers in Cleveland.
In Atlanta, Dorothy Bolden rode the city bus lines to recruit workers for her new organization, the National Domestic Workers Union of America (NDWUA). Bolden began domestic work at the age of nine. When the civil rights movement emerged, she worked closely with Martin Luther King and members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee to ensure equal access to education in Atlanta. But it was her organizing of household workers where she made a name for herself. In 1968, she established a city-wide organization that insisted on a minimum wage of $15 a day plus car fare, and developed standards for the occupation.
In 1971 Roberts, Bolden, and other household workers formed the Household Technicians of America (HTA), the first national organization of household workers. The name of the organization indicated their commitment to reframe domestic work as a professional occupation that requires skill and should be treated the same as all other forms of work. With the help of middle-class women in the National Committee on Household Employment (NCHE), an organization of employers dedicated to reforming the occupation, six hundred mostly middle-aged African American women met in Washington, D.C. to hammer out the details of their new organization. The HTA connected workers’ groups from around the country, served as a national voice for this labor constituency, and fought for professionalization, a federal minimum wage, and respect for the work they did.
Revaluing Household Labor
The core of the domestic workers rights’ movement was fundamentally defined by a demand for greater respect and recognition for household labor. Most household workers believed that their mistreatment, low wages, and lack of labor rights were rooted in the normative devaluation of household labor. Consequently, they made claims for the importance of this work. Dorothy Bolden, for example, worked in other occupations, but she loved domestic work and wanted to bring to it the recognition that she believed it deserved. She initiated an annual “Maids Honor Day,” in which employers wrote nomination letters explaining why their maid should be named Maid of the Year. “The purpose of this event,” the NDWUA announced, “is to recognize and honor outstanding women in the field of domestic labor, for their courage and stability, and the remarkable ability of being able to take care of two households at one time.”5
The movement’s campaign for federal minimum wage protection also illustrates the effort to revalue household labor. Members of the HTA and their allies in the NCHE testified before Congress to extend the federal minimum wage to household workers and rectify the inequality built into labor law during the New Deal. Domestic work was one of the occupations excluded from federal labor protections in the 1930s. At a moment when labor leaders and government officials had come to an agreement that American workers should be assured minimum wages, overtime pay, unemployment and social security benefits, certain key occupations were outside the purview of labor laws. A race and gender hierarchy already existed among different types of work, but New Deal labor legislation reinforced and institutionalized it through the passage of laws that protected certain workers but not others. This, in combination with a powerful labor movement limited by a particular conception of work rooted in the male-dominated manufacturing sector that did little to organize household-based and other marginalized workers, further heightened divisions within the American working class.
In their testimony in the early 1970s, members of the HTA and their allies presented their vision of the importance of household labor and the need for this occupation to be treated the same as all other work. Edith Barksdale Sloan, an African American civil rights activist who headed the NCHE and facilitated the formation of the HTA, said her in her testimony that domestic work should be afforded the same rights of social citizenship and New Deal benefits as other occupations: “Pay must be increased to provide a livable wage… workers must receive the so-called ‘fringe benefits,’ which long ago stopped being ‘fringes’ in every other major American industry. At this time, household workers usually do not receive paid sick leave, vacations, or holidays. Coverage under unemployment and workmen’s compensation is extremely limited and varies widely from state to state.”6 These views were echoed by Carolyn Reed, a domestic worker and organizer based in New York: “I feel very strongly that I contribute just as much as my doctor contributes, you know. And that because he is a doctor does not make him better than me, as a household technician.”7 In 1974, Congress finally passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that federally guaranteed minimum wage for domestic workers.
Feminist Alliances
The domestic workers’ rights movements developed alliances with some strands of the women’s movement that were also trying to bring recognition to social reproduction. Their efforts to revalue household labor paralleled similar theoretical discussions taking place in some feminist communities. Feminists in the 1960s, however, were a diverse group with different and competing positions. Many middle-class women who had been confined to the domestic sphere and felt constrained by their roles as mothers and housewives began in the 1960s to seek more opportunities outside the home. This sentiment was best expressed by Betty Friedan in her seminal book The Feminine Mystique. Friedan wrote about “the problem that has no name” and struck a chord for millions of housewives around the country who had eschewed careers to make family and home the center of their lives, but felt deeply dissatisfied and unfulfilled. In making her claim for more opportunities outside the household, however, Friedan denigrated household labor. As she wrote: “Vacuuming the living room floor—with or without makeup—is not work that takes enough thought or energy to challenge any woman’s full capacity.”8
Other feminists sought, like household workers, to revalue household labor. Welfare rights activist made a claim for government assistance to support them in their work as mothers and insisted on the right to stay home and care for their children at a moment when the state was becoming more demanding about requiring women on welfare to take paid employment outside the home.9 The wages for housework movement, which included women like Selma James, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and Silvia Federici, attempted to reclaim housework as legitimate labor.10 Rather than seeing women’s employment outside the home as the only path to liberation, they advocated attaching a wage to it as a way to revalue the work and compensate women. This argument was rooted in an understanding that wages were a measure of labor’s worth in a capitalist economy. Moving domestic labor from the unpaid to the paid category, they believed, would bring social value and recognition to the work. Although this was a legitimate argument, the experiences of paid domestic workers offer a different perspective. Some domestic labor had been commodified since the emergence of capitalism. As domestic workers repeatedly attested, a wage, in and of itself, did not raise the status of the work.11
Nevertheless, activists in both the wages for housework movement and domestic workers’ rights movement had a common goal of drawing attention to household labor—both paid and unpaid. Reed supported Social Security for housewives as a way to recognize that work, claiming, “they can all become household technicians.”12 At a moment when many African American women as well as middle class women were fleeing household labor in search of other job opportunities, women in the HTA and the wages for housework movement chose to stay and expressed love of the work they did. As Reed explained: “I really love the work, and that’s why I chose to organize the work—because I love what I chose to do as a profession.”13
Challenging the long-standing home/work distinction that emerged with the rise of wage labor, the campaigns that domestic worker activists engaged in and the ideas they articulated illuminate how the work that takes place in the home is not a labor of love, but a form of labor exploitation that both reflects and recreates structures of power. When black domestic workers were denied the right to use the family restroom or expected to eat their food at a separate table, racial distinctions and racial hierarchies were remade. Activists drew attention to the work that took place in the home, a space that is often not considered a site of work. They argued that the way this work was allocated and valued was centrally important. Unequal power relations in the home, whether between husband and wife or between employer and employee, reproduce inequality along race, class and gender lines.
New Organizing Model
The domestic workers’ rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s suggests ways that the contingent workers of today can begin to organize. Because their place of employment was not a viable location to recruit members, household workers organized in public spaces. Rather than the factory floor, city bus lines, public parks, and neighborhoods became the sites of organizing. Workers formed collective community-based organizations even though they worked for different employers. They did not establish employer-oriented labor formations but directed their demands at the state, insisting that legislation be passed that would protect all workers in the industry. They also organized workers regardless of their immigration status. They sought to professionalize the occupation and raise the overall standards of allowable work—refusing, for example, to wash windows or scrub floors on their hands and knees. Questions of race, gender, and culture were central to the organizing, as the above particularities of African American women’s history attest. These constructs became a way to build solidarity among domestic workers.
The domestic workers’ rights movement also complicates assumptions that employers should be the primary targets of labor organizers. Household workers labored in the intimate space of the home. They were privy to a family’s personal matters and sometimes developed emotional bonds with their employer’s family. Although employees organized to wield more leverage and power, they did not necessarily want an antagonistic relationship with their bosses, since they would continue to work in close quarters with them. Many household worker activists developed collaborative relationships with employers and encouraged the creation of employer organizations to support their movement.
The domestic workers’ movement’s emphasis on revaluing forms of social reproduction resonates especially at a moment when good-producing industries account for less than 13% of U.S. employment.14 Valuing the paid and unpaid work of social reproduction, whether it is that of fast food workers, landscapers, home care workers, or housecleaners, is the first step to considering them part of the labor movement and including them in our conversation about how worker power can transform the economic climate.
The distinctive organizing approach that domestic workers adopted emerged from the particular character of the occupation. Other occupations, including Uber drivers, nail salon workers and day laborers are similarly self-employed, with few labor protections and less secure employment. The growth of these occupations is an example of how the workforce is increasingly coming to resemble domestic work. Unsurprisingly, these kinds of contingent workers are also organizing and leading the way to a redefined labor movement. The tactics and strategies utilized by household workers might not be applicable to all industries, but they suggest alternative models of organizing and new ways for workers to come together and wield power.
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How Not To Skip Class: Social Reproduction of Labor and the Global Working Class
“…labor-power is a commodity which its possessor, the wage-worker, sells to the capitalist. Why does he sell it? It is in order to live.”
– Karl Marx, Wage, Labor and Capital
Since its very formation, but particularly since the late twentieth century, the global working class has faced a tremendous challenge – how to overcome all its divisions to appear in ship-shape in full combative form to overthrow capitalism.1 After global working class struggles failed to surmount this challenge, the working class itself became the object of a broad range of theoretical and practical condemnations. Most often, these condemnations take the form of either declarations or predictions about the demise of the working class or simply arguing that the working class is not longer a valid agent of change. Other candidates – women, racial/ethnic minorities, new social movements, an amorphous but insurgent “people,” community, to name a few – are all thrown up as possible alternatives to this presumed moribund/reformist or masculinist and economistic category, the working class.
What many of these condemnations have in common is a shared misunderstanding of exactly what the working class really is. Instead of the complex understand of class historically proposed by Marxist theory, which discloses a vision of insurgent working class power capable of transcending sectional categories, today’s critics rely on a highly narrow vision of a “working class” in which a worker is simply a person who has a specific kind of job.
In this essay, I will refute this spurious conception of class by reactivating fundamental Marxist insights about class formation that have been obscured by four decades of neoliberalism and the many defeats of the global working class. The key to developing a sufficiently dynamic understanding of the working class, I will argue, is the framework of social reproduction. In thinking about the working class, it is essential to recognize that workers have an existence beyond the workplace. The theoretical challenge therefore lies in understanding the relationship between this existence and that of their productive lives under the direct domination of the capitalist. The relationship between these spheres will in turn help us consider strategic directions for class struggle.
But before we get there, we need to start from the very beginning, that is, from Karl Marx’s critique of political economy, since the roots of today’s limited conception of the working class stem in large part from an equally limited understanding of the economy itself.
The economy
The allegations that Marxism is reductive or economistic only make sense if one reads the economy as neutral market forces determining the fate of humans by chance; or in the sense of a trade-union bureaucrat whose understanding of the worker is restricted to the wage earner. Let us here first deal with why this restrictive view of the “economic” is something that Marx often criticizes.
Marx’s contribution to social theory was not simply to point to the historical-materialist basis of social life, but to propose that in order to get to this materialist basis the historical materialist must first understand that reality is not as it appears.2
The “economy,” as it appears to us, is the sphere where we do an honest day’s work and get paid for it. Some wages might be low, others high. But the principle that structures this “economy” is that the capitalist and the worker are equal beings who engage in an equal transaction: the worker’s labor for a wage from the boss.
According to Marx, however, this sphere is “in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham.” In this one stroke Marx shakes our faith in the fundamental props of modern society: our juridical rights. Marx is not suggesting that the juridical rights we bear as equal subjects are nonexistent or fictive, but that such rights are anchored in market relations. The transactions between workers and capitalists take the form – insofar as they are considered purely from the standpoint of market exchange – of exchange between legal equals. Marx is not arguing there are no juridical rights, but that they mask the reality of exploitation.
If what we commonly understand as the “economy” is then merely surface, what is this secret that capital has managed to hide from us? That its animating force is human labor.
As soon as we, following Marx, restore labor as the source of value under capitalism and as the expression of the very social life of humanity, we restore to the “economic” process its messy, sensuous, gendered, raced, and unruly component: living human beings capable of following orders – as well as of flouting them.
The economic as a social relation
To concentrate on the surface “economy” (of the market) as if this was the was sole reality is to obscure two related processes:
the separation between the “political” and “economic” that is unique to capitalism; and
the actual process of domination/expropriation that happens beyond the sphere of “equal” exchange.
The first process ensures that the acts of appropriation by the capitalist appear completely cloaked in economic garb, inseparable from the process of production itself. As Ellen Meiksins Wood explained: “So…where earlier [precapitalist] producers might perceive themselves as struggling to keep what was rightfully theirs, the structure of capitalism encourages workers to perceive themselves as struggling to get a share of what belongs to capital, a ‘fair wage,’ in exchange for their labor.”3 Since this process makes invisible the act of exploitation, the worker is caught in this sphere of juridical “equality,” negotiating rather than questioning the wage-form.
However, it is the second invisible process that forms the pivot of social life. When we leave the Benthamite sphere of juridical equality and head to what Marx calls the “hidden abode of production”:
He, who before was the money-owner, now strides in front as capitalist; the possessor of labor-power follows as his laborer. The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other, timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but – a hiding.4
Marx emphasizes here the opposite of “economism” or “free trade vulgaris” as he calls it. He is inviting us to see the “economic” as a social relation: one that involves domination and coercion even if juridical forms and political institutions seek to obscure that.
Let us pause here to rehearse the three fundamental claims made about the economy so far. One, that the economy as we see it is, according to Marx, a surface appearance; two, that the appearance, which is steeped in a rhetoric of equality and freedom, conceals a “hidden abode” where domination/coercion reigns and those relations form the pivot of capitalism; hence, three, that the economic is also a social relation, in that the power that is necessary to run this hidden abode – to submit the worker to modes of domination – is also by necessity a political power.
The purpose of this coercion and domination, and the crux of the capitalist economy considered as a social relation, is to get the worker to produce more than the value of their labor power. “The value of labour power” Marx tells us, “is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner [i.e., the worker].”5 The additional value that she produces during the working day is appropriated by capital as surplus value. The wage form is nothing but the value necessary to reproduce the worker’s labor power.
In order to explain how this theft occurs every day, Marx introduces us to the concepts of necessary and surplus labor time. Necessary labor time is that portion of the work day in which the direct producer, our worker, makes value equivalent to what is needed for her own reproduction, surplus labor time is all of the remaining work day where she makes additional value for capital.
This ensemble of conceptual categories that Marx proposes here form what is more generally known as the labor theory of value. In this ensemble, two core categories that we should particularly attend to are (a) labor power itself: its composition, deployment, reproduction and ultimate replacement; and (b) the space of work, i.e. the question of labor at the point of production.
Labor power: the “unique commodity” and its social reproduction
Marx introduces the concept of labor power with great deliberation. Labor-power, in Marx’s sense, is our capacity to labor. “We mean by labour-power or labour-capacity,” Marx explains, “the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind.”6 Obviously, the capacity to labor is a transhistoric quality that humans possess irrespective of the social formation of which they are a part. What is specific to capitalism however is that only under this system of production, commodity production becomes generalized throughout society and commodified labor, available for sale in the marketplace, becomes the dominant mode of exploitation.7 Thus, under capitalism, what is generalized in commodity form is a human capacity. In several passages Marx refers to this with the savagery that such a mutilation of self deserves: “The possessor of labour-power, instead of being able to sell commodities in which his labour has been objectified, must rather be compelled to offer for sale as a commodity that very labour-power which exists only in his living body.”8
Further, we can only speak of labor power when the worker uses that capacity, or it “becomes a reality only by being expressed; it is activated only through labour.”9 So it must follow that as labor power is expended in the process of production of other commodities, thereby “a definite quantity of human muscle, nerve, brain, etc.,” the rough composite of labor power, “is expended, and these things have to be replaced.”10
How can labor power be restored? Marx is ambiguous on this point:
If the owner of labour-power works today, tomorrow he must again be able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a working individual. His natural needs, such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary according to the climatic and other physical peculiarities of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are themselves the product of history, and depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilization attained by a country; in particular they depend on the conditions in which and consequently on the habits and expectations with which, the class of free workers has been formed.11
Here we falter and sense that the content of Marx’s critique to be inadequate to his form. There are several questions the above passage provokes and then leaves unanswered.
Social Reproduction Marxists and feminists, such as Lise Vogel, have drawn attention to the “production” of human beings, in this case, the worker, which takes place away from the site of production of commodities. Social Reproduction theorists rightly want to develop further what Marx leaves unexamined. That is, what are the implications of labor power being produced outside the circuit of commodity production, yet being essential to it? The most historically enduring site for the reproduction of labor power is of course the kin-based unit we call the family. It plays a key role in biological reproduction – as the generational replacement of the working class – and in reproducing the worker, through food, shelter, and psychical care, to become ready for the next day of work. Both those functions are disproportionately borne by women under capitalism and are the sources of women’s oppression under the system.12
But the above passage needs development in other respects as well. Labor power, for instance, as Vogel has pointed out, is not simply replenished at home, nor is it always reproduced generationally. The family may form the site of individual renewal of labor power, but that alone does not explain “the conditions under which, and…the habits and degree of comfort in which,” the working class of any particular society has been produced. What other social relationships and institutions are comprised by the circuit of social reproduction? Public education and health care systems, leisure facilities in the community, pensions and benefits for the elderly all compose together those historically determined “habits.” Similarly, generational replacement through childbirth in the kin-based family unit, although dominant, is not the only way a labor force may be replaced. Slavery and immigration are two of the most common ways in which capital has replaced labor within national boundaries.
Relatedly, let us suppose that a certain basket of goods (x) is necessary to “reproduce” a particular worker. This “basket of goods” containing food, shelter, education, healthcare, and so on are then consumed by this mythical (or some would say universal) worker to reproduce herself. But does the size and content of the basket goods not vary depending on the race, nationality and gender of the worker? Marx seemed to think so. Consider his discussion of the Irish Worker and her/his “needs” as compared to other workers. If workers lowered their consumption (in order to save), Marx argues, then they would “inevitably degrade…[themselves] to the level of the Irish, to that level of wage laborers where the merest animal minimum of needs and means of subsistence appears as the sole object and purpose of their exchange with capital.”13
We will have occasion to discuss the question of differential needs producing different kinds of labor powers later, for now let us simply note that the question of reproduction of labor power is by no means a simple one. As we can see there is already intimation of a complex totality when considering Marx’s “hidden abode of production” and its structuring impulse on the surface “economy.” Marx’s original outline, enriched now through the framework of social reproduction of labor power, thoroughly complicates the narrow bourgeois definition of the “economy” and/or “production” that we began with in fundamental ways.
Beyond the two-dimensional image of individual direct producer locked in wage labor, we begin to see emerge myriad capillaries of social relations extending between workplace, home, schools, hospitals – a wider social whole, sustained and co-produced by human labor in contradictory yet constitutive ways. If we direct our attention to those deep veins of embodying social relations, in any actual society today, how can we fail to find the chaotic, multiethnic, multigendered, differently abled subject that is the global working class?
The twains of production and reproduction
It is important in this regard to clarify that what we designated above as two separate spaces – (a) spaces of production of value (point of production) (b) spaces for reproduction of labor power – may be separate in a strictly spatial sense but they are actually united in both the theoretical and operational senses.14 They are, particular historical forms of appearance, in which capitalism posits itself. Indeed, sometimes the two processes may be ongoing within the same space. Consider the case of public schools. They function both as work places or points of production and also as spaces where labor power (of the future worker) is socially reproduced. As in the case of pensions, so in the case of public health or education, the State outlays some funds for the social reproduction of labor power. It is only within the home that the process of social reproduction remains unwaged.
The question of separate spheres and why they are historical forms of appearance, is an important one and worth spending some time on.
A common misunderstanding about “social reproduction theory” is that it is about two separate spaces and two separate processes of production: the economic and the social – often understood as the workplace and home. In this understanding, the worker produces surplus value at work, and hence is part of the production of the total wealth of society. At the end of the workday, because the worker is “free” under capitalism, capital must relinquish control over the process of regeneration of the worker and hence the reproduction of the workforce.
Marx, however, has a very specific understanding and proposal for the concept of social reproduction.
First, this is a theoretical concept he deploys to draw attention to the reproduction of society as a whole not only with the regeneration of labor power of the worker or reproduction of the workforce. This understanding of the theater of capitalism as a totality is important, because at this point of the argument in Capital Volume 1, Marx has already established that unlike bourgeois economics that sees the commodity as the central character of this narrative (supply and demand determine the market), it is labor that is its chief protagonist. Thus what happens to labor – specifically, how labor creates value and consequently surplus value – shapes the entirety of the capitalist process of production. “In the concept of value,” Marx says in the Grundrisse, capital’s “secret is betrayed.”15
Social reproduction of the capitalist system – and it is to explain the reproduction of the system that Marx uses the term – is therefore not about a separation between a non-economic sphere and the economic, but about how the economic impulse of capitalist production conditions the so called non-economic. The “non-economic” includes among other things, what sort of state, juridical institutions and property-form a society has – while these in turn are conditioned, but not always determined, by the economy. Marx understands each particular stage in the valorization of capital as a moment of a totality that leads him to state clearly in Capital: “When viewed, therefore, as a connected whole, and in the constant flux of its incessant renewal, every social process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction.”16
This approach is best outlined in Michael Lebowitz’s Beyond Capital. Lebowitz’s work is a masterful integrative analysis of the political economy of labor power, in which he shows that understanding the social reproduction of wage labor is not an outer or incidental phenomena that ought to be “added” to the understanding of capitalism as a whole, but actually reveals important inner tendencies of the system. Lebowitz calls the moment of the production of labor power “a second moment” of production as a whole. This moment is “distinct from the process of production of capital” but the circuit of capital “necessarily implies a second circuit, the circuit of wage-labor.”17
As Marx sums it up, rightly, and with a bit of flourish:
The capitalist process of production, therefore, seen as a total connected process, i.e. a process of reproduction, produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other the wage-labourer.18
Here, by social reproduction Marx means the reproduction of the entirety of society, which brings us back to the unique commodity, labor power, that needs to be replenished and ultimately replaced without there being any breaks or stoppages to the continuous circuit of production and reproduction of the whole.
There is a lot at stake, both theoretical as well as strategic, in understanding this process of the production of commodities and the reproduction of labor power as unified. Namely, (a) we need to abandon not just the framework of discrete spheres of production and reproduction, but also (b) because reproduction is linked within capitalism to production, we need to revise the commonsense perception that capital relinquishes all control over the worker when s/he leaves the workplace.
Theoretically if we concede that production of commodities and the social reproduction of labor power belong to separate processes, then we have no explanation for why the worker is subordinate before the moment of production even takes place. Why does labor appear, in Marx’s words, “timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market”? It is because Marx has a unitary view of the process that he can show us that the moment of production of the simple commodity is not necessarily a singular entry point for the enslavement of labor. Therefore, “in reality,” Marx tells us, “the worker belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the capitalist. His economic bondage is both at once mediated through, and concealed by, the periodic renewal of the act by which he sells himself, his change of masters, and the oscillations in the market-price of his labour.”19
But this link between production and reproduction, and the extension of the class relationship into the latter, means that, as we will see in the next section, the very acts where the working class strives to attend to its own needs can be the ground for class struggle.
Extended reproduction: the key to class struggle
What binds the worker to capital?
Under capitalism, since the means of production (to produce use values) are held by the capitalists, the worker only has access to the means of subsistence through the capitalist production process – selling her labor power to the capitalist in return for wages with which to purchase and access the means of her life, or subsistence.
This schema of capital-labor relationship is heavily predicated upon two things: (a) that the worker is forced to enter this relationship because she has needs as a human being to reproduce her life but cannot do so on her own because she has been separated from the means of production by capital; and (b) she enters the wage relations for her subsistence needs, which is to say that the needs of “life” (subsistence) have a deep integral connection to the realm of “work” (exploitation).
So far we are more or less in undisputed territory of Marxist theory.
Exact delineations of the relationships between the value of labor power, the needs of the worker, and how those in turn affect surplus value are, however, neither undisputed nor adequately theorized in Capital and it is to this that we will spend the remainder of this section.
Let us revisit the moment in Capital where even the individual consumption of the worker is also part of the circuit of capital because the reproduction of the worker is, as Marx calls it, “a factor of the production and reproduction of capital.”
A central premise that Marx offers us about labor power is that the value of labor power is set by the “value of the necessaries required to produce, develop, maintain, and perpetuate the laboring power.”20 But there is something else to this formulation. For the sake of making a logical argument (as opposed to a historical one) Marx treats the standard of necessities as constant: “In a given country at a given period, the average amount of the means of subsistence necessary for the worker is a known datum.”21
In Capital the value of labor power on the basis of the standard of necessity (U) is taken as constant and the changes in price of labor power are attributed to the introduction of machinery and/or the rise and fall of supply and demand of workers in the labor market.
As Lebowitz has pointed out, taking this methodological assumption as fact would put Marx at his closest to Classical economists: endorsing the formulation that supply shifts in the labor market and the introduction of machinery adjust the price of labor to its value, just as it does for all other commodities.
But there is a reason why the worker’s labor power is deemed a unique commodity by Marx, unlike, say sugar or cotton. In the case of labor, a reverse process may and can take place: the value of her labor power may adjust to price, rather than the other way around. The worker may adjust (lower or raise) her needs to what she receives in wages.
According to Lebowitz, Marx does not have a generalized concept of constant real wages (means of subsistence, U) but only adopts it as a “methodologically sound assumption.”22 In contrast to bourgeois political economists, Marx always “rejected the tendency…to treat workers’ needs as naturally determined and unchanging.” It was patently mistaken, Marx thought, to conceptualize subsistence level “as an unchangeable magnitude – which in their [bourgeois economists’] view is determined entirely by nature and not by the stage of historical development, which is itself a magnitude subject to fluctuations.”23 Nothing could be “more alien to Marx” emphasizes Lebowitz, than “the belief in a fixed set of necessities.”24
Let us consider a scenario where the standard of necessity (U) is fixed as Marx dictates, but there is an increase in productivity (q). In such a case the value of the set of wage goods (our original basket of goods x) would fall thereby reducing the value of labor power. In this scenario Marx says that labor power “would be unchanged in price” but “would have risen above its value.” This means that with more money wages at their disposal, workers can go on to buy more goods or services that satisfy their needs. But according the Lebowitz, this never happens. Instead, money wages tend to adjust to real wages, and capitalists are thus able to benefit from the reduced value of labor power. Lebowitz then proceeds to explain why it is that capitalists, rather than workers, benefit from this scenario.
Briefly put, he points out that the standard of necessity (U) is not invariable, but is actually “enforced by class struggle.” Thus, with a rise in productivity (q) and a “decline in the value of wage goods providing slack in the workers’ budget, capitalists…[are] emboldened to attempt to drive down money wages to capture the gain for themselves in the form of surplus value.”25 But once we see that the standard of necessity is variable and can be determined by class struggle then it becomes clear that the working class can fight on this front as well. Indeed, this is one of the consequences of understanding the expanded sense in which the economic is actually a set of social relations traversed by a struggle for class power.
Once we acknowledge class struggle as a component of the relations of production it becomes clear, as Lebowitz shows, that there are two different “moments of production.” They are composed of “two different goals, two different perspectives on the value of labor power: while for capital, the value of labor power is a means of satisfying its goal of surplus value…for the wage-laborer, it is the means of satisfying the goal of self development.”26
Reproduction, in short, is therefore a site of class conflict. However, this conflict in inflected with certain contradictory tendencies. For instance, on the one hand, as the orchestrator of the production process the capitalist class strives to limit the needs and consumption of the working class. But on the other hand, to ensure the constant realization of surplus value, capital must also create new needs in the working class as consumers and then “satisfy” such new needs with new commodities. The growth of workers needs under capitalism is thus an inherent condition of capitalist production and its expansion.
A further complication in this class struggle over the terms of reproduction is that the growth of needs for workers is neither secular or absolute. The position of the working class under capitalism is a relative one, i.e. in a relationship with the capitalist class. Hence any changes in the needs and in the level of satisfaction of workers are also relative to changes in the same for the capitalists. Marx used the memorable example of how the perception of the size of a house (its bigness or smallness) was relative to the size of its surrounding houses.27 Thus one generation of a working class may earn, in absolute terms, more than its previous generation; however, their satisfaction will never be absolute as that generation of capitalists will always have more. Since the growth of workers’ needs, then, is part of the process of capital’s valorization and their satisfaction cannot take place within the framework of the system, the struggle by workers to satisfy their own needs is also an inherent and integral part of the system.
If we include the struggle for higher wages (to satisfy ever increasing needs) in the argument in Capital is it an exogenous, hence eclectic, “addition” to Marxism? Lebowitz shows it not to be so.
What Capital lays out for us is the path of reproduction for capital. Marx represents capital’s movement as a circuit:
M – C (Mp,Lp) — P — C’ – M’
Money (M) is exchanged for commodities (C) that is a combination of (i) means of production (Mp) and (ii) labor power (Lp). The two elements combine through capitalist production (P) to produce new commodities and surplus value (C’) to be then exchanged for a greater amount of money (M’). Such a circuit is both continuous and complete upon itself, ruling out any exogenous elements.
But what about the circuit of reproduction of wage labor?
The “uniqueness” of labor power lies in the fact that although it is not produced and reproduced by capital, it is vital to capital’s own circuit of production. In Capital Marx does not theorize this second circuit but simply notes that “The maintenance and reproduction of the working class remains a necessary condition for the reproduction of capital,” and that “the capitalist may safely leave this to the worker’s drive for self-preservation and propagation.” This is where Lebowitz argues there ought to be acknowledged a missing circuit of production and reproduction, that of labor power. Marx perhaps would have addressed this in later volumes of Capital, but it remains incomplete as the “Missing Book on Wage Labor.”
Once we theoretically integrate the two circuits: that of production and reproduction of capital and that of the same for labor power, commodities themselves reveal their dual functions.
Commodities produced under capitalist production are both means of production (bought by capital for money), and articles of consumption (bought by workers with their wages). A second circuit of production then must be posited, distinct from that of capital, though in relation with it. This circuit is as follows:
M – Ac — P — Lp – M
Money (M), in the worker’s hands, is exchanged for articles of consumption (Ac) which are then consumed in a similar process of production (P). But now what is produced in this “production process” is a unique commodity – the worker’s labor power (Lp). Once produced (or reproduced) it is then sold to the capitalist in exchange for wages (M).
The production of labor power then takes place outside the immediate circuit of capital but remains essential for it. Within capital’s circuit, labor power is a means of production for capital’s reproduction, or valorization. But within wage labor’s circuit, the worker consumes commodities as use values (food, clothing, housing, education) in order to reproduce herself. The second circuit is a process of production of self for the worker or a process of self-transformation.
The second circuit of production encloses a purposeful activity, under the workers’ own self-direction. The goal of this process, is not the valorization of capital, but the self development of the worker. The historically embedded needs of the worker which themselves change and grow with capitalist growth, provide the motive for this labor process. The means of production for this circuit are the manifold useful values that the working class needs in order to develop. These are more than just means to simple biological reproduction, but are “social needs”:
Participation in the higher, even cultural satisfactions, the agitation for his own interests, newspaper subscriptions, attending lectures, educating his children, developing his taste etc., his only share of civilization which distinguishes him from the slave, [which] is economically only possible by widening the sphere of his pleasures at the times when business is good…28
Whether the working class can access such social goods, and to what extent it can, depends not only on the existence of such goods and services in society but on the tussle between capital and labor over surplus value (which reproduces capital) and the basket of goods (which reproduces the worker). On the one hand the worker consumes use values to regenerate fresh labor power. But on the other hand, the reproduction of labor power also presupposes, what Lebowitz perceptively shows, an ideal goal for the worker:
The second aspect of the worker considered as a labor process is that the activity involved in this process is “purposeful activity.” In other words, there is a preconceived goal, a goal that exists ideally, before the process itself…[and this goal] is the worker’s conception of self—as determined within society…That preconceived goal of production is what Marx described as “the worker’s own need of development.”29
However, the materials necessary to produce the worker in the image of her own needs and goals – be it food, housing, “time for education, for intellectual development,” or the “free play of his [or her] own physical and mental powers” – cannot be realized within the capitalist production process, for the process as a whole exists for the valorization of capital and not the social development of labor. Thus the worker, due to the very nature of the process, is already-always reproduced as lacking in what she needs, and hence built into the fabric of wage labor as a form, is the struggle for higher wages: class struggle. And here, finally, we arrive at the strategic implications of social reproduction theory, or why an integrative sense of capitalism is necessary in our actual battles against capital.
Social reproduction framework as strategy
The “actual degree” of profit, Marx tells us, “is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labor, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction.” This struggle “resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants.”30
Note that as he lays out here the inner logic of the system, Marx does not talk of individual capitalists and the workplaces they command, but capital as a whole. Indeed, Marx is clear that although the system appears to us as a ensemble of “many capitals” it is “capital in general” that is the protagonist and the many capitals are ultimately shaped by the inherent determinants of “capital in general.”
If we apply what I call this method of social reproduction of labor theory to the question of workplace struggle, we can now have a few givens:
That the individual capitals, in competition with each other, will try to increase surplus value from the worker.
That the worker will pull in the opposite direction to increase the time (quantity) and wages, benefits (quality of life) she can have for her own social development. This most frequently will take the form of struggle for a shorter workweek, or higher wages and better work conditions in the workplace.
What is the ideal situation for the worker? That she pulls all the way in the opposite direction and annihilates surplus value altogether, i.e. she only works the hours necessary to reproduce her own subsistence, and the rest of the time is her own to do as she pleases. This is an impossible solution, in that capital will then cease to be capital. The struggle for higher wages, benefits etc. in a work place, against a boss, or even in a series of workplaces and against specific bosses, then is only part of the pivotal struggle of capital in general versus wage labor in general. The worker can even “leave” an individual boss but she cannot opt out of the system as a whole (while the system as it stands exists):
The worker leaves the capitalist, to whom he has sold himself, as often as he chooses, and the capitalist discharges him as often as he sees fit, as soon as he no longer gets any use, or not the required use, out of him.
But the worker, whose only source of income is the sale of his labor-power, cannot leave the whole class of buyers, i.e., the capitalist class, unless he gives up his own existence. He does not belong to this or that capitalist, but to the capitalist class; and it is for him to find his man – i.e., to find a buyer in this capitalist class.31
Most trade unions, even the most militant ones, are typically equipped to fight against the individual boss or a collective of bosses, which in Marx’s terms takes the form of “many capitals.” Trade unions leave the task of confronting “capital in general” alone. There is a very good reason why this is so.
As Lebowitz shows, capital’s power “as owner of the products of labor is…both absolute and mystified” – this ultimately undergirds its ability to buy labor power and submit it to its will in the production process. If the worker is to transcend the partial struggle for better work conditions and direct all social labor to producing only use values for social and individual development, then it is this underlying power of capital as a whole that must be confronted. But capital’s power in this arena is qualitatively different from that of workplace struggles: “There is no direct area of confrontation between specific capitalists and specific wage laborers in this sphere comparable to that which emerges spontaneously in the labor market and the workplace…[Instead] the power of capital as owner of the products of labor appears as the dependence of wage labor upon capital-as-a-whole.”32
Consider the two ways in which surplus value is increased: one by the absolute extension of the work day and the other by cutting wages or reducing the cost of living thereby reducing the necessary labor time. While Marx is clear that absolute and relative surplus are related concepts, it is quite clear that some aspects of this process of realization (the boss’s efforts to reduce wages, for instance) are more easily confronted in the workplace than others.
Let us take a historical example of how the system as a whole will sometimes increase relative surplus value by reducing the cost of living of the working class as a whole. During the 18th century a section of the working class in Britain was put on a diet of potatoes, a cheaper food option to wheat, such that the cost of feeding workers was forced down thereby cheapening the cost of labor as a whole. One of the best and undoubtedly one of the most lyrical historians of working class life, E. P. Thompson, called this a “regular dietary class war” waged for over 50 years on the English working class. What concrete forms did this class war take? While the cheapening of labor increased surplus value at the point of production and hence benefitted the bosses in the workplace, it was not just in the workplace, or at the hands of the bosses, that the cheapening of labor took place. Thompson gives us a moving account of how “landowners, farmers, parsons, manufacturers, and the Government itself sought to drive laborers from a wheaten to a potato diet.”33 The ruling class, as a class, then forced the increase potato acreage over wheat and prompting the historian Redcliffe Salaman to rightly claim that “the use of the potato…did, in fact, enable the workers to survive on the lowest possible wage.”34 Similarly, Sandra Halperin has shown how in the late nineteenth century British overseas investment, control over colonies, its railways, harbor and shipbuilding for Baltic and North American grain, “produced a backflow of cheaply produced…raw materials and foodstuffs that did not compete with domestic English agriculture and drove domestic working class wages down.”35
Trade unions, even the best ones, by nature, struggle against specific and particular capitals, but the above examples show the need to confront capital in its totality. Lebowitz accurately concludes, “in the absence of such a total opposition, the trade unions fight the effects within the labor market and the workplace but not the causes of the effects.”36
To his comrades in the First International Marx pointed to precisely this caveat in trade union struggles. The trade unions, Marx pointed out, were “Too exclusively bent upon the local and immediate struggles with capital” and had “not yet fully understood their power of acting against the system of wages slavery itself.” What, according to Marx, was proof of their narrowness? That “they had kept too much aloof from general social and political movements.” Marx’s advice to them was to overcome this narrowness and go beyond the purely economic struggle for wages:
they must now learn to act deliberately as organizing centers of the working class in the broad interest of its complete emancipation. They must aid every social and political movement tending in that direction. Considering themselves and acting as the champions and representatives of the whole working class, they cannot fail to enlist the non-society men into their ranks. They must look carefully after the interests of the worst paid trades, such as the agricultural laborers, rendered powerless [French text has: “incapable of organized resistance”] by exceptional circumstances. They must convince the world at large [French and German texts read: “convince the broad masses of workers”] that their efforts, far from being narrow – and selfish, aim at the emancipation of the downtrodden millions.37
If we take our lead from Marx himself, then it is utterly unclear why only the economic struggle for wages and benefits at the workplace must be designated as class struggle. Every social and political movement “tending” in the direction of gains for the working class as a whole, or of challenge to the power of capital as a whole, must be considered an aspect of class struggle.
Significantly, one of the greatest tragedies of the destruction of working class power and the dissolution of proletarian living communities in the last forty years has been the loss in practice of this insight about the social totality of production of value and reproduction of labor power.
At any given moment of history, a working class may or may not be able to fight for higher wages at the point of production. Labor unions may not exist or may be weak and corrupt. However, as items in the basket of goods change (fall or rise in quality and quantity of social goods) the class is acutely aware of such changes to their life as a whole, and those battles may emerge away from the point of production, but nevertheless reflecting the needs and imperatives of the class. In other words, where a struggle for a higher wage is not possible, different kinds of struggles around the circuit of social reproduction may also erupt. Is it then any wonder that in the era of neoliberalism, when labor unions agitating at the point of production (for wages) are weak or non-existent in large parts of the globe, we have rising social movements around issues of living conditions, from the struggle for water in Cochabamba and Ireland, issues of land eviction in India and struggles for fair housing in the United Kingdom and elsewhere? A pattern perhaps best summarized by the anti-austerity protesters in Portugal: “Que se lixe a troika! Queremos as nossas vidas!” (“Fuck the troika! We want our lives!”)
The working class: solidarity and “difference”
We should then reconsider our conceptual vision of the working class. I am not suggesting here a concrete accounting of who constitutes the global working class, although that would be an important exercise. Instead, leading from our previous discussion about the need to reimagine a fuller figuration for “economy” and “production,” I am proposing here three things: (a) a theoretical restatement of the working class as a revolutionary subject; (b) a broader understanding of the working class than those employed as waged laborers at any given moment; and (c) a reconsideration of class struggle to signify more than the struggle over wages and working conditions.
The premise for this reconsideration is a particular understanding of historical materialism. Marx reminds us that “the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element.”38
Under capitalism wage labor is the generalized form through which the rulers expropriate the direct producers. In the abstract, capital is indifferent to the race, gender, or abilities of the direct producers as long as her or his labor power can set the process of accumulation into motion. But the relations of production, as we saw in the earlier section, are actually a concatenation of existing social relations, shaped by past history, present institutions, and state forms. The social relations outside of wage labor are not accidental to it, but take specific historical form in response to it. For instance, the gendered nature of reproduction of labor power has conditioning impulses for the extraction of surplus value. Similarly, a heterosexist form of the family unit is sustained by capital’s needs for the generational replacement of the labor force.
The question of “difference” within the working class is significant in this respect. As mentioned before, Marx gestures towards differently “produced” sections of the working class in his discussion of the Irish worker, where the English worker is “produced” with access to a better basket of goods, his or her needs adjusted to this higher level, while the Irish worker remains at a brutal level of existence with only “the most animal minimum of needs.” Obviously Marx did not believe that the value of the labor power of the Irish worker was a constant that remained below that of her English counterpart due to ethnicity. Instead it was a result of class struggle, or lack thereof, and it was the English worker that needed to understand the commonality of their class interest with the Irish against capital as a whole.
Incorporating class struggle as a crucial element that determines the extent and quality of social reproduction of the worker then enables us to truly understand the significance of a Marxist notion of “difference” within the class. Acknowledging that at any given historical moment the working class might be differently produced (with varying wages and differential access to means of social reproduction) is more than simply stating an empirical truth. By showing how concrete social relations and histories of struggle contribute to the “reproduction” of labor power this framework actually points to the filaments of class solidarity that must be forged, sometime within and sometimes without the workplace, in order to increase the “share of civilization” for all workers.
Writing in the Britain of the early eighties, when the working class was being physically brutalized by Thatcherism and theoretically assaulted by a range of liberal theories, Raymond Williams understood very well the dangers of a false dichotomy between “class struggles” and “new social movements”:
all significant social movements of the last thirty years have started outside the organized class interests and institutions. The Peace movement, the ecology movement, the women’s movement, human rights agencies, campaigns against poverty and homelessness…all have this character, that they sprang from needs and perceptions which the interest-based organizations had no room or time for, or which they simply failed to notice.39
Today, we can add to the list the recent anti-police brutality struggles in the United States.
But while these struggles may arise outside the workplace, or be understood as struggles for extra-class interests, Williams points to the absurdity of such a characterization:
What is then quite absurd is to dismiss or underplay these movements as “middle class issues.” It is a consequence of the social order itself that these issues are qualified and refracted in these ways. It is similarly absurd to push the issues away as not relevant to the central interests of the working class. In all real senses they belong to these central interests. It is workers who are most exposed to dangerous industrial processes and environmental damage. It is working class women who have most need of new women’s rights…40
If for whatever historical reasons organizations that are supposed to champion “class struggle,” such as trade unions, fail to be insurgent, it does not mean then that “class struggle” goes away, or that these struggles are “beyond class.” Indeed as Williams astutely observes, “there is not one of these issues which, followed through, fails to lead us into the central systems of the industrial-capitalist mode of production and… into its system of classes.”
Understanding the complex but unified way in which the production of commodities and reproduction of labor power takes place, helps us understand how the concrete allocation of the total labor of society is socially organized in gendered and racialized ways through lessons learnt by capital from previous historical epochs and through its struggle against the working class. The process of accumulation, thus, in actuality cannot be indifferent to social categories of race, sexuality or gender, but seeks to organize and shape those categories that in turn act upon the determinate form of surplus labor extraction. The wage labor relation suffuses the spaces of non-waged everyday life.
“A development of the forces of the working class – suspends capital itself”
If the social reproduction of labor power is accorded the theoretical centrality that we propose it should, how useful is that to our second proposal – the rethinking of the working class?
Social Reproduction theory illuminates the social relations and pathways involved in reproducing labor power thereby broadening our vision of how we ought to approach the notion of the working class.
The framework demonstrates why we ought not to rest easy with the limiting understanding of class as simply those who are currently employed in the capital versus waged labor dynamic. To do so would restrict both our vision of class power and our identification of potential agents of class solidarity.
The “waged worker” may be the correct definition for those who currently work for a wage, but such a vision is, again, one of “the trade union secretary.” The working class, for the revolutionary Marxist, must be perceived of as everyone in the producing class who has in their lifetime participated in the totality of reproduction of society – irrespective of whether that labor has been paid for by capital or remained unpaid. Such an integrative vision of class gathers together the temporary Latina hotel worker from Los Angeles, the flextime working mother from Indiana who needs to stay home due to high childcare costs, the African-American full-time school teacher from Chicago, and the white, male and unemployed, erstwhile UAW worker from Detroit. But they come together not in competition with each other, a view of the working class still in terms of the market, but in solidarity. Strategic organizing on the basis of such a vision can reintroduce the idea that an injury to the schoolteacher in Chicago is actually an injury to all the others.
When we restore a sense of the social totality to class we immediately begin to reframe the arena for class struggle.
What has been the form of the one-sided class struggle from the global ruling class in the past four decades of neoliberalism?
It is crucial to understand that it has been a twin attack by capital on global labor to try and restructure production in workplaces and the social processes of reproduction of labor power in homes, communities and niches of everyday life.
In the workplace primarily the assault took the form of breaking the back of union power. The neoliberal edifice, as I have argued elsewhere,41 was built on the back of a series of defeats for the global working class, the most spectacular examples being those of the air traffic controllers in the United States (1981), the mill workers in India (1982) and the miners in the United Kingdom (1984–85).
If the ruling class attack in the workplace, or on productive labor, took the form of violent anti-unionism, it certainly did not end there. Outside the workplace the attack on reproductive labor was equally vicious. For specific countries this second line of attack may be said to have been even greater. In the case of the US, several scholars from David McNally and Anwar Shaikh to Kim Moody have shown how an absolute decline in working class living and working standards built the capitalist expansion of the 1980s. Key areas of social reproduction were attacked through increased privatization of social services and the retrenchment of important federal programs such as Aid To Dependent Children/Temporary Aid to Needy Families, unemployment insurance, and Social Security. In the global south this took the form of the IMF and the World Bank forcibly raising the price of imports – the bulk of which for these countries were food grain, fuel and medicines.
This was open class war strategically waged on the entire working class, not just its waged members, that became so effective precisely because it extended beyond the confines of the workplace. By systematically privatizing previously socialized resources, reducing the quality of services, capital aimed to make the work of daily regeneration more vulnerable and precarious while simultaneously unloading the entire responsibility and discourse of reproduction onto individual families. Where these processes of degrading the work of social reproduction worked most effectively was in social contexts where capital could bank on, create anew, or re-energize practices and discourses of oppression. From racist clarion calls against the “welfare queen,” new forms of sexualization of bodies that diminished sexual choices, to rising Islamophobia, neoliberalism found increasingly creative ways to injure the working class. It destroyed class confidence, eroded previously embedded cultures of solidarity and most importantly in certain communities, succeeded in erasing a key sense of continuity and class memory.
Spaces of insurgency: confronting capital beyond the factory floor
One of the leaders of a recent factory occupation in India explained to a shocked business reporter: “The negotiating power of workers is the most in the factory but no one listens to you when you reach Jantar Mantar [traditional protest square in the Indian capital of Delhi].”
The experiential discernment of this rebel worker is often the political-economic commonsense of revolutionary Marxism about capital-labor relations. The “dominant” reading of Marx locates the possibilities for a critical political engagement of the working class with capital chiefly at the point of production, where the power of workers to affect profits is the most.
This essay, so far, has been a counterintuitive reading of the theoretic import of the category of “production” and so we must now consider the strategic import of the workplace as a pivotal organizing space. Recent scholarship on the global south, for instance the “coolie lines” in India or the “dormitory labor regime” in China brings to striking analytical prominence not only the places where the working class works, but the spaces where the working class, sleeps, plays, goes to school – or in other words lives full sensual lives beyond the workplace. What role do such spaces play in organizing against capital? And more importantly, do point-of-production struggles have no strategic relevance any more?
The contours of class struggle (or what is traditionally understood as such) are very clear in the workplace. The worker both feels capital’s dominance experientially on an everyday basis, and understands its ultimate power over her life, her time, her life chances, indeed over her ability to exist and map any future. Workplace struggles thus have two irreplaceable advantages. One, they have clear goals and targets. Two, workers are concentrated at those points in capital’s own circuit of reproduction and have the collective power to shut down certain parts of the operation. This is precisely why Marx called trade unions “centers of organization of the working class.”42 This is also why capital’s first attack is always upon organized sections of the class in order to break this power.
But let us rethink the theoretical import of extra-workplace struggle, such as those for cleaner air, better schools, against water privatization, against climate change or for fairer housing policies. These reflect, I submit, those social needs of the working class that are essential for its social reproduction. They also are an effort by the class to demand its “share of civilization.” In this, they are also class struggles.
Neoliberalism’s devastation of working class neighborhoods in the global north has left behind boarded buildings, pawnshops and empty stoops. In the global south it has created vast slums as the breeding ground for violence and want.43 The demand by these communities to extend their “sphere of pleasure” is thus a vital class demand. Marx and Engels, writing in 1850, advanced the idea that workers must “make each community the central point and nucleus of workers’ associations in which the attitude and interests of the proletariat will be discussed independently of bourgeois interests.”44
It is our turn now to restore to our organs and practices of protest this integrative understanding of capitalist totality. If the socialist project remains the dismantling of wage labor, we will fail in that project unless we understand that the relationship between wage labor and capital is sustained in all sorts of unwaged ways and in all kind of social spaces—not just at work.
When the United Automobile Workers (UAW) went to organize a union at the Volkswagen plant in the American South, its bureaucratic leaders maintained a religious separation between their union work at the plant and the workers lived experience in the community. The union leaders signed a contract with the bosses that they would never talk to workers in their homes. But these were communities that had never experienced union power, had never sung labor songs or had picnics at union halls. Unions played little role in the social texture of their lives. In such a community, devastated and atomized as it was by capital, the union movement could only be rebuilt if doing so made sense in the total aspect of their lives and not just in a sectoral way at work alone.
Contrast this tactic to the one used by the Chicago teacher’s union to rebuild their union. They did what the UAW did not, which is connect the struggles in the workplace with the needs of a wider community. For years they brought their union banner to one grieving neighborhood after another when they were about to lose a school to the privatizers and protested against school closures. In the deeply racialized poverty of Chicago, the struggle of a union trying to save a working class child’s right to learn made a difference. So when this very union went on strike they had already established a history of working and struggling in extra-workplace spaces, which is why the wider working class of Chicago saw the strike as their own struggle, for the future of their children. And when striking teachers in red shirts swelled the streets of the city the city’s working class gave them their solidarity and support.
We want such working class insurgents to flood city streets like they did in Chicago during the CTU strike. To prepare our theory and our praxis to be ready for such times the first stop should be a revived understanding of class, rescued from decades of economic reductionism and business unionism. The constitutive roles played by race, gender or ethnicities on the working class need to be re-recognized while struggle reanimated with broader visions of class power beyond contract negotiations.
Only such a struggle will have the power to rupture capital’s “hidden abode” and return the control of our sensuous, tactile, creative capacity to labor to where it truly belongs – to ourselves.
Comments
Introduction to the Archive of Feminist Struggle for wages for housework. Donation by Mariarosa Dalla Costa
This text introduces the Archivio di Lotta Femminista per il salario al lavoro domestico, which contains a wealth of material collected from the 1970s to the present, all graciously donated by Mariarosa Dalla Costa after years of work as a militant in the Feminist Movement and as a scholar of the condition of women. The archive, based in Padua, Italy, collects a broad range of inventoried material from a strand of the Feminist Movement which, in Italy, first called itself Movimento di Lotta Femminile (Women’s Struggle Movement), then later Lotta Femminista (Feminist Struggle) and finally Movimento dei Gruppi e Comitati per il Salario al Lavoro Domestico (Movement of Groups and Committees for Wages for Housework), henceforth SLD. In English-speaking countries it is called the network of Wages for Housework (henceforth WFH) although, undoubtedly, groups aimed at claiming pay for housework have used other names. One example is the Power of Women Collective in London. Even in Italy there have been variations on the name, such as the Collettivo Femminista Napoletano (Neapolitan Feminist Collective) for the SLD in Naples, the Feminist Group Immagine (Image) for the SLD of Varese. A separate case is the Feminist Group of Pescara which, having always collaborated on initiatives of the SLD circuit, was included in the directory of the SLD circuit in the newspaper “Le operaie della casa” (Houseworkers). Since it was impossible to continuously update the lists, there were groups for the SLD that arose which did not appear in the directory of the paper, such as the Feminist Group for the SLD of San Dona di Piave and others. Also in Milan there was an SLD presence which then became part of a broader Collective at the city level; and in Rome there were two groups for the SLD which strangely did not appear in the newspaper. Even more so, it was almost impossible to keep track of the WFH groups that arose abroad. The paper did, however, take into account the principal groups. Many other groups became known when, with the repression of the late ‘70s, numerous telegrams of solidarity arrived which, along with other supporting documents in the archive, constitute an important source, giving an idea of the real expansion of the SLD / WFH network. In Padua, Lotta Femminista would in time constitute the moment for launching the formation of other feminist groups that were organizing themselves autonomously; one such example is Gruppo Femminista Medie (Middle School Feminists Group).
It was, therefore, a feminism of an international, militant, anti-capitalist dimension, leading to big struggles in view of a radical change of the existing condition. The materials contained in the archive are mainly related to the ‘70s, having been designed for immediate use in the work of practical intervention (leaflets and brochures); but there are also more analytical materials which were for the political formation of activists (small books), as well as more thorough study materials concerning issues considered crucial. Even after the ‘70s, this overall production continued along the various paths of the exponents of the network, modulating with the new evolutions of the discourse of its initiatives and the nodes considered important. Collected here is what was possible to attain up to now, with the intention of integrating it further. The archive also includes paper documents produced after the ‘70s that testify to militant activity in various countries, even though, as the era of new information technologies takes over, the flyer and brochure tend to disappear. There are also multimedia materials.
In Italy, the foundation and the start of Lotta Femminista took place in June of 1971, when Mariarosa Dalla Costa who, with her experience of years in operaismo (the workers’ movement), and having begun a political relationship with Selma James in London, convened a meeting in Padua. She asked some of her female companions to come to this meeting and put to their attention a document she had drafted. Her writing dealt with unpaid housework as work that affects the lives of all women and invited women everywhere to launch various forms of struggle to make it cost. The perspective in which the subject matter was treated corresponded with that of other struggles for wages that were led in factories, in universities and throughout the territory by workers and students. The latter group was fighting against the authoritarianism of professors and parents, against the cost of studying, and was also asking for a grant for the work of training their workforce. This archive also contains documents about the struggles of the students as well as those of temporary employees of the university. With regard to housework, women wanted to make it cost; they would require a system of services that allowed time off for the housewife, not just for the woman employed outside the home; they would require a halving of outside work time so that everyone, men and women, could devote time to reproduction, time for duties but also for an emotional exchange.
Within the Italian area of interest, from which most of the material archived here comes, some things should be clarified. The SLD strand of which we speak represents one of the two great souls of feminism, the other being that of autocoscienza (raising consciousness). This one shared significant feelings with the American practice of raising consciousness and favored small groups of women who recounted and compared their stories in the first person. Baring one’s personal experience to others was a way of denying an imposed identity, fixed in the role of wife and mother, and trying to build another identity. One of the aspects that emerged more dramatically through the experience of the small group was the discovery of violence that women experience. In the strand of raising consciousness there were groups with different names which were particularly strong in Milan and in other large cities. In the early ‘70s this strand was also in touch with Psychanalyse et Politique (Psychoanalysis and Politics) a psychoanalytic group in Paris headed by Antoinette Fouqué. The raising consciousness strand had little sympathy for demonstrations and, even on large issues of the Feminist Movement such as abortion, it sometimes preferred not to participate. It rejected what it called “external commitments.”
That is how the two great characterizations in the Italian Feminist Movement were delineated, often labeled as the “psychoanalytic” strand and the “political” strand.
They did, however, find common ground in the break with the discourse of emancipation, in not having any interest for the discussion on equality since it was tainted by the vice of homologation, and in their refusal to have anything to do with the institutions.
“Liberation,” not “emancipation” (a tiring and limited conquest of previous generations) was the new standard that was always being filled with new content as women advanced in their journey and claimed their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their citizenship rights. They wanted to be free from male authority, free from economic dependence on man, free from having to suffer violence, free to decide about sexuality and procreation, free to exercise self-determination in every aspect of their lives.
The “difference” was the other big statement against the discourse of equality. The difference being the specificity of the condition of women, a difference that should emerge and which required specific answers.
The SLD strand of Lotta Femminista saw the difference as it fit into the capitalist sexual division of labor. Men were paid for their work in the production of goods, women were not paid for the work of production and reproduction of labor power. This was the unbearable contradiction: an unwaged worker in a wage economy. This was the hierarchizing difference between man and woman. This was the unbearable condition, being a housewife (Italy at the time had a particularly high rate of housewives) obliged to continuously supply work to reproduce the entire family but dependent on a man for support, and by this dependency hampered in all her life choices.
Breaking this contradiction meant launching struggles everywhere in order to make housework cost. But it was also a great cultural awakening. The theme of housework asserted itself across the Feminist Movement in place of emancipation through work outside the home, even in those circuits that did not seek to require its salarization. Women increasingly rejected a femininity made of endless willingness to reproduce others for free.
If the first signs of a feminist awakening date from the second half of the 1960s, undoubtedly, in Italy, a Feminist Movement that saw thousands of women take to the streets, demonstrate, organize fights, dates to the beginning of the 1970s in a context already characterized by other struggles waged forcefully by workers, students and technicians, with the very active presence of an extra-parliamentary left. From this context came numerous militant feminists who were soon joined by many others that had no previous experience of militancy. Various women from the strand of Lotta Femminista came from years of militancy in Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power). They knew that a great change that offered new and consistent solutions to the problem of human reproduction could not take place unless women’s determination could be heard. Their path, therefore, would tend to build struggles on housework and its conditions, not only in homes and neighborhoods, but also at workplaces outside the home where they wanted to make visible the existence of housework, which all other work depends on. So there were actions like bringing young children to the office, or struggles like those of the secretaries of professional firms in Trieste who refused to continue to perform additional tasks that were asked of them only because they were women. Or struggles like those in the Solari Factory in Udine which sought to reduce the time of reproduction that women had to spend on themselves for treatment and medical check-ups. They asked the management to organize a service with a doctor who would come into the factory. This would save the workers work-days that otherwise would have been lost to bureaucratic paper-work and medical visits. And they got what they asked for. The example then spread to other factories. Of course these, like many other struggles and moments of mobilization, were documented first and foremost in the newspaper “Le operaie della casa” and in other archived materials.
If, in Italy, the claim to have housework cost, to expect retribution for it starting with the most burdensome part, that is raising children, seemed unrealistic, abroad, instead, there were substantial examples to which the militant SLD-WFH network looked: primarily the Family Allowances in England, the Family Allowance Funds in France, the allowances given to Welfare Mothers in the United States, all of which represented a first concrete level of retribution for this long fatigue.
But mobilization on the matter of housework was intertwined with mobilization on all those aspects, those rights denied to feminine life that prevented the woman from emerging as a person. This, in fact, was the great process that was set in motion with the Feminist Movement. Wanting to emerge as a person meant wanting to emerge as an autonomous subject, with all rights and fundamental freedoms, a subject who claimed the ability of self-determination in all areas of her life, starting from sexuality and procreation, affirming that female sexuality is not only in function of the needs of man and is not only in function of procreation. It was a hot topic in those years, one that was constantly intertwined with that of the right of women to knowledge of their bodies, with that of health, with that of violence, with that of abortion. In Padua, a trial on abortion held on June 5, 1973, was used for the first time as a moment of political mobilization in which the whole Movement participated. It was the first act over a course of years that would lead to the legalization of abortion (Law 194/1978).
The opening of the discourse on sexuality, including the right to be able to live one’s sexual orientation, contributed, both in Padua and on a national level, to creating a terrain for debate where it became easier to take the floor for the male homosexual movement as well. A full set of their magazine “Fuori” (Out) was donated to the Augusto Finzi Archives at the public library in Marghera by Mariarosa Dalla Costa a few years ago when the possibility of building this archive in Padua had not yet materialized. However, even in the discourse on sexuality with people of the same sex, what mattered to the SLD network was to highlight that even a gay lifestyle, although in this case the division of labor is less fixed and hierarchical than in a heterosexual couple, does not solve the problem of housework.
There was also a broad commitment to promoting women’s information on what today would be called “reproductive health” and urging the State to do it. The amount of work that was dedicated to building knowledge about everything related to women’s health, which was spread through small pamphlets, mimeographs and books, is amazing. In truth, the books are small and this shows that there was little time to write them and little time to read them, since much of the time was devoted to organization and action. And publishers could not make big investments so the books had to be of limited size and essentially sold. Two such examples are the Marsilio series entitled “Salario al lavoro domestico – strategia internazionale femminista” (“Wages for Housework – International Feminist Strategy”) and the book Un lavoro d’amore (The Work of Love), by Giovanna F. Dalla Costa, a fundamental essay on the relationship between physical sexual violence and the gratuity of housework, published by Edizioni delle Donne in Rome in 1978. Keep in mind that this building of another knowledge by the Feminist Movement was part of a horizon of construction of other knowledge conducted in the ‘70s by various movements. In Padua in 1974, the Committee for the SLD that had taken over from Lotta Femminista opened the first self-managed family planning clinic which would be followed by others in other cities. In this clinic many women and doctors willingly provided their services for free. The law (no. 405) establishing family planning clinics would come in 1975 while previously, in 1971, the legislation (art. 553 c.p.) prohibiting the advertising of contraceptives had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The number of these clinics, however, would always remain far below what was expected and deficient in their functions of providing information and prevention. Much effort was made on the issue of childbirth to return it to the condition of a natural event, as opposed to its excessive medicalization, and to return to the woman the lead role with the right to have at that event the comfort of a trusted person. The Movement paid particular attention to the maternity wards in hospitals and the struggle at the St. Anna of Ferrara hospital remains famous. But overall, the whole field of gynecology was indicted, being still largely in the hands of male doctors, often authoritarian and rough in their relationships with patients. Inquiries were also held in public clinics where women, often posing as patients, went to test the quality of the service. All around maternity there was a hum of feminist research: the Movement for active birth was outlined; Andria, a national coordination of obstetricians, gynecologists and midwives who were particularly attentive to the lesson of the Feminist Movement, was formed; Andria’s mouthpiece Istar, a multidisciplinary journal on birth, was established. The same circuit would be very important later in the ‘90s when the question of hysterectomy abuse was raised.
In 1974, the referendum on divorce was won, thereby allowing this relatively new institution to be part of Italy’s legal system. In 1975, the new family law focusing on equality between spouses entered into force. In fact, the institutional response to the needs of the Feminist Movement was articulated according to the classic form of emancipation and, from 1972-79, the number of women involved in paid employment would increase by 1,500,000. Things were more functional now that women could decide everything regarding their family and employment outside the home on an equal footing with their spouse.
The other major issue addressed was that of prostitution. In 1958 the Merlin Law (no. 75) had abolished the regulation of prostitution. Henceforth, prostitution would not be a crime while the exploitation of the prostitution of others was. Consequently, the State could no longer profit from this activity. In the ‘70s, prostitution itself was no longer a crime in many European countries, but in practice it was criminalized in various ways. Furthermore, male violence was often a common practice that was rather taken for granted by the institutions. In 1975, the murder of yet another prostitute in Lyon induced her street companions to occupy churches and begin to organize themselves as a movement. On June 16th, 1976, the prostitutes held their first meeting at the theater “La Mutualité” in Paris. In the same year in the United States, in New York, frequent raids led public opinion to think that locking up prostitutes in Eros Centers would be the ideal solution. Frequent raids also occurred in San Francisco, so even there the prostitutes rebelled and, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, began to assert their rights, first of all to not be exploited by others, to not suffer violence from clients and police, and to keep their children with them. The big breakthrough that happened was that prostitutes decided to speak in the first person, appearing in public, refusing invisibility, victimization and ghettoization. But above all, they refused letting others discuss their choice in only moral terms and instead insisted discussing it as a job. Since then the term sexworkers was coined and used universally. Even in Italy there would be meetings in which prostitutes spoke in the first person and, through their initiative, committees for the rights of prostitutes would be born. But above all, speaking of prostitution in terms of work would put more light on the poor choices of women forced into being either economically dependent on a man or having to hold two jobs for very low pay. So much so, that some international circuits of prostitutes would pronounce themselves in favor of wages for housework. And there is documentation of all this in this archive. But compared to the situation in which this assertion of rights was given, first among which the right not to be exploited by others, neoliberal globalization would put women from poorer countries, in conditions of weakness and blackmailed by criminal organizations, on the streets of the first world.
In 1975, the ever more impetuous growth of the Feminist Movement in various countries led the United Nations to proclaim 1975 the International Women’s Year, to announce a conference in Mexico City on “Women, Development and Peace” and to devote the new decade to the same topic. At that Conference, Northern women would meet with Southern women and discover they had different priorities. Poverty, not discrimination, was the first problem for those who came from “developing” countries. But even this conference would be perceived with a certain indifference by the Feminist Movement which was never enthusiastic in front of institutional events, especially if a high institution was involved. So there is almost no trace of this in the literature of the Movement.
In 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which would go into effect in 1981. Conceived in only “negative” terms, that is, by listing the areas in which there must not be discrimination against women and, on the other hand, committing states to take action if it does happen, CEDAW covers every aspect of a woman’s life and remains the most important charter on the subject of discrimination. But for the Feminist Movement, even this charter would remain a dead letter, virtually unknown, although later it would be the charter that obligated signatory states, including Italy, to take a series of steps regarding this discrimination. Its fault, if anything, is that it did not expressly contemplate violence as a form of discrimination.
Yet violence, after housework, was the other big issue that emerged in the feminism of the ‘70s, in particular sexual violence. In Italy, the Rocco code still ranked sexual violence among the offenses against public morals and decency. It was a difficult pregnancy, that of the Movement, that wanted to give birth to the woman as a person and then expected that violence against her be counted among crimes against the person. Various bills have been presented since 1979 when the first popular initiative was presented. Even the Communist Party in 1977 presented one but the House did not initiate discussion on it. The Feminist Movement, however, was a bit embarrassed because it did not want to help define penalties. Instead, it mobilized in conferences defined as international tribunals like the one on crimes against women held in Brussels from March 4-8, 1976, involving about 2,000 women from all over the world. And in that conference a resolution presented by the activists of the SLD / WFH network from Italy, Canada, the United States, Great Britain was voted almost unanimously in the final general assembly. The resolution says: “that unwaged housework is robbery with violence; that this work and wagelessness is a crime from which all other crimes flow; that it brands us for life as the weaker sex and delivers us powerless to employers, government planners and legislators, doctors, the police, prisons and mental institutions, as well as to men, for a lifetime of servitude and imprisonment. We demand wages-for-housework for all women from the governments of the world. We will organize internationally to win back the wealth that has been stolen from us in every country and to put an end to the crimes committed daily against us all.” (Document 01467, May 1976)
The Feminist Movement also mobilized around the trials of men who used violence against women. Its presence ensured, first of all, that the victim was not transformed into the accused. In 1975, the mobilization around the trial for the Circeo massacre, the case of two women who had been raped and tortured, one of whom died while the other survived by pretending to be dead, marked the start of this mobilization and being present in trials for violence. But obviously the Movement took a number of other initiatives on this issue, from publicly reporting the names of rapists, to torchlight processions, to much more. It also took the initiative of solidarity by offering its homes as a first source of shelter for women who wanted to leave their homes because they suffered violence. In Italy, it wasn’t until the early ‘90s that there were institutional initiatives such as the first anti-violence centers or homes for women (who suffer violence), while in different European countries they arose at the end of the ‘70s.
As for the law on sexual violence, 20 years would pass before it would go into effect. It would be law no. 66 of 1996. Finally, the crime of sexual violence redefined and articulated in the case studies that considered this would be placed in the context of crimes against the person and no longer against public morals and decency.
Here, too, a passage that took place at the level of the United Nations three years earlier must be remembered. At the Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna from June 14th to 25th , 1993, the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women was produced, which would be approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1993. It was the Charter that gave the most comprehensive definition of gender violence to which national standards refer.
Articles 587 and 544 of the Criminal Code were repealed in 1981, the former referring to the so-called “honor killing,” the latter to the “shotgun wedding.” But the Feminist Movement deserves credit for having first discovered and brought to light the extraordinary courage of Franca Viola in Alcamo (Trapani), who, in 1965, having been kidnapped by her rejected suitor, refused a “shotgun wedding.” In 1968, the Constitutional Court established the unconstitutionality of Article 599 of the Criminal Code which considered adultery as an offense when committed by the wife, but not by the husband. In the same way, in 1971, the same Court, as mentioned above, would declare the unconstitutionality of Article 553 of the Criminal Code which prohibited the advertising of contraceptives.
In 1965, Socialist deputy Loris Fortuna presented a bill to parliament introducing divorce in Italy, which would go into effect in 1970. These flashes in the second half of the ‘60s and the dawn of the ‘70s indicated that some willingness to change the rules and customs that regulated the sphere of reproduction was brewing in the Italian social and institutional fabric. In this context, the behavior of Franca Viola could be seen as a forerunner of a behavior that would be multiplied with feminism. But we would have to go through the explosion of 1968, in which young people achieved a new lifestyle, and through the mass struggles of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, for the condition of women to be thrown into question within a project of great transformation of which the Feminist Movement was the herald.
The great transformation … this was the project that underlay all the action of the Feminist Movement of the ‘70s, just as it underlay the action of the other movements of the period. On the one hand, it was a demand which aimed to achieve better working conditions, more free time, a widening of the sphere of welfare; on the other hand, there was an ambition to gather such force as to cause a great change.
The territory as a social factory, struggles on wages by the various entities that inhabit it, all this was already a fundamental assumption of workerism. But the Feminist Movement revealed that women work behind the closed doors of the home; that the home is a production center, it produces and reproduces labor power daily; that capitalist accumulation passes through two great poles, the factory and the home. Therefore, the woman is the main subject of the social fabric. But there is no housework in Marx. This was the discovery of those most accustomed to handling Capital.
