Rojava News

Thanks for the updates!

There is a forum on Reddit dedicated to Rojava: https://www.reddit.com/r/rojava/

This is a good place to get Rojava news and analysis in English, or to post up articles that you want to share.

Making a Reddit account is easy, you don't even need to give an email address.

any comments on this?

Demonstration in the city of Amouda 27.12.2014, demanding the liberation of the kidnapped girl Hemrin ‘Aidi and against PYD. The PYD kidnapped the girl of 15 years old to serve in the militias of the PYD and carry weapons in their ranks against her will.

https://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2015/01/01/pyd-%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D9%91-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84/

Other than, no other information available?

If you blow up the photographs you'll see that there's a squad of blokes in the background (particularly of the first photograph) wearing red & white shamaghs (keffiyehs). Of course red & white kefiiyehs are common amongst Syrian Arabs, but apparently in Kurdish communities the shamagh designates tribal affiliation. I have seen reference to the the red & white shamagh as associated with the Barzani clan.

Even if this was a KDP-sponsored protest, that doesn't speak to whether or not the girl has actually been pressed into service against her will or not (as opposed to the will of her family/clan).

after some digging I've found this:

http://aranews.net/2014/12/kurdish-girl-abducted-syrias-amude-pyds-forces-accused/

Amuda, Syria – On Tuesday, an underage Kurdish girl was abducted in front of her house in the city of Amuda in Hasakah province, in northeastern Syria, and her family accused gunmen of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) of being behind the incident.
Marwan Idi, brother of the 15-year-old girl, Hamrin Idi, said that he has searched all of the military centers of the PYD-linked Auto-Administration in the city, and stated that they assured him that the girl was not being held by them, but that they would help find her.
On Wednesday morning, a protest was organized by members of the Kurdish Yeketi Party to support the victim’s family in the city of Amuda.
“We took to the street to show solidarity with the victim and to condemn the practices of the PYD’s armed groups, such as the kidnapping minors,” Ibrahim Asaad, a Yeketi member, told ARA News.
Marwan Idi, the victim’s brother, stated to ARA News that the abduction of his sister Hamrin in front of her house “is a crime and the perpetrators must be prosecuted, whoever they are”.
“Did the perpetrates forget that the girl was a minor and should serve her disabled mother?” he wondered.
“I will raise banners that reflect my anger and my hatred to those criminals, and the authorities of the Auto-Administration must bear their responsibility in this regard,” Idi said.
“This is not the first time my family has been exposed to such practices,” he added.

* PYD-run police, known as the Asayish

[quote=Under Kurdish Rule - Abuses in PYD-run Enclaves of Syria - June 19, 2014 VII. Children in Security Forces]Since assuming power in 2012, the Asayish* and YPG have both used boys and girls under age 18 at checkpoints and on bases in `Afrin, Ain al-`Arab and Jazira. Some children have fought with the YPG. The Asayish* serves as a police force, but its members are armed with automatic weapons and its checkpoints have been the target of car bombings and other attacks.

The use of children by the Asayish* and YPG directly violates the internal regulations of both forces (see Appendices II and III), which forbid membership of anyone under age 18. International law prohibits the use of children as participants in direct hostilities, which includes using children as scouts, couriers, or at checkpoints.

The Asayish* and YPG say they have made efforts over the past year to reduce their use of children for military purposes but the problem persists in both forces. During a visit to Jazira in February 2014, Human Rights Watch saw two armed Asayish members who said they were under 18, and two others who looked under 18, but, after pressure from their commanders, refused to give their ages. Human Rights Watch also interviewed a 16-year-old boy who said he had been in the YPG since the previous year. Two other people said that children in their families had recently joined the YPG – one of them a 13-year-old boy whom the YPG sent home after the family complained.

Human Rights Watch did not visit `Afrin or Ain al-`Arab and could not confirm whether children are still in the security forces there...[/quote]

[quote=The Democratic Self-Rule Administration’s Response to the Report of Human Rights Watch Organization]Recruitment of Children:
* The recruitment of children under 18 and their participation in military operations in the Asayish and in the Peoples protection units (YPG) must stop, this includes being active in checkpoints and bases.
* All military training of children must stop.
* The People protection units (YPG) and the Asayish must provide public updates on the number of children who have been demobilized of forces and about their whereabouts.
* Officers who allow children to serve under their leadership must be disciplined.
* The recruitment of children in youth centers or cultural centers must be prohibited.
* There must be cooperation with international bodies for Rehabilitation of children and necessary support to socially integrate them back into society must be provided.

Although, the leadership of the peoples protection units which are charged with the task of protection and defense in the self-managed areas, confirmed the existence of some of these cases, and made clear on the 5th of June that they would cooperate in the mutual task of making sure to demobilize all children under 18 from fighting units within one month forces within one month according to the agreement signed with the organization Geneva Call.
We would like for the sake of explanation only, not to justify any wrongdoings to again point to severe circumstances which we are ongoing to underline that some problems are hard to deal with but we are fully committed to resolving them in order to create a stable society[/quote]

augustynww

after some digging I've found this:

http://aranews.net/2014/12/kurdish-girl-abducted-syrias-amude-pyds-forces-accused/

Amuda, Syria – On Tuesday, an underage Kurdish girl was abducted in front of her house in the city of Amuda in Hasakah province, in northeastern Syria, and her family accused gunmen of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) of being behind the incident.

OK, a straight-forward kidnapping seems more likely. The slightly implausible part about the first piece was that the girl had been kidnapped to serve in the militia, especially in an arms-carrying, active service role. The implausible bit is that the girl could be held incommunicado once assigned to a unit with other women, in an age of mobile phones, etc. That she might have been kidnapped for another purpose - e.g. forced marriage via bride kidnapping or similar - seems more plausible that she was being held incommunicado, such that should couldn't get a message back to her family as to where she was so they could come and rescue her.

But really there's a whole host of possibilities. Impossible to say much else without specific info really.

edit: incidentally, on the topic of forced marriage, here's a brief but interesting piece on the matter in Pahstun society. Obviously Pashtun society is different from Kurdish in many ways, but there is some cross-over. NB also the difference in dowry practices between the Kurd & Pashtun practice of the groom's family paying the bride's family a bride-price, as opposed to the Pakistani, Indian practice of the bride's family paying a dowry (jahez) to the groom's family.

Useful backgrounder on the clashes in Cizre on 27 December just gone. Technically Cizre is the Turkish side of the border, but it relates to political context in Cizre canton.
AM: Turkey's AKP pits Kurd against Kurd

YPG/YPJ retake Mishtenur hill
BBC: Kobane: Kurdish fighters 'capture strategic hilltop'

http://en.firatnews.com/news/news/preparations-for-international-brigade-in-rojava.htm ... seems to be initiated by the MLKP

Levant Front dissolved. Apparently the Islamists quit the group.

We'll have to see if the YPG picks up the secularists involved around Aleppo.

Key Islamist group Shamiya Front resolves itself

More on the end of the Levant Front

Luey Hussein of the Restructuring Syria Movement in Damascus visits Cizîre Canton to investigate Democratic Autonomy.
Luey Hussein: Autonomous administration should be implemented in all Syria. Here is his Facebook confirming his visit to Rojava

Louay Hussein was among the opposition leaders in 2011.

It looks like he was arrested in November 2014 and since released in February 2015. He previously spent another 7 years in jail and "successfully organized the first opposition conference to be held in Damascus " in 2011. His group is neo-liberal and non-violent. He opposes U.S./western intervention. Its curious that he would visit Rojava right out of jail.

He wrote: Syrians do not feel they need a state just prior to his arrest in November 2014.

It's a question how neo-liberal he is. He used to be a member of the communist party. Joining the Communist Labor Party/Communist Action Party was the reason for his 1984 arrest and longest prison term.

After visiting Rojava, he may have fled into Turkey

http://ezidipress.com/en/ybs-rejects-kdp-accusations/

Shingal region – The leadership of Shingal´s Resistance Units (YBS), an Ezidi militia initiated by the People´s Protection Units (YPG) has issued a statement and rejected allegations by security forces affiliated to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) which have accused the YBS and the Kurdistan Workers´ Party (PKK) of establishing an al-Hashd al-Shaabi milita in Shingal.
.
Al-Hashd al-Shaabi or better known as Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) is an anti-ISIS program launched by Baghdad which aims at mobilizing and arming Iraqi militias that are supposed to fight alongside the regular Iraqi army against ISIS.
.
The allegations “were far from the truth”, the YBS said in a statement, adding that the PKK had never formed an al-Shaabi militia. Such claims would be counterproductive in the fight against ISIS. Under the same pretext, Massoud Barzani, the President of the Kurdistan region ordered the arrest of the Ezidi HPS supreme commander Haydar Shesho some weeks ago.
[...]

also

http://ezidipress.com/en/hps-ezidi-party-to-be-established/

Hannover, Germany – An Ezidi party in Iraq is to be established on the initiative of the top HPS commanders Haydar Shesho and Dawud Jindi, the HPS announced in a statement published on Saturday, stating that an establishment of a party led by Ezidis and aimed at ensuring their right of self-determination within the local borders was inevitable due to the rapid changes in the Middle East, the preventable genocide against the Ezidi people and also the political situation in Iraq.
[...]
Haydar Shesho, current HPS supreme commander, was arrested on 6th of April 2015 by Kurdish security forces affiliated to the ruling KDP for the so called creation of an illegitimate militia against Kurdish law. He was released eight days later. Shingal´s Protection Unit HPS was established for the defense of Ezidis against ISIS after around 10,000 Peshmerga fighters had fled the region, abandoning Ezidis to their fate. The HPS currently consists of around 3,200 volunteers according to the HPS commander Jindi.
.
The Ezidis´ future as well as the consequences of the genocide in Shingal will be now discussed in Germany. The establishment of a party is the first result.

Conscription is extended to Efrin Canton. 6 months service for 18-30 year olds; on person per family, only children excluded, also exclusion if a sibling has already been killed fighting among the Rojavan forces.

Self-defense law implemented also in Efrîn

Kantona Cizîrê forces
CizireCanton Reddit
cizirecanton Twitter
Wikipedia: Jazira Canton
SyriacMFS Twitter
SyriacMFS Youtube
SyriacMFS Facebook
Wikipedia: MLKP
Sutoro is different than Sootoro

Kobane canton forces / Euphrates Volcano operations room / Burkan al-Furat
Wikipedia: Euphrates Volcano
Kobane YPG Twitter
YPG Kobanê
servan derwish: Burkan Al-Furat YouTube
Jabhat al-Akrad
Northern Sun Battalion(YPG/Turkmen)

Another cement plant (Güreş/Gorrish) seized in the south-east Kobane area, this one owned by a Turkish investor. I don't have any production details on it, but from the photographs it does not look insignificant.

Turkish cement factory taken by YPG and YPJ in Kobanî

Map

Also, there has been a dramatic advance in Cizire canton where YPG and the Al-Sanadid (Shammar tribal army) seized Al-Guhrah and the entire Abd al-Aziz mountains including its peak. They have since been able to encircle Daesh into a few pockets along the Khabur river.

Map

Map before seizing Abd al-Aziz

Long article in French about the Christians in Rojava and the MFS in particular.

Les milices chrétiennes de Syrie en première ligne

Another article, this one in English, on the origins of the MFS and the long relationship with the PKK.

The following year, in 2013, a police force called Sutoro opened three stations in the Jazira area, and a military force called the Syriac Military Council (Mawtbo Fulhoyo Suryoyo or MFS) announced its existence in an online video. The MFS initially hinted at future military action against the regime, but this never materialized. Instead, a more immediate and existential threat appeared, as a coalition of rebel and jihadist groups suddenly attacked. The MFS and the YPG soon fought side-by-side in the frontlines to defend the area, while Sutoro developed an increasingly close cooperation with its Kurdish counterpart Asayish. Just like in the 1990s, Dawronoye integrated into the security structures of their Kurdish allies, while retaining their own organizations and financing themselves through diaspora donations...

Around the same time as the attacks began, the PYD invited other parties and civil society organizations to participate in a process to form local governance structures. Most turned down the offer, fearing that the PYD would continue to dominate, but the SUP participated actively from the beginning until the end. Among the chief declared goals was one to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious communities. With unmistaken symbolism, one of the first meetings was conducted across the border in Midyat, where Kurdish representatives took the opportunity to apologize for their people’s role in Seyfo. When the autonomous “Jazira canton” was declared in January 2014, representatives of the SUP took up positions in the government and legislative assembly, while Syriac, Arabic, and Kurdish were declared official languages.

“We believe that this philosophy of [the PKK leader] Ocalan can be a model not just for the Kurds but for other peoples also,” says Nazira Goriye, the co-spokesperson of the legislative assembly. “We want our rights not just as Christians, but as a people, as a nation. This is why we are on the side of the Kurds, not on Assad’s side. Assad tries to give our people a morphine injection.”

"Perhaps Dawronoye's activists have now finally found their chance. Dawronoye’s core goal is to ensure the future existence of its people in their native lands, but with the possible exception of the Nineveh plains in Iraq, there is no place where they could realistically seek regional autonomy, let alone their own state. In other words, they have to find a way to live with the majority population without being dominated by it. Meanwhile, the PKK movement has come to embrace a vision of a multicultural mosaic within a decentralized democratic system. While sharing some overarching political structures, different communities should be encouraged to organize their own grassroots-level structures, and manage their own affairs to the greatest extent possible. In other words, the respective projects of Dawronoye and the PKK coincide perfectly in Syria."

The Revolutionaries of Bethnahrin

Over the last few days there's been announcements from various sources (Jabhat al Akrad, YPG) of an offensive to join up the Kobane and Cizire by a pincer push from both Cantons towards Tel Abyiad.
https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/565335-syria-kurds-get-greenlight-for-ambitious-campaign
http://anfenglish.com/features/ypg-s-tel-abyad-operation-and-akp-s-fear

This is a pretty ambitious move as this would cut off the Daesh capital Raqqa's main feedline via the Urfa to Akcakale/Tel Abiad route. Daesh will still hold their other main Turkish supply gateway at Jarablus, but they can still be expected to resist losing northern Raqqa province and the Tel Abiad gateway pretty hard. We could also expect the Turkish state (and local interests in Urfa who are making a shit ton of money out of this war and associated smuggling trade) to do as much as possible in supporting that resistance.

Still and all, Ras Al Ain (Sere Kaniye) was taken last week and the capture of Mabrouka on the main road to Tel Abyiad was announced yesterday. The battle for Suluk (the next major town on the 712 road) could be harder fought, however.

http://aranews.net/2015/05/kurds-regain-major-township-after-clashes-with-isis/
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/syria-kurdish-forces-liberate-mabrouka-isis-1503018

This looks pretty significant but is in note form and either the translation is weak or the original was quite technical so its a bit frustrating trying to extract the full meaning in parts

The Social Economy in Rojava
http://kurdishquestion.com/index.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/the-social-economy-in-rojava.html

Extract

iii. How the social economy considers the core economic activities

1. Production: there is a private sector for production, but the most important form of production is the production through the communes and cooperatives.

2. Working: all workers must work in the communal projects.

3. Ownership: ownership is sacred.

4. Market: the market is a main part of social economy, but the use-value must be greater than the exchange-value, and there is no stock market.

5. Technology: is very important and depends on ecological activities and balance.

6. Industry: there is no industry if it not ecological. This is very important in our economic and social system.

7. Economic progress: we depend on balanced development theory between three cantons.

8. Trade: the main form of trade is the trade between commons. This form foregrounds and develops the importance of use-value.

9. Finance and funding: the banking system is not like capitalist system; it is only to save money and help the communes. The resource of financing is the output of the projects; there is non-centralism in the financing system, because this system depends on communes.

Jabhat al-Nusra (Al Qaeda in Syria) & Ahrar al Sham are attacking YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood of Aleppo. Sheikh Maqsoud is a Kurdish majority neighborhood under YPG control. Because it had been relatively untouched by direct fighting in the war, many refugees moved there.

Jihadis (JaN, Ahrar) encircle Sheikh Maqsood neighborhood under YPG control.

The pretext is that Islamists are going to defend women and want to implement Sharia. The neighborhood of al- Sheikh Maqsoud witnesses tension after “the Operation Room of Labbayki Ya Oktah” threat of declaring the neighborhood as military zone

I had some Aleppo/Sheikh Maqsoud/Şêxmeqsûd details in another thread, but I'll put them here.

Video on Sheikh Maqsoud and Aleppo

Video of everyday life in Sheikh Maqsoud

Here is what Aleppo looks like right now:

YPG control over not just Şêxmeqsûd but also the Ashrafiyah and Rusafah neighborhoods of Aleppo.

Another map

Salvador Zana

"Around Aleppo some have joined the YPG, as it remains the only fighting force to uphold the ideals of the revolution. The threat of Daesh and the horrible years of war have brought many Syrians to rally behind Assad again.

"The fire of the revolution is still silently burning beneath the rubble, and when the unifying common enemy in the form of Daesh disappears and Assad tries to return to normality, these tensions will bring society to erupt again. Already now there is a vibrant exchange of ideas in the Aleppo region between Arab and Kurdish communities. It is now the duty of Rojava to make it known that the revolution has not died and that the new society already exists. The rips within Syrian society are far too deep to be mended by Assad. "

Middle Eastern Power Plays and the People's Spring Rojava

Some details on the Şêxmeqsûd neighborhood in northwest Aleppo under the control of the YPG, 02/2015:

Most of the inhabitants of the neighborhood are displaced and poor. There is complete power outage, and streets are filled with holes and puddles. The activity of the relief committees is limited compared to the large number of people in need. Fatima said, “A month ago, we received one cleaning basket. Fuel prices are very high, and we have to cut wood for heat. But, thank God, we are in a much better state than some families that can’t find anyone to support them.”

The local council in the neighborhood handles the civil administration of the area, and its chairman, Imad Daoud, brags that his council is made up of representatives of all sects and races — Muslims, Christians, Arabs and Kurds.

Leafing through the residential records, he told Al-Monitor, “Around 90,000 people from diverse religions and races live in Sheikh Maksoud. More than half of the residents are displaced people seeking security. Our doors are open to everyone.”

Although the neighborhood is safe from shelling, in the past two months it has seen a wave of displaced due to concerns about a possible blockade that the regime forces might impose on Aleppo. The neighborhood is open to other neighborhoods that are under the opposition’s control, and it has frontlines along which the opposition forces and the YPG are positioned against the regime

“Around two months ago, the population in the neighborhood reached 120,000, but recently, many were displaced outside Aleppo to flee the blockade,” Daoud added.

The council handles the distribution of humanitarian aid to refugees, and dozens of poor people regularly return to the council’s office.

While Daoud addresses the affairs of some of them, he said, “Most of the neighborhood residents do not have an income to support their livelihood, as they lost their jobs. We receive from the organizations, on a monthly basis, 1,200 food rations and another 1,200 containers of cleaning detergents to be distributed to the displaced. But these cannot meet the huge needs.”

He added, “The residents need additional funding to pay fees for generators. Power has been cut for three years now, after the Shaqif power plant, which is a small industrial area in Aleppo, was shelled by the air force. We are facing difficulties in supplying an alternative power line.”

Aleppo's displaced find refuge in Kurdish regions

Ethnically diverse disaster communism of the newly lumpen proletariat.

In 2013:

At the top of the hill near the area’s main mosque, groups of rebels mingled, in newfound amity, with Kurdish fighters from the local People’s Defense Units, the armed wing of Syria’s main Kurdish group, the Democratic Union Party (P.Y.D.). Until Friday, this area had been controlled by Kurdish fighters but was frequently visited by militias and intelligence agents from the regime of Bashar al-Assad. On Friday, though, in an event that may have momentous consequences for the course of the civil war, the Kurds switched sides, and with their help the rebels overran Sheikh Maksoud, which commands strategic high ground north of the city’s center.

The Kurdish Factor

Aleppo had become safe places for the people, adding: “A secure life has been established. People who fled to Iraq and Turkey have begun to return. We are calling on people to come back.”

Rezan Rojhat said around 100,000 people lived in the Kurdish neighbourhoods of Aleppo. He said people who had taken refuge in the city from other places made up 60% of the population of these neighbourhoods. Rojhat said these neighbourhoods were protected by the YPG/YPJ.

YPG commander Rezan Rojhat said there was also an Arab battalion within the YPG and Christians in the public security force. He said people had started to come back from Iraq and Turkey, and that some of the people in Aleppo had fled attacks by ISIS gangs on villages in Kobanê. “We expect people to return now we have established security in the Kurdish neighbourhoods. Of course there are problems. For instance, unemployment. We have tried to resolve this with economic projects. Our part of Aleppo is an example of the progress we have made as regards our understanding of democratic autonomy

YPG Aleppo commander: Syrian regime failed to regain control over Kurdish neighborhoods, 02/10/2015

Here is an article from 2013 on YPG recruitment of Arab FSA fighters in Aleppo: Arabs join Kurdish militia in Aleppo 2/9/2013

Judicial Agreement in Aleppo between Levant Front and YPG , 2/5/2015. The Levant Front has since dissolved.

A recent (May 12, 2015) brotherhood march stressing multi-ethnic unity in Şêxmeqsûd

Peoples march for brotherhood in Şêxmeqsûd

YPG (People's Defense Forces) Aleppo Command has released a written statement regarding the recently enhanced provocative attempts and efforts of Al-Nusra, Ahrar Es-Sham and other gang groups to siege the Sheikh Maqsoud (Şêxmeqsûd) neighborhood.

The statement reported that some armed groups guided by external powers and led by Al-Nusra, Ahrar Es-Sham and groups affiliated to the Turkish state -Sultan Murad Battalions in the first place- have surrounded the Şêxmeqsûd neighborhood in recent days.

“Against the threats, YPG Command will act together with Jabhat Al-Shamiya in order to protect the local people and civilians, and defend all peoples in the region”, the statement underlined.

YPG on guard against threats around Sheikh Maqsoud

"The armed groups that told the inhabitants to leave the neighborhood until 13.00 threatened to declare the area as military area if they wouldn't.
"It is reported that the gangs have started random attacks on mainly Muxaberat street, 20th street, Nebo village and El-Şeqîf area, while on the other hand using heavy weapons in attacks targeting some other areas. YPG forces are reported to have returned fire immediately and with the same intensity."

Gang groups seeking provocation attack Sheikh Maqsoud

"Ahrar ash-Sham has put a blockade on Afrin and stopped all food trucks entering Afrin from Azaz,Aleppo "
source

There may have been a cease fire in Sheikh Maqsoud/Aleppo between YPG and Al Nursa.

Meanwhile in Cizire canton...

What sort of an advantage will the liberation of Mount Kezwan (Mt. Abdulaziz) and Mabruka town provide for the YPG and YPJ in the coming days?

The liberation of this town means the liberation of the border side for the Cezire canton in the first place. It is also of importance for the fraternity of the peoples as it houses Arab and Kurdish people. The area is mainly inhabited by Arabs.

As you speak of the fraternity of the peoples; Did Arabs, Syriacs and Assyrians fought alongside your forces during the recent operations?

As YPG we define ourselves as an army comprised of all peoples living in the region. We believe in democracy, equality and fraternity. The YPG has enabled Syriacs, Assyrians, Arabs and Kurds to act together on the basis of a common sense of patriotism. Everyone has seen the fact that they can live with their own identity under the YPG umbrella. Syriacs undertook an important mission, so did the Arab forces. There is one single aim and purpose uniting us, which is a democratic order.

Member of YPG Military Council Sozdar Derik on Liberation of Mabruka, 5/28/2015

Any updates on the supposed agreement with the FSA not to fight one another?

Thought some of you guys might have some interest in this. Combat footage, some is pretty disturbing including dead child bodies in newly liberated former Daesh territory the Kurds come across, with injuries indicating torture. Also a pretty nasty scene where an elderly Yazedi woman has clearly been killed by Daesh sniper fire.

The documentary overall is uplifting and briefly touches on the libertarian principles of the YPG and YPJ including the Israeli female volunteer and the American Jordan Matson.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sTnS2YbFBkA

Who down voted this? Is there a policy against posting videos?

Georgie89

Any updates on the supposed agreement with the FSA not to fight one another?

which one? FSA isn't all that coherent. YPG has good relations with some FSA groups and not others.

Flint

Georgie89

Any updates on the supposed agreement with the FSA not to fight one another?

which one? FSA isn't all that coherent. YPG has good relations with some FSA groups and not others.

I am not sure just keep seeing YPG members or affiliates on twitter mention it but a lot is translated so not very easily comprehended. I have been in touch with a few YPG members from the UK over the last few days who have been giving me some insight so I will ask them. I just don't want to keep spamming them for every question I have as they have more occupying concerns, obviously.

Who controls the oil and gas in Syria?

Baathists: 8%
ISIS: 80%
Tev-Dem/YPG: 12%

Nursa issued a couple other statements that they intend to continue against the YPG, but they've gotten attacked by Daesh elsewhere and haven't taken further action against Sheikh Maqsood.

Here is more detail map:

Is this a black swan kind of event? Chobani yogurt tycoon donating $700+ million to refugees (focused on Kurdistan). Already donated $2 million to Kobane refugees.

By comparison, the LaFarge Cement plant cost $700 million to build.

Arab participation/alliance with Tev-Dem/YPG

Since July 10, 2014 Humaydi Dahmam al-Assi al-Jarba, a cousin of Ahmet Jarba, former head of the Syrian opposition, has been a co-governor in the province of Hasakah. Humaydi Dahman al-Assi is a leading tribal head from the Shammar tribe.

Syrian Kurds Appoint Arab Governor

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) “prince of Hasaka”, northeast of Syria, issued a statement on Friday threatening the prominent leader of al-Shammar Arab tribe in Qamishli environs, Hmedi Dahham al-Hadi, after the latter formed al-Karama army to support the Kurdish forces of the Popular Protection Units (YPG) against ISIL group.

According to the statement (published online by ISIL-linked activists), the menace’s reason is al-Karama army’s cooperation with the Kurdish YPG forces in northern Syria.

The statement asserted that ISIL “will fight al-Karama army, established by al-Shumar tribe’s militants, by all the means possible”. It also invited the army to “repent and give themselves up”...

Zyad al-Hadi, nephew of al-Shammar tribal leader and a militant in al-Karama army, told ARA News: “We receive these ongoing threats directly and indirectly but they will not demoralize us.”

Al-Shammar leader threatened by ISIL for cooperation with Syria Kurds, June 8, 2014

There are Shammar in the YPG and YPJ in addition to Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ).
Arab youth in the front line with YPG and YPJ, August 8, 2014

"Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira disbanded. Also, it was Shammar tribal militia. Their fighters than formed Karama army, which is now known as Sanadid army."

"Sanadid deployed large force in Tal Hamis battle and are in charge of security of Shammar areas, also jointly control Til Kocer border town"

"Also, not all Shammar are pro-YPG, it's mostly the historically dominant al-Jarba branch, who were the ones supporting YPG. During the February Tel Hamis offensive, loads of Shammaris from al-Faddagha branch were killed fighting for IS against their al-Jarba kinsmen and YPG."

Reddit discussion on the Arab tribes working with the YPG

Zubayd support YPG.

Assyrian communities in the area have begun to form militias that man checkpoints to guard access points to their villages. They are reportedly being organized and trained by an ethnic Assyrian, former Swiss Army soldier and are seeking the assistance of the YPG. Yazidi villagers are stated to have been threatened by Salafi-jihadi fighters and as a result have either fled their villages or are turning to the YPG for armed support. In addition, the al-Sharabiyya and Zubayd Arab tribal communities in the area also reportedly feel sufficiently threatened by the ongoing conflict in Ras al-Ayn and have accepted arms and affiliation with the YPG.

The Battle for Syrias Al Hasakah Province, October 24, 2013

Jawala, Sharabi (Sharabiya), Benitaba and Rashid

The operation you carried out last year didn’t succeed and Arabs in the region opposed you. What attitude was displayed by the local Arab population this time?

All the minorities in the Jazira Canton participated in this operation. I may not mention all of them one by one but a number of tribes such as Shamar, Jawala, Sharabi, Benitaba and Rashid all took part in the operation. In addition to units affiliated to the Syriac Military Council and the tribe of Shamar. It was a successful operation. That is to say, the attitude of the local Arabs wasn’t like last year’s.

YPG Spokesman Redur Xelil: Liberation of Tal Hamis is a Very Strategic Gain, March 1, 2015

New group of Sanadid forces completes trainings, March 15, 2015

Video: Arabic Senadid Forces Speak about YPG Cooperation, February 28, 2015

Notably, YPG and FSA-linked sources confirmed Sunday that there is no intention for the YPG fighters to enter or stay in the Arab villages and areas, and that the administration of theses areas will be assigned solely to the FSA factions only.

Kurdish forces cooperate with FSA to free Arab villages from ISIS, February 15, 2015

hundreds of people participated in the funeral of seven Arab fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in the city of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), in Hasakah province, northeastern Syria.

The victims, who were killed during the battles against Islamic State group (IS/ISIS) in the fighting front of Sere Kaniye, were buried in the village of Bir Kafri near Derbassiyeh in Hasakah province... Members of the Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM) emphasized the necessity of participation by all the Syrian components in the ranks of the YPG forces, saying that these forces are established to protect all social components in northern Syria, “not only Kurds”.

Kurds bid farewell to Arab fighters killed in anti-ISIS battles northern Syria, March 19, 2015

Syrian Kurds and Arabs unified against ISIL. September 29, 2014

The ISIS and other Islamist armed opposition groups had earlier forced the Kurdish FSA group Jabhat al-Akrad (close to the PYD and PKK) out of the mixed areas in the north of Syria – al-Bab, Azzaz, Raqqah, Tel Ebyad, the countryside of Aleppo and other areas – after the YPG expelled the ISIS and other Islamist groups from the mixed city of Ras al-Ayn on July 17. Jabhat al-Akrad was also expelled from the FSA’s Military Council in August (Transnational Middle-East Observer, August 15).

Jabhat al-Akrad was most likely created by the PYD to gain access to mixed Arab-Kurdish areas and to make logistics between the three Kurdish enclaves easier. “Kurds in Syria live in various Arab cities, towns and villages. We wanted Kurds to have a common organization in these regions with other ethnicities. Therefore, we established Jabhat al Akrad,” said Haji Ahmad Kurdi, head of Jabhat al-Akrad (Rudaw, August 11).

A New Strategy Toward the Arab Population

However, since the YPG took over Ras al-Ayn and Jabhat al-Akrad was expelled from most mixed areas, the PYD and YPG have changed their strategy. On October 24, the YPG captured the Iraqi Yaroubiya border crossing with the support of local Arab tribes (al-Monitor, November 25). Some Arab villages supported the YPG in expelling FSA and Islamist fighters in villages surrounding Ras al-Ayn as a result of looting by armed opposition groups (al-Monitor, October 8)...

The PYD therefore maintains a careful policy towards the mixed areas and tries to incorporate Arabs and Christians in their interim administration. This is also part of the imprisoned PKK leader’s ideology of democratic confederalism, which opposes a centralist nation-state and aims to preserve internal autonomy.

Öcalan’s system of confederalism aims for “political self-administration where all groups of society and all cultural identities can express themselves in local meetings, general conventions and councils,” Öcalan wrote in his ideology of democratic confederalism, released on March 20, 2005. [1]

Sinem Muhammad, co-head of the PYD People’s Council for West Kurdistan, said that the PYD rejects borders and called for the recognition of ethnic differences between Arabs and Kurds. She said that in mixed areas, Arabs have the right to have their own council and participate in the administration with their own councils. [2]

The ideology of the PYD and PKK seems to have had some success in the Arab village of Alook, close to Ras al-Ayn, where local Arabs thanked the YPG (al-Monitor, October 13). A local council of Arabs was formed in the village with the help of the PYD, and the YPG stayed out of the village to demonstrate that they do not want to change the local demography.
The YPG also got some support from members of the Shammar tribe when they took over the Yaroubiya border crossing on October 24. The Shammar tribe’s FSA brigade, the Liwa Ahrar al-Jazira (LAJ), was expelled from Yaroubiya in mid-October following allegations of corruption by the al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). [3] The YPG used the local resentment against al-Qaeda to dominate the town.

There are signs that the YPG is now trying to incorporate Arabs in their armed formations. On November 1, the YPG created an Arab brigade in Ras al-Ayn called Ahrar al-Watan (Free Men of the Homeland), led by Hawas al-Akub (Hawar News Agency, November 1). Also in Yaroubiya, local Arabs joined YPG security formations and local Arabs and Kurds will reportedly jointly administer the border-crossing (al-Monitor, November 25).

PYD leader Salih Muslim outlined a clearer Arab policy in a recent interview, saying that the PYD’s militias would fight against jihadi groups, but would not force out local Arabs, whether settlers or native Arabs:

There are three sorts of Arabs among us: there are those with whom we have always lived and who we have fought alongside. We defend the brotherhood between these peoples. There are those who do not belong, Arabs who came from outside, other countries or the region, the jihadists who have burned our homes, and decapitated Kurds. Finally, there are the Arabs who were moved to Kurdistan by force by [former Syrian President] Hafez al-Assad ... to Arabize the region. They are victims ... and we advocate a peaceful solution for these populations. Those who can return to their hometowns should do so and the others can live in peace with the Kurds (AFP December 2).

It seems that the most powerful Kurdish party, the PKK-affiliated PYD, has decided to expand their control over mixed areas in Northern Syria instead of cooperating with the FSA. Their aim is to create a transitional administration. In mixed areas under their control, the PYD also wants to create councils of the local population based on the ideology of imprisoned PKK leader Öcalan and has a ‘soft policy’ that gives local Arabs their own local power. The PYD aims to include local Arabs and Christians in their administration project and their militias, or to cooperate with independent Arab or Christian militias.

Kurdish Strategy Towards Ethnically-Mixed Areas in the Syrian Conflict, Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 23, December 13, 2013

Rojava Forces: Cizîrê Canton, with size, locations and roles. Hêzên Xwe Parastinê (thats the static infantry that includes conscripts) is significantly larger than I thought. It is interesting to note that there is a separate Syriac Christian police force--Sutoro("Security"), but not a separate police for Arabs--only the Asayish. Also, note the acknowledgement of 200 HPG (PKK) in the ranks of the YPG.

There are Arabs in the Asayish, some of whom were killed defending Khabur. Arab Asayish martyrs of the #Khabur resistance

The Kurdish administration in the autonomous cantons has continuously placed emphasis on the protection it offers to minorities. In Cezire canton, Arab and Assyrian battalions form part of the YPG military force. Sheikh Humeydi Denhan, the leader of the Arab Shemmar tribe, is the co-president of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Cezire canton (the YPG is the PYD’s military wing). The Sheikh is an example of cooperation between Arab and Kurdish communities that the YPG hopes to build on.

'Sherwan Qasem, a humanitarian worker in Turkey, said: “The example of Sheikh Humeydi Denhan from the Shemmar clan is exactly the model the Kurds are looking to build on in Rojava. The problem is, for most Arabs, they are not buying it.”

While the YPG may not have fully gained the trust of Arab communities, the YPG have been careful not to increase tensions in the area. Between Tel Abyad and Serekaniye lie hundreds of Arab villages that were originally Kurdish. During the 1970s, the Assad regime pursued a policy of Arabisation on the Turkish border, essentially displacing Kurdish villagers. But instead of raiding the villages and returning them to the Kurds, the YPG have left them alone.

...

One of the new arrivals to this madrasa was an Arab imam from a village near the city of Qamishlo. Two months ago, IS entered his village, but when it became clear he wasn't going to pay lip service to the group, he was forced to flee to Turkey.

“For months, my village had been under YPG control. The Kurds didn't do anything to me, but as soon as ISIS came, it was Arabs who destroyed my home,” Naksibendi said. However, while keen to vent his anger towards IS, he was more hesitant about backing YPG. “My family will never fully support YPG. While I appreciate the security they have offered, many Arabs believe they don't represent us enough.”

Such reluctance to support the YPG is a challenge that the YPG need to overcome. But there is hope on the horizon. The Burkan al-Furat, a military coalition of YPG and various Arab forces - including the Arab Raqqa Rebels who fought alongside the YPG in the defence of Kobane - are part of the advance against IS. Such an alliance will be crucial in convincing Arabs that they are a legitimate force, and if successful, could become a blueprint of Kurdish-Arab cooperation in defeating IS. The challenge to convince the Arab citizens will certainly be a tall order, and in many ways, this is the greatest challenge facing the YPG if they are to successfully implement their project across Syria.

YPG's greatest challenge: Kurdish-Arab relations in Syria: As YPG prepares for an offensive on the border city of Tel Abyad, how will Arab citizens react towards a predominantly Kurdish force?, April 6, 2015

“The Arabs came from the Arab belt. Whoever is in power, they support them. Because the YPG leaves them alone, they appreciate them. But if they can choose between the YPG and the regime, they would choose the regime. But they appreciate the YPG from liberating it from the Free Syrian Army [FSA],” said Kovan Direj, a local Kurdish journalist.

“Only the FSA causes problems. We wish the situation would return to the past. Why did they come here, why did they want to free us? From what? There is nothing here. We never demonstrate. They came here to free us from the YPG, thinking it was a Kurdish village. They don’t know anything about us. They are being taught the YPG are unbelievers, they think everybody is an unbeliever,” said Abu Hamza.

The YPG has a small office near the road on the outskirts of Alouk. The YPG says they don’t want to hurt the Arab population, although the Arab villagers were brought by the regime. “For us, it’s a philosophy. We Kurds see the Arabs as brothers. The Kurds have always protected the Arabs, but the Arabs didn’t protect us. Now they build their own community. If they want help from us, we will help them.” said Qamislo.

The YPG fighters fiercely deny they want to remove the Arab villagers, Qamislo said. "The regime wanted to change the demography of the area, but we don’t want to change it.”

Both the Arab villagers and YPG fighters accuse the Islamist fighters of stealing everything. “Our ideology says they can have their own flags and schools, and teach their own language. The only thing we want from them is to regard the Kurds as their brothers.”

Syrian Arab Village Welcomes Kurdish Fighters, October 13, 2013

The FSA group being mentioned here is Islamist groups such as Ahrar al-Sham which has allied with Jabhat al-Nursa (Al Qaeda in Syria)

Several pro-opposition media outlets and activists accuse the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) of committing human rights abuses against Arabs in the areas it recaptures from the Islamic State in northeast Syria.

Here, Akram Salih, pro-opposition Orient News correspondent embedded with YPG forces in the Al-Hasakah countryside, talks to Syria Direct's Osama Abu Zeid about the allegations, which he describes as “merely talk.”

Q: There's been talk recently about violations that the YPG has committed against Arab civilians in the Al-Hasakah countryside, things like forced migration, burning property, etc. What's your take?

“It's merely talk. Talk that hasn't been attributed to any specific individual, but rather to media activists—without mention of who exactly these activists are. What sort of activist is able to be present, right now, in the middle of the ongoing battles? At the very least there are no pictures available that prove the claim [that the YPG is committing violations against Arab citizens].

Secondly, it's the total opposite of what's going on. The YPG presents emergency aid to the residents of the areas they liberate from IS control.”

Q: What about the pictures that were published recently that show agricultural land burning in those areas under YPG control? As the YPG enters the villages?

“As for burning agricultural land, that's a result of mortars falling during the battles themselves. Keep in mind that right now is harvest season [meaning that fields burn more easily].”

On the Record: YPG expelling Al-Hasakah Arabs ‘merely talk’, May 27, 2015

Ahh... here is another article by Hannah Lucinda Smith that claims the MFS (Syriac Military Council)/Syriac Union Party (SUP) has an uneasy alliance with the YPG.

"It is an uneasy alliance. The YPG has never openly opposed the Syrian regime as the MFS have, and no-one knows what kind of deal can be struck between the two groups should the Kurds get the autonomy that they have coveted for so long."

Christians, Kurds join forces against 'IS'. May 5, 2015

She's is referencing a group that used to be nicknamed the "Assyrian PKK". Notice how she doesn't quote anyone in the MFS or even the local Syriac community talking about an "uneasy alliance".

The history of the Syriac revolutionaries is fascinating in its own right, but they are tight with the PYD and were part of the administration since the very start of Tev-Dem.

in 2013, a police force called Sutoro opened three stations in the Jazira area, and a military force called the Syriac Military Council (Mawtbo Fulhoyo Suryoyo or MFS) announced its existence in an online video. The MFS initially hinted at future military action against the regime, but this never materialized. Instead, a more immediate and existential threat appeared, as a coalition of rebel and jihadist groups suddenly attacked. The MFS and the YPG soon fought side-by-side in the frontlines to defend the area, while Sutoro developed an increasingly close cooperation with its Kurdish counterpart Asayish. Just like in the 1990s, Dawronoye integrated into the security structures of their Kurdish allies, while retaining their own organizations and financing themselves through diaspora donations.

Around the same time as the attacks began, the PYD invited other parties and civil society organizations to participate in a process to form local governance structures. Most turned down the offer, fearing that the PYD would continue to dominate, but the SUP participated actively from the beginning until the end. Among the chief declared goals was one to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious communities. With unmistaken symbolism, one of the first meetings was conducted across the border in Midyat, where Kurdish representatives took the opportunity to apologize for their people’s role in Seyfo. When the autonomous “Jazira canton” was declared in January 2014, representatives of the SUP took up positions in the government and legislative assembly, while Syriac, Arabic, and Kurdish were declared official languages.

“We believe that this philosophy of [the PKK leader] Ocalan can be a model not just for the Kurds but for other peoples also,” says Nazira Goriye, the co-spokesperson of the legislative assembly. “We want our rights not just as Christians, but as a people, as a nation. This is why we are on the side of the Kurds, not on Assad’s side. Assad tries to give our people a morphine injection.”

The Revolutionaries of Bethnahrin, May 25, 2015

Hannah Lucinda Smith fabricated an "uneasiness". She's talking shit she doesn't know about and would frankly sound ludicrous to anyone in the MFS.

Assyrian Nationalists Cooperate with Kurdish PKK Insurgents, Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 8, April 3, 2009

Hannah Lucinda Smith fabricated an "uneasiness". She's talking shit she doesn't know about and would frankly sound ludicrous to anyone in the MFS

I don't know this journalist nor hav CI read this article. I have spoken to Assyrians (here in Turkey not in Syria) who have talked about this 'unease' though. I certainly don't think it's ridiculous.

The think is that you keep posting loads of stuff about how the PYD is on good terms with the Arabs. You don't think it's possible that they are committing acts of ethnic cleansing. I think it is completely expectable.

I also think that these current stories about ethnic cleansing could be lies.

We will see whether it's true or not. Posting loads of stuff about why you think it can't be true, won't change that.

Devrim

Lots of Assyrians distrust Kurds because of historic Kurdish involvement in genocide against Assyrians. Yes, that is totally understable uneasiness. That's not the claim that Smith was making. Smith was claiming the MFS was "uneasy" about alliance with the PYD/YPG. If anything, the MFS are PKK-trained proxies.

Ofcourse ethnic cleansing is a possibility. Its happening all over the place in Syria, and in particular Ahrar ash-Sham (FSA) was doing it to Kurds in Syria a couple years ago. Supposedly, Daesh and some local Arab tribal militias are doing it right now, including 600 refugees stuck at the border . Still no word when Pale Blue Jadal will call on the Turkish state to let those refugees in; nor has PBS (not to be confused with Enternasyonalist Komünist Sol or the International Communist Current!) given an opinion on the videos of Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı(MIT) trucks moving arms into Syria which certainly weren't going to the YPG. 1,000 mortar shells, hundreds of grenade launchers and more than 80,000 rounds of ammunition for light and heavy weapons. Or Erdogan threatening the press over it. I'd say those revelations were moving Kurdish votes from AKP to HDP, but most of those votes already moved and Erdogan's support for anyone but the YPG is sort of assumed.

till no word when Enternasyonalist Komünist Sol will call on the Turkish state to let those refugees in; nor has EKS given an opinion on.,,

This would presumably be because the organisation cease to exist more that six years ago.

Devrim

EKS dissolved like 6 years ago?

Whatever the left-communist group Devrim has influence in is called.

Admittedly that's entirely troll bait, but Devrim already stated he doesn't even bother to read the article I put forward without restating his opinion. He can't read half of them anyway because they are blocked in Turkey and he doesn't care enough to get around the block.

That's not the claim that Smith was making. Smith was claiming the MFS was "uneasy" about alliance with the PYD/YPG.

Yes, that's what I've heard people say.

Devrim

Here, I'll fix it and give the benefit of a doubt... I look forward to Pale Blue Jadal's denouncement of bourgeois state of Turkey's border control policies that prohibit unarmed Kurdish refugees from fleeing the Tel Abyad area into Turkey, but allow the movement of weapons into Syria where they end up in the hands of the Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra.

Joseph Kay

EKS dissolved like 6 years ago?

Ye, six years ago.

Devrim

Flint

Here, I'll fix it and give the benefit of a doubt... I look forward to Pale Blue Jadal's denouncement of bourgeois state of Turkey's border control policies...

Again not a group I'm a member of.

Am I personally against the Turkish state arming people in the Syrian war, and not letting refugees cross the boarder? Well yes obviously, I am, and I'm sure Pale Blue Jadel are too.

Devrim

The Lafarge Cement plant website, unchanged since before the civil war
http://www.lafarge.com.sy/

BBC Interview "Allegations against the Kurds of Syria and PYD response" with Hannah Lucinda Smith and Jiwan Efrin, is a representative of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in London, June 3rd, 2015

Hannah Lucinda Smith went to Rojava--specifically Tel Hamis--in April 2015 with an armed Christian group/militia allied with the YPG (presumably the MFS, who she published a story on here). She claims to have been there 6 weeks after YPG took the area from ISIS.

Transcript:

Hannah Lucinda Smith:"There have been various stories coming out for the past three or four months about things that are going on in the area of northeastern Syria thats controlled by the Kurds and partly by ISIS. This is the area around the city of Hasakah, also aroudn the city of Ras al-Ayn, and around Kobane as well there, Kurdish fores are fighting.

Hannah Lucinda Smith:"Various bits of testimony started coming out saying that the YPG were basically preventing Arab civilians from returning to their homes once the fighting was finished. The most striking things people were talking about again and again was that the YPG forces were going into villages and burning houses to prevent people from returning.

Hannah Lucinda Smith:"I then actually went to Rojava myself in April, I didn't go with the YPG I went with a Christian armed group who are kind of allied with the YPG. And we went to places around Tel Hamis, which was taken back by the YPG from ISIS in Februrary and we came 6 weeks after. There was a large area that was absolutely deserted. This Arab towns and villages. There was a large amount of destruction. We were told it was done by air strikes. But it was quite clear that a lot that was not done by air strikes. Some damage was very clearly done by artillery. Other damage that was done by fire."

BBC Interviewer: "O.K there has been fighting there, what did the YPG the Kurdish People's Protection Units what did they tell you about what might have happened?"

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "What they say is that they--they're trying to rid the area--secure the area from the threat of ISIS. So, what they say is that they are not targetting civilians, they are targetting people are harbouring or supporting ISIS fighters.

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "What the arab civilians are saying is that its more a kind of collective retribution.

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "One of the fighters, again he wasn't YPG, he was one of the christian militia who is allied with the YPG, when we asked him about this he said well you know all of the people in this area support ISIS.

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "Its really difficult one to prove because the YPG have a very, very strong media operation, they keep a really tight check on journalists. Its hard to go anywhere without consent of the YPG.

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "The refugees who have left these village, alot of them have gone into ISIS areas because there is no other place that they can go. It was hard to gather testimony. It took a very long time to do that."

BBC Interviewer: "This is not connected to different branches of Islam though is it? Because Kurds are Sunnis as well as the Arabs that you spoke to."

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "Absolutely, you know its important to say that Kurds are Sunnis, and there are alot of conservative Kurds."

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "The YPG is something quite different, they follow the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan. He is the leader of the PKK--the Kurdistan Workers Party--who has been imprisoned in Turkey for the last decade."

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "This is a very secular left wing ideology, do they not consider themselves muslims. So, its not all kurds--its very specifically the YPG fighters."

BBC Interviewer: "Where did you get your figure of 10,000 arabs driven out?"

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "This was from an NGO source, I can't tell you the name of the NGO."

BBC Interviewer: "Just the one source?"

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "It uses a variety of sources on the ground. They're monitoring all areas. Its not just one source, its a source that comes from a humanitarian organization.

BBC Interviewer: "And where have those thousands gone do you believe?

"

Hannah Lucinda Smith: "A lot have gone towards in Hasakah in northeastern Syria that lies between Raqqa and Mosul. Some others have gone to Raqqa and very few have come into Turkey."

--

Jiwan Afrin: "These allegations, they are biased allegations. They have not taken place. They haven't been verified by the journalist who wrote these allegations... "

Jiwan Afrin: "The Arab component form 14% of the YPG force. This force actually, Arab force which is the FSA with YPG now are in active operation against ISIS. 14% of the actual force on the ground they are Arabs, and other components like Syrica Military Council, al-Khabour forces, Arab al-Senadid forces which are the Arab tribes. Now how come all these forces haven't noticed this type of allegations or this type of acts have taken place."

Jiwan Afrin: "The other thing I would like us to point out sir is Rojava's actual policy or the society we are striving to form is the multi-cultural secular society and it is not based just on a pure national objective that the YPG is persuing"

BBC Interviewer: "Well, I understand that maybe the policy of the leadership, but as you know when conflict comes to an area its very easy to set up divisions between people of different groups and backgorunds, and this journalist did say she saw empty villages."

Jiwan Afrin: "Now lets put it this way now, we know that basically we've been familiar with ISIS activities and brutal war and savagery on the ground. ISIS now turned Rojava into a massive minefield. Wherever they go, they trap they put bomb traps, they put explosives.

Jiwan Afrin: "I can give Kobane as an example, still 190,000 Kobane people can not return to their home just because their home is full of explosives still.

Jiwan Afrin: "Now ISIS when they retreat from a village or somewhere they explode people, they blow up people's houses, they burn their crops, they destory their animal, whatever.

Jiwan Afrin: "ISIS has been destructive force on the ground, now this allegation basically thinking was the general command of YPG. We would like welcome media organization, UN, to do a proper investigation where this allegation took place.

BBC Interviewer: "But your claim is that there are forces of Arab backgrounds from Kurdish backgrounds that are fighting against the Islamic State?"

Jiwan Afrin: "That is correct."

---

Hannah Lucinda Smith is claiming that YPG fighters displaced Arabs from the Tel Hamis areas and that those arabs fled largely to Al-Hasakah. Al-Hasakah is the largest city in the Al-Hasakah goveronate/Cizire Canton. It is partially under YPG control and partly under Syrian Arab Army (SAA)/Assad control. The SAA area is currently under attack by Daesh. It seems counter-intuitive that Arab refugees fleeing YPG ethnic cleansing would flee to an area of greater, more established YPG presence. Or perhaps going exclusively to the SAA/NDF controlled neighborhoods.

Here are maps from the area in February 2015 and then April 2015 (when Hannah Lucinda Smith was there):

Here is a summary of Al-Hasakah offensive (February-March 2015)

Al-Hasakah city control divided between YPG and SAA in January 18, 2015

Units involved in the YPG Tel Abyad campaign.

The Following Forces Are Taking Part In The Operation:

Coming from the east--Cizîrê canton:

YPG and YPJ Forces
Rojava Asayish Forces
Senadit/Al-Senadid Forces (the military force of local Arab tribes-Shammar)
The Syriac Military Council
Sutoro
Natora
Zêrevanên Xabûr/Khabour Guards (Local Assyrian/Syria defense forces)
Liwa El-Tahrir/Liwa Al-Tahrir (the branch of the Burkan El Fırat within the Cizîrê canton), from Ras al-ain / Serekaniye

Coming from the west--Kobanê canton:

joint command of the Burkan el Firat/Burkan al-Firat/Euphrates Volcano: Most of the groups within the Burkan el Firat are also members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The joint command encompasses the following groups:

Liva El Tevhid/Liwa al-Tawhid
Liva El Siwar El Raka/Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa/Raqqa Revolutionaries
Şems El Şemal/kata'eb shams ash-shamal/Northern Sun battalions (YPG Turkmen) attached to the Fecir El Huriye/Liwa Fajr al-Hurriya/Dawn of Freedom Brigades.
YPG/YPJ Forces
Seraya Cerablus/Saraya Jarabulus
Liva Cephet El-Ekrad/Liwa' Jabhat al-'Akrad
Siwar Umunaa El Raka, another Raqqa group
El Kasas Army/Al-Qassas Army
Liva El Cihad Fi Sebilillah/Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah/Jihad in the Path of God Brigade.

Source: Peoples’ Operation To Liberate Girê Spî From ISIS, June 2, 2015

Just in case you live in a cave and Libcom is the only website you can access, HDP crossed the electoral threshold and entered into parliament in Turkey as a party. If HDP rhetoric is to be believed, they will prevent Erdogan from changing the constitution of Turkey and increasing the power of the presidency. Erdogan's party the AKP also moved from being the majority party to the largest minority party in Turkey's parliament.

In immediate economic impacts, it caused the stock market in Turkey and the Lira to decrease in value.

http://www.businessinsider.com/turkish-elections-lira-and-stock-markets-tumbling-after-president-recep-tayyip-erdoan-suffers-election-blow-2015-6

Also, just to give an idea, the company that manufactures the TOMAs is Katmerciler Ekipman, owned by one Ismail Katmerciler, who is an AKP ex-Minister. Cosy.

Anti-government protests in 2013 offered a boost to Katmerciler, generating business for the İzmir-based company in nations such as Brazil and Libya that also face social unrest. Katmerciler sold 60 protest dispersion vehicles in 2013, up from 10 in 2012. The company had entered the TOMA business as early as 2010 and now has 350 workers. Its success is attributed to support from Erdoğan. Back in November, a government deal to purchase 65 TOMAs worth TL 40.6 million from Katmerci helped his firm's shares skyrocket.
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TOMAs are used by the police and gendarmerie and have been exported to countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Libya and Zimbabwe. The company was not immediately available to comment on its market performance on Tuesday.

(Gulenist Press)

However, on the chances of any progressive changes in the constitution or many other things for that matter, I have to agree with ROARMag editor Joris Leverkink's assessment yesterday:

[,,,]
But where the HDP’s victory is rightfully celebrated as an important step forward for the country, it is important to note that the struggle is far from over. The battle has been won, but the war continues.
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The party’s election manifesto — which promises, among many other things, to “realize democratic autonomy”, “establish democratic models of decentralization” and to provide a solution to the Kurdish question by “building a democratic Turkey” — reads like a blueprint for a utopian society in which justice, democracy and solidarity are the guiding principles. The harsh reality is that it is very unlikely that the party will ever become part of a ruling coalition, meaning its possibilities to bring about actual change in Turkey are limited.
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The power of the HDP lies in, and stems from, its close connections to the movements on the streets (and in the parks, the mountains, the squats and the squares). It was grassroots campaigning, close contacts with the electorate and a great number of candidates who have a history of activism that inspired faith among people that the HDP could actually be an alternative to the established powers.
.
However, parliamentary representation should not be seen as the end goal, but rather as a means to create a space in which it is possible for the real facilitators of social change — neighborhood committees, social movements, self-organized workers, grassroots political groups, and so on — to grow, flourish, experiment and build a society in which the idea of parliamentary elections will sound as quaint and unimaginable as a confederation of self-governing communities does today.