Also keep in mind that it was workerism which had promoted the direct relationship between militants and the works of Marx. At the University and in other places, continuous lectures were made on Capital; chapters 8, 24 and 25 of the first book were highlighted, dealing with the workday, original accumulation and the modern theory of colonization (or theory of systematic colonization) respectively. Such issues would come back to the forefront with the attack on common goods deployed around the planet by neoliberal globalization. Numerous studies on the various stages of capital were carried out. The discovery that there was no housework in Marx led to that set of analyses, by this circuit of scholars, which aimed to reveal the hidden phase of capitalist accumulation, that of the production and reproduction of labor power. Here we should mention, above all, the text L’arcano della riproduzione (The Arcane of Reproduction), by L. Fortunati, (Marsilio, Padua, 1981). So, also, we should mention the essay Il grande Calibano (The Great Caliban), by S. Federici and L. Fortunati, (FrancoAngeli, Mlano, 1984) that, relative to the period of original accumulation, rereads and reinterprets the trials of the witch hunts from a political point of view. This is just a first, brief mention of the fundamental texts but there are many others, representing stages of the analytical effort that was sustained, that are in the archive, representing essential components of the theoretical patrimony of the feminist strand we are dealing with.
For completeness with respect to the type of material donated, it must be said that the archive also houses a remarkable collection of feminist magazines from other groups, as well as newspaper sheets or journal issues or other papers coming from different subjects. This is explained by the fact that other active organizations felt that a mutual understanding of what was produced was interesting and so sent us their materials.
In the same way, it should be mentioned that some companions formed the Musical Group of the SLD Committee of Padua which composed and sang at events. These beautiful songs that they wrote and recorded on two albums, recently reproduced on CD, are kept in both versions at the archive. A theater group, which belonged to the same Committee, was also formed and performed the show “L’identità” (The Identity), adapted from a text by Maria Vittoria Arciero. The creativity, the need to express themselves in new forms, was in fact an essential need that exploded across the movement, even among men. The struggle was accompanied by joyful gatherings; it was accompanied by a sociality without boundaries.
The repression in the late ‘70s ended a decade of activism on the part of various subjects, including feminists. Equal opportunity policies as an institutional response to the needs of the Feminist Movement replaced the problem of capitalist development with that of discrimination between men and women, directing the younger generation to circumscribe their analytical effort to that effect. The ‘80s were years of social normalization, the launch of neoliberalism, the drastic application in many countries of structural adjustment policies. For various members of the feminist circuit in question, the impossibility of continuing a discourse in the advanced areas pushed them toward the other end of development, to spending periods of time, working even, in countries of the southern part of the world where the neoliberal globalization of the ‘90s would bring new crucial nodes to their attention: first and foremost, the relationship between the expansion of capitalist relations and subsistence economies, the question of land, water and seeds as fundamental common goods, the policies of food, the global operation of proletarianization and lowering the cost of labor, of which globalization and restratification of the work of caring is an extremely significant outcome.
Renewed studies on the theme of original accumulation therefore return in the readings of neoliberal globalization. Reproduction, in a broader sense, is investigated not only for how it depends on human activities and the supplies of the state, but also for how it depends on the health of the planet Earth.
In a context in which all kinds of disasters that open lethal wounds in the balance of life on earth and in the sea are becoming more and more dramatic and frequent, not only are studies being conducted but new initiatives are being taken. The overall work of the members of the Feminist Movement that was the subject of this illustration thereby meets new generations and helps to create new circuits of analysis and militancy. A good witness to this is the online magazine The Commoner and the complex of materials housed in this archive.
– Translated by Rafaella Capanna
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Le operaie della casa
Introduction
1977 saw the emergence of a new wave of social conflict in many parts of Italy, one that questioned fundamental assumptions about class struggle, political forms, and the nature of social subjectivity. 1977 was also the year in which the autonomist movement briefly came to dominate the local revolutionary milieu, only to retreat in confusion and disorder by the year’s end. Across those twelve months, hundreds of perspectives documents were produced and circulated in Italy by organizations large and small, outlining how capital and the state might be defeated in circumstances where a powerful Communist Party and union movement were calling for social peace and austerity in the name of national unity. What follows are two extracts from one such perspectives document, published in the January-April 1977 (and final) issue of Le operaie della casa. This journal was the mouthpiece of the Comitato per il Salario al Lavoro Domestico di Padova, a group then active in the Veneto region, and counting amongst its more prominent members Mariarosa Della Costa and Leopoldina Fortunati.
The whole of this fourth issue of Le operaie della casa was given over to a long document that, in criticizing the views of the dominant camps within the contemporary revolutionary left (particularly those based in Italy’s North), offered a quite different outlook as to how social conflict should be prosecuted there and internationally. The document was divided into sections: after an introduction that parodied Mao (“Great is the disorder in comrades’ heads; the situation therefore is worrying”), a sustained polemic was outlined against “The New Strategy” proposed both by leading autonomist organizations (above all, the Rosso group led by Toni Negri, and the Senza Tregua group led by Oreste Scalzone and others), as well as by circles associated with fragments of Lotta Continua (e.g. the journal Ombre Rosse) and sections of the feminist and anarchist movements (although who precisely of the latter is being criticized is not clear). Topics addressed included development, underdevelopment, and revolution, with many autonomists being accused of a blind worship of “the productive forces” aimed at setting the waged and unwaged to further toil after “the revolution”; the newfound enthusiasm within much of Autonomia for “building the party” and “seizing the state,” and what the consequences of that approach might again be for the weakest sections of the class; and finally, the flaws of those feminist groups who opposed the politics of wages for housework advocated by Le operaie della casa.
We present here excerpts from the original document in Le operaie della casa, concerning women’s autonomy, “seizing the state,” and the related question of “counterpower.” While acutely aware that the circumstances of Italy forty years ago are profoundly different to those we face today, it is hoped that this material’s appearance will spur others to re-examine the debates of those times (and to themselves translate more of this and other relevant documents of the seventies) – debates which raised a number of important questions, many of which remain unanswered in any practical manner.
– Steve Wright
Women: The Third World in the Metropolis1
The flaw discrediting the whole outlook of our male comrades is that once again, in crisis just as in development, their eyes are locked solely on the factory, and thus they make an inevitably distorted assessment of the forces the class can mobilize against the attack of capital. In fact, just as they fail to see the struggles of the unwaged in the Third World, likewise they do not see the struggles of unwaged workers in the metropolises, and therefore cannot see the variety of the trenches from which the workers’ counterattack departs today.
This outlook continues to ignore, thus, that in the crisis itself a movement of women has developed on an international level, which on the terrain of the wage and the refusal of work has undermined the mechanisms of accumulation in a fundamental way. This movement consists of all the struggles which have always been invisible in the eyes of the left (see the decline in birth rates at the international level, the escalation in the divorce rate, the number of families headed by a woman, and of the women who abandon the family – now one in three in the USA – the number of illegitimate children, etc.) It also includes all those struggles that, insofar in as the left recognizes them, it considers acts of counterculture – the lesbian women’s movement, for example. In reality all these struggles are struggles against housework. These movements have been able to commit to an international level precisely because they have been sustained by a massive conquest of money for this labor. Sure enough, having our own money is for women an unavoidable condition for our ability to refuse dependence on men, and to refuse, therefore, our own work. This we reiterate for everyone who still tells us today that the struggle for “liberation” is not reducible to any one demand, and having money is not what is most important, but rather “transforming the everyday.” But with our pockets empty and constrained to personal dependence, it is very difficult to take back our lives and transform our social relations. Not by coincidence, the massification of the struggle for wages and the massification of the refusal of housework go hand in hand. Thus not only has a big cut of the so-called “public spending” of many states (see welfare in the USA, Canada, England, New Zealand; the “familial salary” in France, etc.) been meted out to compensate domestic labor on the waves of women’s struggles, but actually more and more the state has had to invest in the reproduction of labor-power.
But the more women have negotiated money with the state the more they have managed to refuse housework and dictate different conditions. Furthermore the massification of prostitution (upon which more than 10% of the population in Italy survives, according to Corriere della Sera) demonstrates the refusal of women to supply unpaid domestic labor – in this case, sexual labor. In this direction advances the very significant struggle that prostitutes are carrying out in the USA, England, France, and Spain, etc.
That this kind of struggle, this political subject remains unseen indicates all the limits characterizing the outlook of the left. The NAP2, differently than many others, sees in the prostitute – insofar as she is an extralegal proletarian and a precarious worker – a potential revolutionary subject, but only if she goes to prison. Only with the experience of prison, according to NAP, can the extralegal proletarian overcome uncontrolled, anarchic individualism to discover a collective identity, overcome uncontrolled consumerism (“easy” money squandered on exclusive, trivial luxury goods), to discover a revolutionary political position. From here it is a short step to the rhetoric of the Red Brigades, for whom nothing helps “raise consciousness” like a stint in prison, according to the old “the worse, the better” discourse.
Does Lyon3, for these comrades, mean nothing to the history of the class struggle? These same prostitutes they consider unbridled individualists and consumerists, redeemable for the class struggle only through prison, have occupied churches, gone on strike, attacked the state with very clear demands. They have called for decriminalization against the restructuring plan that would have them closed up in “Eros Centers,”4 and have demanded to keep their children with them, against the state control that de facto obstructs every social life, etc. In more and more towns the prostitutes are organizing as a movement. This movement, according to our male comrades, evidently does not exist?
We can direct the same question also to the comrades of Contropotere who write:
Ask the pundit in the big room pressing all the buttons what will happen before long, today, this evening. He’ll enjoy himself, comrades, with women we pay with labor, and he will bring them into houses we build, and he will use relationships we create working. (Contropotere N.O., September ’76)
Here the comrades are ostensibly berating the capitalist. In reality they are berating the prostitutes, who are immediately portrayed as leeches on worker’s labor, and not as workers in their own right who on a terrain of domestic labor have managed to charge for at least some of the tasks of this work. This is the same understanding for which in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique the prostitutes were persecuted and mandated to “rehabilitate” themselves (that is, prepare themselves for “more productive” work) in actual concentration camps. This is after they were largely used (as women always are) during the wars for liberation, often to carry out very dangerous tasks. Particularly after all this, no one ever cared about how these women could survive economically beyond dependence on men, in war or not.
If this is the destiny into which “red capital,” just as “white capital,” has forced women – trying to close them in the Eros Centers, the sex factories, to increase their sexual productivity and at the same time isolate them from other women and thus restrain in some way the increase of prostitution – there is therefore is a significant connection between the plan of “white” capital and that of “red capital,” both aimed at attacking and repressing in any way the struggles of prostitutes in the world.
It is precisely the ignorance of this arc of struggles (if not the will to repress them) that has been the source of a great sense of defeat for the left regarding the current relation of forces between class and capital. This ignorance is also founded upon the left’s failure to recognize struggles that advance at different levels and with different organizational structures, for which our male comrades will always find the barrel of the gun more definitive than a factory invaded by children. This “difference” is rather always interpreted as weakness. It is not a coincidence that our male comrades have never recognized anything in the struggles of women, and (some) have begun to characterize us as a “proletarian force” (even if they are always ready to forget about us) only when they need to deal with our mass presence in the streets. First of all, unlike the male workers – who, when they “weren’t struggling” only represented “mere labor-power” – we women were little more than elements, sometimes pretty elements, of the natural landscape.
But if we must speak of our “weakness,” then we need to say immediately that if we as women do not represent a major force it is also because we have always found ourselves face to face with (and against) a left which has continuously repressed our interests. In this they are all in agreement, from the PCI5 to the “revolutionaries.” All accuse us of being backwards and blame us because we wouldn’t abandon our struggles – the only ones that would guarantee us real power – to line up at their sides. Let the comrades of the Red Brigades serve as an example: those who continue to dismiss our struggle against exploitation, contrasting it with a “class struggle” of which obviously we women never had any part.
Not until a woman lays claim to not only economic autonomy and the right to choose her own way of life, but also recognizes herself in the exploited class and begins a practice of class struggle…
Similarly in Senza Tregua of Naples:
it’s necessary to criticise the goal of wages for housework, which operates from a correct reading of the process of socialization of capital, productivity and housework, and is characteristic of a sector which is certainly at the vanguard in the theory and practice of women’s struggle. At the same time, the discourse of the refusal of housework, the challenging of that role, and the reappropriation of the political and social dimension, are not presented clearly by these comrades. This limit becomes more grave if we consider that, on the other hand, their aim does not take account of how the crisis closes political spaces for our demands, and that for the program of struggle for the wage as a moment of aggregation against development, we must necessarily substitute our organizational capacity to express power, to assert our will in the form of decree.
But if the left does not understand the profound anti-capitalist radicalism of the struggle of women for wages against housework, the state does very well. Today like never before, in fact, capital knows that undisciplined women produce undisciplined children, and that there is a direct umbilical cord between the refusal of cooking and the refusal of the assembly line, of the school, of the army.
It is precisely this struggle against work, upon which accumulation and the disciplining of the class are largely founded, that has compelled the state to invest more and more in the terrain of the reproduction of labor power. Thus the enormous growth of “public spending” has emerged at the international level.
In fact, behind the process which our male comrades define as “tertiarization” there is in large part the socialization of various tasks of housework (social assistance, “collective mothers” etc.), the immediate consequence of which is the increase in the cost of labor-power itself. nd it is precisely this increase, that is, the need to invest more and more in the reproduction of living labor, which constitutes one of the fundamental factors of the present crisis of capital.
It is not enough to examine the massification of the refusal of women on the terrain of housework. We must also understand what there is behind the organizational difficulties which workers today encounter in respect to their struggles and the refusal of their work. It is a fact, for example, that in addition to the male worker’s defense of the wage at the price of the intensification of work, women refuse to bear the brunt of the intensification of housework to avoid the lowering standard of the family. (The other example of this refusal is the great crisis of the family in the USA with the massification of unemployment, in which women often abandoned their unemployed husbands.)
Similarly, fewer and fewer women are willing to function as footholds, like support pillars, to the struggles that men wage. This is true regarding housework as much as for political work. Without a doubt the fact that women are no longer willing to sacrifice themselves, compensating with their labor for the capitalist attack against workers, represents in the short term a moment of weakness for men. But only in the short term, because in reality capital has founded its authority over male workers upon the sacrifice of women. In fact, if women’s dependence on men represented a power for men who could always count on their jobs, it is alternatively true that it has represented a great weakness for men against capital, because having dependents has always signified a great disciplinary force in the workplace. So the fact that women will not subjugate themselves to plug up the leaks is in the long term a moment of power for men too, insofar as capital has played the power difference within the class against them too.
We hoped that our male comrades would have learned this lesson with the emergence of the Feminist Movement, which if on the one hand signaled a great organizational crisis for the comrades (they were losing their wives, secretaries, and woman-comrade maids), represented on the other hand a great leap of power for the whole class. But instead of gleaning from the emergence of the Feminist Movement some new strategic directions, our male comrades sought to repress this movement because it threatened their immediate interests; or they sought to use it, to instrumentalize it, for what had always been its projects.
New strategic directions, we have said. The first and most evident being that to go beyond the factory doesn’t mean falling into a void that only the assault rifle can fill. Rather it means to unite, and to recompose on the basis of the common need for wages with all these political subjects, which, starting with women, are moving on this terrain. Wages against housework, against precarious work, against school work, and against factory work, remain, in fact, today as always, the slogans of the class.
AND WE CAN WIN.
Concluding, what does the current crisis of capital amount to in our point of view? For us too it is a definitive crisis that signals the extreme limit of capitalist development. It is not because capital does not know how to resolve these organic contradictions, but exactly because the class has attacked the mechanisms of the reproduction of capital.
Seizing the State6
The discourse on the seizure of power translates more or less explicitly into the objective of “seizing the state.” “More or less explicitly” because while there is a great homogeneity in the comrades’ positions concerning the seizure of power, on the seizure of the state the positions are more nuanced: at least for now, or at least in words. The most explicit, as always, are the comrades of Senza Tregua:
The class constitutes itself as state [si fa stato], it seizes political power before rather than after the insurrection (Supplemento a Senza Tregua, 14 July 1976).
Apparently the opposite stance is taken by Rosso, whose members speak of the “extinction” of the state. Clearly, however, this is an affectation [piccolo vezzo], since historically the extinction of the state has never meant its destruction.
But let’s approach things methodically.
What is the State?
Le operaie della casa 3 of 3
For Marx and the Marxists, the State is the product of the irreducible contradiction between the working class and capital, and the guarantor of the primacy of capital’s interests. For this reason Marxists have always criticized Kautskyist (social democratic) conceptions of the State as an organ of mediation-conciliation of opposed interests, the conciliation-mediation of the struggle between the working class and capital. Lenin went back to Marx: the State must be destroyed. At the same time he envisioned, as an intermediary objective, the necessity of seizing the state and managing it, with a view to its extinction. Lenin, like Engels before him, started from the assumption that once the private ownership of the means of production had been abolished – in other words, once these means had become the property of the state (statified, nationalized) – the State in its capitalist-bourgeois function would no longer have any reason to exist. Meaning that its extinction would be the inevitable result of the statification of capital (indeed, Lenin’s struggle was against the anarchy of production).
In reality, capital is not abolished once it is simply nationalized and statified. Exploitation remains, even if the manager of accumulation and the class relation is the state in the immediate form of the party-technocracy. On the other hand, even in the socialist non-communist countries, the state has become the direct manager of capitalist development: the enterprise state. To take an example that affects us directly, in Italy at least 50% of capital is the property of the state (Montedison, ENI, IRI etc.). But there is much more to this. Not only does the state increasingly manage and control production directly; it is also the guarantor for capital of the reproduction of labor-power (and therefore the first organizer and controller of housework).
That the state is the boss of women and the controller-guarantor of the reproduction of labor-power can be seen directly in the fact that: a) it is the state that controls the family, the birth rate, immigration, emigration etc. through the promulgation of pertinent laws; b) it is always the state that intervenes to stand in [sostituire] for women every time the refusal of housework [lavoro domestico] deepens. Indeed, the struggle of women against housework is the fundamental factor behind certain transformations in the state.
Consider the progressive growth of state investment in the social reproduction of labor-power: hospitals, schools, mental health centers, controls at the neighborhood level through social workers, etc., that stand in for mothers and wives. Today, in fact, the state – far from the army/police/government as seen from Lenin’s viewpoint! – is incarnated first and foremost in those institutions that must organize, control and guarantee the reproduction of labor-power. But guaranteeing, organizing the reproduction of labor-power has also meant guaranteeing and organizing power divisions within the class. Divisions based upon the wage and being unwaged, and maintained through the control of the unwaged by the waged: men in relation to women, parents in relation to children, doctors and teachers etc. in relation to women and children. Today, in fact, every time a layer of the class controls and commands the productivity of another layer, it always incarnates directly the authority and function of the state, it is the state in relation to the layer subordinated to it.
Therefore the other essential characteristic of the state is that it is not only the product of the struggle between class and capital, and guarantor of the latter’s primacy. It is also the organizer and guarantor of the power division within the class between waged and unwaged, and guarantor of the primacy of the waged over the unwaged (beating your wife is not violence, beating your children is even less so).
What does it mean, therefore, to seize the state? It means quite simply taking charge of the mechanisms of exploitation, starting with the exploitation of housework in all its aspects (birth rates, regulation of sexual labor etc. – speaking of which, what will become of prostitutes in the new revolutionary state?). And, naturally, rationalizing them, and developing them.
We should add that the discourse on the seizure of the state reflects once again the nationalistic optic through which these comrades consider matters, an optic that can only be anti-worker in presupposing the class as a national rather than international class. This is equivalent to suspending [congelare] the revolutionary process, a process that is necessarily international given that the working class is international. Seizing command (the dictatorship of the proletariat) over the capitalist mechanism in a given country means engaging [riferirsi] with the social wealth present at the national level, rather than the social wealth accumulated internationally. It means navigating within the equilibria of the international relations between various capitalist sectors and state, in the process operating in a manner that remains compatible with such equilibria – the opposite of subverting the latter. This perspective of the self-limitation of struggle in terms of the international revolutionary process is already present in Senza Tregua:
Grasping the fact that the limitations imposed by the network of capitalist relations persist – still not having been subverted at the global level – assumes therefore the permanence of the social product’s commodity form, and thus the permanence of the valorization process… assuming by hypothesis the necessity of maintaining and increasing, for a certain number of years, at the rhythms indicated by Economic Theory [?], a quotient of gross domestic product (and therefore a fund of labor-hours to accumulate, with the aim of producing commodities), poses the question of how to distribute productive activity amongst the population (Supplemento a Senza Tregua, 14 July 1976).
This then is the sense of that “seizing the state” proposed today by many comrades. And this holds also for those who, more primly, speak only of “seizing power” while hastening to speak of the extinction of the state. But, as we have said, historically extinction has never meant the destruction of the state, but only the destruction of one of its particular forms as a means towards its rationalization.
Nonetheless, we can say that “seizing the state” is consistent with “seizing power,” as seizing power means “the reorganization of labor.” But this is once again the scrap heap of a communist strategy that has now had fifty years of working class refusal and irreducibility to embrace as its own.
China is at Hand: Or, the Areas of Counterpower7
The thematic of counterpower, launched by the Red Brigades, recurs persistently in the discourses of the comrades. It is based on the necessity that the class already posits itself and acts as an alternative power to the power of capital. Class indeed: as counterpower. A telling aspect of this proposition is the emphasis everyone places on the decree (counterposed to demands, which presuppose the permanence of capitalist relations) with which the class expresses its essential objectives: with which the class, in other words, legislates.
How is that proletarian counterpower which today represents the intermediary objective of the whole Movement made concrete? The discourse is rather nebulous, but always revolves around the formation/construction of Areas of Counterpower, modeled on the one hand on “no go” zones (liberated zones on the model of Ireland and Angola), on the other hand on the experience of self-management:8 that is, the self-management of particular structures and “political spaces”.
The most concrete in this regard are the comrades of Senza Tregua, who think immediately of the direct management of appropriated/liberated factories for the production of arms and of means of subsistence:
Thus, if today it was possible, in factory x located within territory y, to promote forms of “provisional workers’ government” on a territorial scale (assemblies, councils, equipped to carry out their own decrees on a whole “packet” of questions: prices and tariffs; factory staffing levels and hours; the production goals for small units that generate wage goods for small scale circulation (for example bakeries, pasta makers etc), the distribution professional services on the part of non-working class occupations (doctors) etc. …) (Supplemento a Senza Tregua, 14 July 1976).
And again:
Production for subsistence, production for combat: within the conquest of these overarching terms, a process can develop through which the proletariat begins to construct the autonomy of its social dictatorship, in power… (Senza Tregua 25 March 1976).
And again:
We must build the power to occupy and set to work factories able to produce the means of subsistence and of struggle! Outside, against the reformist fantasies of self-management, we must begin to demonstrate the explosive force of a new revolutionary working class discipline (Senza Tregua 25 March 1976).
It is self-government at a local level that is proposed here; despite the comrades’ exhortations, this does indeed incarnate the reformist fantasies of self-management. In fact self-management, the self-government of the local territory, like the perspective of liberated zones that we must defend with arms, makes it possible, under the illusion of self-control, to justify a politics of misery [miseria], of self-help, of making do with what is to hand. In both cases it is the self-management of one’s own poverty [miseria] (see the experience of the Chinese communes). And it could not be otherwise, because when one’s own area, rather than wealth at an international level, becomes the reference point for what can be obtained, one winds up necessarily with the autonomy of one’s own misery. As a consequence, one falls into the proposition of austerity, of the limitation of needs: and this holds whether one is talking of areas of counterpower, or of the seizure of power, or of the self-government of the producers.
Linked to the theme of self-management is the envisioned end of the division of labor – and, in particular, the end of the division between manual and intellectual labor.
We can say straight away that this discourse also conceals a further intensification of labor. Not only will they make us work, not only will they exploit us, but they will make us plan the forms and manner of our exploitation. As in the communes, this classic model of socialism – with the elimination of the division between “worker,” “supervisor” and “planner” – will not only intensify labor, but has attempted and will continue to attempt to contain class conflict, making workers internalize and directly manage their own control and disciplining.
We women know quite a bit about this, given that we have always had to self-manage our kitchens and bedrooms. And we have always performed both manual and intellectual labor, since not only have we had to sweep,9 clean plates etc., but we have also had to plan the whole family’s budget and activities [vita].
After all, not only women, but the class as a whole, has always used self-management. In the office, the factory, the school, workers have always been responsible for the organization-division-cooperation of labor, covering for each other when someone is absent, dividing up the work to make it more bearable, etc. But self-management has always been used as a defensive, not an offensive weapon – let alone as a strategy.
As we have seen, the thematic of self-management is central to the objective of counterpower. This is a point upon which there is convergence between two of the Movement’s tendencies – the Leninist and the anarcho-libertarian (Situationist, Dadaist) – that are contradictory only in appearance. This should come as no surprise, since the antagonism traditionally expressed at the level of ideology between Stalinists and anarcho-libertarians has always been resolved harmoniously in practice (in this regard, Lenin had seen the cooperative as a model of socialist labor).
In fact there is complementarity, not contradiction, between the thematic of seizing the state, and the thematic of counterpower. There is no contradiction between the perspective of a centralized planning of production and the self-managed decentralization of its execution. Not only do all the contemporary experiences of capitalist organization demonstrate that the more command is centralized, the more is execution can be decentralized, but the very experience of realized socialism has always posed these two prerogatives as complementary.
On the other hand, the anarcho-libertarian dream of self-management (starting from local self-government) has never been in contradiction with the seizure of power, because the anarcho-libertarians’ disinterest for the state is a disinterest not only for its seizure, but for its very destruction. As historical experience has shown, the libertarian left has never represented a force against the state; it has been integrated, as we have said, in all the communist labor plans (see also the experience of the socialist communes, modeled precisely by anarcho-libertarian examples).
This integration has always occurred because there is a fundamental agreement, starting from a common identification in labor, on the necessity of managing, controlling one’s own production, according to the ideal of the artisans who express their creativity through their own labor. As a consequence there is a common agreement in considering the wage as a terrain that has been surpassed in terms of the class struggle. In its place, the anarcho-libertarians have substituted the self-management of the personal: that is, the transformation of production starting from the ambit of the home and familial relations – “the transformation of daily life.” It is in this sense that we must read their “NO” to the reproduction of the family (which is a complete “no” of money to women), by which they understand “reclaiming life.” In the place of money they offer us cultural revolution (a revolution of language, of signs, as well as a sexual revolution, etc.), that is a new alternative model of living – one that can be realised immediately, because it costs nothing, apart from a bit of good will, a lot of mental elasticity, a lucid increase in awareness [presa di coscienza] – and, obviously, a spirit of mimicry [imitazione]. In particular, it is backward to get married, to live as a couple, to have children etc. – and this holds for men as well as women, given that is has been decreed that we are equal.
It’s clear how the anarcho-libertarians use this “decreed equality” between men and women to palm us off, we women, and to close down our process of struggle against men. Which is why, looking at the length and breadth of the liberation for which they yearn reveals the true meaning for them of “women’s liberation.” They are AUTONOMOUS, yes – but their autonomy is not from capital but rather from the CLASS, starting with women.
It is this fracture between the problem of daily life and the daily problem of money that the future pink/reddish bosses are seeking to recompose, united in refusing money to the class, starting with women. Instead they offer us a reheated version of the same old stuff of a “new consciousness” (which, as we know, costs nothing, beyond some small individual effort) – the reorganization of our misery.
Comments
Mapping the Terrain of Struggle: Autonomous Movements in 1970s Italy
The most recent capitalist offensive has sparked a vibrant new wave of struggles over the question of social reproduction. Water, housing, education, to name only a few, are now decisive sites of confrontation, and activists across the globe experiment with new tactics, forms of struggle, and models of organization.
In some ways, our renewed focus on social reproduction shares interesting parallels with the “Italian Revolution” of 1968-1980, the most radical upheaval in postwar Western Europe. For while originally firmly anchored to the struggles of the factory proletariat, many movements began to wage a multitude of struggles beyond the point of production, developing class power on what was called the terrain of social reproduction.
In fact, each phase of the political evolution of the autonomous social movements was characterized by its focus on social reproduction issues, such as self-reduction campaigns on shopping, energy bills, and public transport, often in conjunction with the more radical sections of the unions in the early to mid-Seventies. Housing occupations and rent strikes became important in the mid-1970s as the crisis of Fordism-Keynesianism deepened, particularly in Rome where Workers Autonomy was strong in the urban periphery. Reproductive struggles were also carried out by students on school, university, and education issues. As the decade wore on, youth in the new, smaller, and more repressive post-Fordist factories of the Milanese hinterland began to organize themselves more outside of work and in the social territory as the “Proletarian Youth Circles,” defying the national-popular logic of PCI-championed austerity politics by demanding access to luxury goods, services, and cultural products, not just the basic means of survival, as their parents had. And as factories were restructured and decentralized, involving the laying off of tens of thousands of industrial workers and the automation, robotization, and elimination of their posts, social movements of the unemployed, particularly in the less developed South, or Mezzogiorno, began to make a guaranteed social wage (salario sociale garantito) for all, both working and unemployed, their central demand. But the most important reproductive labor struggles were those of Wages for Housework and other feminist and women’s movement campaigns for the self-valorization of the social reproduction of the workforce by women, particularly housewives, sex workers, and nurses.
While we must certainly forge our own political forms today, there’s no need to reinvent the wheel. Much has changed, but many of these issues remain as crucial as ever. In this context, critically revisiting the robust arsenal of political struggle bequeathed by the Italian movements of that era can provide us not only with inspiration, but also models to help guide us as we find our own way.
Theorizing Social Reproduction
The aim of this brief summary of the theoretical debates on social reproduction within Italian Autonomist Marxism and the part of the feminist movement closest to it in political and theoretical terms, above all the group of feminist intellectuals and activists around the Wages for Housework campaign in Italy and internationally, is to outline a theoretical framework within which to analyze the autonomous struggles on social reproduction in 1970s Italy. The main nodes of these debates are seen as Italian workerism, post-workerism, post-autonomism and, for want of better terms, workerist-influenced and post-workerist feminism.
Karl Marx’s rather limited discussion of reproduction and circulation in Capital Volume II was taken as the starting point by Antonio Negri and others in Quaderni Rossi and Classe Operaia, the main workerist publications of the 1960s, to develop their analysis on the relationship of reproduction with class antagonism. Negri was one of the first workerists to identify the antagonistic nature of reproduction as part of social production, rather than just circulation within capital, while criticizing his more orthodox comrades, such as the PCI-based Mario Tronti who continued to reduce the problem of reproduction to circulation, as indeed had Marx:
we would be forced to reduce the Marxian approach to the issue of reproduction to a question of circulation: this would be absolutely illegitimate – even though it is common, especially within Italian workerism … In fact, the constant upheaval of the terms of class struggle from within the workers’ struggle and capitalist restructuring demonstrates exactly the opposite: the terrain of reproduction is dominated by the antagonistic categories of production and the process of production does not disappear in the commodity but re-emerges in all of its elements (as identified by Marx rather than Smith) in the reproduction of capital and workers’ struggles.… The working class, through its struggles, motivates capital to restructure production as well as reproduction (which is increasingly equivalent to social production).… At the current level of class struggle, worker organization only emerges when the struggle can have an impact on factory production and from there be transferred onto the whole mechanism of reproduction of social capital.1
This criticism of Marx, orthodox Marxism and even of some sections of Italian workerism over the question of reproduction in fact owed much (although not apparently acknowledged by Negri) to previous debates within Italian and later U.S.-based workerist-influenced feminism. Silvia Federici took Marx and all forms of Marxism, including operaismo to task for ignoring or underestimating the central role of social reproduction as both sexual reproduction and unpaid domestic labor in capitalist accumulation and from there in class antagonism. Referring also to a broader feminist critique of Marx, based on the work of the activists of the Wages for Housework campaign in the 1970s, such as Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, Leopoldina Fortunati, and more recently of the Australian eco-feminist Ariel Salleh, and the Bielefeld feminist school of Maria Mies, Claudia Von Werlhof, and Veronica Bennholdt-Thomsen, Federici states that
this critique argues that the analysis of Marx on capitalism was hindered by his incapacity to conceive of an activity as being productive of value unless it was for the production of goods, and his consequent blindness before the meaning of the unpaid reproductive activity of women in the process of capitalist accumulation. To ignore this activity limited his comprehension of the true extension of the capitalist exploitation of work and the function of the salary in the creation of divisions within the working class, beginning with the relation between women and men. If Marx has recognized that capitalism needed to support itself, not only in an immense quantity of unpaid domestic activity for the reproduction of the work force, but also in the devaluation of these reproductive activities with the aim of reducing the cost of the labor force, possibly he would have been less inclined to consider capitalist development as inevitable and progressive.2
As an at least partial riposte to such a critique, the Italian workerist theory of the “social factory” can be seen as an attempt to go beyond its originally exclusive focus on factory-based autonomous struggles to include the related movements of 1968-69, particularly of students, and of working-class community struggles over reproductive issues such as housing, bills, and transport, although the central role of women in the social factory is again brushed over. In Italy in the early 1970s the extraordinary wave of autonomous workers’ struggles launched during the 1969 “Hot Autumn” within the centralized Fordist factory were gradually being rolled back by tactical capitalist retreats and strategic reforms, such as the Factory Councils and the 1970 Workers Charter, and the fulcrum of social conflict began to shift towards the “social factory,” leading Tronti to extend his factory-centered approach over the rest of society, so defining the social factory as:
At the highest level of capitalist development, the social relation becomes a moment of the relation of production, the whole society becomes an articulation of production; in other words, the whole of society exists as a function of the factory and the factory extends its exclusive domination over the whole of society.3
Thus, the “social factory” theory did not deal sufficiently with the feminist critique of Marxism in general and operaismo in particular, as neither did Negri’s theory of the “socialized worker” (operaio sociale), supposedly the new antagonist subject of the post-Fordist social factory of decentralized production, given the neutralization of the struggles of the “mass worker” in the Fordist factory of centralized production in the early 1970s as alluded to by Tronti in the previous paragraph. Although Negri developed his theory of the socialized worker in the early to mid-1970s, the period of the rise of both radical feminism and Workers Autonomy as social movements based, in quite different ways, on issues of social needs and reproduction, his attempt to lump together women and other emergent social antagonists of the period within a “general theory” was received with skepticism and accusations of lack of analytical rigor within Autonomia itself, never mind the feminist movement, although his critics, in this case at least, can in turn be accused of empirical fetishism:
(y)our interest for the “emergent strata” (proletarian youth, feminists, homosexuals) and for new, and reconceptualized political subjects (the “operaio sociale”) has always been and is still shared by us. But precisely the undeniable political importance of these phenomena demands extreme analytical rigour, great investigative caution, a strongly empirical approach (facts, data, observations and still more observations, data, facts).4
Self-Reduction and Social Reproduction Struggles in 1970s Italy
The huge wave of working class unrest begun in the “Hot Autumn” of 1969 continued unabated, reaching its peak with the armed occupation of the gigantic FIAT Mirafiori plant in Turin in March 1973 by a new generation of even more militant workers, the Fazzoletti Rossi (Red Bandanas), who organized autonomously even from the vanguardist groups of the New Left. However, from then on the effects of technological restructuring, redundancies, and the unions’ recuperation of consensus and control through the Factory Councils began to dampen down the autonomous workers’ revolt, which nevertheless continued at an exceptionally high level, compared to the rest of Western Europe, until the end of the decade.5 The largest outbreak of industrial unrest in Italy since the “Red Biennial” of 1920-21 soon spread to working class districts, where the emerging women’s movement, along with students (an increasing number of whom came from the working class since the advent of mass scholarization in the early 1960s) and the New Left groups became active in the self-organized neighborhood committees (comitati di quartiere) which organized rent and bill strikes, the self-reduction (autoriduzione) of public transport tickets and housing occupations to demand an overall improvement in working class living standards, as the growing economic, oil, and stagflation crises of the mid-1970s began to be felt.
Ironically, while the broader movement of Autonomia was gaining strength during the decade, its historical antecedent since the early 1960s, the autonomous workers’ movement, went into decline. This development was theorized by Negri, as the result of the “decomposition of the mass worker,” induced by industrial restructuration, and the “recomposition” of the new central actor in the class struggle, the “socialized worker,” situated more in the social territory outside and around the Fordist factory.6 This post-workerist theory was to prove highly controversial within Autonomia and its still workerist intellectual milieu, accentuating the divisions between Negri’s circle around the journal Rosso and Sergio Bologna’s around Primo Maggio, whose analysis continued to privilege the struggles of the industrial “mass worker.”7
One of the most important examples of social reproduction struggles in the “social factory” was the autoriduzione (self-reduction) campaign in Turin in 1974 where working class communities organized to pay self-reduced fares on public transport, involving the printing and issuing of their own tickets; a struggle in which radical sections of the trade unions, especially the PCI and PSI-based CGIL, were also engaged.8 Similar struggles took place over community control of reproductive needs: low-cost social housing, regulated low rents, and secure tenancies in the private sector, domestic energy consumption bills charged at the same low rate as industry, and “free” or “proletarian” shopping in supermarkets as depicted in Dario Fo’s 1974 play “Can’t pay! Won’t pay!.”9 Later on in the decade leisure and luxury needs became paramount for young urban proletarians, especially in Milan, as part of their critique of and opposition to the division of labor between the “right” to basic needs for the working class and the “right” to luxury and privilege for the bourgeoisie: self-reduced or expropriated eating out in expensive restaurants in the city center, the demand for and sometimes direct practice of free access to any kind of culture, whether it be a Lou Reed rock concert or an art house movie.10
These broader social reproduction conflicts were allied to the struggle of the women’s movement against the nuclear family as the site of the division of reproductive labor and domestic work, and for control of their own bodies and lives through more liberal and properly enforced divorce and abortion laws (many conservative doctors in the public health service refused to carry out abortions under a clause permitting “conscientious objection,” some while continuing to do them clandestinely in their own “back street abortion” clinics) and the democratization and feminization of medical and social services. Other forms of self-reductive and social reproduction struggles took place in the early and mid 1970s through housing occupations and rent strikes, particularly in the outskirts of Rome, a particularly hard-fought conflict by the homeless, marginalized youth and unemployed proletariat, which became one of the early focusing points of Rome Autonomia.
Reproductive Labor Struggles and Wages for Housework
Some ex-Potere Operaio theorists, active in the feminist movement, concentrated on the category of unpaid reproductive labor, which was seen as vital for the reproduction of living labor and therefore capital, particularly Dalla Costa and James on women’s unpaid housework,11 and Fortunati on reproductive labor as both housework and sex work.12 On the basis of this research, a section of the women’s movement close to Potere Operaio and Lotta Continua, Lotta Feminista,13 began a campaign known internationally as “Wages for Housework,” linking up with Selma James’ campaign in the USA and later Britain.14 In June 1974 Rosso (the weekly newspaper of Milanese “Organized Workers’ Autonomy”), as part of a debate between those demanding wages for housework and those who saw this as a “ratification” of housework, published a report by the Padua Committee for Wages for Housework on three days of discussion with the feminist movement in Mestre, near Venice.15
A large number of housewives, teachers, shop assistants and secretaries had gathered to denounce their triple exploitation by their employers, their husbands and the State, rejecting the misery and appalling conditions of work that all imposed: “Our struggle is against factories, … offices, against having to sit at a check-out counter all day … We are not fighting for such an organization of work, but against it.”16 They rejected the view of the political parties and extra-parliamentary groups that women’s emancipation lay in external paid employment, instead demanding that the State, whose most basic cellular structure was the nuclear family, pay them wages for their unpaid housework since they were reproducing and caring for the next generation of its citizens and workers, as well as for the old and infirm. They also denounced the inadequacy of the few “social services” provided, the lack of crèches and nurseries for housewives as well as for employed women, and the objectification and abuse of women’s bodies by the “masculinist” public health system. They called on women to reclaim their bodies and take control of their lives:
We women must reject the conditions of pure survival that the State wants to give us, we must always demand more and more, reappropriate the wealth removed from our hands every day to have more money, more power, more free time to be with others, women, old people, children, not as appendages but as social individuals.17
Milan was the main center of the women’s movement and women in Rosso and Autonomia often found themselves torn in two directions by their “double militancy.” They contributed to the debates on violence and subjectivity both within feminism and Autonomia, from the position that “violence, [understood as aggressive self-assertion as an antidote to patriarchal representations of female passivity and subordination], is a basis for subjectivity.”18 Otherwise, the principal areas of intervention were the factory and the refusal of work (together with Lotta Continua’s Women’s Collective), discrimination in the workplace, deregulated informal work (lavoro nero), prisons, sexual violence and machismo within Autonomia and the overall “Movement,” as well as the body and health. Action was taken in hospitals, over the unequal doctor-patient relationship and the denunciation of those doctors and medical centers that refused to carry out abortions, and of the service in general which victimized women and did not meet their actual health needs. Another area of intervention was international “solidarism rather than solidarity,” based on the feminist practice of “starting from yourself” (partire da se). They were also in touch with radical separatist feminists, who used psychoanalysis for “consciousness raising” and were close to the Radical Party, although relations with the broader feminist movement with its emphasis on the private sphere, consciousness raising, and non-violence, were conflictual. A joint action of denunciation of the Catholic Church’s negative impact on women’s control over their own bodies and lives was the occupation of the Duomo, Milan’s main cathedral and the religious symbol of its official identity. Other actions were taken to contest the stereotyping of women in patriarchal capitalist society as passive consumerist sex objects, including against wedding dress shops and dating agencies. They also participated in Lea Melandri’s “Free University of Women,” where housewives and intellectuals carried out an interclassist work on the representation of women in capitalist society. The crossover between Rosso and radical feminism produced two magazines itself, Malafemina and Noi testarde,19 making the “politics of the personal” and the questioning of gender roles part of Autonomia’s collective identity, although disagreement with Organized Workers’ Autonomy’s “workers’ centrality” position was permanent.20
School and University Struggles
The post-workerists of Autonomia also saw the cognitive labor of students as essential to the reproduction of the highly skilled sector of the work force ( the “general intellect” of Marx’s Grundrisse) and of cognitive capital as intelligence and knowledge, their studies for a higher entry into the labor market being considered as unpaid reproductive labor. This was one of the theoretical innovations that helped operaismo in 1968-69 to break down the historical divide between two of mature capitalist society’s main antagonist groupings – the industrial working class and the hitherto mainly middle-class university student – and build the alliance which was to form the basis of the Hot Autumn and the “Long Italian ‘68.” Here again the question of class composition would be crucial in explaining the arrival of the students as a mass movement, not simply for the much-needed reform of the university system but for the radical transformation of society. As the Italian economy expanded and society urbanized during the 1960s there was a growing need for qualified professionals, technocrats, and bureaucrats in both the public and private sectors. Thus, the social basis of university recruitment was widened to include large numbers of working class students. Simultaneously, the “Miracle” of unprecedented economic growth and relative prosperity since the 1950s meant that many working class families could afford for the first time to put at least one child into higher education who could then aspire to socially upward mobility.
However, despite the center-left reforms of the 1960s, the education system was completely unable to meet such aspirations, becoming one of the main causes of the 1968-69 Italian students and workers uprising, according to Robert Lumley.21 By 1974, there were mass mobilizations of school students and their parents, particularly women, throughout Italy against the dilapidated and under-funded education system, one of the first areas of public spending to be affected by post-Oil Crisis austerity measures.22 Both parents and children demonstrated and occupied schools left empty in protest against an acute shortage of classroom space, equipment, materials, and teachers which left large areas, particularly in the poorer South, operating part-time education with a shift system. Worse, inflation and austerity measures forced the price of schoolbooks beyond the reach of many working-class families. While Malfatti, the Christian Democrat Education Minister, ordered the sacking of militant Left teachers, the overall number of teachers was reduced as 600,000 prospective teachers applied for 23,000 positions.23 The government’s running down of the education system in working-class areas was balanced by its introduction of the “Schools Councils,” made up of delegated parents, teachers and students, with the aim, similar to the Factory Committees with regard to industrial action, that “they would institutionalize the struggle in the schools and re-establish political control by the right-wing.”24
The education cutbacks were also seen as a political attack on a key social antagonist, which had allied itself closely to the overall autonomous workers’ movement since 1968. In October 1974, 45 secondary schools and adult education colleges in Turin went on strike in solidarity with the FIAT national strike of October 17 and 4,000 students and teachers marched through the city center to picket the main gates of the Mirafiori plant. An analogy was drawn between the number of people losing their jobs and the rising number of working class children being failed in exams and expelled from the education system. The same month there were school strikes and demonstrations all over Italy making the common demand for an end to part-time schooling, smaller classes, immediate building programs for new schools and classrooms, no reduction in the number of teachers, improved hygiene, and facilities, local councils to make available funds they were holding back, free transport, books, and equipment for students, and free day centers for preschool children. Links were made between the committees campaigning against the education cuts and the autonomous workers’ movement.
In Rome, 3,000 construction and engineering workers joined a demonstration against education cuts. Students and workers set up joint commuter committees to oppose the increase in public transport fares. Women were especially active on this issue, as they were on virtually all social issues in the mid-1970s, the peak of the mass mobilization phase of the women’s movement, marching on schools, organizing pickets, occupying classrooms, setting up road blocks, all with the demand for better schools and day-care facilities.25 These mobilizations were self-organized with the participation of Autonomia, the New Left groups, particularly Lotta Continua in the South, as well as some of the unions, but were otherwise characterized by their autonomy from and hostility towards the political parties.
Another important element in the youth movement of the mid-seventies were the “autonomous student collectives” (ASC). In the secondary schools students and parents demanded and practiced direct participation in decision-making, which had previously been regulated by institutionalized electoral rules and representative bodies. So were born in the early 1970s the ASC, one of the social bases of Autonomía and the ’77 Movement. They organized strikes, occupations, the “trial” and expulsion of fascists, and autodidáctica (self-teaching) where students in dispute excluded their conservative teachers and taught themselves, sometimes for months. Increasingly, conflict in and outside high schools took place not only against the FUAN and other neo-fascist youth groups but also with the FGCI, the PCI’s youth wing, and with Comunione e Liberazione, a fundamentalist Catholic youth movement. In the most radical situations, autonomous students effectively “liberated” schools from their function as total institutions for the inculcation of capitalist integrative values based on work and the family, converting them into prototype “social centers.”26
Social Autonomia: The Socialized Worker in the Social Factory
One of the key aspects of Autonomia that separated it from the “bureaucratic legalism” of much of the New Left groups was its practice of “mass illegality” through housing squats, occupations of public spaces, the self-reduction of cultural as well as social costs, and forms of social expropriation such as “proletarian shopping.” The New Left, which continued to privilege struggles at the point of production, attacked this as “subproletarian” adventurism. Autonomia’s lauding of “proletarian illegality against bourgeois legality” as an aspect of the “refusal of work” extended to micro-criminal behaviors; the individual circumventing of the law in everyday life, typical of the Italian proletarian arte di arrangiarsi (art of getting by), particularly in the South where poverty and mass unemployment were rife. Here, Autonomia meridionale (southern autonomy) became a diffused social force among workers, the unemployed, and their communities, although relatively ignored by the late-1970s’ press campaign against Organized Workers Autonomy, based more in northern and central Italy.
The “area of diffused Autonomia” (or social autonomy) was the broader movement of workers, students, women, and youth, who preferred to develop their antagonism to capitalist society through a horizontal network structure, guaranteeing the autonomy of each sector and local reality from any attempt at unification and homogenization within a national party structure, and therefore in opposition to the stated aim of the Organized Workers’ Autonomy tendency of the need to create a “Party of Autonomy”27 This “autonomy of the periphery from the center” was closely linked to Autonomia’s different social composition (a mixture of “subproletariat and the intellectualized proletarian labour force. (…) The invasion of the university students without a future.”28 ), compared to that of Potere Operaio and the broader autonomous workers’ movement, which were based on the mass worker:
One can talk about the autonomy of workers who tend to deny their survival as such and to assert their life as communists, of the autonomy of the proletarianized who reject the mercantile-spectacular society, placing themselves against it (nobody believes outside it).29
Organized Workers’ Autonomy, contrasted with the “area of social autonomy” and other new social movements. However, the disparate and localized basis of even this more formally organized sector of Autonomia, which attempted unsuccessfully to privilege the party form, if under a different guise, had contrasting local characteristics and social compositions in its principal locations: in Milan, more linked to industrial factory struggles and the newer post-Fordist productive circuits, but also to struggles around reproduction and the self-reduction of social costs; in Padua, around the students’ movement, public transport and youth issues, but also involved with struggles in the Autonomous Workers Assemblies, post-Fordist factories and sweatshops; in Rome, where a more “populist” and council communist-influenced version militated among the unemployed and marginalized youth of the urban periphery, but also among the growing number of service sector workers, with a strong emphasis on internationalism.
Its Milan-based national newspaper Rosso took an increasing interest in social reproduction struggles:
[Rosso’s] greatest novelty consists in the awareness that the factory (…) is not the only terrain where the initiative of struggle has to develop. Other previously neglected social conditions assume an increasingly important role: those of women, youth, and the marginalized, never considered before as political subjects. Not immediately political but fundamental themes and problems are faced, such as personal relationships and the “general conditions of life.” Subsequently, the newspaper individualized three different sectors of the public to address: the factories, which the section Rosso fabbrica was devoted to, consisting mainly of interventions by the autonomous committees of various factories (Porto Marghera, Alfa Romeo, Zanussi etc.) (…); Rosso scuola, that included both the broad debates and news of the various high school committees; “Rosso tutto il resto,” where space was given to sectors of the youth movement organized outside the groups and of the feminist movement, that were fighting against marginalization. (…) [It] was one of the first magazines to deal with the transformation (…) from the mass worker of the big industrial concentrations to the socialized worker of the diffused factory in the territory. (…) This new political subject was to have its moment of maximum expression in the ‘77 movement. At the beginnings of 1978 the magazine identified four sectors of intervention and debate: 1) directly productive work, “for the reduction of the working day and for the conquest of time freed from work”; 2) public spending, “as the central moment of capitalist control and the reduction of the costs of social reproduction”; 3) the nuclear state and the production of death; 4) the legitimization of revolutionary action, against the repressive apparatus that the statemobilizes for the perpetuation of its dominion.30
“Diffused” and “creative” Autonomia, parts of the “autonomy of the social,” were composed of counter-cultural, unemployed, and semi-employed urban youth, students, radical feminists, homosexuals, and the cani sciolti (“stray dogs,” unaffiliated militants and activists). Youth and graduate unemployment reached crisis levels in the mid-1970s. Many young people consciously chose to avoid even looking for work (let alone the “refusal” of the late 1960s). Increasingly, they fled from the suffocating patriarchal authoritarianism of the traditional Italian nuclear family to live collectively, often in squatted flats and occasionally in communes.31 They survived partially through “black market jobs”32 and partially through mass expropriations of food from supermarkets and restaurants, but also through the “self-reduction” of bus fares, rock concerts, and cinema tickets:
[It was] a swarming process of diffused organization whose real protagonists were young proletarians, marginal to the organized autonomous groups, but inserted into dynamics of spontaneous, magmatic, uncontrollable aggregation.33
The experience of the “Proletarian Youth Clubs” (PYC/ circoli proletari giovanili) was centered in the metropolitan periphery, such as the Quarto Oggiaro and Sesto San Giovani districts in Milan where the effects of the mid-1970s economic crisis were worst felt. The satisfaction of the more complex aspirations of the individual had to be achieved “here and now” and not postponed to the future election of a leftist government or the aftermath of a socialist revolution. Likewise, there was no demand for “the right to work,” but instead one for a “guaranteed social income.” The ethics of self-sacrifice, austerity, and the “dignity of labor,” central to the PCI’s projected “moral culture” and economic strategy, were rejected in favor of the “right to luxury” in the depths of Italy’s worst postwar economic crisis, which the PCI sought to force the Italian working class to accept as “theirs” and not just of capital. Rather than demands, there were diffused behaviors and practices, such as espropri proletari (proletarian shopping) and self-reduction, but now of restaurant bills and cinema and rock concert tickets, as well as of transport costs and household bills: “The superfluous [was] at the center of [their] demands to the indignant consternation of politicians and journalists, intellectuals, and industrialists.”34
An extreme version of the ideology of consumerism was proposed, including the need and the right to consume all kinds of products whatever the extant economic circumstances. Indeed, even among the more libertarian sections of the social movements like the counter-cultural magazine Re Nudo (Naked King) there was preoccupation over the “death of [the collective ideals of] proletarian youth,”35 as this new, more individualist youth culture, based more on “subjectivity” than “solidarity,” overwhelmed the boundaries of the post-1968 counter-culture at the Parco Lambro Free Festival in Milan in June 1976. The expropriation of alternative products, the protagonism of the spectators rather than the performers, feminist separatism and the growing visibility of the heroin problem led to the Festival’s implosion and seemed to signify the end of the ideal of the collective transformation of the status quo.36
The event that presaged the ’77 Movement was the riot by the PYC and others from the “area of Autonomía” outside the La Scala opera house in Milan against the first night of the opera season in December 1976, the first display of a new kind of violence, more of urban youth gangs than of classical extreme Leftism, expressing the “prepolitical” anger of the unemployed, marginalized youth of the “dormitory suburbs,” riddled with despair and a heroin epidemic, against the politics of austerity and sacrifice:37
[This] year the first night at La Scala is – for the Milanese middle class – an occasion of political affirmation over the proletariat and a display of force (…) it is an insult against the proletariat, forced to make sacrifices so that the bourgeoisie can go to its first night. The first night at La Scala is a political date today. The proletarian youth present themselves, together with the women [’s movement], as the detonator and cultural vanguard of the detonation of the present equilibriums of power between the classes, but there is something more than 1968. The logic of sacrifices is the bourgeois logic that says: for the proletarians pasta, for the middle classes caviar. We claim our right to caviar: … because nobody can ever convince us that in times of sacrifices the bourgeoisie can go to the first night but we can’t, that they can eat parmesan but we can’t, or they can even force us to starve. The privileges that the middle class reserves for itself are ours, we pay for them. This is why we want to defeat them and we do so as a matter of principle … The right to take possession of some privileges of the middle class has been a new element since 1968, yesterday rotten eggs today self-reduction … Grassi, “socialist” and director of La Scala has told us that it’s all right to make the middle classes who want to go the first night pay 100,000 lira a head, so that cultural production can be financed; we reply that the first nights’ takings must go to the centers of struggle against heroin, that culture must be for proletarians.38
Movements of the Unemployed for a Guaranteed Social Wage
A major section of the movement of the organized unemployed in Naples also became part of “Autonomia meridionale,” the relatively forgotten part of the movement in the less developed South. It was among the self-organized unemployed movements in Naples and Catanzaro that “Autonomia meridionale” made its greatest impact, through the demand for an adequate “guaranteed social wage” from the State to counteract the social devastation caused by endemic unemployment and economic underdevelopment. The historical struggles of the unemployed for work in Naples, Italy’s poorest major conurbation, and throughout the Mezzogiorno, appeared to be in contradiction with the movement’s refusal of work. In fact the unemployed were seen as performing “unpaid labor”: through their necessary “job search” for a source of income they unintentionally depressed wages in the South and ultimately throughout the national economy as a reserve army of industrial labor, so performing a vital function for capital. The Naples unemployed were well aware of their objective capitalist function, leading them to campaign through sometimes violent mass marches and pickets of the city council’s offices for a “guaranteed social wage” and increased welfare, so that they would not be forced to accept depressed wages and could delay their entry into the labor market if necessary.
Mass unemployment also wreaked havoc with working class communities in the industrial North that were used to secure, rising incomes during the previous 20 years, and there was a significant increase in the number of suicides among redundant factory workers in cities like Turin in the early 1980s. However, for the “No Future” generation of the “socialized worker” and in particular for the ‘77 Movement, unemployment was seen as an inevitable fate which could be turned into a positive personal and collective opportunity given the right conditions: not only to “refuse work,” but also to found what Virno has called the “society of non-work,” based more on “exodus” from work as the defining identity-formation experience than resistance to work in the workplace.39
How successful this campaign of refusal to be blackmailed by unemployment was remains unclear. The implosion of Autonomia and most of the new social movements in the early 1980s, the sharp rise in heroin addiction and the suicide rate among under-30s, and the search for individual neo-mystical solutions through membership of religious cults seems to indicate an extensive collective psychological crisis due to the loss of the solidarity and bonds of communities of struggle (including those based in the workplace), resulting in much higher levels of individual atomization, alienation, and despair.40 An informant describes the “implosion of subjectivity” he witnessed on returning to Padua from abroad in 1979 to find the piazzas deserted, where previously young people had socialized almost permanently during the ‘77 Movement, now replaced by a withdrawal into private life, heroin addiction, and compulsive television viewing.41
Occupied and Self-Managed Social Centers
The occupied and/or self-managed social centers (centri sociali ocupati/ autogestiti /CSO/A) which started to appear in Milan and Rome in the mid 1970s were the main response by the autonomist movements to the crisis of social reproduction of those years, as they sought to provide social spaces for working class youth and their communities to start providing for their own reproductive and cultural needs, with the withering of the welfare state as industrial restructuring and austerity policies began to bite. Since the late 1980s, as post-Fordist globalization deepened and the neoliberal policies of public spending cuts, privatization of public services and the deregulation of the economy became the norm, they have become the “red bases” of the second-wave autonomist movements in Italy, Europe and elsewhere, as autonomism globalized as one of the major components of the “alterglobal” anti-capitalist movement.42
Often squatted and sometimes conceded public buildings, such as disused schools or factories, were taken over by groups of youth, usually from the area antagonista (the post-1983 successors of Autonomia) or anarchists, but also by extra-comunitari immigrants from Africa and Asia, as well as by anti-fascist football fans, to use as meeting places and centers for the provision of alternative social and educational services, as well as cultural and political activities, given official negligence in providing such facilities. Originally, a social phenomenon almost unique to Italy, where squatted housing was much rarer than in other European countries, it mushroomed in the 1990s, resulting in over 100 CSO/A in all the major cities, although many have since been evicted and shut down, particularly by the highly repressive hard right Berlusconi governments after 2001.
The Proletarian Youth Clubs were instrumental in establishing the first squatted and self-managed social centers in the peripheral Milanese working class districts, originally as meeting places for youth deprived of any services or spaces by the city council. Most were either closed down by the police or fell into disuse once heroin addiction reached epidemic proportions in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One of the first to be founded in 1975 (by New Left and Autonomía activists, rather than the PYC with which it had poor relations) was the Leoncavallo occupied social center, which based itself on the immediate social and educational needs of its local neighborhood and in opposition to the property speculators who were already “gentrifying” the center of Milan, inviting local people to discuss how to use the space:
The last city administration never worried about meeting our demands and on the other hand they have never even used the funds paid by industries for social use (1% of local rates). The experiences of the workers’ movement and of those in recent years in the neighborhoods have taught that only mobilization and struggle produce concrete results: as in the factory or in the [self-reduction] of rents and electricity and telephone bills. [T]hinking that only struggle is able to resolve the problems of our neighborhood, the base organisms of the neighborhood have occupied and reactivated the [unoccupied] factory in Via Mancinelli and have also invited the new democratic [red] ‘”junta” of Milan to show in practice its wish to meet the social demands of a popular district such as ours by allowing the social use of the occupied building. (…) Here is a preliminary list of the social structures which are insufficient in our district or even completely missing:
– A CHILDCARE FACILITY
– A MATERNAL SCHOOL
– AN AFTER SCHOOL
-A PEOPLE’S SCHOOL
– AN INTERCOMPANY CAFETERÍA
– A MEDICAL-GYNAECOLOGICAL CLINIC
– A LIBRARY
– A PEOPLE’S GYM
– SPACES FOR PEOPLE’S THEATRE INITIATIVES, MEETINGS,
DEBATES, CULTURAL AND SOCIALIZATION INITIATIVES.
With the building occupied, if we are supported by a mobilization of the whole district we can cover some of these requirements.43
Conclusions
The significance of the 1970s Italian struggles for today’s social reproduction struggles is undeniable, both in theoretical and practical terms, particularly at such a “dark moment” in recent human history when questions of social reproduction, self-reduction and expropriation are once more to the fore. They not only offer an example how social reproduction can become a focal point of movement activity and mobilization in the face of the face of rising policies of austerity and capitalist restructuring, but also provide concrete strategies for connecting this terrain with other spheres which could appear separate: struggles of the unemployed, factory occupations, and industrial labor militancy. In this sense, social reproduction was a nexus, a crucial link, in the chain of building a renewed class power – one that extended from the workplace to the school, from the home to the occupied social center. Moreover, the organizational forms that developed – a dense network (“swarm”) of community councils, clubs, committees, and assemblies – were sufficiently flexible so as to be easily adapted to the divergent urban contexts of Rome, Milan, and Turin. Again, this should not be taken to mean that we can transport these political experiences directly to our present problems; it means, rather, that the autonomous social movements of 1970s Italy are a living laboratory open to investigation, and involved a series of accumulating cycles of struggles that demand careful historical analysis. In other words, tracing the internal trajectory, shifts, and tendencies of these collective experimentations could give us a solid basis for approaching how to politically organize on the terrain of social reproduction today.
Comments
Precarious Intimacies: The European Border Regime and Migrant Sex Work
The combination of migration and sex work often evokes images of sexual violence and exploitation associated with sex trafficking. Mutilated, imprisoned, and silenced young women and children populate the media headlines around trafficking. Many activists and scholars have begun to criticize the proliferation of the sex trafficking discourse and the way it has begun to dominate current discussions on prostitution and sex work in general.1 They recognize that the extent of sex trafficking is exaggerated and that trafficked persons do not form a majority of persons in prostitution. It is clear, then, that the trafficking framework is inadequate to the task of describing the variety of experiences of labor and exploitation in the field of commercial sex: the problems migrants encounter in this field are more often related to the institutional structures of immigration and the implementation of prostitution policies that restrict and prevent possibilities for autonomous work and access to alternative spheres of labor than to individual traffickers.
This essay provides a theoretical and conceptual framework to discuss the role of borders in creating living and working conditions for sex workers within the European border regime. This regime both restricts and enables a structural background for migrant sex work. Following the formulation of Enrica Rigo, borders need to be viewed as institutions that produce social relations.2 I categorize these relations as precarious intimacies in order to describe the ways in which intimacy, commerce, and borders often intertwine in the lives of migrants engaged in commercial sex work. In order to better flesh out this concept, I draw upon insights gained from my fieldwork among and interviews with migrant sex workers in Finland, as well as long-term participation in providing legal counsel to migrants with Freedom of Movement, a grassroots migrants’ rights network in Finland.
Escape and Coercion, Mobility and Precarity
Sex work is a migrant-dominated field in Europe. A recent mapping shows that a majority – 60 to 90% – of sex workers in Europe are migrants.3 A study of one hundred sex workers conducted by the London Metropolitan University, found immigration status to be one of the most important factors impacting working and living conditions for sex workers.4 My encounters with migrant sex workers during the 18-months of fieldwork I conducted in Finland indicate similar conclusions.5
While sex work is not criminalized in the majority of the European states, migrant sex work is often regulated through immigration policies. In Finland and Sweden, for example, selling sex is a sufficient reason for deportation, and in many countries immigration officials are part of the policing of sex work. Also, in countries where sex work is legalized, like Austria or the Netherlands, working permits for migrants coming outside the EU in the sex sector are unavailable or very difficult to obtain. This creates “double” markets where migrants work in more precarious sections. If we want to understand the condition of migrant sex workers in Europe and the factors that make their exploitation possible, we need to examine the role of contemporary European immigration policies and how they intersect with prostitution policies.
Questions of agency need to be accorded a central place in public discussion of both migration and sex work. Migrants are often conflated with the circumstances they struggle with, such as poverty. The multiplicity of their desires and reasons for migrating are easily flattened down to the push-and-pull of structural factors.6 The feminist debates around sex work and prostitution, the so-called “sex wars,” evince this problem of agency in theorizing sex work, and the situation becomes even more complicated when sex work and migration are brought together. The dominance of trafficking discourse has meant that migrant sex work is mainly conceptualized in the context of sex trafficking or “modern slavery,” which reduces migrant sex workers to a simplified image of victims that are exploited by individual evildoers, such as traffickers or clients. Seeing sex workers only as victims obstructs their struggles and negotiations in regards to restrictions of movement, constraints in the labor market, and economic survival.
To make matters worse, trafficking discourse also sidelines the institutional and structural framework that makes the sexual exploitation of migrant workforces possible in the first place: immigration controls, visa requirements, lack of labor protection, and other measures mediated via the nation-state. Sex workers’ rights activists and feminist scholars have pointed out that instead of granting rights and labor market protection for people in sex work, this victimization results in demands for carceral prostitution and immigration policies and the increased involvement of the criminal justice system.7 Or alternatively, this sexual humanitarianism lends itself the moral urgency of a raid and rescue mission.8 Analysis must avoid rendering migrants as victims while not disregarding the structural constraints that they meet in their work and movement. Feminist conceptualizations of precarization offer a fruitful starting point to discuss the tension between the structural constraints that the border regime imposes on migrants and the way migrants negotiate these constraints.
The concepts of precarity, precariousness, and precarization have become popular in current public and academic discussions around the ongoing changes in the capitalist mode of production, working conditions, and modes of life in general. Many theorists and social commentators refer to these changes by tracing the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist organization of production and labor force.9 These concepts refer to the same ongoing social processes and their effects in contemporary Western societies, but carry slightly different meanings: as adjectives, precarious and precarity can refer to the shared ontological vulnerability of life,10 or to socially produced conditions of precarity.11 Precarization, on the other hand, refers more precisely to the social processes that expose people to precarity and produce precarious conditions.12 Researchers and social commentators have mainly applied precarization to the sphere of employment, where it is understood to relate to atypical or irregular jobs. However, precarization also has a deeper and more comprehensive meaning, referring to the crises traversing the support mechanisms that sustain modern social life, as well as the institutions that bring stability and continuity to life: the welfare state, education system, and wage labor. Precarization means processes which produce a lack of protection, insecurity, instability, and social or economic vulnerability.13
Feminist theorizations of precarization emphasize the multifold characteristics at work within these processes: many aspects of precarization are bad (vulnerability, insecurity, poverty), some good (accumulation of multiple skills and knowledge, creating of new networks) and some are ambiguous (mobility, flexibility).14 Precarization, in this light, is inherently contradictory and potentially creative, not simply as a forced condition.15 Feminist conceptualizations of precarization thus enable us to capture the vexed nature of sex work and migration as both forms of agency and as life strategies, as well as processes that are subjected to various forms of control and governance.
Jukka Könönen has described precarization as a process that separates what people are capable of doing to do from what they can do.16 In the lives of migrants especially, precarization limits the possibilities of action and turns efforts that strive for an independent and satisfactory life into survival struggles. As a consequence, migration is one way to escape insufficient economic conditions and to create a more independent and pleasing life.17 This escape should not be conceived as only reactionary, but as an active decision to improve one’s life. Immigration policies and labor market restrictions, however, set the conditions for this escape.
Borders – the spaces where these policies and restrictions are materially condensed – often strip migrants of their acquired and accumulated resources like education, profession, and expertise. Borders compel people to resort to making use of their embodied resources, like language skills, sexuality, or assumed gendered and racialized characteristics.18 Beverley Skeggs provides a means of conceptualizing this strategy by urging us to view gender and sexuality from an angle that would not reduce them to objects or properties of identity, but as resources that can be deployed and combined in various ways.19 Many of the sex workers I met are relatively well or highly educated, but they have not been able to capitalize on their education and skills in migration because of their legal residency status, Finnish language proficiency requirements, restricted access to labor market, and problems in education accreditation.20 As a result, it is intimacy, in the form of gendered sexuality, that becomes the means of acquiring mobility and income. Intimacy, then, assumes a double function: it is both a resource and a source of precarity in many migrants’ lives, a dual nature I try to capture with the concept of precarious intimacies. The majority of the sex workers either migrate with help of temporary visas to do sex work, or, if they are more settled migrants, they had often initially arrived through marriage and later ended up in sex work. Marriage or other intimate arrangements with former customers are also central to the sex workers’ residency strategies.
Contradictions in the Composition of Migrant Sex Workers
“Like citizenship itself, noncitizenship is a complex and divided condition.”21
The Schengen agreement is the basis of the common European border regime. It guarantees the free movement of European Union’s citizens and permanent residents, and removed internal border controls inside the Schengen area. A visa to one Schengen country guarantees free movement within the Schengen area. Many of the sex workers I met during my fieldwork in Finland use the possibilities of free movement to find more satisfactory forms of income. As one Latvian woman traveling to Finland put it: “It is big money. Not so big, but bigger than what you can get if you just work in some small shop or in some factory. Of course this money is bigger.” Most of the sex workers met in Finland are circular migrants, who travel between their country of residence and Finland. They had often worked in several EU countries, and were highly mobile.
Immigration policies form different opportunities of movement and income for migrants depending on their country of origin. The majority of the sex workers in Finland come from Russia and former Soviet countries. One reason for this is that it is relatively easy for Russians to get a tourist visa to the EU, unlike migrants from African or Southeast Asian countries. Large income differences between these countries and the central and Northern European EU countries make cross-border sex work a lucrative option for migrants. For many, sex work is a way to finance their studies, home renovations or other temporary projects, or to support their children while they are growing up. Working abroad also offers a possibility to do sex work in an environment where there is little danger of the nature of their labor to be exposed to their social circles. The majority of the migrants said that they don’t sell sex in their country because they want to avoid the stigma attached to sex work, they only do it while traveling. Migration enables innovative forms of income and possibilities of better life, but at the same time, immigration policies restrict the possibilities for creating permanent living situations and access to other spheres of income besides sex work.
Sex workers also find themselves in different positions depending on their race or ethnicity, working environment, age, gender, income security, and support networks.22 All these factors affect the working and living conditions of the sex workers. However, for migrants one central structural factor that defines their working conditions and level of precarity is their residency status.23
Migrants selling sexual services reside in Finland on either a permanent Finnish residency permit or citizenship; a tourist visa; EU citizenship of another country; a temporary Finnish residence permit (based on study, work, or marriage); another EU country’s residency permit; or without a permit (undocumented). Each of these statuses is associated with a different set of rights. I have illustrated the dispersion of rights between the various permit categories in the following table:
Niina
The major groups selling sex in Finland – Ethnic Finns, Russians, Estonians, Nigerians, and Thais – are all in different positions. The differences are not primarily due to their ethnic group affiliation or cultural belonging, but because these groups have different kinds of residency permits. Russians most often reside on a three-month tourist visa, Estonians are EU citizens, Nigerians typically have a residence permit in another EU-country, and Thais are mostly former marriage migrants and therefore usually have a permanent residence permit in Finland.
Enrica Rigo has noted that the contemporary European border regime’s “main function is less concerned with ‘separation’ than with ‘differentiation.’’’ Rigo refers to the fact that contemporary border controls and immigration policies have detached borders from their pure territorial function.24 Rather than simply separating people, contemporary borders differentiate them by creating different legal statuses based on a person’s residence permit status. This differentiating function of borders is extended within the nation-state through the residency permit and visa system.25 Könönen has theorized how borders produce a hierarchical fragmentation of the legal subjectivities of people residing in the same area.26 Borders thus do not only draw territorial delimitations, but also boundaries of difference between individuals: in other words, boundaries of status.27 Residency status defines migrants’ right to work (access to formal labor markets), the length of their stay and their deportability, meaning their vulnerability to removal from the country.28 In addition, residency permit status defines the access migrants have to state services.29 In a welfare state like Finland, such services are a significant benefit and reduce dependence on sex work as the sole source of income, which for sex workers translates into less of a need to see clients and more control over what kind of clients they receive.
Crucially, circular migrants do not have access to welfare state services or standard housing markets. They often reside in hotels or rent rooms through their networks, which can cost two or three times more than the standard housing market, plus travel costs. Circular migrants also experience the economic strain via increased stress: they work more often, sometimes having none or one day off a week. As such, they have less control over their working hours and conditions. When under economic stress, circular migrants are more likely to sell services cheaper and to clients that other sex workers wouldn’t receive, like men who are drunk or perceived as difficult. The fluctuation in commercial sex income is high and circular migrants don’t have the buffer of welfare benefits.
Another important factor that affects the position of sex workers is labor market access. Migrants residing with tourist visas, mainly Russians and visiting Thais, and those with another EU country residence permits – mainly Nigerians, who especially were eager to get “any kind of job” – are practically excluded from the formal labor market. To take one example, a 31-year old Nigerian women with residence permit based on asylum in Spain explains her situation in trying to find another job:
I would like to stay in this country, if I would get the papers in this country. I don’t know if I can do this job [sex work] because I don’t like this job. I can try my best to live. The job, it’s difficult. But in Spain it’s very difficult to stay. And in Spain I cannot live on the job, but here I can live on the job. […] I’d like to sell something in a shop. I like to do hairdressing or clean, I like to take care of old people. Anything I can do to have money to live my life. That’s what I want.
To have access to the labor market, third-country nationals need to apply for a work permit, a task is almost impossible if you do not have strong personal networks to rely on, which many migrant sex workers do not. To apply for the permit, the employee needs at least a six-month-long work contract from the employer, at near-full time hours. Because they can’t start working before the permit is processed (which usually takes three months), the employer has no inclination of how this person is as a worker. Immigration policies and restrictions on labor market access in part “trap” this group of migrants into sex work, even if they would prefer to do other kind of work. Hence labor market restrictions can function as an institutional form of immobilization of these migrants.30
For these individuals, the fact that sex work constitutes their only source of income means that they have less control over their working pace, choice of customers, and overall working environments. To add to these constraints, if they are suspected of or caught while selling sexual services, they can be deported. Even though selling sex is not illegal in Finland, it is a ground for deportation for third-country citizens. If a person is deported on those grounds, she or he might receive a denial of entry lasting from one to five years. Another Nigerian woman who has a residence permit based on asylum in Spain described the importance of documents and the way the fear of deportation affects her daily life:
Here we have fear. Here we have the fear of the police. I have pressure. My mind is bouncing always, I’m walking fast. I know that sometimes the police come, but not always. If you are walking on the streets here, sometimes they control you, check your ID. They will [deport and] ban that person to not to come here for four to five years […] That’s a reason why we’re afraid. If you have a European passport [citizenship], they are a little bit nicer – because most of people with European passport have a job here, they have Finnish documents. I’m not like them. They have two jobs, work in the street and work in factory. They don’t get shocked like me when they see the police.
Deportability and the fear of the police also affect the working conditions and safety of sex workers in other ways. When I talked with a Russian woman who has a permanent residence permit in Finland about difficult clients, she answered that she always tells her clients in advance that she lives in Finland permanently. This way, she says, the clients know that she is not afraid of police and cannot be threatened with calling the police like the ones who are on tourist visas: “They are afraid for their visa, but I am not afraid and they [clients] know not to make trouble.” According to an earlier study in Finland, clients who harass sex workers know that migrants coming from outside EU – Russians, Nigerians and Thais – have less protection from the law and therefore target these sex workers.31 In other words, the deportability of these circular migrants put them at a higher risk of becoming a target of violence.
Fear of deportation prevents sex workers from contacting officials in cases of violence or exploitation, and forces them to work in more hidden locations. This legal stratification of the field of commercial sex is further buttressed by racist policing practices. During my fieldwork in Helsinki, the police especially targeted black sex workers, and compelled club bouncers to use racial profiling by threatening the clubs with human trafficking accusations. This forced Nigerian women onto the streets and out of safe, social indoor nightclub working environments. A brief look at available statistics shows that the Finnish police also seem to have selective deportation practices. Although Russians outnumber Nigerians in the club and on the street scene, according to 2011-2014 police statistics on deportation on the grounds of selling sex, 70% of the persons deported were Nigerians living in another EU country, as compared to 30% of Russians on a tourist visa who are “equally deportable” third country nationals.32
From these necessarily brief snapshots, it’s clear that immigration policies have become part of labor market regulation.33 In combination with irregular migration processes, immigration policies help to form a labor force that is in a more precarious position and which then clusters to particular segments of the labor market. Stratifications emerge, producing people with different sets of rights related to labor market and welfare services. In short, immigration policies create particular relations to the labor market and produce institutionalized uncertainty for migrants’ lives.34 Combined with the legal regulation of prostitution in Finland, these policies result in a structural differentiation in the field of sex work.
Precarious Intimacies
This focus on the border regime allows for an understanding of how it produces people residing within a nation-state with differential rights, differential access to the labor market, and variable access to the services of the state.35 These differential rights have a structural role in the differentiation of the commercial sex sector, as well as in determining how migrants use intimacy in their migration processes. However, through another optic, intimacy and intimate relations can be viewed as resources – as workable and effective strategies – in these women’s aspirations to create more satisfactory and independent lives from their position of structural disadvantage.
For migrant sex workers with precarious legal status, intimate relations are a way to stabilize their residence in the EU. Many of the migrant sex workers see finding a husband or a rich lover as a great accomplishment. Marriage is the most solid way to obtain a permanent residency permit and a future in Europe. Many sex workers see a European husband as a means for greater material security and a better future. Marriage grants access to the state-provided rights and services, which can be significant not only for the current life situation, but also for future well-being.
In one example, a Russian sex worker had made a marriage arrangement with a Finnish man 20 years older than she in order to receive a permanent resident permit. She said that they do not live together, she wants to have her own independent life. Instead she visits her husband regularly, and while visiting they share different kinds of intimacies: sex, dinners, hanging out watching television and the like. She told me that they are not in love, or at least that it has never been love from her perspective. Instead there is a “long friendship and mutual understanding between them,” and she clearly had warm feelings towards her husband. This woman described her husband as “a generous friend who was helping her” and she said that she has been “lucky in that sense.”
The institutional framework of immigration regulation, however, often reduces women’s autonomy in these intimate arrangements and exposes them to different kinds of vulnerabilities and gendered relations of dependency. According to the Finnish Aliens’ Act, a person has to be married for four years before receiving a permanent residence permit. Sometimes women are literally “counting the days.” One day during my fieldwork several sex workers were celebrating with hugs. I asked a woman what was the cause for revelry; she explained to me that one woman had received a permanent residency permit after being married to her husband for over four years. The woman’s residency permit was no longer dependent on her husband. She seemed to have loving feelings towards her husband and was not planning to divorce him or to end the relationship. Rather, the women were celebrating the fact that she had gained an equal position in a relationship: a certain dependency on her husband had ended.
Some husbands use their position of power to restrict the independence of their wives. For example, some men do not want their wives to work outside the home or take Finnish language courses. The border regime produces further dependencies on spouses. Some current or former husbands take care of all the practicalities concerning their wife’s life, like unemployment and welfare benefits, communicating with the authorities regarding residence permit applications, healthcare, and overall finances. In the case of a divorce, this dependency often turns against the woman. For example, the husband of one Thai woman had not applied for her permanent residency permit even though she was entitled to it. The husband knew that once she had a permanent permit, she would no longer be dependent on being married to him for her residence.
Other forms of precarious intimacies fall short of formal marriage. In one case, a Russian woman’s client had become her client-lover. The client was already married and therefore could not marry her in order to grant her residence permit. Instead, this woman’s lover organized a job for her in his company so she could receive a work permit. She, however, did not actually work at the office – instead they had an intimate arrangement where she was his part-time lover. Their arrangement worked well for some time, but the woman explained to me that at some point her lover became violent and jealous, and she ended the relationship after gaining a permanent residence permit.
Migration scholars emphasize that immigration policies produce precarity in the formal labor market through creating institutionalized uncertainty and burdening employment relations. This makes workers dependent on employers for residency permit sponsorship.36 But for migrants who are positioned in the informal labor market of commercial sex, immigration controls and the legal positions they carve out do not create particular relations of dependency to employers; rather, they produce gendered relations of dependency to customers, husbands, and lovers. Lauren Berlant writes that “at root, precarity is a condition of dependency – as a legal term, precarious describes the situation wherein your tenancy on your land is in someone else’s hands.”37 This etymological description of precarity effectively captures the situation of migrant sex workers: their tenancy was temporarily in the hands of their husbands or boyfriends. The lack of alternative modes of movement and income places migrant women into precarious intimacies: uncertain and shifting gendered relations of dependency that they use to advance their lives, but which also make them vulnerable to different forms of exploitation.
For the migrant women I encountered, intimacy, in the form of gendered sexuality, has become the main resource of mobility and income, as well as a strategy to stabilize their residence in the EU. At the same time that these intimate contracts or relations offer women an escape and a promise of different, less precarious future, they also create gendered relations of dependency and precarious forms of intimacy.
Conclusion: Borders and the Production of Precarious Social Relations
Borders are no longer institutions that solely separate the alien from the citizen. Instead of simple processes of inclusion or exclusion – legality or illegality – borders produce forms of differential inclusion.38 In other words, contemporary immigration policies have resulted in a complex system of residency statuses that are connected to differential sets of rights.39 This means a multiplication of the precarious positions that non-citizens occupy, such as asylum seeker, refugee, student, holder of a work permit, victim of a trafficking, or a family member. These statuses have a fundamental effect on the lives of migrants. Different statuses are connected to differentials in labor market access, political rights, as well as access to welfare and health care services. Trafficking and exploitation of migrant labor are manifestations of these differential rights and statuses.
Migrants working in the field of commercial sex are not a homogenous group that can be discussed in a citizen-noncitizen axis, or even the documented-undocumented dualism. Linda Bosniak has demonstrated that noncitizenship is a complex and divided condition in a similar manner to that of citizenship.40 This complexity of non-citizenship is an important factor in understanding contemporary field of sex work in Europe. Binary categories of citizen-alien or legal-illegal no longer capture the multiplicity of positions occupied by noncitizen sex workers within a nation space. Due to the changing nature of immigration regulation, border regimes, and racist police practices we now face a complex system of legal categories a hierarchical stratification of migrant sex workers.41
Borders structure migrants’ living and working conditions and possibilities, while also having a major effect on intimate life decisions. Migrant sex workers can use intimacy to create relationships that offer a promise of a different, less precarious future. But with the lack of alternative ways of movement, residency strategies, and forms of income, patriarchal relations of dependency and precarious forms of intimacy are also created. This points to the heightened meaning of borders in the contemporary world: borders have become important institutions in the reproduction of social relations.
Despite the fact that my observations are mainly based in Finland, the findings reflect broader transnational nature of the European sex industry. Finland’s immigration policy is not only tied to international humanitarian responsibilities but also to Europeanized border regimes and the global labor market. The residence permit systems, structure of labor markets, and the level of social security vary between European countries. But because the European Union has homogenized its immigration policies and the majority of European countries are bound by the Schengen agreement, there is a uniformity to situations in different countries. Many of the sex workers I encountered during my fieldwork have lived and worked in other European countries; some have citizenship or residency in other EU nations. The multiplication of borders, the proliferation of differentiated legal statuses of noncitizens, and the dispersal of rights are not limited to Europe or to Western countries, but reflect broader global changes in citizenship and immigration regulation. Borders have become a central element of the work and intimate lives of noncitizens, both within and beyond sex work.
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Production, Reproduction, and the Problem of Home for Work
“Rural women are often the most forgotten participants in the economy,” responded economist Lourdes Benería to a 1977 internal report on efforts by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to implement U.N. declarations on women’s equality.1 “Rather than being ‘marginal’ participants in the stream of economic activities,” she asserted, “they are an ‘integral’ part of it.” After all, “they work long hours in domestic and agricultural jobs, and… perform essential activities to the economic system, namely those related to production of foods and services, either in the fields or at home, and those related to the reproduction of the labour force.”2 In recognizing the role of women from the “Third World” in economic development as spanning production and reproduction, Benería underscored a central problematic that is with us yet: the relation of home to work, the meaning of such terms, and their implications for the practice of care.
The ideological split between home and work in the industrialized West has obscured the ways that each realm shapes the other. It also shaped social policy toward “women in developing countries.” Contemporary political debate maintains an opposition between “mother” and “worker” as well as “work” and “care.” This division reflects a pervasive intellectual and political impasse pervading the organization of knowledge – our scholarship – as well as legal rules, government regulations, and union organizing. “Separate spheres” or “the cult of domesticity” long dominated histories of U.S. and European women, especially for the 19th century, even though most women had to labor hard, sometimes in the home, often outside of it, to maintain themselves and their households. They were subsistence farmers, wage earners, and housewives; some were domestic servants and slaves. Even when buying and trading through markets, they had to transform purchased materials into consumable goods. They aided in childbirth, nursed the ill, looked after children, soothed the afflicted, and watched over the dead. Care was interwoven into the fabric of daily life, whether or not they went out to work.3
But industrial capitalism and, in the case of the United States, its racialization, obscured interdependencies in celebrating individualism, promoting male breadwinners, and structuring inequality through gender, race/ethnicity, and class hierarchies. However, transformations in the larger political economy made the male breadwinner inadequate even for those classes, which included families with unionized men, that in the post-WWII years seemed to obtain this ideal. By the 1970s, the beginnings of neoliberal reordering, the dual breadwinner/female caregiver model came to the fore, which left poor single mothers with having to make due on their own with increasingly meager social assistance. Wage earning women began to employ migrant mothers to take up their slack in a new international division of (re)productive labor.4
In this context, by the 1980s, the deconstruction of women’s labors became central to a larger feminist project of dissolving these social constructions, especially the dichotomy of public (work) and private (home). Feminist scholars, especially those writing out of a left tradition, simultaneously set about to revalue work that appeared to be done out of love or obligation (and racialized when coerced out of slaves or ethnic minorities), and thus became underpaid when performed for a wage and devalued in the market economy.5 But whether care is really work continues to confound, shaping social policy and driving political movements.
Care certainly is a narrower concept than reproductive labor. As we learned from the Marxist domestic labor debates of the 1970s and 1980s, reproductive labor consists of activities that produce labor power – activities that transform raw materials and commodities bought with a wage to maintain the worker daily and generate future workforces through the feeding, clothing, caring, educating, and socializing of children. It is performed usually not for a wage and by a woman (as a housewife, though she might also be a wage worker at the same time).6 Care, thus, is one component of reproductive labor, not the same as housework but often performed with other domestic activities – and where the line is between care and housework isn’t so clear. Carework involves personal services for other people: activities that tend to the physical, intellectual, affective, and other emotional needs of partners, children, and elderly, ill, or disabled people. It includes tasks for daily life, including household maintenance (cooking, cleaning, washing, even shopping) and personal existence (bathing, feeding, turning over, ambulation). Sex-affective production can be part of care. It need not be heterosexual or homonormative. Such labor requires, feminist theorists across disciplines argue, “‘caring for’ while ‘caring about.'” To tend the environment of the abode or the body is to care for but perhaps also to care about.7
Who cares varies, and we might even imagine care as disruptive to a hegemonic order rather than central to its functioning. After all, care suggests interdependency, intimacy, and species worth. Nevertheless, the interdisciplinary literature on care still reflects the equation of domestic labor with oppression. It explains women’s responsibility for unpaid family care in terms of labor market segmentation (sexual division of labor), psychodynamics (women mothering reproduces women who give care), and social status (men don’t want to do it.). Some have addressed the movement of care from the home to other workplaces (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and factories), especially in terms of the structure of welfare states and racial division of labor, while others consider care in terms of the work and family dilemma associated with “the double day.” These scholars ask how we as a society should organize care – who should care and who should pay for care, does care remain in the family or move outside of families, is it an individual, family, community, state, or national obligation? A few emphasize the relationship between employers of care and their employees, distinguishing between spiritual and menial housework in terms of mothers, servants, slaves, and low-paid laborers, highlighting the contradictions of immigrant women cleaning and caring for the affluent.8
The skills necessary for cleaning, cooking, laundry, childcare, nursing, and other tasks appear to be natural, their economic value obscured. Some would claim that such labor has use value, but not exchange value, and thus is valueless in a Marxist meaning of value. Others, notably Leopoldina Fortunati, would argue that care already is part of exchange, that the housewife (and the prostitute) both work for capital in reproducing the labor power of the male worker.9 But because of the way we in the West, notably the United States, generally regard such labor, when it moves out of the home into the marketplace, it loses status as a labor of love and becomes classified as unskilled work that anyone can perform, because women have undertaken such activities without payment. It becomes stigmatized for two reasons: first, it involves dirt, bodies, and intimacy; second, those who have performed such paid jobs are of lower status, often men and women of color and/or recent immigrants. Though such jobs need not be women’s, or immigrant women’s work, they have been historically. Characteristics of the worker still define the skill and value of the work.
This essay will proceed in three parts. First, I discuss the dismissal of domestic labor by liberal feminist Betty Friedan in her influential 1963 The Feminine Mystique as an ironic continuation of a Marxist project that equated women’s emancipation with leaving the home for employment outside of it. Second, I analyze a feminist blog discussion over the meaning of care in the United States as indicative of a continuing denigration of domestic labor. Third, I turn to struggles of home care and other domestic workers, whose invisibility hegemonic understandings of home and work have fed into. In their organizing campaigns for recognition as workers under the labor law, we find the equation of reproduction with production. Thus, finally, I end with thoughts on the primacy of production as our paradigm for progress, which leads me back to the prescriptions of Lourdes Benería and the ILO through the lens of Kathi Weeks’ critique of “the work ethic.”
“The Problem that Has No Name” Was a Problem
The Feminine Mystique reinforced, even as it reflected, the devaluation of reproductive labor. Its influence had a pernicious impact for those women who went out to work to perform care and other domestic occupations because it dismissed the worth of the housewife’s labors at precisely the moment when service industries began their economic ascent and so fed into the undervaluing of the women who dared to call themselves “Household Technicians” rather than domestic servants, who rejected the designation, “the help.” Friedan’s understanding of women’s emancipation – employment outside of the home – and silence on care – indicative of her limited concept of work – became prevalent by the late 1960s, just in time to maintain middle class consumption in the U.S. In the aftermath of global economic reorganization and the decline of the (white) male family wage in the subsequent decades, women needed to become breadwinners. Friedan offered a vision fitting for the times, even if that was hardly her intent.10
Liberal feminists like Friedan recast work as liberation in offering employment as the solution to “the problem that has no name.” Women had to become more than “just a housewife.” For housework, which Friedan equated with fit work for “feeble-minded” girls, was unworthy of adult women with “average or normal human intelligence.” While she does not speak of “care,” Friedan equally denigrates such activities through association: “wife, mistress, mother, nurse, consumer, cook, chauffeur; expert on interior decoration, child care, appliance repair, furniture refinishing, nutrition, and education” defines the “modern housewife” who is exhausted so she can’t “read books, only magazines” (25). Caring gets folded into “a world of bedroom and kitchen, sex, babies, and home,” all of which signify limits to women’s horizons (30). “Having babies,” physical reproduction, appears as the antidote to the housewife’s emptiness – nothing more, not the production of future labor power or a product of mother love.
Such a portrait captured the position of the white middle class who, more than other women, were at mid-20th century able to remain outside of the labor force and found paid work away from the home an attractive alternative to boredom within. These were the women whose access to education and other resources (including a white male wage) made it more likely that their work could be interesting and creative. But Friedan neglected the lives of most women who even in the 1950s and 1960s found that they had to work (often part-time) at a job, not a profession, not for joy but to make ends meet or to cement that middle-class life style.
Here lies the irony. Friedan was a woman of the left, a reporter for the progressive United Electrical Workers and the Federated News Service.11 But she learned the wrong lesson from the Communist and labor milieu she lived in during the 1940s and early 1950s. She embraced the dictum of Friedrich Engels in The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) that “the modern individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife” and second, that “if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn”; and third, “the first condition for the liberation of the wife is to bring the whole female sex back into public industry,” that is, women had to go out to work in order to join together in social struggle and work for the common good.12
Another Communist analysis existed, one eventually embraced by women’s liberation, but discredited publically and loudly during the time when Friedan was involved with left politics. In the 1940 In Women’s Defense, California activist Mary Inman asserted that housework, like factory work, was productive labor. Inman prefigured much of the later domestic labor debate by claiming that “widespread denigration of housework and child rearing” was what led to women’s subordination, not the economic function of the work itself that produced future and present labor power. Indeed, Inman contended that professional and business women – those who held the kinds of jobs that Friedan would tout as liberating – faced discrimination as women precisely because of the way that housewives were incorporated into capitalism, that the “subjugation” of the latter shaped the discrimination towards the former. Housewives engaged in “necessary social labor,” but they were indirectly related to production, with “no direct contact with their exploiters” because they “work only at home, and the means of exploiting them is clear only when we take into account the entire system of production.” As “a bearer and trainer of children,” that is, as a caregiver, she creates profits by producing future labor. It wasn’t a question of biology but one of economy. The work of all the separate households was “the pivot of the system.”13
Friedan offered a contrasting view that, in devaluing the labors of the housewife, denied the worth of the domestic servant. The logic becomes, if this labor is so worthless, so routine, why pay decently to not have to do it? The “Help” in The Feminine Mystique are in the background to the main action, the woman who employs them. Paid household workers are referred to as “cleaning help” (227, 234). Friedan sees that women can get along without such help, noting that “in the absence of servants,” when they were in short supply, during WWII, women figured out how to rearrange domestic labor to enter the labor force; they “pooled” resources, organizing work shifts so someone was around to watch the children, or they relied on nursery schools. But child care centers withered away and even those who could afford a “full-time housekeeper,” whose supplies were up, took on all the home labors themselves (176-177). So, while Friedan understood the significance of social supports for labor force participation, her solution was “a new life plan for women” (326), the (re)production of women through education, and not bringing carework and other forms of domestic labor into social production, away from their privatized position. Instead she pushed for some women hiring other women to fulfill home labors while leaving home for jobs.
Given these assumptions – that domestic labors aren’t really work and that women should go out to work – it isn’t surprising that even in the 1990s, Friedan insisted that the National Welfare Rights Movement was not feminist because it sought adequate income for poor single mothers, disproportionately black, to enable its members to reject the coercion of low waged work and government work programs (workfare) to stay home and engage in motherwork.14 For historically, black women were to be workers, not mothers, or the caregivers of other women’s children and homes, undertaking the work that no one else wanted to do, which by the 1970s increasingly took place in the service sector with the movement of reproductive labors to other workplaces. Black women’s refusal of such work opened up the use of immigrant women for home labors when more privileged women went out to work.15
Care≠Work
How does the current generation of feminist commentators regard domestic and care labor? Blogging on The Feminist Wire in March 2012, English and Women’s Studies professor Sara Hosey challenged the feminist framing of care as work by “Rejecting the Rhetoric of the ‘Second Shift'” as a move toward “Insisting on Equity.”16 Sociologist Arlie Hochschild famously referred to daily tasks undertaken for family – such as dropping off and picking up from daycare, cleaning the house, shopping for and preparing food, getting children to bed, washing clothes, packing lunches, and making ready for going off in the morning – as the “second shift,” hours of labor after (or before and sometimes as snatches of time during) employment.17 Much social science literature shows that, decades into the new feminism, women still put many more hours than men into these activities of self-care and social reproduction, so that in all kinds of heterosexual households they work the equivalent of an additional part-time job.18 On the basis of her own experience with a male partner who does half the tasks, Hosey rejected the term “second shift” as an inappropriate, indeed, degrading classification of care activities.
Hosey, of course, is not alone in wishing for an arena outside of capitalism, free from the market, where we can be who we wish to be and where “interpersonal relationships, caregiving, and cooperation” reign supreme. Notable feminist theorists of the welfare state, such as Nancy Fraser and Ann Orloff, have approached the commodification of care as part of a larger critique of neo-liberal privatization and its displacement of social responsibility to families and the market.19 Additionally, for many care theorists, the very term “carework economy” represents an oxymoron. For these philosophers and policy analysts, care and economy stand in for the “hostile words” of love and money, as sociologist Viviana Zelizer has critiqued this strand of thought, an inscription of separate sphere ideology with gendered attributes repackaged: women give care, men earn money.20
These feminist theorists bemoan an increasing commodification of aspects of life that they find should be private, intimate, and personal, such as tending to dependents, usually defined as the frail, ill, and young.21 Philosopher Virginia Held typifies such arguments in regarding “caring work as enabling those cared for to know that someone values them” and for “expressing social connectedness… contributing to children’s development and family satisfaction, and… enabling social cohesion and well-being,” all outside of market norms. Likewise economist Susan Himmelweit defends caring labor as a special kind of work involving relationship and emotional attachment so that “much of the quality of our lives would be lost if the imposition of inappropriate forms of market rationality turned such work into mere labor.”22 Policy analyst Deborah Stone notes that the rules and regulations of caring in the public sphere “promote disengagement, distance, and impartiality,” while discounting the love, partiality, and attachment that many develop toward those cared for. Most caregivers, she concludes, feel demeaned by the label “’worker,” for that implies managed, bureaucratic concepts in contrast to their own “relational and personal concepts of care.”23 In short, as historian Alice Kessler-Harris has charged, these complaints assume “that incorporating women into its [the economic market] competitive value system would negate female nurturing values,” thus, negating “the affective components of life.”24
Hosey joins those who ignore both the history of intimate caring labors and the consequence of state incorporation of care as central to the organization of production, reproduction, and inequality. Her concern is not with the commodification of intimacy, as documented by theorists of sex work, but rather with the negative consequences of care as work. As a consequence, by omission, she, like Friedan, belittles the struggles of care workers for respect and dignity. Hosey thus reinscribes class and race hierarchies even as she argues for gender equity.
This recoiling from the language of exchange and investment, which Hosey connects to the economic, occurs just as she links work with the economic (though these associations are not the only ones that work evokes). This move to the economic erases positive meanings of work. We don’t embrace economic man or woman; instead we think of the economic as cold, calculating, or unfeeling. Hosey couches the act of understanding “parenting as ‘work'” with the verbs “misconstrues” and “demeans.” Labeling care as work, she contends, willfuly misreads “an otherwise complex relationship that is, at its best, definitively loving and mutually-rewarding.” She refers to “larger rewards” than the monetary to explain time spent with family.
Hosey discusses parenting and housekeeping together as two aspects of the second shift. She demotes the significance of housekeeping by relegating it to “a quotidian part of life” and taking it away “from the realm of the serious.” She asserts, “there are better, more empowered ways to spend one’s time and money than scrubbing and polishing.” Here she replicates the division between spiritual and menial housework that black feminist theorist Dorothy Roberts found in the distinction between parenting and cleaning, the first performed by the white mistress and the second given to the black or brown maid, the first justified as mothering and the second devalued as toil. This separation reserves care for only some forms of intimate labor and justifies low pay for those aspects that remain as work – and the further stigmatization of racial/ethnic women that perform the less privileged tasks.25
It isn’t that Hosey has a narrow definition of work, though. She goes on to contrast housework with real forms of work outside of employment: “consciousness-raising and political lobbying, the thinking and writing and organizing that many of us have done and continue to do, often in addition to holding down paying jobs, picking up after ourselves, and spending time with our families.” These are activities that feminist theorist Kathi Weeks might lump under “Hours for What We Will,” but others might name community and creative labors.26
There are consequences to such thinking, the equation Care≠Work. Midway in her essay, Hosey admits that she is talking about “cleaning one’s own home” and doing other household tasks “not for pay.” Focusing on unpaid forms of care and housework, nonetheless, obscures the relationship between unpaid and paid forms of care. The first informs the second and its devaluation. As sociologists Cameron Lynne MacDonald and David A. Merrill explain, careworkers suffer from “institutional misrecognition that defines care work as nonwork, as unskilled work, or female workers as nonworkers; as well as intersubjective misrecognition that bars them from equal access to social esteem by the accumulated psychic harms inflicted on them in interactions with others.”27
The Rising of the Domestic Workers
Such obscuring of the carer as a worker is particularly detrimental, then, not only because it offers a rationalization for poor compensation but also because it throws roadblocks against worker rights and unionization. As one domestic worker organizer explained during the 1970s battle in the United States for legal inclusion, “This is a gut woman’s issue. The reason we haven’t gotten our rights as a paid person in the labor force is because men think they can get their wives or girlfriends to do the job without pay.”28 This conflation has justified discrimination.
The law in the United States is particularly challenging in this regard. Unpaid carework garners no social security because there are no wages or recognized income taxed separately. Dependent housewives can gain husband’s pension benefits; after 1970s reforms and court cases, divorce transfers some social security funds to them if the marriage lasted long enough, but divorce no longer comes automatically with any compensation for intimate labors, including housework and childcare. The call for wages for housework never reverberated politically in the U.S., even though it exposed the economic relation involved. But an unintended consequence of the end of coverture, a demand of legal feminism that came to fruition in the late 1960s, was the end of alimony because men’s rights groups supported such and the monetary valuing of housework failed.29
Paid domestic work also stood outside of the labor law. In 1940, the law classified nurse-companions and other in-home care workers hired directly by clients as domestic servants and thus made them ineligible for old age insurance, unemployment, collective bargaining, minimum wages, maximum hours, or other labor laws.30 The extension of women’s work for the family into the market created an arena easily cordoned off as impossible to regulate.31 More important was the lack of powerful advocates for domestic workers and the racialism of New Dealers and their dependence on Southern votes. Professional women had a vested interest in a cheap supply of servants and most housewives did not view themselves as employers.32 Not until the 1950s would some domestic workers gain coverage under Social Security.33
Inclusion under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act proved more difficult. This was, in part, because, as one “manpower” expert explained in 1971, “the minimum wage is… needed as a floor to express the socially recognized ‘value’ of the labor rather than to meet the income needs of all family heads,” but home labor lacked value.34 Congressional myopia over the worth of such labor – along with the political economy of the South that benefited from depressing African American wages – prolonged the political work of inclusion. In both claiming housework as work and struggling against discrimination in the employment of women, organized feminism allied with domestic workers cleared the way for finally placing domestic work into labor law.35 In 1974, two years after professional women gained access, Congress included domestic servants in the wage and hour law.
These same amendments to the labor law ended up removing home health aides and attendants from coverage if hired by a third party, like a for-profit home health care agency. A definitional ruse, a designation as “elder companions” who were like casual babysitters, reduced the home aide to a friendly visitor, an interpretation of Congressional action by the Department of Labor at the time. The Supreme Court ratified what amounted to wage theft over thirty years later in 2007. The Obama administration in late 2011 proposed new rules to supplant this definition of home care as not work.36
It took twenty-one months, but finally on September 17, 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor announced final rules that ended the exclusion of home care workers from overtime and marked their recognition as workers.37 Significantly, this change considered care as work. It embedded definitions of care as assistance of individuals with “Activities of Daily Living” (i.e., “dressing, grooming, feeding, bathing, toileting, and transferring”) and “Instrumental Activities of Daily Living” (i.e., “tasks that enable a person to live independently at home, such as meal preparation, driving, light housework, managing finances, assistance with the physical taking of medications and arranging medical care”). Whereas the 1970s regulations exempted from the category of “elder companions” those who spent over 20% of their hours in housekeeping and other domestic tasks, the Obama-era ones mandated FLSA inclusion of those who perform care for more than 20% of their time. Companionship services then became restricted to “provision of fellowship and protection.” These could include “engag[ing] the person in social, physical, and mental activities, such as conversation, reading, games, crafts, accompanying…” and being there with someone in their home “to monitor the person’s safety and well-being.”38
In attempting to distinguish care from companionship, the rules replicated the strand of feminist thought that separates physical labors from relational ones, reinforcing the division between spiritual and menial housework. But as any care provider knows, the two can’t be so easily parsed. The percentage of hours represents an attempt to quantify that which overflows such frameworks. The complexity of the rules, and their careful designation, reflected the attempt by administrations to come to grips with the dual nature of care as relation and labor.
As of the writing of this essay in June 2015, it is not clear whether the Obama change in definition would ever come into effect. Just in time for Christmas 2014, at the behest of the Home Care Association of America, the International Franchise Association, and the National Association for Home Care & Hospice, U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon (a George W. bush appointee) struck down the extension of FLSA to these employers of live-in home care workers. Immediately, California delayed its state-level extension of overtime to its MediCal funded workers and a second employer suit right after the New Year led the same judge to vacate the entire new rule. Home care workers face perpetual low-wages, enhanced by the prospect of continuous litigation delaying their inclusion in the labor law, as the Department of Labor appealed. Whatever side prevails, the other probably will take the case to the Supreme Court.39
Like other discourses, legal constructions matter. Home care workers had internalized their non-worker status. Surveys concluded that many saw “their work more as service than as employment.” Rather than workers, they were caregivers, a role “rooted in deep feelings about their religious or cultural traditions.”40 Unionization would come to offer “an identity as a worker’s part of a giant work-force, doing important work that merits recognition, respect, and decent standards.”41 One of the biggest challenges was to make visible an occupation hidden in the home and rendered illegible by the law, but during the last third of the 20th century, that is precisely what the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and other unions managed to accomplish by winning enabling legislation and gubernatorial orders in various states that created mechanisms for collective bargaining with government agencies and put pressure on private employers who were reimbursed through public monies.
Today’s domestic worker movement – internationally as well as in the United States – similarly has sought recognition as workers. With passage of ILO Convention #189, “Decent Work for Domestic Workers,” in 2011, South African Myrtle Witbooi, Chair of the International Domestic Workers Network (IDWN), declared, “we are free – slaves no more, but workers.”42 Activists understood the role of domestic work in social reproduction. As Tanzanian trade unionist Vicky Kanyoka has explained, “It is our work in households that enables others to go out and be economically active… it is us who take care of your precious children and your sick and elderly; we cook your food to keep you healthy and we look after your property when you are away.”43 This sentiment parallels the one expressed by Sarita Gupta, the Executive Director of Jobs with Justice, who has insisted that home care “workers are an invaluable part of our economy – they make all other work possible.”44
Unionization of home care workers has hit an impasse with shifting political winds in the United States, as I have explained elsewhere. The momentum today is with the National Domestic Worker Alliance and its affiliates, who have pushed for bills of rights. Passed in New York, Hawaii, California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Connecticut, these bills vary in scope, but all seek to extend labor protections, especially overtime, to private household workers. They seek to recognize care as work and propel immigrant women of color, the majority of those involved in domestic worker associations, into economic citizenship.45
Domestic workers are creating a new care movement to bring the needs of care receivers and providers together, those who do household labor and those who use such labor. The Caring Across the Generations initiative, begun in 2011, joins rights and respect with love, “to build a more caring economy for all of us.”46 It calls for decent work and a sensible immigration policy, socialized services and attention to human dependencies, with training, labor standards, and participation by families and paid workers alike. This coalition calls for establishing a pathway to staying for immigrant care workers, that is, adequate visas for careworkers.
The National Domestic Workers Alliance with its coalition partners offers hope. This movement is trying to re-signify the meaning of love away from mammy’s natural feelings to a social justice goal. The affect evoked is powerful. For success, the movement is taking advantage of our valuing of production by claiming that household labor, that is social reproduction, is central to the organization of home and work.
Conclusion
That domestic and care workers partake in the language of production makes them legible. They do so trying to shift the discussion by re-connecting production and reproduction. In some sense, over thirty years ago, Benería was pushing the world of development experts to understand this interrelation. She came to root women’s subordination in various modes of reproductive labor. But on the ground, the ILO technical assistance programs sought to redeploy family labor into income generating activities, as with milk and handicraft cooperatives. Care became work.47
Are there other ways to consider care? Feminist theorist Kathi Weeks critiques the tendency to regard “the ethic of care… as an ethic of work.” Demands for inclusion – into employment and wage labor, like Friedan, or by renaming care as work, as by unions and domestic worker associations – “risks contesting the gendered organization of a capitalist work society by reproducing its fundamental values.” The refusal to work need not be a refusal to care but rather to be caught in family values, queer or not, rather than in the activities that enhance “as the autonomist Marxist tradition might have it – of making some space for the collective autonomy that might alter some of the terms of such choices.” Such a reconceptualization might move us from care as a relation of dependency to care as a struggle for social interdependence. Ending naturalized notions of reproductive labor, Weeks suggests, is a first step.48
Perhaps considering care as work isn’t “capitulation to capitalism” – or its mystical thinking. A respondent to Hoey on the blogosphere offered an alternative reasoning by insisting that “unpaid care lets the rest of society, especially capital, off the hook.” To be utopian about care would then mean recognizing that the existence of care work “declares that paid work is possible without a capitalist, without exploitation, without wages, and without commodities.” This position refuses to see the making of people – “our bodies, our reason, and the gifts of language, culture, and the social organization of the world they give rise to” – as reducible to commodities. That is, “to name care as work that must be remunerated cries out for an alternative economic theory that recognizes the economic value of the human connections and practices about which we care most deeply.”49
We all may desire a realm of freedom, but care work by its very nature responds to a world of constraint. It exists because of inabilities, otherwise known as the limits of the human condition. To speak of independence and care is to obfuscate the relationship between care provider and receiver. The goal of social programs to free frail elderly or disabled people from dependency too often have valued the needs of the receiver by ignoring the provider or turning the performer of care into a tool, an appendage, a means of the independence and freedom of the other, whose status is of utmost concern and so the work of care becomes obscured with a focus on the results of such labor. The conditions of the care worker can be rightly ignored because the focus is on the taker, receiver, client, customer, all names for the one who is cared for. But to embrace dependency and the need for community, to celebrate interdependency, now that might just form the basis for a utopia that works – embracing production, reproduction, home, and work or dissolving the distinction as we reveal in our personhoods together.
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Race, Class, and Social Reproduction in the Urban Present: The Case of the Detroit Water and Sewage System
In the last decade, especially after the 2008 financial crisis, the urban centers of the Midwest such as Chicago and Detroit, but also in the Northeast, such as Baltimore and Philadelphia, have developed a new dynamic: the use of the state (in the form of local or regional governments) to transfer infrastructural resources and their control out of or away from marginalized urban populations, which are predominantly black, brown, and immigrant.1 These infrastructures range from health and educational resources to natural and civic resources such as water and sewage systems. There has been a tendency to read these battles around infrastructure as just another round of neoliberalism – another example of the “shrinking state.” Such an approach, however, seems unable to grasp how these infrastructural grabs, rather than a consequence of the state shrinking, are in fact a distinct kind of raced and classed resource transfer mobilized and sanctioned by the state. Nowhere is this clearer than in Detroit, where the predominantly white suburbs succeeded under the cover of Detroit’s 2013-14 bankruptcy proceedings to pry the possession of the water and sewage infrastructure away from the city proper. Not only have the mostly African-American residents of the city lost control of these infrastructures, they now have to subsidize the social reproduction of the predominantly white, wealthier Detroit suburbs.
We frame these ongoing resource grabs by engaging with recent work that has attempted to theorize infrastructure’s connection to modern forms of power. Brian Larkin, perhaps the most prominent theorist of the recent boom in work on infrastructure, has defined infrastructures as “matter that enable[s] the movement of other matter.”2 As such, infrastructures are systems, ones which are frequently hidden from view and considered neutral, one of whose functions is to distribute resources and govern populations: they “comprise an architecture for circulation.”3 Our contribution here is to examine how these systems of circulation have been newly politicized and how social-reproductive infrastructure, as a means for the circulation of resources, has become an object of political contestation, a means of coercive racial and class control, and also productive of race and class itself.4
We take up the Detroit “water crisis” as a case study for thinking about the connection between the successful social reproduction of predominantly white communities and the exposure of African-American and immigrant communities to premature death and failing reproduction. We develop in two ways the connection between social reproduction and race. First, we track the reproduction of predominantly white communities – that is, their provisioning with the resources and infrastructures (water, housing, education, etc.) for reproducing certain conditions of existence and capacitation. Second, we examine how race and racial difference are themselves reproduced through differential access to the means of social reproduction.5 The case of Detroit illustrates how urban social infrastructures violently produce and reproduce race and its urban geographies, shaping the flows of peoples, bodies, and access to resources.
We need to say a word about the class and racial dynamics of Detroit. The demographics of the Detroit metro area (the suburbs as a whole are more than 80 percent white, while the city is 83 percent black) have shaped to a great degree the form that the struggle over infrastructure has taken in the region. Because of the sharp demographic split between white and black populations across city and suburban lines, battles over infrastructure have been racialized along a black-white/city-suburb boundary and marked by a persistent, ongoing, long-term anti-blackness localized against the city of Detroit. It is critical to understand how this anti-black racism has determined infrastructural battles and the forms they have taken in the region and also how social infrastructure itself has been used to produce and reproduce the area’s radical binary racial divide. This means that the material and social lives of non-black communities of color and immigrants, while subject to different forms of racism and structural discrimination, are often subsumed by the binary racial logic dominating the city’s geography, infrastructure, and political discourse. Thus, non-whites as well as poor whites in the suburbs often benefit from the anti-black racism of the predominantly white suburban political elite. Similarly, the possibilities for social reproduction of white and non-black groups within the city limits have been differentially shaped by the anti-black racism that has marked flows of and access to infrastructure in the city.
The specifics of the case of Detroit, although familiar to many post-industrial cities in the Midwest, may not be directly generalizable to other urban areas which might have more spatially complicated forms of class and race differentiation and urban/suburb governance.6 However, it can help us bring out how, across the urban United States, the social-reproductive means of communities of color and immigrants are subject to conditions of intense attack through the existing social infrastructure. Urban studies scholars have shown how welfare infrastructures and the social distribution of resources, while making a vast number of marginalized populations dependent on them, were deployed strategically as a means of social control and social regulation, of racialization, of spatial segregation, and of reproducing social marginality. In the context of neoliberal restructuring, these existing dependencies are being exploited and turned against the marginalized in particularly egregious ways, through the systematic expropriation of access to the resources necessary for basic reproductive needs. These occur through withdrawals, shut-offs and closures, extortion, excessive monetary punishment, and criminalization, keeping those on the margins subordinated to a regime of poverty, debt, and exploitation.
All these instruments have the double effect of expropriation and punishment, of producing marginalization and punishing the marginalized. While they have effectively become new forms of expropriation and dispossession, they also wield new forms of discipline and social control that are specific to the neoliberal regime and that operate on the terrain of social reproduction. Working differently than the regulatory regimes of the welfare state, these are new forms of coercion, repression, and social control over communities of color, immigrants, and the poor, reproducing the structural conditions of their class. In other words, infrastructure’s function is to extract, besides resources, compliance and obedience to the work and debt regime, and also to ensure that material wealth and class power remain structurally unavailable to these communities.7
In the following, we open with how the political and economic elites of the predominantly white suburbs of Detroit have waged a juridical and legislative war since the 1970s in order to pry the possession of the water and sewage infrastructure away from the city proper before turning, by way of conclusion, to some of the historical and theoretical ramifications that can be derived from this case study.
Making Detroit the “Minority” Partner: The Battle for the Detroit Water and Sewage System
After years of debate and speculation, the largest metropolitan bankruptcy in U.S. history became a reality when the city of Detroit filed in federal court on July 18, 2013. It was not the mayor and city council who came to the decision to file for bankruptcy, however. Rather at this moment the city was under control of a governor-appointed emergency manager. An “emergency manager” is a juridical device, which exists in the state of Michigan, in which the governor, having decided that a municipality is in a state of “financial emergency,” can send an official to take control of said municipality. The official then assumes all powers of, and overrides, the mayor, city council, and other elected governing bodies, gaining the ability to break contracts, outsource work, and reorganize any part of the administrative structure in order to return the local government to “financial health.” Before Detroit exited bankruptcy in 2014, it has been estimated that over half of Michigan’s African-American population was under the non-democratic rule of emergency managers.
The decision by the Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD) to begin turning off the water of residents behind in their payments in April of 2014 received a great deal of national media attention.8 Roughly 30,000 people had their water disconnected in 2014; 25 percent were unable to have it turned back on in 48 hours. Moreover, in the city water rates have risen 119 percent in the last decade.9 Protests swelled throughout the summer and were given a national projection when the shut offs were condemned by the United Nations. The shutoffs came during the final months of the negotiation of the Detroit bankruptcy. As was widely reported, holders of DWSD bond debt had been demanding that the department demonstrate that it would have a more stable revenue stream in the future. The shutoffs and their political framing were read as a critique of Wall Street and finance capital – which would not be entirely wrong.10
However, such framing of the shut-offs misses two histories. The first one is the historical relation, sketched above, between the social-reproductive resources of middle- and upper-class, mostly white populations and those of black, brown, immigrant, and poor communities, which have shaped contemporary urban geographies of class and race. The second one is the suburbs’ long-term struggle to pry control of the water and sewage infrastructure from the city, as a means of securing their ability to generate revenue for their own communities. While the shut-offs were a consequence of debt negotiations and the bankruptcy of Detroit, they were also the result of this longer struggle to secure and promote the social reproduction of white communities, a struggle which has become more acute in the moment after the 2007-08 financial crisis.11
The Detroit metropolitan region is composed of four primary entities: the city of Detroit and the counties of Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland. The city runs to the border of the counties where the suburbs begin (roughly bounded by 8 Mile Road on the north and Telegraph Road on the far west). Since the 1950s, the population of the city has shrunk and the racial composition has changed dramatically. As Mathieu Desan writes:
Between 1950 and 2010, Detroit’s white population fell from 1.5 million to 75,000, with close to half of that loss occurring between 1950 and 1970, before the election of Coleman Young [Detroit’s first black mayor]. Meanwhile, Detroit’s black population has gone from accounting for 16 percent of the city’s total population in 1950 to roughly 83 percent today, standing at 590,000 (US Census Bureau). Detroit today remains one of the most segregated cities in America if one considers the metropolitan area as a whole. Whites respectively make up 81.4 percent and 91.6 percent of the suburban counties of Oakland and Macomb, while Wayne County, if one excludes Detroit, is 83.7 percent white and only 8.3 percent black.12
Like many metropolitan areas, the water system of the suburbs was an extension the city of Detroit’s system. This has meant that the city of Detroit, at least until the 1970s, controlled most aspects of the system, from price or rate setting to debt issuance to revenue. The suburbs have bought their water wholesale from the city, at a price set by the city, and then sold it on to their suburban customers. The revenue from the system was used by the city to maintain the physical infrastructure, but as revenue it could also be used for any other purpose for which the city saw fit.
The water system, and the city’s control over it, has been a target of suburban politicians since the 1970s. Because the counties have few levers of power over the city proper, their means for doing so has been juridical and legislative and their primary objective has been the creation of a new, regional governing body which they would control (their aim has been to shift Detroit to being the “minority” partner, in one county commissioner’s language). From 1977 to 2013, the water system was under the oversight of a federal judge due to non-compliance with Environmental Protection Agency regulations. While Judge Feikens (1977-2010), and subsequently Judge Cox (2010-13), declined to create a regional authority ex nihilo, the very fact of their oversight was the first bridgehead into the city’s authority and their approval and promotion of debt-led and neoliberal solutions has weakened the city’s power over time.13 In the 1990s, when Republicans controlled the governorship and both houses in the state of Michigan, suburban Detroit legislators made numerous attempts to create a regional authority at the state level. They finally succeeded in passing legislation in 2004, but then-Democrat governor Jennifer Granholm vetoed it. In an action from 2011, the mayor at that time Dave Bing and local politicians and community leaders protested against the attempted takeovers. It highlighted the historical legacy of appropriation and showed the level of importance in the city concerning the value of the water system. Bing’s comments at this event expressed what was the consensus amongst black (and other) politicians in the city: “It’s ludicrous for Detroit to own the system, to have all the debt but doesn’t have control of management of the system.” (Bing’s comments (being made extemporaneously – thus their grammar) can be heard in this newscast.))
However, what primarily white suburban leaders couldn’t accomplish through juridical or legislative means, the fiat of Detroit’s emergency manager could make real. Part of the bankruptcy agreement – hammered out under the authority of emergency manager Kevyn Orr, was the creation of a regional water board, The Great Lakes Water Authority (GWLA). By establishing the board, the suburbs finally accomplished their goal of wresting control of the system from the city.14 Under this new deal, Detroit retains “ownership” of the system but leases it to the authority for $USD 50 million a year.15 The new board is composed of six representatives, with only two from the city, one each from Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties, and one appointed by the governor (currently Rick Snyder). A super-majority of five out of six votes is now needed for any “major initiatives such as raising rates, borrowing money, and hiring or firing a director.”16 What this means is that the city has lost control over price or rate setting, and it has also lost control over the revenue from the system. Perhaps most importantly, the agreement states that the GLWA can step in to set the city’s rate (i.e., the price customers pay), and takeover or outsource their collection process, if certain conditions are not being met.
Thus, as we argued above, the water shutoffs were not just an outcome of the need to placate Wall Street bondholders but were also part of a longer struggle opened up by white suburban elites, who in last decade have been largely successful in prying key pieces of infrastructure from the city.17 Suburban authorities now have a tool they can use to shield their communities from any future crises with the water system and to socialize those crises onto the residents of the city of Detroit. Given the racist on-record statements of county leaders like Oakland county commissioner L. Brooks Patterson, one should not hope for a lot of fair play in this regard.18 In essence, the balance of power with respect to control of the water system has been almost completely reversed.19 Once the owner of the system, the city is now reduced to less than a customer, as the GWLA retains a de facto oversight of city rate setting and collections. Through this infrastructural vector, Detroit residents will now subsidize the reproductive resources of upper- and middle-class, mostly white, suburbs.
Racialized Control of the Means of Reproduction: Towards A Genealogy
We want to use this analysis of the Detroit water system to reflect on the history of how white communities, since the inception of whiteness in the United States, have controlled the reproduction of and access to the means of social reproduction of immigrants and communities of color – and to reflect on how the present moment is both linked to and different from these historical conditions. While it is not possible for us in the short space of this essay to develop a detailed history, we want to signal some important ways that this control over resources and reproduction (social, individual, and familial) has been thought in the prior literature in order to establish a genealogical sketch of the battles over infrastructural resources and means of reproduction in the present.
The control of black women’s reproductive capacity and the social reproduction of black communities was foundational to the U.S. slave system, and in the last decade a rich vein of feminist scholarship has shown how this control was essential to the material functioning and ideology of New World slavery.20 For example, Pamela Bridgewater argued that, as the Atlantic slave trade was closed in 1808, the south started “producing” its own slaves, marking a shift towards discourses and practices around “breeding,” rewards for having children, and coerced reproduction as a source of profit.21 As Walter Johnson noted in his recent River of Dark Dreams, slaveholders were very clear that the social reproduction depended on “the biological reproduction of the people they owned” or that the successful reproduction of white communities and families depended on the control, not just of slave labor power, but on the resources for and “raw materials” of black bodies’ self-reproduction:
It was not exactly that slaveholders were indifferent to the reproduction of their slaves. Certainly […], most recognized that their own social reproduction, their own legacy to the future – as a class, as members of families, as fathers – depended on the biological reproduction of the people they owned. As with other forms of property, slaveholders used enslaved people to articulate the connections between white households and generations. As a slaveholders’ saying had it, there were three things necessary to beginning a family: a wife, a house, and a slave to work in it.22
The active control of reproduction of black and immigrant populations has been central both to white domination and to the successful reproduction of white communities. Reproduction of white communities in the United States was never “self-sufficient” as the logic of neoliberalism would have us believe; rather, it has depended historically on the control of the means of social reproduction of black, brown, and immigrant communities, to secure its flourishing, while also serving as a vector of white domination. Both of these aspects are present in the current appropriation of urban infrastructures by majority white communities in the Detroit suburbs.
Post-slavery, the differential channeling and appropriation of resources by whites has passed through three primary moments. One of the critical pieces of the New Deal, the Social Security Act, left out both domestic and agricultural workers who accounted for 90 percent of the black, as well as most of the Mexican-American and immigrant, labor force in that moment.23 Moreover, as Mary Poole recently showed, the exclusion of African Americans was not merely the result of an anachronistic southern racism, but rather enacted nationally by “a shifting web of alliances of white policymakers that crossed regions and political parties” who “shared an interest in protecting the political and economic value of whiteness.”24 The same is the case for the post-war period in which the massive flows of Federal dollars that poured into local communities did so in ways to preferentially support the social reproduction of white communities by promoting white flight and extending segregationist practices into the suburbs. With the rise of the penal or carceral state that Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Loïc Wacquant have described, these institutional arrangements were continued and refashioned through a transfer of resources out of the welfare state and into the warfare state (to use Wilson’s language).25
In the case of the Detroit water system takeover, these historical dynamics take on new inflections, in particular in how infrastructure has been newly tied into the reproduction of race and economic marginality. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore has argued, racism is “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death.”26 Although there are multiple ways in which this vulnerability is produced, the withdraw of infrastructure that delivers essential resources, while not entirely “new,” is, we suggest, being reconstituted uniquely within the U.S. system of structural racism as it participates in spatial regimes of class power. In these contemporary configurations, the social reproduction of white communities, through state mechanisms, is supported by or parasitically feeds upon black, brown, and immigrant communities and resources. At the same time, the water system and its withdrawal has been converted into a tool for intensifying class oppression. Residents are now forced to choose between paying water bills and buying food or school supplies. It also appears that the recent spike of foreclosures in the city of Detroit can at least be partially attributed to residents falling behind on mortgage or property tax payments due to increasing water bill pressures.
These seizures of infrastructure are structured by processes that are both historical and emergent. Certainly, they form a part of the genealogy of state-sanctioned forms of resource seizure from or transfer out of economically and racially marginalized communities. While far-right positions around the need to limit the carceral state gain steam, our intuition is that the complex system forming around infrastructure, social reproduction, and racial and social marginality represents a potentially new site of reproducing class and racial domination through the two-fold dynamic of both extracting resources from the poor and communities of color and coercing them into compliance.27
To say this in a slightly different way, we generally find the most convincing accounts of neoliberalism, such as Loïc Wacquant’s, to be those that focus not on the shrinking of the state, but rather on the transfer of resources from the welfare state into the carceral state. This essay has traced another form of transfer, omitted by accounts like Wacquant’s, namely, the transfer of infrastructure. To some extent, capitalist cities have historically been sites of population control, but the state-sanctioned or authorized transfer of resources and capacities for social reproduction in and out of differently raced and classed communities via infrastructural control turns the city itself into a site of intensified coercion and repression. Limiting or conditioning access to the infrastructural means of reproduction thus becomes an effective disciplinary instrument involved not just in the biopolitical governance of “life” (the way Foucault has defined the liberal and welfare state) but that successfully mobilizes the specter of death, famine, homelessness, prison, illness and abandon to exert coercive control.
Conclusion
We would like to conclude with a few observations of a political nature. Most often, the politics one finds in the 1970s literature on social reproduction blends some form of anti-capitalism with a turn to the state, requests to the state for funding, or an orientation towards the state as a site of struggle. We think that the present moment demands that we begin to address these historical legacies of reliance on the state and think differently about politics around social reproduction.
If politics of social reproduction in the 1970s blended anti-capitalism with a turn to the state, what feels different about the present is that much of the state apparatus, to deploy Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s distinction, has been transferred from welfare to warfare. It is hard to imagine turning to the state in the present – where there once might have been points of entry for negotiation, cooptation, and mediation, today one more often finds doors leading into the carceral, judicial, and deportation systems. We know, of course, that historically the state and infrastructural apparatus attached to it have always been used to discipline. What is perhaps distinctive in the present is that the welfare justification of these tools of discipline has dropped away or rather the balance between the state’s “welfare” and “warfare” functionalities has tipped more decisively in the direction of warfare.
These resource and infrastructure seizures in the present generate, almost immediately, acute crises of social reproduction. If you live on a block where the majority of residents have no running water – before there can be a political project of wresting control of the infrastructure back from the suburbs – one is faced with the immediate daily problem of how to source water. At the same time, another particularity of the present, is how one community’s crisis underpins another’s successful reproduction. Where once there was at least a pretense to maintaining a reserve army in conditions in which they could be drawn into the labor force, now, instead of minimal conditions of life, one finds deepening crisis and a widening separation between majority white communities in which social reproduction is possible and those which have been increasingly subordinated by the state and capital to regimes of poverty, debt, and exploitation. One of the tasks of the present then will be to find a way through this situation, a terrain of social reproduction defined more by warfare than welfare, one defined less by biopolitical forms of welfare state discipline and more by forms of the intensification of the disruption of group, familial, and individual processes of social reproduction. Historically, struggles around social reproduction have opened onto the forging of autonomous forms of governance, networks of mutual care, survival, and wellbeing, and invite communities to take back the resources and knowledges necessary for caring for each other and reproducing and continuing to survive on a daily basis. Our sense is that autonomous forms of organizing will be an important part of any political project addressing current crises in social reproduction. Clearly though, putting into play infrastructural systems will also greatly challenge, due to their complex material and technological legacies, a politics of mutual care and autonomy. However, rather than a permanent obstacle to struggle, working through these kinds of challenges are what it would mean to learn to struggle anew on the terrain of social reproduction in the present.
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Radical archives and the new cycles of contention
Vint Cerf, co-designer of the internet’s basic architecture and a vice president for research with Google, recently sounded the alarm about “bit rot” or the degradation of data files. He warns that we’re facing a “forgotten century” of historical documentation because we lack the computer software and hardware necessary to read obsolete computer files.1
Reflect on what this means for social movements: the meeting minutes, manifesto drafts, position papers, poster designs, calls to action, button templates, carefully crafted tweets, Facebook event announcements and RSVPs, and myriad other documents of resistance already lost to bit rot. If we jump forward to today, our enthusiasm for cloud computing could spell just as dire an outlook for documenting our contemporary movements.
The ephemera, strategizing, and documentation of contemporary social movements are at risk. Activists risk losing the official record of their actions when everything that constitutes an archive of social change is entrusted to third-party web apps and companies, such as Facebook, Instagram, Tumblr, and Twitter. We’ve moved relatively quickly from concerns about backing up physical hard drives – easily made obsolete by the collapse of companies (Iomega Zip Drive, anyone?) and the triumph of one file format over another – to blindly trusting that our organizations’ thinking and planning are safe “in the cloud.” After all, who actually reads the terms and conditions for using Google Docs, or any other service that allows for online collaboration and high storage at low cost?
This is a call for better preservation of our historical legacy and guides to organizing for future generations. Like everything else we humans touch, archives are political. At the heart of calls for preserving our past – recent and even further back – is a question of trust. Who are activists going to trust with telling the history of their movements, achievements, and defeats? Who will be able to tell that story if our memories are locked behind a paywall, discarded, or misplaced as the result of a change in ownership of the services we use daily?
Archivists and archival activists are engaged in meaningful debates, and praxis, over the politicization of records, the politics of organizing of documents, the archivist’s role in movements (active agents or passive collectors?), and the power structures that dictate which groups’ records are collected and preserved.2 These debates are critical to activists and organizers because they determine who will know history and, importantly, how it will be known. What becomes of our digital records is part of this conversation.
I’m proposing that we consider movements and our digital records in the context of “cycles of contention.” Think about these cycles as the opening and closing of windows of opportunities for people to realize that their problems aren’t individual failings, but systemic, and then to act on those grievances as a group.
Sociologist Sidney Tarrow, in the 1990s, described these stages as a cycle of contention.3 First, as tensions mount and people begin to articulate their problems, there is a building and coalescing of concerns and movements to action. Next, ideally, we see activists becoming organizers, because they’re thinking about goals, strategies, and tactics, and innovating on forms of protest that have historically worked or failed. Third, we would see the creation of or dramatic changes within frameworks – how we make meaning out of our situation or frame our collective problems. At the same time, a movement would have people acting on the same grievances, but approaching them using different strategies. They might all be part of the same organization, or elements of a social movement “sector” spread out geographically. We’d also see, based on this new level of meaning-making and action, increased interactions between the people and those in power. This becomes a cycle because, win or lose, there will also be those in society with grievances that need addressing but, according to Tarrow, regardless of political stripe, the stages of the cycle will be similar. Grievance, meaning-making, strategizing, action, confrontation; repeat.
It’s not too far of a stretch to suggest that our use of social media, web tools, and cloud storage is now implicated in each stage of this cycle. Take, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement. It’s indisputable that digital technologies brought the murders of Sandra Bland, Eric Garner, John Crawford III, and too many other African-Americans to our collective attention. The urgency with which young people, many of whom have never considered themselves activists, mobilize, create trending hashtags, disseminate meeting times, craft agendas, and spread slogans with digital tools and organizing strategies. These are cycles of digital contention, if you will, which update Tarrow’s schema.
But how do we archivists and preservationists convey to those struggling, in this fast-paced moment, the importance of organizing archives? Those of us who care about preserving our organizing past for use in the future need to convey that an archive isn’t a dead entity – archives are a living repository. Maintaining our own records is the best chance we have of shaping our reality. Otherwise, the story that is told today in the mainstream media and by politicians seeking to criminalize and capitalize on dissent becomes the historical record as recorded by corporate archives and historical societies consumed by the history of “Great Men.”4 This shaping and documenting of our reality means that activists are building a foundation today that will allow future organizers to not have to reinvent the wheel.
I want to reinforce these points, about archiving in general and digital archives in particular, by referring to my own experiences with the analog archives of black feminist activists and organizations. In this instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was an accidental third-party archivist of radical history.
In the 1990s, thirty plus years after the fact, I set out to construct a comprehensive history of 1970s black feminist organizing. There were plenty of magazine clippings in archives that normalized feminism as “a white thing,” the purview solely of white feminists. Black magazines contained articles with titles such as Encore magazine’s 1973 hit piece “Women’s Lib Has No Soul.” It was the allusion, though, to black women’s inclinations toward feminism in mainstream articles, such as a 1973 Newsweek article called “Feminism: ‘The Black Nuance,’” that encouraged my pursuit of black feminists and organized groups. More importantly, conversations with black feminists active in the era affirmed my research into this undocumented history.
Archival research eventually revealed the existence of five black feminist organizations: the Third World Women’s Alliance, the National Black Feminist Organization, the National Alliance of Black Feminists, and Black Women Organized for Action, and the fairly well-known Combahee River Collective. However, more records existed un-archived rather than in institutional archives.
Graduate students are taught, as historical researchers, a key question to ask our interviewees: “Do you have any personal papers or archives related to the organization that I could see?” I quickly learned that the best response wasn’t, “Yes, I donated my papers to University Archive X.” Instead, more fruitful was the unexpected, but often-heard: “Actually, I think I might have some papers in my basement/attic/storage unit/under my bed.” These archives, out of sight and prone to dangers such as fire and flood, lived on, unnoticed, until someone asked after them.
One archival collection speaks to this idea of a living repository. To my knowledge, the FBI collected and maintains the most complete record of the Bay Area-based Third World Women’s Alliance (TWWA) newsletters. Based on a Freedom of Information Act Request request in the 1990s, the FBI sent me over 200 pages of redacted documents. I assumed, or hoped, these records would contain evidence of COINTELPRO action against the TWWA. While there were a few documents providing evidence of infiltration and agents provocateurs attending TWWA organizing meetings, perhaps more significantly the majority of the documents were copies of every newsletter the organization published from 1971-1974.
If it’s possible to set aside for the moment the white supremacist violence and reprehensible violation of civil liberties wrought by COINTELPRO operations, this act of “archiving” a social justice organization’s activities provided a complete historical record of TWWA’s philosophy and actions. This black feminist socialist organization was dedicated to “the elimination of the oppression and exploitation” from which black and Third World communities suffered, and “tak[ing] an active part in creating a socialist society.” The TWWA organized a range of activities in black and Third World communities designed to model the self-determination they and other social justice organizations of the era sought. As I detail in Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations 1968-1980 (Duke University Press, 2005), TWWA’s work in black communities established a defining precedent for later black women’s activism, with the goal of ending racial, gender, and class oppression, or what we now call intersectionality.
Should we thank the federal government for their spying, which resulted in an accidental archive that no other historical archive possessed? It would have been unheard of for the TWWA to consider the FBI their organization’s official archivist. So why are we letting Facebook or even blogging platforms like WordPress be the de facto archivist of our calls to action, poster PDFs, organizational records, and other born-digital materials?
Let’s consider the FBI in the parlance of today’s technological structure: are the FBI and the U.S. National Archives an early version of a third-party platform, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, SnapChat, or a host of other social media platforms? All of these institutions have their own privacy policies, terms of service, and archiving policies. Is it wise to entrust the work and legacy of our movements to corporate (.com), educational (.edu) and government (.gov) third-parties?
If activist groups have our websites regularly crawled by the Internet Archive – bravo! If we’re following guidelines for archiving video from the point of creation, as Witness, an international organization dedicated to video as a human rights tool, advises, we’re empowering ourselves to preserve our legacy. We’re (at least partially) taking care of our activist legacy, ensuring it’s available for the future: for our own use, for tomorrow’s activists, or for historians who will tell the story of our successes or failures.5
If we download our archive using the tools a third-party service provider offers, do we know what file format we’ve entrusted with our archive? Do we have more than one piece of hardware and a copy of at least one software program that will be able to read those files two, three, five years from now?
The Library of Congress offers a set of file formats that it predicts open source, non-proprietary software will be able to read in the future.6 We should revisit our files and save them in these preservation formats. Microsoft Word, for example, might seem now like it will dominate the word processing market forever, and some groups may opt for an open source format such as Libre Office. But PDFs, specifically the format PDF/A 1, not .docx, is the preferred format for long-term preservation of documents.
The ideal backup archival and preservation-ready situation would be to have a copy of your group’s archives, in preservation acceptable format, on three different hard drives. These hard drive backups are then kept in different locations in case of fire, flood, or theft. Those hard drives would, additionally, be tested every year to make sure the files are accessible with the software you have on hand. As a final step, the files would be transferred to a new set of hard drives every five years.
For further information, I’ll recommend the work of activist-archivist-researchers, such as Howard Besser and colleagues’ website, Activist Archivists. They offer sounds reasons for archiving your group’s records, as well as links to other organizations who are archiving movement history. Much recent archival work is related to the Occupy movement, but the advice isn’t exclusive to any one movement. It’s relevant to any social justice group that wants to preserve their work for their own use or that of future activists.
In a recent article about the adeptness with which young activists are mobilizing against racist police violence using social media, the New York Times observed,
Their innovation has been to marry the strengths of social media — the swift, morally blunt consensus that can be created by hashtags; the personal connection that a charismatic online persona can make with followers; the broad networks that allow for the easy distribution of documentary photos and videos — with an effort to quickly mobilize protests in each new city where a police shooting occurs.”7
There are still analog social movement archives being discovered and deposited into traditional archives. But if we’ve lost decades of social movement history due to digital degradation, or bit rot, we would do well to insert the production, archiving, and preservation of our born-digital materials as a crucial step into Tarrow’s cycles of contention. This kind of innovation, which couples social media with mobilization, risks being lost as quickly as it’s developed.
Perhaps this is, as some activists argue, a good thing: keep challenging the status quo with new ideas and identities that are unexpected. But without a lasting record of all the new content, we’ll be left with remembrances of tools that may or may not have contributed to liberation. Whether we’re talking about the analog records of the past, or the digital records of the present, our theory and praxis lives in our documentation and records.
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Repression and Resistance on the Terrain of Social Reproduction: Historical Trajectories, Contemporary Openings
While the idea of social reproduction is most often associated with Marxist feminist literature from the 1970s, considerable work was done around that concept in a wide range of rather disparate bodies of work throughout the 1960s and 1970s.1 In addition to Marxist feminism, social reproduction became a main focus for Italian autonomists, anti-Stalinist socialist humanists in post-Stalinist Eastern Europe, “anti-humanist” critics of orthodox Marxism such as Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault, in studies on slavery, race, and urban development, and by postcolonial and Third-World feminists.
In these bodies of work, social reproduction has acquired a wide array of meanings and has been put to many different uses. Some take the term to mean the material means of subsistence and survival, both immediate and infrastructural, from water and food to housing and health care. Others use the concept to underscore reproduction as a particular kind of labor involved in the regeneration and well-being of others, as in domestic, care, emotional, affective, and sex work, which have historically fallen mostly to women. More recent literature has focused on the commodification of reproductive labor and the global economies and transnational chains of domestic, care, and sex work.