I'm wondering if others could comment on reports about possible civil war among Kurds. I read the following in the Norwegian leftist newspaper Klassekampen (The Class Struggle; sadly the paper is far from as revolutionary as the name would suggest):

Klassekampen

After a period with little conflict between the Kurdish authorities and the PKK, the number of arrests in the Kurdish areas have gone up over the last month.

Several violent incidents lately suggests that the level of tension between the various Kurdish militias again increases. In late May forces of the Turkish pershmerga PKK attacked an Iranian Kurdish militia - inside Iraqi Kurdistan. The basis for this conflict is that PKK is supported by Iran, while the Iranian Kurds are in conflict with the regime in Tehran.

Kurdish civil war feared

While Turkey leans heavily on the KDP, the party in power in Iraqi Kurdistan, wile Iran has its ally in the rival party PUK.

While the Western military aid to the Kurds go to KDPs militias, Iran supports the peshmergas of the PUK.

In a recent report, the think tank International Crisis Group warned against a growing rift between the various Kurdish factions, especially in Iraq.

In the report, ICG concludes that the international support to the Kurdish forces have led to increased polarization, rather than unification.

The authors of the report cites the relationship between Iran and PUK as particularly problematic, but also criticized the United States for provided weapons only to the militias belonging to the KDP.

The military support "risks producing a variety of paramilitary forces, all of whom answers to their own political leaders", concludes the International Crisis Group

Pfffioui! Hard to know where to start with an article so ignorant it refers to "the Turkish pershmerga PKK". I mean, ffs, they should at least try to show some interest in the subject...

It's also hard to make out exactly who they are referring to by the term "Iranian Kurdish militia". Obviously not the PJAK (or more precisely YRK/HPJ, to refer specifically to the PJAK's armed structures). And, from not naming the group in question, the article then, confusingly, goes on to talk about the PUK as Iran-backed, and the possibility of a KDP/PUK clash. All hopelessly confused.

As far as I can gather, the incident in question is probably a clash, killing 2, that happened between PKK and Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) (not to be confused with Barzani's Iraqi KDP, NB) on May 24 (see here and here for e.g.). A truce was announced the following day (Monday 25th). No further clashes or killings have been reported in the following 3 weeks.

I think one thing that needs to be understood in the very framing of the question "a civil war between kurds?" is that it presupposes a unified Kurdish civil society that such a conflict would then divide. No such unified civil society has ever existed. Traditional Kurdish politics is tribal, and tribal means a society divided into shifting patterns of clan allegiances to a plurality of tribal confederations who are defined essentially by being more or less permanently at war with all the others. Until the modern period, this state of perpetual warfare helped maintain a belicosity that aided the relative independence of the various Kurdish emirates and mountainous no-go zones. However in the modern period, it has meant, by the same token, that the various tribal militias, become the playthings of the competing regional and global imperialist players. The KDPI, no less that the Barzanists (KDP) and Talabanists (PUK), and all traditional Kurdish nationalist groups, remain in the long heritage of competing and warring tribal confederations. The Ocalanist/KCK affiliates - principally the PKK, but also the PYD and PJAK affiliates - to a certain degree can be seen as just another competitor in this traditional game. Except for a couple of factors. One, Ocalan and the historic PKK core do not come from the traditional ashirat (tribal) chieftian class. Two their initial naive and somewhat catastrophic foray into Kurdish politics was framed as "a war on feudalism" which quickly came a cropper and eventually ended up dragging them into traditional inter-tribal warfare - resulting eventually in a gerilla that was majoritarian (newly) displaced peasant ashirat kurds lead by an educated urban rayat (non-tribal "subject") cadre. In theory this shouldn't provide an insurmountable barrier to accepting re-absorption into traditional ashirat politics, as tribal structures have always been flexible enough to allow new elites from outside existing Kurdish tribes to become dominant. However, for various reasons, the Democratic Autonomy turn - targeting as it does the patriarchal reproductive roots of tribalism - is explicitly aimed at undermining the continual reproduction of tribalism. Whether that strategy will succeed or not remains to be seen, but it is a novel strategy in the history of Kurdish nationalist politics. Certainly in Bakur (Northern, i.e. within Turkish state) Kurdistan, the level of overcoming of traditional tribal emnities for this last election, while far from complete, has gone much further than anything seen before. Thanks as much to Erdogan's cack-handed interventions over Kobani, as much as anything else, to give credit where credit's due, but evenso.

Certainly, however, regardless of the minor PKK-KDPI skirmishes, there are tensions in KRG (Iraqi/Bashur Kurdistan) over Barzani's supposed legal need to run an election soon. Although the PUK are a much weakened force, having been supplanted somewhat by the Gorran movement (Movement for Change) putting it up to both Barzani and Talabani. Somehow Barzani needs to find a pretext to cancel/postpone the elections, and some kind of clash can't be ruled out. But in some ways this is just "business as usual" really.

For some background "colour" on Iranian Kurds, KDPI, Komala, PJAK, etc http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/iran-turkey-syria-kurds-iranian-kurds-rise-up.html

edit: also this is not bad for Rudaw http://rudaw.net/english/opinion/04062015

Thanks for that Ocelot. I also reacted to the liberal use of Pershmerga and therefore thought that something ain't right if they're that sloppy. Add to the fact that it's the first place I've ever seen even a suggestions of civil war, but not really following event that closely I could not judge for myself. But it also show that the journalistic standards at that paper, which used to be really good when it came to matters on international news, has taken a nose-dive.

I think one thing that needs to be understood in the very framing of the question "a civil war between kurds?" is that it presupposes a unified Kurdish civil society that such a conflict would then divide. No such unified civil society has ever existed.

This is a really good point.

Edit: I re-read the article to see what sources it relies on. While the piece is longer, it mostly deals with Turkey and HDP and for that they only have one source. A Norwegian leftist activist that was down there. For the bit that I quoted nothing is presented as evidence. Surprised I missed that the first time around.

Edit 2: Link to article if folks want to machine translate it (as a short cut I did that with what I posted, but fixed some of the glaring mistranslations). http://www.klassekampen.no/article/20150608/ARTICLE/150609860

There is a greater than zero chance that Barzani will resort to violence to maintain power when faced with an electoral challenge to relinquish the KRG presidency and the very real material benefits he receives from it and the patronage system that Barzani uses for support.

Also, business as usual for Barzani is suppressing any sort of autonomy movement in his perceived sphere of influence, such as suppressing the HPS militia in Sinjar/Sengal (and Rudaw loyally claiming Iranian influence on HPS). HPS isn't near the threat in Iraq/KRG that the HPG/PKK being in Sinjar, Makmour, Kirkuk, etc...

With the PUK in a literal coma and collapsing... it's left split Gorran (Movement for Change) has already eclipsed it electorally. Gorran's rhetorical platform was destroying the KDP-PUK patron machine. If Gorran gains the remaining PUK votes, it would be the electoral majority. Even an a Gorran-PUK alliance now has the votes to oust Barzani from the presidency; which is why he delayed presidential elections by two years. That two years, he has only lost popularity.. not gained it from several problems: the abandonment of the Yezidi on Sinjar, the economic boycott of Rojava, digging a literal trench between Rojava and KRG, delays in public sector payments, economic decline, the weakness of the peshmerga where Daesh almost made it into Erbil/Howler and the road had to be blocked by the PKK, failing to protect Makmour, and the usual charges of corruption, nepotism, embezzlement and authoritarian rule.

The recent flare up with KDPI (distinct from the KDP) by entering into HPG/PKK territory is seen by some as the KDPI as a proxy for the KDP to test the PKK or cause some sort of incident to weaken the PKK’S growing popularity in the KRG/Iraq/Bashur. The PKK is probably more popular than it has ever been. Rudaw dutifully reporting KDPI rhetoric that the PKK was allied with Iran, was made up of Alevis not Sunnis, etc...

The KDP has lost almost all influence in Rojava, and all powersharing agreements with the PYD and the KNC (which is largely KDP affilates parties or their allies, some only a few individuals) failed to work, and with the recent elections in Rojava are void (And KDP parties boycotted the Rojava elections).

KCK/PYD has seen it can grow in failed states like Syria through a combination of canton democracy and force of arms. It's seen that it can grow parliamentary elections through the HDP in Turkey (and the HDP got far more votes than Barzani could dream of getting in KRG. The KDP affiliated parties in Turkey aren't significant). Iraq is a failing state, the KRG is a failing defacto-state. Barzani faces a decision to either have a presidential election he would like lose, or defy parliament's increasing demands to have one. If he flagrantly defies it, we might see new cantons form in Sinjar, Makmour and Sulaymaniyah (the Gorran stronghold).

The KRG peshmerga aren't a unified army. It's more a KDP militia and PUK militia that coordinate. The PUK miltia commander has indicated that he'd take orders from Gorran parliamentary ministers. He also gave his personal sniper rifle to a PYD representative to defend Rojava. The PUK militia in Rojava dissolved into the YPG.

The PKK is barred by the KRG from having an electoral party (they even banned YPG funerals in KRG). PKK has indicated support for Gorran. Gorran has indicated support for the HPG/PKK in defending KRG, and support for the YPG in Rojava.

For Newroz this year, HPG/PKK openly paraded on the streets of Sulaymaniyah.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/kurdkish-parties-puk-pkk-ally-to-curb-barzani-power-in-syria.html

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/pkk-barzani-challenge-kurdistan.html#

http://kurdistantribune.com/2013/ocalan-v-barzani-two-contradictory-worlds/

http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/syria/02022014

http://vvanwilgenburg.blogspot.com/2014/02/gorran-supporting-pkkpyd.html?m=1

http://mobile.todayszaman.com/columnist/orhan-miroglu/disagreements-between-pro-kurdish-groups_348482.html

http://kurdistantribune.com/2015/massoud-barzanis-controversial-presidency/

(Duplicate)

Rudaw dutifully reporting KDPI rhetoric that the PKK was allied with Iran, was made up of Alevis (like Assad) not Kurds, etc...

Turkish Alevis and Arab Alevis are actually different religions. They are usually referred to as 'Alevis' and 'Alawites' in English. If the PKK were made up of Alevis, they wouldn't be the same Alevis as Assad.

Devrim

Devrim

Rudaw dutifully reporting KDPI rhetoric that the PKK was allied with Iran, was made up of Alevis (like Assad) not Kurds, etc...

Turkish Alevis and Arab Alevis are actually different religions. They are usually referred to as 'Alevis' and 'Alawites' in English. If the PKK were made up of Alevis, they wouldn't be the same Alevis as Assad.

Devrim

also quite funny because for long time, the PKK was comparatively weak among the non-Sunni and non-Kurmandji-speaking inhabitants of North-West Kurdistan and was in areas like Dersim perceived as a Sunni & Kurmandji org

Entdinglichung

also quite funny because for long time, the PKK was comparatively weak among the non-Sunni and non-Kurmandji-speaking inhabitants of North-West Kurdistan and was in areas like Dersim perceived as a Sunni & Kurmandji org

It still is perceived in that way by many people. A personal friend from Dersim, who I was talking to recently typifies this. He said he was even voting for HDP because "you have to", but he still felt that the PKK was funds mentally an anti-Alevi organisation.

Now personally I think it's true that the Kurdish national movement has changed on this question, but you can't blame people who feel uncomfortable with it basically for having memories.

Devrim

Devrim

Entdinglichung

also quite funny because for long time, the PKK was comparatively weak among the non-Sunni and non-Kurmandji-speaking inhabitants of North-West Kurdistan and was in areas like Dersim perceived as a Sunni & Kurmandji org

It still is perceived in that way by many people. A personal friend from Dersim, who I was talking to recently typifies this. He said he was even voting for HDP because "you have to", but he still felt that the PKK was funds mentally an anti-Alevi organisation.

Now personally I think it's true that the Kurdish national movement has changed on this question, but you can't blame people who feel uncomfortable with it basically for having memories.

Devrim

true, ... on the same level, there is also the perception, that TKP/ML, MLKP, EMEP/DIDF etc. are organisations which are mainly representing Zaza-speaking Alevis with roots in Dersim and Elazig and that the "T" in the acronym doesn't mean Turkey but Tunceli

There is a feeling among some Zazas that the Kurdish nationalist movement is trying to assimilate them. Of course there are other Zazas who are quite happy to be considered Kurdish. Nevertheless, it is quite ironic considering how the Turkish state denied the existence of Kurds for so long.

Devrim

Relatively up to date Iraq map showing position of HPG/PKK, YPG, etc...

And Syria with the YPG/FSA (Burkan Al-Firat) closing in on Tel Abyad.

In Norther Aleppo, Daesh threatens the FSA. YPG/YPJ has volunteered to protect civilians at the border town of Azaz/

New foreign battalion 'Free Internationalists Brigade' was announced today. The battalion consists of MLKP, TKP-ML/TİKKO, United Liberation Forces "Birleşik Özgürlük Güçleri" (BÖG), MLSPB, Reconstrucción Comunista and German, Circassian, Turkish, Greek and Armenian revolutionaries. The aim of the battalion is to protect all People's in the Region and Middle East against the Islamic State

Battalion member from Germany speaking (English)

"Revulation"? Not sure if something got lost or gained in translation there.

... on the same level, there is also the perception, that TKP/ML, MLKP, EMEP/DIDF etc. are organisations which are mainly representing Zaza-speaking Alevis with roots in Dersim and Elazig and that the "T" in the acronym doesn't mean Turkey but Tunceli

Well, the MLKP did well for itself. The leader of its legal party is now an MP and the cochair of the Peoples' Democratic Party, which came into being as a result of the allience of the Turkish and Zaza leftists and the Kurdish PKK aligned social democracy.

EMEP also has at least one deputy from the People's Democratic Party lists and they are strong in Dersim but more importantly, this party is known for being strong and effective in the trade-union bureaucracy and the working class. It basically behaves like a traditional tankie Communist Party despite its Hoxhaist roots.

TKP/ML and its numerous variants are really the ones who have their roots in Dersim and the Zaza ethnic group. They tend to change their alligence every now and then, making alliences with the Republican Popular Party then and the Kurdish nationalists now. They are a very small organizations, and their guerillas are rumored to spend their times playing cards in village coffee houses by day and going back to the mountains at night.

No, the "T" doesn't mean Tunceli. All of these groups reject the term "Tunceli", a name invented by Kemalists for Dersim, more than they reject the term "Turkey". In fact, no one rejects the latter anymore. In almost every Peoples' Democratic Party rally there were people who waved Turkish national flags.

Leo

No, the "T" doesn't mean Tunceli. All of these groups reject the term "Tunceli", a name invented by Kemalists for Dersim, more than they reject the term "Turkey". In fact, no one rejects the latter anymore. In almost every Peoples' Democratic Party rally there were people who waved Turkish national flags.

if I remember correctly, that was a slur by the PKK

Pictures showing IS preventing displaced families from crossing the Turkish border.
https://twitter.com/issa_kobani/status/609786172534059009

Leo

EMEP also has at least one deputy from the People's Democratic Party lists and they are strong in Dersim but more importantly, this party is known for being strong and effective in the trade-union bureaucracy and the working class. It basically behaves like a traditional tankie Communist Party despite its Hoxhaist roots.

the EMEP's diaspora front DIDF has each one MP in the Netherlands (on the SP list) and in Germany (inside Die Linke) and also two of the twelve state assembly members of Die Linke in Hamburg are from DIDF, also aligned to Die Linke are the HDP/PKK sympathisers, most Yazidi associations (there are 60-80000 Yazidi in Germany) and the GDF which was the front org of the former TKP/TIP

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33143646

This report on the main BBC news last night tends to confirm the recent Times report regarding the "ethnic cleansing" of Arabs by the YPG. The YPG and its American allies have just succeeded in taking the town of Tal Abyad from ISIS. The reports from the fleeing refugees say that they were forced out of their homes and towards the Turkish border by Kurdish forces. There seems very little chance of these people going back to their homes as this latest incident shows the strategy of the US and its allies in its policy of "scorched earth". This is not good news for western leftists, nor western democracies who both see these forces as benevolent progressives or allies in battle. The argument about whether this is ethnic cleansing or not is entirely secondary to the nationalist and imperialist nature of all the forces involved in this war.

Ethnic cleansing is fully part of imperialist war. Whether some bourgeois organisations, or the Turkish government - which is supporting IS in more ways than one - call this "ethnic cleansing" is secondary from a point of view that sees no "socialist" forces engaged here at all - only those fighting for various nationalisms within an imperialist framework.

kurremkarmerruk

5) -At least for me-, what Devrim first stated seems to be getting proven this all ethnic cleansing thing is a propaganda that is created for Turkish state's interests.

It's not actually what I said. What I said was that I was unsure about it and that it could have been black propaganda created in the Turkish state's interests. As time goes on I am more inclined to think that it's not. I think now that we can be reasonably sure that some ethnic cleansing is going on. Of course, personally I am not at all surprised.

I don't think that this is necessarily, or even probably, a decision that was taken by the YPG command structure.It probably starts quite low on the ground, a unit losses discipline and massacre some people in a village, some people take revenge for what has happened to their relatives, and it escalates from there, people on the other side hit back, and it doesn't matter which side started it, and then the spiral deepens.

The YPG/PKK assault on Tal Abyad is already displacing tens of thousands of people. Many will just be fleeing from the war. Even then, most of this round of refugees are Arabs.

Devrim

People fleeing a potential conflict area BEFORE an army shows up isn't ethnic cleansing. It would be ethnic cleansing if the arriving/occupying army actively pushed people out of their homes OR refused to allow refugees who fled the fighting to return. It is important to provide evidence of such.

There is very little evidence in that 3 minute story on BBC news.

Now, Tel Abyad isn't some isolated, rural village. Its a significant town with a prewar population of 52,000 located on a prominent border crossing and Akçakale is large too. Tel Abyad has a large arab population. Whether or not the Turkish state allows Tel Abyad refugees to return to Tel Abyad will be known soon. Whether or not the YPG allows arab refugess to return to Tel Abyad soon will be known soon. Whether or not the YPG encourages kurds who WERE ethnically cleansed from Tel Abyad by Ahrar al Sham and Islamic State will so be known. Then, we will soon know whether a Tev-Dem like local council structure is setup, and whether both arabs and kurds participate. We'll also soon know if no local democratic council is setup and Tel Abyad is run as a military dictatorship by either the YPG or (more likely) one of primarily Arab FSA groups--most likely Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa (Raqqa Revolutionaries). Most likely Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa will want to use Tel Abyad as their headquarters as part of their campaign to liberate Raqqa from the Islamic State. So, we should know what's up with the YPG in Tel Abyad relatively soon.

Tel Abyad is not scorched earth. It was taken very quickly and Daesh seems to have retreated/surrendered/abandoned the city. Its not a ruin like Kobane. YPG-Burkan Al Firat took Suluk, Tel Abyad and Ayn Issa over a few days. It didn't take weeks or months of siege as was feared. The rapid success of that campaign I think was surprising to everyone.

One thing we do know about Tel Abyad is that when it was under Islamic State control, Turkey provided Tel Abyad with electricity. Now that it is under YPG control, Turkey cut off the electricity. Turning back on the electricity would certainly encourage refugees to return. Maybe folks can pressure Turkey to do that.

"The International Commission of Inquiry, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, documented in a report in March, 2014, several crimes committed by the Islamic Movement of Ahrar al-Sham including ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish community in the Kurdish city of Tel Abyad (Gire Sipi) in Raqqa province, northeastern Syria on July 21, 2013, in participation with other Islamic factions, including the organization of the Islamic State (IS/ISIS), an al-Qaeda offshoot."

http://aranews.net/2014/09/u-s-target-ahrar-al-sham-islamists-syria/

Ahrar Al-Sham pushed a group of 15 islamist rebel groups to sign a statement accusing of YPG of engaging in ethnic cleansing in Tel Abyad. None of those groups including Ahrar Al-Sham is currently active in Tel Abyad (Daesh having removed them).

Arabic Al-Baggara tribe's leader Sh al-Tala: Residents denied any ethnic cleansing by YPG

Liwa al-Tahrir (FSA) denouncing claims of ethnic cleansing against YPG. Liwa al-Tahrir (FSA) is one of the Arab groups that helped YPG liberate Tel Abyad from the Daesh.

Good short video from France 24 on the political tensions between PKK and KDP in SInjar

kurremkarmerruk

Well my mistake than Devrim of misquoting you. sorry for that.

No problem, people make mistakes.

kurremkarmerruk

Anyway I am now getting more inclined to think that as Turkey lost its connection with IS might engage more actively with Syria. As there are leaked documents (I shared them in a comment above) proving Turkey provided guns to IS. Also there are real rumors that IS elements travel freely in Turkey. As also Flint noted Turkey supports war efforts of IS also in indirect ways (electricity, see above) This ethnic cleansing thing might be part of this. As there is a governmental crisis in turkey mainly thanks to HDP (kurdish party) it is not obvious which party will rule over Turkey. This is freaking Turkish authorities out as they clearly supported IS war efforts and they can be judged by internal or external courts for that.

I think that it's been quite obvious for quite a while that Turkey has been providing weapons to the Da'esh in the war. The guns found in an aid convoy by the gendarmerie in Adana in January provided more than a bit of a clue. Of course a change in government could quite possibly signal a new policy towards Syria. As you say, there is a crisis in government now, but there has not been a change. The most likely result of this crisis in my opinion will be either snap elections or an AKP-MHP coalition, which wouldn't signify a massive change in policy.

Although lots of people in Turkey are talking about Tayyip being tried as a war criminal, and he certainly is a war criminal, I don't think that this is likely to happen.

Flint

People fleeing a potential conflict area BEFORE an army shows up isn't ethnic cleansing. It would be ethnic cleansing if the arriving/occupying army actively pushed people out of their homes OR refused to allow refugees who fled the fighting to return. It is important to provide evidence of such.

If when the dust has settled there has been a real change in the demographics of the area, I would say there has been ethnic cleansing. We will see.

Devrim

Qasioun news apologizes for publishing fabricated article about YPG leader apologizing for Arab displacement (in Arabic)

The earlier article with criticism

Turkey on Thursday closed its border post of Akcakale on the Syrian frontier, preventing Syrian refugees who had fled fighting in the town of Tal Abyad from returning home, an AFP correspondent reported.

Turkish security forces said they were not allowing refugees across because Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militia has closed the gate on the other side of the border. But the YPG denied this was the case...

Hundreds of Syrians had returned home on Wednesday as calm returned to the town. But on Thursday the Turkish authorities were not allowing through some 200 waiting refugees.

They said they had been told that the border would not open until Monday, meaning they will miss celebrating the start of the holy fasting month of Ramadan at home...

The YPG, who now control Tal Abyad, denied that they were responsible for the border closure.

"From our point of view, the border is open... It's the Turks who closed the border from their side," YPG spokesman Redur Khali told AFP in Beirut, adding that people were continuing to return through unofficial crossing points.

Turkey blocks Syrian refugees seeking to return to Tal Abyad, Thursday, 18 June 2015 (alarabiya.net)

Lucy Kafanov: "Turkey closes its border crossing with Syria at Akcakale, preventing refugees from returning home to Tal Abyad. YPG commander Redur Khalil tells me Turkey decided to close its side of border and that Kurds are keeping border open from Tal Abyad side" (pt 2), 18 Jun 2015

Human Rights Association (İHD), stated that at least 50 ISIS gang members crossed over from Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) to Turkey, and that the Turkish state did not follow upon the arrival of any of these gangs. In its report, IHD said that thousands of refugees kept at the border for 3 days were not able to satisfy their basic needs such as nutrition.

'CIVILIANS KEPT AT THE BORDER WERE UNABLE TO SATISFY THEIR BASIC NEEDS'

Representatives from Human Rights Association (IHD) Headquarters went to Akçakale Border Gate in order to examine the conditions of predominantly-Arab refugees who have been fleeing from Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) due to the clashes between ISIS gangs and the forces of PYD and Burkan El Fırat throughout June, 2015. The IHD committee released its report on its observations and stated that approximately 23,250 crossed over to Turkey between June 3 and 13, 2015. IHD reported that the Turkish state banned border crossings between June 13 and 16, and finally changed its policy on June 16. IHD added that thousands of people including women, children, and disabled individuals were kept at the border for 3 days, during which these civilians were unable to satisfy their basic needs such as nutrition.

'ISIS VIOLENCE CAUSES CIVILIANS TO SEEK REFUGE'

IHD emphasized that ISIS violence was the main cause for civilians’ escape and added that people began to return to Girê Spî after PYD and Burkan El Fırat forces liberated the town from ISIS gangs. IHD stated that 90 percent of the civilians were Arab and got directed to refugee camps in the Derik district of Mardin, and 10 percent of the civilians were Turkmen and got directed to refugee camps in Osmaniye. IHD also emphasized the arrest of journalists who asked questions to Urfa governor, and added that Turkish civilians carried out verbal attacks on the arrested journalists.

'ISIS GANGS CROSSED OVER INTO TURKEY'

IHD Committee stated that ISIS gangs directed fleeing civilians to an area full of landmines in order to use Akçakale Border Gate for crossing over into Turkey themselves on June 5, 2015. IHD reported that at least 50 ISIS gang members entered Turkey as a result of this manipulation. IHD said that a significant portion of the refugees was composed of women, children, old men and disabled individuals. Many refugees were denied access to camps and could not satisfy their basic needs such as nutrition. In its report, IHD posed the question of why Akçakale Border Gate was closed to crossings between June 13 and 16, which created a grave security threat and allowed the passage of ISIS gangs into Turkey.

IHD report: ISIS gangs crossed over into Turkey, Wednesday, June 17, 2015, İnsan Hakları Derneği İHD (Human Rights Association)

In an interview with the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, Saleh Muslim, the PYD co-chair, said: “In the coming days, the city and its surroundings will be cleared of mines, in parallel with the formation of defensive lines to counter any IS attacks.” & "“After imposing security, civilians, who have been forced to leave the city, will be asked to return, and then a civil administration will be formed in which all the social components will be fairly represented,” & “All the components of the city will return, except those who participated in killing civilians and supported Daesh (Islamic State), they will be brought to trial.” as written by Ara News who had as source Hurriyet.

Muslim pointed out that the YPG forces along with other allied rebel factions will hand over the city to the Asayish security forces which will be formed by locals.

A civil administration will run the city without any intervention by the security forces.

He also pointed to the possibility of establishing a joint administration for the border crossing with Burkan al-Furat rebels, Liwaa at-Tahrir and the Raqqa’s Rebels Brigade, reassuring Turkish concerns in this regard.

“When Turkey feels comfortable for its border security, we also definitely feel comfortable,” he argued.

About the claims of ethnic cleansing of Arabs and Turkmen by the YPG forces, Muslim explained: “All the components of the city will return, except those who participated in killing civilians and supported Daesh (Islamic State), they will be brought to trial.”

He pointed out that there are also 10-12 thousands of Kurds who were displaced from Tel Abyad on the hand of IS and allied Islamists.

PYD leader: YPG forces will hand over Tel Abyad city to a civil administration, June 18, 2015 (aranews.net)

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) parliament in Iraq is entertaining a motion of an amendment to presidency that would allow parliament to elect the president by secret ballot of parliament members rather than a general election. PUK and Goran are pushing this position with support of the Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK) and . Islamic Group in Kurdistan (IGK). KDP opposes it, seeing it as a measure to remove Barzani from the presidency. Barzani called for a new election for president in August and he (or his son or nephew) would presumably on the KDP ticket. Problem is, the draft constitution says his time is up. Lots of claims of threats of violence if KDP doesn't get its way. Trouble is, KDP doesn't have a majority of seats in parliament (nor did it get a majority in the last parliamentary elections nor in the governate elections). Gorran (the 2nd largest party) and PUK (the 3rd largest party) have enough votes in either parliament or a general election to unseat KDP and Barzani. 57 out of 111 MPs attend current Kurdistan parliament session--54 KDP affiliated parliament members boycotted the session.

The relevancy to Rojava? PUK and Gorran are far more pro-Rojava than Barzani and the KDP are.

https://twitter.com/SlemaniTimes (PUK media)

https://twitter.com/kurdcommentary

http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/230620153 (KDP media)

http://kurdistantribune.com/2015/democrats-v-authoritarians-kurdistan-region-at-the-crossroads/

Hi Folks!

Really amazing that nobody (kurremkarmerruk? Flint?) didn’t yet publish on Libcom the great last text of the “Kurdish anarchist” Zaher Baher: “The Reconstruction of Kobane – Thoughts of a Kurdish Anarchist”…

Full of instructive stands and grasping about class struggle, state, capitalism and other stuffs…

This resulted in bringing back decision making into the hands of communities. This also leads to decentralization and weakening the authority of the state.

NO! “Decentralization” doesn’t mean and lead to “weakening the authority of the state”, it’s just another way and form how the state gets organized and how capitalism reforms itself. BTW “the state” cannot be confined and restricted to governmental structures and apparatuses.

Capitalism has not been developed in Rojava yet. There are no big corporations, companies or factories. Therefore, the ugly face of capitalism cannot be seen here. In contrast in Bakur there is some form of undeveloped capitalism. This is as a result of a deliberate racist policy from the regime, to exclude Kurdistan from major developments.

GREAT such a grasping of what capitalism is! BTW why then to write just before:

Rojava is an agricultural region and it is very rich in oil, gas and phosphates. […] With all these resources the area can be self-sufficient, without a need from the central government.

It’s true that PKK/PYD is able to manage this sector of the economy without any “central government”. And then Zaher Baher is falling into apology of the development of tourism, probably as a way to develop “Revolution in Rojava” and in the rest of Kurdistan:

In addition the Van Lake is in the heart of Kurdistan. The area with it’s high and snow covered mountains can be a tourist attraction too.

And even farther in the text, he insists:

In addition of the agricultural nature of Van; the region has a great potential to become a great tourist attraction. The House of people in Van has future plans to make it more attractive for tourists and have Eco-tourist projects to protect people and the environment.

And as “Democratic confederalism” praised and applied by PKK/PYD in Rojava as well as in Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan) aims at conserving/abolishing national boundaries (very original conception) between the nations-states of the region, Rojava will surely also become a touristic region as it’s already a destination for Westerner academics delegations trying to find there a renewal of their carriers.

But there as everywhere under the black sun of capitalism, the contradiction bourgeoisie vs. proletariat expresses itself:

One of the other problems facing people is the poor production up to 50% less than expected. This is due to the distraction activities of the regime’s forces. There is also the culture of lack of confidence among people […].

YES indeed! Well done, old mole! A “lack of confidence among people”… What a polite way to say that the proles “there” as “here” don’t care about all these speeches about restructuration of capital even if under mottos like “social economy”, “private property in profit of everybody”, ad nauseam…

Have good reading nevertheless of this text as well as “A mountain river has many bends: an introduction to the Rojava revolution” which is a sheer piece of reformism…

Guerre de Classe

it’s already a destination for Westerner academics delegations trying to find there a renewal of their carriers.

Someone has professor envy.

Guerre de Classe

Have good reading nevertheless of this text as well as “A mountain river has many bends: an introduction to the Rojava revolution” which is a sheer piece of reformism…

"reformism"

Traditional “private property” was abolished in late 2012, meaning all buildings, land, and infrastructure fell under control of the various city councils. This did not mean people no longer owned their homes or businesses, however. The councils implemented an “ownership by use” sovereign principle, a principle that could not be overturned by any council. Ownership by use means that when a building like a home or a business is being used by a person or persons, the users would in fact own the land and structures but would not be able to sell them on an open market. Öcalan wrote that use ownership is what prevents speculation and capital accumulation which in turn leads to exploitation. Aside from property owned by use, in principle any other property would become commons. This abolishing of private property did not extend to commodities like automobiles, machines, electronics, furniture, etc. but was limited to land, infrastructure, and structures.

The commons encompasses land, infrastructure, and buildings not owned by individuals but held in stewardship by the councils. Councils can turn over these public goods to individuals to be used. Commons are conceived of as a way to provide both a safety net for those without resources and a way to maximize use of the material resources of the community. Commons also include the ecological aspects of the region including water, parks, wildlife and wilderness, and even most livestock. According to Dr. Ahmad Yousef, an economic co-minister, three-quarters of traditional private property is being used as commons and one quarter is still being owned by use of individuals. The economic plan (PEP) posits that the commons are robust enough economically that there is no need for taxes, and since the beginning of the Rojava revolution there have been no taxes of any type.

Worker administration is the third leg of the stool of the economic plan. Workers are to control the means of production in their workplace through worker councils that are responsible to the local councils. According to the Ministry of Economics, worker councils have only been set up for about one third of the enterprises in Rojava so far. Worker councils are coordinated by the various economic ministries and local councils to assure a smooth flow of goods, supplies, and other essentials.

I wonder by what criteria Guerre de Classe would regard something as "revolutionist". Four quarters of all property being commons? Five Sixths? Seven Eighths? Nine Tenths? And Workers Councils in half the enterprises? two thirds? three fourths? Workers councils in every 2 member family enterprise?

I still think compared to the situation for the majority of the world's proletarians, the Rojava reforms would be quite welcome.

I'm willing to reserve judgement until I hear how the thousand potential workers at the Lafarge Cement Plant are organized and how the product of that plant is distributed before I decide.

YPJ Commander Nesrin Abdullah speaks in Italian Parliament:

Nesrin Abdullah used her speech to respond to allegations that after the recent liberation of the city of Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) from Daesh, the YPG/YPJ were discriminating between different groups and replacing Turks and Arabs with Kurds.

"We don't have any goal of occupying the region or displacing the peoples living there. There was a call for the people to return; the majority have done so and people are continuing to do so," said Nesrin.She noted that Kurdish forces have helped found an association to aid women from Raqqa and Tel Abyad who have been victimized or abducted by Daesh. In addition, they are providing for the daily needs of the people without any discrimination.

"Life is returning to normal there," said Nesrin."We are saying this now: anyone who wants to travel there and observe the situation on the ground can do so. There have been opportunities created for this."

Nesrin also answered questions about the difference between the YPG and YPJ. She explained that the two groups share a philosophical commitment to gender equality and a new life, but that the YPJ is an autonomous, self-governing organization. "[The YPJ] has its own line of struggle: the liberation of women," said Nesrin.

"The Rojava revolution is a women's revolution," said Nesrin. She noted that the YPJ has emerged as an answer to the savagery of Daesh. "As women, against this kind of savage enemy, war is an honor." However, she said, the YPJ is not only a military organization, but aims to organize all women in society.

Noteworthy that she expresses the YPJ's autonomy.

kurremkarmerruk

Redur Halil says: "although all of the Syria would love if the raqqa is taken we currently have no such plan." He denies the news saying the contrary.

I am really not sure why this difference between the times and YPG is very obvious now, I would really love to know the source of this constant contradiction between these two..

Part of the confusion might be Raqqa the governorate and Raqqa the city, Aleppo the governorate and Aleppo the city, and Al-Hasakah the governorate and Al-Hasakah the city. Aleppo governorate includes Efrin city, Kobane city and parts of the Efrin and Kobane cantons. Raqqa governorate includes Tel Abyad and Sere Kaniye and parts of the Kobane and Cizire Canton. Al-Hasakah governorate includes Al-Hasakah city, Qamshlo, Khabour river valley, Tal Barak Tel Hamis and other parts of Cizire Canton. So YPG is advancing in Raqqa, Al-Hasakah and Aleppo, but the YPG is not seiging Raqqa city yet (and frankly, is unlikely too without considerable FSA and/or Arab support).

Most likely, YPG will surround Sarrin, siege it. They will also probably take Tishrin dam. They will then cross the Euphrates and go for Manjib and Jarabulus and do so by supporting Burkan Al-Firat in the lead, particularly the Jarabulus brigade (Saraya Jarabulus) in the lead along with Jabhat al-Akrad and Jaysh al-Thuwar (including whatever is left of Harakat Hazzm). The Islamic State is unlikely to destroy the Tishrin dam (as they have blown up all the other bridges along the Euphrates river) as that would be a crime against humanity that would most negatively effect the very capitol they are supposedly trying to protect--Raqqa.

Before the rise of the Islamic State, the YPG controlled a considerable area in Northern Aleppo between Efrin and Jarabulus. It was a Kurdish majority area before the war. They could presumably move into the area of Islamic State control in Northern Aleppo and find it easier than sieging Raqqa. They could also move resources between Efrin and Cizirie freely. They could also connect to Sheikh Maqsood in northern Aleppo. Efrin YPG has recently "volunteered" to take over the border crossing at Azaz from the FSA so that the Islamic state doesn't take it.

31 October 2013:

Folks in the YPG have stated that they will pursue Daesh anywhere they were, but that is mostly just rhetoric. Are they going to Yemen, Libya, etc... ? No.

It makes most sense for them to connect the cantons and liberate Sinjar.

Also, the Times article is highlighting FSA/YPG taking Ayn Issa and the Brigade 93 army base. While they are on the road to Raqqa, they more importantly help the YPG finish securing the strategic M-4 highway that runs from Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates then running along the defacto Rojava border in Kobane, into Cizire canton, through Qamshlo, to the Al-Ya'rubiyah border crossing with Iraq (that even includes a railroad line). At this point, the YPG probably cares far more about holding M4 than it does removing Daesh from Raqqa. Securing M4 is also likely why YPG just started an operation to take Sarrin.

New FSA formation in Northern Raqqa:

"The following groups are contained:
Liwa Jihad fi Sabeelillah (Jihad for the Sake of God Brigade) - fought in Kobani, has had a long-standing presence in Raqqah, fighting a guerrilla campaign against ISIS.
Liwa Jund al-Haramayn (Soldiers of the Holy Mosques Brigade) - formed recently, also active in Kobani
Liwa al-Tahrir (Liberation Brigade): Was based in Serekaniye/Ras al-Ayn before the recent YPG/FSA offensive on Tel Abyad
Liwa Ahrar al-Tabqa (Free Men of Tabqa Brigade)
Liwa Harun al-Rashid (Harun al-Rashid Brigade)
Jabhat Thuwar Tel Abyad (Tel Abyad Revolutionaries Front)
Liwa Umana al-Raqqah"

A couple of these groups were already associated with Burkan Al-Firat.

This is old news, but it is a series of questions to Salih Muslim about the Cizire canton elections and the KNC party boycott of that election. I hadn't seen it before, and I imagine most folks haven't.

Q: You are being accused for setting up cantons. In the future do you have any thoughts or ideas about connecting the cantons? And after uniting them, will you have a referendum, like the KRG?

A: I have a question which I want answered. As you know, what is happening in Syria has now been four years of chaos. What is supposed to happen to people who are left without any leadership or protection? I want this question about the future of these people to be answered. In answer to this we decided to establish the cantons. We were forced to establish them, we were forced to build something led by the people. We wanted to organize people so that they wouldn’t live in hunger, and teach them how to protect themselves. We were forced to establish a structure and this, as you saw, was a question for the people. This project was not forced on the people, and it was chosen not only by Kurds but also by Assyrian-Syriacs, Arabs and others who share the same destiny and who live with us in the area. They created a council and in that council they made that decision. We as the PYD had democratic self-rule. Our project was not to build those kinds of cantons but our project was not against it too. We had several different projects, we sought Rojava as one piece but we were forced to build those kinds of cantons. Our goal was to connect all the cantons, but as you know ISIS was present in many parts. We were forced to establish that setup because we were not willing to let ISIS harm our people or to live under their control. We had two choices, either let the people suffer under ISIS or protect our people by letting them organize and lead themselves. We saw the creation of cantons to be a good way of protecting the people. In the future we intend to unite Rojava and connect the cantons to one another. But we want to be open, so that Kurds live with other minorities in Rojava - Arabs, Turkmen and Assyrian-Syriac-Chaldeans. What you see in the Cizire canton is an example for the other parts. It is a very clever project. We think that this project is good not only for the Kurdish area, but for others to use in other parts of Syria. This is the first project that’s succeeding in the Middle East. There is no other democratic project like this, of this measure in the Middle East. It is not only democratic, but also does not silence ‘minorities’. It brings them closer to the project so that they can represent their culture and identity. And let’s not forget the main aspect of this society which is women-centered, encouraging them and putting them in power. For that our enemies (ISIS) are not happy.

Q: A couple of days ago there was an election in Rojava and in the Cizire canton in particular. There were some who did not join it and accused you of being a dictator and your party (PYD) of killing and harassing people.

A: You have to understand what kind of elections they were and for what. In the Cizire canton, we have many cities and towns such as Derik, Qamishli, Serekaniye etc. and many villages that were left without leadership. Many municipalities were left without any leadership and they could not assist the people. Many bakeries were left without people running them and they could not serve the people. When you hire someone to lead, those same parties who left the bakeries accuse us that we hire people from our own party. So we wanted to establish elections so that whoever is elected will lead the people. We wanted to have elections among the people, this is not a new idea. This was supposed to happen two years ago, and as you know, before, there were many municipalities connected to the regime. Most left when the regime left. These people who were taking command temporarily were not the authorized to continue, because they were temporarily there. The elected leaders who were voted by the people will have to work for the people. We wanted to establish elections and we had a council made from this election. This council, which everyone knows the name of had no connection to us, they were neutral and are in the leadership of the self-administration. They are made up of Kurds, Assyrians-Syriacs, and Arabs. The council was not a new idea; it’s been two years since this decision was taken by us and other parties in a meeting in Hewler (Erbil). Those parties were asking us to delay it. So we delayed it for two years but now we cannot delay it any longer because those people need leadership and we want to give it to them. We asked those parties to appoint their representatives in the elections and whoever gets voted let him/her take the chair just like in any other democratic nation. This council gathered with other parties and other political powers in Rojava. They decided to have an election on the 15th of March, which everyone agreed on. A week before elections some people published statements saying they were not concerned about the elections. The election council visited them and asked them to appoint their representative inside the council and to choose names for their candidates. The council asked them: in your statement you are saying this election is not your concern so what can we, the council, do to make it right? The council asked them how they can leave the municipalities without leadership. Will we do that? Of course not. And they said, you’re right there is nothing wrong with it but we have to delay it. The council asked them, “till when?” and they answered “later”. The council asked them: “when? One month?” They replied: “later, later”. The council asked them, “two, three months?” They repeated the same answer. The council asked them to write a new statement that showed them requesting to delay the elections and wait two months but they never did. The council had to continue with the elections. Let me tell you this openly: I think there are some people that just want to provoke. They don’t want to see Rojava as a symbol of freedom and democracy in the area, they don’t want to see Rojava in a good shape. If we kept delaying elections we would not see Rojava, we would not see cantons or leadership. If we did not start, our women and wives would be sold in the markets. Our people would be left without any protection. You can take postponement to a certain limit but after that it can’t be taken any more. And if you make a statement for that purpose, it’s only to provoke. We wish those people to rethink those steps and rethink what will benefit the Kurdish nation. We want to teach them, and teach our people the basic rules of democracy. To hold a pen and write freely on what democracy means by voting. And as you know in the future we would have elections for the leaderships and let the people choose what they want. We want them to join in the leadership of cantons and elections which will be in July or August. We want to establish that election and want to help them. We want everyone to join that election. It is for all our country not only for us. This election council is made by the decision of the Duhok-Erbil meeting. Even in the Hewler meeting we decided that we had to have elections that had been delayed for one and a half years. And in the Duhok meeting we made the same decision that we had to have an election, but three months later they couldn’t choose their representatives in the council to lead Rojava due to arguments amongst themselves about dividing the powers between themselves. Above all that they just give orders if they don’t have their own rights to do it. You have to be serious when you do a job, and if you are not going to do it, don’t say you are going to do it and then withdraw. And when you say you are going to do it and you are not going to do it; it becomes a children’s game.

Answers: Salih Muslim, PYD co-chairman, 21 March 2015

With any luck, I may soon get an answer in regards to the Tev-Dem plans for the organization and distribution of product of the Lafarge Cement Plant soon.

Jaysh al-Qassas may have left Burkan al-Firat

Turkey and Kobane Canton agree to open border crossing (6/18/2015)

With progress by Daesh in Al-Hasakah city, reports coming in of Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and National Defense Force (NDF) defecting/surrendering to the YPG and Asayish (numbers vary); as well as SAA allying with YPG to defend Al-Hasakah from Daesh. NDF in Al-Ghazal neighborhood join YPG forces; loyalists forces evacuated Al-Ghazal barrier in the East of the city and were replaced by kurdish forces this morning. One rumored dynamic is that Christian NDF are joining YPG while Sunni Arab NDF are joining Daesh. Several NDF units and many Assyrian and Armenian families have crossed into Rojavan Hasakah

Meanwhile in Kobane, MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors without Borders) claims 50 civilians held hostage by Daesh.

PKK camps in Bashur/Qandil Mountains/Iraq/KRG in 2008:

I hesitate to post sabre-rattling. It sounds like that Erdogan wanted to create a "buffer zone" between Jarabulus and Azaz to "protect Turkey", but also shove all the Syrian refugees into that zone, but really about putting the Turkish army in the way of linking Afrin and Kobane cantons, and who knows maybe continue supply Islamist/Nursa/Daesh (depending on how conspiracy minded you are). But that the Army doesn't want to do that.

Map of area to create "buffer zone":

Turkey Vows Retaliation, but Rejects Syria Intervention

Turkish army stands firm against government’s demands it engage in Syria

While I think parliament chose an AKP speaker, it still hasn't formed a government yet?

So maybe Erdogan is serious, maybe he's just looking to get some MHP voters to go his way in a snap eelection. Hard to say. Impossible for us to know the minds of Erdogan and generals.

So, I hesitate to post stories that are just talk. And, unfortunately, small scale shelling or bombing by the military of Turkey on Qandil happens as often as the rain, no? And still the PKK largely has held its fire.

So talk is talk.

I've also been hesitant to post about the situation in Hasakah until it was more resolved, but it seems like the YPG has pushed back Daesh, and the Baathists/SAA/NDF will cede territory to the YPG, namely: al-Kallasah district, the industrial zone, al-Aziziyah, the Assyrian district and al-Ghazal. I wanted to wait until this was confirmed, but it seems logical given recent events there. This would likely include the road to the Kawkab Artillery Base and no word on ceding that yet.

The head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) rebuts claims of YPG ethnic cleansing.

Infrared.

The head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) rebuts claims of YPG ethnic cleansing.

Yeah, but that might be like one guy in London.

You're right, it is. After a quick google, on their website it lists one guy as the only contact. Not such a credible source.

Flint, what's your #1 source for Kurdish news? (for me it's this thread). Over the last week you've posted links to a lot of different news sites plus a bunch of twitter feeds, I'm wondering if there's a particular source you'd recommend?

Also, has there been progress on getting a speaker from Rojava to come to Red Emma's like you mentioned a couple months ago?

Well Flint indeed wrote about "Our Beloved Great Leader" [Ocalan] that:

"... he was actually criticizing the patriarchal institution of marriage that wouldn't sound unusual coming from Emma Goldman."

https://libcom.org/library/negri-harvey-graeber-wallerstein-holloway-cult-abdullah-ocalan-rojava-revolution?page=1#comment-559035

I've also read an interview given to Kurdish/Turkish feminist "JINHA" News Agency by two militants of IAF saying that:

"... women like Emma Goldman would be at home in Rojava."

Anarchists: 'we found the Rojava revolution to be our own'
http://jinha.com.tr/en/ALL-NEWS/content/view/20548

Poor Emma, she surely must be turning in her grave while reading this kind bullshit. I'm very skeptical that she would stay long on a supportive position about the fantastic PKK/PYD "revolution" in Rojava. Here is what she wrote about another myth and imposture some decades ago:

"I believed fervently that the Bolsheviki were furthering the Revolution and exerting themselves in behalf of the people. I clung to my faith and belief for more than a year after my coming to Russia.

Observation and study, extensive travel through various parts of the country, meeting with every shade of political opinion and every variety of friend and enemy of the Bolsheviki — all convinced me of the ghastly delusion which had been foisted upon the world.

I refer to these circumstances to indicate that my change of mind and heart was a painful and difficult process, and that my final decision to speak out is for the sole reason that the people everywhere may learn to differentiate between the Bolsheviki and the Russian Revolution."

Emma Goldman
My Disillusionment in Russia
http://libcom.org/library/my-disillusionment-in-russia-emma-goldman-preface

You're entitled to your opinion.

"Anti-War" was deliberately misrepresenting a quotation. That's intellectually dishonest and it makes their contributions to discussion circumspect.

Who knows what Emma Goldman would have thought. We do know that Zeki Yılmaz and Su Ender, of the International of Anarchist Federations have a favorable view of Rojava. Maybe you would also have a favorable view if you went. Or you can keep digging around for century old quotes you think apply to the situation.

It is interesting that JINHA wants to promote the IAF support.

I tend to weigh the opinion of people who actually go places and talk to others more than those who do not (including myself in that category). You, ofcourse, will use your own criteria for determining what is happening (or not happening) in Rojava.

Confirmation that Western volunteers get the same ideological training course that the rest of the YPG/YPJ get.

Some Westerners are not so left-leaning, and bemoan the fact that Ocalan’s "democratic confederalism", which espouses a libertarian socialist ideology derived from the writings of the US anarchist Murray Bookchin, is drilled into them by their Kurdish instructors during their initial training upon arrival.

Who are the foreign fighters taking on the Islamic State?Michael McEvoy, 25 June 2015

When was Social Insurrection founded?

Social Insurrection was founded in 2013 in the tents of resistance in Tuzluçayır. (District in Istanbul Turkey - translator)

Why did you prefer a black and green flag?

Both because of the memory of Makhno peasants and also because of the fact that we are also ecologists.

What sort of a structure does Social Insurrection have?

We defend class war and reject neo-liberal anarchism. Mostly we have classical anarchist, Makhno and Proudhonian comrades. Generally, we have a platformist comprehension. We can call Social Insurrection as: we didn’t take Bakunin, Proudhon, Luigi, Galleani, Malatesta etc as they were. We examined every anarchist and added our own thoughts and said that we are the Social Insurrectionists.

When did you enter the armed struggle?

We defended armed struggle from the beginning of our foundation. Specifically, we were influenced by the view of insurrectionist anarchism of Alfredo M. Bonanno. We founded our own insurrectionist theory. We believe that the revolution will start with armed struggle. First, 3-5 armed acts in Turkish slums like Okmeydanı and now, this all led us to Kobane. But first of all, we dreamed about it.. If we hadn't dreamed about it and tried to practice it, we would just be drinking beers in a bar in Kadıköy or Beyoğlu. Some of our comrades stayed as they were.

From Tuzluçayır to Kobane: Interview With An Anarchist Warrior / Tuzluçayır’dan Kobane’ye Uzanan Bir Anarşist Savaşçı, June 28, 2015

And Fnordie, I haven't ignored your request. Its just a long answer. I've been planning to put out a media guide so folks know what source is PUK-media, what source is KDP-media, etc...

Flint! (about your comment #143)

You're definitely and definitively being dishonest. it's rare to meet somebody so "mauvaise foi" (in French in the original text) exept of course "Our Beloved Great Leader" kurremkarmerruk who is the master of the universe in this connection. There's no need to give any example. Everybody is able to find some on this blog. You definitively put me right off discussing with you!

And I personaly don't care about your "libertarian socialist ideology derived from the writings of the US anarchist Murray Bookchin" which is nothing but just an umpteenth Social-Democratic attempt to deny and suppress proletarian struggles: MB himself pretended that he didn't "believe" anymore to the affirmation of class struggle, the role of the proletariat and he even didn't talk anymore about "revolution" which for me seems to be something good because the lesser reformists claim the essence of social revolution, the better it is for drawing a clear and clarificative demarcation line between reformers and destroyers of capitalism...

Hasta la vista, baby...

Hasakah: SAA/NDF continues to dwindle before ISIS attacks and YPG claiming areas SAA/NDF abandons. As ISIS presses from Nashwah neighborhood into SAA-controlled city center, YPG has come around the south at the Abyad bridge to cut off ISIS supply route and trap them in Nashwah. Folks might also want to note the expansion of MFS and Sutoro into Christian neighborhoods formerly under SAA/NDF control.

Fighting continues near Ayn Issa. Burkan Al-Firat and YPG continue to repel ISIS attacks.

YPG/Burkan Al-Firat encircles Sarrin, which is regarded as key for eventually seizing the Tishrin dam to the south--currently the only crossing point on the Euphrates River for the YPG to go west towards Jarabulus and Manbij. Jordan Matson-a U.S. foreign fighter with the YPG-recently speaking in Sweden stated that the YPG strategy of heading towards Jarabulus border crossing was obvious.

ISIS has increased attacks on the PKK and Iraqi KRG Peshmerga who are defending Makhmur and Kirkuk. Makhmur has a large refugee camp made up of 15000 Kurdish refugees who left Turkey in 1994. They are seen as sympathetic to the PKK and a base of recruitment. ISIS briefly took Makhmur for 3 days in August 2014 before they were then expelled by the PKK and Peshmerga. PKK guerillas are in Sinjar, Rabee'a, Shekhan, Makhmour, Kirkuk, Jalawala and Khanqen.
The History of Makhmur Refugee Camp
The PKK Rumbles in Northern Iraq
After repelling ISIL, PKK fighters are the new heroes of Kurdistan
PKK forces impress in fight against Islamic State
“The PKK Camp”: A visit with PKK fighters at the Makhmour refugee camp

Good map of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and ethnic/religious minority villages/towns:

Politically, PUK and Gorran remain united in proposing that the president of the KRG be elected by parlimentary vote (PUK+Gorran have a simple majority in parliament) rather than a general election. They are also firm on the position that Masoud Baranzi is not eligible for re-election.
As Iraq splinters, Kurds’ own unity put to test
The Monarchy of Iraqi Kurdistan
Barzani’s throne create political turmoil in Kurdistan
DEMOCRATS V. AUTHORITARIANS: KURDISTAN REGION AT THE CROSSROADS
FINANCIAL CRISIS SHUTS DOWN 6,000 PROJECTS IN KURDISTAN REGION
Barzani sees PKK threatening Kurdish unity
KRG tells PKK to vacate Qandil Mountains, abide by reconciliation
PKK rebels say they will not withdraw from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil
Great Spirits and Mediocre Minds

Rojava is still under economic embargo by KRG. Jordan Matson mentioned 27 guntrucks which the KRG is not allowing to cross the border into Rojava. KRG suggested Peshmerga be sent to Rojava. KCK: We are Not Authorised to Decide on Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga Return (This is important in that the KCK is acknowledging that authority about what happens in Rojava is TEV-DEM's decision, not the KCK's decision.)

YPG fighter Jordan Matson Gothenburg-Sweden 2015-07-05 (pt 1)(pt 2)

Interview with Burkan Al-Firat spokesperson Server Dervis

Peoples in Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) will govern themselves(Kurdi)

Dêrik stated that the Constituent Assembly was composed of people from Girê Spî and nobody would come from Qamişlo or Kobanê in order to govern Girê Spî. Dêrik highlighted the importance of self-governance and invited everyone to lay the foundations of co-existence and Democratic Syria in Girê Spî. Dêrik described YPG/YPJ, Burkan El Fırat and Asayiş fighters as the military and security forces of Girê Spî, and emphasized that the assembly should welcome everyone and have executive powers in order to construct a new life in the city.
Representatives from the Turkmen, Arab and Armenian peoples of Girê Spî spoke after Ferhat Dêrik. Gazi Tirkmanî spoke on behalf of Turkmens, and Turkmen and Armenian representatives demanded the solution of their communities’ problems. The Arab representative said that Arab residents wanted to live in a secure environment, and demanded the establishment of a political will for the governance of the region. Kobanê Canton Foreign Relations Council Spokesperson İdris Nahsan stated that they would work towards the establishment of an assembly composed of their constituents.