In these and other writings, the body has become an important focus: the body as a site of biological reproduction, the regulation of sexuality, and the reproduction of the gender binary. The reproductive and reproducible body figures as a kind of resource – a resource for labor but also for producing more bodies and lives, for workers. It becomes mobilized by population control projects and by medical and administrative technologies of regulation towards the reproduction of heteronormativity, of racial and class control, and towards social normalization projects.
Yet some political organizers and theorists have taken social reproduction to mean the public and social institutions that reproduce social relations at large: the state, the school, the factory, and the family, the hospital and health institutions. For example, struggles around access to higher education have revealed universities as sites of reproducing class and social inequality, while underscoring their role in forging social mobility. Further, work coming from critical urban studies has explored cities, urban environments, and geographies of infrastructure as sites for reproducing labor power and class and racial inequalities.
In other words, the range of writings on social reproduction, which appeared more or less coevally in the late 1960s and the 1970s, were not necessarily in dialogue with each other and do not form a coherent theoretical or political body of work. However, they all came to the concept of social reproduction at the particular juncture of the crisis of Stalinist Marxism, to criticize orthodox Marxist analyses of labor and exploitation and expose the blind spots in orthodox conceptions of working class struggle. To a degree that has perhaps gone under-recognized, “reproduction” was a central concept of non-orthodox and anti-Stalinist Marxist work in the 1960s and 70s. The concept played a prominent role in the work of anti-Stalinist Marxist humanists, particularly in the socialist countries, from studies on gender inequality, to education, leisure, the socialist family, the socialist person, and the “socialist way of life.” Anti-Stalinist Marxist humanists in the 1960s turned to the early, humanist works of Karl Marx, which Stalinist Marxism had repressed, to recover the agency of ordinary people, and to move away from the Stalinist “base-superstructure” framework. But critics of this humanist turn such as Louis Althusser also used the concept of social reproduction to critique the limitations of the Stalinist notions of state power and attend to processes of subject formation under capitalism. In short, social reproduction became both a standpoint of feminist critique of productivist Marxism and a lens for developing new critiques and theories of state power in the context of the liberal welfare and socialist states.
The political uses of the concept are not entirely coherent either: some of these works aimed, each in their own fashion, to make visible the ways in which social reproduction had become a site of social control, of gender and racial subjugation, of the reproduction of heteronormative social forms, which opened new terrains for political resistance against capitalism and the state. Others saw social reproduction as a promising site for state-driven projects of social equality and social mobility, deploying apparatuses of reproduction as instruments of regulation within capitalism, and with the help of the state.
What can we learn today from the theory and political experiences of the 1970s? And vice-versa, how do our struggles against the neoliberal restructuring of education and social infrastructure, against policing and the carceral state, and against racism, xenophobia, Eurocentrism, heterosexism, and transphobia – under capitalism, but also in anti-capitalist and anti-state organizing – allow us to develop a new historical perspective on the 1970s? And, perhaps most importantly, how can we think of autonomy and militant struggle on the terrain of social reproduction today?
In this essay, we would like to explore the spectrum of ideas and arguments on social reproduction beginning in the late 1960s and offer a sort of genealogy of the different meanings, political uses, and critiques of the category, while testing the promises and limitations of these various approaches for thinking social reproduction in the present.
Further, by revisiting Althusserian and Foucauldian critiques of capitalism and the state from the standpoint of reproduction, as well as Black, Third-World and postcolonial feminist critiques of Western Marxist and socialist feminism, we hope to broaden existing historical narratives of social reproduction.
Historical Genealogies of Discourses Social Reproduction
In their pioneering work from the 1970s, Marxist feminists in Western Europe and the United States identified social reproduction as a field of productive, generative activity. For them, patriarchal relationships and the subordination of women in the home appeared as a precondition to capitalist exploitation. What stood for labor, namely wage labor and industrial production, was a product of a white male political imaginary unable to account for the work of social reproduction relegated to the home, the “private,” and other spheres outside the factory.2 The work of domestic labor, biological reproduction, and the reproduction of labor power were all ignored by “traditional” Marxist accounts, which confined their notion of labor to the factory. In other words, the critique of the “capital-labor” relationship excluded the sphere of the home and the domestic, where women were responsible for all the work of reproduction of labor power through domestic work, and for the reproduction of the working class more generally, by bearing and caring for children. Marxist feminists showed how these disavowed, invisible, and unrecognized forms of work were absolutely necessary for the existence of the wage-labor form and the “sphere of production” in the first place. Moreover, they showed how women’s work in the home was central to the survival and reproduction of labor power and to capitalist relations more generally. Further, the question was what counted as “work” and “labor,” and who was the subject worthy of what they envisioned as “freedom” from necessity. They fought against the social invisibility of reproductive, affective, and care work and the ways in which these were entangled in naturalized notions of women’s bodies and their affective social lives.
In short, the Marxist-feminist uses of social reproduction in the 1970s became a useful feminist lens for showing how patriarchal social organization was a structural element in capitalist exploitation, and further, how the history of working class struggle had effectively mirrored and reproduced patriarchal relations and gender norms under capitalism. All these became points of feminist critique of the male-dominated Marxist left as well as a focus of feminist organizing against exploitation and capitalism.
However, this body of work had significant limitations. Even though Marxist feminists provided a solid account of how women’s sexuality and the nuclear family became a function of capitalist relations, they essentialized women’s bodies and generally worked with a static notion of the body, took for granted the gender binary, and, to a great extent, accepted the heterosexual premises of both the labor movement and the women’s movement. As contributors to the materialist-feminist journal LIES have recently written, “We find untenable the failure of largely second-wave Marxist feminism to consider gender fluidity and multiplicity under capitalism, to grapple with the forms of exploitation and violence that undergird these categories, and the political consequences of these facts.”3
Marxist and socialist feminists had no account of the kinds of technologies involved in the production of gendered subjects, sexed bodies, and in the regulation of sexuality, and how these may be tied to wage labor, the logic of capitalist accumulation, and the private property regime. Subsequent work in gender studies and queer theory used an alternative path – through Althusser and Foucault – to address these questions, turning to the ways subjects are made and remade, and to the institutions, technologies, and material practices of regulating and policing sexuality, the body, and the gender binary. Much of the subsequent scholarship influenced by Foucault, however, has lost sight of the question of how the body has become a setting for the reproduction of capitalist relations and class inequality, even as these links, we think are addressed in parts of Foucault’s work.4
Further, writing from the United States and Western Europe, Marxist and socialist feminists concerned with issues of reproduction and domestic labor for the most part did not acknowledge prior legacies of women of color organizing around issues of social reproduction, in particular housing and welfare.5 It is perhaps no surprise that black feminists in the United States and the United Kingdom responded critically to them. Drawing genealogies of social reproduction from the perspective of black women’s experience, from slavery to the racist politics of the welfare regimes, black feminists demonstrated that the domestic confines of the housewife was the problem of white working- and middle-class women. Some of these ideas were first articulated in Claudia Jones’ germinal 1949 essay, “To End the Neglect of the Problems of the Negro Woman,” where she coined the idea of a triple oppression of working-class black women. She showed that, having had to work alongside their men, black women were never confined to the “domestic” sphere alone.6 Writing in the 1970s and the early 1980s from opposite sides of the Atlantic, Angela Davis and Hazel Carby continued the line of thought articulated by Jones. “Throughout the country’s history,” Angela Davis wrote in partial response to Wages for Housework, black women toiled together with men under the whip of plantation overseers, suffering “a grueling sexual equality at work.”7 After slavery, Davis continues, black women were employed in vast numbers in a range of industries, from tobacco and sugar, to lumber and steel. Although Davis does not adequately address the question of white immigrant women’s labor in a number of industries, she shows how black women’s labor was mobilized in the reproductive realm as well as in the manufacturing and service industries long before discourses of the “double burden” emerged in white feminist thought. As wives and mothers, workers and breadwinners, notions of black womanhood often revolved around strength, resilience, and independence rather than femininity and subordination, the white middle-class norms of womanhood. Yet Carby had also pointed out that ideologies of black womanhood and constructions of black women’s sexuality did not stem just from the material conditions of oppression and the way they shaped the black family: “The way the gender of black women is constructed differs from constructions of white femininity because it is also subject to racism.”8
Moreover, as both Davis and Carby argue, for black communities the home was historically a site of autonomy and resistance. Davis showed that, paradoxically, domestic labor, that “expression of the socially conditioned inferiority for women,” was in fact “the only meaningful labor for the slave community as a whole.”9 Women’s authority in the home made them the backbone of resistance movements against slavery, colonialism, and racism. Carby argued that “the black family has functioned as a prime source of resistance to oppression” and a “site of political and cultural resistance to racism.”10 Immigrant and Third-World women, as we will discuss later, similarly contested white women’s criticisms of the family as a site of oppression. Showing how the state pathologized, and often punished, forms of family and social life which did not conform to Western liberal models, they focused on the role of family life in cultural resistance and resistance to the state.
However, black women’s labor and their bodies were also central to the successful functioning of the slave system as a whole, and of racial and class domination during and after slavery. Work from the late 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, in particular from Angela Davis, Toni Cade Bambara, and Patricia Hill Collins, exposed how the control of women’s biological reproduction had been mobilized towards racist projects of population control and the outright annihilation of black populations (as well as Puerto-Rican and poor white populations, as in Davis’ work).11 Building upon these earlier works, more recent feminist scholarship returned to the question of reproduction and slavery. Jennifer Morgan has demonstrated the centrality of women slaves’ physical and reproductive labor to the material and ideological formation of the New World slave system. Pamela Bridgewater argued that, as the Atlantic slave trade was closed in 1808, the South had to “produce” its own slaves, marking a shift towards discourses and practices around “breeding” and rewards for having children.12 Walter Johnson has similarly highlighted slave owners’ awareness that their social reproduction depended on “the biological reproduction of the people they owned.”13 These works have also traced the forms of resistance and alternative forms of intimacy, community, and collective knowledge black women conjured in conditions of oppression. Further work on the policing of women’s bodies and reproduction has expanded this focus to other racial, ethnic, and immigrant groups, in particular Latina and Native-American women.14
Marxist-feminist interventions from the 1970s and 1980s had a mixed reception among immigrant women. In one respect, critiques of domestic work resonated with immigrant women, who had been shuttled in massive numbers to perform domestic and care work for the white middle classes in the metropoles. In the United Kingdom, Selma James articulated the Wages for Housework framework with the concerns of immigrant women: for them it was about making visible not only their labor, but also the hidden cost of rebuilding their lives and the lives of loved ones anew in material, cultural, and historical contexts that did not belong to them, after “the uprooting of everything you’ve known.” It was about the strength needed while “fighting to stay” where they are often unwelcome, and about the persistence and resilience of keeping together a life in constant uncertainty and threat of deportation.15 For women coming from the colonized countries, immigration was about “reappropriating their own wealth, stolen from them at home and accumulated in the industrial metropolis.”16 It was the wealth stolen from their own and their ancestors’ labor, and it was as much theirs as it was anyone else’s. As the geographies of the new global division of labor developed – not just in the United Kingdom but across Europe and in the United States – feminists turned to examine the commodification of domestic and care work and to challenge the social hierarchies and meanings of “work.” Focusing on the global reconfiguration of the labor force, they showed how the commodification of domestic, care, affective, and service work reinscribed the devalued social meanings of these activities in hierarchical value-regimes of labor, which mobilized racial, gender, and ethnic differences, as well as immigration status, to subordinate, dehumanize, and devalue black, brown, and immigrant bodies and lives.17
“It is impossible to speak of the relation of women to capital anywhere without at the same time confronting the question of development versus underdevelopment,” James wrote. Her work and organizing held together intersections between women’s struggles, immigration, race, and Third-World liberation movements, while playing with emerging discourses around “development.”18 These tendencies became the basis for international organizations such as the International Wages for Housework Campaign, which welcomed women from a dizzying range of cultural, material, and economic contexts, from Peru and Trinidad, to India, Uganda, the Philippines, and Mexico, to account for their shared political experience and social conditions, while forging an experience of solidarity and togetherness.19
However, this sweeping internationalism came at a great cost: by conjuring an “international sisterhood,” James consistently universalized women’s oppression, insisting that across cultural and material contexts, “what does not vary is that whatever the standard, women are the poorer and the socially weaker sex.”20 These forms of organizing and writing saw a strong push-back from Third-World and post-colonial feminists. Alongside Hazel Carby and others, Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s signature intervention from the early 1980s unpacked their Eurocentric, colonial, and evolutionary premises. Mohanty argued that Western Marxist and socialist feminists contributed to the production of the “Third World” as a monolithic construct across widely different cultural and socio-historical contexts and posited an imagined, singular notion of Third-World womanhood, which reinscribed colonial hegemony. Patriarchy became a universal structure that oppressed all women in the same way – a “stable ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries.”21 Presuming in this way that the conditions of oppression were the same, they erased their historical and cultural contexts and constituted women as a homogenous group on the basis of their shared oppression. Mixed up with racist and colonial prejudice, they posited a subject powerless, dependent, and uneducated, a product of the “backward” socio-economic conditions of which she was part. In this sense, “reproduction” and “unpaid labor” also became universalizing frameworks as they erased the kinds of culturally specific values and social meanings these activities assumed in non-Western and non-capitalist contexts.22 And infamously, by projecting norms of agency and emancipation specific to Western liberal capitalist societies onto non-western contexts, they judged “traditional” gender and sexual practices as “uncivilized,” backward, oppressive, and patriarchal. Thus paradoxically, Carby pointed out, Western Marxist feminists assumed capitalist relations as the gateway to emancipation and progress and implicitly embraced capitalist development as the vehicle for reforms.23
Instead of positing “women” as a coherent group, preexisting and already constituted, postcolonial feminists insisted that feminist analyses should examine how “women” and “men” emerged as subjects through cultural practices in each particular context and examine the culturally specific logics of gender practices and gender subordination, as they configure the political and social meanings of “women,” “men,” and their social activities.24 Uncovering these logics would register not only the historically and culturally specific modes of gender subordination embedded in contexts of social difference and socio-economic conditions, but also render visible women’s agency, power, and their cultures of resistance – rather than just their victimhood. Arguing for situated knowledges, for contextually and culturally specific analyses of gender relations, and for staying attentive to the cultural meanings of gendered social practices, they challenged Western Marxist and socialist feminists to situate their theorizing – to develop an awareness that their concepts and critical methodologies are products of their own socio-cultural contexts and geographies.
Social Reproduction and the State
For the most part, movements around social reproduction in the capitalist West turned to the welfare state to resolve the structural contradictions between the spheres of production and social reproduction, maintaining a rather ambiguous relationship to the state. Even as they critiqued the disciplinary and racializing practices of the state, the welfare rights movement continued to levy their social demands on the state. As Premilla Nadasen outlines in Rethinking the Welfare Rights Movement, this movement was organized around forcing the state to give adequate benefits, while also fighting against the “dehumanizing and surveillance-based components of welfare.”25
Similarly, autonomists, who argued for autonomy from capitalism, autonomy from men and patriarchy, and lastly, autonomy from the state, had a contradictory relation to the state, advocating for women’s economic independence through the “female welfare wage” and various other demands on the state, such as the housework wage. Various “claimants and welfare movements” in the UK and North America, the “Family Allowance Campaign” in the UK, child benefits for single mothers, and other demands to redirect money from the general “family income” towards the specific needs of women, were all ways to advance women’s struggle for independence and empowerment by fighting to “keep the money in women’s hands, to increase it.”26 Against the socialization and collectivization of housework and childcare, Silvia Federici argued:
It is one thing to set up a day care center the way we want it, and then demand that the state pay for it. It is quite another thing to deliver our children to the State and ask the State to control them not for five but for fifteen hours a day. It is one thing to organize communally the way we want to eat… and then ask the State to pay for it, and it is the opposite thing to ask the State to organize our meals. In one case we regain some control over our lives, in the other we extend the State’s control over us.27
Thus, as they addressed their demands mainly to government, the autonomists were positioned ambiguously vis-à-vis the state, especially because by centering their organizing around demands on the state they inevitably endorsed it. Yet these contradictions posed no problem for them: the state was a giant apparatus of control and dispossession, and these demands aimed to reclaim some of the resources that working people were robbed of. The question, Selma James argued, “was not whether the State can afford to give [the demands], but whether we can afford to continue to give so much to the state.”28 But a radical critique of the state was not exactly on their political horizon.
In this sense, they shared some, perhaps unintended, commonalities with post-Stalinist socialist humanists in the East-European contexts, who also had no radical critique of the state but embraced its forms of social distribution. Insisting that ordinary humans were the creators of their own destiny and their own environment, they saw the institutions of the reproduction of social relations at large as the sites where social mobility could be achieved. Social mobility, seen as a measure of freedom and social wealth, was the precondition for the personal and social self-realization of the post-Stalinist socialist person – “the holistically developed person” or the “all-round development of the individual” which Marx spoke about in his 1844 Manuscripts. 29 Their views of social reproduction, wedded to state governance, became an expression of a seamless convergence between social emancipation and social normalization projects. Yet questions of autonomy, of communal control of land, resources, and labor in the socialist countries was configured in very complex and radically different ways – a topic which needs special consideration.
A forceful critique of the state came from another, often overlooked, tradition on social reproduction. Althusser also wrote about social reproduction in the 1970s, independently of Marxist-feminists and against socialist and Marxist humanists. Among all these traditions, he was the one to expose most forcefully the structural role of the state in capitalist relations.30 Though his work does not attend to the articulations of race and gender under capitalism, Althusser, like feminists, came to the question of social reproduction as a way of challenging traditional productivist and orthodox Marxism. But for him, social reproduction was a more expansive category, which included a range of practices, such as – “the reproduction of the means of production, [and] also the reproduction of labor power – family, housing, children, schooling, health, problems faced by the couple, by young people, etc.”31 Besides the law, the courts, the police, and the prisons, he saw the school, the church, and the family as part of the myriad institutions and everyday practices involved in the reproduction of social relations. Further, similar to the work of Italian autonomists, he saw the factory not just as a place where workers produced commodities and their labor was exploited, but as another site involved in the disciplining of bodies, in the making of working class subjects, and in the reproduction of the working class itself.
Such a definition of social reproduction may seem too diffuse and general to be of any use, but what made it specific and conceptually different was that by reproduction, Althusser meant the reproduction of capitalist relations, or “the relations of exploitation.”32 What fell in the realm of “social reproduction,” therefore, were those practices that reproduce relations of inequality and exploitation, those elements that enable and legitimate the relations of domination and guarantee their continued existence. In this sense, Althusser’s project offered another ambitious re-reading of Marx, suggesting that the primary driving logic of capitalism was not just the extraction of resources and labor power from workers. Coexistent, although not always in concert, with the logic of accumulating surplus value and its economic rationality, was the need to reproduce the hierarchies and forms of subordination on which capitalism depended.
Further, Althusser took into account the role of the state seen as the reproduction of social and class subjugation, and to him we owe one of the most interesting Marxist critiques of state power. Marx had left the issue of state power in a relative void, leaving the question “What is a Marxist critique of the state?” an unresolved theoretical challenge. In his essay “Marx in his Limits” from 1978, Althusser wrote that in orthodox Marxist accounts, the state “issued” directly from the mode of production and figured as an expression of the economic and material organization of labor and production.33 This rather simplistic view was taken to its logical extreme in the Stalinist “base-superstructure” doctrine, which saw the state as a derivative of material-economic relations, secondary to the so-called “base” or the organization of economic life. Instead, Althusser saw the state as that which guaranteed the reproduction of the relations of social inequality and exploitation through a continuum of legal, administrative, discursive, and violent or repressive means. In other words, the state was the necessary precondition for the reproduction of capitalist relations; it made sure that the material and normative premises of capitalist exploitation remain intact, that they are being reproduced in daily life.34
Foucault’s work on governmentality and the biopolitical regulation of “life” continues this Althusserian project, yet his work, mostly written in the context of the welfare state, creates oppositions between repressive and productive forms of power, the sovereign right to kill versus the biopolitical approach of “letting live.”35 Unlike Foucault, Althusser never lost sight of, or interest in, state violence and the logic of state repression, seeing them as continuous with the more productive “technologies” of governance under capitalism – a contribution which is useful to revisit in the present political context.
Implications for the Contemporary Moment
That we have turned back to the 1970s at this particular political moment is not a coincidence: such a turn has been prompted by the exigencies of our struggles. To that effect, Amanda Armstrong wrote, out of the student struggles against austerity and the privatization of public higher education, that “now and then seem to mirror one another” both in the structural conditions and the forms of struggle.36 She showed how the crisis of profitability in some industries in the 1970s propelled intense rounds of layoffs, which in turn spurred “waves of organizing” such as wildcat strikes and various forms of rebellions and organized defiance.37
We would add that the two eras seem to mirror each other negatively as well. Hard-fought gains of waged and unwaged women’s struggles in the 1970s are being currently undone, forcing us to return, once again and rather urgently, to the question of social reproduction. In fact, in the neoliberal context, existing infrastructures of social reproduction, the legacies of welfare state capitalism and socialism, have become instruments of dispossession of the means of survival and extraction of resources from already marginalized communities, often through state-administrative means. Their function is, besides extracting resources, to demand compliance and obedience to the work and debt regime, and to ensure that material wealth and class power remain structurally unavailable to those affected. Mostly falling on communities of color, immigrants, and the poor, these measures reproduce the structural conditions of their class through coercion and repression. As we show elsewhere, these trends have been particularly egregious in the post-industrial urban areas of the Midwest, as in the water shutoffs in Detroit, and the closures of public schools and mental health clinics in Chicago. Predominantly in African-American parts of the city, infrastructures of access to social services and social-reproductive needs have been turned into coercive instruments of dispossession and racialization.38
Further, the question of state repression at the site of social reproduction has emerged today more urgently than ever. The capitalist system and the state have amassed tremendous political instruments to prevent the proliferation of social forms alternative to wage-labor, market relations, and the private property regime, whether they are practiced as forms of survival of those on the margins of the system and by different cultural communities, or whether they are part of political visions of imagining social relations differently. As Armstrong argued, “by sustaining regimes of ownership, by enforcing fees for basic necessities, and by breaking up squats and communal encampments, police forces, the courts, and other state bureaucracies enclose the material conditions of life, making it virtually impossible to reproduce ourselves and each other free of waged work.”39 In other words, the state has criminalized a vast range of social, material, and economic forms of life involved in reshaping social and material relations beyond capitalism and the state, and has been persecuting basic forms of survival, of helping and caring for each other – to make sure that capitalist relations remain dominant. By persecuting activities such as panhandling and performing on the streets and in the subways, feeding others in public, and finding shelter outside the private property regime, and by barring direct access to health and gender-affirming technologies and knowledges, the state “close[s] off,” through repression, “of what we could hold in common.”40
These conditions have made us turn urgently to the question of autonomy, of developing collectively skills and resources necessary for our everyday survival. They lead us to the forging of new autonomous forms of collective governance, networks of mutual care, survival, and well-being, and invite communities to take back the resources and knowledges necessary to care for each other and to continue to survive on a daily basis. Armstrong has called these “insurgent forms of social reproduction.”41 In other words, today, unlike during the 1970s, struggles on the terrain of social reproduction, historically tethered to the state, are facing the challenges to reimagine themselves against or outside of its horizons.42 In the process of building autonomy on the terrain of social reproduction, these struggles can humbly learn from the experience and the collective survival of those permanently barred from the reproductive infrastructures of the state through various legal exclusions. Undocumented and precariously-documented immigrants, as well as ex-felons, have been permanently excluded from access to housing, unemployment, food stamps, and other social resources available to citizens. They have accumulated skills, knowledge, and the resilience and strength to survive in spaces of exclusion and invisibility. In this sense, studying the histories and cultures of social reproduction and survival of immigrant communities, who have been historically excluded from or have had little recourse to state resources, is of greatest importance. Further, transgender and gender non-conforming people, often trapped in the administrative and legal limbos of the state and in the binary regimes of public services and the health care system, have developed means of navigating within and against these institutions’ violence and harassment. Their particular conditions have given rise to body autonomy and gender-hack movements dedicated to reclaiming our bodies from the administrative and regulatory regimes of the medical system and the state. As the political links and possibilities for solidarity between these positions are becoming clearer, critiques of the state and struggles for autonomy can hardly go very far without their experiences and insights. This kind of organizing requires a serious commitment to postcolonial critiques of Eurocentrism and First-World frameworks. This is not only because people of color and immigrants who come from non-First-World and non-Western contexts join our struggles only to be subsumed by U.S. regimes of gender, class, and racial difference – a process which erases their social difference and the histories of oppression and resistance present in the multiple worlds they carry and negotiate. It is also because there is a great deal to learn from indigenous and non-Western cultures of social and communal life. We hope that thinking materialist feminism in these directions opens a wider range of avenues for movements in the present, and for building militant struggle on the terrain of social reproduction.
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Sex Work Against Work
While in Anglophone countries the term “sex work” has become quite common, there has been a relative reluctance to discuss it among Francophone intellectuals and activists. Whether among “prohibitionists,” who argue that prostitution can be neither a profession nor work but simply violence, a damage to women’s dignity (as if these two terms were mutually exclusive), or among those who oppose this prohibition yet maintain a kind of “skepticism towards the claim for a recognition of ‘sex work,’” such as Lilian Mathieu, the refusal to speak about sex work is in fact symptomatic of the difficulties that feminists and the left continue to face when discussing women’s labor.1
Even if the topic of sex work might be enjoying growing interest in some parts of the world, the political challenges are by no means new. In the 1970s for example, when a number of feminist collectives launched the “wages for housework” campaign a large part of the left and even of the feminist movement remained hostile to this demand.2 Far from being only a programmatic demand, however, Wages for Housework was instead an invitation; an invitation to radically put not only the whole capitalism system into question, to the extent that capital benefited from the unwaged reproductive work carried out by women, but also the nuclear family itself, in so far as it represents one of the primary places where this exploitation occurs.
Although the Wages for Housework campaign was launched at the very beginning of the 1970s, it was not until 1978 that Carol Leigh, an American sex worker and feminist activist, coined the term “sex work.” And if the claim for “Wages for Housework” might not have the same relevance today now that a large part of domestic work has been commodified – former housewives who have entered the labor market have partly delegated this work to poorer women, especially migrant women – the claim that “sex work is work,” considering the active and often heated discussions it generates, seems more important than ever in our contemporary moment.
Therefore, while certainly taking into account the evolutions in the configuration of the reproductive sector, I will show how “sex work is work” aligns with the struggles for “a wage for housework”; in other words, we will aim to better discern and outline the mutual stakes of the housewives’ struggles and those of sex workers, so as to reaffirm the necessary solidarity between women and the inseparable character of feminist and anti-capitalist struggles. This will allow us to better grasp the relations between sex work and capitalism, and thus reaffirm the need, especially for the left and for feminism, to support these struggles in the name of the revolutionary process they open on to.
Sex Work as Reproductive Work
There are many reasons why we can insist on the kinship between the Wages for Housework movement and those struggles unfolding today that claim “sex work is work.”
First, each of these struggles emerged out of the formidable mobilizations of the feminist movement, which took place on the theoretical terrain as much as the practical one. If the Wages for Housework movement’s affiliation with feminism has always appeared evident, this has not been the same for the sex workers’ movement. We should recall that it was during a feminist conference that Carol Leigh first felt the need to speak about “sex work.”3 We can also note that, according to Silvia Federici, the feminist movement not only allowed the concept of sex work to emerge, but feminism may have also played a role in increasing the overall number of women engaged in sex work:
I think that to some extent, […] but […] to a limited extent, that the increase in the number of women who are turning to sex work has also had to do with the feminist movement. It has given a contribution to undermining that kind of moral stigma attached to sex work. I think the women’s movement has also given power, for example, to prostitutes to represent themselves a sex workers.
It’s not an accident that in the wake of feminist movement you have the beginning of a sex worker’s movement, throughout Europe, for instance. So that the stigma, the feminists, they really attacked that hypocrisy: the holy mother, that vision of women, the whole self-sacrificial, and the prostitute, which is the woman who does sexual work but for money.4
Federici’s definition of the prostitute as “the woman who does sexual work, but for money” points to yet another reason why it is legitimate to connect the struggles of housewives to that of sex workers: since work can exist even where there is no money, sex work is not solely a prerogative of professional sex workers.
One of the main contributions of feminist theorists, especially Marxist-feminists, was to show that just because an activity is not waged does not mean that it is not functional work relating to capitalism. In other words, it is not because an exchange appears to be free that it escapes from capitalist dynamics – much to the contrary. By analyzing “the history of capitalism from the viewpoint of women and reproduction,”5 Marxist-feminist theorists such as Federici have shown that domestic work performed by women – voluntarily inasmuch as it is considered to be what they naturally to do out of love – serves, beyond those who directly benefit from it – workers, future workers, or former workers – the interests of the capitalists, who consequently do not need to take into account the cost for this reproduction in the value of the labor-power they buy.
Beginning with ourselves as women, we know that the working day for capital does not necessarily produce a paycheck, it does not begin and end at the factory gates, and we rediscover the nature and extent of house- work itself. For as soon as we raise our heads from the socks we mend and the meals we cook and look at the totality of our working day, we see that while it does not result in a wage for ourselves, we nevertheless produce the most precious product to appear on the capitalist market: labor power.6
The diverse activities women perform at home – such as looking after the children, preparing meals for the men who come back from their day at work, or providing care for the elderly or ill – count as work that, although it may not not produce commodities in the same way the proletarian laborer does in the factory, nevertheless produces and reproduces what is necessary, indeed, “most precious,” to capitalists: the labor-power that a capitalist buys from the worker. According to this approach, there is no fundamental difference between ironing, cooking, and sex from the perspective of their functions in the capitalist mode of production – all of these activities relate to the more general category of reproductive work. Silvia Federici and Nicole Cox continue:
Housework is much more than house cleaning. It is servicing the wage earners physically, emotionally, sexually, getting them ready for work day after day. It is taking care of our children—the future workers—assisting them from birth through their school years, ensuring that they too perform in the ways expected of them under capitalism. This means that behind every factory, behind every school, behind every office or mine there is the hidden work of millions of women who have consumed their life, their labor, producing the labor power that works in those factories, schools, offices, or mines.7
And while some may think that sex now appears less and less as a service provided by a woman to her spouse after so-called “sexual liberation,” itself led by feminism, that “liberation” in fact only further burdens women:
Sexual freedom does not help. Certainly it is important that we are not stoned to death if we are “unfaithful,” or if it is found that we are not “virgins.” But “sexual liberation” has intensified our work. In the past, we were just expected to raise children. Now we are expected to have a waged job, still clean the house and have children and, at the end of a double workday, be ready to hop in bed and be sexually enticing. For women the right to have sex is the duty to have sex and to enjoy it (something which is not expected of most jobs), which is why there have been so many investigations, in recent years, concerning which parts of our body—whether the vagina or the clitoris—are more sexually productive.8
Finally, it should be noted that while Silvia Federici mostly refers to the heterosexual nuclear family, she does not see any end to the function of sex as work through homosexuality:
Homosexuality and heterosexuality are both working conditions…but homosexuality is workers’ control of production, not the end of work.9
This approach to sex, which treats it as an integral part of reproductive labor, allows us to reject the idea that there is some fundamental distinction between so-called “free sex,” as performed within the couple, and what we today call sex work, prostitution.
Or as in Leopoldina Fortunati’s puts it, “the family and prostitution are the main sectors, the backbone of the entire process [of reproduction]”:
Within the two main sectors, the fundamental labor processes are: (1) the process of production and reproduction of labor power and (2) the specifically sexual reproduction of male labor power. This is not to say that the family does not include the sexual reproduction of male labor power, but (despite often being posited as central) it is in fact only one of the many “jobs” that housework entails.10
From this point, Fortunati obliges us to think of the family and prostitution not as opposed institutions, but rather complementary ones: “its function [of prostitution] must be to support and complement housework.”11
This approach to prostitution in terms of reproductive labor allows us not only to highlight a common condition of women – beyond the division between the mother and the whore, since even if one performs it freely, while the other explicitly asks for money, for both, sex is work – but above all allows us to better understand the position of the sex industry in the capitalist system. Whereas most contemporary theories are essentially interested in capitalist dynamics in the sex industry through an analysis of the relations of production and exploitation between sex workers and their bosses/pimps and/or their clients, this perspective invites us to ultimately consider these two figures as only intermediary forms of the exploitation which benefits, in the last analysis, capital. It then becomes necessary to stop interpreting the criminalization of sex workers exclusively as sexual repression (with evident gendered and racist dynamics) and begin to see it as a kind of repression that fundamentally serves specific economic interests which are secured through sex, class and gender dynamics.
A Whore Army
Yet the apparently shared position of housewives and sex workers in relation to capital as reproductive laborers should not obscure a fundamental difference between their respective situations: unlike domestic labor, sex work is stigmatized and criminalized. Whether it is a prohibitionist regime as in most states of the United States, a regulatory one as in Germany, or an allegedly abolitionist one in France, sex work is criminalized in almost every country in the world, with the exception of New Zealand and New South Wales (Australia) – two countries that nevertheless have strong restrictions on migrant labor. This particular situating of sex work within the broader category of reproductive labor is not without consequences, not only for sex workers themselves, but for all women and workers: the specific treatment of sex work, or more exactly, its evolution between criminalization and liberalization, needs to be read in the more general context of the tensions caused by the dynamics of capitalism, patriarchy, and racism that structure our society.
In her Caliban and the Witch, Silvia Federici provides us with a historical approach according to which the repression of prostitutes starting in the sixteenth century is linked with the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, for which the free character of women’s labor is a an essential foundation.
But no sooner has prostitution become the main form of subsistence for a large female population than the institutional attitude towards it changed. Whereas in the late Middle Ages it had been officially accepted as a necessary evil, and prostitutes had benefited from the high wage regime, in the 16th century, the situation was reversed. In a climate of intense misogyny, characterized by the advance of the Protestant Reformation and witch-hunting, prostitution was first subjected to new restrictions and then criminalized. Everywhere, between 1530 and 1560, town brothels were closed and prostitutes, especially street-walkers, were subjected to sever penalties: banishment, flogging, and other cruel forms of chastisement. […]
What can account for this drastic attack on female workers ? And how does the exclusion of women from the sphere of socially recognized work and monetary relations relate to the imposition of forced maternity upon them, and the contemporary massification of the witch-hunt?
Looking at these phenomena from a vantage point of the present, after four centuries of capitalist disciplining of women, the answers may seem to impose themselves. Though women’s waged work, housework, and (paid) sexual work are still studied all too often in isolation from each other, we are now in a better position to see that the discrimination that women have suffered in the wage work-force has been directly rooted in their function as unpaid laborers in the home. We can thus compare the banning of prostitution and the expulsion of women from the organized workplace with the creation of the housewife and the reconstruction of the family as the locus for the production of labor power.12
Later, during the French Revolution, a time that witnessed an extension of the sphere of consumption, prostitution was decriminalized in 1791. Clyde Plumauzille, who specializes in the history of prostitution in this period, discusses the organization of prostitution in the Palais-Royal:
Prostitution of the Palais-Royal then participates to a set of wider apparatus connected to the “revolution of consumption that affects the whole society” (Roche, 1887; Coquery, 2011): development of the advertising technics with the prostitutes’ directories, diversification of the offer in order to reach a wider public, ostentatious windows and “commodification” of prostitutional sexuality. [The] first sex market in the capital, the Palais-Royal thus facilitated the constitution of a type of prostitution firmly consumerist, between sexual and economic emancipation and commercialization of women’s body.13
This apparent liberalization was less the result of a weakening of control over women’s bodies than of an adjustment of the market to what appeared to be inevitable, even though women’s status left them with no other option than a dependency on men. However, if courtesans in the nicer districts were tolerated, even appreciated, the same cannot be said for prostitutes issuing from the working class, and the intensification of the policing and renewed confinement of prostitutes was in fact a response to this “massification” of prostitution within the popular classes.
To understand this repression of mass prostitution, we have to grasp the link between the regulation of prostitution and capitalist relations of production. Between the French Revolution and the Belle Époque, a long period unfolded in which the ensemble of institutions distinctive of the capitalist mode of production took hold in French society: the Directory, the two Empires, and the beginning of the Third Republic all consolidate the modern forms of exploitation that emerged during the last decades of the Ancien Régime, including the more advanced sectors of agriculture in the north of France and innovations in the chemical, textile, and coal mining sectors.14 The nineteenth century is marked by the generalization of market institutions and the process of rendering the laboring classes dependent upon the market and their employers. Prostitution, and the condition of women in general, did not escape this logic. With the increasing separation of the home from the workplace, as well as the mechanization of labor and the regulation of industries, women were caught in a kind of double bind – caught between the sectors that had little regulation (domestic work, sewing workshops) and largely excluded from the majority of those sectors that were regulated. When they entered the labor market, women played the role of a surplus workforce for capital, what Karl Marx calls the “industrial reserve army”:
By the destruction of petty and domestic industries it destroys the last resort of the “redundant population,” and with it the sole remaining safety-valve of the whole social mechanism.15
As a recent study on prostitution in the Goutte d’Or during the Belle Epoque shows, the regulation of prostitution actually met considerable resistance from sex workers by way of their growing refusal to work for an exclusive employer.16 The street prostitution of the “rebellious” can therefore be understood as a type of worker insubordination: it allowed proletarian women to earn an additional income in those cases where they also worked a waged job and, alternatively, to gain an income pure and simple when they did not have another job. In both situations, the lack of regulation in prostitution actually constituted a point of leverage for women workers – as an enhancement of their bargaining power against capital and patriarchy.
This relation between the role of regulation and sex work, and its connection to forms of labor insubordination among prostitutes, is significant. First, it indicates that we cannot separate sex work and work in general. Second, it shows that the struggles of sex workers possess a very precise gender and class dimension. Lastly, it points to the fact that there cannot be a strict opposition between a regulationist regime and an abolitionist/prohibitionist one. In both cases (and in the hybrid forms that lie between the two systems), it is a question of how to discipline prostituted women and put them to work, which these women then contest by asserting their interests and attempting to strengthen their bargaining power. Before coming back to these aspects in the contemporary era, we still have to understand the reasons for these abolitionist movements and trace their emergence.
Originally, from the end of the nineteenth century onward, women’s groups began to wage a struggle against prostitution in order to denounce this regulationism; while a moral panic concerning supposed white slavery [traite des Blanches] became successful internationally, the abolitionist movement met a very favorable reception, which led in 1946 to the Loi Marthe Richard, which endorsed the closure of brothels. In its preamble, the 1949 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others explains that “prostitution and the accompanying evil of the traffic in persons for the purpose of prostitution are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person and endanger the welfare of the individual, the family and the community.” According to this Convention, to be considered a trafficking victim, it is enough to be procured, enticed, or led away for purposes of prostitution. The Palermo protocols (adopted by the United Nations in 2000) proposes an alternative definition of trafficking:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.17
Although this definition is both wider (every form of exploitation can be for the purpose of trafficking) and more restrictive (it mentions “exploitation of prostitution” but nothing about “prostitution” in itself, and one would expect that its major victims experience it as a form of constraint or as someone taking advantage of their vulnerable situation) than the 1949 definition, it is still intentionally fuzzy since it does not define the notion of exploitation. This blurring allowed France to translate “exploitation of prostitution” into “pimping” [“proxénétisme”] when it introduced and adapted the definition of trafficking into its penal code. Since the definition of pimping in France is particularly wide – allowing the state to sanction any support given to the prostitution of others– this means that the new French trafficking infraction does not contradict the conception of trafficking upheld in the 1949 Convention. In other words, while common law measures do exist to respond to efforts to penalize forced labor, whether in prostitution or elsewhere, prostitution is still subjected to specific measures that penalize it as such.
What is the function of this specific penalization? What broader dynamics does it belong to? What are its consequences? Many answers have already been proposed to these questions, but too often these answers refer to the repression of a prostitution which is, if not idealized, at least ideal, in that it fails to account for the tensions and conflicts that traverse the sex industry. A synthesis of the main theories of the repression of sex work, then, with a view of the general dynamics hat traverse the sphere of reproductive labor, should help us to carefully grasp the stakes of the sex workers’ struggle. Beyond purely historical approaches, it is also worthwhile to take into account the function of this repression and the stigmatization of sex workers in relation to the sexual economy as such. If this repression does have a specific function in a capitalist economy that relies – among other things – on the appropriation of the free labor of women, then an understanding of this economic context is not sufficient to account for the multiple tensions determining this repression.
Paola Tabet’s work shows that if a certain stigma defines prostitution, it does not need the capitalist system to be expressed. In many non-capitalist societies, some women are stigmatized as prostitutes, not just because they take part in a sexual-economic exchange, but because they take part in an exchange that escapes the established rules of the exchange of women in a patriarchal system. Tabet’s works recall an earlier essay by Gayle Rubin, published in 1975 under the title “The Traffic in Women,” which also sets out to explain the oppression of women without subordinating it to its potential role in capitalism. In another essay, “Thinking Sex,” Rubin is especially concerned with analyzing in more detail the systems of sexual hierarchies that structure our societies:
Modern Western societies appraise sex acts according to a hierarchical system of sexual value. […] Individuals whose behavior stands high in this hierarchy are rewarded with certified mental health, respectability, legality, social and physical mobility, institutional support, and material benefits. As sexual behaviors or occupations fall lower on the scale, the individuals who practice them are subjected to a presumption of mental illness, disreputability, criminality, restricted social and physical mobility, loss of institutional support, and economic sanctions.
Extreme and punitive stigma maintains some sexual behaviors as low status and is an effective sanction against those who engage in them. The intensity of this stigma is rooted in Western religious traditions. But most of its contemporary content derives from medical and psychiatric opprobrium.18
In this sense, prostitution is repressed and stigmatized as a deviance, akin to homosexuality, according to a system that constructs oppositions between different types of sexual practices such as the homosexual/heterosexual, free/venal, etc. Rubin’s theory thus presents the repression of sex work as not necessarily holding a subordinate function in regards to an economic order, but as taking place in an autonomous sexual system, in which external interests (economic, but also religious or medical) converge.
Elizabeth Bernstein, a theorist of neoliberalism, analyzes the repression of sex work as a way to reaffirm the boundaries between the intimate and the public sphere, and thus considers contemporary abolitionist campaigns as taking part in:19
a neoliberal (rather than a traditionalist) sexual agenda, one that locates social problems in deviant individuals rather than mainstream institutions, that seeks social remedies through criminal justice interventions rather than through a redistributive welfare state, and that advocates for the beneficence of the privileged rather than the empowerment of the oppressed.20
Thus the repression of prostitution appears not simply as a means to reinforce a certain economic order, but rather as a means to impose the neoliberal logic into the sexual economy itself. And precisely because sex work does not escape from neoliberalism any more than other sectors of productive or reproductive labor, it has to be considered from the same perspective as other sectors of reproductive labor.
In her research on what she calls “femonationalism,” Sara Farris notes that the migration of women who are pushed to work in the reproductive sector, contrary to the migration of migrant men, is quite supported by the state, in the context of the state’s withdrawal from the management of services such as child caring, and a context marked by increasing numbers of “national” women in the productive sector:
Rather than job stealers, cultural clashers, and welfare provision parasites, migrant women are the maids who help to maintain the well-being of European families and individuals. They are the providers of jobs and welfare: they are those who, by helping European women to undo gender by substituting for them in the household, allow those national women to become laborers in the productive labor market. Furthermore, migrant women contribute to the education of children and to the survival and emotional life of the elderly, thus providing the welfare goods from whose provision states increasingly retreat. […] The useful role that female migrant labor plays in the contemporary re-structuring of welfare regimes and the feminization of key sectors of the service economy accounts in a significant way for a certain indulgence by neoliberal governments and for the deceptive compassion of nationalist parties towards migrant women (and not migrant men). […] Despite attempts in the last few years by several EU countries, to establish “the demographic advantage of a certain nationality,” as Judith Butler put it, calls for assimilation addressed to migrant women – Muslim and non-Muslim alike – identify a specific role for them within contemporary European societies, insofar as they are regarded as prolific bodies of future generations and as mothers who play a crucial role in the process of transmission of societal values. As a useful replacement in the reproductive sector for national women, but also as potential wives of European men, migrant women become the target of a deceivingly benevolent campaign in which they are needed as workers, tolerated as migrants, and encouraged as women to conform to Western values.21
Femonationalism, as Farris defines it, names “the contemporary mobilization of feminist ideas by nationalist parties and neoliberal governments under the banner of the war against the perceived patriarchy of Islam in particular, and of migrants from the Global South in general.”22 To put it another way, the rhetoric of discourses that defend the integration of migrant women through labor appears, in the end, to be much less about these women’s interests than about those of the national economy and its workforce, with these female workers assuring the reproduction of the latter at a low cost. In this context, “the female migrant workforce thus seems to amount not to a reserve army, constantly threatened with unemployment and deportation and used in order to maintain wage discipline,” as it was common in the 1970s and 1980s to describe “women as extra-domestic waged,” but rather to “a regular army of extremely cheap labor.”23
Even if the encouragement for the migration of women destined to the reproductive sector seems to fall within a policy opposed to very severe restrictions on the migration of sex workers, these two distinct policies can actually be considered as complementary: first, we can note that the anti-trafficking discourse, and anti-prostitution discourse more generally, which aims to save women from migration networks that supposedly exploit them, and insists on the necessity for “reintegration,” that is to say, reintegration into the legal national economy (that means, primarily for migrant women, relegation to the domestic and care labor sector), do participate in what Sara Farris calls “femonationalism.” Although globalized capitalism dispossesses women from their means of survival, today especially in African and Asian countries, resulting in a massification of migration (and of prostitution), the repression of sex workers, in a context of the commodification of reproductive labor performed by migrant women, constitutes them as a “regular army of extremely cheap labor” on the model of domestic workers, because it has the effect of maintaining sex workers in a precarious situation.
To put it another way, since the repression of sex workers causes their precarization, this repression does not only initiate a shift in the balance of power in favor of clients, third parties, and pimps, but further serves the entire capitalist, patriarchal, and racist economic system that benefits from the cheap cost of this sector of reproductive labor. More precisely, in this sustained precarization of sex workers one can analyze their institutionalized constitution as the reserve army of the domestic workers, and therefore see the formation of a three-level system structuring women’s labor. At the first level, there is the female workforce, confined to the reproductive sector and paid less than men, and which participates in a system that still imposes a heterosexist model over women, since marriage appears as a means to reach a living standard that their wages do not independently allow. At the second level, migratory policies that maintain the cheap costs of domestic labor also reinforce the cheaper wages received by women hired to work in the productive sector. Finally, at the level of sex work, repression and stigmatization appear as threats to women who would not accept the conditions of exploitation in waged work, domestic work, or in marriage.
In this way, anti-sex work discourses – which only view the sexual exploitation of women in terms of non-commodified sex, and only see the basis for economic emancipation in legal forms of labor, especially in the productive sector – actually seem to encourage, contrary to what they claim, this exploitation through a form of work that is all the more exploited, since it appears as free, spontaneous, and natural. The demand for sex work as work, on the other hand, forces us to rethink the relations of reproduction with the aim of doing away with exploitation, whether waged or not.
Sex Work Against Work
As I have tried to show up to this point, the question of “prostitution” should not be restricted to a gender-only perspective. It is on the contrary necessary for the left to grasp the political content of sex work understood as a sector of reproductive labor. It is true, as Silvia Federici comments in her text “Reproduction and Feminist Struggle in the New International Division of Labor,” that the real stakes of reproductive labor have been too often ignored by the feminist movement itself:
If the feminist movement had struggled to make the state recognize reproductive work as work and take financial responsibility for it, we might not have seen the dismantling of the few welfare provisions available to us, and a new colonial solution to the “housework question.”24
For this reason, the sex work debate should be approached as a new occasion to (re)think this question, and furthermore, to build a true opposition to the liberal politics that has for so long controlled the discourse surrounding this question, with the consequences we have observed (femonationalism, liberalization of the sex industry only in favor pimps, an increase in the amount of work performed by women following state disengagement from public services, etc).
To affirm that sex work is work therefore appears as a necessary step insofar as it concerns the struggle against capitalism as well as women’s emancipation, above all their sexual emancipation. It is in this sense that we can qualify the political efficacy of this slogan “sex work is work” by repeating Kathi Weeks’ assessment of the Wages for Housework campaign as “a reformist project with revolutionary aspirations.”25 Indeed, if the struggle against the criminalization of sex work might initially appear to be a reformist project, essentially consisting of requests for a legislative change in order to ameliorate sex workers’ labor conditions, then to apprehend sex work as work nonetheless opens up more ambitious and expansive perspectives for emancipation.
Concerning the struggle against criminalization, it’s enough to recall that if sex workers can be defined as the reserve army of exploited women, be it because of waged work, domestic work, or marriage, then the improvement of their conditions can only be beneficial. In the same way, if the persistence of the stigma around prostitution acts like a threat upon all women in the sense that it not only limits their liberties, but above all legitimizes forms of violence against them, then the struggle against the stigmatization of sex work should be a priority in the feminist agenda. And in so far as the “anti-prostitution” struggle, on a global scale, essentially takes the form of the anti-trafficking (such as defined by the 1949 UN Convention) struggle – through the funding by western governments of NGOs intervening in the Global South to “save” the potential victims of this trafficking – the end goal of these politics would mean more autonomy for the sex workers concerned, who are today regular victims, in many countries, of a kind of humanitarian imperialism through NGOs and personalities making up the “rescue industry.”26 Additionally, while a clear majority of sex workers in western countries are migrants or non-white workers, as are most of those “supporting” their activity and then condemned for pimping, in those countries the struggle against sex work mostly takes the form of a racist offensive that participates in the systematic incarceration of non-white populations. If some can take advantage of this situation, as it emerges from the racist division of sex work, in order to claim the need to penalize the male clients who benefit from sex work – and who are presumed to be primarily white – then the desire to restore equilibrium by reinforcing the very same instruments of this systemic racism seems, on the contrary, dangerous.27 My point is not to uncritically defend third parties and other beneficiaries of the sex industry: the decriminalization of sex work has to be understood as a way of reinforcing the autonomy of sex workers vis-à-vis the situations of clandestinity that make their exploitation easier. In this context, the frequently expressed fears that the recognition of sex work would only give more weight to the sexist and racist division of labor seem not only unfounded, but above all, this recognition constitutes a precondition for the struggle against this division and the oppressions it causes.
To refuse to recognize sex work is to effectively reinforce the division between “true” labor, especially waged work, entitled to be present in the public sphere, and “non-labor,” which takes place in the private sphere. The point is therefore to do away with this opposition between the productive sphere of waged work and the exchanges considered to belong to the non-commodified private sphere, since this opposition, which only serves to hide labor that is performed but not taken into account into the wage, is only profitable for capital:
We have learned from Marx that the wage hides the unpaid labor that goes into profit. But measuring work by the wage also hides the extent to which our familial and social relations have been subordinated to the relations of production – they have become relations of production – so that every moment of our lives functions for the accumulation of capital. The wage, and the lack of it, have allowed capital to obscure the real length of our working day. Work appears as just one compartment of our lives, taking place only in certain times and spaces. The time we consume in the “social factory,” preparing ourselves for work or going to work, restoring our “muscles, nerves, bones and brains” with quick snacks, quick sex, movies, all this appears as leisure, free time, individual choice.28
In other words, the question is how to expand the scope of the feminist slogan “the personal is political” in order to include not only the reproduction of male domination inside the private sphere, but also the reproduction of the dynamics favorable to capitalism. In other words, as Lise Vogel reminds us about domestic work, the division between the sphere of waged work and the sphere considered as merely part of the private sphere, especially in a patriarchal society, only reinforces the structures of domination:
The highly institutionalized demarcation of domestic labour from wage-labour in a context of male supremacy forms the basis for a series of powerful ideological structures, which develop a forceful life of their own.29
To affirm that “sex work is work,” and that sex, waged or not, can be work, must open the possibility for a process of dis-identification – to employ the term used by Kathi Weeks in reference to the Wages for Housework campaign – of women from the sexuality to which they are, in a patriarchal capitalist society, often constrained. As Cox and Federici put it, women can determine what they “are not.”30
In the same way, with the idea that “sex work is work,” even if the point is that we do not yet know which sexuality to (re)build in the perspective of a feminist struggle, it is at least a question of knowing about which one we do not want – a sexuality of services organized according to the sexist division of labor. As Silvia Federici writes:
We want to call work what is work so that eventually we might rediscover what is love and create our sexuality, which we have never known.31
Thus, with the “sex work is work” slogan, we do not mean to ask for sex work to be considered as “a job like the others,” so that its decriminalization would be its own end. The enforcement of such a liberal politics, as witnessed with the German or Dutch examples, essentially serves the interests of the bosses of the sex industry, so that the only effect of these policies is to put sex workers’ compensation in the hands of the capitalists. The point is, on the contrary, to reaffirm that if this recognition of sex work is necessary, it’s precisely because only though a clear identification of sex work will women then have the power to refuse it, within the framework of a broader struggle for the refusal of work and a radical refoundation of society and its dynamics of reproduction.
Conclusion
The analysis of sex work in terms of reproductive work brings many advantages.
First, by inviting us to look at the sex industry not only as a simple industry in which capitalist, sexist, and racist dynamics are deployed, it allows us to consider the fundamental role that sex work itself plays at the very heart of the capitalist system. In other words, the point is not only to consider sex workers’ exploitation by way of the direct beneficiaries of sex work – pimps, third parties, clients – but rather to consider these latter only as the mediators of the more global exploitation of women by capital.
Second, in allowing us to analyze the dynamics at work in the repression of sex work, a repression notably linked to the issue of managing migration, introducing sex workers into the more general category of reproductive workers, side by side with domestic or care workers, allow us to grasp the stakes of sex workers’ struggles in terms of the struggle against neoliberalism and especially its effects on migrant or Third World women.
Finally, by enabling us to rethink the very notion of labor, these analyses offer an opportunity to provide a new dynamic to the struggle against the appropriation of labor, a dynamic that can, in particular, allow us to take into account all those workers traditionally excluded from these struggles and who are often left to fight in isolation, in spite and in consequence of the devastating effects of capitalism on their lives (those who are precariously self-employed, single mothers, sex workers, domestic workers, midwives, etc), in the aim of radically calling into question the division of labor and the ideologies – especially racist and sexist ideologies – on which it rests.
Comments
Social Reproduction Beyond Intersectionality: An Interview
Viewpoint: We can begin with the concept of social reproduction itself. In your recent foreword to the reissue of Lise Vogel’s classic 1983 work, Marxism and the Oppression of Women, you locate Vogel’s distinct contribution to the Marxist-feminist thought in her inquiry into the “conditions of possibility of labor-power,” or the manner in which labor power is biologically, socially, and generationally reproduced. From this important point it is then possible to trace the inner connections of activities and relationships that are necessary for the continued existence of wage labor and processes of class formation outside of production. In your opinion, how does social reproduction transform the categories of Marxist class analysis? What is its theoretical and political importance?
David McNally and Sue Ferguson: First, there’s the question of a category transformation. As your question points out, the social reproduction approach transforms our understanding of labor-power. In conventional Marxist analyses, labor-power is simply presumed to be present – a given factor of capitalist production. At best, it is understood as the product of natural, biologically determined, regenerative processes. In socializing labor-power – in unearthing its insertion in history, society, and culture – social reproduction feminism reveals, in the first instance, that labor-power cannot simply be presumed to exist, but is made available to capital only because of its reproduction in and through a particular set of gendered and sexualized social relations that exist beyond the direct labor/capital relation, in the so-called private sphere. It also sharpens our understanding of the contradictory position of labor-power with respect to capital – identifying all aspects of our social reproduction – of our quest to satisfy human needs, to live – as essential to, but also a drag on, accumulation (because capital pays indirectly for this through wages, benefits, and taxes).
These are the key insights of the early generation of social reproduction feminists. But, as more recent scholarship suggests, this approach also reveals labor-power itself to be a more complex, differentiated, category. When one attends to the social reproductive relations, it becomes clear that – despite the equalizing impulses of capitalist value extraction – all labor-power is not the same. Certain workers, indeed increasingly so, are more vulnerable to heightened oppression than others – not due to any difference in the ways in which capitalist laws of accumulation operate, but because oppressive relations beyond the workplace mediate the social reproduction of labor-power, ensuring not only that workers arrive at capital’s doorstep, but that they do so embodying varying degrees of degradation or dehumanization.
This leads to your second question, the theoretical importance of the social reproduction approach. In explaining the interconnection of the unwaged work we do to reproduce ourselves on the one hand, and waged work on the other, social reproduction feminism presents us with a complexly differentiated yet nonetheless unified understanding of social totality. This is its central theoretical contribution to Marxism. With the turn from dual systems analysis to intersectionality, radical social theorists have convincingly presented us with an image of the messy experiential world, and they have identified key social, political, economic and psychological dynamics that sustain patriarchal, racialized, and settler colonial relations to name but a few. And the best intersectionality accounts have rightly insisted that it is impossible to isolate any particular set of oppressive relations from the other. Yet they’ve not developed any coherent explanation of how and why, for instance, heterosexualized relations intersect with patriarchal relations in some ways and not others (why the family, though its form changes over time to accommodate, for instance, same-sex marriage, nonetheless remains a private institution through which heteronormativity and patriarchy are routinely if not always affirmed). One reason for this has to do with intersectionality feminism’s inadequate theorization of the social totality, the overall processes or dynamic in and through which discrete social relations intersect. This dynamic is either not theorized at all or is simply assumed to be neutral, void of power relations itself. And this means, of course, that despite claiming distinct oppressions are co-constitutive, they are in fact treated as ontologically distinct systems, crisscrossing or inter-meshing in space.
The social reproduction approach, on the other hand, posits a capitalist totality. A capitalist social whole is defined, in the first instance, by the separation of workers (by which we mean all people who work to reproduce themselves and their world, the social reproducers in other words) from the means of their subsistence (or social reproduction). This is a bare fact of existence under capitalism, and as such, it broadly shapes what is possible – within the labor/capital relation, to be sure, but also within our gendered, racialized, hetersexualized, etc. relations beyond the workplace.
While to speak of capitalist determination may sound like a throw-back to Marxist fundamentalism, there is nothing mechanically causal in this notion of determination. Patriarchy and racism, according to this perspective, are not presumed to be directly functional to the needs of capital; they did not arise because capital called them into being. Rather the capitalist imperative to accumulate is determinative in the sense that it sets limits to what is possible, even if the specific possibilities – the degree of women’s participation in the workforce, for example, or access to abortion – are themselves altered through struggle.
By this reckoning, the precise relations through which we socially reproduce ourselves can vary quite a bit. And people can and do continually modify these relations in ways that best accommodate their needs, and may in fact be disruptive to capitalism’s needs for labor-power. People choose, for instance, to live in all types of relationships, including childless relationships. Men, women, and transgendered people might share the housework and childcare equally. Others may choose to spend time painting pictures that will never sell, staring into space, or fighting racism on the streets. None of that is functional to capitalism, and all of it prioritizes human need over the reproduction of labor-power for capital. But, so long as certain oppressive forms of relations facilitate (rather than hinder) the task of bringing labor-power to capital’s doorstep, there will be powerful forces (be they the institutions and practices of state, civil society or capital) sustaining racism, sexism and other oppressions – and discouraging alternative forms of human relations. As a result, the degree to which people can take control over their lives beyond the workplace – the degree, for instance, that women can take control of the conditions of their waged work and reproductive work and bodies, or that racialized people can control housing, childcare and food distribution in their communities – is, within capitalism, limited. Put differently, there is a reason that oppressive practices and institutions have not disappeared under capitalism on their own accord, and why they will remain points of struggle for as long as capitalism survives.
And this brings us to the final question, that of the political importance of social reproduction. Let’s agree that capitalism’s reproduction requires something more than the direct labor/capital relation, “economic” exchanges and laws of motion – that in fact it critically depends upon the messy, complex, set of lived relations carried out by differently gendered, sexualized, racialized human beings. If this is the case, then we need to also realize that racialized, sexualized, gendered bodies, practices, and institutions matter: racism and sexism are not historical aberrations that can somehow be separated from capitalism’s “real” or “ideal” functioning. Rather, they are integral to and determinant of – in the sense that they really and actively facilitate– actual processes of capital dispossession and accumulation. By the same reasoning, challenging racism, sexism, or any oppression that impacts the social reproduction of labor-power, can hinder the reproduction of capital.
It is in this sense that “movement” or non-workplace struggles are class struggles. That is, they are themselves potentially anti-capitalist in essence, just like a workplace struggle is always incipiently anti-capitalist. And just as downing tools can make the capitalist heart skip a beat, so can a movement that demands the end to the differential degradation of human life, full and communal access to the means of subsistence, control over our own human bodies. Certainly, no singular movement or workplace struggle of course will bring the capitalist heart to a full stop. But each disruption reverberates throughout the body, potentially weakening its pulse. So the political importance of the social reproduction approach lies in its capacity to show the importance of struggling on many fronts, but with an explicit anti-capitalist orientation.
VP: In your piece in the recent issue of the Socialist Register, you focus on the connection between social reproduction and migrant labor, particularly in the North American context. Now, the topic of immigration or migration has been covered extensively by Marxist scholars in Europe, but within the United States, Canada, and Mexico, comparatively little has been done to elaborate research on migrant labor into a broad and contemporary Marxist theory. There are exceptions of course – Rosemary Hennessy’s recent book comes to mind – but by and large, the politics of immigrant-rights organizations are not articulated in a Marxist or socialist language. Do you see your piece as contributing to this larger project, i.e., viewing processes of migration and racialization as inseparable from class and gender analysis?
DM and SF: The short answer to your question is yes. A Marxist social reproduction theory helps us draw out and explore the contradiction at the heart of the formation of labor-power. After all, capitalism has a tendency to render labor homogeneous and interchangeable. At the same time, there is no discrete commodity called labor-power just waiting on the market for purchase by capital. Instead, there are concrete human beings who are “bearers” of labor-power, to use Marx’s apt expression. As a result, the capacity for abstract labor is tied to concrete persons. And such persons exist in real, differentiated places and spaces. Just as labor-power must be produced and reproduced in actual social relations, so these relations subsist in concrete space and time. Yet, and this is another tendency of the system, the spaces of capital are differentiated according to regimes of race and empire. All of this massively affects the actual treatment of the living “bearers” of labor-power, particularly if they are racially degraded, or located as outsiders to the principal zones of capitalist accumulation.
There is an economistic strain in much of radical political economy which tends to default to the idea of “labor” as a commodity with its own markets, just like real estate or investment goods. Social reproduction theory demystifies all this by pushing on Marx’s insight about the human bearers of labor-power and then posing questions about the conditions of their production and reproduction. And theorizing the concrete sites of that reproduction requires not only attending to household and community practices – the key insight of early social reproduction theory – but also to the social-geographic location of those households and communities in a racialized social hierarchy within and between nation-states.
And here questions of migration come to the fore. After all, labor-power today is being massively reproduced at low-wage sites outside the core zones of capitalist production and accumulation. In some cases, capital can migrate to set up production, distribution and informational networks in areas where labor-power is cheap. But in cases of work that is spatially immobile – agro-business, childcare for wealthy families in the Global North, or construction, restaurant and hotel service work in those same zones – cheap labor-power (and its human bearers) must be brought to where this work is directly required. But, because its human bearers are generally desperate, they can be attracted without offers of full legal and political rights and membership. This results in differentiated statuses borne by many migrant workers, and the heightened precarity, degradation and oppression that go with them.
Of course, many commentators have provided rich descriptions of temporary worker regimes and the forms of servitude they entail. Much of this work is highly valuable. But we believe that a Marxist social reproduction approach can theorize migrant labor in ways that more fully grasp its role in late capitalism and the multi-dimensionality of the class formations involved, particularly their gendered and racialized dimensions. To offer just one example, consider the spatial separation of sites of household reproduction from those of paid employment. To theorize this adequately we need to attend not only to the physical movement of migrant workers across borders, but also to the counter-flows of chunks of their wages (in the form of remittances), as well as the work of nurturing and educating children, currently reliant on those remittances, who will likely compose part of the global reserve army of labor available for migration to the capitalist core. Social reproduction analysis has the capacity to link these flows of people and wages, as well as the spatially and nationally separated practices of waged work and social reproduction into a complex yet unitary social process. Migration thus becomes central to the reproduction of capital and the global working class, rather than an interesting sidebar. And such a mode of investigation internally links racialization and differentiated status to any meaningful gender and class analysis.
VP: Sue Ferguson has written on the emergence and importance of Canadian social reproduction feminism as an approach that conceptually integrates the relational character of class, gender, and race within the broader context of specifically capitalist power relations. We can think here especially of the work of earlier theorists in journals like Studies in Political Economy and influential edited collections like Hidden in the Household, to more contemporary theorists like Stephen Gill and Isabella Bakker, David Camfield, Alan Sears, and sympathetic critics like Himani Bannerji. Why did social reproduction analysis remain so prominent in Canadian thinking?
DM and SF: It is certainly true that, as Australia’s Kate Davison remarked at last year’s London Historical Materialism conference, there was a “social reproduction party” going on in Canada in the 1970s and 80s. We can only speculate as to why that was the case here, and not elsewhere. To begin with, it is surely important that socialist feminism had become the dominant feminism in English-speaking Canada by the early 1970s (in Quebec a left-wing kind of feminism took hold, with significant roots in the unions and left-nationalist social movements). Meg Luxton and Heather Jon Maroney suggest there were two reasons this was the case: (i) the strength of social democracy (unlike in the United States, a social democratic party has had a meaningful social and electoral presence here since the 1930s), and (ii) the relative lack of institutions and practices espousing a more traditional Marxism (unlike Great Britain or France, where Communist parties had a greater presence). These underlying conditions, they believe, helped create and sustain an intellectual and political culture that took socialist ideas seriously.
As members of a group that differentiated itself from CP-influenced Marxism – David joined the International Socialists in the mid-1970s, and Sue joined in the early-1980s – we participated in many of the debates around Marxist Feminism. This is where we encountered Lise Vogel’s book, Marxism and the Oppression of Women. Although our interest in Vogel’s text was not widely shared within our political ranks, and indeed encountered outright hostility, we continued to consider Vogel’s orientation among the soundest in developing a unitary Marxist Feminist approach.
Even more significant, however, was the way in which socialist-feminism developed some real traction inside the unions in both English-speaking Canada and Quebec. Union drives among retail and bank workers were very significant in this regard, as were strikes by nurses and hospital workers throughout the 1970s. In Ontario, where we are active, a strike by predominantly female auto parts workers in 1978 became a rallying point for the left. At the same time, a large strike by nickel miners erupted, in which women, organized under the banner “Wives Supporting the Strike” played a critical, galvanizing role. This was followed by a union-based campaign in the early 1980s to get women hired in the highly unionized steel industry. All of this meant that feminist issues were resonating within the unions. And this gave real credibility to socialist-feminists who insisted on the inter-connections between gender oppression and class exploitation. This provided a social and political context in which a feminism concerned with labor and class experience in all their complex diversity could develop.
Certainly, we saw a rise of poststructural discourse-based feminism in these quarters. But feminist political economy remained vibrant, including in its Marxist and social reproduction variants. Within the universities, much of the theoretical work being done in this area found its way into the journal, Studies in Political Economy, launched in the late 1970s. Feminists – Meg Luxton, Bonnie Fox, Wally Seccombe, and Pat and Hugh Armstrong among others – started exposing the male bias of most political economy frameworks. Drawing on the pioneering work of Margaret Benston, socialist-feminist theorists like these looked for ways around the shortcomings of the domestic labor debate. While, as Himani Bannerji has suggested, they too often defaulted to a structuralist framework, and neglected theorizing the experiences of racialized women, they nonetheless struggled to theorize gender and class in materialist, unitary terms. Against the odds, they succeeded in sustaining an intellectual interest in social reproduction throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s while so many others were heeding the siren call of postmodernism.
VP: What was the influence of Italian Marxist-feminist thought in Canadian Marxist-feminist circles? Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Silvia Federici, among others, have made distinctive contributions to the development of social reproduction as a theoretical framework. In addition, their work has been quite influential in the United States. Did any direct ties to this tradition exist?
DM and SF: Mariarosa Dalla Costa is the only Italian Marxist feminist that we’re aware of having been influential. Inspired by her work, a few small “Wages for Housework” collectives were formed, particularly in Toronto, but these remained relatively marginal and never constituted a serious alternative to the approach of socialist-feminists working in the unions. Getting women into unionized waged work was much more predominant than the idea of organizing women as homeworkers. Dalla Costa’s work was considered part of the Domestic Labor Debate, and as such was constructively critiqued. And today, the work of Silvia Federici is being very widely read, although in these parts it is taken up less in relation to the wages-for-housework current, and more for its insights and rethinking of issues of enclosure, primitive accumulation, and women’s bodies.
VP: To conclude: we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground. What were the sites of struggle that prompted you to investigate social reproduction and class formation in the recent past and today? Are there specific experiences you can speak to here?
DM and SF: Part of our experience simply has to do with the complex ways in which the left of the 1970s and 1980s struggled in practice and theory to integrate class and gender. Particularly significant for both of us was our involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s. Participation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women. And this raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and strategic questions in which we have both been interested. But especially since the mid-1990s, when we began to work politically in a less dogmatic Marxist environment (especially in the New Socialist network), we increasingly felt the need to grapple much more seriously with race and racialization—and ultimately with sexuality and ability—as constitutive dimensions of class and gender. Our support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly an important part of this story. And we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society.
While intersectionality theory has raised important questions, and generated important insights, it tends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction. Because its approach is holistic and unitary, social reproduction theory is, we think, potentially better equipped in these areas. But this requires a lot of work, and a real commitment to learning from the best of anti-racist and anti-colonial theory and practice, in order to overcome some significant shortcomings of early social reproduction theory. By emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge in a couple of essays by showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones. And our joint contribution in the latest Socialist Register represents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature. We think this is an especially exciting and challenging time for historical materialist work in these areas. And the living pulse of real social struggles is likely to keep pushing work in these areas for many years to come.