(note the FSA and Rojava flags)

Gorran delegation in Rojava: 50 engineers from southern Kurdistan (KRG) will be sent to Kobane to help with rebuilding of the city ( Turkish )

Latest article from Dilar Dirik: Kurdish Women’s Radical Self-Defense: Armed and Political:
Dilar Dirik

In order for society to similarly resist without being militarist, it must refrain from imitating state-like concepts of force and instead protect communalist values, deriving its power from the grassroots. Society, especially women, Öcalan claims, must first of all “xwebûn,” or be oneself. Only with the realization of one’s own existence and its meaning, can one claim the right to live and defend oneself and the community. This must be based on a society that is politicized, self-aware, conscious, and active, while internalizing community-loving ethics — including fundamental values such as the commitment to women’s liberation, rather than relying on law enforced by the capitalist state and its police apparatus. What turned Kurdistan into a pilgrimage site for women and anti-system movements around the world was this ideological stance that defended life, in the face of an army of death...

It is not a coincidence that the first standing armies emerged with the rise of accumulation of wealth, which also marked the institutionalization of patriarchy and the predecessors of the state. The nation-state insidiously asserts its existence by drawing borders between communities, creating paranoia and xenophobia where there have been mosaics of cultures for centuries. Thus, if we are committed to defending society, we must also philosophically tackle all attacks on society, since systems of domination and hierarchy first establish themselves in thought.

Dualisms like man-woman, state-society, human-nature aim to portray hierarchical relationships as natural. What Thomas Hobbes called “homo homini lupus est” to legitimize the unchallengeable leviathan called the state, is practiced big-brother style in our modern times. We must challenge the fascist history-writing that belittles society and objectifies nature and instead practically seek solutions to social problems with a “sociology of freedom” centered around the voices and experiences of the oppressed.

Against the racist premises of the separatist nation-state order and its mental and physical borders, society must strengthen the notion of the “democratic nation,” conceptualized by Öcalan to dissociate the idea of the nation from meaningless ethnic forms of belonging, to strengthen a more meaningful ethical unity based on principles like women’s freedom, especially in the era of the Islamic State group. The Rojava Revolution, where Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Turkmens, and Chechens try to create a new alternative system together, rests on this political notion.

Nesrin Abdullah and Rangin of the YPJ

"So the YPJ is an army of feminists?

"We stand for a radical feminism. We depend on ourselves and benefit from the experience of everyone. Women at home protect the essentialness of women. Our fight is as women (no matter if Kurdish, Syrian or European) and for a nationality that identifies with democratic autonomy and is opposed to the concept of the state. During the fighting for Shingal, women went to save other women. At Til Temir YPJ fighters went to save Arab women. We went to save dozens of women captives in villages occupied by Isis..."

"We are not soldiers, we are militants; we are not paid to make war, we are partisans of revolution. We live with our people, follow a philosophy and have a political project. At the same time we are carrying out a gender struggle against the patriarchal system.

"At this moment in Kurdistan the role of women is historic, not only for Kurdish women and those in the Middle East but also at the international level. Our struggle aims at the creation of a new society starting with an ecological vision, the respect for nature, and the affirmation of the rights and identity of women. The world today is unstable; there are many threats, among these is terrorism. As women combatants we have a lot of responsibility toward all women.

"The world shifted from a matriarchal to a patriarchal system and women lost their identity. Patriarchy has oppressed women, they have also suffered physical violence, and despite struggling they have not succeeded in achieving a space within society. Nevertheless women have always striven for their liberty and their rights. Through our struggle we are realizing this dream...

"fighting this enemy has become a symbol of identity and has mesmerized and won the attention of Arab, Assyrian, Turkish and German women (among whom there has also been a martyr).

The Women Combatants of Rojava: Interviews with commanders Abdullah and Rangin of the YPJ (Women's Defence Units), Socialist Project • E-Bulletin No. 1137, July 7, 2015

Hi Folks!
It's great what Nesrin Abdullah said about opposition to the state, revolutionary militancy, "creation of a new society", etc. But she as other politico-military cadres of organizations like PKK/PYD, YPG/YPJ are well trained to say one thing at one moment and exactly the contrary in another context and combining both with the same belief and eloquence.

E.g. what she stated at the Elysee "Tea Party" when she met President Hollande:

"YPJ commander Nesrin Abdullah said they had met with great interest, adding: “Everyone at the Presidential Palace was talking about the success of Kurdish women. They said the spirit of Kobanê was in Paris. If it hadn’t been for the victory in Kobanê such a meeting could not have taken place. For Kurdish women’s military force to have been welcomed like this made us happy. It is important to be accepted officially."

http://en.firatajans.com/news/abdullah-we-received-pledge-of-help-from-hollande/

Common folks!

That’s enough joke and let’s become serious again! This ridiculous event is nothing but the confirmation, if necessary, of the bourgeois character of the organizations (PKK/PYD, YPG/YPJ…) that contain and claim to represent the social movement of subversion of this world in Rojava (despite its weaknesses and limitations, which are in the image of those of the global proletarian struggle). We are obviously not going to be amazed at the announcement of this “Tea Party” at the Élysée Palace between supporters and representatives of different sectors of the world capitalist State and the ruling class, in this case here its French and Kurdish branches. We will not be amazed either at the media heavy silence on the side of leftist circles, libertarian and other, who didn’t have too much the taste to spread the information about this event, too embarrassed they were to see their PKK/PYD idols “slumming” with the highest political representatives of the “French State”.

I bet they ask the U.S. State Department for anti-tank weapons too.

They don't get them.

Also, your link is broken. (You and "Anti-War" seem to share a disregard for checking your URLs before posting. That's stronger than the connection between the PYD and the Khmer Rouge!)

Here is a link that has most of content you are referring to:

http://supportkurds.org/news/wednesday-11-february-2015/

You're welcome.

HRW: Syria: Kurdish Forces Violating Child Soldier Ban

On June 5, 2014, the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) signed a “Deed of Commitment” with the nongovernmental organization Geneva Call pledging to demobilize all fighters under 18 within one month. One month later, it demobilized 149 children. Despite this promise and the initial progress, Human Rights Watch documented cases over the past year of children under 18 joining and fighting with the YPG and the YPJ, its female branch. Some children under 18 with those forces, based on public sources, apparently died in combat in June 2015...

The YPG and YPJ are not the only offenders among the many armed groups in Syria using child soldiers, but they can do more to stop the practice, Human Rights Watch said.
Based on information provided by local and international organizations, Human Rights Watch compiled a list of 59 children, 10 of them under 15, who were allegedly recruited by or volunteered for YPG or YPJ forces since July 2014. Human Rights Watch confirmed seven of these cases by speaking directly with the children’s relatives. In some cases, the groups enlisted children without their parents’ consent....

on June 13, the YPG had demobilized 27 boys and, on April 20, the YPJ had demobilized 16 girls. In addition, seven YPG officers had been punished for accepting child soldiers – three expelled from the force and four demoted, although the group gave no names or dates.

On July 5, the YPG and YPJ issued a circular to commanders and heads of recruiting centers saying they were not to recruit or accept anyone under 18. Those who fail to comply will face “maximum disciplinary measures,” the circular said.

The internal regulations of the YPG, as well as the Kurdish-run police force, called Asayish, forbid the use of children under 18...

An additional concern is the Kurdish group’s creation of a “non-combatant category” for children aged 16 and 17, based on a reservation the group entered with Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. The reservation says the group will continue to recruit and accept 16- and 17-year-olds but not have them perform military functions.

The YPG said in its letter to Human Rights Watch that it is accepting recruits into this category and is keeping them at “centers” far from the front lines, but it did not know the exact number of children in this group or specify what tasks they perform...

Under customary international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is a war crime for members of armed forces or non-state armed groups to conscript or enlist children under 15, or to use them to participate actively in hostilities. Ten of the 59 children who allegedly joined the YPG or YPJ over the past year were 15 or younger.

The June 5 report of the United Nations secretary-general to the Security Council on children in armed conflict said that the recruitment and use of children in combat in Syria had become “commonplace.” The United Nations verified cases of 271 boys and 7 girls who had been recruited and used by groups affiliated with, among others, the Free Syrian Army (142), YPG and YPJ (24), ISIS (69), and al-Nusra Front (25), and the actual numbers are believed to be higher. Some armed groups fighting with the Syrian government, such as Hezbollah and the Popular Committee, also reportedly recruited children in small numbers, the report said.

“Armed groups in Syria are placing children in direct harm by giving them weapons and sending them to fight,” Abrahams said. “The YPG has a chance to stop this practice and show that it’s serious about keeping its commitments on human rights.”

Hi Folks!

Hey Flint you're right (#154), the link I provided is indeed broken but it's surely because "Firat News Agency" removed the article not a long time ago. Some days ago, I mean this week, when searching on Google with keywords "nesrin abdullah firatajans pledge hollande", the link was still referred to (even if indeed it was already broken). But today not anymore!!! So what? Firat was too much ashamed to see "anti-state" and "anti-capitalist" Kurdish parties so close to capitalist powers like e.g. the state in France? Just a question of tactics? So what???

Fortunately pro-PKK/PYD propaganda stuffs are so much replicated on all the Kurdish national liberation websites that it's still possible to read the original Firat's story at least on two other blogs:

http://kurdishquestion.com/index.php/kurdistan/west-kurdistan/ypg-commander-nesrin-abdullah-we-received-a-pledge-of-help-from-hollande/620-ypg-commander-nesrin-abdullah-we-received-a-pledge-of-help-from-hollande.html

http://www.kurdishinfo.com/abdullah-received-pledge-help-hollande

Flint wrote:

"I bet they ask the U.S. State Department for anti-tank weapons too.

They don't get them."

The problem is not so much that your pets didn't (yet) get any anti-tank weapons from the U.S. State Department... If they really didn't... I'm somehow very skeptical about as everybody knows how the U.S. and their allies of GCC did and I presume are still doing with other rebel groups today!!! BTW they surely have another agenda!!! But the problem is especially why (though they are so "anti-state" and "anti-capitalist" as many of their followers pretend they are!!!) they asked weapons (or anything else) to a state power!!!

See you later... Alligator!!!

In Hasakah, the Syrian Arab Army continued to lose territory in southern part of the city to fighting with the Islamic State. It also continued to cede territory in the northern part of the city to the YPG/YPJ.

The YPG/YPJ then performed a pincer maneuver heading coming from the east and west to cut off the Islamic State's supply lines--encircling them--effectively trapping the Islamic State forces in the city.

YPG reported taking the "Red Villas":

YPG claims Islamic State has used chemical weapons in Hasakah. Also in Tel Brak according to this New York Times article. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights "The Conflict Armament Research (CAR) group and Sahan Research said in a statement Friday that Daesh targeted Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga with a projectile filled with a chemical agent on June 21 or 22. The organizations also documented two such attacks against Kurdish fighters from the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria’s northeastern Hasakeh province on June 28." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE)

In Sarrin, Islamic State counter-attacked north to break the YPG/YPJ's seige.

YPG has regained some lost territory in Sarrin's north:

Syria Status of Control map showng population centers, airbases and oil fields.

A very interesting Ask May Anything (AMA) on reddit with a verified PKK fighter active in Kobane, Cizre, Bakur (Turkey) and Bashur (Iraq):

How much did the PKK change after Öcalan adopted "democratic confederalism" and renounced Marxism-Leninism? Are there such things as elections within the PKK or can you choose your own commanders? Is it less "authoritarian" than before?

I was not there when it happened. A few of the old guard hold on to such dogmatic ideas... but are never really respected and are never really listened to. I'd say the party really believes in now though.

How many female commanders do you have? How has being with the YPG/PKK change your view on women/feminism?

At one point my unit commander was a woman, my sector commander was a woman, my area (front) commader was a woman, the regional area was a woman, and even the canton commander was a woman. Yep. A lot.
It's changed my view a lot. I was pretty degenerate before... I'll admit. When I first came I couldn't believe that they thought they could fight! Nor did I think very much about what women's rights meant or what feminism (in its real form) is.
The Western Feminists are terrible ambassadors for this form of thinking. After I joined, and slowly, I changed when I realized that the best people in the party are almost always women... the bravest are usually women... the most mentally stable and kind-hearted are also women.
The ideology of APO has in some ways made this impact on both us, men (in the party), and on them by allowing them to build their own institutions (like the YPJ) to combat sexuism.
Moreover, I've had so many female commanders that my general respect level for them is much higher than the male ones.
I'd also like to mention that one of the famous Kobane snipers, Musa, was a a friend of mine -- but if I had a chance, of course before he was killed, I would take a female commander over him any day.

That's a lot of female commanders. Are they given these roles based on merit or is it to break social structures of men being in charge?Merit.

How active are the YPJ on the frontlines? Are they treated any differently than the YPG?

How could they be treated differently? Beyond the shampoo and extra soap rations they get... I mean, and the fact I can't directly give them an order... it's hard to imagine how they could be treated differently. What do you mean by different treatment? They're very active. Very active. Just google Sehid Givera on youtube or any of the videos of Kobane and you'll see plenty of YPJ fighters there... fighting.

About feminism again, do you think that the society in Rojava has changed a lot? Of course, before, it was a patriarchal place like any other, and Apo's ideas have the purpose of liberating women. Ofc we have the YPJ to deal with women's issues, but how have these ides become popular among the normal population? And are these policies popular? Like making women fight.

Yes it has. But let's be honest, Syria was much more left-leaning, richer, and more westernized than the other three parts were before the war. So we're launching from that point. Now, feminism, as it's understood in Rojava, means arming women, giving them seperate institutions, allowing them to make important political decisions for themselves and society. This is going on right now and I've never heard any of the civilians complain about this. I think it's because, and let's be honest, women work better with societal organizations than men do! It's also a big change from before the war when Bashar Al-Assad's tribal leaders in certain areas dictated much of what went on in Kobane, or Cizre, or Efrin. Plus, the women are far more impartial -- from what I've heard, compared to the previous administrators.

How supportive of a Kurdish nation state are the local people in Rojava and Bakur? Many songs and poems talk about a Kurdistan but the main parties there are not nationalist.
Even you speak about South and North Kurdistan but PKK do not want nation state. I assume people support it, what is going on dude?

The party feels the nation-state idea is not necessary and not even politically feasible right now.
Why bother with it? We can do so much more in a federated system? One nation-state, whenever it's created, wherever it's created, goes on to oppress a certain group of people. Let's create a local system of government that respects the various differences and is local, and I mean truly local, so it can be inclusive too.

I know the officers/commanders in YPG were well into the ideology of "Democratic Confederalism". My general impression though is that the common Kurdish soldier in YPG is much more motivated by Kurdish nationalism. How does the general command reconcile these two different viewpoints?

No, Kurdish Nationalism does not mean what I think you think it means. It simply means: if you attack me I will fight. If I win, and I am part of a group that believes in Democratic Confederalism, then I get to have a government that can implement this. I am fighting for it, am I not?
That's what 99% fighters would say if you could ask them their straight forward opinion. Everyone knows what Democratic Confederalism means in the YPG/HPG... all of the organizations. It's the beating heart of this army.

what do you mean by democracy?

I would refer you to any book on good governance in economics. I also would refer you to political philosophy either from Bernard Williams, from left-wing authors as well like Noam Chomsky, or to Abdulla Ocalan's work himself.

However, I would personally define it as the ability to define concerns and implement them at a level in which people are not discriminated against, women, men, children, old people, and have a voice in some way in their community. For example, committees are a good way of implementing this. Especially, local ones and so forth.

There have been accusations from both both Arabs and Syrians that Kurds (largely the YPG/PYD) are forcing people out of villages and cleansing villages of local Arab populations and destroying them. Have you seen anything like that happen on a systemic or even rare occasion?

I have seen us go into an Arab area and they ran away. Why did they run away? I have no idea. We weren't going to hurt them. How could we hurt them? If were to even touch one of their woman a YPJ fighter would have taken out her AK-47 and blew me away.

The only I have seen a village burn was when our unit, some of the fighters I was responsible for, they blew up a house that had IEDs in the doorway. So we blew it up. Then it burned. Then it burned down the house next to it. Then it spread to half the village. When night came half the village was gone!

Not only did I get castigated... I got arrested, thrown (unjustly) into a cell in Kobane for it, and had to wait until an investigation was finished into what had happened. To this day I have a black mark for that happening. I suppose we could have not blow up the house? (maybe, but I think if a house is rigged to blow you just blow up the house because you don't know if there are other trip wires connected it). We had to use that village for a nighttime defense operation and there was no way I was going to let that house stay there... all the while it was mined.

Seriously, Arabs, if we're coming... STOP RUNNING AWAY FROM US. You guys saw in Tal Abyad that they ran away from us. As soon as we got there, with female fighters and all, from the reports by my friends, they came back. We won't steal your stuff, we won't take your house. Most likely you'll be interviewed about how you got your income, how you lived, who you knew who joined ISIS. Now, if you worked with them, if it was for an income only, then you get arrested, interviewed, and released. It happens all the time. The local village police then monitor you.
I think that's fair.

I was wondering if you could elaborate on the organizational differences between the PKK and PYD/YPG. In the chat you said PKK fighters can't get married while YPG could. Is there any other major differences?

There's a lot. We're completely different organizations. There are PYD offices in Europe. They, those who work there, do not communicate the PKK on anything. However, ideologically speaking, we're the same.

What is the gerilla main opinion on YDG-H? Do they consider them to be part of PKK or not?

PKK is just an ideology. If you say you're PKK, then you're expected to name the actual organization you're apart of. Even in Qendil if you say you're PKK people will kind of smirk and say, 'what do you mean, which organization are you referring to? Are you HPG? PJAK?' and so on.

How much influence do FSA groups have? Are they important?

They have a lot of influence. They're Arabs and a lot of the areas we're fighting in are Arab areas. We respect them... we hope they respect us. We can't advance into an Arab village without them agreeing to it or supporting us. It's not right. I've seen us being delayed a number of times because they didn't have the numbers to support us on an operation into an Arab village.

But arent you worried they might be extremists like Ahrar al Sham, Nusra, etc.?

We always worry, but it's not like they're administratively in charge of areas they take. We are. Specifically, the FSA who are fighting with us. Like the Euphrates Volcano

How popular is the Rojavan Revolution within Rojava? Has it extremely strong support? We all know that the PYD is not the only party in Rojava and that we have the KNC too and Barzani sympathizers. Do you think that the people there - possibly Arabs and Kurds alike - are extremely supportive? From Young to Old, male and female.

in terms of popularity, obviously it takes time. There's a lot of changes that even people in Kobane don't like (Bashar al-Asad used to give free bread to the people... now they have to pay for it or ask for welfare if they cannot afford it). Such a policy has not been entirely popular... even though it will be up for agreement in the next few months once things settle down and the logistics issues can be fixed in Kobane. However, I know this "nan" issue is irking a lot of people.

What do you think about the current peace process with Turkey and do you think that it will be successful?

I wish it the best. Both the government and the party made a lot of mistakes. I just hope that the two sides can realize that this bloodshed accomplishes nothing. Really -- it accomplishes nothing beyond enlargening egos. I'm tired of this war in Turkey, aren't you? But I'd like to get the basic rights that the party is arguing for. Can't it be resolved peacefully?

What do you think of the likelyhood that the Turkish army will take over a buffer zone in northern Syria. And if it happened how it would affect the power balance in the area.

I don't think they'll do it. If they did it -- it would not be good for them. It would not be good for us. It would be good for everyone else though.

What are the chances of the YPG & SAA reaching a more permanent peace?

Never -- unless they give us autonomy.

What do you think about SAA and Baathism?

It's fascism.

In one of your responses you mentioned that you guys wish to expand west, do you think a deal can be struck with the islamist rebels there to combine your efforts against ISIS?

Never. We'll fight them too.

Is that a good idea if it means making another enemy? Plus that would make a deal with turkey almost impossible.

I don't care.

What is your take on Al-Nusra,Ahrar Sham and other Islamist groups ?

On those ones... they have the same ideology -- but of course internecine warfare creates small differences. People try to enlarge those differences as if they are, truly, different. In reality, they represent the same thing: fascism.

Fascism has a specific meaning. AAS (Ahrar ash-Sham) are not fascists.

AAS? The Islamic Front? Who supports them? Who would give them the legitimacy to form laws in that area? Are they going to allow representative forms of democracy in that area they control. If not... they're fascists. Arab nationalists, Arab Islamists, etc. etc. they're the same to me. They oppress people, big or small forms of it, they do it. I'm tired of them, aren't you?

...fascism in its modern forms is a symbolic ideas. You're looking at the fake wikipedia definition of fascism. You have to interpret fascism and how it manifests itself around the world. There are more symbols of fascism, effecting people right now, then there are wikipedia entries. The academic definition is of little consequence.

What humanitarian aid organizations have you seen working in Rojava? In Sinjar? MSF, Hevya Sor, UNHCR?

They're there. They're amazing organizations too! I don't have too much good to say about UNHCR. I never see them -- just their tents. But Doctors Without Borders, Hevya Sor, they're really fantastic organizations in my opinion. We always see them delivering things right when things turn bad. In Shengal Hevya Sor was right there with us when we opened the corridor.

(comment from an Aid Worker, not the PKK fighter): "Not OP, but IRC is pretty big in Rojava. Save the Children are out there too. UNHCR is not an NGO, but they and other UN agencies like UNICEF have some reach there because the regime is in the area as well as the Kurds. Whereas in rebel-controlled Syria UN has no presence because the government of Syria isn't there and because they didn't have authority until the UNSC resolution. MSF has a hospital in Sinjar, but in general their model is not very well-suited to protracted conflicts in the middle east."

(I altered the order of some of the question/answers to make it flow more easily)

Two battalions--Zaza & Jund al-Heremin (small groups of fighters numbering 50-70) have been "fired" and ordered to leave Kobane because of charges of robbery, unethical actions.

Jund al-Heremin was involved in a "grain racket" according to this 2013 article:

"Oil is not the only way that rebels can make money. Another outfit from Manbij, the Jund al-Haramein brigade, has gone in for the grain racket. In exchange for "protection" from other groups trying to force their flour upon customers, bakeries in the city are obliged to purchase flour sourced exclusively from mills controlled by the al-Harameins. And in case ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra ever becomes unhappy about this arrangement, the al-Harameins can simply opt for protection of their own — by joining the Ahrar al-Sham family. In September, indeed, Jund al-Haramein announced that it was already affiliating itself with the larger group, a move that should suffice to deter any hostile action."

Coalition (USAF, etc..) has begun dropping this image on Shaddadi, Sarrin and Raqqa:

("Freedom will rise and shine")

Interview with YPG foreign fighters: Jordan Matson (US) and Jesper Soder (Sweden)

Rules & Procedures of the YPG(in English)

Dated but useful historical organization chart:
(The KNC-ENKS never really ruled Rojava from what I understand)

Black Rose Anarchist Federation (Kara Gül Anarşist Federasyonu) and Industrial Workers of the World (Dünya Endüstri İşçileri Birliği) from the U.S. visiting the Rojava Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği (Rojava Assistance and Solidarity Association) discussing the importance of international solidarity

Rojava Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği: Black Rose Anarchist Federation(Kara Gül Anarşist Federasyonu) ve Industrial Workers of the World (Dünya Endüstri İşçileri Birliği) üyeleri Derneğimize destek ziyaretinde bulundu. Amerikalı temsilcilere dernek yöneticileri tarafından uluslararası desteğin önemi vurgulanarak,uluslararası alanda yapılabilecek faaliyetler hakkında bilgi verildi

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explosion-kills-scores-at-culture-center-near-syria-border.aspx?pageID=238&nID=85659&NewsCatID=341

An explosion has killed at least 27 in a municipal culture center in the southeastern province of Şanlıurfa’s Suruç district, as scores of people have been hospitalized.

"We are concerned that the number of death will increase. The perpetrators will soon be found and put on trial," Turkey's interior minister said in a statement on July 20.

There is speculation that the blast was caused by a 18-year-old female suicide bomber from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

At least 300 members of the Federation of Socialist Youth Associations (SGDF) were staying at the Amara Culture Center as part of a summer expedition to help rebuild Kobane, which lies directly across the border from Suruç.

The culture center, which is run by the Suruç Municipality under the control of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), frequently hosts visiting journalists and volunteers who work with refugees from Kobane.

The hashtag #SuruçtaKatliamVar (There is a massacre in Suruç) entered the worldwide trending topics list on Twitter soon after the explosion.

Kadir Ergün, an eyewitness, told CNNTürk that he was 100 meters away from the explosion. "It is hard to describe it with words. Blood donations are urgently needed. The people of Suruç are now called to donate blood," he added.

İsmail Kaplan, the HDP's deputy head in Suruç district, told journalists that a simultaneous suicide bombing hit the town center of Kobane, which had been repeatedly attacked by ISIL in the past months, too. Speaking to daily Hürriyet, security sources in Ankara have confirmed this claim.

"If it is Daesh [ISIL], it will not stay in Suruç. Very soon we could end up like Syria," said Muhsin Kızılkaya, a deputy from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

"It's a big massacre. The probability of a suicide bomber is very high," HDP deputy Leyla Güven told Habertürk. "Suspect information has been provided related to the number of deaths. Some say that everyone in the group died."

This Suruç attack is grim. On the plus side, my Izmir comrade S (who was due to go to this, but cancelled at the last minute due to family health issue) tells me that both Kurrem and our Black Rose comrade have survived the blast. However apparently 10 from Izmir are amongst the dead and a further two from Izmir that S and Kurrem have had some contact with are amongst the injured in hospital.

Sosyalist Gençlik Dernekleri Federasyonunun (SGDF)

SGDF Facebook
SGDF Twitter
Socialist youths of Turkey going to Kobanê to help reconstruction
Eye-witness to Suruç massacre Speaks

Ocelot

This Suruç attack is grim. On the plus side, my Izmir comrade S (who was due to go to this, but cancelled at the last minute due to family health issue) tells me that both Kurrem and our Black Rose comrade have survived the blast. However apparently 10 from Izmir are amongst the dead and a further two from Izmir that S and Kurrem have had some contact with are amongst the injured in hospital.

Thanks for the update Ocelot. Glad to hear that Kurrem and your friends are ok; as you say a tiny piece of goods news in what is just horrific overall.

Just back from the local solidarity demonstration. This is all very ugly. I'll never understand how someone can do something like this. And yes, thank you Ocelot for the update.

Gruesome attack on innocent people. Terrible crime.

Black Rose Anarchist Federation Statement on the Massacre in Suruc

Suruç
Red Circle: Amara center
Blue Circles: Refugee camps

Arab and Turkmen refugees in Akcakale had complained that the PYD regards everyone as a potential IS militant.

On the other hand, it is not only Arabs and Turkmens who are not allowed to cross back into Syria. The same goes for the large number of Kurdish refugees waiting at the border. Some had fled Tell Abyad because of the fighting between IS and the YPG, while others had migrated from other cities in Syria after IS had invaded them. They said they had been forced to enter Turkey because the roads in northern Syria were blocked.

It seems that the PYD is not discriminating against any particular ethnicity in its closure of the border. Arab and Turkmen refugees on the Turkish side of the border said that they had not been forced to flee, but had run away because of the clashes between IS and the YPG.

The newly emerging local governance of Tell Abyad also does not appear to be acting in a discriminatory manner. A local parliament has been formed for the first time there, and I attended the first gathering, on July 16. Its members are not only Kurdish, but Arab, Turkmen and Armenian as well, representing the diversity of the local population. Moreover, the Free Syrian Army, supported by the West and Turkey, is also represented. Muslim claimed that this inclusive model is being applied in all of the “canton governments” and local parliaments.

The non-Kurdish members of the Tell Abyad governing body whom I talked to expressed their satisfaction over the liberation of the city from IS by Syrian Kurds. They told of atrocities committed by IS members when they controlled the town, for almost two years, before the Kurdish forces expelled them. They said that IS executed or harshly punished anyone who failed to comply with its strict Sharia rules.