Sue Ferguson
Comments
Social reproduction, but not as we know it
It has been about 35 years since the publication of The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital, and the world has radically changed since then. Society has changed faster than our capacity to re-forge the theoretical and methodological toolbox at our disposal. It is time to ask: what is happening to the reproductive sphere on a structural level?
How should we look at social reproduction?
It has been about 35 years since the publication of The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital, and the world has radically changed since then.1 Society has changed faster than our capacity to re-forge the theoretical and methodological toolbox at our disposal. It is time to ask: what is happening to the reproductive sphere on a structural level? A tsunami is overturning everything. While it is not yet possible to provide a comprehensive picture of all the changes that are taking place here, nor to take full stock of their structural, political, and social meaning, I would at least like to call the reader’s attention to some important points.
We can approach the sphere of social reproduction from at least two perspectives. We can focus on the dark side of the current situation, considering the terrible violence, exploitation, inequality, and poverty that affect women all over the world in varying degrees. Many women of my generation are tempted to look at the present condition of the sphere of social reproduction with sadness and discouragement. Women continue to serve as the pillar of the domestic care of children, adults, and the elderly, even though, as a result of widespread unemployment, a generation of young men are now available to shoulder a bit more of the domestic burden. Violence against women is a global affair and a wide battle is being carried out against women’s bodies through media-imposed body images, the symbolism of the fashion and beauty industries, as signs of submission to capital and male culture. In the global South, families are lacerated by female migration, war, religious conflicts, famine, and fragile economic systems. Women continue to be paid less overall than men, and continue to have children and take care of them, men, the elderly, the ill, and the disabled without any social recognition of their work.
But we can also focus on the trends that show how women have improved their conditions of life everywhere compared to the past, and examine the main social changes they have put in motion. I choose to pursue this second strategy, and I invite women to look with me at the contemporary reproductive sphere with imagination. The feminist wave of the sixties and seventies has helped the women of my generation and those that followed to win greater power in the family and in society, which has also meant achieving more civil rights, a stronger sense of citizenship, and a greater capacity to move between spaces alone, especially in the old industrialized countries. Of course, this empowerment has also been accompanied by partial victories and even burning defeats. However, it is important to see the main trend: a general increase in well-being.
Reversing the Spheres
Up until the 1980s, the driving force of the political, organizational, and technological initiatives in society was the sphere of commodity production, understood not only as the production of goods, but also increasingly of services. From here, various processes and behaviors passed to the sphere of social reproduction, which previously had the task of functioning and producing in a dependent and supportive manner. In fact, the general mechanism was for initiatives, practices, and goods to trickle down from the productive to the reproductive sphere. But today the entire relationship between these two spheres has been reversed, at least in the highly industrialized countries, as the reproductive sphere has become the driving force of the entire system.
Arlie Hochschild was correct in arguing that the logic of the workplace was exported to homes and, vice versa, that the logic of the domestic sphere was being exported to the sphere of production.2 For instance, the fundamental features of housework, such as gratuitousness, precariousness, irregularity, and the absence of collective negotiation by unions and parties, have been exported to the sphere of production, where they have become more common than in the past. Those forms of regulating social relationships, considered secondary or peripheral until recent decades, and only tolerated in the the sphere of reproduction, have now entered into competition with more unionized forms of employment.
However, it wasn’t just the weaknesses that were exported from the sphere of social reproduction. So too were the struggles. The various negotiation processes that developed inside families, between men and women and the various generations, have also been implicitly imported. For example, the struggles against parents’ authoritarianism that developed inside families have inevitably reshaped the way new generations of workers, technicians, or employees now have to be addressed in the workplace.3 As the authoritarian behavior of parents has begun to disappear in the family, new workers have striven to be treated in the workplace in a different manner. Today, they are very often asked to perform a task with a sentence like, “could you please do this?,” rather than as an imperious command.
Indeed, social reproduction can now be said to emerge as an immense laboratory of social and political experimentations, hazards, dreams, initiatives, and visions. The reproductive sphere is where the most relevant political and social movements – such as the Arab uprisings, the Indignados movement in Spain, or Occupy Wall Street in the United States – and the most important collective actions, such as Urban Knitting initiatives,4 have developed in the last decades. The sphere of social reproduction has completely changed its identity: once considered by traditional political organizations as a place of political backwardness, it has now become the pulsating heart of the entire capitalist system, at both the social and political levels. Social and individual reproduction is now the sphere where the future is woven, discussed, and elaborated in the long run and in a real, sustainable, way. In the old industrialized countries, women, men, children, youth, adults, and the elderly are experiencing many forms of gender and generational identity, in order to deal with their own paths of autonomy and self-determination. The old gendered division of labor and the consequent differences between men and women, based on the correspondence between women and prevailing feminine features, as well as between men and prevailing masculine features, have been invested by many social and political changes.
A new gendered division of labor has taken hold: women have learned to deal with the “masculine culture” – based on logos, that is, rational thinking – and men to deal with the “feminine culture” based on metis, empathy and intuition. Women are currently receiving higher levels of education than men, and they earn better grades. This means not only that women are better educated than men, but that they have learned to deal with the logos. On the other hand, men are experiencing a closer relationship with intimacy, affection, and emotion. As consequence, not only have men learned to develop more of their emotional side, they have also learned to have a closer relationship with the body. Men have begun to invest energy in taking care of their body, by shaving, embellishing it with necklaces, earrings, and bracelets, keeping in shape with diets and physical exercises, dressing with much more attention than in the past. In sum, women have become more “masculine” and men more “feminine,” although the apparatuses of media, advertising, and education still convey overall rigid and segregating masculine and feminine images, figures, and roles.
Other old structures of society, such as the nuclear family, have lost their uniqueness. Under the initiative and the pressure of (especially) women and youth, people are living together in different ways, experiencing many distinct family forms, and even living and staying alone. The family, based on a couple with children, has been complemented by other types of families such as those made of couples without children, people living alone, single parent families, mixed families, recombined families in which members belonging to different families live together. The rigid discipline and normativity that had in the past regulated the family as the basic cell of society has become more diverse and flexible.
In this context, the regulation of social distance from others in terms of both family and friendship have changed and diversified, also thanks to the availability and spread of the new media and their practices of use. The behaviors and social practices connected to private and public dimensions of information and communication have highlighted many forms of resistance and mass initiatives from the bottom. At a political level, the regulation of social distance among the different classes has been completely re-negotiated: the awe towards the ruling classes and the subtle forms of social distinction that have been powerful instruments to maintain the power structure in society have weakened. In the streets today walk women and men belonging to the various social classes with a greater degree of social equality than in the past. Last, but not the least, the forms of political engagement and mobilization have been put under scrutiny and been transformed by the social subjects who are in search of their empowerment.
At first glance, all these fronts may seem to describe a phenomenology of a fluid society, but in reality they recount how housework, both at material and immaterial levels, is being transformed. The fact that social relationships as well as the rituals and practices of social life have changed means that immaterial and material care work and housework have been subjected to an intense wave of negotiation among women and men, as well as among generations, and to an intense wave of mass behaviors. To this end, there is no peace in the reproductive sphere, since an unequal division of housework and care work between men and women continues to persist, although in a more attenuated way than in the past. Many other elements deserve to be considered, such as the fact, for example, that families and the state need to invest considerably to housework. As a response to local women’s resistance against housework and to the double work they perform, the care of children, elderly, ill, and disabled is attracting a considerable amount of migrant women’s housework and care work. On the other hand, housework indirectly dialogues with the state by drawing the major part of the state budget towards investments for maintaining high levels of social reproduction of the labor force in the spheres of education, health, and retirement.
At the same time, many aspects of housework are outsourced (people eat in restaurants, cafeterias, or bars, send dresses to dry cleaning, etc.), and other aspects intersect with new ways of conceptualizing housework. Massive processes of simplification, standardization, and automation inside the house, in addition to housework outsourcing, affect many tasks, both at the material and immaterial level: education, affects, entertainment, communication, and information. Cooking, in particular, exemplifies the trend towards outsourcing, but is also being transformed in many different directions: from disappearing from the house to earning a new visibility in television programs. Cooking is no longer an invisible task carried out at home by women or other family members in the shadows, and it is becoming a form of work where new and old expertise combine. Thus, the reproductive sphere now proactively expresses social, political, and media initiatives as women especially request the implementation of new technologies, as the Eurobarometer survey (2012) shows.5
What makes this sphere particularly well equipped to function as space for social change is a particular combination of three forces at work within it: first, the “science of the concrete,” to borrow Lévi-Strauss’s expression; second, the metis, as a particular form of feminine intelligence; and lastly, “affects,” which enhance both.6 Lévi-Strauss, in The Savage Mind, proposed the existence of another mode of thought, distinct from the more modern “scientific” one we take as dominant. This other “science of the concrete,” as he called it, is structured by systematically labelling and classifying the world through perceptions and emotions. The science of the concrete organizes a system of thinking which recognizes the law of cause and effect and the possibilities and opportunities to combine, recombine, and remediate things. The organization of thoughts deriving from this systematic work has been able to generate active and methodical observations and controls, hypotheses to discard or validate, explanations, new questions, ideas and new concepts, and finally myths.
The science of the concrete has brought extraordinary gains, such as pottery, weaving, agriculture, knowledge of herbs and minerals, medicines, and the domestication of animals. Lévi-Strauss discusses the Neolithic paradox, arguing that these innovations would have been impossible without a very effective and powerful science.7 Lewis Mumford also intervenes on this topic, raising the question of the quality of these innovations. In effect, he claims that the quality of the Neolithic innovations and of the science of the concrete is peculiar, since he defines these as bio-technics or democratic and life-exalting technologies.8 By contrast, Mumford points out, the technologies produced by the science of the abstract – the science of engineers, information scientists, etc. – are life-denying technologies.
The other force at work in the reproductive sphere is the metis, a specific way of thinking, cultivated especially by women, based on empathy and intuition.9 It is a form of prudence and cunning intelligence, referring to the intellectual capacity to overcome obstacles by finding ways around them. The ancient Greeks associated this with Metis, daughter of the Titans Oceanus and Tethys, who was impregnated by Zeus and then devoured. The intellectual force of Metis serves to explain a resource and a capacity present or cultivable in all of us. Even if present as a distinctive feature in some of the masculine heroes such as Odysseus, she is still generally considered an “unmanly deity,” as metis is said to have more the force of water than of iron, of pervasiveness more than penetration, of tenacity and patience more than that of domination. A man or woman (and for the woman it is more culturally instinctive) who possesses this force of the mind is sheltered from a series of errors. These individuals are attentive to communication strategies and filter what to say and what to listen to. Moreover, they know how to veil themselves and how to come out of the closet: in other words, they know the importance of the mask, which allows them to decide what to hide and what, instead, to display, in order to make their message really incisive. It is through handling the metis that women were able to build a psychic power stronger than that possessed by men.
The third force is the capacity, the experience, and the competence to deal with and manage affects, emotions, and passions as a fundamental dimension of care work. Over time, in the sphere of social reproduction, women learned to develop a particular sensibility toward the emotional wellbeing of individuals and to sense its impact on the emotional heart of the society. Already Adam Smith had understood that emotions are the glue that keeps together the fabric of society.10 Indeed, no social or political science might work without addressing the reasons of the heart, of which reason, according to the famous quote of Blaise Pascal, knows nothing.11 If social interactions are a blend of emotion and reason, then communication should also be considered in the same way. “Words, most commonly used for interaction, are also part emotion and part reason and this means that one can talk not only of emotional intelligence as proposed by Salovey and Mayer and Goleman,”12 but also of “emotional communication.”13 As women show every day, emotions work like multipliers of energy.
In sum, the sphere of social reproduction is particularly equipped to function as a space of social change because it combines the three very strong forces I have introduced so far: the science of the concrete, the metis, and the affects.
The Movement of the Concrete
Women have only partially won the struggle over technology. Women possess and use many technologies right now – for example, the network of personal technologies or domestic appliances – but perhaps these are not exactly what women need and would like to have. On this topic, it is worth reflecting further. According to Sherry Turkle,14 the mindset that characterizes the digital era is similar to Lévi-Strauss’s “savage mind” or the science of the concrete.15 Another characteristic of the digital era is playfulness. As Valerie Frissen argues, “digital technologies are not only playful technologies but also the results of playful practices.” “Playing with technologies,” she continues, “has always been an important driving force behind technological transformation.”16 Exciting innovations, continues Frissen, are more frequently emerging from networks of experimenting amateurs or so-called “pro-am” (professional amateur) participants (e.g. Linux, Arduino, P2P technology).17 In addition, Frissen claims, digital technologies are a way of intellectually tinkering; paradoxically, since they are not primarily geared to innovate, the primitive, untamed and playful way of thinking by makers has historically led to many radical innovations.18
In the laboratory of experimentations and movements that is the sphere of reproduction today, let me focus on a paradigmatic movement that helps us to explain well the potentiality of this sphere. This movement is what I call the Movement of the Concrete, a political movement that is opening a new stage in human evolution. It has a large social composition and is constituted by women who bring with them the feminist and post-feminist experience: caregivers, women as well as men who are crafters, makers, new and old peasants, ecologists, volunteers, and all those who want to build a new world, immediately, without waiting on the fall of the capitalist system or without focusing only on the way to destroy it. On a practical level, this movement has a specific trajectory of development, if compared to the old and new political movements that generally express their political force with precipitate actions (public demonstrations, flash mobs, strikes, and so on). To understand the dynamics of the Movement of the Concrete we should refer to the powerful image of yeast, which is at the basis of any good process of bread-making. To have the power to leaven the dough, the yeast needs to rest in a closed space. Not so much spectacular initiatives in open public spaces (streets, squares), but a daily work that fills spaces politically, such as homes, garages, workshops, and laboratories.
This large movement aspires to introduce playfulness and to exercise a counter-production, a counter-consumption, and a counter-reproduction, beginning now, during the empire of the capitalist system, not after. Its political program is to liberate the working class, starting with the liberation of labor-power from its obligatory sale on the labor market and from its overall discipline, control, and exploitation by the capitalist regime. The strategy advanced by the activists of the Movement of the Concrete incorporates and metabolizes the politically residual figures of the bricoleur and volunteer, and transforms them into politically antagonistic and powerful figures. The first, crucial site of confrontation with the capitalist process has changed: it is now the home, but a home (and an earth) inhabited by women and men, youth, children, the elderly, ill, and disabled, where all of these live as political subjects.
The Movement of the Concrete has also encompassed emotions, passions, and affects in its development and political culture. It is from the politically residual figure of the amateur, the volunteer, and the caretaker that the activists of the Movement of the Concrete have recuperated the role of emotions and self-expression and creativity in their work, in what they produce. Not by chance, if we come back again to the figure of bricoleurs, it is worth recalling that in the past they were called “amateurs.” The label indicates how these people were and are moved by a passion, and thus pleasure and playfulness were and are the motivating dimensions of their work. After all, the place where amateurs have traditionally worked is the house or the garage, transformed into a small, personal workshop.
Another social figure moved by emotion, and in this case, compassion, is that of the volunteer. In this context, the engine is the compassion and the willingness to offer help to those in need. Of course, the figures of the amateur and the volunteer have a close relationship with the figure of the caretaker, whose labor was seen as a work of love and affects. Housework has always been motivated by sentiments and emotions; it has always represented the emotional and psychological management of the affects and the supply of comfort, support, and wellbeing to all the members of the family. The alienation in these types of work was not provoked by the underdevelopment of emotions and affects but rather by their commodification through the subordination of women as caretakers and through their function in the entertainment industry and the media.
In their political perspective, liberating work from the yoke of capital also requires liberating it from alienation understood as a de-emotion and disembodiment that is de-humanizing. Bit by bit these people show that it is possible to produce by themselves, in collaboration and in solidarity with others, without alienation and self-exploitation. Hence, the activists of The Movement of the Concrete are very far from being only makers, or only concrete thinkers. Now, they have the possibility to draw from not only the science of the concrete, but also the science of the abstract (i.e. the contribution of engineers and information scientists), merging these two different approaches together and making them operate and support each other.
What is interesting in the political strategy of this movement is its distance from the Marxist tradition. In The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, in their attempt to figure out what a society could be after its liberation from the chains of capitalism, advanced the idea that with the end of the slavery of waged labor, people would be free to go fishing or contemplate nature. Thus, he could imagine, in a society without capital, only activities of relaxation and amusement. Playfulness was seen by him as a kind of compensation for the fatigue of the liberation of the society from capitalism. One of the limits of the traditional working-class struggle was to consider the struggle against the capitalist system until its total destruction the only solution. The goal was to establish a different social system, the communist one, but communism had to wait until the end of the capitalism. This political approach offers a totalizing vision of the power of the capitalist system and has led people to believe that it is simply impossible to build anything outside the control of capital until its desired end. Every new initiative and difference in logic would end up inevitably being traced back to the logic of capitalism. This vision, while able to multiply activists’ forces in view of the revolution, paradoxically also brought a certain impotence to the ruled classes. It’s possible that the conceptualization of capital as a Moloch, resonating even in the title of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire, has had the effect of strengthening the capitalist system: the more we attribute power to an entity, the more it acquires power.19
On the contrary, the capitalist system covers a very limited part of human history and its logic is historically determined. The Neolithic period, for example, was much longer and more important than what we call “modernity.” The technologies and innovations invented and implemented in this period have been incredibly important for humankind. Thus it does not make sense to consider the capitalist system as inevitable, or to see it as impossible to change or to even defeat. Moreover, the capitalist system has so many contradictions in its functioning, that even without the strong resistance and antagonism of a billion people it possesses many forces of potential self-destruction. After the collapse of the communist regimes and the evidence of too many flaws in the organization of their societies, people are refusing to struggle against capitalism in a dialectical way – to accept the same fundamental values, although pushed in the opposite direction – and have begun to practice different political approaches and perspectives instead.
The need to sell labor to some capitalist is less and less perceived as the only possibility in light of other alternatives. From the perspective of millions of people, the shift from working to making is a very crucial point. Apparently, it seems a kind of loss of the social and political part of “labor” and a shift toward its mere semantic content. In reality, this shift is a very political one, because it goes to the root of the social relationships at an economic level by starting from the perspective of a “renaissance based on the end of the Regime of Waged Labor.”20 In the last 250 years, people have lost any control over and any knowledge about their work, and in general about the overall organization of work. This knowledge and know-how have become a hostage to the ruling classes. People consequently have been expropriated and have hence lost any sense of what they consume, how the goods they consume have been fabricated, the effects of consumption on their bodies as well as on the earth, the air, and the water. Hence, the ownership of means of production by the ruling class has meant the loss of the ownership not only of the means of production, but in general also of the knowledge and control over work processes, the organization of work, consumption, and the natural forces of social labor such as the environment. Having left to the ruling classes the unchecked use of natural resources, the rest of the earth suffers from their avidity and short-term vision. Without counter-forces by progressive actors and others, the ruling classes will not limit their exploitation of natural resources and are unable to express a sustainable vision for the use of such resources.
The latest developments of immaterial labor and IT technologies, which have brought the dematerialization and automation of many processes in society, have further exacerbated the devalorization and devaluation of material labor and the human body. Communication, education, affection, emotion, and sociability – the areas where women have always excelled – have been mediated by an extraordinary flux of technological innovation, giving to men more capability and hence the preeminence also in some of these sectors. However, these technologies are still life-denying and thus they have introduced the inorganic into the living heart of society.
The Movement of the Concrete is producing a re-evaluation of material and concrete work, by appropriating the process of making and, hence, consuming goods, and discovering the potentialities of working with one’s own hands. Humankind, through guaranteeing to everyone the open access to knowledge and promoting processes such as sharing, collaborating and cooperating together, is returning to the science of the concrete and to the possibility of building life-exalting technologies. In the different components of this movement, men and women are not yet distributed equally. For instance, makers are still more males than females, while women are more involved in handcraft.21 However, I predict that they will not stay segregated by gender for long. In the near future, the science of the concrete will be able to capture all the good that there is in the science of the abstract as it has been developed so far. For example, social robotics and 3D printers can become precious tools, produced by people for their wellbeing. Working at home has now become an even more complex kind of abor. People have more possibilities to design and thus to understand what they eat, how things are produced, conserved, and commercialized. As consequence, the revolution entailed by the Movement of the Concrete concerns not only the field of production considered in all its phases, but also that of consumption and all that takes place in the social reproductive sphere.22
The proprietary and competitive logics which jealously guarded not only the ownership of the means of production, but also scientific knowledge and the practical knowledge connected to them, have given way to three major strategies of demolition of capitalistic logic: open access, community building and mutual support, and solidarity and collaboration. With an Internet connection and willpower, people at home or anywhere else can easily connect with other fellow makers or communities across the world and learn how to do things by themselves.23 These new processes of production and consumption are supported by specific web services such as Tumblr, WordPress and YouTube that have collected and put at the disposal of the public millions of tutorials submitted by users. This immense patrimony of “how to do” every type of thing can be understood as a powerful process of reciprocal social teaching and learning. Today people are experiencing the ability to make almost anything, from a cake to a pillow cover, to a toy, by themselves, using technology, creative recycling, or innovating materials and processes.24 They are also transforming standardized products into personalized goods (see, for example, the online community of IkeaHackers.net). What women have done traditionally in isolation in the management of their houses and families, like cooking for example, has now become a shared and socially recognized strategy.
The Movement of the Concrete provides various venues in which to learn and find original, unusual, and inspiring ideas by putting together different political experiences with a common goal: creating the commons in the heart of the capitalist system. Blogs and forums offer online spaces to get information and discuss components, tools, software, hardware, 3D printers, etc., sharing different knowledges with the online public and publishing photos of handmade creations. In particular, blogs on technological artifacts have considerably contributed to the increase in the popularity of artifacts and to the implementation of indie subculture.25 The development of skills through cooperation with other “makers” brings not only the creation and strengthening of social interactions and social innovation, but above all brings an awareness that we no longer need capitalism. The communities of “makers” constitute a wide social laboratory that experiments with the making of personalized mass goods, by modifying the production mechanisms and components by which they can be made. They are reshaping economic models and housing solutions, they are changing how science is taught and learned; they provide the boost that prepares for a post-capitalist society, as Cory Doctorow explains in his book Makers.26
Reflecting on the Movement of the Concrete is a good exercise not only for political scientists but also for sociologists. While at the end of the sixties a “Sociology of the Future” emerged within the field of futuristic studies (investigating probable, possible, and preferable futures), more recently the future as a cultural fact has garnered attention. From this perspective, new sociologies of the future challenge the supremacy of predictions (mostly formulated in terms of economic issues) by exploring the plausibility of “what might be” within the framework of an “ethic of possibilities.”
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Social reproduction, neoliberal crisis, and the problem with work: a conversation with Kathi Weeks
Even some feminist discourses have fallen into this contradiction and reproduced the work ethic and family values discourse, neglecting the fact that both domestic and waged work dominate our life and that both must be fought. However, although it is more or less clear what is meant by the refusal of wage labor, what it means to refuse housework is considerably more difficult to understand. Would it mean abandoning people and our obligations to care? I believe it is rather a question of understanding how to reorganize care and to redistribute it in a way that does not completely occupy our lives.
Reproduction and Crisis
This dialogue with Kathi Weeks is the result of a conversation in two parts. The first took place in the wake of The Problem with Work’s 2011 publication. The second one took place today, in the seventh year of the global economic crisis, with still no end in sight. In 2011 my interest in Weeks’s book was above all tied to the subject of work, as both production and reproduction – specifically, its refusal and of the possibility of its overcoming. In the situation opened by the crisis, what attracts me above all is her “more expansive conception of social reproduction,” which could best be described as the contradiction between capital accumulation and social reproduction. In this sense it becomes possible to expand theoretical and political reflection beyond housework and care work as historically defined, towards the alleged “naturalness” attributed to the labor of women, opening up a reflection on the family, on the coordinates that determine wage labor, on increasingly outsourced care services, and therefore on the commodification of care and reproduction, the system of welfare and its progressive dismantling.
From this perspective our conversation aims to address the subject of reproduction in general terms, or rather as a reflection that is not limited to considering women’s work (and the historic exploitation that has accompanied women’s work in the domestic sphere), but which assumes a broader plane that calls into question what Romano Alquati, in an anticipatory text on the subject of reproduction written in the early 2000s, identified as the reproduction of the “living-human-capacity” – that the “work specifically with which all of us (co)self-reproduce ourselves” is therefore as much women’s as it is men’s.1
At the same time, by tracing the contradiction between capital accumulation and social reproduction, the conversation situates its discursive space precisely at the level of the tension between valorization and cooperation – a striated and contradictory plane, where the cooperative pressures are able (perhaps) to challenge or even overthrow the processes of valorization and accumulation. This is the political perspective of The Problem with Work, which here we try to consider in relation to the cycle of struggles in the crisis, more precisely a “cycle of subjectivities,” which has attempted to identify a point of discontinuity with respect to the policies of austerity.2 It is, to follow Weeks, a question of considering the possibility of opening concrete and effective paths that point to the construction of new forms of relations and social cooperation inside and outside the family; or, bringing back Alquati, of the “resubjectivation of the man-woman commodity.” To put it another way, it is a question of a plane of political subjectivation that challenges the very ethics of family and of work at the base of the neoliberal project; a plane of tension among reproductive processes that are given as subjection, and reproductive processes that are given as “resubjectivation.”
Between subjectivation and “resubjectivation,” then, the tension between capitalist valorization and social cooperation, between capital and work, plays out. It is in this sense that, it seems to me, we can say that today social reproduction can be understood as a field of battle: the most advanced outpost of the processes of contemporary valorization and at the same time the space for experimentation and processes of radical transformation of what affects social relations, self-expression, and gender relations.3 I am indeed convinced that today, in the crisis, we are part of an important contest precisely on the terrain of reproduction, a contest that is crucial for the very destinies of the neoliberal project and for the possibility of the autonomy and resistance of contemporary living labor and of its processes of cooperation.
On one hand, we witness what Nancy Fraser has identified as an “assault on the social reproduction driven by financial capital,” an assault that we see at every level, just as we see the dismantling of welfare under the pretext of the crisis.4 In Italy, austerity policies have imposed a continuous increase of the retirement age, the drastic reduction of the Social Fund and the constant privatization of health care, not to mention schools and universities that have been effectively dismantled under a strict regime of budget cuts (often in favor of private schools and universities).5 On the other hand it was possible to observe in the crisis what Christian Marazzi has pinpointed as struggles and movements “brought together by the same possibility of survival,” or rather a type of struggle that immediately interrogates the plane of reproduction in its deepest sense: as reproduction of the very human species, or, with Alquati, “living-human-capacity.”6 This struggle is at the same time a struggle for survival and the autonomous reproduction of the human being and a struggle for the survival and the reproduction of capital, in the sense that today the source of surplus-value directly coincides with the exploitation of life in its deepest essence. One thinks for example of the debt system that indissolubly marks the subjective experience of the indebted person in material terms, but also in emotional relationships, or – in a different frame – of the trade in human genomes that, as Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby have brilliantly illustrated, has fostered the opening of new global markets.7
And so the struggle isn’t over yet: we still see, on the one hand, the neoliberal attack on welfare and processes of valorization that target all of life, and on the other, the attempts – however spurious, clumsy, and incomplete – to make of the terrain of reproduction a space and environment of political resistance. It is a field studded with traps and obstacles, and its outcome remains far from certain.
One cannot draw from this conversation any recipe for salvation. Instead, sparks of reflection emerge which can prove useful for rethinking work and social reproduction in the context of the crisis, for reflecting on social struggles, and – according to Weeks – on the forms of life and of subjective work, on the family and gender relations, and at the core, on the work ethic that permeates our society.
It includes, as will be clear, reflections that take up and update the rich debates of second-wave and Marxist feminism – a terrain of analysis and reflection still extremely rich in useful, critical ideas and therefore once more relevant. From this perspective, Weeks’ sharp reflection brings to the fore the always-living centrality of those arguments, and rests on a number of social questions that become increasingly more pronounced in the crisis. Given its genesis, the interview that follows consists of two parts, conceived and elaborated within different temporalities, therefore chronologically distinct but conversationally and analytically integrated together. Through this juxtaposition of specific and interconnected reflections, which are presented in the text following their chronological evolution, we bring out (through repetitions and reconsiderations) the nuances of a reflection that spans five years full of changes.
Altogether, the interview tries to investigate some knots that I consider central for a debate on the present: the subject of work and its (presumed) centrality in biographical and subjective pathways, and the production of meaning attached to work in the context of precarity; its implications in the limits of the production of subjectivity, along the color line and the gender line, and the specificities (and criticalities) that follow from them. Beyond the subject of the family and the organization of housework is the subject of post-work that Weeks posits as a utopian horizon, or rather as the political and social tension for change, a subject which it is necessary above all to grasp and rethink in light of the still more pronounced tendency of neoliberalism in crisis to resort to forms of unpaid work, supplied and taken on by subjects themselves as indispensable moments of social growth and recognition. In short, the crisis as a powerful laboratory for experimentation in the processes of subjection and resistance, in which social reproduction, in its “expansive conception,” is presented as a privileged and, I would say, essential, area of reflection. But let’s proceed in an orderly way.
The Problem With Work
Anna Curcio: What is the problem with work?
Kathi Weeks: There are so many problems. We can mention at least three. First of all, work monopolizes our life. We spend a huge quantity of time and energy at work: preparing and organizing our work, making sure our work is secure, and recuperating our spent energy; we are not only working, we become workers! The second problem concerns the capacity of work to dominate our political and social imagination. Work is where we develop our identity, access social networks, and construct sociality. In the United States, work also establishes the way one accesses health services and other social rights. Finally, work, that is, wage labor, is a problem because as a system of distribution of income and of social inclusion it is, at best, incomplete. As the feminist critique has highlighted, there are many forms of social productivity that are not tied to wage labor, and which are not taken into account in the redistribution of wealth. And then there is perhaps the most important problem, which is the hegemony of the work ethic. Today this ethic is even more central because in forms of post-Fordist production there is an enormous need for workers willing to invest their subjectivity and to identify with their work.
AC: Where does this need arise from?
KW: In the factory workers can be more carefully directed and controlled, and therefore it is less of a problem for employers if they do not identify with their work. But in care work, in sales or in services and in all those other forms of work that dot the post-Fordist universe, there isn’t an analogous model of control and supervision. There is therefore a greater need for self-discipline. Research shows that employers are primarily interested in their employees’ ethical investment in work, which becomes one of the principle apparatuses of subjection.
AC: In your book you talk about a work identity that in subjective experience enters into relation with differences in class, race, and gender. What does this mean in terms of the production of subjectivity?
KW: Work is certainly the space of the “becoming-class” of subjects and of the construction of racialized and gendered identities. On the terrain of gender this relation is particularly powerful because there also exists a gender division of labor in both the waged and unwaged spheres. Statistics show a persistent occupational gender segregation that affects all the productive sectors – although with different gradations.This division can affect not only wage levels but also work schedules and activities. For example, part-time work is dominated by women. And although the division of tasks is often arbitrary, gender difference can function to funnel workers into different jobs. One could think here of the fast food industry, where men often work in the kitchen and women in the front, even though gender stereotypes could dictate the opposite.
AC: So can we think of being up front as a new sexual division of labor?
KW: I don’t think this is something new. This relatively arbitrary division is always grounded in an ideological presupposition of natural sex differences: women do this thing better and not the other. Notwithstanding feminist struggles, women remain the ones principally responsible for unpaid housework, which strongly influences their relation with wage labor. The so-called feminization of work, then, should be accompanied by a discourse on the deep hierarchization of work with respect to gender: otherwise one risks rendering gender norms and forms of occupational segregation invisible.
From the Marxist-Feminist Archive
AC: In your book there are continual references, some of them critical, to 1970s Marxist-feminism. How have these analyses influenced your reflection?
KW: Much of the book is dedicated to reimagining and rewriting some of the analyses elaborated in those years. The writings of the “Wages for Housework” campaign have inspired me most of all, in particular the way in which they incorporated the refusal of work into the feminist project to identify the productive dimension of housework. They first of all recognized housework as socially necessary work, without which the economy of wage labor would not be able to function. They made it visible, underscoring the complementarity between productive and reproductive work. Today, because production and reproduction are superimposed, these terms no longer function adequately, but in those years they made possible the construction of a terrain of very radical demands that allowed one to question the responsibilities of women with respect to the work of reproduction. In this sense, they approached the discourse on housework in terms of the refusal of the moralizing dimension of work, understood as a labor of love within the family. Therefore, while they made an effort to make visible the work of reproduction as immediately productive, they intended simultaneously to fight it. A very complicated and sometimes even contradictory project, which remains of great use today.
AC: Why do you say contradictory?
KW: The problem is how to recognize housework as socially necessary work and to distribute it evenly without the over-valuation of domestic work. Neither should women over-value waged work in their attempt to escape from mandatory domesticity.
Even some feminist discourses have fallen into this contradiction and reproduced the work ethic and family values discourse, neglecting the fact that both domestic and waged work dominate our life and that both must be fought. However, although it is more or less clear what is meant by the refusal of wage labor, what it means to refuse housework is considerably more difficult to understand. Would it mean abandoning people and our obligations to care? I believe it is rather a question of understanding how to reorganize care and to redistribute it in a way that does not completely occupy our lives.
AC: But today, because production and reproduction tend to coincide, to reorganize care would also mean to some extent reorganizing production. How can we rethink this relationship?
KW: This is part of the difficulty, and “Wages for Housework” can again be useful. To demand a wage for housework is also a limitation. In the seventies, these feminists underscored that women did not identify themselves, at least not all of them, with the figure of the housewife. So, in naming housework as women’s work there was the risk of strengthening the association between gender and housework. I have been arguing that the demand for a wage for housework be replaced with a demand for basic income that is neutral with respect to gender and which does not conform merely to the domestic dimension, therefore a demand even more powerful because it concerns everyone. However there remains the problem of how to make visible the fact that housework is conducted primarily by women. It is a question then of finding a way to reconcile the feminist analysis of gender with the demand for basic income. I have suggested that the category of life could be developed as a counter to both work and family.
AC: Can we then say that outside of wage labor the battle lines pass through the family?
KW: Certainly. In the book, discussing struggles for the reduction of working hours, I tried to imagine an alternative to the widespread idea of reducing working hours to have “more time for family.” The movement for the working day in the United States demanded eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we will. I am particularly interested in this idea of “what we will,” which leaves open the space of possibility: of forms of social cooperation outside both wage labor and the institution of the family.
AC: Between production and reproduction, therefore, a space we call “other” takes form, which is specified by what you call “a more expansive conception of social reproduction.” Can you elaborate?
KW: The expansive dimension of social reproduction is a category that I use to propose in a different way the antagonism between capitalist accumulation and social reproduction. Instead of thinking wage-labor on one hand and the family and unpaid housework on the other, taking up again the work of the feminists of the seventies, I reflect on the conflicts that exist between these two spheres. Dwelling only on domestic work and thinking exclusively of reproduction does not offer a convincing solution to the problem. This can lead to “solutions” that center on the commodification of care, which does not address the basic problems. I believe instead that there needs to be a more thorough-going critique of the organization of domestic work, one that points to the construction of new forms of relations and of social cooperation inside and outside the family.
AC: Do you believe that the crisis can be a further occasion for the construction of these new forms of relations?
KW: I don’t know. Certainly in the United States one can imagine that the crisis could provoke a different relationship to consumption. It could certainly be an opportunity for rethinking life in a more cooperative way, the forms of reproduction and of the distribution of wealth. But I do not know how much this is today a reality; in the United States, at any rate, work remains central.
Work, Between Ethics and Refusal
AC: On the other hand, when commodification prevails over cooperation, it is as if the work ethic is imposed on the refusal of work, as if what you call the “work society” has gotten the better of the post-work imaginary that you situate as the political horizon of your book…
KW: The idea of post-work is intentionally a small part of the topics that I discuss in the book. I see post-work as a utopian imaginary that gestures toward possible forms of life that are not strictly subordinated to work, in which place work as a part of life but not all of life. This imaginary reconceives the management of time, the production of identities, and assumptions about our political and social obligations.
AC: Nevertheless, work, as the demand for work, remains central above all for the precarious, who have difficulty refusing work because they have only ever had a discontinuous, uncertain, and temporary relationship with it. Therefore, paradoxically, what might be called the “precariat” produces a renewed demand for work…
KW: The demand for more work must still make up part of a political agenda, including, for example, the efforts to improve the lives of women who do not have an equal and unconditional access to work and to income. Also the demand for better work should be part of the political agenda, especially if it can speak to the “double exploitation” of women at home and at work and an end to the gender division of this work. We should also, finally, cultivate a demand for less work. It is, however, difficult to combine all these domands together. Demands for less work, more work, and better work can be contradictory. My sense is that today less work should be given priority. In short, a post-work imaginary must be informed by a rigorous anti-work politics.
AC: Therefore struggles are against work and post-work remains a utopian horizon…
KW: Exactly, and it is for this reason that I am interested in basic income and the reduction of working hours. At least in the U.S. context there is little space for these types of demands, and that is why I pose them as utopian demands for a post-work society. I believe that it is important to produce an imaginary, although utopian, that allows one to think a beyond to work. It is a question of, in other words, circulating a different idea of life that allows us to rethink work systematically as a redistribution system and subject it to criticism. The demand for basic income and for the reduction of working hours can serve as opportunities to promote debate about work and its organization.
AC: It is a project at the same time critical and “visionary.”
KW: Yes, the refusal of work and the elaboration of a possible imaginary are complementary moments. For example, the refusal of work as an anti-work politics also generates a post-work imaginary. In particular I am interested in the utopian dimension, where by utopia I mean discursive practices that encourage us to expand our horizons of our thinking about work and its ethics. Moreover, in the critique that I advance about work, I also want to put the problem of equality, or rather of an unequal exploitation in work, next to that of freedom, understood in Marxian terms as the possibility of collectively creating the world in which we live: the relations, the institutions, and the goods that we produce. The imaginary that I propose therefore also has to do with the power that subjects are able to exercise over the collective creation of the time and space of the social world. The problem with work and the reason for its refusal are not only referring to exploitation but also concern the control that is exercised on the content and time of your work, on the relationships that you establish with others.
Work and Social Reproduction in the Crisis
AC: The crisis is marked by the emergence of new global struggles. I have perceived these struggles as strongly engaged on the ground of social reproduction, experimenting with new social relations that try to base themselves on sharing and cooperation. I am in particular referring to the experience of Occupy or to the Spanish acampadas that have paid great attention to the management and organization of common activities, by taking charge of services such as kitchens and libraries, by discussing gender relations, violence against women and so on. I think also of experiences such as the Mareas in Spain, or projects to self-manage the health care system in Greece, which remind me of the expansive conception of social reproduction you discuss in your book. In such experiences, the fight against welfare cuts and the consequent reduction of certain services such as health or education have resulted in the testing of new practices that have put together service workers and consumers in the fight against austerity measures, as an autonomous organization and common management of a service. Within such a context, struggles don’t intend to restore the social order compromised by the crisis, or plead for public intervention in support of the welfare system, as earlier struggles did in the 1960s and 1970s. Rather, these struggles are emerging as the experimentation and invention of a new ground of social relations that is “autonomous” from both the private market and the public policy of the state. That is to say, they are practicing and trying out new collective social relationships based on sharing and cooperation. In other words, they are experimenting, with varying success, with the production of the common – or a practice of commoning – that is both a source and a result of social cooperation, the area from which the composition of living labor takes form and its autonomy takes shape. What do you think of such experiments?
KW: I find these practices that emerge within the movements both necessary and insufficient. On the one hand, as laboratories for the development of new ways to reproduce our lives and experiments with more sustainable modes of labor organization and social cooperation, I find them enormously important. To my mind, they are most significant as alternatives to the family model and the many still couple-centric and privatized household forms that mimic it. Most of the examples you mention organize relations of care and cooperation that are not contained within the household. As is the case with other prefigurative practices, the value of these efforts to create new forms of life extends beyond their possible practical (re)applications. For one thing they can also model and inspire the social and political imagination regardless of how one might judge the adequacy of their specific content. And they can also serve to challenge the ethos of austerity – that we should want, dream, socialize and care less, and work and sacrifice more – which is central to both the work ethic and family values discourses that help to legitimate the state’s (non)response to the crisis. These practices insist that we publicize and politicize the work and time of social reproduction, both in the narrow sense of what is required to sustain life itself and in the more expansive sense of what it takes to become more than we are now, to build better ways of being and living together.
On the other hand, I also think it is important to note that these small-scale and local experiments are necessarily limited. As practices that people organize themselves without more institutionalized forms of support, they could also be likened to the kind of entrepreneurial endeavors that neoliberal ideologies celebrate. The relations of social reproduction are inseparable from what is officially recognized as the system of economic production; the reinvention of one depends on the transformation of the other. Social reproduction takes work – the idea must be challenged that it is something that we can do in addition to a lifetime of waged work or, alternatively, in the absence of any other income. And while I do see the importance of developing alternatives to the dominant forms of both private and public reproductive services and support, I think some form of institutionalization is essential lest we continue to assume that our survival should depend on the personal relations we may or may not be lucky enough to find, and may or may not be capable of sustaining.
AC: I would like to pose another question connecting labor and crisis, specifically regarding the increasing reliance on unpaid labor. This is something we have largely experienced by working as precarious workers, or as students in the universities, or through those legalized forms of unpaid labor that are called “internships.” However, within the crisis, in Italy at least, the use of unpaid labor tends to be institutionalized – for example, the Expo 2015 in Milan has “hired” about 15,000 young people with unpaid work contracts. Such labor comes with promises of improved resumes, hence emphasizing the need for some sort of naturalization of unpaid labor as an essential prerequisite for a waged job in the labor market. This is, I would say, a logic in many ways similar to the one that has historically hooked women to the unpaid labor of reproduction, housework, and care. In this regard your analysis on the refusal of work offers important insights. Discussing the refusal of unpaid labor today, a labor largely understood as the harbinger of important promises for the future, takes on a political urgency. What do you mean by refusal of work in these conditions? How, within these coordinates, could we move beyond the labor ethics you largely criticized in your work and think concretely to a post-work society? Is there any room for the refusal of work in such a context?
KW: I think that your claim about the relevance of the case of unwaged domestic work to the current situation of internship labor and other forms of unwaged or underwaged “apprenticeships” is very compelling. After all, capitalist production has always depended on unwaged labor to reproduce the system of waged labor. This is something that second wave Marxist feminists fought to expose, an insight that demands the dramatic expansion of what we understand as the economy and as the terrain of economic struggle. The list of the modes of work that employers profit from but do not compensate us for arguably expands in post-Fordist economies. These include not only all the labor of enabling the present workforce to go to work each day or night and raising new generations of workers, but also most of the educational achievements, communication skills, social networks, cultural forms, and affective capacities that workers are expected to cultivate and that employers do not pay for. Although I think internship and internship-like labor should be understood on this continuum of non-compensated production, there is something stunning about being able to pass these jobs off as something different from paid positions. There doesn’t seem to be a need even to claim that they serve as training periods, as in older forms of apprenticeship. It is as if they are designed to prove that a potential worker is willing to look at the job as something other than an exchange of labor for income, as something one needs for reasons other than mere money. It is as if the point is to demonstrate one’s enthusiastic willingness to embrace a non-instrumental relationship to work. Returning again to the feminist critique, the second wave feminists associated with the “Wages for Housework” demand argued that the first step in refusing culturally (as well as politically and economically) mandated domesticity for women was to insist that unwaged household labor is work. The second step was to see it as merely work. This strikes me as still very relevant advice in the context of these developments in the regime of work.
– Translated by Andrew Anastasi
Comments
Surplus Population, Social Reproduction, and the Problem of Class Formation
The black lumpen proletariat, unlike Marx’s working class, had absolutely no stake in industrial America. They existed at the bottom level of society in America, outside the capitalist system that was the basis for the oppression of black people. They were the millions of black domestics and porters, nurses’ aides and maintenance men, laundresses and cooks, sharecroppers, unpropertied ghetto dwellers, welfare mothers, and street hustlers. At their lowest level, at the core, they were the gang members and the gangsters, the pimps and the prostitutes, the drug users and dealers, the common thieves and murderers.
– Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power
1. Introduction
Today, few uphold the old belief that wage labor will gradually expand to cover the majority of the world’s population. Once, this was the condition of the historical belief that capitalism would create the conditions under which wage labor could be organized as a global power to match capital. Instead another teleology has appeared, claiming that capitalist development entails working class disorganization. Rather than a narrative of progress, this is a narrative of decline, of precarity, informalization, and immiseration.
Marx had once predicted that a revolution would become organizationally possible through “the ever expanding union of the workers,” and materially urgent due to the deepening of proletarian misery: “A radical revolution can only be the revolution of radical needs.”1 In the twentieth century, the combination of misery and organization was rare, due to the concessions given to organized labor in the Global North, concessions which were to a large extent made possible by the exploitation, misery, and violent suppression of colonial populations. Today, we see instead a tendency towards the disorganization of northern labor, which is to a large extent due to competition from low-paid and less organized workers in the Global South. It thus appears that the two elements of Marx’s theory are mutually exclusive, but in a different way than believed by many during the mid-19th Century, when the idea of full employment and unionization was seen as a possibility. Instead, Marx’s own strong arguments for the impossibility of full employment have been re-actualized through a re-reading of Marx’s theory of “generalized law of capitalist accumulation” and the capitalist tendency to produce surplus-populations.2
The foremost luminaries of this reactualization have been the proponents of communization theory, among whom the collective Endnotes is perhaps the most influential voice in the Anglo-Saxon world. Referring to Endnotes, Fredric Jameson, for example, has recently offered the provocative suggestion that Capital is a book about unemployment rather than about exploitation.3 The writings of communization theorists on surplus population are of interest both because they provide an explanatory framework for understanding the empirically observable phenomena of the informalization of labor and the development of immiseration and slums, analyzed by writers such as Jan Breman and Mike Davis, and because it is one of the most sophisticated among the (in any case few) contemporary Marxist attempts to think the conditions of revolutionary communist practice today.
This text takes its diagnostic starting point in these new theoretical developments, with an aim to think through the challenge they pose in terms of the question of class formation and organization. It proposes that the central task of class composition is to respond to the problem of the contingency of proletarian reproduction, which all proletarians have in common, but deal with in many different ways. This means that class composition must start from the recognition that the modes of proletarians’ struggle are extremely diverse: from the limit condition of peasants fighting against becoming proletarianized to the classical figure of the wage-laborer on strike, lies a whole range of struggles to which feminist and anti-colonial writers are more attuned than most Marxists. Once we recognize this constitutive heterogeneity of the exploited and expropriated populations of the world, we recognize that any general theory of “the proletariat” as a revolutionary agent will have to start from the self-organization and composition of differences and particularly of different strategies of life and survival.
In order to elaborate such a theory, I turn to the Marx of the 18th Brumaire, a text not interested in the elaboration of the abstract historical dialectic of communist revolution, but in developing and deploying a method of analysis of concrete struggles. This text has rightly been lauded by many as a model materialist analysis of the conjuncture – of the crisis, the relations of class forces, the historical temporality of events, the dynamics of political representation and violence, etc. Marx’s richly textured meditation on the play of contingency and necessity in the French revolution of 1848 and its aftermath is an important corrective to the all too common Marxist attempt to limit political analysis to what can be derived from the critique of political economy or to the question of the prospects of revolution. What follows is the attempt to relate the widely observed conception of political contingency and class formation in the 18th Brumaire with the question of the contingency of proletarian reproduction. Starting from the latter allows me to read the Brumaire not merely as an analysis of the actions of constituted classes, but to draw from it a theory of class formation and class differentiation.
While the problem of proletarian reproduction has been raised with renewed urgency by the crisis and the growth of surplus populations, it has a wider significance. As observed by Michael Denning, the proletariat is not defined by exploitation and labor, but by its real or virtual poverty. The key insight of this text is that any practice of proletarian class formation and organization – the condition sine qua non of communist strategy – must start not only with this virtual poverty, but with the real strategies of life and survival through which proletarians live this problem.
2. The Necessity of Surplus Population Under Capitalism
Marx always gave a dual definition of the proletariat: in terms of the problem of the contingency of their reproduction, their existence as “virtual paupers,” and in terms of their exploitation as workers.4 In other words, the proletariat is defined by its separation from the means of reproduction, and its compulsion to reproduce itself by reproducing capital. The reproduction of the proletariat (the value of its labor-power) is kept in line with the reproduction of capital through the “normal” working of the law of value: if wages rise too high, capital will hire less workers, thus creating a reserve army exerting a downward pressure on wages.5 The point here is that as long as the employed and unemployed do not combine, wages will always fall back in line with the requirements of capital accumulation.
Marx pointed out that state violence is generally unleashed should such a combination force the law of value temporarily out of function. However, there are two other crucial limitations of workers organization, which are both based on the long-term secular tendencies of capital. First, the production and accentuation of differences within the proletariat along gendered and racialized lines, which leads to competition between and within national workforces; and secondly, the production of surplus populations.
As Marx notes with regards to the national and religious conflicts between the English and the Irish, this antagonism is the secret of the working class’s impotence in England, despite the level of organization of its English part. It is the secret of the maintenance of power by the capitalist class. And the latter is fully aware of this.6 This is not merely a strategy of divide and rule, however, but an effect of capital’s chase for absolute surplus value, which – as soon as it has extended the existing workday as much as possible – brings it to incorporate the labor-forces of areas where the reproductive cost of labor is lower, and where necessary labor is thus less relative to surplus-labor time. In the Grundrisse, Marx writes:
Surplus time is the excess of the working day above that part of it which we call necessary labor time; it exists secondly as the multiplication of simultaneous working days, i.e. of the laboring population. … It is a law of capital … to create surplus labor, disposable time; it can do this only by setting necessary labor in motion – i.e. entering into exchange with the worker. It is therefore equally a tendency of capital to increase the laboring population, as well as constantly to posit a part of it as surplus population – population which is useless until such time as capital can utilize it. … It is equally a tendency of capital to make human labor (relatively) superfluous, so as to drive it, as human labor, towards infinity.7
Second, Marx discovers that the chase for relative surplus value itself replaces workers with machinery, leading to an internal secular tendency towards the growth of surplus populations.8 Thus, by enrolling new populations as workers and by expelling existing workers in favor of machinery, capital produces ever larger working classes alongside ever greater surplus populations, which makes the challenges of suspending the law of value through organization ever greater. We see here two tendencies of capitalism: whether in crisis or in periods of growth, existing lines of production will shed labor. Despite periodic crises, capital will accumulate ever more capital, and employ ever more proletarians. This gives us “the general law of capitalist accumulation”:
The greater the social wealth, the functioning capital, the extent and energy of its growth, and therefore also the greater the absolute mass of the proletariat and the productivity of its labor, the greater is the industrial reserve army. The same causes which develop the expansive power of capital, also develop the labor-power at its disposal. … But the greater this reserve army in proportion to the active labor-army, the greater is the mass of a consolidated surplus population, whose misery is in inverse ratio to the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labor. The more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation. Like all other laws, it is modified in its working by many circumstances, the analysis of which does not concern us here.9
If we try to break this down we have three effects of this law: the expansion of the mass of employed (“active”) proletarians, of the number of unemployed (“reserve”) proletarians, and of the mass of unemployable (“consolidated”) proletarians.10 The effect of the latter two categories is to press down wages, i.e. the monetary part of the reproduction of the working population. Indeed, capital constantly produces a relatively redundant working population, i.e. a population which is superfluous to the fulfillment its drive for valorization.11 The expanded reproduction of capital is thus both the expanded reproduction of the employed and unemployed populations, positing an ever greater relative surplus, a “disposable reserve army” bred by the capitalist mode of production.12 “Modern industry’s whole form of motion therefore depends on the constant transformation of the working population into unemployed or semi-employed ‘hands.’”13
In recent decades such surplus populations have mostly been produced by automation manufactured in the Global North, whereas the surplus populations of the Global South overwhelmingly remain victims of the combined push of population growth and industrial agriculture in rural areas (subdivision of land, capitalist competition and expropriation). The northward migration from the former colonies introduces an already racialized population into an indigenous workforce rendered insecure by off-shoring, automation and informalization, with some longing for the heyday of Northern labor during the time of open white supremacy and the national social state.
In this increasing immiseration of the proletariat it is possible to find both a deepening contradiction between capital and labor – and thus an increased hope of a revolutionary clash rather than an integrationist class compromise – and an increasing competition between workers and between workers and the unemployed, and thus a decreased hope for solidarity and collective action. We discover this ambivalence in the writings of the communizationist journal and writing collective Endnotes. In their second issue, Endnotes developed a structural analysis, which claimed that the reproductive cycles of capital and labor were becoming increasingly decoupled, leading to a “secular crisis” of “the reproduction of the capital-labor relation itself” and an objective pressure on the proletariat to abolish capital.14 The inability of capital to satisfy the demands of the workers was thus a condition of possibility of communism. However, in their third issue this condition of possibility appeared as a condition of impossibility: “an increasingly universal situation of labor-dependence has not led to a homogenisation of interests. On the contrary, proletarians are internally stratified” and their collective interests have often been captured by markers of race, nation, gender, etc.15 These remarks allow, as we will see, no more than a hope grounded in a theory of the secular deepening of the antagonism between capital and labor, and the exhaustion of all possibilities of mediating it. In what follows we will see that Endnotes’s meditations on the necessities of capitalist development and the abstract possibility of communization leaves us without a materialist method of class formation.
3. Reproductive Crisis and Revolutionary Hopes
Endnotes’s theory of revolution is based on the tendency towards antagonistic reproduction given by the General Law of Capitalist Accumulation. They posit a deepening crisis of the reproduction of the class relation itself, whereby the reproduction of capital and of the proletariat will enter into a deepening antagonism:
With its own reproduction at stake, the proletariat cannot but struggle, and it is this reproduction itself that becomes the content of its struggles. As the wage form loses its centrality in mediating social reproduction, capitalist production itself appears increasingly superfluous to the proletariat: it is that which makes us proletarians, and then abandons us here. In such circumstances the horizon appears as one of communization; of directly taking measures to halt the movement of the value form and reproduce ourselves without capital.16
The tendency here described can only be seen as pointing in the direction of revolution or communization, if we claim that capitalism has reached some absolute limit to expansion, some exhaustion of the capitalist teleology itself. Otherwise, capital will have room to maneuver and give concessions, and we would thus be dealing either with a contingent limit, which poses nothing but a window of revolutionary opportunity, or more fluid fields of struggles. Staking everything on one global totalizing process of subsumption and abjection, communization theory describes a process that is heading for its limit. This theory tends to reduce the question of revolution to its structural condition: general squeeze on living conditions. But because the processes of capitalist accumulation entails both the increasing competition and atomization of workers, Endnotes can only conceive of struggle as the spontaneous coming together of the separated, principally in riots and insurrections. But in this duality of objective tendency and subjective irruption, it is easily overlooked that riots are conditioned by everyday resistances that work against the naturalization of oppression and explore the limitations of other less antagonistic forms of redress. It is equally easy to forget the role of whispers, rumors, and camaraderie that precede a riot, setting the tone of its affective atmosphere of anger and contagious mutual trust. To understand all this is necessary to understand the connection between the structural “conditions of possibility of riots” and the riot itself. Perhaps it is the belief in the imminent exhaustion of the global process of capitalist accumulation that makes it possible to neglect such considerations.
Albert O. Hirschman once observed that when Marx and Engels in the late 1840s – most influentially in the Manifesto – thought that capitalism was reaching its final limit, they failed to recognize the capacity of imperialism to displace capitalism’s contradictions and postpone its crisis.17 More problematically, Marx’s prioritization of the thesis that revolution would come about through the globalization and exhaustion of capitalist development, lead him to briefly lend colonialism support as a driver of the process that would make the proletariat a global reality, and thus communism a global possibility.18 This implication is premised on an abstract formal dialectical reversal, which completely effaces how the effects of the global division of labor are divisive and disciplining, and hence the necessary difficult task of developing cross-border solidarity. Similarly, according to Hirschman, V. I. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg only really recognized this power of imperialism when they could say it had run its course, i.e. when the recognition did not contradict the idea that revolution is objectively imminent. Hirschman’s provocation raises the following question: does the orientation of the revolutionary desire of Marxists – insofar as it is sustained by the theory of capital’s real teleology running its course – orient them away from the problem that there might still be venues for capitalist expansion as well as other modifying circumstances to the general law?19 And furthermore, does capital not have the capacity to re-subsume areas and populations it has previously spat out as if they were new to it – once they have been sufficiently devalued? The problem with the thesis of exhaustion is that in order to give hope it needs to suggest a uniform deepening of the proletarian antagonism with capital. This allows theory to avoid the question of strategy and organization, and allows it to “solve” the problem of the proletarian condition through a simple dialectical schematic à la “the expropriators are expropriated.” While we might agree that that is indeed the formal concept of communist revolution, it says nothing whatsoever about the real movement that abolishes the present state of things.
In his critique of communization theory Alberto Toscano relates its “almost total neglect of the question of strategy” to “the collapse or attenuation” of collective bodies capable of projecting a strategy.20 As a theory of communist revolution, communization is a theory of the insufficiency of all real practices, yet curiously a theory of hope. This is the case, because it is speculatively derived from the observation that capitalist development entails a deepening contradiction between the reproduction of the working class and the reproduction of capital. Under such conditions, labor must abolish capital or suffer its own slow death as surplus population. This is a theory of the “conditions of possibility of communism,” in Endnotes’s Kantian formulation. Because Endnotes focus on the “moving contradiction” between capitalist and working class reproduction, they tend to pose the question of composition from the classical point of view of uniting “the” proletariat in order to produce a historical subject adequate to abolish capital, often defining the proletariat in excessively formalistic ways, as fully atomized and mutually competitive and mistrustful, whereby the problem of their coordination becomes so radicalized that even struggle can only be thought as an event of spontaneity rather than a process based on the coming together and increased connectivity of already existing networks of solidarity and trust.21
As with Marx and Engels in the Manifesto, deepening misery becomes the occasion for a conditional belief in progress, a kind of perverse faith that history will progress by its bad side – or perhaps the thesis is merely that if it progresses by its bad side, it will do so in a more communist way this time, unmediated by trade unions and parties, and free of the laborist productivism of former epochs. But freeing themselves of the weight of the past in this way, we also find ourselves in a vacuum, pinning our hopes on the absence of the positive tendency on which Marx and Engels hung their hats, namely the growing organization and productive power of the proletariat, the vehicle through which immiseration spelled the possibility of mass action rather than the barbarism of the war of all proletarians against all.
In addressing this tension, Endnotes do not provide any operational concepts and tactics that might enable the composition or abolition of these differences, except “struggle itself,” which spontaneously will abolish the double-bind in which workers find themselves: “they can act collectively if they trust one another, but they can trust one another — in the face of massive risks to themselves and others — only if that trust has already been realized in collective action.” Instead of participating in the collective development and sharing of tactics and tools of struggle, Endnotes admit the speculative character of their theory, which they consider a “therapy against despair,” the answer (revolution) to which the proletarians have not yet formalized the question. In short, communization is an answer whose only question is abstract, it responds not to the concrete problem of class formation, but to the abstract problem of fending off the despair of the theorists of revolution.
However, the debate that is of interest here is not one between forms of hope, and the possibility of revolution discovered in good or bad general historical tendencies. Neither from surplus population to communization, nor from the multitude to commonwealth, as it were. It is easy to understand that a theoretical indication of hope is necessary to keep practical reason from falling into cynicism, melancholia, or opportunism.22 But such narratives risk leaving us stuck in the Kantian problematic of orientation in thinking, according to which the rational subject will only commit itself to practical, moral action if it has hope that its action will succeed in furthering morality materially or spiritually – and in which only the kind of action that addresses the tendencies that give hope, can itself be seen as carrying a historical promise, that is a promise of more than short term gains and eventual defeat. For Kant, the practical necessity of optimism ultimately becomes an argument for the practical necessity of the idea of God, for Endnotes it becomes an argument for the continuous meditation on revolution, that is, on an answer to which proletarians have not formulated the question. Even if the concept of communization, unlike Kant’s God, is founded on a systematic materialist and dialectical understanding of the laws of movement of capital, such a theory does not, as we have seen, provide us with a strategic, practical orientation of class formation and strategies of reproduction, nor with a concept of state violence.
Even if Marx’s systematic analysis of the tendency towards the production of surplus population is empirically confirmed, as suggested by Endnotes and Aaron Benanav – Marx is still adamant that it has many modifying circumstances from which he abstracts in Capital.23 However, while Marx is right to exclude them from his exposition for methodological reasons, we cannot draw any political lessons from a law without considering its countervailing tendencies that not only work against the tendency, but even suspend it. Some of these are internal, like the periodic devaluation of labor to the point that labor renders highly mechanized production uncompetive, which would lower the organic composition of capital. Another, and more significant moderator is declining birthrates, which Marx does not take into consideration as he methodologically takes demographic growth a variable dependent solely on wage levels. Thus, because of deindustrialization, declining birth rates due to women’s struggles for reproductive health and refusal of child bearing, violent state suppression of birthrates, etc. – it is possible that the tendency towards surplus population is periodically reversed. Further, the available pool of labor has historically been diminished by war, epidemics, famine and the slow death of poverty, declining public health standards and deadly policing of poor neighborhoods and borders.
What is interesting and challenging about the re-actualization of the theory of surplus populations today is that, unlike the immiseration thesis of the Communist Manifesto, it is not predicated on a thesis of the gradual embourgeoisement of the world, or on the homogenization of the proletariat. The reality of surplus-populations poses instead the issue of a generalized crisis of reproduction, and the multitude of survival strategies that arise from it, including modes of wealth appropriation far short of revolution proper, women’s struggles, and various forms of state and para-state violence.24 Reversing the relation between theory and practice, it poses a very non-Kantian question: what does it mean to orient revolutionary practice from the standpoint of the problem of the proletarian condition and the manifold ways to live it?
4. The Common Problem of Reproduction
We have seen how the proletarian condition is best understood as one of separation from the means of reproduction. This is the condition of capital organizing proletarians as wage laborers. New separations are constantly produced by capital’s expansive drive for absolute surplus value, a tendency through which ever new populations are included in the workforce – women and agricultural producers primarily.25 Furthermore, we have seen how the drive for relative surplus value tendentially spits out more workers, rendering them superfluous to capitalist production. In the course of long periods of mass-unemployment, and as an effect of the secular decline in employment we see a growth of the consolidated surplus-population, i.e. a population unfit, unable, unwilling to work, because of poor health, age; or – which Marx only mentions – because it has adopted another mode of reproduction.
Primitive accumulation, violently destroyed and destroys previous modes of reproduction. In Feudal Europe as in the Global South today and in colonial times, primitive accumulation ruptures customary bonds of authority, as well as the peasants’ organic tie to the land, and leaves individuals atomised and bereft of the means and relations necessary to survive and actualise their potentials. Marx’s retrospective analysis of primitive accumulation in Capital focuses on how this process lead to the creation of a mass of proletarians, who had to combine with capital as workers in order to survive. However, we also see in his narrative the outline of a different set of histories of struggles against the enclosures, food riots, and of the criminalized, and thus subversive strategies of survival and reproduction. The impotentiality of individuals had and has to be enforced by private and public violence, their propensity to combine autonomously or within and against their workplaces made the process of the integration of the proletariat into work-life a protracted process.26
In tandem with the repression of other modes of survival, money develops into a general condition for participation in society: if you don’t have it you are compelled to obtain it, be it by working, stealing, selling yourself or by marrying someone who has money. In other words, proletarians have to reproduce themselves through exchange. However, this gives us nothing but the abstract social form through which labor is reproduced; indeed the ways in which labor takes this form are innumerable. Behind the common problem of the proletarians (dispossession of means of re/production) and their common ‘solution’ (money) lies a manifold of heterogeneous modes of life through which the proletarian condition can and must be lived. Thus, as Silvia Federici shows,
primitive accumulation … was not simply an accumulation and concentration of exploitable workers and capital. It was also an accumulation of differences and divisions within the working class, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as ‘race’ and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of the modern proletariat.27
What is also implied here is that as the reproduction of the proletariat became mediated through the wage, it did not abolish proletarian self-reproduction; the wage has very rarely been high enough for workers to obtain all the means of their reproduction (food ready for consumption, sex, cleaning, health care) directly on the market.28 Instead, the wage became a form through which the unpaid reproductive work of women, but also of children and other dependents, was mediated through the mostly male wage, producing what Mariarosa Dalla Costa calls the patriarchy of the wage.29 Whereas Marx’s analysis focuses first on the accumulation of “men,” and then on their production and reproduction of capital through their exploitation, authors such as Federici, Fortunati, Dalla Costa and James provide a theory of the condition of possibility of Marx’s analysis: the production and reproduction of labor power itself.30 To understand the history of how struggles over reproduction started to wane, it is therefore not enough to analyze the integration of proletarians in wage-labor and the criminalization of alternative reproductive practices. We must understand with Federici how one effect of this war on women, whose most violent episode was the witch-hunts, was that the proletariat was split.31 This effect of this war was not just the primitive accumulation and disciplining of women’s bodies by capital, state and church, but also the subordination of proletarian women to proletarian men. For these men the struggle for reproduction was often – and once alternative routes were exhausted mostly – a struggle to find women who could reproduce them. To the macro-violence of the clergy and the state, a micro-violence of the everyday was added, often drawing on the discursive resources and images produced by the former. Economic compulsion and extra-economic violence are inseparable but yet distinguishable under capitalism.
The destruction of the different forms of reproductive self-organization of the proletarians did not entail a destruction of proletarian reproduction as such, but the creation of the modern nuclear family, within which unpaid reproductive work took care of the reproductive needs of children and wage workers, so the workers could remain free-floating mutually competitive productive bodies. Hence we can understand the modern family as an essential survival-unit in a condition of insecurity, but we have to understand how the stability of this nuclear family model is inextricably linked to the stability of the male wage.
Thus, if we read together Marx’s chapters on primitive accumulation with his analysis of the general tendencies of capitalist accumulation, we must conclude that struggles over reproduction are becoming an increasingly important issue, not merely in the form of struggles over the wage and working day, but as defenses of welfare (the social wage), and struggles to appropriate the means of reproduction or against their expropriation. If the proletariat is, as Endnotes and Benanav write, “rather a working class in transition, a working class tending to become a class excluded from work,” we must note that it is also a class increasingly in need of alternative ways to secure its own reproduction. Before this becomes a matter of revolutionary struggle it is a matter of everyday solutions and resistances to the problem of proletarian reproduction.
5. Proletarian Differentiation
Marx conceptualizes the problem of the proletarian condition in two ways: in terms of its exploitation and in terms of its expropriation. If the former relates to the (waged) working class, the latter refers to anybody separated from the means of re/production, a pauper virtual or actual. Marx recognized that the proletariat also attempts to survive outside the capital-relation, as lumpenproletariat, rural or urban. This class lives as an excluded insider to “the silent compulsion of economic relations,” faced not with exploitation but with the “direct extra-economic force which is still… used, but only in exceptional cases.”32 Marx had first introduced the lumpenproletariat in a discussion of Max Stirner’s romantic vision of non-productive and work-refusing ragamuffins and lazzaroni. After 1848, the problem of the lumpenproletariat becomes a problem of the failed revolution, of the proletarians who sold themselves to the reactionaries. This approach, which stresses the difference between the working class and the lumpen, and contains certain moments of moralization from the perspective of the work ethic and law and order, has since been at the mainstream of Marxism, with the most notable exceptions in Frantz Fanon and the Black Panther Party.
Marx’s focus on the contrast between the productivity of the proletariat and the “parasitism” of the lumpenproletariat mirrors capitalist value-production criteria, instead of asking the question of the common condition of the two, and the often blurred borderline between them. To theorize the proletariat as differentiated into workers and lumpenproletarians entails not prioritizing the problem of exploitation over domination or vice versa, but rather seeing these as different ways in which proletarians live their condition: at the extremes some suffer only domination or exploitation directly, but mostly, proletarians are faced with some mix of both. And through the mediation of competition of jobs and state handouts, etc., all proletarians are always indirectly submitted to both, but in an uneven way in which some are relatively privileged over others.
Thus, wage labor is one of many ways in which proletarians try to solve the problem of separation. If the proletarian is a virtual pauper, then in the proletarian condition (to take this word in the sense of the “human condition,” but historicized and negative) the proletariat is stratified into different strategies of dealing with this problem:
proletarian condition
In Marx’s analysis the proletariat analysis is not limited to the actively working industrial proletariat, which was so central to trade union, socialist and communist strategy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If the proletariat consists, as Engels claimed in 1888, of “the class of modern wage laborers, who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labor-power in order to live,” we must note that this does not imply that they find willing buyers.33 The proletariat thus consists both of the employed and the unemployed. If the proletariat and lumpenproletariat are not agglomerations of concrete individuals, but modes of life that individuals slip in and out of according to the need and availability of work or other strategies of survival, the distinctions begin to blur. Yet it is clear that frequent conflicts might arise between these populations, both for moral reasons (e.g. the protestant work ethic) and the negative impact of crime on the everyday lives of working people.34 What distinguishes the lumpenproletariat from the unemployed is its mode of life, its everyday strategies of hustling, theft, and sex work, a subjectivity or conduct that tends to make it unemployable, whereas the unemployed law-abidingly look for work. Similarly, there are conflicts between the unemployed and the employed, most obviously the downward pressure on wages and conditions exerted by the former, or struggles for job-security by the latter. These groups therefore cannot share the same strategies for dealing with their class condition: the workers reject the “parasitism and crime” of the lumpen. The unemployed compete with each other and press the wages of the employed. Many employed workers struggle against the inclusion in the labor market of new groups of (women, lumpen, migrants, blacks) in order to maintain their position. Finally, those reproducing the labor force – mainly women – are under pressure from the labor force itself, to reproduce it. This is what it means that different parts of the proletariat live the proletarian condition differently. Now it becomes clearer what is at stake in the problem of class formation.