In short, non-Kurdish residents do not seem to be overly concerned about who and which ethnic group rules the region at the moment. They are merely happy to have survived IS. Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds appear to have unified in the face of the IS threat. They don’t have the luxury of fighting each other because IS doesn’t differentiate between ethnicities in its cruelty. This has forced the different ethnic groups to seek cooperation among themselves.

The same is true for the PYD. At the moment its top priority is the fight against IS jihadis. This in turn makes it dependent on everyone’s cooperation, including Arabs and Turkmens.

Kurds push back against charges of ethnic cleansing, Verda Ozer, July 20, 2015

(Verda Ozer is a regular columnist for the Turkish dailies Hurriyet and Hurriyet Daily News. She is also a non-residential fellow of the Atlantic Council, Marshall Memorial fellow of the German Marshall Fund and scholar for Istanbul Policy Center (IPC))

OUR SADNESS WILL BE OUR ANGER, KOBANÊ WILL RECONSTRUCTURE, Devrimci Anarşist Faaliyet (DAF)

according to https://syndikalismus.wordpress.com/2015/07/21/selbstmordanschlag-in-pirsus-mit-dutzenden-toten-und-vielen-verletzten/ two anarchists are among the murdered comrades: Alper Sapan and Evrim Deniz Erol, both were 19 years old, a third young anarchist, Caner Delisu, was seriously injured

"CHP Vice Chairmen: We will build the library and the children's playground the massacred youths wanted to do in Kobanê."

(source)

"CHP Deputy Chairman Veli Ağbaba said the responsibility for the bombing lies with the policies toward Syria put forth by MİT and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party).
“There must be consequences. MİT has been already politicized. The undersecretary [Hakan Fidan] should immediately resign, as should the interim interior minister [Sebahattin Öztürk]. We call on the government to take responsibility,” Ağbaba stated."

CHP calls on gov’t to assume responsibility for Suruç attack, July 21, 2015, Today's Zaman

"CHP’s Central Executive Board (MYK), chaired by party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on Tuesday, Koç said, “If we have previously declared mourning for the king of any old republic, mourning at a national level certainly needs to be declared to commemorate the 32 young people who we lost [in Suruç].”

Turkey's CHP calls on Ankara to declare national mourning over Suruç attack, July 21, 2015, BGN News

Looks like CHP is increasingly trying to position itself as more sympathetic to the HDP than the AKP.

Flint

"CHP’s Central Executive Board (MYK), chaired by party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on Tuesday, Koç said, “If we have previously declared mourning for the king of any old republic, mourning at a national level certainly needs to be declared to commemorate the 32 young people who we lost [in Suruç].”

Turkey's CHP calls on Ankara to declare national mourning over Suruç attack, July 21, 2015, BGN News

Looks like CHP is increasingly trying to position itself as more sympathetic to the HDP than the AKP.

Or perhaps are worried about losing the support of leftist Alevis, traditionally one of their most loyal constituencies, to the HDP.

Note the source:

Rojava and Catalonia: Linked Through History, ypgrojava.com, July 19, 2015.

ocelot

Flint

"CHP’s Central Executive Board (MYK), chaired by party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on Tuesday, Koç said, “If we have previously declared mourning for the king of any old republic, mourning at a national level certainly needs to be declared to commemorate the 32 young people who we lost [in Suruç].”

Turkey's CHP calls on Ankara to declare national mourning over Suruç attack, July 21, 2015, BGN News

Looks like CHP is increasingly trying to position itself as more sympathetic to the HDP than the AKP.

Or perhaps are worried about losing the support of leftist Alevis, traditionally one of their most loyal constituencies, to the HDP.

As a correction to the above...

Last night we had a solidarity picket outside the Turkish embassy in Dublin (in solidarity with the victims of the Suruc massacre and calling on the Turkish state to end it's support for ISIS) and a Kurdish comrade was reading out the names of the victims and a brief line or two of their age, where they came from, what they were studying (most, not all, were students) etc. One of the women killed was apparently a CHP member from Istanbul iirc (haven't got details just yet). So rather than being mere political maneuvering, I think it we can take it that CHP's response had also an element of personal grievance.

Juan Cole's speculation that AKP's action against ISIS is because of fear of losing further ground to CHP and HDP in a snap election. No mention of the arrests of suspected PKK/YDG-H and DHKP-C members.

Lots of reports of Turkish jets strike pkk camps in Iraq: basyan, avaşin, zap, hakurk, amediye, kandil also reports about mahmour.

U.S. airforce bombing Al-Nusra.

PKK bases bombed by Turkey's airforce:

The Turkish army is now attacking YPG from the border. This night YPG was attacked near Kobane and Girê Spi (http://tr.hawarnews.com/ypg-turk-orudusu-ypg-ve-oso-mevzilerini-bombaliyor/)

kurremkarmerruk

Should I also start a Turkey news section?

Good idea. Go ahead!

http://sosyalsavas.org/2015/07/eskisehir-anarchists-arrested-in-commemoration-action-for-their-comrades-who-were-killed-in-suruc-last-week/

Today, about 70 anarchists from İstanbul, Ankara, Yalova and other cities (Eskişehir Anarşi İnisiyatifi, Ankara Anarşi İnisiyatifi, İstanbul Anarşi İnisiyatifi ve Devrimci Anarşist Faaliyet), gathered in Eskişehir in a commemoration action for their comrades (Alper Sapan, Evrim Deniz Erol, Medali Barutçu, Serhat Devrim) who were killed by suicide bomb in Suruç (Pirsus) last week. When anarchist gathered and started to march, police suddenly attack and arrested 17 anarchists.

It was the action of Anarchy Initiative which made an international call for solidarity action against Turkish fascist government. Also other groups, autonoms and individuals joined the action in Eskişehir.

Anarchists who gathered in front of Migros (Adalar) and started to march were attacked by police. And 17 anarchist arrested. Other activists dispersed to the streets and cafes. Then, fascgist groups appeared in the streets to annoy the protestors. Some fascists applauded police who were arresting some anarchists.

Meanwhile, police tried to criminalize the protestors and anarchists by a bomb warning in the city center. Already they blokaded roads, they increased the security in the center. Then they exploded the package with fuze on the street.

For now we don’t have more details about arrestees. 17 anarchist arrested and police doesn’t allow the arrestees to talk with their lawyers. Some police hit some lawyers of arrestees. We’ll give more updates soon.

Even the capitalist media in the UK is quoting commentators saying that the Turkish action with support from the USA government, is effectively using limited, if real, action against ISIS primarily as cover for action against the PKK and it's supporters (though we assume not other Kurdish factions) both within Turkey and in Syria and Iraq which indicates the likely further spread and intensification of the militarised conflict. The specific attacks on the YPG have not been reported here yet and it is unclear if this may give rise to further tensions with other European, including NATO allies of the USA.

Spikymike

Even the capitalist media in the UK is quoting commentators saying that the Turkish action with support from the USA government, is effectively using limited, if real, action against ISIS primarily as cover for action against the PKK and it's supporters (though we assume not other Kurdish factions) both within Turkey and in Syria and Iraq which indicates the likely further spread and intensification of the militarised conflict. The specific attacks on the YPG have not been reported here yet and it is unclear if this may give rise to further tensions with other European, including NATO allies of the USA.

same with many bourgeois media outlets in German-speaking countries which are traditionally not particularly friendly towards the PKK

Sarrin liberated by YPG/YPJ and Burkan-Al-Firat (FSA)

ISIS withrdaws from Hasakah. Over the course of the battle, SAA/NDF ceded much territory to YPG/YPJ/MFS/Al-Senadid.

One important detail in regards to the TEV-DEM administration of justice and the involvement of Syriac Christian allies with the YPG is the outcome of the recent trial in regards to the murder of Khabour Guards Chief Dawud Jendo. His murderers were YPG. YPG turned Jendo's murderers over to the civil court of the Cizire Canton, which found them guilty and sentenced 20 years prison for the 2 killers, 4 years and 1 year for the 2 others.

The floor is open for debate about how a libertarian communist society would deal with such a situation.

The Syriac Military Union/Syriac Union Party/Syriac National Council of Syria/European Syriac Union issued a statement against Turkish intervention in Syria and stating they would defend themselves. This isn't all surprising, but some disapora Assyrian groups made claims that the Jendo murder was weakening the relationship between Syriacs and the PYD/YPG. If you look at the above map of Hasakah, the Syriac MFS had their territorial responsibility increased in the city (those are likely Christian neighborhoods). It is a strong statement in the Syriac support of TEV-DEM.

And because I don't honor the arbitrary border of Rojava News/Turkey News--AKA-the kurremkarmerruk-nokta line...

Some German politicians are threatening to withdraw their Patriot missles from Turkey.

There are a lot of stories in the press sympathetic to the PKK in regards to Turkey's bombings in Qandil and political suppression in Turkey:

Turkey conflict with Kurds: Was approving air strikes against the PKK America's worst error in the Middle East since the Iraq War?
Bombing the PKK: It’s the (domestic) politics, stupid!
Turkey sends in jets as Syria’s agony spills over every border, where in The Guardian quotes;

"In the wake of the raid that killed Abu Sayyaf, suspicions of an undeclared alliance have hardened. One senior western official familiar with the intelligence gathered at the slain leader’s compound said that direct dealings between Turkish officials and ranking Isis members was now “undeniable”.

“There are hundreds of flash drives and documents that were seized there,” the official told the Observer. “They are being analysed at the moment, but the links are already so clear that they could end up having profound policy implications for the relationship between us and Ankara.”

Never fear, Fox News is still run by idiots.

Here is a long list of links pertaining to recent events involving Turkey and the PKK.

Interesting Poll Results from CNN Turkey on Turkey's involvement in Syria. even has opinion broken down by political party.

Translation
1st image: Who do you want to control northern Syria?
ISIS - PYD - Neither (not shown)
2nd image: Would intervention in Syria be beneficial or harmful for Turkey?
Harmful - Beneficial
3rd image: Would you agree if Turkey intervene in Syria?
Yes - No - DK/NI
2012 September
2013 September
2015 July
4th image: Do you agree with rumours that some government agencies help radical islamist organisations?
Yes - No
5th image: Should Turkey go to war with Syria in order to overthrow Assad regime?
Yes - No
6th image: Do you find the state's Syrian policy since the beginning successful?
Yes - No - DK/NI
7th image: What is the biggest threat at Syria border in your opinion?
PYD/YPG - ISIS - Assad regime
8th image: See 1st image.

U.S.: No Safe Zone in Syria

How War Destroyed Syria's Economy in Four Charts, Bloomberg, July 29, 2015

Rmeilan oil field of Syria's Hasakeh province, where the Kurds, having fought off jihadists, are extracting and refining oil for the first time. Located in the middle of the desert in the northeastern province of the war-torn country, Rmeilan is Syria's largest oil field in terms of surface area.

Before the conflict, the oil from Rmeilan was transported to the country's two refineries in western Banias and central Homs regions.

But once the war started, "the pipelines going from the fields in Jazire to the refineries were sabotaged, forcing the closures of 1,300 wells in Rmeilan", Khalaf said. (Suleiman Khalaf, head of the Kurdish Energy Organisation -- the equivalent of a local oil minister)...

Last summer, the local administration decided to take matters into its own hands, restarting extraction at 150 wells and creating around 20 makeshift refineries.

The Kurdish operation in Rmeilan now produces around 15,000 barrels of oil a day, more than the barely 10,000 bpd that Syria's government generates.

It is less than a tenth of the 165,000 that Rmeilan was producing before the war, but it is enough to meet the needs of areas in Hasakeh under Kurdish control....

"We defended these installations and these wells with hundreds of martyrs," he said, watching a handful of workers on the field.

The restarted oil flow has been a major boon after years of hardship in the area.

"The winter of 2013 was so severe that many families began cutting down trees and burning their furniture to heat themselves," said Hassan, a government employee at Rmeilan...

Khalaf said the Syrian government had helped get Rmeilan's wells back online by providing raw materials such as oil for turbines and spare parts.

Damascus also continues to pay the salaries of the handful of former government employees who have gone back to work in Rmeilan.

The gasoline produced at the site is bad quality, but it sells for much less than that produced by the government in the few oil wells it still controls.

The gasoline distributed by the state costs 400 Syrian pounds ($1.3) a litre, compared to around 150 for the local product.

The conflict has devastated Syria's oil industry, which was producing 380,000 barrels per day before the conflict.

Now, much of Syria's oil is produced in areas outside of government control -- like in the most productive oil fields in the eastern Deir Ezzor province held by IS...

Khalaf said he would be willing to coordinate with the regime on oil production, as long as the Kurds continue to benefit financially from the work at Rmeilan.

"If the route to the refineries in Homs and Banias reopens, we'll start pumping through it again immediately," he said.

"But on condition that the Kurdish region gets a fair part of the oil revenue."

Syrian Kurds refine oil for themselves for the first time, Maher Al-Mounnes, AFP, July 30, 2015

"If the route to the refineries in Homs and Banias reopens"

That's unlikely to occur as long as ISIS exists. There is a lot of ISIS between Hasakah and Homs. TEV-DEM would need Islamic State out of the way. The Oil Line goes through Deir ez-Zor and the Natural Gas line through ar-Raqqah.

Strategically, now that YPG controls the southern side of Hasakah city, it will logically push ISIS further south. YPG may try to push another 60 kilometers down Route 7 to Al-Shaddadah and the nearby Jbeysa oil field--"one of country's largest". This would reduce the threat of attack from ISIS to the population center in Hasakah, remove some of ISIS revenue from oil sales, and secure that oil for Rojava. The May-June 2015 ISIS offensive against Hasakah city began in Al-Shaddadah.

Speculation that this would be an important part of weakening ISIS:

Once Al Hasakah and surrounding areas have been secured, the Peshmerga forces and other Syrian rebel groups will be encouraged to attack Ash Shaddadah to the south, in order to close down the key ISIS road leading to Sinjar, Tel Afar and Mosul. But this now reverts back to the Syrian rebels. They must be prodded to sustain the momentum and to take the fight back to ISIS by destroying their base at Ash Shaddadah. Coalition airpower should continue to support the Syrian rebels in attacking Ash Shaddadah.

Operation Terminal Spirit: A Ground Force Plan to Reduce ISIS, von Clausewitz' wit, October 1, 2014

The defunct Iraq-Syria pipeline isn't an option, even with repair as it comes in near the Akkas oil field south of Al Qa'iam, which is southeast of Deir ez-Zor along the Euphrates. This is all ISIS held territory.

It may actually be easier for Cizire Canton/Hasakah to send their oil northeast towards Iraq and the Semalka border crossing, currently controlled by the KRG, There was a pontoon bridge which allowed refugees to cross. The KDP has refused to reassemble the bridge and keeps the border crossing closed to regular traffic and trade...

That pipeline in Iraq/KRG can eventually lead to Ceyhan in Turkey. That would be the same line that goes from Kirkuk to Ceyhan.

The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is prone to sabotage and passes by ISIS-held Mosul. But northwest of Mosul, KRG connected the pipeline to Taq Taq and Tawke fields through h Khurmal and Dahuk for export to Ceyhan.

Folks will also notice that some of the PKK camps bombed by Turkey recently are in Northern Iraq/KRG; not far from the Kirkuk-Ceyhan's line before it crosses into Turkey. The PKK bombed the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline on 7/29/2015 in the Sirnak province (northeast of Cizire canton) and/or the pipeline in Agri. If Turkey wants oil from KRG, then they need to make a deal with or neutralize the PKK.

If Cizire Canton wants to sell oil, it has to do so by either working out a political deal with KRG and/or Turkey; or it has to eliminate ISIS from ar-Raqqah, Deir ez-Zor and the rest of the Euphrates river.

Economic development is occurring along the lines set forth by the leadership of the Kurdish Freedom Movement, and current economic growth is being led by newly found communes, committees, unions and civil organizing as part of the democratic economy model.

In the Efrîn canton alone, where hardly a workshop existed under the Baath regime, a new 84 thousand square meter industrial park close to the Eşefiyê neighborhood is now home to at least 800 workplaces providing for the livelihood of 5 thousand families.

Despite having a pre-war population of only around 200 thousand there are currently over 1 million residing in the canton. The new industrial park is helping to employ thousands of people.

All work in the industrial park is organized by committees, unions and civil society organizations attached to the communes.

Despite this success many locals still complain about the expense of vehicle batteries, agricultural equipment and certain machine and plastic products. Supply shortages due to the war are largely to blame for the rising costs.

Selah Misto, one of the administrators of the industrial union, explained that procedures have been developed into order to ensure work proceeds in an orderly fashion and that all work was organized by committees attached to the production communes. He added that communes have already been formed to produce such goods as iron products, batteries, and automotive parts. Coordination between communes has helped to overcome problems with production and the newly founded committees work to provide expertise and oversight...

Adding that the economy was developing as part of the project of Democratic Autonomous Administration and that a a project was currently under to way to find a location for 150 new workspaces.

Communal Economy Grows In Rojava Despite War, Rojava Report, July 31, 2015

All work in the industrial park is organized by committees, unions and civil society organizations attached to the communes.

So that is a really exciting claim. I'm interested in hearing more about this if anyone comes across it. Thanks for the link Flint.

boozemonarchy

All work in the industrial park is organized by committees, unions and civil society organizations attached to the communes.

So that is a really exciting claim. I'm interested in hearing more about this if anyone comes across it. Thanks for the link Flint.

This has been claimed before, but Efrin seems to be expanding its productive capacity on that model, and when it expands, it seems to be largely collective.

"In 2012, the PYD launched what it originally called the Social Economy Plan, which would later be renamed the People’s Economy Plan (PEP). The PEP was based on the writings of Öcalan and the lived experiences of Kurds in North Kurdistan (southern Turkey). Traditional “private property” was abolished in late 2012, meaning all buildings, land, and infrastructure fell under control of the various city councils. This did not mean people no longer owned their homes or businesses, however. The councils implemented an “ownership by use” sovereign principle, a principle that could not be overturned by any council. Ownership by use means that when a building like a home or a business is being used by a person or persons, the users would in fact own the land and structures but would not be able to sell them on an open market. Öcalan wrote that use ownership is what prevents speculation and capital accumulation which in turn leads to exploitation. Aside from property owned by use, in principle any other property would become commons. This abolishing of private property did not extend to commodities like automobiles, machines, electronics, furniture, etc. but was limited to land, infrastructure, and structures...

"The commons encompasses land, infrastructure, and buildings not owned by individuals but held in stewardship by the councils. Councils can turn over these public goods to individuals to be used. Commons are conceived of as a way to provide both a safety net for those without resources and a way to maximize use of the material resources of the community. Commons also include the ecological aspects of the region including water, parks, wildlife and wilderness, and even most livestock. According to Dr. Ahmad Yousef, an economic co-minister, three-quarters of traditional private property is being used as commons and one quarter is still being owned by use of individuals. The economic plan (PEP) posits that the commons are robust enough economically that there is no need for taxes, and since the beginning of the Rojava revolution there have been no taxes of any type...

"Worker administration is the third leg of the stool of the economic plan. Workers are to control the means of production in their workplace through worker councils that are responsible to the local councils. According to the Ministry of Economics, worker councils have only been set up for about one third of the enterprises in Rojava so far. Worker councils are coordinated by the various economic ministries and local councils to assure a smooth flow of goods, supplies, and other essentials. The PEP also calls for all economic activity in the cantons to be ecologically sound. It is unclear who has responsibility for this, whether it is the workers’ councils, the local councils, the City Councils, or the Peoples’ assemblies. Throughout the various statements from the economic ministries, one sees mention over and over again about the primacy of ecologically sensible industry—but details are lacking.

"The PEP is also vague when it comes to its relationship with other economies inside and outside of Syria. A substantial amount of the current economic activity in the region comes from black market oil being sold outside the region. In Autumn, 2014, representatives of Rojava travelled around Europe looking to create “trading partners” and seemed to be suggesting a standard free market policy, while at the same time eliminating banks and other financial institutions inside Rojava. The Rojava canton principles also clearly state that the region will not produce its own money or bonds, so it is unclear how such trading relationships between other governments would actually come to pass even if the embargo is lifted."

A Small Key Can Open A Large Door: The Rojava Revolution

YPG has begun to move south towards Al-Shaddadah

Regiment 121 is a former artillery base

The U.S. train and equip program for "moderate" Syrian who would pledge to fight ISIS (but not Assad) was supposed to find 5,000 recruits. it only graduated 60. Called Division 30, the U.S. still sent that 60 into Syria, through the A'zaz border crossing. Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria) quickly set upon them, kidnapped the leader of Division 30, 5 were killed, 18 wounded. The survivors fled to YPG-controlled Afrin.Subsequently, US Airforce bombed al-Nusra.

There have been some other minor skirmishes between YPG and al-Nusra with some attacks supposedly being enabled from Turkey allowing al-Nusra through the border.. Al-Nusra may have expanded its position in A'zaz from partial to total control. The YPG commander in Afrin previously volunteered to take over security of A'zaz from the Free Syrian Army to defend it from Jihadist groups. The US bombed al-Nusra positions near A'zaz.

Jacobin has a good piece on Turkey's campaign against the PKK/YPG, and the historical context around it - Erdogan's Bloody Gambit

Life under two masters in Syria's Hasakeh, Maher Al Mounes, August 4, 2015.

Article describes the dual power situation between TEV-DEM and the Syrian Arab Republic. This may have changed or is in the process of changing in Hasakah as the Syrian Arab Army and National Defense Forces ceded much of the city to the YPG/YPJ/MFS/Al-Senadid during the most recent ISIS attack on the city.

Conscription law being applied to Arabs, not only Kurds and Syriacs:

Raed, a Syrian Arab living in the northeastern city, avoids passing through checkpoints run by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG).

"I finished my compulsory military service in the government army four years ago. The YPG are demanding that I complete their six-month compulsory service," the 28-year old told the AFP news agency.

"But I have a wife and children, and I can't be away from them for that long."

Syrian Arab Army also looking for conscripts:

In the majority-Kurdish town of Amuda, 85 km north of Hasakeh, Aziz has not seen his mother - who lives in a government-controlled zone of Hasakeh - in two years.

"I'm too scared to visit because I have to pass through a regime checkpoint, and they would force me to do the compulsory military service," Aziz, who has completed his YPG service, tells AFP.

"Why do we, the residents of Hasakeh, have to spend our lives on the front lines and submit to double the military service?"

The term of conscription in HXP (Rojava) is 6 months, in the Syrian Arab Army (SAR) it is 18-21 months.(Best description of conscription difference in Engilsh that I've found.)

Freedom of movement between Hasakah and Qamishli:

Mansur Usi, 56, also holds two military IDs, as well as two driver's licences and two licence plates for his car - a white government plate, and another green one for the YPG.

The Kurdish taxi driver and former government employee moves freely between Hasakeh city and Qamishli, a Kurdish-majority city to the northeast.

"I have two driver's licences: the first is for the government, in case the state police stops me, and the second is for the Kurds, in case the Asayish (Kurdish police) stops me," he said.

Syrian State annual tax, TEV-DEM areas engaged in tax resistance to the Syrian State, TEV-DEM enforcing price controls:

Some stores in Kurdish-controlled areas stopped paying government taxes, while those in areas with overlapping authorities have been charged twice.

Bahfared, 50, owns a pharmacy in one of the areas where both government and Kurdish administrations have influence.

"We suffer from the presence of two authorities: the first belongs to the government's Pharmacists Syndicate, where we pay yearly subscription fees," Bahfared said.

"And now there's also a second side ... issuing me tickets because they say my prices are too high," he said, in an apparent jab at Kurdish forces.

Monthly government taxes to the Syrian state, weekly fee to TEV-DEM for street cleaning:

A man who runs a cell phone store said he pays monthly government taxes as well as a weekly fee for Kurdish authorities to clean the streets outside.

"We are bothered by both sides ... Life in this canton means being hurt by both of them."

Map of recent incidents:

Source.

Our Perspectives and Tasks on the Revolution in Rojava (BRRN)

ANF: Rûdaw and Orient TV’s work permit cancelled in Cizîr Canton

The administration noted that Rûdaw and Orient were financed by political parties that determine coverage content in a way that shows enmity towards Kurdish people, institutions, and martyrs.

This is interesting - based on something Flint sent me, my understanding was that Rûdaw is financed by the KDP and the Barzani family. Not anti-Kurdish, but controlled by capitalist interests in Iraqi Kurdistan.

So is this evidence of rising tensions between the YPG and Peshmerga? Or in this case does the "war of position" not have much to do with the "war of maneuver"?

Fnordie

This is interesting - based on something Flint sent me, my understanding was that Rûdaw is financed by the KDP and the Barzani family. Not anti-Kurdish, but controlled by capitalist interests in Iraqi Kurdistan.

So is this evidence of rising tensions between the YPG and Peshmerga? Or in this case does the "war of position" not have much to do with the "war of maneuver"?

It doesn't necessarily have anything to do with tensions between YPG and KDP Peshmerga (and the YPG and HPG are on good terms with the PUK Pesh).

TEV-DEM shouldn't have done this because Rudaw will talk and talk about it and HRW will flag it as media censorship.

Rudaw is notorious for lying, often taking a position a little more extremely pro-KDP than the KDP is willing to take.

Rudaw was established and fully sponsored by Nechervan Barzani, KDP senior leader and KRG Prime Minister. http://www.milletpress.com/english/en_report/post_detail.php?id=15

Rudaw on their work permits being cancelled: Rudaw blasts PYD ban in Rojava as like 'North Korea'

Meanwhile, in KRG, here is how press freedom is working:

HRW on media freedom in KRG: http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/29/iraqi-kurdistan-journalists-under-threat

Media regulation in KRG: http://kurdistantribune.com/2015/regulating-the-media-in-kurdistan-mission-impossible-or-ignorable/

KRG: free press and democracy http://kurdistantribune.com/2014/kurdish-independence-dream-might-turn-against-free-press-democracy/
http://kurdistantribune.com/2014/criticism-of-political-parties-should-be-welcomed-not-censored/

Most believe that Barzani had Sardasht Osman assassinated. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sardasht_Osman

In Turkey, all these sources, both Rudaw and pro-YPG sources are banned. Rudaw reporting on Turkey banning Twitter after the Suruc bombing, Turkey also had Facebook block Rudaw's Facebook because they had shown pictures of the house of Abdullah Ocalan. Turkey censored twitter and other websites during the Kobani seige and Turkey had Roj TV shutdown in Europe.

Prohibiting the press is a typical tactic by Turkey, KRG and now, unfortunately, TEV-DEM/Rojava.

Even if Rudaw is a pack of bourgeois liars.

Flint

Rudaw blasts PYD ban in Rojava as like 'North Korea'

Never trust anyone who refers to to themself in the third person

Fnordie

Flint

Rudaw blasts PYD ban in Rojava as like 'North Korea'

Never trust anyone who refers to to themself in the third person

http://zorzannews.com/2015/02/24/rudaw-launches-investigation-into-rudaw/

Hasakah

Assyrian-Syriac forces in Hasakah province/Cizire Canton:

Vice News Dispatch from the Battle of Hasakah

KCK senior figure calls on Turkey to return to the negotiation table

PKK calls on US to be part of Kurdish peace process

"Then there emerged the objective of creating a joint force. It became necessary in order to protect the people of the region. We all knew that the Syrian revolution had gone off track. Syria is a country which is a mosaic of peoples and faiths. However a revolution that began with the demands for equality and democracy came to take on a Sunni character. The revolution fell into the hands of Salafis. Those who would not accept this oriented themselves toward Kobanê. This is how is Burkan al-Firat first emerged. The peoples of Syria needed such a force. A force that was not tied to one group of people, religious faith or sect…We are aiming for a democratic Syria. Our goal is a Syria in which everyone lives with freedom and justice and in common with one another."

"Right now our forces have doubled. We said that many would come to us wanting to join following a shift in ideological orientation. Those who want to join the Burkan al-Firat must first accept our principals. These principles are a democratic ideology in which freedom and co-existence. Every place we approach those who oppose ISIS are joining us. Before I did not believe that anyone was thinking about Girê Spî. But now anytime wherever we advance people say that there will certainly fall. And this has become the faith among people. If we opened the door to everyone who came calling our numbers would probably be 10 times as large. But we have conditions that those who join us have internalized the ideology of democracy and co-existence. We as the Burkan al-Firat have been trying to bring back to life the spirit and practice of co-existence. And we have taken steps to accomplish this. We want to grow in this regard and become a force for the democratization of Syria."

Interview With Burkan al-Firat Commander: We Are Fighting To Rebuild A Democratic And Inclusive Revolution

Who is to Blame for Shingal's Fall (Names a number of KDP Peshmerga commanders.)

Posting this because it mentions collaboration between the YPG and Jaysh al-Thuwar.
Source: sylezjusz

"after recent jihadis' attacks on the canton #HXP self defence training centre opened in Kimar village "
HXP is the static infantry that includes conscripts--6 months of military service

#JayshThuwar spox Ahmed Hisu: after #Sarrin time will come for #Manbij and #Jarablus

#JayshThuwar A. Hisu: we'd welcome Turkey's air cover just as we do with coalition, but Turkish intervention would make conflict even worse

#JayshThuwar A. Hisu: while we were preparing more offensives against Daesh&Assad around Aleppo, Nusra attacked us without warning n. Azaz

#JayshThuwar, founded 03/05/15 incl. Infantry 99 Brig., Maham Khasa Brig., Tajamu Thuwar Homs, Jabhat Akrad, 313&S.Selim Brigs, Reg. 777

source: sylezjusz

Jabhat Akrad and Kata'eb Shams ash-Shamal are both part of Burkan al-Furat. Jabhat Akrad is largely seen as a group setup by the PYD to act within the FSA. We may be seeing Jaysh al-Thuwar taking on a role like Burkan al-Furat; particularly if Burkan al-Furat/YPG cross the Euphrates at the Tishrin dam, and if the YPG in Afrin moves from a defensive to an offensive posture against al-Nusra and ISIS.

Supposedly, Turkey handed over 6 injured YPG fighters who were being treated in Turkish hospitals to al-Nusra

Take this with a grain of salt as I got this news from a Daesh supporter, claims of a strike in Qamishli in Cizire canton among Tax drivers against a rise in fuel prices. One thing that has been report a lot is that TEV-DEM does set the price of fuel. Also in indicates that there is still a market economy among taxi drivers. Also indication that there is a "tarriff"/tax on taxis.

google translation

Taxi drivers went on strike in the Corniche neighborhood Qamishli in Hasaka, to work, to protest against the decision of the executive body of the Kurdish self-management, raising the price of the article "diesel" by 50%, according to the correspondent of "Smart".

Our correspondent says that the executive body of the self-management Kurdish in Hasaka, issued a decision to raise the price per liter of material "diesel" from 30 Syrian pounds, to 45, and raising the price of the article "gasoline" from 60 to 75, what he saw as the cabbies decision unfair against them.

He said one of the drivers on strike, "Mussa al-Attiyah," told "Smart", they are demanding the concerned authorities to cut the price of the article "gasoline" and the lifting of tariff Delivery taxis, stressing that this decision affected them negatively, due to the high subjects of "gasoline" price and "diesel", but expensive cut-off switch, and that most of the drivers and the poor of this work only source of income.

Taxi drivers in Qamishli in Hasaka on strike in protest against the raise the price of fuel

kurremkarmerruk

https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/the-rojava-electricity-project-23k-in-23-days#/updates

Rojava Electricity Project:
Crowdfunding the electiricity of Cizre Canton

The organization behind this is the Malmö chapter of the socialist group Allt åt alla.
https://www.facebook.com/alltatallamalmo?fref=ts

https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%B6rbundet_allt_%C3%A5t_alla
https://alltatalla.se/om/in-english
https://alltatalla.se/malmo/the-rojava-electricity-project

Article in the New York Times: Why Turkey Is Fighting the
Kurds Who Are Fighting ISIS, SARAH ALMUKHTAR and TIM WALLACE AUG. 12, 2015

YPG/YPJ gains since May 2015

Proposed "safe zone"

Turkish air strikes (July 24 to August 3, 2015) and conflict violence in Kurdish majority areas (since March 2013)

A collection of links regarding Noam Chomsky's opinions on Rojava, the PKK, KRG, Kurds and Turkey.

Restart the Peace Process in Turkey: No to Turkey’s military intervention in Syria – Defend Rojava!, July 27, 2015

He's opposed to a military intervention by Turkey in Syria because "would greatly harm the people of Rojava who are fighting against the evil forces of ISIS", May 7, 2015

Noam Chomsky has participated in protests in Turkey against the repression of Kurds, including civil disobedience in Istanbul.
Noam Chomsky on the PKK, Kurdistan and Turkey/US/Israel relations, Mar 31, 2015

Noam Chomsky: Iraqi Kurdistan’s very fragile system cannot survive, February 18, 2015

URGENT CALL FOR ACTION: Global Rally against ISIS – for Kobanê – for Humanity!, October, 21, 2014

Noam Chomsky asks UN to save Kobanê, blames Turkey bombardment on PKK, October 15, 2014

Noam Chomsky is a signator to the Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan campaign

"With crucial assistance from the military wing of the Turkish Kurds, the PKK, the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga has apparently held off ISIS. It seems that the PKK are also the most significant force that rescued the Yazidi from extermination and are holding off ISIS in Syria, including the crucial defense of Kobane. Meanwhile Turkey has escalated its attacks against the PKK, with US tolerance if not support. It appears that Turkey is satisfied to watch its enemies -- ISIS and the Kurds -- killing one another within eyesight of the border, with awful consequences likely if the Kurds cannot withstand the ISIS assault on Kobane and beyond."

Dark Clouds Loom: In the Shadow of the First World War, Noam Chomsky Discusses ISIS, Ukraine, and Gaza, October 16, 2014

Statement: Rojava must not fall: Support Kurdish democratic autonomy against ISIS, July 17, 2014

Appeal: Support a Democratic Experiment, March 2014

Noam Chomsky: "On the Kurds", July, 2013

"One of the few American journalists to have really worked in the area, Kevin McKiernan, once described a mountain in northern Iraq called Mount Kandil. He said it has two sides: on one side there are terrorists, on the other side there are freedom fighters. They’re exactly the same people: They’re Kurdish nationalists. But one side faces Turkey, so they’re terrorists. The other side faces Iran, so they’re freedom fighters. Apparently, they’re pretty well integrated. It’s reported that the guerrillas on the mountain have regular commercial and other interactions with the general surrounding population."

Noam Chomsky Discusses Turkey with David Barsamian

Chomsky On The Prospect of Kurdish Independence, February 15, 2011

"Turkey must find its place if, of course, it can heal its internal sores, and none is more malignant than the perennial Kurdish issue... There do appear to be some real prospects with recent negotiations despite criminal efforts to disrupt them"

Noam Chomsky urges Turkey to pursue Kurdish peace, January 18, 2013

"Professor Chomsky criticises the United States for supplying weapons to the Turkish Government, which he says used them to perpetrate "intensive ethnic cleansing" against the Kurds."

, Chomsky Publisher Cleared in Turkey, February 13, 2002

"Turkey and the Kurds. That's one of the most severe human rights atrocities of the 1990s, continuing in fact... The Kurds have been miserably oppressed throughout the whole history of the modern Turkish state but things changed in 1984. In 1984, the Turkish government launched a major war in the Southeast against the Kurdish population. And that continued. In fact it's still continuing.

"If we look at US military aid to Turkey-which is usually a pretty good index of policy-Turkey was of course a strategic ally so it always had a fairly high level of military aid. But the aid shot up in 1984, at the time that the counterinsurgency war began. This had nothing to do with Cold War, transparently. It was because of the counterinsurgency war. The aid remain high, peaking through the 1990s as the atrocities increased. The peak year was 1997. In fact in the single year 1997, US military aid to Turkey was greater than in the entire period of 1950 to 1983 when there were allegedly Cold War issues. The end result was pretty awesome: tens of thousands of people killed, two to three million refugees, massive ethnic cleansing with some 3500 villages destroyed-about seven times Kosovo under NATO bombing, and there's nobody bombing in this case, except for the Turkish air forces using planes that Clinton sent to them with the certain knowledge that that's how they would be used.

"The United States was providing about 80 percent of Turkey's arms-and that means heavy arms. Since you and I are not stopping it-and we're the only ones who can-the Clinton administration was free to send jet planes, tanks, napalm, and so on, which were used to carry out some the worst atrocities of the 1990s. And they continue. Regularly there are further operations carried out both in southeastern Turkey and also across the border in Northern Iraq, attacking Kurds there. There the attacks, with plenty of atrocities, are taking place in what are called "no-fly zones" in which the Kurds are protected by the United States from the temporarily wrong oppressor. The operations in northeast Iraq are similar in character to Israel's operations in Lebanon over the 22 years when it was occupying Southern Lebanon in violation of Security Council resolution but with the authorization of the United States, so therefore it was okay. During that period they killed-nobody really knows because nobody counts victims of the United States and its friends-but it's roughly on the order of 45,000 it would seem over those years judging by Lebanese sources. In any event, non-trivial. And the operations in northern Iraq are kind of similar. That's the no-fly zone.

"Without going into further details-how is all this dealt with in the United States? Very simple. Silence. You can check and see-I urge you to do so. Occasionally, it's brought up by disagreeable people. And when it is brought up and can't be ignored, there is a consistent reaction: self-declared advocates of human rights deplore what they call "our failure to protect the Kurds," and so on. Actually we are "failing to protect the Kurds" roughly in the way that the Russians are "failing to protect the people of Chechnya." Or it's claimed that the US government was unaware of what was happening. So when Clinton was sending a huge flow of arms to Turkey-in fact Turkey became the leading recipient of US military aid in the world (I'll qualify that in a minute) during this period -and his advisers didn't realize that the arms were going to be used. When they were supplying 80 percent of the arms to Turkey-increasing as the war increased-it just never occurred to them that these were really going to be used for the war that was then going on and that coincided very closely with the arms flow. The disagreeable folk who bring the matter up and suggested otherwise are lacking in "nuance," sophisticated commentators observe."

Prospects for Peace in the Middle East, March 4, 2001

Yes Vice, I know, but this interview with an returned german leftist who fought with the YPG includes some interesting bits: „Ich war bereit, dort zu sterben“ – Ein deutscher Linker im Kampf gegen den Islamischen Staat ("I was ready to die there - a german leftist in the fight against the Islamic State"). I've quickly translated a few interesting parts:

How did you got into contact with YPG?
I logged into Facebook and wrote a message to YPG. Two messages later I was told to fly to Suleymania and I was given a telefonnumber I should call when I am there.
[...]
In Suleymania I came into a save house and later we went into the mountains for the training.

How went your deployment?
It was different for me than for most other internationals. The kurds took it very seriously that I was there for political reasons. They call all internationals "Emeriki", Americans. But I was not an "American", but a revolutionary - that made me a heval. Friend of the party. So I was treated differently. In training I met another German, who was already there for three years. He died recently, today I know that his name was Kevin Joachim. We got along very well and so he arranged for me to get into his unity. So I came almost directly to the first frontline. From day one we were 120 meters away fomr Daesh.
[...]
After the liberation of Tel Abiad I switched the unit again and then went to the "International Freedom Batallion", that is only constituted by international volunteers.

Why did you change the unit?
In my second unit I mage a lot of negative experiences and I learned a lot about war. War is a very intensive condition, that changes you very harshly. And there I've seen things that I didn't like and that I couldn't arrange with my believes and attitudes. It was mainly about looting, destruction and mistreatment of prisoners. Mainly the looting was the problem. I then left this unit, because I realized talking to the commander that this wouldn't change in this unit.

In the international "Tabur" (unit) I then found what I was looking for. They were all volunteers and idealists like me. We held the surroundings clean and were always nice to the civilians. We did what I was expecting from the YPG in general.

Did your international unit had other tasks and were you taken seriously?
We were a part of the YPG but independent, we had our own emblem and so on. And with a strong political attitude, that the YPG has in general but not every single unit. Unfortunately we had ridiculously high losses within two weeks. After the first two incidences, where we lost people, the front commander came to us and said "You've shed your blood, this is now your war too". Before we had the feeling that we weren't taken very seriously. We got only minimal equipment from YPG and we had to really fight to get cars. After that it was different and we were taken very seriously. We had fought, we had lost people, we proved ourselves.

How was your fighting organized?
The YPG is a very decentralized army and very chaotic. There is logistics, but it works very bad. In principle you have nothing. You have a uniform, vest, five magazines, two grenades and your rifle. If its working you get a few tomatos, cucumber, bread and cigarettes from logistics - if the truck finds you and if they have enough. Consequently the fighting is very chaotic.

But there is a lot of air support. Without them the offensives wouldn't worked out. Partly this were very intensive bombardments, that supported us strongly. We never attacked without a bombardment before. That's why we never met real resistance in the beginning. [...]

Why did you decided to return in the end?
Well, I've seen a lot, did a lot, learned a lot about my self, the revolution and politics. I changed the unit two times and after the second change I said, that I'll go home soon. I won't put on with this anymore. I accept that this is war, I accept that this must be done and I accept that what happens at the front is not representative for everything that happens there. I still think that but personally I don't want to put up with this. Also I realized that the probability to die at the front is way higher than I thought. It's a fortune that I am still alive. They said this was because of my abilities and in a few situations this may was the case. But in a lot of situations it was just luck. I was ready for the risk, but I don't want to die. And I realized that with the political work I do here in Europe I can maybe do more good things than there - and stay alive.

Did you expected to see things like looting, destruction and mistreatments?
I should have expected this, but I didn't thought about it. That's why I was surprised. And we were also taught in training that this is forbidden and won't be tolerated.

Have theses experiences disillusioned you in regard to the PKK and YPG?
No, not at all. I don't see an error in the structure, I wouldn't blame the YPG for this. These are things that happen in a war. Often this has to do with revenge. I was always in units of turkish Kurds but the syrian Kurds had a, partly understandable, hate towards the arabic villagers. To loose friends in a war changes you. All this dead around you. This is all just very dirty, very bloody and emotionally very intensive.

Different reporters, the interview above is from Vice Germany.

Amnesty International has called for the release of three VICE News journalists who have been arrested in Turkey accused of working with ISIS.

Police sources confirmed to Amnesty that the journalists had been detained on suspicion of assisting ISIS, despite initial reports that they had been arrested for allegedly reporting without official press accreditation.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3215644/Amnesty-calls-release-three-journalists-arrested-Turkey-accused-working-ISIS.html#ixzz3kIm7Aysp

kurremkarmerruk

USA said they won't no longer give any weapons to YPG. They understand the anxieties of Turkey. They will only give weapons to moderate islamist arabs.
http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/abdden-ypgye-artik-silah-yok

Warren knows very well where the weapons/ammunition given to the Syrian Arab Coalition of the Syrian Democratic Forces ends up.

"Warren said the operation was backed by 17 U.S.-led coalition air strikes, killing 79 Islamic State fighters and destroying Islamic State weapons systems around al-Houl, near the Iraqi border. "While this is not a large tactical action, we believe the operation demonstrates the viability of our program to provide support to these forces," Warren told Pentagon reporters. Asked whether this meant more air drops of weaponry, either arms or ammunition, Warren said: "On the weapons resupply, yes. The answer is yes."

U.S. eyes more arms for Syria rebels after latest advance, Wed Nov 4, 2015 6:34pm EST

The al-Houl offensive is lead by the YPG. MFS and al-Sendadid are also involved, but they are tightly allied with YPG these days.

kurremkarmerruk

Apart from this property issues, Christians also criticise forced conscription, taxes and intervention into the courses of christian schools.

I first heard about this list from probably the same article in English on AINA Assyrians, Armenians in Syria Protest Kurdish Confiscation of Property

You'll note that the letter that is signed on by organizations is more reserved in its claims than the article that leads AINA. AINA seems heavily influenced by David William Lazar (or DWL is influenced heavily by AINA). Lazar is dogmatically anti-Kurdish and anti-PYD to the extent that he basically just lies about things. He (and AINA) are also supportive of the Assad Regime.

The Kobanê Agricultural Council has decided to redistribute more than 10.000 hectares. Now that shouldn't impact Christian/Syriac/Chaldean/Armenian communities very much because there are few of those in Kobane canton. However, I wouldn't be surprised if Jazeera canton was also planning to engage in land redistribution. From the beginning of the revolution, TEV-DEM declared the abandoned government and bourgeois property as part of the commons and let people work it either individually or as part of cooperatives.

I've been meaning to post on the new PYD curricula for awhile. I've gone line by line through the longest anti-PYD articles and wrote an analysis. The short version is that TEV-DEM printed some schoolbooks in Kurdish, trained teachers on it, and encourages primary (elementary) education in mother tongue (they also push mother tongue education in Turkey). The Regime has responded by withdrawing the salaries of teachers teaching the new curricula (that is, teaching in Kurdish). So the Regime effectively fired those teachers and has threatened to shut schools down. In Afrin Canton, in addition to training teachers for the Kurdish curricula, they also prepared 100 teachers to teach in Arabic (Afrin has 1625 teachers for 306 schools). Now, that might be the right amount for Arabic mother tongue speakers plus other folks who want Arabic, because Afrin is super-majority Kurdish. Hasakah, isn't super-majority Kurdish. Also, I'd be surprised if in Hasakah TEV-DEM was forcing Syriacs to not get education in Syriac, etc...

What seems to have happened at the private Christian schools is that TEV-DEM offered the new materials particularly for the Kurdish children who were enrolled in the private schools. The private Christian schools refused to use those materials. Further, they then expelled the Kurdish students. There hasn't been a claim that TEV-DEM threatened to shut down the private schools at all... only the Regime has threatened to shut down schools for teaching in Kurdish.

Read the articles from SyriaDirect and ArabWeekly that aren't friendly to Kurdish mother tongue education, and you'll see what I'm saying.

Its interesting to note that TEV-DEM still tolerates private schools, and Kurdish attendance in private schools.

One funny thing is that the KDPS even had a protest against PYD/TEV-DEM for making more Kurdish language education possible. It seems KDPS prefers Arabic. The protests about curriculum have been on the small side.

Another issue brought by AINA is the Amal (Hope) Syriac Orthodox School being used by the YPG. AINA is claiming the YPG just took the school and thats it. That's not how it happened. The SAA/NDF took the school and used it as a military position. After the battle of Hasakah this past July-August 2015, the YPG took the school when the SAA/NDF abandoned it and used it for pretty much the same military purpose. After the battle, the YPG and SAA/NDF even negotiated over it and it was agreed to stay with the YPG. Its actual position is on the edge of regime controlled central Hasakah and YPG controlled territories. Without the YPG intervention in the battle this summer, central Hasakah could have been very well overrun by Daesh. So the talk that its in a safe area isn't particularly true.

Now, its unfortunate that schools get used as military structures in wars, but so do prisons, cement plants, any tall building. It seems that this fall, TEV-DEM has really been pushing to get the school system working well. I've marked the location of the Amal school on this map

If military contribution is any indicator of support, the largest Christian militia in Hasakah is the MFS. Its about 10 times the size of the Gozarto Protection Forces (the GPF is loyal to the regime and was recently flown by Russian aircraft to fight Daesh in Sadad, Homs). There are also other Christians in the HXP (which includes conscripts) and the YPG. The SUP is the dominant Syriac party in Hasakah and its been part of TEV-DEM since the beginning. You'll note that they haven't signed this document, nor has the European Syriac Union.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch which have been critical of a minority of YPG actions in regards to certain Arab and Turkemen villages did not criticize the YPG in regards to Christians at all.

"It's worth mentioning that nearly 35% of all real estate in the area is owned by Christians."
Its also worth mentioning that Christians do not make up 35% of the population of Hasakah. Further that it is probably only a minority of Christians that own much of that land.

The YPG is probably treating Christians better than any other armed faction in the Syrian civil war, and that is both part of their ideology and related to their close military alliance with the MFS (SUP).

If TEV-DEM is moving forward with land reform, putting more land into the commons, and expanding beyond just taking government farms and now also redistributing absentee landlord farms... that indicates revolutionary progress. I'd like to hear a lot more details about TEV-DEM's land reforms, but I don't think I trust the information coming from AINA and related sources about it.

AINA is not a reliable news source. AINA constantly posts inconsistent articles and is usually full of click bait to gain international attention for our cause. If you do use content from AINA, take some time to confirm the information is genuine and that the right terminology is used to recall events.

reddit.com/r/assyria We Need Subreddit Guidelines, abg123rocks, moderator of r/assyria, October 21, 2015

YPG spokesman Redur Khalil:
“Mr. Muslim commented on a number of military matters he is not familiar with.”

http://aranews.net/2015/10/rifts-emerge-between-ypg-and-pyd-over-u-s-armament-in-syria/

The original statement can be seen here

https://www.facebook.com/Redur/photos/a.994272017274051.1073741828.976708389030414/1049856125048973/?type=3&theater

Not exactly news but more stuff on Amnesty international

https://www.change.org/p/amnesty-international-amnesty-international-must-remove-arab-nationalist-lama-fakih-reporting-about-kurdistan?recruiter=62834923&utm_source=share_petition&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=autopublish&utm_term=des-lg-share_petition-no_msg

Oh well, I never trusted these NGOs anyways.

Aside from the supposed reporting bias and the fact that she's Arab, is there any indication (background, political statements) that Fakih is an "Arab nationalist"?

found on https://www.facebook.com/KurdischeNachrichtenCom/?fref=nf

According to kurdish Journalist Barzani Iso in Rojava, SDF had been supplied with 200 tons of Ammunition and Weapons by the United States on Saturday. The Aid including heavy weapons.

Any thoughts on this?

How to understand the following story??? Especially what Bashar says about PYD...
http://www.kurdwatch.org/?e3691

London: Syrian regime arms the YPG

KurdWatch, December 8, 2015 — In an interview on December 6, 2015 with the Sunday Times, the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, dismissed British Prime Minister David Cameron’s claim that there are 70,000 moderate Syrian rebels by declaring that there aren’t even 7,000 or even 10 moderates. On the question of how he would assess the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Kurds, he said: »The Kurds are fighting the terrorists with the Syrian army, in the same areas. [...] We sent them armaments, because they are Syrian citizens, and they want to fight terrorism. We do the same with many other groups in Syria, because you cannot send the army to every part of Syria.« Since the Democratic Union Party's (PYD) People's Defense Units (YPG) is the only armed Kurdish group in Syria, he can only be referring to the PYD when he says »the Kurds«.

*crickets*

Meh. Really? What Bashar says?

Question 6: Not even the Kurds and the FSA for example, the free Syrian army?
.
President Assad:The Kurds are fighting the terrorists with the Syrian army, in the same areas.
.
Question 7: But they are also being supported and armed and trained and backed by the Americans to also launch, to fight ...
.
President Assad: Mainly by the Syrian army, and we have the documents. We sent them armaments, because they are Syrian citizens, and they want to fight terrorism. We do the same with many other groups in Syria, because you cannot send the army to every part of Syria. So, it is not only the Kurds. Many other Syrians are doing the same.

I mean, I'm not clear who these many other Syrians are that Bashar thinks are spontaneously rising up to support the SAA and regime affiliate forces (incl. Hezbollah & IRGC). But the proposition that the external arms and training to the SDF (including YPG/J and Jabhat al Akrad, Sutoro, Al-Sanadid) are being "mainly" provided by the Syrian army, rather than the US, seems pretty unlikely. SAA haven't exactly got lots of spare weapons and trainging resources to spare on forces other than those reliably under their command, it would seem.

Anyway, if by chance, all the serious observers of the conflict were wrong and Assad was actuall telling the truth, instead of talking waffle (as is more normal) would that mean that the "Kurds" were now tools of Russian rather than American imperialism? Or maybe both? (Now there's a conspiracy theory I'd like to see...)

The primary supplier of all rebels including Daesh and the Free Syrian Army in Syria has been the Syrian Arab Army. The primarily supplier of Daesh in Iraq has been the Iraqi army. The primary supplier of the Peshmerga in Iraq has been through Baghdad.

Its materially true in terms that many weapons of the SAA have ended up in the hands of the YPG. Some of those weapons came directly from seizing them from the regime, others come through purchasing them from intermediaries, others come as war spoils from defeating Daesh, etc... Its also true that many Kurds in Syria have been trained by the SAA when they were conscripts.

In Afrin, the YPG even manged to get a few old tanks from the regime. There are a few others they took from Daesh. They've even gotten some Humvees from Daesh.

The biggest things acquired from the regime, sometimes second hand from the Daesh, is the oil fields, the state-owned agricultural land, the Tishrin dam, the public education sector in Qamislo, Hasakah and Afrin.

So far, the largest amount of ammunition directly supplied to the YPG may have been a few weapons drops (primarily light weapons and ammunition) from the U.S. to the Arab forces allied with the YPG in the Syrian Democratic Forces. Opinion is much of that very limited supply went to the YPG. Before that, a small amount of ammunition was air dropped to the YPG towards the end of the siege of Kobane. Also, towards the end of the siege of Kobane KRG peshmerga (about 200 of them) arrived with heavy weapons, they have since left (and took their weapons with them). The YPG haven't been supplied with any heavy weapons such as the CIA TOW missile program.

That is that the Free Syrian Army that Guerre de Classe was so enthusiastic about at the start of this conflict has received far more U.S. made weapons either directly from the CIA or through a proxy like Jordan, Turkey or Saudi Arabia

The U.S. also recently supplied a lot of new kit to the New Syrian Army. They seem quite proud of the M-16s

The YPG is still struggling with their old Kalashnikovs and captured Dushka.

The Assad regime hasn't been even willing to release the artillery from the Hasakah artillery base to the YPG. SAA/NDF can't move outside of the YPG/SDF areas. The YPG/SDF have advanced the frontline in eastern Syria to Ash-Shaddadi. The only utility that artillery base in Hassakah now has would be in threatening the YPG in Hasakah city. One day, the YPG may still come to possess that base and its artillery. They might take it through encouraging desertion of the SAA, through diplomacy or through force of arms. When they do get hold of that artillery, folks shouldn't see it as being allied with Assad so much as forcing the regime to make yet another concession of territory and equipment to TEV-DEM/PYD/YPG/SDF.

Assad has said a lot of things to try and gain support of the YPG. He's said he's open to autonomy, etc... TEV-DEM and the PYD have both said that they see no place for Assad in a democratic future. They have also said they are open to a political/diplomatic solution to the Syrian Civil War. SDF is growing and part of that growth is taking in some Free Syrian Army groups.

It is true that the YPG/SDF do not have major clashes. Until very recently, Assad also wasn't shelling YPG held ares. Allegedly, that changed about a week ago.. There are also occasional skirmishes between the YPG and the NDF (the militia organized to support the SAA). What usually happens is the NDF picks a fight, the YPG returns fire, takes a few checkpoints or neighborhoods--then there is a ceasefire negotiated.

This may well all change in the future when the SDF frontlines are closer to the bulk of the SAA frontlines as the YPG/SDF secures northern Syria and pushes toward al-Bab and Aleppo. Or maybe that'll be the end of the fighting and the regime, the SDF and the Southern Front come up with a diplomatic solution.

Many of the folks in the PYD and TEV-DEM have direct experience with imprisonment and torture by the regime, after both the 2004 Qamislo uprising and also the general authoritarian nature of the state. That's true for Salih Muslim. Its also true for Rojîn Remo, Women’s Representative on the MSD and also on the 9-member Coordination Committee of the MSD.