6. Class Formation Through Struggle
Marx distinguished between the forms that subsume classes (the value-form, money-form, capital-form, state-form, etc.), and the active process of class-formation in struggle.35 This distinction recurs in Operaismo‘s notion of class composition, which has both a passive and an active form: the composition of the class as workers, and the active effort of composing the elements of the class, autonomously. “The political class composition… is determined by how the ‘objective’ conditions of exploitation are appropriated ‘subjectively’ by the class and directed against those very conditions.”36 It is here useful to recover a passage from The German Ideology describing active and passive class formation:
The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their conditions of existence predestined, and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class, become subsumed under it. This is the same phenomenon as the subjection of the separate individuals to the division of labor and can only be removed by the abolition of private property and of labor itself.37
Individuals are formed as a class, through their subsumption and limitation in the web of necessities of their social condition, but are forming a class through a common struggle. When there is no common struggle, those who could form a class fall back into internal competition or mutual indifference. In the absence of common struggles, the “objective class interests” become abstract slogans compared to the concrete reality of the interests of individual and families to compete with others for scarce resources. This should tell us why attempts to “raise proletarian consciousness” are generally met with derision. To say that people share a common problem to which there is a common solution is an abstract truth, which in itself will convince only very few to compose in common struggle; this requires trust in one another and in the tactics of struggle. A common problem is only a problem if a solution can be imagined; if not, it is simply a condition, a given if troubling fact, which might as well instill cynicism and opportunism. Struggles only emerge where people believe – rationally and affectively – that collective response to a problem is better than or complementary to the ways in which they deal with their condition in their everyday.
The last part of the quote indicates that the problem of the proletarian condition cannot be finally “solved,” but only dissolved, through “the abolition of private property and of labor itself.” Thus, the problem will persist and insists through all attempted solutions, be they individual or collective. This is one of the reasons for the investment of hope in political representatives who might solve the problem, religions that promise otherworldly salvation, and drugs that help you forget the whole mess. This also provides a justification for the projections of communist theory, in as much as it projects a solution that at least rests on the collective self-activity of the believers.
But is important that this communist horizon is not construed as a matter of overcoming and negating particular individual strategies of reproduction, in the sense of raising yourself to the level of universality of the class in the uniformity of its antagonism with capital. Rather, the practical task of class composition – which is necessary for posing the problem of the abolition of the proletarian condition concretely instead of remaining stuck in mutual competition and abstract hope – consists in developing collective strategies of life and survival which either combine, supplement or make superfluous individualized forms of reproduction.
If the first aim of resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, combinations, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them than that of wages. This is so true that English economists are amazed to see the workers sacrifice a good part of their wages in favor of associations, which, in the eyes of these economists, are established solely in favor of wages.38
Marx makes this argument, which is clearly orientated by the practice of the English workers, against Proudhon’s theoreticist rejection of workers’ combinations. Proudhon argues against workers’ combinations, for what will they achieve, even if they win wage rises: the capitalist class will push down wages to make up for lost profits, the cost of organizing will itself be higher than what is won, and at the end of the day the workers will still be workers, the masters still masters. While questioning the economic side of Proudhon’s argument, Marx’s focus on the experiences of the Bolton workers suggests that something more, and more important than wages, can be gained from combinations and struggle.39
However, the problem of the proletarian condition is much wider than any existing or even possible organization of wage labor. In the face of surplus population, trade unions will have their bargaining power undermined by the increasing competition from the un- or underemployed, and some will engage in a loosing battle to lower competition through enhancing the exclusion of some groups, on grounds of race, gender, or citizenship status. W.E.B. Du Bois pointed to this problem, when he wrote about the black working class in the United States:
Theoretically we are a part of the world proletariat in the sense that we are the mainly exploited class of cheap laborers; but practically we are not a part of the white proletariat and are not recognized by that proletariat to any great extent. We are the victims of their physical oppression, social ostracism, economic exclusion and personal hatred; and when in self-defence we seek sheer subsistence we are howled down as “scabs.”40
The problem of proletarian separation can only be tackled in those nodal points where common solutions can be produced, and forms of competition – racialized, gendered, nationalistic, etc., can be undermined. This entails, quite significantly, facing the challenge of thinking the conditions of the composition of those that are not part of a workplace, which in Marx’s writing is quintessentially the problem of the peasants and lumpen-proletarians raised in the 18th Brumaire.
7. The Material Conditions of Composition
Where the Communist Manifesto, written shortly before the 1848 Revolutions, was a meditation on the historical tendency towards immiseration, proletarian class power and revolution, Marx wrote The 18th Brumaire in 1852 as a reflection of the failure of that revolution, particularly a failure that was due to the failure of the proletariat to compose with the lumpen and the peasants.41 It is useful to return to this text today, when it is clear that the general tendency towards surplus population leaves us with a theory of the difficulty of revolution as much as of its urgency. In it Marx developed a materialist theory of class composition, as a corrective to the general, historicist projections of the Manifesto. The Brumaire is often read as a text in which the problem of class divisions – between proletarians and between the proletariat and its allies – is one of enlightening proletarians about their objective common interest and organizing them, of establishing alliances with the organizations of other classes, and of finding ways to politically represent the unorganized and “unenlightened” residues of the proletariat and other subaltern classes. Thus the question of strategy and force becomes reduced to the question of recomposing the political forces with a view to establishing new class alliances. However, if we look carefully at Marx’s reflections on classes in the text, we see that it is a profound reflection on the relation between classes as constituted categories of people, and the shifting and inherently practical and existential responses to the contingency of proletarian reproduction through which classes crystallize or melt away. Marx’s analysis of the chaos of the revolutionary crisis solely in terms of its political contingency is implicitly but indisputably shaped by presumptions about the question of reproductive contingency.
7.1. The peasantry
The 18th Brumaire conceptualizes the problem of separation in its most radical, most scattered and isolated forms: the small-holding peasants, a mass of semi-proletarians who are largely being undermined by the developing markets in food, taxes, and debts and the lumpenproletariat. Marx’s analysis of the counterrevolutionary section of the lumpenproletariat that was organized by Bonaparte, touches quite profoundly on the question of reproduction. He did not only offer them representation and partial protection, but a temporary solution to their condition of insecurity and poverty: pay, comradeship, and a mission. While the lumpenproletariat secured the dominance of Louis Bonaparte in the Parisian streets, it was the peasantry that elected him in December 1848. Marx asks what it is about peasant life that made them susceptible to electing a leader so alien to them. Unlike the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry does not easily produce or come into contact with more or less organic intellectuals. This gives us the basis of Marx’s often criticized statement that the small-holding peasants are
incapable of asserting their class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or a convention. They cannot represent [vertreten] themselves, they must be represented [vertreten]. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, an unlimited governmental power which protects them from the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive power which subordinates society to itself.42
But what is it in their mode of life that makes the peasants susceptible to this mode of representation, Vertretung? Here we must ask how Bonaparte became an answer to the peasantry’s need for orientation and representation. By understanding this need we understand how it might instead be satisfied by a movement of revolutionary composition. Marx’s inquiry into this problem starts not with the consciousness of the peasants, but with a description of the peasants’ specific mode of life, their problems and the possible solutions:
The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with each other. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is furthered by France’ bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. … Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient… and thus [the peasantry] acquires its means of life more through an exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. A small holding, the peasant and his family; alongside them another small holding, another peasant and another family. A few score of these make up a village, and a few score of villages make up a Department. In this way, the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes.43
Thus the everyday and the mode of (re)production of the peasants separates them from one another, making it hard to constitute any political collectivities. And unlike the isolated urban proletarians who live in close proximity and attend the same workplaces, peasant families live stationary lives with few neighbors.44 Where a discourse that starts from the need of science and ideology would ask: how can the peasants be represented, and how can they be enlightened about the conditions under which they live, an inquiry starting with the way the peasants are living their condition comes up with different results:
Insofar as millions of families live under conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests forms no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not constitute a class.45
The peasantry lives this common problem, but the very character of the problem itself, as well as the peasants’ limited means of communication and its localized mode of life, means that while it is formed as a class, it cannot form a class. This shows the strictly relational and self-relating character of Marx’s concept of class; the peasants share certain problems (market fluctuations of the prices of their produce, competition, their enslavement to capital through debt), but the ways these are formulated and dealt with are local.46 While this might create or maintain strong bonds of local communities and moral economies, the peasant population as a whole is a mere mass. It does not find the collectivity in which these problems could be articulated as common interests, where the everyday struggles of each peasant family or village could become a common struggle.
The isolation of the small-holding peasants meant that they were lost for the revolution: instead they were united by Bonaparte, a man in whose fame and power these individual peasants found a protector. Their trust in him as their representative was based on the historical memory of their alliance with the old Napoleon. A mass, whether heterogeneous and connected by locale (like the lumpen) or relatively uniform and separated (like the peasantry), is most easily united under a master or master-signifier. However, the isolation also points to the fact that a movement which develops the technical means and organizational forms through which peasants can communicate and link up is one that will abolish the need for a representative and enable the peasantry to represent itself. And indeed most of the successful revolutions and anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century – in China most paradigmatically – were to a large extent successful due to the central involvement of peasant, party due to a communist re-appreciation of the peasantry, and due in part to the increased capacity of transportation and communication and thus coordination due to telegraphs, telephones, railways, cars, etc.
While changes in the means of communication and transportation were not a relevant variable in describing a revolutionary and counter revolutionary period of four years, he did consider the becoming revolutionary of the peasantry. Thus, he invested his hopes in the revolutionary organization of the small-holding peasantry on its worsening condition, pointing to the possibility that a change in the character of the peasants’ problem would lead them to seek its representative in the proletariat. In short, Marx did not suggest that the peasants could not be revolutionary:
The Bonaparte dynasty represents not the revolutionary, but the conservative peasant; not the peasant who strikes out beyond the condition of his social existence, the small holding, but rather one who wants to consolidate his holding; not the countryfolk who in alliance with the towns want to overthrow the old order through their own energies, but on the contrary those who, in solid seclusion within this old order, want to see themselves and their small holdings saved and favored by the ghost of the Empire.47
Marx defines revolutionaries as those who aim to abolish the old order, rather than improve their position within it, who opt for a different future rather than a repetition of the past in the present. Further, he notes that the ranks of the revolutionary peasants are likely to swell with the growth of the rural lumpenproletariat, “the five million who hover on the margin of existence and either have their haunts in the countryside itself” or move back and forth between town and countryside with “their rags and their children,” reminding us of Jan Breman’s contemporary analyzes of the circulation and migration of landless and land-poor labor in South and Southeast Asia.48 As the small-holding peasant class is drawn further into the bourgeois order, the conservative consolidation will become an option for still fewer peasants; in other words, the strategies and modes of living the peasant condition will change as this condition changes. Now, Marx writes (in what was certainly also a strategic intervention in a process of class composition), the interests of the peasants are close to those of the urban proletariat, in which they will find a “natural ally and leader” – while many young lumpen peasants will be lost to the army.49 The terrain of struggle and political class composition also changes – the majority of the peasants no longer find their interests aligned with the bourgeoisie, as under Napoleon, but as turning against it. Thus, while Bonaparte would like to appear as the “patriarchal benefactor of all classes … he cannot give to one class without taking from another,” severely constricting his capacity to unite different classes under his representation.50
Curiously, the proletarian leadership of the peasantry advocated by Marx seems to install it in position of representation of the isolated peasantry, similar to that of the modern Prince Bonaparte, on the one hand, or a certain automatism of them joining the proletariat in the city – instead of the lumpen. It would thus seem that our reading brings us to the very traditional interpretation that Marx – according to the iron logic of his own argument – could only be champion of the industrial proletariat. However, Marx is not hostile to peasants per se, nor does he, as we have seen, present the peasants as necessarily counter-revolutionary. The arguments around their subordination to proletarian leadership mainly relate to the development of the means of communication and combination, i.e. the means of relating and composing in struggle, and of representing themselves. As we see in the case of the petty bourgeoisie, it is the character of their mode of life, its problems and solutions, which keeps them conformist: as their problem is changing, then so will their political orientation. In The Civil War in France, written in 1871, Marx asks: “how could it [the peasants’ earlier loyalty to Bonaparte] have withstood the appeal of the Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry?” The reactionary rural assembly of landowners, officials, rentiers and tradesmen…
knew that three months’ free communication of Communal Paris with the provinces would bring about a general rising of the peasants, and hence their anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of the rinderpest.51
In the 18th Brumaire Marx was hostile to the lumpenproletariat, skeptical of the peasantry’s revolutionary capacities, and hopeful about the urban proletariat. The whole issue here is to keep in mind that Marx’s reflections, while informed by a structural analysis, are first of all conjunctural. They are focused on the material conditions of combining or allying what is separate around common struggles, and on the invention and construction of new solutions to the problems of the times and of life. Technologies of communication (means of contagion, as it were) and the capacity to overcome or bypass the force of the state are decisive. But first of all, it is a question of aligning and shaping the interests of populations under the pressure of time. In his rebuttal of Bakunin’s critique that he wishes to make the proletariat the master of the peasants, Marx remarks that it is simply an issue of composing interests. With owner-peasants it is a matter of the proletariat doing for them at least what the bourgeoisie is able to, while proletarianized agricultural workers can organize with the proletarians immediately, in as much as there reproductive strategies can be composed. Finally, with respect to the rural workers, the goal is not a mere class alliance, but to effect a reorganization of their reproduction toward communal ownership, without antagonizing the peasants, i.e. without forcibly collectivizing them or removing their rights to the land.52 We here see how Marx understands class composition as a matter of composing different struggles around reproduction, and not of feigning that this difference is simply an illusion hiding their common essence, identity, or problem.
7.2 Composing with the lumpen
To raise the problem of the class composition of the peasantry today and already in Marx’ times, is to discuss the struggles around the risk or actuality of landlessness or landpoverty and debt. Along with the question of surplus populations produced by mechanization (which also happens in industrial agriculture), this leads us towards the problem of the lumpenproletariat, as an extreme, informal condition and mode of survival and death.
Already in the Manifesto Marx and Engels had warned against this group:
The “dangerous class,” the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue.53
In the 18th Brumaire the lumpenprolateriat re-enters as a problematic figure for Marx’s schema of revolution: as a class the lumpen are irrefutably a product of bourgeois society and its dynamics, and a class of radical needs, yet one organized against the 1848 revolution in France.
The February Revolution had cast the army out of Paris. The National Guard, that is, the bourgeoisie in its different gradations, constituted the sole power. Alone, however, it did not feel itself a match for the proletariat. Moreover, it was forced gradually and piecemeal to open its ranks and admit armed proletarians, albeit after the most tenacious resistance and after setting up a hundred different obstacles. There consequently remained but one way out: to play off part of the proletariat against the other.54
Thus enter the lumpenproletariat in the narrative of the failure of the revolution, made historically relevant by the 24,000 young men recruited to the Mobile Guard to suppress the revolutionary proletariat. Marx’s scepticism with regards to the lumpenproletariat is a result of his awareness of how the political allegiances of a class are shaped by the ways in which this class reproduces itself. While this did not lead him to suggest that political recomposition can be achieved through recomposition of reproduction, we shall see that such a conclusions can and must be drawn from his writings on the lumpen.
In the 18th Brumaire it would seem that Marx lapses into the organicist idea of parasitism when, invoking the nation, he writes that the lumpen, like their chief Louis Bonaparte, “felt the need of benefiting themselves at the expense of the laboring nation.”55 However, Marx’s “nation” as a victim appears ironically, in relation to Louis Bonaparte’s own consistent self-representation as the savior of the nation. What Bonaparte and the lumpenproletariat have in common is their character as floating elements in the situation – if Bonaparte eventually becomes the figure uniting contradictory class interests it is precisely because of his apparent elevation above the classes. On the other hand, the lumpenproletariat was exploited exactly as an element that has no stable station or stake in society. For Bonaparte – as for the financial aristocracy – it takes abstractions and money to exploit an unstable situation. A significant example is the case of the young members of the Mobile Guard, who were captivated by their Bonapartist officers’ “rodomontades about death for the fatherland and devotion to the republic.”56 On top of this ideological seduction, it took monetary corruption (1 franc 50 centimes a day) to bring the malleable young lumpenproletarians into the Bonapartist ranks.57 The problem of the lumpenproletariat might not be that they are the paradoxical product of bourgeois society standing in the way of the world-historical revolution, but that their untimely up-rootedness is so contemporary in times where “everything solid melts into air,” that its organization in the revolution requires a wholly different mode of political composition.
It is clear that the counterrevolutionary character of this group of overwhelmingly young and male lumpenproletarians does not allow any general points to be made about the lumpenproletariat as such. Consider Marx’s numbers: 25,000 in the Mobile Guard compared to 4 million “recognised paupers, vagabonds, criminals and prostitutes in France” – a large part of whom were women.58 Furthermore, even this particular section enrolled in the Mobile Guard, “capable of the most heroic deeds and the most exalted sacrifices as of the basest banditry and the foulest corruption,” cannot be said to be counter-revolutionary per se.59 Indeed, while Marx does not suggest any tactics by which the lumpenproletarians can be won for the revolutionary cause, his description of how they became counter-revolutionaries, implies that other ideological articulations and other ways of satisfying their needs could bring them to another cause. Here we have radical needs that are not definable in terms of stable class interests, but as the wavering interests of a heterogeneous group which can compose with whomever can help satisfy their needs and desires, with whomever it can share a slogan, an idea and a meal (just like, we should add, the working-class itself before it is ideologically and organizationally homogenized by the workers movement). From this perspective of needs and the thirst for ideas and conviviality, the problem with the lumpenproletarians for the revolution is no longer that their modes of life are essentially counter-revolutionary, but that they, unlike the workers who are fed by capital, will not be satisfied by slogans, but only by cash pay and food (and a bit of moral license). There therefore is no structural reason why Marx’s strategic orientation couldn’t heed the urgency of Frantz Fanon’s call to organize the (mostly landless, rural) lumpenproletariat, whose alliances are never given in advance, but who will always take part in the conflict: “If this available reserve of human effort is not immediately organized by the forces of rebellion, it will find itself fighting as hired soldiers side by side with the colonial troops.”60 And there is no structural reason – quite the contrary – that communisationists should not look to the practices of the Black Panthers, which started from the question of the armed and legal self-deference of a surplus population against the racist policing of its alternative forms of survival – its hustling and informal economies – and progressed to the implementation of survival programs that would drew tens of thousands to the struggle and powerful municipal election campaigns in Oakland, California.61
The willingness of young lumpenproletarians to enlist in the Mobile Guard brings up the question not just of radical needs and their revolutionary potential, but the question of their practical organization around concrete solutions: the problem of all those that cannot or will not work is of an immediate everyday character. The needs of the lumpenproletarian are more immediate than those of the employed, and more non-conformist than those of the unemployed; in the absence of exploitation their modes of life are criminalized, their neighborhoods colonized, in the terms of the Black Panthers, by the police.62 Thus the programmatic demand of an abolition of bourgeois property will be inefficient if it does not address the immediate needs of those that will otherwise sell themselves to the counter-revolution.
The history of the proletariat outside the wage-relation, of the proletarians rendered superfluous to capitalist production (if not necessarily indirectly purposeful as a reserve army) and the proletarians that always were superfluous, is a history of constant attempts to create other modes of reproduction, their victory, co-optation, or suppression. If proletarian self-reproduction against capital – i.e. a reproduction that opens for the self-abolition of the proletariat as proletariat – is to come on the agenda, it is not enough to state that such communization is an invariable revolutionary project of the proletariat (Gilles Dauvé and Karl Nesic) or a project only possible today, a deepening radical need (Théorie Communiste, Endnotes).63 To open the historical orientation of communization theory to the practical question of organization, it becomes unavoidable to relate it to ongoing practices of de-proletarianization. To go beyond this we need to see not only possibility and growing existential need, but potentialities which can be – or are striving to be – actualized. To do this is to open for the question of composition, emulation, organization, and contagion, between heterogeneous strategies of reproduction, as they exist or are needed to satisfy the practical situated needs of proletarians in relation to the many different ways they live this condition-problem.
While the reproduction of large sections of the Western European proletariat was mediated by the welfare state, what Balibar calls the “national-social state,” another range of struggles have taken hold, among migrants in Europe and proletarians in the “Global South.”64 Informal work and illegal activities, squatting and land occupations most significantly, but also what Asef Bayat calls quiet encroachments, a popular version of what Italian autonomists called auto-reduction in poor Levantine and North African neighborhoods and slums.65 Even where such activities are carried out on a small group or individual basis, attempts to crack down on those modes of reproduction have often resulted in mass popular resistance as Bayat points out; in short, we can speak of these as emergent moral economies of the proletariat.66 Similarly, the often “individualized” – if highly networked – ways in which migrants move often cohere into common struggles when they are met with a fence. Bayat shows that strategies of quiet encroachment, along with existing organizations of resistance such as workers unions, informal communities around mosques, and the football fan clubs, were all practical conditions for the capacity of the spontaneous uprising to pose the existence of Mubarak’s regime as a practical problem.
What matters are strategies that might build the proletarian capacity to resist and thus to project solutions to its misery, i.e. see it is a problem rather than a fate. Today, the tactics and strategies for dealing with, and abolishing the proletarian condition can thus only be reduced to the questions of the welfare state and trade unions through gross neglect. Furthermore, such strategies that have long been relevant where “development” was always a fiction, will become increasingly important a Europe that is provincializing itself and abolishing welfare rights in bundles. The forms of organization and class composition possible and necessary under conditions of surplus population and the squeeze on proletarian reproduction starts with “survival” programs. If not, the current violent and economic annihilation of the proletarian capacity to resist and combine will prevent any revolutionary crystallization.
8. Conclusion
Starting with the question of proletarian reproduction has several advantages: it immediately connects the macroanalysis of capital with the existential urgency of individual and collective strategies of life and survival. Further, it allows us to avoid positivistic sociologies of class based on the compartmentalization of a population, and economistic definitions of class in terms of economic functions within the division of labor. It allows us to think the structural and existential aspects of class formation together, and to understand how both composition and differentiation are responses to the same problem.
I have argued that the proletarian problem must be defined more broadly than by exploitation. The lumpen, the unemployed, unpaid reproductive workers, and the working class live the same problem-condition – the separation from the means of (re)production. Yet they live it differently, and these differences of daily practices, creates a differentiation of needs and desires, which is profoundly intertwined with processes of gendering, ableism and racialization, etc. The communizationist orientation to the conditions of possibility of communism poses the question of a solution adequate to the generality of this problem: the proletariat becomes the name for all those who ideally share an interest in abolishing this problem. From a spectatorial distance, this approach points out the limitations of existing struggles from the point of view of the capitalist totality, which provides it with a theory of what form such a revolution must necessarily take to be adequate. To intellectuals this is a theory of the logical form and possibility of revolution; to proletarians it is a theory of the inadequacy of their efforts. Merely pointing out the limitation of any one struggle by reference to the epochal radicality of a problem is a recipe for cynicism and indifference. It is not enough to be faced with a common problem; this yields nothing but an understanding of the proletarian condition as a misfortune. Unless there is the development of common tactics and strategies of dealing with concrete problems, the different mutually competing strategies for dealing with it will prevail. Any revolutionary practice must start with solutions that are situationally more convincing or desirable than existing ones. Instead of withdrawing to its own niche in the division of labor out of habit or for fear of violating the purity of struggles, theory, considered as a part of such movements, is the active effort to disseminate strategies of combination and struggle, and of elaborating commons and transversal points of connection between different struggles. Taking seriously the fact that resistances and networks of solidarity preexist irruptions of open struggle means to go beyond the faith in spontaneity. This entails an ethics of militant, embedded research, knowledge production, and popular pedagogy, which proceeds through practices of collectively mapping of the possibilities of composition, and reflections on how to connect and extend networks of trust and solidarity.67 It implies sharing tools of organizing and tactics of struggle, taking measure of the rumors and whispers, and engaging in small struggles in ways that can help them transform fear and mistrust into courage and solidarity.
The problem of the revolutionary organization of proletarian difference is one of inventing common solutions to the common problem of the proletariat, whether lumpen, employed or unemployed. But this must start with a recognition that the strategies of the struggle will differ significantly, according to the many ways the problem is lived and survived. Our task cannot be to search for the equation that will give us the result we want, but to explore the maximal possibilities of abolitions of separations here and now, between us and between us and our means of reproduction – be it through riots and affinity groups, mutual aid and autonomous zones or through taking municipal or state power. All this depends on situated assessments of the possibilities of composition, the state of the enemies and the relations of forces.68 If the struggle proceeds successfully, class-differences will be abolished both gradually and in leaps. Proletarians will be stuck less and less in the mode of life they had developed to deal with a problem of their separation, by abolishing this separation and thus their existence as proletarians. Struggles for de-separation are not merely courageous struggles for love, but also often entail fearful search for security. The affective atmosphere of communism cannot be given except through sensitivity to the micro- and nanopolitical dimensions of any movement. Further, if communism is to be thought again as a real movement we must accept that it cannot be a unitary process, but only the combination of manifold desires and needs of more or less separated proletarians, uniting for selfish reasons, but producing a telos in excess of their selfishness, a transindividual sublation of their individuality. Marx saw this clearly when he participated in the Parisian proletarians’ conviviality. He noted that the means to create communism is communism itself: that is, communism practiced produces itself as a need and an aim in itself.69 Communism is not an abstract Kantian “ideal” nor a plan, nor a universal and global horizon from which to judge all struggles or find hope. Communism, instead, is best described as a possible emergent telos in processes of combination, when they fold back on themselves and become self-reproducing, self-organized and capable of defending themselves. Such deseparation can only be effective when it involves the world of things and begins to abolish property as a form of separation. What is needed for this to happen is not the sustenance of hope, but practics of composition and experimentation with need, desire and possibility. Globality or universality are not terrains of collective action, but levels of theoretical abstraction. The questions of scaling up and universality will remain practically irrelevant until they are posed as concrete questions of the conditions of reproducing, combining and defending real movements.
Comments
Strangely came across this interesting text whilst searching for material by Aaron Benanav as a result of reading a very positive review of a book by this spgb author in the Socialist Standard here:
https://worldsocialism.org/spgb/socialist-standard/2020s/2021/no-1398-february/2021/capitalism-and-automation-progress-perverted/
an organisation whatever it's strengths, those not being any analysis of 'workers composition' or a political strategy based on such an analysis.
The ICT/CWO to some extent or more significantly perhaps the 'Angry Workers' group does have such an interest if drawing some different conclusions. Some anarchist communist tendencies have also either intentionally or incidentally tried to develop a practice taking the different divisions within the global working class (broadly understood) into account. The above text posted by vicent is useful in drawing together a number of contributions derived from Marx but developed by other sympathetic tendencies. The key point is the recognition that the modern global working class cannot be analysed or organised simply in terms of the direct experience of wage labour, but must recognise the significant material differences within the broadly defined working class that influence the potential or not for their collective struggle and struggles which have potential to unite across those divisions. Not sure that in todays world there is such a significant traditional peasant population that would make this texts exploration of Marx's variable views of the past peasant economic and psychological make up as relevant, but maybe still applicable when looking at for instance the current Indian farmers protests? The conclusions seem to me to strongly suggest the need for organised communist political interventions in all aspects of the class struggle alongside a flexible approach toward experimentation in forms of struggle suited to the differing material conditions of different sectors of the 'dispossessed' class.
Not sure I have phrased that summary so well but thought this text deserved a bump up so others might comment as well.
Edit: I should perhaps mention however that I have other disagreements with the Federici/DallaCosta/James approach when it comes to their actual political practice in the past.
So I would still recommend the spgb review of both Aaron Benanav and Jason E Smith's books on Automation and the future of work in the above link together with this further review of the same books with some different comments here:
https://brooklynrail.org/2021/06/field-notes/The-Future-of-Automation
The Bronx Slave Market
Introduction
Marvel Cooke, a seasoned African American labor activist and member of the Communist Party, wrote this set of investigative reports for the New York-based radical newspaper The Daily Compass in January 1950. For Cooke, it was a return to a familiar setting: she and Ella Baker, the famous civil rights leader, had co-written a groundbreaking exposé on an earlier iteration of the Bronx Slave Market in 1935 for the NAACP’s journal, The Crisis. Cooke’s analysis here is worth revisiting for several reasons. Not only does this represent an important attempt at conducting a form of workers’ inquiry among black domestic workers, at that time still a mostly unorganized sector of the working class; she also picks up a line of argument that resonates with other currents of black radicalism (including Claudia Jones, W.E.B. Du Bois, C.L.R. James, and others), tracing the survivals of slavery within the industrializing northern ghetto, where recent black migrants encountered new forms of extra-economic coercion and superexploitation.1 Over the course of four articles, Cooke demonstrates how the set-up of these “slave markets” across New York City, where women stood on sidewalks near department stores seeking offers for a day’s work, engendered isolation (their actual workplaces were always changing, from the Upper East Side to Long Island) and depressed wages through competition (they had practically no bargaining power). In her personal experience as part of the “paper bag brigade,” Cooke details the the grueling nature of the work and the overt racism often encountered, as well as how the informal wage agreement made procuring daily necessities ‒ transportation, food, etc. ‒ a strenuous task. She ends by emphasizing unionization and struggle as the principal means for abolishing these markets once and for all. Even though the Woolworth’s on E 170th St in the Bronx has long been shuttered, Cooke’s reports remain essential material as we continue to think through the connections between migration, racialization, and domestic labor today.
***
“I Was Part of the Bronx Slave Market”
The Daily Compass, January 8th, 1950, pages 1, 15.
I was a slave.
I was part of the “paper bag brigade,” waiting patiently in front of Woolworth’s on 170th St., between Jerome and Walton Aves., for someone to “buy” me for an hour or two, or, if I were lucky, for a day.
That is the Bronx Slave Market, where Negro women wait, in rain or shine, in bitter cold or under broiling sun, to be hired by local housewives looking for bargains in human labor. It has its counterparts in Brighton Beach, Brownsville and other areas of the city.
Born in the last depression, the Slave Markets are products of poverty and desperation. They grow as employment falls. Today they are growing.
They arose after the 1939 crash when thousands of Negro women, who before then had a “corner” on household jobs because they were discriminated against in other employment, found themselves among the army of the unemployed. Either the employer was forced to do her own household chores or she fired the Negro worker to make way for a white worker who had been let out of less menial employment.
The Negro domestic had no place to turn. She took to the streets in search of employment – and the Slave Markets were born.
Their growth was checked slightly in 1941 when Mayor LaGuardia ordered an investigation of charges that Negro women were being exploited by housewives. He opened free hiring halls in The Bronx and other areas where Slave Markets had mushroomed. They were not entirely erased, however, until World War II diverted labor, skilled and unskilled, to the factories.
Today, Slave Markets are starting up again in far-flung sections of the city. As yet, they are pallid replicas of the depression mode: but as unemployment increases, as more and more Negro Women are thrown out of work and there is less and less money earmarked for full-time household workers, the markets threaten to spread as they did in the middle ‘30s, when it was estimated there were 20 to 30 in The Bronx alone.
The housewife in search of cheap labor can easily identify the women of the Slave Market. She can identify them by the dejected droop of their shoulders, or by their work-worn hands, or by the look of bitter resentment on their faces, or because they stand quietly leaning against storefronts or lamp posts waiting for anything – or for nothing at all.
These unprotected workers are easily identified, however, by the paper bag in which they invariably carry their work clothes. It is a sort of badge of their profession. It proclaims their membership in the “paper bag brigade” – these women who can be bought by the hour or by the day at depressed wages. The way the Slave Market operates is a primitive and direct and simple – as simple as selling a pig or a cow in a public market.
The housewife goes to the spot where she knows women in search of domestic work congregate and looks over the prospects. She almost undresses them with her eyes as she measures their strength, to judge how much work they can stand.
If one of them pleases her, the housewife asks what her price is by the hour. Then she beats that price down as low as the worker will permit. Although the workers usually starts out demanding $6 a day and carfare, or $1 an hour and carfare, the price finally agreed upon is pretty low – lower than the wage demanded by public and private agencies, lower than the wage the women of the Slave Market have agreed upon among themselves.
Few Changes
I know because I moved among these women and made friends with them during the late 1930s. I moved among them again several days ago, some ten years later. And I worked on jobs myself to obtain first-hand information.
There is no basic change in the miserable character of the Slave Markets. The change is merely in the rate of pay. Ten years ago, women worked for as little as 25 cents an hour. In 1941, before they left the streets to work in the factories, it was 35 cents. Now it is 75 cents.
This may seem like an improvement. But considering how the prices of milk and bread and meat and coffee have jumped during the past decade, these higher wages means almost no gain at all.
And all of the other evils are still there.
The women of the “paper bag brigade” still stand around in all sorts of weather in order to get a chance to work. They are still forced to do an unspecified amount of work under unspecified conditions, with no guarantee that, at the end of the day, they will receive even the pittance they agreed upon.
They are still humiliated, day after day, by men who frequent the market area and make immoral advanced. Pointing to this shameful fact, civic and social agencies have warned that Slave Market areas could easily degenerate into centers of prostitution.
So they could, were it not for the fact that the women themselves resent and reject these advances. They are looking for an honest day’s work to keep body and soul together.
“Where Men Prowl and Women Prey on Needy Job-Seekers”
The Daily Compass, January 9th, 1950, pages 4, 7.
I was part of the Bronx Slave Market long enough to experience all the viciousness and indignity of a system which forces women to the streets in search of work.
Twice I was hired by the hour at less than the wage asked by the women of the market. Both times I went home mad – mad for all the Negro women down through the ages who have been lashed by the stinging whip of economic oppression.
Once I was approached by a predatory male who made unseemly and unmistakable advances. And I was mad all over again.
My first job netted me absolutely nothing. My employer on the occasion was a slave boss and I quit cold soon after I started.
My second job netted me $3.40 for a full day of the hardest kind of domestic work. My “madam” – that is how the “slaves” describe those who hire them – on this occasion was a gentle Mrs. Simon Legree, who fed me three crackers, a sliver of cream cheese, jelly, and a glass of coffee while she ate a savory stew.
The brush with the man was degrading and unspeakable.
These are the everyday experiences in the Bronx Slave Market and in the markets elsewhere in the city.
***
I took up my stand in front of Woolworth’s in the early chill of a December morning. Other women began to gather shortly afterwards. Backs pressed to the store window, paper bags clutched in their hands, they stared bleakly, blankly, into the street, I lost my identity entirely. I was a member of the “paper bag brigade.”
Local housewives stalked the line we had unconsciously formed, picked out the most likely “slaves,” bargained with them and led them off down the street. Finally I was alone. I was about to give up, when a short, stout, elderly woman approached. She looked me over carefully before asking if I wanted a day’s work. I said I did.
“How much did you want?”
“A dollar.” (I knew that $1 an hour is the rate the Domestic Workers Union, the New York State Employment Service, and other bona fide agencies ask for work by the hour.)
“A dollar an hour!” she exclaimed. That’s too much. I pay 70 cents.”
The bargaining began. We finally compromised on 80 cents. I wanted the job.
“This way.” My “madam” pointed up Townsend Ave. Silently we trudged up the street. My mind was filled with questions, but I kept my mouth shut. At 171st St., she spoke one of my unasked questions: “You wash windows?”
“Not Dangerous”
I wasn’t keen on washing windows. Noting my hesitation, she said: “It isn’t dangerous. I live on the ground floor.”
I didn’t think I’d be likely to die from a fall out a first-floor window, so I continued on with her.
She watched me as I changed into my work clothes in the kitchen of her dark, three-room, ground-floor apartment. Then she handed me a pail of water and a bottle of ammonia and ordered me to follow her into the bedroom.
“First you are to wash this window,” she ordered.
Each half of the window had six panes. I sat on the window ledge, pulled the top section down to my lap and began washing. The old woman glanced into the room several times during the 20 minutes it took me to finish the job. The window was shining.
I carried my work paraphernalia into the living room, where I was ordered to wash the two windows and the venetian blinds.
As I set about my work again, I saw my employer go into the bedroom. She came back into the living room, picked up a rage and disappeared again. When she returned a few moments later, I pulled up the window and asked if anything was all right.
“You didn’t do the corners and you missed two panes.” Her tone was accusing.
I intended to be ingratiating because I wanted to finish this job. I started to answer her meekly and offer to go back over the work. I started to explain that the windows were difficult because the corners were caked with paint. I started to tell her I hadn’t missed a single pane. Of this I was certain. I had checked them off as I did them with great precision – one, two, three.
The I remembered a discussion I’d heard that very morning among members of the “paper bag brigade.” I learned that it is a common device of Slave Market employers to criticize work as a build-up for not paying the worker the full amount of money agreed upon.
“They’ll gyp you at every turn if you let ‘em,” one of the women had said.
“They’ll even take 25 cents off your pay for the measly meal they give you. You have to stand up for yourself every inch of the way.”
Suddenly I was angry – angry at the slave boss, angry for all workers everywhere who are treated like a commodity. I slipped under the window and faced the old woman. The moment my feet hit the floor and I dropped the rag into the pail of water, I was no longer a slave.
My voice shaking with anger, I exclaimed: “I washed every single pane and you know it.”
Her face showed surprise. Such defiance was something new in her experience. Before she could answer, I had left the pail of dirty water on the living room floor, marched into the kitchen, and put on my clothes. My ex-slave boss watched me while I dressed.
“I’ll pay you for the time you put in,” she offered. I had only worked 40 minutes. I could afford to be magnanimous.
“Never mind. Keep it as a Christmas present from me.”
With that, I marched out of the house. It was early. With luck, I could pick up another job.
Again I took my stand in front of Woolworth’s.
“‘Paper Bag Brigade’ Learns to Deal With Gypping Employers”2
The Daily Compass, January 10th, 1950, pages 4, 21.
I had quit my first job in revolt and now, at 10:30 a.m., I was back in the The Bronx Slave Market, looking for my second job of the day.
As I took my place in front of Woolworth’s, on 170th St. near Walton Ave., I found five members of the “paper bag brigade” still waiting around to be “bought” by housewives looking for cheap household labor.
One of the waiting “slaves” glanced at me. I hope she would be friendly enough to talk.
“Tough out here on the street,” I remarked. She nodded. “I had one job this morning, but I quit,” I went on. She seemed interested.
“I washed windows for a lady, but I fired myself when she told me my work was no good.” It was as though she hadn’t heard a thing I said. She was looking me over appraisingly.
“I ain’t seen you up here before,” she said. “You’re new, ain’t you?”
On the Outside
I was discovering that you can’t just turn up cold on the market. The “paper bag brigade” is like a fraternity. You must be tried and found true before you are accepted. Until then, you are on the outside, looking in.
Many of the “new” women are fresh from the South, one worker told me, and they don’t know how to bargain.
“They’ll work for next to nothing,” she said, “and that makes it hard for all of us.”
My new friend, probably bored with standing around, decided to forgive my newness and asked about the job I had left. I told her how the fat old lady had accused me of neglecting the window I had so painstakingly washed.
“Oh, that’s the way they all act when they don’t want to give you your full pay.” She brushed off the incident as if it was an everyday occurrence.
“Anyway, you shouldn’t-a agreed to work by the hour. That’s the best way to get gypped. Some of them only want you for an hour or so to clean the worst dirt out of their houses. Then they tell you you’re through. It’s too late by that time to get another job.”
“What should I have done?”
“Just don’t work by the hour,” she repeated laconically. “Work by the day. Ask six bucks and carfare for a three-room apartment.”
Expert Advice
My new friend proved helpful. She told me all manner of things for which to be alert.
“Don’t let them turn the clock back on you,” she warned. “That’s the easiest way to beat you out of your dough. Don’t be afraid to speak up for yourself if they put more work on you than you bargained for.”
I asked whether she had tried to get jobs at the New York State Employment Service on Fordham Road. She said she had a “card,” but that “there were no jobs up there…And anyway, I don’t want my name on any records.”
When I asked what she meant by that, she became silent and turned her attention to another woman standing beside her. I guessed that she was a relief client.
There seemed little likelihood of another job that morning. I decided to call it a day. As I turned to leave, I saw a woman coming down the street with the inevitable bag under her arm. She looked as if she knew her way around.
“Beg your pardon,” I said as I came abreast of her. “Are you looking for work, too?”
“What’s it to you?” Her voice was brash and her eyes were hard as steel. She obviously knew her way around and how to protect herself. No foolishness about her.
“Nothing,” I answered. I felt crushed.
“I’m new up here. Thought you might give me some pointers.” I went on.
“I’m sorry honey,” she said, “Don’t mind me. I ain’t had no work for so long. I just get cross. What you want to know?”
When I told her about my morning’s experience, she said that “they (the employers) are all bitches.” She said it without emotion. It was spoken as a fact, as if she had remarked, “The sun is shining.”
“They all get as much as they can out of your hide and try not to pay you if they can get away with it.”
She, too, worked by the job –“six bucks and carfare.” I asked if she had ever tried the State Employment Service.
“I can’t,” she answered candidly. “I’m on relief and if the relief folks ever find out I’m working another job, they’ll take it off my check. Lord know, it’s little enough now, and it’s going to be next to nothing when they start cutting in January.”
She went on down the street. I watched her a moment before I turned toward the subway. I was half conscious that I was being followed. At the the corner of 170th St. and Walton Ave., I stopped a moment to look at the Christmas finery in Jack Fine’s window. A man passed me, walked around the corner a few yards on Walton Ave., retraced his steps and stopped by my side.
I crossed Walton Ave. The man was so close on my heels that when I stopped suddenly on the far corner, he couldn’t break his stride. I went back to Jack Fine’s corner. When the man passed me again, he made a lewd, suggestive gesture, winked and motioned me to follow him up Walton Ave.
I was sick to my stomach. I had had enough for one day.
“‘Mrs. Legree’ Hires on the Street, Always ‘Nice’ Girls”
The Daily Compass, January 11th, 1950, pages 4, 21.
Woolworth’s on 170th St. was beginning to feel like home to me. It seemed natural to be standing there with my sister slaves, all of us with paper bags, containing our work clothes, under our arms.
I recognized many of the people who passed. I no longer felt “new.” But I was not at peace. Hundreds of years of history weighed upon me. I was the slave traded for two truck horses on a Memphis street corner in 1849. I was the slave trading my brawn for a pittance on a Bronx street corner in 1949.
As I stood there waiting to be bought, I lived through a century of indignity.
It was that rainy muggy day after the two-day Christmas holiday, but there was no holiday cheer in the air. The “paper bag brigade” assembled unwilling – slowly. These women knew, even better than I, that there would be little trading on the market today.
I waited with six others one hour – two. Four gave up and left. Then a young couple approached, looked us over, and bargained with the woman next to me. I didn’t blame them for not choosing me. She was younger, obviously more fit. She went off trailing behind them.
An Offer of Work
I was alone. I was drenched and my feet were wet. I was about to give up when a little old woman with a bird-like face asked if I wanted a few hours’ work.
I let my fellow workers down, for I went off with my new “madam” with a bad verbal contract—75 cents an hour for an undetermined amount of work, knowing only vaguely that there was general cleaning and ironing to do. What that meant in detail, I didn’t know.
By the end of the day, I knew very well. Every muscle in my body ached.
On the way to her home on Morris Ave., the little old woman informed me that she had been hiring girls off the street for 20 years and that she’d never been disappointed.
“I’ve always picked nice girls,” she said. “I knew you were nice the minute I laid eyes on you.”
That pat on the back was worse in a way than a kick in the teeth. “I was almost afraid to ask you to work,” she went on. “You look like you belong in an office.”
I glanced down at her. Was it in her mind that the old clothing I was wearing was too good for a Negro? I couldn’t interpret her expression. She had none.
“What’s your name?” she asked.
“Margo,” I answered, quickly selecting a name close enough to my own not to be confusing. However, five minutes later she was calling me Margie. By the end of the day, I was Mary, a name that to her mind, I suppose, was more befitting my station.
Her apartment had two rooms and a bath, with the kitchen unit in one end of the large living room.
A Good Purchase
She watched while I changed into my work clothes. She seemed to be taking stock of my strength. Without turning, I could almost see her licking her lips. She had bought a strapping, big animal.
“First, rinse those clothes and hang them on the drier in the bathroom,” she said, pointing to the tub. “And then you can dust the walls down all over the house.” She handed me a makeshift wall mop.
There were endless chores. I ironed a man’s shirt, four full-length ruffled curtains and a tablecloth. I took the stove apart and gave it a thorough cleaning. I cleaned and scrubbed the refrigerator, a cabinet, the sink and tub and shelves above the sink. I rubbed all of the furniture in the apartment with furniture oil.
Through it all, my employer sat unperturbed, watching my every move. Once or twice she arose from her chair to flick imaginary dust from an area I had already been over. Then she’d sit down again to watch me.
She was gentle, and persistent, and cruel. She had bought her pound of flesh and she was going to get every ounce of work out of it.
They pay-off came when she asked me to get down on my hands and knees to scrub all the floors, which were covered with linoleum. I just couldn’t do it. I realized with some surprise that the ache in my chest I had been feeling all day was just old-fashioned anger. Suddenly it flared. I stood up and faced her.
“I can’t do it!”
“Can’t do what, Mary?”
“I can’t scrub all of these floors on my hands and knees. This method of scrubbing went out with the Civil War. There are all sorts of methods to make floor washing easier. And if they must be scrubbed this way, why don’t you provide a knee pad?” My words tumbled over each other. But she caught their meaning all right.
“All of my girls clean my floors this way, Mary,” she said gently. “This is the way I like them done. Well, finish this one and I’ll call it a day.”
I gathered strength as I scrubbed that floor. I cleaned it with the strength of all slaves everywhere who feel the whip.
I finished my job. After I had changed into my street clothes, this gentle Mrs. Legree counted $3.40 into my hands – exactly what she owed me by the hands of the clock, at least minus my car fare.
I was too exhausted to ask about 20 cents.
“Some Ways to Kill The Slave Market”
The Daily Compass, January 12th, 1950, page 6.
So the Slave Market is back. And it is back to stay unless something is done to kill it off quickly.
A lot of people, aroused by its rebirth in the Bronx, Brighton Beach, Brownsville and elsewhere, are already fighting to beat back its advance. They want no return of conditions that existed during the last depression when wages were driven down to 25 cents an hour. They point to a number of things that can be done.
Says Nina Evans, president of Local 149 of the independent Domestic Workers Union: “Our primary aim is to bring these women into the union. But other things must be done, too. We must carry on a continuous and militant fight to bring domestic workers under the protection of the minimum wage and minimum hour laws, and under the workmen’s compensation and social security acts.”
At present, the domestic worker is covered by the Workmen’s Compensation law only if she works for one employer 48 hours a week, and by the unemployment insurance law only if she is one of four or more household workers employed in a home for 15 days in the calendar year.
Says Laura Vossler, field manager of the New York City household office of the New York State Employment Service: “Slave Markets are a disgrace to New York City. Standardization of domestic employment can never be accomplished while they thrive. My office carries on an unrelenting fight to raise employment standards in the domestic field. But it is an uphill struggle. There must be more employer education and employee training.”
The Domestic Workers Union, manned entirely by volunteer workers, has free hiring halls at 103 W. 110th St., Manhattan; at 927 Kings Highway, Brooklyn; and is searching for a Bronx location.
Organized in 1937 by a group of courageous young domestic workers under the leadership of Dora Jones, the union has watched its membership fluctuate with the times. In the late 1930s, 500 women were paid-up members. At present, the total is 125. The main reason for this downward trend was the fact that many domestic workers went into factories during the war. Now that they are returning to household employment and the “paper bag brigade” is once more on the march, the DWU is redoubling its efforts to bring them into the union.
This is one of the most difficult groups of workers to organize, Nina Evans comments. Unlike those in other fields, they work in isolation from each other and seldom have a chance to exchange work experiences. Long hours and the piling on of impossible loads preclude such interchange after work. When their work day ends, they are dog tired and need to go home to rest, or, in most cases, to take care of their own families.
But the women of the DWU are undaunted. They spend their free time, little though it is, talking with the women of the Slave Markets, passing out leaflets in front of churches and subway stations, and in finding jobs at decent wages for unemployed domestic workers.
Last fall, the union presented a course in Negro history which brought in a number of new members.
“We want our Negro workers to walk erect in dignity and pride with their white allies,” Nina Evans says.
Mayor LaGuardia was the father of the New York State Employment Service (NYSES) household offices. In an attempt to remove unemployed women from street corners and thus eliminate Slave Markets, he opened the first experimental free hiring hall at 1029 Simpson St., The Bronx, on May 1, 1941.
Didn’t Solve Problem
But this clearly was not the answer to the problem. It merely put a roof over the Slave Market. Bidding for labor at depressed rates was more comfortable than heretofore, but other evils of the market remained. However, LaGuardia’s move did pave the way for the establishment of a number of free employment offices under the auspices of the State Employment Service where trained social workers attempt to standardize working conditions and rate of pay.
The offices, at W. 80th St., Manhattan; 384 E. 149th St. and 29 E. Fordham Rd., The Bronx; 205 Schermerhorn St., Brooklyn; and 90-91 Sutphin Blvd., Queens, are in areas where there is a demand for household workers, but where few Negroes live.
The NYSES has no household office in Harlem or in other areas where there is a concentration of Negro workers who form the majority of applicants for domestic employment. Since domestic workers are employed in every borough in the city, and in most cases must travel some distance to work, it would seem logical to set up the employment offices nearer their homes rather than in scattered working areas.
The NYSES stresses education of the employer as a method of eliminating the Slave Market. When it became aware last spring that the “paper bag brigade” was back on the streets, trained field workers from the Employment Services spoke in Bronx churches and before PTA groups, explaining to housewives the bad features of negotiating independently with workers in the streets. “Our aim is to do everything we can to protect the worker,” said Miss Vossler.
Before an applicant goes out on a job, specifications are listed and approximate time to complete the job is estimated. “There is little or no chance that an employer will take advantage of a worker we send out,” she said.
Reject Free Service
Commenting on the fact that women still frequent Slave Markets despite the fact that NYSES offers free service, Miss Vossler said: “There are always some who will not take advantage of our service for one reason or another.” She suggested that these were women who did not have “good referrals.”
However, judging from what the members of the “paper bag brigade” themselves say, many won’t take advantage of the NYSES or any other employment agency because they are relief clients and feel they must avoid employment records of any kind. “What I used to get was little enough,” one woman told me. “What am I going to do in January when my check will be cut still more?”
That is one $64 question. Another is, what will happen to her if the Slave Market ideology grows?
Now she may get 7 cents an hour. But as more and more workers join her “brigade” – as the supply of domestic labor surpasses the demand – wages are bound to be depressed even further.
Her security lies in decent legislative safeguards, in employer education and employee training, and, above all, in unionization.
These, and these only, will make Slave Markets disappear.
Comments
The Negro Woman Domestic Worker in Relation to Trade Unionism
Esther Cooper Jackson is a radical civil rights activist. A member of the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC), she went on to become the managing editor of the famous radical journal, Freedomways, which published such figures as CLR James, James Baldwin, and Kwame Nkrumah. As an undergraduate at Oberlin College, Cooper Jackson observed the plight of the black domestic workers who cooked and cleaned for the students, prompting her to begin a thorough investigation of domestic work in the United States. In the spring of 1940, she defended a Master’s Thesis on the working conditions of black domestic workers, paying particular attention to their struggles to unionize. (For more on Esther Cooper Jackson’s Thesis and the broader context of black feminism, see Erik S. McDuffie, “Esther V. Cooper’s ‘The Negro Woman Domestic Worker in Relation to Trade Unionism’: Black Left Feminism and the Popular Front,” American Communist History 7, no. 2 (2008): 203-209.) The thesis can be read as one of the most thorough theoretical and empirical studies of the labor of social reproduction in twentieth-century United States history. Although the forms and processes of social reproduction have no doubt changed in this country, many of Cooper Jackson’s insights, methods, and questions still stand, especially when we recognize that domestic work remains one of the largest occupations in the United States and is still largely performed by migrant women of color. Moreover, the very conditions which Cooper Jackson identifies as the chief grievances of domestic workers remain the hallmark demands of their movement, and the obstacles which make this kind of organizing so onerous have persisted into the 21st century. We present here an excerpt from her Thesis, with the kind permission of Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York City.
Introduction
In spite of the increased mechanization of the home, and the use of modern electrical conveniences, large numbers of women still find employment in private homes. Today more women in the United States work in domestic service than in any other occupation. About one and one-half million women were employed in domestic service when the 1930 Census was taken.
Domestic work itself is not a popular occupation since there are many disadvantages attached to it, and hence women tend to look on it as a last resort when they are unable to obtain any other type of work. The may disadvantages with which domestic workers are contending have made it necessary to discover some means of eliminating or mitigating the disadvantages of this occupation. Some domestic workers have turned to unionization just as workers in other occupations have done as a means of improving their conditions of work.
Negro women often have to face discrimination and prejudice in addition to the problems which domestic workers as a whole must face. Since Negro women continue to be employed in domestic work in large numbers, this study is concerned with a consideration of their problems and their attempts at unionization.
The material for the body of this study was obtained from interviews, from letters, Government documents, and from magazine and newspaper articles. Those interviewed included organizers of unions, both union and non-union domestic workers, some employers of domestic workers, specialists in the Women’s Bureau, Department of Labor, in the National Negro Congress, in the Women’s Trade Union League, and in other agencies and organizations. Letters were received from the national headquarters of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the National Urban League, and the Work Projects Administration.
It is the plan of this study to examine, first, the status of Negro women as domestic workers in the United States; that is, the historical changes that have taken place in this occupation, the numbers engaged in this occupation at present, the conditions and problems of Negro women in domestic work. Second, trade unionism in the United States today, particularly in relation to Negro women and in relation to other occupations which have been thought to be unorganizable, will be examined. Data on the existing unions in New York, N.Y., Newark N.J., Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois, which are the only unions in existence as far as the writer can ascertain, will be presented. An examination of clubs and other organizations of domestic workers and instances where domestic unions have failed, will follow. Attitudes of others toward unions of domestic workers will be investigated, attitudes expressed by such organizations as the Women’s Trade Union League, the Young Christian Association, by Government agencies such as the Work Projects Administration and the Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor, by organized labor represented by the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor, by the general public represented in newspapers, magazine, women’s clubs, by employers and employees. Finally, this study will appraise the extent to which trade union organization has offered a partial solution to problems faced by Negro women domestic workers.
Chapter 1: The Negro Woman Domestic Worker in the United States
The United States census includes under domestic and personal service a wide range of occupations from laundresses and charwomen to hairdressers and maniourists. However, this study is limited to an investigation of Negro women employed in private homes, who perform general housework and who handle services for members of the household and their guests. In spite of the fact that there are many social and economic problems related to domestic work in private homes, there is little data available as to numbers, race, age and marital status or domestic workers.
Although the exact number of household workers at the present time is unknown, an estimate can be made from the 1930 census. More than 3,000,000 women were employed in domestic and personal service in 1930. There are no accurate figures as to how many women were engaged in domestic work in private homes, but from census figures, the Women’s Bureau has indicated that well over 1,400,000 were in this group. Three of five Negro women workers reported their usual occupation as in domestic and personal service; included in this number, the Women’s Bureau has estimated that over 600,000 Negro women were domestic workers in private homes in 1930. It is a striking fact that there is a high concentration of white women household workers in the age group under 20; 24.2% were in this class age, as contrasted with 15.8% of all white women gainful workers, 15.9% of all Negro women gainful workers, and 14.4% of Negro women in general housework.1 There are, also, large numbers of older white women in domestic work, but for Negro women the age distribution is more scattered. It appears, then, that domestic work is predominantly an occupation for very young or relatively old white women and for Negro women of all ages.
Striking differences between white and Negro domestic workers with respect to marital status emerge from an analysis of census data on this subject. Among white domestic workers, the percentage married in 1930 did not exceed 25% for any age group. In the case of white women, domestic work is done characteristically by single, widowed and divorced women. Among Negro domestic workers, however, the married woman is the rule. From 25 years on the percentage of single Negro women in domestic work is small. From census data, we find that in the 1930 population, 33% of Negro married women were gainfully occupied and 8% were in general housework, but of all married white women, only about 10% were gainfully occupied and less that 1% were in general housework.2
In order to understand more thoroughly the role of the Negro woman domestic worker in present society, and the problems which they face, we shall examine briefly the historical changes among these employees in the United States. As one commentator, writing at the turn of the century put it: “In studying the question of domestic service, therefore, the fact cannot be overlooked that certain historical influences have affected its conditions; that political revolutions have changed its personnel, and industrial development its mobility.”3
During the early history of our country, service of every kind was done by transported convicts, indentured white servants, Negroes and Indians. These servants often complained of long hours of work and ill treatment, while the housewives complained of “ungrateful servants and inefficient service.” In the South, the large plantation developed with its big house and its economic self-sufficiency. Here the Negro slave was the house servant. With respect to this pattern one can see why Roscher, the German economist, discusses domestic service as an appendix to his treatment of slavery. The plantation owner and his wife looked on the Negro house servant with an air of benevolence and maternalism. The relationships between servant and mistress exhibited all the characteristics of the feudal relationship of master and serf. When slavery was abolished in 1863, many former slaves who had been domestic servants continued in this capacity, receiving a small sum of money for the work.
The number of Negro women domestic workers in the period just following the Civil War is not known. It was not until 1890, when the first separate occupational statistics of Negroes was taken by the Census Bureau, that one could get reasonably exact information on the number of Negro women domestic workers in the country. In 1890 the total Negro population was 7,488,676 or 11.9% of the total population. Agricultural and domestic workers comprised the bulk of the Negro population at this time. Almost one-third of all the Negroes gainfully employed were classified as domestic workers, although the number employed as household workers in private homes is not available.4 By 1900 there was an increase of 361,105 domestic workers in the Negro group, an increase of 37.7% over the number in 1890.
Migration of Negroes to both Northern and Southern towns in search of better wages, hours, and conditions of work and other urban attractions may account for some of this increase. Negro girls and women, especially, migrated to the city from rural areas in search of domestic work. In the South, many white women went into the cotton and steel plants, and in so doing employed Negro girls to look after their homes and take care of their children. For this the Negro domestic received wages ranging from 50 cents to $3.50 a week.5 In the North, wages for domestic work were higher, and thus provided an attraction to those seeking better conditions of work. However, in the North the Negro faced much competition in domestic work in addition to the fact that he was refused work altogether in lines of industry monopolized by white persons. Thus, Greene and Woodson say in The Negro Wage Earner: “However, the keen competition for jobs in the North, the fact that domestic service carried with it no social stigma as in the South, and the higher wages paid, all served to weaken the Negroes in this field.” These authors also point out that even though there was a numerical increase in the number of servants in 1900 over 1890, the proportion of Negro women in domestic service showed a decline in 1900 which was due to the keen competition for jobs and to the increased effort of the Negro husband and father to prevent his wife and daughters from “working out.”
From 1900 to 1914, the proportion of all Negro women employed in domestic personal service continued to decline. In the North some employers preferred whites and immigrants to Negro domestic workers. Added to this problem, was the tendency towards smaller homes so that housewives could perform household duties alone or with one domestic worker. The bakeries, the clothing stores, laundries, dairies, etc., began to do work which was traditionally the role of the domestic worker. In the South, the domestic servants began to tire of the feudal relationship and tie to the household; they had for so long been made to feel and acknowledge their social and racial loneliness. Thus, migrations to the North continued. Even though there was a decrease in the proportion of Negro women in domestic work, this field remained one of the main occupations in which Negroes were employed.
By 1920, there was a further decrease in the proportion of all Negro women who were in domestic work. Here again we see various factors entering into the situation; not only does the decrease indicate that Negro women entered into some of the industries and other occupations at this time, but indicates also the whole trend in modern housekeeping. That is, the urban housewife began to use modern mechanical appliances and time-saving devices. She also resorted to the use of birth control mechanisms, so that there were few or no children, and thus there was a decrease in the number of mothers’ helpers and other domestic workers whose duty it was to help care for the young. In spite of this decrease in the proportion of Negro women employed in domestic service which has continued to the present, there was an absolute increase in the number from 1920 to 1930. It seems highly probable that the Negro woman will continue for some time to be employed in domestic service because of the keen competition which she meets in all types of industrial work. thus, it is fitting to examine at this time the conditions under which domestic employees must work, and the problems which they face today.
From the few recent studies of domestic workers which are available one concludes that low wages, long hours, and poor working conditions are characteristic of this occupation. Negro women domestic workers have been discriminated against and exploited with double harshness. The high turnover among Negro women domestics is thereby partly explainable. From various available reports we may conclude that the major problems of domestic workers are lack of employment standards, long hours and low wages, exclusion from the benefits of social insurance and other protective legislation, and the social stigma attached to domestic work.
Lack Employment Standards
Because household workers are scattered in many private homes, thousands of individuals bargain for work. To some extent competitive forces bring about an equalization of wages. That is, domestic workers move from job to job in search of higher standards, at the same time that employers are on the watch for workers who will accept lower wages and longer hours. These competitive forces, however, are fully likely to drive down the level of compensation received by domestic workers as to maintain or raise that level. Hagel Kyrk, Associate Professor of Home Economics at the University of Chicago, states on this point:
The services of household workers are but one of many desirable goods for which personal income may be spent. Those with incomes sufficiently high can pay high wages as they can buy expensive clothes, and pay high rentals. Those with lower incomes struggle to balance their budgets by searching more and more intensively for cheaper help. One of the most difficult points in the household employment situation arises from these two circumstances – a relatively low income and a standard of living that calls for one, possible two hired workers, and two or more younger children. Every element in the situation makes for long hours, heavy work, low wages and limited accommodations.6
The household employee has no wage scale based on skill, amount of work required, or experience. She is usually untrained and unskilled. The demand for efficient and trained workers is much larger than the supply. Little efficiency can be expected when an employment office brings country girls to cities by the truck loads to work at “starvation wages,” and when employment bureaus regard the payment of an application fee as the only requirement for placement. In a study made in Chicago by the Women’s Bureau, Department of Labor (1933), it was discovered that of 246 domestic workers reporting on their training, just over one-fourth, whether white or Negro, had attended such classes, but less that 3% of the total had received there all the preparation for their work. More than one-fourth of the total had secured all their training in their own homes; about one-eight had received all in the homes in which they had worked; and one-third had their training in both these places. Employers reporting in this same study in Chicago indicated inadequacy of training and experience of domestic workers in their employment. More employers found training inadequate in cooking and serving than in any other kind of housework; almost one-third had found it necessary to give training in these branches. Other reported that employees needed training in “my ways of doing things.” Other kinds of work in which employers found it necessary to train their employees were planning, care of children, dishwashing, orderliness, and use of equipment, particularly electrical equipment.
Long Hours and Low Wages
Today employers of domestic workers work their million and half employees an average of seventy-two hours a week and pay them lower wages than are paid in any other occupation.7 Knowledge of wages paid and hours required of domestic workers in various sections of the country are revealed in a number of special studies.
In 1938, Fortune Magazine sent to more than 17,000 Fortune subscribers, to 500 editors of women’s pages of newspapers, and to 3,000 women’s clubs, a questionnaire on the servant problem. The following conclusions on wages and hours were included in the results of the survey.
Wages were highest in the Northeast, lowest in the South. Thus, 73% of general houseworkers in the New England, Middle-Atlantic section earn $40 and over a month; 60% in the western half of the South earn under $40 a month.
Wages were highest in cities of over a million. Thus, 82% of general houseworkers in cities of more than a million earned $40 and over a month; 58% in communities of less than 5,000 earned under $40.
Wages of white and Negro houseworkers ran almost parallel up to $30 a month; thereafter, they favor the whites moderately. But in specialized jobs, wages over $50 favor the whites overwhelmingly.
Five out of every six domestic workers worked more than 8 hours a day; two out of every six worked more than 10 hours; one out of six work more than 12. Short hours were most frequent in the west and in small communities; long hours in the South and in the big cities.8
In Lynchburg, Virginia (1936-1937), a study was sponsored by a Join Colored-White Committee of the YWCA and an Inter-Racial Commission. A total of 141 questionnaires were filled out by 64 employers and 77 employees. The following conclusion on wages and hours were included in the results of the study.
The typical wage of the group covered by the study was $5 or $6 per week, as represented by the two largest classes of approximately the same number of cases. Two cases were reported at $1.50 and one at $10 and there was one report of payment in the form of a house “on the lot” rent free, and one payment made only in clothing.
There were 63 employees who received pay during sickness as against 40 who did not; 58 were paid for vacations and 31 were not. There were 19 employers who states that they gave a raise in wages after a period of time, while 55 employees said they had received no raise on their present job.
There was one report of a working week of 91 hours and 16 of 80 to 90, the typical number being 72 per week.9
Another study was conducted in Philadelphia in 1932 by the Women’s Bureau of the United States Department of Labor. Of the 74 domestic workers who answered questionnaires, only one-fifth were white, and the majority of those were foreign born; this fact is significant for our purpose. The following conclusions on wages and hours are included in the results obtained in this study.
About two-thirds of the women living in who reported the length of their usual day worked as much as 12 hours or more. Two-fifth of all reporting went on duty between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning. Nearly one-half of those by whom the time of quitting work was given, went off duty between 7 and 8 o’clock in the morning.
The median of the week’s wage of ther 72 women reporting is $14.60; for those living out the median is lower than for those living in, the amounts are $12.70 and $15.25 respectively. The white women had a median somewhat higher than that of the Negro woman – $15.35 in contrast to $14.5.10
A more recent Government investigation is that of the Bureau of Research and Statistics of the Social Security Board. An analysis was made of 3,645 registration cards providing a random sample of the active and inactive files for domestic workers registered with the State Employment Office in four cities – Cincinnati and Lakewood, Ohio; Wilmington, Delaware; and the District of Columbia. Data on wages were obtained for 1,734 workers registered in 19936, 1937, and 1938. The following results seemed significant.
In all of the cities covered and in each year most frequent weekly cash wage was from $5 to $7. In Cincinnati, Wilmington, and the District of Columbia, a larger proportion of Negroes than of white workers received from $7 to $9, but larger proportions of white workers received $11 and over.
In Cincinnati, Wilmington, and the District of Columbia daily wage rates varied from 50 cents to $3.50; the largest number of workers, 164 out of the total 450 received between $2 to $2.50 a day. In each of these cities 90% of the workers reported to have been working on an hourly basis received from 25 to 30 cents an hour.
In the records covered by this field study it was found that there was little different, as a rule, in the wage rates of those who live in the homes of their employers and those who live out, and , in a few instances, wages were lower for those living out.11
In all of these studies presented here and in other scattered studies it was discovered that overtime is rarely paid for, that a regular 8-hour work day as thousands of other workers not take for granted is only an ideal to domestic workers. Thus, in Rochester, New York, a domestic worker recently begged for a code setting hours of household labor at 84 a week, twice that of most factory regulations.
Exclusion From Social Insurance and Legislation
Legislation in the field of domestic work has been slow, partly due to the lack of standardization of domestic work, and the lack of a union front of either employers or employees to set up standards in wages, hours, and conditions of work upon which favorable legislation might secure a foothold. Only three states, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, place household employment under workmen’s compensation laws, and Connecticut only if there are four employees working for one employer. New York places domestic workers in line for unemployment insurance only if there are four employees working for one employer.
Today only one state, Washington, has a law which regulates hours of work in a household employment. This law was passed in 1937 and establishes a 60 hour work week for all employees in private households but permits longer working hours in emergencies.12 The original draft of the bill included a six-day week, double pay for overtime, and provisions of $50 fine for violation. In order to get the bill through legislature, its proponents were forced to drop these provisions. The results of the passage of the bill have not been what its proponents had hoped for: employers have been non-cooperative in many instances and employees are hesitant to report violations of the act for fear of losing their jobs.
Only one State, Wisconsin, has set minimum wage rates for women and minors in domestic work. This legislation, the Oppressive Wage Law, passed in 1925, is quite flexible in that it is interpreted and administered by the State Industrial Commission.13 However, the officials who administer the Wisconsin Law find it difficult to see that the laws are being upheld because of the many isolated places of employment, because of public opinion, which resents investigation of private homes, and because the employees are reluctant to file complaints.14
In the Social Security Act, passed in August 1938, household employers were exempted from Federal old-age and unemployment insurance. The Social Security Board, however, has pointed out the sound policy of extending age-old insurance to as many of the nation’s workers as possible and has recommended that the exception of domestic service be eliminated with allowance of a reasonable time before that effective date.
Social Stigma Attached to Domestic Work
Domestic workers have been made to feel and admit their social inferiority. They are often called by their first name, both by strangers and friends, children and adults. What one commentator said in 1897 often holds in 1940:
The domestic employee receives and gives no word or look of recognition on the street, except in meeting those of her own class; she is seldom introduced to the guests of the house, whom she may faithfully serve during a prolonged visit. The common daily courtesies exchanged between members of the household are not always shown her; she takes no part in the general conversation about her; she speaks only when addressed, obeys without murmur orders which her judgment tells her are absurd, is not expected to smile under any circumstances, and ministers without protests to the whims and obeys implicitly the commands of children from whom deference is never expected.15
The owner-slave, lord-vassal, master-servant tradition remains, as Fortune points out, the chief reason on the one hand, “why housewives have failed to be realistic in their handling of servants … and on the other, why domestic work is unpopular and domestic workers difficult to obtain.” Again, the Public Informant Assistant of the Women’s Bureau, Department of Labor, points out quite vividly: “Household employment generally is viewed as unskilled work and persons so engaged are looked down upon socially. This belief holds despite the fact that household tasks are varied and when they are done efficiently demand intelligence and a considerable variety of skills.” Finally, the domestic worker may be given a room off the laundry, or even in the garage; she has no security of any kind, and is treated in such a way by members of the family that a social stigma is attached to her.
Work conditions faced by domestic workers constitute a serious problem for the thousands of individuals directly affected, as well as for society as a whole. Individuals and organizations, in attempting to shape a program for improving conditions of domestic workers, have come to the conclusion that organization of domestic work is one of the bases upon which higher standards might be maintained. In the efforts to unionize domestic workers, leaders had followed closely the experiences of other workers who have organized trade unions and have focused public opinion on their problems.
Chapter 2: Frontiers of American Trade Unionism
The rapid strides in unionization among allegedly unorganizable workers are of considerable significance for domestic workers. Reasons given for the impossibility of organizing agricultural, white collar, technical, and professional employees are similar to those given for the impossibility of organization among domestic workers. Such reasons include isolation, independence of each worker, the lack of strong bargaining power since each employer contends with each employee, the overcrowded labor market which makes competition keen, mobility of the worker associated with frequent changes in employment, the lack of class feeling and unity, and hence, the inability of workers to get together for meetings. Although these handicaps to unionization are real, they have definitely been shown to be not insuperable in the case of white collar, professional, and agricultural workers, since all of these groups are certainly on the road to strong unionism.
The assumption that domestic workers are unorganizable has been proved false in certain European countries. As early as 1910, a domestic workers’ union was started in London.16 This union was the outcome of a series of articles written by a socialist journalist, C. L. Shaw, with the assistance of Kathlyn Olivier, a domestic worker. The story of the development of this union is important for our purpose. After five months of intensive study, Mr. Shaw and Miss Olivier called a meeting of domestic workers to which twelve persons responded. After nine months of work in educating the domestic worker and housewives to the union program, the membership increased to 95. There were many disappointments, many humorous incidents, but also a gradual increase in membership. This union attempted principally to obtain shorter hours, higher wages, and healthier working conditions, and has set up standards for carrying these principles into effect. A recent development in the English Domestic Workers’ Union is the support given by the Trade Union Congress since 1931.17 The program of the Domestic Workers’ Union has been enlarged so as to include a legislative program, the maintenance of social clubs and activities, and provision of legal aid for members, and an employment bureau for aiding members to secure work.
The Scandinavian countries have made a start at unionization of domestic workers. In Lithuania, Denmark, and Sweden, trade unions for domestic workers were organized during 1932.18 The demand which these unions have made include equal civil and political rights for their members, the extension to domestic workers of hours of work legislation, free employment exchanges, inclusion in sickness and accident insurance schemes, and the improvement of conditions as regards to wages, hours, food, and living conditions. Some of these goals have been achieved. For example, the union in Sweden succeeded in placing domestic workers on the same footing as other workers in their work contracts. Also domestic workers now come under the compulsory insurance act, and can use the public employment bureaus since the abolition of fee-charging agencies in 1926.
The change of the position of domestic workers in Russia is a very impressive one.19 Before the Russian Revolution, domestic workers in the cities often worked from dawn to darkness. The living conditions of workers living-in were inadequate: a cot in the hallway, closet, or kitchen were often the only place that the domestic servant had to sleep. The food which the workers prepared was served to the employer, while the worker ate food with little nutritional content. The pay was little and vacations were unheard of. Today under the trade unions, all domestic workers are organized. The work seven hours a day, and sometimes six, received an annual vacation with pay, and if health requires it, receive a few vacation in a sanatorium or rest home. Under the Russian Domestic Worker Order (Legislative Series, 1926) which regulates the conditions of employment of domestic workers within the Labor Code, the working day is often divided into several periods so as to allow the workers rest period.20 The social standing of domestic workers is equal to other workers. There is no stigma attached to the occupation such as we find in the United States today.
The domestic workers’ unions in these European countries have continually pushed for an inclusion of domestic workers in progressive legislation measures. The Denmark Union has succeeded in prohibiting night work for domestic workers, and in providing free time for recreation and night school, if so desired. In Switzerland, the union has given much support to the nine hour rest period law. In each of these countries compulsory sickness insurance for domestic work is in force, due to the efforts of the unions.
In Italy, before the Fascist regime, domestic workers and employers were strong. Today, however, collective agreements between domestic workers and employers are forbidden by the Royal Decree of July 1926.
The domestic workers’ unions in the United States have before them the experiences of unions of domestic workers in European countries and the experiences of unions among white collar, agricultural, and professional workers in the United States. The outlook for domestic workers’ unions does not look so dark when we consider the struggles which other unions have had. Domestic workers’ unions have been organized in Washington, D.C., New York, N.Y., Newark, N.J., and Chicago, Illinois. First steps toward unionization have been taken in other cities. It is the plan of the next few chapters of this study to examine the experiences of these particular unions, and to discover the extent to which unionization has offered some solution to the work problems of domestic workers in the United States.
[…]
Chapter 4: Attempts to Organize Domestic Workers’ Unions: New York and Newark
In New York city, efforts to organize domestic workers have yielded somewhat greater results in terms of numbers enrolled than in Washington, D.C. In relation to the relative sizes of the cities, and relative number of household employees, however, union achievements in New York are less impressive than in Washington.
The beginnings of a the New York Union date from the spring of 1936, when a club of domestic workers in New York initiative a campaign to bring together all workers in private families into some sort of an organization for collective bargaining. Under the slogan, “Every domestic worker a union worker,” they established themselves as the Domestic Workers’ Union of New York. At this beginning stage, it was an independent union not affiliated with any of the established labor organizations. The new union was launched publicly at a mass meeting held in June, 1936, at a Labor Temple, on which occasion speeches of encouragement were delivered by a number of New York labor and civic leaders, including representatives of the Building Service Employees, the Women’s Trade Union League, and several other women’s organizations. Membership began to increase after that meeting, although the growth was far from rapid.
At the present time the membership of the Domestic Workers’ Union is about 1,000. It has taken the important step of affiliation with the Building Service Employees International Union of the AF of L, and at present is the only active domestic workers’ union in the country so affiliated. There are two branches: Local 149 in New York City, and Local 130 in New Rochelle. Local 149 is the branch which is of particular interest since its members are mainly (80%) Negro women from Harlem, New York City. Its executive secretary states that the rate of growth is increasing. The members of the Local are reported to have shown their enthusiasm by saying that the Union is “the only decent thing that has happened to us.”21 Dues are unusually low for a trade union organization. The initiation fee is reported as 50 cents and the monthly dues as 50 cents. The general program of the New York Domestic Workers’ Union is exhibited by its bulletin and by statements of officers. One of the bulletins follows:
Twelve to Sixteen Working Hours Per Day
Household Workers. Why this difference in working conditions? The painters have a strong union which gives them Social Security, Workmen’s Compensation, protection on the job, and leisure time. The Building Service Workers have received the same benefits from the Union.
If the Building Service Workers want the same rights as other workers – time for recreation, church, family and friends.
If we want an adequate wage, social security, and consideration on the job, we too must build a strong union.
Join the Domestic Workers’ Union, Local 149, and speak for yourself, your rights, and your security.
Join the Union and through its strength get a 60 Hour Maximum …work week, workmen’s compensation, higher wages, social security.
The president of the Union, Miss Dora Jones, has suggested the following standards that domestic workers are seeking in a one-employee household.
I would like to know what the job I’m taking really is; what time I’m expected to be on duty, how large the house or apartment and family are, whether there are children small enough to require me to give my evenings watching them.
I’d like a clear understanding that I’m to do no heavy laundry work, no washing windows above the first floor.
I would like a room of my own. I don’t expect a bath of my own, but for the family’s sake as well as my own, I think a definite time should be set aside when I can feel that the bathroom is mine.
I should like to a 10 hour work week and one complete day off a week, not too afternoons.
I think I deserve two weeks vacation with pay, after I’ve had the job a year.
I wish wages which will provide me with decent-plus clothes, some small savings and medical insurance.
I want three square meals a day (coffee and one roll, does not, in my opinion, constitute an adequate lunch.)
I wish to have two evenings a week, when I am free to have callers in this, my home. Naturally, I prefer to entertain them in some part of the house which is not occupied by the family.
I would be willing to submit to a medical examination for the sake of my own health as well as to be able to present a certificate of health to my employer.
I wish two weeks extra pay at time of dismissal and a fairly written reference.22
One can readily understand Miss Jones’ belief that “compared with the present working conditions, the fulfillment of these would be ‘Utopia.’” Actual conditions in New York certainly fall short of this ideal. The “slave markets,” which number about 200, according to the Union, are at the bottom of the scale. Here on New York’s street corners, women wait for housewives to come to them to bargain for a day’s work. Many Negro women stand on these corners until they are hired for 25 cents or 25 cents an hour, or even 15 cents, although 50 cents I the standard rate. Jobs usually last three or four hours. When these women do obtain work, they sometimes have to do a month’s cleaning in a day.23 They are often given stale food on the theory that “a one day fast won’t kill a worker.” For this reason, they sometimes bring their own lunch. One woman who worked six years cleaning windows on the fifth floor of an apartment said, “Never again will I horn in on the Window Cleaners Union.”
The Union has to contend with domestic agencies who charge 10% of the monthly wage for jobs, a sum which must be paid in advance and is not refunded if the worker is not hired. Added to this, girls are brought in from the South and Pennsylvania, sometimes in truck loads, to fill jobs at $15 per month, where they must pay the first month’s salary for transportation costs. The Union girls, Negroes of Local 149, stated to the Sunday Worker:
Fellow comes down on a trip through Georgia and Alabama and wants to know don’t we want to make more money. We get such low pay down there.
I’m from Atlanta and you don’t make much down there. Well, it ain’t but natural that $40 a month sounds pretty good to you and that’s what the fellow promises.
You can read about how they rope in innocent girls to the city to be prostitutes. Well, it’s the same way they do us girls who work out.24
In a 1933 report by the Division of Junior Placement of the New York State Labor Department, there was revealed much exploitation of young women in domestic service. the report showed that girls of 15 and 16 years of age were made to work with no let-up from 6:30 AM to 10 or 11 at night or later. Their wages were frequently below $15 per month, and in some cases they were expected to work for “a good home with no cash wages whatever. the wages actually paid were not always the wages which the employer states at the employment office. Besides this, food, living conditions, and moral standards were low, especially in crowded apartments.”25 Authorities agree that conditions are the same today.
Confronted with many problems, this small group of organized domestic workers has begun its task of classifying domestic workers according to the jobs they do, such as cooks, general houseworkers, etc. defining the work and duties which the Union would require. The employer must sign a contract which states exactly the work conditions to be kept. The Union demands 50 cents an hour for part-time work, 50 cents an hour for general houseworkers, and as much as $100 a month for cooks. The work day is limited to 10 hours and the work week to 60 hours. The New York Union does not allow “on call’ provisions, that is, arrangements for additional hours in the day or week to be spent in the employers’ home “on call” but not actually working. The Union does not allow lower wages for workers who “live in”; it points out that “living in” means extra responsibilities and longer hours. One full day or two half days off per week are required. Added to this, the Union demands two weeks vacation with pay after one year of employment; two weeks vacation with pay after one year of employment; two weeks notice before discharge, a private room and three full meals if the worker lives in, and no heavy laundry to be done by the general houseworker.
[ … ]
There is a good deal of hostility toward the Domestic Workers’ Union of New York City from various groups. While there are 100,000 domestic workers in New York City, the Union as yet has no more than 1,000 members. Attitudes towards the Union are factors which help to make or break the Union. One woman employer, upon being interviewed, said:
I always have an understanding with my servants and I know just how to treat them. I don’t need a union to dictate to me how I should work them, or what day of the week they should have off. Take Mary, for instance, she’s been with me for two years, the longest I’ve ever kept a maid, and she never complains about the hours. She’s faithful. If she started to get into her head any of these silly ideas about joining a union, I’d have trouble right away. I tell Mary that if she works hard, and does it well, we won’t have any difficulties, and she can stay with me as long as she wants to.
A Negro woman employer, a “sophisticated New Yorker,” said:
My girl gets here at 8 o’clock in the morning and goes home at 6:30. She seldom stays later unless I have to entertain. Negroes should join unions, but domestic workers wouldn’t know what to do even if they had a union. They’re too ignorant, and like good times too much to take them seriously.
Because of such attitudes, the officers seem to be fearful that someone will try to break up the Union. Outsiders trying to learn more about union activity are not received particularly cordially at Union headquarters, especially if they ask about methods used to obtain standards, and to enforce them. Often the woman in charge of the office refuses to answer any questions or refers the inquirer to some open meeting at a later date. This attitude is understandable. Union members are afraid of what outsiders will do to them. They know the opposition which other workers have faced and they know the significance of blacklists. They know, too, that their organization is new, that it is not firmly established, that they are opposed on many sides, and thus, they are apt to assume that any outsider is likely to be an enemy.
To the support of the Union, however, come certain liberal housewives. One woman said that she never hires except through the Union, and that she is going to do all that she can “to spread the gospel” to her friends and neighbors. One group of women voluntarily agreed to place the 60-hour work week in their homes as an experiment; the trial period proved to be a success and the women now employ union girls in their homes and are pleased with the work they are receiving in return.
From all available evidence it seems as though the household workers are pleased with the Union. From workers who are members of the Union, the following are samples of their feelings:
The Union has been a God-send. I have some time to myself now; I get time for rest, and to go to a movie every now and then …
I just joined the Union two months ago. Before I belonged, I quit two jobs ‘cause I couldn’t stand it, and then spent a month on the “slave market” working by the day for 25 cents an hour. A girl that lived next door to me told me about the Union. I didn’t know what it was at first, but I went down and talked a bit to some girls who belong. I ain’t never been sorry that I’m a Union member and I’ll fight for the Union all I can.
A young Negro mother said that she now has more time to spend with her children and that the lady for whom she works didn’t want her to join the Union at first, but that after a time the employer was relieved to find that the girls didn’t “picket” her on the slightest disagreement, and didn’t make impossible demands.
Business does not consume all of the time of the Union. Recreation is also a part of the program. On certain afternoons during the week, tea is served at the headquarters. Many races and nationalities take part in these activities in New York, since the problem is not so completely a Negro one as it is in Washington.
The New York Union states as its achievements: “We have been successful in dealing with grievances and in placing members on jobs under union conditions.” the Union considers its greatest problems to be lack of funds adequate to carry on union activities and educational work, as well as the usual handicaps which are encountered in trying to organize workers in this occupation. These handicaps are stated to be a high turnover of members, irregularity in free time, utter exhaustion at the end of the work day, and “a variety of their occupational problems and racial backgrounds.”
[ … ]
Conclusion
This study has examined the conditions and problems of Negro women domestic workers in the United States today and has emphasized particularly their participation in trade union activity.
The fact that Negroes have often been the founders and organizers of the domestic workers’ unions in the United States is of significance for our study. More Negro women have not only suffered from lack of employment standards, long hours, and low wages, exclusion from social insurance and legislation, and social stigma attached to the occupation, but they have also been forced to receive lower pay and to work under lower standards than white employees. Housewives, knowing they can get domestic workers at almost starvation wages, have played employee against employee. One of the worst types of human exploitation is the “slave market” found in New York city, and one of its ugliest aspects is the way in which girls are shipped up in carloads from the South to stand on corners waiting for work at 25 to 35 cents an hour. These workers have formed the nucleus of the Union in New York.
In looking over the four Unions considered in this study, we see that the bulk of unionized domestic workers are those who have suffered most from economic exploitation and racial discrimination. In the main it is these workers who are paid comparatively well by wealthy employers. Domestic employees who work by the day or night, who are hired and fired often, and who receive far below a living wage are the ones from whom an active union program may be expected.
Of the 600,000 Negro women domestic workers in private homes in the United States today, less than 2,000 are organized. These 2,000 are concentrated in four cities: New York, Newark, the District of Columbia, and Chicago. We find that domestic workers’ Unions have set up wage and hour standards and have established contracts to enforce these standards.
The Domestic Workers’ Union of the District of Columbia has set up a contract which not only includes wage-and-hour standards but indicates just what the work is to include, such as general housework, ironing, sewing, cooking, etc., has set up standards as to uniforms, breakage, living arrangements, vacations, insurance, holidays, and provision for entertainment of friends when the worker is living in the home. Both employer and employee sign the contract, both agreeing to one week notice by either party if the contract is broken. Housewives are often willing to sign contracts if they are assured of efficient service in doing so. Although training classes have been started by the District of Columbia Union with the cooperation of the WPA classes, the Union has not yet been able to guarantee well trained workers for all the cells which come through the Union office.
The Washington Union is facing other problems, too. The total membership of the Union, 500, is an insufficient number for effective bargaining. Leadership among the domestic workers has been slow in developing, and Union members often to not cooperate fully with the Union’s employment office and placement bureau. Domestic workers in the District as yet have little feeling of unity; they have been accustomed for generations to work in isolation. Negro domestic workers often have more loyalty to the class which they serve than to other domestic workers. Thus we find a number of serious problems facing the Washington Union. The Union has proved, however, that a domestic workers’ Union is not impossible in the District, that wage scales and classification of domestic workers is important for effective unionization, and that work can be found for members of the Union at standard wages, hours, and conditions.
The New York Domestic Workers’ Union, with membership of over 1,000, is the largest of its kind in the United States, and the only domestic workers’ union affiliated with the AF of L. It has emphasized a legislative program, centering about a drive for a 60-hour week, inclusion of domestic workers in workmen’s compensation benefits and minimum-wage laws. In attempting to carry out this program, the Union has been handicapped by insufficient funds and lack of cooperation on the part of domestic workers and the public in general. However, the Union, with the aid of the International Labor Defense has had some success in dealing with grievances between employee and employer. Its members, nearly all Negro women from Harlem, report to interviewers that improvements which they have achieved since joining the Union, although they are reticent at first in talking with outsiders. The New York Union will perhaps be the nucleus for unionization of domestic workers on a nation-wide scale. In New York may be found domestic workers already union-conscious with a program, with leadership, and knowledge of union tactics. Here, too, are the headquarters for many other unions in the country, powerful unions which started out with small memberships and with many obstacles to overcome.
The Newark, N.J. Domestic Workers’ Union is perhaps the least active of the four Unions investigated for this study. Organized in 1936, the Union now has 250 members, some of whom never come to union meetings or participate in any of its activities. Perhaps the development of the Union in Newark has been slow because of tremendous opposition which members have met on all sides. Negro women themselves have looked to the Union as an impossibility and have cynically waited for its failure. White housewives upon being interviewed have expressed opposition to the Union, and have predicted that it can never include in its scope all domestic workers and therefore cannot be effective. Housewives have carried this opinion to domestic workers in their employment; these workers in turn have been impervious to any pleas which the organizers and members of the Union have made to them. The future of the Union cannot be predicted. Perhaps the fact that over 200 women are receiving wages and working hours according to union standards maybe an incentive for building the Union.
The Chicago Domestic Workers’ Union, as far as can be ascertained, has roots which extend further back than any of the other domestic workers’ unions. As early as 1930, some investigation of conditions of work among domestic workers in Chicago had been accomplished, with the aid of the National Committee on Household Employment and the Women’s Trade Union League. The work took on a fresh start in 1935 when the Domestic Workers’ Association was organized. This Union has been characterized by waves of optimism followed by waves of pessimism. After the defeat of the 8-hour bill for women in domestic work in 1939, the Union entered its most bitter days. The Chicago Union seems to be holding its membership but not increasing its numbers. Its newly defined program is modest; it includes opening training classes for domestic workers, and continuing a program of education through newspaper articles, church contacts and union-sponsored programs. The future of the Chicago Union depends on its ability to find leaders among its members who will devote full time to developing and carrying out the program of the Union, and on an expansion of its program so as to include much more than a legislative drive.
There are possibilities that the Milwaukee Domestic Employees’ Club and the Englewood, N.J., Working Women’s Club, among other organizations, may develop into bonafide unions. Many of these clubs are of recent origin and have not yet gained a foothold or have been confused as to program and policies. They may, however, be able to derive guidance and some degree of encouragement from the experience of the four active unions.
The many difficulties of organizations are not the only problems which domestic workers face. They must deal with deep rooted opinions and attitudes hostile to unionization, such as those expressed by women’s clubs, by employers, by employment agencies, by certain domestic workers who identify themselves with their employers, by newspapers and magazines. The domestic workers’ unions have realized that such attitudes have been counteracted at least partially by active support given to the Unions by such prominent organizations and agencies as the Women’s Trade Union League, the National Urban League, the National Negro Congress and the Women’s Bureau. Other support has come from progressive employers and women’s clubs, and certain Negro newspapers. Finally, the CIO has supported the various attempts of unionization and has expressed its intention of taking organizational steps in this field in the future. The conviction of the CIO that unionization is possible for domestic workers is of significance for the domestic workers’ Unions already organized and for any which may be attempted in the future. Such support tends to stimulate organization.
We have seen in this study that unionization among domestic workers is a fairly recent phenomenon in the United States, and hence, a very small percentage of the total number of organizable domestic workers is unionized. In examining the history of some large labor organizations of today, such as the United Mine Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and the Newspaper Guild, etc., we have discovered that membership was very small in the first years of organization. It is true also that when the CIO was first organized, it gave its attention to helping small Unions of rubber and automobile workers, which were the forerunners of the many affiliated CIO Unions of today. Hence, the small beginnings made in unionizing domestic workers are no indication that they are unorganizable.
It has been stated elsewhere that domestic workers are unorganizable for a number of alleged reasons including especially the point that they work in isolation. However, it has been shown in this study that similar statements have been made concerning agricultural, white collar, technical and professional workers, and yet these workers have organized themselves to an appreciable extent and have sought to standardize their work conditions. We have seen also that domestic workers in England, in the Scandinavian countries, in Russia, and pre-fascist Italy have proved that domestic workers can effectively bargain for higher wages, fewer hours, favorable legislation, and more human living conditions. While the future of unionization among domestic workers in the United States cannot be predicted, nevertheless, it can be concluded that the problems faced by Negro women domestic workers are responsive to amelioration through trade union organizations even when we recognize the many difficulties which are involved in unionizing this occupation.
Comments
The Productive Subject
It is impossible at the present time to write history without using a whole range of concepts directly or indirectly linked to Marx’s thought and situating oneself within a horizon of thought which has been defined and described by Marx. One might even wonder what difference there could ultimately be between being a historian and being a Marxist.1
Power: From Politics to the Economy
In the concluding section to The Will to Knowledge, Foucault explains what led him to consider power, as it exists today, not from a negative perspective – as a constraint that is initially juridical in form – but from a positive one, inasmuch as power relies on mechanisms that materially organize and even help to “produce” human life, instead of imposing boundaries on it. This idea is at the very core of his conception of “biopower.” As he writes about it:
This biopower was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth of both these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and docility; it had to have methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to control. If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of anatomo- and biopolitics, created in the eighteenth century as techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them. They also acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony. The adjustment of the accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of biopower in its many forms and modes of application. The investment of the body, its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensable.2
To put it schematically, Foucault explains in this passage the need to rethink power by freeing it from the grip of politics, so as to bring it closer to the concrete level of the economy; an economy that is primarily concerned with the “management” of life, bodies and their “powers” – a term that persistently recurs here – even before having as its focus the value of traded goods within an economy of things. Furthermore, for Foucault, it is important to restore a historical dimension to this new understanding of power, which he does by relating it to the development of capitalism and the specific social relations of production set in place in the context of the Industrial Revolution. Although the term “class” is not overtly mentioned, it is clearly implied with the reference in the above passage to the “factors of segregation and social hierarchization, exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony,” and “the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit.” Foucault appears here to almost flirt with Marx’s analyses in Capital, which he reconciles with his attempt to view power from a positive and “productive” perspective.
Five years later, coming back to this point in a lecture given in Bahia in 1976, published under the evocative title “The Mesh of Power,”3 Foucault explicitly confirms this convergence. There, he writes:
How may we attempt to analyze power in its positive mechanisms? It appears to me that we may find, in a certain number of texts, the fundamental elements for an analysis of this type. We may perhaps find them in Bentham, an English philosopher from the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, who was basically the great theoretician of bourgeois power, and we may of course also find these elements in Marx, essentially in the second volume of Capital. It’s here, I think, that we may find some elements that I will use for the analysis of power in its positive mechanisms.
Foucault means that Bentham and Marx are basically talking about the same thing, even if they do so in different ways: the emergence of a new configuration of power, coinciding with the rise of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, did not solely consist of an institutional change or a seizure of political power, since it fundamentally depended upon an original harnessing of the forces of life itself, providing the economy with its specific object ‒ an economy whose transformations have driven social change. This perspective, it could be argued, moves toward the thesis of the determination by the economy in the last instance, on condition that the concept is extended to eventually subsume the management or the “production” (to follow Foucault’s ambiguous term) of life in all of its forms. In the rest of the lecture, Foucault enumerates the four dimensions that characterize this historical and social shift in power, and insistently refers to Marx for each one: the dispersion of power into a multiplicity of heterogeneous powers; its detachment from the state-form; its positive, rather than prohibitive or repressive, orientation; and finally, its progressive technicization that developed unplanned through trial and error, and thus was not subordinated to any devised or preconceived ends. Foucault considers this last point to be the most important: it appears in the passage from the Will to Knowledge cited above concerning “methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to control.”
When Foucault cites the “second volume of Capital,” he clearly has in mind the second volume of the French edition of Marx’s work, published by Éditions Sociales, which comprises Parts 4, 5, and 6 of Volume I, the only volume to appear in Marx’s lifetime, the final editing of Volumes II and III being posthumously completed by Engels. Althusser, in a preface written for the 1969 publication of Volume I of Capital in Flammarion’s GF book series, had recommended reading it by starting directly with the second half, that is, by skipping the first part, as its interpretation poses the most problems, problems only resolvable when one gets to the end of the work and can grasp the argumentation as a whole. Foucault seems to go even further, advising that Marx’s book be approached through the fourth part, which deals with “The Production of Relative Surplus-Value (Mehrwert).” Indeed, in this passage he sees, appearing for the first time, the elements enabling the definition of the new configuration of power, heralded from the end of the 18th century by theorists such as Bentham: namely, “bourgeois power” and its mechanisms, i.e., the specific procedures pertaining to a technology of power, to whose analysis Marx made the greatest contribution. By focusing his attention on this part of Capital, Foucault thereby finds a way of distancing himself from the polemical presentation provided in The Order Of Things – not of Marx’s thought stricto sensu, as found in his own texts, but what arose from it in the form of “orthodox” Marxism, in which Foucault had detected an avatar or epiphenomenon of political economy in its Ricardian form, full stop. From this point of view, it is as if Foucault proposed to add a new chapter to the project Althusser himself initiated with the publication of Reading Capital, which had already begun to challenge traditional, orthodox Marxism.
What could have interested Foucault in the passages from Capital, beginning with Part 4, to the degree that he presents them as sources for a positive study of power, rooted in the development of the economy and its “forces?” We would like to clarify this point by returning to Marx’s text, which Foucault’s suggestion prompts us to read in a manner that might be called “symptomatic,” since it is not at all obvious at first glance how one might derive the principles for an analysis of “power” which is at best implicit in Capital, hovering in the background. To roughly pose our question: how is it possible to draw the elements of a theory of power from the explanation of the process of the production of relative surplus value, without falling into overinterpretation, since the problem of power, if not completely extraneous to this explanation, is only posed at its margins? Let us say straight away that this question, which involves the particular relation that power maintains with the economy of capitalism, and which leads us to bracket the relations that power might otherwise have with political and state forms, also leads us to take into account and re-establish the primary importance of the notion Marx himself saw as his principal theoretical innovation, because it enabled him to radically break with Ricardian economics: the concept of “labor-power,” whose wording contains precisely a reference to “power,” a reference Foucault attaches such importance to in his own conception of the new economy of power. This economy, it can be said, is not an economy of things or goods but an economy of “forces,” and as such, inextricably an economy of persons; an economy which in reality is closely integrated with procedures for the subjection of persons and, more precisely, bodies. To put it in Foucault’s terms, we must ask ourselves how capitalism, by utilizing the exploitation of labor-power, developed “methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.” It should be noted that the aim of such an inquiry is not to demonstrate that Foucault’s ideas are already black and white in Marx’s text, which would amount to inventing the fiction of a “Marxist” or “Marxisant”4 Foucault, as such an heir to Marx, but to enrich our potential understanding of this text, by clarifying it in light of the hypotheses Foucault advances and thus traversing the path that leads from Foucault back to Marx in the hope of revealing new aspects of the latter’s thought and – this is the point that primarily concerns us – reframing the question of power in particular by shifting it from the level of politics to that of the economy.5
The System of Wage-Labor and the Exploitation of Labor-Power
In order to answer the questions that have just been raised, we must first return to the theory of wage-labor, which, according to Marx’s presentation, forms the basis of the capitalist economy and radically distinguishes it from preceding modes of production. We can summarize this theory by identifying three major traits. In the specific context of capitalism itself, the production of value-bearing, and thus exchangeable, commodities depends on the productive consumption of labor-power; this last, labor-power, is the property of the proletarian, and in exchange for a wage, the capitalist acquires the right to use it for a certain time within the space of his enterprise, where it is “consumed.” When he talks about the labor contract, Marx often writes that the proletarian sells its labor-power to the capitalist, a misleading shorthand if taken literally. What the worker actually alienates in exchange for a wage is not his labor-power as such, considered in its substance as something embodied in him, in the sense of being inseparable and even indiscernible from his bodily existence; if he were to do that, he would become, in a way, a slave to his employer – he would no longer be free and would lose as a consequence the responsibility of maintaining this substance that is one with his person. In exchange for the wage, the proletarian in reality only grants the right to exploit his labor-power for a certain time and in a certain place: he rents it out, strictly speaking, with the stipulation that the rent he is paid in exchange under the terms of this transaction is deferred, the wage not being paid until after use and not before, as is the case in the majority of rental contracts. This provision renders the exchange relation unequal from the start, insofar as it represents a form of pressure exercised by the buyer over the seller. It follows that if we want to understand what wage-labor is, we must carefully distinguish between labor-power as such – what we have called its substance – and its employment, which is measured in time and space, the basic unit of this measurement being formally constituted by the working day as organized within the bounds of the enterprise (at least until the end of the nineteenth century, manual laborers were generally hired and paid by the day, which distinguished them from salaried employees).
The wage-labor system, which determines the relation of capital to labor, presupposes the separation of these two aspects – the substance and its employment – and therefore that labor-power, as an aptitude borne by the body throughout its life, is in fact separated from the conditions of its activation as it is implemented within certain time limits and in the specific space of the enterprise, where the worker must go, bringing his labor-power with him, so that it can be used under suitable conditions. The existential capacity remains the inalienable property of the worker who, in exchange for a wage, concedes to his boss the possibility of using it, of putting it to work for his profit for a certain period within a given framework. This first point shows that the notion of labor-power, while it initially appears as a simple, unified, natural given, as a “power” originating in life and the body, is much more complex; the historical intervention of capitalism and its specific mode of production, it could be suggested, has the precise effect of complicating this notion by exploiting the aforementioned division, none of which is at all natural.
In this respect, Foucault would be entitled to talk of a technical procedure resulting in the establishment of a power relation: in effect, when he exchanges the employment of his labor-power for a wage, the worker is only formally “free” to do so. But for the procedure to work, the worker must actually be made to do so, because in order to survive, he is placed in the position of a job-seeker; a docile position, it could be said, insofar as it complies with an “economic” necessity that in the last instance has nothing juridical about it. In other words, the fact that labor-power is separated from its usage is historically conditioned: it corresponds to the development of a specific mode of production that depends on the exploitation of labor-power made possible by this separation, and whose very first effect is to bind the worker, the bearer of labor-power, to the constraints of the job market. Indeed, it is not enough that he “has” his labor-power, in the sense that his body belongs to him, as it still needs to be able to be set to work under certain conditions independent of him.
But that’s not all. At the outset, wage-labor appears as an exchange which, like all exchanges between commodities, should in principle be an exchange of equal values. What the worker brings to the labor market is himself: his body, his labor-power, whose usage he alienates; and, for this, he receives a wage which, in principle, must pay for what he has sold at its value, corresponding to its maintenance over the period during which he grants its usage. Maintenance should be understood as everything that enables the regeneration of this power as is necessary both for the survival of the individual worker, and also that of his family. Not only is his own labor-power reproduced within the family, but also that of his offspring; and in paying the wage, the capitalist takes out an option on this latter, thereby exercising a sort of pre-emptive claim over it. For the system to function normally – according to rules, thus making it legally indisputable – the commodity must be sold at its true price, which fluctuates around an average value determined by market conditions, that is, by variations in the relationship between supply and demand, as is the case for all market transactions. When he gets his wage, the worker therefore has not been robbed or plundered, which he implicitly acknowledges by complying with and willingly complying with the terms of the exchange, and formally speaking does so willingly. Nevertheless, one cannot leave matters here. For the exchange to effectively take place, it must reflect the interests that concretely bind the contracting parties. The seller’s interest is completely clear: the worker transfers the use of his labor-power for the wage because without it, he could not satisfy his needs or those of his family. If he brings his “commodity” to the labor market, then it is simply because he cannot do otherwise: it is the condition of his survival. But in regards to the buyer, who will employ this labor-power to his benefit, things are much less clear: what the capitalist bought at its value, he in fact intends to exploit, not at equal value, but in order to derive from it an additional value that will represent his profit, a profit destined to either increase his production or his wealth; at every turn he wins, and if this wasn’t the case, the transaction would not interest him the slightest. So there is something strange, anomalous, in the way that this relation is established. Under the terms of the exchange between the wage laborer and the person paying him, if one of them, the worker, strictly speaking, loses nothing, he does not gain anything either, that is, he cannot hope to gain more than he has initially pledged; and, if turns out that his wage even marginally exceeds his real needs, allowing him either to spend wastefully on extras or to save for himself, a correction almost automatically takes place and his wage drops, eventually bringing about a fall in the average value of the wages for all the other workers. Whereas, under the terms of the same exchange, the other party, the buyer, aims not only to recoup his stake, therefore losing nothing, but to increase it, proving this exchange of equal value, from which the system of wage-labor derives its legitimacy in terms of law, masks a conjuring trick which transforms equality into inequality, without, however, formally violating the commercial right of exchange. What has happened?
To understand this better, it is useful to apply the schema elaborated by Marcel Mauss – in another context, to account for the mechanism of the gift, an exchange which puts two parties in a relation of reciprocity – to the labor contract that sanctions the exchange.6 This schema is triangular, and articulates three operations: “giving,” “receiving,” and “returning.” Let us suppose that the labor contract, which is the basis for wage-labor, falls under this schema. The giver in this case is the person offering the commodity he seeks to part with: namely, the worker who brings his labor-power, his body – whose employment he rents out to someone else – to the market. In exchange, the buyer, his future employer, “returns” to him a value equivalent to the maintenance needs of this power. But, when this buyer is the capitalist, what is therefore “returned” – recompensed in the form of wages – isn’t exactly the same thing as what is “received” by the one who, in terms of the exchange, occupies the position of purchaser: this is the condition for this exchange of equal value to produce inequality. In other words, what the capitalist acquires in exchange for the wage, and granting him the right to exploit it according to his own wishes, in a manner consistent with his interests, is not exactly what has been brought, “given,” or formally sold in exchange for this wage. Thus, at this level, the previous division reappears, splitting up labor-power into two sides: one of these is “given” by the seller, the worker, and the other “received” by the buyer, the capitalist; the aforementioned conjuring trick depends on this splitting, which turns an exchange of equal values into an operation that benefits only one of the contracting parties, and is only possible because this exchange occurs within the framework of a power relation wherein one party, the seller, occupies the subordinate position and the other, the buyer, the dominant position, enabling the latter to impose their interests. For the system of wage-labor to take effect, the worker has to be placed in the position of a split subject who, while remaining entirely in control of his labor-power, alienates only its usage, which presupposes that this power can effectively be separated from its use.
On this basis, we can evaluate the break introduced in the explanation of the system of wage-labor by the substitution of labor-power for labor, a break that Marx presents as his principal theoretical innovation.7 If the seller, the wage laborer, alienated his labor, and if this was paid at equal value, as classical political economy until Ricardo supposed for all exchange, then the buyer, the capitalist, would gain nothing further, and the exchange would not happen simply because it would not present any interest for him. But if what the seller brings – “gives” – is his labor-power, or at least the possibility of employing it for a certain time, then the same cannot be said: for what is transferred, “received” at the end of the exchange is not exactly the same thing as presented at the beginning. What is received is the possibility of employing labor-power over and above its real value, and therefore to profit from its use. This profit is reserved for whoever buys the right to employ labor-power at its value, which is not what it produces, but what produces it, that is, the value necessary for the maintenance of the power that once produced, produces, as the bearer of the capacity to produce in excess of the value needed to produce it. Anticipating concepts that will be introduced later on, we can say that at the moment he accepts the provisions stipulated by his employment contract, the worker undergoes a quasi-miraculous mutation: he ceases to be his body in person, whose existence is by definition equal to no other, and becomes a “productive subject,” a bearer of “labor-power,” whose performance – “social labor” – is subjected to a common evaluation; and, in this fashion, he is subjected [assujetti], in all senses of the word.8
At stake here is the ambiguity surrounding the concept of labor, an ambiguity reinforced by the French language, which combines in one term two things that the English language and the German language distinguish: on the one hand, in these two languages, the terms Werk and work indicate the result of labor, once it is finished and thus when it has attained its end; and on the other hand, there is the operation or the process that produces, that is to say the activity of production as it is actually in progress, and is headed toward its end but has not attained it yet, which is indicated by the terms Arbeit and labor. One could say this terminological distinction is taken up metaphorically by Marx in his discussion of “dead labor” and “living labor.” Dead labor is “finished,” objectified labor, crystallized in the product wherein its trajectory is completed. Living labor is labor in the course of its execution, on a level that gives it a particularly dynamic range, while the product representing dead labor exhibits only a static dimension. In forging the concept of “labor-power,” his own contribution to the theory of wage-labor, Marx introduced these two aspects into this compound formula, just as the capitalist mode of production, which presupposes the possibility of substituting one for the other even though they correspond to different determinations, does in reality. One side of labor-power is decidedly dynamic, a power, with the dimension of capacity that defines it and has living labor as its bearer; dead labor is the other side, the static side of labor, in the sense of being the result of the completed labor process.9 The concept of labor-power, which joins these two aspects together, in this way allows for an understanding of what really happens when living labor transforms itself into dead labor and vice versa.10
Let’s return to the triangular model of the gift on this basis. In exchange for a wage, the worker brings to the labor market something that economically represents dead labor – that is to say, the value of the goods that are necessary for his maintenance and enable his labor-power to exist, inasmuch as labor-power is itself the product of a labor whose value is equal to that of these goods. This is what is paid to the worker, what is “returned” to him as the wage. From this point of view, labor-power is a product. But what the capitalist “receives,” with the aim of exploiting it, is living labor, the possibility of employing or activating the capacity that labor-power is the bearer of when it is exploited beyond what’s required for its subsistence, during the portion of time in which the worker, having ceased to work for himself, works for the capitalist, that is, his profit. This is no longer a product strictly speaking, but what Marx rather enigmatically calls a “productive power,” meaning a power defined by the activity of production that it is conditioned to exercise. By playing with our terms, we can say that what the worker alienates is the usage of his Arbeitskraft, his labor-power as it is wholly constituted since it it is one with him; and what the capitalist exploits is a Arbeitsvermögen, which through a process of exteriorization has been employed within the framework of productive activity. We now understand why the capitalist is the winner – and even in a “win-win situation” – in an exchange that is equal in principle, but in reality is a fool’s bargain, as most juridical relationships are, inasmuch they tacitly conceal a relationship which itself is not juridical.
The question, then, is how such a thing, improbable once its principle is revealed, can come to realize itself in fact. What brings the worker to “freely” – the quotation marks are in Marx’s text – submit to the conditions of this peculiar contract that is in principle between equal values but only in principle, since only one of the contracting parties emerges as the winner, and even cannot lose from an exchange which cannot be said to really “benefit” the other party engaged in this relationship, because it cannot do otherwise? This anomaly can be explained as follows: within the framework of the exchange in question, reciprocity is only apparent because, in the very process of the exchange, following its own trajectory, its nature has changed. At the start of this trajectory, as we have assumed, there is the Arbeitskraft of the worker, that is to say, his labor-power, meaning his personal labor, which is embodied in his individual existence; and it is precisely as an individual and on his own behalf that he agrees to enter into the labor contract, by which he transfers for a certain time the use of his labor-power in exchange for a wage. But at the end of its course, that is, when the buyer – the capitalist – takes delivery of the commodity he has bought, the latter presents itself in a whole new light: it has become labor-power, exploitable within conditions that are no longer those of individual labor, marked by the specific characteristics of the powers of initiative of the person who performs the work, but which define productive activity in general, subject to common norms. Once he has entered into the system of wage-labor, the worker, without even realizing it, has ceased to be the person he is, with his individually constituted Arbeitskraft; truly subjected, he has become the executor of an operation that surpasses the limits of his own existence. This operation is “social labor” which strictly speaking is no longer his labor, or at any rate not only his, but labor carried out under conditions which escape his initiative and control; these conditions are the regulation or rationalization of labor, or what is called at the end of the nineteenth century, by Taylor in particular, the “organization of labor,” whose outline is already traced by Marx. To return to the terminology employed previously, what the worker “gives” is the usage of his body inasmuch as it is the bearer of his own power, and what the capitalist “receives,” with the aim of exploiting for his profit, is the right to use this power as a productive force, whose capacities are assessed, calibrated, formatted, and, one can say, normalized according to principles that condition its optimal use, in the sense of the conditioning of a product – an operation in which a product is reclassified in order to meet common standards. If the exchange authorized by the system of wage-labor takes place, it’s because in the course of the exchange the instrument of the exchange has been transformed without the person looking for work being aware of it, with the consequence that this transformation is not taken into account in calculating the terms of the exchange, an exchange that takes place between equal values while still being unequal, conforming to the interest of the person who in this same relation holds the position of both payer and receiver or buyer. This is what defines the capitalist mode of production: labor-power is treated as a two-sided reality, and so is not exactly the same thing for the person who is its natural bearer and for the person who has become its user. This results in the possibility of deriving a profit from its use, kept by the capitalist for himself in the form of a surplus value (Mehrwert) that is not compensated by the wage and thus appears as a surplus. The exploitation of worker relies on this “trick”: although he remains in possession of his labor-power, he is relinquishes its use, as if its usage was no longer part of this power and as if this force existed independently of its exercise. It really is a sleight of hand, whose invisibility is the condition for its efficacy. This leads us to extend the scope of the concept of industrial revolution, accompanying the development of capitalism. Besides sophisticated machinery (with the steam engine as prototype), the industrial revolution depended on the invention of the “productive power” essential to the operation of these machines, “labor-power,” the result of a technical invention associated with the deployment of specific procedures of power, as Foucault explains following Marx. Machinofacture is a complex system of production that besides physical equipment, includes the more or less skilled agents who run it and are at the same time incorporated into its system as bearers of a labor-power destined to be productively consumed. The images in Chaplin’s film Modern Times show precisely this: they present a particularly forceful analysis of the mode of labor specific to industrial capitalism, in which inanimate machines and human machines are closely intertwined.
The surplus generated by the exploitation of labor-power is variable by definition, insofar as it is itself the result of a variation. In order to theoretically calculate the rate of exploitation (surplus value), Marx uses the model of the “working day”: i.e., the total amount of time during each workable day (and, as we have remarked, in the nineteenth century, manual laborers were generally employed “by the day,” ensuring maximum flexibility in their employment) that the worker spends working, thus activating his labor-power under conditions imposed on him by the entrepreneur. This working day is ideally represented in the form of a segment that can be broken down into its elements, which, according to Marx’s analysis, correspond to two distinct periods of time: one devoted to “necessary labor” (notwendige Arbeit) and the other to “surplus labor” (Mehrarbeit). Necessary labor is labor undertaken to produce a quantity of value equivalent to that required for the maintenance of labor-power as Arbeitskraft: it is this value that is effectively paid by the wage given to the worker in exchange for the right to exploit his labor-power, even though the result of this exploitation represents a value that is not the same as that remunerated by the wage. Surplus labor formally corresponds to the other part of the day during which the worker performs tasks that are not remunerated by his wage, since they produce a quantity of value exceeding that necessary to maintain his labor-power, a quantity of value that, consequently, within the framework of the performance of the labor process where Vermögenskraft is employed, represents the productive activity whose exploitation releases a surplus value, Mehrwert. One must not however lose sight of the fact that this division of the working day into two periods, represented by sub-segments following each other on a single line, has a purely theoretical significance. Only for the purposes of formally calculating the rate of exploitation of labor-power is it assumed that the worker, in performing necessary labor, works for himself until a certain hour of the day, and beyond this limit, for the exclusive benefit of his employer; in reality, from the first hour to the last – every moment the worker activates his labor-power – his time is composed of fixed proportions of necessary labor and surplus labor, whose borderline is not clearly discernible. This is made possible by the fact that, quite unbeknownst to the worker, who has no way of knowing when he is still and when he is no longer working for himself, his labor-power is simultaneously exploited in its dual aspect: as Arbeitskraft, whose value is measured by the quantity of labor necessary to produce it; and as Vermögenskraft, whose value is measured by the quantity of labor that it is capable of producing. This being said, Marx introduces the capital distinction between absolute surplus value (to which the third section of Volume I of Capital is devoted) and relative surplus value (to which the fourth section is devoted, that is to say, the part of the text that particularly interested Foucault for reasons yet to be specified) on the basis of this formal division, and to simplify its proof.
Thus, let the working day be a line (with a direction, as it represents the passage of time in a certain direction) divided into two parts which are meant to succeed one another:
working day222 (1)
The capitalist has an interest in changing the proportions between the two quantities of time (represented above) in his favor; wherein the first segment (A), if it costs him nothing because the value is fully contained in the product he keeps, it also brings in nothing, while only the second segment (B) represents a profit for him, because he does not need to invest the quantity of value represented by the payment of a wage to have at his disposal the goods this segment produces. To succeed in changing the relationship between these two elements, A and B, in his favor, the capitalist can take two courses of action according: lengthen the sub-segment on the right of the diagram, which interests him because it yields a profit, either by extending it to the right (thereby producing absolute surplus value), or by shortening it to the left, thereby reducing the length of the first segment (and producing relative surplus value).
Concretely, the first solution consists in extending the length of the vital part of the day, devoted to the performance of productive tasks, as far as possible, by postponing the end of the working day: the worker, instead of working a total amount of time, X, will work X+X’, then X+X’+X’’, etc…for example, if we take 12 hours of work activity as a starting point, then 14 hours, 16, 18, etc …This tendential increase, however, encounters a natural limit: the astronomical day has a fixed duration of 24 hours. If the capitalist could further prolong this length of time and therefore find the technical procedure allowing it to last for (why not?) 26 hours or 28 hours instead of 24 hours, enabling him to produce more absolute surplus value, he would not hesitate one second; but this procedure has not yet been discovered (he might pull it off by sending his workers to work on another planet without changing their conditions of pay; but the transport costs might burn a hole in his pocket, making the operation unprofitable). On the other hand, regardless of this natural obstacle, regrettably insuperable, the tendency toward the increased production of absolute surplus value encounters two limits: if the capitalist wants to fully profit from the worker’s labor-power for at least the period paid for by the wage, he must also concede a break period of non-work, devoted not to unproductive leisure but to recuperation, and more generally to procedures of maintenance and renewal of this labor-power: to eating, perhaps to procreation, and in this case to have some time to devote to his children, since if he did not do so, his capacities would be rapidly exhausted (as intensive agriculture may, beyond certain limits, exhaust the soil’s yield) and then the colorful expression that “the worker works himself to death” would no longer be just a metaphor. The capitalist who employs this labor-power must take into account the fact that it wears down and that its power would completely dissipate unless given time, even a minimum amount, to restore itself. The tendency toward the increase in production of absolute surplus value encounters another limit, namely the resistance generated by the employer’s insatiability, which pushes him to go ever further in this direction, and thus to continually increase, little by little, the length of labor time: at a certain point, the workers, who are always asked to do more, and realizing that enough is enough, understand that it is in their interest to unite to advance their demands. This terrifies the capitalist because for his enterprise of extracting surplus value to produce maximum returns, he must be able to deal with the workers who appear before him as individual workers, whose divisions he can exploit – not as a group, which would increase their capacity to resist. When it assumes a collective form, this workers’ resistance carries the additional incovenience of becoming public: the capitalist hates publicity! He especially does not want people shoving their noses in his business, which he means to carry on as he pleases! And what really perturbs and infuriates him is when the workers’ demands, after obtaining a measure of publicity and official status, are taken up by public bodies and institutions. Lo and behold, the idea of legally regulating working hours appears, in particular the limitation of child labor, a process that once set in motion expands to include adolescent and adult labor. Then inspectors, who do not necessarily share the businessman’s point of view, and (how narrow-minded! how naive!) claiming that all they are doing is enforcing the law, begin to visit the workshops, make reports, record violations, levy fines, etc., etc. – intolerable from the businessman’s perspective, because as owner of his company, he is resolved to remain master of his own house and rejects out of hand any external control over his activities. The lengthy tenth chapter in the third part of Volume I of Capital on “The Working Day” (Chapter 10 of the French edition translated by Joseph Roy under Marx’s direction) provides abundant (and terrifying) documentation relating to this theme, which Engels had already used in 1845 to write his book on The Condition of the Working Class in England (After the Observations of the Author and Authentic Sources), one of the foundational texts of what would later be called the “sociology of work.” The current controversy around the issue of the 35-hour week demonstrates that this chapter of workers’ struggles is not yet closed, and that the capitalists have not given up on squeezing a maximum of absolute surplus value from the exploitation of labor-power, while deploring the concessions to which they been forced to very reluctantly submit due to the balance of forces; but they always remain hopeful that they can renege on these concessions whenever the opportunity arises, and specifically, that labor time can be extended (at the same wage-rate, of course).
When the possibility of increasing the production of absolute surplus value is blocked despite the capitalist’s efforts, he leaves open the option of switching sides, thus increasing the length of sub-segment B in the overall schema of the working day by stretching it, not towards the right, in the direction of the production of absolute surplus value, but towards the left, in the direction of the production of relative surplus value. How does he do this? Since he understands cost calculation, his specialty, he realizes that this operation, whose goal is to reduce to a minimum the portion of time devoted to necessary labor, is conditional on lowering the value of labor-power in the strict sense, i.e., the Arbeitskraft remunerated by the wage that pays necessary labor and nothing more. There is no other way of doing this other than by lowering the overall cost of goods, which automatically results in a decrease in the amount of value needed for the maintenance of Arbeitskraft, without this decrease being accompanied by a fall in the quantity of value created by the productive activity in the form of Verm[o]genskraft. Not only will this quantity of value not decrease, it will increase: for this to happen, less is paid for the same amount of labor time, creating more value, with this decrease and increase being strictly correlative. In other words, to increase his profit, the capitalist will capitalize on the productivity of labor-power as a “productive power” from which, in the same period of time, and with the production of absolute surplus value having been provisionally stabilized, he can extract a much greater quantity of value in the form of relative surplus value. This notion of productivity allows us to understand the capitalist mode of production by going to its very heart, that is, its vital principle, its driving force.
Labor-Power as Productive Power
What should be understood by the “productivity” of labor-power? To answer this, it is necessary to revisit the concept of “productive forces” whose significance is crucial in this respect. Here, invaluable elements of explication may be found in the Dictionnaire critique du marxisme (Critical Dictionary of Marxism), edited by Georges Labica, in Jean-Pierre Lefebvre’s article on “productive power/productive forces.”11 By productive forces in the plural, Produktivkräfte, is meant the totality of the physical and organic elements which enter into the labor process: that is, both the natural and artificial means serving production as well as bodily dispositions activated by workers to employ these means to produce material goods – the ultimate goal of craft and industrial production. When Marx’s text employs this same concept in the singular, not without a certain terminological inconsistency, Produktivkraft refers not to the elements present, whether these are raw materials, technical instruments or living bodies, but something quite different. It refers to a capacity the force has inasmuch as its reality is “dynamic” in the proper sense of the word, that is, it represents a “power,” a Vermӧgen. Dunamis, in the Aristotelian sense (Metaphysics Delta, 12) is “a source, in general, of change or movement in another thing or in the same thing qua other.” It is the expression of the tendential and continuous process through which what exists at first as “potentiality” is destined, under the right conditions, to realize itself “in action.” For example, when the art of the doctor manages to transform the sick body into a healthy body, representing a change in the state of the body, the doctor does so by exercising the specific “virtue” that applies to him and makes his art effective. From this perspective, the power is meant to represent the cause to which a change is imputed. Before this change takes place or is produced, it exists as a possibility realizing itself only when the change has taken effect, that is, when all the effects have been derived from the cause. The reference to a power assigns to this potentiality a quasi-existence, between being and non-being. For this reason it is marked by an indelible ambiguity, insofar as it “already is” that which it “is not yet,” two formulas where the verb “to be” has two different values mistaken under the same term. The capitalist exploits this ambiguity to the full: with the wage he pays labor-power for what it “already is,” as Arbeitskraft [labor-power], reserving for himself the right to use it for what it “is not yet,” as Arbeitsvermӧgen [labor-capacity], which he intends to mold according to his wishes in order to put it to work. As we have seen, the miracle that the system of wage-labor performs consists in separating power from its action by artificially creating conditions that allow a power to be considered independently from its action, as if a non-acting power, a power that would not be active, would still be a power. From the physical point of view, this is more than a mystery: it is an absurdity.
In the case of a positivist philosopher like Auguste Comte, the causalistic interpretation of power and its action is tainted with metaphysical presuppositions which render his pretention to objectively understand real phenomena perfectly vain. At best, he can only offer an approximate description of them. To say that opium puts one to sleep since it is endowed with a soporific virtue constituting its power or its proper force, from which it draws its capacity to act, does not in any way advance knowledge. This is merely to invent the fiction of a “virtue” existing independently of its actualization, and consequently preceding it so that it “would already be” before even occurring, thus without having “yet” taken place. Therefore, when rational mechanics as a branch of mathematics – which spares it the obligation of facing up to the givens of experience – employs the notion of “force” and states, as Newton did, the laws of action of forces, one must be careful not to attribute to this concept a physical reality. One should confine it to the role of an abstract concept or intellectual construction which has a demonstrative value, but certainly not an explicative one in the sense of a causal explanation. Stating that forces are causes of the motion they generate simply means saying nothing at all. This is why mechanics abandons the evaluation of forces for what they are and contents itself with calculating their “work,” represented through their real effects.
From this point of view, we could say that when the capitalist occupies himself with his workers’ labor-power, which he has acquired the right to employ in exchange for a wage, treating it as a “productive power” whose productivity he intends to increase in order to produce relative surplus value – he practices metaphysics not in a theoretical but in a practical way. He practices this peculiar sort of metaphysics not during his leisure time, as a distraction or mental exercise, as he would a crossword puzzle, but throughout the entire working day dedicated to production. By opening up his company to notions such as “power,” “capacity” and “causation,” he thereby makes them a reality, realizing these fictions, these products of the mind, which he then employs with daunting efficacy. In this way, with payrolls and charts of organizational tasks at hand, he shows, better than a philosopher’s abstract proofs, that the work of metaphysics could not be more material, provided that one knows how to put it to good use in introducing it into the factory. One could, incidentally, derive from this a new and caustic definition of metaphysics: in this rather specific context, it boils down to a mechanism for profit-making, which is no small matter. This means that, amongst other inventions that have changed the course of history, capitalism has found the means, the procedure, the “trick” enabling it to put abstract concepts into practice – the hallmark of its “genius.”
What in fact is this famous productivity attributed to labor-power in order to modify it, or rather to re-modify it? It is the “virtue” or “power” that may be ascribed to it when one begins to consider and treat it materially: as a “productive power” in the sense of a capacity to be put to work. This power is not only measurable on paper but can be modelled and modified so as to increase it. Such is effectively the goal of the rationalization of labor, which, by subordinating it to norms, and by shifting these norms, intensifies labor’s “productivity.” From this perspective, the norm not only has a constative but a performative dimension. It serves not only to determine an average state, counted as “normal,” but itself becomes “normative.” In other words, the norm acts to transform the reality to which it applies, grasps it not as it is but as it could be if one were to develop its potential. This is the theme tackled by Didier Deleule and François Guéry in their short book, The Productive Body, where they draw attention to the fact that it is not at all the same to treat labor-power as a power that produces and as a productive power.12 If the capitalist were to pay a wage to labor-power as the power that produces, he would then be formally placed under the obligation of recompensing the worker with a quantity of value equal to that effectively produced by the worker’s labor. Thus the thesis of Ricardian economics that the worker’s labor is paid at its real value would be verified. But, quite evidently, such a thing cannot be of interest to the capitalist because even if this transaction created value it would not make him any profit, or would at least force him to share with the workers he employs the surplus value created by the activation of their labor-power. If he was to confine himself to the exploitation of the labor-power of his workers measured by results, that is to what it really produces in value terms, such an approach would not generate any “growth” in his terms; that is in the sense of an increase in the value of capital, “his” capital, which he jointly owns with his shareholders, the only people he must account to for the way he manages it. That is why the labor-power he employs interests him – in the strongest sense of the word – not as a power that produces but a productive power. This creates the possibility of treating it not as an active power, which it “already is,” but as a potential power, which it “is not yet,” and as such the bearer of potentialities that one can apply pressure to and control so as to intensify them.
The notion of “living labor” thus attains a new dimension. Living labor is labor that not only produces but is productive, that is, activates labor-power as a “productive power.” Living labor produces value under conditions that can be regulated by exploiting the possibilities for change that, thanks to its plasticity and adaptability, life is so rich in. The issue of “flexibility,” so fashionable today, is at the core of this problem, which a metaphysician of the caliber of Mme. Parisot13 perfectly masters, being a metaphysician without knowing it, making her “speculation” particularly effective. Precisely because it takes labor-power not as the power that produces but as a productive power, capitalism can allow itself to treat labor-power with a maximum of flexibility since it has everything to gain by doing so. To its dying breath it rejects the rules that the law seeks to impose on it under the pretext that these rules stultify a reality it considers to be living. As such, it treats reality as malleable, in the manner of a wild animal to be tamed so that it performs amazing tricks, which at first sight one would never have thought it capable, jumps through flaming hoops, spins faster and faster in a revolving cylinder, etc., etc…In the sequences of his film Modern Times, Charles Spencer Chaplin, a metaphysician of a different class than Mme. Parisot, provides a striking illustration of the high-wire acrobatics perfected by capitalist production. There one sees his hero, Charlot, being caught in an assembly line, his body becoming so supple that, flattened by the conveyor belt, he merges and becomes indistinguishable from it. He becomes an accelerated bolt screw,14 to the point that once he gets out of the factory he neither knows nor can do anything else, which is a way of showing his “power” no longer belongs to him precisely to the extent that it has been separated from him. Of course, this management of his capacities, which makes his labor-power “productive” as suits the capitalist, has the effect of creating a new rigidity, riveting him to his assigned function. He must fulfil this function obeying norms determined for him in the strongest sense of the term. In this way, suppleness recreates rigidity. The capitalist does not content himself with being a metaphysician. He is a dialectician, he reconciles opposites, which is his way of managing the powers he exploits, not just by tracing their parallelogram in the manner of a mathematician but by forcing them to enter into the schema he has established according to his interests. This schema consists in extracting the maximum profit from the means of production at his disposal, including the labor-power of his workers – in particular by making them produce relative surplus value.
One passage in Marx’s text strikingly illustrates this. This passage, which is at the end of Chapter 12, “Division of Labor and Manufacture” (Chapter 14 of the Roy edition15 ), highlights the contrast between the form the division of labor within the factory already takes under the control of the manufacturing capitalist, therefore before the system of industrial machinofacture, and the form it takes within the wider framework of society:
While, within the workshop, the iron law of proportionality subjects definite numbers of workers to definite functions, in the society outside the workshop, the play of chance and caprice results in a motley pattern of distribution of the producers and their means of production among the various branches of social labour…Division of labor within the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men, who are merely the members of a total mechanism which belongs to him. The division of labour within society brings into contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other than that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their reciprocal interests, just as in the animal kingdom the “war of all against all” more or less preserves the conditions of existence of every species. The same bourgeois consciousness which celebrates the division of labour in the workshop, the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as an organization of labour that increases its productive power, denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to control and regulate the process of production socially, as an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom and the self-determining “genius” of the individual capitalist. It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general organization of labour in society than that it would turn the whole of society into a factory.16
In this passage Marx pinpoints the paradox of liberal discourse, which is the warp and woof of bourgeois ideology. If the latter defends laissez-faire, deregulation, non-intervention, it does so to better establish a theory of authority, taking the form of the “lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial operation and his complete submission to capital, as an organization of labor that increases its productive power.” Therefore, a power relation underlies the treatment of labor-power not only as a power that produces, but a power with a measured productivity that can be gradually raised. It is a power imposed on the individual worker, henceforth dispossessed of all initiative in the employment of his labor-power, exploited in every sense of the word within the framework of a system of which he has become a cog. Freedom is the word the capitalist constantly repeats and demands exclusively for himself in order to turn it into a means of enslaving the working classes, whose opinion he does not ask, let alone their consent, in subjugating them to the norms of productivity which he, the apostle of freedom, has made into an “iron law.” Today, almost two centuries after the factory system was established during the first half of the 19th century, coinciding with the explosion of a frenetic capitalism, the rhetoric of the bosses has not changed one bit: freedom is my freedom, from which stems the unlimited right to enslave others, and is the condition of the production of surplus value under both of its forms, relative and absolute.
Thus it is exactly where the labor process actually takes place that a system of power and subjugation miraculously reconciling the opposing values of necessity and freedom is established through the very forms in which labor is organized, that is controlled. Once the worker has alienated the usage of his labor-power in exchange for a wage, it is as if he is split into two and becomes a divided, overdetermined subject. On the one hand, he remains the person he is, attached to his bodily existence, whose inviolable owner he rests to his death. He often drags it behind him like a burden, for he must feed it, shelter it, nurse it, reproduce it (by having children), all this most often at his own expense and on his responsibility, even when he lacks the material resources to do so. On the other hand, he is transformed into a being whose power no longer depends solely on its own conditions of existence because its usage and activation have become dependent on rules that transcend it, turning him into a productive subject. He is the bearer and owner of a labor-power divided into an Arbeitskraft which belongs to him and is his exclusive concern and an Arbeitsvermögen that may be refashioned at will; its substance, Kraft, has been made supple, flexible, so that it may be more closely annexed to the type of task assigned to the worker, at a given level of productivity. Necessity in freedom: that is the great invention of capitalism. And, in fact, it had to be invented and appropriate procedures found to put the idea into practice.
This system of power, which dissolves the opposition between necessity and freedom, is of a particular kind, specific to the epoch of the industrial revolution and the type of society it establishes, which is, in Foucault’s terminology, a society of norms. This system presupposes a complete redefinition of the very notion of power. Namely, for it to work, for the dialectical miracle to happen, the relationship it establishes must not appear as a power on high whose authority consists in the realization of an external order and therefore has the character of a formal constraint that is above all repressive and negative. Quite the contrary, the project of normalization, consisting in the organization of work so as to increase its productivity and thereby the production of relative surplus value, is defined by fact that its intervention must not appear as a command out of the blue. Rather it must be hand in glove with the living reality, with “labor-power” as the “productive power” which it seeks to control and succeeds in inhabiting so as to possess it in its very being. From this perspective, it appears a genuine creation corresponding to the passage to a second nature.
The term second nature designates a necessarily equivocal, ambiguous plane of reality which is a nature without actually being one and has the paradoxical character of a nature that is not “natural.” Hence it is a nature not given as such but produced, created, constructed from top to bottom, suited to become “productive,” flexible, transformable, to comply with the objectives of growth. Itself the product of change, it is always open to change, resulting in an order whose persistence is asserted in the principle of change. Therefore, what we have here is an unstable condition which, in the absence of a base or foundation or purpose to secure it, derives its very substance from its instability. It represents the same through the figure of the other, permanence in the form of novelty. That great practical metaphysician Mme Parisot might well adopt Nietzsche’s dictum according to which “man is the not yet determined animal” (das noch nicht festgestellte Tier). The meaning of this saying lies entirely in the “not yet” (noch nict), indicating the fundamental precariousness of a form of existence in search of its realization, towards which it does not cease to strive precisely in so far as it never attains it. Arguably, if the human, together with human labor-power whose employment constitutes living labor, belongs to second nature, it is because everything in its “nature” or alleged nature is potentially “secondary”; that is, not strictly speaking derived but having an absolutely secondary character that cannot be related to any base or foundation. Therefore, a procedure of expropriation, going beyond the alternative of perfect order and pure disorder, lies behind the topic of second nature. This procedure represents an uncertain mixture of order and disorder that is perpetually flexible and open to manipulation, always ready to tip the scales in a literally never-ending back and forth, searching not above but below, always plumbing the depths of the unrealized, of the “not yet fixed” where the idea of “productivity” takes on its full meaning.17
What is it that allows second nature to present itself as “a” nature even though it is no longer “a” nature or “of” nature? It is the fact that it guides human behavior without ever appearing to consciousness as its governing principle, this being the main condition of its efficacy. It operates under the guise of spontaneity. To belong to second nature is to live under compulsion while accepting this condition as self-evident, hence from the outset refusing to question its raison d’être, the ends it serves and the specific limits placed on these ends. This is, broadly speaking, what Bourdieu sought to analyse using the concept of habitus, and Foucault that of discipline. When he puts forward the concept of habitus,18 Bourdieu resists the temptation to put it under the heading of doctrines of “voluntary servitude.” In his opinion these make the mistake of reintroducing a certain measure of reflexivity into the adoption or acceptance of a type of behavior that is acquired without even being aware of it and followed mechanically, so to speak naturally, except that this “natural” belongs not to first but to second nature. In a similar spirit, Foucault refuses to conceive of discipline as an order or injunction descending from the soul into the body: for discipline is only established at the level of the body and its acknowledged powers through a process of trial and error, relying on disciplining strategies which, as far their functioning is concerned, do not obey any determinate finality that can be consciously understood. This is the sense of the definition of discipline put forward in the lecture “The Mesh of Power”:
Discipline is basically the mechanism of power by which we come to exert control in the social body right down to the finest elements, by which we succeed in grabbing hold of the social atoms themselves, which is to say individuals. Techniques for the individualization of power. How to supervise [surveiller] someone, how to control his conduct, his behavior, his aptitudes, how to intensify his performance, multiply his capacities, how to put him in a place where he will be most useful: this is what I mean by discipline.19
When Foucault speaks, as he does here, of “the mechanism by which we come to exert control,” a formulation which seems to confuse the positions of the one who analyzes the system and the one who makes it function for his own benefit – and not about “the mechanism by which control is exerted,” which would amount to separating out these positions – he doubtless wishes to indicate that the existence of such a system is consubstantial with what he elsewhere calls “the ontology of present,” in the sense of a present which cannot but be ours and thus coincide with our historical epoch. The disciplinary mechanism imposes itself as something that appears natural precisely at the level our actuality, to which it is strictly adapted as only a technology aiming at efficiency can be. It is not self-evident that it should be observed from a distance and reduced to its guiding principle, which is what Marx in a tour de force nevertheless managed to achieve.
Consequently, subjection to the order or disorder of second nature, according to the specific procedures of a discipline or habitus, eliminates the formality of reasoned and conscious assent: but this is to be subjected without any objection to the rule of “it is so,” ruling out any prospect of reflection and critical distance, the bases of contestation. What we have here is a form of subjection that creates a corresponding subject by recreating it ab initio and entirely, denying it any prior, preconstituted reality preceding its imposition. When it functions under these conditions, command transcends the alternative of violence and consensus, as Foucault explains in his essay “The Subject and Power”:
The exercise of power may well inspire as much acceptance as one would like: it can pile up the dead and hide itself behind whatever threats it can imagine. In itself the exercise of power is not a violence which sometimes hides, nor is it an implicitly renewed consent. It is a set of actions upon possible actions; it operates in the field of possibility where the behavior of acting subjects is inscribed: it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult, it enlarges or limits, it renders more or less probable; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; but it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action…to govern in this sense is to structure the possible field of action of others.20
The new power established in this way is one exercised not on real, already accomplished actions, but on possible ones whose implementation it anticipates by “structuring the field of possible action” in which the latter will take place. This field of possible action is precisely what constitutes second nature, whose subjects are configured so as to respond to what is expected of them without any need either to persuade or force them. For they themselves are “possible” subjects, assembled from birth and trained so as to be more easily governed, that is, from the perspective of our return to Marx, economically “productive.” Homo oeconomicus, whose integration is accomplished by this structure, is a fiction in that its reality or “nature” is completely fabricated as a second nature; but this fiction necessarily became real from the historical moment when it became part of the functioning of the mechanisms it blindly serves.