I do wonder what the revolutionary communist position is on whether or not the YPG should be armed and where those arms could come from. If not the YPG feel free to abstract the question of armament to any future or past revolutionary group that find itself in a war.

ocelot

I mean, I'm not clear who these many other Syrians are that Bashar thinks are spontaneously rising up to support the SAA and regime affiliate forces (incl. Hezbollah & IRGC).

He may be speaking of the NDF. He might be speaking of groups like Syrian Resistance. He might be talking about different Arab tribal groups or Druze militia like Jaysh al-Muwahhideen. Recently, the SAA has stopped conscripting Druze if they serve in a local Druze militia; which may also be a response to several Druze towns publicly stating they will not accept conscription into the SAA anymore. He might be talking about Syriac or Christian militias like Sootoro, Khabour Guards and the Gozarto Protection Force (that the Syrian airforce--maybe even the Russian airforce, flew across the country to defend some Christian villages in the west.)

Some of the NDF in Hasakah are literally locals in street clothes wearing flip fops armed with old Kalashnikovs. In Hasakah, some locals see joining the NDF as a way to OPPOSE the YPG.

The YPG has had many opportunities to ally with with the SAA. It would have been helpful to them in terms of arms and it may have even given them more local control in Hasakah and Qamislo. It hasn't done that for political reasons. One of the least of which is the paltry foreign aid it has received from anti-Assad western states. It also hasn't allied with the SAA, even though it could mean Russian arms.

For those who want hard copy to read and distribute.
THE EXPERIMENT OF WEST KURDISTAN

US ground troops working in Rojava with SDF

http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/large-portion-of-additional-250-us-troops-going-to-syria-may-be-green-berets-1.406165

http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/middle-east/272869

Turkey, the Kurds and Syria

[youtube]Rw7nA8f-RIE[/youtube]

At 41:20 roughly guy starts asking about Rojava in a positive light. A series of others criticise him and the speaker also disagrees in his summing up towards the end of the video. Wondered if anybody here would like to comment on it or in general regarding the talk on Turkey?

The SWP not my usual preferred source of information and opinion in this area but I did give it a quick listen. The speaker is probably right about the Gulen movement's influence and role both previously and in terms of the attempted coup as well as some other specific points about the subsequent policy of the Turkish government and it's PKK and HDP opponents in relation to the Kurdish 'movement' and specifically the rise of the PKK inspired mini-state in Syria.The discussion to some extent illustrates the confusions of these Leftists aspirations to 'leadership' when it come to their lopsided 'anti-imperialism' and support for the various often conflicting national liberation movements. It's noticeable as well that for an organisation that claims to be in the vanguard of working class struggle there is a distinct absence of any class analysis in relation to the Kurdish populations dispersed across the Turkish-Syria-Iraq-Iran axis of states. This post is perhaps more relevant still to the other 'Turkey News' thread and relates also to some comments I added to the very end of this earlier thread:
http://libcom.org/news/miliary-coup-turkey-15072016
Perhaps proletarian could explain their own views about the value of their posting this video?

Washington's main Syrian ally in the fight against Islamic State says the U.S. military will remain in northern Syria for decades after the jihadists are defeated, predicting enduring ties with the Kurdish-dominated region,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa-exclusive-idUSKCN1AX1RI

*

Turkish state on the verge of militarily attacking USA supported Kurdish forces both directly and via Syrian proxies amidst USA attempt to secure its diminished place in the carve-up of influence in the region otherwise at odds with it's Turkish NATO ally. Has Turkey assumed too much that the USA would abandon it's Syrian Kurdish allies as soon as ISIS appeared to be defeated?

So whilst this Forum is still retained thought this useful contribution should be listed here as well:
https://libcom.org/blog/defense-afrin-proletarian-internationalism-05032018

Anyone have any takes on the US withdrawal, escalated threats from Erdogan, etc? The whole situation seems pretty grim all round.

Not much but a few things came up around it:

It coincides with Turkey and the US agreeing a $3.5b Patriot missile sale. That could be a massive coincidence or it could explain the 'why' for the withdrawal. A few different sources reporting this, but Bloomberg had some commentary where they reckoned Assad, Iran, and Russia might still be a deterant to a full Turkish annexation of Rojava. They also reckon the US deal with Turkey could mean cancellation of arms deals between Turkey and Russia.

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-19/state-department-backs-missile-sale-to-turkey-in-breakthrough

This idea that the US should stay in Rojava to 'protect the Kurds/Rojava' (I've seen this Chomsky interview go around on twitter again: http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/13cf816e-8e40-41c8-bb76-d453a3261d8b) seems to misunderstand why the US is in Rojava at all - i.e. it's war on terror and a geopolitical bulwark against (mainly) Iran, not to actually support the YPG. Their presence means that both Turkey and Assad will try to avoid direct military confrontation with US troops but not much more.

The announcement of 50% of troops being withdrawn from Afghanistan too I haven't seen as much about - but there were noises earlier this year about privatising the operation there - would be worth keeping an eye on: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/officials-worry-trump-may-back-erik-prince-plan-privatize-war-n901401

SDF/YPG apparently just handed over a town to the Syrian army to stave of an attack by Turkey. Not sure what this source is like.
http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/middle-east/489850

Mike Harman

SDF/YPG apparently just handed over a town to the Syrian army to stave of an attack by Turkey. Not sure what this source is like.
http://www.basnews.com/index.php/en/news/middle-east/489850

BasNews is pro-Barzani/KDP news.

Last year in 2017, Russia (and maybe SAA) also held Arimah. Russia withdrew from the Manbij area and also stopped protecting Afrin's to green light Turkey's invasion of Afrin, as part of a deal for Erdogan to call anti-Assad opposition fighters out of southern Syria (Ghouta, Daraa). It was similar to the deal they reached when Putin allowed Turkey attacking ISIS in Jarabulus and al-Bab; in exchange for Erdogan calling fighters out of Aleppo (which caused the fall of the opposition in Aleppo).

MANBIJ FORCES REACHES AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA OVER DEFENCE AGAINST TURKEY BACKED FSA, March 2nd, 2017, Plymouth University’s Dartmouth Centre for Seapower and Strategy (DCSS)

American, Russian troops in Manbij: Preventing an all-out Turkish-Kurdish face-off?, March 5, 2017, T-Intelligence

Syrian government forces 'enter' Kurdish-controlled Manbij region, December 12, 2018, Al Jazeera (Qatari-based)

If this story is true it would be the SAA/Russia/Iran alliance returning to positions they held in 2017. In 2017, they positioned there to stop Turkey's threats on Manbij and Afrin. At the same time, the U.S. also deployed flagged units to Manbij city proper and the north side of Manbij along the Sajur river to also deter Turkey's threats.

Then in January 2018, Russia (and the SAA) withdrew from the Manbij area, and Russia withdrew from Afrin. This allowed Turkey's successful invasion and occupation of Afrin to occur over a two month period. At the same time, the U.S. maintained its positions in Manbij and dissuaded Turkey form attacking there.

Yeah, I was going to say that that story feels like a re-run of March 2017 (except I had to look the date up). While you're here, would be genuinely interested to know your take on the current situation in general? Do you think there's any prospect of a "good" outcome at this stage, or is it just a choice between one defeat or another?

R Totale

Yeah, I was going to say that that story feels like a re-run of March 2017 (except I had to look the date up). While you're here, would be genuinely interested to know your take on the current situation in general? Do you think there's any prospect of a "good" outcome at this stage, or is it just a choice between one defeat or another?

I had hoped that the war was ending and focus could be on reconstruction. Everything is in chaos now. Anything could happen now. The U.S. leaving in this way is a manner that most weakens the YPG's bargaining position. Also, with the U.S. pulling out, at first glance it looks like Erdogan gets what he wants... but it puts him in a weaker position over all facing Assad/Russia/Iran without U.S./Coalition support.

From what we observed, the U.S. had a relatively lighter hand on TEV-DEM's internal politics and economics than we can expect from either Erdogan or Assad.

Some hope that France and a coalition of other countries could form a deterrent to Turkey. Seems like a slim hope.

Can the YPG cut a deal? Or is it Turkey's occupation and a return to guerilla war, but much worse than we currently seen in Afrin?

I would caution people against writing requiems yet. That won't stop some of you from doing so.

Official confirmation from YPG that they're inviting the Syrian army to hold positions: https://twitter.com/DefenseUnits/status/1078573294402588672

And confirmation from Syrian Army.
https://twitter.com/ferozwala/status/1078591277116084230

Longish analysis from an anarchist in Rojava here: https://crimethinc.com/2018/12/28/the-threat-to-rojava-an-anarchist-in-syria-speaks-on-the-real-meaning-of-trumps-withdrawal

Obviously, very pro-PYD, which in turn means that, in this current situation, the author ends up verging on "soft Assadism" in some places, but I thought these bits were good:

"As anarchists, we have to talk very seriously about how to create other options for people in conflict zones. Is there any form of international horizontal decentralized coordination that could have solved the problems that the people in Rojava were facing such that they would not have been forced to depend on the US military? If we find no answer to this question when we look at the Syria of 2013-2018, is there something we could have done earlier? These are extremely pressing questions...

Finally, you can think about how we could put better options on the table next time an uprising like the one in Syria breaks out. How can we make sure that governments fall before their reign gives way to the reign of pure force, in which only insurgents backed by other states can gain control? How can we offer other visions of how people can live and meet their needs together, and mobilize the force it will take to implement and defend them on an international basis without need of any state?"

I guess the only other option that I could see to prevent a total destruction of any emancipatory prospect at the hands of either Erdogan or Assad would be "the old mole" rearing its head again in either Turkey or Syria (maybe spreading from Iran/Iraq), but I dunno what the odds of that are.

I've no agreement with the aspirations of Kurdish nationalism, particularly as expressed in Rojava, but I'd like to thank the author of the piece linked by R. Totale for its information and humanity. I don't think that it overestimates the Turkish state's capacity for massacre and terror which these latest developments could well bring about.

Just a couple of points:

The US and its coalition allies have lost the war in Syria. The leading world power must confront another set-back in the Middle East which has weakened its position and this will have consequences on the wider imperialist chessboard as well as the detailed perspectives laid out by the author. Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish "assets" are part of this chessboard and are once again paying the price for it.

There is nothing "new" or "startling" about Trump's decision to withdraw from Syria; he talked about it in his election campaign as part of his "America First!" policy, touched on it frequently and six months ago gave a six-month time scale to pull out of Syria. The author says that the move "makes no sense" for "US global, military hegemony". But it makes perfect sense. The biggest concern for US imperialism at the moment is, I think, the movement of Erdogan's Turkey towards Russia - the author talks about the "multi-polar" world and I agree that centrifugal tendencies are a dominant development of imperialism making them unpredictable and dangerous and this is an example of it. It's not just "missile sales" between Russia and Turkey but the existence of a massive, well-organised and battle-hardened military on Nato's southern flank, i.e., the Turkish state, going towards Russia that is the danger to the US. It is absolutely vital for US imperialism in the longer term that Turkey is moved away from deeper alliances with Russia and is fully and decisively integrated into Nato. If that means sacrificing the Kurds you can just picture Trump shrugging his shoulders. Erdogan is playing the game with the March elections and beyond in mind by pitting one against the other with the one thing for sure being that the general imperialist carve-up is just being displaced. There is no peace.

On the perspectives, it can only be the class struggle, workers' assemblies, self-organisation intrinsically breaking ethnic and nationalist divisions. There have been significant episodes of class struggle recently in Iran, Jordan and Iraq and the potential of the working class in Turkey and elsewhere remains intact. The working class is the only possible force able to push back at the bourgeoisie and with a bit of luck eventually overthrow it. But all forms of nationalism have to go with that, not least because nationalism is part imperialist war.

But good luck "anarchist in Rojava". Keep your head down and keep analysing and discussing the situation.

FYI

https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/01/04/why-are-leftists-cheering-the-potential-demise-of-rojavas-socialist-experiment/

It does seem quite reasonable to hope for a socialist experiment to avoid being destroyed by Islamic State fascism, Turkish ultra-nationalism or Syrian absolutism rather than clinging to dogmatism.

Factcheck on the smear piece about Rojava by Roy Gutman on The Intercept:

1/ yes, SDF conscripts, like EVERY other major force in Syria. They're defending their land against ISIS & NATO's second-largest army lol.

"Erka Parastin" (defence work) only lasts a year & conscripts are usually controlling traffic on some desert road, not sent to the front.

https://twitter.com/hashtagbroom/status/1080858562816020480

In March-April 2011, the uprising broke out in Syria. At first in Deraa, then in other cities, “Arabs”, “Kurds” and others. During the first months, Kurdish participation was massive. Despite the particularly violent repression, the demonstrations, much less “peaceful” than the Western media represented, united not only Kurds and Arabs, but, in a few rare cases, also individuals coming from “communities” traditionally connected to the protectors of the hierarchical power of the regime: Alawites, Druze, Palestinians and Christians. There was no united demand, except “Down with the regime!”, which began to appear here and there. The social reasons for revolt were abundant: the brutality of the cops, poverty, military service, the stagnation of a community complicit with the regime at all levels of daily life, but also the formal proletarianization for some Kurds and Palestinians, the latter mostly inhabiting the ghettos, former refugee camps, like Yarmouk in Damascus.

In April 2011, Bashar al-Assad took the plunge in trying to buy out Kurdish proletarians: he signed the “Decree 49” granting citizenship to those who are registered as foreigners in the region of Hasaka, which for the most part meant Kurds. According to an Arab speaker, “it did not work”. According to another person, a Kurd, “we don’t care.”

Meanwhile, while their Kurdish “compatriots” were fighting against the regime’s soldiers and shabiha alongside the Arabs and others, Kurdish political parties, including the PYD, were silent. Almost every one of them had an armed militia, and in the case of the PYD, well-trained, but even as the movement began to show the first signs of militarization, they did not engage in the fight. For this reason, during the period from April 2011 to January 2012, the answer to the question “Are Kurds participating in the uprising?” could be both “yes” or “no” depending on who’s speaking.

This discrepancy, which should be obvious even to the keenest parliamentarists, is manifested by direct and unresolved conflicts, before and after the constitution of Rojava in November 2013.

On June 27, 2013, for example, there was an anti-PYD demonstration in Amuda, a predominantly Kurdish city with a sizeable Arab population. A military convoy was stoned by protesters, to which YPG forces responded with live ammunition, killing three people. The night after, about 50 supporters of the opposition Yekiti party were detained and beaten up at a YPG base.

November 2015, residents of the Erbil refugee camp in Iraqi Kurdistan, protested against military conscription among the YPG among others. The protest was called by members of the Kurdish National Council, a coalition of parties opposed to the PYD, close to Barzani. We do not want to make concessions to the jailers Barzani and his political affiliates (see the 1991 social insurgency in Iraq), but we can see that the way the PYD deals with its opponents is identical to that of a state.

This is no surprise: it maintains essentially coercive institutions such as prison, the police, the (popular) courts, the army (the YPJ and the YPG), even an equivalent of the ignominious shabiha intended to terrorize protesters in the street – everything is intact and even solidified by the constitution which is loosely termed the Social Contract. The jokes that promise the dissolution of the police later do not announce anything revolutionary, because under such conditions, any other protective force, even informal, would inevitably serve the same function of protecting power and capital. There is nothing missing in the state of Rojava.

- here: http://dialectical-delinquents.com/articles/class-struggle-histories-2/on-rojava-and-the-kurdish-proto-state/

Do I understand correctly that the anarchists refused to support Autonomous and, unlike Rojava, predominantly non-party Councils in regions such as Daraa and Idlib?

meerov21

Do I understand correctly that the anarchists refused to support Autonomous and, unlike Rojava, predominantly non-party Councils in regions such as Daraa and Idlib?

Idlib is dominated by Al Qaeda/Jabhat al Nusra/Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Admin; insults deleted - warning - be polite.

1) How do you even talk about it, if you are not familiar with the publications of the Syrian anarchist Leila al-Shami, who constantly talks about the Councils in Arab Syria, created during the Saura (Uprising) against Assad? "The people of Idlib have been at the forefront of the struggle against Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham, or H.T.S. Since Idlib’s liberation from the regime — partially in 2012 and then fully in 2015 — many of its citizens worked to build a free society that reflected the values of the revolution. According to researchers, more than 150 local councils have been established to administer basic services in the province; many held the first free elections in decades. Long-repressed civil society witnessed a rebirth. Independent news media, like the popular Radio Fresh, were set up to challenge the regime’s monopoly on information. Women’s centers grew, empowering women to participate in politics and the economy".

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/02/opinion/idlib-syria-jihadists-democracy.html

2) This text is about the conflict Autonomous Councils and Nusra:

There are about 160 Autonomous Councils in the region of Idlib active and they are in confrontation with Nusra (Al-Qaeda; Hayat Tachrir al Sham). Arab councils are non-party and self-organized. They are multi-confessional, i.e. they are Sunnis, Ismailis, Christians. This is a huge step forward for Syria. But they are in contact with certain groups of anti-Assad opposition.

Currently Nusra (al-Qaeda) is the main enemy of Autonomous councils in the region. And this is so not only because Nusra wants destroy these Autonomous councils, as once did the Bolsheviks in 1918-1921. The reason is that the presence of the Nusra has made "politicaly toxic" entire region of Idlib. I fear that the whole region will be wiped off the face of the earth by joint efforts of the great powers.

http://syriadirect.org/news/hts-storms-idlib-city-council-after-its-refusal-to-surrender-control-of-civil-institutions/

***

3) "We’ve published this interview called “Libertarian communalism and self-government in Syria” made by an internationalist comrade who prefered remains anonymous, but encouraging to extend the debate about the Syrian revolution along the world. The main questions treats on cultural and political relations (and too the radical differences) between the Arab autonomous councils that have been formed since the revolution start on 2011, the Kurdish parties organizative forces and the connotation of try hegemonize the Middle East conflicts of imperialist countries, in a way to understand all advances and gains of this armed process for a better life for the most important subject in this scenario: the communities & people."

http://rupturacolectiva.com/libertarian-communalism-and-self-government-in-syria/

***

Please try to be polite when you're trying to talk to people who are more informed than you.

Its not 2011 anymore. Even Robin Yassin-Kassab, Leila al-Shami's co-author "Burning Country" and now supporter of Turkey's attacks on YPG in Afrin, gave up on Idlib years ago.

"The revolution is still strong in Idlib province, but the fighting men there tend to be dominated by Salafist or jihadist factions like Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra whose politics contradict the revolution’s democratic aims... Northern Aleppo province is also held by Free Army groups and local councils, but in the presence of the Turkish army, and in the context of territorial conflict with... the PYD."

Robin Yassin-Kassab, Our Fates are Linked, Arab Daily News, February 12, 2017

Hope in the "autonomous councils" backed by arms of the National Front for Liberation while disparaging Rojava as "party councils" is the penultimate of mistaking form for substance.

Touting the last hold outs in Idlib against HTS as some sort of thing to support, and to be clear this is totally abstract internet rhetorical wanking support, is just dumb.

More than likely, the Syrian Arab Army assisted by Russia will eventually fight HTS for control of Idlib. Whether there is any armed group separate from HTS (or local government not dominated by the HTS civilian wing the National Salvation Government) remains to be seen, but they will not be a significant military or political factor to the outcome. Whether or not Turkey intends to withdraw from Idlib, assist the SAA offensive or to continue to defend HTS positions remains to be seen; but again any armed body or political council nominally independent of NTS/NSG won't be a significant factor in Erdogan's decision there. Turkey has largely not been interested in defending any such group against HTS. It has mostly facilitated the relocation of armed groups who are themselves little better than HTS... groups like Ahrar al Sham and Ahrar al-Sharqiya to bolster Turkey's occupation of Afrin to receive payment as both mercenaries and to engage in looting.

Comparing the local councils in Idlib that went along to get along with these fore-mentioned armed groups as somehow comparable to the free soviets of the Russian revolution is laughable. Just because a village has a local administrative council that is independent of the Ba'ath party in government in Damascus does not mean said council is a good thing.

From the very Syrian Direct you reference:

“The only weapon we possess—and work on behalf of—is our legitimacy. We are elected [officials] and are recognized by nations abroad,” al-Khadr said.

“We are currently trying to recover the city council,” he added, but did not elaborate on how.

Its over.

It is a terrible situation for the many internally displaced peoples who are now residing in Idlib and the locals of Idlib, but there is no longer any kind of significant social revolution going on there now. All access to the area is controlled by HTS and Turkey.

You can be a rhetorical FSA booster to the dead end, but its a bad look. The only thing that seems at all positive to have come from the civil war seems to be Rojava and the Syrian Democratic Council. For the amount of shade thrown on them in this forum, that folks some folks are still touting the virtues of the local councils in Idlib boggles my mind.

Admin; childish insults deleted - warning - be polite or face sanction.

1) The article of the Syrian anarchist Leyla al-Shami refers to the autumn of the last year. In it she writes about more than 150 councils in Idlib. I fully admit that there are still elements of self-organization in some areas.

2) My question "Do I understand correctly that the anarchists refused to support Autonomous and, unlike Rojava, predominantly non-party Councils in regions such as Daraa and Idlib?" was largely about the past, which is clear from Daraa wich is now occupied by Assad's forces and many people there are repressed.

3) The Assessment that the councils in the Arab regions or in regions with mixed populations are "not party Councils" belongs to Leyla al-Sham. In addition, there are other researchers who write about it, such as Russian scientist (orientalist and political scientist) Kirill Semenov. I remember as Otto Rule wrote once like "centralized party organization is a form of bourgeois organization and its objectives are contrary to the objectives of the Councils". But Of course, some armed factions may influence them by threatening them like Nusra, but in any case, these Councils, as long as they exist (or have existed in the past), are likely to be independent in many internal matters: In any case, this opinion was expressed by both Leyla al-Shami and some experts. May be they wrong, but I have not met a single anarchist who would work in these Councils and could talk about how they operate.

4) "childish insults deleted - warning - be polite or face sanction." - This is a very good decision.
I hope Flint respects Leader of all Kurdish people, Abdullah Ocalan. Leader does not support the rough talk. He is in favour of dialogue. Remember teaching of the Leader.

Flint

Touting the last hold outs in Idlib against HTS as some sort of thing to support, and to be clear this is totally abstract internet rhetorical wanking support, is just dumb.

There have been a few cases where the local population has been able to run HTS out of town including the one meerov linked above. You can 'support' basic community self-defence like this (which in some cases will be linked to the local councils) without pretending it's something that it isn't. Also the relationship between the councils and the FSA was not always friendly afaik?

There has been a massive adoption of war on terror rhetoric by a lot of people against everyone living in these areas due to the domination by Islamist militias (leading to support of both US/coalition strikes or them being retaken by the SAA). Recognising that there are some structures (however weakened) opposed to this which are still in those areas is one way to push back against this. Does it have any meaningful effect on what happens on the ground? No it does not, but the way that absolutely fucked people like Beeley and Bartlett have been able to represent Syria to US and European audiences is also a serious problem.

More background for people not familiar with this:
https://libcom.org/library/experience-local-councils-syrian-revolution
https://libcom.org/history/life-work-anarchist-omar-aziz-his-impact-self-organization-syrian-revolution-leila-al-sh

I pretty much agree with what Mike Harman wrote.
Also I think that the Syrian councils of deputies created during Saura were predominantly non-parti, and I think that this could be the most important interest. Yes, it seems that these Councils could not become an independent armed force opposing authoritarian groups, repeating the tragic experience of the Russian revolution.

As for Rojava, it seems that this is a normal party-state system. It is possible that for Syrian Kurdistan, this system is currently the most tolerant and secure. There you will not be killed for being a Shiite, Christian or atheist. There you can open your business, and the militants will not come to rob you. Your civil rights, including the right to property and freedom of conscience, are protected by the Rojava Constitution. Homosexuality have been decriminalized in Rojava. Women may hold political office.

It is no secret that the opposition Kurdish parties are subjected to repression as Nymphalis Antiopa says http://dialectical-delinquents.com/articles/class-struggle-histories-2/on-rojava-and-the-kurdish-proto-state/ But it is possible that this can be solved, since the United States, which is still protecting Rojava from Turkey insist on the implementation of political pluralism and create peace between the PKK, KDP and other Kurdish parties. Moreover, the PKK called for the unification of all Kurdish parties. In any case I do not rule out that if this region does not become the object of total Turkish or Iranian intervention, it will be able to build a model of some social-democratic state. For the modern Syrian Kurdistan, this is not a bad option when compared with ISIS, Assad, Iran or Erdogan's Turkey. Therefore, talking about humanitarian aid or human rights activities aimed at supporting Rojava make sense. Another thing is that this issue has nothing to do with the libertarian classless society.

My post #245 Jan 2018 comes true in force Oct 2019 with bloody force on a major scale - See also latest KAF statement here: (https://libcom.org/forums/middle-east/solidarity-people-rojava-denouncing-turkish-state-united-states-allies-101020)
Meanwhile see here the unlikely capitalist political case for a greater Kurdish nationalism in the future and more realignments with the major imperialist powers in the region - the games people play with others lives - a bit sick!
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-only-thing-that-can-save-the-kurds/

What a tragic mess. Imperialist gangs big and small were always going to behave in a gangsterish manner. The Western leftists who recruited idealistic young comrades to go and die in Syria for a fake revolution that looks like it will be easily snuffed out now that its US backer has pulled the pin are probably the most disgusting of all the players involved.

Whatever criticisms I have of Rojava and its backers, that last sentence above is a fairly daft bit of posturing.

Anyway, just wanted to say that this seems worthwhile:
Why the Turkish Invasion Matters: Addressing the Hard Questions about Imperialism and Solidarity. Don't think I fully agree with it and there's still a tendency to skip over/give unconvincing answers to the really hard questions, but it's good that they're at least attempting to address actual revolutionary criticisms as well as the usual anti-imperialist nonsense.

R Totale

Whatever criticisms I have of Rojava and its backers, that last sentence above is a fairly daft bit of posturing.

How so?

It's gross that so many anarchists were so eager to recruit people to go and fight for what easily became an auxiliary US force. Talk about taking a running jump over the class lines.

I'm not asking whether or not you think they're "gross", I'm asking whether or not you can justify the ridiculous claim that they're somehow more gross than Assad, Erdogan, ISIS, the "anti-imperialist" scumbags who've spent the last few years rolling out the red carpet for any jew-hating freak willing to deny the right massacres, and so on.

Does anyone have detailed info on the amount of foreign Anarchist/AntiFascist volunteers fighting in Rojava like Anna Campbell who died after a Turkish attack last year.There was a Documentary on her on BBC2 in the Summer.
On Channel 4 News they gave a brief but fair account of Anarchist politics and interviewed comrades from Italy and Germany fighting ISIS.

https://www.besoccer.com/new/sahin-sacked-for-supporting-turkey-s-offensive-in-syria-726460

Might not be to everyone's tastes, but there's a lot of good info in this post (and I think I broadly more or less agree with it): https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2019/10/23/the-turkish-invasion-latest-step-in-the-russian-led-destruction-of-the-syrian-revolution/ I would be particularly keen to know more about the anti-Assad general strike in Manbij.

Thanks to R Totale for that linked text which is very informative and worth others reading.

Yeah, R Totale, that twitter link is very informative and I had never heard anywhere else of the general strike that Manbij residents carried against the Islamic State when the city was occupied by the IS in 2014.

Me either, although I suppose IS-occupied territory probably wasn't the most welcoming place for independent journalists. More broadly I suppose it does illustrate a recurring problem for libertarian communists, which is that activity that's spontaneous, self-organised, etc will usually never be as well-publicised as things that're connected to political parties or similar organisations with good PR machines.

Not really news but this short text summarises the sorry history of Kurdish political and military alignments with, and suffering from, the various global and regional imperialist powers over decades:
https://anarchistcommunism.org/2019/10/30/no-friends-but-the-mountains.