It should now be clear why Bourdieu and Foucault converge in dismissing the reference to ideology, which purports to place between people, their natural dispositions, and the historical forms within which these are exploited an intermediate layer occupied by ideal representations located in the spirit. From this point of view, the Althusserian theory of the ideological interpellation of individuals into subjects is inappropriate and is diagnosed as the return of a rampant spiritualism. For them, the procedure of subjection takes place entirely at the level of the body as an act of penetration or possession which neither corresponds to any recognizable goals of its own nor requires the mediation of any word, good or bad, because it becomes identical with the course of its reproduction. And it should be acknowledged that if the procedure by which the power that produces is transformed into a productive power finds its justification in the ideology of growth which intellectually reunites the outcome of the procedure in the discourse of the capitalist who has himself, little by little, and blindly, developed this same procedure, not knowing exactly where he was going: then this ideology, which intervenes after the fact and takes the form of a secondary elaboration whose role is to justify recuperation, has at best only an auxiliary value. It does not play any direct role in the operation through which this transformation takes place, a transformation that cannot be reduced to a language game. It does not make the decision. For the system of wage-labor – with its specific type of subjection that conditions the existence of the productive subject and not only the subject that produces – to work it is not necessary for ideas and words to be prime movers. What is required are technological and institutional mechanisms which comprehensively refashion the status of the living beings subject to this regime, that is the complex totality of the procedures which Foucault groups together under the concept of “biopower.” Such a power is exercised and produces its effects on the rhythm of life itself which, having taken over, it strives to recreate ab initio. When the capitalist hires productive subjects –the bearers of a two-sided labor-power, both Arbeitskraft and Arbeitsvermögen, a division that enables him to extract surplus value in its two forms, absolute, by extending the length of the working day, and relative, by lowering the cost of goods through raising productivity – he does not have to act the smooth-talking salesman and convince them of the reasonableness of this division. This division appears to them, that is the productive subjects they have become, an established fact that they do not have the choice of accepting or refusing. Bourdieu is right to claim that their servitude is by no means voluntary simply because there is no need, or even possibility, for it to be so considered to be accepted.21
In establishing second nature as part of the process of making labor-power “productive,” capitalism has as it were dissolved ideology in economy, in the sense of both the system of material production and the methods that organize it so as to extract maximum profit at minimum loss. One of those methods, according to Foucault, is the disciplinary system which he defines in general as follows:
Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities. It is true that there is nothing exceptional or even characteristic in this; every system of power is presented with the same problem. But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this ‘economic’ growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system.22
Foucault clearly indicates here that this disciplinary economy applies not to individuals taken separately but to “multiplicities.” It is precisely by incorporating individual lives into such multiplicities, “masses,” that it manages to “economize” their usage in a way that, amongst other savings, obviates the need for ideological representations. The latter weigh in, if at all, only after the event, when the job is already done, having no influence over its course, a course already mapped out by second nature, with little chance of deviation and none of renegotiation.
At first sight, such a situation seems hopeless. If there is at best still some room left for a change in consciousness, it comes only after the fact, hence too late for the problem to be discussed and negotiated. Does this mean that the new figure of power – a horizontal power, close to the ground, insidious, which never has to admit its true nature because it has the advantage of appearing self-evident and spontaneous – wipes out any possibility of resistance? No, but only on condition that our understanding of resistance is completely revised. This revision would dismiss the idea of a global resistance, planned and initiated from the start from a center; and because it is based on a clear understanding of the situation, draws its efficacy from its ability to develop a coherent discourse of justification. Snared in the “mesh“ of the new power, which catches it so to speak at source in its everyday existence, the productive subject can rely only on mobile points of scattered resistance that are initially blind and uncoordinated. The instability of the conjuncture associated with the ambiguity of second nature, which is a mixture of order and disorder, opens an indefinable space for such points of resistance. Rather than adopt a project of permanent rupture corresponding to the formula “class against class” – a striking example being the ideological theme of the revolutionary moment of truth, all the more striking because it is divorced from reality – the productive subject finds a way to oppose the system that captures him from birth and constitutes the key to his subjection, a subjection that makes him a split subject. He does so by engaging in partial struggles, most often improvised, making the most of those occasions when the underlying ambiguities and contradictions of the system, whose trace cannot be completely erased, come to the fore. There is no recourse against biopower, at least in the beginning, save in forms of bio-resistance that, without illusions and with the energy of despair, exploit its weaknesses as much as possible. They do so postponing the synthesis, the provisional reunification of these dispersed initiatives even if it means taking up the problem from scratch when the opportunity arises. Therefore, the productive subject is left with plural strategies, whose threads he is in no hurry to gather into general programmes. The latter are necessarily misleading if they claim to definitively resolve the question with which they are confronted, a question whose clear and rational perception emerges only gradually without promises or guarantees. The best thing for the worker, when pressured to be always more productive, is to follow the very path taken by the capitalist to establish the system of exploitation from which he hopes to extract the maximum profit. Namely, he must proceed by trial and error, step by step, so as to establish little by little, against the technologies of power that have taken control of his very existence, technologies of resistance that strive where possible to loosen this grip. It is therefore in the very process of production, where the employer deploys various figures of authority, that the subjugated worker comes to fight and oppose the authority which has succeeded in penetrating the innermost recesses of his being. This struggle and this opposition, however, have no chance of success if they are waged individually. That is why they have to be taken in charge by workers’ associations, mainly by what are today called unions, that organize their protests down to the last detail and subordinate them to more and more collaborative and coordinated planning in such a way as to rid them of the unfinished character to which they are condemned as long as they remain spontaneous.
The New Power and Forms of Authority Developed Within the Labor Process Itself
From the above we can see why Foucault was particularly interested in the passages of Capital which highlight figures of authority that are closely bound up with the labor process and represent the advent of the new form of power. It is possible in particular to re-read the few pages concerning cooperation of the eleventh chapter (Chapter 13 of Joseph Roy’s translation) of the fourth section of the first book of Capital where some specific modalities of the integration of power relations with the labor process are examined: a trick the capitalist employs, like a magician, to overcome the opposition between freedom and necessity to his advantage.
The first condition of this integration is provided by the assembly of workers in the same place of work, not only next to but together with each other:
A large number of workers working together, at the same time, in one place (or, if you like, in the same field of labour, auf dem selben Arbeitsfeld), in order to produce the same sort of commodity under the command of the same capitalist, constitutes the starting point of capitalist production. This is true both historically and conceptually.23
This assembly in the same “field” where their operations are to be coordinated has a direct impact on the way the workers set their labor-power in motion:
Even without an alteration in the method of work, the simultaneous employment of a large number of workers produces a revolution in the objective conditions of the labour process.24
According to the proverb, “unity is strength,” a power resulting not only from the addition of associated elements but from their combination, which by synthesising them creates a new power whose productive potential is increased both quantitatively and qualitatively:25
Just as the offensive power of a squadron of cavalry, or the defensive power of an infantry regiment, is essentially different from the sum of the offensive or defensive powers of the individual soldiers taken separately, so the sum total of the mechanical forces exerted by isolated workers differs from the social force that is developed when many hands co-operate in the same undivided operation, such as raising a heavy weight, turning a winch or getting an obstacle out of the way. In such cases the effect of the combined labour could either not be produced at all by isolated individual labour, or it could be produced only by a great expenditure of time, or on a very dwarf-like scale. Not only do we have here an increase in the productive power of the individual, by means of co-operation, but the creation of a new productive power, which is intrinsically a collective one.26
The combined working day produces a greater quantity of use values than an equal sum of isolated working days, and consequently diminishes the labour-time necessary for the production of a given useful effect. Whether the combined working day, in a given case, acquires this increased productivity because it heightens the mechanical force of labour, or extends its sphere of action over a greater space, or contracts the field of production relatively to the scale of production, or at the critical moment sets large masses of labour to work, or excites rivalry between individuals and raises their animal spirits, or impresses on the similar operations carried on by a number of men the stamp of continuity and many-sidedness, or performs different operations simultaneously, or economizes the means of production by use in common, or lends to individual labour the character of average social labour – whichever of these is the cause of the increase, the special productive power of the combined working day is, under all circumstances, the social productive power of labour, or the productive power of social labour. This power arises from co-operation itself.27
In particular, once it became a part of this collective power individual labor-power changed its nature, making it calculable according to different parameters. It has ceased to be this or that power whose character is specifically determined by the bodily existence of its owner. As explained, it has become labor-power, even social labor-power, measurable according to unified criteria, enabling the planning, the rationalization of its application in order to increase its productivity, a notion applied to labor-power in general, termed social labor-power, before being extended to the particular labor-power of individuals. The main aspect of this change is constituted by the appearance of, what Marx calls, “the average working day.” At the end of the nineteenth century Taylor will take up this concept when talking of “the loyal working day,” the basic unit of his system of rational work organization. Like Quetelet’s “average man,” this average working day is an abstraction since it never actually completely coincides with the concrete activity of any given worker united in the same field of work, for whom this notion at best functions as a benchmark, a program to fulfill, presupposing a certain margin of approximation or error. But for the capitalist, this abstraction is no longer exactly an abstraction inasmuch as he takes it into account in the calculations according to which he manages his enterprise. In effect, work for him exists only as the result of the employment of a “collective power,” and is defined as such in his accounts. Asserting his authority, he strives to translate this power into reality in his workshops where workers are brought to work together and not separately, each by and/or for himself.
Let us note in passing that, beyond the transformations that cooperation stamps upon the productive consumption of labor-power ‒ which thereby becomes a “collective power” – the characteristic of the new type of society, whose establishment coincides with the industrial revolution and which Foucault calls “the society of norms,” is the, so to speak, mass28 assembly and management of its subjects. Thanks to analytic tools such as statistics and probability calculus – previously unknown to the state administration– it has become possible to evaluate collective performance not on the scale of isolated cases but of large numbers, and from there to anticipate the development of this performance and to adjust its course with the aim of improving productivity. Instead of being carried out on an ad hoc basis, in a disorganized way, individual actions are in some way anticipated, prepared, prefigured by the global system within which they occur, thereby influencing their outcome. One of the aspects of this change is represented by the transformation of agents of production into productive subjects which fundamentally modifies the conditions in which their work is done. In terms of work results, productive subjects must now meet programmed expectations over which they have lost control. The objectives they must achieve are determinable prior to the process charged with accomplishing them. What is decisive in this regard is that one has begun to think in terms of possibilities that can be defined independently of their implementation. In general, “powers” are sought out even beyond the limits of the field of manufacture or industrial production. These powers have the status of virtual realities which are imparted in advance with capacities that have only to be actualized by conforming to the models prescribed to them.
In a society of norms everything is programmed or can be programmed. The behavior of each individual compelled to take his place in a process that is molded in such a way loses the character of individual actions possessing an intrinsic value. It is listed, catalogued, formatted according to functional criteria that are not up for discussion and impose themselves by claiming to be self-evident. In such a collective way of life which is, as we already observed in relation to industrial production, metaphysics in action, one could say, in fact, that essence precedes existence. The order established following this type of procedure is binding but exerts its constraints more smoothly, insidiously, precisely because it takes the subjects to which it is applied at the very source, anticipating their behavior, preparing and leading them towards their goal by incorporating itself into their conduct. When their behavior does not comply with set objectives they are penalized with rejection, sidelined without any need for formal sanction. In this respect, we can speak of conditioning by a norm which no longer depends on obedience to external commands, for like what we previously called “second nature,” it has become completely immanent to the processes it affects as it completes them. In this way, the new politics of “populations” of which Foucault speaks is propagated, a politics that is simultaneously and inseparably an economics since, in the last instance, it is at the level of the economy that the new challenges of power are defined, from which new figures of subjection follow.
These remarks allow us to better grasp the scope and limits of the concept of “the disciplinary society,” on which Foucault from the outset based his explanation of the nature of the new type of power established during the second half of the 18th century within the specific framework of liberal society. The usage of this concept, introduced by Foucault in 1975 in Discipline and Punish, encounters a basic problem. Does describing a certain type of a society as “disciplinary” mean attributing to it an organizing principle, “discipline,” that applies equally to all its aspects and consequently determines it in its very being, more precisely in its “disciplinary being?” This issue is raised by Stéphane Legrand in his article, “Le marxisme oublié de Foucault,” which warns against the essentialist and reductive syncretism of the notion of discipline under which Foucault sometimes seems to subsume mutually heterogeneous forms of subjection, reducing these to a single process for which “discipline” always provides the model: “One wonders, how is it that this same schema can be used to produce training, military prowess, productivity at work, hospital treatment?”29 In the same spirit, we could question the relevance of the concept of “norm” when it lays claim to an explanatory value in itself. However, it is clear that when Foucault talks about the “society of norms” – if this formula means anything and can be taken seriously – it is not in reference to the ideal model of a society of the norm but to a reality of a completely different order, to a complex and differentiated game of norms, a notion that is at any rate better to employ only in the plural. Otherwise one risks attributing to different norms, coexisting at a given moment and potentially confronting each other in the same historical social formation, a single purpose relating to the specific power of a norm in itself, considered both as an essence and as a cause. When, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault talks about “discipline” in the singular (as he does when he gives this title to the third part of the book) he takes precisely this risk and even appears to make matters worse when he presents the panoptic schema not as a particular example but as a sort of model that, starting from the specific case of the prison, can be universally applied, to other disciplinary institutions like the army, school, workshop, hospital, etc…The notion of discipline, like that of “norm,” can only serve as an effective analytic tool if it ceases to be reduced to the abstract presupposition of a convergence of its forms of application and is instead directed towards the interaction of these forms in a context where their content is exposed to perpetual renegotiation. Analogously, if one presents the intervention of norms in the social order by reducing it to a program of “rationalization” formulated with reference to the principle of a reason entirely constituted a priori in itself, one erases at once the historical and thus conjunctural character of this intervention.30
This general objection is not the only one that we can make to the notion of the “disciplinary society.” If the society of norms was nothing but a society of discipline, this would mean that the only point of application for its mechanisms would be behavior, and more specifically individual bodily behaviors whose reform is precisely their objective. However, what characterizes the society of norms is precisely that it does not treat individuals as such but as elements forming larger groups, the type formed by populations. Thanks to this move, it is capable of “governing” them in the very specific meaning that Foucault imparts to this notion, that is, to use a formula we have already encountered, “structuring the field of their possible action.” When Marx speaks of the “field of labor (Arbeitsfeld),” where the capitalist organizes the production of surplus value under his command, he aims precisely at something of this kind. Within such a “field,” the workers have ceased to exist as individuals and become productive subjects, totally immersed in the “collective power,” that is in a collective body outside of which they no longer have a reality of their own.
Let us bring this digression to an end and return to the analysis of new modes of the labor process, in so far as they rest upon the consumption of a collective power, thus enabling the increase of its productivity. Thanks to the unification of individual powers into a collective power, the capitalist is now in a position to exert strict control not only over the results of the labor process, hence over its product as dead labor (Werk, travail, work), but also over its course as the application of living labor (Arbeit, travail, labor). The change in scale thus provokes a modification in the nature of labor. In the beginning the exploitation/extortion of surplus value applies to the individual worker, forced to work not for himself but for another. As exploitation becomes integrated with and “massifes” the operation of the labor process, it comes to apply to the collective worker who performs labor in common, social labor whose organization it now takes in charge:
We also saw that, at first, the command of capital over labour (das Kommando des Kapitals über die Arbeit) was only a formal result of the fact that the worker, instead of working for himself, works for, and consequently under, the capitalist. Through the co-operation of numerous wage-labourers, the command of capital develops into a requirement for carrying on the labour process itself, into a real condition of production. That a capitalist should command in the field of production is now as indispensable as that a general should command on the field of battle. All directly social or communal labour on a large scale requires, to a greater or lesser degree, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious co-operation of the activities of individuals, and to perform the general functions that have their origin in the motion of the total productive organism, as distinguished from the motion of its separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor: an orchestra requires a separate one. The work of directing, supervision and mediation becomes one of the functions of capital, from the moment that the labour under capital’s control becomes co-operative. As a specific function of capital, the directing function acquires its own special characteristics.31
Marx here makes two comparisons in order to explain how the capitalist “directs” the exploitation of labor-power; on the one hand, with the army general, and on the other, with the conductor of an orchestra. These comparisons become even more interesting once further parallels have been drawn between them. The orchestra represents modalities of cooperation conforming primarily to technical objectives; and the army modalities of cooperation involving a vertical, hierarchical structure which organizes joint action by transmitting orders and checking that they are followed in practice, that is obeyed. In line with these two models, a system of authority combining several functions is established: directing, supervision and mediation, as enumerated by Marx in this passage. Direction is the very first form of authority which consists in giving impetus to a movement by prescribing it an unified orientation from which it must not deviate. It establishes the principle of simplification, reducing diversity to homogeneity. The very first task the conductor must ensure instrumentalists respect is that they play together, and not each for himself according to whim. Under the command of its general, communicated through its “daily orders,” an army must march “as one man,” leaving no space for deviant behavior and eliminating in advance rebels or protesters who have no choice but to exit a game in which they no longer belong. However, this direct form of authority, which is exercised far and wide, is not enough: left to itself it risks remaining a dead letter. That is why it must be circulated and in a way cashed in, distributed. Besides a higher authority that in the last instance gives the orders, this presupposes mediating bodies that supervise their application in detail, checking that the smallest individual acts conform to common rules and respect the norms. For this reason, instead of being uniformly communicated from center to periphery, authority expands through the countless channels of a complex organization, thus becoming sufficiently flexible to adapt itself to all aspects of productive activity without exception: in other words, it diversifies. However, to avoid diversification turning into dispersion, flexibility into a factor of disorder, it is necessary, moreover, that the multiplicity of mediating bodies, which concretely enact authority in such a way that it penetrates the most minute details of the labor process, are not left to themselves but are kept to the overall perspective they must obey and from which they must not be detached. Thus, they are reduced to the status of “mediations” chained to one another. Once again, the hierarchical model of the army is foregrounded. Its aides de camp, officers, N.C.O.s, martinets and minions of all kinds ensure that power, instead of residing only at the head, is present at all points of the organization, even the most minute, where it is reproduced, “represented” to the extent that it is assigned a place within the system in which it participates and on which it depends. In such an organization, there is not, on the one side, power, and on the other, opposite it, those it dominates, but a complex network whose proliferating intermediary links occupy positions that are at the same time those of dominant and dominated. Here obeying and commanding are no longer alternative functions but combine to the point where they can no longer be distinguished from one another, which means that those occupying these places obey by commanding. In this way, the operations of direction-supervision-mediation, which enable the organization of the labor process to produce the maximum relative surplus value, are based on this organization, which becomes thoroughly entangled in the “meshes of power” from which it can no longer escape. Foucault took up this idea in summary fashion in his Discipline and Punish:
Surveillance thus becomes a decisive economic operator both as an internal part of the production machinery and as a specific mechanism in the disciplinary power.32
In a footnote, Foucault cites the end of the passage of Chapter 13 (Chapter 11 of the original German edition) of the Roy translation of Capital that we have just commented on.33
In this regard, one can speak of a generalization of authority, which as it extends becomes immanent to the process of its realization, with which it fully merges. Paradoxically, this generalization, which in the beginning follows a pattern of homogenization, leads to an operation of specification or specialization, thus granting relative autonomy to the mediating instances that we have just been discussing:
If capitalist direction is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of the process of production which has to be directed-on the one hand a social labour process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital’s process of valorization – in form it is purely despotic (despotisch). As co-operation extends its scale, this despotism (Despotismus) develops the forms that are peculiar to it. Just as at first the capitalist is relieved from actual labour as soon as his capital has reached that minimum amount with which capitalist production, properly speaking, first begins, so now he hands over the work of direct and constant supervision of the individual workers and groups of workers to a special kind of wage-labourer. An industrial army of workers under the command of a capitalist requires, like a real army, officers (managers) and N.C.O.s (foremen, overseers), who command during the labour process in the name of capital. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function.34
In order to adhere to the operation of the labor process, the command of capital follows it in the double sense of guiding and supervising it, step by step, in such a way that the pressure that command exerts is permanent and the chances of discrepancy or loss are kept to a minimum. Consequently, mass production refines the forms of the division of labor, separating out functions corresponding to activities that are not directly productive and perform this role of guidance and supervision. The idea of supervision, as Foucault has shown, notably in the studies devoted to disciplinary procedures, is part and parcel of the functioning of the society of norms. What specifically does the supervision of activities mean? It means that activities should not only be controlled afterwards in terms of their effects or results but supervised at source even before they have begun to take effect. The system of supervision has primarily a preventive role, acts as a deterrent. It prefigures the ends it seeks to enforce and is the more effective as it has no need to intervene in the activities with sanctions or punishment. This is exactly the function assigned to managerial staff whose authority, precisely because it fulfils a supervisory function, operates in close contact with the labor process, which it “follows” step by step and even precedes, directing the latter in a such a way as to leave no margin of deviation or error. Thanks to these intermediaries, the command of capital spreads throughout the productive body, throughout the collective power of social labor, taking full control using different channels whose organizational structure it has mastered. This is the precondition for its spreading without diluting. On the contrary, it is all the stronger for employing this multiplicity of channels which refine its distribution.
This distribution, ending up with the diversification of control and supervision tasks, is eventually accomplished by the separation of manual and intellectual labor, that is labor which is not satisfied with just “doing” the job or working but in return reflects upon it. This reflection on the organization of the labor process, which aims to set in motion the new collective power created by cooperation, is accomplished both at a distance and in close proximity, on an ad hoc basis and uninterruptedly. Freed from material, that is manual forms of labor, intellectual labor of different levels of graduation provides itself with the means to intervene all the time and everywhere. The first to free himself from the process of production properly speaking – that is the productive consumption of labor power – is the capitalist or boss. From his office, he pulls all the strings, takes important decisions, defines company strategy. In his train, little by little, all those he needs to transmit his orders and make sure they are correctly applied become detached or rather specialized in the “supervision” of the work of others – messengers, inspectors, security personnel, drill sergeants of every shape and stripe, to whom he delegates a part of his authority so as to consolidate its extension.
In this respect, we can talk about an economy of power which is simultaneously a conservation of power. Authority is managed like a material power, thereby reinforcing its effectiveness, whose measure in the last instance is the maximum production of profit. Let us cite in this connection a final passage from the chapter of Capital on cooperation, which summarizes its gains:
The worker is the owner of his labour-power until he has finished bargaining for its sale with the capitalist, and he can sell no more than what he has – i.e. his individual, isolated labour-power. This relation between capital and labour is in no way altered by the fact that the capitalist, instead of buying the labour-power of one man, buys that of 100, and enters into separate contracts with 100 unconnected men instead of with one. He can set the 100 men to work, without letting them co-operate. He pays them the value of 100 independent labour-powers, but he does not pay for the combined labour-power of the 100. Being independent of each other, the workers are isolated. They enter into relations with the capitalist, but not with each other. Their co-operation only begins with the labour process, but by then they have ceased to belong to themselves. On entering the labour process they are incorporated into capital. As co-operators, as members of a working organism, they merely form a particular mode of existence of capital. Hence the productive power developed by the worker socially is the productive power of capital. The socially productive power of labour develops as a free gift to capital whenever the workers are placed under certain conditions, and it is capital which places them under these conditions. Because this power costs capital nothing, while on the other hand it is not developed by the worker until his labour itself belongs to capital, it appears as a power which capital possesses by its nature – a productive power inherent in capital.35
This brings us back to the analyses presented at the beginning of this essay. What the capitalist buys and pays with a wage – under the terms of the labor contract, which is an exchange between parties free and equal in law – is the possibility of using the labor-power of each individual producer for a certain time within the spatial limits of his firm. But, in reality, what he exploits in order to extract a surplus value that he appropriates in full is a general productive power that is more than the sum of individual labor-powers, and which consequently he obtains gratis. This general productive power – that, in Marx’s words, “capital possesses by its nature, a productive power inherent in capital” – is the specific result of cooperation which inserts individual activities into the collective labor process as it is performed under the command of capital, corresponding to productivity norms that have literally seized hold of these activities by placing them under control and supervision. The authority the capitalist exercises in this context is legitimate, therefore legally unassailable, for it rests on an exchange based on rules mutually agreed by the contracting parties. Besides being legitimate this contract is from the point of view of the capitalist also efficient since its implementation “returns” a surplus value in the form of the production of relative surplus value that constitutes his own profit. Without any prospect of profit, unless he is a saint, which is unlikely, he would never embark on any such undertaking. This enterprise turns him into what we have proposed to call a metaphysician in action, one bringing together all the conditions required for essence to precede existence not only on paper but in reality as well. At a push, one could say that capitalist industrial production manufactures the human essence as a form of productive power in order to exploit it.
One can appreciate how much these analyses might have interested Foucault and encouraged him in his efforts to develop a new, non-juridical conception of power. These analyses make it possible to get at, what he called, the “real functioning” of power, of which the law is, at best, the ideological reverse, that is, a representation out of step with how it actually operates. However, one cannot say in the abstract that this ideology is purely and simply wrong and as such should be rejected as an illusion that it would suffice to dispel. For, in its own way, it participates in the functioning of power and contributes to its effectiveness:
Let me offer a general and tactical reason that seems self-evident: power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if it were entirely cynical? For it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its operation. Not only because power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates, but because it is perhaps just as indispensable to the latter: would they accept it if they did not see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom however slight – intact? Power as a pure limit set on freedom is, at least in our society, the general form of its acceptability.36
To be productive, power must become integrated into networks that, along with wealth-producing material goods, produce the bodies which laboriously manufacture these very goods, conforming to norms that govern their manufacture. The condition for this is that the action of power is gradual, without drawing attention or being recognized, otherwise its attempts at penetration run into points of resistance that its advance, once exposed, in turn provokes. To achieve this goal, that is to remain invisible, power uses decoys, including the inverted representation of its action provided by juridical discourse. The trick is to recuperate this representation, which taken in itself corresponds to nothing real, and make it an element of the technology of power.37 This operation, which reduces the law to the level of a pure representation disconnected from any real content, and thus to a negative representation, does not have a timeless character, but takes place, as Foucault specifies, “at least in our society.” In other words, it should not be used to characterize power in general, a concept devoid of any real content. It rather applies to the type of historical society which has made productivity the heart of its existence and developed forms of industrial “cooperation” to achieve this end, that is, in different terminology, capitalist society. In the latter the technologies of power have taken on a particularly refined appearance, permitting them amongst other feats to turn the language of law to their advantage as a mask for their real activity which takes place on a plane entirely different to that of the law and its prohibitions. In other forms of society, such as feudal society, one might ask whether the law was just a language serving the same type of discourse of recovery used by the bourgeoisie. Academic Marxism fell headlong into this trap. It took literally the discourse of power elaborated by bourgeois society which makes power appear as a “superstructure” whose orders come down from high. In reality these orders ascend bottom up, from the depths of the system where value is produced. The truth of power, “at least in our society,” is economic before being political.38
According to Foucault, Marx helps us to better understand this, at least in those passages of his work where he deconstructs the “mechanisms” through which capital exerts its authority over labor, exploiting labor-power so as to increase its “productivity.” But, for this to happen the subjects must themselves be made “productive,” thanks to appropriate procedures of subjection which are part of the establishment of the new economy. These complex procedures of subjection are related to the establishment of the new form of power which, by overcoming the alternative between the individual and collective, constantly moves back and forth between the sphere of the economy and that of politics. As Foucault has explained in a key passage of Discipline and Punish where he refers in a note to Chapter 11/13 of Capital on cooperation, and to Deleule and Guéry’s Productive Body:
If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact, the two processes – the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital – cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital. At a less general level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of production, the division of labor and the elaboration of the disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very close relations (cf. Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Chapter XIII and the very interesting analysis in Guéry and Deleule). Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other. The disciplinary pyramid constituted the small cell of power within which the separation, coordination and supervision of tasks was imposed and made efficient; and analytical partitioning of time, gestures and bodily forces constituted an operational schema that could easily be transferred from the groups to be subjected to the mechanisms of production; the massive projection of military methods onto industrial organization was an example of this modelling of the division of labor following the model laid down by the schemata of power. But, on the other hand, the technical analysis of the process of production, its “mechanical” breaking-down, were projected onto the labor force whose task it was to implement it: the constitution of those disciplinary machines in which the individual forces that they bring together are composed into a whole and therefore increased is the effect of this projection. Let us say that discipline is the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a ‘political’ force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force. The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, “political anatomy,” could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.39
This passage confirms, without having to decide between the hypothesis of a Foucault who is (still) a Marxist and that of Marx who is (already) a Foucauldian, that the encounter between these two analysts of the modern regime of sociability had already taken place, resulting in a new conception of power, authority and the subject which can be taken as the basis for further analyses.
– Translated by Tijana Okić, Patrick King, and Cory Knudson
Comments
The Role of the Housewife in Social Production
Introduction
The contemporary American left press often discusses the 1970s Italian feminist arguments for the productive character of housework. However, this argument had already been made somewhat closer to home. In 1936 Communist Party USA fellow traveler and eventual member Mary Inman, who had roots in Socialist Party and IWW milieus, wrote a large manuscript reviewing anthropological theories of sexual difference, popular discourses around femininity, and the economic role of housework. The manuscript was rejected by the CPUSA, but portions were serialized in the San Francisco-based daily People’s World, and eventually published in book form in 1940’s In Woman’s Defense. Its theoretical conclusion was radical and explicitly stated: “We come then to see the social importance of 22 million housewives’ work, and its present day relation to the production of commodities. And we see how erroneous is the belief that the housewife became unimportant to the system of production when the home mainly ceased to be the place of production it once was. We say mainly, and not entirely, because the most valuable of all commodities is still produced there: Labor Power.”
While Inman’s theory was articulated in the language of the Popular Front, with a strong emphasis on middle-class women, it nevertheless sparked a bitter debate, opposed in official CP polemics by Avram Landy which insisted that women had no special interests beyond gender-neutral socialism. The remainder of Inman’s book, along with a counter-polemic, was published as Woman-Power in 1942, followed in turn by Landy’s 1943 Marxism and the Woman Question. Completely marginalized by the CP, from which she eventually resigned, Inman envisioned a new organization for women called the “Union of Labor-Power Production Workers,” and participated in the “anti-revisionist” movement that split from the Party in the late 40s. In an extraordinary 1949 pamphlet called 13 Years of CPUSA Misleadership on the Woman Question, Inman drew lines of demarcation that had been blurred in the earlier period, exposing the complicity between economic reductionism and identitarian reformism in the CPUSA. By effacing the economic role of women’s work and naturalizing the social phenomenon of motherhood, the Party reduced the mass “struggle against capitalist oppression of women” to the ideological contestation of “masculine superiority.” Socialism, cut off from the agency of working-class women, became little more than an abstract policy to be implemented from above in alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie, including bourgeois women’s organizations.
Inman continued to elaborate on these themes up to 1964’s The Two Forms of Production in Capitalism. We present here an essay from In Woman’s Defense.
The Housewife’s Role in Social Production
Workers of no other group have had their importance so ignored and denied as present day housewives.
Because productive tasks once performed in the home are now performed elsewhere, the housewife’s work now is under-rated to such an extent that she is considered in certain quarters to even be living in ease and parasitism.
Adding to this erroneous notion, and appearing to support it, is the fact that the 22 million housewives who work only at home and do all their work have no earnings or income of their own and must depend upon their food, clothing and housing being bought with money earned by their husbands.
Now this support a husband gives his wife comes out of production, and if she is not useful, in fact indispensable to the owners of industry, why do they permit 22 million women to subsist on the proceeds of industry? They could not possibly be unaware that these 22 million women, not directly productive, are out there.
And this owning class is noted for its ability to exploit the balance of the population in some manner. So insistent are they that persons work for them that they even hound those they refuse to employ, because they are unemployed, as the bulk of the vagrancy cases bear witness.
Why then do not the paid propagandists of this owning class attack this arrangement of 22 million housewives being maintained out of the proceeds of industry, instead of lauding the arrangement and surrounding it with moralistic robes?
There can only be one answer. Under certain conditions it profits them. Under certain conditions it is irreplaceable.
One very striking peculiarity of certain trends of theory about woman and what is called woman’s work, is that this work has been described and then elsewhere, generally apart from it, broad generalizations have been made referring to woman’s subjugation being a part of the system of exploitation of human labor, but these two things have not been adequately connected.
It is somewhat as if the woods were described and in a separate section the trees were also described but the whole matter was left in such a disconnected shape that neither seemed to have any relation to the other; the trees did not appear to be in the woods and the woods were not a collectivity of trees.
Let us illustrate the point further. The work of a cook in a logging camp is a necessary part of the production of lumber. The services of all the cooks in all the camps, restaurants and eating places wherever productive workers are fed, are a necessary part of production. And for the same reason, the work of the cooks in the homes of productive workers is also, at present, a necessary part of production.
The labor of a woman, who cooks for her husband, who is making tires in the Firestone plant in Southgate, California, is essentially as much a part of the production of automobile tires as the cooks and waitresses in the cafes where Firestone workers eat.
And all the wives of all the Firestone workers, by the necessary social labor they perform in the home, have a part in the production of Firestone Tires, and their labor is as inseparably knit into those tires as is the labor of their husbands.
Anyone can multiply this illustration by the products produced by Republic Steel, Standard Oil, Henry Ford, etc., and always get the same answer, that the wives’ labor is a necessary service in the creation of products in these plants.
The labor of workers in the laundries who wash clothing for productive workers is necessary to the system of production. Maids and porters who sweep the floors, make the beds and tidy the rooms in boarding houses or camps where productive workers sleep and rest, so that they may prepare themselves to return to work the next day, are a necessary link in the productive process.
And in the same way, the labor of housewives in the homes of productive workers who perform the services of keeping clothing washed and beds and floors clean, is also an indispensable part of production.
Persons who work in houses where children are boarded and trained, or schooled, are performing a useful service, and their labor is indispensable to the present method of production and distribution. And for a similar reason, millions of women in homes, who do the greater part of such work, are rendering an indispensable service to the present method of producing and distributing commodities.
If profits are to be made, commodities must not only be produced but distributed. Both production and distribution are complex and are inseparably linked to communication and transportation, and have tentacles that extend into schools and almost every legitimate phase of human activity.
The housewife does not cook eight or nine hours like the camp cook, nor wash and iron a stated number of hours like the laundry worker, nor make beds for certain hours like the maid in the hotel or rooming house, nor teach and nurse and feed children, future productive workers, a stated number of hours like teachers and workers in nurseries and schools, but she does perform all these tasks, and more, for unlimited and unstated hours every day, every week, and every month for years.
If the man cook in the lumber camp could be held to a subordinate economic position, directly under another worker and required to work, not nine hours, but an indefinite number, from ten to twelve, or more, and be paid nothing directly but have to get his keep from the little extra given the worker over him, and then be scornfully referred to as being “kept,” it is easy to see that his employer would be further enriched by the decreased status and lengthened hours of the cook.
And it is in some such manner that the collective owners of industry, the Hearsts, Rockefellers, Mellons, du Ponts, Fords and Morgans benefit by the cheap labor of the collective housewives and their resultant economic and social degradation. Besides, the wife’s dependence is a means of binding the man too, and of reaching through the parents their subject children.
And what shall we say of the housework middle class women performed under developing capitalism, cleaning, cooking, ironing, scrubbing and washing clothes and dishes? We must consider the work of most of these women as being necessary to the system of production and distribution also.
It is true that some of them hired girls but in many cases where they did, the housewife herself performed a great deal of useful work. It is our belief that the majority of the women of what is commonly called the middle class, did not subsist parasitically upon society, but did socially useful, necessary work.
Why was it useful, and why was it necessary? Because at one stage of the development of capitalism the middle class was an indispensable part of the system of manufacturing and distributing commodities. These persons with small capital investments were useful to the big capitalists, who had not yet gotten around to department and chain stores, and mass production and distribution.
When feudalism was overthrown by capitalism, the new system in the process of revolutionizing production, and spreading over the world, utilized millions of small producers and distributors.
And until the big capitalists had time and opportunity to expand over the entire earth with imperialistic, monopolistic combines and interlocking companies, banks, loans and business interests, hundreds of thousands of little stores and one-man management factories, with the manager often making a hand himself, were required in the United States, and millions more were required throughout the world.
This middle class helped build and develop and present machine system. During the building, the larger capitalists benefited by collecting tribute in the form of rent, interest, taxes and in various other ways from this middle class.
Yet, although this tributed increased in kind and amount with the years, that did not satisfy the big capitalists who wanted ownership in more and more cases and not only wanted ownership but took it.
And in time, monopoly-finance capitalists, with their inside track on politics and increasing power of wealth control, through financing and producing goods and selling them cheaper, practically destroyed the once numerically great middle class.
The small individually owned and operated factories and stores became outmoded and could not compete with ever-growing enterprises not handicapped by small capital investments. Such a method of production and distribution truly belonged to the horse and buggy days, but like the horse and buggy, useful in its historical setting.
The middle class housewife then, who did useful housework for a husband engaged in such work of production and distribution, or for songs so engaged, or for songs who were already, or preparing to become, technicians, engineers or teachers for the capitalists, or for daughters who would become the working wives of men so employed, such middle class housewives filled a socially useful role in their day to day work, and they contributed to the cumulative building of the great factory process that is modern America.
Housewives of both the middle and the working classes helped create this wealth that is America today, and part of it belongs to them by right of toil.
Mary Inman (1894-1985) was a Marxist-feminist theorist and activist.
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The Social Reproduction of Sexuality: An Interview
Viewpoint: Why use a social reproduction frame to understand sexuality?
Alan Sears: For me, the usefulness of the social reproduction frame to understanding sexuality grows out of the current situation of queer politics. On the one hand, we have won rights that I never could have imagined when I first came out in the 1970s. In Canada, we have basically won full legal equality, ranging from non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to marriage and adoption rights. This is the outcome of powerful mobilizing. Some of the most exciting and defiant demonstrations I have ever been in were about queer struggles.
Yet, we have fallen far short of the vision of sexual liberation. The policing of sexuality continues, we have only shifted the bounds a bit. Just look at the recent raid of the rentboy.com offices in New York, which seems to be a crackdown on sex workers and queer sex. Gender normativity continues to pervade every area of our lives, even if the permissible ideas of masculinity and femininity have expanded a bit and the idea of gender transition is more recognized. Queerness has become a brand, one that people with limited incomes can’t afford to buy. It is not only Pride marches, but queer spaces and visibility that are defined by commerce. These spaces also tend to be defined by whiteness, as the experiences, histories, and activism of people of color and Indigenous people has often been marginalized by a dominant version of lesbian and gay identity rooted in particular social locations in the Global North.
I think the social reproduction frame helps us make sense of the contradictory gains that have been made, and therefore contributes to figuring out the next steps in sexual liberation. The crucial contribution is to show how sexuality and gender are nested in a whole set of relations of “life-making” organized around specific divisions of labor and hierarchies of dispossession. We can’t have real sexual liberation without addressing the ways our bodies and our lives are enmeshed in relations of work, household, and market, and regulated by the state.
VP: Could you be a bit more specific and tell us what you mean when you say our sexuality is enmeshed in other social relations?
AS: Sexuality is not separate from the rest of our lives. It is neither simply a biological drive nor a product of our minds. It is grounded in what we have to do to get by, the ways we use our bodies every day, the power relations that are present in every aspect of our lives. I think the social reproduction frame provides key tools to understand the ways sexuality is grounded in our everyday practices, and what that means for sexual liberation.
Capitalism is the only form of class society where the subordinated class is free in the sense of owning their own bodies. Yet that freedom is completely constrained by lack of ownership and control over the key productive resources of society. To live, we need to sell our capacity to work, be in a relationship with someone who is employed, or attain a wage equivalent, for example, through social assistance, pensions, or some other commercial activity.
Struggles around sexuality in capitalist societies are about navigating that contradiction between freedom and subordination, while sexual liberation requires actually overcoming that subordination. Let me give an example. Angela Davis argues that the sex-positivity in the music of Ma Rainey, Bessie Smith, and other African American women blues singers in the early twentieth century was connected to the fact that some sort of freedom in the realm of sexuality and personal relationships was one of the few real gains of emancipation from slavery. If you look at slavery in the Americas you see an ongoing history of sexual violence and the deliberate destruction of personal relationships built in to the regime of brutal coercion. It is not just that the system put slave owners in a position to rape, but that sexual coercion was part of the way they maintained their power.
African Americans did not win real economic justice or freedom from racist assault or abuse by gaining emancipation from slavery in capitalist America. Black Lives Matter reminds us of how present racist violence is today, and the role that policing and prisons, along with a whole host of other institutions, play in that racism. Emancipation from slavery did bring significant and tangible changes in the area of sexuality and personal relationships – though of course limited by racist violence, economic injustice, and the regime of male dominance built into capitalist gender relations.
I think a social reproduction approach helps us understand that contradiction. As members of the working class in capitalist societies, we own our own bodies, but are dispossessed of control over them. Rather than working directly to meet our wants and needs, we are forced to seek employment and/or engage in unpaid household caregiving labor to attain access to a wage. We do not control the work process or the product of our labor. A whole host of processes is loosed upon us to ensure subordination, ranging from schooling to prisons. We are thus alienated from our selves and each other. And that has a huge impact on our sexual being.
VP: But aren’t you running the risk of turning social reproduction into a kind of theory of everything?
AS: The social reproduction frame emerged specifically as a correction developed by Marxist-Feminists to the limited perspective on class and work advanced by the dominant streams of Marxism. Basically, this limited perspective meant that most Marxists located class formation in the realm of production, that is, wage labor in the paid workplace. Those holding this perspective basically ignored the role of the unpaid labor, mainly done by women in the household, to sustain the existing working class and raise the next generation.
The social reproduction frame opens up our idea of class formation, to include a range of paid and unpaid labor processes organized through divisions of labor that are gendered, racialized, and sexualized. The weight of unpaid labor is disproportionately freighted onto the shoulders of women, but the precise configuration of paid and unpaid labor through which people sustain themselves varies tremendously over time and in different social locations.
VP: You’re talking about gender and division of labor here, but it’s not clear how all this connects with sexuality.
AS: To start with, I think a social reproduction focus on divisions of labor casts a new light on ideas of “heteronormativity” and “homonormativity.” “Heteronormative” is a term used to describe the dominant expectations for heterosexual lifestyles that set the tone for acceptable sexuality for all of society. Heteronormativity is a package that includes divisions of labor, gendered aspirations, leisure patterns, and practices of sexuality. Heteronormativity is not simply ideological, a set of cultural expectations, but is grounded in work practices organized through power relations. Heteronormativity changes over time, and in different social locations.
Roderick Ferguson pointed out that heterosexual African Americans often lived in ways that did not fit with the dominant heteronormative patterns in the United States. For example, African American women tended to participate in wage labor at much higher rates than white women, often including burdensome physical labor that was otherwise not seen as “women’s work.” This has a huge impact on gendered expectations and household practices. We might add, the regime of mass imprisonment, especially disproportionate for African American and Indigenous men, creates non-heteronormative patterns as males are forcibly removed from their communities and detained in situations in which the fulfillment of heteronormative roles – as workers, partners, fathers – is simply impossible. So does the geographic dispersion that means a particular family may include very different households in a variety of countries, for example children raised by grandparents in the country of origin while the father is employed as a temporary migrant in another country and the mother as a paid domestic worker in a third country.
Heteronormativity is not simply about conformism, but about social power, dislocation, racism, divisions of paid and unpaid labor, and the spatial organization of the global labor market. When we say, then, that winning equality rights have meant that lesbians and gays have imitated heteronormativity to create “homonormativity,” this is not simply a decision to assimilate rather than transgress. It is about what Johanna Brenner calls “survival strategies” in a set of social relations organized around dispossession, exploitation, and oppression.
Homonormativity is not simply a choice, at the individual or political level. On the one hand, it is not even an option for some people – including many who are poor, racialized or trans, just as heteronormativity is not even an option for many who are racialized, Indigenous, or migrants as discussed above. On the other hand, many who might prefer to challenge homonormativity or heteronormativity may essentially be forced to conform by regimes of paid labor, unpaid labor, and state regulation. For example, the material pressures to marry in order to obtain migration status or access to benefits required for the well-being of household members (adults and/or children) might trump ideological concerns about inviting the state into our households.
If we want to go beyond heteronormativity and homonormativity, then, it is not only about asserting queerness but about creating the social conditions in which people can thrive while pursuing the ways they really want to live in terms of gender and sexuality. Not getting fired, not being stripped of benefits or status, not getting raped, not getting beaten up on the streets, not being imprisoned or shot by cops. The social reproduction frame reminds us that the organization of paid and unpaid labor in workplaces, households, and through state regulation has a huge impact on what options we may have to pursue sexuality. Of course, we have agency and can make history in the realm of sexuality, but our ability to do so will necessarily be constrained by what is happening in these other realms of life.
VP: Earlier you said that divisions of labor are not only gendered and racialized, but also sexualized. Could you explain what you mean by that?
AS: Divisions of labor orient our lives around particular embodied practices. The labor processes that are most central to our daily routines are bound to have an impact on our experience of our bodies and our desires. A pro football linebacker, an assembly line worker in an auto plant, a department store make-up seller, and a day care worker use their bodies very differently on a daily basis. Carolyn Steedman wrote powerfully about a kind of erotic death she felt as an elementary school teacher touching and being touched by kids all day to the extent that she closed down other forms of contact.1
If you look at the kind of work you are expected to do in paid and unpaid labor, in the household and in the place of employment, it creates a sense of your body that contributes to your own mapping of desire and the erotic. If you spend a lot of time using your body to soothe distressed infants, that is bound to create a different sense of touch, for example, than if you use it to flatten running backs from the opposing team. I am not suggesting for a second that this is the only factor shaping desire, but these practices necessarily play an important role.
About 10 years ago there was a show called Queer Eye for the Straight Guy in which a team of gay men did aesthetic retrofits for straight men. So what does a queer eye in this sense have to do with same-sex desire? I think a social reproduction frame encourages us to think about why we might expect queer guys to know aesthetics and straight guys to be hopeless in that area. There are certainly specific areas of aesthetic and emotional labor that are disproportionately populated by gay men. Then there is the utter compulsory heterosexuality of the pro sports team. I think that real sexual liberation means taking on the coercive and hierarchical nature of divisions of labor in capitalist societies and understanding the impact the organization of work has on our sexual being.
VP: Could you expand on that, the idea that sexual liberation requires a challenge to divisions of labor?
AS: I guess what I am saying is that our abilities to experience sexual pleasure, to resist sexual coercion, to feel fulfilled and engage lovingly with others, are constrained and shaped by the ways we have to fit into specific roles determined by paid and unpaid work. At a most basic level, our work schedules, paid and unpaid, have a very direct impact on our sex lives simply by creating or limiting availability and by exhausting us or leaving us with a sense of accomplishment. At a more complex level, our sense of ourselves, including our bodies, is grounded in the work we do which hyperdevelops certain capacities and shuts down others.
A doctor, a fashion photographer, a teacher, and a mother are likely to see very different things when we stand before them, given the focus they have learned to develop through their experiences of schooling, training and work inside or outside the home. They will touch differently and have different expectations for being touched. Yes, deliberate acts of queering can challenge the normative, but unless we get at the practices and power relations in which the normative is embedded we are going to be limited in how far our liberation project goes.
I also think our sexualities are messed up by the way power works in capitalist societies. Consent and coercion are muddled by the contradiction between ownership of our bodies and the compulsion to sell our capacity to work (or do unpaid labor for someone who does so). Technically, workers consent to work at a capitalist enterprise, but the coercive power of the boss is massive. So do we really know what genuine consent grounded in control over our bodies and our lives actually looks like?
In the legal sense, you can never consent if you are coerced. But in capitalist societies we naturalize the key coercive forces and take them for granted. You have to work because otherwise you won’t be able to eat – all of us find ourselves in this situation, so we freely sign the contract and do the job for however many hours a day. And in some cases that means showing up to work looking sexually attractive, even if that might not be said out loud. Is that consensual?
It is so exciting and important to see some serious work challenging sexual violence, violence against women, and gendered harassment on campuses right now. I think a social reproduction frame might push us to ask questions about the way consent is understood in some of these campaigns. What are the coercive factors and power relations underlying consent that we are simply taking for granted, just as we accept the employment contract as consensual? The basic emphasis on full consent is crucial, but the model we tend to use is based on the autonomous rational actor who is free and informed. Actually, we are deeply enmeshed in power relations of gender, race, class, age, and bodily capacity in a society that is profoundly sex-negative. Those power relations have a huge influence on our sexual being and desires, and on our ability to voice consent or refusal.
VP: You just said that this is a sex-negative society, but does that match the everyday reality of a society where sex is everywhere?
AS: Yes, another interesting contradiction. The society where everything is sexualized, yet actual sexual activity is silenced and made invisible. Sexualized images are omnipresent, but partners often cannot even communicate their sexual desires to each other.
The neoliberal phase of capitalism has intensified the sexualization of things, as relations of commodification enter into every aspect of our everyday lives. So we try to turn ourselves into things to be hot. We try to live up to the images – they set the standards. We process our bodies and turn them into products – training, shaving, dying, tattooing, surgically altering, dieting, wearing the right stuff. The raw unprocessed body – the one that smells like a human being – is seen as contemptible.
So yes – we are negotiating sex-negativity paired with sexualization. Abortion rights, birth control, safety in social spaces and on the streets, places for young people to be sexually active – the things required for positive sexual experience, especially for women, are still walled off.
VP: So what can we look forward to in the use of the social reproduction frame to understand sexuality?
AS: I think this is an exciting moment where social reproduction theory is getting a whole lot of attention and being taken in new directions. This issue of Viewpoint is a valuable part of that. This has been driven in part by a frank recognition of the limitations of versions of Marxism that understood class too narrowly in terms of paid labor at the place of employment. It is also an important moment in sexual politics, as we grope towards a new vision of sexual liberation to take us beyond the polarization between equality rights and transgression.
I think a social reproduction approach to sexuality can combine a broader sense of class formation and life-making in capitalist societies with a transformative queer politics. At the same time, there is a lot of work to be done, for example in thinking through the relationship between divisions of labor and sexualities. To develop this work will need a lot of discussion and debate, good historical and contemporary research and activist engagement.
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Toward a Brighter Dawn
Early dawn on any Southern road. Shadowy figures emerge from the little unpainted, wooden shacks alongside the road. There are Negro women trudging into town to the Big House to cook, to wash, to clean, to nurse children – all for two, three, dollars for the whole week. Sunday comes – rest day. But what rest is there for a Negro mother who must crowd into one day the care of her own large family? Church of course, where for a few brief hours she may forget, listening to the sonorous voice of the pastor, the liquid harmony of the choir, the week’s gossip of neighbors. But Monday is right after Sunday, and the week’s grind begins all over.
Early dawn on the plantations of the South. Dim figures bend down in the fields to plant, to chop, to pick the cotton from which the great wealth of the South has come. Sharecroppers, working year in, year out, for the big landlord, never to get out of debt. The sharecropper’s wife – field worker by day, mother and housewife by night. Scrubbing the pine floors of the cabin until they shine white. Boiling clothes in the big black iron kettle in the yard. Cooking the fat-back and corn pone for hungry little mouths. She has never to worry about leisure-time problems.
The same dawn in Bronx Park, New York. There is yet no movement in the near-by apartment houses. From the subway come women, Negro women. They carefully arrange the Daily News or Mirror along the park bench still moist with dew, and sit down. Why do they sit so patiently? It’s cold and damp in the early morning.
Here we are, for sale for the day. Take our labor. Give us what you will. We must feed our children and pay high rent in Harlem. Ten cents, fifteen cents an hour! That won’t feed our families for a day, let alone pay rent. You won’t pay more? Well, guess that’s better than going back to Harlem after spending your last nickel for carfare…
So thrifty “housewives” drive sharper bargains. There are plenty of women to choose from. And every dollar saved leaves that much more for one’s bridge game or theater party! The Bronx “slave market” is a graphic monument to the bitter exploitation of this most exploited section of the American working population – the Negro women.
Over the whole land, Negro women meet this triple exploitation – as workers, as women, and as Negroes. About 85 per cent of all Negro women workers are domestics, two-thirds of the two million domestic workers in the United States. In smaller numbers they are found in other forms of personal service. Other employment open to them is confined mainly to laundries and the tobacco factories of Virginia and the Carolinas, where working conditions are deplorable. The small fraction of Negro women in the professions is hampered by discriminatory practices and unequal wages.
The economic crisis has placed the severest test upon the Negro woman. Representing the greatest proportion of unemployed workers in the country, Negroes are discriminated against in relief and work relief. Negroes must pay high rent for the worst housing in any city. Segregated Negro neighborhoods are invariably deficient in nurseries, playgrounds, health centers, schools. And in the face of such adverse conditions, Negro women must maintain and rear their families.
It was against such a background that there assembled in Chicago on February 14, 15 and 16, 1936, Negro women from all sections of the country for the National Negro Congress. They made up about one-third of the eight hundred delegates, men and women, who came together from churches, trade unions, fraternal, political, women’s, youth, civic, farm, professional, and educational organizations. Women club leaders from California greeted women trade unionists from New York. Women school teachers made friends with women domestic workers. Women from the relief agencies talked over relief problems with women relief clients. Women from mothers’ clubs and housewives’ leagues exchanged experiences in fighting against the high cost of living. Negro women welcomed the white women delegates who came to the Congress as an evidence of the growing sense of unity between them.
The Women’s Sub-Session of the Congress dramatized the conditions facing Negro women everywhere. Neva Ryan, slight but dynamic, pictured the plight of the domestic workers of Chicago and the steps being taken to organize them. Rosa Rayside of New York told how they already had an A.F. of L. charter there for a domestic workers’ union. Tarea Hall Pittman, state president of the Federation of Women’s Clubs of California, emphasized the necessity of linking together the struggle of women workers with professional women. Marion Cutbert of the National Board of the YWCA and National Treasurer of the National Negro Congress greeted the delegates and urged the need for organization on all fronts. A white delegate from Detroit, Margaret Dean, told of the valiant fight made in her city by both Negro and white women against the high cost of living. Thyra Edwards, social worker of Chicago, and chairman of the Women’s Committee for the National Negro Congress, emphasized the need for consumers’ co-operatives. Rosita Talioferro, student at the University of Wisconsin, urged the mothers to begin early in their children’s lives to educate them upon the pressing problems under discussion. Herbert Wheeldin, from Westchester County, New York, one of the several men delegates who listened attentively, spoke of the severe exploitation of women workers by the rich families of Westchester.
The session ended all too soon, with many delegates yet to be heard from. The facts they related told sad stories, but there was no sadness in these women delegates, many of whom were attending a congress for the first time in their lives. There was a ring of confidence in each report – a confidence, born in many instances right at the congress, that it was possible to change these unbearable conditions. Negro women from all walks of life, unskilled and professional, Negro and white women found themselves drawn together, found that they liked being together, found that there was hope for change in coming together.
Organization and unity were the keynote of the resolution on women passed by the Congress. The resolution embodied a three-point program: (1) Organization of women domestic workers into trade unions of the American Federation of Labor; (2) organization of housewives into housewives’ leagues to combat the high cost of living, and educational facilities for their families, and (3) organization of professional women. All three to be joined together to work for adequate social legislation, for better relief, and against war and fascism. This resolution was presented to the general session of the Congress by Mrs. Nellie Hazell, representing the Negro Democratic League of Philadelphia, and was unanimously adopted.
The delegates have returned to their homes, but not as they came. These women now have a program around which they will rally their sisters at work and in the home. They have a year in which to carry through the declarations of their resolution, so that by May, 1937, when the National Negro Congress again convenes – this time in Philadelphia – they will come together once more in greater numbers and with a different story to tell, of accomplishment, of a struggle nearer the goal of the liberation of Negro women from bitter exploitation and oppression.
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Making a living
Today, amidst a changed political and class landscape, strategy should take precedence over fidelity to the received canon. The activities of social reproduction remain the field of powerful class antagonisms.
The Hidden Abode[ h2]The Hidden Abode[ /h2]
With some minor exceptions, the earliest socialists, such as Charles Fourier, had little interest in the daily struggles of working people. For them, socialism was to be discovered through careful thinking, and realized by a wealthy benefactor. Fourier waited every day in his foyer for some philanthropist to come invest in his socialist future. He even went so far as to pitch to Napoleon his grand scheme to rescue “the human race from social chaos.”1
Not until the 1830s and 1840s, after working people began to struggle independently, did revolutionaries like Auguste Blanqui, Karl Marx, and others begin to consistently argue that socialism had to be based in the struggles of workers, not the elaborate schemes of intellectuals. Eventually this idea took hold, and, especially after mass migration, the spread of industry, and the dramatic sociopolitical restructurings of the 1860s and 1870s, when numerous states granted constitutions, reformed civil laws, and established parliaments, the entire socialist movement anchored itself to the struggles of the “working class.”2 Socialism would henceforth be inseparable from the formation of the working class into a coherent political subject.
Of course, it was unclear who exactly belonged to this class. Workers fell into a thousand different categories, working life remained heterogeneous, and distinct forms of production like slavery, wage labor, and sharecropping constantly bled into each other. Moreover, most workers did not have any kind of fixed identity. They were always on the move, harvesting the land in the fall like peasants, living without work over the winter, perhaps finding a factory job in the spring. The working class therefore seemed less like an indivisible singularity than a chaotic multitude shot through with differences in tradition, religion, culture, trade, race, gender, and nationality.
This unruliness posed a strategic dilemma. How could such a heterogeneous multitude compose itself into a single subject?3 In the late 19th century, social democracy had to confront this problem with a complex set of practices and theoretical proposals. The now familiar theoretical problematic of social democracy rests on three fundamental principles:
First, that one sector of the working multitude metonymically stood in for all the rest. As much of the propaganda of the period attests, the male wage worker in the factory became the face of the working class as such, its struggles rendered the most visible.
Second, the interests of this particular figure took priority over all others; the desires of ethnic minorities for racial equality, of women for emancipation, or of colonized populations for self-determination, would be realized as a subordinate function of the revolution made by factory workers.
Third, socialists privileged the shop floor, where these factory workers worked, as the primary terrain of class formation. The factory was not only where the most ardent battles were said to be fought, but where the entire working class as such entered into world history. Some, like Otto Rühle, took this factoryist logic to the extreme, arguing that “only in the factory is the worker of today a real proletarian… Outside the factory he is a petty-bourgeois, involved in a petty bourgeois milieu and middle class habits of life, dominated by petty bourgeois ideology.”4
For better or worse, these three orientations, which all implied each other, initially derived from largely strategic considerations. The struggles of industrial workers in the factory appeared as primary precisely because this was where the working class was strongest and the capitalists potentially the weakest. For it was not only where profits ultimately derived, but where unprecedented numbers of workers were gathered. In concentrating so many workers in the same, critical location, capital had created the very conditions of its own undoing. As the widely read Karl Kautsky explained:
All the conditions of modern production tend to increase the solidarity of the laboring classes. In the Middle Ages each artisan produced a finished product; he was industrially almost independent. Today it often takes scores, or even hundreds, to produce a finished product. Thus does industry teach co-operation.5
Working alongside each other, cooperating in the production process, experiencing a common situation, and most of all, sharing the same exploitation, wage workers in the factory could overcome their differences to band together as a united force. It was in the hard and hardening school of the factory, socialists assumed, that the working class could learn the practice of politics.6
While this move was originally strategic in nature, it was largely justified through a teleological narrative of history. Industrialization, the story went, would create a more or less homogenous class of industrial wage workers. “Under the influence of machinery,” Kautsky continued, “the distinctions among the trades are rapidly disappearing.”7 The substitutionism implied by these three moves, therefore, would only be temporary, since soon enough all of the toiling masses would simply become industrial proletarians:
We have already seen that the industrial proletariat tends to become the only working-class. We have pointed out, also, that the other working-classes are coming more and more to resemble the proletariat in the conditions of labor and way of living. And we have discovered that the proletariat is the only one among the working-classes that grows steadily in energy, in intelligence, and in clear consciousness of its purpose. It is becoming the center about which the disappearing survivals of the other working-classes group themselves. Its ways of feeling and thinking are becoming standard for the whole mass of non-capitalists, no matter what their status may be.8
Despite all the contradictions, exclusions, and hierarchies of this theory, the political practice of social democracy was remarkably successful. Over the course of the nineteenth and especially twentieth centuries, class became a felt reality for tens of millions of workers in most countries. Organized in unions, committees, and most often mass parties, the historical working class was not only able to win a series of tremendous victories, but succeeded in preserving a sense of subjective continuity between struggles. Class, in short, became an integral part of everyday life.
However, social democracy’s success should not lead us to uncritically accept the story it told about itself. The heterogeneity of wage labor was apparent even in the factory, and the organization of workers as a class did not proceed solely along the lines predicted by the teleology. Kathleen Canning has described, in a study of female textile workers in early twentieth-century Germany, how the experience of pregnancy was a basis of shop floor camaraderie. While these women were only moderately engaged in their union, the Deutscher Textilarbeiterverband (DTAV) – partly because of its sexism – they were highly prone to launching wildcat strikes, sometimes initially in protest of sexual harassment and rape by overseers. Canning recalls that “during the years 1902 to 1904, women made up between 17 and 23 percent of DTAV rank and file but 53 percent of participants in so-called offensive strikes.” By 1908, the DTAV had “appointed Martha Hoppe as its first female secretary and officially addressed the ‘woman question’ at its congress that year.”9
It’s worth noting, however, that German women working in factories weren’t very likely to join the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which saw unions as a privileged site of political composition. In fact, most female party members were not factory workers; they stayed at home and did housework, and were usually recruited to the party by political meetings focused on the inflation of food prices.10
After a turbulent sequence of insurrections, splits, and defeats yielded the German Communist Party (KPD), female militants challenged the new party’s focus on the male factory worker, initiating food riots and the looting of consumer goods. The members of a 1922 women’s study group on Marxist economics expressed dismay at the suggestion that housework was unproductive, and proposed a new set of working-class demands: cooperative households; restriction of domestic labor to an eight-hour day; wages for housework; free choice of profession for women; and sexual freedom. In 1928, the textile workers’ union sponsored an essay contest for women about the relationship between waged work and housework, and published the collected essays.11
The KPD would finally respond to this challenge during the Great Depression, which destabilized the cohesion of the working class in the factory. This period reminds us that a foundational characteristic of the wage relation is unemployment. As Geoff Eley writes:
With its aggressively “proletarian” identity contrasting starkly with its actual members, who gathered on street corners rather than factory floors (80 percent being unemployed after 1930), the KPD found itself willy-nilly the voice of broader-based “nonclass” mobilizations around women, youth, tenants, welfare claimants, and others during its period of growth in 1930–32. Sex reform agitations over abortion and contraception were part of this, with surprising cooperation among Communist, Social Democratic, liberal, and nonaligned left-wing doctors, social workers, and other activists. The KPD—or individual Communists and their professional organizations and the coalitions and forums the party sponsored—energized the 1931 campaign for abortion reform and the remarkable sex counseling clinics that flourished before 1933.12
In other words, the wager of social democracy – that the lived experience of the male wage worker in the factory metonymically represented the whole history of working-class formation, and therefore had hegemony at the strategic level – did not actually reflect the reality of class struggle. Since social democracy’s theoretical problematic was founded on the imagined experience of waged work, which was in reality always marginal to the vast majority of toilers, it obscured the complicated political calculations that were required in its practice. In recoding a contingent decision into an invariant philosophy of history, the strategic, historically specific considerations behind these decisions have been lost. They now haunt us as tradition.
[ h2]Outside the Factory[ /h2]
Of course, during the twentieth century, and especially in its last forty years, many radicals criticized this teleology. In the 1960s and 1970s, feminists provided a fundamental challenge to the belief that the male factory worker and his desires represented the whole of the class, arguing that the socialist movement’s myopic fixation on wage labor in the factory concealed the very sphere of work that made it possible in the first place. Wage labor, by definition, means that workers exchange their labor power for the money necessary to live. But as the feminist critique underscored, payment of wages does not automatically lead to a sated, healthy, rested worker. On the contrary, a considerable amount of work has to be done to make sure these wage workers are ready to return to work the next day. As Leopoldina Fortunati once put it:
Only work can transform the wage into the use-values required in the male worker’s reproduction; but even then the use-values are not directly or immediately consumable by him. More work is necessary to transform these use-values into use-values that are effectively usable, i.e. ready to be consumed.13
That work, which under the capitalist mode of production is the work of replenishing labor power, they called social reproduction. It is the often invisible work of cooking, cleaning, caring, educating that makes wage labor at the point of production possible. Without this, feminists rightly argued, no one can sell their labor power, no wages can be exchanged, no surplus value can be generated. Social reproduction, they continued, generally takes place within the family form, those forced to do it have historically been women, and, while it is sometimes done by waged workers, it is often unpaid. Above all, some feminists, especially in Italy, began to speak of social reproduction not just as a kind of activity, but also as an entire terrain of struggle.
While these two forms of activity – production on the one side and social reproduction on the other – have always been reciprocally implicated, the terrain of social reproduction has frequently been ignored, naturalized, or disparaged. Take, for example, E.P. Thompson’s magisterial account of class formation, The Making of the English Working Class.14 Thompson, like most socialist writers of the time, adhered to the notion of a separate, naturalized domestic sphere. He implied that the home is governed by a natural division of labor, but in the workplace, that division was historically constructed. Since “real” exploitation therefore only happens in the workplace, not at home, “real” politics, and therefore class struggle and class formation, can only emerge at the place of work. Seeing the terrain of social reproduction as outside of history, as something that was always already there, he passed it over in silence. Since this terrain has been historically gendered as female, this basically meant writing women out of history.15 In so doing, Thompson unwittingly reproduced the same teleological narrative of the 19th century socialist movements, but now as official history.
The feminist critique therefore had to be multipronged. At the level of theory, feminists explored the concepts of social reproduction, unwaged work, and surplus value. At the level of history, it was necessary to deconstruct the received story of class formation. Joan Scott and Louise Tilly’s famous book Women, Work, and Family, for example, argued first of all that social reproduction does have a history, and is therefore a site of politics, of class formation; second, that forms of production and social reproduction have always been closely related, with changes in one directly affecting the other; and third, that the home was not, and still isn’t, exclusively the realm of socially reproductive activity, but rather a complex site of both social reproduction and production.16
At the level of contemporary practice, feminists criticized the idea that the factory was the primary site of class formation by organizing a series of struggles on the terrain of social reproduction. In 1970s Italy, for example, one need only mention the struggle to legalize abortion, the Wages for Housework Campaign, or the vast movement to unilaterally reduce bus fares, electricity bills, or rents, sometimes called “autoreduction.”17
Women took the lead in these movements over the cost of living. But it is very significant, and often forgotten, that a number of the factory male workers who once glorified the plant themselves began to argue in the late 1960s that it was time to extend the struggle outside. In 1969, the wave of worker struggles known as the Hot Autumn won pay raises, better benefits, and greater say in the operations of the factory. But the reaction was swift and calculating. On one side, the unions recuperated these demands for political autonomy by creating a more democratic, but ultimately contained, council system; on the other, capitalists simply counteracted these higher wages by raising the general cost of living, increasing rent, the price of food, and the cost of basic services.
Italo Sbrogio, a worker at the chemical plant at Porto Marghera, later admitted that the ploy was a partial success. “In view of this,” he went on, we “put our back into it and said that the intervention inside the factories would have to be carried to the outside, to the ‘social,’ as well, broaching the issue of the rise of living costs.” In other words, struggles inside the factory were now faced with a strategic impasse; it became necessary to surround them by waging the struggle on other terrains. This was one of the primary strategic considerations behind the auto-reduction campaigns, which, it should be noted, began in the proletarian neighborhoods immediately surrounding the factories. Sbrogio recalls how the movement soon spread beyond the factory neighborhoods: “People lowered rents, occupied empty houses, paid less for their food. We organized all this by establishing local committees in the various parts of town. We even managed to organize a shopping strike which forced some supermarkets to cut prices for basic food.” In one case, a major self-reduction demonstration culminated with militants starting “a huge fire by burning all the gas and electricity bills that we had reduced. After four months of nationwide protests the government and union signed an agreement, which cut the price of electricity. Those involved in the committee said that such a strong bond between the factory and the neighborhood had never existed before.”18
In some instances, these struggles over social reproduction led to experiments in collective ways of living, creating day-care centers, communal kitchens, and people’s health centers.19 These experiments in other forms of life, which many considered essential to ensuring the non-reproduction of specifically capitalist social relations, went beyond counterculture precisely because they were fully rooted in a much broader front of struggles.
Of course, there were considerable debates about this general move beyond the point of production, and many factory workers vehemently opposed the demotion of their struggles to second rank. This would in fact prove to be a major contradiction within the movement. Yet in the heat of the struggle, when strategy became the order of the day, the old narrative that placed primacy on the plant came undone, and other paths of class formation revealed themselves.
[ h2]The Political Question[ /h2]
Today, amidst a changed political and class landscape, strategy should take precedence over fidelity to the received canon. The activities of social reproduction remain the field of powerful class antagonisms. Not only has the capitalist assault on the terrain of reproduction taken the form of austerity – the devolution of the costs of social reproduction back onto workers – but the growing response to the squeeze on working-class time has been the accelerated marketization and commodification of reproductive labor.
Many of today’s lines of political contestation are thus being drawn squarely through the terrain of social reproduction – soaring rents, crumbling buildings, underfunded schools, high food prices, crippling debt, police violence, and insufficient access to basic social services like water, transportation, and health care. It’s no surprise that some of the most dynamic mass struggles – such as anti-racism, anti-police brutality, and anti-austerity – are primarily unfolding in neighborhoods. In Ferguson, where unemployment is over 13%, a social movement was born in the streets, not the shop floor. In Detroit, once the heart of factory struggles in this country, one of the major struggles today is the fight for water.
We should not take this to mean that social reproduction is a transhistorical category of economic necessity, and that therefore it joins production as an anthropological imperative. It should point us instead to the specificity of capitalist social relations, which begin, in the words of Michael Denning, “not with the offer of work, but with the imperative to earn a living.”20 When we assume the perspective of social reproduction, we see that our basic state, so to speak, is not defined by a waged job, but rather existential wagelessness. On the terrain of social reproduction it becomes abundantly clear that unemployment precedes employment, the informal economy precedes the formal, and proletarian does not mean wage worker.
The struggles at the level of social reproduction link with those in the fast food industry, agriculture, hospitals, universities, and logistics, attesting to the need for a unitary field of analysis and antagonism. The political question today is how to effectively articulate the plurality of struggles on these diverse terrains in a way that can begin the long process of building a new class power. And that brings us once again to the question of political organization.
Comments
Good work posting all this!
Good work posting all this!
*ahem* Issue 4: The State
*ahem*
Issue 4: The State
Interesting Marxist mag
Interesting Marxist mag Worth a look-see
i am just fiddling with this
i am just fiddling with this as i update the last two editions
btw, if you download the printer friendly page (for each issue) you can read that on your e reader
could you please delete the second issue 5 i created? (delete the one without any children pages)